University of Dublin, Trinity College 

School of Psychology 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Psychoanalytic Exploration of the Super-ego in 

the Postmodern Era 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

by 

 

Sofia Jesus 

 
 

July 2020 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



2 

 

Declaration 

 

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted as 

an exercise for a degree to any other University. 

 

 

 

 

( 

Sofia Jesus) 

10 July 2020 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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Acknowledgements 

 

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. John O’Connor, 

for his invaluable insights and inspiring observations throughout this entire process. I 

would particularly like to thank him for giving each student the space to explore their 

ideas and make something meaningful out of them.   

I would also like to thank all the lecturers for their inspiring, enlightening, and 

challenging lectures. I am particularly grateful to Jennifer Griffin, for her weekly and 

restless support and her amazing ability to contain our thesis related anxieties.  

Lastly, I would like to thank my very interesting classmates who have helped to 

make the best out of every lecture with interesting questions and intelligent criticism. It 

was a pleasure to exchange ideas and spend the year with such exciting people.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



4 

 

Table of contents: 

 

Declaration ................................................................................................................................... 2 

Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... 3 

Table of contents: ........................................................................................................................ 4 

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ 5 

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 6 

Chapter One: Review of the literature on the super-ego over the history of psychoanalysis

 ....................................................................................................................................................... 9 

The super-ego as the heir of the Oedipus complex ................................................................... 9 

The early twofold super-ego ................................................................................................... 14 

Recent contributions to the concept of super-ego ................................................................... 20 

Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 22 

Chapter Two: A Psychoanalytic Examination of the Postmodern Super-ego ..................... 24 

The path to the postmodern super-ego .................................................................................... 24 

The super-ego in the postmodern era: a static, renewed, or annihilated structure? ................. 29 

The issue of guilt ................................................................................................................. 33 

Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 37 

Chapter Three: An illustration of the postmodern super-ego through the discussion of the 

George Floyd protests ............................................................................................................... 38 

The Revolt against the Police .................................................................................................. 40 

The lack of super-ego censorship over the id during the George Floyd protests .................... 41 

The pressure of postmodern ideals as the main generator of anxiety, guilt, and shame: the 

ego-ideal in action ................................................................................................................... 43 

Reflexivity, uncertainty, and anxiety ...................................................................................... 44 

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 45 

References: ................................................................................................................................. 48 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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Abstract   

The purpose of this study is to explore how the postmodern era may have altered 

the functioning of the super-ego. Authors such as Žižek, George Frankl, Lieberman and 

other contemporary psychoanalysts have produced several hypotheses to describe how 

the Freudian super-ego has been modified by the postmodern era, creating a new, 

postmodern super-ego. The aim is to create a discussion about which super-ego features 

may have disappeared, which may have been modified and which may have remained 

unaltered. The following propositions are considered: the break of the bond with the 

authority; the empowerment of the ego-ideal; the lack of a moral compass; the exemption 

from guilt; and the liberation of the instincts of the id. Each proposal is discussed while 

bearing in mind the difficulty of disturbing what is intrapsychic and the challenge of 

distinguishing mere cultural modifications from changes in the functioning of a psychic 

agency. Some of the hypotheses concerning the postmodern super-ego are illustrated 

through the discussion of the George Floyd protests. The analysis of the proposals and 

the discussion of the civil protests suggest that certain structural functions of the super-

ego are no longer active, namely, the repression of the aggression towards paternal or 

authoritarian figures and the acquisition or application of firm notions of right and wrong, 

good and bad. On the other hand, it also suggests that the ego-ideal remains active, 

possibly even more active than before and that the feelings of guilt and shame persevere. 

In sum, the end of prohibitions and obligations brought upon by postmodernity is likely 

to have modified certain aspects of the super-ego, promoting emancipation and the 

reduction of repression. However, it seems to have generated uncertainty, new anxieties 

and an unconditional obligation to conform to an unrealistic ideal of happiness and 

freedom.  

 

 

 

 

 



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Introduction  

It is an ever-lasting challenge to estimate the influence of culture on human beings. 

Culture seems to be continuously evolving and changing, whereas human nature has 

demonstrated a surprising consistency in its most profound features. Some argue that 

history is only repeating itself and so are we. The purpose of this work is to discuss the 

possibility of postmodern culture altering the super-ego. For that purpose, the words 

“change”, “modification” or “alteration” are used several times. The super-ego is likely 

the most culturally-influenced of the three Freudian psychic agencies, which reinforces 

the need for constant revision. However, it will not be argued that the super-ego has been 

permanently modified. Instead, this is a study of how the super-ego may have responded 

to the particular conditions of existence of the postmodern era, rather than a suggestion 

of a permanent and stable alteration of a complex set of ideas.  

There are few works updating psychoanalytic concepts in the light of the 21st century 

culture, particularly, concerning the concept of super-ego. This century, an heir of the 

many conflicts, wars and social challenges of the 20th century, carries a spirit of change; 

an insatiable desire for freedom, relativism, subjectivity and a wish to break with past 

traditions. This change in the Western culture is bound to modify mentalities, behaviours, 

emotional experiences and relationships between people, especially between people of 

different generations. If culture is no longer repressing individuals through prohibitions 

and commandments, if God is questioned and authority figures have lost public trust, then 

how do postmodern subjects decide what to do or what is right and what is wrong? When 

Freud, Klein, Bion, Winnicott and many other psychoanalysts of the 20th century helped 

elaborate the concept of super-ego, society was highly repressive, individuals lived guilty 

and ashamed, and authorities such as parents, governors and educators were held in high 

regard, feared and admired for their power and knowledge. This repression, alongside a 

code of moral conduct and an ideal of what one should become, were introjected in 

infancy. Individuals felt guilty or ashamed whenever culture or their parents said they 

should feel that way. However, in the 21st century, for many who have experienced war 

and others who do not wish to experience it, authority represents fascism, therefore, it is 

refused and fought against. What then of the super-ego? What happens to the psychic 

agency Freud claimed to be created to repress the anger against a more powerful figure, 

a paternal figure? Or what happens to the structure Klein believed to be shaped from the 

relationship of fear, aggression and love towards a parental figure? Furthermore, should 



7 

 

this shift in the relationship of individuals towards the authority alter the way some 

offences are judged by the criminal justice system? It was the lack of answers to these 

and other questions that prompted the idea for this dissertation. The choice of these topics 

comes from a deep interest in the analysis of unconscious processes in groups and 

societies The idea of a collective unconscious and how it may change from a century and 

a culture to another might be one of the most interesting and relevant subjects to explore 

and to further the comprehension of human nature. This interest was combined with a 

concern for the subjects of morality and repression, particularly, about how they have 

evolved and how society reflects upon them, as well as the extent to which society should 

adjust itself and its organisms to its variations in order to assure justice for everyone at 

all times.  

Some authors, such as Žižek, Lieberman, Lipovetsky and George Frankl addressed 

the changes of the 21st century culture and its impact on the behaviour and the psyche of 

Western individuals. Frankl described the postmodern behaviour and argued that the 

super-ego was being annihilated while Žižek coined the term postmodern super-ego and 

focused on the overturn of parental authorities. These authors have pinpointed the 

changes, however, it was necessary to systematically deconstruct their propositions, 

distinguish cultural changes from changes in the functioning of the super-ego and 

compare these suggestions to what had already been said in the field of psychoanalysis. 

In order to achieve this aim, this dissertation is organised in three chapters. The first 

chapter presents a review of the psychoanalytic literature on the concept of super-ego. 

This review focuses mainly on the contributions of Freud and Klein, which are discussed, 

enriched and criticized with the help of other authors such as Bion, Winnicott, Britton, 

Fairbairn and more recent contributors such as Lieberman and Lansky.  

In the second chapter, the concept of postmodern super-ego is presented as well as 

the context in which it has emerged. This is followed by a description and analysis of the 

behaviour of postmodern Western individuals and the possible causes for the changes in 

their comportment and attitude. Then, the proposals made by contemporary authors in 

favour of a new super-ego are analysed. The following hypotheses are discussed: the 

break of the bond with the authority; the changes in the ego-ideal; the lack of a moral 

compass; the exemption from guilt; and the liberation of the impulses of the id.  

In the third chapter, the George Floyd protests and the behaviour of the protesters are 

used to illustrate the changes that may have occurred in the super-ego. The behaviour of 

the protesters is analysed and divided in the following aspects: the revolt against the 



8 

 

police; the lack of super-ego censorship over the id during the protests; the strength of the 

ego-ideal demonstrated in the pressure of postmodern ideals, guilt and shame; and the 

uncertainty, anxiety and reflexivity surrounding both protesters and bystanders. Finally, 

in the conclusion, there is a discussion concerning the aspects of the super-ego that are 

considered to have been modified by postmodernity and those that were preserved. From 

this conclusion was acquired a new comprehension of the concept of super-ego, as well 

as a comprehension of the current state of postmodern individuals in what concerns their 

emotional experience of guilt and anxiety; their ethical decision making process; their 

freedom and happiness; their relationship towards powerful figures and the new 

importance of the self and its ideals for the constitution of a different super-ego. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



9 

 

Chapter One: Review of the literature on the super-ego over the history of 

psychoanalysis 

The concept of super-ego has been a central point of attention in the 

psychoanalytic theory and, as so, it carries with it a long and intricate history. It was 

developed from the observation of a complex set of experiences and it has been mentioned 

in many contexts, by several authors to our present day.  

The super-ego as the heir of the Oedipus complex 

The idea of the “super-ego” emerged from the necessity to name and make sense 

of a set of shared experiences and feelings. Freud explored these experiences separately 

until he began to perceive them as being inter-related and circumscribed them to an all-

encompassing concept. Hence, the abstract concept of super-ego comprises a set of 

different, autonomous and complex experiences, such as the experience of guilt; 

censorship; self-criticism; the experience of love, hate and fear between a child and his 

first object-choices; the idea of ego-ideal and of moral agency. Once these ideas were 

traced to a common denominator, the term “super-ego” was coined. It took Freud several 

years to develop this polymorphous concept. His development of the different ideas that 

compose the super-ego is spread across several of his works, which made it difficult to 

summarise it. These multiple ideas are discussed and clarified in the following 

paragraphs. Firstly, the super-ego is presented in the context of Freud’s second 

topography, which allows for an understanding of its level of consciousness and its 

rapport to other structures of the psyche. Secondly, the connection of the ego-ideal with 

the super-ego is discussed. Thirdly, the importance of the idea of the super-ego as 

censorship is made clear. Next, the aspect of moral agency is explored. Finally, the super-

ego is presented as the generator of the experience of guilt and self-criticism. 

In The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923), the super-ego appears as one of the three 

agencies of the psyche, alongside the id and the ego in his second topography, i.e., his 

second attempt to create a model of the human psyche. These three agencies are similar 

in that they are abstract constructs which enclose complex processes of mental life and 

human behaviour. They can be distinguished by the different functions attributed to them, 

as well as by the level of consciousness they exhibit. Freud describes the super-ego as a 

less conscious division within the ego. In other words, a structure situated somehow 

between the unconscious (the id) and consciousness (the ego). 



10 

 

In The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923), the author speaks of the super-ego and of the 

ego ideal (how the self wishes to be) as if they were interchangeable. The ego-ideal 

consists in the process of the child setting up an ideal in himself, to be sought after, 

through which he measures his actual ego. The ideal the child sets up in himself is a result 

of the identification of the infant with his object-choice, for example, his father or mother. 

The non-alignment of the ego with the ideal, or with the introjected identification, 

produces feelings of guilt (characterized by anxiety and remorse) and shame. Feelings of 

guilt can be conscious, as in people mourning the loss of a loved-one; or unconscious, as 

in with melancholic patients. That is why the super-ego is also mentioned in Mourning 

and Melancholia (Freud, 1914) in relation to states of melancholia, self-deprecation, 

feelings of guilt and inferiority. In this work, Freud also relates this identification 

mechanism with the mourning process by admitting the possibility of the recently lost 

love-object being introduced into the ego and altering its character. Even though the 

super-ego is intimately related to the concept of ego ideal they are not identical (Freud, 

1933) – since the ego-ideal is a part of the abstract concept of super-ego instead of being 

side by side with it. 

In The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900), the author focused on the super-

ego’s function of censorship, which aims to repress or prohibit id’s instinctual wishes 

from becoming conscious or fulfilled. Thus, the super-ego acts as a contact barrier that 

regulates and selects the contents to be repressed from the ones that are allowed in 

consciousness. The function of censorship is fundamental in the super-ego since it 

constitutes the main reason why the super-ego appears in the first place - it appears with 

the purpose of repressing the Oedipus complex. It does so by censoring the feelings the 

child experiences towards his early love-object and by controlling the ego through 

categorical imperatives. The super-ego protects the infant from becoming overwhelmed 

with prohibited desires while, at the same time, it is the one that forbids them - which 

makes the super-ego the protector from anxiety and also its generator. This contact barrier 

is programmed by cultural impediments which, even though they prohibit the expression 

of instinctual desires, they do not prevent the feeling of guilt caused by these desires. The 

repressed wishes can emerge from the unconscious in dreams, where censorship is 

numbed. The level of censorship is as high as the level of distortion of the dream content 

found during dream-work. Similarly, the stronger are the instinctual wishes and the 

Oedipus complex the faster they will be repressed. 



11 

 

Another idea that Freud traced back to the super-ego concerns the moral agency 

of individuals. The moral compass is forged through the exposure to the do’s and don’ts 

in interaction with the parents, culture, and educators. This prolonged exposure 

culminates in the introjection of the parental agency – this introjection constitutes the 

primordium of the super-ego. It is crucial to note that Freud establishes a difference 

between the parents and the parental agency – since he is not referring to the parents per 

se, as much as to the parents’ super-ego (Laplanche, J., & Pontalis, J., 1988). It is 

important to grasp this difference since it offers an insight into how the super-ego 

contributes to the transmission and preservation of traditional values from generation to 

generation. After having established its purpose, Freud (1923) concludes that the super-

ego develops as a result of childhood helplessness and that it is “the residue of the earliest 

object-choices of the id”, as well as “an energetic reaction-formation against those 

choices” (p. 30). This definition carries a powerful image, depicting the super-ego 

emerging from and remaining in a permanent struggle towards the loved, hostile, and 

prohibited infantile object-relations. According to Freud, the identification with the love-

objects and, consequently, the introjection of the parental agency, only take place after 

the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Since the love-object is no longer libidinally 

invested in, this identification is a way to preserve the object-relation after the 

abandonment of the object-cathexis. The result of this process is stored in the super-ego, 

which “retains the character of the father” (Freud, 1923, p. 31). 

In brief, Freud assigns multiple functions to the super-ego, such as to observe the 

ego and, later, judging and punishing it. The function of punishing produces the already 

mentioned feeling of guilt and a persistent self-criticism, which are two of the most 

palpable effects of this psychic structure. Freud (1923) notes that “the super-ego fulfils 

the same function of protecting and saving that was fulfilled in earlier days by the father” 

(p. 61). The super-ego’s punitive agency results in feelings of guilt and shame. The 

generation of this conflict within the ego, regardless of it being consciously 

acknowledged or not, results in a splitting of the ego between an accuser and an accused. 

The sense of guilt is one of the most noticeable consequences of the action of the super-

ego upon the psyche. According to Freud, the appearance in infants of the first signs of 

“guilty conscience” (Westerink, 2009, p. 254) matches the appearance of the super-ego, 

meaning, the stage of the Oedipus complex. This connection led him to the conviction 

that both the super-ego and the sense of guilt are linked to the ambivalent situation of 

aggression towards a beloved parent, who is both loved and admired as a role model, and 



12 

 

hated because he hinders the child’s instinctual wishes. Furthermore, the super-ego of the 

external authority figure is not the only thing internalized by the infant, he also 

internalizes the aggressive instincts experienced towards that authority figure. According 

to Freud, since this internalized aggression cannot be turned outward, it turns inward, 

generating the super-ego and the feelings of guilt and shame.  

Before the Oedipus complex, Freud argues that the child’s actions are not a result 

of a “guilty conscience” but, instead, are a result of a fear of punishment or a fear of loss 

of the caregiver’s love, which is dramatic for the infant, who is in a position of complete 

dependency. At this stage, the child is controlled and intimidated by the super-ego of his 

caregivers and not by his own. This situation takes a turn for the worse when the authority 

is internalized by the infant. At that moment, since nothing can be concealed from the 

super-ego, the child is overwhelmed by the fear of the omnipotence of his thought. The 

sense of guilt does not get relieved by the renunciation of instincts, it persists in thought, 

creating an inescapable “permanent internal unhappiness” (Freud, 1930, p. 74). Thus, 

Freud concludes that the sense of guilt is not just an individual symptom, but a cultural 

and religious collective problem (cultural super-ego). The internalization of the super-ego 

can be problematic if it becomes too overpowering, as in cases of hysteria and obsessional 

neurosis, where the super-ego tyrannizes the psyche.  

Freud’s theorization of the super-ego as being composed of internalized 

aggression suggests he sees this agency as a sadistic and death driven entity (Freud, 1923). 

On other occasions, Freud contradicts himself by considering the super-ego as a prosocial 

structure that raises the moral value of men and prepares them to live in civilization 

(Carveth, 2013, p. 11). He seems unsure about how to qualify the super-ego. In truth, it 

is difficult to morally qualify the super-ego, as it is difficult to judge its level of conscious 

awareness. The idea that the ego and the super-ego are moral structures, while the id is 

an animalistic and malevolent structure has been shown to be oversimplistic. In The 

Immoral Super-ego (2015, p. 6), Carveth quotes the work of Robert J. Lifton (1986) to 

present the argument that individuals responsible for atrocities in the 20th century were 

not acting on the impulse of the id.  They were, on the contrary, “super-ego-driven ‘do-

gooders’ who employed sophisticated ego function in the service of mass murder”. 

Carveth argues that psychoanalysis has tended to overlook both the depravity of the super-

ego and the morality of the id. Regardless of the super-ego being good or bad, Freud 

thought of the super-ego as a narcissistic structure and one that is never wholly given up. 



13 

 

Following Freud’s theoretical views, Anna Freud (1936) focused on the impact of 

the super-ego in the formation of neurosis, and its analysis as an essential part of 

therapeutic work. The author argues that the super-ego acts by setting an ideal standard 

that constrains the expression of sexuality and violence. However, when the ego obeys 

the super-ego’s commands, it can become “incapable of enjoyment” (1936, p. 58). The 

analyst’s role is to relieve the ego by controlling the super-ego’s demands and seeking a 

reduction of its severity. This description conforms to the features of the super-ego 

already identified by Freud: censorship and ego ideal. However, Anna Freud did not just 

limit herself to reiterating her father’s claims, she has also contributed to the subject by 

further developing a theory, originally presented by Sandor Ferenczi (Ferenczi & Dupont 

1995), concerning the mechanism of identification with the aggressor. According to Anna 

Freud and Ferenczi, this mechanism is a primordium of the super-ego. This ego 

mechanism is called into action when the child’s wishes are hindered by an external 

object, towards whom he feels aggressive impulses on the one hand, and a strong libidinal 

attachment on the other. The ego’s response to this conflict is to identify with the 

aggressor, thereby internalizing the criticism, as well as introjecting the characteristics 

and opinions of the external object as if they were his own. It is the identification with the 

aggressor that will promote the introjection of the contents which will later form the 

super-ego. The author argues that identification is one of the most powerful mechanisms 

of the primitive ego against anxiety from an external object. The internalized criticism is 

not right away set against the self and converted into self-criticism. Instead, the self-

criticism is preceded by a projection of guilt, that is, an externalization of the criticism 

onto the external world. In Anna Freud’s (1936) words, “Its intolerance of other people 

precedes its severity toward itself” (p. 111). This initial phase, consisting in an 

externalization of aggression, can offer an explanation to the early sadistic and narcissistic 

behaviours of children. The scenario in which this mechanism takes place corresponds to 

the stage of the Oedipus complex and, consequently, it is consistent with Freud’s 

hypothesis that postulates a connection of this conflict with the formation of the super-

ego. 

In the contemporary Freudian tradition, the Sandlers have described the super-ego 

as being composed of imperatives which, together with moral standards, ideals, and 

desired goals transmitted by the parents and other important figures in the child’s life, 

form the super-ego system (Sandler & Sandler, 1998). They argue that the super-ego is 

not a steady set of values but, instead, “a full and harmonized organisation of divergent 



14 

 

trends” (Tyson & Tyson, 1990, p. 201). They have also provided a clarification that was 

lacking from Freud’s previous work, namely, a necessary distinction between an introject 

– which should be limited to the internalized prohibitions and imperatives; and an ideal – 

the desired standards of the individual. Furthermore, Sandler & Sandler (1998) have 

shown how approval can have a very significant positive effect on the super-ego. They 

have shown that whenever the ego and super-ego are in harmony, a “feeling of being 

loved” is produced and the capacity for autonomy is reinforced (Barnett, 2007, p. 87). On 

the contrary, when the child is in constant need of care and reassurance from his 

caregivers and fails to obtain it, he might become overly attached to his super-ego 

introject as a way to stay in control and to reach his ideal standards of the self. Considering 

the aspects of the super-ego as theorized by Freud, the most emphasized aspect by the 

Sandlers is of the super-ego as the ego ideal, or an ensemble of ideal representations. On 

this subject, they have argued that the ego ideal should be subdivided into ideal object 

representations, ideal child representations and ideal self-representations. The “ideal 

object representations” are formations in which the parents are perceived as perfect and 

omnipotent by the infant, forming strong standards against which later perceptions are 

measured. The “ideal child representations” are composed of the actual parental standards 

or parental fantasies about their ideal child. These representations are mainly derived from 

the parents’ super-egos. The “ideal self-representation” has several sources and is 

considered as the most sophisticated of all (Sandler & Sandler, 1998, p. 12).  

The early twofold super-ego 

Making up for the overly narcissistic super-ego created by Freud, the Kleinian 

tradition helped dissipate some of it by preferring to focus on the relationship between 

the ego, its internalized objects, and their formative value. From her observational 

analysis of children of a young age, Klein managed to uncover primitive impulses of love 

on the one hand; and hatred, aggression, and guilt on the other. From this extensive 

clinical experience, Klein (2002) proposed significant revisions to the classical theory of 

the super-ego. She identified pre-oedipal phantasies1 and anxieties regarding authority 

figures in children under the age of two, which led her to the conclusion that a primitive 

form of the super-ego was already present in the first year of life, contrary to what had 

been previously argued by Freud. In other words, the formation of the super-ego preceded 

                                                           
1 The concept of “phantasy” is here distinguished from “fantasy” in order to designate deeper unconscious 

processes that aim at satisfying instincts by converting them into ideas and images. 



15 

 

the Oedipus complex rather than appearing because of it. Furthermore, Klein argues that 

the primitive super-ego is much harsher, phantastic and sadistic than the one appearing in 

children after the fifth year of life. Freud’s hypothesis of a super-ego that is formed with 

the resolution of the oedipal complex is the final stage of a more complex developmental 

process, associated with part and whole-object relationships. Another possibility is to 

consider the existence of a much more primitive and earlier form of the Oedipus complex 

that would appear at the same time as the primitive form of super-ego. Essentially, both 

authors agree that the super-ego is composed of both aggression and remorse, although 

the crucial difference (the aspect Freud failed to see) is that these two feelings do not 

necessarily surface at the same time. It is possible that an aggressive and primitive facet 

of the super-ego will appear first, and a more mature and remorseful facet later. For Klein 

to come to this discovery, she first had to develop the concept of position (paranoid-

schizoid and depressive) and revisit Freud’s theory of anxiety - restructuring it to integrate 

the concepts of persecutory anxiety and depressive anxiety (which was the first major 

allusion to guilt as a genuine concern for the well-being of others).  

According to Klein, the early formation of the super-ego system begins with the 

weaning process (Barnett, 2007, p. 94). This process creates in the child aggressive 

phantasies towards his mother’s breast and other part-objects. On the one hand, the child 

projects bad part-objects onto his parents, elicited from his own aggression; while, on the 

other hand, he introjects them as “a bad persecuting internal breast” (Klein, 1934). For 

Klein, the super-ego of the child is formed of monsters and terrifying creatures which 

symbolize his parents, despite the fact that they do not coincide with the real image of the 

parents. In short, it is composed of a split-off part of the ego into which good and bad 

aspects of the object-choices are projected. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the child 

fears retaliation and experiences persecutory anxiety - fear of being attacked by projected 

“bad” part-objects. This fear that follows the introjection of the bad object is the first form 

of the super-ego. In other words, the child has introjected the super-ego, and now feels an 

even bigger amount of fear than before, since he is now persecuted from inside. To get 

rid of this anxiety, the child attempts to destroy his objects, which only increases the 

persecutory anxiety he is experiencing. At this stage, we find a preliminary portion of the 

super-ego in action, namely, its feature of aggression. In brief, this early and primitive 

super-ego relies on the identification with internalized phantasy part-objects and 

possesses powerful, destructive qualities, which act unconsciously to punish the child.  



16 

 

In the course of normal development, after the sadistic phase, the child will 

hopefully improve his adaptation to reality, as well as his social connections, which will 

help him to perceive his parents for what they really are - as whole-objects, instead of 

part-objects. This perception transforms the aggressive instincts into feelings of guilt, 

depressive anxiety (fear of what the infant fantasizes his “badness” could do to whole-

objects) and desire to make reparations for the previous destructive attempts. Then, we 

find the remorseful part of the super-ego, also called the depressive super-ego (Zetzel, 

1970). Freud was right to consider that this ability is out of reach for children under a 

certain age, however, the lack of remorse and guilt does not necessarily imply the absence 

of a super-ego, since this can be present initially in the form of aggressive phantasies 

towards the part-object parents. The achievement of this position depends not only on the 

weaning process, but also on cognitive development, on the integration of the good and 

bad breast and on a capacity to withstand frustration. With the depressive position the 

child will also start to perceive himself as a whole-object - the self becomes differentiated 

from a non-self and from the mother. These basic features of ego development are 

important prerequisites for a super-ego to come into existence. It is not possible to 

interiorize a rule, a law, or a set of values without a basic sense of selfhood, involved in 

simple commands such as “You must…”.  

The Kleinian tradition states, in brief, that the super-ego exists from the oral phase, 

manifests itself in the relationship between the baby and the breast and, more specifically, 

from his first introjection of the bad object. In her account of the super-ego, Klein 

maintains the Freudian idea of a formation containing the do’s and don’ts provided by 

authority figures, as well as the implication of the mechanism of identification, already 

mentioned by him in the formation of the super-ego. However, Klein does not attribute 

much weight to the aspects of contact barrier and unconscious repression. 

 Even though authors still disagree on how the super-ego is formed, many have 

produced findings that support Klein’s hypothesis of a primitive super-ego. For example, 

Spitz (1958) has identified behavioural patterns in children under 2 years old, which 

correspond to the early structure formation of a subsequent super-ego. Spitz (1958) also 

observed that infants understand prohibitions and commands from the ninth month of life 

(p. 381). Prohibitions appear to leave a more lasting memory trace in infants, since they 

lead to frustration and are considered as uncompleted actions, which are usually better 

recalled than completed ones. Moreover, Spitz has managed to contradict Freud’s claim 

postulating that the super-ego derives from verbal claims, since the mechanism of 



17 

 

identification with the aggressor does not appear with the word “no” but, instead, with 

the gesture and head-shaking of the parents. 

Besides the already mentioned authors, many others have attempted to contribute 

to the already existing theories on the super-ego. Ronald Britton (2003) wrote extensively 

on the concept of the ego, on how it can emancipate itself from the super-ego, as well as 

how it can be destroyed by it. In short, he explores the relationship between the ego and 

the super-ego. The super-ego is said to derive its energy from the id, even though that is 

not the only thing that it takes from the id. When the id’s love-object is transformed into 

a part of the ego, the latter gains knowledge of the id’s experiences and weaknesses. Since 

the super-ego is a part of the ego, it also benefits from this knowledge which strengthens 

its dominance over the id. According to Britton, the ego must not be considered as a 

helpless entity against an overpowering super-ego since it is equipped with the means to 

fight back. He contrasts two types of authority within the psyche, one belonging to the 

ego and another to the super-ego. The ego has an authority based on knowledge from 

experience and from reality-testing and, thus, it can question the unrealistic emotions or 

ideas originating in the super-ego. This knowledge is necessary for the ego to be able to 

negotiate its way out of the schizoid-paranoid position. In this position, the super-ego has 

the upper hand and it is crucial to reverse this situation as soon as possible. The super-

ego has an authority inherited from the parents and educators, and from culture and 

religion. Therefore, while the ego judges and observes the self; the super-ego observes 

others and judges based on that observation. So far, most authors have argued about an 

over-powering super-ego, whereas Britton gives an equal if not a superior power to the 

ego. He argues that a mature and autonomous ego can judge and question the super-ego, 

causing it to lose its persecutory aspect and to adopt a more flexible form. This process 

puts an end to super-ego punishment and replaces it by remorse and wish for reparation. 

If the super-ego is too powerful or the ego is deficient, the latter can become subdued by 

the former. When the ego manages to balance its relationship with the super-ego, a 

question emerges: did the ego become stronger, or did the super-ego become weaker? 

So far, the authors that were mentioned in this dissertation have focused on 

studying the super-ego and guilt on babies and children, overlooking them in adults. Bion, 

mainly inspired by Klein’s theory concerning the primitive super-ego, has distinguished 

what he called the moral impulse (corresponding to an early, primitive, pathological 

super-ego) from a more sophisticated and rational super-ego and “systems of morality”, 

appearing only at a later stage in life (Barnett, 2007, p. 95). Bion is known for his research 



18 

 

on the psychotic personality and functioning which, when applied to infants, he connected 

to Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position. In infants, he distinguished a normally developing 

super-ego from a psychotic destructive super-ego that turns against the self. He explained 

this decompensation through an unsatisfactory containment. In health, the infant projects 

his beta-elements - chaotic emotions and anxieties (“the contained”) into the “good 

breast” (“the container”) and later receives them from the caregiver in a tolerable, 

processed form (Bion, 2000, p. 28). Bion shows how in a deficient relationship between 

container and contained the thinking apparatus of the child can become obstructed and 

the alpha-function hindered. When this occurs, ideas remain persecuting things-in-

themselves that must be expelled, namely, through an excessive use of projective 

identification. The relationship of the child towards the caregiver will be obscured by 

envy2 and aggression. When a super-ego of this kind becomes established, the psychotic 

part of the personality becomes dominant (as opposed to a normal coexistence of 

psychotic with non-psychotic parts), leading to the formation of a powerful, perverse, and 

destructive super-ego, also called, a “super-super-ego” (Etchegoyen, 1991, p. 752). In 

other words, it becomes a “perverse super-ego guiding, and guided by, a corrupt sadistic3 

morality” (Barnett, p. 96).  

Although the normal super-ego and the super-super-ego both initiate feelings of 

guilt and remorse, the latter is responsible for a higher intensity of persecutory anxiety, 

illustrated in patients who perform “attacks on linking” relationships (Bion, 1967). 

Etchegoyen (1991) also took interest on the subject of the super-ego. He links the 

narcissistic self to the super-ego, due to their similar dynamic with a masochistic ego. He 

argues that Bion’s psychotic super-super-ego possesses the features of a narcissistic self. 

These are manifested in the ideas the super-ego implants in the ego, which are often 

disguised with an ethical moral character, used to manipulate and undermine the ego, just 

like the disguise used by the narcissistic self when it attacks the ego. These ideas are 

typically undermining thoughts such as: “I do not deserve anything good” or “I am not 

                                                           
2 Envy should be distinguished from “jealousy” (Rosenberger, 2005) since the latter is considered more 

socially acceptable. The etymological root of envy is invidia from the Latin verb invidere, meaning “to look 

maliciously upon”. The definition of envy includes “the feeling of mortification and ill–will occasioned by 

the contemplation of superior advantages possessed by another” (Oxford English Dictionary). 

 
3 According to Rosenberger (2005), sadism is a bifurcated concept since it can be used with two different 

meanings. Firstly, sadism can be thought of as a perversion, where it assumes a defensive function - that of 

repairing a loss, resolving a separation, and projecting aggressive impulses by inflicting pain. Secondly, it 

can be used when referring to behaviour thought to be motivated by hate and destructiveness. The latter 

was the meaning intended by Freud in his concept of the death instinct; and by Klein, when she mentions 

hate and destructiveness. 



19 

 

worthy of good things” (Etchegoyen, 1991, pp. 752-753). By setting aside the normal 

super-ego from the envious super-super-ego, Bion contributes to maintain the duality of 

this entity as conceived by Klein: either there are two super-egos (a healthy one and a 

pathological one), or the same super-ego has two positions or moments (a paranoid-

schizoid and a depressive one). Herbert Rosenfeld (1952), through his work with 

schizophrenic patients, has reinforced this duality by contrasting a cruel, sadistic, 

murderous, super-ego with a merely accusatory and critical one which only asks for 

reparation.  

Fairbairn (1943) contributed to maintain the duality of the super-ego by 

postulating the existence of a primitive super-ego, which he called “internal saboteur”, 

and a more mature structure, a super-ego composed of internalized objects. Firstly, he 

postulates that the super-ego is built up in layers corresponding to the stages in oedipal 

development. This suggestion, which extends the timeline of both the super-ego and the 

Oedipus complex, is consistent with Klein’s theory. Secondly, the super-ego is composed 

of multiple good and bad internal objects, contradicting Freud’s hypothesis that the super-

ego is merely composed of bad objects. The existence of multiple and opposite objects 

within the super-ego may lead to ambivalence and a bigger chance of negotiation. Despite 

these contributions, Fairbairn is best known for his revision of the Freudian theory of 

drives. The author defied the classical theory by proposing that individuals are more 

object-seeking than pleasure-seeking, since separation anxiety is a much more powerful 

anxiety than, for example, a frustration of instinctual wishes. Unlike Freud and Klein, 

Fairbairn rejected the idea of a death instinct. He considered that aggression only occurred 

when contact with the object was hindered. Thus, Fairbairn’s claim seems to suggest that 

the super-ego’s initial main function is to ensure that the dependent subject does not lose 

the caregiver’s love. Interestingly, Freud’s theory fits in perfectly with Fairbairn’s claim, 

despite the fact that they have different premises. According to Freud, the super-ego 

appears to repress the Oedipus complex, saving the subject from having to deal with his 

prohibited desires. However, this repression also helps to maintain the caregiver’s love 

by avoiding a major family conflict. This suggestion shows how Anna Freud’s 

mechanism of identification with the aggressor can appear as an absolute need for the 

infant. 

Winnicott’s theory concerning the super-ego assimilates former theories while it 

presents an original perspective. Winnicott sees the super-ego as an internal empathetic 

authority that disciplines and regulates the character of the individual. For this authority 



20 

 

to be obeyed by the other structures of the psyche (the ego and the id), the individual 

needs to feel secure and must have a certain degree of maturity. This authority must 

follow the social laws while being flexible and sensitive when needed. The author 

distinguishes true morality, associated with a healthy development, from false morality, 

a pathological development of morality, typically found in cases of melancholia and 

obsessional neurosis. In these cases, the individuals have lost their battle against anxiety 

and have not managed to transform it into guilt. For Winnicott, a healthy super-ego 

implies an ability to compromise, and to accept the values of the community as part of 

the self. Compromising also constitutes an essential element of work and play. In his 

view, a capacity for concern is essential for a healthy super-ego. To develop a capacity 

for concern, the infant must be in a “facilitating environment” (Winnicott, 1963, p. 103) 

that allows him to acquire a degree of emotional growth, ego health and hope. It is only 

when the infant is capable of tolerating ambivalence and of recognizing the object mother 

and the environment mother as one, that reparation and a capacity for concern become 

possible - guilt is merely tolerated anxiety (Winnicott, 1958). This stage fully portrays 

Klein’s concept of the depressive position. Thus, if a sense of guilt has been developed, 

it means the infant’s ego has “employed certain controlling forces” against anxiety 

(Winnicott, 1958, p. 17). Winnicott identifies these forces as the super-ego. For this 

developmental process to occur, the child must introject a pre-oedipal, maternal super-

ego that is intimately connected with the capacity for concern and with Bion’s concept of 

container/contained. A super-ego is mature when the individual is capable of exercising 

control over the present and future anxieties. A mature super-ego also implies ego 

strength, controlling id drives and taking responsibility for one’s actions. False morality 

is represented by an immature or absent super-ego, which is due to a loss or absence of a 

reparative capacity. Winnicott’s theory focuses on morality and self-development and 

clearly differentiates a good from a bad super-ego, whereas most authors agree it is either 

just evil, or good and evil at the same time.  

Recent contributions to the concept of super-ego 

More recently on the subject of the super-ego, in The Super-ego (2001), Priscilla 

Roth poses the question of “What good is a super-ego if it only makes you feel bad?”. In 

1992, Nina Coltart had already answered this question by having identified some of the 

positive aspects and functions of the super-ego, such as “self-observation, self-reflection, 

kindly criticism... appreciation, esteem and love” (pp. 109-110). Another recent 



21 

 

contribution was given by the work of Ann Hurry (1998), which is a good illustration of 

the importance of play and compromise for a healthy super-ego. The psychoanalyst 

described a more practical work around the super-ego by narrating an experience with a 

ten-year-old presenting a pattern of an automatic super-ego condemnation. Her strategy 

to alter this pattern was to implicate the child’s super-ego in a game of compromise. The 

game was called “Heaven’s gate” and the patient was the “Gate’s keeper”. The child 

would decide who deserves to be in heaven and who is not worthy of it. While at the 

beginning the child projected a lot of guilt and aggression into the analyst and refused to 

let her through the gate, he eventually improved his capacity to play and allowed her in. 

Through play, Ann Hurry turned his super-ego into a more benign, and self-questioning 

entity.  

In another recent reframing of the super-ego, Melvin Lansky (2004) explores the 

benefit of the super-ego concept in both clinical and research settings. Lansky calls for an 

integration of the existing knowledge on the super-ego and presents several contemporary 

objections to this concept. After examining the flaws and the contributions of the super-

ego, the author concludes that this structure should be thought of as representing the 

entirety of consciousness, as it was initially conceived by Freud in 1923. He considers the 

super-ego to be indispensable as long as it is considered outside of the topographical 

model, diluting its association with the Oedipus conflict and the castration complex. Not 

far from Lansky, Lichtenberg (2008) set out to determine in what context the super-ego 

can be considered vital and in what context it is supplanted. He concludes that it is vital 

whenever morals and feelings of guilt and shame can be explained through a conflict 

between psychic structures or when an analyst wants to refer to the concept of conscience; 

and that it is supplanted in a context where morals, values and ethics are considered 

multifactorial, in need of constant revision and never fully determined throughout life.  

An additional recent contribution to the exploration of the super-ego is given by 

Lieberman (2019), an experienced clinical psychoanalyst, who became motivated to write 

about the super-ego after having noticed that an increasing number of her patients’ issues 

were associated to a “new super-ego” phenomenon (p. 26), produced by contemporary 

culture. According to her (2019), patients now present different values and morals than 

what they presented in the 1970s when they reflected the “old classic superego”. She 

remarks the prevalence of symptoms of guilt, anxiety, extreme boredom, “psychic 

emptiness, powerlessness, and despair” (p. 26). Lieberman argues that the “new 

superego” is marked by an increased narcissism, greed, and envy. Her clinical 



22 

 

observations concur with others from several authors who have written about postmodern 

culture and its impact on both the super-ego and the psyche. Her contribution is discussed 

in-depth in the next chapter, alongside other recent contributions by authors such as Žižek, 

George Frankl, Herbert Marcuse and Lipovetsky. 

Discussion 

Throughout this literature review, the concept of the super-ego has been described 

in many ways, some features have remained, while others were lost on the way. Some 

which were lost concern Freud’s theory of repression and the Oedipus complex – ideas 

which have suffered a great deal of transformation. The idea of the super-ego as 

censorship or a contact-barrier, permeating the content that transits from unconscious to 

consciousness, becomes either neglected or attributed indifferently to one or other 

structure of the psyche. On the other hand, all authors agree that the super-ego is a major 

generator of anxiety, guilt, and shame; they all agree it is composed of aggression 

(amongst other things) and that it is an introjection of an identification with the parental 

agency, which translates into an ensemble of commands and prohibitions. Most authors 

agree that the super-ego strives for an ideal and observes, judges, and punishes the psyche 

to attain it. Most authors, after the Kleinian tradition, also agree that there are two super-

ego positions - an early aggressive sadistic one, and a depressive one. This concludes the 

revision, analysis, and comparison of the psychoanalytic concept of super-ego as seen by 

the Freudian tradition, the contemporary Freudians, Kleinians and post-Kleinians and, 

finally, by some independent contributors. 

Despite the numerous contributions of multiple authors for the development of the 

concept of super-ego, there is a lack of recent contributions updating this concept in 

relation to the twenty-first century culture. Lieberman (2019), who has done extensive 

research on psychoanalytic literature on the super-ego censures this lack and accuses 

recent papers on greed, envy, and the super-ego of being vague and nonspecific (p. 26). 

The 21st century society is marked by the horrendous wars that happened in the 20th 

century - an era characterized by an unprecedented number of deaths during conflicts. It 

also carries a new attitude towards existence on earth, due to an unparalleled 

technological advancement that has come to change the way people learn, spend their 

time, think, and interact with each other. This society carries the spirit of change and 

revolution, and that is the reason why it challenges the super-ego, who is a carrier of 

tradition, fear, hate, love, guilt, aggression, and obedience. The encounter of a traditional 



23 

 

and ancestral entity such as the super-ego with a fresh society that discards all figures of 

the past is a phenomenon that will be examined in the following chapters of this 

dissertation. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



24 

 

Chapter Two: A Psychoanalytic Examination of the Postmodern Super-

ego  
 

The aim of this chapter is to examine the plausibility of the proposals made by several 

authors concerning the phenomenon of the postmodern super-ego. Authors such as Žižek, 

Lieberman and George Frankl postulate that certain cultural and social changes that 

occurred from the beginning of the twentieth century until the twenty-first century caused 

significant changes in the human psyche, specifically, in the super-ego. The main purpose 

of this dissertation is to determine the influence that postmodern culture may have had 

and continues to have on the super-ego and to what extent it represents an actual change 

in the super-ego (in relation to how it was described by Freud, Klein and the other 

mentioned authors), instead of a mere shift in our attitudes and mores. In other words, to 

what extent can we consider that the 20th century social reality has influenced what is 

intrapsychic? This analysis consists in an in-depth examination, seeking to present 

arguments against and in favour of each of the major proposals being posited, while 

keeping in mind the ancestry of the foundations of the super-ego, and the inherent 

difficulty of disturbing them. As the super-ego is based on the super-ego of the parental 

agency, it tends to perpetuate culture. However, if we accept this premise, what culture is 

the super-ego perpetuating and can this cycle be disturbed? Before attempting to provide 

an answer to these queries, it is necessary to first introduce the concept of postmodern 

super-ego and the context in which it has emerged; followed by the description of the 

behaviour of the postmodern individual that has caused authors to postulate a change in 

the super-ego in the first place, as well as the possible causes of this behaviour.   

The path to the postmodern super-ego  

The concept of postmodern super-ego was coined by Slavoj Žižek (1999) to 

introduce the transformations that he observes in the moral behaviour of Western societies 

by the turn of the new millennium. First, it is important to clarify what postmodernism is 

and how it prompted the transformation of Western thinking. Postmodernism, initially a 

mode of discourse used in literary criticism, became an intellectual stance, a social and 

cultural attitude towards life and knowledge. This school of thought can be found as early 

as the 1940s, however, it is only in the 1960s that it becomes a powerful force across 

multiple cultural and academic fields such as philosophy, literature, art, architecture, 

music, etc. Postmodernism emerged as a reaction against modernism and against the 



25 

 

rational assumptions of the Enlightenment. In architecture, postmodernism was formed 

as a reaction against the austerity, excess of regulation, and lack of originality of modern 

architecture. Some architects such as Denise Scott Brown, Robert Venturi, Charles 

Moore, and Michael Graves were essential in the introduction and development of this 

style, which later gave rise to other revolutionary styles such as the deconstructivism 

(Rattenbury & Hardingham, 2007). According to Postmodernists, our rational and 

scientific values have only managed to lead mankind to wars and to an even greater state 

of poverty, prejudice, and oppression. Postmodernism is characterized by a sceptical and 

nihilistic attitude towards universal notions, such as the notions of truth, reality, and 

knowledge (Bauman, 1998). Instead, Postmodernists promote relativism: they consider 

all fields of knowledge as culturally-conditioned and arbitrary, and they deny a distinction 

between reality and virtual reality by arguing that “the real” is nothing more than a 

subjective and biased construct. Since postmodern thinkers reject the possibility of 

reliable knowledge, they tend to turn inwards and investigate themselves and the 

conditions for their existence. In brief, they have a tendency for self-referentiality, 

pluralism, and irreverence. In a world where it is agreed that nothing can amount to 

anything trustworthy and that the multiplicity of particular sciences have confused and 

obscured our knowledge more than added to it, self-fulfilment and self-knowledge seem 

to be the only thing left to do (Cassirer, 1953). 

In this social and cultural context, the psychoanalyst George Frankl, in 

Foundations of Morality (2001), identifies a series of mostly negative behaviours and 

attitudes that characterize the postmodern subject. The author identifies the increase of 

tendencies such as the emergence of limitless greed - defined as an “oral-cannibalistic 

drive” (p. 13) - the prevalence of selfishness and the liberation of sadistic-destructive 

impulses. In her first chapter entitled “Analyzing a ‘new superego’? Greed and envy in 

the recent age of affluence”, Lieberman (2019), agrees with Frankl’s depiction of the 

postmodern society, even though her focus is mainly on the interrelations between greed, 

envy and narcissism and how the new socioeconomic situation activates these tendencies. 

Similarly, Žižek (1999) describes the postmodern subject as being increasingly 

narcissistic, obsessed with freedom, self-realization, and enjoyment. The three 

occurrences pinpointed by Frankl coincide with Žižek’s general illustration of the state 

of morality: when Frankl speaks of greed, Žižek speaks of the fixation with the “here-

and-now” experience of life, guided by the commonly accepted premise that “life is nasty, 

brutish and short” and survival is the law (Hobbes, Oakeshott & Peters, 1997, p. 78). 



26 

 

While Frankl prefers to focus on the problem of the uncensored release of instinctual 

impulses, Žižek emphasizes the postmodern cultural ideology that underlies these 

impulses. The latter perceives these changes as embedded in a continuous cultural 

evolution, while the former seems to consider that these changes are not only outside of 

culture but also constitute an attack on culture and on the established order. Albeit the 

two opinions are not contradictory. Both authors agree that there has been an overturn of 

traditional values and parental authority for the sake of freedom and liberation.  

This dismissal of authority and tradition in favour of a personal and subjective 

code of conduct, susceptible to change from situation to situation, is characteristic of 

postmodern thought and has created a climate of moral uncertainty, in which every value, 

rule and moral code is constantly questioned and doubted. The reasons that motivated our 

behaviour in previous ages are now being disclaimed on the basis of a generalized 

nihilistic disbelief towards the values promulgated by the Enlightenment. However, as 

Frankl (2001) insists, we are not more certain of the reasons for our behaviour or about 

the values we should adopt than people of previous ages. Even though we have renounced 

the old ways, we have not created new purposes to replace them. The difficulty in creating 

new values in the 21st century comes from a widespread “state of helpless confusion” 

(Frankl, 2001, p. 03), disenchantment and cynicism in which people find it hard to believe 

that anything can be true or certain. Since tradition can no longer be relied on, everything 

becomes a matter of individual choice and mental life becomes dominated by an excess 

of possibilities. This reality relates to the contemporary phenomenon of “reflexivity” 

(Žižek, 1999), according to which every impulse is a matter of choice and everything is 

up for discussion. 

The philosopher and sociologist Gilles Lipovetsky devoted his career to research 

the postmodern society. In his multiple works, he identifies in this society tendencies for 

exacerbated consumerism, hedonism, individualism, and a loss of meaning of the major 

moral, social, and political institutions. As Žižek, he also refers to the obsession with the 

here-and-now experience of life and defines individualism as the desire to break with past 

tradition and focus on personal pleasure. By the end of the 2000s, he argued that the term 

“postmodern” had become obsolete and incapable of describing a fast-moving and 

ephemeral era like the current one. He then proposed the term “hyper-modern”, which 

integrates the modern and postmodern but elevates them exponentially to include new 

technologies, markets, and global culture. However, Lipovetsky does not reduce the 

current society to a complete deregulation of moral values and to a refusal of all past 



27 

 

institutions like Frankl tends to do. On the contrary, he acknowledges in this society a 

deep and complex paradox: “What defines hypermodernity is not exclusively the self-

criticism of modern knowledge and institutions; it is also the revisited memory. (…) No 

longer just the deconstruction of traditions, but the re-employment of it without 

institutional imposition, the eternal rearrangement of it according to the principle of 

individual sovereignty” (Lipovetsky, Charles & Brown, 2005).  

He identifies a contradiction in the current society that neither Frankl nor Žižek 

explore and that is essential to comprehend the complexity and the state of confusion 

hovering over hyper-modern societies. In the Crépuscule du devoir (Lipovetsky, 1992), 

the author identifies in these societies a collective concern for morality, a concern for 

solidarity and righteousness, a struggle for ethical causes in a truthful demonstration of 

generosity. According to the author, this behaviour is in contradiction to the self-

interested, ego-centred culture in question. Hyper-modern societies are often concerned 

about the future; about social minorities and human rights; about climate change and other 

environmental causes. They are politically engaged and are capable of organizing rallies 

that could last for days, in defence of a single individual who suffered an injustice at the 

hands of an authority figure. An example of this can be found in the recent protests led 

by the “Black Lives Matter” movement, against the death of George Floyd, on the 25th of 

May 2020. This depiction of reality does not necessarily contradict George Frankl and 

Žižek. In truth, it supports the idea that the postmodern subject is obsessed with freedom, 

self-realization, and enjoyment, even though it apparently contradicts the feature of 

selfishness and narcissism. However, it is possible that individuals will act in an 

extremely selfish and narcissistic manner if their freedom is being threatened. This seems 

to indicate that moral values persist in the current societies and that, in addition, they 

remain quite severe. However, they impose freedom instead of repression and 

containment. It is also possible that the imposition of freedom is still an imposition and 

may quickly turn into repression. Hence, on the one hand, we find a flexible, pragmatic, 

and liberal dialogue about morality while, on the other hand, we find binary, rigorous, 

and unrealistic claims that cause repression instead of realistically opposing to it. An 

example of the latter is the concern with political correctness that reveals a “moral neo-

conformity” (Lipovetsky, 1992) that adopts rigid strategies to dogmatically defend 

minorities. 

 Unlike Žižek, George Frankl (2001) offers multiple explanations and possible 

causes for this generalized transformation of behaviour. According to Frankl (2001), this 



28 

 

new morality is a result of the colossal failure of traditional values during the twentieth 

century, which is exemplified by the numerous wars, increased poverty, unemployment, 

prejudice, oppression, and extermination camps. Frankl (2001) argues that “(…) we 

cannot trust our judgements or even our perceptions because we cannot trust the concepts 

of our civilisation which have determined our judgements” (p. 07). These events of the 

twentieth century have brought upon a wave of disenchantment that has corrupted the 

bond between individuals and authority figures. The authority figures under consideration 

here are not just governors and law enforcers, but also God(s), parents, teachers and 

anyone who might be in a position of power over us. This relationship, instead of being 

marked by respect, fear and admiration, is now characterised by anger, scepticism, and 

uncertainty. This patriarchal bond is at the foundation of the super-ego and that is why 

Frankl (2001) claims to be witnessing the “murder of the super-ego” (p. 29). Frankl’s 

decision to blame the war events of the twentieth century for the new century’s morality 

is thought to be oversimplistic, even if it holds true. The author has neglected many other 

possible factors, which are admittedly difficult to account for in its entirety, such as the 

increasing disbelief in formal religion, technological advancements, globalization, and 

many other possible factors. Furthermore, the events of the early 20th century have already 

been exhaustively explored, as argued by Lieberman (2019), whereas the state of the 

world post-1950 has received far less attention and is “taken for granted rather than 

examined as a causative factor” (p. 29).  

It is also interesting to question how Freud might have contributed to this “state 

of helpless confusion” and uncertainty of the postmodern society. One might assume that 

psychoanalysis is not postmodern in its nature or, at least, that it has not been so far, since 

it hypothesizes about universal tendencies in human motivation and behaviour. However, 

some of the aspects in Freud's theory of the psyche are sympathetic to postmodernism 

(Horrocks, 2014). Particularly, the hypothesis of the unconscious suggesting that we can 

never be sure about the reasons that motivate our behaviour. This fundamental Freudian 

idea, which may also be a result of the consequences of the war events in Freud himself, 

has contaminated the minds of the postmodern subjects with doubt, nihilism and disbelief. 

Furthermore, several of Freud's ideas met the post-modern ideals, namely the subjectivity 

he attributes to mental life when he argues we perceive the representation of things rather 

than things themselves (Casey, 1972). Similarly to postmodern thinkers, he places great 

emphasis on the individual and his inner struggles. Even psychoanalysis as a discipline is 



29 

 

becoming postmodern and “preoccupied as never before in studying itself” (Lansky, 

2008, p. 155).   

Regardless of the causes of postmodernism, Frankl, Lieberman and Žižek 

postulate that the super-ego has undergone significant alterations, which are at the origin 

of the behaviour of the postmodern subject, and that these are not mere cultural changes. 

Some of these alterations influence not just the super-ego but the entire balance of the 

psyche. The most radical hypothesis was suggested by the Austrian-British 

psychoanalyst, George Frankl, who advocated that the super-ego has been annihilated. 

Žižek, in a less radical stance, argues that there has been a disintegration of the old 

stability and a decline of parental authority which have significantly altered the super-

ego. 

The super-ego in the postmodern era: a static, renewed, or annihilated structure? 

The following paragraphs present several proposals concerning the ways in which 

the super-ego may have been altered by the postmodern era. In order to do this, the 

concept of the super-ego is again disassembled to reveal the multiple ideas it encloses. 

Each of these ideas is revisited in the light of the 21st century culture with the purpose of 

discussing which features persist unaltered, which have been modified and which may 

have disappeared. This analysis begins with the proposal of the break of bond with the 

authority, where the current state of the rapport between individuals and authority figures 

is reviewed. Afterwards, a review is made of the state of the ego-ideal. Thirdly, the 

proposal of the liberation of the repressed instincts of the id is presented. After that, the 

argument of the lack of a moral compass is analysed. Finally, the problem of guilt is 

discussed, where authors’ opinions diverge between a social increase in guilt or an 

exemption from guilt. While George Frankl postulates that the corruption of all of these 

ideas has taken place and constitutes proof of the annihilation of the super-ego, other 

authors argue for a less radical idea, the one of “a new super-ego” or an altered super-ego 

which has lost some of its components and amplified others.  

It is George Frankl’s (2001) contention that, while traditionally aggression 

towards the authority and the super-ego was repressed and projected against the ego or 

against others, as postulated by Anna Freud, now it is directed at the super-ego with the 

purpose of annihilating it. Frankl posits that the savagery displayed by the two world wars 

and by the horrors of Auschwitz has brought disappointment and apprehension towards 

the future. Most of our current disappointment is due to the excessive expectations held 



30 

 

in the past regarding science, reason, and the wonders of industry. In addition to this 

disappointment, these events also elicited anger and aggression against the “father-figure 

which promised so much and failed so miserably” (Frankl, 2001, p. 7). According to 

Freud, one of the aims of the super-ego is precisely to repress the anger against the 

“father-figure” and help preserve the relationship with the love-object. If the anger is such 

that the super-ego is destroyed, there is nothing preventing the subject from acting-out 

his aggressive impulses. George Frankl applies this paradigm to the Middle Ages when 

people admired and glorified their king while, at the same time, they hated the power he 

had over them and envied his wealth and his privileges. The people’s love for their king 

was usually strengthened by killing the king’s enemies and by hating other kings. This 

displacement mechanism allowed citizens to discharge their aggression and not incur in 

the forbidden murder of the ‘own father’. According to contemporary Freudian theory, 

the current lack of displacement that Frankl points out, or the directness of the aggression, 

means that the pressure to express the anger has surpassed the benefits or the capacity to 

supress it. In that scenario, the individual is thrown into the middle of an active and 

uninhibited Oedipus complex which could have catastrophic consequences. In this 

scenario, the annihilation of the super-ego is favoured, on the one hand, by the increase 

in aggression towards the father figure and, on the other hand, for the lack of inhibition 

of the Oedipus complex.  

Nonetheless, the super-ego is not restricted to the functions of suppression of the 

Oedipus complex and regulation of the relationship with the authority. If that were true, 

the damaging of that relationship would be enough to annihilate the super-ego. On the 

contrary, the super-ego also includes a self-observing and self-criticizing agency – the 

ego-ideal – which, even though it is formed in the relationship with the other, it mostly 

manages the relationship of the individual with himself. That agency alone can generate 

a great deal of shame and anxiety. Furthermore, if the super-ego were no longer a structure 

in the psyche or if it had been modified, then likely we would note the absence or the 

modification of the ego ideal, as well as of the feelings it produces. The relationship 

between the super-ego and the ego ideal is still uncertain: at the beginning of his career, 

Freud spoke of these concepts as interchangeable, even though he later began to 

differentiate them. It is unclear whether the ego ideal is a part of the super-ego or whether 

it is a different entity, one that is created through the same bond as the super-ego – a bond 

of love, admiration and envy with someone considered superior – and that shares similar 

mechanisms to it, such as the punishment of the ego. An indication of the state of the ego 



31 

 

ideal could be provided by the preponderance of shame in society. Shame is commonly 

associated with embarrassment, shyness, and humiliation. While the ego ideal qualifies 

behaviours in terms of “good and bad”, the super-ego measures them in terms of a “right–

wrong” scale. This distinction brings shame closer to the ego ideal and guilt closer to the 

super-ego (Rosenberger, 2005).  

On this subject, while Frankl would probably be of the opinion that shame is 

experienced less often and with minor intensity; Žižek is likely to argue, in view of the 

increase of opportunities for social comparison on social media, that shame is on the rise. 

Consequently, it is possible that the ego ideal is becoming stronger while the super-ego 

is weakening, causing individuals to feel shame rather than guilt. In addition, considering 

the fact that the ego-ideal has recurrently been associated with narcissism in the past 

(Freud, 1991; Rosenfeld, 1992) and that the postmodern society has been described as 

predominantly narcissistic, it could suggest that the ego-ideal has taken command of the 

psyche in detriment of the super-ego. This hypothesis could explain how anxieties can 

persist even though the bond with authority has been damaged.   

The third hypothesis being analysed also represents a structural change of the 

psyche. This hypothesis consists in the idea that the id has been liberated from the 

oppression and censorship of the super-ego. Since censuring the id is pointed out as one 

of the main functions of the super-ego (Freud, 1900), its absence can constitute an 

indicator of the disappearance or weakening of the latter. According to Frankl, this 

liberation is attested by the unconstrained behaviours of postmodern societies. The author 

entitled this phenomenon “ego mania”: a state where the id runs free. He devotes an entire 

chapter to the description of “the breakthrough of the repressed”, in which primitive areas 

of the psyche, such as aggressive, narcissistic, and sexual drives, previously repressed 

and sublimated, now find unrestrained expression. Frankl is not the only author claiming 

that there has been an increase in behavioural permissiveness and an ease of obligations 

and restrictions after the Second World War. This idea is supported by both Lieberman 

and Lipovetsky in several of their works. Žižek does not strictly disagree with Frankl’s 

claim, he agrees that a new array of behaviours has become available and that individuals 

are no longer culturally required to meet traditional expectations of society.  Nonetheless, 

he claims that individuals often still feel an inner pressure to please by conforming to 

those same expectations. Similarly, while there are no longer strict cultural obligations to 

control instinctual wishes, there is an inner accuser that may act whenever ‘infractions’ 

are committed. Thus, despite the cultural changes inspiring a free expression of instincts, 



32 

 

feelings of guilt and shame may still apply as if nothing had changed. Žižek’s divergent 

opinion on this matter is further explored in the next section, which is devoted to the issue 

of guilt. Herbert Marcuse (2002) provides another perspective for the analysis of this 

behavioural tendency that Frankl observes in the postmodern society – a tendency for 

searching immediate satisfaction of instinctual drives.  

In One-dimension man (Marcuse, 2002), the sociologist addresses the post-

technological society of the West and describes it as still feeding off the phantasies and 

desires of the pre-technological era, even though they are now irretrievable. This nostalgia 

can be related to Frankl’s description of the current disappointment that people experience 

towards industry, mass production and technology. As Frankl puts it, this progress, 

despite having improved our material life, it has failed to provide the moral and spiritual 

solace needed in the current cynical godless society. According to Marcuse (2002), the 

present civilization strongly opposes to the loss of higher culture and its dilution into mass 

culture. However, the mechanisms being used to defend this higher culture is 

transforming it into goods and services, thereby accomplishing the opposite of the 

intended effect. Hence, there is an immense nostalgia of the feudal culture, of the pre-war 

values. This nostalgia creates a refusal of the reality principle and reinforces the pursuit 

of the pleasure principle. The author names this phenomenon desublimation: “replacing 

mediated by immediate gratification”. However, Marcuse (2002) argues that 

desublimation favours social cohesion, as opposed to creating chaos and anarchy, as 

suggested by Frankl. This implies that what is occurring is a sort of sublimation of a 

desublimation, or, as Marcuse puts it a “controlled desublimation”, since immediate 

gratification is presently enforced and welcomed by society. In the words of Marcuse 

(2002), “sublimation becomes the cognitive power which defeats suppression while 

bowing to it” (pp. 54-55). At the time when Freud wrote Civilization and its discontents, 

the demands of society and those of the individual were intrinsically conflictual, thereby 

generating unhappiness and social neurosis. Is it possible that, in our present times, 

individuals and society are being able to negotiate these conflicts and aligning their 

demands? If so, does that reality improve our lives and well-being? In other words, does 

it make us happier no longer needing to convert our instinctual desires into something 

else more socially acceptable and being free to express and satisfy these desires?4 

Nevertheless, the argument of the liberation of the id does not necessarily support the idea 

                                                           
4 These and other similar pertinent questions are discussed by Fromm and Ingleby in The Sane Society 

(2008).   



33 

 

of the annihilation of the super-ego, contrarily to what Frankl advocates. The main reason 

why this conclusion does not follow from this argument is that the instinctual drives of 

the id are not being expressed without constraints; on the contrary, the freedom they 

impose generates a great deal of anxiety whenever individuals attempt to balance their 

obligations versus their freedom to gratify their desires. 

While evaluating the state of the super-ego, Frankl postulates that in our present 

time there is an absence of a moral compass which relates to an alteration of the super-

ego. These notions are acquired through the identification to and introjection of the do’s 

and don’ts of the parental agency. The moral compass can be disturbed at two different 

moments in the life of an individual: either at its origin or later in life. Even though Frankl 

argues that individuals in the twenty-first century lack a moral compass, he did not explain 

how nor when this change came to be. If we consider that the problem of the acquisition 

of the do’s and don’ts is a transmission problem, then there are three possible scenarios. 

In the first scenario, the individual has failed to identify with the caregiver/authority 

figure. In the second, the individual might have failed to introject the identification. In 

the third, it is also possible that the do’s and don’ts were not presented as such, possibly 

because the authority figure was already troubled with postmodern doubt. If we consider 

that the problem with morality happened later in life, then it is a problem of application 

of the do’s and don’ts. In that case, it means either that the individual has gone through 

the process of identification and introjection but later got rid of those introjections and 

parts of his character; or that he maintains these notions but lacks an enforcer and thus 

doubts every one of his notions. If we accept the emphasis postmodernism has placed on 

individualism and on the obligation to be free, as well as how it has overturned all moral 

institutions, then it is understandable that individuals feel a lack of a moral compass. The 

freedom to make one’s own choices only increases the uncertainty and difficulty of 

making them, especially when compared with the simplicity of following tradition or a 

religious text that pre-establishes the aim of life and the way to attain that aim. 

The issue of guilt 

The lack of an enforcer brings us to another indicator of the state of the super-ego: 

the preponderance of the feeling of guilt. The super-ego produces guilt as a means to force 

the ego and the id into conforming to certain idealized standards. Therefore, if the super-

ego has been annihilated, that should cause the feeling of guilt to disappear. The 

experience of remorse appears with the depressive position in response to the damaging 



34 

 

attacks or phantasies about such attacks done to the parental figure. The intensity of the 

guilt is a good indicator of how much the super-ego is overpowering and, often, an 

indicator of the amount of aggression that is being repressed. When guilt is experienced, 

the feeling of love and admiration surpasses the anger and resentment, and the individual 

begins to wish to make reparations for the previous sadistic attacks. However, Frankl 

postulates that if the bond of love with the authority has been damaged, then remorse is 

not experienced, and anger is free to express itself. According to Frankl, this scenario 

illustrates the current state of Western civilization: he argues that individuals no longer 

experience guilt or experience it far less than before the twentieth century. On this 

important topic, Žižek, Lieberman and Frankl are not in agreement. Žižek and Lieberman 

consider that the postmodern super-ego has generated new and increased forms of 

anxiety.  

Even though the link between super-ego and guilt is strong and undeniable, there 

is another important aspect to consider. The absence of guilt does not necessarily mean 

the super-ego has been annihilated. If we consider the double-faced super-ego conceived 

by Klein, an absence of guilt could mean that we are faced with a primitive and sadistic 

super-ego, which has not yet attained the depressive position. Indeed, Frankl’s description 

of the behaviours currently happening under what he considers to be an absent super-ego 

seem to correspond to the behaviours found under a pathological super-ego as described 

by Bion, or to the primitive Kleinian super-ego. Assuming the super-ego is created when 

the first bad object is introjected, would it still be considered a super-ego if the sadistic 

phase never ended and the individual was forever without remorse? If the super-ego never 

developed pass the introjection of bad objects, would that entity, constituted by a bad 

thing in itself that instigates fear and retaliation, still be considered the primordium of the 

super-ego? If the super-ego can exist without the experience of guilt, then the argument 

presented by Frankl is not valid. Even though, for the sake of this argument, a pathological 

super-ego is being compared with the postmodern super-ego, it is important to distinguish 

between the two. While the former is characterized by sadism, envy and aggression, the 

latter does not settle for aggression or remorse, it is more often uncertain about its conduct 

and its true character. 

In any case, this discussion is only relevant if we consider that societies are now guilt-

free, which Žižek and Lieberman do not. According to Žižek, the postmodern super-ego 

has brought upon a peculiar and unique obligation – the obligation to be free and to enjoy 

life. This order, which resembles a direct commandment from the id, generates “new 



35 

 

guilts and anxieties, instead of opening up a brave new world in which we can enjoy 

shifting and reshaping our multiple identities” (Žižek, S.,1999). The previously 

mentioned liberation of instincts brought by postmodernity is only apparently free of 

restrictions. In Žižek’s publication on the London Review of Books entitled “You May!” 

(1999), the author argues that there are no “strong prohibitions in a society awash with 

permissiveness”. However, there is also no escaping from the excessive freedom it 

conveys. Thus, “You May!” becomes mandatory, it becomes “you must”. There is a call 

for an unconstrained transgression with the promise of suspension of judgement. Yet, if 

individuals are being encouraged to have the maximum pleasure by enjoying themselves 

to the fullest, then they must enjoy, otherwise, if they feel that they could have enjoyed 

more or feel unable to enjoy, it will result in a feeling of guilt for failing to be happy. If 

culture no longer imposes obligations, postmodern individuals now impose them to 

themselves and feel compelled to enjoy them, since they are the ones “choosing” to fulfil 

them. The postmodern society is falsely permissive since it is replete with regulations and 

impositions under the false pretence of ensuring our happiness. These new anxieties 

mentioned by Žižek resemble a recently conceptualized social anxiety, known popularly 

and in the field of psychology as FOMO – fear of missing out -, which is similar to FOBO 

– fear of better options. FOMO is described as the anxiety of being disconnected, of being 

excluded, of missing an opportunity for social interaction, of not making the right choices 

in a paradigm where every experience must be enjoyed to the fullest. FOBO is 

characterized by a feeling of anxiety, frustration, stress, and unhappiness. These result 

from the excess of freedom of choice, which becomes problematic for the postmodern 

subject because he has no fixed criteria to help him decide. These two terms, coined by 

Patrick McGuinnis, in 2004, are indissociable from an unhealthy use of the internet and 

social media.  

Lieberman (2019) agrees with Žižek on the subject of guilt. From her recent 

clinical observations, she concludes that her patients exhibit more feelings of guilt than 

ever before. To illustrate this reality the author gives the example of practices of self-

starvation, excessive exercise and unreasonable diets which serve to punish the ego, 

control the impulses of the id and force the individual to conform to an unrealistic ideal. 

All these practices follow the often-heard expression “no pain, no gain”.  

Previously, it was shown how we could conceive the absence of guilt without that 

implying the absence of the super-ego. However, another scenario should be considered 

in which the super-ego has been annihilated, as Frankl argues, but the sense of guilt 



36 

 

persists, as Žižek contends. If Žižek’s contention holds true and the postmodern society 

is suffering from additional anxieties, how can that idea be reconciled with the theory of 

the annihilation of the super-ego? Shouldn’t the disappearance of the super-ego suppress 

these anxieties? In other words, is it possible to experience guilt without a super-ego? The 

formulations made by Freud, Klein, Bion, Winnicott and many others are not favourable 

to this hypothesis since the super-ego is pinpointed as the main generator of guilt.  

However, in one of his writings, Žižek has managed to explain how we can 

conceive the perseverance of the feeling of guilt in the absence of the super-ego. In the 

postmodern era, with the purpose of self-assertiveness and self-fulfilment, there is, 

according to Žižek, a tendency for a positive rewriting of the narrative of our past, as a 

way to surpass traumatic or unpleasant experiences. The same solution is applied to the 

traditional rules of society whenever they are considered too severe. Žižek illustrates this 

idea with a sarcastic and rhetorical question that ridicules the priorities of postmodern 

thinkers: “Is one of the Commandments too severe? Well then, let’s regress to Mount 

Sinai and re write it: adultery – fine, provided it is sincere and serves the goal of profound 

self-realisation” (Žižek, 1999). There is a sort of collective illusion of omnipotent control 

over life, rules and personal emotions. It is an illusion because the rewriting of a moral 

rule or emotional experience does not really erase nor alter the consequences the real 

experience had in the first place. In other words, “what disappears is not ‘hard fact’ but 

the Real of a traumatic encounter whose organising role in the subject’s psychic economy 

resists its symbolic rewriting” (Žižek, 1999). This proposition is very important for the 

understanding of how culture can change without it necessarily altering the functioning 

of the psyche. For example, if we consider that post-modern ideology has changed the 

way the new generation cares for the elderly family members, which is an idea Žižek 

entertains, particularly towards a disengagement and a lack of accountability, then, 

according to Žižek, that would not absolve our moral conscience of the feeling of guilt. 

Therefore, if the super-ego has faded from our psyches there could be a time lag between 

its fading and the disappearance of its effect, i.e., the feeling of guilt. In addition, the fact 

that the learning of the do’s and don’ts depends less on culture and more on the 

transmission of the unconscious processes of the parent’s super-egos (Laplanche, J., & 

Pontalis, J., 1988) reinforces Žižek’s proposition. In sum, the feeling of guilt may persist 

even after the rules that cause that feeling have been overturned and even after the psychic 

entity that produces that feeling has lost its ground.  

 



37 

 

Discussion  

If we pay close attention to George Frankl’s arguments, we realize that his 

hypothesis of the annihilation of the super-ego relies on arguing that the functions and 

consequences attributed to the super-ego since its conception are inoperative and no 

longer take place in the postmodern era. Even though he might have been relatively 

thorough, some of his arguments have found more support than others in the 

psychoanalytic community. Authors agree that the overturn of authority figures implies 

that there has been a liberation of the id from super-ego oppression. However, not all 

authors agree that there has been an unconditional liberation of impulsive drives, since, 

as Žižek observed, the postmodern subject is not entirely free from restrictions, 

obligations, and traditional expectations. In brief, the id may have been liberated from 

super-ego oppression, since it not as often repressed. However, the expression of the 

recently liberated instincts is not exempt from guilt and shame. Additionally, the idea 

according to which there is a generalized state of helpless confusion, causing individuals 

to doubt their concepts of truth and falsity, right and wrong, is fully corroborated by 

several authors. All of the authors mentioned above are also in agreement concerning the 

idea that there has been an overturn of paternal authority, i.e., a break of the bond of 

obedience, fear and love with authoritarian figures, as well as a disbelief in moral and 

social establishments.  

Nevertheless, as already stated, Frankl’s theory concerning a guilt-free society 

found a great deal of opposition. Finally, the idea that the super-ego has suffered changes 

or that it might be getting weaker is quite different from the idea of an annihilation of the 

super-ego, which is far more extreme and, consequently, more difficult to support. In the 

next chapter, these ideas are applied to a real and ongoing social problem, which is taking 

place worldwide. The illustration of the postmodern super-ego simplifies its analysis and 

puts to test the aspects said to have been modified and the ones said to have remained 

unaltered. 

 

 

 



38 

 

Chapter Three: An illustration of the postmodern super-ego through the 

discussion of the George Floyd protests  

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the hypotheses presented in chapter two 

concerning the postmodern super-ego. The multifactorial character of the concept of the 

postmodern super-ego on the one hand, and the fact that it is an intrapsychic phenomenon 

on the other hand makes it difficult to find an all-inclusive practical example. The super-

ego, as an abstract psychic agency, gives rise to internal conflicts which are difficult to 

exemplify. Nonetheless, it is an extremely current phenomenon that has sprouted from 

postmodern culture, making some of the actions of the postmodern individual a walking 

example of the facets of the postmodern super-ego. The functioning of this agency can 

become apparent in the way individuals experience guilt; in the pressure to conform to an 

ideal; in the acquisition of a code of conduct; and in the repression that is applied over 

instinctual drives. In this chapter, the challenge is to find a real and current scenario where 

these feelings and behaviours may surface and can be explored. The year of 2020 has 

presented us with many challenges so far, the most important one being the COVID-19 

pandemic which is mentioned in this chapter but does not constitute its main focus. 

Instead, this last chapter discusses the recent and ongoing protests happening worldwide 

concerning racism and police brutality. These protests are an extremely complex 

phenomenon that erupts from a history of longstanding racism, prejudice and oppression 

that precedes, by far, the postmodern era. Nonetheless, there are certain aspects of these 

protests, and of the context in which they have emerged, that are unique and that can be 

seen to reflect postmodern culture and the decadence of the Freudian super-ego. The 

chosen example can allow the exploration of collective ethical and emotional issues 

concerning the relationship with paternal figures, traditional values and impulse control.   

The demonstrations were triggered by the already mentioned death of the African 

American George Floyd, on the 25th May 2020. George was an African American man 

who was killed by a police officer who pressed his knee to Floyd's neck during his arrest 

in Minneapolis. The video of his death generated protests all around the world against the 

use of excessive force on ethnic minorities by the police. Most protests have been 

peaceful, however, demonstrations in certain North American cities, such as Minneapolis, 

have escalated into violent riots, property damage, looting and street fights, causing the 

president to declare martial law. By the 4th June, at least 9,300 people had been arrested 

across the US, including all four police officers involved in Floyd's death (Aljazeera, 



39 

 

2020a). During the protests, several demonstrators and officers of the law have lost their 

lives and many others were injured. The protests have also been associated with the 

removal and destruction of statues considered symbols of segregation. Nonetheless, this 

revolt has been contributing to create spaces of autonomy, social cohesion, and new 

collective identities; and to raise awareness for racial injustice, police misconduct and the 

bias in the criminal justice system. It is important to note that this unrest is occurring 

during the global COVID-19 pandemic, thereby facilitating and accelerating the spread 

of the virus.  

The purpose of this chapter is then to explore how the behaviour of the protesters 

during the George Floyd protests can illustrate the postmodern super-ego. This chapter is 

not intended to examine the full complexity of the protests, on the contrary, much of this 

phenomenon remains to be examined since it is being considered exclusively in so far as 

it illustrates the ideas posited in the previous chapter. The various elements, present or 

past, that could have contributed to these protests and to its globalisation, such as the 

long-simmering, systemic racial inequities, the deep-seated racial divide in treatment by 

police officers, transgenerational issues, the economic and political context and even the 

effect of the COVID-19 on the African American community, are not being taken into 

consideration. In other words, this chapter focuses exclusively on what can be seen within 

these protests regarding behaviours that implicate changes of the super-ego. 

 In short, there are f