The Schreber case : towards a philosophical construction of madness
Citation:
Lorna Lees, 'The Schreber case : towards a philosophical construction of madness', [thesis], Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland). Philosophy Department, 2009, pp 224Download Item:
Lees TCD THESIS 8771 The Schreber.pdf (PDF) 143.4Mb
Abstract:
Daniel Paul Schreber, lawyer and judge, is better known as a "psychiatric
patient par excellence". Schreber's case is also interesting in terms of the debate as to
what constitutes health and what, disease. The three main philosophical accounts of
disease - naturalist, normativist, and Wakefield's hybrid theory - are examined.
None of them, however, are able to satisfactorily explain Schreber's complex case.
The key issue is that, following Schreber's second breakdown, he was well enough to
leave the Asylum but he maintained his delusional framework and adhered to the
strictures it placed upon him. How can a person be neither strictly sane nor mentally
ill? An alternative analysis of disease is examined. Ereshevsky's claim is that the
objective facts about a bodily or a mental state must be taken into account when
discussing disease, but these objective state descriptions ought not to be conflated
with the subjective experience of the patient or, where applicable, that of the medical
practitioners involved.
Author: Lees, Lorna
Advisor:
Berman, DavidQualification name:
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)Publisher:
Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland). Philosophy DepartmentNote:
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Full text availableKeywords:
Philosophy, Ph.D., Ph.D. Trinity College Dublin.Licences: