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dc.contributor.authorSTONE, PETERen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-24T10:50:41Z
dc.date.available2012-01-24T10:50:41Z
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.date.submitted2010en
dc.identifier.citationPeter Stone, Three Arguments for Lotteries, Social Science Information, 49, 2, 2010, 147 - 163en
dc.identifier.otherYen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2262/61820
dc.descriptionPUBLISHEDen
dc.description.abstractPhilosophers and social scientists have offered a variety of arguments for making certain types of decisions by lot. This paper examines three such arguments. These arguments identify indeterminacy, fairness and incentive effects as the major reasons for using lotteries to make decisions. These arguments are central to Jon Elster?s study of lottery use, Solomonic judgments (1989), and so the paper focuses upon their treatment in this work. Upon closer examination, all three arguments have the same basic structure, in that they appeal to a single effect lotteries can have ? a sanitizing effect. Lotteries have this effect because they make possible decision-making that makes no use of reasons, whether good or bad. All arguments for or against decision-making by lot must ultimately appeal to this effect.en
dc.format.extent147en
dc.format.extent163en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSocial Science Informationen
dc.relation.ispartofseries49en
dc.relation.ispartofseries2en
dc.rightsYen
dc.subjectElsteren
dc.subjectFairnessen
dc.subjectIncentivesen
dc.subjectIndeterminacyen
dc.subjectLotteriesen
dc.titleThree Arguments for Lotteriesen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.type.supercollectionscholarly_publicationsen
dc.type.supercollectionrefereed_publicationsen
dc.identifier.peoplefinderurlhttp://people.tcd.ie/pstoneen
dc.identifier.rssinternalid77204en
dc.identifier.rssurihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018409359362en
dc.identifier.orcid_id0000-0001-8343-6843en


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