Mereology and Truth-Making
Citation:
Peter Simons, Mereology and Truth-Making, Logic and Logical PhilosophyDownload Item:
Abstract:
M
any mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are
entitled to ask why they are true. One frequently given type of answer to
such questions evokes truth-makers, that is, entities in virtue of whose exis-
tence the propositions in question are true. However, even without endors-
ing the extreme view that all contingent propositions have truth-makers, it
turns out to be puzzlingly hard to provide intuitively convincing candidate
truth-makers for even a core class of basic mereological propositions. Part of
the problem is that the relation of part to whole is ontologically intimate in
a way reminiscent of identity. Such intimacy bespeaks a formal or internal
relation, which typically requires no truth-makers beyond its terms. But
truth-makers are held to necessitate their truths, so whence the contingency
when
A
is part of
B
but need not be, or
B
need not have
A
as part? This
paper addresses and attempts to disentangle the conundrum.
Author's Homepage:
http://people.tcd.ie/psimons
Author: SIMONS, PETER
Type of material:
Journal ArticleCollections
Series/Report no:
Logic and Logical Philosophy;Availability:
Full text availableKeywords:
mereology, mereological propositions, truth-makers, continuantsSubject (TCD):
MEREOLOGY , truth-makersDOI:
10.12775/LLP.2015.020Metadata
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