Finance and the government of Ireland 1660-85

Abstract

Traditionally, historians have viewed this period as being dominated by Ormond and that its only interest lies in its being the aftermath of the Cromwellian Settlement and prelude to the 1688 Revolution. This thesis re-evaluates both of these features. Firstly, Ormond's pre-eminence is reassessed, and it is shown that after 1671, at least, Ranelagh and the various English treasury ministers were the dominant force in Irish matters. Secondly, and more importantly, it is shown that these years marked a unique period of Irish history. The foundations for this reinterpretation are based upon viewing the government of Ireland through a financial perspective. Up until 1667-68, the crown's Irish policy was principally concerned with securing Ireland for the monarchy, but, as the king freed himself from the tutelage of his Clarendonian advisers, the crown began to pursue the goal of political independence. The chief restraint on this was the crown's inadequate finances, which made it dependent on parliamentary aid. It was within the context of making himself financially and politically independent that Charles embarked on his Dover policy. Its Irish counterpart was the first endeavours, under Robartes and Berkeley, to ensure that Ireland should be solvent and require no more English money, as it had done up to 1667. Under Ranelagh's guidance in 1671, and with Danby's assistance as lord treasurer after 1673, the strength of the Irish revenue enabled Ireland's role in crown policy to be redefined; in 1672-3, Irish troops were used in England and Irish money paid to the privy-purse. Ireland thus became a source of profit to the crown. After 1676, the treasury ensured that this profit was systematically collected and by the 1680s, the English treasury directed most Irish matters and Ormond, as lord lieutenant, was no more than a figurehead. When the Irish revenue was placed under the control of the treasury appointed revenue commissioners, the Irish government's subordination to the treasury was completed. By 1683, Irish money was being used to aid the crown's pursuit of political independence, by paying for troops in England and remodelling the Irish army. James II’s accession to the throne ended the treasury's domination of Irish matters and the crown's Irish policy was once more redefined. It is, therefore, the financial perspective, and particularly the treasury's domination of Irish policy, which throws new light on the conventional assumptions of the dynamics of this period. It was a unique period in which a clearly defined crown policy for Ireland evolved. Ireland's financial position, not its land settlement or its religious divisions, was the dominant feature, and formed the context in which the crown's policy and the motives of the leading political figures in Ireland are best understood.