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Cosmopolitanism and Irish Foreign Policy: A Case Study Analysis

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Ph.D.

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November 1999

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SUMMARY

This thesis sets out to explore cosmopolitanism as a position within International Relations theory in the context of the activism of Irish Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) in Irish foreign policy. NGOs are posited as espousing a cosmopolitan activism in their attempts to influence Irish foreign policy makers.

The methodology adopted was primarily a case study approach allowing an intensive analysis of three foreign policy issues: East Timor, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment policy of the International Monetary Fund and the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, 1995. In addition, the thesis also features the results of a survey of the NGO landscape in Ireland. In all, a total of 61 NGOs were surveyed on organisational, strategic and normative dimensions to their work.

The thesis argues that Irish NGOs have the capacity to transform the Irish foreign policy environment through the successful articulation of cosmopolitan ideas. However, there are significant structural constraints, arising from the both the domestic and the international environment, which limit the possibilities of cosmopolitan foreign policies. At a multilateral level these constraints arise from the requirements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the structure of diplomacy attendant with UN multilateral conferences.

The thesis is divided into four parts. Part one locates the thesis in the current theoretical debate within International Relations literature on cosmopolitanism. Part two sets the context for the study. Chapter's two and three set the scene trace the evolution of Irish foreign policy in terms of both substance and structures. Chapter three details the results of the survey. Part Three contains the case studies. Chapter four details the development of Irish policy on East Timor. Chapter five traces the evolution of state policy on the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. Chapter six examines the involvement of the Irish women's movement, through NGOs, in the states preparation for and participation in the Beijing conference on women. Part Four, containing the final chapter, concludes the thesis.

COSMOPOLITANISM AND IRISH FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

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Chapter One.

Theory and Practice: Cosmopolitanism and NGO Activism.

Introduction

In recent years, leaders of several large states have espoused an ambition of integrating ethics into the core values of their foreign policy. NATO has gone to war with a European state for "humanitarian reasons". The European Union (EU) has begun to talk about human rights when pondering the architecture of its common foreign and security policy.

At the non-state level, we have seen a proliferation of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), of all shapes and sizes, calling political leaders and political institutions to account for their failures in regard to the humanitarian and human rights dimensions of their policies. These NGOs, whether working on behalf of refugees, political prisoners, women in the developing world, indigenous peoples or religious minorities or against increased militarisation, the arms trade or deforestation, share a common language. They tend to advocate broadly similar goals. A common thread among these diverse groups is their use of the discourse of human rights and the responsibilities that arise from common humanity. In this discourse the spectre of globalisation looms large. Globalisation links the once disparate spheres of domestic and international polities in a manner that requires new solutions to problems of the global commons and links issues of economic, military, civil, social and environmental security into an interconnected web.

Yet, political leaders and existing intergovernmental institutions are still largely bound by their roles as representatives of and collectivities of sovereign states. Tensions between a state-bound ontology and tendencies of globalisation are reflected in the discipline of International Relations (IR) where considerable ink is spilt on constructing new ways of describing a world in which, despite its obstinacy, a traditional form of citizenship is no longer sufficient to describe the responsibilities, duties and bonds between people. Where the notion of a world structured around discreet nations of citizens, bound to each other in a self-referring political, moral and ethical

community of co-nationals, was once unproblematic as a foundation of IR theory, it can no longer be taken for granted.

An exciting departure within IR is the coming together of a theoretical position that matches the often awkwardly articulated cosmopolitanism of much NGO activism. Drawing on classical and modern traditions in western political thought, reworking them to account for both the impact of postmodernism's contributions in the discipline and the reality of contemporary international politics, theorists of cosmopolitanism have provided, *inter alia*, an entirely new way of looking at the ethics of international relations. They have also, in the context of this thesis, sketched new ways of looking at how civil society activists (i.e. ordinary citizens) can contribute to new and often powerfully compelling discourses on the importance of an ethical dimension in how foreign policy and international relations are conducted.

But to date little empirical research has been done linking the theoretical position with the empirical reality of cosmopolitan activism and how such activism might engage with and effect change in the foreign policy process. A considerable literature is available within IR on the role of NGOs in issues of global governance or of managing the global commons.[1] This literature tends to focus on transnational or international organisations and does not consciously make links between cosmopolitanism as a theoretical position within IR and NGO activism. These two gaps in the literature provide the raison d'être for this thesis in that it focuses on national (and indeed local) NGO activism in the broader theoretical context of cosmopolitanism as a position within IR.

The work of one of the principle exponent of cosmopolitanism, Andrew Linklater, has been criticised for its 'impossible' abstraction and its failure to deal with 'concrete structures and institutions of political power'.[2] In providing concrete case studies and tracing the role of NGO activism through actual structures and institutions of political power, the thesis provides an empirical enquiry into the philosophical and empirical plausibility of

---

[1] See Weiss, Thomas G. and Gordenker, Leon, (Eds.) 1996. *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance*, Rienner, Boulder and London and Willetts, Peter, (Ed.). 1996. *The Conscience of the World: The Influence of NGOs in the UN System*, Hurst, London.

[2] Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 1999. "Really Existing Communities" *in Review of International Studies* , no. 25: 142,

cosmopolitanism. It will look at how, and if, NGOs can transform existing paradigms of political community to help create a "post-sovereign international community" based on common humanity.[3]

At the heart of the thesis is a puzzle with theoretical and practical dimensions that directly concerns the impact of NGOs. Do their activities merely broaden, and perhaps reinvigorate, the current system or do they transform it into something new? In other words can their demand for a cosmopolitan order be accommodated by states and the international system without any concomitant paradigmatic shift? It is a puzzle that greatly exercises political theorists but also challenges the work of NGOs. While many NGOs have little time (or resources) to step aside and analyse the long term impact of their work they do struggle with the question of whether they have made a "difference".

For the purposes of this research, two overall positions have been distilled from the relevant IR debate. They are:

1. That something called cosmopolitanism exists as a coherent position and practice in international relations. Cosmopolitanism argues that 'all human beings should be treated equally, is if they already belonged to a moral and political community which embraced the whole human race'.[4]

2. That NGOs, albeit nationally based and operating in and around the inter-state system, can push states down the road to a cosmopolitan world order. They can act as 'outriders' for cosmopolitanism and go beyond extending the pluralism of the existing system.

It is the second position - built as it is on the sustainability of the first assumption - that is at the centre of this research. The coherence of cosmopolitanism as a theoretical and/or political position is not something that can be proved or disproved. It is a philosophical and ethical position

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[3] See Linklater, Andrew, 1998. *The Transformation of Political Community*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

[4] Linklater, *op cit.*: 49.

which is, of course, subject to interrogation. It requires closer examination but it cannot be 'falsified'.[5]

Within IR, the puzzle of this thesis is symbolised by the opposing position in contemporary debates taken by critical theorist Andrew Linklater and postmodernist RBJ Walker. The framework of the ongoing debate between these two contributors sets the parameters of the enquiry within this thesis and will be developed below. For the moment, however, our puzzle centres on asking if Linklater is right in arguing for the transformative potential of cosmopolitanism or if Walker is right in arguing for its (cosmopolitanism's) inability to posit an ethical position that can endure outside the pluralist base of the existing order.[6]

The potential role allocated in this thesis to NGOs is not one specified by Linklater. It is offered here as a mean of exploring the viability of cosmopolitanism. Linklater emphasises the politics of what he calls 'cosmopolitan citizenship' based on a moral responsibility to the whole of humanity. Cosmopolitan citizenship is an important moral resource against wrongful exclusion and contains the transformative potential of political community to create social relations that are a) more universalistic, b) more sensitive to cultural difference and c) less unequal.[7] Cosmopolitan citizenship is not reducible to NGO activism but, it is suggested here, NGO activism is a critical element of cosmopolitan citizenship. The kinds of ideas and politics espoused by the NGOs investigated here are cosmopolitan. They argue that the concern of Irish foreign policy should be widened to include the interests of, say, women in Sub-Saharan Africa, poor farmers in Mozambique and the people of East Timor. NGO activism thus is understood here as an example of the kinds of modern citizenship with which Linklater is concerned.

Developing the empirical linkage of this thesis further, the foreign policy landscape that has been chosen to explore the connections is that of the Irish state. The choice of Ireland is not entirely derived from the need to embark on research that is practicable. There are historical, political and institutional

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[5] Or, in terms of paradigmatic debate, cosmopolitanism and other such IR approaches cannot be "closed" or "concluded" because their proponents "see the world in different ways and from different perspectives". See Brown, Chris, 1992. *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, and Singapore: 235-236.

[6] Walker, RBJ, 1994. "Social Movements/World Politics" in *Millennium*, vol. 23, no. 3: 669-700.

[7] Linklater, *op cit.*: 6-7.

reasons why Ireland can provide a starting point for the kind of exploration carried out in the thesis. As a small, post colonial state, Ireland emerged onto the world stage almost three hundred years after the nation-state system of western Europe had been carved out with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. It developed a role for itself as a defender of the colonised and the underdeveloped and as a champion of collective security and international organisations such as the League of Nations. It did not bring weighty baggage of strategic, economic or military interests along with its participation in multilateral politics. The details of these affinities and characteristics are developed in chapters two and three to follow. However, what they point to, overall, is that if any state might be so inclined, Ireland holds out the possibility for the incorporation of cosmopolitan ideas into its foreign policy. The case for openness to cosmopolitanism is furthered by some domestic factors. Ireland's polity is small and its political culture is characterised by both clientelism and, more recently, partnership (between the state, the private sector and the community and voluntary sector) in the day to day politics of governance. Hence, it can be expected that NGO activists seeking to influence the policy makers are, at least, operating in a political culture where the intervention by citizens and other non-state actors is not repudiated. In sum, Ireland holds out the promise of being something of a 'soft option' for cosmopolitan activism. It is of interest because of its particularity but it is these particularities that allow an intensive exploration of the potential of cosmopolitan activism.

The thesis is divided into four parts. In part one, consisting of this chapter, the theoretical debates framing the thesis is set out. Part two of the thesis (chapters two-four) sets out the contextual landscape for the enquiry. Chapter two explores the policy issues that have dominated Irish foreign policy with particular reference to Ireland's involvement in international politics through multilateralism. In addition to setting the scene in a general way, this chapter explores the extent of 'statism' as a feature of Irish foreign policy. We need to know to what degree Ireland has, historically or contemporarily, resisted cosmopolitan ideas in favour of exclusively self-serving interests. Chapter three (chapters five-seven) then goes on to explore the specific institutions and structures within which Irish foreign policy is formed. Again, the concern here is with constraints and opportunities, not only in relation to the state, but also in relation to NGOs - the organisations whose activities provide the link throughout each of the chapters. Chapter four allows us turn specifically to

the NGO universe in Ireland and the details of a survey of 61 Irish NGOs will be presented.

Part three provides the main empirical contribution to the debate: the case studies. Each of the three presented here was selected according to two primary criteria: the level at which policy was articulated and the nature of the NGO involved. The concern here was to ensure that different levels of policy arena, types of NGOs and state actors were represented. This methodology ensures that the same issue can be viewed from divergent angles resulting in a more complete final picture.

Cosmopolitan activism will invariably confront constraints be they of a mundane kind (lack of personnel or funds on the part of NGOs) or of an institutional kind whether at a national or international level. It is to be expected, for instance, that ideological resistance to the notion of a cosmopolitan ethic will be found within a diplomatic political system founded on the nation-state as the primary ethical community. In an international praxis based on competing national interests (even if attenuated by integration such as in the EU) resistance to a diminution of those interests for the sake of human rights of non-nationals might be strong. Cosmopolitan activists might also find aspects of the existing system that enhance and validate their work. Obligations on states arising from international conventions and agreements might provide a legal and political rationale for arguing cosmopolitanism's case. The UN itself after all is rooted in a notion of a common, global humanity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights held out the promise of sets of rights available to all people at all times where rights exist then obligations and duties also exist. It is also to be expected that the economies of scale arising out of collective action might enhance the potential of cosmopolitan ideas to find application.

By selecting case studies that were worked out in different policy arenas (national and intergovernmental) we will evince a comprehensive overview of how the overall system responds to such activism. By selecting different kinds of NGOs (selected according to categories devised from their policy goal and their institutional make up), we can get a sense of how cosmopolitan activism is spread across the proliferating landscape of Irish NGOs. We can expect that different constraints will apply at different levels of policy and that different kinds of groups might bring different resources and mechanisms into the policy arena. A third factor was used in the selection of

case studies. Once the differences referred to above were accounted for, it was important that the case studies had significant currency within the political arena for a considerable time. They were not, for instance, once-off campaigns, run with a burst of activity for a short period in response to particular event. They were selected, however, without reference to the outcome.

The fourth and final section of the thesis contains the conclusion which will draw together the threads of the chapters to make some final remarks about the activism of Irish NGOs in the foreign policy arena.

Considerable theoretical and analytical ground needs to be covered first. The function of the remainder of this chapter is to identify the central tenets and critiques of cosmopolitanism. Section one establishes the identity of the groups with which the thesis is concerned. Section two briefly presents elements of the theoretical context from which cosmopolitanism emerged with an emphasis on the role allocated within theory to NGOs. Section three presents cosmopolitanism itself, its ethical base and its institutional requirements and both theoretical and empirical critiques. Section four examines the nature of the relationship between NGOs and cosmopolitanixs activism. Section five draws conclusions and sets the stage for the chapters to follow.

The Who of NGOs

It is important to clarify at the outset the type and nature of the groups examined in this research. They are Irish-based voluntary associations that are involved in policy advocacy in the sphere of Irish foreign policy on a range of issues or a single issue excluding development agencies or relief organisations.

Within the UN the nomenclature of NGO is used to describe a group involved in a range of activities in human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, environmental protection and so on.[8] In other words it is understood as exclusively applying to non-sectoral organisations. This is also the case in Ireland where the term connotes non self-interested activism. The government's White Paper on Foreign Policy uses the term NGO widely but

[8] Article 71 of the UN Charter institutionalises this term.

qualifies two subgroups: "human rights NGOs" and "humanitarian NGOs", the latter referring to development/aid agencies.[9]

The term NGO, however, is not without its difficulties. It can cover a multitude of groups; formally speaking any organisation that is not part of the structures of governance. Large membership trade unions, private business corporations, church organisations, and, as is often pointed out, international crime syndicates are all NGOs. The groups featured in these chapters are, theologically speaking, on the side of the angels: human rights groups, solidarity organisations, organisations involved in women's rights and issues of development. They are - in the traditional language of political enquiry - "cause groups"; usually posited on the other side of the spectrum from sectoral or interest groups which exclusively represent the sectoral or professional interests of their members.

The terms "philanthropic groups" has been used to describe groups whose members are not the intended beneficiaries of activities.[10] The charitable overtone of this term appears inappropriate given the highly political work evident in the case studies to follow. The term "private voluntary organisations" can be rejected on similar grounds.[11] "Northern Voluntary Organisations" (NVOs) has been proffered[12] but can be used only for organisations located in the North. i.e. the industrialised world. The term "solidarity groups"[13] might also be suggested: groups motivated by solidarity with peoples from the developing world. As the NWCI, featured in chapter seven, is not such an organisation, this term is too narrow.[14] Similarly, the term "human rights groups" is too restrictive although human rights concerns inform the groups featured. The term "transnational organisations" is useful because of its emphasis on the transnational nature of foreign policy activities

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[9] Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996. *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: White Paper on Foreign Policy,* Stationary Office, Dublin: 223, 230.

[10] Gamson, William, 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest,* Dorsey Press, Illinois: 61.

[11] Willetts, Peter, (Ed.), 1996. *Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-governmental Organisations,* Pinter, London: 2.

[12] See Baranyi, Stephen, *et al,* 1997. *Making Solidarity Effective: Northern Voluntary Organisations, Policy Advocacy and the Promotion of Peace in Angola and East Timor,* CIIR, London.

[13] This is the term used predominantly in Ireland for single issue and human rights groups involved in development education and foreign policy lobbying.

[14] The NWCI (formerly the Council for the Status of Women) is, correctly speaking, a Quasi Autonomous Non Governmental Organisation. It is funded largely by, but is autonomous from, government.

but can be misleading because of its association with transnational corporations.[15] It also precludes groups that do not engage beyond the national terrain.

Thus, while the term NGO may appear unduly broad, it provides the best overarching word to describe the groups in this research. It is fluid enough to cover a range of groups of differential organisation structures and working practices. It does not imply a state-bound actor such as is implied in the terms 'interest group' and 'lobby group': both used predominantly in political science enquiry. Chapter four presents a detailed anatomy of the groups that inhabit the Irish NGO universe within which the three NGOs of our case study are located. However, our NGO interest in this chapter relates to their relationship to cosmopolitanism. It is to this theme that I now turn.

Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory

The purpose of this section is not to present a comprehensive overview of IR theory but rather to present the theoretical traditions against whose background cosmopolitanism has emerged and to examine the role allocated to non-state actors therein.

If the insight of one commentator is correct that, within the discipline of IR, NGOs and other sub-national organisations have been graced with the status of "mosquitoes on the evening breeze",[16] then the task of this section is rendered rather simple. It can be presumed that the metaphor serves to draw attention to the perceived futility of and irritation towards those organisations. Mosquitoes may be ever present, even have a function in the greater eco-system, but can be ignored or repelled.

Is this a valid analysis of how IR treats NGOs? To answer this I will begin with the conventional paradigmatic framework of realism, liberalism and structuralism[17] and examine how each in turn views the "irritants" in the body politic. The inadequacy of this approach must, however, be

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[15] Willetts, *op cit.*: 3.

[16] Walker, *op cit.*: 669-700.

[17] To avoid confusion the categories of realism (to incorporate neo-realism), liberalism (sometimes known as interdependency or idealism) and structuralism (sometimes knows as world systems theory and/or marxism) will be used.

acknowledged.[18] Each paradigm, in fact, exists in a relationship with the other. For instance, commonality exists between realism and liberalism.[19] Further, it must be acknowledged that the theories are a constitutive part of the practice. Realism's positing of international relations and non-state actors as incompatible illustrates that theory's failure to explore arrangements beyond those prescribed in a state-centric world view.[20] However I will use the paradigmatic approach as a heuristic device because it allows us to draw rough boundaries[21] within this discipline. Beginning with the three paradigms creates an entry into the literature of international relations.

Realism

Of the three paradigms realism is the most state-bound. It posits that an analysis of the state is both necessary and sufficient to explain international relations. It views international relations as an anarchical world in which states compete to maximise their national interest.[22] Order is rendered through the threat of physical force which is fungible to military might.[23] Competing powers maintain a balance in the system. The proper focus of international relations is war and the conditions of peace/security/order and the main units of analysis are the (diplomatic-military behaviours of) states.[24]

Inevitably, realist thought has had to adapt to both theoretical and empirical challenges and there is a very real debate between traditional realism and its

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[18] For a critique of the disciplinary categorisations, see Smith, Steve, 1995. "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory" in Booth, Ken and Smith, Steve, (Eds.). *International Relations Theory Today*, Polity Press Cambridge.: 1-37. Smith holds that the paradigm approach usefully introduces the theories.

[19] See Wheeler, Nicholas J, 1992. "Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention", *Millennium*, vol. 21, no. 3: 463-488. For a critique of paradigmatic boundaries see Griffiths, Martin, 1992. *Realism, Idealism and International Politics: a Reinterpretation*, Routledge, London and New York.

[20] This is not to say that neo-realism has not accommodated the challenges. See Waltz, Kenneth, 1986. "Political Structures" in Keohane Robert O, (Ed.). *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York and Guilford: 87-89.

[21] Griffiths, *op cit.*: 3.

[22] The related concepts of a unitary 'nation-state' and a unitary 'national interest' are amongst those which have been subject to the greatest amount of critical deconstruction. See for instance, Linklater, Andrew, 1990(a). "The Problem of Community in International Relations" in *Alternatives*, Vol. XV,: 135-153.

[23] See Stoessinger, John, 1991. "The Anatomy of the Nation-State and the Nature of Power" in Little, Richard and Smith, Michael, (Eds.). *Perspectives on World Politics*, Routledge: 23-35.

[24] Holsti, KJ, quoted in Griffiths, *op cit.*: 9.

offspring, neo-realism.[25] Notwithstanding that debate and the more nuanced perspective of the offspring, the paradigm is amenable to brief summation. Rosenberg has neatly caught the essentials of realism in his argument that it suggests that:

> "1. International politics is to be understood predominantly as the realm of interaction between sovereign authorities - a realm which is separate from that of domestic politics.
> 2. The distinctive character of this realm is given by the condition of 'anarchy' - meaning that the competitive pursuit of divergent 'national interests' takes place in the absence of regulation by a superordinate authority.
> 3. The result is a set of compulsions generic to relations between states which works, through the complex operation of the balance of power, to determine how states behave internationally. To understand the balance of power is therefore to explain international politics".[26]

From this necessarily brief exposition of realism we can extract three relevant themes. Firstly, and quite starkly, realism's domestic/foreign divide precludes positing a role for sub-national organisations within international relations. Secondly, the pre-eminence of both states and the principle of national sovereignty furthermore preclude transnational organisations, be they human rights groups or professional interest groups, from playing a significant role in international relations. Thirdly, continued articulation of the state-of- anarchy thesis renders inconceivable the notion of a civil society beyond the state; the co-ordination and regulation of ideas and actions that occurs among non governmental organisations, for one, at a transnational level. In its state-centric world view, realism offers little conceptual scope to trace the role of civil society actors. The concerns articulated by the NGOs under examination here, furthermore, put them outside the reach of a realist framework which argues, forcefully, that morality has no role in international relations save in the national interest.[27]

Liberalism

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[25] See Keohane, *op cit.: passim.*

[26] Rosenberg, Justin, 1994. *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, Verso, London: 9-10.

[27] For a defence of realism against criticisms of its amorality see Gilpin, Robert, 1986. "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" in Keohane, *op cit.*: 319-321.

Liberalism's roots are found in three related sets of ideas. From the Enlightenment came ideas about progress, rationality, and non-inevitability of war or inter-state conflict. From League of Nations idealism came the idea of collective security. From the post World War two period came the commitment to inter-state co-operation though intergovernmental organisations.[28] Where realism posits an anarchical world, liberalism posits a world in which conflict and co-operation co-exist and where, in fact, peace is the normal state of affairs.[29] Where realism posits state-centrism, liberalism proposes international society based on common interests and rules (about diplomacy, the conduct of war, respect for agreements, *etc.*) and sets of institutions that govern the space between states.[30]

Crucial to liberalism is the notion of regimes defined here as principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a particular issue-area.[31] Regimes govern and maintain order in international relations. There are regimes, for instance, concerning trade, environmental management, human rights, the implementation of international law and so on. Regimes allow co-operation between states thus diminishing the impulse towards state-centrism. Interdependence replaces competition. Hand in hand with liberalism's international relations goes a belief in the universality of western democratic institutions and norms and of free trade. In the words of one commentator, for liberals, 'peace and profit are coterminous'.[32]

What role does liberalism allocate to NGO and other civil society actors in international relations? Unlike realism, liberalism does not preclude a role for NGOs. In the domestic realm, they are a component of civil society whose ligitimisation of states is functional to their (state's) legitimacy in international politics. They form part of the mix of democratic institutions and practices that make up the western liberal tradition within which liberal

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[28] For this approach and for a basic analysis of the nuances of liberal thinking see Dunne, Timothy, 1997. "Liberalism" in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, (Eds.). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford university Press, Oxford: 147-154.

[29] Burchill, Scott, 1996. "Liberal Internationalism" in Burchill, Scott, *et al*, (Eds.). *Theories of International Relations*, Macmillan, Basingstoke: 31.

[30] Bull, Hedley, 1995. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Macmillan, Basingstoke: 63.

[31] Krasner, Stephen, 1983. *International Regimes*, Cornell UP, Ithaca and London: 1.

[32] Burchill, *op cit.: 38*.

internationalism is rooted.[33] Turning to the inter-state system, the practice of liberalism has been, increasingly, to allocate a role for NGOs in the policy process. This is nowhere clearer than in the incorporation of NGOs into the UN system and its many regimes.[34] As we will see in the chapters to follow, NGOs deliver services, offer advise and analysis and lobby. The extent of their legitimacy as actors, the level of their inclusion and the impact of their activism is not for debate here. All we need to note is that civil society actors such as NGOs are part of the mix of liberal internationalism.

This formulation goes straight to the heart of the theoretical formulation within this thesis. How does liberalism differ from cosmopolitanism in its articulation of civil society activism? Liberalism, after all, is built on a belief in the endowment of all human beings - by virtue of their humanity - with 'certain fundamental and inalienable rights, benefits and protections'.[35] It posits international law and sets out rules for intervention by the international community in the affairs of another state The pluralism of the interstate system can expand and adapt to the demands of NGO activists towards the broader problem of 'global governance'.[36]

Given the centrality of the questions that liberalism begs, we can only, at this point, note some general remarks and move on. The theoretical link between liberalism and cosmopolitanism is significant. Linklater has, after all, returned to Kant's categorical imperative as a founding stone of cosmopolitanism. But he has also returned to the emancipatory elements of marxism and acknowledged postmodernist, feminist and other critiques of liberalism to construct a position in which ethics are prior to and not contingent on the inter-state system. Liberalism may not preclude the emergence of cosmopolitan ideas (universal human rights for instance) but it does not posit their necessity.[37] Universalism is part of the language of liberalism. But as an ethical system it allows a state to prioritise its citizen's claims over the claims of humanity.

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[33] *Ibid.*: 28-38.

[34] Article 71 of the UN Charter empowers the Economic and Social Council to consult with NGOs where they are concerned with matters within its competence.

[35] Burchill, *op cit.*: 38.

[36] Gordenker, Leon and Weiss, Thomas G, 1996. "Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions" in Weiss and Gordenker, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 17-47.

[37] See Brown, Chris, 1995. "International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community" in Booth and Smith, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 93.

It is within this nexus that we locate the key differential between cosmopolitanism and liberalism in relation to the role of NGOs. They can be accommodated by liberalism. However, within a cosmopolitan order, they are empowered with the emancipatory potential to transform the interstate system into an order where humanity makes the prior claim on action. In this regard then NGOs not only become significant actors in their own right, as Gordenker and Weiss have proposed,[38] but, potentially, outriders of a much more radical world polity.

Structuralism

However constructed, structuralist theories of international relations have one common root: a marxist critique of global capitalism and its relationship with world politics. Thus although divergent voices exist, we can draw a line from Marx's critique of capitalism to Lenin's critique of imperialism, to the work of Wallerstein[39] and Frank.[40] The latter represent, respectively, two dominant contemporary approaches; World Systems Theory (WST) and the Dependency School. Dominating in the global capitalist system is the transnational corporation (TNC) supported, in its position, by other institutions some of which are intergovernmental, such as the World Bank, the IMF and NATO. The interests of the TNC and individual states may not, however, always coincide.[41]

Notwithstanding the dangers of crude simplification, we can draw out structuralism's central themes. They are that;
1. International relations are played out in the spatially constructed system of global capitalism laid down during 16th and 17th century European colonialism.
2. That system is driven by the accumulative needs of capital at the 'core' (the capitalist heartlands) and worked out in the peripheries.
3. The interstate system and global capitalism are not coincidental - they grew and consolidated their positions coterminously.

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[38] Gordenker and Weiss, *op cit.*: 33.

[39] See Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1989. *The Modern World System*, Academic Press, San Diego and London.

[40] See André Gundar Frank, 1979. *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

[41] Sunkel, Osvaldo and Fuenzalida, Edmundo, 1991. "Transnationalism and its National Consequences" in Little, Richard and Smith, Michael, (Eds.). *Perspectives in World Politics*, Routledge, London and New York: 325-332.

4. The function of the interstate system is to uphold and enforce property rights and to reduce contradictions that arise within the system.
5. Economic liberalism has reached a hegemonic position globally as reflected in the globalisation process of recent decades, increased international trade and the global labour market.
6. International relations are explained by the economic interests of capital as represented directly or indirectly by states.[42]

Marxism has been proposed as a cosmopolitan theory. Albeit eurocentric, socialist internationalism supposed a cosmopolitan emancipatory power in class politics.[43] Some inherent blindnesses within marxist thought such as to the force of nationalism,[44] to the capacity of the inter-state system to extend many of the values of cosmopolitanism[45] and its faith in the superiority of western civilisation,[46] render its classical formulation, at least, somewhat tattered. As we have seen, Linklater, for one, has adapted elements of its cannon into a vision of the good life accounting for the above critiques

But what about the contribution of NGOs? If marxism holds out the capacity for transformation and is based on a universalist ethic why, then, the need for its (partial) reformulation in cosmopolitanism? As we have seen briefly above, flaws within marxism's epistemology render it vulnerable to the critiques of post modernism and feminism for instance. However, more importantly for our purposes here, in elevating class above all other concerns, these flaws also diminish, if not negate, the role of concerns expressed by NGOs. Notwithstanding marxism's many nuances,[47] a contingent theme is the secondary or ancillary role played by the state and all other actors to global capitalism. Its critical framework rests, therefore, on a dynamic of class/capital conflict. Its prescription is built on the primacy of class politics. Such a dynamic is too limiting for the politics and perspectives of the NGOs concerned but that does not assume that they reject an anti-capitalist stance.

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[42] For an overview of structural theories see Hobden, Steve and Wyn Jones, Richard, 1997, "World-System Theory" in Baylis and Smith (Eds.), *op cit.*: 125-145.

[43] On marxist internationalism see Colás, Alejandro, 1994. "Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice: The Case of Socialist Internationalism" in *Millennium*, vol. 23, no. 3: 513-534.

[44] See Linklater, Andrew, 1990(b). *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, for a critique of marxism's failures.

[45] Colás, *op cit.*: 533

[46] Linklater, Andrew, 1996(b). "Marxism" in Burchill, Scott *et al* (Eds.). *Theories of International Relations*, St Martin's Press, New York: 140.

[47] Block, Fred, 1991. "Marxist Theories of the State in World System Analysis" in Little and Smith, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 395-403.

Cosmopolitanism as a Contribution to IR Theory

While adherents of cosmopolitanism by no means form a united church, they do share one common precept. That is they prescribes an order which transcends the conventional arena of the 'community' of a nation-state to posit an order that is prior to the social construct of 'nationhood' and its deductive adjunct 'citizenship'. Cosmopolitanism seeks to delink citizenship from its attachment to particular nations and to relink it to something more transcendent. However, cosmopolitanism does not posit a breaking up of the nation-state structure, or the creation of a single citizenship under a single global jurisdiction, (i.e. a world government).

For Linklater the question at the heart of cosmopolitanism is one that has preoccupied political philosophy since its inception; that of the man versus citizen dichotomy.[48] More particularly it involves the question of establishing criteria for conferring primacy to one of three competing visions of community - the nation-state, the society of states or a community of mankind.[49] Our common humanity, not any communitarian principle based on nationhood, ethnicity, gender, religion or any other ontology, provides our moral obligation to each other. The elemental nature of Linklater's proposition in this regard is such that Brown suggests it provides a first order categorisation system for international relations theory. All theories are either cosmopolitan or communitarian. The latter attach the primary value to a system of states (the inter-state system) or to a particularistic community (such as a nation).[50]

A cosmopolitan critique of international relations traces the relationship between political community and nation and concomitant boundaries drawn between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' to the collapse of Europe's mediaeval order and the rise of the nation-state system after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The new system of states confirmed that sovereignty should be ascribed not just to the sovereign but to the particularity of the territorial holdings.[51] This

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[48] While my own preference is for non-sexist language, I recognise that the word 'man' was considered, unthinkingly, a representative term.

[49] Linklater, 1990(a). *Op cit.*: 136.

[50] Brown, *op cit.*: 12.

[51] Hansman, Matthew and Marshall, Andrew, 1994. After *the Nation State: Citizens, Tribalism and the new World Order*, Harper Collins, London: 5.

established the discrete obligation of the ruler to those committed to his charge who, in turn, owed him personal loyalty and obedience and were denied the right to deal separately with external powers.[52] During the 19th century the concept of citizenship became clearly defined and firmly allied to the concept of territorial states. This was the century of nationalism. States were made up of single nations of citizens, united internally by a common history, language and, frequently a common ethnic and religious identification. Populations enclosed within these units developed a primary loyalty to the state and to each other.[53] This particularly forceful combination of territorial sovereignty and unifying citizenship of a defined political sovereign laid the foundations upon which modern international relations and the modern inter-state system were built.

The historic nature of cosmopolitan ideas got 'sidelined' in the post-Westphalia world order.[54] Cosmopolitans argue that particular late 20th century trends have facilitated its re-emergence. Amongst these are; globalisation,[55] the pacification of core areas in the West in particular and the rise there of forms of co-operation which do not rest on assumptions of anarchy and war, and, finally, the rise of ethnicity as a tendency which competes with the totalising effect of 'nationhood'.[56] Ekins argues that problems facing the world today (such as human rights abuses, militarism, environmental depredations) are not exclusively of the 20th century. But the manner in which groups have formed to solve them are.[57] For many of these groups, a new normative approach is needed - one which recognises as mutable, the boundaries of statehood and citizenship. That said, there is no

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52 Watson, Adam, 1992. *The Evolution of International Society*, Routledge, London: 187-93.

53 *Ibid.*: 193.

54 The notion of sidelining is encapsulated in the title of Smith, Steve, 1992. "The Forty Years Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations" in *Millennium*, vol. 21, no. 3: 489-506.

55 The particular form of late 20th century globalisation creates the primary demand for change. It has virtually annihilated territorial boundaries as barriers to socio-economic relations. See Held, David, 1995 in Held, David and Archibuggi Daniele. (Eds.). *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*, Polity, Cambridge: 101. See also Linklater, 1998, *op cit.*: 27-34. On globalisation see Lipschutz, Ronnie D, 1992. Reconstructing World Politics: the emergence of Global Civil Society" in *Millennium*, vol. 21, no. 3: 389-420, argues that globalisation and the leakage of sovereignty through EU and NAFTA regional integration are among the factors that pull in favour of a nascent cosmopolitanism.

56 Linklater, 1998, *op cit.: passim.*

57 Ekins, Paul, 1992. *A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Social Change*, Routledge, London.

agreement that ethnicity as a form of communalism will cede to cosmopolitanism.[58]

In its reformulation á la Linklater, cosmopolitanism builds on the contributions of critical theory (including feminist theory) to IR and, in particular, constructs an order from among the residues of normative theory left in the wake of postmodernism's critique.[59] Cosmopolitanism and feminist theories of international relations share much. Sylvester's notion of 'empathetic co-operation'[60] as an IR methodology provides a useful tool with which to break from the state-centrism of existing theories. For Linklater, it provides the 'starting point'[61] for the discourse ethics required for the construction of thin cosmopolitanism's ethical universalism.[62]The ontological concerns of feminist writers, in refocusing the enquiry on those who have been excluded[63] and in reworking key IR concepts such as 'security' and 'peace'[64] from a feminist perspective, offer a more inclusive and emancipatory approach. Feminist contributions, while not cosmopolitan in their entirety,[65] are contingent on the creation of 'global responsibility'.[66] Cosmopolitanism's focus on agency as much as on structure or process,[67] like the orientation furnished by feminism, raises challenging questions for international relations.

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58 Halliday argues that nationalism is one of the two most significant normative challengers to IR (the other is the question of intervention). Halliday, Fred, 1994. *Rethinking International Relations,* Macmillan, Basingstoke. Camilleri and Falk also argue quite forcefully that the impact of globalisation can render nationalism and ethnic communalism attractive foci for political organisation. See Camilleri, Joseph and Falk, Jim. 1993. *The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World,* Edward Elgar, Aldershot: 203-205. See also Brown, Chris, 1995. *Op cit.*: 96-98.

59 See Brown, 1992, *op cit.*: section 111, for the influence of post modernism and critical theory, and, Linklater, 1998, *op cit.: passim* for the influence of both these and feminism.

60 Sylvester, Christine, 1994. 'Empathetic Co-operation: A Feminist Method for International Relations' in *Millennium,* vol. 23, no 2: 315-34.

61 Linklater, 1998, *op cit.*: 95.

62 *Ibid.*: 4

63 See, for instance, Enloe, Cynthia 1993. *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War,* University of California Press, Berkeley and London.

64 See Tickner, J Ann, 1992. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security,* Columbia UP, New York.

65 See Zalewski, Marysia, 1994. "The Woman/Women Question in International Relations" in *Millennium,* vol. 23, no. 2: 407-423.

66 Shaw, Martin, 1994. *Global Society and International Relations,* Polity Press, Cambridge: 132.

67 Hill, Christopher, 1999. "What is Left of the Domestic? A Reverse Angle View of Foreign Policy" in Ebata, Michi and Neufeld, Beverly, (Eds.). *Confronting the Political in International Relations,* Macmillan; forthcoming.

There are two distinct approaches to cosmopolitanism. On one hand there is the approach represented by Linklater and, on the other, the approach represented by Held and Archibuggi. The distinction between them is ultimately a question of focus. The focus of the latter two contributors is on the institutions of cosmopolitanism, Linklater's is on ethics. Although they inform each other and the distinction may appear somewhat forced, I will deal with each separately here. By presenting the institutionally-centered approach of Archibuggi and Held we can get a sense of how an applied cosmopolitanism might look.

Cosmopolitanism as an ethical system

The ethical base of cosmopolitanism has been crystallised as follows:

> "1. Individuals are members of a single moral community by virtue of their humanity;
> 2. They therefore have moral obligations towards other human beings which transcend particular boundaries of ethnicity, creed or nationality;
> 3. These obligations require political activity to be carried out across these boundaries and imply the upholding of certain universal categories (e.g. universal human rights, common needs and values)."[68]

However, in his most recent contribution Linklater has coined the terms 'thin cosmopolitanism' and 'thick cosmopolitanism' as a means of distinguishing quite distinct tendencies derived from this apparently simple ethic.[69] Both share a common aspiration to create a sense of global responsibility and to detach citizenship from the bounded construction of statehood. But they part company in attempting to 'model' the cosmopolitan citizenship, or the desired cosmopolitan order. The thicker the order prescribed the more assumptions are made about the good life. A thin cosmopolitanism, in contrast, requires that the question of priorities must always be negotiated.[70] Thin cosmopolitanism rejects the possibility of 'an Archimidean viewpoint from which some universalisable conception of the good life can be identified. It posits instead 'dialogue communities', which may require engaging with the

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[68] Colas, *op cit.*: 513-514.

[69] Linklater, 1998, *op cit.*:

[70] Linklater, Andrew, 1999. "Transforming Political Community: a Response to the Critics" in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25: 169.

radically different in working towards the good life.[71] Classical marxism conforms to a 'thick' cosmopolitanism[72] as did mediaeval christianity.[73] A kantian international relations, based on the categorical imperative is cosmopolitan.[74] But it conforms to a thick version in that it universalised from enlightenment ideas about rationality and citizenship.

The issue of negotiating priorities is perhaps the trip wire between cosmopolitanism and the universalism of liberalism. For Linklater, the important step is to find and articulate new forms of political responsibility above and below national governments and reconfigure citizenship in the process. Rather than concentrating new forms of power in the hands of new supranational authorities, cosmopolitanism seeks to dispatch 'state responsibilities to various sites of power and to encourage further diversification of human loyalties'.[75] Such a step ensures that no particular loyalty or institution automatically takes precedence in any particular issue. Rather each 'precedence' is negotiated.

Linklater's ethical base is founded on the possibility of dialogic communities not as 'a vehicle for reconciling value-difference but as the medium through which greater human variety can be discovered and explored'.[76]

The institutional base of cosmopolitanism.

For Held and Archibuggi cosmopolitanism's source is not primarily ethical but political. It is linked to the necessity of reshaping institutions of democracy to accommodate globalisation, interdependency and the problems of collective action. Cosmopolitanism proposes 'a model of political organisation in which citizens, wherever they are located in the world, have a voice, input and political representation in international affairs in parallel with and independently of their own governments'.[77] The position can be summarised into the following three points.

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[71] Linklater, 1998, *op cit.*: 8-9.

[72] Brown, 1992, *op cit.*: 44-46

[73] For a discussion see Linklater, 1990(b), *op cit.*: 135-53 and Brown, 1992, *op cit.*: 95.

[74] See Brown, *ibid.*: 31.

[75] Linklater, 1999, *op cit.*: 169.

[76] Linklater, 1998, *op cit.*: 41.

[77] Archibuggi, Daniele and Held, David, 1995. "Introduction" in Archibuggi, Daniele and Held, David, (Eds.). *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda For a New World Order*, Polity, Cambridge, 1995: 13.

1. Cosmopolitanism derives from the extension of political obligations required to match the realities of international politics today. Increasingly, decisions made by national parliaments and their representatives and quasi-regional and quasi-supranational organisations have an impact on people outside the political community to whom those parliaments and organisations are accountable. Democracy demands that the consent of all those effected by any decision is sought and, inversely, decision makers must be held accountable to all affected.[78]

2. Cosmopolitanism can co-exist alongside the state system, albeit one whose founding principles of sovereignty and citizenship have been reformulated. Cosmopolitanism demands that, in as much as (national) democracy requires an active demos, cosmopolitan democracy requires the recognition, legitimation and inclusion of a global citizen whose participation is welcomed as functional to democratic politics. Hence cosmopolitan democracy would require the creation of regional parliaments (for example in Latin America and Africa), an enhancement of existing regional parliaments (such as the European Parliament), an entrenchment of clusters of rights (including civil, political, social and economic) and a reformed General Assembly.[79] Such a global framework is the foundational architecture of what Held calls the "cosmopolitan model of democracy".[80]

3. A cosmopolitan order is based on a pluralist ethos: one that recognises the plurality of identities in the world. Cosmopolitanism does not propose a meta-narrative of the 'good' but rather that, once a prior commitment to democracy is in place, a political dialogue over the resolution of value-conflicts is possible. This democratically-based dialogue can legitimately frame and delimit competing narratives of the 'good'.[81]

This version thus conforms to a 'thin' cosmopolitanism based predominantly on reforming Western political institutions. For Held a reformulated United Nations will provide the central institution within which this will occur. Also

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[78] Held, David, 1993. *Democracy and the New International Order*, Institute for Public Policy Research, London: 1-25.
[79] *Ibid.*: 14-15.
[80] Held, 1995, *op cit.*:: 106.
[81] *Ibid.*: 116.

required is the normalisation of organisations such as the EU.[82] A ceding of sovereignty in relation to the state's coercive powers and restrictive powers is necessary.[83] Held stresses the importance of subsidiarity in decision making and a division of powers and competence based on local, regional, and international levels. Other international institutional changes would be required such as compulsory jurisdiction before an international court and the creation of an international military force.[84] The UN must strengthen human rights instruments and, as Archibuggi argues, re-invigorate its pre-Cold War commitment to the universality and fundamentality of human rights.[85] The importance of the UN Declaration on Human Rights as an enabling document for the creation of a cosmopolitan world order has been stressed by other institutional-based contributors in the field.[86]

That declaration alone may create what Pogge has called a legal cosmopolitan order in which human rights law is upheld. However, such a legal order must be distinguished from a moral cosmopolitanism order which is both institutional and interactional (derivative of interactions between persons) but in which moral responsibility for others in assigned to every human being.[87] Pogge's distinction is useful in drawing attention to the fact that, although primarily interested in the institutions required to construct a cosmopolitan democracy, Held's approach is based primarily in the praxis of cosmopolitanism. Linklater's as we have seen, begins with the ontology of cosmopolitan values.

Cosmopolitan Diplomacy

We have seen the ethical basis of cosmopolitanism and how the existing system might be reformed to allow those ethics. What would an applied cosmopolitanism be like? How would a cosmopolitan diplomat go about her work? The instruments that any state has derive from the traditional practices

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[82] This means reformulating the Security Council and creating a 'global parliament' from the General Assembly. *Ibid.*: 111.

[83] Archibuggi and Held, *op cit.*: 14.

[84] Held, 1995, *op cit.*: 99-114.

[85] Archibuggi, Daniele, 1995. "From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy" in Archibuggi and Held, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 121-162.

[86] See Falk, Richard, 1995. "The World Order between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions" in Archibuggi, and Held, (Eds.), *ibid.*: 163-179.

[87] Pogge, Thomas, 1994. "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" in Brown, Chris (Ed.). *Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives*, Routledge, London: 89-94.

of the diplomatic system and are applied in the existing arena levels: bilterally, multilaterally within a regional organisation or multilaterally within the UN. Each level contains its own number of options. The UN sets out conditions whereby states may actually intervene in the affairs of another state using force. Within the EU, as we will see in chapter three, several levels of action are available.

Within the existing structures a state might begin with confidential representations to the government concerned in the hope of bringing about change in attitude or action. Failure to change behaviour at this level may be followed by shifting into declaratory diplomacy; public denunciations of behaviour at a bilateral or multilateral level. This may be followed by action at the UN calling for intervention such as through the Commission on Human rights. Moving up a notch states may then begin to cancel events such as ministerial visits, cultural or sporting contacts, reduce or cancel aid programmes and place an embargo on arms trade. From a diplomatic point of view, breaking off diplomatic ties (and with it, for instance, halting aid) symbolises the last step in the ladder. The imposition of trade sanctions at a bilateral or multilateral level is an option.[88] The most serious option (within the rule of international diplomacy) remaining is that within the UN chapter concerning the use of force.

Theoretically, multilateral activities enhance greatly the scope and potential impact of any single state. Ireland's voice as a member of the EU is, theoretically, stronger than Ireland's voice as a single, small state when confronting human rights abuses. Moving up a step further, a decision by the Security Council of the UN to embark on a range of actions is, theoretically, more powerful still as it represents an even greater number of states.

However, the scope of actions described above come from the rules of the liberal inter-state system. There, the rule of law is mediated by a recognition of national interests and the primacy of sovereignty. Cosmopolitan diplomacy, however, requires states to go beyond those rules. If diplomats and political leaders are bearers of a responsibility that derives from their common morality with all other human beings and if that responsibility is prior to their obligations to their fellow citizens (indeed, those they represent)

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[88] Luard, Evan, 1981. *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris and Frankfurt: 26-27.

than this translates into an obligation to defend human right everywhere. Hence, while a cosmopolitan order might use the existing instruments of the inter-state system, they are not sufficient to built a cosmopolitan order.

What is necessary and sufficient for a cosmopolitan action to have taken place? At first glance, the notion of cosmopolitanism appears deceptively and attractively simple. In the context of international relations it means, on the part of a state, eschewing national or self-regarding interests in favour of treating, as of equal moral worth, the interests of those others effected by the policy being considered. In other words the interests of all "stake holders" within a policy arena are considered as valid and all "stake holders" treat each other in a manner in which none has a prior claim to a universal ethic.

In this regard cosmopolitanism goes beyond the liberal "do no harm" admonition. It is not enough just to seek to do no harm to anyone as a result of one's actions. This immediately raises an pertinent question in relation to cosmopolitan activism. Does it imply a cost? Does cosmopolitan activism necessarily bring a diminution of state's interests and therefore some cost?

It would involve continuous normative dilemmas for officials obliged to prioritise human rights responsibilities over economic or trade or strategic interests of their own states whose interests they represent. Such statecraft would collide significantly with the dominant norms of international diplomacy which are built on norms of particular communities. The conventional philosophy of ethics as applied in international relations is based on the notion of circles of concern moving outwards. At a national level, the interests of the state circumscribe the limits of our loyalty. If we were to place equivalently demanding circles of loyalty that extend to the whole of humanity, do we necessarily have to sacrifice our commitment to those who share the piece of soil to which we are attached in common citizenship?

This question can be answered at both a philosophical and a practical level. Nussbaum argues:

> "...(C)osmopolitanism does not require, in any case, that we should give equal attention to all parts of the world. None of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition denied that we can and should give special attention to our families and to our own ties of religious and national belonging. In obvious ways we must do so since the

> nation-state sets up basic terms for most of our daily conduct, and since we are all born into a family of some sort. Cosmopolitans hold, moreover, that it is right to give the local an additional measure of concern. But the primary reason a cosmopolitan should have for this is not that the local is better per se, but rather that this is the only sensible way to do good."[89]

Thus, the favouring of the local (or national) arises not from moral valorisation of the value of the local (or national) but because the structures of daily and national live make render these levels the most practicable.

Where does this lead the cosmopolitan desires of state, should a state seek to implement cosmopolitan foreign policy? States, unlike citizens, are confronted each day with an international forum within which they must create hierarchies of moral worth: the national beef industry over the economic interests of poor debt ridden farmers in west Africa: the national fish stock over the interests of Spanish fishing interests; the importance of the military hard ware industry to local employment levels as against the need for international arms control to create a world with less armed conflict.

In an analysis of the UK's claims to posit an ethical foreign policy, Wheeler and Dunne have argued that obligations to be a "good international citizen" do not translate into taking risks with key strategic interests. A state must also protect its citizens.[90] Using the notion of a 'good international citizen' Wheeler and Dunne reveals the parameters of action for a cosmopolitan state. Good international citizens are not required to sacrifice their own vital security interests but they are required to consider the interests of international society (i.e. peace, security and so on) ahead of their own pursuit of particularistic national interests.[91] This means forsaking narrow 'commercial and political advantage' where it clashes with human rights.[92]

At this point, the claims of cosmopolitanism begin to loose their apparent simplicity. In an inter-dependent world, almost every action by a state, or a

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[89] Nussbaum, Martha, 1996. "Reply" in Cohen, Joshua, (Ed.), *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Cosmopolitanism*, Beacon Press, Boston: 137.

[90] Wheeler, Nicholas, and Dunne, Tim, 1998. "Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy", in *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 4: 847-870.

[91] *Ibid.*: 847-70.

[92] *Ibid.*: 855.

group of states such as in the EU, will have an impact on somebody somewhere. A consistent cosmopolitanism in the current international climate would leave a state so busy with other-regarding concerns in every trade deal, every diplomatic initiative, every common position within the EU, that it would have not time to keep up with the agenda let alone balance the self-regarding demand of nationhood.

Cosmopolitanism does not necessarily require a 'cost'. It may be, as many theorists argue and, as Nussbaum has suggested, that placing humanity as our central concern is, in fact, the only practical and sustainable solution to problems today. However, it is clear that cosmopolitanism is truly tested in cases where 'costs' arise. Where, in prioritising, a state must chose to elevate the concerns of humanity over the concerns of the citizenship, cosmopolitanism is fully challenged.

Linklater, regretfully, does not offer any easy solutions to this problem. His absence of such directional advise is, however, wise. The essence of cosmopolitanism is to be recalled here. It is concerned, above all with, a constant negotiation of priorities. The *sine qua non* of such a dialogue is that it is sensitive to the needs of 'aliens beyond secured borders and a range of internally subordinate groups'.[93]

A Critique of Cosmopolitanism

One of the difficulties in tackling cosmopolitanism, is, to use Walker's image, moving from the 'here' of our current system to the 'there' of a new vision.[94] Our understanding of international politics is so state-bound that there are structural and political, but also deeply conceptual difficulties to be overcome. Rosenau has called this the requirement of a 'conceptual jail break'[95] As an architect of institutional cosmopolitanism, Archibuggi is not deluded about the political, moral and institutional difficulties that such a vision faces.[96]

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[93] Linklater, 1998, *op cit.: 41.*

[94] Walker, RBJ, 1993, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: ix.

[95] Cited in Shaw, op *cit.*: 80.

[96] Archibuggi, *op cit.*: 124-162.

This difficulty renders the cosmopolitan project vulnerable to accusations of utopianism, or, naive aspirationalism. It may be indeed that cosmopolitanism is something of a doctrine of immanence. Like the radical pluralism of domestic politics envisaged by Mouffe it may be "conceived as a good that only exists as good as long as it cannot be reached".[97] Applied at a global scale, the project of radically re-working pluralism into a cosmopolitan framework is also contingent on the continuation of the politics of difference, conflict and antagonism whose resolution may spell the end of that framework.

From the perspective of this thesis, the most important challenge to cosmopolitanism comes from postmodernism. In rejecting the notion of meta-narratives generally, postmodernism also rejects the narrative of a global humanity and the possibility of constructing any global order on, say, universal human rights. Rorty has argued that there is no basis for believing that species membership alone is a sufficient surrogate for closer kinship. There is no argument, other than one built on sentimentality, for making the case for a 'universal human nature'.[98] Rorty's pragmatism is thematic to postmodernism's contribution to the debate. In a similar vein Walker argues that the basis of a universalist ethic has yet to be established (a different matter from its desirability). Although the inter-state system, more particularly the nation-state as a means of organising political communities, may be problematic in terms of exclusionary consequences, it is the only 'co-ordinate' within which we can tackle the problem of insider and outsider in international relations.[99] For him such is the futility of identifying some ethic or value which can be universalised 'out', that the very notion of a 'global ethic' is conceptually a non-starter.[100]

Walker's postmodernism perhaps provides the most sustained critique of Linklater's cosmopolitanism. Like Rorty, he is deeply sceptical of the project of creating a global ethic but his criticisms, unlike Rorty's, derive directly from IR perspectives.[101] His problematising of the notion of a global ethic

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[97] Mouffe, Chantal, 1993. *The Return of the Political*, Verso, London: 8. Mouffe meant that democracy is contingent on the playing out of conflicts and antagonisms that are the 'condition of the impossibility of its realisation'.

[98] Rorty, Richard, 1998. "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality" in *Truth and Progress, Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 167-85.

[99] Walker, 1993, *op cit.*: 162.

[100] Walker, 1994, *op cit.*: 669-700.

[101] *Ibid.*: 695-9.

raises the core question of this research: does the cosmopolitan activism of Irish NGOs constitute a reformulation or a transformation of the inter-state system?

Walker fears that cosmopolitanism avoids asking the key question. Having begun with some form of ethically constituted tradition, it slips into universalising from those claims into a global order. This is a seductive and irresistible outcome but it prevents theorists from asking whether the world described in these approaches profoundly challenges and transforms the existing order or, in contrast, simply 'sustains an international pluralism or enables more universalist or solidarist account of a properly world politics'.[102] As he states:

> "Movements do connect, converse, learn from each other and sometimes develop partial solidarities. But a politics of connection is not necessarily a politics of a united front or a counter hegemonic strategy....Whatever the rhetorical and tactical appeal of a women's movement, or an environmental movement, in the singular, it is an appeal that cannot disguise the differences and even intolerances among such movements".[103]

Walker's critique is rooted, it must also be said, in a challenge to what he sees as the misguided appropriation of the work of Marx, Kant and Hegel by Linklater to support his position. He furthermore considers Linklater's argument somewhat circular: the primary conclusion (that of the possibility of a cosmopolitan order) is also the premise of the argument (that the possibility of a cosmopolitan order has a long theoretical tradition).[104]Walker's mode of analysis, finally, rests on two arguments. The first is theoretical and ultimately can be settled only by 'faith'. That is that something called a global ethic based on the commonality of humanity exists. The second is built on the first and is an epistemological argument. Cosmopolitanism cannot offer a critique of the sovereign states-system (and offer an alternative) because it is "*already* (author's italics) a constitutive principle of the sovereign states-system."[105] For Walker, Linklater's theorising will not, in the end, radically

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[102] *Ibid.*: 694.

[103] *Ibid.*: 699.

[104] Walker, RBJ, 1999. "The Hierarchicalization of Political Community" in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25: 153.

[105] *Ibid.*: 153.

transform the existing system but will result in the creation of new hierarchies within political community.[106]

The focus of this thesis cannot do justice to the scope and depth of the debate touched on in the above sections. The thesis has not set out to solve the theoretical debates but to bring empirical data to bear on the cosmopolitan position. It is in such empirical studies that we can find, however, some rejoinders to Walker's critique. The paralysis that Walker seems to confront (in that he too, like Linklater, is interested in new form of politics that are emancipatory and non-exclusionary) can perhaps be attenuated by evidence from actually existing politics outside of the state. While IR theory has accepted international society (the inter-state system) it has been less willing to account for the creation of global society. To accept that global society is divided by fractures of class, race, knowledge, power, culture and lifestyle is not to deny the existence, in the first place of the entire complex of social relations at a global scale that is more than international society.[107] Analyses of attempts by civil society groups to articulate a politics from within that global society have managed to articulate a cosmopolitanism without homogenising differences in race, ethnicity, knowledge and power.[108] Such positions might provide an ontological starting point to counteract Walker's postmodern pessimism.

Walker's work is not the only critique of cosmopolitanism. In addition to the contemporary debates the cosmopolitan position has been subject to contestation through the annals of political theory and philosophy. The concern of this thesis, however, is exclusively with the viability of cosmopolitanism to help us understand the role of NGOs in international relations. The greater theoretical debates must, perforce, be left to the theorists.

There are other flies in the ointment, however, that detract from the claims of cosmopolitanism. Within international law today, for instance, there has been a surge of communitarian-based rights movements whose arguments come

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106 *Ibid.*: 155.

107 Shaw, *op cit.*: 132.

108 See Gabriel Christina and Macdonald, Laura, 1994. "NAFTA, Women and Organising in Canada and Mexico: Forging a Feminist Internationality" and La Violette, Nicole and Whitworth, Sandra, 1994. "No Safe Haven: Sexuality as a Universal Human Right and Gay and Lesbian Activism in International Politics" both in *Millennium*, Winter 1994, vol. 23, no. 3; 535-62 and 563-88 respectively.

from both left and right of the political spectrum.[109] There is also distinct evidence that globalisation, particularly through the free rein of global market forces, is leading to the collapse of social solidarity and the rise of global élites. An integrated global economy might foment greater links between previously separated people. But it might also produce a politically polycentric world.[110] As Brown has so graphically put it, to say that more people are now more like each other than before (eating the same food, wearing the same clothes, using the same technology) is not the same as saying that people will begin to think of the previously-separated as now part of the same moral community.[111] Again, these are not central debates within this thesis. We can simply note the broad challenge these positions raise and move on.

NGOs as Practitioners of Cosmopolitanism

A significant literature is available on the networks, activities and functions of NGOs within the realm of the international. Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Amnesty International (AI) operate transnational economic, social and cultural networks.[112] Environmental groups work together across state boundaries.[113] Solidarity groups establish international networks. Nationally based NGOs take on intergovernmental organisations in their attempts to assert their agenda for change.[114] Aid and resources from Western NGOs finds its way to civil sector groups in the developing world sometimes by-

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[109] Howard, Rhoda, 1995. "Human Rights and the Search for Community" in *The Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 32, no. 1:1-8. In an earlier book, Linklater had rejected the notion of rights as a way forward for building a global community (as it is contract-bound and embedded in a world order based on insiders and outsiders) and posited instead claims. See Linklater, Andrew, 1990(c). *Men and Citizens in International Relations*, Macmillan, Basingstoke: 195-201.

[110] Hirst, Paul, 1997. *From Statism to Pluralism*, UCL, London: 205-210.

[111] Brown, 1995, *op cit.*: 91-92.

[112] See Burke, Tom, 1982. "Friends of the Earth and Conservation of Resources" in Willetts, (Ed.), *op cit.*: 105-124 and Ennals, Martin, 1982. "Amnesty International and Human Rights" in Willetts, (Ed.), *ibid.*: 28-45.

[113] See Princen, Thomas, 1994. "The Ivory Trade Ban: NGOs and International Conservation" in Princen, Thomas and Finger, Matthias, (Eds.). *Environmental NGOs in world politics: Linking the Local and the Global*, Routledge, London: 121-59.

[114] See Kalaw, Maximo, 1994. "Public Participation in the UN and The Philippine Experience in Childers, Erskine, (Ed.). *Challenges to the United Nations: Building a Safer World*, CIIR/St. Martin's Press, London and New York: 188-99.

passing state machinery in that process.[115] The transnational nature of these activities is undisputed and in the case of environmental issues inevitable.[116]

Much of this literature stresses the functionality of these activities in the inter-state system. The role of many NGOs as partners in solving problems of global governance is recognised. The UN's welfare system is significantly based on the services of humanitarian and aid agencies. Relationships of 'complimentarity' exist between NGOs and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN and many of its agencies in the of division of labour in the field.[117] So is Walker correct then in arguing that NGO activities serve to extend the pluralism of the inter-state system?

For Wapner the significance of these organisations derives not just from the nature of the issues they are tackling but from the fact that they have the capacity to transform state institutions in their efforts to improve collective life. Environmental NGOs, he argues, create an 'ecological sensibility' which acts as a form of governance or a mechanism of authority which can shape human behaviour globally.[118] A commitment to universal values is created within a global space and it permeates and transcends the territory of the nation-state and commands the same moral force as nationally defined collective space. In other words, it establishes a moral equivalence; it does not - nor does it necessarily want to - transform the inter-state system into something else. These values as propagated and promoted by NGOs 'shift the standards of good conduct'.[119] In other words, they are outriders of the cosmopolitan order as theorised by Linklater. Camilleri and Falk collaborate with this conclusion by suggesting that such organisations offer a 'purchase' greater than that of individual or collectivities of states. Environmental groups, human rights groups and others transcend the requirements of sovereignty that have traditionally restricted the domain of political action and consequently undermine the notion of sovereignty itself.[120]

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115 Sutton, Mary, 1987. "Development Aid: A Comment on the Role of Non-Governmental Organisations" in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. 2. no. 3: 47-50.

116 Environmental damage does not recognise borders and requires international governance solutions.

117 Gordenker and Weiss, *op cit.*: 29.

118 Wapner, Paul, 1995. "Environmentalism and World Civil Politics" in *World Politics*, vol. 47: 320

119 *Ibid.*: 322.

120 Camilleri and Falk, *op cit.*: 207.

For Weiss and Gordenker, the debate is not about an "either or" choice. NGO activities may run parallel with and co-operate with the inter-state system or act in competition with it. But together, these approaches contribute to a pluralisation of global governance, *viz.*, they bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political problems that extend beyond the capacity of a state to address individually. In other words, NGO activities may simultaneously, extend the pluralism of the given order (such as by working in partnership with the international system or with states on issues) and reformulate the given order by creating a force of moral equivalence.[121] They may change the code of good conduct and help create an 'ethic of global responsibility'.[122]

Looking at perhaps the most universal of all NGO discourses, human rights activism, Luard has argued that human rights advocacy should not be judged on the basis of its power to bring about direct change but rather on its capacity, over time, to sensitise the decision makers in both the target area and in the international system to the importance of human rights. They normalise an expectation of human rights as central to all foreign policy decision making.[123] In the long term such activism extends the boundaries of community.

All NGOs face a choice in their working agenda; that of working internally (in the domestic arena) and/or externally (in the international arena).[124] The choice will heavily dictate the level of skills, expertise, resources and personnel required. The choice will also heavily determine the level of transnational networking that the NGO will be involved in. There are also some parameters of need and some constraints. Brett has argued that, to begin with, NGOs need finances and public support, the latter to legitimise their activities. Legitimacy can also be achieved through international law. NGOs also need to establish 'partners', or local matching organisations in their area of interest. They need to achieve a balance between denunciations of both their own and other governments and keeping governments friendly. They need to remain flexible and focused to avoid internal personality cults and to respond quickly as situations change. Finally, she says, NGOs also need friendly supportive governments that have influence at some extra-domestic

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121 Gordenker and Weiss, *op cit.*: 17.

122 Shaw, *op cit.*: 131-32.

123 Luard, *op cit.*: *passim*.

124 Gordenker and Weiss, *op cit.*: 39.

level. Some NGOs are structured into the UN welfare system in particular but it is ultimately states that hold the power.[125]

Brett's shopping list can be applied to NGOs generally. Our interest here is with specific NGOs in a specific context. We want to examine NGO activism within the domain of Irish foreign policy. But the list is useful in that it draws attention to the constraints that all NGOs operate under, not least of all the constraints of the inter-state system built as it is on governments whether friendly or hostile.

As stated at the outset of this chapter, the case studies were selected in order to provide us with different kinds of NGO actors seeking policy change within different arena of policy making. Our reading of these case studies can now nestle into the broad picture of cosmopolitanism presented here and the broad picture of NGO activism. Our first case study, in chapter five, examines Irish foreign policy in relation to the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. The principle level of activism here was within the European Union and the principle institution was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The NGO involved was a small single issue group. In the second case study, detailed in chapter six, the issue was Irish policy towards the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of the International World Bank/IMF. The policy arena here is non-UN multilateral and the actor involved, the Debt and Development Coalition (DDC), was a coalition of NGOs and other organisations. Chapter seven details the last case study, that of the participation of Irish women's NGOs in the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing). The policy arena here is UN - multilateral - and while the broad NGO background is the diffuse organisational landscape of the women's movement, the particular NGOs of concern are a mixture of a small, élite NGO and larger, representational groups, including the "women's interest" group, the National Women's Council of Ireland (NWCI). The focus in this latter case study is on the issue of participation and not a particular policy. NGOs were formally included in the preparatory process for and the state's participation in Beijing. Given this scenario, the case study presents an opportunity to explore the extent of the state's capacity to incorporate NGOs into a foreign policy process.

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[125] Brett, Rachel, 1995. "The Role and Limit of Human Rights NGOs at the UN" in *Political Studies,* (Special Issue), vol. 43: 96-110.

Conclusion and Issues for the Case Studies to Follow

The chapter has posed the question as to whether the cosmopolitan activism of Irish NGOs helps extend the pluralism of the existing order or, alternatively, helps contribute to the creation of a new cosmopolitan order. Theoretically speaking the opposing positions are represented here by the contributions of, respectively, Walker and Linklater. At the heart of the argument is the factor that separates Linklater's cosmopolitanism from the liberalism of the existing system, as articulated through postmodernist lenses by Walker; the dialogic ethic.

The challenge of this research is not to establish the cosmopolitan credentials of the NGOs featured in the chapters to follow. By definition, as NGOs involved in lobbying Irish foreign policy makers in order to widen their circle of concern and representation to include non-citizens, they are, *de facto* cosmopolitanists. What is important is the manner in which they present cosmopolitan arguments, the interaction between these arguments and the policy making actors at a national, regional and intergovernmental level and the constraints or otherwise on the adoption of such arguments. The thesis then is concerned with the nature of the dialogic community generated by NGO activism, the nature of the constraints placed on that dialogue and, not least of all, whether that dialogue induced, facilitated or engendered transformation.

It will be argued that, as agents of cosmopolitanism, Irish NGOs have the capacity to both pluralise the existing inter-state system and create a more solidarist world polity. It will also be argued, moreover, that both achievements are complimentary targets of cosmopolitan activism. In focusing then on shifting the standards of good conduct, or changing norms of behaviour over time, in the context of a dynamic, multi-layered, interactive relationship between NGOs, the Irish state and the inter-state system, we can examine the possibilities for and constraints on cosmopolitan activism.

Chapter Two.

The Evolution of Irish Foreign Policy: Substance

Introduction

This chapter and the following provide an historical and contemporary context for the study of the role of NGOS in three selected issues in Irish foreign policy. Both chapters focus on the relationship between the Irish state, domestic civil society and international society in the creation of cosmopolitan values. However, while positing their interrelationship, it is important, and useful, to draw a conceptual distinction between the substance of Irish foreign policy and the structures through which it is processed. Drawing this distinction then allows us move (in chapters five to seven) to an examination of their confluence in the case studies. The case studies have been chosen to allow a focused examination of how cosmopolitan values are moved across the range of multilateral commitments within which Ireland processes foreign policy.

This chapter focuses on substantial issues of Irish foreign policy and how they evolved over time. It will take as distinct, although sometimes coinciding, sets of values those of the state and those of Irish civil society. The enquiry rests on the assumption, as set out in chapter one, that cosmopolitan values are generated from within, *inter alia*, civil society and are articulated outwards onto the state. The state may or may not choose to incorporate these values within its foreign policies. The enquiry is framed within two extreme models of substantive policy content. On one side there is a statist model where the state exclusively pursues its own interests. On the other is a cosmopolitan model where the state extends its moral community/concern 'beyond the confines of state to embrace the species as a whole'.[1]

The chapter sets out the evolution of substantive issues of foreign policy over three periods corresponding to different levels of involvement in multilateral organisations. Particular attention will be paid to the campaigns, varying in

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[1] Colas, Alejandro, 1994. "Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice: the Case of Socialist Internationalism" in *Millennium*, vol. 23, no. 3: 513.

success, which were organised by civil society groups on Irish policy on South Africa and Central America during the third and fourth periods. In recognition of the centrality of NGOs to this thesis, the main NGO profile will be extracted and given a separate section (section four) although the activism can be traced through two periods outlined here.

This chapter is organised into five sections. The first section details the formative period of Irish foreign policy (1922-1956) in which, notwithstanding Irish participation in the League of Nations, constraints on Irish foreign policy from either domestic or global civil society, or from multilateral institutions, are weak. This period coincides with the consolidation of Irish statehood culminating in the declaration of the Republic in 1948. This period provides a model of decision making least affected by non-state actors of a cosmopolitan nature or otherwise and ends with the acceptance of Ireland's application for UN membership. The second section details the period of 'creeping' multilateralism (1956-1972) when Ireland joined the UN and moved towards European Economic Community (EEC) membership. The period also coincides, in its latter years, with the nascent influence on public and foreign policy of the Irish media and other public opinion shapers including solidarity organisations. The period closes with Ireland's membership of the EEC.[2] The third section details the period of regional multilateralism (1972-1996); Ireland's increased EU integration. Particular attention will be paid here to the evolution of an integrated approach to foreign policy through the institutions of European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The requirements of EU membership have created multilateral commitments which are both more intensive and comprehensive. The key question for this section is to what extent Ireland was constrained by EPC and CFSP. Underlining the interplay between substance and structure, this question will be posed, but answered according to different criteria, in both this and the following chapter. The fourth section examines the growth of NGOs from the formative years in the early 1960s to high profile activism in the 1970s and 1980s. While we see the rise of organised civil society intervention in foreign policy issues in the 1960s, it is from the 1970s onwards that such organisation becomes a significant feature

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[2] A note about terminology to is needed here. The name for the institution being referred to at the time in question will dictate usage. Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. It became the European Community (EC) in 1986. Following the Maastricht Treaty (1993) it officially became known as the European Union (EU). Where an overarching term is required the nomenclature 'EU' will be used.

of the landscape. References will be made also to the relationship between public opinion and NGO politics. The fourth, and final section will conclude the chapter.

The Formative Years: 1922-1956

Under Cumin na nGaedhael, which came into power with the formation of the Irish Free State (Saor Stát Éireann) in 1922, Anglo Irish relations constituted, not surprisingly, the main concern of government. The Saor Stát emerged independent but a member of the Commonwealth; the renamed and partly-reconstituted 'Empire'. Long fought-for republican status was not yet achieved. Furthermore, partition had left one corner of the island of Ireland in British hands. The political leadership, inheritors of the mantle of republicanism, thus found themselves grappling with the issue which had long exercised their predecessors - that of sovereignty.[3] The relationship with Britain became a high priority of successive governments and was not considered to constitute 'external' policy but, rather, was itself a constitutional issue. In turn, this framework created a tendency, by political leaders, to eschew any great interest in 'external' relations outside of Anglo-Irish relations.[4] However, this bias did not go hand in hand with a blinkered view of foreign policy. While Anglo-Irish relations dominated they did not, by any means, prevent the incorporation of other external matters.

Ireland the Commonwealth and the League of Nations.

Despite the overarching concern for the constitutional question, an active internationalist policy, informed by idealism and not concerned solely with issues of national interest, was pursued by Ireland at both the League of Nations and within the Commonwealth.

Ireland joined the Commonwealth in 1922, accepting dominion status within the organisation. But its colonial history and aspirations for independence laid out a path of activities that endowed Ireland with a particular identity and role within the Commonwealth. Informed by its desire to assert national autonomy, Ireland successfully set out to change the association from a

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[3] Keatinge, Patrick, 1978. *A Place Among the Nations: Issues in Irish Foreign Policy*, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin: 54-58.

[4] Keatinge, Patrick, 1973. *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy*, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin: 6-7.

Westminster dominated 'Empire' into a Commonwealth of 'free and equal partners'[5]. From 1926 onwards, the new state began to play a significant role in the affairs of the League of Nations.[6] This role was continued, and enlarged, with the change of government in 1932 and the coming to power of the Fianna Fáil party.[7]

Two competing views of Ireland's role at the League of Nations have been offered and are relevant to this thesis. Kennedy argues that Fianna Fáil's accession to power was a watershed for Ireland's engagement with the league as its (Ireland's) profile and activism increased. Ireland won a three year seat on the Council of the League and there Eamon de Valera, as Minister for External Affairs, (a position he held simultaneously with that of Taoiseach) championed collective security both as a desirable international norm and as the best means of ensuring Irish security in the face of growing conflict in Europe.[8] In contrast, Sharp argues that Fianna Fáil's attachment to the norms of the league was entirely instrumental. Ireland used its membership of the league for its own interests and there, it struggled to establish, most of all, an independent voice as means towards achieving status. Its policy goals were founded on the premise that 'England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity' and any apparent 'idealism' is ultimately reducible to self interest.[9]

Both analysts agree, however, that foreign policy activities expanded and decreased according to many other factors being played out externally and internally. That is to say, in the words of another commentator, foreign policy activity grew during this time when conditions, both domestic and international, were 'favourable'.[10] The nature of these conditions varied and were of both domestic and international character. Reflecting domestic economic concerns, the cost of league membership was opposed by Department of Finance at intervals in the 1920's and 1930's.[11] Domestic

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[5] Harkness, David, 1969. *The Restless Dominion: The Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations*, 1921-1931, New York University Press, New York: 256.

[6] Kennedy, Michael, 1996. *Ireland and the League of Nations,* Irish Academic Press, Dublin. It must be noted, however, that Kennedy's analysis of League policy is limited to a handful of diplomats and a Minister for Foreign Affairs during an eight year period of the League's 25 year history.

[7] Fianna Fáil had rejected the Treaty between Ireland and Britain.

[8] Kennedy, *op cit.: passim.*

[9] Sharp, Paul, 1990. *Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community,* Dartmouth, Aldershot: 1-3.

[10] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 17.

[11] Kennedy, *op cit.*: 94 and 189.

electoral politics took the attention of senior politicians away from the concerns of the league in the run up to the national elections of 1932 and 1933.[12] A factor that favoured Ireland's participation in extra-national politics was the commitment of individual diplomats such as Sean Lester to the core values of the League of Nations. It is noteworthy that he frequently acted without instructions from his department in Dublin.[13] In contrast, his successor F.T. Cremins, (1934-1940) was far less committed to issues of collective security and universal norms.[14] The different orientation resulting from the change in diplomatic personnel reflects the room for manoeuvre that was given to Ireland officials abroad at the time.

However, it may be the case that, given the low level of public interest in and knowledge of the affairs of the League of Nations and the Commonwealth, and given the importance of key individuals at key times in shaping attitudes, it is more appropriate to speak of Irish 'activity' rather than Irish 'policy' in international affairs during this period.[15] Ireland was still a very young state, the question of the 'nation' was still unresolved. The pull to the domestic was strong. Nevertheless, 'activity' did revolve around a continued emphasis on the rule of law and support for the norms of the league. Ireland may indeed have approached the league and the Commonwealth with only its national interests in mind while pursuing the norms of international peace and collective security as key values in a newly evolving order. As a small, independent state, economically overwhelmed by its former coloniser, the league did, for a time, hold out the promise of security and peace for Ireland. In this sense means and ends coincided for Ireland in the league.

World War Two and After

The collapse of the League of Nations and the onset of World War Two introduced dramatic changes to the international environment. In the face of war, Ireland opted for a policy of neutrality: at least, officially. If the architects of neutrality policy hoped, thereby, to see progress on the issue of partition they failed. After the war, Ireland found itself still divided. The national question remained unsolved and Ireland retained its Commonwealth status.

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12 *Ibid.*: 155.

13 Barcroft, Stephen, 1979. "Irish Foreign Policy at the League of Nations" in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 1: 19-29.

14 Kennedy, *op cit.*: 191-193.

15 Barcroft, *op cit.*: 20.

An over riding concern for the national question may have led Ireland to badly misjudge its status abroad in this period. When offered membership of NATO in March 1948 Ireland refused on the basis that it could not enter into a political alliance while partition remained. That decision assumed that Ireland's membership would be courted, and that it could be used as a bargaining chip in Anglo-Irish relations, and proved badly founded.[16]

In the period after the war, Ireland's isolation could not have been deeper. The state's commitment to neutrality, derived from the issue of partition, precluded Ireland from participation in several multilateral regimes. The level of isolationism was symbolised and, in turn, intensified by the rejection of Ireland's first application to join the UN in 1946.[17] However, isolationism may, indeed, have become a *modus operandi* during the 1930's and war years as the application was, at best, half hearted and made without enthusiastic support from either the public or the Dáil.[18]

The national elections of 1948 ousted Fianna Fáil and returned a coalition government, with Fine Gael as the largest partner, heralded significant changes in the state's commitment to external associations. On a visit to Canada in September 1948, Taoiseach John A. Costello (Fine Gael) announced Ireland's intention to repeal the External Relations Act of 1936.[19] Costello's proposal was subsequently approved by the Cabinet and was officially enshrined with the Republic of Ireland Bill on December 21 1948. The declaration of the Republic cleared the way for new sets of relationships between Ireland and the rest of the world. The inter-party government was to prove itself not short of initiatives in this regard.

Moving Closer to Europe

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16 McCabe, Ian, 1991. *A Diplomatic History of Ireland, 1948-1949,* Irish Academic Press: Dublin. Chapter eight argues that then Minister for External Affairs, Seán McBride, hoped to keep the back door to NATO membership open but the US took Ireland's refusal to join at face value.

17 Greatest opposition came from the Soviet Union.

18 See Fanning, Ronan, 1986. "The Anglo American Alliance and the Irish Application for Membership of the United Nations" in *ISIA,* vol. 2, no. 2: 35-62.

19 See McCabe, *op cit.*: *passim* for a detailed analysis of the decision. McCabe suggests that advance (Irish) media speculation may have been prompted by Costello's fellow Cabinet member, Seán McBride and that Costello's announcement did not come on the spur of the moment.

Under the influence of External Affairs Minister, Seán McBride, significant moves were made away from isolationism towards engagement in multilateral organisations. McBride led Ireland into the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948 and, despite playing no part in the war effort, Ireland benefited from the European Recovery Programme (ERP) - known as the Marshall Plan.[20] McBride also led Ireland into the Council of Europe, established in 1949.[21] McBride's republicanism was undoubtedly a factor and participation in the Council of Europe was determined by the quest to solve the issue of partition.[22]

The impact of participation in such post-war ventures was not solely confined to the scope of action for Irish foreign policy. Participation in the ERP and in the Council of Europe, coupled with the need to build an independent diplomatic network outside of the Commonwealth, meant expansion and growth in the Department of External Affairs itself. McBride's expansionist designs were supported by the Minister for Finance in the inter-party government Mr. Patrick McGilligan, himself a former Minister for External Affairs[23] sympathetic to the need to look beyond national and Anglo-Irish preoccupations.

A significant collaborative movement in Europe at the time was the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Ireland declined to join this organisation. The decision may have been an entirely pragmatic one, mediated by Britain's decision to do likewise. For, despite diplomatic manoeuvres to assert independence, the Irish economy was hugely dependent on that of the UK.[24] Nor did Ireland participate in the signing of the Brussels Pact that led to the formation of the Western European Union (WEU). The pressure that such a defence pact might exert on state sovereignty and continued sensitivity to partition precluded membership.[25]

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[20] Whelan, Bernadette, 1992. "Ireland and the Marshall Plan" in *Irish Economic and Social History*: 49-70.

[21] The Irish delegation to the first consultative assembly of the Council was a cross party affair. Fianna Fáil opposed the 'fast track' to a federal Europe but there was bipartisan support for general council principles. See Keogh, Dermot, 1990. *Ireland and Europe, 1919-1989: A Diplomatic and Political History*, Hibernian University Press: Dublin and Cork: 225-229.

[22] Salmon, Trevor, 1989. *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 187-8 and Sharp Paul, 1990. *Op cit.*: 8.

[23] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 81.

[24] Keogh, *op cit.*: 229.

[25] Salmon, *op cit.*: 187.

In summary, Ireland exhibited a certain commitment to the communal aspects of the Commonwealth and to the idealism of the early years of the League of Nations during this period. However, arising from domestic and international conditions Ireland retreated to more narrowly defined, nationalist perspectives on the function and scope of foreign policy in the late 1930s. In this regard Ireland was not unique in Europe where the onset of war made the collective efforts of the League of Nations untenable. The fragile coalition of post-world War One Europe could not bear up under the strain of the violent expansionism of Germany and its allies. Constrained from below by a national preoccupation with the construction of the nation-state and from above by the instability of the international system , Ireland's foreign policy at this time was as close to exclusively 'statist' as has ever been the case.

In the post war period, Ireland's isolationism began to give way to multilateralism. In the autumn of 1946 an application for UN membership was made but proved unsuccessful. But, as faith in the cherished republican tradition of economic autarchy came under domestic scrutiny in the 1950s so too was Ireland's world view. In 1955 the USSR lifted its objection to Irish UN membership and in November of the following year, Liam Cosgrave, as Minister for External Affairs in the second inter-party government made the country's first speech at the General Assembly of the organisation in New York. This event marks the beginning of the second period in this historical analysis of Irish foreign policy in which we see evidence of stronger multilateral constraints on that policy area.

Creeping Multilateralism: 1956-1972

This period is demarcated by changes in the external environment and domestic environment that coincided, and mediated, the realisation of Ireland's application for membership of the UN in 1956. In relation to the former, there was the new attitude of the USSR towards Irish UN membership and, importantly, global economic growth of the post-war era. In relation to the latter, Ireland's underwent revolutionary change in economic policy, moving towards an export-orientated model of organisation

UN membership acceptance provided an opportunity to evaluate the broad principles of Irish foreign policy. Minister for External Affairs, Liam Cosgrave set out the broad parameters of policy to mark the occasion in a signal speech to the Dáil on July 3 1956. The speech has been widely analysed and is of

interest here in its exposition of the guiding principles of policy makers. Ireland would, firstly offer unequivocal support to the UN. Secondly, it would maintain an independent stance within that organisation and not participate in the East/West Cold war blocs at the UN. Thirdly it would be guided by Christianity morality and an anti-communist doctrine.[26]

The debate within the UN on the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 allowed Ireland to express these themes in a single coherent policy. Ireland formulated a position that supported the UN's position on the invasion, supported the rights of small nations and valorised the popular (and anti-communist) nature of the revolt in Hungary.[27] In the debate on the Suez crises that same year, Ireland again expressed support for the UN's role in upholding international law in respect of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.[28] Symbolising Ireland's desire to participate in UN efforts was the decision, announced by Cosgrave during Ireland's maiden speech to the General Assembly of the UN, on November 30th 1956, to accept over 500 Hungarian refugees.[29]

Minister Cosgrave was not given a long innings to implement his principles. The national elections of 1957 returned Fianna Fáil to power, and, a new Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken. Some different shadings notwithstanding, the broad strokes of foreign policy remained fairly constant between one government and the next. Independence at the UN remained an overall policy goal for Fianna Fáil. This translated into, again, a desire not to get caught up in the polarising politics of the Cold War divide. A difference in shading was that Fianna Fáil was less concerned than its predecessor with adopting anti-communist positions.[30]

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[26] *Dáil Debates*, July 3 1956. Vol. 159: cols. 137-146. For a detailed analysis of the speech see Skelly, Joseph Morrison, 1997. *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations: 1945-1965*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin.

[27] *Ibid.*: 46.

[28] *Ibid.*: 52-56.

[29] For details see Ward, Eilís, 1996, "'A big show-off to show what we could do'. Ireland and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956" in *ISIA*, vol. 7: 131-141.

[30] Skelly, op *cit.*: 86-165. For Skelly, ideological differences between the two parties were the single most important factor in explaining different attitudes to the UN. Cumin na nGaedhael/Fine Gael was more pro-Western, anti-Soviet and anti-communist than Fianna Fáil. In the opposition benches after the 1957 elections, Fine Gael, denounced Fianna Fáil for its support of China's UN membership application. See Keatinge, Patrick, 1973. *Op cit.*: 256.

Controversial issues such as China's application for UN membership (which is returned to later in the section), on Goa, West Irian and the issue of decolonisation, provided contexts for the working out of the defining parameters of policy concerns. On all of these issues Ireland managed to sustain a position that was independent of power blocs and, at the same time, expressing the small state's concern for territorial integrity and a preference for preventative diplomacy, tension reduction, and, overall, the defence of the UN and its institutions.[31] Ireland's willingness to go out on a limb on some of these issues diminishes Sharp's argument that Ireland's foreign policy during these years was driven exclusively by the need for status.[32]

Notwithstanding the efforts alluded to above, and how it may have been viewed by the state and its servants, Ireland's independence must be understood in relative terms. Ireland was still perceived to be allied with the West and, indeed, frequently acted with the 'West' in the bi-polar politics of the day.[33] On many issues, there was no evidence of independence from the western powers in the East/West division and consistency of position was lacking on occasion.[34]

It may indeed be the case that Ireland's dedication to upholding core UN principles was a product of its own time. Ireland had few economic, strategic or political interests to pursue on the global stage. It was, in a sense, 'free' to pursue flexible and autonomous positions.[35] Such an analysis must, however, also take account of the idealism expressed by Aiken in relation to, for instance, his proposal for a Middle Eastern peace plan in 1958.[36] Ireland's success in guiding a resolution on nuclear non-proliferation through the UN in 1961 indicated, in the words of a senior diplomat at the time, that "small unaligned powers can make a significant individual contribution to world order issues by goading the superpowers into action".[37] The crisis in the Congo (then Belgian Congo) in 1961 created the state's first opportunity to

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31 *Ibid.*: 86-148. This period is often termed the 'golden period' of Ireland's UN membership

32 As stated, this is the variable isolated by Sharp to explain the dynamic of Irish foreign policy. Status-seeking is more likely to have prompted fervent support for the western powers, particularly the US, to ensure Ireland's acceptance as a loyal member of the western club.

33 See Salmon, *op cit.*: chapter seven.

34 Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 172.

35 *Ibid.*: 172.

36 See Skelly, *op cit.*: 154-65.

37 Manathunga, Catherine, 1996. "The Evolution of Irish Disarmament Initiatives at the UN 1957 - 1961" in *ISIA*, vol. 7: 113.

participate in high profile, large scale UN peacekeeping missions.[38] Ireland participated fully in the long-running UN debate on the financing of such missions.[39]

Overall, similarities can be drawn between the substance of Irish policy at the UN during this period and the substance of Irish policy at the League of Nations. Ireland's UN performance was in keeping with those of small, relatively powerless, states that recognise that their security is best guaranteed by 'peaceful, negotiated solutions to problems'.[40] Participation in UN debates, while driven by high ideals was, in the words of a senior diplomat, matched by a prudence bred of a recognition of 'wider national interests (and) the need to maintain good relations with major friendly countries such as the US'.[41]

Of significance during this period, both in terms of impact on the substance and direction of foreign policy, was the election of 1957 which returned Fianna Fáil to power. Seán Lemass replaced Eamon de Valera as Taoiseach and leader of the party. Lemass went on to reorientate Ireland's economy towards direct foreign investment and away from import substitution a turn around that significantly effected foreign policy goals.[42]

While UN involvement was marked by continuity despite change in government (as was the case previously) the importance of the UN as the main forum of foreign policy began to wane in 1961 when Ireland decided to apply for Common Market membership. Profound economic changes within Ireland reflected the changes in the global economy and Ireland's main concern during this period was development and consolidation of economic growth.[43] In preparation for the eventual entry into the Common Market the

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[38] Ireland had participated in small scale observer missions prior to this

[39] See Cremin, Con, 1984. "United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: An Irish Initiative, 1961-1968" in *ISIA*, vol. 1, no. 4: 79-84.

[40] See Holmes, *et al, op cit.*: 28-29, who argue that neutrality and the commitment to peacekeeping contribute to a 'general feeling' that Irish foreign policy should be more altruistic.

[41] Dorr, Noel 1996. "Ireland at the UN: 40 Years On" *ISIA*, vol. 7: 48.

[42] Laffan, Brigid and O'Donell, Rory, 1998. "Ireland and the Growth of International Governance" in Crotty, William and Schmitt, David, (Eds.). *Ireland and the Politics of Change*, Longman, London and New York: 156-177.

[43] See National Economic and Social Council, 1989. *Ireland and the European Community: Performance, Prospects and Strategy*. NESC Report No. 89, Dublin. Chapter four details economic changes prior to the application.

Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement had been adopted in 1965. Furthermore during that year historic Anglo Irish talks symbolised a move towards reconciliation on the question of Northern Ireland.[44]

These domestic changes had an impact in the administration of policy: the remit for Common Market issues (deemed of exclusively economic importance) was held by the Taoiseach and his office bolstered by input from the other relevant departments. Anglo-Irish affairs continued to remain within the Taoiseach's brief. Everything that remained was within the remit of the Department of External Affairs and in effect amounted to the UN.[45]

However, as negotiations over Europe intensified in the late 1960s and early 1970s and in the period after membership was accepted in 1972, the Department of Foreign Affairs began to play a much more central, and co-ordinating role in European (i.e. Common Market) affairs. The change of name, in 1971, from the Department of External Affairs to the Department of Foreign Affairs, perhaps best symbolises the institutional changes which were beginning to occur: a break with the past order was being made.

The institutions changes brought by EEC membership are dealt with in detail in the following chapter. But before moving on to examine the substantive issues that EEC membership introduced to Irish foreign policy considerations, I now turn to the role of civil society actors during this period of creeping multilateralism.

Civil Society Actors and Creeping Multilateralism

A striking, but not surprising, feature of foreign policy formation at this time is the small and exclusive arena within which decisions and policy were made. Although the situation that pertained during the early years of the League of Nations (when the Irish representative had to decide policy in the absence of instructions from home) was ephiphenomenal, the circle of actors did not expand significantly. During this period, policy was formulated almost entirely by senior civil servants at the Department of Foreign Affairs (in Dublin and overseas), the Minister for External Affairs and the Taoiseach.

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[44] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 34.

[45] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 35.

Overall, public opinion was 'largely indifferent' to foreign policy matters and the decision makers were 'cautious and tight-lipped'.[46]

There were three issues in which this was not the case and the debates on these issues prefigured the extended role of civil society actors in foreign policy concerns to become evident later. The issues were; the UN debate on China 1957 – 1961: the UN's deliberations on South Africa in the 1960's and the issue of peacekeeping.

The Debate on China

Ireland's participation in the protracted UN debate on China's application for membership reveals something of the contradictory tensions between Ireland's idealistic support for developing nations, an independent stance and its increasingly Western-favoured orientation. Ireland stood out among the European and Western powers in September 1957 when it voted in favour of discussing China's accreditation.[47] But ultimately, in December 1961, Ireland voted in tandem with its geographical allies and opposed China's admission. One key to understanding this policy, inconsistent in the context of East/West divisions within the UN,[48] is perhaps the strength of organised opposition to China's admission within the domestic sphere. Opposing the state's policy were the Catholic Church and the Irish media and members of the public.

The row was indeed, intense. Seán Lemass faced 'withering criticism' which he eventually neutralised by moving Ireland' position in line with the anti-communist western allies.[49] But sensitivity to domestic opinion alone was not what brought the change. Irish-US relations, and the change in Ireland's economic organisation, were very significant factors in the final vote.[50]

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[46] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 35.

[47] Ireland found itself aligned with India, the Soviet bloc, most Afro-Caribbean members and the Nordic countries. See Skelly, *op cit.*: 114-124 for detail.

[48] While Holmes *et al, op cit.*: *172* argue that the development was inconsistent, it is conceivable to argue in favour of discussing a particular country's membership application while, in fact, opposing it. Skelly argues that Aiken was committed to the principle that all topics were amenable to discussion. See Skelly, *op cit.*: 119-121.

[49] *Ibid.*: 227, 233.

[50] *Ibid.*: 226-35. Keatinge argues that the limits of Ireland's pro-developing world and anti-imperialist policies were reached in the 1960s mediated by the pragmatism of Lemass and subsequent Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the conservatism of the Catholic Church which, in favour of an ethical dimension in foreign policy, was also anti-socialist and anti-communist. This is not to say that the position of the Catholic Church automatically curried favour. Despite a highly organised campaign by the Irish Catholic Church in favour of Franco

Nonetheless, the issue stands out because of the level of public engagement with it and its impact on the domestic political sphere. It was hotly debated in the Dáil, for instance,[51] a chamber not generally known for grave concern with foreign policy matters.

The Debate on South Africa

As in the debate on China, of interest here is how South African politics became a mobilising focus for civil groups or individuals in Irish society. Revulsion towards the South African apartheid regime was the catalyst that brought together the first formally constituted, non-Church organised group that sought to influence government foreign policy, outside of Anglo-Irish relations, in a sustained and protracted manner. That group, the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement was formed in 1964. From 1958 onwards, Irish policy on South Africa had fitted the overarching concerns relating to post colonial societies that largely determined voting patterns at the UN.[52]

But why South Africa in particular? Because of the missionary networks created by Irish religious orders in Southern Africa the region was not unfamiliar territory to the general Irish population.[53] These links, bolstered by the strong moral stance taken by the Catholic church on apartheid fomented the popular basis of the Irish Anti Apartheid Movement.[54] The manner in which the debate on South Africa eventually percolated into the Irish polity and became an issue at national election time will be dealt with in some detail in the final section of this chapter. However, the Irish tradition of anti-imperialism, a concern for justice and the sympathy of the moral issues involved with the moral framework of the Catholic church, along with the organisational skill and cross-ideological, cross-party base of the movement meant that there was a formidable representative force of Irish public opinion on this issue by the late 1960s.

The Debate on the Congo

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during the Spanish Civil War, the Irish government stuck with its policy of non-intervention. See Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 170-76.

[51] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 206.

[52] Skelly, *op cit.*: 187-88.

[53] Holmes, *et al, op cit.* argue that Irish missionaries laid down a prototype diplomatic network in Africa.

[54] Laffan, Brigid. 1998. *Ireland and South Africa: Irish Government Policy in the 1980s,* Trócaire, Dublin: 26.

As stated earlier, Ireland's agreement to participate in the UN peacekeeping forces in the Congo from 1960 - 1964 was a badge of membership in international society. However, the killing of 9 Irish soldiers in the Niemba attack shocked the nation and came at a time of crisis about the future of the UN.[55] In all, 26 Irish soldiers died in the Congo but neither government nor defence forces wavered in their support for the principles of the UN Charter.[56] Popular public and media opinion wavered somewhat after the deaths of the soldiers but ultimately legitimised Ireland's continued contribution to the general aims and goals of the UN.[57] The participation of the Irish troops in such operations was widely debated in the media and still resonates in contemporary discussions on Ireland's international obligations.[58]

Interestingly, the kinds of tensions we saw emerging in relation to Ireland's League of Nations participation were to be found here too. While the Department of Defence was enthusiastic about the participation, the Department of Finance was concerned about the extra financial burdens it would impose on the state.[59]

What conclusions can we draw from this period in relation to the evolving substantive concerns of Irish foreign policy? As we saw, the period spanned Ireland's involvement in the UN to the point of departure for EEC membership and the significant domestic changes that occurred therein. The period can be characterised then by two distinct sub-periods as Ireland's interest and activism in the UN, as the main foreign policy forum, was weaned on to European affairs. The guiding vision was the 'modernised' Ireland as articulated by Taoiseach Seán Lemass. Undoubtedly, more acutely drawn national economic interests led to a more self-interested policy orientation. Membership was almost entirely viewed from the vantage point of economic benefits. For instance, the needs of the domestic agricultural sector was a major factor in Ireland's decision to join the EEC. Yet the

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[55] Murphy, Ray, 1998. "Ireland, the United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations" in *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 5, no. 1: 30-31.

[56] *Ibid.*: 30.

[57] Holmes *et al, op cit.: 155*-156.

[58] The Congo participation has been described as the "first physical expression of Irish independence not as an act of separation but as an act of connection to a world beyond ourselves." Fintan O'Toole, *Irish Times*, April 18 1997,

[59] Holmes, *et al, op cit.*: 155.

'tentative internationalisation'[60] of pre-EEC foreign policies was not fully abated and neither were substantive issues determined exclusively by national interest. As we have seen disarmament and arms control remained as important policy issues.

This period is also characterised by the formation, albeit slow and tentative, of groups and individuals concerned about peace and justice issues in the international milieu. However, the most significant issue of this time, and that which provided the cut off point from this period was, of course, Ireland's successful application to the EEC, approved by referendum in May 1972 and realised in January 1973. Membership marked the beginning of the third phase of this enquiry and it is to this that I now turn.

Deepening Regional Multilateralism: 1972-1996

The two significant themes of concern within this period are Ireland's participation in a more comprehensive form of regional multilateralism as European Political Co-operation (EPC) eventually gave way to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the rise of civil society actors the field of Irish foreign policy. This section deals with both these themes separately below.

Ireland joined the EEC in the wake of the Luxembourg Report which had set out the EPC framework. EPC began as a 'pragmatic' way of achieving a common foreign policy identity alongside the economic identities of the European Communities established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome.[61] Thus Ireland's membership coincided with the formal institutionalisation of a long process leading through the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the Amsterdam Treaty (1996). In Ireland's case new dimensions within EPC demanded institutional change in the domestic environment which, in turn, enhanced Ireland's capacity to respond to new foreign policy challenges. Hence substance of policy and the structures within which they are enacted are very closely linked. However, keeping in mind the conceptual distinction outlined at the start of this chapter attention here is attuned to the substantive issues only. Chapter three allows us to focus on the framework

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[60] Keatinge, Patrick, 1986. "Unequal Sovereigns: the Diplomatic Dimension of Anglo-Irish Relations" in Drudy, PJ, (Ed.). *Ireland and Britain Since 1922*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 147.

[61] Nuttall, Simon J, 1992. *European Political Co-operation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1.

and structures of EPC and CFSP through which these concerns were played out.

The most important question to be posed in relation to the impact of EEC membership on Ireland relates to the extent to which, and manner in which, it changed the substance of Irish foreign policy and acted as a constraint and/or a facilitator of policy issues and objectives. This question begs a prior question about what Ireland brought with it, as key concerns, into the EC foreign policy process. In order to examine these, two themes have been identified. The first refers to the impact of the EC on Ireland and the second to the content of Ireland's foreign policy baggage. The two themes, dealt with separately below, are the policy scope that EEC membership altered and the manner in which EEC membership brought a consolidation of previous policies.

EEC Membership and Policy Scope

On joining the EEC in 1972, Ireland, as we saw, joined the foreign policy consultation process formulated under EPC. (EPC had actually begun in 1969 as a practice but did not have any legal basis until the SEA of 1986). EPC operated at an intergovernmental level and although, on paper, it created a distinction between 'political' (i.e. EPC) issues and economic (i.e. EC) issues, in practice, this distinction can be seen as somewhat false.[62]

What the EPC process sought to do was to bring about a greater convergence of national foreign policies towards the creation of consensual approaches to a range of issues of concern to the Community and to its members states. The debate about whether it produced common foreign policies or co-ordinated foreign policies is noted here. How this debate is resolved, however, depends on the protagonist's starting point and what yard stick is used to measure 'success'[63] and, furthermore, is not entirely relevant for this enquiry. EPC did, however, involve a process that required a constant dialogue between members, not only on the value of co-operation itself, but on the response to crises and issues as they arose.[64]

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[62] Holmes, et *al*, *op cit.*: 12-114 argue that economic and political concerns were effectively indistinguishable in EC/Middle East relations.

[63] Nuttall, *op cit.*: 309-10.

[64] Wallace, William, 1983. "Introduction" in Hill, Christopher, (Ed.). *National Foreign Policies and European Political Co-operation*, George Allen and Unwin, London: 1-18.

For Ireland, EPC membership meant having a 'stake' in the foreign policy designs of a bigger and more powerful institution than Ireland itself could ever be. Ireland could no longer conceive itself as acting exclusively on something called 'national interest' and confine its diplomatic activities to those arising from that 'interest'. Neither could it 'pick and choose in accordance with its own priorities'[65] the issues that it would take a position on. The political and moral obligations of multilateralism within EPC were clear from the start. Put in brief, it meant that a narrow statist framework, (even if informed by idealism and internationalism on occasions) was no longer viable in itself. In principle at least, the EEC provided a policy framework in which all member states were obliged to open for discussion and possible amendment such statist views and, indeed, provide for the possibility of a quasi-cosmopolitan synthesis.

The effect can be summarised by saying that, on joining the EEC, the scope of Ireland's foreign policy became as wide as the globe itself. Membership required that Ireland forge closer relationships with the other member states of the EEC. Ireland also found itself having to prepare positions and participate in discussions on, for instance, Arab Israeli relations, the break up of colonial Africa, EEC/ASEAN relations, US policy in Central America and the non-military aspects of East-West relations.

But as the scope widened the commitment to multilateralism became more comprehensive. The centrality of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the development of European affairs established its pre-eminence among Irish government departments.[66] And, indeed, the centrality of European affairs in Ireland's foreign policy considerations meant that political co-operation in Europe was seen as 'defining the context within which Ireland related to the rest of the world".[67]

Consolidation in the EEC

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[65] Mac Kernan, Pádraic, 1984. "Ireland and European Political Co-operation" in *ISIA*, vol. 1, no. 4: 16.

[66] Tonra, Ben, 1999. "Europeanisation and the Department of Foreign Affairs" in *EU Member State Foreign Ministries*, European Commission, DG1A. Tonra suggests that the DFA is seen as the second to the Department of Finance in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

[67] *Ibid.*: 61.

While Ireland found itself confronting new opportunities and challenges through EEC membership in 1972 it did not do so as a *tabula rasa.* Did the new environment thus allow a deepening or consolidation of pre-existing goals and values? An assessment of this question invariably introduces the more complex foreign policy decision making environment that Ireland found itself in from 1973 onwards than at any previous stage. Following EEC membership, Ireland was obliged not only to participate in the structures and process of EPC. As a move towards co-ordination of political issues, including foreign policies, EPC also effected Ireland's role, approach and policy positions at the UN and other multilateral agencies This, of course, continued and deepened with the obligations of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, as stated, this theme will be returned to in the following chapter.

Sharp has argued that Ireland's EEC entry created a new environment for continuation of the role it had carved out in the UN during the 1950s. Thus Ireland sought to influence and gain favours by creating a reputation "for the country as a strong supporter of the 'European' ideal". In other words it adopted the 'communitaire' ethos of supporting the process of integration itself but it also had no difficulty in abandoning this for a more narrow perspective when Irish interests were threatened by such.[68] This analysis, although dependent on Ireland's status as a small, insecure, post colonial state emerging onto a stage of former global powers, may be equally applicable to other EU members states of various capacities, autonomies and histories. Combining the protection of national interests with the pursuit of an overt communitaire approach may not be unique. This analysis, furthermore, does not sufficiently account for the differences between economic interests (Pillar One) and the more overtly political interests under the ambit of intergovernmental control (under the CFSP; the second pillar). While foreign policy interests may, indeed, be reducible to economic interests, they are conceptually distinct and in terms of formal decision making within the EU, are also institutionally distinct.

But what were those values that Ireland brought with it to consolidate? As has been set out in the previous section, the question of partition had dominated Irish foreign policy since the formation of the state. Arising from the same pool of historical experience came other goals. McKernan argues

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[68] Sharp, *op cit.*: 104-5.

that Ireland's commitment to the rule of law to international stability and to solidarity with former colonial peoples and countries continued to feature in EPC. In particular Ireland's attitudes to arms control and disarmament, and towards both the Middle East and Southern Africa, are examples of a consolidation of traditional concerns.

An overview of Ireland and EPC up to 1983 posits continuity in Irish positions before and after EPC membership. Ireland's general orientation within EPC, whether expressed at the UN or within the EPC process itself, was identified with the 'moralist' rather than the *'realpolitik'* end of the spectrum. The source of this orientation was twofold. Firstly it emanated from the historical commitment to universalistic goals and values, such as outlined above. Secondly, in relation to development and aid issues, it was mediated also by a strong development co-operation lobby within the domestic polity.[69] This factor will be returned to in the section below.

A core value for Ireland throughout EPC and into CFSP (and on going) was, of course, the issue of military neutrality. That is not a debate than can be entered into here. However, Ireland's position in opposition to defence pacts, and to any policies that would compromise its traditional neutrality, did render it an 'odd man out' within the EU.[70]

While acknowledging the declaratory nature of commitments to peace, global stability and respect for international law, Holmes *et al* argue that they were not acted upon with clarity. In regard to relations between Ireland and the developing world, as mediated through the EPC, Ireland did not consistently build on its goals but acted with primary reference to the general multilateral framework. This may partly be explained by the limited power the state wielded within the EPC process but not entirely. In relation to both EC-Lomé and EC-Latin American relations, Ireland took a lesser role than it could have in promoting policies that supported the interests of the developing world. In relation to EC relations with the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific bloc (ACP), Ireland "was no more an active proponent of Third World interests....than any other state".[71]

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[69] Keatinge, Patrick, 1983. "Ireland: Neutrality inside EPC" in Hill, Christopher, (Ed.), 1983. *Op cit.*: 140-51.

[70] McSweeney, Bill, 1990. "Ireland and European Integration" in *Studies*: 187.

[71] Holmes *et al, op cit.*: 138-141.

However, in relation to the specific issue of South Africa, Ireland did take a position, along with some other EU states, of promoting strong policies to dismantle apartheid. Indeed, Ireland would have wished the EU to go further than it did. Given the confidential nature of EPC it is, however, impossible to make a definitive assessment of Ireland's individual role in the collective policy which ensued.[72] The particular role played by Ireland leading up to and during its Presidency of the EC in 1990 (Gerry Collins) has been credited, with some validity, with bringing the voice of black South Africa into EU deliberations on sanctions and with preventing an early disintegration of the Community's position on the same sanctions.[73]

The case study provided in chapter five to follow affords an opportunity to examine the evolution of Irish policy in relation to East Timor through the institutions of CFSP. As we will see, Ireland was to become an ardent supporter of the cause of East Timor within the EU and participated in the process leading up to the EU's adoption of a common position on the issue.

Consolidation at the UN

Did EPC participation mediate any apparent changes or interruptions of patterns at the United Nations?

An examination of issues where Ireland diverged with other EPC states (such as on attitudes towards South Africa and nuclear non-proliferation) in terms of both policy positions and voting patterns up to 1984 reveals a coincidence between them and the issues which informed Ireland's UN orientation: solidarity with former colonial countries, support for disarmament and for the continued strengthening and implementing of the principles within the UN Charter.[74] Irish positions on Latin America, traditionally undeveloped, did undergo significant change in the early 80's with the enhanced scope provided by EC/Latin American relations. But with one or two exceptions, actions embarked on in the region emanated from the collective EC response.[75]

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[72] Laffan, *op cit.*: 102-103.

[73] Tonra, Ben, 1994. "Ireland in European Political Co-operation: the Victory of Substance over Form" in *Irish Political Studies*, vol. 9: 99-118.

[74] Mac Kernan, *op cit.*: 16-21.

[75] Kirby, Peadar, 1992. *Ireland and Latin America: Links and Lessons.* Trócaire/Gill and Macmillan, Dublin: 120.

One such exception occurred during the Falklands/Malvinas dispute in 1982 when Ireland, along with Italy, refused to continue with the EC-wide sanctions policy against Argentina. It may be the case that the then state of Anglo-Irish relations, fed by historic differences between the two states, was a key factor in explaining Ireland's behaviour.[76] However, the issue of neutrality (coupled with a domestic political crisis) along with Ireland's distinctive relationship with Argentina and the traditional profile Ireland had at the United Nations were equally significant factors in determining Ireland's position on the dispute.[77]

While Ireland's traditional relationship with the Central and South American regions has not been as strong as that with the African continent, Ireland did, however, play a distinct role in San José process in the mid 1980's through which the EC began to institutionalise its relations with the American regions.[78] However, while this role may have been characterised by independence within Europe, it has been said that EPC involvement has become a substitute for an independent relationship with Latin America.[79] Such an analysis much be contextualised by the fact EPC functioned to co-ordinate EC member's foreign policies and attenuate independent tendencies.

The level of co-ordination of policy at the UN would, under CFSP, and in theory at least, be deeper than that in EPC. As will be seen in the following chapter, all EU members co-ordinate their positions in advance of debates and votes. In the absence of sustained analysis of Ireland we cannot draw any conclusions about substantial changes that CFSP may have brought to Ireland's policy positions at the UN.

The Rise of Civil Society Actors

Keatinge has argued that, outside of Anglo-Irish relations, the effect of interest groups on foreign policy has been negligible. Although agricultural and business interests have had a significant impact on decision making cause

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[76] McQueen, Norman, 1985. "The Expedience of Tradition: Ireland, International Organization and the Falklands Crisis" in *Political Studies*, XXX111: 38-55.

[77] Tonra, Ben, 1996. "The Internal Dissenter (11): Ireland" in Stelios Stavridis and Hill, Christopher, (Eds.). *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, Berg, Oxford: 132-50. See also Kirby, *op cit.* for an overview of Irish/Latin American relations including those with Argentina.

[78] *Ibid.*: 123-124.

[79] *Ibid.*: 126.

groups have not had a good innings. This is partly because of a lack of any 'systemic and sustained intellectual tradition' in the field of foreign policy and international relations in Ireland.[80] This analysis was concluded in the early 1970s'. How does it stand up today?

An historical exception to such a conclusion is the role played by the Catholic Church on foreign policy. In particular, the impact of the Irish missionary tradition has not been insignificant.[81] Since the early part of the Century, the Catholic Church has created a population that is receptive to the issues of aid and development co-operation. The influence of the Church on the Bilateral Aid Programme (BAP)[82] is evident. It largely followed the geographical paths laid down by Irish missionaries in sub Saharan Africa.[83] Kirby has argued that the church along with public opinion generally and solidarity groups had a direct effect on Irish policy towards the US's Central America policy in the 1980s. The 1984 visit to Ireland by US President, Ronald Reagan, provided a focus for the activities of solidarity groups, trade unions, church groups and individuals.[84] As we saw in relation to South Africa the activities of the IAAM, trade unions and other NGOs, working with members of the parliament, directly brought about the government's decision to ban the importation of South African products.[85]

Evidence from the three case studies to be presented in following chapters suggests that groups are in a strong position to influence the policy outcomes. The domestic environment within which foreign policy is formulated has changed in subtle but significant ways since these groups began to emerge. These changes (to be traced in the following chapter) have enhanced the permeability of the small élite groups of decision makers and enhanced the efficacy of the attentive minority of opinion shapers, lobbyists and interest groups. The overall effect has been to legitimise NGO activity.

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[80] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 293.

[81] See Holmes, et *al, op cit.: passim* and Kirby, *op cit.*: chapters seven to twelve.

[82] The BAP was launched in 1974 under the Fine Gael/Labour Party coalition (Garrett FitzGerald was Minister for Foreign Affairs) and prioritised Tanzania, Sudan, Lesotho, Zambia and India. India was removed from the BAP in 1978 and since then Mozambique has been added.

[83] Holmes, *et al, op cit.:* 77-82.

[84] Kirby, *op cit.: 157-159.* Kirby, highlights the involvement of Catholic laity and clerics in the Central American solidarity campaign in the 1980's. US President Ronald Reagan's visit to Ireland in 1984 was met with lobbying, street demonstrations and other actions by non-state actions.

[85] Laffan, *op cit.: passim.*

NGOs: The Formative Years

During the early years of the era of regional multilateralism we see a rise of NGOs and civil society activism on foreign policy issues. The changes that we have seen earlier in this chapter, effected the potential role(s) played by NGOs in the policy process. EU membership opened up new levels of political action for Irish lobby groups[86] of all kinds and NGOs were no exception. It has been argued that the requirements of EPC brought a significant constraint on the activities of NGOs in Ireland as, up to 1980, they did not have to consider an extra-Irish dimension to the lobbying arena.[87] However, such an assertion requires an examination of life before and after EPC. It is possible that the potential for cross national coalitions and the sharing of analysis and information that such coalitions bring, equally provides opportunities for Irish NGO activities. More recently, funding is an issue. Many Irish groups involved in such activism benefit from EU funding either for their core policy or related work which in turn, promotes and supports the organisation.

A key departure point for Irish NGO activism was the founding of Amnesty International (Irish section) in Dublin in 1961. Four years later, the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement formed in Dublin at the initiative of a South African academic living in Ireland. It is interesting to note that the first AGM of the IAAM (in 1973)[88] was launched by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs. His presence conferred great legitimacy to the IAAM and its goals.

The radicalising impact of Vatican Two on many Irish religious[89] - in particular those who worked overseas - was a further contributory factor in the changes of this period. While the radicalisation process began in the 1960s its substantial impact was felt in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the consolidation of religious-based aid agencies. The promotional campaigns and fund raising drives of the aid agencies, required generating consciousness about contemporary development issues in the 'third world'. Gorta, the first,

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86 Brown, Tony, 1993. "Ireland: Decolonised Lobbying" in Van Schendelen, MCPM, (Ed.), *National Public and Private EC Lobbying*, Dartmouth, Aldershot: 201-224.

87 Kirby, *op cit.*: 164, quoting a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and a Trócaire official.

88 By this stage, the IAAM had run several very effective campaigns. In 1970, a South African visit by the Irish trade board, An Córas Trachtála, was cancelled because of IAAM protests. See Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 284.

89 In equalising the issue of liberation with the goal of evangelisation Vatican Two brought Catholic clerics into a new realm of political action.

was founded in 1965.[90] Concern, established in 1968, made development a 'household word' in Ireland.'[91] UK based agencies, Oxfam and Christian Aid set up operations in Ireland in the late 1960s and 1970's. A vehicle for fomenting more political attitudes towards development (i.e. attitudes based less on charity) was the magazine *The New Internationalist* which both organisations promoted in Ireland.[92]

Other aid agencies were established in this period: the Church of Ireland Bishop's Appeal in 1969 and Trócaire in 1973. The Association of Missionary Societies was established in 1973 and the Irish Missionary Union in 1970. Trócaire, in particular, went on to become a radical voice in the Irish landscape on questions of US policy in Central America. In 1981, its chairperson, Bishop Eamonn Casey, called on Ireland to break off diplomatic relations with the US over its Central American policies.[93]

The linkages that these agencies and the missionary groups formed created a national awareness of the complexity of issues arising in the third world and evoked a sympathetic affection for Africa, Asia and Latin America at a grassroots level in Irish society. Before funds could be raised public awareness of undevelopment was required and the agencies promoted their work and causes among the wider public. Importantly, they also had an impact on the development of Ireland's aid commitments and sought to highlight principles of 'justice and freedom' with both policy makers and the public.[94]

The influence of the Catholic church can be seen in the establishment of the 'first generation' of solidarity groups formed during this period although not all were religious-linked. An active Filipino-Irish support group was established in 1975 by a group of Columban missionaries and lay people but waned somewhat following the release of imprisoned Irish Columban missionary Niall O'Brien.[95] A group campaigning on human rights in Argentina ran out of steam following the release from prison there of an Irish

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[90] Gorta is the Irish committee of the UN's Freedom From Hunger Campaign.

[91] Hanan, *op cit.*: 16.

[92] Hanan, *op cit.*: 19. Holmes *et al*, claim that the Irish Catholic church played a major role in stimulating interest in the developing world, from the publication of the first Irish missionary magazine in 1914 onwards. Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 53.

[93] Kirby, *op cit.*: 154

[94] Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 51-54.

[95] Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 90-99.

priest.[96] An Irish Chilean solidarity support group emerged after the coup in Chile and successfully campaigned for the acceptance of Chilean refugees into Ireland.[97] Chilean politics provided a focus for much of the Irish left's internationalism in the 1970's as the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution did in Ireland in the 1980's.[98] In none of these specific cases had the Irish state a prior position or engagement on the issue. In the O'Brien case, the response of the public and organised groups was both speedier and more proactive than that of the government.[99]

Comhlámh, the organisation for returned development workers, was founded, largely at the initiative of the Chief Executive of APSO[100] in February 1976. Comhlámh's brief has extended to providing a service for returned development workers and its 1996 mission statement is worth quoting here. Comhlámh sees itself as: "a membership organisation of global development workers. Our constituency is made up of people committed to working for development from an integrated analysis and with a global orientation, be it overseas in countries of the South, or from Ireland in solidarity with peoples and communities in the South, or in communities here in Ireland".[101]

NGO Consolidation

During the period of deepening multilateralism the number of Irish NGOs involved in foreign policy issues grew steadily. As a causal explanation we can look to many factors. The same factors that led to the extension of Ireland's bilateral and multilateral relations: economic growth of the 1960s and early 1970s, internationalisation of the economy and EU membership and the consequential widening of the scope of Irish foreign policy concerns onto a global scale, all had an effect. The impact of travel opportunities and of access to global media gave Irish people immediate and, sometimes, direct experience of issues confronting peoples in other parts of the world. The

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96 See Kirby, *op cit.*: 155-156.

97 The original group was bedevilled by political differences and unity was not achieved until 1977. See Kirby, *op cit.*: 155.

98 During the 1980s many Irish work brigades were organised to Nicaragua. During the 1980s and 1990s Nicaraguan and Tanzanian participative models of democracy were particularly attractive to the Irish left and Irish development agencies. See Hanan, *op cit.*: 34.

99 Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 99

100 Hanan, *op cit.*: 11-15.

101 *Ibid.*: 95.

expansion of third level education from the 1970s onwards introduced a generation of Irish citizens to international issues. Returned development workers sought to build a constituency in Ireland for receipt of the lessons learned abroad.[102] Two indicators of the extent to which discussion on development issues had become integrated into strands of Irish life are the establishment in 1981 of a Third World Committee by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions[103] and the inclusion of development education on the curriculum of schools from mid 1980s onwards. Development education as a formal part of the secondary school curriculum has gone through various metamorphosis but developments in recent years are firmly based in cosmopolitan ideas. The curricular needs of schools and NGOs interest in public education and promotional work are met in the tradition of inviting groups to give talks and encouraging students to do projects on particular human rights or development issues.[104] As we will see in the case of the East Timor campaign school work became an important part of the campaign.

During the 1980s three foreign policy issues generated high profile NGO activism and created widespread public debate: the boycott of South African fruit and the Dunnes Stores strike;[105] US foreign policy in Central America[106] and Irish policy in the Philippines.[107] The role of NGOs and church-linked groups in the campaign against US foreign policy in Central America and in support of the government of Nicaragua and popular movements in Guatemala and El Salvador was particularly pronounced. The Irish Nicaragua Support Group (INSG) was the most well organised and active of the Latin America groups during the 1980's.[108] One parliamentarian commented that, such was the weight of public opinion on the side of the Nicaraguan government (the government of the Frente Sandinista Liberation

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[102] *Ibid.*: 33-69.

[103] The committee, funded by the European Commission, the NCDE, Trócaire and Oxfam, promotes development issues among Irish trade unions.

[104] The Junior cycle course in 'Civil, Social and Political Education' is organised around key concepts: human rights and responsibilities, interdependence, democracy, law, human dignity and development. The Senior cycle applied course contains modules rooted in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The overall thrust of these courses in the curricula is to mainstream ideas of human rights and global responsibility and encourage students to make connections between local and global issues.

[105] See Laffan, *op cit.: passim.*

[106] See Kirby, Peadar, 1992. *Op cit.*: 149-66.

[107] See Holmes, *et al, op cit.*: 90-9.

[108] Kirby, *op cit.*: 156.

Nationale or the FSLN) that 'no Irish diplomat would feel free to take anything other than a progressive line in relation to Nicaragua'.[109]

The values of these groups were, unsurprisingly, not universally welcomed. A senior Irish diplomat criticised what he saw as an 'anti-American bias' among Irish NGOs. Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald expressed similar antipathetic comments about church groups and NGOs. Both these remarks, however, underlined the strength of NGOs in the policy process.[110] A comment by a senior Irish diplomat, that solidarity groups could damage Irish-US relations and were dominating the debate in Ireland, indicates that their activities must have had some impact.[111]

It is important to note here that the activities described above were not unique to Ireland. The major issues that Irish NGOs were grappling with in the 1980's - Central America, US foreign policy, development aid and apartheid in South Africa - were equally exercising NGOs throughout the Northern hemisphere and made their way onto the agenda of the UN and the EU. In the US, for instance, there was a sharp rise in the number of groups participating in the foreign policy process from the 1970s onwards with a noteworthy number of citizens groups entering the fray. Moreover church groups began to extend their activities to include environmental issues, concerns for nuclear disarmament and intervention into areas of global conflict; Central America, the Middle East and South Africa.[112] Similar movements were visible in Holland where the number of single issue groups increased dramatically from an estimated 64 in 1970 to 174 in 1982.[113] In the UK, Latin American solidarity groups were very active in the 1970s' and 1980's.[114]

It is also interesting to note that NGO activism in a range of other areas within Irish society was marked during the 1970s. By 1978 the Irish Anti Nuclear

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[109] Deputy Michael D. Higgins, TD, quoted in Kirby, *op cit.*: 162. Deputy Higgins was himself a supporter of the FSLN.

[110] Kirby, *op cit.*: 163-4.

[111] *Ibid.*: 163.

[112] Uslaner, Eric, M. 1995. "All Politics Are Global: Interest Groups and the Making of Foreign Policy" in Cigler, AJ and Loomis B A, (Eds.). *Interest Group Politics*, CQ Press, Washington: 371-3.

[113] See Everts, Ph.P, (Ed.) 1985. *Controversies At Home: Domestic Factors in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands*, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht: 62-3.

[114] See Wilkinson, Derek, 1990. "The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America, 1973–1990." Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Hull.

Campaign had already scored two victories. The first was against uranium mining in Donegal and the second against the siting of a nuclear power plant in Wexford.[115] As we will see in relation to chapter seven the Irish women's movement also grew to strength in the 1970s and 1980.

By the 1990s there was a range of groups active on single country solidarity campaigns and single issues representing interest in Africa, Asia and Latin America. A particular phenomenon of the 1990s and one that reflects an increased sophistication of the NGO sector has been the rise of coalitions or networks of groups formed specifically to amplify the voice of NGOs and co-ordinate lobbying activities. The details of these and other groups will be returned to in chapter four.

The changes and, more particularly the successful campaigns run by NGOs cast doubt on the validity of Keating's comment that there was no 'systematic and sustained intellectual tradition in the fields of foreign policy and international relations'.[116] During this period, a tradition of opposition and surveillance emerged and policy makers could no longer assume no opposition from the domestic environment.

NGOs and Public Opinion

In as much as we can consider interest groups as articulating a section of public opinion in an organised fashion we must also recognise that much public opinion is expressed in a non-organised manner; in letters to the editor sections in newspapers, on radio and television, on the doorsteps at election time and so on. Our interest in public opinion in this thesis is confined to how it might be used by NGOs. Public opinion itself is not necessarily a direct determinant in the political process. That the mass of public opinion throughout the EU (including Ireland) is not much concerned with foreign policy issues generally,[117] does not prevent the EU and its members from concerning themselves with common foreign policy matters. The potential of public opinion lies in its power as a resource that can be mobilised or 'spent'

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115 Baker, Susan, 1987. "Case Study. Dependent Industrialization and Political Protest: Raybestos Manhattan in Ireland" in *Government and Opposition*, vol. 22, no. 2: 354.

116 Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 293.

117 Feld, Werner, 1991. "European Political Co-operation and Public Opinion" in Reif, Karlheinz and Inglehart, Ronald, (Eds.). *Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion*, Macmillan, Basingstoke: 46.

by other actors.[118] NGOs can use public opinion for direct mobilisation (through public events and campaigns) or indirectly through generating an attentive public for their campaigns. As we have seen, public opinion played a role in shaping government policy on Central America and on apartheid in South Africa.

The media is an extra dynamic in the public opinion/NGO relationship. The media can facilitate an unfettered expression of public opinion which, in turn, can be called upon by NGOs. But the media can also actually shape public opinion. Newspaper editorials in the national press may be powerful forces of opinion shaping and newspapers themselves may have interests to pursue. An intensive piece of research carried out in the 1980s showed that, among the Irish public, the media was the most important opinion forming institution in relation to foreign policy, followed by the Catholic church and politicians.[119]

Overall, we know comparatively little about the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in Ireland and what we do know is localised and usually confined to a short time frame. Keatinge's analysis of the impact of public opinion on Irish foreign policy remains valid today in that the absence of any sustained research renders it irrefutable.[120] The effect of 'disorganised' public opinion on policy is difficult to assess and, in fact, the concept of public opinion as a variable in the process of policy formation is nebulous.[121] Surveys carried out by the now disbanded Advisory Council on Development Co-operation in relation to aid and development show that although Irish people continue to support the provision of aid to the developing world, there is an, apparently contradictory, high level of ignorance of third world issues in the population.[122] This general aid commitment is, furthermore, carried into Irish people's conception of the role of the EU as a donor.[123]

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[118] Everts, *op cit.*: 14-15.

[119] Horgan, John, 1987. *Images of Africa*, Trócaire, Dublin: 9.

[120] In relation to the referenda required to join and then deepen Ireland's EEC relationship the majority opinion supported both. However, only in the 1972 referendum was the turnout (70.9 percent) high enough to indicate an absolute majority in favour. See Sinnott, Richard, 1995. *Knowledge of the European Union in Irish Public Opinion: Sources and Implications*, Institute for European Affairs, Dublin: 6-8.

[121] Keatinge, 1973, *op cit.*: 184.

[122] Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 58.

[123] European Commission, 1997. *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union*, report No. 46. "The Importance of Aid to Third Countries from the European Union": 55-57.

Research on Irish attitudes to neutrality and its relationship to European integration underlines, *inter alia*, the difficulties, arising from problems of consistency and precision of language and concepts, in measuring the opinion of the public.[124] More recently the support of public opinion has been deemed crucial to the continued success of the EU.[125] In this regard, while Ireland ranks slightly above the average across the EU in terms of level of knowledge of the institution, 59 percent of the population have been ranked with low or very low levels of information.[126] The relationship between levels of knowledge and actual policy making by the government is, however, unknown.

The task of separating public opinion as a single variable in a flux of many operating in the foreign policy arena is immense. This difficulty is similar to that facing any evaluator of interest groups/cause group lobbying on foreign policy formation albeit where the latter is focused and can be expertly directed at policy makers, the latter is often undirected and perhaps never even heard. Added to this is the complexity, highlighted by Keatinge, that governments will always ensure the maintenance of their decision-making and final-arbitration authority in all policy making and eschew yielding too much to public opinion on any issue.[127]

However, as the survey data to follow in chapter four shows, NGOs overall believe that influencing the media, the community and voluntary sector (a potentially sympathetic attentive public) and the public directly through talks and lectures is valuable work for enhancing their cause. In the case studies we see that letter writing campaigns, marches and protests, hosting public events and the mobilisation of affected sectors (the women's movement in the case of chapter seven) are all tactics used by the NGO lobby to bring public opinion on their side.

Conclusion

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[124] Marsh, Michael, 1992. *Irish Public Opinion on Neutrality and European Union,* Institute for European Affairs, Dublin.

[125] Irish Minister for European Affairs, Gay Mitchell claimed that public opinion would determine the 'pace and nature' of further EU integration. Mitchell in Sinnott, *op cit.*: v. See also McDonagh. Bobby, 1998. *Original Sin in a Brave New World,* Institute for European Affairs, Dublin: 12-15. McDonagh, a senior Irish diplomat, considers the challenge of public support amongst the greatest facing the EU.

[126] Sinnott, *op cit.*: 1-38, revels that despite three rounds of European Parliament elections over half of the respondents did not know that the parliament was elected directly.

[127] Keatinge, *op cit.*: 207.

Increased integration into the European project resulted in a widening of scope for Irish foreign policy creating a new and ever changing range of policy areas and issues. Ireland introduced values that had been first developed in the early decades of the state and developed a reputation for independence albeit one tempered by the European reflex. It has been argued that the EPC widened and deepened the policy process but did not shift it from a reactive to a more proactive one.[128] In relation to the issue of European foreign policy, Ireland remained firmly on the side of the status quo during key negotiations leading up to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.[129]

Thus, the EU has acted as a facilitator and a constraint both in terms of the scope and implementation of foreign policy and the role of civil society actors therein. However, in terms of policy process, it is difficult to argue against the assertion that, overall, the amplification of Ireland's potential and status following from participation in the EU has outweighed the diminution of autonomy. This point has been noted by many commentators and analysts.[130]

We can only speculate as to what Ireland's foreign policies might have amounted to had Ireland remained outside the EU process. Holmes, *et al* point to a difficulty of decision makers assuming that the EU process amounts to the only, or indeed the best, framework through which Irish policy can be decided and implemented.[131] It is not the case that EPC and now the CFSP absorb, in any legal and or political manner, the total potential of Irish foreign policy. The strength of the Irish Aid budget and growth in sophistication of its disbursement outside of multilateral structures attests to that. The position taken by the State in the IMF, as shown in chapter six, also points to life outside CFSP.

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128 Tonra, 1992, *op cit.*: 9.

129 Petersen, Nikolaj, 1993. "The European Union and Foreign and Security Policy" in Norgaard, Ole *et al* (Eds.). *The European Community in World Politics*, Pinter: London and New York: 9-30.

130 See, for instance, former Foreign Affairs Minister, Peter Barry quoted in Salmon, *op cit.*: 292.

131 Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 140.

It would be foolhardy to suggest that Ireland has not pursued its own national interests in its foreign policy.[132] However, it could also be claimed that those national interests, variously expressed through a general commitment to the rule of international law (in preference to the use of force) and international human rights law, to collective security, to the rights of emerging, post colonial nations to self-determination and to sovereignty, make the state receptive to cosmopolitan ideas. Small states arguably need the big ideas of international law to protect them and therefore it is in their interest to see that such law is applied equally to everyone at every time. Thus we may talk about 'enlightened self interest' which might coincide with cosmopolitanism. However, this would imply that as Ireland became less vulnerable and less determined about its post colonial identity, more economically buoyant and more politically integrated into the European project, the basis of these interests might no longer exist. (Testing this is however, beyond the ambit of this thesis). Conceptually, this point raises questions about the very notion of national interest in its conventional positing as oppositional to 'internationalism' .

Overall, Ireland did exhibit however, a strong commitment to internationalism at the League of Nations at the UN and within the EPC. While cosmopolitanism requires internationalism to thrive, the latter does not amount to the former and Ireland, as we have seen, did not stray too far from the general EPC/western powers framework. There were, of course, some exceptions: Ireland's position on the Falklands war, its early and very active opposition to apartheid in South Africa, its commitment to disarmament and its critical evaluation of US policy in Central America in the 1980s. A significant departure during this time was the rise of single issue and human rights and solidarity groups seeking to project cosmopolitan values into the policy framework. From the mid 1980s onwards these groups became more intent on getting access to the policy making structures and institutions. It is to these structures and institutions that this thesis now turns.

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[132] McKernan, *op cit.: passim.* See also McDonagh, *op cit.*: 111-124 detailing the marriage of national interests with EU common foreign and security policies.

Chapter Three.

The Evolution of Irish Foreign Policy: The Structures

Introduction

The decision-making environment in which Ireland participates has changed radically in the 25-odd year period since Ireland joined the EEC. An understanding of that environment and the institutions which lie therein is vital in order to interpret the content of Irish foreign policy. Of concern here are the trajectories of decision making through the domestic, regional and international environment. This chapter will attempt to isolate where the power to influence lies, who the most powerful actors are in any stage of a decision making process and what the entry points to effecting change within that process are. The focus of this chapter, hence, will be on the current landscape within which the case studies to follow are embedded.

As we have seen in chapter two, Irish foreign policy has gone through three distinct stages in terms of external institutional participation since the foundation of the state: from occasional isolationism to 'creeping' internationalism to participation in an ever deepening, regional multilateral organisation; the EU. In terms of foreign policy decision making, this process reached, perhaps, its most institutionalised point when Ireland voted by referendum to accede to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 thereby consolidating the Treaty base of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The implications of CFSP for civil society activity in Ireland's foreign policy are very significant. Any activist seeking to influence a policy now needs to take account of CFSP procedures and, thus, of the intentions of not only the 14 other EU member governments but potentially, at least, civil society activism within the jurisdiction of those governments. It also needs to consider the implications of CFSP for how Ireland behaves at other fora such as the UN. This does not mean that activists will by-pass national governments but, like sectoral groups such as the Irish agricultural lobby, they can equally operate to influence the policy process in Brussels itself.[1] As the CFSP remains

[1] See Brown, Tony, 1993. "Ireland: Decolonized Lobbying" in Van Schendelen, MPCM, (Ed.). *Lobbying the European Union: National Public and Private EC Lobbying*, Dartmouth, Aldershot: 201-224.

intergovernmental, national governments are still the primary policy makers and thus both the national and transnational avenues[2] to influencing policy are of primary strategic importance. But the policy making environment has become one where many more actors and interests are at play than those in the less complex decision-making environment of a state such as Ireland.

The concern here is the issue of permeability of the system to the role of civil society actors such as the NGOs being examined in this thesis. This requires examining the formal and informal sets of relationships that have evolved. Taking a top-down approach - in terms of moving from global to local but not necessarily implying any corresponding power relationship - the chapter will begin by looking at UN structures and conclude by looking at the lobbying and campaigning role of NGOs in Ireland.

The chapter is divided into four sections organised according to different spheres of policy making. Section one details the decision making structure of the UN with particular reference to the NGO/UN relationship and human rights competencies. The second and third case studies are located, respectively within the of institutions of the IMF and World Bank and the institutions of UN multilateral conferences and, hence, each will be referred to in this section also. Section two details the decision making structure of the European Union. References will be made to the EU/NGO relationship, and, to the structure of the CFSP. The 'Europeanisation' of the Irish foreign policy making process will be explored here. Section three details the decision making structure of the Irish government. Section four details the decision making structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Reference will be made to recent changes in the Department that affected the terrain under examination in this thesis. The fifth and final section concludes this chapter.

The United Nations

Although the membership and range of issues that the UN has dealt with have changed dramatically sine 1945, the core structure has remained. The

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[2] The choice of national and/or transnational routes to policy influencing is determined by, *inter alia,* the sector, the level of organisation of interests in that sector and the level of competence over decision making retained at a national level. For a discussion of these points in relation to the then European Community generally, see Greenwood, Justin, *et al,* 1992. "Conclusions: Evolving Patterns of Organizing Interests in the European Community" in Greenwood, Justin, *et al,* (Eds.). *Organized Interests and the European Community,* Sage, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: 238-252.

end of the cold War in 1989/1990 raised expectations that the UN could now 'return' to its original brief with greater enhancement of functions designed to promote global peace, security and human rights.[3]

Four main areas of activity have been identified with regard to membership of the UN. These are:

a) participation on a permanent basis at the General Assembly or on a rotating basis in the Security Council;

b) selective participation in other UN activities such as peacekeeping;

c) financial contributions to the range of UN sponsored agencies such as the offices of the International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and

d) participation in a range of organisations such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, (the GATT now known as the World Trade Organisation WTO), the World Bank (or, more correctly, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). What makes these latter organisations different in the multilateral landscape is that they are not formal agencies of the UN and do not follow the one-state, one-vote pattern of control and representation of the other agencies listed above.[4]

But how is the United Nations structured and how is policy formulated within it? The most significant division of labour within the UN is that between the Security Council and the General Assembly. In terms of the UN's global function of maintaining peace and global security the Security Council holds the power although the General Assembly is the central, representative body. The Assembly operates on the basis of full plenary sessions and seven committees. It is within the committees that detailed debates take place and from these that recommendations make their way into the Assembly. Decisions made by the General Assembly - where the principle of one state one vote applies - are not legally enforceable. States, can and frequently do ignore the policy applications of such decisions. The Cold War divide further attenuated the impact of General Assembly decisions.

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[3] Wilenski, Peter, 1993. "The Structure of the UN in the Post-Cold War Period" in Adams, Robert and Kingsbury, Benedict, (Eds.). *United Nations, Divided World: the UN's role in International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 437-467.

[4] For an excellent overall account of UN structures see Baehr, Peter and Gordenker, Leon, 1994. *The United Nations in the 1990s*, Macmillan, Basingstoke. See also Bailey, Sydney, and Daws, Sam, 1995. *The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide*, Barnes and Noble, Boston.

The Security Council, on the other hand, has the power to enforce its decisions. Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the UN Charter enable the Security Council to take action against another state - progressing on a range of options from diplomatic communications to the use of force. The mandate for action, as provided by the Council through these Articles, is legally binding on all signatories to the Charter. However, in practice, collaborative actions from the mandate are, *de facto*, voluntary.[5]

One of the policy making mechanisms within the UN is the multilateral conference, or as they are sometimes known, world conferences. These events are of particular interest to this thesis because one such conference provides the policy arena for the case study in chapter seven. The reason this policy arena was selected, in turn, arises from the level of participation of NGOs in the conference process and actual event itself. Below I set out the decision making structures that apply, with variable degrees of efficacy, at UN multilateral conferences and where Ireland fits in.

UN Multilateral Conferences

There are two consultative layers in which each UN member participates prior to a multilateral conference: the Preparatory Conferences (PrepComs) and the Regional groupings. It is useful to distinguish, briefly, between these two here. The degree of policy co-ordination and actual negotiations at each layer will vary. A third layer, that of EU co-ordination must be added to the mix and while reference is made to this layer below, it is dealt with substantially in the section on EU structures to follow.

Most[6] UN members are members of one of five self-regulating regional groupings. These groupings have no official status within the UN system, rather, they evolved informally through practice, principally for electoral purposes within the organisation. They do not have a policy co-ordination

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[5] An illustrative test for Ireland was Security Council Resolution 678 of August 1990 which resulted in a UN-directed military attack on Iraq. Ireland supported the effort by allowing US Airforce planes to refuel at Shannon airport. The government claimed that its actions were obligatory under international law which overrode any commitment Ireland might have to neutrality. For details see Heffernan, Liz and Whelan, Anthony. 1991. "Ireland, the United Nations and the Gulf Conflict: Legal Aspects" in *ISIA*, vol. 3, no. 3: 115-45. The authors conclude that Resolution 678 did not legally oblige Ireland to take such a step.

[6] Some UN members, such as Israel and The Holy See are not part of these groupings although they may so align themselves.

function although some of the groupings attempt to render them with such. The grouping of concern here is the Western European and Other Group (WEOG) of which Ireland is a member.[7]

However, there is a complex layer of unofficial co-ordinating bodies which may coincide with these grouping in practice and which, again, produces varying degrees of policy co-ordination. There are four principle groups here, but of most concern, is the European Union (EU) group, which, arising from co-ordination obligations under the CFSP is the most coherent and effective of all. The EU group operates as an unofficial but highly formal co-ordinating group in which common positions are sought on all matters. As a result, the EU is a powerful body within the UN.[8]

Negotiations at proceedings of each of these bodies or indeed, at each of the groupings where negotiations and co-ordination may take place, are normally conducted by diplomatic staff in New York missions. In relation to the EU group decisions may have been taken elsewhere within the system. Ideally, a streamlining of all EU member state's policies occurs so that what the members say bilaterally will reflect what the EU says externally and vica versa.

Turning to the high level preparatory committee meetings, the PrepComs, these are held in the run up to each multilateral conference. They are organised by the particular body within the UN structure with competence over the given areas for discussion. In the case of the Beijing conference, for instance, the organising authority was the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). PrepComs serve, firstly, to give input to the draft document which, in turn, dictates the agenda for the multilateral conference. Secondly, and most importantly, PrepComs serve to agree the final document. Except where the issue is of particular national importance, the decision making ethos is towards diplomatic consensus tempered with considerable give and take.[9] Diplomats may retain constant contact with their capitals during

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[7] The USA has observer status at WEOG and shares information with and participates in discussions with this grouping. The other groupings are the Latin American and Caribbean Group, (LACG), the African Group, the Asian Group and the Eastern European Group.

[8] Second is the non-EU, western member's group known as JUSCANS (Japan/the US/Canada/Australia and New Zealand and non-EU European states). Third is the group co-ordinated by the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) . Fourth is the G 77 (Group of 77) which, although technically distinct from NAM is made up of largely NAM membership.

[9] Author's interview; DFA 4, July 21 1998.

negotiations or, depending on the issue involved and the personnel available, may be given considerable freedom to negotiate. It is within the PrepComs, in the preparation and redrafting of the draft documents, that UN policy making actually takes place. As we will see in chapter seven this ideal system does not always function efficiently - in the case of Beijing the PrepCom process concluded without agreement on a final document.

A second policy arena that nestles within the broader UN framework of concern to this thesis is that of the World Bank/IMF. Chapter six presents a case study of the work of one Irish NGO to influence a particular policy of the Irish state within the this arena. Below, then, is a presentation of the decision making structures that apply here.

Governance of the World Bank/IMF

Although they evolved as and are part of the UN system, the World/Bank/IMF are 'footloose' within that system and are not, in fact, accountable to the UN.[10] From an internal governance point of view, both the World Bank and the IMF are 'owned' by their members; totalling 181 governments for the period 1996/7. While both organisations are, *de jure*, distinct and separate, the *de facto* situation is that the same personnel acts as governors of both and they have replica structures. The twice-annual meetings (the autumn AGM and a spring meeting) of both organisations are shared events. They share a Board of Governors, which meets at the AGM, and have distinct Boards of Executive Directors (EDs) which transact daily business. The same person holds the office of governor in both organisations. Each member has one governor, constituted by the ministers of finance of the member state, or their representatives.

Each of the five largest subscribers (the US, the UK, France, Germany and Japan) have one ED each. The remainder are organised into groupings with one ED each and membership of each grouping is determined on the basis of weighed criteria. Voting power in the governing bodies is assigned in proportion to the payments made by the member governments albeit to a formula which slightly over-represents the small subscribers.[11] The same five

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[10] Jamal, Amir, 1994. "The IMF and the World Bank: Managing the Planet's Money" in Childers, Erskine, (Ed.). *Challenges to the United Nations: Building a Safer World*, CIIR/St. Martin's Press. London and New York: 59.

[11] Nelson, *op cit.*: 14

states dominate both organisations and, since the foundation of the system, the US has dominated in subscription and voting power within both although the degree of US domination has lessened over time.

Within the World Bank, EDs are accountable to their governments. Group representatives tend to take a multilateral representative position and the single-members state EDs tend to represent the view of their government unilaterally. However, in practice, EDs enjoy 'complete freedom when seeking guidance or instruction' from their member states. The exact nature of the relationship between EDs and the governments that appoints or elects them is not defined in the IBRD's legal framework.[12] Accountability between EDs and the home parliaments varies from state to state but is generally limited. The only direct line of accountability runs between the Board of Governors and the EDs - in other words Ministers for Finance and the Executive Directors.[13] The relationships of governance of the IMF are the same as those of the World Bank presented above.

Any examination of large organisations must keep in mind their tendency towards institutionalised interests. In this regard, the World Bank is no exception. An organisational culture has emerged within the World Bank allowing it to be seen as a social entity that holds to values and priorities of its own and seeks to preserve itself and its own interests.[14] There is no reason to assume that the same tendencies do not exist within the IMF.

Human Rights in the UN

Unlike the League of Nations, the UN set out to include a formal brief for human rights and was the first organisation to formulate fundamental human rights for all mankind. The engine of the human rights machinery is the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) established in 1946 to develop an international bill of rights, declarations and proposals relating to a range of human rights-related matters.[15] Notwithstanding difficulties that were

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[12] Gerster, Richard, 1993. "Accountability of Executive Directors in the Bretton Woods Institutions" in *Journal of World Trade*, vol. 27, no. 6: 91.

[13] *Ibid.*: 92.

[14] Nelson, *op cit.*: 142-175.

[15] Baehr and Gordenker, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 99.

confronted,[16] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN in 1948.[17] The CHR has remained the main focus point for human rights issues within international law and is empowered to investigate specific and/or continuous violations of human rights whether country-specific or thematic under that law.

Customarily, the rights contained in the Declaration are categorised into three sets: firstly rights relating to the physical and spiritual integrity; secondly civil and political rights; and thirdly, social, economic and cultural rights. In 1966 two international covenants, were adopted by the General Assembly dealing with economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights and establishing structured supervisory mechanisms and reporting requirements. These covenants[18] served to translate specific human rights notions contained in the Charter into obligations on governments. In addition, there has been a large number of conventions and declarations on specific subjects.[19]

At the end of the day, however, the UN system deters states from violating human rights by the 'mobilisation of shame' against such behaviour. It operates not above national human rights protection systems but as a 'corrective' to them.[20] Any discussion of human rights at the UN must confront the paradox at the heart of the UN itself: its members are, at the same time, violators of abuse and protectors of rights. That progress is determined by the collective will of those governments, renders the process towards human rights protection slow, piecemeal and painstaking.[21]

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16 Difficulties ranged from ambivalence towards the notion of universal human rights to doubts as to the applicability of the notion. See Farer, Tom and Gaer, Felice, 1993. "The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning" in Adams and Kingsbury, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 245-247.

17 The declaration was adopted in the General Assembly on December 10 1998 by forty eight votes in favour and eight abstentions.

18 The covenants were as follows: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Negotiations leading to agreement on the covenants lasted 15 years and it took a further 10 years for them to come into force. Particularly contentious was the debate over the hierarchy of rights.

19 See Baehr and Gordenker, *op cit.*: chapter five. For human rights instruments see Tomasevski, Katarina, 1994. "Human rights: fundamental freedoms for all" in Childers, (Ed.), *op cit.*: 85-86.

20 *Ibid.*: 98 - 99.

21 *Ibid.*: 82 - 83.

Notwithstanding the reality of continued and often extremely blatant human rights abuses, the raft of UN human rights documents constitutes an 'accepted normative framework of which governments are conscious and according to which their subjects sometimes seek justice'.[22] This analysis nicely captures the dual function of international law relating to human rights relevant to our enquiry on NGOs and cosmopolitanism. The normative framework that exists in a global space, is part of but also greater than the interstate system, can be called upon from below by subjects or groups of subjects or can determine and circumscribe, laterally, the behaviour of governments and can be utilised from above by international society to curb the behaviour of one member.

If international human rights law means that governments no longer have the 'ultimate say in how to treat their "own" population'[23] then that law can be said to create global citizens albeit with status conditional on co-operation from governments or states. Reflecting on the relationship between global citizenship and human rights protection it can be said that the very strength of the UN system is at the same time its weakness'.[24] Turning this paradox on its head, it can also be argued that it is the very weakness of the UN human rights system that has strengthened the role of NGOs, particularly human rights NGOs, therein.[25]

The UN/NGO Structure

A complex UN/NGO structure has evolved over time. The basis of the structure dates back to the UN Charter itself which, in Article 71, states that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)[26] is empowered to consult with such groups.[27] Consequently ECOSOC represents the main institution where NGOs and governments can formally co-operate. ECOSOC Resolution 1296 governs the UN-NGO structure. It establishes criteria required for consultative status, the functions of the NGO Committee, the terms of

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22 Baehr and Gordenker, *op cit.*: 107.

23 Tomasevski, *op cit.*: 89.

24 *Ibid.*: 98.

25 Brett, Rachel, 1995. "The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations" in Beetham, David, (Ed.). *Politics and Human Rights,* Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge: 96-110.

26 ECOSOC is an intergovernmental body of 54 UN members and co-ordinates and oversees work relating to economic and social policies.

27 Charter of the United Nations, Article 71.

consultation and the categories of NGOs.[28] NGOs have right of access to the General Assembly but no right to make oral or written statements there unless special exemptions are made and they have no formal status with the Security Council.[29] It is through ECOSOC, for instance, that NGOs have consultative status at the CHR. They have the right to address that commission, to take part in debates and to have their statements circulated as UN documents.[30]

There are three means whereby NGOs can influence the UN human rights machinery. Firstly they can help establish the standards by which human rights are judged. Secondly they can provide information to treaty bodies, those committees set up by human rights conventions and covenants.[31] Thirdly they can provide information to political bodies such as the CHR and thematic working groups. [32] Given the limited resources allocated to human rights within the UN generally, the comparative advantage that NGOs have is their access to immediate and comprehensive information, their local linkages, the field experience they bring and their role in legitimising UN action. This advantage strengthens NGOs and it would not be untoward to state that the UN human rights system would collapse without NGO participation.[33] The limits of NGO activism were, however, clearly underlined at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. While some important agreements were reached,[34] the conference was marked by disagreement between members on universal human rights principles and, *inter alia*, by attempts to limit the involvement of the estimated 800 NGOs in attendance.[35]

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[28] Category 1 NGOs are international organisations whose concerns coincide with those of ECOSOC, Category 2 NGOs have competence in particular fields. Roster Status is allocated to NGOs that make occasional contributions to UN work. See Adams, Barbara, 1994. "The People's Organisations and the UN: NGOs in International Civil Society" in Childers, (Ed), *Op cit.*: 181.

[29] *Ibid.*: 176-87.

[30] Baehr and Gordenker, *op cit.: 101.*

[31] Brett, *op cit.*: 96-110. This refers to the influential role of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace on the Irish government report produced on accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[32] *Ibid.*: 96-110.

[33] *Ibid.: passim.*

[34] The conference agreed to appoint a High Commissioner on Human Rights and despite disagreements agreed a final document: the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights.

[35] For a detailed analysis of the conference see Boyle, Kevin, 1995. "Stock-taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993" in Beetham, (Ed.), *op cit.*: 79-95.

A detailed evaluation of the efficacy of the UN/NGO is beyond the reach of this chapter. What can be extracted from the literature, however, is that NGOs are very much part of the machinery of the UN system in relation to human rights work and in broadly defined 'development' work including issues of trade, aid, economic and social policy. Symbolic of the relationship that has built up between NGOs and the UN is perhaps the parallel conferences that run alongside UN global conferences such as the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. At each of these conferences the UN sanctioned (and partially funded) parallel conferences allow, variably, a direct input from civil society into the intergovernmental proceedings; a fostering of collaboration between governments and their domestic NGOs and a significant networking and exchange between all NGOs whether international, regional, national or sub-national and whether single issue organisations or broad based thematic organisations. The relationship between groups of Irish NGOs and the state in the process leading to the Beijing Conference provides case study three in this thesis and will be returned to in detail in chapter six.

But, the above debates on the UN need to be refocused to bring Ireland more into view. Did UN membership bring significant change in the Irish foreign policy landscape?

The UN and Ireland

While Ireland did not participate in the 1945 San Francisco conference that launched the United Nations, membership of the organisation has since become, in the words of the Department of Foreign Affairs, a 'cornerstone' of Irish foreign policy.[36] Since membership was accepted in 1955, Ireland's participation has deepened and commitments to peace-keeping, disarmament and the promotion of human rights have become themes centrally associated with its participation.

It was through the global network of the UN and its many multilateral agencies that Ireland first amplified and widened its foreign policy. Since joining the UN Ireland has maintained permanent representation to the

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[36] Government of Ireland, 1996(a). *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: White Paper on Foreign Policy*, Government of Ireland: 18-21.

organisation in New York, Vienna and Geneva, the latter the headquarters of the Commission on Human Rights. As a UN member Ireland has participated to a significant degree in all four potential levels outlined in above. Ireland participates actively in proceedings in the General Assembly and views its activities in that forum, in the words of a senior diplomat, as a 'bridge builder' between the North and the South concerned with 'effective implementation' of UN legislation rather than 'legalistic and constitutional perfection' based on the country's history of common law.[37] In addition, Ireland's Ministers for Foreign Affairs regularly contribute to the annual opening sessions of the Assembly. As we saw in chapter two issues of disarmament and concern for the de-colonisation process were particularly significant issues for the diplomatic service at the UN during the 1950s – 1970s. In relation to reporting under Convention and/or declaration requirements, Ireland has fulfilled its duties including those relating to NGO inclusion in the reporting process.[38]

Ireland has served on the Security Council twice only; in 1962 and in 1981 - 1982. The year 2000 has been targeted for a third term of office.[39] In addition Ireland serves on executive boards of other UN organisations such as the Internal Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Contributions to the range of multilateral agencies form a significant component of Ireland's Overseas Development Assistance package each year.[40]The largest UN recipients of Irish aid are the UNDP, UNICEF and the UNHCR.[41] However, looking at the overall Irish aid landscape the allocation to the UN (13% in 1997) is less than that to the EU (20% during the same year) underlining the Holmes *et al's* contention that Irish foreign policy is increasingly being channelled through the EU.[42] It is to EU structures that this chapter now turns.

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[37] Swift, John, 1995. (Ireland's permanent representative to the UN). "Ireland at the UN" delivered at a seminar on the White Paper on Foreign Policy, Galway, January 14, 1995.

[38] See Government of Ireland, 1994. *United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: National Report of Ireland,* The Stationary Office, Dublin; and the Department of Equality and Law Reform, 1995. *United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: Supplement to the National Report of Ireland,* Department of Equality and Law Reform, Dublin. See also Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996. *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: First National Report of Ireland,* Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin: 116-121.

[39] Government of Ireland, 1996(a), *op cit.*: 19.

[40] In 1997, of the £122.1 million ODA budget, £39.1 million went on bilateral aid allocations such as to the EU, the UN and the World Bank.

[41] Department of Foreign Affairs. 1997. *Ireland's Official Development Assistance: 1997,* Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin.

[42] Holmes, *et al, op cit.*: 176.

The European Union

The decision making structure of the EU is for the purposes of this thesis, perhaps best approached by briefly looking at a) the actors and b) the policy arenas. The following two sub-sections will look at each of these topics and this section will conclude by looking at the EU/NGO relationships. Finally it will, as was the procedure in the section on the UN, turn the focus to look specifically at the impact of EU membership on Ireland. The state and NGOs will both be included in this evaluation.

The Institutional Actors

There are four main actors to be considered in relation to the European Union. They are the Commission, the Council of Minister, the European Council and the European Parliament. Each of these is dealt with briefly below.

At the time of writing, the Commission was constituted by 17 Commissioners, appointed by the members for five year (renewable) periods of service and they constitute the 'heart of the EU system'.[43] The most significant function of the Commission is to propose and develop policies and legislation and the Commissioners function with the assistance of a bureaucracy structured around Directorate Generals (DGs) such as DG 1 which is concerned with external economic relations; DG 1A with external political relations and DG V111 with development. The Commission alone has the power to initiate and draft legislation although the prompt for such legislation may come from other institutions within the EU.

The Council of Ministers constitutes the main decision-making institution of the EU and can be considered the legislator (or under co-decision making procedures in relation the European Parliament, the co-legislator) for the European Union.[44] Thus the Council must approve of any proposed legislation. The Council is made up of Ministers from the member states and is headed by a Presidency which is rotated amongst members. The current, past and future Presidents form what is known as a 'troika' which supports

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[43] Nugent, Neill, 1994. *The Government and Politics of the European Union,* Macmillan, Basingstoke: 85. See chapter four on the Commission. Since this point the number of Commissioners has been enlarged,

[44] *Ibid.*: 123. See chapter five on the Council of Ministers.

the President in his or her office. Council meetings occur regularly and the work of the body is supported by the Committee of Permanent Representatives, (COREPOR) which consists of national delegations of diplomats and other civil servants, committees and working groups and the Council Secretariat.

The European Council consists in a more informal, less bureaucratic forum than either of the above that brings together heads of governments and their foreign ministers to discuss policy and legislation and to reach political agreement on old or new issues which might be particularly contentious or difficult. Despite the less formal (and 'quasi-legal') nature of the council[45] it is an extremely important political player in that, constituted by the heads of government, it can give overall direction for the EU and all legally binding decisions taken within the EU, in general, require its clearance. Its twice-yearly meetings are co-ordinated by the Presidency and special summits can also be held.

Despite recent changes in the Amsterdam Treaty[46] the power of the European Parliament (EP) within the EU, while not insignificant, is not comparable to the power of national parliaments in relation to the legislative and policy making process.[47] As with national parliaments, however, the European Parliament is directly elected by the 'people' of Europe and, as with national parliaments it can influence policy. The routes to influence are through the legislative process, the budgetary process and control and supervision of the legislature. Unlike national parliaments it does not however have the final say on passing laws. It has the right to be consulted and can offer recommendations and debate issues but that advise and its own decisions can be ignored by the Council and the Commission.

Despite its limitations, the parliament can become a foreign policy actor through its debates and procedures for motions, as it did in the case of South Africa and apartheid in the 1980s[48] Recent changes introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty have given the parliament greater powers over budgetary decisions and therefore over the implementation of policies under CFSP. The

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45 *Ibid.*: 155.

46 Co-decision powers of the European Parliament were extended in the Amsterdam Treaty.

47 Nugent, *op cit.*: 174. See chapter seven on the European Parliament.

48 See Holland, Martin, 1995. *European Union Common Foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa*, St. Martin's Press, New York: 108-115.

parliament is, furthermore, perhaps the EU institution most open to lobbying activities and consequently targeted by interested actors.[49] In particular, the committees, special rapporteurs and intergroups in the EP system are generally accessible to outside groups.[50]

The Policy Arenas

The policy making arena of the whole EU is customarily divided according to the three pillars established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991.[51] Pillar One, the European Union arena, legislates for agricultural policy, the internal market, monetary policy and a range of other policy areas. Pillar Two, which constitutes the policy arena largely of concern to this research, is governed by the CFSP as laid down in Article J.1(2) of the Maastricht Treaty and ratified in the Amsterdam Treaty. This arena of policy making constitutes a key area of national sovereignty and is organised at an intergovernmental and not a community level. The final pillar, Pillar Three, concerns issues of Justice and Home Affairs such as asylum and immigration policies and inter-EU police co-operation on issues of anti drug enforcement and so on.

While Pillar Two issues are, nominally, of exclusive concern to this thesis, it is important to point out that the institutional distinction between 'foreign' policy (Pillar Two) and external trade or monetary policy (Pillar One) and indeed, immigration policy (Pillar Three) does not necessarily stand in terms of creating discreet policy making arenas. Smith has argued that trade and economic policies were closely linked to 'foreign' policies in EU relations with Central and Latin America.[52] The blurring of competence between the Pillars in terms of the bundle of issues which go into determining policy and the range of actors that are involved in the decision making process is significant. In terms of Pillar One activities, the European Commission holds power and decision making occurs at a community level. Pillar Two decision making is held within the competence of the Council of Ministers and under the

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[49] Greenwood, Justin, 1997. *Representing Interests in the European Union*, Macmillan, Basingstoke: 43.

[50] Intergroups are informal, unofficial clusterings of MEPs with an interest in a particular policy area and are a useful entry routes into the EU system. See, *ibid.*: 44-48 for a discussion.

[51] This Treaty came into force in November 1993 and in Ireland's case was ratified by referendum

[52] Smith, Hazel, 1998. "Actually existing foreign policy – or not?: the EU in Latin and Central America" in Peterson, John and Sjursen Helene, (Eds.). *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*, Routledge, London and New York: 152-168. Policy makers did not consider the political aspects of their relations with the region in abstraction from trade relations.

regulations of CFSP decision making, the European Community is represented by the Commission. Since EPC, the practice has been that the Commission is a 'dialogue partner' in the EPC/CFSP agenda in order to ensure consistency across the pillars. For instance, in EU/ASEAN relations (of relevance in chapter five), the Commission is included in all discussions except where they are led by the President alone.[53]

EU/CFSP

A considerable amount of literature is available on the CFSP itself.[54] As an exceptional measure within international politics it provides much material for consideration. However, this thesis need only briefly sketch the institutional and policy obligations that apply to all member states within this second pillar of the Amsterdam Treaty. The question to consider here is; to what extent does the CFSP act as a constraint on the foreign policies of a member? A second question arises from the constrains of EU membership that might apply outside external relations within the competence of CFSP. In other words, what is the relationship between CFSP and EU external trade and economic relations?

At the apex of the CFSP structure is the European Council. This body, ideally, provides direction arising from its six monthly meetings. Below it, the 26 working groups (comprised of senior diplomatic staff in the member states) agree and formulate policy on a more regular basis. As CFSP operates by unanimity, decisions tend to proceed by consensus. Communications are channelled through the COREU network. The Commission acts as an extra 'delegate' in these proceedings.[55]

The instruments available to the EU under CFSP are joint actions, common positions and declaratory statements.[56] Declaratory statements are issued either as European Union or Presidency statements and 'represent the

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[53] See Nuttall, Simon, 1988. "Where the European Commission Comes in" in Pijpers, Alfred, Regelsberger, Elfriede and Wessels, Wolfgang, (Eds.). *European Political Co-operation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe*, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, Boston and London: 104-117.

[54] In addition to texts listed here above see also, for instance, Holland, Martin, (Ed.), 1997. *CFSP: the Record and Reforms*, Pinter, London and Regelsberger, Elfriede, *et al*, (Eds.) 1997. *The European Union and Beyond: from EPC to CFSP*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London.

[55] Cameron, Fraser, 1998. "Building a Common Foreign Policy: do Institutions Matter?" in Peterson and Sjursen, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 65-6.

[56] The Amsterdam Treaty added common strategies to the instruments.

common denominator of the EU member states' opinions on various problems in the world, be it domestic politics in third countries or international affairs'.[57] Common positions are conceived to define the approach of the union to a particular matter, whether of a geographical or thematic nature.[58] States are obliged, under Article J 2 (2) of the Maastricht Treaty, to ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions. While there is no legal definition of what a common position is, it does go beyond a declaration which has no legally binding status.[59] A common position does not, necessarily, get translated into action.

Perhaps the most significant change brought to the instrument of foreign policy co-ordination by the Maastricht Treaty was that of joint actions. The process and mechanism for such an action are detailed and exact. The scope, means, goals, funding for, in addition to other defining characteristics of the action, are agreed by the Council which takes into account the views of the Commission. Security issues were identified as particularly appropriate for joint action.[60]

From the perspective of obligations each of these three instruments require different degrees of involvement. A declaratory statement brings no concomitant policy requirement. A common position, in theory, requires cohesion with domestic policy but, should the situation arise, the EU can not legally force such a requirement. Common actions on the other hand require political, monetary, diplomatic and, perhaps, military involvement in the policy outcome. However, to view the CFSP in such a simple 'constraint' perspective, is to miss a crucial point. As the decision-making process is based on consensus, by the stage an collective position has been hammered out each member has agreed a formula that is acceptable to them. Overall legal and political obligations (i.e. to the process of agreement) furthermore provide states with the 'alibi' in the face of domestic resistance or hostility to decisions, positions or statements agreed within CFSP.

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[57] Luif, Paul, 1995. *On the Road to Brussels*, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Luxembourg: 59.
[58] Cameron, *op cit.*: 70.
[59] Luif, *op cit.*: 65.
[60] Luif, *op cit.*: 67-69.

Outside CFSP, the EU has a range of other instruments that it can wield – predominantly in the area of commerce and trade.[61] These range from embargoes and boycotts to providing aid and concluding trade agreements. The potential of such instruments are, particularly in the context of the weaknesses within CFSP, extremely powerful. How then, do trade and commerce matters, 'external policy' relate to 'foreign policy' decisions taken under CFSP?

In relation to competence for trade, there is no ambiguity, as we have seen, about where the power lies within the EU: with the Commission. However, under the Maastricht Treaty the Commission is obliged to ensure there is consistency between its policies and those emanating under CFSP. The nature of this relationship is, of itself, one of the weaknesses of the CFSP. For instance, if we seek to examine the EU's foreign policies in relation to Central and Latin America through the institutional lens of the CFSP we will be blinded to the highly influential activities that went on under the competence of the first pillar – emanating from the Commission.[62] Because of the difficulties in achieving coherence across the pillars, it has been suggested that all external components of first and third pillars should be merged into the deliberations and decisions of the CFSP.[63]

The EU at the UN

While UN membership is legally based on the status of statehood only, EU membership adds another layer to the UN negotiating process. Under CFSP, all EU members, ideally, co-ordinate their UN positions through an intense consultation process prior to and during General Assembly sessions in New York each year. Thus while, officially, EU members are part of the Western European and Other Group (WEOG), they do operate as a voting bloc within the UN. The EU also has observer status at the UN.[64]

To what extent does CFSP actually work to systematically co-ordinate EU member's positions at the UN? It is possible to discern a pattern, over time, of

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[61] See Smith, Karen E., 1998. "The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy" in Zielonka, Jan, (Ed.). *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London and Boston: 72-74.

[62] Smith, Hazel, *op cit.*: 152-168.

[63] Rummer, Reinhardt and Wiedeman, Jorg, 1998. "Identifying Institutional Paradoxes of CFSP" in Zielonka, Jan, (Ed.). *Op cit.*: 55.

[64] Luif, *op cit.*: 273-275.

increased co-ordination through the period of EPC and into CFSP. However, there also has been variance arising from the topic. Where agreement towards a common position had been reached through EPC there was greater UN co-ordination. But there is more than average dissent among members where security issues are concerned. Despite the coming into force of the CFSP on November 1 1993, EU voting co-ordination at the UN that day (the day of the first recorded votes of the 48th session of the General Assembly) did not significantly increase beyond the level it had been at previously. That level was, on average, just below 50 percent agreement.[65]

The EU and NGOs

Considerable research has been carried out on the relationship between NGOs and the EU albeit predominantly in the areas of social and environmental policy[66] In other words largely in policy areas under the competence of pillar one. Given the more sensitive nature of foreign and security policy decision making this focus is perhaps not surprising and reflects gaps evident in terms of domestic foreign policy making also.

Like the UN, a complexly structured, formal arrangement has evolved within the EU to organise its relations with NGOs. From the point of view of NGOs involved in the issues involved in this thesis[67] the principle structure is the NDGO/EU Liaison Committee[68]established by DG V111. This committee sponsors and funds National Platforms in each of the 15 member states. It is constituted by a representative from each platform, from the Commission and one representative from each of three EU-wide private networks of development agencies.[69] The committee's brief is to meet three times a year

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65 *Ibid.*: 276-281.

66 See Greenwood, *op cit.: passim* and Harvey, Brian, 1993. "Lobbying in Europe: the Experience of Voluntary Organisations" in Mazey, Sonia and Richardson, Jeremy, (Eds.). *Lobbying in the European Community*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

67 There is a myriad of networks of voluntary and citizenship groups operating at the EU level. For a detailed analysis see Harvey, Brian, 1995. *Networking in Europe: A Guide to European Voluntary Organisations*, NCVO, London.

68 Although the terms Non-Governmental Development Organisation (NGDO) conventionally refers to an organisation which is involved in development co-operation the interests of the member groups includes issues of trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and economic policy.

69 These networks are distinguished by religion: EUROSTEP is the network of secular aid agencies (Irish members: Concern and Oxfam); EUROCIDSEE, the network of Catholic agencies (Irish member: Trócaire) and APRODEV, the network of Protestant agencies, (Christian Aid).

and the thematically-organised working groups meet approximately three times a year also. Over 1,000 NGOs from the EU are members of the committee through their national platforms.

Outside the Liaison Committee, many human rights NGOs and solidarity groups seek to influence EU policy through their national structures and/or directly at the level of the EU. Amnesty International (AI), for instance, established an EU section in 1985.[70] An analysis of its campaigning on EU refugee policy underlines the importance of flexible, well co-ordinated coalitions among NGOs directed at, not just Brussels-based EU institutions, but also national governments.[71]

The EU and Ireland

Inevitably, as a consequence of the general widening of scope described above, institutional change was required in Ireland with regard to the bureaucratic machinery. EU membership had a very significant impact on the Department of Foreign Affairs which underwent a major restructuring from 1971 onwards. This restructuring effected both the home office at Iveagh House in Dublin and the external office network through the foreign missions. The previous structure made way for the evolution of a desk system within the department's Political Division. The system was devised to correspond to geographical areas throughout the globe and the change allowed the development of Irish expertise in these areas as well as the evolution of more efficient operating procedures.

A permanent delegation was established in Brussels and, between 1973 and 1978, Ireland established diplomatic relations with 24 states mostly based on non residential accreditation but including also permanent residential missions.[72] In 1974, the Oireachtas established the Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation to scrutinise and oversee the implementation of EU legislation in Ireland. A development co-operation section was established within the DFA reflecting not just the importance of post colonial politics at a

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[70] See Van der Klaauw, J, 1994. "Amnesty Lobbies for Refugees" in Pedlar and Schendelen, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 258-282 for an Amnesty case study.

[71] *Ibid.*: 280-281.

[72] See Keatinge, Patrick 1978. *A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish Foreign Policy*, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin: 203-222.

global level[73] but particular Irish interests in this area. That said, these developments, do not amount to an assertion of complete control over EU matters by the DFA. EU membership expanded the scope of other departments also most especially the Departments of Agriculture and of Finance. In addition, other departments continued to exert significant control in relation to other multilateral bodies such as the Department of Finance in the IMF, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[74] The DFA emerged as a powerful co-ordinating organ of all the sectoral and sub-national interests which form the complete picture of Irish/EU bureaucratic relations.[75]

Equally important to the structure of the foreign service both in Iveagh House and in embassies abroad is the *esprite de corps* that EU participation has fostered. Given the legal obligations under the Treaty of Rome and moral, political obligations under the EPC such a change was inevitable. This spirit has been termed the 'European reflex'[76] whereby states see problems or issues which arise from their 'collective dimension' or, in other words, with regard to the interests they may have within other member states. In theory, at least, the spirit engenders a greater flexibility in negotiations. The immutability of the reflex may, indeed, only be tested in situation of severe conflict of interests between Ireland and the EU. EU membership meant that civil servants 'straddled the boundary between the domestic and the European, no longer servants only of their own state'.[77]

EU membership also brought changes to the Irish parliamentary structure. In 1974 the Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation was established to oversee the implementation of any EC-derived legislation. As we will see later, this Committee was subsumed into the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, established in the Oireachtas, after long debate, in 1993.

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[73] Tonra, Ben, 1999, " Europeanisation and the Department of Foreign Affairs" in European Commission, *EU Member State Foreign Ministries*, DGV111, Brussels: 67-68.

[74] *Ibid.*: *passim* details the departments and their interests.

[75] Sharp, *op cit.*: 111.

[76] The source is Phillippe de Schoutheete quoted in Mac Kernan, Padraic, 1984. "Ireland and European Political Co-operation" in *ISIA*, vol. 1, no. 4: 21.

[77] Laffan, Brigid and O'Donnell, Rory, 1998. "Ireland and the Growth of International Governance" in Crotty, William, and Schmitt, David, (Eds.). *Ireland and the Politics of Change*, Longman, London and New York: 166.

The effect of EU membership on the Irish foreign policy institutions was both modernising; bringing the Irish diplomatic service more into line with its European partners, and, Europeanising; integrating Irish foreign policy into a bigger European-wide arena. In this sense the 'Europeanisation' of Irish foreign policy that began at this time was played out both in content and structure and brought about a fragmentation and specialisation of service to deal with the more complex and ever changing international milieu.

The EU and Irish NGOs

EU membership opened up new levels of political action for Irish lobbying groups. Elements of Irish political culture, especially clientelism and centralisation, influenced Ireland's lobbying style in Europe and emphasising inter personal relations characterised its lobbying activities there.[78] In relation to what we know of the EU/NGO relationship, there are two, not necessarily competing, perspectives on the impact of membership on NGOs. On the one hand, the positive evaluation considers EU membership to have enhanced NGO opportunities. On the other hand, the negative evaluation considers it to have diminished the potential of NGOs to influence the policy arena.

The positive evaluation stresses the enhancement opportunities that the EU presented to NGOs in terms of forging greater contacts and links and enlarging the field of play.[79] As we saw, formal networks between the institutions of the EU and member-state NGOs exist. Irish membership eventually resulted in a reorganisation of the NGOs sector in Ireland: an impact that could perhaps be considered to signal the 'Europeanisation' of Irish NGOs.

In 1979, the Confederation of Non-Governmental Organisations for Overseas Development (CONGOOD) had been established to co-ordinate the activities of organisations involved in development co-operation with the third world. In response to developments within the EU the Irish National Assembly was established to co-ordinate the activities of the same sector *vis a vis* the then-EC/NGO Liaison Committee. As Ireland's development policies became increasingly influenced by development in the EC/EU, the need for a

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[78] Brown, *op cit.*: 201-224.

[79] This is the argument made by O'Donnell and Laffan, *op cit.*: *passim.*

combined national/European co-ordination became more apparent.[80] Following an internal review of CONGOOD and a series of consultation between the two organisations, they merged in 1993 to form Dóchas: the national umbrella body of organisations involved in development issues which became the Irish member of the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the European Union.

Dóchas emerged as the national representative body and official umbrella organisation of Irish NGOs at the EU. Dóchas imposes criteria on potential members: they must, *inter alia*, provide copies of both a constitution and audited accounts for a two year period; they should be concerned with development, and, existing members must be satisfied that the applicant meets the objectives, aims and practice of Dóchas.[81] This is not to say however, that non-Dóchas members are precluded from engaging with the EU. Its membership criteria precludes many single country solidarity organisation from joining but does not preclude them either from engaging with Irish, or indeed, EU officials. The manner in which Dóchas evolved was also particular to the Irish context. According to a former National Platform representative, Dóchas considered lobbying on a range of issues, not just those confined to development co-operation, as part of the brief of the Liaison Committee.[82]

The negative evaluation stresses the manner in which EU membership restricted the capacities of the NGOs by the diminution of Ireland's sovereign power through the process of foreign policy co-operation. Put simply as the number of actors in the decision-making process extended and did so beyond the reach of Irish NGOs, their potential to have an impact on the overall outcome was severely reduced. Undoubtedly. EPC diminished Ireland's control by fusing its foreign policy interests and goals into the greater process of co-ordination. Did this necessarily change the relationships with NGOs,

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[80] The merger document drawn up by CONGOOD lists changes that created pressure for a new organisation. Among those were the proliferation of new aid agencies in Ireland, the disbandment of the Advisory Committee on Development Co-operation in 1991, the development of specialist European networks and the planned increase in Irish overseas development aid from 1993 onwards. See CONGOOD, 1993. *Recommendations on the Merger of CONGOOD and the Irish National Assembly*, April 1993.

[81] The last criteria proved controversial when Dóchas rejected the application to join by World Vision (Ireland) on the basis that its child sponsorship programme was contrary to Dóchas practice.

[82] Personal interview with Robin Hanan, former National Platform Representative, July 16 1998.

their status and domestic capacities? For one analyst, increased integration into the EPC process resulted in a change in attitude towards NGOs in the Department of Foreign Affairs: there was a clear rejection of the challenging position presented by that sector. This analysis may have also been mediated, at the time of writing, by Irish-US relations and the US reaction to what was perceived as anti-US sentiment in Irish public life in the 1980's.[83] If such an analysis is correct, it does raise an important point. That is that while, for instance, EU and US relation are institutionally distinct within the Irish arena, DFA officials (and indeed government members) must always maintain an overview of foreign policy outcomes; how decisions in one arena might effect goals and outcomes in another. This point allows us now turn to the decision making structures of the Irish government with particular reference to the permeability of the structures to outside influence.

The Irish Government.

Irish political culture has been characterised as, *inter alia*, centralised and clientelist and it is no surprise that the policy process, and particularly the potential of civil society actors to influence that, bear those marks also. Political culture is not unimportant even when decisions are being made in a multilateral context. The small size of Ireland's polity renders it comparatively open although this does not necessarily translate into permeable boundaries.

Any NGO interested in influencing policy making at a domestic level can choose one of at least six points of entry, none of which are mutually exclusive. These entry points are; the political parties, members of the Oireachtas; members of relevant Oireachtas committees; government ministers, the Taoiseach and officials in the bureaucracy be that the DFA or any other department with competence over policy.

While each of these entry points can produce different results and different degrees of success, it is the case too that foreign policy making remains the preserve of government and within government of the executive branch.[84] In comparison to other European countries the foreign policy decision making structure in Ireland involves relatively few actors and is, organisationally, quite simple. On a day to day basis, DFA officials are the principle actor in the

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[83] Kirby, *op cit.*: 164-165.

[84] Holmes, *et al*, *op cit.*: 33.

formulation and implementation of policy. Their formulations are, of course, subject to ministerial and/or cabinet approval.[85] Hence it is to be expected that department officials would be a critical port of call for organisations seeking to influence policy.

In terms of the executive/parliament relationship, Ireland's parliamentary input into foreign policy formation, let alone debates on issues, has traditionally been weak[86] although the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs does provide a comparatively new avenue for input into policy and for the development of a closer working relationship between the bureaucracy and the legislature. The same is true of the sub-committees of that committee and, as we will see in chapter six, one such sub-committee became a vital entry point for the debate on debt and structural adjustment. In terms of effective power, the only legal weapon which parliament has over foreign policy is a 'constitutional blunderbuss' - the no confidence vote leading to governmental resignation.[87] This would prompt an expectation that if the goal is to influence the decision-making process, contacting Oireachtas members might not be a rational priority for NGOs. That is not to deny the role of Oireachtas members of raising, debating and themselves agitating within the Dáil and Seanad. Parliamentary question time is furthermore an important, if erratic, means of drawing out government positions.

The conclusion that Irish foreign policy is formulated in a closed, élite circle and is executive-driven[88] still largely holds true. There have, however, been significant changes in the wider environment within which that formulation occurs: a broadening out of the number of actors to include, amongst other, NGOs and single issue groups and, as a result of the changes described in the previous chapter, an enhanced role for officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs who now confront a vast array of policy issues within a complex multilateral decision making environment. These themes will be addressed in the following section beginning with the structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

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[85] *Ibid.*: 35.

[86] *Ibid.*: 38-39

[87] Tonra, Ben, 1996. "The Internal Dissenter (11): Ireland" in Stavridis, Stelios. and Hill, Christopher, (Eds.) *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, Berg, Oxford: 133.

[88] Keatinge, Patrick, 1973. *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy*. IPA, Dublin.

The Department of Foreign Affairs.

As we saw, EU membership had an emphatic influence on the organisation of the DFA. The changes introduced at that point have not been immutable but the overall structure has remained somewhat constant. There are eight divisions within the department, each staffed according to a hierarchical rank, and each division is further subdivided. For instance the political division is subdivided into sections on CFSP; bilateral relations; the UN; the OSCE; the Council of Europe; security policy (including disarmament and non-proliferation) and human rights and democratisation.

EU membership however renders the strict division of competencies difficult to sustain in practice. For instance those involved in the Asia desk of the political section are involved in European Council and CFSP deliberations on Asia through the Asia Working group of the Council. Equally, officials from the Development Co-operation division have competence not just over bilateral aid issues but also multilateral aid within the EU. As a small department in a small state, multilateral commitments to both the EU and the UN brought new demands on resources. Staffing and resource restrictions within the department continue to pose problems and, in particular, commitments to multilateral policy institutions and developments impose strain on already-hard pressed officials.[89]

The election of the Coalition government (Fine Gael and the Labour Party) in 1973 introduced further significant changes which were partially of domestic origin but were also linked to the opening up that occurred as a result of Ireland's EU membership. That coalition brought a more internationalist outlook to foreign policy considerations than that brought heretofore by Fianna Fáil.[90] One critical change was the establishment of the Bilateral Aid Programme (BAP) in 1974.[91] To recruit and provide personnel for the programme, the state established the Association for Personal Services Overseas (APSO) the same year. The following year, Higher Education for Development Co-operation (HEDCO) was formed to involve third level

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[89] O'Donnell and Laffan, *op cit.*: 171-172.

[90] Many ministers in the government were involved in Irish anti-apartheid and anti-Vietnam war campaigns. Hanan, *op cit.*: 19.

[91] The Bilateral Aid Programme was founded in 1974 and prioritised Irish aid to five countries: India (dropped subsequently), Sudan, Zambia, Tanzania, Lesotho. Irish aid offices were opened in Lesotho (1974) and in Tanzania (1979).

colleges more closely in work for developing countries. In 1980 the government established the Advisory Council on Development Co-operation, (ACDC) to, as the title implies, advise on aspects of development aid. NGO representatives were included on the ACDC Board and this practice continued after it was disbanded in 1991 and replaced by the Irish Aid Advisory Committee (IAAC) in 1993. The new committee is funded by DFA, is independent from government and is constituted entirely by voluntary members with expertise in given areas. In 1994 the National Committee for Development Education (NCDE) was established, and like the IAAC is constituted by state and civil society representatives. The NCDE is funded by the DFA and is an extremely important organisation for NGOs as it administers a funding scheme for development education carried out within the voluntary sector. The NCDE is somewhat unusual in its involvement of both statutory and non-statutory actors in a formally structured approach to development education.[92] In all of these change, the DFA was brought closer into working with the NGO sector and to incorporating citizens into the development and implementation of aid and development co-operation.

These changes and the pattern of collaboration that they put in place were further developed in recent changes in the foreign policy landscape each of which had a direct, although not exclusive impact on the DFA. This section concludes by presenting these changes allowing an up to date picture emerge of the aspects of the foreign policy landscape which are of particular strategic interest to Irish NGOs. Several of the changes examined in this section occurred after the research period defined for this thesis: 1996. However, in the interest of completing the institutional picture, and in recognising that all of those changes were derived from commitments given in the White Paper, all innovations will be referred to. The dates given identify whether the changes occurred within the remit if the thesis.

Recent Changes in the Environment

Undoubtedly, the two most significant institutional changes in the landscape, and changes that have many knock on effects, have been the establishment of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1993 and the promulgation of the White Paper on Foreign Affairs (1996)[93] and the implementation of many of

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[92] Department of Foreign Affairs, 1997, *op cit.*: 40.

[93] Government of Ireland, 1996(a), *op cit.*: *passim*.

its recommendations. The white paper process, a radical departure in the tradition of Irish foreign policy, must also be viewed in the context of the government from which it emerged. As we saw in chapter two, government ideology is a factor that must be taken into account when explaining the tenacity of NGO policy proposals within the system. The white paper process took place under the lead of Labour Party leader, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, who had set out to generate public debate and ownership of foreign policy during his period in office.

There were other changes within the political infrastructure that may have helped change the climate within which NGOs related to the structures of governance. For instance the 1990 election of Mary Robinson to the Irish Presidency enhanced the status of NGOs. In December 1990, she held the first annual receptions in Áras an Uachtaráin for returned development workers. In 1992 she agreed to become Comhlámh's patron. At that organisation's 1994 AGM, she described overseas development workers as her 'listening posts to the world'.[94] What happens within the realm of the Irish President may not necessarily have any bearing on the foreign policy realm but Ms. Robinson's inclusion of the NGOs within her institutional structure surely validated their role in the broader environment, in their own eyes at least.

The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs

The establishment of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1993 following years of debate within the Oireachtas and, in a more limited manner, outside the house. The committee subsumed the Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation and expanded its brief to scrutinise legislation, make proposals and provide a forum for details debates on all issues relating to Foreign Policy. In 1995, however, a separate Joint Committee on European Affairs was re-established in recognition of the importance of scrutiny over EU legislation as distinct from wider foreign policy concerns.[95]

The committee receives deputations from solidarity groups, individuals or interest group so long as their concerns are relevant to the brief. Committee member are consequently key target for lobbying and for input into the system. A second dimension of the committee is its function in relation to

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[94] Hanan, *op cit.*: 91.

[95] O'Donnell and Laffan *op cit.*: 168.

accountability of the decision makers to the parliamentary process. DFA officials are expected to participate in discussions and the secretariat of the committee is seconded from that department. In addition, government ministers attend and give evidence. While the committee is restrained somewhat by a lack of resources, it has contributed to a greater openness in foreign policy and allowed a group of Senators and TDs engage directly with foreign policy matters.[96] As we will see the committee provided an important animating site for discussion of policy issues on two of the case studies to follow.

The committee's establishment was cited as one of the catalysts for the merger of CONGOOD and the Irish National Platform, referred to above, into Dóchas. The committee and its brief raised an expectation of both more co-ordinated and effective work on the part of development organisations. It was felt that, otherwise, the credibility of the sector could be damaged and its impact on the ground could be minimised, in particular, if NGDOs were seen to be in competition or contradicting each other.[97]

The White Paper on Foreign Affairs

Following the accession of the 1994 coalition government (Fine Gael, the Labour Party and Democratic Left) the process towards the publication of the White Paper on Foreign Affairs began. This process included hosting public seminars on specified themes throughout the country as part of a public consultation. Interested groups and individuals were invited to make oral submissions to these seminars and to make submissions to the white paper process itself. The opportunities to do so were not passed by Irish NGOs.[98]

The White Paper committed Ireland to establishing a human rights unit within the DFA and this was realised in 1996 shortly after the publication of the document. However, the focus on Ireland's presidency of the EU in the months after publication deferred to full functioning of the unit and it was not until 1997 that its was given a full expression. It is interesting to note, in relation to the Irish Presidency, that the Minister for State at the Department

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[96] O'Donnell and Laffan, *op cit.*: 168.

[97] CONGOOD, *op cit.*: 5.

[98] The number of NGOs attending the seminars was impressive and 62 written submissions were received from members of the public the majority of which were from NGOs. For a list of latter see Government of Ireland, 1996, *op cit.*: 342.

of Foreign Affairs Joan Burton instituted regular meetings with NGOs to evaluate and discuss the work of the Presidency on foreign concerns which came within their brief. Deputy Burton worked through Dóchas as a representative body for Irish NGOs. As a former development worker herself and a former member of the IAAM and Comhlámh, the Minister had many ties with the NGO sector which eased access by groups.

The brief for the unit within the foreign policy landscape is wide. As the only section in the whole governmental structure with a denominated human rights brief the unit can bring a unique overview to the overall foreign policy process.[99] The unit chairs an inter-departmental committee which examines all human rights issues that arise across the complete foreign policy landscape. It also has responsibility for the ratification and reporting to international instruments. Within the DFA, the unit is available for consultation by the others divisions when issues of specific concern arise and also offers unsolicited advise and suggestions.[100] On a day to day basis much of the unit's work is taken up with reporting functions under UN instruments, servicing the needs of the Interdepartmental committee and providing information for the Oireachtas - in response to Dáil debates and/or parliamentary questions. The unit's staffing is somewhat small given the brief. On establishment the unit's personnel consisted in one counsellor, a first and third secretary and one (rotating) legal stagiere. No denominated secretarial support exists.[101]

From the point of view of a port-of-call solidarity and human rights groups tended historically to approach the relevant desk to raise an issue or to seek information. The establishment of the Human Rights Desk opens up a new and frequently used entry point into the system. Officials within the desk however, while welcoming such first calls, encourage interested individuals to continue contact with the relevant desk even if the issue is a straight forward human rights and not one tied to political/economic/aid or multilateral issues.[102]

Perhaps the most innovative element of the unit's work is the outreach dimension - organising and chairing the DFA/NGO Standing Committee. A

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99 Author's interview; DFA1, July 9 1998.

100 *Ibid.*

101 *Ibid.* Limits on staffing, both official and secretarial, are a concern for the unit.

102 *Ibid.*

second commitment of the white paper, standing committee, was not constituted until 1997. All members, with the exception of two representatives of solidarity groups, are nominated by the DFA. All are appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and their term of office runs for two years. A total of 17 people sit on the committee nominated on the basis of expertise in the field of human rights and range of experience.[103]

The committee meets regularly and an executive summary of its proceedings are circulated throughout DFA. The meetings are also attended by officials from DFA or relevant department. While it has no direct policy making function and exists primarily to facilitate an exchange of views between the department and the NGO sector, the committee's recommendations are systematically passed on to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The head of the human rights unit, who chairs the committee, is bound to report the views and recommendations of the committee and has the power of sanction.

A third commitment given in the white paper was the holding of an NGO/DFA forum and the inaugural meeting was held in March 1998 and is expected to be repeated annually. The purpose of the Forum is to extend the dialogue between government and the NGO sector. It is expected that a report from the Forum will be published annually.[104]

The establishment of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the founding of the NGO/DFA Standing Committee on Human Rights and the establishment of the annual NGO Forum by the Department of Foreign Affairs, have all legitimised the activities of the NGO sector and brought it into closer working relationships with officials and government members. The changes and adaptations described above occurred in a dialectical manner with changes that were ongoing within civil society. In particular the changes must be seen

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[103] In July 1998 the Department nominees were: four individuals with specific expertise, (one vacant space); ten individuals from the following organisations; Amnesty International (Irish section), Banúlacht, Christian Aid Ireland, Concern, Dóchas, GOAL, the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, the Irish National Committee for UNICEF, Oxfam Ireland and Trócaire and the two solidarity group representatives were from the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign and the Kurdistan Information Network. The latter were nominated by solidarity groups at the Inaugural NGO Forum on Human Rights, in March 1998. The allocation of two seats was a compromise between the Department's original allocation of one and the solidarity group's demand for four. It is expected that committee membership will not change significantly over time and will continue beyond the first two year period.

[104] At the time of writing the report for 1998 had not yet been published.

as part of the broader evolution of the concept of partnership as the means of both evolving policy (creating ownership by all the stakeholders in a particular area) and of resource distribution in a policy arena.[105] They also, over time, served to diffuse the boundary between state and civil society - by putting in place semi-state organisations with both advisory and decision making capacities in which NGO representatives and officials work together. The co-funding procedure of the Department of Foreign Affairs in particular brought Irish aid agencies in as agents of official Irish aid policies. In relation to aid, policy networks existed between the state and certain civil society groups characterised by an exchange of resources between the state and groups.[106]

Conclusion

The decision making environment facing all those involved in the Irish policy process, governmental and societal, has become even more complex in recent years and the range of issues, as we saw in the previous chapter has also broadened. UN institutions introduced new fora for debate and new institutional frameworks. In the case of the EU integration the scope of policy issues widened and deepened as integration continued apace.

Of particular interest here, however, is the changes that occurred in the environment *vis a vis* the opening up of the policy process to NGOs. The EU/NGO Liaison Committee legitimised the role of NGOs in policy development. At a UN level, ECOSOC and the parallel conferences run at all multilateral conferences play a similar role. The promulgation of the White Paper and its concomitant changes all provided openings for dialogue, and in some cases, institutionalised this dialogue. Changes in the Oireachtas system have opened up the discussion on foreign policy to, not just NGOs, but to parliamentarians also. The widening scope of foreign policy issues and arena have created a 'niche' for NGOs as carriers of information and knowledge. As we will see, in the next chapter, the NGO sector itself has expanded and deepened in scope.

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105 O'Donnell and Laffan, *op cit.: passim* argue that partnership was a key means of managing Ireland's increased participation in international governance from the 1970s onwards.

106 See Smith, Martin, 1993. *Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo and Singapore: 7.

It does not follow, however, that any of this translates into a greater capacity to influence. EU membership has diminished Ireland's autonomy as a single actor while widening the field of action and, potentially, increasing its capabilities as one of the greater union. The opening which has occurred thus at the national level and the concomitant widening of arenas for action must also be viewed in the context of the more complex multilateral decision making environment in which Ireland participates. The CFSP constitutes an overarching edifice that is at one a determinant of and greater than solely Irish foreign policy interests. There are many new opportunities but there are also many new constraints.

The challenge to any Irish NGO is thus to evaluate and prioritise the decision making hierarchy in order to formulate a campaign which will bring the most desired outcomes. The three case studies which follow illustrate in detail how three different policy issues were tackled by a range of NGOs and details the policy outcome. Before moving on to the case studies, I will present in the chapter to follow, an analysis of the universe of Irish NGOs.

Chapter Four

The Universe of Irish NGOs: a Survey

Introduction

Traditionally, as has been seen, the fields of international relations and foreign policy studies have paid little attention to the role of human rights groups, solidarity organisations and other such cause groups. Chapter one set out some of the theoretical and epistemological factors that facilitated this.

The discipline cannot be accused entirely of neglect. Contributions, however, largely focus on transnational or international NGOs operating primarily within a multinational or transnational environment.[1] These NGOs are themselves part of a greater NGO universe that includes small, sometimes unstable, frequently badly resourced and funded NGOs that operate at a national or sub-national levels in pursuit of human rights, sustainable development, the rights of indigenous peoples and other such causes. The main target of these groups is national–level politics. This is not to preclude consequential or directed engagement with other NGOs, governments and IGOs beyond the boundaries of the state where they are located. As we will see in this chapter, extra-national linkages and advocacy are all increasingly integral to the activities of even small NGOs.

This chapter turns the telescope specifically onto Irish civil society by analysing data compiled from a survey of the Irish NGO landscape. It allows us to establish the 'universe' from which the case studies emerged and make some links between the concerns of chapter one and the world of Irish NGOs. It allows us examine some general expectations of and answer some basic questions about Irish NGOs. How do they set about doing their work? What

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[1] This bias reflects the emergence from the 1970s onwards of environmental , feminist human rights NGOs and so on. On environmental internationalism see Prince, Thomas and Finger, Matthias, 1994. *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global*, Routledge, London and New York. For IR orientated research, see, Weiss, Thomas G and Gordenker, Leon, (Eds.), 1996. *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London; Willetts, Peter, (Ed.), 1982 . *Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organisations*, Frances Pinter, London.

do they believe are the best routes to influence the policy process? Do they groups collaborate? What values do they espouse?

The chapter is in three sections. Section one sets the big picture of the groups surveyed. Section two then moves on to focusing on the details. Within this section I will firstly, briefly present the research design and details about data presentation. I then move on to the main contribution of this chapter; the survey results. The results are structured around three dimensions of NGO activism: organisational, governance and strategic, adapted from an analytical model devised to explain the role of NGOs at the UN.[2] To enhance analysis and to facilitate organisation a four part categorisation of the NGOs surveyed here has also been devised. It is suggested here that four distinct categories of groups can be identified. These are: single country solidarity groups; single issue groups; coalitions and/or umbrellas of other groups and the final category of 'others', essentially those groups that do not fit in to any of the above. Using the categories, we then explore the dimensions of Irish NGOs surveyed. The final and third section of the chapter will conclude.

What do we already know about Irish NGOs? Some literature does exist but what it tells us comprises a partial and piecemeal account. In 1977, Irish attitude groups, not just the kind under consideration here, were found to be under-resourced, largely reliant on voluntary labour and unable to develop the organisational expertise that characterised Irish sectional groups. They were not afforded the same consultancy status by government as sectional groups and despite a high degree of enthusiasm remained outside the corridors of power.[3] Irish sectoral groups (farmers, trade unions, business interests) participated systematically in consultation processes with relevant government departments in relation to foreign policy issues. The Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement (IAAM) stands out as a 'cause group' that influenced Irish foreign policy in the 1970s. Details of this case have been presented in chapter two and need not be rehearsed here.

Some ten years later it was argued that while there may indeed have been some successes, it is the norm that solidarity groups are successful only when there is a *prior* (my emphasis) 'ground swell of public opinion and sympathy

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[2] The model was devised by Gordenker, Leon and Weiss, Thomas G, 1996(a). "Pluralizing global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions" in Weiss and Gordenker, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 41-44.

[3] Maguire, Maria, 1977. "Pressure Groups in Ireland" in *Administration,* vol. 25, no 3: 356-7

in an issue'.[4] The relationship between the Department of Foreign Affairs and NGOs, based on politeness rather than any genuine exchange, is offered as an explanation. In contrast, it has also been argued that certain Irish NGOs were extremely successful in both influencing Irish foreign policy output and in generating public support of their causes in the 1980s. NGO activism on Central America created a consensus among Irish politicians of support to the FSLN government in Nicaragua[5] and opposition to US policy in the region.[6]

Two common themes emerge from the above research. The first is the relative marginalisation of NGOs within the policy process in comparison to sectional groups. The second is the comparative newness of such groups. We see their emergence from the 1960s onwards. As we saw earlier in this research the mid 1970s can be seen as a 'turning point' for Irish involvement in the developing world and in the formation of NGOs. From this point on, we see more groups emerging engaging with a wider number of issues.

None of the research referred to here, however, provides an anatomy of NGOs and, with the exception of that relating to the IAAM,[7] conclusions have been drawn therein without any systematic analysis of their role in the policy process. Is there a 'typical' NGO in Ireland? What are its characteristics? Is there a degree of uniformity to allow generalisations? It is useful to firstly present a general picture of the NGOs involved in this research.

The Groups: a General Picture

The groups surveyed range from tiny-membership, entirely voluntary, groups to Irish sections of international organisation that have complex internal structures and are dedicated to advocacy on issues that are intrinsically global. An attempt to sketch a 'typical' group (beyond the defining characteristics for inclusion in the survey) is of limited utility because of their diversity. But they are not, either, all deviants. From an organisational perspective, the typical group concerned here was founded

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[4] Holmes, Michael, Rees, Nick and Whelan, Bernadette, 1993. *The Poor Relation: Ireland and the Third World*, Trócaire and Gill and Macmillan, Dublin: 57.

[5] The Frente Sandinista Liberation National (FSLN) came to power following the revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 and won the first post-revolutionary elections in 1984.

[6] See Kirby, Peader, 1992. *Ireland and Latin America: Links and Lessons*, Trócaire, Gill and Macmillan.

[7] Laffan, Brigid, 1988. *Ireland and South Africa: Irish Government Policy in the 1980s.* Trócaire, Dublin.

sometime after the 1970s and is a membership organisation with at least two layers in its structure: an executive committee (or steering group) and a membership. From a normative perspective these groups typically perceive themselves as oppositional to the dominant norms of foreign policy makers. Typically this opposition translates into direct and/or indirect lobbying on issues of concerns. Much of this work will be done, typically, by voluntary labour.

Beyond these broad strokes however, differentiation is significant. The basis of the four part categorisation (referred to above) was derived from the different dimensions in relation to aims and organisational structure of the groups. It can be assumed that groups in one categories will behave differently in the policy arena, will have access to different resources and will have different methods of organisation from groups in another. These differences will be teased out in the pages to follow. Appendix A lists the organisations surveyed giving their founding goals and date of establishment.

There are 14 groups in the first category; single country solidarity groups. They are predominantly younger organisations such as the Kurdistan Information Network, Burma Action, the Bhutanese Refugee Support Group and the Ireland/South Africa Association.[8] These groups have a clearly defined focus of action and their activities are delineated by the national boundaries of the peoples, or country, with which they are in solidarity. Their solidarity may be with the government of the country or not.[9] They may find themselves campaigning on different issues and engaging in a wide variety of actions. The Cuba Solidarity Campaign, for instance, organises work brigades to Cuba, fund raises and lobbies against the US blockade of Cuba.

There are six groups in the second category; single issue groups. These are the Association of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Ireland (ARASI); Irish Black and Migrant Women; Voluntary Services Ireland (VSI), Bóthar; the Chernobyl Children's Project and Baby Milk Action. Their activities are bounded by concern with a specified issue area rather than a geographical location

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[8] The remainder are the Cuba Support Group; Ogoni Solidarity; Ireland Kosovo Support Group; Ireland Algerian Solidarity Group; Peru Support Group; Irish Mozambique Solidarity; Irish El Salvador Support Committee; Irish Sudanese Solidarity Group; the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign and Miqesi: The Irish Albanian Society.

[9] A good example of how solidarity focus may change *vis a vis* government is the Irish Nicaragua Support Group which was pro government when the FSLN was in power but could no longer maintain such a position once it lost the elections in 1989.

(although the two may coincide as in the case of the Chernobyl Children's Project). Baby Milk Action for instance is involved in lobbying against the use of formula milk primarily in the developing world but is also involved in the promotion of breast feeding and issues of nutrition.

A total of ten groups are housed in the third category; coalitions and/or umbrella groups. Among them are the Irish Missionary Union, (IMU); the Debt and Development Coalition (DDC) and Banúlacht.[10] These groups were largely formed as a result of a felt need of prior organisations or individuals for collaborative work towards broadly agreed aims, with shared values, and, for general co-ordination of activities.[11] The policy focus of these groups is determined by the interest(s) of the members. It can change as membership and issues change. However, each has a defined field of endeavour that acts as a magnet for all groups involved in related or similar work. For all the groups in this category many different, but related, issues may be adopted and the focus may transcend the particularitiy of a single territorial boundary. Many of these groups may furthermore be involved in campaigning on different issues simultaneously.

Some differences between groups in this category need to be pointed to. Both Amnesty International (Irish Section), (hereafter known as AI) and the Pontifical Mission Societies (hereafter PMS) represent a national constituent member of a global network. AI, for instance, has 41 branches throughout Ireland. The PMS has a branch in each of the 26 dioceses in the country and national organisations in every country in the world.

Finally the remaining six groups in the 'other' category are; Action From Ireland (AFrI); Comhlámh; Viatores Christi; the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP) and 80:20. This category is constituted by a variety of groups, generally clustered around development issues but with a particular institutional focus which may lead them to work on a number of country-specific or issue-specific topics. Several of these groups target the linking of

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[10] The remainder are Amnesty International (Irish Section); the Pontifical Missions Society (PMS); the Irish Council for Overseas Students(ICOS); the Irish Refugee Council (IRC); Development Education for Youth (DEfY) and the Latin American Solidarity Centre (LASC).

[11] Networking of activities is a feature of the voluntary sector on the basis that a network can formalise links with government and create cohesion in the sector, expand available resources, allow strategic planning to take place and provide services that were not previously available. Cited in Powell, Fred and Guerin, Dónal 1998. *Civil Society and Social Policy*. A and A Farmar, Dublin: 159.

development and social justice 'overseas' with development and social justice at home. Comhlámh, for instance, has campaigned in Ireland against EU trade policy in relation to the Multi-Fibre Agreement (which restricted the importation of clothing to the EU) and, laterally, on Irish/EU refugee policies. AFrI began in 1975 as an aid agency but its emphasis changed to working in Ireland for justice, human rights and protection of the environment in Ireland and elsewhere.

A feature of the groups in this category is their linkage to other Irish institutions. ICOS membership is made up of educational and training institutions such as the universities, the Institute of Public Administration, APSO and the Irish Management Institute. The Irish Foundation for Co-operative Development (IFCD) is appointed by the Irish Co-operative Organisation Society, the umbrella organisation for private agricultural co-operatives.[12] The ICJP, like its national counterparts throughout the world evolved from post Vatican Two concerns of the Roman catholic church. Both these organisations then are linked to significant sectoral interest groups in Irish society: the Irish Co-operative Organisation Society and the Roman catholic church.

The research design

Using lists provided by two organisations in the field, supplemented by personal knowledge of the sector, a total of 61 NGOs were identified for the survey.[13] In keeping with the parameters established for this enquiry in chapter one certain categories of NGOs were excluded. These were private, professional or other interest groups, aid agencies and missionary organisations.[14] However, in terms of the field of enquiry both these latter types of organisations have significant influence as supporters of, or as members of some of the surveyed groups such as the DDC and the Irish Refugee Council.[15] One of Ireland's biggest aid agencies, Trócaire, funds the

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[12] The Irish Co-operative Organisation Society, the oldest in the survey, was founded in 1849.

[13] Dóchas, provided its membership list and NODE provided copies of contact lists for the field. NODE (National Outreach in Development Education) is the Dublin-based network for 11 development education centres throughout the island of Ireland.

[14] The terrain of Irish Catholic missionaries is of itself quite complex. In 1998, there were 3,277 missionaries serving in 93 countries. For a detailed account of Irish missionaries overseas see Irish Missionary Union, 1998. *Survey of Overseas Irish Personnel,* IMU, Dublin.

[15] In fact both the DDC and the IRC were established largely as an initiative of missionary groups and aid agencies in an effort to generate lobbying activities in areas relating to their work in the field. In the context of the DDC the concern arose, as we will see in chapter seven,

development education activities of a significant number of Irish NGOs. For instance, the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign featured in the following chapter receives Trócaire funding for its newsletter and for other once-off activities. Also excluded from the enquiry were local centres dedicated to development education on the basis that they were established to promote development education at a local level in schools and in the community and voluntary sector.[16] They could not be considered NGOs as defined in chapter one, although like the missionary groups and aid agencies, they play a role in influencing the environment.

A questionnaire was sent to each of the 61 organisations and, subsequent to telephone follow-up, a 60 percent return rate was recorded. Thirty-seven questionnaires were returned of which 36 were usable.[17] The reply from one network, the Latin American Solidarity Centre (LASC) represented the aggregated reply from three different groups, LASC itself, the Irish Nicaragua Support Group (INSG) and the Chile Desk.[18] This left 22 organisations not accounted for in returns.[19] A copy of the questionnaire is in appendix B.

The Survey

Cosmopolitanism assumes that it is possible for citizens of a state to engage in a politics based on the claims of global humanity. This thesis is founded on a proposal that solidarity groups, human rights groups and other NGOs form part of a global network or participate in formal and informal links that transcend national boundaries based on the claims of humanity. Their activities can bring about norm changes within international relations and how state's view their foreign policies. Their values and ethics render them, in

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from the impact of debt on the economies where aid and missionary work were being carried out. The IRC initiative resulted from links made between EU migration/asylum policies (and Ireland's role therein) and the work of missionary/aid agencies in the developing world.

[16] These form the members of NODE. See footnote thirteen.

[17] One organisation requested that the reply be treated as confidential.

[18] Both the INSG and the Chile Desk are working groups of LASC. There are other single country solidarity groups operating under the rubric of, but are autonomous from, LASC. All share office facilities and technical resources and key personnel may, at different times, prioritise different activities. LASC is funded by the NCDE and Trócaire, fund raising and membership subscriptions.

[19] Of the remainder some organisations appear to have become defunct either temporarily or otherwise. In two cases (The Tibet Support Group and The Colombia Network) the lead person was outside the country. Others simply failed to return the data possibly because they felt that their organisation was not 'relevant'; an explanation offered by several organisations when contacted. Others contacted complained of questionnaire fatigue.

a general sense, oppositional to the existing inter-state system based, as it is, on state sovereignty as an absolute value. This formulation throws up some general expectations about (Irish) NGOs: that they are cosmopolitan activists, that they campaign for the implementation of such a value in Irish foreign policy and that they are linked into networks, national and transnational that assist them in their activities.

These expectations are not of the 'testable' type and, furthermore, 'testing' for cosmopolitanism would prove a tautological exercise in that the groups under examination in both the case studies and the survey are, by definition, not sectoral or professional interest groups. They are largely[20] driven by an altruistic concern for others outside their membership[21] and believe that Irish foreign policy should reflect these concerns. But we must be able to say something coherent about the groups.

Data Presentation

The model devised by Gordenker and Weiss to examine international NGOs at the UN, posits four dimensions for analysis.[22] The dimensions were designed to locate the site of activities within governing structures and the structures and aims of NGOs (the first and second) and to examine the strategies of NGOs and their outputs or products (the third and fourth). Given the transnational nature of the groups examined in their scheme and that most were aid or relief agencies, (i.e. offering a service of some kind), the fourth dimension, relating to product, is not useful for the groups under investigation here. Elements of 'outputs' identified by Gordenker and Weiss, such as networking and information giving will be incorporated into the first dimension below; the organisational dimension. The three dimensions that will be used here are as follows;

a) Organisational dimensions. There are two aspects of this dimension. The first relates how NGOs fit into the 'organisational framework that extends from the village to the globe.'[23] This is

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[20] Two of the groups however can not be considered purely altruistic in their goals. Both the Irish Black and Migrant Women and ARASI engage in activities that benefit their members.

[21] This is not to deny indirect, beneficial consequences of group activity on their membership. For instance creating a more peaceful and just world; satisfying the need to engage in altruistic activism and ideological or political needs; providing social interaction and so on. However, the *intended* beneficiaries are not the group members.

[22] Gordenker and Weiss, *op cit.*: 42-43.

[23] *Ibid.*: 43.

called external organisational aspects. The second concerns the internal arrangements of NGOs including their resource base and participative issues. This is called internal organisational aspects.

b) Governance dimensions: these relate to the instruments of governance that NGOs come into contact with.

c) Strategic dimensions: these relate to the goals that NGOs establish for themselves in the context of governance and organisation. Included here are normative foundations and tactical modes employed.

Where the data will allow, the three dimensions are applied to the aggregate of each of the four categories rather than the aggregate of all groups. The nature of the data, at times, does not lend it self to such a presentation and in these cases, a group aggregate presentation is given in the text and the aggregates for each category is given in the appendix and identified appropriately.

The first dimension relates to organisational issues within the NGOs. This dimension allows us evaluate the geographic range of the NGOs (is their universe local, national, regional trasnational?); their support base (nature of membership); their personnel (voluntary or paid staff); their financing and their legal basis (do they have constitutions, hold an AGM?). In relation to external linkages, geographic issues differ from the other issues of internal organisation. Adopting the distinction between internal and external dimensions, the data has been presented thus below.

External organisational dimension

In the global picture, NGOs are to be found at every geographic range of governance, from the purely local and community to the transnational level. It is also a general feature of NGOs that they act as a 'bridge' among several ranges.[24] That bridging exists is not unexpected given, as Weiss and Gordenker point out, that many NGOs seek governmental contracts for humanitarian relief, programme implementation, and so on, 'overseas'. None of the NGOs in this survey fit that model of operation however. They may

[24] Gordenker, Leon and Weiss, Thomas G, 1996(b). "NGO Participation in the International Polity Process" in Weiss and Gordenker, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 211.

choose to make 'bridges' for operational and/or strategic reasons but none have such interests borne of institutional survival.

What kinds of linkages do the NGOs surveyed have? Are they connected to other groups engaging at a national, European and/or international level to promote similar policy outcomes and effects or norm changes? Do they share information and engage in collective monitoring or engage in more proactive collaborative advocacy work?

All groups were asked to indicate if they were 'involved' with national networks, European or EU networks and international networks. The term 'involved' was used deliberately to encompass the broadest base of linkage; many networks are informal and do not have strict membership rules. In some cases they may operate simple for information and knowledge sharing; epistemic communities of activists.

An impact of new information technologies on political action is the creation of a world in which the erstwhile 'natural' barriers to communication, territorial boundaries, have become increasingly artificial. Global communicative webs are now in place which alter the 'effective distances between individuals, communities, branches of corporations, political groups and nations'.[25] Are Irish NGOs linked into such global webs?

Respondents were asked to identify their uses of the internet and how important it was to their work. Their responses are treated in the data discussion presented for table 4.1 below which details the frequency of involvement with networks, and the frequency of general internet use. In tabulation a failure to answer was taken as a 'no'.

[25] Camilleri, Joseph and Falk, Jim, 1992. *The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot: 5.

Table 4.1 General Linkages of NGOs: national, European, international and on the internet.

(n=36)

Organisatn. Linkages	National network?		Eur/EU network?		Internat. Network?		Use of internet?	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Single country groups? (n=14)	50%	50%	42%	58%	50%	50%	71%	29%
Single issue groups (n= 6)	66%	33%	50%	50%	66%	33%	50%	50%
Coalitions/ Umbrella groups (n=10)	50%*	50%	90%	10%	40%	60%	80%	20%
Others (n=6)	84%	16%	66%	33%	66%	33%	100%	0%
Total involvement	58%	42%	61%	39%	52%	48%	75%	25%

* indicates a network other than their own.

The data indicates a pattern of significantly consistent linkages among NGOs at a national level which continues to a European and international level. With the exception of singly country groups and European-level linkages, at least half the groups in all categories network at all three levels. In some cases the frequency is significantly greater than half. Only one of the 'other' category is not involved in a national network and only one of the coalitions/umbrella groups is not involved in European-level networks.

The number of single country organisations not involved in any networking at all is interesting. There is a higher rate of non-involvement here than in any

other category. A consistent minimum of 50 percent are not involved in networks. At the same time, 71 percent of these groups use the internet.

In several cases the link to the European and international level were facilitated through membership of national coalitions such as Dóchas which links its members into the EU/NGDO Liaison Committee. It is at the level of coalitions and umbrella groups that we see real evidence of 'bridging'. Most organisations in this category are, in fact, members of others at a national level (e.g. DEFY is a member of Dóchas; LASC is a member of the DDC) and at a European level (the IRC is a member of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles and the DDC is a member of EURODAD the European Network on Debt and Development). The linkages outside the European arena are marginally less strong. The overall frequency of involvement in international networks is less than at both other levels but not dramatically so.

The patterns for internet use reflect a high level of involvement – only nine organisations overall do not use the internet for their work. However, internet use can range from functional email communications to more political work of maintaining web sites, posting information or conferencing.

To get a sense of how the internet was used in the NGO sector, respondents were asked a series of questions about its use; its importance to their work, the kind of information accessed and the source of the information. Twenty seven groups use the internet in their work.[26] The internet was used for many purposes; getting information, maintaining contact with other organisations and email communication. Several post information on the internet and one, the Cuba Support Group, maintains a home page. The ETISC runs the East Timor 'virtual country' web site.[27] One organisation – 80:20 – uses approximately 150 human rights and development internet sites. These sites are maintained by intergovernmental organisations, by governments and by other NGOs. The Chernobyl Children's Project considers the internet as its "international lifeline for sending our message, receiving enquiries and some funding". LASC makes use of Latin American newspapers on the internet and

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[26] The groups that do not use the internet are ARASI, the IMU, El Salvador Support Group, Ogoni Solidarity, Irish Black and Migrant Women, Miqesi – Irish Albania Society, the Peru Support Group, PMS and IFCD.

[27] The ETISC through the server, Connect Ireland, maintains a top level domain for East Timor from Dublin. The service was temporarily disrupted early in 1999 when hackers (believed to be from the Indonesian military) attempted to alter the crucial data and 'destroy' East Timor. *The Independent*, January 29, 1999.

to maintain contact with other NGOs (in Latin America and elsewhere) with whom it shares information and engages in collective lobbying.[28]

The nature of information used and the nature of contacts maintained will vary according to the nature of the work of each NGO. Several indicated in their replies that the internet was becoming 'increasingly' important to their work implying a greater internationalisation and more linkages to follow. To gauge the relative reliance on internet linkages respondents were asked to rate its importance to their work. Of the 26 internet users, five considered it extremely important/essential; 15 considered it very important or important; four considered it 'becoming important' and 2 considered it 'not very important'.

Internal Organisational Dimension

Weiss and Gordenker state that while democratic governance of NGOs is raised several times in their text, the relationship between organisational membership and activities is unclear.[29] Are more formally constituted, democratic organisations (with internal rules, election procedures, checks and balances) more likely to be effective? Will they behave any differently in the policy arena? Does their internal organisation have an impact on their access to governance?

In order to examine any patterns in internal organisation and how they might have an impact on activities, respondents were asked a series of questions about legal status, whether they held an AGM, their organisational structure and if it had a membership. Table 4.2 below presents the findings.

Some of the headings used on the table need clarification. An organisation was considered to have a 'legal structure' if it had a constitution and/or statutes. Qualification for 'open membership' was determined by whether anybody could join. For instance, DEfY was not considered to have an open membership because membership is conditional on prior membership of a youth-related organisation or group. The DDC has an open membership

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[28] After the arrest of General Augusto Pinochet in London, for instance, in 1998, LASC circulated urgent action calls from other Amnesty International and other persons to all on its mailing list. The communication included email, fax and 'phone numbers of the British Home Secretary, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[29] Weiss and Gordenker, 1996(b), *op cit.*: 211.

because, while its biggest membership comes from other organisations (especially missionary organisations), any individual can join. Respondents were considered to have a bureaucratic structure if they had more than one layer in their organisation. In relation to staffing, respondents were asked how many of their staff were volunteers and how many were paid workers. The information is tabulated below according to the three types of staffing arrangements: where staff is entirely voluntary (vol); where staff is mixed voluntary and paid (pd/vol) and where staff is entirely paid (pd). Where no answer was given in relation to these questions (with the exception of the question relating to staffing) the response was taken to indicate a 'no'.

Table 4.2: Internal Organisational dimensions of NGOs

(n=36)

	Legal structure?	Holds an AGM?	Open mbrship?	Burcratic structure?	Staff structure
Single country group (n=14)	58% 58%	42% 58%	50% 50%	35% 65%	All vol
Single issue group (n=6)	83% 17%	83% 17%	50% 50%	33% 66%	Pd/vol: 3; Vol: 3
Coalition/ umbrella groups (n=10)	100% 0%	90% 10%	40% 60%	80% 20%	Pd/vol: 7; Pd: 3
Others (n=6)	66% 33%	83% 17%	33% 66%	50% 50%	Pd: 1 Pd/vol: 5
Total (n=36)	75% 25%	70% 30%	45% 55%	50% 50%	

The most striking difference between the groups relates to the issue of staffing. None of the single country solidarity groups has paid workers. Three

of the single issues groups depend entirely on voluntary staff. Three of the coalitions/ networks have no voluntary workers and rely entirely on paid staff. The remaining operate on combinations of paid and voluntary staffs.

And what of the other dimensions to internal organisation? It is clear that coalitions and umbrella groups are more likely than any other categories to be legally constituted and to hold an AGM – to adopt the formal rules of democracy.[30] They are also more likely to have a bureaucratic structure but not necessarily more likely to have an open membership. Single country groups are perhaps most unlike the coalitions/networks in that they are least likely to adopt formal democratic structures.

Given the nature of the groups; none of these patterns is unexpected. It would be most unusual for a coalition to function successfully without internal rules and procedures. Furthermore, given their representative nature and that the members are, in many cases, other organisations, membership fees can be levied towards the cost of running a secretariat and paying staff. They have, in other words, greater access to potential resources and, in most cases, the groups in this category came about because of a 'gap' identified by existing organisations. What might be surprising is that they less likely than other categories of groups to have an open membership. Again the organising principle of these groups indicates why: many were formed as a coalition of existing organisations to service their collective need. They were formed with a 'captive' audience and an established constituency.

In contrast, single issue solidarity groups tend to be small, formed by a group of individuals (often activists) concerned about a particular issue, sometimes in reaction to a particular policy or global event. Their lack of bureaucratic structures facilitates speedier responses. There is no committee to be consulted, no membership from whom advice must be sought and none of the requirements of minute taking, quorum reaching and so on.

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[30] The one organisation in this category that does not hold an AGM and is a one layer-steering group is Banúlacht, the Irish platform for the EU-funded Women in Development Europe (WIDE) Membership is by invitation and it is made up of women with expertise who may be employed by, but are not representatives of, other organisations. Banúlacht proposes to hold its first AGM in 1999 – a decision that will change its structure considerably. Banúlacht as we will see in chapter seven, was very involved in the preparatory process for the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing).

Can we make any overall assessment of number of people involved or members of these groups? Twenty of the groups were membership organisations[31] and the number of members varied hugely ranging from AI (Ireland) with 10,000, to the Irish Sudanese Solidarity Group and Misqui - Irish Albanian Society which had 30 each. It is, in fact, not possible to calculate an aggregate membership. Coalitions and umbrella groups may have a 'membership' that is somewhat meaningless in this enquiry. Among ICOS members are all the major third level institutions in the state and professional organisations such as the Irish Medical Organisation (the professional organisation for medical doctors) and the Irish Management Institute (the professional organisation of managerial workers). To claim that all IMO members are members of ICOS may be literally true based on representative membership. But it hardly amounts to a political commitment as, for instance, joining the Cuba Solidarity Group does. In the case of ICOS and the IFCD we can perhaps talk about organisations whose members *represent* a significant proportion of the population. The same can be said for the DDC which has 80 groups in its membership many of whom are religious/missionary organisations with large memberships. Excluding organisations whose membership was made up of such constituent groups, membership overall stands at 18,314.[32] Given the diversity of the membership numbers per group, giving an average membership per group would be of minimum utility here. However, if we exclude Amnesty from this calculation (which actually seeks mass membership) then the number of members of the groups, based on their own figures, is 8,314. Of these, the ETISC claims 2,000.

The evidence here indicates no direct relationship between the nature of the group and the nature of its membership although the smaller single country cause groups were less likely to be membership organisations and more likely to be a loose group of individuals working informally without bureaucratic or traditional structures of democratic accountability. While it is not by any means the case that the NGOs overall rely on voluntary activism, the role of the volunteer is still very important. In the case of category one groups, they are the *since qua non* of activism.

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[31] Half of those not membership organisations were single country solidarity groups. However, there were some difficulties evident in terminology. DEfY, for instance, claimed it was not a membership organisation based on the fact that its membership is constituted by groups not individuals. The Irish Albanian Solidarity Group claimed it was 'not really' a membership group but has 30 members and anyone can join. Both were classified here as membership organisations.

[32] The calculation was based on figures given by the groups themselves.

Voluntarism is, of itself, not a definer of relationships and access to levels of governance. As we will see in chapter five, the ETISC, an entirely voluntary group managed to significantly influence Irish foreign policy on East Timor and has built up good working relationships with all levels of governance in Ireland. At the other end of the scale, the more institutionally bound, formally structured groups with large official memberships and less (or no) reliance on volunteers are less likely to engage in direct lobbying activism. ICOS, the IFCD and the ICJP, for instance, do not directly lobby but through their membership of other umbrella groups and coalitions allow their name and institution go forward in such activity. Furthermore, at an international level, voluntarism (at lest having voluntary activists on board) is officially a precondition of accreditation with ECOSOC at the UN.[33]

Internal organisation dimension: funding

A key issue facing any NGO is its funding not only in terms of amounts but also sources. Levels of funding can determine organisation structure, activities, strategies and, success. Sources of funding can influence the capacity for autonomous action. At a global level, some NGOs refuse financial support from governments (Amnesty International is a case in point) while others can be totally financed by governments and IGOs (the International Red Cross is an example here).[34]

Respondent were asked to rate the importance of specified funding sources to their ongoing work. An important point to be clarified at the outset is that six groups proposed an 'other' category as their most important source of funding: fund raising activities. The majority of these (4) were single country solidarity groups although one coalition and one single issue group also fund raises. Typically, funds are raised through social and cultural events. The questionnaire had understood the 'gifts etc.' category to include fund raising. A 'no answer' was taken to mean 'not important'. Table 4.3 below sets out the overall picture for all categories of groups and the break down per group is given in appendix C.

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[33] Weiss and Gordenker, 1996 (b), *op cit.*: 212.

[34] Natsios, Andrew, 1996. "NGOs in the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Co-operation" in Weiss and Gordenker, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 67-81 deals with issues of financing and co-operation.

Table 4.3: internal organisational dimension: importance of funding sources.

(n=36)

Degree of importance	Unimportant Freq.	Of some importance	Important
Subscriptions	22	4	10
Earnings	29	4	3
Govt. grants	27	4	5
Grants frm othr Irish orgs.	24	3	9
Gifts etc.	25	5	6
Trust funds	28	6	2
Corporate funds	31	5	1
EU grants	25	6	5
Othr transnat. Org. grants	32	3	1

The data here indicates that subscriptions comprise the most important source of funding for NGOs followed by grants from other Irish organisations. In relation to this latter point, the importance of Trócaire as a funder of development education awareness projects has already been referred to.

Given the range of groups under examination here funding issues have differential impacts. Organisations with full time staff operate at different resource levels from those without. The profile of single country solidarity groups is striking here: as we know they all rely on voluntary labour for their work. This does not translate into freedom from financial burdens. One single country group respondent commented that her 'personal income' was often used to finance activities. Another commented: 'we have no funds' and added that other organisations provide free use of facilitates such as fax machine, photocopying and internet. In many cases the organisations operate out of the homes of key individuals and basic costs are absorbed into the household budget (telephone and other such costs). The evidence above, that for many of

the groups, none of these sources of funds are important can be partially explained by the fact that, for the single country solidarity groups particularly, work is carried out within minimum financial requirement: i.e. largely on voluntary commitments. For organisations with corporate and /or other organisations memberships such as DEfY, DDC, and ICOS, subscriptions from members comprise the most important source of funds. However, looking across the total number of groups, grants from the EU and from other organisations are the most important to the largest number of groups. That said, in each case less than one third of the total, in each case, rated these sources as most important.

In conclusion, it is clear that, other than the largely voluntary nature of the single country solidarity group, no clear funding pattern emerges from across the groups here. Most rely on combinations of subscriptions, fund raising, small grants from Irish organisations for development education work (such as Trócaire and the quango the NCDE) EU grants gifts and donations. Where these organisations are least likely to raise funds is from private corporate donations and from other transnational organisations.

Governance dimension

The second dimension, that of governance, relates to the instruments of governmental policy that NGOs come into contact with.[35] At the level of global governance, NGOs have, in fact, developed roles in relation to the former diplomatic functions of maintaining peace and security, have developed integral roles with national governments, and, there is a high level of both informal and formal relationships between NGOs governmental personnel and IGOs. NGOs are involved in 'norm and policy setting, policy execution, contracting and inter-level mediation'.[36] To what extent can we find evidence of such activity, in actual or prototype form in the survey keeping in mind the importance differences between the NGOs surveyed here and those for whom the model was devised.

Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency with which they lobbied or had contact with 11 named positions ranging from local authority members to the Presidency of the EU. For presentation purposes, these eleven positions

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[35] Gordenker and Weiss, 1996(a), *op cit.*: 43.
[36] Gordenker and Weiss, 1996(b), *op cit.*: 212 – 213.

were categorised into four distinct levels of governance: local level, national level, EU level and IGO level. In addition respondents were asked if they had attended or made presentations at the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. As we saw in chapter three the establishment of this committee provided an entry point into national governance on foreign policy issues. The research sought to establish to what extent this entry point was used. Table 4.4 below presented the overall frequencies of contact with the four levels and the committee.

Table 4.4. Governance Dimensions of NGOs.

(n=36)

Levels of govrnce	Local level		Joint Commtte		National level		EU level		IGO level	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Single country groups (n=14)	50%	50%	85%	15%	100%	0%	92%	8%	42%	58%
Single issue groups (n=6)	50%	50%	0%	100%	66%	33%	66%	33%	33%	66%
Coalitions umbrella groups (n=10)	30%	70%	40%	60%	80%	20%	80%	20%	70%	30%
Others (n=6)	33%	66%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%
Total (n=36)	42%	58%	53%	47%	81%	19%	78%	22%	50%	50%

The table shows that Irish NGOs have a presence at every level of governance from local to the international. The Dóchas EU/NGDO link is important as a

route to European level networking. Other organisations are linked into other European level organisations specific to the issue area. Many solidarity groups have formed links with other like-minded groups throughout the globe. Most groups, furthermore, use multiple channels although largely concentrated on the national level, from TDs and Senators to officials and government ministers, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At a national level, Irish NGOs also make regular use of the Oireachtas committee. In particular, the single country solidarity groups have a high profile here – several of the respondents commented that they regularly make oral or written presentations. Furthermore, many of them are invited to participate by the clerk of the committee. The only exception is the single issue groups – none of which has used the committee to make its case.

That solidarity groups are a presence at the committee level is not surprising. Their comparative advantage is precisely that they have knowledge and up to date information on single countries that may not be available to the Department of Foreign Affairs and is less likely to be available to hard-pressed parliamentarians whose working brief is vast.

While this table gives us an overall view of the levels of governance within which these NGOs engage, it doesn't indicate the intensity nor the preferences within those levels of governance. It is one thing to contact local members of the European Parliament seeking information or lobbying on an upcoming vote, it is another to directly lobby a Commissioner or the EU Presidency.

Respondents were asked to rate the frequency with which they contacted named offices at each level of governance; for instance, European Commissioners and officials at the Commission, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The frequencies for the total number of respondents is given in Table 4.5 below. The categories 'often' and 'very often' were collapsed to ease presentation. Again, failure to answer was taken as a 'no'. The breakdown per category is given in appendix D.

Table 4.5 Frequency of contact with named offices.

(n=36)

Freq. Of contact	Very often/often	rarely	never
Taoiseach	3	0	23
Tánaiste	2	11	23
Mnstr. For For. Affairs	14	11	11
Other govt. Ministers	7	13	16
Mnstr. of State For For. Aff.	18	9	9
Other TDs	18	9	9
Senators	15	10	11
DFA officials	22	5	19
Other govt. officials	15	6	15
Local reps.	5	11	20
MEPs	20	8	8
EU Commssn.	6	7	23
Commssn officials	9	11	16
EU Presidency	9	7	20

If this data was derived from the results of a popularity poll (for the office or person most popular with the NGOs) then officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs would come out on top. Second most popular are MEPs, followed by, with equal scorings, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and other TDs. Least popular are the Taoiseach and, with equivalent scores, the Tánaiste and EU Commissioners. Coming a close joint second as least popular amongst the NGOs are the Presidency of the EU and local (Irish) elected representatives.

While the data does indicate a Europeanisation[37] of NGO lobbying activities it is important to stress that the national level of governance remains more important.[38] NGOs may not be rushing out to make contact with the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but Senators, Dáil Deputies and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs are still seen as important contact points in the policy process. In particular, the frequency of contact with officials at DFA indicates that as far as NGOs are concerned, linkages at this level are the most important of all.

Strategic dimension

These dimensions establish what it is that NGOs hope to achieve and how they hope to achieve it. Globally, some NGOs seek very specific goals (a change in particular policy) and some seek a change in terms of 'social ideology'. By this is meant, for instance, the goal of international feminist organisations to bring about wholesale changes in social organisation. The primary mode of activism chosen by NGOs operating at a UN level is advocacy and lobbying. Monitoring of governmental and IGO policies is a second mode. However, mass demonstrations and mass propaganda do not feature highly although the women's movement has, at an international level succeeded in establishing mass conferences and tribunals that parallel intergovernmental events.[39]

What are the tactical and normative modes adopted by Irish NGOs? Do they prioritise lobbying and advocacy? Do they attempt mass or popular mobilisation? Are they single-goal orientated or are their activities embedded in social ideology and therefore elements of a desire for broader social change? In order to answer these questions respondents were asked questions about their organisational goals[40] their normative values and the tactics and strategies they chose to achieve those goals. Reflecting the distinction drawn by Weiss and Gordenker between tactical and normative modes, the data is

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[37] NGOs are more likely to make contact with officials at the EU Commission and/or the EU Presidency than the combined offices of the Taoiseach and Tánaiste. They are also more likely to contact MEPs than both the Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

[38] While a total of six groups said were in contact with EU Commissioners often, or very often, twenty three never have any contact at this level.

[39] Gordenker, and Weiss, 1996(b), *op cit.*: 213-215. The role of the international women's movement is dealt with in some detail in chapter seven.

[40] The stated goals of each organisation are given in Appendix A.

presented in two parts below. Tables 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) look at the normative aspects to the strategic dimensions and Table 4.7 looks at the tactical aspects.

Norms

Respondents were asked to rate five values in terms of their importance to the processing of Irish foreign policy. Table 4.6(a) below sets out the tabulated results for all groups. Failure to answer was taken to mean 'not important'.

Table 4.6(a) Strategic Dimension: NGOs foreign policy norm.

(n=36)

Importance of value	Not important	Of some importance	important
Human rights	9%	0%	91%
Irish trade interests	37%	55%	8%
Ireland's EU membership	36%	44%	20%
Irish employment	27%	47%	26%
Global peace and security	8%	8%	84%

The respondents were then asked their perceptions as to how foreign policy makers would rate the same values. The answers given are, of course, entirely subjective. The respondents have no real way of knowing which Irish foreign policy makers rate which values. Furthermore the term 'Irish foreign policy-makers' did not specify what policy makers. We have no way of knowing which policy makers the respondents had in mind. The question formulation cannot account for the complex decision making process, and the differences that can exist between different actors and institutions within that process. It will provide an overall sense of 'fit' between the values of the organisations and what they view as the dominant values within the decision making élite. Table 4.6(b) below sets out the values that NGO perceive that policy makers attach to the processing of foreign policy. A failure to answer was tabulated as 'not important'.

Table 4.6(b): NGOs view of policy maker's norms.

(n=36)

Importance of value	Not important	Of some importance	important
Human rights	47%	50%	3%
Irish trade interests	22%	11%	66%
Ireland's EU membership	19%	13%	66%
Irish employment	30%	22%	47%
Global peace and security	27%	61%	11%

What do these tables tell us about the values of the NGO sector? The single most striking aspect is that the NGOs view their values as exactly the reverse of those held by state policy makers. The easiest way to present these results is in aggregate value from most to least important. The ratings below takes into the account the aggregate values plus the total valid replies for each value. Respondent's values are as follows, in descending order: human rights; global peace and security; Irish employment; Ireland's EU membership and finally, Irish trade interests. In contrast, the respondents view the prioritisation of foreign policy makers of the same values as follows in descending order: Irish trade interest; Ireland's EU membership; Irish employment; global peace and security and finally, human rights

These lists do not however, underline the differences that exist between NGOs in this evaluation. For instance the agreement between NGOs on their own evaluation is strikingly consistent while, in assessing the evaluation of the policy makers, there are differences within the overall pattern. Eighteen respondents feel Irish policy makers view human rights as of 'some importance', 11 feel they consider human rights of 'no importance'.

There is one figure that requires further brief examination if only because it is unexpected. Table 4.6(a) indicates that, for three respondents, human rights

and global peace and security issues are not important. The figure attests somewhat to the margin of error required in evaluating such surveys. One respondents did not answer this section in the questionnaire and all values were rated 'not important'.[41] The remaining two replies can be accounted for. Both respondents, I suggest, gave reverse values to those actually espoused.[42] These distortions do not, however, significantly affect the overall pattern.

However, it should be pointed out that standing in opposition to the values of the governing élite is not necessarily a problem for NGOs. In fact NGOs may anticipate a position of 'outsider' and view their oppositional voices as a badge of integrity and honour.[43] The independence of the NGO sector is also a characteristic valued by those in decision-making positions.[44] An oppositional stance as a function of the NGOs is a characteristic sometimes encouraged by the governing élite. At a conference on human rights organised by Trócaire the Minister for State for Foreign Affairs, Liz O'Donnell addressed the largely NGO audience with the following words: "You are entitled to ask of the Irish government that we place human rights considerations at the forefront of Irish foreign policy; that we seek to promote human rights considerations in words and in action; that we unambiguously condemn violations of human rights as a matter of fundamental policy wherever these violations occur'.[45]

The pre-eminence of human rights and global peace and security as foreign policy values attests to the cosmopolitan ethic that underlines these groups. For them the particularistic national demands of loyalty to Irish trade, and employment interests and the regionalism of the EU are less important. This attachment to universality is the *sine qua non* of cosmopolitanism. Translating it into cosmopolitan activism is the challenge for these groups.

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[41] This organisation was IFCD.

[42] The two were Dóchas and AFrI. Both rated human rights as least important despite organisation goals and working ethics that prioritise human rights.

[43] The fact that some NGOs view working with governments and international organisations such as the UN, as a threat to their independence and autonomy has been referred to. See Robinson, Mary, 1998. "NGOs - The Challenge of Partnership" speech delivered at the Japan Federation of Bar Associations and the International Human Rights Law Association (Japan), Tokyo, 28 January, 1998.

[44] Irish Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Liz O'Donnell told a gathering of NGOs and policy makers that a 'strong, independent-minded and vibrant' NGO community was 'central' to how a democracy functioned. Liz O'Donnell, address delivered to the Inaugural NGO Forum on Human Rights, Royal Hospital Kilmainham, Dublin March 7 1998.

[45] O'Donnell, Liz. Address at Trócaire Conference, 26 February, 1998, Dublin.

Tactics

NGOs view themselves as oppositional to the values of Irish foreign policy makers. Some NGOs seek wider social, political and economic change in one policy area. How are their values translated into tactics? Do differences in goals translate into different tactics? Respondents were asked what specified activities they engaged in. Table 4.7 sets out the results of these questions. As above where no answer was given it was taken to indicate a 'no'

Table 4.7: Strategic dimensions: NGO tactics.

Tactics used	Media work	School Work	Public talks & meetngs	Work with vol. Sector	Pickets & public events	Cultural events
	Y N	Y N	Y N	Y N	Y N	Y N
Single country groups (n=14)	85% 15%	50% 50%	85% 15%	78% 12%	71% 29%	42% 58%
Single issue groups (n=6)	100% 0%	66% 33%	100% 0%	100% 0%	33% 66%	66% 33%
Coalitns Umbrlla groups (n= 10)	90% 10%	70% 30%	90% 10%	80% 20%	60% 40%	40% 60%
Others (n=6)	83% 17%	83% 17%	83% 17%	66% 33%	33% 66%	50% 50%
All (n=36)	89% 11%	64% 36%	89% 11%	81% 19%	55% 45%	47% 53%

Public talks and meetings clearly occupy much of the time and energy of NGOs. Strikingly all of the respondents provided an answer to this activity (the only question which evoked a full response in the questionnaire). Thirty two engage in this activity. Collaborative events with other NGOs come second as activity regularly engaged in (controlling for the total valid answers), followed by media activity. School and educational work is also considerably high on the list of activities (23 groups do this regularly) followed by pickets or other such public events (20 do this regularly). The activity that the groups is least likely to engage in is cultural events (19) but this represents only marginally a bigger number than those who do (17).

The convergence on public/schools/meetings activities indicates that popular mobilisation is an important tactic for the NGOs. As will be seen in two case studies to follow (that of the ETISC and the DDC) mass mobilisation through post cards and letter writing campaigns, petitions and demonstrations were part of the tactical weaponry used to put pressure on the policy makers. As we saw in chapter three, the opening up of the Irish secondary school curriculum to issues of development and human rights has provided a potentially rich terrain for NGOs to cultivate cosmopolitanism.

However, of interest here is the extent to which these groups can facilitate the organising of cosmopolitan values from within Irish civil society into levels of governance. AI provides an outlet in Ireland for mass protest and activism on human rights issues. At least half of all the other groups are open to participation by any concerned individual to influence the foreign policy process. Populist tactics generate a political space at a grass roots level wherein a contesting perspective on Irish foreign policy can be articulated, and, ideally acted on.

Assuming all activities have strategic value, much of which is immeasurable, how do groups evaluate their activities? In order to explore this question, respondents were asked to rate the strategic importance of influencing five set of actors in terms of achieving their organisational goals. The results are set out in table 4.8 below. Failures to answer were included in the 'not important' category. A breakdown according to category is given in appendix D.

Table 4.8: Degree of importance of influence.

(n=36)

Degree of importance	Not important	Of some importance	Important
Influencing the government	22%	16%	61%
Influencing govt. officials	33%	27%	41%
Influencing the public	27%	27%	44%
Influencing the media	22%	30%	47%
Influencing com/vol grps.	25%	38%	36%

The greatest frequency of groups (22) agreed that influencing government represents an activity of importance. The second greatest frequency (17) felt that influencing the media was important followed by influencing the public (16), influencing government officials (15) and influencing other community and voluntary groups (13).

However, when we aggregate 'of some importance' and 'important' a different kind of pattern emerges albeit one in which the differences are very small. On the basis of this combination, influencing government is viewed as being as important as influencing the media (both at a frequency of 28); followed by influencing the community and voluntary sector (27), influencing the public generally (26) and, finally, influencing government officials (25).

The differences between these frequencies is not terribly significant. We can say that for these groups influencing the policy making élite (government and officials) is important tactically. But as important, overall, is influencing popular opinion by working through the media, other community and voluntary sector groups or directly through meetings demonstrations and

other public events. However, some reference must be made to the number of groups who do not consider influencing government, officials, the media and so on important. Clearly, the groups featuring in the 'not important' column are not consistently the same. Some groups do not consider influencing government officials important but to consider influencing the government to be, and vica versa. Closer examination of the responses indicates that a consistent five groups (Viatores Christi, IFCD, ICOS, Irish Black and Migrant Women and VSI) do not, generally consider strategies of influence important for their organisation. Of these, four are members of networks or coalitions that do engage in lobbying activities. Hence we can conclude that for these four lobbying is of secondary importance to their work. The fifth group, Irish Black and Migrant Women, is one which provides support for its members and seeks to promote a positive image of black and migrant women. However, activities of influence (to promote this image) are concentrated in the community and voluntary sector and the organisation is not a member of other networks or coalitions.

Linking normative and tactical aspects of strategies we get a clearer picture of how these groups assert cosmopolitanism in their everyday work. The vast majority of groups (twenty nine) actively lobby on their own behalf. Of the remaining seven,[46] four are members of other networks that lobby on their behalf leaving only three that do not directly target policy makers as part of their goals. These are the Irish Black and Migrant Women, PMS and AFrI.[47]

The founding goals of the NGO gives some indication of the manner in which ethics become action. As referred to earlier we can distinguish between activism focused on a wide social ideology or on a specific target. This distinction may be somewhat misleading as most of these groups can be considered cosmopolitan. The social ideology from which they generate norms about how the world ought to be, and how Irish foreign policy ought to contribute to that, is a cosmopolitanist ideology. At a practical level, however, not all groups, set their targets on a grand scale. Borrowing from similar research in a different contex we can say that some seek 'modest

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[46] The groups that do not engage directly in lobbying were: Irish Black and Migrant Women, IFCD, AFrI, ICOS, VSI, Viatores Christi and PMS.

[47] The diffuse boundaries between organisations are underlined by the AFrI reply to this issue. While the organisation is not a member of other networks or coalitions, the respondent was a member of LASC, ETISC, DEfY and Comhlámh and the organisation is active in many campaigns on issues of peace, justice and human rights. This situation also throws up a feature of these NGOs – the interchangeability of the leading individual in the organisations.

change' rather than a sweeping aside of the old order and its institutions.[48] From the point of view of stated policy goals therefore we can distinguish between those groups prioritising wider social change and those prioritising single targets. A content analysis of the group's goals (see appendix A) shows that only two the espouse widespread social change: Dóchas and AfrI.

Thus, whether the vehicle chosen is a network, a singe country solidarity group, a single issue group or some other organisational form, the preferred strategy for cosmopolitan activism is incremental reformism. The Cuba group seeks a lifting of the US blockade on Cuba; the East Timor groups wants the East Timorese to choose their own future; the Baby Milk Action group wants all parents to make informed and free choices about infant feeding, VSI wants to provide people with opportunities for cultural exchange and volunteer action in the interest of promoting peace and greater understanding between peoples world wide. All seek to influence Irish foreign policy, to varying degrees and with varying tactics to allow these goals come about.

Furthermore, these groups attach significant importance to creating an attentive public for their views: working with community and voluntary groups and directly influencing public opinion are worthy of time and energy. In the cosmopolitan world view, activism is not just about bringing about a specific policy change. It is also about changing norms over time and sensitising civil society towards those norm changes. This requires the sensitising of national civil society towards the notion of a society of individuals beyond the state: global civil society. The goals of two organisations are particularly good illustrations of this. LASC seeks to make links between individuals in Ireland and Latin America working for social change. Banúlacht seeks to make links between Irish women and women world wide on the links between issues of their gender and development.

Conclusion

The content of the case studies and of this chapter echoes similar work done in relation to Dutch foreign policy[49] and to the evolution of UK policy

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[48] Gamson, William A. 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Dorsey Press, Illinois: 38.

[49] See, Everts, Ph.P, (Ed.), 1985. *Controversies at Home: Domestic Factors in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands*, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht.

towards Latin America in the 1970's and 1980's.[50] In the Dutch case, as the traditional élite consensus on foreign policy declined (such as on issues of security) a greater politicisation occurred in Dutch society creating a demand for participation in the foreign policy process. That demand was expressed through and acted on by the domestic activities of church groups, NGOs and other actors. That well organised lobby groups, supported by certain political parties and with good public profiles for their issues, can influence the foreign policy output is not in doubt. The Dutch system is, however, more open and amenable to domestic activism than other comparable systems in Europe.[51]

In the British case, while specific NGOs remained active and proved themselves extremely durable and flexible lobbyists over time, their impact on the policy output was felt only, and then minimally, under the regime of a Labour government. The values of Conservative governments coupled with the business lobby left their efforts to change policy largely ineffective.[52]

What has become apparent from this chapter is the growth of NGOs in the Irish foreign policy landscape from the 1960 onwards and, in particular, the growth of single country solidarity organisations. We have seen from the dimensions of activities within this category that these groups tend to be similar organisationally: with ad hoc structures and often without memberships. These groups have, at the same time, proved to be extremely durable. Given the nature of their organisational goals such organisation is to be expected within this category.

We have seen also that coalitions and umbrella groups have become firmly established in the landscape and provide another lobbying instrument. This category of group also shows remarkable similarity across organisations structure, goals and lobbying activities. Frequently cross cutting to a complex degree throughout the NGO sector, they have a multiplier effect on the individual voices and through pooling of resources and co-ordination of activities have the capacity to organise what could be an otherwise anarchic sector. Coalitions and umbrella groups stand out in the landscape because they do not rely on voluntary labour. They are staffed by people with skill and expertise who call, in turn, upon the skill and expertise of their

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[50] See, Wilkinson, Derek, 1990. *The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy Towards Latin America,* 1973-1990. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Hull.
[51] Everts, *op cit.*:, 325.
[52] Wilkinson, *op cit.*: *passim*.

component members. They link Irish NGOs into European and international governance levels seeking policy outcomes at an these level. Many groups have become reliant on the internet for their work. For some it is the main source of information.

In relation to the two other categories, some other consistent patterns emerged. The category of 'others' contains the most diffuse groups, not surprisingly given the criteria for their categorisation. Many of these groups were established to service particular needs (such as the needs of returned development workers, the needs of Irish missionary organisations) and, over time, have extended their activities into the public/political domain to take on issues of development and/or human rights work more generally. These groups are more likely to have closed membership, to have organisational structures and are less likely to directly engage in lobbying activities. Similarly the single issue groups are focused on the particular issue that sparked the organisations establishment and are less likely to engage directly in the political realm. However, despite the differences along the dimensions examined here, the categories share a common value system and, in general, are linked to each other in a complex organisational network which articulates a competing set of values and norms about the content of Irish foreign policy into the policy arena.

The decision making landscape has, in this sense become pluralised and the scenario described by Keatinge[53] is a thing of the past. The landscape has become Europeanised and internationalised. Innovations in communications technology allow groups link directly with other like-minded groups across the globe and provide invaluable sources of up to date information and analysis. This is turn challenges a power traditionally held exclusively by government: information. In many cases NGOs surveyed here are ahead of policy makers when it comes to information. Technology and the nature of networking that exists has allowed Irish NGO participate in collective action that resonates with the actions of new social movements world wide.[54]

Through media work, letter writing campaigns, street actions and other public demonstrations, public meetings and collaborative work with other community and voluntary groups, the NGOs have created a public

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[53] Keatinge, Patrick, 1973. *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy*, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin: 267-293.
[54] Camilleri and Falk, *op cit.*: 199-235.

constituency for foreign policy issues. Occasionally, that constituency can be effective in directing, altering or partially influencing policy. It is evident that these groups seek to create popular responses to the policy goals they wish to effect: it is not simply a question of influencing the policy-making élite. For many groups the strategic linkage of Irish public opinion (influenced through the media, through educational work, through public events and so on) is derived from the conviction that development and human rights are not just issues for 'overseas' even if the target of policy change is exclusively 'overseas'. Rather the groups consciously draw links between the foreign policy outcomes and the domestically arena. In this sense these groups pursue a politics which is, to use a phrase 'intermestic';[55] integrating the domestic and the international.

[55] Uslaner, Eric, M, 1995. "All Politics are Global: Interest Groups and the Making of Foreign Policy" in Cigler, AJ and Loomis, BA (Eds.). *Interest Groups Politics*, CQ Press, Washington: 371-406.

Chapter Five.

Case Study: The East Timor Campaign

Introduction

This case study illuminates the role of an Irish NGO in the Irish state's adoption of human rights in East Timor as a central foreign policy issue during the period 1992-1996. The importance of the issue for Ireland during this period is indicated by the high profile it received under Dick Spring's foreign ministry leading up to and during Ireland's Presidency of the European Union (EU) in 1996. In the mission statement for the Presidency we find a prioritised commitment to "support international efforts to promote a just global and internationally acceptable solution of the East Timor question on the basis of the Common Position".[1] Ireland's taking over of the Presidency coincided with the adoption of the Common Position on East Timor[2] by the Council of the European Union on June 25 1996. It furthermore concluded with the adoption of a range of actions on East Timor that emerged from the European Council marking the handing over of the Presidency to the Dutch in December 1996.

This case study was selected, as we saw in chapter one, because of the nature of the NGO (a single issue group) and because of the main arena of foreign policy activism (at the EU). However, the clear success of the campaign rendered it attractive from a cosmopolitan perspective. Why did the issue arise in the Irish polity in the first place? Why did Ireland go on to become so concerned about the fate of a small population on the other side of the globe with whom there were no traditional ties? From a researchers perspective, the campaign run by the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC) also held out the promise of a detailed story that needed to be told.

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[1] *Ireland 1996: Presidency of the European Union. Priorities for the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union:* Undated publication: 40.

[2] The Common Position on East Timor, 25 June 1996, No. 96/407 CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L168/2, July 6 1996.

The ETISC could not make its case for East Timor based on Ireland's responsibility as a former colonial nation, or, as an Indonesian trading partner, or, because of cultural or ethnic ties to the people of East Timor. Ireland had no such links. The case rested solely on common humanity with the people of East Timor and their claim to international support for their cause based on international law. This framework neatly encapsulates three cosmopolitan assumptions. These are, firstly that individuals are members of a single moral community by virtue of their humanity, secondly that consequently they have obligations towards other human being in transcendence of national, ethnic or religious ties and thirdly that political activity must be thus carried out beyond these boundaries implying that universal categories (such as human rights, common needs) must be upheld.[3]

It will be argued here that the activities of the ETISC were a catalyst in forming the Irish East Timor position. The organisation mobilised public opinion, generated support within both houses of the Oireachtas and in the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. The ETISC campaign, based entirely on voluntary activism, nudged the state down the road of 'ethical globalism'[4] by arguing a cosmopolitan position.

Two interesting challenges to cosmopolitanism are thrown up by this case study. One raises the issues of whether a 'cost' is required in order for a state to pursue a cosmopolitan foreign policy. It may be irrefutable to claim that Ireland was expressing a cosmopolitan ethos in pursuit of human rights in East Timor (whether successful or not is not the issue) unless and until Ireland carries some tangible 'cost' such as loss of trade and/or prestige. Are all positions in favour of human rights cosmopolitanism by definition? In pursuing human rights questions, is a state not merely acting out of one of the frameworks for the liberalism of the interstate system: international law?

The second challenge relates to constraints against cosmopolitanism. Adherents argue that one of the sources of cosmopolitanism is the attenuation of the power of sovereign states through regional organisations such as the EU. In this point of view, the integration process in European sets a serious

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[3] Colas, Alejandro, 1994. "Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice: the Case of Socialist Internationalism" in *Millennium*, vol. 23, no 3: 513-4.

[4] Hill, Christopher, 1999. "What's Left of the Domestic? A reverse Angle View of Foreign Policy", in Ebata, Michi and Neufeld, Beverly, (Eds.). *Confronting the Political in International Relations*, Macmillan: forthcoming.

challenge to the 'historical reality' of the inter-state system.[5] However, it will be argued here that, in this particular case, the cosmopolitan tendencies of the Irish state in relation to East Timor was constrained by the requirement of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP) .

This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section gives a contextual background to the East Timor issue. This section will be necessarily brief. Section two looks at Ireland's engagement with East Timor from 1975 to 1991. The year 1991 was chosen as a watershed for East Timor in the international response to their plight because of particular event that occurred that year. Section three describes the formation of the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC) its activities, goals and strategies. Section four presents Ireland's engagement with East Timor from 1991 to 1996. Section five examines how the East Timor issue was played out in the context of the common position of 1996 while Ireland held the EU Presidency. Given the importance of the EU in determining Ireland's position on East Timor and the potential of the EU presidency in external relations this is an important section. Section six draws some conclusions about the validity of cosmopolitanism to explain the relationship between the ETISC and Irish foreign policy.

The East Timor Issue

This section will look at four aspects of the issue of East Timor in a chronological manner. The first section presents the history of the territory itself. The second looks at how East Timor was played out in the UN in the period from 1975 to 1991. The third examines East Timor and the EU focusing in particular on the role of Portugal as an agitator on East Timor. The fourth and last section looks at the change in world opinion that occurred after the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991.

East Timor: a brief history

At the heart of the issue of East Timor lies the annexation by Indonesia of that country following its invasion of the territory on December 7 1975. But East Timor's history of colonisation stretches back much further.

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[5] Colas, *op cit.*: 515.

The Portuguese first arrived on the island of Timor in the early 16th century.[6] Following the arrival of the Dutch, who established a foothold in West Timor, both western powers struggled for control of the territory. The dispute was not finally settled until 1850 when as accord resulted in the incorporation of the western part of the island into the Dutch East Indies and the eastern part into Portuguese control. Portuguese colonial rule was not consolidated however until the early 20th century and was not extensive. Portugal's main colonial interests were concentrated in Africa.[7] The Dutch East Indies (including West Timor) received achieved independence from the Dutch in 1945.

The Portuguese 'carnation' revolution of April 1974 suddenly released the colonial yoke from East Timor and, indeed, other former Portuguese colonies.[8] Like its fellow colonised territories, an anti-colonial resistance had been active in East Timor prior to the departure of the Portuguese. In the aftermath of the departure, East Timor society was characterised by the coexistence of both a colonial and an indigenous system; the former was eventually subsumed into the latter. From the latter arose a popular movement for reconstruction based on indigenous culture and kinship alliances. It was led by Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Leste-Timor Independente), a socialist political party that had been founded in September 1974 and that had effectively administered the territory after the Portuguese withdrawal.[9] On November 28 1975 Fretilin proclaimed an independent, democratic republic in East Timor . There was, however, resistance, to such a move from the two other significant parties. The Associacao Popular Democratics Timorense (APODETI) sought integration within a Portuguese commonwealth and the latter sought integration into the new Indonesian republic.[10]

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[6] The island is at the eastern end of what is now the Indonesian archipelago.

[7] Traube, Elizabeth G, 1995. "Mambai Perspectives on Colonisation and Decolonisation" in Carey, Peter and Bentley, G Carter, (Eds.). *East Timor at the Cross-roads: The Forging of a Nation,* Cassell, London: 45-46.

[8] The revolution toppled the Caetano government, the successor to the 40 year dictatorship of Antonio Salazar (1928-68).

[9] Taylor, John G, 1995. "Emergence of a Nationalist Movement" in Carey, and Bentley, (Eds.),*op cit.*: 33-36.

[10] de Magalhaes A. Barbedo, 1992. *East Timor: Indonesian Occupation and Genocide,* President's Office, Oporto University, Oporto: 13-21.

East Timor's experience of autonomy was to prove short lived. The Indonesian invasion of December 7 was followed within a year by the 'pacification' of the territory by military force. An estimated one third of the total East Timor population of 680,000 died directly at the hands of the Indonesians or indirectly through famine and disease.[11] The invasion was justified by the Indonesians by claiming that the turbulence in East Timor was a threat to its (Indonesia's) own security. General Suharto, who had come to power in Indonesia following an anti-communist coup in 1965, argued the necessity of the action to prevent the rise to power, furthermore, of a hostile, left-orientated neighbour.[12]

If the Portuguese departure from East Timor had been swift and somewhat unexpected the new Portuguese regime in Lisbon did not entirely cut its cords with the former province. Immediately following the December invasion, Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia but continued to take an interest in East Timor. This was expressed multilaterally through the General Assembly of the UN. Portugal also sought to engage directly with the Indonesians through the offices of the UN. In 1982[13] the General Assembly of the UN mandated talks that eventually became the Tripartite Talks between the UN, the Portuguese and the Indonesians under the chair of the special envoy Jamsheed Marker. These talks were to prove fruitless during the 1980s and were temporarily broken off by the Portuguese before Santa Cruz.[14]

*I*n the face of changing fortunes, however, Portugal remained the administering power in East Timor and committed to seeing an independent East Timor. The Portuguese constitution, adopted in 1976, obliged Portugal to "promote and safeguard the right to self determination and independence of East Timor". The Portuguese President, and his government, were empowered to "perform all acts necessary for achieving the(se) aims".[15]

East Timor and the UN

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[11] Carey, Peter, 1995. "Preface" in Carey and Bentley, (Eds.), *op cit.*: xiv.

[12] Amnesty International, 1985. *East Timor: Violations of Human Rights*, Amnesty International, London: 3.

[13] It was not until the coming to power of President Eamalho Eanes (1976-1986) that significant Portuguese initiatives emerged.

[14] The talks were eventually to produce the agreement of 1999 in which the Indonesians accepted that should the people of East Timor reject a plebiscite on autonomy, independence would be given. At the time of writing, this agreement was being concluded.

[15] Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1989, Articles 293.1 and 293.2, (second revision).

What was the response to the invasion in the world outside? While the General Assembly of the United Nations responded swiftly to condemn the invasion in 1975, no specific actions were put in place. In December, shortly after the invasion, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3485 that, *inter alia*, deplored the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor and called upon the Indonesians to withdraw in order to allow the people of East Timor freely express their right to self determination.[16] The US, Canada and many European states, including Ireland, abstained, Australia and Portugal voted in favour and Japan, India, Malaysia and, not surprisingly, Indonesia itself were amongst those which voted against. The response to this resolution prefigured, with some not insignificant changes, the voting pattern on the floor of the General Assembly in the years to follow.

On December 22 the Security Council approved resolution 384 that, *inter alia*, called on all states to recognise the territory of Timor (*sic*) and the inalienable right of its people to self determination.[17] Resolution 389 was adopted by the Security Council on April 22 1976 and it, *inter alia*, ordered Indonesia to leave the occupied territories of East Timor and called on all states, and other parties, to achieve a peaceful solution to the situation.[18]

The resolutions had little impact on Indonesia's behaviour and it did not withdraw from the territory. To the contrary, four months later, Indonesia formally annexed the territory completing the invasion process. However the use of Chapter 7, the mechanism of enforcing Security Council resolutions, was not considered by the UN. The failure of the UN in the aftermath of the invasion may not have been a failure of will. The 'total ineffectiveness' of the Security Council during these years guaranteed that supporters of Indonesia in the west were not obliged to bring pressure to bear on Jakarta.[19]

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[16] Resolution 3485 (XXX). Question of Timor December 12 1975. For the most comprehensive and detailed account of UN documents relating to East Timor see Kriege, Heike, (Ed.). 1997. *East Timor and the International Community, Basic Documents*, Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1-491.

[17] UN Security Council Resolution 384 (1975) of December 22 1975.

[18] UN Security Council Resolution 389 (1976) of April 22 1976.

[19] Carey, Peter, 1996. "East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity" in *Conflict Studies*, RISCT, October/November 1996: 2-3.

Between 1975-1982 the General Assembly debated eight resolutions on East Timor. The right to self determination was reiterated and the Declaration of the Granting to Independence to Colonial Nations and Peoples was frequently mentioned. However, despite the frequency of the debate and the strength of language used, voting patterns became less favourable towards East Timor. For instance, in 1975, the vote was 72 to 10 in favour. But in 1982 a motion was narrowly passed by 50 votes to 46. The principle proponent of a pro-Timor position was Portugal, supported mainly by the USSR and its political allies (but including also China) - a support that was the cause of some embarrassment to the Portuguese.[20]

Most European members, Ireland included, consistently abstained on resolutions in the General Assembly. In 1982, however, Ireland changed its vote to one in favour of East Timor.[21] Consistently opposing any UN moves on the issue were the US, Japan, Australia (from 1978 onwards) and Asian nations that were friendly towards the US such as Singapore, the Philippines and, not surprisingly, Indonesia itself. East Timor had clearly become a cold war issue and while 'East' and 'West' held onto opposing positions the European powers remained solidly in between. The Non- Aligned Movement, of which Indonesia was a main player, tended to vote with Indonesia. India, for instance, opposed all resolutions between 1975 and 1982. Concerned that the diminishing voted in their favour were in danger of shrinking even further, Portugal decided in 1982 not to raise East Timor in the General Assembly again. The issue moved into the chambers of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and to sub commissions and Working Groups where details of human rights abuses were debated.[22]

Statements from the US in the years after the invasion managed to argue that both no act of self determination had occurred in East Timor and that the incorporation of the territory into Indonesia (following annexation) was acceptable.[23] Bob Hawke, the Prime Minister of Australia - Indonesia's most powerful neighbour, announced in 1985 that it recognised East Timor's

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[20] de Vasconcelos, Alvaro, 1996. "Portugal: a Case for an Open Europe" in Algieri, Franco and Regelsberger, Elfriede, (Eds.). *Synergy at Work.*, Institut fur Europaische Politik, Bonn: 124.

[21] General Assembly Resolution 37/30: Question of East Timor, November 23 1982.

[22] See Krieger, (Ed.),*op cit.*: 221-61.

[23] de Magalhaes, *op cit.*: 24-6.

integration into Indonesia. The announcement came during negotiations between the two powers on access of the former to oil in the Timor Gap.[24]

On the eve of its accession to the EC in 1986, Portugal had struck a deal with Indonesia, under UN auspices, that it would recognise the annexation of East Timor provided Indonesia respected the cultural and religious identity of its people. However, Portugal altered its position and went on to become the repudiating voice on Indonesia within the EEC. The change resulted from a change in domestic political leadership.[25]

East Timor and the EU

Portugal's accession to the EEC presented that country with another forum for debating and generating international support for East Timor. In a non-partisan initiative Portuguese MEPs began raising East Timor within the Parliament through the use of resolutions. In the year of its accession Portugal temporarily boycotted an EC/Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)[26] meeting as a means of raising East Timor's profile. Portugal was also active at Council level introducing East Timor as a new item for consideration under the mechanism of European Political Co-operation (EPC).

However, EEC members, as the voting patterns at the UN had shown, were not easy Portuguese allies. Indonesian importance within ASEAN engendered a reluctance among European powers to take a strong line against its activities in East Timor. It was not until 1988 that the EEC, under the Presidency of Germany, broached the issue publicly. At the 43rd UN plenary session, Germany referred to the desire for an internationally acceptable solution to the East Timor issue. Persistent lobbying by Portugal finally resulted in the achievement of a consensus among the twelve members to support the continuing involvement of Portugal in talks with the Indonesians (ongoing under UN offices) and to defend human rights within the territory.[27]

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[24] Indonesia and Australia came to an agreement on the Timor Gap on December 11 1989. See Clark, Roger, S. 1995. "Timor Gap" in Carey and Bentley, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 73-94.

[25] de Vasconcelos, *op cit.*: 125.

[26] ASEAN members were in 1996; Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. For an analysis of EU/ASEAN relations see Stankovitch, Mara, 1995. *The European Union and ASEAN: a background paper*, CIIR, London.

[27] de Vasconcelos, *op cit.*: 126.

The Santa Cruz massacre and after

However an event at Dili in East Timor on November 12 1991, (known as the Santa Cruz massacre) provided a catalyst for change within the international community. The massacre of 200 civilians[28] occurred in a graveyard in Santa Cruz when Indonesian soldiers opened fire on a demonstration. The killings received much media attention globally live footage from the scene went on to provide powerful images for television documentaries made shortly afterwards and broadcast widely. The massacre also occurred after the collapse of the USSR and Cold War bipolar politics. The disintegration of the bipolar alliances allowed a global reassertion of core UN principles of sovereignty and self-determination. For instance, the UN's response to the Iraqi invasion, while, driven as much by economic interests of some of the more powerful members, opened new possibilities for UN interventionist politics.

The EEC responded quickly and issued a declaration condemning Indonesia for its actions - seen as a serious violation of a basic human right. From the Portuguese point of view, the Santa Cruz massacre served to validate its prioritised concerns for East Timor during its Presidency which began in December 1992. However, a draft resolution that Portugal sought on behalf of the 12 for the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in January of that year was 'watered down' to a statement from the chair (of the Commission) due to US pressure.[29] Economic ties between Indonesia and some of the more powerful EEC members (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands), however, mediated against Portugal's attempts to co-ordinate a position internally that strongly opposed or criticised human rights violations by Indonesia.[30]

Ireland and East Timor: 1975 - 1991

This section will trace the emergence of East Timor within the Irish political domain from 1975 until 1991. The Indonesian invasion of East Timor was not mentioned in the Oireachtas and was not raised in proceedings there until 1987 when Deputy John Bruton (Fine Gael) asked the Minister for Foreign

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[28] The Indonesians claim 50 were killed.

[29] de Vasconcelos, *op cit.*: 126. The following year, a resolution expressing grave concern over continuing human rights violations in East Timor was, however, passed.

[30] de Vasconcelos, *op cit.*: 126-7.

Affairs, Brian Lenihan, about Ireland's position on the recognition of the territory of East Timor.[31]

At a multilateral level, however, Irish officials were well aware of the East Timor issue, its implications for international law, and, its human rights dimensions. As we saw, East Timor was a regularly debated in the UN's General Assembly. Ireland consistently abstained on the East Timor resolutions.[32] This included abstaining on a vote in November 1979 requesting the UN to send relief for refugees and children in East Timor and one, in November 1981 which, in response to an outbreak of famine within East Timor, called on the UN humanitarian system to provide assistance. However, in abstaining Ireland behaved in synchronicity with its fellow EEC members.

During this period, Ireland's position can be summarised as supporting the Portuguese/UN talks. In this sense, there was no evidence of a 'true Irish position'[33] on the matter of Indonesia's presence in East Timor. The position was sustained into the late 1980's. According to the Minister's reply to Deputy Bruton's 1987 question, Ireland took the view that "the question can best be solved by negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia. Accordingly, we support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General and we welcome the discussions between the two countries under UN auspices".[34] The Minister stated that Ireland did, however, have 'friendly relations' with Indonesia. If this was the first official statement of Ireland's position on the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, it was somewhat oblique, The Minister did not address the substance of the question - the issue of recognition.

His response fits with a failure of Irish governments to make 'clear and comprehensive statements' on the issue of recognition in general.[35] In his statement that the issue of East Timor was "a matter of dispute" between

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31 *Dáil Debates*, June 9 1987. Vol. 373: 915.

32 Resolution 3485 of the General Assembly 12 December 1975; resolution 31/53 of 1 December 1976; resolution 32/34 of November 28 1997; resolution 33/39 of 13 December 1978; resolution 34/40 of 21 November 1979; resolution 35/27 of 11 November 1980; resolution 36/50 of 24 November 1981; resolution 37/80 of 23 November 1982.

33 Symmons, Clive, 1993-1995. "Irish Policy and Practice on Recognition" in the *Irish Jurist*, vols. xxvii-xxx (new series): 193.

34 *Dáil Debates*, June 9 1987. Vol. 373 (a): col. 915.

35 Symmons, *op cit.*: 199.

Indonesia and Portugal"[36] the Minister provided the key to Ireland's position. This was that East Timor was exclusively a bilateral matter for Indonesia and Portugal and not of concern to the international community, Ireland included. This position changed dramatically over the next ten years.

The Formation of the ETISC

Amongst those who watched the ITV documentary on East Timor, (entitled "In Cold Blood - the Massacre of East Timor" and featuring live footage from Santa Cruz) in December 1991, was a group of neighbours in Ballyfermot, Dublin. Although none had a prior involvement with solidarity organisations, human rights issues or development politics they decided to get involved with the issue. According to one founder member, Tom Hyland, the killings in East Timor struck a chord in terms of the impact of the great famine on the Irish population in the late 19th century.[37] For his own part, two highly personal factors helped form his response. The impact of death on a community evoked deep empathy from Mr. Hyland who had not long before suffered two deaths in his family. Furthermore, as someone who had been bullied as a child he was 'in awe' of people defending themselves against bullies.[38] For Mr. Hyland the documentary had changed his world view. He felt he had witnessed something from which he could not turn away.

Immediately after the programme, Mr. Hyland telephoned the London office of TAPOL the UK-based Indonesian human rights campaign. This contact instantly linked Mr. Hyland and his colleagues into an international network of solidarity and human rights groups. The East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign was born. The rather accidental birth of the group - had the founders decided to turn on a radio rather than a television that night - along with the class origins of the founders was useful in generating publicity. Led by a former bus driver (Mr. Hyland), composed of unemployed people and located in a working class Dublin suburb, the ETISC presented an unusual profile.[39]

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36 *Dáil Debates*, June 9 1987. Vol. 373 (a): col. 915.

37 *Irish Times*, September 30 1995.

38 Personal interview with Tom Hyland, January 15 1997. According to Mr. Hyland the images of people being killed at gravesides were particularly powerful. Something "broke through" that night.

39 Mr. Hyland feels, for instance, that the great interest which greeted the group's founding emanated from the novelty aspect of the members' class origins. Author's interview with Tom Hyland, June 12 1996.

The early days

The group's immediate goal was simply to publicise the events that had provoked them into action. Its members believed that once people knew about what was happening in East Timor there would be a 'whole wave of public outrage not just here but right across the world".[40]

The first difficulty the ETISC faced was media and public ignorance about East Timor. The most immediate activity consequently was getting a message out to the public and within weeks of its establishment the ETISC had received substantial national media coverage. An interview on a popular morning radio programme was followed by a special profile of the group's campaign in the main evening television news during prime time viewing thus introducing the activities and the issues to a substantial portion of the Irish population.

A high profile protest out side the British Embassy in April 1992 formally launched the campaign and drew attention to Britain's sale of Hawk jet fighters to Indonesia. As Indonesia does not have an embassy in Ireland, the connection with British trade policy provided a local focus for activities. But the embassy vigil was more than simply symbolic. The ETISC claimed that British military hardware was used to support the Indonesian occupation.[41] The protest went on to become a regular activity.

Minimal strategic, organisational or policy decisions were taken by the ETISC in its first year. The loose steering group internal structure was maintained and the organisation saw itself as, primarily, an activities-based, grass roots organisation. However two important decisions were taken. Firstly, it was agreed to secure patrons representing a wide cross section of Irish society, including especially, representatives from all political parties, and beyond. Among the patrons are two Nobel Peace Prize winners, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Mairéad Corrigan. The Campaign also included representatives of

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[40] Author's interview with Tom Hyland, January 15 1997.

[41] The march which launched the campaign also went past the American and Australian Embassies in Dublin - linking these states also with the Indonesian activities. However, the British link is particularly significant. In 1993, British trade in Hawks (to the Indonesian government) rendered the UK the biggest arms supplier to Indonesia. See Carey, op *cit*.: 15.

marginalised sectors in Irish society such as travellers and the homeless.[42] Secondly the ETISC agreed that it would not become identified with any particular political party or political ideology. Links were made with other human rights and solidarity groups but a decision taken early on not to join Dóchas has been retained. According to Mr. Hyland, the ETISC can co-ordinate and collaborate equally well with other groups without joining an organisation whose work might distract from the main focus: East Timor.[43]

During its first year the ETISC was primarily concerned with generating publicity and developing contacts. The Embassy protest, media work and providing speakers for community groups filled the schedule. In addition, the openness of the secondary school's curriculum to outside speakers on human rights and development topics provided several opportunities to widen support and Mr. Hyland frequently spoke in schools. Contact was made with politicians and the ETISC set out to speak to anyone who would listen. An important contact was made with former Foreign Minister for East Timor, José Ramos Horta, who came on his first visit to Ireland in September 1992.[44]

From diffuse to strategic activities

However, by late 1992/early 1993 the campaign began to recognise that more strategic activism and goal-setting were required. A particularly bruising encounter with an official at the Australian Embassy in Dublin forced the campaigners to re-think their capacity to make a difference.[45] Advice from other experienced activists in Ireland made them realise that 'a few people from Ballyfermot were never going to free East Timor'.[46] An experience during their first oral submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, when a senior Irish diplomat commented that the Department of Foreign Affairs had been inundated with letters about East Timor, forced a

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[42] For the list of patrons see appendix E.

[43] Author's interview with Tom Hyland January 15 1997.

[44] This was the first of three visits by Mr. Horta to Ireland. The others occurred in April 1996 and April 1998. Mr. Horta, who went on to win the Nobel Prize for Peace (along with Bishop Belo) in 1996, enjoyed only a short time in office as foreign minister - his government was ousted by the Indonesian invasion.

[45] As told by Mr. Hyland, the campaigners were advised to go home and not be worrying about East Timor. Tom Hyland at seminar on East Timor, Liberty Hall, Dublin, February 20 1999.

[46] Author's interview with Tom Hyland, January 15 1997.

recognition that, at the same time, wide spread Irish support could make an impact on how Ireland viewed the East Timor issue.[47]

The experiences changed the orientation of the ETISC. Firstly, there was a realisation that media coverage of events such as public talks could affect 5,000 as opposed to the 50 who might actually attend. Seeking and nurturing good relations with the Irish media became a clear strategy rather than a tactic. Secondly it was realised that the ETISC would only ever be a "cog in the wheel" of a greater campaign that included the resistance of East Timorese themselves. Translated into activism this meant acting on behalf of the East Timorese denied the right of political activity. This furthermore implied that, while autonomous, the ETISC saw itself as a servant of the East Timorese. "My overall position now is that we will continue to be an irritant, to put on pressure, to lobby to do whatever is necessary until we receive the signal from the Timorese: you can stop now it's time for us to take over".[48]

The re-evaluation did not diminish the range of activities but, rather, lead to the evolution of a coherent plan of action. A mission statement of 1994 catches the subtle, but nonetheless important evolution of policy orientation. The ETISC sought to create "awareness among Irish people of the continuing violations of human rights in East Timor: highlight the involvement of Western governments in military and economic aid to Indonesia; and help to create a situation where the people of East Timor will have the right to self determination".[49]

In November 1994 the ETISC adopted a more conventional organisation structure. The loose ad hoc group gave way to a Board of Management and a Constitution was adopted and AGMs were introduced. The board advises the campaign and makes strategic decisions. Decisions about day to day activities are taken by Mr. Hyland who remained as co-ordinator from 1992 onwards. This position he held entirely on a voluntary capacity until 1996 when he was employed on a government-sponsored scheme. Administrative staff were also employed from that point on work schemes but campaigning activities

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[47] During his talks in schools, Mr. Hyland answered student's questions about what they could do by advising them to contact the Department of Foreign Affairs. His response was not derived from any tactical organisation but because it seemed appropriate.

[48] Author's interview with Tom Hyland, January 15 1997.

[49] Institute of Public Administration, 1994. "ETISC Mission Statement" in *IPA Year Book and Diary*, IPA: Dublin.

remained as voluntary activity. The campaign's preference is to maintain the voluntaristic style as this engenders a less bureaucratic and more open organisation and emphasises the notion of 'solidarity'.[50]

The voluntary emphasis has spilt over into capital costs budgeting. The ETISC prefers not to engage in protracted fund raising activities and once-off appeals for donations have always produced what is required in the way of technology, office furniture and equipment. Exceptional costs, such as those required for Mr. Hyland's 1994 trip to East Timor (see below), are generated from appeals also.

From 1993 onwards, an annual grant was received from Trócaire for the ETISC's newsletter Maubere, and, from 1996, The National Council for Development Education funded development education work. Specific projects, such as the Human Rights Award, given to school children for project work on human rights are also funded by Trócaire.

Four years after its establishment the ETISC had spawned eight local groups around the island of Ireland, including one each in Derry and Belfast. With the exception of the last two, the local groups are linked to the national group but have autonomy in terms of actions, fund raising and all local initiatives.

Within 18 months of its establishment, the ETISC had accepted that its role was to be, as put by Mr. Hyland, an "irritant". But it was an irritation whose impact was directed at three spheres of Irish public life. Firstly, the ETISC developed a deep and long-lasting network of contacts with the Irish media and a sophisticated response system to any events (Irish or external) that required a comment or challenge. The network also facilitated coverage for the many other public or community events organised by the ETISC. An adopted orthodoxy was the importance of maintaining a visible profile for East Timor. Secondly, the ETISC established and maintained regular contact with parliamentarians generally not just identified supporters of the cause. Within this arena particular attention was paid to the offices of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other cabinet members. Thirdly, the ETISC regularised contact with officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs through briefings by members of the campaign or by visiting academics, activists or other experts or through seeking clarification of the Irish position at every change in

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[50] Personal interview with Tom Hyland, January 15 1997.

the circumstances at the UN, in the EU or in Indonesian/East Timorese relations on the ground. The ETISC acted thus as both a watchdog and a provider of information and up to date analysis for the department officials.

The collective impact of this strategy and its particular key expressions are dealt with below as the ETISC introduced the issue of East Timor into the public realm and the Irish foreign policy process, particularly, from 1993 onwards.

Ireland and East Timor: 1991 – 1996

If Ireland appeared to pay little attention to East Timor in the fifteen years after the invasion, that changed subsequent to the formation of the ETISC. During the period in question here Ireland underwent three changes in government. However, it is during the period from 1993 to 1996, that we see an acute and rapid evolution of a particular policy position on East Timor.[51]

There were three significant catalysts to the formation of Irish policy. Firstly, the Santa Cruz massacre; secondly, the introduction of East Timor onto the agenda of EPC (and later CFSP) and thirdly, the formation and consolidation of the ETISC campaign.

This section will detail the evolution of Irish policy on East Timor up to the 1996 Common Position on East Timor the timing of which coincided with Ireland's EU Presidency, before going on to examine the issue of East Timor for Ireland's Presidency itself.

The first full parliamentary debate

One of the entry points identified by the ETISC into the formal political arena was the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and it is perhaps, no surprise, that

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[51] The first government change occurred in 1992 with the collapse of the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat Coalition and the elections that led to the Fianna Fáil/Labour Party Coalition. The Foreign Affairs portfolio was held, during this government, by David Andrews (FF). With the withdrawal of Labour from that arrangement in 1994, and the agreement that led to the Rainbow Coalition (Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left), Mr. Dick Spring, Labour Party leader, held the portfolio.

it was within this committee, in June 1993, that the first full debate within the Irish parliament on East Timor took place.[52]

On foot of invitations, a delegation from the ETISC, and the Portuguese Ambassador, came before the committee. The invitations had not come out of the blue. For months prior to the debate, the ETISC had prepared the ground well by developing working relationships with Senators and TDs.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had also done its homework in preparation for the hearing. A detailed information pack, containing briefing documents on East Timor, the UN resolutions and the position of the Irish government was provided by the Asia Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs.[53] Both protagonists presented a detailed account of their analysis of the situation. During the debate, many favourable references were made to the work of the ETISC as was the case when the members returned to the draft resolution (see below) in July 1993.[54]

Following the hearing the Committee passed a seven point resolution on East Timor that condemned human rights abuses in East Timor and recalled the UN's recognition the rights of all people to self-determination. The resolution proposed the following:

* that the Irish government should use all means open to it at the UN and the EU to assist in the finding of a comprehensive political settlement on the basis of self-determination.
* that the Irish government should continued to raise its concerns about East Timor with Indonesia and within the EU and the UN
* that the Indonesian Ambassador (accredited to Ireland from his base in London) might be invited to meet the Committee.
* that a delegation from the committee should visit East Timor
* that the resolution be transmitted to Foreign Affairs Committees in all EU countries with a view to promoting Community-wide support for international action on East Timor.[55]

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[52] Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 30 1993. However, there appears to be no public record of proceedings from this date. This is not altogether surprising given that the committee restructuring, which resulted in the founding of this committee, had just begun and furthermore that publication of committee proceedings was not and has not been systematic.

[53] Department of Foreign Affairs, 1993. Untitled briefing document on East Timor.

[54] Parliamentary Debates, *Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs*, July 14 1993: 136-40.

[55] Copy of the resolution from the office of David Norris, Independent Senator.

Two points can be made here about the hearing in relation to an anticipated outcome of the establishment of the Joint Committee. Firstly, the debate forced the Department of Foreign Affairs not just to prepare a detailed document, but to be prepared to defend it in a public realm. The dialogue within which the defence occurred enhanced accountability for foreign policy decision making. Secondly, the debate allowed ordinary TDs and Senators, of both governing and opposition parties, formulate actual policy goals specific to Ireland's role in this matter. In this regard the dialogue also widened the number of actors in the debate about East Timor not just to parliamentarians and citizens but to representatives of the voice of East Timor itself.

In relation to policy goals, the committee's proposals very specifically outlined a role for Ireland that went beyond simple declaratory statements. However, the proposals carried no obligation on the part of the Minister, the Cabinet or officials. In keeping with tradition the proposal was conveyed to the Minister by officials for his consideration. However, East Timor had had a thorough airing, broad cross-party agreement had been reached on both analysis and proposals, and policy goals were outlined.

Ireland, Australia and East Timor

East Timor became a very live issue in Ireland for a few brief days in 1993 occasioned by the official visit by Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating from 19 to 22 September. A round of activities was scheduled in advance including a trip to the Dáil. The visit prefigured the manner in which East Timor would, in coming years, percolate through the body politic of Irish society. It was raised through parliamentary, diplomatic and civil society channels and serves as an illuminating micro-study of the ETISC's efficacy.

The ETISC did not waste the opportunity to draw links between East Timor in the context of Indonesian/Australian relations and Mr. Keating's personal family history in the context of British colonialism in Ireland. A full page advertisement carried on the first day of his visit taken out by the ETISC and run in the *Irish Times* on the day of his arrival welcomed Mr. Keating to Ireland, the country from which his forebears had fled to escape colonial

conditions. It then went on to illustrate the means by which Australia facilitated continued Indonesian oppression in East Timor.[56]

In advance of Mr. Keating's arrival, substantial preparatory work had been carried out by the ETISC. Detailed information packs on East Timor had been issued widely to the national media and to politicians. The ETISC hosted a parallel visit by Shirley Shackleton, the wife on an Australian journalist killed by the Indonesian army in East Timor in October 1975.[57] She met members of the Oireachtas and spoke at a press conference on Australian involvement in East Timor.

The impact of the ETISC campaign was visible on the day of Mr. Keating's visit to the Dáil when sympathetic members of the Oireachtas wore white carnations in their lapels.[58] Marking the state dinner held in Mr. Keating's honour that evening were not only invited guests but protesters who held a candlelit vigil outside the venue Dublin Castle.

East Timor was raised during private discussions between Mr. Keating and the Irish government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, told the Seanad at a later date that Mr. Keating had used the opportunity of his visit to explain his country's East Timor policy.[59]

While the ETISC was the principle organiser of the events that marked Mr. Keating's visit, and provider of information to the media and to politicians, cross sectoral action from within the NGO sector was evident. The vigil at Dublin Castle was co-organised by AfrI and Oxfam hosted the Shackleton press briefing. Collaborative work with other like-minded NGOs is, as we have seen in the survey, characteristic of the NGO universe. It is also particularly characteristic of the activities of the ETISC.

Parliamentary engagement

The parliamentary support for East Timor, evident during Mr. Keating's visit, found outlets over the coming years through parliamentary questions and

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[56] *Irish Times*, September 20 1993.

[57] See Shackleton, Shirley, 1995. "Planting a Tree in Balibo: A Journey to East Timor" in Carey and Bentley, (Eds.),*op cit.*: 109-119.

[58] *Irish Times*, September 21 1993.

[59] *Seanad Debates*, April 20 1994. Vol. 140, no. 1: 77-86.

motions in both the Dáil and Seanad and in Irish participation in debates at the European Parliament.

This pattern of interest did not wane as a result of the change of government in 1997 underlining the cross party support that the ETISC had so carefully nourished. In the three years after Keating's trip, leading up to the EU Presidency in 1996, East Timor was never very far away from proceedings within the Oireachtas. Appendix F carries the number of Parliamentary (written and oral) questions on East Timor. Cross party support for the issue was evident. The only exception was the Labour Party which, as the coalition party in government throughout this whole period and the party from which the Minister for Foreign Affairs came, did not, naturally, lay questions. It is noticeable however that Fianna Fáil members began asking questions once they joined the opposition in 1994. In all 66 questions were placed before the Dáil, 65 of them in the four year period between 1992 and 1996. This compares with a total of 53 Dáil questions placed on the issue of Ireland's South African policy during 1981-1987.[60] Indeed the intensity of debate on East Timor was such that it can be compared, as a foreign policy concern, to the issue of South Africa during the 1980s.

Parliamentary procedures in the Seanad allowed fuller debates on East Timor than did those in the Dáil. During 1994 to 1996 East Timor was debated in great detail six times. Three of those debates resulted from motions tabled by Senators, two resulted from statements on East Timor by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring and the last briefer discussion resulted from an adjournment debate. However, with the exception of the latter, each debate produced a detailed statement of policy on the government, delivered by the Minister himself or a Minister of State. In his statement to the house on April 20 1994, Minister Spring committed the government to use all the resources at its disposal to "bring pressure to bear on the Indonesian authorities". Throughout the debates, members frequently referred to the work of the ETISC both in raising the issue of East Timor and in providing information and analysis to the Senators in their work.[61]

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[60] Laffan, Brigid 1988. *Ireland and South Africa: Irish Government Policy in the 1980s.* Trócaire: *94.*

[61] See appendix G for a breakdown of the debates and text of agreed motions.

Not surprisingly however, given its purpose, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs featured several detailed debates on East Timor in the period from its establishment in 1993 to 1996. In particular the activities of one Senator, David Norris, made a significant impact. A long-time defender of human rights issues he became particularly identified with East Timor, in both the Oireachtas and the public eye. Fully utilising its powers and its functions, the Committee called upon the ETISC to make presentations on June 30 1993 (this resulted in, as stated earlier, the first full debate within the Oireachtas on East Timor) and, again, on September 14 1994.[62] In the former case, the Portuguese Ambassador to Ireland was invited to present his government's position. In October 1994, a delegation from the Portuguese Parliament addressed the committee and among the topics discussed was East Timor.[63] During all such debates, DFA representatives and, on occasions, members of the government were in attendance. In keeping with the intended style of the committee system, the debates were characterised by a non-partisan collaboration and an attempt to tease out details of policy considerations. The records, as with the Seanad debates, show frequent references to the work of the ETISC in raising Irish awareness about East Timor.

The draft resolution was debated by the committee again in July 1993 when members clarified the language and expression of the June agreement.[64] In September 1994, the ETISC made a second presentation to the committee. During this debate, Deputy John Connor (Fine Gael) told the members that he had attempted to raise the issue of East Timor with his Indonesian counterparts at the UN (Cairo) World Conference on Population.[65]

Ireland /East Timor at the European Parliament

From the late 1980s onwards debate on East Timor within the European Parliament started to become evident. A resolution passed by the Parliament in 1988, for instance, set down 18 recommendations for action on behalf of the EEC.[66] In the debates that were held over the coming years, two significant

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62 See Parliamentary Debates, *Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs*, June 30 1993 and September 14 1994.

63 Parliamentary Debates, *Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs*, October 7 1994.

64 Parliamentary Debates, *Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs*, July 14 1993: 136-40.

65 Parliamentary Debates, *Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs*, September 14 1994: 35.

66 Resolution on East Timor. Doc. A 2-143/88. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. C262/142, September 15 1988.

themes emerged from within the Parliament. Firstly, the EEC should push for a referendum in East Timor to allow the inhabitants choose their own future. Secondly, that EEC should push the Indonesians to accept a delegation from the parliament - sanctioned previously but never acted on because of Indonesian resistance.[67] Issues of the arms trade from EEC members to Indonesia, political violence, aid, human rights and the relationship between East Timor and events in Indonesia itself featured in the debates.

Irish MEPs participated in these debates on East Timor. Three MEPs in particular, Patricia McKenna (Green Party), Niall Andrews (Fianna Fáil), and Mary Banotti became identified with the issue. On September 21 1995, for instance, the European Parliament passed a motion that had been co-sponsored by Niall Andrews which supported East Timor's independence claim. The motion strongly condemned Indonesian military oppression and supported East Timor's right to self determination.[68]

It is probably no coincidence that MEPs Andrews and McKenna and Banotti are patrons of the ETISC. A total of five Irish MEPs, one from each of the parties represented in the parliament, had been asked, and agreed, to act as patrons.[69] The three are, furthermore, members of the Inter-Group for Solidarity with the People of East Timor within the European Parliament.[70]

Diplomatic initiatives

We can also trace the manner in which East Timor became an issue of diplomacy for Ireland during this period - diplomacy of the formal bilateral or multilateral level or more informal initiatives.

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[67] See resolution on the situation in South -East Asia. Doc. A 3-o219/91. *Official Journal of the European Communities,* no. c267/160, October 14 1991. Between 1986 and 1996 a total of 15 resolutions on East Timor were adopted by the European Parliament.

[68] While the majority of MEPs focused on Indonesian human rights abuses, Patricia McKenna pointed the finger closer to home. She referred to the UK and to Germany as providers of defensive and offensive weaponry to Indonesia. See Debates of the European Parliament, *Official Journal of the European Communities,* report of proceedings, September 18-22 1995, 1995/1996 Sessions: 21.09.95, no. 4-467/227.

[69] See appendix E.

[70] This intergroup should not be confused with a second group, the Intergroup East Timor which, while seeking to co-ordinate European Parliamentary activity against oppression in East Timor, laid the blame firmly with the Portuguese. See Intergroup East Timor, Declaration of Principles, (undated document), Doc. En/ARC/205500.

The first diplomatic initiative occurred with the visit by José Ramos Horta, in September 1992. Although Mr. Horta was not, *de jure*, a diplomat, he was one of the representatives of the Indonesian government in exile and his trip can be accorded *de facto* diplomatic status in the context. The trip was organised by the ETISC in conjunction with TAPOL which, had been Tom Hyland's first point of call following the television documentary in 1991. During a meeting with Irish Foreign Minister, David Andrews, Ireland was proposed by Mr. Horta as mediator between the Indonesians and East Timorese. Ireland could play a "pivotal role" in ending Indonesia's 17 year rule in East Timor. Ireland had shown an interest in the past and as a non-colonial country with little strategic or trade interests in the region, it would be relatively acceptable in that role. The Minister, a politician with a track record of interest in human rights issues, (and a brother of MEP Niall Andrews referred to above) undertook to raise East Timor at both EU and UN level: "at every opportunity".[71]

As we saw, East Timor became a subject of discussion during the visit by the Australian foreign minister to Ireland in September 1992. When The Taoiseach raised human rights in East Timor during his return visit to Australia in September 1994 he received "the dusty reply" that the matter was an internal one for Indonesia.[72] That same month, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Tom Kitt, raised the issue at a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers and the ASEAN bloc in Germany. Mr. Kitt expressed concern about Indonesia's policy in East Timor to Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. Also in attendance at the meeting were representatives of the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand.[73] A Joint EU/ASEAN Declaration, issued at the conclusion of that meeting, included a statement pointing out that it was the duty of all states to promote and protect fundamental freedoms. This clause was, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs, included at the instigation of the Irish participants at the talks.[74] During that month also, direct talks took place between the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian Embassy, in Dublin although the content of those talks was not revealed in the Seanad when referred to, some months later, by the

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71 *Irish Times,* September 4 1992.

72 *Irish Times,* September 21 1994.

73 *Irish Times,* September 23 1994.

74 East Timor: Steering Note, provided for the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 30 1994.

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs, also raised East Timor with Australian Embassy in Dublin.[75]

In February 1994, Senator John Dardis (Progressive Democrats), with parliamentary colleagues from the UK, Australia and Sweden, raised the issue of human rights in East Timor at a meeting with the Secretary General of the UN. In a memo presented to the Secretary General the parliamentarians called for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, the holding of an election in East Timor and for the UN to open an office there and other measures.[76] Mr. Dardis's participation in this initiative had come about as a result of an "invitation offered" by the ETISC to raise the matter at UN level.[77] At the EU/ASEAN ministerial meeting in Karlsruhe, Germany in September 1994, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Tom Kitt, met with the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas. The meeting, according to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring contributed to the international pressure building up against the Indonesian presence in East Timor.[78] At the UN Commission on Human Rights session in Geneva in January 1995, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Joan Burton spoke about East Timor and met with Jose Ramos Horta who was also in attendance at the session - although in an observer capacity. Referring to this meeting, Deputy Burton later told a debate in the Seanad that it was important to maintain international pressure on East Timor. She also referred to the desirability of establishing a UN International Criminal Tribunal (for war crimes) which would "speedily address issues such as East Timor".[79]

On May 24 1995 Irish concern with East Timor was again raised directly with the Indonesian government when the Minister Spring referred to human rights abuses in East Timor during EU/ASEAN talks in Dublin. Mr. Spring was meeting the Indonesians as part of the EU Troika. When the meeting ended, the London based Indonesian ambassador accredited to Ireland, Mr. Junus Effendi Habibie, was forced to leave by the back door because of the ETISC protesters picketing the front.[80]

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[75] *Seanad Debates*, April 20 1994. Vol, 140, no. 1: 79.

[76] *Ibid.*: 95-97.

[77] *Ibid.*: 96.

[78] *Seanad Debates*, March 8 1995. Vol 142, no. 5: 668-670.

[79] *Seanad Debates*, June 14 1994. Vol 143, no. 17: 1911-1912.

[80] The meeting was held in the Department of Trade and Tourism, *Irish Times*, May 24 1995.

In September 1995 Minister Spring walked out of an EU/ASEAN meeting in New York after he had been "berated"[81] by Mr. Ali Alatas. The cause of Mr. Alatas' ire was an article on East Timor that Mr. Spring had published in the *Irish Times* several weeks previously in which he had declared Ireland as one the of "main advocates"[82] of East Timor's struggle. Mr. Alatas, in turn, had found Mr. Spring's comments in the newspaper to be tantamount to a "declaration of war".[83] The row received considerable media coverage in Ireland and led the Irish Times to comment that it had left Irish/Indonesian relations 'in tatters'.[84]

East Timor: generating public heat

There were several high publicity events during this time that maintained East Timor in the public eye. In June 1994, Tom Hyland and Northern Ireland peace activist Mairéad Maguire were both deported from the Philippines en route to the Asian Pacific Conference on East Timor being held in Manila.[85] Amongst those at the airport to meet the pair on their return were the leader of Democratic Left, Pronsias De Rossa and three candidates in the European Parliament Leinster constituency elections due within weeks. A similar event a year later featuring two Irish parliamentarians, Patricia McKenna (MEP) and Senator David Norris, generated equally wide publicity. In November 1995, both were removed by Indonesian security agents from a scheduled flight to East Timor when their plane had touched down temporarily in Bali.[86] They had been part of a 15-person international delegation en route to a Santa Cruz commemoration ceremony.[87]

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[81] The function of the meeting was to discuss EU/ASEAN co-operation. According to Mr Spring, Mr. Alatas complained "in extreme terms" that Mr. Spring had gone public on his criticisms on East Timor while other foreign ministers aired their complains in private. Mr. Alatas then refused to accept terms for a continuation of the meeting. *Irish Times*, September 27 1995.

[82] *Irish Times*, July 13 1995.

[83] *Irish Times*, September 29 1995.

[84] *Irish Times*, September 27 1995.

[85] *Irish Times*, June 2 1994.

[86] Bali is an island in the Indonesian archipelago.

[87] Six other delegates were interrogated at Bali and a further six were expelled from East Timor on landing there.

In July 1995, East Timorese Bishop Carlos Belo, an outspoken critic of Indonesia, (and later a recipient, along with José Ramos Horta, of the 1996 Nobel Prize for Peace) was an official guest of President Mary Robinson at Áras an Uachtaráin and concelebrated mass in the Pro Cathedral with the Archbishop of Dublin Dr. Connell. His trip to Ireland was part of a European tour organised by the Catholic Bishops conference in the US. In Ireland he met Irish NGOs, and church leaders on the issue of East Timor.[88]

The extent to which the issue of East Timor was in the public arena was manifested in an unusual manner in a newspaper debate between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring and the former Minister for State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Tom Kitt in July of 1995 (a former Coalition partner). An article authored by Deputy Kitt appeared in the *Irish Times* on July 5, heavily criticising the government for its failure to act on East Timor despite verbal commitments to the issue. It set out ten recommendations for action. These were that Ireland should:

1. Seek the establishment of a permanent UN presence in East Timor
2. Request the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN) to visit East Timor
3. Support East Timor's right to be represented at the UN
4. Support an arms embargo against Indonesia
5. Push for full access to East Timor by international media, observers and NGOs
6. Pursue the release of all political prisoners
7. Pursue the increased presence of UNICEF and the International Red Cross in East Timor
8. Examine the role of the World Bank in the Indonesia and East Timorese economies
9. Consider the use of the UN Convention on Genocide in relation to Indonesia military activity in East Timor and
10. Convey the government's position, to Australia in particular, in seeking the withdrawal of occupying Indonesia forces.[89]

Despite the fact that he was involved in a critical stage of negotiations on the Northern Irish peace process, Minister Spring replied. His comment appeared six days later in the same newspaper[90] and was remarkable for three reasons.

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88 *Irish Times*, July 4 1995.
89 *Irish Times*, July 7 1995.
90 *Irish Times*, July 13 1995.

Firstly, it indicated great sensitivity to criticism. Secondly, it is most unusual for the Minister for Foreign Affairs to set out the details of particular foreign policy in the media in such a manner. Thirdly, that he had the time to devote to writing and article for the Irish Times is, of itself, remarkable, in the context of the peace process.

The article committed his government to doing more to assist the people of East Timor in their struggle to achieve justice and human rights. It outlined the history of East Timor and the history of Ireland's actions, both at EU and UN level. It stated that Ireland had not only consistently condemned Indonesia's policies but had gone beyond condemnation to 'include active international engagement on the issue with clear objectives'. Deputy Spring committed Ireland to seeking:

* an end of Indonesia's occupation,
* a political solution on the basis of international law and justice,
* the enjoyment by East Timorese of their full human and political rights,
* an end to the supply of arms to Indonesia which could be used as instruments of oppression in East Timor,
* the release of Fretilin leader, Xanana Gusmao and other political prisoners.
* co-operation between Indonesia, the UN and international NGOs on human rights issues.

From a policy development perspective, it is clear that Mr. Spring's position had become more critical and demanding than that outlined in the Seanad debate the previous year when the government was clearly setting its actions within the terms of common foreign policy goals of the European Union.

Ireland, the EU and the Common Position on East Timor

In April 1996, prior to Ireland's accession to the EU Presidency, José Ramos Horta visited Ireland again and spoke of the country's unique position to argue for East Timor. Ireland's presidency presented an "ideal opportunity" for the inclusion of human rights in the EU's dialogue with Indonesia.[91]

The signs all around Mr. Horta seemed to indicate that he was pushing against an open door. Both Mr. Spring as Minister for Foreign Affairs and

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[91] *Maubere*, Newsletter of the ETISC, August 1996.

John Bruton, as Taoiseach and European Council President, agreed to prioritise East Timor during the presidency to "support international efforts to promote a just global and internationally acceptable solution of the East Timor question on the basis of the Common Position."[92] In June 1996, Joan Bruton, Minister of State at the DFA, stated that Ireland would use the Presidency to facilitate a solution to the East Timor problem.[93] The ETISC had high hopes. Specifically they anticipated that East Timor would be placed on the top of the EU's foreign policy agenda. The signals were good and the Campaign expected a major initiative.[94]

The Common Position on East Timor, adopted just before Ireland took over the office could be read then in two ways. Either it co-incidentally set a basic framework within which Ireland could prioritise its interests in East Timor, or it would, equally co-incidentally cap any future prioritising of activities on East Timor issues other than the drawing of applied policy initiatives for the region. The Common Position is worth examining hence in some detail. (See appendix H for the text of the document). It was this framework, adopted by the EU Council on June 25, which Ireland inherited when it took over office on July 1 1996.

The focus here however, is not on the Common Position itself, but is on what, if any, steps Ireland took within or beyond that framework while in the office of the Presidency. The consensual process required, even at the level of the issuing of a vote of congratulations on behalf of the Union was perfectly illustrated in July 1996 at the EU/ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. An attempt by Ireland to send a motion of congratulations to the two Nobel Prize winners, José Ramos Horta and Bishop Belo was blocked by the German government and, consequently, nothing was issued from the EU. Ireland subsequently issued its own vote of congratulations.

However, the President, in his or her individual capacity is comparatively free within the Presidential address given to the European Parliament at the beginning of the office, to refer to what ever is their choosing. As the address serves as an indicator of priorities, goals, general objectives and mission statements, it does not translate necessarily into policy. Furthermore, there is

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[92] "Ireland 1996: Presidency of the European Union. Priorities for the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union" undated publication: 40.

[93] *Irish Times,* June 6 1996.

[94] *Timor Link,* October 1996, no. 37, CIIR, London.

room for individual stamps in recognition of the different interests (geographical, strategic and so on) that individual Presidencies bring with them. In Dick Spring's address to the Parliament on July 17, no single reference was made to East Timor.[95]

However, Ireland did raise in East Timor in its Presidential capacity during the EU/ASEAN talks in July when Dick Spring referred Indonesia to the common position and the EU's commitment to the achievement, by dialogue, of a settlement that respected the legitimate aspirations of the East Timorese and was in conformity with the charter of the United Nations.[96]

In a subsequent statement issued by ASEAN, East Timor was referred to as an internal matter for Indonesia and was not the business of any other state. The Press release issued by the ASEAN informal summit, referred to "the efforts of one member of the EU" to introduce extraneous issues such as the question of East Timor" into EU/ASEAN proceedings.[97]

Once the common position had been adopted the EU got to work on its application. In November 1996, DGV111 of the Commission announced a three-year, 6 million ECU aid package for health sanitation and education projects. Negotiations began between the Commission and European-based NGOs (some with partners in East Timor and Indonesia) to disburse the funding. The Commission aimed to channel funds directly to NGOs and by-pass the Indonesian government. While not recognising the legality of the Indonesian occupation, the EU confronted a very formidable barrier in the *de facto* status of East Timor as a province of Indonesia. The Indonesia government did its best to undermine any action which, in its, view, undermined its sovereignty in the territory. That the process was described by an official from the Department of Foreign Affairs as difficult[98] was probably something of an understatement.

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[95] Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Dick Spring to the European Parliament, July 17 1996, "Statement on the Priorities of the Irish Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Council".

[96] Press Release issued by the Taoiseach's Office, Presidency of the European Union, July 24 1996. "Tánaiste tells Jakarta meeting of EU Position on East Timor".

[97] Press Statement, the First Informal meeting of the Heads of Government of ASEAN, Jakarta, November 30 1996. The reference to the 'one member' singled could have been to either Ireland or Portugal.

[98] Author's interview; DFA3, January 22 1997. The official anticipated that the Indonesians might indeed view the measure as challenging to their legitimacy in the region.

That said, the European Council Conclusions from the Dublin summit of December 1996, welcomed the EU's funding proposals.[99] While officials and Council members may have anticipated the difficulties ahead they also hoped for an effective delivery on aid. This chapter's brief does not extend beyond Ireland's presidency which came to a close in December 1996 - still early in the life of the common position's. An analysis of the common position in the year following its agreement concluded that the EU had, in the end, implemented the document minimally. Where it was translated into action - in the aid package - the emphasis was, furthermore, on humanitarian aspects of the situation in East Timor and not the political dimensions of the problem.[100]

The Irish Presidency Evaluated

It is difficult to make a final evaluation on Ireland's role in the Presidency *vis a vis* East Timor. This is not only because of the difficulties referred to in the introduction of this chapter, in separating cause from effect, but also because of the non-availability of official sources documenting negotiations leading up to and subsequent to the common position.

It is important at this point, however, to set out the limits and possibilities not only of the Presidency of the European Union to initiate or lead on policy matters but the possibilities for collective action on the part of the EU within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The power of the Presidency to set the agenda within the EU is limited by "finding consensus around which proposals can be built".[101] Thus the acquiescence of member states is required on an issue no matter how powerfully motivated or engaged any particular Presidency may be. The Presidency also operates within the troika that always contains at least one of the larger states ensuring at this level, a coalition of interests. The Presidency furthermore acts as the representative of the Union on all matters which concern CFSP positions.[102]

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[99] European Council. Presidency Conclusions, Dublin, December 13 and 14, 1996.

[100] For an analysis of the common position itself and its implementation attempts in the first year, see Ward, Eilís, 1997. *EU Policy in East Timor: Fulfilling the Potential of the Common Position*, CIIR, London: i-viii.

[101] Holland, Martin, 1995. *European Union Common Foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa*. St. Martin's Press, New York.

[102] Edwards, Geoffrey and Nuttall, Simon, 1994. "Common Foreign and Security Policy" in Duff Andrew, Pinder, John and Pryce, Roy, (Eds.). *Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union*, Routledge, London and New York: 100.

However, Presidencies can prioritise (as Denmark and Belgium did to the issue of South Africa in 1993) and the holding of office affords many opportunities address particular concerns. As the "President of Europe" the international legitimacy and authority of the person in the position, and his or her representatives is beyond doubt. The history of the EUs South African policy shows that many Presidencies, including that of Ireland in 1990, took strong initiatives while recognising the overall continuity of policy and the constraints that operated.[103]

An important institutional difference must be referred to here. South Africa was processed by the EU through the framework of European Political Co-operation (PC), not the CFSP. While the CFSP remains an intergovernmental institution it does require consensus, as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. It is conventional wisdom that attempting to create a single foreign policy, and devise an action based on agreement between the different member states with their often conflicting positions and policy goals, is a recipe for minimalism. The end result in terms of policy may well be the lowest common denominator: an analysis accepted as valid by the DFA.[104] Certainly what results is less an integrated common foreign policy than a co-ordination of different policies.[105]

Nonetheless, the difference between the position outlined by Dick Spring in the *Irish Times* article the year before the Presidency and the Common Position is stark. In the former, Ireland was committed to a limited boycott of Indonesia and called for, *inter alia*, the release of Xanana Gusmao. The common position, in contrast, makes few specific proposals and essentially reflects the mores of international law by reaffirming a respect for self-determination and rejecting of the use of force in conflict resolution. It set out no political or diplomatic proposals.

Could more have been done? The DFA claims that it was entirely satisfied with the outcome within the EU and that all its aims were achieved.[106] The position of the ETISC is somewhat less sanguine: it concludes that no ground was lost on East Timor through the common position and Ireland's

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[103] Ireland issued three declarations on South Africa during its Presidency in 1990. Holland, Martin, 1995. *Op cit.*: 59.

[104] Author's interview; DFA3, January 22 1997.

[105] Edwards and Nuttall, *op cit.*: 99.

[106] Author's interview; DFA3, January 22 1997.

Presidency.[107] Senator David Norris argues that Ireland could have highlighted East Timor more. For instance Dick Spring's failure to refer to East Timor in his address to the European Parliament was one lost opportunity. In policy terms Ireland could have offered itself as a host for both parties in the continuing intra-Timorese talks in the style of Norway's role during the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Finally Ireland could have called for a consultation with people of East Timor on the possibility of a referendum on East Timor's fate.[108]

Conclusion

Two overarching questions need to be posed here. The first concerns the relationship between Ireland's position on East Timor and the activities of the ETISC. Can it be argued that if the ETISC did not exist Ireland would not have concerned itself with human rights in East Timor in any significant manner. Or to put the question in our theoretical framework; did the ETISC manage to draw Ireland down the road of cosmopolitanism?

The second question is a little more difficult to answer. It asks how successful the ETISC was in attempting to enlarge the concept of 'community' to include human rights in East Timor as a cause for concern for our national representatives?

This question assumes a positive answer to the first; that East Timor was an issue for Irish policy makers as a result of the activities of the ETISC. But conceptually a distinction can be drawn between the two questions. The former concerns itself with the relationship between the ETISC, Irish public opinion and the policy makers; the national arena. The second concerns itself with the international and transnational aspects of the question.

In neither case can any definitive evidence be marshalled. Rather conclusions must be drawn and offered with a degree of tentativeness. As stated at the outset of this chapter, the thesis may be impossible to 'prove' given the number of actors and the different levels within which they interacted sometimes simultaneously.

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[107] Author's interview with Tom Hyland, January 20 1997.
[108] Author's interview with David Norris, January 22 1997.

I will firstly deal with the issue of the effectiveness of the ETISC in widening the Irish foreign policy circle of concern to include the interests of East Timor. Ireland entered the Presidency of the EU with a commitment to prioritise the issue of East Timor. Its Minister for Foreign Affairs had gone out on a limb to identify himself as a defender of East Timor and an opponent of Indonesia's policy in the territory. We saw the evolution of a specifically Irish position (represented by Dick Spring's *Irish Times* article) that went beyond the EU position represented in the common position. Ireland had become identified with East Timor within Europe and internationally.

It is evident that this interest in East Timor began to express itself after 1993. That is after both the events in Santa Cruz, which served as a catalyst for popular global concern, and the consolidation of the ETISC campaign. The frequency of parliamentary questions, the number of statements issued by the governments in both the Seanad and the Joint Oireachtas Foreign Affairs Committee and the many times that the issue exercised the members of the Committee indicate not just the cross party concern but also the depth of knowledge and interest there was in East Timor. Parliamentary debates frequently refered to the ETISC. By 1992 the ETISC had established contact with politicians from all parties and regularly provided information for their use. Several independent parliamentarians and at least one senior politician from within each party, had become identified with East Timor including two party leaders, Dick Spring (Labour Party) and Prionsias de Rossa (Democratic Left) both of whom served in the Cabinet during Ireland's Presidency.

Special reference must be made to the role of the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee. A critical distinguishing factor to debates here is the presence, and participation of diplomatic staff. Not only is staff required to prepare statements and thus be well briefed but they must be prepared to answer questions on a range of aspects relating to any particular issue. This requires a level of competence and knowledge of particular foreign policy issues that, otherwise, may not be called upon. At least, that is, in an environment where public accountability is required.

As stated earlier it was the first committee debate in June 1993 that resulted in the issuing of a comprehensive briefing paper by the Department of Foreign Affairs. According to a member of the Asia Desk in the Department of Foreign Affairs questioning at the committee can be "quite sharp". In relation to the impact of attendance before the committee he suggested that the

experience can "have a capacity to influence a person's view of things". The indirect influence of motions (at committee level) is potentially strong. Resolutions are important because they go from a Dáil committee directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs who is then asked to do what he can. "People on the Foreign Affairs Committee are lobby-able....(they)....represent the people and the resolutions go straight to the Táiniste".[109] Furthermore committees allow NGO representatives engage in direct dialogue with both parliamentarians and officials. Treated as 'partners' in the debates which follow the committee validate and affirm the role of organisations such as the ETISC in policy development

In the public realm, the ETISC maintained a media profile through capitalising on each domestic and international event that had links with the issue. For instance in mid December of 1996, the ETISC hosted a 'ceremony" in Dublin's Temple Bar in which a symbolic door was opened and one of three Timorese in Ireland was 'accepted' as consul for his country.[110] Just over a month later, the national media carried detailed stories, with photographs, of Timorese following a visit to Leinster House to meet the Minister for Foreign Affairs to thank him for his involvement.

Of importance also was the informal network created throughout Ireland by the ETISC of many high profile people from the arts and entertainment industry, from the human rights sector and from other aspects of public life. This network went beyond the formal list of patrons.

Measuring the impact of such work on the policy output is, perhaps, an impossible task. The activities outlined above occurred at a time when Ireland's foreign policy arena was undergoing some change. The series of public seminars held throughout the country during 1994/5 following by the publication of the White Paper on Irish Foreign policy had indicated a receptivity, on the part of the government and the administration, to input from non governmental groups. The Oireachtas committee's function in hosting delegations and in bringing the NGO sector and officials together reflected this.

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[109] Author's interview; DFA3, January 22 1997.

[110] *Irish Times*, December 11 1996.

It also has to be said that the issue of East Timor was, comparatively, an uncomplicated issue for Ireland to take on. Ireland has few trade links with Indonesia. Condemnation of the activities of Indonesia can be facilitated with recourse to the most general principles of international law upheld by the UN covenant. There was little 'cost' to Ireland.

All of these factors meant that the domestic environment that the ETISC found it self engaging with was a more friendly place for a single issue campaigning group than had existed before.

As far as the DFA is concerned the ETISC however is "part of the mix" of state and civil society actors that creates an awareness of a foreign policy issue and translates that into policy. But did they have an instrumental role in initiating the issue? "I wouldn't have any doubt that the ETISC has very much helped to keep the issue of East Timor in front of the Department and in front of the Dáil and the government and will continue to do so...There is no doubt that in a democracy such as ours that the role of these lobby groups in waking people up, in influencing the media is very big...But...it is the government that makes government policy".[111]

As someone who became identified with the ETISC, Senator David Norris, not surprisingly, allocated a more instrumental role to the organisation. If not for the ETISC East Timor would have become just another human rights issue among many. The ETISC kept pushing the issue among his parliamentary colleagues and providing detailed information and question topics. This detail meant that parliamentarians were extremely well briefed and, indirectly were plugged into an international network of activists concerned about East Timor.[112]

This brings us to the second question. Having created an issue at a national level, how effective was the ETISC, through the Irish government, in bringing about change in Indonesian policy towards East Timor? What is important to keep in mind when exploring this question that the ETISC overall goal was a simple one - to keep the issue of East Timor on the international agenda so that it would become untenable for Indonesia not to move towards resolution. The nature of that resolution would be decided by the Timorese.

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[111] Author's interview; DFA 3, January 22 1997.

[112] Author's interview with David Norris, January 22 1997.

Evaluating the influence of NGOs on governments is remarkably difficult.[113] The impact of Ireland's position, in isolation from its participation in any EU or UN actions, on the current regime in Indonesia may never be established definitively. But it is clear that Ireland's bilateral response caused some discomfort and provoked a strong reaction from the Indonesian Embassy in London. Can we say conclusively that such activities brought about a change in Indonesian policy in East Timor, or a change in how it viewed the issue? Ireland's demands were that self determination of the East Timorese was respected and that human rights abuses came to an end. At the time of writing, neither of these two goals had been achieved. Must we then conclude that Ireland's policy was of no effect? Or can we frame our desire for 'proof' in some other perspective?

In relation to all human rights issues, success or otherwise of a particular campaign, must not be tied exclusively to a direct cessation of the abhorred activities or a direct taking up of better practices. Increasingly, human rights advocacy is seen in terms of bringing about slow incremental change in the global environment. Luard, for instance, argues for an orientation that does not seek validation through immediate results. A foreign policy that argues for human rights can bring about profound change over time by indirectly sensitising staff in the target state's embassies to become aware of how their governments' actions may, in the long run, involve a cost. It may also strengthen and validate human rights groups active within the target state. And finally it may serve to, over time, normalise the expectation of human rights observance at the level of inter-state and transnational relations.[114]

Did the activities of the ETISC prise open the seal of national enclosure to allow universalist ideals to infiltrate the delivery of foreign policy? Or, to put the question more simply: would Dick Spring have incorporated East Timor

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[113] This is a commonly accepted problem. Research on Amnesty International fails to make any definitive evaluation of its effect on governments that are abusing human rights not only because of the difficulty in establishing cause and effect in a complex environment but also because the relationship between cause (say, AI's campaigning on behalf of a political prisoner) and effect (the release of that prisoner) is ever acknowledged by governments. Few governments will admit to yielding to outside pressure. See Martin Annals, 1982. "Amnesty International and Human Rights" in Willetts, Peter, (Ed.). *Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organisations*, Pinter, London: 63-83.

[114] Luard, Evan, 1981. *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris and Frankfurt: 1-36.

into the rhetoric of Irish foreign policy at the UN, at the EU or in EU/ASEAN talks if the ETISC did not exist? A definitive answer is impossible. Who can say what Dick Spring or other officials in the DFA or members of the Oireachtas would not have done as a result of information or demands from other sources or from personal commitment to human rights issues. Undoubtedly there were external factors also. Portugal's interest in East Timor kept it alive at the EU and Ireland worked with Portugal on the issue.

However, it is ultimately a domestic audience to which politicians must look when engaging in the activities of politics be it articulating human rights issues or pushing for trade. In his statement to the Seanad in April 1994, Dick Spring introduced his comments by referring to the "great concern" which existed in Ireland for human rights issues in East Timor.[115]

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115 *Seanad Debates*, April 20 1994. Vol. 140, no. 1: 78-79.

Chapter 6.

Case Study: the Debt and Development Coalition and the IMF

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the role of a network of NGOs, the Debt and Development Coalition (DDC), in helping to shape Irish policy towards the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). In 1994, the DDC launched a campaign against ESAF - the same year that the government agreed to participate in the scheme.[1] At the time, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Tom Kitt, told the Dáil that ESAF contributions would be a 'positive and tangible indication of Ireland's commitment to the solution of the debt crisis'.[2] However, payment into the scheme was deferred pending appropriate legislation to allow the contribution be drawn.

Before such legislation was presented to the Dáil, a change of government occurred and, with it, a reversal on ESAF. In July 1996, Minister for Finance, Ruairí Quinn, announced that Ireland was withholding its contributions to the fund conditional on a 'satisfactory operational implementation of a comprehensive debt relief framework' being put in place.[3]

The fortunes of the ESAF policy have, since that point, reversed again and following a protracted parliamentary debate, the new government (elected in 1997) saw the Bretton Woods Agreement (Amendment) Bill 1999 through the final legislative stage in the Dáil in March 1999. At the time of writing, Ireland was preparing to make its first payment into the fund.

While references will be made in the conclusion to this second policy reversal, this chapter's focus is on the period between the DDC's founding and the 1996 Ministerial decision. The anti-ESAF campaign will be located within the broader DDC activism: to campaign for debt reduction and/or cancellation.

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[1] The Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, gave a commitment to join ESAF following a personal request to do so from the IMF's Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, at a meeting in Dublin.

[2] *Dáil Debates*, June 2 1994. Vol. 443: col. 1229.

[3] *Dáil Debates*, February 13 1997. Vol, 474: col. 1614.

As we saw in chapter one, the ESAF campaign was selected as a case study because of the arena of policy making (non-UN multilateral), because of the nature of the NGO (a coalition) and because of the principle government department involved in policy formation (Department of Finance, hereafter the DoF). In these regards, this case study presents us with a different policy arena and different kinds of protagonists, from both other case studies, within which to explore cosmopolitanism. There are other factors derived from the policy issue itself. The issues holds additional attraction because of the political and ideological distance that separates NGO activists from the IMF/World Bank.[4] Furthermore, as motivation goes, tackling international financial norms and values does not lend itself easily to mobilisation; global indebtedness and fiscal policies do not have the immediacy of human rights violations or third world disasters. ESAF then, apparently, presents something of a 'hard case' for cosmopolitanism from the point of view of generating popular support and encouraging public, if not, political debate. Finally, the ESAF campaign is also of interest because, while most Irish civil society activism focuses on institutions within the domestic sphere,[5] the DDC set out to both directly, and indirectly, influence the IMF and World Bank.

It will be argued that, in this case, the DDC expanded the Irish state's community of interest to include the indebted countries of the developing world participating in Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) such as ESAF. It channelled their voice and concerns into the domestic debate on how Ireland could play a role in assisting the citizens of those countries. In this role, the national dialogue was transformed to one in which cosmopolitan values were given weight alongside considerations such as the need of (Irish) institutions of state to deliver on a commitment and the concerns for how a rejection of ESAF might effect Ireland's stance within the IMF. While it is likely that the ESAF reversal may have occurred without the intervention of the DDC, it is highly improbable that such a transformative dialogue would have occurred without their participation and in such an extensive manner. It is argued here that it is the nature of the dialogue that occurred which enhanced its transformative powers. The citizens alliance of the DDC

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[4] Nelson, Paul J, 1995. *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organisations,* St. Martin's Press, New York: 4. Nelson uses the metaphor of 'opposite poles of a continuum' to describe the relationship between NGOs and the World Bank/IMF.

[5] The target of most Irish NGO activism is institutions much closer to home and not policy at a multilateral level. Holmes, Michael, Rees, Nicholas and Whelan, Bernadette, 1993. *The Poor Relation: Irish Foreign Policy and the Developing World,* Trócaire/Gill and Macmillan, Dublin: 154.

widened the dialogic community considerably and, in the process, sensitised the public, the electorate, state bureaucrats. the parliament and the government to the, perhaps unforeseen and unintended, negative impact of state policy on the intended beneficiaries of that policy.

In the process of agitating for a policy change the DDC could count itself among the NGOs that have proved their ability to impinge on the workings of the World Bank and IMF.[6] It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the DDC's campaign brought about any *change* (my italics) in the agenda and practices of those institutions.[7] From the campaign's perspective the battle on ESAF was, in the end, lost, but the efforts produced many favourable results. As the DDC co-ordinator commented, "people were empowered by the campaign, even here in such a small country and there was a great sense of pride that we could take on an organisation like the IMF. The (1996) policy decision also showed to the IMF that people on the ground can have an impact on their policies and that has implications for the IMF".[8]

The chapter is organised in four sections. Firstly it presents a comprehensive overview of the evolution of the IMF and World Bank within the Bretton Woods institutions, and, of ESAF itself. Secondly, it examines Ireland's role in those institutions. Thirdly, it presents a history of the DDC and its campaign against ESAF. Finally, the chapter concludes by drawing themes from the case study that are relevant to the broader thesis enquiry.

The World Bank/IMF and Structural Adjustment.

Before discussing the ESAF, some background information on the World Bank - more correctly speaking, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) - and the IMF is needed. The ESAF emerged from within these institutions and their global regime, more particularly, the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) introduced in response to the debt crisis, in March 1986. SAF, in turn, is one mechanism in the broader instrument of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).

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[6] Nelson, *op cit.*: 109. the author details how the 'green agenda' was incorporated into World Bank/IMF concerns because of the work of environmental NGOs.

[7] Nelson accepts that the greening of the institutions occurred without any concomitant alteration of their development paradigm. Nelson, *op cit.*: 109.

[8] Author's interview with Jean Somers, March 12 1999.

The Institutions: the World Bank /IMF

The World Bank and the IMF emerged after world war two as integral to the UN-sponsored Bretton Woods system, part of a grander plan to manage interdependence in the global economy, support government intervention to redress shortfalls in the domestic markets and promote full employment.[9] The system was informed by Keynesian economics and was comprised of four pillars. Three specifically focused on trade and finance: the IBRD, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Trade Organisation (ITO). The fourth pillar was the United Nations (UN) itself and its agencies.

Within the system, the IMF functioned to fund short term balance of payment needs; the World Bank to assist in post-war reconstruction and in the development needs of the underdeveloped countries and the ITO to ensure a free flow of goods.[10] Overall, the IMF was the "keeper of the rules"[11] or the regulatory body. Its overarching power was derived from a collective desire to prevent a crash such as occurred in the 1930s. While the World Bank provided funds for sectoral reform, or for specific development projects, the overall stability of the system was to be marshalled by the IMF through regulation and surveillance. IMF Membership would commit economies to a common, global regime.

The economic difficulties facing western Europe in the immediate post-war period contrasted with continued US liquidity and resulted in a power shift within the Bretton Woods system. By 1947, it was being managed unilaterally by the US. This continued until the 1970's, from which point, it was managed multilaterally under US leadership.[12]

The issue: the debt crisis and structural adjustment.

Two significant and uncontentious points can be made about the evolution of the Bretton Woods system. Firstly, while the vision was somewhat integrated

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[9] ul Haq, Mahbub, *et al*, 1995. "Overview" in ul Huq Mahbub, *et al*, (Eds.). *The UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions: New Challenges for the Twenty-First Century*, Macmillan, Basingstoke and London: 3-5.

[10] The ITO never got off the ground, was supplanted by the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 which became the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994.

[11] Spero, Joan Edelman, 1993. *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, Routledge, London and New York: 33.

[12] *Ibid.*: 35-37.

in that human development, full employment and financial security were of equal importance, different priorities began to emerge. The goal of full employment receded, the free market displaced the role of the state and private market flows dominated official fund flows such as through the IMF and the World Bank.[13] Over time, neo-liberalism replaced Keynesianism.

Secondly, the boom enjoyed by many members during the decades after World War Two, and the 1960s in particular, was not permanent. In the 1970's two events altered the course of continuous growth leading to the 1980's debt crisis. The first was the US decision to break the link with the gold standard sending exchange rates into a free float. This event ended the formal Bretton Woods regime although its institutions, norms and power structure remained. The second was the oil crisis of 1973 resulting in, *inter alia*, the release of huge surpluses of 'petro-dollars' into the banking institutions.

In contrast to the industrial countries many developing countries did not adjust to the economic shock caused by the oil price increase. Rather they borrowed heavily from the commercial and other banks at rates which were, at that time, favourably fixed.[14] The crisis was brought to a head when, in a state of near economic collapse, Mexico suspended repayments on its debt in August 1982.[15] The then Chancellor of the British Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, stated that the scale of the problem "threatened to overwhelm the international financial and banking system."[16]

The immediate response of the private banking and the Bretton Woods institutions was posited on the mutability of the crisis. Unlike corporations, countries could not go bankrupt and had strong incentives not to default.[17] Internal structural problems were identified as the cause of liquidity problems: underdevelopment in sectors of the economy and high levels of public spending. The way forward was loan reconstruction and maintenance of borrowing facilities. The banks were, however, also concerned about self protection.[18]

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13 ul Haq, *op cit.*: 6.

14 Toye, John, 1993. *Dilemmas of Development*, Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge: 213-214.

15 The Mexican debt amounted to more than $80 billion. Total external debt of less developed countries amounted to $831 billion in 1982. Spero, *op cit.*: 52-54.

16 Quoted in Toye, *op cit.*: 221.

17 *Ibid.*:: 222.

18 *Ibid.*:: 223.

The first institutional response to the crisis was the Baker Plan of 1985 that proposed increased lending by the IMF and the World Bank. Participation in the plan required the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The Baker plan was unsuccessful, largely because it failed to acknowledge that private banks were unwilling to provide further funds for countries which were in a debt crisis. The second response was the Brady Plan of 1989. It accepted that formal debt-reduction negotiations would be required and proposed that the International Financial Institutions, (IFIs)[19] would provide partial guarantees of the value of the paper which embodied the new, discounted debt[20] and that commercial banks would write off portions of debts. In all cases, assistance was conditional on the adoption of 'appropriate economic policies' by the debtor country.[21]

(Enhanced) Structural Adjustment Facility

As the central issue of this chapter is the campaign conducted by the Debt and Development Campaign on the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, introduced by the IMF in 1986 as a refinement of SAF. I will now focus on this measure. At the core of the instrument of structural adjustment is a general disillusionment with the ability of state intervention to redress economic and fiscal problems.[22] A programme of adjustment would, typically, involve a liberalisation of trade and commerce, an increase in the role of the private sector and a privatisation of public utilities.[23] A programme of adjustment is introduced by the debtor nation following negotiations between the state and IMF officials and is customarily, specifically tailored.[24] Concessional loans were to be provided by the IMF.

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19 The term IFI is used to signify both the Bretton Woods and private banking institutions. The former includes the regional banks that were spawned over time under the IBRD such as the European Investment Bank (consisting of EU member states), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, formed in 1991 to assist the former Soviet bloc in East and Central Europe.

20 Toye, *op cit.*: 223.

21 Riggs, Robert, E. and Plano, Jack, 1994. *The United Nations: International Organisation and World Politics*, Wadsworth: Belmont: 254-255.

22 Stevens, Christopher and Killick, Tony, 1991. "The EC and Structural Adjustment" in Prendergast, Renee and Singer, H W, (Eds.). *Development Perspectives for the 1990s*. Macmillan, Basingstoke and London: 1-21.

23 Stevens and Killick, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 7.

24 See Adefulu, Razaq A. 1991. "African Debt Crisis and the IMF Adjustment Programmes" in Prendergast and Singer, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 37-57 for case studies of Zambia, Nigeria and Ghana.

ESAF, an enhancement of the existing lending terms, was introduced because of continued difficulties among the poorer debtor nations to make existing repayments under SAF.[25] In carving out a new role for the IMF in the provision of concessional finance, the ESAF marked significant change within the Bretton Woods institutions. ESAF signalled a changed approach to debt management; recognising that debt forgiveness was a valid option in specific circumstances.[26] ESAF is considered particularly apt for countries involved in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative launched in 1996.[27]

Two aspects of ESAF are significant here. Firstly, it involves the IMF in the provision of concessional finances. This is not a role originally envisaged for the organisation. Secondly, it involves the IMF in the day to day management of the economies of poorer countries as architect, and overseer, of the adjustment programmes. The majority of ESAF participants are in sub-Saharan Africa. Stringent eligibility rules apply and many of the poorest HIPCs do not meet them. The role of the World Bank in ESAF is, technically, nil. However, it works in close partnership with the IMF throughout and, in practice, their relationship is characterised by interdependency.[28]

Prior to ESAF's launch, IMF members were asked to make extra contributions over and above standard IMF/World Bank contributions. This measure required, in most states, an allocation from central funds and, in some cases, an amendment of the domestic legislation adopted by all participating members on accession to allow governments allocate towards the Bretton Woods institutions. (In Ireland's case, the Bretton Woods Agreement Bill). The IMF did consider selling some of its gold reserves to support ESAF.[29]

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[25] For details of the terms and conditions of SAF and ESAF see Wood, Angela 1996. *The IMF, ESAF and the Debt Crisis: How the IMF can Assist the Heavily Indebted Countries*, Debt Crisis Network, London.

[26] Spero, *op cit.*: 190-195. Spero refers to 'debt fatigue' in the multilateral agencies.

[27] The HIPC initiative involves a detailed programme - ideally lasting six years - in which participating countries move through target driven phases of economic development to qualify for debt reduction overseen by the IMF.

[28] Participation in ESAF requires drawing up a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) to be agreed by the national government, the World Bank and the IMF. The PFP is 'owned' by the government and becomes a blue print for economic development.

[29] See Debt and Development Coalition, 1996. "A Coalition Briefing: Highly Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative", briefing document, DDC. For a detailed analysis see IMF *Annual Report*, 1997. IMF Washington: 119-122.

ESAF then can be described at the general policy instrument that has been fine-tuned by the IMF in response to the cycle of indebtedness experienced by the poorest countries in the world. It emphasises the regulatory and surveillance role of the IMF within the institutional goals of ensuring liquidity and stability in an increasingly interdependent global economy. As of 1995, 27 countries had signed ESAF agreements. They are listed in appendix I.

ESAF – a critique

A critique of ESAF is generally embedded in a wider critique of structural adjustment programmes. These programmes are extremely controversial and feature dominantly in development literature. A profound problem in their evaluation arises from difficulties in defining 'development' itself and, furthermore, its relationship to growth. The dialogue of the deaf that has built up between the Bretton Woods institutions and NGOs on the meaning of 'development' has rendered genuine co-operation somewhat intractable.[30]

It comes as no surprise that, broadly speaking, economists and development theorists are not as one on an evaluation SAPs.[31] The World Bank maintains that, overall, 'adjusting' countries are faring better than 'non-adjusting' countries.[32] The validity of such a claim has been questioned in the context of both the multiple variables that affect development and the subjective nature of selecting 'key' criteria. However, within the limited terms of 'development', as defined by the World Bank (i.e. monetary-led), structural adjustment programmes can be considered to have failed.[33] An overview of the World Bank's own evaluations of lending under SAPs concluded that, by 1989, the gap between it and its critics had narrowed. The bank accepted that its was 'not possible to conclude' that adjusting countries were growing out of debt.[34]

The critique of ESAF incorporates the critique of structural adjustment (i.e. that it does not work within its own terms and, furthermore, causes additional hardship to those living in the debtor country) to include

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30 See Nelson, *op cit.*: 1-12.

31 For an evaluation of the impact of structural adjustment on Africa see Adefulu, *op cit.*: 37-57.

32 Cassen, Robert, 1994. *Does Aid Work,* Clarendon Press: Oxford: 82.

33 For an overview of the World Bank's defence see Nelson, *op cit.*: 20-30. See also Stevens and Killick, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 7-8.

34 World Bank quoted in Singer, H W, 1990. "'Reading Between the Lines': A Comment on the World Bank Annual Report 1989" in *Development Policy Review,* Sage, vol. 8: 203-206

specifically a critique of the role played by the IMF. It is not considered the appropriate institution to be involved in 'developing' the debtor nations. ESAF often means that debtor nations divert resources away from poverty alleviation (i.e. the development process) to service the IMF debt.[35]

Debt and the Bretton Woods Institutions: Ireland's Role.

Locating where Ireland 'fits' into the global aspects of the debt crisis can be approached via two separate, albeit interdependent, routes. Firstly Ireland's role as a 'creditor' to the indebted nations must be established. Secondly, there is Ireland's role as a participant in the Bretton Woods institutions.

The first perspective can be dealt with swiftly before moving on. Ireland's own bilateral aid programmes have been based on the provision of aid and not loans and consequently, no *direct* Irish involvement in the debt crisis can be identified. In a Dáil Debate on Ireland and global debt in June 1994, Minister for State at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Tom Kitt stated that official debts arose under the heading of 'government guaranteed debts' from commercial transactions on which export credit insurance was invoked.[36] However, the share of third world debt owed to Ireland was small even taking into account Ireland's size. "Ireland does not have any debts to collect, or more to the point, any debts to forgive".[37]The second dimension in regard to Ireland's links to debted countries is central to this thesis and it is to this Inow turn.

Ireland and the World Bank/IMF

Ireland became a member of the Bretton Woods institutions a year after joining the UN in 1956.[38] It is also member of the Paris Club[39] and contributes annually to IDA as part of its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) programme.[40] Ireland is not a member of any of the regional

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35 For a comprehensive and succinct critique of ESAF see Wood, *op cit.: passim.*

36 *Dáil Debates*, June 2 1994. Vol. 443: col. 1229.

37 *Ibid.*

38 Ireland joined the GATT in 1967.

39 The Paris Club is a group of OECD countries that meets regularly in Paris to organise bilateral debt policy. Irish responsibility for Paris Club was, in 1996 with the Department of Trade and Tourism.

40 IDA was established by the World Bank in 1960 to provide loans for development projects on concessional terms. IDA loans are considered 'softer'.

Development Banks with the exception of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).[41] Ireland joined the GATT in 1967.

Thus in relation to ESAF, Ireland's links with participating states run through four channels: the Paris Club, the Bretton Woods institutions, Ireland's own Bilateral Aid Programme (BAP) and Ireland participates in multilateral aid and trade policies of the European Union. However, this focus of this enquiry is exclusively on ESAF as a particular policy instrument of the World Bank/IMF. Because of the relationship between ESAF and the BAP however, the wider relationship between aid and debt is also relevant and will be referred to later.

The organisational arrangements of the Bretton Woods institutions were outlined in chapter three as part of the Irish foreign policy landscape. A total of 12 countries are in Ireland's constituency whose Executive Director is Canadian.[42] Within its constituency Ireland is the second most powerful (in terms of casting votes), having a greater number of votes than the combined votes of all except Canada and the Bahamas.[43] More comparably, however, Ireland carries the second weakest voting power among its fellow EU members weighing in just above Luxembourg (at 1,605 votes) and below Portugal (at 5,826).

Ireland has two permanent representatives in Washington, one each at the IMF and the World Bank. Personnel are appointed by the Minister for Finance from among senior ranks in the Department of Finance and the Central Bank. representatives normally hold office for three years. Within the IMF, the Irish representative acts as Alternate Director, deputising in the absence of the Executive Director. In the World Bank, Ireland acts as an advisor.

Ireland does not see itself as a policy generator within the Bretton Woods institutions. Continuity rather than change marks the policy agenda there and policy direction is generated from the AGM when Governors outline key

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41 The situation is being kept 'under close scrutiny'. See DFA, 1993. *Irish Aid: Consolidation and Growth. A Strategy*, DFA, Dublin: 41.

42 The remaining are Belize, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

43 The voting power is as follows in descending order: Canada: 43,453; Ireland: 5,500; Jamaica: 2,259; The Bahamas: 1,199; Barbados: 739; Belize: 385; St. Lucia: 360; Grenada: 335; Antigua and Barbuda: 335; St. Kitts and Nevis: 315; Dominica: 310; St. Vincent and the Grenadines: 310. See World Bank, 1996. *Op cit.*: 216.

themes for the states. In advance of the AGM discussions continue among representatives so that what emerges at the annual event is already, customarily, indicative of generally accepted positions. The nature of this process is underlined by the fact that the governor's speeches are, as in Ireland, written by officials who have been involved in daily communications with representatives. At a national level, furthermore, while governments come and go, stability of position is maintained by the continuity of input from officials; both in Washington and at home.[44]

The nature of the representative system raises one question. To what extent do the Irish nominees represent Irish interests or the wider interests of their constituency and the IMF/World Bank themselves? Ireland's IMF representative commented that he represents Ireland only when Irish issues are on the agenda. The remainder of the time, he is a full time IMF official.[45] Representative's salaries are, in fact, paid by the World Bank/IMF and not the home governments. According to a DoF official once the constituency view is formed (during which Irish views are represented guided by instructions from home), then the Irish representative becomes accountable to the constituency. This dual function has not yet proven problematic.[46]

In the national policy making environment, the department's IFI section considers the Department of Foreign Affairs as a consultative partner. The DDC has achieved unofficial 'consultative' status. Department of Finance officials attend many events organised by the DDC and the IFI section holds an open door policy to its representatives. In addition, the Department has introduced members of the coalition to officials from both IMF and the World Bank.[47]

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[44] The relationship between the Department of Finance and Irish representatives is 'close'. Author's interview; DoF1 and DoF 2, December 5, 1997.

[45] O'Loghlin, Cathal quoted in DDC, 1998. *Annual Report, April 1997 – March 1998*, DDC, Dublin: 3.

[46] Author's communication with DoF1, April 11 1999. However, the question of conflicting interests was raised during a subsequent Oireachtas debate when members wondered how Canada could represent Ireland's position on debt relief for Uganda given that it (Canada) did not support the initiative. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told the members that the Canadian representative had been briefed on Ireland's position and would be briefed again before the next World Bank meeting. See Parliamentary Debates, *Select Committee on Foreign Affairs* , April 23 1997, cols.: 37-42.

[47] Author's interview; DoF1 and DoF2, December 5, 1997.

Ireland's funding allocation to the IMF comes directly from the exchequer and requires an amendment to the Bretton Woods Agreement Bill - the enabling legislation. As we have seen, the 1994 commitment required amendment of that bill to effect the commitment given by Mr. Ahern to allocate £500,000 to ESAF.

Ireland on debt, aid and structural adjustment

Ireland's position on debt and structural adjustment is marked by support of the existing regimes - albeit a support tempered by concern for protection of the poorest sections of societies from the impact of structural adjustment.[48] Issues of structural adjustment and the role of the Bretton Woods system have not been, traditionally, the subject of much public debate. In the period from 1986 – 1996 a total of 16 parliamentary questions were tabled on the issue of global debt. The majority of them, however, were tabled from 1993 onwards.[49] Speeches by successive Governors at AGMs show Ireland as a supporter of the Bretton Woods neo-liberalism. There, Ireland has sought to use its membership to achieve a 'liberalised, rule-based, international trading environment featuring safeguards against unilateral protectionist actions'.[50] The theme of global interdependency and the link between trade and development also features often.[51]

Again we see this position reflected in the White Paper on Foreign Policy (1996). The paper committed Ireland to supporting efforts to resolve the debt issue through membership of the World Bank and the IMF.[52] Ireland was also committed to securing an international environment in which trade and

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[48] Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1994. *Report on Third World Debt with Particular Reference to the Role of the IMF and the World Bank*: 9.

[49] The distribution of questions across the ten year period is as follows. In 1986: 0; 1987: 0; 1988: 2; 1989: 0; 1990:2; 1991: 0; 1992:1; 1993: 2; 1994: 3; 1995: 3 and in 1996: 3. See *Dáil Debates*, 1986 – 1996.

[50] Government of Ireland, 1996. *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: White Paper on Foreign Policy*, DFA, Dublin: 273.

[51] See for instance the 1986 speech by governor John Bruton which welcomed the increased co-operation between the IMF and the World Bank and the development of structural adjustment facilities. World Bank/IMF 1986. *Summary Proceedings*: 228. In 1990, Governor Albert Reynolds stressed the importance of structural change to correct underlying distortions and weaknesses in indebted countries. World Bank/IMF 1999. *Summary Proceedings*: 117.

[52] Government of Ireland, 1996, *op cit.*: 249. See also the support given to these institutions in the strategy plan for Irish Aid published in 1993. In relation to debt, the plan states that Ireland's main role is to support the efforts of the main agencies through which this problem is addressed: the World Bank and the IMF. DFA, 1993. *Op cit.*: 49.

investment could flourish based on a stable and just international order, sustainable development, liberalisation and the development of bilateral relations with countries through providing business opportunities.[53] However, in supporting debt cancellation as an option,[54]the Irish government located itself on the more progressive IMF and World Bank benches. Furthermore, Ireland has been a strong supporter of IDA.[55]

The Department of Foreign Affairs views coherence across the totality of state policies that impinge on the developing world as functional to an effective aid policy.[56] Ireland is somewhat unusual in that most of its overseas aid is not tied. Its overseas development programmes have been termed, in fact, altruistic.[57] But that is not to say that Irish ODA is void of self interest. One of the three goals of BAP was to give Irish companies the experience to compete for larger contracts from multilateral agencies.[58] Furthermore sending of Irish personnel to work overseas through the Agency for Personal Service Overseas (APSO), the direct procurement of goods and services by development agencies in Ireland and increased exports stimulated by the ODA, all benefits the economy.[59]As an EU member Ireland also contributes to EU multilateral aid programmes and participates in trade/commercial relations with the developing world. Within EU and African/Caribbean/Pacific (ACP) relations, Ireland generally supports the interests of ACP - so long as they did not conflict with Irish interests.[60] Within GATT, Ireland has protected its own economic interests[61] a role that led a government deputy to claim in a Dáil debate that Ireland could not 'cover itself in glory' as a friend of the developing world.[62]

Within that general framework, however, state policy on third world development specifically and inextricably links debt to the challenge of

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53 Government of Ireland, *op cit.*: 276.

54 *Ibid.*:: 249.

55 DFA, 1993, *op cit.: 41.*

56 Government of Ireland, 1996, *op cit.*: 233.

57 Hogan, Vincent, *et al*, 1994. *The Impact of Ireland's Official Development Assistance on the Irish Economy*, a report prepared for the Irish Aid Advisory Committee, Dublin.

58 O'Brien, Declan, 1980. *Ireland and the Third World: A Study of Government Aid*, Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, Dublin: 64.

59 Hogan, *et al, op cit.*: 4-5.

60 Holmes, *et al, op cit.*: 131.

61 *Ibid.*:: 165-70.

62 Pat Gallagher (Labour) *Dáil Debates*, June 2 1994. vol. 443: col. 1269.

development.[63] The strategy plan for Irish aid, produced by the DFA in 1993, refers to debt as mitigating against sustainable development. Nonetheless, it concludes that support of the World Bank and the IMF presented Ireland's best option in this regard.[64] The link between the two issue areas framed how the state responded to the ESAF debate. The link, however, also underlines an apparent institutional incongruity in relation to World Bank/IMF participation. While the Department of Foreign Affairs deems debt of concern to its remit on ODA, policy development and implementation is, *de facto*, within the remit of the Department of Finance.[65]

Thus while a focus on ESAF isolates Ireland's position specifically on IMF structural adjustment, policy on debt, development and SAPs more generally is not exclusively contained within the stance on ESAF. The connection between the progress of aid programmes and debt was usefully exploited by the DDC.

The Debt & Development Coalition

The primary impetus for the formation of the Debt and Development Coalition arose from informal discussions among Irish-based aid agencies many of which were involved partners in the BAP as aid deliverers. A need had emerged for cross-agency collaboration on what was considered a primary cause of under development: debt. Continued indebtedness was, in particular, viewed as a profound barrier to sustainable development.

In 1992 a network of agencies was formed to address this issue. Its members included development organisations such as Trócaire, Concern and Oxfam, and Cómhlamh, the catholic church, represented by the Conference of Major Religious Superiors, the advocacy group AFrI and missionary orders such as the Columban Fathers and the Franciscans. Key catalysts were two (Irish) Columban priests one of whom had worked in the Philippines where he was influenced by the local Freedom From Debt Coalition.

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[63] Government of Ireland, 1996, *op cit.*: 250. A sub-section of the chapter on overseas refers to the need for an integrated approach to the debt problem.

[64] DFA, 1993, *op cit.*: 41.

[65] The DFA's 1996 estimates for ODA, for instance, includes the proposed £500,000 ESAF allocation. See DFA, 1996. Op cit.: 344. In 1997, outgoing Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, proposed that the DFA should also be represented at the World Bank/IMF. See Oxfam, 1997. *Position of the Political Parties on Multilateral Debt and the IMF*, Oxfam, Dublin.

The network formed itself around a working group that sought representation from as wide as possible a spread of Irish third world activists, and, of appropriate skills.[66] This working group established three targets. Firstly it sought, and eventually received, funding from the EU - from the DG V111 budget line[67] - matched by donations from network members. Secondly, it began a public information campaign on debt. Thirdly, it began to 'build up relations' with officials in the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Finance.[68]

The Debt and Development Coalition, as the group became, was formally launched in Dublin in December 1993. By this time it had secured EU funding for three years for its core activities and developed contacts and links with state officials. Over 50 organisations were listed among its members and that number grew.[69] In addition, a full-time co-ordinator had been employed. A formal model of representative democracy was chosen for the structure and the campaign was first located in the premises of a church organisation outside Dublin and later moved to the capital. Aims and objectives were set out at the launch. The DDC aimed to "lobby Irish politicians to work for debt reduction and cancellation policies in all the international bodies in which Ireland had a voice, notably the World Bank, the ED, the UN and the Paris Club".[70]

The DDC was launched at a time when the World Bank had begun re-evaluating its relationship with NGOs.[71] The timing of the launch, marking the 50 anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions, was no coincidence. Equivalent events were planned by similar groups globally to use the anniversary to provoke debate.[72] From the very beginning the DDC viewed its role as integral to the global movement campaigning both against the

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[66] As a matter of policy, the working group sought to widen the range of representation to both urban and rural areas and to people of different skill and experience. Author's interview with Annette Honan, founding member of the working group December 2 1997.

[67] DG V111 of the European Commission is concerned with development.

[68] Author's interview with Annette Honan, December 2 1997.

[69] See Appendix J for the membership list.

[70] *Irish Times*, December 10 1993.

[71] See Nelson, *op cit.*: 4, for the argument that many NGOs became tools for the implementation of development policies that they were, in fact, opposed to. The Bretton Woods institutions viewed them as organisations on the ground that could soften the blow of structural adjustment policies.

[72] The campaign launched by the DDC on its birth was called 'Fifty Years is Enough'. It set out key dates and strategies for its members and identified specific proposals for debt reduction. See *Update on Debt and Development*, no 1, February 1994.

economic orthodoxies of the IFI's response to debt and for greater accountability and transparency in both the IMF and World Bank.[73] Of particular importance for global networking was the Brussels-based European Campaign for Debt and Development (EURODAD) of which the which the DDC became a member[74]

Promoting debate on debt and development

An analysis of its activities indicates an isolation of three channels to influencing the policy formation process on the part of the DDC. They were; the Irish public; officials in the relevant government departments, and, elected representatives including the minister for finance. In addition, the DDC sought and gained access to officials from the World Bank and the IMF to attempt to influence policy directly at a multilateral level.

The DDC chose firstly to provide information for mass dissemination through its members. This served not just an immediate function - to provide knowledge and analysis - but also, according to the DDC co-ordinator, "to enable people to participate in a new global order.....to enable people not to feel helpless when they face the World Bank or the IMF or any other global quangos".[75] The national structure of the catholic church was also used (underlining the link with the church, broadly speaking, and the DDC) in 1994 when a 'parish pack', including homilies for priests, was widely circulated using the DDC's contacts with local clerics.[76] As in the case of the East Timor campaign, the development education component of the secondary school curriculum proved a useful promotional entry point. The DDC compiled a 'debt pack' for use in schools and with youth groups.

The Parliamentary process was targeted early in the campaign's life and in September 1993 just before the World Bank/IMF AGM a representative of one

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[73] Both the broader agenda and the commitment to policy alliances were evident in the DDC's presentation made to the Sub-Committee on Development Co-operation in 1994. See *Parliamentary Debates*, Sub Committee on Development Co-operation, February 1 1994: cols. 98-101.

[74] EURODAD was established in 1990 as a network of NGOs in sixteen European countries working on debt, structural adjustment, financial markets and reform of the IFIs. Its objectives are to achieve greater co-ordination of NGOs and civil society activities in these areas. It collaborates with a partner organisation in the North and the South. EURODAD runs an on going campaign against ESAF.

[75] Author's interview with Jean Somers, November 12 1997.

[76] Author's interview with Annette Honan, December 2 1997.

of the DDC's founding organisations made a presentation to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. As a result, the committee agreed a motion on debt relief to go to the Minister for Finance.[77] That motion was formulated around the argument made by the DDC representative. There was, clearly, great receptivity to the ideas being developed by the DDC among the committee members. Indeed, the committee, as we will see, became a notable conduit for the DDC into foreign policy-making circles. The relationship between the DDC and committee is dealt with in detail below

During 1994 the coalition made a submission to the discussion process organised by the DFA in preparation for the White Paper. With reference to ESAF the DDC did, however, accept that by remaining as a contributor to ESAF and IDA, Ireland's potential to influence the multilateral agencies was stronger than if it were to redirect all aid through its own bilateral aid programmes. Given this, the DDC argued that Ireland should articulate a role of standard-setting for the IMF and the World Bank during negotiations on ESAF and the IDA.[78]

Pursuing the extra-national dimension to their work the DDC travelled to the 1994 AGM. This trip was to become and annual event and allowed the DDC lobby officials and Ireland's IMF/World Bank representatives in co-ordination with other NGOs. In the previous months it had travelled to London to meet the local representative of the World Bank and had lobbied Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the World Bank/IMF, when he was in Ireland that June.

During this first year, the DDC decided to specifically examine the impact of Structural Adjustment Policies on the recipients of Ireland's bilateral aid programme funding. Its membership of aid agencies and missionary organisations made such a proposal extremely practicable. Most of Ireland's ODA partners are defined as severely indebted low-income countries (SILICs): Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In 1995 these six countries together owed $40 billion and debt-servicing 'eats significantly' into their annual export earnings.[79] Such a focus would not only

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[77] *Parliamentary Debates*, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 22 1993: cols. 204-212. The motion requested the Minister to consider supporting the adoption of the Trinidad Terms.

[78] DDC, undated document (A). Submission to the White Paper on Foreign Policy, Dublin: 2.

[79] *Ibid.*: 1

contextualise the issue of debt in relation to the recipients of Ireland's bilateral aid for the DFA but also provide a national dimension for its member groups. Many DDC members engage in development work in BAP countries and were, thus, in a position to provide immediate information on the impact of SAPs on specific local development initiatives. What they brought to the debate, therefore, was an informed analysis from the perspective of those effected by structural adjustment.

The DDC argued that, as a donor to *SILICs*, Ireland had an immediate and concrete interest in the policies of the multilateral agencies there. Firstly, in funding basic-needs projects such as in health care and education. Ireland's aid could be, in effect, wiped out by the impact of structural adjustment on indigenous provision of those services. Secondly, it is possible that bilateral resources were being 'diverted' to finance debts. In 1992, virtually half of all International Development Assistance (IDA) transfers to the severely indebted countries were wiped out by repayments to the IBRD.[80] In other words, Ireland's ODA assistance to the SILICs could be viewed as 'mopping up'[81] the excesses of structural adjustment and, in the context of the negative transfers from the debtors to the creditors, could be viewed as, ultimately, a transfer from Ireland to the IFIs via the debtor nations.

It was this argument, which firmly located Ireland as an interested party in the relationship between the SILICs and the Bretton Woods institutions, which the DDC utilised in its approach to the Irish government, to politicians and the officials involved. Thus the global debt became a foreign policy issue for Ireland in a manner which rendered Ireland, not just a member of the World Bank/IMF, but as a country for whom structural adjustment programmes have a significant impact on the efficacy of ODA commitments. The argument, in fact, set Ireland's ODA programme against its participation in the World Bank/IMF and, later, in ESAF in particular.

According to the DDC co-ordinator, the focus on bilateral aid forced the DFA to answer questions as to whether Ireland should be 'mopping up' after SAPs. The two countries which were chosen for the particular focus by the DDC were Tanzania and Zambia. In 1994 the DDC hosted an informal meeting with the Minister for Finance, officials from his Department and the DFA.

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80 *Ibid.*: 2.

81 *Ibid.*: 13.

Documentation provided for this meeting established, in detail, how SAPs were at the root cause of development-related problems that the BAP was attempting to redress. A briefing paper prepared by the Department of Finance was also circulated in advance of this meeting. The DFA was represented by Deputy Joan Burton, Minister of State at the department and an official from the development co-operation section.

Debt in Oireachtas debates

From the point of view of promoting debate on debt, the DDC also needed to establish the details of Irish policy in relation to structural adjustment and related areas. No detailed document existed setting out the philosophical and conceptual base of Irish policy within the IMF and the World Bank. Parliamentary questions and letter-lobbying from TDs, according to the DDC co-ordinator, were thus extremely productive in 'flushing out' the Irish position, albeit piecemeal in their effect.[82]

In the early months of 1994 the Sub Committee on Development Co-operation[83] of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, hosted several debates on debt and SAPs and invited speakers to make submissions. Included among them was the DDC. At its first presentation to the sub committee meeting in February 1994, members agreed to work with the DDC towards making specific proposals on debt that would then go forward to the Dáil for debate. The DDC made specific proposals for significant debt reduction, or cancellation, for Sub-Saharan African countries, for greater accountability and transparency in the manner in which the IMF and World Bank implement their decisions and for an inclusion of poverty reduction and environmental protection mechanisms as central priorities in their programmes.[84] During the debate that followed the presentation by four DDC members several parliamentarians commented on the usefulness of the exchange, the importance of the information and expertise supplied by the DDC and the need for further meetings and collaborative work.[85]

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[82] Author's interview with Jean Somers, November 12 1997. See footnote 48 for details of parliamentary questions.

[83] See appendix K for the Sub Committee members.

[84] *Parliamentary Debates*, Sub-Committee on Development Co-operation, February 1 1994: cols. 98-114 .

[85] *Ibid.*: *passim.*

The deliberations resulted in the publication of the first report on debt in April 1994.[86] In proposing the report to the joint committee, in advance of laying it before the Dáil and Seanad, sub committee chairperson, Pat Gallagher, hoped that it would influence Ireland's participation, not alone at the spring meeting of the World Bank/IMF, but also in the EU arena"[87]

Although the report made no reference to ESAF it provided a critical framework within which resistance to ESAF could be located at a later stage. It shared the general perspective of the DDC that debt was a barrier to development, that debt repayments result in a transfer of resources from the South to the North and that, *inter alia*, the solutions presented to date by the IMF and World Bank have failed to tackle the root of the problem. The report concluded by stressing Ireland's traditional concern for protecting the poorest sectors in the developing world. It made five recommendations relating to the role of the IMF and World Bank; debt cancellation and of reform of World Bank and IMF policies.[88]

On foot of the sub-committee's report, a full Dáil debate was devoted to the issue of debt and structural adjustment on June 2 1994.[89] Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Tom Kitt (Fianna Fáil) rejected, however, two aspects of the report's recommendations. Firstly, selling off its gold reserves would serve only to weaken the IMFs capacity to continue to raise funds. Secondly, debt forgiveness, of itself, would not solve the problem of underdevelopment. Linking, again, the issue of debt and development assistance Mr. Kitt stressed the role of the Irish BAP in building and developing economic capacities of the poorer countries. There were two ways in which Ireland could directly make practical contributions to the problem of indebtedness. Firstly, Ireland could continue to contribute to a United Nations programmes on legal debt management to which Ireland had contributed £90,000 in 1994. Secondly, regular briefing of Ireland's IMF representative on the difficulties facing Ireland's priority BAP would render him 'well informed' for relevant discussions.[90] Minister Kitt commented in the debate that because of Ireland's lack of involvement as a 'creditor' (not having any debts to forgive') Irish calls for large-scale debt forgiveness may run the risk of sounding hollow and

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86 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1994. *Op cit.: passim.*

87 *Parliamentary Debates*, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 12 1994: col. 411.

88 See appendix L for the text of the recommendations.

89 *Dáil Debates*, June 2 1994. Vol. 443: cols. 1212-86.

90 *Ibid.*: 1229-31.

opportunistic. On the other hand it did enable Ireland to lend its voice to the calls of those, and they come not just from developing countries, who wish to see a much more concerted and vigorous effort to address the debt problem.[91]

Deputy Prionsias de Rossa (Democratic Left) told the house that the reason debt was being debated there was because a group of NGOs made it an issue and submitted representations to the parliamentarians so that it eventually made it way into the Dáil itself.[92] Deputy Pat Gallagher (Labour) agreed and commented the DDCs successful lobbying of their work would surely make other similar groups 'envious' of it.[93]

The Minister for Finance, Bertie Ahern, (Fianna Fáil) spoke in the debate with reference to his capacity as Governor of the IMF and the World Bank. He considered ESAF to be 'a 'very effective mechanism' for providing concessional finance to Africa. Ireland would continue to be a 'very firm supporter' of the IMF and the World Bank.[94] The Minister spoke of meeting with the DDC during 1994. He commented that he was 'happy' to hear of the experiences of the DDC which would 'better inform' him on the policies of the IMF and the World Bank[95]

However, the government position on debt was not universally accepted within the ranks of government party members in the Dáil. Deputy Brian Lenihan, chairperson of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and a senior Fianna Fáil member, called for the liquidation of the entire debt of Sub-Saharan Africa. He was critical of his Minister's defence of the IMF.[96] Deputy Pat Gallagher (Labour) who had chaired the sub committee and written the report also rejected the Minister's of State's rejoinders.[97] Michael McDowell (progressive Democrats) erroneously claimed that Ireland's contribution to ESAF and to the IMF for that year were 'fairly small sums of money but a tangible indication and a symbol of our commitment to these programmes".[98]

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91 *Ibid.*: 1229.
92 *Ibid.*:: 1255.
93 *Ibid.*: 1269.
94 *Ibid.*: 1263-8.
95 *Ibid.*: 1263.
96 *Ibid.*: 1259-61.
97 *Ibid.*: 1268-75.
98 *Ibid.*: 1246-47.

A striking feature of the debate is the extent of knowledge displayed by deputies of, not just the functioning of the IMF and the World Bank, but of the economies of the poorer indebted countries. Cross-party support for a more radical solution to the debt crisis was evident.

Subsequent to the Dáil debate the DDC followed up by lobbying Minister Ahern. The campaign was anxious that he would be fully briefed, at least, on the arguments of the campaign in advance of his speech to the AGM of the IMF/World Bank the following Autumn. In his speech, Mr. Ahern made no mention of ESAF but did refer to the "significant" debate that had occurred in his home parliament on debt and structural adjustment. He also referred to the meetings he had had with Irish NGOs in the previous months and stressed the common goals of NGOs and the World Bank/IMF in promoting development. He regretted the negative perceptions that NGOs had of the role of the World Bank/IMF and urged the latter to increase their transparency and co-operation with NGOs.[99]

The ESAF campaign

From the start, the DDC included opposition to SAPs in its campaign. That opposition became modulated over time and, importantly for this thesis, was partially refined to isolate ESAF as an issue that was particularly pertinent for Ireland. Recognising the need for a parliamentary debate to process the pending Bretton Woods (Amendment) Bill, the DDC launched its 'Say No to ESAF' in June 1995. In the campaign choice, the DDC was following a lone path among the other Europe-based and international campaigns lobbying on structural adjustment and debt. The home governments of most other national groups were already contributing to ESAF and campaigns were of a reformist nature in relation to ESAF.[100] The legislative requirement presented the DDC with a single, targetable issue which, in turn, encapsulated the DDC's prior critique. The focus on ESAF allowed a particularistic distilling of the complexities of structural adjustment and its impact on third world development. In relation to BAP and ESAF a particularly strong case could be made by the DDC. Of the six countries priorities within Irish aid programmes

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[99] World Bank/IMF, 1994. *Summary Proceedings*: 68-69.

[100] Author's interview with Jean Somers, April 3 1999.

(Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia) all except one (Lesotho) are participants in ESAF.[101]

A two-pronged campaigning strategy was drawn up. Firstly, the coalition devised information sheets for public distribution on ESAF, SAPs and Ireland's role within the multilateral institutions. They were distributed through the membership network. Secondly, briefing documents on the ESAF were prepared and used to lobby the Cabinet and members of the Parliament, including the Minister for Finance. This lobbying was largely conducted through a letter campaign; correspondence chiefly flowing between TDs and the Minister. DDC supporters were also asked to send postcards or letters to Minister Quinn and their local TDs raising their objections to ESAF.[102]

The campaign had already received the support of the Sub Committee on Development Co-operation in that its general analysis of related issues had been adopted into the report and, as we have seen, furthermore, informed much of the debate in the Dáil. According to the DDC co-ordinator a significant number of meetings and discussions took place on the ESAF within the Oireachtas. "The ESAF campaign" she said, "served the purpose of promoting debate within the institution".[103]

An animating site for the debate was the Sub Committee on Development Co-operation of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. Ground work for the focus on ESAF had been laid in the previous year, as we have seen, with the debates leading to the publication of the report on debt and structural adjustment. In the 13 month-odd period between the campaign launch and the Ministerial decision to withdraw from ESAF activity and debate on ESAF was, comparatively speaking, intense.

The DDC briefed the Sub-Committee on Development Co-operation at a meeting on July 13. The sub-committee returned to debate the role of the IMF and the World Bank again and its deliberation produced the second report on third world debt. Building on the case presented in the first report, this document however specifically refers to the role of ESAF. While the government was considering ESAF contributions it believed that it (ESAF)

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101 See IMF, 1997. *International Financial Statistics*, IMF, Washington: 9,

102 The Minister acknowledged later to the DDC that he had received 'voluminous correspondence' on the issue. Author's interview with Somers, March 1 1999.

103 *Ibid*.

could "assist in generating the macro-economic conditions which are essential if real economic growth and social improvement are to be improved."[104] The Committee members themselves, however, were 'not yet convinced' that Ireland should make any additional contributions to ESAF. Strong consideration should be given instead to funding IDA whose "primary aim of poverty reduction and social"[105] met with their concerns.

The Minister for Finance, Ruairí Quinn, was invited to attend a subsequent sub committee meeting prior to his departure for the 1995 AGM of the World Bank/IMF and was informed there of the ESAF proposal. At that meeting, the Minister of State for Development Co-operation, Joan Burton, made a strong speech condemning ESAF and proposing instead that the money allocated for ESAF be redirected into the BAP to be used for small scale, local credit schemes. She instanced specific projects which, she argued, would make better use of amounts which might be contributed to the IMF. Following this meeting, she was requested by the Minister for Finance to draft a policy paper on ESAF. Minister Quinn also requested the World Bank furnish him with its analysis of the ESAF.[106] This analysis then provided the basis of a further response from the DDC which, in turn, was circulated to the Minister and the members of the foreign affairs committee.

An opportunity to debate ESAF was provided by the 1996 debate on estimates for development co-operation which Minister of State with responsibility for development co-operation at DFA, Joan Burton, placed before the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 16 1996. Two TDs who had been closely associated with the anti-ESAF campaign, Deputy Tom Kitt (Fianna Fáil and former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) and Deputy Pat Gallagher (Labour) raised ESAF. Deputy Kitt told the committee that NGOs (including the Debt and Development Coalition) had recommended that the money earmarked for ESAF be allocated instead to IDA. His comment was supported by Deputy Gallagher who urged Ireland to play a role in fighting 'at the World Bank and the IMF for a more realistic approach to debt reduction and debt relief'. Irish people would, furthermore, far prefer to see

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104 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1995. *Second Report on Third World Debt with particular reference to the Roles of the IMF and World Bank*, October 4 1995: 5. See appendix M for the report's recommendations.

105 *Ibid.*: 5-8.

106 This was useful as it 'flushed out' the World Bank and helped put the issue into the public arena. Author's interview with Jean Somers, November 12 1997.

their money go to micro credit schemes for the poor in the developing world than into schemes supporting structural adjustment.[107] Supporting the ESAF opposition, Minister Burton commented that it would be 'foolish' to make any commitments to ESAF until the IMF review was carried out given that seven of Ireland's BAP countries were under scrutiny in that review.[108]

The DDC was scheduled to brief the Sub-Committee on Development Co-operation again at a meeting on July 10. Prior to that meeting the campaign was told by a government deputy that Minister Quinn had decided not to make the ESAF contributions.[109] The subsequent issue of the DDC's newsletter congratulated its members on "achieving this important movement" in the government's ESAF position. The victory, however, was "initial" underlining the DDC's recognition of, not only the possibility of a future reversal of the Quinn decision, but also of the long road in achieving change at the IMF.[110]

At the World Bank's 1996 AGM, Minister Quinn spoke on behalf of the EU (in Ireland's capacity in the Presidency) and gave his continued support to debt-relief policies of the World Bank/IMF through both bilateral programmes and ESAF contributions. There was widespread acceptance that ESAF played a 'meaningful role' as a centrepiece of the IMF strategy to assist the lower income countries in conjunction with the International Development Association (World Bank).[111] He made no reference to Ireland's decision on ESAF. In the circumstances - as a representative of the EU - such a reference would have been inappropriate. He did, as was the norm, use the opportunity to present a brief overview of developments in his domestic economy.

However, acting in his capacity as Governor for Ireland he told a meeting of the Overseas Development Institute during the AGM that Ireland had decided to revoke its position on ESAF. He commented at the meeting on the number of requests he had received from members of the Irish public to pursue such a policy.[112] In a Dáil debate over six months later Minister

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107 *Parliamentary Debates*, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 16 1996, cols.: 58-61.

108 *Parliamentary Debates*, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 16 1996, col. 63.

109 Author's interview with Jean Somers, November 12 1997.

110 *Update on Debt and Development*, no. 8, July 1996. The DDC was aware of strong support for ESAF within other EU countries. See *Update on Debt and Development*, no. 9, October 1996.

111 World Bank/IMF, 1996. *Summary Proceedings*: 117.

112 *Update on Debt and Development*, no. 9, Oct. 1996.

Quinn commented that the decision was made because Ireland could not make funds available unless 'satisfactory implementation of a comprehensive debt relief framework' was in place.[113]

A battle won but a war lost?

Less than a year after Minister Quinn took the decision to reverse the previous government's policy on ESAF general elections returned a new government to power: a coalition of Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats. The new Minister for Finance was Charlie McCreevy.

The DDC lost little time in establishing the new government's position on ESAF. Within weeks of the election coalition members met with the new Minister and sought assurances that the Quinn policy would be maintained. Both parties of government had indicated prior to the elections that they were in support of debt relief.[114] The DDC hoped that this broad sympathy with the indebtedness, plus the reversal itself, would negate any government interest in re-opening the ESAF debate. However, the DDC also recognised that the position of officials from the DoF - in favour of ESAF - should not be discounted.[115]

The speech delivered by the new Minister at the AGM for that year did not bode well for the DDC. Minister McCreevy congratulated the IMF and the World Bank on their debt relief efforts. Making no reference to the fact that Ireland had withdrawn from ESAF, he welcomed the pending results of the on-going ESAF review. His support of ESAF, however, was measured by a comment on the importance of assessing the impact of structural adjustment on social sector programmes as being 'critical to implementing the ESAF in an optimal way'.[116]

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113 *Dáil Debates*, February 13 1997. Vol. 443: col. 1229.

114 DDC member, Oxfam had carried out an election survey on the attitude of all political parties to debt. The information was then circulated to development and advocacy organisations for lobbying purposes. With the exception of Fine Gael, all parties had accepted that debt cancellation was a realistic policy initiative. Fianna Fáil supported a complete write-off of the debt of less developed countries. the Progressive Democrats accepted a write-off in the case of countries with no chance of ever meeting their repayments. Oxfam General Election Survey, 1997. Partial results of survey carried in *Update on Debt and Development*, no. 11, July 1997.

115 Author's interview with Jean Somers, November 12 1997.

116 Statement World Bank/IMF AGM 1997. Press release No. 41, IMF Records, Division, 202 623 4712, no. 646.

Unanticipated by the DDC was the response of the IMF to its (the DDC's) role in the ESAF decision. Stanley Fischer, vice director of the IMF personally sought a meeting with the DDC in October 1996 when on a business trip to Ireland. His intervention was viewed as an attempt by the IMF to 'lobby' the DDC to effect a change in its policy.[117] Furthermore, the DoF began to lobby the DDC to firstly support the review of the World Bank and secondly, through this, also to change its recommendations.[118]

While the DDC continued its campaign, notwithstanding the lobbying-role reversal described above, and continued to lobby members of the government and opposition on ESAF, DoF officials began preparing legislation in allow the Bretton Woods Agreement Bill be amended. The case for ESAF was, from their perspective, boosted by the publication of the report on the ESAF evaluation carried out in 1967. While critical of aspect's of ESAF that report did go some way to incorporating elements of the measures raised in the past by NGOs such as the DDC.[119] Despite the launch of a second "Say no to ESAF"[120] campaign by the DDC, and a similar pattern of activities as described above, that legislation was passed by the Dáil in March 1999. According to a DoF official interviewed after the Dáil decision, the turn-around on ESAF was simply the logical step that Ireland needed to take to increase its funding for the poorest countries of the third world. ESAF was the best instrument through which such funding could be made. Furthermore, a commitment had been given by the Taoiseach and its eventual execution was anticipated.[121]

Four significant factors were identified here as central to the 1996 change in ESAF policy. Firstly, there was the presence of an ideologically sympathetic party in the Fianna Fáil/Labour coalition government of the day, *viz*, the Labour Party. In particular the fact that the Labour Party held the Finance portfolio and that of the Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, was significant. Secondly, there was a coincidence of concern between

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117 Author's interview with Jean Somers, November 11 1997.

118 *Ibid*.

119 The DDC argued, however, that the review did not go far enough and was being used by the new government 'as an excuse' to contribute to ESAF. See DDC *Briefing Document on ESAF*, November 6 1998.

120 When it became clear that the ESAF legislation would be passed, the DDC campaign focused almost entirely on lobbying TD's to vote no. See DDC *Annual Report*, 1998 - 1999.

121 Author's interview; DoF1, April 11 1999.

Ireland's Bilateral Aid Programme (BAP) and the majority of countries participating in ESAF. This provided a specific and immediate context for evaluating the impact of ESAF. Thirdly, the cross party support which the anti-ESAF campaign mustered within the Oireachtas, particularly within the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Sub-Committee on Development Co-operation. Fourthly, of course, there was the focused and sustained campaign orchestrated by the DDC against ESAF.

The salience of each factor in producing the outcome is, perhaps, best described as of different levels of importance at different times. That our concern is to assess the role of the DDC does not preclude examining the inter-functioning of all factors. However, it would be unwise to assume that the DDC proposal, once dropped into the broader policy-making environment would emerge at output at the other end, intact and unscathed. However, some assessment must be made as to the role of the DDC in the whole process and the views of significant actors were canvassed with a view to making some such assessment. The replies are interesting in their variance, and, not entirely unanticipated.

According to the then Minister, Ruarí Quinn, there were three significant influences on his decision - each internal to the Labour Party structure. The dominant influence was the "general political and ideological perspective" of his party on the debt issue. Through its international linkages the party had a clear understanding of development co-operation. Secondly and thirdly were analysis provided, respectively, by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Joan Burton, and the chairperson of the Sub Committee on Development Co-operation, Pat Gallagher. Both urged him not to bring forward the ESAF legislation reinforcing the Minister's belief that legislation on ESAF was not needed.[122] Mr. Quinn's analysis did not discount the role of the DDC but allocated it a secondary role of highlighting ESAF within the system. The linkage of the DDC to secondary schools and to a 'substantial network" development organisations was also significant. The Labour Party, and Deputy Quinn himself, felt that bringing forth ESAF legislation would be a regressive move - a position which intrinsically linked him to the concerns of the supporters of development co-operation in Ireland.[123]

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[122] Author's communication with Ruairí Quinn, March 8 1999.

[123] *Ibid.*

Deputy Quinn's perspective was echoed in the analysis provided by then Minister of State Joan Burton. With reference to her personal experiences as a development worker in Tanzania and as a Minister for State with a brief for development co-operation she commented that "under no circumstances" would she have supported Ireland's participation in ESAF regardless of the campaign run by the DDC. Where the DDC performed an 'important and very difficult role," however, was in educating politicians on a complex issue, mobilising public opinion and engaging in a dialogue, on technical aspects of debt, with the Department of Finance. "It was a very demanding role and the DDC did it very well".[124] Neither Quinn nor Bruton felt that the debates within the Sub committee on Development Co-operation, nor the joint committee itself, was major factors in influencing the outcome.

From the perspective of the Department of Finance, the DDC, however, was responsible for the postponement of the ESAF legislation and fed into prior opposition within the Oireachtas to produce, eventually, the Quinn decision.[125] This analysis thus allocates the DDC the role of a catalyst role and posits that, had the campaign not existed, ESAF legislation would have been passed probably without debate. Not surprisingly, at the same time, the DoF was none too pleased with the outcome of the DDC's campaign. In its assessment, the impact overall was negative: Ireland's status within the IMF as the only EU member not contributing to ESAF was diminished and, furthermore, the DDC's campaign enforced a 'nervousness' among politicians and officials, about the power of lobby groups.[126]

However, the reversal of the ESAF policy in 1999, and the clear signals given by the new government in advance of the Oireachtas debate on legislation point to the overarching importance of one factor: the role of the Minister for Finance. Once in place, the new Minister made his intentions to support ESAF as clear as the DDC's opposition to the fund. At the end of the day, with the government majority in the house, no arguments offered by the DDC, or its supporters within the house or in the wider development co-operation lobby could muster the political power required to resist it.

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[124] Author's interview with Joan Burton, March 19 1999.

[125] Authors communication; DoF1, April 11 1999.

[126] Author's interview; DoF1, DoF1, December 5 1997. The diminution argument was not one accepted by the former Minister who proposed that his decision on ESAF, in fact, sent a constructive signal to the wider development community. Author's communication with Ruairí Quinn, March 8 1999.

Conclusion

The swiftness of the policy reversal under the new government brought to nought the extent of public, and/or attentive public resistance to ESAF, the arguments about is inefficacy and unjustness, the significant DDC support with the Oireachtas even from among members of Fianna Fáil and the opposition to it that emerged from the Department of Foreign Affairs. If the case against ESAF was swung, in 1996, by the persuasive power of cosmopolitan thinking, then that thinking proved extremely vulnerable to the realities of electoral politics.

Despite the apparently difficult and often quite technical nature of the issue chosen for this case study, and, the inherent conservatism of the DoF as a treasury, the ESAF campaign may, in fact have provided a 'soft' case for cosmopolitanism. The prior sympathies of the Minister for Finance to issues of development co-operation and the prior hard-line view on structural adjustment taken by the Minister for State for Development co-operation, meant that, from the point of view of national governance, the DDC was pushing against an open door. It could be argued that there was no better time, than under the regime of a Labour Party Minister, to present cosmopolitan ideas at the door of the policy-makers including, importantly, the Department of Finance. At the end of the day, the Minister was willing to (as was his prerogative) ignore the advice of his department officials.

Taking the ESAF stance, despite misgivings by those officials, invoked no cost to the state and did everything to enhance the Labour Party's support among the well organised and extensive network of development agencies and other NGOs who make up the DDC and their supporters.

However, the case for cosmopolitanism does not stand or fall solely on policy outputs. As we saw in chapter one and as is argued throughout this thesis, cosmopolitanism is equally exercised by the *process* of transformation. The DDC, for instance, at all times displayed an acceptance of the odds stacked against bringing about a rejection by the IMF of ESAF. This did not, however, stop the activists from campaigning on the issue. According to a DoF official the ESAF debate had, *inter alia*, resulted in a shifting of the positions of both the department and the DDC on the issue of debt and structural adjustment. He commented: "on the whole there has been a movement in both directions.

the Department of Finance has moved closer towards the NGO cause and the NGO's have moved closer towards the concerns of the department. It's a question of nudging along in that direction (of the NGOs)."[127]

Pragmatic and optimistic even in the face of losing the ESAF battle, the DDC conclusion is, as indicated in the opening paragraphs, positive. The words of DDC co-ordinator are worth quoting in full. "What was really good was that people were mobilised on a very difficult issue and against a very abstract and difficult institution, the IMF. Our democracy is based on people taking very simple actions....We fought an action and won our position against the IMF. We were probably the only people in the world to do that." The ESAF decision, furthermore, had given the DoF a golden opportunity to build a more progressive position within the IMF. "They could have claimed that it was the government's policy although they didn't like it themselves. But because they didn't agree with the policy they were disempowered by it". In contrast, the DDC was empowered by the campaign success. In the run up to the passing of the Bretton Woods Agreement (Amendment) Bill, the DDC claimed, probably without exaggeration, that there was unlikely to be a TD in the house who was unaware of the issues surrounding ESAF.[128] The issue might have been lost but the experience was good for the longer term work of the DDC because it gave immediate experience (and short term success) to its members and because it brought about a sustained and very detailed debate on structural adjustment within the Oireachtas. The long term influence of that process was evident in the extent of the debate on ESAF and on structural adjustment generally that occurred in the Oireachtas in 1999. In the words of one Deputy the issue "was given a full run through the house. Every aspect of the issue was debated in full."[129] There is no doubt but that the DDC transformed the dialogue from a technical issue relating to (given) commitments to the Bretton Woods institutions to an intense political, moral and practical debate about how Ireland can best accommodate the needs of the developing world into its policies within those institutions.

However, the arguments produced by the DDC underwrites one serious impediment to the persuasiveness of cosmopolitan ideas: the tenacity of the inter-state system and the salience of national interest. The DDC learned early

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[127] Author's interview; DoF1, DoF2, April 11 1999.

[128] See undated DDC Press Release: "ESAF Legislation Delayed", December 1998.

[129] Personal interview with Michael D. Higgins (Labour Party), April 1 1999.

in its campaigning days that the most powerful way to convince the policy makers about their ideas was to present them in the parameters of the national interest. Thus, the most persuasive, albeit not the only, argument against ESAF was its effect on the BAP. The case was enhanced by the alternative provided by IDA - again an argument based on practical utility rather than universalistic arguments. However, it would be a mistake to assume that these arguments were not solidly founded on the general case made against SAPs. That case is based on a cosmopolitan perspective of bringing in the voice of the voiceless (in this case the poorest sections of the developing world) into the dialogue on debt, and, of positing their rights (to education, to health care, to food security, to a say in the development process) as equivalent, at least, to the needs of international finance and global liquidity.

Chapter 7

Case Study: Ireland the Women's Movement and the Beijing Conference.

Introduction

This case study examines the participation of non-state actors in the process leading up to, and including, Ireland's participation in the UN Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, China from September 4 to 15, 1995 (the Beijing Conference). Multilateral conferences, such as the Beijing conference, are important in the cosmopolitan world view as they provide the formal arena wherein states come face to face with cosmopolitan ideas. As the upholder of international human rights law, as a defender of a concept of global humanity and as the repository of international laws which, in theory bind member-states, the UN is, more than any other intergovernmental institution, an agent of cosmopolitan practice. However, the UN is also, in effect, no greater than the will of its component members; sovereign states. Multilateral conferences provide the meeting rooms where the member's will meets the collective aspiration of the greater institution to negotiate those cosmopolitan ideas.

Whether the UN does indeed produce or facilitate a cosmopolitan order and whether its members fully endorse such an order in their own foreign and domestic policy practice is not for debate here. We have seen in previous chapters however, that international human rights law provides the backbone of cosmopolitanism and is critical for engagement with state and inter-governmental institutions by cosmopolitan 'outriders' such as human rights, solidarity and groups in civil society.

The purpose of this chapter is to focus specifically on how the Irish state, in conjunction with its civil society partners, proceeded towards the Beijing Conference. The issue here is not a particular policy but that of participation: to what extent could, or did, the Irish state integrate the actors, who may themselves be propounding cosmopolitan, ideas into the Beijing process? What were the limits to that participation and how permeable was the state structure to incorporation of those actors?

The questions raised here resonate with current debates within democratic theory but as these do not have a direct impact on this investigation, they

will be not be examined here.[1] The cosmopolitanism project does involve a revisioning of democracy globally and a reworking of a cosmopolitan democratic theory into IR theory and practice. This chapter's purpose is a small part of that project: to describe and analyse one particular case study.

Feminist activism, based on a set of ideas that is essentially cosmopolitan (in that feminism argues that all peoples will benefit from a feminist world order) provides particularly rich ground for the exploration of cosmopolitan ideals. The global nature of women's movements is represented by the linkages of ideas, strategies and goals and enshrined in networks that span many countries to create what has been has been termed 'planetary feminism'.[2] The relationships between governments, women's movements and women's groups[3] must be viewed in a dialectical manner. In as much as international feminism (ideas, networks and organisations) has influenced the policies of national governments[4] and regional organisations such as the EU and the UN itself, the birth and development of grass roots women's organisations is often sparked by the availability of government funding[5] and/or, in the EU context, funding such as in the NOW Programme.[6] At the policy end, the relationship between feminist activists and the state has resulted in the institutionalisation of women's interests, an outcome that forms part of the picture of the Beijing process. Given that women's groups, many of which espouse a feminist ideology, were incorporated into the preparatory process for Beijing and were part of the Irish national delegation at Beijing, the case study provides a clear opportunity to explore the extent to which a state is vulnerable to cosmopolitan impulses.

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[1] The challenge to traditional models of representative democracy brought about by demands from the hitherto excluded is a central theme in contemporary democratic theory. See Mendus, Susan, 1992. "Losing the Faith: Feminism and Democracy" in Dunn, John, (Ed.). *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey*, OUP, Oxford: 207-220 and Parry, Geraint, and Moyser, George, 1994. "More Participation, More Democracy?" in Beetham, David (Ed.). *Defining and Measuring Democracy*, Sage, London: 44-62.

[2] Morgan, Robin, 1985. *Sisterhood is Global: The International Women's Movements Anthology*, Penguin, London.

[3] It is understood here that while the women's movement is based on feminist principles and is made up of, *inter alia*, women's groups, not all women's groups are feminist.

[4] Galligan, Yvonne, 1997, "Implementing the Beijing Commitments in Ireland" paper presented at the World Congress of IPSA, Seoul, Korea, 17-21 August, 1997.

[5] See O'Donovan, Orla and Ward, Eilís, 1999. "Women's Networks and Politics in Ireland" in Galligan, Yvonne, Ward, Eilís and Wilford, Rick, (Eds.). *Contesting Politics: Women in Ireland North and South*, Westview/PSAI Press, Boulder and Dublin: 92.

[6] New Opportunities for Women is a training and employment initiative for women.

A factor distinguishing this case study from the others is that the NGOs concerned were formally incorporated into the preparatory and policy development process concerned. NGOs nation-wide were invited to make submissions to the National Committee preparing Ireland's national report; NGOs sat on that Committee and were part of the national delegation that attended Beijing and, finally, NGOs were free to attend the NGO Forum that ran alongside the multilateral conference. There are other factors that render this case study distinct from those of the previous two chapters. They are;

1. The level of activity: the arena wherein policy was played out was exclusively that of the UN although Ireland's EU membership was a factor in Ireland's approach to the Beijing Conference.

2 The number of actors: in contrast to the case of the ETISC (a small, single issue group) which campaigned on East Timor and the DDC (a coalition of groups) that campaigned on ESAF, the number of groups and individuals represented indirectly through the delegation to Beijing and participating in the process before hand runs to hundreds.

3. The range of issues involved: a wide array of issues were treated ranging from women in development to violence against women.

This chapter is organised into four sections. Section one will look at the relationship between the global women's movement and international politics as reflected in the UN. Attention will be paid here to feminism's input into the conduct of UN multilateral negotiations. The section will conclude with an overview of the Beijing process. Section two will focus on Ireland and its involvement with the UN women's agenda concluding with Ireland's preparation for the Beijing conference itself. Section three will examine Ireland's participation in Beijing: the actors, the issues, the process and the outcome of the process. The fourth and final section will draw conclusions.

Some terminology need to be clarified here. To distinguish between two different but related conferences, both known as 'world conferences', this chapter will refer to the NGO event as the 'Forum' and the multilateral event as the 'Conference'.[7] Both terms are used in reference to Beijing and

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[7] The inter-related nature of the two events has been noted not just in terms of their organisation and timing, but in terms of the influence of the women's movement globally on UN women's and other conferences such as Conference on the Environment in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and the Vienna Conference on Human Rights (1993). See Alter Chen, Martha, 1996. "Engendering World Conferences: the International Women's Movement and the UN", in

the many other world conferences that have become standard events in UN politics. The term 'Beijing process' will be used to refer to the preparations for Beijing by the state and NGOs. It is based on, furthermore, a recognition that attendance at Beijing was the outcome of a long and complex process that began, globally in 1975 and, in Ireland, predominantly, in 1985.

The Global Women's Movement and International Politics: Towards the UN Decade and Beyond.

Although global feminist politics long preceded the establishment of the UN,[8] the development of an organised international feminist movement grew up along side the UN's development and, in particular, the UN's 'women's agenda'. Considerable scholarship is available that both recovers the role of women in international politics, including in the evolution of the UN, and uncovers the gender blindness of international relations theory and international politics.[9]

The effect of feminist activism on the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and on the foundation of the UN has been traced and is seen in the context of a close relationship between the development of feminist thought and women's participation in international organisation.[10] The first stage runs concurrently with the first wave of the women's movement and feminist activities focused on political rights and peace.[11] The second stage

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Weiss, Thomas G and Gordenker, Leon, (Eds.). *NGO's the UN and Global Governance*, Rienner, Boulder: 139-158.

[8] See, for instance, Kamester, Margaret and Vellacott, Jo, (Eds.), 1987. *Militarism Versus Feminism: Writings on Women and War*, Virago Press London which traces the relationship between early C20^{the} feminism and pacifism. For a sustained evaluation of women of women and international politics see Stienstra, Deborah, 1994. *Women's Movements and International Organizations*, St. Martin's Press, New York: 43-90.

[9] For feminist contributions to the discipline of international relations see Whitworth, Sandra, 1997. *Feminism and International Relations*, Macmillan, Basingstoke. See also Stienstra, Deborah, 1994, *op cit*. Both Stienstra and Whitworth argue that theory and perspective are constitutive of the practice of international politics and that gendered values and norms can change over time. The challenge of feminism is to expose the manner in which meaning is constructed and to propose alternative norms. For a good example of such theorising see Tickner, J Ann, 1992. *Gender in International Relations: Achieving Global Security*, Columbia University Press, New York.

[10] As conventionally understood feminism developed in two significant waves. The first was organised around issues of civil and political rights and ran from the late 19th century until World War Two. Second wave feminism began in the 1970s and has given way to a more fragmented social movement struggling with differences between women.

[11] For an evaluation of the radical feminist perspective on women and peace see Burguieres, Mary, 1990. "Feminist Approaches to Peace: Another Step for Peace Studies", *Millennium*, vol. 19, no. 1: 1-18.

coincides with the period from the collapse of the League of Nations to the UN's first decades when international feminist organisations sought policy changes based on equality with men. This activism coincided with the setting of human rights on the United Nations agenda. The third stage brought together the development of second wave feminism and the UN's awakening interest in the role of women in development.[12]

Women in Canada, the United States and Mexico formed a across-border alliance to campaign on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)[13] Issues of sexual orientation have also galvanised women's groups in recent years to campaign at an international level.[14] Within a regional context, the relationship between the second wave of the women's movement in Europe and EU initiated policies on a series of issues has been documented.[15] In east and central Europe the collapse of the former Soviet Union has led to the rise of autonomous women's groups that are forming links across national boundaries. [16]

A very recent development within international feminism is the rise of the 'women's rights are human rights campaign'. Based on women's rights under international law to be free from all form of discrimination due to their status as women this campaign evokes UN law as its *raison d'être* . In this case the instrument is The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, (CEDAW), adopted by the General Assembly in 1979.[17] The campaign is representative of the international women's movement that emerged subsequent to

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[12] Stienstra, *op cit.*: 118-144.

[13] See Gabriel Christina and Macdonald, Laura, 1994. "NAFTA Women and Organising in Canada and Mexico: Forging a 'Feminist Internationality'" in *Millennium,* vol. 23, no. 3: 535-562.

[14] See LaViolette, Nicole and Whitworth, Sandra, 1994. "No Safe Haven: Sexuality as a Universal Human Right and Gay and Lesbian Activism in International Politics" in *Millennium*, vol. 23, no. 3: 563-588.

[15] Lovenduski, Joni, 1986. *Women and European Politics: Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy,* Wheatsheaf, Brighton.

[16] See for instance, Matynia, Elzbieta, 1995. "Finding a Voice: Women in Postcommunist Central Europe" in Basu, Amrita, (Ed.). *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective,* Westview: Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford.

[17] For the text of CEDAW see Annex I in Pietila, Hillka and Vickers, Jeanne, 1994. Making Women Matter: The Role of the United Nations, Zed Books, London: 173-180. Groups such as Amnesty International had begun to pay attention to women's rights in the late 1980s. For the women's rights are human rights campaign see Friedman, Elisabeth, 1995. "Women's Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement" in Peters, Julie and Wolper, Andrea, (Eds.). *Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives,* Routledge, New York and London. The campaign at the UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna was led by the Centre For Global Leadership in Rutgers University, New Jersey.

feminism's second wave in the 1970s. Strategic in its thinking, highly organised and linked to local and national campaigns, the campaign draws on the work that had been done in previously years by other global networks such as Development Alternatives for Women for a New Era (DAWN).[18]

It should not be assumed, however, that feminism has been a united church in relation to international politics and international organisations. Two tendencies have emerged. First, are liberal feminist organisations that have a historical relationship with organisations such as the UN and its agencies and posit strategies based on equity for women. Second, are women's organisations espousing a more radical agenda that seek a restructuring, not just of organisations, but of gender relations within them. The second tendency is more likely to be linked to grass roots women's organisations and to prioritise women's mobilisation. However, a significant level of co-operation occurred between the two tendencies during the UN Decade for Women (1976 - 1985).[19]

Neither should it be assumed that the global women's movement has been fully satisfied with progress at the UN's. The hosting of international conferences by women's groups, while they may have fed into UN proceedings, derive from a frustration with multilateral UN.[20] Furthermore, many of the gains made by the women's movement in Copenhagen and Nairobi and in other UN Conferences such as in Cairo and Rio de Janeiro were challenged by a 'well organised and well financed backlash' in the lead up to Beijing.[21]

The point to draw out here is that linkages between grass roots and international women's organisations have existed for considerable time. Both have had an impact on the UN's gender policies and the UN's commitment to fostering a world of greater equality between men and women in which sex does not necessarily become a determinant of life

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[18] See Chen, *op cit.*: 139-153. Other examples are the International Women's Tribune Centre (Mexico) and the Women's Environment and Development Organisation (US).

[19] Stienstra, *op cit.* : 118-144 and see also Chen, *op cit.: passim.*

[20] See Ashworth, Georgina, 1982. "The United Nations 'Women's Conference' and International Linkages in the Women's Movement" in Willetts, Peter, (Ed.). *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, Pinter, London: 125-147.

[21] Chen, *op cit.*: 152. The author does not spell out the source of the challenge. However, the Beijing conference was marked by a coalition of Catholic and Muslim fundamentalist politics against issues of women's fertility control and sexuality.

chances. The linkages are best exemplified in the development of the UN's women's policies leading up to the Decade for Women and beyond.

The UN Decade For Women

While the principle of equality between men and women was included in the original UN Charter, adopted in 1945, it was not until the 1970's that issues relating to women were given dedicated attention within the UN and its agencies.[22] The UN declared 1975 as International Women's Year[23] and hosted the first world conferences on women in Mexico city that year. The conference published a report, later endorsed by the General Assembly, that provided the baseline for the activities earmarked by the UN for the Decade for Women.

The adoption of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 symbolised, in turn, the UN's adoption of women's rights and gender equality. Carrying the status of international law, the convention provides the UN with an instrument of enforcement. However as is the case in all international law, implementation is ultimately dependent on voluntary compliance.[24] The UN subsequently embarked on a series of multilateral conferences to reach agreement on strategies for achieving equality for women, in Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995).

The Copenhagen conference marked the mid-point in the decade and sought consensus on priorities for member governments over the subsequent five years. It was, however, marred by divisions and disagreements.[25] The Nairobi Conference broke new ground both in terms of its size and its gender politics. Delegates concurred on an analysis of women based, neither on their assumed role as instrumental 'vehicles' of development, nor in terms of achieving 'equity' with men, but on women as subjects of their own requiring particular attention.[26] The conference appraised the achievements and failures of the decade and resulted in the launch of the Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women

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[22] Pietila and Vickers, *op cit.*: i. However the Commission on the Status of Women had been established by the UN in 1946 to process issues relating to human rights and women.

[23] The initiative was itself prompted by an international women's organisation that had consultative status at the UN and was taken on by two members of the CSW.

[24] Sotelo, Sonia Picado, 1994. "Foreword" in Cook, Rebecca, (Ed.). *Human Rights of Women and International Perspectives*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: xi.

[25] Sharp divisions were also found in the parallel NGO conference where the concept of feminism was hotly debated. See Stienstra, *op cit.*: 128.

[26] Stienstra, *op cit.*: 132.

Towards the Year 2,000 (hereafter FLS). In contrast to the experience of the previous conferences, the FLS was adopted by consensus at Nairobi thus facilitating smoother progress towards the Beijing Conference.[27] Beijing served to provide a mid-term assessment of the FLS and to agree a platform for action, and a declaration, to be known as the Beijing Declaration.

Precipitated by the activities and lobbying of the women's organisations that had been involved at UN level for a considerable number of years[28] and, in keeping with the norm established with the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment,[29] parallel NGO fora were held at each of the multi-lateral conferences. These were organised via the offices of the NGOs with consultative status at the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC, the UN body that organises and co-ordinates work in the economic and social field. At Mexico, for instance, 145 government delegations were in attendance and 135 NGOs – all with consultancy status – sent observers.

Outside the UN NGO fora, other events facilitated networking and collaborative work. In response to perceived shortcomings in the Mexico plan of action a group of women's NGOs came together in Brussels in 1976.[30] Conferences held in Bangkok and New York early in 1980 produced documents which were 'manifestos' for the mid-decade UN conference in Copenhagen.[31] These events featured newly emerging women's organisations that were, generally, committed to feminist principles and the analysis provided by these groups during this decade went on to remain at the foundation of much international feminist politics.[32]

The international women's movement did not confine it sights exclusively however to the Fora. Building on pre-existing global networks with expertise and knowledge in given areas, the tradition was established of organising women's Caucuses at each Conference customarily focused on specific conference themes. The Caucuses functioned to organise meetings, debriefings and lobbying activities for all NGOs and to generate alternative proposals, documents and resolutions for official delegates.

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27 Pietila and Vickers, *op cit.*: 48-49.

28 Stienstra, *op cit.*: 101-102.

29 See Ashworth, *op cit.*: 136-138.

30 Stienstra, *op cit.*: 126.

31 Charlotte Bunch (US) quoted in Stienstra, *op cit.*: 109.

32 Stienstra, *op cit.*: 106-109.

That this strategy worked well is not in question and was evident in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, in Vienna in 1993 and in Cairo, in 1995. In Cairo, for instance, the Caucus organised daily reviews of the previous days negotiations and identified advocacy priorities for the following day that were, then, taken up by the 1,000 women NGO members with their national delegations. The evening meeting, held each day by the Caucuses was attended by both official delegations and the international press.[33]

In confronting UN multilateral diplomacy however, women's organisations and the women's movement came face to face with an arena of decision making that is, at once, complex and complicated.[34] Chapter three detailed the decision-making structure of UN multilateral conferences. As we saw agreement on policy is hammered out at a series of preparatory conferences (PrepComs) prior to the major event. From an NGO perspective, the Rio Conference on the Environment in 1992 was something of a watershed. From that point on, it became a practice, variable in application and in scope, that governments would consult with NGO leading up to conferences and incorporate them, to some degree, on the national delegation at conferences. The inclusion of NGOs is, it must be pointed out, not by any means a norm and must be negotiated as part of the resolution agreed to enable a preparatory process begin.

That said, the experience of feminist activism at the UN points to four entry points into a multilateral policy process. Each contains its own possibilities and potential requiring different strategies and is accessible to actors operating at different levels. The entry points are:

1. The multilateral preparatory process for each UN conference. Governments may include NGOs in the preparatory process. The extent to which they do will depend on the government's orientation and the domestic relationship between it and the NGO community. The greater part of the negotiations between members states is completed in the preparatory consultations and is conducted by diplomats. Influencing the multilateral preparatory process (including the PrepComs), therefore requires co-operation and co-ordination

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[33] For a detailed analysis of the caucus and their influence at UN conferences see Chen, *op cit.: passim.*

[34] An experienced Irish diplomat commented that such is the complexity of the decision-making environment that there is probably no single diplomat involved with a complete grasp of the picture. Author's interview; DFA4, July 21, 1998.

between different national organisations[35] and/or a high level of organisation from international women's organisations.[36]

2. The national preparatory process for each UN conference including participation in the national committee and in the delegation that each state sent to each conference. The best way to influence a national government's position within the UN is 'at home'.[37] In the case of EU members, the 'at home' is hugely determined by the CFSP process adding an additional EU dimension to any lobbying agenda. As in point one above, this decision making environment demands co-ordination by women's groups across national boundaries.

3. The activities of the Caucus during Conference proceedings. The Caucus is organised, as we have seen, by existing international organisation[38] in advance of the Conference. The caucus and its daily activities have been described as providing a 'bridge'[39] between the Forum and the Conference. Is not conventionally accessible to national and sub-national women's organisations unless they have a prior involvement with the international organisation.

4. The NGO Fora. While any group with the resources to do so can attend UN Fora, a Forum's potential to influence their national governments or the UN Conference is limited.[40] However, the Fora are an important part of the wider policy process. They are crucial for networking, information sharing, skills learning, generating co-operative actions and so on, effects that should not be underestimated.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that the women's movement, through a combination of all the routes described above has, over long time, influenced the language, conceptual thinking and policy outcomes of the UN multilateral conferences on women. It has brought about norm

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35 Pietila and Vickers, *op cit.*: 83.

36 Chen, *op cit.: 151.*

37 Pietila and Vickers, *op cit.*: 83.

38 The Caucus on women's human rights at the Vienna Conference was organised by the Centre For Global Women's Leadership.

39 See Chen, *op cit.*: 144.

40 According to one commentary this was a bitter lesson for women's NGOs. See Pietila and Vickers, *op cit.*: 83.

changes.[41] The Caucus, in particular, has proved influential at PrepComs and Conferences. Given the complexity of the decision making structures - rendered more complex in the EU case because of CSFP requirements - feminist activism at the UN needs a sophisticated understanding of international diplomacy and a high level of skills.[42]

The Beijing Conference

The goals of the Beijing Conference were to review the FLS; to 'mobilise men and women at policy making and grass roots levels' to help achieve the objectives of FLS; to adopt a series of agreed strategies in relation to gender-related policies and to prioritise issues for the period leading up to the year 2,000.[43] The two most significant UN institutions structuring the Conference, were CEDAW, which provided the basic framework for issues under consideration and the Commission on the Status of Women that produced the draft platform for Action (in February 1995) and organised the PrepComs. The Commission's annual conference in March 1995 served as a PrepCom and, in anticipation of the long negotiation process, the Commission held a PrepCom in New York in January 1995.

Under UN procedures, should a single government find part of a text, or terminology, unacceptable, it will be square bracketed and thus re-opened for consideration. The final PrepCom in New York in March 1995 produced, after four weeks of negotiations, an agreed document which, as stated above, was heavily square bracketed. The conference itself was divisive and a small number of member states (fewer than a dozen out of 184) objected to sections of the text leading to the bracketing. The conference was also marred by restricted NGO access and by a cumbersome drafting process.[44] Thus, when the Conference opened in September 1995, very significant sections of the platform were yet were square bracketed.

This posed a challenge for EU members in particular. Required to be internally co-ordinated, they found themselves, hence, confronting an

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[41] *Ibid.*: 161. For an Irish context for this discussion on influence see Reilly, Niamh, 1997. *State Accountability for Women's Human Rights in Ireland,* WERRC, Dublin: 8.

[42] Pietila and Vickers, *op cit.*: 83.

[43] Government of Ireland, 1996(b), *First Report on Implementation of the Platform for Action,* The Stationary Office, Dublin :1

[44] Chen, *op cit.*: 153.

external negotiating environment in which the agenda was still significantly open. The PrepComs had facilitated agreed positions but the totality of positions could not be agreed until the wider UN dialogue was, in turn, agreed. EU-level preparatory meetings held in advance of Beijing were important but could not complete the process. these meetings will be returned to later in the text and are listed in appendix N.

Two other factors must have increased the burden of officials facing into the Beijing negotiations. First, there was the fact that given the size of the UN, progress is slow, complicated by the negotiation tactic whereby actors often hold their concessions in reserve until the last possible moment.[45] Second there was the fact that apart from highly charged debate on issues of abortion, sexual orientation and birth control - all yet to be concluded – there was profound disagreement over the use of the term 'gender'.[46]

When the conference opened in Beijing on September 4 the 184 states, represented by 40,000 individuals, sat down to un-bracket the draft document in these circumstances. Their arrival was preceded by the 36,000 NGO delegates at the NGO Forum already under way in Huairou, 30 miles from the Conference site from August 30 - September 8.[47] The exceptional circumstances, of a significantly square-bracketed document, may, in contrast, have rendered Beijing more attractive to NGO activists. There was, to use a sporting metaphor, much to play for.

Ireland and the UN: Towards Beijing.

Ireland participated in the activities leading up to and following on from the UN Decade for Women, although its denominated state machinery on women's issues developed after the decade had begun. Below, I will briefly trace the main themes of Ireland's participation and focus on the actors in the process. The shift in lead responsibility for Ireland's participation in

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[45] Bailey, Sydney and Daws, Sam. 1995. *The United Nations: A Precise Political Guide*, Macmillan and Barnes and Noble: Basingstoke and Boston: 111.

[46] *Irish Times*, 17 August 1995. As it assumes a socialisation process in the formation of sex roles and attributes, the term 'gender' is problematic for those who wish to argue that these are 'natural' or 'biological'.

[47] Allegedly the decision to house the NGOs far from the official site was made by the Chinese Premier, Li Ping after a confrontation with protesters at the UN summit in Copenhagen. See Siggins, Lorna, 1996. "The Fourth World Conference on Women: Beyond the Headlines" in Van Lieshout, Mary, (Ed.), *A Woman' World: Beyond the Headlines*, Attic Press, Dublin: 19.

UN decade activities, from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of the Taoiseach, and finally to the Department of Equality and Law Reform, will be traced.

The most significant date in Ireland's involvement in the UN Decade, in terms of institutions, policy and practice is 1985. Prior to 1985, competence for all reporting and negotiating in relation to UN obligations on Irish gender issues rested with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Specifically, the permanent UN mission in New York maintained the brief. Ireland viewed the UN's women's agenda predominantly through the rubric of obligations under international human rights law.

Ireland's accession to and providing its first national report under CEDAW in 1985 was the source of the change. In turn, the accession must be viewed in the context of inter-related pressure from both the Irish women's movement and from UN membership generally. Due to campaigning by the women's movement the office of a Minister of State for Women's Affairs was established in 1982 within the Department of the Taoiseach.[48] Following further pressure[49] the government acceded to CEDAW and filed its first national report in time to mark the end of the UN Decade for Women in 1985.[50] The report was the first comprehensive account of the status of Irish women that was formulated in accordance with international standards and had been nudged along by domestic demands.[51] (The combined second and third reports were not provided until 1997.[52]) The report was submitted to the Nairobi Conference in 1985 where Ireland committed itself to the Forward looking Strategies (FLS) for the Advancement of Women towards the year 2,000.

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[48] The office was held by Nuala Fennell (Fine Gael).

[49] Reilly, *op cit.*: 19.

[50] Minister of State for Women's Affairs, undated. National *Report of Ireland: United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (1976-1985),* Minister of State for Women's Affairs, Dublin.

[51] The consideration by Irish feminists of UN norms and expectations in relation to women's equality had already led to the setting up of the first Commission on the Status of Women in 1969. See Mahon, Evelyn, 1987. "Women's Rights and Catholicism in Ireland" in *New Left Review*, no. 166, Nov./Dec.: 27.

[52] Government of Ireland, 1997. *Ireland's Combined Second and Third Reports Under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,* The Stationary Office, Dublin.

The changes of 1985, importantly, signalled that the UN agenda was being incorporated into the domestic realm and was no longer a 'foreign' policy concern. This, clearly had institutional implications and from this point onwards, the Department of Foreign Affairs acted as advisor and co-negotiator, but not of lead agency, in UN-related gender issues.

Of equal importance for this thesis was the extension of the policy-making community that occurred as a result of the 1985 decision. A National Committee was appointed to oversee the report and it comprised of representatives of government departments and of civil society: the then Council for the Status of Women (CSW – the organisation, established in 1972, changed its name in 1995 to the National Women's Council of Ireland, NWCI) and the Irish Countrywomen's Association (ICA).[53] The Nairobi delegation comprised of officials and NGO representatives.

That the UN required a civil society input into CEDAW reporting is not a sufficient explanation for the incorporation of the women's movement into the Irish UN-gender agenda from this point on. By the 1980s, the more visible parts of the Irish women's movement had been institutionalised into the state structure to a significant degree and was a powerful factor in shaping domestic policy and politics. Much of the movement's success resulted from a decision to pursue conventional interest-group type activities.[54] The 'insider' status in its relations with the

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[53] The NWCI is, more correctly, a Quasi Autonomous Non Governmental Organisation (QUANGO) in that while it retains its autonomy from the state the bulk of its funding has comes from the state since 1979. The ICA is a private, voluntary organisation whose activities are distinct from those of government. Government departments represented were: the Department of the Taoiseach (2) in addition to the Junior Minister; the Department of Health (1); the Department of Education (1); the Department of Labour (1); the Department of Foreign Affairs (1); the Department of the Taoiseach (1); the office of the Minister of State for Women's Affairs (1) and the Employment Equality Agency.

[54] See Galligan, Yvonne, 1998. *Women and Politics in Contemporary Ireland*, Pinter, London. Other factors were significant; the type of decision making environment: the receptivity of the governing élite, the number of other actors aligned with the women's movement and their status in the decision-making environment and the lobbying skills of the movement. For an analysis of the relationship between the Irish women's movement and the state, see Connolly, Linda 1996. "The Women's Movement in Ireland: 1970-1995" in *Irish Journal of Feminist Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1: 43-77. For an analysis of state feminism in Ireland see Mahon, Evelyn and Morgan Valerie, 1999. "State Feminism in Ireland" in Galligan, Ward and Wilford, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 55.

state was, perhaps, epitomised by the continued state funding of the NWCI and its status as 'official' representative of women's interest.[55]

The women's movement in Ireland did not flourish in a vacuum. Extra-national actors effected both how the movement articulated its objectives and how they were, in turn, incorporated by the state and translated into policy. These actors included the EU,[56] UN organisations such as the Commission on the Status of Women and the International Labour Organisation[57] and, not least of all, women's groups and activists in other parts of the world.[58] That the patterns of the Irish feminist activism conform generally to the evolution of the feminist movements in other parts of the world attests to the global linkage. The nature of the relationship between Irish women's groups, individual feminists and movements in other parts of the world underlines the essentially cosmopolitan nature of feminism itself.

Electoral politics facilitated one other institutional change that altered the policy-making structure. In 1993 the new Fianna Fáil/Labour Government established the Department of Equality and Law Reform.[59] Primary responsibility for equality issues, including those derived from the UN, now rested here. The department took charge of the Beijing process. The next section will examine those preparations.

Policy development towards Beijing: the state.

In preparation for Beijing the new department immediately set about compiling the national report. Work began in 1993 and the report was understood by, the department, as a governmental report and one that would be written by government.[60] While the UN instructed that NGOs

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[55] The level of expertise and applied experience in some policy areas has rendered many NGOs national experts and imbues them with the status of formal consultants. See Galligan, *op cit.*: 137.

[56] Gardiner, Frances, 1999. "The Impact of EU Equality Legislation on Irish Women" in Galligan, Ward and Wilford, (Eds.), *op cit.*: 38-54.

[57] Galligan, *op cit.*: 49 (CSW) and 68 (ILO).

[58] Levine, June, 1982. *Sisters*. Ward River Press, Dublin.

[59] The new Department, brought together the Equality Unit from the Department of the Taoiseach, a section from the Department of Labour, civil law reform elements from the Department of Justice and the Employment Equality Agency.

[60] Author's interview; DELR1, February 20 1998.

participate in the report process those instructions were 'vague'.[61] In the event, the DELR took NGOs on board as 'advisers' although the National Co-ordinating Committee for Beijing (hereafter the National Committee) was, in fact, not formed until the following year.[62] It met four times between 1994 and September 1995.[63] At each meeting, drafts of the report were circulated and discussed.

How did the DELR select NGO representatives? On the basis of prior relations with particular organisations and their greater numerical representation,[64] the Department requested the NWCI and the ICA to each nominate one delegate. Both organisations had participated in the National Committee for Nairobi in 1985. Prompted by the NWCI a former President of the World Federation of Methodist Women, was also invited onto the committee in a personal capacity. At the behest of the Department of Foreign Affairs a representative of Dóchas/Banúlacht was sought.[65] The remainder of the National Committee was made up by representatives of six government departments;[66] three of the social partners representing the employers, farmers and the trade unions[67] and the Employment Equality Agency.

During its deliberations, the National Committee received submissions from eight women's organisations including the NWCI the ICA and Banúlacht.[68] All submissions were read by committee members and were included in an appendix to the final report which was published in

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61 *Ibid.*

62 See appendix O for the list of Committee members.

63 Those meetings were held in August and September 1994, March and June 1995.

64 The ICA has a fairly constant affiliation of 1,000 branches amounting to approximately 20,000 members. The NWCI had 135 affiliated groups in 1997/8.

65 See chapter four for details of Dóchas and Banúlacht.

66 These were: Equality and Law Reform, Education, Health, Foreign Affairs, Enterprise and Employment and Social Welfare.

67 The organisations were, the Irish Farmers Association (IFA), the Irish Business and Employers Federation (IBEC) and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU).

68 The remaining submissions came from the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network; The Irishwomen's Environmental Network and Earthwatch (joint submission); the National Rehabilitation Board; the National Traveller Women's Forum and Women's Aid.

October 1994.[69] Due to the large number of late submissions, the committee published these in a separate supplement in August 1995.[70]

Both the DELR and DFA worked separately within their own policy constituency to foment discussion and debate about Beijing. The DELR allocated small grants totalling £24,000 to women's groups to hold their own seminars and to travel to Beijing itself.[71] The full list of groups and the funding received is given in appendix P. As we will see later, the DELR funded the NWCI to organise regional and a national seminar and to compile an alternative report for Beijing.

The DFA played its role in the preparatory process outside the National Committee work. In May 1995, the Department organised an open day in Dublin, addressed by its Minister for State Joan Burton and a senior official from the Department amongst others. The purpose of the day was to 'reach out to groups of women who might not have been involved in the issues'.[72] Furthermore, the department held regular consultations with Dóchas and Banúlacht, and other NGOs in the months prior to the New York PrepCom and in the compilation of the national report. Following a request the DFA also (partially) funded three delegates from Dóchas/Banúlacht to attend the 1995 New York PrepCom.

Ireland's participation in the Beijing process, of course, extended beyond activities at the national level. As we saw in chapter three and above, multilateral conferences involve states in a detailed round of meetings. In 1994 the round of global meetings towards the Platform for Action began and Ireland participated in each relevant level: the UN PrepComs, the EU level co-ordination, ECE level and a meeting organised by the Council of Europe. Appendix N details the meetings and those who attended as

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[69] Government of Ireland, 1994. *United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: National Report of Ireland, 1994,* The Stationary Office, Dublin.

[70] Submissions from 17 organisations were included in the Supplementary Report: Amnesty International (Irish section); the Association for the Protection of the Rights of Separated Spouses; Baby Milk Action (Ireland); Dóchas; Fine Gael; Fianna Fáil Women's Group; the Forum of People with Disabilities; Inishowen Women's Network; the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed; the IFA; KLEAR; Labour Women's National Council; the National Youth Council of Ireland; Sinn Féin Women's Department; UNIFEM; Women in the Home and Women in Solidarity.

[71] Author's interview; DELR1, February 20 1998.

[72] Author's interview; DFA2, September 14 1998. According to the official, over 1,000 people attended.

national delegates. When the meetings was structured at Ministerial level (such as the ECE Vienna conference in October 1994), the Minister for Equality and Law Reform led the delegation. For all other meetings, the lead agency was the DELR.

Policy development towards Beijing: civil society.

While the state machinery was preparing for Beijing, the Irish women's movement, too, was engaging with the conference and its implications for women in Ireland and elsewhere. Two types of activities predominated; lobbying and fostering internal debate. At a national level, the lead was taken, to various degrees, by three groups: the NWCI, Banúlacht (referred to in chapter four) and a coalition known as the Irish Women's NGO Forum for Beijing (hereafter known as the Irish forum). What makes these three groupings stand out is that all went beyond their membership to target debate nationally about Beijing and to lobby the government. I will briefly sketch relevant details about each group and then go on to examine the scope, and nature of the national debate that occurred. As we will see, tensions emerged between the national groupings prompting a suggestion that in as much as Irish women had an impact on the Beijing process, that process also had a significant impact on the women's movement.

The NWCI, as we have seen, had been on the National Committee since 1994, and formed a sub-group to deal specifically with Beijing related matters. The then chair of the NWCI, Anne Taylor, was involved in the Beijing preparatory activities of the European Women's Lobby.[73] The NWCI also participated in the Irish forum as we will see below. Banúlacht, the organisation concerned with women in development, was also on the National Committee, as we have seen, on a seat shared with Dóchas the national organisation for development NGOs. Banúlacht began preparing for Beijing in the spring of 1994 and used its membership of Women In Development Europe (WIDE) to provide basic analysis, briefing documents and other materials.[74] Finally, the Irish forum was launched in

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[73] The European Women's Lobby (EWL) has consultative status at ECOSOC and is a European-wide lobbying organisation on a range of women's issues.

[74] WIDE was involved in a preparation process for Beijing which included networking with other European or EU-based development networks and, as the European-based lobby organisation on issues of gender and development, had attended all the PrepComs and EU-

January 1995 and was spearheaded by two national women's groups, Women's Aid (concerned with women and violence), Banúlacht, and a third organisation, Aontas, the national association for adult education, which had a strong interest in women's issues. Each of these three organisation had begun internal preparations for Beijing and viewed the process as providing opportunities for lobbying government and mobilising their constituencies.

While debate about Beijing was ongoing in discreet spheres of the women's movement (predominantly, but not exclusively, those groups with international connections such as the ICA,[75] Banúlacht, NWCI and Women's Aid[76]) and while the state had included some of these groups in its formal preparatory structure, it largely took an external event to prompt a co-ordinated national campaign. That event was the ECE Vienna preparatory conference in October 1994. NGO delegates on the national committee, and other NGOs, attended this conference.[77]

The Irish NGO delegates at Vienna agreed to organise their own feedback session on their return and at that session a decision was taken to set up a national NGO forum to prepare for Beijing. Amongst the reasons cited for organising were an apparent lack of government preparedness for Beijing evidenced by non-possession of ECE working documents in advance of the conference; a 'climate of secrecy' that covered the process itself and the need for government to gain a 'full understanding' of the issues involved through better organisation of relations with NGOs.[78]

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based preparatory meetings. WIDE lobbied at Commission and Council level and also co-ordinated the lobbying activities of each of national platforms which make up its membership. Personal interview with Helen O'Connell, then chair of WIDE, March 5 1999.

[75] The then President of the ICA, Bridín Twist, was also involved in the Associated Countrywomen of the World, a global women's NGO that has consultancy status at ECOSOC and had been involved in its own preparations for Beijing.

[76] Women's Aid's prior links into the Beijing process came through its connection with the Centre for Women's Global Leadership in Rutgers University, New Jersey one of the main protagonists in the "women's rights are human rights " campaign. The range of groups listed in footnote 70 above, those who made submissions to the National Committee, illustrates the extent of debate.

[77] NGOs that attended were: the NWCI, Aontas, Women's Aid, the ICA, the ICJP, The National Travellers Women's Forum, the Women's Education, Research and Resource Centre. (Dublin), the Northern Ireland Women's European Programme and the West Belfast Economic Forum. All groups participated in the official intergovernmental Conference as well as in the parallel forum.

[78] See document: Briefing document of CSW and Other NGO Delegates Who Attended the Vienna NGO/Governmental Conference, October 25 1994.

The Irish Women's NGO Forum for Beijing was launched at a public meeting in Dublin on January 12 1995[79] and it immediately undertook a comprehensive national effort to promote Beijing.[80] Its working group, a self selected group made up largely of the NGO representatives who had attended Vienna, met approximately every fortnight over the following seven months. Its activities included: meeting with the Minister for Equality and Law Reform (February 14 1995); making a submission to the National Committee in advance of the New York Prep Com; co-organising an Open Day in Dublin on April 1; providing information to women's groups throughout the country and encouraging debate in the media and in the wider women's movement. The scope of the debate was framed by the thematic organisation of the Beijing conference, on the themes of equality, peace and development, and the sub themes that set the agenda for the Beijing working groups.[81] Women's groups were encouraged to consider how each of these issues effected them and their work particularly but the forum encouraged groups to explore all Beijing themes.[82] Linking local/particular difficulties with the global position of women was, thus, a common feature in the debates.[83] When it came to lobbying, hence, the broad sweep of the Beijing Platform was included in the NGO agenda and, furthermore, NGO's petitioned the Irish government on general conference issues such as accreditation and the siting of the NGO Forum.[84]

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79 The meeting took place in Buswells Hotel, Dublin when the ad hoc group presented a mission statement and called on women's groups to organise for Beijing. See appendix Q for a copy of the mission statement.

80 By the end of January 24 different women's organisations had affiliated to the forum.

81 These groups addressed the following themes: women and poverty; education and training; health; violence against women; women and armed conflict; women and the economy; decision-making; institutional mechanisms; human rights of women; the media; the environment and the girl-child. See UN, 1996. *Platform for Action and Beijing Declaration*, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York.

82 Minutes of Irish forum working group, January 25 1995.

83 An interesting example of this linkage was to be seen at a conference in July when the National Traveller Women's Forum opened its presentation on Beijing with an expression of solidarity with 'gypsies: our international sisters". See National Traveller Women's Forum, "What do Traveller Women Want from Beijing?" presentation to National Conference, Dublin Castle, July 19 1995.

84 Two issues were the subject of international lobbying: the refusal of the Chinese government to accredit certain women's NGOs and the siting, felt to deliberately remove the NGOs far from the Conference. See, for instance, reply to forum letter on these issues by Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Joan Burton, July 30 1995.

At an early stage in its campaign the Irish forum identified the compiling of an independent national report on CEDAW as an important strategy. Not only was the government report felt to be inadequate but there was a desire to use Beijing to generate a politicisation process among Irish women's groups. It was envisaged that the report, thus, would be compiled following a nation-wide consultation.

In the event, and largely through 'force of circumstances'[85] Banúlacht took on the role of national co-ordinator for NGOs travelling to Beijing. In this, it was funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs which had allocated a total budget of £100,000 for Beijing.[86] Banúlacht had a long established relationship with the Department of Foreign Affairs in relations to issues of gender and development. The (partial) funding of three of its members, to attend the New York PrepCom, by the DFA. was simply an extension of that relationship. For Banúlacht, however, attendance became a vital link between the global and the national Beijing process. Official and NGO documentation gathered there including, most importantly, the Draft Platform of Action, became key resources for the domestic preparatory process. On return from New York, copies of all documentation were distributed systematically by Banúlacht at relevant meetings. It was hoped, thus, to popularise the Draft Platform For Action amongst women's groups and to explain the organisation and structure of the Beijing Conference. During the winter and spring of 1995, Banúlacht held seminars on Beijing. It also co-organised the national Open Day with the Irish forum. In effect, Banúlacht became the national organiser for those NGOs attending Beijing. Its authority in this regard is illustrated by its hosting of the two preparatory conferences for intended travellers, on July 12 and August 2 at which it provided a 'kit bag' for all NGOs attending.[87] As national co-ordinator Banúlacht's role, hence, involved providing

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[85] Author's interview with Christine Murray, Banúlacht staff member at the time of Beijing, January 14 1999. By force of circumstances she meant that leadership was required and was not forthcoming elsewhere and that Banúlacht was well placed with information and contacts, through WIDE, to take up such a position.

[86] Author's interview with Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Joan Burton, March 19 1999. This funding covered attendance by officials at all conferences, National conferences held in Ireland, funding of NGO delegates (those on National Committee and other) to Beijing and preparatory conferences and funding of the domestic NGO preparatory process through Banúlacht. At the time of writing, the Department of Foreign Affairs was unable to provide a breakdown of the NGO funding in the process.

[87] The National Committee for Development Education (NCDE) provided £4,290 to Banúlacht towards conference/workshop, kit bag and some NGO forum costs. Included in the kit bag was a briefing document on each of the 11 themes on the Beijing agenda.

political and strategic preparation and practical assistance such as making accommodation arrangements in Beijing.

Banúlacht, it must be stressed, did not embark on a solo run on the Beijing preparatory process. Its activities are difficult to separate from those of the forum's. It worked, throughout, in co-ordination with the forum. However, the forum's plans, particularly that of compiling the alternative report through a nation-wide consultation process was to prove the source of considerable tension among the forum's key constituents. The tension was a function of NGO/state relations, particularly, access to state funds.
From February onwards, the national report was a central issue for the forum. In May, however, the NWCI announced that it had received funding from the DELR for both a preparatory national conference and the compilation of an independent report. The conference was to be held on July 19 and to be preceded by five regional conferences held in June - July.[88]

While pleased that funding was being made available, the forum, however, was not too happy with the proposals for its spending. Holding a national conference in July was considered problematic not just because most women's groups 'close shop' during the holiday months of July and August but also because the late-timing left little, if any, opportunity for a full consultation with Irish women. In addition, as registration for accreditation for the Beijing Forum closed on April 30, the conference could not serve to provide information for prospective attendees. In response, the forum first considered boycotting the July conference[89] but, in the event, tensions were attenuated and forum representatives spoke at the conference[90] and, indeed, played a significant role in organising the five regional conferences. Despite the rather late start, the NWCI published its report in August 1995 in time for Beijing.[91]

The workings of the Irish forum, the ICA, Banúlacht, and more latterly of the NWCI generated a comprehensive debate within the Irish women's movement on the Beijing process. That 27 groups attended the NGO

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88 These were held in June-July 1995 in Waterford, Drogheda, Longford, Tralee and Letterkenny.

89 Minutes of Irish forum working group, May 10 1995.

90 *Irish Times*, July 20 1995.

91 National Women's Council of Ireland, 1995. *An Independent Report to the Fourth UN World Conference on Women: Beijing and Beyond*, NWCI, Dublin.

Forum is bears testimony to the efficacy of that campaign. The tensions between the Irish forum and the NWCI underline the difficulties of representation between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'.

Much of the tension derived from access to funding and direct participation in the formal Beijing process. The NWCI sat on the National Committee, went to Beijing as an official delegate and received a total of £9,000 from the Department of ELR for the seminars, conference, independent report and all preparatory work. In contrast many of the Irish forum members came from organisations that could not afford to send delegates and had to rely on existing resources to fund their Beijing activities. For the forum members formal representation through the NWCI delegate was insufficient. They sought a preparatory process of local level organisation and mobilisation in order that Irish women would have a "sense of the relevance for them and participation in the International conference"[92] and would be "fully informed about Beijing and facilitated to make our voices heard in the discussions and policies generated before and during the Beijing gathering".[93] Setting up the forum, in the first place, met the need to create a greater participatory process outside the existing structures of the NWCI and promised alternative modes of representation other than the single (NWCI) delegate sitting in on the National Committee. It cannot be assumed that had the NWCI begun compiling its national report much earlier in the year subsequent to a wide consultation process, that the Irish forum would have disappeared.

The different perspectives on the Beijing process can also be seen in the light of the two dominant tendencies within international feminism identified earlier in this chapter. The patterns of behaviour of the NWCI and its relationship with the state (i.e. its integration into the policy machinery relating to women's issues) conform to the model of liberal feminism. The forum, in contrast, thrown up by a need within the women's movement to meet a particular demand, loosely organised, weighing the *process* of organising towards Beijing as equal to the

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92 Minutes of Irish forum working group, March 15 1995.

93 Letter from the forum to the Minister for Equality and Law Reform, Mervyn Taylor, January 14 1995.

outcome of Beijing, conforms to the pattern of more radical feminist organisations.

There is, also, a more mundane but nonetheless significant aspect to explaining the tensions that emerged. Coincidental with the months leading up to the Beijing Conference, the NCWI was, itself, undergoing a radical changes reflected in the election at the AGM of 1995 of a new Chairperson with a brief for a new direction for the organisation and the subsequent appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer. The inevitable internal tumult meant, not least of all, little continuity of personnel and context for engagement with Beijing.

Ireland Inc. at Beijing

This section is divided into two subsections which look at the actors at Beijing and the process of policy formulation. By actors we mean both state and non-state actors, those on the official delegation and those exclusively at the Forum.

The Actors

The members of the National Committee formed the core of the national delegation which finally left Ireland for Beijing in September 1995. The women's organisations, the ICA and the NWCI thus continued to participate in the state team's organisation and Dóchas/Banúlacht, the appointee of the Department of Foreign Affairs, also travelled. Two appointees of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Gretchen Fitzgerald of the Irish Aid Advisory Committee and Rose Hogan of Irish Aid Tanzania joined the team late in the day as delegates. The latter was nominated to the delegation by the Minister for State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Joan Burton, and did not participate in the preparatory process. Thus a total of five 'civilians' were part of the national delegation whose official tally ran at 35 members.[94]

Of those on the list submitted by Ireland to the Chinese authorities many were nominal 'delegates'.[95] Of the total delegation those empowered with the right to negotiate were confined to Ministers or Ministerial

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[94] In contrast, the delegation from Iraq numbered eleven.

[95] Without official delegate status attendance at Beijing was difficult to secure.

representatives and senior officials from the main Departments concerned: Foreign Affairs, Equality and Law Reform, Health. Five officials from the Irish Embassy in China, including the ambassador, provided support.[96] Although on the national delegation NGOs could not conduct negotiations.

The delegation was led by the Minister for Equality and Law Reform, Mervyn Taylor and although he left before the Conference concluded, a Ministerial presence was maintained by the Minister for Education, Niamh Breathnach and the Minister for State at the Department of the Taoiseach, Avril Doyle. The Minister for State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Joan Burton, did not attend because of unease about human rights abuses in China.[97] The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Health were represented by senior officials in both cases by individuals who had been closely involved in the preparatory process.

The 'unofficial' delegation was made up of 27 Irish women's groups or others with a particular interest in gender issues. As is evident from the groups who sent representatives to Beijing they reflected a range of policy areas being addressed at Beijing for instance disability, poverty, education and women's human rights. These groups were also a mix of national (such as Women's Aid) and local (such as the Trale Women's Forum) organisations. For the full list of the groups that travelled see appendix S.

The process

For Ireland, as for each EU member state, the starting point at Beijing was national policy positions - except where an EU position was subject to prior agreement on an issue that was not still square bracketed. Secondly Ireland then had to negotiate and agree positions among its the EU colleagues. Finally, these positions went forth into the UN – through the working groups (on each theme) and plenaries. In the UN Chambers, the EU position was presented by Spain as the holder of the EU Presidency. At

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[96] See appendix R for a list of the Irish delegation.

[97] *Irish Times*, August 28 1995. Irish President, Mary Robinson also declined to attend because it would involve a return state visit by Chinese leaders to Ireland. See Siggins, Lorna, 1996. *Op cit.*: 19.

Beijing, however, EU-level negotiations were complicated by internal difficulties over direction, resources and availability of translators.[98]

As we have seen, strict procedures apply in relation to the conduct of multilateral conferences. These, inevitably, set the rules for NGO participation - be it international NGOs involved in the Caucus or NGO delegates on national teams or national/local NGOs participating in the Forum. Negotiations are overall, as stated above, conduced by officials and/or Ministerial level representatives. In relation to EU co-ordination, it is the norm that negotiations are conducted at an exclusively intergovernmental level. This stricture is derived from the Treaty base of the CFSP. Negotiations under the CFSP are treated as strictly confidential (for instance, all EU communications under CFSP are by code) including EU negotiations towards UN multilaterals. The parameters of these negotiations has encouraged an ethos in which there is a 'huge amount of give and take and an acceptance that some things are non-negotiable for some member states'.[99]

Indeed, such is the importance of EU co-ordination at Beijing that the two issues which caused greatest difficulty for Ireland (in terms of national interests) were to arise within this level of negotiations. The issues related to allocation of resources for development aid by member governments and abortion rights. In the case of the former, Ireland was successfully proactive in pushing for greater expenditure on aid, in keeping with domestic commitments it had made and overall UN targets. In the latter case, Ireland found itself defending its constitutional prohibition on abortion following an attempt by another EU member to reopen the debate. In the end the 'give and take' of internal EU negotiating norms prevailed and Ireland did not find itself facing a constitutional crisis on abortion arising from the EU position on abortion. In terms of the greater UN debate, a successful attempt by Ireland to reopen aspects of the debate on multilateral debt - related to its gender implications- resulted from

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[98] *Irish Times*, September 11 1995.

[99] Author's interview; DFA2, September 14 1998. Sensitive and constitutional national issues such as that of abortion of Ireland do not normally, under this diplomatic norm, become the subject of inter-EU negotiation.

direct lobbying of the Irish officials by a Irish NGO delegate at the Forum.[100]

What roles were allocated to the NGO representatives on the Irish team? Each day the delegation members held their own briefing for that day's negotiations and a second briefing for the NGO Forum attendees. The NGO delegates participated in both. In both circumstances, their participation was on the basis of advisers and in some debates, they could, indeed, offer detail and analysis arising from their particular expertise. In this regard, their function filtered into the overall state's perspective on each days proceedings.

These briefing commitments were comparatively straightforward in comparison to the round of negotiations and meetings that Ireland confronted. And in this regard, the function of the NGOs became, perhaps inevitably, more diffuse. The number of meetings held each day precluded Ireland's attendance at all and choices were made depending on national relevance. It was here that NGOs found a role, however, outside their overall advisory. On several occasions, NGO representatives attended plenary sessions to 'keep tabs and gather information'.[101] According to an official from the DFA the role played by in NGO's in this regard was, in fact, critical to how Ireland could participate fully in the Conference given the restrictions on personnel that Ireland faced.[102]

If the NGO on the national delegation were circumscribed by the rules and procedures of multilateral diplomacy, the Irish NGOs at the Forum found themselves even more circumscribed. The siting of the Forum, as NGOs had predicted, made attendance at the Conference difficult. Nonetheless, a small number of the Irish participants participated in the Caucuses which, as we have seen, were organised to lobby the national delegations and, indirectly, the UN process itself. The daily NGO briefing undertaken by the national team presented an opportunity for these women to lobby, clarify positions and present alternative views and Irish Caucus participants did not waste it. For the majority of the Irish Forum attendees, Beijing was

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[100] *Ibid.* According to the official "the language that the NGOs gave us and the elaborate mechanisms that they had already in place made it possible for Ireland to reopen the issue".

[101] *Ibid.*

[102] *Ibid.*

primarily an opportunity to network with women's groups from all over the world. It allowed them to participate in what has been described as the flourishing of women's networks, North and South in which "a growing number of women have linked together across borders, race and class to struggle jointly in an alternative vision of society".[103] In other words, it brought them into the orbit of "planetary feminism" described at the outset of this chapter.

In a speech to the Conference, Minister Taylor, referred to Irish progress and goals in relation to each of the themes under consideration. He also lauded the role of the women's NGO sector in the implementation of the Platform. They had a vital role, he said, in agenda-setting and in charting practical strategies for action in a manner that complemented democratic accountability of governments to parliaments and to the electorate.[104] The Irish government made twelve policy commitments at Beijing.[105] Despite the unusually difficult negotiation process facing all UN members at Beijing the process was completed resulting in agreement on the Platform For Action and the Beijing Declaration.[106]

Three months after the conference ended the government published its report on the Beijing conference which listed these commitments as 12 key areas of concern for action. Corresponding strategies were outlined to tackle each of these concerns.[107] It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide an assessment the Platform for Action and its application in Ireland. That will be left to other researchers. The government's own report on the Platform in readiness for the inter-governmental Beijing evaluation to be held in New York in 2000 was underway at the time of writing. However, in relation to our concern here of participation, it is noteworthy that the 1996 report, compiled inter-departmentally, makes no reference to institutionalising a function for NGOs in the implementation and monitoring of the Platform except that they will be consulted 'as appropriate'.[108]

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[103] Robinson, Mary, 1996. "Foreword" in Van Lieshout Mary, (Ed.). *Op cit.*: 8.

[104] Taylor, Mervyn, 1995. Statement to the United Nations World Conference on Women, Beijing, September 6 1995.

[105] See appendix T for the text of those commitments.

[106] UN, 1996. *Op cit.: passim.*

[107] Government of Ireland, 1996 (b), *op cit.: passim.*

[108] *Ibid.*: 9

Conclusion

In the conclusion to section three above, four entry points were identified into the Beijing process relevant to activists. To what extent did Irish women's groups have access to these levels and what was the state's role in facilitating that access? Below I will examine participation at each level before moving on to general analysis and, finally, a conclusion to this chapter.

1. The multilateral preparatory process. Establishing cause and effect analyses at this level is particularly difficult. While the DFA funded three NGO representatives to attend the final PrepCom in New York, the most significant negotiations there for Ireland took place at an EU level – negotiations that specifically precluded NGOs.[109] NGOs attended the ECE preparatory conference in Vienna in 1995. No NGOs were included in the EU and Council of Europe preparatory conferences.

Hence the inclusion of NGOs in the National Committee and in the state's multilateral preparatory commitments to Beijing was limited by norms and institutions that have built up around diplomatic negotiations. The extent to which the presence of the NGO representatives acted as an influence while the conferences proceeded, or to which the negotiating officials heeded any advise/analysis offered by NGOs is difficult to assess. The difficulty arises not just from a general difficulty in cause-effect analysis in complex environemnts but also the limited influence of any individual state at EU-level negotiations anyway, further filtered through the PrepCom itself.

2. The national preparatory process. There were three ways in which NGO's utilised this entry point into the Beijing process. Firstly, NGOs were represented on the National Committee and contributed to discussions on the compiling of the national report. Secondly, groups made submissions to that committee. Some of these were included in the national report and the remainder in an index published subsequent to the reports. Thirdly, members of the Irish forum directly lobbied relevant departments.

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[109] According to one, the PrepCom provided opportunities for lobbying the Irish delegation, which, in turn, kept the three delegates informed of developments. The three delegates understood their role in New York to be three fold: lobbying, making contact with other NGOs in New York and providing information on return to Irish women's groups.

The committee met only four times during the process and the NGOs acted as 'advisers' in that process. From the DELR point of view, there was some ambiguity about the role of NGOs and their participation derived largely from a UN directive in the first place. Reflecting a different perspective the NGO role in the DFA's participation in the whole process was deeper and on a more solid footing. Not only did the DFA incorporate a significant NGO input into their contribution to the national report (the development and aid aspects in particular) but, according to an official, regularly consulted with the NGO community during the process.[110]

3. The Forum Caucus. While Irish women at the NGO Forum participated in the Caucuses, the possibility of taking a lead role in those Caucuses was limited. An analysis of the international women's' movement and the UN suggests that Caucuses can be extremely successful when they mount a global campaign by building coalitions and consensus among diverse women's organisations, prepare policy documents in advance, seek to influence national delegations at the Conference and, in the process, bridge NGO and official delegations.[111]

Such a shopping list implies significant, and protracted, advance preparations. Thus NGOs. to be fully effective, need to be directly linked into and active participants in global NGO activity and/or are linked into the advance Caucus structures and organisation.[112]

As we have seen, some of the NGOs involved (in the delegation and at the Forum) had such links and did, indeed participate in the Caucus. Banúlacht, as we saw, was linked into WIDE and, from the Forum, Women's Aid participated in the Caucus on violence against women. However, the preparatory process that Irish women had undergone was severely limited in comparison to that undergone by some of their EU partners.[113] The impact of such participation on Irish women's groups and on strengthening the already strong international bonds between women's movements cannot be measured in any categorical way[114] and may not be at first apparent. The rapid and successful formation of the Northern

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[110] Author's interview; DFA2, September 14 1998.

[111] Chen, *op cit.*: 151.

[112] An example of such activism is the Women's Voice Alliance '94 which brought together 100 women's NGOs to prepare for the Cairo Population Conference.

[113] Author's interview; NGO 3, January 18 1999. The informant was a member of an Irish NGO that participated in the Beijing caucus and lobbied Irish officials.

[114] Siggins, *op cit.: passim.*

Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC) at a critical stage of the Northern Ireland peace process in 1997 has, for instance, been explained by preparatory work done by the women's movement there for Beijing.[115]

4. The NGO Forum. As we have seen, the potential to influence from the NGO Forum is limited to begin with. The Beijing Forum suffered by being sited a considerable distance from the Conference and Forum members had to choose between both rather than interact between them.[116]

Finally, there is the Conference itself. NGOs on the national team were precluded from attending EU-level meetings and were not a full part of the negotiating team. Given the significance for EU-level co-ordination for the policies of all member states, this amounted to preclusion from the most critical policy-forming arena. Exclusion, however, was a factor of EU negotiating norms. At the same time, we know however, that a position taken by Ireland within EU-level negotiations which brought it into conflict with the prevailing EU norm, (on increased development aid spending) was one that domestic (development) NGOs had been campaigning on for considerable time. It was also an issue, it must be said, that had been the subject of commitments by the government.

Notwithstanding the above demarcations in the NGO/state relationship, it can not be concluded that Irish NGOs had little influence on the Beijing process. A detailed analysis of a series of policy positions and how they evolved over time would be required, to begin with, in order to assess that influence. This chapter was not, moreover, concerned with an input/output analysis.

If we look at the extent of participation in the 12 months prior to the Beijing conference, in isolation from the greater global and national policy process, it might be concluded that the potential to influence was severely limited by the norms of the policy making environment. It is certainly the case that the differing institutional cultures of the two main government department involved determined, furthermore, the extent to which NGO ideas and activism was brought in to the policy-making arena. One might conclude that, to a greater extent the Irish state moved through the Beijing process based on a general position that 'areas of decision-making, namely

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[115] McWilliams, Monica and Kilmurray, Avila, 1997. "Athene on the Loose: the Origins of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition", *Irish Journal of Feminist Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1: 1-21.

[116] Corréa, Sonia, 1995. "Beijing Conference" in *Women Against Fundamentalism*, no. 7: 20.

government, have to be left to political experts whether bureaucrats or party politicians.'[117] This perspective validates the comments of one of the NGO representatives who commented that her inclusion in the delegation was based on 'patronage rather than objective criteria'.[118] A second commented that her presence served largely to 'placate' the NGO community.[119]

These comments do not invalidate a caution that it would be a mistake to isolate Beijing from the much wider, and deeper, policy process of which Beijing was just one stage. In relation to violence against women, for instance, activism by women's groups on this issue began in Ireland in the 1970s. Women's Aid has proved itself a highly skilled and successful lobbying organisation over time.[120] The national report to Beijing was heavily influenced by the report of the Second Commission on the Status of Women,[121] which emerged following a major consultation process with the women's movement, and, by commitments given in the programme for government.[122] In this regard, cognisance must be taken of the longer historical relationship between the Irish women's' movement and the evolution of the state's agenda in relation to equality in which, as we have seen, the movement was a very significant actor.

However, this case study does throw up one central issues referred to above: the differentiation between the two main government departments in openness to NGO participation. How can we explain the distinction reflected most acutely, perhaps, in a DELR official's comment that the national report could have been written entirely without NGO participation.[123] In contrast a DFA official's commented that NGOs not

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[117] Cochrane, Allan, 1986. "Community Politics and Democracy" in Held, David and Pollit, Christopher, (Eds.). *New Forms of Democracy*, Sage, London: 53

[118] Author's interview; NGO1, February 17 1998.

[119] Author's interview; NGO2, January 21 1999.

[120] Galligan, *op cit.*: 112-142.

[121] Government of Ireland, 1993. *Second Commission on the Status of Women: Report to Government*, Stationary Office, Dublin.

[122] See Programme for a Partnership Government 1993–1997. In Gallagher, Michael and Laver, Michael, (Eds.) *How Ireland Voted 1992*, PSAI Press/Folens, Dublin and Limerick: 174-193.

[123] Author's interview; DELR1, February 20 1998.

only provided key sections of its contribution to the report but also provided important analysis throughout the entire process?[124]

There are at least two sets of explanations. Firstly, the institutional brief of DELR is for the domestic sphere exclusively and, while complex in its self, is limited in scope and largely already subject to domestic legislative and policy proposals. Put in the words of the official from DELR; "there was a feeling (in DELR) that the international aspects (of Beijing) were not in our brief.[125] The sphere of the DFA necessarily is as limitless as is the brief of the UN itself. A DFA official described the significance of the Beijing Platform in the context of its global use, to seek improvements in women's lives the world over, through the UN process. The shape of these different perspectives can be drawn by the distinction between a purely national policy interest (how Beijing will effect the Irish state's policy towards Irish women) and a global, or cosmopolitan policy interest (how agreement can be reached on a document that will improve all women's lives, including Irish women).

What this amounts to is a permeability, on the part of the DFA to the concerns, perspectives and proposals of the NGO community. In other words, an openness to cosmopolitanism. The closure of the DELR towards non-national concerns renders it more impermeable to universalism and to cosmopolitanism.

Secondly, and arising from the above, the DFA has built up a solid relationship with the Irish NGO sector over time and has come to rely on the sector's role in providing up to date information that may not be available internally due to resource, personnel or other constraints. In contrast, the DELR did not have such a historic relationship to call upon and did not, indeed, see the need for inclusions of NGOs other than to satisfy the requirement of the UN. This, it must be said, did not translate into a hostility to NGOs and their work, simply, that the DELR could have proceed happily to Beijing without them.

What conclusions can be drawn about cosmopolitanism and Irish foreign policy from this case study? What is the added value of the focus on the participation process in multilateral diplomacy?

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[124] One official commented:"(A)t Beijing we were really dependent on the goodwill of the NGOs on the delegation to attend the plenaries and keep tabs on what was happening. This arrangement worked very well" Author's interview; DFA2, September 1998.

[125] Author's interview; DELR1, February 20 1998.

As stated at the outset, such conferences provide a structured site for the debate of cosmopolitan ideas within the interstate system. Their purpose is to bring UN members together to agree goals and strategies to, in this case, improve the lives of *all women* (my emphasis) regardless of culture, religion and other particularistic qualities. That it not to say, however, that particularise does not, in practice, effect how those goals and strategies are designed and implemented. As we saw, Ireland's protection of its constitutional restrictions on abortion was a determining factor in the EU's position on abortion rights. However, the debate here is not about whether the UN is, in fact, a gatekeeper of cosmopolitanism. Rather the context here is of the UN as an international actor with significant potential for the pursuit of a cosmopolitan agenda.

At the other end of the spectrum of enquiry in this chapter rests the role of the women's movement as an 'outrider' for cosmopolitanism. That is not to say that all women's groups are cosmopolitan. Rather, as we have seen the tradition of feminism, and its manifestation in the women's movement, has been one of positing universality of concerns among women and the need for international activism to create a world in which all women, regardless of their culture, religion or other particularities, are treated with, at least, equality in relation to all men. Notwithstanding full, partial or negligent implementation by member states, the Beijing Declaration, like all UN declarations can become a vehicle of cosmopolitanism. While not amounting to international law, in an equivalent manner to human rights law, signing a declaration represents a political commitment on the part of the state to implementation. This commitment can be used by relevant UN bodies (such as the UN Committee overseeing CEDAW) and by international and national NGOs to bring about positive change.

In bringing these two ends of the spectrum together in an examination of how a movement attempted to influence the potential cosmopolitan agenda of the inter-state system, through the policy machinery of one state, three conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the institutions of multilateral diplomacy impose structural limitations on the extent to which NGOs can influence the decision making process. The international women's movement has learned to circumvent these restrictions with counter-veiling conferences and with networks based on analyses and proposals for action, egitimised by the voice of experience and depth of knowledge and validated by 'people

power'. These can bring about a UN policy re-orientation that in turn opens a space at a domestic level for the articulation of a pro-woman's agenda backed by commitments given by each members state at the UN.[126] The extent of impact must be measured against the absence of a formal mechanism through which women's NGOs can submit reports and participate in the monitoring and implementation process of CEDAW.[127] The pre-eminence of the state system has established standard operating procedures for how states approach UN multilaterals in which 'reasons of state' dominate albeit softened.

Secondly, at the same time, the UN requirements of NGO participation acts to diminish the absolute sovereignty of the state. Hence, NGOs do get to sit on preparatory committees and join national delegations. Such a configuration would, undoubtedly, have been unthinkable in earlier decades in the history of Irish foreign policy. In this, their presence underlines the extension of the foreign policy community beyond the traditional structures of domestic governance. Importantly also, in this case, we saw how the UN requirement led the Irish state to provide resources to the Irish women's movement to participate in the global process and, in turn, to directly interact with global feminism. Both these points are made while mindful of the differential response to participation within the institutions of the state. This leads to the last point.

Thirdly, the creation of a more cosmopolitan order by NGOs is conditional on sympathetic institution of governance (national and international) which will validate cosmopolitan voices and will channel them into policy. It requires a significant level of focused, systematic and long-term organisation and lobbying and not least of all linkage into pre-existing, or creating anew, global networks of like minded individuals and groups.

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[126] See Connors, Jane, 1996. "NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations" in Willetts, (Ed.),*op cit.*: 147-180.

[127] In general terms the NGO contribution remains at the level of providing information to assist the UN's examination of country reports under CEDAW. See Connors, *op cit.: 164.*

Chapter Eight.

Cosmopolitanism and Irish Foreign Policy: a Conclusion.

Introduction

Each of the case studies in this thesis presented a focused examination of the role of NGOs in the processing of an Irish foreign policy issue. Those examinations took place in the context of an overall view of the substantive issues of Irish foreign policy, the structures within which that policy is processed and, finally, the national universe within which those NGOs locate themselves.

The purpose of the case studies was to allow a testing of the durability of cosmopolitan ideas and the permeability of the Irish foreign policy system to those ideas. This involved examining both policy issues and the policy process. The broad theoretical questions that framed the enquiry were; does NGO activism participate in the kind of transformative politics envisaged by Linklater or merely extend the pluralism of the existing inter-state system? The latter formulation is derived from the work of RBJ Walker, whose postmodernism has provided some of the most sustained critique of Linklater's work

The answer to this question was traced by the manner in which the ethical concerns of NGOs were processed in the complex foreign policy decision making environment within which Ireland is located. Of interest was the interaction of norms and institutions towards the implementation of ethically-constructed policy goals. This focus derived from a view of NGOs as engaged with and acting out of the idea of (modern) cosmopolitan citizenship that Linklater has prescribed and described. For Linklater such citizenship extends beyond the spatio-temporal enclosure of the nation state as part of the evolutionary process of creating new forms of political community that are universalistic and emancipatory. As we saw in chapter one, these principles are secured in a dialogic ethic; one in which norms, values, and the principles of social interaction themselves, have to be negotiated by those who are

effected by them.[1] The goal of dialogic relations with those who are systematically excluded is a normative ideal. The duty to associate with others within the discourse rests on the fact that there are 'no compelling differences between human beings which can legitimate their prima facie exclusion from dialogic interaction".[2] No claims come to the dialogue with a given superior moral worth and all partners in the dialogue treat each other with moral equivalence.

This conclusion is in three sections. Firstly I draw some analytical conclusions about cosmopolitanism in relation to the case studies. Secondly I look at the factors, identified in the case studies that might act against or, with, a cosmopolitan agenda. Thirdly I will draw some reflections on the contending analyses offered at the outset of this thesis.

Cosmopolitanism and the Dialogic Ethic

This section will first address some analytical issues in relation to cosmopolitanism that arose in the case studies and the general universe within which those case studies were located. The focus of two case studies - that of the positions on ESAF and East Timor - were on the evolution of policy, while the third - the UN Fourth World Conference on Women - examined the issue of participation in a policy process.

The question that is addressed in this section is; to what extent the NGOs involved in each of these policy issues prompted the state to incorporate a cosmopolitan perspective. A key factor in defining cosmopolitanism, and in distinguishing it from liberal internationalism, is the dialogic ethic but, as Linklater points out, it exists within the canon of cosmopolitanism as a normative ideal.

In contrast, while the liberal order allows the playing out of universal ideas (the UN Charter on Human Rights for instance), dialogue within that order is contained by the co-ordinates to the inter-state system. States represent their citizens. The ethical duty of every citizen to others stops at the frontier of their shared territory, or in the case of a diaspora, wherever their fellow citizens

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[1] Linklater, Andrew, 1999. "Transforming political community: a response to the critics" in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25: 173.

[2] Linklater, Andrew, 1998. *The Transformation of Political Community*, Polity Press, Cambridge: 85.

live. It is not an ethical norm for citizens to expect their states to consider the interests of non-citizens when formulating and acting on policy. At best liberalism bids its adherents to 'do no harm' to others.

What can we say about the dialogic ethic in relation to our case studies? In order to separate the complexities of each of the case studies we can distinguish between three levels within which dialogues took place. First, there is the dialogue that occurred at a transnational level between the NGOs and those whom they sought to represent. Second, there is the dialogue between the NGOs at the state and/or the institutions of the inter-state system. Third, there is the dialogue that occurred between the NGOs and their immediate community: their members, supporters and the Irish public generally.

The NGO/Beneficiaries Dialogue

Dialogue at this level is perhaps the most elemental in the cosmopolitan order. If NGOs as outriders of cosmopolitanism want to bring in the voices of the excluded they must, firstly, listen to the demands of those voices.

As we saw, most of the NGOs in the case studies and in the survey are linked into networks nationally or at a European level, which in turn are linked into networks with groups in the South. In the case of the Debt and Development Coalition (DDC) links to beneficiaries run through the formal NGO route and through the more informal constituencies of its membership. The DDC is an active member of EURODAD, the EU-based campaign for debt issues which, in turn, works closely with partner networks in the developing world. EURODAD is important to the DDC because of the analysis, information and tactical support it provides in bringing to the fore the concerns of those most effected by debt in the developing world. Equally important for the DDC however, was its own membership and its links to those countries most effected by structural adjustment and, in particular the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme. Thus the DDC was in a position to provide detailed analysis from the ground, on the impact of ESAF on poor farmers in the Bilateral Aid Programme (BAP) countries, to the Department of Finance, the Minister for Finance, the members of the Oireachtas and in its presentations and discussions with the IMF.

In relation to the ETISC case, the relationship between activists and intended beneficiaries was particularly close. The ETISC sees it self as the servant of the people of East Timor. Through internet links to Indonesia and East Timor, and secondary network links to other NGOs and exiled East Timorese, the campaign is in constant contact with the evolving positions of the East Timorese. Should the people of East Timor suddenly have decided that they, after all, wanted integration with Indonesia, then the campaign would have in theory supported that position. (Effectively this would translate into the end of the campaign.)

Should the people of East Timor have gone one step further and argued that Indonesia should annex other surrounding states, and deny the cultural, religious and other rights of the citizens of those states, then the East Timor campaign would doubtless find itself in a profound moral dilemma. Thus it is not simply that the ETISC serves the interests of the people of East Timor, uncritically and without recourse to its own moral standpoint. In the dialogic exchange that began with the outrage at Indonesian activities in East Timor and was translated into pro-East Timorese activism, a shared morality was established in relation to universal rights (to self determination, to political freedoms, to the right to free association and free movement, the right not to be tortured, the right to cultural expression) and translated into needs (the need to keep East Timor as an issue on the EU/CFSP agenda and on the agenda of the UN; the need to maintain the internationalisation of the issue). It is in the arena of activist-beneficiary dialogue that we can locate moral appeals to a shared humanity that has "transcultural validity".[3]

In other words, the campaign became a spokesperson for, rather than a shaper of, the interest of the East Timorese that were subsequently articulated into the Irish foreign policy process. Of course, how those concerns were articulated and the day to day expression were determined by local conditions. But the important point to stress here is that the ETISC constructed its policy position in accord with East Timorese people and other defenders of East Timor globally including East Timorese exiles.

Given that the groups involved in the Beijing process were not coherently organised to speak with one voice (nor would they have wanted to) the issue of dialogic communities becomes more diffuse in this case study. The study is

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[3] Linklater, 1999, *op cit.*: 79.

complicated in this regard because of the extent of participation and because the case study was focused not on policy but on participation *per se*. On the one hand, some women's organisations were formally included in the preparatory process and participated in the state team fielded at Beijing. This process was determined according to a prior agenda and structured within the institutions of state. On the other hand, more women participated in the civil society process and in Beijing itself. Here the dialogue was not directed or channelled in any way other than by the thematic concerns of the Beijing Platform. As assessment of all groups and the origin of their concerns would require more time and space than this conclusion can give.

The Beijing process highlights the extension of the dialogic community at a domestic level as much as at an international level. This layer of dialogue is returned to later in the chapter and must be passed over here for now. Nonetheless, the patterns identified in the other case studies are replicated here. Banúlacht, whose representative participated in the formal process, is linked in turn to Women In Development Europe (WIDE), a Europe-based organisation that links with similar organisations in the developing world to engender a global view of women and development. The National Women's Council, also on the official team in Beijing, was linked into the European Women's Lobby. Prior to their participation at all in the national process, these groups had been involved in dialogues with their partners. That dialogue centered on how women's organisations can articulate best practice and best policy into their domestic arenas in order to improve the lives of all women everywhere.

As this thesis did not adopt a discourse analysis methodology no conclusions can be drawn about the domination, or otherwise, within these communications. We cannot make any claim about whether these dialogue were entirely cosmopolitan in their values. It was the case that, for instance, many of the women's groups who made submissions prior to Beijing and travelled to the conference were exercised by the needs of their immediate constituency. The important point to extract, however, is that dialogues are, as a matter of course, taking place from NGO to NGO, from network to network, from activist to activist (through the internet, through conferences) in a manner that transcends national boundaries and with a policy goal of introducing the interests of the outsiders into the arena of foreign policy. This happened in relation to ESAF, to the position on East Timor, and to a more diffuse degree, in relation to the preparatory process for Beijing. The overall

impact of lobbying carried out in relation to ESAF, East Timor, and, the Beijing Platform was to propose, as a normative ideal, the notion that the state has no right to deny the participation of the traditionally excluded simply because they are not citizens of the state.

NGO State/Inter-state dialogue

The second dialogic level was that between the NGOs and the state and the inter-state system. As we saw the domestic dialogue was carried out with the existing structures and hierarchies of the state machinery, and varied in degrees of incorporation. Again, we need to keep in mind Linklater's reference to domination free dialogue. In relation to the case studies we here confront an immediate difficulty: the structural domination of the state within the foreign policy process.

While notions of partnership are embedded in Irish social relations, partnership is very unevenly spread across the range of actors involved in foreign policy processing. It is, furthermore, effectively contingent on the receptivity of not just Ministers, but also civil servants and officials. While it would be unthinkable in practice, there is nothing to stop a Minister for Foreign Affairs barring all NGOs from the environs of governance, or less dramatically, reducing their access considerably and ignoring their requests. When pushed to its extreme, the state/NGOs dialogue is conditional, first of all, on a receptive state. Most particularly, there are many parts of the state institution that can act as constraints. These are dealt with below.

Even at this somewhat mechanical adaptation of the notion of dialogue, the problem of structurally embedded inequalities within institutions raises questions about the possibility of a domination free dialogue. Yet, the dialogue must begin somewhere, and the "somewhere" in international relations is a space largely shaped by the inter-state system. This point brings us nicely to Walker's contending notion: getting beyond the inter-state system is improbable. As we will see in the next section, the constraints on dialogue, to begin with, are many. They emanate from within the state structures and traditions and from within the complex multilateral decision making environment within which Ireland is located. For NGOs participation in dialogue with the state is not based on any legal right but on tradition and practice. Ultimately, NGOs need friendly governments that will adopt their proposals and idea and present them at the UN, at the IMF or at the EU. In

seeking inclusion within the policy process, they do so through the traditional channels of democracy; they write letters, they make submissions, they present at parliamentary committee meetings, they organise protests, publicity stunts, they try to mobilise public opinion behind them.

At an inter-state level, they participate in EU or UN accredited networks and NGOs that make submissions, write letters, sit in on committees and try to mobilise public opinion. They organise alternative conferences and compile alternative reports. In what way is any of this activity distinct from the work-a-day activities of the lobby groups in terms of its impact on political processes and outcomes?

To list the constraints in such a manner is to miss the point. That is that we cannot assume that the NGO/state/inter-state dialogue is the only one in town and that NGOs are exclusively driven by a desire to effect particular policy outcomes. The transformation required within a cosmopolitan ethic more generally is one based on reforming the existing structures and norms over time. Part of this transformation is on going at the level of NGO-NGO dialogue at a national and international level and at the NGO-public level. Policy outcome is important to NGOs, but so is the longer term goal of changing the parameters of Irish foreign policy: shifting its focus from the narrow concerns of the community of citizens to the global concern of humanity.

NGO/Public Dialogue

For the NGOs involved in the case studies participation in the foreign policy process had two goals. Firstly there was the desire to see a particular outcome. Secondly there was the desire to politicise the public, the media, the members of parliament and officials of the state to the broader issues at stake. Put in organisational terms, for the groups process was of no less importance than outcome. The ETISC perspective was something of an exception, however, in regard to this.

In relation to this point the fact that the Beijing process may have had a greater impact on the Irish women's movement than the Irish women's movement had on the Beijing process does not necessarily amount to a failure on behalf of the movement. The campaign carried out, in civil society in particular, by groups such as Women's Aid, Aontas and Banúlacht,

consciously drew links between women in Ireland and women globally. The conflict between the Irish platform (for Beijing) and the National Women's Council of Ireland on funding and organisation was about more than just money. It was a debate about the inclusion of voices in the state's co-ordination and preparation for Beijing and about creating a sense of ownership of policy among as many Irish women as possible. In the words of one organiser of the Platform: "As far as we were concerned, Beijing was not about something happening over there somewhere, it was about giving Irish women an opportunity to have a say in the future direction of their lives. It was about making links between the lives of Irish women and women the world over".[4]

For DDC, the campaign against ESAF was, in the words of its co-ordinator, as much about empowering people in the face of the apparently impregnable might of the IMF and the World Bank as about halting Irish contributions to ESAF. According to her, the ESAF campaign must be assessed in an overall positive light because it engaged many ordinary citizens with the decision-making process of the IMF and affirmed their desire to have an impact there. This, of itself, involves a reconfiguration of citizenship: articulating the notion that Irish citizens can lobby with the goal of improving the lives of those outside the 'community' of statehood. In her view, the DDC may have lost the war but they won several battles along the way, not least of which was a widespread politicisation of the Irish people towards issues of debt. At the level of praxis, furthermore, the bill finally passed in the Dáil will require annual accountability to the Oireachtas of Ireland's financial commitments to the IMF. Such an outcome may not have been uppermost in the DDC's campaign but it has transformed the ownership of Ireland's IMF policy from the hands of state officials to the hands of the demos.

However, the same mix of process and goals was not evenly distributed in the campaign run by the ETISC. Tom Hyland's eschewing of formal collaboration with other groups arose from a desire not to allow the process of politicisation about issues in Asia, for instance, dilute the immediate need to maintain international pressure to bring about a change in East Timor. But this is not to say that the ETISC campaigned in isolation from other similar groups. As we have seen the ETISC worked with several other NGOs (such as AfrI and Oxfam) at many points during the years of activities described in chapter five.

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[4] Author's interview with Christine Murray, January 14 1999.

As a single issue group, however, the ETISC is a more goal-orientated organisation than elements of the women's movement and the DDC.

Cosmopolitanism: Constraints and Facilitators

This section identifies the factors within the case studies that enhance or constrain cosmopolitan activism. The three case studies presented an opportunity to establish the confluence of events that vary from case to case and whose constituents parts can act differentially in different cases, in relation to policy processing. In examining how a policy issue was processed through a series of levels from the formulation on the ground by the NGO through to the manner of its translation (or not) into a policy output at an international level, the case studies allowed us examine the many factors and structures - institutional, cultural, attitudinal, ideological - that come into play. These factors operated at both a national and an international level.

Bureaucratic culture

The case studies brought us into an examination of relationships between NGOs and three different departments: the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Department of Finance (DoF) and the Department of Equality and Law Reform (DELR).

Given the tradition and role of the Department of Foreign Affairs, it proved itself most open to inclusion of non-state voices. This is, perhaps, somewhat ironic considering the traditional "high politics" nature of foreign policy but not surprising in the context of the growth and nature of Irish foreign policy. As we have seen the bureaucracy is small and the issues that it confronts are as wide as the globe itself. It must to some extent rely on non-state actors for information and analysis. Particularly, it relies on Irish NGOs, to a large extent, for the disbursement of bilateral aid. But the content of policy also contains important variables. Of all government departments, the DFA does not have a legislative brief and its concerns are external at least in primary orientation. This is not to discount the importance of Irish trade concerns in how foreign policy is processed. The flag follows trade argument is not one that was addressed here but cannot be discounted. The point, however, is that it is the only department that we examined that is intrinsically internationalist in its outlook. Such an orientation endows the DFA with a prior sympathy to cosmopolitanism.

The difference was drawn sharply in the positioning of DFA Vs. DELR in relation to Beijing. For a DFA official the Beijing process represented a vital opportunity to prepare a document that would be liberating for women world wide. It was about how Ireland could participate in a process of global gender transformation. For a DELR official the Beijing process was about national accounting to international standards and it was about Ireland's interests within that process. It was also clear that while the DDC has legitimate status within the DoF in matters relating to debt and development and the role of IFIs, internal support for ESAF ultimately won the day.

The role of the sympathetic insiders

The Debt and Development case in particular isolates the contingent nature of the state's incorporation of external ideas. Not so much because the state, *per se*, did not deliver on the DDC's campaign at the end of the day but exactly because elements within the system were so open to it. Not only did the ESAF campaign get launched when a Labour Party Finance Minister was in place, but there was also in the Department of Foreign Affairs, a Minister of State who herself was extremely critical of the role of the IMF. Furthermore there were several parliamentarians on the sub-committee on development co-operation who, like the Minister for State, had a prior interest in the technical details of IMF politics and the implications of structural adjustment. Had none of these factors been in place, the ESAF campaign is likely to have died an early death.

The very swift reversal of the Quinn policy with the coming to power of the new government and, particularly, under the new, and fiscally conservative finance minister, Charlie McCreevy indicates just how vulnerable cosmopolitan policies are to the exigencies of parliamentary politics. Conversely, had the DDC campaign not been in place, it is possible that Minister Quinn would have taken the same decision to suspend the ESAF commitment. As Minister of State Burton stated in chapter five, she was herself vehemently opposed to instruments such as ESAF and would not have allowed it go through.

However, the East Timor case raises contrary evidence on the vulnerability of NGO work. While the main focus of the case study here coincided with the period of governance of the Fianna Fail/Labour Party/Democratic Left

coalition in which the Labour Party held the foreign affairs portfolio, the cross party support given to East Timor has continued beyond the change of government. The period after the Presidency is outside the brief of this thesis but it is important to recognise that the incoming Minister for Foreign Affairs, David Andrews (Fianna Fáil) has enthusiastically supported the ETISC campaign. While this conclusion was being written (April 1999) Mr. Andrews was on an official trip to East Timor - the first EU foreign minister ever to visit the territory. Mr. Andrews was a long time supporter of the campaign and a patron of the ETISC. This historic commitment doubtless was a factor in explaining the continuity over governments. But it is also the case that, unlike the ESAF position, no resistance had been offered to the ETISC campaign within the government department concerned.

Government ideology

It is perhaps no coincidence that the case studies examined in chapters five to seven spanned, predominantly, the life of two coalitions governments which included member parties of a socialist orientation. Furthermore, as stated above, during the period 1992-1997 the Foreign Affairs portfolio was held by the leader of one of those parties Dick Spring of the Labour Party.

The case studies were not chosen because of this but the conditions that led to the choosing of the case studies were partially mediated in two cases by the ideology of the government. As we saw in chapter one the case studies were selected on the basis of the different levels of international governance within which the issue was acted out and the different type of NGO involved. Necessarily, case studies were also selected because something could be said about them. In other words they were issues that were "corriente"[5] meaning, not just current, but engaged with the policy process and institutions.

Drawing conclusions about the direct relationship to party ideology and the success of NGO campaigning would require a comparative study of a range of issues across time. As we have seen above however, the ESAF position fell with the change of government and the change from a Labour to a conservative finance minister. Support for the East Timor issue seems not to have altered in any way with the same change. As the Beijing case study concentrated on a particular period of participation, no comparative

[5] The term is taken from Spanish.

comments can be drawn. However, while the level of participation is variable across government departments, the practice of NGO inclusion in such processes is unlikely to wax and wane as governments come and go. NGO consultation has become part of the institutional response to multilateral conferences.

In practice, it is likely that the role of government ideology and sympathetic insiders are closely linked to the success of cosmopolitan activism. It is possible that without the prior commitment to internationalism of Mr. Spring, and the sympathetic perspective taken by the Labour party to issues of human rights and development, the issue of East Timor might not have received such a sympathetic outing and been the subject of government initiatives. For Finance Minister, RuairÌ Quinn, the ESAF decision was informed by the general ideological orientation of the Labour Party and, importantly, the advice of a party minister whose resistance to ESAF was founded on personal experience and political/ideological analysis.

The requirements of EU multilateralism

CFSP requirements were relevant in two case studies: in the evolution of the Irish position on East Timor and in the diplomatic process towards the Beijing Conference. The question of interest was whether CFSP constrained or enhanced the engagement of cosmopolitanism.

As we have seen, CFSP co-ordination inevitably produces the lowest common denominator. As a general remark, the position a state begins with on the spectrum of policy options and goals will determine whether this is a constraint or a facilitator. However, this is an argument about structure rather than substance. The existence of a collaborative requirement does not, of itself, constrain cosmopolitanism *per se*. At the risk of stating the obvious: it is the existence of more state-centric interests within those structures that can constrain the operationalising of cosmopolitan activism. It is not inconceivable that the CFSP would enhance and facilitate the creation of a more ethical international relations. Human rights instruments and practices are weak within the CFSP but it is an intergovernmental instrument within which norms and values are subject to constant debate. It is not static.

Specifically, in the case of East Timor, there is no doubt that the common position amounted to less than the Irish position that had evolved within the

domestic polity. From this point of view, we can say that the CFSP constrained Ireland. This conclusion must be balanced with the contending view that EU membership overall enhanced Ireland's capacity to act on East Timor. It is unlikely that Dick Spring and other ministers would have had opportunities to engage directly with their Indonesian counterparts if it (Ireland) was not an EU member. In theory, at least, EU membership provides a forum for the articulation of ethical policies that would otherwise be denied a state as a single entity in the interstate system. But it ought not be assumed that this necessarily enhances prior ethical and cosmopolitan concerns.

In relation to the Beijing process, we saw that NGO participants in the national team at the Conference were excluded from critical EU-level negotiations because of the practice of EU multilateral diplomacy. This exclusion does not necessarily preclude the potential to influence through other means. It simply means that, as currently organised, EU multilateral diplomacy cannot incorporate NGO voices directed (regardless of what they might be saying) within the decision-making arena.

From an NGO perspective, both these points prompt a conclusion that NGO activism requires co-ordination at a multilateral NGO level. The institutions of the CFSP impose an obligation of log rolling among members in relation to foreign policy issues. In order to maximise their impact and to ensure the echoing of cosmopolitan positions throughout that log rolling process, NGOs need to co-ordinate their activities across the member states. There was evidence from the case studies and from the survey of such co-ordination. Given the extent of EU co-ordination, transnational NGO coalitions with linkages to national organisations are critical to the currency of cosmopolitan ideas. If political co-operation empowers states on the world stage then it may also empower the veracity of cosmopolitan activism.

The requirements of UN multilateralism

The requirements of UN multilateral diplomacy were centrally relevant in the Beijing case study only. There was no evidence that the ESAF position had any bearing on Ireland's EU position or vica versa. In this case, Ireland was free to take a unilateral stance within the IMF. In as much as the UN was relevant for EU policy on East Timor it emerged from within prior EU-level co-ordination, principally, the common position.

When we graft the requirements of CFSP onto the requirements of multilateral diplomacy at events such as the UN conferences, we are presented with very complex decision making environments indeed. From the point of view of cosmopolitan activism, this decision making environment brings with it a demand of equally sophisticated lobbying tactics and widespread co-ordination. As we have seen, the global women's movement has spawned a multilateral organisation that can match the official Conference with its own Forum and that can provide expertise and analysis on a range of topics under consideration by the official delegates.

From the perspective of a national NGO, linkage into the global women's movement is critical to the enforcing of cosmopolitan ideas. Such linkages requires cost and capacity - resources not available to all national and regional groups. Ironically, perhaps, in the case of Beijing the state provided the resources required by many NGOs to link into the global network by attendance at the Forum. What this amounts to is that the state, for its own reasons, had provided the opportunity within UN multilateral diplomacy for the flourishing of cosmopolitan ideas.

Cosmopolitanism and NGOs: Reflections on Theory

At the outset of this thesis, two possible interpretations were presented for explaining the outcome of the cosmopolitan activism of the NGOs under examination. These were that their activism served to transform the existing system to create a world that is more universalistic, less unequal and more sensitive to cultural differences, or that their activism is explained by and incorporated into the pluralism of the existing system.

It is useful to explore a little further the tensions between these two positions represented by contributions from critical theory (Linklater) and from postmodernism (Walker). There is much that is shared between these positions. Both agree that IR theory is constitutive of practice and that the sovereign state does not command the exclusive loyalty of its subjects. Or, as Walker argues "the claims of sovereignty can no longer effectively resolve all political contradictions in space and time."[6] They both desire new relations between universality and particularity. Where they part company is on the

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[6] Walker, RBJ, 1993. *Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 161.

possibility of articulating a new relationship based on the commonality of humanity. This is crucial, because agreement on a common appeal based on humanity is required for the kind of action Linklater envisages as breaking down the binary 'man'/citizen debate characteristic of western political thought and the practice of international relations.

The case studies here have illustrated the manner in which Irish NGOs articulated a common humanity and, further, sought action on their government's part to defend the ethical responsibility of a global humanity. The validity of such claims was structured, to a great extent, on the norms established in the inter-state system relating to human rights and the right to self-determination. Throughout this thesis, references to universal human rights instruments and norms found continuous resonance. The Beijing process was, in the end, about defining women's socio-economic, political and civil rights in a globally acceptable manner and, subsequently, building a new gendered order based on those rights. For the ETISC, the core issue at the heart of its campaign was the right to self determination. For the DDC, the issues that informed the ESAF campaign can be encapsulated by the an assertion of the range of socio economic rights around the issue of development and the citizens right to having a say in their development process even when framed according to rules of international political economy.

Within these case studies cosmopolitan activism was articulated into the state and inter-state system from the norms derived within that system over time. That system, like international capital, has the capacity to absorb and incorporate new demands, new definitions and new claims. The evolution of the "women's rights are human rights" (referred to in chapter seven) campaign within the whole of the UN is one such example. In this regard, Walker is not, of course, claiming that the inter-state provides the only co-ordinates for progress - what ever the direction we go in.

To focus on the discourse of human rights and how that discourse is structured within the institutions of liberal internationalism, however, is to focus on only part of the picture. Linklater accepts that human right are part of the institutional frameworks which widen the boundaries of the dialogic community.[7] It is in moving beyond this point that liberalism gives way to

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[7] Linklater, 1998, *op cit.*:: 7.

cosmopolitanism. For Linklater human rights activism is part of the cosmopolitan project but is not the totality of the cosmopolitan project. Neither does the cosmopolitan project begin with a common starting point, universally agreed, as to what rights are. For Linklater, appealing to fundamental basic human rights and basic human needs is not the preferred route to establishing principles of an a cosmopolitan order.[8] Rather, it is, the discourse itself which will secure the principles. We can separate the rather complex, and as we have seen, difficult requirement of the dialogic ethic (in establishing the core principles) from the notion of human rights themselves. The appeal to a realm of human obligation itself "challenges the rationale for a state-centred international relations; it articulates the vision of a more humanised international relations, an entirely reconstructed system of economic and political life designed to express acceptance of the idea of a universal kingdom of ends".[9]

Through the interstate system and through the dialogue engaged in, in what can be termed global civil society, (expressed in the internet, international networking, epistemic communities and so on), the actors and the beneficiaries have agreed a prior normative approach. NGOs use this approach to push out the boundaries of "community" of the state and create a more solidarity world order. To say that in these cases cosmopolitanism is evidenced and projectable onto the project of a state's role in international affairs is to state just that. It is not necessarily to make any claim for an all encompassing, banal, universal humanity of the kind envisaged in the project of modernity. Perhaps the answer may be that, as applied, it is in furthering and deepening the existing system that the transformation occurs.

Returning to Linklater's articulation of the transformative capacity of modern citizenship, it is important to note that he posited change in relative and not absolute terms. Modern citizenship, he said, avails societies of the possibility of creating the triple transformation of political community in articulating an order that is *more* universalistic, *less* unequal and *more* sensitive to cultural differences (my italics). The project then is one of degrees. This does not rule out the degrees of change first being accounted for within the existing system.

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[8] Linklater, 1999, *op cit.*: 173.

[9] Linklater, Andrew, 1990. *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, Macmillan, Basingstoke: 203.

Walkers scepticism forecloses on any progressivist accounting of such activism. Linklater posits such activism as constituent of a grander transformational dialogue. The transformative potential of the NGOs was evidenced in the case studies. But whether they actually transformed the Irish foreign policy process or the Irish state's conception of moral community, is subject to debate. Proving transformation consequential to action raises, again, the issue of causality.

But we can make some evaluations on change over time. When local women's groups are funded by the state to travel to a UN conference in another continent a transformation of state/citizen relations has occurred. When an unemployed bus driver is invited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to accompany him on his official state visit to a third country, as part of the official delegation, a transformation has occurred.[10] When an Executive Director of the IMF, on a routine visit to Ireland, requests a meeting with a national network of citizens seeking to dismantle the very projects his institutions hold so dear, a transformation has occurred.

Partially successful, partially inchoate and partially inspired, the NGOs described in these case studies are involved in a long term project of no less significance than reconstituting the political community that acts as legislator within the Irish foreign policy process.

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[10] Mr. Hyland accompanied Minister Andrews and his officials on the trip to East Timor and Indonesia in April 1999.

ACRONYMS

ACDC	Advisory Committee on Development Co-opertion
ACP	African/Caribbean/Pacific
AFrI	Aid From Ireland
AI	Amnesty International
APODETI	Associacao Popular Democrática Timorense
APSO	Agency for Personal Service Overseas
ARASI	Association of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Ireland
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BAP	Bilateral Aid Programme
CHR	Commission on Human Rights
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CEDAW	Convention for the Elimination on all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CONGOOD	Confederation of Non-governmental Organisations in Overseas Development
COREPOR	Committee of Permanent Representatives
COREU	Correspondence European Union
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
DAWN	Development Alternatives for a New Era
DELR	Department of Equality and Law Reform
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs.
DEfY	Development Education for Youth
DDC	Debt and Development Coalition
DG	Directorate General
DoF	Department of Finance
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EPC	European Political Co-operation
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ED	Executive Director
EP	European Parliament
EURODAD	European Campaign for Debt and Development
EWL	European Women's Lobby.
FLS	Forward Looking Strategies (for the Advancement of Women)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EEA	Employment Equality Agency
EEC	European Economic Community
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ED	Executive Director (World Bank/IMF)
EPC	European Political Co-operation
ERP	European Recovery Programme
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ETISC	East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

HEDCO	Higher Education Development Co-operation
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IAAC	Irish Aid Advisory Committee
IAAM	Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement
IBEC	Irish Business and Employers Confederation
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IAAM	Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement
ICA	Irish Countrywomen's Association
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJP	Irish Commission for Justice and Peace
ICOS	Irish Council for Overseas Students
ICTU	Irish Congress of Trade Unions
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank/IMF)
IFA	Irish Farmers Association
IFCD	Irish Foundation for Co-operative Development
IFI	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Irish Missionary Union
INSG	Irish Nicaragua Support Group
IRC	Irish Refugee Council
ITO	International Trade Organisation
JCFA	Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs
LASC	Latin American Solidarity Centre
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCDE	National Committee for Development Co-operation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIWC	Northern Ireland Women's Coalition.
NODE	National Outreach in Development Education
NVO	Northern Voluntary Organisation
NWCI	National Women's Council of Ireland.
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (World Bank/IMF)
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFP	Policy Framework Paper
PMS	Pontifical Mission Society
PREPCOM	Preparatory Conference
WEU	Western European Union
WIDE	Women in Development Europe
WEDO	Women
WEOG	Western European and Others Group
WHO	World Health Organisation
WST	World System theory
WTO	World Trade Organisation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme

SAL	Structural Adjustment Lending
SILIC	Severely Indebted Lower Income Country
TNC	Transnational Organisation
UDT	Uniao Democratica Timorense
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United National International Children's Emergency Fund
VSI	Voluntary Services International

APPENDICES

Appendix A: The NGOs Surveyed; A Brief Description.

1. AFrI.
This group was founded by an Irish missionary to provide assistance for small projects in the Third World but now focuses on development education in Ireland to promote human rights, justice and environmentalism both in Ireland and overseas.
2. Amnesty International (Ireland) (1961)
This is the Irish section of the international voluntary activist movement that works towards the observance of all human rights as enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.
3. Association of Refugees andAsylum Seekers in Ireland (ARASI) (1997).
The purpose of this group is to develop self help support systems for refugees and asylum seekers in Ireland and to combat racism in Ireland.
4. Baby Milk Action Ireland (1994)
This organisation was founded to help create informed choices on infant feeding for parents and to seek accountability of manufacturers of artificial feeding products.
5. Banúlacht (1990)
This organisation was founded to raise awareness of the links between development issues that effect women locally and globally.
6. Bóthar. (1991).
This organisation was founded to promote sustainable agricultural development largely through the transfer of far, animals from Ireland to Africa.
7. Bhutanese Refugee Support Group (1994)
This group was founded to advocate on behalf of Bhutanese refugees in India and in Nepal.
8. Burma Action Ireland (1996)
This group was formed to support democracy and the promotion of human rights in Burma.
9. Chernobyl Children's Project (1991)
The work of this organisation grew out of the work of the Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)in order to raise awareness of the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl and to offer relief (material) programmes in Belarus, the Ukraine and Western Russia.
10. Comhlámh (1975)
This is the association of returned development workers. Its main function is to bring to bear on Irish overseas development-related projects, the experience of reteurnee and it also seeks to promote human rights and sustainable development in Ireland and abroad.
11. Cuba Support Group – Ireland (1993).
This group was founded to oppose the US blockade on Cuba and to raise awareness in Ireland about Cuba.
12. Debt and Development Coalition (1993).
This organisation was formed by development agencies, missionary organisations and others to promote a solution to the debt crisis.
13. Development Education For Youth (1989)
This organisation was originally founded as part of the National Youth Council of Ireland but became independent in 1997. It functions to promote more and better development education in the Irish youth sector through co-ordination of activities.
14. Dóchas (1976).
This is a network of 18 agencies involved in development issues, formed to contribute, through the cooperative effort of members, to a world where basic needs are met, people are empowered, there is equity in the management and distribution of resources and where human rights are respected.
15. East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (1992).
The Campaign was launched to achieve the right to self determination for the people of East Timor.
16. Ireland Kosovo Solidarity Group (1998)
The group was founded out and has replaced Ireland Action for Bosnia (which had included Kosovo in its brief) in order to raise awareness of the Kosovars oppression and to support their struggle for independence.
17. Ireland Algeria Solidarity Group (1998)

The group was formed to promote the protection of human rights in Algeria.

18. Irish Black and Migrant Women (1994)

The main goals of this organisation are to provide support for black and migrant women and to provide positive images of them in Irish society.

19. Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (1965).

This organisation was founded by the Irish Catholic Bishops Conference to promote justice, peace and human rights issues in Ireland through awareness raising and also to advise the Catholic Church on human rights/development issues.

20. Irish Council for Overseas Students (1970)

The council was founded to promote the general welfare of international students and trainees in Ireland.

21. Irish El Salvador Support Committee (1979)

This group was founded to raise awareness in Ireland of El Salvador.

22. Irish Missionary Union (1970)

This is the association of missionary, mission-sending and mission-aid organisations in Ireland. It provides training courses and mission awareness training throughout Ireland and also places lay volunteers in missionary and development work overseas.

23. Irish Mozambique Solidarity (1988).

This group was founded by development workers returned from Mozambique and seeks to promote political and material solidarity with Mozambique.

24. Irish Foundation for Cooperative Development (1978)

This organisation was established in order to transfer agricultural expertise from Irish co-operatives to rural co-operatives in Africa.

25. Irish Peru Support Group (1990).

The group was founded during the years of extreme violence in Peru to engage in solidarity action with the victims of human rights abuses there.

26. Irish Refugee Council (1990)

The Council primarily provides a service for asylum seekers in Ireland (including a legal sergvice) and campaigns for and engages in awareness raising on issues of asylum in Ireland.

27. Irish South Africa Association (1994)

The association was founded from the ashes of the Irish Anti Apartheid Movement which disbanded following the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994. It seeks to build on and expand the foundations and links established by the IAAM with South Africa.

28. Irish- Sudanese Solidarity Group (1998).

This group was founded to engage in awareness building on the effects of the war, and on human rights abuses, in Sudan.

29 Kurdistan Information Network (1994)

The network was formed in order to change Irish foreign policy in favour of Kurdish human, political and cultural rights.

30. Latin America Solidarity Centre (LASC) (1996)

The centre was established to promote mutual solidarity between those working for progressive change in Ireland and Central America.

31. Miqesi: The Irish -Albanian Society (1993)

The society was established to encourage and promote links between Ireland and Albania and to encourage and promote investment, in aid and support, for Albania and its people.

32. Ogoni Solidarity Ireland (1995)

The group was founded to raise awareness and campaign in Ireland on behalf of the Ogoni.

33. Pontifical Mission Societies (1838).

The organisation is part of an international movement that was founded in 1822. Its function is to promote mission awareness and to encourage aid – material and spiritual – for the missions.

34. Viatores Christi (1960)

This organisation was founded for the recruitment, preparation and placement of laity in areas of need overseas.

35. Voluntary Services International (1965).

This is the Irish branch of Service Civil Internationale. It promotes and co-ordinates voluntary work camp activity in Ireland and elsewhere, in order to work for peace, social justice and international understanding.

36. 80/20 (1996).
This organisation was founded to engage in human rights work on development and human rights issues in Ireland.

Appendix B: The Questionnaire.

Name of Organisation.
Address For Correspondence.
Phone No:
Fax:
Email:
Position of respondent (to questionnaire)

Section One: Profile of Your Organisation.

1. When was your organisation founded?
2. What is its main goal?
3. How many branches of your organisation are there and where are they located?
4. Is it a membership organisation? (If not please skip to question 5)

    How many members have you?
    Do you actively recruit members?
    How does one become a member?
    How do members participate in activities?
    Are your members located primarily in one geographical area?
5. Please rate the following sources of funds in their importance to the on-going work of your organisation:
    membership subscriptions
    earnings
    government grants
    grants from other Irish organisations
    gifts or endowments
    private trust funds or foundations
    donations/sponsorships from private companies
6. Do you have a board of directors or executive committee? (If 'no' please ignore the following section)
    What is the function of this board or committee?
    How is this board or committee appointed?
    Who can sit on the board or committee?
7. If you do not have a board or committe, please describe the structure of your organisation. (eg: ad hoc group of self-selected individuals; ad hoc organisation of representatives from other groups).
8. Does your organisation hold an AGM?
9. Does your organisation have a constitution?
10. Who makes the policy decisions in your organisarion?
11. How many paid workers and how many voluntary workers do you have?
12. Has your organisation used government- sponsored employment schemes to provide staff?

Section Two: Lobbying.

If your organisation is not involved in lobbying at any level please ignore the following section.

13. In the normal course of your work which of the following instruments of Irish policy-making do you come into contact with and how frequently. (need a yes/no box and range of frequencies here; very often, often, rarely, never).

The Taoiseach?
The Tánaiste?
The Minister for Foreign Affairs?
Other Ministers in the Cabinet?
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs?
Other Dáil Deputies?
Members of the Senate?
Officials at the Dept. of Foreign Affairs.?
Officials in other government Depts?
(specify here: name Dept)
Elected members of local authorities?
Members of the European Parliament?
Commissioners of the European Union?
Officials at the Commission?
The office of the President of the European Union?

14. Has your organisation lobbied, directly or indirectly, at international policy making instruments (eg UNHRC, members of the General Assembly of the UN, UNHCR etc.)

15. Has your organisation made representations to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs? (if 'no' please skip to **Section 3)**

How many times?
Were you invited or did you request representation?
Did you make oral or written representations?

Section Three: Strategies.

17. Which of the following activities do you regularly engage in: (yes/no alternative)

- media work/liasing with journalists
- carrying out educational work in schools
- public talks and meetings
- meetings/workshops with other community and voluntary groups
- staging pickets and public events
- promoting cultural events

18. Please rate the following in order of their strategic importance to achieving your goals.

Influencing government
Influencing officials (civil servants)
Influencing the public
Influencing the media
Influencing other community/voluntary organisations?

Section Five: Linkages.

19. Is your organisation involved in any national coalitions or networks? Please indicate what these are. (If your organisation is a coalition or network please ignore this question)

20. Is your organisation involved in any European coalitions/networks?
(Please indicate what these are)

21. Is your organisation involved in any international coalitions/networks? (Please indicate what these are.)

22. Does your organisation use the internet in its work?
(If 'no' please ignore the following section)

If yes how frequently (frequencies...daily, weekly, irregularly)?
What kind of information do you access in internet?
Who or what is the source of this information?
How important is internet information to your activities?

Section Six: Values

23. How would you rate the following as values that Irish foreign policy should reflect?

human rights

Irish trade interests
Ireland's EU membership
employment at home (Ireland)
global peace and security

24. How do you think Irish foreign policy-makers rate the same values?
human rights
Irish trade interests
Ireland's EU membership
employment at home (Ireland)
global peace and security

25. Are you a member of other similar organisations or other voluntary community organisations (please indicate the nature of these groups and, if possible, identify them)

Appendix C: Break down of NGO funding importance per category.

1. Single Country Soldarity Groups. (n = 14)

Degree of importance	Unimportant	Of some importance	Important
Subscriptions	8	3	3
Earnings	12	1	1
Govt. grants	10	1	3
Grants from other Irish orgs	6	3	5
Gifts etc	6	3	5
Trust funds	12	2	0
Corporate funds	11	3	0
EU grants	11	2	1
Other transnat. Org. grants.	14	0	0

2. Single Issue Groups (n = 6)

Degree of importance	Unimportant	Of some importance	Important
Subscriptions	5	N/A	1
Earnings	6	N/A	0
Govt. grants	5	N/A	2
Grants from other Irish orgs.	5	N/A	1

Gifts etc..	5	N/A	1
Trust funds	4	N/A	2
Corporate funds	3	N/A	3
EU grants	1	N/A	5
Other transnat. Org. grants	5	N/A	1

3. Coalitions/networks (n = 6)

Degree of importance	Unimportant	Of some importance	Important
Subscriptions	5	1	4
Earnings	8	2	0
Govt. grants	6	1	3
Grants from other Irish orgs.	7	1	2
Gifts etc	6	1	3
Trust funds	9	1	0
Corporate funds	10	0	0
EU grants	8	0	2
Other transnat. Org. grants	8	2	0

4. Others. (n = 6)

Degree of importance	Unimportant	Of some importance	Important
Subscriptions	5	0	2
Earnings	6	0	0
Govt. grants	3	0	3
Grants from other Irish orgs.	4	0	2
Gifts etc..	4	0	2
Trust funds	4	0	2

Corporate funds	3	0	3
EU grants	2	0	4
Other transnat. Org. grants	5	0	1

Appendix D: Frequency of contact with named offices/individuals per category.

1. Category: Single Country Solidarity Groups (N=14) no answer = never.

Frequency of contact	Very often	often	rarely	never
Taoiseach	0	1	3	10
Tánaiste	0	1	6	7
Mnstr for For. Affairs	2	4	6	2
Other govt. Ministers	1	3	5	5
Mntrs. State For. Affairs	1	8	4	1
Other TDs	3	7	4	1
Senators	3	5	5	1
Officials at DFA	2	6	4	2
Other govt. officials	2	4	3	3
Local Reps.	2	1	4	7
MEPs	3	6	4	1
EU Commissrs.	1	1	1	11
Commiss. Officials	1	1	5	7
EU Pres.	1	1	5	7

2. Single Issue Groups (no answer = never). N=6

Frequency of contact	Very often	often	rarely	never
Taoiseach	0	1	0	5
Tánaiste	0	0	1	5
Mnstr for For. Affairs	1	0	1	4

Other govt. Ministers	0	0	3	3
Mntrs. State For. Affairs	0	2	2	2
Other TDs	1	1	2	2
Senators	1	0	1	4
Officials at DFA	1	2	1	2
Other govt. officials	1	3	0	2
Local Reps.	0	1	2	3
MEPs	0	2	2	2
EU Commissrs.	0	0	2	4
Commiss. Officials	0	1	2	3
EU Pres.	0	0	0	6

3. Coalitions/Networks no answer = never. N =10

Frequency of contact	Very often	often	rarely	never
Taoiseach	0	0	6	4
Tánaiste	1	0	2	7
Mnstr for For. Affairs	3	2	3	2
Other govt. Ministers	0	2	3	5
Mntrs. State For. Affairs	5	0	3	2
Other TDs	1	4	2	3
Senators	1	3	3	3
Officials at DFA	5	3	0	2
Other govt. officials	3	1	2	4
Local Reps.	0	1	3	6
MEPs	2	4	2	2
EU Commissrs.	0	3	3	4
Commiss. Officials	2	2	3	3

EU Pres.	1	4	2	3

4. Others (no answer = never) N = 6

Frequency of contact	Very often	often	rarely	never
Taoiseach	0	1	1	4
Tánaiste	0	0	2	4
Mnstr for For. Affairs	1	1	1	3
Other govt. Ministers	0	1	2	3
Mntrs. State For. Affairs	1	1	0	4
Other TDs	0	2	1	3
Senators	0	2	1	3
Officials at DFA	2	1	0	3
Other govt. officials	1	0	1	4
Local Reps.	0	0	2	4
MEPs	0	3	0	3
EU Commissrs.	0	1	1	4
Commiss. Officials	1	1	1	3
EU Pres.	0	2	0	4

Appendix E ETISC Patrons.

Honorary President: Xanana Gusmao; Nobel Patrons: Mairéad Maguire, Archbishop Desmond Tutu; Patrons: Niall Andrews (MEP); Mary Banotti (MEP); Monica Barnes; Denis Carroll; Pat Cox (MEP); Martin Collins; Senator John Dardis; Deputy Prionsias De Rossa; Bobby Eager; Des Geraghty; Deputy Michael D. Higgins; Hot Press; Sr. Stanislaus Kennedy; Prof. Brendan Kenneally; Peadar Kirby; Deputy Tom Kitt; Bernie Malone (MEP); Deputy Gay Mitchell; Eleanor McEvoy; Patricia McKenna (MEP); Don Mullan; Joe Murray; Senator David Norris; Deputy Dan Neville; Fr. Seán O'Cuiv; Deputy William Penrose; Adi Roche; Deputy Dick Roche; Caitríona Ruane; Deputy Eoin Ryan; Senator Brendan Ryan; Deputy Trevor Sargent and Deputy Alan Shatter.

(Source: East Timor Solidarity Campaign 1997).

Appendix F: Dáil Éireann - Parliamentary Questions on East Timor 1986-1996.

Date	FF	FG	Lab.	PD	DL	Green
11.12.96	x				x	
26.11.96	x		x			
31.10.96	xxx				x	x
10.10.96	x					
04.07.96					x	
19.10.96		x			x	
07.12.95	xx					
20.09.95	x					
01.03.95			x			
31.01.95			x			
19.10.94		x			x	
18.10.94		xxxxxxxx				
11.10.94		x				
20.04.94		xxxx		xx		xx
02.03.94		xxxx		x		
19.10.93		x		x	x	
07.10.93		xxxxxx		xx		
10.06.93				x	x	
01.06.93		xxx				
06.05.93		xxx		x		
08.04.93		x				
07.07.92			x			x
03.04.92		xxxx	xx			
01.05.91		x				
09.05.87		x				

(FF- Fianna Fáil; FG - Fine Gael) Lab. - Labour Party; PD. Progressive Democrats; DL - Democratic Left; Green - Green Party/An Comhaontas Glas)

Total number of questions: 73; x = one question.

(Source: *Dáil Debates* 1986-1996.)

Appendix G: Seanad Éireann Activities on East Timor 1986-1996.

June 16 1996

Motion
Tabled by Dan Neville (FG)
"That Seanad Éireann compliments the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs on his repeated condemnation of the atrocities perpetrated against the East Timorese people, commends the Tánaiste's and the Irish Government's commitment to an internationally acceptable solution to the ongoing occupation and human rights abuses in East Timor and urges the Government to

make this one of its priorities during the upcoming Presidency of the European Union".
Outcome: passed.

December 7 1995 **Statement**
Dick Spring, Táiniste and Minister for Foreign Affairs

June 14 1995 **Motion**
Tabled by John Dardis (PD)
"That Seanad Éireann endorses the declaration made in Lisbon at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on East Timor; and calls on the Irish Government to take all necessary steps to ensure the implementation of the declaration in order to secure the freedom and right to self-determination for the people of East Timor." That declaration stated;
"In view of the exxisting situation, the participants in the Lisbon international parliamentary conference:
1. Exhort the Republic of Indonesia to abide by the UN resolutions on East Timor and comply with the international norms of human rights and international law;
2. Call on the UN to esnure the respect for human rights in East Timor;
3.Urge the UN and all Governments and Parliaments of the countries which have been selling arms to Indonesia to take measures aimed at enforcing an embargo to such trade cendemned by the European Parliament and by the international community;
4. Demand the immediate releases of Xanana Gusmao and all Timorese political prisoners held in custody in Indonesia and East Timor;
5. Urge the UN's member states, namely the powers with an influence in the area, to co-operate in the search for an internationally acceptable solution that enables the East TImorese people to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination;
6. Request the UN to proclaim the 7th day of December as the international day of East Timor;
8. Appeal to Parliaments in the international community to show solidarity with East Timor".
Outcome: passed

May 31 1995 **Adjournment Debate**
Tabled by Dan Neville (FG)

March 4 1995 **Motion**
Tabled by David Norris (Ind.)
"That Seanad Éireann, in pursuance of the motion of 16 November 1994 in the Portuguese Parliament: (1) firmly repudiates the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia and the crimes systematically perpetrated by the respective police and military authoritiesto the atriots of that martyred and heroic territory;
(2) regrets the persisting climate of terror and oppression endured by the Timorese citizens for so long - unresigned and unsubmissive;
(3) again draws the attention of the international community to the inalienable rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination; which the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic safeguards and the Portuguese support;
(4) in particular, firmly condemns the serious violations of human rights that have been perpetrated in East Timor and
(5) urges the release of all Timorese political prisoners, especially of Commander Xanana Gusmao".

Outcome: passed.

April 20 1994 **Statement**
Dick Spring, Táiniste and Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Source: Seanad Debates 1986-1996.)

Appendix H the Common Position of June 26 1996.

As adopted on June 26 1996 the Common Position was set out as follows:
In Article One The European Union, referring to previous declaration on East Timor, intended to:
1) "contribute to the achievement by dialogue of a fair, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor, which fully respects the interests and legitimate aspirations of the Timorese people, in accordance with international law;
2) to improve the situation in East Timor regarding respect for human rights in the territory."
Article Two set out the position to bring about the goals under Article One. They were that the European Union:
1) "supports the initiatives undertaken in the United Nations framework which may contribute to resolving this question;
2) supports in particular the current talks under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary General with the aim of achieving the solution referred to in point 1) of Article 1, effective progress towards which continues to be hampered by serious obstacles;
3) encourages the continuation of intra-Timorese meetings in the context of this process of dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations;
4) calls upon the Indonesian government to adopt effective measures leading to a significant improvement in the human rights situation in East Timor. In particular by implementing fully the relevant decisions adopted in this connection by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;
5) supports all appropriate action with the objective of generally strengthening respect for human rights in East Timor and substantially improving the situation of its people, by means of the resources available to the European Union and aid for action by NGOs."

(Common Position 25 June 1996, No. 96/407, CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 168/2, July 6 1996.)

Appendix I: Countries with ESAF agreements as of April 1995.

Albania, Benin, Bolivia, Burkino Faso, Cambodia, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam and Zimbabwe.

Appendix J: Organisational members of Debt and Development Coalition.

Action Aid; AfRI; Cambodia Solidarity; Christian Aid; Christian Brothers; Columban Missionaries; Conference of Religious in Ireland; Columban Sisters; Comhlámh; Concern; Cuba Support Group; Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul; DEfY; Dominican Sisters; Earthwatch; East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign; Franciscan Missionaries; Franciscan Missionary Sisters for Africa; Franciscan Missionaries of Mary; Holy Faith Sisters; Holy Ghost

Fathers; Interculture Ireland; Irish Commission for Justice and Peace; ICTU Third World Committee; Irish Missionary Union; Irish Mozambique Solidarity; Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed; Irish Nicaragua Support Group; Irish Woodworkers for Africa; Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice; Kerry Action for Development Education; Kiltegan Fathers; Development Studies, Kimmage Manor; Laois Peace and Justice; Little Sisters of the Assumption; Loreto Sisters; Medical Missionaries of Mary; Mercy Sisters - Western Province; Mercy Sisters - Southern Province; Mercy Sisters - South Central Province; Mercy Sisters - Northern Province; Missionary Sisters of the Holy Rosary; One World Group - Tullamore; Pax Christi; Presentation Sisters - South West,; Presentation Sisters - South East; Religious of Jesus and Mary; Sisters of the Faithful Companions of Jesus; Survival International; Trócaire; Volunteer Missionary Movement; World Education Project - Sligo; Co-operative Banking; Sisters of Charity; Basyside Missionary Group; Missionaries of Africa; Raheny Missionary Project; Church of Ireland Bishop's Appeal; Mill Hill Missionaries; One World Centre - Northern Ireland; One World Group- Galway; Oxfam; Presentation Sisters - Northern Province; Presentation Sisters - Generalate; Sisters of Our Lady of Apostles; SMA Fathers; the Aisling Magazine; Viatores Christi Lay Missionary Association; Waterford One World Development Centre; Casa Loreto; Ballyfin Women's Group; Mercy Sisters Central Leadership Team; Christian Brothers - St. Helen's Province; Midland Development Education Project; Society of the Sacred Heart and the Society of the Divine World.

The Debt and Develeopment also has an individual membership category.

(Source: Debt and Development Coalition, March 1999)

Appendix K: Members of the Sub-Committee on Development Co-operation 1992-1994.

Deputy Pat Gallagher, Chairperson, (Labour Party);
Deputy Noel Ahern (Fianna Fáil);
Deputy John Connor (Fine Gael);
Deputy Bernard Durkan (Fine Gael);
Senator Michael Lanigan (Lab?);
Deputy Michael McDowell (Progressive Democrats);
Senator David Norris (Independent);
Deputy Rory O'Hanlon (Fianna Fáil);
Deputy Eoin Ryan, (Fianna Fáil);
Deputy Sean Ryan (Labour Party);
Deputy Madeline Taylor-Quinn (Fianna Fáil).

Appendix L: Recommendations of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Development Co-operation on Third World debt with particular reference to the role of the IMF and the World Bank.

Recommendations.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the IMF and the World Bank. Accordingly, while it is recognised that other bodies (such as the Paris Club and commercial banks) have a major involvement, it is appropriate to recommend realistic reforms in the actions of the IMF and the World Bank regarding Third World Debt. These recommendations should be supported and promoted by Ireland as a member of these institutions.

Role of IMF and World Bank
The IMF and World Bank should spearhead the case for effective debt relief, and should push for the adoption of the Trinidad Terms as a first step towards more comprehensive debt relief, as well as a new approach to debt relief which starts from the requirement to meet the human and economic needs of developing countries, rather than to maximise debt collection.

Debt Cancellation

There is an overwhelming case for reducing the debt profile of the IMF in Sub-Saharan Africa. Currenlty the IMF holds golf stock valued at $36bn. The IMF could write off the whole of the Fund's exposure in Africa by using merely 10% of its reserves.

A special fund should be created to write off Africa's debt to the IMF through the sale of these gold stocks.

Reform of World Bank and IMF Policies

Accountability. The IMF should respond to calls from citizens in developing countries to *make the Policy Framework Papers available to the social partners in countries negotiating and adopting Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment.*

Country Reviews. Periodicially, the IMF Board of Directors reviews the performance of Stabilisation programmes in debtor countries. The names of countries under assessment are not disclosed prior to the review. *The IMF should announce the countries on the review agenda prior to the Board of Director's discussion.*

Poverty Alleviation. While the introduction of the Social Dimensions of Adjustment is to be welcomed, these have so far failed in their objective. *The World Bank must reform and monitor its poverty related interventions.*

(Source: Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1994 (April) *Report on Third World Debt With Particular Reference to he Role of the IMF and the World Bank.*)

Appendix M: Recommendations of the Second Report of the Sub Committee on Development cooperation on Third World Debt with Particular reference to the Roles of the IMF and the World Bank

1. Debt Relief.

The World Bank and IMF should continue to develop and pursue appropriate responses for the requirement for an approach the question (sic) of debt relief which prioritises the pressing need to meet human and economic needs of developing countries. The government should continue to use its membership of these institutions to press for movement in this direction.

2. Debt Cancellation.

The question of the elimination of Africa's debt to the IMF through the sale of gold stocks should be pursued. In particular, the Government should continue to seek support for this issue at European Council level, particularly during Ireland's Presidency of the European Union in 1996.

3. ESAF.

The Government should use its membership of the IMF to press for any reformation necessary to ensure that programmes such as ESAF are complementary to the need to minimise adverse social impact. The Joint Committee is not yet convinced that any additional funding by Ireland for the International Financial Institutions should go to ESAF, and welcomes further dialogue with the Minister for Finance on the issue. Strong consideration should be given to contributing any additional funding to IDA.

4. Reform of the IMF and World Bank Policies.

(a) The need for interest groups and civil society in debtor countries to be consulted by the IMF and World Bank prior to the adoption, and during the operation, of structural adjustment programmes should be acknowledged and acted upon.

(b) Moves by the World Bank, such as the trust fund proposed for discussion at the Autumn meeting, to examine and establish improved strategies for dealing with debt relief should be encouraged and supported by the Government.

(Source: Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1995 (October). *Second Report on Third World Debt with Particular Reference to the Roles of the IMF and World Bank.).*

(Source: Wood, Angela, 1996. *The IMF, ESAF and the Debt Crisis: How the IMF Can Assist the Heavily Indebted Countries*, Debt Crisis Network, London: 17)

Appendix N: The Beijing Process and Ireland – Preparatory Meetings.

UN-LEVEL: PREPCOMS.

March 1994. New York. PrepCom.
Delegates: Irish UN Mission (New York)
DELR

January 1995. New York. Annual meeting of the UN Commission (New York)
Delegates: Irish UN Mission (New York)
DFA
DELR

March 1995. New York. Final PrepCom.
Delegates: DELR (2)
Irish UN Mission (New York) (UN) (1)
DFA (1)
NWCI (1)
Dóchas/Banúlacht (3)

ECE Level

October 17-21, 1994 – Vienna
Delegates: Mervyn Taylor, Minister for Equality and Law Reform
Irish permenent representative to UN (Vienna)
DELR (3)
DFA (1)
Irish Ambassador to Austria
Private Secretary to Minister for ELR
Theresa Ahern T.D., Chairperson of Joint Oireachtas Committee on Women's Rights
Charles Flanagan, T.D., Member of Joint Committee on Women's Rights
Employment Equality Agency (1)

EU LEVEL.

27 January, Brussels.
Delegates: DELR (2)

14-16 April 1994, Toledo.
Delegates: DELR (2)
Employment Equality Agency (2)
IBEC (1)
ICTU (1)

COUNCIL OF EUROPE.

February 1995, Strasbourg. Conference: "Equality and Democracy – Utopia and Challenge".

Delegates: Mervyn Taylor, Minister DELR
Adviser to Minister for ELR
DELR (1)

June 1995, Strasbourg. Preparatory Conference of Steering Committee on Equality

Delegates: DELR (1)
DFA (1)

Appendix O: Members Of The Irish National Coordinating Committee For The UN Fourth World Conference on Women.

John Hurley	Dept. of Equality and Law Reform.
Peter Flood	Irish Business and Employers Confederation.
Rosemarie Smith	Irish Farmers Association.
Lee Mac Curtain	Department of Education.
Ruth Barrington	Department of Health.
Liam Canniffe	Department of Foreign Affairs
Margaret Nolan	Irish Congress of Trade Unions
Anne Taylor	Council for the Status of Women
Margo Monaghan	Department of Enterprise and Employment.
Kathleen Connolly	Employment Equality Agency
Deirdre Hogan	Department of Social Welfare.
Bridín Twist	Irish Countrywomen's Association.*
Pauline Eccles	Dóchas/Banúlacht.*
Edith Loane	World Federation of Methodist Women.
Frances Comerford	Department of Equality and Law Reform.

*Indicates NGO representation.

Appendix P: Funding provided to NGOs by DELR for the Beijing Conference.

National Women's Council of Ireland (£9,000)
Irish Country Women's Association (£2,700)
Cork Federation of Women's Organisations (£2,300)
Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed (£2,300)
Women of the North West (£2,300)
National Traveller Women's Forum (£2,700)
Forum of People with Disabilities (£2,300)
Inishowen Women's Network (£1,200)
Tallaght NOW (£1,200)
National Youth Council of Ireland (£1,200)
Women's Aid (£2,700)

Appendix Q: Mission Statement of Irish NGO Forum for Beijing.

Working List of Aims and Objective of the Irish NGO Forum for Beijing.

1 To provide an opportunity for groups to get and share ideas and information on preparatory activities.
2 To lobby the Irish Government to obtain adequate resources for women's groups to prepare for a participate in the Beijing process.

3 To encourage maximum participation by Irish women in preparatory discussion through supporting the organisation of Pre-Beijing Seminars, Conferences and an alternative Irish report.
4 To provide support and feedback to the NGOs represented on the National Committee,
5 To develop collective lobbying strategies regarding the position and contributions of the Irish official delegation.
6 To coordinate actions designed to stimulate media interest in Beijing.
7 To coordinate a representative, inclusive, creative and strong Irish NGO contribution to Beijing.
8 To facilitate and organisation in Ireland of parallel activities during the Beijing Conference.
9 To organise a Pre and Post Beijing conference.

(Source: undated document prepared for forum launch Buswells Hotel, Dublin, Jan 12 1995.)

Appendix R:
The Official Irish Delegation to the Beijing Conference on Women.

The full delegation was as follows, ranked according to the official delegation list in order of seniority in the government bureaucracy:

Head of Delegation: the Minister for Equality and Law Reform
the Minister for Education
the Minister of State, Dept. of the Taoiseach
the Secretary of the Department of ELR
the Irish Ambassador to China
the Director of the Department of Health
a counselor at the DFA
Principle Officers (2) in the Department's of ELR and Education
the Progamme Manager in the Department of ELR
the Special Adviser to the Minister for ELR
Assistant Principle Officer (1) in the Dept of ELR; First Secretary in the DFA at the Permanent Mission in New York
First Secretary, DFA (Dublin)
Press Officer in the Dept, of Education
Private Secretaries (3) to the Ministers for ELR, Education and the Minister of State
four officials from the Irish Embassy in Beijing; three TD's and one Senator
the clerk of the Oireachtas Committee on Women's Rights and the Oireachtas Committee on Social Affairs
the CEO of the Employment Equality Agency
the chairperson of the National Economic and Social Forum
the NWCI (1)
the ICA (1)
Irish Aid Advisory Committee (1)
Dóchas/Banúlacht (1)
Irish Aid Tanzania (1)

Appendix S: Irish NGOs at the Beijing Forum.

The full list of groups was as follows: Women's Aid; the (Dublin) Rape Crisis Centre; Cork Women's Poetry Circle; European Women's Lobby; Banúlacht; the Irish Women's Environmental Network; Cork Women's Federation; the National Forum on Traveller

Women; Fianna Fáil Women's Group; The Global Women's Network; Tralee Women's Forum; Women in Media and Entertainment; Women of the North West; Inishowen Women's Network; UNIFEM Ireland; Married Women for Equality; Amnesty International (Ireland); the National Youth Council of Ireland; Oxfam (Ireland); Concern Worldwide; the World Education Project; KLEAR; Solidarity; Development Education for Youth; the National Forum for People with Disabilities; the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed and the Centre For Research and Documentation.

Appendix T: Text of Irish government's 12 point commitment given at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing.

- to ensure at least a 40 percent quota of women on state boards,
- to strengthen and extend the scope of employment legislation to outlaw discrimination on grounds of gender and marital and parental status, and other grounds,
- to follow through a process of consultation on Irish women's and health which set out to improve the delivery of services by the Dept of Health,
- to implement a comprehensive family planning service within the public health care system,
- to provide for equal participation of women in all areas of the educational curriculum,
- to facilitate the publication of a document on gender equality in all third level educational institutions,
- to increase Ireland's overseas aid commitment to reach the UN target of 0.7 of GDP each year,
- to implement the 20/20 concept as included in the 1995 Copenhagen Summit (UN Social Summit).
- to provide for the participation of Irish NGOs in the platform to be agreed at the Beijing Conference,
- to continue to emphasise gender aspects of the Irish aid programme,
- to ensure appropriate, family-friendly conditions of employment, including access to child care,
- to provide legislation to further protect victims of family violence.

(Source: *Irish Times*, September 14 1995.)

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1. Persons who were interviewed or with whom there was correspondence.
2. Files, documents and correspondence of organisations.

Published.

3. Official Publications.
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   Official Journal of the European Communities.
   Eurobarometer
   General Assembly Resolutions
   Security Council Resolutions
   Dáil Debates
   Parliamentary Debates: Proceedings and of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the Sub Committee on Development Co-operation
   Seanad Debates

   Statements and Press Releases: World Bank/IMF and Irish Presidency (European Council)
   Various addresses and speeches by (Irish) government ministers.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Newspapers, Newsletters

   Irish Times,
   Maubere
   Update on Debt and Development
   Women Against Fundamentalism
   Timor Link
   The (London) Independent

2. Books, monographs, articles and Conference Papers.

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   Eurobarometer
   General Assembly Resolutions
   Security Council Resolutions
   Dáil Debates
   Parliamentary Debates: Proceedings and of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the Sub Committee on Development Co-operation
   Seanad Debates

   Statements and Press Releases: World Bank/IMF and Irish Presidency (European Council)
   Various addresses and speeches by (Irish) government ministers.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Newspapers, Newsletters

   Irish Times,
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