Moralised Definitions of Freedom, Autonomy, and the Personal Value of Opportunities to Perform Morally Impermissible Actions
Citation:
Pietro Intropi, Moralised Definitions of Freedom, Autonomy, and the Personal Value of Opportunities to Perform Morally Impermissible Actions, Ethical Perspectives, 28, 4, 2021, 417 - 443Download Item:
Abstract:
Are the opportunities to perform morally impermissible actions valuable? And, if so, has their value
any role to play in normative arguments? In this essay I examine the personal value of opportunities to
perform morally impermissible actions: the value that such opportunities have in virtue of contributing
to someone’s autonomy and wellbeing. In particular, I discuss the relevance of the value of
opportunities to perform morally impermissible actions for assessing moralised definitions of freedom
in the context of an ethical system that appeals to axiological considerations, and I examine Raz’s
account of the relationships between freedom and autonomy. Moralised definitions of freedom can be
understood as claiming that only unobstructed opportunities to perform morally permissible actions
should count as freedoms: I show that considerations concerning the personal value of the opportunities
to perform morally impermissible actions underpin traditional critiques of moralised definitions and
that emphasising this aspect allows to extend such critiques with new lines of argument. Furthermore,
I discuss whether an argument recently advanced by Kramer can be framed as an internal critique of
Raz’s account of the relationships between freedom and autonomy.
Sponsor
Grant Number
European Research Council (ERC)
819043
Author's Homepage:
http://people.tcd.ie/intropipDescription:
PUBLISHED
Author: Intropi, Pietro
Type of material:
Journal ArticleCollections
Series/Report no:
Ethical Perspectives;28;
4;
Availability:
Full text availableKeywords:
Opportunity, Moralised freedom, Autonomy, Raz, Personal valueMetadata
Show full item recordLicences: