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Undocumented Migrants and the Hegemonic Ideology of the System of Territorial Borders

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A Critical Analysis of Ideological Contention in Irish Christians' Moral Imagination

by

Damian Frederick Jackson

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Dublin

Trinity College

2013

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

Damian Jackson

Summary

States respond punitively to those who cross their borders without authorisation. Consequently the human rights of undocumented migrants, often including the right to life itself, are systemically denied them. Every year, about 800 people die trying to enter the European Union, with little enough protest against such unjust and violent occurrences. The questions behind this research seek to probe how such a morally flimsy system persists with little critique, and how it influences moral reasoning so that it is the undocumented migrants who are typically held responsible for their own predicament, and portrayed as a threat in popular discourse.

The central argument developed in response to these questions is that the border regime of the territorial state system is an ideological system which dominates contemporary public imagination, rendering states' rights to regulate migration unquestionable. The power of this system is significantly exercised through symbolic discourse, particularly in the forms of myth and ritual practice.

Following three theoretical chapters analysing the ways in which ideologies vitiate the moral imagination and how the border regime acts ideologically, the second part of the thesis (chapters four to six) is dedicated to interviews in the Irish context, with Christians who are long-term members of now ethnically diverse congregations, or ecumenical bodies, or who work with migrant organisations. These were selected partly as a "deviant case", given the frequency of opportunities afforded them for encounter with people from other cultures and countries, and also because of their habitual exposure to an ethical framework in the Christian tradition which offers, at least in part, an alternative vision to those generally prevailing in state or society secular systems.

A critical discourse analysis of the interviews is then undertaken, seeking evidence of competing discourses when issues concerning vulnerable migrants were under consideration. Although counter discourses were expressed, they emerge as demonstrably subordinate to those which maintain the ideology of the border regime. It is the latter which are seen as the dominating influence on the interviewees' moral deliberation.

Finally, a hermeneutical tool is presented in the form of the symbolic conceptualisation, from the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, of the human person created in the image of God, and thereby a unique, irreducible person of innate dignity. This is examined with a view to its application in exposing the ideological working of the border regime and to engendering in the ideological imagination a recovered sense of the inalienable human dignity and a "re-humanising" of undocumented migrants.

It is the thesis' conclusion that the theorisation of the border regime as exercising power primarily through symbolic, ideological means is effective in providing a rationale for its persistence despite the often blatant, systemic unjust discrimination that it masks. The ideological power of the border regime was evident in interviewees' symbolic discourse. This was visible in their evocation of myths and metaphors that reinforce and reproduce it as "commonsense" and legitimate. While alternative perspectives did feature in their narratives, influenced by Christian ethics or secular ethical frameworks of human rights, these were not as strong and did not dislodge the border regime's superordinate status as a natural spatial structuring of political power. Alternative ethical perspectives showed themselves to be of limited effectiveness towards "re-humanising" the essentialised "illegal immigrant" of dominant discourses.

This grave ethical disjuncture is a matter, I propose, that churches, ecumenical bodies and Christian individuals, whether in Ireland or elsewhere on our shared planet would do well to confront, in terms of the integrity and effectiveness of their truth claims and of their pastoral vision and mission.

Acknowledgements

A PhD thesis is not a solo project and therefore many others are deserving of my acknowledgement and thanks. First and foremost I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors Dr Gillian Wylie and Dr Geraldine Smyth. Throughout the process they provided encouragement and support, as well as incisive and constructive critique and suggestions as needed, not to mention extraordinary editing skill! Without their help the quality of the thesis would undoubtedly be diminished. I only wish I had the capacity to better incorporate their excellent advice and suggestions into the manuscript.

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Introduction

Borders are dangerous places, particularly for those who are fleeing from war and danger, or those who lack an entry visa, passport, or proof of identity. On the 6th of September 2012, twenty minutes from the beaches of the luxurious Richmond Ephesus Resort in Kusadasi, where wealthy northern Europeans were sunning themselves, a pleasure boat left the town of Ahmetbeyli with about 110 people on board, seeking to cross the invisible line into Europe. Several hours later, only 25km down the coast, the Turkish authorities were fishing 61 bodies out of the sea. They had been locked below the main deck and could not escape when the boat hit rocks and sank, even though it was only 50 metres from the shore. Each had paid $6,000 for the privilege.[1]

Research Aim and Questions

The primary aim of this thesis is to investigate how the ideology of the border regime of territorial states dominates the public imagination so that undocumented migrants are typically demonised in government and media discourse, despite the extreme precarity of their circumstances.

My interest in this originates in a consideration of the ethics of territorial borders which resulted in my M. Phil. (Peace Studies) Thesis (2008), "The Migrant is the New Black: Investigating the ethics of territorial borders from a human rights perspective".[2] In that thesis I analysed, from an ethical perspective grounded in human rights norms, the differential treatment of people at inter-state territorial borders. In particular, my critique focussed on the systemic denial of the human rights of undocumented migrants.

I subsequently considered a paradox similar to that which motivated the legal scholar Gregor Noll: "While human rights are practically inaccessible to undocumented

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[1] Andrew Simmons, 'Turkish Captain Charged over Migrant Deaths', *Al Jazeera* (Ahmetbeyli, Turkey, 8 September 2012) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/20129862746768903.html > [accessed 1 May 2013].

[2] Damian Jackson, 'The Migrant Is the New Black: Investigating the Ethics of Territorial Borders from a Human Rights Perspective' (unpublished M. Phil (Peace Studies) thesis, Dublin: University of Dublin, Trinity College, 2008).

migrants, this inaccessibility apparently does not detract from claims that human rights are universally applicable."[3] I asked why the following contradiction persists: The inaccessibility of human rights to undocumented migrants makes them very vulnerable to exploitation, yet public discourse, rather than recognising their precarity, and the discriminatory nature of the border regime that causes it, portrays them as a threat to society and further demonises them.

To move towards an answer in this thesis I theorise the border regime of the system of territorial states as an ideological domination system and ask how it works to sustain its domination in the public imagination, in contrast to the social unacceptability of other discriminatory ideologies.

To gain further insight into the nature of this ideological domination I conducted interviews with people whose affiliation to their church gives them access to an alternatively informed ethical framework.[4] They represent what the social researcher David Silverman calls a "deviant case" and so are a potentially rich source of insight into understanding the competing of different ideologies in influencing the moral imagination.[5] I therefore sought to explore the following questions:

How does the ideology of the territorial state system influence the moral imagination of Christians, and how do alternative perspectives afforded by the Christian ethical tradition interact with the ideology of the territorial state system in their imaginations when they consider issues of migration?

Finally, looking forward, I ask what resources from the Christian ethical tradition could enable the fostering of a renewed and emancipatory perspective which shakes off the "commonsense" of borders and engages with issues concerning vulnerable migrants?

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[3] Gregor Noll, 'Why Human Rights Fail to Protect Undocumented Migrants', *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 12 (2010), 241–272 (p. 241) <doi:10.1163/157181610X496894>.

[4] This Christian ethical tradition, although diverse, can offer a strong critique of the territorial system of states, for example with its traditions and norms of hospitality and welcome to the stranger, as well as the prophetic concern for social justice arising out of the Hebrew historical experience of slavery and exile.

[5] David Silverman, *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*, 3rd ed (London: SAGE, 2010), pp. 281–285.

Line of argument

The thesis argument proceeds along the following lines: Firstly I argue that the current system of territorial state borders unjustly discriminates against undocumented migrants, rendering them vulnerable to exploitation. I note that despite this unjust discrimination, public discourse further demonises them and portrays them as a threat, rather than threatened. I contend that this unreasonable demonisation is evidence that the border regime of the territorial state system ideologically dominates the public imagination and masks itself as a factor in their predicament. I postulate that the fingerprints of ideological work are nonetheless discernable and propose a fingerprint framework to disclose its traces in the use of emotive symbolic discourses of "commonsense", categorisation and altruism.

The border regime effectively categorises undocumented migrants as different to "us" in a morally significant way, thus, under its ideological influence, the same moral reasoning is not applied to their situation as to that of others in vulnerable situations and they are cast as responsible for their own situation.

I seek evidence for the ideological working of the territorial state system through a critical discourse analysis of interviews with long term members of diverse church congregations under the fingerprints mentioned above, in particular, exploring its interaction and competition with alternative perspectives on these issues derived from the interviewees' Christian ethical tradition. Finally, I argue that the symbolic conceptualisation from the Biblical narrative of humankind created in the image of God can foster a renewal of the imagination, enabling a restoration of empathy with, rather than just sympathy for, each person, and thus a full recognition of their human dignity and agency, as well as a call to accompaniment of and solidarity with those who are subjects of systemic oppression.

Layout of thesis chapters

Part one of the thesis (chapters 1-3) deals with the ideological nature of the border regime of the territorial state system and its impact on undocumented migrants. Chapter 1 looks at the working of ideological domination systems, drawing from Foucauldian perspectives on discourse and power, Marx and Gramsci on hegemonic ideology and Giddens' concepts concerning social reproduction of dominant power constellations. I then outline a diagnostic framework for unmasking the fingerprints

of ideological working in discourse,[6] and propose Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodology well-suited to unmasking the influence of (potentially disavowed) ideology in discourse.[7]

Chapter 2 seeks to theorise the border regime as an ideological system and to begin the work of analysing its operation using the diagnostic fingerprint framework. It begins by positing the border regime as a domination system, demonstrating the nature of its overt and indirect violent consequences for undocumented migrants. Subsequently chapter 2 seeks to probe the ideological nature of the territorialised state system by deconstructing some of the "commonsense" assumptions behind it: that territorially defined states delimit natural and cohesive "nations" or "peoples" (which enables its categorisation of people), and that the current system of territorial states is a natural spatial political ordering. Finally, it points to some potential alternative political orderings.

The third chapter unpacks how the ideology of the territorial state system remains dominant and relatively unquestioned in public discourse, despite its unjust and discriminatory consequences. Following Foucauldian concepts of discourse as the conduit of power the chapter analyses the territorial state system under the fingerprint of the emotive use of symbolic discourse. In particular it considers symbolic discourses in the forms of myth and ritual, noting how they operate in the unconscious to reinforce the ideologies they derive from. I demonstrate how bordering myths and rituals work ideologically to categorise people in certain ways which has the effect of constructing them as different in a morally significant way. I conclude that many of these myths evoke the more fundamental myths of difference and scarcity which, taken together, transform those deemed different into a threat, and thus are particularly potent ideologically.

The second part of the thesis (chapters 4 to 6) asks how the ideology of the territorial state system influences the moral imagination of Christians, or how alternative perspectives afforded by the Christian ethical tradition interact with the ideology of

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[6] Briefly, I argue that ideological working is evident in four "fingerprints": commonsense, categorisation, use of emotive symbolic discourse and altruism.

[7] More specifically, I follow the Discourse-Historical method of critical discourse analysis developed by Ruth Wodak. Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, 'The Discourse-Historical Approach', in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 2nd ed (London: SAGE, 2009), pp. 87–121.

the territorial state system in their imaginations when they consider issues concerning migrants and migration (regular and irregular). Long term members of diverse congregations, people involved in ecumenical work and people who work with vulnerable migrants were interviewed. Chapter 4 consists of a narrative analysis of the interviews, delineating the main topics and themes that arose in the interviews. The intention is to enable the reader, as far as possible, to draw their own conclusions concerning the content of the interviews in advance of the critical discourse analysis of the next chapter, and to make the analytical process as transparent as possible. Chapters 5 and 6, then, comprise the critical discourse analysis of the interview transcripts. The aim of this analysis is to explore the contention and competition between discourses associated with different ideological frameworks and value systems in the interviewees' moral reasoning as they consider issues concerning migration, their church, community and country. It is structured according to the framework of ideological fingerprints and traces the linguistic means and discursive strategies used by the interviewees as they discuss these issues.

In the final, third part of the thesis (chapter 7 and the conclusion), I turn to the Christian ethical tradition and, in chapter 7, ask what resources could be drawn from it which could enable a re-imagining of undocumented and other vulnerable migrants and prompt a rethinking of Christians' actions within and without the church. I explore the doctrine of humankind's creation in the image of God as a hermeneutical tool which could enable such a re-imagining by undermining and unmasking the working of the ideology of the territorial state system. Particular thought is given throughout to drawing out points of correlation between Christian ethical thinking and ethical deliberation grounded in other traditions to enable fruitful engagement between the traditions.

Firstly this involves a broad overview of various sources of ethical guidance from the Christian tradition applicable to the situation of vulnerable migrants, through the lens of creation in the divine image. Subsequently the ideological fingerprint framework is again put into service to demonstrate how an understanding of undocumented migrants as people created in the image of God can reveal, and therefore undermine, the ideological working of the territorial state system to discredit and dehumanise them.

The final, concluding chapter then briefly outlines a framework for developing a renewed engagement with migrants, as well as those within and without the churches in the light of this discussion. Key to it is the recognition that while some will welcome such a renewed engagement, others will likely be reticent and perhaps even fearful, and that a respectful and humble approach is required in each case. However, also key is the contention that the moral obligation to the most vulnerable, and a hermeneutical perspective of each human as created in the divine image mandate engagement with these issues. I suggest that personal, one-to-one encounter with migrants is key to challenging conceptions rooted in the status quo and enables an imaginative reframing of one's perspective which is facilitated by emancipatory ethical resources. I advocate that local churches seek opportunities within and outside the congregation for encounter between people from different backgrounds to open the door for such engagement.

Part 1: Undocumented Migrants and the Territorial State System

1 Hegemonic Domination of the Imagination

1.1 Introduction: Three walks

In this chapter I explore the ways that ideology can come to hegemonically dominate the imagination of an individual, or even a population. This can mean that its effects are masked and that the ideology is therefore removed from critique, resulting in the perpetuation of the unequal power relations that it legitimates. I shall then draw out several "fingerprints" characteristic of the working of hegemonically dominant ideologies in order to develop a framework useful in firstly identifying such cases, and then for critiquing them. I also propose Critical Discourse Analysis as an appropriate methodology to unmask evidence of covert ideological influence in discourse, even for those who might disavow that particular ideology and profess adherence to others (although probably not naming them an "ideology").

The purpose of this work is to provide the theoretical background which, later in the thesis, will enable me, firstly, to analyse the territorial system of states and argue that it is an ideological construct which hegemonically dominates the imagination of many people, rather than an immutable political order. Secondly, I can then look at the human consequences of the precarious situations it engenders for certain people (particularly undocumented migrants) and for others whom it inures to their fate. Thirdly, I will be able to use the framework to undertake a critical discourse analysis of the interview transcripts to explore evidence of contention between the ideology of the territorial state system and discourses from the Christian ethical tradition in the moral imagination of those interviewed by looking at what they say and do not say about undocumented migrants, and the effects of migration on the local community and the country.

In order to build this theoretical foundation I will review literature from various disciplines, with a focus on philosophy (particularly political philosophy) and critical discourse analysis, on the phenomena of domination, power, discourse, ideology, legitimacy and hegemony. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the research, and the thesis as a whole, I do not intend to review exhaustively the critiques and

discussions which have characterised each one, but rather to use the concepts of several philosophical traditions, having their origins in major figures, to demonstrate a consistent picture of the phenomena I discuss. The aim is to reveal consistency between the various traditions on the subject of ideological support of power inequalities, although each tradition has its own language to describe it. I thus hope that this polyglot approach, rather than being a weakness, will prove to be a strength of the research, showing, as I hope it will, a consistency in perception of the phenomena discussed across different and relatively independent philosophical traditions.

I begin by situating my argument in the realm of late modernity, recognising that Lyotard's "master narratives"[8] still have much to offer in terms of understanding the world, if one remains conscious of their essentialising tendencies. I then consider the enduring persistence of systemic domination today in many fields of life and review theory concerning the non-coercive means by which the unequal power relations they maintain are reproduced in society, paying particular attention to the use of discourse as a means by which thinking is framed.

Then I embark on three walks through traditions which theorise the phenomenon of systemic domination and its persistence, beginning with Michel Foucault's theorising of power as an apparent agent itself: categorising subjects and constituting them accordingly; and his conception of discourse as a conduit of power. I consider differences and similarities in the understanding of discourse for Foucault and in the field of Discourse Analysis, with its perspective of language use as a social practice, reproducing social structures (of domination).

I then look at the concepts of ideology and hegemony focussing on how they are understood in the Marxist tradition, but also reviewing other understandings of them, and their functioning in sustaining domination and power inequalities. In particular, I am interested in theory concerning *how* they function to conceal and naturalise (unequal) power relations. To that end I draw on Anthony Giddens' concepts of "discursive consciousness" and "practical consciousness" as well as Roland Barthes' work on myth and Max Weber's modes of legitimation to build up an understanding of the working of hegemony which will enable critique of domination systems

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[8] J.-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

through the unmasking of their basis in ideological myth and ritual. To this end I then finally outline a diagnostic framework for unmasking the fingerprints of ideological work and propose Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodology well-suited to unmasking the influence of (potentially disavowed) ideology in institutional, social, communal or individual discourse.

1.1.1 Situating the argument in late modernity

According to Paulo Freire, domination is the fundamental theme of the present epoch.[9] For him, an epoch is "...characterised by a complex of ideas, concepts, hopes, doubts, values and challenges in dialectical interaction with their opposites, striving towards fulfilment", and he defines a theme as the "concrete representation" of these ideas, values, concepts and hopes. In other words, he is saying here, that the prevalent ideas in society today manifest themselves in systems of domination by some people of others.

This is modern sounding language, with its implication that a particular set of ideas or concepts can be said to characterise an epoch. I agree with Freire on the persistence of domination on many scales, from the intimate to the global; and in many areas of life, from the home, to the workplace and in the workings of international organisations. So, whilst recognising the challenge of what is often labelled "postmodernism" to political philosophical understandings of society, I still wish to acknowledge the persistence and ubiquity of, in particular, the spatial mode of political organization, namely, the system of territorial sovereign states. As Michael Mann says: "The nation-state ... is not in any *general* decline, *anywhere.*"[10] It is this aspect of society that is of key concern here and so, with Angus Stewart (and Anthony Giddens as he acknowledges) I situate my study in "late modernity".[11] Stewart explains by referring to J. F. Lyotard's *magnum opus*, *The Postmodern Condition*:

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[9] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 75.

[10] Quoted in Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson, *Borders, Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State* (Oxford: Berg, 1999), p. 7.

[11] Angus Stewart, *Theories of Power and Domination* (London: Sage Publications, 2001), pp. 2–4.

> *Lyotard wishes to refute any critical theory positing general sites of domination on the grounds that 'the social' is heterogeneous and non-totalisable. In this account, therefore, what distinguishes modernity and postmodernity as perspectives upon power and politics is the latter's prohibition of the use of general frameworks of analysis such as those of capitalism and patriarchy. ... [yet] the present argument nevertheless endorses the centrality of just such normative theories of justice and social-theoretical accounts of macro-structures to the analysis of domination and power...*[12]

In this context I shall adopt a similar lens of analysis, recognising that many of Lyotard's "master narratives", such as nationalism, religious belief and the consumerist society, persist in the popular imagination, and thus dominate behaviour, despite destabilising postmodern challenges, while others no longer retain the same explicatory power or influence on conventional behaviour. Therefore, general frameworks of analysis such as patriarchy, capitalism and nationalism can, if deployed with due reflection, remain useful and continue to offer valuable insights into the working of society. What postmodern critique has offered here is the valuable and constant precaution against the tendency of an analysis from the perspective of a master narrative to essentialise, generalise, or bypass what is particular and distinct. The master narratives do not explain everything. This is a precaution of which I have been conscious throughout my research, as I seek to maintain an awareness of nuance and contingency despite the evident patterns in my observations.

1.1.2 The persistence of systemic domination

Few would dispute that domination is prevalent on many different levels in societies today; within small communities like a workplace, but also on a global scale with the economic domination of the developed world over the developing world, so called. This, of course, is not new but it is interesting to look at how this domination works and persists, despite emancipatory movements and reforms that have taken place in the last couple of centuries.

Examples of persistent domination are not difficult to identify. In Ireland, it is evident that remnants of patriarchy are evident, for example in the male domination of the

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[12] Lyotard.

political and business spheres.[13] This is merely a replication of the situation in much of Europe and North America. Economically speaking, the contours of domination are even clearer: there is a huge discrepancy in the wealth of the "first" and "third" (more properly "two-thirds") worlds, which not only persists but is growing. Exploitation of the natural resources of poorer countries for the benefit of the rich (local politicians as well as citizens and corporations of the "first world" countries) continues unabated.[14]

Although manifested particularly, much of this domination is systemic in nature, or at the very least appears to be. In the preface to his book *Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression*, Joe R. Feagin defines the word "systemic" as "manifested in all major societal institutions"[15] From this perspective, one can certainly say that even discredited (and now even illegal) means of discrimination and domination such as racism and sexism (or patriarchy) remain ubiquitously embedded in practice and, thus can be said to be systemic, despite emancipatory movements, and the legislative developments they led to. In fact, in some ways, the legislative "progress" made in countering these hegemonies can be said to have impinged upon practical resistance

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[13] The international survey of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (a UN observer body) ranked Ireland 88th in the world in terms of female representation at national level, and last in the EU. 'Gender Balance in Irish Politics Ranked Among World's Worst | Irish Examiner' <http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/gender-balance-in-irish-politics-ranked-among-worlds-worst-92051.html> [accessed 1 October 2010].

Yet the issue of gender quotas in the Dáil remains controversial: 'Martina Devlin: Bridging Dail Gender Gap Is Vital for a Fairer Society - Martina Devlin, Columnists - Independent.ie' <http://www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/martina-devlin/martina-devlin-bridging-dail-gender-gap-is-vital-for-a-fairer-society-2349540.html> [accessed 1 October 2010]. and 'Gender Quotas for Women TDs - The Irish Times - Tue, Aug 10, 2010' <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/letters/2010/0810/1224276469840.html> [accessed 1 October 2010].

[14] Coverage of over-exploitation of natural resources in the developing world, as well as the human exploitation that it routinely entails, may be found in: Corpwatch, 'CorpWatch : Natural Resources' <http://www.corpwatch.org/section.php?id=190> [accessed 1 October 2010].

[15] Joe R. Feagin, *Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. xiii.

to them by de-legitimating the emancipatory discourse itself.[16] An example is the phenomenon of "colour-blind racism", particularly in the United States, whereby anti-racist discourse becomes discredited and marginalised as "activist" or even "extremist" by mainstream media which portrays society and public policy as "colour-blind" since the "success" of the civil rights movement of the 1960s.[17] This is despite the empirical fact of the consistent discrepancy between the living standards of people from different ethnic backgrounds across many measures of social wellbeing.

In history, domination has usually been coercive in nature: master-slave, husband-wife, white-black, coloniser-colonised. Either through force, law backed by force, or exclusionary closure[18] (where "qualifications", such as land ownership, academic requirements or citizenship requirements, are needed to access resources or rights), the interests of one were subjugated for the benefit of the other. Since the emancipatory movements of the past century or so, the means of domination are no longer so coercive or conspicuous, but appear no less effective for it.

A potential reason for the persistence of domination that has been expressed variously and in various disciplines is that, in order to resist domination, a society or individual must itself become dominating. One has to mirror the dominating system to overcome it. At a societal level, one theologian of globalisation, Walter Wink claims that "[t]he irony is that successful defence against a power-maximising aggressor requires a society to become more like the society that threatens it. Thus, domination is a disease, a contaminant..."[19] That this race to domination is unchosen[20] is reflected by Paulo Freire who describes how "the oppressed" have adapted to the structures of

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[16] We shall explore this apparent contradiction where seemingly progressive moves actually serve to reinforce oppressive power structures later when we look at altruism as a means of self-legitimation.

[17] Ashley Doane, 'The Changing Politics of Color-blind Racism', in *The New Black: Alternative paradigms and strategies for the 21st century*, ed. by Rodney D. Coates and Rutledge M. Dennis, Research in Race and Ethnic Relations (Oxford: JAI Press, 2007), XIV.

[18] Frank Parkin's concept of exclusionary closure is described in Peter Jackson, *Maps of Meaning* (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989), p. 54.

[19] Walter Wink, *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 40.

[20] Wink, p. 42.

domination which oppress them so that "[t]hey are at one and the same time both themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized."[21]

1.2 Walking with Foucault: Strategies for sustaining domination

The persistence of domination systems is testament to their success at maintaining and masking the power inequalities that they represent. Domination is about the maintenance of structural power inequalities. In order to investigate this a little further I shall discuss Foucault's understanding of the nature of power and the roles it plays in the maintenance and challenging of domination systems.

Stewart criticizes what he regards as the customary conflation of domination and power, distinguishing between power *over* (domination) and power *to*, which is cooperative in nature. Power has emancipatory potential as well as subordinating potential. He maintains that structures of domination "...are not mechanically monolithic but *sites of struggle*."[22] This contingency of domination systems reflects the relational nature of power: its exercise is dependent on the mutual recognition of the parties in the relationship of their relative positions, and the submission of one party to the other. This submission can be either willing or unwilling, induced via persuasion or coercion. Thus, control over means of coercion or persuasion is essential to the maintenance of power. That is, as Michael Mann maintains, power is not usefully regarded as a resource itself, but resources are the means through which power is exercised.[23] Or rather, as Foucault describes in a passage which recalls Wink's virtual personification of power, power seeks to install *itself* and produce real material effects (through the use of resources):

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[21] Freire, p. 24.

[22] Stewart, p. 6ff. Italics in original

[23] Stewart, p. 23.

> *Let us not ... ask why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In other words, rather than ask ourselves how [for example] the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects.*[24]

Foucault regards subjects (in the sense of those on whom power operates, who may or may not benefit from that operation) as having been *constituted* by power, rather than using it to preserve or challenge the prevailing order. In other words, if I may hazard it, domination systems (as loci of power) are self-preserving, *appearing* to have their own agency. He suggests that, in analysing domination systems, it can be more useful to ask about the processes that are inherent in that system, constituting subjects in such a way that they act in certain ways toward each other.

Processes for conservation of power differentials, or preservation of the structures of social interaction, can be coercive or influential/persuasive, and, as for Foucault, it is the latter that is of primary interest. I now discuss several processes through which power constitutes subjects (to use Foucault's term) to behave in certain ways.

Firstly, persuasion can be enacted in the form of demonstrations of coercive capability (public hangings are a particularly visceral example). This has perhaps distracted us from the fact that the emotive *impact* of the demonstration is more powerful than the coercive act itself; that it is the impact that proscribes the behaviour of the witnesses, encouraging submission to the domination system. Such overtly violent demonstrations are rare now in the west, as Foucault noted, his thesis being that a defining characteristic of modernity is the change in disciplinary method from spectacle to surveillance.[25] A striking example of this surveillance society is the oft-cited statistic that on average, each UK citizen is captured on CCTV 300 times per

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[24] From Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* (London: Harvester Press, 1980), p. 97. quoted in Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject* (London: UCL Press, 1995), p. 22.

[25] Discussed in McHoul and Grace, p. 66. This, again, situates our discussion in the context of late modernity.

day.[26] He discusses this phenomenon in terms of the implications of the Panopticon, a design for a building allowing the efficient and constant surveillance of prisoners. Today the same is achieved exponentially more efficiently through the use of CCTV. For Foucault, "... the major effect of the Panopticon [is]: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. ... that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary."[27] This second method, of surveillance, enables domination to be reinscribed more efficiently by causing their subjects to refine their behaviour according to that expected by the system: "...it relies on 'surveillance' and the internal training this produces to incite states of docility; it need not rely on displays of physical force or violence."[28] Foucault is, of course, discussing a technique for use in a prison, but, being a technique, it can and has been applied elsewhere. I see the ubiquity of CCTV as an application of the same technique without the need to physically constrain the observed party. The intended effect is the same: to encourage certain behaviours and discourage others by making people aware that they are never beyond surveillance.

In general, domination is imagined as being backed up by force, and thus, at least potentially imposed coercively. In the above process, Foucault is suggesting that more fundamental to the operation of power is its capacity to induce modes of behaviour in those subject to it, behaviour that perpetuates and reproduces extant power relations.

Another approach to the conservation of power differentials is to attempt to influence the thinking of others so that the status quo becomes accepted as inevitable, or just, or natural. If a domination system can convince its subjects that it is natural, inevitable or a given fact of social organization, then resistance to it will seem futile and even absurd. The fact that, as discussed above, domination systems seem to have their own agency gives them an appearance of inevitability, encouraging submission

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[26] Stephen Graham, 'CCTV: The Stealthy Emergence of a Fifth Utility?', *Planning Theory & Practice*, 3 (2002), 237 <doi:10.1080/14649350220150116>.

Clive Norris, *The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV* (Oxford: Berg, 1999).

[27] From Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), p. 201. quoted in McHoul and Grace, p. 67.

[28] McHoul and Grace, p. 67.

to them, or rather, making resistance to them seem pointless and futile. In fact, of course, subjects (who are people), do maintain agency, and retain the choice to submit or resist. In this sense power remains consent-based, as peace theorist, Gene Sharp maintains.[29] Yet, the extent to which resources can be utilised by the "regime of truth"[30] to deflect attention from, or undermine the collective and individual agency of people, and thereby conceal the *relational* nature of power, is evident in the persistence of domination.[31] According to Foucault, in this sense, it is *discourse* that is the conduit of power. Control of discourse enables the maintenance of extant power relations.

1.2.1 Discourse as the conduit of power

Discourse, as noted already, is a complex term that is ascribed varied meanings within different academic disciplines. I consider two influential senses in particular: Foucault's, and that of the discipline of critical discourse analysis.

For Foucault, in brief, discourses are structures of knowledge, and interpretation is merely the act of one discourse trying to secure another within its bounds. Certain discourses can thus 'gain the upper hand' and obtain greater credibility in a society, while at the same time discrediting others. Perhaps one broadly historic example would be the era of the Enlightenment, when rationality and 'scientific method' displaced traditional authorities as ways of knowing. No interpretation can be complete, but discourses seek to 'stitch up' their imperfections through (disciplinary) techniques whereby they claim to 'know' their subject. Foucault cites the Catholic confessional and the aforementioned Panopticon as examples of such techniques, whereby the discourse of knowledge, whether that of the Church or the judicial system, claims to know the "sinner" or the "criminal" authoritatively.[32] In this context, therefore, discourse is the conduit of power; promoting certain understandings and ways of knowing which it claims as "truth". For Foucault, discourses are constitutive,

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[29] Brian Martin, 'Gene Sharp's Theory of Power', *Journal of Peace Research*, 26 (1989), 213–222.

[30] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 131.

[31] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 131.

[32] McHoul and Grace, pp. 22–24.

as Michèle Barrett observes, they "... do more than just designate things; they are practices 'that systematically form the objects of which they speak'."[33]

An important limitation to this is that, for Foucault, particular constellations of power and their associated disciplines (techniques of truth-demonstration) and discourses are historically-specific and thus contingent, despite their best efforts to appear otherwise. Discourses (attempt to) constrain the possible things that can be said or written about a given social practice or object in a certain historical period. He therefore encourages critical thinking on the perceived permanence of current power constellations:

> *It is fruitful in a certain way to describe that-which-is by making it appear as something that might not be, or that might not be as it is. [...] It is also why, in my opinion, recourse to history [...] is meaningful to the extent that history serves to show how that-which-is has not always been [...] and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made.*[34]

Foucault regards discourses, or bodies of knowledge, as developing discontinuously through history, rather than in an ordered progression: scientific change for him is not seamless and rational, progressing closer and closer to the "truth". This understanding is key to his critique of "dominant" or "official" discourses.[35] If social structures are demonstrated to be historically specific and temporally discontinuous, then they are demonstrated to be contingent and changeable. Therefore alternative configurations of social relations become imaginable: the ideological hegemonic *domination of the imagination* can be broken.

In the field of discourse analysis, the term "discourse" is more narrowly concerned with text and talk. It is this sense of the word that is perhaps more familiar, and at first the two senses of the word (linguistic and socio-political) may seem completely unrelated; two separate phenomena which happen to have been identified by the

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[33] Michèle Barrett, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 130. quoted in Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *Jesus and the Politics of Interpretation* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc, 2000), p. 15.

[34] Michel Foucault, *Politics Philosophy Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 37. quoted in McHoul and Grace, p. 11.

[35] McHoul and Grace, p. 4.

same name by their students. However, on closer analysis, parallels and similarities become apparent. Critical discourse analysis is specifically concerned with the analysis of text and talk as a social practice: discourse, whether speech or writing, is understood as more than just language use, but as a type of social practice. Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak explain further:

> *... discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of, and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it.*[36]

In the light of Foucault's view of discourse as representing bodies of knowledge, acting as the conduit of power, and thereby as constitutive of subjects' self-understanding of their (relative) positions in the status quo, the conceptual parallels in functional terms become clear when considering the above quotation, although the different senses of the word "discourse" can be misleading. The question then arises as to *how* power differentials (i.e. domination systems) are reinscribed through discourse? To work towards an answer I wish now to walk with Marx, who critically engages with the concept of ideology. Power, discourse and ideology will be demonstrated to work closely together in the preservation of domination systems.

1.3 Walking with Marx: Ideology and hegemony

In order to understand *how* discourse acts as the conduit of power it is helpful to look at the working of ideology. Ideology is a term that is capable of many different meanings, so in order to situate my own usage of term, I will undertake a brief review of the development of the concept in political philosophy: what is ideology, what does it do and how does it do it?

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[36] Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in *Discourse as Social Interaction*, ed. by Teun van Dijk, Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction (London: Sage, 1997), II. quoted in Deirdre Coghlan, 'Critical Discourse Analysis' (unpublished, 2009).

1.3.1 The Genealogy of Ideology: What is it?

The first use of the term "ideology", by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy,[37] was, as with most other "...ology" words, as a science of ideas. Such a seemingly neutral and benign conceptualisation is no longer prevalent, with more pejorative interpretations, having their origins in Marxist thinking, more commonplace. I briefly trace the development of understanding of ideology in both its pejorative and non-pejorative senses and then conclude with a rationale for my own use of the term which draws more from the Marxist, pejorative sense.

Evolution of the term from its "neutral" sense of a science of, or system of ideas to the sense in which it is generally understood today begins with Karl Marx. For Marx, the ruling class was able to use its material domination of the means of (re)production of ideas, such as politics, the media, and education to impose its ideology on society as an apparently immutable and "natural" order. Thus a system of ideas which benefits the elite is presented as an objective and disinterested truth, and the way in which it promotes certain narrow interests is masked. This masking, or concealing, of interests is the key characteristic of ideology according to John Urry.[38] So, domination in the field of ideas is obtained for the elite through their control over the means of production.

Antonio Gramsci, from a Marxist perspective, reworked these ideas, questioning their dependence on economic dominance. He used the term "hegemony" to denote the way that an ideology can dominate the *imagination* of society and shape our thinking so that alternatives to the status quo are not imagined, or appear naïve or utopian. In the perfect case of hegemonic domination, an elite can impose its ideology by persuading the subordinate classes that the prevailing moral, political and cultural values are to their benefit. The energies of the dominant elite are thus invested in preventing discernment that this may not be the case. As Paulo Freire notes (quoting Simone de Beauvoir in *La Penseé de Droite Aujourd'hui*): "The interests of the oppressors lie in 'changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them', for the more the oppressed can be led to adapt to that

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[37] As noted in Teun van Dijk, *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (London: Sage Publications, 2009), p. 1.

[38] Peter Jackson, p. 52.

situation, the more easily they can be dominated."[39] Thus "...the exercise of hegemony is a much more efficient strategy than coercive control, involving the use of fewer resources and reducing the potential for open conflict by securing the acquiescence of the oppressed to their subordination."[40] For Gramsci, hegemony was exercised through the myriad ways that everyday social practices reinscribed the social order, and thus the primary context for this re-inscription was in civil society, rather than in the state or in people's individual habits. Thus "[i]t is with Gramsci that the crucial transition is effected from ideology as 'systems of ideas' to ideology as lived, habitual social practice – which must then presumably encompass the unconscious, inarticulate dimensions of social experience as well as the workings of formal institutions."[41] However, Perry Anderson has asserted that Gramsci is mistaken in locating the working of hegemony in civil society alone, and maintains that the parliamentary system is "the hub of the ideological apparatus of capitalism"[42], in that it fosters the illusion of self-government on the part of the populace; thus the capitalist state is itself also an instrument of hegemony on its own behalf.

More recently, feminist theorists have further developed Marxist thought on ideology by recasting hegemony as the discursive linkage of ideas, bringing us back to discourse as the conduit of power. Roxanne Doty puts it clearly:

> *The hegemonic dimension of global politics is inextricably linked to representational practices... Hegemony involves the very production of categories of identity and the society of which they are a part. Hegemonic practices ... seek to create the fixedness of meaning that ... is ultimately impossible.*[43]

So discursive representations (of people) produce categorisation that is hegemonic in nature as it makes the interested and value-based appear natural and factual. This reminds me of Foucault's theorisation of discourse as the conduit through which power constitutes and categorises subjects.

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[39] Freire, p. 47.

[40] Peter Jackson, p. 53.

[41] Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 2007), p. 115.

[42] Quoted in Eagleton, p. 112.

[43] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 8.

Consider a couple of examples: dominant political discourses concerning the nature of democracy and legitimate protest, and post-enlightenment understandings of scientific knowledge. Meghana Nayak and Jennifer Suchland, following Doty's feminist critical work, describe how current hegemonic practices of neoliberalism and neocolonialism

> *...circumscribe what democracy and rights are supposed to look like in terms of their appropriate forms and definitions, the legitimate actions taken in the name of democracy and rights as well as the parameters of justice and political participation.*[44]

In so doing, these practices de-legitimate certain forms of political action and the people who practise them, enabling the institutions of state to counteract them by means which would otherwise invite protest or criticism.

Critical understandings such as these have also questioned modernity's claims about the disinterestedness of science and of the academy. Nancy Hartstock, the critical feminist philosopher delineates the consequences:

> *Through reason the philosopher could escape the limits of the body, time, and space to contemplate the eternal problems related to man as knower. Finally, as a result of all this, Enlightenment political thought was characterized by a denial of the importance of power to knowledge and concomitantly a denial of the centrality of systematic domination in human societies. The subject/individual and power were said to be distinct.*[45]

Therefore, an effective critique of systems of domination must include the unmasking of the power relations at play in the production of social "knowledge", for example in media portrayals or official state discourses of the situation under study (state territoriality and its related field of cross-border migration, in this study).

John Agnew also observes the phenomenon, recognising the importance and power of the claim of portraying a "view from nowhere": that it can legitimate what could be a very partial view of the world. "If it were seen as just a view from somewhere, its

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[44] Meghana Nayak and Jennifer Suchland, 'Gender Violence And Hegemonic Projects - Introduction', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 8 (2006), 467 (p. 470) <doi:10.1080/14616740600945024>.

[45] Nancy Hartstock, *The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 206–207., quoted in Fiorenza, p. 22.

partiality and situatedness would be signalled from the outset. In this way a political claim on behalf of a particular interest is turned into a natural claim about the world as it is."[46] This is reflected in Cynthia Weber's observation that ideology acts as a generaliser of the particular.[47]

So hegemonic practices seek to categorise identity and frame discourse so that thinking and action are shaped within certain bounds of acceptability or imaginability. Yet, as Doty hints, powerful as these practices may be, they can never succeed absolutely – indeed, Gramsci maintained that hegemony is always contested.

To summarise: in the classical Marxist sense, the function of ideology was to serve the interests of the dominant class in imposing their ideas on the population in order to establish the current power structures of society as "natural", rendering resistance futile or even absurd. Gramsci brought the additional function of the hiding of those power interests into the picture. In his conception, ideology provided a justification for the status quo in terms of power relations so that, in the ideal case, they would be accepted as not only inevitable, but just and necessary for the general good of society. The exercise of hegemony evoked "voluntary" consent to domination.

In contrast, the discourse analyst Teun van Dijk documents that, since the second half of the twentieth century, less pejorative understandings have been restated, in which ideologies are "... usually defined as political or social systems of ideas, values or prescriptions of groups or other collectivities, and have the function of organizing or legitimating the actions of the group."[48] Understood in this sense, ideologies *per se* are neither 'good nor bad', but can be used or abused for emancipation or domination. This is where van Dijk situates his conception of ideology, citing Clifford Geertz's contention that ideologies are not always rooted or devised in order to legitimate interests and power, but can arise out of contradictions (strains) in societies. For Van Dijk, the cognitive nature of the working of ideology is key, operating as it does, through the thought processes and beliefs of individuals as well as the contextual, collective beliefs of society. van Dijk follows Stuart Hall in viewing ideologies as

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[46] John Agnew, *Geopolitics:Re-visioning World Politics*, Second (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 11.

[47] Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd edn (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 6.

[48] van Dijk, p. 3.

enabling people to form a *mental model* of events and situations around them, so that they can "make sense" of their experiences and consequently direct their actions.[49] This cognitive aspect is complemented by a social (practice) element, which it influences, but not completely, so that beliefs and actions are not necessarily always consistent with each other.[50]

Later, in a well known enumeration of the characteristics of political ideology, which is largely non-pejorative in character, Terence Ball and Richard Dagger proposed a working definition of ideology encompassing four essential functions: explanation, evaluation, orientation and political program.[51]

- Explanation: Ideologies offer deceptively simple explanations for complex phenomena. (e.g. to the question of why there is a big gap between the richest and poorest?)
- Evaluation: Ideologies offer standards for evaluating social phenomena (e.g. is gay marriage a good thing?)
- Orientation: Who am I? Where do I fit? Who are we?
- Political Program: What should we do? How should we do it?

van Dijk also proposes a list of functions of ideologies, they are: membership, activities, goals, values/norms, position/group relations and resources. It is interesting to see the similarities between the two lists, the only one not having an obvious home in Ball and Dagger's list being resources, which van Dijk expresses as the question – "What are the essential social resources that our group has or needs to have?"[52]

I share this perspective that ideology can, in theory, be used either for domination or emancipation. Ball and Dagger seem to regard the proponents of an ideology as

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[49] van Dijk cites Hall's defnition of ideology: "By ideology I mean the mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works." quoted in van Dijk, p. 9.

[50] van Dijk, chap. 1.

[51] Richard Ball and Terrance Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* (Harper Collins, 1995), p. 5.

[52] van Dijk, pp. 69–70.

generally doing so overtly, with benign intentions.[53] However, because of its inherent functions of organising thoughts and making sense of the world, ideology has a tendency, seen in all social groups, to privilege or even render absolute "our" truth, and thus discredit others' truths.

For example, to consider the orientative function of ideology: as well as giving an answer to the question of who I am, it of course also tells me who I am *not* and who is not one of "us". Thus ideology functions as essentially exclusivist in this understanding and is thus useful to those interested in sustaining certain power structures by constituting "in" and "out" groups. This ignoring of power and interests is, in my opinion, the major weakness of these non-pejorative approaches.

The Christian ethicist Terence Anderson explains that an ideology as a moral package can become "... fixed, closed and resistant to any experience or empirical data that does not fit in its 'box'".[54] It thus requires deliberate reflexivity and intentionality to remain open to alternative perspectives and to retain the humility required to listen. In the field of politics, in particular, such characteristics are in short supply and so we frequently see various ideologies opportunistically exploited for political gain at the great social cost of engendering exclusion and enmity between groups. Therefore, more often than not, ideology is used in the reproduction of domination and exclusion rather than to encourage resistance and emancipation. The prevalent understanding of ideology as pejorative is therefore generally justified.

In my understanding, while I would agree with Dagger and Ball's four essential functions of ideologies, I recognise that the proponents of ideologies are usually self-hiding, and make disingenuous use of ideology to further self-interest at the expense of others. Thus I take a more Gramscian perspective of ideology and its functioning as a tool for the rationalisation of extant power relations.

In summary, hegemonic domination of the imagination allows an ideology to act like a lens. It affects the appearance of everything we perceive, yet the lens itself is

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[53] "The men and women who follow and promote political ideologies – and almost all of us do this in one way or another – try to make sense of the world, to understand society and politics and economics, in order either to change it for the better or to resist changes that they think will make it worse." Ball and Dagger, p. 4.

[54] Terence R. Anderson, *Walking the Way: Christian Ethics as a Guide* (London: United Church Publishing House, 1993), p. 259.

invisible to us and we are unaware of its presence. Therein lies its power: we may *think* that we are perceiving objectively, yet our perception of everything we see is distorted. So, with an appropriate hegemonically dominant ideology, the existential reality of our lives under a system of domination is experienced and interpreted in such a way that its unequal effects, which serve the interests of a particular group, are not perceived as doing so. The system is regarded as natural, or commonsense, its contingency is masked. Its unjust effects are not attributed to it and the power inequalities it sustains are naturalised. The ideological domination system is effectively invisible, apparently symptom-free and value-free.

1.3.2 The Working of Ideology: How does it function?

How then do ideologies bring stability to unequal power relations? The classical Marxist explanation maintains that the elite's control of the means of production means that they can make their ideologies more or less accepted as the 'natural' way of things. Those disadvantaged by the status quo do not perceive it as the reason behind their disadvantage and thus have an incorrect understanding of what their 'real interests' are. This is known by the Marxist term "false consciousness". More recent scholarship in the Marxist tradition has rejected this conception as being elitist (the subordinated are to be rescued from their predicament by enlightened scholars who explain to them what their real interests are). This is reflected in Paulo Freire's contention that when

> *... certain members of the oppressor class join the oppressed in their struggle for liberation, ... they almost always bring with them the marks of their origin ... which include a lack of confidence in the people's ability to think, to want, and to know. ... because of their background they believe that they must be the executors of the transformation. They talk about the people, but they do not trust them; and trusting the people is the indispensable precondition for revolutionary change.*[55]

But what of other people who are not particularly disadvantaged by an ideology? How does it affect them? How can they affect it? Firstly, in many ways, whether various groups of people are or are not disadvantaged by a particular domination system is not of concern to those who benefit from it. Their concern is to maintain their own position. Thus, ideology is not necessarily concerned with depriving others,

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[55] Freire, p. 36.

it is merely ambivalent towards their deprivation.[56] So, from a Gramscian perspective, it operates in a similar way on all people, disadvantaged or not: through myth, with a similar result: the naturalisation of the status quo. To those it disadvantages, ideology naturalises their lot of hardship and suffering; to others it becomes simply the way things are. Thus, even when motivated by compassion, well-meaning people often are immobilised by a sense of hopelessness in the face of the seeming inevitability and permanence of extant power relations. For others, a certain level of material comfort and the distractions of media, celebrity and consumerism function to anaesthetise them to others' situations, inducing apathy. Ideology works by masking itself, masking the interests it serves, and masking the fact that it serves interests. The next walk, with Giddens, will throw light on the significant roles played by discursive myth and ritual in enabling ideology to do this.

1.4 Walking with Giddens: Unconscious social practices

Anthony Giddens' develops concepts of "practical consciousness" (tacit, or unconscious knowledge) and "discursive consciousness" (conscious knowledge) to describe how power relations are replicated through unconscious reproduction of social structure(s).[57] He argues that

> *... relations of domination are sustained by the social perceptions, or social knowledge, of the dominated. This knowledge involves knowledge of how to reproduce social structure – structures which, in assembled form, constitute a system of domination.*[58]

Key to this explanation is the fact that "[b]ecause of its tacit nature, practical consciousness knowledge is immune from critical reflection."[59] The fact that many

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[56] Wink, p. 42.

[57] "Practical consciousness consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to 'go on' in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression." Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. xxiii. He contrasts this with discursive consciousness: "'Consciousness' in this sense presumes being able to give a coherent account of one's activities and the reasons for them." Giddens, p. 45.

[58] Mark Haugaard, 'Power, Ideology and Legitimacy', in *Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations*, ed. by Henri Goverde and others (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 65.

[59] Haugaard, p. 66.

social practices are immune from critical reflection means that we all collaborate in social structures which we have not subjected to critique, and therefore, may be unwittingly reproducing social structures which constitute or reinforce unequal power relations:

> *The fact that much of social knowledge is practical, as opposed to discursive, consciousness knowledge is a source of systemic stability which frequently contributes to the maintenance of structured relations of domination by making a confirming structuration routine possible even in instances where the structures reproduced entail asymmetries of power.*[60]

According to the Giddens scholar Mark Haugaard, "... the vast majority of our social knowledge is actually practical consciousness knowledge", but knowledge can move from "practical consciousness" to "discursive consciousness" and in the other direction as we become behaviourally proficient in new social contexts, or encounter newcomers to our context, as Giddens explains:

> *I do not intend the distinction between discursive and practical consciousness to be a rigid and impermeable one. On the contrary, the division between the two can be altered by many aspects of the agent's socialization and learning experiences. Between discursive and practical consciousness there is no bar; there are only the differences between what can be said and what is characteristically simply done.*[61]

This conceptualisation recalls Gramscian hegemony, by which a system of domination comes to dominate the popular *imagination* such that alternatives are not imagined or are rejected as utopian or absurd. If alternatives are absurd then people keep behaving in the same way. Paulo Freire describes the same phenomenon in a different way, noting that even if those disadvantaged by the unequal system (the "contradiction") escape their position of disadvantage, the system itself remains stable as they often become "oppressors" rather than oppressed:

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[60] Haugaard, p. 67.

[61] Giddens, p. 7.

> *The very structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped. ... At this level, their perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor does not yet signify involvement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; the one pole aspires, not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole.*[62]

Thus the oppression has reached into their very selves: "They are at one and the same time both themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized."[63]

Critique of such structures must therefore entail converting knowledge of the way social practices reproduce unjust social structures from "practical consciousness" into "discursive consciousness", or in Freire's terms, conscientisation, a rejection of "...subjectivist immobility, which would divert the recognition of oppression into patient waiting for oppression to disappear by itself" leading to liberation, "...a childbirth, an act of midwifery, where a new man is born who is neither oppressed, nor oppressor."[64] Haugaard cites as an example of such critique feminists' success in generating awareness that the use of gendered language is part of a set of practices which reproduces uneven power relations in the form of patriarchy. Unlike "false consciousness", this conception is not elitist as it leaves intact the agency of those subordinated by the domination system. Once an understanding of the effects of common social practices is gained, they are free to decide what their "interests" are and whether and how to resist the structures through changing their social practice.

These explanations for the persistence of domination systems share a root cause: a lack of understanding on the part of the dominated. But what if there is no such lack? Why does domination often persist in cases where knowledge of the social structures which reproduce it is "discursive consciousness" knowledge rather than "practical consciousness" knowledge? There are various potential explanations for this, the simplest of which is coercion. As discussed above, however, for the purposes of this discussion I am more interested in non-coercive, ideological, processes. From my perspective, using Ball and Dagger's terminology, the key, is the *explanatory* function

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[62] Freire, p. 22.

[63] Freire, p. 24.

[64] Freire, p. 25.

of ideologies, which I regard as providing the foundation for all the other functions. Once an understanding of a particular social phenomenon is established, the evaluation of its merits, the understanding of one's position relative to it, and the appropriate response to it in terms of action all become apparent. Ideology works to naturalise the status quo and render it as commonsense by providing a simple and seeming logical explanation as to why things are the way they are and how one fits into the order of things. Thus, in my view, the most fundamental function of an ideology is to *tell us a story* which makes sense of the world for us. This brings us to myth and ritual and their social functioning.

1.4.1 Myth and ritual

In this context, myth and ritual can function in a manner opposite to Haugaard's critique of social practices, described above. Rather than "...helping individuals or groups to convert practical consciousness knowledge into discursive consciousness knowledge (by telling them *what they already know* albeit in a different form)"[65], as his critique does, it uses "material which has already been worked on ... which presupposes a signifying consciousness"[66] and *reinforces* it, reifying its presuppositions by naturalising them. In other words, it pushes what we *already* "know" further back into the unconscious. According to Roland Barthes, "...myth is depoliticized speech": it seems disinterested but, in fact, works to preserve extant power constellations. He goes further:

> *Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact.*[67]

A naturalising story provided by ideological myth can reinforce extant systems of domination as "commonsense" which Barthes defines as "what-goes-without-saying".

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[65] Haugaard, p. 67. my italics.

[66] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. by Annette Lavers (London: Cape, 1972), p. 110.

[67] Barthes, p. 143.

Commonsense, with its almost primordial rejection of alternative perspectives, in this way is "...ultimately a rationalisation of a culture's power relations."[68]

This is not to deny the utopian and emancipatory potential of myth.[69] I wish, however, to demonstrate here the way that myth can provide the sense-making stories which justify and normalise unequal and discriminatory power relations, thus contributing to the explanatory function of ideology. The consequence of this explanatory function is the movement of understanding from the conscious to the unconscious, from the contingent to the natural, where beliefs are places beyond critique. As Cynthia Weber observes, from a semiological perspective, "...unconscious ideologies are the foundations of our ideological and political thinking that we place beyond debate."[70] She claims that "...power works through myths by appearing to take the political out of the ideological."[71] Myth is very effective at achieving this as it appears innocent and disinterested (the opposite of "political", which is, by definition, interested) and thus typically dampens any suspicion, as Barthes explains:

> *In fact, what allows the reader to consume myth innocently is that he does not see it as a semiological system but as an inductive one. ... This confusion can be expressed otherwise: any semiological system is a system of values; now the myth consumer takes the signification for a system of facts: myth is read as a factual system, whereas it is but a semiological system.*[72]

The apparently disinterested, factual nature of myth means that it is effective at achieving another classical function of ideology, the hiding of interest. This is all the more potent post-enlightenment. The modern (enlightenment) project of demythologising former "master narratives" means that we now perceive ourselves as operating in the sphere of the rational, where reason is king. Therefore, our eyes are not open to the present day working of myths. We often assume them defeated

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[68] James Arnt Aune, 'Cultures of Discourse: Marxism and Rhetorical Theory', in *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader* (New York: Guilford Press, 1999), p. 548. quoted in Fiorenza, p. 26.

[69] Richard Kearney, 'Myth and the Critique of Tradition', in *Reconciling Memories*, ed. by Alan D. Falconer, 1st edn (Dublin: The Columba Press, 1988), pp. 8–24.

[70] Cynthia Weber, p. 5.

[71] Cynthia Weber, p. 7.

[72] Barthes, p. 131.

and suspend our "hermeneutics of suspicion".[73] When something *appears* natural, we are perhaps now more likely to accept it as such, as we think ourselves wise to the tricks of myth. This is a result of the claimed "view from nowhere" of scientific endeavour. John Agnew proposes a succinct self-definition of modernity: "Modernity is, by definition, life without myth", explaining that "[i]t is precisely the *commonsensical* quality of the opposition between the traditional and the modern that gives it mythic power."[74]

Speaking more specifically on the working of ritual, Haugaard theorises that, "...systemic structures are routinely sustained by an actor's knowledge of social life, often despite the fact that these structures confer differential power resources upon these self-same actors."[75] Haugaard explains this using Giddens' social structuration theory. When people interact within a certain social context, certain (ritual) behaviours are expected of them dependent on their respective social positions. When those behaviours are enacted, the social structure is thereby reproduced and reinforced. He recalls Parson's and Arendt's conceptions of power, both of which presuppose some kind of consensus as being the basis of power, rather than simply coercion, asserting that the consensus they describe is actually consensus on social reproduction. This consensus is interactive and relational, requiring both an "act of structuration" *and* validation by another in order for the social structure(s) to be reproduced.

We quickly learn when our actions are *not* deemed socially appropriate when an act of structuration is not validated, and tend to modify our behaviour in the future to "fit in". This "failure or partial failure ... is highly significant for our understanding of the relative (but not absolute) stability of social order. Non-confirmation of structuration practices represents the mechanism of structural constraint at work in everyday interaction."[76] So this mechanism of structural constraint represents the consensus by which social order is preserved as is, according to the extant, but often covert, system of power relations.

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[73] Kearney, p. 11.

[74] Agnew, p. 48. It is important to note that this is a *self*-definition. It is precisely its reflexive renunciation of the influence of myth that makes modernity susceptible to it.

[75] Haugaard, p. 59.

[76] Haugaard, p. 62.

In inflating the contingent into "commonsense" and thereby hiding the fact that "what appears rational, is, in fact, interested",[77] myth and ritual fulfil an ideological function by (invisibly) participating in the *legitimation* of the status quo. A closer look at forms of legitimacy and processes of legitimation will enable us to better understand how myth and ritual work.

1.4.2 Legitimation

Max Weber identified three legitimating authority types: legal, traditional and charismatic. Haugaard describes them as follows:

> *Legal authoritative sources rest upon a 'belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands'; traditional authority rests 'on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them'; while charismatic authority rests 'on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns of order revealed or ordained by him'.*[78]

Different authority types appeal to different types of people, for example, an individual who is brought up with a respect for law and order (instrumental rationality) would be predisposed to regard as legitimate a system which claimed authority based on its legal status (legal authority), perhaps even if personal freedoms had to be infringed. Haugaard adds a fourth authority type which recalls the discussion of the scientific "view from nowhere" above. He calls it "expert authority", which claims its legitimacy based on a claim of scientific "truth" drawing on Foucault's "regimes of truth". van Dijk echoes this, pointing out the ideological potential of scientific knowledge.

Antonio Reyes explores various linguistic strategies of legitimation used in political speeches which reflect these rationality types. He studied speeches by Barack Obama and George W. Bush who have the advantage of embodying for many all three of Weber's authority types: legal, traditional and charismatic. Reyes' identified

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[77] Walter Brueggemann, *Interpretation and Obedience: From Faithful Reading to Faithful Living* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), p. 54.

[78] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978). quoted by Haugaard, p. 69.

strategies are: emotions (particularly fear), a hypothetical future, rationality, voices of expertise and altruism.[79] We can see that these are related to the four rationality types above as well as Haugaard's expert authority.

The exception seems to be altruism, which I regard as very important and a key characteristic of ideological myth. It is effective in sustaining extant power relations as it enables the agent to self-present as benevolent thus de-legitimating criticism of them. So, moves by power-holders towards apparent reform need to be carefully critiqued to see whether they actually change the power structures or simply reinforce them by making criticism and resistance seem petty or motivated by bitterness.

Domination systems deploy ideological myths as well as rituals which appeal to different rationality types to legitimate the power relations that constitute them. Thus we can analyse myths (if we can identify them as such in the first place) in terms of these authority types, to see which rationality type they are appealing to. Rituals tend to appeal to the traditional rationality type, reinforcing respect for traditional power structures through participation in long-established practices.

Haugaard observes that the power of these authority types to induce conformity comes not from people's commitment to a particular form of reasoning (or rationality), but to an innate desire to avoid ontological insecurity. In other words, once an authority and a subject come to the understanding that they share common assumptions concerning the legitimacy of the authority type, (a *moment of convergence* in the language of Habermas and Apel's communicative action that he uses), it becomes clear to the subject that should she decide *not* to submit to the authority (validate the authority's act of structuration), that that would represent a self-contradiction.[80] A part of the subject's identity would be denied in the denial of authority. Michael Skey explores how ontological security is reinforced and undermined in ritual and discourse for various ethnic groups in England. He theorises that certain ethnic groups are perceived, by themselves and others as belonging

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[79] Antonio Reyes, 'Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions', *Discourse & Society*, 22 (2011), 781 –807 <doi:10.1177/0957926511419927>.

[80] Haugaard, pp. 69–74.

"without question", and that this affords them resources in terms of legitimacy and acceptance that others have to work harder to achieve.[81]

This is why part of the explanatory function of ideologies is to explain who I am (in Ball and Dagger's *orientative* function). As Foucault explains, with clear parallels in Haugaard's theorisation of the reproduction of social structures:

> *This (modern) form of power applies itself to everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience of self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.*[82]

If our identity is based (at least partly) on our understanding of (or subject to our understanding of, in Foucault's terms) our place in a domination system, then one of the costs of resistance would be a re-evaluation of one's self, a reconstitution of one's identity: an unsettling and uncomfortable prospect. This goes some way to explaining the typical reluctance to induce ontological insecurity by critiquing prevailing power relations or engaging in acts of resistance.

1.5 Summary: Myth, ritual and the persistence of domination

If an ideology is hegemonically successful, it will succeed in distracting attention from the inequalities it causes so that they are attributed to some other cause, usually to the disadvantaged themselves. This is frequently evident in myths and myth-evoking stereotypical claims, for example those concerning the innate laziness of the poor, or that the unemployed do not want to work but are parasitic scroungers. In other words, one of the key techniques of ideologies is categorisation of groups of people. The myths and rituals which reproduce its story serve to naturalise and justify the "differences" between the people of different categories thus engendering structured

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[81] Michael Skey, '"A Sense of Where You Belong in the World": National Belonging, Ontological Security and the Status of the Ethnic Majority in England', *Nations and Nationalism*, 16 (2010), 715–733 <doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2009.00428.x>.

[82] Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, ed. by H Dreyfus and P Rabinow (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), p. 212. quoted in Stewart, p. 19.

social practices which operate differentially for people in different categories. Ideology operates on people in all of its "categories", through discursively-communicated myth and ritual practices to maintain structured power asymmetries that constitute systems of domination.

To summarise this section on the working of ideology through myth, ritual and discourse, and to create a useful framework for my research and analysis, I refer to the schematic representation below.



Starting at the top left of the diagram, domination, or unequal power relations, gain legitimacy through ideological myths, stories and rituals which appeal to the various legitimation types. Through continuous reproduction in discourse and social practice these can become unreflected-upon "truth", or practical consciousness in Giddens' term. Our practical consciousness informs our (often ritualised) social practices which therefore reproduce the social structures that uphold those unequal power relations. Ideology acts by masking the interests served, the fact that interests are served and the power inequalities that result.

Of course, this is an overly simplistic representation of a complex interplay within each individual of many competing beliefs and understandings of the world, and it

risks diminishing (but does not eliminate) the potential for individual agency. Although structure and received understanding do constrain social practice, they do not control it, and the remaining freedom and agency of individuals and groups (among many other factors) enables structural change over time.

So ideology is disclosed in ritual practices and myths which appeal to the various legitimation types and perform the different ideological functions. Amongst the effects of these myths and practices is the reproduction of social structures which manifest domination, or unequal power relations.

Therefore, in order to analyse particular systems or structures of domination, it is necessary to study the myths and rituals which reproduce and reinforce them. In order to do this it is necessary to study discourse (from government, media and social interactions) whilst looking for recurring themes reflecting ideological myths which naturalise relationships of domination. Rituals which reinforce the validity of particular social structures, thereby maintaining unequal power relations can also be analysed.

1.6 Critique of Systemic Domination

So how then can an effective critique of self-hiding, interest-hiding, naturalised systems of domination be built? I have touched on this earlier and would summarise by identifying two useful approaches to the critique of systemic power asymmetries. Firstly, I outline a diagnostic fingerprint framework to be deployed to disclose the ideological nature of discourses and social structures, and secondly, the use of critical discourse analysis to trace the influence of bordering ideology on the imagination of actors within those structures.

1.6.1 Unmasking the Presence of Ideology: A diagnostic fingerprint framework

Given that one of the most effective strategies to maintain a structure of power inequalities is to hide it, either by naturalising it or encouraging misdiagnosis of its cause, an effective critique would be the disclosure of its presence and working. To that end I propose a simple framework which identifies several common "fingerprints" of ideological working which can indicate its presence. This tactic could aid in correcting misdiagnosis of the causes of systemic inequality, thus opening the system up to critique, in line with Haugaard's theorisation of moving knowledge of

socially structured practice from "practical consciousness" to "discursive consciousness".

This framework is not intended to encompass *all* of the symptoms of hegemonic ideologies but merely to enable the exposing of tell-tale "fingerprints" of ideologies so that further thought and study can be brought to bear on a more thoroughly considered critique. I shall deploy this framework later to examine the characteristics of the territorial state system by which politics is geographically or geopolitically organised.

1.6.1.1 ***Commonsense and its opposite, absurdity***

As demonstrated above, myth and ritual work by reinforcing the status quo as commonsense: the current orderings of society are regarded as "natural" and assume a fixedness both temporally and spatially. Alternative readings of reality or suggestions for ordering society seem ridiculous or naïve and are dismissed as absurd, irrespective of any evidence that they may make sense. Words like "natural", "commonsense" and "absurd" are a flag for the presence of such a hegemonically dominating ideology. Ideology thus acts a conversation stopper whose truths are held as self-evident and, when challenged, it usually refuses argument but rather discredits the credentials of the challenger or rationalises the contradiction as natural. As Cynthia Weber demonstrates, using Barthes' definition of commonsense as "what-goes-without-saying", a good question to ask is, "What must go without saying for this myth to be true?"[83] In tandem with this, to undermine the perceived naturalness and consequent seeming permanence of extant power relations or systems of social organization, a demonstration of the historicity of the social structure(s) in question, as Foucault suggested (see section 1.2.1 above), can enable the imagining of alternative orderings.

1.6.1.2 ***Categorisation, othering and dehumanisation***

These three phenomena are symptomatic of the same function of ideology: the categorisation of humanity to create "others" who can then be diminished or dehumanised. Wholesale domination requires dehumanisation of the dominated. As less-than-human, their oppression is facilitated as "we" no longer identify with

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[83] Cynthia Weber, p. xvi.

"them", "we" no longer empathise with "them", thus discrimination is not seen as such and is regarded as natural and appropriate. The other comes to be regarded as a threat, justifying punitive or violent action against "them".

From a feminist theological perspective, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza notes how

> *... discourses of domination are engendered by the logic of difference or the logic of 'othering.' This logic of difference as domination understands the other always as a 'not' (e.g. not-white, not-male, not-civilised) who lacks the valued qualities of hegemonic society and whose humanity becomes the opposite of that of those who are elite and in power.*[84]

From a similarly politico-ethical perspective, Freire notes that the dehumanising function of ideology impacts upon both the oppressor and the oppressed. The lens of ideology distorts and normalises everyone's perspective so that its distortions look "right", and thereby the oppression looks right. So, in regarding the oppressed as somewhat less than human, the oppressor denies a part of his own humanity. Thus the task of the oppressed is to re-humanise (reinstate the sense of humanity of) both herself *and* the oppressor by subverting the system, rather than escaping or inverting it. This, according to Freire, is an act of love.[85]

1.6.1.3 ***Use of, and distortion of, emotive symbols***

Ideologies gain traction in the imagination through subtle appeals to what Weber denotes "traditional" authority types and settled opinions by co-opting or distorting their meaningful symbols so that they appear to legitimate its values or the social structures it seeks to sustain. Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson show how political power is enhanced through the manipulation of cultural symbols:

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[84] Fiorenza, p. 21.

[85] Freire, pp. 20–21.

> *All culture is based on shared symbols, and all social and political systems are structured and expressed through complex relations of symbols and rituals. ... to understand politics in any society 'it is necessary to understand how the symbolic enters into politics, how political actors consciously and unconsciously manipulate symbols, and how this symbolic dimension relates to the material bases of political power'.*[86]

Clifford Geertz points out that ideologies work with "systems of interacting symbols, as patterns of interworking meanings." Thus, attentiveness to uses of emotive symbols can reveal where they are being manipulated or co-opted to bolster ideas quite at odds with their original contexts. So, for example, historically and currently, we can often see the sacralisation of military service, with the use of language of sacrifice, duty and honour making resistance to it seem sacrilegious, politically subversive and even treasonable.

1.6.1.4 ***False generosity or altruism***

The final fingerprint of ideological functioning I wish to discuss is that of false generosity. The term is from Paulo Freire and denotes the way the dominant elite often voluntarily concedes (some) power or resources to the subordinated in an ostensibly magnanimous or compassionate gesture. Despite its portrayal as a generous and spontaneous act of goodwill, the concession functions to legitimate, reinforce and perpetuate extant power relations thus de-legitimating resistance and maintaining the elite as the source of agency.[87] It also distracts attention from the ideology underlying the social order and the interests it is serving, and so performs part of the concealment function of ideology. Freire maintains that an unjust social order is the "fount" of such false "generosity" and that real generosity undermines, rather than reinforces an unjust social order, and is transformative, rather than charitable.[88]

This is evident in Reyes' legitimation strategy of altruism, noted above (see section 1.4.2 above). Elite declarations of altruistic motives undermine the legitimacy of

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[86] Donnan and Wilson, p. 65., quoting David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics and Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

[87] Freire, p. 21.

[88] Freire, p. 21.

critique or resistance whilst doing nothing to subvert the power structures which currently obtain.

For example, the *Kairos* Group, writing in the context of apartheid South Africa, denigrated "...the justice of reform, that is to say, a justice that is determined by the oppressor, by the white minority and that is offered to the people as a kind of concession." They point out that "[r]eforms that come from the top are never satisfactory, [as] they seldom do more than make the oppression more effective and more acceptable."[89] The oppression becomes more effective by increasing the perceived legitimacy of the regime, and more acceptable by making it look more unreasonable and less legitimate to oppose the "benevolent" regime. Therefore "[i]t is in their [the oppressors'] interests to introduce a number of reforms in order to ensure that the system is not radically changed and that they can continue to benefit from it as they have done in the past."[90] So reforms can have the effect of entrenching the unjust power structures and are therefore sometimes (when the system is fundamentally un-reformable and unjust) counter-productive to the project of liberation.

Apparent concessions, or spurious altruistic claims, by a seemingly benevolent power, then, merit particular analysis. A characteristic fingerprint of ideological functioning is the tactical use of apparent concessions which do nothing to dismantle the prevailing order, but serve to discredit acts of resistance to it.

1.6.2 Unmasking the Influence of Ideology: Critical discourse analysis

As well as deploying this fingerprinting diagnostic framework to disclose the *presence* of ideology, I also adduce the methods of critical discourse analysis in my attempts to trace the *influence* of ideology, in particular on the imagination of groups who may eschew any alignment to a particular self-interested ideology. This entails a focus on text and talk over other modes of discourse (e.g. photographs, movies, advertisements, gestures).

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[89] Kairos Theologians, *The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church: a Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa*, Rev., 2nd ed. (Braamfontein; Grand Rapids, Michigan: Skotaville Publishers; Eerdmans, 1986), p. 11,12.

[90] Kairos Theologians, p. 21.

With the critical discourse analyst Teun van Dijk, I maintain that verbal discourse, language use and communication have a *special* role to play in the reproduction of extant power relations.[91] It is not that non-verbal discourse does *not* play a role in such reproduction, but non-verbal discourse (such as ritual) works through inference and is therefore dependant on contextual common understanding, or to put it another way, on myth. Barthes explains that "[m]ythical speech is made of material which has *already* been worked on so as to make it suitable for communication: it is because all the materials of myth (whether pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason about them while discounting their substance."[92] It is not that verbal discourse operates above and separately from myth, rather that it is only through *verbal* communication that the myths themselves can be (re)constructed, and that they evolve and are contested. To quote van Dijk:

> *Discourse ... has a special status in the reproduction of ideologies. Unlike most other social practices, and in a more explicit way than most other semiotic codes ... various properties of text and talk allow social members to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs, or any other opinion related to such ideologies.*[93]

In this way I understand that "[p]ower is something that is exercised and dispersed in language rather than something that is simply possessed."[94]

This is the rationale behind my decision to use the methods of critical discourse analysis in my research. If we are alert to the use and reproduction of myth in the talk of the subjects, we can unmask the fingerprints or traces of ideology which unconsciously influence their imagination.

1.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, I have discussed phenomenon of the persistence of domination, despite the relational nature of power relations. I have drawn on the traditions of Marx, Foucault and Giddens to explain how relations of domination are sustained through

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[91] van Dijk, pp. 191–192.

[92] Barthes, p. 110. italics in original

[93] van Dijk, p. 192. italics in original

[94] Fiorenza, p. 15.

learned structuration practices and justificatory ideological myth rather than coercive inducement.

Thus in order to critique unequal systemic domination it is necessary to counter the naturalising function of ideological myth. Given the key self-hiding aspect of ideology, an effective critique is to disclose its operation. To this end I outlined a diagnostic fingerprint framework (commonsense, categorisation, use of emotive symbols and altruism).

I also argued that discourse is the primary means through which power relations are reproduced, both in the Foucauldian sense of discourses as bodies of knowledge and in the sense used in critical discourse analysis. I therefore argued that critical discourse analysis is an effective means to unmask the influence of ideologies and ideological myth on people's (and organisation's) imagination(s). This too will be deployed in the analysis of the interview transcripts in chapters four, five and six.

In the next chapter I deploy the fingerprint framework to demonstrate the ideological nature of the border regime of the territorial system of states. I begin by outlining how it causes particular dangers for undocumented migrants who cannot satisfy its symbolic documentary requirements, before exploring the peculiar interplay between human rights norms and the state that is supposed to uphold them that results in the paradoxical exclusion of undocumented migrants from any claim to these supposedly inalienable rights. Finally, I examine the system under the commonsense fingerprint, demonstrating that its seeming naturalness as a model of spatial political organisation is belied by its recent development in history. This demonstration of the historicity of the territorial system of states can enable the imagining of alternative orderings, some of which I outline at the end of the chapter.

2 The Border Regime of the Territorial System of States

2.1 Introduction

In this and the next chapter I discuss the border regime of the territorial system of states by which our politics is currently spatially organised in the light of the previous discussion of the working of ideology in dominating the imagination. I have argued (to state it briefly) that domination, or unequal power relations, gain legitimacy through the use of ideological myths and rituals which are reproduced in discourse and social practice. Using Giddens' terms, these myths and practices can become part of our practical consciousness, or unreflected-upon practices, that we reproduce and thereby, perhaps unwittingly, reinforce the very social structures that uphold those relations of domination.

To assist in uncovering ideology at work, I devised a "fingerprint" framework of common characteristics of ideologically sustained social structures and practices. This comprised a (mythical) understanding of the status-quo as "commonsense", the use of emotive symbols in ritual and myth, categorising of "others" and self-presentation as altruistic.

In this chapter I will first review evidence that the border regime constitutes a domination system that produces unequal power relations between different groups of people who encounter borders. This is manifested in systemic discrimination against certain groups of people and in favour of others. Specifically, this results in systematic violation of the human rights of undocumented migrants.[95]

I will then analyse the regime from the perspective of the commonsense fingerprint of ideological working, critiquing the unspoken assumptions behind the current system of territorial borders which sustain the social acceptability of the

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[95] I generally use the term "undocumented migrants" here to refer to those who cross borders in a way that is not sanctioned by the states themselves. Commonly used pejorative terms for the same people are "illegal migrant" or "illegal alien". I refrain from using such terms as I do not believe a human being can be "illegal": we can commit acts deemed illegal but we cannot *be* illegal ourselves. The fact that these terms are used at all is telling: migrants become defined by their act. We do not call murderers "illegal people", we retain the separation between the illegal act and the actor.

discrimination that is inherent in it. In particular I interrogate the pervasive assumptions that territorial borders delimit between different cohesive groups of people ("nations"); and that a separate, territorial sovereign state is necessary to protect the particular cultural life of these cohesive groups. I look at how this assumption, in conjunction with the contradiction between democratic and liberal conceptions of equality, means that undocumented migrants find themselves in a "state of exception", excluded from meaningful membership and open to exploitation and violation of their human rights.

Finally, I critique the commonsense perception that a spatial political ordering incorporating precisely delineated borders is natural and ontologically permanent through an account of territorial borders' historical development. I propose that, despite its apparent stasis, a change in the nature of borders and the manner in which they function is possible when they are seen in the light of their relatively recent historical development. In the next chapter I will then continue my analysis of the border regime by looking at the other aspects of the fingerprint framework: the use of ritual and myth, and the categorising of "others".

2.2 The Border Regime of the Territorial System of States as a Domination System

2.2.1 Violence at the Borders of Europe

Every year, about 800 people die as a result of the border regime of the European Union.[96] Through drowning in rickety boats drifting on the Mediterranean, suffocating in refrigerated trucks or containers, or through suicide in fear of deportation, the human right to life is extinguished.[97] Between January 1993 and June

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[96] UNITED for Intercultural Action, *List of 16264 Documented Refugee Deaths Through Fortress Europe*, 13 June 2012 <http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf> [accessed 4 January 2013]; OWNI.eu, 'Fortress Europe: a Deadly Exodus', *OWNI.eu*, 2011 <http://owni.eu/2011/03/04/app-fortress-europe-a-deadly-exodus/> [accessed 8 March 2011].

[97] The basic human rights I refer to are those that can be said to pertain to every human being by virtue of their humanity and are not contingent upon any particular status granted by a state. As such I mention rights that are set out in the Universal Declaration of Human rights. The right to life is set out in Article 3. 'The Universal

2012 the non-governmental organisation UNITED for Intercultural Action documented 16,264 deaths of refugees and migrants due to "Fortress Europe", i.e. due to "border militarization, asylum laws, accommodation, detention policy, deportations, carrier sanctions..."[98]

More recently, Italy's dubious[99] "pushback" deals with Libya[100] (a state which is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and which recently expelled the UNHCR[101]) before Gaddafi's overthrow led to a reduction in dangerous attempts to cross the Mediterranean in boats.[102] This "pushback" deal was renewed with the

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Declaration of Human Rights' <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> [accessed 25 March 2010].

[98] UNITED for Intercultural Action.

[99] Human Rights Watch, 'Italy/Libya: Gaddafi Visit Celebrates Dirty Deal | Human Rights Watch', *Human Rights Watch* <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/09/italylibya-gaddafi-visit-celebrates-dirty-deal> [accessed 8 March 2011].
Matteo Tondini of the INEX Research Project assessed the legality of the Italy-Libya operations in the Mediterranean, concluding that "since Libya cannot be considered a 'safe third country' in this sense, the interception of migrants on the high seas and their forced return to Tripoli may entail violations of maritime, human rights, migration and refugee law at both an international, European and domestic level." Matteo Tondini, 'Fishers of Men? The Interception of Migrants in the Mediterranean Sea and Their Forced Return to Libya' (INEX Research Project, 2010) <http://www.inexproject.eu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=51&&Itemid=72> [accessed 8 November 2010].

[100] ECRE, 'Pushbacks to Libya - European Council on Refugees and Exiles', *ECRE*, 2011 <http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/access-to-europe/88-pushbacks-to-libya.html?> [accessed 24 June 2011]; Human Rights Watch, 'Pushed Back, Pushed Around', *Human Rights Watch* <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/09/21/pushed-back-pushed-around-0> [accessed 8 March 2011]; Human Rights Watch, 'Italy/Libya: Forced Return of Migrants Violates Rights', *Human Rights Watch* <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/07/italylibya-forced-return-migrants-violates-rights> [accessed 8 March 2011].

[101] UNHCR, 'UNHCR Says Ordered to Close Office in Libya', *UN High Commissioner for Refugees*, 2010 <http://www.unhcr.org/4c0e79059.html> [accessed 8 March 2011]; ECRE, 'Tripoli Orders UN Refugee Agency to Leave Libya: Business as Usual for the EU? | European Council on Refugees and Exiles' <http://www.ecre.org/resources/Press_releases/1586> [accessed 8 March 2011].

[102] Tondini relates that "...[a]ccording to the [Italian] Ministry of Interior, in 2009 it was registered a 90 percent drop in the migration flow by sea from Libya (from 5 May to 31 December 2009 only 3,185 migrants reached Italy, whilst in the same period of 2008, the migrants arrived from Libya were 31,281). During the first three months of 2010 only 170 migrants landed on the Italian coasts, marking a 96 percent loss."

Libyan National Transitional Council in June 2011.[103] It was later condemned by the European Court of Human Rights which ruled that, by pushing migrants back to Libya, Italy violated the European Convention on Human Rights and in particular the principle of non refoulement.[104]

However, this reduction in attempts did not mean a reduction in the precarity of the situation of migrants who have taken the decision to risk leaving their own countries to try to make a new life in Europe; it merely changed the main routes for entry into Europe. In 2009 the majority (about 75%) of undocumented migrants entered Europe overland via the Greek-Turkish border.[105]

The "Arab Spring" revolts led to great upheaval for trans-Saharan migrants but the net result in terms of Mediterranean deaths was an increase to numbers even higher than those of earlier years.[106]

Tondini, p. 6., citing a Speech of the Italian Minister of Interior, Roberto Maroni, before the Italian Parliament's 'Schengen Committee', 14 April 2010. 'Camera.it - Lavori - Resoconto Stenografico Delle Audizioni Per Singola Commissione' <http://nuovo.camera.it/470?stenog=/_dati/leg16/lavori/stenbic/30/2010/0414&pagina=s020> [accessed 9 February 2011].

[103] Migrants at Sea, 'Memorandum of Understanding Between Italy and Libyan NTC', *Migrants at Sea*, 2011 <http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/memorandum-of-understanding-between-italy-and-libyan-nct/?> [accessed 24 June 2011].

[104] ECRE, 'Italy Condemned by the European Court of Human Rights', *ECRE*, 2012 <http://www.ecre.org/media/news/latest-news/breaking.html#ecthr-judgment?> [accessed 24 February 2012].

[105] Frontex, 'Annual Report 2009', *Frontex*, 2010, p. 5 <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2009/gen_rep_2009_en.pdf> [accessed 23 January 2013].

[106] According to the UNHCR, at least 1,500 people died trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2011. UNHCR, 'Mediterranean Takes Record as Most Deadly Stretch of Water for Refugees and Migrants in 2011', *UNHCR*, 2012 <http://www.unhcr.org/4f27e01f9.html> [accessed 23 January 2013]. Stefanie Grant, '"Identity Unknown": Migrant Deaths at Sea', *Forced Migration Review*, 2011 <http://www.fmreview.org/technology/grant.html> [accessed 12 October 2011]. A particularly harrowing case in which 63 people died was reported on in detail to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Council of Europe, *Lives Lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who Is Responsible?* (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 5 April 2012) <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=18095&lang=EN> [accessed 23 January 2013].

This story is not new; long before the agreement between Italy and Libya, A UNITED for Intercultural Action report described how in 2003

> *... the Italian government ... financed a repatriation program from Libya to other African countries. The report, following a EU investigation, reveals that 47 charter flights left Libya. The number of passengers, their nationality and the destination of the flight are also registered. 5,688 passengers were boarded on flights financed by the Italian government and directed to various destinations: Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Niger, Nigeria, Ghana, Bangladesh, Mali, Sudan, and Eritrea. Most of these countries are not safe. (Espressonline, 5 May 2005).*[107]

As Maurizio Albahari reminds us, "[t]he European Parliament's 'Resolution on Lampedusa' of April 2005 clearly points out, among several violations of basic human rights, that *en masse* deportation constitutes a breach of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (article 33.1), which requires individual cases to be genuinely examined and prohibits the expulsion or return (*refoulement*) of refugees."[108] Even though many of these people may have wanted to exercise their right to claim asylum[109], this right is arbitrarily, and illegally denied them, with no apparent consequences for Italy. This situation is even worse now, as these migrants are usually unable even to set foot on European soil, let alone apply for asylum.[110]

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[107] UNITED for Intercultural Action, 'Campaign Fatal Realities of "Fortress Europe"' <http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pages/campfatalrealities.htm> [accessed 10 March 2010].

[108] Maurizio Albahari, 'Death and the Modern State: Making Borders and Sovereignty at the Southern Edges of Europe' (The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2006), p. 20 <http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CCIS-Albahari-death-and-the-moral-state-june-15-2006.pdf> [accessed 17 March 2010].

[109] Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

[110] "The EU's border agency Frontex has become increasingly active through joint maritime operations, some of which have involved coordination with countries of departure outside the EU such as Senegal. Even though in September 2011 the EU gave Frontex an explicit duty to respect human rights in its operations and a role in supporting rescue at sea operations, these operations have as a primary objective to prevent boats from landing on EU member state territories. This has also prevented migrants, including asylum seekers, from availing themselves of procedural rights that apply within EU territory." Human Rights Watch, 'Hidden Emergency: Migrant Deaths in the Mediterranean', Human Rights Watch, 2012 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/16/hidden-emergency> [accessed 23 January 2013].

Migrants who crossed the Sahara, and sometimes attempted to cross the Mediterranean, found themselves detained indefinitely in internment camps in the Libyan desert in sub-human conditions without access to humanitarian relief or legal due process.[111] After Gaddafi's overthrow the situation became even more dangerous for these detainees and other migrant workers from Sub-Saharan countries. Rebel fighters often assumed that they were mercenaries fighting for Gaddafi and subjected them to intimidation and violence, often with little or no evidence.[112]

As a result of these developments, many migrants decided to travel through Egypt, usually guided by paid smugglers, and then attempt to enter Israel. For example, EveryOne Group, an Italian NGO advocating on behalf of those whose human rights are being violated, reported on the 24th November 2010 that:

> *We received a request for help from 80 Eritrean refugees seized at the border between Egypt and Israel, by traffickers who pretend to pay US$8,000 for release. These refugees say that departed from Tripoli Libya, to go to Israel, have already paid the agreed price of US$2,000, but smugglers have betrayed the agreements...*[113]

Debts accumulated in these contexts can be used to exploit migrants. The Israeli advocacy group Hotline for Migrant Workers has recently published a report of first hand accounts of this including violent incidents such as rape and electric torture from migrants before they gained access to Israel.[114] In an effort to tackle such

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[111] EveryOne Group, 'Refugees "pushed Back" by Europe Are Being Subjected to Inhuman Treatment in Libya' <http://www.everyonegroup.com/EveryOne/MainPage/Entries/2010/7/6_Refugees_pushed_back_by_Europe_are_being_subjected_to_inhuman_treatment_in_Libya..html> [accessed 8 March 2011].

[112] Ian Pannell, 'Libya Conflict: Black African Migrants Caught in Backlash', *BBC News*, 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14965062> [accessed 24 January 2013].

[113] Everyone Group, '80 Eritrean Refugees Seized at the Border Between Egypt and Israel', *Everyone Group*, 2010 <http://www.everyonegroup.com/EveryOne/MainPage/Entries/2010/11/24_80_Eritrean_refugees_seized_at_the_border_between_Egypt_and_Israel.html> [accessed 8 March 2011].

[114] Hotline for Migrant Workers, '"The Dead of the Wilderness" - Testimonies from Sinay Desert' (Hotline for Migrant Workers, 2011) <http://hotline.org.il/english/pdf/Testimonies_from_sinay_122010.pdf> [accessed 2 March 2011].

irregular migration, Israel is building a border fence along its border with Egypt.[115] It has also passed a law allowing for automatic detention without charge or trial of unauthorised border crossers for three years in violation of its obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention.[116]

Europe is exporting its "problems" to third parties, either explicitly (for example in the Italy-Libya deal) or indirectly (as in the Israel/Egypt handling of undocumented migrants). Since 2012, Frontex has been authorised to sign cooperation agreements with third countries, the objectives of which include joint operations, information sharing and training.[117] As of June 2012 it had signed 17 such agreements and is negotiating more, mostly with countries in Eastern and Southern Europe and West and North Africa.[118]

These are vivid particular examples of what is, in fact, routine: the denial of the most basic human rights of undocumented migrants.[119] Martha Scarpellino, in her

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[115] "Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office said on Wednesday that the final section of a security fence along the border with Egypt's barren Sinai should be finished by the end of March." Breitbart News Network, 'Israel: Egypt Border Fence Near Completion', *Breitbart News Network*, 2013 <http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/01/02/Israel-says-Egypt-border-fence-near-completion> [accessed 23 January 2013].

[116] Amnesty International, 'Israel: New Detention Law Violates Rights of Asylum-seekers', *Amnesty International*, 2012 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/new-israeli-detention-law-violates-asylum-seekers-rights-2012-01-10> [accessed 23 January 2013].

[117] The organisation Frontexit has a map showing the countries with whom Frontex has either finalised, or is in the process of negotiating, a cooperation agreement: 'Frontexit - Maps', *Frontexit*, 2013 <http://www.frontexit.org/en/resources/maps> [accessed 18 April 2013]. For a detailed examination of the process, costs, consequences and implications in terms of fundamental human rights of the EU's programmes of border militarisation and surveillance see Ben Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen, *Borderline - The EU's New Border Surveillance Initiatives* (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation, June 2012) <http://www.boell.de/publications/publications-borderline-eu-new-border-surveillance-initiatives-15133.html> [accessed 8 April 2013].

[118] Frontex, 'Frontex | Third Countries', *Frontex* <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/partners/third-countries> [accessed 23 January 2013].

[119] Many people initially enter a state legally, with an appropriate visa, but become undocumented subsequently when their visa or work permit expires, when they lose their job, or sometimes as a result of bureaucratic inefficiencies. A better term for such people might be "undocumented worker". They are not a particular subject of

examination of the ethical arguments concerning "hard" international boundaries (boundaries which are hard for certain people to cross) concludes that, in their current incarnation, borders manifest structural violence in Johan Galtung's sense: "...violence that originates in unjust institutions, violence that is not attributable to a known actor."[120] She claims that the "...violence suffered by undocumented migrants is structural violence" and that "... the intensification and militarisation of the boundary – the hardening of the boundary – has resulted in institutional violence that threatens the life, liberty and security of human beings, in violation of their human rights."

2.2.2 The "Structural" Violence of the Border Regime

Physical violence is not the only violent effect of hard borders: as Kartik Varada Raj points out, borders are merely "...where generalized violence finds it particular manifestations."[121] Han Entzinger observes that "[i]n much of Europe, border controls have been partly replaced by controls at the desks of social, healthcare and housing services, in what may be referred to as 'the dual border of the welfare state'."[122] Thus the violence of the border regime "...not only finds its expression in overt violence –

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this thesis although they do face a similar climate of fear and are subject to similar dehumanising discourse as undocumented migrants. In this thesis I make use of sources that are talking about other "categories" of migrant such as asylum seekers or refugees, to build my argument. My justification for doing so is that, although asylum seekers and refugees have a status in international law, unlike undocumented migrants, they face similar demonization and are usually forced to use similar, dangerous, means to gain access to other countries to seek asylum. Their border experiences, and the risks they are forced to take, are similar to those of undocumented migrants. So my arguments hold for them also, even though they are entitled to more legal protection, because the system of territorial states has similar consequences for them.

[120] Martha Scarpellino, '"Corriendo": Hard Boundaries, Human Rights and the Undocumented Immigrant', *Geopolitics*, 12 (2007), 330–349 (p. 341) <doi:10.1080/14650040601169048>.

[121] Kartik Varada Raj, 'Paradoxes on the Borders of Europe', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 8 (2006), 512–534 (p. 520) <doi:10.1080/14616740600945081>.

[122] Han Entzinger, 'Open Borders and the Welfare State', in *Migration Without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People*, ed. by Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2007), p. 130.

beatings, arrest, detention of migrants – but also pervades the social realm in the most quotidian of instances..."[123]

Undocumented migrants and others, who do not or cannot fulfil the documentary requirements of the border regime, experience violence that is generalized both temporally and spatially in their constant fear of discovery, which could lead to deportation. This means that they are eminently exploitable, and thus experience poor living conditions, poor or no pay, are afraid to report crimes against themselves and often do not seek medical care if injured or sick.[124] Bridget Anderson points out that even workers who *have* the required documentation often live in a situation of "institutionalised uncertainty" as their residency is tied to their employment – their employer is the required "sponsor", so their right to stay in the country is dependent on the goodwill of their employer.[125]

Felicity Lawrence of the Guardian describes slave-labour like conditions for undocumented migrants who worked in Almería, Spain in greenhouses growing salad vegetables.[126] Her findings include:

- Migrant workers from Africa living in shacks made of old boxes and plastic sheeting, without sanitation or access to drinking water.
- Wages that are routinely less than half the legal minimum wage.
- Workers without papers being told they will be reported to the police if they complain.
- Allegations of segregation enforced by police harassment when African workers stray outside the hothouse areas into tourist areas.

The Italian journalist Fabrizio Gatti spent a week undercover amongst undocumented migrants in Puglia, Italy, who effectively live under conditions of slave labour. He documents their horrifying experiences, working long hours picking tomatoes, living on mattresses in shacks, often unpaid and regularly experiencing extreme physical violence, including rape:

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[123] Raj, p. 517.

[124] Donnan and Wilson, p. 112.

[125] Bridget Anderson, 'Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers', *Work, Employment & Society*, 24 (2010), 300–317 (p. 309) <doi:10.1177/0950017010362141>.

[126] Felicity Lawrence, 'Spain's Salad Growers Are Modern-day Slaves, Say Charities', *The Guardian* (Manchester, 7 February 2011), section Business <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/07/spain-salad-growers-slaves-charities> [accessed 9 February 2011].

> *They make the men work from 6 AM to 10 PM. And they pay them only - when they pay them - 15 or 20 Euros per day. Complaints are dealt with by beatings with a steel bar. Some workers decided to seek the assistance of the Police, in Foggia: thanks to the Immigration Law named after Umberto Bossi and Gianfranco Fini, they were arrested or expelled from Italy because they didn't have the necessary work permits.*[127]

So undocumented migrants find themselves forced to

> *...inhabit an everyday limbo of precarity and indeterminacy in which they have to be borders. The concern of hegemonic projects such as an attempt to build a "Fortress Europe", is to create a political order that relies upon maintaining a delicate and generalized violence directed against people who live their experience marked as borders, standing in welfare lines, asking for public housing, sitting in police stations and waiting for hospital treatment.*[128]

For example, Nicholas de Genova notes how a change in U.S. law generalised spatially the previously localised structural violence of the border to the entire territory:

> *The 1986 U.S. legislation, for instance, which instituted for the first time federal sanctions against employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers, was tantamount to an extension of the 'revolving door' [of repeated border-crossing attempts] to the internal labor market of each workplace where undocumented migrants were employed.*[129]

The border becomes ubiquitous if you have not got the right piece of paper: "The 'illegalities' of everyday life are often, literally, instantiated by the lack of various

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[127] Fabrizio Gatti, 'I Was a Slave in Puglia - L'espresso', *L'Espresso*, 2006 <http://espresso.repubblica.it/dettaglio/i-was-a-slave-in-puglia/1373950> [accessed 7 February 2011]. It seems that this situation has not improved. PICUM reports that the Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano show[s] that exploitation of foreign labour in Southern Italian [*sic*] remains unchanged. Undocumented migrants are still working about 15 hours a day in informal contract situations receiving a payment of 20 euro per day. PICUM, 'PICUM Bulletin — 17 April 2013', *Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants*, 2013 <http://picum.org/en/news/bulletins/39961/#cat_25544> [accessed 18 April 2013].

[128] Raj, p. 517.

[129] Nicholas De Genova, 'Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 31 (2002), 419–447 (p. 437) <doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.31.040402.085432>.

forms of state-issued documentation that sanction one's place within or outside the strictures of the law"[130]

Basic human rights, such as the rights to privacy, work, a family life and health no longer apply following the illicit crossing of a border.[131] According to the Global Migration Group, the "...fundamental rights of all persons, regardless of their migration status, include:

- The right to life, liberty and security of the person and to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention, and the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution;
- The right to be free from discrimination based on race, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, or other status;
- The right to be protected from abuse and exploitation, to be free from slavery, and from involuntary servitude, and to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
- The right to a fair trial and to legal redress;
- The right to protection of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, an adequate standard of living, social security, adequate housing, education, and just and favorable conditions of work; and
- Other human rights as guaranteed by the international human rights instruments to which the State is party and by customary international law." [132]

As documented above, we can see that these rights are routinely infringed. Yet what we have is not so much a systematic denial of human rights, but systemic *discrimination* as to whose human rights are deniable. Different groups of people experience borders in different ways, depending on how the border regime categorises them in a Foucauldian production of the subject: as desirable or undesirable.[133] This is the categorisation fingerprint of the ideology of the territorial system of states.

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[130] De Genova, p. 438.

[131] As specified in articles 12, 23, 16 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

[132] The Global Migration Group comprises the International Labour Organization, International Organization for Migration, World Bank and many UN agencies. Global Migration Group, 'Statement of the Global Migration Group on the Human Rights of Migrants in Irregular Situation' <http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/> [accessed 2 October 2010].

[133] Foucault, *Discipline*. Foucault discusses the production of "the criminal" through the disciplinary techniques of modernity. Similarly, the "illegal alien" is produced through the disciplinary techniques encountered at the border.

2.2.3 Systemic Discrimination at the Border

The French Marxist thinker Étienne Balibar speaks of how states "... tend to operate in the service of an international class differentiation, and to that end, to use their borders and apparatuses of control as instruments of discrimination and triage."[134] He discusses the 'transit zones' in airports as material manifestations of this "... differential operation ... of the notion of the border..." where,

> *For a rich person from a rich country, (...whose passport increasingly signifies not just mere national belonging, protection and a right of citizenship but a surplus of rights – in particular, a world right to circulate unhindered) the border has become an embarkation formality, a point of symbolic acknowledgement of his social status, to be passed at a jog-trot. For a poor person from a poor country, however, the border tends to be something quite different...*[135,136]

In a similar vein, the anthropologist Shahram Khosravi, himself a one-time undocumented migrant,[137] described the border as a place where:

> *[p]rivileged members of the rich world with surplus mobility rights crossed paths with émigrés from the developing world who are frozen in immobility. These two groups do not represent two disparate realities, nor are they mutually exclusive categories; rather, they are parts of one system that connects them economically, and their existence is interdependent, mutual, and symbiotic.*[138]

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[134] Étienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, trans. by C Jones, J Swenson and C Turner (New York: Verso, 2002), p. 82.

[135] Balibar, p. 83.

[136] See Thurlow and Jaworski for an analysis of frequent flyer programmes as a symbolic acknowledgement of social status. Crispin Thurlow and Adam Jaworski, 'The Alchemy of the Upwardly Mobile: Symbolic Capital and the Stylization of Elites in Frequent-flyer Programmes', *Discourse & Society*, 17 (2006), 99–135 <doi:10.1177/0957926506058066>.

[137] For an auto-ethnography about his journey as an undocumented migrant to his current home in Sweden, see Shahram Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller: An Auto-ethnography of Borders', *Social Anthropology*, 15 (2008), 321–334 <doi:10.1111/j.0964-0282.2007.00019.x>.

[138] Shahram Khosravi, 'An Ethnography of Migrant "Illegality" in Sweden: Included yet Excepted?', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 6 (2010), 95–116 (p. 98) <doi:10.3366/E1755088210000479>.

Balibar calls this a "world *apartheid*": a "dual regime"[139] for the circulation of individuals, based not on colour, but on wealth; between, at the extremes, "... those who 'circulate capital' and those whom 'capital circulates'." This dual regime discriminates not only on the country of origin, symbolically represented by the passport,[140] but also on other criteria, particularly race and individual wealth. All of these interplay in the rituals enacted at the border and the hardness of the border to the migrant depends on the regime-defined categories one falls into.

Evidence of this lies in Martha Scarpellino's observation that, for the undesirable classes, "...boundaries can vary along a continuum from soft to hard."[141] Not only do borders vary from soft (easy to cross) to hard, the hard borders are soft to some and hard to others. They are soft for those who come from the right place, or have economic desirability, but for those who are undesirable, they vary from soft to hard. This variation has the effect of constructing different classes, as Balibar noted, and in doing so creates an elite at one end of the continuum whose interests it serves at the expense of others at the opposite end.

Discrimination takes place at borders based on a variety of criteria: primary among them being race, wealth and location of birth, and the "dual regime" discriminates based on all of these. Balibar emphasises wealth over race but I would say that location of birth, codified in the country on one's passport over which only the mobile elite generally have any control, is underemphasised, even hidden. Although border guards discriminate all the time concerning whom to stop and whom to let past based on the colour of their skin or the quality of their clothes,[142] it would be socially unacceptable if such procedures were codified formally.[143] Yet the fact that it is

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[139] Balibar, p. 4.

[140] John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Although people do not always hold the passport of the country they were born in.

[141] Scarpellino, p. 332.

[142] Shahram Khosravi describes how, long after he had attained Swedish citizenship, "[a]fter passing immigration control, I was stopped by a security official who let my blond fellow travellers pass. In the middle of a narrow corridor a mini interrogation began which lasted for half an hour. ... My status as a Swedish citizen disappeared at the border because of my face." Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller', p. 332.

[143] "Once a fundamental value (such as equality or democracy) is generally accepted in a society, such values can no longer by simply 'rejected by groups without losing

perfectly acceptable; indeed, the whole bureaucracy of border passport checks involves discrimination based upon the passport one holds, i.e. for most people, upon the location of their birth; highlights two of my fingerprints in that it demonstrates the commonsense nature of territorialised categorisation at borders.[144]

So, for those on the wrong end of the scale, where are the softest and where are the hardest boundaries? As Balibar's contention would predict, we see that the "softest" inter-state borders are usually between states of similar wealth: at one end of the scale, between the countries of the EU, and at the other, between various countries where the standard of living is low, who do not have the resources to monitor their frontiers beyond the main crossing points, especially in remote or desert areas, for example the borders between countries in sub-Saharan Africa. At the other end of the spectrum, we see the hardest borders (which are often hard in a physical as well as a metaphorical sense – being made of concrete) at the intersections between wealthy and poor states. This is evident most vividly in the walls being built along the Mexico-US, Greece-Turkey and Israel-Egypt borders.[145] The enabling factor behind the softness of the intra-EU borders is the huge resources the EU devotes to the hardening of its external borders, and the projection of its border control to third country borders through Frontex cooperation agreements and other bilateral agreements such as the Italy-Libya ones mentioned earlier.

Matt Sparke explores an example of the class differentiation that the border regime can produce in his examination of the theoretical and ethical implications of the North American NEXUS scheme, which enables an economically elite business class to pay to avail of expedited border procedures when crossing from Canada or Mexico into or out of the United States. This system constitutes "...a business class civil citizenship [that] has been extended across transnational space at the very same time

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their credibility, respect or societal legitimacy. Hence the prominent role of denials of racism: whatever one may have against minorities, it will never be self-defined as racism." van Dijk, p. 77.

[144] Robert Ford, 'Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain Is Affected by Migrants' Region of Origin', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37 (2011), 1017–1037 <doi:10.1080/1369183X.2011.572423>.

[145] Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 'Israel: Border Barrier to Keep Asylum-seekers Out', 2010 <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ce247591e.html> [accessed 17 February 2011].

as economic liberalization and national securitization have curtailed citizenship for others"[146] especially those at the other end of the scale, who Balibar sees as "frozen in immobility", who carry the border with them wherever they go – the undocumented migrants. Sparke, however, regards these undesirables as experiencing a mirrored expedited privileging – that of expedited *removal* across the border (often without proper procedures). He argues that this parallels the expedited extraordinary rendition of terror suspects.

In summary, there is a *single system*, operating a "dual-regime", which produces and connects those with "surplus mobility rights" and those "frozen in immobility", discriminating between these two groups of humans based on ethically dubious criteria of location of birth, individual wealth, wealth of their country of origin, and race.

To express this situation frankly: the border regime systemically denies human beings their right to life because of accidents of birth over which the individual has no control. Had they simply been born in a different geographical location, or with a different colour of skin, they would not have had to take such desperate risks in search of a decent life. On the other hand, this same system privileges a select elite who are symbolically rewarded for their economic desirability. That this remains largely beyond critique is, I submit, a clear instance of the commonsense fingerprint of ideological working and thus is symptomatic of an ideological system: a seemingly disinterested fact of (political) life that privileges an elite at the expense of others whom it disadvantages.

It is no longer ethically or socially (or legally) acceptable to discriminate based on the criteria of race, ethnicity, sexual orientation or gender. That is not to say that such discrimination does not happen, but that it is not generally regarded as legitimate. So, my question is, why is this remaining case of discrimination based upon accidents of birth perceived not only as legitimate and socially acceptable, but as a commonsense fact of life?

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[146] Matthew B. Sparke, 'A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border', *Political Geography*, 25 (2006), 151–180 <doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.10.002>.

2.3 Unmasking the "Commonsense" Assumptions Behind the Territorial System of States: A people and their territory?

I submit that the fact that hard, discriminatory territorial borders are generally socially acceptable and regarded as legitimate and ethically justified, in spite of their violent consequences, is testament to the immense ideological power of the concept of the territorially-defined state in our imaginations. To explore potential reasons behind the extraordinary power of this idea(l) I now discuss the assumptions behind borders in their current form and how political theorists' work in this area can inform thinking about the current situation of undocumented migrants.

First I wish to discuss why it is important to distinguish between the state system itself and the border regime it currently incorporates. Then, with that distinction in mind I consider the assumptions behind borders as delimiters of membership and community. Thirdly, I discuss the human rights situation of undocumented migrants as symptomatic of the liberal-democratic equality paradox that inheres in the current system of territorial borders. Finally, I look briefly at some alternative border configurations that theorists have proposed.

2.3.1 State and Border: Analytically separate

For the purposes of this discussion I wish to separate analytically the state system and the current border regime. This is important because I want to ensure that I am clear that when I critique the border regime as a domination system, I am not critiquing the state itself. The way in which borders operate in the present is what is being interrogated. The two are so intrinsically connected in our understanding that this can be difficult (itself evidence of the power of the ideal of the territorialised state in our imaginations and a case of the commonsense fingerprint of ideological working). However, as we shall see in more detail later, the two evolved quite separately in history. Sovereign states have been in existence since at least Ancient Greece,[147] however states with precisely defined and regulated territorial borders are much more recent and developed only in the last two to three hundred years. Thus, the border regime we now experience is, relatively speaking, a new phenomenon and, while it is intricately linked to the state, it is not intrinsically linked, and we can

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[147] Philip Bobbit, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* (London: Penguin, 2002).

therefore critically analyse it separately. As John Williams insists: "Bordering, often on the basis of territory, instead needs to be understood and explored as a social practice that stands separate to the creation of sovereign states."[148]

2.3.2 Borders and Membership: Lines around community?

If we define discrimination as differential treatment of groups of people based upon one or more differentiating criteria (rather than a more pejorative meaning presuming the wrongness of discrimination), then borders that do not discriminate are meaningless – reduced to functionally-neutral characteristics of place like contour lines on a map. Thus a discussion of potential reasons for the legitimacy of the border regime becomes a discussion of the justifiability of *criteria of* discrimination at the borders, rather than a discussion of the justifiability of discrimination (itself) at the borders. Donald Galloway observes an analogous discussion in democratic political theory: "...for democrats the identification of defensible criteria by which to define the commonality shared by citizens but not by others becomes a basic political imperative."[149]

The territoriality of borders implies a claimed linkage between a certain physical space and a certain group of people. For communitarians such as Michael Walzer, that link has ethical weight because that group of people have a recognised cohesion.[150] Failing that, what justification could there be for separating them from others spatially, legally, socially and in all the other ways that membership of a state entails? This contention: that the inhabitants of a territorial state share a certain cohesion, that they are members of a meaningful community; is central to the communitarian ethical argument for the validity of a territorial state that discriminates between members and non-members at its borders.

From this perspective, the bordered space affords the members benefits of physical security from attack, protection of their cultural traditions, language and way of life,

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[148] John Williams, *The Ethics of Territorial Borders: Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sands* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 80.

[149] Donald Galloway, 'Noncitizens and Discrimination: Redefining Human Rights in the Face of Complexity', in *Of States, Rights, and Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship*, ed. by Oliver Schmidtke and Saime Ozcurumez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 37–61 (p. 39).

[150] Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

the ability to establish a system of political representation and economic life, as well as systems of social welfare, healthcare and many other benefits that enhance their quality of life and well-being. All of these are undoubtedly social goods, and if discrimination at the borders enabled their continued realisation then that would be a strong argument for it, but our affection for our bordered space is more visceral than that. As Oliver Schmidtke observes:

> *Beyond this 'rational' base for the nation-state, there is an additional pivotal element that is crucial in attributing stability and legitimacy to national citizenship regimes, particularly in the European version of the nation-state. This is a 'pre-political' sense of belonging that is ethnically or culturally defined, and provides a supposedly unquestionable reference point in stipulating who can legitimately claim to be part of the community and who cannot.*[151]

The bonds of membership of a community can engender strong feelings of loyalty and identity that today are undoubtedly given focus in the institution of the territorial state. So connection to states can go beyond a dispassionate appreciation of the social, political and economic goods they afford us, to an emotive identification. This emotive link is manifested in the symbolic life of the state, its leaders, representatives and citizens. It is most strongly in evidence in ritualised ceremonies of state, international sporting events, support for the military and in national holidays.[152]

By extension, because of the apparently intrinsic and commonsense conceptual link between the state and its borders, "[b]orders ... are in many ways inseparable from the identities they help demarcate or individuate."[153] Thus an "attack" (an

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[151] Oliver Schmidtke, 'Borders in Public Perception: Renationalizing Modes of Inclusion and Exclusion', in *Of States, Rights, and Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship*, ed. by Oliver Schmidtke and Saime Ozcurumez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 91–112 (p. 94).

[152] Anthony D. Smith shows how national rituals of remembrance draw on older classical Christian rituals and symbols for their emotive power, claiming that they resonate because of "... the ease with which secular great men and heroes, and later the common soldier, who lived and died for the nation, could be identified with earlier saints and martyrs, for a communal faith, and more especially, with Christ." Anthony D. Smith, 'Will and Sacrifice: Images of National Identity', *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 30 (2001), 571–582 (p. 577).

[153] Josef Lapid, 'Introduction', in *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, ed. by Mathias Albert and David Jacobson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 7.

unauthorised crossing?) on a border is experienced as an intrusion into the personal space of the citizen. Even states with a declared multicultural identity, such as the United States or Australia have a strong emphasis on building a sense of commonality as a "nation". They may not base it on a long common history or shared culture but discourses extolling the worth of the nation and the privilege of belonging are often all the stronger for the lack of a common history, resulting in the same phenomena of emotive attachment and structurally violent discrimination against undocumented migrants.[154]

All of this means that, to use Giddens' term, ontological security, which he defines as "the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action"[155], often becomes vested in the perceived security of states and in the stability of their perceived essential characteristics, including borders. Thus, because perceived challenges to the essence of the state become challenges to one's own self-identity, these challenges are resisted. This entails a much more visceral resistance to transformation in the functioning or role of borders than a philosophical appreciation of their utility would warrant.[156]

Breaking this conceptually intrinsic link between the state and its borders (at least in their current manner of functioning) can help us to analyse more dispassionately the characteristics and effects of the current border regime.

2.3.3 Challenges to the Concept of a Cohesive Membership

Challenges to this communitarian perspective of the state and its borders can be mounted in many ways. For example one can question the assertion that the inhabitants of the state constitute, in any practical as opposed to ideological sense, the members of a cohesive community.

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[154] Michael Grewcock, *Border Crimes: Australia's War on Illicit Migrants* (Sydney: Institute of Criminology Press, 2009); Aviva Chomsky, *'They Take Our Jobs!' and 20 Other Myths About Immigration* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007); Joseph Nevins, 'Dying for a Cup of Coffee? Migrant Deaths in the US-Mexico Border Region in a Neoliberal Age', *Geopolitics*, 12 (2007), 228 <doi:10.1080/14650040601168826>; Scarpellino.

[155] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 92.

[156] Skey.

This question of the cohesive validity of the community under consideration should be addressed prior to any discussion concerning obligations outside it. Yet the cohesiveness of a community comprising the inhabitants of a state has nearly always simply been assumed (as commonsense):

> *... the inter-state frontier has been regarded as fundamentally different to other kinds of boundaries because of the doctrine of sovereignty and the territorial principle. The territorial exclusivity of the 'nation'-state implied that there could be no intrusion by external jurisdictions and no political loyalties across the frontier. The people confined by a frontier were supposed to share a common fund of loyalties, values and characteristics.*[157]

This assumption has also penetrated academic thinking in other disciplines. In geopolitics John Agnew has called it the "territorial trap" and has analysed its effects on much research in that discipline.[158] I would contend that it infects much debate across a wide range of academic disciplines but geopolitics is a highly relevant one for my interests. Agnew outlines three common assumptions which constitute the territorial trap, the third being the most relevant here:[159]

1. "...modern state sovereignty requires clearly bounded territorial spaces'
2. "...there is a fundamental opposition between domestic and foreign affairs."
3. "...the territorial state acts as the geographical container of modern society."

Membership of this bordered society is effected through citizenship, which entails (at least in democracies) most importantly the right to vote, as well as many other privileges. For Martin Heisler, "[c]itizenship [acts] as a bordering mechanism ... [which] bounds the population for which the polity acts and from which it derives its authority."[160] Joseph Carens asserts that "[c]itizenship means full membership in a

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[157] Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 5.

[158] John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 4.

[159] Agnew and Corbridge, p. 53.

[160] Martin Heisler, 'Now and Then, Here and There: Migration and the Transformation of Identities, Borders and Orders', in *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, ed. by Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Josef Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 237.

political community, and, according to any modern conception of democracy, this citizenship must be equal: generally speaking, all citizens must enjoy equal rights."[161] He then points out a new dilemma: that "... not everyone who is physically present in a society becomes a citizen, at least not right away. What rights are the non-citizens entitled to?"[162]

In particular, immigrants usually do not hold citizenship and thus represent by their bodily presence, a challenge to the homogeneous state with their claims to certain of the benefits of state membership without necessarily sharing the characteristics the members would regard as "essential" to their cohesive identity. Heisler asserts that this challenge is causing a generalised increase in concern over identity and collective belonging: "The changes associated with transnational migration contribute to the growing preoccupation with personal and collective identity evident in much of the world today."[163] In other words, migration is undermining ontological security for members (citizens) by its challenge to the state's homogeneity. Whilst these are ethically complex questions, my point here is that this complexity undermines the notion of a cohesive membership of a bordered territorial space that is necessary to justify discrimination at the borders.

Quite apart from external challenges to the state's ideal of homogeneity, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and political diversity *amongst* citizens also challenges the communitarian ideal of cohesive membership and difference to those outside the borders, particularly in "newer" countries whose borders were often arbitrarily drawn by colonial administrators. Indeed, most "old" European countries have long-established ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities who have just as much of a claim to membership of the state as the ethnic majority and thus it would be ethically wrong (but not uncommon in practice) for the state to seek to de-legitimate their social practices and traditions just because they do not represent a democratic majority. "Whether what the majority wants should prevail depends on how

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[161] Joseph H. Carens, 'On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay', *Boston Review*, 2005, 16–19.

[162] Carens.

[163] Heisler, p. 227.

oppressive it is to those who do not want it, and how oppressive what they want would be to the majority."[164]

This is not to undermine the importance of bonds and boundaries that are essential for the development of a shared communal identity and worldview that enables people to find ways to live in the world and relate to each other based on a shared understanding and a rich contextual common-ground. What I wish to question is not the importance or validity of such bonds, but the validity of the assumption that they can be realised and protected only through territorially bordered expression in the form of a sovereign state. The state can, and indeed surely should, protect these relations, but it should protect them for *all* the various cultural groups that live within its borders.

Hannah Arendt situates the origin of this assumption in the failure of the Minority Treaties (that were a part of the Peace of Versailles in 1919) to protect the cultural and linguistic rights of minorities living in the new European state. This failure was most dramatically illustrated in the forcible population exchange that took place after the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-22. Nicholas Xenos records that at "Lausanne [where the convention to reach a settlement was held], it was agreed that there would be 'a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory.' Over *1.5 million* were forcibly exchanged..."[165] According to Xenos these populations had been territorially mixed for millennia yet it was deemed appropriate to uproot them forcibly because homogeneity of religious affiliation was deemed essential. "By the logic of the nation-state, people must leave their homes in order to come home." "The home is exchanged for the home*land*, which exists as an imagined necessity rather than as a lived or historical contingency."[166]

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[164] Michael A. E. Dummett, *On Immigration and Refugees*, Thinking in Action (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 13.

[165] Interestingly, religion was here deemed to be the key characteristic of the nation, rather than, for example, language. Nicholas Xenos, 'Refugees: The Modern Political Condition', in *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, ed. by Michael Shapiro and Hayward Alker, Borderlines (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 233–246 (p. 239). Italics in original.

[166] Xenos, p. 240.

From that point on, it was assumed that national security could only be attained through national emancipation in the form of sovereignty:

> *... the nationally frustrated [minority] population was firmly convinced – as was everybody else – that true freedom, true emancipation, and true popular sovereignty could be attained only with full national emancipation, that people without their own national government were deprived of human rights.* [167]

I submit that this conviction remains in our collective consciousness and was evident in the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia along "national" lines post 1989. It is a reason for the resilience of the ideal of the homogeneous territorial state and therefore the social acceptability of the actual and structurally violent consequences of the discriminatory border regime.

2.3.4 The Liberal-Democratic Paradox

Even if one did grant that the inhabitants of a particular bordered state do represent a broadly homogeneous group, there are other ethical problems with discrimination at the borders, particularly if the state purports to hold a liberal democratic ethos. The liberal-democratic paradox arises when issues of equality are raised: should a liberal or a democratic conception of equality prevail? Chantal Mouffe explains in her discussion of Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal democracy:

> *In [Carl Schmitt's] ... view when we speak of equality we need to distinguish between two very different ideas: the liberal one and the democratic one. The liberal conception of equality postulates that every person is, as a person, inherently equal to every other person. The democratic conception however, requires the possibility of distinguishing who belongs to the 'demos' and who is excluded and for that reason the democratic conception cannot exist without the necessary correlate of inequality...* [168]

Democracy, in other words, requires inequality and exclusion on some criteria, and thus is always less than perfectly liberal. This dilemma is at the centre of the

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[167] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New Ed (Harcourt Publishers Ltd College Publishers, 1973), p. 272.

[168] Chantal Mouffe, 'Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy', in *Law As Politics: Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism*, ed. by D. Dyzenhaus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 161–163.

conceptual conflict between state sovereignty and human rights and represents the paradox we are addressing here: the border regime causes gross violation of human rights; rights that are regarded as inalienable by the inhabitants of the bordered states who nevertheless regard the border regime as legitimate and necessary:

> *The citizenship regimes in the European tradition are thus characterized by deep ambivalence regarding their basic normative claims: a strict form of social closure with respect to its outer boundaries mirrors the universalistic and egalitarian inclusion into the national community.*[169]

This paradox is illustrated by recurrent blind spots in legislation concerning human rights in many liberal countries. Donald Galloway gives several examples of such blindness, highlighting how absurd contradictions arise out of this apparently "commonsense" arrangement. The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is required to be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination, yet it categorises people with various immigration statuses. The "...idea that immigration statuses may themselves be discriminatory and inconsistent with principles of equality is nowhere on the horizon."[170] Similarly, the Irish citizenship measures that came into effect in 2005 "...recognise that those born in Ireland to parents with a substantial connection to the country (calculated by reference to time spent in the country) should be entitled to citizenship."[171] Yet it stipulates that time spent awaiting asylum does not qualify as relevant to the issue of "substantial connection". That this may be discriminating against asylum seekers and violating principles of equality is not explained on any principled ground. Perhaps most extraordinarily, the European Convention on Nationality, which authorises states to make laws determining who are its nationals, prohibits any distinction "which amounts to discrimination on the grounds of ... national or ethnic origin."[172] Galloway remarks that "...there is no hint of

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[169] Schmidtke, p. 96.

[170] Galloway, p. 51.

[171] Galloway, p. 51.

[172] *European Convention on Nationality, ETS No. 160*, 1997, sec. 5.

a doubt that creating rules of nationality may itself discriminate on the basis of national origin."[173]

It is clear, though unrecognised explicitly, that a democratic conception of equality pervades in practice in these countries' legislation (and in the practices of their border regimes) whilst a liberal conception is espoused verbally. The sometimes violent consequences of this for those who ca not fulfil the requirements of the border regime were seen above.

The *de-facto* consequence of the democratic conception of equality behind the current border regime is the transformation of the non-citizen into the non-human as far as rights are concerned. Human rights are reduced to citizen's rights: only the members can claim what is supposed to be inalienable. The consequences of this *de facto* reduction for undocumented migrants are examined in the next section.

2.3.5 Consequences of the Liberal-Democratic Paradox

Although, as human beings, undocumented migrants theoretically enjoy many human rights specified in various conventions that most countries have signed; in practice these rights are routinely infringed with impunity. While, in theory, "*...persons* exist separately from any particular state; persons, as such, are prior to states, and therefore human rights, because they rest on human-ness, exist prior to any rights afforded by states",[174] unfortunately states are the only institutions capable of enacting and protecting human rights. Undocumented migrants bodily undermine one of the essential legitimating characteristics of the state in their "illegal" presence within its borders and thus, in effect, are excluded from any protection the state might offer. In effect they become both stateless and rightless.[175]

Their situation is akin to that of the stateless people Arendt considered, concluding that:

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[173] Galloway, p. 51.

[174] Scarpellino, p. 335.

[175] Blitz and Otero-Iglesias observe the same phenomenon for refused asylum seekers (who thereby become undocumented, finding themselves without the appropriate documents to stay in the country). Brad K. Blitz and Miguel Otero-Iglesias, 'Stateless By Any Other Name: Refused Asylum-Seekers in the United Kingdom', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37 (2011), 657 <doi:10.1080/1369183X.2011.545311>.

> *The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships – except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.*[176]

There is apparently still nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of this bare life, this *homo sacer*,[177] in its manifestation as the undocumented migrant – the contemporary stateless. Undocumented migrants exist permanently in Georgio Agamben's "state of exception"[178]: included in society through the economic services they provide, yet excepted from membership, the rights that pertain to it and the protection of legal due process.[179]

Foucault formulated the concept of biopolitics, which he sees as having its genesis in the modern state's preoccupation with administering its people as a population which entailed the use of technology to enable new supervisory and regulatory means.[180] This greatly enhanced the state's power over its population, which Foucault termed *biopower*.

Agamben developed this concept but maintained that its roots originate much earlier that the modern era, and that powers have always used the means available to them to bolster their status through inclusion and exclusion. He also noted that Foucault never discussed what he maintains is the most extreme manifestation of state biopower: the camp.[181] He theorises that certain people are reduced to bare life, which he terms *homo sacer*, drawing on a Roman expression denoting people who are stripped of their political existence, against whom it is not possible to commit a crime

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[176] Arendt, p. 299.

[177] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. by Daniel Hellen-Roazen (Stanford University Press, 1998).

[178] Agamben, p. 9. Agamben defines the exception as "...what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included." Agamben, p. 25.

[179] Khosravi, 'Migrant "Illegality"'.

[180] Foucault, *Discipline*.

[181] Agamben, p. 4.

and thus whose inclusion is only evident through their exclusion from the polis, through the fact that they can be killed.[182]

This concept of *homo sacer* is apposite in the context of the situation of undocumented migrants today, who in many countries are detained indefinitely despite having been convicted of no crime,[183] who are excluded from any political participation (or even making a claim for any sort of participation in the "pushback" programmes designed to prevent the possibility of asylum claims) and whose human rights can be infringed, and are infringed as a matter of routine, with no accountability. They are held in a *relation of exception* to the rest of society.[184] Agamben describes this relation of exception as a "relation of ban", and illustrates the precarity of such an existence:

> *He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is literally not possible to say whether one who has been banned is inside or outside the juridical order.*[185]

The undocumented migrant, *homo sacer*, is depoliticised but biopoliticised[186] life, included in the polis solely through her exclusion,[187] in contrast to those who hold the

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[182] Agamben, p. 8.

[183] Amnesty International; Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Wan, 'The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand.', *International Migration*, 42 (2004), 33–64 <doi:10.1111/j.0020-7985.2004.00273.x>; Stephanie Silverman, 'Legal but Unfair: The High Stakes of the UK Immigration Detention System', *The COMPAS Blog*, 2011 <http://compasoxfordblog.co.uk/?p=37> [accessed 5 October 2011]; UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Alice Edwards, 'Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of Person and "Alternatives to Detention" of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless Persons and Other Migrants', *UNHCR*, 2011 <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dc935fd2.html> [accessed 5 October 2011].

[184] Agamben, p. 19.

[185] Agamben, p. 28.

[186] Alexandra Hall discusses the application of Agamben and Foucault's theorisation of biopower to the detention of "failed" asylum seekers in the UK. Alexandra Hall, '"These People Could Be Anyone": Fear, Contempt (and Empathy) in a British Immigration Removal Centre.', *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, 36 (2010), 881–898 (p. 884) <doi:10.1080/13691831003643330>.

appropriate documentation to demonstrate their citizenship. Citizenship becomes the bordering mechanism[188] and the border is carried with the body in the documents (or lack of them) that are the state's biopolitical tools.

2.3.6 Alternative Modes of Bordering

Philippe Legrain is amongst those who argue convincingly for the general *economic* benefits that would accrue from an opening of borders to migration.[189] Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright argue for "No Borders" as a practical *political* project, critiquing the prevailing border regime as an ideological system fostering nationalism, with close ties to capitalism and which is constitutive of systemic inequality.[190]

Joseph Carens has strongly argued that for the administrative, political and legal functions of the state, the appropriate membership boundary criterion is not territorial (although the administration will cover a certain territory), or ethnic, or even one of citizenship; but the length of time resident in the country.[191] He asserts that everyone resident within a territory for a certain period (and thus contributing to its resources through taxes and work) should be eligible to share in its benefits and that it is unethical to exclude people who have so contributed just because they lack citizenship (membership) documentation. "Length of residence, not legal status, is the key moral variable. The longer the stay, the stronger the moral claim to most legal rights."[192]

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[187] Agamben, p. 8.

[188] Heisler, p. 237.

[189] Philippe Legrain, *Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them* (London: Little, Brown, 2006).

[190] Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright, 'Editorial: Why No Borders?', *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees*, 26 (2011) <http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/article/view/32074>.

[191] Joseph H. Carens, 'Immigration, Democracy and Citizenship', in *Of States, Rights, and Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship*, ed. by Oliver Schmidtke and Saime Ozcurumez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 17–36; Carens, 'On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay'.

[192] Carens, 'Immigration, Democracy and Citizenship', p. 18. This moral claim is perversely recognised by being explicitly denied to asylum seekers in Irish legislation. Their time in direct provision, awaiting a decision on their asylum application is specifically excluded from counting towards any subsequent welfare entitlements.

For example, it is often argued that immigration can threaten to overwhelm the social welfare system. Han Entzinger acknowledges this danger but observes that under the current border regime many are excluded from welfare benefits even though they contribute to welfare systems through taxes. He notes the European requirement for immigration to counter the ageing population and suggests various potential solutions including welfare entitlement differentiated on time resident in the country as well as a de-territorialisation of welfare (from the state).[193]

Critics of this phenomenon assert that it risks devaluing (political) citizenship and that those who gain it that way would not understand or appreciate the responsibilities that come with it. I find this view to be patronising and unfair, as most citizens of the state gained their citizenship through no effort of their own by being born in the right place, yet no such accusation (of undervaluing their citizenship) is made of them. In fact, people who have taken great risks to reach a country, who have lived under more oppressive and dangerous regimes, perhaps with no political rights, have every reason to appreciate the rights and security offered by a liberal democratic state they have travelled to that has offered them the chance of rebuilding a life for themselves.

Seyla Benhabib theorises de-territorialisation of rights as the "disaggregation of citizenship" and notes that it is already happening in a limited manner with respect to various social, civic and political human rights in Europe,[194] although she recognises that political representation remains territorialised by state.[195] She also argues that

> *...democratic rule has been based on various constitutive illusions such as the homogeneity of the people and territorial self-sufficiency. The challenge today is to reconfigure democratic voice without resorting to these illusions.*[196]

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[193] Entzinger, pp. 127–130.

[194] Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 158–161.

[195] She recognises that not all people within the territory are a part of the political *demos*, but that the principle of membership (codified in citizenship) is envisioned territorially. Benhabib, p. 217.

[196] Benhabib, p. 171.

Benhabib argues for a process of "democratic iterations" whereby, through ongoing public debate and exchange, the appropriate boundaries of membership for various goods and rights are established, which may or not be coterminous with the state territory in nature, but which require a democratic commitment to a locality which may be smaller or larger than the nation-state.[197] She continues, however, to conceive of the boundaries of the demos as territorial boundaries (but not necessarily coterminous with the state).[198] I would argue that here she could be accused of falling into Agnew's "territorial trap" and that territory is an unnecessary factor in democratic boundary-making, voting rights at corporation AGMs being an obvious example of bounded membership which is not territorial.

As Benhabib notes, state-territorial self-sufficiency is an illusion as no state's economy operates in isolation. It can therefore be argued that the vast discrepancies in living standards between states imposes an ethical obligation on citizens of wealthier states towards those in poorer states. Jonathan Seglow argues that ethically this requires either globalised resource redistribution or open borders, preferring the former to the latter.[199] Ayelet Shachar notes that birth in a wealthy country confers many advantages denied people who happened to be born elsewhere, that they have done nothing to deserve. She claims that this is analogous to property inheritance and that thus "questions a widespread intuition that citizenship assignment based on birth is unproblematic".[200] She argues for a globalised resource redistribution (as suggested, but not advocated, by Seglow) enacted through a once-off birthright citizenship levy on those born in wealthy countries to counter the unjust inequalities that chance location of birth perpetuates.[201]

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[197] Benhabib, p. 174.

[198] "I see no way to cut this Gordian knot linking territoriality, representation, and democratic voice." Benhabib, p. 219.

[199] Jonathan Seglow, 'The Ethics of Immigration', *Political Studies Review*, 3 (2005), 317–334 <doi:10.1111/j.1478-9299.2005.00026.x>.

[200] Anna Moltchanova, 'The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality - by Ayelet Shachar', *Ethics & International Affairs*, 24 (2010), 431–433 (p. 431) <doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2010.00280.x>.

[201] Ayelet Shachar, *The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009).

I find myself closest to Benhabib here. She retains a strong commitment to democratic norms, yet separates the membership criteria from the territorial state. She also seeks to find ways to respect "... the discourse principle of legitimacy, which enjoins that all those who are affected by the consequences of the adoption of a norm have a say in its articulation...".[202] However, I find her retention of territory as a necessary boundary condition for membership of the *demos* unnecessary.

2.3.7 Summary

As John Williams notes,

> *...privileging the interests of fellow citizens remains generally acceptable. The need to create a category, or categories, of those who possess rights ... and to whom we owe special duties as a result ... is an enduring trait. Doing this on the basis of citizenship – a formal connection to a territorially bordered place – is a particularly powerful mechanism for deciding who is in, and who is out; who counts, and for how much, if at all.*[203]

This mechanism is powerful both in practical and ideological terms. Despite all of these ethical and empirical challenges to the ideal of the homogeneous territorial (nation-)state, a nationalist narrative retains huge symbolic power and therefore we regularly see it adopted by politicians looking for a populist electoral boost.[204] There is minimal electoral gain to be had by arguing for more open borders or a more pragmatic or humane immigration approach, so other politicians rarely counter these populist appeals. The simple appeal of the nationalist narrative[205] with its attendant

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[202] Benhabib, p. 218.

[203] Williams, p. 70.

[204] This approach is often very successful, for example, in Australia in 2001 (John Howard's Liberal Party), in Germany by the CDU to win regional elections after its defeat in the general election of 1998, and in 2010 in the UK when David Cameron promised to reduce inward migration from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands. Jeremy Webber, 'National Sovereignty, Migration, and the Tenuous Hold of International Legality: The Resurfacing (and Resubmersion?) of Carl Schmitt', in *Of States, Rights, and Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship*, ed. by Oliver Schmidtke and Saime Ozcurumez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 61–90 (p. 64ff.); Schmidtke, p. 102.

[205] "National community still provides the most forceful narrative of defining identities, interests, and individual entitlements." Schmidtke, p. 106.

potential contribution of electoral advantage[206] are evidence of the continuing power of the ideal of the homogeneous territorial (nation-)state and therefore the general social acceptability of its current border regime despite the human rights violations that it entails. Paradoxically, it is perhaps *because of* these challenges to the homogeneous state that a reinforcement of the borders is seen as essential. The power of the ideal is reinforced when the system is challenged, leading to the legitimation of systemic reinforcement:

> *As the meaning of the nation as a symbolic device used to differentiate between members and aliens becomes questionable, and as the notion of a national community characterized by distinct cultural or ethnic patterns of identification loses what Pierre Bourdieu calls* doxa *(the exclusive way to see the world), the more societies engage in reifying the identity and boundaries of this community. In this respect, the affirmation of borders can be read as one of the paradoxes of modernity.*[207]

This paradox is a result of the discrepancy between a liberal conception of equality (as espoused in much EU legislation), and a democratic one (evident in border practices) and impinges specifically and with violent consequences on undocumented migrants.

In terms of the state's role in the protection of indigenous (but not necessarily homogeneous) cultural and linguistic traditions, the citizenship/territorial boundary can be argued for; but even here, Michael Dummett argues, the closing of the border to immigrants (he speaks specifically of refugees) is only ethically warranted under the very narrow conditions where further immigration would threaten to overwhelm the indigenous population or if there is an imminent risk of over-population. He notes that this is not the case in developed countries in Europe, North America or Australasia at the moment.[208]

John Williams summarises (perhaps a little idealistically) for us:

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[206] "The plea for an unambiguous symbolic boundary between members and aliens has proven to be both an integral part of the discursively reproduced self-understanding of these societies and a successful political tool in the mobilizing efforts of a variety of anti-immigrant, populist organizations throughout Europe." Schmidtke, p. 107.

[207] Schmidtke, p. 105.

[208] Dummett, chap. 5.

> *Where useful, [borders] can endure, mainly in dividing up those parts of political authority that continue to be territorialised. Where harmful, or just plain irrelevant, then they can be set aside as different mechanisms are found for working out questions of authority.*[209]

2.4 Unmasking the "Commonsense" Assumptions Behind the Territorial System of States: A natural spatial political ordering?

Having discussed some of the assumptions behind and critiqued the consequences of the current border regime and concluded that some functions that are usually attributed to borders need not necessarily be territorially delimited, I now seek to look at the historical development of the border regime into its current form, recalling Foucault's understanding of the temporal discontinuity of "knowledges".

State boundaries *do* sometimes move; states have also split into smaller states recently, most dramatically with the fall of communism in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union, as well as the subsequent breakup of Yugoslavia. However, the *systemic* division of political power along precisely defined territorial boundaries remains a constant. In essence, in this section, I wish to account for the "commonsense" aspect of the ideological fingerprint framework with respect to the system of hard-bordered territorial states.

Although the division of the surface of the earth into distinct spaces separated by thin lines on the map has a timeless feeling to it, it is in fact a new phenomenon. School textbooks give it a sense of permanence by the drawing of such maps for periods in ancient history (i.e. in the time of the Roman empire), giving the impression that space has been understood and delimited in that manner for thousands of years. Yet this is a misleading and inappropriate imposition of new cartographic techniques onto an earlier time.

2.4.1 Historical Development of the Border Regime

Many studies have traced the evolution of spatial political organisation into its present form,[210] but Alexander Murphy's study is particularly interesting for my

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[209] Williams, p. 79.

[210] Alexander B. Murphy, 'The Sovereign State as a Political-territorial Ideal', in *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct*, ed. by Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Malcolm Anderson; Bobbit; Jordan

purposes, as it traces not only the history of the evolution of the linearly-bordered sovereign territorial state, but also the concurrent development of *perceptions* of sovereignty and the territorial organisation of power. This is particularly interesting as it is *perception* of a system as commonsense that gives it its ideological power and has the potential to make it seem an immutable, timeless fact of life, rather than a temporary arrangement, contingent on historical chance.

Murphy shows how what he terms the sovereign territorial ideal ("...a world view in which discrete, quasi-independent territorial units were seen as the principal building blocks for social and political life."[211]) became more and more fixed (or commonsense) as a principle of political organisation. As this political order became more established, it had the effect of self-perpetuation as the "...order itself affected social, economic, and political arrangements and *shaped people's geographical imaginations.*"[212] It is the power of the system over people's imaginations that legitimates its consequences, and, given the nature of the consequences related above, we can surmise the extent of that power.

2.4.1.1 ***Political Developments and the Sovereign Territorial Ideal***

Murphy traces attitudes to sovereignty as a territorial ideal since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. He argues that the view that social and political life should be organised territorially has grown in acceptance progressively since then, and gained such inertia that alternative conceptions of political-spatial organisation are rejected as absurd: "...the sovereign territorial ideal became the only imaginable spatial framework for political life."[213] This absurdity, again, is an instance of the commonsense fingerprint of ideological working as it indicates a dismissive, out-of hand rejection of alternatives to the commonsense way-things-are with no logical consideration of their potential validity.

Branch, 'Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change', *International Organization*, 65 (2011), 1–36 <doi:10.1017/S0020818310000299>; Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System', *World Politics*, 39 (1986), 27–52.

[211] Murphy, p. 82.

[212] Murphy, p. 82. My italics.

[213] Murphy, p. 91.

The question then is why the sovereign territorial ideal enjoyed an increasing legitimacy over this period. Murphy shows that sovereign-initiated bureaucratic, linguistic and military centralisation served to reduce regional differences *within* their territories and, with the advent of nationalism, engender an identification with the state. These developments also increased differences *between* states which further reinforced territory as the fundamental measure of political power and a fundamental characteristic of the "nation". Over time, government economic, social and cultural policies and initiatives have *produced real* inter-state cultural and economic differences. It is important to remember, though, that these differences are a consequence of the bordered state system, not a prior reality necessitating it.

As Murphy puts it: "People [now] generally accept the assumption that the land surface of the earth should be divided up into international discrete territorial units, each with a government that exercises substantial authority within its own territory."[214] This assumption has led to a methodological nationalism in which intra-state variations are masked and inter-state differences reified in discourse. As John Agnew points out: "Currents of thought allowing for more complex views of the geographical scales at which social, economic and political processes could take place were effectively marginalized."[215] This is evident in the fact that much sociological and scientific data was and is collected and studied at the scale of the territorial state, unreflexively assuming the territorial state to be the appropriate unit of analysis. The unreflexive nature of the adoption of territorial thinking is indicative of the ideological way in which the border regime works in the imagination.

Over time the territorial organisation of social and political life became more and more reinforced in the popular imagination; nationalism in particular feeding into the sovereign territorial ideal by giving states a powerful new basis for claiming legitimacy.[216] In this way political and social practices reinforced the sovereign territorial ideal, whilst at the same time being (often unconsciously) influenced by it.

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[214] Murphy, p. 81.

[215] Agnew, p. 52.

[216] Murphy, p. 97.

2.4.1.2 *Technological Developments Contributing to the Sovereign Territorial Ideal*

Aside from these political developments, other innovations and social changes fed into the sovereign territorial ideal, perhaps most obviously developments in cartography. Richard Mansbach and Franke Wilmer note that "[i]n feudal Europe, the overlap among identity-based boundaries and, therefore, political communities meant the absence of a clear identity hierarchy to determine 'us' from 'them'."[217] Jouni Hakli reflects that, at that time (and indeed for a long period after it), "[i]n the absence of proper maps, the realm was primarily known as a succession of places, epitomized by the medieval itinerary, which was predominantly a written description of the route and travel time between places."[218] When space is experienced in this linear, sequential way it would seem absurd to be arbitrarily forced to stop one's journey between two towns. Each town would have its own identity and cultural and linguistic changes would be gradual as one continues one's journey. While such a world of gradually changing cultural, linguistic and political landscapes seems strange, even absurd to us, our world of sharply delimited political territories, often with co-located sharp changes in language and culture would seem equally absurd to someone from feudal Europe. This illustrates vividly the force of current power constellations over our capacity for imagining alternatives and accepting them as potentially viable and recalls Foucault's conception of power constellations, though seeming to be permanent, as temporally discontinuous.

The advent of advanced mapping techniques enabled a panoptical "view from nowhere": seemingly objective, yet reflecting a political claim on behalf of a particular interest.[219] It is this seeming objectivity that makes maps (and other technological and social developments) very ideologically powerful instruments for shaping perceptions of social reality. Maps are perfect manifestations of Barthes'

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[217] Richard Mansbach and Franke Wilmer, 'War, Violence and the Westphalian System', in *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, ed. by Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Josef Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 56.

[218] Jouni Hakli, 'In the Territory of Knowledge: State-centred Discourses and the Construction of Society', *Progress in Human Geography*, 25 (2001), 403–422 (p. 413) <doi:10.1191/030913201680191745>.

[219] Agnew, p. 11.

"depoliticised speech",[220] apparently completely disinterested but implicitly reinforcing myths of national homogeneity, or at least national homogeneity as an ideal, through simple lines on a page.

Hakli observes that "...while statistics and maps have been instrumental in making society visible in a manner relevant to its government, they have also been quite concretely involved in the construction of the territorial-administrative structures of the state."[221] Jordan Branch maintains that "...mapping was fundamental to three key characteristics of the medieval-to-modern shift: the homogenization of territorial authority, the linearization of political boundaries, and the elimination of non-territorial forms of organization."[222] I would argue that they contributed to the elimination of non-territorial forms of political organisation *from the imagination*. He contends that developments in cartography were integral to the development of our system of exclusive territorial sovereignty.

Another field that became territorialised over the same period was that of legal administration. Positivistic theories of law gradually replaced natural law and thus undermined the former centres of legal authority of king and church. "Positivists looked to human-created institutions as the basis for law. In the international political geographic context of the time, this meant sovereign territorial states."[223] All of these state-based knowledges contribute to a territorial state-centred Foucauldian discourse which is hegemonic in its domination of imaginations.

Nevertheless, despite all of these forces, national identity, loyalty and cultural and linguistic homogeneity were slow to become dominant. According to Malcolm Anderson "[t]he whole population [of France] only became aware of their "Frenchness" in the mid and late nineteenth century with state education, cheap press and the railway network."[224] Not only was it a slow process, it remains incomplete in many senses. Although "Frenchness" is generally accepted as a self-identity in France, in many countries, especially in the global South, the state one is

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[220] Barthes, p. 143.

[221] Hakli, p. 414.

[222] Branch, p. 1.

[223] Murphy, p. 98.

[224] Malcolm Anderson, p. 23.

born in is often not the primary source of national identity for many people. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge note that "[i]n Africa, the territorial states inherited from colonialism have failed to establish national identities that override local and ethnic loyalties."[225] Heisler concurs with Anderson: "Identification with and cardinal loyalty to such authority was not to become grounded in social consciousness and institutions until much later, when national societies and states coincided in appreciable degree. That, of course, did not happen in most of the world."[226]

2.4.1.3 ***Summary***

Even in countries where much of the population feels little connection to the sovereign authority, the fact that politics is territorially organised remains beyond question. Rather it is the *location* of borders that is under question. As Hannah Arendt showed, since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 ethnic minorities have realised that in order to protect their culture and freedom, i.e. to have national self-determination, they must attain their own sovereign territorial state.[227] This is reflected in Murphy's assertion that the sovereign territorial ideal has been overwhelmingly dominant since the first world war: sovereignty is vested in territory and a breach or violation of territory is a violation of sovereignty. This perhaps provides some insight into the force and violence of states' responses to "infiltrating" undocumented migrants.

In summary, we have come from a reality where, "[m]ultiple, often shifting claims to authority over territory in the pre-Westphalian world precluded a fusion of identity and space on any but the smallest scale or in a lasting and legitimate way"[228] to one in which the fact that territorially discrete states are the medium for the organisation of political and social life is unquestioned. Yet, the factual historicity of the territorial system of states is important because it demonstrates its contingency and consequent potential for transformation. David Delaney expresses it succinctly:

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[225] Agnew and Corbridge, p. 97.

[226] Heisler, p. 242.

[227] Arendt, pp. 267–302.

[228] Heisler, p. 242.

> *"Far from being a timeless and universal feature of human social existence, territory is deeply historical, (and historically contingent) in a number of ways. ...it is important to remember that the sovereign territorial state has been a global phenomenon for less than 60 years."*[229]

This opens it up to interrogation and critique as it no longer appears to be a given, commonsense fact of political life and becomes recognisably subject to human agency. However, if we are to do this then alternative structures for the organisation of social and political life must be imaginable and imagined.

2.4.2 Alternatives to the Sovereign Territorial Ideal?

It is difficult to imagine alternative forms of spatial political organisation when all of our political structures operate at and sustain a territorial understanding of politics. Even when we have political structures that operate at a different scale, of which there are few, they are generally conceived of in state-like terms.

Murphy argues that the European Union, rather than undermining the sovereign territorial ideal, actually reinforces it because it is consistently imagined in state-like terms.[230] Nevertheless, although the European Union is state-like in many ways, it is *not* a state, and its assumption of certain powers that previously were vested in individual states has perhaps hinted at possibilities of layered accountabilities, beyond the state monopolisation of all political power.

The border regime is, in fact, one such area that has been largely assumed by the European Union, for example, with the Schengen regulations.[231] In practice, however, from the perspective of the undocumented migrant this has had little effect, merely displacing the authority from individual states to a yet more de-localised (and unaccountable) authority, and displacing the geographical location of the border

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[229] David Delaney, *Territory: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 12.

[230] "...most analyses of the European Union continue to treat it either as a puppet of the member states or as a superstate in its own right. In the former case, the continuation of the territorial status quo is assumed, In the latter, some adjustment in the current political map is contemplated, but not in the nature of the system itself." Murphy, p. 106.

[231] European Commission Home Affairs Directorate General, 'Schengen Area', *European Commission*, 2012 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm> [accessed 23 January 2013].

crossing from the state borders to the outer boundary of the EU, in particular the Mediterranean.[232] In this aspect of its operation then, the European Union is state-like, vigorously defending its claimed right to exclude whomsoever it chooses. In the European case, responsibility for border enforcement has been removed from individual states to Frontex to a certain extent, yet the border regime continues to operate as before, certainly from the perspective of the poorest who encounter it.[233] This is why it is important to separate analytically the border regime from the state to demythologise it as a bulwark against chaos.

Paradoxically, although its operation is as oppressive as ever, this partial de-linking of the border control aspect of state functioning from the individual states may give a glimpse of potential alternative border orders in which the criteria for membership – the applicable border regime – can vary according to the relevant aspect of state function, as advocated by Benhabib. Different membership criteria are appropriate for a just and equitable dispensation of the particular benefits of each state function.

In summary, as John Ruggie reminds us, "The modern system of states is socially constructed."[234] John Agnew elucidates: "[t]he modern geopolitical imagination is a system of visualizing the world with deep historic roots in the European encounter with the world as a whole. It is a constructed view of the world, *not* a simple spontaneous vision that arises from simply looking out at the world with 'common sense'."[235] He goes on to conclude that "[t]here was nothing inevitable about the

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[232] Andrew Geddes analyses this phenomenon, arguing that "...while the meaning of territory and territoriality have changed as a result of European integration, this does not mean that migration controls in Europe have been deterritorialized. Rather ... there has been a 'rebundling of authority' at the EU level..." Andrew Geddes, 'Borders, Territory and Migration in the European Union: From the Politics of Migration in Europe to the European Politics of Migration', in *Of States, Rights, and Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship*, ed. by Oliver Schmidtke and Saime Ozcurumez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 205–224 (p. 205).

[233] Bridget Anderson shows how state authorities have been concerned with regulating the movement of the poor since at least the middle ages and places the current border regime in this context. Bridget Anderson, 'Migration: Controlling the Unsettled Poor', *openDemocracy*, 2011 <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/bridget-anderson/migration-controlling-unsettled-poor>.

[234] John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 180.

[235] Agnew, p. 6.

emergence of the system of territorial states"[236] and (with Stuart Corbridge) that therefore "[t]he territorial state society is a historically and geographically contingent one."[237]

My intention here is not to enumerate all the different alternative political territorial constellations that have been proposed or imagined, but to undermine the power of the commonsense aspect of the ideology of the territorial system of states by demonstrating its contingent (and ideological) nature so that its consequences can be revealed as such (rather than cast as depoliticized and naturalised, inevitable or "tragic" events,[238]) and thus to open it up to critical analysis and re-imagination. Pierre Bourdieu notes how such an analysis enables understanding of the political nature of what appears natural:

> *What appears to us today as self-evident, as beneath consciousness and choice, has quite often been the stake of struggles and instituted only as the result of dogged confrontations between dominant and dominated groups. The major effect of historical evolution is to abolish history by relegating to the past ,i.e. , to the unconscious, the lateral possibles that it eliminated. The analysis of the genesis of the state as the foundation of the principles of vision and division operative within its territorial expanse enables us to understand at once the doxic adherence to the order established by the state as well as the properly political foundations of such apparently natural adherence.*[239]

The fact is, as Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson claim, citing Peter Sahlins' authoritative study of the development of the France-Spain border in the Pyrenees, that "...there is no intrinsic, inherent nor necessary relationship between territory, identity and sovereignty."[240]

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[236] Agnew, p. 56.

[237] Agnew and Corbridge, p. 94.

[238] For example: "While the national and EU media do mention most shipwrecks and major migrant deaths, they tend with few exceptions to present these deaths as fatalities, accidents, and tragedies." Albahari, p. 2.

[239] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field', *Sociological Theory*, 12 (1994), 1–18 (p. 15).

[240] Donnan and Wilson, p. 52. referencing Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

2.5 Conclusion

Despite this bleak picture, hope remains in the recollection that "...the idea that political structures are importantly, if not almost entirely, ideational, rather than material, and thus the product of human agency, massively extends the realm and role of choice in international politics, and with choice comes ethics."[241] Human agency remains important and so there is potential for change and transformation.

Despite the fact that there is no necessary relationship between territory, identity and sovereignty, I have endeavoured to explain, from the history of geopolitical and international relations development, why this does not seem to be the case. Yet this political explanation does not seem to satisfy as an answer as to why we generally accept as legitimate a structure which, from an (attempted) objective perspective, systemically discriminates between people, producing human rights violations, deaths and suffering for those who, usually through no fault of their own, cannot produce the *papiers* it needs.

States' legitimacy depends on the social goods they provide, some of which require a delimited membership to operate. Communitarian justifications for border discrimination based on a supposed "national" cohesion, regulated through citizenship are not resilient to critique; the inherent diversity of state populations and the arbitrary location of some borders are some of the difficulties communitarian claims fail to overcome.

The inherent contradictions between democratic and liberal conceptions of equality are brought into relief when we look at the violent consequences of the way the border system currently operates for those who fail to fulfil its criteria. They expose the incompatibility between states' declarations concerning the universality of human rights, and their discriminatory nature in terms of membership.

The exclusivist ideal of national homogeneity which operates behind discourses legitimating such discrimination at the borders is also ethically unjustified, as well as often having ugly racist or xenophobic roots, with attendant potential for populist political exploitation. Alternative modes of bordering have been suggested, most promisingly those which detach territoriality from membership and use appropriate

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[241] Williams, p. 9.

criteria, such as the length of residence in a country, to determine access to particular social or political privileges.

I have shown that continuing popular support for the current border regime has more visceral and emotive roots than mere concern for the practical benefits of the state system would warrant. "Top-down", political explanations seem inadequate in the legitimating force they have at the level of the individual. I submit that the real power of the ideology of the territorial system of states to dominate the imagination is symbolic in origin, reproduced and reinforced in its continual discursive reproduction in myth and ritual practices that are re-enacted repeatedly and often unthinkingly, from the "bottom-up". This is what I will explore in the next chapter and I submit that it is in this discursive reproduction, from the "bottom-up", rather than in choices in the realm of international relations, that agency has the greatest potential to transform the structures of society.

3 Myth, Ritual and the Politics of the Border Regime

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter incorporated an analysis of the territorialised state system under the commonsense fingerprint, noting that borders are simply regarded as a natural ordering and thus remain unquestioned as an ahistorical fact of political life. I uncovered this as "myth" by demonstrating the recent nature of current spatial power constellations.

In this chapter I continue this analysis by deploying the other fingerprints of emotive use of symbols, categorisation and altruism. The fingerprints of categorisation and the use of emotive symbols have in common the fact that they operate primarily in the symbolic rather than ethical or material plane. Having briefly developed working definitions of symbol, myth and ritual and their working, I look at two fundamental classes of myth that lie behind much of the symbolic discourse around borders and those who encounter them. They are myths of difference (distinguishing "Us" from "Them") and scarcity. I claim that myths of difference, in themselves, need not be discriminatory or sources of contestation and domination. However, when they interact with myths of scarcity, they turn those who are deemed different into a threat.

In the light of this claim, I then examine various types of border-associated myth and ritual and trace how they draw on the more fundamental myths of difference and scarcity to categorise the Other and cast her as a threat. This contributes to a justification of discrimination against her and a reification or naturalisation of the border system that performs that discrimination.

Finally, I examine the role that altruism plays in reinforcing the domination of the border regime in the imagination by working to legitimate it as benevolent, or at least benign, whilst de-legitimating discourses that criticise it.

3.2 The Symbolic is Real Politics

Pierre Bourdieu claims that "the state ... is the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power."[242] If this is the case, then an analysis of the symbolic aspects of the system of territorial borders which adheres so tightly to the concept of the state in the modern imagination, would be useful. I thus look to the work of political anthropologists who have examined the system of territorial borders for insights in this area. With their keen awareness of the importance of ritual and myth in the production of social order, they offer a fresh insight into the power of borders in the imagination.

Borders and the bureaucracy that surrounds them are a locus of many "performances" which could be categorised as rituals which merit analysis, for example, queueing in (categorised) lines awaiting the approval of documents by a uniformed officer, applying for work permits or residency, customs searches, passport applications, clandestine night-time border crossings and citizenship and language proficiency tests. These rituals are also reinforced through many myths which concern those they categorise as different to "us". These myths use various telling metaphors which can implicitly legitimate discrimination by essentialising people who are "other" (as well as ourselves) or naturalising the concept of the state as delimiting a natural territory and group of people.

One political anthropologist, David Kertzer notes that "[p]eople are not generally aware that they themselves endow the world with their own symbolically constructed version of reality. On the contrary, people believe the world simply presents itself in the form in which it is perceived."[243] If one looks for it, one can see the importance of symbolic discourse in politics. For example, whether consciously or unconsciously, politicians *are* aware of the importance of symbolism and the invisibility of its operation, and are skilful manipulators of symbolically powerful myths and rituals. Their words and actions convey their understanding that:

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[242] Bourdieu, p. 9.

[243] Kertzer, p. 4.

> *[t]he symbolic is not a residual dimension of purportedly real politics; still less is it an insubstantial screen upon which real issues are cast in pale and passive form. The symbolic is real politics, articulated in a special and often most powerful way.*[244]

In this chapter I argue that symbolic discourse via myth and ritual is of key importance in the particular goal of understanding the seeming contradiction between the persistent perceived legitimacy of the border regime and its systemic infringement of supposedly cherished and "inalienable" human rights.

3.2.1 Symbolic Discourse through Ritual and Myth

Before going further it is important to briefly describe my understanding of the important concepts of symbol, myth and ritual.

Clifford Geertz uses the term symbol in the sense of "any physical, social or cultural act or object that serves as a vehicle for a conception."[245] Kertzer notes that in these terms the conception contains the meaning of the symbol. He further breaks down the characteristics of symbols, observing that they have characteristics of:

- Condensation: they have many diverse associations which interact subconsciously (and hence more powerfully) and become associated in the mind of the observer to produce new meaning.
- Multivocality: They mean different things to different people.
- Ambiguity: They have no single, precise meaning. In other words, they "...are not arcane ways of saying something that could be more precisely expressed in simple declarative form. The complexity and uncertainty of meaning of symbols are sources of their strength."[246]

A further important characteristic of symbolic operation is its invisibility. As mentioned earlier, we are not conscious of the fact that we interpret the world around us through symbolic lenses. The symbolic universe is hidden (from our perception as well as from empirical analysis).

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[244] Clive S. Kessler, *Islam and Politics in a Malay State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 244–245.

[245] Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', in *Ideology*, ed. by Terry Eagleton (New York: Longman Publishing, 1994), pp. 279–294 (p. 291).

[246] Kertzer, p. 11.

These characteristics mean that symbols can work effectively to engender a sense of cohesion without consensus. Because symbols are multivocal, they can elicit an emotive response from people, each for a different reason, engendering a sense of cohesion which obviates the need for discussion and consensus-building before collective action.

This collective action often takes the form of ritual, which Kertzer defines as "...the repetitive use of emotionally charged symbols in symbolically significant locations at symbolically appropriate times."[247] Here, he follows a middle path between overly restrictive definitions in the tradition of Durkheim, which have confined ritual to religious rites, and more inclusive ones which incorporate any repeated action.[248] It is evident from Kertzer's definition that the building blocks of ritual are emotive symbols. I thus envision ritual as an enacted language of which symbols represent the words. Without its symbolic content, ritual is merely habit or custom. In any case, as Kertzer points out, it is not possible to define ritual exactly, it is more helpful to ask if a particular definition is more or less useful than another in helping us gain understanding.[249]

The multivocality of symbols mean that although we all may be using the same words, they do not mean the same thing to all of us, thus the appeal of a particular ritual for each of its participants comes from their own values and personal history. Kertzer notes that "[t]he common reading of [Emile] Durkheim, that he identified a sense of cohesion with value consensus in his interpretation of ritual, misses the strength of his argument. His genius lies in having recognized that ritual builds a sense of cohesion *without* requiring the sharing of beliefs [i.e. without value consensus]. The sense of cohesion is produced by people *acting* together not by people *thinking* together."[250] Not everyone comes together in ritual for the same reasons, or is attracted to participate because they hold the same values, but the shared experience engenders a powerful sense of communal purpose and can motivate collective action or support for a common cause. This understanding will be important later when

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[247] Kertzer, p. 92.

[248] Christopher G. Flood, *Political Myth* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 182.

[249] Kertzer, p. 8.

[250] Kertzer, p. 76. My italics

considering the effects of border ritual in reifying the territorial ideal of the sovereign state.

Both ritual and myth function to promote social cohesion, yet they have an interesting distinction between them (other than the fact that myth operates through language and ritual through action); that is, that ritual is expressed through fixed rules which govern its execution. It retains its potency only as long as these rules persist. If the context changes such that this is no longer the case, the meaning of the ritual changes. It may then be abandoned or no longer function as it did originally. That is why new political regimes institute new rituals and older ones become associated with the former political order and thus become subversive. Neither myth nor ritual are static and unchanging, but both are continually evolved and adapted to new social and political contexts. On the other hand, according to the political philosopher Chiara Bottici, myth promotes social cohesion through variants that are always grounded in a particular context. Thus myth must be able to adapt to changes in context:

> *In the last analysis, political rituals must remain unchanged in order to promote social cohesion, whereas political myths, having to ground always-changing circumstances, must be open to change in order to promote the same purpose.*[251]

While I agree with Bottici here on myth, I think that her assertion on the unchanging nature of ritual is overstated unless one holds a very restrictive definition of ritual (which she implicitly appears to) which includes religious and formal state ceremonies. I, after anthropologists such as Kertzer, Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson,[252] adopt a slightly more inclusive definition which includes border rituals such as presenting passports to border officers at airports which do vary depending on the context, whilst retaining a common function of engendering a sense of cohesion (and exclusion of others). However, it is useful to bear her distinction between myth and ritual in mind.

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[251] Chiara Bottici, *A Philosophy of Political Myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 183.

[252] Donnan and Wilson include certain business practices in their conception of ritual: "Businesses, governments, universities and sports teams use ritual to socialise people into the corporate ethos." Donnan and Wilson, p. 67.

3.2.2 Myth and Ritual can be Emancipatory as well as Conservative

The above discussion seems to offer a fairly fatalistic picture of the working of symbolic discourse and practice. However both Kertzer and Richard Kearney emphasize the emancipatory potential of ritual and myth respectively. Kearney maintains that "[m]yth ... is a living dimension of culture which can serve either a negative *ideological* or a positive *utopian* function".[253] For him "... myth is neither good nor bad but interpretation makes it so."[254] His thesis is that "demythologisation", or the unmasking (but not discrediting) of the interpretative work done with myth is necessary before its emancipatory potential can be engaged.

Teun van Dijk[255] and David Kertzer[256] both use the concept of cognitive schema (or mental models) from cognitive psychology to explain how ideology operates by offering simplifying frameworks which unconsciously facilitate evaluation of events. Kertzer notes that:

> *[t]here is thus a strong conservative bias built into our perceptions and our thought processes. Since we interpret what we encounter in daily life in terms of pre-established schemas that tell us what to expect, we tend to ignore information that conflicts with our schema, just as we seize on any information that appears to confirm it.*[257]

People do, however, make use of a variety of schemas and can switch between them. Thus the same experience can be interpreted in different ways, so for Kertzer also, ritual is not an inherently conservative force:

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[253] Kearney, p. 8. He uses the term utopian in a generous and inclusive sense, rather than as a narrow, hegemonic imposition.

[254] Kearney, p. 18.

[255] van Dijk, chap. 7.

[256] Kertzer, p. 81.

[257] Kertzer, p. 80.

> *Rituals do change in form, in symbolic meaning, and in social effects; new rituals arise and old rituals fade away. These changes come through individual creative activity. People, in short are not just slaves of ritual, or slaves of symbols, they are also molders and creators of ritual. It is because people create and alter rituals that they are such powerful tools of political action.*[258]

Not everyone can mould ritual with equal success, however. Those with more power and influence over public discourse can harness the power of ritual to their own ends more easily. Thus, although ritual does have creative and emancipatory potential, it nevertheless has a conservative bias because of the dominating influence of extant power relations in providing the appropriate symbolic interpretations for ritual practices.[259]

So, myth and ritual both use "already worked upon" symbolic language. Their building blocks are emotive symbols that, in their multivocality, can appeal to many different people for different reasons and engender a sense of cohesion. I now look at the symbolic operation of the border regime and how it renders the territorial system of states as commonsense and categorises people through myth and ritual.

3.2.3 The Importance of a Symbolic Analysis of Border Politics

Kertzer holds that there is a common conceit that "people in modern societies behave in pragmatic, goal-oriented ways"[260] and that therefore the effects of symbolic as opposed to pragmatic stimuli on people's political behaviour has been under-appreciated.

For example, people repeatedly vote for parties and candidates whose policies would harm their material interests because of the symbolic power and importance of other stated policies. Consider the support for the U.S. Republican party among working class voters in the "Bible Belt". Republican tax and fiscal policies hurt the economic

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[258] Kertzer, p. 12.

[259] "Through symbolism we recognise who are the powerful and who are the weak, and through the manipulation of symbols the powerful reinforce their authority. Yet, the weak, too, can try to put on new clothes and to strip the clothes from the mighty." Kertzer, p. 4,5.

[260] Kertzer, p. 3.

interests of working class Americans and favour those of the wealthiest but they retain their support because of their declared positions on "moral" issues such as abortion. Republican strategists certainly understand the symbolic power of those issues and their capacity to effect action in terms of voting behaviour. In co-operation with various "religious right" organisations they have successfully reduced the scope of "morality" in political discourse to a small number of issues, chief of which is abortion. I argue that the symbolic dimension of border politics, codified in border rituals and expressed in common myths, some of which are catalogued below, has similarly narrowed the field of moral consideration to exclude those who fall outside desireable categories in many people's imaginations.

To quote Kertzer:

> *Politics is expressed through symbolism. Rather little that is political involves the use of direct force, and, though material resources are crucial to the political process, even their distribution and use are largely shaped through symbolic means. To understand the political process, then, it is necessary to understand how the symbolic enters into politics, how political actors consciously and unconsciously manipulate symbols, and how this symbolic dimension relates to the material bases of political power.*[261]

It is important to recall that the border regime is not a natural and given order of spatial power relations, but a political construct, which I argue serves the political interests of certain groups over those of other groups, in particular, undocumented migrants. If it is true that to understand politics, the study of the role of the symbolic must not be neglected, and that the border regime is a political construct, then an analysis of the border regime in terms of its symbolic manifestations in myth and ritual would be instructive.

This will also involve discussion of the state, as the symbolic power of the border in people's imaginations is very closely tied to that of the state, as I argued in the previous chapter. It is nevertheless important to maintain the two as analytically distinct: a criticism of the character of the extant border regime is not necessarily a rejection of the institution of the sovereign state.

In his discussion on the role of symbolic discourse in politics, Michael Walzer points out that "[t]he state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen,

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[261] Kertzer, p. 2.

symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived."[262] Emotional interaction with the state occurs in the symbolic plane. This emotional interaction is materially reinforced at the border in the rituals undertaken there. These rituals have an emotional impact which reifies state power and state territoriality as a natural and legitimate order in the imagination. In other words, border ritual reflects the commonsense fingerprint of ideological working.

> *The state, which epitomises the belief in the homology between culture, identity, territory and nation, is a structure of power. Boundary making and breaking within and between states is a political act which can be seen to support or oppose that structure.*[263]

Borders are essential in reinforcing the belief in this homology as it is expressed territorially and this is evident in the rituals practised there and their place in political myth-making and manipulation.

In studying border myth and ritual I will probe the symbolic meaning of the border and thus demonstrate that an analysis of the border regime in terms of its symbolic manifestations in myth and ritual is indeed instructive as it throws some light on the apparent contradictions inherent in the border regime. In this light, the persistence of these contradictions becomes more comprehensible and the reasons behind the generalised support for the border regime, despite its systemic infringement of supposedly cherished and inalienable human rights are clarified.

3.2.4 Aim: To disclose rather than deconstruct the mythical working of the border regime

In this exercise, the aim is not simply to deconstruct or discredit the myths and rituals (to show that they are not "true"), but rather to disclose them (as I proposed in the first chapter) so that their effectiveness in legitimating and gaining assent for the systems they reinforce can be seen more clearly. In fact, deconstruction of myths can ironically *increase* their power by encouraging their dismissal as important factors in influencing people's behaviour, thus removing them (again) from perception and critique.

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[262] Michael Walzer, 'On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought', *Political Science Quarterly*, 82 (1967), 191–204 (p. 194) <doi:10.2307/2147214>.

[263] Donnan and Wilson, p. 10.

The power of political myth comes, not from its empirical truth (which is often non-existent), but from the more fundamental mythical "truth(s)" it symbolises. Thus exposing the myth itself as factually false has no effect as it does not address the fundamental, mythical "truth" it really speaks to. Mikael Hjerm and Annette Schnabel have illustrated this empirically in the case of attitudes to taxation and redistributive welfare programmes:

> *We show that it is the subjective aspect of national identity, or social cohesion, that in fact matters for predicting attitudes to the welfare state. In comparison, more objective measures of heterogeneity like the inequality of income distribution, language fractionalisation or the percentage of foreign-born individuals do not have any effect on attitudes to the welfare state.*[264]

This supports my contention about the power of emotive symbolic discourse in forming political opinion. If, as Hjerm and Schnabel claim, it is the *subjective* sense of social cohesion that drives attitudes then symbolic discourse, particularly from influential elites such as media and government should be studied, as well as empirical factors.

This is something the political left usually does not "get". Chiara Bottici puts it like this:

> *... what makes a political myth out of a simple narrative is not its content or its claim to truth, ... but the fact that this narrative creates significance, that it is shared by a group and that it affects the specifically political conditions in which this group operates.*[265]

For example, in the debate on President Obama's proposed reforms of the health system in the U.S., the committees analogous to the UK's N.I.C.E. committee[266] (which decides on public health grounds which treatments and drugs the NHS will cover)

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[264] Mikael Hjerm and Annette Schnabel, 'How Much Heterogeneity Can the Welfare State Endure? The Influence of Heterogeneity on Attitudes to the Welfare State', *Nations and Nationalism*, 18 (2012), 346–369 (p. 346) <doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00523.x>.

[265] Bottici, p. 179.

[266] The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence NICE, 'Welcome to the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence' <http://www.nice.org.uk/> [accessed 27 July 2011].

were dubbed "death panels" by the Republicans. This stroke of symbolic genius diverted attention from the current role of private health insurance companies (Health Maintenance Organisations or HMOs) as often genuine "death panels", with a financial incentive to find ways *not* to cover people's treatment, and appealed to the almost primordial symbol (in an American context) of freedom, expressed in the oft-repeated and vote-winning myth of government intrusion into individual's intimate lives.

The Democrats wasted much energy pointing out that these committees would not decide individual cases (unlike the HMOs) and that the moniker was therefore unfair and inappropriate. Yet the damage had already been done and Obama's reforms were irretrievably cast in many people's minds as yet another case of (Democratic) government intrusion into individual liberty. The "truth" or otherwise of the "death panel" myth was irrelevant as its purpose was to associate Obama's proposed reforms with another, more fundamental and powerful myth. The temptation to focus exclusively on deconstructing myth must be resisted, as it distracts attention from the symbolic plane where the myth's work is done.

So the relevant exercises are:

- to ask what are the more fundamental myths evoked by border myth and ritual as well as what they say about a) the established population and b) the "Other" in the guise of undocumented migrants.
- to look at certain paradigmatic border myths and rituals and trace out how they evoke these fundamental myths and thus work ideologically to legitimate the discriminatory categorising work of the border regime examined in the previous chapter.

In doing this the fingerprint framework is being deployed to expose the ideological working of the territorial system of states. This is done by exploring how its symbolic discourse, enacted in myth and ritual which draw upon emotive symbols, reifies the border regime as a commonsense ordering and its categorising of people as natural.

3.3 Fundamental Myths: Difference and Scarcity

I mentioned that myths' power comes not from their empirical "truth", but via the association their symbolic content evokes with other, more fundamental myths, held as axiomatic truths. My thesis concerning the border regime is that two such

fundamental myths are repeatedly and consistently evoked, co-opted and distorted by border myth and ritual. The first is the myth of difference: that "they" are different from "us"; the second is the myth of scarcity which takes various different forms.

There are of course many other myths that are evoked (myths of cultural purity are also prevalent in my area of interest but I would argue that this can be viewed as a variant of the myth of scarcity). However, I wish to focus on these two because of their ubiquity, axiomatic nature, emotive potential and the way in which, taken together, they provide a particularly potent mix in the context of the border regime. I now discuss them in more detail before enumerating some border myths and rituals and demonstrating how they evoke these fundamental myths.

3.3.1 Difference: Categorising "us" as different to "them"

The myth that "they" are different to "us" is the fundamental categorising myth that is characteristic of all ideology. It touches on both the commonsense and categorisation fingerprints of my diagnostic framework: drawing on commonsense understandings of who "we" are and who "they" are to simplify by separating those groups into different essentialised categories. It is relevant not only to the ideology of the territorial state played out in the daily rituals of the border regime, but is in the background of *all* ideological working, from loyalty to one's sport team to affinity with others physically far away who share one's political or religious affiliation.

The emphasis can be on the unity of the "us" (positive), *or* the difference of the "them" (negative) as Kertzer points out:

> *Rituals bring people together, identifying a common allegiance through these symbols and making them feel as one. At the same time, 'negative' rituals – witch-hunts, impeachment trials, mass protests against perceived foreign enemies – reaffirm the national purpose and forge national solidarity through reaction.*[267]

A recent ugly example of the latter from Italian politics was when Silvio Berlusconi blatantly pandered to racist attitudes in the Milan mayoral elections in May 2011: "Milan cannot turn into an Islamic city, a zingaropoli [Gypsytown] full of Roma camps,

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[267] Kertzer, p. 64.

besieged by foreigners to whom the left wants to give the right to vote..."[268] the implication being that Muslims, Roma and foreigners are all different to "us" Italians.

This myth of difference underlies many border myths and rituals, it appeals to a primordial "truth" inherent in all human cultures and part of a commonsense understanding of humanity. It has been a constant throughout human history and thus lends resonance and power to discourses which co-opt it.

To repeat: resonance with primordial mythical "truth" is what is important about co-opting myths, so a preoccupation with dismantling them empirically is not constructive or effective in undermining their potency, although it is usually possible to do so. However, if this is attempted by asking, as Cynthia Weber does: "What must go without saying in order for this myth to be true?"[269], it becomes apparent that generally it is possible to demonstrate that there is no such thing as "us" because within any given designated group there is great diversity and disagreement. However, rather than undermining the potency of the myths and rituals that draw on this fundamental opposition between "us" and "them", this lack of consensus is a demonstration of it. Despite this diversity and disagreement, the myth of difference retains its potency, its "truth". Kertzer explains that "...far from always creating solidarity by reinforcing shared values, one of the crucial functions of ritual is to produce solidarity *in the absence* of any commonality of beliefs."[270]

On its own, the symbolic separation of "them" from "us" need not be oppressive or dominating – difference can be celebrated, tolerated or ignored. I argue that it is the *interaction* of this fundamental myth of difference with the myth of scarcity that provides the exclusionary and discriminatory impetus behind ideologies of domination and oppression, including that of the territorial state exercised through the border regime. So it is the myth of scarcity that I must next address.

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[268] BBC, 'Berlusconi in "Gypsytown" Warning', *BBC*, 23 May 2011, section Europe <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13507941> [accessed 9 June 2011].

[269] Cynthia Weber, p. xvi.

[270] I prefer to speak of a "sense of cohesion" rather than use the term "solidarity" as Kertzer does. I use solidarity in its other sense of support for others who are suffering or struggling. Kertzer, p. 66. My italics.

3.3.2 The Postulate of Scarcity

I extrapolate the myth of scarcity from Nicholas Xenos who shows how the postulate of scarcity underlies liberal economic and political theory.[271] He traces it back to the work of Adam Smith and David Hume who built their theories of wealth generation and justice on the basis of a postulate of scarcity. Scarcity here is understood as based on a conception of human needs which

> *"...(1) emphasizes their social dimension, thus accepting the elasticity of the concept of need and the difficulty of distinguishing between needs and desires when material objects are involved, and (2) encourages their rational pursuit as a socially desirable project."*[272]

For Smith, this elasticity of need comes from social inequality, but this inequality is essential for the motivation it provides to generate wealth which benefits the whole of society. This is a circular process as more wealth provides more goods precipitating a further extended conception of need and so on. For Hume, then, the protection of property gained through industriousness is the fundamental duty of any system of justice.

> *Scarcity is thus a cause of society and the basis for government. Justice assumes the character of security for property rights in this scheme, which is to say that it is simply an extension of principles derived from the supposition of scarcity.*[273]

Xenos then demonstrates how this underlying assumption of scarcity underpinned the genesis of the new science of economics, particularly in Carl Menger's Marginal Utility Theory whereby actors exchange in the marketplace based upon their conceptions of the relative values of goods in order to maximise the satisfaction of their perceived needs. "Markets are thus seen in neoclassical economics as a natural institutional setting for a social order based on scarcity."[274]

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[271] Nicholas Xenos, 'Liberalism and the Postulate of Scarcity', *Political Theory*, 15 (1987), 225–243.

[272] Xenos, 'Scarcity', p. 226.

[273] Xenos, 'Scarcity', p. 228.

[274] Xenos, 'Scarcity', pp. 235–6.

The scarcity postulate also finds its way into liberal conceptions of justice, where John Rawls invokes it in establishing the necessary context for the existence of justice. There is no need for justice in situations of abundance, only in situations of scarcity:

> *...the circumstances of justice obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity. Unless these circumstances existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice, just as in the absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no occasion for physical courage.*[275]

Thus, as Xenos points out, in the dominant understandings of both economics and justice, "...scarcity assumes the form of a myth..."[276] which justifies exclusionary institutions and practices in a discourse of property and security, legitimating and making acceptable huge inequalities in wealth and sustaining discourses which place responsibility for the predicament of the poor on their own shoulders.

3.3.3 Scarcity Turns Difference into Threat

While conventional economic theory does not adopt a zero-sum perspective, instead envisioning continuous economic growth, it nevertheless depends on an understanding of economic goods as scarce and desirable, thus engendering a competitive environment for their attainment. However, when it comes to territorial space there *is* a zero-sum situation so the potency of myth and ritual which draws upon the fundamental myth of scarcity is all the greater. The territorial surface of the earth is a resource which, unlike economic resources, is fixed, and therefore by definition, scarce.

The ideology of the territorial system of states, as discussed earlier, delimits difference spatially. As already demonstrated, the history of this spatialisation is recent but it now has a commonsense place as "eternal": a sense of "Irish-ness" or "German-ness" is very much "real" in common understanding and linked to ancestral origin in the territorial area of those states.

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[275] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 128.

[276] Xenos, 'Scarcity', p. 239.

The border regime obtains potency as a focus of myth and ritual because it co-opts symbolic power from both of these fundamental myths of difference and scarcity by spatialising identity and associating it with a scarce resource. This double co-option (of the myths of scarcity and difference) ratchets up the emotive effect of border myth and ritual dramatically: "they" are different to "us" becomes "we" belong "here"; scarcity turns difference into a threat.

The anthropologist Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo describes the power of the border in symbolically separating "them" from "us" and in marking this space as "ours" in his study of the border between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Melilla.[277] He supports Liam O'Dowd's argument that

> *borders are integral to human behaviour—they are a product of the need for order, control and protection in human life and they reflect our contending desires for sameness and difference, for a marker between 'us' and 'them'.*[278]

For Kertzer, this "master fiction" that the world is divided into a fixed number of mutually exclusive "nations" and that "[t]his symbolic conception of the universe leads people to believe that everyone 'has' a nationality, in the same sense that everyone has a gender"[279] operates as a cognitive schema, affecting interpretation of border events by offering categories into which border-crossers can be classified.

The ideological explicatory power of the border regime through the spatialisation of identity is evident in discourse concerning migration, asylum seekers and "illegal immigrants", categories of people generated by the border regime and codified by its symbolic documents in the form of visas and work permits. They do not fit this simple schema of nation and territory and are thus rejected as legitimate members of society and cast as a problem (in need of a solution). They represent exceptions in Agamben's sense and thus the state exerts its biopower all the more forcefully over them.

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[277] Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo, 'Theorizing the Spanish-Moroccan Border Reconfiguration: Framing a Process of Geopolitical, Functional and Symbolic Rebordering', 2006 <www.qub.ac.uk/cibr> [accessed 9 February 2011].

[278] Liam O'Dowd, 'The Changing Significance of European Borders', in *New Borders for a Changing Europe. Cross-Border Cooperation and Governance*, ed. by J Anderson, L O'Dowd and T Wilson (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 4.

[279] Kertzer, p. 6.

Another example of the categorising power of this double co-option (of difference and scarcity by the ideology of the border regime) is evident in coverage of systemically produced disasters such as deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean. Demonstrating such migrants' reduction to bare life or *homo sacer*, against whom it is impossible to commit a crime, these disasters are cast as inevitable "tragic" accidents resulting from the choices and behaviour of the people involved. Systemic factors behind the incidents are elided from media and government accounts.

The myths of difference and scarcity, spatialised by the border regime can fulfil Dagger and Ball's four functions of ideology:[280] explanation, evaluation, orientation and political program in analysis of "illegal immigration". "Illegal immigration" is explained by scarcity-driven desire; it is evaluated as undesirable both because allowing it would entail the moral hazard of undermining justice by infringing property rights, and because its orientative function has constructed "our" identity in opposition to "theirs" and so they have no right to be in "our" space. Finally, all of this combines to construct "illegal immigrants" as a threat, which points towards a political programme which seeks to eliminate illegal immigration (and "illegal immigrants").

I now analyse some myths and rituals relevant to the border system and those who encounter it through the lens of the diagnostic fingerprint framework, specifically categorisation and use of emotive symbols. I point out the use of emotive symbolic discourse to categorise people whose differential treatment thus becomes justifiable or, failing that, is cast as their own responsibility, a result of their own (foolish or nefariously motivated) decisions.

3.4 Categorisation in Border Myth

We can briefly trace various ways that the myths of difference and scarcity function to legitimate the discriminatory border regime through symbolic discourse which (usually at an unconscious level) draws on these myths and implicitly creates

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[280] To remind us: Explanation: Ideologies offer deceptively simple explanations for complex phenomena (Why do asylum seekers come here?); evaluation: Ideologies offer standards for evaluating social phenomena (e.g. Gay marriage as a good thing?); orientation (Who am I? Where do I fit? Who are we?); political program (What should we do? How should we do it?) Ball and Dagger, p. 5.

distinctions which categorise "them" and "us". Again, the empirical veracity of these myths is not what is important, and is often not believed even by their proponents.

Certain tropes are common in media and social discourse concerning immigration which draw on myths of difference and scarcity. Examples are: the container metaphor for the state, images of migrants as carriers of impurity, dirtiness or disease, and natural disaster as metaphor for immigration, particularly undocumented immigration. What is common to them all is that they transform the migrant "Other" into a threat, either to "our" scarce resources (of land or social welfare benefits), to "our" cultural purity or to "our" social order.

3.4.1 *Container Metaphor*

David Delaney notes that the territorial state is viewed as having existed prior to society. It is therefore viewed as a container of society which itself then becomes a national phenomenon.[281] Thus a threat to, or penetration of, the container is transformed into a threat to the security of society and consequently one's own individual security: physical, ontological and economic.[282]

Jonathan Charteris-Black shows how container metaphors are used as a method of self-legitimation by right wing politicians in Britain.[283] He observes the particular power of the image of Britain as a container because it merges a time concept with a spatial concept. It "... implies that controlling immigration through maintaining the security of borders (a space-based concept) will ensure control over the rate of social change (a time-based concept)."[284] Implicit in these metaphors is the contention that the inherent difference of the undocumented migrants who transgress the boundaries of the container illegitimately becomes a threat to "our" collective, bounded identity by inducing social change through their very bodily presence.

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[281] Delaney, p. 58.

[282] Skey; Agnew, p. 12.

[283] He quotes the 2005 BNP election manifesto: "Britain is *full up* and the government of Britain has as its first responsibility the welfare, security and long-term preservation of the native people of Britain." Jonathan Charteris-Black, 'Britain as a Container: Immigration Metaphors in the 2005 Election Campaign', *Discourse and Society*, 17 (2006), 563–581 (p. 575) <doi:10.1177/ 0957926506066345>. Charteris-Black's emphasis.

[284] Charteris-Black, p. 579.

Immigrants also cause a build-up of "pressure" in the container with the perceived demands they place on services such as housing, education and jobs, playing on the scarcity myth, as indicated in these quotations gathered by Bríd Ní Chonaill in her study of attitudes to immigrants in the Blanchardstown area of Dublin:

> *They come into this country they get houses ... but in saying that my government have me like that. I'm not racist, don't get me wrong, but they have me the way I am, the way I feel about them. I don't blame the people coming into the country I blame the government.*[285]

> *...they are taking our jobs: I mean only for this job in probably another two years it'll be all foreign workers working here. I mean we won't get a job do you know what I mean, they are taking our jobs. I don't care what anyone says, they are.*[286]

These quotations illustrate the classic disclaimer of racism and an explicit rejection of any attempt to "disprove" the stereotype that "they are taking our jobs", hinting at the importance of its underlying "truth" to the worldview of the speaker, indicating that the truth of these assertions would be received as a personal attack.

3.4.2 *Natural Disaster Metaphor*

This perceived pressure on (scarce) resources is a common theme which is often spoken of as being the result of immigration. A common metaphor here is that of natural disaster, particularly in terms of water such as floods, waves, bursting or tides. This discursively reverses the *de-facto* precarity of the situation of unwanted migrants and turns them into a threat, making the established population the vulnerable group.[287] Some examples may illustrate:

- "Participants acknowledged the scarcity of resources in the area where services like schools and hospitals are 'stretched to the limits', 'bursting at

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[285] Bríd Ní Chonaill, 'The Impact of Migrants on Resources: A Critical Assessment of the Views of People Working/Living in the Blanchardstown Area', *Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social Transformation Review*, 2 (2007), 70–89 (p. 82).

[286] Ní Chonaill, p. 79.

[287] Alexandria J. Innes, 'When the Threatened Become the Threat: The Construction of Asylum Seekers in British Media Narratives', *International Relations*, 24 (2010), 456–477 <doi:10.1177/0047117810385882>.

the seams' and the fact that there was no plan when the 'explosion' happened."[288]

- "Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday that the recent 'flood of illegal workers infiltrating from Africa' into Israel was 'a concrete threat to the Jewish and democratic character of the country.'"[289] This draws on both the scarcity and difference myths.
- Silvio Berlusconi referred to the arrivals from Tunisia in the wake of the revolution there as "...a human tsunami".[290]

In such examples unwanted migrants are symbolised as a natural disaster in the form of the overwhelming power of water, usually the sea, which breaks or infiltrates the imagined container of the "pure" community. This rhetoric transforms a group whose human rights, and often lives are actually under threat, into a perceived threat to the established community.

3.4.3 *Cultural and Physical Purity: Disease and animalisation metaphors*

The myth of cultural homogeneity within the borders and irreconcilable cultural difference without finds resonance in metaphors of purity, impurity, disease and infiltration as well as animalisation in discourse concerning undocumented migration in particular.

Examples include the strong assertion by Benjamin Netanyahu quoted in the above article where he speaks of the Jewish character of the state as well as claiming that "[i]nfiltrations [into Israel] have become an entire industry..."[291] Charteris-Black notes how The Daily Mail brings AIDS into a discussion of migration:

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[288] Ní Chonaill, pp. 83–84.

[289] Barak Ravid, 'Netanyahu: Illegal African Immigrants - a Threat to Israel's Jewish Character - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News', *Haaretz* (Jerusalem, 18 July 2010) <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/netanyahu-illegal-african-immigrants-a-threat-to-israel-s-jewish-character-1.302653> [accessed 15 June 2011].

[290] Corriere Della Sera, 'Berlusconi: "It Is a Human Tsunami"', *Corriere Della Sera*, 2011 <http://www.corriere.it/politica/11_aprile_01/immigrazione-piano-cabina-regia_ef3d7c94-5c38-11e0-b06c-b43ad3228bba.shtml> [accessed 13 April 2011]. Charteris-Black gives further examples which speak of "a nightly tidal wave of asylum seekers", "a growing flood of Roma asylum seekers" and "trickle of applicants [that] has become a flood." Charteris-Black, pp. 570–571.

[291] Ravid.

> *. . . heterosexually-acquired HIV has taken off, growing by a factor of five in the last 10 years to reach 3,800 new cases last year. And of those infections, 90 per cent are believed to have been acquired overseas, mostly in Africa.*
> *According to Dr Kevin Fenton, a co-author of the report, 'this increase . . . is largely contributed to by the migration of people from areas of the world where there is a high prevalence of HIV, such as sub-Saharan Africa' (Sir Andrew Green, The Daily Mail, 2 December 2004).*[292]

Shahram Khosravi lists animalistic slang terms from all over the world for undocumented migrants and situates them in the language of ritual sacrifice; his use of the word "transgressors" indicating a perception of those who cross borders without authorisation as sinning against the sacred order of the world.

> *The vulnerability of border transgressors is best demonstrated by their animalisation. The terminology used in this field is full of names of animals to designate human smugglers and their clients; coyote for the human smuggler and pollos (chickens) for Mexican border crossers (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 135); shetou (snakehead) for Chinese human smugglers and renshe (human snakes) for smuggled Chinese (Chin 1999: 187). Iranians usually use the terms gosfand (sheep) or dar poste gosfand (in the skin of sheep) to refer to 'illegal' border crossers. Represented in terms of chicken and sheep – two animals traditionally sacrificed in rituals – the border transgressors are sacrificial creatures for the border ritual.*[293]

Donnan and Wilson expand on the implications of this discourse of disease and animalisation:

> *Spread of disease and the use of animal imagery are transparently metaphors for talking about something else: the undesirability of the alien. By narrating this in terms of disease and animal categories, the antipathy to the alien is naturalised and even racialised as an element of foreign bodies which is immutable and inherent, a justificatory mechanism for exclusion and closure.*[294]

It is implicit (commonsense) in these metaphors that the cultural purity of the established community is a good that should be protected, so they function to justify

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[292] Charteris-Black, pp. 574–575.

[293] Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller', p. 324.

[294] Donnan and Wilson, p. 136.

exclusion and discrimination based on the ideological categories of the territorial system of states which cast these Others as diseased or less-than-human.

3.4.4 *Ethical Purity: Criminalisation and securitisation metaphors*

Portrayal of intending immigrants as a criminal and terrorist threat is widespread and reflects the construction of justice in Humean terms as fundamentally concerned with the protection of property. In this sense the property is the communal property of the territory and the accumulated wealth of the ("decent, hard-working") national people which is desired and threatened by undesirable immigrants. Not only are immigrants portrayed as criminals in the sense of stealing (individual's) property, but also as lazy welfare scroungers[295], who steal the communal property of tax revenue (rarely is the fact that immigrants are also tax-payers highlighted in state or media discourse, or that asylum seekers in Ireland are forced to rely on state provision because they are not allowed to work) as well as potential terrorists whose intention is to steal away "our" way of life itself.[296] This is not always expressed explicitly, but the frequent description of the established community as "law-abiding", undocumented migrants as "illegal" immigrants and the use of phrases such as "terrorists, traffickers and illegal immigrants" implicitly suggests that immigrants have a predisposition to act illegally – a discursive passive criminalisation.[297]

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[295] "[Noel] O'Flynn [TD] remarked earlier this year [2002] that some asylum-seekers in Cork were spongers, freeloaders and conmen. Not only did the subsequent furore fail to damage him locally, but he actually seems to have gained significantly." Maol Muire Tynan, 'O'Flynn Is with FF on Immigration', *The Post.ie*, 2001 <http://www.thepost.ie/archives/2002/0428/oflynn-is-with-ff-on-immigration-187298628.html> [accessed 24 June 2011].

[296] Innes cites the British Conservative Party's 2010 election promise that "[u]nlike Labour's Border Agency, which does not even include the police, our force will have the power to stop, search, detain and prosecute the terrorists, traffickers and illegal immigrants who currently slip through the net. Only then will we be able to start making Britain safer." Innes, p. 467. Citing Conservative Party, 'Where We Stand: Immigration' (Conservative Party, 2010) <www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Immigration.aspx>.

[297] Ineke Van Der Valk, 'Right-Wing Parliamentary Discourse on Immigration in France', *Discourse & Society*, 14 (2003), 309–348 (p. 323) <doi:10.1177/09579265030143004>.

Of course such perceptions are not universal. Delancey Gustin and Astrid Ziebarth point out variations across the political spectrum as well as differences between Canada and the U.S:

> *Overall, it seems that threat perception of immigrants in the labor market is much greater in the United States than it is in Canada, which might explain some of the relative skepticism in the United States about immigrations' benefits.*[298]

Nevertheless, the dominant discourse is one of difference and undesirability,[299] regarding immigrants as terrorists or criminal risks to be removed and kept outside:

> *"We must man the region, and then it will be possible to minimize the terrorist infiltrations, as well as the smuggling of drugs and illegal workers," the prime minister went on to say. "If we don't move forward with construction of the fence, the problem will only get worse."*[300]

Taking all of these myths together, it is apparent that myth associated with the border regime works ideologically by co-opting and then distorting the ambivalent myth of difference in combination with the myth of scarcity, so transforming unwanted migrants from a group who are under threat into a threat to the established community.

3.5 Categorisation in Border Ritual

As well as their continual recollection in discourse concerning undocumented migrants and other border "transgressors", the fundamental myths of difference and scarcity are also ritually reinforced in border practices, as touched on earlier in Khosravi's reading of the discursive animalisation of migrants.

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[298] Delancey Gustin and Astrid Ziebarth, 'Transatlantic Opinion on Immigration: Greater Worries and Outlier Optimism', *International Migration Review*, 44 (2010), 974–991 (p. 980) <doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2010.00832.x>. They specify: "Whereas 50 percent of Americans thought that immigrants take jobs away from the native born, only 30 percent of Canadians agreed. Likewise, a plurality of Americans (48 percent) believed that immigrants bring down the wages of native born workers; only 25 percent of Canadians thought the same about immigrants' effects on Canadian wages."

[299] Donnan and Wilson, pp. 112–113.

[300] Ravid. quoting Benjamin Netanyahu

As mentioned previously, Kertzer explains the effectiveness of ritual in generating a sense of cohesion without consensus. Borders have a key role to play in the ritualised generation of "national unity" or identification both with "one's state" and with others likewise identified. Indeed, Kertzer claims that for Durkheim, the essence of worship is the expression of mutual interdependency that comes with identification with others who "belong" to the same entity: "What is important about rituals, then, is not that they deal with supernatural beings, but rather that they provide a powerful way in which people's social dependence can be expressed."[301] Borders are amongst the most visible apparatus of the state, symbolising and personifying it as Walzer described above, so that it can be "loved" and become a vehicle for this "worship" that is an expression of social interdependence.

Kertzer illustrates the power of ritual in building national-level sense of cohesion with the example of the state of post independence Tanzania, which encouraged the transferral of allegiance from distinct tribes to the larger scale nation-state through construction of monuments, rites of allegiance, rites of royal entry (to local towns and villages), establishment of local party and government offices, and national representatives holding local meetings. He observes that "in the past, many of these people [from other tribes] had been considered foreigners; but now, as they are all busy performing the same rites, they have been redefined as fellow countrymen."[302]

In detailing these various ways that border rituals categorise, I aim to reinforce my contention that those categorised as "other" are separated from the moral community, which is narrowed to those who are affirmed by the ritual.

3.5.1 *Border Performances*

What more impressive monument is there than the border itself? The border is saturated with ritual performance, which reinforces the role of the state as the authority which defines the national people (by issuing passports) as well as the provider of identity (symbolised by the passport and other identification documentation).[303] It is also established as the protector of the people with its "high

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[301] Kertzer, p. 9.

[302] Kertzer, p. 22,23.

[303] "...in order to be implemented in practice, the notion of national communities must be codified in documents rather than merely 'imagined'." Torpey, p. 6.

priests" (border officials) who judge the supplicants (scrutinising their symbolic offerings of documentation as well as their bodies themselves, which are also symbolically powerful as potential carriers of impurity – disease or forbidden material), allowing those who can provide the appropriate offerings, or who take the opportunity to confess their sins ("Something to Declare") and atone (financially) for them, to pass, whilst those who ca not are subject to humiliation and rejection.

> *The embodied knowledge of the border guard thus confronts the bodily demeanour of the border crosser in a meeting where the bodily dispositions and performances of the 'protagonists' are structured by the rules of the state and the attempt to evade them.*[304]

Meanwhile those who attempt to circumvent judgement (through deceptive border "performances"[305]) risk severe punishment and banishment (deportation), or ongoing exclusion[306] and fear of detection even if they do somehow gain access to the sacred space. Thus the sacrosanct nature of the national space/territory is reinforced, preserved and protected for future generations.[307]

It is not just the border-crossing body that must perform, but also the border regime itself. The repeated performance that is the capture and deportation of undocumented migrants, only for them to cross the border again and risk recapture,

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[304] Donnan and Wilson, p. 131.

[305] Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller', pp. 329–332.

[306] Khosravi, 'Migrant "Illegality"'.

[307] A fascinating insight into the incredible ideological power of the myth of the border as protector is given by psychologists Arul Mishra and Himanshu Mishra in their study of people's perception of the danger of natural disasters which spread from across the border of a different state, which they term "border bias". They found that "...people underestimate the potential risk of a disaster to a target location when the disaster spreads from a different state, but not when it spreads from an equally distant location within the same state." The border is perceived as magically protecting them even from natural disasters, to which human-defined borders pose no obstacle. "Following research on categorization, we propose that people consider locations within a state to be part of the same superordinate category, but consider locations in two different states to be parts of different superordinate categories." The categorising power of the border regime is evident: locations within the borders are "here" and other locations are "there" and borders prevent danger from getting "here" from "there". A. Mishra and H. Mishra, 'Border Bias: The Belief That State Borders Can Protect Against Disasters', *Psychological Science*, 2010 <doi:10.1177/0956797610385950>.

strangely both undermines the border regime as well as reinforcing it. Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney and Emanuela Paoletti demonstrate how it is strikingly symbolically constitutive of the distinction between citizen and non-citizen, yet, at the same time is disruptive of it, giving rise to contestation amongst citizens as to what normative principles should govern membership and belonging.[308]

Deportation also demonstrates the impotence of the border regime when faced with the sheer volume and determination of potential border crossers, particularly in areas such as the Southwest U.S. and the Mediterranean Sea, whilst, as a Foucauldian "spectacle", simultaneously reinforcing the necessity of border reinforcement in the public imagination.[309] Thus these "border games"[310] are really a symbolic performance of the regime for domestic public political consumption, rather than having a genuine ambition to stop clandestine immigration.[311]

Ritual provision is also made for a select few to achieve belonging in the "congregation" after a usually lengthy process which serves as a demonstration of commitment and worthiness (e.g. the Australian "points" regime). There is usually a ceremonial swearing of allegiance and perhaps a forfeiting of other previous loyalties. It can be seen that the issue of dual citizenship would present ritualistic difficulties for the border regime and indeed many states do not allow it. This reflects the hegemonic discourse of discrete national identities spatially expressed in the bordered state but does not recognise the complexity of people's identities, which are layered and often contradictory. It allows only a solitary, overriding identification

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[308] Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney and Emanuela Paoletti, 'Citizenship, Deportation and the Boundaries of Belonging', *Citizenship Studies*, 15 (2011), 547–563 <doi:10.1080/13621025.2011.583787>.

[309] De Genova, p. 437.

[310] Peter Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide*, 2nd edn (Cornell University Press, 2009).

[311] "Despite the efforts made in their tangible sealing off, the European Union external borders in Africa remain permeable. ... The peculiar management of these borders raises several questions regarding the real purpose of the militarization and introduces the idea of the symbolic use of this peculiarly sealed-off fragment of the EU perimeter. Rather than as a product of rational border regulation, the militarization of the (EU)ro-African borders might be interpreted as a symbolic performance for domestic consumption, aimed at marking the symbolic limits of the emergent EU identity." Ferrer-Gallardo, p. 19.

with the state. It is at the border that this essentialised identity becomes absolute in its dominance.

I have outlined the ritual of border crossing as a quasi-religious act of submission or supplication, but many other border-associated rituals could be given a similar treatment. To give an impression of the variety and ubiquity of such ritual, consider this list: passport and visa applications, customs searches, residency and work permit applications and citizenship tests.

3.5.2 *Spatial Categorisation*

This ritual allocation of physical space in border ritual is a notable manifestation of categorisation by the border regime. For example, there are different lines for people holding different categories of passport, whilst those without the required documentation are allocated no space whatsoever and experience either prolonged liminality[312] of being neither here nor there as they wait in the "transition zones" of airports and border crossings[313], or the potentially lethal danger of attempting to avoid the official ritual altogether by clandestine crossings. Even those who succeed in crossing the border continue in a liminal existence as they can never "belong" without the necessary symbolic recognition.[314] Meanwhile, those who can participate

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[312] "Border crossing reinforces and challenges our social and political status. It has its own ritual – passport, applying for a visa, security checks and the performance of going through specific places and spaces of border control and customs. Border crossing, being in 'borderland' (Hannerz 1997), a zone of betwixt and between, a predicament of liminality (Turner 1982) is per se, in anthropological sense, a ritual. The border ritual reproduces the meaning and order of the state system. The border ritual is a secular and modern sort of divine sanctity with its own rite of sacrifice. Several hundred clandestine migrants die en route to Europe each year." Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller', p. 330.

[313] Human Rights Watch, 'Lost in Transit', pp. 8–14 <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/10/29/lost-transit-0> [accessed 23 March 2010]; Balibar, p. 83.

[314] Donnan and Wilson recount Leo Chavez' theorisation of the process experienced by undocumented migrants from Mexico crossing into the U.S. Chavez draws on Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner's three phase model of moving from one group to another: separation, liminality and incorporation and notes that often the undocumented migrant does not complete all these phases and remains in a state of liminality, where even return is problematic. Donnan and Wilson, p. 110. referencing Leo R. Chavez, 'Outside the Imagined Community: Undocumented Settlers and Experiences of Incorporation', *American Ethnologist*, 18 (1991), 257–278 (p. 257).

legitimately in the border ritual are affirmed by the regime in their status as chosen and belonging, having a "surplus of mobility rights".[315]

Khosravi discusses how this ritual spatial discrimination was manifested for him at Arlanda airport in Sweden:

> *Along with a few other asylum-seeker-looking-persons, we were taken to the police station at the airport, albeit still in the transit area. In a corridor we waited outside a door. There were only a few chairs. Some of us sat on the floor and others stood along the wall, while regular passengers passed by. Border crossing can be experienced in terms of honour and shame (cf. Kumar 2000). A legal journey is regarded as an honourable act in the spirit of globalism and cosmopolitanism. The legal traveller passes the border gloriously and enhances his or her social status, whereas the border transgressor is seen as anti-aesthetic and anti-ethical (they are called 'illegal' and are criminalised). We live in an era of 'world apartheid', according to which the border differentiates between individuals. While for some the border is a 'surplus of rights', for others it is a 'color bar' (Balibar 2002: 78–84).*[316]

This categorisation is a ritualised manifestation of the myth of difference, whilst the myth of scarcity is enacted in the value of legitimate participation in border ritual symbolised by the preciousness of the "right" passport, which is treasured and desired.

3.5.3 *Categorising, or "Reclassifying" Ritual*

Donnan and Wilson make use of Michael Kearney's term, 'reclassification', for the effective change in class position and relations which occurs when a border is crossed, noting that migrants "...leave one set of class relations to become part of new fields of unequal power and economic value, in which they are also classified anew in terms of the receiving state's definitions of citizen, visitor and migrant."[317] This is the border's discriminatory function in action, differentiating between people based on "class" differences, where the "class" depends on criteria of the border regime's own

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[315] Thurlow and Jaworski; Balibar, p. 83; Raj, p. 517; Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller', p. 4.

[316] Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller', p. 331.

[317] Donnan and Wilson, p. 108.

making and symbolised in the documents it provides. Étienne Balibar expresses it thus:

> *"Today's borders ... are, to some extent, designed to perform precisely this task: not merely to give individuals from different social classes different experiences of the law..., but actively to differentiate between individuals in terms of class."*[318]

The power of the border regime is such that, if one does not have the necessary symbolic resources to participate in its ritual with honour, it can "reclassify" you as it sees fit – a total power asymmetry. Inherent in this, and often neglected, is the other side of the affirmation that those with a surplus of mobility rights experience, namely, shame, as Khosravi experienced in Arlanda airport, above.[319]

This reclassification is evident in various ways, perhaps most obviously in the phenomenon of migrants working in menial jobs despite professional qualifications. For example, asylum seekers in Ireland are prevented from working and live in effectively indefinite detention, no matter what their personal history or qualifications.

3.5.4 *Responsibility and "Tragedy"*

Consideration of undocumented migrants through the lens of this seemingly natural and even sacred order, renders them as transgressors, as Khosravi recounts, and thus responsible for their own predicament. Alexandra Hall observes this in the attitudes of officers working in a British immigration removal centre:

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[318] Balibar, p. 81.

[319] The effects of this humiliation for the migrant are recounted by Khosravi: "There is a risk that the illegal migrant, subjected to a gaze and treatment that divests him or her of humanity, internalises the shame – as I did – and understands the lack of travel documents and documentation as personal deficiencies and inadequacies. The importance and centrality of shame in the experience of migration is still unexplored." Khosravi, 'The "illegal" Traveller', pp. 331–332. It is perhaps not surprising that this is unexplored as it is only experienced by the protagonists. It is perhaps an indictment of academic research on undocumented migration as it indicates that it is very much driven "from the top".

> *The officers have little appreciation of the productive, creative and tactical nature of the implementation of law in the immigration context, and the fluid distinctions it creates between lawful and unlawful mobility. Rather, illegality is a fixed and moralised condition. The detainees' illegal behaviour is seen to entirely justify their confinement ...*[320]

Nick Lynn and Susan Lea's analysis of the social construction of asylum seekers in letters to British newspapers also highlight this. They discuss a quotation from a letter to *The Daily Mail*:

> *"Those who arrive in Britain should abide by our rules. If these are not to their liking, why come here? (Daily Mail, 2 April 2001)"... The logic, and asylum-seekers choice, is therefore clear. If they don't like our rules, then they need not come to Britain. Of course, this construction privileges a view of asylum-seekers as free agents, choosing to leave their home country, and their subsequent destination after careful consideration, instead of seeing them as people who have fled their home country in often horrific circumstances.*[321]

As a free agent, the asylum-seeker (like any other essentialised category of immigrant) bears full responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. Also, the categorizing power of the border regime is evident: "they" in their difference, do not respect "our" rules (because they do not share "our" underlying values). Both "us" and "them" are essentialised.

This brings us to the ugliest aspects of border ritual, which include indefinite detention without trial of undocumented migrants[322] and the "tragic" ritual sacrifice of those who have transgressed against the sacred order. These two instances confirm the state of exception that unwanted migrants are placed in, where normal procedures of law and due process, not to mention human rights, do not apply.

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[320] Hall, p. 893.

[321] Nick Lynn and Susan Lea, '"A Phantom Menace and the New Apartheid": The Social Construction of Asylum-Seekers in the United Kingdom', *Discourse & Society*, 14 (2003), 425–452 (p. 441) <doi:10.1177/0957926503014004002>.

[322] Detained Lives, 'Detained Lives // Home Page' <http://www.detainedlives.org/> [accessed 9 February 2011]; Blitz and Otero-Iglesias, p. 660; Grewcock; Antje Ellermann, 'Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the Liberal State', *Politics & Society*, 38 (2010), 408 –429 (p. 421) <doi:10.1177/0032329210373072>.

This is reflected in the media's treatment of incidents of migrant deaths. According to Maurizio Albahari, "While the [Italian] national and EU media do mention most shipwrecks and major migrant deaths, they tend with few exceptions to present these deaths as fatalities, accidents, and tragedies."[323] This depiction as tragedy deflects attention from any systemic factors behind them and presents them as regrettable but unavoidable consequences of the migrants' choices.

He gives the example of the *Kater I Rades*, a boat that was carrying about 120 people that capsized, having been hit by an Italian warship, the *Sibilla* in Albanian territorial waters on the 28th March 1997. The *Sibilla* was taking part in "Operation white flags", a *de facto* naval blockade of the Strait of Otranto. "This tragedy, as many others, is popularly and institutionally defined as an "accident," suggesting also that it was the Albanian captain who caused it by his dangerous manoeuvres, and moreover carrying dozens of people on a boat built for nine." "The larger chain of command, legal framework, discourses, and established practices already taking place in the Strait of Otranto and Italy and *resulting* in the shipwreck are not discussed or judicially investigated."[324] Such simplistic media treatment of these "tragic and unfortunate" events enables ascription of responsibility to the individuals involved and so the events' systemic nature, as symptomatic of a discriminatory border regime, is hidden.

Similarly, Hall points out that "[d]etention - what the White Paper described as 'an *unfortunate but essential* element in the effective enforcement of immigration control' - has emerged as a crucial element of the search for a 'robust and credible' system."[325]

Again the rituals and practices that the border regime requires function to reinforce it as the commonsense order of things. Structures of authority establish hierarchical categories of power relations manifested in the use of space within and without border transit points, and based on the symbolic legitimacy conferred or not on the putative border crossers by the documentation they hold. At the same time, discursive myth contributes to a cognitive schema which offers an interpretative

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[323] Albahari, p. 4.

[324] Albahari, p. 7,8.

[325] Hall, p. 882. My italics. Referring to UK Home Office, 'Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain', 2002 <http://www.archive2.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm53/5387/cm5387.pdf > [accessed 26 July 2011].

framework in which moral responsibility for tragic events is placed on the shoulders of those whose situation is already precarious, because they have transgressed against this sacred order.

3.6 Altruism and Border Myth

As well as sustaining the legitimacy of the border regime's ideological categorisation and reclassification work, other myths do this work by painting states as altruistic and compassionate, thus reinforcing their legitimacy as just and disinterested arbiters of migration.[326] In particular, discourses around asylum and refugee obligations and practices often portray states as responsibly fulfilling, in fact exhausting, their humanitarian obligations to vulnerable migrants in their refugee programmes. They also play the ideological role of distracting attention from, or masking, the causal factors behind refugee movements, many of which are linked to international economic policies and *realpolitik* in international relations by the countries of the Global North.[327] As well these discourses around asylum, Maurizio Albahari explores the legitimating role played by humanitarian narratives which uncritically present the state as a rescuer of those in distress.[328]

Taken together, these factors mean that "... the border aesthetics of humanitarianism and death is congruent with the public anaesthesia (i.e. inconsequentiality) of death, and works as a legitimation to the state project of human mobility regulation."[329] The public is anaesthetised so that normal conventions of concern about facing suffering and potentially death are suspended and the legitimacy of the border system of mobility regulation is reinforced as commonsense in the imagination.

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[326] Alexandria Innes gives the example of UK acceptance of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War as appearing, but not being, disinterested and altruistic. "... that the UK provided a haven for an individual fleeing communism showed the UK to be benevolent and fortified the contrast between freedom in the West and an oppressive communist regime. It was in the interests of the British government to do this, as it perpetuated the liberal identity." Innes, p. 463.

[327] B. S. Chimni, 'Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 13 (2000), 243 –263 <doi:10.1093/jrs/13.3.243>.

[328] Albahari, p. 16.

[329] Albahari, p. 30.

3.7 Summary

Political science and political philosophy have historically downplayed the role of the symbolic in determining political behaviour. I assert that political behaviour is very difficult to understand without analysis of the symbolic context in which it takes place. Therefore in this chapter I attempt to analyse the working of myth and ritual in legitimating and naturalising the border regime itself and categorising those who encounter it in ways which justify its consequences for them. I note that the empirical dismantling of myths is not productive in undermining their effectiveness because the emotive power of myth is what is important. This emotive power is heightened by their evocation of other more fundamental or primordial myths.

Two such fundamental myths of particular relevance for the ideological power of myth and ritual related to the border regime are those of difference (which is ambivalent in and of itself) and scarcity.[330] The spatialisation of identity that the border regime effects creates a potent environment in which the interplay of the myths of difference and scarcity transforms the territorial "other" into a threat. It is this sense of threat which underpins the categorising work of border myths and ritual practices. These myths and rituals therefore represent a powerful legitimating force for the systemic discrimination inherent in the border regime.

I therefore discussed common metaphors in border myth, demonstrating how they draw on the myths of difference and scarcity to do this ideological work, before discussing border rituals, noting the categorising and reclassifying work they do, particularly through the use of space to de-legitimate border "transgressors" thus enabling the casting of their "sacrifice" as "unfortunate" and "tragic".

This categorization enables the systemic discrimination and denials of human rights that undocumented migrants and other unwanted border crossers face as they are ritually placed in different spaces (e.g. remote border-crossing points, detention centres) and discursively placed in different categories (e.g. "them", "illegal" immigrants, through animalisation). While Kertzer notes the power of ritual in building a sense of cohesion without consensus, it is evident that it also has the

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[330] The myth of scarcity is also arguably ambivalent, in that it could perhaps be used to make an argument for social justice in the sharing of scarce resources.

potential to destroy solidarity (also without explicit consensus) with those "others" who cannot participate in the rituals.

The inter-human solidarity due to undocumented migrants and expressed in the various human rights instruments is powerfully undermined through border rituals and border discourse. Those who transgress the border, sinning against the sacred order, can be detained indefinitely, lose many other of the most basic human rights, or can even be killed. Yet they can still successfully be portrayed as a threat rather than threatened. This is testament to the ideological power of the myth and ritual of the border regime and the symbolic power of the fundamental myths they co-opt.

In part one of the thesis I have built a theoretical basis for ideological work in the symbolic plane and proposed the fingerprint framework to uncover evidence of such work. I applied this theorisation to the border system and the situation of undocumented migrants, demonstrating how they expose an inherent contradiction between the territorial system of states and claims of the inalienability of human rights. Despite these claims, undocumented migrants are unable to avail of their human rights. The domination of the popular imagination is demonstrated in the widespread demonisation of undocumented migrants in popular discourse and the obscuring of the precarity of their actual situation.

In part two of the thesis I undertake a methodological shift to test these analyses and conclusions by investigating the discourse of long term members of diverse church congregations. The aim is to see how they are influenced in their moral imagination by this ideology by analysing their use of symbol in metaphor and discursive myth as they talk about issues of migration. In the next chapter I undertake a narrative analysis of the interview transcripts to delineate the main themes and tropes which were elucidated and to gauge their views on and responses to issues concerning migration in their local church, community and Irish society as a whole (however they understand it). In the following two chapters I undertake a more focussed critical discourse analysis to probe their discourse for symbolic pointers to contending ideological influences on their moral imagination, using the fingerprint framework to structure the analysis.

Part 2: Competing Ideologies and the Moral Imagination

4 Narrative Analysis of Interview Transcripts

4.1 Introduction

In the theoretical work of the the first part of this thesis (chapters 1 to 3) I explored how ideology works to dominate the imagination by moving certain concepts into what Anthony Giddens calls "practical consciousness", while others remain in "discursive consciousness".[331] Concepts in practical consciousness are removed from critical examination and unconsciously accepted as axiomatically true . Another way of saying this is that they dominate the imagination. However, as Michel Foucault pointed out, different ideologies (or "discourses") are continually competing for dominance in our imaginations.[332]

I developed this with respect to the territorial system of states, exploring how it acts ideologically and is reinforced through dominating state and media discourses. It legitimises certain perspectives and de-legitimises others. It categorises people according to its own criteria, according or denying them legitimacy through symbolically important objects, rituals and discourses.

The intention of this, second part of the thesis (comprising chapters 4 to 6) is to test the theory that the ideology of the border regime is dominant today. I therefore selected for interview people whose affiliation to the church gives them access to an alternatively informed ethical framework. This Christian ethical tradition, although diverse, can offer a strong critique of systemic discrimination which causes vulnerability for a particular group of people. I will offer a model for such an ethical critique in chapter seven.

To explore the influence of the ideology of the system of territorial states over their imagination, and seek evidence of its competing with the alternative ethical discourses offered by Christian ethical traditions, I asked the interviewees about their

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[331] Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*.

[332] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*.

attitudes to, and thoughts concerning inward migration (regular and irregular), the state and the church, and the relationships between them.

4.2 Methodology

4.2.1 Interviewee Selection: Purposive sampling, seeking a "deviant case"

In selecting potential interviewees I adopted purposive sampling to increase the validity of my findings.[333] In this approach one chooses a particular subject group because it illustrates some feature or process in which we are interested. In my case I am interested in people involved in the churches because the Christian tradition offers an alternative ethical framework which could act as a competing discourse (in Foucault's sense) to the dominant (ideological) perspective on migrants, and particularly undocumented migrants, who, as previously discussed, are routinely de-legitimised in state and media discourse. In addition, churches and church-related bodies have a history of leadership in advocacy for and provision of services to migrants in precarious situations.[334] One may reasonably suspect that people

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[333] David Silverman, p. 141,281.

[334] Some examples from ecumenical bodies: CCME, 'Report on the Conference "Irregular Migration: a Challenge to European Migration and Asylum Policies" 1st November 2002 in Athens, Greece', 2002 <http://www.ccme.be/archive/2002/ConferenceAthens01Nov2002.pdf>; CCME, 'Towards a Balanced Approach in EU Migration and Asylum Policy: 12 Recommendations', 2007 <http://www.ccme.be/secretary/NEWS/12%20Recommendations%20EN%20final%200707.pdf>; CCME & COMECE, 'Contribution to the European Commission Hearing on a Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents', 2002 <http://www.ccme.be/archive/2002/returnpolicy.pdf>; CCME et al., 'Common Principles on Removal of Irregular Migrants and Rejected Asylum Seekers', 2005 <http://www.cec-kek.org/English/CommonprinciplesonremovalE.pdf>; CEC/CCME, '2010 - Year of the European Churches Responding to Migration' <http://evl.fi/EVLen.nsf/Documents/EBC1EF84433CD855C22576A9004730C2?openDocument&lang=EN> [accessed 8 July 2010]. Examples from Ireland: Crosscare Migrant Project, 'Undocumented Migrants Immigration System at Fault', 2007 <http://www.migrantproject.ie/images/Undocumented%20Migrants%208.11.2007.pdf>; ICBC and Bishops' Committee on Asylum Seekers and Refugees, '18 June 2001 - "A Glass Wall of Exclusion" - Statement from the Bishops' Committee on Asylum Seekers and Refugees on the Proposed Introduction of Carrier Sanctions', 2001 <http://www.catholicbishops.ie/media-centre/press-release-archive/3-2001/755-35-2001> [accessed 11 May 2009]; Inter-Church Committee on Social Issues, 'Immigration Issues', *ICCSI integration project*

involved in churches represent a "deviant case": one whose attitudes could be outliers.[335] To further strengthen the validity of the sample I selected interviewees from ethnically diverse churches, minority churches, ecumenical bodies and church-related organisations who work with migrants, in other words, people who have regular opportunities for face-to-face encounter with people from different countries and who may therefore have personal experience as well as public and Christian ethical discourses to draw on.

The profile of the interviewees was as follows: Clergy and members of the congregation from three churches (two parishioners from a Roman Catholic church, three parishioners from a Church of Ireland church and three members from a Baptist church). In each case I asked the minister/priest to put me in touch with long-established members of the congregation so that they would be able to give me a longitudinal perspective on the changes that had occurred in the congregation over the last ten years or so, as the diversity of the host society changed. I also interviewed people in national leadership positions in the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the Methodist Church, and in ecumenical bodies, the Irish Council of Churches and the Corrymeela Community. Finally, I interviewed a person who works for an (independent) church-related non-governmental organisations that works with migrants.

I interviewed sixteen people in total: four women and twelve men, five living in Northern Ireland and eleven in the Republic of Ireland, six clergy and ten lay people, aged from their thirties to their eighties. While this may be thought to be a small sample size, it follows David Silverman's recommendations and represents a carefully (purposively) selected sample according to specific criteria designed to test the hypothesis in question and with the aim of providing a rich data set. Most of the interviews were "middle-class". In the interests of transparency it is important to record that I was previously acquainted with two of the interviewees: one of whom I know by name but only on a casual basis, the other since secondary school, and as a

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<http://www.iccsi.ie/information/index.html> [accessed 18 June 2009]; Jesuit Refugee Service <http://www.jrs.ie>.

[335] David Silverman asserts the importance of overcoming any tendency to select a case which is likely to support one's argument. Rather he advocates seeking out "negative instances" as defined by the theory with which one is working. He dubs these "deviant cases". David Silverman, p. 146.

good friend. Finally, it should be noted that, due to a technical glitch, about fifteen minutes of one of the interviews was lost.

4.2.2 Interview Technique: Semi-structured with open questions

As stated previously, the intention of the interviews was to explore the interviewees' thoughts and feelings about migration, the church and the state, the appropriate relationships between them and their effects on each other. The best way to access this sort of information is through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with people. This method is preferable to surveys or questionnaires, which do not provide enough scope for deep reflection or follow up questioning. Due to the discursive nature of the interviews, questions were not always asked in the same order, nor phrased in exactly the same way. However, in each interview I attempted to cover the same subject matter, and used a prompt sheet for myself to assist this.[336]

A primary concern was that interviewees would not be completely honest with me, but would tailor their answers to what they perceived to be contextually socially acceptable. In my case the context being established through the interviewees' awareness that they were being interviewed because of their church involvement. This is what William Foddy calls "question threat" where "respondents will be under psychological pressure to give answers that they think are normatively acceptable to the interviewer."[337] He suggests various strategies that can be used to counter question threat, which I took on board and adapted to my particular context, details of which are specified in appendix A.

Following Gladys Ganiel's suggestion, and also in line with Silverman's recommendation, I did not discuss my theoretical work or analytical aims with the interviewees. My thinking was that this would increase the question threat and diminish the likelihood of interviewees giving honest, rather that what they deemed contextually socially acceptable, answers.[338]

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[336] The prompt sheet used for this purpose is reproduced in appendix D.

[337] William Foddy, *Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires: Theory and Practice in Social Research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 121.

[338] Silverman claims that presenting one's main research question to respondents causes two problems: it can affect their responses if they are made aware of one's interests and it can lead to lazy research where careful data analysis is replaced by

Foddy questions this approach, claiming that if you do not tell the respondent your purpose they have to deduce it for themselves and although they are unlikely to get it right, their deductions will influence their answers. Foddy advocates telling interviewees your purpose because:

> *Such a course [telling the respondent the purpose of the questions and interview] will only create problems if respondents perceive a research project to be against their interests – in which case, they might either refuse to cooperate or give invalid answers. It should also be said that if an investigation is not likely to serve the interests of respondents one could (and perhaps should) take the view that it should not be undertaken at all.*[339]

I would argue that, in my case my concern was that respondents may *falsely* perceive that the research project would be against their interests, and thus refuse to co-operate and give invalid answers. I tried to counter the likelihood of such a perception by not telling them the purpose and by the strategies to reduce question threat above, in particularly by undertaking the interviews anonymously. I did, however, inform them of the proposed subject matter of the interviews and ask verbally for their consent to use anonymised quotations from the interviews in my thesis. I did not seek written confirmation of consent for two reasons: firstly, my interviewees were purposively selected because of their long-term membership in their church communities – they are not "vulnerable" in terms of their establishment in the community, migration status or social class. Secondly, I did not want to unnecessarily "formalise" the interview context which could place a further obstacle to the interviewees expressing their honest opinions, even if they may be deemed "politically incorrect" in the context of situation.[340]

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simple reporting of what respondents have said. David Silverman, p. 197. Personal conversation with Gladys Ganiel, 'Personal Conversation', 2011.

[339] Foddy, p. 72.

[340] The "context of situation" refers to the immediate context of the interview situation. For example, in my case the interviewees knew that I was interviewing them because of their long-term membership of their churches. Therefore they may have felt pressure to answer according to what they would deem appropriate for a "Christian", rather than expressing their actual thoughts. I sought to mitigate this risk by anonymising the interviews. See appendix C for more on context of situation. Reisigl and Wodak, p. 93.

Foddy suggests explicitly providing appropriate recall cues, making the threat as low as possible and making sure respondents have plenty of time to think and know why the researcher wants the information. I therefore tried to keep the questions short at the beginning of the interviews, using longer questions and including the interviewee's own words and expressions in them, later in the interviews.[341] I did not always succeed in this, however.

4.2.3 Narrative Analysis: Delineation of prevalent themes and topoi

In approaching the data gathered in my interviews I split my analysis between narrative analysis: a description of the main themes and topoi that arose repeatedly in the course of the interviews (in this chapter); and a critical discourse analysis of the responses (in chapters five and six).[342] In this I am following the recommendations of Ruth Wodak who advocates a separation of discussion from analysis.[343] In this chapter, therefore, I present the findings from the interviews descriptively, refraining from critical analysis.[344] The intention is to enable transparency so that the reader can draw their own conclusions, as far as possible, from the words of the interviewees and evaluate the subsequent critical analysis of the next chapters in that light. Therefore the bulk of this chapter is made up of quotations taken from interviews, arranged according to the main topics that arose in them which are relevant to my argument. It is therefore not an exhaustive account of the subject matter of the interviews.

Broadly speaking, the main subjects discussed during the interviews were migrants, the state and the church. The actual questions are listed in appendix D. I therefore present the findings in three main sections covering the three relationships and contexts of interaction between these notional subjects: Migrants, Society and the State, Migrants and the Church, and the Church and the State.

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[341] Foddy recommends keeping questions short, but notes that "Blair et al. (1977) and Sudman and Bradburn (1982) have reported that long, open questions worded in the respondents' own language increased the level or reporting for socially sensitive or threatening topics." Foddy, p. 49.

[342] For an explanation of the concept of topoi see Appendix C.

[343] *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 2nd ed (London: SAGE, 2009), p. 32.

[344] The process undertaken in this narrative analysis is outlined in Appendix B

4.3 Migrants, Society and the State: Good worker or burden?

In terms of the interaction of migrants and the state, three broad categories of narrative emerged: (1) the effect(s) of migration on the economy of the country, both in terms of work and welfare, (2) opinions concerning the working of the border system itself, and (3) thoughts on the effect(s) of inward migration on local society in recent years.

4.3.1 Migrants and the Economy: Work and welfare

In terms of the economy, interviewees spoke about the effects of migration in terms of work and the labour market, and in terms of welfare and benefits.

4.3.1.1 *Migrants and Work: Competing perspectives*

4.3.1.1.1 Inward migration has been good for the local economy

When asked an open question about how they think inward migration is affecting society, a majority of the interviewees expressed the opinion that inward migration has been of benefit to the local (Republic of Ireland or Northern Ireland) economy. Various reasons were offered, including that having people from diverse backgrounds facilitates creative thinking, that migrants have contributed in terms of labour, expanding horizons and talent and that (migration led) increase in population contributes to economic growth and affords new opportunities as a by-product of the increased economic activity:

> *I mean you have the population, sure that kind of thing creates work, you know and business ... they have to be fed. ... So it's bound to increase things. [...] Naturally if you increase the population you're going to increase the business ... and that's what happened.*[345]

A particularly prevalent theme was that, especially during the boom years, "established" Irish people were reluctant to do certain jobs which they regarded as menial or beneath them. Those who expressed this opinion were all lay members of church congregations, as opposed to people involved in church leadership or ecumenical organisations.

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[345] Interviewee 15 Jack, 2012.

The contention that immigrants, especially during the period of economic growth, worked harder and to a higher standard than Irish workers whilst also being prepared to work for less money was also expressed. There was respect for immigrants in this sense and little sympathy for Irish peoples' complaints. Variations on this theme included expressions of regret about Irish peoples' perceived laziness or lack of application, and a counter narrative of exploitation – that Irish people are opportunistically exploiting this newly available cheaper labour.

> *... you know we have areas here where there's chronic unemployment. But the reality also is that we have employers who would rather employ a Pole or a Czech than they would a local person 'cause they know they'll do a better job. [...] That's a terrible thing to say in a sense but that's what employers will tell you.*[346]

4.3.1.1.2 Migrants take jobs and depress wages

In contrast to these narratives (that migration has been beneficial to the economy), offering a competing discourse were narratives which maintained a zero-sum perspective on the job market. This is where the job market is imagined as fixed in size, leading to the familiar "they're taking our jobs" refrain. Jack, above, proved the exception to the rule, with several other interviewees mentioning that migrant labour had led to downward pressure on salaries (although some recognised that this was not necessarily the migrants' fault but a result of exploitation, as we shall see later) and a reduction in the number of available jobs for the established community:

> *Then the job situation's gone down and a lot of them [undocumented migrants] are working, are exploited. [...] Therefore our people are feeling that they are making life difficult for them because if they're working for very low salaries, that they have to, that they said it's the race to the bottom, they call it.*[347]

Despite his previous recognition of the positive impact of increased population, Jack also expressed the contrary opinion that recent immigration has led to local unemployment, although a lack of skill on the part of the interviewer, evident in the

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[346] Interviewee 4 Roger, 2011.

[347] Interviewee 16 Maura, 2012.

asking of a relatively leading question should be pointed out here as a qualifying factor.

> *interviewer: ... is your feeling that migration has caused economic changes now, in terms of people's jobs and that sort of thing? respondent: Oh, yes, ... well, of course there's a terrible lot of people idle. And an awful lot of people idle, you see that's the trouble.*[348]

Doreen observed on several occasions that, although migrants made an essential contribution during the economic boom, particularly in terms of labour, attitudes to them have changed since the downturn, with increasing resentment and hostility:

> *In the economic downturn it's more difficult to say ... [...] I think the perception is they, they're taking the jobs, they're taking everything that's going. [...] you know you might find bricklayers who were getting £10, £12 and hour finding somebody was coming in willing to take minimum wage. And that's pushed, pushed prices down, you know, trying to explain to people that's not the fault of migrants.*[349]

To summarise, in terms of the effects of inward migration on the economy and employment, a range of sometimes contradictory opinions were expressed. However, the thrust of sentiment was that migration has had a positive effect on the economy, primarily because the economic boom meant that a lot of labour was required, but also because of the perception that Irish people thought themselves above various "menial" jobs. The counter-argument to this – that immigrants caused downward pressure on wages and took "Irish" jobs, was generally expressed as the opinion of others, but also in such a way as to exonerate the migrants from blame for this and cast it in terms of exploitation.

4.3.1.2 ***Migrants and Welfare***

The other broad area in which inward migration effects the economy is welfare, and particularly entitlements, be they entitlements to certain payments such as child benefit or unemployment assistance, or entitlements to residency, asylum or citizenship. In this context, two primary tropes were prevalent in the interviews: migrants use fraudulent or dishonest means to gain these entitlements, and migrants

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[348] Interviewee 15 Jack.

[349] Interviewee 11 Doreen, 2011.

are a burden on the rest of society. However, although these tropes were prevalent, they were not uncontested and various counterpoints and systemic critiques were offered by the interviewees.

4.3.1.2.1 Migrants associated with fraud

Several interviewees said that migrants were coming to Ireland in order to claim benefits, and then moving back to the countries they came from whilst continuing to claim and receive those welfare payments (illegally):

> *Like if we can't pay ... children's allowances and all are going out to Poland and places ... that, like, we can't afford them but.*[350]

A variation of this is the claiming of benefits for family members who are not in Ireland, although the claimant is:

> *it probably annoys me a little bit when I when I hear that you know, eh, ... and that would mainly concern EU member states, where people come into this country and, you know take social welfare for their children who are actually living in the other EU country.* [351]

The most common expression of this trope is that migrants have come to Ireland simply to avail of the social welfare entitlements:

> *Where it probably went wrong, or started to go wrong, was when the people coming in and taking up work, that should not have been coming in in the same numbers and, ok they might have been working but they were coming in mainly to avail of our social welfares as it was called then - benefits- and there was quite a high incidence of that and there probably still existing to day - a fair high incidence of that also that's now being tackled as a fraud issue.*[352]

One interviewee, Mark, rather than asserting this directly, expressed it as a general fear and linked his perception of scrounging to the need for tighter benefit entitlements:

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[350] Interviewee 9 Doris, 2012.

[351] Interviewee 8 Ryan, 2012.

[352] Interviewee 6 Brian, 2011.

> *I think I'm probably hinting at a solution. There is something in the reduction of social services and income provided to people coming in. If you removed those things then [...] you probably have no reason to refuse somebody's entry whatsoever.*[353]

In the case of undocumented migrants, the initial reaction of two interviewees was that because they were undocumented they did not pay tax. Cara maintained this perception despite the fact that she herself had worked undocumented in the United States but had paid tax while she was doing that:

> *I tell you what it does annoy me though about, when you say undocumented people working [...] not paying taxes, that does annoy me. I know I said I did work, I did work illegally, but actually that person, the alias I worked under, [name of alias], she did pay taxes.*[354]

Whilst not rejecting the notion that many migrants come to Ireland for the benefits, two interviewees noted that many Irish people also "scrounge", so the finger should not be pointed solely at migrants.

> *There are some, there are some [Irish people], I have to say, won't work. They are full time on the social.*[355]

Other expressions of the trope associating migrants with fraud involved the use of deceptive means to attain entitlements including various strategies used to gain residency or asylum in Ireland, or to avoid the various bureaucratic processes if their asylum case was not "genuine". Brian, speaking of asylum seekers, yet demonstrating a "blurry" understanding of what they actually are said:

> *There are people held that are that are, emm, semi asylum status. They haven't got approval, they've been known to be seeking approval and I think they're kept together in certain areas, but I think an awful lot of them fizzle off in to the night too.* [356]

Joel noted that some migrants attached to sister churches were lying to gain access:

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[353] Interviewee 3 Mark, 2011.

[354] Interviewee 5 Cara, 2011.

[355] Interviewee 10 Tim, 2012.

[356] Interviewee 6 Brian.

> *[...] there were a number of Romanians [...] in related churches, some of our sister churches where ... they were economical with the truth. Em, and [...] one or two of my fellow pastors in other Dublin churches had to basically say to these guys 'Look, you know if you want to maintain integrity. You've got to go to the authorities and tell them that that's not true what you told them.'* [357]

Marcus and Brian said that pregnant Africans come, or used to come, to Ireland because of the entitlement to citizenship for anyone born in the country.[358]

> *there is strong evidence of .. African people coming in, heavily pregnant ladies coming in through England ... that loophole has been closed off I believe. You know, ostensibly to have the child here to qualify for the Irish passport, which would mean then that they would, you know be able to drag their other family members and so on.*[359]

They also said that deceptive methods were used by migrants to gain access to Ireland by enrolling in education programmes, by marriages of convenience or using false documents.

> *There's some people, and I've had to deal with some of these people in the past, where they might have had about six identities, and six passports and I was asked to sit down opposite one and say: "Listen, do you know X,Y and Z?" [affects Nigerian accent] "No sir, no sir, no, no, no definitely not!" I said, "Do you realise that I'm asking you and that this interview is being CCTVed?" ... didn't matter, you know. They were just continual until they're caught, really.*[360]

Migrants were also routinely associated with crime by some interviewees. Doreen, however, noted that sometimes migrants, particularly undocumented migrants, or those whose asylum cases had been turned down but who could not be returned to their country of origin, had little choice but to turn to criminality as they could not work and were not entitled to any benefits.

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[357] Interviewee 2 Joel, 2011.

[358] This entitlement no longer applies since the 2004 citizenship referendum.

[359] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[360] Interviewee 6 Brian.

> *if you come here seeking asylum, your claim is turned down and then you can't be returned home, but you're not allowed to work, and nobody will give you your costs, how are you going to live? ... What better way of forcing people into criminality?* [361]

4.3.1.2.2 Migrants perceived as a burden

Other than being suspected of deception in order to gain entitlements and being involved in crime, the predominant trope concerning migration and society was one of burden, usually a financial burden on society:

> *Certainly, the social welfare, em, it is a drain on social welfare I suppose. A number of people who would come who are not working.*[362]

It in interesting to recall that most of my interviewees are middle class, yet still expressed these sentiments, which are generally thought to be more evident amongst those who are more economically poor.[363] Sometimes the nature of the burden is not clear. It could be cultural, or one of social tensions as a result of increased diversity. Here, the reported perception is that "they" are getting all kinds of benefits:

> *... it has caused some tensions, [...] people had a perception that people coming here from other countries are getting everything for nothing. They're being given free houses, free cars, (laughing) you know, all these outlandish things, em, there was a little bit of that I don't hear as much of that now.*[364]

A variety of competing discourses was evident. Some indicated a perception that this sense of burden is a result of the increased hardships people are facing since the economic downturn.

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[361] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[362] Interviewee 14 Daniel, 2012.

[363] Susanna Snyder, *Asylum-seeking, Migration and Church* (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), pp. 99D":"Z

[364] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

> *Maybe in the good times people wouldn't have mattered, but now [...] we're in a different ... time and a different probably monetary situation and people resent them more now than they did originally, a couple of years ago. I find now, people are resenting them, saying they're taking over, and there's not enough to go round.*[365]

Others however recognised that, despite the current economic circumstances, people in the "West" still have living standards far higher than in much of the world and therefore have a certain obligation to welcome those coming from desperate circumstances, even if they are a burden on the economy. There was also a recognition that as many migrants have no recourse to state support they therefore cannot, in fact, represent much of a financial burden to the economy.

4.3.1.3 ***Summary***

In summary, two dominant and competing discourses concerning inward migration and the economy were evident: that migrants have worked hard and contributed to economic growth, and that migrants are a burden on the rest of society in that they reduce wages, take jobs and, sometimes fraudulently, make demands on the welfare system. These two narratives are apparently often held as simultaneously true in the imaginations of the interviewees with only a rare recognition of their inherent contradiction. Often the expression of the former narrative (positive economic contribution) is discursively "owned" and expressed as the interviewee's own opinion after conscious thought; whereas the counter-narrative is often (but not always) expressed as the perceived opinion of society or "Irish people" or "my friends".

It is interesting to ask whether this relates to Giddens' distinction between practical consciousness (unconsciously-held knowledge) and discursive consciousness, enabling, for example, negative media portrayals of migrants to have a certain purchase in the imagination without prompting conscious critique.

The most, and only, conscious expression of this contradiction was by Doreen. She recognised that it had consequences for policy and that policy therefore has to balance these two opposed stimuli:

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[365] Interviewee 16 Maura.

> *At the minute we don't have an economy that's going to support a lot of people coming. However we've an aging population [...] Em, so we need a certain number of migrants to come in to fill jobs that people here can't do, to look after our aging population, to generate national insurance, and ... you know and taxes. And yet on the other hand, if people come in and they're allowed drain on resources, and you end up with a lot of unemployed people because very often migrants are more highly skilled than some of the people we have [...].*[366]

The policy implications raised by Doreen here are explored in more depth in the next section which concerns interviewees' thoughts as to the appropriate policy responses to migration in terms of border regulation, as well as their thoughts about the efficiency or effectiveness of its operation and its effects on migrants who encounter it.

4.3.2 The Border System

Broadly speaking, interviewees' talk about the border system addressed the necessity for borders to be controlled, proposals for various permit and entry schemes, and a variety of criticisms of the manner borders are regulated.

4.3.2.1 *Border Control*

When interviewees were asked their opinions about the amount of freedom of movement people should have the most common response emphasised the need for the borders to be controlled and for the administration to know who is coming in and out of the country. This was sometimes rationalised further, often citing the perceived burden that inward migration places on the receiving economy, or the perception that migrants' motives are to live off, rather than contribute to, the welfare of the receiving society.

> *It would vary a great deal from country to country in the EU. I suppose, probably ehh ... we're now in the situation of an economic downturn with massive unemployment, so you're probably talking about having to be more restrictive in the number of migrants that you take at the moment.*[367]

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[366] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[367] Interviewee 7 Alex, 2012.

There was evidence of counter-discourses in the recognition that, although control of access is a necessity, the current system does not always get it right and that, once admitted, migrants can face difficulties resulting from their lack of rights in the receiving country.

> *I mean if people are coming ... from non-EU countries. ... for financial reasons, or you know come, it's very difficult to say yes, just let everybody in. You know there does have to be restrictions [...]. But the difficulty is we cannot trust the systems here to make good decisions around that.*[368]

Jack un-reflexively stated the need for "limits" despite his previous recognition of the economic benefits of increased population. Later, he again un-reflexively enunciated a zero-sum perspective on the jobs market before recognising the "strange"-ness of the fact that increased population creates economic activity.

> *Ah well there's limits to it. You have to have limits to it, [...] But em, ... yes, I think that em , ... in the long run it will be better... because you can do something when you have the population there, do you know?*[369]

> *you can only allow the people in that they'll have jobs for. The only thing about the population, it's a strange setup - it creates work and creates activity and creates business ... once the population is, if the population's not there you're nothing to go on, you know.*[370]

Daniel explicitly recognised conflicting value-systems, expressing the moral undesirability of excluding those in need from the country but nevertheless maintaining that borders do need to be restrictive, without offering a specific reason why.

> *My own reaction is yes it's awful to say that people have to be left in poverty and left in states where there's oppression, where there's fear and terror. There has to be a reaching out, there has to be some kind of welcome for them But, [exhales] ... I don't know. it's a conflict.*[371]

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[368] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[369] Interviewee 15 Jack.

[370] Interviewee 15 Jack.

[371] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

Irfan recognised the humanitarian imperative of keeping the borders open for those who leave their homes out of necessity as a result of persecution or poverty. He observed that people do not leave home unless circumstances force it, and recognised that the actions of the wealthy Western states in the international arena are often a factor in causing migration.

> *you know [...] they don't just think it's a good idea to up their tents and go somewhere else. Em, ... circumstances bring them to that point and circumstances include em [...] .persecution, eh, but also poverty. And European legislation [...] where it's lacking is that it doesn't recognise that poverty actually makes life unsafe, and can bring people to a point where they have to get up and go.*[372]

Another response that several interviewees gave was an implicit or explicit assumption that the border system as it currently operates is fair and that the demands it makes of potential entrants in terms of documentation of evidence of identity are reasonable and not too onerous.

> *I think it's fair. [...] So ,we've noticed that if we want to apply in truth, we have the paperwork to do that. So, maybe that does hint that the system is somehow fair [...] If all people were honest these things would be easy to come up with.*[373]

An un-reflexive acceptance of the border system per se was also evident at the end of the interview when interviewees were asked about people who have died trying to cross the Mediterranean on unseaworthy craft.

> *In the example of somebody gets on a raft and dies in the process. Is it the responsibility of the immigration law, did the immigration law cause that death? No. not at all. [...]. Why did the person get on the raft? Because they believe there is a better country somewhere else. [...] And to what extent any person can be responsible for someone else's desire ... you know, really hard to ... say that.*[374]

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[372] Interviewee 13 Irfan, 2012.

[373] Interviewee 3 Mark.

[374] Interviewee 3 Mark.

> *It's really a difficult one isn't it? Those are tragic em, situations. Eh, and we hear them documented ... far too often.*[375]

In summary, there was broad support for a restrictive border regime amongst the interviewees and the prevailing system was generally perceived as fair. However, it was not universally accepted: some held mutually contradictory opinions and some recognised the humanitarian imperative to welcome people who are facing persecution.

4.3.2.2 ***Entry Schemes***

Interviewees spontaneously made various policy suggestions to address the perceived "problems" for migrants and the receiving country resulting from the present border system.

Tim maintained that the current work permit system is too restrictive, citing the difficulty he had, and a relation of his is currently having, in recruiting labour for his (agricultural) business.

> *I think in certain industries there's still not enough staff, even allowing the proper EU and EEA areas. And the department has now [...] makes it very difficult to get work permits for those people.*[376]

An alternative proposal put forward by several interviewees was for time-limited work permits which allow the holder to work in any role they like for a certain period of time.

> *[...] our middle son has just gone over to New Zealand. And he's gone for a year and he got a working holiday visa for one year you get once in a lifetime [...]. I think that's quite, em, I think that's a very fair system. And if you work hard and you prove yourself there, then you can apply for a proper work visa.*[377]

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[375] Interviewee 8 Ryan.

[376] Interviewee 10 Tim.

[377] Interviewee 5 Cara.

Two clergy favoured a sort of quota system, where the receiving country estimates the amount of labour required for certain industries, and issues work permits in line with those estimates. Roger places it in the context of redressing inequality.

> *Eh, ... I guess that I would probably favour some sort of a quota system which allows people from certain countries from outside the European Union to come, maybe not unlike the United States system. But I think also we've got to be very careful that that doesn't simply favour people that suit us - that it is actually redressing a wider issue in terms of equality in the world.*[378]

Joel proposed a similar system in relation to asylum, as opposed to work permits: that it be possible to receive temporary asylum during a period of unrest in one's country that would expire when that situation is resolved. It was also suggested that it should be possible to apply for asylum in the country of origin to avoid the dangers inherent in journeying to another country.

> *Em, and I guess there's also, there's a difference between temporary asylum and permanent, you know wanting to actually settle, isn't there. If you're a, if you're caught up in the Libyan conflict or something and you want to get out of Libya until it's settled down, fair enough. Em, ... so I think you know there may be variations where you can say 'Well we can grant temporary asylum, but not permanent status.*[379]

Three of the interviewees, all clergy, made policy proposals concerning undocumented migrants when asked how the state should respond to the reality of the phenomenon. In each case the given solution was that they be documented. Roger did not say whether he meant as a matter of course, amnesty-style, or dependent on their individual circumstances. Joel expressed it in the context of contribution to society, implying that they are excluded from taxation. Alex proposed an amnesty-style regularisation programme for those who had been in the country for a certain period – an ethical position in line with that of Joseph Carens.

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[378] Interviewee 4 Roger.

[379] Interviewee 2 Joel.

> *So you've still got, you've got to have a, a I suppose a principled approach to the undocumented. So in principle they need to be documented. They need to be clarity about their status, about ... them being included in the system. So if it's ok for them to be here let them be registered, let them pay tax, let them contribute to the society.*[380]

Concerning work permits and asylum interviewees suggested various reforms to the border system including quotas and time-limited access, however in the case of undocumented migration, the perceived "solution" was to somehow regain documentation.

4.3.2.3 ***Criticisms of the Border System***

There were various criticisms of the border system as it currently operates (or is perceived to operate). They concerned two broad areas: hypocrisy and fairness.

4.3.2.3.1 A harsh border regime is hypocritical because of the Irish history of emigration

Half of the interviewees noted that the Irish history of emigration is pertinent in a discussion of immigration into Ireland.

> *Em, ... so, in the bottom line, I welcome it. Welcome it particularly because in Ireland we have seen the other side of the coin so often, where there has been emigration from the land and we've felt impoverished by that.*[381]

> *I mean, as a nation we're very proud of all what we've done abroad with [as] emigrants but we don't really want them here. That doesn't seem right.*[382]

The facts that many people emigrated from Ireland due to hunger and poverty, that many Irish people are currently in the United States without the required documentation and that we know the social impact of emigration on a society, were all mentioned as placing a certain obligation on our part to have a fair and compassionate border system.

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[380] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[381] Interviewee 12 David, 2012.

[382] Interviewee 9 Doris.

4.3.2.3.2 The immigration system is often unfair

Related to these were concerns about the fairness of the system. Two interviewees who work in church-connected NGOs recognised the need for a humane and compassionate border system, and maintained that most people favour this, despite the predominantly negative rhetoric in media and government discourse. This contrasts with the assumption of fairness, noted above, that some other interviewees had.

> *...but you need a level of compassion in the middle of that. And it depends why you're undocumented. Some people are undocumented through no fault of their own.*[383]

Two interviewees, both clergy, had worked with parishioners navigating the asylum processes (of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) and both had a strong sense that the systems are unfair in that they have a prevalent culture of rejection, of disbelief, as well as poor quality of service (with no effective accountability for that). They maintained that an applicant's probability of success is highly dependent on the access they have to certain resources; in particular contacts in the receiving country, as well as skills in assertiveness or negotiation to "push" your case, as opposed to the facts of the case alone.[384]

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[383] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[384] Roger told the story of a case he had been involved in where his intervention was critical and the poor quality of service of the applicant's lawyer was evident and beyond accountability: "Like I ... just a wee story I dealt with one situation where a very well-known immigration, or solicitors firm here in Belfast, one of the best-known ...em, had totally messed up this guy's immigration case. And he was to be deported, in fact he had been removed to Dungavel in Scotland when he contacted me and asked for help. And I had to get involved with immigration and , I fortunately, and this is partly why I am involved in all this Larne detention unit because I made contact with senior immigration officers and I had done before anyway and I had a relationship there ... and was able to get things investigated. But, eh, part, when I went to see this particular solicitor ... I was appalled at how badly the case had been handled. It was basically this solicitor's fault. The whole thing was messed up . And when I left his office, the guy who was with me told me, he said 'That is the first time that anybody has made any effort to communicate with me as to what is going on.' [...] Em, because he said when I was there the immigration lawyer was prepared to deal with the issue, whereas this guy was not prepared to do it, basically. Which is ridiculous 'cause he was getting paid for it, you know and as I say it's a very reputable firm in Belfast." Interviewee 4 Roger.

> *My impression was that there was a definite culture that people were generally refused on the first go and that then there was a sort of, if you were, if you really were able to push it; if you had the resources or you had the contacts in Ireland which would help you to sort of push your case that eventually quite often the Department would relent [...] So I'd say on the whole probably that's not a just way of doing it.*[385]

Several interviewees said that the opacity and complexity of the border system caused vulnerability. For example, there are many ways that someone's status can become irregular, for example by losing the job to which their work permit was attached. Once someone's status has become irregular they become extremely vulnerable to exploitation and this was recognised by several of the interviewees.

> *You can limit the number of people come and control all those things without making it so complicated that it makes people vulnerable. That would be my main issue, that people are able to come and then left in difficult positions.*[386]

> *They came in, em ... the work permits were very restrictive, and if they lost their job they were kind of left in limbo. And they kind of were working on cash payments, that end of it.*[387]

Another systemic injustice was pointed out by one interviewee reflecting on his own personal experiences travelling and contrasting them with the experiences of people of other races. His conclusion was that the border system is essentially racist.

> *Em, but I do have reservations about the way we put down, we raise barriers and, and also I think it's very arbitrary the way we choose people, based on where they're from. I think, ... I think fundamentally it's racist.*[388]

Criticisms of the border regime were expressed, despite prevailing support for it. They ranged from assertions that it is hypocritical in the context of Irish history of emigration to concerns about its harshness, opacity and discriminatory nature.

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[385] Interviewee 7 Alex.

[386] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[387] Interviewee 10 Tim.

[388] Interviewee 4 Roger.

4.3.2.4 *Summary*

To summarise, when the interviewees thought about the border system, they accepted the state's right to regulate access as axiomatic but they suggested various policy innovations which could be introduced. In general, these were intended to enable the receiving country to gain access to labour resources it needed in a timely fashion without introducing obligations to the incoming migrants. However, competing discourses were evident, particularly where interviewees had worked directly with vulnerable migrants, in that they also recognised the vulnerabilities, particularly for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants (although interviewees were often unclear, despite attempted clarification, on the distinctions between the various migration statuses) that are systemically caused by the opacity and complexity of the border system.

4.3.3 The Effects of Migration on Irish Society

In addition to the effects of migration on the economic life of the receiving country and appropriate responses in the administration of the border system, the interviewees also commented on the effects migration has had on the host society. Three narrative, and competing, tropes predominated: Firstly, that inward migration has enriched society culturally although paralleling this was secondly, the somewhat contradictory assertion that migrants "stick to their own". It is interesting that the former was generally expressed by clergy, the latter by laypeople. The third predominant narrative is the perception that immigration has awoken a latent racism in Irish society.

Resonating with the trope of migrants contributing to the economy, the view that a diverse society enriches cultural life was also evident. Alex gave an example:

> *Its helped to eh, give Ireland a more international view of itself and also I think, ... and ah its ah brought a much needed cultural diversity to what was a quite introverted sort of Ireland before.*[389]

However, an essentialising, counter-discourse was also apparent, which implicitly ascribed responsibility for cultural "ghettoisation" to the migrants, exonerating the receiving community:

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[389] Interviewee 7 Alex.

> *I know here in [interviewee's town] they're inclined to keep to themselves. That unless ... you're not inclined to go and talk to them unless they ... even a smile, you know, make a move ... You can't [speak] their language in the first place, you know that leaves a barrier and, my perception is they seem to go [...] they go together.*[390]

Several interviewees asserted that migration into the country has revealed a latent racism in Irish society, evident in resentment towards people of non-Irish origin.[391]

> *There's more of an acceptance, but there's no doubt there's certainly some undertones of racism and ... you hear stories, individual stories of people not accepting em .. people from other countries. [...] There's a welcome by a lot of people, but there's also certainly a hostility by some.*[392]

In my sample of interviewees, there was a distinction between those in church leadership positions and "ordinary" churchgoers in the perception of the effects of inward migration on the host society. Leaders, perhaps conscious of their burden of representation, spoke of how the increase in diversity had enriched the cultural life of the society, whilst lay church members played down those effects, saying that migrants generally kept to themselves.

4.4 Migrants and the Church: Welcome to attend or welcome to belong?

Having presented the interviewees' thoughts on the various effects inward migration has had on Irish (North and South) society, I will now look at their thoughts concerning migrants and the church.

4.4.1 Newcomers in Church: Welcomed or resented?

Most interviewees expressed the opinion that migrants (and newcomers in general) should be welcomed into the church.

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[390] Interviewee 9 Doris.

[391] Maura cited a friend who disapproved of her (white) daughter's black boyfriend: "[...] she said 'Well you know, never, I mean it's not right, they should keep to their own culture and their own people.' You see, and yet [...] I would have thought she was very welcoming of them. But she wouldn't like her daughter to get involved, like, in a relationship or anything with one of them. She wouldn't like that, and think black should be black and white should be white, like." Interviewee 16 Maura.

[392] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

> *As a church our major concern has been to see that we have been a welcoming church. [...] Em, ... and so in, in terms of welcoming and accepting migrants I hope that that's what we do and I think that's the attitude of our church.*[393]

Several put this expression in the context of a particular Christian ethical principle or biblical imperative: the inclusiveness of the Gospel, the fact that we are all created in the image of God, that we (Christians) are also aliens and strangers in this world, the Hebrew prophetic tradition of concern for the widow, the orphan and the poor, of welcome to the stranger and provision of cities of sanctuary.

> *[...] there's a biblical mandate to welcome the stranger, you know to look after the alien and the widow. So it's, you know it's a non-option, it's a non-brainer as far as we're concerned. It's, people will come here and they must be welcomed and they need to be included.*[394]

Ethical principles correlating with secular ethical traditions, such as human dignity, were also cited.

> *I really feel so strongly, so angry when I hear of people receiving racist abuse. And I do hear about it. [...] That people could treat them so badly. Whatever your feelings about whether we can afford them or not. They're still humans with dignity and they need to be treated with respect.*[395]

There was a predominant perspective that the increased diversity of the local congregations has led to an enriched and more vibrant congregational life, both in the style and conduct of the service and in other church activities.

> *... it's lively worship so we would have people, we'd have African, we'd have Asian people, we'd have a lot of Americans, Australians, from those kind of groups. So, it has impacted us, it means we're a lot more diverse than we were before [...]* [396]

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[393] Interviewee 12 David.

[394] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[395] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[396] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

Again, a counter-narrative was evident which maintained that migrants in the parish community tend to stick with each other and not mix much with the more established membership of the congregation.

> *I mean most of ... our church, they're very much involved here, the [new] people that are here. Now, some of them are not. Then they're resent[ed], they're bringing in another culture, I suppose. But I think it's, it's a bit, ignorance on the part of a lot of people. You see, ... they're inclined to stay together too. They feel that people don't want them. Some of them have said to me they feel people resent them.*[397]

There was also a recognition that, although many churches have now a sizeable proportion of members from other countries, that this has generally had little effect on governance or how the churches are run, the form or character of services or the make-up of leadership bodies, the suggested reason being inertia in church culture.

> *I kind of felt that the Church of Ireland was kind of generally positive towards the phenomenon: they recognised that it had been very transforming to certain parishes [...] but ... I never quite felt they kind of got to grips with, with, with the kind of potential that was in there in parishes, to really kind of make a difference to, to, to the congregations to perhaps if you like change the culture of the congregations.[...] if you looked at things like synods and so forth who are so overwhelmingly white and umm traditional C of I people and so forth.*[398]

Attitudes to newcomers in church were very varied. A widespread expression of the obligation to welcome was tempered by assertions that "they" were resented and stuck together. Newcomers were deemed to have brought a vibrancy to (sung) worship by several interviewees but their effect on other areas of church life was limited.

4.4.2 Undocumented Migrants and Church: Divided loyalties?

Most of the interviewees were initially unclear on the distinctions between asylum seekers, refugees, rejected asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. To address this, given its centrality to the research, I briefly explained the distinction between undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, which helped in most cases.

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[397] Interviewee 16 Maura.

[398] Interviewee 7 Alex.

However, some interviewees' understanding remained unclear. Nevertheless, most recognised that many migrants are in situations of precarity and vulnerability. One interviewee [who understood the distinctions clearly] recognised that, at both a denominational level and within individual congregations there is a great diversity of opinion concerning undocumented migrants.

> *... you know, the [interviewee's denomination] is a hugely diverse body of people [...] there are people who would have very, very open immigrant policy, [...] and there are people who feel that immigrants are the root cause of much of the problems that we have on these islands.*[399]

There was, however, in several of the interviews, an expression of the ethical obligation to welcome and support people into the congregation irrespective of their migration status.

> *... well, surely as a Christian you should welcome them. [...] You know, you should treat them the same. And in church above all I mean the idea, what, what, if you don't do that what do you do?*[400]

Although the importance of welcome was recognised, a predominant theme was that the interviewees had not actually encountered undocumented migrants.

> *So, em, ... I ... my feeling on it, I suppose I haven't any really strong feelings on it, and I certainly haven't come across, I'm aware of them but I haven't come across them in any practical way.* [401]

One interviewee thought immediately of a member of the congregation who was actually an asylum seeker (and is now a refugee):

> *I know Rosanna, who was from Cuba. I know there was a lot of prayer going on for Rosanna when she was trying to get her citizenship. Which she did [...] I haven't encountered [any], no, except for Rosanna.*[402]

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399 Interviewee 4 Roger.

400 Interviewee 9 Doris.

401 Interviewee 8 Ryan.

402 Interviewee 5 Cara. (Cited name changed)

Another interviewee was well aware of the various ways that people sometimes become undocumented but recognised that they have not encountered people in that situation. One interviewee was self-contradictory; acknowledging that he had not encountered people who were undocumented but expressing the fear that there may be many more.

> *I've never known it to arise to be honest with you so its kind of a unique question. Emmm..... you'd wonder if, is this the tip of the iceberg, are there many more?*[403]

Only one interviewee looked behind the question of why undocumented migrants were not encountered in a church context, recognising the their migration status would necessitate discretion on their part.

> *But then, I don't think it really would happen, I don't think they'd come to the church. I believe that if they're hidden they'll stay hidden. They're not going to come out and admit it.*[404]

In addition to a recognition of the ethical requirement to welcome was a caution against naïveté and a claim that some migrants will be intent on abusing the goodwill of the church.

> *I think, in the first instance I think we need to be welcoming and accepting and open. But also, ... you know I think we need to be cautious too, and not totally naïve about the reality of what's going on. And also there are people who abuse the system [...] it's not because immigrants are any different to anybody else [...] I don't want to create a negative impression of immigrants.*[405]

> *If they [undocumented migrants] start seeking help and assistance then maybe is this a case maybe of abusing or you know abusing or using is it?*[406]

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403 Interviewee 6 Brian.

404 Interviewee 10 Tim.

405 Interviewee 4 Roger.

406 Interviewee 6 Brian.

One interviewee is involved in work specifically on the issue of undocumented migration and has sought to inform the leadership of his denomination as well as instigating practical initiatives to address their vulnerability, such as working to establish a multi-denominational chaplaincy for the UK Border Agency's Larne Detention Centre.

> *I felt that this was a real opportunity for us to make this story known, to make people aware of what the situation was for those who didn't have regular immigration status, also, to try to challenge people's thinking and their stereotyping of people who were deemed 'illegal' by the state.*[407]

Welcome was again advocated for undocumented migrants, although the term was not always precisely understood. In most cases, however, this welcome was in the abstract, as they had not encountered undocumented migrants. This only provoked enquiry in one case. Nor was welcome advocated universally as some were dubious about the integrity of migrants who came asking for help. One interviewee was involved directly in advocacy work and demonstrated a passion for awareness raising in his denomination.

4.4.3 Summary

To summarise, the interviewees recognised the increasing diversity of their own church congregations and denominations. There was widespread agreement on the obligation to welcome new people into their congregational and parish communities and that this diversity has contributed to their vibrancy. However counter-narratives were evident: that migrants keep to themselves, have had little effect on how we "do" church and that undocumented migrants are rarely encountered. There was little evidence that this lack of integration prompted questioning as to the reality or effectiveness of that welcome, with only one interviewee acknowledging this possibility:

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[407] Interviewee 4 Roger.

we're quite complacent about our need to welcome and accept people who are different. And, because I believe that welcoming and accepting involves us changing to accommodate others, we're very, very poor at that.[408]

4.5 The Church and the State: Mutual suspicion or mutual respect?

When interviewees were asked about church-state relations, four principal narratives emerged: the idea that churches and states should not interfere in one another's domains; a recognition that churches today have little influence (social or political); that churches should have a sort of "critical friend" perspective on the state – a relationship of mutual respect; and finally, the sense that the state is a suspect, power-hungry entity, that needs to be carefully watched.

4.5.1 Sacred-Secular Divide: Churches should not interfere in political matters

The predominant perspective was that the church and the state each have their own domains of interest and that neither should interfere in the other's. This was most starkly expressed by Mark:

you know ... it's stereotypical but churches should have their head in the clouds. Because they should be thinking about heaven and stuff like that. Their job is different, eh ...they should be dealing with anyone who is a victim of the state, they should be caring for them. But ....[409]

A corollary to that is that relations between church(es) and state should, on the whole, be friendly and respectful:

the church should never influence the state or the state should never influence the church really, that's what I would think. That they should be free to - you have to 'what belongs to Caesar belongs to Caesar' if the taxes are due you pay them.[410]

Mark also reflected that the transfer of responsibility for education and healthcare to the state has meant that churches' service to the most marginalised has been adversely affected.

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[408] Interviewee 4 Roger.

[409] Interviewee 3 Mark.

[410] Interviewee 6 Brian.

> *Government deals with health and education now, not churches. We used to do that, we don't do that anymore. [...] the proper provision of social services is publicly perceived as being in the place of government as a consequence of taxpayers [...] Em, ... so, that independence of churches to serve the most marginalized has kind of ... gone absorbed into that culture.*[411]

Daniel's sense of these separate domains was disclosed in his discomfort when asked what he perceived were "political" questions. He accepted a proffered discursive escape route and justified his lack of political engagement by declaring that political considerations don't affect his opinion of or work with parishioners.

> *interviewer: How should the state decide whether somebody can come in or not?*
> *respondent: I don't know why you're asking me this. I don't ... wouldn't feel qualified ... to an[swer] ...*
> *interviewer: well, I'm asking for, I mean I don't want you. You know I'm not expecting an expertise. I'm expecting just your thoughts and feelings on it really, Em, ... and if you don't have particular thoughts on it that's ok.*
> *respondent: Yeah, I don't have, really. It does, never would cross my mind. I deal with people as I find them, as they're here. I don't question why they're here, or why they should be here or shouldn't be here.*[412]

He then elucidated his perspective further, clearly disowning any obligation to consider the legitimacy of individuals' migration statuses:

> *My attitude is I try to just support them. I don't, it's not my job to make a judgment on whether they should or shouldn't be here, that's the state's job.*[413]

He also maintained that even church politics are outside his interest, reflecting more of a "politics"-faith divide than a sacred-secular divide in his imagination:

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411 Interviewee 3 Mark.

412 Interviewee 14 Daniel.

413 Interviewee 14 Daniel.

> *I really don't have, I'm not that well up on the bigger picture. I tend to think local in every sense of the word. When it comes to church in particular. The church, institution of the church and the Vatican and all that ... [laughing] keep away from me! To me the church is [town name], it's local .. I, I that's the way I happen to be...*[414]

Maura explores the relationship between the church and the state in some depth, expressing the opinion that the institutional church should not get involved in political matters beyond advocating certain values to be taken into account in political consideration. Church members, in a personal capacity, can, however, get involved in politics.

> *I don't the church should get really, would get involved in all of that. [...] I think, like, the church's role is to ... teach the gospel, myself. And I think, whereas they can talk out and do, about civil rights, and all the rights of people, I don't think they can get into [sic] poli, the politics of it. [...] And if then people [...] want to get involved [...]*[415]

When asked specifically about the border system and potential church responses to it this sacred-secular divide was again prominent. Borders and their administration were placed firmly in the domain of the "political", and thus outside the purview of church concern. Border regulation was often referred to as a matter for the state:

> *I think, I suspect that the Church ought to be, ought to be keeping the State, in respect to its immigration policies at sort of arms length. ... In a way its not up for the for the church or church congregation to be judging that. That's the state's decision...*[416]

Church involvement in this area was constrained to the individual level: support of church members in their dealings with the border bureaucracy:

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[414] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[415] Interviewee 16 Maura.

[416] Interviewee 7 Alex.

[...] in a way its not up for the for the church or church congregation to be judging that; that's the state's decision [...] but they don't, as we've said, they don't always make the right decision and therefore it's the congregation's, hopefully if they have built up the relationships they'll work on behalf of the person to get them right, to make it right, and help them as best they can with their case.[417]

Cara, although she indicated that she had not thought about this before, considered a personal acquaintance threatened with deportation and expressed a counter-narrative as she deliberated, eventually rejecting a sacred-secular notional divide. She advocated action where there is injustice in border regulation.

interviewer: Ok, Em, ... do you think this issue of people being in an undocumented situation, eh, is something the churches should address explicitly, or not?
respondent: ... yeah, I do. I do actually, let me think through that. My gut reaction is saying yes. Yeah, because I know, I'm thinking of one poor girl that I've got to know quite well and she's in Balseskin now and she's in a terrible state. In case she is going to be sent back to Albania. And we all know her quite well. [...] And we've all written letters [...] No I think we do, we should. Yeah I do think we should. And I think we should apply on behalf of people if we think they're in trouble. Yeah, I think we should come to their aid. Big time. I think it's part of the church's job to be honest with you. Never thought of it before but, it's part of the ministry ... to those who are in trouble and the less well off. It's part of the basic ministry.[418]

The stance of separate church and state domains was predominant in the interviews, and applied in particular to matters of border administration. It was not uncontested, however, and alternative configurations were also described.

4.5.2 Churches have little influence in political matters

Another common narrative was that churches have little influence on politics or societal discourse today:

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[417] Interviewee 7 Alex.

[418] Interviewee 5 Cara. Balseskin is a reception centre in Dublin where newly arrived asylum seekers are temporarily housed before being "dispersed" to an accommodation centre while they await an asylum decision.

But who listens to churches? Maybe in Italy, the Catholic church, but other than that... I suppose in America, some of them. I suppose yeah... [419]

Various reasons were given for this including the churches' inability to speak with a unified voice; that the increasingly diverse nature of society means that government now wants to ascertain a broader, faith-communities' perspective (as opposed to a Christian perspective) on certain matters; and the perception that the church is out of touch with contemporary society, in particular being perceived as socially regressive and no longer capable of constructive input into debate.

... but the church is a massive institution, and the church is lots of different massive institutions. It's like a whole crowd of dinosaurs trying to turn at the same time in different directions. [laughing] [...] it's not easy, to speak and be rel[evant], as the whole church. So, ... and how much weight does it have?[420]

the state is less interested in dialogue with churches, and is now interested in dialogue with faith communities. [...] and that means the position of Christianity has been massively weakened. What that will do in terms of the church's attitude to the state when it's no longer a player at all is going to be interesting.[421]

Doreen made the contrasting observation that the values of the church can also be served through *individual* members' work in their various roles in society, and that, given the limited influence of the institutional church, churches should deliberately equip their members for such activity.

But sometimes it's important [...] to empower people in the church 'cause the people in, you know politicians are members of churches, you know government officials are members of churches, people, you know in the United Nations are members of churches. And equipping our individual members to actually stand up.[422]

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[419] Interviewee 5 Cara.

[420] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[421] Interviewee 3 Mark.

[422] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

While the lack of church influence was bemoaned by some interviewees, others were ambivalent about it, and one suggested that the appropriate response is for churches to focus on enabling a more individual engagement with political issues, rather than seeking institutional influence.

4.5.3 The church should be a critical friend of the state

Related to the position of a sacred-secular divide is another position that several interviewees articulated. In this perspective there is a recognition that certain aspects of social and political life are appropriately regulated by the state but that, even in those areas, the church has a moral responsibility to the most vulnerable in society. The state should recognise this and take the churches' criticisms on board in those areas. Several people recognised that in Ireland's history the church has often had too much influence over the political life of the state and that this was not healthy for the church or the state. They emphasised that the church should not seek coercive power, but that, if motivated by its values, it could offer a respected voice that deserved the attention of the state.

> *but I personally feel that em, ... that the church should be active in politics but not in ... making the decisions if you know what I mean. They should be contributing to that ... em, and people should be involved in politics, [...] but not em, .. to be, have this special position and to be able to say 'that's what's going to happen.*[423]

Some interviewees went a little further, indicating that on occasion the churches' critique may have to take the form of civil disobedience if certain principles are violated. Interestingly, in all but one of these cases, the interviewee explicitly took personal (as opposed to collective or representational) ownership of this position, implicitly acknowledging the controversial nature of this position.

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[423] Interviewee 8 Ryan.

there are times when churches walk fairly near the legal edge, in caring for people. [...] if we get into trouble for doing what we believe to be right, so be it. ... eh, we'll face that one and defend it. But it over, in overall terms, relationships between church and state [...] we want to have open, robust conversation with the state. [...] But not trying to usurp the responsibilities of the state.[424]

... you see for me the state's us. [...] it's not the government's money, it's my money, it's our money. So for me they need to listen to us. [...] You know we're considered a critical friend, of government, of police, of the housing executive [...] but also on the other hand [...] I have no problem breaking the law if I thought I was being asked to do something that was morally wrong.[425]

Perhaps surprisingly, given stereotypical perspectives of Northern Irish Protestants as strong "law and order" advocates, all four of the interviewees who expressed a willingness to break the law in certain circumstances were from the Protestant traditions and live in Northern Ireland.

4.5.4 A Hermeneutic of Suspicion: The church should be sceptical of the state

The final position articulated was the most sceptical of the state, regarding it as predisposed to undermining the authority and means of the churches, so that it must be constantly watched. From this perspective it is important that the churches be assertive in promoting their views and defending their rights.

Well we have a special position haven't we, to the state? Again, I haven't ... but it's hard to see, I see they're cutting back, they're breaking their promises on education now.... well, we want to stand up to, for our rights, you know, what we're entitled to.[426]

I think, eh, the state. I'm not too happy about the state at the moment. ... I think, particularly now, being a Catholic ... [...] I think, em ... there's two ministers which I know would be very anti-Catholic at the moment in the government at the moment. And I see that as a danger, myself.[427]

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[424] Interviewee 12 David.

[425] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[426] Interviewee 9 Doris.

[427] Interviewee 16 Maura.

Here the social roles traditionally occupied by the churches in Ireland, in particular in education, are viewed as part of the churches domain, and relatively core to her essence. There is a posture of defensiveness towards the state, whose interference in these areas is not welcomed and needs constant vigilance.

4.5.5 Summary

The predominant perspective on church-state relations was that each has its own domain and should not interfere in the domain of the other. This sacred-secular divide was applied to the border when several interviewees expressed the opinion that decisions of access and migration status were the concern of the state and that churches should "take people as they come", with no regard for (or critique of) their migration status.

Several competing discourses were also evident, including that churches should be a "critical friend" of the state, holding it to account in terms of its treatment of the most vulnerable in society and that the state is an inherently suspect institution to be continually monitored to ensure it fulfils its obligations (usually to the church). Finally, there was a recognition that churches have little (remaining) political influence. One interviewee accepted this and concluded that the appropriate response was for the churches to focus on equipping their members to apply the principles of their faith in the roles they fulfil in their work and home lives, rather than seeking to restore the previous influence that the institutional churches had over the state (at least in Ireland).

4.6 Conclusion

The aim of this empirical research was to test the thesis that the ideology of the territorial system of states is hegemonically dominant over the public imagination. Interviews were conducted to explore the influence of this ideology over the imagination by seeking evidence of discourses which reflect the commonsense and categorising work of the ideology of the border regime. To do this I intentionally chose interviewees who are exposed to an alternative value system in their Christian faith and examined the evidence of these competing ideologies, or value systems, providing competing discourses in the interviewees' talk.

Certain perspectives predominated in each area discussed. Nevertheless, in each area some of the interviewees did express competing discourses reflecting their

understanding of the implications of their Christian convictions. There were also some cases where, during the interview, the interviewee questioned their own initial convictions and revised their statements to align with what they perceived the ethos of their faith would deem appropriate.

This reflexivity was rare, however, and most of the opinions expressed concerning migrants effect on the economy and cultural life of Irish society were remarkably "normal", reflecting acceptance of the border regime as it currently exists and perspectives of migrants as a burden on society, although again, minority counter discourses were expressed on these topics.

In terms of opinions on church and state roles, the predominance of the sacred-secular divide indicated acceptance of the state's prerogative in matters of migration. Most interviewees un-reflexively deemed the border a political matter, off-limits to church concern.

Once a newcomer came into contact with the church, however, most interviewees expressed the opinion that their migration status should not be a concern (again, exclusionary counter-discourses were evident here) and that they should be welcomed into the community. They did relate that, although there are many newcomers in their churches, their involvement is limited. This was, however, with only one exception, put down to the newcomers "sticking to themselves" rather than the welcome being less complete than it could be.

In summary, I would argue that the narrative analysis of the interview subject matter demonstrates the influence of the ideology of the territorial system of states on the interviewees' conceptualisations of the state's role concerning border regulation, the effects of immigration on the economic and cultural life of society, and the respective roles of the church and the state, particularly in the areas of migration and border management. However, competing narratives reflective of emancipatory discourses from the Christian tradition were expressed in each of these areas by a minority of the interviewees.

In the next two chapters, these discursive themes and the interviewees' various perspectives on them will be analysed critically. The ideological fingerprint framework will be deployed to examine contention, evident in discourse, between the ideology of the border regime and the alternative perspectives offered by the ethical resources of the interviewees' Christian tradition.

5 Critical Discourse Analysis of Interview Transcripts: Commonsense and altruism

5.1 Introduction

This and the next chapter comprise a critical discourse analysis of the interviews in the light of the theoretical foundation established in the first three chapters on the ideological working of the territorial system of states in dominating the contemporary imagination. As previously discussed, the effect of this is often that the precarity of migrants, and in particular undocumented migrants, becomes normalised and rationalised as an inevitable consequence of their choices. The systemic factors behind this are thus hidden and the system itself is placed beyond critique.

In these chapters I used the ideological fingerprint interpretative mechanism developed earlier to frame the analysis of the interviews, tracing contention between different discourses in the moral deliberation of the interviewees.[428] First I looked at the "commonsense" fingerprint to see if the territorial division of space between "nations" is regarded as a given fact of social and political organisation. In particular, I ascertained whether the borders which divide these territories were imagined as delineating primordially different groups (nations).

Secondly, I examined the interviews in the light of the altruism, or "false generosity", fingerprint. I sought evidence of legitimation of the status quo through casting of certain aspects of the border system as altruistic, especially when confronted with the factual extreme endangerment of undocumented migrants who attempt to cross the Mediterranean. I also looked at the interviewees' portrayal of themselves and those they categorised as "us", to see when they self-presented as altruistic and what they were trying to achieve by doing this.

Finally, under the "categorisation fingerprint", I explored the transcripts to examine whether the interviewees unconsciously adopted differentiating stances in line with

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[428] Recall that the "fingerprints" of ideological working I identified were commonsense, categorisation, altruism and the use of emotive symbols. The latter permeates the interviewees' discourse and is evident, for example, in the use of metaphor. I therefore do not deal with it separately as it is evident in the discussion of all of the other fingerprints.

the territorial ideology. This is important, because in order to rationalise the discrimination inherent in a territorialising ideology as legitimate, the categorised "other" must be recognised as fundamentally different in some morally significant way, otherwise one is discriminating against oneself.[429] Metaphor is hugely important in this work as the "others" can be collectively cast as an inhuman phenomenon, essentialised as an undifferentiated mass or force of nature; rather than as individual human beings (like "us"), who are seeking to make the best of their lives.

This analysis was methodologically based on the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse analysis developed and described by Ruth Wodak.[430] The mechanics of this approach are set out in detail in Appendix C. The analysis discussed the interviewees' discourse under each fingerprint by identifying the salient topics and the discursive strategies used to communicate them. In doing so I identified relevant quotations from the interviews to illustrate the particular point. Some quotations therefore also illustrated other points or discursive strategies which may be apparent to the reader but may not be explicitly analytically drawn out in a particular instance. This also meant that some quotations were referred to more than once as they illustrated more than one important point.

5.2 Commonsense: The state and its people?

As described in chapter one, one of the characteristic "fingerprints" of ideological support for extant power structures I have dubbed "commonsense".[431] Several such "commonsense" manifestations of the ideology of the territorial state system were evident in my interviewees' talk about the border regime.

Firstly, the territorial system of states was regarded as a natural arrangement, benignly demarcating separate groups of people regarded as inherently different in a

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[429] Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 25.

[430] Reisigl and Wodak.

[431] Here discursively reproduced myth and ritual practice reinforce the status quo as natural, rendering power relations of dominance invisible notwithstanding their visible, ethically unjust effects. They are thus removed from active critique while presenting those adversely affected by the resulting inequalities as responsible for their own predicament. By contrast alternative orderings are regarded as naïve or ridiculous and often dismissed out of hand without due consideration of evidence to the contrary.

(morally) significant way. Secondly, it was taken as axiomatic that states have the legitimate authority to regulate migration and symbolically categorise people as they see fit. Thirdly, the only imagined alternative was that of completely open borders – easily dismissed as impossible or absurd.

In this analysis, I draw attention to certain sections from the interviews which are manifestations of "commonsense" and argue that they demonstrate the influence of the ideology of the system of territorial states on the interviewees' imaginations. Nevertheless counter-discourses reflective of the interviewees' Christian ethical framework are also evident and analysed.

5.2.1 The Territorial State is Imagined as the Natural Container of a People

In several interviews there was an implicit understanding of the state as a container of a naturally cohesive people. This is often reflected in daily speech by the use of national monikers in talk about "French" or "Kenyan" people as discussed earlier in this thesis. However, it is also revealed in more subtle forms of speech in which its consequences in terms of discrimination can be evident upon closer scrutiny:

> *I think the first priority should be to look after one's own citizens, as best you can, you know and that doesn't mean to the exclusion of everyone else but you know, it will, when things get tough, and they are getting tough now, and there's high unemployment, the natural tendency is 'Well what are we doing for ourselves?' Or "What are we doing for the man next door?". Does that mean we should have an open gate to let someone else come in?*[432]

Here the speaker claims it a "natural tendency" to look out for "one's own citizens", "ourselves" and "the man next door". Taken in its literal or practical sense it could be argued that this is indeed true. Both communitarian and cosmopolitan approaches to ethics agree that there is a morally relevant distinction between family members and neighbours (or people we know personally) on the one hand, and people we have never met on the other.[433]

However, the interviewee did not intend this literally. The fact that this is not at first apparent when it was spoken, or when read, indicates the power of the territorial

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[432] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[433] Linklater, pp. 4–5.

ideology in popular imagination. So ingrained is it that most people do not realise that they are not interpreting the words literally when hearing the deictic "ourselves", or "the man next door".[434] Of course "ourselves" is intended to refer to people *of our own nationality*, and the man next door likewise. It does *not* necessarily include the man who *literally* lives next door unless he happens to have been born in the same country. One's next-door neighbour and one's co-national are implicitly conflated.

So these words are implicitly constructing a slick *moral* equivalence between the local community of people one knows personally, and people born within the same state borders as oneself. Such moral equivalence would legitimate discrimination between fellow-citizens and others privileging the community of national belonging: "What are we doing for ourselves?"

5.2.1.1 ***Competing Discourses***

Alternative or competing discourses were evident in some of the interviews, yet unlike the dominant territorial perspectives, they were often simultaneously critically undermined as in this citation from a clergyman:

> *Yeah, I mean I can see, look it's a basic Christian principle: 'I was hungry and you fed me. I was a stranger and you welcomed me.' And we say 'No, well we only want you if you're white and European. We don't want to welcome you if you're not.' it's against all Christian principles. Yet, and yet, and yet, the states, the governments have to have their ... you've to care for your own and if you can't feed and support your own population, you can't really take on an extra few million from somewhere else.*[435]

He makes explicit reference in particular to the relevant Christian tradition of welcome to the stranger (implicitly conceived as someone from another country). He also explicitly recognises the frequently *de facto* racist character of border discrimination ("white and European") which operates in contradiction to known "Christian principles". Despite this he also espouses the same perspective (as noted in another interview above) that the deictic "your own" are distinct in a morally significant way from those from "somewhere else". Additionally, he evokes the myth

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[434] See Appendix C for explanations of deixis and other discursive strategies.

[435] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

of scarcity by putting the potential number of immigrants at a hyperbolic "extra few million".

The use of the impersonal "you" is a discursive strategy which is often an implicit acknowledgement that the speaker is aware of the inherent weakness of the argument. Significantly, the speaker does not take full ownership of the point being made but seeks to draw in the dialogue partner for affirmation of its validity.[436]

One interviewee, Joel, did espouse the commonality of believers as being of more significance than "national" differences and explicitly grounded this perspective in the context of the universality of the redemption brought about by Jesus. For him, this is a "foretaste" of heaven, and he later placed it in a context of necessary submission to the temporal (state) authorities.

> *I suppose from a Christian perspective, especially in the light of things like Ephesians 2 where you know the walls of hostility are broken down. [...] and so all the ethnic divisions, if you have a common faith in Jesus Christ, should be broken down, in the sense of being able to express a united congregation. That multi-cultural, multi-national reality, I suppose in my book is a foretaste of heaven.*[437]

Although concepts of catholicity and a global church are here expressed, my analysis suggests that territorial state borders showed themselves as predominant *de facto* delimiters between peoples in my interviewees' imagination. Such discourse can implicitly conflate the state and the local, the citizen and the neighbour, generating a discourse of an unexamined moral equivalence between them.

5.2.2 States Have the Right to Control Access as They See Fit

States' right to control access as they see fit is another "commonsense" aspect of the border regime. This is naturalised through the use of metaphors likening the border to a fence or wall, such as that around a garden or property. This has overtones of protection and safety or security as well as separation of what is ours from what is others'. Walls and fences also have gates which enable one to admit whosoever one

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[436] *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, ed. by Ruth Wodak and others, trans. by Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten and J. W. Unger, 2nd ed (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 161.

[437] Interviewee 2 Joel.

chooses. Again there is the implicit conflation of the state and the local, generating a discourse of moral equivalence between the two. It is natural that one has the right to one's own property, that others have no right to enter without permission, and that one can set criteria for admission in whatever way one sees fit.

5.2.2.1 *Border Metaphors: Line, gate or fence*

The "open gate" metaphor quoted from Brian's interview above, is one instance of the implicit association of the territorial border around the state with the garden fence around one's home. The opening of the gate is symbolically akin to allowing strangers into one's home with all the imagined dangers of doing so. One's co-nationals are imagined as family members, as opposed to those who have come in through the gate, or worse still, have illicitly climbed in over the fence at some unguarded point.

There is also the implication that the gate is closable, and can therefore protect us from the others outside, which in turn assumes that the others outside are people "we" need protection from. He also implies that the "tough times" would be exacerbated by letting "others" in. The interviewees' recognition that, given Ireland's emigration history, it is hypocritical for the Irish state to be overly-restrictive in its admission policies,[438] noted in chapter four, does nothing to de-legitimate the ideological axiom that the Irish state (like all states) has the absolute right to determine access as it sees fit. This recognition also reinforces the image of the border as separating essentially different groups of people. Aviva Chomsky observes,

> *[t]oday's immigration restrictions do not explicitly mention race, but they still apply, overwhelmingly, to people of color. And they still respond to the idea that governments should mandate the composition of the populations within their territories, and ensure that socially dominant groups remain numerically dominant.*[439]

This is the domination system that the use of metaphors of line, wall and fence in discourse reflects. Behind the axiom that states have the right to and should control who crosses the borders is the fear that "we" shall be overwhelmed. Thus "we" (who are socially and politically dominant) must retain numerical dominance. This was

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[438] Evident in quotations such as "... like we've been very happy to send our own people out abroad, like. We can't object to people coming in." Interviewee 9 Doris..

[439] Chomsky, p. 177.

reflected by the concern of several of my interviewees that there are large numbers of aspirant immigrants and that the state is not controlling access appropriately:

> *But they [the government] didn't prepare for them. They just opened the gates and let them in without proper structures.*[440]

> *we're not managing our immigration control points well enough.*[441]

In contrast to this, however, some interviewees had a sympathetic perspective on undocumented migrants, recognising their vulnerability to exploitation:

> *I think it's not having a good effect. I think the people I know who have gone in. They are exploited, and I suppose that is mostly what our people think. That the fact that they came in, first of all, they were brought in, and most of them had to take lower salaries. [...] And a government allowed that to happen.*[442]

In this extract, despite the sympathy for exploited undocumented migrants, the state is portrayed as having all the agency, bringing people in, or allowing them to come in, for its own reasons. This is regarded as potentially unjust but within the legitimate purview of the state.

The only situation in which the state's right to decide admission was constrained was in the case of asylum, which was asserted as a basic human right by a majority of my interviewees. Nevertheless, the validity of asylum cases was often questioned by the interviewees, casting doubt on the applicant and legitimating state suspicion of asylum applicants:

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[440] Interviewee 16 Maura.

[441] Interviewee 9 Doris.

[442] Interviewee 16 Maura.

> *Em, you know I was visiting Egypt recently and, em, am conscious that it's pretty hard to be a Christian there and there is systematic discrimination against Christians in the employment field. Em, so does that mean that every Egyptian that wants to have asylum in Ireland or in another European country should be granted asylum .... Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't ... eh, there's over 10 million of them , you know ... where do you draw the line?*[443]

Here, the line metaphor refers to the prerogative of the state to differentiate between those who do and do not fulfil the requisite criteria for asylum, reintroducing state agency into the asylum domain, the only one where it was discursively contested. Implicit here also is an understanding that there is a morally significant distinction between political and economic oppression, made explicit by the same interviewee:

> *so in my mind I would distinguish very clearly in principle between the refugee and the economic migrant. [...] Em, and yet I'm conscious that sometimes the lines blur.*[444]

The interviewees admission that the "lines" sometimes blur is particularly interesting. It could be read as an example of the discursive strategy of mitigation whereby the speaker seeks to take the edge off the severity of their sentiments without disowning them. This is often a recognition, as with the impersonal "you" above, of unacknowledged conflict between different ethical frameworks. Yet no examples are given of when the lines blur and the ethical distinctions become less clear, thus in this case the right of the state to distinguish between those who are allowed access and those who are not according to its own criteria, remains uncontested. Alternatively, one could argue that the speaker is qualifying the right of the state and augmenting the ethical claim of the asylum seeker.

Irfan recognised that legislation here is narrow in deciding what criteria make a vulnerable migrant deserving of asylum, and that poverty can necessitate leaving one's home as much as political persecution.

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[443] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[444] Interviewee 2 Joel.

> *European legislation ... eh recognizes em ,... a valid reason for giving asylum to somebody is that they face persecution [...]. What that legislation, where it's lacking is that it doesn't recognise that poverty actually makes life unsafe, and can bring people to a point where they have to get up and go.*[445]

The use of metaphors of line, gate or fence naturalises the border and constructs it as morally equivalent to a local area – creating an equivalence between the neighbour and citizen and generating moral significance for the distinctions of the border system. The majority of interviewees used such metaphor, some explicitly elucidating the moral significance of such distinctions. However, at least one expressed a counter-discourse that recognised the distinction between "economic" and "political" migrants as an arbitrary construct, recognising that someone fleeing poverty also deserves refuge .

5.2.2.2 ***Sacred-Secular Divide: "It's not a church concern"***

Another strand of evidence which illustrates the axiomatic acceptance of the state's right to control access to its territory an be found in the concept of the 'sacred-secular' divide. Most interviewees explicitly removed migration issues from the ethical purview of the church, dividing matters that were of church or state concern, thus exempting border regulation from ethical critique. Sometimes, as seen in chapter four, it was simply declared that these issues were not a matter of concern for the church. To quote Brian,

> *No matter how high the fences and all how much the borders, people are going to try and break through and, em, how the churches should respond to that? They would say well isn't this a political matter? I don't think that they can have a direct involvement in anything like that.*[446]

In another case, however, the interviewee distanced himself from the institutional position, without explicitly specifying his own, which could be either interpreted as a mitigation strategy or a recognition that he should perhaps be more critical of the state:

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[445] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

[446] Interviewee 6 Brian.

> *... to , and I do appreciate that there must be some level of restriction. Em, ... but exactly where you draw those lines I don't, certainly the [interviewee's] Church in Ireland hasn't got an opinion. My personal opinion is, I guess, a little unclear.*[447]

Many interviewees admitted never having thought about it, in this case offering the justification that these are "political" issues, in a different domain to his concerns as a member of the clergy.:

> *Interviewer: How do you feel that the EU should react to these issues [of undocumented migration]?*
> *respondent: m-hmm...yeah, I never thought about it. You're asking me more political questions. I've never thought about it*[448]

The strongest critique of the state border regulation amongst my interviewees recognised that the bureaucracy often makes unjust decisions and where the church knows people thus affected it has a moral obligation to support them however it can in their appeals. However, state prerogative for the decision remains (in this case explicitly) uncontested:

> *Its primarily about the relationships that are built up within the congregation and they should be assisting the undocumented migrant or whoever to, eh, to, to, with their case and then its not, in a way its not up for the for the church or church congregation to be judging that; that's the state's decision.*[449]

> *My attitude is I try to just support them. I don't, it's not my job to make a judgement on whether they should or shouldn't be here, that's the state's job.*[450]

In summary, the interviewees repeatedly separated the domains of legitimate church and state action. The churches' responsibility was generally portrayed as local and pastoral, having no call to question or challenge the state on border regulation. What

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[447] Interviewee 12 David.

[448] Interviewee 1 Marcus, 2011.

[449] Interviewee 7 Alex.

[450] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

emerges clearly here from a church perspective is a need for better information and conscientisation and a greater capacity for moral reflexiveness.

5.2.2.3 *The Necessity of Documentation*

Further evidence of the state's right to control access as it sees fit is found in discourses surrounding regularisation. This is seen in instances where undocumented migrants become the embodiment of the problem and the response is an appeal to the state to (altruistically) provide some means for these "unfortunates" to "regularise" their migration status. For example, one sympathetic interviewee who is a member of the clergy with a particular interest in work with migrants said:

> *But ... you know I think one way we've got to get, is get those people regularized. Cause it's a horrendous situation where people are in limbo, em, .. they're stateless, most of them can't go home to where they came from for a whole range of reasons.*[451]

His concern for the "horrendous situation" of undocumented migrants leads him to advocate for their regularisation, but there is no criticism of the border regulation system that caused their situation. Two other clergy, both of whom have assisted asylum seekers in their own congregations also regard a restoration of documentation as a natural solution, the second of whom explicitly acknowledges the prerogative of states to put certain "hoops along the way" and maintains that biblical principles mandate a submission to those rules "unless they're oppressive".

> *I think that people have been here, maybe a year or more and they're settled in the place and there needs to be a situation where those people can be encouraged to come forward to get documented and to get their employment situation regularised.*[452]

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[451] Interviewee 4 Roger.

[452] Interviewee 7 Alex.

> *Well, I suppose my only thought on that is that they should be documented. You know if you're going to go to a country you have to respect the laws of that country. And if the laws of that country say you have to go through certain hoops to get, em, residence then you should go through those hoops. That would be my feeling. I suppose based on, again, the biblical principle that you respect those in, you respect the government, and the laws, and unless they're oppressive laws which are clearly designed to, you know, to persecute[...]. Em, ...on the basis that authorities are placed there by God. For the good of society. As a general principle, you know, à la Romans 13.*[453]

Again, over-simplification of the sacred-secular divide is evident, as is a refusal of any attempt at correlation or recognition of the value or acceptability of mutual critique in regard to public morality; although here it is contingent on the laws not being designed to persecute, which may open the door to a critical stance towards the border system. However, the "general principle" is deemed to mandate respect for the particular (legal) domain of the state, and for the church to confine itself to its own (spiritual and pastoral) domain.

5.2.2.4 ***The Symbolic Power of Documents: Desired but mundane***

The symbolic power of state-given documents was explicitly recognised by several interviewees, in one case personally, with a repeatedly stated indignation that "they" stamped his passport, which was experienced as a slight on his integrity ("they wouldn't believe..."):

> *I still had a Cypriot passport and when [...] they saw my passport they were afraid that I was a refugee and I was trying to get to England illegally. ... and eh, they wouldn't believe that I was ... from Ireland .. eh .. you know as far as they were concerned I had a Cypriot passport so they stamped my passport and said that I could not stay in Britain for longer than three months ... and not to take up work paid or unpaid. They stamped my passport. ... and I kept saying to them "look I've been to England hundreds of times" you know "I've come over from Ireland" [...] if I came over again and this was on my passport for any reason I thought so that was I decided to get an Irish passport and of course I had no problem having lived ... having grown up here.*[454]

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[453] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[454] Interviewee 1 Marcus.

In another case the interviewee expressed his astonishment at the importance of "official" documents to his immigrant parishioners. These documents seemed comparatively trivial to him, yet to his parishioners they were anything but. This is reflection of, in Balibar's words, the border regime's "... establishment of a world *apartheid*, or a dual regime for the circulation of individuals, [which] raises massive political problems for acceptability and resistance."[455] Requirements of the border regime, such as passports, visas and other documentation, that are trivial for people who were born in the "right" places are extremely valuable when attained by those who are not so fortunate in the location of their birth:

> *for them it seems to be very important to get that letter. It's like something official from ... the church to say that they're ... getting documents seems to be always important. Even things like a certificates of baptism or confirmation - they want to get the bit of paper. It's very important to get the document.*[456]

Even where the privileges of wealth are recognised, interviewees gave the benefit of the doubt to the bureaucracy, assuming it to be objective and benign, and thus legitimate, and implicitly assigning responsibility for their predicament to the undocumented migrant. Here the interviewee is speaking of his and his spouse's personal experience and implies that if documents are not attainable it must be because of some untoward behaviour on the part of the migrant, albeit with a passing acknowledgement that their "middle class" status may be a factor:

> *We have never been turned down, we have never had any problems. [...] So, for us, as kind of middle class people from two countries, it hasn't really been a problem. For us. Probably true of most middle classes anywhere in the world, [...] we have noticed that ... when we are trying to say something different we don't have the trail of paperwork [...]. So, we've noticed that if we want to apply in truth, we have the paperwork to do that. So, maybe that does hint that the system is somehow fair, that [...] [i]f all people were honest these things would be easy to come up with.*[457]

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[455] Balibar, p. 82.

[456] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[457] Interviewee 3 Mark.

> *I think it is right to have [to have] passports, I do. Yeah, I just think you can't have, yeah, I definitely do. It's not a huge thing. Like it's not an enormous thing for somebody to get a passport.*[458]

It could be argued from these quotations that there is a tendency for these, globally mobile Western people to take for granted the documents which enable that mobility, and to express astonishment at the great value ascribed to even seemingly insignificant documentation (such as baptismal certificates) by people from other parts of the world. In the last two cases these demands are deemed reasonable and legitimate and thus, if people have difficulty fulfilling them, doubt is cast on their integrity.

5.2.2.5 ***Competing Discourses***

Even though the border system itself was unconsciously regarded as a natural ordering, there was not a complete absence of critique of its operation in practice. Several interviewees, all of whom had worked directly with asylum seekers, recognised that the system lacks compassion, has a culture of refusal, or sometimes operates arbitrarily. The right of states to regulate access was not questioned, but the manner of the execution of this right was ethically critiqued and its subordination to the human right to claim asylum was acknowledged.

> *but you need a level of compassion in the middle of that. And it depends why you're undocumented. Some people are undocumented through no fault of their own. Some people choose to come in an undocumented manner in the hope that they won't get caught and sent back. [...] but it needs to be done humanely and in a system that everybody understands.*[459]

> *My impression was that there was a definite culture that people were generally refused on the first go and that then [...] if you had the resources or you had the contacts in Ireland which would help you to sort of push your case that eventually quite often the Department would relent [...] So I'd say on the whole probably that's not a just way of doing it.*[460]

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[458] Interviewee 5 Cara.

[459] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[460] Interviewee 7 Alex.

> *I think there is a case for the Church higher up, em to be critiquing the State's policy on immigration, if they think criteria are unfair, or unjust, or they're not being applied fairly. [...] to critique the State and saying this is not right, its part of its prophetic role, not that the Church of Ireland is very good at that...*[461]

In summary, all of the interviewees regarded the territorial system of states as a natural ordering. Its legal responsibility in terms of regulating access was unquestioned as axiomatic and therefore often discursively placed beyond critique as a systemic cause of injustice or inequality, confining the churches' remit to pastoral care of those migrants who participated in church life. Several interviewees suggested a "solution" to the problem of undocumented migrants' vulnerability in regularisation, which, whilst demonstrating compassion for their situation, does not challenge the *modus operandi* of the border regime. However, some interviewees, who had worked directly with migrants, or more specifically asylum seekers, were critical of the way the border regime operates in practice, recognising the systemic causes of the situation and in one case stating that the church as institution should engage critically with the state in this situation.

5.2.3 Open Borders: A naïve ideal

As noted above, a corollary of the domination of the imagination by a particular ideology is the apparent naïveté or absurdity of alternative orderings. This was evident in many of my interviews in respect of the prevailing border regime. When asked what level of freedom of movement people should have, the alternative structure of open borders was mooted by many interviewees. As if unready to grapple further with the implications of this, however they all then dismissed it as impossible or invalid. For some of them this was presented as an obvious truth, requiring no supporting rationale, providing further evidence of the naturalising ideological power of the territorial state system. For example:

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[461] Interviewee 7 Alex.

> *Em, ... the vision of totally open borders, is, I guess, impossible. ... eh, and that I, that I do understand. I suppose that would be my, my heart for it really. Em, ... to ... and I do appreciate that there must be some level of restriction.*[462]

Here, the interviewee understands open borders as a naïve ideal, not grounded in the real world. While he expresses compassion and awareness of the hardships that result from the current system, having a "heart" for open borders, he simultaneously recognises the pragmatic "impossibility" of such a system.

Others expressed a rationale based on a declared pragmatism, which would ("obviously") preclude "unmanaged immigration" or "an open policy", however desirable that may be.

> *Em, ... my personal bias, and now this wouldn't be a position I would take publicly, particularly, would be a much more open immigration system worldwide. [...] Em, ... but I'm also aware of the practicalities of making it happen, em, you know, like how do you manage immigration? [...] So I'd tend to be sympathetic. But I hope I'm not so naïve to believe that you can just have a totally open policy and that that's going to work.*[463]

This (clergy) interviewee has a particular interest in migration so it is interesting to note the double-hedging of his declaration that he favours a more open immigration system. Firstly, he does not feel that he's in a position to take this position publicly, thus implying that many members of his denomination would not favour such a position. Secondly, he hedges this declaration with a "particularly", perhaps implicitly recognising that he should be prepared to be more public with this "bias" or that his denomination should be more in favour of it. In any case, this hedging is symptomatic of the contentious nature of such a position in his context and a recognition of the competing discourses which it invokes, including the specifically mentioned one of "managed migration" with its assumptions of migration as a problematic issue needing "management", again reinforcing the territorial state system as axiomatic.[464]

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[462] Interviewee 12 David.

[463] Interviewee 4 Roger.

[464] The language of "managed migration" has been adopted by government bodies concerned with border regulation. It often appears in conjunction with language concerning prevention of "illegal immigration" and sometimes other undesirable activities (which are therefore implicitly associated with irregular migration) such as

As with the previous interviewee, he situates himself as a "compassionate pragmatist": sympathetic yet not naïve.

Various other competing discourses were invoked as pertinent to the contention that open borders are a naïve ideal. In particular, discourses of (numeric) overwhelming, burden on the welfare system, that migrants are of an inherently inferior character or pose a security risk, or simply that this is a "difficult" issue, were in evidence as the following excerpts demonstrate:

> *So, ... you know , but we do live on an island, and it's not possible to have everybody coming here freely, I don't, you know, [my] personal opinion would be we can't, we have to have managed migra[tion] [...]. And those who are allowed to come and can be here need to be treated exactly the same as me.*[465]

> *Well it would be wonderful if people had total freedom. [...] but I presume, for security reasons, because there are people out there who may have ulterior motives and ... eh, ... that we have to have protection ... em, I suppose 9/11 was the thing that really sparked that off. [...] so when it comes to barriers and whether people should be free to go wherever they ... it would be ideal, but I don't think it's practical.*[466]

Taken together, these reasons given for the naïveté of more open borders rely on an Other who is discursively constructed as fundamentally distinct from "us", as well as a potential threat, either to our culture (through numeric overwhelming), or to our welfare or safety. The fact that several interviewees regarded it as axiomatic that borders could not be relaxed demonstrates the domination of the imagination in terms of the given-ness of the border as protector from the threatening "other". At the same time, the discursive strategies used by the interviewees, in particular the frequent hedging of their expressed sentiments, indicates that they perceive them as contending with other contextually-relevant (but un-named, unexamined) ethical frameworks, political factors and conflicting principles and ambivalence of values. It is interesting to note that amongst the wide variety of discourses cited in

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organised crime and trafficking. It is thus regarded with suspicion by organisations advocating on behalf of undocumented migrants. For example, see UK Home Office, pp. 16,20,38,78–81.

[465] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[466] Interviewee 8 Ryan.

interviewees' discussions of border control and the naïveté of open borders, Judaeo-Christian ethical discourses such as welcome to the stranger were rarely explicitly invoked, rather, a perspective of separated sacred and secular domains predominated.

5.2.3.1 ***Competing Discourses***

This last point was not without exception, however. Mark, for example, expressed an alternative perspective of the church as a worldwide community bound by common beliefs by invoking a comparison with the Muslim concept of *umma*. He painted a picture of a global church operating within the temporal political state structures but prepared to defy them should they impinge on their core values.

> *And, and I think we have a, as churches we have a strong sense of, the Muslim word is* umma *which is [...] the congregation of believers on a worldwide basis. Em, ... so, I think churches by definition are border free [...] Em, ... we, we deal with the management of human beings into state structures and we operate within them but, and we obey the laws as long as they don't impinge on our core values, of any state, and we support churches who break the laws of the state in order to promote their core values.*[467]

Here he risks conflating the political and religious realms, as *umma* generally (though not necessarily) supposes a theocratic state. My sense was that he was trying to outline a pragmatic stance whereby the churches recognise the primacy of their worldwide community of faith whilst temporally (or temporarily) adapting to the current fact of political territorial organisation. So, my understanding is that he is not challenging the territorial system of state *per se*, but is however, suggesting that the churches have multi-layered loyalties and will resist the state if they feel it is impinging upon their "core values".

Another interviewee expressed the opinion that most people in the church (denomination) would be sympathetic to vulnerable migrants but do not engage with those issues unless directly confronted with them:

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[467] Interviewee 3 Mark.

> *I think people in the church, by and large, ... are probably sympathetic. But even before that I think ... em, a lot of them, unless they're confronted with immigrants, and have in their congregation or community, they either, they're oblivious to what's going on, and in many cases I think don't care - it's irrelevant.*[468]

However, another interviewee who works with an NGO, expressed the opinion that, although dominant discourse portrays migration in a negative light, there is a "silent majority" who have a more compassionate outlook. He cited empirical evidence from the British Refugee Council which demonstrates that two thirds of Britons are sympathetic to refugees already in Britain.[469]

> *Em, ... but, in my understanding, I mean, I think there's a great silent majority in the public who are actually much more, em, ... interested in fairness and being inclusive and welcoming and hospitable. Em, ... that's something I've kind of sensed and picked up and em ... and there's, there's some research which has been conducted which, which says that eh, [...] Britain is seen to be generally a welcoming place and that's the experience of refugees and asylum seekers.*[470]

This indicates a possible alternative thesis for a lack of critique of the border regime: that a negative perspective is so dominant in public media and government discourse that people are intimidated into silence or acquiescence. However, I undertook intentional methodological measures to mitigate this intimidation factor, for example by anonymising the interviews.

5.2.4 Summary

The discourse analysis of the interviews reflected repeated discursive construction of states as natural territories, demarcating fundamentally different groups of people; axiomatic acceptance of the legitimacy of the border regime to regulate access; suspicion of those who lack required documentation and a perception of (more) open borders as naïvely idealistic.

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[468] Interviewee 4 Roger.

[469] British Refugee Council, 'Refugee Council | April | Helping Others Is Part of the British DNA' <http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/archive/press/2011/april/20110418_refugeepoll?> [accessed 30 May 2011].

[470] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

Several interviewees were sympathetic to the predicaments of vulnerable migrants (especially if they had personally encountered them) and some criticised the way that the border bureaucracy works in practice. The concept of the church as a global community of believers was also elicited as being somewhat in contention with extant political orderings. However, the system of territorial borders itself was perceived (usually unconsciously) as a common-sense, natural ordering. It was therefore, with rare exceptions, not regarded as a systemic cause of the precarity, inequality or injustice faced by undocumented migrants. I argue therefore that even with a potentially "deviant" population, the ideology of the territorial state system successfully conceals its dominating power relations and naturalises its discrimination at borders. I now turn attention to the altruism fingerprint.

5.3 Altruism, or "False Generosity": Sympathetic, but "difficult" decisions are necessary

I described in the first chapter how altruism is a fingerprint of ideological working. Altruism is manifest in two predominant ways. One manifestation is as what Paolo Freire calls "false generosity": appearing to welcome the migrant but only on "our" terms and contingent on their "good behaviour" and appreciation. This is often a somewhat paternalistic perspective and has colonialist overtones. Such declared altruistic intentions reinforce the legitimacy of the speaker as an actor or commentator as they are claiming to speak or act not out of self-interest, but for the good of others.

> *I'm torn, you know. The Christian side of me says 'You have to support them and look after them.' And yet there's another side that says 'If you're living in our society you must abide by our way of doing things.'*[471]

Antonio Reyes analyses the use of altruism as a legitimation strategy in political speeches and similar strategies were evident in the interviewees' talk.[472]

The second main manifestation of altruism is more systemic in nature and occurs when a political system is lauded for its altruistic effects. This similarly reinforces its legitimacy while obscuring other systemic effects which may be discriminatory and

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[471] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[472] Reyes, pp. 801–803.

support unjust power inequalities. In the case of the border regime, the asylum system is often portrayed as altruistic and this can hide injustices in the asylum system itself, and also unjust effects of the border regime as a whole. This form of altruistic discourse was less evident in my interviews.

5.3.1 The Self as Altruistic

My interviewees were attentive to their self-presentation as not speaking out of self-interest. They were careful to present themselves as established in the church and therefore legitimate commentators – asserting their ontological security. They were also keen to establish themselves as objective, speaking from first hand experience and relating anecdotes from trusted sources. They also expressed their own and their church community's intention to be welcoming, open-minded, tolerant and friendly.

An example of this that was repeatedly evident was sympathy talk, where the interviewee presented her or himself as sympathetic to the "tragic" situation of vulnerable migrants. While this was undoubtedly often an expression of genuine concern, what is interesting is that this sympathy talk was often expressed in conjunction with discourses which may reflect the ideological influence of the territorial state system. This is strongly reminiscent of what Scott Hanson-Easey and Martha Augoustinos found in their conversation analysis of talkback radio programmes on humanitarian refugees. They conclude that

> *... social actors in talkback radio are conceived as holding and articulating pre-formulated, hegemonic meanings (see Gramsci, 1971) in relation to representations of refugees and their activities, whilst concomitantly modulating their talk reflexively in regard to the interactions they are engaged in.*[473]

What is perceived as commonsense here (and thus protected from critique) is that the interviewees regard themselves as the ones with the social capital which provides them with the agency to be sympathetic and tolerant (should they choose to do so), and regard the refugees (in these instances) as lacking such agency. Thus this

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[473] Scott Hanson-Easey and Martha Augoustinos, 'Complaining About Humanitarian Refugees: The Role of Sympathy Talk in the Design of Complaints on Talkback Radio', *Discourse & Communication*, 5 (2011), 247 –271 (p. 248) <doi:10.1177/1750481311405588>. Citing A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).

sympathy talk, whilst usually well-intended, rather than being emancipatory, serves to reinforce established power relations as static and natural. In these examples altruistic sympathy talk is found adjacent to instances of the topoi of suspicion, genuineness and criminal disposition that were discussed in the previous chapter.

> *The obvious one would be like if they're refugees of a kind, yes I would be very sympathetic to refugees. Em, ... em, and I ... I'd be sympathetic to all of them because I really feel if they want to come in, I'd like to know why they want to come in here. Em, .. but eh, and if they're being persecuted in their own countries or wherever they live.*[474]

> *Well, I think on European on the European level I think we must try and share as much as possible. But one thing I always argued that the constitutional rights the human rights of every individual are sacrosanct. But I think when people are out to defraud, I think, em, you know the bigger issue is there should be wide cooperation between everywhere to stop as much of it as possible ...*[475]

Another effect of sympathy talk and self-presentation as altruistic is to imply that "'we" have done all we can and therefore it is up to "them" to accept the welcome offered and participate in the community. To the extent that they fail to do so, it is their own responsibility. This was reflected in several interviewees' talk about the affect of increasing diversity on their churches in terms of the conduct of services and church activities.

One interviewee recognised that a church has to change in order to grow and said that hers definitely had, but then rhetorically indicated that the change was more in the diversity of the congregation than existing practices:

> *respondent: [...] for a church to grow it has to change with the times [...].*
> *interviewer: yeah, and [church name] has, do you think?*
> *respondent: Definitely, definitely. Now it would still be a little bit - you don't express yourself that much, or you learn how to express it and you don't show it too much, but eh ... it has changed enormously, it has changed enormously. And it's lovely, it is so, em, so many different nationalities, so many different nationalities.*

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[474] Interviewee 8 Ryan.

[475] Interviewee 6 Brian.

Changes that newcomers have brought to church praxis were not necessarily welcome. One member of the clergy noted that diversity had brought a certain amount of "conflict" in areas of worship style and length as well as punctuality. He established ownership of the right to define church culture and praxis as belonging to the "Irish people", thus reinforcing their legitimacy and constraining the meaning of welcome to attending rather than belonging.

> *There's a lot of singing, a lot of dancing, a lot of clapping, it goes on for much longer than an Irish mass would. So, there's a little bit of conflict there. When it's an Irish, a regular mass, ... it's, it's 40 minutes [...]. That would be a bit alien to Africans.*[476]

That it was the responsibility of the newcomers to adapt to the prevailing church culture without being "difficult" was evident in the interviews in the discursive tropes of the "good stranger" and "they stick to themselves" which categorise newcomers accordingly. Here Indian and Filipino 'good strangers' were juxtaposed with 'difficult' Nigerians. The implication is clear here that responsibility for the 'barrier' rests with them: they're not 'integrating' properly.

> *we became very close [...] with the, say, Filipinos, and with the Indian nationals, more so. We found it harder to, we got involved with a lot of Nigerian people here too, but we found them more difficult. Their culture was completely, I found them, it wasn't as easy to integrate and I think everyone finds that way [...]. There seems to be some kind of a barrier there, you know. You don't get as close. We got very close with all the others.*[477]

In contrast, Roger, another member of the clergy, was aware of this tendency and noted "our" reticence to change so that newcomers are accepted as they are, to develop a church culture and praxis which reflects the current, rather than the historical, membership.

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[476] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[477] Interviewee 16 Maura.

> *We're quite complacent about our need to welcome and accept people who are different. And, because I believe that welcoming and accepting involves us changing to accommodate others, we're very, very poor at that.*[478]

In the interviews there were many instances of altruistic talk. However, very often it was joined to essentialising or negative tropes which could indicate that in such cases, rather than being wholly genuinely well-intentioned, it was a discursive strategy to self-present as objective and well-meaning, or to place the responsibility for a lack of integration in the community on the shoulders of the newcomers, rather than the established community.

5.3.2 The State as Altruistic

The asylum system was repeatedly referred to as an essential part of the state's obligations to vulnerable migrants. The interviewees regarded it as axiomatic that the state should provide refuge to those who are facing political persecution.

> *I can think of one [member of the congregation] from Sierra Leone for example who was conscripted, who was walking down the street in his village, em, jumped on, dragged into one of the armies in the civil war, escaped ... walked for a couple of weeks till he got to the coast and basically ended up here. [...] Now when it's someone like that, em, escaping a civil war .. I have every sympathy. And think that we should give them asylum.*[479]

> *Well, I think there's the absolute issue around asylum. If somebody is in a well-founded fear of persecution, that's it. No brainer. ... I mean with the European Union, it's a done deal, you know, that's the way it is.*[480]

Where this serves the ideological purpose of reinforcing the status quo is in the aforementioned restriction of this obligation to *political* persecution. Other systemic injustices in which the restrictive border regime plays a part are thus removed from critique as if the state's moral obligations are entirely met through the asylum system. This reinforces the topos of suspicion on all other migrants who do not fit into the narrow category of asylum seekers or refugees as they are imagined as having

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[478] Interviewee 4 Roger.

[479] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[480] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

migrated out of a selfish desire rather than out of necessity. It also places asylum seekers and refugees under suspicion as having potentially played the system to gain access.

5.3.2.1 *Giving the System the Benefit of the Doubt: The topos of difficulty*

Contention around this distinction between political and "economic" refugees was thrown into relief when I asked the interviewees about what they thought appropriate levels of freedom of movement across borders would be, and what criteria they thought states should use when making decisions as to whether someone should be allowed to enter the state. In this situation the interviewees' responses frequently reflected the topos of "difficulty", some examples of which can be seen above.

Here the issue is framed as "difficult". That it is perceived as difficult for the state rather than the migrant is indicative of hegemonic domination of the imagination. The "difficulty" in the mind of the interviewees was a result of the complexity of the overlapping obligations and considerations that the state must make in such decisions. Thus the benefit of the doubt was often given to the state as was evident in several quotations earlier, and attention was diverted from systemic problems such as a culture of refusal. The *real* difficulties faced by migrants in precarious situations did not receive the same consideration.

This is reminiscent of a common political discourse of "difficult" decisions noted by Fintan OToole in the Irish Times. He observes the frequent use by political leaders of language of the government making "difficult decisions" in the context of economic austerity (a manifestation of scarcity). These decisions are not "difficult" on the decision makers in any material sense but all too much so for the often voiceless or disenfranchised objects of the decision who usually find their circumstances further straitened.[481]

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[481] Fintan O'Toole, 'Kenny's Plea "for Sacrifice" an Empty Gesture', *The Irish Times* (Dublin, 6 December 2011) <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/1206/1224308618918.html> [accessed 25 October 2012].

interviewer: Em, .. so, what criteria do you think should inform a decision as to whether somebody should be allowed to come into the country or not? respondent: Mmm, that's a fairly difficult one, now, isn't it. I , I mean ... em, just simply saying 'well we should be sympathetic to them' is, is not enough because you've got to have, you've got to ... mmm. to make decisions or you've got to have .. rules or conditions because otherwise it actually would be a free-for-all and [...].[482]

that's a personal and fairly ignorant response, ignorant of ... how you wrestle with these things 'cause they are difficult, I don't doubt that for a moment. They're difficult. But, em ... I've no doubt that Europe with slightly more open borders would help.[483]

In the context of migration the scarce resources are the physical space and material resources of the receiving state (which the interviewees sometimes explicitly referred to in conjunction with this topos of difficulty), which are perceived as under threat, thus justifying these "difficult" decisions.

An alternative reading of this common "difficulty" topos is that it is posited as a substitute for the challenging moral thinking necessary to wrestle with the realities of these issues from different perspectives and angles – especially from the "underside" – the perspective of undocumented migrants.

5.3.3 Summary

In summary, the altruism fingerprint was apparent in my interviews principally in two different forms. Firstly in the interviewees' construction of themselves and their "own" community as legitimate commentators and "owners" of the community, acting not in their own interest but for the common good, with due sympathy to the precarious situation of vulnerable migrants.

They are thus established as the ones with agency and justified in their expectation that migrant newcomers, having come by choice, are obliged to adapt to the prevailing culture and praxis. A hierarchy of legitimacy is thereby discursively constructed, reinforcing power relations in line with the migration status endowed by the state's border system.

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[482] Interviewee 8 Ryan.

[483] Interviewee 12 David.

Secondly, the state is legitimated in its discrimination between migrants it categorises as political or "economic" refugees in the interviewees' frequent allusions to the asylum system and in their ethical distinction between these categories of migrant. The topos of difficulty is prevalent when these distinctions are brought into relief. It functions to portray expectations that the state will treat each migrant fairly as unreasonable in practice given the complexities in play. Thus it distracts attention from both the real material difficulties of migrants' situations and from injustices in the states' border administration and bureaucratic culture.

5.4 Conclusions

In this analysis I sought out and highlighted evidence of competing discourses, calling attention to interviewees' use of such discursive phenomena as broken speech or mitigation. In the interviews (some more than in others) there were occasional acknowledgements of emancipatory aspects of Christian ethics but allusions to systemic injustices were rarer. However, despite this methodological strategy, and these counter-discourses and acknowledgements, I believe my analysis supports the thesis that the ideology of territorial state system is dominant in the imagination of my interviewees.

I found that their discourse provided evidence that they thought the border regime to be inevitable and necessary, and in many cases justified in its manner of operation. Concerns over the border system were frequently regarded as being a political matter, outside of the churches' purview:

> *I don't think the church should get really, would get involved in all of that [politics]. [...] I think, like, the church's role is to ... teach the gospel, myself.*[484]

The injustices and suffering of vulnerable migrants seen as being largely of their own making, and thus their own responsibility:

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[484] Interviewee 16 Maura.

> *In the example of somebody gets on a raft and dies in the process. Is it the responsibility of the immigration law, did the immigration law cause that death? No. not at all. [...] no immigration law is going to prevent that person getting on a raft. ... And to what extent any person can be responsible for someone else's desire ... you know, really hard to ... say that.*[485]

For the churches themselves, even though, as noted before, welcome was expressed as an essential characteristic of the church, the established members are discursively constructed as having "ownership" in the sense of the right to prescribe the nature of church praxis and culture. Migrants and other newcomers are deemed welcome to attend, rather than belong: a very diminished expression of the Hebrew and Christian tradition of hospitality which is considered in chapter seven.

> *On a local basis, it's easy. Churches should provide a welcoming atmosphere. Should receive anybody who wishes to em, to engage as part of the church community.*[486]

In one of the starkest examples of domination of the imagination, when Brian was presented with the reality of migrant deaths on the Mediterranean he regarded migrants' desperation as a demonstration of the need for tighter border restrictions, that if there was freedom the "total influx" would make everything "lopsided", and that we have to look after "our own". The totally lopsided nature of economic and power relations that causes this desperation, and the moral obligation to the poor and "desperate" are completely overwhelmed in his imagination by the power of the territorialised distinction between "us" and "them". The apparent moral significance of that distinction dominates his imagination to the extent that it overrides the moral significance of the injustices evident in the migrants' desperation.

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[485] Interviewee 3 Mark.

[486] Interviewee 3 Mark.

> *Where, where you've incidents coming across in boats trying to get into Italy from North Africa being turned back ehh, and there's other areas in the world and that sort of area has to be controlled because it's, it's like some areas of the world are so poor so everything, so they must, they're desperate to do something to further their way of life and they're desperately trying to get from A to B; so there can't be freedom or else you'll have a total influx in one country that that totally puts everything lopsided, you know and that's not right, really. I think the first priority should be to look after one's own citizens, as best you can, you know...*[487]

Having looked at the ways the border regime was normalised and reinforced as essential to prevent such an "influx", I now turn attention to how the peoples the border is deemed essential in separating are discursively constructed and reproduced as fundamentally different. How does the border regime categorise people? How is this categorisation reflected in discourse? What are the effects of this categorisation on the place of migrants and potential migrants in the interviewees' moral imagination?

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[487] Interviewee 6 Brian.

6 Critical Discourse Analysis of Interview Transcripts: Categorisation

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I turn attention to analysis of the interviews under the categorisation fingerprint of ideological working. According to Ball and Dagger one of the fundamental functions of an ideology is orientation, enabling people to answer questions like "Who am I?", "Where do I fit?" and "Who are we?".[488] I would argue that implicit in that is another question: "Who are we not?" In terms of my fingerprint framework for revealing the operation of ideology, this orientating function is in part fulfilled by categorising discourse which reveals an understanding of humanity in terms of groups of people who are analytically, and thus morally, distinct.

In terms of critical discourse analysis I now examine the use of discursive strategies such as nomination, predication, perspectivation and deixis in the interviews.[489] The deictic distinction that was most prevalent in the interviews was that between Irish-born people and immigrants, regularly denoted "us" and "them" in deictic terms. This was to be expected to some extent, given the subject of the interviews, but I will argue this type of categorisation was altogether disproportionate, nonetheless. The other apparent subject of nomination is the state, though this is often evident in the context of distinguishing "us" from "them".

In the next section I will review the interviewees' talk concerning the "us" and "them" categories, discussing how this categorisation is done and what the effects of this categorising work are in terms of the interviewees' construction of a framework for understanding and talking about migration, church and society. I will not specifically address interviewees' talk on the state as this has been covered partly under the commonsense fingerprint in the previous chapter, where the perceived given-ness of states and hard borders was analysed.

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[488] Ball and Dagger, p. 5.

[489] These terms are explained in Appendix C.

6.2 Talk About "Us": Establishing belonging and legitimacy

6.2.1 What Is Said About "Us"

In terms of the "us" category, the interviewees regularly adopted discursive strategies of predication in attributing to themselves certain characteristics which legitimated them as belonging to the established community. Secondly, they adopted perspectivisation in assuming the authority to speak of the opinions and characteristics of others, achieved mainly by adopting a role as "one who knows", reinforced by offering first hand experience.[490]

The main categorising use of nomination as a discursive strategy to denote "us", which occurred in six of the sixteen interviews, was the use of the term "our own" to denote ethnically Irish people. Even though several references to "our own people" were not complimentary, the use of the expression reveals a prevailing distinction in the speaker's imagination between the newcomers (who are not "our own") and the established members.

> *and so many of our own people, so many Irish people are having to leave because of unemployment and so on.*[491]

> *Well you see, there's an area of our own people won't work...*[492]

6.2.1.1 *We Belong: Long-term establishment*

Two of the three people who were *not* born in Ireland felt it necessary at the very start of their interviews, without prompting, to establish their credentials as long-term residents in Ireland and members of their church congregations. It is implicit in this that their understanding of their legitimacy as commentators on changes in the local and church communities depended on their belonging. This was established, in a manner consistent with Carens, primarily by asserting long-term residency. Their

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[490] The terms of predication and perspectivation are explained in Appendix C.

[491] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[492] Interviewee 10 Tim.

ontological security depended upon recognition of their belonging in the "us" category.[493]

> *Well .. eh.. I came to Ireland a long time ago and there've been a lot of changes. [...] One example is there were, when I first came to Ireland in the early 50s, 1950s, there were very few foreigners.*[494]

> *Well we've been here 18 and a half years nearly, since we've moved from England ...*[495]

Another interviewee was keen to establish credentials as having lived in the community for many years before it became an urban area.

> *But I seen that change, of course this was rural, completely rural, the whole area, and I was, I was born down here in a little place. I'm still in the same, the same place. [laughing]*[496]

The keenness of these interviewees to establish themselves through demonstration of long term residency in the area is consistent with an understanding of belonging rooted in the ideology of the territorial state system whereby nativity places the issue of one's belonging beyond question.[497]

6.2.1.2 ***We Know: First hand experience***

Another legitimation strategy that was regularly adopted by the interviewees was to claim firsthand knowledge of the situations they were describing.

> *... my wife is on part of the school management ...*[498]

> *I used to own a business...*[499]

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[493] Skey.

[494] Interviewee 1 Marcus.

[495] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[496] Interviewee 15 Jack.

[497] Skey, p. 730.

[498] Interviewee 10 Tim.

In the following anecdote in which the interviewee asserts his legitimacy as a commentator by recounting a firsthand experience, he begins with a mitigation of what he is going to say next: the classic prolepsis "I won't say racist but ...". He subsequently mitigates again by denying that it is just the "Chinese", saying that other groups have exhibited similar behaviour (so that he cannot be labelled as anti-Chinese), and then later a third time by saying that he is "slow to be throwing arrows and darts". This repeated mitigation indicates a certain discomfort with what he is saying and perhaps reflects a recognition that his essentialisation of "these people" is contentious.

> *I won't use the word racist, but you know when I mentioned Chinese and their education.... Yes, I would've come from a banking past I've seen evidence of that as well. And also others as well, you know I'm not just talking specifically about the Chinese I'm taking about very serious incidents with the Nigerian community, who are, you know I'm slow to be throwing arrows and darts in particular areas but.. they would have quite a high incidence of fraud. and you know they're... not even apologetic about it, you know.*[500]

6.2.2 What are the Purposes of the Talk About "Us"? Legitimation and authority

It is important to ask what the interviewees are setting out to achieve in this categorising talk of "us". I propose that a primary, though perhaps often unconscious, objective is to establish themselves as members of the community and therefore as legitimate and disinterested commentators on matters affecting it. Once so established they often apparently understand themselves as vested with authority to commentate on behalf of the newcomers. We see this in the following examples where interviewees spoke with an assumed authority ("I know") about what "they" do, as well as how "they" feel, what "they" like and what "they" want.

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[499] Interviewee 10 Tim.

[500] Interviewee 6 Brian.

Now, maybe the Polish people tended to stay very much in their own communities, but the children mixed well. I would say it worked better at child level rather than at adult level. That wasn't as successful if you want to call it successful. I think the Polish people, there was nothing they didn't feel alienated, they just wished to be pretty well on their own.[501]

Em, then again, now when things are bad, em, ... they probably want to go home. There's probably, they've moved on to another source. [...] We kind of used them when we needed them and now they're ... they've moved on, but I think they're quite happy in a certain way, to do that.[502]

However unconscious, this categorisation pattern betrays an underlying intention to be on the "right" side of the divide.

6.2.3 Summary

Arguably then, a primary purpose of the discursive strategies used in talk about "us" was to establish the speaker's legitimacy as a commentator about "them". This was done through establishing the interviewees as belonging, which is an assumed status for those born in Ireland but had to be justified for those who were not – their ontological security depended on their long-term residency. Claiming first hand experience, or at least second hand from a trusted source, and assertions of disinterestedness were other strategies adopted to reinforce the legitimacy of their commentary and opinions.

6.3 Talk About "Them": Collectively suspect?

6.3.1 How Are They Discursively Categorised? Essentialisation

One impact of the interviewees' speech about newcomers was an essentialisation of the newcomers through discursive categorisation, portraying them as an undifferentiated mass and assigning presumed "national" characteristics to whole groups. In the following excerpts we see Nigerian people characterised as having poor timekeeping and being aggressive, and we see Indian and Filipino people characterised as being more gentle.

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[501] Interviewee 8 Ryan.

[502] Interviewee 10 Tim.

I don't mean this as a criticism, 'cause Irish people maybe are not the most punctual but Nigerian people are even worse. they are, they're punctuality. They talk about Nigerian time. They have very little sense of time.[503]

See the Africans I've found, the Nigerian people are a bit aggressive. They're more pushy and aggressive. They're not a gentle, maybe as the Indian or the Filipino people that I have friends with. But I have, em, I have two of my best friends are from the Congo, and I've got very involved with them...[504]

Such essentialisation is not always pejorative. The characteristics ascribed to groups of migrants were often very positive in the interviews, when referring to the cultural richness or impressive work ethic associated with essentialised groups.

Like, there was one stage, I wasn't there that long, and I just thought it was so exciting, we'd a lot of Koreans in the church. And they start, I had a Christianity Explored in my house for Korean women, and I had a translator that used to come because none of the women spoke [English], and I just thought ... this is exciting, this is the way the church is supposed, you know! I loved it, I loved it, yeah.[505]

[...] and at the beginning there was a big difference in the Polish standard to say .. example the Irish standard [...][506]

However, even in these cases where the characteristics of groups are celebrated, essentialisation can naturalise thinking about the nominated group as a distinct, generalised group with particular, potentially morally significant characteristics. The risk here is that migrants are reduced to an essentialised exotic curiosity, valued for their interesting "dish, dance and dress", or for their value as economic units, rather than regarded holistically as complex human beings capable of agency. This tendency to regard people as economic units was explicitly acknowledged and lamented by one interviewee:

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503 Interviewee 14 Daniel.

504 Interviewee 16 Maura.

505 Interviewee 5 Cara.

506 Interviewee 1 Marcus.

> *I also am concerned about the whole situation of economic value. That if you've got money and you've got resources, and you've got a certain level of education then you're more desirable than somebody who hasn't. And that person who hasn't probably has not had the opportunity to have all those things. You know, as a Christian I just have problems with that.*[507]

Furthermore, such essentialising ascription of attributes discloses an assumed epistemological and ideological superiority and authoritativeness that is unself-critical and divisive in effect.

6.3.2 How Are They Discursively Categorised? Dehumanisation

The cumulative effect of deictic and essentialising categorisation can be the dehumanisation of migrants so that ethical considerations normally taken into account for humans are not applied to them and they become commodified or reduced to a "problem" requiring a solution. In other words, they became different in a morally significant way.

This effect of essentialising could be seen in some interviews. For example, in the quotation below a number of discursive strategies are used including positive self presentation, negative "other" presentation, implication, mitigation and deixis. These combine to dehumanise undocumented migrants, enabling the speaker to self-present as considered and principled whilst prescribing that they should be sent home (en masse) if they have no legal right to be here. Individual personal circumstances do not enter the equation.

> *you've got to have a, a I suppose a principled approach to the undocumented. So in principle they need to be documented. There needs to be clarity about their status, about ... them being included in the system. So if it's ok for them to be here let them be registered, let them pay tax, let them contribute to the society. If in a sense they have no right to be here, they have to be, eh, ... ever so politely asked to go home. That's probably naïve but they need to be taken home I think. And yet I'm conscious that you know, that there are hard cases but hard cases make bad law.*[508]

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[507] Interviewee 4 Roger.

[508] Interviewee 2 Joel.

Sometimes dehumanisation is evident in seemingly incidental slips of the tongue: "any*thing* and every*thing*" instead of "any*one* and every*one*"; "*what* they have" instead of "*who* they have":

> *Ah well there's limits to it. You have to have limits to it [...]. They're not letting anything and everything in, you know. I'm sure they have it well sized up by this.*[509]

> *but those [countries] perhaps around the Southern end, the Mediterranean fringe are probably struggling to cope with what they have.*[510]

The tendency to essentialise migrants was not reflected in all interviews, however. For example, Roger objected to the tendency to essentialise and dehumanise migrants inherent in the academic and bureaucratic obsession with numbers and quantitative measurement,

> *immigrants can be invisible... they don't have a vote, they don't have a say ... they're very easily manipulated by you know even governments the way they're treated like a political football you know. People talk about immigrants in a sweeping you know, rather than any suggestion that they're people, and it's all about statistics and number crunching and all this type of thing.*[511]

This quotation demonstrates that not all of the interviewees accepted the dehumanising essentialisation of migrants. However, it was notable that certain common discursive framings of migrants did emerge in many interviews as delineated later in this chapter and in the narrative analysis of chapter four, in particular section 4.3.1 on migrants and the economy.

6.3.2.1 ***Framing the Discussion: The topos of illegality***

In a number of the interviews the most powerful means of discursive dehumanisation of migrants was through a discourse of illegality. In this discourse, rather than the *actions* of undocumented migrants being described as illegal, the *people themselves* are called illegal.

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[509] Interviewee 15 Jack.

[510] Interviewee 7 Alex.

[511] Interviewee 4 Roger.

> *Presumably they are illegal immigrants. Em, ... em, ... that's what I would ... people outside of the net, people not on the radar of the state system, em, ... illegal immigrants I think is probably the universally, legal term.*[512]

> *they would have to fall in to the category of asylum seekers, if they're discovered.. emm if they're here and they don't have formal documentation or papers, in fact they're illegal, they must have and they should have proper documentation in support of their time here.*[513]

As well as being defined as illegal people, undocumented migrants' undefined migration status was occasionally regarded as synonymous with being a criminal and "such people" are therefore naturally subject to arrest at any moment:

> *If the person came [to church] and you knew that they were there illegally and they shouldn't be there illegally can they be arrested? I don't know..... is there? Well what way does the state deal with such people? [...] How it's controlled? I, I just don't know.*[514]

Entirely absent here is any concept of the ancient and widespread tradition and understanding of "Sanctuary".

For another interviewee, however, personal encounter with migrants re-humanised them in his imagination and removed any imputation of criminality from them, provoking him to problematise his previous position on how much migration should be allowed,

> *maybe this is just a normal human reaction but I would say in general, yes I think we need to control the numbers who come in, and yet when I meet the individuals, when I get to know them as people I say 'Well, how could I not support them.' You know these are nice people, they're good people ... that's how I would see it. I, I, I hate the idea of having to say to anybody 'You're not welcome in our country, or in our community.' And yet I know that our community just can't just keep on absorbing more and more and more people.*[515]

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[512] Interviewee 3 Mark.

[513] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[514] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[515] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

As in the earlier example, there is an explicit recognition of contention between different discourses although the discourse of the territorial state system again dominates as normative and hegemonic in the recognition of the "general [...] need to control the numbers" and the exaggeration of "more and more and more".

6.3.3 What Characteristics are Attributed to "Them"? The use of emotive symbols

Analysis of the interviewees' talk about undocumented migrants (and other migrants) enables tracing of the topoi, metaphors and myths that are used to describe them. This is where the use of emotive symbolic discourse can clearly disclose the fingerprint of the ideology of the territorial state system, further undermining respect and empathy for vulnerable migrants. This was evident in interviewees' frequent reflection of predominant myth in media and political rhetoric questioning migrants' "genuineness", asserting that "they are taking our jobs", that migrants are here only to (fraudulently if necessary) avail of our over-generous social welfare benefits, or that migrants are predisposed to criminal behaviour.

Underlying much of the interviewees' talk about undocumented migrants was a perspective of suspicion. Their migration status being somewhat messy, or ill-understood was perceived as being indicative either of some sort of wrongdoing or of some sort of character flaw, as illustrated in the following quotation,

> *I think that , ... it's trying to circumvent the law. That's why you come in undocumented isn't it? You don't want to go the legal route. Why not? Eh, have you something to hide, [...] you're a stateless person, you're in danger if you go home? [...] But are you just someone who's just trying to play the system, or dodge the system?*[516]

There was also evidence that several interviewees had picked up the governmental discourse of "genuine" and "bogus" migrants.

> *if they can, if they're making a case that they can genuinely have work, or they can find work or they have, say, family and they're genuinely looking for work, they, maybe they could be given a, a time period to locate work.*[517]

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[516] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[517] Interviewee 10 Tim.

> *But, well, again, research shows that em ... you know the vast majority of people who want to come here're not scroungers, they're genuine refugees and asylum seekers eh [...], and also that many of the people who get here are quite talented and can make a huge contribution.*[518]

The linking of permissible levels of migration to employment opportunity was apparent in several interviews:

> *Interviewer: Do you think the EU should accept more migrants or less immigrants?*
> *respondent: (Blows air...) That's hard to say. It would vary a great deal from country to country in the EU. I suppose, probably ehh ... we're now in the situation of an economic downturn with massive unemployment, so you're probably talking about having to be more restrictive in the number of migrants that you take at the moment.*[519]

In this myth migration becomes a threat as the economy is perceived as providing a certain fixed number of jobs, thus for each migrant admitted there is one less job for the established community. Of course the jobs market is not a zero-sum game as an increase in population also creates jobs, as was recognised by one interviewee.[520] However, the predominant perspective reflected the myth that "they take our jobs".

Along with the conception that migrants take jobs that would otherwise be taken by a citizen, the most common myth concerning migrants was the contradictory one that they are a burden on the public purse. So migrants are in a lose-lose situation: either they work, and thereby "take a job", or they do not, and thereby "scrounge" off the state. Sometimes the myth was not expressed as pejoratively, but migrants were regarded as putting a strain on scarce resources:

> *Certainly, the social welfare, em, it is a drain on social welfare I suppose. A number of people who would come who are not working.*[521]

Sometimes, however, migrants were portrayed as more than just possibly lazy, but as deceptive and exploitative, thus the identification of "genuine" migrants becomes of

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[518] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

[519] Interviewee 7 Alex.

[520] Interviewee 15 Jack.

[521] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

paramount importance. Here it is implicit that the focus of the Department of Social Protection on reducing social welfare fraud is primarily in response to *migrants* abusing the welfare system:

> *Yeah I think, I think, em, our, the, the cop on has now come, big time. You know it had to. You know under the social protection department [...] they have to justify a cut of whatever and [...] that'll be filled up by 'oh yes we can save x million, one million - that'll be comprised five or six hundred million in fraud detection savings. [...] So the incidence in the past has been quite extensive of migration into our country; abusing our country's benefits.*[522]

Another interviewee associates migrants with tax-dodging despite acknowledgement that she did pay taxes when she was an undocumented migrant in the United States, and a recognition that Irish people often do not pay their taxes. The conception that migrants are particularly prone to tax evasion is resilient in her imagination.

> *I tell you what it does annoy me though about, when you say undocumented people working, but it's not exclusive, it's much the same as everything, not paying taxes, that does annoy me. [...] I get annoyed when people tell me they're not paying their tax. 'Cause it's not fair on those who do.*[523]

Aside from tropes of fraudulently claiming benefits to which they are not entitled, and evading tax, three further such tropes concerning fraud and deception on the part of migrants in the area of social welfare entitlements were apparent: marriages of convenience, "anchor babies" and claiming child welfare whilst living abroad. The underlying thesis is that the connection between residency or citizenship status and welfare entitlements is not lost on immigrants and therefore they may seek to gain residency or citizenship through fraudulent means.

Both Marcus and Brian referred to the "anchor babies" trope, Marcus claiming a specific instance of a lady being told to come to Ireland to have a baby and Brian here claiming that the over-generous welfare system is a direct incentive to people coming to Ireland to have their baby,

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[522] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[523] Interviewee 5 Cara.

> *there is strong evidence of .. African people coming in, heavily pregnant ladies coming in through England.. that loophole has been closed off I believe. You know ostensibly to have the child here to qualify for the Irish passport [...] we had been a very generous welfare state in the past, too generous I would suggest.*[524]

Here the interviewee self-presents as *one who knows* that "a lot of them" claim benefits from abroad.[525]

> *of course, now that some of them have lost their jobs but they've been here long enough to collect the dole .. I know that a lot of them would come over .. to collect the dole and take a Ryanair flight back to Poland...*[526]

Once more the epistemological superiority of the commentator is assumed.

The other commonly invoked myth concerning the character of immigrants, particularly undocumented migrants, was that they are predisposed to criminal activity and thus a danger to both the physical and economic security of the established community.

In this quotation we see an association of crime as a direct consequence of immigration (into Cyprus in this case). This is linked to essentialised Africans, Libyans and Romanians, and accompanied by a classic racism disclaimer: "not to run down Romania ... I have Romanian friends".

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[524] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[525] Plans to end such payments have recently been shelved by the Minister for Social Protection Joan Burton as they amounted to only €15.4 million out of a total of €2 billion paid out in child benefit in 2011. Certification has to be provided every four months for children resident abroad to ensure continuing payment of this benefit. Mary Minihan, 'Efforts to Save Money on Child Benefit Going Abroad Shelved', *The Irish Times* (Dublin, 12 October 2012) <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2012/1012/1224325188343.html> [accessed 26 October 2012].

[526] Interviewee 1 Marcus.

> *now in Cyprus it's similar problems, so there's a little more crime, but it's mostly coming from African, the Libyans, em ... there's Romanians. [...] and not to run down Romania or anything .. cause I have Romanian friends who are ok but, but there was a group coming from Romania from the gypsies who were targeting Cyprus as a, as a good place for crime and pick pocketing*[527]

The repeated mitigating disclaimers could indicate a perception that such aspersions of criminality are discriminatory, which is understood as inappropriate in the context of situation.

A special case of the criminality myth is the securitisation discourse in which border security trumps other concerns such as concern for the protection of the human rights of vulnerable migrants. Several interviewees reflected these security concerns:

> *Hmmm, ... well it would be wonderful if people had total freedom. That would be wonderful, but I presume, for security reasons, because there are people out there who may have ulterior motives and ... eh, ... that we have to have protection ... em I suppose 9/11 was the thing that really sparked that off.*[528]

> *Em, ... is it wrong for a state to monitor people coming in and out of it? No, it's good policing, in a sense. Em, ... 'cause the state, the state exists to guarantee the security of its population. And people would leave that state if they felt insecure and unsafe. Em, ... they would leave it very quickly.*[529]

This securitisation discourse is rendered justificatory of increasing expenditure on border enforcement apparatus and is significant and increasingly evident in political and media rhetoric.[530] It is also reflected "on the ground" in ever-increasing militarisation of border enforcement.[531]

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[527] Interviewee 1 Marcus.

[528] Interviewee 8 Ryan.

[529] Interviewee 3 Mark.

[530] For example, on border expenditure, a recent report by the Heinrich Böll Foundation has demonstrated that the two EU border surveillance initiatives, the European External Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP), will cost of the order of €2 billion. Hayes and Vermeulen, p. 7.

[531] Frontex, the European response force dedicated to border control, for example, as of February 2010, "... had at its disposal 113 ships, 25 helicopters and as many as 22

6.3.3.1 *Competing Discourses – Unreconciled*

In the section above it can be seen that prevalent myths surrounding migrants (as elucidated in chapter three) were evident in the responses of many interviewees. However, contrasting perspectives were to be found which rejected the association of migration with suspicion, scrounging, criminality and threat.

Tim had first hand experience dealing with the bureaucracy around work permits and when he alludes to the topos of genuineness it does not have the overtones of suspicion. He has seen that immigrants do want to work and rejects the myth of scrounging. In fact, for Tim, the suspicion is on Irish people who are not prepared to work in the available jobs and would rather be "on the social".

> *I know my brother in law is finding it very hard to get them. [...] But there's lots of Thai people wanting to take up jobs. That's not very fair. [...] the government clamp down, kind of on the outside labour is not fair that if they're genuinely want to work. And they meet the criteria. They should be able to work.*[532]

> *Well you see, there's an area of our own people won't work [...]. There are some, there are some, I have to say, won't work. They are full time on the social.*[533]

These topoi of suspicion and genuineness also find expression in many common myths (some of which are mutually contradictory) that were reproduced by my interviewees. For most of these myths at least one interviewee expressed a competing discourse or recognised that the myth was also applicable to Irish people.

Doreen recognised that certain industries require a labour force that is prepared to do certain types of work that are deemed unpalatable and so immigration contribute by enabling such industries to continue.

> *we didn't have people here really to work in these industries and a lot of migrants took those jobs and that really boosted the economy, it boosted the feel-good factor.*[534]

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planes." Thomas Deszpot, 'EU Earmarking Billions to "Secure" Borders', *OWNI.eu*, 2012 <http://owni.eu/2012/06/07/eu-earmarking-billions-to-secure-borders/>.

[532] Interviewee 10 Tim.

[533] Interviewee 10 Tim.

Doreen also countered the myth of scrounging, noting that even if migrants lost their job, many of them are not entitled to benefits and so would not be a "drain" on the public purse.

> *In the economic downturn it's more difficult to say.. I don't think they've had a negative economic impact, and a lot of that's purely due to the fact that they have no, they have no recourse to public funds therefore they weren't going to be a drain if they lost their job.* [535]

Another interviewee recognised not only the tendency to essentialise "Nigerians" as lazy and sponging, but that Irish people (in "our own society" – still categorising the "Nigerians") can also be lazy.

> *I mean you can say that 'some Nigerian people are this' and 'some ...'. But then, how many Irish people are lazy and sponging on the state [...] we can so easily point the finger at the others and forget that it's happening all over the place in our own society as well.* [536]

The mutual contradictions between the discourses of taking jobs and scrounging were noted by Tim. He pointed out that asylum seekers are not allowed to work, and are therefore forced to depend on the state for their necessities, which can drive them to seek work "on the black economy".

> *I suppose in this area they.. most common side of that would be the asylum seeker, people from Nigeria. I don't really want to pick on them but that's the only one I can think of. Where they've come in, got asylum they've no work, they're kind of idle. Because they're awaiting their asylum to be gone through the system and they can't work until they have. [...] so if they're getting work they're kind of getting it on the black economy. So it's kind of a grey, a very grey area.*[537]

Even contradictory evidence when noted is nonetheless absorbed, unreconciled, rather than more deeply examined, thus contributing to the force of hearsay.

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[534] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[535] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[536] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[537] Interviewee 10 Tim.

6.3.4 Summary

The categorisation of migrants, and particularly undocumented migrants as somehow different from the established community and yet essentialised and discursively constructed as a homogenous group of people enables certain characteristics to be (often uncritically or even unconsciously) attributed to them. The fact that several of the interviewees were unclear about the distinctions made by the state border system between various different types of migrants according to their migration status revealed a lack of inflected knowledge and understanding, thus subjecting all migrants to a perspective of suspicion. This was reflected in the interviewees' discourse, particularly in respect of the welfare system and job market. While a range of thoughts were expressed, many interviewees alluded to and seemingly adopted common myths of scrounging off benefits, taking jobs or being predisposed to criminality.

6.4 What are the Effects of Categorisation: Difference, scarcity and threat

In the context of my thesis of the hegemonic ideological domination of the imagination by the inevitable nature of the territorial system of states, the question arises as to how the discourse of the interviewees reflects and bears this out. How does their discourse reflect, reinforce or reproduce that ideological perspective on migrants, the state and the established community?

I believe that such reflection is already evident in the data reviewed thus far on the discursive construction of the border regime and the discursive categorisation and predication of "us" and "them". However, a closer look at the use of metaphor corroborates my earlier contention that ideological working is evidenced when myths of difference (established ideologically through categorisation and discursively through predication) and perceived scarcity combine to effectively turn the other into a threat.

This perception of the other as a threat with its ensuing sense of endangerment is evident in the use of liquid metaphors for migrants and potential migrants, with the implied metaphor of the state as a container of the established population, surrounded by borders symbolised as walls, lines or fences as noted earlier. The regular use of these metaphors by populist and fundamentalist politicians in Britain, critiqued by Jonathan Charteris-Black and others, was noted in a previous chapter. These metaphors were also prevalent in my interviewees' speech.

Also evident are disaster or overwhelming metaphors in the context of discussion of border control. Use of such metaphors strongly reproduces the border regime as essential and axiomatic and reinforces the territorial ideology of separate and distinct peoples demarcated by the state that underlies it.

I now trace and probe the use of telling metaphors applied to migrants (liquid), the state (container) and the phenomenon of migration (natural disaster) by my interviewees which reproduce and reinforce migrants (collectively) as a threat, rather than just individual people who come from a different place. Subsequently, I shall analyse further the nature of the perceived threat, which is sometimes apparently amorphous in the interviewees' speech, but at other times, is more precisely imagined as a threat to a particular aspect of social life, be that social order, economic or job security or cultural identity. First, a brief reflection on metaphors is illustrative.

6.4.1 The Telling Use of Metaphors

The use of liquid and natural disaster metaphors in talk about migration can have connotations of national purity, with migrants imagined as pollution or overwhelming threat. This reflects the ideology of the territorial state system as consisting of primordially separate and different "nations". The corresponding metaphor of the state as container has connotations of protective barrier or enclosure, but simultaneous threats of puncturing and infiltration, or rupture under pressure, with an implicit need for constant maintenance and reinforcement of the apparatus of protection. Some of these aspects of the state are also apparent in metaphors of fence or gate as acknowledged previously.

Recall Charteris-Black's observation that the representation of the state as a container is particularly powerful as it merges a time concept with a spatial concept. It "... implies that controlling immigration through maintaining the security of borders (a space-based concept) will ensure control over the rate of social change (a time-based concept)."[538] Thus the unauthorised transgression of spatial limits (borders) becomes an almost sacrilegious act as it threatens the purity and integrity of the contents.

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[538] Charteris-Black, p. 579.

6.4.1.1 *Liquid, Container and Natural Disaster Metaphors*

The most common term used by the interviewees for arriving migrants was "influx", invoking a metaphor of migrants as a large flow of liquid (into a container) – unsurprising given its naturalised reiteration in media and public discourse. Even the dictionary uses refugees in its example of the usage of the term:

> *an arrival or entry of large numbers of people or things: a massive influx of refugees from front-line areas.*[539]

Here, some instances of the use of the term serve to reinforce myths of overwhelming potential immigration, benefit scrounging and national purity.

> *as soon as people from Poland and other countries, including Cyprus joined the EU there was an influx ... an influx of, em, overseas people*[540]

> *France gets a total influx of people from North Africa I believe, because of their nearness and Spain, Italy the same.*[541]

One interviewee was deliberate in pointing out that the "influx" was not necessarily a negative phenomenon, but has been culturally beneficial:

> *I think it's been very, very beneficial for Irish society to have an influx of non-nationals...*[542]

Other liquid metaphors were also used. It can be seen how this commodification of people reduces them into an undifferentiated mass: in this case a potentially useful resource (water), or a potentially threatening prospect, (an iceberg).

> *There was a huge pool of Latvians, they had friends and neighbours and everything but that has kind of dried up now.*[543]

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[539] *The New Oxford American Dictionary*, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2010).

[540] Interviewee 1 Marcus.

[541] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[542] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[543] Interviewee 10 Tim.

> *I've never known it [undocumented migrants coming to church] to arise to be honest with you so its kind of a unique question. Emmm..... you'd wonder if, is this the tip of the iceberg, are there many more? You see it raises more questions than answers.*[544]

The liquid metaphor was brought further several times to invoke a threatening image of natural disaster in the form of a flood,

> *We don't have that big flood of people like we did have a couple of years ago.*[545]

In other cases the natural disaster metaphor was evoked through the term "floodgates" for the border. This reflects the myth that borders *can* be sealed or made impermeable, as floodgates can be closed, and thus validates political discourses for reinforcement of border control. A similar effect is produced with the image of the tap. In both cases (floodgates and tap) there is a powerful agent who decides whether and when to open or close the flow. One interviewee anthropomorphises this agent, and implies that they have some sort of secret agenda and have opened the floodgates "unbeknownst to you".

> *Well, I suppose they, they know what they're doing. They're hardly just opening the floodgates and letting them in at will. Although at times when you'd look out and see the number of coloured people that are about, you'd say to yourself is there, they must be letting them in at a tremendous rate. And they never notified anybody. Did you notice that? That this all took place unbeknownst to you.*[546]

> *...the Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish group has kind of dried up [...] But then again, I can see where the department, the department of Enterprise and Employment, I can see their side of, if they opened up the tap the whole thing would just gush out everywhere.*[547]

These liquid metaphors symbolically construct those outside the country as potentially huge in number and overwhelming. In conjunction with the container

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[544] Interviewee 6 Brian.

[545] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[546] Interviewee 15 Jack.

[547] Interviewee 10 Tim.

metaphor for the country (implied in most of these quotations), which we discuss next, this mass of people becomes a threat, as a container is obviously spatially limited, and thus brings the notion of scarcity into play. It also evokes thought processes of confinement which can so easily slide into assuming the necessity for segregation and even confinement in a holding centre (recalling Agamben's analysis of the "camp").

In several cases this container was imagined as a sponge which "absorbs" immigrants. Sponges have a limit as to how much liquid they can absorb and thus the metaphor entails an implicit scarcity (of space).

> *And yet I know that our community just can't just keep on absorbing more and more and more people.*[548]

Often the state was regarded as a container of finite and exhaustible resources (as opposed to people). Therefore it was seen as necessary to ensure that only those entitled to them were able to avail of them. This quotation spells this out: migrants from poor ("developing") countries are *the* threat to social welfare in rich countries. This is why the border essentialises people according to their location of birth and discriminates accordingly.

> *I think on the whole there should be reasonably good freedom of movement between countries. [...] That having been said, eh we don't live in an ideal world and we, I think its .... in terms of being able to spread a country's resources and look after country's resources there has to be some immigration controls other than, otherwise inevitably people from the developing world will, will move en masse or (small laugh in voice) in a large way to, to countries which are better off and nobody would say why wouldn't you?*[549]

Another metaphor for the state as container is as a vulnerable boat, susceptible to sinking if overloaded (or being holed by the iceberg of undocumented migrants, above) with obvious implications for the necessity of restrictions. Interestingly, in the two cases where this metaphor was deployed, the threat of sinking came not from

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[548] Interviewee 14 Daniel.

[549] Interviewee 7 Alex.

migrants from other countries, but in one case from returning Irish emigrants and in the other, the interviewee uses the metaphor to deny the threat from immigration.

> *if all the Irish were sent back to Ireland [...] I'd say the country'd sink.*[550]

> *I don't believe that these little islands would sink if we were able to embrace more.*[551]

It is important to note that the metaphor of state-as-container is particularly apposite in the case of Ireland, as it is an island state.

> *we do live on an island, and it's not possible to have everybody coming here freely...*[552]

To some, but not all interviewees, these metaphors were powerful symbolic means to convey the threat that immigration represents to the state. They also could convey the imagined (cultural or moral) purity of the container's contents, susceptible to pollution by an "influx".

These liquid, container and natural disaster metaphors can rhetorically justify a hardening of the border regime and its increasing securitisation because of the perceived fragility of and overwhelming risk to the container. They are emotive symbolic representations which potently construct migrants as a threat, and the state as protector of the citizens, thus reinforcing the ideal of territorial borders in the imagination.

6.4.1.2 ***Competing Discourse***

Not all interviewees used these liquid metaphors in this pejorative sense. Irfan, whilst adopting the liquid metaphor, rejected the characterisation of potential immigrants as threat. He noted that this apparent "flood" is in fact more of a trickle, and that most refugees (political and economic) end up in adjacent countries, which are usually also poor.

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[550] Interviewee 9 Doris.

[551] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

[552] Interviewee 11 Doreen.

> *The vast majority of people who need shelter are actually absorbed by some of the poorest nations of the world. Em, ... a trickle of this you know global em ... what's the number, some people talk about 50 million. Who [are uprooted] [...] But that's not how it's communicated. It seems like everybody's flooding over here, and we can't do this and other countries should take their share.*[553]

Such explicit rejection of popular discourse was unusual, however, and the prevailing discourse was one of "influx" and the need to at least rigorously monitor immigration. The cumulative effects of the ideological categorisation of migrants as other; in conjunction with, firstly, discursive predication imputing certain characteristics upon them, secondly, the topoi of suspicion and illegality engendering a predisposition towards doubting their integrity and thirdly, the predominant myths of scrounging, taking jobs and criminality; all conspire, particularly in the context of an economic downturn (with its implications of scarcity) to construct the migrant and the potential immigrant as a threat. The varying guises of this threat are what we discuss next.

6.4.2 The Migrant as Threat

This threat is experienced or perceived in different ways in different contexts but in my interviews fell into four main varieties: a threat to order, a threat to economic welfare, a threat to personal safety and a threat to personal identity. All of these varieties are reflected in the various myths alluded to by the interviewees above.

6.4.2.1 *A Threat to Order*

The topos of illegality evident in the framing of conversations about migration in legal terms casts the migrant, and the potential migrant, as a threat to order inasmuch as the rule of law is inherently regarded as a foundation of order in western society. The myth of migrant criminality builds on this sense of migrants as a threat to order.

As well as that, undocumented migrants, in crossing borders in an unauthorised manner, represent a threat to the structural order that the system of international states imposes. Luis Cabrera submits that in doing so undocumented migrants are exercising a sort of global civil disobedience, claiming the mobility rights that are

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[553] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

denied them because of the location of their birth – in poor countries.[554] Nicholas de Genova notes that "[m]igrant 'illegality' is produced as an effect of the law, but it is also sustained as an effect of a discursive formation."[555] This Foucauldian notion of power structures producing material effects and reproducing itself in discourse was evident in my interviewees' association of migrants and crime. For example, Marcus used the word "problem" four times in reference to "Africans" and "crime", regarding them as unruly subjects necessitating discipline.

Roger noted the power of the concept of illegality in the imagination of the Northern Irish Protestant population in particular and reflected on the importance of the local (within Northern Ireland) structures and context in giving added potency to the perceived illegitimacy of undocumented migrants through its interplay with the ideology of the territorial state system.

> *I think one of the big problems, and it's fascinated me. I noticed this about us as Presbyterians in Ulster, once the word 'illegal' is used in any shape or form, people run a mile, and I find that fascinating. I also find it fascinating that when I talk, share this with a Catholic colleague, they said it was far less likely to happen in their community. Em, ... I think it's particularly hypocritical because I think we choose what we see as illegal or otherwise but I wonder is it partly because Protestants tend to feel that the law is on their side. And therefore anybody who breaks the law is against them, in some shape or form. And I think also that for a lot of people a very unquestioning acceptance of the law. ...*[556]

Joel, also, as we saw above, was concerned with the restoration of order that is disrupted in the lack of documentation on the part of undocumented migrants. The perception that they do not pay taxes also feeds into this conception of undocumented migrants as the exception, as disorderly subjects, a problem that needs a solution.

6.4.2.2 *A Threat to Economic Welfare*

In addition to migrants as threat to order, myths of scrounging and taking jobs cast them as a threat to welfare, particularly economic welfare. This is reinforced by

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[554] Luis Cabrera, 'Mobile Global Citizens: Unauthorised Immigrants and Global Civil Rights' (Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College, Dublin, 2008).

[555] De Genova, p. 431.

[556] Interviewee 4 Roger.

constructions of migrants as criminally inclined and prepared to deceive and pursue fraudulent means to obtain access to welfare rights or jobs.

Joel and Irfan put this into perspective, reflecting on the huge economic disparity that exists between countries of the Global North and South, and the injustice inherent in that disparity which is a major driver of migration. However, although other interviewees recognised this disparity, they regarded it as axiomatic that, rather than accept a diminished standard of living in the Global North, "our" economic welfare must be protected. That they saw borders as a key part of this protection was evident in their allusions to those myths and the use of liquid, container and disaster metaphors.

David reflected on this, using container metaphors to describe how people feel threatened and noting that the perception that people feel this way affects politicians environment such that they feel they have less room to manoeuvre in terms of loosening the restrictiveness of borders.

> *Well, I think it's the big, the big ... issues that politicians face all the time which is the tendency among populations to put up fences and close doors and say 'Any more people coming in here will take away some of our money.'*[557]

This is a reflection (as in a mirror image) of Ineke Van Der Valk's findings of the construction of immigrants in parliamentary discourse in France. She found that "right-wing political discourse is organized by a global strategy of negative other-presentation".[558]

Taken together we have an illustration of how political (and media) discourse, along with perceptions of public opinion are mutually reinforcing. The effect of this is that border regimes remain tight with consequent suffering for those who fall foul of their requirements, such as undocumented migrants. Irfan reflects that these perceptions of public opinion may be incorrect, speaking of the predisposition towards firmness of border regimes.

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[557] Interviewee 12 David.

[558] Van Der Valk, p. 309.

> *Firmness and fairness, they would say, both of those things, and it's got to be firm. But I, I think, em, the tendency from government is to kind of lean towards firmness eh , because they probably feel that that's the general public opinion. Em, ... but, [...] I think there's a great silent majority in the public who are actually much more, em, ... interested in fairness.*[559]

The dominance of the perception of the desire for ever increased border security is, I therefore argue, indicative of the ideological domination of the territorial border system over our imaginations: it is just common sense that the borders must be reinforced and tightly regulated.

6.4.2.3 ***A Threat to Personal Safety***

The construction of the migrant as a threat to personal safety was manifested in two main ways in my interviewees' speech, both of which are reflected above. The first is as a threat to one's physical safety, which is evident in the myth of criminal disposition in particular. Several interviewees related anecdotes from personal experience by which they sought to establish that they were not just reflecting dominant discourses but were providing concrete evidence to support their contentions. Marcus spoke of his mother being mugged by a Romanian immigrant and here Cara speaks of a volunteer counsellor that a friend of hers knows, who is "broad-minded, like me", who spoke from experience about the dangers of getting into taxis driven by "Nigerian taxi drivers":

> *And the woman [..] she's a counsellor and once a month she volunteers in James' hospital in the rape area. And this woman would be somebody like me who'd be broad minded [...]. And she actually said to my friend you must tell your friends never, and this sounds terribly racist to say, me saying, but she said they have come across rapes by Nigerian taxi drivers [...]* [560]

Cara betrays an acute discomfort here. She is concerned that she may be identified as racist, yet feels it important to relate this story from a trusted source. The use of mitigation is indicative of her sense of its conflict with her declared "open-mindedness" and the context of situation, in which we both know she is being interviewed as a Christian.

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[559] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

[560] Interviewee 5 Cara.

6.4.2.4 *A Threat to Personal Identity: The topos of suspicion*

The final predominant way that the migrant was represented as a threat in the interviews was as a threat to one's integral identity. In this representation it becomes apparent how important the perceived essential character of the "nation" is in the formation of the personal identity of some of the interviewees. The threat that migrants or migration was understood to represent to the state (in terms of security) or nation (in terms of character) was often expressed in personal terms.

The threat to the character of the nation is evident in the use of metaphors of pollution and dilution. Here Cara altruistically says that a criminal record should not automatically result in the person's exclusion. However, we then see the topos of suspicion as she then advocates that we need to keep an eye on those who come in, implying that they have an inherently inferior (in this case potentially criminally inclined) character and that they should be "spread out", to dilute any deleterious effect,

> *I suppose, em, so criminal records [...] Of course somebody who has a criminal record has a chance to try again. But just to, not to let too many in at the same, you know to, to keep an eye on how many come in. Em, ... I suppose you've just to decide what countries they want to go into the EEC. Like if they wanted to come to Ireland, just to spread it out.*[561]

This casting of migrants as a threat to one's personal identity because of an unconscious link with state security or the understood character of the national people emerged in the interviews. This unconscious linkage is analysed in the previously cited work of Skey on the understanding of English national identity.[562] Skey adduces Giddens' concept of ontological security to explore the perceived legitimacy of different ethnic groups as belonging in England. Cara's words might be read as revealing her own sense as belonging "without question", or even as if conferring on her the authority to advocate a close watching of the newcomers (whose status is inherently insecure); in other words, her ontological security is assumed and theirs is fragile, contingent upon their behaviour. Nevertheless, her ontological security is not perceived as absolute, but potentially threatened by

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[561] Hall, p. 893.

[562] Skey.

excessive immigration, thus necessitating vigilance. Alternatively, her words could be construed in terms of a legitimate concern to distinguish the vast majority of migrants from the minority of individuals with a criminal bent.

6.5 Summary

Interviewees' talk about "us" was primarily aimed at establishing the interviewee's authority as a commentator and validating her opinions as disinterested and objective. The context of situation was important here (as elsewhere), each interviewee demonstrating consciousness that they were being interviewed as members of a church.

In terms of talk about "them", I analysed how the categorisation is done by essentialisation and dehumanisation, particularly through the topos of illegality. An ethical distinction between "political" and "economic" migrants was made by the interviewees, reflecting dominant discourses which insist on the absolute right of states to decide access with the sole proviso of the right to asylum for political refugees.

Interviewees' talk about migrants was punctuated with the topoi of suspicion and genuineness, allusions to urban myths of migrants taking jobs, scrounging and welfare fraud, criminality and securitisation. The prevalent choice of liquid, container and disaster metaphors demonstrated the effect of categorisation: the inherent difference established, in the context of perceived scarcity, becomes a threat – to social order, economic welfare, personal safety and identity; all of which are provided by the state. Thus the state is cast as a protective container and the status quo in terms of the border regime and territorial state system as a whole is reinforced, and the migrant, particularly the undocumented ("illegal" or "economic") migrant is demonised and disowned.

This was not the whole story, and not uniform. The interviewees – some more than others – did critique and question the injustices and contradictions discussed, sometimes making allusion to such biblical principles as social justice or welcome to the stranger. It is notable that many of the counter discourses were prompted by interviewees' recollection of particular personal encounters with people in the situations under discussion, for example because they were helping someone in their asylum application, or employing someone from outside the EEA who needed a work permit. Such recollections then prompted the interviewees to reframe their analysis,

often deploying resources from biblical principles or other ethical sources. The significance of personal encounter was certainly, at least anecdotally, confirmed in the interviews. That said, these counter-discourses were very much the exception. Such critiques were often expressed in a context of wishful thinking, with the status quo then affirmed as inevitable or justifiable – their critique notwithstanding.

In conclusion, the principal story emerging from the interviews reveals that, despite occasional concession, acknowledgement and self-questioning critique, the ideology of the territorial state system was accepted as inevitable and justified, and migrants, particularly undocumented migrants, were de-legitimated, dehumanised and portrayed as a threat to this order. Typically, also, the speakers placed their own viewpoint in a position that required less questioning and little critique. The fingerprints suggest a story of ideological domination of the imagination within Christian communities even though these are possessed of a fundamental counter-narrative. This counter-narrative challenges ideologies of "Them" and "Us", and posits the unique dignity of every person, and the moral imperative of welcoming the stranger, rather than of reductionism and exclusion. However the Christian narrative was alluded to and affirmed, the evidence points to a dominating theory and practice of another parallel and indeed governing ideology.

To draw this analytic part of the thesis to a close on a more hopeful note, I turn to Cynthia Weber's question that I have referred to in earlier chapters: What must be left unsaid for these myths to be true? Two interviewees offered a simple and poignant point that succinctly undermines the power of these myths that do so much to transform the stranger into a threat:

> *'Cause nobody wants to leave their home. Nobody voluntarily uproots themselves, you know.*[563]

> *I think very few people willingly leave their country. And their family and friends and support networks and familiar surroundings you know.*[564]

Consciousness of this simple fact that "very few people willingly leave their country" reverses the essentialisation and dehumanisation of migrants by opening our eyes to

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563 Interviewee 13 Irfan.

564 Interviewee 2 Joel.

the fact that they are individuals, "just like us", ordinary people who have had to deal with extraordinary circumstances.[565] It can awaken empathy within us. Each person has a story as to why they left the place they are from, their families and friends. It undermines the topos of suspicion, and the myths of scrounging and criminality. They become somebody, like us, who wants to live, to avoid suffering and to seek happiness, and the fact that many have taken such risks can shock us into an awareness of the injustices and inequalities that would drive a person or a family to such measures. Could such empathy offer a potential way out of the domination of minds and imaginations?

In the next part of the thesis (chapters seven and eight) I draw on resources from Christian and other ethical traditions which both internally and inter-relationally – brought into mutually critical conversation with one another – could enable a re-awakening of an inter-human, emancipatory and empathetic perspective on migrants to counter the dehumanising ideology of the territorial system of states.

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[565] Theologian Susanna Snyder observes that "[e]nemies and friends can ... ironically both create dehumanizing stereotypes of forced migrants. As Summerfield notes (2005:111), governments and the conservative social sectors 'paint asylum seekers as resilient and wily' while their supporters, 'the liberal and radical social sectors', tend to 'pitch asylum seekers as people who had no choice but to run from their countries, innocent of any thought other than to escape further persecution, torture or the risk of death. They do not conjure up resilience, but vulnerability, weakness and damage.' Whether portrayed positively or negatively, asylum seekers 'are rarely regarded as ordinary human beings who have or are going through extraordinary circumstances' (Hynes 2011:42)." Snyder, p. 82. citing D Summerfield, 'My Whole Body Is Sick ... My Life Is Not Good', in *Forced Migration and Mental Health: Rethinking the Care of Refugees and Displaced Persons*, ed. by David Ingleby (New York: Springer, 2005), pp. 97–114. and quoting Patricia Hynes, *The Dispersal and Social Exclusion of Asylum Seekers: Between Liminality and Belonging* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2011).

Part 3: Resources for a Renewed Perspective

7 Towards a Multi-Vocal Christian Ethic of Migration

7.1 Introduction

In the critical discourse analysis of the previous two chapters I analysed the interview transcripts looking for evidence of the working of ideology, in this case the ideological working of the territorial system of states. I used the diagnostic fingerprint framework developed earlier to structure this analysis, investigating how each fingerprint (commonsense, categorisation, the use of emotive symbols and altruism) was evident in the discourse of the interviewees. I found that contradictory perspectives are often held at the same time with no sense of their mutual contention. Several interviewees pointed to alternative perspectives on migrants, drawn from the resources of their Christian faith, and in this chapter I hope to tap and explore some core resources from the Christian ethical tradition which may summon to a more emancipatory outlook on migrants and the territorial state system, seeking to free the imagination from domination by ideological discourses of exclusion and othering.

While there are many sources which could be used to ground an appropriate ethical response to border discrimination and the consequent precarity for undocumented migrants, such as the principle of equality or human rights norms; and various ethical traditions with their own models for application in ethical consideration, such as utilitarian or deontological ethics; I will adopt an approach which draws on sources from and informed by the Christian ethical tradition because my primary aim is to address the churches rather than the state institutions, society at large or migrants themselves. I suggest, therefore, a hermeneutical tool, which may have the potential to re-humanise the essentialised undocumented migrant, by seeing them as persons with their particular history, needs and aspirations, and to unfetter the imagination from ideological domination, with a view to enabling more fruitful future engagement between those involved in the churches, migrants and the established community.

In this chapter I first outline a multi-vocal model for ethical deliberation, grounding a response to issues of undocumented migration in sources from the Christian ethical tradition, drawing on and holding in mutual critique the relational-responsibility

method advocated by Terence Anderson, and Walter Brueggemann's provocatively named, "sectarian" hermeneutic.

I adduce the doctrine of the human person as created in the image of God as a central credal and hermeneutical perspective from the Jewish and Christian traditions and draw out various implications which are useful for correlation with other ethical traditions. I then survey the various ethical base points for ethical deliberation on Anderson's relational-responsibility method, seeking to draw out a congruent ethical basis from which to develop appropriate church responses to the situation of undocumented migrants.

Finally, in conjunction with the ideological fingerprint framework developed in Chapter One, I assess the potential effectiveness of this perspective and hermeneutic in unmasking the operation of the ideology of the territorial state system and opening the way to constructive alternatives.

7.2 Seeking an Ethical Model with Summoning Power and Correlative Potential

Various ethical forms and methods have been advanced in current discourse in the weighing of ethical issues and choices raised by the current border regime. Thus, Michael Dummett argues for more open borders from a deontological perspective, arguing that freedom of movement is a universal ontological good, that open borders should be a norm rather than simply an ideal, and that a state has no right to exclude people except in two rare cases: where there is a danger of the rapid submergence of its people,[566] or where there is an imminent risk of over-population.[567] Joseph Carens also adopts a deontological approach, arguing that length of residence (rather than citizenship) should be the criterion for political participation, which he views as a good in itself.[568] Peter and Renata Singer, contrastingly, offer a utilitarian argument that "immigration policy in general and refugee policy in particular should give equal

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[566] I would question this rationale myself as it seems to rely on a state containing "a people" who have a right not to be submerged, but all states contain minorities and many "peoples" are spread over more than one state.

[567] Dummett, pp. 72–73.

[568] Carens, 'On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay'.

consideration to the interests of all those affected and, where the interests of different parties conflict, priority should be given to those with the most pressing claim."[569]

Deontological and utilitarian ethics are, however, usually decision-based, quandary ethics, and overlook broader questions of how to live. They therefore emphasise moral norms and values in their deliberations. On the other hand, the approach of virtue ethics with its focus on human character formation as the prior ground of moral decisions and action, has been criticised for being overly-subjective and thereby inadequate to the social context and complexity involved.

Needed is a multivalent approach which may form a basis for reflection on broader issues of life, in particular concerning responses to migrants. At the same time I also seek a method with particular moral appeal to those from a Christian tradition, yet able to offer points of correlation with other ethical traditions. To that end I shall draw on the critically correlational work of the Christian ethicist Terence Anderson and that of the theologian Walter Brueggemann. They offer contrasting approaches which counterbalance each other while providing a ground of correlation and dialectical engagement with secular and other religiously grounded ethical approaches, to build a multi-vocal Christian ethic of migration.

Anderson advocates a model known as the "relational-responsibility" method that balances ethical deliberation over a range of what he calls "base points" for ethical reflection.[570] Each of these base points contributes to the ethical "landscape" in a different way and can throw light on the decision or situation in question. The ethical base points are:

1. Moral Norms and Standards. These come in the form of principles and values that imply certain obligations towards others.
2. Character. This entails consideration of valued character traits and how they would be manifested in the situation under consideration.

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[569] Luke Bretherton, 'The Duty of Care to Refugees, Christian Cosmopolitanism, and the Hallowing of Bare Life', *Studies in Christian Ethics*, 19 (2006), 39–61 (p. 43) <doi:10.1177/0953946806062268>. citing Peter Singer and Renata Singer, 'The Ethics of Refugee Policy', in *Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethics and Political Issues*, ed. by Mark Gibney (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 121–122.

[570] This method is generally associated with H. Richard Niebuhr, James Gustafson, Bernard Häring and Charles Curran. Terence R. Anderson, p. 247.

3. Basic Convictions. Perspectives on moral norms and character are influenced by one's worldview, which is evident in the basic convictions held concerning oneself, one's purpose and the desirable organisation of society.
4. Analysis of the Situation and Wider Context. Anderson argues that empirical analysis of the situation is essential for reasoned ethical deliberation.
5. Authoritative Sources. Authoritative sources such as human reason, experience and scriptures are foundational in discernment of the moral norms, or aspects of personal character that are to be most valued.[571]

Anderson considers these in this order as aligned to their susceptibility to change, or how close they are to the specific core of one's ethics. In other words, one can more easily change one's ethical norms than the underlying vision and values of one's scriptures or authoritative, yet dynamic community tradition. A corollary of this is that the further one goes down the list, the more specific to one's ethical community is the content of the ethical deliberation. While norms and values may be shared across ethical traditions, each tradition may ground them in their own scriptural sources.

In this approach the focus is on the moral life, which is characterised by relationships and social interaction, as opposed to methods for making specific moral decisions on particular issues. It is thus appropriate to the case in hand: the search for an appropriate ethical framework for responding to situations concerning undocumented and other unwanted migrants. According to this Christian Ethics approach, deliberation must be as *comprehensive* as possible (taking into account all of the base points); and *congruent*, seeking harmony between all the base points and particularly with the human person and God as revealed in Jesus and the scriptures. Finally, it must be *integrative,* recognising that not all of the base points should receive equal weighting. Anderson notes that "[i]n the final analysis, however, integrating all of the base points and bringing them to bear upon a moral decision requires a kind of sanctified imagination. ... A well-ordered heart."[572] This is a salutary reminder that when it comes to moral discernment that is focussed on persons and social groups, a cut and dried empirical approach will not well serve.

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[571] Terence R. Anderson, pp. 16–18.

[572] Terence R. Anderson, p. 256.

In addition to appropriate consideration of all the base points, Christian ethicist, James Gustafson nonetheless suggests that for comprehensive and coherent ethical consideration, base points "... need an organizing perspective, metaphor, analogy, or principle."[573] Given that my objective is to examine critically the *churches'* perspective on undocumented migrants, and to suggest potential sources which might enable their reimagining, I note Walter Brueggemann's argument for "the legitimacy" of what he posits as "a sectarian hermeneutic", by which he means a hermeneutic that is grounded in the ethos, narrative, practice and belief systems that ground and give shape to a particular ethical tradition, whose concepts and nuances may not be immediately intelligible to society at large.[574] He asserts that such alternative perspective is necessary to probe and critique a dominant reality. I would claim that such alternative perspectives can usefully be found, *inter alia*, within the Christian and indeed Jewish ethical tradition. I therefore adopt the deep symbol and organising metaphor of creation in the image of God, from the Hebrew Scriptures.

Brueggemann argues that a legitimate sectarian epistemology, that holds together "...the reality of experience, the necessary functions of administration, and the expressive symbols which claim assent and generate energy", can offer a valid alternative understanding and critique of the domination systems prevalent in a

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[573] James M. Gustafson, 'An Analysis of Church and Society Social Ethical Writings', *Ecumenical Review*, 40 (1988), 267–278 (p. 268).

[574] The word "sectarian" is a loaded term (not least within the particular context of sectarianism as understood in the Irish context). Thus it is important to clarify and posit here the sense in which Brueggemann is using it. Following Ernst Troeltsch and H. Richard Niebuhr, Brueggemann is adducing the idea of sect as "... a community that does not share in or participate in the commonly accepted definitions of reality. It operates out of a different practice of perception, epistemology, and language. It holds to a set of alternative values which it regards as the truth. That is, it seeks to construct for its members an alternative life-world." See Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1931: George Allen and Unwin, 1931).

Brueggemann acknowledges that "the term often conjures up a sense of narrowness and provincialism" yet argues that this need not be so. He claims that the truth claims of a sect are not a danger in themselves, but become so only when a sect regards itself as having a monopoly on truth. It is this truth-monopolising that leads to liberal rejection of the sect, but, claims Brueggemann, sect-truth can instead be a proposal to the larger community. In that way it can offer an alternative reading of reality and can be an invitation to participation in which the larger community can share. Brueggemann, p. 46.

society, with the capacity to free the imagination from the power of those systems.[575] Such a sectarian epistemology can posit truth claims inspired by symbolically grounded convictions which can counter the truth claims of the dominant ideology. Such spiritual knowing is deeply counter-cultural in post-enlightenment political orthodoxy dominated by unexamined rationalist assumptions and discourses. That said, the idea of a sectarian hermeneutic clearly needs to be connected to a larger, self-transcending horizon of meaning.

One reason for the use of a symbolic organising metaphor from particular, Christian and Jewish scriptures is the summoning power of symbols that are particular to (though not necessarily exclusive to) a tradition.[576] Also, symbols that hold internal meaning and symbolic power within a particular tradition can serve a utopian purpose liberating the imagination of those upon whom they have purchase from colonisation by the dominant ideology to an emancipatory reimagining of social ordering.[577] What is required is the imagining of an alternative ordering of society,

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[575] Brueggemann uses the encounter between the Israelites and the Assyrian envoy in 2 Kings 18-19 as a case study to show that Israel's sectarian communal memory enabled them to counter "the narrative of the empire" and demonstrate that it is far from disinterested despite its claims to rationality: "Israel's alternative memory notices that what passes for public discourse is in fact a new sectarian proposal [from the Assyrians] of an ideological kind." Israel's communal history and particularity of insider perspective enables criticism of that dominant rationality. Brueggemann, p. 54,62.

[576] A propos of this summoning power, the North American theologian Edward Farley, posits that within religious and narrative traditions reside what he calls "deep symbols" which are possessed of the power to both "summon and constrain" the community they originate in. They "are ideals that exercise a certain transcendence over a community' and its members. ... They embody a kind of vision of what the community or its members should be and do." For Farley, deep symbols "are the values by which a community understands itself, from which it takes its aims, and to which it appeals as canons of cultural criticism. ... The community's particular character, tradition and situation are the locus of deep symbols." Edward Farley, *Deep Symbols: Their Postmodern Effacement and Reclamation* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press Inter, 1996), pp. 3–4.

[577] Writing from a Ricoeurian hermeneutical perspective about typologies of myths and the range of their critical function, Richard Kearney speaks in similar mode of a hermeneutics of affirmation, which suggests "... that there may be an ulterior meaning to myths in addition to their anterior meaning – an eschatological horizon which looks forward counteracting the archaeological horizon which looks back." Kearney, p. 16.

rather than a simple reversal of roles.[578] This reordering is impossible without an alternative language, coming from an alternative interpretation of reality, capable of challenging the truth claims of the dominant discourse from perspectives rooted in a sectarian hermeneutic. Thus symbolic resources from a particular ethical tradition are powerful resources, capable of reawakening and sustaining the moral imagination which may be acculturated to or dominated by another ideological discourse or may have fallen prey to internal slackness, smugness or even corruption.

This is not at all to exclude the ongoing necessity for internal self-critical reflection on the tradition via a hermeneutics of suspicion[579] to expose the liability and actuality of internal failure, inadequacy or solipsistic disconnection from context and history, or signs of entrapment in a past or present cultural matrix. I therefore intend that my analysis will be able to point to potential ways forward for churches, both in their own practices and communities, as well as their interaction with the wider world. In doing this, I aim to remain conscious of Kearney's warning that "[m]yths are not neutral ... [t]hey become authentic or inauthentic according to the 'interests' which they serve ... [which] can be those of utopian emancipation or ideological domination." Similarly, Farley's cautionary warning of the fallibility that is also inherent in "deep symbols", is worth emphasising:

> *...when a community absolutizes its deep symbols, it forgets their historical, constructed, or corrupted character and simply identifies them with the word of God. Thus the words of power can become fixed, changeless idols floating above the dramas of history.*[580]

My aim is to build a multi-vocal resonant ethic of migration, grounded in an organising symbolic conceptualisation drawn from the Christian ethical tradition, thus having considerable evocative power to those within that tradition, yet also to suggest possibilities for correlations with values and principles of other ethical traditions in order to enable fruitful dialogue. As Brueggemann insists, it is imperative that churches learn to be bilingual, "...able to speak both the language of policy formation and the language of transformative imagination" and translate their

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[578] Freire, p. 22.

[579] Another Ricoeurian term

[580] Farley, p. 7.

insights into language that can be understood by those "outside the wall" (of the sectarian tradition).[581] I therefore explicitly aim to seek proposals which are emancipatory; challenging and subverting structures of injustice rather than unintentionally reinforcing them, which engender empathy and solidarity rather than sympathy or self-complacency. The underlying biblical tradition from which such a vision is drawn is that of the biblical prophetic tradition. Elsewhere, Brueggemann writes of "The Prophetic Imagination", demonstrating the prophetic obligation to startle and provoke the apathetic community of faith out of its complacency when confronted with situations of oppression or injustice.[582]

Firstly, then, I shall consider the symbolic conceptualisation of creation in the image of God as an organising metaphor for subsequent ethical deliberation along the lines of Anderson's relational-responsibility method, all the while drawing out potential opportunities for correlative engagement and cross-fertilisation with other ethical traditions and contemporary discourses. Finally, I briefly consider my ideological fingerprint framework in the light of this ethical discussion, hinting at how this multi-vocal ethical framework may be useful for critiquing the dominant ideological discourses of the territorial system of states.

7.3 A Sectarian yet Self-Transcending Hermeneutic: Created in the image of God

> *So God created humankind in his image,*
> *in the image of God he created them;*
> *male and female he created them.*[583]

In the case of the situation of undocumented and other unwanted migrants, I propose that this ethical deliberation can usefully be undertaken around the organising symbol structure of humankind created in the image of God. This is a broader symbolic conceptuality than others – such as a family of believers – as it is self-transcending and inclusive of all people, whether or not they are part of the particular

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[581] Brueggemann, p. 62.

[582] Walter Brueggemann, *The Prophetic Imagination* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001).

[583] Genesis 1:27 *New Revised Standard Version Bible* (Oxford University Press USA, 1992).

community in question (Jewish, Christian, Muslim, for example). A potential consequence of an epistemology grounded upon this symbol of creation in the image of God is a renewal of the ethical imagination, enabling a restoration of empathy with, rather than just sympathy for, each person – "every tribe and tongue and people and nation" (Rev. 5:9) – and thus a full recognition if not restoration of their human dignity and agency as well as a call to accompaniment of and solidarity with those who are subjects of systemic oppression. Such an epistemology directly counters the essentialising and ethically instrumentalising consequences of the ideology of territorial state systems.

M. Daniel Carroll R. helpfully enumerates three ways that this metaphor of creation in the image of God can be interpreted: as saying something about what humans inherently are, something about their innate relationality, or something about their *telos* or purpose. The first is usually expressed in the language of innate human dignity, the second focuses on implications for inter-human relationships and human relationship with God, and the third connects interpretatively to implications for humans' dominion over nature.[584] The first two are most significant for my purposes and I shall now further explore their implications with an eye to eliciting insights apposite to the purpose in hand.

7.3.1 Related to Human Dignity and Human Rights

The main implication, for my purposes, of biblically grounding human dignity in an understanding of humans as created in the divine image is that a particular dignity, innate to each and every human being,[585] whether or not they are deemed "worthy"

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[584] M. Daniel Carroll R., *Christians at the Border* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), pp. 66–67. For alternative taxonomies of understanding creation in the image of God see Roger Ruston, *Human Rights and the Image of God* (London: SCM, 2004), p. 269; Claus Westermann, *Genesis 1-11: A Commentary*, trans. by John J. Scullion (London: SPCK, 1984), pp. 150–153.

[585] Speaking from a European ecumenical perspective, Bishop Wolfgang Huber, Chairman of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany and speaking at the Irish School of Ecumenics takes just this stance: "It has been pointed out time and again that Christian theology has been using the concept of human dignity since the times of the Church Father Augustine in the 5th century AD at the latest, and thus takes up the Biblical understanding that the human person was made in God's image." Wolfgang Huber, 'Theological Reasons for Human Rights and Their Consequences for the Ecumenical Process' (Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin, 2008).

by society, calls forth certain obligations.[586] This is particularly relevant in the case of undocumented migrants, deemed "unworthy" by the guardians of the territorial system.[587] Furthermore, this dignity, whether viewed theologically as gift, or ethically as unconditional, is not a result of any particular merit but is, rather, inalienable.[588]

The implications of human creation in the image of God mean that Christians base their sense of obligation on grounds *beyond* those envisaged or required by secular law. In Farley's terms, the theological and moral summoning power of the symbolic conceptuality reaches deeply into the life and authentic integrity of the community. While this summoning power is particular to the community, it is also possible to build useful dialogical and ethical bridges with other moral traditions with congruent, resonant or correlative concepts and constructs.

The language of inalienability offers a first dialogical bridge. It recalls language often used in the domain of human rights, and indeed many writers who consider this reading of the symbolic conceptuality of the human person as created in the image of God claim that it forms a foundation of the concept of human rights. Even if one does not accept the foundationalist argument, the correlationist approach is theoretically persuasive and practically sensible.

Irish Anglican theologian, Patrick Comerford identifies another resonance when he outlines the obligations corresponding to the acknowledgement of humankind created in the image of God, as entailing a transcendence of all socially constructed categories:

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[586] Christine D. Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers: Insights from the Christian Tradition', *Studies in Christian Ethics*, 19 (2006), 81–101 (p. 86) <doi:10.1177/0953946806062287>.

[587] "Holding this understanding alongside a model for society in which the most vulnerable are highly valued creates a powerful prophetic voice that can be raised to challenge hostility and indifference to asylum seekers" Hannah Skinner, *A Place of Refuge: A Positive Approach to Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the UK* (London: Church House Publishing, 2005), p. 9.

[588] "Human dignity is a gift of God. It is inextricably bound up with God. [...] As this idea that every human person was made in the image of God (imago Dei) is part of the idea of creation, it follows that the dignity inherent in every human being was not acquired or earned by the human person, but granted – granted by an authority beyond our control. This is why the dignity of every human person is inalienable." Huber.

> *How we treat other people who are different from us or who are strangers is not only a matter of politics, social order, legislation or economics; it is also at the heart of our religious faith and practice, for how we treat others, especially those who are different, is how we treat those who are made in God's image and likeness.*[589]

Thirdly, biblical scholar Kieran O'Mahony, writing of biblical teachings about treatment of the stranger, takes the dialogue further, noting resonances between the grounding of human dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the transcendent language within the biblical tradition:

> *A document such as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) speaks of the dignity of the human person. This dignity [...] is rooted in an understanding of the uniqueness of each person. [...] In the Bible, this reflection goes even deeper. The biblical view of the human person sees the deep reason underpinning this dignity not only in the uniqueness of each individual, but in God's very self. Because every single human being, without exception and without distinction, is made in God's image ..."*[590]

Another key interpretative insight associated with the creation of humans in the image of God, which has great summoning and sustaining power, yet also retains potential for translation, concerns relationality.

7.3.2 Related to Relationality and Equality

In this picture the fundamental aspect of God which is imaged in humans is the capacity and need for relationship, with both God and the neighbour. One source for this aspect is the fact that, within the Christian understanding, the one God is seen to have being and existence in three persons. However metaphysically abstruse, the meaning is clear that relationship is inherent in the very nature of God.[591] This has

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[589] Patrick Comerford, *Embracing Difference: The Church of Ireland in a Plural Society* (Dublin: Church of Ireland Publishing, 2007), p. 42.

[590] Kieran J. O'Mahony, *What the Bible Says About the Stranger: Biblical Perspectives on Racism, Migration, Asylum and Cross-community Issues*, Second edn (Belfast: Irish Inter-Church Meeting, 2009), pp. 33–34.

[591] Skinner elucidates this relational trinitarian horizon: "As we are created in the image of God in the Holy Trinity, so we are created for relationship with others. Our engagement with strangers is fruitful in the reform of our thinking, and reminds us of the God-given capabilities and unique dignity of all." Brueggemann, *Interpretation*.

implications for Christian self understanding, signifying that the human person as *imago Dei* is likewise inherently relational – created in, through and for relationship and, correlatively, that a worldview based on such a relational trinitarian understanding carries moral implications, in so far as, "what is wrong with the world is that which violates or breaks right relationships."[592] This insight can be usefully adduced and deployed in the theological critiquing of discriminatory dominant ideological discourses from within a Christian churches' domain.[593] Here potential resonances with secular ethical anti-discriminatory discourses may be perceived and indeed lend a combined critical force to necessary ethical reform of unjust systems of domination and exclusion .

From another perspective, in creating humans in His image God was creating a counterpart "... with whom he [could] converse, whom he [could] address as 'You', and an 'I' who is responsible before God."[594] An understanding of undocumented migrants based on this relational and participatory hermeneutic poses theological challenges to any well-meaning but paternalistic concern for "vulnerable" migrants which actually operates in ways that undermine their own agency and capabilities. It mandates a respect for the autonomy of the individual.[595] Again, opportunities for

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[592] Terence R. Anderson, p. 165.

[593] At a CCME Conference on irregular migration, His Beatitude, Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and All Greece, did just this, appealing to the very heart of the Eastern Orthodox tradition: "The Orthodox Church understands man [*sic*] to be created "in the image of God" and evaluates society on the basis of how close[ly] it approaches and conforms to the Church's ideal and model for it: the communion of Love between the Persons of the Holy Trinity. In this loving communion or society of persons there is no room for the usual barriers or prejudices based on sex, nationality, social status, financial situation or religious faith." Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, *Irregular Migration: a Challenge to European Migration and Asylum Policies* (Athens: Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, 1 November 2002) <http://www.ccme.be/archive/2002/ConferenceAthens01Nov2002.pdf>.

[594] Roger Ruston adopts an ecumenical breadth: as a Roman Catholic ethicist, he argues this position from the theology of Karl Barth, whose understanding is drawn from the 4th Century Cappadocian Fathers – Sts Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa. Ruston, p. 277.

[595] Bretherton also takes account of this in characterising the appropriate response of the churches to refugees as twofold in responsibility: recognising the agency and relationality of refugees: "it summons forth bare life from exclusion by abiding with refugees as persons able to express themselves within and act upon a common world; and it names refugees as creatures called by God to participate as persons in divine communion." Bretherton, p. 55.

correlation with other and compatible ethical traditions' use of the principle of human dignity and human equality in arguing against discrimination are present. This is clearly illustrated by the Archbishop's Working Group on Combating Racism of the Church of Ireland Diocese of Dublin and Glendalough, in its assertions for gender, ethnic and global equality:

> *The Genesis story of creation is unambiguous that all humankind was created in God's image, male and female. The 'global equality' implicit in this single verse forces us to ask 'How can we perceive God to ordain ethnic superiority when he made us all in his image?*[596]

Ruston, should be heeded, however, by all churches when he warns that the opposite can be seen in actual practice:

> *The doctrine of God's image born by every human being has been, and remains in some respects, severely counter-cultural. The fact that Christians themselves have had enormous trouble in putting their own doctrine of basic human equality into practice is evidence for this.*[597]

Churches too need to be alive to what history illustrates – that cultural realities can dominate the collective religious imagination ideologically and thereby skew ethical deliberation[598] and obscure their own most foundational theological beliefs. Therefore, when considering the situation of undocumented migrants it is important to remain conscious of the naturalising tendencies of the dominant ideology of the territorial system of states to so as to avoid letting the social reality of the exclusion of undocumented migrants obscure the theological understanding and reality of their innate dignity as created in the image of God, and to hear the summoning to relations

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[596] Archbishops Working Group on Combating Racism, *Welcoming Angels* (Dublin: Fodhla Books, 2005) <http://ireland.anglican.org/archive/hardgospel/index.php?do=articles&sid=3&rid=5> [accessed 18 June 2009]. quoting Philip McKinley, ' 'Discovery' – A Time for International Ministry', *Search. A Church of Ireland Journal*, 28 (2005), p. 28.

[597] In the light of the specific language of Genesis 1:27 ("male and female, he created them"), Ruston criticises an over-reliance on ethical deliberation in the natural law tradition as being particularly susceptible to such distortions: "It was the social fact of male domination that led to conclusions about nature, which in turn led to a refusal to draw any social or ecclesial consequences from woman's equal God-likeness as implied in the Genesis text." Ruston, p. 288.

[598] Ruston, p. 282.

of gift and reception that personhood in the image of God is constituted by and entails.[599]

In summary, what has been argued is that a symbolic conception rooted in a particular tradition has a tremendous summoning power, as Farley and Brueggemann both attest. This, however, may retain only limited usefulness unless its universalisable implications can be translated in such a way as to be intelligible for those who are not members of that community. Even without "translation", it is true that such can still be useful to a community under oppression, to unite and motivate for resistance. However, with translation, it can be doubly useful in combating social injustices which are hidden by a dominant ideology, as the alternative perspective of the community can give them insights from their own tradition which, when correlated with concepts from other ethical traditions, can be offered as alternative "truths" and imagined realities to open up creative possibilities for restoration of social justice. Here, the symbolic conception of human creation in the image of God has a double potential. Firstly, it can summon those for whom it holds particular symbolic power. Secondly, it can enable them to translate and communicate the ethical implications of such a summoning into and with cognate ethical "languages" beyond their own religious borders .

7.4 Ethical Base Points that Require Consideration

It is time to consider and mobilise each of Anderson's base points for ethical deliberation in the light of this organising symbolic conceptuality, seeking to identify necessary learnings and new insights from each as relevant to the subject of undocumented migrants' situation and the churches' attitudes to and interactions with them. This analysis does not assume to be comprehensive, but I will attempt to draw out the most useful guidance that each base point can yield, whilst noting and making apposite correlations to particular principles or scriptural narratives that were cited by those interviewed.

I will consider the base points in the reverse order to Anderson: authoritative sources (scriptures, tradition, reason, experience), contextual analysis, basic convictions or worldviews, character and finally values and norms. It will become evident that the former influence the latter, and are more specific to the Christian tradition. Therefore

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[599] Bretherton, p. 57.

values and norms offer greater potential for dialogue between ethical traditions, but their origins can often be traced for Christians in principles drawn from scripture, whence their summoning power derives.

7.4.1 Authoritative Sources

I begin with the base point of authoritative sources, and in this respect adduce Anderson's identification of scripture, reason, tradition and experience as significant authoritative sources.

7.4.1.1 *Scripture*

In the Christian tradition, the primary authoritative source is biblical scripture, revealed and interpreted. Precise ethical directives can rarely be derived directly from scripture since context, conditions and presuppositions were so different and as most ethical questions under consideration today were not matters of moment for the scriptural authors who operated within their own different cultural, historical and religious context. It is important therefore that contemporary ethical moot questions not be mapped or manipulated into a literally construed biblical scenario or template.

Biblical texts, are, however, a rich moral resource funded by literary myths, historical reconstructions, legal codes, prophetic pronouncement, narratives and wisdom tracts which are deemed to be inspired and revealed by God working through the writers and redactors who composed them in the light of their particular historical need or circumstance. These were also shaped by the communities that celebrated them in worship and sought to live out of them in fidelity and witness. In particular, it needs to be emphasised that for Christians, the primary revelation of God is the person of Jesus, who is understood and who understood himself as in some way radicalising some of the traditional patterns of life, leading his people into freedom and saving them through his life, death and resurrection. As such Christ and his teaching is rooted in the wider biblical story and cannot be properly understood apart from this wider creation and salvation history. At the same time, Christ is portrayed as source of grace and moral transformation and as an ethical model for his followers. [600]

The moral relevance of the scriptures was certainly reflected by the interviewees, most of whom adduced biblically grounded (if not derived) principles or passages of

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[600] Terence R. Anderson, pp. 229–231.

scripture when considering questions of migration. Examples included the "Golden Rule" of Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31,[601] that prescribe a particular duty to vulnerable persons, in this case undocumented and other unwanted migrants, often appealing to the repeated Old Testament prophetic injunction to social justice expressed in terms of concern for the poor, the widow and the orphan.[602] The concept of the unity of all Christian people as brothers and sisters in Christ,[603] in one case specifically citing Ephesians chapter 2 was also invoked in respect of immigrants who came to church.[604] Finally, the importance of offering welcome to the stranger, particularly into the church congregation, was recognised by most interviewees, several of whom referred to scriptural injunctions as a basis for it,[605] including one who observed that there are thirty six instances in the Old Testament of an injunction to care for the stranger, but only one to "love your neighbour".[606]

Each of these principles can also be seen to be in sympathy with the symbolic conceptuality of creation in the image of God. The mutual relationality that is inherent in this image becomes motivation for treating others as one would wish to be treated oneself, and the innate dignity of every human being entails a particular concern for those who are in precarious situations or vulnerable to exploitation. These obligations were all the stronger when the other was seen also as a believer, and in this context the image of God in them was enhanced by their being a brother or sister in Christ, imaging Christ also through the work of the Holy Spirit in them. Thus, the obligation of welcome was seen as correspondingly stronger, as it would be to welcome a member of one's own human family.

There are many other possible metaphors and narratives in scripture which cannot be examined here, but which can and in many instances do stimulate an imaginative awakening to the need and call of migrants. The celebration and ethical core of the

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[601] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[602] Interviewee 8 Ryan; Interviewee 4 Roger; Interviewee 11 Doreen; Interviewee 2 Joel; Interviewee 13 Irfan; Interviewee 12 David; Interviewee 5 Cara.

[603] Interviewee 3 Mark; Interviewee 5 Cara.

[604] Interviewee 2 Joel.

[605] Interviewee 8 Ryan; Interviewee 11 Doreen; Interviewee 9 Doris; Interviewee 4 Roger; Interviewee 14 Daniel; Interviewee 12 David; Interviewee 5 Cara; Interviewee 16 Maura; Interviewee 7 Alex; Interviewee 10 Tim.

[606] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

Eucharist as a communal meal hosted by God, and the self-perspective of Christians as aliens in this world or the Israelite histories of slavery, exodus and exile are cases in point.

Although such narratives, guiding values and principles can be appealed to in order to call Christians to their obligation to love and have concern for migrants, it is important to recognise that the Bible also includes many texts and narratives which are not positively disposed to strangers or foreigners. Susanna Snyder cites the books of Ezra and Nehemiah in this light, noting that they contain many xenophobic traits, such as scapegoating and anti-women injunctions. In particular, the Israelites were instructed to separate themselves from the peoples of the land and leave their foreign wives (with no provision being made for their welfare).[607] According to Snyder there has been a tendency to either ignore these texts altogether, or to spiritualise them: "Commentators from a northern evangelical tradition have tended to focus on the 'spiritual' messages which can be gleaned, sidestepping awkward xenophobic elements."[608] She advocates two alternative approaches for dealing with these texts: reading the books from the perspectives of the submerged voices, and looking for learning which could give insight into the contemporary migration situation and the hostile mentality that often surrounds it.

A disposition of humility is required to engage honestly with the churches' past taking specific times and context into account, and to confront any present complicity with secular authorities in legitimating discrimination and exclusionary practices against migrants, even through silence or apathy.[609]

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[607] Ezra 10:11, Nehemiah 13:3

[608] Snyder, p. 141.

[609] Snyder notes that "[t]oday in the US, some among the Christian right have been at the forefront of calls from immigration restriction. They cite Romans 13:1-5 to argue that earthly authorities and laws (including immigration laws) are effectively God's laws and must therefore be obeyed, and claim that Christians have a special duty to family, community and nation and that nation-state boundaries are ordained by God." Snyder, p. 146.

> *Naming the exclusionary strand within the Christian tradition is a matter of honesty, integrity and theological credibility. ... Doing 'realistic theology' in relation to migration ... requires recognition that some Christians today inhabit ecologies where the stranger is feared and suspected and that all, in different ways and that's different times, marginalise and oppress strangers.*[610]

This "ecology of fear" as Snyder terms it, needs to be recognised, acknowledged – but also transformed through more truthful personal reflection and social analysis.[611] It is necessary to probe and recognise the reasons behind hostility towards inward migration, to assess if there are well-founded reasons for this apprehension. Snyder's great insight here is that an attentiveness to and humble engagement with those who inhabit this "ecology of fear" within the church is essential if churches are to be authentic in their practices with migrants, and to bear witness to society at large to their insights as well as to counter-cultural or alternative, biblically-grounded perspectives. The hermeneutic of the image of God could be particularly powerful here in engagement with those *inside* the church community itself who inhabit the ecology of fear, as it counters the strangeness of those "perceived to be strangers", opening them to acknowledging the strangeness within themselves and to the transcending mystery of God. In this, the perception of threat and fear can be transformed, and the other person seen for who they are apart from the negative projections.

This brief analysis of the Christian scriptures related to migration demonstrates that no singular "message" can be directly inferred. That is why the broad symbolic conception of creation in the image of God can be useful as a hermeneutical framework for drawing out guiding principles that are congruent with issues and questions regarding migration, whilst continuing to hold in mind the central orienting power of the person of Jesus as the primary revelation of God's will and purpose for the world and for every creature and social community.

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[610] Snyder, p. 146.

[611] See the next "base point" of contextual analysis.

7.4.1.2 *Tradition*

The second authoritative source for Anderson is that of tradition.[612] The church tradition most relevant for my purposes is that of the practice of offering hospitality to strangers, as has already been indicated by the frequency of the references to the importance of welcome by the interviewees. Hospitality, as opposed to welcome, was however mentioned by only one of the interviewees.[613] Hospitality incorporates much more than welcome, involving putting one's resources at the disposal of another with no expectation of reciprocation and it often implies the obligation to protect or provide sanctuary. It has been a perennial characteristic of Jewish, and then Christian tradition, associated with the Israelites' first hand experience of being foreigners in Egypt and in exile.[614] Christine Pohl claims that hospitality in the Christian tradition is shown to offer "... a generous welcome to the 'least' without concern for advantage or benefit to the host."[615] In that Pohl is reflecting the understanding of hospitality as a sign of God's love and justice. She also recognises its importance for acceptance and belonging, as opposed to mere provision of physical resources: "People cannot live, much less flourish, without a network of relationships that give them a place in the world",[616] whilst acknowledging that "[a]lthough hospitality is inadequate as a total response to the needs of strangers, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, it is a crucial component of any response."[617]

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[612] Used in this sense, a tradition encompasses long-term practice or knowledge of a particular people. It can adapt and change as time goes on, but is not understood as a practice that comes and goes as fashions and tastes wax and wane. Farley speaks of it in this sense: "...because of tradition, something accumulates out of the past that assists a people in the ordering of life, the interpretation of situation, and even in creative responses to the new." Farley, p. 29.

[613] Interviewee 13 Irfan.

[614] Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', pp. 87–88.

[615] Christine D. Pohl, *Making Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Tradition* (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), p. 16; Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', p. 92. This is often derived from Jesus words in Luke 14:12-14: "When you give a luncheon or a dinner, do not invite your friends or your brothers or your relatives or rich neighbors, in case they may invite you in return, and you be repaid. But when you give a banquet, invite the poor, the crippled, the lame, and the blind. And you will be blessed, because they cannot repay you, for you will be repaid at the resurrection of the righteous."

[616] Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', p. 83.

[617] Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', p. 83.

Hospitality is typically posited as one-directional and a gift, though some writers, including Skinner, emphasise the need for the host to be open to the possibility of receiving from the stranger:

> *In encountering Others, in the person of the refugee or asylum seeker, we are called not simply to give but to acknowledge what we can receive. Our relationship with refugees is not a one-way process, but one that can teach and refresh us.*[618]

Otherwise, as Ilsup Ahn argues, "the act of hospitality is not clearly distinguished from the act of mercy as a form of gift."[619] For him, the problem is "[i]f the concept of hospitality is built on the paradigm of gift, then ... there is *no moral obligation* for the hosting citizens to show their hospitality toward the incoming strangers."[620] Key to the tradition of hospitality for him is that it imposes an obligation. He therefore proposes a model based not on gift, but on forgiveness of invisible debt. This invisible debt "subsists in the forms of 'you owe us your presence' (on the part of the host) and 'I owe you my security and success' (on the part of the guest)."[621] Acknowledgement of this invisible debt then affords the host the opportunity to discharge it through offering hospitality, and thereby transcend the creditor-debtor consciousness. This is an act of grace on the part of the host. Paul Ricoeur speaks in terms of the whole divine economy, of the "logic of the gift" as mirroring divine grace that gives extravagantly and beyond desert, in contradistinction to the worldly human pattern which he designates as the "logic of strict equivalence" giving measure for measure as if fearful and selfishly anxious because of the assumption of perpetual scarcity.

I agree with Ahn that the gift paradigm of hospitality is inadequate in that it precludes obligation, and that his paradigm of forgiveness of invisible debt is insightful as it affords the opportunity to unmask the "'negative moral economy' of invisible debt in the political discourse of immigration".[622] However, the forms he assigns to the

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[618] Skinner, p. 48.

[619] Ilsup Ahn, 'Economy of "Invisible Debt" and Ethics of "Radical Hospitality": Toward a Paradigm Change of Hospitality from "Gift" to "Forgiveness"', *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 38 (2010), 243–267 (p. 47) <doi:10.1111/j.1467-9795.2010.00428.x>.

[620] Ahn, p. 252. My italics

[621] Ahn, p. 253.

[622] Ahn, p. 253.

debt(s) in this context (of immigration) seem to me to be applied to the wrong party. Surely, it is the host who owes her security and (economic) success to the guest, as – by extension – one can argue that the wealth of the Global North is built on exploitation of the Global South. Thus in providing hospitality to an immigrant, a citizen of the Global North is affording *the migrant* the opportunity to transcend the creditor-debtor consciousness by forgiving that debt. It is an act of grace on the part of *the guest* to accept hospitality and thereby forgive the host for having been part of a system that oppressed him or her.[623]

Again, the perspective afforded by a hermeneutic grounded on the doctrine of creation in the image of God is useful here in enabling one to see injustices as opportunities for hospitality. Pohl explains:

> *In order to respond hospitably, people must be willing to see and to give attention to human beings and circumstances that are easily overlooked by more secure populations. Being willing to 'see' often requires a willingness to put oneself 'in the way of knowing' and to work to make sure that injustices and need are not conveniently hidden from public view.*[624]

It brings out the sense of costly and self-giving hospitality that – paradoxically – does not count the cost and a giving that brings enrichment and its own reward.

7.4.1.3 ***Reason***

The primary rationale and pattern in Christian ethical deliberation has been located within the tradition of natural law ethics, which attempts to derive ethical principles from the ordering of life around us, which is seen as part of God's general revelation. For Christian ethicist, Robert Gascoigne, its strength is that it recognises certain common human characteristics that can be known and upon which an ethic can be built. Yet it is criticised for undermining the potential for change in that what *is* can be said to be natural, without sufficient recognition that it may be subject to change or needs to be changed. Gascoigne notes that natural law has been interpreted and used to justify as natural certain historically contingent social inequalities such as the

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[623] There is a resonance here with Ayelet Shachar's argument for a globalised resource redistribution based on the undeserved benefits that accrue to those born in the Global North. Shachar.

[624] Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', p. 100.

different roles of the sexes.[625] For my purposes, this identified weakness of the natural law as it has been traditionally deployed is especially pertinent in the endeavour to unmask the domination of the human and Christian imagination by an historically contingent social order passing itself off as natural if not absolute. The danger of natural law ethics singularly relied upon or narrowly construed outside a dynamic theological anthropology and of social justice, is that it lends itself to rigid normative application and thereby stifles the capacities for re-thinking and for fresh imagination in new contexts, or in light of more dynamic, historical understandings of human nature and the human condition whether personally or socially. Attentive to this weakness, Gascoigne states that

> *[t]he meaning of natural law today, then, is not a set of obligations that can be read by everyone in the open book of an unchanging human nature, but rather a common and communicative search for insight into what way of life will fulfil the fundamental characteristics and potential of the human person.*[626]

Such a search will require reflection on human experience in its embodied complexity, which I shall now consider.

7.4.1.4 ***Experience***

Experience is perhaps the most fallible of the authoritative sources, relying as it does on critical reflection by the subject on her own life, a very difficult exercise to achieve objectively. In the context of the tradition of a community, however, the pitfalls inherent in unreflexive subjectivity are mitigated to an extent, as the results of such reflection are tried and tested collectively by the community over time. Stanley Hauerwas sees similar fallibility in natural law ethics, insisting that it belongs in the realm of experience as much as reason as it "really names those moral convictions that have been tested by the experiences of the Christian community and have been judged essential for sustaining its common life."[627]

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[625] Robert Gascoigne, *Freedom and Purpose: An Introduction to Christian Ethics* (Sydney: E. J. Dwyer, 1993), p. 24.

[626] Gascoigne, p. 25.

[627] Stanley Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics*, 2nd edn (London: SCM Press, 2003), p. 120.

One difficulty with experience as a potential source for ethical deliberation in the matter of undocumented migration is related to difficulties also associated with natural law deliberation, namely, the dominant order and ideology of the territorial state system. This order systematically prevents experience of encounter between the established population and undocumented and other unwanted migrants, and its ideology systematically normalises as "natural" their exclusion from the everyday life of the established population.

This is why the Christian community can probe its particular ethical resources, drawn from its scriptures and traditions, to present an alternative ordering and perspective on undocumented migrants as made in the image of God as foundational for the person's inalienable human dignity and demanding equality and parity of esteem. Furthermore, overbearing use of the natural law tradition makes the experience of one group normative while totally overlooking and failing to enquire into and seek out the experience of the other, thereby constructing a marginalising and exclusionary structure.

7.4.2 Contextual Analysis

Having considered some authoritative sources for ethical guidance, I turn to the base point for ethical reflection found in analysis of the political and social context. Ethical deliberation must be based on concrete, even empirical analysis of the actual situation of the object under consideration. In the case of undocumented migrants I have demonstrated that their current situation is one of precarity and vulnerability, extreme risk and exclusion. In addition to assured knowledge of the facts of the situation, analysis must be undertaken to ascertain the factors and causes behind it. This is usually arrived at through theoretical and empirical social research. In my case I argue that the system of territorial states and its sustaining ideology are the main factors behind the persistence of the unequal power relations that result in the suffering of unwanted migrants.

Anderson argues that, whilst recognising their usefulness, Christians must keep such social scientific theories under critique as they generally discount the perspective of God's creative and redemptive purpose as a valid vantage point for assessing the

significance of the considered phenomena.[628] While a critique of migration policies based on their disregard of the immanent image of God in each person could have considerable summoning power in a church context, it will not be regarded as valid in most social scientific circles. Howevern the underlying correlative of inalienable human dignity could provide a basis for fruitful exchange.

7.4.3 Basic Convictions or Worldviews

A further base point for ethical reflection is what Anderson terms basic convictions. They are shaped by understandings of scriptures, experiences and analysis of the world we encounter. They also shape other aspects of ethical reflection. Basic convictions comprise one's worldview and are partly unconscious, operating through instinct and "gut feeling". Anderson sees them as expressed in answers to questions such as: Who am I? Where am I? What's wrong? What is the remedy?[629] These questions are reminiscent of Ball and Dagger's four functions of ideology: explanation, evaluation, orientation and political programme. This similarity can flag up susceptibility to unconscious ideological influence in that what one thinks of as one's basic convictions are only the consciously-held part of one's worldview. Worldviews are, in fact, largely unconsciously held and therefore only revealed when challenged, or in cross-cultural contrasting experiences.[630]

Given the unconscious nature of many of our convictions, their main use in ethical deliberation is as a check on whether one's actions or opinions are congruent with what one holds to be one's most basic convictions. They can protect, for example, from the risk of obligation being reduced to a legalistic or moralistic casuistry.[631] Inconsistencies between actions and stated convictions can be indicators of ideological influences otherwise hidden from awareness

Thus, I would argue, demanding tighter border controls would be inconsistent with an ethic grounded upon the obligation of social justice and a worldview which regards each human being as possessed of an inalienable human dignity – in Jewish-Christian-Muslim theological terms, as created in the image of God, in the face of the

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[628] Terence R. Anderson, p. 211.

[629] Terence R. Anderson, p. 162.

[630] Terence R. Anderson, p. 151.

[631] Farley, p. 52; Hauerwas, p. 120.

outrageous frequency, for example, of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. The hermeneutical framework of understanding the human person as created in the image of God clarifies the moral wrong of supporting the deployment of overwhelming coercive force to prevent desperate people from being landed safely on the shore, so that they can attempt to build a new life and escape poverty or oppression. Used in this way as a consistency check, it becomes apparent that one's worldview influences one's interpretation of norms and standards. It is a useful exercise in self-criticism to ask whether one's worldview, as evident in the interpretation of norms and standards, is closer to the dominant perspective, or to alternative but still only marginally practised traditions offered by one's particular community. For Anderson, "[t]his power of self-transcendence is necessary for the self-criticism essential to true moral action."[632]

7.4.4 Character

Character and its relationship to virtue ethics is concerned with the kind of person (or community) one is in one's whole life, rather than focussing upon what one should choose or do in each particular situation. It represents another base point for ethical reflection in Anderson's schema. He claims that "God calls us to a new way of being, not only a new way of doing."[633] In the Christian context, character virtues such as love, hope, faith and patience are to be valued, and they are also theological in their source and origin. Such attributes as Paul claims are "gifts of the Spirit" in Galatians 5 are virtues. For Anderson, one's *dispositions*, or one's virtues (or vices), are key aspects of one's character in this regard. He defines a disposition as "a persistent tendency or a stable readiness to speak and to act in a certain manner or way."[634] For the purposes of this discussion on attitudes to undocumented migrants and other newcomers I wish to reflect further on Snyder's contrastive theorisation of an "ecology of faith" and an "ecology of fear", in terms of dispositions.

As noted earlier, the scriptures of Ezra and Nehemiah offer an insight into what Snyder calls the ecology of fear. If one acknowledges fear as a disposition in Anderson's sense then it can be seen that many people, including people in the

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[632] Terence R. Anderson, p. 179.

[633] Terence R. Anderson, p. 146.

[634] Terence R. Anderson, p. 117.

churches, do have a persistent tendency to react in a fearful way to strangers, or in response to the prospect of strangers coming into one's community or country.

Snyder juxtaposes this ecology of fear against an ecology of faith, which she elaborates through examination of the book of Ruth and the story of Jesus' encounter with the Syro-Phoenician woman in Mark 7:24-30. For Snyder "[a]n ecology of faith indicates a way of living and being which is trusting and compassionate towards those who are unknown."[635] Such a disposition is closely related to one of hope, which Anderson describes as "... founded on the confidence that God's promises and mercy are 'ever faithful, ever sure' [and which] fosters clarity of vision. We can look squarely at the limitations of immediate prospects."[636]

A faithful disposition, founded on confidence and faith in God, enables an empathetic, humble and compassionate attitude to those who are habitually portrayed in terms of fear and threat. So too, it engenders a confidence to engage openly (without fear) with those who are unknown or who have different perspectives or beliefs. A faithful disposition also enables a confident yet humble engagement with others within the church community who may be operating out of an ecology of fear when it comes to their attitudes to migration. This confidence in one's identity in God is strengthened within the Christian heart and community if they remember, believe and act in the light of every human creature as created in the divine image.

7.4.5 Norms and Values

The final base point for ethical reflection is that of values and norms. The language here is inherently more "translatable" than that of the other base points.

My primary motivating norm behind this work is that of social justice both in its biblical grounding and in its (philosophical) ethical foundation, function and correlation. In the understanding presented in this thesis, the territorial state system is inherently unjust to undocumented migrants, both in bureaucratically creating – or more correctly, constructing them – and in coercively oppressing them. The effects of this have been documented earlier, as has the way the border system works ideologically to mask its interestedness and justify its effects by, amongst other

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[635] In this context "'Faith' is used to indicate the opposite of fear rather than a system of religious doctrines and practices." Snyder, p. 163.

[636] Terence R. Anderson, p. 134.

means, shifting responsibility for their predicament onto the migrants themselves and casting them (whose lives it threatens) as a threat.

Anderson quotes J. C. Bennett: "God's love for all persons implies a strategic concentration on the victims of society, on the weak, the exploited, the neglected persons who are a large majority of the human race."[637] In Pohl's terms, undocumented migrants fit all of these categories and so deserve a particular consideration:

> *There are no more vulnerable persons than those who have been forced from their homes into alien settings and are dependent on the kindness of strangers. If part of Christian identity involves caring for the weakest, welcoming strangers, and being advocates for those with no voice, then one might properly expect Christian leaders and communities to be significantly engaged.*[638]

Certainly, such concern was explicitly reflected within the interviews. As noted above, most interviewees recognised the relevance of biblical narratives of welcome to the stranger and, still more relevantly, concern for the most vulnerable. In recognising the frequent precarity of migrants' situations, interviewees correspondingly acknowledged a particular obligation towards them.[639]

It is in this sense that liberation theologians speak of God's "preferential option" for the poor or oppressed. Anderson prefers Bennet's term of "strategic concentration" on the oppressed. For him the poor are the *anawim* of Psalm 146 who "have no one to speak on their behalf, no one to plead their cause ... [who are] without a voice before the legal, economic, political and cultural structures."[640] I would maintain that this is an accurate description of undocumented migrants today. It is important, however, not to romanticise these (or any other oppressed group). They are not necessarily any more virtuous or morally deserving in terms of character. It is the underlying injustice of their situation that is the source of obligation to them. Another danger is

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[637] Terence R. Anderson, p. 47.

[638] Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', p. 85.

[639] Interviewee 13 Irfan; Interviewee 8 Ryan; Interviewee 7 Alex; Interviewee 14 Daniel; Interviewee 2 Joel; Interviewee 4 Roger; Interviewee 11 Doreen.

[640] Terence R. Anderson, p. 47. quoting R. L. Mouw, 'Jesus and the Poor', *Mid-Stream*, 20 (1981), p. 411.

that their continual portrayal as vulnerable and needy may obscure their agency, capability and initiative.[641]

A useful secular norm when considering the situation of undocumented migrants is that of human rights – not least because of its common linguistic and ethical currency within church and secular society in the modern world. The language of human rights is one that most Western Christians are at least familiar with, if not fluent in, and thus is fruitful in translating concerns born in consideration grounded in Christian ethical sources into language that is morally accessible and comprehensible to both church and secular proponents. It is not difficult to demonstrate its underlying roots in the earlier religious and moral language of human dignity, which can in turn be biblically grounded in the theological understanding of humans made in the image of God.[642]

Many people (perhaps every person) suffers as a result either of violations of their human rights, and being caught in a conflict of competing rights leading to difficulties over the question of whose rights have most claim on the resources at hand. Anderson advocates David Hollenbach's suggested approach to this, in which he proposes the following three priority principles:

1. The needs of the poor take priority over the wants of the rich.

2. The freedom of the dominated takes priority over the liberty of the powerful.

3. The participation of marginalised groups takes priority over the preservation of an order which excludes them.[643]

I examined earlier how the current border regime discriminates against undocumented migrants and violates their human rights and would argue that under Hollenbach's approach they would have a very strong claim to the prioritising of their human rights, particularly in the light of the third principle considering their marginalisation under the order of the border regime.

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[641] Snyder notes the irony in the fact that many common myths concerning migrants paint them as wily and deceptive, with nefarious motives, whilst those who advocate on their behalf generally paint them as vulnerable, blameless and needy. Rarely are they depicted as ordinary human beings going through extraordinary circumstances. Snyder, p. 82.

[642] Pohl claims that "Calvin's impact on political theorists in that time suggests an important connection between ancient Christian concern for strangers and the eventual articulation of basic human rights." Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', p. 89.

[643] Terence R. Anderson, p. 94.

While human rights are acknowledged as an important means of advocating for vulnerable groups, they are often criticised as a negative expression of one's obligations, not taking into account the needs of the whole person, as Pohl recognises in her statement that "rights claims alone do not result in giving people a place of belonging."[644] Yet Hollenbach's principles would seem to be more positively articulated as affirmations and ways of promoting human capability, rather than operating as protective norms that can do little more than minimise or mitigate threats and damages to human life and flourishing.

7.4.6 Summary

This brief survey of ethical base points in the light of the metaphor of creation in the image of God attempts to demonstrate a significant congruency between these in the matter of Christians' attitudes to undocumented and other unwanted migrants. An emphasis was placed on the base points of scriptural narratives (which were also reflected by the interviewees), tradition (likewise) and the desirability of a confident yet humble disposition rooted in faith in and relationship with God. Such a disposition enables fruitful engagement with those inside and outside the church community who may react to migrants out of an ecology of fear.

Human rights norms are also useful as a method to communicate to others outside the community of faith, arguably having their origin in Christian discourses of concern for the most vulnerable. In particular, the resonances between discourses of human dignity and human rights afford opportunities for effective communication and bridging of sacred and secular discourses.

One of the most useful aspects of this type of ethical deliberation is that it can reveal ideological presuppositions and biases through a self-critical examination of the assumed or purported consistency in the interpretation of norms with consciously held worldviews. This self-critique is a work of the imagination and can be stimulated by the symbolic, hermeneutical and doctrinal framework associated with creation in the image of God.

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[644] Pohl, 'Responding to Strangers', p. 90.

7.5 Unmasking Ideology from an Alternative Perspective

How useful is the symbolic conceptuality of creation of the human person in God's image as a hermeneutical framework for unmasking the ideological working of the system of territorial states? To examine its applicability as an effective means of countering the hegemonic outworking of this ideology, it is useful once more to return to my fingerprint framework.

In this short analysis I focus on the hermeneutical utility of creation in the divine image because, as noted earlier, a "sectarian" hermeneutic such as this has a summoning power to motivate a community from its internal resources, and consequently is useful in stimulating ethical reflection in a situation of oppression or crisis. I thus argue that it is appropriate in view of the violent impact of the border regime on undocumented migrants; the more so, since my aim is to address churches in particular and encourage and challenge them to critique the dominant orderings of society and their own orientations towards it. This internal perspective, however, in no way obviates the continuing need for broader ethical reflection and correlative dialogue with other ethical traditions and perspectives.

7.5.1 Commonsense

In the critical discourse of analysis of the interviews I drew out some prevalent themes which reinforced or reproduced the current form of the border system as commonsense and natural, and implied potential alternatives as absurd. As recognised in the analysis in chapters five and six, prophetic counter-discourses were also in evidence. However, the aim here is to assess whether the symbolic conceptuality of the human person created in the image of God can serve to expose this aspect of the territorial state ideology at work.

The first emergent theme was that the territorial state is imagined as the natural container of a people. The understanding of every person as created in the image of God, nullifies such an imagining or claim, since it advances the fundamental dignity and equality of all people, whatever other differences of circumstance, nationality, custom and culture may be brought to the fore.

A second theme concerned the assumption of the state's right to control access as it sees fit. From the broader, alternative epistemological perspective of creation in the divine image, and in particular with regard to its implications of inalienable human

dignity, this right too can be shown to be contingent. The state cannot gainsay the dignity and rights of each person. Whether or not the state accepts any theological foundation does not justify the ethical failure to uphold a person's dignity and rights. The principle holds: it can be argued that the state has over-reached its ethical authority, while for Christians the dimension of the rupturing of the appropriate relationship of secular and sacred continues to evoke critique on rhetorical and rational as well as theological grounds. From the perspective of this more inflected epistemology, the symbolic power of the state's documents of identification, is cut down to size as merely administrative tools. From within this larger perspective, open borders, rather than being *ab initio* rejected as absurd, naïve or impossible, can be viewed as a closer approximation as much to a more human political ordering of the state as to congruence with God's ideal for humankind. Once more correlation is possible, without undermining the integrity of either domain – secular or religious.

7.5.2 Use of Emotive Symbols through Myth and Ritual

All of this reflects the fact theology can be exercised not only for but more rightly against the fallacy of the "myth of difference", challenging its very roots through the doctrinal language of the human person created in the image of God. Human beings and societies can be clearly shown as not primordially divided into "nations"; rather, humans are to be valued equally and treated according to their innate dignity. As the power of this spurious idea of inherent difference is eroded, the potency of the myth of scarcity and its outworking is also eroded. There may still be scarcity, hardship and suffering but the accompanying scapegoating and exclusion does not necessarily follow. Rather, under the full scope of imagination, the inherent value of each human *qua* human comes into view, rather than an arbitrary or "interested" splitting of humanity into different classes and treating them according to inconsequential, insignificant differences. The sense of the migrant as inherently and inevitably a threat or danger is undermined when the fallacy of these myths is unmasked and they are thereby emasculated of their power.

7.5.3 Categorisation

This imaginative expansion of empathy thereby contributes to the unmasking of the most fundamental categorisation of the border regime as arbitrary and contingent rather than axiomatic and ultimate: that of "us" as the natural people of this county and "them" as those who do not naturally belong; a system artificially constructed

and codified in practice by border rituals, citizenship and its associated symbolic documentation. Discourses of "illegality" and criminality and the conglomerating of people with different migration statuses into an essentialised and suspect group is shown up for what it is by the imaginative restoration of unique created-ness to each person. Mythical claims of scrounging, job-grabbing and increasing criminality are likewise placed under question. Holding onto the inalienable dignity and rights of each person and also, for Christian Churches, belief in the created-ness of each person in God's image, opens a way for those in the host nation to empathetically imagine themselves in the Other's shoes, and understand that migrants are ordinary people, like "us", who have faced extraordinary circumstances.

Furthermore, the internal Christian epistemology (shared with Jewish and Muslim traditions) of humans as God's representatives on earth and stewards of God's creation can also serve to undercut, or at least mitigate the damaging effects of territorialised discourses of belonging. Human persons do not belong pure and simple to a particular place. Neither, in this view, does the land belong to anyone, but to God, and those who find themselves on it have a responsibility to care for it with respect as a gift over which none has strict sole ownership. While this may indeed be argued against according to Lockean principles of private property so beloved of Western modernity, responses to the current ecological crisis and to the scandal of world hunger have caused even this deeply enshrined orthodoxy to be put in question.

7.5.4 Altruism

The more subtle fingerprint of altruism, or what Paolo Freire calls false generosity, comes into view. Here too, it was noted that claims of disinterestedness on the part of either the state or the person themselves can function as "cover" for systemic injustices or exclusionary practices. Such claims were generally evident in the interviewees' references to the state's generosity in providing asylum to those fleeing political persecution, with the unspoken understanding that the state's obligations ended there.

These limits of obligation, founded on the socially constructed distinctions of "refugee" and "economic migrant", melt away, however, when migrants are regarded as human beings possessed of an inalienable human dignity, or as created in the image of God, because these socially constructed distinctions are subordinate to the

innate dignity of each migrant as a human being and the rights and duties inherent in this.

7.5.5 Summary

I have argued that broad ethical reflection, considering the various "base points" of the relational responsibility method through the hermeneutical lens of human beings created in the image of God, in conjunction with my ideological fingerprint framework, constitutes an effective model for unmasking and gradually disempowering the exclusionary symbolic discourses associated with the territorial system of states as quasi-absolute. For Farley, "[e]nchantment means the way finite reality participates in sacred power, the infinite creativity." The undocumented migrant, essentialised and often dehumanised by the exclusionary discourses of the border regime, can be rethought, re-imagined, or "re-enchanted" through the enlarging of the social imagination when related to as one like "us" (from the religious understanding), carrying the image of God as sign of her participation in sacred freedom and power, in God's creativity. The ideological operation of the border system is also unmasked, revealing it for what it is: a socially constructed regime which works in the interests of some, generally the rich, the already documented and the white, discriminating against others whom it casts as a threat, whilst in fact threatening and damaging their welfare and even their lives.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I outlined a multivalent ethic of migration that is grounded in the Christian ethical tradition. It aims to hold in mutual counterbalance and critique Brueggemann's model of the sectarian hermeneutic and Anderson's relational-responsibility method. To that end I advocated the utility of the hermeneutical lens of the symbolic concept from the Hebrew scriptures of human creation in the image of God, showing its correlative potential with other ethical traditions through the conceptualities and principles of human rights and human equality. As a deeply rooted symbol of God's love for each human being with its accompanying imperative to treat each person according to their inherent mystery and dignity it has summoning power to keep in check and transcend individual or group interests, in favour of those who have a claim of protective hospitality from the Christian community.

Having briefly considered the situation of undocumented and other systemically disadvantaged migrants under each of Anderson's "base points" for ethical reflection, I then looked again at the system of territorial states through the hermeneutical lens of creation in the image of God aligned with my ideological fingerprint framework, aiming to discover the ethical potential this model yields in unmasking the ideological operation of the system of territorial states.

I argue that doctrine of humans' creation in the image of God is a fruitful symbol structure in ethical deliberation seeking the appropriate Christian response to undocumented migrants. It can counter the ideology of the territorial state system and undermine the potency of its associated myths and ritualised categorisations as it summons Christians to relate to undocumented migrants as human beings with innate dignity, free, equal and deserving of respect. It thus stimulates the imagination to reinstate essentialised "illegal immigrants" as fully human and capable of social relationships of equality in church and in society.

All of this places the power relations implicit in prevailing border regimes under fresh scrutiny and question, dismantling their apparatus and claims as commonsense and natural. The emotive symbols its ideology calls on to inspire identification with the "nation" as manifested in the territorial state are exposed as arbitrary social constructs when discrimination against other human beings is seen through the lens of this symbolic conceptualisation.

In considering the various ethical base points of the relational-responsibility method in this light a congruence can be perceived between their implicit demand for a re-evaluation of perceptions of undocumented migrants and to work out the consequences of such a re-imagining for actions inside and outside the church community. In the concluding chapter I shall briefly consider some possible outworkings of this ethical deliberation for the potential shape of action within and without the community of believers concerning undocumented and unwanted migrants.

8 Conclusion and Moving Forward

8.1 Introduction

In this final chapter I review the original aims and questions this thesis sought to address, briefly discussing the insights that the research has provided in relation to them. I then look forward to implications for the churches, institutional and local, of these insights, drawing out some possible approaches that could be adopted in churches' engagement with migrants and particularly the undocumented "others", as well as in their internal practices.

8.2 Learnings and Limitations

This thesis sought to investigate the extent to which the contemporary imagination is dominated by the ideology of the border regime of the territorial state system. The theoretical argument was carried through a study of the status of migrants (regular and irregular) in the moral imagination of Christians, who were purposively selected because of their frequent opportunities to encounter people from other cultures and countries and their exposure to an alternative ethical framework. In the introduction I explained how the motivation for the research arose out of consideration of the contradiction that, despite the inaccessibility of supposedly inalienable human rights to undocumented migrants, which makes them very vulnerable to exploitation, public discourse portrays them as a threat to society and further demonises them, rather than recognising their precarity and the discriminatory nature of the border regime that causes it.

To move towards a proposed explanation of this I theorised the border regime of the system of territorial states as an ideological domination system and developed the ideological fingerprint framework to demonstrate its workings. This theorisation proved useful and fruitful, as my analysis of the system of territorial states demonstrated that the conflation of a territorial space with a "people" or "nation" leads to the ideological categorisation of "others" not deemed to belong to the primordial "people" of the state. It also leads to an unquestioning acceptance of the state's right to regulate the flow of people across its borders. The axiomatic acceptance of this state right transposes responsibility for their predicament onto the

shoulders of the migrant herself, thereby obscuring systemic factors and the "host" nation's responsibility for her precarious position.

A Foucauldian understanding of such domination is characterised by a conception of competing "knowledges": no ideology can dominate absolutely. Therefore I sought to explore further the nature of this domination by investigating the presence and effectiveness of competing knowledges or discourses.

This evoked the research question mentioned in the introduction: How does the ideology of the territorial state system influence the moral imagination? Applied to the interviewees I purposively selected, this question can be more precisely expressed: how do alternative perspectives afforded by the Christian ethical tradition interact with the ideology of the territorial state system in their imaginations when they consider issues of migration?

I therefore interviewed long-term members of diverse congregations and undertook a critical discourse analysis of their talk to discover the extent to which it replicated or reflected discourses congruent with the border regime of the system of territorial states, or alternatively, discourses from the Christian or human rights ethical tradition which may counter them. Such competing discourses were evident, but the more prevalent discourses reflected the influence of the ideology of the territorial state system. These included the conflation of territorial space with a "people", an unreflective recognition of the state's right to control access, a discursive shifting of responsibility onto the migrants themselves and a perspective of alternative spatial political orderings as absurd. Stronger critiques were offered by those who had had direct one-to-one encounters with asylum seekers or unskilled migrant workers, upholding my thesis of the domination of the ideology of the border regime in the moral imagination of Christians.

This led me to ask what resources from the Christian ethical tradition could enable the fostering of a renewed and emancipatory perspective on and engagement with issues concerning vulnerable migrants. The symbolic conceptualisation of humankind's creation in the image of God was proposed as one such potential resource. Its effectiveness was demonstrated by assessing how the image re-humanises undocumented migrants and can undermine the working of ideology evident in each fingerprint of the framework and thereby counter the domination of the territorial state system over the imagination.

In terms of limitations, perhaps the most obvious case in the thesis is that of scope. As I was seeking primarily to explore the influence of discourses from the ideology of the border regime on Christians' imagination I interviewed long-term members of diverse congregations, following David Silverman's recommendation to seek "deviant cases". However, valuable additional data would doubtless have been obtained had I had the capacity to interview members of those congregations from other countries. An analysis of their perceptions of their reception into church and local communities would offer an interesting and doubtless fruitful avenue for future research of interest both to sociologists of religion and the churches themselves.

8.3 Implications for Local Church Engagement

What, then, are the implications of this research? Perhaps to assess this it would be useful to restate the problem it aimed to engage. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza expresses it concisely as follows:

> *... discourses of domination are engendered by the logic of difference or the logic of 'othering.' This logic of difference as domination understands the other always as a 'not' (e.g. not-white, not-male, not-civilised) who lacks the valued qualities of hegemonic society and whose humanity becomes the opposite of that of those who are elite and in power.*[645]

The implication here is that in order to undermine discourses of domination, the "logic of difference" must be confronted. The essence of the logic of difference, as Fiorenza perceptively distils here, is the portrayal of the Other as one who lacks. What is perceived as lacking is reflected in the myths of the dominating discourse, which I delineated and observed in the interviewees' speech. Therefore these myths, the ritual practices that sustain them, and the hegemonic (commonsense) nature of the territorial system, must be intentionally tackled.

While there are many church initiatives at local, national and European levels which work and advocate on issues pertaining to migrant vulnerability, the evidence from my research indicates that, particularly at a local level, there is room for self-critique and greater engagement as exclusionary attitudes and uncritical acceptance of discriminatory power structures remain significant.

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[645] Fiorenza, p. 21.

The question then is how to stimulate such engagement? In terms of precise directives, as M. Daniel Carroll R. points out: "[t]he means will vary according to the opportunities and limitations, in any given context, but the responsibility remains."[646] Therefore, rather than attempt to say exactly what form action should take, I briefly outline some principles that could influence consideration of contextually appropriate actions, and sketch a framework which could be adopted to aid sensitivity to the various target groups of such actions.

It is important to remain mindful of the scale and nature of the structural injustices that are under consideration in order to instil a sense of the gravity of the situation and the consequent necessity of action. That neutrality, in a context of domination, is an agent of legitimisation has been observed by Christian ethicists and theologians considering what they deem to be structural injustices resulting from domination systems. Charles Elliott, considering the effects of inflation following the oil crisis of 1973 points out, that churches are, or have been, the "mystical legitimizers of structural injustice".[647] William Cavanaugh, examining the co-option of just war theory as a tool of statecraft to justify war, notes the risk that the "[c]hurch itself becomes one more withering 'inter-mediate association', whose moral reasoning and moral formation are increasingly colonized by the nation-state and the market."[648] I argue that the structural injustices of the border regime place a similarly strong obligation of engagement on the churches which will, of course, require courage.

Again this might seem utopian but there is a need for a radically different vision with the energy to summon and inspire: in Susanna Snyder's words "... a dream of a more harmonious and mutually enriching future in relation to migration."[649] Such an imaginative awakening could enable discernment of contextually appropriate actions. Also, such a vision could facilitate fruitful collaboration with others, who are not members of the church community, to build together a more holistic vision of society, if it is communicated effectively (hence the aforementioned need for conceptual and

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[646] Carroll R., p. 109.

[647] Charles Elliott, *Inflation and the Compromised Church* (Belfast: Christian Journals Ltd, 1975), chap. 7.

[648] William Cavanaugh, 'Killing for the Telephone Company', *Modern Theology*, 20 (2004), 243–274 (p. 268).

[649] Snyder, p. 211.

linguistic correlations with other ethical traditions) and modelled faithfully in the community of the church and in the lives of believers.

Central to the outworking of such engagement must be the recognition that although some within and outside the church community will welcome a renewed vision and engagement in relation to migration, others will be reticent and perhaps even fearful, and that therefore a respectful and humble approach is required in each case. Hence I adopt Snyder's concepts of the ecology of faith and the ecology of fear when considering engagement on these matters within and without the church community.

8.3.1 Within the Church Community

Pentecostal Christian ethicist Paul Alexander argues for intentional engagement: "...religious leaders should specialize in arguing for the giftedness and rights of the 'other'."[650] As I demonstrated, the concepts of human dignity and human rights can be grounded in the Hebraic understanding of humans created in the image of God, and serve to undermine ideologically constructed "otherness" by recognising the divine image in each person.

As well as the verbal aspects of church life, interpersonal aspects also need scrutiny. Specifically, I observed that counter-hegemonic discourses were most often raised by interviewees who had direct one-to-one meaningful encounters with newcomers and migrants. Such one-to-one encounters seem essential to engender critique of dominant conceptions. Neither an emancipatory intellectual or theological understanding of the other, nor a diverse congregation (where encounter could indeed occur but may not be more than superficial in nature) is apparently sufficient alone.

Anecdotally (and further research would be informative here), it was recollection of substantive one-to-one encounters with newcomers that seemed to "trigger" self-questioning in the interviewees' thinking, and at that point, alternative perspectives grounded in (their) Christian ethical principles were brought into play and offered them a framework to process the experience of the Other in a new light. The systemic physical separation of migrants in precarious situations from the general population

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[650] Paul Alexander, 'Toward Particular Declarations of Human Gifts: A Christian Reflection on Religions, Stories, and Untold Suffering', *Religion & Human Rights: An International Journal*, 3 (2008), 235 (p. 268).

by the border regime is therefore telling, given the apparent emancipatory effect on the imagination of interpersonal encounter. This institutionalised separation is achieved through systems like direct provision in Ireland, but also through the generalised structural violence which necessitates a life in the shadows for fear of deportation for those who do not have the right paperwork.

An awareness of the necessity of an alternative hermeneutic *in addition* to meaningful encounter could stimulate intentional action in local churches to provide opportunities, perhaps such as small group work, where such encounters could occur, again whilst being sensitive to the reservations that some may have.

8.3.2 Outside the Church Community

When it comes to engagement with those outside the congregation, the institutional church has degrees of access to politicians and government bodies responsible for policy making and delivery. While I recognise the importance of continuing engagement on migration issues in this way, beyond the aforementioned need to communicate bilingually, my research is not primarily oriented in this direction.

For individual congregations and local churches to address issues of migration in their areas and encounters, humility and respect for others' perspectives must engender a caution and self-awareness in engagement. There is a need both to communicate and demonstrate that the Christian community recognises that it does not have all the answers but does want to engage, in love and in respect with those who are most vulnerable in society. I find myself in agreement with Doreen's sentiments that I noted in chapter four: she asserts that this engagement is better enabled through equipping church members to engage in their day to day encounters, rather than through institutionally-driven programmes,

> *But sometimes it's more important [...] to empower people in the church 'cause the people in, you know politicians are members of churches, you know government officials are members of churches, [...]. And equipping our individual members to actually stand up.*

Whilst many Christians, churches and church-based organizations do work to help and advocate on behalf of asylum seekers and refugees (though less of undocumented migrants), if this is restricted to humanitarian work it runs the risk of reproducing prevailing power relations and undermining the agency of those it seeks to help,

rather than seeking to subvert the dominant power constellations which cause their vulnerability.[651]

Therefore, paradoxically, it may be wise not to begin such action with action, but to ensure a clear understanding that the action is grounded in a subversive and emancipatory rationale (the understanding of human creation in the image of God indeed has subversive implications). The agency of the Other needs to be recognised so that relationships of reciprocity are germinated to counter the risk of reinforcement of unequal power relations.

This is particularly important when the Other is cast as "vulnerable" (as has admittedly often been the case in this thesis). In the Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe study "Mapping Migration: Mapping churches' responses", Darrell Jackson and Alessia Passarelli draw on Roman Catholic theologian Gioacchino Campese's proposed "tentative" theology of immigration. He maintains that such a theology "... will emphasise not only the vulnerability of the migrant but also the hope, resilience, and courage shown." They affirm his observation that "[t]his will enable proper attention to the situation of migration not merely as one in which people are *at* risk and *pose* risks, but also one in which people *take* risks."[652] A deliberate attention to the obvious fact that migrants, and particularly undocumented migrants, have weighed up the options available to them and decided to take the great risks involved in such migration renders their agency obvious.

8.4 Moving Forward

Evidence from my research points to at least three characteristics that I would deem essential in action seeking to respond to that call and to challenge the ideological domination of the system of states and their borders. Firstly, it must take into account the fact that not all, either within or outside the church community, will welcome such action, and that their reservations must be given space to be heard and acknowledged. Secondly, action must facilitate respectful one-to-one, embodied

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[651] Snyder, pp. 189–190.

[652] Darrell Jackson and Alessia Passarelli, *Mapping Migration: Mapping Churches' Responses* (Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe, 2008), pp. 23–24. citing Gioacchino Campese, 'Beyond Ethnic and National Imagination: Towards a Catholic Theology of U.S. Immigration', in *Religion And Social Justice for Immigrants* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007), pp. 178–184. Italics in original.

encounters between church members and migrants within and outside the church community. Finally, while the inspiration and summoning call to action is most potent (for Christians) when grounded in ethical resources particular to the Christian tradition, church members need to be able to correlate linguistically their own sources of motivation with sources (such as human rights) with which others can identify and ground in their own ethical traditions.

Carroll R. insists that "... the imperative of caring for the sojourner is ... binding today." He continues:

> *It ought to be demonstrated in specific measures that respond to the needs of the immigrant. ... It also will entail majority-culture Christians and churches opening themselves up and allowing the sojourner admittance to their culture and lives. In addition, if this moral imperative is for all nations, then these Christians have the obligation to be a voice for God's heart in the country at large. Again, the Bible does not provide a blueprint, but it does make its call clear.*[653]

Evidence from the interviews demonstrates that for many Christians, when it comes to undocumented migrants, this "voice for God's heart" is strangely muted. The sense of obligation to those living in situations of precarity seems dulled in this case. Recognition of this is not to diminish the work done in this area by many individuals and church organisations, but does point to a need intentionally and continually, at the local level, to engender practices which encourage self-analysis and self-critique amongst Christians if they are to be true to biblical principles such as social justice. Again, the interviews suggest that personal encounter and collaboration with sympathetic others are effective here. The Christian ethical tradition offers a rich vein of resources to enable such "conscientisation" and thus protect against the subtle domination of exclusionary and discriminatory ideologies which dull the radical and emancipatory vision of unity implied by the concept that each human is a person created in God's image.

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[653] Carroll R., p. 109.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Measures Taken to Counter Question Threat

"Question threat" is a term used by William Foddy to denote the risk that interviewees' responses to questions do not reflect their actual opinions but are tailored to what they perceive to be acceptable in the social context of the interview.[654] I list here several strategies he suggests to counter the risk of question threat, and how I adapted the suggestions to my particular context.

- "casual demeanour & question phrasing" – I attempted to generate an informal atmosphere in pre-interview conversation and introduction
- "lessen imputation of deviance (...everyone does it sometimes...)" – rather than verbal diminishment, as Foddy suggests here, I attempted to indicate acceptability of proffered opinions through body language and non-verbal gestures.
- "Anonymous process" – I informed interviewees that I was going to anonymise the interviews and have therefore not used real names in this discussion.
- "lessen psychological immediacy" (e.g. letting respondents answer on behalf of others) – many interviewees did this unprompted, where others seemed reticent I suggested it.
- "adopt a 'knowing' approach" – I did not follow this suggestion. To my mind it risks a certain complicity. I attempted to project a neutral and accepting approach.
- "ask a direct question assertively (a la Kinsey)" – I did not follow this suggestion.

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[654] Foddy, p. 121.

- "adopt an indirect approach (e.g. using projective approach)" – I did adopt this approach when an interviewee seemed reticent. I see it as similar to "lessen psychological immediacy", above.
- "ask threatening questions late on having established a rapport" – I adopted this suggestion. Only at the end of each interview, having discussed all my subject matter, did I present the interviewee with facts concerning migrant deaths in the Mediterranean and church responses to them, asking them their opinions on this.

Appendix B: Narrative Analysis Process

The sequence of tasks I undertook in preparation for carrying out the narrative analysis incorporated familiarising myself with the material through repeated listenings, note taking, transcribing and coding as follows:

1. Listen through each interview without interruption or note taking
2. Listen through each interview again, taking notes on the subject matter, topics and views expressed
3. Transcribe the interviews. I transcribed with the objective of retaining the pauses and delays in speech, as well as some of the prosody (such as "eh...", "emmm...") . I used "..." to indicate pauses whereas "[...]" indicates ellipsis in the quoted text. The transcriptions are not intended to be a complete record of the conversation, such as would be used in conversation analysis
4. Code the transcripts according to the main topics (narratives) that arose during the first two listenings and transcription
5. Put together a structure for this chapter based on the thematic content of the interviews and extract quotations from the transcripts that are pertinent to each topic

Appendix C: Critical Discourse Analysis – The discourse-historical approach

The critical discourse analysis of chapters 5 and 6 drew on the discourse-historical approach as developed and described by Ruth Wodak.[655] The interview transcripts were examined and linguistic means and discursive strategies by which the interviewees communicate their views were identified. Discursive strategies such as predication, deixis, implication, mitigation or intensification were identified, as were linguistic strategies such as dichotomy, exaggeration, understatement, disclaimers or repairs.

The discourse-historical method acknowledges the relevance of the historical context. In my case the most relevant historical contexts are the development of the territorial state system and the historical culture of the church. These contexts were integrated into the interpretation. However, the immediate context is also extremely important in this analysis: each interviewee knew they were being interviewed because of their involvement in a church or church-based organisation and thus the risk that they may have tailored their responses to an extent if they were concerned that their true thoughts or opinions may not reflect "Christian" perspectives must be acknowledged. This immediate context is known as the "context of situation".[656]

According to Reisigl and Wodak, the discourse-historical approach follows Mouzelis' recommendations for social research:

> *...not to get lost in theoretical labyrinths, not to invest too much in the operationalization of inoperationalizable 'grand theories' – but rather to develop conceptual tools adequate for specific social problems.*[657]

Whilst discourse-historical studies can be large-scale, such as an interdisciplinary longitudinal project, explicit scoping choices both in terms of data selection and analytical approach can enable much smaller studies, such as this one. Thus in my analysis I focussed on the following discursive strategies:[658]

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[655] Reisigl and Wodak.

[656] Reisigl and Wodak, p. 93.

[657] *Wodak and Meyer, p. 26.* Citing N. P. Mouzelis, *Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong? Diagnoses and Remedies* (London: Routledge, 1995).

[658] See Wodak and Meyer, p. 29.

- Nomination: Evident, for example, in the use of linguistic devices such as metaphor or deixis in categorising people as members or outsiders.
- Predication: The application of essentialising positive or negative characteristics to a particular group either directly or through implication.
- Argumentation: Evident, for example, in the use of discursive topoi or fallacies to justify inclusion or exclusion or a particular power structure.
- Intensification or Mitigation: Strategies which affect the illocutionary force of utterances.
- Perspectivation: Positioning the speaker as having a particular point of view.

The most prevalent of these discursive strategies and linguistic devices in my interviews included the use of metaphor, deixis, essentialisation, implication, topoi and fallacies and mitigation. Some of these could benefit from further explanation.

Deixis is a discursive means of constructing and shaping one's surroundings in the imagination through the use of small 'pointing' words which denote different categories of people. Typically the use of 'we/us/our' and 'them/they/theirs' to categorise people into groups which are imagined as fundamentally different in some way which makes it appropriate to treat them analytically differently.[659] A side effect of deixis is often that 'they' are perceived as an undifferentiated mass devoid of individual characteristics as human beings. This impedes critique of systemic discrimination they may be experiencing and naturalises the status quo, which may disadvantage them.

Mitigation is a discursive strategy whereby the speaker rhetorically distances themselves from the statement they have just made, or are about to make. It can take various form, such as a disclaimer (like the common prolepsis of "I'm not a racist but ..."), an attempt to co-opt the listener ("you know what I mean") or the use of the impersonal "you", where the subject changes from the first to the second person (either "I" or "we" to "you"). Its use can indicate evidence of competing discourses in the speaker's mind, such that their gut feelings are critiqued by certain values that they hold, or feel that they should demonstrate given the particular context of

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[659] See Farhat Shahzad, 'Forging the Nation as an Imagined Community', *Nations and Nationalism*, 18 (2012), 21–38 (p. 23) <doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00502.x>.

situation. Competition between internal discourses is also sometimes evident in speech through broken sentences or hesitation.

Reisigl and Wodak describe topoi as strategies of argumentation which are 'conclusion rules' that connect the argument with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify (a shortcut) transition from the argument to the conclusion.[660]

[660] Reisigl and Wodak.

Appendix D: Interview Prompt Sheet

The following is the prompt sheet with a list of interview questions and topics that guided me in addressing the desired material in each interview. The interviews were semi-structured, in-depth interviews so questions were not necessarily asked in the same order each time, nor were all of the questions asked in each interview as sometimes material was covered earlier spontaneously by the interviewee.

Section 1: Introduction:

- Introductory remarks to establish a rapport.
- Introduce the topics of the interview: people who have crossed borders without authorisation and live in the country.
- Attempt to establish terminology ("illegal immigrants" may be volunteered, otherwise I may suggest undocumented or irregular migrants).
- Enquire about the interviewee's level of knowledge of the situation of undocumented migrants in Ireland/EU.

Section 2: Feelings about migration

- How do you feel inward migration is affecting society?
- How much freedom of movement between countries do you feel people should have?

Section 3: Feelings about state responses to migration

- Do you think that the state/EU should accept more or less immigrants?
- What factors should influence whether the state allows a potential immigrant to enter the state or not?
- How should the state respond to (the phenomenon of) undocumented migration?

- Do you think the current migration system is fair or just?
- How could it be made more so? (if thought unfair)

Section 4: Church and migration

- How has immigration affected your church?
- What do you feel your church tradition has to say about the issues we've discussed?
- How should the churches/Christians respond to (the phenomenon of) undocumented migrants (migration)?

Section 5: Reactions to situation of undocumented migrants in the EU

- Tell the interviewee some statistics and information about the situation of undocumented migrants attempting to access the EU via the Mediterranean.
- Were you aware of this type of information?
- How do you feel about the information just presented?
- In the light of this information what contribution do you think your tradition could/should offer?
- What alternatives could there be to the way the EU border regime currently operates?