Weakness of will and practical reason
Citation:Karina M. Halley, 'Weakness of will and practical reason', [thesis], Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland). Philosophy Department, 2004, pp 271
Halley TCD THESIS 7491 Weakness of.pdf (PDF) 195.1Mb
This thesis argues that a correct understanding of weakness of will (that is, freely failing to act as one thinks one has most reason to act) is crucial to a correct understanding of practical reason. Central to a theory of practical reason is the question of how practical reasons are related to motivation and action. On a common view (the Intemalism Requirement), if an agent thinks she has reason to act, then ceteris paribus, she will act. However, I argue that this view is difficult to reconcile with the possibility of weakness of will. Indeed, a proper examination of weakness o f will can serve to determine to what extent the Intemalism Requirement is acceptable and to what extent it needs to be revised or even abandoned.
Author: Halley, Karina M.
Qualification name:Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Publisher:Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland). Philosophy Department
Note:TARA (Trinity's Access to Research Archive) has a robust takedown policy. Please contact us if you have any concerns: firstname.lastname@example.org
Type of material:thesis
Availability:Full text available