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dc.contributor.authorParlane, Sarah
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-17T14:40:26Z
dc.date.available2011-10-17T14:40:26Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.citationParlane, Sarah. 'Procurement contracts under limited liability'. - Economic & Social Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring, 2003, pp. 1?21, Dublin: Economic & Social Research Institute
dc.identifier.issn0012-9984
dc.identifier.otherJEL L14
dc.identifier.otherJEL L24
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2262/60164
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited liability enhances competition and thus the likelihood of bankruptcy. Among efficient auctions in which only the winner gets paid, the commonly used first price auction is shown to give the lowest probability of bankruptcy. Finally, it shows that the characterisation of a mechanism minimising the project?s cost results from trading-off bankruptcy costs with informational rents.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEconomic & Social Studies
dc.relation.ispartofVol.XX, No. XX, Issue, Year
dc.sourceEconomic & Social Reviewen
dc.subjectProcurementen
dc.subjectLimited liabilityen
dc.subjectContractorsen
dc.titleProcurement contracts under limited liability
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.publisher.placeDublinen


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