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Incorporating Dissent in the Renewal of Dublin's Inner City: Engagements between the local state and inner-city communities in Dublin's Liberties.

Paula Brudell.

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D.

University of Dublin

2011


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Paula Brudell,

July 2011.

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Summary.

This research addresses a crucial silence in the Irish neoliberal discourse, the voices and struggles of working-class communities resident in those areas in which the state pursued its neoliberal urban-development agenda throughout a decade of intensive development in Dublin's inner city. The research was prompted by the discrepancy between the official consensus surrounding the Irish state's urban-renewal agenda and the more critical assessments emanating from communities in the targeted areas. The extent to which those experiences and critiques were obscured from public view raised questions about the manner in which the Irish state managed to proceed almost with impunity while pursuing a highly political urban-development policy resulting in far-reaching negative consequences for working-class residents. The research explores the manner in which such apparent harmony and political quiescence is to be comprehended, notably addressing the degree to which the Irish state largely succeeded in either incorporating or marginalising and negating criticism, dissent and opposition while simultaneously, throughout the property-development boom, presenting the interests of the property-development sector as synonymous with the public good.

The theoretical framework draws heavily upon the tradition of critical geography and sociology as it evolved in the 1970s and 1980s and continues to resonate throughout the 1990s and 2000s. It encompasses two major thematic areas in urban studies. The first of these pertains to the role of the state, the evolution of the neoliberal local state and the essential nature of the state's interest in working-class communities. In seeking to find the theoretical formulation best equipped to respond to what Castells (1977a) had described as 'increasingly explosive urban contradictions,' the research adopted a political-economy perspective as it provided the most incisive analytical tools for exploring the manner in which the state was intervening in the urban environment to secure the interests of the property-development sector and to manage any potentially disruptive opposition. Thus, the research assumed a particular focus on the role of the local state and the distinct functions which it performs on behalf of the central state in capitalist economies – functions which assume a heightened significance during the 'rollout stage' of neoliberalism. The second thematic area explores the theorisation of engagement between the state and working-class communities in urban-planning and development with particular attention to active participation, protest and quiescence. The research was particularly interested in the degree to which such inherent conflicts of interest were judged to be amenable to reconciliation, exploitation or suppression.

The research was conducted in Dublin, a city which has been distinguished by the adoption of an increasingly neoliberal entrepreneurial orientation since the 1990s (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001; Kelly, 2008). That changing orientation is inextricably intertwined with the manner in which the local state has repositioned itself as a key player in the implementation of urban-renewal schemes which have dominated the urban-policy agenda since the mid 1980s. The city administration has now been characterised as perhaps the most advanced Irish local authority in the adoption of "an increasingly flexible role as an enabler of market forces" (Drudy & Punch, 2005: 148). The advancement of the neoliberal agenda has been accompanied by a new governance regime which has seen the local state make increasing overtures to low-income working-class communities. This exploration of the nature of the engagements which ensued between working-class communities and the state in the implementation of one manifestation of that neoliberal agenda, urban renewal and regeneration, directed this research to two categories of state interventions in the urban realm: the first involving its financial incentivisation of property development; the second undertaken in the interests of managing emerging opposition to the property-development sector's plans.

This research is primarily interested in the second decade of urban-renewal, heralded as a radical departure from the earlier property-led phase of renewal and distinguished by formal policy moves to incorporate working-class communities within the local state's consultative and participative structures. In defiance of repeated attempts by the state to move from one urban-renewal policy to the next without quantifying the costs or benefits visited upon communities by successive policies, the research undertook a longitudinal study in an historic quarter of Dublin's inner city which has been subject to successive waves of urban renewal, that of the Liberties. The research questions

were explored within the context of two specific urban-regeneration projects in the area, the first of which engendered a decade of unprecedented development, the second of which provided for a large-scale reconfiguration of the land-uses and economy of the quarter. As a district, the Liberties has been targeted by increasingly ambitious urban-regeneration plans underwritten by progressively more aggressive state interventions and elaborate public participation structures. As such, it provided an important site within which to explore the ends to which the state's participatory overtures have functioned. The research employed a case-study methodology as it allowed for the necessarily in-depth qualitative enquiry into the complexity of the urban-renewal paradigm and the many factors at play in the forging and maintenance of a powerful consensus surrounding a programme in which different and sharply contradictory property interests were at stake. The data was obtained from a wide range of secondary sources, namely, the publications of central and local government, community and area-based partnership organisations, researchers and academics and a comprehensive programme of primary data gathered from interviews with key governmental, political, community and local-development personnel together with a programme of observation within a large-scale regeneration process convened within the area.

The research concludes that the participatory overtures which have become such an integral part of the state's increasingly neoliberal interventions in the urban realm have functioned to contain, preclude and negate the emergence of opposition to what is being done to working-class areas in the name of urban renewal. The integrated, redistributive renewal promised by the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme has been revealed to be a fiction, with the latter acting as little more than a formal mechanism for the administration of fiscal incentives. More recent departures in urban regeneration have seen the state's attention shift from tax-incentive sites to its public-housing land holdings. In this situation, the state and its private consultants have begun to draw an explicit antagonism between the interests of public-housing tenants and the powerful interests gravitating towards regeneration projects. While collaborative planning has not succeeded in assuaging contradictory interests and trenchant criticisms have been made of the state's renewal policies, the latter has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to withstand and outwait working-class opposition in a manner which problematises future community participation within the state's structures. The research raises important questions about the roles which a number of distinct groups - private consultancies, public representatives and community-development organisations - have played in the mediation and legitimation of highly political development agendas in the study area. In relation to the latter group, the research points to the different and entirely contrary analyses and paths of action which different community organisations may be instrumental in articulating and pursuing in relation to key state interventions in the urban environment. The research concludes that the state's participatory overtures have functioned as a classic governance feature of 'rollout neoliberalism' in their concerted attempts to mobilise contradictory interests in 'the service of neoliberal goals' (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 390). The research identifies a strong argument for cutting through the state's facile insistence on partnership and consensus between developers and the public good and argues for the articulation and reinstatement of the core antagonism at the heart of the state's urban-renewal and regeneration interventions.

The research closes by pointing to the analytical and political importance of attending to those instances in the urban environment in which the presence of an objective contradiction between the interests of the state and working-class communities has not resulted in any public or political articulation of that antagonism. In all such instances, the research points to the importance of critically interrogating the official consensus in the interests of uncovering the state's role in constructing and maintaining that consensus, whether it involves the construction of specious participatory structures of questionable legitimacy or the suppression and marginalisation of those critical working-class residents and activists who have sought to articulate that contradiction in its starkest and most politically potent form.

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PREFACE

Introduction and Overview.

Introduction: the genesis of the research question.

The topic for this research, the incorporation of dissent in the renewal of Dublin's inner city, arose directly from the difficulties confronting working-class communities as they sought to assert and defend their interests in the implementation of the Irish state's urban-renewal and regeneration plans in which other powerful interests were at stake. Those difficulties arose within a very specific context, the new participatory structures within which the state sought to engage resident communities in numerous state interventions in the planning, development and public-housing arenas undertaken from the late 1990s. In many instances, communities had been persuaded to set aside previously adversarial relations with the local state to engage in the conciliatory partnership structures established to oversee the renewal projects which had come to dominate the urban-policy arena. Notwithstanding the many rhetorical commitments in which the state's invitations to communities were couched, the latter began to find themselves in the increasingly incongruous situation whereby the growing proliferation of new governance, participative and community-representative structures instead appeared to be militating against the engagement of disadvantaged urban communities with regard to crucially important planning and land-use issues.

The research was prompted by the position of vulnerability occupied by inner-city communities within those participatory structures. That vulnerability arose from a number of factors. In the first instance, individual community and residents' representative were assuming considerable responsibility in undertaking to represent and defend the interests of their communities in programmes which were essentially seeking to transform the landscape, economy and society of their locales. Upon entry into these participative structures, they quickly became aware of the profoundly unequal position which they occupied in relation to the other powerful public and private-sector actors. More seriously, those who chose to interpret the state's invitation in a literal manner and sought to engage fully with the key planning, development and land-use issues involved in these renewal programmes quickly became aware of the parameters beyond which the state was unwilling to permit the community to venture, namely the core private-sector development agendas underlying these regeneration programmes.

The participation of working-class communities within the state's participatory structures problematised the relationship between inner-city communities and the state in a manner which neither party could have anticipated at the outset. In the area explored in this research, the Liberties in Dublin's south-west inner city, an extensive engagement of the community with one of the Integrated Area Plans prepared under the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme resulted in the production

of a series of critical reports and position papers (see Chapters 3 and 4) in which the community documented its growing concerns about the nature of the decisions being taken by the local state and the ends to which the latter's participative structures were functioning. In seeking to effect a resolution of the contentious issues and concerns which arose, the inner-city community in question sought to engage the City Manager and his officials, local councillors, constituency TDs, the Minister for the Environment, the National Parliament and the European Commission. The state would neither engage with nor concede the legitimacy of the carefully considered concerns and questions outlined therein. It was thus that the questions at the core of this research were thrown into sharp relief: in whose interests were the urban-renewal programmes being implemented; why was the Irish state so intent on enjoining inner-city communities to virtually every endeavour in which it was engaged while steadfastly refusing to concede the legitimacy of the experience, perspectives and concerns of those communities; why was the consent of economically powerless and generally propertyless communities so necessary to public-private projects of such significant economic dimensions; what parties in the community did the state look to in seeking to construct that consensus and what was the fate awaiting those who persisted in dissenting from one of the core, if unspoken, assumptions of the state's urban-renewal agenda, that the interests of the property-development sector were synonymous with the public good?

Contribution to research.

These questions arose from the nature of the engagements ensuing between inner-city communities and the state on a daily and weekly basis throughout the implementation of the state's urban-renewal and regeneration projects. Notwithstanding the immediacy which these questions assumed for inner-city communities which have been obliged to contend with the negative externalities arising from the state's renewal programmes, their concerns remained largely obscured from the public and political arenas. In the absence of such critical voices, debates about the relative merits of the state's entrepreneurial and neoliberal role have been dominated by 'the hollow rhetoric' of politicians, policy makers, city boosters and elite coalitions espousing such policies (Hubbard & Hall, 1998: 18-21). Meanwhile the voices of inner-city communities which have had some of the most sustained exposure to the actions of both the property-development sector and the state's repeated interventions on its behalf, have been largely lost to the public debate. This is a point of some significance in light of the fact that much of the tax-incentive fuelled development which is now being universally denounced for its role in inflating the property bubble actually took place in inner-city areas such as the Liberties. The research accordingly sets out to explore the experience and analyses of inner-city communities targeted by successive waves of urban-renewal policies in the inner city, the nature of the engagements which have taken place between the local state and inner-city communities in the implementation of these policies and the latter's assessment of their impact on the landscape, economy and society of the inner city.

The fundamental significance of this research accordingly lies in its contribution to critical public research on the role of the Irish state and the manner in which the state's urban polices were subordinated throughout the property-development boom to the interests of the property-development sector and its profitability criteria. In the process of exploring the nature of the engagements associated with the state's interventions in the urban environment, the research contributes significantly to the academic literature on a number of aspects of neoliberal urbanism. The core questions underlying this research arose directly from practice and more specifically from the attempt to appreciate the larger significance of the contradictions which were arising in the engagements taking place between inner-city communities and the state. While the research questions were originally formulated at a remove from the extensive body of academic literature on neoliberal urbanism, it was apparent that the manner in which a number of key thematic areas had been theorised within that literature was of immediate relevance to communities which had been obliged to confront that neoliberal agenda in a particularly stark form. Those thematic areas include the role of the state, the language of gentrification and urban frontiers, urban governance and postpolitical orders, typologies of participation and collaborative planning, urban contradictions and neoliberal contestations, incorporation and political and ideological domination. While the research has an interest in each of these areas, the focus of the empirical work dictates that its principal theoretical contribution arises from its exploration of the increasingly elaborate urban-governance structures and practices refined and elaborated by the local state in its quest to pre-empt, contain and suppress any emerging opposition to its increasingly aggressive interventions in the urban realm in the 'rollout stage' of neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

Overview of thesis.

The research is laid out in five sections. Part I presents the theoretical framework, which is centred around two thematic areas in urban studies particularly pertinent to the research questions under consideration. Chapter 1 explores the manner in which the role of the state in the urban environment has been theorised. It considers the four major theoretical formulations of the state with particular reference to the analytical insights afforded by the political-economy perspective. It then turns to the aspect of the state at issue in this research, the local state and the distinct roles that it performs on behalf of the central state in a capitalist economy. That leads in turn to the literature on the evolution of the neoliberal local state and two of its recent manifestations in the urban realm: the entrepreneurial city and the creative city. The chapter then proceeds to explore the larger significance that urban-development projects assume for critical theorists, with particular attention to the governance regimes and plethora of participatory and partnership initiatives which have unfolded in tandem with the neoliberal agenda. Chapter 2 opens with a consideration of the significance which various theorists have ascribed to the engagements and struggles that have followed from the state's interventions in the urban realm, before proceeding to explore the three broad modes of engagement and non-engagement among communities targeted by these policies.

Under the heading of 'participation,' it assesses the hegemonic status that collaborative planning has assumed before considering the analytical insights afforded by typologies of participation and the other guises which participation has assumed – partnership and active citizenship. Turning to the literature on protest, it attends to some of the more notable urban-renewal protests, considers the nature of contemporary contestations in the urban realm and attends to the distinctive character of community struggles, with particular attention to the arguments which have been made for the reassertion of the economic antagonisms and distinct class interests at the heart of many of the state's interventions in the urban realm. Chapter 2 closes with a consideration of the various explanations which have been posited for political quiescence and inaction among working-class communities, with particular attention to the manner in which it has been considered within pluralist and political economy perspectives.

In Part II (the research methodology), Chapter 3 outlines the core concern of the research, namely the nature of the engagements taking place between working-class communities and the local state as the latter assumes an increasingly neoliberal and entrepreneurial orientation in the urban realm. It outlines the aims and objectives of the research topic and takes cognisance of the methodological challenge arising in its investigations. It notes the semantic difficulties arising in the description of the various modes of engagement with the state and attempts to delineate the precise significance of each term employed in the research. It proceeds to outline the research strategy employed, namely the urban policy at issue, the case-study area selected, the rationale for conducting a longitudinal study, the categories of data obtained from the wide range of secondary sources consulted and the categories of data gathered from primary sources employing a number of different research strategies.

Part III (Chapter 4) turns to the Irish research context and the specific state interventions in the urban environment at issue in the research. As the state interventions in question coincided with a period of significant changes in the form and function of both the local-government body charged with the implementation of urban-renewal programmes and the community-development organisational structures in those inner-city areas where the state was intervening in the most sustained and intensive manner, the research context delineated is consequently three-fold: (i) the urban geography context, (ii) the local-government context and (iii) the local community-development context. This chapter situates the research's empirical research programme within each of these different contexts, highlighting recent research and discussion in both the academic and the public realms in Ireland as they relate to the key concepts at issue in the research questions under consideration. Chapter 4 attempts to marshal the available evidence about the impact of urban renewal on inner-city communities. It attends to the significant (corporate) restructuring that took place in the local authority in Dublin city and the manner in which community-development

organisational structures have simultaneously been reoriented around a conciliatory social-partnership model.

The thesis then moves to present the empirical research as it pertains to the two urban-renewal and regeneration plans explored within the research. Part IV comprises five chapters and covers two distinct phases of urban regeneration. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present a detailed retrospective of the community's engagement with the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan (IAP), one of 49 IAPs prepared under the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme. Chapter 5 explores the rationale underlying the fiscal-incentive mode of state intervention employed in the IAPs. It also considers the rationale for the participatory departure in the state's urban-renewal policies. While the research has earlier referred to the analytical insights afforded by typologies of participation, it has also acknowledged their shortcomings. Chapter Six charts the different trajectories taken by four different community organisations/residents' associations upon entry into the state's participatory structures. It does so in the interests of illustrating the entirely different trajectories taken by those who elected to engage with the substantive planning and development issues at stake in the IAP and those who confined their engagement to the more peripheral aspects of the plan. The trajectory is followed by the assessments of all parties on the impact of the community's participation. The exploration of the community's experience of engaging within the state's participative structures takes place at all times with reference to the degree to which the community was, through its participation in the local authority's structures, able to influence and determine the resultant outcomes of the IAP. Chapter Seven thus attempts to assess the degree to which the IAP represents a significant departure from the property-led renewal programmes which had preceded it and the degree to which it actually emerges as yet another property-led programme distinguished only by the rhetoric of 'radical departures' and 'holistic, integrated renewal' in which it was couched.

In as far as practicable, the research's presentation of the second phase of urban regeneration, the stand-alone Liberties Regeneration Project, adopts a parallel format in Chapters 8 and 9. It does so in the interests of elucidating the highly significant changes which had taken place in the fundamentals of the state's regeneration agenda, as they were reflected in a new and more aggressive form of state intervention (namely proposals for the disposal of publicly-owned land) and a more elaborate public consultative process which was distinguished by the outsourcing of that process to private consultants. Chapter 8 outlines the local state's rationale for the significant departures evident in a regeneration project which was laden with the rhetoric and core tenets of Florida's (2002) 'creative-city' thesis. Thereafter, Chapter 9 attends closely to the ends to which private consultants have functioned in the mediation of this highly political development agenda, with attention always to those aspects of the process of key analytical importance to the experience and fate of working-class interests within urban regeneration. By virtue of the fact that the new regeneration plan was accorded statutory status, the research was also afforded the opportunity to

observe the manner in which urban-regeneration plans possessing far-reaching consequences for working-class communities proceeded through the political decision-making process.

Part V brings the thesis to a close. Chapter 10 presents the research's closing analysis under three broad headings. The first pertains to the significance of the state's interventions in the urban realm and the manner in which those interventions have been received and resisted by the host working-class communities, detailing a number of key conclusions which the research has reached about the nature of the engagements which have proceeded between the state and inner-city communities. The second considers the role that a number of the key actors in the urban-renewal arena have played in the construction of the consensus surrounding the state's urban-renewal and regeneration agenda. The third examines the argument for the recognition and reinstatement of the core antagonism between the distinct property interests found within urban renewal. The chapter closes with a consideration of the degree to which the state has succeeded in incorporating arising dissent among those communities targeted by its policies and some critical reflections on the research question.

CHAPTER 1

The role of the state in the urban environment.

1.1 Introduction.

1.1.1 Geographical tradition and orientation.

In his treatise on revolutionary and counter-revolutionary theory in geography, Harvey (1973) deliberated upon what does and does not constitute a revolutionary geography.

> "Let me say first what it does not entail. It does not entail yet another empirical investigation of the social conditions in the ghettos. In fact, mapping even more evidence of man's patent inhumanity to man is counter revolutionary in the sense that it allows the bleeding-heart liberal in us to pretend we are contributing to a solution when in fact we are not" (Harvey, 1973: 144).

The need for a revolutionary geography at that time was located in the "clear disparity between the sophisticated theoretical and methodological framework which we are using and our ability to say anything really meaningful about events as they unfold around us... The objective social conditions demand that we say something sensible or coherent or else (through lack of credibility or, even worse, through the deterioration of the objective social conditions) remain silent. It is the emerging objective social conditions and our patent inability to cope with them which essentially explains the necessity for a revolution in geographic thought" (*ibid.*, 128-9). Harvey was at all times concerned with the organisation and production of knowledge and the Marx and Engels proposition that 'the ruling class produces the ruling ideas in society.'

> "...*in general* all knowledge is suffused with apologetics for the *status quo* and with counter-revolutionary formulations which function to frustrate the investigation of alternatives" (Harvey, 1973: 147).

Harvey's treatise has a number of resonances in the present research context. Academia accommodates many 'sophisticated theoretical and methodological frameworks' which appear to operate in many instances at a complete remove from the objective conditions that they purport to address. This research is an attempt to harness some of the more perspicacious theoretical formulations and analyses in the service of working-class communities attempting to grapple with an increasingly neoliberal state apparatus. This research is also concerned with the organisation and production of knowledge, in this instance the organisation and production of the state's public knowledge about the position of inner-city communities within the neoliberal city, the degree to which that knowledge is suffused with 'apologetics for the *status quo*' and the degree to which the state functions to impede the emergence of an alternative knowledge and analysis that might threaten that *status quo*.

The theoretical framework for this research draws heavily from the tradition of critical geography and critical research as it evolved in the 1970s and 1980s (Harvey, 1973; Castells, 1977a; Scott, 1980, Dear, 1981). The research is concerned with formulating the theoretical framework best

equipped to undertake such an analysis. As such, this research rejects a conception of science which holds that knowledge evolves in a linear fashion, invalidating and superseding that which has gone before. The briefest of literature reviews on the issues at the core of this research topic quickly disproves any such thesis. The literature from the earlier period of radical geography remains entirely appropriate to the topics under consideration in this thesis: the role of the state; the theoretical formulation of the state best equipped to explain its interest and interventions in disadvantaged working-class communities; the nature of the relationship between the economic base and ideological and political superstructures; the manner in which the nature and degree of participation, protest and quiescence to be found among working-class communities is to be understood and the threat of cooption and incorporation looming over those seeking to advance a more radical analysis of the state's policies and actions in relation to working-class communities.

1.1.2 Theoretical context.

The theoretical context for this research project encompasses a number of major themes in urban studies: the role of the state; neo-liberalism and entrepreneurialism; planning and property development; inner-city renewal and regeneration; community impact and engagement; consensus, protest and quiescence. Two of these areas have emerged as being particularly relevant to the research questions under consideration. This chapter explores the first of these thematic areas: the role of the state, the evolution of the neo-liberal local state and the nature of its interest in working-class communities. Chapter 2 examines the nature of participation, protest and quiescence among urban working-class communities in their engagements with the local state with particular attention to engagements pertaining to the state's urban-renewal programmes.

1.2 The role of the state.

1.2.1 The role of the state in the urban built environment.

The position taken on the state's interests in urban working-class communities is contingent on the theoretical position taken on "the structural role of the state within capitalism" (MacLaran, 1999a: 184). In the midst of an expansive body of literature on the different aspects and understandings of the state's role within capitalism, it is important to clarify the precise aspect of that role that is of particular interest in the present research context, i.e. the role of the state as it intervenes in the urban environment to secure the interests of property-development capital (Larmarche, 1976) and its treatment and management of potentially disruptive working-class interests encountered in that environment. The decision to focus on the role of the state as opposed to that of the property-development sector is informed by the fact that capital is understood to operate in accordance with clear self-interest. There is accordingly no great enquiry to be undertaken in relation to either its interventions in the urban realm or its disposition towards or overtures to resident working-class communities. The interesting research questions rest in the manner in which the state, while

presenting itself as the neutral broker and arbiter of the public good, acts to secure the interests of private capital.

1.2.2 The four major theoretical formulations of the state.

The delineation of the theoretical framework for the consideration of the research problematic at this core of this research project accordingly begins with an examination of the four major theoretical formulations of the state: pluralism, managerialism, reformism and political economy as they have been outlined in Kirk (1980) and MacLaran & McGuirk (2003). While noting the variety of other ways in which the role of the state has also been conceptualised (see, for example, Badcock, 1984; Dear, 1981 and Saunders, 1979), this research focuses on the four major theoretical formulations in question with particular attention to the insights which each offers into the nature of engagements taking place between the state and the working-class in the urban environment.

(i) Pluralism.

This exploration commences with the pluralist approach that has become so "pervasive and influential" that it has passed into "conventional wisdom" (Kirk, 1980: 57). Pluralism is of interest primarily for its characterisation of the political system as open, democratic, accessible and responsive to any individual or group sufficiently exercised by a given issue to become politically active. It is also of interest for the role that it posits for the state as a neutral arbiter between the competing and conflicting interests that emerge to argue their case in the public arena. Pluralism is generally understood to be based on three central assumptions: (i) a weak polity "lacking in any developed ideology or particularly separate identity" susceptible to strong external influences; (ii) an environment in which public opinion constitutes one of the decisive influences determining public policy; (iii) "political activity [that] is determined by people's interests" and that "faithfully reflect[s] the balance of interests in a community" (Dunleavy, 1977: 194). Kirk (1980: 58-60) identifies a number of factors that may be cited in support of the pluralist formulation of the putative vibrant and democratic political realm: a marked increase in pressure-group activity in civil society; the mobilisation of 'communities of interests' around new axes that are more flexible and transient than the traditional axes of place and class; the 'implicit egalitarianism' of a model that envisages people organising around issues that concern them and enjoying both equality of opportunity in the representation of those interests and 'theoretically equal chances' in the achievement of their objectives.

Pluralism's representation and legitimation of "existing social and political arrangements, as fundamentally just and fair" and "the idea that inactivity is a sign of satisfaction with the situation as it stands, or at worst, disinterest" (*ibid.*) is of particular interest to this research's exploration of the meaning and significance of apparent inactivity among working-class communities and the role of the state in the production and maintenance of such inactivity (see Chapter 2). It is in this

context that the principal criticisms advanced in respect of the pluralist formulation assume a particular significance, namely its negation of the degree of inequality among the various interest groups competing for political influence and the different standings in which they are held by power-holders; its flawed assumption of the unidirectional flow of political influence from the public to the polity without any concession of the considerably more complex and multidirectional operation of political forces and its emphasis on activities to the exclusion of apparent inactivity, a failure compounded by its superficial analysis of the latter's significance (*ibid.,* 60-3).

In enunciating the various premises upon which it is based, pluralism essentially provides a series of criteria upon which its *bona fides* may be validated or invalidated. It is of interest in this regard. It is also of interest for the wealth of critical insights that unfold from the critical interrogation of what Broadbent (1977) characterises as a market theory of politics, not least its exposure of the second face (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962) and third dimension of power (Lukes, 2005).

(ii) Managerialism.

In contrast to the open, responsive and democratic governmental institutions of pluralism, managerialism vests considerably greater power in the institutions of the central and local state. The state's public bureaucracies are described as "complex structures, difficult to penetrate and largely impervious to influence from local residents" (Kirk, 1980: 66). At local state level, that managerialism manifests itself in an intricate and professionalised bureaucracy, which functions to impede democracy further by virtue of the relationship of dependency into which elected councillors are directed *vis-à-vis* expert and professional bureaucrats (*ibid.;* see also MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003). This conceptualisation of the power and significance of public bureaucracies finds its most tangible expression in the office of urban manager and the crucial role that the manager plays in mediating "between the state and the private sector" and the "central state authority and the local population" (Kirk, 1980: 72). Kirk locates the strengths of the managerialist perspective in its acknowledgement of "the power and complexity of central and local government bureaucracies" the increasingly interventionist nature of the local and central state in the urban environment and the "vital importance" that local authorities assume in urban working-class communities in light of their control over key public resources (principally housing) and key public functions (principally planning) (*ibid.,* 68-9). The merit of the managerialist perspective is also located in its attention to the vulnerability of poorer communities in the face of such "complex and impenetrable... state machinery" (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003:73).

Those aspects of managerialism that have been identified as strengths have also given rise to a number of fundamental criticisms. The attention to the difficulties experienced by poorer communities in engaging with the local state has been criticised for fundamentally misconstruing those problems as matters only of poor relations between community and local state, with the

reduction of the ensuing critique to one of poor communication, insufficient information, mistrust and casual disrespect etc. (Kirk, 1980). Meanwhile, concern has been expressed about the tendency for both disadvantaged communities and those working with them to concentrate their criticisms of the state on its most visible and immediate manifestation, local-authority officials. The principal criticism of the formulation is, however, reserved for managerialism's treatment of such "conflicts of interest... within an economic vacuum" and its failure to recognise that local governments are not separate from and outside the state but very much under "the bureaucratic control of central government" (Kirk, 1980: 72) which is itself operating within the constraints of a capitalist economy.

While there are aspects of the managerialist thesis which provide valuable insights into the role and significance of the local state in the urban environment, its greater importance lies in the debate that it has engendered among critics about the need to make the necessary analytical leap to a more radical critique of the role of central government, land markets and private capital in the distribution of crucial land and housing resources in the urban environment (*ibid.*).

(iii) Reformism.

Unlike pluralism and managerialism, reformism does not treat conflicts of interest in the urban environment within a political vacuum. It instead "recognizes the inevitability of inequality in capitalist society" and stresses the state's role as "a vehicle for social reform" (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003: 74). The state is regarded "not as a monolith working in the service of capital but as a terrain of political struggle" within which reformers can seek to formulate progressive policies that will correct and ameliorate the most harmful outcomes of the capitalist economy while leaving its fundamentals unaltered (*ibid.*). The strengths of the perspective are located in its recognition of "basic structural inequalities or power, influence, income and wealth" (Kirk, 1980: 73) and the need to effect some kind of reform of these inequalities. The latter imperative is attributed to the two theoretical positions upon which reformism draws, humanistic liberal egalitarianism and aspects of Marxism. It is a theoretical legacy that directs critical attention to "persisting inequalities," their point of origin and the means and institutions through which they are reinforced and perpetuated (*ibid.*). Harvey, in his earlier work, is cited as one of the most influential proponents of the reformist formulation, with particular attention to his work on the mechanisms governing the distribution of income within the urban system. Others meanwhile acknowledge that "the state does attempt to effect marginal redistributions between competing interests" but are highly sceptical about the scope for progressive redistributive measures within land-use planning systems in which "private-sector development profitability" remains an imperative (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003: 75).

The above paragraph has alluded to the influence of Marxist thinking on the reformist formulation. While clearly discernible in its analysis of the root cause of inequality, that influence does not extend to the solutions proposed to remedy that inequality. Reformism instead seeks to find solutions "within the constraints of the existing economic system" (Kirk, 1980: 75) without threatening the viability of that system in any way (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003). Reformist solutions are typified by the area/place-based and positive-discrimination programmes introduced in areas of acute inequality and deprivation. Kirk pointed to the "severe limitations" of such programmes, which attempt to effect resolution of acute social and economic problems within tightly delimited geographical boundaries without reference to the structural origins of those problems (see also MacLaran, 1999a). The inherent conservatism of reformist solutions stands in sharp contrast to the radical prescriptions for action advanced by those who "do not fight shy of the logic of their own analysis in their recommendations for action" (Kirk, 1980: 77), whether that analysis pertains to the planning system or the economic system within which it operates. Beyond the limitations of the solutions that can be effected within the constraints of a capitalist economy, reformism has also been criticised for its treatment of class conflict, namely its attempt to deny the fundamental antagonism at the heart of capitalist society in the interests of deflecting incipient class conflict into more 'productive' and 'benign' conflict (Donnison, 1973, in Kirk, 1980) which can be contained within "the scope of existing local political institutions" (Kirk, 1980: 76).

Contradictions notwithstanding, reformism continues to define the parameters within which those concerned with poverty and inequality are obliged to operate if they wish to avail of state funding. In this they confront an ineluctable dilemma, a theoretical formulation which invites research and enquiry into the root causes of urban problems but prohibits the radical course of action that follows from the logical conclusions of such an enquiry.

(iv) Political economy.

Marxism does not fight shy of the conclusions that follow from a structural analysis of the problems of capitalist societies. "Highly critical of the reformist conception of state activity," the Marxist formulation does not view the state as a benign institution (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003: 78-9). The subject of a number of different formulations and the focus of considerable discussion within Marxist theory, all Marxist conceptualisations of the state "are founded on the notion that the economy and political spheres are inextricably intertwined" while maintaining the semblance of operating in separate and discrete spheres (*ibid.,* 75-6). Categorically rejecting the depiction of the state as "a neutral umpire, arbitrating impartially between competing groups" (George & Wilding, 1976, cited in Kirk, 1980), the core function of the state is outlined in the following manner "the reproduction and management of existing class relationships, through the formal institutions of the courts, army and police, and informal institutions of socialisation, especially through schooling and within the family" (Kirk, 1980:119).

Kirk (1980) identified a number of strengths that distinguish the Marxist formulations from the other major theoretical formulations of the state. In the first instance, it understands the intimate relationship between politics and the economy and the power exercised by distinctly ideological positions about market economies that have come to assume the status of unimpeachable truths. In the context of urban planning and development, it understands that the problems besetting urban areas are inextricably intertwined with the capital accumulation process and is accordingly in a position to cut through more conservative analyses that seek to problematise the city and its working-class populations to go straight to the core antagonism at the heart of land-use planning markets in capitalist economies (see also MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003). In enumerating the analytical strengths of the Marxist perspective, Kirk (1980) pointed to the contributions made by a number of prominent Marxists who were moved by the economic crisis of the 1970s to engage with the economic, political and ideological processes at work in the urban environment. These include Larmarche's (1976) delineation of a specialist type of capital, 'property capital;' Lojkine's (1976) understanding of the state's role in creating the conditions necessary for capital accumulation; Castells (1976)'s depiction of urban planning as 'the intervention of the political system in the economic system' and urban social movements as 'class agents' within the urban system and Olives' (1976) exploration of the factors that determine whether objective contradictions in the urban system becomes manifest in protest movements (see Kirk, 1980: 79-86).

Political economy formulations of the role of the state in the urban environment have also and inevitably been the target of searing criticisms. Some of the more pertinent criticisms in this context pertain to its over-simplification of the role of the state; its refusal to afford the state any credit for its actions in "ameliorating the harsh logic of capitalist enterprise" (Pahl, 1975: 282); its axiomatic assumption that "authorities will not grant changes which threaten the stability of the mode of production," which leads it to deny the role and capacity of the state as an agency of change or concession (Pickvance, 1976: 202-3). It has also been criticised for its failure to acknowledge the role played by parties other than the state and oppositional urban social movements in the urban-development process and its crude depiction of municipal authorities as "the 'lackeys' of big business" without any attention to those occasions in which the state is demonstrably not acting in the interests of capital (Kirk, 1980: 123-5).


Notwithstanding the many criticisms to which the political economy formulation has been subjected, its advocates maintain that it continues to provide "the most profound conceptualization of the state's origin, its evolution and contemporary functions" (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003: 75-6). That conceptualisation extends to the realm of urban planning and land use in which Marxism continues to provide the most incisive analysis of the manner in which "the contradictions inherent in the capitalist economic system become reflected in that built environment" (*ibid.,* 79).

(v) Rationale for adoption of a political economy perspective.

In recognition of the ends to which any given paradigm, theory or conceptual framework can function (Harvey, 1973), this research has sought to find the formulation best equipped to respond to what Castells (1977a: ix) has called "increasingly explosive urban contradictions" - a formulation that is capable of engaging with the questions and anomalies denied and displaced by "the traditional categories within which the social sciences, technocracy and the mass media have usually conceived urban problems" (*ibid.,* vii). Such a formulation is of particular importance in the present research investigation into the nature of engagements between the state and inner-city communities pursuant on major state interventions in the urban realm and property market. This research finds in the political economy perspective a theoretical framework within which the research problematic can be explored fully. In addition to the analytical strengths detailed above, it identifies the Marxian understanding of the nature of the relationship between the economic base and the political and ideological superstructure as particularly significant in the present context. (See Figure 1.1 for the theorisation of this relationship in MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003.)

This point is made with particular reference to its delineation of the manner in which "the state acts to assuage the conflict between capital and labour, to mediate class conflict, to legitimate capitalist society and its property relations and, ultimately, to guarantee the relations of production" (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003: 76).

Figure 1.1 Relationship between the economic base and the political and ideological superstructure (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003: 77, after COBI, n.d., 52).



In exploring the ways in which the state intervenes to perform each of these functions and to secure the interests of capital, the research also notes the repository of important conceptual tools to be found among those writing within the Marxist tradition. Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony and his analysis of the manner in which ideological domination is effected and maintained are crucially important, as are Habermas's (1976) writings on legitimation and legitimation crises in late capitalism (see Chapter 2 for an exploration of the merits of the dominant ideology thesis). In adopting a Marxist formulation of the role of the state, the research is empowered finally to bring an unapologetically critical spotlight to bear on one of the central concerns of this research, the role that the Irish state has played in enabling a neoliberal urban-development agenda while endeavouring to maintain the complexion of "neutral arbiter of competing interests on which corporatism is premised" (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002: 2).

In adopting a Marxist political economy perspective on the role of the state, this research also acknowledges the important analytical insights - "all that is useful and valuable" (Harvey 1973: 145) - generated by other theoretical perspectives on the state. In particular, it notes the importance of Harvey's concept of the " 'hidden mechanisms' of income redistribution," his depiction of the political activity of the city as bargaining for the use and control of the hidden mechanisms of income distribution and his belief that the state would encounter greater difficulty in the implementation of its allocational decisions if the gains and losses following on those decisions were to become explicit (*ibid.,* 50-95). The research also acknowledges the 'observable validity' (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003:75) of managerialism's depiction of the power exercised by public bureaucracies, while endeavouring to extricate that analysis from its 'economic vacuum' in the interests of situating it within a structural analysis that is capable of taking account of the economic interests on whose behalf that power is exercised.

1.3 Role of the *local* state in the urban built environment.

1.3.1 Rationale for focusing on the local state.

An examination of the role of the state in the urban environment becomes in large measure an examination of the role of the *local* state in the urban environment. As noted, political economy formulations caution against analyses of the problems of urban working-class communities that treat the local state as an autonomous, stand-alone bureaucracy operating in isolation from the central state and the functions that it performs on behalf of capital. In contrast, political economy formulations understand the importance of the local state in capitalist economies and insist that analyses establish its precise role and significance *vis-à-vis* the central state, a task which involves "stepping outside the conventional frame of reference and seeing local government... for what it really also is: a key part of the state in capitalist society" (Cockburn, 1977: 41). Dear (1981: 190), in turn, cites a number of aspects of the local state's functions and operations, including its increasing cooperation with "large-scale corporate capital... in the patterns of city development"

that tend "to confirm its implication in the maintenance of capitalist social relations" and its "wider function of facilitating capital accumulation."

The ensuing deliberation on the specific functions of the local state is prefaced by a consideration of its form. This exposition on the rationale for adopting a specific focus on the local state accordingly turns to the seminal work by Cockburn (1977) in which she documented the advent of corporate management and corporate decision-making in local authorities in Britain of the 1960s and 1970s as municipal authorities "geared up to govern more intrusively and more effectively" (*ibid.,* 12). Cockburn was concerned with central government's role in the corporate restructuring of local government, the movement of "the principles and practices of corporate management and planning... from the business world into central and local government in the 1960s" (*ibid.,* 11) and the role that private management consultancies played as intermediaries between business and the local state. She was also concerned with the impact of this new corporate style of management on the functioning of the local authority as it related to elected members of local government and the public. In relation to the former, she noted the emergence of a "vertical pyramid of control" in a corporate structure in which senior officials proceed to define and delimit the parameters of the agenda and decision-making process. Meanwhile, the elected councillor body remained "technically sovereign" but in practice became little more than "a set piece, a farce, a public relations show" (*ibid.,* 34-37). In relation to the latter, Cockburn was centrally concerned with the relationship between the corporate restructuring of local government and the accompanying drive for community development. In the opening pages of *The Local State,* she considered where corporate management and community development represented two contrary and contradictory initiatives or whether they might be considered as the 'the tough and tender aspects of one principle: management.' For Cockburn, the significance of these developments could follow only on a complete understanding of "what it is that local government is trying to manage" (*ibid.,* 52). It is thus that critical urban geographers turned their attention to the precise role and function of the local state in the urban environment.

For Dear (1981: 191), the interrelationships between central and local states provide the essential context within which the form and function of the latter must be understood. While functioning as part of the larger state apparatus, the local state is understood to perform a number of functions that are distinct from those of the central state *vis-à-vis* capital (Cockburn, 1977). Three of those functions are particularly pertinent in the present research context. In the first place, the central state allows the local state to engage in a purposeful 'conflict diversification strategy' (Hirsch, 1980, cited in Dear, 1981), whereby the problematic effects of the structural crisis can be deflected to the local state arena. In this manner, crises arising from the central contradiction in capitalist societies are "regionalized... temporarily removing the burden from the central state, and implicating the local state in the genesis of the crises" (Dear, 1981: 192). Secondly, the local state

plays a key role in crisis avoidance through a "pre-politics processing of political information" that Dear characterises as part of the ideological hegemony of the state (*ibid.,* 193). That 'pre-processing of political information' (Roweis, 1981: 168-170) is effected through amongst other means the use of "citizen participation channels" and is undertaken in the interests of forestalling political disputes and facilitating and legitimising the state's decisions (Dear, 1981). For Dear, the local state comprises two elements that are vital in the achievement of ideological hegemony: electoral politics and state bureaucracy. The former functions to contain social conflict and secure societal consent, while the latter with its powerful officials and complex structures functions to obscure the real power relations in capitalist societies. Finally and crucially, the local state is the arm of the state which is entrusted with land-use and planning authority. For Broadbent (1977: 141), land-use planning is the mechanism through which "the local state intervenes in the major internal market of the city – the land market," with the same differential distribution of costs and benefits associated with all market mechanisms. As such, "urban planning experiences the same crisis of legitimation that haunts the state as a whole in capitalist society" (Dear, 1981: 196).

1.3.2 Growing neoliberalism of the local state.

The above texts derive from the 1970s and 1980s from a period in which critical geographers were pointing to the need "to delve below the 'level of appearances' in state organisation" to conduct a structural analysis of the " 'social reality' underlying and causing those appearances" (Dear, 1981: 184). That need became increasingly pronounced in the ensuing decades as the local state became enmeshed in the service of the new agenda of neoliberalism that had been crystallising throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This review accordingly moves to the overarching political-economy framework which has seen the local state assume an increasingly proactive role in the commodification and marketing of the urban environment. The aspect of neoliberalism with which this research is centrally concerned relates to the local state's orientation towards the urban environment, the working-class inhabitants of that environment and the nature of the relations engendered between the two as the state intervenes in an increasingly assertive and aggressive manner in pursuit of that neoliberal agenda.

- ***From utopian ideal to political project.***

"Conceptions of neoliberalism matter" (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 27). They matter politically and analytically if urban geographers are to attain a complete understanding of the core tenets and objectives of an ideological programme that has infiltrated virtually every aspect of the political economy of contemporary capitalist societies. Neoliberalism is characterised as "an elite intellectual project (increasingly) closely intertwined not only with state power but also with some of the key circuits of financialized capitalism" (*ibid.,* 26). All accounts of the ascendancy of neoliberalism as a political project attend in the first instance to its genealogy (Peck & Tickell, 2002, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Allen, 2007). Peck and Tickell (2007: 36), for example,

trace the genealogy of neoliberal theory "along multiple political, institutional, and economic pathways, many of which were transnational in origin from the outset." It is thus that they chart the ascendancy of neoliberalism from the writings of Friedrich von Hayek and the teachings of Milton Friedman to the emergence of a series of think tanks which "played a crucial role in organizing and articulating this ascendant project of the 'theoretical Right'" (Desai, 1994, in Peck & Tickell, 2007: 39). It is evident that the forging and ascendancy of neoliberalism was very much an intellectual project, but while the 'power of ideas' was a central tenet of these free-market think-tanks, Peck & Tickell (2007: 38) point out that they were "ultimately more concerned with securing policy outcomes than merely winning arguments."

The "evolutionary dynamic" of neoliberalism as a political project as distinct from the coherent ideal-type ideological construct forged in the right-wing think tanks detailed above has seen neoliberalism unfold in many mutations and variations across different locations and at different times (Harvey, 2005). Peck and Tickell (2007: 28) elaborated "a conception of neoliberalization as a socially produced, historically and geographically specific, crisis-driven, conjectural, and definitionally incomplete phenomenon." Brenner and Theodore (2002a: 349), meanwhile, advanced the concept of "actually existing neoliberalism" to emphasise the manner in which neoliberal restructuring projects have been "produced within national, regional, and local contexts [and] defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles."[1] Beyond denoting the importance of the "path-dependent" interactions between the "inherited regulatory landscapes" and the "market-oriented restructuring projects" that neoliberalism is seeking to effect *(ibid.)*, Brenner and Theodore argued that the concept also provides a means of exposing both the "contradictory, destructive character of neoliberal policies" and the ideological distortions in which it has sought to cloak itself (*ibid.,* 353).

Notwithstanding the demonstrably variegated character of local neoliberalisms, Peck and Tickell (2002: 387-8) pointed to the persistence of key generic features in all such mutations in which it was possible to distinguish "broader patterns and connections... in the process of neoliberalization as it has taken shape in the North Atlantic zone." The specific 'broader pattern and connection' to which geographers have repeatedly returned pertains to "historical shifts in the constitution of the neoliberal project" (*ibid.*), namely proto-neoliberalism in the 1970s, an emergent and "explicit political-economic project" in the 1980s and the "deep neoliberalisms" of the 1990s (*ibid.,* 384). In the transition from one 'historical constitution' to the next, Peck and Tickell (2002, 2007) distinguish two distinctive shifts in neoliberalism that have necessitated significant reconfigurations in the role of the state to enable the "consolidation of neoliberalism as a new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the state level" in the first instance (Harvey, 2005: 22) and, more

[1] See Attuyer (2010) and Boyle *et al.* (2008) for an exploration of 'actually existing neoliberalisms' in a number of distinct French, Irish and Scottish contexts.

latterly, to enable the consolidation and management of both "marketization and its consequences" (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 33).

- ***Role of the state in neoliberalism.***

The theoretical position regarding the role of the state in neoliberalism is relatively straightforward. With its "fundamental commitment to ideals of personal freedom" proto neoliberalism was fundamentally and deeply opposed to all forms of state intervention in the economy (Harvey, 2005: 20). The translation of this abstract intellectual concept into a political project (Peck & Tickell, 2002) ushered in a 'roll-back neoliberalism' in which proponents of neoliberalism sought to roll back the frontiers of the state in the interests of enlarging "the space for private enterprise, competition and individual liberty" (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 28). This 'rolling back' of the state was not to be understood as an attempt to evacuate the state in its entirety but rather the institutions of the Keynesian-welfare state impeding the advance of the neoliberal project and its repertoire of neoliberal practices that included privatisation, deregulation, outsourcing etc. Characterised as a phase of 'active destruction' (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 386), it was followed in the 1990s by a second phase of neoliberal transformation that sought to deal with the political limits and perverse economic and social consequences of "narrowly marketcentric forms of neoliberalism" (*ibid.,* 388). The second phase, a 'roll-out neoliberalism,' saw neoliberal regimes expand their horizons beyond the narrow logic and parameters of the market to establish "new forms of institution-building and governmental intervention" which would allow them to reregulate, discipline, contain and manage the contradictions, casualties and critics of the first phase of neoliberalism (*ibid.,* 389). It was thus that those who initially clamoured for 'less government' were subsequently obliged to demand "'more government' to mask and contain the deleterious social consequences" of the first phase of the neoliberal project (Wacquant, 1999 in Peck & Tickell, 2002: 389). For Peck and Tickell (2007: 31-33), this epitomises the "neoliberal conceit" in which "only rhetorically, does neoliberalism mean 'less state.'" Harvey (2005) similarly identified this as one of the core contradictions at the heart of the neoliberal project (see also Jessop, 2002).

The re-emergence (or 'political foregrounding') of the state in this manner underlies Peck and Tickell's (2002: 384) identification of the roll-out stage of neoliberalism as the phase demanding "both analytical and political attention." Their exploration of "the changing character of neoliberalism as a regulatory project" provided an important framework within which to explore the increasingly close engagements into which the state has sought to draw those "marginalized and dispossessed by the neoliberalization of the 1980s" (*ibid.,* 389-390). Of particular interest in this context is the attempt to mobilise diverse and potentially antagonistic actors in "the service of neoliberal goals" through "extramarket forms of governance and regulation" including "the selective appropriation of 'community' ...the establishment of social-capital discourses... the

incorporation (and underwriting) of local governance and partnership-based modes of policy development and program delivery in areas like urban regeneration" (*ibid.,* 390).

- ***Significance of 'the local' and 'the city' within neoliberalism.***

In addition to the mounting and deepening state intervention required to deal with the problems generated by the roll-back phase of neoliberalism, Peck and Tickell (2002: 390) also identified two other analytically and politically significant aspects of the second (roll-out) phase of neoliberalism: changes in its "scalar constitution" and the "substantive foci" of its policies (*ibid.,* 391; see also Brenner & Theodore, 2002a and Jessop, 2002). It is the former that is of principal significance in the present research context. The extension of national state powers to local administrations and extra-state agencies has seen cities emerge as "strategically crucial arenas" (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a: 367) in the unfolding of a "neoliberal offensive" that has ushered in, legitimised and enforced "a new regime of highly competitive interlocal relations" and rendered all local areas "subject in one way or another to the disciplinary force of neoliberalized spatial relations" (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 386). The ascendancy of the local state in neoliberalism marks a significant departure from the Keynesian era in which the central state was the "the principal anchoring point for institutions of... social integration and (limited) macro-economic management" (*ibid.,* 385).

That disciplinary force is evident in the 'hold' that neoliberal orthodoxy now retains "over municipal policy-making throughout much of the developed capitalist world" (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b: 345). Brenner & Theodore made this point in the face of a populist political rhetoric that seeks to construe 'the local' as one of the remaining spaces of local empowerment in which apparently irreconcilable differences can be reconciled without reference to extraneous political-economic forces and "uncontrollable *supra*local transformations, such as globalisation" (*ibid.,* 341-2). For Brenner and Theodore the 'new localism' becomes instead a 'space of neoliberalism' (2002b), while cities become "key politico-institutional arenas within the broader geographies of actually existing neoliberalism" (2002a: 367). The reconfiguration of the role and significance of municipal authorities in this manner follows on factors both external and internal to city governments. It is thus that cities find themselves "embedded within a highly uncertain geoeconomic environment" in which local governments have been obliged to engage in interurban competition and the accompanying range of policies, practices and measures necessary to position themselves competitively within this arena. Meanwhile their situation is rendered more precarious by the retrenchment of government spending at national level that imposes "powerful new fiscal constraints upon cities" (*ibid.*). However, it is not only a matter of obligation or external constraint. The core tenets of neoliberalism have also been internalised within urban policy regimes in many cases. It is in this context that Brenner & Theodore (2002a: 368) state that

> "cities... have become increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for a variety of neoliberal policy experiments, from place-marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development

> corporations, public–private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism to workfare policies, property-redevelopment schemes, business-incubator projects, new strategies of social control, policing, and surveillance, and a host of other institutional modifications within the local and regional state apparatus."

The reconfiguration of cities as 'institutional laboratories' for neoliberalism in this manner has followed on "the processes of institutional creative destruction,"[2] which have taken place with "particular intensity at the urban scale, within major cities and city regions" (*ibid.,* 367). Brenner and Theodore proceed to identify a series of 'mechanisms of neoliberal localization' through which the institutional reconfiguration of the local state has been effected as one form of the state has been dismantled to allow for the forging of an entirely more assertive set of local government institutions and practices reoriented towards the needs of the market. A number of those processes and mechanisms pertain directly to the reconfiguration of the local state's role and orientation *vis-à-vis* the built environment, namely the recalibration of intergovernmental relations, the reconfiguring of the institutional infrastructure of the local state, the restructuring of urban housing markets and strategies of territorial development, the transformation of the built environment and urban form, the advent of inter-local policy transfer and mechanisms for the re-representation of the city (*ibid.*, 369-372). They argue further that each of the three phases of neoliberalism identified by Peck and Tickell (2002), have been anchored and fought out in "particularly pronounced forms… within strategic urban spaces" (*ibid.,* 373).

As with Peck and Tickell (2002), the phase of neoliberalism with which this research is primarily concerned is the latter roll-out phase in which "the basic neoliberal imperative of mobilizing economic space… as a purified arena for capitalist growth, commodification, and market discipline" (*ibid.,* 374) had been established and normalised but was in pressing need of "new flanking mechanisms" if the new neoliberal hegemony was not to be threatened or disrupted by the crises, contradictions and failures inherent to neoliberalism.

- ***Role of the local state in the neoliberal city.***

It is apparent from all of the above that the state has categorically not been rendered redundant by the advent and progression of the neoliberal project (Harvey, 2005; Peck & Tickell, 2002, 2007). This is very evidently the case for the local state, charged as it is with responsibility for what Broadbent (1977: 141, see 1.3.1) had earlier termed "the major internal market of the city – the land market" and confronted as it is with the most salient expression of the contradictions and tensions of 'actually existing neoliberalism' (Jessop, 2002: 452). It is within this context that the distinct functions performed by the local state within a capitalist economy (see 1.3.1) are deployed

[2] Brenner and Theodore (2002: 349) present the concept of 'creative destruction' as "a useful means for describing the geographically uneven, socially regressive, and politically volatile trajectories of institutional/spatial change that have been crystallizing" as "the neoliberal restructuring projects of the last two decades have… profoundly reworked the institutional infrastructures upon which Fordist-Keynesian capitalism was grounded."

in a heightened form under neoliberalism as the task of managing the arising conflicts and contradictions and maintaining hegemony becomes increasingly pressing. It is a function with which supporters of the neoliberal project appear to be very familiar. Jessop (2002) invoked a 2000 World Commission report *(World Report on the Urban Future 21)* as an illustration of the way in which the global neoliberal project is naturalised in significant measure through the renewal and consolidation of neoliberal principles at the urban scale. He discerned four major implications for cities in this quest to naturalise the neoliberal project. Two of those implications pertain to the role that cities assume as "engines of economic growth" and as mechanisms for reducing the cost base of the state and fostering "human capital" in the interests of enhancing international competitiveness (Jessop, 2002: 465-6).

The other implications pertain directly to the city's role in managing the crises, conflicts and contradictions inherent to neoliberalism. It is thus that Jessop cited a "key role for cities in managing the interface between the local economy and global flows" and each of the conflicting demands and potentially explosive contradictions and challenges that arise at that interface (*ibid.,* 466). As "the major sites of civic initiative as well as of the accumulating economic and social tensions associated with neoliberal projects," (*ibid.,* 455), that interface becomes the site on which the neoliberal consensus will either be manufactured and maintained or ruptured and destroyed. Significantly, while it is envisaged that arising "problems should be resolved at the lowest level possible," that task is to be undertaken with "capacity-building and financial support from the national administration" (*ibid.,* 466). As it sets about reconciling and defusing those tensions, Jessop noted the significance that city administrations assume in the strong emphasis that the neoliberal era places on governance *via* partnerships and networks as opposed to "top-down national government." The local state accordingly becomes the agent and architect of partnerships "between the public and private sectors and between government and civil society" (*ibid.,* 466). It is thus that the central state withdraws so that the local state "can do well what it alone can do" – the forging of "good governance" structures within which the interests of "local government, civil society and the private sector" (*ibid.,* 466) can be reconciled without threat to the neoliberal order. That reconciliation is effected by 'good governance' which, in the absence of any structural analysis of the conflicts and contradictions arising within neoliberalism, is presented as the panacea for its ills.

> "This harmonization of contradictions and antagonisms is to be achieved at the urban level through a rallying of the good and the great, the movers and shakers, the rich and the poor, shanty dwellers and property capital, men and women, to the banner of 'good governance.'" (*ibid.,* 469).

This exploration of the growing neoliberalism of the local state concludes with a brief exploration of two manifestations of that neoliberalism in the urban environment: (i) the entrepreneurial city; (ii) the creative city.

1.3.3 Entrepreneurial city.

Harvey's (1989) exploration of the "shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in urban governance" and the manner in which the "mechanisms of inter-urban competition shape outcomes and general macroeconomic consequences" (*ibid.,* 3) remains the seminal text in all discussions about the entrepreneurial turn in urban governance (Ward, 2003). Harvey (1989: 4) traced the shift from the managerial approach of the 1960s to "initiatory and 'entrepreneurial' forms of action" in the 1970s and 1980s against the backdrop of the economic problems following the recession of 1973. The economic conditions that provided the impetus for the translation of the abstract intellectual concept of neoliberalism into the "state-authored restructuring projects of Thatcher and Reagan" (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 388) also provided the impetus for the forging of a powerful consensus about the positive consequences that would follow from the adoption of "an entrepreneurial stance to economic development" by cities throughout the advanced capitalist world (Harvey, 1989: 4). The declining power and control of the nation state over the global flow of capital provided an additional backdrop to the emergence of local administrations with a heightened role in the negotiation of international investment in an urban environment in which they sought "to maximise the attractiveness of the local site as a lure for capitalist development" (*ibid.,* 5). Notwithstanding the 'checkered' nature of the outcomes from this shift to entrepreneurialism, Harvey noted the generalisation of the entrepreneurial consensus across national, political and ideological boundaries thereafter.

For Harvey, entrepreneurialism is defined by three core precepts: (i) an urban governance which is constructed around the 'centrepiece' of public-private partnership (PPP); (ii) a dynamic which follows directly from the essentially speculative character of PPPs and is "dogged by all the difficulties and dangers" attaching to speculative development; (iii) a political economy of place that is more concerned with "the speculative construction of place rather than the amelioration of conditions within a particular territory" (*ibid.,* 7-8). While there are many strategies that entrepreneurial regimes may pursue, Harvey identified the essential and core dynamic of entrepreneurialism that is common to all - "some level of inter-urban competition… a force that puts clear limitations upon the power of specific projects" and that "will almost certainly operate as an 'external coercive power' over individual cities to bring them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development" (*ibid.,* 10). That 'discipline and logic of capitalist development' unfolds in the urban environment with all of the familiar contradictions and "increasing disparities in wealth and income" (*ibid.,* 12).

The literature on entrepreneurial governance continued to grow throughout the 1990s as "the notion of cities behaving in a manner akin to business" spread internationally and was increasingly accepted as the "the orthodoxy in local economic development" (Ward, 2003: 116). That literature has given rise to the concept of the 'entrepreneurial city' within which local governments have

been reoriented away "from the local provision of welfare and services to more outward-oriented policies designed to foster and encourage local growth and economic development" in a manner that has seen them forge increasingly close alliances with the private sector and assume many of the "characteristics once distinctive to businesses" (Hubbard & Hall, 1998: 2). In the process of delineating the fundamental components and characteristics of the entrepreneurial city and the new urban politics that has enabled the reconfiguration of its management and governance, Hubbard and Hall pointed to two basic defining characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism: (i) the "political prioritisation of pro-growth local economic development" strategies in which boosterist policies emerge as the cornerstone of a "'generic' entrepreneurial mode of governance;" (ii) an "associated organisational and institutional shift from urban government to urban governance" (*ibid.,* 4-6) which has blurred the boundaries between public and private sectors, undermined class-based politics and allowed "new bourgeoisie and property interests" to gain control of the polity (*ibid.,* 9). Exploration of the manner in which these two defining characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism have unfolded in the urban environment lead, in turn, into a myriad of analytically important aspects of the entrepreneurial city. They include the constitution and role of the new 'urban coalitions' that have mobilised around growth agendas, the reconstitution of cities as growth machines and the manner in which entrepreneurialism has obliged "a restructuring of the local state apparatus in the interests of the central state" (*ibid.,* 9-11). Contrary to the rhetorical representation of entrepreneurial urbanism as a product of 'less government,' it emerges as a form of urbanism predicated on "a highly interventionist form of state regulation" (Ward, 2003: 117).

In the midst of an expansive literature on urban entrepreneurialism and its repertoire of urban-development strategies, Hubbard and Hall (1998) pointed to a number of significant gaps, crucial silences and unanswered questions in this literature. This point is made with particular reference to the "paucity of studies which have hypothesised as to the likely long-term consequences of entrepreneurialism" and its "speculative mobilisation of local resources to promote growth" for those living in city areas targeted by entrepreneurial policies (*ibid.,* 12-13). In the absence of a critical scholarship on this point, "debates about the effectiveness of entrepreneurial policies" have instead been "dominated by the hollow rhetoric of politicians and policy makers" (*ibid.,* 18). In recognition of the manner in which entrepreneurial policies "inevitably tend to subjugate the overall interests of the community in the interests of capital accumulation" (*ibid.*) while carefully circumscribing any arising opposition to their implementation, Hall & Hubbard have pointed to the outstanding task of "exploring the manner in which entrepreneurial cities are experienced and understood by local populations, and the ways in which this differs from the hyperbole of the city boosters" and elite coalitions espousing such policies (*ibid.,* 21).

1.3.4 Creative city.

Peck and Tickell (2002: 385) have described the manner in which cities engaged in "a lemming-like rush towards urban entrepreneurialism" following the celebration of "a few 'turnabout entrepreneurial cities" in the 1980s (Peck, 2005: 749). As the 1990s drew to a close, the entrepreneurial city was eclipsed by the rapid rise of the 'creative city' in a manner that was reminiscent of the ascendancy of the former. The impetus this time derived not from the "pioneering property-led and partnership-facilitated downtown revitalization" that typified the entrepreneurial city but rather the writings of a regional-development academic (Richard Florida) and "a new set of extant and aspirant creative cities" that quickly rose to prominence "on the back of the work of Florida and his followers" (Peck, 2005: 749).

Florida's thesis as outlined in his international bestseller *The Rise of the Creative Class: And how it's transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life* holds that "the rise of human creativity as the defining feature of economic life" is "powering the great ongoing changes of our time" (Florida, 2004: 21). That 'great ongoing change' is nothing less than "a new kind of capitalism that is powerful and full of promise" and that is centred on "the rise of creativity as the central force in our economy" (Florida, 2003). Florida's creative-city thesis consists of a number of core tenets. "Regional economic growth is driven by the location choices of creative people – the holders of creative capital – who prefer places that are diverse, tolerant and open to new ideas" (Florida, 2004: 223). The holders of creative capital are identified as a class whose defining basis is economic and whose identity derives from "its members' roles as purveyors of creativity... the driving force of economic growth" (*ibid.,* xxvii). As such, it has become "in terms of influence... the dominant class in society" (*ibid.*) and its members "the natural – indeed the only possible – leaders of twenty-first century society" (*ibid.,* 315). It is accordingly the new favoured class around which urban policy must be oriented. In the entrepreneurial city, "the task of urban governance" was "to lure highly mobile and flexible production, financial, and consumption flows into its space" (Harvey, 1989: 11). In the creative city, "the new task for cities" consists of "ensuring that creatives are 'welcomed'" (Peck, 2005: 741). It is thus that aspirant creative cities set about tailoring the urban environment to the locational choices and preferences of the creative class (*ibid.,* 745).[3] Florida (2004: 249) identified "the 3 Ts of economic development: Technology, Talent and Tolerance" that must be in place within cities "to attract creative people, generate innovation and stimulate economic growth." Technology and talent are understood to be prerequisites while tolerance is characterised as "the crucial magnet, the supply-side foundation upon which creative clusters are built" (Peck, 2005: 746). While Florida offered a number of indices to gauge the tolerance and diversity of a given city, one of the primary indicators was located in the conspicuous presence of gay people who are described as "the canaries of the

[3] See Peck (2005: 745) for a list of the "avant-garde economic indicators" and "more concrete clues" about the types of urban environments that 'creatives' are likely to seek out (as outlined in Florida 2002).

creative economy. Where gays are will be a community... that has the underlying preconditions that attract the creative class of people" (Dreher, 2002: 2, Interview with Florida).

Beyond outlining the core components of his creative-city thesis, Florida (2004: 235) also proceeded to devise a "baseline indicator for evaluating a region's position in the Creative Economy, the Creativity Index."[4] Utilising this index and a number of others (see Florida, 2004, Chapter 14), Florida offered cities the opportunity to measure and assess their ranking in the 'Creative Economy' in what Peck (2005: 746) described as "a transparently calculated but also highly effective means of popularizing the creative city thesis." It is thus that "almost at a stroke" Florida's creative-city league tables created "a new dimension of urban competition" in which "any big city, with the right political will" could, if it really wanted to, 'turn it around' (*ibid.,* 747; see also Dreher, 2002). In holding out the creative city and the creative economy as objectives to which all large cities could aspire, Florida exempted one category of urban settlements only: "the hopeless places... the small places with huge working-class backgrounds or places that are service-class centers that aren't tourist destinations" (Dreher, 2002: 5, Interview with Florida).

Florida's creative-city thesis has attracted criticisms from both right- and left-wing critics. As with Peck (2009), this research is more concerned with the urban-policy implications of the creative-city thesis than the intricacies of a thesis which appears to rest on a very specious analysis of the factors underlying the economic development of cities and which has evidently been formulated and mobilised in the service of an élite development agenda. Of the myriad of criticisms that have been levelled against the thesis, this research selects three which are particularly pertinent to the exploration of the implications of successive urban-development policies for working-class communities in those areas of the city in which the state is continually intervening to refashion, remake and reconfigure for capital: (i) the analysis and treatment of inequality; (ii) ever-shortening policy circuits and the role of private consultancies in their transmission; (iii) the essentially neoliberal character of creative-city strategies.

The first concern relates to the impact of creative-city strategies on working-class communities and the analysis advanced of urban inequality within the creative-city thesis. Baris (2003), for example, expressed concern about the harmful effects of one of the cornerstones of the creative city, flexible labour markets, on 'non-creative workers.' In a similar vein, Peck (2005: 756) pointed to its "relative neglect of issues of intraurban inequality and working poverty" and directed attention to the questions relating to its "(generally negative) distributional consequences... which are variously denied, obfuscated or finessed out of existence" in the quest for "creative urban advantage" (*ibid.,* 767). Meanwhile, Florida's attempt to deny both the existence of any meaningful or enduring class

[4] The Creativity Index is a composite of four different indices: the Innovation Index, the High-Tech Index, the Gay Index and the Creative Class Index (Florida, 2004: 334)

conflicts or divisions in the creative city and the legitimacy of those forms of collective organisation (unions, class-aligned political parties etc.) that had previously mobilised around such conflicts and contradictions in capitalist societies (*ibid.,* 746) functions to militate further against the emergence of any critical analysis or action on these issues.

The position of those adversely affected by creative-city strategies is further impeded by the "extraordinary rate of adoption of urban creativity strategies" which Peck (2005: 767) identified as one of the "enduring legacies of entrepreneurial urbanism." It is thus that creative-city strategies, which have become "the mainstream way of articulating contemporary urban-development strategies," are characterised as "the epitome of fast urban policy" (Peck, 2009). The speed of transmission of creative-city strategies is attributed to the "now-extensive circuitry of the fast-policy regime that has been constructed around cities" and the "profound policy vacuum" that had come to characterise the neoliberal urban regime rather than any inherent value of the thesis itself (Peck, 2005: 767). Within such circuits, creative-city strategies function as carriers for a series of highly political policy agendas and urban-development practices in ever shortening policy implementation cycles (Peck, 2005, 2009) in which working-class communities are obliged continually to regroup and redirect their critical resources and faculties to a continually shifting urban-development discourse and practice.

The operation of that fast policy circuit is facilitated in turn by the urban-consultancy industry that has burgeoned around the creative-city thesis as private-sector policy intermediaries have assumed a heightened role in the transmission and management of these policy agendas. That urban consultancy may come in the form of the architect of the creative city, Richard Florida and his Catalytix organisation, or it may come more modestly *via* the plethora of urban-development consultancies that have entered the new consultancy market created by Florida's thesis. Beyond the somewhat Orwellian situation in which virtually identical consultancy products are marketed to cities as bespoke packages tailored to the distinctive needs and character or each city (Peck, 2009), considerably more serious questions arise about the precise role played by private consultancies in the generalisation and normalisation of policy agendas that have been mobilised in the service of urban élites. As parties that are increasingly securing major contracts with municipal authorities, questions also arise about the degree to which the urban policy-making process and the public consultation processes through which the policy-making process attempts to demonstrate its legitimacy are increasingly being privatised. It is in this context that "obvious difficulties" and serious concerns arise about the definition of the public interest in the transfer of such an "inalienably public" function as planning, "a system designed to regulate the private sector (developers)" (Fordham, 1990: 243-5), to urban-development consultancies that are an intrinsic part of that same private sector. (See also Molotch, 1993 for an exploration of the power exercised by these "insulated authorities" and McCann, 2001 for the influence that private-planning

consultants and their putative 'consensus-based, collaborative, and inclusionary' planning practices are having on the future development of cities.)

The final criticism to be advanced of the creative-city thesis in the present context is prompted by Florida's attempt to position the creative-city thesis "outside the neoliberal mainstream and above the political fray" (Peck, 2005: 760). In exploring the relationship between urban entrepreneurialism and neoliberalism, Peck and Tickell (2002: 394) outlined several ways in which "the parallel ascendancy of neoliberalism... [was] crucial in reinforcing, extending and normalizing ...entrepreneurial city governance." A similar correlation appears to pertain in the case of the creative city. The creative-city urban-development strategies that followed in the wake of entrepreneurialism and quickly became the "policies of choice" (Peck, 2005: 740) were couched in a distinctive rhetoric that proclaimed them to be part of "a whole new system for creating wealth" distinct from the "'old economy' solutions" typified by tax cuts, financial incentives, fiscal pump-priming, financial safety nets, tariffs etc. (Florida, 2003). Contrary to Florida's presentation of the creative city as a significant departure in urban-development policy, Peck (2005: 740-1) pointed out that creative-city strategies "also work quietly with the grain of extant 'neoliberal' development agendas, framed around interurban competition, gentrification, middle-class consumption and place-making" (see also Peck, 2009). Behind the rhetorical flourishes and the hyperbole in which it is couched, the creative-city thesis translates into tangible urban-development practices, which draw upon a "narrow repertoire of newly legitimized regeneration strategies" (Peck, 2005: 752). As a urban-development strategy that is "predicated on, and designed for, this neoliberalized terrain" (*ibid.,* 764), it is suggested that rather than unleashing a new creative economic order in which the ownership of the means of production is vested in the creative faculties of all persons (Florida, 2004) creative-city strategies insinuate the logic and contradiction of the neoliberal project progressively more deeply into the urban environment.

1.4 Urban Development Projects and Governance.

In exploring the core components of the neoliberal agenda as it has been manifest in the urban arena, critics have pointed to the persistence of a narrow and clichéd repertoire of established regeneration strategies upon which the different phases of neoliberalism have drawn to date (Peck, 2005). Notwithstanding the elaborate rhetorical embellishments in which individual strategies and interventions in the urban environment have been couched, property-based strategies continue to occupy a central position in the policy armoury of local states. Local authorities have continued to rely heavily on large-scale urban-development projects (UDPs) "as part of an effort to re-enforce the competitive position of their metropolitan economies in a context of rapidly changing local, national and global competitive conditions" (Swyngedouw *et al.,* 2002: 548). This chapter accordingly turns to (i) the significance of UDPs and the facet of urban development at issue in this

research, urban-renewal and regeneration programmes and (ii) the governance mechanisms through which these projects have been mediated in the urban environment.

1.4.1 UDPs and their larger significance.

The facet of the neoliberal agenda selected for attention in this research is the UDP, "one of the most visible and ubiquitous urban revitalization strategies pursued by city elites in search of economic growth and competitiveness" (Swyngedouw *et al.,* 2002: 551). UDPs in their various manifestations make a powerful statement in the built environment and it is often the desirability or otherwise of that physical development that preoccupies public commentary, whether mobilised in support of or in opposition to a given urban development. For critical urban geographers, UDPs assume a considerably larger significance.

On foot of a wide-ranging study of thirteen large-scale UDPs in European countries, Swyngedouw *et al.* (2002: 552) concluded that the commonalities evident in these projects shared "a new approach in urban policy that strongly expresses, at the scale of the urban, the main ingredients of a New Economic Policy." That new economic policy was "the policy platform of conservative liberalism" which had always maintained "a very special and intimate relationship with state intervention" (*ibid.*). Behind the rhetoric of the liberal and market-led economy, "the myth of the absent state" (*ibid.,* 556) is shown to be just that - a myth that is dispelled by the outspoken, decisive and risk-taking role that the state assumes in the new urban policy environment. While UDPs may continue to be presented as stand-alone individual projects, it is clear that their significance should be understood to have transcended project-specific boundaries to assume the status of *de facto* urban policy (Swyngedouw, 2006) with clear and discernable policy objectives, most notably the revalorisation of prime urban land (Swyngedouw *et al.,* 2002: 556-7). UDPs are not to be understood as the mere product or consequence of political and economic changes taking place elsewhere but rather as agencies or catalysts for urban and political change in and of themselves (*ibid.*, 551). In an era in which political transformations have endeavoured to "align local dynamics with the... requirements of a deregulated international economic environment, whose political elites were vigorously pursuing a neoliberal dogma" (*ibid.,* 550), UDPs have functioned to actively produce and embody 'new political and economic regimes' at a variety of scales from the local to the global (*ibid.,* 551). As such, UDPs provide a lens within which it is possible to observe the interplay between a variety of geographical scales as one becomes inscribed in the other (Swyngedouw, 2006). The global becomes 'localized' as the local becomes 'globalized' (Swyngedouw *et al.,* 2002:).

In this manner, UDPs function as the bearers of a new liberal order in a number of ways: the enabling of a vision of the city as 'an élite playing field,' while simultaneously disabling other visions; the movement from 'a social to a spatial definition of development' that targets places

rather than people; the accompanying diversion of public monies from universal programmes to place-specific projects; the emergence of new systems of urban governance conducive to more 'centralized and more autocratic management.' Further, as entities whose viability is dependent on the production of increased urban rents, UDPs are characterised as "inherently speculative and hence highly risky" ventures that disrupt the physical, social and economic structure and functions of target areas in a manner that results in a fragmented, polarised 'patchwork city' with "increasingly sharp boundaries" (Swyngedouw *et al.,* 2002: 567-576). In this newly neoliberal environment, UDPs alter the political, social and economic power relations in the city in a number of important ways. They function as "a vehicle to establish exceptionality measures in planning and policy procedures" in a manner that results in a reorientation of urban interventions around "élite driven priorities" (*ibid.,* 547). Meanwhile local-democratic participation mechanisms are applied in a manner that results in "a new choreography of élite power" in a situation in which the core mechanisms and processes at the heart of UDPs (real estate markets and the reorientation of public spending away from social objectives) are functioning to "accentuate socioeconomic polarization" (*ibid.,* 547-8). In a radically altered urban-policy environment operating in accordance with different priorities and hierarchies, it follows almost as a natural corollary that the legitimation requirements attaching to UDPs will be dependent on the emergence of new and socially innovative forms of governance (see 1.4.3).

As stated at the outset, UDPs make a powerful statement in the built environment. However, their significance is in no way confined to their physical manifestation. They are categorically not to be mistaken or dismissed as stand-alone place-specific interventions operating in a political, economic or ideological vacuum that are matters for local governments and local populations only. Their larger significance is captured in Swyngedouw *et al.*'s (2003: 9) characterisation of UDPs as

> " 'grains of sand,' albeit of a particularly rough-edged variety, that hold the world's complex socio-spatial and political-economic configuration in their crystalline structure."

There is a similar point to be made about the larger significance that might attach to any emerging opposition to these neoliberal interventions in the urban realm. Peck and Tickell (2007: 46) noted that neoliberal contestations to date have generally been directed at the consequences of neoliberal policies as opposed to their ideological foundations, a situation upon which the hegemony of the neoliberal order depends. In the same manner that universal processes resonate in the local and particular, it is suggested that particular demands and opposition directed against local manifestations of those processes could also lead to a "politicization of particulars" and come "to function as a metaphoric condensation of the global opposition" against the larger global order (Žižek, 1999a, quoted in Swyngedouw 2007: 23-4).

1.4.2 Urban renewal and regeneration as cases in point.

The form of urban development (or UDP) selected for investigation in this research is urban renewal (and regeneration), a form of state intervention that is described in the literature on UDPs as a "mediated objective" that creates the "necessary precondition for economic regeneration" (Swyngedouw *et al.,* 2002: 533). Urban renewal has been construed in a number of different ways by critical geographers following the series of dramatic urban-based popular mobilisations that followed its introduction in European, American and Australian cities in the 1960s and 1970 (see Chapter 2). This section directs attention to two critical facets of the literature on urban renewal, the significance of the language in which these state interventions have been couched and the real processes and agendas underlying that rhetoric.

- ***The rhetoric of renewal and regeneration.***

The rhetoric in which this major state intervention in the urban realm has been couched has attracted considerable critical attention. Returning to the earliest decades of urban renewal in the United States, Smith (1996: xiii-xvii), for example, looked at the role that the discourse of urban renewal played in the transformation of the central theme of anti-urbanism in US culture. The discourse is associated strongly with the way in which "a vision of the urban frontier" replaced the "the imagery of urban wilderness" and converted the inner city into a frontier - a gentrification frontier, which would be "advanced not so much through the actions of intrepid pioneers as through the actions of collective owners of capital" (*ibid.,* xvi). That language is also, of course, replete with strong inferences about the standing that should be afforded urban working-class communities resident behind those frontiers. In a similar manner, Weber (2002: 520) explored the significance that discourses of urban renewal and urban blight have assumed among those mechanisms that states "have developed... to make the built environment more flexible and responsive to the investment criteria of real-estate capital." It is apparent that these discourses have played a key role in the depoliticisation and legitimation (Habermas, 1976) of what might otherwise have been perceived as highly political and contentious urban-development agendas.

In the decades since the urban-renewal agenda began to attain momentum, a number of different terms have been used to describe these forms of state intervention in the urban property market. As a term, 'renewal' appears to be have been largely replaced in recent years by 'regeneration.' While practitioners use the terms 'renewal' and 'regeneration' interchangeably, there appears to be some confusion in the literature on this point. Lovering (2007: 344), for example, considered whether "'regeneration' is merely the latest in a series of words beginning with R that can be used to describe (British) urban strategy over the past half century: Reconstruction in the 1950s was followed by Revitalization in the 1960s, Renewal in the 1970s, and Redevelopment in the 1980s. The implication that urban-regeneration is the latest name for whatever governments do to be seen to tackle their urban problems may capture an important truth." For Smith (2002: 438),

'regeneration' was not just another 'R'- but represented "large-scale multi-faceted urban regeneration plans, far outstripping 1960s urban renewal." The language of urban regeneration as it has been deployed since the 1990s "bespeaks, among other things, a generalization of gentrification in the urban landscape" (*ibid.,* 438-9) in an era in which gentrification has assumed the status of 'global urban strategy.' Characterised as "a central goal" of British urban policy, its agents are now "governmental, corporate or corporate-governmental partnerships" (*ibid.,* 439). Smith identified "a number of striking aspects of these new 'urban regeneration' agendas," namely, their scale, their geographical focus, their concern with social balance (which is interpreted as a euphemism for "a major recolonization by the middle and upper-middle classes... of the political and cultural economies as well as the geographies of the largest cities") and "the question of the anodyne language of 'regeneration' in itself" (*ibid.,* 444-5). It is the latter that is of particular interest in the present context.

Smith attended in the first instance to the biomedical and ecological connotations of the term 'regeneration' and the way in which those connotations are used to disguise and erase "the quintessentially social origins and goals of urban change and... the politics of winners and losers out of which such policies emerge" (*ibid.,* 445). He then proceeded to outline the reasoning behind the decision to replace the language of gentrification with that of regeneration. That reasoning is alarmingly simple.

> "The language of regeneration sugarcoats gentrification. Precisely because the language of gentrification tells the truth about the class shift involved in 'regeneration' of the city, it has become a dirty word to developers, politicians, and financiers." (Smith, 2002: 445)

As such, the encoding of this most political and contentious of urban-development processes in the deceptive and insipid language of 'regeneration' is characterised as both a victory of the language itself in "anesthetizing our critical understanding of gentrification in Europe" and, by extension, "a considerable ideological victory for neoliberal visions of the city" (*ibid.,* 446).

- ***The intent behind the rhetoric.***

It is perhaps because of the extent of that linguistic and ideological victory in the public realm, that critical urban geographers have maintained an unrelenting and critical focus on the real intentions and core agendas obscured by the relentlessly positive, powerful and apparently progressive rhetoric of urban renewal and urban regeneration. For Weber (2002: 519), urban renewal remains just another 'spatial policy' that depends on "discursive practices that stigmatize properties targeted for demolition and redevelopment." The state is centrally implicated in this 'discursive constitution, coding and ordering' of "the meaning of place through policies and practices that are often advantageous to capital" (Weber, 2002: 524). The local state in particular is posited as playing a significant role in this "arbitrary and inconsistent process" of "finding value or a lack thereof in the built environment" (*ibid.*). Similarly, for Smith (2002: 446), urban regeneration is to be understood

as little more than an anodyne rhetorical front for a new wave of gentrification "planned and financed on an unprecedented scale."

- ***The aspect of urban renewal at issue.***

In confronting the state's urban-renewal and regeneration programmes, urban working-class communities confront a core component of neoliberal urbanism that is encoded in a pleasing and conciliatory rhetoric. It might more aptly be characterised as 'hard policy, soft rhetoric.' This research is concerned with the significance of the urban-renewal and regeneration programmes that have come to dominate urban policy in the neoliberal era. It is particularly concerned with the nature of the engagements that ensue between the state and working-class communities resident in areas targeted for renewal and regeneration. There are accordingly two state interventions at issue in this research, the first decisive state intervention in the urban realm to incentivise urban and property development undertaken without reference to the impact which that intervention was likely to have on the resident population; the second and more nuanced state intervention undertaken in the interests of managing and assuaging any emerging opposition or impediments to the implementation of those renewal and regeneration programmes. This research is particularly interested in the manner in which states have sought to enjoin potentially antagonistic parties to the implementation of these programmes. It is thus that this chapter turns finally to the advent of a markedly different era in the government of urban renewal and development that is more accurately characterised as an era of governance.

1.4.3 Governance of UDPs.

The literature on neoliberalism, urban entrepreneurialism and the creative-city thesis abounds with references to the significance of the urban-governance regimes that emerged in tandem with the unfolding, changing character and mutations of the neoliberal agenda in the urban realm (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002, 2007; Ward, 2003 etc.). The emergence of new urban-governance regimes is particularly associated with the state's attempt to grapple with "previous market, state, and governance failures partly (or even largely) initiated by neoliberalism itself" in the 1990s that obliged it to develop responses "outside the narrow repertoire of deregulation and marketization" in the interests of safeguarding the neoliberal project (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 390). While noting the broader literature that has emerged on the subject of governance (see, for example, Stoker's (1998) delineation of the manner in which 'governance' differs from 'government,' the different theoretical treatments of the concept and the elaboration of a theory of governance based on five propositions), this discussion returns to the work of Swyngedouw, whose writings on the significance of UDPs extended to a detailed deliberation on the forms of urban governance that have evolved around UDPs. This chapter attends to two aspects of that discussion: governance-beyond-the state and the post-political condition.

- ***Governance-beyond-the-state.***

For Swyngedouw *et al.* (2002: 542) "UDPs reflect and embody a series of processes that are associated with changing spatial scales of governance... [reflecting] a shifting geometry of power in the governing of urbanization." The term 'governance-beyond-the-state' is invoked to refer to "the emergence, proliferation and active encouragement... of institutional arrangements of 'governing' which give a much greater role in policy-making, administration and implementation to private economic actors on the one hand and to parts of civil society on the other in self-managing what until recently was provided or organised by the national or local state" (Swyngedouw, 2005: 2). While government typically operates in a "hierarchical and top-down" manner, governance arrangements are predicated on horizontal and networked institutional arrangements comprised of participants with a 'stake' in the issues or developments under consideration (*ibid.,* 4-5). These arrangements are lauded for their "promise of greater democracy and grass roots empowerment" (*ibid.,* 2). The fact that individual 'stakeholders' may enter these structures with conflicting and even contradictory interests does not appear to pose any impediment to the functioning of these "idealised-normative model[s] of horizontal, non-exclusive and participatory (stake)holder-based governance" (*ibid.,* 5). This idealised model is instead proffered as a mechanism through which all arising conflicts and contradictions can be reconciled through a process of negotiation, cooperation and "mutually satisfactory and binding" decision-making procedures (Schmitter, 2002, quoted in Swyngedouw, 2005: 4).

Swyngedouw took issue with many of the spoken and unspoken promises and premises upon which these governance-beyond-the-state arrangements are predicated. The key criticism in the present context pertains to the contradiction between their stated objective of engendering greater democracy and citizen empowerment and the frequently undemocratic and autocratic ends to which these structures work – governance structures and arrangements that Swyngedouw identified as being closely aligned with the neoliberal establishment (*ibid.*, 3). For Swyngedouw, the state remains deeply implicated in the establishment of these governance-beyond-the-state arrangements. The shift from government to governance does not represent any diminishment in the role or authority of the state but merely "a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government" (Lemke, 2002, quoted in Swyngedouw, 2005: 7). Civil society organisations and actors are certainly being afforded greater opportunities to participate in the business of governance, but the ends to which their participation is being solicited are not clear. Citizen participation can, for example, inadvertently be mobilised in the service of "an imposed and authoritarian neo-liberalism" (Swyngedouw, 2005: 8). Meanwhile, the "consolidation of new technologies of government" and the "profound restructuring of the parameters of political democracy" effected by the shift from government to governance has resulted in a "substantial democratic deficit" (*ibid.,* 3). That democratic deficit results in significant measure from network-based forms of governance operating without codification or clearly specified parameters or power.

(See Swyngedouw (2005: 9-11) for the serious concerns that arise in relation to: the 'entitlement to participate;' representative structures and credentials; 'mechanisms and lineages of accountability;' 'mechanisms of legitimation of policies and/or regulatory interventions;' shifting 'geometries of power' and 'orders of governance.')

It was Swyngedouw's contention finally that the governance-beyond-the-state arrangements, which have been lauded for their innovation, inclusiveness, democratisation and empowerment, may in actuality be functioning to eclipse their essential role in the consolidation of the neoliberal order.

> "The socially innovative figures of horizontally organised stakeholder arrangements of governance that appear to empower civil society in the face of an apparently overcrowded and 'excessive' state, may, in the end, prove to be the Trojan Horse that diffuses and consolidates the 'market' as the principal institutional form" (*ibid.,* 13).

- ***Postscript, the post-political condition.***

The consolidation of that neoliberal order and the apparently successful management of arising threats to its hegemony, at least in the public sphere, have prompted concerns about the state of politics. In a later paper on sustainability and environmental politics, Swyngedouw (2007: 14) argued that that the manner in which environmental issues are 'framed politically' contributes to "the making and consolidation of a postpolitical and postdemocratic condition, one that actually forecloses the possibility of a real politics of the environment." His concerns about the foreclosure of a real politics in environmental politics find an immediate resonance in the urban environment where the neoliberal agenda continues to engender contradictory outcomes while remaining untroubled by any significant political articulation of that contradiction or any political threat to its hegemony. It is in this context that this review turns in closing to Swyngedouw's discussion of the concept of 'post politics' and the manner in which it contrasts with a 'genuine' politics.

"Postpolitics rejects ideological divisions and the explicit universalization of particular political demands" and rests on a consensus that has been "built around the inevitability of neoliberal capitalism as an economic system" (*ibid.,* 24). It reduces ideological conflicts to matters that can be resolved *via* collaboration, negotiation and compromise in "the guise of a more or less universal consensus" (Žižek, 1999a, quoted in Swyngedouw, 2007: 24). It reduces politics to a matter of administration and management. In contrast, a 'genuine politics' recognises that conflict and "the unconditional primacy of the inherent antagonism" (Žižek, 1999b, quoted in Swyngedouw, 2007: 25) are integral constitutive elements of 'the political.' For Swyngedouw (2007: 25), "a true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or no place." Predicated as it is on a neoliberal consensus that neither recognises nor concedes any conflict or fundamental contradiction, the postpolitical order provides no such place. Under this postpolitical constitution, which Swyngedouw earlier defined as "new forms of autocratic governance-beyond-the-state" (see Swyngedouw, 2005), anyone can speak, anything can be discussed "everything is

politicised... but only in a non-committal way and as a non-conflict... pluralism becomes an end in itself, real politics is pushed to other arenas" (Diken & Laustsen, 2004, quoted in Swyngedouw, 2007: 25).

1.5 Nature of the state's interest in the problems of the inner city.

1.5.1 Nature of state's interest in urban working-class communities.

This chapter has attended in some detail to the role of the state and, in particular, the neoliberal state in the urban environment. It has explored the larger significance of the facet of the neoliberal agenda selected for investigation - the urban-development project and the body of critical literature that has amassed around the move from government to governance. In so doing, this chapter has endeavoured to sketch the essential character of what might be termed a dual neoliberal offensive by the state: hard concrete interventions in the urban realm which are transforming the social, economic and physical character of target areas on the one hand and soft governance interventions which are seeking to draw working-class communities into increasingly conciliatory, institutional arrangements with the state on the other hand. Prior to moving to an exploration of the various ways in which working-class communities have responded to this dual offensive, this chapter directs its attention to one of the core questions underlying this research, the essential nature of the state's interest in urban working-class communities when divested of the conciliatory and progressive rhetoric in which its interventions have increasingly been couched.

The research has elected to adopt a political economy framework and accordingly returns to the understanding of the state's essential interest in urban working-class communities evinced within that framework, namely as a potential threat to the interests of capital. It notes in particular the treatment of the state's relationship with inner-city communities as it had been explored by critical theorists and researchers in the decades immediately prior to the evolution of the era of governance, which has blurred the demarcation lines between state and community and public and private sectors considerably (Hubbard & Hall, 1998). It also notes the nature of the threat vested in continuing disaffection and social unrest in the inner city as explored in the writings of critical theorists in the 1970s (Castells, 1977a; Cockburn, 1977; British CDPs, 1977) and the manner in which the state gradually expanded its role in various different guises into a range of areas within urban working-class communities. If the working-class is ultimately a class which must be fashioned into "an appropriate relation to capital" (Cockburn, 1977: 56) and, in turn, to the state as it intervenes to create the conditions favourable to capital accumulation, attention turns to the manner in which that relationship is effected, partly by coercion but more typically "by ideology – by inculcating a view of the world to bring about consent" (*ibid.*, 57; see also Gramsci 1971).

1.5.2 Participation and partnership as a means of restructuring relations.

It is this context that the research turns to the qualitative shift which has taken place in the relationship between the state and working-class communities following on the participation and partnership initiatives which the state has introduced in tandem with its increasingly neoliberal interventions in the urban realm, for the latter appear to have effected a significant restructuring of the relationship between the two parties.

The expansion of the state's role within working-class communities in this manner has attracted considerable attention internationally. In the UK, for example, Jones (2003: 582) noted the 'meteoric rise' of participation, "premised upon the supposed benefits brought by multisectoral participation to projects." He also noted "the paradox... that even as it reaches its very zenith, participation comes under heightened criticism from a growing chorus of observers" (*ibid.*). Similarly, Fyfe (2005: 537) described "a remarkable revival of interest in the role of the third sector as a possible 'panacea' for the problems facing neo-liberalising states" and noted the manner in which the UK government had effectively mainstreamed the third sector into public policy. In noting the "substantial growth of government interest in partnership working" Craig *et al.* (2004: 221) took cognisance of both the opportunities which such initiatives represented for voluntary and community organisations and the resultant dilemma as they strove to manage the accompanying threat to their independence and autonomy (see also Taylor, 2007).

The prevalence and ascendancy of this new mode of participatory governance has also received considerable attention in countries as far afield as New Zealand and South Africa. In the case of New Zealand, a country "internationally recognized as an exemplary case of neoliberalism and market-oriented restructuring," collaboration and partnership have come to be identified at "the highest possible level 'as our normal way of doing business'... particularly in the area of social policy" (Larner & Butler, 2007: 74-6; see also Larner & Craig, 2005). Meanwhile in South Africa in the wake of the transition to democracy and the liberalisation of the economy, Habib (2008: 59) described the "dominant model of public governance... [as] one that emphasises institutional participation and collegiate relations between state and civil institutions." It is interesting in this context to note the manner in which critiques advanced of participatory governance in political and geographic contexts as distinct as the South African resonate directly with the Irish experience of participation and partnership within the state's structures (see Chapter 4).

While different theorists continue to deliberate on the opportunities and threats presented by these new participatory structures, all appear to be in agreement in calling for close critical attention to their precise significance, particularly as they relate to major interventions it the urban realm.

> "Given the current ascendancy of 'participation' and the rapid diffusion of participatory and partnership methods, critical perspectives are therefore extremely timely and correct in flagging-up the insidious effects of participation within regeneration programmes" (Jones, 2003: 582-3).

The chapter immediately following turns to the manner in which the state's interventions and overtures have been received by working-class communities resident in those areas which the state is intent on remaking for capital.

CHAPTER 2

Participation, protest and quiescence.

2.1 The specific type of state-community engagements at issue.

2.1.1 Urban renewal and regeneration.

Recent decades have witnessed an increasing intensity of state incursions into working-class communities as the state has sought to engage working-class communities on an increasingly broad range of issues. Chapter 1 closed by noting the growing proliferation of participatory and partnership initiatives that the state has introduced in tandem with its increasingly neoliberal interventions in the urban realm. Those neoliberal interventions have been received in different ways and provoked a variety of responses among working-class communities in the targeted areas. Communities have also mobilised around the broad range of issues and problems that arise from the history of state neglect which has traditionally blighted inner-city areas, the impact of state policies that have been judged to be injurious to their wellbeing and, more recently, the withdrawal of state-funding and community projects and services from areas in which such funding and services were of critical importance to the social and economic wellbeing of communities. Of the variety of issues on which the state has sought to engage working-class communities and around which communities have mobilised, this research is specifically interested in engagements between the state and inner-city communities as they relate to interventions in the urban built environment, for example land-use, planning, housing, urban renewal and urban regeneration. It is particularly interested in those occasions on which the state intervenes on behalf of property capital (Larmarche, 1976) to militate against the interests of working-class communities. The research's interest accordingly lies in the nature of the engagement that has been afforded working-class communities in the implementation of these policies and the manner in which host communities have responded to the state's interventions in the urban realm, whether with a willingness to participate, a predilection to oppose or apparent inaction and indifference. This chapter explores the treatment of each of these modes of engagement and non-engagement within an academic context which stretches from the late 1960s to the present. While it is primarily interested in these three broad modes of engagement as they pertain to urban renewal and regeneration initiatives, it also expands its focus on occasion to consider the insights generated by the broader literature on working-class engagements with the state.

This exploration will be prefaced by a brief consideration of the significance which various theorists have ascribed to the engagements and struggles that have followed from the state's interventions in the urban realm. For Castells (1977b), the significance of such engagements and struggles arose from the fact that they were taking place in the realm of 'collective consumption' as opposed to the realm of production within which analyses of class conflict had traditionally been

concentrated. It was his contention that state intervention in crucial aspects of collective consumption would result in "the displacement of economic contradictions toward the sphere of consumption" and politicise "the entire urban perspective" (*ibid.,* 64). Invoking Habermas (1976), Saunders (1979: 109) similarly pointed to the manner in which state intervention would lead to "the emergence of a visible agent which may be held responsible for economic effects which people previously accepted as almost natural and inevitable." The emergence of such a scenario was predicated on the establishment of a clear relationship of causation between the state's intervention and any ensuing disparity or inequality of outcomes. In the event that this relationship became explicit, Harvey (1973) predicted that the degree of inequality and injustice following on mechanisms governing any consequent redistribution of income would lead to a period of intense conflict within the urban system. Badcock (1984: 269), meanwhile, reserved the term 'urban struggle' for those occasions on which different and competing property fractions in the urban land and housing market were coming into conflict as such 'urban struggles' were to be distinguished from other forms of political struggle that did not have any urban component. Within Badcock's schema, the working-class communities, which are also at issue in the current research, would be located among the 'non-owing tenants' and 'owner-occupiers/mortgagees' domestic property fractions confronting commercial property fractions and state corporations and instrumentalities in the urban realm *(ibid.,* 271-2). Not all critics foresaw the confrontation between the state and the urban working-class communities in such confrontational or potentially explosive terms. Castells (1977a) was aware that politicisation might lead to conflict or might equally provide an opportunity for dissenting voices to be redirected into non-threatening participation structures. Those cases where conflict did ensue might also function as an opportunity for the state to defuse contentious situations and pre-empt the emergence of "greater and more fundamental conflicts" (Cockburn, 1977: 117). In this manner conflict might be "safely contained... moderated and converted... into a style of governance" (*ibid.*).

Irrespective of the different political ends to which that engagement or confrontation might lead, the spectacle of urban working-class communities becoming involved with the state's interventions in the built environment assumed an undeniable significance for the state and the property-development sector. In electing to engage with the state's major interventions in the urban realm, inner-city communities were venturing out of the social-service and social-care issues within which those communities had traditionally confined their engagements with the state, to engage with other issues and policies impacting most fundamentally on the lives of disadvantaged working-class communities, namely land-use issues, planning and housing (Cockburn, 1977). In so doing, community groups were stepping onto the terrain of property capital where their presence posed a potential threat to the interests of the property-development sector and the state's actions on behalf of the sector. It is in this context that the significance of engagements between the state and working-class communities should be understood.

2.1.2 Significance of working-class communities in urban renewal and regeneration.

As this research is essentially concerned with the conflict of interests which ensue when the propertied fix their sights on the land of the propertyless, it also takes the opportunity to attend to the precise significance which working-class communities may assume for the state and the private sector in the implementation of urban-renewal plans. A working-class community may, for example, be viewed as a sympathetic and supportive community which welcomes the advent of state-engendered renewal programmes and the return of private capital to inner-city areas because of anticipated accompanying benefits. Conversely, it may be construed as an antagonistic party with the potential to delay, disrupt and obstruct the plans of the state and private capital as the area is 'remade for capital.' Gentrification studies point to the obstacle that a resident working-class community may pose to realising the market value of public lands in lucrative locations (Smith, 1996). Chapter 1 has already alluded to the inferences that can be drawn from the language of gentrification about the significance (or lack thereof) which should be afforded urban working-class communities in the "back-to-the city movement by capital" (Smith, 1996: 70). That point is elaborated at some length by Smith who describes how "gentrification portends a class conquest of the city" in which "the new urban pioneers seek to scrub the city clean of its working-class geography and history" (*ibid.*, 26-7). In those situations where working-class communities prove particularly militant or persistent, their continuing presence can be used to confer an exciting edginess or "exquisite ambience" on gentrifying areas (*ibid.*). Smith is, however, in no doubt about the fact that "the effort to recolonize the city involves systematic eviction" (*ibid.*) and that gentrification "portends a displacement of working-class residents from urban centers" (Smith, 2002: 440).

Urban-renewal and regeneration programmes are premised on very significant state interventions in the urban realm. As Habermas (1976: 36) predicated, substantial state interventions of this manner in the market creates "an increased need for legitimation." Those working-class communities resident in designated areas have clearly become an entity to be engaged if the legitimacy of the state's intervention is to be established. It is interesting in this context to note the threat posed by an excessively apathetic or quiescent population. "Too much apathy and quietism – and the system appears a charade losing its ability to legitimate the state in people's eyes" (Cockburn, 1977: 118). While the public and private interests driving renewal and regeneration processes may be clear about the significance that resident working-class communities assume in the successful prosecution of their plans, they still appear to assume something of an unknown quality in these public-private processes (see Chapter 4 for further discussion of this point). Notwithstanding the differing significances that resident working-class communities assume in the implementation of renewal and regeneration projects, they also appear to be an entity whose experience has not been judged worthy of sustained critical attention. Hubbard and Hall (1998) have pointed to the limited engagement that researchers have shown with the experience and analysis of those targeted by the

state's entrepreneurial and neoliberal polices. Expressing regret about the 'dwindling' critical perspectives on gentrification, Slater (2006: 743) similarly notes "that there is next to nothing published on the experiences of non-gentrifying groups living in the neighbourhoods into which the much-researched cosmopolitan middle classes are arriving en masse." In the academic literature, they remain "backstage, both perennial understudies and perennially understudied" (*ibid.,* 744).

It is important in this context to note that the Irish academic literature does not stand accused of such an omission, as is apparent from Punch's (2000, 2001) research on grassroots urban struggles in Dublin's Docklands; Brudell *et al.'s* (2004) assessment of the community's experience of urban planning and regeneration in Dublin's Liberties; MacLaran *et al.'s* (2007) exploration of the various participatory planning and regeneration structures in which disadvantaged communities were invited to participate in Dublin and Waterford; Kelly's (2007a, 2008) analysis of the impact of gentrification on working-class communities in Dublin's Liberties; Attuyer's (2010) examination of the ability of indigenous communities to change the outcomes of regeneration in Dublin's Historic Area Rejuvenation Project.

2.1.3 The dilemma confronting communities in urban regeneration.

Notwithstanding the elision of the experiences and perspectives of working-class communities from much of the official literature, communities have been obliged to engage with the immediacies of the state's renewal and regeneration processes on a continuing basis. As the state expanded its role and its infrastructure into the lives of inner-city communities and as it unrolled policies and plans which many perceived to be detrimental to the long-term interest of working-class communities, Saunders (1979: 131) pointed to "the fundamental dilemma... which confronts all those engaged in urban protest: whether to pursue a limited strategy of reformism within the system, or to pose a direct challenge from outside it." Darke and Walker (1977: 80) described it as the "classic political dilemma" in which radical pressure groups find themselves.

> "To maintain views which are unpopular with power holders in local government ensures that members and officers will largely disregard the group, while a moderation of views to help bring the voluntary group's agenda forward for debate with the local authority may mean relinquishing some basic principles of beliefs" *(ibid.).*

In the case of renewal and regeneration programmes, those stakes may include the very land and housing in which the future of working-class communities is vested.

The ensuing deliberation upon participation, protest and quiescence among urban working-class communities will attend to the significance that each of these different modes of engagement and non-engagement assume for working-class communities in the face of this dilemma.

2.2 Participation: engaging with the state; the scope and manner of participation.

This chapter turns to the first of the three broad modes of engagement at issue in this research, the first and most evident course of action available to communities in the face of the state's overtures, that of participation. Derived from the Latin, 'participation' is defined very simply as a "taking part" (Allen, 1990: 867). However, its clear and innocuous dictionary definition is eclipsed by the many conflicting meanings, "understated euphemisms and exacerbated rhetoric" (Arnstein, 1969: 216) attached to the term as it has been used to describe the predominant means through which working-class communities have been allowed to engage with major state interventions in the urban realm. While a cultivated ambivalence about what precisely is denoted by the term "may have helped the promise of public involvement gain purchase," Cornwall (2008: 269) has stated that it is now time for "clarity through specificity."

> "The widespread adoption of the language of participation across a spectrum of institutions, from radical NGOs to local government bodies to the World Bank, raises questions about what exactly this much-used buzzword has come to mean. An infinitely malleable concept, 'participation' can be used to evoke – and to signify – almost anything that involves people. As such, it can easily be reframed to meet almost any demand made of it. So many claims to 'doing participation' are now made that the term has become mired in a morass of competing referents" (*ibid.*).

The confusion that arises from the different understandings of the terms is exacerbated by the manner in which it has been invoked to signify a variety of distinct processes and modes of engagement in an urban landscape in which the state is endeavouring to enjoin radically different parties with distinct and frequently conflicting interests to the implementation of its urban-development polices. Participation has, in many ways, come to constitute the terrain on which contested understandings of the standing and entitlement of working-class communities within large-scale urban-development policies, plans and projects have been articulated and fought out. In such cases, the original meaning of the term has been eclipsed by the plethora of different processes and practices in which working-class communities have been invited to participate by the state. This section takes the opportunity to consider the evolution and proliferation of collaborative and communicative planning structures which accompanied the move from government to governance. It explores the different understandings of participation evident in the typologies of participation as they have been formulated during the decades since participatory initiatives first came into vogue. It also attends to a number of quite distinct processes that fall under the rubric of participation, with particular attention to the literature on social partnership and active citizenship. This section closes by considering the degree to which the plethora of participatory initiatives represent a victory for campaigning working-class communities and the degree to which participatory initiatives may have displaced other and more combative modes of engagement.

2.2.1 Participation as collaboration and consensus building.

The broad movement and institutional changes that have taken place in the movement from government to governance find immediate expression in the urban planning and regeneration arena

where new participatory structures and initiatives have come to constitute one of the core components of the new urban governance. For critical sociologists such as Jessop (2002: 454), this shift to "partnership-based forms of governance" may be understood as a reflection of "the neoliberal belief in the probability, if not inevitability of state failure and/or the need to involve relevant shareholders in supply-side policies." Collaborative planning practices and structures may be considered to be a manifestation *par excellence* of the new governance arrangements which have come to characterise the rollout stage of neoliberal urbanism. For Healy (1997: 34) and other advocates of collaborative and communicative planning, these new forms of planning governance provided a means of redressing the aspatial economics underpinning neoliberalism by reasserting the importance of space, "co-ordinating through 'thinking together' and focusing on long-term impacts on places and people." Some have pointed to the new opportunities for community input afforded by the changing operations of planning under neoliberalism, asserting planning's potential co-ordinating functions and stressing its interactive role with respect to private-sector interests, public interventions and local communities (see Stoker & Young, 1993; Hall & Hubbard, 1998). Others such as McGuirk and MacLaran (2001: 439) were a little more skeptical. They acknowledged that such "a shift in operations may seem to offer the opportunity to become more closely involved in key decision-making processes" but cautioned that "this potential may be rather more apparent than real." In a similar manner Brand and Gaffikin (2007: 283) pointed to the way in which collaborative planning "as an inclusive dialogic approach to shaping social space appears to accord with certain features of contemporary society... [including] the increasing hegemony of neoliberalism." Following an "intellectual wave [which had] been building up in the planning theory field since the 1970s" (Healey, 1997: 29), the growing currency that collaborative planning has enjoyed since the 1990s has generated much discussion among both advocates and critics. Notwithstanding the contrary assessments that have been advanced of these new planning practices, there is little disagreement about the hegemonic status that collaborative planning has now assumed (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998).

Healey has been identified as the most prominent author in the refinement and popularisation of the concept of collaborative planning in a European context (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007). While Healey had already deliberated at length on the emerging features of 'an inter-communicative planning' (see Healey, 1992: 154-6 for a summary of this new direction in planning in ten propositions), the publication of *Collaborative Planning* in 1997 is widely regarded as her major statement of the subject. Healey (1997: 310) took as her starting point "the challenge of how to deal with matters of collective concern which arise from the problems and opportunities of the co-existence in shared spaces of relational groups, or cultural communities, often with very different priorities and ways of looking at things." The concept of 'stakeholder' was offered as a useful means of capturing the diversity to be found among these 'cultural communities.' Importantly, the 'stakeholder' term was employed to cover a wide range of interests whose stake in the area or strategy under consideration

may be territorial or functional.[5] Healey made the argument for forging relational links between these cultural communities and diverse stakeholders across a number of different barriers (cultural, organisational, power-differential) and "cultivating the capacity for collaborative, multi-cultural communication and learning" in the interests of enabling an inclusionary approach to planning (*ibid.,* 310-11). She identified Habermas's theory of communicative action with its communicative ethics and its focus on "how political communities communicate in public arenas" (*ibid.,* 53) as providing "a rich seam of ideas about how to reconstitute the public realm, through open, public debate" (*ibid.,* 49) and "a valuable conceptual resource" in reconstituting a new collaborative planning realm (*ibid.,* 311). Habermas's writings have similarly been invoked by theorists and advocates of consensus-building who point to the similarity between the conditions necessary for 'authentic dialogue' and Habermas's communicative rationality (Innes, 2004).

From the perspective of the current research, the core significance of Healey's (1997) concept of collaborative planning lies in the manner in which it attempted to reconfigure an adversarial and antagonistic arena into a collaborative and consensual one.

> "The effort of collaborative planning is surrounded by powerful pressures, explicit and implicit, from some cultural communities, to produce hegemonic outcomes within which their point of view prevails – the 'I win-you lose' approach. Collaborative planning efforts, however, search for more than the 'win-win' outcome of the conflict management textbooks... It looks for an approach which asks: can we all get on better if we change how we think to accommodate what other people think? If this can be done, then we might think about winning and losing in a different way" (*ibid.,* 312).

In seeking to reconfigure such a collaborative arena, Healey pointed to two 'terrains' necessitating critical attention: the terrain of planning practices (the soft infrastructure of stakes, arenas, routines, styles, discourses etc.) and the terrain of planning systems (the 'hard infrastructure of institutional design'). She acknowledged the challenges which arose in seeking to effect the necessary institutional changes in the planning system and was aware that the task would be both "power-challenging and ethically-demanding" (*ibid.*, 313-4). She was also aware of the different factors upon which the outcome of collaborative planning processes would be contingent. Nonetheless, she was adamant about the improvements that would follow for the different 'cultural communities' participating within such structures – benefits that would flow from "the deliberative work of collaborative capacity-building, not through encouraging individualistic competitive behaviour" (*ibid.*, 313).

"Collaborative planning is not a monolithic block of axioms set in stone" and has been understood as both a planning theory genus encompassing a variety of different theory species and as a

[5] See, for example, Healey's (1997: 271) suggestion of the range of interests that might be identified in a stakeholder mapping exercise. "This technique seeks to identify the kind of stake people may have in a strategy-making exercise, from being residents of neighbourhoods to the interests of global investors, or national heritage considerations, or the nesting needs of migrating birds. It generates a conception of a *stakeholder community,* with both territorial and functional reasons for membership."

particular species of communicative planning theory in itself (Brand & Gaffikin, 2007: 284). As such, collaborative and communicative planning has generated a considerable body of documentation amongst both its advocates and its critics. The scope of the current research does not allow for a detailed critique of the finer points of these critical exchanges (see, for example, Healey (2003) in which she responds to critics of her treatment of collaborative and communicative planning theory). It is, however, instructive to consider a number of the key criticisms that have been levelled at a planning theory that seeks to reconcile distinct and potentially antagonistic interests through collaborative structures and planning practices. For example, Brand and Gaffikin (2007: 282) have questioned the degree to which a collaborative planning concept can find "affinity with the uncollaborative world within which it has to operate." They identified "an apparent paradox in the promotion of collaborative practice rooted in values of cohesion, solidarity and inclusivity in a world that can be seen as ever more individualist, socially fragmented, competitive, or in other words, uncollaborative" (*ibid.,* 283). They pointed to the way in which the prioritisation of consensus militates against any accommodation of "a more candid agonistic discourse" (*ibid.,* 305) and leads to the suppression of frequently ineradicable discord surrounding the spatial and distributive consequences of contested planning policies. Collaborative planning was also criticised for its attempts to confine planning matters within place- and time-specific parameters to the exclusion of any consideration of the overarching global and structural issues which may be directly responsible for the planning and development problems with which communities are confronted.

Meanwhile, one of the earlier and most important critiques of collaborate planning identified "three broad areas of concern that militate against the option of a collaborative planning approach" (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998: 1975). In the first place, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger questioned the theoretical foundations upon which communicative rationality is based and pointed to a significant disjuncture between "its seeming neutrality of process where the emphasis is on uncoerced and undistorted interaction among competing individuals" and "the important assumptions regarding participatory democracy, the role and values of professionals and market economies," masked by that apparent neutrality (*ibid.,* 1977). In practical terms, the attempt to translate the theory into practice has been dogged by practical problems which have seen projects concentrate on process (and empowerment-type issues) at the expense of actions and outcomes. The concern with fostering an arena of 'undistorted interaction' has meanwhile led to a critical neglect of the significance of "the practical workings of planning practice... [and the] power-laden political arena" within which collaborative structures are constituted (*ibid.*, 1977). The third heading under which Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger presented their critique relates to the values held by planning personnel within the collaborative process. Specifically, they contended that the values held by the theorists of collaborative planning do not find any wide resonance among either planners or politicians. Additional and associated questions arise about the values held by the

person or persons appointed to act as facilitators between different and competing stakeholders (*ibid.,* 1985). It is thus that they directed attention to the questions of 'dominatory principles' from which planning discourse can never be divorced.

As the collaborative planning arena has increasingly become the province of private consultancies who proclaim their processes to be "consensus-based, collaborative and inclusionary" (McCann, 2001: 207), those questions assume an increasing urgency. McCann's elucidation of the manner in which one the most prominent tools within the private consultancy repertoire, urban visioning, has been used by "local elites to negotiate the contradiction between privatized and nominally collaborative planning" in a way that renders dissent difficult and produces a level of consent for what is essentially the vision of élite urban groupings (*ibid.,* 216). He also drew attention to the way in which the clamour for collaborative and inclusionary planning processes has affirmed rather than negated "the important political and policy making role of planning as a site of struggle in the production of urban geographies" (*ibid.,* 208).

2.2.2 Typologies of participation.

- ***Analytical insight afforded by typologies.***

The new governance environment is populated by a plethora of participative, collaborative and partnership structures and processes. The existence of significantly greater opportunities for urban working-class communities to participate in the state's planning and urban-renewal programmes is not at issue. However, the precise standing, authority and function of the structures and processes in which those communities have been invited to participate is very much at issue. The pervasiveness of governmental participatory initiatives and the significant and discernable degree of differentiation evident in the participatory arrangements which have been put in place has prompted theorists to evolve a number of different typologies of participation. Typologies of participation, which delineate a series of stages or ideal types across broad spectrums that generally range from nominal and essentially powerless forms of participation to significantly more powerful forms of engagement, have been identified as "a useful starting point for differentiating degrees and kinds of participation" (Cornwall, 2008: 270). They have also provided a useful starting point for deciphering the motivation and intent of those parties initiating participation. The following exploration of a number of typologies of participation is prefaced by an important distinction that should be borne in mind in considering their significance. It is a distinction that is often lost in the midst of increasingly elaborate participative structures and methodologies, namely the distinction between participation that concerns the determination of ends and that which concerns the determination of means. This point has been strongly made by Kirk (1980) who argued that analyses of different typologies should take place at all times with reference to the larger theoretical framework within which the role of the state is understood. Operating at a lower level than the determination of means, participation may be concerned merely with the exertion of a


degree of influence on the process or may not extend to the exertion of any influence on proceedings. Kirk (1980: 156) cited a frequent assumption "that what is of interest is the mechanics of involvement, that the purpose of involving people is 'understood,' and that all participants have some understanding of their roles." This research is concerned with 'the determination of means' and 'the mechanics of involvement' in so far as they enable participants to exercise influence over the 'ends' or outcomes of the participatory processes in which they are engaged. Its essential interest, however, lies in the degree to which participants are afforded the opportunity to exercise influence over the determination of ends.

- ***Arnstein's typology.***

Published in 1969 concerning the experience of engaging with a variety of different public programmes (including urban renewal) in 1960s America, Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation continues to have a strong resonance for communities engaging with urban regeneration. The typology distinguishes between eight types (or rungs) of participation under three broad headings, each representing a significant gradation in the degree of power allowed citizens in "determining the end product" (Arnstein, 1969: 217). These included Non-participation (Manipulation, Therapy); Tokenism (Information, Consultation, Placation) and Citizen Power (Partnership, Delegated Power, Citizen Control) (see Figure 2.1). Arnstein's landmark critique of public participation remains the most frequently cited typology of participation and is notable on a number of grounds. In the midst of participatory and collaborative initiatives that have become increasingly sophisticated in their structures, their rhetoric and their claims, the typology provides an important yardstick against which analysts and participants can attempt to identify the precise character of participation (or non-participation) which is being afforded citizens and communities. In the process of elucidating the defining features of each stage on the ladder, Arnstein also touched on a number of issues which remain central to contemporary considerations of working-class engagements with the state. Those issues include the techniques used to dissuade genuine participation, the conditions conducive to effective participation (including an organised power-base and access to independent high-quality technical advice), the disjuncture that may exist between community representatives and their supposed constituencies, the problematic nature of the inferences drawn from the position of community representatives that may be neither representative of nor accountable to their constituent communities[6] and the state's determination to "return the genie of citizen power to the bottle" in those rare cases where it had managed to escape (*ibid.,* 220). Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation is delineated in tabular form below.

[6] Arnstein (1969: 221) pointed to the problematic nature of the "acquiescence" given by community groupings to city plans where those groupings were unrepresentative, unaccountable and "not likely to reflect the views of the unemployed, the young, the more militant residents and the hard-core poor."

Figure 2.1 Arnstein (1969) Ladder of citizen participation.



- ***Variations and insights from other typologies.***

The years since the publication of Arnstein's typology have seen a proliferation of typologies in which the distinctions outlined by Arnstein resonate to greater or lesser degrees (see Appendix 2.1 for a summary presentation of a range of sample typologies). Formulated in the years immediately following Arnstein's work, Dennis (1972) outlined a six-fold typology that ranged from "participation in its most derisory form," the receipt of benefits (Kirk, 1980: 158) through various stages in which the state endeavours to engage and incorporate potentially oppositional elements within cooperative structures through to a grassroots radicalism in which "the 'client' is at his most conflict-oriented" and typically engaged in political activity (*ibid.,* 163). While Dennis' typology has been subjected to a number of criticisms for its ideological conservatism (Kirk, 1980), it is underwritten by an understanding of the oppositional and conflictual dynamic that may inhere in such participatory initiatives. Others, such as the South Lanarkshire Council (SLC, as delineated in Davidson, 1998) in Scotland, have formulated typologies which are clearly oriented around considerably more conciliatory understandings of the public's role in planning. The SLC's 'wheel of participation' may be understood as an attempt to contain the Pandora's box unleashed by Arnstein's typology and is presented as a means by which "problems of aiming for inappropriate levels of community empowerment can be overcome" (Davidson, 1998: 14). It is thus that the SLC

refuses the Arnstein ladder and any suggestion that "the aim is always to climb to the top of the ladder" in favour of a horizontal circular model in which the appropriateness of a given participatory technique will be determined by the aims and objectives in question "at any particular point in the participation process" (*ibid.,* 14).

While most typologies commence with manipulative and information-giving strategies, gradations vary thereafter as levels of involvement increase and are of interest both for the delineation of additional and interim types of participation and for their differing conceptualisations of the final and most powerful type of participation to which participants might aspire. For example, the final stage of Pretty's (1995) typology (as adapted in Cornwall, 2008: 272) is 'self-mobilisation,' a mobilisation which may take place to a number of different ends and which "may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power" (*ibid.,* 271). The end points of other typologies, meanwhile, stop short of any kind of 'citizen control' and are pitched variously at "ongoing involvement" (Dorcey *et al.,* 1994), "support" (Wilcox, 1994) or "self-management" (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1997) as is apparent from Oxley Green and Hunton-Clarke's (2003) tabulation of these different typologies. The latter's tabulation also includes a typology of public communication for risk management (Fischhoff, 1998) which is of interest for its markedly utilitarian conceptualisation of the maximum level of participation required in each phase. As in the case of the SLC's wheel of participation, not all typologies of participation are to be understood as a linear progression from less powerful to more intense forms of participation. For example, White (1996, as adapted in Cornwall, 2008: 273) outlined a typology around rather different axes, namely the meanings which different forms of participation may assume for the implementing agency, the target audience as well as the essential function of the participatory process.

In an era which has seen the practices of the private sector increasingly permeate government and public arenas, it is interesting to note that the situation has been somewhat reversed in the case of participatory practices. It is the public, community and developmental sectors which are acknowledged as the leaders in the area of stakeholder participation. It is thus that Oxley Green and Hunton-Clarke (2003: 293) pointed to "the roots of stakeholder participation within the public sector" and typologies of participation as they have been developed by parties as diverse as Arnstein and the UNDP in seeking to formulate a typology of stakeholder participation appropriate to environmental decision-making procedures within private companies. It is interesting in this context to note the frank discussion of both the requirements of typologies of stakeholder participation that are "'company' rather than 'community' focused" (*ibid.,* 295) and the delineation of the benefits that companies might anticipate from such participative initiatives. It is also instructive to note the much-simplified three-stage typology that Oxley Green and Hunton-Clarke propose as appropriate to the needs of companies: "informative, consultative and decisional"

participation and their insistence that company decision making can remain entirely separate from and independent of any informative and consultative participatory processes initiated (*ibid.,* 295-7).

- ***Limitations of typologies.***

Typologies are not without their limitations. Arnstein (1969) acknowledged the necessarily simplistic and generalised nature of the abstractions employed in her own typology; the absence of any analysis of "the most significant roadblocks to achieving genuine levels of participation" and the motivation of 'powerholders' in soliciting the participation of the 'have nots' (*ibid.,* 217-8). Others have also pointed to the limitations of the many typologies formulated in the wake of Arnstein. Cornwall (2008), for example, advanced a series of criticisms about the manner in which participation is conceptualised within such typologies, including the danger of underestimating the way in which lesser and apparently 'innocuous' forms of participation may provide the catalyst for other and more progressive forms of engagement, the problematic nature of the 'stakeholder' term and the fallacy that everyone can participate in such participatory processes when such processes almost always follow on "explicit or implicit choices... as to who might take part" (*ibid.,* 276-7). She also pointed to an important and fundamental facet of the state's participatory initiatives; the fact that they are almost always targeted at 'poorer people' as opposed to middle-class communities. All such criticisms were accompanied by an insistence on the importance of situating analyses of participatory initiatives within the broader political context and recognising that the responsiveness of authorities will be "contingent on wider institutional changes and the political will to convert professed commitment to participation into tangible action" (*ibid.,* 278).

- ***Enduring significance of Arnstein.***

Typologies are not then without their shortcomings and cannot engage with the full panoply of considerably more political questions that unfold in any examination of working-class engagements with the state. As many "carry with them normative assumptions" (Cornwall, 2008: 270) which both locate participation along an axis from 'good' to 'bad' " and define the parameters of legitimate forms of participation, neither are they to be understood as ideologically neutral tools. They do, however, continue to constitute a useful analytical tool for mining behind the increasingly elaborate rhetoric in which these initiatives are cloaked to establish the precise standing that communities have been afforded by the state in the implementation of its major policy interventions in the urban realm. This section has attended to the significance of a number of typologies but returns in the final analysis to the enduring analytical significance of Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation. Its importance lies in its expansion of the spectrum of legitimate community aspirations beyond the realms of low-grade participation and even power-sharing to a situation in which a significant redistribution of power would see citizens assume 'control.' Arnstein goes further than her successors. Her definition of citizen participation as "a categorical term for citizen power" (Arnstein, 1969: 216) constitutes an important marker in this respect. The

most extraordinary aspect of the Arnstein typology remains, however, the simple fact of its continued relevance in discussions about the nature of the engagements between the state and working-class communities after more than four decades during which a proliferation of new and elaborate networked governance structures were supposed to have transformed state-community engagements and rendered all such contentious considerations redundant. It is interesting in this context to note the frequency with which critics of newly-privatised consultative procedures reach back to Arnstein to make sense of the treatment of those citizens who continue to dissent from the dominant economic model (see, for example, McCann, 2001).

2.2.3 Participation in other guises.

- ***Participation as partnership.***

Chapter 1 adverted to the proliferation of participatory initiatives that accompanied the shift from government to governance. Notwithstanding the articulation of considerably more powerful and progressive forms of citizen engagement within the different typologies considered in Section 2.2.2, the state's participatory initiatives frequently find expression in considerably more modest partnership initiatives and structures. In an international context, for example, "the pronounced shift towards 'mandatory partnership working'" (Larner & Butler, 2007: 82) in countries which have been to the forefront in the neoliberal project, has generated a considerable academic literature. Analysts have reached different conclusions about the significance of the opportunities afforded communities within such partnership initiatives. Looking to the substantial body of global research on the opportunities presented by new governance arrangements, Taylor (2007: 297) noted that "the scope for communities to exercise real influence in these spaces has been limited - indeed, some argue that this apparent opening up masks new forms of state control," his having noted in the case of Britain that the community engagement rhetoric has far outpaced the reality of partnerships on the ground. Taylor's own exploration of a variety of participatory and partnership initiatives meanwhile led him to conclude that "new governance spaces are still inscribed with a state agenda" (*ibid.,* 314). Others have advanced more positive analyses of the experience of partnership. For example, Larner and Butler (2007: 78-9) considered the implications that the emphasis on partnership has had for the social sector in an environment in which the state is constantly seeking to identify 'strategic brokers' with whom to build collaborative relationships and to negotiate and navigate the antagonisms between two formally distinct sectors. Although they have acknowledged the conclusions that have generally been reached about state-community partnership arrangements, namely "the governmentalization of community," they have suggested that the New Zealand experience of partnership has been more positive and has led to a "communitization of government" (*ibid.,* 85).

It is not, however, necessary to look to the international literature for in-depth academic critiques of the partnership approach. A number of aspects of the social-partnership model in Ireland and its

close association with the Irish economic boom has attracted considerable attention, not least the expansion of the Irish social-partnership model to encompass the community and voluntary (C&V) sector as a fourth pillar (alongside the original employer, trade-union and farming pillars) within its institutional structures at the end of the first decade of social partnership. Much of this literature pertains to the experience of the Irish C&V sector and is accordingly presented as part of the context for this research in Chapter 4. However, several issues raised in that body of literature also represent an important contribution to the broader discussion of the place of working-class communities within the state's partnership structures. Those issues include the ongoing arguments for and against the participation of disadvantaged communities within social partnership (Murphy, 2002), the arguments for and against corporatist models (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002) and the centrality of 'communities' and 'community development' within the state's corporatist project. That literature also considers the manner in which the state has used partnership with civil society groups to "effectively extend its legitimacy in situations where legitimacy was strained" (Collins, 2002: 91) and suggests that it is "the absence of any civil society" rather than any "oppositional mode or tendency" which poses the greater threat to the state (*ibid.,* 96). This position is accompanied by the argument that "the 'bottom-up' mobilization which underpinned the partnership project was essentially a sophisticated process of state building" and should be understood as an expansion of the state's frontiers as opposed to any rolling back of its powers (*ibid.,* 99-100). As the state "immerses itself in the politics of community development" (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002: 5) and partnership, the need to re-evaluate critically the role of the state and its self-professed role as "a neutral arbiter between competing (intractable even) social interests" (*ibid.,* 3) becomes increasingly pronounced. (See Chapter 4 for discussion about the manner in which the state has sought to reorient the C&V sector around this conciliatory partnership model.)

- ***Participation as active citizenship.***

In the arena of civil society, the state's participatory overtures find expression in the guise of active citizenship. In an Irish context, the discourse of active citizenship has been "vigorously promoted by state and select civic actors alike through a wide-ranging active citizenship campaign promoted by a Task Force of select state and civic actors" appointed by the Taoiseach in 1996 (Gaynor, 2009: 2). The Taskforce on Active Citizenship (TAC) in 2007 espoused a vision of active citizenship that is about:

> "engagement, participation in society and valuing contributions made by individuals, whether they are employed or outside the traditional workforce. In practical terms, this engagement and participation may mean membership of a residents' association or political party or lobby group, or volunteering to help out in a local sports club, or caring for a family member or neighbour, or simply being active and caring about the local neighbourhood, the environment as well as larger global and national issues" (TAC 2007: 2).

Enveloped in a series of "wholesomely positive values" it was not surprising that the concept, which appeared "all at once virtuous, worthy, and highly seductive" should gain considerable

currency in community-development discourses in Ireland (Gaynor, 2009: 1). Equally, it was not surprising that the manner in which it was conceptualised should attract significant criticism in the wake of an economic boom that had jettisoned any concept of social solidarity in pursuit of economic growth. Cronin (2007, 2009) has advanced a far-reaching critique of the concept of active citizenship which resonates with the broader critique of participation and partnership. He highlighted the "conspicuously rare" use of the word 'power' in the Taskforce's documentation and the "false symmetry of relationships implicit in the notion of active citizenship" (2009: 64-5), which is characterised as a 'rhetorical ploy' (2007). He also pointed to the Taskforce's "relentless and repeated emphasis on individual agency" which functions to conceal the fundamental asymmetry of power between different citizens and perpetuate the neoliberal construction of "politico-economic issues as a matter of personal choice and individual preference" (2009: 66). The Taskforce was also indicted for its failure to undertake any kind of structural analysis of the economic forces that had led to its expression of concern for "the level of inequality in Irish society, and its impact on solidarity between individuals and communities" (TAC, 2007: 1). In the absence of such a political-economy analysis, the ensuing response is condemned to rehearse biological solutions to structural problems (Cronin, 2007). In the midst of an ahistorical, asocial-class and apolitical concept of active citizenship, Cronin argued for the assertion of a notion of identity based on social class, which would be markedly more powerful than that encapsulated in the concept of active citizenship. In a community-development context, Gaynor (2009: 3) has responded similarly to the concept's contribution to "an ongoing depoliticization of the principles and practice of community development" by arguing that community-development actors and activists need to "to re-colonise the space offered by active citizenship, re-inserting power and politics into the spirit and practice of community development" (*ibid.,* 13). Pending such a reconfiguration of the public arena, Cronin (2007) issued a cautionary warning to those who might respond to the state's call for active citizenship with greater enthusiasm than intended by the state. 'Active citizens' who become too active and take their engagement too far may find themselves in trouble, because the one thing over which the state retains control is control itself.

2.2.4 Participation as counterpoint to protest.

This exploration of the various parameters within which the state's participatory initiatives have been framed in recent decades closes with a brief consideration of the manner in which participatory responses relate to protest responses. For Cornwall (2008), the proliferation of participatory initiatives has served to displace and delegitimise older forms of participation. This point was made with particular reference to the diminution of the spaces in which public protest can legitimately take place and in which communities can organise and engage autonomously outside of the parameters set by the state. Others, such as Cockburn (1977), have understood the participatory spaces created by the state's overtures to be considerably more fluid and pointed to the potential for participatory responses to be transformed into either incorporated positions or

protest responses. In this manner, Cockburn described the incorporation of local populations in the state's business as "a two-edged sword for the state (and for the working class)" (*ibid.,* 101). For yet others, participation and protest were understood to be informed by two entirely different dynamics. Mathiesen (1974) suggested that the pursuit of "any genuine political alternative necessarily contains two elements: competition and contradiction" (cited in Saunders, 1979). In his terms, participation emerges as a form of "competing agreement" in which no contradiction or conflict of interest is recognised. In the absence of any such antagonism, participating groups merely compete with other groups of similar standing for whatever gains are to be made without challenging the *status quo* or "the prevailing pattern of resource allocation" (*ibid.,* 288: see also Bell & Newby, 1971). It is thus that Saunders (1979: 288) was led to conclude that "at best, participation succeeds in securing limited objectives, but that at worst it results merely in the symbolic legitimation of the system without securing any fundamental concessions." Castells (1977a) was in agreement with this position and suggested that the absence of any avenues of 'negotiation' could, in fact, be deemed to be a good thing in so far as their absence functioned to assist the process of radicalisation. Criticisms of participatory initiatives were also accompanied by cautions against discounting the benefits that might follow from engagement, including increased access to information, greater public awareness of proposed policies, a decrease in fatalism and political alienation and opportunities for greater and more critical engagement than that envisaged by the state (Saunders, 1977). At all times, however, Cockburn (1977) insisted that communities take cognisance of the tactics and strategies employed by the state in instigating such participative initiatives. Such scepticism, she argued, was an important corrective to the idea that the state's offer of participation represented "gains in themselves for the working class. Rather, they are what the working class can make them" (*ibid.,* 103).

2.3 Protest: resisting the state; the scope and mechanics of resistance.

This chapter has noted the way in which the state's participatory initiatives have functioned in many ways to reconfigure and colonise the spaces in which working-class communities might otherwise have organised in a more oppositional and antagonistic manner in response to major state interventions in the urban realm. The state has not always been successful in its attempts to pre-empt the emergence of protest among working-class communities targeted by its policies. This chapter now turns to an exploration of protest responses among urban working-class communities as they have mobilised in opposition to urban policies that they have judged to be detrimental to their interests. This section commences by attending to the particular dynamic underlying protest responses and the significance of the articulated contradiction. It notes the insights forthcoming from some of the more notable protests which emerged around urban-renewal and regeneration projects as they have been documented in some of the landmark critiques of the 1970s, before considering the nature of contemporary contestations in the urban realm. It considers the factors conducive to the emergence of protest. This consideration of protest responses also takes

cognisance of the very important distinction that theorists have drawn between protest movements and urban social movements. In recognition of the prominence of the community as the terrain on which many of these protests and struggles mobilise, this section will also attend to the particular character of community struggles and the significance that state-funded employees assume in such struggles. Against the backdrop of a governance environment intent on denying and evacuating the existence of contradictory and irreconcilable interests, this section considers the arguments that critical theorists have made for the reassertion of economic antagonisms and distinct class interests at the heart of many of the state's interventions in the urban realm. This discussion is conscious at all times of the argument that the distinction between protest and participation responses might be considered more usefully as polar points on a continuum along which communities will be ranged at different stages in their engagement with the state rather than being understood as binary opposites (Saunders, 1979).

2.3.1 Protest as 'non-competing contradiction.'

This chapter has already adverted to the distinct dynamics that inform participatory and protest responses. Unlike participatory responses which are characterised by 'competing agreement' from which any concept of contradiction is absent, protest responses are premised on the recognition of a fundamental contradiction of interest and are characterised as 'non-competing contradiction' (Mathiesen, 1974, cited in Saunders, 1979). The latter term is used to refer to situations of genuine conflict in which groups use coercive strategies and "mobilize against some aspect of local policy by ignoring the rules of access, either because such access is not available to them, or because they anticipate that a participatory strategy would result in failure" (Saunders, 1979: 235). In such a situation, groups decline to compete with others of similar standing for whatever gains are to be made within the implementation of a given state policy or programme in favour of contesting the very logic of the policy or programme in question. Saunders did not disallow the possibility that a participation response might evolve into a protest response but pointed to the altered dynamic that would accompany such a trajectory. In such a situation, a growing awareness of the contradiction at the heart of a given state intervention might displace participants' previous willingness to confine their engagement to 'competing agreement' within state programmes and parameters which might hitherto have remained uncontested. The recognition of a fundamental contradiction follows from the employment of a more radical analysis of the role of the state and, as such, may set groups upon an entirely different trajectory of action in their engagement with or resistance to the state's operations. Swyngedouw (2007) has written about the manner in which the post-political order is predicated on a neoliberal consensus that has striven to eradicate all contradictions and antagonisms from the public arena (see Chapter 1). In a specifically urban context, the significance of the articulated contradiction becomes apparent in Punch's (2000) depiction of the city as a rapidly transforming and highly contradictory landscape in which each contradiction offers a space for the mobilisation of oppositional movements and the mounting of challenges to capitalist

hegemony. It is interesting in the present context to note the undeniable 'inherent contradiction' that Punch has identified in state-engendered urban-renewal policies.

The recognition and articulation of a contradiction and antagonism at the heart of the state's urban policies essentially allows communities the opportunity to surmount the strictures of the state's participative structures to engage with the implications of its policies in a more dispassionate, analytical and rigorous manner in the public arena. That situation carries with it all of the opportunities and all of the risks that accompany more oppositional courses of action. It is in such situations that the extent of the dilemma confronting communities who find their interests to be at variance with the *status quo*, becomes fully apparent. One may therefore:

> "play the game by the rules and become 'defined in' as a minor and accommodating appendage to the system, or attack the system from the outside and become 'defined out' as an irritating but inconsequential irrelevance to it" (Saunders, 1979: 293).

2.3.2 Protests in urban realm.

- ***Insights from urban-renewal protests.***

Writing in the early 1970s, Harvey predicted that the degree of inequality and injustice generated by the mechanisms governing the redistribution of income in place would, unless amended, lead to a period of intense conflict in the urban system. Harvey cited the evidence from the United States and Britain in support of this prediction. Events in France in the years immediately following certainly appeared to bear out Harvey's prediction. The dearth of research into urban social movements as opposed to local participation at that time prompted Castells (1977a) to adopt a particular focus on urban social movements. He was concerned with articulating "phenomena that are supposedly charged with contradictions" with "the class struggle in general" and found such a phenomenon in the struggle against urban renewal in Paris, notably that of the contradiction between the housing conditions of the resident population and the renewal project "articulated with the profit of the property developers" (*ibid.*, 325-7). Castells was concerned with, amongst other things, the types of action taken by protest groups; the ability of local actions to impact on overall policies; the conditions conducive to the emergence of forceful opposition campaigns; the different levels (claim-specific or political) at which struggles might be conducted and the process through which urban struggles make the transition to political struggles in the public arena. In his quest to address the "major problem" of his research, the establishment of "systems for the detection of social movements," Castells formulated a "semi-theoretical, semi-descriptive" classification of the different elements of oppositional actions and the manner in which their interrelationship determines the urban and political effect (*ibid.*, 343-348). Adopted immediately by others investigating urban contestations of urban renewal in Paris (see Olives, 1976), the Castells schema remains an important analytical tool in the exploration of urban struggles and the way in which they may or may not translate into larger political struggles.

Castells' (1983) *The City and the Grassroots,* subsequently enumerated the myriad of diverse forms in which urban protest movements were becoming manifest: squatter communities (Germany, Holland and Denmark), youth movements (Switzerland), neighbourhood associations and movements (Spain and America), uprisings over public services (Italy), tenant struggles (France), inner-city revolts (England), urban mobilisations in newly industrialised countries (Middle and Central America) etc. (*ibid.,* xv). In his quest to develop a theory of urban change that would be grounded in evidence, Castells proceeded to undertake further extensive empirical work in different socio-cultural contexts, including neighbourhood mobilisations in a mission district in San Francisco, squatter mobilisations among those located in the 'threshold areas' of large cities' in Latin America and the Citizen Movement in Madrid. That process of theory-building was informed by a series of fundamental research questions which remain central to explorations of contemporary urban contestations, including the question of "how and why contemporary urban crises express some of our deepest social contradictions" (*ibid.,* xvii).

The decades since those landmark explorations of urban protest and urban social movements were undertaken by Castells have seen a transformation of the government and governance of major state interventions in the urban realm (see Chapter 1). While it is evident that "local populations… do not always accede to the selling of the city or the [entrepreneurial] policies espoused by the élite coalition," Hubbard and Hall (1998: 21) noted that opposition to these policies is "often carefully circumscribed by the state, and it is only rarely that it coalesces into effective campaigns of protest." The protests which mobilised in opposition to the development of London's Docklands are cited as one of the rare instances in which opposition to entrepreneurial renewal and development policies did become manifest in the public realm. The "fierce opposition" in question (Rose, 1992: 32) was also of interest for the manner in which local (Labour-controlled) councils joined local communities in opposing the plans of a regeneration body established by a Conservative government. Rose charted the principal concepts and themes through which local community groups framed their opposition to the regeneration plans of the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDCC): community, history, land and collective protest. Meanwhile, Brownill (1990: 131) proceeded to deconstruct the characterisation of the conflict in London's Docklands as one between the 'local' and the 'national' interest. The representation of the regeneration project as being in 'the national interest' was characterised as a significant triumph for "the ideological zeal" of central government and the private sector "to bring market forces into the inner city," while 'the local interest' was understood to be a "euphemism for market-critical policies based on meeting the needs of mainly working class residents" in the Docklands area. While the LDCC remained in the ascendant, Brownill pointed to the way in which the contradictions of its approach became "all too apparent" (*ibid.,* 132). (See Chapter 4 for discussion of the opposition that was similarly mobilised by the core contradiction at the heart of the market model of urban renewal in the case of Dublin's Docklands (Punch, 2001).)

This brief perusal of some of the notable analyses of protests which mobilised in opposition to urban-renewal policies during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s concludes by returning to a notable episode of community resistance to urban-development policies in 1970s Australia which continues to attract critical attention. The episode relates to the forging of an alliance between a builders' trade-union movement, the NSW Builders Labourers' Federation (BLF) and resident-activist groupings in Sydney. The alliance in question resulted in the emergence of a highly effective opposition to unwelcome development centred on the placement of 'green bans' on contested developments (Burgmann & Burgmann, 1998; Short, 1988a, 1988b; Anderson & Jacobs, 1999, Badcock, 1984). The term 'green bans' was coined by a union leader in the NSW BLF to "distinguish it from the traditional union black ban imposed by workers 'to push their own issues'" (Burgmann & Burgmann, 1998: 8). It was thus that the BLF extended its concerns beyond the narrow range of wages and employment conditions to use its collective union power to block developments because of "environmental or broader social considerations" (Short, 1998a: 727). The resulting Green Ban strategy provided an important insight into the position of strength which relatively powerless communities could attain when allied with a powerful builders' federation. Badcock (1984: 281-2) described how "by recruiting the BLF to their cause the resident associations introduced the classic confrontation between wage labour (builders' labourers) and capital into urban politics (*à la* Castells)." Subsequent attempts by those targeted by the green bans to rename them as "red bans to stress the dangerously radical orientation of the union and the revolutionary implications of the bans" were understood as a *de facto* admission of the political threat vested in the alliance between besieged communities and the organised labour movement (*ibid.,* 9). While the subsequent demise of the BLF during the ensuing property-development slump marked a significant setback for oppositional movements in Sydney (Short, 1998a), the Green Bans continue to provide an important point of reference for the formidable oppositions that can be mobilised in working-class communities which have exhausted all state channels and have no other means or resources to wield against powerful public and private-development interests.

- ***Insights from contemporary contestations of neoliberal urbanism.***

The literature from the 2000s is distinguished by its conceptualisation of opposition to urban-development policies as resistance to neoliberalism. It is an opposition that assumes a particular importance within the larger neoliberal project, as in apparent from Brenner and Theodore's (2002b: 346) direction to "the strategic role of cities as sites of resistance and oppositional mobilization against neoliberalism" even as they have been "subsumed within neoliberal agendas of various kinds in recent decades... in an age of neoliberal dominance." Brenner and Theodore identified this as a "particularly urgent issue" that had only begun to be addressed within the papers collected within the special issue of *Antipode* on the 'spaces of neoliberalism' in 2002. That gauntlet was taken up by Leitner *et al.* (2007a) when they undertook to produce a book focused explicitly on "contestations in and of neoliberal urbanization – particularly those emerging from

within civil society" (*ibid.,* vii). All contributors were described as sharing "a concern to destabilize neoliberalism, both analytically and politically" (Leitner *et al.,* 2007c: 313).

In their exploration of the types of resistance that have mobilised in opposition to neoliberal urbanisation, Leitner *et al.* (2007b: 13) pointed to "the multiplicity of imaginaries that may be brought to bear in contestations of neoliberalism," the different ways in which contestations may be framed and the different targets against which those contestations may be directed. Contestations may, for example, be directed against specific negative outcomes of neoliberal policies as opposed to "the workings of neoliberalism *in toto*" (*ibid.*). They may be directed against neoliberalism for its role in facilitating other sources of oppression or injustice with the latter, rather than neoliberalism itself, constituting the primary target of the contestation. The multifaceted nature of neoliberal contestations is rendered more complex by the fact that contestations may be staged by groups with distinct visions operating without any shared analysis of the primary source of oppression or any consensus on the form that political action should take. As a consequence, those contesting neoliberalism may find themselves engaged in internal conflicts prompted by "conflicts and contradictions between their respective imaginaries" (*ibid.,* 13-14). Leitner *et al.* proceeded to identify four particular realms of contestation: (i) direct action, particularly mass public protests; (ii) lobbying and legislative action, frequently undertaken as a means of addressing the needs of the most visible victims of neoliberalism; (iii) alternative or non-neoliberal knowledge production to counter the "promarket knowledge… widely recognized as central to neoliberalism;" (iv) alternative economic and social practices that seek "to create and promote alternative economic, social and political spaces" (*ibid.,* 15-19). The distinction and demarcation lines between each should not, however, be understood to be absolute as the authors point out that groups may engage in several different practices at the same time for tactical reasons.

After a wide-ranging series of contributions on various forms of opposition and resistance to neoliberalism in starkly different urban settings, Leitner *et al.* (2007c) returned in closing to distinguish a variety of trajectories that neoliberal contestations may take. They distinguish four broad trajectories from the accounts offered by the various contributors. The first of these is engagement and is described as the trajectory taken by 'non-neoliberal' interests who either opt for or do not conceive of any option outside of "cooperation with neoliberal corporate and institutional power" (*ibid.,* 320). The outcomes vary from the cooption of 'non-neoliberal' actors into neoliberalism to the effecting of changes in state agendas and institutions. The second is opposition to that same corporate and institutional power in which opponents employ diverse forms of collective action and build diverse alliances that sometimes find political expression in newly formed political parties. While some campaigns may remain singular in their adoption of opposition strategies against the state, attention is also directed to other occasions in which "activist practices strategically combine opposition with engagement… to advance their agenda" (*ibid.,*

320). Oldfield and Stokke (2007: 140), for example, argue that "polemical political discourse does not reflect the complexities of political practice" whereby the exigencies of everyday living obliges community organisations to continually cross "the boundary between engagement with the state and opposition to state programs and policies." Their exposition of "the present repertoire of protest" employed in an anti-eviction campaign in the Western Cape of post-apartheid South Africa provides an interesting illustration of the complexities of community and political oppositional practice on the ground (*ibid.,* 148). A third trajectory corresponds to one of the broad realms of contestation identified earlier, that of alternative knowledge production, which is described as "part of the wider project of critiquing and destabilizing the market order" (Leitner *et al.,* 2007c: 322). The fourth and final trajectory, disengagement, represents a significant departure from the other three modes of contestation in so far as it ceases either to engage with, oppose or critique the neoliberal project. Instead, it seeks to develop independent spaces within which "alternative practices can be pursued in their own right and on their own terms" (*ibid.*). As a mode of contestation, it has been subject to contrasting assessments. Advocates suggest that such practices may provide a space for "validating and reinforcing non-neoliberal subjectivities" while critics suggest that such practices may prove at best "modestly disruptive" and, at worst, facilitate the reproduction of neoliberal norms (*ibid.*)

The effectiveness of the different realms and trajectories of neoliberal contestations has now become "an intensely debated issue," with assessments ranging from "qualified optimism... to scepticism if not pessimism" (*ibid.,* 322-3). What is not, however, at issue is the continuing and strategic role that cities continue to occupy as 'urban frontiers' in the simultaneous progression and contestation of neoliberalism. It is thus that Leitner *et al.* (2007c: 312) conclude that

> "Cities contain some of the most audacious examples of neoliberal governance, but at the same time are also among the principal sites and stakes for the generation of oppositional movements and alternative social visions."

For neoliberals, urban frontiers may constitute "the edge of civilized life" and "the frontiers of the market order" that are to be continually extended (*ibid.,* 311). Meanwhile, for non-neoliberals, they may be characterised as the edge of a different and non-market civilisation on which the further encroachment of the neoliberal offensive is to be continually contested and resisted.

- ***Factors leading to emergence (and radicalisation) of protest.***

In the process of exploring the various protests and campaigns that have mobilised in opposition to the state's urban policies, researchers have identified a number of factors conducive to the emergence, progression and success of urban protest movements. Those factors include the spatial concentration of working-class communities (Glass, 1968; Saunders, 1979) and a class-consciousness which is understood to provide a more "viable social base for significant political mobilization" than community (Saunders, 1979: 127). Bell and Newby (1976: 192), for example, characterised 'community' as an ideology of control and containment which denies the existence of

any conflict of interest in favour of an interpretation of social relations "characterized by harmony, reciprocity, stability and affection" (see also Cockburn, 1977). By virtue of providing a visible political agent against which discontent or anger can be directed, state intervention provides an unwitting aid to politicisation, although Castells (1977a: 463) pointed out that the ensuing politicisation may not necessarily translate into a more critical and conflictual course of action but may equally function as "a mechanism of integration and participation" in the absence of any articulation of a contradiction. For Castells:

> "everything depends on the articulation of the contradictions and practices or, to put it another way, on the dialectic between the state apparatus and the urban social movement" (*ibid.*).

The analysis employed in confrontations between the state and the community is thus of key importance. A radical analysis provides the basis for a programme of radical political action while a conservative analysis typically declines to articulate any fundamental contradiction of interest and directs any arising discontent into a reformist programme of action (Saunders, 1979). The presence of "an able and mature working-class leadership" in a position to advance such a critical analysis and link local conflicts with larger underlying structural issues plays a critical role in this respect (Mingione, 1977, cited in Saunders, 1979). The intervention of outside political organisations possessing such an analysis can perform a similar function, although Castells (1977a) cautioned against any attempt to graft a radical political analysis or leadership onto any struggle or movement that does not already contain that analysis and dynamic in embryonic form (Saunders, 1979).

Critics have also attended to the many obstacles that protest movements may encounter in seeking to construct arguments that run counter to the logic of the state's policies interventions. Those operating outside of official channels are often obliged to adopt provocative and confrontational tactics to advance their case. In so doing, they run the risk of diverting public attention and sympathy away from their cause to the means used to advance that cause. Saunders (1979: 292-3) pointed to the ease with which protest movements articulating a core contradiction and issuing a direct challenge to the system can be demonised as illegitimate, undeserving and subjected to "strategies of exclusion on the part of the local authority." They also face the continuing and frequently insurmountable obstacle presented by the establishment and vested interests which are sufficiently powerful to remain entirely impervious to their tactics and the demands of protest groups (Dunleavy, 1977). The catalogue of obstacles confronting protest groups is also accompanied by the factors which assist protest movements in the successful prosecution of their demands and campaigns. Those factors include the necessary organisational resources, including personnel, financial, informational, professional and political resources (Pickvance, 1976; Kirk, 1980). Kirk (1980: 87) accepted that "groups with demands which threaten the *status quo* tend to have fewer resources than those who do not" but cautioned against placing an overemphasis on the resource issue to the neglect of a protest group's aims. The failure of "groups with radical demands... is at least as much to do with the nature of their aims as their relative lack of resources"

(*ibid.*). There is a key additional factor to be noted in this brief perusal of the factors enabling and disabling the progression of protest movements, the presence of a political party to give political expression to the position and demands of the protest group (Allen, 2004) and the nature of the relationship between working-class communities and the political parties to which they have traditionally looked for political representation (Saunders, 1979; Kirk 1980; Cockburn, 1977).

- ***Distinction between protest and urban social movements.***

The consideration of the factors leading to the emergence and radicalisation of protest responses also takes cognisance of the important distinction that theorists have drawn between protest movements and urban social movements. For an oppositional response to be classified as an urban social movement, Castells (1976: 151) argued that it must lead to "the production of a qualitatively new effect on the social structure... The term 'qualitatively new effect' may refer to either of two basic situations: at the level of structures... at the level of practices." For Saunders (1979: 110), this was interpreted as either "a change in the dominance of capitalist property relations, or a modification of power relations by weakening the structure of political domination or... strengthening the development of working-class organization." In surveying available evidence about urban class struggles, Saunders concluded that many of these struggles were taking place in pursuit of rather modest goals, irrespective of attempts by 'radical organizers' to elevate or articulate them to broader class struggles. In such instances, the term 'urban social movement' was refused in favour of "participation or protest movements which result, not in qualitatively new effects, but in reproduction of the existing system of social relations... and in reform respectively" Castells (1997a, cited in Saunders, 1979).

2.3.3 Character of community struggles.

The deliberation on protest in the urban realm would not be complete without an examination of the arena in which engagements and conflicts between the state and low-income working-class communities have been concentrated increasingly in recent years. This section accordingly attends briefly to the distinctive character of community struggles and the significance that community organisations and employees assume therein.

- ***Distinctive character of community struggles.***

The flight of industrial capital from inner-city areas from the mid-twentieth century deprived inner-city areas of both the industries in which residents had traditionally found employment and the labour movements in which they had historically organised. In the case of Britain, this was accompanied by what Hindess (1971) termed 'the decline of working-class politics.' He anticipated that the vacuum left by that decline would be filled by new community-based groups and that "the issues themselves" would thereafter be "increasingly raised outside the formal political organizations" (Hindess, 1971, cited in Saunders, 1979). Thereafter, Cockburn (1977) pointed to

the way in which the community became the new terrain of class struggle and the site on which a new politics began to emerge. That politics was characterised by a local and territorially-defined focus, an agenda typically populated by housing, public services, community facilities and social-care issues (issues that Castells, 1977b, categorised as 'collective consumption' issues) and a proliferation of new community-based organisations often articulating short-term deliverable demands. It was frequently accompanied by a philosophy that stressed political education and radicalisation *via* action and was resolutely anti-paternalistic (Cowley *et al.,* 1977; see also Punch 2001, Collins 2002). Its most pressing concerns, meanwhile, ensured that its attentions and demands would typically be directed at the state and the actions of local-government management officials in particular (Cowley *et al.,* 1977; Kirk, 1980; Cockburn, 1977). Those with a critical understanding of the essential role of the state in capitalist economies pointed to the contradiction that inhered in the articulation of the demands of these new community groupings in the form of demands for greater state intervention in a situation in which the latter's interventions would, in the final analysis, be undertaken in the interests of maintaining capitalist hegemony (Cowley *et al.,* 1977). The most distinctive feature of community struggles may, however, be located in the couching of all collective actions and struggles in community as opposed to class terms, a situation which prompted Cockburn (1977, 159-162) to identify the following fundamental difficulties with community as an organising principle. Community action takes place on terrain prepared and controlled by the state. It is closely associated with the consumer protection movement and the "economically and politically weak" role in which it casts citizens. It is frequently "defined as classless" and seeks to 'splinter' "'the deprived,' 'the poor' or even the 'poor-poor'" from the broad mass of the working-class and comprises an entity which political parties seek to use for competitive political advantage. The difficulties confronting community organisations are compounded by the danger of cooption and incorporation attending upon all of their dealings and relationships with the state (Cowley *et al.*, 1977).

- ***Significance of community organisations and employees within community struggles.***

This chapter alluded earlier to the key importance which writers such as Castells attributed to the analysis of the particular issues and crises confronting working-class communities. In an arena which has frequently been vacated by both the trade-union movement and the traditional parties of the left, community organisations and their employees emerge as significant and, on occasion, pivotal figures in determining the nature of the engagements between the state and their constituent communities. This point may be illustrated with reference to the myriad of roles that community organisations and employees assume in areas otherwise bereft of resources. Critical attention thus comes to bear on a number of key issues. These include the nature of the funding relationships in place between state agencies and community organisations and the parameters within which organisations and employees are mandated to engage with their constituent communities; the ideological position and understanding of the role of the state and the problems of the inner-city

informing their work; the analysis and perspectives adopted *vis-à-vis* state policies; the nature of the assistance provided to communities in formulating their response to state policies; the degree to which community organisations seek to transcend their territorial boundaries to forge linkages with others in similar positions and the parties to whom they look for the expression and progression of the community's issues. In short, critical attention is brought to bear on the ends to which community-development and other community-participatory organisations are functioning, whether in an independent, critical manner in defence of working-class interests or as tools of social control and instruments of an integrationist ideology (Saunders, 1979). Critical attention also comes to bear on those state-funded community employees who breach reformist parameters to prescribe a more radical analysis and programme of action than that envisaged by their state funders. The experience of the Community Development Projects established by the UK Home Office in the 1970s continues to represent one of the most important illustrations of the fate attending upon those who seek to advance a structural analysis of the problems of inner-city communities (see Community Development Project, 1977; Kraushaar, 1977).

- ***Case for an alliance between community and economic struggles.***

Although the above literature on the character of community struggles and the significance that community organisations and employees enjoy in their articulation derives, in the main, from the 1970s, the degree to which these analyses continue to resonate with the analyses and critiques of community organisations and community action in the 2000s is striking. Writing in 1977, Cockburn argued that the realm of production was not the only valid site of economic struggle and proceeded to make the case for redressing the manner in which the parties of the left had traditionally neglected struggles outside the realm of the production. "To organise at the workplace alone leaves out half the worker's own experience of exploitation – speaking as it does of the cash wage but not of prices or the social wage. More important, it excludes all wageless people from organisation" (Cockburn, 1977: 166). That argument surfaced two decades later in Tufts' (1998: 228) exploration of the argument for 'community unionism,' which he defined as "an organizational model still in an embryonic stage of development... characterized by the formation of coalitions between unions and non-labor groups in order to achieve common goals." Noting the growing literature on the prospects for extending and translating trade-union practices across different spaces and sectors, Tufts also invoked Soja's (1989) call for class struggle to embrace 'the territorial structure of exploitation.'

> "Class struggle (yes it still remains class struggle) must pass and focus upon the vulnerable point: the production of space, the territorial structure of exploitation and domination, the spatially controlled reproduction of the system as a whole. And it must include all those who are exploited, dominated and 'peripheralized' by the imposed spatial organization of advanced capitalism: landless peasants, proletarianized petty bourgeoisies, women, students, racial minorities, as well as the working class itself" (Soja, 1989: 92, cited in Tufts, 1998).

Writing in the Australian context in which Burgmann and Burgmann (1998: 7) had already employed the term 'social-movement unionism' to describe the green ban movement of the 1970s, Lipsig-Mummé (2003) similarly cited the meanings, uses and potential of community unionism together with the range of alliances that might usefully be forged between trade unions and communities.

- ***The argument for the reassertion of economic antagonism and class.***

Against the backdrop of a restructuring of the public realm that has sought to contain the problems of economically poor working-class communities within the ideological and geographical confines of area-based 'communities' and a governance environment that has sought to annihilate the existence of contradictory or irreconcilable interests, this section closes by attending to the arguments that critical theorists have made for the reassertion of economic antagonisms and distinct class interests at the heart of many of the state's interventions in the urban realm. Holgersen and Haarstad (2009: 348) have directed attention to the manner in which "class interests tend to be obscured by the contemporary preoccupation with the class-ambiguous category of 'community'." Writing about the site of what has been termed the biggest inner-city redevelopment in Europe (Kings Cross, London), they remarked on the virtual absence of the "issue of class... from the discussions around the redevelopment, which are managed through a 'communicative' planning process and resisted by various 'community' groups" (*ibid., 348*). For Holgersen and Haarstad, 'the communicative ideal,' which proceeds as if economic antagonisms and economic conflicts can be overcome through 'proper communication,' is characterised as little more than a fallacy (*ibid.,* 349). In defiance of the attempt to evacuate the issue of class from urban planning and redevelopment, they set out to 'make visible' the economic antagonisms excluded from the communicative planning processes through which these major urban interventions are progressed. Notwithstanding the articulation of opposition to the Kings Cross development as "'community' rather than 'labor'" (*ibid.,* 354), they highlighted the 'clear class effects' that could be distinguished in different aspects of the development process (*ibid.,* 357) and concluded that the widespread use of the category of 'community' could be attributed to the service that it performs for "neoliberal discourses that promote economic rationality rather than economic antagonisms in the governance of society." They then proposed three strategies for the reinsertion of class into planning theory and practice: (i) to acknowledge that "capitalism is based on economic antagonisms" and accordingly to bypass the 'contemporary assumptions' re 'community' and 'consensus' to identify the class antagonisms at issue in planning; (ii) to extend an awareness of "the dialectics and interdependence between different social, economic and political spheres" to an understanding of the dialectic relation that similarly exists between planning and each of these spheres; (iii) to take a 'standpoint' on economic antagonisms such as 'class' in planning and, more specifically, "to take a standpoint for the dominated classes" in contradistinction to the 'normative standpoints' for 'communities,' 'investment climates' and 'local business' etc. that are already prevalent in contemporary planning.

Holgersen and Haarstad point out that the latter standpoints are "in effect not any less political than a standpoint for the dominated classes" (*ibid.*, 367).

2.4. Quiescence, incorporation and domination.

The third and final mode of engagement and non-engagement at issue in this research pertains to political quiescence and inaction among working-class communities in response to public policies which are detrimental to their objective interests (Saunders, 1979). This section examines the available literature on political quiescence with particular attention to the manner in which it has been considered within pluralist and political economy perspectives. While it is primarily concerned with instances of quiescence and non-engagement as they pertain to urban renewal and regeneration, it also expands its focus to consider the insights which have been forthcoming from the broader literature as it refers to the nonparticipation of low-income working-class communities in policies, plans and processes that have a determining effect on their lives. It commences with an examination of the treatment of non-engagement among low-income communities in general and closes with a consideration of the way in political quiescence is problematised.

2.4.1 Non-engagement among low-income communities in general.

The issue of non-participation has attracted considerable attention in the sociological and political-science literature. In the field of sociology, Bagguley (1991) has written extensively about political acquiescence among the unemployed. He was particularly interested in the structural position occupied by the unemployed, the nature of their relationship with the state and the degree to which the experience of unemployment was "an isolating rather than collectivising experience" (*ibid.*, 145-7). In attempting to establish the degree to which discontent was "translated into an oppositional discourse and associated collective action" (*ibid.*, 164), he pointed to significant differences both between the involved and uninvolved and amongst the involved themselves. For Bagguley, the principal distinction among the latter grouping was drawn between those advancing a traditional class analysis and those espousing individualist responses and "ideologies associated with 'new social movements'" (*ibid.*, 165). The following factors were identified as important for political mobilisation: class consciousness, opportunities for and prospects of collective organisation and action, 'communicative competence' and political organisation itself when it came to "producing and disseminating critical, oppositional beliefs" (*ibid.*, 167). While activists were characterised by a greater degree of optimism, there did not appear to be agreement on either the analysis or course of action to be pursued. When it came to the 'un-mobilised,' fatalism was identified as "the most important ideological mechanism" (*ibid.*, 200) impeding the collective mobilisation of those with a clear understanding of the manner in which the system was militating against their interests.

Political quiescence also appears to have commanded considerable attention within political science. MacCulloch (2004: 830) pointed to two strands of literature that have emphasised respectively "the role of deprivation and grievances brought on by economic or political conditions" and the participation decisions that follow on a 'utility calculation' about the gains and losses likely to follow on participation. His principal interest lay in "the impact of [national] income on the taste for revolt" (*ibid.*). He concluded that GDP increases impact negatively on "revolutionary tastes" as does significant upward mobility between income groups (*ibid.,* 843). Solt (2008) looked behind the levels of national income to demonstrate the way in which "economic inequality powerfully depresses political interest, discussion of politics and participation in elections among all but the most affluent" (*ibid.*, 48). The withdrawal of 'the non-affluent' in this manner allows the consensus constructed on key redistributive issues among the affluent to proceed largely uncontested through the political process. Focusing specifically on those in receipt of welfare payments, Soss (1999: 363) explored the reasons why welfare recipients, who have "an unusually visible material stake in government policies" are "an especially quiescent group." He identified some of the most widely accepted explanations for quiescence, namely pre-existing characteristics, cultivated dependency, diversion and cooptation of "political demand-making" and "the experience of welfare participation itself," prior to selecting the latter for particular attention, namely the manner in which "welfare programs are designed to shape poor people's behaviors both inside and outside the welfare agency" (*ibid.*). The issue continues to resonate with sociologists and political scientists with Chaves *et al.* (2004) considering the degree to which government funding suppresses the political activity of 'nonprofits;' Lawless and Fox (2001: 363) attending to the factors and nuances that account for "variations in levels of participation *within* the population of poor citizens, a minority of whom *do* participate" and McVeigh and Smith (1999: 685) seeking to establish the factors that differentiate "those who protest from those who engage only in institutionalized politics and from those who engage in no political action."

2.4.2 Pluralist and political economy perspectives on political quiescence.

- ***Pluralist perspectives.***

As noted in Chapter 1, pluralism advances a decidedly sanguine interpretation of political quiescence. It characterises the political process as being open and democratic with easy access to both decision-makers and channels of communication and assumes that those who feel strongly about a particular issue will be able to make their views heard in the political arena. Accordingly, political inaction is to be understood as "as a sign of satisfaction with the situation as it stands, or at worst disinterest" (Kirk, 1980: 60). While recognising that political inactivity might "reflect fatalism as much as satisfaction," Dahl argued that "those with intense preferences and political concerns will be motivated to voice them" (Dahl, 1963, cited in Saunders, 1979). Dahl's concept of a 'normal political process' was delineated as being:

> "one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision... [by which] I mean more than the simple fact that it makes a noise; I mean that one or more officials are not only ready to listen to the noise, but expect to suffer in some significant way if they do not placate the group, its leaders or its most vociferous members" (Dahl, 1956: 145, cited in Dunleavy, 1977).

However, this depiction of a 'normal political process' does not stand up under scrutiny. Of the many criticisms which have been levelled at the pluralist understanding of political inaction, Bachrach & Baratz's (1962, 1970) rebuttal to the pluralist understanding of political inaction bears particular attention. For Bachrach and Baratz (1962), the appearance of quiescence may be attributed to the operation of a 'second face' of power. The concept is used to illustrate the way in which power is often exercised by "confining the scope of decision-making to relatively 'safe' issues" (*ibid.,* 948) thereby confining "the scope of the political process to the consideration of issues which are generally innocuous and which pose no real threat to the structural bases of economic power" (MacLaran & McGuirk, 2003: 72). It was a line of analysis that Lukes (2005: 28) was subsequently to elaborate in his conceptualisation of a third and ideological dimension of power, "the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things" because they cannot conceive of any alternative. Bachrach and Baratz's critique of pluralism subsequently expanded to encompass the concept of 'non-decision-making' to illustrate the manner in which power could be used to prevent the emergence of potentially disruptive opposition in the public arena. They pointed to three ways in which an opposition might be stifled in this way: (i) the failure of the powerful to make any response to 'the articulation of political demands by less powerful groups' thereby ensuring that a decision is never taken; (ii) the failure of the less powerful to articulate or 'press their demands' because of anticipated failure or retaliation; (iii) the 'mobilization of bias' by dominant interests to curtail the expression, reception and even conception of certain political demands (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, discussed in Saunders, 1979: 28-31)..

Criticisms of the pluralist understanding of inaction do not end with Bachrach and Baratz. Kirk (1980) pointed to the *laissez faire* attitude underlying the pluralist approach which provides a number of different means of engaging and then places the onus on individuals to avail of those opportunities. It does not, however, take cognisance of "the very real possibility that many people are apathetic from a feeling of powerless" in the face of issues, which "fundamentally do not appear to be negotiable" (*ibid.,* 171). The introduction of apathy as a factor to be considered in non-engagement is accompanied by an important caveat. Attempts to construe the non-participation of large elements of the population in working-class areas as "either communal listlessness or contentment with the *status quo*" have been rejected as being "inherently conservative assessments of declining engagement in public processes... [which] might more reasonably be understood as a wholly rational response resulting from alienation from underlying power structures" (MacLaran *et*

al., 2007a: 324-5). Saunders (1979: 23) suggested that "the starting point for any explanation of political action or inaction lies in a consideration of the distribution of crucial political resources in society" in light of the 'generally close' relationship that exists between economic and political power. This is not, however, a relationship that pluralism is willing to concede. Saunders continued by identifying a number of 'critical omissions' in the pluralist understanding of inactivity, including the manner in which legitimation may be secured through "the prior exercise of inducement, coercion or manipulation" (*ibid.,* 27-8). Pluralism's failure to attend to "a fundamental power relationship within the urban system, particularly one usually tending to keep an issue latent," meanwhile leads pluralism to neglect the incidence and analytical and political significance of latent or non-protests (Dunleavy, 1977: 200). For Dunleavy, pluralist and structuralist analyses are similarly indicted on this charge. The criticism of structural analyses is extended to incorporate the latter's explanation of "the non-achievement of urban or political effects or of reforms" with reference only to "the deficiencies of the protest or urban social movement," a conclusion which Dunleavy judged to be "extraordinarily conservative" (*ibid.,* 197-8).

- ***Political-economy perspectives.***

The Marxian political-economy perspective advances a completely contrary analysis of inaction within working-class communities whereby political quiescence is understood in one structuralist formulation to be the product of a dominant ideology, which "functions to incorporate the working class within a system which is, in fact, operating against the material interests of labour" (Abercrombie *et al.*, 1980: 2). The dominant ideology thesis is formulated with varying degrees of strength. In the stronger (incorporation) formulation, "the command exercised by the ruling class over the apparatus of intellectual production" is such that there can only be one dominant culture in society into which all are incorporated (*ibid.,* 8). The weaker (domination) formulation, meanwhile, holds that the dominant ideology functions to inhibit and confuse the development of a counter-ideology among subordinate classes. As a consequence "an observer will necessarily perceive only the ruling ideas and will not be able to apprehend the culture of the subordinate classes simply because that culture does not have institutions to give it expression" (*ibid.*). The latter formulation appeared to resonate with critics such as Kirk (1980: 161-2) who pointed to the manner in which even the most radical of local protests were condemned to remain local in the absence of either a political party or 'coordinated political action' to give political expression to their demands.

Chapter 1 has already noted the particularly important analytical contribution made by Marxist writers concerned about the role of ideology in maintaining "the apparent stability of capitalist societies and the lack of a radical working-class consciousness" (Abercrombie *et al.,* 1980: 9). Habermas's (1976) concept of legitimation is of key importance in this respect as is Althusser's (1971) depiction of the role that repressive and ideological state apparatuses play in securing the reproduction of the relations of production and submission to the ruling ideology. However, it is

Gramsci (1971) more than any other theorist who has contributed to the contemporary formulation of the dominant ideology thesis (Abercrombie *et al.,* 1980). Central to this discussion is Gramsci's (1971: 57) concept of hegemony, whereby "the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership." For Gramsci, the domination of one class over another is achieved by a combination of repressive and ideological means, with the balance between coercion and consent varying in accordance with the historical context. He did not, however, believe that the working class was ever completely subordinated or incorporated. He evolved the concept of dual consciousness to describe the way in which working-class people simultaneously hold "two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness)" (*ibid.,* 333), one formed by the dominant ideology and culture, the other generated by the lived class experience. While Gramsci acknowledged the existence of working-class consciousness, he also pointed out that its end product tended to be "a condition of moral and political passivity" in the absence of "a struggle of political hegemonies" (*ibid.*). In effecting such a struggle of hegemonies, Gramsci pointed to the key role that 'organic intellectuals' would assume as a category of intellectuals which were "distinguished less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong" (*ibid.,* 3). Crucially this category or intellectuals would both emerge from within their own class and 'remain intellectuals *of* their class' (*ibid.,* 6). The threat that the emergence of such a category of intellectuals would pose for the state was self-evident.

The dominant ideology thesis has attracted numerous criticisms, not least its failure to recognise the ability of subordinate groups to develop their own and potentially revolutionary consciousness. Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is clear that many of the concepts propounded by those Marxist thinkers who were concerned about the role of ideology in the maintenance of the cohesion and stability of capitalist society, continue to underwrite some of the most critical assessments of political passivity in the face of extremely fractious neoliberal policies. Gramsci's concept of hegemony remains central to analyses of the ascendancy and stability of the neoliberal order. Harvey (2005: 39), for example, charted the manner in which the political consent constructed across "a sufficiently large spectrum of the population" enabled the neoliberal revolution to be "accomplished by democratic means" in both the United States and Britain. For Harvey, consent was typically grounded in Gramsci's 'common sense.' Swyngedouw (2007: 36) has similarly written about the consolidation of a "hegemonic neoliberal view of social ordering… one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict and the possibility of a different future." In an Irish context, Kirby (2007) has suggested that the social-partnership model was a recipe for the quiescence of the public sphere in so far as it created a structured political and public space dominated by a consensus culture from which all contradictory spaces had been eradicated. (The manner in which the Irish social-partnership model functioned to co-opt critical dissenting voices is discussed further in Chapter 4.) The "operations of the state [to] ensure a sufficient degree of economic and political

harmonization and ideological control to enable capital accumulation... to be sustained" are to be discerned with equal clarity in the urban planning and development arena at the level of the local state (MacLaran and McGuirk, 2003: 76).

- ***Additional explanations.***

The explanations reviewed above comprise a sample of those which have been advanced from within the pluralist and structuralist perspectives. Other explanations are not so easily categorised. Saunders (1979), for example, argued that the problems encountered by working-class communities are not simply problems of dominant ideologies or inadequate channels of communication but may also to be attributed to the difficulties encountered in negotiating the rules of access determined by gate keepers:

> "...it is also the case that one very important source of inaction and bias lies in the operation of political routines themselves... Put simply, the rules (both formal and informal) governing differential access to political power generate a bias in favour of some sections of the population and against others, and the causal responsibility for this bias can be traced to those who operate the rules" (Saunders, 1979: 60).

In such circumstances, quiescence may be considered as the end product of the state's actions to ensure and maintain political inaction. MacLaran *et al.* (2007a) identified a series of formidable barriers impeding the participation of working-class communities in urban planning and regeneration. Extending the analysis of political inactivity to public representatives, Cockburn (1977) pointed to the responsibility that corporate local-government structures bear for the advent of quiescent and politically inert local councillors. Those same structures were understood to militate in a particular way against the participation of working-class public representatives. It was thus that established political structures and routines could be mobilised to impede the entry of working-class interests into the public arena even in those cases where working-class communities had succeeded in electing local representatives. Dunleavy similarly (1977: 215) concluded that political inaction should be understood as "the product of continued domination, politically as well as ideologically" and a simple indication of powerlessness in the face of the powerful coalition of state and private-sector interests confronted in the urban realm. Conservative analyses of inactivity also failed to engage with the history of engagements and struggles that might have preceded the current quiescent complexion of working-class communities. Castells (1977a), for example, described the tactics utilised by urban-renewal bodies to intimidate and fragment protest groups in the interests of depriving those movements of their collective character. It was in this context that the significance of the false dichotomy which had emerged between 'the poor' and 'the wider working population' and functioned to impede the emergence of a potentially powerful class alliance, became fully apparent (Allen, 1999).

Regardless of the particular explanation to which critics subscribe, it is apparent that the dynamics characterising apparently politically inactive and unengaged communities are significantly more

complex than initially appears to be the case. Beyond all of the analyses of the barriers impeding the mobilisation and engagement of working-class communities, little attention has been given to the hard lessons that communities have learned from previous engagements with the state, which have in some instances resulted in the 'pragmatic choice' of 'active self-exclusion' (Cornwall, 2008: 280).

2.4.3 Merits of research investigation into political quiescence.

This exploration of the different meanings and explanations which have been ascribed to political quiescence and inaction among working-class communities in the face of public policies detrimental to their objective interests concludes with a brief consideration of the merits of problematising political quiescence in this manner. This point can be made with reference to explorations of political quiescence in the broader population at a time when the neoliberal and post-political order have both sought to foreclose on the consideration of any alternative social order and to render the entire public sphere quiescent. Crouch (2004: 4) argued that politics was increasingly moving towards a post-political order, in which:

> "The mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals given them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests."

As "politics and government are gradually slipping back into the control of privileged elites" (*ibid.*, 6) it appears that post-democratic governance and citizen quiescence might be treated as two sides of the same coin.

Attempts to problematise political quiescence with respect to low-income communities only, overlook the fact that significantly more powerful interests also may not choose to assert or defend their political interests in the public realm. Kirk (1980: 170-1) pointed to two kinds of interests which are "not active and visible in the political process... those to whose interests policy automatically defers without any positive assertion on the part of the interests in question... and those with contrary interests who never even consider opposing because they feel that it would be pointless." In a similar manner Anderson & Jacobs (1999: 1022) referred to 'certified' or 'legitimised publics,' which enjoy "a degree of official authority and bureaucratic embeddedness which is denied to counterpublics." These legitimised publics can abstain from the political process confident in the knowledge that their interests are "typically already 'defined in' (and served by) development agendas" (*ibid.*) The inference that the interests of those who run counter to such legitimised publics will conversely be 'defined out' may go some way towards explaining why "most of the time, it is poorer people who are required to participate in these ways" (Cornwall, 2008: 275) for it is the latter who are obliged constantly to defend their interests in the face of repeated neoliberal offensives.

There is an additional question to be considered in the quest to understand quiescence in low-income communities - the possibility that the research question itself may be flawed. The more important research question may pertain to the factors which are functioning to obscure the considerable degree of activism, engagement and mobilisation that *is actually* taking place in such communities (see MacLaran *et al.,* 2007; Brudell & MacLaran, 2009). Community-development practitioners have described the way in which many disadvantaged communities are in fact characterised by high degrees of community activity and activism and yet remain politically powerless, while more affluent communities conversely enjoy considerable political power while remaining inactive and unengaged (Murray & Rogers, 2007).

- ***Addendum.***

This review has adverted to the treatment of political quiescence in the broader academic literature and the analyses which it has advanced of apparently low rates of political engagement among low-income communities. In relaying the findings of such research, it is important to be aware of the sources from which such analyses emanate and to consider whether there are other and more important bodies of documentation that should be consulted on the topic. This point is made in the context of a conservative public realm which has functioned to obscure the very critical experiences and perspectives of those who have found themselves in conflict with the state. That hypothesis can be validated in an Irish context by reverting to the body of both published and unpublished literature produced within low-income communities themselves. The latter body of documentation is characterised as 'grey literature,'[7] a category of literature produced by bodies for whom publishing is either 'not the primary activity of the producing body' or a sphere of activity from which 'the producing body' is debarred by virtue of a paucity of resources. While the 'grey literature' produced within working-class communities will not be sourced through conventional publication channels, it nonetheless may constitute a repository for work of significant empirical, analytical and political import which, unlike many of the analyses which find their way into publication, is not as Harvey (1973) has noted 'suffused with apologetics for the *status quo.*' Investigations into apparent quiescence in low-income communities which fail to engage with this body of literature may, in some respects, be complicit in acquiescing uncritically with the unwritten power relations that function to impede the entry of critical voices into the public arena, where they might prove disruptive of the dominant definition of the situation and of the meaning which dominant groups ascribe to the apparent political inactivity of working-class communities.

[7] Grey Literature is defined as "information produced on all levels of government, academics, business and industry in electronic and print formats not controlled by commercial publishing i.e. where publishing is not the primary activity of the producing body" (http://www.greynet.org/ accessed 11th November 2010). This definition is extended in the present context to incorporate community organisations which may not have access to commercial publishing for financial reasons.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology.

3.1 Introduction and overview.

3.1.1 An investigation into engagements between urban working-class communities and the local state.

This thesis is concerned with the nature of the engagements taking place between working-class communities and the local state as the latter assumes an increasingly neoliberal and entrepreneurial orientation (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001). The neoliberal orientation of the local state finds expression in a number of ways: interventions in the urban environment *via* urban-development projects; the withdrawal from the provision and management of public housing; the promotion of public-private partnerships in housing regeneration; the sale and transfer of public lands; the privatisation of refuse collections; the introduction of increasingly strict controls on the public domain (e.g. *via* the prohibition on the display of public posters outside of election time) etc. However, the manner in which this agenda has been received in Ireland by urban working-class communities has been an as yet sporadically researched area. The research has selected one particular facet of that neoliberal agenda as the medium within which to explore the core concerns of this thesis, namely urban-development projects and, more, specifically urban-renewal and urban-regeneration projects.[8] This chapter outlines the methodology employed in conducting a comprehensive investigation of the manner in which this facet of the neoliberal agenda has been received, understood and, on occasion, resisted by low-income urban communities.

This chapter outlines the aims and objectives of the research topic, taking cognisance of the methodological challenge arising in the investigation of the topic. It notes the semantic difficulties which emerge in the description of the various modes of engagement with the state and attempts to delineate the precise significance of each term employed in the research. It proceeds to outline the research strategy employed, namely the urban policy at issue; the case-study area selected; the information required; the categories of data sourced from secondary sources and the categories of data gathered from primary sources. It provides full details of each of the sources consulted and the manner in which all data was collected and analysed. The chapter closes with direction to the manner in which the large body of data generated by this comprehensive programme of data collection is presented in the body of thesis.

[8] It is important at the outset to state that the research is specifically concerned with urban-renewal and urban-regeneration policies as they pertain to the development, sale and/or reorganisation of large tracts of urban land in key city locations as opposed to housing-regeneration policies as they are pursued in respect of individual local-authority flats complexes.

3.2 Aims and Objectives.

3.2.1 Statement of research aims and objectives

The central concern of this thesis is the relationship between participation, incorporation and resistance in low-income urban communities which are obliged to play host to the increasingly neoliberal interventions of the Irish state in the urban environment. In an environment characterised by a proliferation of new governance and social-partnership structures, this thesis is concerned with the degree to which these new participation structures have been instituted to facilitate the genuine participation and interests of economically marginalised communities, and the degree to which they have been instituted to incorporate, marginalise and suppress any arising dissent and opposition arising among disadvantaged communities to the real private-sector interests involved in the implementation of urban-renewal programmes.

In pursuit of this overall aim, this thesis has articulated three specific research objectives; (i) to examine the spectrum of inner-city community involvement with the local state in the implementation of urban-renewal and regeneration programmes; (ii) to investigate the community's experience of both engaging with the state, with reference to the scope and manner of that participation and resisting the state, with reference to the scope and mechanics of that resistance; (iii) to establish the state's success in forging and maintaining a consensus surrounding urban-renewal and regeneration programmes. In exploring the nature of the engagements which ensued between inner-city communities and the local state in the implementation of urban-renewal and regeneration programmes, this research seeks to establish the state's rationale for seeking to enjoin host working-class communities to these projects; the adequacy of the steps taken to ensure that all sections of the host urban communities were adequately represented in the formulation and implementation of these plans; the factors underlining the non-engagement of large sections of disadvantaged communities; the gains and losses accruing to communities in current implementation procedures and the implications for future relations between low-income urban communities and the local state as the latter intervenes in an increasingly aggressive manner in the urban environment.

The central question to be pursued in all of the above concerns the manner in which the relative harmony and apparent political quiescence (Gramsci, 1971) surrounding the implementation of these programmes in Dublin's inner city is to be understood and the degree to which such quiescence reflects a 'second face of power' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). As urban renewal and regeneration brings land-use change and increasing housing pressures to bear, this research also considers the likely implications for working-class communities resident in these areas and whether that political quiescence could now give way to more confrontational engagements.

3.2.2 A clarification of terms.

This research investigates three broad modes of engagement on the part of low-income urban communities with the state – *participation and engagement, non-engagement and inactivity* and *opposition and resistance* - and the cumulative effects of each of these forms of engagement and non-engagement for those communities targeted by the state's urban-renewal and regeneration programmes. It is interested in the processes, structures and ends to which the state has sought the *incorporation* of working-class communities within the new governance structures established to oversee the implementation of these urban-renewal and regeneration programmes. It is particularly interested in the *political quiescence* that has ensued following increasing contacts between the state and inner-city working-class communities. As the demarcation lines between each of these broad modes of engagement are not as clear or absolute as might initially appear, the research recognises the importance of having clarity on what is denoted by each of the terms.

'Participation' within the state's structures may, for example, be undertaken towards either supportive or oppositional ends. The decision to participate in a supportive manner may follow on a reasoned assessment of the gains likely to follow from engagement with the state. Participation in the preparation and implementation of a plan inimical to one's own interests might be considered a form or incorporation or political acquiescence. Conversely, critical participation in the implementation of such a plan might also be a way of subverting the state's participative structures to other and more critical ends (Cockburn, 1977). Participatory responses retain the potential to be transformed into a protest response at all times. While 'disengagement' from those same structures and processes may denote a greater level of critical activity than 'non-engagement,' it would be mistaken to equate uncritically 'non-engagement' with 'inactivity.' Both might conceivably follow from a considered and critical assessment of the relative merits and demerits of engaging with the state's processes and structures. In those instances where such an assessment results in the assumption of a protest or oppositional stance, cognisance should also be taken of the degree to which oppositional stances are maintained and the degree to which they are adopted as tactical stances to secure concessions prior to resuming participation.

Particular care must also be taken with the ascription of the terms 'acquiescent' or 'quiescent' to those on the receiving end of the state's renewal policies. First, a population can only be considered to be acquiescent in relation to a particular policy or development when it has been fully apprised of the full content and import of the given policy or development. In those situations in which the state elects to engage with a community *via* invited representatives, the acquiescence of the community cannot be inferred from the acquiescence of community representatives if the latter are not deemed to be genuinely representative of and accountable to the target communities (see Arnstein, 1969). A similar distinction must be drawn between quiescence in the face of a policy or development of which the host community has been fully informed and quiescence in the face of a

policy or development where no such information has been forthcoming. In the face of a very powerful political and media consensus which functions to inhibit the emergence of any contradictory or oppositional voices in the public domain, the distinction between real and apparent quiescence clearly remains very important. This research will remain alert at all times to those instances in which an apparent quiescence masks an underlying radical consciousness and analysis.

This brief deliberation on the semantic difficulties and different gradations of meaning arising in the employment of each of these terms provides an illustration of the care necessary when examining the precise nature of the engagement or non-engagement encountered in the primary research undertaken in this research. The careful application of these terms allows the research to address the continuum of community positions encountered, from supportive engagement to outright opposition.

3.2.3 Methodological challenge.

In embarking upon the investigation of the above research questions, the research encountered an inner-city population engaged in an apparently harmonious relationship with a local state which appeared to have successfully enjoined all parties to the consensus surrounding the implementation of its urban-renewal and regeneration programmes. The research sought to investigate behind the official rhetoric of urban renewal to establish the basis upon which that apparent consensus rested. It sought to establish the degree to which that quiescence was indicative of a genuine consensus and contentment among the host population, the degree to which it was a product of new governance structures and mediated relations which seek the incorporation of local communities and the degree to which it had functioned to eclipse an altogether more critical and oppositional stance *vis-à-vis* the state's urban-renewal and regeneration projects.

In attempting to devise a methodology which could decipher the genesis, actuality and extent of that political quiescence and its relational significance *vis-à-vis* other forms of harmonious and antagonistic relations with the state, this research attended to existing academic research into political quiescence and resistance among low-income working-class communities. It looked in particular at the methodology employed in other analyses of quiescence and resistance as they relate to urban renewal and regeneration (Castells, 1977a; Dunleavy, 1977; Olives, 1976; Punch 2000). As this research was specifically concerned with the range of responses forthcoming in disadvantaged urban areas, it also looked at more general analyses of political inactivity and quiescence among low-income and unemployed groups (Bagguley, 1991; Chaves *et al.*, 2004; Lawless & Fox, 2001; MacCulloch, 2004; Solt, 2008; Soss, 1999).

This research attended, in particular, to one of the criticisms frequently advanced of analyses of urban social movements and protest, namely the failure to attend to interests "not active and visible

in the political process" (Kirk, 1980: 170-1) and the failure to illuminate those instances where "a fundamental power relationship within the urban system" functions to keep issues latent (Dunleavy, 1977: 200). In attending to the ability of individual theoretical frameworks to provide adequate explanation for the emergence and non-emergence of protest in those situations where all objective factors would dictate the emergence of opposition, this research attended at all times to "the capacity of the state apparatus and other dominant groups to suppress or deflect hostile political developments, and the consequent analytic necessity of studying political inactivity or quiescence in addition to overt political action" (*ibid.*, 194).

In so doing, the research was informed by a structural analysis that directs attention to those instances in the urban environment in which it is possible to discern an objective structural contradiction at play in the enjoining of radically different class interests to endeavours essentially functioning for the benefit of one class only (see Chapter 4). In articulating such a criterion, the methodology endeavoured to surmount the earlier methodological failure of both structural and pluralist analyses in focusing exclusively on manifest protest activity to the exclusion of apparent political inactivity (Dunleavy, 1977). This research accordingly adopted as its starting point "not political practices *per se,* but rather, the identification of system contradictions" (Castells, 1977a, cited in Saunders, 1979: 110) and, thereafter, the factors determining the manifestation or non-manifestation of such conflicts of interest in the public arena. Thus, it established a basis for this research to expand its investigations to incorporate those interests active and inactive, visible and invisible in the political process (Kirk, 1980).

In exploring the range of responses forthcoming from communities resident in areas targeted for the state's interventions in the urban realm, this research examined the manner in which inner-city communities responded to the range of participatory structures recently instituted by the state. In so doing, it sought to establish the relative merits and demerits and analytical insights forthcoming from the very different ways in which participation has been theorised in the literature on planning and more general participatory typologies, partnership, collaborative planning and neoliberal governance (see Chapter 2). As this research also sought to explore the range of responses outside such formal structures, it sought to establish the contribution, if any, which such typologies could make to the exploration and analysis of other modes of engagement and non-engagement. The research endeavoured to uncover the full panoply of relations between the local state and working-class communities established in the course of urban-renewal and regeneration projects in the area of Dublin's inner city in which the research elected to conduct its investigations. That spectrum of relations included those who supported the state in the implementation of its plans, thereby assuming a high visibility in the public arena; those who resisted the state's plans and were frequently obscured from the public view and the largely silent majority whose public silence has often been taken as a tacit endorsement by official parties.

While attending closely to the theoretical framework within which the core concerns of this thesis have been conceptualised, the methodological framework within which researchers investigating similar topics have worked and the methodological framework outlined below, this research accorded precedence to the lived-experience, knowledge and understanding of those inner-city working-class communities which have engaged and struggled with the state. It set aside and 'wrote from below the theory' in all cases where that theory proved inadequate to the facts of working-class lives. Interviews and individual analyses form, therefore, an integral part of the research.

3.3 Research Strategy.

3.3.1 The urban policy at issue – urban renewal and regeneration.

The urban policy selected as the medium within which to investigate the research objectives is the urban policy described variously as urban-renewal and urban-regeneration, which with its programme of fiscal incentives constituted a major component of Irish urban-development policy between 1986 and 2008. While the state may no longer have this policy tool at its disposal, in the case of Dublin at least, the local state appears intent on maintaining the momentum for urban-regeneration, albeit using a different type of state intervention (see Chapter 8 and 9). The phase of the urban-renewal and regeneration agenda at issue here is the phase distinguished by formal policy moves to incorporate the host communities within the statutory consultative and participative structures established to oversee their preparation and implementation, i.e. 1998-2008 (see Chapter 4).

- ***Rationale for policy selection.***

The rationale for selecting this particular form of state intervention as the arena for investigating the research objectives is based on a number of factors. In the first place, urban-renewal and regeneration programmes centre around the most crucial resource in the urban environment – that of land and the processes set in train to effect a revalorisation of land in those urban areas whose property values had dwindled following the earlier withdrawal of capital. As the revalorisation of land has immediate and direct implications for the housing of indigenous communities, whether they be awaiting housing on the social-housing waiting lists, resident in social housing, the private-rental sector or owner-occupied housing, urban-renewal programmes represent one of the most significant interventions that the state can make in the lives of urban working-class communities. Urban-renewal and regeneration policies may be cited in many instances as specific examples of the state's intervening to take allocational decisions which benefit one class over another (Harvey, 1973) and, specifically, to take decisions that benefit property capital over propertyless working-class communities.

- *The aspect of the policy at issue.*

This research is interested in two aspects of urban-regeneration policies: (i) their impact on urban working-class communities; (ii) the nature of engagements that have taken place between the local state and local communities in their implementation. In a policy environment in which the implementation of these policies is presented as being in the interests of all parties: government, city, banking, investment and development interests, future residents as well as indigenous communities, this research is specifically interested in the demonstrable and quantifiable impact of regeneration policies on urban working-class communities. It is interested in the manner in which such programmes have been experienced by communities living in the areas targeted by these policies. It is especially interested in the overtures made by the local state to communities in their implementation and the choices which the latter have made when confronted by such policies and overtures. As noted in Chapter 2, these initiatives also provide an important opportunity to attend to the changing dynamics which follow on the movement of deprived urban communities outside the activities to which the state has traditionally sought to confine them onto a terrain where their actions have the potential to disrupt the interests of capital and the state's actions on its behalf (Cockburn, 1977).

3.3.2 The case-study area selected.

- ***Rationale for case-study methodology.***

The nature of the research enquiry, an investigation into the extent and actuality of the consensus surrounding urban-regeneration programmes and the range of responses forthcoming from the host communities in the face of these programmes, was judged to be best served by a case-study enquiry. This decision was based on a number of factors. A case-study enquiry allowed for the necessarily close attention to the complexity of the urban-renewal paradigm. It allowed the research to establish the nature of the engagements taking place between the party spearheading the state's intervention, the local authority, and the party targeted for these interventions, low-income working-class communities. It allowed the research to inquire into the degree to which the experience of those inner-city communities playing host to the implementation of these interventions in the urban environment accorded with the official orthodoxy surrounding urban-regeneration programmes and the degree to which that orthodoxy might be serving to obscure an altogether different and more contested reality.

A case-study enquiry allowed the research to research to look beyond the assessments of the local authority to establish the degree to which its positive assessments were shared by the host communities and the broader range of positions and experiences that might be obscured by the government's assessments. More particularly, it allowed the research to carefully consider the many factors, circumstances, assessments and relationships at play in the maintenance of a powerful consensus surrounding a programme in which different and sharply contradictory

property interests were at stake. It provided a means of illustrating the nature of the relationships, the micro-political issues and the patterns of influence that come into play in a particular context when a number of different and competing interests are at stake (Bell 1993: 9). The adoption of a case-study methodology was accordingly judged to be an appropriate research method as it allowed for the necessarily in-depth qualitative exploration of the manner in which consensus is forged, hegemony effected and dissent managed in the implementation of such programmes.

- ***Geographical area of interest.***

This research elected to conduct its enquiries in Dublin for a number of reasons. As the capital city of a country with a comparatively small number of cities and urban centres, Dublin provided the only urban centre of sufficient size and population density to explore the research questions detailed above. As the capital city, Dublin has an evident national strategic importance as the seat of government and the site of many of the major institutions of the state. The National Competitiveness Council (2009) has pointed to the importance which cities assume both as national drivers and in securing Ireland's competitive advantage globally. In a global economy, it has been Dublin more than any other Irish city that has been promoted internationally on the global stage on which cities now appear obliged to compete. Regeneration projects are one of the means through which Dublin has been encouraged to enhance its competitive edge.

> "The OECD in its *Competitive Cities in the Global Economy* argues that underperforming areas 'may constitute the next best hope for a major improvement' in a city's competitiveness.' In a forthcoming study, Dublin does not compare well with other European cities in relation to successful inner city regeneration" (DCC, 2008a: 84).

Within Dublin, the decision to focus on Dublin's inner city was informed by a number of factors. Dublin's inner city more than any other part of the city has been the target of sustained interventions in the urban realm over the past two decades. As the site subject to the most demands and as a consequence most prone to contestation, NESC (1981: 308) described the city centre as

> "the only area in the region that is a part of the existence of nearly all the inhabitants. Because of its multiplicity of roles, complexity of functions and its historical investments in buildings and structures, the Central Area and the adjacent parts of the Inner City represent the most complex and intractable planning problems, requiring a comprehensive and balanced approach."

In the decades since NESC characterised the inner city in this manner, the local authority in charge of Dublin's inner city, Dublin City Council, has been characterised as having assumed a distinctively neoliberal and entrepreneurial orientation (see Chapter 4). Dublin city has also been the site of significant community mobilisations during these decades and the site on which the state began to intervene with an elaborate series of partnership and inter-sectoral initiatives from the 1990s on (Punch, 2000, 2001).

As will be apparent in the chapter immediately following, Dublin's inner city contains many sites, streets, areas and quarters which have been designated for urban renewal and regeneration in the many guises which urban-renewal interventions have assumed since their introduction in 1986. In seeking to identify the optimum site on which to conduct this research's investigations, there were a number of options to consider: a cross-sectional study which would compare the community's experience of a given urban-renewal programme in different areas at a particular moment in time or a longitudinal (temporal) study which would examine the community's experience of successive urban-renewal programmes over a period of time. While there are many arguments that might be advanced for conducting a cross-sectional study, including the opportunity to investigate the impact of location-specific variables on the progression of the same policy initiative in different quarters of the inner city, this option was rejected in the interests of conducting a longitudinal study for a number of other important reasons, including the latter's ability to generate richer and more detailed data about the nature of engagements and non-engagements ensuing between state and community.

- ***Rationale for longitudinal study.***

In the interests of generating data that would enable the project to reach meaningful conclusions which would have an applicability beyond one specific instance of urban renewal in one specific moment in time, the research elected to examine the experience of communities subjected to successive waves of urban renewal. The decision to conduct a longitudinal study allowed the research to establish the relation of individual urban-renewal programmes to each other. One of the defining features of the working-class experience of urban renewal in Dublin's inner city has been its sustained and prolonged exposure to state interventions in the built environment, in the form of road-widening projects, tax-incentivised development, major infrastructural projects, etc. Such interventions have tended to be pursued as stand-alone programmes in which designated areas are approached by in a *de novo* manner on each occasion without any attempt to assess in any comprehensive or independent manner the impact of previous interventions or programmes. This research was conducted in the wake of a decade of extensive tax-incentive fuelled private development as the government was preparing to embark on another and more ambitious urban-regeneration programme. Accordingly, the decision to extend the focus of the research to cover two different phases of urban renewal provided an important opportunity to deepen the analysis of the community's position within the state's urban-renewal programmes in a number of ways. It allowed the research to establish the legacy of ten years of tax-incentive development both on the general resident body of the designated area and on the host community's orientation towards subsequent renewal programmes. As such it provided an opportunity to overcome repeated attempts by the local state to move from one urban-renewal policy to the next without any attempt to quantify either the costs or benefits visited upon host communities by successive waves of urban renewal or the treatment meted out to communities in earlier renewal programmes.

While the merits of a longitudinal study are not at issue, such a study is often not feasible within the lifetime of a research project such as this. In this instance, a lengthy exposure to the impact of urban-renewal programmes on an inner-city area dating from the late 1990s provided a rare opportunity to conduct such a longitudinal study.

- ***Rationale for the research site selected.***

This research therefore undertook to follow the nature of the approaches made by government and the nature of the responses forthcoming from communities over time as the consequences of urban-renewal policies became apparent, the nature of the state intervention varied and the state experimented with different modes of community engagement, consultation and participation. In the interests of conducting such an in-depth investigation, it was necessary to confine the programme of primary research to one case-study area. The research did so with the knowledge from the many seminars and public forums attended that the research problematic at the heart of this research had been replicated across many disadvantaged urban communities in Dublin city and the country as a whole (Tosach, 2006; CURS, 2008; Combat Poverty Agency, 2008; Brudell & MacLaran, 2009). It was important, therefore, that the case-study area selected would illustrate the dynamic that was increasingly coming to distinguish engagements between the local state and disadvantaged urban communities in planning, development and regeneration matters across the city and the country.

The south-west quarter of Dublin's inner city, hereafter referred to as the Liberties, provided one such case-study area (see Figure 3.1). In adopting a specific focus on an inner-city area, this project was conscious of the significance with which the problems of inner-city areas have been invested as "merely the general problems of a capitalist economy exposed in exaggerated form" (Community Development Project Political Economy Collective (CDPPEC), 1979: 4). It was also conscious of the significance that key inner-city locales have assumed for entrepreneurial city governments seeking to create "conditions conducive to capital accumulation" (Hubbard & Hall, 1998: 2) in areas previously seen as too risky for investors. Located immediately beside the central business district of Dublin city, the Liberties provided one such locale. The Liberties has been the target of successive waves of urban-renewal policies from the inception of the first Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) in 1986.

> "Much of the SWIC has been directly impacted by successive state-led urban renewal schemes which acted as catalysts for investment influxes to the area from 1990 onwards" (Kelly, 2007a: 98)

Following the announcement of a new URS in 1998, the Liberties was one of 49 areas approved for Integrated Area Plans (IAPs) across the country and "one of five areas in the inner city targeted by Dublin Corporation for the preparation of Integrated Area Plans" (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: 5) (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Fuelled by fiscal incentives whose lifetime was to be extended on a number of occasions, the IAP was to run for almost a decade.

Figure 3.1 Dublin's south-west inner city, quarter boundaries.
(Source: Kelly 2008, adapted from Ordnance Survey Ireland).




Figure 3.2 The Liberties IAP plan area in a sub-region context
(Source: Dublin Corporation, 1998a).





Figure 3.3 The Liberties/Coombe IAP in the context of DCC's five IAPs
(Source: Dublin Corporation, 1998a).



1 Liberties-Coombe;
2 Kilmainham-Inchicore.
3 HARP.
4 O'Connell Street.
5 NEIC.
6 Docklands.

As the tax incentives inaugurated under the 1998 URS were coming to a close, the Liberties was selected for a further wave of urban regeneration in 2007, a flagship stand-alone urban-regeneration programme on the initiative of the local authority (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5).

Thus, the Liberties provided an ideal research laboratory in which to examine the impact of successive waves of urban-renewal and regeneration programmes on an indigenous working-class community; the community's experience of engaging with the state as the latter assumed an increasingly entrepreneurial orientation with each successive intervention in the urban realm, and the nature of the assessment and response forthcoming from the host community on each occasion. The particular urban-renewal and regeneration programmes selected for investigation within the Liberties were two large-scale regeneration projects: (i) the Liberties/ Coombe Integrated Area Plan (1998-2008) prepared under the 1998 URS; (ii) the Liberties Regeneration Project (2007-2009) prepared as an stand-alone programme on the initiative of the local authority. Both regeneration plans were underwritten by significant state interventions - fiscal incentives in the former; public land sales and public-realm interventions alongside policy moves for greater building heights in the latter. Both derived their impetus from government - central government in the former; local government in the latter. Both were characterised by distinctively different modes of community participation.

The rationale for selecting the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan (IAP) lay in the specific statutory requirement placed by the Department of the Environment (DoE)[9] upon local authorities to incorporate community representatives in the structures established to oversee the implementation of urban-renewal plans which were publicly committed to effecting the integrated physical, social and economic renewal of designated areas. The mode of community participation provided for in this instance may be characterised as a very contained 'community representative' type of engagement (see Chapter 5). The decision to examine the Liberties Regeneration Project (LRP) lay in the continuing determination on the part of Dublin City Council (DCC)[10] to secure community participation in the consultative structures surrounding the subsequent preparation of a significantly more ambitious renewal plan which sought to promote "the type and quantum of development that will enable the Liberties to become an exciting, attractive and liveable city quarter as well as contributing to the economic prosperity and social success of the city and the nation" (DCC, 2008a: 3). The mode of community participation provided for in this case represented a significant departure from the previous community-representative mode of

[9] The name of the Department of the Environment has altered slightly with each new administration in recent years and has been known variously as the Department of the Environment, the Department of the Environment and Local Government and the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. In the interests of brevity, it is referred to as the Department of the Environment (DoE) throughout the research, while the bibliography relays its full title as it pertains to individual documents and publications.

[10] See Appendix 3.1 for a glossary of all acronyms used in the research.

Figure 3.4 Liberties Regeneration Project, area boundaries (Source: John Spain Associates, 2008).





Figure 3.5 Liberties Regeneration Project area, city context (Source: DCC, 2008a).



participation to a more generalised public-forum type engagement which the local authority termed 'direct democracy' (DCC, 2008d) (see Chapter 8).

Together, these two regeneration programmes can be taken to comprise a decisive phase in Irish urban-renewal and regeneration policy. It was a phase during which the central state formally provided for the participation of the host communities across the country and the local authority subsequently sought to expand and insinuate its participative channels and structures within the broader community as its regeneration policies assumed an increasingly ambitious character. As mediated within the parameters of these two regeneration programmes, the urban-renewal and regeneration agenda pursued throughout this decade provided an arena within which the research could investigate (i) the state's rationale for seeking to enjoin low-income working-class communities to its interventions in the land, housing and planning arenas; (ii) the precise opportunities and modes of engagement that these newly inaugurated policies and structures offered to working-class communities wishing to participate in the redevelopment and renewal of their areas; (iii) the manner in which working-class communities responded to these new overtures and modes of engagement from the state; (iv) the precise nature of the relationship that ensued between the two parties as the state sought to engage communities in the implementation of its urban-renewal policies.

Having selected the Liberties as a suitable case-study location, the research proceeded to identify the specific categories of data required for its investigations.

3.3.3 The data required.

The investigation of the research objectives necessitated the collection of a wide range of data which may be categorised under the following headings.

Table 3.1 Categories of data required.

Policy information – government (and political) perspectives.
- Rationale for the introduction of urban-renewal/regeneration policies. - Distinctive feature of each phase of urban renewal/regeneration. - Rationale for the movement to a new type of urban-renewal/regeneration policy. - Identification of the interests served by urban renewal/regeneration.
Policy orientation *vis-à-vis* host communities – government perspectives.
- Rationale for the introduction of the community-participation component of urban-renewal/regeneration policy. - Mode of community participation provided for within each renewal/regeneration plan.
Policy actualisation – government (and political) perspectives.
- Government experience of actualising community-participation component of urban-renewal/regeneration policy. - Spectrum of community positions on urban renewal/regeneration. - Range of responses forthcoming from host community.

Policy impact and experience – community perspectives.
- Salience and importance of urban-renewal/regeneration issues among host communities. - Assessment of the interests served by urban renewal/regeneration. - Rationale for engaging in urban renewal/regeneration. - Experience of engaging in community-participation structures. - Experience of engaging with the local state in the implementation of urban renewal/ regeneration, in both supportive and oppositional manners. - Spectrum of community positions on urban renewal/regeneration.
Policy evaluation – government, community and political perspectives.
- Assessment of successes and failures of community-participation initiatives. - Assessment of successes and failures of urban renewal/regeneration. - Assessment of the role of government in the implementation of urban renewal/regeneration.
Policy reflections - government, community and political perspectives.
- Role of the state in urban renewal/regeneration. - Role of community organisations in urban renewal/regeneration. - Impact of urban regeneration on state-community relations. - Likely complexion of state-community relations into the future.

3.3.4 Programme of secondary data collection.

The research commenced by embarking on a programme of secondary data collection, comprising documents relating to the participation of inner-city communities in Dublin in the implementation of urban-regeneration projects. That documentation was secured from three sources and related to the two phases of urban regeneration under consideration (See Table 3.2 for a tabulation of all secondary data sources consulted.)

- ***Central and local government.***

Documentation sourced from central government facilitated a review of the critical findings made about previous property-led urban-renewal schemes that had led the government to alter the character of its urban-renewal policy in 1998 (KPMG *et al.,* 1996; DoE, 1997). It established the legislative and guideline provisions made for the preparation, introduction and implementation of the IAPs prepared under the 1998 URS (Government of Ireland, 1998; DoE, 1999a) and allowed some insight into the nature of the directions issuing from central government to its local authorities during the implementation of the IAPs (DoE, 1999-2006 Circulars). Perusal of the parliamentary record provided an insight into the manner in which the concerns of disadvantaged urban communities were dealt with in the national parliament (Dáil Éireann, 2002). As the 1998 URS moved into its closing years, the more recent review of tax-incentivised development yielded important information about the successes and failures of the many socio-economic commitments made to communities within those areas designated for Integrated Area Plans (Goodbody *et al.,* 2006).

In attempting to secure all relevant secondary data, the research also sought records held within the Department of the Environment under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Acts 1997 and 2003. The records in question would have allowed a valuable insight into deliberations and communications between central and local-government officials consequent upon critical community submissions made to both DCC and the DoE. While the latter released a 'schedule of records' detailing nine records, it declined to release all but three documents on the grounds that the remaining documents consisted variously of "communications between interested groups, to which the matter has been referred by the Government for consideration" and "a record given to a member of the Government or Minister of State for use by him or her for the purposes of proceeding in either houses of the Oireachtas... including briefing provided in relation to oral and written PQs [parliamentary questions]" (DoE, 2008; see Appendix 3.2). As the three released documents comprised correspondence between the Minister and the community representatives and were already a matter of public record, they failed to provide any additional insight into the matters under consideration. The research was accordingly denied the opportunity to consider the DoE's adjudication on the many serious charges made by community representatives. A subsequent appeal to the DoE proved similarly ill-fated when a more senior official affirmed the earlier decision "to refuse access to the records requested under S(s) 19 (aa) (ii) and 46 of the FOI Act" (DoE, 2009).

Turning to local government, the documentation secured from DCC was important for its indication of the provisions made for community participation in the renewal programme that formed the precursor and experimental arena for the IAPs, the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) (McDonnell, 1996). The IAPs subsequently produced for the other main residential quarters in the inner city (Dublin Corporation 1998a; 1998b) were of interest both for their practical elaboration of the integrated physical, economic and social renewal brief with which they had been entrusted and for the specific provisions made for community participation – provisions which were subsequently revoked following the issuing of guidelines from central government. Thereafter, the Annual Reports submitted to the DoE in respect of the Liberties/Coombe IAP provided an important record of the local authority's assessment of the progress being made under each of the IAP's objectives (Dublin Corporation/Dublin City Council, 2000-2006). The progress reported in respect of 'community gain' was of particular importance in this respect as was the representation of the position of those community representatives who formally resigned their positions from the IAP Monitoring Committee in 2002. Additional and incidental documentation supplied by a senior planner within the local authority provided further insight into planning perspectives on community gain and the manner in which the achievement and significance of urban-regeneration projects was being construed within professional planning and architectural circles (Rose 2005, 2006; DCC, 2006a).

In the apparent absence of any overarching national policy framework governing the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the second phase of urban regeneration under consideration, the LRP, the documentation provided by the local authority and its consultants constituted the only available secondary data. The documentation consulted in this instance was notable in a number of respects. The preparation of this stand-alone regeneration plan appears to have generated significantly more documentation in its opening 16-month phase than had its national (IAP) predecessor in its ten-year lifespan. This is a point of some significance in that the appointment of numerous external consultants to the preparation of this regeneration plan appears to have been one of the defining features of this next phase of the regeneration process. The literature produced within this process was of interest for a number of reasons, including the recurrence of certain core tenets and objectives that appear to have underlain the regeneration process from the outset; the manner and extent to which it represented the views expressed by communities throughout the consultation process (John Thompson & Partners (JTP), 2008; DCC 2008a), together with the markedly more assertive and unapologetic boosterist tone evident in the local authority's plans for the area. (See Table 3.2 for details of additional local-government documentation produced as part of the LRP and ensuing Draft Local Area Plan (LAP) process, including DCC 2008b-e; 2009a.) The documentation produced for councillors as part of the political decision-making process surrounding the 'making, amending or revoking' of Local Area Plans was of particular interest in this respect (DCC, 2008f, 2009b).

In addition to the extensive body of secondary documentation produced by DCC and its consultants during the preparation of the LRP, the research also availed of the Freedom on Information Acts to obtain information on the monies expended by DCC on the various consultants contracted during the course of the project (FOI/2929/10, see Appendix 9.1). In this instance, the FOI request succeeded in eliciting the information requested and is presented in Chapter 9.

- ***Community and area-based partnership organisations.***

In a community-development environment marked by an increasingly elaborate infrastructure, the research looked first to the documentation emanating from the area-based partnership company responsible for Dublin's inner city. The Dublin Inner City Partnership (DICP) had both participated in a community-representative capacity in the renewal of Dublin's inner city and been party to the establishment of a series of parallel community networks across the inner city, which had accepted a community-representative position on each of the IAPs. The documentation sourced from the DICP was of interest on a number of levels. First, a postgraduate thesis completed by the partnership's director represented an early community assessment of the impact of the first decade of urban-renewal (Connolly, 1997). Completed in the year following the government commissioned KPMG *et al.* review, it can be read as a companion piece to the government's review. This thesis was also of interest for its delineation and promotion of the area-based

partnership approach that was to become the overarching framework within which engagements between the state and host communities would proceed during the implementation of urban-renewal and regeneration programmes in the following decade. A second and more recent review commissioned by the DICP (Haase, 2009) provided valuable data about 'the changing face of Dublin inner city' between 1991 and 2006. That review, which accessed more detailed Census data than that released in respect of District Electoral Division (DED)[11] units, documented considerable disparities in levels of affluence and deprivation at neighbourhood level and was of great assistance in seeking to establish the real impact of urban-renewal policy at micro level. Other documentation sourced from the area-based partnership provided a record both of its hopes, fears and reservations at the outset of the 1998 URS (Connolly, 2000) and the position of community representatives in relation to the various IAPs in progress across the inner city at that time (Coveney, 2001).

Three other documents produced within Dublin's inner city contained material of immediate interest to this research. These included a short critical account of the community's experience of the Steering Committee inaugurated within the first incarnation of the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (McCue, 2000), a good practice guide to community participation which sought "to encourage and support local people to get involved in the actions and decisions which affect their lives and their communities" (Community Participation Project & Doherty: 2008: iii) and a 'protocol for progressive engagement' which sought to set definite parameters to govern future engagements between DCC and 'Dublin inner city local and community development organisations' (DICP & DCC, 2007).

The most vital body of secondary data was secured from within the study area itself and related directly to the first phase of the urban-renewal project at issue in this research, the IAP. The documentation in question resulted from an extensive engagement of the community with the implementation of the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme between 1999 and 2004 and provided a valuable repository of knowledge of direct relevance to the research questions under consideration. This body of documentation can be considered under a number of headings: (i) reports that addressed the larger urban-renewal agenda, concerns about the ends to which the local authority's monitoring structures were functioning and the role and continuing rationale for community participation within those structures (Brudell, 1999; 2000: 2002); (ii) position papers and articles that detailed the community's experience of the planning and planning appeals process (Brudell *et al.,* 2004; Hammond, *et al.,* 2001a; 2001b; 2002); (iii) submissions that sought to influence the development of specific buildings and zones within the larger designated area (Brudell & SWICN Environment Group, 2003; Hammond, 2002a; SWICN Environment Group, 2002b); (iv)

[11] I.e. the lowest spatial level at which data from the Census of Population is regularly published. Haase carried out his analysis of relative affluence and deprivation at "a higher level of spatial disaggregation... the level of Enumerative Areas (EAs). EAs describe the physical areas of each individual census enumerator and these areas tend to be smaller in urban areas than EDs" (Haase, 2009: 11).

correspondence with and presentations to a variety of official parties, including city councillors, developers; MEPS and the European Commission (SWICN Environment Group 2002a; SWICN Environment Group Archive 2002-3). The compilation of this body of documentation followed from a highly critical and contentious engagement between the community and local state in which the former undertook to adopt a critical monitoring role in relation to the manner in which DCC was implementing the IAP. The questions posed by that community and the responses with which it was met by all official parties are integral to the research questions under consideration. Their significance will be considered in full in the following chapters.

The second phase of urban regeneration in the Liberties, the LRP, has to date not yielded any comparable body of literature from the host community. The secondary data which does exist would appear to be confined to the submissions made by a relatively small number of residents to the statutory consultation process surrounding the adoption of the Draft LAP produced for the area. A number of these submissions are considered in Chapter 9.

- ***Independent third parties.***[12]

In addition to looking to the documentation produced by government and community parties, the research also examined research which had attended to the community's experience of urban-regeneration programmes as it emanated from third parties, including researchers and academics. A number of academic papers and theses provided important information on different facets of the community's experience of engaging with the state. Punch's (2000, 2001) work was important for its historical overview of community organisation in Dublin's inner city; the nature of the urban conflicts that had followed on the introduction of urban-renewal strategies in Dublin's Docklands and the manner in which community organisations were being "restructured from an oppositional to an incorporated position" (Punch, 2001: 43) as the influx of state funding into community organisations, hitherto bereft of all such finance, altered irreversibly the relationship between disadvantaged communities and government. Although addressed to the housing-regeneration arena rather than the broader urban-regeneration agenda, Redmond's (2002) investigation of the participatory overtures made by the local 'landlord' state to its tenants in the regeneration of individual social-housing estates was of interest for its exploration of the degree to which the transposition of the new emphasis on citizen participation to the more immediate locales of people's homes and neighbourhoods signified "a fundamental change in urban governance" and the degree to which it might more "plausibly [be] interpreted as a sophisticated rhetoric... [masking] traditional power relationships" (*ibid.,* 1).

[12] Details of the academic publications consulted are contained in the bibliography as opposed to the tabulation of secondary data sources detailed in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 **Secondary data sources.** *(See Appendix 3.3 for complete details of all secondary sources listed below.)*

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Central Government Documentation re Integrated Area Plan (IAP).		
Commissioned reviews.		
KPMG *et al.* (1996) Review of urban renewal.	- Impact of property-led urban-renewal schemes on inner-city communities. - Impetus for moves to incorporate communities within subsequent programmes.	- Findings and recommendations re form of urban renewal immediately preceding IAPs.
Goodbody *et al.* (2006) Review of urban renewal.	- Impact of 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) with particular reference to the integrated development aspect of its brief.	- Findings re socio-economic impact of IAPs.
Guidelines, Legislation & Circulars.		
DoE (1997) 1998 URS Guidelines.	- Changes introduced into urban-renewal policy on foot of the KPMG review. - Guideline directions to local authorities in preparation of IAPs.	- Modifications to urban-renewal policy under 1998 URS.
Government of Ireland (1998) Urban Renewal Act 1998.	- Statutory provision made for the IAPs prepared under the 1998 URS.	- Legislative provision for preparation and implementation of IAPs.
DoE (1999a) 1999 URS Monitoring Guidelines.	- Directions from central government to local government re the monitoring of IAPs.	- Provisions re community participation in IAPs.
DoE (1999-2006) Circulars re 1998 URS.	- Communications between central and local government during the implementation of the IAPs.	- Directions issuing from central government to local authorities during IAPs' implementation.
Dáil records.		
Dáil Éireann (2002) Written response to Parliamentary Questions re Liberties/ Coombe IAP.	- Community experience of engaging in formal government channels. - DoE's response to community concerns re IAP.	- Treatment of community concerns re IAP.
Departmental records.		
DoE (2008) Schedule of Records released: FOI/2008/123 re Liberties/ Coombe IAP; (2009) Decision on review requested in relation to FOI/2008/123 request.	- DoE's deliberation and adjudication on the charges made by community representatives in relation to DCC's implementation of the IAP.	- N/A as no relevant documents released.
Local Government (Dublin City Council) Documentation re IAP.		
Integrated Area Plans (IAPs).		
McDonnell, P. (1996) Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP).	- Nature of representation afforded to community in the experimental precursor to the 1998 URS.	- Mode of community participation in the precursor to the IAPs.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Dublin Corporation (1998a) Liberties/Coombe IAP; (1998b) North East Inner City IAP.	- Mode of participation for communities in IAPs prepared under the 1998 URS in Dublin's inner city - Articulation of integrated development brief under physical, social end economic renewal objectives.	- Mode of community participation in IAPs. - Objective of IAPs.
IAP Monitoring Committee Reports.		
Dublin Corporation / Dublin City Council (DCC) (2000-2006) Liberties/ Coombe IAP Annual Reports.	- Local-government assessment of the progress made under each of the IAP's objectives with particular reference to 'community gain.' - Local-government representation of position of critical community representatives.	- Assessment of success/failure of IAPs' (i) social and community objectives; (ii) community-participation initiatives.
Senior Planner Reports, Articles.		
Rose, K. (2005) Meeting Notes re retail poverty; (2006) Article on Cork St.; DCC (2006a) Paper re new apartment apartments.	- Local-government planner's assessment of (i) planning and development within IAP; (ii) additional arising community gains.	- Assessment of success/failure of IAPs.
Local Government (Dublin City Council) Documentation re Liberties Regeneration Project (LRP).		
LRP and related documentation.		
John Thompson & Partners (2008) Liberties Community Planning Report	- Objective of LRP (vision, core tenets etc.). - Public record of community views expressed during consultation.	- Objective of LRP. - Representation of community views.
DCC (2008a) Liberties Draft Local Area Plan (LAP).	- Objective and distinctive features of LRP (vision etc.) - LRP provisions of immediate relevance to public housing and public land. - Public representation (if any) of community position on public-housing proposals.	- Objective of LRP; anticipated impact of LRP on working-class community; exclusion of critical views on public-housing proposals.
DCC (2008b, c, d, e; 2009a) Liberties Regeneration Newsletters 1-5.	- Information and communication strategy adopted by LRP.	- LRP information and communication strategy.
DCC (2008f) Liberties Draft LAP: Manager's Report on Submissions from Public Display.	- Ratification procedures for LRP/Draft LAP. - Nature of interests gravitating to LRP/Draft LAP process. - Content of community and resident submissions to LRP/Draft LAP. - Local-government response to community concerns, including manner in which community submissions mediated by officials to city councillors.	- Degree of community engagement with, and spectrum of, community positions on LRP/ Draft LAP; local-government commentary on community concerns. - Interests gravitating to LRP/Draft LAP.
DCC (2009b) Liberties Draft LAP: Manager's Report on Councillors' Motions.	- Content of councillors' motions to the Liberties Draft LAP. - Local-government response to councillors' concerns.	- Local-government commentary on councillors' concerns.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Local Government records re LRP.		
DCC (2010a) Response to FOI Request FOI/2929/10 re monies expended on private consultancies in LRP/LAP.	- Private consultancies contracted and monies expended on private consultancies in the preparation of the LRP/LAP.	- Costs incurred by outsourcing consultative process.
Local Development / Community Documentation re Urban Renewal and more General Engagements.		
Dublin Inner City Partnership (and associated parties).		
Connolly, D. (1997) Third-sector local development assessment of urban renewal.	- Assessment of urban-renewal schemes from a third-sector local development perspective. - Local development framework within which community workers operating.	- Assessment of impact of urban-renewal schemes preceding IAPs; overarching framework for community-development organisations engaging with IAPs.
Haase, T. (2009) Report on 'the changing face of Dublin's inner city.'	- Impact of developments between 1991-2006 on key socio-economic indicators. - Measurement of levels of affluence and deprivation at neighbourhood level.	- Assessment of impact of urban-renewal schemes 1991-2006.
Connolly, D. (2000) Brief for community representatives on IAPs.	- Third-sector local development position on 1998 URS at outset. - Assessment of interests served by urban regeneration and rationale for engaging.	- Third-sector local development orientation *vis-à-vis* IAPs.
Coveney, E. (2001) Conference report on community participation in IAPs.	- Inner-city community's experience of early years of IAPs.	- Community orientation *vis-à-vis* IAPs.
McCue, K. (2000) Critique of community experience of HARP I.	- Experience of engaging in community-participation structures in the precursor to the IAPs.	- Experience of community participation pre-IAP.
Community Participation Project & Doherty, G. (2008) Good practice guide to community participation.	- Importance attached to participation in initiatives with a determining impact on people's lives and communities in Dublin's inner city.	- Community orientation *vis-à-vis* participation.
DICP & DCC (2007) Protocol for local government and local and community-development engagement.	- Nature of relationship evolving between local state and local-development and community organisations in Dublin's inner city.	- Overarching framework for relations between local state and local community.
Community Documentation from Study Area re IAP.		
Reports.		
Brudell, P. (1999) Area action plan for Liberties community organisation.	- Community attitude to urban renewal and regeneration in advance of the implementation of 1998 URS.	- Community orientation *vis-à-vis* urban renewal and regeneration pre-IAP
Brudell, P. (2000) Mandate for community representatives to Liberties/ Coombe IAP.	- Community understanding of urban renewal and the role, standing and experience of the community's representatives in the early years of the IAP. - Community presentation of concerns to local government.	- Experience of engaging with the local authority's community-participation structures.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Brudell, P. (2002) Minority report of community representatives to Liberties/Coombe IAP.	- Community opposition and critical questions re manner in which IAPs being implemented by local government. - Community presentation of concerns to central government.	- Experience of engaging with local and central government.
Articles/Position Papers.		
Brudell *et al.* (2004) Community perspective on urban planning and regeneration.	- Community's experience of planning and planning appeals process on IAP tax-designated sites.	- Experience of engaging with statutory planning system.
Hammond *et al.* (2001a; 2001b; 2002) Observations on the undermining of the community's role in planning in the IAP.	- Community's experience of planning and planning appeals process on IAP tax-designated sites. - Community presentation of concerns to local-government officials, councillors.	- Experience of engaging with local-government officials and councillors on planning issues arising in IAP.
Presentations/ Submissions.		
SWICN Environment Group (2002a) Presentation of community concerns to Dublin South Central Area Committee.	- Community presentation of concerns to local councillors.	- Experience of engaging with local councillors.
SWICN Environment Group (2002b) Submission re Draft Urban Design Framework Plan (UDFP) for retail zone within IAP.	- Community position on development proposals for key retail areas within IAP.	- Experience of engaging with local government on planning issues.
Hammond, C. (2002a) Submission re Draft UDFP for retail zone within IAP.	- Community position on development proposals for key retail areas within IAP.	- Experience of engaging with local government on planning issues.
Brudell, P. & SWICN Environmental Group (2003) Submission re the conservation of key heritage site.	- Community position on redevelopment of key heritage site within IAP.	- Community vision of urban renewal and concerns about the heritage of the area.
Correspondence.		
SWICN Environment Archive (2002-3) Correspondence with DCC, City Councillors, Minister for Environment, Developer, MEPs and European Commission.	- Nature of community approaches to local-government officials, city councillors and central government and nature of responses forthcoming. - Nature of correspondence with private developers. - Community submission of concerns to Irish MEPs and European Commission and nature of responses forthcoming.	- Community experience of engaging wide range of (mainly public) parties from local officials and councillors, through central government to Irish MEPs and European authorities.

In light of the paucity of community accounts of the experience of engaging in the structures established to oversee the precursor of the IAPs, Russell's (2001, 2003) papers on community participation in the first incarnation of the Historic Rejuvenation Area Project (HARP I) addressed a significant gap in the early urban-renewal literature. The factors leading to the piloting of the steering-committee model of community participation and the lessons drawn by both government and community parties from this experimental phase of community participation provided an important backdrop to the community-participation structures subsequently instituted within the nationwide 1998 URS. The report by MacLaran *et al.* (2007a) thereafter provided a comprehensive exploration and analysis of the experience of disadvantaged urban communities in participating in urban planning and regeneration across a number of urban areas. Its importance also lay in its direction to a significant gap in existing research, the perspective and experience of ordinary residents and community members operating at a remove from official community-representative structures.

In its exploration of the secondary data, the research was primarily concerned with the nature of engagements taking place between government and disadvantaged urban communities. Those engagements and this investigation have taken place against the backdrop of profound structural change in the land use, economies and societies of designated areas, structural changes that have been the subject of both government and community-commissioned assessments and reviews. In a situation in which government reviews have featured only fleetingly in the public arena and community assessments have never been admitted to that arena, the issuing of a number of assessments of the impact of the urban-renewal schemes from independent third parties represented an important addition to existing assessments. Such assessments assume radically different characteristics. The work of urban geographers such as Kelly and MacLaran (2004), Kelly (2007a; 2007b; 2008) and Punch (2000, 2001) was of importance for their assessment of the impact of urban-renewal programmes and their component land-use, planning and housing policies on indigenous communities. The latter were accorded a position of primacy within the work of these urban geographers, largely denied them in government reviews. The largely negative findings made in respect of the impact of urban-renewal policies on the land, housing, economy and society of the indigenous community were of importance in establishing the urban geography context against which this research was undertaken (see Chapter 4).

Meanwhile, the research issuing from other academic disciplines has been characterised by decidedly more favourable assessments of the impact of urban-renewal schemes (Corcoran & DCC Entrust Team Members, 2003) and markedly more benign assessments of the difficulties experienced by communities in engaging with the local authority. Other research emanating from the social sciences was also of interest for its articulation of urban-renewal policies to other major central-government policy initiatives (Payne & Safford, 2004) and its assessment of the political

success of what it termed 'participatory, metropolitan governance' (*ibid.*, 1). The findings of significance to the research questions in hand are again relayed in Chapter 4. In addition to the range of assessments issuing from the various government, community and academic commentators, the Irish print media also attended to aspects of the state's urban-renewal programmes. While it was not possible within the parameters of this research to conduct a systematic content analysis of the media's coverage of urban-renewal matters within each of the national newspapers, this research did maintain a continuous review of news and commentary sections of the paper of record, *The Irish Times*. This provided an important opportunity to observe the media's assessment of the successes and failures of the urban-renewal programmes and its attitude towards the growing entrepreneurialism of local government.

- ***Significance of the secondary data.***

The above programme of secondary data collection was of value for a number of reasons: its revelation of the paucity of official documentation underlying increasingly elaborate government overtures to disadvantaged communities in each of its interventions in the land-use, planning and housing arenas and its identification of a series of critical reviews of the impact of urban-renewal schemes on disadvantaged communities from parties as diverse as central government, area-based partnerships, community networks, community representatives, community activists and academics. While such reviews were reaching remarkably similar conclusions about the negative impacts of these schemes on indigenous communities, they had not featured to any great extent in the public discourse and had in no way impeded the local government's pursuit of an increasingly ambitious regeneration agenda. The programme of secondary data collection was also of interest for its elucidation of a striking disparity between the extensive paper trail left in the wake of one community's highly critical engagement with the implementation of the IAPs and the dearth of documentation from the state's side. The secondary data was thus of value for the insights which it afforded into the issues underlying this research and its clarification of the range and depth of additional information required to adequately investigate the key questions at issue in the research. However, it did not have the ability to answer these key questions. For this, it was necessary to undertake a programme of primary data collection.

3.3.5 Programme of primary data collection.

The primary data was collected using two qualitative research techniques, a programme of interviews with a wide range of interests in the study area and a programme of observation at a series of public meetings. These research techniques were complemented by attendance at a series of seminars and conferences ongoing in Dublin at this time (see below).

- ***Contextualising seminars, conferences.***

The programme of primary data collection was informed at all times by close attention to public discussions taking place within a number of public seminars and conferences addressing the nature of engagements taking place between working-class communities and the state in general and in relation to urban regeneration in particular (see Table 3.3).

A number of seminars and conferences convened by parties as various as a university research centre, a community-development project and a government anti-poverty agency provided an opportunity to observe the importance which planning and regeneration issues had assumed for inner-city communities from the mid 1990s; the nature of the difficulties encountered by inner-city communities in the face of large-scale development, renewal and regeneration programmes; the degree to which such experiences have been replicated across the city and country; the variety of ways in which communities had sought to defend their interests in the face of such powerful forces and the increasingly critical discussions taking place about the strategic choices now facing communities (Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (CURS), TCD, 2004, 2008; Combat Poverty Agency, 2008; Tosach, 2006).

Conferences convened by statutory authorities and private-sector interests provided a rather different insight into the significance ascribed to host communities and areas designated for urban renewal. Such forums were of interest for the markedly different attitudes displayed towards host communities and their place in the urban-renewal paradigm in accordance with the composition of the audience. They were also of interest for the introduction of international perspectives on the significance of 'pre-existing communities,' culture as a driver of urban regeneration and the role of third-party mediators in the facilitation of regeneration projects (DCC, 2006; Temple Bar Cultural Trust, 2006). As statutory discussion documents moved from discussion to draft stage with proposals to authorise greater building heights and densities in key inner-city locations, large-scale public consultation meetings provided an insight into both the local authority's orientation towards the citizenry as a whole and the degree of consensus evident between local-authority officials and elected members (DCC, 2008). Meanwhile, discussions within forums comprised almost exclusively of private-development interests and the professionals engaged in their service presented a valuable opportunity to observe the core market components of the urban-renewal agenda when not phrased in holistic integrated rhetoric (City & Financial Conferences, 2008).

The research was also fortunate to have taken place at a time when debate about the future role of the voluntary and/or community sector was gathering momentum. A national conference organised by the Centre for Nonprofit Management, TCD (2007) provided an insight into the issues and difficulties arising between the state and the voluntary sector, dependency on state funding having brought the latter into closer alignment with the state. A series of seminars on 'community

Table 3.3 Contextualising seminars, conferences.

Date.	Topic.	Convenor.	Data generated.	Relevance.
Urban Regeneration.				
May 2004	Community experience of urban regeneration.	Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (CURS) TCD.	- Importance of planning and regeneration for inner-city community organisations from mid-1990s. - Community experience of engaging with urban regeneration *via* planning system in the inner city.	Contextual – experience of urban regeneration in broader inner-city area.
March 2006	Community experience of housing and urban regeneration.	Tosach Community Development Project (CDP).	- Community experience of engaging with urban regeneration *via* direct engagement with developers in the inner city	Contextual - experience of urban regeneration in broader inner-city area.
June 2006	Future development of Thomas St. area, Liberties.	Dublin City Council.	- Discussion of future development of Liberties by mixed panel and audience. - Significance invested in future development of Liberties. - Economic potential vested in cultural, retail, tourist activities etc. - Foregrounding of key concepts and motifs around which the later LRP would be constructed. - Significance ascribed to Liberties and indigenous community in future plans.	Study area - discussion of future development of Liberties and significance of communities therein.

Nov. 2006	Role of culture in urban regeneration.	Temple Bar Cultural Trust.	- International perspectives on:
			  - Role of culture in urban regeneration.
			  - Significance of indigenous communities in regeneration.
			  - Role of independent third-party mediators in regeneration process.
			  - Concept of 'creative community building.'
				Contextual – significance of (i) culture as an urban-regeneration driver; (ii) indigenous communities within regeneration.

Date.	Topic.	Convenor.	Data generated.	Relevance.
June 2008	Future direction and prospects for Public Private Partnerships in Ireland.	City & Financial Conferences	- Private-sector (consultant) perspectives on regeneration, including - Financial viability of regeneration projects. - Significance of private sector in regeneration. - Relations with planning authorities - Orientation *vis-à-vis* host communities.	Contextual – the understanding of regeneration informing private sector discussions of urban regeneration.
Sept. 2008	Community experience of regeneration.	CURS, TCD.	- Community experience of engaging with regeneration and development across Dublin, Limerick, Cork and Waterford. - Discussion about the strategic choices facing communities within regeneration and development.	Contextual – the experience and assessment of regeneration among a broad cross section of communities in Irish cities; consideration of options facing communities within regeneration.
Nov. 2008.	Community experience of regeneration.	Combat Poverty Agency.	- Community experience of engaging in regeneration and development across Dublin. - Discussion about strategic choices facing community workers in regeneration and development.	Contextual – consideration of the options facing community workers within regeneration.
Planning and Development..				
April 2008 June 2008	Maximising the city's potential – height and intensification strategy.	Dublin City Council	- Nature of presentation of local-government strategy for increased heights and densities for Dublin city to (i) a citywide audience; (ii) a local constituency audience. - Nature of consultative procedures surrounding progression of discussion strategy document. - Degree of consensus between local-government officials and councillors on issue. - Community concerns re heights and densities proposed.	Contextual – the manner in which overarching policy documents with direct implications for study area being progressed.
State-Community Engagements – General.				
June 2007	Role of Irish 'non-profit sector.'	Centre for Nonprofit Management, TCD.	- Issues and difficulties arising in relationship between state and voluntary sector. - Impact of state funding and social partnership on the operation and independence of 'nonprofit' organisations.	Contextual – deliberations on role of voluntary organisations *vis-à-vis* the state.

Date.	Topic.	Convenor.	Data generated.	Relevance.
Oct. 2007	Theoretical concepts structuring state-community engagements	North Dublin Development Coalition (NorDubCo).	- Critical analysis of key concepts in which state-community engagements couched, including active citizenship and social capital.	Contextual – deliberations on conceptual parameters within which state-community engagements structured.
Nov. 2007	Position and role of community organisations within social partnership.	NorDubCo.	- Degree to which social partnership has been institutionalised in Ireland. - Nature of relationship between community development and state. - Questions and dilemmas facing community-development practitioners as state-community alignment grows.	Contextual – overarching framework within which state-community engagements taking place.
State-Community Engagements – Dublin's Inner City.				
Nov. 2006	Employment conditions in community sector.	Community Sector/Trade Union Joint Campaign Group.	- Community sector's relationship with state. - Tension between advocacy and service-delivery roles. - Impact of employment conditions on strength of community sector. - Significance of proposed alliance with trade-union movement for relations with state.	Contextual - overarching framework within which state-community engagements taking place in inner city.
Nov. 2008	Poverty in Dublin's inner city.	Dublin Inner City Partnership.	- Incidence of poverty in Dublin's inner city at close of economic boom. - Impact of urban renewal on indigenous community. - Reorientation of community sector in straitened economic circumstances. - Positioning *vis-à-vis* partnership model	Study area - impact of urban renewal at inner-city and quadrant level. Contextual – role of area-based partnerships and community organisations in straitened economic circumstances.

development and social institutions in Ireland, 1991-2007' allowed for a more detailed examination of the position and role of community organisations within 'social partnership,' the key concepts in which the government has couched its overtures to communities and the questions and dilemmas arising for community-development practitioners as the state has sought to incorporate it further into the machinery and institutions of the state (NorDubCo, 2007). While more localised community discussions were not framed in such explicit terms, a campaign seeking to effect greater engagement between community workers and the trade-union movement provided an insight in the community sector's understanding of its own relationship *vis-à-vis* the state and the arena of legitimate activity allowed it by the latter (Community Sector/Trade Union Joint Campaign Group, 2006). As the years of unprecedented economic growth gave way to recession and retrenchment of government funding, discussion about the continuing degree of poverty in inner-city areas prompted greater attention to the impact of urban renewal on indigenous communities and the changing role of area-based partnerships and community organisations in straitened economic circumstances (DICP, 2008).

- ***Programme of semi-structured interviews.***

The subsequent programme of primary data collection sought to source the categories of data outstanding and necessary to investigate the research's core objectives. Interviews were selected in the first instance over other and more remote data-collecting tools such as questionnaires or surveys on the basis that the latter would be unlikely to yield the requisite depth of responses required. This was particularly important for research seeking to go behind and beneath the official rhetoric of urban renewal to establish the manner in which the consensus surrounding the urban-renewal project had been forged and maintained. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the format which would allow for the necessarily in-depth investigation of the full spectrum of community engagement and resistance.

- *Method.*

While each interview was approached with a parallel interview template, the focus of individual interviews was largely determined by the specifics of the interviewee's phase of involvement, mode of engagement and particular interest in or analysis of urban-regeneration projects. The adoption of a semi-structured format allowed interviews to proceed within broad predetermined parameters in which discussion could be oriented around the main areas of empirical enquiry. Within these broad parameters, it allowed interviewees the latitude necessary to expand on the experiences, issues and perspectives of particular importance to them and, in a number of cases, on important aspects and understandings of the process not anticipated by the interview questions. As some categories of interviewees were better placed to answer particular questions than others, this format allowed these questions to be probed in the detail appropriate to individual interviewees. In a small number of instances where the time allotted by interviewees for the interview process was

not adequate to cover the range of questions tabled for discussion, the maximum number of questions possible were posed of interviewees. In summary, where practicable and appropriate, the same semi-structured questions were posed of all categories of interviewee, thereby allowing for the collection of very detailed, nuanced and considered responses. The adoption of a semi-structured format thus allowed for the necessary depth, detail, complexity and latitude of exploration while retaining the degree of interview management necessary to yield comparable qualitative data from all interviews. All interviews were recorded digitally[13] and were transcribed in full.

- ***Rationale for categories of interviewees selected.***

The programme of semi-structured interviews was carried out with six categories of interviewees deemed to be best placed to provide the requisite information, namely (i) central-government officials; (ii) local-government officials; (iii) TDs; (iv) councillors; (v) community representatives; (vi) independent third parties. (See Table 3.4 for a listing of all categories of interviewees and the interviewee codings employed in each case.)

Interviews with the principal power holders in this equation, national and local-government officials, allowed the research to establish the official assessment of the successes and failures of the urban-renewal programmes and the role of the host communities therein. It provided an official baseline against which the assessments of other parties within the process could then be measured. These interviews provided an insight into the official thinking underlying the drive for urban-renewal programmes and the incorporation of indigenous communities within their consultative and participative structures. They also afforded an insight into the central-government parameters within which local authorities interpret, activate and less frequently initiate urban policy. Most strikingly in the context of the research questions under consideration, they afforded an important insight into the significance which community opposition might assume for the central and local state and the manner in which the state was likely to respond to those who might have occasion to take issue with core tenets of its renewal agenda.

Interviews with the second group of interviewees, namely national and local public representatives, sought to establish the degree to which individual public representatives had aligned themselves with the state's presentation and assessment of the urban-renewal agenda - a point of some significance in light of the fact that government parties were in a minority among the area's representatives. These interviews provided an important opportunity to establish whether the experience and views of the host communities were filtering through to the national and local political arena. As with government officials, the research was particularly interested in the manner in which public representatives were likely to respond to representations from the local community.

[13] One interviewee only indicated his preference not to be recorded.

As the public representative body comprised two distinct bodies, the national-parliament and local-government representatives, there were interesting nuances to be explored about the impact of distance from, and proximity to, proceedings between local government and local community. Interviews with local councillors, who had participated in both the Monitoring Committee of the Liberties/Coombe IAP and the preparation of the LRP provided a particularly important opportunity to explore further the precise standing of local elected representatives in the nexus of power relations between officials, public representatives and community representatives.

The third group of interviews took place with community organisations and associates in the study area. As the individuals nominated by community organisations and associations formally to represent the community's interests in the implementation of the first of the urban-renewal programmes under consideration, interviews with community representatives provided an opportunity to probe the experience and assessments of those who had engaged most directly with the implementation of the IAP. Interviews with this group provided an opportunity to establish a number of key factors: the nature of the ties between community representatives and their constituent communities; the manner in which the community's interests were mediated through community-representative structures; the nature of the community representatives' engagement with the urban-renewal agenda; the treatment of community representatives and their concerns within the state's structures and, ultimately, the degree to which community representatives had succeeded in influencing the outcome of proceedings. The assessment of the successes and failures of urban renewal forthcoming in such interviews also afforded an important opportunity to establish the degree of convergence and divergence between government and community assessments of the urban-renewal agenda.

A final and supplementary round of interviews were conducted with a number of independent third parties engaging with the host community in several different capacities. The first of these interviewees, the director of the area-based partnership for Dublin's inner city, was selected for his historical and analytical overview of the experience and significance of urban-regeneration programmes for communities across the inner city. The second interviewee, a community planner, carried a similar inner-city wide brief and had the distinction of being the only community planner available to assist inner-city communities engaging in planning, development and regeneration issues. She was thus in a position to comment on the distinctive features of community engagement with each of the IAPs across the inner city. The third interviewee was an urban geographer who had engaged in urban-regeneration projects in a professional capacity in a number of areas in the city, including the Liberties study area. The interviewee was accordingly in a position to speak about the parameters and considerations within which local authorities were framing their community-participation initiatives.

Table 3.4 Programme of semi-structured interviews.

Interviewee.	Position.	Data generated.	Relevance.
Central Government.			
Central-Government Official I (CG-I).	Assistant Principal, Urban and Village Renewal, Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government. 2001-2008.	Experience, perspective and assessment of the central-government official charged with the co-ordination and monitoring of IAPs nationally – including the assessment of complaints received from host communities.	Central-government rationale for, and assessment of, IAPs nationally.
Local Government.			
Local-Government Official I (LG-I).	Project Manager Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan (IAP), Dublin City Council. 2000-2004.	Experience, perspective and assessment of the local-government official charged with the management of the Liberties/Coombe IAP during the years of most intensive development and critical community engagement.	Local-government experience and assessment of Liberties/Coombe IAP.
Local-Government Official II (LG-II).	Project Manager Liberties/Coombe IAP, Dublin City Council. 2004-2008.	Experience, perspective and assessment of the official charged with the management of the Liberties/Coombe IAP during the closing years of the project when the business of the IAP Monitoring Committee had been largely reduced to the administration of the community-gain fund.	Local-government experience and assessment of Liberties/Coombe IAP.
Local-Government Senior Planner (LGSP-I).	Senior Planner, Forward Planning & Economic Development Unit, Dublin City Council. *Previously* Senior Planner Liberties/Coombe IAP 2001/2-2006.	Experience, perspective and assessment of the senior planner who had been in charge of planning in the Liberties during the central years of the IAP and whose subsequent move to the 'Forward Planning & Economic Development Unit' ensured a continuing professional interest in the regeneration of the Liberties.	Local-government professional experience and assessment of Liberties/Coombe IAP.
Local-Government Official III (LG-III).	Project Manager, Liberties Regeneration Project (LRP), Dublin City Council. 2007–Ongoing.	Experience and perspective of the local-government official charged with the preparation and implementation of the new and more wide-ranging LRP.	Local-government rationale for, and experience of, the opening stages of LRP.

Interviewee.	Position.	Data generated.	Relevance.
National Politicians.			
TD I (TD-I).	TDs representing the Dáil constituency of Dublin South Central.[14]	Perspective of a TD espousing very supportive assessment of urban-regeneration projects but very critical assessment of local-government body charged with their implementation.	National (i.e. Dáil constituency) political perspective on urban regeneration from representatives from four different political parties
TD II (TD-II).		Experience and perspective of a TD (previously a local councillor member of Monitoring Committee Liberties/Coombe IAP) espousing a broadly supportive position of urban-regeneration projects.	
TD III (TD-III).		Perspective of a TD (who had tabled critical parliamentary questions in relation to the IAP) espousing a critical view of both urban-regeneration projects and local government's implementation of same.	
TD IV (TD-IV).		Perspective of a TD (engaging in regeneration issues across the broader constituency) espousing a broadly critical position on urban regeneration.	
Local Politicians.			
Councillor I (Cllr-I).	Councillors representing the Local Government constituency of Dublin South West Inner City.[15]	Experience and perspective of a local councillor and community activist with a lengthy involvement in development issues; a member of Liberties/Coombe IAP Monitoring Committee and participant in the LRP consultation process.	Local political perspective on urban regeneration from representatives from two different political parties.
Councillor II (Cllr-II).		Experience and perspective of a local councillor who joined the IAP Monitoring Committee in its closing years and also participated in the LRP consultation process	

[14] The Dáil constituency of Dublin South Central encompasses the portion of the south inner city in which the Liberties/Coombe is located. Of the five TDs representing the constituency, four acceded to the request for an interview. One of the TDs interviewed had been elected to the Dáil during her tenure as a Councillor for the Dublin South West Inner City local-government constituency and had also been a member of the Liberties/Coombe IAP Monitoring Committee.

[15] The Local Government constituency of Dublin South West Inner City accords very closely with the boundary areas for the Liberties/Coombe IAP. The boundary areas for the LRP covered a smaller area and also fell within this constituency. Two of three councillors representing the constituency acceded to the request for an interview.

Interviewee.	Position.	Data generated.	Relevance.
Community Representatives.			
Community Representative I (CR-I).	Chairperson of the residents association living along the route of the new bypass that constituted the centrepiece of the Liberties/Coombe IAP.	Experience and perspective of a community representative who resigned from the Monitoring Committee of the Liberties/Coombe IAP in protest at the contraventions and failures of the plan – including the case for resigning on foot of a very critical assessment of the IAP.	Community Representatives' perspectives on IAP in particular and urban regeneration in general.
Community Representative II (CR-II).	Manager of a community development project in the Liberties.	Experience and perspective of a community organisation that maintained its participation in the IAP Monitoring Committee for the duration of the plan – including the case for participating in the face of a very critical assessment of the IAP.	
Community Representative III (CR-III).	Chief Executive Officer of a network of community organisations in the South West Inner City.	Experience and perspective of a community representative that resumed his organisation's community-representative seat on the IAP Monitoring Committee following an earlier resignation in protest at the contraventions and failures of the plan - including the case for participating in the face of a very critical assessment of the IAP.	
Community Representative IV (CR-IV).	Co-ordinator of a network of community organisations in Rialto.	Experience and perspective of a community network organisation that maintained its participation in the IAP Monitoring Committee – including the rationale for participation in the face of an uncertain assessment of the IAP.	
Independent Third Parties.			
Area Based Partnership Director (TSDW-I).	Director, Area Based Partnership, Dublin Inner City.	An inner-city wide perspective on regeneration from a third-sector local-development director who had engaged both directly in the implementation of one of the first urban-renewal programmes and subsequently both directly and at a remove in the ensuing IAPs *via* the funding of a series of parallel area networks in each of the quarters of the inner city delegating community representatives to the IAPs.	Third-sector local development experience and assessment of regeneration.
Community Planner (TSCP-I).	Independent Community Planner, Dublin Inner City.	An inner-city wide perspective on regeneration from a community planner engaged in the provision of technical support to individual residents and community groups engaged in a wide range of renewal, regeneration and development issues.	Third-sector community-planner professional experience and assessment of regeneration.
Urban Geographer Academic (UG-I).	Senior Lecturer, National University of Ireland.	A city-wide perspective from an academic who had engaged in urban-regeneration projects in a professional capacity in a number of areas, including the Liberties study area.	Independent academic experience and assessment of regeneration.

- ***Programme of observation at public forums.***

In addition to the programme of interviews detailed above, the research also undertook a programme of observation at a series of public meetings and community forums convened as part of the consultative and public information process surrounding the introduction of the second of the regeneration plans at issue in this research, the LRP. The decision to extend the programme of primary data collection to encompass a programme of observation allowed the research to observe the state's presentation and progression of an urban-regeneration agenda that was, for the first time, to have an immediate and direct impact on public land and public housing in the study area. The opportunity to engage in this programme of observation over a prolonged period (16 months) allowed the research to attend carefully to the manner in which the dynamic of engagements and proceedings between the local state and the local community altered in accordance with the introduction of a new mode of state intervention, a new mode of community engagement and the local state's decision to outsource the consultative process to private consultants. As the programme of observation expanded to encompass a series of meetings involving political activists, community activists, residents and councillors, the research was also afforded the opportunity to attend to the discussion and analysis taking place in a number of parallel forums. (See Table 3.5 for a summary of the different *fora* which the research was in a position to observe. Appendix 3.4 provides complete details of same.) Careful attention to proceedings within each of these forums allowed the research to chart the nature and trajectory of the community's engagement, views and interests throughout the preparation of the urban-regeneration plan in question, the public consultative process, the statutory consultative process and the final adjudication of local-government officials and councillors on the submissions of those residents and activists who persevered to the final stages of the process.

In additional to yielding important data about the nature of proceedings within the new regeneration process, the programme of observation also provided an important opportunity to expand and deepen the analysis of a number of issues arising within the programme of interviews. In a situation where the research was confronted with differing government and community records of the behaviour and positions of government and community within regeneration processes, the instigation of a large-scale consultative process provided an important opportunity to supplement the 'self-reporting' of all such behaviour with 'direct observation' of government and community positions, interventions, actions and inactions in public forums unmediated by any third parties (Nisbet & Watt, 1980, as discussed in Bell, 1993). It also provided valuable exposure to the position and views of a broad cross-section of the grassroots community, many of whom would not have been accessed through established community-development channels. In this, it greatly assisted the research in establishing the degree to which the views expressed during the programme of interviews with community representatives were representative of the views of the broader working-class community of the study area. The programme of observation proved, in essence, to

be a qualitative research technique which, when used in conjunction with the programme of in-depth interviews, allowed the research to deepen considerably and verify its understanding of the nature of engagements ensuing between local government and community in the implementation of urban-regeneration programmes.

- *Method.*

As the mode of community participation provided for within the LRP represented a significant departure from the mode of participation that had preceded it and as the detail of the regeneration plan was not known in advance of the public meetings, all LRP forums were approached in an exploratory manner. Careful attention was paid to the parameters within which discussions were framed; the parties leading the process; the agenda pursued within each meeting; the manner in which the process was managed; the nature of the issues arising for discussion; the treatment of emerging core issues on the regeneration agenda and the nature of exchanges ensuing between the various parties.[16] Detailed notes were taken of all meetings attended and transcribed in the immediate aftermath of each. Field notes consisted of both a record of proceedings, discussions and interventions and any arising observations about the manner in which the regeneration agenda was being progressed. Digital recordings were also made of all public consultation and information meetings in the event that particular points noted might require clarification or verification. As the programme of observation involved attendance at 30 different meetings comprising approximately 70 hours of observation, it was not practicable to consider transcribing individual meetings in full. The production of full transcripts of all such forums was in any case rendered unnecessary by the detailed data emerging from the lengthy handwritten notes taken during each of the sessions attended.

- ***Types of forum.***

Forums attended may be categorised under three general headings: (i) an extensive public consultative process initiated by local government during the preparation of the Framework Plan (and subsequently Local Area Plan) phase of the LRP; (ii) a series of *ad hoc* meetings convened by community activists and residents to respond to the new regeneration plan; (iii) formal and informal assemblies of local councillors responding to community concerns and more latterly exercising their reserved functions in relation to the 'making, amending or revoking' of a local area plan within Council chambers. The significance of each of the individual forums selected for observation within each of the three processes is outlined below.

[16] In some cases individual forums constituted one-off stand-alone stages of the overall process. Other components of the process comprised a series of meetings adopting a broadly parallel and established format. In the case of the latter, it was possible to chart the treatment of the emerging core items on the regeneration agenda as the preparation of the regeneration plan gathered momentum.

- ***Local-government consultative and information process.***

The first of these processes may be described as an elaborately structured public consultative process initiated by local government during the preparatory phase of the LRP. Observation within this process was undertaken in the interests of observing the operationalisation of a new mode of community and public participation within urban regeneration. Undertaken in an exploratory manner at the outset and without any notice of the extent of the regeneration project or consultative process envisaged, it became clear that the unfolding consultative process would be of great value to the research questions under investigation. Each stage of the consultative process provided important insights into distinctive aspects of the process. The official launch of the project provided exposure to the core components of the state intervention at issue in the new regeneration project as presented to an audience comprising developers, politicians, residents and others. It also served as the first introduction to the consultants appointed to mediate the consultative process. The series of neighbourhood meetings instigated in the wake of the project launch provided an insight into the parameters within which the local authority's consultants were seeking to frame the community consultation process. This series of meetings proved to be of great interest for the manner in which individual meetings came to function as *de facto* focus-group discussions of the community's experience and assessment of the nature of the development that had ensued in the previous decade and the role of local government in facilitating same.

The community planning weekend was of interest for two reasons: the actualisation of the 'community-planning process' and incidental insights gleaned into the planning and decision-making processes taking place in tandem with the community-planning component of the public process. It was also of interest for the nature of engagements that ensued between consultants and indigenous working-class communities upon entry into a more socially-mixed forum. The public forums, which constituted the mainstay of the consultative and public information process, provided the most sustained exposure to the core and defining components of this new regeneration project and process. (The detail of the data generated is outlined in summary in Table 3.5 and in full in Appendix 3.4.)

- ***Resident and activist forums.***

Attendance at the various forums surrounding the LRP process led in turn to attendance at other meetings and forums convened in response to the announcement of the new regeneration project. The second series of forums attended was a series of meetings convened by activists and residents grappling with the import of the new regeneration project without the machinery, finance or clearly delineated parameters of the local-government process. In the first instance, a public meeting convened by political activists provided a forum for a wide-ranging political discussion and analysis of the community's experience of regeneration and development at a time when the first of the regeneration plans under consideration was coming to a close and the second had just

commenced. Thereafter, an invitation to attend the meetings of a small grouping of political activists, community workers and residents convened in the wake of this meeting provided an opportunity to observe the analysis and critique advanced and opposition proffered to those aspects of the regeneration project deemed detrimental to the interests of working-class communities. The latter series of meetings took place over a 12-month period and afforded an important opportunity to observe the nature of the issues and difficulties arising amongst a small activist grouping attempting to oppose the progression of the LRP. In a somewhat similar manner, a series of *ad hoc* residents' meetings convened for the specific purpose of making a formal written submission to the statutory consultation process preceding the adoption of the Local Area Plan afforded an insight into the analysis and experience of residents endeavouring to oppose the progression of the LRP in isolation from both community organisations and political activists.

- ***Formal and informal assemblies of councillors.***

The third series of meetings observed comprised a mixture of formal and informal assemblies with public representatives. As the analyses and strategies emerging from the above meetings of activists, community workers and residents resulted in formal overtures to the public representatives for the area, two meetings with elected councillors followed: a formal presentation by the community-activist grouping to the councillors of Dublin South Central Area Committee (DSCAC) and an informal meeting between residents and a lone councillor following on the issuing of an invitation to the entire membership of the DSCAC. These meetings were of interest primarily for the nature of the issues with which the community sought to engage public representatives and the political response of the latter to those adopting a critical position *vis-à-vis* urban regeneration. They also yielded additional insights into the issues confronting working-class communities attempting to engage in the formal processes surrounding the progression of regeneration plans.

The programme of observation culminated in attendance at the monthly meeting of Dublin City Councillors on the night on which the Draft LAP was tabled for discussion following the completion of the statutory consultative process. The opportunity to observe the procedures and protocols through which the elected body of Dublin City Council exercised its reserved function in the 'making, amending or revoking' of a draft Local Area Plan in the formal setting of the Council chambers provided an important insight into the procedures and protocols obtaining in the forum charged with the final and ultimate decision-making power in relation to the adoption or rejection of the Local Area Plan proposed for the study area. It also generated additional insights into the political decision-making process, which greatly enhanced the research's understanding of the manner in which the political passage, agreement and endorsement of urban-regeneration projects in working-class areas is secured.

Table 3.5 Programme of observation, Liberties Regeneration Project (LRP).[17]

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
Local Government (Dublin City Council) Forums.			
Launch 'A New Vision for the Liberties.' *October 2007.*	The first public presentation of the new urban-regeneration project for the Liberties.	- Parties to the launch and composition of launch audience. - Core components of new regeneration plan, including relation to previous regeneration plans; significance of area designated for regeneration; type of state intervention planned; details of regeneration and consultation strategy. - Role ascribed to (i) consultants and (ii) community in preparation of the plan. - Nature of contributions from audience and response from officials.	Fundamentals of Liberties Regeneration Plan (LRP) including – context, driver, key components, themes, strategy, schedule, parties and implications for community.
Neighbourhood Meetings. **(i)** Pimlico; **(ii)** Liberties; **(iii)** Grand Canal Harbour/Basin Lane. *October 2007.*	The instigation of the community consultation process in neighbourhood-based locales.	- Consultation agenda and consultants' conduct of session. - Composition of neighbourhood meeting audience. - Community response to (i) consultation agenda; (ii) consultation process and consultants. - Community (i) assessment of previous development; (ii) understanding and analysis of urban regeneration as a process; (iii) concerns re new regeneration plan. - Nature of contributions from all parties – residents, community organisations, politicians, teachers etc. and response from consultants.	An unconstrained grassroots community assessment of development and urban regeneration to date and DCC's facilitation of same. Community perspective and orientation *vis-à-vis* future regeneration plans.
Community Planning Days. *November 2007*	The 'community-planning' component of the regeneration plan.	- Consultants' conduct of workshops and prominence within regeneration process. - Meaning of 'community planning' in practice, including 'community-planning' agenda. - Composition of community-planning audience, including community and public interests in attendance and dynamic between different groupings. - Opportunities for public/community contributions, including treatment of community concerns and issues. - Insights into decision-making in progress and brief with which consultants entrusted.	Clarity on key components of regeneration plan. Insights into decision-making-process taking place alongside public consultation and planning process.
Public Forums. *January – December 2008.*	The public forums within which the regeneration plan was communicated	- Method of notification and communication employed. - Public-forum regeneration agenda issues (and non-issues) with particular reference to proposals with greatest implications for indigenous working-class community. - Parties to regeneration process, including speakers tabled on forum agendas.	Detail of LRP – content and process as presented and mediated by consultants to a socially mixed public

[17] See Appendix 3.4 for full details of forum dates, venues and a complete statement of the data generated within each forum and the relevance of same.

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
(Public Forums *Jan. – Dec. 2008* ***Continued).***	and elaborated to a public audience.	- Detail of regeneration plans, including rationale and evidence base; legal status of regeneration plan; relation to policies currently in process and draft policy documents in circulation; information re land use, planned developments, status on planning applications etc. - Consultants' conduct of forums, including degree of control exercised over forum agendas, contributions, interventions and discussion. - Composition of public-forum audience, including nature of (i) community interests both in attendance/represented at forums and those conspicuous by their absence and dynamic between indigenous and incoming population. - Community response to (i) consultation agenda; (ii) consultation process and consultants. - Opportunities for public/community contributions, interventions and discussion. - Nature of contributions from all parties, including residents, community activists, political activists and other interest groups and nature of response from government officials and consultants, with particular attention to critical issues. - Role and function of (i) consultants; (ii) local-government officials; (iii) public/ community within process.	audience, including key components, themes, legal status, strategy, schedule, parties and community implications.
Political & Community-Activist/Resident Forums/Meetings.			
People before Profit Public meeting: Developers – Friends or Foes? *November 2010.*	A public meeting convened by political activists to discuss the community's experience of development.	- Community experience of opposing unwanted development (and development-related confrontations) within both the study area and other parts of Dublin. - Nature of discussion and analysis surrounding urban regeneration within the parameters of a meeting convened by political activists, including the opportunities and difficulties arising in engaging with large-scale urban regeneration projects. - Nature of strategy agreed for engagement with new regeneration plan.	Experience of engaging with regeneration and large-scale development in two different areas of Dublin.
Liberties Development Action Group (LDAG) Activist Meetings. *January 2008 – January 2009.*	A series of meetings in which community and political activists organised to defend interests of working-class communities within LRP.	- Nature of resident, community and political interests participating. - Core issues around which critique of regeneration structured. - Analysis advanced of regeneration, consultative and public information agenda and process. - Strategies adopted by activists organising in opposition to regeneration plans, including stance adopted *vis-à-vis* local-government officials and councillors and attempts to engage/mobilise broader range of interests. - Difficulties experienced by activists and residents in engaging in consultative process and opposing regeneration plans.	Experience of opposing the preparation and progression of LRP.

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
LDAG Presentation to Councillors, Dublin South Central Area Committee. *July 2008.*	A formal presentation of concerns of community and political activists to local councillors.	- Number and party affiliation of councillors in attendance. - Content of community critique of LRP, including rationale for approaching councillors. - Response of both councillors and local-government officials to the presentation of community concerns. - Outcome of meeting.	Political response to community concerns re LRP.
Resident Meetings. *November 2008, January 2009.*	A series of *ad hoc* residents' meetings convened to make formal submissions to Local Area Plan (LAP) process.	- Composition of resident grouping. - Analysis advanced of regeneration, consultative and public information process. - Core issues around which critique of Draft LAP structured. - Difficulties encountered by residents in engaging with regeneration process. - Assessment of role of public-representatives within the regeneration process and attempts to engage public representatives with concerns.	Experience of opposing progression of LRP and adoption of Draft LAP.
Resident meeting with Councillors of Dublin South Central Area Committee. *January 2009.*	A meeting convened by residents to present their concerns re LRP to the area's councillors.	- Number and party affiliation of councillors in attendance. - Core issues of concern for residents, including officials' treatment of community submissions to Draft LAP. - Councillors' response to community concerns. - Significance of regeneration and development concerns in working-class areas *vis-à-vis* affluent areas. - Outcome of meeting.	Political response to community concerns re LRP/Draft LAP.
Local-Government Councillors' Forum.			
Dublin City Council Meeting. *February 2009.*	The meeting at which Councillors asked to adopt the Liberties LAP.	- Insight into behind-the-scenes negotiations between area councillors and officials prior to discussion of LRP/Draft LAP by Council body. - Nature of councillors' contributions re LRP/Draft LAP prior to decision of councillors, including number of speakers on issue and time occupied by discussion; significance of Liberties within the city; degree of consensus and dissent characterising debate; the representation of community's position re LPR/Draft LAP. - Insight into dynamic between (i) councillors and government officials; (ii) councillors from different constituencies; (iii) political parties re LRP/Draft LAP. - Procedure and protocols through which the Councillor body exercises its reserved functions in 'making, amending or revoking' of LAPs. - Outcome of discussion.	Role of elected councillors in urban regeneration.

3.4 Presentation of the research findings.

The large body of data generated by this comprehensive programme of data collection is presented in the ensuing chapters. The chapter immediately following draws on the programme of secondary data collection to delineate the features of the Irish research context pertinent to the research's investigations. Thereafter the research proceeds to present the main empirical findings arising from the programme of primary data collection in Chapters 5-9. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 pertain to the first of the urban-renewal projects at issue in the research, the Liberties/Coombe IAP, while Chapters 8 and 9 attend to the second of the urban-regeneration programmes under consideration, the Liberties Regeneration Project. Chapter 10 then proceeds to present the research's closing analysis under three broad headings.

CHAPTER 4

The Irish Research Context.

This research takes place within the context of increasing state interventions in the urban environment. The state interventions in question coincided with a period of significant changes in the form and function of both the local-government body charged with the implementation of urban-renewal programmes and the organisational structures that had emerged to represent communities in those inner-city areas where the state was intervening in the most sustained and intensive manner. The research context delineated below is consequently three-fold: (i) the urban geography context, (ii) the local-government context and (iii) the local community-development context. This chapter situates the research's empirical research programme within these different contexts, highlighting recent research and discussion in both the academic and the public realms in Ireland as they relate to the key concepts at issue in the research questions under consideration.

4.1 Urban geography context.

4.1.1 Urban-renewal interventions in the city.

Urban-renewal schemes underwritten by fiscal incentives have constituted "a major component of urban development policies" in Ireland since 1986 (Williams, 2006: 2). The urban-geography literature abounds with chronologies of this major state intervention in the urban realm from the introduction of the first scheme in 1986 through to the conclusion of the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) in 2008 (see Bartley & Treadwell Shine, 2003; Drudy & Punch, 2000; Kelly 2008; McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001; MacLaran & Williams, 2003; Russell, 2001; Williams, 2006). This section accordingly confines itself to a statement of the original rationale for urban renewal and the feature that has remained constant throughout the ensuing two decades of renewal. It outlines a brief chronology of Irish urban renewal from its inception in 1986 to the demise of the fiscal incentives awarded under urban renewal in 2008, thereafter attending briefly to the nature of urban renewal in a post tax-incentive era. It closes by noting significant watersheds in the evolution of that chronology with particular attention to the key policy departure from the perspective of this research.

- ***Rationale and core feature of Irish urban renewal.***

The rationale for the landmark urban-renewal intervention in Ireland, the 1986 Urban Renewal Act, comprised two elements. First was the need to address "the tracts of dereliction and decay" left in the wake of the deindustrialisation and decline of the country's main urban centres; second was "the need to create activity in the construction sector" (KPMG *et al.*, 1996: 4). That rationale translated into a series of core objectives centred around the promotion of the urban renewal, redevelopment and revitalisation of inner-city areas, which it was hoped would generate a self-

sustaining renewal process and create a financial climate for large-scale private-sector investment in "the construction and reconstruction of buildings in designated inner city areas" through the provision of a stimulus to the construction sector (*ibid.,* 5*)*. In the case of the latter, the objective was two-fold, an expanded construction output and the creation of employment in the construction sector. The 1986 URS provided for tax incentives for development in designated areas in Ireland's five cities in addition to the establishment of the Custom House Docks Development Authority in Dublin.

From the beginning, the Irish government's urban-renewal policies were constructed around the imperative of securing private-sector investment, which was understood as being central to the urban-renewal process. In seeking to effect such an outcome, the Irish government introduced a series of fiscal incentives which would reduce the investment risk posed by these geographically-central but, in property terms, decidedly secondary locations. Fiscal incentives in various guises and packages would come to be the central and defining feature of the various renewal schemes that followed. A decade after they had first been introduced, KPMG *et al.* (1996: xii-xiii) described urban renewal in Ireland as "inextricably linked to tax incentives and cautioned that "urban renewal cannot be achieved by tax incentives in isolation, nor should urban renewal initiatives be led by tax incentives." It was clear from the Goodbody review conducted a decade later, however, that their significance had not diminished. Shorn of the rhetorical embellishments in which urban renewal had become enmeshed at that time, Goodbody *et al.* (2006: 135) described the Urban and Town Renewal Schemes as "property-focussed fiscal measures aimed at addressing geographically bounded market failures."

- ***A brief chronology of urban renewal, 1986-2008.***

The years following the introduction of the 1986 URS saw a considerable expansion of the designated areas following the lobbying of property owners who had found themselves on "the 'wrong side' of the incentives boundary" in 1986 (MacLaran & Williams, 2003: 161). By 1990, the designated areas had expanded to encompass a large proportion of Dublin's city centre in addition to a large green-field site on the periphery of the city. In 1991, the government's attention turned to the Temple Bar area of Dublin where it set about creating 'a cultural and tourist quarter,' which would protect and enhance the types of land-use functions that had begun appearing in the area (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001: 443). The 1986 URS came to a close in 1994, at which point the Government proceeded to introduce 'a new and more targeted scheme.' The 1994 URS, which applied to 36 Irish urban areas, was to be more focused than its predecessors and concentrate on those areas with the most severe dereliction. In addition to the adoption of a greater emphasis on residential development, the new scheme also introduced financial incentives for a 'Living Over the Business' initiative in the country's five cities and provided for the designation of six (and subsequently three further) 'Enterprise Areas' in Dublin, Cork and Galway. Originally intended to run for a three-year period, the 1994 URS was extended on three different occasions under three

different Finance Acts, with the qualifying period for remaining aspects of the scheme finally coming to a close in 1999 (Department of Finance, 2010).

At the close of the first decade of renewal, the Department of the Environment (DoE) commissioned a major review of "the impact, effectiveness and cost of the Urban Renewal Schemes" (KPMG *et al.* 1996: i). The findings of that review provided the impetus for the evolution of a new 'holistic' concept of urban renewal and the introduction of a new URS in 1998. Presented as a 'radical departure' from the URSs that had preceded it, the 1998 URS provided for the continued use of tax incentives but within a new framework in which "the designation of an area should not take place in isolation but should emerge from a broadly-based Integrated Area Plan (IAP)" (DoE, 1999a: 1.1). A total of 49 IAPs were subsequently approved across 43 cities and towns nationwide, distinguished by the following characteristics: integration, area-focus, targeting, consultation, participation, partnership, realism, implementation and marketing (DoE, 1998). Tax designations approved within the 1998 scheme were initially intended to have a lifetime of three years. In the event, the qualifying period for the scheme was extended on three different occasions, with the recommendations of the second major review of the Government's area-based tax-incentive renewal schemes in 2006 finally signalling their demise. Notwithstanding the recommendation that the "Government retain tax incentivisation as a tool of policy" in the event that it might be required by future economic circumstances, Goodbody *et al.* (1996: v) concluded that "the scale of economic activity and the availability of capital" had reduced the need for such interventions. Tax incentives for urban renewal were terminated with effect from July 2008.

The demise of fiscal incentives did not, however, signal the end of urban regeneration in Dublin city. It is apparent from the briefest perusal of the *Draft Dublin City Development Plan 2011-2017*, which identifies "continuing and enhancing regeneration... [as] a priority," that it is firmly entrenched as one of approaches to be adopted in "responding to the challenges facing the economy of the city and its role as the national and regional economic engine" (DCC, 2010b: 111). The text of the Draft Development Plan meanwhile invokes 'regeneration' in a number of different guises throughout its pages: as a policy tool that has proven its efficacy in the past and that continues to occupy a key position in the armoury of DCC into the future; as a policy objective in and of itself; as an area characterisation; as a primary land-use zoning category; as a potential to be realised in redevelopment proposals; as a criteria to be employed in assessing strategic planning and development opportunities and one to which proposals for mid- and high-rise buildings must have regard etc. (DCC, 2010b). In the absence of tax incentives, it is apparent in any case that DCC has other forms of state intervention at its disposal to incentivise development in areas that had hitherto proved resistant to the state's regeneration agenda, including public-private partnerships (PPPs), public-land sales, public-realm intervention and business improvement districts, in addition to

statutory planning tools such as Local Area Plans which can function to create a climate of greater certainty for private-sector developers (see also Goodbody *et al.,* 2006: 135-9).

- ***Significant watersheds in chronology of urban renewal.***

The succession of URSs has been understood in different ways by different commentators. For example, the principal distinction drawn between the various schemes by McGuirk and MacLaran (2001) and Bartley and Treadwell-Shine (2003), was between the era of 'centralized renewal initiatives' from which the local authority was systematically excluded and the era of integrated area planning in which the local authority emerged as a party which had proved itself to be a competent and willing authority with the requisite skills, infrastructure and orientation to take responsibility for securing the development and renewal of derelict lands within its jurisdiction. This was understood as a significant watershed in DCC's movement from its traditional managerial role to a new and distinctive entrepreneurial role (see 4.2.2). The authors also drew attention to the movement from "a narrowly conceived physical regeneration" to a holistic concept that embraces the social, economic and environmental strands of renewal (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001, 443-7). The transition has also been construed as the movement away from a 'social polarizing' model to "anti-exclusionary 'social models' of urban renewal" (Bartley & Treadwell-Shine, 2003: 146). In the progression from one model of urban regeneration to the next, attention has also been directed to the progressive insinuation of a partnership model that has sought to draw "community and other elements of 'civil society'" into regeneration projects that had previously been a matter for the state and the private sector only (*ibid.,* 155-8). Others have focused on the rationale for fiscal incentives obtaining in the distinctly different economic circumstances in which each phase of urban renewal proceeded from the period of severe recession in the 1980s, through a resurgence in the economy in the 1990s, to the emergence of Ireland as one of the strongest economies in north-west Europe in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Williams, 2006).

The distinctions advanced in all such analyses illuminate a number of facets of the Government's URSs that are integral to this research, including the economic rationale advanced for such interventions in the urban realm and the manner in which the local state has reconfigured its role *vis-à-vis* central government and the private-sector development interests at stake in urban renewal. However, the primary distinction to be highlighted from the perspective of this research is that between property-led urban-regeneration schemes which proceeded separately and independently from communities resident in areas designated for urban renewal and the new era of integrated URSs that actively sought to incorporate those same communities within the structures established to oversee the implementation of these schemes. Accordingly, it is the rationale for and significance of the emergence of community participation as a core component of the state's renewal policies following the introduction of the 1998 URS that is the primary focus in this case. (See 4.2.3 for the evolution of the community-participation component of the state's URSs.)

4.1.2 Urban-renewal impacts on disadvantaged urban communities.

During the years in which the various URSs and extensions were in progress, urban-renewal and regeneration policies were the subject of a carefully constructed official consensus which presented the outcomes of these policies as overwhelmingly positive. It was a consensus that 'brooked no opposition' (Brudell, 2008). Those who dissented from this orthodoxy confronted powerful public and private players in an environment that was entirely hostile to all such critiques. However, in the wake of the financial crash the state's urban-renewal programmes have increasingly been interpreted in a far more critical manner. Assessments in this instance have taken place primarily with reference to the contribution that the succession of fiscal incentives made to the property bubble which ultimately precipitated the crash in the property market and the Irish banking system. Yet, these critiques still fail to take cognisance of the impact of the state's urban-renewal programmes on the working-class communities resident in those areas in which the state had been pursuing such policies. Neither do they take cognisance of the wealth of assessments, critiques and data that had accumulated among both the host communities and a variety of governmental, local development, community and academic commentators.

- ***Impact on disadvantaged urban communities nationally.***
- *Government assessments.*

The primary evidence about the impact of urban renewal on disadvantaged urban communities nationwide is located in the two major government reviews commissioned in the wake of the 1986/1994 and 1998 URSs respectively. The 1996 KPMG *et al.* review welcomed a number of aspects of the first decade of urban renewal, including the amount of private-sector investment (£1.7 billion) generated in the designated areas and the manner in which the ensuing residential, office and commercial development had effected major changes in the physical environment and cycle of decay and dereliction in Irish cities and towns (*ibid.,* ii). From the perspective of this research, its key findings related to the net cost of the schemes to the Exchequer (in the range of IR£367 - IR£461 million) and the schemes' impacts on host inner-city communities (see KPMG *et al.,* 1996, chapters 9 and 10). In relation to the net cost of the schemes, the current research also notes the concerns expressed by the Combat Poverty Agency (CPA) about the significant costs imposed on the state, the contraction of the tax base, the impediment posed to the redistribution of resources and the undermining of the progressive nature of the tax system (CPA, 1996: 3). Returning to the KPMG et al. review, the current research also notes the catalogue of negative findings, which it presented in relation to communities "indigenous or adjacent to designated areas," including the failure to address "issues... central to the regeneration and sustainable redevelopment of these areas," the manner in which low incomes and escalating land values precluded local participation in tax-incentive led development, the inadequacy of existing public consultation mechanisms and the failure of urban renewal to translate into employment opportunities in the absence of planning and cooperation between public, private and community

sectors (KPMG *et al.,* 1996: x-xi). KPMG *et al.* concluded their review with a series of recommendations for a new concept of urban renewal that would redress the body of concerns identified within its review (*ibid.,* xii-xvi).

Commissioned by the Department of Finance almost ten years later, the Goodbody Review did not reveal any substantive change in the orientation or impact of urban renewal. Like its predecessor, it was again in a position to enumerate a number of positive outcomes, most notably "kick start[ing] developments in a number of areas... that developers might normally have eschewed," matching development to local needs and priorities, positive impacts on dereliction, improvements in urban design, enhanced housing outputs in target areas, significant benefits in commercial development etc. (Goodbody *et al.,* 2006: iii). The stated objectives of the 1998 URS had, however, established significantly more stringent criteria upon which urban renewal should be assessed. The scheme had been "successfully implemented" in development terms but "less successful in delivering social and community benefits" (*ibid.*). The 'lesser' degree of success referred to was in fact a catalogue of significant failures in the areas of community-gain financing, local employment and public housing, namely:

- 'Poor implementation' of the community gain aspect of the scheme'[18] in which the maximum (community gain) contribution made by developers amounted to "about 1 per cent of Scheme expenditure" and then only in "IAP areas where a serious effort was made" (*ibid.,* 78).
- "Generally very poor outcomes" in securing local employment from developers and builders in the construction phase (*ibid.*).
- "No instances of... private support for social housing" (*ibid.*).
- "Negative impacts on social integration" arising from heavy involvement of residential investors and increased supply of rental properties (*ibid.,* 146).

The implementation of the scheme had meanwhile taken place at considerable cost to the Exchequer. The review predicted that that the area-based tax-incentive schemes would cost the Exchequer €1,993 million by the time they reached a conclusion in June 2006 and that the 1998 URS would account for 74% of the anticipated costs (*ibid.,* ii). The sizable costs incurred by the state gave rise to two critical questions. Had the state achieved 'valued for money' in incurring such costs? To whom had the very significant tax benefits accrued? In relation to the former, Goodbody *et al.* concluded that "the Scheme has proved expensive in value for money terms," a fact illustrated by the "very substantial" discounted cost to the Exchequer of €40,917 per residential unit developed (*ibid.,* 86). In relation to the latter, the consultants found that the tax benefits had accrued to "relatively few higher income individuals" and that the significant inflation of property prices had benefited a small number of landowners and developers (*ibid.,* iii). Their conclusion on the redistributional impact of the 1998 scheme was clear.

[18] I.e. Goodbody *et al.* (2006: 78) cite the planned imposition of "special levies on developers to fund community facilities and education and training initiatives" alongside the "allocation of jobs in the construction phase to local people" as mechanisms through which it was intended that "the Scheme... would provide community benefits."

"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Scheme has had very negative equity impacts" (*ibid.,* 86).

- ***Impact of on community of Dublin's inner city.***

Government-commissioned reports provide the primary point of reference for the impacts of urban renewal nationally. At a city level, it is possible to discern a greater diversity of sources and interested parties and perspectives. These include assessments by academics, local-development and community-development organisations and activists concerning the impact of urban renewal on inner-city areas and communities.

- *Academic assessments.*

Urban geographers have engaged critically with different aspects of URSs. Writing in the early 1990s, MacLaran (1993: 225) signalled an early warning about the negative consequences that were likely to ensue from the state's renewal programmes, namely rising land and property prices which would displace community-based activities; developments that were "likely to be of very limited significance for inner-city communities in terms of employment opportunities" and the removal of deprived communities whose continuing presence provided 'unacceptable' if 'striking evidence' of 'the inequalities of capitalism.' Meanwhile, the high visibility of these property-related schemes would give the impression that action was being taken, while allowing the government "to abandon any concerted attempt to attract appropriate industrial employment into the inner city" *(ibid.).* In the wake of the first decade of urban renewal, Punch (2001) pointed to a core contradiction at the heart of "the market model of renewal" in which "the exchange-value interests of the owners or private property" would always come into conflict with and "prevail over the use-value interests of the [inner-city] community" (*ibid.* 45-48). It was a concern that was elaborated throughout a body of critical assessments at that time as urban geographers enumerated the many costs and negative externalities visited by property-led urban renewal upon inner-city communities (Drudy & Punch, 2000; MacLaran & Williams, 2003; Punch 2000, 2001). For Punch, the core concern was located in the dramatic rise in land prices and speculative activity that followed on the preparation of renewal plans and tax designation. Renewal was a "code for the recommodification of land... previously either under-used or derelict" which was then placed beyond the use of communities unable to enter the property marketplace (Punch, 2001: 49; see also Drudy & Punch, 2000). Other urban geographers have attended closely to the nature of the development boom 'sparked' by the succession of fiscal incentives in the office and residential sectors in designated areas across Dublin city (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001, MacLaran & Williams, 2003).[19] In the process, they have also noted the negative consequences that this

[19] The Irish academic literature on this point is considerable. See, for example, MacLaran *et al.* (1987) for an examination of earlier office development booms; MacLaran and O'Connell (2001) on 'the changing geography of office development in Dublin;' MacLaran (1996a, 1999b) on the natures, causes and impacts of recent private-residential sector development in inner Dublin; Kelly and MacLaran (2004) on 'the residential transformation of inner Dublin;' Williams and MacLaran (1996) and Williams (2006) on fiscal incentives

development has engendered for inner-city communities, including the loss of low-grade business and blue-collar employment, rising residential prices and the dilution and obfuscation of continuing serious problems among inner-city communities (MacLaran & Williams, 2003; see also Bartley & Treadwell Shine, 2003; MacLaran *et al.,* 2007).

The consequences enumerated above had followed from the era of property-driven urban renewal initiated and controlled by central government and special-purpose authorities. From 1998, the advent of a new era of holistic urban renewal thereafter appeared to promise something qualitatively different. Although none presumed to pre-judge the outcome of the new URS, its introduction was nonetheless greeted with considerable scepticism and fear that "local priorities may be marginalized by the privileging of economic efficiency over social concerns" in the midst of "powerful discourses of entrepreneurialism, globalization and place competitiveness" (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001: 453). Punch (2000) expressed similar reservations about the likely emergence of significantly different outcomes from renewal models operating within unchanged structural confines. That scepticism was not misplaced. Academic reviews conducted in the years since the introduction of the 1998 URS do not indicate any distinctive, let alone seismic shift in the outcome of a scheme presented as being distinctively different from its property-led predecessors. Looking at the different cycles of investment in evidence during the past two decades, Kelly (2007a) charted the transformation that has taken place in the physical and economic landscape of Dublin's inner city during the two decades in which the urban-renewal programmes have been in progress. As is evident from the transformation effected in both the wider inner city and the study area, the drive for land-use upgrading has continued apace throughout the 2000s.

> "In the most recent round of urban restructuring in Dublin, inner-city areas have become a major target for large-scale inward investment, generally embodied in new office and commercial spaces, in an influx of private residential apartment complexes and in a major land and house-price spiral." (Kelly, 2007a: 116)

Those with a vested interest in land-use upgrading, spiralling land and house prices and the accompanying dramatic changes that have taken place in the class structure of the inner city (see Kelly & MacLaran, 2004) have cited all such outcomes as evidence of the success of the state's urban-renewal policies. Those with no such vested interest have been obliged to bear what Kelly and MacLaran (2004: 56) call the "enormous costs being thrust onto the indigenous working-class residents of the inner city," the "deepening housing affordability crisis" being identified as the most obvious of those costs.

It is possible to find other and considerably more favourable assessments of the impact of urban renewal on the communities of Dublin's inner city (see for example, Corcoran & DCC Entrust Team Members, 2003). However, these appear to be very much in the minority. It is the findings of

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and incentive areas. The preceding analyses are part of a considerably broader body of literature that has amassed on the nature of development engendered by fiscal incentives.

critical urban geographers in any case that find the greatest resonance with the critiques advanced by local-development, community and activist personnel across Dublin inner city. This is apparent both in the findings of a major Combat Poverty Agency funded research project undertaken by the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (CURS), Trinity College, which documented the very negative experience of those community organisations and associations that undertook to represent their communities' interests in the implementation of the various regeneration programmes in process over the last decade (see MacLaran *et al.,* 2007a, 2007b). The contents of a conference convened subsequent to the publication of that report meanwhile established that the report's very critical findings were generalised across many urban areas in Ireland (Brudell & MacLaran, 2009).

- *Local-development assessments.*

The convergence between the findings of critical geographers and local and community-development personnel is also apparent in the critiques emanating from the latter. As noted in Chapter 3, Dublin's inner city was the site of an unprecedented level of development during the decade under consideration (1998-2008). With the exception of a short-lived initiative to forge an inner-city wide engagement with urban renewal under the auspices of the Dublin Inner City Partnership (DICP) in 2002,[20] engagement largely took place on a project-specific basis. The two decades of urban renewal were however punctuated by two important local-development assessments of urban renewal. The title of Connolly's (1997) exploration of the first decade of urban renewal was placed in the interrogative, *Developing Dublin's Inner City – Who Benefits?* He concluded that "while the urban renewal programme has achieved a substantial physical impact on the inner city area, this has been at significant expense to the state and of marginal benefit to the resident communities" only (*ibid.,* 76). His critique of urban renewal was conducted within a broader critique of the government's failure to respond to an inner-city crisis that had been clearly identified in its own literature in 1981 (see National Economic and Social Council (NESC), 1981). Subsequent policies, including urban renewal, had "exacerbated the situation, contributing to a weakening of the traditional community cohesion and increasing the division between wealth and poverty. The end result is a 'dual city' as described by Castells and Mollenkopf (1991)" (Connolly, 1997: 77). In the absence of a specific and coherent urban policy that would engage with the fallout from the global restructuring of capital, the impact of national policy on inner-city areas and the need for an integrated public policy to address the urban crisis, Connolly predicted that the situation for the majority of inner-city residents was likely to deteriorate and that the divisions between the rich and poor were likely to increase (*ibid.,* 77-83).

That predication was confirmed a decade later in a DICP-commissioned report which sought to mine behind the aggregate District Electoral Division (DED) figures published by the CSO "to

[20] Following the publication of a critical review of community engagement in the Liberties/Coombe IAP (see Brudell, 2000; Coveney, 2001).

establish the scale, concentration and persistence of acute poverty in the Dublin inner city area" at neighbourhood level in the wake of an unprecedented 15-year development boom (Haase, 2009: 3). Selecting a DED for investigation at neighbourhood level across each quarter of the inner city in the 2006 Census, Haase's analysis led him to identity a number of grounds on which the regeneration of Dublin's inner city had failed disadvantaged inner-city communities. Those findings included spatial segregation between the 'highly disadvantaged' and 'highly affluent' neighbourhoods, the earlier loss of significant numbers of the original population from now gentrified areas of the inner city who could not by definition derive any benefits from the renewal of their areas, "a considerable contraction in the overall number of social housing units available" with an almost ten per cent decline in the inner-city's public-housing stock between 1991 and 2006, an ensuing insecurity about the long-term prospects of being allowed to remain in their current accommodation and increasing marginalisation within an encroaching alien environment (*ibid.,* 29-31). Continuing poverty and deprivation was meanwhile being obscured by "a fallacy or statistical artefact" whereby Census data at DED level had positioned the inner city in "the middle field of the overall affluence-to-disadvantage spectrum" (*ibid.,* 32). The reality was rather different.

> "Rather than having benefited all communities in equal proportions, the urban renewal of Dublin's inner city has resulted in the creation of a finely-knit patchwork of highly affluent and disadvantaged neighbourhoods at the micro level, which have little in common and are unrelated to one another... Generally, the worst-affected areas in 1991 are still in the same position in 2006." (*ibid.*)

It was interesting in this context to note the suggestion at a public forum on continuing poverty in the inner city that the community gain promised during this phase of urban renewal had in places functioned as something akin to 'a carrot in front of a donkey' to silence criticism and dissent (Docklands resident, Verbal contribution to DICP Forum, 2008).

Outside of these city-wide assessments, a number of those who engaged with the IAPs in their respective designated inner-city areas have also produced critiques of urban renewal. In a paper entitled "*People's manifesto for the north west inner city or meal ticket for developers*," McCue (2000) concluded the latter to have been the case in the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) Framework Plan. During the closing years of the second incarnation of the HARP, Byrne (2006) charted both the positive and negative outcomes of the community's engagement with the IAP. With a catalogue of costs that included an unprecedented pressure for high-rise development, a piecemeal approach to development and a continued downgrading of public-sector housing in favour of private tenures, it was clear that the 'pains' had again outweighed gains for the host community (see also Byrne *et al.,* 2004).

Of the various locations designated for renewal across Dublin's inner city, it is the Liberties area that has yielded the most extensive critique of the impact of urban renewal on inner-city

communities. It is to that body of documentation that this brief overview of the impact of urban renewal on inner-city communities now turns.

- ***Impact on community in study area, the Liberties.***

The documentation produced in respect of the impact of urban renewal in the Liberties derives from three distinct sources: local residents and community organisations, urban geographers and social and economic consultants.

- *Local community assessments.*

The largest body of documentation derived from two of the associations and organisations invited to represent their community's interests in the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP. The documentation in question provided a record of every stage and every facet of the community's engagement from its position prior to entering into the IAP process in 1999 to the critical conclusions of those who chose to withdraw formally from the state's structures in 2002 (Brudell, 1999, 2000, 2002; Brudell & SWICN Environment Group, 2003; Hammond *et al.*, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Hammond, 2002a; SWICN Environment Group, 2002a, 2002b; Brudell *et al.*, 2004). As a later chapter will explore the assessments of community representatives at the close of the Liberties/Coombe IAP, this section confines itself merely to a summary statement of those conclusions as relayed in a critical exploration of the community's experience of engaging in the implementation of the IAP from that time.

> "The article contends that the Department of the Environment and Local Government and its local authority, Dublin City Council, misrepresented both the real agenda being pursued *via* the IAPs and the role and standing of the Community Representatives therein. It contends that the Liberties/Coombe IAP and its governing Departmental Guidelines were presented in a manner designed to persuade the community that it had a stake and an authority in the implementation of the IAP which neither party was prepared to concede when faced with the assertion of such a stake and authority. It would appear reasonable to conclude that the manner in which the Liberties/Coombe IAP and the role and authority of its Monitoring Committee were presented was an attempt to pre-empt and co-opt any potential community opposition to the real agenda being pursued *via* the IAP in question" (Brudell *et al.*, 2004: 84).

- *Academic assessments.*

The impact of urban renewal in the study area has also attracted considerable academic attention (Kelly, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Kelly & MacLaran, 2004; MacLaran *et al.*, 2007; Punch *et al.*, 2007). Kelly's (2008) examination of entrepreneurial governance and gentrification in inner Dublin represents the most in-depth and sustained academic exploration of the impact of urban renewal on the Liberties. In a wide-ranging thesis which reviews "the structural forces underlying the recent and dramatic transformation of inner Dublin," Kelly looked at the way in which "gentrification has been adopted as part of a broader entrepreneurial or neo-liberal urban strategy" (*ibid.*, v-vi) with attention always to the impact of this new entrepreneurial regime on disadvantaged urban

communities. The ensuing analysis of the physical and residential transformation of the Liberties is particularly pertinent in the present context.

In relation to 'the physical' element, Kelly characterised the period since the early 1990s as one of "exceptional functional transformation" in Dublin's southwest inner city (SWIC) (Kelly, 2007a: 116). That functional transformation initially took the form of new office development as developers, attracted by fiscal incentives, began to venture outside the Dublin 2 office core into areas deemed 'secondary' in terms of office development. The greater functional change in the SWIC, however, "occurred in the residential sector where a development boom between 1992 and 2003 resulted in the construction of almost 6,000 dwellings, mainly in the form of private apartment complexes" (*ibid.*). The scale of the transformation effected by the widespread coverage of the Liberties with apartment complexes becomes fully apparent in Kelly's exposition of the wide range of industrial functions for which most of the sites of recent residential development had previously been utilised. Development meanwhile involved "not only functional upgrading... but also... the upgrading of the class of function and intensity of development scale" (*ibid.,* 115). The physical transformation of the built environment of Dublin's inner city was accompanied by "a concurrent social and demographic transformation [as]... former industrial and working-class residential areas... experienced an influx of a middle-income, professional population" (*ibid.,* 116; see also Kelly & MacLaran, 2004). This was also the case in the Liberties, as was apparent from the dramatic changes recorded in respect of each key CSO data category between 1991 and 2002. Kelly (2007b, 2008) cited the latter as evidence of the gentrification which had taken place in the Liberties during these years.

In reviewing the impact of earlier urban-renewal programmes, Drudy and Punch (2000: 260) pointed to the manner in which such programmes resulted in "a clear division between "'winners' and 'losers,'" with the latter being "overwhelmingly found in the lower socio-economic groupings and among the 'local' population." That dynamic had not been altered by the most recent round of renewal. The following were among the costs identified for working-class communities in the newly gentrified Liberties: a dramatic increase in land prices, significantly altered accessibility to housing, a worsening affordability crisis (Kelly, 2007b) and "the displacement and erosion of valuable locally-relevant retail functions" in an environment in which development pressures were "likely to intensify in the medium term" (Kelly, 2007a: 116-7). Kelly's enumeration of the various costs and threats confronting indigenous communities in an increasingly polarised social environment culminated in

> "the political question of the degree to which urban policy will increasingly be framed towards satisfying the demands of this incoming, higher-income group with regard to the protection and enhancement of its property interests over those of the indigenous poorer population" (*ibid.*).

- *Local-development assessments.*

A number of commentators have pointed to the way in which the "profound change in the socio-economic composition" reported in recent census data (Haase, 2009: 11) has functioned to obscure the continued existence of poverty and deprivation among indigenous working-class communities. While that data "appeared to suggest that Dublin Inner City had been dramatically transformed from the area with the largest concentration of disadvantage in Ireland in 1991 to a generally affluent area by 2006" (*ibid.,* 3), the experience of those working and researching on the ground in Dublin's inner city indicated that "deprivation is nowadays as prevalent within it as it was fifteen years ago" (*ibid.,* 11). In his detailed exploration of the DED area selected for analysis at 'micro level' in the Liberties,[21] Haase uncovered socio-economic indicators that pointed to "significant regeneration" and the "exceptional influx of [a] better-educated population" and "higher skilled professionals" into the area on the one hand and the "exceptional displacement" and "significant replacement" of the pre-existing population on the other. He also found a significant degree of differentiation in the spatial distribution of relative affluence and deprivation at street and neighbourhood level with individual streetscapes ranging from 'affluent' to 'extremely disadvantaged.' Taking his investigation to the scale of the street, he described "sanitised" areas with "alienating streetscapes... entirely dichotomised" into local-authority housing complexes and large-scale private apartment developments in a strikingly high-security environment.[22] He noted "the greatest decline in the proportion of social housing in any one area throughout the country" in the years between 1991 and 2006 (*ibid.,* 22-23, see also Haase 2008a). He found, in effect, a microcosm of the divided city.

4.2 Local government context.

The introduction of the phase of urban renewal under consideration in this research (1998-2008) coincided with a period of significant changes in the form and function of the local authority charged with the implementation of the state's urban-renewal schemes in Dublin's inner city. This section examines aspects of that restructuring and reorientation of particular significance to the context within which this research takes place, namely (i) the institutional restructuring of the local authority; (ii) the growing entrepreneurial orientation of an increasingly corporate local authority; (iii) the evolution of a new *modus operandi* accompanied by increasing overtures to disadvantaged communities. It closes with a brief consideration of the significance that inner-city communities assume in the context of urban renewal and arising questions about the significance of the

[21] The individual DEDs chosen for analysis at micro level in each of the four quarters of the inner city were selected on the basis that each "was very disadvantaged in 1991, but no longer reveal high levels of deprivation in 2006" (Haase, 2009: 16). The findings relayed above pertain to the Ushers B (DED) 'micro area' in the Liberties only.

[22] In noting the "high levels of security features" prevalent in new gated-apartment complexes across the inner city, Haase (2009: 24) also pointed to the presence of "sometimes inordinate screening features against their surrounding neighbourhoods."

participation commitments that have now become a fixture of the state's interventions in the urban realm.

4.2.1 Coincident changes in the form of local government.

The experience of community engagement with large-scale urban-renewal programmes has in some ways been a history of fragmentation and the repeated disaggregation of communities into separate manageable entities. It is fitting that this approach has been pioneered by a local-government body that has itself undergone considerable fragmentation in recent years. The Local Government Act 1991 (Regional Authorities) Establishment Order 1993 saw the division of the Dublin region into four separate administrative areas within the Dublin Regional Authority (DRA) in 1994 (DRA, 2010). The division of the metropolitan area created "a fragmented administrative structure with little co-ordination" in which the newly-established local authorities were obliged to adopt a competitive stance and "vie with one another to attract valuable office and retail developments, reminiscent of the 'fiscal mercantilism' found in US cities" (MacLaran & Williams, 2003: 169; see also McDonnell, 2005). In the years that followed, the fragmentation that took place across the Dublin region also pervaded the operation of individual local authorities, as a process of extensive restructuring began in the mid to late 1990s.

Local government comprises two very distinct entities: appointed officials with executive functions and elected councillors with reserved functions. In a local-government policy environment that has been replete with large rhetorical commitments to participatory democracy in recent years, the role and significance of representative democracy can sometimes be obscured. Its role in urban renewal has certainly been obscured by the rhetorical importance attached to participatory democracy in urban renewal and the fact that many of the difficulties that have ensued therein have centred around conflict between community representatives and officials. The growing peripherality of councillors in the affairs of local government has, however, also and more concretely followed on substantive changes in the structures of local authorities.

- ***Institutional restructuring of local government.***
- *Better Local Government.*

1996 appears to have been a pivotal moment in the reorientation and restructuring of Irish local government in general and DCC in particular. That year saw the publication of the DoE's *Better Local Government* with its stated objective of creating "a modern, efficient and properly resourced local government system... [that] offers local government an opportunity to re-establish itself as the legitimate voice of local communities and to lead government action in support of those communities" (DoE, 1996: i). From the perspective of this research, the key proposals contained within that report pertained to the dismantling of the established forums for councillor participation (the *ad hoc* committee system) and the establishment of a number of alternative structures in their

place: Strategic Policy Committees (SPCs), a Corporate Policy Group and Local Area Committees (LACs), which promised councillors an enhanced role both in the development of policy and in the translation of that policy into effective service delivery at local level (*ibid.,* 13-18). The establishment of the LACs was intended to "enable operational matters to be discussed at that [local] level, leaving the full council free to discuss issues affecting the whole area" and was to prove particularly significant thereafter in determining the scope of councillors' participation.

In tandem with the introduction of reforms ostensibly designed to enhance the role of councillors, the DoE also introduced formal provisions for the participation of non-elected members of the public in local-government structures (see Ó Broin, 2002). Representative democracy could, the DoE argued, "be strengthened by the involvement of local people in a meaningful way in devising new approaches to meet community needs" (DoE, 1996: 17).

- *Stronger city management.*

The proposals for the radical overhaul of local-government structures coincided with the appointment of a new city manager for Dublin city who came to office with two distinct pillars: a strong entrepreneurial ethos (TSDW-I) and a much vaunted commitment to public participation (McDonnell, 2005). In the years that followed, the Local Government Act, 2001, characterised as "the most ambitious restructuring of local government in over fifty years" (Ó Broin, 2002: 48), gave legislative effect to the reforms proposed in *Better Local Government.* It also conferred significant new powers on the office of the City or County Manager; 'plenipotentiary powers' which were not tempered by the vesting of comparable powers in the elected members (McDonnell, 2005). Under the Act, managers, who had always enjoyed considerable powers, were made "very, very powerful" and into something approaching "a prince in their own kingdom" with a commensurate loss of power for elected councillors (McDonnell, 2005).

- *Enfeebled, fragmented City Council.*

The SPCs and Corporate Committee system that replaced the old *ad hoc* committee system were meant to "allow councillors a more meaningful role in policy review and development" (DoE, 1996: 16-17). The reality, as described by one senior professional officer who had worked within the local-government structures, was rather different. It had resulted in the dismantling of "very strong, powerful and useful" committees (committees which Cockburn (1977) would have described as 'blue chip' committees), to make way for poorly attended SPC structures in which management ended up "dictating the agenda and writing the minutes and producing the papers so it's signed, sealed and delivered more or less" without any meaningful discussion (McDonnell, 2005). Academics have similarly noted the manner in which "increased power for managers has led to a concomitant decrease in the influence of elected councillors, who must importune their managers on behalf of constituents" (Forde, 2005: 138). Meanwhile, other legislation introduced in

the same year as the Local Government Act has functioned to "eliminate... the role of councillors" in specific key decision-making areas and, as a consequence, "substantially reduced the scope for citizen involvement and participation" in these areas (Ó Broin, 2006: 176). Contributions from councillors at public forums have been dominated by complaints about the need for local-government reform and the hostility of central government to such change, the arrogance of senior officials and the weakness of both local government in general and the position of councillors in particular (Democracy Commission, 2004; TASC, 2008; LRP Neighbourhood Meetings, 2007). Attention has also been directed to the tensions that have ensued between elected councillors and non-elected representatives of the community and voluntary sector in the uneasy marriage that local government has sought to effect between representative and participative democracy within its 'reformed' local-government structures (Forde, 2005: 141). Meanwhile, the departure of almost one third of councillors from DCC between 2004 and 2009 would appear to be indicative of significant dissatisfaction, disquiet and demoralisation among the elected body at the very least.

In the midst of such criticisms, concerns and disaffection, it is important to note the range of reserved powers still held by councillors in the areas of land disposal, housing, planning and development (see DoE, 2004: 81-95). Notwithstanding the significance of such powers, it has been suggested that the creation of Local Area Committees, which have essentially functioned to confine the political engagement of councillors to their respective constituencies, has inhibited the emergence of any collective engagement with the broader and cumulative consequences of the planning and development issues arising in individual areas (McDonnell, 2005). In contravention of Agenda 21's prescription to 'think global, act local,' councillors are depicted as now both 'thinking and acting local' (McDonnell, 2003). The question of whether the suppression and attenuation of political conflict noted as one of the consequences of jurisdictional fragmentation (MacLaran, 2006) may also be ensuing as a natural consequence of the disaggregation of elected city councillors into area committees in this manner merits consideration. Meanwhile, it has been suggested that some councillors have been quite happy to confine their engagement to their respective local areas and to retreat from the assumption of significant decision-making powers and the responsibility that would have accompanied such powers (McDonnell, 2005). The depiction of such a scenario is accompanied by the suggestion that such reticence is inappropriate in public representatives who should be moving beyond "banging the table" with frustration to take charge of the decision-making process (*ibid.,* see also TASC, 2008).

- *Stronger central government.*

The emergence of an executive manager with consolidated powers has had very evident reverberations for the position of elected councillors. It has also had implications for the position of local-authority professionals who have found themselves, in the wake of *Better Local Government,* operating within an increasingly corporate local-government culture structured around the figure of

the city manager. A former Chief Planning Officer has described the way in which the local authority is now operating 'as a firm' which takes corporate decisions and holds party lines, with the accompanying denial of any room for independent thinking to those who might diverge from the party line (McDonnell, 2003). The emergence of such an autocratic, corporate management structure has been accompanied by reports of the progressive marginalisation of senior planners who have found themselves unable to toe such a party line.

> "The Manager runs the place as the manager sees fit, has absolute power over the officials. No official does anything without the Manager's say-so." (McDonnell, 2005: 29)

Furthermore, the consequences attending upon the creation of such a powerful office extend beyond elected members and senior professionals. Attention has been directed to the fundamental antagonism at the heart of local-government reforms that have sought to engender greater participatory democracy at the very time that they have moved to consolidate the powers of senior executives and management (McDonnell, 2005). Pointing to the "the distinctly managerialist tone" of the objectives outlined in *Better Local Government,* others have queried how the conflict between 'managerialist' and 'democratic renewal' aims are to be reconciled (Forde, 2005: 144-5).

Because of the constitutional relationship of subordination of local authorities to the central state, where local authorities are creatures of the national government, it is important to note that stronger city management translates into stronger central-government management. In addition to consolidating the powers of the city and county managers, the Local Government Act 2001 (S69) also outlined a specific requirement for local authorities to have regard to the "policies and objectives of the Government or any Minister of the Government in so far as they may affect or relate to its functions" (Government of Ireland, 2001, in Forde, 2005). Indeed, central government possesses, in the case of non compliance with central authority, the power to dismiss a local authority and appoint commissioners to undertake its functions. In the executive position of city manager, central government finds the precise person to exercise that 'regard.'

4.2.2 Coincident changes in orientation of local government.

The restructuring of DCC has taken place in tandem with the emergence of an increasingly entrepreneurial orientation on the part of the local authority (McGuirk, 2000; McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001; Bartley & Treadwell Shine, 2003; MacLaran and Williams, 2003). That changing orientation is inextricably intertwined with the manner in which the local authority repositioned itself as a key player in the implementation of the urban-renewal schemes that had come to dominate the urban policy agenda from the mid 1980s. This section presents an overview of the context in which that transformation took place; the steps taken to effect such a radical reconfiguration of its organisational orientation *vis-à-vis* development issues and the range of areas into which that entrepreneurialism has spread. It closes with a brief exploration of the most recent turn in the state's entrepreneurial urban-development agenda, that of 'the creative city.'

- ***Emergence of entrepreneurial local government.***

The reorientation of DCC away from its traditional role of service provider and permissory Planning Authority to a more entrepreneurial stance took place against a background of growing entrepreneurialism, both nationally and internationally. Bartley and Treadwell Shine (2003: 160) pointed to the influence of North-American neo-liberal management theories on the management changes subsequently introduced by the Irish government in its local authorities. In the case of Dublin, those management changes followed a decade of renewal in which central government had bypassed its local authority to take the lead in pioneering a new urban entrepreneurialism through the introduction of a series of property-led renewal schemes. McGuirk and MacLaran (2001: 441) attributed central-government's exclusion of its local authority from the first decade of renewal to its disaffection with local-government inertia and its perceived inability to tackle the scale of dereliction and vacancy in the inner city. In such circumstances, DCC confronted a situation in which it could either allow itself to be further marginalised by subsequent central-government interventions in the inner city or it could take the opportunity to reconfigure and realign its organisational structures in a manner that would leave it positioned to embrace that entrepreneurial urbanism.

McGuirk and MacLaran detailed the series of steps taken by the then Dublin Corporation to move from a managerial to an entrepreneurial form of local government that would allow it "to respond pro-actively to the development opportunities being realized through central government initiatives" (*ibid.,* 444). Those steps included the formation of an Inner City Development Team which would act in "a highly entrepreneurial fashion" as a mediator, facilitator, catalyst and safety-guard for those willing to develop in the inner city and the use of Corporation lands "to broker innovative development deals." They also included the evolution of "a pervasive pro-development managerial structure" in the Planning Department in which a more 'favourable interpretation' of the rules became apparent (*ibid.*, 444-5; see also McGuirk, 2000). Following careful attention to the approach adopted by the special-purpose authorities established by central government, those steps also saw local-authority planning depart from its "historically bureaucratic functions of zoning and development control" to the evolution and pioneering of a holistic concept of integrated area planning that asserted "planning's potential coordinating functions and stresses its interactive role with respect to private-sector interests, public interventions and local communities" (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001: 448-450; see also Gleeson, 1999; McDonnell, 2005). It was thus that the City Development Plan prepared in the wake of such radical restructuring and reorientation proclaimed itself to be a "more stream-lined strategic plan, capable of responding to the complex development needs of the city" (Dublin Corporation, 1999: 9) and that Dublin Corporation emerged as

> "a flexible, outcomes-orientated and entrepreneurial entity... capable of working flexibly with private and community-sector organisations to produce new modes of governance. The Corporation's new managerial ethos is concerned both with providing service efficiency and with city boosterism, promoting and selling the city

in order to attract investment in a highly competitive environment." (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001: 453)

- ***Different strands of entrepreneurial local-government agenda.***

It is to be presumed that private developers welcomed the repositioning of local government as an entrepreneurial player in the development of the city in this manner. That welcome was not confined to the private sector. Senior third-sector development personnel had observed the oppressive and stultifying effect of previous local-government regimes which had functioned as something akin to a 'dead-hand state' and welcomed the advent of a more entrepreneurial local-government order as "a breath of fresh air" (TSDW-I). The ends to which that that entrepreneurialism would be used by DCC were not, however, clear at that outset. As that entrepreneurial agenda became "more deeply engrained in its operational activities" (Kelly, 2008: 106) and market ideologies began "seeping right down into very local public housing areas" (Drudy & Punch, 2005: 149), it would become abundantly evident.

Building on the work of McGuirk and MacLaran (2001), Kelly (2008: 106) traced a "deepening commitment to neo-liberal approaches to governing and shaping the city" through a range of central-government policy initiatives and interventions in planning and housing policy that DCC set about promoting throughout the 2000s. In the area of planning, she pointed to a deeply entrepreneurial orientation and, in places, ideological position in DCC's promotion and implementation of the private-development component of the Liberties/Coombe IAP. This disposition was also discerned in its involvement in and facilitation of the development of the Digital Hub project[23] in the same area. Regarding housing, she detailed a raft of central-government policy initiatives that the local authority had enthusiastically embraced which signalled "a conscious rolling-back of the local-government's responsibilities in relation to housing provision" (*ibid.,* 118). These included DCC's adoption of a leading national role in initiating the use of PPPs in the regeneration of public flats complexes, the continuing sale and transfer of public lands and efforts to extend the 'right to buy' provision to the tenants of its public flats complexes. Meanwhile, a series of policy documents and plans promoting 'social mix' and avoidance of 'undue social segregation' functioned to prevent the provision of additional local-authority housing in wards with an excess of 50 per cent of public housing (a prohibition that subsequently became more expansive). The cumulative significance of these and other policy initiatives and interventions 'rolled-out' by DCC during the 2000s led Kelly to conclude that a new and distinctive phase in the evolution of the entrepreneurial local state in Dublin had taken place involving the movement from a role that was facilitative of development (as delineated in McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001) to a local state whose role "can be more precisely interpreted as shifting to that of overt

[23] The Digital Hub is "an Irish Government initiative to create an international centre of excellence for knowledge, innovation and creativity focused on digital content and technology enterprises." Located in Dublin's Liberties, "the project is managed by an Irish government agency, the Digital Hub Development Agency, which was established in July 2003" (http://www.thedigitalhub.com/ accessed 5th August 2010).

'agent' of capital" (Kelly, 2008: 129). Drudy and Punch (2005: 148) agreed strongly, characterising DCC as perhaps the most advanced local authority in "the adoption... of an increasingly flexible role as an enabler of market forces."

- ***Most recent turn, the creative city.***

In the reorientation of its operational procedures in the service of a neoliberal urban-development agenda, it is apparent that DCC has attended closely to international trends and the conceptual categories in which its European and American counterparts have recently couched their economic growth strategies. This is particularly apparent in the manner in which DCC has embraced the 'creative city' thesis promulgated in Florida's (2002) *The Rise of the Creative Class*. The concept has assumed a remarkable currency for DCC, as is evident from the prominence accorded it in a number of its key policy documents: *Maximising the City's Potential* (DCC, 2007), the *Economic Development Action Plan for the Dublin City Region* (DCC *et al.,* 2009) and the *Draft Dublin City Development Plan 2011-2017.* It is also apparent in the plethora of events, seminars and conferences on creative and/or cultural cities that DCC has either convened (e.g. Dublin Innovation Festival, 2009; Lord Mayor's Commission on Employment, 2010; Temple Bar Cultural Trust & DCC, 2008[24]) or contributed to in recent years (e.g. Gleeson, 2006; Rose, 2007; Stubbs 2007[25]). Meanwhile, DCC has established a 'Dublin Creative Alliance' which is serviced by its Economic Development Unit. The Alliance has given rise in turn to an annual Innovation Festival and the commissioning of a study "to provide insight into the challenges in, and possibilities of, measuring the scale and scope of the creative sector and its value to the City's and Nation's economy" (Curran & van Egeraat, 2010). More immediately, it is abundantly clear that the preparation of DCC's new flagship regeneration project (the Liberties Regeneration Project) has been infused at every turn with the core tenets and rhetoric of the creative-city construct (see Chapters 8 and 9).

Concerted efforts to promote Dublin as a creative-city region with a creative-city economy have been rewarded with international recognition for Dublin as one of 'the most successful' models of 'the Creative Community;' a city which 'does... all 3Ts of economic development' and which is working hard "to provide the broad creative ecosystem in which all forms of creativity can take root and thrive" (Florida, 2004: 298). Jansson and Power (2006: 10) have similarly described Dublin as a city which has shown how a change in image, brand and place perception can greatly assist 'economic redevelopment and reinvention.' Ireland has also been recognised as "an up-and-

[24] I.e. DCC & Creative Dublin Alliance (2009) *Innovation Dublin Festival*; Lord Mayors Commission on Employment (2010) *The Cultural and Creative Industries & Innovation in Dublin Workshop*; Temple Bar Cultural Trust and DCC (2008) *Culture and the City: Keeping Dublin Creative.*

[25] I.e. Gleeson (2006) "Culture and urban regeneration." Paper to Temple Bar Cultural Trust (2006) *Symposium on the Role of Culture in Urban Regeneration;* Rose (2007) "Diversity driving success" and Stubbs (2007) "Planning and the creative city region." Papers to Dublin Regional Authority and Dublin Employment Pact (2007) *Dublin Creative City Region Conference.* See also newspaper contributions such as Rose (2008) Dublin could be a 'creative city' if we get rid of limiting mindsets, *The Irish Times,* 17th June 2008.

coming nation, with significant growth in its Creative Class and its underlying creative capabilities since 1995" (Florida & Tinagli, 2004: 6). In the research arena, the Greater Dublin Area has featured as one of 13 cities selected for an exploration of "the impact of the emerging creative industries and knowledge-intensive activities on the competitiveness of several EU metropolitan regions" (Redmond *et al.,* 2007: 1).[26] In the midst of the many claims being made for the creative economy and city and emerging research agendas concerned with the impact of creative industries on economic competitiveness and the conditions favourable to their location, concerns are already being raised about the exclusionary impact of policies that function to direct "investment towards a particular class of people (i.e. the creative class)... to the exclusion of other members of society" (Murphy & Redmond, 2008: 77). In an international context, Peck (2005: 761) has argued that the creative-city strategies have functioned to extend "established neoliberal approaches to urban entrepreneurialism" as opposed to heralding a new and distinctly different urban-regeneration order. In an Irish context, it remains to be seen whether the most recent turn in the local state's entrepreneurial agenda will mitigate or compound the many costs that inner-city communities have already sustained from two decades of entrepreneurial renewal policies.

4.2.3 A *modus operandi* accompanied by participatory overtures.

- ***Impetus for community participation component of urban renewal.***

In attending to the significant watersheds that have occurred in the chronology of Irish urban-renewal policies, this chapter has identified the move from property-led urban regeneration schemes, which proceeded separately and independently from the host communities, to the new era of integrated urban renewal, which has actively sought the incorporation of those same communities within its structures, as the decisive turning point in the present research context. Accordingly, it is to the evolution of the participatory component of Irish urban-renewal policy to which this chapter now turns.

The participatory turn in the state's urban-renewal policies took place against a broader context in which parallel urban-renewal initiatives in European countries had begun to venture outside a narrow property-development remit to engage with broader economic development issues. While the urban-renewal regime in Dublin had remained "largely focused around a narrowly conceived physical regeneration" (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001: 443), Dublin had not remained indifferent to the growing recognition elsewhere of "the failures of property-led regeneration to inspire lasting urban economic revival and sustainable social regeneration" (Turok, 1992, in McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001). It is in that context that the critical findings of the KPMG *et al.* review in 1996 appear to have provided the Irish government with the immediate impetus for the significant policy departures that followed in the state's urban-renewal policies from the late 1990s.

[26] The research project *Accommodating Creative Knowledge* [ACRE] was funded under 'priority 7' within the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU, 'Citizens and Governance in a knowledge-based society' (http://acre.socsci.uva.nl/ accessed 21st June 2010).

- ***From HARP, Dublin's Docklands to IAPs and beyond.***

Urban-renewal plans published in the years immediately following the KPMG *et al.* review articulated a broader and more participatory concept of urban renewal. In an urban-renewal environment hitherto dominated by central-government interventions and special-purpose authorities, Dublin Corporation's (1996) *Historic Area Rejuvenation Project* (HARP) represented the local authority's first venture into the implementation of a holistic and integrated planning concept of urban renewal. It also represented Dublin Corporation's first venture into a more participatory form of governance in which it sought to forge partnerships outside of the traditional nexus of the state and the property-development sector. The implementation of the HARP Framework Plan would be overseen by a Steering Group comprised of a number of the social partners (including community groups) and its operation would be guided by clearly stated terms of reference (McDonnell, 1996: 89). While community participation within the HARP Steering Committee was not without its difficulties, it was notable for the manner in which the entry of independent third-sector and community parties introduced a radically different dynamic into local-government structures (see Chapter 5.3.2) and the position of strength into which community representatives managed to manoeuvre themselves (see Russell, 2001; Attuyer, 2010).

While remaining the province of a special-purpose authority, the renewal of Dublin's Docklands also adopted a markedly more integrative and inclusionary complexion thereafter. The Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA)'s Master Plan stated that "urban renewal is now seen as not only the physical renewal of cities and towns, but [as] expanding to embrace significant social, economic and environmental dimensions." In tandem with this development, the DDDA also announced a process that would be "more democratic, inviting communities to participate in and contribute to the development of their areas" (DDDA, 2007: 19). That participation would be effected through the establishment of a Community Liaison Committee (CLC) intended "to maximise the involvement of the communities in the local areas in the redevelopment of Docklands" and "to provide a forum for direct communications between the Authority, developers and representatives of the local communities and *vice versa*" (*ibid.,* 3). In addition to the newly inaugurated CLC, the community were also and more significantly invited to participate in the DDDA Council (MacLaran, *et al.,* 2007). The position of relative strength in which community representatives were to find themselves within the DDDA's structures stands as an important landmark in the history of engagements between inner-city communities and the state.

However, the provisions established for community participation within the DDDA appear to have been a standalone initiative without any particular relational significance to the mode of community participation subsequently introduced within urban-renewal projects across the city. That distinction belongs to the HARP. The latter was to prove to be an important precursor of the IAP approach which was subsequently formalised, adopted and generalised within the 1998 URS.

The legacy of the HARP would be notable both for the aspects of its renewal programme which were subsequently adopted (integrated area planning) and the aspects of its implementation structures which were discarded (steering committees being replaced by *ex-post facto* monitoring committees as the appropriate forum for community participation) in the implementation of the IAPs established under the 1998 URS. The abolition of the Steering Committee in HARP – a structure which was perceived by some of the committee's members as an unintended anomaly on the part of the Irish government - was understood as a retrograde step and "evidence of central and local government wresting back from the community and others what little power they had devolved" (Russell, 2003: 23-4).

After a succession of central-government URSs which had not contained any requirement for community participation and which had been the concern of central government and the property-development sector only, the 1998 URS was to be distinguished by the formal inclusion of the stake-holding community in the preparation and implementation of the series of IAPs approved under its auspices. The *1998 URS Guidelines* charged local authorities with the responsibility for preparing IAPs in accordance with guiding principles that included a strong emphasis on "consultation, participation and partnership" and a direction that "local groups and residents should be encouraged to be stakeholders in the IAP" (DoE, 1997: 20). The ensuing *1999 URS Monitoring Guidelines* directed that each local authority "should establish a cross-sectoral Monitoring Committee" with the responsibility "to monitor progress on the implementation of the IAP and to provide guidance on how delays or barriers to implementation can be eliminated" (*ibid,* 2.1). It was suggested that monitoring committees, which were to "adopt an ongoing, proactive role" should consist of nine members of whom three should be community group representatives (DoE, 1999a: 2.1, 2.2). For the first time in the history of the Irish government's URSs, the local state would be required formally to invite representatives of the host community to participate in the implementation of its URSs and take cognisance of their views. It was thus that the urban-renewal programme moved from the narrowly conceived exclusionary concept of physical renewal which had characterised the government's early URSs, through a number of experimental engagements with the concept of community participation, to the evolution of the fully-fledged holistic, inclusive and participatory concept of integrated urban renewal in the late 1990s. (The provisions made for community participation in the two urban projects under consideration, including the movement to outsource the consultative and preparatory stages of urban-renewal plans to private consultancies, are detailed in Chapters 5 and 8).

- ***Significance of inner-city communities within urban renewal.***

The evolution of the participatory component of Irish urban-renewal policy has followed from the policy rationales, policy interventions and policy experiments outlined above. It has also followed on the advancement of an entrepreneurial and neoliberal agenda in the urban-development arena at

both central and local-government levels. In an environment in which the local state has begun to intervene in the urban environment in a manner which is more overtly facilitative of capital, there are other and more critical perspectives that might be advanced about the actual rationale underlying the state's overtures to working-class communities in the implementation of its URSs. There are, for example, questions about whether these overtures have been made in the interests of facilitating the genuine participation and interests of inner-city communities or to pre-empt and co-opt any arising dissent to the state's urban-renewal programmes (Brudell *et al.*, 2004: 84-5). More broadly, there have also been suggestions that the move to engage members of the community and voluntary sector in the structures of local government has been motivated by an attempt to counter the failure of representative democracy in those areas where "marginalised and socially excluded members of Irish society do not participate in political activity as envisaged by liberal democratic theory" (Ó Broin, 2002: 52-3). It is thus that the state has sought to redress such a failure by engaging those sectors who have demonstrated their ability to involve this constituency in their structures.

The importance attached to engaging non-elected representatives from disadvantaged areas in the implementation of the state's urban-renewal programmes clearly necessitates consideration of the significance that resident working-class communities are likely to assume for local-government bodies seeking to ensure the uncontested implementation of their urban-renewal plans. It is in that context that the low levels of political engagement which have traditionally characterised inner-city communities (Kavanagh 2002, 2004) may assume a particular significance for a government body intent on establishing and demonstrating the legitimacy of its interventions in the urban realm. Beyond the threat that low electoral participation rates pose to state legitimation, there is also the unease and latent political threat associated with working-class communities operating at a remove from electoral politics with the latter assuming something of an unknown quantity for official parties. While commentators often label political disengagement as apathy, those living and working in disadvantaged communities dismiss the suggestion that disadvantaged communities are depoliticised as a misconception and point to the fear that non-aligned and non-state controlled community groups hold for the government (Egan, 2004; see also MacLaran *et al.,* 2007: 189-191). It is clear that there are significant mobilisations underway around housing and regeneration issues in particular (Bissett, 2008; Punch 2009). It is apparent in any case that political abstentionism among deprived working-class communities is in no way immutable. Political geographers note that "the response of socially deprived areas in Dublin... to government indifference in the past has been largely expressed in terms of electoral abstentionism" (Kavanagh, 2004: 23). However, they also point to recent electoral evidence that "a targeted mobilising of the electorate, either on partisan or non-partisan bases, linked to contentious, often locally focused, issues can combine to produce higher than expected turnouts in some under-resourced communities" and "often on an anti-government basis" (*ibid.,* 23).

Irrespective of the actual rationale underlying the drive to engage disadvantaged urban communities within the state's structures, it was apparent from the late 1990s that urban working-class communities had attained a very particular significance for the state in the advancement of its urban-renewal agenda. In the decade that followed, the state's new found interest in community participation would be mirrored by public if somewhat unconvincing displays of deference to inner-city communities on the part of private developers (see Chapter 8.2.1).

4.3 Local community/development context.

The Dublin City Council that moved to engage inner-city communities in its newly forged participatory and partnership structures had been subject to significant changes in its form and function. In approaching inner-city communities in this manner, it is apparent that it encountered a community-development sector that had also undergone significant changes in its form and orientation that had significantly altered its disposition towards the state. This chapter closes with an exploration of (i) the nature of engagements between inner-city communities and the local state prior to the participatory turn in the latter's urban-development policies; (ii) the broader context in which the community and voluntary sector has been reoriented around a conciliatory social-partnership model; (iii) the manner which the social-partnership model has been insinuated at grassroots level. In this altered environment, it considers whether the functioning of the community-development sector may be considered to be that of critical activist, service provider or both.

4.3.1 State-community engagements prior to 'community participation' era.

The state's attempt to engender a conciliatory and partnership-type relationship with inner-city communities in the implementation of its urban-renewal programmes followed a rather more turbulent history of engagements between the two parties on urban-development issues. In order to gain an appreciation of the significant changes that subsequently ensued in the relationship between the two parties, it is necessary to attend briefly to the disposition with which the latter initially confronted the state.

Punch's (2001: 40-1) exploration of "the historical process of community organisation" and "the initial construction of a community-development infrastructure in Dublin's inner city" identified the early 1970s as an historic turning point in the character of the community and voluntary sector in Dublin as organic grassroots community organisations emerged to lay claim of a space that had previously been dominated by "top-down activity informed by a charity ethos." Collins (2002) similarly pointed to the significant distinction that should be drawn between the traditional voluntary sector underwritten by Catholic social teaching and the community sector that was inspired by anti-poverty programmes and a more radical social analysis. Informed in many cases by such a radical analysis and agenda, tenants' groups and community organisations began to mobilise

around the many issues and conflicts arising in Dublin's inner city at that time. While poverty-related issues constituted a central and constant theme for many activists, Punch (2001: 41) located "the major impetus for general mobilisation initially, and for many years the core thematic content of community action" in "the urban crisis." That crisis was crystallised for many inner-city communities at that time by public-housing strategies which involved detenanting local-authority flats-complexes and displacing inner-city communities out to the periphery. The crisis was exacerbated by road-widening policies that threatened the viability of resident communities and blighted the future of those areas for many decades thereafter (see Brudell *et al.,* 2004). These policy interventions were greeted with "vigorous local opposition" that took the form of campaigns, housing-action committees, coalitions of tenants' organisations with both local and national remits and road blockades (Punch, 2001: 41-2). Those confrontations with the state served to radicalise some activists who emerged with a clear understanding of the core antagonism at the heart of these policies and the interests in which the state was operating.

In what Punch (2001: 41) described as "a busy micro-world of bottom-up community organisation responding to the local needs and conflicts," a number of other issues and problems were also to galvanise inner-city communities into action. The very serious social and economic problems that followed "the dramatic erosion of the traditional industrial base of the inner city" and the deepening long-term unemployment crisis provided the impetus for a number of different community and local-development responses to the problem (*ibid.*, 41-2). Those social and economic problems were to be compounded by other and more acute problems. By the early 1980s, the structural inequalities that had become particularly marked in the inner city led to a situation in which the drugs trade began to flourish. The crisis presented by widespread drug misuse and drug dealing in turn gave rise to another form of grassroots mobilisation. It was inevitable that such frenetic organisation and activity would attract some form of response on the part of the state. Punch pointed to an important qualitative shift in community organisations which saw them move from organisations that "operated at street level, retained a high level of autonomy and often adopted confrontational strategies" to organisations and mobilisations that were reoriented around "project-based approaches" (*ibid.,* 43). That reorientation followed, in large measure, on the funding arrangements put in place by the state which, while enabling communities to initiate, deliver and coordinate local responses to pressing local problems (principally long-term unemployment and the drugs crisis), also altered the character of these grassroots mobilisations and organisations and gave rise to a number of concerns. Those concerns included the incorporation of community organisations; the privileging of funders' agendas over those of the grassroots; the fracturing of previously united communities; the imposition of 'partnership' structures (see 4.3.2) on communities of activists; the co-option of those who would previously have spoken and acted critically and independently of the state and the diversion of community anger into non-threatening organisational structures curtailed by state funding (*ibid.,* 43-44).

While the provision of funding in this manner may have provided community organisations with much-needed organisational resources, those resources were dwarfed by the scale of the major structural problems confronting the inner city by that time. As communities sought to grapple with the mounting problems arising from the multi-dimensional nature of the unemployment problem and the ramifications of an escalating drugs crisis, the introduction of urban-renewal schemes in the mid 1980s constituted one further pressure on an already overburdened inner city. Unlike the problems of unemployment and drug use, the state did not at that point appear to have established any community-project-type structures or channels within which community concerns or opposition to urban-development issues could be safely diverted and contained. In this situation, urban-renewal and high-rise schemes "continued to provoke community action across the inner city" (*ibid.,* 45). In the case of Dublin's Docklands, the community's opposition manifested itself in "intense community mobilisation, mass public meetings and street-level campaigns" and analyses that recognised the contradiction at the heart of new renewal strategies (*ibid.,* 45). The recognition of such a fundamental antagonism of interests was to provide the impetus for renewed grassroots mobilisations from the mid 1980s. Urban renewal and associated interventions (such as road-widening and other major infrastructural projects) were to become "the primary focus of a number of organisations" across the inner city throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Punch, 2000: 121).

At a time when the state was seeking both to assuage private developers' fears about investing in inner-city areas in general and ensure the successful establishment of the Irish Financial Services Sector in Dublin's Docklands in particular, it is likely that such community analyses and mobilisations were unwelcome at the very least. It is also probable that the resultant resistance to aspects of the state's renewal policies must have prompted the latter to concede that the blunt imposition of its urban-renewal policies was provoking too much opposition and proving counter-productive (MacLaran, 2006). Thereafter, the state carefully attempted to engage those same communities in the implementation of urban-renewal plans which had hitherto served only to mobilise highly inconvenient and disruptive community opposition. As detailed earlier, that invitation would be extended to communities in the North West inner city in 1996 (HARP Framework Plan), communities in Dublin's Docklands in 1997 (DDDA Master Plan) and all communities in designated areas in 1998 (IAPs). It was thus that inner-city communities, which had previously remained outside the structures of the state's renewal schemes and "generally aligned around confrontational positions" (Punch, 2001: 47) as they sought to defend their interests against an encroaching and threatening suite of renewal policies, found themselves in an infinitely more complex situation whereby they were being invited to sit formally on the councils and committees established to oversee those very policies.

This short overview of the history of contentious engagements that characterised engagements between the state and inner-city communities in urban-development matters prior to the advent of

participatory urban renewal closes with one key reflection on the nature of the community that the state sought to incorporate within its structures. In those parts of the inner city where the most extensive grassroots mobilisations had taken place, the decision to organise and mobilise on a community basis was taken in a self-consciously political manner by left-wing activists who were motivated by a 'pragmatic radicalism' (see Kraushaar, 1979) "to explore the possibilities of political action channelled through local organisations and built around everyday needs and conflicts experienced at community level... The community focus was seen at this point as a means of grounding class issues in a given urban context" (Punch, 2000: 119-120). For such community activists, there was a clear understanding of the core antagonism at the heart of the state's interventions in the urban realm (*ibid.,* 123; see also Punch 2001: 44). This point is made in the interests of establishing the hard critical, analytical and antagonistic perspectives that the state encountered in its move to incorporate inner-city communities within the many participatory and partnership structures that it subsequently established to oversee the various renewal and regeneration programmes in progress across the inner city. The successful incorporation of such antagonistic interests in structures that would work assiduously to deny the existence of any such antagonism was not a foregone conclusion.

4.3.2 Reorientation of community sector around social partnership.

The move to incorporate communities in the implementation of this particular strand of the state's urban policies took place against a broader national context in which the state moved to reorient all sectoral interests around a conciliatory social-partnership model. Introduced in 1987 against a backdrop of a severe economic depression, the first social-partnership agreement, the *Programme for National Recovery*, was adopted as "an agreed strategy to escape from Ireland's vicious circle of real stagnation, rising taxes and exploding debt" (NESC, 2010). Social partnership was constructed on a number of core principles: wage restraint, "international competitiveness, macro economic stability, tax reductions and employment creation" (Murphy, 2002: 82). It also contained "important economic, industrial, agricultural, labour market and social policy commitments" (*ibid.*). The series of social-partnership agreements reached on a three-yearly basis thereafter established social partnership as the overarching institutional framework within which Ireland's economic and social policy would be conducted over the following decades. Initially comprising three 'pillars' (employers, trade unions and farmers) the process subsequently expanded in 1996 to embrace a fourth pillar, the community and voluntary (C&V) sector.[27] In addition to evolving into "the dominant paradigm of policy-making in Ireland," social partnership thereafter provided "the

[27] "The Community and Voluntary sector includes seven national organizations and the Community Platform... The Community Platform, formed in April 1996, is a self-organizing grouping of national organisations that has defined itself as exclusively concerned with equality, social inclusion and poverty issues... There are 25 national organizations and federations in the Community Platform" (Murphy, 2002: 80-81). Under the Fianna Fáil/Green Party Coalition Government, Social Partnership subsequently expanded to incorporate a fifth pillar, the Environmental Pillar in 2009 http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/EPAReview/Submissions/FileDownLoad,23458,en.pdf (accessed 20th October 2010).

institutional framework within which community development organizations interact[ed] with the state" (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002: 2). There is an important distinction to be made between the 'community' and 'voluntary' organisational sectors conflated with social partnership. While the voluntary and community sector "share a common platform and nomenclature in Ireland, this poorly conceals a fundamental fracture within the sector" (Collins, 2002: 96-7). It is the community-development component of that amalgam of organisations denoted by the C&V sector within social partnership that is of interest in the present context.

At a national level, social partnership has been subject to sharply differing assessments. Widely credited with providing the unique governance arrangements within which Ireland's economy moved "from recession in 1987 to record levels of economic growth in 2000" (Murphy, 2002: 81), the social-partnership model has been much feted by the Irish government. Parties such as the National Economic Social Forum (2010) have attributed Ireland's emergence as "a leading and much studied, example of negotiated economic and social governance" to these partnership agreements. Conversely, other and more critical parties outside government circles have characterised social partnership as embodying noble ideals and "a distinctly pleasing" rhetoric (Allen, 2003: 66) while engineering a governance model that has functioned to advance a neoliberal agenda and a "project of privatisation, deregulation and redistribution in favour of the wealthy" (*ibid.,* 71). Such critics also point to the fact that social partnership has proven to be "highly successful in co-opting potential sources of opposition to the growing inequality in the Celtic Tiger" (*ibid.*).

The successes and failures of the Irish social-partnership model have been the subject of considerable critical attention at this juncture (see, for example, Allen, 1999, 2003). The aspect of social partnership that is of primary interest to the present research context, however, is the significance of the state's move to incorporate the community sector within the parameters of a corporatist social-partnership model, which oversaw the simultaneous transformation of Ireland into a more prosperous and more unequal society. It is in this context that the chapter now turns to the critiques which followed the entry of the C&V sector into social partnership; a move which was "officially heralded as evidence of a thriving civil society and a growing participatory democracy" (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002: 4; see also Meade, 2005). In the context of the considerable literature that has emerged on the subject, there are–several aspects of that experience and analysis of engaging within the state's structures at national level that provide important points of reference for the ensuing exploration of the community's experience of engaging with the state at local level.

For social scientists, social partnership has been interpreted as the culmination of corporatist tendencies that had been apparent from the earliest stages of the Irish state as it set about denying the existence of societal differences and class divisions in the interests of forging a nation

(O'Carroll, 2002; see also Breen *et al.,* 1990). In this context, partnership became "a bulwark against unseemly class conflict" (Meade, 2005: 356). Under social partnership, those same corporatist tendencies became mobilised in the interests of the "state-directed organization of the economy in the name of the nation" (*ibid.,* 14; see also Meade, 2005). The expansion of the state's partnership structures to incorporate interests beyond those of capital and labour have meanwhile led to the application of the term 'neo-corporatist' to such arrangements (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002:1). While the different community organisations which entered into social partnership had obviously taken a conscious decision to do so, that decision had followed in large measure from the dearth of alternative strategies that might have been pursued in the quest for "greater social inclusion and reductions in inequality and poverty" (Murphy, 2002: 83). Reflections on this reality prompted some to consider whether the structures that they had freely entered had not, in fact, been effectively imposed on them.

Participation within social-partnership structures presented a number of specific difficulties for community organisations, including the building of common policy positions, the demands imposed and the time-consuming nature of participation, together with the very different understandings of participation employed by the different C&V organisations. The latter difficulty was compounded by a lack of clarity about the precise motivation for and specific outcomes sought from participation. Participants complained of being excluded from key aspects of the process and described themselves as retaining an 'outsider' status *within* the state's partnership structures (Murphy, 2002). These difficulties were accompanied by concerns about the legitimacy of corporatist representative structures in which the power to determine who should be deemed representative rested with the state. Concerns about the state's conferring of "monopolistic representational legitimacy" on some organisations to the exclusion of others (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002: 1) were accompanied by concerns about the representative credentials of a professionalised community-development sector, who "derive their status simultaneously from their impartiality and from their assumed capacity to represent relevant social interests and advocate on their behalf" (*ibid.,* 7). In addition to concerns about those community parties and organisations excluded from such monopolies (Meade, 2005: 357), attention was also directed to the way in which corporatism had diminished the powers of elected representatives in policy making (*ibid.,* 356).

Contributions from members of the Community Platform reveal a continuing preoccupation with and constant reassessment of the case for and against participation. Members sought to reconcile the serious failures of social partnership, including its complicity as "part of the general policy system that produces income inequality" and functions to protect "the dominant economic model and status quo," while according "tokenistic and symbolic" victories only to the C&V sector, with a number of acknowledged benefits from its operation (Murphy, 2002: 81-85). Alongside the 'valid

practical reasons' for remaining within social partnership, there were serious concerns about the degree to which participation was functioning to divert, co-opt, silence and immobilise community organisations. The fear of co-option was a recurring theme in a corporatist process that "not only relegates community issues into second place, but also, through its more hidden function of legitimating the state... co-opts community participants into a process which may at times be diametrically opposed to its own interests" (O'Carroll, 2002: 16). That fear was articulated primarily with reference to the narrow ideological parameters which functioned to negate the emergence of any conflicts or contradictions that might threaten the consensus that the partnership process was intent on forging and maintaining (Murphy, 2002; O'Carroll, 2002). The form of politics that emerged from social partnership was described as 'making a fetish of consensus and anathematizing difference' (O'Carroll, 2002: 18) and elevating consensus over justice as the goal of social policy (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002: 7) in government circles in which "an almost pathological fear of dissent" had emerged (Meade, 2005: 350). In this manner, social partnership was functioning to silence critical voices within social partnership and preclude the emergence of critical dissenting voices in the public arena. The silence of the resultant 'apparent consensus' was described as deafening (Murphy, 2002: 85). It was not surprising then that there were recurrent concerns that participation was serving to "contribute more to the legitimation of the state than to the cause of community development" (O'Carroll, 2002: 10; see also Meade & O'Donnell, 2002; Murphy, 2002).

The deliberations on whether or not to participate within social participation appear to have provoked a profound dilemma for some parties (Meade, 2005). Those deliberations were accompanied by concerns that participation was taking place at the expense of other and possibility more productive strategies and methods. There was considerable doubt, however, about the prospects for and viability of alternative strategies such as confrontational approaches, direct action, judicial rights-based approaches etc. (Murphy, 2002: 87-88). There was also an awareness of the costs that community organisations would incur by positioning themselves outside social partnership, including the "risk [of] being labelled hazardous to the national interest by a disapproving government and its cheerleaders" (Meade & O'Donovan, 2002: 7). Notwithstanding such risks, some critics had by the mid 2000s begun to urge the C&V sector to explore other and more confrontational forms of engagement. That argument was informed by a belief that "community development organizations have been sold recognition within national and local social partnership processes as a cheaper alternative to redistributive justice" (Meade, 2005: 353). In this context, it is instructive to attend to Meade's delineation of the consternation attending upon the presentation of the sixth social-partnership agreement in which a number of organisations agonised as they sought to reconcile criticisms of the plan with their reluctance to withdraw from partnership. That agonising prompted her to identify "a strong purgatorial aspect to social partnership" (*ibid.,* 365). Meanwhile, those who subsequently rejected the social-partnership

agreement in question were in a position to point to the precise costs attending upon such an action (Verbal contributions to Centre for Nonprofit Management Conference, 2007).

In the midst of the many different concerns, dilemmas, ambivalences and anxieties arising from the participation of community organisations within social partnership, it has been suggested that all such deliberations were in danger of overlooking the fundamental and primary purpose of the partnership arrangements that the state was instigating with communities, "a development of the administrative machinery of the State" in those areas where the latter perceived a threat in "the absence of any civil society" (Collins, 2002:96; see also Meade, 2005 for the control and surveillance that accompanies participatory overtures). From this perspective, the emergence of community-based participatory democracy processes was understood as "an induced – if not driven – State expansion of its frontiers in constituencies where its presence was weak or predominantly repressive" (Collins, 2002: 100). It appeared as if that expansion had been entirely successful. By the early 2000s, Meade & O'Donovan (2002:4) pointed out that

> "the institutionalization of social partnership has not just occurred at national level; it has also been officially promulgated as the new policy-making paradigm at regional and local level and has become the way of doing business in a number of policy domains... According to some, partnership governance characterizes the entire island of Ireland, north and south."

It was in this context that the insistence that partnership was "the only 'game in town'" was judged to have achieved "hegemonic status" (*ibid.,* 2002: 6, see also Meade, 2005).

4.3.3 Insinuation of social partnership at grassroots level in the inner city

- ***Reorientation of local-development sector around social partnership.***

There is a sense from the literature of the pre-partnership era that the emergence of autonomous grassroots community organisations had taken the state somewhat by surprise.

> "Meanwhile the 1960s have witnessed a growth of 'community' associations throughout the Dublin area for the purposes of identifying, articulating and remedying area needs and deficiencies. Though the 1941 Local Government Act allows the delegation of certain functions to an approved Local Council, Local Authorities have been slow to act on this. While the 1971 White Paper on Local Government Reorganisation welcomed the establishment of Community Councils it did not specify their future statutory role. In the specific field of planning, the operation has remained highly centralised and there has been little attempt to positively utilise the resources of communities. All too often Community Councils are in a conflict situation with the Planning Department..." (NESC, 1981: 272)

Punch (2000) detailed the intensification of the state's interest in grassroots organisations from this point. He chronicled the series of initiatives and agencies that followed from the state's interest in poverty and the community organisations that had mobilised in opposition to its incidence at a time when "the concept of local people organising to bring about change was treated as an illegitimate challenge by the established power structures" (Kelleher & Whelan, 1992: 7, quoted in Punch, 2000). By the late 1980s, following pilot programmes and false starts, the State had established the

Combat Poverty Agency and introduced the Community Development Programme under the then Department of Social Welfare (Punch, 2000, 131-2).

The late 1980s had also, as detailed above, seen the advent of social partnership, which "the Irish government has not been content to treat... as a purely national phenomenon" (Meade, 2005: 357). The first and decisive move to translate the partnership model from the national to the local scale followed on the second social-partnership agreement, which provided on a pilot basis for the establishment of area-based partnerships in areas of long-term unemployment with the provision that "satisfactory models" would thereafter be "progressively extended nationwide" (Government of Ireland, 1991: 75-78). Thirteen area-based partnerships (ABPs), including the Dublin Inner City Partnership (DICP), were established in 1991 with the number subsequently rising to 38. While the Irish government appears to have taken its inspiration from the introduction of area-based approaches in the United States and Britain (MacLaran, 1999a; Connolly, 1997), it is clear from interviews given by senior-government officials that the more immediate impetus for the introduction of ABPs followed directly on the success of partnership at national level.

> "What was particularly important in getting the bandwagon rolling was the belief that in the light of positive experiences of partnership at the national level that it should be possible to produce the same consensus and a problem solving approach at the local level." (Senior Department of the Taoiseach Official, quoted in Connolly, 1997: 67-8)

It was thus that the government sought, among other things, "the extension of the concept of national consensus to embrace social issues and to formally include the community and voluntary sector" (Connolly, 1997: 69). In this way, the social-partnership model articulated so explicitly at national level began to insinuate itself progressively at grassroots level.

In seeking to assess the impact and significance of the ABPs, Connolly (1997) attended to reviews of ABPs in Ireland and critiques as they had emerged more broadly of area-based approaches in Ireland and abroad. In respect of the international experience, he relayed the more critical findings forthcoming from those such as Cockburn (1977) and Turok (1987) in the UK and Glickman (1980) in the USA. He also noted the fundamental objections of others who pointed to the ideological dangers inherent in area-based policies and their hopeless inadequacy in the face of the structural causes of poverty (MacLaran, 1996b; see also MacLaran, 1999a). Against such a backdrop, Connolly detailed the structure, purpose, composition, activities and achievements of the DICP and the Local Development Programme for whose implementation it had become the lead agency in the inner city.

> "While the scale of activity and the provision of benefit to local unemployed residents over a five year period is impressive the main issue with regard to the existence of the Partnership is its relevance to the implementation of government policy at a local level." (Connolly, 1997: 72)

On this basis, the findings were significantly more positive than those emerging from the body of critical literature adverted to above. While a mid-term evaluation of the Local Development

Programme by Goodbody Consultants concluded that it was too early to assess the impact of the partnership approach at that point, an OECD report in 1996 had identified a number of positive and distinctive aspects in the operation of ABPs in Ireland (Sable, 1996: 4, quoted in Connolly, 1997). Meanwhile, it was clear from the assessments of senior-government officials, that the ABPs had been singularly successful in the expansion of the national social-partnership model.

> "Policy has never been more open and more accessible – more pluralist if you like than it has been in this framework and the obvious example of this is the extent to which the definition of social partnership has been expanding to incorporate more and more players and indeed the process of policy making, the building of partnership at local level as well as centrally and even now at enterprise level reflects a widening of the policy domain and a prising free of certain levers which were otherwise previously in the control exclusively of certain interests." (Senior Department of the Taoiseach Official, quoted in Connolly, 1997: 73)

The organisational structure established by the DICP (*ibid.,* 70-1) would provide the overarching framework and core infrastructure within which much of the engagement between the local state and the communities of the inner city would ensue.

- ***Insinuation and consolidation of partnership model at grassroots level.***

ABPs did not represent an isolated policy foray on the part of the government into the communities of Dublin's inner city. The decade in which they were established also saw "the convergence of many integrated, interagency and community initiatives in Dublin's inner city in response to the very many pressing social problems of the 1980s and 1990s, including Area Based Partnerships, Area Network Organisations, Local Drugs Task Forces, Integrated Services Projects, Tenants' Forums, Community Policing Forums and Community Development Projects" (Brudell *et al.,* 2004: 76). That list of mini social-partnership structures was augmented further by the series of Monitoring Committees, Regeneration Teams, Regeneration Boards and additional stand-alone structures, including a Community Liaison Committee, a Community Information Group and a Community-Public-Private Partnership, introduced to oversee the preparation and implementation of various urban-renewal schemes, housing-regeneration programmes and other major state interventions in the urban realm in Dublin's inner city in the late 1990s and 2000s. All sought the participation of the host communities in their structures. Meanwhile, the social-partnership programme agreed in advance of the 1998 URS made a specific reference to "enhancing community and business participation in the Programme of Urban and Village Renewal" (Government of Ireland, 1996: 19).

In the case of Dublin's inner city, the DICP continued to occupy a strategically important role in relation to community participation in urban renewal. As one of the parties that had been instrumental in promoting the community-participation component of urban-renewal programmes, it had succeeded in securing a place for each of its constituent community networks on the monitoring committees established to oversee the IAPs introduced in the inner city (TSDW-I). Its

central importance in this respect would be reasserted in a significant way almost a decade later. The variety of renewal and regeneration programmes in progress by the mid to late 2000s had thrown relations between local government and inner-city communities into sharp relief. Those engagements had, as will be apparent in the ensuing chapters, become fractious and actually broken down in places. In that context, the agreement and publication of a *Protocol for Progressive Engagement* between DCC and local and community-development organisations operating within the inner city in 2007 marked an important milestone in the institutionalisation of the relationship between the two parties. The "protocol for collaboration" had emerged from "discussion between these sectors and the realisation that the goals and objectives of both are broadly similar" and was accordingly initiated with "the aim of reducing conflict and improving the impact and effectiveness of urban regeneration on and public services to the residents of the most disadvantaged communities" (DICP & DCC, 2007: 3).

- ***Community-development sector: critical activists or service providers?***

In his exploration of the "historical process and structure of grassroots praxis" in inner Dublin, Punch (2000) outlined the concerns that had arisen in relation to the independence, solidarity, autonomy and critical functioning of community organisations consequent upon the receipt of state funding. He summarised the situation in the following manner: "local organisations in the inner city are now confronted with the hegemonic tendencies to co-opt and control any emergent bottom-up force" (Punch, 2001: 43). It is apparent from discussions with community organisations and contributions from community employees and activists at public forums in the ensuing decade that those concerns became more pronounced in the more contentious and subsequently more straitened economic circumstances pertaining in the late 2000s.

It was apparent from interviews conducted with community organisations in the ensuing years that community organisations engaged in service delivery had reached different positions on the role and function of community organisations and their relationship with the state (Brudell, 2005-2006).[28] Some had taken a conscious decision not to seek state funding in the interests of retaining their independence. Others were in receipt of state funding and continued to assert their independence. Critical community-development workers were concerned about many issues, including the largely uncritical nature of relations between the community sector and the state; the constraints attaching to state funding; the withdrawal of funding from critical community actors; the encroaching threat to the independence of community-development projects and a fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction at the heart of state-funded community-development. Others pointed to the declining relationship between the community and statutory sectors as social

[28] The interviews in question were conducted with community organisations and groups engaged in the delivery of services in Dublin's southwest inner city in 2005 and 2006 and were undertaken as part of the *Health, Governance and Citizenship Project,* on which Dr. Karen Murray, University of New Brunswick, was the principal investigator.

partnership began to facture. Some had long since abandoned community-development and partnership structures to address their concerns though other and more binding processes.

Meanwhile, the manner in which the state was allocating funding to community organisations had emerged as a highly contentious issue. For some, it had engendered intense intra-community competition that was divisive and corrosive. For others, who spoke of individual community organisations appropriating all available funding in given areas while operating without any apparent accountability to their constituent communities, the issue was considerably more serious. Some had established very good working relations with their statutory funders and had developed a sophisticated understanding of the locus of power in government. Significant problems remained, however, including the absence of adequate or long-term funding and the denial of any role or influence in policy formation. In one case, it was apparent that the eligibility criteria attaching to state funding would oblige one organisation to withhold services from some of the most vulnerable in the community in a manner that was entirely contrary to its community-development ethos. It was apparent that community organisations were also making very different choices about their primary duty and the larger context in which to situate their work. For one group, it was a matter of weighing the relative merits of confining one's work to the grassroots and forgoing a public voice or forgoing that important frontline work in the interests of entering the policy arena. Some had grown disillusioned with the 'community-development scene' and its perceived funding anomalies and had withdrawn to concentrate on their immediate catchment areas. Others were very proud of the services provided and appeared to have no ambitions to adopt any political or activist-type role. It was apparent that individual community organisations had come to occupy very different positions on the critical-activist – service-provider continuum.

In the more contentious and subsequently more straitened economic circumstances pertaining in the late 2000s, it was also apparent that the concerns of those on the more critical end of the spectrum were becoming more pronounced. The launch of a campaign to unite the community sector and trade-union movement in 2006, provided an interesting insight into the community sector's understanding of its own relationship with the state and the arena of legitimate activity allowed it by the latter (Community Sector/Trade Union Joint Campaign Group, 2006). For some, state funding had placed community organisations in an invidious position both in relation to their target communities and in maintaining solidarity with other community employees and organisations. There were differing positions evident on the question of whether community organisations could simultaneously engage in 'advocacy' (a term which appeared to be used as a proxy for activism throughout) and service provision. Some believed that the two roles were complementary, mutually reinforcing and a source of potential strength for the sector. Others expressed concern about the degree to which the sector's advocacy role had been sidelined by its diversion into service delivery and pointed to the funding penalties imposed on those adopting a strong advocacy role. As the

sector sought to forge stronger links with the trade-union movement, it was interesting to note that differing views emerged on whether such an alliance would serve to strengthen the community-development sector or bring it into increasingly greater alignment with the state, with the accompanying threat of incorporation (Verbal contributions to Community Sector/Trade Union Joint Campaign Group Conference, 2006). Meanwhile, at subsequent forums as the full implications of the economic downturn unfolded, the groundswell of support for greater advocacy, campaigning, agitation and mobilisation within the sector became palpable (Verbal contributions to DICP Forum, 2008). Such sentiments appeared increasingly at odds with those who wished to maintain the type of agreements previously reached within social partnership.

The various positions and concerns outlined in the above public forums and discussions were articulated in respect of community organisations involved in various developmental activities and work. In forums convened to discuss the experience of community organisations, activists and residents endeavouring to engage with urban renewal, regeneration and large-scale developments, it was apparent that those who had come to be critical of the state's behaviour in all such programmes were also grappling with the optimum course of action to be pursued in seeking to defend the community's interests in a very uncertain and increasingly antagonistic environment. It was thus that the presentation of a report on community participation in regeneration and development (MacLaran *et al.*, 2007) prompted intensive discussion about whether community-development workers should participate in such structures or whether they should refuse social-partnership type models and revert to the confrontational mode adopted by community organisations in the 1980s. Such a proposition was accompanied by an immediate identification of the dilemma with which those same workers would be confronted in a punitive funding environment unwilling to tolerate the critical engagement, organisation or mobilisation of community-development organisations in this way (Verbal Contributions to Combat Poverty Agency Seminar, 2008). Meanwhile discussion in broader forums dominated by critical residents, community activists and employees was increasingly being reoriented around "the strategic choice facing communities confronted by each of the regeneration and large-scale development projects in process - participation or protest" (Brudell & MacLaran, 2009: 14).

4.4 Objective contradiction in urban renewal.

This chapter endeavoured to delineate the different contexts within which the research's empirical programme takes place. That empirical programme pertains to the nature of engagements that have taken place between the state and inner-city communities in the implementation of urban-renewal and regeneration programmes. As the agency of the central state responsible for the implementation and, more latterly, the initiation of renewal programmes, this chapter attended at some length to the significant changes that have taken place in the form and function of the local authority in Dublin city during the period in question. It similarly attended to the changes that have taken place within

the organisational and operational structures of the community-development sector during an era in which the social-partnership model articulated so explicitly at national level began to insinuate itself progressively at grassroots level. In a situation in which partnership has assumed an hegemonic status and participation and consensus have become imperatives, the distinct and sometimes contradictory interests of working-class groups within these structures has been blurred considerably. It is thus that this chapter took the opportunity to examine the precise significance of the state intervention at issue in this research, urban renewal, for working-class communities. The chapter adopted a specific focus on the impact of urban renewal on disadvantaged communities resident in designated areas as available evidence had been relayed within government-commissioned reports, academic reviews, local-development and community assessments. It assembled the findings of national reviews conducted in the wake of the first and second decades of urban renewal. It then refined its geographical focus to Dublin's inner city in the first instance, prior to honing in on the study area, Dublin's Liberties. It relayed the findings of all such documentation in the interests of focusing critical attention on the aspect of urban renewal that was never deemed worthy of admission to the public realm in any meaningful way, namely the impact of urban renewal on those who were "precluded from enjoying benefits arising from tax incentives" by virtue of "[in]sufficient tax liability or capital" (KPMG *et al.*, 1996: 117), but who were obliged to bear all of the negative externalities visited upon them by the excesses of successive urban-renewal policies, while securing only the most modest and piecemeal of benefits. All such findings are presented as evidence of an objective contradiction at the heart of urban renewal that has become increasingly explicit.

CHAPTER 5

Liberties/Coombe IAP – a Retrospective.

5.0 Introduction – a retrospective.

This chapter is presented as a retrospective analysis of engagements between the community of the Liberties and the Irish state in the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan (IAP). The retrospective is occasioned by the disparity between the manner in which the Liberties/Coombe IAP was presented to the community of the Liberties with its detailed physical, social and economic objectives and planning specifications and the manner in which the IAP was subsequently implemented. It is also occasioned by the contrast between the many community-participation commitments outlined in the literature of central and local government in advance of the IAP and the arrangements and structures put in place to give practical effect to those commitments. It is occasioned in short by the discrepancy between the significance with which the IAP was invested as a radical departure from the property-led renewal programmes that had preceded it and the manner in which it divested itself of its much-vaunted integrated renewal brief to revert effectively to property-led renewal.

The community of the Liberties did not greet the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) as the 'radical departure' heralded by the Irish government. It did, however, extend an enthusiastic welcome for the integrated programme of social, economic and physical regeneration outlined within the Liberties/Coombe IAP (Brudell, 1999). As a quarter of the inner city that had been blighted by very serious economic, social and physical problems since the 1950s (Brudell, 1999; Brudell *et al.,* 2004), the introduction of the Liberties/Coombe IAP was welcomed as the "the most significant development taking place in the south west inner city" (Brudell, 1999: 16). For the community of the Liberties, the Liberties/Coombe IAP "signified, above all else, the return of central and local government's political attention to an area which had been awaiting that political attention and political will for almost half a century" (Brudell *et al.,* 2004: 74-5). Representatives of that community entered into the structures established to oversee the implementation of the IAP with public statements of support, good will and good faith (Brudell, 2000; Brudell *et al.,* 2004; see also Connolly, 2000).

An engagement that started positively in 1998 descended quickly into division, contention, anger, opposition and recrimination (Brudell, 2000, 2002; Brudell *et al.,* 2004). The community divided on the question of whether its interests were better served by continuing to participate in the plan's implementation or by withdrawing from the state's participative structures to defend its interests from without. The engagement of the more critical community representatives resulted in an extensively documented record of the community's experience, analysis and attempts to resolve

difficulties with the various governmental and political bodies at local, national and European level (Brudell, 1999, 2000, 2002; Brudell & SWICN Environment Group, 2003; Hammond *et al.*, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Hammond, 2002a; SWICN Environment Group, 2002a, 2002b; Brudell *et al.*, 2004). It also provided a clear statement of the grounds on which two of the representatives took the final decision formally to withdraw from the state's participative structure. The absence of any alternative forum within which those critical of the state's behaviour could have reconvened essentially functioned to silence those vocal critics of the state. As those who elected to remain within the state's participative structures had not documented their positions at any point,[29] the community's public record of its engagements with the state in the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP effectively ended at the close of 2002. While the annual reports of the IAP project-management team did acknowledge the resignation of two of the community's representatives in 2002, the local state appeared otherwise indifferent to the serious criticisms advanced of its behaviour in the implementation of the IAP.[30] Unlike the community's representatives, it did not appear to be plagued by any similar equivocation or division. Instead it continued with the implementation of the IAP through to its conclusion in 2008 in a manner which could be described as *laissez faire* were it not for the fact that the nature of the development taking place with its ever increasing heights and densities was being underwritten by generous fiscal incentives. It is these silences and these gaps in the public record which will be addressed in this chapter.

This research took place at the close of a lengthy community engagement and disengagement with the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP – over five years after the breach in state-community relations detailed above and ten years after the local state had published its regeneration plan for the area. In total, the structures established to oversee the implementation of the IAP were in place for between nine and ten years, a period during which the character of the community engagement with the local state altered considerably. As such, the research provided an opportunity to explore with the main protagonists the significance of all proceedings, critical issues and questions raised during that time after a period in which all had had the opportunity to reflect upon the series of events that had unfolded in 2002. Thereafter, it provided an opening to explore the nature of the engagements that had ensued between the remaining community representatives and the local state in the years following the withdrawal of those community representatives most critical of proceedings. In addition, it provided an opportunity to revisit the larger significance of the IAP and the key questions arising therein at a time when the IAP was drawing to a close and its full impact was becoming apparent.

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[29] I.e. outside of research interviews with third parties (see, for example, MacLaran *et al.*, 2007).

[30] Such a position stood in stark contrast and contradiction to the many commitments made by the local authority to the importance of ensuring the involvement of the local community in the implementation of the IAP (see Dublin Corporation, 1998a).

This retrospective analysis will be presented in three chapters. Chapter 5 will explore the rationale and distinctive features of the Liberties/Coombe IAP with particular attention to the form of state intervention underlying the Integrated Area Plans. It will consider from the perspective of both government officials and a number of third parties who had attended closely to proceedings the state's rationale for seeking to enjoin the host inner-city community to the implementation of the IAP. It will also consider the factors underlying the community's decision to accept the state's invitation to be party to the implementation of its renewal plans. It will then attend to the mode of community participation instituted to facilitate the engagement of the community, with particular attention to the adequacy of the structures and procedures put in place to give practical effect to the state's commitment to community participation.

Chapter 6 will outline a detailed trajectory of the community's engagement with the IAP, from the supportive stance which all adopted at the outset of the IAP to the almost uniformly critical position held by the close of proceedings. In the process, it will chart the different choices made by individual community representatives in the face of the resolutely impervious local state encountered within those structures. In light of the importance attached to community participation within the 1998 URS (DoE, 1997, 1999a; Dublin Corporation, 1998a), that chapter will then move to explore the perspectives of community representatives, government officials, public representatives and third-sector development personnel on the nature of state-community engagements within the IAP and the relative merits of participation in such structures. In so doing, it will attempt to identify the various factors militating against the effective participation of inner-city communities within the state's urban-renewal structures.

This retrospective analysis of the community's experience of engaging with the state closes with an examination of the second distinctive aspect of the 1998 URS, the expansion of the urban-renewal brief to encompass the three-pronged objective of social, economic and physical renewal. Chapter 7 will accordingly present the assessments of all parties consulted on the outcomes of the Liberties/Coombe IAP. In so doing it will be particularly attentive to the criteria employed by all parties in making that assessment.

5.1 Rationale and distinctive feature of IAP.

5.1.1 Rationale underlying 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme and IAPs.

In the wake of a decade of unprecedented construction and development that had transformed the face of Dublin's inner city, many critical questions about the role of the state in engendering and incentivising the type and quantum of development that had taken place during the boom years remained unanswered. The first of those questions pertained to the precise rationale underlying the introduction of the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme and the IAPs approved under its auspices.

For central government the rationale advanced for the 1998 URS was two-fold – policy and political. Policy-wise, the urban-renewal scheme followed directly from KPMG *et al.*'s (1996) *Study of the Urban Renewal Schemes.* The Department of the Environment (DoE) took the 1998 scheme 'hook, line and sinker' from the recommendations of this report (CG-I). A local-government official similarly attributed the distinctive integrated development brief of the IAPs to the consultants' finding in respect of previous urban-renewal schemes that

> "whilst areas got developed physically, it wasn't a sustainable development plan... local communities didn't benefit in any way. So the IAP planned for the social, economic and physical regeneration of areas... [the 1998 URS] came about mainly [so] that local communities would benefit from community gain that would arise from developments. In previous schemes, the developers just got the tax incentives and moved on and local communities didn't benefit in any way." (LG-I)

The political rationale meanwhile was located in the move to "tighten up" the awarding of property tax reliefs in an environment in which concerns had been expressed about their *ad hoc* application (CG-I). In looking to the political forces behind the introduction of the 1998 URS, it is interesting to note that the Housing and Urban Renewal ministry, while nominally a junior ministry within the DoE, was effectively operating as a full ministry under the control of a Progressive Democrat minister. Such an arrangement was described as a function of the coalition arrangement in place between the latter and its Fianna Fáil partners in government at that time (CG-I). The DoE stressed that the approval of each IAP was a matter for an independent expert panel established by the Minister but one in which he had no function. It was up to each local authority "to make the case" for each proposed IAP. Thereafter it was the responsibility of the Expert Panel to assess whether the proposed IAP and the tax designations sought for individual sites were justified (CG-I). Neither central-government nor local-government officials appeared to be in a position to advance any hard quantitative criteria or indicators used in determining the need for such a targeted renewal policy and programme in the inner city at this time.

Central government suggested that the approval or otherwise for individual tax-incentive sites was likely to be based on "the development of that site in and of itself" and its role as a catalyst for the surrounding and larger area as a whole (CG-I). Local-government officials and planners pointed in a more general manner to the range of social problems (concentrations of disadvantage, high unemployment, high concentration of social housing, pockets of disadvantage characterised in places as 'ghettos'), the extent of the physical dereliction (urban dereliction, physical dereliction, physical decay) and the poor state of the economy to be found in the Liberties and the larger inner city at the outset of the 1998 URS (see Plates 5.1 – 5.4).

> "The economy wasn't as vibrant as it is now and has been for the last ten years or so. At the time there were disadvantaged areas still in the inner city of Dublin. And five of the IAPs were relating to the inner city... three on the north side and two on the south side. And, definitely, in the Liberties area alone there was a lot of disadvantage, a lot of social problems, a lot of physical and urban... dereliction, a lot of it arising it from the... road reservations, that hadn't happened for years even though it had been in



Plate 5.1 Derelict site, Thomas St., Liberties.



Plate 5.2 Derelict site, Usher St., Liberties.



Plate 5.3 Derelict site, Crane St., Liberties.



Plate 5.4 Derelict site, Mill St., Liberties.

> planning stage for forty years [in an area such as] Cork St. The whole area was in need of regeneration, in need of a boost. And the 100 or so sites that were designated were to be the catalyst for development." (LG-I) (See Figure 5.1)

When considered in conjunction with the low level of private-developer activity in inner-city areas, the case for designation was presented as being "fairly clear cut."

> "Don't forget that most of the tax-designated sites were in areas where there was no development happening at the time" (LG-II) "The private sector seemed to be staying away from the Liberties and also the other areas that have IAPs." (LGSP-I)

Individual politicians also located the rationale in the prevalence of dereliction along the quays and across the inner city. Like officials, they were somewhat vague about the precise indicators employed but advanced a familiar litany of problems that would constitute 'flashing lights' for central government.

> "I don't exactly recall, but I'm sure that it would have been things like unemployment, bad street architecture, dereliction, lack of community facilities, drug or alcohol abuse problems, poverty *per se*, deprivation, large numbers of single parents – all that kind of thing. Those would be flashing lights as far as the DoE is concerned." (TD-I)


5.1.2 Legitimacy of tax-incentive mechanism during construction boom.

Information from the European Commission indicates that approval for the use of tax incentives under the Commission's State Aid rules was granted on foot of representations from the Irish authorities that "it has not been possible in the past to develop these areas by the role of market forces alone. It is strongly believed by local and national economic actors that the fiscal relief provided by this scheme will offer the necessary incentive for companies to engage in activities benefiting regional development" (European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, 1999). The estimate of the amount of revenue that would be forgone in the awarding of the tax incentives sought at time was approximately €114 million (*ibid.*). In the years that followed, the Irish government secured approval to extend the qualifying period for the range of tax incentives first approved under the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme in 1999 on three separate occasions (see Chapter 4). By the time the Department of Finance's *Goodbody Review* concluded at the close of 2005, it was clear that the cost to the Exchequer had increased significantly. Area-based tax incentives had cost the Exchequer €639m in tax forgone in respect of developments undertaken to the end of 2004 and it was estimated that that figure would rise to €1,933m by the time that the schemes were due to expire in July 2006.

> "Almost 74 per cent of these anticipated costs will arise in respect of the Urban Renewal Scheme. The major impact on the Exchequer is yet to come, as even those developments completed by end 2004 will give rise to claims for tax relief for a considerable future period." (Goodbody *et al.*, 2006: ii)

Among the various government, public-representative and third-party interviewees consulted, a variety of positions were advanced about the rationale and legitimacy for the programme of tax incentives as they were initially approved and subsequently extended throughout the lifetime of the 1998 URS. In the wake of the Department of Finance's Review, the DoE expressed anger at the

Figure 5.1 Liberties/Coombe IAP tax-incentive sites (Source: Dublin Corporation, 1998a).



criticisms accompanying the *Review's* findings on the amount of tax revenue forgone to date and the projected amount of revenue to be forgone before the expiration of the scheme. In particular it rejected criticisms about the element of dead weight and displacement[31] to be found in the developments that had taken place on the grounds that the whole point of the tax incentives had been to attract development from areas in which development would otherwise have taken place. It cited the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) as an indication in 'the dark 1980s' of how development could be attracted and kick-started in this way. Dismissing the Goodbody criticisms as 'easy,' it questioned who else would have come into the designated areas in the absence of tax incentives. In light of the risk that developers were being asked to take in the late 1980s and early 1990s in coming into 'these areas,' it identified a strong case for the use of tax incentives. This defence was, however, followed by the acknowledgement that "by 2003/4/5, it does look crazy to be giving tax incentives" (CG-I).

It was a view endorsed by a local-authority official within the Liberties/Coombe IAP who, while conceding the need for tax incentives in the early years in "areas where there was no development happening at the time," pointed to the evolution of an economic and development situation in subsequent years which rendered such incentives unnecessary.

> "Now if they had waited a couple of years maybe until 2000, 2001 – the way the economy went and the building trade went, they probably wouldn't have given tax incentives on any of the sites because the economy itself would have developed those sites. So on the basis that there was no development happening, and on the basis of the then Development Plan those heights and densities were the ones that were listed but they were overtaken almost immediately by new Development Plans and new ideas about heights and strategies for the city." (LG-II)

The decision to make repeated requests for the extension of the tax incentives was a matter for central rather than local government and appears to have been taken without reference to the first-hand knowledge of local-authority officials.

> "It wouldn't really be a matter for us. It's very much a matter for the Minister for Finance to renew them. Each time they were extended, he would have based his extension on whatever advice he was being given on the time... Now I think in 2003... a lot of development had not occurred at that stage so maybe there was a reason to [extend them then]. But by 2004, I would have thought maybe there was no reason." (LG-II)

Left to administer the applications for tax designations, project-management personnel could only speculate on the rationale for and significance of the repeated extensions granted, including the difficulties that might have attended upon their termination, the lengthy timeframe required to allow passage of planning permissions through the Irish planning system, the facilitation of developments that were already in progress and the closed-nature of the state's liability in respect

[31] Goodbody *et al.* (2006: 14) describe 'dead weight' and 'displacement' as "two means by which an investment in a particular area does not have the desired impact on the local area, and the value for money of the incentives policy is reduced. Dead weight occurs where, in the absence of the incentives scheme, the investor would have invested in the designated area on some scale and at some time. Displacement occurs where, by investing in the area, activity is created, which displaces activities from other areas."

of successive extensions. While the official in question proceeded to rationalise and diminish the significance of the repeated extensions, it is clear from later comments that development had at a certain point assumed a momentum of its own that was no longer reliant on the availability of tax incentives.

> "If you look back on files back to when the [IAP] plan was put in place first, there were numerous meetings with developers, planners, architects so there was a role there to try to project-manage sites, to encourage developers to develop on those sites. As I said, two things happened, one, the sites started to be developed so the role diminished anyway. And secondly the economy indicated that it would make sense to encourage the sites so they didn't necessarily need our encouragement anymore. We wouldn't have met with any developers in the last four years to encourage development on the site because they were doing it anyway... Certainly [in] no site have I been involved in promoting development of since I came in here. The developers would come maybe with their own ideas and they might have pre-planning discussions but not from a point of view of instigating development in the first place. The economy looked after that." (LG-II)

Politicians assumed different positions on the legitimacy of the tax-incentive mechanism in addressing dereliction in inner-city areas. For some, tax incentives had encouraged development and brought new life to areas, "particularly around a lot of flats complexes" that had "gone past their sell-by date" and become both literal and metaphorical "eyesores" (TD-II). In the depressed economic circumstances prevailing in the 1980s and early 1990s, tax incentives were heralded as the only mechanism available to government to address the dereliction to be found across the city. In such circumstances, the rationale for the use of tax incentives in earlier years was elaborated with reference to the state of virtual bankruptcy in which the city and country found itself at that time. There was, however, no attempt to assess the continued validity of this rationale in the changed economic conditions of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

> "There was no such thing as urban regeneration when I joined the Council. All you had was dereliction across the city... In the 1980s, it was derelict building after derelict building and not just on the quays but on Gardiner St., the Liberties, all over the inner city... Not that all the dereliction has gone, but a start was made and the only way you could do that at the time was by tax designation and that was because the country was on the verge on bankruptcy." (TD-I)

Others accepted that there might be a necessity for tax incentives on sites that had proved particularly resistant to development or during periods of economic downturn, but rejected the idea that they were necessary during the years in which IAP was in progress. In the event, the tax incentives granted were judged to have encouraged a type and quantum of apartment development that communities didn't want and that developers mightn't have sought in different circumstances (TD-IV). There was agreement on this point from the one independent planner to which the community had recourse throughout these years. Had the awarding of tax incentives been conditional on the achievement of 'progressive standards' on selected sites, they could have been used to create models of development. In the absence of any such requirement, tax incentives were awarded in a *laissez faire* manner that led to a succession of 'shoe-box apartments' across the inner city.

> "It was a *carte blanche*... race to the bottom... there was no size requirements... no light requirements... no height requirements. It was based on a very loose development plan. What could have been done was that the DoE... could have put in more progressive standards [on these sites]... Instead what you created was the proverbial shoebox. The phase of inner-city living - and I think it is a phase because I have a feeling it's not going to last - was taking off anyway. And there was no in-depth look at any issues around design, integration, populations... That's only been looked at now, ten years too late. And also no model... around mixed management of units, anything like that. So tax incentives... should only have been given on sites that should have been models – large enough sites that could have and should have been models for best practice high-quality design, giving something back... whether it's to the state, the city or the community or all three. In terms of... building insulation, standards... models around management; a whole range of things. But none of that was given." (TSCP-I)

Lone dissenting voices disputed the case for tax incentives in any circumstance. One TD described tax incentives as having been simply granted "to support developers rather than with any particular interest in relation to the community" (TD-III). A community representative characterised the government's fiscal incentive policy as a 'grantocracy' within which state aid was provided to those least in need of financial assistance at the tax-payer's expense. The awarding of all such tax incentives to developments that would clearly have yielded sizeable profits in the absence of any such incentives (as was evident in the prices that developers were prepared to pay for sites in the area, see Chapter 7) was judged to be a reckless use of the public finances. Property-less communities with prohibitively low incomes were meanwhile denied access to any such financial incentives or assistance (SWICN Environment Group, 2003). A senior third-sector development worker (TSDW-I) described an earlier discussion in which he had tried to persuade a senior government official of the prohibitive costs attaching to the use of tax incentives. That opposition was maintained to the present day on the grounds that finance capital would always make its way to the source of profit. In an open economy, land in the centre of the city would always have been a valuable commodity and would have attracted capital on its own merits and in its own right.

> "The case I was trying to argue, using that report [the KPMG 1996 Review] and my own knowledge, was that [tax incentives] had been at a huge cost to the Exchequer, not a benefit, because that development potentially would have taken place. His argument... was 'well they initiated it... to get the ball rolling... and [that] without... making it attractive to developers to come into the IFSC or whatever, then you wouldn't have got the development. Now personally I don't believe that. I think that finance capital will go to wherever the profit is and Ireland became part of an economic boom. It's an open economy. Land in the centre of the city is of huge value, globally. So it may have taken a year or two longer but I've no question but that the private sector would have come in there without a lot of those incentives." (TSDW-I)

This does not, however, appear to have been the received wisdom in Dublin City Council (DCC), which had advised an urban geographer (UG-I) with whom it was collaborating that developers

were unlikely to choose to develop in the inner city during an economic boom, particularly when confronted by community-gain[32] obligations.

> "Because as we tried to get community gain, it was very hard to get it. We were being told 'Look, the reality is that we need developers in here because the economy is booming [and] in an economic boom, the developers don't have to come here... they don't want the incentives. Why would they come in here and give community gain when they can build anywhere outside the IAP without having to pay gain?'" (UG-I)

Some remained ambivalent about the efficacy of the tax-incentive mechanism and suggested that the impediment to development in inner-city areas might be located in entirely different factors. It was suggested that the tax incentives had merely replaced the problem of insufficient development with a new predicament posed by an unsustainable level of development activity.

> "It's a complex thing, I suppose, in some ways because you can look at... the lack of development in Dublin 8, Dublin 7 and Dublin 1 and say that there's something isn't happening - that there's some barrier going on there. And so you could say that they do need tax incentives. But maybe the barrier is something else unrelated to tax incentives and people would argue that the tax incentives thing... just drove up the price of land, that there was enough development pressure without adding more on with the tax incentives." (LGSP-I)

Notwithstanding such reservations, the same official continued to extol the merits of the tax-incentive mechanism in getting developers 'moving' on streets like Cork St.

> "A lot of those sites [on Cork St.] were tax driven and they happened very quickly. I suppose that was one of the good things about it. The [impending deadline] ...forced developers to get going with development whereas... they might [otherwise] sit on a site... because... they might develop somewhere else quicker, easier ... So that was one thing anyway, it got them moving." (LGSP-I)

5.1.3 Tax incentives – defining feature or 'icing on cake.'

The idea that the IAPs were 'all about tax incentives' was a point on which officials divided. The idea was refuted by some within central and local government who argued that the tax incentives represented no more than the 'icing on the cake' of an integrated concept of planning that should obtain in all planning.

> '[From our point of view] the tax relief was the icing on the cake. As a concept, 'IAP,' why isn't that just called planning and done everywhere without the tax incentives? ...A lot of it rests on the approach to planning permissions taken, whereby a planning authority can condition a planning permission to include all of the aspects of integrated planning. If [the Planning Authority is] dedicated they don't have to wait for an IAP.' (CG-I)

This is a position with which the senior local-authority planner interviewed was in agreement. The supposed distinctive integrated brief of the IAPs was dismissed as the normal gamut of issues that should be considered in any planning application.

> "One of the things that was useful from the IAP was to actually be very specific about the gamut of issues that had to be considered. But you know that is, should be, involved in any planning consideration anyway because it's in the Development Plan

[32] The term 'community gain' pertains to "a development levy of 15% of the site value" which Dublin Corporation (1998a: 109) stated would be "attached to key development sites designated for tax relief" and "invested in the provision of community and leisure facilities in the Plan area."

> – all of those various policies are there so in assessing a planning application, you should have regard to the entirety of the plan, rather than [just the individual site in respect of which the application is being submitted]." (LGSP-I)

Others refused to consign the tax incentives to the status of inessential extra. For one official, the plan's tax incentives emerged as the core and abiding feature of the IAPs. The power to award tax incentives had in fact constituted the only legal component of a plan that had never had the legal standing to ensure compliance with its detailed development specifications.

> "I don't know what the status [of the IAPs]ever was. It's set up on a statutory basis in so far as the tax designations require legislation both through the Department of the Environment and the Department of Finance." (LG-II)

It was the one legal standing retained by the IAP long after the commitments and specifications contained within the plan had been rendered obsolete.

> "The plan is long outdated and bears no significance or relevance, in my opinion, to any development. In fact since 2005, it's completely – I'm sure you're aware of some of the issues on heights and densities in Cork Street, so even in the earlier years of the plan it was outdated... The plan was written effectively in 1998 and has no significance or relevance in a planning or development context any more. That's a personal opinion now, right." (LG-II)

In such an account, the IAP appeared as little more than an open-ended administrative framework to legitimate the granting of tax incentives without reference to the design specifications and development briefs upon which the awarding of tax incentives was to have been contingent.

5.1.4 Responsibility for dereliction rendering urban renewal necessary.

It was clear in all of this that the amount of dereliction to be found throughout the Liberties had taken a very serious toll on the lives of the community (Cllr-I). While there was no disagreement on this fact, some were adamant that the frequency with which dereliction was cited as a rationale for urban renewal should not be allowed to obscure responsibility for the dereliction that had come to characterise the Liberties in the first place. For such parties, dereliction was understood to be a direct consequence of policy decisions taken throughout successive decades as opposed to a natural and inevitable feature of inner-city areas. The road-widening policies pursued by Dublin Corporation[33] were judged to have had a particularly detrimental impact on the environment of the Liberties (Cllr-I; see Brudell *et al.,* 2004 and Kelly, 2007b for the impact of the road-widening schemes pursed by Dublin Corporation; see also Dublin Corporation, 1998a for the impact of housing policies pursued in the 1950s and 1960s).

[33] Dublin Corporation formally changed its name to Dublin City Council in 2001. As this research is concerned with the actions and publications of the local authority for Dublin city both prior to and subsequent to that date, both names will be used as appropriate throughout.

5.1.5 Standalone policy or core component of larger policy thrust.

In speaking about the rationale for the 1998 URS and IAPs, some pointed to its relational significance to other policies. For central government, the immediate point of reference was the Dublin Docklands, which was described as "an amazing model," an authority with a single function that took the autonomy and the "one amazing asset" given it (a public land bank) and used it to speculate further. The inadvertent description of this statutory body as 'speculator' was immediately modified to the characterisation of its role as 'preparing land for development and selling on' (CG-I).

Looking outside of the earlier urban-development projects that appear to have inspired the DoE in the development of the IAP model, others pointed to the considerably larger significance of the IAPs and located them firmly within the armament of a neoliberal policy agenda. For one independent planner who has been engaged in virtually every form of renewal and regeneration in Dublin's inner city over the previous decade, the IAPs were understood as part of larger policy thrust to privatise public land and public housing in a move to promote private-tenure urban living and alter irrevocably the social demographic of inner-city areas. While a small amount of community gain might have accrued to the indigenous community in the process, such dividends appeared almost incidental in a policy move which, if it was frank, was essentially seeking to alter the social and economic demographic of inner-city areas.

> "I see [the IAPs] as a larger policy thrust.. I can see where they stand alone in terms of the DoE's policies. But they are part of a larger thrust... mainly around privatisation of housing and land... For example, [in] the IAPs it was around the reuse of land... predominantly... for private housing with some small accrual of community benefit coming from the profits... There was certainly this push for urban living, which is an international phenomenon. And the fact that it was to be private, it was to change the social mix of an area. Nothing was ever really defined around social mix initially. There was all this thing about demographics. But essentially when it did come out, it was a different wage-earning class that was to be brought into less desirable areas." (TSCP-I)

It is in this context that the Docklands Authority was invoked again. It was credited on this occasion with exhibiting the greatest degree of honesty about its intentions.

> "I think bluntly, the group that spelt it out... was the Docklands. I think... they were the most honest about [the fact] that they were bringing in a new professional class for a new professional business in the Financial Services Centre and that the existing communities would get a benefit from it, if they worked with them. But they were quite upfront that they were building for profit. I think the City Council and the DoE were less straightforward in what they were saying." (TSCP-I)

While not advancing any comparable oversight or critical perspective, it was clear that local-government officials made a clear connection between the type of regeneration at issue in the IAPs and the regeneration that was in process in the various public-private partnership (PPP) housing-regeneration projects across the Dublin 8 area.

> "There are certain pockets that probably didn't benefit from the IAPs that much. But the City Council as well as having the IAP in the area, it had its project teams in the likes of Fatima, in the likes of Teresa's Gardens, in Dolphin House[34] working away with communities. We would have been feeding into information from the Housing Department on how progress was going on those. They were separate projects but they were all to do with improving the lot of the local community and Fatima is, I think, a great success in the way it's growing and developing and it's part of the IAP area... a totally separate element to the tax-incentive sites – but everything pulling together is what it's all about. It's an integrated approach to regeneration and each of the little sites has to have something going on themselves." (LG-I)

It was apparent that the IAP was very definitely not to be understood as a standalone policy initiative.

5.2 Rationale for community participation in IAP.

5.2.1 Government rationale for enjoining host communities to urban renewal.

The determination to enjoin and structure the participation of host communities within the implementation of the 1998 URS appears to have rested entirely with the DoE. This was apparent in the guideline documentation issued to local authorities in the preparation of IAPs (DoE, 1997). It was apparent in the *1999 Urban Renewal Scheme: Monitoring Guidelines* issued to every local authority. It was apparent in interviews with central and local-government officials and, as will be evident in Section 6.1.3, it was apparent from interviews with community personnel that the DoE's imprimatur was clearly discernable in the subsequent treatment of community representatives.

For the DoE, the 'absolute' point of reference for the local authorities' overtures to host communities was the findings of KPMG *et al.*'s (1996) *Study of the Urban Renewal Schemes* (see Chapter 4). Central government made reference to an understanding that the nature of the development that had taken place in the last mini-boom in the 1960s had been 'wrong.' This point was made with reference to the manner in which inner-city communities had been displaced out to "sink estates" (CG-I). There was, as a consequence, a political feeling that urban renewal would this time have to be done with the support of local communities (CG-I). Any suggestion that the quest to enjoin a largely property-less community to a market-driven plan, that was to derive its impetus from the private-development sector intent on maximising its profits, was somewhat anomalous was rejected outright. Investment was a simple prerequisite.

> "No, you were talking about a rotten core in the middle of the city. Everyone was getting out of an area that was a ghost town in the evenings. The idea of raising a family in the inner-city was a radical idea then... Investment had to come in." (CG-I)

It was accepted that both communities and developers were going to approach the process with different priorities. Just as developers were not going to approach the IAP with the community's

[34] A number of housing regeneration projects were either in process or in discussion for a number of local-authority flats complexes in DCC's administrative area in the period in question, including Fatima Mansions, St. Michael's Estate, St. Teresa's Gardens, Dolphin House.

interests as their top priority, neither was the community going to prioritise those of developers. The whole point in having consultation and the monitoring committee process was to allow arising conflicts to be aired in the open and a degree of balance to be found. Those who envisaged a process of any greater significance had clearly misunderstood. "At the end of the day, certain communities would have wanted total power. That couldn't happen" (CG-I).

DCC appears to have taken its lead on the community- participation component of the IAP directly from central government without any difficulty.

> "Well, I suppose, that came really from the way that they were envisaged by the DoE. They issued the monitoring guidelines... And the Monitoring Committee was to consist of three reps. from the community and three elected representatives and then people from interests groups like architects. So [we] were working on those guidelines really... We were quite happy to work on those guidelines. In fact, we exceeded what was required." (LG-I)

While local-authority officials were unable to point to any specific policy documentation (outside of the DoE's *1999 Monitoring Guidelines*) underlying the move to community participation, they understood the consultative turn in urban-regeneration policy to have been part of a broader reorientation towards a more consultative *modus operandi* in every sphere of planning activity.

> "Well, I think the whole thing about planning in Dublin changed. Certainly in my time in planning in the 1990s, there was no such thing as Part 8s or Part 10s[35] where a local authority had to get permission to do their own development. Definitely, there was consultation. Consultation became the norm in any new proposals, be it for a social-housing scheme or a childcare facility or... framework plans for areas. Consultation became the name of the game then and especially working with a small project team in a small area. Anything that we were proposing there was consultation on it, drafts of plans were presented and submissions were invited... and plans were changed to take account of those submissions and just the whole ethos changed in relation to planning. At one stage... a local authority could just go ahead and build without any kind of consultation. That definitely changed and we were very keen to embrace the requirements of the community." (LG-I)

The significance of the local authority's overtures to the communities in the implementation of the IAPs appears to have extended far beyond planning issues into larger governance matters. The relocation of officers into the community and the nature of the relationships established with local groups and communities was seen as the clear forerunner for the area-management approach that was commencing in Dublin at that time (LG-I).

There was also the question of what precisely was denoted by the entity of 'community' that the government sought to enjoin to the IAP. This was a difficulty for at least one local-government planner who welcomed the creation of a new channel for community participation on planning issues alongside the standard statutory system but was unclear about who precisely was being

[35] I.e. Section 179 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended, and Part 8 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, as amended, which set out the "requirements in respect of specified development by, on behalf of, or in partnership with local authorities."

invited to engage with planning matters within such structures. "People are diverse in their needs, in their aspirations, in their ideologies, in what they want, in what they don't want... It's very difficult to say 'this is a community perspective'" (LGSP-I). This uncertainty was accompanied by fears that the individuals who ended up representing their community's interests would be little more than an unrepresentative and "self-selecting group of people."

> "The whole issue of community development and community is a very unclear one. Who, what is the community for example in an area? Who is in it and who is not in it? Does it include younger people? Does it include people who have moved in relatively recently? In some cases, does it include people who are owner occupiers or is it people who are tenants of the City Council? And there's one of those great phrases that 'most people want to be left alone.'" (LGSP-I)

In light of the manner in which the term 'community' had been appropriated in so many different ways by so many different groupings - including special-interest activist groupings, corporate groupings, banking and financial interests etc. - it was suggested that that the term had become problematic to the point of being meaningless.

5.2.2 Third-party thoughts on government rationale.

Questions about the government's rationale did not appear to have a resonance with all public representatives and third parties. However some honed in on the political and pragmatic nature of the rationale immediately.

> "I would be a bit cynical about it in the sense that it seems like the right thing to do and it is the right thing to do. And having the community around the table is critical... you will go nowhere without them. I think every organiser, every manager, every politician will know that and the people in power will certainly know that." (TD-III)

While there was no disagreement about the desirability of community participation, community, political and third parties understood the government's new consultative *modus operandi* in a rather less benign light. In the first place the government's overtures to communities were thought to arise from a European requirement as opposed to any new-found commitment to a more participative democracy on the part of the Irish administration (CR-I, TSCP-I). While there was a recognition of the many important rationales that might be advanced for community participation, none was accepted as the primary motivation for the consultative turn in regeneration policies. For some, that motivation was located in the attempt to pre-empt the emergence of community opposition to the developments that were to follow in the IAP (CR-II). That rationale was understood to have assumed a particular urgency in relation to critical communities, which were beginning to become more organised (Cllr-I). The creation of consultative and participative structures was understood as a pragmatic attempt to contain any emerging resistance within local-government structures (TD-IV).

Further insight into the rationale for community participation was forthcoming from reports of the manner in which communities were increasingly being drawn into negotiations in which the

delivery of a community or public good was presented as being contingent upon the acceptance of a private development that might otherwise have been rejected outright. Communities were essentially being drawn into consultative and negotiative structures in which they would be at some point faced with an "all or nothing" package (TD-IV). In such a manner, the loss of public land or the acceptance of high-rise development was increasingly being proffered as the *quid pro quo* for the delivery of necessary community housing and facilities. Communities holding out for better deals meanwhile risked the steady diminution of project funding. In such a manner, the logic of public-private partnerships was being insinuated more and more deeply into working-class communities (TD-IV).

Independent commentators detected a larger governance significance in the overtures being made by local government to working-class communities at this time. For some it was understood as a component of the broader national social-partnership model that was expanding into all spheres of Irish public life at the time (TSCP-I). For others it was viewed as a defensive move by a local authority seeking to assert and secure its role, authority and domain in a very uncertain new governance environment. Thus, an initiative that was thought to have emerged from a genuine commitment on the part of individual officers was quickly appropriated by the larger City Council for rather different ends.

> "There were people who were open to that, but the thing about it was... the way it was implemented meant that it was easy to hijack it and the environment was one of uncertainty and fear among the local authority, that they were going to be side-lined because they had been pushed out, and they saw themselves as being involved in this kind of fight back." (UG-I)

5.2.3 Community rationale for engaging in IAP.

The community's rationale meanwhile for engaging in the IAP was located in the commitments that the IAP had made to the social, economic and physical renewal of the area. The detail in which that rationale was enunciated varied in accordance with the nature of the involvement of individual community representatives with the detail of the IAP. For some, the decision to engage was taken on the simple grounds that the IAP was seen as "a very good thing for the area" (CR-III) and the terms of reference appeared to offer a real chance to move forward (CR-II). For others, engagement followed on a close acquaintance with both the findings of the 1996 KPMG review, the presentation of the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme as a radical departure and the detail of the plan's stated objectives in the areas of social housing, local employment and community-gain finance. The integrated nature of the plan's putative distinctive brief was not in any case markedly different from a plan prepared by the residents' association along the route of the Cork St./Coombe Bypass (see Murray O'Laoire, 1997).

> "Because we had ideas very, very similar and we were told that this time the IAP would be different to any urban renewal that went before it. And we were really convinced of that when we read the KPMG report... it mentioned that where urban renewal had taken place, that the locals... were left not only disillusioned but actually

> embittered by the way it had gone and that would never happen again and shouldn't happen again. And this was a report commissioned... by the DoE and it was included in [the preamble to]... DCC's IAP... So we said, this all sounds very genuine. There's going to be gains for the community, we're going to get rid of all the derelict sites, there'll be 20% social housing provided for people who need housing. There'll be local employment provided. There'll be community gain collected... off developers and distributed among the community. All of that sounded great to us. And we couldn't get into it quick enough, to tell you the truth." (CR-I)

The community, which hoped to be finally rid of the derelict sites that had plagued it for years, had the additional assurance of very detailed design specifications given under oath at a Compulsory Purchase Order Hearing prior to the commencement of the IAP. Individual community representatives had been sufficiently motivated to attend these sworn hearings and had witnessed the detailing of the mini-development briefs setting out the proposed form and use of development to which developers would be obliged to comply if they wished to avail of tax incentives.

> "Before they could... get going with the building regeneration of the area, they had to do an EIS [Environmental Impact Study] study of Cork St. and Dolphin's Barn Street and the Coombe. And there was... an oral hearing in front of... an inspector held to explain to the community what was going to happen and also to give the developers, the builders and the site owners a chance to have their say... Everybody who gave evidence had to take the oath and swear. And the Corporation officials not only said, but they swore that the area would be developed in a certain way or else the tax concessions wouldn't be paid. And that certain way was spelt out in fourteen or fifteen... different sites. And the highest building on those sites was to be 4-storeys. The vast majority was to be 3-storeys. And the density was to be a reasonable kind of a density... That's the way that we thought it was going to be developed. They swore, they drew up the plans, their engineers and their architects, their town planners drew up the plans. They swore as to what was going to happen." (CR-I; see Transcript CPO Hearing 1999, 136-7)

Not all community representatives were in a position to advance such a considered rationale for engaging in the implementation of the IAP. One, in fact, was not in a position to explain why the nominating community organisation had engaged at all. A change in personnel had taken place in the organisation in question and there did not appear to be any written record to draw upon. (See 5.3 below.)

Additional insight into the enthusiasm with which communities had responded to the invitation to participate in the IAPs was forthcoming from others who had engaged closely with communities in different capacities. For one community planner, the enthusiasm was explained with reference to the fact that this was the first big urban-renewal initiative in which the community stood to make sizable gains. The range of community commitments set out in two earlier regeneration plans – the *Historic Area Rejuvenation Project* (HARP) (1996) in its first incarnation and the *Dublin Docklands Area Master Plan (1997),* were described as "the big seller" of this new integrated approach. It was, very significantly, the first time that the general right to 'a place at the table' had been established for communities in each quarter of the inner city (TSCP-I). For others, the

rationale was understood to arise from the pragmatic wish to salvage some benefit from development that was likely to be disadvantageous to indigenous communities. Undertaking to engage in the implementation of such a major development plan was also a means of asserting and staking a claim in an area in which people wished to remain. In this, communities were seeking to ensure that remaining family and community ties would not suffer the same fate as the family relationships, support networks, community identities, facilities and services lost following the displacement of previous generations to the "no man's land" of the suburbs (TD-II). This point was elaborated always with reference to the importance of family and community networks for the economic survival of low-income inner-city communities (TD-II).

5.2.4 Support, opposition and indifference anticipated.

Whatever the motivation of central and local government in extending this invitation to host communities, and whatever the motivation of the community of the Liberties in accepting, it was clear that none anticipated the conflict that emerged between the local state and the community in the implementation of the IAP. Local government certainly did not anticipate the difficulties and acrimony that ensued. Officials spoke of embarking "with a clean slate" on the implementation of a plan that had involved extensive consultation with the local community (LG-I). For their part, public representatives had not anticipated that the community would have engaged with the IAP in any great depth. Previous experience had taught them that people restricted their involvement to matters that had a direct and immediate impact on their own lives. Impressed by the local authority's overtures to the community and surprised by the latter's interest on this occasion, it had been hoped that collaboration on the implementation of the IAP would represent a breakthrough (Cllr-I). Communities were understood to have approached the IAP with a very pragmatic and reasonable position. They were positively disposed to the IAP in particular and development in general and would have been willing to listen to the pros and cons of any reasonable developments proposed. There were no hard ideological or utopian positions in play.

5.3 Mode and logistics of community participation in IAP.

5.3.1 Structures proposed and structures established.

On its publication in 1998, the *Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan* pointed to the importance of developing "an effective implementation process" that would be "crucial in ensuring the success of the IAPs" (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: 125). At that point, it proposed establishing an implementation mechanism that would comprise a 'steering group' and a 'project implementation team.' The former was to "include wide representation from public, private and community sector groups recognised as having a role and associated with the Plan area" and was to "be established to guide the implementation" of the IAP (*ibid.*). The latter would be comprised of "a project manager and multi-disciplinary project team," which would report to the steering group (*ibid.*). The implementation mechanism subsequently established in 1999 under the guidelines issued by the

DoE differed from Dublin Corporation's proposals in one very significant respect, the substitution without explanation of a cross-sectoral monitoring committee for the proposed cross-sectoral steering group. The 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) Monitoring Guidelines effectively inverted the hierarchical implementation structure proposed in 1998, returning the power to steer and direct the implementation of the IAP to local-authority officials and relegating the community to an after-the-fact monitoring role instead of the agenda-setting steering role originally proposed. Community documentation from the opening years of the IAP registers significant community disquiet on this point (Brudell, 2000). Community documentation also indicates that it was not a point on which the local authority was ever prepared to engage or concede (Brudell, 2002). The local authority advised communities representatives that it had "no discretion" on this point (Fitzgerald, 2001). The Monitoring Committee established by the then Dublin Corporation continued through to the conclusion of the IAP in 2008.

This section presents the views of all central and local-government officials, community representatives and local public representatives about the adequacy of the structures and procedures put in place to give practical effect to the state's public commitments to community participation. It also contextualises the issues discussed with additional insights from third-sector local-development personnel who had both engaged in the precursor to the IAPs and also directly and indirectly in the IAPs instituted across the inner city thereafter. It is prefaced by a consideration of the lessons learnt by both community and government players in an earlier and experimental stage of community participation within the HARP Project, which was widely accepted as the precursor to the IAPs.

5.3.2 Lessons learnt from HARP

The Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP) was also operating in accordance with guidelines issued by the DoE when it had earlier invited community representatives to participate in a steering group "to oversee implementation of the Plan and advise the Corporation's Implementation Group, who will be responsible for the implementation of the Plan" (McDonnell, 1996: 89). One individual who had participated in that steering committee provided an interesting account of the way in which the entry of independent third-sector groups into the HARP implementation structures had introduced a new dynamic in an arena hitherto occupied by officials and councillors only. DCC had learnt "at a fast rate" from this early experience of engaging with critical, assertive and resourced parties such as An Taisce and the local area-based partnership, the DICP (TSDW-I). The critical engagement of these parties had resulted in a number of significant challenges being issued to local government (on issues such as the exclusion of public-housing areas from the regeneration plan and the operation of the tax-incentive mechanism) and a number of significant achievements for the resident inner-city community (including the development and formalising of the 'community gain' concept (see Chapter 7) and the introduction of community representatives into HARP's

participative structures alongside third-sector local-development interests). The position of strength which such parties had attained after a three-year engagement was also, however, thought to have led to DCC and DoE's determination to dissolve the HARP Steering Committee in advance of the IAPs in the interests of introducing a considerably more restricted and passive forum for community engagement over which they could exercise more control.

> "We had almost got ourselves to the point that we were calling ourselves 'a steering committee' and we were driving a lot of things and were asking questions and getting information. That's the stuff that was rolled back" (TSDW-I)

The dissolution of the HARP Steering Committee appears to have represented a closed chapter in an experiment that the state would not be repeating. The lessons learnt from HARP were evident in the structures subsequently established for community participation in the 1998 URS.

5.3.3 Adequacy of structures established.

While the DoE referred questions about many aspects of the IAP to its local authorities on the basis that it operated at a remove from the operationalisation of policy on the ground, it was clear that there were particular issues on which it was very closely involved. The decision to substitute the proposed steering committees with monitoring committees was clearly taken at central-government level. Notwithstanding the insistence that it operated at a remove from the on-the-ground implementation of its policies, the DoE's authority was clearly discernible in the architecture and parameters of the structures within which communities were invited to engage. For it, monitoring committees were very definitely "the appropriate forum for community participation" within the IAPs (CG-I).

> "A steering committee creates confusion over who is governing. The local authority is supposed to be doing the governing - and people who are elected. At the end of the day, it is the job of government to govern." (CG-I)

In the job of 'governing,' central government pointed to the value of having officials 'on side' and the way in which this allowed government to circumvent party-political obstructions in driving policy. The suggestion that monitoring committees might have been anything less than the appropriate forum for community participation elicited an invitation to consider what the IAPs would have been without any provision for community participation (CG-I). This was a recurring theme for central government in responding to suggestions that the community gains were rather less than envisaged at the outset. Any gains were better than no gains.

Had the monitoring committees been given the requisite power to monitor the implementation of the IAP, it is likely that community representatives would have reconciled themselves to their relegation to a significantly lesser role in the IAP.

> "Well it wasn't adequate, but at least it was a step in the right direction. Had it been enabled to fulfil [that role], it would have been given the power to know what developments were about to take place... whether they were in tune with the local-development plan etc. But of course they never had [that power]. They weren't

> resourced properly... I mean 'monitoring' ... it was never spelt out in practice what their role was. They ended up [being] just a talking shop." (CR-II)

While much of the criticism subsequently advanced by community representatives was directed at the local authority, it was clear from speaking with project-management personnel that the imposition of this first and most fundamental stricture on the role of the community lay with central and not local government.

> "Well I know that in the HARP... it was a steering committee... I think a steering committee would have given greater powers to the community if they were directing that a certain thing be done... I think that a steering committee is more of a driver than a monitoring committee.... But that's a question more for the DoE who changed it. We had it in the plans that it was to be a steering committee – that was what we thought was going to happen and we would have lived with that and worked with that... But it was a monitoring committee that the DoE decided was the way to go." (LG-I)

The ease with which central government was able to prevail on this issue and delimit the role of host communities in the implementation of the IAP functioned to obscure any appreciation of what an alternative conception of community participation might have looked like. The ineffectual and powerless monitoring committees that transpired were contrasted with the flashpoint that steering committees could have been – structures that would have attracted other and more powerful allies if they had been invested with real decision-making power; committees that would have been forums for real consensus or conflict; forums through which the future of the designated areas would have actually been fought out and decided.

> "[Steering committees] would have been very different. They would have been very contentious and you would have had greater levels of support from groups like... An Taisce and the trade unions and other bodies if they were seen as something more than 'the locals giving out about things that are happening in their area.' And that's what... it degenerated into... Local people were going in not knowing the agendas of the meeting, not knowing the issues that were being put before them... as a *fait accompli."* (TSCP-I)

In the absence of any real power or function, monitoring committees degenerated into non-entities as communities were relegated to the reactive and ineffectual role of requesting minor changes and amendments to plans on which all significant decisions had already been taken.

5.3.4 A structure riven with shortcomings.

- ***Absence of terms of reference.***

Despite repeated requests, Community Representatives were never furnished with terms of reference to inform and govern their participation in the Monitoring Committee (Brudell, 2000: 22). This was not an issue to which central or local government were prepared to ascribe any importance. Central government adopted a 'hands off' position in relation to this matter reverting to the default position that it had taken a deliberate decision not to adopt a directive approach in its dealings with local government. They had given the latter leeway and were obliged to respect its actions (CG-I). If they had, in fact, been given leeway in this matter, local government declined to

avail of the opportunity to exercise any such discretion. Rejecting the need for separate terms of reference, the departmental guidelines were adopted as the local-government 'bible.'

> "We felt there was enough in the Monitoring Guidelines to show what the role of the Monitoring Committee should be... how to overcome barriers, how to get development in the area. I don't think there was a need for separate terms of reference." (LG-I)

Those community representatives who sought to salvage something from the reduced monitoring role with which they had been entrusted, found that even this role had been denied them.

> "It wasn't adequate at all because to me a monitoring committee would mean that we have a plan and we both know what the plan is and a monitoring committee would... make sure that the plan is being implemented in accordance with the way it was written down. Now that never happened... We could never get them to implement the plan as it was written." (CR-I)

With the benefit of hindsight, most community representatives would come to a clear understanding of the precise role that the Monitoring Committee had been intended to play. They did not however enter into the IAP structures with any such clarity and, as a consequence, found themselves in a very uncertain environment in which they were obliged constantly to improvise in the face of a complex and difficult regeneration environment (TSCP-I). This remained a significant issue for community representatives who believed the omission to have been a significant failure on the part of local government and one which had impeded their attempts to grapple with very contentious development issues. In the absence of any clear statement of the precise standing of the Monitoring Committee, they were left to come to a slow realisation of their own powerlessness in the face of an all-powerful local-government body.

> "It left it that 'whatever we [DCC] say will be the way, we'll do it.' But when we fought that one far enough, we were told that 'the final say will be with the City Council no matter what we say.' We didn't count. They didn't say we didn't count, but they meant we didn't count...When there was a difference of opinion, the City Council would decide what way things were going to be done. And that's what actually happened. That was the breaking point with us." (CR-I)

- ***Narrow definition of participation.***

With hindsight, it would become clear that both the local community and the local government had entered into the implementation of the IAP with very different understandings about what precisely would be understood by 'participation.' Ten years of community engagement within the structures of the IAP had not served to reconcile these different understandings of the concept.

For central government, participation was to be understood as consultation (CG-I). For local government, it was the provision of information and progress reports within forums which could also function as *de facto* forums for 'problem-solving' (LG-I). On planning matters, the community's role was described as an advisory one in an environment in which "their point of view would be taken into consideration on particular issues or in terms of development" (LGSP-I). That 'consideration' did not, however, extend to any acknowledgement of the specific

responsibility that the 1999 Monitoring Guidelines had vested in the Monitoring Committee in relation to "the development of the designated sites and their role in achieving the overall objectives of the IAP" (DoE, 1999a). In light of the legal constraints within which planning authorities are obliged to operate upon receipt of a planning application, the interest that monitoring committees were invited to take in the development of individual tax-designated sites appeared somewhat disingenuous in retrospect.

> "There's a statutory process... when we get involved in a planning application - either pre-application or [with] a planning application that has been lodged - the input for third parties, community or whoever, is defined and limited." (LGSP-I)

Thereafter, the only route for public input at local-government level was either that involving standard planning observations and objections or representations *via* Local Area Committees.[36]

Local councillors understood participation within the context of the IAP to be a means of apprising committee members of recent developments and a forum within which greater information could be sought about particular developments. They did not see local government's understanding of participation extending beyond the status of 'discussion' within a forum which people approached from very unequal positions (Cllr-I). Monitoring committees were understood as the first and tentative initiative of their kind with limited powers that did not extend to planning issues. In dispensing with the difficulties experienced within the IAP with the belief that things would be done rather differently within subsequent framework plans, it was clear that councillors took a more sanguine view of what remained a very significant shortcoming from the community's point of view. For councillors, the Monitoring Committee was only one of a number of committees within the larger infrastructure of local government in which they were participating. While the relatively powerless position in which they found themselves as members of the Monitoring Committee may not have been dissimilar to their community-representative counterparts, they were also in a position to point to the significant reserved functions held by elected councillors. This point was made with particular reference to the power that councillors retained in relation to the disposal (i.e. sale) of public land.

> "You only had the same vote as anyone else. But one of the advantages you had, the chairperson always had to be a councillor so you could chair the meetings and you could stop things going through or you could control the meeting. But you hadn't got any other powers being on that committee except that you would have the opportunity to vote on [the issues at other forums]. You could vote for the disposal of land at your [Local] Area meeting or at your City Council meeting." (Cllr-I)

As councillors, they also had access to other political and parliamentary forums through their broader party-political infrastructure and representative structures (Cllr-II). As a consequence, participation and its precise meaning within the Monitoring Committee did not assume the same significance for councillors as it did for community representatives.

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[36] I.e. one of the area-specific forums for local councillor participation established on a constituency basis following the restructuring of local government (see Chapter 4).

For those community representatives with a lengthy history of engagement in formal community-development structures, the question of what precisely was denoted by 'participation' had an immediate and more pressing resonance.

> "There are many words in the lexicon... Participation is a key one. And how the City Council understands that and how the local communities understand it is enormously different and it can lead to so much conflicting and confusing expectation... For example, how does the City Council, the City Manager or local councillors understand community participation? And then how does the community understand that? We had huge differences and rows with the then City Manager... at the time." (CR-II)

This deliberation prompted an enumeration of others key words and terms arising in engagements between state and community that were similarly cloaked in confusion, including 'community,' 'partnership,' 'inclusion,' 'exclusion' and 'integration.' In an environment in which the different meanings invested in such terms was understood to denote radically different worldviews, the matter was understood to be anything but academic. "They are not just mere words. They shape two different worlds and they direct worlds going in different directions" (CR-II). This deliberation on the semantic difficulties arising was accompanied by a refusal to accept the existence of any genuine commitment to community participation within DCC. While acknowledging the commitment of visionary individuals within local government, the historically weak commitment of the larger City Council was contrasted with the genuine commitment exhibited by the European Commission in piloting early community-participation initiatives in the city (CR-II).

Critical assessments of the nature of participation on offer were tempered in the case of one community representative who had joined the Monitoring Committee in the closing stages of the IAP and judged the participatory provisions to have been adequate to the organisation's lesser stake in the plan (CR-IV). However, this assessment was qualified by an admission of very limited knowledge about earlier proceedings and an inability to comment on many of the issues that had exercised other representatives.

- ***No devolution of powers to community.***

Although some interviewees found discussions about the type of participation on offer within the IAP somewhat abstract, they were immediately and considerably more articulate on the question of power and the degree of power devolved to the Monitoring Committee. While central government stated that it once again left the question to individual local authorities, the decision to confine the community to a monitoring role severely delimited any powers that local government might have elected to confer on community representatives. Third-sector development personnel were in agreement on this point. Any powers that might have been enjoyed by community representatives had been rescinded with the decision to dispense with steering committees in favour of monitoring committees (TSCP-I). It was clear from central government's response that it had never envisioned admitting communities to anything approaching a policy domain. In praising the powers that had been accorded communities in other regeneration projects in Dublin, it transpired that the powers in

question related to choice of house and sometimes of neighbour, but never to any substantive issues at stake (CG-I).

The only power which local government understood the community to have afforded within the Monitoring Committee was the approval of the annual report, which it was obliged to return to the DoE each year (LG-I). It was also, however, clear from the indifference of both central and local government to the decision by community representatives to withhold their approval from the annual report in 2001, that the devolution of this power was purely perfunctory.

> "The only real vote of the Monitoring Committee was the adoption of the annual report and there were problems with that. The community wasn't happy to endorse the report [on the grounds] that developments of a certain height were taking place and that was documented. But we still sent our report to the DoE each year [without] the approval of the Monitoring Committee, for two years anyway. And that was made quite clear in the report, it was never sent to the Department as the annual report that had the approval of the Monitoring Committee. It was made quite clear to the Department that the Monitoring Committee had not signed off on this for the [stated] reasons." (LG-I)

DCC described itself as having been open to any reasonable decision that the community might have taken, but it is clear that the power to define the parameter of reasonableness lay with government parties at all times and extended to relatively pedestrian issues only.

Notwithstanding the failure of local government to specify the degree of power allowed the Monitoring Committee, community representatives had come to a clear understanding of the power relations operating in the Monitoring Committee and the implementation of the IAP. They described being allowed "only one… or two inputs" as opposed to any actual decision-making power. This minor role was further diminished by the fact that all such 'inputs' required the support of councillors if they were to carry any weight (CR-III). It was a monitoring committee in name only, which had never been vested with the power to monitor developments and whose function had been reduced in the closing years of the IAP to the distribution of the finance accumulated in the community-gain fund.

> "If you look at the establishment of the IAPs... by the DoE… it laid down the law to the City Council… But really it [the Monitoring Committee]... was never given any executive or any real power… They used this word 'monitoring...' It was misuse of the word... We never monitored any developments that I'm aware of… As time went on they reduced the power more and more [until] you end up with them just as a distributor of the community-gain funds and now they're saying 'well, our job is done.' That doesn't make sense to me." (CR-II)

It was apparent in all of this that individual community representatives differed sharply in their assessment of which arm of government should be held responsible for the treatment of host communities in such a manner. For some, the DoE was the honest and visionary broker whose wishes had been thwarted by an obstinate local authority. For others, it was the party from whom the policies and instructions were emanating (CR-I) and the party whom the local authority was

obeying in the faithful execution of those same policies and instructions. From a position of powerlessness, the more critical of the community representatives dispensed with the local authority as the mere functionary of a determined DoE and traced the real seat of power back to central government and the property interests standing behind it.

> "We had no decision-making power and we'd no power at all over what was happening on the Monitoring Committee. We could point out what we liked and they would say what they wanted to say. And whatever they wanted to say, I'm sure, was influenced by the DoE and that's what became the law – whatever the DoE wanted, not what we wanted, not what was good for the community, but what was good for the people who... had the most clout with the DoE and that was big developers and big speculators. They were the ones whose interests were served." (CR-I)

- ***Scant information.***

In addition to the many criticisms advanced about the inadequacy of the implementation structures, the continuing confusion about its precise function and the decision to afford community representatives only perfunctory engagement with the decisions being taken within the Monitoring Committee, it appears as if the community's representatives were also deprived of the information and resources necessary to engage with the plans being progressed within the IAP. First raised as an issue in a report presented to the City Manager in 2001 (Brudell, 2000), local government's management of the information and resources at its disposal remained a significant issue for community representatives throughout their engagement with the IAP.

DCC's reticence in the provision of adequate and timely information was manifested in a number of ways: withholding of key information, strategic management of information dissemination and sharp practice. For one community representative, this reticence had culminated in what he understood as the most serious transgression on the part of DCC – the deliberate withholding of information relating to the fact that the standing and provisions of the IAP had been superseded by new Departmental residential density guidelines (DoE, 1999b). This information, which was conceded only after the community had had accidental sight of an internal City Council communication (Dublin Corporation, 2001) and insisted that the matter be clarified, set in train a series of confrontations with the local authority that resulted ultimately in the formal resignation of the community representative in question (CR-I). Others who elected to remain within the confines of the Monitoring Committee described a situation in which informational constraints functioned to impede their ability to engage in any meaningful sense. These constraints were understood to be in line with the management of information relating to all major decisions within DCC, whereby only that information required to secure the interests of local government and developer would be released (CR-III). Meanwhile, local councillors who were engaging with the local authority across a range of issues and committees, described a situation in which access to information was dependent on being in a position to frame information requests in precise and unequivocal terms capable of eliciting the necessary information in the first instance. It was in this context that DCC's

behaviour in the dissemination of vital information was described as 'sharp practice' (Cllr-I). Sharp practice or not, the end result was that community representatives were being asked to consent to plans without any real knowledge of their import for public land, public housing, public monies or public infrastructure.

> "They had no idea of the depth of information held in various planning applications - in the land-transfer agreements; the swaps; the agreements around where the 20% social and affordable [housing] was going to be; in terms of the levies that were going to be levied; in terms of the community gain and where it was already earmarked for; in terms of things like the height strategy, the DEGW strategy;[37] in terms of even traffic planning... No, they didn't [have the necessary information]. They were not given the big picture or... even frequently... the small picture." (TSCP-I)

These concerns and criticisms found no resonance in DCC's assessment of its own practice in the dissemination of information. Officials cited occasions on which plans had been obliged to go "through the loop" on foot of public consultations to illustrate the openness and transparency with which it had operated in the implementation of the IAP (LG-I). It was interesting to note, however, that the proposals outlined in at least one framework plan that had been shelved following community opposition in 2002 appeared to have resurfaced in a not dissimilar guise in a subsequent regeneration plan for the area, the Liberties Regeneration Plan (see Chapters 8 and 9).

- ***Absence of resources.***

The disjuncture between the concept of participation employed by the state and the community reverberated throughout every facet of the arrangements put in place to give practical effect to the government's commitment to community participation. It was again evident in the differing significance ascribed to the issue of resources and the question of whether or not community representatives should be allowed to avail of independent resources and expertise in their engagement with the IAP. The position assumed on this issue turned on two very different understandings of the community's relationship with the state in matters of renewal and development. Where the community was understood to be engaged in a joint venture in which its interests were synonymous with those of the state, the provision of an independent resource stream appeared somewhat unnecessary. Conversely, where the community was judged to be engaged in an adversarial and antagonistic arena populated by distinctly conflictual interests, their provision appeared to be an imperative.

Government and community parties took entirely contrary positions on the issue. When first mooted by the community, the suggestion had been dismissed by the then City Manager as something akin to funding an opposition, while the DoE had declined to engage on the issue. That

[37] I.e. a report commissioned by DCC on the intensification of land use, (DEGW, 2000) *Managing Intensification and Change.*

position did not appear to have changed for either party. Central government took the familiar line of declining to engage on this detail of the IAP,

> "Speak to Dublin City Council about that. It's grand in principle but who's going to pay for it?" (CG-I)

Local government was clearly not going to pay for it. Local officials deemed resources unnecessary and an injudicious use of funds in an IAP that had been "built on trust."

> "If we, as a project team, engaged consultants to do a bit of work for us... that was for the whole project team. There weren't any separate instructions given by the City Council element of it as distinct from the Monitoring Committee... To have one group of consultants working on a project was enough. I think if we had a second group working, it wouldn't have been the best use of funds." (LG-I)

If a relationship putatively built on trust obviated the need to ensure that each sector was adequately resourced to defend its interest within the IAP, there was no attempt to address the inverse of that position – the necessity to ensure that all parties were adequately resourced to assert and defend their interests in the event that that relationship of trust ever broke down.

It is clear from the documentation that that relationship had begun to disintegrate by the end of the first year of the plan's lifetime (Brudell, 2000). In such a situation, the provision of resources became an absolute imperative for those community representatives endeavouring to engage with the detail of a plan whose intent had become increasingly clear. In the face of continued refusals to provide such resources and in the absence of the independent means to access their own professional expertise, community representatives were left with three possible sources from which they might have sought assistance and advice: (i) local-government officials and professionals; (ii) independent professional interests on the Monitoring Committee; (iii) their own communities.

Following DCC's granting of planning permission on tax-designated sites in contravention of the building height and density specifications set out in the IAP (Brudell *et al.,* 2004) and concealment of the altered standing of the IAP (as detailed above), there does not appear to have been any basis on which those community representatives engaging with planning issues would have sought further advice from local-authority officials or planners (see also MacLaran *et al.*, 2007: 158-9).[38] Even if relations between state and community on planning issues had not been fractured by such a serious altercation, advice from local-authority personnel would never have been accepted as impartial and disinterested. Local-authority officials, planners and associated professionals would clearly have been constrained by their organisational role, rules and regulations in the proffering of any advice.

> "The offer that was put before them was... that planners or technical experts from the local authority could speak to them, which was fine as an offer, but local-authority employees are bound by certain rules and regulations so they would not be able to say how to object or appeal... They could explain certain things but they're hamstrung in that their boss is the [City] Manager." (TSCP-I)

[38] Chapter 6 elaborates on both points in greater detail.

The advice of other professionals gathered around the monitoring-committee table was similarly declined on the basis of their likely partiality. This situation was confirmed for one community representative upon finding that an independent architect to whom he had been directed for advice and assistance was both closely involved with DCC and with one of the biggest developments in the area. Had the community representative had a full appreciation of the nature and power of the vested interests positioned both within and without the structures of the IAP, it was unlikely that he would ever have undertaken to engage in the IAP in any capacity.

> "When we heard that we were on the Monitoring Committee first, we looked for funding to employ our own experts such as architects, engineers and people like that and that was refused point-blank. We were supplied with an architect who we were told would be independent and who would give advice to the community and we found out the hard way that rather than being independent or giving advice to us, he actually had done plenty of work for DCC and was now in private practice and, subsequently, we found out that he had an interest in a big development – one of the biggest developments in the area. So rather than being on our side and being independent, you'd have to have to say he... had a vested interest in development in the area. So we were really up against all the professional people, the City Council, all their experts that they had and we had no expertise and they wouldn't give us any money to employ our own. At this stage, I think... that if I had it [to do] all over again, I would just quit, because I found that it was an impossible task to take on all those people on all those different fronts." (CR-I)

His testimony was confirmed by a councillor who had observed the arrival of a succession of professionals with vested interests to the Monitoring Committee in a supposedly independent capacity.

> "We were to have had an architect on the Monitoring Committee who was supposed to be representing the community but one of them left because he didn't like what [CR-I] said. The other came on in this place and only attended a few meetings. And it turns out now... he made his name as a community architect, but now he's a real developer... involved with big developments... One of the architects was also doing other work for the City Council at the same time. He was doing other plans and drawing up plans for them for other areas. So we felt he had a vested interest. He might have been a good architect but he had to [adhere to City Council's agenda] – he was in 'the circle.' And the Corporation always work like that. They have a panel of architects and they want to pick the architect themselves." (Cllr-I)

In such a situation, community representatives were essentially facing a tightly-knit body of professionals whose allegiances would always be with their fellow professionals and a local authority in a position to put work their way.

> "I think that there should be some monetary allowance to people to engage their own independent experts... If you get someone being paid by the state or being brought in and no one is paying them at all, you're left at their mercy whether they're going to look after your interests or their own interests. And their own interest in the long-term is not to fall out with fellow planners, not to fall out with fellow architects, not to fall out with a government that can give them contracts, not to fall out with the City Council that can give them work... So it has to be independent funding and that funding used to pay people of your choice to look after your interests." (CR-I)

The only resource available to the community representatives thereafter was that located within their own community. For some local-authority officials, the resources of the state-funded

community-development sector were judged to be adequate to the task. In accepting that inner-city communities might have been insufficiently resourced in their own right, attention was directed to the number of community-development organisations as evidence of other and alternative resources that might be called upon by community representatives.

> "If you compare it to other areas in the city obviously… no, people didn't have [the necessary resources] in comparative terms... But equally there would be a fair amount of community-development organisations in the area, area partnerships… and community-development workers – that whole sector I would imagine was available, so the Dublin Inner City Partnership would have been available to the local community. And then, there would have been a fair number of local groups funded through that community-development stream of funding. So people would not have been devoid of resources." (LGSP-I)

However, early attempts at forging an inner-city wide forum that would have sought to both consolidate the resources available to all representatives engaging with IAPs and effect a unified inner-city wide response to the issues and difficulties confronted within the various monitoring committees established (Brudell, 2000: 35-36) had failed and individual community representatives were left to forage for whatever resources might be sourced within their own immediate community in a decidedly *ad hoc* manner.

In the case of the Liberties, that assistance in the opening years of the IAP came in the form of two community employees – a policy analyst working with a network of community organisations in the designated quarter and a community planner with a working brief that covered the whole of the inner city. The assistance of both employees was understood to have significantly enhanced the manner in which the more critical community representatives engaged. In the first place, it allowed their engagement to be underwritten by carefully researched and documented position papers, technical knowledge about both planning policy and the planning process and detailed advice about planning issues, applications and appeals as they arose in respect of individual sites. It also allowed the community representatives to mount successive challenges to disputed government decisions and actions on the government's own terms both within and without its structures in the public realm. While the working relationship that evolved between these employees and the two critical community representatives enabled the latter to achieve critical outcomes that were entirely disproportionate to their meagre resources (see also MacLaran *et al.* 2007: 138-9), they could never have hoped to take on the panoply of professionals, experts and consultants at the disposal of both government and developers (CR-I).

At a time of unprecedented property development during the 'Celtic Tiger' years, the sole independent planning resource available to the community was the aforementioned planner with a working brief covering all four quarters of the inner city. In addition to dealing with the specifics of planning objections and appeals, planning negotiations, planning-enforcement cases, court injunctions and personal appearances relating to planning issues, the planner in question also

carried a considerably broader remit that extended to the delivery of accredited training courses, the organisation of conferences, meetings with community representatives engaging in IAP monitoring committees, the provision of assistance with social-housing and community plans and the calculation of community-gain levies (TSCP-I). It was her considered assessment that the extent of development and regeneration ongoing in Dublin's inner city in the years between 1998 and 2008 warranted the placement of an absolute minimum of four if not five community planners at the service of inner-city communities. In the absence of such resources, she described areas of the inner city as being 'slaughtered' by the succession of housing and urban-regeneration programmes launched in their midst (TSCP-I).

In all of this, it is important to note that it was those who engaged with the detail of the planning decisions being progressed through the IAP who were most exercised by the resource issue. This was the case in the Liberties, where only one of the four community representative engaged with the substantive planning issues at stake in the IAP. It is interesting to note that a similar dynamic was reported in respect of the wider inner city where different quarters and different community organisations were reported to have displayed differing degrees of interest in planning issues (TSCP-I). While some engaged with the detail of the planning proposals outlined within the local authority's various regeneration plans, others circumvented all such planning and technical issues to go directly to the negotiation processes that inevitably arose in the progression of all such plans.

Such qualifications notwithstanding, it was clear that the resource issue remained significant for both community and elected representatives in their continued engagement with the technical issues arising in both the IAP and associated development and regeneration plans. In addition to assisting communities to grapple with the detail of these plans, it was suggested that the allocation and judicious use of resources within inner-city communities would also have allowed for significantly more productive engagements between state and community.

> "The community representatives [on the Monitoring Committee] should have been able to get expertise paid for by the City Council. That's happening now in Michael's Estate for the Regeneration Board and it raises the standard. The people don't argue about issues that don't matter. They're well informed by their own architect." (Cllr-I)

Those who participated in both the IAP Monitoring Committee and the Community Public Private Partnership Process within the Digital Hub noted the operation of similar dynamics in the latter and concluded the withholding of resources to be a deliberate attempt to incapacitate the community's engagement with all such plans (CR-III). For other independent parties who were watching at a slight remove, participation without 'the wherewithal' was dismissed as nothing more than managerialism (UG-I).

5.3.5 Politics of community representation.

In a mode of community participation in which the participation and consent of community representatives was being taken as indication of the consent or otherwise of the host community, the representative credentials of each community representative was obviously a matter of some importance. In discussing this matter with the various interviewees, a number of issues emerged as significant: (i) the manner in which community representatives had been selected; (ii) the significance or residency in the community represented; (iii) representative credentials.

- ***Selection of community representatives.***

The decision about which organisations or associations would be deemed to be representative of the community's interests was taken by local government who used its local knowledge of the community in selecting representatives (LG-I). In exercising its discretion on this point, it displayed a bias towards community-network organisations and community-development projects over residents' groups. The chairperson of the lone residents' association granted representation in the IAP, the Cork Street & Maryland Residents' Association (CS&MRA), advanced a very simple rationale for the state's venturing beyond the formal community-development sector in his association's case - the wish to maintain the support of all residents living along or in close proximity to the route of the new bypass road that was to form the centrepiece of the IAP.

> "The community representatives were selected, not elected... I would suspect by Dublin Corporation... because, certainly, we weren't elected by the community... We were asked would we go on the Monitoring Committee. And I would suspect in my case that I was asked... because I was so *pro* the IAP, because in my naivety... my innocence, for want of a better word, I really thought that it was *bona fide* and that everything was going to be grand. I had spoken in favour of what the plan was etc. and I had asked people to trust me and go along with me in this... I was selected as a community representative and two other... people who worked for community organisations... were selected also as community representatives. So, of the three of us, I was the only one that lived in the area and that wasn't employed in the [community-development sector in the] area." (CR-I)

Virtually all community representatives had concerns about the manner in which representative positions had been allotted within the community. For some, it was a 'hit and miss' affair (CR-II). For others, it was a deliberate attempt to fragment and limit the community's representation within the structures of the IAP.

> "But when you think about it, they're extremely smart people in the Council because they would have known that we were a small enough organisation at that time and they gave us... a fee for doing the consultation [for the preparation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP]... A lovely plan was drawn up... and the structure and the Monitoring Committee was lovely. But then when it actually came down to people participating on it and one position [being] given to us and the community being split up and fragmented in its representation by DCC, I was naïve, I hadn't got enough experience at the time to see the wood from the trees. I do now... When they say to us 'it's new to us all and we're all learning by doing' type thing... I don't mean to come across as paranoid here but... to do a design like that, thought had to go into it. And to fragment a community and its representation, thought had to go into it." (CR-III)

Such concerns were accompanied by speculation about whether DCC had allotted representative positions to organisations that it knew to be unaccountable within the community (CR-III).

Those who were concerned about the representative credentials of other community-development organisations attracted similar scrutiny and concern themselves. The bias displayed towards community groups crystallised a larger concern about the manner in which an elaborate and professionalised local community-development infrastructure was increasingly being taken as a proxy for the actual residents of the inner-city (Cllr-I). In monopolising all available community-representative positions and channels, there were concerns that the community-development sector was effectively displacing and disempowering the very community on whose behalf it was ostensibly working. It was clear that the issue had a particular resonance for those who had come into conflict with both the area-based partnership and its constituent network organisation in the quarter over who precisely should be deemed to be representative of the community.

> "I was pointing out to the City Manager that the only people who should represent a community are [the] people living in the area... It is [a strong point of principle], because if you live in an area, you have to suffer 24 hours a day what's happening. If you don't live in an area, you should have a say... you should represent your own interests... if you're representing another organisation, you should be representing that, but you shouldn't be representing the community... I think that's the row at the moment between the [area-based] partnerships and the community. Who is the community? ...The Partnership [are] saying that the groups they set up are the community. It's in their interests to say that because they have people who they're funding who will support them. They support each other." (Cllr-I)

In addition to profound concerns about the manner in which the community's interests were being represented or misrepresented by the officers and employees of individual state-selected community-development organisations, other and more pedestrian procedural concerns arose in the allocation of community-representative positions to the community-development sector. Personnel changes within these organisations ensured a significant number of changes in the individuals holding representative positions. For the most part, the individuals in question were not resident in the community represented. In a number of cases they had left the area prior to the conclusion of the IAP and were no longer available to speak about proceedings within the IAP or the grounds on which particular positions had been taken. With the movement of community representatives out of their positions and out of the area, crucial experience and knowledge of the regeneration plan and process had been lost. More seriously, any concept of accountability for decisions taken and support or opposition proffered to different aspects of the plan had been ceded.

It is important in this context to note that the transient nature of representation was not confined to community representatives. At the time at which this research was conducted, only one of the three local councillors elected at the previous local election in 2005 remained in place. The remaining two positions were occupied by councillors co-opted to the Council following the departure of

party colleagues. Having only recently been co-opted to the position, the involvement of one of these councillors was confined to the closing stages of the IAP in which proceedings had been dominated by the administration of the community-gain funds. She was not, as a consequence, in a position to comment on other aspects of proceedings between local government and the community (Cllr-II). The other co-opted councillor did not respond to the invitation extended to participate in the research.

- ***Significance of community residency.***

Had all community representatives maintained a common position in their engagement with the IAP, it is unlikely that issues relating to community residency or community employment would have become an issue. In the event, the conflict that crystallised around the planning issue occasioned a schism in the community-representative body throwing all such issues into sharp relief. The fault line that emerged between community-development organisations and local residents prompted a particular concern among the latter about the manner in which the representation of the community's interests had been impeded by the operation of some representatives at a distance from the communities that they purported to represent.

> "Well, it shouldn't really make any difference whether you live in the area or not but I feel that it did make a difference because they hadn't got to face people every day who they were allegedly representing. Nobody could ask them questions or stop them or get them into discussion and I think that if [they had been subject to that type of scrutiny], their understanding of what the people wanted would have been different and they might have fought harder for what the people really did want. So I think that it did make a difference." (CR-I)

Those representing the various community organisations adopted differing positions on this point. They accepted that there was a natural expectation that a community representative might be resident in the area represented. However, they also suggested that there were occasions when a community's interests might be better served by a skilled professional community employee who shared the community's interests while remaining sufficiently detached and independent to adopt an objective apolitical stance (CR-II; CR-IV). Meanwhile, others had come to understand that 'skilled professionals' might find themselves as powerless as any local resident in the face of a complex local-government machinery.

> "It should be [residents] primarily. We would advocate local participation... But the problem is to get... a local person to have a certain capacity... to be at a stage that they can deal with the information that's being put in front of them. But to be honest you don't have to be at that capacity because the information is never put in front of you. So you just have to be able to understand in the best way you can the issues and what the best thing is for the area." (CR-III)

- ***Representative credentials.***

The question of representative credentials prompted very different responses from different representatives. Where one could enumerate the number of households affiliated to the residents' association that he was representing within the IAP, another disputed the validity of the term

'representative' if not used in the context of a democratically-elected public representative. The representative espousing the latter position rejected any claim to being representative of a given grouping of people in favour of a position that was representative of the interests of the community.

> "We keep saying we do not represent people in the community. We maintain the only people that can say that are the local councillors because they have been voted in. What we do attempt to represent are the interests of people in the community, something different... We're looking at health issues, education issues, we're working with schools... unemployment, whatever the issue is... What we say is 'the most we can hope to do is be faithful in representing the people's concerns and dealing with them.' There are people around the Liberties [who say] 'oh I represent this one, I represent [that one].' I don't believe any group, including SWICN, represents anybody in the community. I could never say that again, that we are representing the Liberties community... we've gone away [from that idea of representing a particular grouping] because there was so much tribalism and warfare going on." (CR-II)

In the absence of any democratic mandate, it was not clear how the interests of the community might be determined. Attention was also directed to the difficulties of achieving any kind of representation across what was described as a divided inner-city community in which terrain was fiercely contested.

> "The issue of participation of local people in the Liberties is so problematic anyway. I mean who represents who; who speaks for whom? ...It's nearly impossible to do that because the Liberties is very much... an old traditional community. And the downside of that is it's very tribal and every block of flats has... some kind of spokesperson... but who do they speak for? So really it's those who would have the most energy, the like of [CR-I] above... [CR-I] could say he was representing, because he had the strong [Cork St. and] Maryland association, but not many had it." (CR-II)

In a quarter which has seen significant demographic change in the past decade (Kelly, 2007b, 2008; Haase, 2009), it was clear that the term 'community' had become increasingly problematic. It was suggested that the nearest approximation to 'community' in the Liberties was to be found in local-authority flats complexes. Outside of those specific geographic locations in which the term could be employed in its traditional community-development understanding of the term, the only other entities which might be denoted as 'communities' were 'communities of interest' (CR-II). In light of the increasingly meaningless nature of the term, there were immediate and pressing questions about the value of selecting individuals and organisations to represent the interests of an indistinct unknown entity (CR-II).

Difficulties associated with such a 'community representative' form of participation were not confined to the study area. Those who were engaging with communities across a number of IAPs identified a number of problems with the community-representative procedures in place across the city. They included the absence of clarity on the selection process and representatives' credentials, the absence of terms of reference and reporting mechanisms and the omission of a review process to enable the reselection or deselection of community representatives.

> "Having somebody... who doesn't necessarily live in the area is not necessarily a problem but it does become a problem when they're supposedly representing residents' interests. Who are you? Who are you representing? How did you get here? Are you re-elected? What's your reporting mechanism? What are your terms of reference? None of this is clear." (TSCP-I)

In the absence of any limit on the length of time that the position might be held, a given community representative could retain a community-representative position for the lifetime of an IAP irrespective of significant changes in circumstance or movement out of the area. Serious concerns were also expressed about the manner in which representatives' positions had been given to the largest community organisations without reference to those residents most directly affected by given projects.

> "It was seen as the largest organisation gets a place and 'to hell with you if you happened to be the one most [affected]. If you happened to be the resident's group most clearly affected [by a given development or project], we have to talk to a large professional community person.'" (TSCP-I)

Different arguments were advanced for and against the allocation of representative seats to community organisations over residents' associations. The argument for preferring community organisations was based on the independence and resilience that an organisation might be able to show in the face of overtures from either state or private developers. The arguments against preferring community organisations were prompted by fears that their smaller and less immediate stake in a given development might lead them to engage and collaborate with the local authority to the detriment of residents (TSCP-I). In a situation in which significant demographic changes had taken place in inner-city areas as a result of the extensive residential development ongoing within the IAPs, the absence of any mechanism to allow communities to revisit the representative credentials of those representing their interests had inevitably led to situations in which some individuals nominated to the IAPs did not remain representative of their constituent communities for the duration of the IAPs (TSCP-I).

Community parties had had cause to deliberate at length on the manner in which DCC had allocated the community representative positions at its disposal. They were not alone in investing the issue with such importance. Third parties who had engaged with DCC and other local authorities in associated regeneration initiatives had observed the care taken by local authorities in selecting community representatives. They pointed to the operation of a vetting procedure in which those likely to be critical or oppositional were 'screened out' at an early stage.

> "They did it informally, this was the whole point... They knew... that they had people there and they were waiting to get their person, the right person on the monitoring committees. So they were vetting who was going on." (UG-I)

On those occasions on which 'a wrong person' had been inadvertently admitted to the local authority's structures, the local authority had simply employed the necessary stalling tactics until dissenters had been dealt with and orthodoxy restored.

> "They just hold the process until later on and they say 'it's a temporary arrangement.' And you could see what happened, they wouldn't accept, as happened with [CR-I's opposition to proceedings within the Liberties IAP]... There was a criticism of the IAP and they refused to sign off on it... They'd just deal with that... As far as they're concerned, that's just the renegade, not really working as partnership. *They* define the terms of what's successful, what's valid, what's acceptable, what's appropriate, and anybody then who doesn't, is demonised. So that's why I think it's always good to have an independent outsider." (UG-I)

In the vetting and management of community representation in this way, the state was described as playing "a brilliant game" (Brudell & MacLaran, 2009: 8).

5.3.6 Community participation as diversionary tactic

In an environment in which the demands of the state's participative structures were such that the community's energy could easily be wholly absorbed and diverted from other and more important modes of engagement, there was the suggestion that the community's interests might be better served by refocusing its resources on other key channels and processes. Notwithstanding rhetorical commitments about the importance of community participation in urban renewal, it was clear from one senior planner that the most important arena for community and public engagement on planning issues remained the arena in which planning decisions are actually determined, the standard statutory planning system.

> "Once you [become involved in] planning applications, you're in a statutory framework then and... participation... unfortunately... is in terms of people making submissions, observations or objections to a particular planning application and that being evaluated and going to the Board [An Bord Pleanála] or whatever." (LGSP-I)

Alongside that statutory framework, attention was directed to another and perhaps underutilised route through which communities might seek to effect political representation of their planning interests, those formal and informal forums in which local-authority planners were obliged to engage with elected councillors.

> "There's another level of participation which is with the local councillors, us [planners] presenting planning applications to the Local Area Committee of the South Central Area or engaging with councillors on a maybe... more informal way about development proposals and so on." (LGSP-I)

There was a clear inference in all of this that communities had allowed their scarce resources to be diverted away from binding statutory processes and potentially influential political processes into empty participatory structures that were of little consequence and less standing.

CHAPTER 6

A trajectory of engagement with Liberties/Coombe IAP.

6.1 A trajectory of community engagement with Liberties/Coombe IAP.

6.1.1 Organisations to whom representation accorded.

In accordance with the *Monitoring Guidelines* issued by the Department of the Environment (DoE), the Monitoring Committee established by Dublin Corporation to oversee the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP provided for three community-representative positions. That provision was subsequently expanded to incorporate a fourth position in 2001. While communities groups and organisations were invited to nominate a representative to a consultative forum that would oversee the implementation of the IAP, the decision about who would be deemed representative of the community was, as outlined in 5.3.5, taken by Dublin Corporation. Three of the four positions were allocated to organisations working in the formal community-development sector: two community-network organisations, the South West Inner City Network (SWICN) and the Rialto Network and one community-development project, the South Inner City Community Development Association (SICCDA). The fourth position was allocated to the residents' association along the route of the Cork St./Coombe bypass, the Cork St. and Maryland Residents Association (CS&MRA).

Of the many grounds on which community-development organisations might differ from residents' associations, there were several distinguishing features that appeared particularly material to the issues under consideration. They included the closer alignment with the various agencies of the state into which community-development organisations would inevitably be drawn, the broader community-development remit with which community-development organisations were entrusted and the considerably larger body of organisational resources and networks that they would have been in a position to draw upon in their engagements with the state. While the residents' association in question was in receipt of minimal and incidental funding, it did not have any formal or structured relationship with the state. Unlike residents' associations in more affluent areas, it was nevertheless engaging with a considerably broader range of socio-economic issues that extended far beyond the residential amenity of its members to include such issues as drug treatment facilities, facilities for psychiatric patients, home-help for elderly people and facilities for young people.

6.1.2 Involvement with urban-renewal issues prior to IAP.

- ***Nature and extent of involvement.***

The nature and extent of the involvement that each of the four nominating organisations and associations had previously had with urban-renewal and development issues prior to entering into the IAP differed considerably. One community organisation had had a considerable involvement with urban-renewal issues dating back to the 1980s and had produced both a plan outlining

proposals for the area's many derelict sites and an integrated development programme for the Liberties (SICCDA, 1982, 1989). It had also been involved in campaigns surrounding the area's many road widening schemes and the *Quartiers en Crise* movement in the 1990s. The residents' association, which had first become involved in planning issues in the 1970s, had taken the more recent initiative of instigating the preparation of an integrated development plan for the area immediately surrounding the site of the anticipated new road development on Cork St. Having endured the physical dereliction and social and economic blight that had accumulated along Cork St. and across the wider Liberties following the setting aside of the road for a future road-widening scheme almost 50 years earlier, the association's representative was keenly aware of both the devastation that had followed the abandonment of the area and the important opportunities vested in its future redevelopment. The announcement that the government was finally in a position to begin construction of the new road had provided his association with the impetus to translate its many ideas about the physical, social and economic gains that could follow into its own integrated renewal plan *Cork Street/Maryland: Towards a New Future* (Murray O'Laoire, 1997).

The two other community organisations appeared to have had a lesser involvement with urban-renewal issues. One had assisted the then Dublin Corporation in the consultation process preceding the preparation of the *Liberties/Coombe IAP,* but did not appear to have had any involvement with planning and development issues outside its more recent involvement with housing-regeneration projects. The involvement of the other community-development organisation was similarly confined to more recent housing-regeneration projects and area improvement plans.

- ***Importance ascribed to urban-renewal issues.***

Of the range of issues that people were dealing with in inner-city areas, the residents' representative judged urban-renewal issues and the mass of derelict sites upon which they were predicated to have been of the utmost importance in an inner city otherwise bereft of assets. For him, urban renewal and planning issues were very much a matter for working-class communities.

> "Well they should have been the most important… The only asset we had was the amount of dereliction that could be renewed... We felt that it was the most important asset in the area that we had... Urban renewal done properly would have made a tremendous difference to the people in the area. It could have provided people with trades... locals with homes... factories and shops... crèches for kids. And by and large… money could have been put into doing all of these things and the builders could have still made a profit." (CR-I)

While external interests had clearly understood the potential vested in the area's land, it was his feeling that the community had failed to see beyond the problems posed by dereliction to the real value of the land underneath.

> "There wasn't much of an appreciation at all… I don't want to claim credit but a few people would have seen the possibilities in [the derelict sites] but by and large the community didn't really realise… didn't see them as assets. Rather they saw them as deficits, things that weren't useful to them... Even the couple of us that did see... didn't see the full potential whatsoever. But people who are used to buying up sites and

> developing them... certainly saw them as assets... and they knew what could be done with them." (CR-I)

Recognition of that potential was evident to varying degrees among community-development organisation representatives. While it was clear from one organisation's prior involvement with urban-renewal issues that the issue had assumed a high priority in its work programme at one time (SICCDA, 1982, 1989), another did not see urban renewal, planning or development issues as featuring among its organisation's priorities. Although improvements to the area would always be welcome, it was felt that available monies would have been better spent on social-development issues. Conversely, urban-renewal issues were understood to be of greater importance to the upper-middle and professional classes driving the process. This was, however, a minority view among the four community representatives. Most had a clear understanding of the chain reaction triggered by urban-realm interventions and the consequent impact on virtually every aspect of the lives and living conditions of the indigenous community. Urban-renewal issues were described as being of "primary importance" by virtue of their impact on the built and social environment, housing affordability and service provision (CR-III).

Third-sector development personnel who had had the opportunity to survey the impact of regeneration programmes across the inner city over a number of years espoused different positions on the significance of urban-renewal programmes for working-class communities. For one party, it was understood as a policy intervention with the potential to have a defining effect on the living conditions, health status and economic and social wellbeing of communities (TSCP-I). While it might never assume the immediacy of food, shelter, drugs or alcohol-addiction issues, it was described as "a constant" in the lives of inner-city communities, who were living in the shadow of a continuing onslaught of regeneration policies and programmes.

> "They know frequently they're in a waiting game in terms of regeneration, redevelopment. So they have to keep living, knowing that this is going to happen at some stage, in some cases whether they want it or not." (TSCP-I)

Where one party articulated a very clear relationship between urban renewal and the wellbeing of communities, another had come to occupy an ambivalent position about whether the community-development sector had attached too much importance to regeneration programmes and in the process allowed itself to be diverted away from its core anti-poverty agenda. For this party, the importance of regeneration issues had now been downgraded and was ascribed a significantly lower ranking than the incidence of acute poverty with which the independent local-development sector was again confronted.

> "Well, there are different ways of looking at that...I would argue now that too much of our energy and resources got drawn into the regeneration process... The [Area Based] Partnership has been here 17 years and personally I've been involved in the inner city well past 30 years [from the time when the inner city was characterised by decline and dereliction through the 20 years during which regeneration has been ongoing]... Looking at it now and looking at the last few years, I would say too much of our energy and time and resources have been diverted into it. Secondly, in many ways the

> resources we have which might help to employ people locally, the Network co-ordinators,[39] the people working in the flats themselves... You could say also that that energy has been used or misused in serving the state system to an extent because by being there and dealing with the issues and dealing with residents, they've made it easier for the state system to engage with it or to facilitate it - not deliberately, but... unconsciously or whatever. It's a reality that you have to deal with." (TSDW-I)

Concerns about the manner in which its resources had been depleted by participating in the various manifestations of the regeneration agenda were compounded by fears that the local-development and community sectors' willingness to engage may have assisted the state in the implementation of a policy agenda that was now judged to have been fundamentally detrimental to the interests of inner-city communities.

6.1.3 A trajectory of the community's engagement with IAP.


Each of the community organisations and associations that accepted community-representative positions on the IAP Monitoring Committee appear to have adopted a supportive stance in entering into the implementation of the IAP. However, most had come to occupy a very critical position on proceedings by the time that the IAP was drawing to a close. Nevertheless, the largely critical conclusions reached about the manner in which the IAP had been implemented did not lead all community representatives to pursue the same course of engagement and action. It was instead possible to distinguish a number of distinct trajectories of engagement among the four community organisations and associations in question throughout the duration of the IAP (see Figure 6.1) All, however, commenced by pursuing a broadly unified position and course of action in the opening years of the IAP.

Phase I: Engaged and supportive.

The three community representatives nominated to the Liberties/Coombe IAP at the outset comprised one residents' association and two community-development organisations. All acceded to the Monitoring Committee in 1999. Accountable in the first instance to the members of his residents' association, the CS&MRA's representative also took a decision to report back on IAP proceedings to the general body of a local community network organisation, SWICN – an organisation to which his residents' association was then affiliated. An active member of the SWICN Environment Working Group which was then chaired by the SWICN representative to the Monitoring Committee, the engagement of both community representatives proceeded broadly in tandem for the first three years of the IAP's lifetime. In the presentation of all agreed positions, they were joined by the third community representative from another community-development project (SICCDA).

[39] I.e. the co-ordinators appointed to manage the area-network organisations established in each quarter of Dublin's inner city.

Figure 6.1 Trajectory of community-representative engagement (and disengagement) with Liberties/Coombe IAP.



The composition of the Environment Group at that time was to have a determining influence on the nature of the community's engagement with the urban-renewal issue during the opening years of the IAP. It was coordinated by the organisation's policy analyst who undertook to work closely with the two community representatives in ensuring an effective and critical community presence in the implementation of the IAP. The group also included the only independent community planner available to inner-city communities. The close working relationship that evolved between these two community representatives and the members of the Environment Group proved to be the catalyst for a considerably more extensive community involvement with decision-making practices and procedures within the local authority as they pertained to the IAP from that point forward. The significance of the role played by that group was characterised by MacLaran *et al.* (2007) in the following manner in their examination of the community's experience of urban planning within the IAPs.

> "As a working group almost exclusively concerned with urban renewal, planning and social-housing issues, SWICN's Environment Group subsequently assumed an important function in mediating and imparting information on the implementation of the IAP to the organisation's affiliated membership of community organisations and tenants' and residents' groups. In the years that followed, it would make submissions on the restoration of public buildings, draft urban-design framework plans and the City Development Plan. It would provide assistance to individuals engaging in the planning appeals process and local-authority residents whose homes and amenities were threatened by proposals contained within a draft urban-design framework plan. It would itself object and appeal to one of the largest planning applications lodged in respect of the area at that time. Beyond the provision and brokering of technical expertise, it also began to adopt a critical monitoring role in relation to the manner in which Dublin City Council was implementing the IAP and the ends to which the urban renewal project was functioning. Crucially, it undertook to document and archive the community's experience and growing concerns in relation to the implementation of the IAP, ensuring that each report and position paper was researched, referenced, documented scrupulously and placed in the public arena" (*ibid..,* 139).

None, however, anticipated the emergence of such concerns in acceding to the Monitoring Committee itself. It was instead greeted as invitation from the local authority to set aside the adversarial role that the community had hitherto been obliged to adopt in relation to the local state to support and engage positively in the implementation of an IAP in which the community had been assured of its stake and standing (Brudell *et al.* 2004: 75).

Phase II: Concerned but conciliatory.

Although all had adopted a positive and supportive stance in entering into the Monitoring Committee of the IAP, the experience of engaging with the local authority in the opening year of the plan had given all three community representatives cause for considerable concern. The first indication of a growing disquiet on the part of the community's representatives was found in a report completed at the end of the first year of the community's engagement with the IAP, *A Mandate for the Community Representatives to the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan* (Brudell, 2000). Originally conceived as a record of proceedings at a seminar on community gain

held earlier that year, it became the first public statement of the community representatives' concerns about the ability of the IAP to deliver on its programme of "real and quantifiable gains for the residents of the south west inner city" (*ibid.,* 12). At that time, the issues understood to be critical to effecting such an outcome were outlined under seven broad headings (*ibid.,* 12-57).

(1) Positive & negative aspects of 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme & IAPs.
(2) Adequacy of IAP implementation and monitoring mechanisms.
(3) Recognition of distinct interests being pursued within IAPs.
(4) Resources required for community representatives to IAP.
(5) Community gain objectives - definition, clarification and objectives.
(6) Revenue for delivery of community gain.
(7) Reporting and accountability structures for community representatives.

The preparation of the *Mandate* report had clarified and crystallized all of the issues, concerns and recommendations which the community representatives had outlined in relation to their participation within the structures of the Monitoring Committee. It had clarified, more fundamentally, their concerns about the diminishment of the community's stake in the plan's implementation. In so doing, it had also created clear grounds for a frank and constructive engagement between the community and Dublin City Council (DCC) (Brudell, 2002: 23). In addressing and presenting its concerns and recommendations to local government in this manner, it essentially represented the assumption of a concerned but conciliatory position in the face of a local government that was invited to engage on those grounds on which concern had been expressed. The position as outlined in that report was endorsed by all three community representatives.

The report in question was formally launched in March 2001 and received the widespread endorsement of community representatives engaging in each of the other IAPs across the inner city. That overwhelming community consensus and endorsement stood in sharp contrast to the manner in which the report and the issues on which it sought to engage the local authority were summarily dismissed at its launch by the then City Manager, John Fitzgerald, who "did not at any stage concede the validity or legitimacy of the concerns and recommendations outlined in the Mandate report" (Brudell, 2002: 24).

Phase III: Critical and 'minority' position within government structures.

In the year following the local government's refusal to engage with the community's proposals and concerns, community documentation recorded the community representatives' "continuing incomprehension and absolute refusal to accept Dublin Corporation's failure to provide a formal response to the report or to engage in any meaningful manner with the substance of the report's findings and recommendations" (*ibid.,* 25). While community representatives did acknowledge a number of modest attempts on the part of the local authority to resolve the community's concerns, including the convening of a half-day session with external consultants to assist the Monitoring Committee in 'reflecting on its role,' "the substantive issues remained unacknowledged and

unaddressed" (*ibid.,* 27). It was the opinion of the community representatives that DCC's consultants had "sought to misconstrue fundamental differences and clearly reasoned criticisms as mere misunderstandings and confusions" (*ibid.*). Notwithstanding the community's dissatisfaction with the approach taken by these consultants, it did note one important judgement outlined within the 'reflections and suggestions' accompanying the recommendations of the latter.

> "We consider the representatives of community NGO's in the MC [Monitoring Committee] to be in quite a difficult situation with few possibilities to live up to high ambitions of bringing the community–focus to the agenda." (Cesam, 2000, quoted in Brudell, 2002: 27)

In the year following the launch of the Mandate document, community representatives did not report "a radical, or indeed, any other kind of difference in the nature of the representation accorded to the community" within the Liberties/Coombe IAP (*ibid.,* 29). The substantive issues remained outstanding. "If anything, the situation had been exacerbated. Existing difficulties continued and were, in many cases, compounded" (*ibid.*). Many of the difficulties and concerns that had been anticipated in the *Mandate* document became manifest in the second year of the IAP's lifetime (*ibid.,* 29-35). By the end of the year, a series of unresolved issues and difficulties left the community representatives in a position where they could not "in conscience" endorse the 2000-1 Annual Report of the Liberties/Coombe IAP (*ibid.,* 36). Informed by DCC that the DoE had judged their non-approval of the Annual Report to have "no implications" for proceedings, the community representatives took a collective decision to approach the Department directly with their concerns. In advance of making that approach, they prepared a detailed *Minority Report* outlining the history of their engagement with the IAP and closed with a series of fifteen questions for the Minister for the Environment (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Questions posed of Minister for Environment by Community Representatives.

(1)	Had the IAP been implemented in accordance with government recommendations detailed in KPMG's (1996) *Review of Urban Renewal Schemes?*
(2)	Had the IAP been implemented in accordance with the government's commitment to urban renewal in the *Programme for Prosperity and Fairness?*[40]
(3)	Could the Minister give a commitment to address each of the criticisms made of the Monitoring Committee of the Liberties/Coombe IAP?
(4)	Was the Minister willing to provide the resources to enable community representatives to participate effectively and equally in the monitoring of the IAP?
(5)	In the absence of any corrective measures, did the Monitoring Committee provide an adequate forum for meaningful community participation?
(6)	Which of the objectives outlined in the Liberties/Coombe IAP remained deliverable and feasible?
(7)	What was the Minister's understanding of the 'community-gain' concept?

[40] The social partnership agreement in place between the Irish government and the social partners at that time.

(8)	What was the Minister's position on the "paltry sum of finance" realised through the community-gain levy at that point?
(9)	What was the most appropriate mechanism for the administration of the community-gain fund?
(10)	Could the Minister provide categoric answers to questions pertaining to the precise standing of the IAP, the hierarchy of plans used in determining a planning application, the existence of a policy decision to supersede IAPs with new guidelines and the inviolability of agreed policies?
(11)	What was the precise standing and authority of the Monitoring Committee?
(12)	What was the precise status of the 1999 Monitoring Guidelines?
(13)	What were the Minister's views on the competency of the local authority in assuming responsibility for the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP?
(14)	What accountability did DCC and the DoE have to the European Authorities in the implementation of the IAPs?
(15)	Did the Minister plan to commission an evaluation of the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme? Was such an evaluation not now urgently required?

(Source: Brudell, 2002: 38-45).

It is apparent from the content and tenor of the report that the community representatives had by the end of the second year of the IAP come to occupy a considerably more critical position than that evident in the earlier *Mandate* report. All were at one on this position. In addressing these questions to the Minister with responsibility for the local authorities entrusted with the implementation of the IAPs, it was also clear that they were still amenable to the resolution of all such difficulties within the parameters of the IAP in the event that central government was prepared to intervene to address and provide clarification on each of the questions raised.

Phase IV: Crystallisation of conflict around planning.

The impetus for this *Minority Report* appeared to have been derived in large measure from the exacerbation of many of the difficulties signalled in the *Mandate* document and growing concern about the failure of the IAP to deliver on its key socio-economic objectives (Brudell, 2002: 29-31). It was also clear that the antagonism between the local state and community had crystallised for some around the new and key issue of planning. More specifically, it had crystallised around DCC's decision to grant planning permissions on a number of tax-designated sites in breach of the design specifications laid down both in the appendices to the IAP in 1998 and in a sworn Compulsory Purchase Order Hearing in 1999. By 2002, the planning contraventions were identified as the substantive issue at the heart of the community's conflict with the IAP; the issue that went "straight to the heart of (a) the continuing validity of the Integrated Area Plans, and (b) the value and legitimacy of continued community participation" within their structures (*ibid.,* 31). It was equally clear from the documents referenced throughout this section of the community's *Minority Report* that the IAP and its planning issues had come to assume an immediacy and a significance

for the residents' representative in a way that they had not for the community-development organisation representatives.

The presentation of the planning contraventions of the IAP as "the substantive issue" at stake within the *Minority Report* was underwritten by the conflict into which the residents' representative had been drawn with the local authority following a number of planning decisions in contravention of the Liberties/Coombe IAP along the route of the Cork St./Coombe Bypass. As with all difficulties arising in relation to the IAP, the residents' representative had first sought to resolve the issue within the confines of the local authority through both an informal approach to the wider Monitoring Committee and Project Implementation Team and two formal submissions to the Planning Authority. In the course of these two documents, the residents' representative sought clarification on a number of key questions in relation to the standing of the IAPs, including (i) the hierarchy of plans used in determining the granting or refusal of planning permissions within the IAP; (ii) clarification on whether the management of DCC had taken a policy decision to supersede the IAPs; (iii) the position on elected city councillors on plans which were a stated policy of the Dublin City Development Plan 1999 (Hammond *et al.*, 2001a, b). On the first occasion, the Planning Authority responded by describing the community's observations as a "thesis" and declined to engage with the key questions posed. On the second occasion, it responded to the effect that it saw "no merit in engaging in further correspondence" on the issue (Dunne, 2001).

The unresolved issues between the residents' representative and the Planning Authority would subsequently culminate in the preparation of a detailed case study in which the residents' representative outlined a comprehensive history of the planning issues arising in respect of one sample tax-designated site and then proceeded to extrapolate the likely implications for proceedings on the area's remaining 99 tax-designated sites. He concluded the case study by asking the members of the Monitoring Committee to adjudicate on the local authority's contravention of its own IAP and reminded them of "the responsibility which each assumed in accepting a place on this Monitoring Committee."

> "When the implementation of the Plan reaches a conclusion, will the Monitoring Committee of the Liberties/Coombe IAP be in a position to say that it fulfilled its responsibilities in monitoring the Plan or will it be obliged to concede that it acquiesced in the obfuscations, equivocations and evasions with which DCC has responded when challenged on instances in which it was clearly acting outside of the agreed Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan." (Hammond *et al.*, 2002: 19)

Although the other members of the Monitoring Committee, which included local councillors in additional to sectional interests, did not prove to be any more forthcoming than the local authority's planners in responding to the planning issues raised, it was evident by this stage that the residents' representative was coming to a clear understanding of the incompatibility of the planning decisions being progressed through the IAP with the interests of the existing residents of the Liberties.

Phase V: Critical, movement to engage political and extra-state authorities.

(i) Public representatives (constituency councillors).

The *Minority Report* submitted to the Minister for the Environment in April 2002 closed by stating that comprehensive answers to each of the fifteen questions posed were "necessary if the community representatives are to be in a position to assess (a) the continuing validity of the IAPs and (b) the value and legitimacy of continued community participation within the structures of the *Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan"* (Brudell, 2002: 45). Notwithstanding this exhortation, the Minister's office showed a marked reluctance to engage with the community representatives.

When five months had passed without anything other than a perfunctory acknowledgement of the report's submission, the community representatives sought for the first time to engage the assistance of parties external to DCC and the IAP Monitoring Committee in the resolution of the community's difficulties. Following an overture to the public representatives representing the wider constituency of Dublin South Central in which the Liberties was based, the residents' representative made a formal presentation of the community's concerns to the Dublin South Central Area Committee (SCAC) in September 2002. The presentation succeeded in securing only a routine request from the SCAC that the three councillors for the immediate Liberties area meet with the community representatives (SWICN Environment Group, 2002c). As each of the councillors in question was already participating within the IAP, this request did not assist the community representatives in furthering their cause in any way. They had instead encountered another non-responsive arm of local government that appeared determined to confine the community's concerns within the immediate environs of the south-west inner city and deny the significance of anything other than a local quarrel to the issues raised. DCC's minutes of this meeting confirmed that the community's presentation had failed to merit anything other than a record of the fact that "a deputation was received from the South West Inner City Network Ltd" and that a report would be prepared on the community-gain proposals for the IAP in respect of the following three years (Dublin SCAC, 2002).

(ii) Extra-state authorities (European Commission).

The presentation to the SCAC was followed by the submission of a formal complaint to the European Commission in October 2002. The DoE's 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme Monitoring Guidelines, had contained a provision that obliged DCC to "comply with European Commission reporting requirements on implementation of the [IAP] scheme," (DoE, 1999a: 3.9). On foot of such an obligation, the community representatives assumed that there was a legitimate basis on which they might approach the European body that had authorised the use of the tax incentives with its concerns about the manner in which DCC was implementing the IAP. It accompanied that complaint with the extensive body of documentation outlining the community's concerns. It was not, however, to experience any greater success in its attempt to engage the European Commission

than it had with local and central government. The Commission's Directorate-General Environment to whom the complaint had been forwarded declined to engage on the grounds that "on the basis of the information supplied, it has not been possible to identify any EU environmental legislation which may have been breached with regard to the regeneration of the Liberties" (Kremlis, 2002). It did direct attention to some environmental legislation of possible relevance, but the community were clearly to be left to investigate the feasibility and merits of any such legal route without any assistance from the European Commission. In the absence of the resources that would have allowed them to procure the necessary legal assistance, this course of action was never to prove possible. [41]

(iii) National parliament (parliamentary questions).

In the interim, the earlier presentation to the South Central Area Committee had yielded one incidental but important outcome. An opposition T.D. offered to assist the community representatives in securing a response from the Minister for the Environment to the *Minority Report* that had been forwarded to him in early 2002 but that had failed as yet to secure any response. That assistance came in the form of a series of parliamentary questions which sought amongst other things a statement from the minister on the serious concerns raised in the *Minority Report*; a meeting with the community representatives; a review of the manner in which the Liberties/Coombe IAP was being implemented and clarification on the legal status of both the IAPs and the urban design framework plan contained within the Liberties/Coombe IAP (Dáil Éireann, 2002).

In sharp contrast to the indifference with which the community's *Minority Report* had been received by the Minister for the Environment, the parliamentary questions succeeded in eliciting a prompt written response that provided clarification for the first time on the actual standing of the community representatives within the Liberties/Coombe IAP. It stated that the "bottom-up approach [provided for within the 1998 Urban Renewal Act] was designed to ensure that the IAP would create an holistic vision for the future of the area" and balance the different strands of development and renewal. It then continued by clarifying the precise role and standing of the Monitoring Committee *vis-à-vis* the local authority. "The role of the various monitoring committees… [was] to advise and assist the relevant local authority, monitor progress on the implementation of the IAPs" but clearly did not extend beyond that.

> "However, under the legislation overall responsibility for the implementation of the IAPs, including its monitoring, rests with the local authority. The interpretation of the terms of a particular IAP, and the certification of individual projects as being consistent with the objectives of that IAP are, in law, matters within the competence of the local authority concerned, in this case Dublin City Council." (Dáil Éireann, 2002)

[41] While informal contacts with European Commission officials indicated that there were two issues on which the community might seek to engage two separate Directorate Generals (DGs) within the Commission, i.e. DG-Competition in relation to the state aid rules attached to the awarding of tax incentives and DG-Environment in relation to the cumulative impact of the nature and type of development that had taken place within the IAP, the resources were not available to pursue either route (SWICN Environment Group, 2002d).

In the following weeks - and six months after the submission of their *Minority Report* – the community representatives finally received a written response to their report from the DoE (Falvey, 2002). That response was relayed in the same text used in the earlier response to the parliamentary questions. While the community was clearly welcome to engage, participate, advise and assist in monitoring the implementation of the IAP, the actual authority on the manner in which the IAP would be interpreted and implemented rested as a matter of law with the local authority. That response represented the closure of one more governmental avenue through which the community might have achieved resolution of its concerns. This negative response did, however, have the merit of providing the community representatives with the first direct admission that they did not exercise any authority in the implementation of the IAP. It became clear at this point that the voices of the community so lauded in the publications of central and local government had become unwelcome and inconsequential voices of critical dissent in the renewal of their own locality.

Phase VI: Division on question of continued participation.

In the wake of the Minister's response, the community's representatives reached diametrically opposed positions on the question of whether or not they should continue to participate in the Monitoring Committee of the IAP.

(i) Withdrawal from government structures for some.[42]

The community representative for the Cork Street and Maryland Residents' Association resigned his position in the wake of the Minister's response to the parliamentary questions. In a lengthy letter to DCC he outlined his reasons for resigning from the Monitoring Committee of the IAP. Implicating both the Department and its local authority for its blatant misrepresentation of the role, function and authority of the Monitoring Committee at the outset, his letter of resignation ended with the following statement:

> "I have no option left but to resign from the Monitoring Committee. I refuse to allow DCC any further opportunity to cite my presence... as any evidence of community agreement with, or endorsement of, the manner in which it is implementing the Liberties/Coombe IAP. I refuse to allow DCC any further opportunity to make the community complicit in the obfuscations, equivocations and evasions in which the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP has become enmeshed. When the community... decided to cooperate with DCC, it did so in good faith. When I, as an individual, undertook to represent my community... I did so in the understanding that the Plan would be implemented in accordance with the commitments outlined in the plan as it was published in 1998. Little did I, or my community, realise that the IAP would... attribute wholesale precedence to market interests over the legitimate social and economic rights of the resident community. Little did we realise that the extreme right-wing policies of the present Government would ensure that the maximum benefit of the urban renewal of a heretofore 'unfashionably' deprived area would accrue not to the deprived inhabitants of such areas but to the representatives of private capital who are moving in and reclaiming that land in their droves on the back of Government approved tax incentives. I am sorry to have to say that the last opportunity to do

[42] I.e. Two community representatives, representing a community network organisation and a residents' association respectively.

> something helpful for the Liberties/Coombe area has been lost forever, in order to pander to the avarice of the private sector in the shape of developers. Perhaps if the community were in a financial position to make large donations to political parties, the outcome would have been different. (Hammond, 2002b)

The Environment Group of the SWICN refrained from making any decision on the matter until it had exhausted a last-ditch opportunity to resolve its difficulties with local government. That opportunity was presented by a meeting that took place with local councillors in the wake of its earlier presentation to the SCAC. In the event, the attempt proved futile as the community encountered the familiar intransigence of local-government officials and an ineffectual councillor body with, in some cases, only the most tenuous grasp of the issues in contention. The organisation submitted its resignation immediately upon departing that meeting on the grounds that

> "Were the Community Representatives to remain within the Monitoring Committee, they would be attempting to monitor the implementation of a nebulous entity which has become clouded in obfuscations, equivocations and evasions – in short, a Plan with no clear, definable and fixed content or standing. Were the Community Representatives to remain within the Monitoring Committee, they would be acquiescing in a farcical pretence of nominally monitoring the implementation of such a Plan while accepting that the Monitoring Committee does not have the authority or standing to execute the very task for which it was established. Meanwhile the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP would continue unimpeded and its successive breaches of the Plan with apparent impunity." (Boylan, 2002)

In agreement with the Cork Street and Maryland Residents Association, it too refused to be implicated any further in this 'farcical pretence.'

(ii) Continued participation for others.[43]

The written record does not contain any indication of the assessment of the position of either of the other two community representatives who remained within the IAP Monitoring Committee, SICCDA and the Rialto Network. This may have been in part because the individual who had undertaken to record each stage of the community's engagement with the IAP had been working most closely with the representatives who had resigned their positions. Neither of the remaining community-development organisations were members of the Environment Group which had documented the progression of the community representatives through the IAP to that point. There was not, as a consequence, any written record of the deliberations attending upon the Minister's response or any indication of whether it had occasioned any disquiet in relation to their participation in the IAP among the two community representatives in question. Notwithstanding the reservations that had occasioned the submission of the Minority Report to the Minister in 2002 and the subsequent resignation of two community representatives, those who remained within the IAP were sufficiently supportive of proceedings to resume their endorsement of the work of the IAP's Project Implementation Team in the subsequent Annual Report (DCC, 2004). In so doing they ensured that the IAP would once again carry the official imprimatur of the community.

[43] I.e. Two community representatives, representing two community-development projects.

It was thus that the relatively unified community position that had been maintained for the first three years of the IAP was sundered in the wake of this confrontation between the community and the local and central state in 2002. Thereafter, the Annual Reports of the IAP confirmed that both organisations maintained an unbroken engagement with the Monitoring Committee through to its conclusion. Significantly neither of the individuals representing these organisations resided in the area represented.

Phase VII: Division on question of abstention.

(i) For one, diminishing involvement and resumption of seat.

In the wake of the resignations from the IAP, the two resigned community representatives retained their membership of the SWICN Environment Group. The minutes of the Group's remaining meetings indicate that it maintained a critical interest in proceedings within the IAP and remained concerned about ongoing planning decisions, public-land sales and private developer behaviour in relation to public buildings. It continued to explore the avenues and options through which it might seek redress for all such concerns. Meeting minutes also reveal the group's concerns about the selective and partial recording of the community's concerns in the formal records and reports of the IAP and the likelihood that DCC might seek to recruit other community representatives to replace those who had resigned. Significantly the minutes also record the Environment Group's concerns that its larger network organisation (SWICN) might seek to overturn the decision that the Group had taken to resign from the IAP (SWICN Environment Group 2002c, 2003).

The SWICN organisation underwent a number of significant changes in the years following its withdrawal from the IAP. Attendance at the Environment Group dwindled and its meetings appeared to ceased in 2003. The position of the policy analyst, who had taken responsibility for co-ordinating and formulating each of the formal written challenges to the local government's implementation of the IAP, became untenable and the officer in question was obliged to leave the position in 2004. The written record of SWICN's engagement with the IAP ended with her departure. The organisation subsequently resumed its position on the Monitoring Committee in 2005. While there does not appear to be any written record of the reasons for this *volte face,* the resumption of its position within the IAP Monitoring Committee appeared to have been motivated by a belief that a presence 'at the table' was a simple imperative if it was to have advance knowledge of plans being mooted for the area both within the IAP and associated initiatives such as the Digital Hub (see MacLaran *et al.*, 2007: 213).

SWICN's route back to the Monitoring Committee of the IAP appears to have followed a significant reconfiguring of the organisation's engagement with the IAP. In the immediate aftermath of its resignation in 2002, it was the understanding of a former employee of the organisation that "DCC had taken a decision to bypass those who had been asking and demanding

answers to the hard critical questions about the IAP to engage directly with other sections of the organisation that had never sought to engage with the very serious issues at stake in the plan's implementation and that were more likely to acquiesce uncritically with City Council's plans" (Former Policy Analyst, cited in MacLaran *et al.*, 2007, 211-2). SWICN appears to have taken its lead from the local authority in this matter. Having marginalised the role of its Environment Group and rendered the position of the officer working with the group untenable, the organisation was free to set aside the serious criticisms that had occasioned its earlier resignation from the IAP and resume its participation within the Monitoring Committee in a significantly more conciliatory and uncritical manner

(ii) For the other, hardening of oppositional position.

The received wisdom that it was always preferable to retain 'a seat at the table' irrespective of the business being transacted at that table did find any resonance with the residents' representative. The CS&MRA did not waiver from the hard critical grounds on which it had tendered its resignation from the IAP in 2002. If anything, the opposition of this community representative hardened considerably in the following years as he and his residents' association sought to oppose the most unsavoury aspects of the IAP as private citizens. Having been obliged to concede the failure of the socio-economic gains promised in the IAP, his association resolved to resist the most harmful aspects of the physical developments taking place on tax-designated sites along the route of the Cork St./Coombe Bypass. The planning decisions being taken in respect of these sites remained a live and pressing matter for the residents' representative in the years following his resignation from the IAP as development assumed an apparently unstoppable momentum. This opposition manifested itself in a number of different ways from that point.

Phase VIII: Opposition in the public realm.

(i) Third-party appeals system; confrontation with development interests.

Following many heated and acrimonious discussions about how the impasse over the planning contraventions taking place within IAP might be overcome, the IAP's Project Management Team had earlier issued a direction to the residents' representative. If the CS&MRA was unhappy with the planning decisions being taken in respect of tax-designated sites within the IAP, it should pursue the issue as private citizens through the standard statutory planning system and appeal each planning decision of concern to An Bord Pleanála (Brudell *et al.*, 2004: 79). Essentially, local government had challenged the residents' representative to contest the planning decisions, which it had taken in contravention of the IAP, within the national planning appeals system. Assuming such an adversarial stance, the residents' representative proceeded to appeal several planning decisions taken in respect of tax-designated sites to An Bord Pleanála. In so doing, he confronted private-development interests in the open for the first time, in an openly antagonistic development environment unencumbered by the holistic integrated rhetoric in which the development of the tax-

designated sites had been couched in the state's literature. The private developers confronted were rather more candid about the position and the tactics to be employed against any arising obstacles to their development plans. In the course of resisting all such overtures, the residents' representative was obliged to come to a fuller understanding of the nexus of power relations in which development interests were enmeshed.

> "The lodging of each successive appeal has served to focus the attention of very powerful and wealthy interests on the third-party appellant and the obstruction which the appeal is perceived to pose to the proposed private development. On lodgement of each appeal, a familiar pattern has now begun to establish itself, whereby pressure to withdraw appeals is exerted from all sides. This article does not allege any attempts to bribe third-party appellants in the inner-city community in question because such a word has never to the authors' knowledge been explicitly used in any approaches... It can, however, describe the nature of the approaches which have been made to the inner-city organisation in question.
>
> On a number of occasions, the chairperson of the Cork St. and Maryland Residents' Association has been contacted by developers and promised 'community gain' if the appeal was withdrawn. In the case of one particular appeal, which had been taken (as with all the appeals) on the basis that the grant of permission constituted a contravention of the Liberties/Coombe IAP, the private developers enquired if the appellant had taken the appeal on a matter of principle and was accordingly 'not for turning' or if there were room for discussion. In the event that there were 'room for discussion' a map of the proposed development was produced and the developers proceeded to point to a building within the development site which could then be 'talked about.' The overture, like all others, was refused. It subsequently emerged that the building, which the private developer appeared to be using as a bargaining tool in an attempt to negotiate the withdrawal of the appeal in question was, in fact, a publicly owned building, which An Bord Pleanála subsequently ordained should be the subject of a separate planning application. The meeting in question followed on a personal telephone call from a former Government Minister enquiring if the third-party appellant would consider meeting with the developers in question. It is within such a nexus that the lodgement of planning appeals has threatened to mire this inner city community." (Brudell *et al.*, 2004: 81)

In retrospect, it was to become clear to the residents' representative that private developers only stepped in to negotiate their own interests directly when there was some doubt about the ability of the state's planning system to guarantee the desired planning decision. In so doing, developers appeared to have no compunction in using every resource at their disposal to negotiate and pressurise the withdrawal of planning appeals. As it transpired, the private-development sector had no great grounds for concern as An Bord Pleanála repeatedly upheld planning permissions in clear contravention of the IAP. On a number of occasions, such permissions were upheld in defiance of the recommendations of the Board's own inspectors which had vindicated the grounds on which the residents' association had lodged its appeals (*ibid.,* 82). A definitive account of the complex, political, potentially compromising, occasionally dubious, profoundly unequal and ultimately indifferent arena into which this inner-city community stepped in embarking on the planning appeals route is provided by Brudell *et al.* (2004.)

(ii) Site protest and attempted court injunction.

Having exhausted all governmental and political routes, refused all overtures from the private-development sector and failed to halt unwanted developments through the planning system, the CS&MRA subsequently sought to resist the more disruptive and harmful effects of these developments through more public and confrontational courses of action. One such confrontation ensued on a large site immediately adjoining the terrace where some of the CS&MRA's members lived. Residents had failed to overturn a planning permission for a large-mixed-use development that included five, six and seven-storey blocks and that was again in contravention of the IAP. They were further discommoded by the development company's refusal to abide by the conditions attached to the planning permission, the damage inflicted on their homes and the threat posed by the developer's refusal to provide security during construction. Compelled to place a picket on the construction site, residents were immediately confronted by Gardai and the threat of arrests (Hammond, 2007). The residents' representative subsequently sought redress for some of the concerns relating to this particular development through the Courts but was forced to abandon the application for a court injunction in the face of looming legal costs.

(iii) Street protest and extension of solidarity to others.

While the opposition of the residents' association was never to coalesce into public street protests, the CS&MRA's chairperson did subsequently offer his support at public meetings and protests staged in respect of another of the sites along the route of the Cork Street/Coombe Bypass. This support was offered most notably in respect of a public campaign staged against the sale of a local-authority tax-designated site that had been earmarked for the construction of a new national school on land immediately adjacent to the oldest national school in the Liberties. Involvement in that campaign provided valuable insight into an alternate mode of resistance and a multi-faceted campaign that included the tabling of City Council questions, approaches to central-government officials alongside public meetings, street protest and press briefings. That campaign was ultimately successful in effecting the removal of the site from the open market and the construction of a new school by the Department of Education. In this, the tactics employed and the successful outcome secured provided a telling point of contrast for the CS&MRA, which had delayed adopting any such confrontational tactics until all conciliatory governmental processes and procedures had been exhausted. (See Plates 6.1 – 6.4 for two contrasting modes of engagement with the IAP.)

Plate 6.1 Report produced by community representatives, Liberties/Coombe IAP, (2000).




Plate 6.2 Report produced by community representatives, Liberties/Coombe IAP, (2002).





Plate 6.3 Protest action taken against sale of site within Liberties/Coombe IAP (2003).



Plate 6.4 New school constructed on site following removal from market (opened 2008).



(iv) Entry into public realm.

Beyond his engagement with urban-renewal issues and contested sites specific to the Liberties/Coombe IAP, the residents' representative also began to speak publicly in communities across the inner city about his experience of engaging with local government in planning and urban-renewal matters. This entry to the wider public realm took the form of advice and assistance in neighbouring working-class areas where communities were grappling with similar planning and urban-renewal matters; numerous interviews with researchers drawn to the public confrontation that had taken place between the state and the community in the Liberties; presentations at university seminars and conferences; co-authoring of articles and addresses at political meetings seeking to galvanise the community's opposition to unwanted developments.

Attempts to engage the national media proved less successful. A number of letters seeking to highlight the community's opposition to land and development issues within the IAP, including the proposed sale of the aforementioned school site and the lack of transparency evident in An Bord Pleanála's decision-making procedures, did not succeed in engaging the national print media's attention. It was left to fringe political publications such as the *Socialist Worker* (2005) and special-interest environmental publications such as *Local Planet* (2008) to accord any coverage to the community's experience. The very limited circulation figures for all such publications ensured that the dissemination of the community's experience was confined to a very small readership. On those rare occasions on which the residents' representative did succeed in gaining access to national television programmes, concerns over litigation meant that appearances were preceded by strict warnings about the material that could and could not be discussed. Such strictly defined parameters precluded discussion of key aspects of the community's experience of planning and development matters and the core substantive issues in contention.

The CS&MRA maintained its opposition to the manner in which the IAP was being implemented through to its conclusion. The association was, however, to find itself increasingly stripped of the incidental resources and supports that had enabled it to challenge the planning decisions being taken within the IAP. The burden imposed by the personal and financial resources necessary to lodge successive planning objections and appeals became untenable. The Environment Group of SWICN had, as noted above, ceased to meet. The policy analyst who had been co-ordinating both the meetings of that group and the community's written engagement with the IAP had left the organisation. During the years in which that Group had been fully functional, it had succeeded in forging important working contacts with an independent community planner, urban geographers and critical journalists. In the absence of a central focal point around which interested community parties could mobilise to pursue an agreed course of action and a community employee in a position to take responsibility for the formidable body of work involved in such an undertaking, all such resources and contacts were lost to the to the resident community. Subsequent concerns about

the manner in which the community network organisation was operating obliged the residents' association to disaffiliate from SWICN in 2004. The absence of any alternative forum around which critical community representatives might have reassembled and the removal of the resources that had underwritten the residents' association's engagement to that point, effectively functioned to isolate and silence a very formidable critic of the behaviour of both central and local government in the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP. The fracturing of the community's representation ensured that the sole residents' representative (the chairperson of the CS&MRA), who was also the only community representative actually resident in the area, was left to occupy a minority and increasingly marginalised position in his continued opposition to the Liberties/Coombe IAP.

In this, the CS&MRA stood apart from the three community-development organisations, which had surmounted the concerns that had occasioned earlier refusals to endorse one of the IAP's Annual Reports in the case of two of the organisations and a formal resignation from the IAP Monitoring Committee in the case of one of the organisations to remain publicly supportive of the Liberties/ Coombe IAP to the end.

6.2 Community perspectives following on participation in IAP.

In light of the markedly different paths that the community representatives pursued in their engagement with the IAP, it is instructive to consider (i) the manner in which each assessed the impact of the community's participation within the IAP, (ii) the factors judged to have impeded its engagement and (iii) the conclusions that each had reached about the case for and against participation with the state in urban-renewal and regeneration projects.

6.2.1 Impact of community participation.

Virtually all community representatives were in agreement about the community's failure to impact on proceedings within the IAP. For the residents' representative, the impact of community participation was assessed with reference to one criterion only, the degree to which the community had succeeded in securing any of the gains promised them in the IAP. Measured against such a criterion, their participation had been singularly unsuccessful and they had achieved "very little"

> "Because you see the thing, our aims were so clear. We wanted social housing, we didn't get it, we didn't get one social house in this area. We wanted kids getting jobs, very little success. A couple of them got to drive diggers on Cork St. but we wanted local businesses where local people could get employment. We didn't get it. We wanted community gain to be spent in the area and we didn't get it. So how can you say that we influenced it at all? ...We made a great stand against them and we did the best we could to get what was agreed we'd get. But we didn't gain from it. You were knocking your head against a stone wall really." (CR-I)

The only gain that he was in a position to identify was the learning that his association had attained about the autocratic manner in which planners operated and the corresponding burden that any

working-class community assumed in attempting to resist the planning decisions taken by those same planners.

> "A planner can tell you anything, he's not telling you lies, but he's telling you... from his point of view why it's justified... The same planners who designed the M50, who built the houses out around the M50... who rezoned the land – the very same planners are telling you now that we shouldn't have M50s, that we shouldn't have land rezoned out there, [that] we shouldn't have so many people trying to get into work from there, that we should all live in the centre of the city. When they were all so wrong before, how can they be all so right now? They can justify anything very, very easily." (CR-I)

Community representatives who had maintained their participation throughout the IAP depicted the Monitoring Committee as a "blocking mechanism" for actual community participation. It was described as "another quango set up by the DCC" which had allowed communities to be "abused in the name of participation in planning" (CR-II). While they had been able to influence the concept of 'community gain,' their impact beyond that one achievement was judged to be negligible.

> "We haven't evaluated [the impact of participation] and I would say if I were to make an overall statement, perhaps very little at the end of the day... Certainly the concept of 'community gain' was something that we pushed, that people should benefit financially, [that] the community should [benefit] from... developers coming in. It wasn't that big a deal. For the rest, I couldn't say offhand, very little I would say." (CR-II)

In the wake of such negligible outcomes, there were also concerns that the community's participation may have functioned to confer credibility on a disingenuous process.

> "You know for the time and amount of energy really we'd have to question whether there were benefits at the end of the day... Were you actually giving credibility to a structure that wasn't going anywhere? That would have been [CR-I's] view and my own view." (CR-II)

The significance attributed to the community-gain fund outcomes appeared to depend on the individual representative's understanding of the full gamut of issues at stake in the implementation of the IAP. Those who had joined the IAP in its closing years and who had had little involvement in the plan beyond the administration of the community-gain fund expressed satisfaction about the role that they had been allowed in its allocation (CR-IV). This was also the case for the community representative whose organisation had withdrawn its earlier resignation to resume its place within the IAP.

> "Well I was only on it for a year, a little over a year. The only thing I could say my participation impacted on was the distribution of the funds to the area." (CR-III)

Beyond that, the organisation's decision to resume its participation within the Monitoring Committee was judged to have made little difference in a structure in which community and not-for-profit organisations were never going to enjoy any actual power.

> "They [the organisation] went back because they felt that if they weren't on board that they couldn't influence it at all. But in retrospect ... whether they had been there or not, I don't think that it actually mattered at the end of the day." (CR-III)

The acceptance of such a blatantly unequal position in such a matter-of-fact manner was of particular interest in deriving from the community organisation that had earlier resigned its position on foot of trenchant criticisms of the treatment of community representatives and community interests within the IAP.

6.2.2 Impact of community opposition.

Outside of relatively tangential issues such as the allocation of community-gain monies, it was clear that community participation had failed to make any significant impact on the outcome of the IAP. There was, however, an additional aspect of the community's engagement that also necessitated investigation, the impact of its opposition. In public the government continued to deny that that opposition had been of any consequence or significance to the progression of it renewal plans. That indifference remained incomprehensible to the community-development organisation that had rescinded its earlier resignation to rejoin the Monitoring Committee. It remained incredulous about the failure of the local authority to make any attempt to address the grounds on which the earlier resignations had been tendered.

> "I would imagine if I was the manager of the IAP and... I went back to my senior manager in DCC and said Cork St. [i.e. CS&MRA] has resigned and SWICN has resigned, I'm sure that... there should be some sort of process of investigation. As far as I'm aware, that didn't happen. So where's the accountability there? You're supposed to be primary stakeholders from the community, which as far as I'm aware... was a key issue when the European Union drew up the whole process of IAPs. Community participation in an IAP was of primary importance to the function and development of the area. And yet you have a local authority that doesn't even make a phone call to ask why somebody withdrew." (CR-III)

However, it is also significant to note that the failure of either local or central government to make any attempt to address the difficulties in question had posed no impediment to his organisation's decision to resume its position within those same local-authority structures.

The precise impact of the adversarial stance adopted by some community groups was also difficult for the CS&MRA to ascertain in light of the indifference with which all statements of community concern and opposition had been greeted. However, having come to appreciate the sensitivity of the planning and development issues and decisions at stake, the residents' representative was in no doubt that the issues raised had caused considerable discomfort for local-government officials.

> "It's very hard to know that because to your face they wouldn't be admitting anything. But I've no doubt that when they went away that some of them at times were very worried. There were certainly times when they should have been worried... There were things that we brought to their notice that were happening, like developers coming to us and offering us bribes – that's all you could call it. And when I reported that back to the IAP... that must have been bothering them but again, it didn't do any good." (CR-I)

Reports that the European Commission had initiated contacts with DCC on foot of the community's complaint were cited as a further indication of the manner in which the community's actions had discommoded the local authority.

> "There is evidence when they [DCC] had to contact people in Europe to try and change things to try and support them rather than us – that's fairly worried." (CR-I)

If such contacts had in fact taken place, it would appear that that the issues raised by the community had also occasioned concern in the European Commission.

6.2.3 Arnstein Ranking.

With the exception of one community representative who had had a very limited exposure to proceedings within the IAP and was therefore not in a position to comment, all ranked the type and nature of participation afforded them within the IAP at the lowest rungs of Arnstein's (1969) Ladder of Citizen Participation.

> "There's a word, I can never think of... it's where you participate in something where you don't really have any power in the decision-making. [Tokenism?] That's it, yeah. It's so simple. It's token participation." (CR-III)

> "Whatever the lowest rung of the ladder is... Education and persuasion [1st rung] – Yes I'd say that's where we were, the very bottom." (CR-I)

> "I think it was even below the first rung. I think it was an abuse of the word 'participation' of local people. It was a way, I think, for the City Council to conform to government policies at the time." (CR-II)

While all appeared to agree on the perfunctory nature of DCC's operationalisation of the community-participation component of the IAP brief, community representatives differed on the party responsible for this failure. For some, the impetus for the treatment of the community in this manner was located firmly with local government. Its abuse of the community-participation concept was contrasted with the 'genuine advocacy' of the European Commission, as it had been demonstrated in the poverty programmes of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and the Neighbourhood in Crisis movement. It was also contrasted with the more enlightened understanding of the concept to be found within the DoE (CR-II). Others advanced a more critical and political analysis that understood the treatment of community representatives to be a direct consequence of a clear policy direction from central government as opposed to being a mere matter of ineptitude or bad behaviour on the part of individual officials within local government. The indifference of the DoE in the face of the community's formal representations to it was invoked in support of this analysis.

> "Well central government... were very, very anti what we were trying to do...When we began to get disillusioned, we tried to meet politicians. We managed to get to meet one group in Leinster House [the Dáil] one night and I could see at the end that there was no support for us from any section. In the end, the DoE, the Minister for the Environment... sent down the instruction that it is only what the Corporation officials thought, that they would rule the day. And that we were only there as - he didn't say it but we were only there giving it a token [endorsement]... rubber stamping." (CR-I)

Any suggestion that either central or local government had misrepresented, if not perverted, a more radical concept of community participation advocated by the European Commission was similarly belied by the very perfunctory response of the latter to the detailed complaint submitted to it by the community representatives.

6.2.4 Impediments to community participation.

The inability of the community's representatives to exercise anything beyond the most marginal influence on proceedings within the IAP would appear to have been the natural, direct and intended consequence of the structures put in place to facilitate their participation (see 5.3). If this was the fundamental and insurmountable impediment that essentially condemned the community representatives to one of two options, acceptance and acquiescence or refusal and withdrawal, there were several other factors that impeded the community's engagement with the IAP. While discussions with community representatives were punctuated with the many difficulties and barriers encountered in engaging with the IAP, the following were among those identified as explicit impediments. The catalogue of impediments identified by community representatives is also supplemented by additional impediments identified by public representatives and third-sector development workers.

- ***Impediments external to the community.***
- *Policy progression by stealth.*

For some, the fundamental impediment was located in the larger policy environment as opposed to the specific structures at issue in renewal plans. One senior third-sector development worker described an environment in which major policy initiatives progressed by stealth. As a result, communities were often not in a position to recognise the full import and consequences of major policy advances until such time as they had assumed the momentum of full-blown policies (TSDW-I).

- *Absence of key parties from structures.*

Upon entry into the local-government structures, communities found that they were part of a structure from which the party most vital to proceedings – the property development sector – was absent. As a consequence community representative were afforded the opportunity to engage with local-government officials only. The latter were depicted as little more than 'significant buffers' between developer and host community. In this way, conflicts of interest that could have been addressed more directly and productively with private developers were deflected and displaced into ineffectual wranglings with the government officials fronting the policies. It was thus that local-government structures ostensibly established to facilitate community engagement with urban-renewal programmes functioned to prevent the community from confronting the very forces driving these policies and programmes. In this way, community concerns that might have assumed greater

clarity had they been understood and articulated as fundamental conflicts of interests between largely property-less communities and wealthy property developers were instead misconstrued and misrepresented as local quarrels between local community representatives and local-government officials.

> "The first thing is [that those that] the community are sitting around the table with generally are not the actual development forces, because... they're kept away... You're not sitting there with developers or the ones that are driving [the process]. There's a buffer, a significant [buffer] between them at a local level. So where the conflicts arise they're more to do with the attitudes of either local residents or people who are working with them – we'll call them community workers – versus the City Council or the political interests, who may have another agenda that they're pursuing for better or worse. So the conflicts are often over that issue or the best way forward or 'people shouldn't be let away with such and such a thing' or there has to be more demands made... [on] things like the community gain. So that's the first point. There [are very few examples] other than [in] some individual circumstances... where there would have been any engagement with the real forces that are developing the IFSC or the apartments or the Zoe developers. They're not even known to people." (TSDW-I)

- *Blocking tactics employed against communities.*

For most community representatives, it appeared that anger at proceedings within the IAP had indeed been predominantly directed at the local authority and the behaviour of the officials encountered within the structures of the IAP. DCC was described as employing three tactics to "block communities from having real power or real say."

> "One is what I call delaying tactics. Communities are voluntary groups; they've only so much energy. So if the City Council refuses to respond, you put in a request and you don't hear from them, you send it again, and you don't hear... So delay kills the morale of the group. That's a deliberate ploy... It's the response to change... a classical one. The second one is, if they do respond, they say 'ah well, we have no resources to do that or we have no power to involve you.' So they use certain legal arguments from the law to say 'oh they can't do it...' Sometimes they just confront groups and write them off in the sense of... [withholding] information... Information is power and that's what killed us off in all these developments here. The community could not access key information on who was buying up the land, what it was being sold for... The first thing you knew the building was up, almost. So [in summary, first], non-response; second, withholding of information and the third way is blackballing community groups... It has to do with power. If the local authority has power, it doesn't want community to have any of that say. They're the three ways they block that power." (CR-II)

- *Bureaucratic nature of local-government structures.*

The bureaucratic nature of local-government structures was described as another institutional resource that had been deliberately mobilised to impede community participation as opposed to an inevitable but incidental by-product of a large organisational structure. The manner in which those structures had been used to retard the community's full understanding of and engagement with the key decisions at issue in the IAP had allowed all such decisions to be progressed without any unwelcome surveillance or interference.

> "If you wanted to look on it from a sociological perspective in relation to even the way DCC is organised... it's an institution, and the way decisions are [taken], even with the

> staffing structures, the bureaucratic system that you have to go through makes it so difficult that by the time you get to the end of it you're exhausted. But they've already made the decision and got the information. It's a system that works... a bureaucracy that works for them... They know that, most certainly." (CR-III)

That assessment of proceedings was endorsed by an independent third party who had previously partnered the local authority in an urban-renewal related project that had run in tandem with the IAP. He described a system in which bureaucratic procedures were used to stall and contain community participants within tightly confined formal structures while developers were allowed to circumvent all bureaucratic structures to proceed directly to the locus of activity and decision-making within the local authority. The operation of such informal channels in tandem with the public formal channels led to a conviction that communities needed to reorient their engagement to incorporate a dual strategy targeted at both formal and informal processes.

> "As things unfolded, you could see that the manipulation was going on... that there was a formal and informal, if you like, process in train... There were gate-keeping exercises going on... They [the community] were engaged in all sorts of questions and processes [in the formal channels], while the other guys [the developers] went straight in and did their business." (UG-I)

Pending the evolution and finessing of such a dual strategy, the continuing and impenetrable bureaucracy of the local authority's structures was one of the factors that had allowed the latter to operate without public scrutiny or accountability.

> "DCC... had people on the IAP and they made mistakes that they could have been called to task for. But they're a big organisation... an institution in themselves and they're very hard to call to task. Whatever way they want something to go will go. It's very hard to get any sort of an inquest or complaint answered." (CR-III)

- *Authoritarian management culture.*

In enumerating the various impediments to community participation within local-authority structures and processes, attention invariably came to focus on what was understood to be the overarching and fundamental cause of all such impediments, the authoritarian culture and management model in place within the local authority. The latter was described as being simply incompatible with the consultative, participative model of community engagement that the local authority was ostensibly seeking to institute (UG-I). In a culture that was unwilling to tolerate any obstacles to the progression of its organisational goals, the standard response to critical, oppositional and dissenting voices had been to dismiss them as unrepresentative of the community (UG-I).

- ***Community-based impediments.***
- *Fatalism.*

The sense of fatalism induced by repeated defeat and failure within local-government structures was perhaps more powerful than the barriers confronted within those same structures. The experience of participating within the IAP had been particularly detrimental to the community's

morale and was cited as one of the factors leading to the assumption of a markedly more resigned position in the face of other major state interventions in the area. The resources, work and time required to oppose the implementation of undesirable aspects of state policy was an investment that some community organisations were no longer prepared to make.

> "After the big [community effort expended]... on the IAP, people just sort of disengaged to be honest with you. That left a profound effect on the area... Because it's like the same thing is happening [in the Digital Hub]. Well the same thing is not happening because we... protested about the reorganisation of the Digital Hub and the community participation on it. But when it went to a certain point... I said to [my organisation], if they want to participate in it, go and participate... and nominate somebody good... [but] there's no point in me sitting there because it's a *fait accompli*. Maybe four, five, six years ago, we'd have fought that tooth and nail to the very end... [whereas now] you get to a stage where you can sort of accept it. You protest to a certain amount and then you say 'well if I'm to go down that avenue, it's going to take a massive amount of work, a massive amount of resources and a massive amount of time, and my own specific job is going to suffer... So, I'm going to make the decision now and I'm not going to do that.'" (CR-III)

Meanwhile others who would never willing have disengaged from projects of such magnitude were simply too burnt out to embark on another round of engagements with the state.

- *Absence of resources.*

While the formidable impediment posed by the absence of resources had long been acknowledged by community representatives, other parties had also come to recognise the significance of the issue. Those councillors and TDs who had taken the community-activist route into public life had long been aware of the manner in which inner-city communities had been hampered by the absence of independent planning advice (Cllr-I). They had tried to persuade local community-development organisations of the importance of securing the services of a planner if communities were to be in a position to engage with planning matters with any credibility.

> "From the very start when SWICN was set up, I tried to get them to employ a planner, but they didn't think it was of any importance. Had they had a planner, they would have been able to give a credible case for proper, better planning for the area. But they didn't think that of importance." (Cllr-I)

Having never been in a position to retain the services of such an independent professional, community representatives had been left with two possible sources of professional advice within the IAP, neither of which was independent or acceptable: government officials whose first duty was obviously to their employer and nominally-independent professionals whose interests were closely aligned with those same government officials.

> "Even I as a councillor – and I would have said the same thing for community activists – you need to be able to call on expert, professional advice at times. But you wouldn't have the means of doing it because you wouldn't have the funding. The Monitoring Committee had... architects... business people... union officials. So... that Monitoring Committee technically should have been able to give you any advice you wanted, answer any questions you asked, but it didn't. They weren't there at all meetings. They didn't want people arguing... They would go by what the officials said. So I would like to be able to consult someone... if there was some issue that I wanted

expert advice on. You'd go by the official but you'd know it wouldn't be quite right." (Cllr-I)

Others had observed first-hand the panoply of experts deployed by more affluent communities in defending their planning interests – planning consultants, engineers, traffic advisers, senior counsels, etc. and were acutely aware of the stark contrast between working- and middle-class areas in this respect.

> "The poorer communities... [are] financially poor as well a lot of the time and don't have the money simply to engage the experts… It's very difficult if you live in a community where.... a lot of people either may be unemployed, may be in low-paid jobs, [may have] some social problems. They don't have the financial resources. I'm involved... at the moment with an issue in Bluebell [Dublin 12], where they want to put up a 24-storey development… Now I was saying to them 'really, you've got to fight fire with fire. You need a really good planner.' And they were saying 'how much would a really good planner cost?' I said 'thousands' and they said 'well, where are we going to get thousands?' I said 'I don't know...' When you work it through very simply and logically, people don't have the money to engage and...I think that's a really big issue." (TD-III)

> "In other communities… you will find architects... environmental planners and all that amongst the communities. In the ones we're talking about, they don't have that expertise to hand and it has to be paid for." (TD-IV)

It was those with fewest resources who, somewhat anomalously, refused to bow to the might of the government and private-development sector interests. The absence of the requisite resources remained an abiding impediment for all community representatives, but was particularly acute for the CS&MRA, which alone among the community representatives attempted to engage with the nature of the planning decisions being progressed within the IAP. In the face of the government's continued refusal to provide the community with independent professional expertise or the financial resources required to access them, the only resources to which the residents' representative had recourse were those housed within the surrounding inner-city community. While the residents' representative acknowledged at all stages the assistance provided by the two community employees referred to above (see 5.3 and 6.1), his association was never in possession of the resources that would have allowed it to challenge the IAP on every occasion on which such a challenge was deemed necessary. Neither was it in a position to exhaust every available channel in pursuit of redress for its concerns. In any case, the assistance provided by the community employees in question appeared to follow from the commitment of the individual employees rather than any long-term commitment on the part of the local community-network organisation through which that assistance had been channelled. While the residents' representative believed that residents should "should be able to look to the community organisations – the ones that are funded to give advice and to represent not only individuals in the area but small organisations in the area, organisations that have no expertise," he had not found any long-term organisational commitment to the provision of such support or representation in the immediate area (CR-I).

Even if significantly greater resources had been made available to the residents' representative, it was clear that the task of challenging the combined might of a powerful government body and a wealthy private-development sector could not have been sustained by a single residents' association.

- *Vulnerability to divide and conquer tactics.*

Community representatives endeavouring to oppose aspects of the state's renewal policy confronted not only the detail of the contested policy but also the range of other tactics at the disposal of a state which appeared intent on neutralising any focal point of dissent around which others might mobilise. The ease with which the local authority could denigrate and isolate critics imposed an additional burden on those already grappling with hostile forces. That isolation could have been countered if individual community representatives had been surrounded by a supportive community body with whom it was possible to report and consult. In the absence of such support, individual critics were left to occupy 'a very lonely place.'

> "I suppose the biggest barrier is that... it's very easy for them to brand you... as a malcontent. Unless you have support you find yourself becoming very isolated and very disillusioned... You'd want to have a way of reporting back and getting the support of people in the area...What you'd want would be the community organisations and then a group of people who are... living in the area where the dust and the noise and the dirt and the building work is going on... included on the Monitoring Committee so that at least you'd have people there talking through experience as opposed to just reading about it." (CR-I)

The denigration and marginalisation of individual community representatives appeared to have been greatly facilitated by the ease with which DCC was able to 'divide and conquer' within a fractured community which did not house the powerful resident lobbying groupings found in other and more affluent areas (CR-III).

> "The power to divide and conquer is very powerful... The downside [of a traditional community] is the tribalism, [the fact] that blocks of flats hardly talk to one another, they never have. And so you can easily divide and conquer, you can spread rumours... and that's what's bedevilled us over the past decade here, particularly since [named community organisation] was formed... and maybe before that... Nobody ever checks the reality... So... it's very easy for any authority to put one side against another, to offer something to one side as against another. So it's a classic [case] of those who have power - if people are trying to take it away from you, you divide and conquer them." (CR-II)

Public representatives also pointed to a number of factors militating against the emergence of the kind of community solidarity that might have served as a bulwark against such tactics. For some, the low levels of community solidarity were directly attributable to the divisive gradations of social standing attached to the different housing tenures that had historically existed in the area.

> "The bottom... would have been... bad tenements... [then] tenements, [then] local-authority flats. Local-authority houses were all right because they were a little better, but the people who lived in the artisans' dwellings always considered themselves a cut about the people living in local-authority schemes. They always felt themselves a bit

> better. The people in the Iveagh Trust [voluntary housing complexes] considered that they were better than people living in Corporation flats." (Cllr-I)

The public representative in question had endeavoured to engage with and represent all housing tenures but was aware that the persistence of perceived boundaries continued to impede the realisation of the latent collective strength of the community.

- *Internecine community politics.*

In the absence of any such solidarity, local internecine community politics and tensions had come to pose a persistent barrier to effecting any kind of co-ordinated engagement with regeneration programmes. The tensions and rivalries that had traditionally beset resident and community groups in dealing with urban-renewal policies were contrasted with the considerably more coordinated manner in which tenants' groupings had begun to galvanise all available resources, expertise and experience in their engagement with later housing-regeneration programmes.

> "The community weren't as strong initially and as focused. Local tensions, local agendas can often play a role. Local politics is more vicious than national politics in many ways… Not party politics [but] ... politics in terms of 'this is my area, I know best.' It's amazing what residents' associations can get up to against each other sometimes. Some of it is ego, some of it is genuinely believing that their views are better than somebody else's... Some of that is because there hasn't been... as much time and effort given to training and ensuring that those who are on residents' associations can best represent their [area]... I think that's the little change that's happened over the last two or three years... the community groups – in particular in the regeneration programmes in Dolphin House, Michael's Estate [local-authority flats-complexes] and the like, have gone and got the expertise... and the training and have pulled themselves together... I think Fatima gave an example to other areas. Michael's Estate would be another one which would be far ahead and I think that the expertise that they've got and [are] lending to other people, and some of the [material in] the Tenants First group[44] would be very interesting where they can rely on expertise built up over years." (TD-IV)

One public representative suggested that communities had only begun to attain the skills and strength necessary to engage with the IAPs as the plans were winding down (TD IV). Others, who had had a greater acquaintance with the facts of the situation, recognised the skill, knowledge and commitment that individual community representatives had brought to their engagement with the IAP from the outset, but suggested that the failure of larger numbers to mobilise alongside them had left those most outspoken and critical vulnerable to hostility, denigration and marginalisation (TD III).

- *Area-based approach to urban renewal.*

The power to divide and conquer did not appear to be confined to residents' groupings within the designated area in question. The residents' representative had vested particular hope in the forging

[44] Tenants First is described as "an independent forum of tenants and community workers who have come together to share information and experiences and to support each other on issues of common concern." Its central aim is "to provide a strong collective voice for local tenants on issues related to their living and dwelling conditions." (http://www.stmichaelsestate.ie/projects/tenants_eng.html)

of a united front between community representatives from each of the IAPs in progress across the inner city at that time.

> "If people all over the city were prepared to do that and stand [and] unite together instead of having different IAPs with no connection with each other. If we had a group of IAPs together and exchanged views and stood together, I think we would have got somewhere." (CR-I)

However, the forging of such strategic alliances had not proven possible. It was thought that the understandings that some communities had reached with individual developers in their own areas had made them reluctant to jeopardise any anticipated gains by embarking on a more critical or political engagement with the nature of the planning decisions and developments taking place across the inner city as a whole.

> "I don't think a serious effort was made to do it. There were efforts made to do it through the [area-based] partnership all right, but not to the extent that it should have been. And I think that people are easily changed... I don't want to name areas, but there was a developer who was considered to be a great developer and a lovely man in a certain area of the city. And they were going along with him and I'm sure that when they'd go back [after discussions with us], they'd say 'look if we're getting ourselves involved with that, we'll have to take on this fellow as well... and we don't want to lose his friendship or whatever, his benevolence.' So, I think it's human nature again that if you're getting something in your own area and you don't tell someone somewhere else that maybe that's a better way of doing your business." (CR-I)

It was thus that the one potential critical strength that might have been mobilised within an inner-city community otherwise bereft of resources was lost to the adoption of an area-based approach in which every dynamic functioned to contain the engagement of community representatives within tightly delimited area boundaries. This situation also ensured that any emerging conflict, opposition or dissenting voices would be contained within the quarter of the city in which they had first arisen and, in the case of the Liberties, in the immediate vicinity of the one residents' association that had been granted representation within the Liberties/Coombe IAP. In this way, it was possible to observe the manner in which an area-based approach had functioned to preclude the emergence of a coherent critical engagement with urban-renewal issues.

6.2.5 Case for and against participation.

- ***Perspective of those who remained within state structures.***

In what was described as a 'David and Goliath' type situation (CR-I), there was little disagreement about the inability of the community's representatives to exert any influence over anything outside of the administration of the community-gain fund. Notwithstanding the very critical judgements offered about the treatment of community representatives in the implementation of the IAP, community representatives continued to reach diametrically opposed positions on the case for and against participation at the close of the IAP.

Those organisations which maintained their participation throughout the IAP continued to maintain the case for participation. The rationale advanced was in one case as simple as an acceptance of the received wisdom that it was always preferable to be within a process than without.

> "For me, the arguments for staying in [is that] at least you know what's being discussed around the table, whereas if you're outside of it... unless you've got somebody feeding you [information] from the table... you're at a loss as to what's being said and what the plan is.... I don't like staying within certain things, but unless it... goes against every value you believe in as a community-development worker, I would say you're better off in than out." (CR-IV)

In another, it appeared to follow from a pragmatic consideration of the place from which the community could exercise most power rather than from any principled position. While the organisation in question had earlier considered withdrawing from the IAP in agreement with the other two representatives, it had refrained from such a course action in the interests of retaining its perceived power.

> "Politically we've done this so many times. Sometimes by resigning you give away your power, whatever power you have... It's an issue facing the Greens or the PDs in government. Do you stay in and try and change things from the inside or do you resign on principle?" (C-II)

The decision to remain within the IAP structures did not, however, appear to have conferred any significant powers.

> "We stayed but in practice we've more or less resigned now because we don't hear anything from them. We haven't had a meeting for over a year and a half that I'm aware of." (CR-II)

The withdrawal of the other and more critically engaged community representatives was understood to have weakened the position of the remaining community representatives considerably. The need for protest was recognised, but it was thought that that protest would always be channelled most effectively within the system.

> "We did try to encourage [CR-I] to stay there and try to change it... Had he stayed, we might have changed things, at least... used [the Monitoring Committee] as a channel of protest. Because when you're outside the system, no matter how much you protest you're not going to be heard." (CR-II)

For this community representative, power should never be given away. Neither should withdrawal be considered unless it served to remove all power and legitimacy from the forum in question. The adjudication on all such options should follow on foot of a cold strategic assessment of the likely impact of both courses of action and not on emotional grounds.

> "I am a believer [that] you don't give away power. You choose to give it away. Never give away power unless you find that by walking out of something you actually take the power with you... I mean sometimes in a group, one can walk out of that group and take power and leave the group powerless... But I would advise against anybody walking out of a group and becoming powerless. It's a strategy really... a strategic decision about power and it should never be emotional." (CR-II)

This deliberation on the importance of strategic engagement within all such forums was accompanied by the suggestion that similar care be taken when engaging in print. Any decision to

place critical views in the public arena should be underwritten by an assessment of the strategic gains and losses attendant upon such a move and the likely impact on both the powerful and powerless (CR-II).

- ***Perspective of those who resigned from state structures.***

Of the two community organisations which had resigned from the state's structures in 2002, one had set aside the hard critical position taken in 2002 to resume its seat in the Monitoring Committee in 2005. By this time, there had been significant changes in personnel in the organisation in question. It may have been significant that the community employee who now held the community-representative position had neither had any involvement with nor appeared to have an accurate grasp of the precise issues on which the organisation's earlier resignation had been tendered. By his own admission, the organisation had resumed its participation without effecting any resolution of the concerns and difficulties that had occasioned the impasse in 2002. It now appeared to realign itself with the default position of the other community-development organisations that participation within the process was a simple imperative. The rationale advanced for resuming participation in these circumstances included access to the information and influence that it had been denied following its resignation (CR-III). The fact that the IAP was now moving to administer the community-gain fund also appeared to have been a significant factor in the decision to resume its position within the IAP.

> "You're dealing in an area of disadvantage... [which] some could term a sort of 'cat and dog' [situation] when it comes to resources because there's a minimum amount of money there… [and community groups are] competing with each other... They thought that there was no... valid input that you could actually [have while outside the structures of the IAP]… People thought 'well, if there's going to be community gain here, we want to try to get it distributed in as much around the area as we possibly can. And that was one of the reasons why they got involved with it." (CR-III)

It was thus that an organisation that had previously withdrawn its support for an urban-renewal plan on the basis that it would not allow DCC any further opportunity to cite its presence around the Monitoring Committee table as "any evidence of community agreement with, or endorsement of" the manner in which it was implementing the IAP (Boylan, 2002) now set aside that position in the interests of sharing in the administration of the one tangible gain to emerge from the implementation of the IAP, the community-gain fund.

It was possible to detect a significant degree of cognitive dissonance in those community representatives who had decided to maintain their engagement with the IAP notwithstanding continuing and significant concerns. There was no such dissonance discernible in the CS&MRA's representative. The government's determination to proceed with its urban-renewal plans, irrespective of the opposition encountered, had not weakened his association's resolve. If anything, it had provided valuable political insight into a core antagonism at the heart of urban-renewal plans in which the interests of a powerful central- and local-government body and a wealthy private-

development sector were ranged against largely property-less working-class communities. The representative's experience of engaging with the various arms of government charged with overseeing the implementation of these plans had shown him that such a fundamental conflict of interest was not amenable to resolution within the social-partnership type structures instituted within the IAP.

> "No, no, it didn't make me compromise. If anything, it made you hardened. You knew what you were up against and you weren't surprised when you couldn't beat all of them." (CR-I)

This position followed on a rational and considered assessment of the issues and forces at stake in property-led renewal programmes. In those instances where the state was seeking to engage communities in projects of a purely public nature that were free of speculative interests, the residents' representative identified a continuing and strong case for community participation. However, no such case could be advanced in respect of urban-renewal-type projects in which the community was being invited to participate in empty and powerless structures while all significant business with private-development interests was being transacted outside those same structures.

> "If it was an Integrated Area Plan, you're as well off staying out... If the community is engaging overtly and if the speculators are engaging covertly, then... the community is wasting its time." (CR-I)

- ***Perspective of those engaging at slight remove.***

Third-sector development workers, who had previously been wholly committed to the partnership approach to regeneration, had also come to revise their position considerably by the time the IAPs were drawing to a close. That revised position followed growing evidence about the negative manner in which urban-renewal programmes had impacted on the communities of Dublin's inner city (see Chapter 4) and the collapse of a number of PPP housing-regeneration projects across the city. The strong case for participation that had underwritten their support for community participation had now disappeared. This *volte-face* was informed by the realisation that not alone had participation not mitigated the most harmful effects of regeneration on inner-city communities but that it may have also facilitated the advance of policies detrimental to the interests of those same communities.

> "The partnership approach... in terms of regeneration... hasn't really worked... There [isn't] much example of it working that I can see... because those [community] interests are sitting around a table with one big gap... the actual developers... [The participation of] other interests, let's call them residents or community activists or statutory agencies [other] than the City Council... and councillor representatives... hasn't mitigated the impact of regeneration. It may have facilitated some of it and... diverted energy into facilitating it. So I don't think there's a future in that." (TSDW-I)

The independent community planner was in agreement in concluding that the community-participation component of the IAPs had been unsuccessful. She believed that community representatives had been demoralised by their involvement within the state's monitoring structures.

> "I think, in some senses, people feel more disheartened by having been involved...The Liberties lost through the planning process... [and] lost through the IAP... The community-gains question you have to ask is 'would that [gain] have been there anyway through the state through different mechanisms? Would it have been there through Rapid I, Rapid II?'[45] And the economic gains – yes, there has been a lot of new employment, but that has been employment that the market has brought." (TSCP-I)

The officer in question was adamant that any gains made by the community had been made on foot of its adoption of an adversarial stance within the statutory planning system. The latter was clearly understood to be the key and pivotal arena for community participation and not the special monitoring forums convened to oversee the implementation of the IAPs. While critical representations within the IAP may have succeeded in securing minor amendments and community concessions, she could not point to a single programme that had been significantly altered on foot of the community's participation (TSCP-I). It was not suggested that communities forsake such forums completely. Attention was, however, pointed to the necessity of engaging both inside and outside such formal forums and processes. Engagement within was necessary if communities were to be apprised of all planned developments and have the opportunity to make the necessary formal representations. However, it was also necessary for communities to underwrite that participation by demonstrations of their strength and support outside of those same structures.

> "The rule, as far as I'm concerned, is you have to be within and without. You have to take action outside of the round-table discussion at the IAP for them to notice you and to show that you've got support outside." (TSCP-I)

Essentially, communities had to be prepared to mobilise and engage in protest activities as circumstances demanded, if they wished to secure the necessary leverage in their formal engagements with the state.

Another independent party, an urban geographer, who had engaged with local-government officials in the development and delivery of a project (the Four Cities Project[46]) which had sought to "identify and advance innovative ways of maximising the involvement of local communities in the implementation of urban-regeneration projects" (DMD, 2004) in the study area, had also had cause to reflect on the case for and against community participation with the state. The realisation that the local authority had begun to use the programme in question for its own ends had prompted a consideration of whether or not withdrawal from the process should have been considered (UG-I). While the academic partner in this project had been acutely aware of the danger of cooption, he and his colleagues had elected to remain within the process with the local authority. They had done so, however, not as an endorsement of the local authority's behaviour but as a means of 'infiltrating'

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[45] I.e. the two phases of the Irish Government's Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development (RAPID) Programme.

[46] The Four Cities Project was "a European Union funded initiative exploring four important themes in urban renewal – city living and environmental sustainability, physical planning, economic and community development and cultural diversity and segregation." Four cities - Dublin, Belfast, Brussels and Liverpool were involved in the project with the Liberties /Coombe area being been chosen as the case study for Dublin (DMD, 2004: 4).

and gaining insights into the machinations of a local-government structure of which they had become very critical.

The case for participating 'under cover' was outlined in the following manner: the insights to be gained into DCC's organisational culture, concerns and *modus operandi* (including the vetting procedures employed in the selection of prospective community representatives) and the opportunity to work with officials who were committed to developing a social model of regeneration, notwithstanding the absence of an official policy to that end (UG-I). The experience of engaging with other local authorities across the city had provided additional insights into the 'perverse ends' to which 'well intentioned officials' could sometimes function, when obliged to engage and consult with communities in unviable and inoperative frameworks.

> "But you can see the perverse outcomes that you get when you have a system, an emerging system such as that model of the IAP which was compelling people who were well-intentioned to act this way in what they thought were the interests of the community. Any kind of model has that danger, unless people are willing to say to their paymasters 'look, this isn't going to work properly. You're asking us to do something within a framework which is not operational, which is not viable, without us being cynical about the whole exercise.'" (UG-I)

The experience of engaging so closely with local-government officials had led to a number of convictions in relation to community participation for this third-party observer: the importance of identifying and tracking the informal local-government processes through which officials and others were working alongside the formal community-participation processes; the importance of recognizing the sophistication of local-authority 'blocking mechanisms' and effecting a significantly more coherent community engagement within those structures; the importance of establishing as many links and networks as possible both within communities and with sympathetic third parties to counter the dearth of resources impeding the community's engagement with such projects (UG-I). The experience of engaging within local-government structures had also led this urban geographer to share the community planner's conviction that community interests were best served by the adoption of a dual strategy: participation within government structures in ensure access to information about all proposed plans and developments; participation outside to enable a broader mobilisation and solidarity.

> "I think it's both…I think you do have to mobilise and develop some kind of solidarity outside and we were encouraging that. That's what the networking was all about. But then also know how it works inside. The more you've networked inside... the more effective you'll be. It's not 'either, or.' It's both. We got people to network in the City Council as far as possible and we got people to network with other people and encouraged [them] ... to develop their own capacities. In other words, the more vocal, the more effective you can be through the networking." (UG-I)

Notwithstanding the enumeration of the various learnings, insights and convictions that had followed on the decision to remain within the joint process initiated with DCC on this occasion, it

was interesting to note that the party in question was not prepared to engage in a project of this nature with the local authority again.

6.3 Government and third-party perspectives on participation.

6.3.1 Government perspectives on conflict with community.

- ***Denial of any significance to conflict for central government.***

While acknowledging the distinctive position that the Liberties had come to occupy among the large number of IAPs in progress, the DoE did not appear willing to concede that the conflict between local government and the community of the Liberties had derived from anything more significant than 'bad blood' (CG-I). This assessment of the conflict had not been tempered by the carefully referenced body of documentation placed before the Minister for the Environment by the community representatives in 2002. The official who had assumed responsibility for the matter within the Department was unwilling to entertain any suggestion that the conflict had centred around issues of any greater substance or significance.

In so far as the conflict was acknowledged, central government adopted its familiar 'hands off' position in relation to the matter. The rationale for the Department's non-engagement was located in the multitude of approaches made to the Minister on a wide range of issues and the ensuing obligation to use all ministerial interventions judiciously (CG-I). While there was no indication of whether the concerns and questions raised by the community had been insufficiently pressing or excessively sensitive politically to command ministerial attention, it was clear that it was not deemed judicious to engage with the community representatives on that occasion. Although there was a distinct reluctance to engage with the specifics of the case, it appeared that the Department had conducted its own behind-the-scenes investigations into the issues before adopting such a publicly disinterested stance (CG-I). This investigation appeared to have been an intra-government affair only and had not involved any engagement with the party which had approached the Department with its concerns in the first place. The ensuing body of documentation on file in the Department would have been of immense value in illuminating its thoughts and deliberations on the questions raised. In a situation in which central government had declined to respond in anything but the most cursory manner to the community's representations, it would also have provided an opportunity to examine its assessment of the serious charges that community representatives had laid against one of its local authorities.

In the event, a Freedom of Information (FOI) request and subsequent appeal served to secure copies of only three documents, two of which had been submitted by the community in the first instance and all of which were already in its possession. Meanwhile, six additional documents that might have provided some insight into the Department's thoughts on the matter were withheld under various sections of the Freedom of Information Act (see Appendix 3.2). It was thus that the

Department maintained a *de facto* policy of non-engagement and non-disclosure in the face of all approaches made to it on the matter – whether such approaches came in the form of community requests, parliamentary questions, FOI requests or questions from academic researchers. In the absence of any indication of the Department's adjudication on the various matters raised, the series of questions placed on the public record by community representatives remained unanswered and essentially uncontested. Furthermore, there was the abiding anomaly whereby the views and concerns of a community, whose participation the government had been intent on securing, had in the final analysis warranted no greater response from the central-government body charged with oversight of that plan than a two-page letter (Falvey, 2002). The only inference that could logically be drawn from this situation was that the views of that community had been entirely inconsequential to proceedings.

However, central-government officials were not so reserved when it came to suggestions about the other courses of action that recalcitrant community representatives might take. The Minister's office was not the last point of redress. The state also contained other avenues that community representatives might have pursued, for example, the Ombudsman, the Courts and the High Court (CG-I). In an expression of frustration with "community representatives who feel that they have the God-given right to make the decisions for their area" and echoing the attitude of DCC which had earlier suggested that the CS&MRA take its dissatisfaction with DCC's planning decisions to An Bord Pleanála, it was suggested that community representatives who continued to take issue with the behaviour of local government should stand for election and make their argument in the political arena (CG-I).

- ***Differing positions on significance of conflict for local government***

In contrast to central government's determination to deny any significance to the conflict between local government and the community, local-government officials displayed an immediate understanding of the precise grounds on which the conflict had occurred, the sensitivity of the issues raised and the significance of such an opposition and mobilisation around planning issues in a working-class area. For local-government officials, the conflict centred around the planning component of the IAP and was understood to have emanated from the overly prescriptive nature of the IAP.

> "The big controversial one was the heights really. Maybe the IAP was too prescriptive. It talked about specific heights: 2-storeys, 3-storeys, 4-storeys... Things change and maybe it was too prescriptive... Maybe the local community insisted on those heights when the thing was being developed... but it was always going to be a row when that was changed and it was... imposed on the local community... It was seen as a breach of the IAP. The document said one thing and here was something else happening. Our argument... is that no plan is written in stone, that it [has] to be flexible and take account of changing circumstances. And that's what was being done throughout the life of the IAP, that new things were introduced. If there was an opportunity there that wasn't there in the original plan, it worked both ways. Some

> things were changed for the worse maybe; other things were changed for the better. We had other things like the Four Cities Project… [and] the Digital Hub [which were] never envisaged at the time that the IAP was being done. But they were new initiatives that came into the area and we were happy to embrace those… as part of the regeneration of the area… [as] 'added value' to it. So if you wanted to say 'listen we can only deal with the 1999 plan,' we might have lost out… I like to think that we were flexible about it." (LG-I)

Some local-authority officials grappled with the difficulties in which the ambivalent standing of the IAP had mired proceedings in the early years of its implementation. Those who had joined the project-management team in the closing years of the IAP wrestled with no such ambivalence. For the latter, the conflict appeared to have centred around an erroneous understanding of the plan's statutory standing and the ensuing but erroneous belief that subsequent planning decisions were in contravention of the plan's putative statutory standing. As a plan, it had never had statutory standing and its content had been rendered obsolete within months of publication.

> "The plan doesn't have a statutory basis of its own from a planning aspect. The rules and regulations… are under the Planning & Development Act and the Development Plan. So, having a plan that indicated 4-storeys on Cork St., for instance, was of no significance once the new Development Plan came in and allowed higher heights and densities in Cork St. That overruled effectively the IAP. From a planning perspective, it didn't have a statutory basis. It's more - not necessarily wishful thinking, but aspirational… I think the plan is just outdated effectively and probably was outdated within months of having been written by nature of what happened in the building trade and the way development went." (LG-II)

Within such an understanding, any community representative seeking to ensure that planning decisions were taken in compliance with the provisions of IAP was essentially making demands of an empty planning entity. If local-authority officials were right on this matter, the role outlined for the Monitoring Committee in the DoE's 1999 Monitoring Guidelines in relation to the development of individual tax-designated sites stood in direct contradiction to the actuality and would appear to have substantially misrepresented the role and function of the members of the IAP Monitoring Committee (see 5.3.4). Notwithstanding the insistence that the provisions of the IAP were rendered obsolete from the outset, one aspect of the IAP retained its validity and statutory standing for the duration of the IAP, the provision for the awarding of tax incentives (see 5.1.3), or more specifically the provision to furnish developers with certification that particular developments had been in compliance with the IAP. This certification enabled developers to progress their applications with the Revenue Commissioners.

> "Did they avail of the incentives? Nearly all the sites that developed did, but there are some that didn't. But you have to remember that there are other issues around tax incentives. We don't give them the tax incentives, that's a matter for the Revenue Commissioners… Our process was just to say that they complied up to the level that we have an involvement with, which is effectively that they built in accordance with their planning permission and [that] that planning permission met the aims and objectives of the IAP… If everything is developed in accordance with the planning permission and is in compliance with the objectives with the IAP, you get a final stage certificate of consistency." (LG-II)

In the light of repeated denials that the plan, whose content was judged to have been outdated almost from the beginning, had any statutory standing, it is not however clear what these aims and objectives might have been by that time.

- ***Local government's bind as regards planning matters.***

The local-government official who presided over the most turbulent period of the community's engagement with the IAP accepted that the standing of the plan had been mired in considerably greater confusion in the plan's opening years. He also had an appreciation of the sequence of events and commitments that had lead the community to hold an entirely contrary position on the legal standing of the plan.

> "Now it didn't always work out nice and cushy either. There was arguments along the way and a couple of community reps. tendered their resignation on the Committee during the process and one of them came back on board subsequently. But they were over particular planning issues… and what they saw as breaches of the IAP." (LG-I)

The community's belief that the planning provisions of the IAP were binding had been based in large part on the sworn evidence given by local-authority officials in relation to the development of tax-designated sites along the route of the Cork Street/Coombe Bypass at a Compulsory Purchase Order Hearing in advance of the IAP (Transcript CPO Hearing, 1999).[47]

> "It's a fair point. They [the design specifications] were [given under oath] and that is all documented. But I think they were given in good faith, it wasn't an attempt to hoodwink the community... That evidence was given at the time and heights were discussed. I was at some of that inquiry myself and I saw the evidence that was presented. That is fact and I can see where the community would be coming from on that. But again things change, the [Residential] Density Guidelines… and the Bacon Report[48] came out about housing and sustainable development along public transport corridors. That was the new position then and planners were looking at extra heights then to comply with those new developments [and] new initiatives from the DoE. But definitely, I have no issue with the community feeling that way and if I was living in the community myself, that's the way I'd be feeling too." (LG-I)

While there was regret at the difficulties that had ensued, the IAP's Project Team was caught in "a bind" as regards having to implement changes in government policy that altered the building-height and density provisions of the IAP (LG-I).

> "They were the main issues that led to the resignation of two of the representatives at that stage. But there was never any personal animosity. They understood where we as a project team were coming from, I understood certainly where they were coming from." (LG-I)

It is clear from all such responses that the impetus for the shifting hierarchies of plans, policies and guideline documents lay with the DoE and that it was the DoE and the Planning Department to

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[47] I.e. Transcript of (1999) Cork Street/Dolphin's Barn Street/The Coombe Area Compulsory Purchase (Road Widening, Improvement and Construction, Housing and Development), Order 1998 Sworn Inquiry.

[48] I.e. one of a series of three reports commissioned on the Irish housing market by the Irish Government from Bacon, P. and Associates between 1998 and 2000, namely *An Economic Assessment of Recent House Price Developments* (1998); *The Housing Market: An economic review and assessment* (1999); *The Housing Market in Ireland: An economic evaluation of trends and prospects* (2000).

which the project manager was primarily accountable. The Planning Department, meanwhile, described the disagreement surrounding the standing of the various design specifications given under oath as "a very controversial issue" (LGSP-I). While it acknowledged that it would "have had regard to those kind of issues," the issues in question did not appear to have been a significant consideration in its adjudication on individual planning applications.

> "But obviously in the end it's a decision on a particular application that's before us and it's the proper planning, the sustainable development of the area having regard to the Development Plan... that was the framework of assessment." (LGSP-I)

Following the effective editing of the IAP from that 'framework of assessment', the stage was set for confrontation between those who sought to uphold the integrity of the IAP that they had undertaken to monitor and those who were working in accordance with an entirely different 'framework of assessment.'

Local-authority officials also pointed out that the DoE had been apprised at every stage of the growing estrangement of the community representatives from the local authority's structures.

> "There was a refusal to sign off on an annual report... I was upfront about it to the DoE as regards why they felt they had a problem in signing off. There was a Minority Report done by the local community [with] their angle on it. It was all in the public domain. There was nothing... secretive about it. There were genuine reasons and I could certainly see that there were. But as project manager at the time, I had to be guided by what the planners wanted for the sustainable development of the area and what government policy was saying about sustainable development." (LG-I)

While there was also regret at the escalation of the community's concerns to the point that two of the community's representatives had felt obliged to withdraw from the IAP, this did not extend to an admission of any wrongdoing on the part of local government. The conflict was instead understood to be an inevitable outcome of a plan in which a distinct antagonism had emerged between the government's and the community's interests. The government's actions were defended at all times.

> "Definitely, it was something I would have preferred not to have happened. But I think in all these things there's going to be controversies, there's going to be challenges from... all concerned in implementing a scheme like that. I hope that I was upfront with the community and I think there was never any personal animosity... They saw that I was trying to do my job and I could see where they were coming from certainly... I must say I have no regrets about what I've done. If we had gone ahead with the development and with the heights that were proposed in the 1999 plan, they would certainly be out of date now." (LG-I)

It is interesting in this context to note that this antagonism had centred around hard substantive issues and never been personalised to individual officials or community representatives. In this, it was clear that central government's refusal to accept that the conflict had derived from anything more significant than 'bad blood' did not find any resonance on the ground.

- ***Abatement of conflict following exit of critical representatives.***

The antagonism which became explicit during the years of the most critical community representation, receded in prominence following the withdrawal of these critical community voices. So too did the controversy attaching to the planning decisions being taken within the IAP. The official who subsequently assumed responsibility for the management of the IAP had a hazy knowledge of the planning conflicts prior to his tenure and planning did not appear to be high on the agenda of those community representatives who remained within the IAP. The conflict had all the semblance of having been 'done and dusted' for the local authority by that point. Shorn of any competency on the planning issue, the brief of the Monitoring Committee had been reduced to a non-contentious administrative one.

> "I think the IAP is long forgotten, maybe not. For some people there are different issues. I mean Cork St. was quite contentious… I wasn't involved in any of that so I'm only able to read between the lines of what people told me... I'm aware of problems… to do with the road widening and the CPO-ing which wasn't driven by the IAP. It was driven by the desire of the City Council to put a road through there for traffic reasons. It happened to be in an IAP area and the Monitoring Committee got quite involved… There would have been documentation there to show the issues, but again none of that came into when I was dealing with the IAP. It was done and dusted I suppose… We had only peaceful meetings…There was obviously no contentious issues whatsoever… There was no point. From my perspective, I explained that we weren't going to be influencing the planning process in a statutory way." (LG-II)

Following the exit of the more critical community representatives from the Monitoring Committee, engagements between the local government and the community had been entirely conciliatory.

> "Having read some of the files, most of – and I choose my word carefully – the protagonists have left the battlefield so the newer people that came on probably weren't that knowledgeable themselves of the history of what went on. So… it met under far more consensual arrangements from 2004 onwards… They brought none of the antagonism to the table from the time I arrived. Now I could claim credit for all that but I'm not that naive. The battle was done and they just either gave up or realised it… around the monitoring table." (LG-II)

While there was an admission that the community might advance diametrically opposed assessments of the outcome of the IAP, the position of the critical and oppositional appeared to have receded into the past.

> "So, the people that are involved in the Monitoring Committee now might say 'it's great, we got €3,500,000' [community-gain funding] because that's the bit they were involved in. The people that were there back through 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 might say 'everything we said would happen, did happen.' For them the truth is different… I think because the [community-representative] group changed so dramatically. Why that is, I don't know, did they decide the fight was over, like 'what can you do, the buildings are built, what's the point in continuing to give out about six-storey buildings that are there when they should have only been four-storey' in your opinion?" (LG-II)

Those community representatives remaining at the table were not interested in planning issues. The majority of planning permissions had been granted by 2004 and their attention was understood to

be firmly fixed on the administration of the community-gain fund. Meetings proceeded in an entirely consensual manner without animosity or acrimony to the conclusion of the IAP (LG-II).

6.3.2 Incidence of planning objections as class anomaly.

In all of this, there was a general acknowledgement that Cork St. had been distinctive in the incidence of planning objections and appeals emanating from a working-class community (LGSP-I). It was certainly unusual among the other IAPs in the inner city in the prominence attained by planning issues.

> "I don't think any other community reps. resigned because of planning issues. And you would have [had] similar development. Smithfield [in the HARP IAP], for example, is high-rise development. Down along the north-east inner city [IAP] has a lot of high developments, same heights as Cork St. But it seemed to be particularly vocal opposition, lets say, in the Liberties." (LG-I)

A senior planner pointed out that while it wouldn't have been unusual for people in middle-class areas to have been sensitive or 'objection driven' to the nature of development taking place in their midst, the incidence and vociferous nature of the planning objections on tax-incentive sites along the route of the Cork St./Coombe Bypass had been unusual in a working-class area (LGSP-I). It was explained primarily with reference to the controversy surrounding the standing of the design specifications outlined in the IAP – a core objection that was exacerbated by a number of ancillary factors: the historic nature of the area; fears about the destruction being wreaked on the area's distinctive heritage and the settled nature of the resident working-class community (LG-I). It was also suggested that the prominence assumed by the planning issue on Cork Street was a simple function of the unusual concentration of a large number of development sites on a single street so close to the city centre .

> "That's the way heights were going, so Cork St. was going to be no different from anywhere. The only difference with Cork St. was [that] there was a lot of sites to be developed on Cork St. which was unusual being so close to the city centre." (LG-II)

In addition to the 'stated reasons,' attention was directed to the other factors that were believed to lie behind the publicly-stated grounds for opposition, namely a general resistance to and sensitivity surrounding any attempt to increase building heights, fears about the detrimental impact of concentrations of apartment development and a general and reactionary fear of change.

> "You can look at the stated reasons and then you can look behind and think what were the other reasons? Stated reasons obviously are that people felt that the City Council had changed it's mind or had said certain things - that they were going to be a certain height along the street and then that it was permitting higher, taller developments. There is just a general issue throughout the city that people have an objection to taller buildings... I'm not talking about 30-storey, I'm talking about something that's higher than the other, so if the average is 2-storey, people object to 4; if it's 4, they object to 8, so there's... a sensitivity to issues of height... Looking behind that, you could think that maybe [there's] a historical issue... that people felt that apartment schemes run by the City Council were the problem in the area and... people felt more secure with something that looked more like standard housing. But you know... there's a fear of

> change… there is a definite thing that… people are often uncomfortable with change." (LGSP-I)

The latter assessment was accompanied by the suggestion that the opponents of the nature of development taking place on Cork Street were merely a vocal and unrepresentative minority who had functioned to eclipse a silent but supportive majority.

> "I would know quite a few people who live in the area and they would regard the change in the area, resulting from the Cork St. development as being terribly positive but they wouldn't go to community [consultations]… It's a standard thing, I suppose, that people are more motivated in opposition than in support. And people also… are unlikely to express a difference to a prevailing point of view… They'd have to feel very strongly about something and motivated about it to say 'actually, I disagree with my community.'"(LGSP-I)

However, the presentation of such an analysis was not accompanied by any willingness to engage with the question of how those initially judged to be representative of their community were subsequently deemed to be unrepresentative upon the adoption of a critical and oppositional position.

In the face of all such opposition, the local authority remained convinced about the rectitude of the planning decisions taken within the IAP.

> "I think the decisions made by the City Council were, I'm quite convinced… in the interests of the proper planning and sustainable development of the area… The way the street has developed is very positive." (LGSP-I)

In the final analysis, the community's negative assessments of the planning decisions taken within the IAP were countered by the very positive assessments with which the regeneration of the area had been greeted in the property pages.

> "It's unfortunate that the row developed over the particular sites. But there are more positives than negatives out of it. If you read any of the papers about property – the property sections… talk about Cork St. as a regenerated area. It's getting great press [as] a great area to live in… so near town and all the new development there. So all that kind of positive spin is good... the Liberties area is back up there as an area that people want to live in and people want to buy property in." (LG-I)
>
> "It is encouraging to see the area being described as a 'fast developing growth area' by various independent commentators." (DCC, 2004: 2)

Local-authority officials had grounds for confidence on this issue. Beyond commending the nature of the development that had taken place across the Liberties in the property pages, the environment editor of the *Irish Times* had selected the manner in which Cork Street was being "sensitively redeveloped… after a grim past" for particular praise (McDonald, 2006). While there was a passing reference to the fact that the scale of the transformation was "so staggering that long-term residents of the area must be reeling in shock at what's happening," the latter were cast in the role of dazed passive onlookers as opposed to fierce opponents on the nature of development that had ensued. There was, the newspaper noted "a real sense that enlightened planning policies are nudging Cork Street in the right direction" (*ibid.*).

6.3.3 Government assessments of community impact.

Local-government officials responded to questions about the impact of the community's participation with reference to the particular phase or aspect of the IAP with which they had been most engaged. For the official charged with the management of the IAP during the years of full community participation, the community's impact had been most notable in the planning arena. Significantly that impact had come about not as a result of the community's representations to DCC within the Monitoring Committee but through the reversion of individual community representatives to the statutory planning process as third-party appellants. That community impact was located in the outcome of the adjudications of An Bord Pleanála on the planning appeals lodged in respect of controversial tax-designated sites. Although the residents' representatives had failed to win a single one of those appeals, local-government officials believed that the appeals had resulted in a degree of compromise and restraint in the final planning permissions granted by An Bord Pleanála. As such, they had served to temper the heights sought by developers in subsequent planning applications along the route of the Cork Street/Coombe Bypass. It was thus that the community's opposition had succeeded in mitigating what might have been significantly more negative planning outcomes from its perspective.

> "It did impact... We as Project Team... certainly didn't want to be fighting with our Monitoring Committee and arguing over heights and it certainly would have been brilliant if it was an amicable relationship all along. But I think when hard decisions are being made about things, and challenges have to be faced, there's always going to be a row somewhere along the way... Maybe, the fact that the community wanted certain heights, maybe that stopped them from going somewhat higher, so maybe the balance is somewhere in the middle. If the community hadn't objected so strongly to the heights, maybe the developers would have started coming in looking for higher again on certain sites. So maybe the compromise was what was reached in the end... through their participation because they would have objected to... planning applications along the way and An Bord Pleanála would have upheld them in some cases or conditioned out storeys in other cases." (LG-I)

For other local-government parties, the community's preoccupation with the heights issue was judged to have impaired the impact that the community might otherwise have enjoyed within the IAP. Regret at the descent of government and community parties into adversarial camps was accompanied by the suggestion that the community had lost out on other social and environmental gains by focusing so intently on the issue of building heights.

> "It was unfortunate that it became a 'them and us' situation and things like open space were not a subject of so much controversy, for example. [The controversy] seemed to focus, particularly on the issue of height and that seemed to be the major concern [to the exclusion of]... educational attainment, the lack of open space, perhaps anti-social activities, ...the quality of the environment in terms of clean streets and so on. That was the most unfortunate thing about it - that it came down to a situation where the debate focused on 'should it be 3-storeys or 4 or 7 or whatever'?" (LGSP-I)

In a similar vein, attention was also directed to the economic costs that had followed from the adoption of such a rigid opposition to increased building heights, costs that would be incurred both within the immediate community and across the wider economy and society. In the interests of

averting such economic costs, it was suggested that engagements with communities should take place within carefully delimited frameworks in which the non-negotiable nature of key strategic issues would be clearly specified. Such a situation would allow for the necessary flexibility and concessions in the face of the requirements of key government initiatives and large employers.

> "You can't wish away the Digital Hub and presumably people wouldn't want to... it must develop... jobs must be provided... and that means development and that may mean, for example, that [in the case of] the Digital Hub that maybe it needs large floor-plate offices. Google is down in the Docklands, it grew from 5 to 1,500 workers. I mean that could have been a phenomenal [development]. That should be in the Digital Hub... it's a digital media company. [Companies like that couldn't locate here] because there was no office space of that appropriate scale there for them." (LGSP-I)

Within such an assessment, concessions from the community on issues such as building heights, densities and land-use change were presented as the *quid pro quo* for local employment, more housing, lower housing prices, a greater social mix to redress the area's problematic concentrations of social housing, an increased population to support a sustainable retail and services infrastructure, public parks, social facilities etc.

> "That's an opportunity because that's a choice that people have to make. They have to say... 'what do we want? Do we want more housing – social, private and affordable? Do we want a good park? Do we want the shopping and the employment facilities and all of that?' So, something falls off the table. Either you keep the housing numbers that you want and then you've no park, or you've smaller apartments and housing, you just squash people into a smaller floor-plate. Or the employment drops off." (LGSP-I)

Beyond the planning aspect of the IAP, government officials pointed to their willingness to concede any 'reasonable' representations made by the community representatives. Such successful representations appear to have related to significantly less substantive issues than the core planning points in contention, such as parking spaces, play issues, community issues, footpath design etc. (LG-I). The manner in which the community-gain fund would be allocated and administered appears to have constituted one further issue on which the community were allowed to have an impact. This, in fact, appears to have been the one issue that was devolved substantially to the community and councillor members of the IAP Monitoring Committee.

The impact of the community's participation could also be inferred from incidental digressions and the general tenor of discussions with officials. This was particularly the case with central government where it was clear that it was operating with a considerably more conservative understanding of community participation and the influence that communities would be allowed to exercise within any participative structures established.

> "Participation was to involve consultation. But not up to the point of blocking anything." (CG-I)

A question relating to whether non-engagement at public consultation meetings would or should be taken as a sign of consent elicited the sharp rejoinder that public meetings were about the provision of information only and not the securing of consent (CG-I). While the critical position adopted by

some community representatives in the Liberties had attracted the behind-the-scenes attention of central-government officials, it was clear from the DoE's continued refusal to engage with the repeated approaches made to it, that the views of the host community were never going to be – and had never been intended to be - of any consequence to the progression of the IAP. It is the only conclusion that could be drawn from the failure of the community's highly critical body of documentation to elicit anything more than a summary letter of dismissal. In addressing its concerns to central government and in vesting all hopes of resolution in the office of the Minister, the community appeared to have directed its critical energy to a body that was determined to remain resolutely impervious to those same concerns. The scarce community resources and energies invested in ensuring that the community's case was carefully referenced and documented appeared to have been entirely futile in the face of a government that was never prepared to engage with or concede any of the points in contention, irrespective of the calibre of the case or the documents put before them.

In the midst of such contrary assessments of the significance of the community's participation, discussions with public representatives and those engaging with communities at a slight remove provided an opportunity to explore some third-party adjudications on the issue.

6.3.4 Political understandings and perspectives on the conflict.

Local councillors espoused different positions in relation to the conflict that had ensued between local government and the community within the IAP. Those positions appeared to turn on their familiarity with and understanding of the issues that had precipitated the conflict. For one councillor whose attention was firmly fixed on the planning aspects of the IAP, the entry of the most critical of the community's representatives, the residents' representative, had brought a critical and analytical force to bear on proceedings that had clearly not been anticipated by the local authority.

> "They realised that community instead of being passive had a voice of their own and [CR-I] was always very well informed and he wasn't afraid to speak his mind. At the Monitoring Committee meetings he'd say something and they'd say 'no' and he'd be able to produce documents to prove that he was right." (Cllr-I)

For this councillor, the emergence of such a knowledgeable and engaged community representative represented an important correction to a situation in which the community's engagement had been hampered by the absence of a knowledge of planning and an advocate and defender of its planning interests in the public realm.

> "That was one thing I always felt as a councillor and as a community activist that... they always lacked here... people with knowledge of planning. If you know planning you know immediately if you're being told something that's not right." (Cllr-I)

He believed that the residents' representative had been vindicated in the criticisms advanced of the Monitoring Committee and in his continued insistence that that officials were 'taking their orders

from above.' While there were no public admission of this fact, it was thought that local-government officials had grudgingly come to concede the truth of the arguments advanced by the residents' representative (Cllr-I).

The other public representative who had the opportunity to observe proceedings within the IAP first-hand (a TD who had previously participated in the IAP Monitoring Committee as a councillor) displayed an uncertain grasp of the issues and sequence of events that had precipitated the conflict. The most glaring inaccuracy lay in the belief that the conflict had originated in the local community's opposition to the implementation of a plan that had been prepared without any consultation or agreement with the community (TD-II). This was an erroneous understanding of the series of events that had transpired, whereby the local authority had actually secured community agreement for a detailed framework plan and then proceeded to contravene that plan in successive planning permissions. The advancement of such an incomplete and, in places, flawed understanding of both the issues in contention and the sequence of events led the public representative in question to commend the local-authority officials for the accommodations made, to reaffirm the case for participation and to overlook the substantive issues in contention.

> "As the IAP grew and as it got to know its workings and it got the participation from all the different groups... the officials on it broadened their own thinking... Their thing was 'well look, this is only a framework plan, it can be changed but we have to start somewhere.' And some people listened and some people didn't... Some people said 'no way' and walked away, which I think was a pity... And one or two people I know myself who resigned, they resigned more in frustration than anything else." (TD-II)

6.3.5 Third-party assessments of community impact.

For one councillor who had been a member of the IAP Monitoring Committee since its inception, the impact of the community's participation was impeded by the existence of a power hierarchy that had relegated the community representatives to the lowest rung of the ladder. That hierarchy had been maintained through the exercise of tight controls over the dissemination of information (Cllr- I). While community groups had made incidental gains through their participation in the IAP, those gains had not extended to any influence over the local authority's actions. The latter had continued with its plans irrespective of the position taken by members of the Monitoring Committee.

> "It did bring community, public representatives and others together. And some of it has been helpful... but it wasn't taken that seriously by the people... Officials felt that they'd be able to do whatever they wanted to do, irrespective of the position you came to. They'd keep it going until they got what they wanted." (Cllr-I)

Another public representative, a TD, judged the community-participation component of the IAP to have been a failure. While this TD believed that real and meaningful community participation was possible in principle and could point to at least one housing-regeneration project in which the

community had participated successfully, urban-renewal projects such as the IAP were described as purely commercial ventures.

> "I think it [community participation] was possible and I think it didn't happen. If I can refer to Fatima [Mansions flats complex], to a great extent, it did happen in Fatima. I would still have some issues with it, but... I'm on the Fatima Regeneration Board and we talked so much about bricks and mortar... [but] it wasn't just about buildings, it wasn't about structures, it wasn't just about housing. It was social engagement in particular and bringing the people who most needed it on board and looking after their needs and I suppose maintaining the culture of Fatima... I think that the... redevelopment of the Liberties, the supposed regeneration and integrated plans and all of that... seemed more to me like a commercial adventure rather than an engagement with people's needs, which is a pity." (TD-III)

The state's rationale for seeking to engage communities within urban renewal was regarded as a cynical and political attempt to persuade them of their stake in the implementation of these plans. However, its overtures had proved counterproductive and were ironically functioning to alienate those same communities.

> "It seems to be to a political – in inverted commas – exercise that is really quite negative in the long run, because what it does is distance those people in the community who really should be listened to. And I think most of the community people that we… know in the Liberties would be very committed to the culture of the area and to the environment and to the people... and you could say the mores and folkways of the people of the Liberties. It's never going to happen in any development that everything will be in place. Life isn't like that. But I think you have to go a good distance down the road with the community or you're damaging them in the long run and I think that's what happened. I think having them around the table... in practice it was the right thing; in theory it was the right thing, but the outcome of it wasn't what it should have been." (TD-III)

Although the community had not had the strength necessary to prevail over other and more powerful parties within the IAP (TD-IV), another TD pointed to the manner in which the experience and learning of the CS&MRA's representative had begun to reverberate across other working-class communities. In bringing the aptitude of a "political brain and a community activist" to bear in his engagement with the IAP, he had gained an understanding of the government's urban-renewal agenda that had enabled him to assist other neighbouring communities in successfully opposing unwanted developments.

> "I remember arguing on the urban fabric [in Kilmainham, Dublin 8] and [CR-I] was one of the best... in terms of dealing with that. We won a big challenge in Kilmainham based on information that [CR-I] gained from being on the IAP and the arguments that he had... He explained it to me. He said 'check the Urban Framework... you have an Urban Framework' and we were able to use the Urban Framework… to prove that [it] was a legal document that could be used to block the development in Kilmainham... Based on that, the original plan was blocked and it was scaled down somewhat. So that's an example of how [the knowledge of] someone like [CR-I] – political brain, community activist – learnt through hard experience of one area could have an advantage and a benefit to another area." (TD-IV)

There was agreement on this point from a former councillor who acknowledged the considerable influence that the residents' representative had brought to bear within the Monitoring Committee.

She proceeded to express admiration for the way in which this representative had attained detailed planning knowledge and successfully challenged local-government professionals on planning points within the IAP.

> "I respect him so much because this man was standing in the Planning Office every day of the week going through these plans. No experience of architecture or planning. He was just an ordinary resident, very concerned about [the fact that] the place where he'd lived all his life was going to change so dramatically and what could he do to influence that change. And he did... influence an awful lot of change... [CR-I was] probably one of the [most] prominent people around the IAP and the development of the IAP... I think his impact was the knowledge he developed himself around the development of sites... he got in and he read the fine print... I was at meetings where [he] would become very frustrated and very annoyed with officials... and make them change their mind in some of the things that they had suggested because of... how well he knew the planning application. I remember his challenging... one of the architects over some planning application that was on Cork St. ...It was some reference to some part of the planning application, and your man hadn't got a clue what [CR-I] was talking about. [CR-I] knew because he had studied the maps... [and] the planning applications and he knew exactly what he was talking about and your man had to leave the room and get the planning application and come back and stand up and state 'you were right.'" (TD-II)

Nevertheless, the litany of commendations from public representatives for the challenge offered by this 'ordinary resident' to the planning contraventions of the IAP did not, beyond one occasion on which a TD tabled parliamentary questions on the community's behalf, translate into any form of public political action in support of the concerns raised by the same community representative. In the case of the councillor members of the IAP, admiration for and recognition of the calibre of the challenges posed by this residents' representative appeared to co-exist quite easily with public endorsement of the manner in which the IAP was being implemented.

Only one public representative was notable for the absence of sympathy for the plight of communities endeavouring to represent and defend their interests within urban-renewal and regeneration programmes. While there was agreement that consultation was a simple prerequisite for successful development, it was accompanied by exasperation at the lengths to which consultation processes were being carried - with the clear inference that excessive consultation was inhibiting the progress of important projects. This frustration related to regeneration programmes in general as opposed to the IAP in particular.

> "By and large, the amount of consultation since about the year 2000 has been very, very good, too good... There's too much consultation. You can consult to death and not do anything. St. Michael's Estate in Inchicore, they've been consulting for twelve years, fifteen years, a long time anyway... Too much consultation is a bad thing... And you'll always have someone objecting. I'm very much for consultation. When I was Lord Mayor of Dublin, I stressed there should be a lot more communication - that was my big thing, communication. But there's communication, there's consultation and there's also decisions. And I'm a believer in making decisions and getting on with it. There's a lot of people in the city - there's some people, I'll amend that, who would talk themselves to death." (TD-I)

Communities were accorded a role in all such processes but it was clear that it was very much a secondary role. In his view, there was a time when all such processes should be set aside to allow necessary decisions to be taken.

> "They [the community] have a monitoring role. They're not going to build the things themselves, are they? They have a monitoring role and a management role in the facilities. There are some great examples of community involvement... So I'm not saying that residents shouldn't be involved but there's a time when you have to cut the cake." (TD-I)

6.4 Outstanding question in relation to Liberties/Coombe IAP.

Central and local government had remained resolutely indifferent to the concerns of those community representatives who had sought to intervene on the key physical, social and economic renewal issues at the heart of the IAP. They had persisted in their denial of anything but the most marginal administrative role to the representatives of that inner-city community in the implementation of the plan. Those community representatives who had sought to intervene on the central issues at stake in the IAP had been informed that they were entering into a domain in which they had no legal competence. The DoE had been categoric in its statement that responsibility for the implementation of the IAPs, including their monitoring, rested with the local authority as a matter of law. Both central and local government had failed, whether by design or omission, to institute the structures, processes and procedures that would have given practical effect to the many commitments made in respect of the role and standing of inner-city communities in the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP. However, these were not the only commitments at issue in the IAP. Central and local government had also made commitments about the distinctive integrated brief of this urban-renewal project, which had been heralded as a radical departure from previous property-led renewal programmes. The question of whether or not the local government body, which had been designated as the competent body in this matter, had succeeded in delivering on each of the social, economic and physical renewal strands of that integrated brief remained outstanding. The following chapter attends to this precise question.

CHAPTER 7

IAP Successes and Failures.

The literature on participation makes a key distinction between participation that is concerned with the determination of means and participation that is concerned with the determination of ends (Kirk, 1980). This exploration of the community's experience of engagement with the Liberties/ Coombe IAP has engaged at some length with the means through which the participation of the community was both enabled and disabled. That exploration has, however, been undertaken at all times with reference to the degree to which the community's representatives were able to assert and defend the community's stake in the IAP. Ultimately this research has been concerned with the degree to which the community were, through their participation in the local authority's structures, able to influence and determine the end outcomes of the IAP. This is a matter that could only be settled be attending to the degree of success or failure that the IAP had enjoyed in delivering on its distinctive integrated renewal brief.

The stated objective of the Liberties/Coombe IAP was "to bring about sustainable urban regeneration by integrating physical, social and economic interventions to address the key issues in the area" (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: i). While the annual reports submitted by the IAP project-management team had been positive in the main in their assessment of the progress made under each of the headings requested by the DoE,[49] it was clear that the assessments reported therein were at variance with the considerably more negative assessments that had been forthcoming from critical community parties from the outset (Brudell, 2000, 2002; Brudell *et al.,* 2004; Hammond *et al.,* 2001a, 2001b, 2002; MacLaran *et al.,* 2007). These critical and contrary assessments of the impact of urban renewal on indigenous host communities would find resonance within central-government and local-development circles as the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) drew to a close (Goodbody *et al.,* 2006; Haase, 2009). The final years of the Liberties/Coombe IAP appeared to be the apposite time to ascertain the degree to which the local authority in this IAP had succeeded in effecting the much heralded integrated, sustainable urban regeneration of the Liberties. As with all other aspects of this analysis, the views of all parties – government, public representative, community representatives and local-development personnel were sought.

The primary points of interest in the various analyses advanced were the aspects of the IAP on which different parties focused in assessing the outcome of the plan, the criteria employed in the assessment of its successes and failures and the degree of knowledge informing the analysis of all parties. For the purposes of this analysis, assessments are presented under two broad headings: physical renewal and social and economic renewal. This categorisation is qualified by an

[49] I.e. (1) Physical Development: (2) Economic Benefits; (3) Social and Community Benefits; (4) Environmental Benefits: (5): Marketing and Promotion (DoE, 1999a: 3.3)

acknowledgement that the demarcation lines between the different strands of the IAP were not absolute. The physical, social and economic strands of the IAP were often inevitably and inextricably intertwined.

7.1 Physical Renewal.

7.1.1 A single-strand integrated renewal plan.

In assessing the impact of the Liberties/Coombe IAP, the attention of virtually all parties converged on the impact of the IAP on the physical built environment. For some, this was a reflection of their primary interest in the IAP. For others, it was an indication of the magnitude of the changes that had taken place in their living environment. For yet others, it was the easiest and most salient aspect of the IAP on which those without any detailed knowledge of the broader integrated programme could comment. It was thus that central- and local-government officials extolled the benefits of the transformation that had been effected to the built environment, community representatives described the manner in which a period of intense construction had literally and metaphorically shaken the resident community to its foundations and many public representatives unwittingly displayed their knowledge or ignorance of proceedings in the assessments offered.

7.1.2 Impact of state intervention.

- ***Role and significance of tax incentives.***

While acknowledging that the tax incentives had kick-started development in areas that developers would normally have avoided, the Department of Finance's 2006 *Goodbody Review* had expressed concern about the continuing problem of dead-weight development in all such urban-renewal schemes (Goodbody *et al.,* 2006: iii). The DoE was aware of these comments, but remained steadfast in its support of the 1998 URS in the face of all such reservations and criticisms (see 5.1.2). The central-government official in question described his position as 'aggressively assertive' in support of urban renewal (CG-I). Meanwhile, local-government officials were unaware of the existence of the *Goodbody Review* and were thus unfettered by any defensive stance in offering their assessments of the role and significance of the tax-incentive mechanism. For some officials, the tax incentives had proved their efficacy as a catalyst for development on both tax-designated sites and adjacent sites not granted tax designation (LG-I).

While the development that had taken place along Cork Street was offered as the most obvious illustration of the catalytic significance of the tax incentives (see Plates 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5), their role in attracting developers to less visible streets previously considered to be "no go areas" was also lauded (LG-I). Tax incentives were described as giving people "the confidence or… just the extra boost to go in and do it" (LGSP-I). Notwithstanding an acknowledgment that the IAP's physical renewal objectives had failed in parts of the quarter, it was felt that it had succeeded in creating a

momentum for development that would see the development of outstanding streets and sites in subsequent plans.

> "Some people would... say 'sure it hasn't changed it a bit.' If you walk up Thomas St... Meath St., Francis St., there's no significant change. Some development has taken place... a few LOTS schemes but really ... there's no evidence of [the Framework Plan for that area] having had any effect. Francis St. has got a fair bit of development all right. But Meath St, Thomas St... There are a lot of sites that you nearly wouldn't... notice any new improvements [on]. There's a long way to go still… The IAP has done its bit. It didn't achieve probably all that [it set out to do]; it didn't bring everybody up to the level that they might want. But certainly it's a kickstart for the area. It's a hell of a lot better… than if it didn't have those tax incentives. (LG-I)

Other officials were not as certain that the quantum of development that had taken place should be attributed to the existence of the tax incentives and appeared to be in agreement with the *Goodbody Review* in identifying an element of dead weight in the implementation of the IAP. While the project-management team continued to receive applications for tax incentives in the closing stages of the IAP, the fact that these applications were being made retrospectively in respect of developments that had already been completed was an indication that many of those developments would certainly have taken place in the absence of incentives. This was one further anomaly in an urban-renewal plan whose only remaining function appeared to be the granting of tax incentives.

> "There's no duration set down in any regulations that I can find in relation to the [lifetime of the] IAP. The relevance of that [is that]... people, who have developed two or three years ago and completed their development within the rules and regulations of the IAP as set out by various circular letters but never actually come near us, can still at this stage apply [for tax incentives]… They can because the works they've done and the monies they've expended have been carried out or expended in the timeframes... set out in the IAP. There's no timeframe for when you can apply... In the last number of weeks, a developer came in with three different properties that he had completed in 2006 and there was nothing on our files to indicate that he'd ever come near us since he initially applied to be part of the scheme back in 2003... And yet, when we checked up, it would appear that - assuming that the development complies with the planning permission and the objectives of the IAP - he's eligible to apply."(LG-II)

While individual officials were prepared to reflect on the differing assessments that might be offered of the IAP if it were to be measured in accordance with a number of economic and social criteria, they returned always to the single and principle criterion by which the success and failure of the IAP was to be gauged – the degree to which it had succeeded in securing development when and where development was needed.

> "From an economic perspective, many of the sites may well have been developed anyway [with] the way the economy went in the end. Nobody would have known that back in '98 or '99. So success or failure again, I don't know. My version of what happened and the community's... might be different. We don't have a measurement of success or failure. Success? Yes, the sites were developed. That was the measure back... in '99. That's what we wanted – development, that's what happened. As the years went by, the development was [of] better quality as regulations and rules around developments, heights, sizes, densities... open space, quality of workmanship... all improved. That had nothing to do with the IAP. That was to do with the way society was going anyway and the planning laws. From a social point of view... rising employment may have changed that more than anything the IAP would have

> done...The physical side? I don't know. Some people think Cork St. is great, other people think it's dreadful. Some people think the [tall] building on Dolphin's Barn... [is] a piece of beautiful architecture, others don't agree. So I don't have an answer for you. From our point of view, the sites were developed; we encouraged development at a time when it needed to be developed." (LG-II)

- ***The other major state intervention in the IAP.***

The Government's tax incentives played an important and catalytic role in creating a momentum for development within the Liberties/Coombe IAP. They were not, however, the only form of state intervention at issue. The state had also intervened in another and very specific way with the construction of the Cork St./Coombe Bypass (see Plate 7.3). The street had first been earmarked for redevelopment in the 1950s, a planning decision that had seen the area "descend into a state of dangerous physical dereliction, disadvantage and blight – a situation which infected every aspect of the accompanying social and economic infrastructure of that community" (Brudell *et al.*, 2004: 72). In the years leading up to the IAP, it became apparent that the government was finally in a position to proceed with the long-awaited road construction. Although described as a separate and distinct project from the IAP (LG-I), it was clear from the tax incentives attached to sites along the route of the new bypass road, that the two forms of state intervention were closely intertwined. The announcement that DCC was now in a position to proceed with the new road was - in conjunction with the package of tax incentives - understood as a clear signal to developers that the area was now ripe for redevelopment. The construction of the new road proceeded to function as an additional catalyst for the various residential, commercial and transport developments that followed along the route (see, for example, Plates 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5). Controversially, the road construction also made it possible for the local authority to dispose of a number of its own sites along the route.

> "The other gains would have been the development of the Cork St. road.... It was a separate kind of project from the IAP but again it was totally interlinked with the development of the sites along Cork St. If the road hadn't happened, developers may not have moved on those sites, they'd be seeing that it'd be premature and that the area's not ready for it yet. And certainly when we sold the sites along Cork St. corridor, developers wouldn't have been interested... if the new road wasn't in, so that acted as a catalyst for development." (LG-I)

- ***Revenue forgone.***

Local-government interest in the IAP's tax incentives was confined to the degree to which it had succeeded in incentivising development in the designated areas. Other parties were rather more concerned about the cost of all such incentives to the Exchequer. While the only figures released into the public domain pertained to the national aggregate of revenue forgone in the implementation of all area-based renewal schemes nationally (Goodbody *et al.,* 2006), it was clear that the repeated extensions of the scheme's tax incentives and the jettisoning of the building height and density specifications originally attached to those tax incentives had resulted in a highly beneficial tax-incentive environment for developers in excess of that envisaged at the outset.

Plates 7.1, 7.2 Tax-incentive developments, Cork St. (north side).







Plate 7.3 Cork St./ Coombe Bypass.

Plates 7.4, 7.5 Tax-incentive developments, Cork St. (south side).





> "On urban-renewal sites, it would be hugely relevant that sites were tax-designated maybe at three or four storeys and [that] they might have built [to] eight or nine [storeys] at this stage and... be availing of tax incentives. So they would have done well out of the scheme in that sense. It wouldn't have been envisaged how much in tax incentives that they would have been able to avail of... But it had more to do with the planning regulations or Development Plan changing rather than the financial thing changing. They were lucky in the sense that they happened to be building on a site that now allowed six storeys instead of four storeys so the incentives that they or their purchasers were going to gain would have been greater than envisaged initially. Again that would have happened more [for] those who had left their development later on.... I don't know if the state has ever successfully quantified the cost to the state of tax incentives... It wouldn't be a role for the local authority; it'd be a matter for the Department of Finance or the Revenue Commissioners to assess the tax forgone. (LG-II)

The 'cost to the state' of the tax incentives was very much a matter for the community and local-development personnel. In light of the consequences of significantly reduced returns to the Exchequer, local-development personnel were anxious that the precise cost of the tax incentives be quantified.

> "In terms of tax forgone and lost to the state itself, there are significant amounts lost to the state... That has a consequence for local people as well" (TSDW-I)

They believed that the true impact of the loss of all such revenue on both the residents of designated areas and the wider society would become fully apparent if a comprehensive review of all revenue forgone in the implementation of these schemes were conducted. The sense of grievance following on the loss of this revenue was compounded by an awareness of the highly profitable property market which developers would have enjoyed even in the absence of such incentives.

> "There's enough profit to be made without making it easy on them... forgoing... taxes and all the rest of it... I've never seen [that analysis] done... If it was done, the conclusion… would be that not only have the residents lost out for all sorts of different reasons in terms of the nature of what was developed, the lack of housing for themselves, the use of space that was in public ownership etc.... No question, they've lost out. But the actual bigger society, Irish [society], the community here have lost substantial amounts. (TSDW-I)

Community personnel meanwhile focused on the doubly regressive redistributive impact of the tax incentives awarded within the IAP, as it was manifest in the awarding of tax incentives for the construction of private apartment complexes in the first instance and compounded by the state's subsidy to the rental income that investors would derive from units subsequently leased to social-welfare recipients. The belief that many of the new tax-incentive apartments were destined to be occupied by tenants in receipt of rental subsidies from the state was based on on-the-ground intelligence of community representatives. It was confirmed by the findings of the Goodbody Review (2006).

> "Moreover, it is clear that, for some of the larger urban areas, the Scheme did not contribute to social integration aims, as the housing of social welfare recipients was concentrated in a few tax incentivised developments." (*ibid.*, 79)

Thus, separate but parallel strands of the state's housing policy were functioning to reduce the City's public-housing stock,[50] while simultaneously IAPs was functioning to incentivise the construction of private housing that would find a new and ready market among those who would previously have sought public housing from the state.

> "Instead of social housing being provided by the State or by the Corporation, you could say that social housing has [now] been provided by the developers... and... speculators... They got the full price back through tax concessions to build them... and they rented them out to people that couldn't afford to buy... Where people couldn't afford to pay those rents, the rent was supplemented by the EHB [Eastern Health Board] so you can say that the State are financing people [to provide social housing]. The state paid the money effectively to build the apartments and the state is now paying the money to supplement the people living in the apartments. (CR-I)

7.1.3 Type of development engendered.

Beyond the role that the tax incentives had played as a catalyst for development in an area in which development might or might not otherwise have taken place, there was a more pressing question about the type of development engendered by those same tax incentives. For most, the quantity and quality of apartment development was the defining feature of the Liberties/Coombe IAP. The manner in which the succession of private apartment complexes had transformed the physical landscape of the Liberties was the subject of sharply contrasting assessments.

Local-government officials characterised the development that had taken place within the IAP as 'sustainable development' that was very much in accord with the government's policies "in relation to residential density guidelines and sustainable development along public-transport corridors" (LG-I). While the IAP hadn't succeeded in effecting the development of all sites, overall it was judged to have been "a success" with "good examples of best practice" (LG-I). Officials suggested that the large number of new residential units had allowed a lot of 'native residents,' who might previously have been obliged to leave the area, to find housing within their own locale. Third-sector local-development personnel also acknowledged the gains that the greater number of units represented for the existing inner-city community insofar as members of that community had succeeded in gaining access to units through rent-subsidy schemes (TSCP-I). The findings of earlier research on the social composition of occupiers of previous tax-incentive developments did not, however, support the contention that new apartments were likely to make their way into the ownership of indigenous residents (see MacLaran *et al.,* 1995) and there did not appear to be any empirical evidence to back up the claim being made in respect of the more recent phase of tax-incentive development.

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[50] I.e. the steady reduction of social-housing units through the advancement of the PPP model; the implementation of Part V of the Planning & Development Act 2000 in a manner that favoured affordable housing over social-housing units; the demolition of local-authority flats complexes on sites subsequently placed on the market.

Government officials were largely on their own in any case in advancing such a positive assessment of the apartment development that had taken place right across the quarter. The most positive assessment forthcoming from others was a pragmatic acceptance that such development was better than the dereliction that had preceded it (TD-I, LG-I). This was the position of a number of TDs in the area.

> "In some ways, I'm glad parts of the inner city were redeveloped. I just don't like the way it was done. But... Cork St. is better now than the dereliction that was there for 40 years. It's not necessarily better for those who are living in the houses and if you were/are overshadowed, but what happened has livened up the place a little bit anyway." (TD-IV)

It was not, however, to be taken as an overwhelming endorsement of the development that had taken place under successive urban-renewal programmes. While the difference between the "the Liberties today [and]... the Liberties in 1985" was "like night and day basically" (TD-I), the development that had taken place was described in critical terms.

> "It's been too haphazard and too shambolic... It hasn't gone with any kind of master plan or any grand vision. If you take a look at James St. and High St., they're both disgraces... Thomas St., James St.... an absolute disgrace... For a large stretch, there's no trees... There's lots of derelict buildings. There's no seats. There's no modern urban design. Street lighting, I'd say, hasn't changed in an awfully long time. Full of drug peddlers and winos. I mean, absolutely no care and attention has gone into that street." (TD-I)

The public representative in question had not been aware of the existence of the IAP. While he could point to a number of community centres and facilities that had been provided in the same time period, he was not in a position to point to any visible evidence of a comprehensive redevelopment of the area (TD-I).

A number of the area's TDs did not, however, evince any kind of consistency in the assessments and analyses offered. It was thus that local government could be simultaneously lauded and derided for the nature of development that had taken place. In a similar manner, the proliferation of apartment developments was both criticised and welcomed by individual public representatives. In a rejoinder to critics, it was suggested that apartments were the only option in a modern city in which the dearth of available sites dictated a considerable densification of new residential development. To that end, the tax incentives were applauded for their success in engendering development appropriate to the city's circumstances.

> "We have to make the city as welcoming as possible, and to do that we have to provide accommodation and because we don't have the sites that we had to develop on, now the only way is up." (TD-II)

However, most were critical of the quantum of apartment development that had taken place and failed to identify any redeeming qualities. For some, the concentration of apartment development was a clear indicator of failure; a physical reminder of each of the other public-land uses and public amenities that had been forgone to allow for the proliferation of this dominant form of development

across the quarter. The apartment developments had become emblematic of an IAP that had become a 'developer's paradise.'

> "The physical development? I don't think that has worked either... If you were to take each [building] perhaps in isolation, you could say 'that's not a bad building and that's okay, etc.' But... overall, it's that lack of integration again in relation to things like green spaces. Where are the green spaces in the Liberties? ...Where are the playgrounds? ...If you have just apartment blocks, where do children play and what kind of community are you trying to deliver there? If you have loads of one-bedroom apartments, a builder's paradise or a developer's paradise where... you get more for two one-beds than you do for one two-bedroom or... three-bedroom [apartments], they're not family-friendly, they're not intended to create a community." (TD-III)

7.1.4 Collateral damage.

- ***Negative externalities.***

Any support that might have existed for the apartment developments taking place was steadily diminished by the many negative externalities that the construction of those same apartments had visited upon the surrounding community. The developments taking place within both the IAP and neighbouring PPPs were described as having "an awful effect" on the lives of people who had been living alongside construction sites for years (CR-IV). For one public representative, poor planning enforcement had become the second most frequent ground for representations from constituents. She pointed to the many costs thrust onto local communities by the inadequate allocation of enforcement officers to the area at a time of an unprecedented construction boom.

> "Nearly every day you would get a phone call [from] somebody complaining... particularly [about] development... Planning enforcement in this area is practically non-existent... 80% of the cases I deal with are housing. The next thing after that is planning enforcement or lack of planning enforcement. There's only two planning enforcement officers for the whole of Dublin South Central – two![51] It's one of the areas with the biggest rate of redevelopment in Dublin and yet we've two planning enforcement officers... Of the money that goes into planning, I think... 85% is development and 15% deals with everything else. There's a huge amount of money spent on the development stage... But... once the planning application goes through, the people living around the development put up with the consequences of daily breaches of planning conditions. I mean, how many times have the community around Rialto had to go and picket Elliot Brothers [the developers responsible for the Fatima PPP development], stand in front of trucks and lorries? And this is still ongoing years down the road, they still have huge problems." (Cllr-II)

- ***Loss of public and community space.***

As developers moved to construct apartment complexes on all available open space, community organisations were finding themselves increasingly deprived of the open public space necessary to

[51] DCC's Planning and Economic Development Department confirmed that two enforcement officers were allocated to the Dublin South Central Area during the decade in which the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme was in progress, 1998-2008. No enforcement officers were solely allocated to the Liberties/Coombe IAP.
(DCC's Planning Enforcement normally houses ten enforcement officers (in addition to ten administrative support staff, an enforcement manager and an assistant manager) for the city as a whole.* Four enforcement officers are allocated to the north side of the city, five to the south side with one dedicated officer dealing with protected structures. *In the wake of a recruitment embargo, DCC's Planning Enforcement was in 2011 operating with seven enforcement officers, seven administrative staff and one assistant manager.) (Information provided by DCC Assistant Enforcement Manager, March 2011.)

function. In this way, the proliferation of apartment development was coming to function as a stranglehold on the community and was rendering its position increasingly untenable.

> "In Inchicore... literally, every open space was filled in with apartments and there is now no open space left on the map. That's one of the big problems. There's no place for the community to develop and even if it wanted to build new community facilities... they don't have brown spaces and they don't want to build on what little green space is left, which means that the community then has to look at... renting from the private sector... which makes it more difficult and more expensive for the community organisations to run and to function." (TD-IV)

- ***Sustainability costs.***

Not alone had apartment development displaced the possibility of much needed public facilities, it had delivered housing that would only ever be suitable for transient populations. While the benefits of apartment living for some categories of people were acknowledged, the bias towards this form of housing had militated against the future accommodation and settlement of families in the area.

> "The community didn't gain because in some ways you're only getting one housing type being built in those areas... It's apartments or nothing. And, yes, there's benefits to apartment living, especially for senior citizens or young couples... But when you have kids, it's a lot different... if you have a front or a back garden or a green space or an open space in front of your house. The big challenge for people who are going to be living in the inner cities is to ensure that their children have a space to play in in the future and the City Council is going to have to become imaginative." (TD-IV)

The heavy involvement of investors on tax-designated sites had translated into a heavy concentration of rental apartments and transient populations who were unlikely to bring any sustainability to the area (CR-III). Meanwhile, it was anticipated that the claw-back conditions attaching to (Part V) affordable-housing units would further militate against the long-term settlement of apartment dwellers in the area (Cllr-II).

- ***Overburdening of infrastructure.***

While the problems that might arise from such transience would only become apparent in time, there were other and more tangible impacts that were already visible within the community. The quantum of apartment development had placed significantly increased demands on an already overburdened infrastructure.

> "The profile of that area has changed very significantly in the last ten years... in terms of all the apartments. Some of that is good, some of that is not so good. Again, I think that those apartments... and the people... inhabiting them [were] at a remove from the community, totally distanced from it. No engagement with them and I think no awareness of what was at the heart of the Liberties and the redevelopment of it and I think that hasn't been particularly good for the area... [Far too many] gated complexes... and built without taking account of the fact that you need services to go with them and you need a development that is sympathetic both to the environment and the community. I don't think either of those happened in relation to those gated communities around the area." (TD-III)

The failure of the local authority to provide for additional infrastructure in tandem with the permitted density of apartment development was cited as evidence of an IAP that had functioned in the interests of developers as opposed to those of the existing or incoming population.

> "I think the best interests [served] were those of developers because they got as many apartments into as small a space as possible without any thought or development of the community services required. Yes, some community development happened, but that was an after-thought." (TD-IV)

Regeneration programmes that continued to concentrate exclusively on the built environment in this manner, to the exclusion of the service and developmental needs of the inhabitants of its buildings, were described as being doomed to failure (CR-II).

- ***Segregated development and destabilisation.***

The most significant collateral damage arose from the destabilising impact of the nature and quantum of apartment development on the resident working-class community. The threat to the community's cohesion and stability was attributed to the manner in which the private apartment developments had served to segregate that community (CR-III). That segregation arose in the first instance from the physical gates placed between the old and new communities.

> "The real problem here now for the Liberties is the apartments. How is anyone going to integrate anybody who is living in those into a community when we can't even contact them?" (CR-II)

However, those locked gates were only the physical manifestation of a more profound demarcation line arising from the starkly different socio-economic circumstances perceived to distinguish the incoming population from the existing community. The number of private apartment enclaves punctuating the streets and landscape of the Liberties had fractured the landscape and led to the loss and breakdown of the vibrant community spirit that had previously characterised the area (TD-II).

> "One of the biggest assets this area had was its... vibrant community... and the fact that neighbours were there for each other... We've gated communities now and these are communities that are locking themselves off, making themselves insular. The communities outside can't integrate with them, and they, because of the gates... can't integrate with the community outside. (Cllr-II).

In a situation in which the ratio of public to private housing had been altered by both the quantum of private tax-incentive residential development taking place within the IAP and the quantum of private units planned and in progress for the various PPPs in process in the Dublin 8 area, there were fears that the resident community would be dwarfed by the large incoming population and divide along public- and private-housing lines. In the event that that the anticipated division and segregation did transpire, it was not clear who, if anyone, would take responsibility for countering this spatial, social and economic polarisation of the population.

> "When you look at the number of people who are going to come in to live in Fatima - not in Fatima, what's it called? Herberton... The Fatima people won't call it Herberton but the developers have 'Herberton something or other up on it.' But will the people coming in want to become involved in the actual local community or are

> they just coming in as private-house owners who want to keep themselves to themselves? ...While bringing both groups together ideally is good, an awful lot of work has to be done for that to work. And I would wonder who would do that piece of work." (CR-IV)

While the growing division between the old and new communities was a cause for concern for many community and public representatives, the recognition of such a division was at least an acknowledgement of the socio-economic difficulties that continued to beset the resident working-class community. There were fears that the greater levels of affluence characterising many of the incoming population would obscure the degree of poverty that was still to be found among large sections of the original inner-city community.

> "I've noticed, especially when you see the Census returns, a 'yuppification' of the area where the people in the apartments have more money... This area has poverty, it's like other inner-city areas, but because of the gentrification of the area, there's more money... but it's only centred in around one area. The poverty is still there. The lack of education is still there. The lack of facilities is still there. But when the [Census] returns come, you'd think that... the poverty levels are reducing. They're not." (Cllr-II)

On-the-ground observations of local councillors on this point found an immediate resonance in research commissioned by the area-based partnership company for the area (Haase, 2009; see Chapter 4).

Beyond the many negative externalities thrust upon the resident community by the type of development engendered within and alongside the IAP, some had paid a high price for the renewal of their communities – displacement from those same communities. While virtually all areas of the inner city had sustained social-housing losses, the losses were understood to have been greatest in the Liberties (UG-I; TSCP-I; see Chapter 4 for evidence of the gentrification that took place in the Liberties between 1991 and 2002). Across the inner city it was thought that elderly people had been the biggest casualties of the development boom. It was suggested that the significance of all such displacements should be gauged with reference to living conditions prior to displacement. For some, movement out of the inner-city meant the loss of family and community-support networks that had enabled people to survive in the most vulnerable of economic circumstances. For others, it represented an improvement on appalling living conditions. In the case of the latter, the decision to abandon 'horrendous' living conditions (where such existed) could not be said to constitute a free and fair choice and could quite validly be characterised as the only available option available to those left in unviable living conditions. The casualties from urban renewal were enumerated in the following manner.

> "Numbers were the big loss. A loss of old people in a lot of cases... because a lot of them did move out... of their communities into specialised units, whether that's good or bad, you can argue. But again, there hasn't been a coherent plan around having supported housing within working-class communities. Supported housing happens to religious organisations. It doesn't happen to inner-city communities... And some of them were quite happy to wave goodbye. But some aren't, particularly if they have a very good social network around them." (TSCP-I)

7.1.5 Success or failure of IAP on its own terms.

- ***Market saturation.***

While developers were apparently free to impose whatever negative externalities they wished on surrounding communities with impunity, there were serious question marks over whether the tax incentives awarded to developers had been successful even on their own terms. The levels of vacancy observed in both residential and commercial developments across the quarter indicated a significant oversupply of both residential and retail units and belied the rationale advanced for the introduction of those incentives in the first instance. Community representatives continued to assert a legitimate public interest in all such questions in light of the significant public funds forgone in the construction of these units. Fears were also expressed about the likelihood of other large-scale state interventions ongoing in the area at that time, such as the Digital Hub and the PPP housing regenerations, meeting with a similar fate.

> "We were told at the time was, there was a massive housing need but there's still an awful lot of apartments that haven't been sold, they're still sitting there vacant [along Cork St.]... And obviously the way the units were designed...[are] obviously not catering for the local population, even for the ones that are living in the apartments... Businesses wouldn't be encouraged at the moment to locate in that area because it hasn't the demand... That would be my fear for the Digital Hub redevelopment and for St. Teresa's Gardens redevelopment [a planned PPP]... Because I think one of the main things to bear in mind is the accountability part of it... The redevelopment of the whole area [involves] significant public funds." (CR-III)

- ***Poor calibre developments.***

While some focused on the manner in which the apartment developments had damaged the built environment and public amenity of the surrounding communities, others focused on the very poor calibre of the apartment developments themselves. In pointing to the proliferation of "the proverbial shoebox" apartments left in the wake of the IAPs, the community planner concluded the tax incentives to have been a catalyst for a 'race to the bottom' in development standards (TSCP-I, see 5.1.2). There was an acceptance within DCC itself that the heavy involvement of investors in the tax-designated schemes might have militated against the quality of apartment developments.

> "One of the big things, I suppose, was the tendency for places... to be built for rent basically and that was one of the big problems in Dublin 8. It was [a] very low level of apartment quality that they were trying to [achieve and] that people were applying for. Whereas arguably anyway, if people are owner-occupiers, [they] are more choosy about what they're buying. Anecdotally, it seemed that people were buying Section 23 apartments without even seeing them." (LGSP-I)

What might have been taken as a powerful indictment of the IAP for the calibre of apartments engendered by its fiscal incentives was nevertheless credited by one local-government planner with having provided the impetus for the preparation of guidelines to ensure greater quality in subsequent apartment developments (DCC, 2007).[52] The drive for greater apartment quality was

[52] See DCC (2007) Variation No. 21 to the Dublin City Development Plan 2005-2011, on foot of which it was agreed on December 3rd 2007 "to vary the Dublin City Development Plan 2005-2011, adding a new

attributed to the experience of observing the lesser quality of apartment development permitted in Dublin 8 as compared to more affluent parts of the city (LGSP-I). As such, it was heralded as a positive consequence of proceedings within the Liberties/Coombe IAP.

Some public representatives appeared happy to join the local authority in celebrating the anticipated gains that would flow from future apartment developments,

> "One of the big things DCC did last year was appoint... one of the chief planners, to look at the whole structure of apartment living and how it should be bigger and [how] there should be more facilities and more storage space and more community common areas. All of that will have a huge impact on what happens within a community and will help community life grow within those complexes as well." (TD-II)

However, third-sector local-development personnel were less sanguine in their assessment of the local authority's new interest in the quality of apartment developments. The need for such policy intervention had been apparent from the earlier phase of urban renewal. The failure to intervene with any corrective measures until the substantial body of apartment development engendered under the 1998 URS had been completed was an empty gesture akin to 'closing the door after the horse had bolted.' Somewhat ironically, the intervention, which had been intended to improve living conditions for urban dwellers, was understood to have been a contributory factor in the collapse of a number of PPP housing-regeneration projects across the city in 2008 by virtue of having increased the costs of development.

> "That's like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. When they've finished building all the apartments, they then have a new regulation about size which results in the collapse of the PPP or contributed to it anyway. But those are the issues that were apparent enough early on. Zoe development, for example, was doing things down on Bachelor's Walk that had people already asking questions." (TSDW-I)

Meanwhile, those who were left to administer the IAP to its conclusion were left to contemplate the somewhat anomalous situation whereby the certification procedures attaching to the granting of tax incentives within the IAP would have militated against the awarding of tax incentives to the larger apartment sizes required from 2007.

> "It was interesting [that] some of the tax incentives on... the apartments were specific to apartment sizes, particularly over the LOTS [sites] ... Apartment size was set out in the LOTS scheme, it couldn't be any bigger than that. Now those apartment sizes would be significantly smaller that what we would be requiring today... If you applied now for a LOTS scheme with apartments bigger than [that] allowed under the LOTS scheme, but yet complying with today's apartment standards, you would be refused the tax incentive. They're too big." (LG-II)

7.1.6 Cork St./Coombe Bypass.

The type of development that had taken place across the Liberties had elicited a range of contrasting assessments. The positions taken about the manner in which the centrepiece of the IAP,

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section 4.5.0 'Achieving Liveable Sustainable New Apartment Homes' in the Residential Chapter 4 and associated policies..."

the Cork Street/Coombe Bypass, had been developed were similarly polarised. The contrast in assessments offered was best encapsulated in the positions taken by those protagonists who had been sufficiently motivated by their respective positions to document their positions in print.

It was thus that the senior planner who had been in charge of planning in the Liberties during the central years of the Liberties/Coombe IAP extolled the successes of the street's development. As the "last major street in the city to be (re)created," Cork St. had benefited from "the lessons of elsewhere" (Rose, 2006). The redevelopment of the street had yielded the fruits of the performance criteria that City Council had opted for over "rigid height maximums or minimums," namely "housing quality, architectural creativity, contribution to the public realm, mix of uses etc." It was a street on which planners had recognised the time "to go for the radical option and take a carefully calculated risk especially when dealing with creative and serious architects and an enlightened developer." In the ensuing development of the street, planners had set about changing the area's poor image ("a mixture of 'Dublin in the rare old times', dereliction and social problems") by changing both the reality and perception surrounding the street. This transformation had been effected through the construction of new buildings of 'appropriate scale,' a street improvement programme, a new social-housing scheme, the incorporation of art works in a number of developments and the planned conservation of an historic church that would now be occupied by an architectural firm. The latter was described as "another significant contribution to the growing creative industries cluster in the area." In its transformation of Cork St. into a 'city street,' DCC had embarked upon a programme of promotion and revaluation of both the street and the wider area in the city's consciousness. Rose's article in *Architecture Ireland* closed by positioning the Liberties as a quarter with "a crucial role in the future of the city" – a city that had the potential to fulfil its possible destiny – as 'the first post-European city', 'a global city,' 'an open city,' 'a city of excellence.'

It was an assessment that found no resonances in the assessments of the residents' association which had represented the interests of those living along and in close proximity to the new road in opposing many of the contested planning permissions. As was apparent from the following assessment of the impact of the development of Cork Street, it was doubtful that the residents of the street would have recognised their street from the above assessment.

> "When this inner-city community surveys the landscape of the Liberties, it can now see with great clarity what the net outcome of the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan, and its centrepiece – the Cork St./Coombe Bypass – has been: a road which has dissected this community by day and which will continue to provide the blank dead space which has plagued this community by night for decades; the 'tax incentivising' of the area which has attracted the ruthless and speculative greed of private developers while simultaneously failing to yield any significant revenue for the delivery of 'community gain;' ever increasing building heights and densities in wildly inappropriate and overblown private gated developments which are destroying the residential amenity, social cohesion and distinctive architectural heritage of this once

> distinctive historical and cultural quarter; the displacement of the resident community which will always follow as an inevitable consequence on the influx of private capital as land and property values rise; the auction and privatisation of publicly held lands at a time when the shortage of publicly owned land is being cited as one of the major barriers to the provision of social housing; the failure to secure any social-housing units from the extensive private residential development taking place in the area.[53] In addition to the failure to deliver on the key social and economic objectives outlined in the plan, continued breaches of the UDFP[54] for Cork St. attest to the manner in which the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP is actually damaging the existing physical environment and placing increasing and unsustainable strains on the area's already overburdened infrastructure" (Brudell *et al.*, 2004: 83).

The rather more critical assessment of the road's development was not peculiar to the residents' association adjoining the route of the new bypass. It was, with its loss of character, piecemeal development and succession of apartment complexes, described by one public representative as "one of the bigger failures of the IAP" (TD-II). Another described the centrepiece of the IAP very simply as an "unnecessary" development, which could have been avoided with proper traffic management (Cllr-I). Public representatives were joined in this assessment by another community representative who described the bland barren development of the street as being akin to a drive-through motorway and pointed to the failure of planners to avail of this once-off opportunity to recreate a streetscape and enhanced environment for the residents of the area. In place of the vibrant streetscape that might have resulted from this regeneration of Cork St., the community were left with "an artery to facilitate traffic coming off the M50" that "cut right through" the area (CR-III). All were agreed on the disjointed and piecemeal developer-driven nature of the development that had taken place along the street. The new and re-imagined city street described in the senior planner's description clearly did not find any resonances in the assessments of community and public representatives.

7.2 Social and Economic Renewal.

7.2.1 Preface: the key socio-economic commitments

The transformations effected to the built environment were understandably to the fore for most parties when assessing the IAP. As was evident in 7.1, both central- and local-government officials reverted to the strand of the IAP concerned with physical and property renewal in assessing the IAP. For them, the plan had been successful in effecting a significant physical renewal of the quarter. While they were joined in this assessment by a small number of public representatives, it remained very much a minority position. The nature of the physical developments that had taken

[53] This 2004 assessment of the development of Cork St. is qualified by an acknowledgment of the fact that DCC did secure 12 social-housing units from a development on Cork St. in 2008 under Part V of the Planning and Development Act, 2000. (Information supplied by DCC Affordable Housing Unit, May 2011.)

[54] I.e. the Urban Design Framework Plan for the Cork Street/The Coombe Relief Route as contained in (i) the appendices to the Cork Street/The Coombe Relief Route Environmental Impact Statement 1998, (ii) the appendices to the 1998 Liberties/Coombe IAP and as attested to in (iii) the Cork Street/Dolphin's Barn Street/The Coombe Area Compulsory Purchase (Road Widening, Improvement and Construction, Housing and Development) Order 1998 Sworn Inquiry.

place had occasioned a schism between the state and the resident community. Those who had engaged with the detail of the planning decisions within the IAP clearly recognised the serious breach that these represented in the contract between state and community. Those who were unfamiliar with the planning details and the sequence of events that had led to the schism were equally critical of the nature and quantum of development that had taken place within the IAP and were acutely aware of the negative externalities visited upon the resident community.

The physical developments that had taken place within the Liberties/Coombe IAP were, however, only one strand of a renewal plan whose distinctive dimension had been predicated on "the concept that the designation of an area should not take place in isolation but should emerge from a broadly-based Integrated Area Plan" (DoE, 1999a: 1.1). In the course of elaborating on that integrated renewal brief, Dublin Corporation had outlined a wide range of renewal strategies under a number of headings: land use; built environment, urban form and urban design; employment, enterprise, education and training; health, community and amenity; housing; conservation and archaeology; tourism, arts and culture; transport and movement (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: 19-85). Of the considerable range of objectives and commitments articulated thereunder, the community had seized upon three specific objectives as being of prime importance to their interests:

(i) The generation of a community-gain fund through the imposition of a community-gain levy.
(ii) The securing of social-housing units through the allocation of a percentage of residential development on certain incentive sites for social/affordable housing.
(iii) The creation of local employment through a local-labour clause.

For the community representatives, the community's stake in the IAP had been contingent on its ability to deliver on each of these key socio-economic objectives. It was clear that the community's faith in the nature of the physical developments that would take place within the IAP had been misplaced. It remained to be seen whether its hopes and expectations in relation to the social and economic renewal of the area had suffered a similar fate.

7.2.2 Community-gain finance.

- ***Genesis of concept.***

The 'community-gain' concept owed its genesis to discussions about the implications of regeneration in Dublin's inner city in the early 1990s. The revelation that the local authority had been collecting 'community levies' from developers had established the feasibility of such a levy. The fact that there did not appear to be any accompanying obligation on the local authority to channel the collected funds into the areas in which the developments had taken place had highlighted an anomaly that the local community and development sector had become intent on redressing.

> "The original concept came... from way back when the Dublin Inner City Partnership was formed in 1991/1992. We started looking at... the implication of regeneration in the inner city and who was benefiting... One thing we learned... was [that] the

> Council were actually collecting community levies and had been for years, but none of it was arriving back in the areas that they were collecting them from. They couldn't tell us how much they were [collecting]. So, in a sense, that's when we started to explore that and ask them 'who are you getting [the levies] from, where are they going and what's it for?' ...So, in a way, it was that initial learning... that there actually was such a thing that you could levy a developer for the benefit of a local area... So that when people tried to argue you couldn't have a levy for the benefit of the community, we could actually say 'well, they've been doing it themselves.'" (TSDW-I)

Armed with this knowledge, third-sector development workers who had entered onto the Steering Committee of the HARP Framework Plan in the wake of its publication in 1996 had set about securing a formal agreement to ensure that resident communities would receive some benefits from local developments. In seeking such an agreement, local-development workers found themselves in an ideological battle with senior DCC officials who opposed the placement of any barrier in the way of developers.

> "You certainly had an attitude and a lot of the tensions in the early days around HARP... to do with the perspective from some of the senior officials [who]... felt... that the developers were doing the city a favour by agreeing to develop derelict sites... They had this thing in their minds that somehow you couldn't do anything to threaten them or put pressure on them. Whereas the counter argument we were giving – the DICP, An Taisce and others – was 'no, there is a huge value to the sites. They may be derelict for years. But, one, the city was beginning to take off... Secondly, there is no such thing as them doing favours for anybody, there are huge profits to be made. [Thirdly], that you could be much stronger in your demands [and] not just for money. It wasn't... about money, but... what could be extracted as a consequence of allowing development to take place, given that they were the Planning Authority as well.' So you could call it an ideological debate.'" (TSDW- I)

In all such negotiations, they had encountered a local-government body whose commitment to the public good and interests of the citizenry and city was judged to be significantly less than its European counterparts. The local authority's deferential relationship and subservience towards private developers had hampered the evolution of a concept of community gain that could have conferred significant benefits on the resident community.

> "We could never really realise the potential where you had a mindset... which I imagine... in other countries in Europe would be much more protective of the common good, of the citizen's interest and much stronger [in their defence]... And certainly where I had contact with other cities in those days around regeneration – Liverpool, London, some of the European cities, they were much more aggressive in protecting the interests of the city versus [developers] – and much more capable of extracting benefits for the city. It was part of their way of working" (TSDW-I)

The fact that they had succeeded in securing the inclusion of a formal commitment to the community-gain concept in each of the IAPs that followed was cited as one of the significant achievements of the first incarnation of the HARP.

> "We developed the concept of community gain. We got each of the [subsequent IAP] plans that went through a consultation process to incorporate... the concept of [local] benefits... to the community in terms of money, local labour, social-housing percentages etc. They were formally written into those plans. So, in that sense, the lessons we learnt from the first few years [of HARP I] had some negative outcomes in terms of the way it was controlled more, but positive outcomes in the sense that we

> realised we needed to formalise certain things and have them in it at the beginning." (TSDW-I)

In contrast to the resistance encountered from the local authority, third-sector development personnel noted a greater willingness to make concessions among those private developers who entered into negotiations with communities around planning matters. Notwithstanding the pride surrounding the evolution of the formal community-gain commitment within the state's renewal plans, local-development personnel had come to believe that the community might have been in a position to extract greater gains from direct engagement with private developers if the local-authority 'buffer' had been removed altogether from the equation.

> "There was a willingness in developers... where, if they were able to deal directly with local residents' interests, they would concede things much more than the Council would be asking of them, if they thought they were going to get their way with planning applications or whatever... Where you did manage to sit down with a developer, you could extract much more from them." (TSDW-I)

However, this conclusion about the relative benefits of engaging directly with developers in an *ad hoc* manner rather than through local-authority structures was reached only with hindsight. At the outset of the IAPs, the formal commitment to community gain had been judged to represent a significant advance in the interests of inner-city communities and its outcomes had been keenly anticipated.

- ***Community-gain formula.***

The original commitment to community gain as outlined in the *Liberties/Coombe IAP* provided for the imposition of "a development levy of 15% of the site value" on "key development sites designated for tax relief." The levy funds were to be "'ring-fenced' ...and invested in the provision of community and leisure facilities in the Plan area" (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: 109). However, by the time that the IAP was ready to move into its implementation phase, that '15% of site value' had been diluted to an unspecified "financial contribution based on a percentage of the current site value" (Stubbs, 2000: 72).

The rationale for downscaling the community-gain contribution was explained in the opening years of the IAP with reference to the DoE's failure to secure approval for the full range of tax incentives sought under each IAP by Dublin Corporation. This failure was regarded as a significant barrier for DCC in its subsequent engagements and negotiations with private developers. Essentially, the percentage of community gain sought from developers would thereafter be determined through a negotiation process between the IAP Project Manager, DCC's Economic Development Section and developers, in which DCC would be obliged to remain flexible and exercise fine judgement calls (Brudell, 2000: 50-1). By the time that DCC had arrived at a definite formula for the calculation of the community-gain contribution for each tax-designated site, it was clear that the developer's contribution was to be significantly less than the original '15% of site value.' The following were

the actual community-gain arrangements put in place by DCC's Economic Development Office for those designated sites on which developers chose to avail of tax incentives.

Table 7.2 Community-gain formulae for tax-designated sites.[55]

"Residential (New Build) Seek 15% of scheme to include car parking (if required) for social and affordable housing purposes at cost price, cost to include site cost, construction cost, professional fees etc. This will also apply to schemes affected by Part V of the Planning And Development Act 2000. or As an alternative to above, a financial contribution towards a community development fund calculated at €4,400... per apartment in the scheme will be sought.
Residential (Refurbishment). Buildings refurbished for residential use will satisfy the community gain requirement.
Commercial Development A financial contribution calculated at €41... per square metre of development (gross internal floor area), to include car parking, will be sought towards a community fund.
Exemption. Development comprising a gross floor area of less than 350 sq.m. will be exempt from a community gain requirement."

(Source: DCC, 2004: 15-16)

For IAP project-management personnel in the DCC area, the above provisions "boiled down to effectively two aspects to community gain - [both] financial. €4,400 had to be paid per apartment that was built and €41 per square metre of commercial/retail" (LG-II).

- ***Negotiation and collection.***

The fulfilment of the community-gain obligation on tax-designated sites consisted, in the main, of straightforward financial transactions calculated in accordance with the above formula. A few developers were also allowed to avail of other means of offsetting their community-gain obligations (see Plate 7.6). In these cases, developers fulfilled those obligations through one or more of the following measures: the refurbishment of listed buildings, the installation of public-art works, the provision of public spaces, the restoration of public footpaths with lighting and tree planting, the provision of community facilities.


> "In this area, very few sites were involved in anything other than the straightforward financial contribution. There was a small number [who did otherwise]... There's an art feature on the side of the building on the corner of Ardee St. and Cork St... That art feature was offset against their community-gain obligation and some of the costs of... the open space in front [also]... On the other side of Ardee St., there was one listed house. But the three houses were very similar and [the developer], of his own

[55] DCC (2004: 15) outlined five categories under which developers could make the community-gain contribution attaching to tax-incentive sites: (i) a percentage of residential development to be allocated for social or affordable housing; (ii) a financial contribution based on the development proposed; (iii) the provision of facilities/opportunities within the physical development; (iv) the development itself; (v) the provision of permanent employment opportunities and training for members of the local community. Table 7.2 outlines the formulae delineated in respect of the first and second of these categories.

Plate 7.6 Public art work accepted in lieu of community gain, Cork St.



Plate 7.7 Gated apartment complexes, Cork St.









> volition, restored the three of them. Now it was a development of maybe twenty or thirty apartments, ten of them were in the three listed buildings so we offset the community gain for those ten as he had fulfilled his obligations just in relation to them... There's a community centre that had to be given over in another development and it was bigger than it was originally meant to be ... so we got a valuer to value up the difference and we let him offset it against the community gain" (LG-II)

Notwithstanding the significant reduction in the community-gain levy payable on sites on which developers were benefiting from significant tax savings, the local authority continued to meet resistance to the payment of this levy in a number of cases.

> "A lot of them didn't want to pay... A lot of them felt that they had met their community-gain [obligation] by way of their affordable-housing commitments and a variety of other things. So, in that sense, you're negotiating with them." (LG-II)

While it was not possible to quantify the number of cases in which such resistance had been encountered, it was clear that developers had responded in very different ways to the imposition of the levy.

> "Some just posted the cheque in, full stop. Others said they had no money; they were going broke. As I say, you'd get a cheque in maybe for €200,000 or €300,000 from a big developer... it was part of the costings, that was it. You told him what he owed you and he paid the cheque. And others [said] 'I'm not paying, I'm refusing to pay.'" (LG-II)

In one such case, responsibility for the resolution of the issue had reverted to the local authority. It had previously owned the tax-incentive site in question and in selling that site had agreed a programme of incremental payments, the return of a community facility and 30 percent of the completed units as affordable-housing units. The fact that it had a vested interest in the completion of the development left it in a situation where it was obliged to reach an accommodation with the developer if both were to avoid complicated litigation procedures.

> "In one case, I can't be specific, the developer said he would go broke; in two cases he would go broke. In one case, we insisted that he paid anyway, which he finally did. And in the other case we offset some of the things against works that he had done – the community centre being one and he was obliged under his planning permission to reinstate the footpath but we wanted it reinstated to a higher standard in granite so we let him offset that. He said he'd be broke. Now there were huge complications with that site. We sold the site to him in the first place. If he went broke, we don't get paid. The site payments are incremental as he develops. If he went bankrupt, there were other issues. He had to give 30% affordable housing... Now if he went broke, we wouldn't have got those 30% units. The development was more or less finished. It could have ended up in litigation for years (LG-II).

As a consequence, the community secured a slightly larger community facility than originally envisaged but was obliged to sustain the loss of publicly-owned land and forgo the community-gain financial contribution as the local authority backed down in the face of threatened legal action from the defaulting developer.

Those instances in which the state accepted various other forms of gain *in lieu* of the prescribed financial contribution were in the minority and involved four or five sites only (LG-II). The

community-gain formula had otherwise been applied in an uniform manner. At the time at which the community-gain fund was totalled for distribution to the community, the figure stood at almost €3 million. However, as developers were still making retrospective applications for tax incentives in respect of developments already completed, it was anticipated that the final figure might rise by an additional €250,000 to €500,000. The total of the community-gain fund at the conclusion of the IAP when all applications from developers had been processed was thus projected to be between €3.25 million and €3.5 million (LG-II).

- ***Administration of fund.***

The community-gain fund was administered in the form of a Minor and Major Grants Scheme to which all groups in the area were invited to apply. The Minor Grants Scheme provided for the allocation of grants up to €10,000 while the Major Grants Scheme invited applications for grants in excess of €50,000. Amounts of €250,000 and €2,700,000 were allocated to cover grants awarded under the two schemes respectively. In adjudicating on the applications received, the IAP Monitoring Committee employed a number of loose criteria – favouring applications submitted by schools, for example, on the grounds that the ensuing benefits were likely to generate long-term benefits for a greater number, while disfavouring applications submitted in respect of salaries as the funding was being allocated on a once-off basis (LG-II).

In the final analysis, the Monitoring Committee received 82 applications requesting amounts totalling over €600,000 under the Minor Grants Scheme under a number of broad categories: community development, education, sports, arts and culture, childcare, environment. Of the 82 applications, 64 were granted sums between €1,000 and €10,000 totalling €250,600 (Beggan, 2006). The Major Grants Scheme attracted 52 applications requesting amounts totalling over €9 million euro. Of those, 27 were granted funding amounts of between €20,000 and €400,000 to a total figure of €2,710, 200 (Beggan, 2007). Decisions on applications were taken transparently, collectively and with unanimity by the Monitoring Committee (LG-II).

- ***Assessment of community-gain outcomes.***

Assessments on the amount of finance generated through the imposition of the community-gain levy divided into two broad camps. Those who cited the final amount as an illustration of the benefit that urban renewal had conferred on the resident community contrasted sharply with those who judged the figure to be a derisorily small outcome from an IAP in which private landowners and developers had obtained enormous financial gain. Local-government officers identified the community-gain fund as one of the big gains for the community and described the "€3 million coming out of the tax-incentive site [as] a hell of a fund to divvy out" (LG-I). The late accumulation of monies within the funds had been a simple function of the timeframes and

deadlines to which developers were working. The payment of community-gain contributions had not, in any case, been the priority for developers in the IAP.

> "The problem was that the community gain only comes in when the development is finished. A lot of the developments didn't finish until '05 and '06 because they were timing them with the... finish date of the tax incentives. They weren't worried about giving the community the money. That wasn't their first issue. They paid over when their developments were finished." (LG-II)

The inflow of monies in the latter years of the IAP had confounded earlier pessimism surrounding the operation of the community-gain fund. The closing figure of approximately €3 million was understood to represent a significant advance on the 2004 figure of €439,136 (DCC, 2004) and was "way beyond what any of them would have anticipated."

> "If you were here in 2004... [when] the IAP was then five years old, I think, yes, €3,000,000, €3,500,000 would have been way beyond what any of them would have anticipated. I don't know, you'd have to ask the individual people [on the Monitoring Committee]. I thought it was a significant amount of money" (LG-II).

Any reservations that local-government officials might have entertained about the community-gain fund pertained more to the manner in which it had been expended as opposed to the actual figure collected. Particular disappointment was expressed about the calibre of applications received for the Major Grants Scheme.

> "We... would have liked if there'd been a significant major project where you could look back and say 'that's what we got' and that didn't happen. A lot of salary applications came in and refurbishment grants and things like that." (LG-II)

In place of the preferred flagship project, the funding had been used to finance projects of more modest dimensions across a range of groups. Disappointment about the absence of such a project was accompanied by an acknowledgement of the dilemma into which any such endeavour would have plunged DCC if it had been accused of expending community-gain funding on a project for which it had statutory responsibility (LG-II). Local government vacillated between despondency at the failure of the community-gain fund to achieve any lasting and significant legacy and hopes that the modest amounts of funding dispensed might function as seed money.

> "In terms of the value, in ten years time, will people remember? You can look down through the applications; some of them are for salaries. I don't believe in a year's time they'll remember [the funding], but maybe that doesn't matter... Maybe they'll be able to mainstream those jobs, so they'll have kick-started the process." (LG-II)

In any case, it was not clear to local-government officials that the community had approached the IAP with any particular expectation or coherent conception about the form that community gain would take.

> "In terms of visible community gain... I'm not sure. Is that what people expected? [That there] would be gold-plated streets and gold-plated crash barriers? I'm not sure what the people expected. I don't know if they had worked out what their idea of community gain was either. There doesn't seem to be a great lot of documentation or discussion on it." (LG-II)

There had, in fact, been considerable attention to the formulation of a coherent concept of community gain in the opening years of the community's engagement with the Liberties/Coombe IAP. The community had convened seminars on the concept and outlined its position on the key aspects of what it understood to be "one of the most significant achievements which the community can cite in respect of the IAP" (Brudell, 2000: 37). This was evident from the headings under which the community had presented its deliberations on the concept in its 2000 *Mandate for the Community Representatives to the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan.*[56] However, those parties which had spearheaded the discussion and formulation of the community's position regarding community gain were no longer involved in the IAP at the time at which the fund was being allocated. In the absence of critical community interventions pointing to the fallacy of this statement, the local authority was free to make such pronouncements without fear of contradiction.

Third-sector development personnel who had been involved in the evolution of the concept in the early 1990s conceded that, for their part, the initial argument for 'community-gain' had been made without any attempt to quantify the likely financial value of such a fund (TSDW-I). They believed that the IAPs had delivered on their community-gain commitments "to a great extent. Certainly in terms of money because quite a number of million was collected and spent in different ways over the last few years" (TSDW-I). That position was nevertheless qualified by an acceptance that the final community-gain fund figures were not 'big' when compared with the financial gain that developers had extracted from those tax-incentive developments. The modesty of the community-gain outcomes was attributed to a timid local authority which had neither the political will nor the authority to extract the kind of finance that had been realised in European and American cities.

> "Obviously at the end of it all, you'd have to say, given the scale of it, that a few million, two or three million is not big, given that there's huge potential... if it was done in a genuine way... [in the way] that maybe other cities in Europe might do... Boston was one of the models that were talked about early on where they actually charged developers significant amounts of money... as a concession for letting them into the centre of the city to develop... But we don't have a local authority with... the political muscle to do that." (TSDW-I)

The latter position was shared by individual community representatives, who judged the community-gain outcomes to be modest compared to the profits that developers had made from the fiscal incentives. As the only tangible gain to have followed from the IAP, it had conferred only "limited resources" on the area, "small funds really at the end of the day" (CR-III). Meanwhile those Monitoring Committee members who had cited the paltry amount of community funding in place when they tendered their resignation in 2002 remained singularly unimpressed by the final €3 million figure. For the residents' representative, the amount in question amounted to little more than the sale price of perhaps nine or ten new apartments (CR-I).

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[56] See Brudell (2000: 37-56), Section 1.2.5: Community gain – definition, clarification and objectives; Section 1.2.6: Revenue for the delivery of community gain – securing, administering and targeting the resources of the state.

In so far as they were sufficiently familiar with proceedings within the IAP to comment, public representatives advanced two contrary assessments. Those whose involvement had been confined to the final years of the IAP were effusive in their assessments of the community-gain fund and pointed to the manner in which it had allowed some community groups and services to remain in operation (Cllr-II). This 'very positive' assessment was tempered by one regret only, the wish that greater numbers within the community had been aware of the gains that had followed from the development that had taken place in the area.

> "I actually thought... that everybody knew about the community gain from the IAPs. It's a pity that they don't ... you should be publicising the fact that over €2.5 million was spent... in [the] south west inner city, because of money that came from development... I know it's hard for anyone to appreciate that there was actually some gain from... some of these monstrosities of developments, but there was." (Cllr-II).

Not all public representatives were over-awed by the €2.5 million and €3 million figures being mentioned. When compared with the wealth generated by the quantum of apartment development that had taken place, it was dismissed as "pathetic... a drop in the ocean... just harmless in the overall scheme of things" (TD- III).

- ***Redistributional impact.***

In all of the above, it was important to note that the distribution of a €3 million community-gain fund was of immediate significance to inner-city communities often operating with meagre funding. Criticisms of the final amount of finance were not an expression of nonchalance in relation to the placement of much needed finance at the community's disposal. Criticisms were not intended to detract from the significance of the community-gain funding allocated to the variety of community, education, childcare, youth, sports, family-centre, senior-citizen, education and health-education projects etc. The more critical matter pertained to the serious discrepancy between the cost of the state aid given to private developers in the form of tax incentives and the value of the community-gain fund returned to the community in recompense by those same developers. It pertained to the regressive distributional impact of an urban-renewal scheme in which the Exchequer was forgoing €40,917 in respect of every apartment constructed on a tax-designated site (Goodbody *et al.,* 2006: 84), while obliging developers to make a paltry community-gain contribution of €4,400 in respect of each of those same apartments. It was in this context that the assessments of all parties were sought on the significance of the IAP's community-gain outcomes

Despite the markedly greater financial benefit accruing to developers in each instance, local-government officials continued to exhibit confusion about whether the community-gain fund should be regarded as public or private monies.'

> "I would again stress [in letters to applicants to the community-gain fund] that it wasn't our money. It was hard to know how we would explain that. Any time we wrote about it in any newsletters, we always explained ultimately it was the developers' money. And maybe at the end of the day we might write to all those developers and explain to them where that money went... Now, whether you'd say

> they were liable to pay it or not isn't really the issue. The bottom line was [that] it was their money that was paid over into community gain and that was then expended on behalf of the community by the Monitoring Committee." (LG-II)

It was a confusion that might equally have been characterised as a deference and servility to a private-development sector that had been significantly enriched at the expense of public revenue.

7.2.3 Employment and economic dividends.

- ***Genesis of local-labour commitment.***

As with the concept of community gain, the commitment outlined in respect of local employment in the IAP had also taken its impetus from earlier discussions within the local community and development sector about the benefits that might be secured from regeneration. The argument had initially been advanced within the first tranche of large-scale development in the Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA) in Dublin's Docklands. Early negotiations between a local community-development organisation, the Alliance for Work Forum (AWF)[57] and the CHDDA at that time had laid the foundation for a similar approach to Temple Bar Properties to seek the incorporation of a local-labour clause in its regeneration programme. The success of the initiative had led to the subsequent agreement of a similar clause in the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA) (MacLaran *et al.,* 2007: 118-119).

The experience of pressing for local-employment gains within earlier regeneration programmes also informed the community's engagement in HARP I and the subsequent negotiations that preceded the preparation of each of the IAPs across the inner city. While advised that each IAP incorporated a commitment to local labour, the precise status of that commitment appeared somewhat unclear. Guidelines issued by the DoE suggested that local authorities "encourage local labour pacts where possible" in their IAPs as part of their "strategies to maximise impacts on local employment."

> "In relation to local labour pacts, it is suggested that a voluntary code be included in the IAP e.g. 'Employers, including contractors and sub-contractors shall at all times make reasonable efforts to provide for the employment of residents from within the local area on construction and later phases.' " (DoE, 1997: 5.14)

The text of the Liberties/Coombe IAP did not contain a specific commitment to local labour, but did state that "gaining access to employment, especially for school leavers and those over 40, was seen as a fundamental issue" for the community. Some groups had "considered [that] there should be 'Local Labour Clauses,' whilst others were concerned that such clauses would restrict opportunities for local workers" (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: 14). Dublin Corporation appear to have settled for a 'wait and see' position in 1998 in relation to the proposed local-labour clauses.

> "The difficulty in gaining access to trade apprenticeships for local young people has been identified... Related to this is the issue of employment in construction projects in

[57] The AWF was a locally managed community-development organisation in Dublin's north inner city that operated two Community Employment projects.

> the area. Because of the difficulties faced by locals in gaining employment, local labour clauses are identified as a possible mechanism. This is being developed by the Docklands Authority." (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: 38)

The DDDA subsequently incorporated a commitment to securing 20% local labour. It was the clear understanding of both third-sector development personnel and the residents' representative to the Liberties/Coombe IAP that Dublin Corporation had made a similar commitment to it in the implementation of the Liberties/Coombe IAP.

- ***Assessment of local-labour outcomes.***

At the outset of the IAP, the appointment of an Enterprise and Employment Officer to the project-management team had signalled a significant commitment on DCC's part to securing local employment. It was to be a commitment that would not survive the early years of the IAP (LG-II). A number of explanations were advanced for its discarding: the legal difficulties involved in the implementation of local-labour clauses; the counter-productive nature of such clauses and the poor calibre of the jobs that might be secured for local people if such positions were granted in fulfilment of a legal requirement only (LG-I, TSDW-I).

> "When I arrived here [as IAP Project Manager] anyway, [local-labour clauses] weren't in place and they weren't being pursued. I would imagine they were just probably legally difficult to enforce. I mean, we've had local labour clauses attempted on numerous occasions. My understanding... [is] that they're illegal and it may even have been brought to the European Court... a number of years back. So, to try to force a developer to take on local people just doesn't work. It's far better if the developer wants to do it for his own reasons [rather] than being told that you have to do it. What local people would they take on then? Are they just the guys guarding the gate or directing the traffic, which wouldn't really be what we would want. We'd want them to take on apprentices maybe or to skill-up people. So, there was no pursuit of that, certainly from the time I was here. We did as part of the IAP project have somebody looking after employment and trying to encourage it, but I think it would be more by way of encouragement than by way of saying 'if you don't do it, you won't avail of something.'" (LG-II)

There was an acceptance by senior third-sector development personnel that the clause had been too crude to redress the underlying causes of long-term unemployment and had been plagued by a mismatch between the skills required and the skills available within inner-city communities.

> "It was one thing putting them in and another thing delivering on them. In relation to local-labour clauses, it was more the economic changes that weakened that case, because when they finally came around to endorsing that idea, the difficulty was delivering on it in terms of local people – unemployed people, being available with the skills etc. So, what started off as a big demand became even at a community level [undeliverable]. And therefore the focus came more on community gain [as] money." (TSDW-I)

Notwithstanding the fact that the objective had been quietly jettisoned by local government and conceded on pragmatic grounds by third-sector local-development personnel, it remained a live issue for community representatives for the lifetime of the IAP. The failure of the commitment to translate into any local employment had been one of the issues cited in the letter of resignation

tendered by the residents' representative in 2002 (Hammond, 2002b) and remained a very significant failure for the residents' association as the IAP drew to a close.

> "There were no people employed to work on the building of [the apartments]. There were no kids taught trades so that they could help to build them and maybe have a trade when the building was all over. None of that happened. Very, very few local kids were employed in any way, shape or form with the exception of a few people that got in as clerical workers in the DCC. There was some [cases], I have to recognise, where there was employment created there and that was no thanks to developers." (CR-I)

Another community representative had requested figures for the numbers of local people employed in the extensive construction works ongoing throughout the IAP but had been informed that the local authority had failed to keep any figures on the matter (CR-III). Local-government officials were unapologetic about the matter, the dramatic change in circumstances in the broader economy having rendered the local-employment component of its brief obsolete in their opinion. While it was accepted that 'full employment,' in the economist's sense of the term, may not have translated into employment for long-term unemployed people, the issue had not been sufficiently pressing to warrant either a dedicated position or any formal records.

> "Local employment secured? There was no issue about that because we never kept figures on it from a community-gain perspective. As part of the IAP, there was [a position]... an Enterprise & Employment Officer... but the post just fell by the wayside... [with] the turn in the economy... Employment was at full employment level in terms of the way it's measured in economic terms. Now, whether... you could have pockets of unemployment locally, and people would say there still is. But it just didn't require an Employment & Development Enterprise Officer any more. The job just fell by the wayside. So there were no figures kept on that." (LG-II)

- ***Local economic dividends.***

Government personnel were significantly more animated about the broader impacts of the IAPs on the local economy, as opposed to the specific impacts on the resident working-class community. Central-government personnel located the economic dividend for inner-city communities in the manner in which the IAPs had brought the economic boom to areas which might otherwise have been bypassed. In this, the 1998 URS was viewed as having been 'fantastic' (CG-I). Questions about the specifics of the economic dividends from such a 'fantastic' programme were, however, redirected to local government. For their part, local-government officials identified a number of positive economic outcomes that had followed from the developments on tax-designated sites, including the location of new services, retail outlets and small manufacturing outlets.

> "I think it benefits everybody... If you can look at it in terms of Cork St. or that general area, as a result of tax driven development... you've got services [and shops] being provided... The Credit Union moved from an older premises into a newer one. Then you have... service employment being delivered... small little food manufacturing units have moved into tax-driven sites... and that's local employment for people... [There is also] the Spar [shop] which is really high quality and has a café and deli... That was an area that had... very, very poor quality shopping... After [the tax-incentive developments]... you get a certain kind of momentum." (LGSP-I)

The benefits of such developments were understood to be two-fold, the creation of local employment and the marked improvement in the range of services on offer to the population. Similarly, the opening of a large discount supermarket was identified as an important correction to a serious deficit in the area's retail services. It was cited as one of the specific planning gains to follow from the IAP and attributed to the flexible interpretation of the zoning attached to the site.

> "I do think that is a significant issue... retail poverty and [things] like that and... planners just being aware of what an area needs... For example, that particular Lidl [discount supermarket] is 1,500 square meters and it has its own basement car park. Let's say in terms of encouraging it through the planning process, we took a flexible view on planning policy... to look at the end result [and] the benefit... [That particular site] was zoned Z6 for employment purposes... So what it says you can have is a neighbourhood shop. You could interpret neighbourhood shop very narrowly or more flexibly, more positively. And so we said that Lidl is a neighbourhood shop because... there are people from Teresa's Gardens, Dolphin [House flats-complexes], all over the place and there's no quality shopping at all, so this will be a local shop. So it's taking a... less bureaucratic or blinkered view [in planning].... Now there is this place [Lidl], which I think is a brilliant thing. It's brilliant for everybody... If you think of that issue of food poverty, that people can't afford a healthy food basket, it is a brilliant local [affordable] amenity." (LGSP- I)

The importance attributed to the issue of retail poverty had moved the senior planner in question to make presentations to both DCC and the Combat Poverty Agency on the issue (Rose, 2005).

Local-government personnel also pointed to the longer-term benefits that would follow from the improvement of an environment that had impacted negatively on confidence, expectations and aspirations.

> "If you look at issues of poverty - a lot of [those issues have to do with] low expectation and a feeling that you don't deserve much better and so you lower your expectations or aspirations... A very poor quality physical environment compounds [that] sense of inferiority." (LGSP-I)

The cited environmental improvements included new buildings, retail and café facilities "as classy as something you'd have down in Docklands or Dublin 4" (LGSP-I) street paving, tree planting and a street cleansing regime. In assessing the impact of the environmental improvements on the psychic well-being of the surrounding population, the senior planner in question had again been moved to document his views in print.

> "NESC uses a great phrase that 'low ambitions achieve low outcomes.' The corollary is that high ambitions achieve high outcomes and this should be a mantra for all planners and architects. You can see clearly the impacts of low and high ambitions in the physical environment. Numerous surveys have highlighted how young people in disadvantaged areas are keenly aware of the quality of their surroundings and they identify poor environmental quality as a serious negative which can compound their low self-esteem and aspirations" (Rose, 2006).

While such publications acknowledged the "50-year-old road-widening proposal" as one of the factors leading to the 'disintegration of Cork St.,' the ultimate responsibility for the physical, economic and social blight that had come to characterise the area was lost in the exhortation to planners and architects to adopt 'high ambitions' (*ibid.*) There was no indication about the manner

in which the ambitions of such professional groupings would relate to the ambitions of those who had lived along that 'disintegrating' street during the previous five decades. Neither was there any admission of the role that road planners and the Planning Department had previously played in encouraging the relocation of industry to purpose-built industrial estates at the periphery and the deterioration of the built environment of inner-city areas as a consequence (MacLaran, 1993).

Not everyone joined in the celebrations surrounding the changing character of the area's retail services. Others had a sense of immense changes underway and were concerned about the erosion of the area's traditional retail- and market-economy base. Those fears centred around the three streets forming the retail core of the area: Francis Street, Meath Street and Thomas Street. The loss of the Iveagh Market on Francis Street was still keenly felt two decades after its closure and there were fears that Meath Street might suffer a similar fate. The more recent closure of a department store (Frawley's) which had been considered to be iconic of the Liberties was interpreted as the end of an era (see Plate 7.8).

> "Take Thomas St. for instance. You look at Frawley's [Department Store] closing down and there's a whole chunk of history gone." (TD-II)

The symbolic importance of such a closure was further underwritten by the fact that the site of this iconic department store had passed into the ownership of a property development company which, with its trademark "shoebox apartments," had become iconic of a rather different Liberties (Zoe Group) (see McDonald, 2008).

- ***Economic dividends nationally.***

In the absence of any demonstrable improvements in the economic circumstances of resident working-class communities (TSCP-I), others sought to assess the larger economic significance of the quantum of development that had taken place within the IAPs with particular reference to the net impact on the public finances. The contribution that the construction boom had made to Exchequer returns could not be disputed. Neither could the short-term nature of the arising revenue gains. In advance of the collapse of the public finances in 2008, third-sector development personnel were already directing attention to the unsustainable nature of the taxes generated by the construction sector and the way in which they were distorting the government's finances (TSCP-I). Dismissing the various economic rationales advanced by the state for the programme of tax incentives introduced under the 1998 URS, the attention of the sole community planner in the inner city was, for example, firmly fixed on the net loss of taxation to the state; the enormous financial benefits conferred upon developers and investors; the manner in which the tax incentives had favoured investors over owner occupiers and skewed the market against other types of development and the contribution that the tax incentives had made to the housing bubble that had ultimately precipitated the property crash.

> "Initially, okay, the state's [interests were served] to the extent that it gets a stream of taxation in. For example, Smithfield [in the HARP IAP] gave something like €50m

Plate 7.8 Closure of Frawley's Department Store, Thomas St.



> back in taxes... That's the view from the state. They see the tax forgone... [being offset by] the tax stream coming in... The state would also see it as an employment issue... People [are] employed so they don't have to pay them unemployment [benefit]. But in reality, the main beneficiaries were the developers and the investors because the state set up the IAP tax incentives in such a way that owner occupiers were at a loss in comparison to investors if they bought any of the developments. And, of course, because there were tax incentives on the site... it unfairly skewed the market against other developments, which meant it helped create the housing bubble, for investors." (TSCP-I)

7.2.4 Social-housing outcomes.

- ***Social-housing commitment.***

Alongside the formal commitment to community gain and local employment, the incorporation of a specific objective in relation to social housing was cited as one of the most important achievements made in respect of the 1998 URS.

> "In the case of social housing, section 5.18 of the 1998 Urban Renewal Guidelines specifies that the overall objective should be to ensure that at least 15% of additional bedspaces provided in the total area covered by the IAP shall be social housing." (DoE, 1999a: 3.4)

It was the third and all-important commitment from which the community was given to understand that significant public-housing gains would follow. On its publication in 1998, the Liberties/Coombe IAP similarly proceeded to outline its commitment to social housing, albeit in wording that conflated two different categories of housing, 'social' and 'affordable.'

> "In order to provide for social and affordable housing in the Liberties/Coombe area it is proposed that on certain incentive sites at least 15% of new residential development be allocated for social affordable housing" (Dublin Corporation, 1998a: 109).

However, that commitment was immediately modified to exempt some incentive sites from the 15 percentage requirement on the grounds of "the existing concentration of social housing in the Liberties/Coombe" and the impractical nature of imposing such a requirement on many of the 'small scale' sites in the 'fine-grained' built environment of the quarter. The commitment, while watered down to an unspecified percentage in respect of some sites, nevertheless did appear to remain absolute in the case of designated sites along at least one of one of the six target tax-incentive areas in the Liberties (Marrowbone Lane) (*ibid.*). Notwithstanding the qualifications and exemptions outlined above, it was clear that the then Dublin Corporation still intended to secure the "inclusion of social housing in the redevelopment of Liberties/Coombe through % component in private developments (or other acceptable means)" (*ibid.,* 119).

- ***Social-housing outcomes.***

It transpired that the commitment to social-housing had been anything but absolute. Those in charge of the implementation of the IAP in its closing years described the original objectives articulated in respect of social-housing as "a bit vague" (LG-II). They had, in fact, been so vague

that no attempt had been made to quantify the financial cost of securing the specified proportion of social-housing. The commitment had apparently been quietly dropped.

> "They were talking about 15% for social-housing [in the original plan]... I'm not sure if they had quantified the value of that. But all that was dropped." (LG-II)

The standing of the commitment had in any case been compromised by concerns about the unconstitutionality of any such social or affordable-housing requirement in respect of developments taking place on private property in advance of planned legislation (Hammond *et al.*, 2001a: 3; see also Smith, 1999). While the subsequent introduction of Part V of the 2000 Planning and Development Act[58] had been welcomed as a means of securing at least some of the social-housing units promised under the IAP (MacLaran *et al.,* 2007), DCC's decision to seek affordable-housing in the main as opposed to social-housing units in fulfilment of its Part V housing entitlements in the Liberties removed one further means of securing any meaningful social-housing gains. Project personnel did not comment on the counterintuitive logic of a policy that had responded to one of the key indicators of deprivation – a high incidence of social housing – by disabling one of the few remaining mechanisms through which this key social support could be delivered. Their attention was instead fixed on the administrative aspects of the policy.

> "What happened in this area here was that the 20% Part V housing was all affordable, there was no social... In some areas it'd be 10% social and 10% affordable. It was deemed [that] there was enough social housing here so the 20% would be affordable. However, that had nothing really to do with the IAP... even though the IAP suggested the 20% affordable. The commitment... or the obligation to give is [an obligation under] planning legislation and developers just had to comply with the planning laws. So again the IAP had no role in ensuring that happened. It's a planning permission issue. We had no statutory right." (LG-II)

While information subsequently provided by DCC's Affordable Housing Unit indicated that it had not in fact sought affordable over social-housing units in all cases, the numbers of social-housing units acquired under Part V had been very small. In the years between 2000 and 2008, DCC's Affordable Housing Unit acquired 57 Part V housing units in the Liberties/Coombe area. The majority of these units (45) were affordable-housing units, while social-housing units accounted for 12 units only, the latter being secured in respect of a single development on Cork St. in 2008.[59]

While the IAP project-management team had the authority to withhold certification until the developers had met their Part V obligations, the negotiation and agreement of all such housing obligations had been a matter for the Affordable Housing Unit within DCC as opposed to the IAP management team. With the introduction of the new Planning and Development Act, it appeared that any brief that the IAP may have held in relation to housing issues was quietly relinquished to

[58] Part V of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 stipulated that local authorities "could require the provision of up to 20 per cent of any residential development for 'social and affordable housing' as a condition of planning permission" (Drudy & Punch, 2005: 143).

[59] Information provided by DCC Affordable Housing Unit, May 2011.

the Planning Department. Thereafter, the IAP functioned as a mechanism to ensure compliance with a legislative requirement that was entirely independent of the IAP.

> "We wouldn't issue [certification] if you hadn't resolved your affordable-housing obligations, so it was a mechanism of forcing them to resolve it. Now, having said that, they have to resolve it anyway because under planning law there's an obligation to contribute whatever percentage of housing is relevant to their planning permission and I presume it would end up in court if they didn't. Whereas, in our case, we would ... withhold the cert. That would be one of the areas of compliance that would have to be shown... And we would ask for a letter from our Affordable Housing section to confirm that they have finalised their deal. Now we wouldn't try to influence that deal, because the number of units can sometimes be dependent on the value of the units and there's negotiations, so that really isn't our role. Just we wouldn't issue the cert until the compliance was met by developers." (LG-II)

The hope that had been vested in Part V of Planning and Development Act, 2000 was further eroded by a significant dilution of its provisions following vocal opposition from the construction sector and related interests which resulted in the Act being amended in 2002 (Drudy & Punch, 2005: 144).

- ***Assessment of social-housing failure.***

The casual manner in which the IAP's social-housing commitments had been discarded had clear resonances with the way in which other aspects of the IAP had also been quietly jettisoned. During the years in which the residents' representative had repeatedly sought to draw attention to the IAP's social-housing obligations, he had not been apprised at any stage that the commitment had been 'dropped.' In submitting his letter of resignation to the IAP in 2002, his association had numbered among its fundamental concerns the IAP's "failure to secure any social-housing units from the extensive private residential development taking place in the area [and] uncertainty about DCC's intention to fulfil its social-housing commitments outlined in the IAP" (Hammond, 2002b). There had been no attempt by either central or local government to clarify the status of the social-housing commitments at that time.

There could be no such uncertainty about the status of the social-housing commitment at the end of the IAP. It had failed to yield a single social-housing unit.[60] Considered in conjunction with the loss of public land that had taken place within the IAP, the failure was taken as further evidence of the manner in which the urban-renewal project had diminished the interests of the resident community.

> "Not only have our interests not been served but we're actually worse off through urban renewal. Because when the thing started there was supposed to be social housing provided – 20% social housing provided [and] integrated into the complexes and whatever was built by the speculators or developers. That never happened... There was a lot of land taken over that could have provided social housing." (CR-I)

[60] This point is made in respect of the social-housing commitment outlined in the Liberties/Coombe IAP. As already noted, DCC did secure a small number of social-housing units (12) in the Liberties/Coombe area under Part V of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 in 2008.

In making this point, the representative in question was referring to three publicly-owned "landmark sites" adjacent to the Cork St/Coombe Bypass that DCC had placed on the market in 2003 with the expectation that each would make "well over €1million" (Irish Times, 2003). In the event, the sites in question sold for €10,500,000, €7,320,000 and €5,004,444 respectively (see Kelly, 2008: 189).[61] While local-government officials pointed with pride to the 30 percent affordable-housing requirement attached to the sale of each of these sites, they failed to appreciate the loss represented by the preference for affordable over social housing for those sections of the community unable to aspire to 'affordable' owner occupation.

For third-sector local-development personnel, the loss of public land and the alternative uses to which it might have been put if retained in public ownership was recognised as a major loss to the community. This point was made with principal reference to public housing.

> "I think over a period of time there's a loss of public space… Space has been privatised… Certainly a lot of the sites that were developed in the inner city were [previously] in public ownership... If you give land to developers, if you make concessions to them to develop, it is at the expense of alternatives... And the alternatives could be parks for people... facilities for people... public housing, which was another argument that was never being pursued, because this whole consensus thing moved away from the idea of public housing being built." (TSDW-I)

With the benefit of hindsight, local-development personnel acknowledged their failure to press for the provision of public housing on public land at a time when that argument could have been made productively. Public representatives were criticised for their failure to capitalise on that opportunity at a time when the political consensus had not yet mobilised against the construction and maintenance of public housing. With the advance of the neoliberal agenda, that opportunity had now passed. Those sections of the resident working-class community dependent on the state for housing were left to suffer the negative consequences of every public-land sale proposed by officials and authorised by councillors.

> "One of the arguments I made very early with the Docklands – didn't get anywhere and didn't even get support for it – was the argument that there was enough land down there to produce large-scale public housing. That's still an argument… on public land. Why shouldn't there be? … The environment now, and this diversion to PPPs, drove that completely off the agenda. But there was a period [when] I felt the councillors should have been stronger… There was enough public land and there was enough money four or five years back to actually build on public land… There's been huge negative implications… for people in the inner city and the wider city as a consequence of the development that's taken place." (TSDW-I)

- ***Larger policy orientation vis-à-vis social housing.***

In the move to prevent any accretion of the local authority's public-housing stock, the IAP had not operated as a stand-alone policy. It was in sympathy with DCC's decision to accord precedence to

[61] DCC sold five sites to private developers in the Cork St. area between 2003 and 2004, namely Ardee St./Cork St. (€10,500,000); Cameron St./Cork St. (€7,320,000); Reuben St./Dolphin's Barn St. (€5,004,444); 4,5,6 Ardee St./Cork St. (€3,939,000) and Newport St./Robert St./Bond St. (€1,765,500). The sites in questions yielded a total of €28,528,944 for DCC. (DCC South Central Area Committee, March 16th 2004, City Manager's Response to Councillor's Questions (Q25), cited in Kelly, 2008: 189)

affordable over social housing in its interpretation and implementation of Part V of the Planning and Development Act, 2000. Meanwhile, the net social-housing stock in the south-west inner city was set to be substantially depleted by the cumulative loss of social-housing units anticipated in each of the PPP housing-regeneration projects. This was of concern even for those public representatives who were broadly supportive of the PPPs.

> "I welcome all the regenerations in the area. I have my reservations about PPPs, but... it's working so far. But under the PPPs, Fatima, Teresa's, Dolphin's House [flats complexes], we lose half the housing stock in those developments and the Council aren't replacing them." (Cllr-II).
>
> "There is affordable [housing within the PPPs], but that's not social [housing] at the end of the day, which means that the housing stock is reduced... If the people who were dependent on social-housing do not and cannot stay in the area... the housing lists will grow longer. Yes, you will get units in some of the apartment complexes under the Part V or the Part 8[62] projects but... not at the same level. So conceivably... between those four or five complexes... in the south-west inner city you could lose up to 500, 600 social-housing units... It means that the host community has been contracted, squashed." (TD IV)

Beyond the housing and land losses sustained and anticipated in both long and short terms from PPPs, there were deeper fears that all such policy moves signalled a larger and concerted move by DCC to withdraw from the direct provision and management of social housing. The manner in which the local authority had begun to transfer land to the voluntary-housing sector compounded those fears.

> "I don't know if this is the Council's way of opting out of social housing....There's a lot of land being given to voluntary housing agencies in this area: the Iveagh Trust, Oakley, Sophia, NABCO. I'm worried that maybe the Council are heading in the direction where maybe they won't be responsible for housing." (Cllr-II)

With the cumulative diminution of the overall social-housing stock, there was a growing concern about the consequences of a deepening affordability crisis (Kelly & MacLaran, 2004). Affordable housing secured under Part V had proved to be a misnomer and would remain beyond the reach of many (CR-I, Cllr-II). In a situation where social and affordable housing had been removed from the equation, the only remaining option for those on the housing list was the poorly monitored private-rental sector which did not provide meaningful security of tenure.

> "So you force people into the [private] rented sector which, in my opinion, ...isn't monitored. You're at the whim of a landlord and you've no security of tenure" (Cllr-II).

Local councillors did acknowledge the advent of government initiatives such as the Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS) which sought "to secure medium to long-term availability of rented accommodation" for people "in receipt of rent supplement" who were "assessed as having a long-term housing need" within the private and voluntary housing sector (DoE, 2010), but were aware that the number of places were not adequate for the numbers on the housing waiting list

[62] Part 8 refers to developments on land owned by local authorities and pertains to "requirements in respect of specified development by, on behalf of, or in partnership with local authorities" (Planning and Development Regulations, 2001).

(Cllr-II). Moreover such schemes did not alleviate the fundamental concern about the rate of attrition in the public-housing stock.

In assessing the implications of the IAP and associated planning and regeneration policies for those who would never be in a position to surmount affordability barriers to owner occupation, it was interesting to note that concerns about the diversion of public monies, which could have been used to augment the public-housing stock, into the private-rental sector did not feature in the concerns of those public representatives who were otherwise engaged with the housing needs of the resident working-class population. A more radical critique of the transfer of resources from public to private sector ensuing from the state's taxation, urban-renewal, planning and social-housing policies was left to a small minority of community and third-sector local-development personnel.

- ***Significance of changing demographics.***

The radically altered social demography of the Liberties (Kelly 2008, Haase 2009) occasioned contrasting responses from different categories of interviewees. For community representatives, the failure of the IAP to generate additional social-housing units to compensate for the steady diminution of the public-housing stock represented one of its most significant failures. For others, it was an important indicator of the IAP's success. For one senior local-government planner, the social and economic ills of disadvantaged areas had arisen from the concentration of social-housing populations in their midst. It followed that the resolution of those problems would be effected by the introduction of new and more affluent populations that would dilute problematic concentrations of low-income populations. This position was not accompanied by any admission of the displacement that might follow for those individuals and communities heretofore dependent on the state for housing. It was instead suggested that the anticipated change in economic circumstances would allow the children of current social-housing tenants to 'aspire' to home ownership.

> "I think there's a general recognition that the problems in places like the Liberties and in Ballymun [arise from] concentrations of disadvantage and lack of social integration, which necessarily means that to sort that problem out, you either increase the number of people living in private apartments or you reduce the amount of social housing. It would seem [that] the best thing to do is to increase the amount of people living in private [housing]." (LGSP-I)

While the pursuit of the optimum social mix of "a third [social], a third [private], a third [affordable]" did not have to mean a reduction in social-housing numbers in absolute terms, it was clear that a net reduction would be called for in areas that had become social-housing enclaves.

> "No, not necessarily reduce, no... Well maybe, I suppose, certainly reduce in certain areas so that you don't have big *cul de sacs* of social housing like Teresa's Gardens and Dolphin House [flats complexes]. So that when they're redeveloped you won't have... 300 social-housing units all together, because everybody seems to agree that that is not a good idea." (LGSP-I)

Local-government personnel weren't alone in issuing such uncritical support for the social-mix ideology. There was a palpable sense of excitement among some public representatives about the numbers of professionals and would-be professionals newly resident in the Liberties. It was an assessment based on pride about the manner in which their presence would transform the Census returns for the area rather than any transformation that might be effected in the educational or economic circumstances of the existing indigenous population. As an assessment, it was entirely untroubled by the fears that others had expressed about the manner in which the influx of a new and more affluent population might function to eclipse the persistence of continuing poverty and serious socio-economic difficulties among the original working-class community.

> "The whole inner city has changed so much now with all this development, with new apartments and a lot of people who are… lawyers and solicitors and bankers and… people coming into the inner city with real education potential... They're adding now to the area and to the whole census of the area… A couple of years ago, say even ten years ago, you would have looked at the census – 1% of the people went to third-level education. Now if the census were done… there'd be a huge increase on that… so that's changed the face of the inner city as well…. What are the gains? Well, I suppose, more people are living in the inner city. I hate to say 'the calibre' of people but it's the only word I can think of... I suppose people coming now from a more professional background… which wasn't heard of before. So straightaway there's a sense of 'this is a place to live, it's an upmarket place to live.' I was asked the other day on the radio what I thought of Dublin 8 being the gay society now… it's the most popular place to live if you're gay [apparently], the Dublin 8 district." (TD-II)

The championing of the area's altered social demographic and new image as 'an upmarket place to live' was the effective rejoinder to those who continued to advance serious concerns about the social-housing losses and negative externalities visited upon the community by the proliferation of apartment development that had taken place across the quarter, most notably the destabilisation and segregation of the resident working-class community (see 7.1.4).

There were two options to consider in confronting these sharply contrasting assessments of the changing residential and housing tenure profile of the Liberties. The first was that the combination of reduced social housing, greater social mix and newly arrived professional middle-class role models could in fact be the trigger that the residents of the local authority's housing complexes needed to rejoin the mainstream market economy from which their low aspirations had previously excluded them. The second was that there was an objective contradiction at play in the implementation of urban-renewal programmes which had assumed an unusual immediacy and clarity in the case of the IAPs. That contradiction was manifest in the antagonism between the interests of those in need of public housing and the interests of the private-development sector which were vested in ridding the area of a devalued housing tenure which was both preventing the release of land for more profitable use and inhibiting the market value of adjacent private residential developments.

7.2.5 Community facilities and adjacent developments.

For the community representatives, the community's stake in the IAP had been predicated on its ability to deliver on its community gain, local employment and social-housing commitments. In outlining the different categories of community gain that would be considered in fulfilment of the obligation attaching to each tax-designated site, DCC had listed two additional categories of gain: "the development itself" in so far as the preservation or restoration of buildings of historical or architectural merit or the remodelling of shop-fronts and facades met with the objectives of the IAP and the "provision of facilities/opportunities" for the community "within the physical development"[63] (Dublin Corporation, 2000: 11). The latter figured largely in the gains identified by local-government and public-representative personnel.

- ***Community facilities***

The range of community facilities listed as being in some way attributable to or associated with the IAP included the following: sports facilities, childcare facilities and community facilities - including a community facility secured from a site formerly in the ownership of DCC.

> "So it wasn't just a case of City Council or the Project Team selling off sites for maximum gain. We were all the time conscious of the requirements of the local community and they were built into the brief for the sale of those sites" (LG-I).

Another tax-designated site that had also been in DCC's ownership had been transferred to the Department of Education to provide for the construction of a new school in what was described as "one of the few notable successes for the community" (MacLaran *et al.,* 2007: 167). This notable success had only been won following a confrontational public campaign that had forced the local authority to take the site in question off the open market (see 6.1.3). In an engagement in which the community had secured very few victories, the local authority was not prepared to accept that its *volte-face* on this site had had anything to do with the public campaign in question. The suggestion that its real intention had been to proceed with the public-land sale to the detriment of the promised educational facility was firmly rejected (LG-I).

> "No, no… There was a deadline on the tax incentives and we put it on the market to show the Department of Education that if they didn't move on it, that we were going to. And it became a topical issue at the time but we were quite happy and we always said… that if money came through for the [school] project, that that's what it's going for. That's what it ended up as." (LG I:5)

Nevertheless, it was clear that this record of events did not accord with the accounts of either the community representatives (SWICN Environment Group, 2003) or the public representatives who had joined the campaign to oppose the proposed land sale.

[63] E.g. "play areas, youth club facilities, training workshops, low cost offices, community resource centres, pedestrian links to new or existing spaces, creation or enhancement of small neighbourhood squares or parks etc." (Dublin Corporation, 2000: 11).

> "Sure I spoke to the manager myself, John Fitzgerald.... John Fitzgerald was going to get a whole heap of money for it. Maybe he needed it, but we weren't going to let him away with it." (TD-I)

- ***Appropriation of adjacent developments.***

Notwithstanding the differing accounts advanced in relation to the manner in which the above educational facility had been secured for the local community and notwithstanding larger questions about the value of the aforementioned community facility secured relative to the public loss sustained from the sale of the local authority's site on Cork Street, it was clear that both facilities owed their provenance directly to the Liberties/Coombe IAP. In a number of other instances, the precise relationship between the various sports and community facilities cited and the IAP was more difficult to discern.

It was symptomatic of a larger confusion about the manner in which the IAP should be assessed. This confusion extended to an inability to distinguish between the outcomes of the IAP and the outcomes and anticipated outcomes of the various PPP housing-regeneration projects in progress or planned across the quarter. It was thus that a local-government official described the housing PPPs as "separate projects but... all to do with improving the lot of the local community" (LG-I). In discussing the impact of the IAP, the attention of a number of public representatives similarly converged on the PPP housing projects. For some, they were initiatives to be celebrated for the enhanced living conditions, improved housing and positive participative experiences that they had delivered (TD-II). For others, there was greater ambivalence. Any gains anticipated in respect of these PPPs were dependent on the progression of these projects and there was an awareness that all such gains for remaining tenants would be offset by considerable losses in the public-housing stock.

The inability of a number of public representatives to differentiate between the outcomes of urban-renewal and housing-regeneration programmes may have been indicative of a number of factors: a general lack of knowledge about the objectives of the IAP, an inability to distinguish any significant socio-economic gains to be cited in respect of the IAP and a local-governmental environment in which communities and public representatives were invited to conflate two forms of regeneration. It may also have been a reflection of the significantly greater difficulty experienced in attempting to grapple with the long-term impact of large-scale complex urban-renewal programmes as opposed to the more immediate and tangible impacts of geographically defined housing-regeneration projects. It was thus that one public representative proceeded to enumerate an exhaustive inventory of the gains that were attributed with various degrees of accuracy and inaccuracy to the IAP.

> "I am surprised that people genuinely don't seem to know of the good things that go on. I'm not saying that the IAP was completely successful but... it brought money into the area [and] infrastructure, I mean the [Marrowbone Lane Sports] Centre... was part

> of the IAP; it was part of the plans of the IAP to bring about... sustainable urban renewal... We have the Donore Community Centre. We have the Early Days Crèche in School St., all part of the plan for urban renewal in this area... We have Fatima [Mansions PPP]. St. Teresa's [Gardens planned PPP], please God, is moving along at a great pace. So there are benefits to all [from] the development in the area." (Cllr-II)

- ***Caveat re gains identified.***

For third-sector local-development personnel, there was no such confusion about the outcomes that should be attributed to the IAP and outcomes that had an entirely separate derivation. One local-development worker accepted that inner-city areas had gained new cultural and community facilities in the years in which the IAPs had been ongoing, but suggested that such facilities were the product of normal government functions and operations as opposed to any "orchestrated urban-renewal programme" (TSCP-I). The provision of such facilities was believed to have been well within the spending power of a government that was, at that point, in the middle of an unprecedented economic boom.

This point was also extended to cover acknowledged improvements in the quality of local-authority housing. Different local-development personnel applied different weightings to the significance of public-procurement housing-regeneration programmes in assessing the impact or urban-renewal programmes. For one local-development officer, there was an insistence that urban renewal should not be assessed with reference to private-sector development only.

> "You can't reduce renewal to just private-sector development, because over the last 10 years, significant renewal took place in some of the housing complexes. And that's [why I go] back to [the significance of City Manager] John Fitzgerald's entrepreneurial team or approach. That also had the consequence of significant pressure on the DoE to develop... the public housing, to make it better... So you can't discount the fact that in Sean MacDermott St., in parts of the Liberties, around [the northwest inner city and] ...parts of Ringsend... money did go into improving... conditions in the public housing. Some new housing was built, not much, but some very good quality new... public housing was built... Public funds went into regenerating existing housing... A certain amount of improvement schemes happened around flats complexes. So regeneration included that as well as [the activities of] the private sector." (TSDW-I)

Others did not dispute the improvements wrought in public housing and living conditions in the inner city but suggested that the provision of good quality housing should be regarded as "truly a normal function of the state" and not an additional extra that urban-renewal schemes should be allowed to appropriate to the credit side of their balance sheet (TSCP-I). This caveat about the degree to which all such housing improvements and community facilities should be attributed to the IAP was entered in an attempt to impose a degree of discipline on the assessment of the 1998 URS's IAPs and to prevent the clumsy appropriation of positive but unrelated developments that followed from distinct and separate policy lines (TSCP-I).

In this, the third-sector local-development employee in question was joined by one of the more critical community representatives who rejected the indiscriminate appropriation of developments that were in some cases unproven but in all cases entirely independent of the IAP.

> "People will say 'what about the regeneration of Fatima Mansions? What about the regeneration that is going to take place at Teresa's Gardens? What about the facilities that we've supplied in Donore Avenue – the community centre and the one on Marrowbone Lane?' All of those things took place. I won't be the judge of whether Fatima Mansions is a success or a failure until I see it in operation; likewise with Teresa's Gardens. But none of the four things that I mentioned, not a penny came from the developers or from the speculators towards them. That was money that came from the government and governments don't have to be thanked when they build a community centre that is fifty years out of date... I'm glad that it happened, but you don't have to be saying that it was great work at a time that the country had plenty of money those things were done." (CR-I)

Even for those who continued to conflate the IAP with all other policy initiatives ongoing in the area at that time, there was the sense that the net beneficiaries had unquestionably been the developers. "They got land and they got it cheap. They got the tax incentives. They got all the breaks" (Cllr-II).

7.2.6 IAP socio-economic failures.

- ***Assessment of failures.***

On its publication, the 1998 URS had been heralded as "a radical departure" from the property-led renewal programmes that had preceded it. The characterisation of the scheme in this manner had emanated from the DoE. It was the Department that had issued both the initial guidelines to local authorities about the manner in which they should prepare their respective IAPs and the subsequent guidelines about the manner in which their monitoring should take place. It was the Department responsible for the series of circulars communicated to each city and county manager throughout the lifetime of the IAPs. It was, most significantly, the Department to which each local authority was obliged to submit an approved annual report outlining the progress made under each strand of its integrated renewal brief in respect of each year of the plan's lifetime. When it came to the assessment of the impacts of this 'radically different' urban-renewal programme, it was the Department of Finance, however, and not the DoE that commissioned the review of the scheme's performance.

For the DoE, the matter appeared to be closed. There had been what it described as an 'economic analysis' of the 1998 URS (i.e. the *Goodbody Review*). The DoE had not commissioned any qualitative assessment of the IAPs and it was unlikely that any such assessment would now take place. The urban-renewal and integrated area plan approach had "moved on" and the assessment "wouldn't be worth it" (CG-I). It was a somewhat anomalous position to adopt towards the implementation of an URS that was to have been distinguished by the expansion of its brief beyond "issues of physical development" to cover "wider issues of local socio-economic benefit" (DoE,

1999a: 1.2). While it was not clear which aspects of the IAP would have featured in such a qualitative review, the description of the *Goodbody Review* as an 'economic analysis' appeared to overlook the fact that it had actually attended to the three key socio-economic objectives upon which the community's stake in the IAP had been predicated: community-gain finance, social housing and local employment (see Chapter 4).

As already noted, local-government officials in the Liberties were not aware of the existence or the findings of the *Goodbody Review*. DCC had not commissioned its own review of the IAP and, beyond the Annual Reports submitted to the DoE each year, did not have any definitive assessments or indicators to draw upon in charting its success or failure in the implementation of each of the three strands of the IAP. While it had put the requisite monitoring procedure in place, it had not attempted to conduct an overall assessment of the success or failure of the IAPs.

> "The success or failure of the IAP? We [DCC] haven't done... any assessments on it. Now, whether they'll be done afterwards? We may not be great at assessing stuff that we do... We don't tend to be great at bringing [out] papers on things afterwards... It's not part of your day-to-day job. You're not given time or the resources to sit back. You've... day-to-day work to do, so we don't tend to do it." (LG-II)

In light of the transformations that the state's urban-renewal policies were effecting in the economy, society and built environment of each of the designated areas in the city, the failure of DCC to conduct such an evaluation could only be described as a very significant oversight.

- ***Aspirational, unviable socio-economic brief.***

Notwithstanding the local authority's failure on this point, a reminder of the integrated brief with which it had been entrusted in the implementation of the IAPs did elicit a number of insights about the implausibility of the various social and economic renewal strategies outlined in the original Liberties/Coombe IAP. Local-government officials were particularly sceptical about the degree to which such socio-economic objectives might ever have been considered viable in the absence of any financial mechanism to give practical effect to them. In the absence of the necessary funding, it was suggested that all such objectives may have been 'aspirational' only.

> "There was no funding put in place to deliver on the creation of jobs or the other social aspects. Where was the money to come from? You know the plan had aspirations across a whole range of things. It didn't ever outline how they'd be delivered. Many of them would be delivered well outside the City Council remit. Education would be [a matter] for the state. Employment is a matter for the state. So certainly there was no financial mechanism outlined in the plan or no financial resources made available outside of the community gain [fund]." (LG-II)

The idea that a localised committee with a budget limited to community-gain contributions secured from private developers could have attempted either to challenge national policies or redress the more negative impacts of those policies was implausible.

> "Well, not on the basis of €3,500,000 [community-gain fund], that wouldn't go very far... So I don't know [where] those that wrote the plan... foresaw where the finance or the wherewithal would come to deliver on it. Maybe it was never meant to be

> delivered by the IAP itself. It was just [an aspirational statement that] 'these are the things that should happen in the area.' The IAP can only drive so many things. I mean we didn't have representatives from Social Welfare or the Department of Education or Employment or Labour or Finance on the committee. So it was more localised committees trying to challenge national objectives or aspirations." (LG-II)

Objectives that were articulated in respect of socio-economic difficulties rooted in national structural problems were never going to be amenable to resolution within the powers or the resources available to local government (LGSP-I). The rationalisation of the IAP's larger failures in this manner allowed individual officers to proceed with a degree of equanimity and pragmatism in advancing a decidedly positive assessment of the developments and achievements that had proved possible within the IAP. "So it's a game of two halves. Or is the glass half-full or half-empty?" (LGSP-I). Divested of any aspirations or pretensions in relation to the larger socio-economic objectives outlined within the IAP, there was an admirable clarity in the assessments offered by other local-government officials in relation to the core objective of the plan as they had understood it, development when and where it was wanted (see 7.1.2).

7.3 Taking issue with the rhetoric of renewal.

Community- and local-development personnel, who had spent the previous decade attempting to withstand the negative impacts of the large-scale developments taking place within the state's urban-renewal programmes, were considerably less forgiving about the planning transgressions, socio-economic failures and considerable costs thrust upon inner-city communities by the IAPs. After many decades of governmental inactivity and neglect, inner-city communities had found themselves on the receiving end of a succession of urban-renewal and regeneration programmes in the late 1990s and early 2000s. All programmes had been heralded with great rhetorical flourishes and commitments about the gains that would be conferred on resident communities. All programmes had been couched in a positive and progressive rhetoric that had admitted no criticism and brooked no opposition. Many of these urban-renewal and regeneration programmes had then proceeded to be implemented in a manner that had resulted in the sale and privatisation of publicly-owned land, the diminution of the public-housing stock and the fracture, destabilisation and displacement of the resident working-class community. The benefits of successive waves of urban-renewal programmes had flowed to the private-development sector while the accompanying short and long-term costs had been overwhelmingly and disproportionately borne by the host working-class community.

The rhetoric of urban renewal did not encompass any admission of the conflicting property interests at the heart of renewal projects. It did not contain any acknowledgement of the fact that the logic of state-engendered urban-renewal programmes would work inexorably for the betterment of private-development interests while militating against the material interests of working-class communities. It did not apprise communities of "the negatives that would be coming their way" or

of the fact that "there would always be winners and losers" in the implementation of renewal programmes (TSCP-I). Nether did it incorporate any measures to "mitigate against unintended negative effects" (TSCP-I). By the close of the 1998 URS, the language and rhetoric of urban renewal which had functioned to legitimate the advancement of a policy agenda with very questionable environmental, economic and social outcomes was itself under attack. Critical community representatives and employees were writing and speaking publicly about the manner in which "the Department of the Environment and Local Government and its local authority, Dublin City Council, [had] misrepresented both the real agenda being pursued *via* the IAPs and the role and standing of the community representatives therein" (Brudell *et al.*, 2004:84). They were contending that "the local authority's new found *modus operandi* of conciliatory partnership" was "functioning to preclude and negate the emergence of any legitimate criticism of what [was] being done to working-class communities in the name of urban renewal" (*ibid.,* 85), while inner-city communities themselves were beginning to speak of "being regenerated to death" (TSCP-I).

CHAPTER 8

Liberties Regeneration Project - a Prospective.

8.0 Introduction, a prospective.

As the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan (IAP) drew to a close, Dublin City Council (DCC) announced the commencement of a new phase of urban regeneration in the Liberties in 2007, the Liberties Regeneration Project (LRP). This research took place during the opening phase of that regeneration project, i.e. the 16-month period dating from the official launch of the LRP in October 2007 to the formal adoption of the LRP's Local Area Plan in February 2009. The research explores the manner in which the programme was launched; the consultation and public information process surrounding the preparation of the regeneration plan; the nature of the engagements that took place between the state and the community within those structures; the statutory consultative procedure subsequently launched consequent to the decision to place the regeneration plan on a legal footing and the final decision taken by the elected councillors of DCC in exercising their reserved function in relation to the 'making, amending or revoking' of the ensuing draft Local Area Plan (LAP) for the Liberties.

This chapter reviews the rationale for the introduction of this new regeneration project and the distinctive features of this new and more ambitious form of urban regeneration. It considers the continuing rationale for community participation within the state's urban-renewal programmes with particular attention to the rationale for moving to a new mode of community participation ('direct democracy') and the rationale for outsourcing the public consultative process to private consultants. The chapter immediately following explores the nature of engagements between the state/the state's consultants and the community within this new consultation process with a view to elucidating the key critical and analytical points arising for working-class communities in an increasingly aggressive urban-regeneration environment. Moving outside of the community consultation process, it details the formal authority with which local councillors are vested in the 'making, amending or revoking' of LAPs and the manner in which the political consensus surrounding urban-regeneration projects in working-class areas is forged. The chapter closes with the outcomes of the first phase of the LRP and available indications about the long-term future of working-class communities residing in areas which the state is intent on remaking for private capital.

8.1 Rationale and distinctive feature of LRP.

8.1.1 Moving on from the Integrated Area Plan.

Launched in October 2007, in the closing years of the Liberties/Coombe IAP, DCC's *New Vision for the Liberties* was presented as "the next step in progressing beyond what was our IAP"

(Assistant-City Manager, Launch 2007). The positioning of the LRP in such a direct relationship to the IAP was undertaken in a selective manner. DCC had not undertaken any evaluation of the IAPs which had been in progress across the city during the previous decade. Neither did it make any reference to the series of highly critical findings which the Goodbody Review had reached about the social and economic failures reported in respect of its nationwide assessment of the IAPs (see Chapter 4). The nature of the relationship between the two regeneration plans appeared to rest solely on DCC's determination to build on the momentum for development created by the IAP and to address any factors that might have impeded the extent and nature of development sought in the Liberties to date.

Any failures that might have been conceded in respect of the Liberties/Coombe IAP were explained with reference to the constraints attaching to a renewal plan in which the programme of tax incentives were frequently not sufficient to compensate for the investment risk that the area continued to pose for developers (LG-IV). The redevelopment of the Liberties had also been hampered by a rich archaeological heritage in which developers risked unearthing valuable archaeological sites and incurring extensive work stoppages with every foundation laid (LG-IV). The new regeneration regime was not in any case disposed to concede the legitimacy of any of the criticisms levelled by the community against the implementation of the IAP. The criticisms in question were attributed to the latter's failure to appreciate the considerably longer timeframes within which the local authority was obliged to operate in the development of the city. Measured against such a timeframe, the 10-year lifetime of the IAP was an impossibly 'minute' period in which to assess anything meaningfully (LG-IV). It was also suggested that developers had been unfairly demonised in an environment in which the media had conspired to portray them as "the Machiavellian bad guys" (LG-IV). Their demonisation in this manner was attributed to the failure to look behind headline-property values to the significant borrowing costs, financial risks and planning difficulties incurred and assumed by developers in respect of each development. In defiance of such 'short-sighted' assessments and 'cynical stereotypes,' individual developers were lauded for their bravery in investing money in the Liberties when it was still "a scary place" to be. Their pioneering spirit was credited with bringing parts of the Liberties to public attention (LG-IV). Developers did not demur from such compliments and spoke in a similar vein about the "massive social and cultural" significance of individual developments that had "put the Liberties on the map" (LRP Public Forum (PF) 3, Apr. 2008).

Notwithstanding the failure of the IAP to oversee the full extent of the development sought, it was credited with both advancing the currency of key ideas and concepts such as permeability, open space etc. and in establishing design baselines to which the local authority and developer could revert when the environment became more conducive to development once again (LG-IV).

8.1.2 Rationale for Liberties Regeneration Project.

The decision to introduce a new regeneration project in the twilight years of the IAP signalled DCC's intent to redouble its efforts to create an environment that would be conductive to development and that would "effect the transformational change required to encourage investment in the former industrial areas" (DCC, 2008a: 9).

DCC outlined the rationale for the regeneration programme in the most general of terms in the opening stages of the process. It had "established the Liberties Regeneration Project because it realised that there was huge potential in the area which needed to be managed strategically" (DCC 2008b: 1). However that rationale had assumed considerable detail and force by the time that the *Draft Local Area Plan* was ready for circulation.

> "The Liberties is an area facing major change. Over the next decade improvements to Dublin's public transport infrastructure are planned, including the Interconnector and LUAS extension, which will significantly increase the connectivity of the area. Within the same timeframe a number of large brownfield sites will become available for redevelopment. The Draft Local Area Plan (Draft LAP) must seize this opportunity to re-shape the western segment of the inner city. In line with best practice in sustainable urban planning, high intensity development clusters should be created around public transport nodes. At the same time the historic character of the Liberties must be recognised and respected. The key role of the Draft LAP is to strike a balance between protecting what is cherished within this historic city quarter and promoting the type and quantum of development that will enable the Liberties to become an exciting, attractive and liveable city quarter as well as contributing to the economic prosperity and social success of the city and the nation" (DCC, 2008a: 3).

The opportunity that DCC was intent on seizing was presented by a mixture of positive and negative factors in an area that LRP personnel described as being 'in flux' in terms of the social, economic and built environment. A curious mixture of sentimentality and hard financial acumen was evident in the delineation of that rationale. In enumerating the positives factors that could be mobilised in the service of a new regeneration project, the Liberties was depicted as "the emotional centre of Dublin" – a "slightly gritty… slightly edgy… earthy," not too gentrified part of the city populated by a proud "bolshie" people with a harsh sense of humour that was unforgiving of pretensions in others (LG-IV). The continuing attraction of the area's traditional markets and retailers for those who had earlier migrated out to the suburbs and the resurgence of interest in the Liberties as quarter in which to live was cited as evidence of the manner in which the quarter continued to resonate with the wider city (LG-IV). The 'grittiness' of the quarter meanwhile provided DCC with a distinctive angle around which the regeneration of this previously industrial area could be marketed for young gentrifiers.

Notwithstanding the sentimental construction of the area's significance in this manner, there was also great clarity about the real asset and the real opportunity at issue in the LRP, the land. The Liberties was an area with large land blocks that needed to be looked at – "like the Diageo land

block, and even the DCC land block and the Digital Hub land block and maybe even the Iveagh Market land block" (LG-IV). It was an area in which significant blocks of private and public land were about to be released onto the market. In the case of the latter, DCC's statement of its intention to reorganise some of its public-housing stock and the large sites on which they had been inappropriately constructed in earlier decades (LG-IV) signalled a particularly important development opportunity.

On the negative side, it was clear that DCC was still confronted by many of the factors that had impeded the wholesale transformation of the Liberties to that point. Despite the fact that the Liberties was "very much geographically and physically located in the middle of the city," it continued to occupy a peripheral status as a city location. The LRP was intent on redressing this anomaly and putting the area "back at the centre of the city" (LG-IV). The extent of the DCC's ambitions in respect of the Liberties would subsequently become apparent in the "major role" that the Draft LAP identified for the Liberties in "the success and global competitiveness of Dublin as a whole" (DCC 2008a: 84). The LRP was also intent on redressing the Liberties' continuing failure to establish its credentials as an area in which middle-class people could settle and raise their children. Notwithstanding the numbers that had been attracted back into living in the area, there were concerns about the isolation and difficulties that apartment dwellers might be experiencing in seeking to integrate into the local community (LG-IV).

The area, meanwhile, continued to be characterised by many of the negative built-environmental indicators which had provided the original impetus for urban renewal. This point was made with particular reference to the degree of dereliction to be found along the area's main thoroughfare and arterial route into the city (Thomas Street) and was credited with providing the original impetus for a regeneration project that had then expanded to encompass neighbouring streets that were "not really working" and flats complexes that were "coming to the end of their sell-by [date]" (LG-IV).

> "I think, probably Thomas St. kicked it off... It's a main artery into the city. It's a route that a lot of people go down and it was beginning to look rundown and seedy and people were beginning to say... that this is an important part of the city. It's near the old city wall, it's where people identify with and the issues we spoke about earlier to do with the emotional attachment that everybody in Dublin seems to have to the area. And then it was like 'well it's not just Thomas St. is it really? It's Meath St. and it's not just Meath St., it's Francis St...' And so the combination of the housing really needing to be looked at and the economic areas needing to be looked at and the importance of both of them to the city just presented an opportunity." (LG-IV)

Coupled with the manner in which the area had been fractured by the configuration of some of the larger land blocks and the nature of the public housing and roads development that had taken place (LG-IV), it was apparent that DCC had marshalled all available liabilities in the physical environment to make a compelling case for state intervention in the area on a scale not previously seen.

> "The regeneration of the Liberties represents a significant opportunity for Dublin City Council to contribute to economic growth at a city and national level. This strategically located area could potentially be transformed from a run down, if historic, neighbourhood with a poor reputation into an exemplar urban quarter with a unique character and revitalised economy." (John Thompson & Partners (JTP), 2008: 1)

There was, however, one significant liability in the area that could not be repackaged as a regeneration opportunity. It was a liability that had to be countered definitively if the many opportunities identified by DCC were to be realised – the significant investment risk that the area continued to pose to bankers, investors and developers.

> "[The Liberties] was always perceived by the banks as a high-risk place... Even when I was talking to the Grand Canal Harbour[64] people about the development there and that had a very, very fragmented land ownership – a huge consortium pulling in different directions and then finally it was bought out by two groups and they're operating under a single development agency now. But they were saying that they had a huge job convincing the banks that it wouldn't be high-risk in a commercial sense." (LG-IV)

It was the latter more than any other factor to which DCC addressed itself in the introduction and progression of the LRP. If it is possible to distinguish one predominant motivating factor for the LRP, it was the need to instil investor confidence in the Liberties.

8.1.3 Form of state intervention.

In presenting the Draft LAP for public consultation in October 2008, DCC's consultants took great care to outline the full panoply of European, national, regional and local planning-policy documents that had informed the preparation of the plan (DCC, 2008a: 23-25). Notwithstanding the ease with which the regeneration plan could be slotted into the prevailing policy and draft policy paradigm of the time (see 9.1.4 for the manner in which draft planning-policy documents were invoked as *de facto* policy throughout), the LRP did not, unlike its predecessor, emerge from any overarching national regeneration policy context. It was instead presented as a self-financing city project that owed its impetus directly to the City Council.

> "It is a city project. It's not the government's project. I mean I'm not saying they're against it, but they haven't given us a whole lot of money. So this is one of those projects that the City is going to find the money to do itself. Now we will get some money off the government for particular things, but... they aren't the originators of the project. The City Council is the originator of the project." (LRP Project Manager, LRP Community Planning Weekend (CPW), Nov. 2007)

As such, the programme of tax incentives available under the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) had been terminated and would not be at the disposal of DCC in this new regeneration plan. This did not appear to pose a serious impediment to LRP project personnel who suggested that the IAP's programme of tax incentives had never been capable of overcoming the investment fears attached

[64] The Grand Canal Harbour was one of the "significant redevelopment sites" identified within the Liberties Regeneration Project (DCC, 2008a: 156).

to commercial and residential development in the area. In this context, LRP project personnel pointed to the considerably greater power wielded by the local authority in an urban regeneration project when the land earmarked for development was in its ownership.

> "The IAPs... would have been very much based on trying to get developers and property owners to take a risk in an area on the back of tax concessions. And I think they worked in certain areas but I think they worked in the areas where they probably would have worked anyway. I think that it was very optimistic to think that if there was an area that was perceived as high-risk in terms of investment for either commercial or residential [development] that tax was going to really make a difference. Because if you're losing money, you're not paying tax, so you're not saving any money anyway." (LG-IV)

It appeared that those fears had not been allayed by the ten years of extensive development that had taken place across the quarter.

- ***Assuming the risk in a new form of intervention.***

Having taken cognisance of the limitations of regeneration programmes driven purely by tax incentives, DCC had resolved to assume the risk necessary to instil investor confidence. This appeared to be the major *raison d'être* of the LRP.

> "I think banks... have quite a short horizon when they're looking at risk and that developers are in that same mould and that it's really down to a public authority to do the upfront risk taking in terms of investment in the public realm, in terms of putting out a vision, selling a place and trying to minimise the risk or trying to at least to articulate a vision that gives the bank the idea that this is the new place to be... I think the very fact that you announce a regeneration [plan] gives a reassurance to banks that there is less risk associated with it than they may have been previously thought." (LG-IV)

In assuming such a risk, it was clear that DCC's attention had moved from private to public-land drivers and that it had resolved to proceed with a new, more ambitious and arguably more aggressive form of state intervention in the urban realm through public-land sales. It is important in this context to note that DCC had also disposed of a number of its sites during the course of the Liberties/Coombe IAP and that the LRP might, as such, have been considered to be following a well-worn regeneration trajectory. The form of intervention at issue in the LRP was, however, distinguished by the fact that the local authority had now turned its attention to it public-housing land holdings.

The newspaper coverage relayed the key selling points of this new regeneration plan – the scale of the project, the existence of an ambitious landmark project already at design stage, the major transport infrastructural developments planned for the area and the appointment of an international architectural firm to develop the project. It also relayed the key signal given to those interested in obtaining land holdings in a central city area in which land was at a premium – "Council land to kick start Liberties redevelopment" (O'Brien, 2007) and the amount of land at issue, "some 21 hectares (nearly 52 acres)" (*ibid.*) but did not accompany this good-news property story with any

consideration of the implications of the planned land sales for those currently residing on the land in question. The significance of DCC's accompanying, if rather oblique, statement of its intention to consider the future of some of its public-housing schemes as part of the regeneration process (City Manager, LRP Launch Oct. 2007) with the objective of establishing "which are the ones that work and which are the ones that don't" (JTP, LRP Launch, Oct. 2007) appeared to have been lost on all but the small number of local residents in attendance at the launch.

As the plans for the LRP gathered momentum it became clear that the local authority also planned to activate and stimulate the future regeneration of the area through public-realm interventions.

> "The additional thing that we would have as a regeneration project that the IAP wouldn't have is that the interventions that we're making in the physical world in terms of putting in a new park, a library, increasing the routes, putting in more roads, redefining the Depot site[65] and building on the edges. So all of those things that we're doing are an attempt to stimulate activity – economic activity and building activity, but also obviously to deliver clear products." (LG-IV)

In the interests of creating a development environment of greater certainty and confidence for the bankers and developers who were seeking to ascertain the precise returns to be obtained from prospective investments and developments, the LRP would also be served by wider policy initiatives at city level. DCC's decision to commission a new citywide *Strategy for Intensification and Height* (DCC, 2007) was cited as being particularly significant in this respect and was presented as an important corrective to a situation in which the City Development Plan had been the only tool available to adjudicate on building heights and densities.[66]

> "I think that's an advantage now that the McGarry study, *Maximising the City,* is quite clear about where you can build high and where you can't. And, okay, it even defines high as what it means by high and it isn't; it obviously isn't talking about 50-storeys anywhere except in very specific locations around Heuston and the Docklands. So that isn't even on the table anymore when a developer is going to an architect... [or] when somebody is trying to figure out how much their land is worth because I think that was probably the big factor that people were paying over the odds on the back on an expectation that wasn't realistic and then they were trying to achieve that expectation because of the amount of money they had told the banks the land would be worth. So I do think that whole issue of some sort of certainty [is welcome], whether it was good news or bad news." (LG-IV)

Beyond establishing development parameters that would assist prospective investors and developers in establishing the value and likely returns from land holdings in the area, the *Strategy for Intensification and Height* went one step further in articulating a number of its policies and criteria for development to one of the areas earmarked for development in the Liberties. The Digital Hub was, for example, incorporated within a "new north-south 'knowledge' axis... facilitated by the release of redundant industrial and institutional lands" and listed as a "high intensity cluster" with "significant scope for intensification and... clusters of high buildings and/or landmark

[65] I.e. a large land holding belonging to DCC in the area.

[66] The agreement of new apartment building guidelines (see 7.1.5) for Dublin City was similarly commended for setting 'ground rules' for the type of development permissible in the city (LG-IV).

buildings within the inner city" (DCC, 2007: 23). Citing the IAPs as one of the policy vehicles through which intensification (or "sustainable consolidation of the central regeneration areas") had been achieved to date, it continued with a statement of the significance of the various framework plans in preparation at that time. They were described as "an efficient and flexible planning tool, facilitating the reconstruction and expansion of the city core" – planning tools that represented "a conscious move away from more unsustainable forms of development towards intensification and, where appropriate, identify locations for additional height" (*ibid.,* 5-7). Framework plans were to be 'the principle tool' used to guide the development of high intensity clusters (*ibid.,* 23).

The core components of the proposed state interventions undertaken in the LRP may accordingly be summarised as the sale of public lands to 'kick start' development, interventions in the public realm to instil greater investor confidence and policy interventions to create a development environment of greater certainty. The certainty of that development environment was further enhanced by DCC's subsequent decision to proceed on a statutory Local Area Plan basis as opposed to a Framework Plan basis. It was only the third occasion on which it had embarked on the statutory LAP route in the city.[67] These core interventions were accompanied by a host of other ancillary features designed to enhance the area's attraction for bankers, investors and developers.

8.1.4 Distinctive character of LRP.

The most distinctive feature of the new regeneration project rested in the forms of state intervention outlined above, notably that of public-land sales. While the precise ends to which the targeted public lands would be mobilised within the LRP did not become apparent in the early stages of the process, it was clear from the salience given to the local authority's future plans in respect of both the public-land and flats complexes housed on that land, that it was to be the central driver for the LRP. The opening presentation of the LRP was also, however, notable for the emergence of a number of additional distinguishing features that would receive fuller elaboration and articulation as the LRP agenda unfolded. While the manner in which the LRP was presented had direct resonances with the early presentations of the IAP in some respects, it was clear that the local authority was in the process of remaking the area around a number of quite distinct conceptual blocks. The Liberties was presented as an area with an obsolete industrial history that needed to redress its economic neglect. It was also an area that would was in the process of becoming a focal point for " the burgeoning digital media industry" by virtue of the government's decision to locate the Digital Hub in its midst (DCC, 2008a: 4). The Liberties was an area with a rich architectural heritage and a rich inventory of cultural assets that included a long tradition of markets and a burgeoning artistic and creative cultural community. It was an area in which suitable mixed-tenure housing would be sought in a quarter whose mobility and connectivity would be greatly enhanced

[67]An earlier Draft LAP for Phibsborough/Mountjoy had been adopted in October 2008while a Draft LAP for Ballsbridge had been rejected in June 2007.

by the construction of a new light-rail transit line. The Liberties was finally an area in which significant development was planned, an area in transition that had the feeling of being 'at tipping point' (LRP Launch, Oct. 2007).

All of the above factors and motifs featured in the opening presentation of DCC's new vision for the Liberties. Each would receive significantly greater elaboration in the evolving consultative and public information process (see Chapter 9) in which the LRP would come to resemble the archetypal "creative city" urban-regeneration project in the manner of Richard Florida (2002).

8.1.5 Significance of LRP for resident working-class community.

The LRP was to be distinguished from the regeneration projects that had preceded it by the nature of the state intervention, the scale of the regeneration agenda, the sophistication of the regeneration process, the myriad of stakeholders assembled and the rhetoric in which it was couched. While markedly more modest in both agenda and process, the IAPs had also promised a holistic and integrated programme of physical, social and economic regeneration. They too had been heralded as radical departures from the urban-renewal programmes that had preceded them. It remained to be seen whether the LRP, with its elaborate and rhetorical embellishments, represented anything substantially different from previous regeneration programmes. In seeking to assess the significance of the LRP, the research was attentive to the likely implications of its regeneration vision and objectives for the resident working-class community and the degree to which the latter was likely to find the LRP agenda to be antagonistic or sympathetic to its interests. It was also interested in the reception that those who accepted DCC's invitation to participate and sought to represent their interests within its structures were likely to meet.

8.2 Rationale for community participation in LRP.

8.2.1 Significance of working-class communities within urban regeneration.

- ***Insights gained from a decade of community participation.***

Introduced in the late 1990s "towards the end of a decade that had seen the convergence of many integrated, interagency and community initiatives in Dublin's inner city"[68] (Brudell *et al.,* 2004: 76), the community participation component of the 1998 URS was heralded as one of the distinctive features of the IAP. Participation within the IAPs had provided the host communities with an important insight into the workings of urban-renewal programmes. It had also provided local authorities with an invaluable insight into the manner in which working-class communities were likely to operate within such structures and the degree to which their presence was likely to further or impede the implementation of the state's urban-regeneration agenda. The endeavour had

[68] Including Area Based Partnerships, Area Network Organisations, Local Drugs Task Forces, Integrated Services Projects, Tenants Forums, Community Policing Forums and Community Development Projects (Brudell *et al.,* 2004: 76).

allowed DCC invaluable exposure to the varying degrees of consent and opposition to be found among working-class communities to the planning and development issues confronted within urban renewal. It had also allowed it to assess the degree to which the community-representative mode of participation had served to dissipate or crystallise emerging conflicts of interest and core antagonisms in the implementation of its regeneration programmes across the city.

Alongside the IAPs, DCC had also expanded its new inclusive and participative *modus operandi* across the various public-private-partnership (PPP) regeneration projects instituted in a number of flats complexes across the inner city. The frequency with which the local authority and community-development sector were coming into contact was to provide the impetus for the agreement of a formal protocol governing engagements between the two parties/sectors (DICP & DCC, 2007). These were only some of the means through which the state was insinuating itself into those communities targeted for major interventions in the urban realm, drawing communities into closer and closer engagement within its own structures (see Chapter 4).

- ***Mainstreaming of an experimental policy tool.***

It was thus that what started out as an experimental component of regeneration policy in the mid- to late-1990s became a mainstream policy tool with which the local authority had become very familiar by the late 2000s. As a concept, it was clear that the participative *modus operandi* and the significance that resident working-class communities assumed within urban regeneration had also filtered into the consciousness of other interested groups and parties with which local government was engaging. In a public forum convened by DCC as part of the *Creative Corridor, Thomas St. is Happening Festival* in June 2006, public contributions from all parties present (independent facilitators, senior DCC professionals, creative industry personnel, private developers and architectural firms engaging in the area) abounded with public commitments to the unique and strong community presence to be found in areas such as the Liberties and the importance of respecting and working with the original community that had given the area its character and identity (DCC, 2006b). All such commitments followed on an opening address in which the forum's facilitator spoke about the important distinction to be drawn between the 'hardware' (i.e. the buildings) and the 'software' (i.e. the people, the culture and the making of public space) components of urban development and regeneration.

Participants at other and more targeted forums aimed at professional interest groups were similarly attentive to the 'software' component of regeneration projects but spoke of the indigenous working-class communities resident in designated areas in a somewhat different manner. Within the context of one such forum on the role of culture in urban regeneration in 2006, resident communities were depicted by the panel of Irish and international speakers as something of an uncultured impediment to the advancement of the new cultural turn in urban-regeneration projects.

They were described variously as communities that may not be living imaginatively in areas in which no culture may be discernable prior to the arrival of artists (Glasgow Merchant City Initiative speaker on culture-led regeneration); socially difficult areas impeding the penetration of urban-regeneration programmes (DCC speaker on culture and urban regeneration); entities whose social and economic problems should be played down in the interests of not deterring investment (Toronto Artscape speaker on unlocking creative potential). The forum in question was replete with references to the importance of artists, cultural institutions and icons, public investment in cultural infrastructure, public spaces, 'hard and soft infrastructure in the creative milieu,' innovative governance and third-party intermediaries in regeneration and 'creative community building' (Temple Bar Cultural Trust, 2006). It was a forum that resonated very clearly with the core tenets of Florida's (2002) creative-city thesis (see Chapter 1).

8.2.2 Rationale for community participation within LRP.

The attempt to effect the formal incorporation of host communities within the structures of the IAP had been one of the defining features of the 1998 URS. Notwithstanding the problems encountered between state and community in the implementation of the IAPs and the sharply contrasting treatments of the significance of working-class communities within urban regeneration, it was clear that the LRP was also to be characterised by the imperative that had seen community participation become firmly entrenched as a cornerstone of the state's regeneration policies by the late 2000s (see Plates 8.1 and 8.2). In the opening stages of the LRP, the imperative for community participation was articulated in rhetoric remarkably similar to that employed within the IAP. Senior DCC officials spoke about their plans to "capture and retain the essence of the Liberties" and the importance of taking "special care to get it right for the residents of the area" (City Manager, LRP Launch Oct. 2009). DCC officials were adamant that both they and their consultants were approaching the regeneration of the Liberties without any predetermined plans for the area and that the process would be distinguished from traditional consultation processes by the fact that DCC would be working with the community to develop a vision for the Liberties. In addition to its stated intention to attend carefully to the views of the community, it appeared that DCC was also intent on mobilising the resident community in support of its new regeneration project. In an area with "a rich history in community development and involvement" DCC would be "looking for people who come from the locality to act as champions of the area during the regeneration process" (*ibid.*). It was confident that such an outcome could be realised. If, at the end of the day, it had not succeeded in getting people involved in the process, it believed that it would not have succeeded. In investing the community's and public's participation with such significance, DCC had given an effective hostage to fortune. By its own terms, the failure to engage the community in the project would mean that the consultation process had failed.

Plate 8.1 Flyer announcing LRP Neighbourhood Meetings.



Plate 8.2 Flyer announcing LRP Community Planning Weekend.



Beyond passing references to the shadow cast by "a legacy of distrust between the community and the city council" (DCC 2008a: 10), "the need for the city council to build trust with the community" (JTP, 2008: 125) and the importance of developing "a vision for the future built on the solid foundations of stakeholder and community consensus" (*ibid.,* 1), neither DCC nor its consultants outlined any formal statement of the rationale for the extensive consultative process initiated as part of the LRP. Greater elucidation was, however, forthcoming from the stated aims and objectives of the draft terms of reference for the community/public forums convened in early 2008[69] and from a senior project official who identified a number of rationales for seeking to engage the community in such an extensive consultation process, namely to test the issues and needs raised in an earlier unnamed feasibility study; to establish the distinction between housing-regeneration projects and urban-regeneration projects and divest the latter of the misperception that urban regeneration was a matter for local-authority tenants only; to broaden out the consultative process beyond public-housing tenants to incorporate a wider spectrum of stakeholders – the "untapped resources or assets or experts that we need to bring into the process" (LG-IV). Beyond the stated rationale for community participation, it was possible to infer other and more pressing rationales in incidental statements about the importance of achieving an agreed position on the planning and development issues in the LRP's documentation. In this, the rationales in question appeared to be underwritten by a determination not to witness the protracted planning objections and appeals that had characterised the IAP.

> "It is vital to encourage both public and private investment in the Liberties over the next decade and we believe the Draft LAP can facilitate this by providing clear guidance for developers and their architects that will minimise the perceived risk of prolonged planning negotiations and failed applications" (DCC, 2008a: 138).

8.3 Mode and logistics of community participation in LRP.

The stated and unstated rationale advanced for the community participation component of the LRP did not appear to differ radically from the rationale advanced in the IAP. The more important points of distinction appeared to rest in the mode of participation established, a point made with reference to two particular aspects of the participative process: (i) the decision to outsource the consultation process to a firm of private consultants: (ii) the decision to move from a community 'representative democracy' mode of participation to a 'direct-democracy' mode of participation. This was to have significant implications for the position of the indigenous working-class community within the regeneration process. The rationale for both departures is outlined below.

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[69] Comprising the following specific aims and objectives: "to help shape a new vision and strategy for the Liberties including the development of a framework development plan for the area; to provide a forum for developers (should they wish to use it) to consult with the local community on new proposed developments; to improve the quality, delivery and design of projects in the Liberties; to foster cooperation between service providers, residents and investors; to raise community awareness of planning, regeneration policy and development issues; to gauge the views of the community on planning and development matters and give feedback; to generate ideas about how to improve social capital, volunteering and active citizenship; to provide a community perspective on the management of the area; to help develop a communication strategy for the project" (DCC, 2008b: 9).

8.3.1 Outsourcing the process to private consultants.

- ***The consultancy product.***

In launching the LRP, DCC announced its decision to outsource the consultation, information and preparatory stage of the new regeneration project to an international firm of private consultants specialising in architecture and urbanism, John Thompson & Partners (hereafter referred to as JTP).[70] Unlike the IAP, whose preparation and implementation had been solely a matter for local-government officials, the opening and preparatory stages of the LRP were to be mediated in their entirety by a private consultancy firm, which had "over the past decade… pioneered a consensus-led approach to planning that can add value for local authorities, private developers and existing communities alike" (JTP, 2010).

JTP's collaborative and community-planning web pages boasted an array of participatory techniques that could be applied to projects of any scale and that had been shown "to accelerate the decision-making process, break down barriers and achieve a common sense of ownership. Together these create a shared vision for the future that is attractive to investment, whilst facilitating capacity building within local communities" (*ibid.*). The community-planning process as described by JTP appeared to consist of two core components: "information sharing and debate about local issues and development imperatives" following which "stakeholders" would be facilitated "to work towards consensus-led design solutions" (*ibid.*). All of this could apparently be achieved in a very short space of time irrespective of the scale or complexity of the project. "The events are intensive and aim to create a shared vision for a project in a matter of days, regardless of the size, nature or complexity of the area in question" (*ibid.*). The frequency with which the term 'consensus' was invoked throughout each of the consultancy's collaborative and community-planning web pages could leave prospective clients in no doubt about the principal product on sale; "a consensus-led approach to planning," "consensus-led design solutions," "consensus-led development proposals" (*ibid.*). It remained only to observe the manner in which the consensus in question would be constructed and maintained in an Irish context and the fate of those who might not be in a position to subscribe to that consensus.

The participatory techniques and services on offer from JTP read like an inventory of the participatory techniques that would subsequently be utilised within the LRP, including "Stakeholder charrette processes; Community capacity and vision building; Enquiry by design; Neighbourhood-led regeneration; Community-planning events." DCC had bought an off-the-peg consultancy package that had been "test[ed] and develop[ed]... in a wide range of contexts including the UK, Ireland, France, Germany, Iceland, Russia and Italy." It appeared particularly apt

[70] While JTP appeared to function as the lead consultancy throughout the process, it is listed as one of two lead consultancies (i.e. John Thompson & Partners (JTP) and Metropolitan Workshop (MW)) commissioned by DCC to prepare the Development Framework Plan (JTP, 2008: 3; DCC. 2008a: 6) and subsequently the Draft Local Area Plan for the Liberties Regeneration.

that the consultancy charged with the preparation of a regeneration plan seeking to "effect the transformational change required to encourage investment in the former industrial areas" (DCC, 2008a: 9) of the Liberties should itself be based in what its website described as "an early twentieth century warehouse" in an historic area of London (*ibid.*). With the benefit of hindsight, it would become clear that the vision subsequently formulated in respect of the Liberties had actually been inscribed in the consultants who came to the process as ostensibly disinterested independent brokers.

- ***Rationale for outsourcing process to private consultants.***

In outlining the rationale for outsourcing the consultation process to a firm of private consultants, DCC project personnel denied that that the decision represented any significant departure from established procedures in relation to regeneration programmes. DCC had already used consultants in two major programmes on Dublin's Northside - the regeneration of Ballymun and the preparation of a LAP for the Phibsboro area. It would, it suggested, be more unusual for a framework or local area plan to be prepared internally (LG-IV). The decision to outsource the preparation of the regeneration plan to consultants on this occasion was a means of allowing DCC to 'step back' and become a player within the regeneration process as opposed to assuming the leadership role that it would have been obliged to take in the absence of consultants. Local-authority officials described how they would then have the freedom to speak to meetings in a way that would not have been possible had they been burdened with the powerful position of chair. The relinquishment of the public chairmanship of the project did not, however, appear to signify any actual concession of power. Relieved of the public leadership of the project, DCC planned to position itself as a major and all-embracing stakeholder in a process in which it would assume the right to make representations on behalf of many diverse interest groups.

> "I would see it as a stepping back rather than a stepping away. And I know that might be a bit subtle but I think if we tried to chair those meetings ourselves, it would be very difficult for us to speak to the meeting because we would be in such a powerful position as Chair. So, what we've been trying to do is to become a stakeholder along with the other stakeholders and to come up with a view that is our view and the citizen's view and the tenant's view and the business's view but that is… put through this facilitation process." (LG-IV)

In this manner DCC would be free to insinuate itself into the process as a stakeholder alongside other stakeholders. As the party which had initiated the regeneration project, commissioned the consultation process and appointed consultants to mediate the process, it had engineered a situation whereby it could retain power over the project behind the scenes while positioning itself in public as a ordinary stakeholder with a mandate to make disinterested representations on behalf of any and all interests that it deemed to be legitimate stakeholders in the process. In this way it was possible to see how the local authority might come to function as a proxy for the public good and make representations on behalf of any and all sections of the community, including those most affected by the LRP's proposals and those who might be likely to oppose those same proposals.

- ***Role and independence of consultants.***

In the ensuing process in which the local authority had considerably reconfigured its role, the consultants would then act as facilitator and broker seeking the "best solution" as opposed to "a consensus because… sometimes in consensus nobody gets what they want" (LG-IV). In working to broker that 'best solution,' DCC accepted that there might be a cynical view that the consultants would be acting for their paymasters. It was a cynical view that DCC did not entertain. JTP consultants were presented as being firmly at the service of all sections of the public and as working assiduously and fairly to document and record the views of all parties present.

> "I mean obviously we're paying them, so if you wanted to be cynical, you could say 'well they're just going to do what you say.' But no matter who you brought in, somebody's going to have to pay them… Sometimes people are saying 'we want our own planning consultant, our own architect,' but I would see John Thompson's as… our own in terms of who the stakeholders are. They are our own consultants. If… people in the audience come up with ideas, they're recorded and documented." (LG-IV)

The independence of the consultants was illustrated with reference to the even-handed, forthright manner in which they had recorded and presented the outcome of the community-planning stage of the consultation and planning process. The direct manner of its presentation was contrasted with the rather more diplomatic style that DCC might have adopted had it been in charge of the process. Beyond the manner of presentation, DCC did not point to any other aspects of the process that might be invoked to illustrate the independence of the consultants.

> "If you read [the *Community Planning Report*] there's stuff in there that if I was writing it as a City Council person, I wouldn't put in that language, I would be very much more diplomatic in it. So if we had done it ourselves, I think there would be that risk that you would be... putting a DCC spin on everything. So to try to give it a much more even-handed response and to have the reporting more even-handed, we've employed them. And their brief really is to come up with the best plan for the Liberties." (LG-IV)

8.3.2 Movement from 'representative democracy' to 'direct democracy.'

- ***Broadening of consultative and public information process.***

The LRP was initiated after almost ten years of tax-incentive fuelled development that had substantially altered the residential demographic of the Liberties (Kelly 2007a, 2007b; 2008; Kelly & MacLaran, 2004; Haase 2009). In embarking on the LRP, DCC confronted a markedly more heterogeneous population than it had in the IAP.

During the sixteen months in which the consultation, planning and information process was in progress, the process assumed many guises, including 'neighbourhood meetings,' 'community-planning days' and 'community forums,' which subsequently became 'public forums.' The movement from the language of 'community' to that of 'public' in the latter and longest phase of the process was notable in a number of respects and represented a significantly greater shift in the thrust of the consultation process than might have been appreciated at that time. In the first place, it

represented a significant broadening out of the consultative audience to encompass both the larger resident body of the Liberties and the panoply of other public and private interests which were now being invoked as stakeholders in the area. As such, it represented a demarcation of and diminution in the standing of the indigenous working-class community within the process in which it became only one interest group among other and more powerful interest groups. The substitution of 'public' for 'community' also prepared the ground for the move to a significantly different form of participation instituted thereafter.

- ***Rationale for move to direct-democracy mode of engagement.***

DCC located the distinctive aspect of the LRP consultative process in the movement from the established community-representative mode of engagement to a new mode of engagement that it termed 'direct democracy' (LG-IV, see also DCC, 2008d: 1-2). The term was applied in the fourth and penultimate stage of the process (see Table 8.1) when the process had been distilled down to a series of public-forum meetings taking place alongside a series of focus-group meetings and was explicitly linked to the *raison d'être* for the public forums. The new *modus operandi* adopted within the LRP was at all times defined in contradistinction to that adopted in public-housing regeneration projects.

> "The purpose of holding public forums instead of carrying out consultation *via* a regeneration board is to develop a system of direct democracy where authority is given to an open public gathering of everybody who chooses to participate" (DCC, 2008d: 1).

The mode of engagement employed in the various housing-regeneration projects was described as 'representative democracy,' the essential feature of which the LRP's Project Manager proceeded to explain to readers of its newsletter.

> "In representative democracy, decision making is exercised by a subset of those affected... based on the principle of selected, independent people being charged with the responsibility of acting in the interests of all those affected" (*ibid.*)

- ***Case against 'representative democracy' and for 'direct democracy.'***

The 'representative democracy' mode of engagement was, for example, exemplified by the regeneration boards that had been established in the housing-regeneration projects being pursued *via* PPPs across the inner city. The LRP project manager neglected to state that it was also the form that community engagement had taken in the implementation of the IAPs. That system of [community] 'representative democracy' was now rejected by DCC because of a number of "inherent risks," notably the risk that individuals who were selected or self-selected to represent the interests of others might be or become unrepresentative of the constituency that they had been invited to represent, the difficulty that individuals might experience in placing the interests of the larger regeneration project over their own agency's interests and the fear that 'original' members of the community might take decisions that would adversely affect newcomers to the area (including minorities) or make them feel in some way less entitled (DCC, 2008d: 1).

Each of the "inherent risks" and shortcomings identified in respect of community-representative democracy would be "lessened in direct democracy structures such as the public forum meetings" which DCC had convened in the Liberties. The latter were intended "to develop open governance where any interested person can add to the creation of policy" (*ibid.*). The arguments advanced for the 'direct-democracy' mode of engagement were located in its ability to enable one type of engagement while simultaneously disabling another. The engagement that it sought to enable was that of an apparently undifferentiated general public who, by virtue of being freed of the constraints of the representative mode of engagement, would be free to represent their own interests directly and to exert greater influence on policy and decision making. The nature of the forums established under direct democracy would be sufficiently flexible to allow people to 'dip in and out' in accordance with their own interests and commitments. In this way, public forums would be in a position to capture the diversity of views that might otherwise have been missed by representative-democracy structures. Once within those structures, participants would also have an opportunity to overcome the natural tendency to self interest which prohibits a consideration of the "the needs and values of society as a whole, particularly if those needs are not properly explained" (*ibid.,* 2).

However, the more important rationale for the move to direct democracy appeared to rest in its ability to inhibit the ability of unnamed 'special interests groups' to dominate and disrupt proceedings; groups which appeared to have been a significant factor in the move away from the representative-democracy structures previously pursued by DCC. DCC was particularly intent on avoiding the division and dissention that followed within representative-democracy structures when they were peopled by the 'usual suspects' purporting to speak on behalf of the wider community. While DCC enumerated the various ways in which direct democracy could combat apathy, disconnection and consultation fatigue, it appeared to be equally focused on the optimum means of dealing with the insufficiently apathetic, those special interest groups which had the potential to become "powerful and influential minorities" with the ability to hijack meetings for their own particular interests without reference to the wider agenda. Direct democracy would provide a means of managing such special interest groups and ensuring that "decisions can be taken on their own merits and 'special interests' …managed and not allowed to take over" (*ibid.*).

The statement of this rationale was accompanied by a commitment to democratic decision-making that was not in any way dissuaded by the 'good bit of shouting' encountered in such forums.

> "What I wanted to do was... that thing that everybody always says they want, to bring people together in the sort of democratic way where everybody gets to speak about what they want to speak about and to allow the agenda to reflect that. I'm doing it like that... because I really do believe in the democracy of sharing decisions and I think power is one of those things that [grows] as you give out power and is reduced if you try to hold onto it." (LG-IV)

DCC judged the scale of the Liberties to be "such that it could effectively accommodate direct democratic participation through a series of public-forum meetings" (DCC, 2008d: 2).

> "All things considered, direct democratic structures such as the public forum meetings augmented by a web-based public forum seem to present the greatest chance of successfully bringing about an implementable and sustainable local area plan which people accept as their plan" (*ibid.*).

It was confident that "if people were prepared to spend time listening to the ideas and contributing their thoughts, that the plan coming from this process will reflect the views of the 14,000 people who live here and the hundreds of people who work here and have invested in the area through their businesses and voluntary work" (*ibid.*).

8.3.3 Chronology of LRP public consultation and information process.

The principal components of the LRP's community and public consultation and information process consisted of five stages; (i) public launch; (ii) neighbourhood meetings; (iii) community-planning weekend; (iv) public forums; (v) statutory LAP consultation process. DCC's consultants also held a number of additional community consultation meetings with 'hard to reach groups,' including school children within local primary and secondary schools and street traders (JTP, 2008: 70-73). As this research was not party to the latter consultations, the material relayed in the chapter immediately following relates to proceedings within the principal components of the public process (see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Chronology of LRP public-consultative and information process.

Stage.	Forum.	Meetings.	Dates.	Documentation.
I	**Launch.**	1	Oct. 2007.	
II	**Neighbourhood Meetings (NM).**			Liberties Community Planning Report.
	Tranche 1: Pimlico; Liberties; Grand Canal Harbour/Basin Lane.	3	Oct. 2007.	
	Tranche 2:[71] Oliver Bond Neighbourhood & North East Liberties; Maryland & Newmarket x2; Digital Hub Tenants.	4	March-May 2008.	
III	**Community Planning Weekend (CPW).**	2 (2-day event)	Nov. 2007.	
	Report Back Meeting.	1		
IV	**Public Forums (PF).**	11	Jan. 2008 - March 2009.	LRP (1-5) Newsletters
	Focus Groups (6 in total)	Various.		Wide array of documentation on website.[72]

[71] Following the decision to extend the parameters of the regeneration area, it was decided to extend the community consultation process to include "a series of local area meetings… to include local people from the extended study areas in the process" i.e. Oliver Bond Neighbourhood Meeting; Maryland & Newmarket Neighbourhood Meetings (March, May 2008); North East Liberties Neighbourhood Meeting (May 2008); Digital Hub Tenants Meeting (May 2008) (DCC, 2008a: Appendix F). The analysis presented in this research is, however, based on proceedings within the opening series of neighbourhood meetings in public-housing areas that would later assume the status of 'opportunity' or 'catalyst' sites.

Stage.	Forum.	Meetings.	Dates.	Documentation.
V	**Statutory Consultative Process.**[73] - 6-week statutory public display period. - 6-week statutory period to allow for preparation of Manager's report on submissions received. - Vote of elected members of DCC on Draft LAP.	N/A.	Sept. - Nov. 2008. Nov. - Dec. 2008. Feb. 2009.	Environmental Report of the Draft Liberties LAP. Draft LAP (including Focus-Group Consultant Action Plans).

In addition to the community and public component of the process, DCC's consultants also consulted with a variety of other stakeholders (including key DCC officials; Local Councillors; Digital Hub; Municipal Depot officials; the South Inner City Community Development Association; the National College of Art & Design (NCAD); LINKS Teacher Group; Rail Procurement Agency (LUAS); CMS Alternative Learning Group (JTP, 2008: 69). All such meetings took place outside of the public forums and accordingly do not form part of the following analysis.

[72] The documentation posted on the website of the Liberties Regeneration Project (www.theliberties.ie) included meeting flyers, newsletters, a community-planning report, a framework plan, action plans, consultant presentations, an urban design study, various third-party presentations and both the draft and agreed local area plan. This research is not in a position to relay a full list of all documentation posted on the website as the web account for domain appears to be have been suspended in 2010.

[73] The statutory provisions for the 'making, amending or revoking' of Draft LAPs comprises 18 weeks if adopted on foot of the first Manager's Report; 35 weeks if amendments are to be made.

CHAPTER 9

A trajectory of community engagement with the LRP.

Chapter 8 reviewed the rationale for the introduction of the LRP and the distinctive features of this new and more ambitious form of urban regeneration. It considered the continuing rationale for community participation within the state's urban-renewal programmes with particular attention to the rationale for moving to a new mode of community participation ('direct democracy') and the rationale for outsourcing the public consultative process to private consultants. Chapter 9 explores the nature of engagements between the state, its consultants and the community within this new consultation process with a view to elucidating the key critical and analytical points arising for working-class communities in an increasingly aggressive urban-regeneration environment. Moving outside of the community consultation process, it details the formal authority with which local councillors are vested in the 'making, amending or revoking' of LAPs and the manner in which the political consensus surrounding urban-regeneration projects in working-class areas is forged. The chapter closes with the outcomes of the first phase of the LRP and available indications about the long-term future of working-class communities residing in areas which the state is intent on remaking for private capital.

9.1 A trajectory of community engagement with LRP.

In the following delineation of the engagements that ensued between the local state, its consultants and the host working-class community in each stage of the LRP process, the analysis selects distinct aspects from each stage of the LRP process of key analytical importance to the experience and fate of working-class interests within urban regeneration. It does so in the interests of illustrating and interrogating critical aspects of the community's experience and critical aspects of the state's behaviour in a new and more ambitious urban-regeneration order.

9.1.1 LRP Launch.

- ***Visibility and invisibility of private-development forces.***

The trajectory of the community's engagement with the LRP is prefaced by a brief consideration of the stage of the process from which it was largely absent – the public launch of the LRP in October 2007. The launch of *A New Vision for the Liberties* was notable for a number of reasons: the mode of state intervention planned in the urban realm; the outsourcing of the public consultation process to a private consultancy firm and the signalling of a number of distinctive themes and motifs that were to become increasingly explicit as the process unfolded.

The launch was also notable for the presence and high visibility of the private-development sector in the assembled audience for a meeting that was "top-heavy with developers and business" (Cllr

II, LRP Neighbourhood Meeting (NM) 3, Oct. 2007). While a small number of developers (and developers' agents) made intermittent appearances at public-forum meetings in the year following the launch of the LRP when there were immediate development issues and plans at stake, the private-development sector was absent from the public consultative and information process thereafter until the commencement of the statutory Local Area Plan (LAP) consultative process in September 2008 (see 9.1.5). In this manner, the private-development interests and panoply of professional consultancies working in their service who stood to make significant gains from regeneration, limited their public involvement in the formulation of the LRP to their physical presence at the launch of the LRP and their considerably more specific representations in relation to the content of the Draft LAP in the closing and binding stage of the process. In their absence, the public consultative and information process inaugurated in the intervening months became largely a matter for the local authority, its consultants and the resident community.

In the community consultation process instituted with local residents thereafter, DCC's consultants were at pains to deny that the resident community had been excluded from a forum of any significance.

> "Can I just explain just briefly why we did it like that? Because basically it's like an advertisement. We had this event, we invited the press, we invited what we thought were representatives of groups and the key developers and all those sort of people to one event. At that event we basically just said 'this is the beginning of a process. We're now going to have these three meetings, and then we're going to have the community-planning weekend.' The purpose of the launch was just to... raise publicity. It wasn't that deals were done at the launch. It was not that sort of an event at all. Your councillors were there. They can vouch for this. It was very much to raise the profile, to get people aware of [the regeneration project]" (JTP, LRP NM3, Oct. 2007).

However, this was an explanation that the community, which had had ample opportunity to observe the *realpolitik* behind development and regeneration plans, was not prepared to accept. It had participated in similar processes on a number of occasions and understood the precise distinction to be drawn between invitations to participate in high-profile showcase events with key players and invitations to participate in low-profile consultation events with communities. For those who attended both forums, the different attitudes adopted towards developer and business audiences and community audiences were manifest in the contrast between the business-suit attire donned by consultants for the former and the casual jeans attire donned for the latter. Their exclusion from the public engagement between local government and developer was merely a more public manifestation of their exclusion from the behind-the-scenes engagements that all understood to be in process. They were also aware of the manner in which their absence from all such forums would be construed as apathy.

> "But you see that's what happens. Then the speculators and the developers and the DCC say 'sure the people don't care, we'll put what we want in there.' But we weren't informed... We should have been represented for the developers. It was the launch of the thing at the beginning. I object to that now, because everything will be signed,

sealed and delivered at the first launch. I'm very sceptical because we had these meetings before" (Liberties Resident, LRP NM3, Oct. 2007).

9.1.2 LRP Neighbourhood meetings.

The community consultation process commenced with a series of parallel neighbourhood meetings across the Liberties in locations that would subsequently be characterised as 'opportunity' or 'catalyst' sites within the context of the larger LRP, namely 'Pimlico' (the site of six public-housing complexes), 'Liberties' (adjacent to two public-housing complexes) and 'Grand Canal Harbour/Basin Lane' (the site of one public-housing complex). The precise significance that each site would assume within the LRP's plans was not made known within the meetings convened at that time. DCC's consultants instead sought to structure and contain audience discussion and contributions under three generic headings: (i) problems; (ii) dreams; (iii) solutions. In meetings in which attending DCC officials maintained a silent presence, ensuing proceedings were a matter for the private consultancy firm appointed to the process and the members of the local community present.

The research has identified three aspects of those proceedings as being of key analytical importance: (i) the legacy of the IAP and a decade of extensive development for the host community; (ii) orientation *vis-à-vis* new regeneration project; (iii) evidence of competing visions within a newly heterogeneous community.

- ***Legacy of decade of extensive development for host community.***

The primary point of interest in the neighbourhood meetings was the manner in which the meetings in question proceeded to function as an unmediated grassroots assessment of the decade of intensive development that had taken place under the IAP and which was, at that point, drawing to a close. The anger of the community was evident throughout, particularly from those who had engaged with DCC on previous housing and urban-renewal initiatives. Despite repeated attempts by consultants to structure and contain proceedings within the 'problems, dreams, solutions' paradigm, participants refused the three-heading format to return repeatedly to trenchant criticisms of the local authority's past behaviour in relation to planning, planning enforcement and the nature and quantum of development permitted over the preceding decade. In the face of a community that had borne the brunt of that decade of private development, the format appeared hopelessly naive.

In the event that the community had been prepared to abide by the 'problems, dreams, solution' format, it was clear that the consultants were either unwilling or unable to cope with or contain the floodgates of anger and militancy unleashed by a format that had clearly been intended to engender a considerably softer discussion. The litany of serious problems, for example, identified in response to the consultant's questioning occasioned the following exchange between a consultant and a member of the community.

Consultant: "That's an awful lot of problems all at once."

Resident: "But that's what you're talking about. You're talking about dreams and solutions. So what's the solution?" (LRP NM3, Oct. 2007)

It was abundantly clear from those meetings that the rhetoric of urban renewal held no currency among those communities which had been obliged to play host to the state's previous urban-renewal schemes. They instead spoke quite simply of bad planning, inappropriate and excessive development, poor planning enforcement and the *carte blanche* that developers appeared to have enjoyed throughout the decade. Contributions were astute, angry and focused on a number of very contentious issues (see Table 9.1).

Table 9.1 Community assessments of planning and development 1990/2000s.
(LRP Neighbourhood Meetings 1-3, Oct. 2007)

- The absence of any basis for good-faith engagements with DCC in regeneration.
- A history of bad planning, unfettered (inappropriate, excessive, fragmented) development.
- Poor planning enforcement.
- The burden placed on existing physical infrastructure by excessive development.
- The poor quality of tax-incentive apartment developments ('new slums' of future).
- The poor calibre of streetscapes.
- The poor conservation and preservation of a historic area.
- Dereliction and degeneration of the built environment.
- The burden placed on social infrastructure by the location within the area of a disproportionate number of services for citywide social problems.
- Social fragmentation and segregation arising from the proliferation of gated-apartment complexes.
- The displacement of residential communities, community services, facilities and employment.
- A transport policy orientated around development.
- The absence of adequate facilities and poor quality of existing facilities.
- The absence of green and/or public open space.

While participants also identified the kinds of social problems around which discussions of problems in inner-city areas traditionally centre (e.g. crime, policing, vandalism, drug use, unemployment, poor educational attainment, neglect of older people, etc.), their attention was firmly fixed on the core issues of land, housing and planning.

It was, in short, an assessment of the development that had taken place under urban renewal that stood in sharp contrast to the assessment offered by local-government officials. It was an assessment that was unwilling to accept the outcome as having been an inevitable consequence of the unassailable balance of pro-development forces confronted within urban renewal. As such it was an assessment that also stood in sharp contrast to that offered by those community representatives who had engaged with the IAP to its conclusion. Irrespective of the position taken by their putative representatives, it was a community which had clearly not consented to the nature

or quantum of development that had taken place in the quarter and which was considerably less reconciled to the *carte blanche* that developers had been afforded throughout the boom years.

- ***Orientation vis-à-vis future urban-regeneration projects.***

When the discussion moved to participants' aspirations, dreams and proposed solutions in the future regeneration of the Liberties, contributions were again dominated by the housing, planning and development practices that had created a chasm between government and community in the preceding decade and that many feared would be replicated in the new regeneration programme under consideration. Reforms were sought in relation to all such policies and practices (see Table 9.2).

Table 9.2 Reforms sought on housing, planning and renewal policy.
(LRP Neighbourhood Meetings 1-3, Oct. 2007).

- Housing policy that would operate for public as opposed to developer good.
- Correction of profligate public spending on refurbishment programmes subsequently rendered null and void by demolition decisions.
- Planning reform that would allow for planned, balanced development accompanied by necessary facilities and public space.
- Greater transparency and accountability in planning decision-making.
- Concrete provisions to ensure that the community was apprised of and resourced to engage with planning proposals.
- Development control to guard against excessive densities in general and excessive apartment development in particular.
- Planning enforcement.
- Environmental and transport improvements to deliver clean, green, safe, accessible, managed streets.
- Tangible gains for the community in the form of social housing, community buildings etc.
- Extension of fiscal incentives policy to local residents and small businesses to assist in the creation of sustainable communities.
- Decentralisation of power and pivotal role in urban-realm interventions away from central government; reform of local government.

The identification of the various prescriptions required to correct deeply unacceptable planning and development practices did not at any stage give way to any optimism about the nature of future development. Communities did not appear to anticipate any significant changes in developer behaviour in an unchanged planning and development environment where sites were privately owned, planning applications had the backing of large planning and architectural practices, planning permissions were granted with few conditions attached and developments were allowed to proceed in the absence of any significant planning monitoring or enforcement.

The one point on which veterans of renewal and regeneration programmes appeared to have clarity was the fact that the future of the area and any influence that might be exercised over its future development rested in the public ownership of the land. It was understood to be the key resource at stake in the process. If the land ownership question was conceded, the community understood that

it would also have conceded any bargaining power that it might have hoped to exercise in the process. The latter point was accompanied by an acute sense of the vulnerability of those living in local-authority housing on land that had now increased greatly in value. Fears that housing and land might be conceded to private-development interests at 'the stroke of a pen' had led to a determination to resist the demolition of any social-housing units in the process. For those who had experience of the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in process at that time in a number of flats complexes across the city, the opposition to any further PPPs in the regeneration of social housing was absolute. In the face of what some understood to be a deliberate policy of degeneration intended to render flats complexes uninhabitable, residents pointed to the need for a programme of investment that would safeguard the homes and future of existing public-housing communities.

The community did not reserve its anger and reservations for the planning, development and urban-regeneration process. It was also strongly critical of DCC's decision to outsource the preparation of the new regeneration plan to a private consultancy. The latter was subjected to a litany of questions regarding the party that had commissioned it to undertake the process; its specific remit in the regeneration of the area; the absence of local-government officials from the process; the manner in which the community had been apprised (and not apprised) of the process; the other parties with whom it was consulting; the existence of DCC's plans for area in advance of the consultation process; the fundamentals of the regeneration plan process, including the legal standing of the proposed plan; the process and financial provisions in place for its progression, agreement and implementation; the standing of the community in the implementation of the plan thereafter, etc. In opening meetings, the consultants appeared to be neither sufficiently briefed on the specifics of the Irish policy and political context nor the history of engagements between the state and the community on renewal and regeneration issues. Visibly floundering, they were subjected to a relentless, angry and articulate community critique that took every opportunity to remind them of the considerable body of experience that the community brought to its engagement with the issue and the process. Meetings evolved at times into the somewhat anomalous situation in which the role of consultant and consulted were reversed and the information and intelligence that might have been expected to emanate from the expert consultancy firm was instead firmly vested in the residents in attendance.

The precise significance of the role assumed by this international firm of consultants will be considered later (see 9.1.4). The analysis confines its attention at this point to the consultants' attempts to consign the community's negative experience of planning, development and regeneration programmes to the past in the interests of looking to the future and allowing the new regeneration project to proceed. The attempt was singularly unsuccessful. The legacy of that earlier experience, in which the basis for good faith had been progressively undermined and participants had become accustomed to a well worn path from participation to pickets, was an unapologetic

scepticism about the engagements and process within which DCC was once again seeking to incorporate it in its relentless drive for renewal. The abiding lesson was that those without money counted for nothing in the face of developers and speculators.

> "But you see if you look at the past, that's an idea of what the future is going to be. That's all we have to go by... because money speaks and we don't have the money. But the speculators and the developers have the money and God help us, we don't have it. We just have an ordinary wages coming into our homes and I don't care what anyone says in this room, if the developers and the speculators want it, they get it... This happened before and this is all we have to go by. You're saying 'well maybe in the future it'd be different; we're going to try…' It's no different, it's no different because still the same people are running DCC and they have fixed ideas… I worry that it's already signed, sealed and delivered" (Resident, LRP NM3, Oct. 2007).

- ***Evidence of competing visions among gentrifying community.***

There was an additional feature of the neighbourhood meetings of interest in assessing the impact of successive waves of urban regeneration. This involved the markedly different visions for the area envisaged by the different social groupings evident in a resident body whose demography had been significantly altered by a decade of development and gentrification. This contrast was particularly evident in the second of the workshops, which was distinguished by the presence of a number of students and young professional people. Their voices, which dominated proceedings to a significant extent, introduced the views and critiques of a section of the population who were similarly critical of planning and development practices at that time, albeit from a different standpoint. As owner occupiers and mortgage holders who had purchased their homes at greatly inflated prices in areas whose residential amenity continued to be impaired by ongoing development, they were critical of both the planning practices and inflationary house prices that had facilitated and accompanied the development boom. It was clear that they were also, however unwittingly, functioning as agents of gentrification. This was abundantly clear from the vision espoused for the area that would see it being remade as an internationally renowned cultural quarter of artistic and architectural excellence, a centre for excellence that would be fostered by the awarding of tax breaks for young artists and architects and the provision of studios, small galleries, exhibition centres etc. in a quarter in which third-level institutes and students would assume a significantly greater presence. This was a vision that was well on its way to conforming to the fundamentals of the creative and cultural city that was gaining currency in official circles at that time (see Chapter 4). None appeared to view the growth of an artistic community within the area as anything but an unquestioned benefit. None appeared to have any sense of the well-worn gentrification trajectory on which this would set the area.

As with the meeting dominated by young gentrifiers, the dynamic of the other two meetings was determined by the composition of the audience in attendance. It was thus that proceedings within one meeting were distinguished by the presence of residents who had had a critical involvement in regeneration and renewal programmes and whose attention was firmly fixed on the implications of

the proposed regeneration project for the future of social housing and public land in the quarter. It was thus that another meeting was peopled by older and decidedly more militant residents (both local-authority tenants and owner occupier) who had engaged in many similar discussions and processes in the past and who refused to concede the floor to consultants to perpetrate what was, in their view, one more fraud on the community. In sharp contrast to the centre of cultural, artistic and architectural excellence proposed by the young gentrifiers, the attention of participants at the latter meeting was firmly fixed on securing the basic facilities, services and amenities necessary for the normal functioning of any community.

However, the platform, which was afforded or, more accurately commandeered by the resident indigenous community at the neighbourhood meetings, was not repeated in subsequent stages of the LRP process. The most vociferous critics of the development that had taken place under the guise of urban renewal were similarly absent for the most part thereafter. It is for that reason that this analysis has attended in such detail to the issues, criticism and analyses advanced in the opening stages of the public consultation and information process. All such meetings provided unprecedented insight into the hard, critical, articulate anger housed within that community, an anger that was largely imperceptible from the outside but clearly awaiting only a public forum through which to find expression.

9.1.3 LRP Community Planning Weekend.

Thereafter, the consultants leading the process appeared to have marshalled their collective resources and agreed a line whereby the community had had an opportunity to vent its anger but that it was now time to consign all such criticisms and 'old ground' to the past in the interests of "moving forward... being creative and looking to the future" (JTP, Community Planning Weekend (CPW), Nov. 2008). Following on the earlier meetings, now described as a 'warm up', the second stage of the community-planning process, a community-planning weekend, was presented as the launch of the consultation process proper. The event provided an opportunity to decipher what was actually meant by 'community planning' in practice – an approach that JTP described as "an established methodology which enables local people to play an active part in the design and development of proposals for their area" (JTP, 2008: 67). This stage of the process was of interest primarily for two reasons; first, the nature of the participation afforded the community within that stage of the process ostensibly devoted to them and, secondly, the insight afforded into the central motor for the new regeneration project involving 'opportunity' or 'catalyst' sites.

- ***Community planning in practice.***

The most notable point to be made about the operationalisation of this 'established methodology' was the contrast between the prospectus and the actuality. On paper, the two-day programme of workshops promised detailed discussion of a number of important thematic areas within a number

of parallel workshops (see Table 9.3). All workshops were to be facilitated by 'an international team of facilitators' – a fact apparently intended to signify that a great honour was being bestowed on proceedings.

Table 9.3 LRP community-planning weekend workshops.

	Day 1		Day 2.
(a)	Bigger picture: Liberties and Dublin context.	**(a)**	**Education, arts & culture / Community life.**
(b)	Open space, sport and recreation.	(b)	Character and identity.
(c)	**Public and private development.**	(c)	Quality of the public space.
(d)	Getting about: movement and transport (including LUAS).	(d)	Market traders (street traders walkabout vox pop).
(e)	Social and economic issues - jobs, training and local economy.	(e)	Heritage and regeneration.

In practice, the conduct of the workshops was rather a different matter. In line with the central focus of this investigation, this research elected to observe proceedings at the workshop that appeared to be of most importance to the indigenous community on each day. Both provided important insights into the position and stake of the indigenous working-class community within the new regeneration process.

The workshop on 'Public and private development,' for example, might reasonably have been expected to incorporate discussion about the relationship, costs, benefits, potential tensions, harmonies and conflicts of interest arising between public and private development within the new regeneration plan. As such, it could have provided a forum within which participants could have explored one of the core issues at the heart of state-engendered regeneration – the relationship between public and private and the implications of the interventions taken by the former to enable the development activities of the latter. In actuality, the workshop in question functioned as a poorly-facilitated, unstructured and frequently inaudible round-table discussion in which the most vocal and articulate were allowed to dominate. Individual residents, who had been amongst the most strident critics at the neighbourhood meetings, hovered silently at its fringes. Discussions proceeded in a piecemeal manner and concentrated on the sites and streets of greatest interest to individual participants as opposed to the central thematic issue indicated in the title of the workshop. The prospect of PPPs did not feature at any point in the discussion.

That process and dynamic was repeated in a second workshop entitled 'Education, arts and culture/ Community life.' Originally intended as two separate workshops, 'Education, arts and culture' was casually conflated with 'Community life' ensuring that the interests of the indigenous resident community were quickly subordinated to those preoccupied with the future of arts and culture in the area. In a workshop in which artists and art students were in the majority, discussion moved

quickly to the importance of securing arts facilities and ensuring the viability of professional arts within the community – a discussion that became fractious on occasion as different artistic interests competed for the area's artistic spoils. When the small number of local-authority residents present intervened, they were indulged as individuals but without any attempt to attend to the issues of concern to local-authority residents as a group. The tensions between the community and artistic interests extended to the latter's rebuking the former for being 'anti-college' in a situation in which "you need more artists in this area, not fewer" and for focusing the discussion on the local economy when education and schools were under threat.

It was in this manner that the dwindling number of local-authority residents in attendance at this second stage of the community consultation process began to be sidelined and eclipsed by more vocal and affluent interest groups.

- ***Central motor for LRP – 'opportunity' or 'catalyst' sites.***

A number of the themes with which participants were invited to engage subsequently emerged as core themes in the public consultative and information process elaborated within the ensuing public forums and draft Local Area Plan. In this way it was possible to observe the insinuation of what would later transpire to be core themes and key motifs into the earliest stage of the public discussion instigated within the process.

Themes and motifs would not, however, have been sufficient to engender regeneration on the scale envisaged by the LRP. Clarification on the actual motor for the LRP came in the second half of the second day of the community-planning weekend when consultants invited participants to join a number of 'walkabouts' in the area. Of the range of 'walkabouts' announced (Housing quality and connections; Historic route; Oliver Bond [flats complex]; Opportunity sites), three pertained to areas that had suddenly attained the status and designation of 'opportunity sites.'

> "Through the last period of time we were working on this Liberties project, three key areas have come up, I think it's fair to say, as sort of opportunities... The first one being the Grand Canal Basin… The second one being… School Lane, Pimlico, Marrowbone Lane area… The third area… is the Vicar St., Swifts Alley, Swifts Lane area between Meath St. and Francis St." (JTP, LRP CPW, Nov. 2007).

Each housed public-housing communities. Each had either been the location of, or immediately adjacent to the location of the neighbourhood meetings convened in advance of the community-planning process proper. Each, it became apparent, was intended to trigger the transformation that the LRP sought to effect in the Liberties.

> "As part of the community consultation which took place in 2007, a vision for the Liberties Regeneration was formed. Part of this vision called for sites for significant development to act as catalysts for the regeneration, which would set off a chain reaction and jumpstart development in the area" (DCC, 2008a: 141).

Further elucidation on the stage and status of those designations was forthcoming from one of the walkabouts in question. The purpose of the walkabouts was described in a manner that seemed to invest the participants with decision-making power

> "Really what we're looking for now is some real firm... decisions almost. What are we going to do? How's it going to happen? How are you going to make it happen? And what's the process for making it happen from now on? So we want real vision with action plans related to your area or your subject" (JTP, LRP CPW, Nov. 2007).

However, it was abundantly clear from the manner in which consultants proceeded to survey individual local-authority complexes (commenting on one complex to the effect that 'oh, we'll leave it as it is;' identifying another as one that people wanted to leave and considering the possibilities that would be opened up if another block of flats 'weren't there') that the fate of the flats complexes in question had already been decided and that attention had now moved to the proposals that might be pursued on the opportunity sites in question once cleared. The account of this 'walkabout' through public-housing areas now designated as "key opportunity sites" was significantly and tellingly termed "Liberties Rebirth" in the formal record of proceedings in the ensuing *Liberties Community Planning Report* (JTP, 2008: 108).

9.1.4 LRP Public Forums.

The community-planning weekend had been described as the start of the community consultation process proper. However, both it and the neighbourhood meetings that preceded it were dwarfed by the scale and sophistication of the public forums which DCC convened in their wake and which consultants described as "the essential first step towards developing trust" (JTP, 2008: 153). The content and conduct of the series of meetings that followed yielded a number of grounds upon which any critical examination of state-engendered urban regeneration might have focused.[74] For the purposes of this research, the principal point of analytical interest was located in the manner in which the private consultants appointed to the process set about mediating a very political development agenda. This point is illustrated with particular reference to the public-housing component of the LRP and the nature of engagements that ensued between the state, its consultants and the community in the progression of those proposals. In the interests of establishing the larger regeneration context within which the public-housing proposals were advanced, this section first attends briefly to the manner in which that agenda was elaborated through the items tabled for discussion at the succession of public forums convened throughout 2008 and 2009. It then undertakes a detailed exploration of the manner and ends to which consultants functioned in the mediation of that agenda. It closes with an exploration of engagements between the state/its consultants and the community on the aspect of the LRP agenda of immediate consequence for them, that of public housing.

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[74] The LRP convened eleven public forums in total. This research draws upon proceedings within nine of those forums.

(i) LRP regeneration agenda.

A perusal of the items tabled for discussion on the agenda of each of the public forums convened during the fourth stage of the LRP public information and consultative process would not have suggested that the LRP plan was concerned with issues as fundamental or substantive as the homes of sitting public-housing tenants.

The public-forum process opened with a recapitulation of the content and proceedings of the vision that had 'come out' of the community-planning process. A number of the issues relayed were immediately recognisable (e.g. fears re quality, height and density of future developments; improvements necessary in community facilities and infrastructure; the need to effect a greater integration between indigenous and incoming communities; the absence of trust between local government and community etc.). DCC's consultants also reported a number of the themes and issues that would subsequently come to dominate regeneration proceedings as having originated and emerged organically from within that same process. The 'themes' in question were a combination of the assets to which the LRP was clearly seeking to align its regeneration agenda (e.g. the National College of Art and Design; the Digital Hub; the remnants of the area's very distinctive heritage; the commercial potential vested in the area's principal tourist attraction, the Guinness Storehouse; the planned extension of the city's light rail system through the area; key 'catalyst' or 'opportunity' sites within the plan area etc.) and the liabilities which it was intent on correcting (e.g. the area's poor reputation for drugs, anti-social behaviour and crime; the poor calibre of the public realm; impediments to greater pedestrian movement through the area etc.) In the agenda tabled for discussion at subsequent public forums, the centrality of many of the above issues and themes to the LRP regeneration agenda would become fully apparent.

The following is an indication of the aspects of the regeneration plan around which the public forums sought to structure and contain public information and discussion (see Table 9.4).

Table 9.4 Parameters of LRP Public-forum agendas (core issues and themes). [75]

- **Regeneration plans, procedure, process and progress related issues,** including progress reports, organisational framework within which proceeding and legal standing of plan.
- ***Arts and culture,*** centrally concerned with "creating a climate for arts and culture in the Liberties" (Liberties Action Plan: Arts & Culture, 2008).
- ***Biodiversity and open space,*** concerned with the creation of new public parks, the upgrading of existing parks, street linkages between new and improved green spaces and the integration of biodiversity and open space within new developments (Tubridy & Associates, 2008).
- ***Sports, leisure and recreation,*** concerned with conducting an audit and review of existing provision, activity, policies and plans etc. and developing an action plan (Scott Wilson, 2008).

[75] The issues around which the LRP proceeded to convene focus groups and/or commission action plans for inclusion in the Draft LAP are italicised.

- ***Environment – waste, energy and recycling***, concerned with "redevelop[ing] the area into a clean, green and healthy environment for residents and visitors to enjoy" (Patel Tonra Ltd. 2008).
- ***Communication***, concerned with the agreement of terms of reference and the development of a communications strategy -"the public face of the Liberties regeneration: the newsletter, the website, and flyers…" (DCC 2008b: 11).
- ***Built heritage***, concerned with ensuring the retention and enhancement of the area's "unique urban village character," the historic built environment and historic building stock "recognised as a vital component of the identity of the Liberties" (DCC, 2008e: 9).
- **Horse-and-carriage tradition**, an issue introduced midway through the process, concerned with the preservation and streamlining of the area's horse-and-carriage tradition.
- **Planning applications, permissions and appeals update,** i.e. the provision of information about large commercial planning applications including hotels, apart-hotels, student accommodation, residential, office, retail, etc.
- **Redevelopment opportunities and land-use upgrading,** as vested in both the public-housing sites identified as 'opportunity sites' and subsequently in the large tracts of industrial land scheduled to be released onto the market.
- **Public housing,** i.e. the rationale for not convening a focus group on public housing and short briefings on public-housing plans proceeding outside of public forums.
- **Heights and densities,** with particular reference to an urban-design study that DCC had commissioned to address "the urban design deficits in the area and to develop a 3-dimensional framework within which future building proposals are placed" (McGarry Ní Éanaigh & KCAP, 2008: 2) - a study that sought to locate the Liberties within the hierarchy of heights outlined for the city within DCC's (2007 Draft) *Maximising the City's Potential: A Strategy for Intensification and Height.*
- **Developer plans,** as they related to major developments that had either secured planning permission or were the subject of resubmitted applications that had proved unsuccessful in the first instance.
- **Public security and policing,** including the possibility of introducing 'a safer Liberties' strand within the LRP's plans.
- **Digital Hub,** a national government initiative that the LAP envisaged would see the area attain "an international reputation for innovation and excellence in digital media and creative industries" (DCC, 2008a: 15) and one whose employees were now included as a party to be consulted in the same manner as local neighbourhood communities.
- **New and improved retail and markets,** particularly the opportunities presented for same in both agreed and proposed developments that appeared to approximate to Covent Garden type developments in London (see 'Covent Garden in Dublin's Liberties' in DCC, 2008c: 11).
- **Modern public transport infrastructure** that would follow from the construction of new light rail (LUAS) line through the quarter.
- **Public well-being,** i.e. the commission of a survey of well-being of 'individuals, households and neighbourhoods' in the LRP area (Haase, 2008b).

In the wake of the community consultation process, JTP had proposed establishing sub-groups for "taking forward the various strands of regeneration… based on… [ten] key themes" (JTP, 2008: 153). Of the ten key themes proposed, JTP proceeded to establish six focus groups: (i) Arts and Culture; (ii) Biodiversity and Open Space; (iii) Sports, Leisure and Recreation; (iv) Environment –

Waste, Energy and Recycling; (v) Communication; (vi) Built Heritage and appoint individual consultants to facilitate meetings and prepare action plans in respect of each issue (with the exception of the Communications Focus Group which was facilitated by JTP itself). In subsequent meetings, it became apparent that DCC had also retained the services of other professional consultant groupings to advance both core (i.e. Urban Design) and relatively peripheral (i.e. Liberties Horse and Carriage Tradition) components of its regeneration strategy. Midway through the process, it also announced the appointment of a consultant to undertake a Public Well-being survey. While it proceeded at different stages of the process to invite informal discussion on a number of additional issues in small round-table 'breakout groups,' those aspects of the regeneration agenda with which the public were invited to engage formally were clearly signalled by the issues deemed worthy of formal focus groups and/or action plans and studies. Following the appointment of a number of private consultancies to manage the briefs in question, public-forum agendas assumed a familiar complexion and a steady rhythm in the advancement of a regeneration agenda that was clearly weighted towards the interests of a more affluent resident body.

- *Critical interventions into public-forum agendas.*

The presentation of the above agenda occasioned a number of critical interventions by residents and community activists through both scheduled and unscheduled contributions to public-forum proceedings. Community concerns and questions posed within the public forums may be categorised under two broad headings relating to (i) items and proposals on the LRP agenda and (ii) structures and procedures through which the agenda items were being progressed. (See Table 9.5 for an illustration of some of the interjections made.)

The nature of these contributions and critical interventions and the degree of agreement and disagreement on all such issues varied in accordance with the entry and exit of new parties, including critically-engaged residents, housing-regeneration activists, political activists, middle-class residents, planning experts etc. to and from the process. These critical interventions are offered as an illustration of the way in which the dynamic of meetings and meeting agendas could be altered by the entry and exit of critical and activist community members. They are also offered as an indication of the issues and critical perspectives that could just as easily recede from public attention in those cases where the numbers of critical residents and activists in attendance had either dwindled or been eclipsed and silenced by the voices of the more affluent.

Table 9.5 Critical interventions into public-forum agendas.

Regeneration-agenda related issues.	Process and structure related issues.
- Criticism of single-strand private-sector regeneration vision with emphasis on physical regeneration to exclusion of social. - Growing concerns about financial arrangements in place for implementation of LRP in wake of collapse of PPP housing model. - Opposition to planned demolition of public-housing complexes and articulation of same to failed PPP policies. - Anger at planning decisions taking place outside LRP process. Characterisation of proposal to demolish apartment complex constructed with tax incentives to make way for office development as 'outright greed.' - Concerns about impact of emerging development trends, i.e. hotels, apart-hotels, student accommodation on stability and sustainability of area. - Rejection of attempts to invoke draft planning-policy documents advocating greater heights and densities as *de facto* policy. - Request for moratorium on development pending agreement of LRP to prevent advancement of development plans outside process.	- Lack of clarification on legal standing of regeneration plan and process. Value of engaging in a process of unspecified standing. Relative merits of Framework Plans versus Local Area Plans. - Importance of reaching collective agreement on terms of reference. - Locating the locus of power in decision-making process and establishing the parties wielding power in LRP. - Proliferation of consultants and absence of officials. Criticism of decision to appoint consultants to process and absence of DCC officials from same. - Exclusion of issues of fundamental importance from public forums while disproportionate amount to time allotted to secondary issues. - Failure to evince hard empirical research/evidence in support of far-reaching regeneration proposals. Requests for hard socio-economic data.

- *Public-housing issue and proposals.*

From the resident community's point of view, the most significant outcome relayed from the community-planning process pertained to the identification of three key 'catalyst' or 'opportunity' sites for development, a factor that was again presented as having emerged organically from within that community-planning process.

> "There are three key ones ['catalyst sites'] really. The Canal Harbour Basin and adjacent area, the area around Marrowbone Lane/Pimlico and the area around Vicar St. were seen as key opportunity areas where DCC owns enough land to be able to make a difference in these areas..." (JTP, LRP Public Forum (PF) 1, Jan. 2008).

Of the range of LRP issues and proposals that were likely to have an immediate and material impact on the lives of the resident working-class community, the research elected to adopt a particular focus on the public-housing proposals subsequently advanced for each of those 'opportunity' sites within the LRP. The LRP had been replete with intimations about the

importance of its public-housing holdings to the regeneration project that it was seeking to kick-start in the Liberties. The precise nature of the opportunity vested in these sites became apparent in the course of the public forums, not through any formal or public announcement of the fact that DCC had taken a decision to embark on a demolition and re-housing programme that would affect nine flats complexes but rather through the outcry that followed on DCC's despatch of a mail-shot letter to tenants in those flats complexes. The letter informed tenants of DCC's plans and invited them to attend a meeting on the same day if they wished to register their interest in remaining in the area (Pimlico Resident, 2008). Those plans were subsequently detailed in the Draft LAP.

> "The Liberties LAP proposes the demolition of 432 local authority flats in three areas Vicar Street, Basin Street and Pimlico. The schemes affected are Vicar St./Michael Mallen House (*sic*), Basin St. flats, Pimlico – Braithwaite St., Pimlico Terrace, Meath Place, Summer St., Thomas Court Bawn, School Street.
>
> The proposal is to increase the number of local authority units by 20% (316). The number of units to be provided by direct provision and Part V will therefore be 748, (432 replacement units and 316 additional units)" (DCC, 2008a: 92).

The announcement of this decision to demolish and re-house struck an anomalous note in a regeneration plan that was ostensibly being developed in conjunction with the local community. The abrupt and cursory manner of its communication was also significant for the clear signal which it conveyed to tenants about the integrity of their homes and their precise standing as tenants within the process.

Tenants of the flats complexes in question would be rehoused in "replacement units... close to the units being demolished" in a phased housing programme that "assumes new build, relocation, and demolition, followed by more new build" (DCC, 2008a: 93). It was a process that the Draft LAP said would "release land for disposal which will help to finance community facilities," before proceeding to outline detailed plans for each of the three opportunity sites that would subsequently assume the status of "significant redevelopment sites," i.e. Vicar Street and the Iveagh Markets (*ibid.,* 142-145); Pimlico (*ibid.,* 146-149); St. James Harbour (Grand Canal Harbour) (*ibid.,* 156-161).

- *Rationale for demolition of selected flats complexes.*

DCC's rationale for the demolition and re-housing proposals was prefaced by a statement of the factors which were not in play. The social problems and social dysfunction that had prompted the demolition and regeneration of local-authority complexes in other areas across Dublin were not at issue in the Liberties.

> "The ones that we'd be identifying for demolition – unlike other places in the city there really aren't the same level of social problems going on there... there's a bit of anti-social, there's a bit of vandalism, there's a bit of graffiti, but nothing significant." (LG-IV)

While DCC identified a small number of blocks in one of the opportunity areas "that are clearly not working as well as the other two blocks" this seemed be to be an exception in an area that housed "a very strongly [and] closely-knit community" (LG-IV). There were areas in which "problems with drugs and anti-social and vandalism" were more noticeable than others but there were also signs that the community had "got to grips with some of its problems and [was] sorting them out" (LG-IV).

> "[The Liberties] isn't on the City Council's radar the way Moyross [in Limerick] would be, or the way Ballymun was. [As a problematic area?] Yes... it's not a problem in terms of housing... Socially... it hasn't got the problems that Fatima or O'Devaney [flats-complexes] had. It's a much more stable area... a much more long-term area – very low rates of turnover, two or three generations living in the same complexes. So the need to... create a better social mix and so on wasn't, isn't perceived as being a big driver. The perception is that the streets don't work. The public realm doesn't work. The housing isn't working. But the people are fine kind of in a way." (LG-IV)

In an inadvertent admission about the social engineering in which it had engaged in other regeneration programmes, DCC officials denied the existence of any such rationale for its interventions in its public-housing stock in the Liberties.

> "I think on balance when you look at the Pimlico housing, I would be very happy to move those people as a community and I would feel no need to do any social engineering." (LG- IV)

Instead, the rationale for the demolition and re-housing programme was attributed to a number of physical and structural features concerning the flats themselves and the surrounding environment. In relation to the former, DCC pointed to the poor physical condition of flats "coming to the end of their sell-by [date] where refurbishment really isn't an option" (LG-IV). The layout of the flats had also left a legacy of inappropriate and inadequate housing accommodation (including insufficient bedroom numbers; inadequate kitchen and bathroom size; absence of circulation areas and hallways etc.). Structural faults extended from the interior to the exterior of the flats complexes. The inappropriate 'quasi-green field' manner in which the flats had been constructed in the 1960s without reference to the surrounding area or streetscape had left buildings without street frontages, a fractured streetscape and a very poor physical environment (LG-IV). In outlining the various difficulties and negative externalities attaching to the flats complexes in question, DCC had ruled out refurbishment.

> "But people are coming to me with... alternative proposals which are refurbishment and what I'm saying to them is 'I'm not involved in a refurbishment programme.' I will have difficulty getting money to do new build in the current climate and certainly there are a number of schemes around the city that would be ahead of them in the queue for refurbishment... But people think that if we have an idea for a new build that we must have money that they can have instead to do refurbishment. And I know that doesn't sound sensible but that isn't the way it is." (LG-IV)

The choice facing tenants living in the designated opportunity areas was essentially demolition and re-housing or nothing. Notwithstanding the delineation of the various rationales about structural

deficits and negative environmental impacts, it was difficult to escape the core rationale underlying the sudden imperative attaching to the demolition and re-housing programme – the strategic and catalytic importance of the sites currently occupied by the flats complexes in question for the realisation of the LRP's regeneration vision. It was in that context that the denial of refurbishment as an option became comprehensible. (See Table 9.7 for a chronology of state-community engagements on the LRP's public-housing proposals.)

- *Proposals for public-housing opportunity sites.*

Released from their current public-housing incumbents, the proposals advanced in respect of each site abounded with visions, analyses and objectives for landmark developments that were to be iconic of a new and transformed Liberties. One opportunity area (Vicar St.) was to be redeveloped in such a way as to "establish a distinctive character for the... area, with vibrant markets and creative industries as economic catalysts for its regeneration" (DCC 2008a: 144). It was to be replete with tourist trails, public spaces that would provide a natural focus for patrons of "exciting performance venues" in the area; studios and small workshop spaces for the creative and artisan industries in a "new art quarter" that would have a special relationship with the National College of Art and Design (NCAD) (DCC 2008a: 142-144). The redevelopment of another opportunity site (Pimlico) at "the natural centre of the Liberties" was to see a reconfiguration of the area's street layout "focused around a substantial new public park at the heart of the Liberties." The park in question was to incorporate a library that would be "utilised as an icon of the area's new identity at a local, city, national and international level." In the same way as the identity (and fortunes) of the Vicar St. area was to be intertwined with the NCAD, the identity of the Pimlico area was to be aligned with the Digital Hub and the Guinness Enterprise Centre *via* "the promotion of training, exhibitions and venue facilities within the [proposed] multimedia library building" (DCC 2008a: 146). In the third public-housing opportunity area (St. James Harbour), "the hidden heritage qualities of the large canal and basin structures" were to be unearthed to "form the basis of a distinct identity for the redevelopment of the area." The harbour development would, in turn, provide one of the catalysts for the regeneration of the surrounding area in which the opportunity presented itself for "a major redevelopment providing a vibrant mixed use 24-hour destination offering further amenity to visitors of the adjacent Guinness Store House." While the objectives for the area did incorporate the development of educational facilities, objectives were equally addressed to the delivery of "cultural destinations" and the promotion of "mixed recreational and leisure facilities accessible to the emerging community" (DCC 2008a: 156-9).

The vision and redevelopment objectives articulated for each of the three public-housing opportunity sites were distinctive in so far as they endeavoured to articulate the future of each area to different artistic, creative-industry and cultural-tourism drivers. All were, however, accompanied by a remarkably similar series of proposals for mixed-used developments, public-realm

improvements and public-open spaces onto which surrounding day-and-night time activities, cafes, bars, restaurants, hotels, libraries and local shops could spill.

While the redevelopment proposals did incorporate provisions for the provision of replacement housing in those cases where the demolition of social-housing units was proposed, it was abundantly clear that the future housing of those local-authority residents currently resident in the selected local-authority sites would now be contingent on the local authority's new and transformative regeneration vision for the areas in question. Where the presence of local-authority tenants on valuable land posed an impediment to the realisation of that vision, they would be moved at the convenience of their local-authority landlord which was increasingly moving to subordinate its landlord function to its new and larger entrepreneurial place-making role. As would be apparent from the *Manager's Report on Submissions from Public Display of Draft LAP* (DCC, 2008f) compiled in response to submissions received during the ensuing statutory LAP consultative process, DCC would not hesitate to remove any recalcitrant tenants who continued to pose an obstacle to its plans.

> "In the event that a minority of people do not wish to move the law can be used to require them to move provided the landlord is offering appropriate new accommodation" (DCC, 2008f: 38).

In setting its sights on land currently occupied by public-housing tenants and proceeding to articulate a series of elaborate redevelopment proposals that would be contingent on the removal of the public housing and/or disposal of the public land in question, the antagonism between competing land uses inherent in urban regeneration had once again become explicit. So too had the highly political development agenda that DCC was intent on pursuing within this regeneration plan. The principal point of analytic interest thereafter lay in the manner in which DCC's consultants proceeded to mediate that agenda.

(ii) LRP Process – role and function of private consultancies in regeneration.

Each stage of the LRP process provided valuable insights into the emerging role and significance of private consultancies within urban regeneration. Of the different stages of the LRP public information and consultation process, the public forums provided the most prolonged exposure to the manner in which the private consultants managed and mediated the body of the LRP agenda. The research selects a number of aspects of the process that appear to have been particularly significant in the advancement of the LRP agenda. These include the proliferation of consultants and the dearth of officials, the nature of the consultation process instituted within the public forums with particular reference to the consultancy tools and strategies employed therein and the partial and ideological nature of that process. It is particularly attentive to those aspects of the consultants' behaviour that sought to generate a momentum and construct a consensus around aspects of the LRP likely to appeal to more affluent residents and interest groups, while working to sideline and marginalise those issues and interests likely to pose an impediment to the realisation of the LRP's

core and underlying objective, namely the catalytic land-use and development reactions that the LRP was seeking to effect across the Liberties.

- ***Elaborate and sophisticated consultative process.***
- *Proliferation of consultants.*

The defining feature of the public forums was the number of consultants appointed to mediate and facilitate the progression of the LRP agenda. In launching the LRP, DCC had introduced the firm of lead consultants which had been contracted to prepare the then Framework Plan for the LRP. While the lead consultants remained constant throughout the process, they were accompanied by a procession of different colleagues and associates at different meetings to assist with different facets of the process. The presence of 'an international team of facilitators' had, as noted earlier, been announced as a matter of great importance as if conferring enormous importance on proceedings. In the opening meetings of the public forums, DCC announced that it had further expanded the number of consultants at the service of the LRP by advertising for additional external consultants to prepare individual action plans and facilitate focus groups on particular themes.

The number of consultancies in the service of the LRP grew steadily thereafter, as became apparent in a particularly stark way in the plethora of private consultancies credited in the publication of the Draft LAP (see Plate 9.1). When considered in conjunction with the other professionals and consultants retained by DCC in the course of the LRP process, the degree to which consultants were positioned at every juncture in the LRP process becomes apparent.


Table 9.6 Private consultants engaged in the LRP and Liberties Draft LAP.

Consultants credited in the publication of the Draft LAP.
- John Thompson & Partners LLP.
- Metropolitan Workshop.
- John Spain Associates.
- Bernard Williams Associates (BWA).
- Scott Wilson.
- Patel Tonra Ltd.
- Sarah Searson & Cliodhna Shaffrey.
- Dublin Civic Trust (an independent charitable organisation, see below[76]).
- Mary Tubridy & Associates.
- Deirdre McDermott & Associates.

Additional professionals and consultants retained in the course of the LRP.
- McGarry Ní Éanaigh Architects & KCAP Architect & Planners.
- Trutz Haase Social & Economic Consultant.
- Peggy McMullin & Carly Hamilton (contracted to work with the Horse & Carriage Owners Association).

[76] Dublin Civic Trust is "an independent charitable organisation that works to recognise and protect the city's architectural heritage" (http://www.dublincivictrust.ie/ accessed 15 April 2010).

Plate 9.1 Consultants credited in DCC (2008a) *Liberties Draft Local Area Plan.*



The sheer number of consultants appointed to the process and the difficulty on occasion in distinguishing between consultants and ordinary members of the public in attendance was itself remarkable. The manner in which they were deployed at every stage throughout the process was even more remarkable for the manner in which this secondary body of ancillary consultants, ostensibly functioning to facilitate greater public engagement, were actually functioning to insinuate and embed the core tenets and objectives of the LRP within both the consultation process and the consultative body which they had been contracted to consult. In this manner, consultants were insinuated ever more deeply into the process until they appeared to be functioning as a self-referential group and an actual proxy for the communities ostensibly being consulted.

An FOI request (FOI/2929/10) submitted to Dublin City Council in the wake of the LRP consultation process revealed that it had expended in excess of €1.5 million (€1,519,118.12) on private consultancy services during the process. (See Appendix 9.1 for details of the monies expended.)

- *Appropriation of independent and critical consultants.*

In addition to the host of consultants contracted to facilitate focus groups, consult with particular interest groups, prepare action plans or specialist urban-design studies, the consultant body also expanded beyond the standard (arts, culture, biodiversity etc.) professional consultancy repertoire to incorporate an independent socio-economic consultancy that had recently been engaged in conducting critical research into the incidence of affluence and deprivation in Dublin's inner city. This earlier programme of work had included a critical assessment of "the causes and consequences of the particular form of urban renewal that has taken place in Dublin's inner city over the past fifteen years" (Haase, 2009: 29; see Chapter 4 for further discussion of same). Charged with collecting data about public well-being in the Liberties in 2008, which would then be used as a baseline against which the impact of the new regeneration project would be measured in the future, the brief on this occasion did not appear to extend to the impact of the decade or urban renewal that had just drawn to a close. It was thus that the findings of that well-being survey, which revealed a locality in which families and children were experiencing significant problems, were enlisted to strengthen the case for regeneration as opposed to being read as an indictment of the regeneration which had hitherto taken place. The socio-economic consultant in question prefaced the preliminary presentation of his findings with the comment that "the news won't be good because this wouldn't be a regeneration area if everything was 'hunky-dory.'" The consultants concurred, commenting that the survey findings "read like a big cry for help" (LRP PF10, Dec. 2008). Interestingly, the report in question, while generating valuable data on socio-economic and well-being indicators across different tenures in the area, had not been commissioned in time to facilitate the inclusion of its findings in the Draft LAP.

- *Dearth of officials.*

The proliferation of consultants stood in sharp contrast to the dearth of senior officials within the public process. DCC officials did feature as speakers at public forums but never, with the exception of one notable appearance by an assistant-city manager, of seniority greater than project or area manager. Following a series of contentious and hostile public exchanges with a former member of the IAP monitoring committee at one public forum meeting, the assistant-city manager in question did not attend again. Senior officials may have chosen to abstain from the public progression of the LRP but they remained fully engaged behind the scenes. Project documentation revealed the existence of a Liberties Regeneration Steering Group that included the Assistant City Managers for Housing and Residential Services and Planning and Economic Development respectively as well as the City Planner and the City Architect in its membership (JTP, 2008). DCC had not, as in the IAP, made the mistake or proposing a cross-sectoral steering committee or convening any monitoring-committee type structure that might have misunderstood or tried to exceed its powers. Instead, it had convened an in-house steering group comprised exclusively of senior officials.

- ***Nature of consultation process instituted within public forums.***

In the publications produced alongside the LRP process, DCC had celebrated the public forums as issuing in a new *modus operandi* of 'direct democracy' that would allow members of the public to have "direct local input into the LAP" (DCC, 2008d: 1). It had also, as detailed in 8.3.2, fashioned a model of public engagement empowered to guard against the emergence of unnamed, sectional special interest groups that might seek to hijack or dominate the process. DCC had clearly anticipated a significant level of opposition to aspects of the regeneration agenda that was to follow. The consultation and public information process that ensued was an elaborate and sophisticated process in which meetings were chaired by lead consultants and agendas populated by a succession of polished, professional presentations from the various consultants to whom it had contracted out the major items on its public-forum agenda. It was also a very tightly controlled process which sought to delimit strictly the opportunities for public contributions to proceedings.

- *Omission/denial of key focus groups.*

That control was evident in the first instance in the manner in which consultants sought to confine and delimit public engagement to those aspects of the LRP's agenda deemed worthy of focus groups. The panoply of focus groups convened was notable for the omission of focus groups on the two issues which earlier forums had revealed to be among the prime concerns of the resident working-class community, those of public housing and planning. Significantly, they were also the issues that were likely to have been the most contentious. The decision not to convene a planning focus group followed a very contentious exchange between an assistant city manager and a former community representative to the IAP Monitoring Committee during an early public-forum meeting in which the calibre of DCC's planning decisions had come under uncomfortable public scrutiny. It

was an exchange in which the former community representative had been prompted to ask "who is trying to fool who?" and the assistant-city manager had moved to distance himself publicly from critical remarks about substandard development made by the LRP project manager. The public forum in question had also been notable for the inclusion of planning in the series of 'breakout groups' convened therein, a breakout group to which a large number of participants had immediately gravitated (LRP PF2, Feb. 2008). The newsletter published in the wake of this meeting sidestepped the convening of any future planning focus groups by detailing the introduction of a new arrangement whereby a local-authority planner would "keep the forum up to date with information about planning applications and decisions" and would, at the request of any of the councillors, convene "a dedicated team of planners… [to] go through the plans with local people and the councillor making the request… This system is used a lot in other parts of the city but has not been used as much in the Liberties to date" (DCC, 2008b: 6). Significantly, although DCC and JTP also stated their intent to assent to the request for a planning focus group through facilitating the group as part of the forum's 'break-out session' (*ibid.,* 11), planning was never to be the subject of future focus or 'break-out' group discussions.

The same newsletter acknowledged the need for "a focus group looking at housing issues" but deferred the convening of such a group until the "local authority as landlord" had "consult[ed] with the tenants likely to be most affected by redevelopment proposals" (*ibid.,* 5). Subsequent newsletters characterised the LRP's public-housing proposals as a private matter between landlord and tenant. "When it comes to issues related to the possibility of demolition and replacement of local authority flat schemes it will naturally be necessary for confidential and detailed discussions with those directly affected i.e. the landlord/their agents and tenants/tenant groups" (Hanlon in DCC, 2008d: 2). It was thus that DCC's consultants sought to prevent the entry of the key and very contentious issue of public housing into the public arena. While the particular housing situations and housing preferences of individual tenants were correctly regarded as a private and confidential matter, the LRP's proposal to demolish 432 units across nine flats complexes (DCC, 2008a: 92) was anything but a private matter.

Notwithstanding a series of critical interventions asserting this point, DCC and its consultants persisted with the denial of any such legitimate public interest and proceeded with its housing proposals outside of the gaze of the public forum in a manner that served to individualise and fragment the progression of highly political public-housing and public-land use proposals. The denial of any legitimate public and collective interest in its proposals took place in the face of vociferous opposition from the residents of at least one of the three public-housing areas earmarked for demolition (LRP PF6, June 2008). The latter refused to accept that public-housing proposals were a matter to be confined and contained within so-called 'housing clinics' separate from the public forums. In an early public-forum meeting consultants had described the role of the forums

and workshops in the following manner, "the big forum for the big topics, the workshops for the specifics" (JTP, PF1, Jan. 2008). The latter might more accurately have been amended to specify 'the workshops for the relatively innocuous items on the LRP agenda plan on which public engagement was invited.

- *Diversionary forum agendas.*

In the absence of any forum around which those concerned about the LRP's public-housing proposals could convene, organise or mobilise, public forums provided the only opportunity for residents to voice their concerns. Here too they confronted a polished professional consultative machine. The list of issues tabled for public-forum agendas followed in large measure from the themes and issues deemed worthy of consultants and focus group. Chaired by the lead consultants and populated by the various consultants to whom it had outsourced strands of the regeneration plan, meeting agendas were constructed in such a way as to allot issues of relative insignificance considerable space and prominence which were entirely disproportionate to their importance to the indigenous community, while steadfastly denying access to the real and substantive issues at stake in the LRP. It was thus that issues such as arts, culture and biodiversity came to assume a prominence on forum agendas denied to the substantive issues of public-housing, public-land, planning and development. It was not that any party sought to deny the importance or desirability of arts, culture, biodiversity, open space, environment and heritage issues. It was rather that these matters appeared entirely superfluous to those seeking a public hearing for their opposition to the LRP's public-housing demolition and re-housing proposals. Beyond the increasing sense of the absurd attaching to discussions about birdsong and butterflies when people's homes were under threat, it became clear that the realisation of many of the objectives articulated within the LRP would be at the expense of the current homes of some local-authority tenants and the sparse amenities enjoyed by a number of vulnerable groups in the area.

The refusal to convene a public-housing focus group or to allot public housing a place on the agenda commensurate with its importance was thrown into sharp relief by the space and importance conferred on another community issue that received extraordinary prominence within the public forums, namely the area's horse-and-carriage men tradition. As an issue, it was deemed sufficiently important to require the services of consultants, the undertaking of an audit of horse-and-carriage men in the area, the founding of a Liberties Horse & Carriage Men Association with a uniform, logo and website and the allotting of substantial time slots to the consultants appointed to the issue at four separate public forums. When compared with the importance of the contested and contentious issues at stake in the LRP's public-housing proposals, the prominence attributed to an issue that could reasonably be described as a non-threatening diversionary soft issue appeared highly anomalous. The discrepancy between the time allotted the two issues prompted an aside from one critical observer to the effect that the LRP appeared intent on preserving the signature

features of the Liberties in aspic for the ambience of a new incoming population, an ambience which would be undisturbed by the presence of the working-class population that had given the area its character in the first instance.

- *Curtailment of opportunities for public contributions.*

Opening meetings of the public forum had been dominated by critical public interventions in a largely unstructured meeting format in which consultants grappled to contain a succession of highly critical exchanges on contentious issues. Thereafter, consultants approached subsequent meetings with markedly more determined chairing style. The third public forum saw the introduction of a protocol governing public contributions to meetings that allowed each of the assembled tables around which participants were invited to group, to submit one question or one comment (but not both) at ordained times during forum meetings. While that protocol was relaxed at times to allow impromptu interventions in later meetings, consultants remained alert at all times to potential flash points and intervened to shut down or divert the course of any discussions that threatened to become overly contentious – whether those interventions related to public housing or planning and development issues. It was a chairing style that on occasion could only be characterised as authoritarian.

- *Signature consultation tool, the charrette.*

The adoption of strict chairing strategies and the administration of sharp rebukes would appear to have been a last resort deployed to deal with those instances in which consultants had failed to prevent the entry of contentious issues into the public domain. Of the range of participatory and consultative tools and techniques used to prevent the crystallisation of any such conflictual or contentious situations, there was one that could be termed the signature tool of the LRP process, namely the charrette. JTP's website had listed 'stakeholder charrette processes' among the range of participatory techniques and services on offer from its consultancy. While JTP did not use the 'charrette' term explicitly in the LRP process, it was clear from the continual disaggregation of the regeneration agenda and assembled participant audience into smaller groupings variously described as 'focus groups,' 'breakout groups,' 'discussion groups' and 'sub groups,' that the strategy was utilised at every stage of the LRP process to direct and structure the public's engagement under selected permitted strands of the LRP's regeneration programme. Charrettes were also and, more tellingly, used on those occasions when community anger at particular aspects of the LRP threatened to disrupt proceedings as a means of diverting discussion of contentious and potentially explosive issues away from the public forum into smaller facilitated groupings where such difficult issues could be more easily defused and contained. In this manner, it was possible to decipher the true nature of the engagement enabled and disabled within the 'direct democracy' mode of participation and the validity of the many claims made in respect of it by DCC (see 8.3.2), as it was operationalised by a local-authority intent on pursuing a particular urban-regeneration agenda.

- *Insights into real brief of public forum.*

Alongside formal statements of DCC's rationale for convening such an elaborate forum for public engagement with the LRP, there were occasional insights into the real purpose and remit of the public forums in those instances when the consultants appeared to depart from the publicly stated purpose of the forums. In contrast to public statements that sought to invest the public forums with civic-minded and democratising objectives, consultants conceded in one public forum that its purpose was rather more pedestrian and pragmatic. "The community forum is being used to communicate the biggest problematic projects" (LRP PF1, Jan. 2008). Yet it was evident from all of the above that some projects were simply too 'problematic' to be communicated *via* the public forums. Thus, following an impromptu decision to invite public-housing tenants who had been protesting about the proposed demolition of their homes to address a forum meeting, one of the consultants sought to wind up proceedings by justifying the exclusion of the most contentious issues from the forum agenda and describing the public forums as a courtesy on the part of DCC only.

> "This is an information platform where we're running through a number of parallel happening projects and planning issues etc. to get you all informed again and again and again. So this is just a courtesy of the DCC. It never happened ever before in other projects, such an intensity of information…" (JTP, LRP PF6, June 2010).

Proposals relating to public housing would "require a separate and a unique and specific consultation process" outside and apart from the public forums (*ibid.*).

- ***Partial and ideological consultative process.***
- *Evidence of partiality.*

In introducing themselves at the earlier Community-planning Weekend event, JTP had introduced DCC as "our client" to the assembled audience. In spite of DCC's denial that the consultants would be acting for their paymasters, there were several indications that they were very evidently operating in the direct service of their 'client.' That partiality was evident in a number of ways. For example, criticisms of DCC or the regeneration agenda were greeted with the rejoinder that "it's easy to criticise, it's much more difficult to take decisions" (JTP, NM3, Oct. 2007). The defence of its client became more pronounced within the public forums when criticisms of DCC were countered with exhortations to "try not to criticise DCC. They're quite an easy target. Let's move it on and get some positive change. We are where we are" (JTP, PF1, Jan. 2008). That defence was unapologetic. In the face of criticisms of the defensive stance adopted on behalf of a local authority which, residents protested, was more than capable of speaking for itself, one of the lead consultants responded to the effect that he would "defend anyone that I think needs defending" (*ibid.*). Those instances in which consultants lost their veneer of impartiality under pressure were relatively easy to identity. So too were those cases where it was possible to identify a clear discrepancy between the formal and public record of proceedings and first-hand observations of same. This point is made with particular reference to the manner in which consultants excluded any reference to the

opposition among public-housing tenants to the LRP's public-housing proposals from both the *Community Planning Report* (JTP, 2008) and the *Draft Local Area Plan* (DCC, 2008a).

- *Key motifs.*

Closer attention to proceedings was, however, necessary to discern the repeated insinuation of key ideas and ideological premises into the presentation and advancement of the regeneration agenda. The process was distinguished from the outset by the reiteration of certain ideas in such a manner as to establish them as key motifs in the process, for example the idea that the area was 'at a tipping point' and had somehow arrived organically at that point; the designation of individual public-housing areas as 'catalyst sites' or 'opportunity areas' which were then presented as being integral to the catalytic transformation that the regeneration plan was seeking to trigger across the area; the identification of a growing number of 'character areas' within the larger Liberties area for which the LAP then proceeded to outline key development objectives (DCC 2008a: 57-74). Of the range of motifs identified in process, the first of these, the idea that the area was "at tipping point" (JTP, 2008: 116) and on the brink of great things, was used to very particular effect. Reiterated throughout the different meetings and forums, it served to imbue the process with a ceaseless and inexorable momentum. The Liberties was described as an area that had seen "significant development to date" and one in which "dramatic change" was imminent (JTP, PF1, Jan. 2008); an area that was variously "in the middle of big changes" (JTP, NM2, Oct. 2007) or on the "cusp on major change" (JTP, CPW, Nov. 2007); an area that "does seem to be on a sort of tipping point of changing" and for which there was "a huge amount of things proposed" (JTP, NM2, Oct. 2007). It was clear that that momentum should be understood to be propelling the Liberties towards great things. There was no attempt at any stage to take issue with this assumption or to interrogate the integrity of the past or proposed state interventions that had brought the area to this precipice.

- *Ideological premises.*

The idea that the further change and development that would follow within the LRP represented an unquestioned benefit for the area was just one of the ideological premises with which the LRP proceeded. The subordination of use value to market value was similarly presented as part of the natural order of things. Community concerns about the implications of land-use upgrading for the resident working-class community (see Kelly, 2007a), the local employment losses sustained to date and the replacement of the workplaces of the past with the cafés and café culture of the future were met with the simple rejoinder that "lower-value land uses tend to be replaced by higher-value uses... There are natural processes of change. There's reality as well" (JTP, PF1, Jan. 2008). In the process of normalising land-use upgrading and development imperatives, consultants acquiesced with the treatment of controversial draft planning-policy documents as *de facto* policy in the advancement of height and density proposals within the LRP. Meanwhile, they responded to an early request for a moratorium on development pending agreement of the new Framework Plan

with a response that showed that they were clearly *au fait* with the power hierarchies surrounding the Irish planning and development process. It informed the petitioners very simply that they 'aimed high' (JTP, PF1, Jan. 2008). On the matter of financing mechanisms, communities were informed that public-private arrangements were the established means through which such plans were progressed and community gain was secured (JTP, NM1, Oct. 2007). The latter was accompanied by anecdotal references to practices in the consultants' country of origin. In this way it was possible to observe the transmission, normalisation and promotion of what were highly ideological premises and tenets throughout all stages of the process.

- *Evidence base for proposals.*

In light of the highly ideological nature of many of the public-housing and land-use proposals advanced within the LRP, it is important to note the failure of either the consultants or local government to advance any hard empirical evidence in support of proposals seeking to effect significant changes to existing social-housing policy and practice. The latter included proposals to initiate a demolition and re-housing programme that would see 432 households moved from their current homes to new apartments during an elaborate five-year phasing programme that some believed could "only be very destructive of existing public-housing communities" (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 5-6). When challenged on the failure of their *Community Planning Report* to underwrite their regeneration proposals with hard data on population loss and displacement, the implications for social housing, employment loss and displacement, industrial land loss, land-use upgrading, the number of live planning applications etc., both JTP and its local-authority client noted the points made with interest but appeared unperturbed. The suggestion that the parties in question had failed to conduct the research necessary to underpin their regeneration proposals did not deter either the local authority or its consultants. The former stated that the report contained a record of what people had said to them during the consultation process and that the issues referenced above would be considered in a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) in process at that time. It later qualified its defence of the content of the *Community Planning Report* by stating that it could not guarantee that every word uttered during the community-planning phase had been included in the document. The latter stated that the report in question was "a process document not a research document." The points raised were "all very relevant" but consultants and officials looked for agreement so that the meeting could move on (DCC and JTP, PF5, May 2008).

There was only one conclusion to be drawn from this exchange and the fact that JTP subsequently proceeded with its far-reaching public-housing proposals within a scant four-page 'Liberties Housing Strategy' (DCC 2008a: 92-95). Elaborate, expensive but essentially insubstantial community consultation processes, with all of their inherent weaknesses and proven inefficacies in both ensuring the participation of all those affected and the documentation of the most serious concerns expressed by those who did participate, were being used as a substitute for hard,

objective, empirical research which would have been obliged to present the hard facts and figures underlying each policy move and regeneration proposal and their predicted impacts.

(iii) LRP public-housing engagements.

- *A chronology of state-community engagements on public-housing proposals.*

This exploration of the LRP's public forums opened by delineating the core components of the LRP agenda as they were progressed within those forums. It continued by examining the manner in which DCC's consultants proceeded to mediate that agenda through an elaborate, sophisticated but very tightly controlled consultative forum. This exploration of the content and conduct of the public forums concludes with a brief exposition of the exchanges and engagements that ensued between DCC, its consultants and local-authority tenants on the issue of primary interest to this analysis, the LRP's public-housing proposals, as those engagements were transacted within the public forums. This chronology (as detailed in Table 9.7) is offered in the interests of illustrating the manner in which the consultative process was mobilized to marginalise and exclude all but the most peripheral discussion of the key issue of concern to the resident working-class community, public housing. This chronology is offered in the interests of illustrating the ability and determination of a powerfully resourced government and consultant body to withstand critical interrogation, vocal opposition, disruptive resistance, public protests and public embarrassment to proceed with a body of highly contentious public-housing proposals with only the most minor of concessions to their critics.

There is an important caveat to be entered into the information relayed hereunder. The LRP's demolition and re-housing programmes affected nine flats complexes in three public-housing 'opportunity areas.' Of the three public-housing communities resident in the designated 'opportunity areas,' only one maintained a vocal presence throughout the engagements that ensued within the public forums. The public-housing community in question was resident at "the heart of the Liberties" (DCC 2008a: 15). Of the two other public-housing communities (located to the east and west of the LRP area respectively) one made a number of representations in the early stages of the public forum (indicating their preference to engage with DCC outside of the public forums); the other was not evident at any stage. The material relayed below pertains to the exchanges that ensued between DCC, its consultants and the public-housing community resident in the Pimlico area and, more particularly, the residents of the South Summer Street flats complex which the LRP proposed demolishing to make way for a new public park. As the views of local-authority tenants derive for the most part from the single public-housing community that elected to engage with the LRP's public-housing proposals in the public forums, the chronology is accompanied by an acknowledgement of a crucial unknown factor - the nature of the engagements that ensued between DCC, its consultants and local-authority tenants resident in the other public-housing 'opportunity areas.'

Plate 9.2 Protest staged by public-housing tenants at entrance to LRP public forum meeting.
(Source: DCC (2008d) *LRP Newsletter 3*.)



Plate 9.3 Participation within LRP public forum meeting.
(Source: DCC (2008d) *LRP Newsletter 3*.)



Table 9.7 A chronology of state-community engagements on public-housing proposals within LRP Public Forums.[77]

PF	Place on Public-Forum (PF) agenda.	Community contribution/intervention/action.	Key significance of forum *vis-à-vis* public-housing proposals.
PF1 (15 Jan. 2008)	Featured under recap of 'LRP Vision' i.e. identification of three key catalyst / opportunity sites "where DCC owns enough land to be able to make a difference." Outline sketch of proposals for redevelopment of area.	Local-authority tenant interventions, included - Concern at low representation from tenants of public housing in one of the three opportunity sites (Vicar St.). Low representation explained with reference to lack of notification and fears re entry into public forum. Preference expressed for engagement outside of forum. Request for audit of social housing.	Identification of catalyst/opportunity sites.
PF2 (26 Feb. 2008)	Referenced under 'Focus Groups,' i.e. DCC announcement of intention to convene a Housing Focus Group in future but 'public discussion' deferred until consultation with tenants in affected areas has taken place.	Local-authority tenant interventions, included - Questions re plans for local-authority flats complexes in one of the three opportunity areas (Vicar St.). - Request that process admit the learning and experience which community has gained from participation in housing PPPs.	Exclusion of housing from panoply of convened focus groups.
PF3 (08 Apr. 2008)	PF following letter informing tenants of demolition and re-housing plans in two of the three opportunity areas (i.e. Pimlico and Basin St.) Featured under 'Report from Local Area Meetings,' i.e. a presentation incorporating data on numbers of social-housing units and size of local-authority land holdings in respect of all local-authority housing sites within LRP Framework area. Outline of plans for Pimlico area. Tabled agenda item. Report on meetings held with social-housing tenants in two opportunity areas tabled under 'First Design and Housing Programme.'	Local-authority tenant interventions, included - Request for clarification on implication of new parks and facilities proposals for social housing. - Stated opposition and resistance to demolition and re-housing proposals. - Series of comments and questions re manner in which demolition plans communicated, rationale underlying demolition proposals, implications for number of social-housing units etc.	Antagonism between existing homes of public-housing tenants and regeneration objectives (new amenities, parks etc.) becomes explicit. Threat of displacement also explicit for first time. Apparent that local-authority tenants to be confined to allotted time slots in responding.

[77] The LRP convened 11 public forums in total. This research draws upon proceedings within nine of those forums.

PF	Place on Public-Forum (PF) agenda.	Community contribution/intervention/action.	Key significance re public housing.
PF4 (06 May 2008)	Featured under 'Progress Report' as part of recapitulation of key aspects of plan. Incidental points made in response to interventions including issues arising in discussions with local-authority tenants; arguments for demolition and re-housing over refurbishment.	Adoption of disruptive techniques by social-housing tenants from Pimlico area seeking to voice opposition to LRP's demolition and re-housing proposals. Local-authority tenant interventions, included - Reference to survey undertaken by Pimlico tenants indicating 85% preference for refurbishment over demolition. - Assertion of support for park proposals but refusal to concede homes. Attempts by other participants to silence interruptions by Pimlico public-housing tenants. Community activist interventions, included - Contradictory nature of DCC's actions and proposals *vis-à-vis* public space (selling off playing pitches on one hand; proposing demolition of habitable housing to make way for new parks on other). - Requests for clarification on manner in which LRP consultation process differs from housing-regeneration consultation process.	Power of critical social-housing tenants to disrupt a regeneration agenda otherwise peopled by innocuous arts, culture, biodiversity-type issues. Studied indifference and determination to proceed on part of consultants in face of opposition of Pimlico tenants to LRP plans. Recurring inference that local-authority residents standing in way of vital public facilities.
PF5 (27 May 2008)	Featured under 'Report back - local area meetings' including plans for Vicar St. 'opportunity area' and reference to sensitive treatment of those obliged to move out of homes. Circulation of *Liberties Community Planning* report.	Critical activist interventions, included – Direction to unanswered questions re funding mechanisms for proposals; concern in wake of collapse of housing-regeneration PPPs. – Contrast between exclusion of substantive public-housing and public-land issues from forum agendas and repeated tabling of superfluous items such as Liberties' horse-and-carriage tradition. – Invitation to sign petition calling for a 'slowing down' of process. Critical (Pimlico) tenant interventions, included – Request for clarification on whether DCC proceeding with housing demolition proposals within LAP in spite of tenants' opposition.	Defence of *Community Planning* report as a consultation as opposed to a research document and acceptance that 'not every word' uttered included. Determination to proceed in face of critical interventions from public-housing tenants, critical activists and academics. Direction to right of all to make views known *via* statutory LAP process. Refusal to reopen discussion about relocation of proposed park when the Pimlico social-housing site identified as 'logical site.'

PF	Place on Public-Forum (PF) agenda.	Community contribution/intervention/action.	Key significance re public housing.
PF5 cont'd.		– Exclusion of social-housing concerns from *Liberties Community Planning* report. – Concerns at proposals to proceed with demolition of successful public-housing flats complexes in wake of problems wrought by PPP collapse. – Withdrawal of outspoken critics of housing demolition plans from meeting in protest. Critical academic intervention, included – Failure of *Liberties Community Planning* report to advance data or research necessary to underwrite LRP proposals.	
PF6 (17 Jun. 2008)	Featured as impromptu admission to agenda in response to street protest staged at entrance to meeting.	Street protest by Pimlico public-housing tenants at entrance to public-forum meeting. Series of critical statements in opposition to the LRP's demolition and re-housing proposals, included - Articulation of opposition to demolition of habitable housing to collapse of housing-regeneration PPPs. - Anger at manner in which original decision communicated to tenants - Militancy of older residents - defiance in face of LRP proposals and refusal to concede homes to make way for park. Refusal of LRP attempts to characterise local-authority tenants as impediment to delivery of new parks. - Denouncement of focus-groups consultants for formulation of various plans for public parks and open spaces without reference to the people and communities impacted by such plans - Enumeration of positive features characterising a successful public-housing community of longstanding, including strong neighbourhood and community solidarity. - Refusal of attempts to characterise opponents as a minority. - Stated preference to remain in place with necessary refurbishment to homes.	Prolonged public exchange between Pimlico tenants and JTP/DCC on disputed public-housing demolition and re-housing proposals. Articulate, coherent and militant defence of homes and community (see adjacent). Attending response from DCC & JTP. Statement of regret on part of *consultants* at residents' anxiety and concerns– a situation which it had not intended. Proposals defended by *local authority* with reference to views expressed during consultation process about lack of open space and inadequacy of current local-authority flats etc. Assertion that LRP had sought to improve life in the quarter and not to cause unhappiness in the community. Differing responses from different officials included - Statement of intent by one official to continue with proposals for 'best thing

PF	Place on Public-Forum (PF) agenda.	Community contribution/intervention/action.	Key significance re public housing.
PF6 cont'd.		- Scepticism at new-found concerns for living conditions in public housing in light of indifference traditionally shown towards public-housing maintenance problems. - Concern re viability of proposed public spaces in light of failure of existing public spaces. Scepticism at local-authority enthusiasm for parks in light of neglect of existing play areas attaching to flats complexes. - Request that contested proposals be removed from future LAP. Expressions of support from - Housing-regeneration workers from failed PPPs (including critical questions about expenditure of public monies on consultation process if decisions already taken). DCC accused of moving to dismantle and destroy a successful public-housing community. - Residents in private housing (including alerting officials and consultants to the fear that the rehousing proposals have instilled in community).	for the area' within LAP, at which point people free to make their views known in print. Views to be considered by officials and councillors with ultimate authority vested in the latter. Attempt again to insinuate antagonism between public housing and public parks. - Undertaking by another official to review residents' concerns and views and consider possible alternative location for park. Reiteration of right to make submissions *via* LAP process. Renewed defence of proposals on part of *consultants* with reference to the views of other people who "don't necessarily come along [to process] with placards and loud speakers" – including other local-authority tenants. Assertion of obligation to take own responsibilities as consultants seriously. Denial of any attempt to 'muffle' protesters and direction to reports of opposition carried in newsletters. Denial of any attempt to break up community. Attempt to close discussion by explaining that public forum is "a courtesy of the DCC" and that consultations re housing should be subject of separate meetings with affected tenants. Issue closed with invitation to tenants to visit replacement apartments and attend separate meeting with DCC and consultants.

PF	Place on Public-Forum (PF) agenda.	Community contribution/intervention/action.	Key significance re public housing.
PF7 (22 Jul. 2008)	Notification of LRP Newsletter (3) featuring articles on housing proposals, including (i) two opinion pieces on Pimlico housing proposals (one in favour; one against); (ii) consultant piece outlining alternative location for park and anticipating support for housing proposals. Featured under - 'Timber Yard Flats Visit,' i.e. the new local-authority apartments to which DCC proposing to rehouse Pimlico tenants. - 'Urban Design Progress Report.' Decision to relocate Pimlico park away from contested local-authority flats complex site to alternative location within Pimlico. - 'Breakout groups' which included three public-housing opportunity sites.	Contributions (and enquires) within 'Pimlico/ Marrowbone Lane/Park' breakout group, included - Welcome for relocation of park away from site of South Summer St. flats. - Differing positions on refurbishment versus demolition housing options. - Implications of redevelopment for future housing needs. - Nature of public space and community facilities planned.	Impact of protest staged and concerns expressed by Pimlico local-authority tenants – DCC decision to relocate proposed park away from site of South Summer St. flats but no indication that relocation of park accompanied by any decision to allow the flats complex in question to remain in place. Evident that DCC proceeding with arrangements to source alternative accommodation for those in favour of re-housing proposals.
PF9 (28 Oct. 2008)	Featured as 'Housing Breakout Group.' Exhortations to make submissions in respect of those aspects of LAP of which in favour. Caution re likely response from DoE in event that it were to become aware of opposition to housing demolition and re-housing proposal.	Discussion at 'Housing Breakout Group' (at which only one local-authority tenant in attendance). Feedback relayed to meeting by official without any indication of absence of all but one local-authority tenant in group. Confirming that central-government support for housing replacement programme in place if proposals have local and political support. Feedback on position on demolition and re-housing proposals – some for, others against.	Illustration of manner in which (i) discussions on public housing can proceed in absence of local-authority tenants; (ii) the operation of 'breakout discussion groups' can mask absence of local-authority tenants from larger forum. Indications of the potential of a vocal local opposition to disrupt regeneration proposals.
PF10 (09 Dec. 2008)	Not featured on agenda. (PF10 took place in the interval between the LAP statutory consultation process and the vote of elected councillors on Draft LAP.)	No interventions on public-housing proposals.	Public housing a non-issue as final decision on proposals now a matter for elected councillors.

- *The standing of local-authority tenants within urban regeneration.*

With rare exceptions, DCC and its consultants remained impassive in the face of the vocal criticism and opposition to which its public-housing proposals were subjected within the public forums. The determination to proceed with the LRP's demolition and re-housing proposals did not allow for any public deliberation or consideration of alternative courses of action or any genuine engagement or discussion on the standing and rights of local-authority tenants within urban regeneration. Greater insight into the disposition of the local-authority towards its tenants and the oppositional position assumed by some of those tenants was forthcoming only in interviews with project-management personnel outside of the public forum.

DCC acknowledged the existence of divided positions across the flats complexes at issue in the LRP and admitted that the final outcome was "to be played for" before proceeding to utilise that division to undermine critics and opponents of its housing proposals. Those speaking out at the public forums were not necessarily representative of their communities (LG-IV). DCC had, in any case, identified the most outspoken of these critics as housing-regeneration workers from the various PPPs in progress at that time – regeneration workers who had failed to understand the distinction between housing regeneration and urban regeneration.

> "I think it's interesting that the people who are most vociferous in their opposition are people who've worked in other regeneration projects, like the ones who are speaking most at those meetings are workers in St. Michaels and St. Teresa's and Fatima. And they feel that they know and understand the regeneration process... And they're not recognising the difference between a housing-regeneration project and an urban-regeneration project and I think there are huge differences." (LG-IV)

Their failure to make that distinction prompted DCC to embark on a treatise on the key points of distinction between the two forms of regeneration. From the perspective of this research, the most significant point of distinction was the disproportionate amount of power and authority assumed by sitting tenants within housing-regeneration projects, a standing that was clearly not going to be afforded them within an urban-regeneration project on the scale of the LRP.

> "And whatever you might think about the validity of 120 people in Fatima deciding what's going to happen to that huge tract of land that really is belonging to the whole city, there is no validity for 460 people or households in the Liberties deciding for the other 13,000 what's going to happen to the whole project. And I think maybe people who are tenants of local authority are saying - and rightly - that they're going to be the most affected because [it's] their homes that have been identified for demolition and I'm not saying that's not a valid view but there are other things. There are huge other decisions that need to be made – LUAS, Diageo, Digital Hub, architectural conservation, Frawley's [Department Store] – all the rest of those things – the Tivoli [Theatre], the Vicar St. Hotel - all of those things are as well as housing." (LG-IV)

In an urban-regeneration plan in which many powerful and wealthy interests had gathered, the standing of those without property or wealth had shifted accordingly. Those living on land

"belonging to the city… as tenants" had "special rights" as tenants, but the rights of tenants were not to be confused with the rights of the citizen.

> "I think sometimes they confuse their right as a tenant with their right as a citizen and they want to make citizen decisions in their role as tenants… I think sometimes… local-authority tenants take on roles of speaking for an area that is disproportionate to their rights and that whatever you might say about that in a housing-regeneration project where there's a tight geographic area [at issue] that… maybe it is a lot of land and maybe it is valuable land but it's still… where their homes were situated. In this case it's a wider picture that needs to be put into the frame as well." (LG-IV)

DCC proceeded to delineate and delimit the extent of the rights of public-housing tenants – "to be housed in good accommodation and not to be arbitrarily moved" (LG-IV) and its responsibilities as landlords before asserting the rights that also accompanied those responsibilities.

> "And recognising that we have a special relationship and a special duty of care to our tenants as a landlord - but also recognising… that with that responsibility of being a landlord, we have some rights as well in terms of how the property is managed, how it's refurbished or rebuilt or whatever. So it's not private property, I suppose, is somewhat of the message that needs to go out a little bit." (LG-IV)

In adjudicating on the fate of those local-authority flats complexes deemed to be sitting on 'catalyst' or 'opportunity' sites, those unwilling to concede their homes to make way for a park were in danger of being construed as an obstacle to the public good. In an inversion of the positions traditionally ascribed to propertied and the propertyless, the latter were in danger of assuming the guise of 'greedy land hoarder' while the local authority assumed the mantle of 'socialist' battling for the public good.

> "I think that the same people who are saying to you that the developers are being greedy are also… being greedy in a way because they're saying they won't give up their land for a public park. I think there's a huge kind of interest - when it's somebody else… you're talking about, its greed. And when it's you, it's somehow noble. So I'm not [surprised], I mean, I think property… land is hugely problematic in the Irish psyche. I think there's a very low level of interest in the common good. And I think almost you're ridiculed if you're talking about the common good even, it's like you're a socialist or you're a bad guy in some way." (LG-IV)

In the antagonism which the local authority appeared intent on constructing between the self-interests of local-authority tenants and the public-good interests of the citizenry, it was abundantly clear whom it understood as 'bad guys.'

- *Outcome of engagements on public-housing proposals within LRP.*

In the battle between local-authority tenants and local-authority landlord within the public forums, the latter prevailed. From the point of view of those who had mounted a sustained and vocal opposition to the LRP's public-housing proposals throughout the public-forum process, the key outcome to note in the Draft LAP placed before the public during the statutory consultation process was the inclusion of the LRP's demolition and re-housing proposals with only one minor concession to critics. The public park proposed for the site of the South Summer St. local-authority flats complex in Pimlico would now be relocated to another site in Pimlico. The demolition of the

South Summer Street flats complexes would proceed along with each of the other eight flats complexes, if approved within the statutory consultation process.

9.1.5 LAP statutory process.

- *Decision to move to LAP and statutory consultative process.*

The various concerns expressed about the standing of the LRP consultative process and the weighting to be afforded to the views of different parties therein were rendered mute by DCC's decision to change the status of the proposed regeneration plan from a 'framework plan' to a 'local area plan' in May 2008. That decision had the merit of ushering in a tightly delimited consultation process and regeneration plan with a clear legal standing. However, as with the IAP the community again confronted a very complex and technical regeneration process without the resources necessary to engage in such processes (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 4). The scale of the challenge became apparent upon publication of the Draft Local Area Plan (LAP) in September 2008 in a lengthy 252-page development document.

Table 9.8 Summary overview of Liberties Draft LAP.

- A vision statement for the Liberties in 2020 (DCC, 2008a: 13-19).
- The policy and planning context (*ibid.*, 21-25).
- A description of the regeneration 'study area' (*ibid.*, 27-52).
- A detailed description of the "key characteristics… along with broad brush development objectives" for each of eight "distinctly different character areas" identified within the regeneration area (*ibid.*, 55-74).
- "A draft LAP development strategy" under the six overarching themes identified by DCC as "integral to the development of the city" (*ibid.*, 77-137).
- "Key objectives for each [of 10] significant redevelopment sites within the Draft LAP area" (*ibid.*, 139-193).
- A phasing and implementation programme setting out "the [10] measures required in order to ensure the full implementation of the Draft LAP Strategy" (*ibid.*, 195-201).
- A series of individual action plans in the appendices to the Draft LAP (*ibid.*, Appendices A-E).

The statutory consultation process detailed within the Planning & Development Act 2000 and Planning & Development Amendment Act 2002 provided for a six-week period during which the public would be free to make submissions or observations in respect of the content of the plan.

- *Re-emergence of wealthy as community recedes in LAP consultative process.*

With rare exceptions, developer interests had remained largely absent from the LRP public information and consultative process. They did not, it appeared, expend their energies in consultative processes of indeterminate standing. That situation changed with the inauguration of the LAP statutory consultation process, which was notable for the re-emergence of the panoply of development and professional interests that converge around regeneration programmes. In the six-

week period allowed for public observations and submissions, DCC received 78 submissions in total (DCC, 2008f: 137-140). Of that number, 18 (23%) were made by a variety of urban-design, development, architectural and planning professionals and consultancies. While it was not possible to infer from the Manager's Report whether the consultancies in question were making their submissions on behalf of particular clients or whether they were motivated by a public-good interest in the area's future development, reference to a number of the consultants' websites provided a clear indication of the core interests of the consultancies in question. One, for example, described itself as "the market leader in managing Urban Regeneration PPP projects in Ireland" and boasted of its ability to enable "the public sector to leverage private sector expertise to help unlock significant value from state-owned land and infrastructure while safeguarding the public interest" (Urban Capital, 2010). The latter had "refined a unique skill set through the delivery of some of the largest property PPP projects in Ireland by forming a 'cultural bridge' between the public and private sector" (*ibid.*). Another took the trouble to state its support for consensus-led approaches and to point to its competency in a wide range of consultation techniques including charrettes (DMD, 2010). Some appeared to be quite large international concerns engaged in the provision of advice on "the development of land, property and infrastructure" (RPS, 2010), while some were smaller architectural and planning practices which had had recent professional involvement in planning applications in the area (de Blacam & Meagher Architects, 2010; David Mulcahy Planning Consultant, 2010). Several spoke of their experience across both the public and private sectors (Reid Associates, 2010; GVA Planning & Regeneration Ltd, 2010) while one was acting as an adviser to the four Dublin authorities on energy issues (Codema, 2010).

The panoply of professionals engaged in the provision of planning, architectural and development services, who had been sufficiently motivated by the preparation of the Draft LAP to make written submissions, were joined by one development company which chose to make a submission in its own name (P. Elliot & Co. Ltd.). With the addition of the latter, the total number of consultant, professional and developer submissions combined accounted for 24% of all submissions made to the LAP consultative process.

Alongside the representations made by professional, consultant and developer interests, DCC also received an additional 59 submissions from a variety of national, government, city, commercial, housing, educational, political, community and resident interests. In as far as it was possible to distinguish resident, activist and community organisations from within the Dublin 8 area, the list of those who made submissions included two residents' associations, one community organisation, two activist groupings and 19 individual residents, of which only two appeared to be tenants of the local authority. In summary, individual residents from the regeneration plan area were matched submission for submission by consultants or developers. Outside of the one community-development project listed among those who had made submissions, the compendium was notable

for the absence of any additional submissions from the formal community-development sector. The silence from those community organisations which had held community-representative positions in the IAP was particularly marked. The formal community-development sector had, it appeared, largely withdrawn from the urban-regeneration arena. The Draft LAP's Housing Strategy meanwhile had attracted a total of eight submissions only. That number included three individual residents (of which one was resident in a flats complex earmarked for demolition), a residents' association, an activist grouping, a politician and a town-planning consultant. While the critiques advanced by those opposed to the Draft LAP's Housing Strategy were trenchant, they were small in number. The critical and formidable working-class critics and opponents of the LRP's public-housing proposals, which had insisted that their voices be heard throughout the LRP consultative process, had essentially been lost in the crucial statutory stage of the process.

While DCC may have found solace in the small number of critical submissions directed at its housing proposals, there was the outstanding question about the position of the overwhelming majority of local-authority tenants in the designated area who had declined to take a position either in support of or in opposition to those proposals within the formal statutory process. Speaking at the launch of the LRP, DCC had stated that

> "If at the end of this process, we haven't succeeded in getting people involved in this process, we haven't succeeded" (Dublin City Manager, LRP Launch, Oct. 2007).

It was clear from the negligible number of submissions received from those likely to be most directly affected by the Draft LAP's proposals that that DCC had evidently failed to meet the criteria that it had itself set for the process at the outset. Thus, there remained very serious questions to be posed about the legitimacy of a process through which such far-reaching proposals had been pressed.

- *A regeneration process notable for its symmetries.*

The LRP was a regeneration process distinguished by a notable symmetry between the opening and closing of the public information and consultation process. Both stages were notable for the visibility of the wealthy and the relative invisibility of the resident working-class community. There was an additional symmetry to be noted in the manner in which so many private consultancies had gravitated to a process that had been led, orchestrated, peopled and propelled by private consultancies. The LRP and the Draft LAP prepared within that process emerges as a regeneration process and plan *by* consultants *for* consultants; on one side of the regeneration table sat a body of private consultants advocating for the state, on the other, a body of private consultants advocating for the private-development sector.

- *Focus moves to political decision-making process.*

There were many critical factors that might be interrogated in analysing the manner in which this new and distinctively democratic regeneration process had produced a regeneration plan replete with the planning and development imperatives that had characterised all regeneration processes to date and that had mobilised the planning and development interests that had traditionally gravitated around such processes. The process had now, however, moved beyond the ambits of the local community, the general public and the army of consultants appointed to the process. At the close of the six-week statutory display period, the Local Area Plan process required DCC to prepare a 'Manager's Report' listing all submissions, summarising the issues raised and outlining the opinion of the manager in relation to all matters raised. Thereafter, the final decision on "the proposal to make, amend or revoke a local area plan and the report of the manager" (Government of Ireland, 2000) rested with the elected members of DCC. The focus of this research accordingly shifts to the political decision-making process.

9.2 Political decision-making process surrounding Draft LAP.

9.2.1 Spotlight on role of councillors in urban regeneration.

The decision to move from a framework to a local area plan status had, as already noted, the merit of ushering in a consultation process and regeneration plan with a clear legal standing. By virtue of the formal powers vested in the elected members of DCC in relation to the making or otherwise of LAPs, it also had the merit of placing the decision-making process within clearly delineated political channels. In a local-government environment in which elected councillors had been rendered increasingly powerless, the principal point of analytical interest in this final stage of the preparation and agreement of the LRP lay in the manner in which elected councillors were likely to exercise one of the key reserved powers remaining to them.

- *Positioning of councillors within LRP and LAP.*

The spotlight on the formal role of councillors in the final stage of the process followed on a lengthy consultation process in which DCC and its consultants had pointed at all times to the authority vested in the people's elected representatives in relation to all proposals under consideration in the LRP. Their role had been invoked both formally in presentations on the manner in which the LRP would relate to existing organisational structures within DCC (DCC, 2008b: 5) and informally on a number of occasions when officials and consultants had sought to diffuse potentially contentious issues by insisting that the final authority on all proposals presented within the LRP rested with the people's elected representatives. The invocation of councillors' powers in this manner was particularly evident in discussions surrounding the fate of public housing and public land within the LRP. Impromptu directions to the standing and authority of councillors within the LRP were complemented by the incorporation of a 'Politicians Perspective'

column that allowed each of the area's three councillors to outline their position on the LRP within the project's newsletter (DCC 2008c: 10; d: 11; e: 11; 2009a: 10-11).

The nature of the authority vested in the councillors became explicit following the decision to proceed on a statutory LAP basis. In an environment in which elected councillors had frequently decried the limitations placed on their powers and called for local-government reforms that would see greater powers conferred on them, the decision to place the LRP on a statutory basis also provided an opportunity to observe the manner in which councillors would choose to exercise one of the significant statutory powers remaining to them. Thereafter it remained to be established whether there was a discernable separation of powers evident within DCC in the progression of the LAP through political decision-making channels or whether the repeated redirection of critics and opponents to the political decision-making process had merely provided DCC and its consultants with a smokescreen behind which they could continue unimpeded to develop and progress far-reaching urban-regeneration proposals and plans.

- *Indications of position of councillors prior to LAP vote.*

In advance of the formal vote within the chambers of City Hall, there were several opportunities to observe the position taken by councillors *vis-à-vis* the LRP, namely (i) the formal contributions of councillors to the LRP's newsletters; (ii) their response to a formal presentation made to the Dublin South Central Area Committee (SCAC) by a resident and activist grouping in the area; (iii) the engagement and discussions that followed an attempt by a residents' grouping to convene a meeting with the Dublin SCAC.

- *Indications from 'Politicians Perspectives.'*

The 'perspectives' of the area's three councillors, as outlined within the LRP's newsletters, were remarkably similar. All welcomed the regeneration project with individual councillors espousing their belief in the ability of "this regeneration if properly planned and truly participative [to] make a real difference for the current residents of the Liberties" (DCC 2008c: 10). While one identified the need for more consultation and active participation in the decision-making process (*ibid.*), others proceeded to endorse both the consultants and the consultative process (DCC 2008d: 11). In some cases, the participation imperative was explicit - "we should be partners rather than opponents in the important process of regeneration" (*ibid.*). In others it was couched in more folksy deliberations on how "together as a community we can build a castle" (DCC 2008e: 11). Of the range of issues selected for special mention, namely planning control, regeneration financing, the potential vested in large private landholdings due to come on the market, the views and concerns of young people, the LRP's public-housing proposals were the only issue to feature in more than one 'Politicians Perspective.' The councillors in question pointed to a genuine fear among local-authority tenants in relation to these proposals and requested that the importance of people's homes be acknowledged

and their concerns addressed as a priority (DCC 2008c: 10; d: 11). In one case, this was accompanied by an insistence that the regeneration "should not be at the expense of selling off our public land" (DCC 2008c: 10). The decision by consultants to invite street protesters to address the general body of the public forum was meanwhile welcomed by another councillor as 'encouraging' (DCC 2008d: 11). Beyond these statements of concern about the fears of social-housing tenants, none adopted a definite position on the LRP's housing proposals.

- *Indications from engagements between community and councillors.*

The content of the LRP's housing proposals were the subject of a number of formal community approaches to the councillors representing the larger constituency of Dublin South Central within which the Liberties was located. In investigating the various factors that had militated against the entry of critical community voices into the public domain, the nature of the relationship between critical community interests and elected representatives had come into increasingly sharp focus. Greater insight on the nature of that relationship was forthcoming from the engagements (and lack of engagements) that followed two formal approaches to constituency councillors from an activist and a residents' grouping respectively.

- *Engagements between activist/resident grouping and councillors.*

The first engagement under consideration followed the request by an activist and residents' grouping, the Liberties Development Action Group (LDAG) to present their "concerns about the future of public housing and public land within the LRP" to the councillors of the South Central Area Committee (LDAG, July 2008). The meeting in question was notable for the very poor representation from the area's councillors. Of the eleven councillors representing the constituency, three attended, four sent apologies; four were simply absent. The meeting was also notable for the antagonism of one of the councillors (Fine Gael) present towards the delegation – an antagonism based on concerns about the delegation's representative credentials and one in which she was joined by the project manager of the LRP. Significantly, the councillor in question had no electoral mandate from the area, her having been co-opted to her Council seat following the election of the previous incumbent (her mother) to the Dáil.

The presentation, which posed a series of questions about the LRP's public-housing proposals and the position and policy of elected city councillors on the LRP, elicited a number of different responses from the assembled councillors. Responses ranged from an acceptance of the credentials of the group and the importance of the public-housing issues raised, on the part of two councillors (Labour, Independent), to a litany of issues on which the third (Fine Gael) councillor found herself in disagreement with the delegation. The antipathy of the latter was compounded by her anger at the manner in which the delegation had bypassed the area's local councillors to request the meeting in question and by the stated intention of one of the residents present to 'fight the issue' in the

approaching local election. As in the LRP public process, the LRP project manager was again at pains to stress that the decision-making power in the LAP process lay with councillors not officials. This was a fact of which the LDAG delegation was well aware. Reminding councillors of the ends to which that power had been exercised in another and more affluent area of Dublin, they urged them to reject the LRP as it would be 'recommended' to them by officials.

> "[Councillors] have the power to shoot down the LAP. It's been done in Dublin 4 where the community went to war on the councillors" (Member LDAG delegation, Presentation to Councillors of Dublin South Central Area Constituency, July 2008).

It remained to be seen whether the general body of councillors would be as exercised by the proposals outlined in the Draft Liberties LAP as they had been by the Draft Ballsbridge LAP. In the interim, the failure of councillors to provide any further response to the questions placed before them by the LDAG did not bode well for such an outcome.

- *Engagements between resident grouping and councillors.*

The second engagement or, as it transpired, non-engagement, followed a formal invitation to the councillors of the Dublin SCAC to attend a meeting with a small residents' grouping in the Liberties in the week preceding the formal vote on the Draft LAP. The request was again motivated by residents' concerns about public-housing and public-land proposals and specific proposals which they understood to be in breach of agreements made with residents' associations in the area (Hammond & O'Connor, 2009). In the event, one councillor (Labour) discussed the residents' concerns with them in advance of the meeting; one (Sinn Fein) councillor attended the meeting and one (Independent) councillor sent apologies. The remaining eight neither attended nor forwarded apologises at any point. Beyond the inferences to be drawn from the casual discourtesy shown to concerned residents, the research was denied the opportunity to explore either the positions held by the broader membership of the Dublin SCAC or their willingness to carry critical community views into the political arena.

In the case of the single councillor who did engage with the residents in question, it was possible to observe the familiar disjuncture between the critical position taken by residents and the considerably more pragmatic line taken by elected public representatives (Residents' Meeting with Councillors of Dublin South Central Area (DSCA), 2009). Residents did not dispute the commitment or sincerity shown by individual councillors who had clearly engaged at some length and in some detail with the LRP and its proposals. One Labour councillor had, for example, reportedly submitted 100 motions seeking amendments to the Draft LAP. They did, however, find themselves at significant odds with the analyses advanced and positions taken by their elected councillors in relation to the public-housing proposals outlined within the LAP. Residents had particular difficulty with the failure of councillors to be outraged by successive breaches of agreements between DCC and communities in the area, a point made with particular reference to DCC's proposal to 'dispose' of (i.e. sell) a site that had originally been detenanted to make way for

a redevelopment containing 62 social-housing units (Doherty, 2006). Their anger was also directed at councillors' apparent ignorance of the manner in which the LRP sought to recycle earlier discredited social-housing proposals; their acceptance of a poorly argued rationale for the proposed housing demolition programme and their support for housing proposals on which the resident community were clearly divided and which were apparently being advanced without reference to the implications for the operation of the housing waiting lists.

The incomprehension on the part of residents also extended to the timid and supplicant nature of the political representation afforded working-class communities in areas such as the Liberties which stood in contrast to the markedly more combative and unapologetic political representation afforded wealthy residential areas.

> "Why was it possible for councillors in Ballsbridge to persuade all city councillors to vote against their Draft LAP? And why not here in light of the [public-housing] issues at stake?" (Resident, Residents' Meeting with Councillors of DSCA, Jan. 2009).

For residents, that explanation was located in the differing degrees of wealth and influence housed in the two residential communities. The standoff that had taken place in Ballsbridge was described as "a row between billionaires," while the conflict in the Liberties was merely one between "the penniless and the developers" (*ibid.*). While individual councillors were not uncritical about DCC's behaviour in the advancement of its housing and regeneration proposals in both previous and current regeneration projects, those criticisms did not translate into any corresponding critical analysis or paths of action. The disjuncture in the critical positions assumed by both was perhaps best encapsulated in the contrast between the 'reservations' entertained by some councillors and the 'total opposition' of some residents.

In making this formal approach to the constituency's councillors, the resident grouping had been attempting to engage councillors with the substantive issues outlined in an earlier detailed submission made to the LAP statutory consultative process (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008). They had failed to engage the attention of the majority of the constituency's councillors and they had failed to persuade those who had undertaken to engage with them of their merits of their argument.

- ***Observations on conduct of LAP vote.***
- *Behind the scene negotiations.*

The Liberties Draft LAP and the *Manager's Report on Submissions from Public Display of Draft LAP* (DCC, 2008f) were finally placed before the elected body of DCC in February 2009. They were accompanied by a third report, the *Manager's Reports to Councillors' Motions* (DCC, 2009b), a compendium of 140 councillor motions followed by the Manager's recommendation in each case. This compendium of motions and recommendations had been compiled after lengthy negotiations between local councillors and DCC officials and planners. It was apparent that the councillors and officials in question had reached an agreed position on the Draft LAP prior to

entering the larger council chamber. That consensus was now presented to the larger council body with the agreement and imprimatur of both local councillors and officials. It was a consensus that would brook no opposition.

> "After marathon negotiations, we have secured significant improvements and we have consensus" (SF Councillor, Meeting of Dublin City Council, 02 Feb. 2009).

That consensus had two key dimensions – a consensus between councillors and officials and a consensus between the public representatives from the three different political parties representing the Liberties area. The latter would ensure the uncontested passage of the Draft LAP with agreed councillors' motions through the chambers of DCC.

- *Key amendments (and concessions).*

The compendium of councillors' motions circulated to the general body contained 140 motions accompanied by an additional three amendments on which councillors and officials had also and more latterly reached agreement. The key changes to be effected to the Draft LAP following a review of both public submissions and councillors' motions were represented in the following manner in the LRP newsletter issued in the wake of the meeting.

> "Key changes include revisions to housing and height strategies and alterations to the more detailed proposals for Grand Canal Harbour, Diageo Lands and the Digital Hub sites. A number of modifications have also been made to strengthen the protection of archaeology and heritage" (DCC, 2009a: 3).

The key revisions to the Draft LAP's housing and height strategies had followed in part from the text of the three last-minute amendments placed before the council body and, presumably, represented the most hard-won concessions secured by the area's councillors. Those amendments included a motion that DCC "will seek to ensure that social housing will be maintained at a level of 29% of the total housing units within the Liberties Area, having regard to increases in population" (DCC, 2009b: Amended Motion 20). They also included concessions on building heights in two key sites, including a reduction of the proposed height of a 'singular landmark element' in Grand Canal Harbour from 16 to 12 storeys and the placement of a 16-storey building cap on buildings in the Heuston Square area (*ibid.,* Amended Motion 40). These concessions did not, however, alter the key demolition and re-housing components of the Liberties Housing Strategy outlined within the Draft LAP.

- *Content and calibre of discussion preceding vote.*

In the course of the discussion preceding the vote on the Draft LAP, a total of eleven councillors spoke on the issue. (The party affiliation of each speaker[78] is noted in each case in the interests of illustrating the interchangeability of all positions expressed.) That discussion included three critical contributions from councillors who both questioned the relevance of any debate about LAPs in

[78] FF = Fianna Fáil; FG = Fine Gael; GP = Green Party; Lab.= Labour; PD = Progressive Democrats; SF = Sinn Fein; Other = Independent/Non-party.

light of the planning authority's earlier 'blatant disregard' for the City Development Plan in Ballsbridge and criticised officials for the manner in which the general meeting of the city's councillors - "the decision-making forum in the final analysis," had effectively been sidelined in the decision-making process surrounding the regeneration of an area as "important to Dublin as a whole" as the Liberties (FG, Lab.). While other councillors expressed a number of reservations about the LAP's height proposals in a local authority 'ruled' by its Development Department (Lab.) and councillors from the Liberties area alluded to the legacy of mistrust left by bad planning and past corruption and the persistence of genuine fears among those living in flats complexes earmarked for demolition (SF, Lab.), discussion about the Draft LAP was otherwise characterised by superlatives and commendations for all concerned.

The succession of superlatives saw the Draft LAP characterised as "an extremely positive piece of work" which could only improve the lives of people in the Liberties and leave one with "great hopes for the outcome" of the project (FG, Lab.). It was presented as a regeneration project which would stand in contradistinction to the type of regeneration delivered under the IAP and would serve as a safeguard against the free-for-all that might have ensued in its absence (Lab., FG). Importantly, it was presented as carrying the imprimatur of the local community. Residents had engaged in the process (SF) and most groups were happy with the outcome (SF, FG). Local-authority tenants who had been concerned about the LRP's housing proposals and the consultation process had been 'heard' and the situation had been corrected (Lab.). Thereafter, it remained only to commend all concerned, the residents for engaging in the process, local councillors for their role in formulating key amendments, the consultants for their interest in the area and the quality of their documentation and planners and officials who had worked on the plan and brought the process to a conclusion (SF, FG, Ind., Lab.).

The discussion that preceded the formal vote of the council on the Liberties Draft LAP did not, as will be apparent above, contain any indication of the substantive issues at stake in the plan, the divisive nature of its public-housing proposals or the serious questions that had been posed about the manner in which key aspects of the LAP had been progressed outside its public forums (not unlike the manner in which the decision-making process surrounding the LAP had been progressed outside the chambers of the decision-making forum of DCC). An awareness of all such factors would have been dependent on each councillor's perusal of the full text of both the Draft LAP and the *Manager's Report* on all submissions received from the public. There was no evidence that the general body of elected members had gone to such trouble.

- *Degree of political consensus and dissension.*

The south-west inner-city local electoral ward was represented at that time by three different political parties. The Dublin South Central Area was comprised of eleven representatives from four

political parties and independents. The City Council, in turn, comprised 52 councillors from five different parties and independents (see Table 9.9).

Table 9.9 Political representation across DCC area.

Constituency	FF	FG	GP	Lab.	PD	SF	Other	Total
South West Inner city		1		1		1		3
South Central Area.	1	2		3		3	2	11
Dublin City Council.	**12**	**10**		**15**	**1**	**10**	**4**	**52**

The research had identified the formal vote of Dublin City councillors as an important opportunity to establish the degree of political consensus and dissent surrounding large-scale urban-regeneration programmes in a council body that included elected representatives of all political parties. In the event, it encountered an unwritten protocol that rendered all such considerations mute, by dictating that the general body of city councillors would abide by the position taken by the councillors representing the immediate electoral ward under consideration. That protocol became apparent in a number of ways. First, it was evident in the apparent imperative attached to reaching an agreed local position prior to entering the larger chamber of DCC; secondly, in the interventions by the Lord Mayor to request a critical 'outside' councillor to give way to councillors from the area; thirdly, in a local councillor's denial of the right of a councillor from another ward to intervene at this late stage in proceedings; fourthly, in the commendation of the Draft LAP by one of the local councillors to the larger council with the hope that "it's passed tonight with everyone's support;" fifthly, in the statement by another councillor that she intended to "be guided by the local councillors" in voting on the LAP; finally, in the expressed wish by another councillor that an urban-regeneration plan in his ward would also be passed with cross-party support. Urban regeneration, it appeared, was not a party-political issue. In so far as it was possible to discern political tensions during the various contributions to the discussion, they pertained to geographical tensions between different electoral wards as opposed to political parties.

In the course of the earlier discussion, a lone councillor from another ward had indicated his intention not to vote for the Draft LAP. The opportunity did not arise. Following the series of exchanges detailed above, the amended Draft LAP as it had been agreed in advance of the meeting was proposed and seconded by the local Sinn Fein and Labour councillors respectively. The matter was closed with a parliamentary 'yea' from the other assembled councillors. In marked contrast to the Draft LAP for Ballsbridge which had provoked such controversy and was eventually rejected, the Liberties Draft LAP which was likely to have considerably greater consequences for the residents of the Liberties was passed without major comment or incident in 29 minutes and 16 seconds (DCC, 2009c).

- *Forging of a political consensus around urban regeneration.*

The opportunity to observe the political decision-making process surrounding the Liberties Draft LAP followed in the wake of an IAP in which elected councillors appeared to have played a curiously impassive role in the face of repeated critical approaches from highly-engaged and critical community representatives (see Chapter 6). The IAP had been an urban-renewal plan in which councillors had been at pains to stress the relative powerlessness of their position *vis-à-vis* local-authority officials in a manner that did appear to be dissimilar to that of designated community representatives within the IAP. However, that situation did not obtain in the political decision-making process surrounding the LAP in which the final authority on the 'making, amending or revoking' of the Draft LAP rested as a matter of law with elected representatives. The Liberties Draft LAP was only one of three LAPs to come before DCC. It had previously adopted an LAP for the Phibsboro area on Dublin's northside and rejected a LAP for the Ballsbridge area in Dublin 4. Thus, the decision of the elected body of the DCC in relation to the Liberties Draft LAP did not have to be a foregone conclusion.

As it transpired, the decision to adopt the Draft LAP "subject to agreed amendments arising from motions received" and the placement of all arising "material amendments and other amendments, as agreed with the Members of the South Central Area Committee... [on] public display in accordance with the provisions of the Planning and Development Acts 2000 – 2006" (DCC, 2009d: 3-4) had all the appearances of a foregone conclusion. A number of factors proved crucial in ensuring the final outcome – the freedom and license that DCC and its consultants enjoyed in the formulation and progression of far-reaching urban-regeneration plans, which were depicted as having the status of 'proposals' only pending the decision of elected city councillors; the effective confinement of the core decision-making process to the small number of councillors representing the immediate geographical area under consideration, thereby creating an area-based approach which militated against any broader political, ideological or even citywide debate about the significance of the proposals under consideration; the presentation of the Draft LAP to the larger body of the council with the imprimatur of local residents, local councillors, DCC officials and planners; the operation of established voting protocols in the DCC chamber which prioritised geographic affiliation over political affiliation or ideological persuasion and rendered any further enquiry or interrogation of the substance or significance of the Draft LAP virtually impossible. It was thus that a local area plan with far-reaching consequences for the resident working-class community of the Liberties passed uncontested through the political decision-making channels.

9.2.2 Outcome on key issues for working-class community.

- *Outcome on key issue of public housing.*

As an issue of key importance to the well-being of lower-income working-class communities, the research elected to adopt a particular focus on the LRP's public-housing proposals. Those

proposals were pursued in respect of three public-housing sites described variously as 'opportunity' or 'catalyst' sites. The opportunity or catalytic potential vested in these sites was contingent on securing agreement for the demolition and rehousing proposals that would see the removal of the flats complexes from the public-land holdings in question. In the absence of any opposition from the assembled councillors, these proposals were among the body of proposals adopted in the Liberties LAP.

The text of the Housing Strategy outlined in the adopted Liberties LAP differed very little from that outlined in the Draft LAP. The core component of that strategy remained unchanged, i.e. the proposal for

> "the demolition of 432 local authority flats in three areas Vicar Street, Basin Street and Pimlico," units which the Housing Strategy states will then be replaced "by way of direct provision and Part V (although consideration could be given to using contributions to fund direct provision on lands owned by DCC within the Liberties area" (DCC, 2009e: 95-96).

In addition to the 432 replacement units, DCC also reiterated its proposal to provide an additional 316 units, thereby increasing the number of local-authority units in the area by 20 percent (*ibid.,* 96). The latter proposals were accompanied by an asterisked note explaining that "the figures for new units are indicative and will depend on final designs and build out of sites" (*ibid.,* 95). The timetable for the delivery of the new social-housing programme was similarly described as "an indicative phasing" programme which "assumes new build, relocation, and demolition, followed by more new build" (*ibid.,* 96). The kernel of DCC's Housing Strategy was accompanied by a number of additional aspirational and conciliatory statements and objectives, including its intention to "support and retain existing communities by rehousing tenants from existing flats complexes together and in close proximity to their existing location," to "liaise closely with existing tenants of social-housing complexes proposed for demolition and redevelopment," to "establish a Regeneration Committee as part of the demolition and redevelopment process" and to "seek to ensure that social housing will be maintained at a level of 29% of the total housing units within the Liberties area" (*ibid.,* 96-97).

The articulation of conciliatory ancillary objectives may have provided welcome reassurance for those who were concerned about the manner in which DCC intended to proceed with its demolition and rehousing programmes. They did not, however, detract from the fact that DCC had now been endowed with the power to proceed with the demolition of 432 housing units and the rehousing of 432 household units across the Liberties. The agreement of the LRP's public-housing demolition and rehousing proposals on these three key sites was a prerequisite to the catalytic reaction that the LRP was seeking to effect across the area. On foot of DCC's success in securing the agreement of its elected members, the way had been cleared to set that catalytic reaction in train.

- ***Anticipated outcomes of LAP implementation.***

The 'Liberties Housing Strategy' was just one aspect of a considerably broader LAP adopted by DCC in February 2009. That vote took place in the wake of the collapse of the Irish property market which placed a question mark over the realisation of the many redevelopment objectives articulated in respect of both public and private lands within the Liberties LAP. The manner in which DCC proceeded with such ambitious regeneration proposals in the wake of the financial and property crash was, however, a clear indication of its determination to ensure that its future vision for the Liberties would be enshrined in a statutory local area plan. It remains to be seen which aspects of the LAP become implemented and which are quietly jettisoned. As such, the precise impacts of the Liberties LAP remain unknown. At this point, it is possible to speak only of anticipated outcomes and anticipated gains and losses.

Like its predecessor, the Liberties/Coombe IAP, the Liberties LAP offers a comprehensive, if more elaborate and ambitious, programme of regeneration. That regeneration programmes incorporates many admirable overarching objectives, which are reminiscent of the many socio-economic-environmental-cultural objectives outlined in the IAP. They include objectives pertaining to quality of life, appropriate social and community infrastructure, diversity and choice in housing provision, the stimulation of the local economy, safeguarding the strong sense of community identity, the protection of the distinctive heritage of the area as a whole and the character of individual areas therein, promotion of the principles of good urban design, high-quality public spaces, parks and streets, sustainable modes of transport, the realisation of the area's cultural and tourism potential and environmental sustainability (DCC 2009e: 5)

The LRP has considerable support, including that of the area's local councillors. After lengthy negotiations with DCC planners and officials on foot of the many motions submitted by councillors, the latter profess great hope and confidence in the future implementation of the Liberties LAP. That hope and confidence is tempered in places by reference to past mistakes and failures on the part of DCC in relation to urban renewal, planning and development decisions, local-authority housing and buildings of architectural and historic importance. It is also tempered by awareness of "a genuine fear among some tenants that they will lose their homes through demolition" and a recognition of the need for "more careful planning and better enforcement and monitoring than has taken place in the past decade" (Ní Dhálaigh in DCC 2009a: 11). Notwithstanding past recollections and continuing reservations, the area's councillors are, however, united in their support for the Liberties LAP.

> "My principal concern was the potential loss of social housing in the area. This has been addressed through an agreed amendment to the housing objectives whereby the existing level of social housing at 29% will be retained in the future. Height was another huge concern in the area and amendments have been successfully agreed to reduce permitted heights in particular around the Grand Canal Harbour where height will now be capped at 12 storeys or 40 meters; this is lower than the nearby

Storehouse and this we as councillors felt is how it should be!" (Ní Dhálaigh in DCC, 2009a: 11).

"By now we hope that people feel that this is their plan and that they will help the Council to implement it in stages over the next number of years. As your representative I hope to be in the Council Chamber to help ensure that the plan is implemented and that the area is improved for local residents and visitors" (Byrne in DCC 2009a: 11).

"I feel that this new plan will make the Liberties a better place for all" (Gallagher in DCC, 2009a: 10).

The support of the three local area councillors was also, of course, formally generalised across the body of elected city councillors within DCC.

However, the LRP has equally been the subject of very trenchant criticisms from those who had engaged at great personal cost in both the IAP which had just drawn to a close and in the PPP housing regeneration projects which had collapsed during the time that the LRP was in process. While these residents and activists did not deny the existence of positive provisions within the Liberties LAP, they judged them to have been "eclipsed by the other substantive and considerably more serious proposals and issues at stake" in the Liberties LAP (LDAG, 2008: 3). The following are an indication on the concerns raised by resident and activist critics in their submissions to the LAP consultative process.

Table 9.10 Resident and activist criticisms of Liberties Draft LAP.

- The anticipated costs of many of the "euphemistically worded" overarching objectives for working-class communities (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 2).
- Indications that the LAP will continue the "entrepreneurial development-led regeneration of the type that had wreaked such havoc on the community of the Liberties throughout the preceding decade" (*ibid.,* 2).
- The decision to outsource the preparation of the LAP to private consultants who were not equipped with the necessary knowledge of the local, institutional, policy or political context (*ibid.,* 3).
- The manner in which the DLAP's public-housing proposals were progressed; the inadequate, obsolete and disingenuous data with which the proposals were underwritten; the serious changes that the housing strategy was seeking to effect to existing social-housing policy; the loss of public land with the accompanying implications for the future provision of public housing; the impact of the proposals on DCC's housing-allocations policy; the destructive effect of the housing phasing programme on successful public-housing communities; DCC's poor record in ensuring the successful completion of phased housing-replacement programmes (*ibid.,* 4-7; see also LDAG, 2008).
- The recklessness of proceeding with the demolition of habitable public housing at a time of straitened financial circumstances (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 6; see also LDAG, 2008: 4).
- The proposed public-land disposals (i.e. sales), including one site that had originally been cleared to make way for new social housing (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 7-8; see also LDAG, 2008: 4).

- The future use of PPPs in light of the destruction that the "failed PPP policy initiative... has already engendered" in public-housing complexes across Dublin city (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 6) and "the extreme distress" that it has imposed on the tenants of these complexes (LDAG, 2008: 4-5).
- Public-space proposals that would necessitate "incursions onto land currently being used by a number of distinct vulnerable groups within the Liberties" and that may in some places only serve "to confer further profitability on adjoining private developments" (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 10-13).
- Height proposals that followed the treatment of a number of draft planning and urban-design documents as *de facto* policy and that were pursued without sufficient regard to the impacts of such a heights and intensification strategy on residents (*ibid.*, 10-11).
- The viability of the LAP's development strategy in the wake of the property crash and concerns about the lasting damage that might be visited on the area in the event that large-scale developments were to prove unviable and collapse (*ibid.*, 13).
- Failure to outline community-gain provisions that would address the extent of deprivation and inequality in the area (LDAG, 2008: 6).

All of the above concerns were exacerbated by an awareness of the manner in which the dearth of resources had impeded the attempts of resident and activist groupings to assess the import and impact of an impossibly vast regeneration plan that had been formulated with the combined resources of DCC and the "apparently inexhaustible body of professional consultants at its disposal" (Hammond & O'Connor, 2008: 11). Residents were also aware of the many vulnerable groups who would be directly affected by the implementation of the LAP but whose views would not have been represented at any stage or any form in the consultation process (*ibid.*, 13). Concerns about the legitimacy of the consultation process, the regeneration plan that had emerged from within that process and the precise genesis of some of most significant proposals (most notably the designation of three public-housing areas as 'opportunity areas') were also shared by others (LDAG, 2008: 2-4).

It was possible, meanwhile, to discern contrary positions among those resident in one of the public-housing opportunity areas identified within the LRP.

> "The proposal to replace Pimlico's public housing is necessary... In these situations, we should seek the solution that generates a net community gain. Replacing the current old fashioned flats with bigger, more secure and better insulated apartments will deliver more family friendly facilities for the locality (Residents for change in Pimlico, in DCC, 2008d: 10).
>
> "The proposed demolition of Pimlico's public housing — an opportunity for whom? ...Our area has been designated as an *'opportunity area'*. While these proposals may represent an opportunity for those interested in making the Liberties more attractive for property development and speculative interests, they would — if agreed — spell the demise of the Pimlico community" (Marrowbone Lane Tenants Association (NATO Branch) in DCC, 2008d: 10).

As the submissions received within the statutory display period preceding the adoption of the LAP did not afford an opportunity to quantify the extent of the support or opposition to be found among

local-authority tenants in the areas in question, these differing assessments are relayed as an indication of the contrary positions to be found among the residents in question.

- *Future adjudications on the success or failure of LRP.*

DCC stated at the outset that the LRP was a city project - a city project in a quarter over which the city was clearly intent on asserting its dominion. The LRP had been in many ways an attempt to reclaim the Liberties for the many important and powerful interests that DCC identified as having a legitimate interest in the future regeneration of the area. The public good was invoked a number of times throughout the process. There will undoubtedly be a number of aspects of the regeneration plan in which diverse interest groups will be likely to find common cause. Equally, there will be a number of aspects of the regeneration plan on which different interest groups will be likely to find themselves in direct conflict. In a regeneration plan in which the local authority intends to use some of its public-land holdings or, more specifically, its public-housing land holdings, to 'kick-start development' in defiance of the views of at least some of those resident in the targeted public-housing complexes, it is inevitable that that antagonism will crystallise around the future use of the land and the fate of the local-authority flats complexes currently situated on that land.

The voices and concerns of resident working-class communities can, as illustrated above, be obscured and eclipsed by well-resourced state and private-consultancy groups collaborating in the preparation of large-scale regeneration programmes. Those difficulties do not abate in the implementation phase of such plans. The experience of those who engaged critically in the IAP has demonstrated this point eloquently. While the government does on occasion commission reviews that reveal serious discrepancies between the stated objectives and actual outcomes of a regeneration policy (as in the case of the *Goodbody Review*), such reviews do not appear to pose any impediment to the pursuit of larger and more aggressive regeneration policies subsequently. Their publication often occasions minor short-term public embarrassment prior to slipping quietly out of the newspapers and public attention. The tangible and long-term costs incurred by those obliged to bear the brunt of the state's regeneration policies are equally susceptible to being lost in the assessments that follow the completion of such plans. This is due in part to the plethora of powerful public and private groups who enjoy considerably greater access to the public and political domains in which the success or failure of given interventions are adjudicated and pronounced upon. It is also due to the personal toll that engagement can take on those residents and activists who endeavour to defend their neighbourhood and community interests in the face of a powerful regeneration machine.

Different class interests employ vastly differing criteria in assessing the success or failure of renewal and regeneration policies. Following on the views expressed by a number of the resident and activist interests who engaged either in person or in print in the consultation process

surrounding the LRP, this research accordingly takes the opportunity to propose a number of criteria to be employed in any future adjudications on the impact of either this most recent or any subsequent regeneration project on resident working-class communities. These include (i) any loss of public land; (ii) any demolition of habitable housing; (iii) any disruption to the city's housing waiting list; (iv) any loss of public-housing units in the long-term; (v) any disruption, displacement or weakening of established communities; (vi) any intrusion upon the rights and amenities of vulnerable populations residing or availing of vital services in the area (including the elderly, those in need of psychiatric care or those dependent on drug treatment services), which ensue from the implementation of these plans.

9.3 Closing questions.

9.3.1 Summary.

This chapter has endeavoured to adopt an analytical approach to its examination of the progression of a new and more ambitious urban-regeneration agenda in a quarter of the city which has been on the receiving end of successive waves of urban renewal. The LRP was introduced as an urban-regeneration plan on a scale not previously seen in the Liberties. It was to be mediated through an elaborate public-information and consultative process that was also to be unprecedented in its scale, structure and sophistication. There were several aspects of each stage of the public information and consultative process that could have been interrogated within any critical analysis of urban regeneration. As this research was predominantly concerned with the significance of a new and more ambitious strand of urban regeneration for inner-city working-class communities, it elected to subject one key aspect of each of the stages through which the LRP was progressed for detailed scrutiny and analysis. In the interests of evolving a coherent multi-layered analysis of a process that became increasingly elaborate at every stage, the research elected to contextualise its analysis within a chronology of the public information and consultative process that ensued from its public launch in October 2007 to its adoption by the elected members of DCC in February 2009.

Chapter 8 commenced with an examination of the core rationale that appears to have underlain this new and distinctive regeneration programme from the outset (the need to instil investor confidence in the area) before moving to examine the significance that the resident working-class community was likely to assume in an urban-regeneration programme of such proportions. In examining the latter, it was particularly interested in the insights that the local authority had gained from a decade of community participation which had seen the mainstreaming of what had been introduced as an experimental policy tool in the mid 1990s. If the rationale for community participation did not appear to have changed significantly, the mode and logistics of community participation had evolved and become considerably more sophisticated. In this context, the research attended to the rationale underlying the state's decision to outsource the consultation and information process to a private firm of consultants dealing in a very specific consultancy product (consensus). It also

considered the factors that had led the state to abandon the 'representative democracy' mode of participation in favour of a 'direct democracy' model with particular attention to the modes of engagement enabled and disabled by the latter.

In the first stage of the process (the public launch), Chapter 9 took the opportunity to consider the visibility and invisibility of private-development forces within the public progression of the urban-regeneration project in question and to consider the particular stages of the process in which they deemed it judicious to assume a public presence. The second stage of the process (the neighbourhood meetings) offered a rare opportunity to observe an unmediated grassroots' assessment of the decade of intensive development that was just drawing to a close in Dublin's inner city at that time and to consider what the legacy of that phase of urban renewal might be for subsequent regeneration projects. The third stage of the process (the community-planning weekend) was of interest for two reasons. It provided a valuable insight into what the much celebrated methodology meant in practice. More significantly, it also allowed the research to observe the manner in which the real urban-regeneration agenda was proceeding entirely independently of the community consultation process (namely the formulation of plans for the area's public-housing 'opportunity' or 'catalyst' sites).

In the fourth and most elaborate stage of the process (the public forums) which was distinguished by the proliferation of consultants, the research examined the manner in which the latter proceeded to mediate a highly political development agenda in a manner which sought to depoliticise key political land-use and development proposals. This point is made with particular reference to the project's public-housing proposals and the various means through which DCC and its consultants contrived to pre-empt the emergence of public housing as an issue of legitimate public interest for all. The fifth stage of the process (the statutory consultation process) was marked by the re-emergence of private-development and consultancy interests as working-class interests receded at the most crucial stage of the process. The research noted the remarkable symmetry evident in the gravitation of a large number of private urban-design, development, architectural and planning professionals and consultancies working in the service of the development industry to a process that had been fashioned in its entirety by another set of private consultancies working in the service of the state. Thereafter, the fate of the regeneration plan passed out of the hands of consultants and officials into the hands of the elected members of the local authority.

The research attended in the final stage of the process (the political-decision making process) to the manner in which elected councillors behaved in exercising one of the key reserved powers remaining to them. It charted the forging of a political consensus that allowed an urban-regeneration plan with far-reaching consequences for working-class communities to pass virtually uncontested through the political decision-making process.

This chapter closes with a brief consideration of two questions. First, it considers whether the LRP represents a significance departure in urban regeneration and, secondly, whether working-class communities need to engage with each successive wave of urban regeneration.

9.3.2 LRP as a significant departure.

The LRP was launched at a time when the concept of 'creative cities' had attained considerable currency within DCC (see Chapter 4). While the term was not used in the many meetings and forums convened throughout the process, the subtext of those meetings and forums and the actual text of the LAP indicate that it was the overarching conceptual framework within which the regeneration plan was prepared. The LRP and the ensuing LAP were clearly distinctive in some respects. The LAP was couched in the rhetoric of the creative city and was distinctive both in its stated intention to turn the Liberties into "a powerhouse for creative industries" (DCC 2008a: 12) and in its continual dissection of the area into a series of existing and proposed 'character areas' (*ibid.,* 57-74), 'focus zones,' 'key places,' 'opportunity nodes' (*ibid.,* 115-117) and 'significant redevelopment sites' (*ibid.,* 141-193) for which it then proceeded to articulate detailed regeneration objectives. Its aims and visionary statements were entirely in synchronisation with the vision of a creative city while its agenda was peopled by all of the standard issues, themes and strategies that typify the creative-city construct. With its myriad of international consultants, the process would appear to have been tailor-made for the pursuit of such a strategy.

It was equally clear, however, that underneath and alongside the creative-city rhetoric and embellishments, that the city was embarking on the familiar repertoire of neo-liberal urban-development strategies that had characterised its interventions in the built environment during the preceding decade. That repertoire included a continued dependence on state interventions (in this case, public-land sales) to stimulate urban development; the state's willingness to assume 'upfront risk-taking' in the interests of allaying the investment fears of banks, investors and developers; the continuing importance of land-use upgrading; the familiar push for greater height and density; the emphasis on the type and quantum of development required and the continuing imperative of securing private-sector investment. In summary, the LRP's core components bore all of the hallmarks of established neoliberal interventions in the urban realm. In setting its sights on land currently housing local-authority tenants, the LRP represented a new and more aggressive turn in urban-regeneration policies.

9.3.3 Working-class engagement with successive waves of urban regeneration.

This consideration of the LRP earlier attended to the significance that working-class communities were likely to assume within the new era of urban regeneration. It closes by inverting that question to consider the significance that the latter was likely to assume for working-class communities. The LRP proceeded with a public agenda from which the issues of fundamental importance to working-

class communities were almost entirely excised, namely those of public housing and public-land sales. It was a consultative and public information process manned by a myriad of consultants which assumed an unstoppable momentum in a complex and technical regeneration process which working-class communities again confronted without the necessary resources. It was a queered pitch in which the indigenous working-class community confronted local government across a barrage of international consultants and new and more affluent residents. It was dismissal in a process in which the views of the propertyless appeared to count for little in the face of the powerful. It was a factious regeneration agenda in which some public-housing communities became divided on the demolition and rehousing programmes proposed. It was a new creative-city rhetoric centred around a core antagonism of 'liberating mindsets' versus 'limiting or fearful mindsets' that sought to silence critics and dissenters by positioning them on the wrong side of history.

> "The liberating mindset is characterised by embracing diversity; having high ambitions for a better quality of life for all; a confidence in our ability to deliver positive change; openness; flexibility; responsiveness to changed circumstances and prioritising real people's lives over abstract ideological positions... The limiting or fearful mindset is characterised by being change-averse; having low ambitions; a lack of confidence; a resistance to diversity and sacrificing ordinary people's life opportunities to a glorification of either a past that never was or a rigid ideological position" (Rose, 2008).

The remaining question for working-class communities on the receiving end of wave after wave of urban regeneration relates to the merits of engaging with each successive wave of regeneration. On the one hand, communities approach these processes with an unmistakeable degree of clarity about the real private-sector interests at stake in past regeneration plans. On the other, they approach elaborately-constructed consultation processes in which the familiar panoply of public and private-sector interests are assembled and clearly intent on proceeding with their 'regeneration' plans irrespective of whether or not the host communities choose to engage. There is also the abiding difficulty whereby those who endeavour to engage in a critical manner repeatedly confront impenetrable government and political channels which ensure that the most trenchant and formidable of critiques never progress beyond the parameters set by local government. The net outcome of the very elaborate formal and informal processes and procedures militating against such critical engagement is that the interests of inner-city working class communities are repeatedly denied access to the political arena proper – the arena in which the political and class-contradictory nature of such urban policies should rightfully be fought. This, rather than the latest rhetorical turn in urban-regeneration policies, remains the abiding problem for those upon whom wave after wave of increasingly aggressive urban-regeneration polices has been visited.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion and Analysis.

10.1 The central research concern.

This research addresses a crucial silence in the Irish neoliberal discourse, the voices and struggles of working-class communities resident in those areas in which the state pursued its neoliberal urban-development agenda throughout a decade of intensive development and construction in Dublin's inner city. The research was prompted by the sharp discrepancy between the official consensus surrounding the Irish state's urban-renewal and regeneration agenda and the markedly more critical assessments emanating from those on the receiving end of its policies. Those with experience of working alongside inner-city community residents were aware of the degree to which these communities were bearing the brunt of the state's policies. They were also aware of degree to which inner-city communities were, in places, extraordinarily animated by very detailed and articulate critiques of those same policies. However, inner-city communities were only gradually to become aware of the extent of the state's indifference to the substantive issues underlying such critiques. The extent to which those experiences and critiques have been obscured from the public view by "the hollow rhetoric of politicians and policy-makers," which Hubbard and Hall (1998: 18) claim has dominated the debate about the efficacy of entrepreneurial and neoliberal urban policies thus far has been extraordinary and has represented a significant triumph for the powerful consensus which the state constructed around its urban-renewal agenda at the height of the property-development boom in Ireland. Many other powerful interest groups were also, of course, party to that consensus: the banking and financial sector, the property-development sector, the panoply of urban-development consultancies, associated professionals, the political establishment and the media. However, it is the state, which presents itself as the independent neutral arbiter of the public good, and its role in the construction and maintenance of the consensus and hegemony surrounding urban-renewal and regeneration programmes which is at issue in this research.

The degree to which the experience, critiques and struggles of working-class communities have been obscured from the public view and edited from the public record might appear unremarkable at first viewing. History has been replete with engagements of this nature between the powerful and the powerless. However, what is remarkable in the present context is that these urban-development policies have been mediated through elaborate governance structures which were heralded as a new and more inclusive form of renewal in which the state sought to consult with and engage members and representatives of those communities most immediately affected by those policies within its structures. Writing in 1998, Hubbard and Hall had pointed to the outstanding task of "exploring the manner in which entrepreneurial cities are experienced and understood by local populations and the ways in which this differs from the hyperbole of the city boosters" and "élite coalitions" espousing

such policies (*ibid.,* 21). In the Irish case at least, a decade of community participation in elaborative participative structure and initiatives had done nothing to disrupt or displace that hyperbole in the public realm. It was in this context that the research set out to explore the manner in which the apparent harmony and political quiescence surrounding the most political of development agendas in Dublin's inner city was to be understood. The specific question which it sought to address was the degree to which the state had succeeded in incorporating the criticism, dissent and opposition which arose among working-class communities in the regeneration of Dublin's inner city and the degree to which that apparent quiescence might be attributed to an entirely different set of factors. That research agenda was activated through three specific research objectives: (i) an examination of the spectrum of engagements that had taken place between inner-city communities and the state in the implementation of urban-renewal programmes; (ii) an investigation of the community's experience of both engaging with and resisting the state's policies; (iii) an assessment of the degree to which the state had succeeded in forging and maintaining a consensus surrounding its renewal policies among the host inner-city community.

These research questions were explored within the context of two urban-renewal and regeneration projects in Dublin's Liberties, the first of which engendered a decade of unprecedented development across the area, the second of which provided for a large-scale reconfiguration of the land and economy of the quarter which is set to alter irrevocably the form and function of the area. The research took full cognisance of Dear's (1981: 196) statement that "urban planning experiences the same crisis of legitimation that haunts the state as a whole in urban society" and accordingly took the opportunity to situate this research within the larger discussion about the manner in which the state seeks to legitimate highly political interventions in the economy and society at large. The research's investigations took place in a specifically Irish context but have a direct resonance with a number of the key concerns identified within the broader international literature on neoliberal urbanism. The first of those concerns pertains to the failure of much of the academic literature to move behind the official rhetoric of 'renewal' to consider the way in which the state's interventions in the urban realm are received, understood and sometimes resisted by inner-city communities and the ways in which this differs from the hyperbole of Hubbard and Hall's élite coalitions and city boosters. The second relates to the strategic importance that cities assume within neoliberalism as the sites where neoliberalism is simultaneously at its most audacious and its most vulnerable and, accordingly, the sites on which the state has been obliged to intervene with an increasingly elaborate set of flanking governance mechanisms to manage the crises, contradictions and failures inherent to neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002).

This closing analysis is presented under three broad headings. The first pertains to the significance of the state's interventions in the urban realm and the manner in which those interventions have been received and resisted by the host working-class communities, detailing a number of key

conclusions which the research has reached about the nature of the engagements which have proceeded between the state and inner-city communities. The second considers the role that a number of the key actors in the urban-renewal arena have played in the construction of the consensus surrounding the state's urban-renewal and regeneration agenda. The third examines the argument for the recognition and reinstatement of the core antagonism between the distinct property interests found within urban renewal. The chapter closes with a consideration of the degree to which the state has succeeded in incorporating arising dissent among those communities targeted by its policies and some critical reflections on the research question.

10.2 Conclusion and Analysis.

10.2.1 Significance of the state interventions at issue.

This research has been concerned with the significance of two major state interventions in the urban realm over the past decade, the first and decisive intervention to incentivise the property-development sector and the second and more nuanced ('flanking') state intervention to establish new participatory governance structures within which the state sought to engage and incorporate the host working-class communities. The preceding chapters have presented a detailed critique of the import of both of these interventions. This chapter accordingly confines itself to highlighting some of the most pertinent findings from that critique as they pertain to the implications of the state's renewal policies for working-class communities.

- ***Significance of urban-renewal policy intervention for working-class communities.***
- *Fiction of integrated, redistributive renewal.*

In the first place, the integrated rhetoric in which the state has couched its urban-renewal programmes has been shown to have been largely a fiction to date. The IAPs, for example, appear to have functioned as little more than a formal mechanism for the administration of developers' applications for tax incentives. Meanwhile the local state has, with impunity, been free to jettison key social and economic commitments and contravene the development specifications attached to tax-incentive sites. At the end of the property-development boom, serious questions remain about the legitimacy of the government's programme of tax incentives approved under the succession of urban-renewal schemes first introduced in 1986. In the case of the 1998 URS, tax incentives were first approved for IAPs in 1999 and were thereafter extended on a number of occasions during the 2000s when the case for incentives had long since vanished. All parties in the public arena now acknowledge the contribution which the succession of fiscal incentives made to the overheating of the property sector, ultimately precipitating the crash in the Irish property market and banking system. As the full costs of the property and banking crash become apparent and the government unfolds its fiscal austerity measures, it is clear that there will be a severe retrenchment in government spending on public services. It is thus that the costs imposed by the property boom on

working-class communities are set to reverberate across low-income communities long after the termination of those fiscal incentives.

- *Losses versus gains.*

Notwithstanding the larger devastation wrought by these urban-renewal programmes at national level, this research does take cognisance of the incidental benefits which were secured by inner-city communities but suggests that the significance of those benefits should be considered at all stages with reference to the sizable losses that communities have also incurred. That point can be illustrated most easily by contrasting the final figure for the community-gain fund in the IAP area in question (€3.25 – €3.5 million) with the public assets which were lost during the same period. In the case of revenue forgone, the community-gain contribution of €4,400 made by developers in respect of each apartment constructed on tax-incentive sites should be contrasted with the figure of €40,917 which the National Exchequer was forgoing in respect of each of those apartments (Goodbody *et al.,* 2006: 84). In the matter of public-land losses, the community-gain figure is similarly dwarfed by the value of the public-land which DCC sold into private ownership during this period. The price received for five DCC-owned sites sold between 2003 and 2004 exceeded €28.5 million, with the value of individual sites repeatedly exceeding the value of the community-gain fund (see Kelly, 2008: 189). The long-term ramifications of the casual disposal of scarce public land in the designated inner-city area may be cited as one of the 'intriguing paradoxes' identified by Harvey (1973: 81) whereby the rich are unlikely to give up an amenity at any price while the poor, least able to sustain any losses, are likely to sacrifice amenities for 'a trifling sum.' In the case of the Liberties, the latter should be amended to indicate the compulsory nature of such 'sacrifices.' Thus, it is apparent that the costs imposed on working-class communities have been formidable, while the compensatory gains have been modest at best. Looking to the future, those costs look set to rise considerably.

- *Larger policy significance of renewal.*

The significance of the state's urban-renewal interventions extends far beyond the immediately observable costs and benefits. These interventions have not operated as stand-alone policies but should instead be understood as one of the core components of a larger entrepreneurial and neoliberal urban-policy agenda (see Chapters 4, 5 and 9). The larger policy significance of the state's urban-renewal and regeneration programmes can be seen in the manner in which each has functioned to insinuate the logic of the market and market competition progressively more deeply in the urban landscape (Harvey, 1989) and to advance core components of the neoliberal urban agenda. This is apparent from the manner in which urban policy has been reconfigured around the profitability criteria of the private-development sector; targeted tax incentives which have triggered a widespread process of gentrification; the sale and privatisation of public land; the attempt to render the delivery of public goods dependent upon the successful progression of the plans of the

private-development sector etc. It is also apparent that the state's urban-renewal projects may be considered as part of a larger suite of urban policies which have functioned to effect a steady diminution in the stock of public land and social housing in inner-city areas during the years in question (Kelly, 2008). It is thus that Peck (2009) has identified the most recent manifestation of the neoliberal agenda (the 'creative city') as "the mainstream way of articulating contemporary urban-development strategies" while Swyngedouw *et al.* (2002) have characterised the state's urban-development policies as 'bearers of a new urban order.' Meanwhile, Smith (2002: 438-9) was in no doubt about the manner in which regeneration had come to signify "a generalization of gentrification in the urban landscape" in an era in which gentrification had assumed the status of 'global urban strategy.'

- *Indications of future implications.*

The hopes of those who thought that the demise of fiscal incentives would provide some relief from the relentless development pressure to which inner-city areas have been subjected for the past two decades have proved ill-founded. Having exhausted the state's fiscal incentives provisions, the local state has now turned its attention to the development potential vested in its public lands. The era of urban renewal fuelled by the attachment of tax incentives to privately-owned land may have functioned to contain the immediate impacts of the state's renewal programmes to those living in close proximity to the tax-incentive developments. However, that situation was altered radically by the advent of a new and more aggressive era of urban regeneration in which the state targeted land under public housing, which was deemed to be of such strategic importance to the city that it rendered their continued occupation by public-housing tenants untenable. Chapter 9 documented the increasingly vulnerable position that public-housing tenants came to occupy within an increasingly aggressive urban-regeneration agenda. These ambitious and complex urban-regeneration machines have been employed by the city administration in an effort to reappropriate working-class areas in the service of the latest manifestation of the neoliberal urban-development agenda, whether that agenda be couched in the relatively unsophisticated terms of the property-development sector or in the elaborate and sophisticated rhetoric and theoretical constructions of the proponents of the 'creative city' (see Peck, 2005). That vulnerability will increase in accordance with the increasingly explicit antagonism that the state has begun to draw between the interests of public-housing tenants and the wide array of powerful public and private stakeholders which are now invoked as legitimate interests in regeneration plans. The manner in which the local state has begun to articulate an emerging antagonism between the interests of recalcitrant public-housing tenants and those of the regeneration project may function to reconfigure relations between the state and public-housing tenants along more confrontational lines, somewhat in the manner which ensued in the state's PPP housing-regeneration projects. In the consultation process preceding the adoption of the LRP, the most recent regeneration project in the Liberties, the presence and critical interjections of critical residents, activists and community employees who had

amassed a considerable body of experience about the state's behaviour in such matters in other parts of the city, would indicate the strong likelihood of such an outcome in at least some of the public-housing areas so targeted. In all such confrontations they will, however, inevitably confront the familiar panoply of public and private-sector interests which have underlain the state's regeneration programmes to date. At a time when the rhetoric of 'creative cities' and 'smart economies' are in the ascendancy in a manner reminiscent of the rhetoric of renewal and regeneration, there is a danger that the long-term consequences of the plans unfolding behind that rhetoric may again function to obscure the significant costs that the state's plans will again inevitably visit upon working-class communities.

- ***Significance of state's urban-renewal participatory interventions.***

The second of the state's interventions under consideration in this research pertains to its establishment of new participatory governance structures within which it has sought to structure and contain the engagement of host working-class communities with the implementation of its urban-renewal policies. This section considers the precise significance of those new participatory-governance structures.

- *Mainstreaming and modification of an experimental policy tool.*

As a policy tool, the Irish state's participatory initiatives in the area of urban renewal and regeneration are relatively recent, dating from 1996 only. As Cockburn (1977) predicted two decades earlier, the decision to invite working-class communities to depart from the social-care parameters within which the state had previously sought to corral community activity, to engage with land-use issues has proved to be a double-edged sword for the state in places. Collins (2002: 96) has described the state's participatory and partnership overtures to working-class communities as a means of expanding "the administrative machinery of the State" into areas in which it had been historically weak. That expansion of 'the administrative machinery of the state' in this manner has also given working-class communities the opportunity to gain an insight into the precise workings of that 'administrative machinery.' In some cases, participating groups have been content to confine their engagement within the relatively innocuous parameters defined by the state, while others have refused these limitations in favour of a sustained critical engagement with the substantive planning, development and land-use questions at the heart of renewal programmes in a way which does not seem to have been anticipated by the state. While the participation of some community organisations has greatly assisted the smooth progression of the state's renewal policies, the participation of more critical residents' interests has presented significant obstructions to the progression of those same policies. Cockburn's (1977: 101) analysis of the manner in which "the closer working-class groups come to inclusion within the state system, the more dangerous is any disruptive behaviour to the equilibrium of the state" continues to resonate strongly in such circumstances.

It is apparent from the different forms which those participatory initiatives and structures have assumed in the years since they were first introduced that the form and function of the state's participatory initiatives and structures have been under constant review. What commenced as an experimental component of regeneration policy in 1996 has now been mainstreamed as an integral part of the state's regeneration policy, albeit with significant modifications. While community representatives as a bloc have never approached anything like Arnstein's (1969: 220) 'genie of citizen power,' individual representative have on rare occasions proved a significantly more formidable and disruptive presence than that intended by the state (see Chapter 6). On each occasion, the mode of participation inaugurated in subsequent renewal plans has been modified considerably, resulting in a significant diminution of the position of inner-city communities within those structures (see Chapters 5 and 8).

- *Collaborative language, antagonistic planning.*

In inviting working-class communities to engage with the preparation and implementation of these policies, the state has not employed the language of Healey's (1997) collaborative planning. It has been more likely to speak about the importance of capturing the unique voice, experience and spirit of inner-city communities rather than Habermas's (1992) 'communicative rationality.' Nonetheless, some variation of collaborative planning and consensus building appears to have provided the framework within which the state has couched its participatory overtures to communities. There does not, however, appear to be any equivalence between the invitations extended to communities and the nature of the participation and decision-making power subsequently afforded them. The manner in which this disparity has been understood has depended in large measure on the critical perspective and analysis employed by participants. More conservative analyses attribute ensuing collaborative failures to relatively minor issues such as the nature of the local state's commitment to community participation, while more critical analyses have increasingly settled on the emerging antagonism between the interests of inner-city communities and the regeneration project itself. For the latter, it is the critiques such as those offered by Brand and Gaffikin (2007) which point to the inadequacy of collaborative language and rational communication in the face of the irreconcilable and contradictory interests frequently encountered in land-use planning that find the greater resonance in the community's experience of collaborative-planning structures. In the case of the latter, the state's collaborative planning and implementation endeavours have failed to reconfigure an adversarial and antagonistic arena into one which is collaborative and consensual.

- *Participation as a classic governance feature of 'rollout neoliberalism.'*

One of the central questions that has animated this research has been the degree to which the participative overtures which accompanied the state's urban-regeneration programmes have functioned to facilitate the genuine participation of inner-city working-class communities and the

degree to which they have functioned to contain, preclude and negate the emergence of opposition among such communities to what has taken place in the name of urban renewal and regeneration. The parallels are striking between the manner in which the Irish state intervened with elaborative participative structures during the second decade of urban renewal and the way in the state has intervened more broadly in the rollout stage of neoliberalism to establish governance structures to manage and contain the crises and contradictions engendered by the earlier rollback stage of neoliberalism. So too are the many concerns expressed by Swyngedouw (2005) about the serious democratic deficits which arise from network-based forms of governance (see Chapter 1). This point is made always with reference to the questionable manner in which such structures are being used to legitimate highly political planning policies and decisions.

There are other parallels to be drawn between the social-partnership structures, through which the neoliberal agenda was mediated at national level and the mini social-partnership structures established to mediate the state's urban-renewal agendas at local level. In this regard, the latter stages of the neoliberal project found an institutional environment in Ireland which was perfectly attuned to its requirements. Brenner and Theodore (2002a: 349) have stressed that neoliberal restructuring projects have been shaped by national, regional and local contexts and defined by, amongst other things, "the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles." In attempting to distinguish the distinctive institutional framework and policy regime which has determined the form which 'actually existing neoliberalism' has assumed in Ireland, the primacy of the social-partnership model and the degree to which it has expanded to pervade virtually every scale and facet of Irish public life must surely constitute the distinctive and determining factor of the neoliberal project in Ireland. Allen (2003) is very clear on the primacy of this relationship and points to the way in which the social-partnership governance model functioned to advance the neoliberal agenda in Ireland.

- *State participatory initiatives as a diversionary tactic.*

The research indicates that the state's participatory overtures to working-class communities in the preparation and implementation of its renewal and regeneration projects have functioned as a diversionary tactic, in so far as they have served to divert scarce community resources away from the key statutory and political processes in which communities might have asserted and defended their interests more productively. The research does not discount the benefits which arose from participation within the state's participative structures for those parties who were content to confine their engagement to ancillary elements of the regeneration agenda. However, the experience of those communities which sought to engage with the substantive land-use and development issues at stake in these plans *via* the state's participatory structures demonstrates the latter's determination to preclude any meaningful engagement on the part of working-class communities with the substantive issues. This became apparent in the IAP in the context of state's continued denial of

any authority to those members of its monitoring committee who were concerned about successive contraventions of the planning specifications laid down in the IAP (see Chapter 6). It was similarly evident in the subsequent regeneration plan in the local state's repeated refusal to convene focus groups on the two issues of most importance for working-class communities, those of housing and planning (see Chapter 9). In adjudicating on the relative merits of participating within the state's regeneration structures, the research suggests that communities circumvent the rhetorical commitments in which these invitations have typically been couched to establish the precise statutory standing of the provisions which the state has made, if any, for community engagement with the substantive housing and planning issues at stake in regeneration plans. In those cases where the community has been denied any engagement with and, more importantly, standing on these issues, it is suggested that communities redirect their energies from essentially empty showpiece participative structures to key statutory and political processes. In the case of the latter, there is a strong case for considering whether the championing of participatory democracy may not have contributed to the further enfeeblement of representative democracy in working-class communities which have a pressing need of cogent, articulate political representation in the public realm.

- *Reverting to the analytical tools of an earlier era.*

In a situation in which it has become increasingly difficult to sustain any conception of collaboration, common purpose or consensus, critical attention has increasingly reverted to the analytical tools devised by writers such as Arnstein during an era in which the contradictory nature of such state interventions was more clearly understood and articulated. Chapter 2 has already noted the enduring significance of Arnstein's typology and its importance as an analytical tool for dispensing with the increasingly elaborate rhetoric in which these initiatives have been cloaked, in order to establish the precise standing which communities have been afforded in the implementation of the state's major policy interventions in the urban realm. In an era in which increasingly serious questions are being raised about the merits of continued engagement in any capacity with the state's participatory structures, it is suggested that there is a strong case for elaborating a new typology which could take cognisance of the variety of other modes of non-engagement, disengagement and oppositional mobilisation which have taken place in response to the state's interventions in the land and housing markets. The elaboration of such a new typology would also provide a means of bridging the gap between available typologies of participation and trajectories of contestation and capturing the political and analytical significance of the wide spectrum of intermediate positions.

- ***Significance of protest and oppositional responses to urban renewal.***
- *Range of oppositional responses alongside and outside participatory responses.*

While the years since the first tentative steps towards participatory initiatives in the urban-renewal and regeneration realm have in many ways come to be defined as the era in which participation and partnership became the new orthodoxy, they do not represent the totality of the community's experience of engagement with the state's regeneration programmes. The latter have also engendered significant criticism and anger among the communities targeted by its policies. In light of the many negative consequences which these programmes have visited upon working-class communities (see Chapters 4, 7 and 9), it is not surprising that this should be the case. The more important research enquiry has related to the nature and significance of the critical actions, opposition or resistance (if any) in which that criticism and anger has resulted. Chapters 6 and 9 have described the various critical and oppositional stances adopted by working-class communities towards the state's urban-renewal and regeneration programmes in the study area. This closing chapter takes the opportunity to point to one of the significant distinctions which might be drawn between the various oppositional actions observed, namely that between protests mediated *via* community organisations and oppositional actions undertaken and directed by individual residents and public-housing tenants in their own right.

- *Protest mediated via community organisations.*

In those instances in which opposition did emerge to the state's urban-renewal agenda, it was more likely to originate from critical residents and activists rather than the state-funded community-development sector whose default position in all such matters appeared to be one of participation irrespective of the degree of discontent and frustration experienced. In this respect, the first of the regeneration projects considered (the IAP) provided an important opportunity to observe the different ends to which community organisations could function in contentious situations. Chapter 2 pointed to the significance and, on occasion, pivotal role that community organisations could play in determining the nature of the engagements between their constituent communities and the state in an arena which has largely been vacated by both the trade-union movement and the traditional parties of the left. This point may be illustrated succinctly by pointing to the critical and pivotal role which one of the community organisations in the study area assumed in the engagements that ensued between inner-city residents and the local state. The emergence of close alliances between individual employees and local residents and the placement of research and planning expertise at their disposal in one case allowed residents to mount a series of challenges to the manner in which the urban-renewal plan in question was being implemented. More particularly, it placed residents in a position which enabled them to demand from the state exactly what it had promised, much in the manner that Swyngedouw (2006) affirmed that people should. This course of action proved to be a particularly valuable tactic in exposing both the core private-profitability criteria and property-development agenda lying behind the 'anodyne language of regeneration' (Smith, 2002: 445) and

the manner in which both the central and local state had misrepresented the precise standing of working-class communities within the state's participatory structures. In this manner, the forging of strategic alliances between critical community employees and residents allowed the latter to achieve effects disproportionate to their numbers and resources.

Equally, the research showed the entirely contrary ends to which a community organisation could function in those situations where it decided to abort such a critical course of action, dispense with the services of critical employees, distance itself from critical residents and reaffirm its organisational support for the state's urban-renewal plans. Saunders (1979) has pointed to the process and dynamic through which a participation response can be converted into a protest response. Conversely, this research has charted the manner in which an oppositional and exclusionary stance can also be reconfigured into a supportive and incorporated position. One of the most critical concerns to emerge from this research pertains to the questionable legitimacy attaching to the actions of state-funded community-development organisations in their continued endorsement of state plans in those instances where such plans had been categorically rejected by those residents who were most directly impacted by them.

- *Protest staged outside community-development channels.*

The very low profile, or in some cases absence, of community-development organisations in the second regeneration project considered, provided an opportunity to observe the more confrontational stance which individuals and groups of residents were likely to adopt in asserting and defending their interests in a situation in which they were operating independently of the area's community-development organisations. In a regeneration plan in which a serious antagonism had begun to emerge between the interests of the city and the resident working-class community, a catalogue of oppositional and protest activities ensued. Oppositional actions included the initiation of independent consultative procedures within local-authority flats complexes targeted for demolition; repeated critical interjections at regeneration meetings to remind the local authority of its culpability in previous regeneration projects and the community's opposition to its current plans; the staging of public protests at the entrance to regeneration meetings and public addresses to the assembled audiences therein. Meanwhile outside the state's structures, a small number of residents decided to engage in a more strategic manner within a political-activist type grouping engaged in, amongst other things, the convening of public meetings to discuss the community's stance towards development, the collection of petitions across the wider community, formal presentations and representations to the area's councillors and formal submissions to the statutory consultative process.

In attending to the different arenas in which community opposition manifested itself, it is also important to note the parameters within which it was contained. For example, in the case of the

LRP, the series of critical interventions staged by public-housing tenants were vociferous, persistent and certainly disruptive of proceedings within regeneration meetings. On one occasion, it was also apparent that both local-government officials and their consultants were visibly embarrassed by the distress which their public-housing proposals had evidently visited upon those resident in the local-authority flats complexes in question. However, the oppositional actions of public-housing tenants did not, in the main, extend beyond public displays of opposition to formal representations within the sole statutory stage of the consultation process surrounding the preparation and agreement of the regeneration plan in question. In this manner, the most critical and oppositional community voices were lost in the final and crucial stage of the state's consultation process. There may, in fact, be important lessons to be drawn from the behaviour of the private-sector in this regard. The latter does not appear to trouble itself with lengthy public meetings and public forums but instead conserves its energies for those aspects of the process which have a defined statutory standing (see Chapter 9).

- *Analytical insights afforded by literature on protest, contestation and urban social movements.*

This consideration of the significance of protest and oppositional responses to the state's renewal programmes closes with a consideration of the manner in which these different responses would be categorised within the trajectories of contestation outlined by Leitner *et al.* (2007b, 2007c). It is possible, for example, to identify three categories of contestation within the latter's trajectories which accord closely with the types of protest, opposition and contestation that emerged within the Liberties, namely (i) contestation *via* engagement in lobbying (and legislative) type actions within the state's structures; (ii) contestation *via* oppositional actions such as street and site protests; (iii) alternative knowledge production (most particularly in the case of the IAP, where critical community parties produced an extensive and sustained written critique of the state's urban-renewal polices). It is important also to note the forms which opposition never assumed in the study area, including any kind of strategic alliance between resident communities and organised labour (as in the case of Sydney's Green Ban movement). Furthermore, returning to Castells' landmark critique of urban struggles in the urban realm, it is apparent that the critical, oppositional and protest stances taken towards urban renewal in the Liberties study area never approached anything like the status of a political struggle or urban social movement. (The formidable obstacles impeding the progression of community struggles into the public realm are discussed further below.) In those situations in which individual residents and residents' associations were obliged to concede defeat, it was nevertheless possible to observe a politicisation and radicalisation of individual residents who had found themselves to be in serious (structural) conflict with the state for the first time in their lives. This, as Castells (1977a) noted, was one of the factors that could be cited as a political victory in the midst of defeat. It was also, of course, a newly politicised oppositional force which the state would be obliged to confront on each of its subsequent interventions in the urban realm.

- ***Factors impeding participation and opposition of working-class communities.***

In the course of formulating and implementing its urban-renewal and regeneration plans in Dublin's inner city, the state has not encountered any kind of generalised or collective resistance. It has nevertheless been obliged to confront criticism, opposition and resistance of varying kinds from residents, activists and, on rarer occasions, community organisations. Criticisms of the state's actions have been trenchant and, at time, potentially sensitive politically. Protests have been vociferous, disruptive and embarrassing for the local state. While the succession of planning objections and appeals undertaken in the IAP have been credited with effecting a degree of modification in the nature of the planning permissions sought and approved for tax-designated sites and while tenant protests about the proposed demolition of their homes in the case of LRP did result in the modification of the state's plans for the cleared site post-demolition, the state has managed to surmount such challenges relatively unscathed and emerge with its regeneration plans largely intact. Chapters 5-9 have attended in detail to the variety of factors which impeded the engagement of inner-city communities as they sought both to participate with and oppose the implementation of these plans at various stages throughout the past decade. The following factors emerge from within that body of empirical work as some of more formidable and enduring obstacles which have impeded the successful prosecution of critical and oppositional positions, namely, the dearth of resources, the ability of the state to withstand the most trenchant of criticisms and the impenetrability of local-government structures.

- *Fundamental barrier posed by dearth of resources.*

The research acknowledges the rigid and conservative parameters within which the state has sought to confine the community's engagement with its renewal plans. It also acknowledges the range of issues with which the state was never prepared to engage or concede in its dealings with inner-city communities, no matter how cogent, persuasive or politically sensitive the criticisms and resistance offered by communities were. Notwithstanding the state's apparent determination to remain impervious to any criticisms and demands which might prove disruptive of the *status quo*, it is apparent that many may not have been in a position to make such criticisms or demands given the absence of resources in the first place. Chapter 2 has alluded to the third and ideological dimension of power which Lukes (2005) invoked to illustrate the manner in which ideological power can be exercised to impede the perception or articulation of any grievance among the aggrieved. The dearth of resources among 'the aggrieved' may play a more mundane but equally effective role. This is a point that may be illustrated with reference to the extraordinary complex and frequently impenetrable and incomprehensible entities which planning and regeneration plans assume for communities which are not in a position to retain either the individual professionals to which other more affluent communities have recourse or the panoply of professionals at the service of the local state. The extent of the resource inequality was revealed most starkly in the second of the regeneration plans considered in the research. In the process of conducting the consultation process

and preparing the Liberties LAP, DCC expended in excess of €1.5 million on private consultancy services. In attempting to grapple with the detail and implications of that LAP, the working-class members of that inner-city community were equipped only with the lessons which they had learned from previous renewal and regeneration plans. The profoundly unequal position which working-class communities occupy in relation to the panoply of powerful public- and private-sector interests assembled within the state's urban-renewal programmes accordingly emerges as one of the most powerful factors in preventing the emergence of potentially contentious issues into the public realm.

- *Ability of state to withstand and outwait criticism and opposition.*

Kirk (1980) has pointed to the manner in which critics have attached excessive importance to the resource issue in their efforts to explain the failure of protest movements to achieve their demands and has cogently argued that their failure may have as much to do with the nature of those demands as their lack of resources. The experience of inner-city communities in the two regeneration projects considered in this research has certainly demonstrated the state's determination to withstand all demands and opposition as they relate to the key issues of planning, development and land use. In the case of the IAP, this point may be demonstrated with reference to the official silence which community representatives encountered in their repeated attempts to engage local government, central government and the European Commission with their serious concerns about the manner in which the local authority was implementing the renewal plan. In the second regeneration plan, this strategy was demonstrated by the manner in which local-government officials and consultants continued with their proposals for the demolition and rehousing of a number of public-housing communities in the face of vociferous opposition from one of the targeted communities. The strategy employed in this instance was to insist that the proposals remained mere proposals until such time as they were put before elected councillors as part of the democratic decision-making process. Unsurprisingly, the proposals in question had gained such momentum by the time they reached the formal decision-making process that their adoption was almost a forgone conclusion. The practice of 'non-decision making' first identified by Bachrach and Baratz in 1970 (cited in Saunders, 1979: 28-31), whereby the powerful simply refuse to engage with or respond to "the articulation of political demands by less powerful groups so that no decision is ever taken" or, at least, not taken until such time as opponents have dispersed, appears to retain its currency and power in the urban environment. In the Dublin context, the ability of the state to withstand the opposition of the economically powerless emerges as one of the most powerful and effective tactics at its disposal in dealing with the trenchant criticisms and oppositions encountered among the working-class communities targeted by its policies. This emerges as one of the key conclusions from the research.

10.2.2 Key players in the urban renewal of working-class areas.

In the midst of a very altered government and governance environment which has seen the *rapprochement* of previously distinct public and private interest groups within "a bewildering array of partnerships, networks and development corporations" (Hubbard & Hall, 1998: 9), the boundaries between the many different players in the urban-renewal arena (state and community, community-development sector and working-class residents, public and private sector, local-government officials and public representatives) had been blurred considerably. This analysis attempts to counter the obfuscation which has seen many parties of differing degrees of sympathy and antagonism mobilised in "the service of neoliberal goals" (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 390). The analysis accordingly highlights a number of significant points arising in relation to the role played by three key parties which functioned as important intermediaries between the state and inner-city communities in the urban renewal of working-class areas: the community-development sector, private-sector urban consultancies and public representatives. This section of the analysis is prefaced by a reaffirmation of the pivotal role of the state in the rollout stage of neoliberalism.

- ***Pivotal role of state in rollout stage of neoliberal urbanism.***

In a neoliberal age, proponents of neoliberalism have sought to dispense with questions relating to the role of the state as questions belonging to an earlier age. Contrary to the ideological premises on which the neoliberal project rests, it is apparent that the question remains live, especially in the neoliberal age, in which the fallacy of the 'neoliberal conceit' that neoliberalism means less rather than more state has been exposed (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 31). While this research has at all times been concerned with the role of the state in the urban environment, it has been specifically concerned with the role of the state in the rollout stage of neoliberalism in which the state has been obliged to intervene with increasingly elaborate 'flanking mechanisms' to pre-empt the emergence and articulation of contradictions that threaten to impede or obstruct the implementation of the state's urban-development agenda and the plans of the property-development sector. As such, the research concurs with Peck and Tickell's (2002: 384) identification of the rollout stage of neoliberalism as the phase demanding political and analytical attention. As noted in Chapter 1, an examination of the role of the state in the urban environment becomes in large measure an examination of the role of the *local* state in the urban environment. The adoption of a necessarily in-depth focus on the activities of the local state has, however, been informed by a political-economy analysis which understands that the local state is "a key part of the state in capitalist society" (Cockburn, 1977: 41) and insists that any analysis of the local state should seek at all times to establish its precise role and significance *vis-à-vis* the central state. In undertaking this task, the analysis has been greatly enriched by the manner in which that role had been theorised in the earlier period of critical geography which had, in advance of the more recent concern with the concept of urban governance, already understood the precise role that the local state plays in the management of the contradictions inherent in capitalism. While all public- and private-sector

parties would readily number the land-use and planning powers entrusted to the local state among its most important functions, the significance of the other distinct functions that the local state performs on behalf of the central state may not have been so readily recognised. Dear's (1981) enumeration of the distinct roles performed by the local state anticipates with remarkable precision the role which the local state has subsequently assumed in the second decade of urban renewal, namely the provision of a site unto which the contradictions generated by capitalist societies can be deflected and 'regionalized' as locally- and geographically-bound problems in a situation in which the local state assumes a pivotal role as "a primary agent of ideological hegemony" (Dear, 1981: 198). Similarly, Dear's description of the manner in which the local state functions to obscure the real power relations in capitalist society and acts to contain social conflict and secure societal consent is equally applicable to the role of the local state in the implementation of the neoliberal urban-development agenda that followed two decades later. If there is a distinctive dimension to be noted in the role of the local state in the latter stages of the neoliberal project in this respect, it may be attributed to the fact that the local state has now assumed an increasingly prominent role in the initiation and promotion of large-scale urban-development projects as part of its drive to establish and enhance its competitive position in an increasingly globalised economy in which 'metropolitan economies' have assumed a new importance (Swyngedouw *et al.,* 2002: 548). It is thus that the local state has increasingly been obliged to intervene to manage the contradictions engendered by its own urban-development policy interventions in addition to those originating within central government.

This research has been primarily concerned with the nature of the engagements which have taken place between inner-city communities and the local state in the implementation of the state's urban-renewal programmes. That concern cannot be addressed adequately without attending to the distinctive role played by a number of third parties which have assumed an increasingly important role in the mediation of the state's urban-development policies. The analysis accordingly considers the precise significance of the roles played by three of these parties, the community-development sector, private consultancies and local public representatives.

- ***Role of the community-development sector.***
- *Observations on differing perspectives adopted on the role of the state.*

The introduction to this chapter has pointed to the fact that inner-city communities were in places animated by highly detailed and articulate critiques of the state's urban-renewal policies. Those critiques were not generally shared by the state-funded community-development sector, which were invited to represent formally the interests of their constituent communities in the study area in the first of the urban-renewal plans (the IAP) considered in this research. The research raises important questions about the ends to which the state-funded community-development sector has functioned in the mediation of urban-renewal policies which have transformed the physical, social

and economic landscape of inner-city areas over the past decade. It prefaces that discussion with some observations on the significance of differing perspectives adopted on the role of the state.

Chapter 1 considered the different theoretical understandings of the role of the state and noted the analytical insights afforded by the four principal formulations before electing to adopt a political-economy perspective. This analysis has sought to elucidate the structural role of the state as it became manifest in its policy interventions undertaken in pursuit of sectional interests. It has also sought to explore the understanding of the state which has informed the engagement of different parties within the community. While electing to adopt a political-economy perspective, this research noted the important analytical insights afforded by other theoretical positions. The latter allowed the research to gain a richer and more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in the urban environment and to attend to the different understandings of the role of the state evident in the engagement of some of the main players in urban regeneration.

In the first place, it is possible to characterise the phase of urban renewal at issue in this research – the holistic, integrated, participatory phase of urban renewal - as a reformist project in so far as it continued to operate in accordance with market principles while being accompanied by a range of compensatory measures designed to ameliorate the excesses of a purely property-led model of regeneration. Reformism is also evidently the theoretical framework within which the community-development sector has framed its engagement with urban renewal. In the case of the IAP, this was epitomised by the manner in which the engagement of the latter was gradually whittled down to the administration of the community-gain fund, to the neglect of both the highly political development agenda proceeding through the IAP and, more fundamentally, the core contradiction at the heart of the market model of renewal. Even where such an analysis was to be found among senior third-sector development personnel, it was not accompanied by any critical courses of action which might have been expected to follow logically from such an analysis. Previous renewal battles had been lost and it was evident that an entirely more pragmatic course of action had been adopted towards development in the inner city. This approach was encapsulated in many ways in the much celebrated concept of 'community gain,' whereby the community- and local-development sectors effectively confined their engagement to the anticipated public-housing, employment and community-gain finance results, while relinquishing any critical interest in the larger structural transformation which was being effected to the land, economy and society of inner-city areas. In short, it was apparent that the institutional infrastructure of the local and community-development sectors had distanced itself from the challenges which might previously have been issued to the logic of these programmes (see Punch, 2000, 2001) in order to pursue a reformist line of action in which the logic of the market model of renewal was conceded.

- *Social partnership as the overarching framework for engagement.*

Chapter 4 noted the manner in which the national social-partnership model expanded to incorporate virtually every facet of Irish public life from the inauguration of the first partnership agreement in 1987. While the community and voluntary sector was not formally incorporated within the partnership model until almost a decade later, the state had recognised the importance of "getting the [partnership] bandwagon rolling" at local level with a view to extending the "positive experiences of partnership at the national level... to produce the same consensus and problem solving approach at the local level" (Senior Department of the Taoiseach Official, quoted in Connolly, 1997: 67-8). Chapter 4 traced the manner in which the social-partnership model and ethos was insinuated at virtually every level of the local-development and community-development infrastructure throughout the 1990s. It was thus that by the time the 1998 URS was introduced with its new and distinctive provisions for community participation, that the state confronted communities which had in many ways already been refashioned into what MacLaran and McGuirk (2003) might have termed an appropriate relationship with the state, namely partnership. In the case of the Liberties, the majority of the community-representative positions were allotted to state-funded community-development organisations which were already well versed in the dynamics of partnership.

This research has been concerned throughout with the degree to which the state-funded community-development sector functions in an independent critical manner in defence of working-class interests or as a tool of social control and instrument of an integrationist ideology (Saunders, 1979). In the case of the Liberties, the research leads towards the latter conclusion. While community-development organisations continued to criticise the manner in which they had been treated within the state's structures and appear to have been significantly disillusioned by the participatory process, they nonetheless continued to participate and formally endorse the manner in which the local authority was implementing the IAP. This research has also alluded to one occasion during the course of the IAP in which one community organisation took an unusually critical and oppositional stance in relation to the state's behaviour in the implementation of the renewal programme (see Chapter 6). With the benefit of hindsight, the adoption of such a critical stance appears to have been an unintended anomaly, which the organisation took the opportunity to correct at the earliest possible opportunity. Nevertheless, it illustrates the different and entirely contrary analyses and paths of action which community organisations may be instrumental in articulating and pursuing in relation to key state interventions in the urban environment. It is again interesting in this context to note the manner in which the experiences of the British CDPs in the 1970s continue to resonate in those cases where individual employees set aside collegial relations with the local state to advocate other and more critical courses of action. However, in the main, the public acquiescence of the community-development sector within the local state's partnership structures appears to have served a function which was not dissimilar to that served by the

community and voluntary sector's participation in social partnership at national level, the obfuscation of the distinct and contrary interests within state projects ostensibly functioning in the public and national interest. This point is made with particular reference to the consequences which have unfolded from the Irish state's close alliance with the property-development sector.

- *Observations on the emerging schism between community organisations and residents.*

The most important finding to be noted in relation to the role played by the community-development sector was the markedly more critical analyses employed and the confrontational stances taken by individual residents towards the state's renewal programmes compared to those taken by the community-development sector. In those areas in which a serious schism had emerged between the two parties, residents began to pose serious questions about the legitimacy of the numerous partnership structures in which the participation and consent of community organisations was being treated as the *de facto* consent of the host community. In such situations, the representative credentials of some of the community organisations purporting to represent inner-city communities became an increasingly contentious issue, as did the political affiliations of board members in some community organisations. It was significant in this context to note the movement of critical residents and community activists from a reformist perspective to something approaching a political-economy understanding of the state. This was particularly the case for individual residents who had had an in-depth involvement with the planning decisions being progressed within urban-renewal projects. Similarly, it was apparent that those who had had experience of the state's PPP housing-regeneration projects also approached subsequent urban-regeneration projects with a clear understanding of the core agenda being progressed through the state's regeneration programmes and the fact that, behind all the seductive rhetoric, regeneration was simply about the reappropriation of public land, which might be deployed to other and more profitable ends.

- *Important caveat to the analysis.*

There is an important caveat to be entered in advancing such an analysis on the position played by state-funded community-development organisations. In other areas of the city, it is apparent that community-development organisations have adopted a considerably more critical and independent stance in relation to the state's regeneration programmes (see, for example, Bissett, 2008; Brudell & MacLaran, 2009; MacLaran *et al.,* 2007; Punch, 2009; Tenants First, 2006, 2009). Accordingly, the research is not in a position to extrapolate its findings in this particular instance to the broader community-development sector. The findings which have arisen in the study area are offered nonetheless as an important illustration of the significance which community organisations assume in the local state's attempts to establish the legitimacy of highly political interventions in the urban realm. In those situations in which community organisations are operating as proxies for working-class communities, it is apparent that considerably greater interrogation of their responsibility and accountability in endorsing state interventions is warranted.

- ***Role of professionals and private consultancies within urban renewal.***
- *A new addition to the powerful public-private nexus confronted in urban renewal.*

In undertaking to engage with the preparation and implementation of the state's renewal programmes, inner-city communities confronted a powerful nexus of public and private interests: the state body charged with the mediation, implementation and, more latterly, initiation of the state's renewal policies and the property-development sector whose interests were inscribed in these plans but which for the most part refrained from public/direct engagements with the host community. While third-sector local development personnel had complained about the manner in which state officials had come to function as something of a buffer between private developers and inner-city communities, they had at least provided a visible statutory body with which some notion of public accountability and responsibility could be associated and sought. The decade of renewal under consideration in this research saw the entry of a new private-sector interest into the regeneration arena, that of private consultancies. Under the 1998 URS, community representatives had already observed the close alliance between local-government personnel and the various professional interests invited to participate in an ostensibly independent manner within the government's structures. While introduced under the central state's 1998 URS which provided for a development of a more coherent renewal policy, IAPs had been prepared by the local state. Indeed the devolution of this responsibility to the local state in the case of Dublin had followed on the latter's repositioning of itself as a key player in the implementation of the urban-renewal schemes which had come to dominate the urban-policy agenda from the mid 1980s. Within a decade of wresting this control from national government, the local state had begun to outsource this function to private consultancies. That decision effected a significant reconfiguration of the regeneration arena. The state's withdrawal from the public regeneration arena in this manner had two important consequences. The regeneration arena had now been evacuated by the one statutory body to which the public could address its concerns, while its place had been taken by a private-sector actor which then functioned to insulate the local state from any direct challenges and confrontations that might arise from it regeneration plans. Private consultants were also thereafter in a position to function as an agency of the private-sector development and regeneration interests which had underwritten the state's interventions in the urban realm from the outset.

- *Purveyors of neoliberal urban-development order and authoritarian consensus.*

Chapter 9 has attended in detail to the ends to which the plethora of private consultants appointed to the LRP process had operated in the mediation of a new and markedly more aggressive regeneration policy. This concluding analysis confines itself to highlighting some of the more notable aspects of that role. It notes the manner in which private consultants functioned both as carriers and normalisers of the core tenets of a broader neoliberal urban-development agenda and as the agents of a particular urban-development policy agenda which had been gaining momentum across American and European cities throughout the 2000s, that of 'the creative city'. Chapter 4

highlighted the growing currency which creative-city strategies and rhetoric were assuming among senior local-government officials during the years in question. In their recruitment of an international consultancy firm which had tested and developed its consultancy product in a variety of European and Russian cities, the local state found a skilled body of urban-development and regeneration professionals who were in a position to articulate the urban-development strategies to which it had been gravitating over the preceding years. It also found a body of professionals in a position to orchestrate and choreograph a public consultation process which, if it did not succeed in engineering a genuine public consensus, effectively functioned to marginalise, silence and disempower any dissenters who might have impeded the passage of the draft urban-regeneration plan through the political decision-making process. The website of the consultants in question boasted of the consensus-led approach to planning which it had pioneered. The Liberties case-study afforded a telling and alarming insight into the manner in which such authoritarian consensuses are forged in the "now-extensive circuitry of the fast policy regime" (Peck, 2005: 767) in which Dublin has taken its place.

- *Depoliticisation of political development agendas; privatisation of policy-making process.*

In the wake of the LRP, serious questions arise about the state's decision to outsource the preparation and mediation of state-engendered regeneration projects which impact directly on publicly owned land. While it is possible to distinguish the ideological *raison d'être* for such projects, it is considerably more difficult to distinguish their evidential base. The entry of private consultancies has seen the ascendancy of soft-consultancy products over hard empirical research as the basis for decisions which will have far-reaching consequences for the future of public land and public housing. An evident lack of knowledge about the Irish political and policy context, the specifics of the designated area and the nature of engagements which had previously ensued between the state and the targeted communities proved no impediment to consultants armed by a sophisticated consultancy machine and an evidently firm grasp of the state's core plans for the area and its public land. In the mediation of their regeneration brief, it was apparent that they functioned at all times to depoliticise a highly political land-use and development agenda. This was evident through the repeated refusal to provide a public forum within which these most political of issues could be discussed and through the determination to close and 'move on' on each occasion when those immediately impacted by their proposals refused to acquiesce with the authoritarian and censorious nature of a rigid consultation process. It was in essence a process in which no amount of focus-group discussions about biodiversity or the desirability of butterflies in the urban environment could mask the core components of the regeneration agenda. Peck's (2005) critique of the manner in which urban consultancies have functioned in the transmission and management of new and more ambitious urban-development policy agendas emerges as a primary point of reference in this Dublin study. In a similar manner, the concerns expressed by others such as Fordham (1990), Molotch (1993) and McCann (2001) concerning the consequences of privatising

key policy-making processes assumes an increasing urgency. While it would be mistaken to attribute too much agency to consultancy firms who are evidently acting in accordance with the plans of their paymasters, they have undoubtedly played a key role in assisting states in formally articulating their development agendas and in constructing the perfunctory lineaments of a public consensus sufficient to the state's legitimation requirements.

While consultation processes are always presented as participation processes which are open to all, Cornwall (2008) has pointed out that such processes inevitably involve an element of predetermination about who will actually participate. The LRP may, in many ways, be characterised a 'www.regeneration project.' While it did on occasion avail of more traditional means of communication, notification was by and large by email and participants were repeatedly directed to the project's website for details of presentations, reports etc. In working-class communities, especially those with an ageing population, some have access to the internet, many do not. This may accordingly be cited as the first step to delimit the participant audience. It was mirrored by a more traditional exclusionary strategy at the close of the process which capitalised on the fundamental asymmetry of resources between working-class communities and the state and the plethora of consultants in the latter's service, that of resource inequality. In the end, the combined might of the consultants' and the state's resources resulted in the production of a lengthy and complex Draft LAP upon which the community was again invited to comment. It will have come as no surprise to either DCC or its consultants that the resultant regeneration plan found one of its most receptive, responsive and able audiences not in the resident working-class community and the public-housing tenants most impacted by its proposals but in the plethora of private urban-consultancies working in the service of the property-development sector.

Meanwhile, those concerned about the significant changes that the entry of private consultancies to the regeneration arena has effected to both the policy and practice of regeneration, have been left to contemplate the fact that scarce public monies have once again underwritten the preparation of a highly political regeneration plan which appears set to compound the costs which the state's renewal policies have already imposed on inner-city communities. Private consultants received a combined figure in excess of €1.5 million for their involvement in the preparation of the Liberties LAP, the public having effectively paid for the privatisation of a questionable policy-making process.

- ***Role of public representatives within urban renewal.***
- *Role in passage of renewal policies through political decision-making process.*

In a local-government policy environment that has been replete with rhetorical commitments to participatory democracy and new modes of governance, the role and significance of elected public

representatives and representative democracy within urban renewal and regeneration has been largely obscured. Chapter 4 described the manner in which the role of elected representatives had been progressively sidelined following the corporate restructuring of local government. Notwithstanding a significant diminution in the standing of elected representatives within local-government structures, it is important to note that they do also retain a number of key reserved functions which have a direct bearing on urban renewal and regeneration. It is with that aspect of their role that this research has been primarily concerned, namely the role and responsibility of elected representatives in the passage through the political decision-making process of urban-renewal plans for working-class areas.

The role of councillors in the implementation of the first phase of renewal under consideration in the research (the IAP) had left many unanswered questions in its wake. For the most part, councillors had remained unresponsive to the critiques placed before them about the manner in which the local state was implementing its urban-renewal plans. That indifference extended to occasions on which community representatives had sought formally to highlight the responsibility which councillors would themselves bear for the 'obfuscations, equivocations and evasions' in which the IAP had become enmeshed (Hammond *et al.,* 2002: 19). It was also, however, apparent that the position of elected representatives within the IAP was in some respects not dissimilar to that of the unelected community representatives (see Chapter 6). The IAP did not have statutory standing and local-government officials appeared to have been acting in accordance with the directions and guidelines issued to them by central government. A rather different situation obtained in the second regeneration programme considered in this research following the decision to place the proposed regeneration plan on a statutory (LAP) basis. Thereafter, the pivotal decision-making power in relation to whether the regeneration plan would be adopted, amended or revoked, reverted to the elected councillor body of DCC. Chapter 9 charted the manner in which the regeneration plan in question progressed through the political decision-making process. This concluding analysis confines itself to highlighting two important issues that arise from the manner in which politicians exercised one of the key formal powers remaining to them.

- *Observations on the separation of powers within local government.*

Local government comprises two distinct entities: appointed officials with executive functions and elected councillors with reserved functions. Democracy is predicated on the separation of these two distinct powers. It would appear that the legitimacy of the local state's actions similarly depend in large measure on securing the imprimatur of the area's elected representatives. Throughout the public consultation process preceding the adoption of the LAP, both local-government officials and the private-sector consultancy firm stressed that the decision-making power on the key proposals outlined within the regeneration plan rested with elected councillors and not appointed officials. However, the manner in which the Draft LAP proceeded through the formal decision-making

channels within DCC would not point to any significant or discernable separation of powers. On the contrary, the ease and speed with which the plan proceeded through the decision-making channels would suggest that the importance which officials and consultants repeatedly attributed to the political decision-making process to follow at the end of the public consultation process instead amounted to little more than a smokescreen behind which officials and consultants could continue unimpeded to develop and progress far-reaching urban-regeneration proposals and plans. While councillors did seek and secure amendments to these proposals, the concessions secured did not fundamentally alter the core thrust of the regeneration plan. Councillors do not emerge as a separate and distinct power from the officer corps of local government but rather as one more party amenable to incorporation within the public consensus forged by DCC around its regeneration programmes.

- *Factors impeding a collective political engagement with regeneration issues.*

The other important aspect of the political decision-making process pertains to the manner in which the restructuring of local-government forums for councillor participation along area-committee lines has functioned to impede the emergence of any collective political engagement with the broader and cumulative consequences of the planning and development decisions being taken within the confines of individual area-committee boundaries (McDonnell, 2005). Chapter 4 considered whether the suppression and attenuation of political conflict, noted as one of the consequences of jurisdictional fragmentation (MacLaran, 2006), might also be a consequence of the disaggregation of elected city councillors into area committees in this manner. The question merits consideration. It is not apparent that the members of the City Council in 2009 displayed any predilection for the adoption of any kind of oppositional stance *vis-à-vis* the local government's renewal plans for working-class quarters such as the Liberties. However, it is apparent that the jurisdictional fragmentation of the councillor body and the evident protocols accompanying the disaggregation of councillors into their respective geographic areas certainly did function to impede any broader political engagement with or appreciation of the likely impacts of a statutory regeneration plan which had outlined far-reaching plans for public housing and public land in a working-class area. It is thus that the consensus which had been forged at area-committee level was generalised effortlessly across the wider body of councillors and the Liberties Draft LAP was passed without major comment or incident (as noted in Chapter 9) in 29 minutes and 16 seconds.

10.2.3 Argument for recognition of core antagonism between urban-renewal interests.

- *Contradiction attaching to working-class engagement with market model of urban renewal.*

This research has been concerned with the phase of the Irish government's renewal and regeneration agenda distinguished by moves to incorporate working-class communities within the structures through which that agenda was being implemented and within the consensus upon which its legitimacy was based. This phase of urban renewal could easily be characterised as a corporatist

project within which the interests of all parties had been aligned with the state's urban-development agenda and from which any concept of distinct or contradictory interests had been evacuated. The characterisation of the state's urban-renewal and regeneration programmes in this manner sits uneasily with the facts. Saunders (1979) acknowledged the subjective nature of the concept of interests and the difficulty that arises in attempting to identify and classify different interest groups. However, no such difficulty is presented by the objective category of clearly measurable costs and benefits. Through a review of secondary sources (Chapter 4), consultation with those involved in the implementation of the IAP (Chapter 5-7) and observation of the nature of the plans being progressed within the LRP (Chapters 8-9), this research has attended to the clearly identifiable costs which the urban-renewal project has imposed on working-class communities. The available evidence points to the existence of an objective contradiction at the heart of the market model of urban renewal which has become increasingly explicit. Those facts and that contradiction sit uneasily with the state's determination to incorporate those communities most negatively impacted by its urban-development policies within the increasingly elaborate governance structures established to oversee the implementation of those same policies.

- *Case for recognising the objective contradiction at the heart of urban renewal.*

This research has examined engagements between working-class communities and the state in an era of partnership in which the latter was intent on denying the existence of core contradictions at the heart of many of its interventions in the urban realm – core contradictions that had become manifest in a striking way in the case of urban renewal. The research identifies a strong argument for cutting through the state's facile insistence on partnership, consensus and common interest between developers and the public good and argues for the articulation and reinstatement of the core antagonism at the heart of the state's urban-renewal and regeneration interventions. The research argues that the recognition of that fundamental conflict of interest will provide for a considerably broader understanding of participation and engagement for working-class communities than that provided for within the local state's constricted and politically conservative understanding of the concept. In making this point, the research is aware that the position taken on this issue will place the ensuing analysis, mode of engagement and programme of action in two entirely different theoretical traditions. On the one hand there is the proliferation of governance theories and the body of collaborative planning literature which has sought to reconfigure an adversarial and antagonistic arena into a collaborative and consensual one in which the public realm will be reconstituted 'through open, public debate' (Healey, 1997: 49). On the other, there is the body of critical literature that has insisted on the key analytical and political significance of the recognised and articulated contradiction, a body of literature which originated with Castells in the 1970s and continues to resonate in contemporary analyses of urban renewal in London in the 2000s (Holgersen & Haarstad 2009). The recognition and articulation of a contradiction and antagonism at the heart of the state's urban policies essentially allows communities the opportunity to surmount

the strictures of the state's participative structures to engage with the implications of its policies in a more dispassionate, analytical and rigorous manner in the public arena. That situation carries with it all of the opportunities and all of the risks that accompany more critical analyses and oppositional courses of action. It also carries with it the theoretical richness of the political-economy perspective and the insights which it affords into the role of the state in capitalism and the essential nature of its interest in working-class communities.

- *Case for reassertion of concept of 'class' in place of 'community.'*

The argument for the assertion and reinstatement of the core antagonism at the heart of state-engendered renewal problematises the conceptual framework of 'community,' which is predicated on an entirely more conciliatory analysis and mode of engagement *vis-à-vis* the state (see Chapter 2). That disjuncture, however, provides an opportunity to dispense with the essential conservatism of the concept and category of 'community,' whose ubiquity Holgersen and Haarstad (2009) attribute to the service that it performs for neoliberalism, including the negation of the core antagonisms at the heart of the state's interventions in the urban realm, which the state has sought to effect through the proliferation of its governance structures (Swyngedouw, 2007). The concept is accordingly rejected in favour of an argument for the reassertion of the more incisive concept of 'class,' which would provide an analytical framework capable of recognising and admitting such core antagonisms, with all of the concomitant implications for the framing of subsequent engagements with the state.

10.3 Closing, critical reflections on the research question.

- *The incorporation of dissent, the success or failure of the state's project?*

The analysis returns, in closing, to the original question which animated this research, the degree to which the state succeeded in incorporating arising dissent among inner-city communities in the regeneration of Dublin's inner city. In attempting to delineate the full spectrum of responses among inner-city communities targeted by the state's regeneration policies, it is clear that the term 'incorporation' is not adequate to describe the variety of critical and, in places, confrontational responses to the state's regeneration policies. Undoubtedly 'co-option' and 'incorporation' have emerged as the appropriate terms to describe some forms of engagement, but the analysis has also had to expand to take cognisance of the many critical and articulate perspectives housed within inner-city communities which have been in no way incorporated but which have never succeeded in gaining admission to the public or political arenas in which such powerful consensuses are constructed and maintained. In many ways that question must be asked of two distinct groups within the community, the formal community-development sector, which is in some cases taken as the legitimate and representative voice of the community, and the working-class residents of these areas themselves. In relation to the formal community-development sector, the state has enjoyed a considerable degree of success in the study area. In relation to the latter, the state would appear to

have largely failed to persuade working-class communities that their interests were served by the state's repeated interventions in the urban realm to incentivise the activities of the property-development sector. This becomes abundantly clear from those rare instances where inner-city communities have been afforded a public platform on which to voice their experiences of the decade of intensive development that had just come to a close. On such occasions it was clear that the rhetoric of urban renewal held no currency among those communities which spoke quite simply of bad planning, inappropriate and excessive development, poor planning enforcement and the *carte blanche* that developers appeared to have been allowed throughout these years (see Chapter 9). The more interesting question in these circumstances pertains to the factors which have been responsible for obscuring these critical perspectives from the public and political view.

- *The treatment of dissenters.*

There is an associated and important question to be asked in this context. What happened to those dissenting voices which refused to acquiesce uncritically with the manner in which the state behaved in these matters? It is in this context that that the analytical and political significance which earlier critical theorists such as Dunleavy (1977) attached to the study of latent or non-protest becomes apparent. The findings of this research similarly affirm Swyngedouw's (2007) argument that those seeking to uncover genuine politics in a post-political era dominated by a plethora of governance structures, which have sought to evacuate all antagonisms and contradictions from the public realm, must look to the margins to find the sites on which the real antagonisms and politics engendered by neoliberal policy interventions are playing out, frequently in a manner that goes unnoticed by the general public. This point can be illustrated with reference to the issues around which critics of the state's urban-renewal and regeneration programmes have mobilised over the past decade. They include questions relating to the legitimacy of the state assistance accorded to developers during a property-development boom; the consequences attending upon public-private partnerships; the nature of the planning decisions being taken by local-government planners and upheld by the national planning appeals board; the privatisation of the policy-making process and the persistent and vociferous protests and opposition staged by public-housing tenants against the incursion of the state's regeneration plans onto their homes. It is in such areas that the full consequences of the state's neoliberal urban-development agenda have been unfolding in a particularly stark way. There is accordingly much to be learnt from the nature of the engagements which have ensued between the state and inner-city communities during these years, notably with regard to the manner in which the state has sought to manage, contain and legitimate highly political interventions in the urban realm.

- *Continuing relevance of the research question.*

Urban renewal was couched in a positive, progressive and very powerful rhetoric and in a consensus that brooked no opposition throughout the boom years. No arm of government would

engage. Few politicians were prepared to assist. No media was willing to admit the serious questions raised. The community was confronted by an all-powerful consensus in which the interests of the property-development sector were presented as synonymous with the public good. Those who dared to suggest otherwise and who attempted to stand up to both local government and private developer incurred significant costs both personally and financially. Following the collapse of the Irish property market and the devastation wreaked on the Irish economy, that situation clearly no longer obtains in mainstream discussions. That consensus appears to have been ruptured irrevocably. However, it would be a mistake to think that the interests of working-class communities have been decoupled from the interests of the property-development sector in inner-city areas. The consultation process for the most recent regeneration plan introduced in the study area continued throughout 2008 and was adopted only in 2009. It continued to promulgate all of the familiar tenets on which the urban-renewal agenda had been based throughout the boom years. The fortunes of working-class communities, particularly those living on public land, continued to be presented as being inextricably tied and subordinate to the interests of the state's neoliberal urban-development agenda. If anything, the standing of public-housing tenants within the most recent urban-regeneration plan appears to have diminished further, as the antagonism between working-class communities and the market models of urban regeneration has become increasingly explicit. It remains to be seen whether the state will persist with its quest to incorporate potentially antagonistic interests within its regeneration projects or whether it will adopt more openly punitive tactics. In either case, it is apparent that critical attention must remain focused on the precise nature of the engagements ensuing between the state and working-class communities in those parts of the city which continue to experience the vicissitudes of the property market in particularly explicit and exaggerated forms.

- *Future research agenda.*

In the wake of the collapse of the Irish property market, development activity has stalled and urban-regeneration plans appear to have been shelved for the foreseeable future. Working-class communities and the state have withdrawn from the governance and partnership structures, which became so much a feature of the era of state-engendered urban-renewal and regeneration, to their respective camps. In the national arena, politicians and economists speak endlessly about the need to restore 'growth' in the Irish economy. In the 1980s, that imperative led the state "to provide a stimulus to the construction industry, expanding output and employment significantly in the short term" (KPMG *et al.,* 1996: 2.03). That short-term stimulus turned into two decades of fiscal incentives and engendered a property-development boom which became the defining feature of the Irish economy during the 1990s and 2000s. During that period the local state reconfigured and realigned its organisational structures and *modus operandi* in a manner which left it perfectly positioned to embrace an entrepreneurial urbanism which would see urban policy increasingly reoriented around the profitability criteria of the property-development sector. The manner in which the logic of the

market and market competition was insinuated progressively more deeply in the urban landscape left the inhabitants of inner-city areas open to ravages of the market. Notwithstanding the catastrophic consequences which have unfolded from the collapse of the Irish economy for the broader public, it is not as yet apparent that either politicians or government officials have taken the opportunity to radically reconsider the long-term viability of the neoliberal entrepreneurial agenda which it had been pursuing during the last decade. In the case of Dublin, the local state has continued to lay the foundations for further intensive development in the urban environment. It is not as yet clear when either the state or the property-development sector will be in a position to realise the plans which have been formulated within local government or whether the state will again seek a "harmonization of contradictions and antagonisms… at the urban level through a rallying of the good and the great, the movers and shakers, the rich and the poor, shanty dwellers and property capital, men and women, to the banner of 'good governance'" (Jessop, 2002: 469).

However, in the event that the state endeavours to do so, it is apparent that it will confront working-class communities which have had the opportunity throughout a 'lost decade' of failed community participation to attain a clear understanding of the essential role of the state in the urban environment and its continued indifference to the impact of its policies on working-class communities. The nature of the engagements which will ensue in those radically altered circumstances must form the subject of future research.

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Appendices.

Appendix 2.1 Sample typologies of participation, 1969-2003.

Arnstein (1969)	**Dennis.** (1972)	**Dorcey *et al.*** (1994)	**Wilcox** (1994)	**Pretty,** (1995)	**White** (1996)	**UNDP** (1997)	**SLC (Davidson** 1998)	**Fischhoff** (1998)	**Oxley Green & Hunton-Clarke** (2003)
Citizen control.	Grassroots radicalism.	Ongoing involvement.	Supporting.	Self-mobilisation.	Transformative.	Self-management.	Empowerment.	All of below.	Decisional.
Delegated power.	Decision making.	Seek consensus.	Acting together.	Interactive participation.	Representative.	Partnership.	*- Entrusted control.*	Make them partners.	Consultative.
Partnership.	Attention to consumer demands.	Test ideas, seek advice.	Deciding together.	Functional participation.	Instrumental.	Risk-sharing.	*- Independent control.*	Treat them nice.	Informative.
Placation.	Dissolution of organised opposition.	Define issues.	Consultation.	Participation for material incentives.	Nominal.	Decision-making.	*- Delegated control.*	Show them it's a good deal for them.	
Consultation.	Carrying out tasks.	Consult on reactions.	Information.	Participation by consultation.		Consensus-building.	Participation. *- Limited decentralised decision-making.*	Show them that they've accepted similar risks in the past.	
Information.	Receiving benefits.	Gather info perspectives.		Passive participation.		Consultation.	*- Partnership.*	Explain what we mean by the numbers.	
Therapy.		Educate.		Manipulative participation.		Information.	*- Effective advisory body.*	Tell them the numbers.	
Manipulation.		Inform.				Manipulation.	Consultation. *- Genuine consultation.*	Get the numbers right.	
							- Customer care.		
							- Limited Consultation.		
							Information. *- Good quality information.*		
							- Limited information.		
							- Minimal communication.		

Appendix 3.1 Glossary of terms.

C&V	Community and Voluntary (sector)
CS&MRA	Cork Street and Maryland Residents Association (Dublin 8).
CURS	Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (Trinity College Dublin).
DCC	Dublin City Council.
DDDA	Dublin Docklands Development Authority.
DoE	Department of the Environment / Department of the Environment and Local Government / Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government.
FOI	Freedom of Information.
IAP	Integrated Area Plan.
JTP	John Thompson & Partners LLP (Consultants).
LAP	Local Area Plan.
LDAG	Liberties Development Action Group.
LOTS	Living Over the Shop Scheme.
LRP	Liberties Regeneration Project.
LRP CPW	Liberties Regeneration Project Community Planning Weekend.
LRP NM	Liberties Regeneration Project Neighbourhood Meeting
LRP PF	Liberties Regeneration Project Public Forum
PPP	Public Private Partnerships.
SCAC	(Dublin) South Central Area Committee.
SICCDA	South Inner City Community Development Association (Dublin 8).
SWICN	South West Inner City Network (Dublin 8).
TAC	Taskforce on Active Citizenship.
URS	Urban Renewal Scheme.

Appendix 3.2 Schedule of Records: Freedom of Information Request No: FOI/2008/123.[79]

No.	Brief Description	Relevant Facts.	Release Status	Basis of Refusal[80]
1	Letter to SWICN [South West Inner City Network] Environment Working Group Chairperson 14/11/02.	Letter of Reply from Minister.	R.	N/A.
2	Copy of local letters (21/11/02).	Correspondence between Minister & Community Representative.	R.	N/A.
3	Copy of local letters (20/12/02).	Correspondence between Minister & Community Representative.	R.	N/A.
4	Appendices to Observations II.	Appendices to Observations.	NR.	Section 19.
5	Observations (II) by the Community Representatives.	Obs (II) on the response by Dublin Corp.'s Planning Dept. to Observations (I).	NR.	Section 19.
6	Response from Dublin Corp. Planning Dept. to Observations (I).	Correspondence between Dublin Corp. & Project Manager.	NR.	Section 19.
7	Recommendations for the Monitoring Committee.	Report on Workshop held with the Monitoring Committee.	NR.	Section 19.
8	Memo between Law Agent, Dublin City Council & Project Manager.	Relating to the observations of the Community Rep to the IAP.	NR.	Section 19.
9	Briefing notes to Minister provided in relation to oral PQs.	Ministers briefing notes.	NR.	Section 46.

[79] Excerpt from DoE response to Freedom of Information Request No: FOI/2008/123, 10th December 2008. (R=Release; NR=Not Release.)
[80] i.e. Section of Act.

Appendix 3.3 Secondary data sources.[81]

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTATION re INTEGRATED AREA PLAN (IAP).		
Commissioned reviews.		
KPMG *et al.* (1996) *Study on the Urban Renewal Schemes.*	- Impact of property-led urban-renewal schemes on inner-city communities. - Impetus for moves to incorporate communities within subsequent regeneration programmes.	Findings and recommendations re form of urban renewal immediately preceding IAPs.
Goodbody *et al.* (2006) *Review of Area-Based Tax Incentive Renewal Schemes.*	- Impact of 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) with particular reference to the integrated development aspect of its brief.	Findings re socio-economic impact of IAPs.
Guidelines, Legislation & Circulars.		
Department of the Environment & Local Government (1997) *1998 URS Guidelines.*	- Changes introduced into urban-renewal policy on foot of the KPMG review. - Guideline directions to local authorities in preparation of IAPs.	Modifications to urban-renewal policy under 1998 URS.
Government of Ireland (1998) *Urban Renewal Act 1998.*	- Statutory provision made for the IAPs prepared under the 1998 URS.	Legislative provision for preparation and implementation of IAPs.
Department of the Environment & Local Government (1999a) *1999 URS: Monitoring Guidelines.*	- Directions from central government to local government re the monitoring of the IAPs.	Provisions re community participation in IAPs.
Department of the Environment, Heritage & Local Government (1999-2006) Circulars re 1998 URS.	- Communications between central and local government during the implementation of the IAPs.	Directions issuing from central government to local authorities during the implementation of the IAPs
Dáil records.		
Dáil Éireann (2002) Written response to Parliamentary Questions 190-193 re Liberties/ Coombe IAP, Dáil Éireann, 23 October 2002.	- Community experience of engaging in formal government channels. - Department of Environment's (DoE) response to community concerns re IAP.	Treatment of community concerns re IAP.

[81] Appendix 3.3 presents complete details of the secondary data sources consulted in this research, as relayed in summary format in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Departmental records.		
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (2008) Schedule of Records released: Freedom of Information Request No: FOI/2008/123 for documentation held re four specific incidences within Liberties/Coombe IAP. _____(2009) Decision on review requested in relation to schedule of records released: Freedom of Information Request No: FOI/2008/123	- DoE's deliberation and adjudication on the charges made by community representatives in relation to DCC's implementation of IAP.	N/A as no relevant documents released.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (Dublin City Council) DOCUMENTATION re IAP.		
Integrated Area Plans (IAPs).		
McDonnell, P. (1996) *Historic Area Rejuvenation Project.*	- Nature of representation afforded to community in the experimental precursor to the 1998 URS.	- Mode of community participation in the precursor to the IAPs.
Dublin Corporation (1998a) *Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan.* _____ (1998b) *North East Inner City Draft Action Plan 1998.*	- Mode of participation for communities in IAPs prepared under the 1998 URS in Dublin's inner city - Articulation of integrated development brief under physical, social end economic renewal objectives.	- Mode of community participation in IAPs. - Objective of IAPs.
IAP Monitoring Committee Reports.		
Dublin Corporation / Dublin City Council (DCC) (2000-2006) *Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan Annual Reports, 1999-2000; 2001-2002; 2003; 2004; 2005.*	- Local-government assessment of the progress made under each of the IAP's objectives with particular reference to 'community gain.' - Local-government representation of position of critical community representatives.	- Assessment of success/failure of IAPs' social and community objectives. - Assessment of success/failure of community-participation initiatives.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Senior Planner Reports, Articles.		
Rose, K. (2005) Retail provision and poverty: Notes for meeting with Housing, Planners and the Combat Poverty Agency. Rose (2006) Cork St.: creating a city street. Dublin City Council (2006a) Achieving liveable sustainable new apartment homes for Dublin city. Issues paper.	- Local government planner's assessment of (i) planning and development within IAP; (ii) additional arising community gains.	- Assessment of success/failure of IAPs.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (Dublin City Council) DOCUMENTATION re LIBERTIES REGENERATION PROJECT (LRP).		
LRP and related documentation.		
John Thompson & Partners (JTP) (2008) *Liberties Community Planning Report.*	- Objective of LRP (vision, core tenets etc.). - Public record of community views expressed during consultation.	- Objective of LRP. - Representation of community views.
DCC (2008a) *Liberties Draft Local Area Plan.*	- Objective and distinctive features of LRP (vision etc.) - LRP provisions of immediate relevance to public housing and public land. - Public representation (if any) of community position on public-housing proposals.	- Objective of LRP. - Anticipated impact of LRP on working-class community. - Exclusion of critical views on public-housing proposals.
DCC (2008b, c, d, e; 2009a) *Liberties Regeneration Newsletters 1-5.*	- Information and communication strategy adopted by LRP.	- LRP information and communication strategy.
DCC (2008f) *Liberties Draft Local Area Plan: Manager's Report on Submissions from Public Display of Draft LAP.*	- Ratification procedures for LRP/Draft LAP - Nature of interests gravitating to LRP/Draft LAP process. - Content of community and resident submissions to LRP/Draft LAP. - Local-government response to community and resident concerns. - Manner in which community submissions mediated by officials to city councillors.	- Degree of community engagement with and spectrum of community positions on LRP/Draft LAP - Local-government commentary on community concerns. - Interests gravitating to LRP/Draft LAP.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
DCC (2009b) *Liberties Draft Local Area Plan: Manager's Reports to Councillors' Motions.*	- Content of councillors' motions to the Liberties Draft LAP. - Local-government response to councillors' concerns.	- Local government commentary on councillors' concerns.
Local Government records re LRP.		
DCC (2010a) Response to FOI Request No: FOI/2929/10 for details of monies expended by DCC on private consultancies in the preparation of the LRP/LAP.	- Private consultancies contracted and monies expended on private consultancies in the preparation of the LRP/LAP.	- Costs incurred by outsourcing consultative process.
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT / COMMUNITY DOCUMENTATION re URBAN RENEWAL and more GENERAL ENGAGEMENTS.		
Dublin Inner City Partnership (and associated parties).		
Connolly, D. (1997) *Developing Dublin's Inner City - Who Benefits?*	- Assessment of urban-renewal schemes from a third-sector local development perspective. - Local development framework within which community workers operating.	- Assessment of impact of urban-renewal schemes preceding IAPs. - Overarching framework for community-development organisations engaging with IAPs.
Haase, T. (2009) *Divided City: The Changing Face of Dublin's Inner City.*	- Impact of developments between 1991-2006 on key socio-economic indicators in Dublin's inner city. - Measurement of levels of affluence and deprivation at neighbourhood level in inner city.	- Assessment of impact of urban-renewal schemes 1991-2006.
Connolly, D. (2000) Developing the brief for community representatives on the Integrated Area Plan Monitoring Committee.	- Third-sector local-development position on 1998 URS at outset. - Assessment of interests served by urban regeneration. - Rationale for engaging in urban regeneration.	- Third-sector local-development orientation *vis-à-vis* IAPs.
Coveney, E. (2001) *Round Table Conference on Community Involvement in Integrated Area Plans.*	- Inner-city community's experience of early years of IAPs.	- Community orientation *vis-à-vis* IAPs.
McCue, K. (2000) People's Manifesto for the north west inner city or meal tickets for developers.	- Experience of engaging in community-participation structures in the precursor to the IAPs.	- Experience of community participation pre-IAP.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Community Participation Project & Doherty, G. (2008) *Good Practice Guide to Community Participation: Community Participation Project.*	- Importance attached to participation in initiatives with a determining impact on people's lives and communities in Dublin's inner city.	- Community orientation *vis-à-vis* participation.
DICP & DCC (2007) *Protocol for Progressive Engagement: Formal Operating Agreement between DCC and Dublin Inner City Local and Community Development Organisations.*	- Nature of relationship evolving between local state and local-development and community organisations in Dublin's inner city.	- Overarching framework for relations between local state and local community.
COMMUNITY DOCUMENTATION from STUDY AREA re IAP.		
Reports.		
Brudell, P. (1999) *Critical Perspective and Agenda for Action: South West Inner City Network Area Action Plan 1999–2006.*	- Community attitude to urban renewal and regeneration in advance of the implementation of 1998 URS.	- Community orientation *vis-à-vis* urban renewal and regeneration pre-IAP
Brudell, P. (ed.) (2000) *A Mandate for the Community Representatives to the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan.*	- Community understanding of urban renewal and the role, standing and experience of the community's representatives in the early years of the IAP. - Community presentation of concerns to local government.	- Experience of engaging with the local authority's community-participation structures.
Brudell, P. (2002) *Minority Report of the Community Representatives to the Liberties/Coombe Integrated Area Plan.*	- Community opposition and critical questions re manner in which IAPs being implemented by local government. - Community presentation of concerns to central government.	- Experience of engaging with local and central government.
Articles/Position Papers.		
Brudell *et al.* (2004) Urban planning and regeneration- a community perspective.	- Community's experience of planning and planning appeals process on IAP tax-designated sites.	- Experience of engaging with statutory planning system.

Source.	Data sought.	Relevance.
Hammond *et al.* (2001a; 2001b; 2002) Observations on the undermining of the community's role in planning in the IAP.	- Community's experience of planning and planning appeals process on IAP tax-designated sites. - Community presentation of concerns to local-government officials and councillors.	- Experience of engaging with local-government officials and councillors on planning issues relating to tax-incentive sites.
Presentations/ Submissions.		
SWICN Environment Group (2002a) Presentation to Dublin South Central Area Committee: Community concerns about the manner in which DCC is implementing the Liberties/Coombe IAP.	- Community presentation of concerns to local councillors.	- Experience of engaging with local councillors.
SWICN Environment Group (2002b) Submission re Draft Urban Design Framework Plan for Francis St./Thomas St./Meath St. Area. Hammond, C. (2002a) Initial response of the Community Representatives to the Draft Urban Design Framework Plan for the Retail Zone of the Liberties/Coombe IAP.	- Community position on development proposals for key retail areas within IAP.	- Experience of engaging with local government on planning issues.
Brudell, P. & SWICN Environmental Group (2003) Submission re the conservation of St. Luke's, the Coombe.	- Community position on redevelopment of key heritage site within IAP.	- Community vision of urban renewal and concerns about the heritage of the area.
Correspondence.		
SWICN Environment Archive (2002-3) Correspondence with DCC, City Councillors, Minister for Environment, Developer, MEPs and the European Commission.	- Nature of community approaches to local-government officials, city councillors, central government and nature of responses forthcoming. - Nature of correspondence with private developers. - Community submission of concerns to Irish MEPs and European Commission. - Nature of response forthcoming from the European Commission.	- Community experience of engaging wide range of (mainly public) parties from local officials and councillors, through central government to Irish MEPs and European authorities.

Appendix 3.4 Programme of observation at Liberties Regeneration Project.

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (Dublin City Council) FORUMS.			
Launch 'A New Vision for the Liberties.' **Date:** 08 October 2007. **Venue:** Digital Hub, Crane St., Dublin 8.	The first public presentation of the new urban-regeneration project for the Liberties.	- Parties to the launch: the local-government departments; officials and consultants involved. - Composition of launch audience. - Core components of new regeneration plan as outlined by (i) DCC; (ii) JTP consultants. - Details of preparatory work in advance of public launch. - Relation of new regeneration plan to previous IAP (and Digital Hub). - Significance of area designated for regeneration. - Type of state intervention planned. - Key motifs. - Details of regeneration strategy – including consultation schedule. - Role ascribed to consultants appointed to preparation of plan. - Role and significance ascribed to community in preparation of plan. - Nature of contributions from audience and response from officials. - Community concerns and questions re regeneration plan.	Fundamentals of Liberties Regeneration Plan (LRP) including – context, driver, key components, themes, strategy, schedule, parties and implications for community.
Neighbourhood Meetings. **(1) Pimlico.** **Date:** 10 October 2007 **Venue:** St. Catherine's Sports Centre, Marrowbone Lane, Dublin 8 **(2) Liberties.** **Date:** 11 October 2007. **Venue:** St. Nicholas of Myra Parish Centre, Carman's Hall, Dublin 8. **(3) Grand Canal Harbour/Basin Lane.** **Date:** 18 October 2007 **Venue: St.** James Parish Hall, James St., Dublin 8.	The instigation of the community consultation process in neighbourhood-based locales.	- Consultation agenda, i.e. the parameters within which consultants sought to structure and contain consultation process. - Composition of neighbourhood meeting audience, including homogeneity/heterogeneity of communities in attendance - Community response to (i) consultation agenda – degree of adherence and digression; (ii) consultation process and consultants. - Community assessment of previous development and the state's behaviour re same – experience, engagements and outcomes. - Community understanding and analysis of urban regeneration as a process. - Community agenda and concerns in discussion of new regeneration plan. - Nature of contributions from other parties – politicians, community organisations, teachers etc. - Nature of response to community issues, concerns and questions. - Consultants' conduct of session – competency (knowledge of national policy and local context); authority and control; impartiality; evidence of ideological positions; key motifs and treatment of community concerns.	An unconstrained grassroots community assessment of urban regeneration to date and community perspective and orientation *vis-à-vis* future regeneration plans. Meetings that functioned as *de facto* focus-group discussion of the nature of recent development and DCC's facilitation of same. A firsthand observation of a consultation process to measure against the official printed record that would follow.

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
Community Planning Days. **Dates:** - O9 November 2007 - 10 November 2007. **Venues:** - St Catherine's Church, Thomas St., Dublin 8. - Digital Hub, Crane St, Dublin 8.	The 'community planning' component of the regeneration plan.	- Consultants' conduct of workshops – environment; management of workshop brief; facilitation of public/community participation; partiality; key motifs and recurring themes. - Prominence of consultants within project. - Meaning of 'community planning' in practice. - 'Community planning' agenda – i.e. the issues around which workshops organised. - Composition of community-planning audience: nature of public interests in attendance; nature of community interests in attendance. - Dynamic between community members and artistic interests in attendance. - Opportunities for public/community contributions. - Treatment of community's concerns re (i) past development: (ii) proposed regeneration project. - Insights into decision-making in progress and brief with which consultants entrusted.	Clarity on key components of regeneration plan. Insights into decision-making-process taking place alongside public consultation and planning process.
Public Forums.[82] **Dates:** - 15 January 2008. - 26 February 2008. - 08 April 2008 - 06 May 2008. - 27 May 2008. - 17 June 2008. - 22 July 2008. - 28 October 2008. - 09 December 2008 **Venue:** Digital Hub, Crane St., Dublin 8.	The public forums within which the regeneration plan was communicated and elaborated to a public audience.	- Method of notification and communication employed. - Public-forum regeneration agenda issues, i.e. the agenda items around which consults sought to structure forum meetings. - Public-forum regeneration non-issues (i.e. items excluded from meeting agendas). - Parties to regeneration process, including speakers tabled on forum agendas. - Detail of regeneration plans. - Rationale and evidence base underlying aspects of regeneration plans. - Legal status of regeneration plan. - Relation of LRP to policies currently in process and draft policy documents in circulation. - Information re land use, planned developments, status on planning applications etc. - Aspects of plan with implications for indigenous working-class community. - Consultants' conduct of forums – competency (knowledge of national policy and local context); chairing; authority and degree of control exercised over forum agendas, contributions, interventions and discussion; management of process; impartiality; evidence of ideological positions; key themes and	Detail of Liberties Regeneration Plan – content and process as presented and mediated by consultants to a socially mixed public audience, including key components, themes, legal status, strategy, schedule, parties and community implications.

[82] In addition to the nine Public Forums listed, there were two additional Public Forums (23 September 2008 and 10 March 2009) which the research was not in a position to observe.

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
(Public Forums *Jan. – Dec. 2008* ***Continued.)***		- motifs; treatment of community concerns; momentum with which process invested. - Composition of public-forum audience, including nature of (i) community interests in attendance and/or represented at forums (whether local-authority tenants, owner occupiers, activists or community organisations etc.); (ii) community interests conspicuous by their absence. - Homogeneity/heterogeneity of public audience in attendance. - Opportunities for public/community contributions, interventions and discussion. - Community response to (i) consultation agenda – degree of adherence and digression; (ii) consultation process and consultants. - Nature of contributions from all parties, including residents, community activists, political activists and other interest groups, with particular attention to community interventions. - Insights into impact of previous development and regeneration. - Nature of response from government officials and consultants to community issues, questions and concerns – with particular attention to critical issues. - Degree of conflict evident at meetings. - Role and function of (i) consultants within the process, including aspects of the regeneration agenda with which charged; (ii) local-government officials within process; (iii) public/community within process.	
POLITICAL & COMMUNITY-ACTIVIST/RESIDENT FORUMS/MEETINGS.			
People before Profit Public meeting: Developers – Friends or Foes? **Date:** 26 November 2007 **Venue:** St. Catherine's Community Centre, Marrowbone Lane, Dublin 8	A public meeting convened by political activists to discuss the community's experience of development.	- Community experience of opposing unwanted development in both the study area and other parts of Dublin. - Community experience of developers and development-related confrontations with local government and Gardai in the study area. - Nature of discussion and analysis surrounding urban regeneration within the parameters of a meeting convened by political activists. - Discussion of the opportunities and difficulties arising in engaging with large-scale urban regeneration. - Nature of strategy agreed for engagement with new regeneration plan.	Experience of engaging with regeneration and large-scale development in two different areas of Dublin.

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
Liberties Development Action Group (LDAG) Activist Meetings. **Dates:** - 28 January 2008 - 19 February 2008 - 11 March 2008 - 15 April 2008 - 18 June 2008 - 25 July 2008 - 09 October 2008 - 15 January 2009 **Venues:** - St. Andrew's Community Centre, Rialto, Dublin 8. - St. Nicholas of Myra Parish Hall, Dublin 8.	A series of meetings in which community and political activists organised to defend interests of working-class communities within LRP.	- Nature of community and political interests participating. - Core issues around which critique of regeneration structured. - Analysis advanced of regeneration, consultative and public information agenda and process. - Strategies adopted by activists organising in opposition to regeneration plans. - Stance adopted *vis-à-vis* local-government officials. - Assessment of role of public-representative within process. - Attempts to engage/mobilise wider community, councillors, adjacent areas/groupings, academics and national heritage organisations. - Difficulties experienced by activists and residents in opposing regeneration plans. - Difficulties arising in engaging as activist grouping in planning and LAP consultative process.	Experience of opposing preparation and progression of LRP.
LDAG Presentation to Councillors, Dublin South Central Area Committee. **Date:** 28 July 2008. **Venue:** Dublin City Council Civic Offices.	A formal presentation of concerns of community and political activists to local councillors.	- Number and party affiliation of councillors in attendance. - Content of community critique of LRP, including rationale for approaching councillors. - Councillors' response to (i) request to make presentation by community-activist grouping (including concerns re representative credentials); (ii) response to presentation of community concerns. - Local-government response to presentation of community concerns. - Outcome of meeting.	Political response to community concerns re LRP.
Resident Meetings. **Dates:** 5,7/8 Nov. 2008 21 Jan 2009. **Venue:** St. Nicholas of Myra Centre, Dublin 8.	A series of *ad hoc* residents' meetings convened to make formal submissions to Local Area Plan (LAP) process.	- Composition of resident grouping. - Analysis advanced of regeneration, consultative and public information process. - Core issues around which critique of Draft LAP structured. - Difficulties encountered by residents in engaging with regeneration process. - Assessment of role of public-representative within the regeneration process. - Attempts to engage public representatives with concerns.	Experience of opposing progression of LRP and adoption of Draft LAP.

Forum.	Significance.	Data Generated.	Relevance.
Resident meeting with Councillors of Dublin South Central Area Committee. **Date:** 26 January 2009 **Venue:** St. Nicholas of Myra Centre, Dublin 8.	A meeting convened by residents to present their concerns re LRP to the area's councillors.	- Number and party affiliation of councillors in attendance. - Core issues of concern for residents. - Officials' treatment of community submissions to Draft LAP. - Councillors' response to community concerns. - Significance of regeneration and development concerns in working-class areas *vis-à-vis* affluent areas. - Outcome of meeting.	Political response to community concerns re LRP/Draft LAP.
LOCAL-GOVERNMENT COUNCILLORS' FORUM.			
Dublin City Council Meeting. **Date:** 2 February 2009. **Venue:** City Hall, Dublin 2.	The meeting at which Councillors asked to adopt the Liberties LAP.	- Insight into behind-the-scenes negotiations between area councillors and officials prior to discussion of LRP/Draft LAP by Council body. - Nature of discussion re LRP/Draft LAP prior to decision of councillors. - Number of speakers on issue and time occupied by discussion. - Significance of Liberties within the city. - Degree of consensus and dissent characterising debate. - Representation of community's position and concerns re LPR/Draft LAP. - Dynamic between area councillors and government officials re LRP/Draft LAP. - Dynamic between political parties re LRP/Draft LAP. - Dynamic between councillors from different constituencies re LRP/Draft LAP. - Procedure and protocols through which the Councillor body exercise its reserved functions in 'making, amending or revoking' of LAPs. - Outcome of discussion.	Role of elected councillors in urban regeneration.

Appendix 9.1 Schedule of Records: Freedom of Information Request No: FOI/2929/10.

The names of the private consultancies contracted by Dublin City Council (DCC) to work on the Liberties Regeneration Project (LRP) and the Liberties Local Area Plan (LAP) and the monies expended by DCC on these private consultancies in the conduct of the LRP and LAP consultation process and in the preparation of the Liberties LAP between 2007 and 2010.

€	**Consultants employed in Marrowbone Lane and Liberties Regeneration 2006-2010**
15,246.00	Cormac Russell T/A The Nurture Programme Needs Analysis in original Marrowbone Lane Study.
16,351.21	Deirdre McDermott & Associates Ltd. – Biodiversity Strategy.
936,684.63	John Thompson & Partners Limited – Lead Masterplan and Local Area Plan consultants.
56,007.50	Mary Tubridy – Biodiversity Strategy.
171,655.02	Metropolitan Workshop Architects – original Marrowbone Lane Study.
84,942.00	Michael McGarry T/A McGarry Ni Eanaigh Architects – Height Study.
15,100.00	Miss Cliodhna Shaffrey – Art and Culture Strategy.
65,430.74	Patel Tondra Ltd. – Environmental Sustainability Study & Strategy.
8,500.00	Sarah Searson – Arts and Culture Strategy.
61,867.66	Scott Wilson Scotland Ltd. – Sports and Leisure Strategy.
38,720.00	Trutz Haase – Socio Economic Profiling.
48,613.36	Dublin Civic Trust – Heritage and Conservation Strategy.
1,519,118.12	**Total.**