Chance in preferential voting systems - an unacceptable element in Irish electoral law
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Economic & Social Studies
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John Coakley, Gerald O Neill, 'Chance in preferential voting systems - an unacceptable element in Irish electoral law', Economic and Social Research Institute, Economic and Social Review, Vol.16, No. 1, 1984, 1984, pp1-18
Abstract
The single transferable vote system of proportional representation as operated in elections to Dail Eireann is one of the most sophisticated electoral systems, maximising the capacity of the voter to determine the outcome of an election and allowing multi-dimensional representation of party political and other interests. Its most significant drawback is the fact that it retains an element of chance in certain circumstances, although this has been reduced to insignificance in the comparable electoral systems of Tasmania, Northern Ireland and the Irish Senate. The random element may occur as a consequence of surplus distribution. If the surplus votes of an elected candidate are fewer than the number of transferable votes in the parcel being examined, Irish electoral law provides, in effect, for a random selection of papers to pass to continuing candidates. Further preferences on these papers may affect the final outcome of the election. This problem could be overcome by amendment of the electoral formula, but in an electoral system where the formula is already very complicated this would place a heavy extra burden on the agencies responsible for the election count. Technological development may, however, allow introduction of the computer in elections, and this could permit the elimination not merely of the random element but also of certain other arbitrary provisions that violate the norms of social choice theory.
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Publisher: Economic & Social Studies
Type of material: Journal article

