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The impact of electoral systems upon the behaviour of members of parliament

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
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Dedication

To my parents Rasim and Naxhije Mjekiqi.

Summary

This thesis examines the impact of electoral systems on the way Members of Parliament (MPs) behave as measured both in terms of Parliamentary Party Group (PPG) unity and constituency links. The main argument is that electoral systems are likely to have a greater impact on MPs' behaviour in newly-democratised countries that have weak Party System Institutionalisation (PSI) than in established parliamentary democracies that have high levels of PSI. In weak PSI countries, I argue, electoral systems that allow intra-party competition are likely to lead to lower PPG unity and stronger constituency links, while electoral systems that lack intra-party competition are likely to lead to higher PPG unity and weaker constituency links. Whereas in high PSI countries, electoral systems are found to have little impact on MPs' behaviour as MPs generally tend to vote along with their party and establish close links with their constituents regardless of the electoral systems, there is very little knowledge about the real impact, if any, of electoral systems in countries where PSI is low.

The research adopts a quantitative approach by analysing roll-call votes (RCV) from 21 European countries, including 6 South East European (SEE) countries never studied before and in addition, a qualitative approach is used to examine the extent to which MPs in two SEE countries, namely Kosovo and Macedonia, establish close links with their constituents. The analysis of roll-call votes reveals that PPG unity is generally lower among SEE countries compared to Western European countries, although the difference is not significant. Moreover, results of multi-level regression analyses show party system institutionalisation to matter more than electoral systems. That is, when the level of PSI is low, cohesion tends to be generally higher under closed-list PR, among other party-centred systems, and lower under open-list PR, among other candidate-centred systems. Government parties are also seen

as more cohesive compared to opposition parties. And, similarly, the smaller the margin of government over opposition within parliament, the higher the PPG unity.

When examining the impact of electoral systems on the extent of constituency links MPs establish, the case of Kosovo, where the electoral system changed from closed-list PR to open-list PR shows that MPs under the latter system develop more links with their constituents as opposed to their former colleagues. MPs under the open-list PR system reported they spend more hours on constituency activities, more hours in the local area, they receive a larger number of requests weekly by the voters and spend more time dealing with those requests. The case of Macedonia, with a closed-list PR system, also shows that MPs tend to develop close links with their constituents, but interviews with MPs revealed this is mainly due to methods of candidate selection where parties' decision on where to place candidates on the list is dependent on the latter's perceived popularity among the voters. This finding shows that the electoral system alone is not sufficient to enable us to understand and predict MPs' behaviour. If opinion polls are used to determine list order, as is the case in Macedonia, then in effect this comes close to transforming a nominally closed-list system into a de facto open-list system.

Overall, the research shows that the impact of electoral systems is more nuanced than some previous research has suggested. The impact is contingent upon other factors, especially the level of party system institutionalisation. When PSI is low, the electoral system, especially the choice between open-list and closed-list versions of PR, is likely to make more of a difference than when it is high. Moreover, even the unifying impact of closed-list PR can be negated by other aspects of the process through which individuals become MPs, especially the candidate selection process, which in Macedonia has the effect of inducing MPs to behave much as MPs elected under open-list PR are predicted to behave. Hence, the study suggests that the level of party system institutionalisation, and methods of candidate selection, are important variables that should not be neglected in any theory of PPG unity and of links between MPs and the electorate.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The study of legislative behaviour has attracted wide academic attention among scholars in parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. Legislatures, with dominant roles over legislation, the making and breaking of governments, and representation of constituency interests are seen as core institutions for the democratic functioning of countries. A number of scholars have especially explored the institutional factors under which parliamentarians operate in, such as electoral rules and methods of candidate selection, which 'serve to constrain the space of possible outcomes and thereby to shape the behaviour of legislators' (Alvarez and Sinclair 2011, p.545). In particular, electoral systems, through which citizens' votes are converted into parliamentary seats, influence the way members of parliament perceive and fulfil their tasks as parliamentarians (Deschouwer et al 2014, p.1), and they are 'the practical instruments through which notions such as consent and representation are translated into reality' (Bogdanor 1983, p.1).

The electoral systems are said to affect the extent to which legislators can benefit from developing a personal rather than a party reputation (Carey and Shugart 1995, pp.417-8). Generally, systems such as closed-list PR and most mixed systems, which lack intra-party electoral competition, are more party-centred providing few incentives for MPs to appeal for personal votes, while systems such as PR-STV, open-list PR and flexible-list PR, which allow intra-party electoral competition, are more candidate-centred and provide greater motivation for MPs to seek such

votes (Mitchell 2000, pp.341-2). These relationships are mainly measured through voting patterns of Parliamentary Party Groups (PPG) and/or the nature of links that legislators develop in relation to their constituents. They are both important when examining MPs' behaviour because under electoral systems in which MPs are vastly dependent on their parties it might seem that they can afford to 'disregard the voters' and vote on party lines, while in other systems MPs will presumably be more inclined to develop a personal reputation (Gallagher 2008, p.557).

The incentives for politicians to develop a party line and/or develop close links with their constituents rest on their desire for advancement and reelection (Carey and Shugart 1995, p.418). Just as establishing good links with voters improves MPs' prospects of reelection, adhering to the party line provides them with access to leadership positions or cabinet posts as well as privileges linked to those positions including committee appointments, campaign finance and publicity. Assuming that 'legislators are rational and career seeking', and as such they 'cast votes, introduce legislation, and lobby for pork to please the actors that control the most important resources', MPs will be inclined to spend more resources on the relationships that are electorally most rewarding to them. That is, MPs will make their strategic choices about whether and where to commit their scarce resources such as their time, media access or any other types of organizational assets in reaching their objectives (Strøm 1997, p.158).

Hence, if MPs can attain their goals through party loyalty only then they will adhere to the party line (Desposato 2004, pp.262-3). If, instead, there are alternative ways, such as through a direct relationship with voters, they are more likely to develop a personal reputation (Sieberer 2006, p.152). Overall, thus, the institutional framework within which MPs operate influences MPs' behaviour as it gives them incentives to follow one course of action more than the other. At times, however, even if the electoral system provides no incentives for MPs to develop a personal reputation there might be an expectation among the public that MPs will perform these tasks (Gallagher et al 2011, p.70), or legislators might regard constituency casework

as psychologically rewarding (DeWinter 1997a, p.142). In fact, it is the case with most parties within established democratic systems that MPs feel a sense of duty and commitment both to the party and their electorate (Norris 1997, Skjaeveland 1999).

We already know from previous research, that when party system institutionalisation (PSI, a term that we will discuss in more detail below) is high variations in the electoral system do not affect much either PPG unity or the extent to which MPs develop constituency links. Knowing that the level of party system institutionalisation is high among these countries, it does not seem logical, however, that findings among established democracies would easily apply elsewhere. For instance, within countries with a weak nature of party system institutionalisation, parties have weaker roots in the society as they tend to appear and disappear frequently from the political scene, and they are often seen as a barrier for candidates to win election because they often promise things which they will not necessarily accomplish (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, Roberts 2010). In such cases, MPs will have more leeway in exercising their roles and hence may be more influenced by the type of electoral system in use. This thesis will therefore test whether the conclusions that hold true for high PSI countries necessarily apply to low PSI countries, too.

Certainly, this raises the question of why exploring the consequences of electoral systems in countries where PSI is low is important in the first place. Firstly, this has practical benefits for democratising countries thinking about the type of electoral system to choose. As we know, the process of constitution-building following the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe entailed a heated debate in these countries about which electoral system to adopt (Norris 1997, p.298). Moreover, many countries, but particularly those of SEE, continue to change their electoral systems in order to reinforce or weaken MP-constituency activities. The latter has especially been the case with countries where MPs are considered to put too much emphasis on constituency relations to the detriment of dealing with national issues, e.g. as was the case with Colombia (Crisp and Ingall 2002), but it is

unclear what impact these changes have and how successful countries are in doing so. As Katz argues, 'changing electoral systems in the hope that they will lead to a mechanistic response from representatives is wrong because political culture plays an important part in determining the political consequences of electoral systems; the same institutions may be associated with quite different outcomes if the actors pursue a different mix of objectives' (1999, p.16). Therefore, the findings of this research could bear implications for both SEE democracies as well as those in other parts of the world as they struggle to unveil the true impact of electoral systems.

Secondly, the thesis will also throw light on the relationship between electoral systems and parliamentarians' behaviour in the SEE region, which is a relatively understudied part of the world. Perhaps, one of the reasons is the scarcity of data. As will be shown later, even the undertaking of this research project has entailed collecting original data which had previously not been available for research. Moreover, lack of interest in the SEE region might be attributed to the weak nature of democracy in these countries, which is often seen to hinder the actual effect of institutional rules. Yet, it is precisely the weak nature of the party system institutionalisation there that aids our understanding of the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour in these countries. Likewise, the fact that electoral systems change frequently in this region, allows us to examine MPs' behaviour over time, an advantage that we cannot avail of among Western European countries where these rules have remained relatively intact.

Overall, my objective is to examine whether electoral systems explain MPs' behaviour as measured along both PPG unity and the amount of constituency links that MPs establish. In doing so I conduct a broad roll-call analysis of 21 European countries, including 6 South East European (SEE) countries not studied before and in addition, through interviews with members of Kosovan and Macedonian parliaments, I investigate MPs' links with their constituents. The countries included in the analyses have different electoral systems, which allows us to test whether there is any systematic relationship between electoral systems and legislators' behaviour.

Moreover, the change in electoral system from closed-list PR to open-list PR in Kosovo allows us to compare MPs' behaviour over time there. Finally, taking Macedonia with a closed-list PR system as the other case study allows us to compare the behaviour of Macedonian MPs with their counterparts in Kosovo considering the similarities between the two countries.

In order to get a better understanding of party system institutionalisation among established and new democracies, the remainder of this chapter gives an overview of PSI for several European countries, and then provides a more detailed understanding of the nature of party system institutionalisation in both Kosovo and Macedonia; the countries examined in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6. At the end of this chapter, an outline of the entire dissertation is also provided. As will be explained more thoroughly later, we are limited in terms of the measure of PSI which we use here since data on this phenomena are generally lacking among SEE countries. Nevertheless, by looking at the pattern of government competition, which in Mair's terms marks 'the core of any party system qua system' (Mair 2006, p.65), we show that SEE countries fall behind Western European countries in terms of party system stability, and this has several implications for how MPs behave.

1.2 Party System Institutionalisation (PSI)

Party system institutionalisation (PSI) is defined as a 'process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time' (Casal Bertoa 2012, p.453). The level of institutionalisation is important for understanding party systems, yet the literature has devoted little attention to it outside advanced democracies, where PSI is relatively uniform. Most importantly, the level of party system institutionalisation has consequences for both representation and electoral accountability (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, p.2). Highly institutionalised party systems suggest that there is stability in the competition among political parties, and parties fulfil many of their democratic functions including representation of voters' interests (Lindberg 2007, p.215). On the contrary, under weakly

institutionalised party systems, the interaction among parties is fluid and the nature of representation is individualistic as the electorate tends to vote more in terms of personality and clientelism rather than the party (Mainwaring 1999, p.38). As such, considering that new democracies are characterized by diverse social and political contexts, it is more than clear that the impact of electoral systems in Western democracies will not necessarily hold among the weakly institutionalised systems of Eastern Europe (Moser 1999a, p.365). As Moser argues, 'given the absence of well-institutionalized party systems in most new democracies, it is crucial to return to the question of electoral systems in new democracies' (1999b, p.3).

According to Mainwaring and Torcal, weakly institutionalised party systems possess four features which distinguish them from highly institutionalised party systems. Firstly, party support changes frequently as parties themselves appear and disappear frequently. When party competition is stable, which is the case with most Western European democracies, voters can easily identify with a particular party on the basis of ideological or programmatic preferences, but when party competition is fluid, voters have a hard time identifying with any particular party. Hence they are more likely to vote on the basis of candidates' personal features or clientelistic goods rather than party ideology or programme (2005, pp.2,18). For instance, in 13 out of 30 African countries, Kuenzi and Lambright find that older parties fail to win any seats in parliaments, suggesting that the leading parties are in fact the younger established parties whose support in society has not stabilized yet (2001, p.453). Where this is the case, accountability is hindered because for it to work voters must be able to identify what those parties are and what they stand for (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, p.25).

Secondly, parties have weak roots in the society as they maintain distant relationships with constituents. Rather, the basis of relationships in weakly institutionalised countries are personalistic linkages between the electorate and their representatives. As Mainwaring and Torcal show, linkages among voters and representatives are more personalistic in what they call post-1978 competitive regimes compared to es-

tablished democratic countries (2006, p.204). When individuals rather than party organizations are more important, accountability also suffers, and as such we may expect that 'the promise that representative democracy holds, that elected politicians will serve as agents of the voters to advance some common good or to advance interests of specific constituencies, may break down' (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, p.26).

Thirdly, parties lack legitimacy as people often do not regard them as necessary organizations for democratic functioning. According to the same authors, 'citizens and organized interests must perceive that parties and elections are the means of determining who governs, and that the electoral process and parties are accorded legitimacy' (1995, p.14). Yet, among weakly institutionalised party systems MPs are aware that they do not necessarily need the parties to gain representation. In fact, it is common among these countries, for MPs to run as independents or even, as Mainwaring shows in the case of Peru (Mainwaring 1998, p.79), for MPs to switch parties knowing that they can still gain reelection and the electorate will not punish them for doing so. If however, the electorate tends to vote for the same party from one election to the next, there are limited electoral shifts that candidates can hope to benefit from (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, p.206).

Finally, parties are seen by political actors as weak organizations. For instance, in countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, Mainwaring argues parties suffer from weak resources and professionalisation (1998, p.78). There are two implications from this. On one hand, parties are subordinated to the interests of the leadership and as such fail to acquire an independent status in the society (2005, pp.5,25). In fact, often in these types of countries party labels are nothing more than 'personalistic vehicles for their leading figures' (Mainwaring 1998, p.78) where the leaders exercise strong control over nominations and appointments. On the other hand, weak party organization also affects how the individual MP perceives the party, and in turn what the party can do to control his/her behaviour. As Tavits argues, 'the stronger the party organization, the more valuable the party is to the

legislator, and the more credible and effective is the threat to withdraw electoral benefits if a legislator undermines party unity' (2011, p.410).

So how does the level of party system institutionalisation interact with electoral systems? As explained earlier, under party-centred electoral systems such as closed-list PR systems, for instance, since voters cast a vote for the party list and cannot distinguish among candidates, MPs have few incentives to vote independently from their parliamentary party group. Under candidate-centred systems such as open-list PR, however, where MPs have more incentives to distinguish themselves from their co-partisans, because of the intra-party electoral competition, MPs will try to do several things such as vote independently of the party line on some issues, develop close links with their constituents, or engage actively in conducting parliamentary business. Certainly, it makes more sense for an MP to try to distinguish himself/herself from the party when the level of party system institutionalisation is low, considering that voters tend to choose a candidate on personalistic grounds, and parties may hamper candidates' chances for reelection. Whereas, when the level of institutionalisation is high, it would be unwise for the MP to distinguish from the party because voters will choose a party first and only secondarily will they decide which candidate to cast their preference votes for.

More specifically, when the electoral system is candidate-centred, under circumstances where parties are weakly organized and where voters tend to identify with individuals rather than parties, the party will not be able to constrain the individual legislator's behaviour because the MP may gain reelection on the basis of his/her own efforts with the electorate. As mentioned above, legislators know that they can gain reelection even if they switch parties, or run as independents. Therefore, candidates in low PSI countries are presumably less constrained in their behaviour compared to those in high PSI countries, where voters identify closely with the party and as such candidates have fewer chances of gaining election on their own. When the electoral system is party-centred however, the party may threaten to remove the candidate, or not include him/her, on the list in the following elections if the can-

didate does not stick to the party line. Likewise, knowing that the electoral system does not allow voters to cast a preferential vote for the candidate, MPs will have few incentives to develop close links with their constituents.

Similar effects could be expected under party-centred systems in highly institutionalised party systems, but there the incentives to develop close links with constituents will be greater considering that MPs find constituency work psychologically rewarding, or they believe it is one of the principal duties as legislators (Norris 1997, p.47). One of the explanations for these incentives is related to political culture, or the expectations that constituents have of their legislators. For instance, within the British context, Searing shows that much of the psychological reward on the part of MPs, for having provided a particular service to their constituents, is a result of the gratitude that voters express afterwards (1985, p.377):

> And every now and again you do have a success. And my secretary will say, "It's a lovely post today, you have got three or four thank you letters". And, er, it makes you feel good. It feels good because one has done one's duty in taking the trouble to provide a service. And she wrote me such a sweet letter saying, "Thank you so much for taking the trouble to look after my small interests".

But, within weak PSI countries we see a different picture. For instance, in Turkey, Kim et al report that not only is there no similar follow-up when an MP has provided a service to his/her constituents, but also that a large number of constituency demands are of a personal nature and consume a relatively significant amount of MP's time. A response from a Turkish MP illustrates this (1984, p.145):

> They [constituents with personal grievances] come all the time. They may call you any time of the day or the night from the bus or the train station, tell you their problem and expect you to get on it immediately. They often don't know the capital, how to get around, how to do business. They want you to go and meet them, take them around and feed

them. If their business cannot be taken care of in a day, you may have to find a bed for them. When all is done, you have to see them off and on many an occasion buy their return ticket.

Thus, based on the above arguments, the electoral system is expected to have the following effects as shown in Table 1.1. Under strong PSI in electoral systems that allow intra-party electoral competition (e.g. open-list systems) both PPG unity and the amount of constituency links will be high, as is for instance the case with Ireland. The same is expected in strong PSI under electoral systems that lack intra-party (e.g. closed-list systems), such as in Norway, where MPs value constituency links. Under weak PSI, in electoral systems with intra-party electoral competition, such as Kosovo, cohesion is expected to be low but constituency links will be high. Finally, under weak PSI in electoral systems without intra-party electoral competition, such as Macedonia, cohesion will be high but the amount of constituency links will be low.

This theory builds upon the logic of work of both Moser (1999a) and Thames (2005). Using the effective number of parties to analyse party behaviour, Moser finds that the constraining effects of electoral systems, in terms of reducing the number of parties, are dependent on the level of party system institutionalisation. In countries such as Poland and Hungary with higher levels of party system institutionalisation, the number of parties was lower than in weak PSI countries. Moreover, in these countries the electoral system showed greater tendencies for strategic behaviour and learning over time compared to Russia and Ukraine with lower levels of PSI. Although not all electoral systems have the predicted effects, the study shows that the effects of electoral systems on party behaviour among highly institutionalised party systems are very different from those found under weakly institutionalised party systems suggesting that PSI is a key variable upon which the effects of electoral systems are conditional.

Similarly, in studying the impact of mixed electoral systems on MPs' behaviour in Hungary, Russia and Ukraine with varying levels of PSI, Thames found that a

Table 1.1: PPG unity and constituency links under different electoral systems and PSI levels

		Party System Institutionalisation	
		Strong	Weak
Electoral Systems	Intra-party electoral competition	**high cohesion high constituency links**	**low cohesion high constituency links**
	No intra-party electoral competition	**high cohesion high constituency links**	**high cohesion low constituency links**

lower level of PSI gave way to a 'mandate divide' in Russia, while no such divide was present in Hungary and Ukraine with higher levels of PSI. A 'mandate divide' suggests that MPs elected in single-member districts need to satisfy local constituents to ensure reelection because they are elected through local contests. Whereas, MPs elected under the PR component have a strong incentive to follow the command of the party leadership because they gain votes based on voters' perceptions of their parties as a whole, and depend on party leadership to secure inclusion on a good list position in the following elections. Thames further explains that in Russia, compared to the other two countries, in the absence of strong PSI the MPs elected under SMD did not think either that their reelection depended on their party's support, or that the party could deny them valuable electoral resources (2005, pp.284-7).

Overall, party systems of advanced democracies are considered to be more institutionalised compared to those of new democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, p.1). As Mainwaring and Torcal point out, party systems are more stable in the US and Australia compared to Latvia, Romania, Peru, etc. (2005, p.9), although there is evidence that suggests that party attachments have also decreased among the former (Dalton and Weldon 2007, p.183). Moreover, because of uniformity of institutionalisation levels across these countries, the topic has rarely been the subject of scholarly attention (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, p.2). In Eastern and Central Europe, Owens claims electoral support for parties is volatile, parties provide limited electoral resources, they lack ideological distinctiveness and legislators hamper

party responsibility because they know they can gain reelection even if they switch parties (2003, p.19). Similarly, Roberts notes that among weakly institutionalised party systems, parties know they may not be around for very long and hence have no incentive not to make big promises. In fact, they may never be around to face the consequences of over-promising (2010).

One may argue that the level of party system institutionalisation increases over time as voters learn to identify with specific parties, as parties develop ideologically, and as this feature becomes the ground for parties to contest elections and maintain links with the voters. Certainly some countries such as Poland and Hungary seem to have stabilized their party systems over time, while others like Russia and Ukraine have not (Moser 1999a, p.360). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that party systems in newly-democratised countries do not necessarily become more stable as time passes (Bielasak 2002, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). For instance, Mainwaring and Torcal find that electoral volatility in 19 world countries remained about the same across elections, and that there was no statistically significant difference between volatility at first elections and its level in the following elections (2005, p.10). Similarly, Lindberg finds across 21 African countries that party systems have not become more stable over time, but that a pattern of stability has remained among highly institutionalised party systems (2007, p.216). This aspect is worth pointing out knowing that the impact of electoral systems is tested over time across different countries here. Moreover, while our measure of PSI reports the level of institutionalisation at the most recent government term, for which we have data (see bottom of Table 1.3 for each country), looking at PSI levels for countries at each government term, it does not appear that the level of institutionalisation has gone up over the years.

Measuring party system institutionalisation however is not easy. In fact, employing the four different criteria outlined above such as party identification, party roots in the society, party legitimacy and party organization would be an impossible task among SEE countries included here. Many of the countries lack data on many of

these aspects of party system institutionalisation especially party roots in the society and party organization. Moreover, even among the highly institutionalised party systems rarely are all four components used. For instance, Mainwaring and Torcal acknowledge that there are difficulties obtaining data even among these countries (2005, p.8). Most often, electoral volatility, using Pedersen's Index, is used which measures the level of stability in the party system by comparing net support for parties in subsequent elections (Pedersen 1979, Roberts and Wibbels 1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, Tavits 2008). Others have used a dichotomous measure of PSI whereby countries are classified as having a weak or strong PSI without allowing for differentiation between levels of institutionalisation (Moser and Scheiner 2004). As Lindberg shows, even among African countries, with generally low levels of PSI compared to Western European countries, there is variation within leading him to classify the party systems into three categories: fluid, destabilized, and stable (2007, p.216). In addition, others have made implicit the low level of PSI among the newly-democratised countries without really providing a measure for it (Thames 2006).

What seems more feasible among the weakly institutionalised countries, however, is a measure of PSI provided by Casal Bertoa and Mair (2010), which is based on government competition, and is easier to measure and operationalize among the SEE countries. While the definition and conceptualization of PSI as used by Mainwaring and Torcal is certainly one which is most frequently used, perhaps because it focuses on parties rather than governments, the quality of data we are able to gather among SEE countries limits our definition of PSI to one which is practically testable. Hence, for this reason we adopt Casal Bertoa and Mair's conceptualization of the term and use government competition, instead of party competition, to measure the level of party system institutionalisation among countries.

The authors use four criteria to determine the level of PSI among several countries, including those of Central and Eastern Europe, as depicted in Table 1.2, namely frequency of change (how often party composition of government changes),

Table 1.2: The components of Party System Institutionalisation

	Party System Institutionalisation	
	Strong	Weak
Frequency of change	**low**	**high**
Alternation of government	**wholesale/none**	**partial**
Governing formulae	**familiar**	**innovative**
Access to government	**closed**	**open**

Source: Casal Bertoa and Mair 2010

alternation in government (whether the government composition changes entirely - total alternation, partially - partial alternation, or remains unchanged - no alternation), governing formulae (whether coalitions are composed of the same line-up of parties each time a new government is formed), and access to government (whether the government is open to including new parties in its composition, or the same parties tend to be in government most of the time). The level of PSI is considered high if the frequency of government alternation is low, if there is either total or no alternation in government, if the governing alternatives are stable and familiar and, access to government is limited to a number of parties; in the sense that new, previously non-governing, parties have few chances of being included in the government. On the other hand, PSI is considered low if frequency of change in government is high, alternation in government is mainly partial, governing parties lack stability in composition, and new, previously non-governing, parties have greater access to government (2010, pp.2-4).

For practical reasons, therefore, it is this measure rather than that of Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) which has been used to calculate levels of PSI for 34 European countries, as given in Table 1.3. Before looking at the scores, however, it is important to explain how each of the components have been coded and measured. 'Frequency of change' simply measures the number of changes in party composition from one government to the next, excluding the first government. A case where at least one

party either joins or leaves the government, is noted as one instance of government change. It must be emphasised that different from Casal Bertoa and Mair (2010), here a new government is considered one which resulted either from elections or from changes in partisan composition without elections necessarily having taken place because the measure otherwise is biased against stability of competition. Moreover, in order to make this component comparable to the other three, we have modified it, and instead measure the average changes in partisan composition per government. For each instance of government change, the number of parties that enter or leave the government are taken into account in our measure. For instance, if party A,B, C and D are in government at time t, while party C leaves the government at time t+1 then the average change in composition from one government to the other is 1/4. Similarly, if parties A,B,C and D are in a coalition at time t, and at time t+1 party C is out, but party E joins then the change is also 1/4 as only one fourths of the government changes. Since according to the table the higher the frequency of change, the weaker the party system institutionalisation, the scores for average changes in partisan composition have been subtracted from 1. As such, the higher the score on this component, the more institutionalised the party system.

'Alternation' measures the extent to which changes in government composition are wholesale; that is, the entire government is replaced by a whole new set of parties, or there is no alternation at all in which case the same parties remain in power in the next government. Scores on alternation range from 0-1, where 0 means there has been no case of wholesale/non-alternation and hence all cases of government alternation have been partial, e.g. as is the case with Romania where at each period of new government only some parties are replaced by new governing parties, while a score of 1 means all cases of government alternation have either been total or there was no alternation, as is for instance the case with Denmark. Similarly, a country with a score of 0.7 in the alternation component, such as Ireland, means that 70 percent of its government alternations have either been wholesale or there was no alternation, and the remaining 30 per cent of alternations have been partial.

'Governing formulae' measures the extent to which the line-up of parties changes with every new government in place. For instance, if out of five governments (excluding the first government and the first instance of government change), three have been familiar (a stable group of parties governed together) but two have been innovative (a new combination of parties formed the government), then 2/6[1] or 33 per cent of the government is innovative. However, in order to be consistent with the other components, whereby the higher the score the more institutionalised the party system, we subtracted the scores from 1. Hence, a score of 0.75 on this component, as is the case of Germany, means that in 80 per cent of its government changes, the same line-up of parties have been in government. Similarly, a score of 0.22, as is the case with Albania, means that in 20 per cent of government changes the same parties composed the government, while in 80 per cent of the cases, a new line-up of parties did so.

Finally, 'access' measures the extent to which new parties, namely parties that have never been part of the government before, partake in the new government. For instance, following from the logic above, if out of the two innovative governments only one of them entailed a new party which previously did not govern, then 1/6 or 17 per cent of governments have been open (included at least one previously non-governing party) while the remaining governments have been closed (all parties had governed at an earlier point in time). Similarly, in order to match the other components, scores here have been subtracted from 1. Hence, a score of 1 means that governments were always comprised of parties that have been in government before, while a score of 0.4 means that in 40 per cent of the time governments excluded new parties in their composition, while in 60 per cent of the time there has been at least one new party which was incorporated.

Certainly, measuring PSI has required us to deal with and take into account party splits and mergers, which perhaps are not so problematic for Western European countries, as they are for Central and Eastern European countries. In order to

[1]Note: the first instance of government change is included in the denominator.

account for these changes, the following rules have been applied: 1. if two parties merged into one then the resulting party was considered to be an 'old' party, and 2. if one party split from the other then the splinter party was considered new but not the party from which it split (Casal Bertoa and Mair 2010, p.12). The overall PSI score reported in the last column of Table 1.3, gives a single PSI score for each country which has been calculated by taking the average of scores on all four components. As mentioned earlier, the reported scores represent the level of institutionalisation at the most recent government term for which data have been available and are shown at the bottom of the table. The higher the score the more institutionalised the party system, and the lower the score the less institutionalised the party system.

What the table shows is that on the whole SEE countries have lower PSI scores compared to Western European countries, although exceptions exist. Figures presented at the bottom of the table show that the PSI mean for SEE countries is as low as 0.36, much lower than the Western European average of 0.75 (p-value=0.00), and it is also lower in the region compared to non-SEE countries (p-value=0.00). It is worth noting that as regards individual components, for instance, the change in partisan composition of government in SEE countries is not regular and takes place between regular elections as well as right after elections, which is a feature of weakly institutionalised party systems. This has happened in four of the countries, namely Serbia between the 2003 and 2007 elections, Croatia between the 2000 and 2003 elections, Slovenia between the 2000 and 2004 elections and in Macedonia between 2002 and 2006 elections. Similarly, in terms of the frequency of change in party composition of government, SEE countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia appear to be the most extreme cases with 9, 8 and 7 changes, respectively, in party composition of government with the less extreme cases among them being Croatia with 5 changes and Kosovo with 3 changes.

One might argue that problems may arise from using temporal aggregates for PSI scores of around 20 years. Yet, as explained earlier, the level of PSI seems

Table 1.3: The level of PSI in 34 European countries

Countries	Frequency	Alternation	Governing Formulae	Access	Average PSI
Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1
Denmark	0.80	1	1	1	0.95
Sweden	0.83	1	1	1	0.95
Greece	0.71	1	1	1	0.93
United Kingdom	0.67	1	1	1	0.93
Portugal	0.60	1	1	1	0.90
Spain	0.60	1	1	1	0.90
Austria	0.83	0.60	1	1	0.85
Germany	0.60	0.50	0.75	1	0.73
Ireland	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.75	0.73
Hungary	0.42	0.80	0.60	0.80	0.65
Iceland	0.80	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.65
Norway	0.33	1	0.60	0.60	0.63
Finland	0.73	0.33	0.33	1	0.58
The Netherlands	0.67	0.16	0.33	0.83	0.50
Belgium	0.80	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.48
Montenegro*	0.81	0.33	0.33	0.50	0.48
Estonia	0.67	0	0.25	0.75	0.45
Poland	0.48	0.57	0.29	0.43	0.45
Czech Republic	0.48	0.38	0.25	0.38	0.43
France	0.63	0.67	0.33	0.33	0.43
Slovakia	0.42	0.60	0.40	0.33	0.43
Italy	0.48	0.57	0.14	0.43	0.40
Latvia	0.61	0	0.20	0.80	0.40
Slovenia*	0.59	0	0.29	0.71	0.40
Croatia*	0.44	0.67	0.17	0.17	0.38
Macedonia*	0.51	0.50	0.10	0.40	0.38
Serbia*	0.58	0.44	0.22	0.33	0.38
Albania*	0.60	0	0.22	0.55	0.35
Lithuania	0.50	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.35
Romania	0.64	0	0.20	0.60	0.35
Bosnia*	0.56	0	0.14	0.57	0.33
Kosovo*	0.69	0	0.33	0.33	0.33
SEE mean					0.36
WE mean					0.75
Overall mean					0.59
N=34					

*SEE countries. Denmark 1996-2009, Greece 1993-2011, Luxembourg 1995-2013, Portugal 1995-2011, Spain 1993-2011, Sweden 1994-2010, Switzerland 1991-2014, United Kingdom 1992-2014, Austria 1994-2013, Germany 1994-2013, Hungary 1994-2013, Ireland 1994-2008, Norway 1993-2013, Finland 1995-2010, Iceland 1995-2009, France 1995-2007, Italy 1996-2011, Montenegro 1993-2010, Poland 1995-2011, Slovakia 1994-2011, The Netherlands 1994-2011, Albania 1992-2009, Belgium 1991-2008, Czech Republic 1992-2013, Croatia 1992-2014, Estonia 2002-2011, Latvia 2002-2011, Lithuania 2000-2011, Macedonia 1992-2014, Romania 2004-2014, Serbia 1991-2012, Slovenia 1992-2012, Bosnia 1997-2014, Kosovo 2002-2014. Source: European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook and Berglund et al 2013 (for government composition data in SEE).

to have remained about the same in countries examined. More specifically, among highly institutionalised party systems the level of PSI stabilised over time, but it did so even among weakly institutionalised party systems, perhaps with the exception of

Poland and the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, since our measure of PSI focuses on four different components, if at some point in time one of these components appeared more stable it would reflect this in the current level of PSI. Thus, although the overall PSI for each country represents the level at the most recent government term, this is calculated by taking into account information from all previous cases of government formation.

It must also be noted that in addition to the above measure, both electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, Tavits 2008) that measures the change in electoral support for parties from one election to the next, as well as government volatility, which measures the change in ministers from one government to the next, have also been calculated for all countries, although the scores are not shown here. The importance is that, overall, by all three measures the level of PSI among SEE countries is below the average for all countries. This is also true if relying on a new continuous measure developed by Casal Bertoa and Zsolt (forthcoming). Since it seems that electoral systems play little role on MPs' behaviour in highly institutionalised party systems it thus makes sense to focus on low PSI countries with different electoral systems in order to see whether there is any systemic relationship between electoral systems and MPs' behaviour.

1.3 Outline of the dissertation

Having provided an overview of party system institutionalisation as the principal theory behind this research, the rest of the thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on electoral systems and candidate selection methods and their consequences for MPs' behaviour. This chapter is broken down into two sections, one that reviews the literature on electoral systems and PPG unity, and the other one on electoral systems and constituency links. Explanations are offered as to why we would expect electoral systems and methods of candidate selection to have an impact on MPs' behaviour. In addition, a number of other factors, apart from electoral rules, are considered which potentially also affect how

MPs behave. Several hypotheses are derived from this literature and are then tested in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

Chapter 3 offers an explanation of the methodology used in this research. A mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods have been used to analyse MPs' behaviour. The quantitative component relates to the way MPs vote in parliament; that is, the thesis analyses roll-call votes across 21 European countries in order to examine the propensity of MPs to vote along with their PPG. As will be explained in greater detail in this chapter, the major contribution of the roll-call analysis conducted here is the addition of roll-call votes from 6 South East European countries, namely Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia which have never been examined before. A thorough description of data collection is also provided for each of these countries. The qualitative component relates to the other aspect of the dependent variable - constituency links. An overview of the interviews conducted with MPs in Kosovo and Macedonia under different electoral systems is also provided in this chapter along with an account of the data collection process. Likewise, the chapter also explains how both PPG unity and constituency links have been measured.

Chapter 4 examines the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour as measured through PPG unity in parliament. An analysis of roll-call votes from 21 European countries is provided here. As will be shown, the level of PPG unity among SEE countries is lower compared to those in Western Europe, although this difference is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, results suggest that party system institutionalisation is important in explaining MPs' behaviour in these countries. When PSI is low, PPG unity tends to be lower under open-list PR, among other candidate-centred systems, and higher under closed-list PR, among other party-centred systems. Roll-call votes from Kosovo and Montenegro are then clustered into different issues in order to see whether the level of cohesion is higher on issues related to government survival and lower in those which are not. Evidence suggests that in both countries cohesion is generally uniform across issues regardless of their

importance for government survival.

Chapter 5 looks at the amount of constituency links that MPs in Kosovo develop by comparing their behaviour under closed-list PR system, in use in 2004, and open-list PR, in use both in 2007 and 2010 elections. A detailed overview of the weak nature of the party system institutionalisation and its electoral system is also provided. Evidence gathered from interviewing 59 legislators shows that MPs under open-list PR tend to develop closer links with their constituents as opposed to those elected under closed-list PR. Among the former MPs, they report a larger number of hours spent doing constituency work, a greater number of requests, a greater amount of time devoted to those requests, and more hours spent in their local area compared to the latter MPs. In terms of candidate selection, these methods are quite centralised across parties, but under the open-list PR system candidates have a better chance to get reelected if they maintain close links with their constituents will get them reelected through preference votes.

Chapter 6 also investigates the incentives of MPs to establish close links with their constituents but within the Macedonian context, where closed-list PR system is used, through interviews with 49 Members of Parliament. An overview of its party system institutionalisation and its electoral system are likewise provided. Contrary to the expectations that under closed-list PR incentives for MPs to develop close links with their constituents will be lower, Macedonian MPs are very active in this regard. What explains this behaviour is the fact that when placing candidates on the list, party leadership takes into account candidate's popularity among the voters. Many of the Macedonian parties tend to rank most popular candidates highest on the party list. A comparison of Macedonian MPs' behaviour with that of their Kosovan counterparts follows next. Overall, Macedonian MPs resemble more Kosovan MPs elected under open-list PR than those elected under closed-list PR for reasons which, I argue, are mainly related to methods of candidate selection. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of key findings of the entire dissertation. Implications of these findings are also discussed here along with directions for future research.

Chapter 2

Literature review and hypotheses

Studying party unity and the extent of constituency links that MPs develop is important for understanding how democracy works. Legislatures, where major public policy decisions are debated and adopted, affect representation as they provide citizens with information through which citizens can tell whether parties deliver or not (Carey 2007, p.97). Moreover, in parliamentary systems, which is the case with all the countries examined here, cabinet survival depends on majority support in parliament since the government can be dismissed through a vote of no confidence (Lijphart 2004, p.103). One way of investigating MPs' behaviour has been to analyse voting patterns using roll-call, or recorded, votes in parliament. Roll-call votes provide a perspective on MPs' behaviour as the electorate can monitor how MPs vote on issues that are of interest to them. Compared to other types of legislative behaviour, recorded votes are also more easily monitored by both voters and interest groups (Carruba et al 2008, p.543). The other way has been to explore whether legislators do anything 'to increase their accessibility beyond what would normally be expected of them'. Looking at whether MPs hold regular office hours in their constituencies so people can have the opportunity to speak to them privately about their problems is one method of doing so (Mezey 1979, p.179).

One of the principal theories that has been employed to explain MPs' behaviour is rational choice. The theory assumes that electoral rules shape the incentives that political actors face, and that these actors are rational vote-maximizers that respond strategically to electoral incentives in pursuit of electoral office (Norris 2004b, p.7). Hence, considering that legislators are 'rational and career seeking' we expect that

they will 'cast votes, introduce legislation, and lobby for pork to please the actors that control the most important resources' (Desposato 2004, pp.262-3). If these resources are controlled by the party, which is most often the case with party-centred electoral systems that lack intra-party electoral competition, then MPs will have more incentives to comply with the party line and will have few incentives to develop close links with their constituents (Depauw and Martin 2009, pp.107-8). Apart from winning reelection, toeing the party line will provide them with access to leadership positions or cabinet posts as well as privileges linked to those positions including committee appointments, campaign finance and publicity (Desposato 2004, pp.262-3). In other cases, however, where there is intra-party electoral competition and thus local members may have greater control over MPs' reelection, the latter may be faced with constituency demands which are different from those of the party (Carey 2007, p.94). In such instances establishing good links with voters is essential to improving one's prospect of reelection.

To assume that politicians have monolithic roles is an oversimplification given the complex range of motivations that drive the pursuit of power (Norris 2004b, p.9). In other words, some MPs might be guided by motivations other than career-seeking. Perhaps the best summary of the different roles that legislators may have, and how in turn these may affect how MPs behave, is presented by Searing. Those who are mainly focused on representing constituents are termed 'constituency members' but there are also 'policy advocates' whose main goal is to try and influence government policies, 'ministerial aspirants' who are primarily concerned with being recruited for government positions, and 'parliament men' who are primarily focused on conducting parliamentary business (1994, p.32). For instance, among British MPs Norton notes that there has been a shift in role orientations of MPs from 'ministerial aspirants' to 'policy advocates' (1997, p.26).

Moreover, even when the electoral system provides no incentives for MPs to develop a personal reputation, the latter might regard constituency casework as psychologically rewarding, as has been shown in a number of Western European

countries (Searing 1985, DeWinter 1997a, Norris 1997). In other words, MPs may 'still engage in constituency service because of tacit social norms, informal rules within parliaments, or because some enjoy the intrinsic philanthropic rewards of helping the public' (Norris 2004b, p.13). Hence, we do not preclude that legislative behaviour might not as well be explained by a 'logic of appropriateness' whereby the assessment of costs and benefits on the part of MPs is determined by the social norms that are prevalent within the community as sociological institutionalism would predict (Martin et al 2014, p.10). Nevertheless, as Saalfeld argues, 'the precise process through which norms and role orientations are internalised is difficult to trace empirically. The causal link between role orientations and norms on the one hand and behaviour on the other remains unclear' (1998, p.797).

Comparatively, 'the electoral motivation forms the basis of the most famous and powerful explanations of the behaviour of politicians'. Most scholars have relied on rational choice institutionalism not only to explain the impact of electoral systems, but also of methods of candidate selection as well as legislative rules and organization on legislative behaviour. As Strøm argues, although legislators' behaviour may be shaped by cultural expectations and personal idiosyncrasies 'they are most likely of all to flow from reasoned and deliberate pursuits in which parliamentarians engage'. Thus, above all, legislators are goal-seeking men that behave in a way that suits the destinations they have in mind (1997, pp.158,165). Acknowledging the different incentives that might guide MPs orientations, Norris claims 'in all these cases, the Darwinian theory predicts that politicians who are not vote-maximizers, at least to some degree, will gradually become less common because, in general, they will be less successful in gaining election or re-election' (2004b, p.9).

Apart from being widely used, rational choice theory allows us to study MPs' individual behaviour as opposed to their group socialisation. This is particularly important when examining MP-constituency activities as we are interested in understanding how MPs view their own roles, and how in turn they allocate their resources to fulfill those roles. In the following section we explain the theoretical

mechanisms at work within our context. In particular, we elaborate the link between electoral systems, party systems institutionalisation and legislative behaviour.

2.1 Theoretical mechanisms

Rational choice theory is well suited to explain legislative behaviour both in terms of parliamentary party group unity and the amount of constituency links MPs develop. As explained, at the heart of the theory lies the assumption that legislators are utility-maximizers that seek reelection to parliament or advancement to legislative and party office, and in reaching these goals they respond to punishments and rewards provided by the party. As regards PPG unity, if we take parliamentarians' behaviour to be a result of the motivational approach, the theory predicts that unity is achieved and maintained as members of parliament discover their self-interested reasons to vote en-bloc (Davidson-Schmich 2003, p.88). It is rarely the case that those MPs that defect from the party enjoy access to career advancement and perks. Moreover, by linking the passage of the bill to confidence votes, party leadership is able to squash possible internal opposition (Hazan 2003, p.6).

Members of parliament may have incentives to defect from party unity, but only when they are faced with contradicting demands between party leadership and the voters. In such cases, legislators will find themselves torn between the former, that normally control selection of candidates to the party list, and the latter, which determines MPs' reelection through preference votes. The extent to which MPs follow one course of action over the other, however, depends on their perceptions as to who controls the resources. Otherwise, MPs might vote against their party line when this does not jeopardize their standing within the party; for instance, when the issue on which the MP votes against is not vital to the party, or the party is certain it will pass the legislation without the support from the respective MP.

This is not to say that cohesion may not be the result of MPs' own accords; that is, legislators might vote the same way for normative reasons including ideological beliefs, socialization, solidarity with the party and so on, rather than rational cal-

culations (Hazan 2003, p.3). In fact, Hazan argues that what keeps MPs together is either a sense of duty that they feel both to the party and their colleagues, or it is the institutional framework that provides incentives for the legislators to act in a unified manner (Hazan 2003, p.4). Nevertheless, we argued earlier that our interest is only in explaining MPs' way of voting in parliament and not their preferences, to which party discipline directly relates to. Equally important, within weakly institutionalised party systems, where MPs lack a sense of duty and commitment to the party which we find among high PSI countries, we cannot expect that PPG unity will be a result of such feelings on the part of legislators. As such, there is more scope for the institutional rules - electoral systems - to affect how MPs behave.

When it comes to constituency links, rational choice theory aids our understanding of MPs' behaviour as it focuses on their individual preferences and incentives rather than group norms. When studying these links links, we are particularly interested in understanding what MPs think about their roles and their conceptions about own activities. As it is argued 'the chief methodological recommendation of the motivational approach is the reconstruction of political roles as they are understood by their players' (Müller and Saalfeld 1997, p.10). The way MPs perceive their roles affects, in turn, the amount of links they develop with constituents, and how they calculate the costs and benefits of constituency service in view of the political opportunities and incentives they face (Norris 1997, p.30). Or, as Norris puts it: 'Roles shape what politicians do, how they do it, and why they think it appropriate behaviour (ibid, p.33).

When the type of electoral system is such that voters cannot cast preference votes, e.g. closed-list PR, MPs may view their role primarily in partisan terms and give little focus to establishing close links with their constituents, that do not have a direct say over their reelection. In such cases, MPs derive more electoral benefit by concentrating their focus and resources in winning intra-party battles that would give them a favourable position on the list, than by developing a personal vote (Mitchell 2000, p.345). When the electoral system, however, allows voters to

distinguish among candidates, MPs will view their roles in constituency terms and focus much of their resources in maintaining visibility and links with voters. By doing so, MPs hope to get the support that would enable them to serve another term in office. In other words, constituency activities are more likely to be performed when they are valued and agents have practical electoral incentives to carry out such tasks (Mitchell 2000, p.345). All in all, rational choice is perfectly fit to help us understand and explain MPs' behaviour both as regards voting unity in parliament and their links with constituents. In the following we review each of these aspects separately.

2.2 Parliamentary Party Group (PPG) Unity

Parliamentary Party Group (PPG) unity or cohesion, defined as '...an objective condition of unity of action among party members, which may or may not be the function of disciplinary repressions' (Ozbudun 1970, p.305), has attracted wide attention. Party unity, which therefore relates to the way MPs vote in parliament, differs from party discipline. The latter is defined as 'the outcome of a strategic game played within political parties, in which legislators who are party members respond to rewards and punishments determined by some internal party decision-making regime' (Gianneti and Laver 2005, p.2) and is thus directly linked to MPs' preferences, which is outside the scope of this thesis. A high level of party unity is considered crucial for the proper functioning of modern parliamentary regimes (Epstein 1980) as cohesive parties can facilitate the enactment of party programmes, patronage and stable governments (Owens 2003, p.23). The vast bulk of this research however, has focused on studying legislative behaviour within established parliamentary democracies, including studies of party group unity within the European Parliament, which perhaps is not the ideal setting for studying legislative behaviour since lack of unity would not jeopardize the existence of the government (Giannetti and Laver 2005, pp.2-3). Moreover, Western European parties are seen to be very cohesive leaving us with very little variation to explain.

There are several theoretical explanations as to why PPG unity might be higher in some countries and lower in others, barring established democratic cases whereby unity tends to be generally high for reasons which will be explained later. One of the explanations is the institutional structure under which MPs operate in, such as electoral systems that define the rules of translating votes into seats. Depending on these rules, MPs in some countries may have greater incentives to follow the party line compared to MPs in other countries. The other main explanation is that of candidate selection methods. Similar to electoral systems, the incentives for MPs to toe the party line will be greater under some rules of candidate selection than under others. Yet, explanations also include party related factors such as whether the party in question is in government or opposition. The following section explains these factors in greater detail and offers several hypotheses which are tested in the later chapters.

2.2.1 Electoral Rules

The conventional wisdom on MPs' behaviour holds that in electoral systems such as open-list PR systems and Single Transferable Vote (STV), Parliamentary Party Group unity will be lower compared to systems such as closed-list PR rules, Single Member Plurality (SMP) and most mixed-member systems (Carey 2009, p.92). The main reason is that in candidate-centred electoral systems where voters can cast a preference vote, candidates need to compete both with members of other parties as well as those of their own. Whereas, in party-centred systems this intra-party competition is absent as candidates only need to compete with candidates of other parties. From this we should expect that *PPG Unity will be higher in party-centred electoral systems which lack intra-party competition than in candidate-centred electoral systems which allow such intra-party electoral competition* (H.1). Moreover, for reasons which we explained in Chapter 1, we expect that the above effects of electoral systems will only hold when the level of party system institutionalisation is low (H.1.a). At times when an issue is not vital to the party, or the margin of

government over opposition is wide, the latter may allow some MPs to vote against the majority vote as this would not endanger the passage of the bill itself. However, when defections risk the passage of the bill, legislators will face greater pressure to stick with the party line on the matter.

In Western Europe, however, the electoral system has little or no impact on MPs' willingness to support the party line in parliamentary votes. As Gallagher observes, even parties that offer voters intra-party choice generally 'operate as near-unitary actors in parliamentary votes' (Gallagher 2008, pp.544-5). For instance, in studying 11 Western European countries, Sieberer finds little evidence that candidate-centred electoral systems are a sufficient condition for MPs to defect from their party (2006, pp.154,163). Similarly, small N-studies among these countries suggest the same. The case of Ireland is, as Bowler and Farrell put it quite 'puzzling', because the candidate-centred electoral system in use, PR-STV, not only induces Irish MPs to maintain close links with their constituents but it also produces high voting unity in the Dáil (1991, p.316). In addition, Gallagher and Komito note 'it is extremely rare for the deputies not to vote with the party; the norm is that every TD votes in accordance with the party line on every issue'. According to the authors, part of the reason why there is high voting unity in Ireland, although the PR-STV system does not conform to the standard idea of a party system produced under such preferential vote system, is a 'sense of loyalty and common purpose' among the TDs (2010, pp.201,213).

Hence one of the explanations for this type of behaviour on the part of MPs is the important role that cultural differences play, or the existence of a 'cultural effect' (Farrell and Scully 2007, p.58), rather than the presence of electoral incentives (Gallagher 2008, p.559). Skjaeveland argues it is collectivism in much of Europe that fosters a group-based model of representation and one bound by the party. In the case of Denmark, he finds that there is a sense of moral commitment and an obligation to vote with the party (1999, pp.124,130). The other explanation, elaborated in the introduction, is that the level of party system institutionalisation in

these countries is high. Under such circumstances, compared to weakly institutionalised party systems, there are firm attachments between voters and parties, and the latter; being strong organizations, are in a better position to deprive the legislator of the electoral resources in case the legislator does not comply with the party's position (Tavits 2011, p.410).

Outside Western European countries there is mixed evidence however. For instance, in Latin American countries Carey finds that even under closed-list PR rules unity is low, but this is mainly attributed to the presidential form of government whereby government's survival does not depend on majority support in parliament (Carey 2009, pp.161,168). On the contrary, the existence of a vote of confidence procedure in parliamentary systems is in itself an important element that fosters cohesion. For instance, Diermier and Feddersen provide evidence to show that attaching a vote of confidence procedure to a draft law is sufficient to produce cohesion (1998, p.616). Moreover, in presidential systems legislative bargaining takes place at the committee level compared to parliamentary systems where such bargaining takes place among the cabinet members. Accordingly, cohesion is high in the latter since cabinet is only composed of members from the governing coalition, but cohesion is low in the former because committees are normally bipartisan and minority parties also have the ability to exert influence (Diermier and Feddersen 1998, p.617).

In their study of Lithuania, Clark et al show that under its mixed system legislators elected in Single Member Districts (SMD) were more cohesive than those elected under open-list PR[1] (2008, pp.330-2). Under the open-list PR component, PPG was lower because deputies competed with members of their party as well, and in seeking to distinguish themselves from their party colleagues, they had more incentives to defect from the party line. This competition however, was absent under the SMD component where candidates only had to compete with candidates of other parties. Hence, PPG unity was higher as a result (ibid, p.320). Overall, the level of

[1]Note: The electoral system in Lithuania allows parties to decide whether they want to present a party list or allow voters to cast preference votes. In the study, all parties presented open-lists (Clark et al 2008, p.323).

cohesion in Lithuania, which is about 90 per cent in Rice scores, is much lower compared to Western European countries, although there is variation between parties (Lukoŝaitis 2004 cited in Clark et al 2008, p.322). Moreover, the frequent nature of party switching as well as the frequent tendency of parties to split, is considered to hinder PPG unity further. Similarly, low levels of unity have also been reported under open-list PR electoral system in the Czech Republic, where candidates could cast up to four preference votes. Moreover, although there seems to be variation in levels of unity among parties, government parties are found to be more unified compared to opposition parties (Linek and Rakuŝanová 2005, p.433).

In examining a number of African countries, VonDoepp finds that closed-list PR system facilitated high voting cohesion in Namibia. In such instance, the electoral system gave the party leaders absolute control over candidate selection and hence MPs complied with the party line for fear of being de-selected in the next election. But, in both Malawi and Zambia using SMP, MPs had more scope to defect from their party line. MPs elected under the SMP system considered they had more leeway in running as independents and still succeed (2005, p.75). Overall the study suggests that the main challenge to low party unity in Southern African countries is the individual MP's decision to defect from the party line for different personal reasons (2005, pp.67,75).

In Israel, under closed-list PR, Rahat finds that cohesion is quite high, similar to the pattern of cohesion found among parties in Western European democracies, but that it tends to be higher on some issues and lower in others. For instance, cohesion is generally high on issues pertaining to government survival such as the budget, it is median on issues such as security, foreign affairs and religion, which define parties' identities and coalition potential, and it is lower on constitutional issues (Rahat 2007, p.279). Similarly, unity is expected to be higher on issues which are directly linked to party ideology, as they tend to distinguish among political parties, and lower on issues which tend to cut parties from within (2007, pp.281-2). In another study, Hawkins and Morgenstern show that Latin American parties are

highly divided when it comes to sensitive; 'most divisive', issues. Most parties across countries exhibit low levels of cohesion on these issues (2010, p.153).

Nevertheless, it is hard to know which issues are ideological in the case of both Kosovo and Montenegro, where this effect is examined, knowing that parties do not have firm ideological grounds. Moreover, within these contexts, in the absence of an independent measure it is hard to ascertain which issues distinguish parties from each other and which issues cut parties internally. Certainly, if the test of whether an issue is internally divisive or not for a party is whether its MPs vote differently in parliament on that issue, then the hypothesis becomes a tautology. What we can do however, is to categorise issues in terms of whether they are important for government survival or not. Hence, we should expect that *PPG unity will be higher on issues which are important for government survival, than on issues which are not important* (H.2).

In addition, MPs' incentives to vote independently from the party will be greater as district magnitude rises. This, however, only applies within candidate-centred electoral systems where there is intra-party electoral competition. The rationale is that as district magnitude rises so does the number of co-partisans against whom every member is competing leading, thus, MPs to seek out a personal vote (Shugart et al 2005, p.439). As is noted in Gallagher and Holliday, 'incumbent MPs are vulnerable to losing their seat to a candidate of another party, and they are also vulnerable - perhaps, indeed they are especially vulnerable to being ousted by another candidate of their own party. This, it has been suggested, makes them especially attentive to the wishes and caprices of their constituents' (2003, p.109). As MPs seek out a personal vote, developing a closer electoral connection to the voters might pull them in directions contrary to what the demands of the party leaders are (Carey 2007, p.94). In closed-list PR systems however, the effect is not the same. In fact, as district magnitude rises, so does party unity (Depauw and Martin 2009, p.106).

There is another causal mechanism that explains why candidates in larger dis-

tricts would have more tendencies to vote independently from their party as they seek out a personal vote. According to Hix, as district size increases, party leadership's threat to drop or remove a candidate from the list decreases, because in larger districts, more so than in small districts, there is a greater chance that popular incumbents who disagree with their party leaders can potentially stand out as independent candidates and still gain reelection. Candidates in smaller districts, hence, are more vulnerable to pressure from their party as opposed to candidates in larger, multi-member, districts (2004, p.198). From the above arguments it follows that *PPG unity will be lower the higher the number of co-partisans against whom candidates have to compete* (H.3).

2.2.2 Candidate Selection

A set of literature suggests that candidate selection, in addition to the electoral system, also influences MPs' behaviour (Gallagher and Marsh 1988) although the two are closely related. That is, different candidate selection methods have different effects depending on the type of electoral formulas (Gallagher 2008). According to Gallagher, 'if both are closed or both are open we have a reasonable idea as to what to expect, but if candidate selection is entirely closed and controlled by the elite while the electoral system is open, or vice versa, our predictions can be less confident'. More specifically, if candidate selection is centrally controlled, such as by central party organs or party leadership, MPs are more likely to vote en bloc, whereas if their reelection depends on local party members, then they might be more likely to follow their own preferences, or the preferences of local members, which might not be the same as those of the national leadership (2008, pp.557-9).

A combination of centralised candidate selection methods however can co-exist with candidate-centred electoral systems, and decentralised methods of candidate selection can also co-exist with party-centred electoral systems. Both these scenarios have implications for MPs' behaviour. For example, in Israel a closed-list PR under a nationwide constituency co-exists with decentralised methods of candidate selection

and, because the local party members select the MPs, the latter only need to pay close attention to their grass roots. Moreover, under these circumstances, after MPs receive the necessary support from the party members they do not need to obtain the direct support from the people and, therefore they do not need to be responsible to the interests of the wider constituency (Hazan 1999, p.796). On the other hand, as the case of Belgium for selecting candidates for the European Parliament (EP) shows, under candidate-centred electoral systems centralised methods of candidate selection can also be used. But, if a candidate is threatened with removal from the party list he/she can choose to run as independent. Overall, what is central in any case when assessing candidate selection methods is MPs' perceptions as to who selects them and who has the right to de-select them in the following elections.

The literature on candidate selection methods however is very limited (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Bille 2001, Lundell 2004, Hazan and Rahat 2006) and there is not sufficient data on countries, except perhaps on some of the established democracies. Compared to electoral systems, however, there is somewhat more evidence that candidate selection methods affect MPs' behaviour. Sieberer, for instance, finds across 11 democracies that party unity is higher when there is a centralised method of selecting candidates (2006, pp.154,163). Hix also finds within the European Parliament that MEPs are less likely to defect from their national parties if there is a centralised method of candidate selection (Hix 2004, p.216). Lack of data for most SEE countries included here however, makes it impossible to study the impact of candidate selection on PPG unity. Nevertheless, data through interviews have been gathered for both Kosovo and Macedonia, among the SEE countries, and as such the impact of candidate selection will be examined in terms of MPs' incentives to establish links with their constituencies in these two countries.

2.2.3 Party factors

There are a number of other factors that are considered to affect party unity. One of them is the government status of parties. Parties in government are expected to

exhibit higher PPG unity than opposition parties. This is for several reasons. Firstly, government parties have more at stake. That is, their survival depends on a majority support in government. Secondly, by being cohesive these parties can also govern more effectively (Sieberer 2006, p.157). Moreover, in cases of a coalition government, the need to reach consensus on different issues among themselves may lead coalition partners to a more cohesive outcome, although the opposite could also be true that depending on the number of government parties, they may find it difficult to reach an agreement hence, pushing voting unity down. Finally, in parliamentary systems party leadership is seen as the most influential actor on legislators, and since among governing parties the leadership of the legislative branch and that of the executive are fused they have more resources to impose unity on the part of MPs (Carey 2007, p.95). From this we hypothesize that *PPG unity will be higher for government parties than for opposition parties* (H.4).

The gap or margin of government over opposition can also impact voting unity. As mentioned earlier, if the gap between the two is considerable, the government can afford some level of disunity as this does not jeopardize the legislation at stake. However, in cases where the margin is close the incentives for the government party to foster unity among its legislators will be higher since every vote is crucial to adopting the legislation (Sieberer 2006, p.158). Often times, however, even when MPs may not agree with the position of the party they may decide to abstain rather than to actually vote against (Carey 2007, p.98). From the above logic we infer that *the closer the margin of governing parties over the opposition, the higher PPG unity will be* (H.5). For instance, Sieberer finds across 11 European countries that as the margin increases, cohesion drops significantly (2006, p.166).

Several studies have also found that *small parties tend to be more cohesive than large parties* (H.6) because they are more homogeneous than the bigger parties (Desposato 2005, p.732). Both Mainwaring and Linan, in the case of Brazilian parties, and Hertig in the case of Swiss parties, find this to be the case (ibid, Hertig 1978, p.69). One caveat however, is that the index of cohesion tends to portray

small parties as being more cohesive than they actually are (Depauw and Martin 2009, p.104) which is why, as will be explained later, the averages for SEE countries are weighted by the number of party MPs taking part in each vote. Finally, *older parties will be more cohesive than younger parties* (H.7) because they tend to be more institutionalised.

2.3 Constituency Links

Looking at the extent to which MPs develop constituency links is another way of assesing MPs' behaviour. Several studies have tried to grasp this behaviour by exploring the extent and nature of MPs' interaction with their constituents (Ames 1995, Norris 1997, Saalfeld 2002, Gallagher and Holliday 2003, Farrell and Scully 2007). This aspect of MPs' behaviour is directly linked to the issue of representation which is a key feature of democratic governance (Studlar and McAllister 1996, p.69). Or, as Dahl puts it 'a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals' (1971, pp.1-2). As such, legislators are seen as an important link between voters and the government, mediating on behalf of the people to ensure that their rights are upheld (Norris 1997, p.29).

As outlined earlier, MPs will want to establish close links with their constituents in order to improve their prospects of getting reelected. That is, by representing specific interests, MPs can hope for increased electoral support in the next elections (Mezey 1979, p.193). Studies of constituency links within established parliamentary democracies are also far more numerous than those on newly-established democracies. Moreover, the findings suggest that MPs in highly institutionalised party systems generally tend to develop strong links with their constituents regardless of the electoral system (Norris 1997, Skjaeveland 1999, Skjaeveland 1999, Saalfeld 2002, Leston-Bandeira 2007), although there is variation in between. Yet, whether findings on MPs' behaviour in established party systems translate into weakly institutionalised party systems is not clear at all. Based on electoral rules, candidate

selection methods and representational roles of MPs, the following section provides a thorough explanation as to why, in practice, some legislators may develop greater links with their constituents than others.

2.3.1 Electoral Rules

Similar to the logic outlined earlier, candidate-centred electoral systems provide greater incentives for MPs to develop constituency links compared to party-centred systems. Certainly, there are differences within candidate-centred systems and these differences have consequences on MPs' behaviour. For instance, under a flexible-list system, such as that of Sweden, a pre-ordered list can influence the outcome of elections in cases where voters do not make use of their preference vote. Whereas, under a pure open-list PR, such as Switzerland, the list of candidates as presented does not determine who gets elected. Rather, voters alone can decide which of those candidates are elected (Mitchell 2000, p.342). But, in both cases, compared to party-centred systems, voters have a say in determining who gets to sit in the parliament.

On the other hand, party-centred systems are seen to 'prioritize party loyalty rather than constituency-related activities' (Gallagher 2008, pp.561-2, Carey and Shugart 1995, p.418). Firstly, in such systems, a legislator's reelection is considered to depend largely on the inter-party competition, therefore personal reputation is least important (Carey and Shugart 1995, p.424). Moreover, since the party determines the list of candidates, all that matters for MPs seeking reelection is to make sure they are selected again in the next election and secure a high position on the list. Finally, under party-centred systems, because voters vote simply for the party and cannot distinguish among candidates, they are not able to reward or punish those who get elected. Therefore, the incentives to cultivate a personal vote are few (Golden 2003, p.195), except to the extent that the candidate selectors' decision as to where to place a candidate on the list is influenced by the apparent reputation of the candidate among voters. From this we can expect that *MPs elected under*

open-list PR system will establish greater links with their constituents than those elected under closed-list PR (H.8).

Electoral systems are found by most previous research to have little impact even on the amount of constituency links that MPs in highly institutionalised party systems develop. For instance, in studying the behaviour of British MPs under the FPTP system, Norris finds that the amount of constituency activities that parliamentarians engage in are relatively large, but this is mainly a result of MPs' perception that constituency casework is rewarding rather than anything else. In her terms, 'recognizing this situation, electoral and selectoral incentives appear less important to British politicians than progression up the greasy pole of Westminster politics, combined with a general sense that casework is an important public duty of representatives' (1997, p.47). Moreover, studies show that the amount of constituency links that British MPs develop has increased over time (Gaines 1998, p.167). For instance, in 1971 most MPs spent about 11 hours per week working on behalf of constituents, a decade later they spent 16 hours, while in 1992 they spent 25 hours or 1/3 of their work (1997, p.30).

Similarly, under the closed-list PR system in Portugal, where 'the nature of representative mandate is still dominated by the party mandate' (Leston-Bandeira and Tiburcio 2012, p.384), Leston-Bandeira notes that MPs felt satisfaction in developing close ties with their citizens (2007, p.412), although this has largely been accredited to the rise of new communication means (Leston-Bandeira and Tiburcio 2012, p.384). Nevertheless, the authors acknowledge that a representative mandate only started developing post-1970 democratisation period. Before that, a history of political and institutional instability had created incentives for clientelistic relations between representatives and the voters as representatives would promise favours to specific constituencies in exchange for their support. Hence, the nature of representation was more personalistic and MPs followed their own individual agendas rather than collectively that of the party (ibid, pp.385-6).

In Germany, Saalfeld argues that despite the closed nature of the PR component

within the mixed electoral system, MPs 'establish dense communication networks in their constituencies', through e-media, personal contacts, local newspapers, web-sites, as well as individual offices in their constituencies. However, the extent to which parliamentarians engage in such activities varies among state and federal parliamentarians. For example, 37 per cent of the state parliamentarians spend more than 50 per cent of their working time on constituency work, as opposed to 18 per cent of the Bavarian Members of the Bundestag. In terms of constituency demands, members of Bundestag receive about 50 letters per week from their constituencies and another 50 from citizens outside their core constituencies. Moreover, the study notes there has been an increase in the number of constituency demands over time as a result of increased education and confidence in the political system (ibid, pp.56-62).

Similarly, Farrell and Scully (2007, p.199) found that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elected under open-list PR system tended to develop close ties with their constituents but so did British MEPs elected under its closed-list system. Likewise, as mentioned earlier, this is mainly a result of a 'cultural effect' present among British parliamentarians that induces a feeling of satisfaction on the part of MPs, rather than the electoral system (Katz 1997, p.218). An earlier study on MEP-constituency relations shows that there is certainly variation within the EP itself, with British MEPs for instance being more active in their constituencies than the French MEPs (Scholl 1986, p.323). But, the nature of links that MEPs establish as opposed to deputies in national parliaments are also different because of the diverse settings under which the two operate. For instance, MEPs have little to offer to the individual voters and hence they tend to serve local businesses or authorities by helping them gain access to grants and loans (ibid), and they also have limited powers over certain legislation in the EU.

However, outside strongly institutionalised party systems, findings are mixed and it is hard to compare them since they touch on different aspects of voter-constituency relations. For instance, in Honduras, Taylor-Robinson finds that the

closed-list PR system is not sufficient to explain MPs' behaviour in terms of the number of locally targeted bills that MPs initiate. Rather, the main causal factors are informal institutions, such as clientelism that fills the 'representation gap left by ineffective representation provided by formal institutions'. The parties, knowing that maintaining support from their local constituencies is essential in order to win the presidency, induce their MPs to maintain close links with the voters and even monitor the extent to which deputies perform such services (2006, pp.106-7). Moreover, the study finds that regardless of whether an MP is elected in a safe or marginal seat, and regardless of whether his/her reelection prospects are high or low in that area, deputies coming from poorer constituencies tend to initiate more locally targeted legislation as opposed to those from richer areas where the population is also more educated. Overall, the number of locally targeted bills that MPs initiate, as opposed to other bills, is seen as a reflection of constituency demands. As Taylor-Robinson puts it 'Honduran voters do not understand that a deputy's job is to legislate, and they do not value legislation because you cannot eat a law' (ibid, pp.111,117-8).

A comparative study of the Baltic countries does not find that electoral systems 'have an immediate or unequivocal impact on MPs behaviour', either. In other words, the study shows that MPs elected under centralised electoral systems do not appear to be more party oriented in their behaviour compared to those elected under candidate-centred electoral systems. In fact, Latvian MPs were the most concerned about addressing constituency issues and ready to relate to concerns of interest groups, although Latvia with a list PR system is considered to have the least candidate-centred electoral system (Pettai 2005, p.462). However, because the electoral system in Latvia allows voters to cast a preference vote within the party list, and in turn, party lists are re-arranged based on the number of votes received by the candidates (IPU Parline), there is a level of uncertainty as to the real impact of the electoral system. As the authors note, candidates have an opportunity for individual campaigning in order to encourage voters to vote specifically for them

as opposed to their party colleagues (ibid 2005, p.465) so this could be part of the explanation for constituency-oriented behaviour on the part of MPs.

Moreover, low levels of links between MPs and constituents have been noted in the case of Malawi using the SMP electoral system, suggesting that there is a 'representation gap' between electors and their representatives there (Afrobarometer 2006, pp.1-2). Responding to the question *'How much time does your Member of Parliament spend in this constituency?'*, in a nation-wide opinion poll conducted by IfESOR, 56 per cent of Malawians claimed their representatives never visited them in their constituency, 12 percent said they only visit once a year, and over 18 per cent said MPs only visited once a month. Moreover, on the question of *'How much of the time do MPs listen to ordinary citizens?*, 55 per cent of Malawians claimed their representatives 'never' listen, another 17 per cent said they 'only sometimes' do so, 13 per cent of them said 'often' and only 11 per cent said 'always'. The same report notes that what hinders representation of constituents is lack of accountability as voters are not given other mechanisms, apart from regular elections, through which they can hold their representatives to account (ibid, pp.4-6). In sum, the above studies show that it is hard to find a systematic relationship between electoral formulas and constituency representation in these countries, but they do point out the different environments that surround legislators.

District magnitude, along with the ballot, is also seen to influence MPs' incentives to cultivate a personal vote although, more so within candidate-centred than party-centred electoral systems. Under closed-list PR, where voters vote for a party list, as district magnitude grows MPs' incentives to cultivate a personal vote decrease. Absent the intra-party competition which we find under candidate-centred systems, and given their position on the party list, legislators may enhance their prospect for reelection only by 'putting a human face on the party' and winning the party the additional seat (André et al 2012, p.4). Whereas, as was mentioned earlier, under open and flexible-list PR systems as district magnitude increases so does the number of co-partisans against whom every member is competing (Shugart et al 2005, p.439).

In these systems, where each candidate depends on his/her own popularity rather than that of their party in order to get reelected, legislators will have more incentives to distinguish themselves from their co-partisans which they will do, among other things, by developing a personal reputation (Crisp et al 2004, p.825). Moreover, since candidates are members of the same party and are considered to be supporters of the same platform, they are unable to compete on the basis of either policy or ideology. Instead, they need to compete in terms of personal competence (Bowler and Farrell 1991, p.305).

Using bill-initiation, rather than constituency activities, under flexible-list system in Belgium a study finds that MPs submit more single-authored bills as intra-party competition increases (Brauninger et al 2012, p.626). Similarly, another study on a few Latin American countries finds that for legislators who face personalizing incentives, as district magnitude increases MPs' incentives to provide local or private public goods also increase (Crisp et al 2004, p.843-4). Looking for a relationship between district magnitude and MPs' incentives to develop close links with their constituents, however, is unlikely to be productive both in the case of Kosovo, since the whole territory makes up a nationwide district, and that of Macedonia where the country is divided into six equally sized multi-member constituencies.

The number of preference votes MPs garner is also seen to affect their behaviour within preferential vote systems, although as Norris notes, the effect of preference votes is contingent upon the actual use of such votes (1997, p.2). That is, in some cases voters may cast a vote for the party only although they may have the choice to cast one for the candidate as well. Members of parliament who get more preference votes could be expected to establish closer links with their constituents. Findings suggest that Belgian MPs react to the way their constituents make use of preference votes. That is, those MPs that attain more preference votes are also seen to initiate a larger number of bills (Brauninger et al 2012, p.610). But, the reverse could also be expected, that MPs who establish closer links with their constituents might garner more preference votes in the next election. Casting preferential votes in the case of

Kosovo for instance, which we examine in greater detail later, is optional as voters can decide to cast a vote for the party only. Hence, the effect of preference votes on MPs' amount of constituency links will be tested in this case, but for reasons which will be explained in detail in Chapter 5, this is quite problematic.

2.3.2 Candidate Selection

Candidate selection methods also influence MPs' propensity to establish close links with their constituents (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Gallagher 2008). As Norris notes, 'the selectorates are the representatives' primary constituency' (1997, p.32). When candidate selection is centralised, MPs are generally regarded as being dependent on their party's selectors therefore, they can afford to focus on developing a party reputation and be indifferent to voters (Gallagher 2008, p.557). Moreover, by developing a party reputation, the party can offer them a higher position on the list in the next elections. On the other hand, under decentralised methods of candidate selection where selection is made by the local party organization, MPs have more incentives to develop constituency links either because they think this will enhance their reelection prospects, or because the local party may consider this to be important. From this it follows *the more centralised candidate selection is, the lesser the extent to which MPs will establish close links with their constituents*, and *the more decentralised candidate selection is the larger the extent to which MPs will establish close links with their constituents* (H.9).

Certainly, there may be cases when even under centralised methods of candidate selections parties will want the MPs to establish close links with their constituents in order to boost overall party's support in the constituency. Similarly, under decentralised methods of candidate selection, local party selectors may expect MPs to primarily focus on national matters. However, generally, when candidates are centrally elected the assumption is that because party's central organs value more deputies' activities at the national level, parliamentarians will focus most of their energies in carrying out parliamentary duties. Yet, when candidates are selected

locally, and assuming that ordinary members are more concerned with how visible parliamentary representatives are in their local area, MPs will spend more time in developing constituency links or similar activities which keep them in contact with the local membership (Gallagher 1988, p.15).

There are a few studies that suggest strong effects of decentralised methods of candidate selection in tandem with candidate-centred electoral systems on MPs' behaviour. In Ireland, Arter notes that a combination of STV electoral system with decentralised candidate selection methods leads TDs to develop personal links with constituents, among other things, by holding 'clinics' across constituencies (Arter 2011, pp.131-4). Another study reports that 85 per cent of TDs interviewed hold clinics or advice centres in their constituencies on a regular basis (O'Leary 2011, p.335). In fact, Irish TDs are often criticized for being overly focused on building constituency links as opposed to focusing on national policy matters (Gallagher and Holliday 2003). Similarly, in Finland, a combination of decentralised methods of selecting candidates with open-list PR systems shows MPs to be far less party oriented compared to their counterparts in other Western European countries, although, on the other hand, the bulk of constituency activities that these MPs undertake concern bill initiation rather than constituency activities such as holding clinics, which we find in Ireland and elsewhere (ibid, p.149).

Overall thus, candidate selection seems key for electoral success of candidates, but measuring it can be quite complex. This is because candidate selection processes 'involve several sets of actors at various stages in the process from nomination to selection' (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003, p.68), and the power of central organizations vis-a-vis local ones varies from one party to the other within countries (Gallagher 1998, p.489). Moreover, while data are generally lacking even for developed countries, as Gallagher argues, for less developed countries, the problem is often lack of simple information (Gallagher 1988, p.17).

2.3.3 Representational Roles

As hinted earlier, MPs' representation of particular interests rests on their incentives to increase electoral support in the following elections (Mezey 1979, p.193). These roles however, which are generally classified into constituency, party and interest group roles (Wahlke et al 1962 cited in Müller and Saalfeld 1997, p.5), are only a fraction of what MPs do as legislators. As Katz argues, 'to serve as a mouthpiece or transmission belt for the views of ordinary citizens is one possible role conception, but there are many others' (1997, p.211). Representational roles vary within depending on 'focus'; namely whom MPs feel they represent, as well as 'style' which relates to the way MPs make their decisions. As regards the latter, under the 'trustee model', legislators, having been entrusted representation from the voters, tend to follow their own judgment of what is the proper course of action, while others tend to follow the 'delegate model' of representation, who once elected focus mainly on representing their constituents' preferences (Pitkin 1967). On the question of whether representatives would, in the case of conflict, trade off their party's opinion with their personal judgment on the one hand and their voters' opinion on the other hand, about 60 per cent of respondents in 15 Western European countries indicated they would follow the party line even if this means setting aside their personal opinion. And, similarly, 65 per cent indicated that they would follow their party line before that of their voters (André et al 2014a, p.103).

As regards the former, the nature of representation can vary from territorially defined interests, in which case the MP is seen to represent a designated geographical unit, to other spatial areas such as 'the nation', to functional in which case MPs are viewed to represent economic, religious or any other particular interests, as well as partisan interests in which case the main focus is on the party rather than the constituency (Brack et al 2012, p.387, Judge 1999, p.148). For instance, De Winter notes that almost half of Belgian MPs, when asked whom they felt they primarily represented, indicated constituency as one of the three most important roles, with socio-economic categories and party's electorate within MP's district being second

and third respectively (1997a, p.134). On the other hand, Arter finds that the majority of Finnish MPs represented primarily all Finnish citizens, then all citizens in the constituency, own voters in the constituency, party's voters in the constituency and finally all party voters in the country (2011, p.133-4). In Spain, a study finds that the primary focus of MPs was to represent all Spaniards, while their secondary focus was to represent all voters in their constituency (Mendez-Lago and Martinez 2002, p.70). In Hungary, Judge and Ilonzski show that under a hybrid electoral system, MPs elected under party lists identified the wider geographical areas of the nation as their primary focus while those elected in a constituency reported equal emphasis on the nation and constituency (1995, p.169).

Overall, when examining the nature of MPs' representation, it is important to find out who representatives consider they represent within a particular constituency and, in turn, how these can 'provide voting cues to the representatives themselves' (Judge 1999, p.148). Knowing whom MPs feel they represent can tell us about whom they listen and are responsive to. Explaining how MPs perceive their roles is also important among weakly institutionalised party systems. Mezey notes that in many of what he terms 'marginal legislatures', those characterized by a lack of congruence between legislators' behaviour and public expectations, such as Kenya and Thailand, legislators do not deal with their constituency casework effectively because they do not perceive their role in those terms. Moreover, in legislatures where candidate selection is centrally controlled, the party may want its legislators to become their agents rather than agents of their constituents (1979, pp.188,280). In such cases, legislators will focus on representing party's interests rather than the interests of the electorate.

Who MPs' feel they represent is closely related to the type of electoral system. Under closed-list PR, since MPs are elected through a party list they will, in principle, not be answerable to the voters but rather to the party that retains the right to renominate them or not in the next elections. Hence, representatives will tend to think of their constituencies largely in partisan terms (Mezey 2008, p.51). For in-

stance, Leston-Bandeira notes that due to the closed-list PR system and centralised methods of candidate selection, Portuguese legislators develop a party model of representation. As a result, 'parliamentary representation is therefore centralised around the parties and the opportunities for direct contact between parliament and citizens are few and far between' (2012, p.425-6). Under open-list PR systems, however, because voters have the choice to cast preference votes within a party's list, MPs need to pay close attention to the electorate as well. From this we can expect that *MPs elected under open-list PR will be more likely to view themselves as representatives of the electorate than those MPs elected under closed-list PR* (H.10). In addition, in cases where MPs are faced with a dilemma of whether to follow the party line or that of the electorate, we should expect that *MPs elected under closed-list PR will primarily follow the party line rather than that of their voters* (H.11).

In terms of representation there is another issue which merits discussion. While we argued earlier that MPs in open-list systems will establish greater links with their constituents compared to MPs in closed-list PR, who to develop close links with in the absence of territorially defined area, e.g. in nationwide district, is difficult to define. Moreover, when districts are small legislators can easily locate and consult with their constituents but, as districts grow this process becomes more problematic (Mezey 2008, p.56). In such cases MPs might identify themselves with the entire nation, their place of birth, or non-territorially defined groups such as women, ethnic minorities, and so on. These groups will then be the main focus for establishing close links with. As such, it follows that *candidates elected in multi-member districts will tend to focus their activities mainly in those districts, but under nationwide list-PR, in the absence of a geographically defined constituency, MPs will tend to focus their activities in their local area, such as their place of birth, or non-geographically defined groups* (H.12).

Although we have only looked at one aspect of establishing constituency links here, namely direct engagement of MPs with their constituents, there are other ways through which MPs can establish close links with their constituents, or perhaps,

signal activities to them. For instance, several studies look at intra-parliamentary activities such as bill initiation (Brauninger et al 2012, Arter 2011, Gamm and Kousser 2010, Taylor-Robinson 2006 Crisp et al 2004) while, others look at the amount and nature of parliamentary questions MPs raise (Martin 2011, Soroka et al 2009). Moreover, some have inquired into pork-barrel activities, such as providing private and public goods to local constituents (Ames 1995, Crisp et al 2010). Finally, the literature has also paid attention to the use of new ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies) by MPs in order to maintain links with the voters (Leston-Bandeira 2007, Ward and Lusoli 2007, Norton 2008).

The reason why this dissertation focuses on the first is because other forms of signalling activities seem to be irrelevant both in the case of Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as other countries of the region, and thus it seems unlikely that they may capture the extent to which MPs develop constituency links. Firstly, in the interviews I conducted most MPs mentioned directly meeting with constituents as a form of constituency activity. Bill initiation or any other forms, on the other hand, were rarely mentioned. Moreover, among weakly institutionalised party systems as is the case of Brazil, Ames claims 'deputies introduce legislation with no intention of shepherding their bills through to final passage' (2001, p.142). Thus, it is likely that MPs in these type of countries may introduce legislation simply to signal their constituents that they are active, yet not follow through. Secondly, data that summarizes the number of parliamentary questions that MPs make regularly is lacking. Obtaining this information would require us to look at the minutes of parliamentary meetings which would be far time-consuming. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that social media is widely used to foster MP-constituency links in our two case studies, due to a young population in both countries and high Internet penetration, and although not examined here, may prove productive in further research in SEE countries.

All in all, considering that the literature which explains the effect of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour is mainly limited to established democratic countries

that have high levels of PSI, this research contributes to the current literature by examining this impact within newly democratised countries that have low levels of PSI. There are theoretical expectations which suggest that the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour among the latter countries will be stronger, and the only way to find out is to test this within the context of weakly institutionalised countries. The principal implication, as will be seen later, is that conclusions reached among established democracies cannot be applied to newly democratised countries for reasons pertaining to their party systems. Hence, party system institutionalisation is a variable which should not be neglected in other studies of legislative behaviour, as it may have great implications for democratising countries elsewhere.

Chapter 3

Methodology

This research uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods in examining the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour. The quantitative component concerns the first aspect of the dependent variable; namely Parliamentary Party Group (PPG) unity. To measure PPG unity, an analysis of roll-call votes from parliaments of 21 Western, Central Eastern and South East European countries, involving over 100 parties, and several thousands of votes, across multiple legislative terms has been conducted. The purpose of the roll-call analysis is to explore voting patterns of MPs across as many pieces of legislation as possible. The analysis is suitable for revealing whether MPs vote along with their party group in parliament in which case voting unity will be high, or defect from their party line in which case voting unity will be low. Moreover, the analysis will provide a picture of where party unity in newly-democratised countries of SEE, which we know little about, stands in comparison to generally high party unity in established democratic countries.

The qualitative component of the research concerns the second aspect of the dependent variable, namely constituency links. The reason for including the qualitative component is to acquire information on MPs' behaviour which is not obvious from analysing recorded votes only. Through a roll-call analysis, as explained, one is able to see whether unity is low or high across parties/countries, yet little is known about MPs' propensity to establish close links with their constituents. Hence, semi-structured interviews with legislators in Kosovo and Macedonia aim precisely at understanding their efforts in developing such links with constituents. More specifi-

cally, the aim of conducting interviews has been to assess MPs' perceptions of their role as parliamentarians, their focus of representation, the kind of links that they establish with constituents, the amount of time they spend on those activities and so on. The following section explains in detail these two methods as well as the data collection process.

3.1 Roll-Call Votes (RCV)

Roll-call, or recorded, votes from 21 European countries have been used to analyse MPs' behaviour in terms of PPG unity. Roll-call votes are the principal tool of analysis for legislative behaviour (Carrubba et al 2006, p.691), and they are as Ferejohn and Fiorina frame it 'the most conspicuous aspects of legislative behaviour' (1975, p.411). While the literature that examines legislative behaviour using roll-call votes has increased over the years, it has been argued that relying on roll-call votes has its own risks. Owens (2003) gives three reasons why this is so. Firstly, by analysing MPs' behaviour through roll-call votes one misses the intra-party and inter-party differences which may exist before a draft law is brought to the floor, and what the parties do to reconcile these differences, which we referred to as discipline. In fact, in comparing party cohesion with party discipline in the Swiss Parliament, Hertig notes that the rate of consistency between how MPs felt and how they behaved varied from party to party because MPs hardly ever voted the same way they felt in discussions prior to the actual voting (1978, pp.77-9). Secondly, and related to the first argument, roll-call votes only reflect legislators' visible actions and not their hidden preferences. Thirdly, political parties are able to manipulate rules and procedures by keeping issues which would breach party unity off the legislative agenda (Owens 2003, p.16).

In fact, the last point highlights an important aspect of using roll-call votes for analysing MPs' behaviour; that is, the fact that in most Western European legislatures RCVs are only a subset of all votes. In such cases whether a roll-call is used or not is a result of a strategic choice by one of the parties (Carey 2009). As Saalfeld

argues, 'recorded votes are usually taken when an issue is highly contentious, when at least one party wants to signal its position to the public, or even the party whips need to assure Members' attendance' and as such they tend to overestimate cohesion in parties (1997, p.50). As regards the first set of critiques, they are more concerned with 'how MPs feel' rather than 'how they behave'; which is what the focus of the thesis is on. As regards the latter critique, however, the use of roll-calls seems to be a norm in parliaments of SEE countries. For instance 95 per cent of votes in Kosovo's parliament are recorded votes. The large number of roll-calls in Macedonia and Slovenia also show the frequent use of recorded votes. Nevertheless, I hope that deficiencies have to some extent been overcome by interviewing legislators in countries of SEE. Overall, the two measures should give us a sufficient understanding of MPs' behaviour in these countries.

3.1.1 Data collection

In order to collect roll-call data for the 21 European countries, I have been in touch with a number of academics, parliament officials, NGO representatives, colleagues, and acquaintances from Kosovo and other SEE regional countries. The number of countries for which roll-call votes have been collected is a result of data availability rather than anything else. Compared to those countries for which we calculated the level of party system institutionalisation in Table 1.3 (see p.17), the number here is considerately lower because gathering roll-call votes is much more difficult. For most Western European countries which are included in our analysis the data are mainly available on the Internet, or upon request from academics. Nevertheless, as Owens notes, even among democratic countries 'a cursory investigation reveals that roll call data are not available...at least for lengthy periods of time'. Among Wester European democracies, in fact, only for the United States are all recorded votes publicly available and come in an easily readable format (Carey 2007, p.98). Moreover, some countries appear to run about 1,000 pieces of legislation through a roll-call, as is for instance the case with Italy, but others as few as 50 (2003, pp.7-8).

Even among the legislatures for which data gave been collected, there is huge variation in terms of the number of RCVs obtained and used for analysis. Although this number is not shown for Western and Central Eastern European countries, they range from a few hundreds to several thousands. Likewise, even the information provided on a given vote is different across countries, with some providing very detailed information about the issue area MPs vote on, the type of vote (e.g. legislation, decision, etc.), and the different voting outcomes. Yet, the type of information we find in all legislatures is whether MPs voted in favour, against or abstained on a given vote which is in fact the only thing that interests us and is sufficient to calculate voting unity. Even if a greater number of countries and roll-call votes were to be included in the analysis, there is little evidence that results would change. As the literature suggests and the analysis later shows, there is comparatively a larger level of unity among WE countries, and more variation in the level of unity among CE and SEE countries.

More specifically, data on Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and UK have been obtained from Ulrich Sieberer (Sieberer 2006). Data on Belgium, France and Ireland came from Sam Depauw and Shane Martin (Depauw and Martin 2009) whereas data on the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland were collected from Margit Tavits (Tavits 2013). In addition, I managed to collect data on 6 SEE countries, namely Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, leaving out Albania and Croatia for which attempts to collect the data were unsuccessful. Table 3.1 gives an overview of the data by country, time period and source.

Data on Bosnia, Macedonia and Slovenia have been obtained from their parliamentary websites. In the case of Bosnia the data have been manually collected and as such there may have been some very minor errors along the way in transforming the data into a workable format, despite double-checking the votes. In the case of Macedonia however, since the number of RCVs was larger, they were scraped from the website. The same goes for Slovenian roll-calls but compared to the Macedo-

Table 3.1: Overview of roll-call data for 21 European countries

Country	Years	Source
Austria	1994-1997	(Sieberer 2006)
Belgium	1991-1995	(Depauw and Martin 2009)
Bosnia	2010-2012	Author
Czech Republic	1996-2009	(Tavits 2013)
Denmark	1990-1996	Sieberer 2006
Estonia	1999-2007	(Tavits 2013)
Finland	1995-1996	Sieberer 2006
France	1993-1997	(Depauw and Martin 2009)
Germany	1980-1990	(Sieberer 2006)
Hungary	1994-2006	(Tavits 2013)
Iceland	1995-1996	(Sieberer 2006)
Ireland	1994-1996	(Depauw and Martin 2009)
Kosovo	2005-2010	Author
Macedonia	2002-2006	Author
Montenegro	2009-2011	Author
Norway	1990-1994	(Sieberer 2006)
Poland	1997-2007	(Tavits 2013)
Serbia	2011	Author
Slovenia	2008-2012	Author
Sweden	1994-1995	(Sieberer 2006)
United Kingdom	1992-2001	(Sieberer 2006)

nian ones, they took a much longer time because of the particular nature of the website. Moreover, the different characters in MPs' names, which were not recognized by R, and the mismatch between names across terms posed further difficulties in working with the data. Likewise, party affiliations were largely missing in some cases so I had to obtain these manually and add them to the dataset myself. The data on Kosovo were obtained from an Assembly staff member who was in charge of handling electronic voting in parliament, with the permission of the Permanent Secretary of the Assembly. Data on Montenegro and Serbia were collected through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from both countries. There was one NGO in each country, dealing mainly with parliamentary oversight, that collected the raw data on my behalf. Altogether, collecting these votes has taken three years of my PhD, and another year working with them especially since the Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian data came in hard copies, and moreover, those of Serbia were in Cyrillic and required me to change the names into Latin in order for R to recognize them. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the number of votes collected for each SEE

country broken down by country and term.

Table 3.2: Overview of roll-call data for SEE countries

Country	Years	No of votes
Bosnia	2010-2011	371
	2011-2012	727
Kosovo	2005-2007	1771
	2007-2010	3863
Macedonia	2002-2006	4869
Montenegro	2009-2011	662
Serbia	2011	558
Slovenia	2000-2004	2133
	2004-2008	2946
	2008-2011	1854
	2011-2012	190

As hinted earlier, all data on SEE required cleaning. In the case of Bosnia, all votes which were obtained from the website have been used apart from one in the second term which was duplicated. A summary of votes provided on the website, which gives the order of votes, suggested that some votes were missing, but this could be because of other forms of voting in the parliament, which is in fact the case with all parliaments. In the case of Kosovo, 183 votes were excluded because they had no date and instead of the date it read abstain. In the case of Macedonia, only the votes for the 2002-2006 term have been acquired, although votes for earlier periods were available on the web. The issue with the latter type of votes was that not all votes were legible and some files would not open, and as such they were left out of the analysis. In the case of Montenegro, out of 667 votes, five votes have been omitted due to similar problems. Even in the case of Montenegro roll-call votes existed even before 2009, however efforts to acquire those data were fruitless since they had been managed by an independent company and not stored by the parliament. As regards Serbia, there were many votes in which only a fraction of MPs voted and the rest did not vote but were nevertheless listed. Where this was the

case and fewer than 1/3 of MPs voted, I excluded the votes. In addition, as regards Macedonia and Serbia, voting results were provided in Cyrillic only and as such they were then coded into 1 (Yes), 2 (No) and 3 (Abstain). In some countries the roll-calls registered a no-vote (e.g. did not vote) as well, in which case the MP was either present but did not vote, or was not present but his/her name was mentioned in the output file. Nevertheless, these votes not taken into account either, as the Rice Index of cohesion only considers votes in favour and against.

Roll-call data analysis required data on party switching as well to account for MPs who belonged to one party in one term and switched their affiliation to another party group in another term. This was not as problematic though because one could clearly observe this behaviour within the data sets. Yet, more problematic was to know which MPs switched parties during a single parliamentary term. To acquire this data I checked reports on parliamentary activities in each country. These reports were certainly more detailed for some countries than others, but in most cases MPs were listed and notes about their changes in party affiliations were also provided. At times MPs switched party affiliations as many as 3-4 times within one mandate, where, for instance, one MP moved from party A to being independent, to joining party B in a few months. This was, for instance, the case with Slovenian MPs that served during the 2004-2008 mandate, although there were very few that changed their party groups in the last mandate. Hence, I tried to take into consideration all these changes.

The varying degree in the number of roll-call votes for the SEE countries raises the question of why for instance Kosovo, Macedonia, and Slovenia have several thousands of votes, while Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia only have a fraction of those votes, an issue which merits discussion. Put generally, why do some countries legislate more than others, although one cannot exclude the possibility that a fraction of those votes are decisions since we cannot always tell.[1] One would assume that the legislative workload for all countries would be the same because they are all on the

[1]Note: Even in other studies, recorded votes used for analysis do not necessarily distinguish among types of votes, see for instance Saalfeld 1997.

road to becoming European Union (EU) members. As such, the EU requires the countries to harmonise their legislation with its own legislative framework, namely the 'acquis communitaire'. The adoption of a number of legislation is also required as part of EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs), which all the countries apart from Kosovo; although it is included in the process, have signed. One would also suggest that smaller parliaments adopt a lesser amount of legislation compared to larger parliaments, but this does not explain why Bosnia with a 42 seat parliament adopts 727 pieces in a year, compared to 558 in Serbia with a 250 seat parliament. Moreover, if we look at the case of Kosovo, which will be explained in greater depth later, the country declared independence in 2008 so the large amount of legislation could be a result of its state-building efforts rather than the size of its parliament. Looking at the pieces of legislation adopted over time does not offer a plausible explanation either. In the case of Montenegro, the parliament adopted 276 laws (116 amendments) in 2009, 420 laws in 2010 (1562 amendments), 525 laws (1940 amendments) in 2011, and 225 laws (812 amendments) in 2012 [2]. As such, it is difficult to come to terms with a single explanation that can be applicable to all the countries. Nevertheless, even if the level of unity were to be calculated based on a small sample of votes in each country, as the case of Kosovo shows, the overall unity scores would probably hardly change.

3.1.2 Measurement

In measuring PPG unity, I use Stuart Rice's Index of cohesion (Carey 2009) which is a standard measure of PPG unity in legislative behaviour. The Rice Index is denoted with the following formula:

$$RICE_{ij} = \frac{|\%AYE - \%NAY|}{\%AYE + \%NAY} \tag{3.1}$$

for party i on vote j. Hence, the percentage of those voting in favour (AYE) and those voting against (NAY) are calculated as proportions of those voting either aye

[2]See Izvjestaj u Radu Skupstine Crne Gore (2009)

or nay, and as such sum to 100 percent. The RICE score can range from 0, when an equal number of MPs vote aye and nay, to 100 in cases where all members who cast votes vote together. An alternative Index is the Agreement Index denoted by the following formula (Hix et al 2005):

$$AI = \frac{max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2}[(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{(Y_i + N_i + A_i)} \tag{3.2}$$

where Y represents the number of YES votes expressed by group on a given vote, N denotes the number of NO votes and A the number of ABSTAIN votes. When all members of the party group vote together, equals 1. When members of the party are equally divided between the three of these possible voting options then will equal 0. Compared to the RICE Index, the Agreement Index takes into account abstentions as well, which as Mezey argues might be important because 'dissent within parties may be manifested by abstentions from voting and, much less frequently, by voting against the party' (Mezey 1979, p.102). However, there are two main reasons why I choose to use the former. The first reason is that there is high correlation between the two indexes (Hix et al 2005). The second one is that cohesion scores on Western European countries that I obtained from Sieberer have been calculated by the author using the Rice Index. Thus, although the two indexes correlate well, using AI for SEE countries would be to compare the countries on slightly unequal grounds.

3.2 Interviews

In order to collect data on constituency links, I have conducted a number of interviews with MPs in Kosovo, both under closed-list and open-list PR, and in Macedonia under the closed-list PR. One can question the reliability of interviews as a means of assessing MPs' strength of constituency links; that is, MPs may have an incentive to overstate their constituency activities to appear active in their role. Moreover, I acknowledge that even those MPs who do not wish to be in contact with, or contacted by voters, might not openly admit. Hence, this certainly under-

mines the accuracy of their responses. Nevertheless, in addition to the fact there is no other feasible way to obtain data on MPs' activities in South East Europe, there did not seem any apparent reason why MPs would not give their best answers, and why they would systematically exaggerate the amount of time they spent on constituency work; after all, the data on individuals would not be disclosed publicly, so they had, in principle, no incentive to be dishonest. In fact, even though each MP was promised confidentiality and the interviews were recorded, almost all of them said they would not have a problem if their identity was revealed, apart from two MPs in Macedonia who did not want the interviews to be recorded altogether.

To try to get around this potential problem however, I employ several measures of constituency connections. One is the number of hours that MPs spend doing constituency work per week, out of their working hours as legislators. The second is the number of requests dealing with public authorities that MPs get from constituents per week. The third one is the number of hours MPs spend dealing with those requests. Finally, the number of hours that MPs spend in their local area per month is also used to measure constituency links. Moreover, in the case of MPs' activities under closed-list PR in Kosovo, the data consists of MPs' recollections of their behaviour a number of years ago. This could also be problematic in terms of the accuracy of MPs' memories. Nevertheless, this approach, with all its potential problems, is justified by the opportunity to examine the effects of electoral system change while holding all else constant.

At the time when interviews were being conducted in Kosovo the country was on the verge of local elections. In Macedonia, at the same time as MPs were being interviewed, early parliamentary elections were called. One could thus also question the extent to which MPs, swayed by the unofficial electoral campaign, might have exaggerated the time they spend with their constituents, and that this may not be representative of their time outside an election period. Nevertheless, only a few MPs were running for mayoral elections in Kosovo, while in Macedonia the fact that MPs had to be in parliament to adopt the large amount of legislation that was brought

by the government in the last few weeks of their mandate meant that MPs had to think outside the election period as otherwise, as largely conveyed, the time they spent with constituencies in that particular month was minimal.

3.2.1 Data collection

Kosovo

In collecting data on Kosovo, I first did a pilot study by conducting, within a one week period, during April 2013, 14 interviews with MPs: 7 with members of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 4 with members of Kosovo's Democratic Party (PDK) party, and 3 with members of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). Out of these, 5 out of 7 from LDK and all from PDK served both under closed-list and open-list PR. There was also an MP from AAK who has served both in 2004 and 2007 but the MP no longer lived in Kosovo so I could not interview her. Questions were mostly open ended with MPs first being asked questions about methods of candidate selection within their parties, followed by questions about their ways of keeping in contact with the electorate.

As a result of examining MPs' responses to the questions asked in the pilot study, the questionnaire was refined based largely on the PartiRep survey (see Appendix A) so that the data generated from interviews would be more suitable for analysis and in the summer of 2013 I went back with a redesigned questionnaire. Members of Parliament did not always feel particularly keen on answering the 'math-questions', such as how many hours per work they spent doing constituency work, but I gave them plenty of time to think before they answered. The first interview was conducted on 20 June 2013 and the last one on 16 August 2013. In total I conducted 59 interviews with 49 MPs in total, but 10 MPs were interviewed twice and as such they are counted additionally. The number of MPs interviewed from the three main parties by electoral system and gender is shown in Table 3.3. Other parties have been purposely excluded as they were either very small, or were not represented across terms and as such one could not compare their behaviour over time. It must

be noted that one member from a minority community also features here because he was part of one of the larger pre-electoral coalitions and likewise part of their PPG group as well. In that case even the questions pertaining to candidate selection were posed in such a way as to gather insight on rules governing the selection to the electoral list rather than his own party list.

At the time the interviews were conducted, MPs were heavily loaded with work as the parliament met every single working day apart from Tuesdays. In a way this was a good thing because most of them could be found in Assembly's hallway. It also helped having worked previously in the same building and knowing the terrain, but it only took one confirmed appointment for the day in order to be able to get inside the building. For the rest, I would stay in parliament, often for several hours, until I got as many interviews done as I could. Generally, MPs were very approachable on short notice and a large number of them even came out of the parliamentary session to conduct the interview and get back in time for the voting period. On average, the interviews lasted about 40 minutes, with the longest being about 1.5 hours and the shortest about 15 minutes.

The largest number of interviews were conducted while the parliament was still in session, thus until the beginning of August. Certainly, this did not apply so much to MPs who were not currently serving their mandates. After that it was difficult to get in touch with MPs because of the holiday period. The interviews were conducted in MPs' offices in the parliament, in parliament's hallways, in cafés outside, and two were completed through email because one MP was currently abroad but offered to answer the questions, and the other one thought that was more practical. In cases when MPs were interviewed in cafés or hallways, I made sure that they were conducted in private and that legislators were not overheard by others. The first set of interviewees were selected purposively because the aim was to interview those MPs who served both under closed-list and open-list PR in order to ask them about their constituency links under both systems. Afterwards, snowballing helped a lot. Overall, however, it is hard to give a response rate for the interviews because not

Table 3.3: Number of MPs interviewed in Kosovo, 2013

	PPG			Gender		Electoral System		
	LDK	PDK	AAK	Male	Female	closed-list PR	open-list PR	N
MPs	27	21	11	43	16	19	40	59
Size	25*/29**	37/34	13/13	85/80	35/40			120***
Government	Y/N	Y/Y	N/ N					

First term. **Second term. * MPs from 20 reserved seats were not interviewed.*

all MPs were targeted for reasons which were explained earlier, and those that were targeted broadly responded to the questions.

Knowing that party switching is common in Kosovo, I had to ensure that those switches were taken into account when classifying MPs into party groups. No particular data were consulted however because of my familiarity with the political developments. It is worth noting that there was no case, from those interviewed, where MPs switched parties during the mandate for which they were being interviewed. Three cases are worth considering however. One is an MP that belonged to one party when serving in the first term and to a different party at the second term. I only interviewed the MP about the second term mainly because the MP's party was dissolved and is no longer represented in parliament. The second case was an MP who had been part of another party earlier, but at that time he was a Minister rather than an MP so this was irrelevant since his behaviour over time could not be compared. The third case is the MP from the minority community who has been in parliament for several terms, but similar to the first case I only interviewed the MP regarding the current term under which he was part of a larger party group; one that has been in government for several mandates.

Macedonia

In studying the incentives of Macedonian MPs to maintain close links with their constituents, interviews with legislators have also been conducted there, similar to the case of Kosovo. A total of 49 interviews were conducted during February 2014 with the first interview having been conducted on 4 February and the last on 28 February. Having found out in January that there may be early elections scheduled along with regular Presidential elections in April, I arranged to stay in Macedonia for the whole month just prior to the conclusion of the parliamentary term on 5 March. Interviewing MPs after this time was difficult since they all scattered around the country to campaign, although the official campaign had not started yet; a common practice in most countries in the region. Table 3.4 shows the number of MPs interviewed by parliamentary group, gender and ethnicity.

Questions used were the same as those on Kosovo, under closed-list PR system, thus largely taken from the PartiRep survey. At times, MPs complained about the length of the questionnaire but over 90 per cent of the MPs interviewed answered all questions. Giving an overall response rate for Macedonia, similarly as in the case of Kosovo, is hard however, although it would have been helpful in order to compare these with response rates of other studies. The main reason for this is that I only aimed, and managed, to secure 50-60 interviews in both Kosovo and Macedonia; enough to give me a representative sample of the entire body of MPs. The success to conducting so many interviews in such a short period of time lays mainly with the help I received from the chair of the ethnic-Albanian PPG Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). DUI's staff provided me with assistance in scheduling the interviews, and since the party was part of the coalition I managed to interview a large number of ethnic-Macedonian MPs from their coalition partner as well. Moreover, the interpretation provided by DUI's staff as well as a Macedonian academic was extremely helpful in conducting interviews with Macedonian speaking legislators. The first group of interviewees were selected purposefully, namely those that spoke English and Albanian; my mother tongue. After this however, snowballing was the

Table 3.4: Number of MPs interviewed in Macedonia, 2014

	PPG						Ethnicity					Gender		
	VMRO	SDSM*	DUI	DPA	PEI	NDR**	Macedonian	Albanian	Vllach	Bosnian	Roma	Male	Female	N
MPs	18	14	9	5	2	1	30	15	2	1	1	26	23	49
Size	56	37	15	8	5	2	84	25	2	2	2	81	42	123***
Government	Y	N	Y	N	N	N								

**The number of seats that the SDSM coalition gained is 42, however PEI along with two independent MPs (also part of the SDSM coalition) formed a separate parliamentary group later. **NDR has no parliamentary group. ***None of the three diaspora MPs were interviewed.*

main approach as many of the MPs interviewed would refer me to, or even schedule me interviews with, their party fellows. Overall, 17 interviews were conducted in English, 15 in Albanian, 14 in Macedonian with interpretation, and I myself conducted 3 interviews in Serbian. This made it possible to include in the list of interviewees MPs of different ethnicities and age groups but, it certainly prolonged a few interviews. The shortest interview lasted about 15 minutes and the longest interview lasted about 1.5 hours.

The interviews were scheduled on short notice. I initially sent emails to all the Macedonian MPs' official email accounts but the response rate was very low especially since most of their inboxes were full. Consequently, I obtained MPs' telephone numbers and, once I got to Skopje I either called or messaged MPs directly to schedule interviews. In fact, contacting MPs through telephone is probably the only way to arrange interviews both in Macedonia and Kosovo. The other difficulty was that, as mentioned earlier, it was pretty clear that by the time I got to Skopje, parliamentary elections would also take place shortly after the Presidential elections which were scheduled for April. As such, the parliament was meeting every day including Fridays, which according to the Law on the Assembly (Article 36), are days

when representatives should meet with their constituents outside the parliament, and committee meetings were taking place even more often. In the last few days of its mandate alone, over 150 laws were brought for adoption by the government. Generally, therefore, MPs had little time to do anything else, but were nevertheless approachable and most allowed enough time to answer all the questions.

In order to find out whether any of the MPs interviewed switched parties during the mandate, I had to consult the data on party switching which came from the Macedonian parliamentary website.[3] The so called 'Izvestaj' (Report) that described all parliamentary activities for a specific period of time, were only available in Cyrillic. At times, the Izvestaj provided the list of MPs for the parliamentary term in question but did not specify who switched party groups from the previous period. In those cases, I compared the list of MPs and their party groups from one period to the other. None of the MPs interviewed switched parties during the term for which they were interviewed. It must be noted, however, that there was a case with one of the MPs interviewed who claimed to be independent but nevertheless the MP was part of one of the larger PPGs. As such the interview was included in the analysis, although some of the party-related questions were skipped.

3.2.2 Measurement

The total number of questions asked in the interviews was thirty one. Among other things, MPs were asked who determined candidate selection, what they considered their role as an MP was, what they thought their main focus of representation was, the amount of constituency links they did, their means of maintaining such links, whether and how many demands voters posed to MPs and so on. Constituency links, as mentioned above, were then measured using four similar questions in order to improve the accuracy of the measure. As also mentioned, the questions have largely been taken from the PartiRep survey and are therefore helpful in comparing findings on Kosovo and Macedonia with those on Western European countries where

[3]Note: The same was done to acquire party switching information for calculating PPG unity there.

the questions have been used and tested. A sample of the questionnaire fielded to MPs elected under open-list PR is provided in Appendix A.

In terms of the independent variables, in the case of Kosovo, they are the electoral system and candidate selection. The rules governing elections are reviewed from several legislations that were enacted between 2001 and 2010. The laws are all published in the official gazette of the Parliament of Kosovo and can easily be reached on parliament's website. Candidate selection has been measured using interviews with MPs. One could certainly review the rules of procedure of different parties and try to ascertain how candidate selection works, but what is central is grasping who MPs perceive as controlling candidate selection because that is whom they will be responsive to. Measuring candidate selection however is not an easy task empirically. As Rahat and Hazan note, 'selection is made by different selectorates, these selectorates use different nomination systems, and some candidates are selected at different types of locations, defined territorially and/or functionally' (2001, p.299). This study adopts a simple measure of candidate selection where candidates' responses are placed on a continuum between decentralised and centralised methods of candidate selection (Gallagher 1998, p.4). In the case of Macedonia, the independent variables are candidate selection, gender, age, and MPs' term in office. Data on these variables were collected from the parliamentary website, and similarly candidate selection methods are measures using MPs' responses.

It was mentioned earlier, in Chapter 2, that there is lack of a well-grounded method of studying candidate selection. For instance, Rahat and Hazan offer four indicators that include candidacy (the question of who has the right to present candidates), the selectorate (the body that selects the candidates), decentralization, and voting versus appointment systems (2001). Nevertheless, the same authors argue that it is sufficient to focus only on the selectorate as a means of examining candidate methods, which is what we do. As they argue, 'it is the selectorate that exhibits the most significant and far-reaching consequences in general, and it is the centralization versus exclusiveness of the selectorate that does so in particular' (2007, p.369).

Most importantly, considering that 'the existing literature suggests that the locus of control usually lies somewhere between the two extremes' (inclusive/exclusive or de-centralised/centralised) (Gallagher 1988, p.4), we are primarily concerned here with seeing whether candidate selection is at one extreme; in the sense that candidate selection rests with the central party agency (regardless of what type of agency and how big this agency is), or is at the other extreme; in which case the local party members select the candidates.

To sum this chapter up, the experience with data collection and analyses has been long and very time-consuming. Anyone engaging in similar kind of research among new democracies should anticipate the amount of work this will require. I was fortunate to have had a network of people who greatly helped in collecting this data, and my familiarity with the region also helped to a large extent. Similarly, those engaging in similar research should know that formal ways of arranging interviews do not work within the SEE context, as most interviews are scheduled by phone, mainly text messaging, and on an ad-hoc basis contrary to the suggestions one encounters in the Western European literature on conducting interviews. For as much as this can be considered an advantage, there is also a great disadvantage to it as there is a lot of uncertainty. As mentioned earlier, I spent a lot of time in the parliaments of both countries waiting for MPs to respond so I could do the interviews. It is unlikely that a similar number of MPs would have been secured without actually having gone there. Moreover, indulging in such a research with no financial assistance or grants is tricky. Collecting data on Macedonia has required me to live in Skopje for one month, precisely because of the ad-hoc way of scheduling the interviews. Finally, the kind of measures which are used are very much determined by the kind of data that are collected, and within SEE there is not much variability of data. All the data collected for this project however, will be made available for other researchers, and hopefully this will raise academic interest in studying the region. The following chapter examines the impact of electoral systems on the first aspect of our dependent variable; parliamentary party group unity.

Chapter 4

The impact of electoral systems upon the behaviour of members of parliament

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter we will examine the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour, first by analysing voting patterns of MPs across 21 European countries and then by focusing in particular on 6 countries of South East Europe (SEE). As mentioned in earlier chapters, while studies on legislators' behaviour using roll-call votes have been conducted on several Western European countries, the major contribution of this chapter is that, in addition to examining fresh data for a number of Western European countries, it adds data to this from 6 SEE countries, which have not been examined before. By doing so, this study offers a broader analysis which allows us to compare the level of unity among parties in Western European countries, where party system institutionalisation is high, with that of their counterparts in the SEE region where, as shown in Chapter 1 (see in particular Table 1.2), institutionalisation is much lower. Even though it has been suggested that 'the systematic relationships between institutional characteristics and party unity can be assessed only if the party system of a country is reasonably settled and stable' (Sieberer 2006, p.159), as is shown here, it is the varying level of unity among weakly institutionalised party systems that offers us motivations to explain this variation. Otherwise, among highly institutionalised party systems, with the exception of Finland, the pattern of cohesion is uniform across countries, leaving us with very little variation to explain.

Countries included in the analysis use different electoral systems, and have different levels of party system institutionalisation, which allows us to look for any system-

atic relationship between these independent variables and our dependent variable - PPG unity. As outlined in Chapter 2, MPs' incentives to vote independently from the party will be lower under party-centred electoral systems which lack intra-party electoral competition and thus the party controls MPs' prospects of reelection, and it will be higher under candidate-centred electoral systems, which allow intra-party electoral competition, and hence MPs' reelection depends both on the party and voters. Therefore the first hypothesis which is tested here is: *PPG Unity will be higher in party-centred electoral systems which lack intra-party electoral competition than in candidate-centred electoral systems which allow such intra-party electoral competition* (H.1). Moreover, we expect that these effects will only hold when the level of party system institutionalisation is low for reasons which were outlined in great detail earlier (H.1.a).

It was also mentioned in Chapter 2 that cohesion is expected to be higher on some issues than on others. More specifically, cohesion will be higher on issues which are crucial to government survival, such as the budget for example, as opposed to less crucial issues to government survival, such as environmental issues. As such we inferred that *PPG unity will be higher on issues which are important for government survival, and it will be lower on issues which are not important for government survival* (H.2). Testing this hypothesis across the 21 European countries however is complicated as it would have required us to hand code the issues for each country. Moreover, to do that we would need to have a relatively good knowledge of the issues within countries in order to be able to label them appropriately because what might be considered an important issue in one country might not be seen so important in another. As will be seen later, in the context of Kosovo within which this hypothesis is tested, issues which are important for government's survival are those related to independence or the final status settlement, which are quite different from the type of issues which may be linked to government survival in other countries.

Hypothesis 3 suggested that *PPG unity will be lower the higher the number of co-partisans against whom candidates have to compete.* That is, the higher the dis-

trict magnitude, the lower the level of unity will be. The rationale behind this is that as district magnitude grows so does the number of co-partisans against whom candidates have to compete. This is only expected under candidate-centred electoral systems however, where there is such intra-party electoral competition. As Carey explains, what determines whether increases in the district magnitude lead to greater or fewer incentives for personalism is whether voters are given the opportunity to elect candidates through preference votes (2007, p.94). Lacking such competition, under party-centred electoral systems as district magnitude grows the incentives for candidates to differentiate themselves decrease (Carey and Shugart 1995, p.418). Among both candidate-centred and party-centred electoral systems, districts vary in magnitude in our sample ranging from single-member districts, such as is the case with France, to 250 in the case of Serbia, where the entire nation is one electoral district. Other countries fall somewhere in between. This provides sufficient variation to test the effect of district magnitude on parliamentary party group unity.

We also argued that *PPG unity will be higher for government parties than for opposition parties* (H.4). Firstly, this is because in parliamentary systems cabinet survival depends on a majority support in parliament. As such, the vote of no confidence procedure is considered sufficient to induce party cohesion. Secondly, by acting cohesively coalition partners can govern more effectively. In fact, the need to reach consensus among the coalition parties will in itself lead to a more cohesive outcome in those parties, although we acknowledged that depending on the number of parties in the coalition it may also become difficult for parties to agree on a voting outcome. Related to this we also suggested that the margin of government over opposition will also affect PPG unity. More specifically, *the closer the margin of governing parties over the opposition, the higher the PPG unity will be* (H.5). When the difference between the two is wide, government parties can, to some extent, afford to allow MPs to vote differently than the majority of the PPG. But, when this difference is narrow, allowing MPs to defect can endanger the passage of the

bill. In our dataset this margin varies from negative values such as in the case with minority governments in Scandinavian countries to comparatively large margins as is the case, for instance, with governing parties during the 1994-1998 government in Hungary. Finally, relying on findings within the existing literature, we assumed a number of control variables would also affect the level of unity, namely party group size and age of the party. Firstly, small *parties will be more cohesive than large parties* (H.6) because they are more homogeneous and likewise, *older parties will be more cohesive than younger parties* (H.7) because they tend to be more institutionalised. The following section presents an overview of the level of cohesion across the 21 countries before discussing the findings from testing all of the above hypotheses in the later section.

4.2 Analysis

As mentioned above, this section gives an overview of the level of cohesion (Rice scores) across the 21 European countries which is provided in Table 4.1. It is worth pointing out that, using the Rice index, cohesion scores are calculated for each party in a given term (which is our unit of analysis), and then averaged to give a single score for that term in the respective countries, which is provided in the last column of the table. The averages of term scores for each country, which are nevertheless not shown here, give us the overall cohesion score for that country. But, where data were only available for one year, that single-year score represents the overall country score. This is specifically the case with Finland and Iceland among the Western European countries, and with Serbia among the South East European countries. One may argue that because the figure for some countries is based on the average of cohesion scores for a number of years, whereas for other countries it is based on scores for only one or two years, the figures for the latter may be less reliable. However, in most countries there is little variation in cohesion levels over the course of a parliamentary term, suggesting that it is not particularly problematic to base the measure on behaviour during one or two years. Moreover, that cohesion

is lower in Finland compared to other Western European countries has well been documented in the literature (Sieberer 2006, Depauw and Martin 2009).

As can be seen from the table, average parliamentary party group unity is highest for Western European countries where, as noted earlier, in the presence of strong party system institutionalisation or any other reasons, the electoral system has little or no role to play in explaining MPs' behaviour. Overall, the average level of cohesion for SEE countries is 95.91 which is lower than 97.53, the average level of cohesion for Western European countries, but it is slightly higher than the CEE mean of 94.68. Although the figures are not shown here, the lowest level of cohesion is noted in the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) with an average Rice score of 80 per cent and in the Democratic Party of Kosovo during the 2004-2007 term, with an average score of 85. We also find a similarly low figure for Social Democrats in Finland; where the level of PSI is lowest among Western European countries, but apart from this example and the generally low party figures in Finland, figures are uniformly high in this part of the world.

In Western Europe, the highest PPG unity is observed in Denmark, under open-list PR system. Figures are as high for the United Kingdom with an FPTP electoral system and Ireland with the STV system. Among SEE countries, highest unity scores are observed for Serbia and Bosnia that use closed-list PR systems, while the lowest mean level of cohesion, on the other hand, is noted in the case of Macedonia where the same system is used. The fact that unity is low in Macedonia is certainly surprising since we assumed that the level of cohesion would be high under such systems. Nevertheless, as will be explained in Chapter 6, this could partly be a result of methods of candidate selection there, where a candidate's standing among the electorate is considered to influence the decision of the party on where to place the candidate on the list. Otherwise, a low PPG unity score is also noted in the case of Montenegro that uses a closed-list PR system, too. The other two SEE countries, Kosovo and Slovenia, with open-list PR systems fall somewhere in between.

Table 4.1: Average PPG unity in 21 European countries (unweighted figures)

Country	Period covered	Parties	Mean PPG unity
Western Europe			97.53
Austria	1994-1997	SPO, OVP, FPO, Grunen, LiF	98.33
Belgium	1991-1995	AGALEV, VB, VLD, PRL CVP, PSC, BSP, PSB, VU	99.06
Denmark	1990-1994	A, C, V, B, F, Z, K, CD	99.81
	1994-1996	A, C, V, B, F, Z, CD	99.89
Finland	1995-1996	V, SD, SFP, KoK Kesk, Vihr, KD	88.63
France	1993-1997	PCF, PS, UDF, RPR	99.34
Germany	1980-1983	CDU, SPD, FDP	98.12
	1983-1987	CDU, SPD, FDP, GR	96.49
	1987-1990	CDU, SPD, FDP, GR	96.81
Iceland	1995-1996	Women's Alliance, People's Alliance People's Movement, Social Democrats Independence Party, Progressive Party	96.93
Ireland	1994-1996	FF, FG, Lab	100
Norway	1990-1994	SV, A/Ap, Sp, H, FrP, KrF	98.55
Sweden	1994-1995	V, SAP, FP, M, C, Miljoparteit, KD	96.57
United Kingdom	1992-1997	L, Con	99.46
Central and Eastern Europe			94.68
Czech Republic	1996-1998	CSSD, KDU, KSCM, ODA, ODS, SPR-RSC	93.66
	1998-2002	CSSD, KDU, KSCM, ODS, US, CSSD	90.53
	2002-2006	CSSD, KDU, KSCM, ODS, US	93.01
	2006-2009	CSSD, KDU, KSCM, ODS, SZ	93.66
Hungary	1994-1998	Fidesz, MDF, MSZP	92.39
	1998-2002	Fidesz, FKGP, KDNP, MDF, MSZP, SZDSZ	96.09
	2002-2006	Fidesz, MDF, MSZP, SZDSZ	97.21

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Table 4.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Period covered	Parties	Mean PPG unity
Poland	1997-2001	AWS, PSL, ROP, SLD, UW	93.14
	2001-2005	LPR, PiS, PO, PSL, SLD, SO	95.44
Estonia	1999-2003	ERL, EYRP, IL, KESK KOOND, SDE, RE	95.60
	2003-2007	ERL, IL, KESK, RE, RP, SDE	97.69
South East Europe			95.91
Bosnia	2010	SDA, SBiH,SDP BiH, SNSD	97.48
	2011-2012	HDZ BiH, SBB BiH, SDA, SDP BiH, SDS, SNSD	98.79
Kosovo	2005-2007	AAK, LDK, PDK, ORA, KDTP, VAKAT	93.60
	2007-2010	AAK, AKR, KDTP, LDD-PSHDK, LDK PDAK, PDK, SLS, VAKAT	96.00
Macedonia	2002-2006	Together for Macedonia, VMRO-DPMNE, DUI, DPA	93.52
Montenegro	2009-2011	ECG, NOVA, PzP, SNP	94.53
Serbia	2011	G17 PLUS, PGM, PUPS, SPS-JS, ZES, DSS, SRS, SNS, LDP	97.67
Slovenia	2011-2012	DL, NSI, PS, SD, SDS, SLS	98.22
	2008-2011	DESUS, LDS, ZARES, SD, SDS, SLS, SNS	96.93
	2004-2008	DeSUS, LDS, Lipa, NSi, SD, SDS, SLS, SNS, Zares	97.01
	2000-2004	DeSUS, LDS, NSi, SDS, SLS, SNS, ZLSD	94.91

One could well argue that the overall level of cohesion among the SEE countries is influenced by the figures of small parties that have for instance 3 to 4 MPs, such as SLS in Kosovo or PzP in Montenegro, considering that those with fewer than 3 MPs have been excluded from the analysis. In order to avoid that minor parties have a disproportionate impact on the figure for the country as a whole, weighted averages have also been calculated for all SEE countries and the scores are given in Table 4.2. Lack of disaggregated data for the other countries does not allow us to do the same for all countries. Averages have been weighted by the number of party MPs on each vote. This is a more accurate figure than weighting the scores by PPG size because it is often the case that not all party MPs participate in a given vote but, for instance, 10 MPs vote on one issue, and on another issue 20 of them do so. This also affects the large parties where the number of MPs voting varies hugely from vote to vote. For instance, in the case of Serbia, the size of DSS party group in parliament during 2011 was 30, but the greatest number of MPs that participate in any given vote during this period is 20. Moreover, as is explained below DSS only participates in a limited number of votes altogether.

It must be noted that the unit of analysis here is average party unity per issue, and as mentioned above, the way this has been calculated was to weigh the averages by the number of party MPs per vote. Column six of the table reports the number of votes per party. As can be seen, the largest number of observations (212530) is shown for Together for Macedonia coalition which votes on 4869 pieces of legislation, while the lowest number of observations is noted in the case of LDP in Serbia (44), where MPs only vote on 8 pieces of legislation. It is worth pointing out that the huge disparity between the number of observations in Serbia is a result of opposition parties not voting on the vast number of legislation, which seems to be a common practice in Serbian politics, and is not only limited to the 2011 period for which we have data. Overall, what the table shows is that weighted cohesion scores only change marginally. Even with weighted averages however, overall figures are still slightly lower for SEE countries compared to Western European countries.

Table 4.2: Average PPG unity in SEE countries (weighted figures)

Country	Period covered	Party	PPG size	Number of observations	Number of votes	PPG unity	Term unity
Bosnia	2010-2011	SBiH	8	2565	384	96.73	97.63
		SDA	9	2929	371	98.57	
		SDP BiH	5	968	251	98.35	
		SNSD	7	2169	355	97.14	
	2011-2012	SDA	7	4147	727	98.21	98.49
		SDP BiH	8	4393	674	98.41	
		SNSD	8	4635	697	98.27	
		SDS	4	1946	539	98.87	
		SBB BiH	4	2002	550	99.10	
		HDZ BiH	3	414	138	99.03	
Kosovo	2005-2007	PDK	30	23451	1705	94.13	92.82
		LDK	47	58885	1771	96.15	
		AAK	9	8779	1726	90.93	
		ORA	7	3645	940	97.37	
		KDTP	3	1062	354	97.74	
		VAKAT	3	1887	629	93.96	
	2007-2010	PDK	37	77931	3863	96.91	95.68
		LDK	25	59726	3858	97.11	
		AAK	10	16986	3218	89.77	
		AKR	13	23012	3712	91.10	
		LDD-PSHDK	11	18782	3242	95.15	
		KDTP	3	3102	1034	99.41	
		PDAK	3	1938	646	98.14	
		SLS	3	1941	580	99.59	
		VAKAT	3	3387	1129	98.64	

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Table 4.2 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Period covered	Party	PPG size	Number of observations	Number of votes	PPG unity	Term unity
Macedonia	2002-2006	Together for Macedonia	60	212530	4869	95.97	94.35
		VMRO	33	94243	3734	89.55	
		DUI	16	38828	4749	96.48	
		DPA	7	847	218	93.86	
Montenegro	2009-2011	ECG	49	26194	662	93.32	94.15
		NOVA	8	2685	523	92.85	
		PZP	5	1340	344	96.27	
		SNP	16	6750	591	97.48	
Serbia	2011	SPS-JS	15	7266	555	99.86	99.71
		DSS	30	83	3	56.63	
		G17 PLUS	24	12000	556	99.93	
		LDP	13	44	8	100	
		PGM	4	2697	516	99.56	
		PUPS	5	2420	529	100	
		SRS	58	209	6	100	
		SNS	20	76	6	100	
		ZES	78	40836	558	99.69	
Slovenia	2000-2004	DeSUS	4	2415	805	97.85	94.51
		LDS	34	58692	2133	95.40	
		NSi	8	5994	1215	97.10	
		SDS	15	5439	1005	94.12	
		SLS	10	8538	1657	89.18	
		SNS	4	1359	409	100	
		ZLSD	11	20440	2126	92.76	
	2004-2008	DeSUS	4	6026	1769	92.89	97.84
		LDS	11	16118	2329	95.63	
		Lipa	3	588	196	100	
		NSi	8	20785	2927	98.60	

Continued on next page

Table 4.2 – *Continued from previous page*

Country	Period covered	Party	PPG size	Number of observations	Number of votes	PPG unity	Term unity
		SD	14	16309	2316	98.15	
		SDS	29	78778	2946	99.20	
		SLS	7	15186	2871	93.63	
		SNS	3	2868	812	99.09	
		ZARES	7	2550	645	98.51	
	2008-2011	DeSUS	5	6757	1638	94.41	97.16
		LDS	5	7617	1796	98.45	
		SD	27	46303	1854	98.25	
		SDS	27	33342	1585	96.67	
		SLS	6	6654	1505	98.26	
		SNS	5	3516	928	98.23	
		Zares	7	12078	1829	95.63	
	2011-2012	DeSUS	6	1024	190	97.07	98.50
		DL	8	1330	190	98.50	
		NSi	4	686	186	99.42	
		PS	28	4287	182	98.04	
		SD	10	1580	189	96.20	
		SDS	26	4426	185	99.77	
		SLS	6	963	190	99.38	

To visualize cohesion scores for all countries, Figure 4.1 shows a boxplot of PPG unity in these countries. Overall, the median is higher for Western European countries such as Ireland, Denmark, France and Austria, and it is lower for SEE countries such as Montenegro and Macedonia. Certainly, Finland is an outlier among the more institutionalised party systems as the level of cohesion is far lower than those of other Western European countries. Depauw and Martin (2009) argue this could be related to the decentralised methods of candidate selection, whereby candidates are selected at the sub-national level, along with an open-list PR system in use there. Moreover, the fact that often ministers are recruited from outside means that PPG leadership does not have monopoly over MPs' advancement into executive office and hence cannot control their behaviour (Sieberer 2006, pp.169-70).




Figure 4.1: Boxplot showing the level of PPG unity across 21 European cgountries

4.2.1 PGG unity by issue

Since our earlier analysis does not give us much understanding about the type of issues which legislators vote on, and considering that differentiating among issues is important because MPs might have more incentives to cooperate on one issue and few incentives to cooperate on another issue (Hypothesis 2), we now turn to the type of issues that MPs in both Kosovo and Montenegro vote on. The reason for limiting our analysis to these two countries is not particular, although the overall goal was to test this effect within SEE countries, as well as possibly both under open-list and closed-list PR. For this purpose, roll-call votes have been clustered into different issues depending on how important they are for government survival. Alternatively, we could have divided the issues into those which we expect would distinguish among parties, and those which tend to divide parties within. Considering that the most frequent type of voting in parliaments of both Kosovo and Montenegro is through a roll-call then we would have been quite certain that all types of issues have been put to a vote regardless of how divisive they were; a distinction which in other cases might have been problematic. Nevertheless, it is hard to know which issues are ideological in the case of both Kosovo and Montenegro where parties do not have firm ideological grounds. Moreover, in the absence of an independent measure, the only way of knowing whether issues divide parties internally is to calculate cohesion scores first.

Dividing the issues on the basis of whether they are important for government survival or not, however, is not an easy task among South East European countries either as, unlike Israel (Rahat 2007), there is no simple distinction between issues that are crucial and issues which are not. In Israel, for instance, the type of issues which are categorised as important for government survival are votes of investiture, votes of no confidence, and bills proposing early elections (ibid 2007), but there are no such votes in our dataset either in the case of Kosovo or that of Macedonia. Moreover, based on previous political developments in both countries, it is highly unlikely that if governments were to be defeated they would resign. Our best shot

hence, is to rely on our judgment about the importance of different issues both in the case of Kosovo and that of Montenegro. The following subsections explain the sample sizes and the way issues have been coded in both countries, while the results of Hypothesis 2, as well as all others related to PPG unity, are presented within the findings section of this chapter.

Kosovo

In the case of Kosovo, cohesion across issues have been calculated only for the second term (2007-2010), e.g. under open-list PR, as data in terms of issues being voted on were lacking for the first term. It is important to delve into the ways we came up with the different issues and how votes have then been clustered into those issues. Firstly, rather than coding issues for all 3863 votes we have obtained, which would have taken us a long time, five hundred votes from the second term were randomly selected. These votes have been selected and clustered into different issues prior to calculating PPG scores. Otherwise, one might suggest that we have selected more important issues for government survival according to highest PPG scores and vice-versa. For about half of these votes, one could clearly see the issue MPs voted on within the original dataset, and hence coding those issues was easy. For the rest however, the vote subject only stated 'Functional Committee meeting' and specified the number of amendments on which MPs voted, but gave no information about the actual issue that MPs voted on. According to the rules of procedure, in addition to permanent committees, the parliament can set up functional committees on different policy areas which may include diverse topics such as agriculture, education, culture, etc. Where this was the case, I reviewed minutes of the sessions from the parliamentary website and matched the votes with the issues.

At times, the issue was complicated further as even looking at the minutes it was not clear among several pieces of legislation with the same number of amendments, which amendment belonged to what issue MPs voted on. In those cases, I had to compare the voting records from the dataset with the summary of voting results

within minutes and match those with the issue at stake. Errors were eliminated by the fact that there was never a case of voting in which the result was the same for several amendments; that is, there was no case where the same number of MPs voted in favour, against and abstained in more than one piece of legislation. Ten votes were omitted from the sample because there were no minutes provided on those and neither did that day's plenary session feature within the agenda of the parliament.

In addition, since in February 2008 Kosovo declared independence and had to adopt several laws deriving from the Ahtisaari[1] package (status settlement), and since most of this legislation had been left out initially, I added all votes on Ahtisaari laws from the whole dataset to the sample. The reason for including these under a separate heading is because the laws tackled a number of issues which were considered sensitive e.g. minority rights, international community's presence in Kosovo, and decentralization of power, and hence very important not only for the declaration of country's independence but also for the establishment and functioning of the new state. Moreover, one could also argue that because the package formed the blueprint of an independent Kosovo, which is what the majority of parties aimed for, then parties would have incentives to be cohesive in order to approve it. Table 4.3 gives an overview of the number of votes per issue and their percentages relative to the 590 votes used in this analysis.

The 15 roll-calls featuring within 'Appointments and Dismissals' include for instance appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court, appointment of the Ombudsperson, and that of board members of independent institutions. The reason for differentiating these votes from the other votes is because appointments, which are often political, are important for parties. Knowing that appointments to various institutional boards are political, parties aim to appoint their own members through whom they can then exert influence over the institution. By way of example, it took the parliament several years to approve the Ombudsperson in 2010 because of the politicization of the issue by the parties. The same issue reappeared again

[1]Named after former Finnish President Maarti Ahtisaari who mediated the talks between Kosovo and Serbia.

later, in a similarly deeply divided parliamentary debate. The 97 roll-calls within 'Constitutional' issues include issues relating to the Constitution such as minority rights, elections, law on the President, freedom of association, law on civil servants and so on. It must be noted that the large number of votes, relative to some other issues, is mainly a result of a new constitution having been adopted and therefore new institutions being set up. The 162 votes within 'Economic issues' relate to all aspects of economy such as tax, budget, personal income, employment, pensions, social insurance as well as trade and energy; important issues for government's everyday functioning.

Table 4.3: Roll-call votes by issue in Kosovo

Appt's and Dismissals	Constitutional Affairs	Economic Affairs	European and Int'l Affairs	Justice and Security	Ahtisaari Laws	Other	Total
15	96	162	17	63	112	125	590
2.5 %	16.3%	27.5%	2.9%	10.7%	19.0%	21.1%	100.0%

The 17 votes within 'European and International Affairs' broadly relate to issues concerning foreign policy such as accession of Kosovo into the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, bilateral agreements between Kosovo and Macedonia on border demarcation as well as a number of EU related legislation such as that on return and re-admission of irregular migrants. The 63 roll-calls within 'Justice and Security' include legislation pertaining to security issues such as legislation on Kosovo Security Force, use of explosives, intelligence, corruption and so on. As was explained earlier, the 112 votes under 'Ahtisaari laws' include legislation pertaining to the status settlement but it must be noted that they cut across issues. Several of these issues include consular missions and personnel, citizenship, Police Inspectorate, municipal boundaries, civil aviation and other areas as diverse as these. Finally the last 125 roll-calls fall within 'Other' because they are very diverse and as such could not be clustered into any of the other sections. Issues included here

are laws on environment, agriculture, census as well as health legislation which were very few in numbers and hence could not feature in a separate category. All in all we should observe the highest level of cohesion on constitutional and Ahtisaari laws which were considered to be the most important issues at the time.

Montenegro

In terms of Montenegro, party unity across issues has been calculated for the entire dataset simply because there were only 662 votes and as such it was easy to code those votes, compared to 3863 in the case of Kosovo. These votes have also been clustered into seven issues similar to Kosovo: 'Appointments and Dismissals', 'Constitutional', 'Economic, 'European and International Affairs', 'Justice and Security, 'Public Health and Safety' and 'Other'. The only difference is thus the 'Public Health and Safety' issues which in the case of Kosovo were only very few and hence we included them within 'Other' category. Likewise, Macedonia had no status issues similar to Kosovo for which we included the Ahtisaari laws. Table 4.4 shows the number of votes per issue, and their percentage out of all roll-call votes.

Table 4.4: Roll-call votes by issue in Montenegro

Appt's and Dismissals	Constitutional Affairs	Economic Affairs	European and Int'l Affairs	Justice and Security	Public Health	Other	Total
25	83	243	35	77	58	141	662
3.8%	12.5%	36.7%	5.3%	11.6%	8.8%	21.3%	100.0%

The 25 roll-calls within 'Appointments and Dismissals' include for instance appointments and dismissals of members of independent institutions such as electing a member of the Council of Radio Television of Montenegro. A large number of roll-call votes did not specify which institution the appointment was made to. Excluded in this category are appointments of members of parliamentary committees. The 83 roll-calls within 'Constitutional' issues include issues relating to the Con-

stitution such as the draft law in response to the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of some of the articles of the constitution, as well as issues pertaining to local self-government, civil servants, border management, human rights and minorities and approval of the government. The 243 votes within 'Economic' issues relate to all aspects of economy such as tax, budget, personal income, employment, pensions, social insurance as well as energy and regional development legislation. The 35 votes within 'European and International Affairs' include all legislation relating to European Union and international organizations such as ratification of conventions, establishment of the European Communications Office and so on. The 77 roll-calls within 'Justice and Security' include legislation pertaining to security issues such as legislation on the army, courts, prosecutor, criminal code and extradition agreements between Montenegro and other countries. The 58 roll-calls within 'Public and Health' issues include issues such as the sale of alcoholic drinks, sanitary inspection, drug control as well as regulations on the use of motor vehicles. Finally the last 141 roll-calls fall within 'Other', these include laws on biological samples, communications and postal services, census, transport, theatre and education. Different from the case of Kosovo, however, we should expect unity to be higher among issues related to economy, e.g. budget, appointments, as well as foreign affairs mainly because of country's EU membership aspiration, rather than on other issues.

4.3 Findings

Having provided an overview of the level of unity across countries, whereby we showed the level of unity to be higher among Western European countries, and having explained how votes have been clustered into issues in the case of Kosovo and Montenegro, this section presents the findings from both analyses. The purpose here has been to test the impact of electoral systems on PPG unity by including several independent variables which were outlined in Chapter 2, and are further explained below. Likewise, we wanted to test whether cohesion tends to be higher

on some issues and lower on others, as also explained above. Table 4.5 in the following provides descriptive statistics for 21 European countries and the variables used in our analyses.

Our first independent variable is the average district magnitude (DM). We decided to include raw district magnitude values in our analysis, although a test for the effect of DM using logged valued does not change the results. Among both candidate-centred and party-centred electoral systems we look at, districts vary in magnitude ranging from single-member districts, as is the case with France, to 250 in the case of Serbia, where the entire nation is one electoral district. Our next independent variable is the level of party system institutionalisation that, as mentioned earlier, reports the level of institutionalisation for each country at the most recent government term for which data have been available (See bottom of Table 1.3, p.17). Then is the Parliamentary Party Group size which we argued is important to take into account since it is suggested that smaller groups will yield greater unity because they are more homogeneous. The figures presented in the table relate to the number of MPs each parliamentary group has. The age of the party is also given in the table and simply reports parties' age from their foundation year until 2014, or until the year of their dissolution where this applies,

The effect of the size of the parliament on PPG unity, which is also reported, is not tested on PPG unity, but rather the statistics are provided because the variable is used to measure the margin of government over opposition. This variable is calculated using the following formula: Margin=(Sum of Government Parties)/Total Parliamentary Seats*2*100-100. Finally, the share of seats is calculated as the ratio of PPG size and the total number of parliamentary seats. Data on these variables have been collected from various sources: Matt Golder's Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World dataset, for electoral systems and average district magnitude countries' parliamentary websites for PPG size and that of parliaments, Electoral Studies Political Yearbook for government status/composition data, as well as Political Parties of the World (2005) for parties' age.

Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for 21 European countries

	Min	Median	Mean	Max	St dev
Rice	80.00	96.95	96.26	100.0	3.57
Average district-magnitude	1.00	11.20	31.65	250	54.67
Party System Institutionalisation	0.20	0.30	0.48	1.00	0.26
PPG size	3.00	22.00	41.61	419.00	60.56
Party age	3.00	25.00	45.63	184.00	39.19
Size of the parliament	42.00	181.00	231.70	650.00	153.21
Margin of government over opposition (%)	-34.08	8.30	7.46	63.60	19.67
Share of seats	0.01	0.11	0.17	0.64	0.14

Since countries vary among each along different dimensions, e.g. they have different electoral systems and different levels of PSI, I use multi-level regression analyses, results of which are reported in Table 4.6. As Brambor et al argue, multi-level regression analyses are frequently used when the relationship between two variables depends on the institutional context (2006, p.63). Within our setting, the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour is set to be conditional on the level of PSI. More specifically, we argue that only under low levels of PSI will the effect of electoral systems over MPs' behaviour be stronger. Moreover, multi level regression analyses are frequently used when data is nested in more than one category. In our case the unit of analysis is the party in a legislative term (in total there are 215 observations), nested within electoral systems, within countries.

The first regression, reported in column I of Table 4.6, is expressed by:

$$Unity = \beta_0 + \beta_1 electoral\ system + \beta_2 psi + \beta_3 district\ magnitude + \beta_4 gov\ status + \beta_5 party\ age + \beta_6 margin + \beta_7 PPGsize + \epsilon \tag{4.1}$$

The formula for the second regression reported in column II is the same, apart from the fact that an additional-dummy variable is added, 1 for countries belonging to

the SEE region, and 0 otherwise in order to control for the regional effect:

$$Unity = \beta_0 + \beta_1 electoral\ system + \beta_2 psi + \beta_3 district\ magnitude + \beta_4 gov\ status + \beta_5 party\ age + \beta_6 margin + \beta_7 PPGsize + \beta_8 SEE + \epsilon \tag{4.2}$$

Finally, because we argue that the effect of electoral systems on cohesion is conditional on the level of PSI, interaction effects between electoral systems and the level of PSI, are added in column III using the following formula:

$$Unity = \beta_0 + \beta_1 electoralsystem * psi + \beta_2 districtmagnitude + \beta_3 govstatus + \beta_4 party\ age + \beta_5 margin + \beta_6 PPGsize + \beta_7 SEE + \epsilon \tag{4.3}$$

At first sight, looking at the first regression analysis we can see that several variables are significant. On average, PPG unity (in Rice score terms) is about 6 points higher among majoritarian systems compared to closed-list PR systems. Cohesion has the predicted sign under both flexible and open-list PR, but the variables are not significant. The PSI variable is slightly significant however. All equal, for a change in PSI level from 1 SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, the level of unity goes up by 1.43 points. Similarly, on average, PPG unity is higher by 1.19 points among government parties compared to opposition parties. Finally, the other variable which has a significant effect on cohesion is the margin of government over opposition. As the margin changes from 1 SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, PPG unity goes down by 2.26 points.

Looking at the second regression output, where the only difference is the addition of a regional dummy which is nevertheless not significant, same as previously PPG unity tends to be higher by about 6 points under majoritarian systems compared to closed-list PR systems. Also, for a change in PSI level from 1 SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, the level of unity goes up by 1.91 points. Finally, the margin of government over opposition variable retains the significant effect from the previous regression. All else equal, as the margin changes from 1 SD below the mean to one SD above the mean, PPG unity goes down by 1.97 points.

Table 4.6: Multi-level regression analyses at the party level

	I	II	III
(Intercept)	96.00***	94.96***	87.41***
	(1.17)	(1.44)	(2.82)
Flexible-list PR	-0.70	-0.17	8.14**
	(0.98)	(1.07)	(2.93)
Open-list PR	-0.57	-0.57	4.29*
	(0.84)	(0.84)	(2.10)
Majoritarian	5.95**	6.01**	16.73***
	(2.06)	(2.01)	(4.23)
Mixed	-0.72	-0.50	-2.68
	(1.21)	(1.22)	(13.83)
STV	2.27	2.55	2.49
	(2.16)	(2.16)	(2.15)
Average District Magnitude	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Party System Institutionalisation (PSI)	2.71.	3.63*	14.50***
	(1.48)	(1.65)	(3.87)
Government (Y)	1.19**	1.17**	1.03*
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Party Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Margin of Government over Opposition	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PPG size	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
SEE (Y/N)		1.21	3.19*
		(0.96)	(1.25)
Flexible-list PR*PSI			-12.66**
			(4.20)
Open-list PR*PSI			-7.66*
			(3.29)
Majoritarian*PSI			-17.95**
			(6.65)
Mixed*PSI			1.56
			(18.75)
R-squared	0.50	0.50	0.55
N	215	215	215

I without SEE dummy, II with SEE dummy, III with interaction effects. Standard errors in parentheses.'.'p-value 0.1, ''p-value 0.05, '**'p-value 0.01, '***'p-value 0.001.*

The two regressions however do not tell us much about the effect that the electoral system has on PPG unity conditional on the level of PSI, which is why we added interaction effects between the two in the third regression. What the output shows is that the effect of several other variables is now significant. Nevertheless, we are mostly interested in interpreting the interaction effects. In order for us to

have a better idea of how these interactions affect cohesion however, we first plot the marginal effect of PSI on PPG unity conditional on the type of electoral system, and then we plot the effect of electoral system change on cohesion depending on the level of PSI, as well as explain the magnitude of the effects. We calculate the marginal effect of PSI on the level of cohesion, and the standard errors, using the following formulas (see Brambor et al 2006):

$$\frac{\partial PPG\,unity}{\partial PSI} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 Z \tag{4.4}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}\frac{\partial PPG\,unity}{\partial PSI} = \sqrt{var(\beta_1) + Z^2 var(\beta_3) + 2Z cov(\beta_1 \beta_3)} \tag{4.5}$$

What we see in Figure 4.2 is that only closed-list PR and open-list PR systems are significant among the electoral system types. For example, if under closed-list PR systems the level of PSI increases by 0.5 points, cohesion also goes up by 7.3 points (0.5 x marginal effect). The same is true for open-list PR systems, although the effect is smaller as cohesion increases by 3.4 points only. As regards the other types of electoral systems, as the level of PSI increases by 0.5 points cohesion goes up by 0.9 points under flexible-list PR, it goes up by 8 points under mixed systems and it goes down by 1.7 points under majoritarian systems. Hence, what the analysis shows, is that as predicted, when the level of PSI increases, the level of unity also goes up regardless of the electoral system.

Nevertheless, the effect could also work in a different direction; that is, the impact of electoral system on cohesion could be dependent on the level of PSI. As such, in Figure 4.3 we show the effect of electoral system change from closed-list to open-list PR, and from closed-list to flexible-list PR, conditional on the level of PSI. The x-axis shows the level of PSI, while the y-axis reports the effect of electoral system change on PPG unity. We left the other types of electoral systems out however because their effect was not significant. Both graphs in the figure show




Figure 4.2: Marginal effect of PSI on PPG unity depending on electoral system

only significant effect of change from closed to open-list and from closed to flexible-list PR when the level of PSI is at its maximum; it thus equals 1. Specifically, at the 5 per cent level of significance, 20 per cent of our countries (flexible-list PR) and 10 per cent respectively (open-list PR) lie within the significant range of PSI. No other significant effect however is noted as the 95 percent confidence intervals surround 0 for much of the range of PSI. [2]

Overall, and referring back to our theoretical expectations in Table 1.1 (See p.11), we do not find that when PSI is low as the system changes from party-centred, e.g. closed-list PR, to candidate-centred, e.g. open-list PR, the level of cohesion drops. In

[2]The fact that for some countries, particularly Germany and Finland, party unity (see Table 3.1, p.55) is measured for an earlier stage while Party System Institutionalisation is measured for a later stage (See Table 1.3, p.18) might appear problematic in terms of the effect of the latter on the former in our regression analysis, and as such it requires a robustness test. Hence, we re-ran the analysis by dropping both Germany and Finland. The results show the effect of electoral system change, both from closed-list to open-list PR and from closed-list to flexible-list PR, on PPG unity conditional on the level of PSI to be insignificant this time. The marginal effect of PSI on PPG unity remains more or less the same, only closed-list and open-list PR are significant, although mixed systems drop out of the analysis this time. More specifically, if under closed-list PR PSI level increases by 0.5 points, cohesion goes up by 4.8 points. If under open-list system the PSI level increases by the same amount, PPG unity increases by 3.3 points. Overall, although the effect of electoral system change on PPG unity loses significance, the results were pretty weak even before taking the two countries out. In essence, the effects are running counter to my expectations and are barely significant. Hence, the robustness test does not tell us anything beyond.




Figure 4.3: Effect of electoral system change on PPG unity conditional on PSI

fact, our main claim has been that the effects of electoral system on MPs' behaviour would only hold under low levels of PSI. On the contrary, our finding here shows that the impact of electoral systems is significant under very high levels of PSI and that it decreases rather than increases, which would make more sense considering the generally high levels of cohesion among countries that have high PSI levels. Hence, our expectations are not entirely met. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that the level of party system institutionalisation is more important than the type of electoral system in explaining MPs' behaviour. When the level of PSI is low, PPG unity tends to be generally higher under closed-list PR, among other party-centred systems, and lower under open-list PR, among other candidate-centred systems.

4.3.1 PPG unity by issue

As mentioned earlier, in the case of Kosovo, we expect that cohesion will be higher on issues which are important for government survival, e.g. 'Constitutional affairs' and 'Ahtisaari laws', and it will be lower on issues which are not important for government survival, e.g. 'Justice and Security' or 'Other' issues, which include issues pertaining to education and environment among others. In the case of Montenegro however, we expect PPG unity to be higher on 'Economic issues', 'Appointments

and Dismissals' as well as 'European and International', and lower on issues such as 'Public Health and Safety'. Having explained in the analysis section how the issues have been coded, Table 4.7 shows the level of PPG unity in Kosovo across the seven different issues. As also explained earlier, not all MPs from the PPG groups participate in all votes all the time. As such, the first column for each party represents the number of roll-calls that their MPs voted on. For instance, KDTP party participates in only 4 of the 17 'European and International Affairs' votes. Likewise, SLS only participates once on 'Appointments and Dismissals issues'. To account for this, we weigh the average cohesion scores by the number of party MPs on each vote similar to what we did for all SEE countries earlier. Generally, the governing parties tend to participate in the largest number of votes, but those of opposition only vote on a limited number of laws. Certainly, one explanation could be that opposition parties do not take part in a vote if they know that their rejection will not impede the coalition partners to adopt the law.

Looking at the table, we can see that the level of cohesion is pretty high across issues. The lowest cohesion score, 94 per cent, is observed under 'Economic Affairs' and the highest cohesion score, 97, is noted under 'European and International Affairs'. What the analysis shows is that, contrary to our expectations, even on key issues for government survival, such as 'Ahtisaari laws' and 'Constitutional issues', the level of cohesion is not significantly higher compared to the level of cohesion in other areas. Moreover, it does not appear that there is any uniform pattern of cohesion among parties; e.g., the highest level of cohesion for both PDK and LDK is on 'European and International' issues, but for AAK it is within 'Ahtsaari laws', and for AKR it is on 'Other' issues. We do find two consistent patterns however. Firstly, smaller parties, such as KDTP, PDAK, SLS and VAKAT are generally more cohesive than larger parties, which we assumed would be the case in all 21 countries although the evidence disconfirmed our expectations. And, secondly, the level of cohesion is higher for government parties, namely PDK, LDK, KDTP and SLS than for opposition parties.

Table 4.7: PPG unity by party and issue in Kosovo (Term 2)

	PDK*		LDK*		AAK		AKR		LDD-PSHDK		KDTP*		PDAK		SLS*		VAKAT			
	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Average	Votes
Appointments and dismissals	15	97.12	15	97.60	14	87.80	14	86.36	14	95.17	4	100	5	100	1	100	4	100	94.89	15
Constitutional Affairs	96	96.27	96	96.69	89	85.75	93	93.70	85	94.94	34	100	16	100	14	100	39	98.29	95.31	96
Economic Affairs	162	97.13	162	96.67	128	84.98	149	81.72	120	91.78	41	100	25	100	29	100	34	96.08	94.02	162
European and Int'l Affairs	17	98.21	17	98.48	11	96.92	17	95.12	14	91.30	4	100	5	100	3	100	10	93.33	97.18	17
Justice and Security	63	95.86	63	96.88	49	91.94	63	88.97	52	97.82	20	100	8	100	12	94.59	16	91.67	95.20	63
Ahtisaari laws	112	96.16	112	96.31	112	97.97	112	91.72	110	95.17	52	98.72	32	100	4	100	49	100	95.93	112
Other	125	95.95	125	96.49	103	91.61	119	96.06	121	98.64	32	100	18	100	16	100	43	100	96.25	125
Total	590	96.43	590	96.65	506	90.99	567	90.05	516	95.29	187	99.64	109	100	79	99.24	195	97.95	95.35	590

**Government parties.*

The same analysis was conducted on Montenegrin votes as well, except that the entire dataset of 662 votes has been used here since the number of votes was relatively small compared to the roll-calls on Kosovo. Table 4.8 shows the results of this analysis. As can be seen here most of the issues are the same as those on Kosovo except that Ahtisaari laws do not feature here, rather 'Public Health and Safety' issues are included because they were numerous. Similar to Kosovo, there is very little difference from issue to issue. Yet, compared to Kosovo, here, the lowest level of cohesion, 92 per cent, is observed under 'Constitutional Affairs', which suggests that perhaps in the case of Montenegro they are not as important for government survival as they are in Kosovo. On the other hand, the highest level of cohesion, 99 per cent, is noted on 'European and International issues'. The difference between the two, and all other mean cohesion levels however, is not statistically significant (p-value=0.07).

Looking at those figures, one can also see that the level of cohesion for ECG as the governing coalition is not much higher compared to opposition parties; a finding that was consistent in the case of Kosovo. Moreover, similar to the case of Kosovo, the figures are not consistent across parties. For instance, the highest level of cohesion for ECG is observed on 'European and International' affairs, for SNP on 'Constitutional' issues, and for both NOVA and PzP the highest levels are noted within 'Economic issues'. To sum up, the findings from our analyses on the level of cohesion across issues in Kosovo and Montenegro show that the level of cohesion is generally high across issues and there is no significant difference between cohesion on issues which are important for government survival and those which are not.

4.4 Discussion

The purpose of this chapter has been to test whether electoral systems affect the way MPs behave in newly-democratised countries of South East Europe compared to established parliamentary democracies, using roll-call votes. The main rationale for conducting this study was that in democracies where the level of party system

Table 4.8: PPG unity by party and issue in Montenegro

	ECG*		SNP		NOVA		PzP			
	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Votes	Unity	Average	Votes
Appointments and Dismissals	25	98.98	19	93.33	23	89.66	13	87.76	96.98	25
Constitutional Affairs	83	90.41	66	99.47	61	84.98	47	86.83	91.77	83
Economic Affairs	243	92.86	208	95.93	181	95.91	120	98.29	93.83	243
European and Int'l Affairs	35	99.86	35	98.92	20	92.11	6	100	99.35	35
Justice and Security	77	95.54	70	98.80	72	95.63	66	95.20	96.12	77
Public Health and Safety	58	94.18	57	96.15	52	89.11	26	95.96	94.31	58
Other votes	141	91.65	126	98.96	114	92.10	66	94.72	93.20	141
Total*	662	93.32	581	97.48	523	92.85	344	96.29	94.15	662

**Coalition in government.*

institutionalisation is high few links have been found between the electoral system and legislators' behaviour. However, in cases where PSI is low, where party politics are volatile and there is generally no strong relationship between parties and voters, the expectation was that electoral systems will play a greater role in determining MPs' behaviour. In weak-PSI countries with electoral systems that lack intra party competition, the assumption was that cohesion would be high, while in the same set of countries with electoral systems that allow intra party electoral competition cohesion was expected to be low.

An analysis of several thousands of roll-call votes across 21 European countries using different electoral systems and with different levels of party system institutionalisation showed that the level of cohesion is generally lower, but only slightly, among SEE countries as opposed to Western European countries, and that it is

slightly higher than the average level of cohesion found in Central European countries. Our Hypothesis 1, which assumed that the level of PPG unity would be higher under party-centred electoral systems compared to candidate-electoral systems was not supported however. For instance, the highest level of unity among SEE countries was found in Serbia using a closed-list PR system, but the lowest figures among these countries were also found in two other closed-list PR systems, namely Montenegro and Macedonia. Nevertheless, our Hypothesis 1.a, which suggested that the effect of electoral system would be conditional on the level of PSI was partially confirmed. That is, when the level of PSI was low, cohesion tended to be generally lower under open-list PR, compared to closed-list PR. As the level of PSI increased, so did the level of cohesion under both systems. Nevertheless, this was not the case for all types of electoral systems and hence, we cannot generalize on its impact of PPG unity under all candidate-centred systems and party-centred electoral systems.

Among other hypotheses we implied, only some of them showed significant effects. For instance, we found that cohesion tended to be generally higher in government parties as opposed to opposition parties (H.4). Moreover, the wider the margin of government over opposition was, the higher the PPG unity (H.5). On the other hand, we did not find that cohesion was lower as district magnitude increased. Hence, our Hypothesis 3, which suggested that the larger the number of co-partisans that candidates have to compete with, the lower the PPG unity would be was not supported. Neither did we find any evidence that cohesion was higher for smaller parties than for larger parties (H.6), or that cohesion was higher for older parties compared to younger parties (H.7). We also presented analyses of roll-call votes across issues for both Kosovo (sample data) and Montenegro (entire dataset). The analyses showed similar patterns in both countries; that is, PGG unity was generally high across issues regardless of how important they were for government survival. This finding is contrary to what Rahat (2007) finds in the case of Israel whereby cohesion was lower on constitutional issues, which were less important for government survival, and was higher on issues pertaining to government survival

such as budget. Moreover, the pattern of cohesion was not consistent across parties. Some parties showed highest levels of cohesion on some issues, while others were more cohesive on other issues.

While the impact of electoral systems conditional on the level of party system institutionalisation was only confirmed under some types of electoral systems, this chapter provided an analysis of MPs' behaviour in countries which have not been studied before and of which, thus, we knew little about. Moreover, even though the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour among weakly institutionalised party systems is not as strong as predicted, the analyses showed that the electoral systems do not have the same effect in weakly and highly institutionalised party systems. Moreover, it revealed that the level of party system institutionalisation is more important than the electoral system. As such, this study highlights the importance of exploring institutional behaviour among newly-democratised countries where the findings of Western European countries are not generally applicable. Perhaps there are other factors, other than the ones which have been taken into account here, which will help us explain why cohesion is lower among these countries. Overall, this study has paved the way for further research on MPs' behaviour. Having explored the effect of electoral system on PPG unity, one of the two dependent variables, in our next two chapters we explore the impact of electoral system on the other dependent variable, namely constituency links, in the case of both Kosovo and Macedonia among the South East European region.

Chapter 5

The extent of constituency links among MPs in Kosovo: A comparison of MPs' behaviour under closed-list and open-list PR systems

5.1 Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 2, studying constituency links is important for understanding how representation works. Yet, it was also noted that very little is known about MPs' incentives to develop such links outside established democracies. Looking at the case of Kosovo, where the level of party system institutionalisation is low, this chapter examines the extent to which its MPs develop close links with their constituents. In doing so, the chapter will compare MPs' behaviour under closed-list PR system which was used in the 2004 elections and open-list PR system which was used both in the 2007 and 2010 elections. The main argument is that due to the weak nature of the party system institutionalisation in Kosovo, MPs elected under open-list PR system, where there is intra-party electoral competition, will develop closer links with their constituents than those elected under closed-list PR, where such intra-party electoral competition is absent.

Knowing that MPs in many established democracies develop close links with their constituents, as well as express satisfaction from it (Brouard et al 2012, p.157), regardless of the electoral system, Kosovo as a newly-democratised country provides a good site to test whether the electoral system has any impact on MPs' propensity to do so. In order to examine MPs' behaviour, this chapter uses a qualitative approach by interviewing MPs from all three legislative terms, namely 2004-2007,

2007-2010 and 2010-2014. The main reason for choosing Kosovo, among the other regional countries, to assess the impact of electoral systems upon the behaviour of MPs is that Kosovo is the only country in the SEE region that has experienced a change in its electoral system from closed-list to open-list PR. As such, Kosovo provides a good natural experiment through which we can test the effect of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour across time while holding all else equal.

One of the main hypotheses which is tested here is that *MPs elected under open-list PR system will establish greater links with their constituents than those elected under closed-list PR* (H.8). We argued earlier in Chapter 2 that one way for MPs to distinguish themselves from their co-partisans under open-list PR systems, where there is intra-party electoral competition, is to develop greater links with their constituents. On the other hand, under closed-list PR systems, where candidates are largely dependent on the inter-party competition, the incentives to build a personal reputation are least important. The other hypothesis was that *the more centralised candidate selection is, the lesser the extent to which MPs will establish close links with their constituents, and the more decentralised candidate selection is, the larger the extent to which MPs will establish close links with their constituents* (H.9). Under centralised methods of candidate selection, where the selectorate is the party leadership, candidates need only pay attention to it if they aim to be reselected again. Moreover, assuming that party leadership will value more deputies' activities at the national level, legislators will focus most of their energies at that level. Under decentralised methods of candidate selection however, assuming that local members will be more preoccupied with how visible representatives are in the local area, MPs will have more incentives to develop close links with their constituents (Gallagher 1988, p.15).

There are two other hypotheses which are tested here that are mainly related to representational roles of MPs. As mentioned earlier, finding out who MPs represent is important because that is on whom, we assume, they will focus their constituency activities. Firstly, *MPs elected under open-list PR will be more likely to view them-*

selves as representatives of the electorate than those MPs elected under closed-list PR (H.10), because where voters are given the opportunity to cast preferential votes, MPs need to be attentive to those interests. When voters cannot distinguish among candidates on the list however, legislators will tend to view their constituencies largely in partisan terms (Mezey 2008, p.51). And, secondly, *under nationwide list-PR, in the absence of a geographically defined constituency, MPs will tend to focus their activities in their local area, such as their place of birth, or non-geographically defined groups* (H.12). Although MPs are elected by voters across the country under both open-list and closed-list PR in Kosovo, focusing those activities throughout the whole territory is difficult for practical reasons. Hence, we expect that MPs will concentrate their activities in their place of birth or on non-territorially defined groups as the hypothesis suggests. Results from testing these hypotheses are presented in section 5.4 of this chapter. In the following, an overview of both party system institutionalisation as well as the electoral and party system are provided.

5.2 Party System Institutionalisation

The main argument of this thesis was that the electoral systems in countries with weakly institutionalised party systems (PSI) will have a greater impact on MPs' behaviour compared to their impact in highly institutionalised party systems. It was also noted that there are several reasons why we would expect a greater effect of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour under weak PSI countries, two of which are relevant in this context. Firstly, there is a weak linkage between parties and the electorate. This is because parties appear and disappear frequently and as such voters have a hard time identifying with a particular party. This has two implications. On the one hand, parties know they are not going to be around for very long and hence have no incentive not to make big promises. In fact, they may never be around to face the consequences of over-promising (Roberts 2010). On the other hand, because political parties in such instances fail to deliver what citizens seek from them people become disillusioned and in turn look for independents or

outsiders. Consequentially, this leaves room for personalistic linkages between voters and candidates (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, p.218).

Secondly, when the level of party system institutionalisation is low parties are seen as weak organizations with no credible effects to deprive the legislators of their electoral benefits if they obstruct party responsibility (Tavits 2011, p.410), and legislators know that they can gain reelection even if they switch parties (Owens 2003, p.19). The latter happens for several reasons. Building on his examination of the case of Brazil, Mainwaring argues politicians switch parties not so much because of their ideological inclination, but rather because of their own political ambitions and their ties to powerful politicians. According to the author, 'the cost of switching is often low given the absence of legal sanctions and the electorate's toleration of politicians who change affiliations' (1999, p.145). In addition, MPs' motivation to switch parties might be grounded in their incentives to gain access to better institutional positions offered by the other party (Owens 2003, p.20).

Party appearance and disappearance in Kosovo is relatively easier to document compared to party identification, for which public opinion data are generally lacking. A mere look at the parliamentary elections shows that in 2001 there were 26 political entities; parties as well as citizens' initiatives, that registered for the elections (International Crisis Group 2001). In 2004, this number increased to 33 (Walecki 2006, p.82) with ORA party entering the elections for the first time only to dissolve[1] after it failed to pass the threshold in the next elections. In 2007 there were 26 entities (EP Election Observation Delegation 2007). Among those entering contestation for the first time was the AKR party. In 2010, there were 29 political entities that competed in the elections, two of which were new parties, namely Vetevendosje (VV) and FER (BBC 2013). Currently, only Vetevendosje continues to exist as FER was not able to pass the 5 per cent electoral threshold in the elections of the same year and dissolved, although a considerable number of its members later joined VV. Between 2012 and 2013 another five new political parties registered (KQZ 2013). Overall, 31

[1]Note: A large part of it later joined the LDK

political entities contested this year's elections out of which 19 were political parties (Telegrafi 2013).

In terms of the other aspect, it is hard to find data that assesses the level of party system institutionalisation in Kosovo. I have calculated the level of PSI for several countries using Casal Bertoa and Mair's (2010) index of government competition, which was discussed in great detail in Chapter 1, and that shows that the level of PSI in Kosovo is lower than the overall average for 34 European countries included in the analysis. In addition, it is recognised that one of the elements that diminishes the level of PSI in Kosovo is the frequent switching of MPs from one party to another (KIPRED 2012, p.5). Between 2007 and 2010 eleven of the 100 MPs switched parties and four became independent (KDI 2010, p.15). A report by the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) states 'there is almost no single party in Kosovo that has not lost members and even high officials who switched to another party, as there is almost no party that has not received members and officials from another party'. The same report states that reasons behind party switching include electoral and financial benefits, the ability to exercise influence over the judicial system by holding a powerful position, as well as enjoying higher social status. Among these financial benefits seem to be the main reason which, on the other hand, are also seen to further strengthen the role of the leadership since they enjoy the right to 'reward' incomers with political posts (2012, p.5).

The reasons for party switching are thus quite personal, and are aided by a lack of clear ideological positioning of parties. As such, it is very difficult to provide a general understanding of the pattern of party switching in Kosovo. One would suggest that party switching occurs most frequently from opposition parties to parties in government since they control access to most state resources, which is often the case with Kosovo as well. Nevertheless, MPs from parties in government have also switched to opposition parties, and those of opposition parties have also joined other parties among the opposition. For instance, five deputies from PDK, which has been in government during the 2010-2014 term, left the party to join other par-

ties which were not in coalition with PDK (Zëri 2014). In fact, most of the MPs that switched parties during this legislative term have joined LDK; the main opposition party. Perhaps MPs had incentives to think that, amidst allegations of corruption and mismanagement of country's economy by PDK, the latter would lose to LDK in the following elections but, providing an accurate justification is difficult.

Overall, political parties in Kosovo follow a top-down approach of party organization where party leadership exercises the most prominent roles over the party's business, such as electing central party organs, selecting candidates for elections, and controlling parliamentary party's business. Major decisions within the party, such as forming a coalition or pulling out of a coalition are also decisions which are reached by a handful of party officials. A report by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) states that the strong influence of party leadership over the way parties function, leaves little room for direct engagement of party members within the decision making process, 'weak influence of functional groups (youth, women, retired persons, etc.) within parties, a lack of affiliated organizations, hierarchical internal order, simple organizational patterns copied at all levels, indirect elections of central party bodies, significant overlapping of the party in the central office and the party in the public office, limited autonomy of the parliamentary party' (2012, pp.9,21). The democratic role of parties is further undermined as party statutes tend to change frequently, and even the leadership tends to override the formal rules outlined in the statutes. Overall, thus, the features highlighted here complement the low PSI scores for Kosovo provided in Chapter 1.

5.3 Electoral and Party System

The electoral system that is used to elect members of *Kuvendi* (Assembly) in Kosovo is open-list PR held under nation-wide district, out of which 100 MPs are elected. This system was introduced for the first time in the 2007 elections, mainly due to civil society calls to strengthen MP-voter relations, as previous elections were held under a nationwide closed-list PR system beginning with the first parliamentary

elections of 2001. The PR system was introduced to accommodate the interests of all communities in Kosovo following the end of the war in 1999. What resulted from this electoral engineering are also 20 reserved seats (in addition to the 100) for minority communities in Parliament; 10 for the Serb community and 10 for the other minority communities namely Roma, Turkish, Ashkali and so on. Political parties are required to abide by a 30 per cent female (termed minority gender) quota when presenting their list of candidates and there is a 30 per cent quota for female representation in parliament as well. Likewise, political parties need to pass a 5 per cent threshold for gaining representation in parliament.

Over the years, open-list PR system has undergone slight changes. In 2007, voters could cast up to 10 preference votes. In 2010, this number was reduced to 5. Currently, thus, voters must cast a vote for a party and, if they wish, express up to 5 preference votes for candidates within the same party. A voter may cast only one vote or cast all five, but if more than five candidates are voted for, then only the vote for the political party will count. The order in which parties present their candidates does not matter, in principle, as the list gets reordered in descending manner based on the number of votes received by each candidate. However, this does not mean that practically it does not influence voting behaviour since voters without any set preferences most often will tick the first five candidates on the list. Moreover, 'party's list order may indicate an organizational preference to which some voters may defer' (Katz and Bardi 1980, p.108-9). The only thing that impinges on a true reordering of the list based on preference votes is the 30 per cent female quota as women with fewer preference votes than men are still elected. So, if after the allocation of seats to a political party female candidates have not been allocated seats according to the 30 per cent requirement then the last male candidate is replaced by the next female candidate from the reordered list and so on until the 30 per cent is reached.

Before the open-list system was introduced in 2007, the electoral system was closed-list PR under nationwide district which was mainly put into place to foster women representation. The fact that MPs have been elected in a nationwide district

has not changed, so it is not possible to explore the effect of changing district magnitude on MPs' behaviour over time. Similarly, there were 120 MPs in total with 20 seats out of those reserved for minority communities. The electoral system between 2001 and 2010 has experienced several changes, apart from the ballot however. For instance, the 30 per cent female quota was introduced in the 2004 elections, the parliamentary term was extended from three to four years in the same year, the 5 per cent threshold was introduced in 2007, as mentioned the number of preference votes voters could cast changed from 10 to 5 in 2010, and the principle that allowed the leader of the party to automatically gain a preference vote each time a vote for the party was cast was removed in 2010.

Both these forms of proportional representation systems have always produced a coalition government of a few governing parties, and several parties represented in the parliament. From 2001 up until 2007, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was the major political party with the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) ranking second and the Alliance of the Future for Kosovo (AAK) ranking third. Consequent elections however have seen the emergence of new and rather smaller political parties namely ORA; which later merged with the LDK, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AKR). The political scene changed in the 2007 elections as LDK and PDK swapped in strength; with PDK thus becoming the largest parliamentary party. The Democratic League of Kosovo nevertheless managed to remain in government, as PDK's coalition partner, until 2010 when it pulled out of the coalition a result of which new elections took place. Even then, PDK managed to gain the largest number of seats, but this time it entered into a coalition with AKR, leaving LDK in opposition. Additional political parties have also emerged including Vetevendosje that gained representation in the elections of the same year. Proportional Representation, together with reserved seats for the minority communities, has also resulted in a large number of parties being represented in parliament despite the 5 per cent threshold. In the 2010 elections, 17 political parties gained representation with the same number of parties having won representation in the 2007-2010 mandate (KQZ),

while there were 19 in the 2004-2007 term (OSCE 2004).

It is important to note that there has been continuous debate on the change of the electoral system although this is more related to the need for improving the way elections are organized rather than the electoral system per se. In terms of the impact of the change from closed-list to open-list PR at the 2007 election, one might wonder whether the MPs elected in 2004 knew of this early in the parliamentary term and hence adjusted their behaviour accordingly. However, the historical record shows that the change was made at a late stage before the 2007 elections, and mainly in response to external pressure rather than as a result of the unconstrained choice of MPs. It is evident from the interviews conducted with MPs in the 2004-2007 parliament that the MPs who were elected in 2004 did not know that the closed-list PR system would change to open-list PR in the following elections until late in their mandate.

In addition, while civil society organizations had called for an open-list PR system much earlier, it only became known that this would probably be the case when the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, the so called Ahtisaari Plan, was adopted on 2 February 2007. This suggested that elections would need to be carried out under an open-list PR. The parliament of Kosovo then had to enact several laws, including one on elections, in accordance with the Plan. Likewise, there has long been a suggestion by some political parties to close the lists again for the 2014 elections, nevertheless none of the MPs interviewed mentioned this. Moreover, although a parliamentary committee on reforming the law was set up in 2011 party representatives failed to reach an agreement over the necessary changes to the electoral law which had to be adopted before the 2014 parliamentary elections. At the time of writing the dissertation, the 2014 elections took place and were carried under the same electoral system as that in 2010. If anything, this illustrates the uncertain environment in which MPs operate.

Moreover, while we indicated previously that the change in electoral system allows us to compare MPs' behaviour across time, it is not entirely possible to

hold everything else constant or control for all the changes in the meanwhile. Most importantly, Kosovo declared independence in February 2008, right after the 2007 elections took place in November that year. Hence, one could well argue that MPs in the previous term paid more attention to national issues, such as when independence would take place, rather than constituency activities. Acknowledging this difficulty, one could also argue otherwise, that MPs were more concerned with constituency interests in the aftermath of the post-war period, hence at the time when Kosovo's status had not yet been resolved, because this was a period in which things like running water, roads, and schools, were still missing. Hence, we would assume that people addressed concrete demands to their representatives. But, once these were put in place, at a later time, perhaps MPs faced fewer such demands.

5.4 Findings

Before delving deeper into the results, it is important to note two important findings that the interviews revealed in terms of the weak nature of party system institutionalisation. Firstly, there is an apparent lack of resources that MPs possess in dealing with their constituents. The majority of MPs admitted they are on their own when it comes to campaigning and maintaining links with their constituents. Out of all MPs, those who chair parliamentary committees enjoy the greatest resources with an office allocated to them and a secretary paid by the parliament. Most of them indicated that they use these resources to meet with their constituents, although a number of them made a distinction between pure party supporters that they claimed they met at party offices and regular citizens whom they normally receive in their parliamentary office. It must be noted that upon the initiative of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and civil society organizations, offices were set up across municipalities of Kosovo in the first parliamentary mandate (2004-2007) so MPs could spend one day per week meeting with constituents, but only a few MPs benefited from this and after a short time, once funding ran out, the offices were closed.

Secondly, a large number of MPs noted irregularities surrounding the way preference votes were cast. In fact, a large number of them believed that allowing the voters to cast five preference votes in the last election, left a lot of room for voter fraud as MPs in cooperation with the election commissioners were engaged in illegal vote transfer to boost candidates' electoral support. An MP from PDK noted (Interview with Kosovan MP, 08 April 2013):

"*I am not against open-list PR but the system needs better organization and a citizen's vote needs to go to where the citizen wants it to go. When we campaign, we are prone to believe that the votes citizens cast for us will remain ours. In the last elections, there was somehow no will to ask citizens to vote for you because their vote did not always reach the person it was destined to*".

Another MP from the same party stated (Interview with Kosovan MP, 08 April 2013):

"*They (candidates) gave money. Let's say a commissioner gets 100 Euros and then takes 100 votes from one candidate and gives it to the other. In these cases it does not matter who you are, how much support you've got, or how people vote*".

"*It sounds pretty bad, but I've heard candidates ask each other 'how many more votes did you need here?' No wonder, for instance, I had over 800 votes in Skenderaj initially but once the elections were repeated [a revote took place later] someone who was observing the counting told me although I received about the same number of votes again, a large number of them just vanished*".

It is well known that the largest scale of manipulation took place around the Skenderaj region, where at times electoral turnout was greater than 100 per cent. The same MP, in expressing his antagonism to the current electoral system in terms

of the number of preference votes one is allowed to cast, further noted:

"*I had proposed before the committee on electoral system change that since the number of preference votes cast could not be changed, as it was decided that it would be five, to at least ask voters to write down the number of preference votes they actually cast, for instance, if they cast four they would have to put number four down in order to prevent abuse*".

In fact, another MP noted (Interview with Kosovan MP, 11 April 2013):

"*If the same electoral system remains in place, election organization, voting and the way votes are counted need to be carried out better in order to prevent vote manipulations and abuse*".

These findings are also backed up by a report of the European Union Election Expert Mission to Kosovo (2010, p.29) which makes reference to decision A08/2011 of 13 January 2011 of the Election Complaints and Appeals Committee (ECAP), that noted 'in many polling stations there was theft of votes, bribing of commissioners, falsification of signatures, threats, ballot stuffing, family voting, pressures and blackmail, etc'. Similarly, the same report cites a local newspaper article that identified 133 court cases against commissioners (ibid, p.57). This makes it difficult to have a clear picture of what percentage of voters truly express a preference vote and how many of them express all of their five preference votes. As such, using preference votes can be tricky in the case of Kosovo, although they would give us an indication of, as it was noted in Chapter 2, whether the more preference votes MPs receive the more likely they are to establish closer links with their constituents, and vice-versa. Nevertheless, in order to examine the validity of the findings, correlation tests between preference votes and the amount of constituency links that MPs develop are done later in the chapter.

Certainly, this raises the question of why would MPs even bother building constituency links if they could get reelected just by paying the counting official to give them preference votes? And, similarly, why bother building constituency links since even if this wins a candidate more preference votes, these might be taken away from them by the counting officials. But, the issue is not as simple. Firstly, vote manipulations take place within parties and as such candidates would first need to make sure that their party gains as many votes as possible. The more votes the party gets, the greater the chance for MPs to win a seat because of the proportional nature of translating votes into seats. The way to do this, presumably, would be to keep in contact with the voters. Secondly, one does not know how many preference votes he/she needs knowing that this is dependent on the number of preference votes other candidates garner. Also, because of the gender quota, women normally get elected to parliament with fewer preference votes than men. For instance, in 2007 elections, within PDK, the top candidate received 105,378 votes, while the female candidate at the bottom received only 6,503 votes. The male candidate at the bottom received 11,353 votes however.

In terms of reelection, as predicted, the majority of MPs elected under open-list PR considered this depended on the voters although, as is shown below, some considered this was due both to the party and the electorate. One MP from AAK under open-list PR stated (Interview with Kosovan MP, 11 April 2013):

"*Even our election within the party is due to voters. Sometimes there is a misunderstanding. People who are familiar with political parties know one thing, no political party will include in its list people that they think will not gain votes. The party can make him a minister, a director of some agency, or anything else, but only those who are exclusively seen to capture votes will be included on the list, and there is no other reason*".

On the other hand, those elected under closed-list PR acknowledged that their

reelection was primarily due to the party. In fact, to illustrate the contrast, an MP who served under both electoral systems noted (Interview with Kosovan MP, 08 April 2013):

"*When I first contested the elections in 2004, the lists were closed. So, we were elected on a party vote. But, in the 2007 elections we were directly voted and so we gained reelection on the basis of the votes that we won as individuals*".

Yet, as mentioned, there were cases when MPs elected under open-list PR considered their reelection was depended both on the party and voters. Two MPs from LDK noted (Interview with Kosovan MPs, 10 April 2013 and 09 April 2013):

"*The party's trademark helps, too. I am certain that if 90 per cent of MPs ran as independent candidates they would not win*".

"*The party label cannot be neglected. We've had cases within our party when those who ceased to be an MP or a mayor thought they could change the label and still win, but this has shown that all those who do will lose the support of the people*".

One explanation for this is the fact that candidate selection methods are quite centralised in the sense that in all of the parties examined here, central party organs select candidates. Moreover, the entire candidate selection process is similar across parties as local branches propose a number of candidates, sometimes even greater than required, the party presidency which is the party's executive body, makes the final list and then hands it over to the party's general council for formal approval. Although the final word in most cases belongs to the council or the presidency, MPs mentioned certain qualities which are required from candidates in order to be placed high on the list. Those include reputation among the voters, how closely in touch one is with the electorate, how close one is to the leader, MP's contribution

to the party, as well as a number of other personal qualities like being a public speaker, demonstrating leadership traits, not having been involved in corruption scandals, being a good manager and having shown good records during the work in parliament.

Generally, party presidencies are smaller than party councils. For instance, LDK's general council is made up of 99 members, while the presidency contains 23 members. Similarly PDK's council is made up of 81 members while the presidency has 29 members, and finally, in the case of AAK the council is made up of 120 members while the presidency has 60 members. There are cases, certainly within PDK, where some MPs, as will be shown below, noted that in practice the final word belongs to the leader, who after the list has been approved by the council, has the right to make changes to it. It was noted by one MP that there were cases when candidates who were endorsed by the council were taken out by the leader on the grounds that they would be made ministers or given some other governmental post. In fact, one MP I interviewed admitted having been removed from the list for following elections after having been initially included (Interview with Kosovan MP, 30 July 2013). Two other MPs also mentioned this and even justified this behaviour on the part of the leader, whom they considered knows best what sort of candidates will win most votes. Within LDK, MPs noted the right to de-select a candidate belongs to the presidency, although a few of them said the leader retains that right. Within AAK, many MPs noted the right to remove certain candidates belongs to the council without recognizing any role of the leader over it. One justification for this could be that the leader of the party spent several years in the Hague, where he was being tried for war crimes.

In terms of candidate selection, as regards LDK 71 per cent of the respondents under open-list PR claimed the final word belongs to the council, while 29 per cent stated the final decision rested with the presidency; both central party agencies. Figures are similar for AAK, where 80 per cent claimed the decision belongs to the council and 20 per cent said this belonged to the presidency. On the other

hand, within PDK 64 per cent claimed the final word for selecting the candidates belonged to the council, 9 per cent said this belonged to the leader while 27 per cent stated the final word rests with the presidency. As such, candidate selection within all three parties is centralised; it basically rests with the central party agencies, as opposed to local party agencies. Moreover, candidate selection methods have largely remained intact across parties, with the exception of LDK perhaps, where MPs noted a stronger role of the party leader under the closed-list PR.

Turning back to electoral systems, the contrast between two types is not that evident when MPs were asked to explain what their main focus of representation was, although the contrast reappears later on. The majority of MPs across the two systems claimed they primarily represent the entire people as the following two tables show. Moreover, under open-list PR the greatest number of MPs ranked representing own voters and party's voters second and third respectively while, representing the party and specific groups in the society were ranked lowest. Under closed-list PR, representation looks pretty much the same considering that representing own voters is excluded as a category due to the absence of preferential voting under such systems. Specifically, Table 5.1 summarizes representational roles of MPs under open-list PR systems while Table 5.2 summarizes those under closed-list PR systems.

Table 5.1: Representation under open-list PR

	Ranked 1 %	**Ranked 2** %	**Ranked 3** %	**Ranked 4** %	**Ranked 5** %
Representing own voters (preference votes)	12.5	40.0	32.5	12.5	2.5
Representing party's voters	7.5	32.5	37.5	15.0	7.5
Representing the entire people	67.5	12.5	7.5	10.0	2.5
Representing the party	5.0	15.0	7.5	40.0	32.5
Representing specific groups	7.5	0.0	15.0	22.5	55.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100

N = 40

Table 5.2: Representation under closed-list PR

	Ranked 1 %	**Ranked 2** %	**Ranked 3** %	**Ranked 4** %
Representing party's voters	10.5	47.4	42.1	0.0
Representing the entire people	73.7	5.3	15.8	0.0
Representing the party	15.8	36.8	26.3	26.3
Representing specific groups	0.0	10.5	15.8	73.7
Total	100	100	100	100
N = 19				

What the two tables suggest, which is consistent with our expectation, is that MPs elected in a nationwide district have no particular constituency. Thus, both under open-list PR and closed-list PR, MPs had a hard time identifying themselves with particular constituencies other than the entire nation or people. This finding is similar to what Dudzińska et al find in the case of France, Israel, Italy, Poland and Portugal where MPs emphasised greater importance on representing all people in their countries (2014, p.25). In other countries, however, such as in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK, MPs either placed greater emphasis on representing their constituencies, or as is the case with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, MPs placed greater importance on representing the party (ibid). Representing the entire people, does not however indicate that MPs maintain links, and that with all of them. In fact, MPs tend to focus their activities in particular areas. For instance, when MPs were asked to give examples of ways they maintain links with 'the entire nation', most of them mentioned examples from their own geographical areas. Perhaps the quote from an LDK MP explains why this is the case (Interview with Kosovan MP 9 April 2013):

"*In principle, we represent the entire people because we get votes all around Kosovo, but it's difficult to represent the interests of all these people. So what do we do? Normally, MPs focus their activities in the areas they come from. For instance,*

LDK MPs who come from Gjilan, Peja, Prizren, etc. are closer with the citizens of those areas because that's where their electoral base is despite the fact that they could have, and probably did, gain votes even in Prishtina. The fact that there are MPs from different regions and different municipalities means that MPs are more responsible for some of these areas rather than others".

Many of them expressed their dissatisfaction with this way of representation since they actually lack 'a constituency' in the sense of geographically defined area that they can easily locate and pay close attention to. The same MP noted (Interview with Kosovan MP 9 April 2013):

"*I must be honest, Kosovo has a nationwide district, it is true that we're neither a big country nor a big nation, but by being an MP for all one runs the risk of being everywhere and nowhere at the same time. If, instead, an MP would be elected in a smaller district he would focus on that district only and certainly his contribution would be greater*".

Looking at preference vote distribution would perhaps help us understand whether MPs tend to focus their efforts in those regions where they obtained the largest number of votes, but this data is not available for Kosovo. Attempts to retrieve the 2007 data from either Central Election Commission (CEC) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was previously responsible to election management, were void. Moreover, an MP that served under the 2004-2007 term who ran for office in the next elections, but did not win, mentioned never having found out how many votes he personally got. Nevertheless, one can get an idea about this by looking at MPs' responses. For instance, one MP from LDK noted (Interview with Kosovan MP 11 August 2013):

"*There is a problem here. The problem is that I am supposed to be an MP of all*

citizens of Kosovo and as such I have no particular area, but I always try to engage more in those areas where I got more votes".

When it comes to primary focus within parliament however, Kosovan MPs do not seem interested as much in providing services to their constituents as they are in conducting parliamentary business. In some way, Kosovan MPs are similar to the German ones who think of themselves primarily as law makers (Saalfeld 2002, p.62). As Table 5.3 shows, when asked *'What do you think your primary role as a parliamentarian is? Do you consider your primary role is to represent voters, represent the party, legislate, hold government to account, or perform any other tasks?'* the majority of MPs under open-list PR claimed their primary role was to conduct parliamentary work such as law-making and holding government under account, while a slightly smaller number claimed they were primarily interested in representing the voters. Contrary, within closed-list PR the majority of MPs said they were primarily interested in representing the voters while a slightly smaller number mentioned parliamentary work. Although representing the voters does not, as will be shown later, entail more constituency work, perhaps this can be linked to our earlier argument that MPs were more sensitive to constituency issues before independence took place. Moreover, although the percentage of MPs who stated they were primarily interested in representing the voters is slightly higher under open-list PR, the difference between the two proportions is not statistically significant (p-value=0.4). The difference in proportions is not significant for MPs who stated their primary role is conducting parliamentary work (p-value=0.2) either, but it is significant for MPs who stated their primary role is to represent the party (p-value=0.03), with a greater number under closed-list PR saying so.

That Kosovan MPs are more parliament rather than constituency oriented is also explained in Table 5.4. Overall, MPs in open-list PR spend more time working as an MP than those in closed-list PR, with the difference in means being statistically significant (p-value=0.05). Both under open-list PR and closed-list PR, the

Table 5.3: Primary role of MPs

Electoral system	MPs	Representing the voters	Representing the party	Doing parliamentary work	N
Open-list PR	No	18	2	20	40
	%	45.0	5.0	50.0	100
Closed-list PR	No	8	4	7	19
	%	42.1	21.1	36.8	100

majority of MPs said they spend more time doing parliamentary work, that includes sessions, committee work and government oversight,[2] rather than doing constituency work. The difference in mean hours among the former is not statistically significant (p-value=0.5) but it is among the latter (p-value=0.01). Apart from their work as legislators, MPs were also asked how much time they spend in their local area per month. As shown in the last column of the table, MPs under open-list PR said they spent on average about 12.7 hours more in their local area per month than those under closed-list PR. The mean difference between the two, however is not statistically significant (p-value=0.2).

Table 5.4: Breakdown of MPs' work

Electoral system	Number of working hours p/w	% spent doing constituency work p/w	% spent doing party work p/w	% spent doing legislation work p/w	Hours spent in local area p/m	N
Open-list	35.8	25.6	18.5	55.9	42.3	19
Closed-list	27.7	20.1	18.8	61.1	29.6	40
Open and closed	33.3	24.0	18.5	57.5	38.9	59

To find out how they maintain links with constituents, MPs were asked to indicate how often they perform each of the nine activities below (question as asked in the PartiRep project):

[2]Note: MPs had difficulty differentiating the time they spent on each activity or any other parliamentary activity, see for comparison De Winter 1997b, pp.130-1.

1. attending or sending out letters on the occasion of weddings, wedding anniversaries, and funerals[3] in the local area,
2. meeting with small parties of constituents in their private homes to talk about their wants and needs,
3. giving lectures and speaking at debates,
4. sending out a personal newsletter and direct mailing,
5. holding clinics,[4]
6. advertising their constituency work services e.g. in newspaper ads or by visiting neighbourhoods,
7. publicizing their success in attracting business and obtaining government grants for their local area,
8. meeting local businesses and action groups, and
9. featuring in local media.

As Table 5.5 illustrates, a greater percentage of MPs elected under open-list PR, compared to those elected under closed-list PR, said they did at least one of the activities at least once a week. The difference in proportions between the two is statistically significant (p-value=0.03). By way of comparison, among Western European countries PartiRep survey found that there was variation among the countries. For instance, in Ireland over 90 per cent of TD did at least one of these activities every fortnight, in the Netherlands over 20 per cent of MPs did so, while in Norway about 25 per cent (André et al 2014b, p.174). The study also finds that in Ireland and Israel it is very common for legislators to frequently attend weddings, wedding anniversaries, and funerals, similar to the pattern we find in Kosovo. In fact, it is worth mentioning that there was a wide agreement among Kosovan MPs that paying tribute to a deceased is a good way of keeping in contact with the people. One MP from LDK noted:

"In our case, it is traditional that we pay tribute to the deceased by going for 'te pame' [a visit] - I don't think this is practiced elsewhere. For instance, it has hap-

[3]Note: in the context of Kosovo, after a funeral has taken place those who want to pay tribute may visit the family of the deceased by simply walking into their house. This usually lasts for a period of three to five days and is solely intended for that purpose. MPs were also asked if they would pay any such visits and most of them claimed this is a very good opportunity to meet with large numbers of people and discuss many issues.

[4]Note: There is no word in Albanian that would match the English word for clinics, therefore MPs were asked whether they had an MP's office (Zyre e Deputetit) which they would visit at least once a week and citizens could freely walk in knowing that they would be there.

pened to me that in a single day I personally met with 200-300 people in different places. Firstly, people feel respected when we do so and secondly, as representatives, we have a sense of obligation to be close to the people in such difficult times."

The same MP also stated that there were times when the MP along with party colleagues went to pay tribute to someone they knew but once in the village they realized that someone else had died,[5] and as such did the same to his/her family.

Table 5.5: Number and percentage of MPs who claimed they do at least one of the activities at certain intervals

Electoral system	**MPs**	**at least once a week**	**at least once every fortnight**	**at least once a month**	**might do it**	**would never do it**	**N**
Open-list PR	No	37	3	0	0	0	40
	%	92.5	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	100
Closed-list PR	No	14	3	1	1	0	19
	%	73.7	15.7	5.3	5.3	0.0	100

The differences between MPs in the two systems are more obvious when MPs were asked to say how often they perform at least two of the activities, and the gap widens as the number of activities increases. Although the figures are not shown here, 80 per cent of MPs under open-list PR said they do at least two of the activities at least once a week while only 58 percent of MPs under closed-list PR said the same. The difference in proportions between the two is also statistically significant (p-value=0.03).

MPs were asked another question from the PartiRep project as follows: *'In your role as MP, how often in the last year have you had contact with the following groups, persons, or organizations'*:

1. youth organizations,
2. organizations for the elderly,

[5]Note: In Kosovo, when somebody dies an empty chair is placed in front of the house gate/door, visible to those passing by.

3. workers organizations and trade unions,
4. employers organizations,
5. womens organizations,
6. farmers organizations,
7. organizations of ethnic minorities,
8. mosques/churches or religious organizations,
9. environmental organizations, and
10. journalists.

The purpose of asking MPs this question was to get an understanding of the frequency of MPs' contacts with various groups, and the type of groups MPs tend to focus on; that is whether they tend to focus more on specific groups, or whether parties apply a catch-all strategy by focusing on several groups (Caramani et al 2014, p.44). As Table 5.6 shows, a greater percentage of MPs under open-list PR said they meet with at least one group/organization at least once a week compared to those under closed-list PR. The difference in proportions between the two is statistically significant (p-value=0.03) suggesting those under the open-list PR met with these organizations more often. However, this difference is no longer apparent when MPs are asked how often they meet with at least two of the groups/organizations. In fact, 45 per cent of MPs under open-list PR said they do so at least once a week while 47 per cent said so under closed-list PR. The difference between the two proportions however is not significant (p-value=0.4).

Table 5.6: Number and percentage of MPs who claimed they meet with at least one group at certain intervals

Electoral system	**Electoral**	**at least once a week**	**at least once a month**	**at least once every three months**	**at least once a year**	**no contact**	**N**
Open-list PR	No of MPs	37	3	0	0	0	40
	% of MPs	92.5	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	100
Closed-list PR	No of MPs	16	3	0	0	0	19
	% of MPs	84.2	15.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	100

Moreover, Table 5.7 shows the kind of groups that MPs claimed they meet more

often; e.g. once a week or once a month. As can be seen, both under closed-list and open-list PR, the largest percentage of MPs tend to meet most frequently with journalists, youth, and sports organizations. Those who claimed they meet with elderly, environment, ethnic minorities', and farmers' organizations are, however, few. Perhaps, one of the reasons why MPs tend to focus on youth organizations is because Kosovo has a young population, and at each new election 30,000 young persons become eligible to vote. Similarly, by maintaining contact with journalists, MPs can get more publicity.

Table 5.7: MPs' contacts with various organizations

	Open-list PR	**Closed-lst PR**
Youth organizations	60.0	63.2
Elderly organizations	20.2	36.8
Workers' organizations	35.0	36.8
Employers' organizations	27.5	26.3
Womens' organizations	32.7	47.3
Farmers' organizations	22.5	26.3
Ethnic minorities' organizations	22.5	15.8
Religious organizations	27.5	31.5
Environment organizations	20.0	20.1
Sports organizations	45.0	36.8
Journalists	92.5	84.2

Note: Percentages of MPs who claimed they had contact at least once a week or once a month

To some extent, these findings are similar to what PartiRep Project finds across Western European countries. Members of Parliament there tend to focus mainly on representing young groups. Over 44 per cent of MPs in 15 countries said they had contact at least once a week or once a month with youth organizations. Another 40 per cent said they had as frequent contact with elderly and workers' organizations, about 29 per cent said they did so with employers' organizations, 26 per cent with women and farmers' organizations, about 15 per cent with ethnic minority organizations and 19 per cent with religious organizations (Caramani et al 2014, p.52).

Measuring MP-constituency links involved looking at the number of requests that MPs under both systems received. Members of Parliament were asked the question

'How many requests for help (letters, e-mails, phone calls, visits) in dealing with public authorities do you receive in an average week? And how many inquiries from individual citizens relating primarily to policy matters do you receive per week?'. As reported in Table 5.8, those under open-list PR system received on average a larger number of requests per week, both those that dealt with public authorities, and those related to policy matters, compared to MPs under closed-list PR. Comparing the mean differences between the two shows the difference to be statistically significant (p-value=0.02).

Table 5.8: Number of requests for help MPs receive on average per week

Electoral system	**Requests dealing with public authorities**	**Requests dealing with policy matters**	**Total requests**	**N**
Open-list PR	11.0	2.7	13.8	40
Closed-list PR	5.1	2.8	7.9	19

Members of Parliament were then asked to specify how many working hours they spent on requests that required help in dealing with public authorities. As Table 5.9 shows, MPs under open-list PR spent more time dealing with those type of requests than those in closed-list PR. When it comes to the type of requests that MPs receive, they mostly mentioned financial type of requests such as getting a job, getting medical treatment abroad for a family member, or getting into University; requests that MPs attributed to the low level of social and economic development in Kosovo. The difference in means between the two types of electoral systems does not prove statistically significant however (p-value=0.1).

This perhaps explains why, when asked the question *'How do you feel when voters contact you?'*, most MPs stated that they feel good when they can do something about these requests, but feel terrible when they get requests that that they cannot do much about. Equally, all of them said they are very open to voters contacting them through phone, email, Facebook, or directly meeting with them in the parlia-

Table 5.9: Average hours MPs spend on requests dealing with public authorities per week

Electoral system	Average hours p/w	N
Open-list PR	4.9	40
Closed-list PR	3.4	19

ment or in their own parties' offices. In fact, other than direct visits, MPs said they largely use phone and Internet when communicating with voters. For instance, the majority of them stated they use Facebook to regularly keep contact with voters while a number of them admitted they get frequent messages and phone calls as well. A few MPs also mentioned cases when voters showed up at their homes, which they considered was normal.

Table 5.10: MPs' responses on what would happen if they reduced their efforts to respond to constituency requests

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
I would lose a significant number of votes as a result	1/2.5% 1/5.3%	5/12.5% 1/5.3%	0/0% 1/5.3%	16/40% 9/47.3%	18/45% 7/36.8%	40/100% 19/100%
I could well face a serious challenge in candidate selection as a result	3/7.5% 0/0%	13/32.5% 7/36.8%	5/12.5% 1/5.3%	11/27.5% 7/36.8%	8/20% 4/21.10%	40/100% 19/100%
I would lose touch with problems voters face in their daily life as a result	1/2.5% 0/0%	3/7.5% 1/5.3%	1/2.5% 0/0%	19/47.5% 8/42.1%	16/40% 10/52.6%	40/100% 19/100%

First row open-list PR, second row closed-list PR

While the majority of MPs admitted that the party leader requests that they maintain close contact with the voters, MPs also recognized that there are electoral

benefits from helping people deal with their requests. For instance, on the question *'What do you think would happen, if you were to reduce the efforts you make in assisting voters in their dealings with public authorities?'*, as seen in Table 5.10, the majority of MPs in both systems either agreed or strongly agreed that, among other things, one would lose a significant number of votes as a result.

So far, we have provided evidence on some aspects of constituency links, but in order to test the effects of electoral system, party and gender on constituency links (hours of constituency work per week, number of requests dealing with public authorities per week, hours spent dealing with those requests per week, and the number of hours spent in the local area per month), I conduct negative binomial regression analyses on each of the dependent variables separately. The reason for using negative binomial regressions is because of the nature of data; that is, we are dealing here with count data, or the number of hours that MPs allocate to different activities. Moreover, compared to a Poisson regression, negative binomial regressions are more appropriate for over-dispersed data, which is certainly our case [6]. Finally, a test of overdispersion confirms that the mean and variance are not the same (p-value=0.001, p-value=0.01, p-value=0.006, and p-value= 0.0001 respectively for all four DVs). Table 5.11 provides summary statistics for all variables used.

The results which are presented in Table 5.12 show the electoral system to be statistically significant in three cases. Interpreting the exponentiated regression coefficients, firstly, MPs under open-list PR tend to spend about 3.2 hours more on constituency work out of their parliamentary hours compared to those in closed-list PR. The variable is significant at 0.05 level. Secondly, MPs in open-list PR also receive about 7.3 more requests dealing with public authorities per week compared to MPs under closed-list PR, and the variable is also significant at the same level. Thirdly, MPs in open-list PR spend about 1.7 more hours per week on requests dealing with public authorities than MPs under closed-list PR. This variable is

[6]DV Mean-Variance comparison: mean(constituency hours per week) = 8.01, var(constituency hours per week)=29.6, mean(number of requets per week)=9.9, var(number of requests per week)=114.1, mean(hours spent on requests per week)=4.5, var(hours spent on requests per week)=13.9, mean(monthly hours local area)=38.9, var(monthly hours local area)=1211.6.

Table 5.11: Descriptive statistics (Kosovo)

	Min	Median	Mean	Max	St dev
MPs' work hours	13.50	37.50	35.81	60.00	10.54
Hours constituency work	0.00	8.45	9.17	24.00	5.55
Hours party work	0.00	5.75	6.66	18.00	4.19
Hours parliamentary work	5.00	19.20	20.03	40.00	8.60
Number of requests dealing dealing with public authorities p/w	0.00	10.00	12.15	50.00	11.97
Total requests p/w	1.00	12.00	14.90	55.00	12.23
Hours spent on requests dealing with public authorities p/w	0.00	3.00	4.96	20.00	4.04
Number of hours p/m spent in the local area	2.00	36.00	42.27	200.00	37.03

Table 5.12: Negative binomial regressions on each dependent variable. (1) Number of hours spent doing constituency work per week, (2) Number of requests received per week, (3) Hours spent on those requests per week, and (4) Number of hours spent in the local area per month.

	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Intercept	1.91***	1.50***	1.02**	3.98***
	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Open-list PR	0.46*	0.91***	0.39.	0.19
	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.22)
LDK	-0.37	0.14	0.44	-0.17
	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.30)
PDK	-0.03	0.26	0.66*	-0.65*
	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Male	0.00	-0.10	-3.64	-0.25
	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Log-likelihood	-348.18	-475.66	-287.39	-538.07
N	59	59	59	59

Significance levels: '.'p-value 0.1,''p-value 0.05, '**'p-value 0.01, '***'p-value 0.001.*

significant at 0.1 level. The electoral system variable however is not found to be significant when the dependent variable is the number of hours spent in the local area per month, although on average MPs in open-list PR system spend about 6.3 hours more than those under closed-list PR. Regarding the other independent variables, MPs from PDK tend to spend about 3.1 more hours per week on requests dealing with public authorities than those of AAK. The variable is significant at 0.05 level. Nevertheless, MPs from PDK tend to spend about 26 hours less than those of AAK in their local area per month. This variable is significant at the 0.05 level. Neither gender nor party variables are significant in the analyses.

Moreover, it was suggested in Chapter 2 that the higher the number of preference votes, the larger the amount of constituency links that MPs will establish. Likewise, the larger the amount of constituency links that MPs establish, the greater the amount of preference votes they will gather. The first set of relationship can only be tested using data from 16 MPs that served under both open-list and closed-list PR, otherwise a comparison is not possible for those that were only elected under one electoral system. Hence, to make both relationships comparable both samples are set at 16. Table 5.13 in the following reports the correlation coefficients. As we can see from the table preference votes are not a good predictor of the amount of constituency links and, neither are constituency links a good predictor for preference votes perhaps with the exception of the number of hours spent doing constituency work per week and the number of votes MPs got consequently.

5.5 Discussion

The purpose of this study has been to inquire into the nature of links that Kosovan MPs develop with their constituents by comparing MPs' behaviour under both open-list and closed-list PR knowing that the level of party system institutionalisation is low compared to established European democracies. The 59 interviews that were conducted with MPs that served under both systems revealed the weak nature of

Table 5.13: Correlation of preference votes and electoral support for MPs with DVs. (1) Number of hours spent doing constituency work per week, (2) Number of requests received per week, (3) Hours spent on those requests per week, and (4) Number of hours spent in the local area per month.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	N
Did more constituency work bring MPs more preference votes?	-0.10	0.56	-0.06	0.19	16
Did those who obtained more preference votes establish more constituency links?	-0.23	0.13	-0.02	0.01	16

party system institutionalisation, such as apparent lack of party resources and vote manipulation that not only makes it difficult to assess voter-MP relations, but also leaves doubt about the incentives of MPs to attract personal votes knowing that some other MPs might, in cooperation with an electoral commissioner, steal those votes away from them. Overall, the findings showed that MPs under open-list PR generally developed stronger links with their constituents than MPs under closed-list PR, as expected in our Hypothesis 8. That is, the former MPs spent on average more hours, out of their parliamentary time, dealing with constituency work per week, they met more frequently with various groups, they received more requests per week, spent more hours dealing with them, as well as spent more hours, on average, in their local area per month. Among the other independent variables, the party variable was also significant with PDK MPs spending more hours on requests dealing with public authorities per week, but fewer hours compared to AAK MPs in their local area per month.

Moreover, as expected, MPs in the absence of constituencies under the nation-wide district had a larger focus of representation. Most MPs across the two electoral systems claimed they represented the entire people. When it comes to maintaining links with constituents however, also as also expected, MPs generally focused their activities around their own geographical areas (H.12) Although MPs were aware

that their vote support is dispersed, they acknowledged that maintaining links with all was practically impossible. In terms of MPs' representational roles in parliament, although we expected that those elected under open-list PR would mostly view themselves as representatives of the electorate compared to those elected under closed-list PR, the findings did not conform to the expectation (H.10). Finally, the findings suggest that MPs in Kosovo tend to focus more on doing parliamentary work than representing constituency interests as they spend most of their parliamentary time doing the former. But, MPs considered that when spending time dealing with legislative work, they also made sure that the legislation took into account constituency interests.

The nature of candidate selection was also explored to a certain extent. These methods are centralised across parties, as central party organs select the candidates for elections. Moreover, no differences in candidate selection methods were observed across terms thus making it impossible for us to test Hypothesis 9. While the majority of MPs under open-list considered they owed their reelection to the voters, and those under closed-list considered this was due to the party, we suggested the reason why some MPs in open-list PR system considered they owed their reelection both to the party and voters, was because of the centralised methods of candidate selection. Hence, even though voters can cast preference votes for their preferred candidates, the party decides who runs for elections and where, in turn, candidates are placed on the list.

To sum up, the electoral system largely explains MPs' behaviour in Kosovo. Our interviews with MPs across terms, showed that those under open-list PR generally developed more constituency links than those under the closed-list PR. Acknowledging all the difficulties, and considering that studies on MPs' behaviour along this aspect can only be studied through interviews in this part of the word, the study has shown that examining the impact of electoral systems in a weakly institutionalised party system yields interesting findings that may have implications not only for Kosovo, but also for newly-democratised countries elsewhere. As such, future

research on the behaviour of parliamentarians should pay particular attention to the nature of party system institutionalisation in these countries. In the next chapter, we turn to the behaviour of Macedonian MPs and the comparison between them and their Kosovan counterparts.

Chapter 6

To what extent do MPs in closed-list PR electoral systems develop close links with their constituents? Evidence from Macedonia

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter delved into the nature of links that MPs in Kosovo establish by comparing their behaviour under closed-list and open-list PR, this chapter seeks to examine the extent to which Macedonian MPs establish close links with their constituents under closed-list PR system. As outlined in earlier chapters, under such systems, MPs seem to have few incentives to establish close links with their constituents because of the lack of intra-party electoral competition that MPs under open-list PR face. In such systems, because MPs are elected on a party list they only need to make sure that they are reselected on a secure position in the following elections. The higher MPs are placed on the party's list, the greater the chances that they will secure another mandate. Certainly, we noted that decentralised methods of candidate selection can also co-exist with party-centred electoral systems, which has implications for MPs' behaviour because in case of conflict between party leadership and local party organization, MPs will be faced with a dilemma as who to follow. Whom MPs respond to however, is primarily dependent on their perceptions of who controls their reelection.

In a broader sense, the choice of Macedonia to investigate MPs' behaviour is a logical follow up of what the overall purpose of the thesis is, which is to investigate the impact of electoral systems in newly-democratised countries. As is shown in

greater detail in Chapter 1, Macedonia, similar to Kosovo, has a level of PSI below the overall average for the 34 countries. More specifically, however, the choice of Macedonia to investigate MP-constituency activities is a result of both theoretical and practical reasons. Firstly, having conducted a similar study on Kosovo, Macedonia presents us with a case which can easily be compared to that of Kosovo, quite apart from the fact that the two countries geographically border each other. For instance, both countries were part of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, Kosovo had a war in 1999 and Macedonia had an ethnic conflict in 2001. Likewise, both countries have dominant majorities in parliament but also a number of minority communities. Finally, the countries have more or less the same level of economic development, and they both aspire to become members of the European Union. Secondly, although Albania and Serbia, from the regional countries, also use closed-list PR, inquiring into the nature of links in Serbia would have been more problematic as a Kosovan citizen. On the other hand, while getting to Albania would have been rather easy and practical in terms of the language, interviewing MPs there would bias my selection towards ethnic Albanians, given that I already interviewed mainly Albanian-speaking MPs in Kosovo.

Most of the hypotheses, regarding both the electoral system and candidate selection methods, which are tested here are similar to the ones we already tested on Kosovo, but the only limitation here is that the electoral system has not changed recently in Macedonia. Therefore, comparing the behaviour of MPs over time is not possible. Nevertheless, after exploring the extent to which MPs in Macedonia develop close links with their constituents, we will test the impact of electoral systems on MPs' propensity to establish close links with the electorate (H.8) by comparing Macedonian MPs' behaviour with that of Kosovan MPs under both open-list and closed-list PR; as reported in the previous chapter. In terms of representational roles, since Macedonian MPs are elected under a party-centred electoral system, we expect that they will primarily tend to view themselves as representatives of the party rather than the electorate (H.10). Moreover, if MPs are torn between follow-

ing a party line or that of their constituents, we expect that they will follow the first (H.11) for reasons which were explained in Chapter 2. Likewise, since the country is divided into six districts, we assume that MPs will tend to focus their activities in their own districts (H.12), although the fact that they can run in different districts at different elections may lead them to have a broader focus of representation. Finally, as regards candidate selection, we expect that MPs elected under centralised methods of candidate selection will have fewer incentives to develop close links with their constituents compared to those elected under decentralised methods of candidate selection (H.9).

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section gives an overview of the nature of party system institutionalisation in Macedonia by focusing specifically on party instability and party switching. The second section provides some background information on the electoral law and party system in Macedonia. The third section provides an overview of the findings from our interviews with 49 MPs which were conducted during 2014, by explaining both the extent and the nature of links that MPs develop. The last part provides a comparative analysis of the behaviour of Macedonian and Kosovan MPs before concluding with a brief summary at the very end of the chapter.

6.2 Party System Institutionalisation

The nature of party system institutionalisation in Macedonia is similar to that of Kosovo in the sense that parties exhibit a pattern of instability as they appear and disappear frequently from the political scene. In the early elections of 2011 two large coalitions, one led by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and the other led by the Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), participated in the elections along with 16 other political parties. More specifically, the VMRO-DPMNE led coalition included 22 parties while the SDSM coalition included 15 parties. Overall, a total of 53 political entities were registered to partake in the

elections (OSCE 2011). In 2008 elections, there were also two large coalitions led by ethnic-Macedonian parties, two main Albanian parties and 16 other political parties. Overall, 41 political entities contested the elections (SEC 2008). In 2006, 31 political parties, coalitions and groups of voters contested the elections (OSCE 2006). The total number of entities registered for the elections was 50 (Hislope 2013, p.614). With an average of 40 parties presenting candidates in national elections since the first post-communist elections in 1990, Hislope regards Macedonia as a smorgasboard of party-types (ibid, p.607).

Much of the party fragmentation in Macedonia originates in the parliament as personal disagreements within parliamentary parties have led to the creation of new party groups. For instance, internal disagreements within VMRO have led to the creation of ten splinter parties with VMRO as their prefix, some of which merged with VMRO at a later date. Similarly, the New Social Democratic Party (NSDP) split from SDSM in 2005, joined the VMRO-DPMNE coalition in 2006 and then re-joined the SDSM coalition again in 2008. Finally, some members of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) left the party to form New Democracy in 2008. A large number of small parties are often termed 'celebrity parties' which appear on the political scene often to manage the candidacy of prominent politicians, but fail to acquire any strong basis of organization, or gain much popular support. Nevertheless these parties play a large part in the fragmented nature of the party system in Macedonia (Hislope 2013, pp.612-3).

In terms of party switching, Macedonia appears quite stable. Between 2006 and 2008 three MPs switched parties and five MPs became independent. Between 2008 and 2011 five MPs, all from DPA, switched to the newly formed New Democracy (ND) party and one of them later became independent. Finally, between 2011 and 2014 no single MP switched party group. In this aspect Macedonia is also more stable compared to some other party systems such as Brazil, for instance, where Desposate shows over a third of MPs switch parties, some as frequently as seven times (2006, p.63). It is worth mentioning that before 2004 the Electoral Code

of Macedonia stipulated that MPs who switched parties would have to give up their party mandate, and although this provision in practice was often ignored, the Constitutional court annulled it (Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska 2006 cited in Hislope 2013, p.612).

As regards party organization, Karasimeonov (2005) notes there is generally lack of democracy and transparency in how parties operate in Macedonia. Moreover, there is a strong tendency for party-leadership to dominate the decision making process leaving very little room for deliberation at parties' different levels of organization (KAS no date, p.48). The leadership's dominance is observed over both intra-party elections as well as over candidate selection methods (Daskalovski et al 2012), and it is considered to be the main hindrance to party democratization. Moreover, the strong influence of party leadership over party politics hinders parties' capability to represent the preferences of their constituents and it constrains MPs' behaviour in parliament, as MPs can rarely go against the party's position knowing that marginalization and exclusion can result from it (KAS no date, pp.13-4,48). All in all, the party system institutionalisation in Macedonia resembles that of Kosovo and, as was shown in Chapter 1, they have more or less the same level of PSI.

6.3 Electoral and Party System

According to the country's Electoral Code, Macedonia uses closed-list PR system to elect its 120 members of *Sobranie* (Assembly) while 3 out-of-country MPs, representing Europe and Africa, North and South America, as well as Australia and Asia, are elected under majoritarian system. The latter is a result of the 2011 decision to amend the electoral code of 2006 just before the early elections of 2011 took place. Under the PR system, the country is divided into six, multi-member districts comprising several municipalities that elect 20 MPs each. Candidates can run in one unit at one election and run in another unit at another election depending on their popularity in those areas. While there is no threshold for gaining representation, there is a 30 per cent female (or the less represented gender) quota ensuring

increased female representation in parliament.

The electoral system in Macedonia has undergone several changes between 1990 and 2002 including a change from majoritarian, to mixed-member and then pure proportional representation system in the latter year. Although the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended the 2001 ethnic conflict in Macedonia, had not specifically suggested a change in the electoral system (FES 2008), the proportional representation system has mainly been adopted to foster minority representation as a consequence (IEOM 2002). Considering that Macedonians comprise 64 per cent of the population, and as such are the largest ethnic group, the PR system has indeed increased the representation of Albanians that comprise 25 per cent of the population (often cited as 30-35 per cent), as well as that of Turks and Roma comprising 4 and 3 per cent respectively.[1] In fact, it was the Albanian parties that had proposed a PR system under a nationwide constituency, which they considered would enhance the number of Albanian MPs represented, whereas the Macedonian parties favoured maintaining the majoritarian system for electing some seats, in addition to their preference for smaller constituencies. The result was a PR system with six multi-member constituencies (IEOM 2002).

The elections of 2011 resulted in a coalition government between the ethnic-Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE led coalition and the ethnic-Albanian party DUI. The VMRO-DPMNE led coalition received 56 seats in the parliament while DUI received 15 (IPU Parline). The opposition comprised the SDSM led coalition with 42 seats, the DPA with 8 seats and the NDR (National Democratic Revival), also ethnic Albanian, party with two seats. Coalition governments, normally comprising one ethnic majority and one Albanian minority party, are a norm under the proportional system in Macedonia, and likewise there has been a tendency for larger parties to enter into pre-electoral coalitions with a number of smaller parties in order to 'gain a competitive edge over their opponents' and/or, be able to meet the double majority requirement for passing certain legislation (Hislope 2013, p.613). To some

[1] `http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=4021`, accessed 12 June 2014.

extent party competition has stabilized around two major blocks; either the right-wing VMRO party leads the government, or the Socialist SDSM block does so, but both competition and representation are largely based on ethnic grounds as political parties comprise and represent voters along those lines.

As main coalition partners are almost always from two different ethnic communities, government functioning is not an easy task. For instance, tensions between VMRO and DUI on a 'consensual' candidate for the 2014 Presidential elections led DUI to submit its motion to dissolve the parliament in early March as a result of which early elections were scheduled for 27 April. Moreover, government-opposition relations are often tense. It is worth noting that the opposition, namely SDSM, boycotted the Parliament from 24 December 2012; when the government pressed through the 2013 budget, that SDSM considered 'unconstitutional', and was expelled from the parliament along with a number of journalists, until 1 March 2013 when a deal between the two was reached (EIU 2013). This certainly had implications for the work of the parliament as well as MPs' activities outside of it. The 2013 European Commission's Progress Report, which evaluates country's progress in fulfilling EU membership criteria, stated that although the deal was reached in March, the main opposition parties rarely took part in the plenaries until September that year (EC 2013).

6.4 Findings

Similar to Kosovo, interviews with the Members of Macedonian Parliament revealed lack of electoral resources on the part of legislators to carry out activities although, Macedonian MPs, unlike Kosovan ones, still benefit from the initially NDI-run project. Generally, heads of Parliamentary Party Groups and committee chairs are given an office within the parliament which a number of them indicated they also use to meet with their constituents while in parliament, as well as an assistant, or even more in the case of PPG chairs. Other MPs also have assistants, but there is only one assistant for every five MPs, and they can either use the PPG office or

meet with their constituents elsewhere.

In addition, as indicated above, Macedonian MPs also have offices in their local areas, which were set up as part of an NDI-run project that started in 2003.[2] At the early stage of the project, 46 offices had opened placing two MPs, normally, and one assistant in every office. As such most of the MPs benefited from the project. An additional 19 offices were opened by 2006, and by 2009 the number reached 75, giving an even greater number of MPs access to them. These offices are still existent, although they do not function well for a number of reasons.[3] Firstly, the NDI handed over the project to the parliament in 2012 and the latter seems to struggle with running the offices and paying the assistants. Secondly, some MPs were never allocated a local office. Some of them even indicated that assistants are paid to sit at home but that in the absence of the office it is difficult for people to contact the MPs. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, while the initial idea had been to team-up with local municipalities that were willing to offer office spaces for constituency purposes, instead a number of MPs decided to locate their office within the local party branch giving it a political character. As such, citizens, other than obvious party supporters, hesitated to approach the MPs.

Before presenting the findings of the interviews, it is also important to note that unlike Kosovo, the interviews revealed no apparent vote manipulation, perhaps also because within-party manipulations are not possible without preference votes. Nevertheless, the 2011 OSCE report on the parliamentary elections notes 'reciprocal allegations of voter intimidation and misuse of state resources persisted'. The same report also states that 'very few official complaints were filed with the SEC (State Election Commission) and none with the courts', but it also accredits this to the insufficient address for complaints procedure in the Electoral Code and the lack of citizens' trust in the complaints procedures and bodies.[4] Certainly things

[2]Note: the project was funded by USAID (United Stated Agency for International Development) and CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), as well as SDC (Swiss Development Cooperation) at a later stage.

[3]Personal interview with Gezim Jashari and Edip Bilalli of National Democratic Institute (NDI) 29 February 2014.

[4]ibid

seem to have improved over the years. Previously, an OSCE report notes that the Election Day was marked by organized violence which 'disrupted voting in many predominantly ethnic Albanian areas, leaving one person dead and several injured'. Moreover, 'this contributed to a number of irregularities and instances of election fraud. The cumulative result of these events impacted on the freedom of voters to cast their ballots without intimidation, violence or fear of retribution' (OSCE 2008). As a result, elections had to be repeated. The 2006 OSCE report also notes party allegations on irregularities such as voter pressure, intimidation, and possible election fraud (OSCE 2006).

As already described in section 3.2.1 above, a total of 49 Macedonian MPs, representing different ethnic groups, were interviewed in February 2014. The questions that MPs were asked were the same as those asked to Kosovan MPs that served under closed-list PR, and largely based on the PartiRep survey. One of the primary questions that MPs were asked concerned MPs' perception of their reelection. We assumed earlier that MPs, being rational actors, will focus their resources on those that they consider their reelection will depend upon, and for that we asked them whether they considered they owed their reelection primarily to the party, voters, or both. The majority of them, 37, said they believed their election was a result of both the party and voters. A smaller number, 7, said their election was mainly due to the voters, while 5 MPs said this was mainly due to the party. The main reason that MPs, especially those from ethnic Macedonian parties, offered as to why they think their reelection was due both to the party and the electorate is that although the party makes the decision to include someone on the list, where the candidate is placed is very much dependent on the pre-election opinion polls that parties conduct with voters. In answering the question, two MPs from SDSM noted:

"*The party conducts surveys to see who is popular among the people. Those that are popular make it to the high positions on the list. It can well be that some person who's not a member of the party is very popular as well in which case we get them*

to run for us in our party list. This has happened often because nobody requires that they had been members before" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 5 February 2014).

"*I think it's both because as I said the party does polls...so it is important that you have a good ranking in your city*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 6 February 2014).

In fact, one MP mentioned that the decision for candidates to run in one constituency or another is often based on candidate's popularity in that area. The following quote explains:

"*I was in electoral unit 6 in 2006 and twice I was in electoral unit 5*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 10 February 2014).

When I asked the MP if they can decide themselves in which constituency to run, the MP responded:

"*No...according to the surveys*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 10 February 2014).

Another MP from the same party answered the following way, when asked to determine whether his re-election was mainly due to the party or voters:

"*It's a bit difficult. First, you owe it to the party because they put you on the list and a higher place on the list where you actually get to win...I was not, let's say on a secure position because the polls were saying that we were going to have six MPs [in the district] and I was number eight...so basically I think I owe a bit to the voters because I think the work during the campaign and previously made it possible that I get elected*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 5 February 2014).

Certainly, the decision to put someone on a secure position on the list seems to be dependent on a number of factors in addition to enjoying a good standing in the polls. This includes having a high ranking within the party hierarchy, being a devoted member of it, maintaining the local party's support, being loyal to the party and its programme, having good links with the voters, being a good speaker, coming from a larger city, being active in parliament and so on. Nevertheless, the fact that the majority of MPs consider they owe their reelection both to the party and the voters is, above all, explained by the peculiar methods of candidate selection, because although the final decision on the rank ordering is made by the central party organs, this decision is very much influenced by each candidate's popularity among the voters.

This is not the case with all parties however. For instance, among the Albanian parties, that do not carry out polling on individual candidates, the majority of MPs said the final decision, as to who is included and where candidates are placed on the list, is made by the leader. Among DUI, 56 per cent of MPs said the decision belongs to the leader, 33 per cent said this belongs to the presidency and 11 per cent said this belongs to the council. Within DPA, 60 percent said the decision is made by the leader while 40 per cent said this is done by the presidency. Among the Macedonian parties, acknowledging the importance of candidates' standing among the electorate, all MPs mentioned central party organs as having the final say over candidate selection. Within VMRO, the majority (82 percent) said the final decision was made by the central committee which is made up of about 120 people,[5] while 18 per cent said this was done by the leader. Among SDSM MPs, 71 per cent of them said the final decision is made by the central committee which comprises about 90 people, while 29 per cent said this is done by the conference (general council) that comprises on average about 700 members[6] and it is considered as one of the highest

[5]Members include the president, the vice-president, secretary general, presidents of municipal committees, members of the executive committee, etc. See party statute at `http://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/?page_id=174`.

[6]Note: it includes the president, vice-president, secretary general, members of other party organs, MPs, ministers and mayors. For more info see statute at `http://www.sdsm.org.mk/upload/documents/STATUT%20SDSM_2013.pdf`.

organs convened regularly before parliamentary and presidential elections.

The fact that, among ethnic-Macedonian parties, voters can influence candidates' chances in being placed high on the list is reflected in MPs' focus of representation. When MPs were asked what they considered their primary and secondary roles as MPs were, among representing the voters, representing the party or dealing with legislation, the majority of them, across parties, mentioned representing the voters as their primary role while an equal number mentioned representing the party and dealing with legislation. In terms of the secondary role, the majority of MPs stated this was to represent the party, a smaller number said it was to represent the voters and an even smaller number mentioned dealing with legislation. Table 6.1 and 6/2 in the following provide a summary of the responses.

Table 6.1: Primary role of MPs

	Representing the voters	**Representing the party**	**Doing parliamentary work**	**N**
No of MPs	29	10	10	49
% of MPs	59.2	20.4	20.4	100

Table 6.2: Secondary role of MPs

	Representing the voters	**Representing the party**	**Doing parliamentary work**	**N**
No of MPs	14	25	10	49
% of MPs	28.6	51.0	20.4	100

In order to get a closer picture on the focus of representation, MPs were asked to rank from 1-4 what they found most satisfying in terms of representation among the following: representing party's voters, representing the entire people, representing specific groups in the society, and representing the party. As Table 6.3 shows, the majority of MPs ranked representing the entire people first, representing party's voters second, representing the party third, and representing specific groups fourth.

It must be noted that, based on the responses given, the concept of representing the 'entire people' is different among the different ethnic parties, especially the minority communities, that mainly hinted at representing their own ethnic group. Although this was not pronounced among the Macedonian MPs who claimed to represent the entire people regardless, among ethnic Albanian parties, for instance, it was pretty clear that they were primarily focused on representing the interests of the Albanian community. As regards the groups that MPs claimed they represent they include women, LGBT groups (especially among SDSM MPs), workers, and so on.

Table 6.3: MPs' focus of representation

	Ranked 1 %	**Ranked 2** %	**Ranked 3** %	**Ranked 4** %
Representing party's voters	10.2	49.0	26.5	14.4
Representing the entire people	67.3	8.2	14.3	10.2
Representing the party	14.3	22.4	30.6	32.6
Representing specific groups	8.2	20.4	28.6	42.8
Total	100	100	100	100
N = 49				

There could be several explanations as to why MPs tend to represent the entire people first, but we focus on two visible ones. Firstly, article 2 (3) of the Law on the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia states: 'the MP shall represent the citizens and shall decide within the Assembly according to his/her beliefs'. The other reason relates both to the electoral system, as voters vote for parties and MPs do not know who voted for the party, as well as candidate selection methods, whereby opinion polls are conducted before elections or even regularly by some parties. On the first part of the last argument, one MP noted:

"*It is very difficult to make the distinction between a citizen who has voted for your party and one who hasn't. I believe the very moment an MP begins his/her*

mandate, he/she is the representative not only of his/her voters but of the entire people" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 25 February 2014).

On the second part of the argument, another MP stated:

"*You have to represent the entire people because at the end you cannot guess who will be asked a question or will be part of some poll on your reputation*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 18 February 2014).

Although MPs seem to be mainly focused on representing the people before representing the party or even dealing with legislation, when they were asked to break down the time they spend working as an MP between dealing with constituency work, dealing with party work and dealing with legislation, as Table 6.4 shows, the majority of MPs, similar to their counterparts in Kosovo, claimed they spent most of their time dealing with legislation. One of the reasons for this is that MPs are overloaded with committee assignments, in fact to a greater extent than their counterparts in Kosovo. That is, on average, one MP belongs to about five committees either as member or deputy member, with the latter only attending the meetings if the member is unable to attend or is attending a different committee. As the table shows, the amount of time that MPs spend doing constituency work is far less than the amount of time MPs spend dealing with legislation. Moreover, the time spent on constituency work varies substantially among the MPs. About 50 per cent spend less than 10 hours a week, while only about 16 per cent spend more than 15 hours per week.

In terms of constituency work, MPs were also asked how many working hours per month they spent in their constituency (including at public events and meetings), the results of which are presented in the last column of Table 6.4. Before going over the findings however, we must emphasise that by constituency we mean the municipality. For example, the capital of Macedonia; Skopje is divided into 10

Table 6.4: Breakdown of MPs' work

	Number of working hours hours p/w	% spent doing constituency work p/w	% spent doing party work p/w	% spent doing legislation work p/w	no of hours spent in local area p/m
Mean	43.7	20.5	14.9	64.6	38.0
Median	45	9.8	5	30	40
SD	11.5	6.3	6.3	11.3	20.7
N = 49					

municipalities, from which MPs come from within the electoral district. Moreover, it is worth noting that Article 36 (2) of the Assembly Law states that 'every Friday shall be devoted to the MPs' contacts with the citizens in the constituencies' and MPs seemed well aware of this provision. Designated days for constituency service is what we find in Western European countries as well. Leston-Bandeira and Tiburcio note that Parliamentary Rules of Procedure in Portugal introduced in 1993 specific days for constituency contact (2012, p.390).

Nevertheless, the majority of MPs noted they hardly can go to their local constituencies on Fridays as either sessions or committees are scheduled on that day. Instead, they normally meet with constituents on weekends or, some mainly meet their constituents in the parliament, or cafés and other places outside of it. As such, even the distribution of working hours MPs spend in their constituencies varies greatly. They range from 2.5 to 80 hours. We would have expected that MPs from Skopje would spend more hours in their constituency per month, mainly because of proximity but in fact, they only spend about 30.6 hours on average. On the other hand, those from other cities spend about 43.2. Perhaps one of the explanations for this is that MPs from Skopje might consider that they do not need to be as present in their municipality because constituents can easily approach them in the parliament as well.

In trying to coordinate the time that MPs spend in the parliament as opposed to outside of it, one MP explained a failed initiative on the part of the MPs:

"*We had a good idea when the mandate started to have some sort of schedule so not everyone has to be present on the plenary...let's say we agreed that people who are in the committees tackling the laws that are discussed in the plenary would stay in and the others would have this type of constituency meetings, but unfortunately it never came into life. It worked like a week or two weeks, and then everyone started finding excuses*" (Interview with Macedonian MP 5 February 2014).

Moreover, to those that claimed they had a local office I asked them if they dealt with constituents' requests themselves or whether their assistant, who usually works part time, does most of the job. The majority said the role of the assistant was only to schedule the meetings and deal with the logistics, but that when it came to meeting the people they would do so themselves. Those that had no office, on the other hand, claimed they also visit their constituencies but mainly through party organized events. Two MPs stated:

"*Usually I go to my constituency here in the center of Skopje where I live, in other areas as well, but according to the network that the party organizes in some area that must be covered by the party's system*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 10 February 2014)

"*We have let's say party activities in visiting neighbourhoods...these are collective activities not that I personally go there*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 20 February)

To find out how MPs maintain links with constituents, MPs were asked to indicate how often they perform each of the nine activities (as outlined in Chapter 5). As Table 6.5 illustrates, the majority of MPs claimed they do at least one of the activities at least once a week. When at least two activities are taken into account

the results change slightly with 84 per cent claiming they do at least two of the activities at least once a week, 2 per cent do this at least once every fortnight, 6 per cent do this at least once a month, 2 per cent do this at least once every three months and another 6 per cent said they might do two of these activities.

Table 6.5: Number and percentage of MPs who claimed they do at least one of the activities at certain intervals

	at least once a week	at least twice a week	at least once a month	at least once every three months	might do it	would never do it	N
No of MPs	45	3	1	0	0	0	49
% of MPs	91.8	6.1	2.1	0	0	0	100

In addition to the activities included in the question, MPs mentioned a number of other activities. Most often, they mentioned being regularly active on Facebook such as answering messages, chatting with constituents and even publicizing their activities there. In fact, as the early parliamentary elections were announced, an MP from VMRO mentioned the fact that candidates were required by the party to open Fan Pages on Facebook, in addition to their own individual accounts. Other activities, that MPs also mentioned they do regularly include playing football or basketball with constituents, going to a betting shop, meeting constituents in local cafés/tea places and restaurants, receiving people at MPs' own houses, and certainly meeting with constituents in their local party branch office. I myself visited two local party offices, together with MPs from two different parties, but at the time when the unofficial campaign for the next elections was taking place, there was little going on apart from party meetings.

As featuring in the media (both local and national, as not all cities have local media) was included among the activities that MPs regularly do, it is worth noting that in terms of access to it, some of the opposition MPs claimed that the media, especially the national ones, are either pro-government oriented or controlled by it.

As such, they claimed they hardly get the chance to feature in them apart from appearing on the parliamentary channel which broadcasts all sessions and committee meetings as they happen. Perhaps, this is why social media seem to be so widespread among the MPs as a means of communicating to the public. The following response from an SDSM MP illustrates the difficulty of access to the media:

"*No...I don't feature because I am part of the opposition...the media are pro-government oriented and they allow no space for the opposition. For instance, for me...for 2-3 seconds of being featured in the media I'm asked to pay 1,500 euros. That's why the only way I am able to overcome this obstacle is to have direct contact with the people, and that daily*" (Interview with Member of Parliament, 13 February 2014).

Another MP, from another opposition party, stated:

"*They hesitate to invite us because we are an opposition party*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 12 February 2014).

The response was often the same when MPs were asked if they would publicize their success in attracting business and obtaining government grants for the constituency, to which they claimed it is impossible to ever get anything from the government for their own constituency.

"*I speak for Skopje...it is not possible that I have money from the government to promote my project. It is not possible...I am hard-core opposition*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 11 February 2014).

Another MP from the same party noted:

"No...no...we don't have very much chances to do that because we're in a deep opposition " (Interview with Macedonian MP, 20 February 2014).

Table 6.6: Number and percentage of MPs who claimed they meet with at least one group at certain intervals

	at least once a week	**at least once a month**	**at least once every three months**	**at least once a year**	**no contact**	**N**
No of MPs	35	13	1	0	0	49
% MPs	71.4	26.5	2.1	0	0	100

I also asked MPs how often they met with different groups, such as business organizations, women, minorities and so on, as outlined in the previous chapter. As Table 6.6 shows, the majority of MPs stated they meet with at least one of those groups at least once a week, followed by the largest percentage of them saying they meet with at least one group at least once a month. No MP mentioned not having met at least with one group within a three month interval. Table 6.7 shows the type of groups that Macedonian MPs meet with more frequently. Similar to their Kosovan counterparts, the majority of Macedonian MPs tend to meet more frequently with youth organizations and journalists. This percentage is far greater than those MPs who claimed they meet with the other types of organizations.

Table 6.7: MPs' contacts with various organizations

	%
Youth organizations	77.6
Elderly organizations	36.7
Workers' organizations	36.7
Employers' organizations	26.5
Womens' organizations	48.9
Farmers' organizations	44.9
Ethnic minorities' organizations	34.7
Religious organizations	28.6
Environment organizations	30.6
Journalists	75.5

Note: MPs who claimed they had contact at least once a week or once a month

Another question that MPs were asked in order to assess their links with the constituents was *'How many requests for help (letters, e-mails, phone calls, visits) in dealing with public authorities do you receive in an average week? And how many inquiries from individual citizens relating primarily to policy matters do you receive per week?'*, and then they were also asked how many hours they spent dealing with the first type of requests. The number of requests MPs get per week varies greatly, ranging from 1 to 1000 as reported in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8: Number of requests for help MPs receive on average per week

	Requests dealing with public authorities	**Requests dealing with policy matters**	**Total requests**	**Time spent on requests dealing with public authorities p/w**
Mean	83.5	3.4	86.0	7.6
Median	21	1	25	5
N = 49				

It must be noted that that the type of requests that MPs mentioned most often were job related, similar to what we found in the case of Kosovo. Almost every MP mentioned receiving such requests on a regular basis about individuals who sought employment within the public sector, and those who did claimed over 90 per cent of requests they receive are work related. Members of parliament also mentioned receiving requests dealing with social and healthcare problems, issuing of building permits, agricultural subsidies, infrastructure, as well as direct requests for money. The MPs also mentioned that these requests tended to be greater for the government parties, also confirmed by our findings, as they are perceived by the electorate to be able to influence such decisions to a greater extent than MPs from the opposition parties. Members of parliament from the opposition claimed the only time they can actually do something about the requests is when, for instance, the mayor, in the local constituency where the MP comes from, belongs to his/her own party. Certainly, even MPs from the governing parties acknowledged that finding jobs for

everyone is difficult, but nevertheless MPs will often help their constituents find a job in the public sector. The following quote illustrates this:

"*I am motivating for instance students to come for an internship...some of them showed interest and I just called them when we had an open call for assistants to the parliamentary group...they became assistants...certainly they applied...but they made it*"(Interview with Macedonian MP 7 February 2014).

The MP then added:

"*...if they cannot make it then we have self-employment initiatives where they get grants from the state something like 3,500 euros for starting a private business*"(Interview with Macedonian MP 7 February 2014).

Although the majority of requests are job related, the majority of MPs said they feel quite good when voters contact them, and consider dealing with those requests quite important. Even in the case when they cannot do much, MPs claimed it is important to meet with constituents to tell them what the situation is and explain why nothing can be done. Nevertheless, to find out why MPs deal with these constituency requests we asked them among: a. losing significant number of votes in the next elections, b. having difficulties within candidate selection process, and c. losing touch with problems people face in their everyday lives, what is it that they thought would happen if they did not help people deal with those requests (question as asked in PartiRep survey). As the following table shows, the majority of them admitted that the main reason for dealing with requests is reelection. As reported in Table 6.9, over 70 per cent of MPs either agreed or strongly agreed that they would lose a significant number of votes if they did not deal with those requests. Similarly, about 70 per cent claimed they would face a serious challenge within the candidate selection procedure as a result, and finally over 80 per cent said dealing

with requests was important in order to keep in touch with problems that voters faced in their daily lives.

Table 6.9: MPs' responses on what would happen if they reduced their efforts to respond to constituency requests

	Strongly disagree	**Disagree**	**Neither**	**Agree**	**Strongly agree**	**Total**
I would lose a significant number of votes as a result	3	6	2	16	21	48
	6.2%	12.5%	4.2%	33.3%	43.8%	100%
I could well face a serious challenge in candidate selection as a result	0	10	4	25	9	48
	0%	20.8%	8.3%	52.1%	18.8%	100%
I would lose touch with problems voters face in their daily life as a result	0	4	4	19	21	48
	0%	8.3%	8.3%	39.6%	43.8%	100%

So how can we explain all this variation in terms of MPs' activities? Similar to the case of Kosovo, since the dependent variables are count data e.g. the number of hours spent dealing with constituency work per week, a negative binomial regression is also used here. Table 6.10 summarizes descriptive statistics of both the dependent and independent variables. While, Table 6.11 presents the results of negative binomial regression analyses on four of the dependent variables: 1) the number of hours MPs spend doing constituency work per week, 2) the number of requests dealing with public authorities they receive on average per week, 3) the number of hours they spend dealing with those requests per week, and 4) the number of hours they spend in their local area per month. Looking at the first column, none of the variables are significant apart from the term variable which is significant at 0.01 level. Interpreting the exponentiated coefficients, shows that those whose current term is their second or third, spend about 2 more hours on constituency links compared to those whose current term is their first. Our second column shows both party and

young variable to be significant at 0.001 level and 0.05 level respectively. That is, members of VMRO tend to receive about 10 more requests per week compared to members of DPA. Likewise, younger MPs (below 40 years of age) tend to receive about 3 fewer requests compared to older MPs. The third column, shows the party variables to be significant but no others. Members of Parliament from VMRO tend to spend about 3 more hours dealing with those requests per week compared to members of DPA. This variable is significant at 0.01 level. Also, members of SDSM tend to spend about 2.5 more hours than MPs of DPA. The last column shows none of the variables to be significant.

Table 6.10: Descriptive statistics (Macedonia)

	Min	Median	Mean	Max	St dev
MP work hours	15.00	45.00	44.17	65.00	5.55
Hours constituency work	0.00	5.00	10.00	9.51	5.55
Hours party work	0.00	5.00	6.66	25.00	6.26
Hours parliamentary work	6.00	30.00	28.53	54.00	8.60
Number of request 1 per week	0.00	22.00	86.53	1000	11.97
Hours spent on Request 1	1.00	5.00	7.90	25.00	6.11
Number of hours p/m spent in the local area	2.50	40.0	38.84	80.00	20.78

While the earlier analyses showed that Macedonian MPs do tend to develop close links with their constituents, and having delved into the different activities that MPs perform, the final part focuses on MPs' voting behaviour. In order to assess the extent to which Macedonian MPs are torn between following a party line or that of their own, I asked them the following PartiRep survey question *'How should, in your opinion, a Member of Parliament vote in a situation where the party has one opinion on an issue to be voted on in Parliament, and you personally have a different opinion?* This was one of the questions that MPs found most difficult

Table 6.11: Negative binomial regression on: (1) Number of hours spent doing constituency work per week, (2) Number of requests received per week, (3) Hours spent on those requests per week (4) Number of hours spent in the local area per month.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	1.93***	2.93***	1.34**	3.40***
	(0.33)	(0.68)	(0.43)	(0.31)
DUI	-0.26	1.34.	0.49	0.14
	(0.37)	(0.76)	(0.47)	(0.35)
SDSM	-0.05	1.36.	0.89*	0.29
	(0.34)	(0.70)	(0.44)	(0.32)
VMRO	0.08	2.32***	1.18**	0.26
	(0.33)	(0.69)	(0.43)	(0.31)
Male	0.10	0.10	-0.10	0.06
	(0.19)	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.18)
Young	0.03	-1.02*	-0.09	0.08
	(0.20)	(0.42)	(0.23)	(0.19)
2nd Term	0.63**	-0.04	-0.23	-0.08
	(0.19)	(3.3)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Log-likelihood	-290.01	-479.95	-230.32	-418.29
N	47	47	40	47

Significance levels: '.'p-value 0.1, ''p-value 0.05, '**'p-value 0.01, '***'p-value 0.001.*

to answer on the grounds that most often there are no such cases where he/she has a different opinion than that of the party. Nevertheless, the majority of MPs, as Table 6.12 shows admitted that if a situation like that arose they would have to follow the party's line. Those that claimed they have voted against the party line at least once mentioned legislation such as law on courts, administration, education, tobacco, agriculture, taxes, privatization, environment, and media. Only about two MPs refused to mention the cases when they voted against the party line. However, even those MPs who never voted against the party line said there were times when they could not agree with the position of the party but instead of voting against, they decided to abstain or not vote at all.

Table 6.12: MPs' voting behaviour

	MP should vote according to his/her opinion	**MP should vote according to his/her party's opinion**	**MPs who claimed they voted against their party line at least once**
No of MPs	18	31	17
% of MPs	36.7	63.6	34.7
N = 49			

Some MPs were pretty clear about which line to follow. One MP noted:

"*I am not an independent MP, I am a partisan MP...it is my moral duty to support the position of my party to which I belong*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 06 February 2014).

Another MP noted:

"*Sometimes there is a political decision so regardless of whether we like the law or not we must support it...we must be honest*" (Interview with Macedonian MP, 7 February 2014).

While this behaviour on the part of MPs is in contradiction with Article 2(3) of the Assembly Law which stipulates that the MP '...shall decide within the Assembly according to his/her beliefs' it is nevertheless in agreement with what the parties' formal positions on this are. In evaluating internal democracy among Macedonian parties, a Konrad Adenauer Stiftung report states that SDSM members have very little room for maneuver since 'the Central Board evaluates the work of the parliamentary group and gives suggestions in relations to issues in parliamentary debate (art.77)' (KAS no date, p.20). Within VMRO, the report argues that MPs in theory have the right to vote against the party line but in practice this rarely happens.

In fact, an MP from VMRO mentioned that all legislation which passes through in parliament is also discussed thoroughly within the party. Among the Albanian parties, their statutes stipulate that it is the job of the parliamentary party group to coordinate the activities of its members and make sure that they are in compliance with the party's statute and programme (ibid).

6.5 Comparing the behaviour of Macedonian MPs to their Kosovan counterparts

So far we have explained the nature and the extent of constituency links that both Kosovan and Macedonian MPs establish, and we also provided an overview of the different activities that MPs perform in order to keep in contact with the voters. Moreover, using negative binomial regressions, we tested the effect of several independent variables on the extent of constituency links in both countries. In this section, we compare the behaviour of Kosovan MPs with that of Macedonian MPs. We are particularly interested in explaining whether the behaviour of Macedonian MPs resembles that of the Kosovan MPs under closed-list or open-list PR, or whether Kosovan MPs have more in common with each other, in terms of their behaviour, than either does with Macedonian MPs by looking at MPs' primary roles, their focus of representation, their allocation of time to different activities, and the extent of constituency links.

In terms of primary roles of MPs, the percentage of MPs under both open-list and closed-list PR in Kosovo who claimed their primary role was to represent the voters is similar. We reported in Chapter 5 that the difference in proportions between the two is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, a slightly greater percentage of MPs in Macedonia reported their primary role was to represent the voters as can be seen in Table 6.13. The difference in proportions between either group of Kosovan MPs and Macedonian MPs is not statistically significant either (p-values=0.17 and 0.20 respectively). Looking at this alone, however, does not give us much understanding

Table 6.13: Primary role of Kosovan and Macedonian MPs

	Kosovo		Macedonia
	Open-list PR	Closed-list PR	Closed-list PR
Representing the voters	45.0	42.1	59.2
Representing the party	5.0	21.1	20.4
Doing parliamentary work	50.0	36.8	20.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	40	19	49

on whether the behaviour of MPs is similar or different across the two electoral systems and countries. As mentioned in respective chapters, MPs might view voter representation as one of their most important roles in terms of representing their opinions and broad interests, but this does not necessarily manifest itself in stronger constituency links.

Kosovan and Macedonian MPs are broadly similar when it comes to their focus of representation. As Table 6.14 shows, the largest number of MPs both in Kosovo, under the two systems, and in Macedonia, under closed-list PR, said their main focus was to represent the entire people. Tests of difference in proportions between the three groups show none of the differences to be significant. In Kosovo, we said the main reason behind this is the existence of a nationwide constituency under which MPs are elected. Under a nationwide constituency, MPs seem to have a broad focus of representation because their electoral support comes from the entire country. In Macedonia, on the other hand, although MPs are elected in six multi-member constituencies, apart from the fact that the parliamentary rules of procedure specify that MPs shall represent the entire people, MPs are aware that voters' opinion matters to party leadership when the latter draws up the list of candidates. The better the reputation of candidates' among the voters, the higher on the list those candidates are placed. Of course, it must be acknowledged that the option of

Table 6.14: Kosovan and Macedonian MPs' focus of representation

	Kosovo		Macedonia
	Open-list PR	Closed-list PR	Closed-list PR
Representing own voters	12.5		
Representing party's voters	7.5	10.5	10.2
Representing the entire people	67.5	73.7	67.3
Representing the party	5.0	15.8	14.3
Representing specific groups	7.5	0.0	8.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	40	19	49

'representing the entire people' probably has more positive connotations than, say 'representing the party', which may seem a more partisan and less public-spirited role, so we need not take all of these responses entirely at face value. However, we can see that there is variation among MPs in the responses they gave and, in addition, in the interviews many MPs gave a more nuanced explanation of what they have in mind when they talk in terms of 'representing the entire people'.

However, when it comes to MPs' allocation of time as parliamentarians we do observe some differences. By looking at Table 6.15 our first impression is that overall, the majority of MPs in all three columns spend their largest percentage of time doing legislation work, as opposed to doing constituency and party work. A test of difference in proportions indeed shows the differences not to be statistically significant for either category (p-values=0.19 and 0.30 respectively). The large amount of time that MPs spend dealing with parliamentary work can be related to the large legislative workload that MPs in both countries are exposed to. In Macedonia, MPs form part of several committees, and parliamentary sessions take place very often, including Fridays which in theory are intended for constituency work. In Kosovo,

Table 6.15: Breakdown of Kosovan and Macedonian MPs' work

	Kosovo		Macedonia
	Open-list PR	Closed-list PR	Closed-list PR
Number of working hours	35.8	27.7	43.7
% spent doing constituency work	24.6	18.8	20.5
% spent doing party work	18.6	18.0	14.9
% spent doing parliamentary work	55.8	57.9	64.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	40	19	49

on the other hand, legislators had to adopt a large amount of legislation as a result of the country's declaration of independence in 2008. Moreover, MPs in both countries consider that spending most of their parliamentary time dealing with legislation does not necessarily mean that constituency interests are neglected, because it is through legislation that MPs make sure constituency interests are represented. Finally, parliamentary work also includes other tasks such as committee work and government oversight which comprise a significant proportion of legislators' work, and which legislators had a hard time differentiating among.

A difference in means test for working hours however, shows that Macedonian MPs work, on average, more hours per week as parliamentarians compared to their Kosovan MPs under closed-list PR (p-value=0.09), but not compared to those under open-list PR (p-value=0.91). The other statistically significant difference that we observe is related to the amount of time, out of their working hours, MPs spend doing constituency hours per week. Macedonian MPs spend more hours per week out of their parliamentary time doing constituency work compared to their Kosovan counterparts under closed-list PR (p-value=0.03), but they spend less than those under open-list PR (p-value=0.03). Overall, thus, we can see that in terms of

MPs' primary roles and their focus of representation, Macedonian legislators are very similar to their Kosovan counterparts under both open-list and closed-list PR systems. Nevertheless, when it comes to the number of working hours and the amount of time Macedonian MPs spend doing constituency work, the former are more similar to Kosovan MPs under open-list than those under closed-list PR.

This is generally the pattern we get when we look at the extent of constituency links along our four dependent variables as shown in Table 6.16. Having reported the significant differences between Kosovan MPs under open-list and closed-list PR in Chapter 5, the average number of hours MPs in Macedonia spend doing constituency work per week is larger compared to the number of hours MPs under closed-list PR in Kosovo spend (p-value=0.01), but it not significantly different from those under open-list PR (p-value=0.97). In terms of the number of requests dealing with public authorities that legislators receive per week, as shown in the table, the number is far greater for Macedonian MPs, and they exceed the number of requests that Kosovan MPs under both open-list PR (p-value=0.003) and closed-list PR (p-value=0.003) receive. The huge difference in the number of such requests received by MPs in Macedonia compared with those in Kosovo is evidently due to country-specific factors that lie outside the scope of this thesis. Macedonian MPs also spend more hours per week dealing with those requests compared to Kosovan MPs under open-list PR (0.004), but they don't devote more time to them than MPs under closed-list PR (p-value=0.75). Finally, in terms of hours spent in the local area per month, neither the difference between Macedonian MPs and Kosovan MPs under open-list PR (p-value=0.52), nor that of Macedonian MPs and Kosovan MPs under closed-list PR is statistically significant (p-value=0.40).

To sum up, Kosovan MPs under both systems show a similar behaviour as their Macedonian counterparts under closed-list PR when it comes to primary roles and MPs' focus of representation. But, judging MPs' behaviour in terms of our four dependent variables, we can see that Macedonian MPs resemble more, or even outperform, their Kosovan counterparts under open-list PR. We attribute this similarity

Table 6.16: Kosovan vs Macedonian MPs along four dependent variables

	Number of constituency hours per week	Number of requests dealing with public authorities per week	Number of hours spent dealing with requests per week	Number of hours in the local area per month	N
Open-list PR (Kosovo)	9.17	9.33	4.50	42.28	40
Closed-list PR (Kosovo)	5.49	8.63	3.41	29.61	19
Closed-list PR (Macedonia)	9.22	83.49	7.58	38.01	49

in behaviour on the part of Macedonian MPs mainly to the way candidates are selected there. Although in both countries candidate selection is centralised in the sense that the final decision on candidates' placement depends on the central party organs, the fact that in Macedonia this decision is influenced by public opinion polls of candidates' standing leads MPs to develop greater constituency links there. Hence under such methods of candidate selection, Macedonian MPs elected under closed-list PR have more incentives to pay close attention to constituency links than their counterparts in Kosovo elected under both closed-list PR and centralised methods of candidate selection.

6.6 Discussion

This chapter has sought to examine the extent to which Macedonian MPs under closed-list PR system establish close links with their constituents. Overall, the responses revealed the weak nature of the party system institutionalisation, although not to the same extent as that in the case of Kosovo, where the main hindrance to party system stability was the abuse with preference votes. Members of the Macedonian Parliament also enjoy more resources than their counterparts in Kosovo, benefiting from the same NDI project which was not as successful in Kosovo. With local

offices now having been transferred under parliamentary competences, it seems unclear whether MPs will continue with the same intensity in carrying out constituency work. Moreover, a large number of MPs from the opposition parties mentioned selective access to media, which seems an important way to maintain visibility and communicate to the public.

Results of interviews with 49 MPs showed that, generally speaking, Macedonian MPs consider that their reelection is equally due to the party and the electorate. Moreover, and similar to the case of Kosovo, the primary role of Macedonian MPs is to represent the voters, contrary to what Hypothesis 10 suggested, although when it comes to the allocation of time a larger percentage is spent carrying out parliamentary work than doing any other task. In this sense, both Macedonian and Kosovan MPs are more focused on conducting parliamentary business rather than representing constituency interests. Likewise, similar to Kosovo, the focus of representation among Macedonian MPs is very wide. Most MPs mentioned representing the entire people first, again contrary to our predictions (H.12). One explanation for why MPs consider they need to be attentive to the people primarily is because parties conduct regular opinion polls before placing candidates on the list. Maintaining a good reputation among the people is thus central to ensuring a key position on the list for the next elections. At the same however, MPs need to be attentive to the party leadership because it has the final say over candidate selection. Party effect was particularly strong, when MPs were asked in case of a clash between the opinion of the party and that of the voters who they would follow (H11), as the majority of MPs said they would follow the party.

By testing the effect of party, age, gender and term on constituency links, we showed that only a few of these variables had a significant impact. First, MPs who were serving their second or third mandate spent a greater amount of time doing constituency work than those who were serving their first term. Members of VMRO, to a larger extent, as well as those of DUI and SDSM, tended to receive more requests and spend more time per week dealing with those requests compared to members

of DPA. In terms of hours spent in the local constituency, members of parliament from the capital however, surprisingly, do not spend more time compared to others that live further out. One of the explanations for this is that MPs from Skopje can easily be approached in the parliament by their own constituents.

When comparing the behaviour of Macedonian MPs with that of Kosovan MPs under both systems, we said that there are similarities in terms of primary roles and focus of representation. Nevertheless, when it comes to the extent of constituency links we showed that Macedonian MPs' behaviour is more similar to, and even outperforms, the behaviour of Kosovan MPs under open-list PR. We attributed this kind of behaviour to the nature of candidate selection where party's decision as to where to place candidates on the list is influenced by the latter's popularity among the voters. Hence, our study has enabled us to understand that even a combination of a closed-list system and a centralised candidate selection method can create electoral incentives for MPs to build popularity among the voters, whether this is done through constituency links or any other method. Yet, without having conducted interviews we would have not been able to show that the electoral system alone is not sufficient to explain MPs' behaviour.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to explore the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour along two dimensions, Parliamentary Party Group (PPG) unity, and the extent of constituency links that MPs establish. Considering that electoral systems have been found to have little impact on the way MPs in Western European countries behave, perhaps because of the highly institutionalised nature of the party system, or for other reasons, examining the impact of electoral systems among weakly institutionalised party systems seemed promising. Above all, as Moser argues, one cannot be sure that the findings among established democracies are easily applied to newly-democratised countries knowing that these countries operate within a whole different context of political and social developments (1999a, p.360). Indeed, the findings from our analyses suggest that although the effects of the electoral system are not as strong as predicted, they are conditional on the level of party system institutionalisation.

Taking into account that the current literature finds that MPs in Western European countries both vote along their parliamentary party groups and establish close links with their constituents regardless of electoral rules, we outlined several reasons why we considered the effects of the electoral systems to be greater under weakly institutionalised party systems compared to highly institutionalised ones. Firstly, party competition is fluid among weak PSI countries. In these countries, parties appear and disappear quickly, which makes it difficult for voters to identify with a particular party. Secondly, parties have weak roots in the society and as such the basis of relationships are personalistic linkages between the electorate

and their representatives, instead of the electorate and the parties. Thirdly, parties lack legitimacy as people often do not regard them as necessary organizations for democratic functioning (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). Finally, parties are seen by political actors as weak organizations. Since the party is not perceived as valuable to the legislator, the party cannot credibly threaten the MP that it will withdraw electoral benefits if the legislator undermines party unity (Tavits 2011, p.410).

Hence, our theoretical expectation was that PPG unity would generally be higher under party-centred electoral systems, such as closed-list PR, and it would be lower under candidate-centred electoral systems, such as open-list PR (H.1). The results however, suggested that this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, we predicted that the effect of electoral system will be conditional on the level of PSI; that is, such effects of electoral system would only be observed under weakly institutionalised party systems (H.1.a). Testing the impact of electoral systems on PPG unity using several thousands of roll-call votes across 21 European countries, we found that the level of cohesion was slightly lower among SEE countries, although this difference was not statistically significant. When we added interaction effects between electoral systems and the level of PSI to our model, the results showed party system institutionalisation to matter more than the electoral system. Hence, when the level of PSI was low, the effects of both open-list PR and closed-list PR, though not of other electoral system types, were as predicted.

Among other hypotheses, we found that PPG unity was higher for government parties than opposition parties (H.4). Moreover, the smaller the gap between parties in government and those in opposition the higher the level of PPG unity was (H.5). On the other hand, we did not find that cohesion was lower as district magnitude increased (H.6), or that cohesion was higher for older parties compared to younger parties (H.7). Our analysis of issues which legislators in Kosovo and Macedonia voted on showed the level of unity was high across issues regardless of how important or not the issues were for government survival (H.2). Likewise, the pattern of cohesion was not consistent across parties. Some parties showed highest levels of

cohesion on some issues, while others were more cohesive on other issues.

On the other hand, the impact of electoral systems on constituency links was tested using interviews with MPs from two weakly institutionalised party systems, namely Kosovo and Macedonia. The case of Kosovo presented a good case to test such effects as the change of electoral system from closed-list to open-list PR allowed us to compare MPs' behaviour over time. The case of Macedonia, on the other hand, was quite comparable to that of Kosovo, as a neighbouring country, although MPs' behaviour was investigated only under closed-list PR system, in which MPs might seem to have few incentives to establish close links with their constituents. Both studies revealed interesting findings suggesting that both the electoral systems and methods of candidate selection affect the amount of constituency links that MPs establish. Overall, Hypothesis 8 was confirmed in the case of Kosovo, but it was disconfirmed in that of Macedonia. While, the fact that candidates under all systems in both countries were elected through centralised methods of candidate selection, made it impossible for us to test the impact of candidate selection rules on their behaviour (H.9).

In Kosovo, MPs elected under open-list PR system were found to develop closer links than their colleagues under closed-list PR system. On average, MPs under the former system spent more hours, out of their parliamentary time, dealing with constituency activities per week, received a greater number of requests per week, spent more time dealing with those requests per week, and spent more time in their local area per month than those under the latter system. As regards Macedonia, the extent to which MPs develop close links with their constituents was quite comparable to the amount of constituency links that Kosovan MPs under open-list PR developed. The main explanation for this, we argued, are the methods of candidate selection there, at least for the ethnic Macedonian parties, where party leadership takes into account candidates' popularity among the voters before drawing up the electoral list.

Comparing the behaviour of Kosovan MPs with those in Macedonia, we showed

Table 7.1: Expected and observed relationships of IVs on PPG unity and constituency links

Hypotheses	Independent variables (IV)	Expected relationship	Observed relationship
		PPG Unity	
H.1	Candidate-centred	-	Rejected
	Party-centred	+	
H.1.a	Candidate-centred*low PSI	-	Partially
	Party-centred*low PSI	+	Confirmed
H.2	Issues important for government survival	-	Rejected
	Issues not important for government survival	+	
H.3	Larger DM	-	Rejected
	Smaller DM	+	
H.4	Government parties	+	Confirmed
	Opposition parties	-	
H.5	Wide margin of government over opposition	-	Confirmed
	Small margin of government over opposition	+	
H.6	Small parties	+	Rejected
	Large parties	-	
H.7	Old parties	+	Rejected
	Young parties	-	
		Constituency links	
H.8	Open list PR	+	Partially
	Closed list PR	-	confirmed
H.9	Centralised candidate selection	-	Rejected
	Decentralised candidate selection	+	

that there were similarities in terms of primary roles and focus of representation. The majority of MPs in both countries claimed their primary role was to represent the voters hence, disconfirming our Hypothesis 10 which claimed that MPs under candidate-centred electoral systems will be more likely to view themselves as representatives of the electorate than those elected under closed-list PR. Moreover, the largest number of MPs in both countries said their main focus of representation was 'the entire people'. In the case of Kosovo we said this was mainly a result of the existence of a nationwide constituency, under which MPs' electoral support comes from the entire country. Yet, in Macedonia, where MPs are elected in six multi-member constituencies, we attributed this to methods of candidate selection. Hence, Hypothesis 11 was only partially confirmed. Table 7.1 lists all hypotheses

outlined in the thesis, as well as their expected and observed effects on both PPG unity and the extent of constituency links. Hypotheses 10 and 11 are left out of the table because they are related to representational roles and focus of representation rather than constituency links per se.

7.1 Implications

One of the central implications of this study is that indeed, as Moser (1999a) suggested, the findings among Western European countries cannot automatically be applied to newly-democratised countries that operate among different political and social contexts. Even if the effect of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour among weakly institutionalised party systems was not as strong as predicted, our results suggest that there are important factors which set these countries apart from established democratic countries, and which are worth exploring. Certainly, one of these variables is the level of PSI, indicating that the level of PSI should be taken into account, or employed as an intervening variable, even when other phenomena are studied among these countries. The other factor is the way candidate selection is made which we explored only to a limited extent both in Kosovo and Macedonia. As was the case with the latter, even under a party-centred electoral system as well as centralised methods of candidate selection, MPs may have incentives to establish close links with their constituents if the party leadership takes into account candidates' popularity among the voters when drawing up the list of candidates.

Generally, PPG unity seems to mark a greater distinction between weakly and highly institutionalised party systems compared to the nature of links that MPs in these countries establish. The level of unity was generally lower among weakly institutionalised party systems, considering that the overall average for Western European countries was also influenced by that of Finland as an outlier, which is perhaps an indication that parties among these countries lack discipline and the necessary mechanisms to compel MPs to vote with the party. The other explanation could be that the public among these countries can hardly observe the behaviour of

MPs along these lines because roll-call data are not easily accessible. When this is the case there are fewer incentives for MPs to follow the party line. For instance, in the case of Denmark, Skjaveland notes that voters punish MPs who defect from the party line, but in the case of the US, they do not, so it seems reasonable for members of Congress to focus more on constituency activities that help them get reelected rather than worry about party's position (1999, p.124).

Certainly studying legislative behaviour through party group unity is much more complex than looking merely at voting outcomes. In order to gain a greater understanding of why cohesion is lower among these countries, it would be worth exploring what goes on before the voting actually takes place. Therefore, studying party discipline would perhaps tell us more about the incentives behind MPs' voting such as what kind of a strategic game is played within political parties that determines whether, and how, MPs may respond to rewards and punishments that are determined by decision-making rules within parties (Gianneti and Laver 2006, p.2).

When it comes to the extent and nature of constituency links that MPs in weakly institutionalised party systems establish, as mentioned, the electoral system was found to have a significant impact in the case of Kosovo, but not so much in the case of Macedonia. Generally MPs in these countries develop close ties with their constituents and they do so in similar ways to their counterparts in the West, such as holding clinics, featuring in the media, attending funerals and so on. Moreover, if the institutional rules permitted and the MPs enjoyed the necessary resources to carry out constituency activities, as the Macedonian case shows, they would perhaps establish closer links with the people. In fact, most of the MPs interviewed in Kosovo said that if they had a local office they would hold clinics regularly. Otherwise, doing so by relying on MPs' own resources is much more difficult.

To some extent Kosovan and Macedonian MPs seem similar to their Western counterparts in the sense that they are rational actors that seek reelection and advancement. Even in the case where the electoral system did not explain the amount of constituency links, such as the case of Macedonia, MPs were primarily

motivated by how candidate selection was carried out. On the other hand, however, constituency links seem more personalistic among newly-democratised countries. A large number of MPs from both countries mentioned the economic nature of requests that they regularly receive, such as job requests. This suggests that, although MPs did not acknowledge that one way of maintaining themselves in power is by helping people find jobs within the public sector, the clientelistic relations between representatives and voters would be worth exploring. It is of no surprise that this is the case since, for instance, public sector employment in Kosovo is quite high (about 35 per cent) and so is the rate of unemployment (about 40 per cent). Moreover, unless the economic conditions improve it is hard to see how MPs' behaviour would change.

When it comes to the main roles that MPs have, representing the people seemed important among Kosovan and Macedonian MPs, but there is little we can understand of this question in terms of how MPs represent constituency interests in parliament. As such, looking at parliamentary questions to see if MPs ask questions pertaining to their local area or examining any other activity within the parliament might yield interesting results, especially since MPs seem more focused in conducting parliamentary work rather than dealing with constituency activities. When asked on which activity MPs spend most of their time in parliament, the majority of them in both countries said dealing with legislative work. Certainly, the fact that MPs spend the greatest percentage of their time in parliament could be because the countries have a greater amount of legislation to adopt compared to their Western counterparts. With the exception of Slovenia, which has already done so, all the other SEE countries have to align their national legislation with that of the EU. There is likewise a tendency among these countries, certainly in Kosovo and Macedonia, for governments to enact a certain amount of legislation before concluding their terms for fear that they may not be running the government again. Lastly, as the case of Macedonia showed although, in theory, Friday was designated for constituency work, the fact that the parliament schedules sessions and committee meetings on

Fridays could be related to how important MPs perceive one activity over the other.

The way constituency links were measured also have implications for truly capturing the extent to which MPs establish such links. Some would argue that MPs might have incentives to exaggerate the amount of time they spend doing constituency links, although we justified in Chapter 3 why this has probably not been the case here. Moreover, while the reason for using PartiRep questions was mainly to be able to compare MPs' behaviour in these countries with that of MPs from Western Europe, MPs did not seem familiar with the nature of questions and, moreover had difficulties quantifying constituency links which are quite irregular and hard to keep track of. One could certainly cross-check the accuracy of such answers by inquiring into public opinion polls on voter-representative linkages, but in the absence of such surveys this is impossible. As such, although elite interviews and surveys might not be the best measure to capture constituency activities among SEE countries, they are pretty much the only way such relations can be examined at the moment.

Overall, this study has gone beyond the existing studies of legislative behaviour and institutional impact by examining these effects among newly-established democracies. While our test of theories regarding the impact of electoral systems suggested that their role might not be as great as sometimes assumed, it is clear that the level of party system institutionalisation should not be neglected. Further research should explore the impact of electoral systems on MPs' behaviour in other countries that also have low levels of party system institutionalisation. Possibly, the effects we find among SEE countries could be attributed to the fact that the countries neighbour each other, share a similar history, operate within similar institutional structures, and have adopted electoral systems as a result of institutional engineering and in some cases external pressure. But, studying these effects in other countries could tell us whether there is any regional effect, or whether findings across newly-established democracies are more or less the same regardless. In any case, it is unlikely that we will observe any uniform pattern of legislative behaviour among these countries.

Overall thus, there is plenty of scope for research in newly-democratised countries

that may enlighten our understanding of institutional rules and their impact on legislative behaviour, but anyone who engages in such research must bear in mind the data limitations. Perhaps, as Owens argues 'system immaturity and instability cannot be a sufficient condition for low legislative party cohesion or party fluidity. For, important variations have been found across transition systems - for example, in Latin America between Brazil and Argentina, in Eastern Europe between legislatures in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia' (2003, p.16), but without further research it is perhaps too early to reach definitive conclusions.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Interview questions

Questions used to interview the MPs in Kosovo and Macedonia have been largely taken from PartiRep project that surveyed MPs in 15 Western European countries. Some of the questions have only slightly been modified to fit the SEE context, and a few additional questions have also been added e.g. on candidate selection methods. Questions as well as the findings from PartiRep project can be found in Deschouwer, K. and Depauw, S (2014) *Representing the People. A Survey among Members of Statewide and Sub-state Parliaments*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To a large extent questions asked to MPs under closed-list and open-list PR are similar, hence we provide only one questionnaire pertaining to the questions asked under open-list PR. Nevertheless, in cases where questions have been modified to account for the closed nature of the electoral rules they are reported as modified.

CANDIDATE SELECTION

a. the leader ☐
b. the party leadership/presidency ☐
c. the party council ☐
d. the local branches ☐
e. other ☐

2. What qualities do you think are sought from candidates in order to be included on a good position in the list (e.g. being a good speaker, being an experienced party worker, being committed to the constituency)?

3. In case the list was determined by a different organ, who had the final say over the list?

4. Who do you need to please, or avoid displeasing, in order to make sure that you are not de-selected at the next election?

5. What do you think is the most important thing that will help your re-selection as a party candidate?

Being loyal to the voters	Being loyal to the party
☐	☐

MPS' ELECTION

6. Do you consider the fact that you have been elected as an MP is due to:

Voters	Party	Both
☐	☐	☐

MPs' ROLES

7. What do you consider is your primary and what your secondary role as an MP?

	Primary	Secondary
1. Representing the voters	☐	☐
2. Representing the party	☐	☐
3. Lawmaking (incl. committee work and government oversight)	☐	☐

8. Approximately how many hours per week do you spend working as an MP?

9. What % of this time do you spend in:

	%
1. Dealing with constituency work	☐
2. Dealing with party work	☐
3. Dealing with legislative work	☐

10. What do you think is more important for you? Please rank these from 1-5:

1. Representing the people that voted for you (preferential votes)	☐
2. Representing all those that voted for your party	☐
3. Representing the entire people	☐
4. Representing specific groups in the society	☐
5. Representing the party	☐

10a. (Closed-list PR) What do you think is more important for you? Please rank these from 1-4:

1. Representing all those that voted for your party ☐
2. Representing the entire people ☐
3. Representing specific groups in the society ☐
4. Representing the party ☐

CONSTITUENCY LINKS

11. Do you maintain close contacts with voters throughout the legislative term?

Yes	No
☐	☐

12. Mentioned below are some of the many different things that Deputies do to keep in touch with constituents. For each one, do you actually do it outside election campaign periods, might you do it, or would you never? Please tick one box in each row.

	Actually do it					
	At least once a week	At least once a fortnight	At least once a month	At least every three months	Might do it	Would never do it
1. attending or (sending out letters on the occasion of) weddings, wedding anniversaries, and funerals in your local area/constituency	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. meeting with (small parties of) constituents in their private home to talk about their wants and needs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. giving lectures and speaking at debate nights	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

4. sending out a personal newsletter and direct mailing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. holding clinics	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. advertising your constituency work services (e.g. in newspaper ads or by visiting neighbourhoods)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. publicizing your successes in attracting business and obtaining government grants for the local area	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. meeting local businesses and action groups	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. featuring in the local media	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. other (please specify)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13. In a typical month, how many working hours (incl. at public events and meetings) would you say you spend in your constituency?

14. Roughly what proportion of this time is taken up by attending local community functions and social events in the constituency?

15. How many requests for help (letters, e-mails, phone calls, visits) in dealing with public authorities do you receive in an average week? And how many inquiries from individual citizens relating primarily to policy matters do you receive per week?

Requests for help in dealing with public authorities

Policy-related requests

16. How many hours per week would you say you, personally, spend dealing with these requests for help in dealing with public authorities?

17. Can you give an example of a request which has been made to you?

18. How do you feel when voters contact you?

19. What do you think would happen, if you were to reduce the efforts you make in assisting voters in their dealings with public authorities?

(Please tick one box in each row)

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly agree
1. I would lose a significant number of votes as a result	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. I could well face a serious challenge in the candidate selection process as a result	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. I would lose touch with the problems voters face in their daily lives as a result	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

20. How would you choose to allocate your limited resources? Would you choose to spend more effort and money on achieving the goal on the left-hand side, would you choose to spend more effort and money on the goal on the right-hand side, or

would the allocation of resources to both goals be about equal?

(Please tick one box in each row)

1. on a personal campaign	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	on a party campaign
2. to mobilize the party faithful	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	to persuade floating voters
3. to retain support from the groups in society that that have supported you in the past	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	to seek out groups in society that haven't supported you in the past
4. to be considered as a leader by the voters	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	to be considered by voters as one of them
5. to obtain the national party leadership's support	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	to obtain the local party's support

21. Does the party leader request that you maintain close contacts with the voters?

Yes	No
☐	☐

22. Besides, why do you maintain close contacts with them?

1. I consider that it will help me get re-selected ☐
2. I consider it will help me get re-elected ☐
3. I consider it morally beneficial ☐
4. I have a duty as a representative of the people ☐
5. Other (please specify) ☐

23. On what kind of issues do you try to get input from voters (please rank from 1-3):

1. National policy matters ☐
2. Community concerns ☐

3. Personal matters ☐

24. How can voters contact you? How easy/difficult do you think it is for them to contact you?

25. In your role as an MP, how often in the last year have you had contact with the following groups, persons, or organizations?

(Please tick one box in each row)

	At least once a week	At least once a month	At least every three months	At least once a year	(almost) no contact
1. youth organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. organizations for the elderly	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. workers' organizations and trade unions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. employers' organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. women's organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. farmers' organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. organizations of ethnic minorities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. mosques/churches or religious organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. environmental organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. journalists	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. other (please specify)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

26. How should, in your opinion, a Member of Parliament vote in a situation where the party has one opinion on a vote in Parliament, and you personally have a different opinion?

MP should vote according to his/her own opinion ☐
MP should vote according to his/her party's opinion ☐

27. How should, in your opinion, a Member of Parliament vote if his/her own opinion on an issue does not correspond with the opinion of his/her voters?

MP should vote according to his/her own opinion ☐
MP should vote according to the opinion of his/her voters ☐

28. How should, in your opinion, a Member of Parliament vote if his/her voters have one opinion and his/her party takes a different position?

MP should vote according to the opinion of his/her voters ☐
MP should vote according to his/her party's opinion ☐

LAST QUESTIONS

29. If you were to decide to stand at the next national elections, how confident do you feel that you would be re-nominated by your party?

I would surely win the re-selection process	I would probably win the re-selection process	It could go either way	I would probably lose the re-selection process	I would surely lose the re-selection process
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

30. If you were to decide to stand at the next national elections, how confident do you feel you would be re-elected?

I would surely win the re-election process	I would probably win the re-election process	It could go either way	I would probably lose the re-election process	I would surely lose the re-election process
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

31. If you plan to stand for the next elections, what you think is the most important thing that will help your re-election?