



Creative Relationships: A Basic Concept within Entrepreneurship Education?

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Abstract. This article outlines a concept termed “creative relationships” which ultimately could be used as basic concept and discursive tool in entrepreneurship education. A specifying distinction between “creative co-operation” and “creative co-existence” is also tentatively introduced, and it is argued that both these aspects need to be recognized in the discourse. The concept “creative relationships” is built on a review and an analysis of three distinct relational conceptions of creativity; Hannah Arendt’s, Kenneth Gergen’s and Martin Buber’s. A main point of the analysis is that the concept of creativity, as well as its broader counterpart, entrepreneurship, is not comprehensible without recognizing its relational context. At the end of the article, the outlined concept is applied to the question of curriculum development in entrepreneurship education.

Keywords: entrepreneurship education; creativity; relationship; creative relationships; Arendt, Gergen, Buber.

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1. Introduction

According to the European Commission (2002), entrepreneurship is widely recognized as one of the basic skills to be provided through lifelong learning. Entrepreneurship in school is assumed to include two important features: it is a means for creating new businesses, i.e., to provide necessary skills to those who intend to start their own venture, and, perhaps more importantly, it is a way of fostering an entrepreneurial attitude, “a general attitude that can be usefully applied to everyone in everyday life and in all working activities” (p. 9). The entrepreneurial attitude includes personal qualities such as “creativity, spirit of initiative and independence (...)” (p. 15) (cf. Johannisson 2009).

According to Holmgren and From (2005), the overall political purpose of entrepreneurship education is to promote economic growth. To succeed in this, schools need to encourage an entrepreneurial identity: “The inculcation of the right attitudes, on both general and specific levels, is the task for entrepreneurship education” (p. 385). From this point of view, entrepreneurship education is part of

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a European, or indeed global project, a neoliberal reconstruction of society and education. With an expression borrowed from Guedalla et al. (2001), Holmgren and From (2005, p.382) describe entrepreneurship education as “Taylorism of the Mind.”

There seem to be three alternative approaches if we want to study entrepreneurship: (1) to uncritically embrace the individualistic ideology that characterizes much of the discourse; (2) to take a critical stance against this ideology and discuss the discourse “from the outside,” or (3) to take a critical stance against the ideology, and try to elaborate the discourse “from the inside.” The present article chooses the third approach.

Bruyat and Julien (2000) argue that researchers within a specific field need to be in relative agreement with each other regarding questions as to how the field is defined and what its main research objects and themes are. For a long time, the field of entrepreneurship has wrestled with the problem of definition (ibid.). In an attempt to define the field, Bruyat and Julien speak of an open, entrepreneurial system in which relationships between the entrepreneur and his/her value creations, together with environmental factors, are taken into account. This system differs from the traditional approach in which the entrepreneur, the project, the product/value, and the environment are regarded as separate units and in which actions are seen as synonymous with individual performance. Research on entrepreneurship in which the intersubjective is the key unit of analysis and which adopts relational approaches – that is, trying to transcend the dualism between subjectivity and objectivity – is continually increasing, but still scarce (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman 2011; Hosking & Hjort 2004; cf. Hosking 2009). The present article aims to contribute to this research.

If we assume that Bruyat and Juliens (2000) are right in saying that consensus is needed within a field of research, we may add that such a consensus largely has to do with the formation of *basic concepts*, by which I mean a collection of well-defined, internally related, and characteristic concepts for a particular field or discipline. Since these concepts are assumed to be the founding parts of the discourse, we could expect them to be relatively few in number. Even if we could expect a reasonably good consensus within the field regarding *which* the basic concepts are, the meanings and implications of the concepts may vary considerably. In the social sciences, the question of basic concepts is closely tied to anthropological and ontological assumptions. When it comes to education, such assumptions have to do with “educational man,” *homo paedagogicus* (cf. Kupferberg 2011).

Research in the field of entrepreneurship education has an empirical preponderance. For instance, it has revealed different types of entrepreneurial teaching and how teachers perceive education. Theoretical research is less developed. A large number of terms, often less well defined, flourish in the field (see, for example, the review from The Swedish National Agency for Education (2010). A discussion of basic concepts seems to be needed as part of the project

of defining the field. Of course, such a discussion is important within every field of research. It includes conceptual construction, discussion and distinction. Also, it includes integrating results from singular empirical studies – preferably without losing their contextual implications – and relating them to a shared and growing conceptual world (cf. Fritzell 2011). The present article aims at contributing to the first aspect. More specifically, it aims at *outlining a concept termed “creative relationships” which ultimately could be used as a tool in the discourse of entrepreneurship education, e.g. in curriculum development*. Thus, the discussion has a theoretical character; it deals with the question how we (could) write and talk about education, but it scarcely deals with the level of educational practice.

In the general (political, ideological, scientific, practical, etc.) discourse on entrepreneurship in school there is a broad consensus regarding the idea of creativity as an essential aspect of the educational process. The number of definitions and analyses of the concept of creativity seems almost uncountable. One definition that often recurs in one or another variant, emanating from a comprehensive overview of the field, is as follows: “Creativity is the ability to produce work that is novel (i.e., original, unexpected), high in quality, and appropriate (i.e., useful, meet task constraints)” (Sternberg et al. 2005). In the following sections, I analyze meanings and implications of the concept and focus on three theories which, in line with the purpose of the article, are selected on basis of their distinct relational or sociality-philosophical² conceptions.³ I first explore the concept as implied in Hannah Arendt’s (1958) theory of human activity, followed by Kenneth Gergen’s (2009) concept of creativity as it appears in his theory of “the relational being” (2009), and finally Martin Buber’s (1923) pedagogical idea of creativity and relationship as essential aspects of education. Following these sections, I outline the concept of “creative relationships”, and discuss implications for the discourse of entrepreneurship education.

2. Creativity and Human Activity

Hannah Arendt’s (1958) notion of creativity could be distinguished from her theory of the human condition, *vita activa*, in which three basic forms of activity – labor, work, and action – are explored. As we will see, creativity in this context specifically refers to *work* and *homo faber*, that is, the human being who cultivates and produces objects. Unlike *animal laborans*, *homo faber*’s activity contributes to a persistent world of things:

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2. Hansen (2001) uses the term “sociality philosophy” to label theories that aim to bridge the duality between subjectivity and objectivity and that conceives man as an intersubjective being.
 3. It should be noted that the article does not aim to give a broad discussion of the concept creativity. For such a discussion, I refer to Robert J. Sternberg (Ed.) (1999) and James C. Kaufman & Robert J. Sternberg (Eds.) (2006).

The work of our hands, as distinguished from the labor of our bodies – *homo faber* who makes and literally “works upon” as distinguished from the *animal laborans* which labors and “mixes with” – fabricates the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total constitutes the human artifice (p. 136).

Labor, as Arendt defines it, is subject to the necessity of life. The purpose of labor is to maintain the biological existence of man: it is “bound to the recurring cycles of nature (...) prescribed by the biological process of the living organism (...)” (p. 98). Man as *animal laborans* is like his/her fellow animals; activities result in non-permanent objects, things that are being consumed just as fast as they are being produced. Thus, if labor is a “natural” occupation, *work* is an “unnatural” one. Man as *homo faber* manages and constructs things. *Homo faber* produces an artificial world that becomes permanent, stable, safe, and sets the framework for his/her actions. Unlike labor, work is directed by an instrumental ends-means thinking: “(...) in a strictly utilitarian world, all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be transformed into means for some further ends” (p.154). *Homo faber* has a product in mind, and he/she uses tools to achieve the prescribed goal.

Action differs from both labor and work in that it belongs to a world actually existing between humans, that is, not between the individual and the material world. In other words, while labor and work are performed by separate individuals, action presumes the existence of other human beings: “Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (p.7). In the sphere of action nothing is produced; instead the activity is characterized by non-productivity and being an end in itself. Man as unique being breaks into an already existing “web of human relationships” (pp.183). *Who* the subject is cannot be known in advance, i.e., before the concrete constitution of the web. To act is to initiate an intersubjective, unpredictable process, in which the responses of others are essential. The activity is dependent on transparency in the relationship, i.e., that both the subjective act and the response are essentially unbound. For instance, if I would try to control the responses of the other, I would make him/her the object and means of my goal. In doing so, I would leave the realm of action and consequently cease to be a unique being. First in relationship with someone else, someone not identical with me, I can become *someone* (Arendt, *ibid.*; cf. Biesta 2003).

The activity Arendt (1958) labels as labor is not creative. Labor is repetitive, directed by the necessity of life. In this activity, the surrounding world is not changed in any significant way. Here, we could relate to various jobs and tasks that are monotonous and to housework of various kinds. As has been indicated, creativity, from Arendt’s perspective, is primarily a matter of *work* and the activity of *homo faber* (cf. Liboriussen 2012). Work is an activity in which people use physical or mental tools to process and construct the world. For example, we

could think of various kinds of handcraft (including scientific ones) and artistic creation. Creativity, in this sense, means to cultivate and give shape to the world. Basically, work has to do with a single individual who plans, performs, controls, and evaluates the results of his/her activity. Arendt's concept of *action* implies another, and in a way more crucial, aspect of creativity. As we have seen, "to act" means to begin or initiate something, to break into the "web of human relationships." An action has no definitive end. It can hardly be seen as creative in itself, since its meaning does not arise until it is, so to speak, "baptized" in a world of multiple subjects. In other words, the becoming of a unique subject is a process immanent in the sphere of action. It is to do with a form of creativity that is not bound to the instrumental behavior of the individual. Rather, it is related to the non-instrumental actions of two or more individuals. Such creativity could not occur in any kind of social context. On the contrary, it presupposes a particular context, one in which the responding others also act as unique subjects (cf. Biesta 2003).

3. Creativity and Co-Action

To comprehend Kenneth Gergen's (2009) notion of creativity, we could start by considering his main idea of man as "relational being." Gergen constructs a theory that blurs the traditional separation between individuality and environment. All meaningful action, Gergen asserts, exists in relational processes. Whatever we do – whether we are physically alone or present to others – expresses our relational existence (p. 15). An individual is in fact a byproduct of relational processes (p. xxvi). This way of defining man differs in a radical way from the dominant idea of man in Western culture, the idea Gergen labels "the bounded being."

"The bounded being" is fundamentally alone, contained in him/her-self, separated from others. What is valuable to him/her exists within him/her. From this perspective, relationships are created when two separate individuals temporarily converge. The individual self is regarded as primary, relationships as secondary. Such an approach implies distrust of others, as well as continuous perception and evaluation of the status of the self. Relationships mean risks of getting injured or of being subject to constraints and demands, that is, threats to individual freedom. Thus, the idea of bounded being recommends cautiousness and maintenance of a reserved, self-contained attitude towards others (p. 4).

Gergen argues that the tradition of bounded being has deep historical roots. In recent centuries, it has been promoted and strengthened by the social sciences, such as in theories of economy, sociology, and psychology. Gergen clearly expresses its negative impacts on the social self; for example, that it turns man into a servile, self-absorbed actor:

I have emphasized here the ways in which this tradition invites a sense of fundamental separation and loneliness; encourages narcissism at the expense of relationships; generates unending threats to one's person, and transforms the self into a marketable commodity. (p. 27)

The alternative approach that Gergen explores, inspired for instance by the I-Thou philosophy of Martin Buber, is rooted in the idea of "the relational being." Gergen suggests that everything we perceive as real, true, valuable, and good originates from relationships, or, more accurately, that such qualities are products of *co-action*. In short, co-action means to coordinate actions with (the actions of) others. We co-act in all kinds of situations: for example, when we cook a meal, read a book, chat in a social medium and, of course, when we communicate face-to-face. In order to be meaningful and comprehensible an utterance needs to be part of a joint flow of events.

Co-action is mainly a rule-based activity. Both spoken and written languages are characterized by formal and informal rules. Actions are not understandable if such rules are violated. Still, the existing rules do not *stipulate* actions; that is, co-action is never totally determined by social order. Rather, every conversation is a potentially open field, holding numerous possibilities for action. Participants in a given relational context can make use of resources from numerous relational contexts, in the actual situation or on an imaginary level. Also, participants could always interpret the actions of others in multiple ways. Consequently, concepts as action, relationship, and identity, in Gergen's approach, assume the existence of an ongoing relational process, characterized by both attachment and openness.

Historically, the concept of creativity has been closely related to "the tradition of bounded being" and, more specifically, to the idea of an autonomous, norm-breaking and innovative individual (p. 91-95). Creativity is conceived as a process within an individual mind. Not least, this idea is a recurrent theme in the narrative (myth) of the lonely, divinely inspired genius. From Gergen's viewpoint, creativity is not mainly a matter of personal inspiration or a result of a single trait, but actions within relationships. So, the essential aim of research should be to explore relational conditions that are more or less fruitful for creative processes:

To view creativity as a personal inspiration, isolated from others, suggest little about possible means of fostering the kinds of actions that we might praise as creative. One is creatively inspired or not, full stop. However, if we see that creative acts are actions within relationship, then we can ask about the relational conditions favoring such innovations. (p. 93-94)

Against the individualistic conception of creativity, Gergen emphasizes that the very idea of a creative act is a byproduct of a relational tradition, that is, defined in different ways in various historical, cultural, and social contexts. Within all traditions, there are sophisticated systems to decide what is creative

and what is not. Gergen finds that actions such as musical or other artistic ones emerge as creative first with reference to – or, rather, within – relevant contexts.

To conclude, Gergen argues that creative acts emerge from participation in relationships. This thesis holds true even when it comes to especially talented and innovative persons. Inevitably, actions of such persons are in different ways founded on concrete or imaginary relationships, and get their label (creative) in a relational process. Indeed, to be creative means to challenge the existing order, but to do so, one more or less needs to be part of a relational context. Support from concrete others is of great importance for promoting creative action. Gergen (p. 95) cites Mockros and Csikszentmihalyi, who claim that “social support systems and interactions are critical throughout the life span for the emergence of creativity.”

At first glance, Gergen’s (pp. 91–95) conception may give the impression that creativity is an exclusive phenomenon, largely related to exceptional acts, relationships, and situations. However, the discussion indicates that the concept is much broader. The main point of Gergen’s argument, as I understand it, is that an action never exists in a vacuum. When someone acts, the action occurs in a relational context. Thus, it seems relevant to put the prefix “co-“ before the word “action” when we are dealing with creative as well as non-creative actions.

4. The Quest for Creativity and Relationship

Before we address Martin Buber’s (1947) concept of creativity we could consider his I-Thou philosophy, founded in the masterpiece *I and Thou* (1923). As a whole, Buber’s writings are based on the ontological idea that the world, to man, is twofold, in that it either takes the form of *Thou* or *It*. Correspondingly, the *I* of man is also twofold: either it is the *I* of the *Thou*-relationship or the *I* of the *It*-relationship. In the *I-Thou* relationship, the partner is experienced as subject, a living being of immediate meaning to the self. The *I-Thou* event actually exists between the two parties. In the *I-It* relationship, the other part is experienced as an object, a point in space and time, and as a means for the *I*. The *I-It* process is located to individual consciousness.

Buber’s concept of creativity was explored in a pedagogical context, originally at the International Conference of Education in Heidelberg in 1925, where Buber was keynote speaker. The main theme of the conference was “The development of the creative powers in the child.” Buber’s presentation questioned the progressive idea that the aim of education is to “develop creative powers in the child.” One of his arguments was that the progressive movement, in its criticism of traditional pedagogy, distorted the origin of the creative forces as well as its educational potential by neglecting the human quest for relationship. Buber (ibid.) speaks of “the originaive instinct” and “the instinct for communion” to label two fundamental, existential dispositions. From Buber’s

point of view, as we will see below, “the originitive instinct” is an essential part of education but not its primary force. The search for genuine relationship, for Thou, is guided by “the instinct for communion”:

The child, in putting things together, learns much that he can learn in no other way. In making some things he gets to know its possibility, its origin and structure and connexions, in a way he cannot learn by observation. But there is something else that is not learned in this way, and that is the viaticum of life. The being of the world as an object is learned from within, but not its being as a subject, its saying of I and Thou. What teaches us the saying of Thou is not the originitive instinct but the instinct for communion. (Buber, *ibid.* p. 104)

Below, I will use modernized expressions for these two interrelated terms. Instead of “the originitive instinct” and “the instinct for communion,” I will speak of “the quest for creativity” and “the quest for relationship.”

Initially, Buber adopts a historical perspective on creativity: he speaks of the origins of the concept, the early connection to geniality and extended meanings in later times. In modern discourse, the concept signifies an elementary process in social life. Even the small child wants to create things, shape the shapeless mass, and experience him/her-self as a creative subject. Creativity, Buber stresses, should neither be confused with “occupation” nor with “desire.” “The quest for creativity” simply aims at shaping the world, discovering and creating things. When someone is creative, he/she experiences the performed action as intense and perceives that it leads to something that did not exist a moment ago. Often when this fundamental quest is discussed, we associate it to artistic creation, yet, according to Buber, it is a universal phenomenon. For example, the small child generating spoken language illustrates creative endeavor.

Buber states that “the quest for creativity” does not necessarily involve reciprocity and participation. It is in this context that he introduces a second fundamental quest. “The quest for relationship” is directed towards involvement in a living relationship, that is, toward an immediate encounter with someone who is not identical with the self. The creator acts solo and is, in an existential sense, alone. Therefore, education which solely aims to develop “the quest for creativity” takes the risk of leading to isolation. The release of creativity is just a first step in the educational process. The critical moment comes from the response to the creative act. In Buber’s educational philosophy, the response of the teacher is of particular importance. Here, we should not associate to explicit reprimands. Buber believes that the potential for genuine encounters is obstructed if the student experiences the teacher’s response as encroachment. The response of the teacher is mostly of a subtle kind: “This almost imperceptible, most delicate approach, the raising of a finger, perhaps, or a questioning glance, is the other half of what happens in education” (p. 105). The value of the student’s creative act is shown in an interhuman encounter. Of vital importance for this to happen is that the student experiences the teacher as genuinely, immediately present.

According to Buber (*ibid.*), modern, progressive pedagogical theory focuses on individual freedom and in doing so it does not realize the importance of the second step in the educational process, i.e., the relationship. Similarly, the traditional pedagogical theory, with its strict orientation to social order, does not understand the importance of the first step, that is, the creative act of the child. Freedom, as Buber defines it, is a prerequisite for the educational process, but it is not an end in itself. Education certainly includes developing creative forces, but for this to happen, a vitalizing and guiding counterpart is called for.

As a result, we could say that creativity from Buber's standpoint is an elementary human quest. Human beings want to invent things, design and produce the world. What is creative could not be decided from "the outside," from some kind of general standard, for example, based on norms within a field stating what is conventional and what is original. Basically, creativity is about acting in a way that makes a significant difference in the relationship between a person and his/her world. Buber also presents another elementary quest, the quest for relationship. As I understand it, it is when this second aspect is introduced that Buber's contribution to the educational conception of creativity first becomes visible. From Buber's pedagogical standpoint, the creative act becomes fruitful within a process of relationship, or, more specifically, in relation to a pedagogical response. The development of creative powers requires a guide.

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Now, let me conclude these sections of the article by commenting on the question what teachers in entrepreneurship education could learn from the argument. One point is that it is generally not adequate for teachers to stay in the background, e.g. with the argument that students become more creative if they are left alone or by themselves. Especially in Buber's pedagogical thinking, the teacher-student relationship and the teacher's role in the creative process is stressed. Education, we may say, is in great part about making space for creativity, but it is also, and above all, about vitalizing and channeling creative acts. Moreover, from the discussion in the first section (on Arendt's theory) we could learn that the teacher should promote two basic forms of creativity: one connected to production; i.e. creation of physical objects, values, and experiences etc., and the other connected to the students emerging as unique persons in relation to each other and the teacher. From the discussion in the second section (on Gergen's theory), we learn that the creative process is always relational in nature, and, more specifically, takes the form of co-action. Thus, we could expect radically different consequences if we, as teachers, relate to creativity as an ongoing relational flow or as a force to be "pumped up" from inside the student. From the discussion in this third section (on Buber's theory), we could learn that teachers need to consider both "the quest for creativity" and "the quest for relationship", and see

them as mutually dependent. Consequently, in an educational program that over emphasizes “the quest for creativity” individual students and their accomplishments are in focus while the bonds between the students and between teacher and student, are neglected. Similarly, an educational program that over emphasizes “the quest for relationship” focuses on building bonds in the group and/or between teacher and student, while the students are not given opportunities for creating things or, on the whole, for distinguishing themselves as unique subjects.

5. “Creative Relationships” – Outline of an Educational Concept

A main assumption following from the theories I have discussed is that creativity concerns a relational process rather than single individuals (and abstract collectives). From this assumption, it seems reasonable to transform the discourse on creativity to a discourse on creative relationships.

In one sense, creativity could be regarded as a fundamental aspect of human development. This thesis is illustrated in the idea of the twinborn social self (Pfeutze 1973), for example as it appears in Mead’s (1934) concepts “Me” and “I.” “Me” signifies the organized set of social attitudes, i.e., an institutionalized, habitual, and predictable moment of consciousness. On the other hand, “I” represents a creative response to “Me”, i.e., an unorganized, dynamic and unpredictable moment. “Me” and “I” are two parts of the same whole, that is, of a dialectical relationship or, in other words, two interrelated aspects of the “ongoing social process of experience and behavior” (p. 81). “I” acts on the basis of “Me,” while “Me” responds to the activities of “I.” Yet, even if it is true that “I,” and therefore creativity, is a fundamental aspect of the social self, it is also true that this aspect is not self-evident. For instance, it is not very likely that we will find a high frequency of creative acts in social systems that are rigorously regulated.

The activity that Arendt (1958) terms “labor” is, as we have seen, not creative. We might also expect that a great deal of the activities Arendt labels “work” lack elements that are in significant ways creative. Moreover, we may state that “action,” in its conventional sense, does not necessarily involve such qualities. However, we may say that Arendt’s concept of action implies creativity, since it prerequires a newborn self, a unique being, breaking into a specific form of relationality. My interpretation of Arendt suggests the existence of two forms of creativity: *the creativity of work*, in which a human subject approaches the world purposefully and produces objects, and *the creativity of action*, in which the human subject emerges in relation to other subjects, and where this event does not have a fixed result.

Following Gergen (2009), all kinds of social activity could be described in terms of “co-action.” From this perspective, the three forms of activity that Arendt

(1958) conceptualizes are constructed in coordinated action. Yet, we cannot regard all kind of co-action as creative. For example, Gergen differentiates between relational processes that are synchronized and those that are not. Creativity is a specific kind of co-action, one in which the existing order is challenged and – as a consequence of the flow of co-action – transformed. I propose that we speak of *creative co-action* to define co-action which gives the relationship a vitalizing injection. In other words, “creative co-action” is co-action that is generative, that expands rather than limits the flow of meaning (cf. Gergen, p. 47). Such sequences differ from and provide something significantly new to the pre-existing reality/relationality.

From my interpretation of Buber (1947), it follows that creativity and relationship constitute a coherent educational concept. Creativity – whether it refers to individuals, actions, teams, events, or environments – presupposes a relational process which “departs from” and “lands in” relationships. In one way or another, human beings always relate, and thus, being creative means to relate either to someone or to something.

Against this background I propose that we conceive creativity and relationship as interrelated phenomena, and speak of “creative relationships” as a coherent concept. Furthermore, I propose the following distinction between two forms of creative relationships:

1. *Creative co-operation*: a relationship which involves purposeful, planned actions, and which leads to innovative products; and
2. *Creative co-existence*: an unpredictable, innovative relationship, which is experienced as a by-product of the encounter.

This distinction should not be understood hierarchically, so that one term is more pedagogically valuable than the other. Rather, both forms are proposed as important components of all successful education. The distinction simply suggests that we can speak of two distinct forms of creative relationships, and that they have different implications for education and subjectivity.

6. Conclusion and Implications

In the introductory part of this article, I referred to sources illustrating that the discourse on entrepreneurship education is usually focused on individuals, and that entrepreneurship is defined as an individual attitude (see also below). The discourse assumes a dual purpose, to develop students’ awareness of entrepreneurship as a career option and a certain entrepreneurial attitude. In this article I have argued for theoretical demarcation, asking for an intensified discussion of “basic concepts” in the field, and proposing that creativity and relationship are such concepts. The aim of the article is to outline a concept

termed “creative relationships” which ultimately could be used as a tool in the discourse of entrepreneurship education, e.g. in curriculum development. To achieve this aim, three relational conceptions of creativity — those of Arendt, Gergen, and Buber — were analyzed. The analysis resulted in the idea of “creative relationships” as a coherent concept. Moreover, a specifying distinction between the aspects “creative co-operation” and “creative co-existence” was proposed.

Hence, a main result of the analysis is that the concept of creativity, as well as its broader counterpart, entrepreneurship, is not comprehensible without recognizing its relational context. A person is/becomes creative and entrepreneurial within ongoing relationships. Here, we could note the etymological meaning of “entrepreneurship”. The word derives from the French word “entreprendre,” which denotes “undertake.” Roughly speaking, “entrepreneur” means “one who undertakes or manages.” To be an entrepreneur is associated with traits as energetic, smart, and inventive. Thus, etymologically, the discourse is linked to the idea of *a single individual who undertakes something with something or someone, and thereby accomplishes something*, that is, a permanent result (whether it be a physical product, an idea, or a value of some sort). By adopting three relational conceptions of creativity, I have tried to reveal a complementary conception. In short, this conception implies that entrepreneurship education is about *doing something* but also about *being someone in a relationship*.

What implications could this relational reconstruction have for curriculum development in entrepreneurship programs? Below, I will briefly discuss this question.

The Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), which manage parts of the EU’s programs in education, have defined learning outcomes for entrepreneurship education. EACEA’s publication *Entrepreneurship Education at school in Europe* (2012), developed in close cooperation with the European Commission, states that: “the overall goal of entrepreneurship education is to give students the attitudes, knowledge and skills to act in an entrepreneurial way” (p. 19). These three broad dimensions are, in turn, broken down into three categories which “provide the framework for the wide range of specific learning outcomes adopted by European countries” (ibid.). The first dimension, “attitudes” includes two categories: i) self-awareness and self-confidence, and ii) taking the initiative, risk taking, creativity and problem solving. Under the dimension “knowledge” three categories are listed: i) knowledge of career opportunities; ii) economic and financial literacy and iii) knowledge of business organization and processes. The third dimension, “skills”, includes two categories: i) communication, presentation and planning skills as well as team work, and ii) practical exploration of entrepreneurial opportunities.

Let me comment on the first dimension, “attitudes”, and its first category. “Self-awareness” and “self-confidence” are described as “the entrepreneurial attitudes which constitute the basis for all other aspects of entrepreneurship.”

(ibid., p. 19). Thus, the message to program makers in the field across Europe is that fundamentally, entrepreneurship education is about promoting two attitudes. Moreover, it is assumed that these attitudes are the source of creativity: [self-awareness and self-confidence] "entail discovering and trusting in one's own abilities which then allow individuals to turn their creative ideas into action" (ibid., p. 19). Apparently, the focal point in this discourse is the individual and his/her internal relationship, a notion that certainly seems questionable in light of the previous analysis. From the relational point of view, the main aim of entrepreneurship education is not to develop certain individual attitudes. Instead, the main aim is about promoting creative relationships; encouraging individuals to "act" in a world of multiple subjects (Arendt), vitalizing generative relational processes (Gergen), and laying the grounds for interhuman encounters (Buber). The relational perspective implies that creativity and other central concepts, such as self-awareness and self-confidence cannot be defined as an aim in itself, i.e. are not intelligible without considering their relational context. I propose that we deeply consider the notion that no one is an entrepreneur in a vacuum, but is an entrepreneur either by *undertaking something* or by *relating to someone*.

How could this analysis contribute to the construction of programs for entrepreneurship education? Since the outlined concept is defined as a relational process, it could hardly be transformed into learning outcomes. However, it may contribute to curricula in another way; as a portal concept, i.e. as a comprehensive declaration that the purpose of education is to encourage creative relationships. Hypothetically, how could the description of entrepreneurship education in the publication from EACEA change if relational aspects were considered? On the basis of the theoretical argument, I propose that the three broad dimensions of entrepreneurship education are supplemented by a fourth dimension called creative relationships. An introductory text could state that the principal purpose of entrepreneurship education is to promote such processes. Under the heading "creative relationships", the two subcategories *creative co-existence* and *creative co-operation* could be defined. These definitions could be followed by the assertion that essentially, entrepreneurship education is about creating space for production of things and values, but also about encouraging students to "break out" as unique subjects in relationships with others.

Inevitably, educational relationships structure social behavior and set the arena for development of entrepreneurial attitudes and identities. Various conditions surround the students and the teacher, and they, so to speak, exist before any concrete encounter. As we have seen, relationships could also be understood in a fundamentally different way: as phenomena constantly created, changed, and developed *in* the encounter. From this argument, it seems especially important to pay greater attention to the phenomenon I have called "creative co-existence". How we should go about organizing and performing education that encourages such relationality is an expected follow-up question.

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