Weakness of will and practical reason
Citation:
Karina M. Halley, 'Weakness of will and practical reason', [thesis], Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland). Philosophy Department, 2004, pp 271Download Item:
Abstract:
This thesis argues that a correct understanding of weakness of will (that is, freely failing to act as one thinks one has most reason to act) is crucial to a correct
understanding of practical reason. Central to a theory of practical reason is the question of how practical reasons are related to motivation and action. On a common view (the Intemalism Requirement), if an agent thinks she has reason to act, then ceteris paribus, she will act. However, I argue that this view is difficult to reconcile with the possibility of weakness of will. Indeed, a proper examination of weakness o f will can serve to determine to what extent the Intemalism Requirement is acceptable and to what extent it needs to be revised or even abandoned.
Author: Halley, Karina M.
Advisor:
Politis, VasilisQualification name:
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)Publisher:
Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland). Philosophy DepartmentNote:
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Full text availableKeywords:
Philosophy, Ph.D., Ph.D. Trinity College DublinMetadata
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