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The development of Irish refugee policy through the prism of the state's foreign policy objectives, 1935- 1973

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2015

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

Summary

This dissertation asserts that refugee policy was utilised throughout the mid-twentieth century by the Irish government in order to facilitate the successful pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. The period in question, 1935 to 1973, saw Ireland emerge onto the world stage through an actively pursued policy of international engagement. Irish foreign policy objectives shifted over the decades, yet this study shows that refugee policy was continually, and successfully, used as a political tool by successive Irish governments to influence international perceptions of the country.

In the 1930s, Irish authorities were concerned with asserting their sovereignty, with both Britain and the wider international community, through active involvement with the League of Nations, which would frequently manifest through Irish involvement with refugee initiatives and issues. During World War Two, refugee policy was used in order to mollify Western perceptions, and ill feelings, regarding neutrality. The reactive nature of Irish refugee policy during the war meant that the country would respond to specific Western requests for help, yet would not create security concerns by liberalising their admittance policy. Immediately following the war, the main Irish foreign policy objectives concerned negating any ill feelings that the Allies still harboured concerning Irish neutrality, as well as the successful pursuit of a UN membership bid. The realisation of these goals was due, in part, to active Irish involvement with various refugee initiatives organised by such organisations as the UNRRA, IRO and UNHCR.

Once Ireland had taken up its seat in the General Assembly, refugee policy was formulated around Irish UN policy. The mid-to-late 1950s saw Ireland concerned with fostering an independent UN policy, centred around reinforcing its sovereignty on an international level, as well as championing the rights of self-determination and small state

rights in the General Assembly. Irish engagement with refugee initiatives allowed for the state to pursue these policy objectives. The West did not view early Irish UN activity as preferable, and the Irish used their humanitarian credentials to appease Western distain. A shift in Irish UN policy occurred in the 1960s, when pragmatic economic concerns necessitated a more pro-Western stance. Ireland still actively engaged with refugee aid and initiatives, yet now used these to soften domestic critics of this western shift.

As this study analyses the development of refugee policy through the prism of foreign policy goals, and asserts that the Irish government politically manipulated refugee aid, the majority of archival research emanates from Irish government documents, namely from the departments of External Affairs, Justice, Industry and Commerce and Taoiseach. As a crucial theme within this work focuses on how British concerns regarding border security and immigration practices influenced the development of Irish refugee policy, an examination of British Home, Foreign and Dominion Office files has proven invaluable. The collections of various other archives have been utilised, namely the Irish Military Archives, the American Jewish Archives and the American National Archives and Records Administration. A multitude of international treaties, as well as League of Nations and UN resolutions, have been used to place the development of Irish refugee policy firmly within the context of the international situations responsible for refugee creation. This study is firmly grounded within the development of the international order that began to emerge following World War One, and as such places Irish policy development within this context.

Acknowledgements

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List of Abbreviations

AJA	American Jewish Archives
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DM	Deutschmark
EEC	European Economic Community
ERP	European Recovery Programme
FFHC	Freedom from Hunger Campaign
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
ICEM	Inter-Government Committee for European Migration
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRO	International Refugee Organisation
NAI	National Archives, Ireland
NARA	American National Archives and Records Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
TD	Teachta Dála
TNA	The National Archives, London
UCC	University College, Cork
UCD	University College, Dublin
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WJC	World Jewish Congress
WRB	War Refugee Board
WRY	World Refugee Year

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Introduction

Research Objectives

The main aim of this research is to fill a hole present within twentieth-century Irish historiography, mainly to provide a survey of the development of Irish refugee policy within the context of evolving Irish foreign policy objectives. Where this study differs from those already present is in its focus on Irish utilisation of refugee policy to pursue its foreign policy objectives and bolster its international reputation. The current research concerning refugee policy within Irish historiography tends to focus on one group of people, either those identified with a certain ethnicity or religion, within a limited time period. At present, there is no research that has attempted to examine the evolution of Irish refugee policy, from the first group of refugees pounding at the door (German Jews in the 1930s), to the beginning of a standardized European approach to refugee situation with the forming of the early pan-European bodies that would eventually lead to the formation of the European Economic Community and the European Union. What is attempted here is not an all inclusive list of every time the Irish government engaged with a refugee plea, scheme or situation, but an analytical study of how policy developed over time, what was shaping the formation of policy and how that policy was utilised to facilitate foreign policy objectives; essentially, an examination of Irish refugee policy through the prism of international relations.

Organisation and Methodological Approach

Structure and terminology

This study is divided into five subject chapters. The study is conducted chronologically, as policy development builds upon itself over time, and necessitates such a structural approach. During the time period in question, the state was learning how to successfully engage with refugee issues, and this evolved understanding is clearly delineated through this study. Most chapters include an early section that examines the international situations that led to refugee creation as a way to contextualize the Irish and international response. Various groups of refugees, as well as refugee organisations, are the subjects of

sections. Each chapter concludes with an analysis that further aims to integrate the issues examined within a wider set of Irish foreign and domestic policy objectives.

There are a number of terms used frequently within this study that must be defined. The term 'Ireland' is used throughout the entire scope of this study to refer to the government and people of the twenty-six counties. When referring to the six northern counties, the term 'Northern Ireland' is used. 'Britain' is utilised throughout the study to refer to the island of Great Britain, but the term 'British government' refers to the government. Mentions of the government in Belfast are clearly differentiated of the United Kingdom, and commonly referred to as 'Stormont'.

The term 'refugee' was first applied to various groups of Europeans who, facing religious or political persecution, felt it necessary to leave their home countries. These groups included the French Huguenots of the seventeenth century, the German Palatines of the eighteenth century and the political *émigrés* from Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century.[1] The specific meaning of the term 'refugee' shifts slightly throughout the mid-twentieth century, as different organisations tailored their definitions based on the contemporary refugee situation in question. As such, there will be various distinct definitions of the term 'refugee' utilised within this study, as organisations such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the International Refugee Organisation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, etc., defined the term differently. Regarding a general definition, Michael Marrus simply defines refugees as 'people obliged by war or persecution to leave their dwellings and seek refuge abroad'.[2] James C. Hathaway provides a slightly more detailed description, stating that 'a refugee is usually thought of as a person compelled to flee his State of origin or residence due to political troubles, persecution, famine

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[1] Claudena M Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: the emergence of a regime* (Oxford, 1995), p. 13.

[2] Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War Through the Cold War* (Philadelphia, 2002), p. 3.

or natural disaster. The refugee is perceived as an involuntary migrant, a victim of circumstances which force him to seek sanctuary in a foreign country'.[3]

The term 'foreign policy' also warrants definition. Patrick Keatinge, in his work *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy*, provides a detailed definition of the term which will serve as the basis for how the term will be interpreted and utilised within this study. Keatinge states that the term 'foreign policy' can be utilised in a 'narrow, specialised sense to denote those activities often referred to as 'high politics': issues related to peace and war, the security and survival of the state in the face of external threats, and the negotiations, alliances and other attempts to exert influence which are associated with such issues'.[4] He further states that 'foreign policy also has broader connotations' and that 'it is appropriate to include economic, social and cultural relations between states in addition to the more dramatic concerns of traditional diplomacy, even at the risk of crossing the indistinct lines between 'foreign' and 'domestic' policy…'[5] This latter approach, that of considering economic, social and cultural issues when attempting an analysis of foreign policy development, shall be utilised within this study.

Two terms that beg definition are those used to describe the two main choices for a refugee: repatriation and resettlement. The term 'voluntary repatriation' is 'used when refugees individually and freely express a wish to go back to their homeland'.[6] 'Forcible repatriation' simply refers to the act of forcing refugees to return to their home countries against their will. 'Resettlement' usually refers to the movement of refugees from the country of first asylum to a third country, which will allow for the permanent integration of the refugees into its society and economy. The term 'displaced person', or 'DP', is commonly defined as a person removed from their home, usually forcibly, by the Germans

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[3] James C. Hathaway, 'The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950' in *The International and Comparative Law Quartlerly*, xxxiii, no. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp 348.

[4] Patrick Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin, 1973), p. 4.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kim Salomon, *Refugees in the Cold War: toward a new international refugee regime in the early postwar era* (Lund, 1991), p. 92.

during World War Two.[7] Displaced persons differed from refugees, as they wished to return to their homes after the war ended. Various other terms are defined upon first mention within the text

Scope and Content

The time period with which this study is concerned, 1935-1973, was chosen for a variety of reasons. Ireland, on the periphery of Europe, had not experienced any *substantial* number of refugees seeking admittance into the country during the twentieth-century until the mid-to-late 1930s. On occasion, smaller groups of refugees did enter into Ireland during the nineteenth and early twentieth-century, and there was present within the country, particularly in Dublin, a foreign-born minority. These groups will be briefly discussed within the next section. However, once German, mainly Jewish, refugees became more desperate, and countries of preference began restricting their admittance policies (the USA, United Kingdom, Palestine, Canada), other, non-traditional destinations became more appealing.[8] In the mid 1930s, Ireland was still in its first throes of independence, and as such was concerned with various issues that did not prove conducive to an increase in refugee admittance. Irish nationalism, and a sense of creating an Ireland for the Irish, was still central to both government and public thinking. Furthermore, a prevailing belief within the inter-war period was that homogeneity was a contributing factor to political stability, and this may very well have affected Irish refugee policy during the Free State's early years. Éamon de Valera's[9] Fianna Fáil had succeeded in an electoral victory over Cumann na

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[7] Ibid., p. 39.

[8] German immigration into Ireland did occur in the 1930s before the dramatic increase of German refugees in 1938 and 1939. These Germans were mainly admitted due to their technical expertise, and were engaged in such initiatives as the Shannon hydroelectric scheme, the Electricity Supply Board and Bord na Móna. Eunan O'Halpin, in *Spying on Ireland: British intelligence and Irish neutrality during the Second World War* (Oxford, 2008), states that there was a tendency to favour continental specialists in an attempt to reduce dependence on British technical expertise. p. 28.

[9] Éamon de Valera was one of the most influential politicians of twentieth-century Ireland. He was born in New York City, but was brought to Ireland by an uncle when he was two years old. As the sole surviving commander of the Easter Rising, he quickly rose to political prominence, becoming the President of Éireann directly preceding, and during, the War of Independence. De Valera fought for the Anti-Treaty forces during the Civil War, and as such, was in opposition during the Cosgrave government. His Fianna Fáil party won the electoral

nGaedheal, led by W.T. Cosgrave, in 1932 and with that victory came the need for Fianna Fáil to legitimise their government through the pursuance of policies aimed at validating their nationalistic credentials.[10] These policies, which focused on creating a self-sufficient Ireland, did not lend themselves to a liberal alien policy.

There was also an understandable concern regarding how Irish immigration and refugee admittance policy would be interpreted by British authorities. Irish immigration policy was determined by British legislation before independence, and measures such as the restrictive British Alien Act of 1906 did decrease the entry into Ireland of foreigners, particularly that of Russian and Lithuanian Jews.[11] After 1922, the Free State government carried on along the lines of the cautious alien policy set down by the British Home Office, and it was mutually decided by both governments that to work in close cooperation regarding alien admissions was of importance.[12] The British continued to issue visas for foreigners wishing to visit Ireland until 1924, and expressed concern when the Free State government made it known that they wished to assume this responsibility. Eunan O'Halpin, in his work *Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality during the Second World War*, states that as it was not feasible to seal the border between the Free State and Northern Ireland, Irish authorities were persuaded to adhere to British black lists and screening practices.[13]

It was not until 1935 that the Irish state turned its attention towards forming its own legislation regarding alien rights. 1935 saw the passing of the

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race in 1932, and he became Taoiseach, as well as the Minister for External Affairs. De Valera was Taoiseach for three periods (1932-48; 51-4; 57;59), the External Affairs portfolio for sixteen years (1932-48). He resigned as Taoiseach in 1959 to assume the Irish Presidency (1959-73).

[10] This focus on 'Irishness' was actively pursued by de Valera, who thought that through agricultural independence and the growth of domestic industry, Ireland could become largely self-sufficient and independent. Joseph Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 182-7.

[11] Dermot Keogh, *Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland: Refugees, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust* (Cork, 1998), p. 54; Cormac Ó'Gráda, *Jewish Ireland in the Age of Joyce: A socioeconomic history* (Oxford, 2006), p. 95.

[12] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 78.

[13] O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland*, p. 8.

Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act and the Aliens Act,[14] both of which delineated the rights of citizens' and the state's powers concerning alien issues. The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act established the requirements for citizenship, as well as the criteria through which a foreigner could apply for Irish naturalisation. The Act also dealt with issues regarding reciprocal rights and privileges between the Free State and other countries, the recording of the births of Irish nationals abroad and the legality of automatic conferral of British nationality on Irish citizens. The Aliens Act was the first piece of legislation emanating from the Free State that dealt exclusively with alien matters, and it created the legal basis for an independent Irish stance on immigration issues. The Act addressed issues regarding the government's right to prohibit alien admittance, permit admittance with restrictions and conditions, to control alien movement and to establish a system of alien registration to monitor alien employment and activity. The Act also regulated the business practices of aliens, and made it illegal for an alien to assume any name other than the one under which he or she had originally registered.[15]

This legislation would provide the legal framework within which the government would operate regarding alien and refugee admission and rights for the scope of this thesis. Interestingly, as will be shown, within the relevant government records regarding such issues, the relevant legislation was rarely directly referenced. Chapter Two features discussion regarding the wartime legislation passed by the government, and how it directly influenced refugee activity in Ireland. The government frequently made direct reference to the Emergency Powers Act[16] and the Offences Against the State Act[17] regarding

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[14]Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1935 (1935 no. 13) (10 Apr. 1935); Aliens Act, 1935 (1935 no. 14) (10 Apr. 1935). Irish Statute Book. http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1935/1935.html.

[15] Possible motivation for an alien wishing to change their name was domestic animosity towards those with foreign sounding names. One example of this can be seen in a letter to the editor submitted to the *Irish Independent* and run on 14 Nov. 1938. '... the bulk of the names of new citizens, by their very nature suggest persons who, for the most part, can have little in common with Irish men'. (Military Archives Ireland, hereafter referred to as MAI, G/X/0304).

[16] Emergency Powers Act, 1939 (1939 no. 28) (3 Sept. 1939). Irish Statute Book.

refugee infringements of employment restrictions, as well as refugee engagement in the production of propaganda or other non-neutral acts. An attempt to locate specific instances in which the government made use of certain provisions within the Aliens Act, such as determining a refugee's nationality when it was unknown, or enforcing the provision that prohibited an alien to change their name once resident in Ireland, proved fruitless.

Contextually, the restrictive nature of the Irish nationality, citizenship and alien laws of the 1930s were comparable with the increasingly illiberal immigration laws developing throughout Europe. Siobhán O'Connor cites increasingly restrictive policy in various western European countries that limited the number of aliens admitted, particularly restricting Jewish entry.[18] France, traditionally a country that welcomed refugees, followed this trend. In 1933 the French government began tightening border controls in an attempt to limit the entry of German refugees. Blum's Popular Front government attempted to liberalise admittance policy in 1936, yet these steps were reversed in 1938 by the Daladier government.[19] In May a decree was passed further restricting those refugees eligible to apply for temporary residence permits. Furthermore, the French 'armed itself with the means to denationalize immigrants who had obtained French citizenship'.[20]Switzerland, another country with a history of liberal refugee admittance, while continuing to admit refugees during the 1930s, did passed legislation restricting the right of those admitted to engage in employment.[21] This limited which refugees were able to enter Swiss territory, as they had to provide proof of financial security. The Russian government passed a

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[17] Offences Against the State Act, 1939 (1939 no. 13) (14 June 1939) Irish Statute Book.

[18] Siobhán O'Connor, "The Obliviousness of the Fortunate' Policy and Public Opinion towards refugees 1933-1945', in Gisela Holfter (ed), *German-speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945* (Netherlands, 2006).

[19] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 146-48.

[20] Ibid., p. 148.

[21] Ibid., p. 155.

law stating that any Russian citizen outside of Russian territory for a period of five years would automatically lose their Russian citizenship.[22]

Due to the continued existence of a free travel zone between Northern Ireland and the Free State, the British would have taken particular notice of the foreigners and refugees that Irish officials were allowing into the state, particularly from countries such as Germany. By 1936, with the situation in Europe ever worsening, there was serious discussion regarding the establishment of immigration controls between the Free State and Britain, both between the Free State and Northern Ireland, as well as between the entirety of the island and England.[23] It was decided by the British Home Office that it was not feasible to establish any such control, and that any attempt 'would almost certainly lead to frontier incidents which would have serious consequences on the relations between the peoples and governments of the two parts of Ireland'.[24] The outbreak of the war would eventually necessitate British security controls regarding Irish nationals and resident aliens in 1940,[25] yet during the 1930s any alien admitted into the Free State could easily enter British territory. British/Irish relations were still contentious during the 1930s due to a variety of reasons, and any increase in tension was generally viewed as detrimental to both countries.

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[22] Sir John Hope Simpson, 'The Refugee Problem' in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)*, xvii, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct., 1938), pp 607-628.

[23] 'As regards entry into the United Kingdom, while it would be a comparatively simple matter to establish an immigration control at those ports in the United Kingdom at which traffic from the Irish Free State arrives, this alone would be ineffective since after a time much of the traffic would tend to be diverted via Northern Ireland. To make the control effective, it would be necessary to establish a control on the traffic via Northern Ireland. This could only be done either by establishing a control along the land frontier between the Free State and Northern Ireland, or at those ports in Great Britain at which the traffic from Northern Ireland arrives. If the first alternative were adopted, it is to be observed that the experience of other countries shows that effective control of a land frontier is practically impossible... The second alternative would involve the setting up of a barrier within the United Kingdom, and would cause the gravest offence to Northern Ireland.' Memorandum prepared in the Home Office', 13 July 1936 (The National Archives, hereafter TNA, Home Office 213/319).

[24] Ibid.

[25] O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland*, p. 10. For a more complete account of the development of Irish/British immigration during World War Two, see Chapter 2, *Irish/British border security concerns.*

As such, a variety of reasons necessitate beginning this study in 1935. By 1935, Fianna Fáil and de Valera were in control of the Irish state, and had passed the first Irish legislation specifically addressing the Irish state's policy regarding citizenship, naturalisation and alien rights and activity within the state. The international situation, particularly in Europe, was worsening, and issues such as refugee admittance were beginning to take on added importance. Issues of alien admittance began affecting Irish/British relations, as the British become more concerned regarding the security of the islands as the possibility of war became more concrete. The first large group of refugees attempting to gain entry into Ireland during the twentieth-century occurred in the mid-to-late 1930s, causing the new state to seriously address refugee admittance for the first time.

1973 was chosen as the end date of this study, as this is when the nature of international refugee situations shifts, and European countries became more apt to send aid or United Nations (hereafter referred to as the UN) missions into areas dealing with a refugee crisis. As this study focuses, mainly though not exclusively, on the admittance of refugees into the Irish state, it makes sense to use 1973, and Irish entry into the European Economic Community, as an ending point. Irish refugee aid and admittance became far more standardised after 1973, and were not utilised politically in the same manner as previous decades.

This study does not limit itself to any specific ethnicity, nationality or religion of refugees. These distinctions do feature prominently within the study, as groups of refugees were politicised differently, yet it is the intended benefits of this politicisation that interests us here. If the admittance of a refugee group was used to influence international opinion or enhance Irish foreign policy, that group is examined. Due to these criteria, the majority of refugees examined within the study are those present in groups. This is not to say that the aid or admittance of an individual refugee could not have political implications, and some surely did; yet it was more common to politicise larger groups of people. Individual refugee applications for admission into the state are briefly examined in Chapter One (*Individual refugee application outside of refugee organisations*), as well as in Chapter Two (*Jewish Refugees: Groups and Individual appeals*), yet these are

utilised mainly in order to facilitate an examination of the internal mechanisms by which refugee admittance decisions were being reached within the main departments involved, namely Justice and External Affairs. Various government officials would become personally involved in cases featuring prominent individuals, and a dynamic developed through this admittance practice that is important to comprehend.

This study concentrates on the political implications of Irish refugee aid on an international level. As such, Irish interactions with other countries are of crucial importance, and feature prominently within this study. The special relationship between Ireland and Britain affords that extra attention be given to issues concerning Anglo-Irish immigration, common travel areas and shared interest in refugee admittance.[26] A comparative analysis of the actions and policies of other small, European neutrals is utilised throughout in order to place Irish action within a wider context. Irish authorities were always cognisant of the activity of other neutrals, and this undoubtedly affected Irish policy development. The intersection between the Irish desire to become actively engaged with the new international organisation regime that emerged after the First World War and that regime's active involvement in refugee matters necessitated Irish involvement in the refugee problems of the mid-twentieth century. As such, Irish involvement with these organisations is a cornerstone of this study.

Domestic issues are always factored into a state's foreign policy, as neither can be created within a vacuum, and for either to be successful both must be pursued in tandem. Domestic factors, such as economic climate and emigration levels, always factored into the government's attempt to both utilise refugee policy and placate Irish public opinion. It needs to be clearly stated, however, that

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[26] An interesting point of comparison could be drawn between Anglo-Irish border and immigration issues and those between the Canadian and American governments, as both groups share a relatively unguarded land border. Immigration issues have always been cause for contention in both the United States and Britain, and both countries would have been well aware of the political implications had the bordering state, Canada and Ireland respectively, admitted large numbers of refugees that would have been deemed unacceptable by the Americans or British. This potential comparison does fall outside the realm of this study, yet would be an interesting area for further research.

this is not a study of the influence of Irish domestic influences on the government's refugee policy.

Chapter One focuses on the Irish response to the refugee crisis resulting from the rise of the European fascist state, mainly the dramatic increase of Austrian and German refugees in the 1930s. In order to properly contextualise the development of the situation, German racial policy between the years 1933 and 1938 is briefly examined. The international community's reaction, mainly through League of Nations initiatives, is also used to set the stage for a proper analysis of the Irish response. The majority of this chapter focuses on the activity of the Irish Co-ordinating Committee. Established in 1938 by the government, the Co-Ordinating Committee was an umbrella organisation that consisted of a multitude of domestic groups concerned with the developing refugee crisis. The Committee put forward a variety of schemes, and was responsible for the admittance of non-Aryan Christian refugees throughout 1938.[27]

This chapter also addresses a variety of international and domestic refugee organisations not involved with the Co-ordinating Committee. A British organisation, the Religious Emergency Council for German and Austrian Jewry, had a rather contentious dialogue with the government concerning the ad hoc nature of Irish admittance policy, and allows for an examination of inter-departmental policy development. The Catholic Committee for Refugees, based at University College, Dublin (hereafter referred to as UCD), also attempted to persuade the government to admit a variety of foreign academics.

It is important to remember that not every admittance request emanated from a refugee organisation, and the necessity of examining individual refugee applicants has already been commented upon. This chapter also features sections concerning individual applications made directly to the government, as well as individual refugees attempting to gain entry through employment. These sections allow for a more nuanced understanding of how the departments functioned, both individually and in tandem, regarding policy development.

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[27] The term 'non-Aryan Christians' could be defined as Jews who had converted to Christianity. These people were still considered Jewish under Nazi racial law and policy, and were thus affected by the Nuremburg Laws, etc.

Chapter Two provides an analysis of Irish refugee policy during World War Two, as well as the Irish reaction to the shift in German Jewish policy after 1941 with the implementation of the Final Solution. The chapter begins by addressing a variety of factors that greatly affected Irish refugee policy during the war: issues of domestic security, the pursuit of Irish neutrality in relation to the activities of refugee aliens present within Ireland, domestic Irish anti-Semitism and Irish/British border security concerns. As de Valera's overriding foreign policy objective during the war was to safeguard Irish neutrality, refugees became an extremely contentious issue. Would neutrality be threatened if Ireland admitted too many refugees with Axis nationality? How would the British feel about an increased presence of German, Austrian or Italian citizens within Irish territory? Would a large-scale admittance of German nationals fleeing the Nazi regime anger the German legation in Dublin? This chapter addresses these foreign policy concerns through the prism of refugee admittance.

The nature of the war necessitates that a large section of this chapter be devoted to Irish engagement with Jewish refugees, both before 1941 when German authorities were bent on pressured emigration and after, when extermination became the German solution to its 'Jewish problem'. Both group and individual cases are examined, as well as various rescue schemes initiated by foreign governments and international refugee organisations. The section entitled *Politics of Rescue, 1940-45* examines how the Irish response to these schemes was not solely due to a humanitarian concern for the fate of European Jewry, but was also based firmly within pragmatic political considerations.

Ireland, as one of the bastions of western Catholicism, also engaged with a variety of organisations concerning the admittance of Catholic refugees. Catholic priests, nuns and clerical students, mainly Polish, German and Austrian, were admitted into the state during the war years. Cooperation also existed between the Vatican and the government concerning Catholic refugees and Jewish rescue schemes. A study of Irish policy concerning Catholic refugees also allows for a comparative analysis between Irish attitudes regarding Catholic and Jewish refugees. Issues concerning racism, anti-Semitism and the forging of a strong

Irish national identity are all factors in the differential treatments of these two refugee groups.

This chapter also includes a brief account of both Swedish and Swiss refugee policy during the war, allowing for a comparative analysis. Sweden and Switzerland, as European neutrals with relatively small populations, were both in roughly similar positions as Ireland during the war regarding their refugee policy concerns. However, Sweden chose to liberalize its policy, admitting thousands of Jews and actively participating in international rescue attempts. Swiss and Irish policy shared more similarities, as both remained fairly restrictive and reactionary throughout the war, yet both countries did nominally engage with international rescue attempts. A brief account of Northern Irish refugee admittance during the war is also included within this section, as officials in Dublin would have been aware of Stormont's engagement with such issues.

Chapter Three focuses on the immediate postwar refugee crisis, examining the Irish response to the emergence of the UN refugee initiative. Irish refugee policy is placed within the context of early Cold War tensions, as the ideological divide of Europe was already well under way by 1945. The international climate of the postwar world is briefly examined, including the various peace settlements, early UN initiatives and the emergence of European Cold War entrenchment. Irish involvement with the Untied Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Agency (operational 1944-1947) and the International Refugee Organisation (operational 1946-1952) are analysed, as the politics of involvement with either organisation were crucial to Irish concerns regarding perceived Allied opinion of Irish policy during the war, namely the active Irish pursuit of neutrality even when an Allied victory was all but assured. Within this chapter, the Irish preoccupation with postwar international perceptions of Irish foreign policy becomes clear, thus beginning the examination of this theme that will continue throughout the rest of the study.

This chapter also features an examination of relatively large groups of Eastern European refugees landing illegally in Ireland, and in some cases, attempting to secure permanent resettlement. Due to geographic isolation, Irish

authorities had never dealt with any large-scale illegal entry into Ireland until the postwar period, when refugees setting sail from Sweden would dock in Irish ports. This provides an interesting and clear example of Irish policy being directly influenced by international opinion. Irish authorities were worried that allowing such illegal entries to remain on Irish soil would set a precedent, and ideally would have denied these refugees permission to remain. However, due to international pressure and Allied accusations that Ireland had a fairly easy go of it during the war years, Irish officials were pressured into admitting the refugees.

As Cold War polarisation set over Europe, a variety of issues, including those concerning refugees, became highly politicised. As the Allies and the Russians scrambled to establish spheres of influence over territories and groups of people, an ideological battle for the souls of millions of displaced Europeans was waged. The majority of Chapter Four examines the Irish response to international concern over the refugee crisis in Europe. There was a worry that millions of displaced people would increase disillusionment with the West, and encourage adherence to political extremism, which in this case referred to Soviet communism. As such, there was a push to settle displaced persons as quickly as possible. Due to this Allied concern, Ireland became increasingly willing to admit refugees into the state, as well as increasing the amount of monetary and material aid it sent abroad.

Three of the refugee groups analysed within this chapter were displaced directly as a result of Soviet postwar expansionism: White Russian refugees present in China, Hungarian refugees resulting from the revolution of 1956 and East German refugees. Irish willingness to admit 539 Hungarian refugees in 1956 was due in part to recent Irish UN membership, as well as stemming from a desire to prove that Ireland was an active member of the international community, albeit with an obvious affinity westwards. Irish UN policy during this period walked a thin line between championing the rights of self-determination and small state sovereignty, as well as proving a mediating presence at the UN between the West and the Soviet Union while making it clear that Irish sympathy and ideological

affinity lay with the West. One way that these varying objectives were reached was through Irish refugee policy.

The examination of Irish activity at the UN continues into Chapter Five, when shifting Irish international concerns necessitated a reassessment of refugee policy. The 1960s saw a reorganisation of the Irish economy, as Seán Lemass took over control of Fianna Fáil from de Valera in 1959. This reorganisation featured increased integration between economic and foreign policy development, which in turn led to increasingly pragmatic foreign policy development. Much of Ireland's UN and international policy had been based within an ideological framework during the postwar period. Issues concerning Irish guilt over neutrality and low level of action regarding Jewish admittance and rescue attempts fueled this focus on ideological humanitarianism. However, once economic development became a priority for the Dublin government, foreign policy objectives began to change, as Irish officials began to court foreign investors. Cold War tension was also increasing, and Ireland began to realign its UN position westward.

This chapter features a focus on Irish monetary and material aid sent to aid refugee situations in Africa and Asia. Most of these conflicts resulted from a nationalist movement, frequently utilising Cold War animosities, striking out at a European colonial power. Not only did these conflicts affect the European powers directly concerned, they also played into the Cold War power struggle that was a main concern of most western European countries during the 1960s. In many cases, Ireland used its refugee aid to placate domestic public and political criticism that the government was forsaking its ideological position as a champion of small nation rights and self-determination in order to curry Western favour. This can be seen within the case of Algeria, which saw Irish aid sent, yet also Irish attempts within the UN General Assembly to placate the French President, Charles de Gaulle.

This study concludes with an assessment of the main assertions reached through this research. The main claim of this study, that Irish refugee policy was maneuvered and utilised in order to facilitate Irish foreign policy objectives, as well as to foster an international reputation, is examined and its development

traced throughout the study. Other main themes are examined, including the presence of various domestic tensions that affected the implementation of refugee policy, Irish UN objectives, refugee criteria and assimilation and religion are all commented on.

Source Material

The crux of this study is the assertion that the Irish government politically manipulated refugee aid, and as such, the study necessitates a strong grounding within governmental archival material, particularly through a thorough study of material emanating from the departments of Justice, External Affairs/Foreign Affairs, Taoiseach and Industry and Commerce. Various military records have proved invaluable, particularly those of the Irish military intelligence agency, G2.[28] Other domestic Irish sources including Dáil Debates, the Irish Statute Book and Irish newspapers are utilised when necessary.[29] The Irish newspapers prove particularly useful when attempting to ascertain exactly when a refugee group arrived in the country, and where they were first housed. Material from the American National Archives, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency files, prove crucial in ascertaining international opinion concerning Ireland after World War Two. Various other primary sources, such as League of Nations' documents, UN documents, international conferences, and treaties were useful when placing Irish refugee aid activity within the context of increasing global internationalism.[30]

An examination of British Home, Foreign and Dominion Office files was also crucial, as the extremely close relationship between Ireland and Britain, as well as their shared border and common travel zone, necessitated cooperation regarding alien activity and refugee admittance. British Cabinet minutes and

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[28] G2 files are held at the Military Archives, Ireland.

[29] Dáil Debates accessible at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/; Irish Statute Book accessible at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/.

[30] Various online and digital sources proved crucial when accessing such sources. These included the Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/), German History in Documents and Images (http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/) and the United Nations History Project Online Archival Collections (http://unhistoryproject.org/research/online_archives.html) for League of Nations and United Nations material.

memoranda were also utilised. It need be remembered that Ireland, as an island behind an island, did not engage with refugee migrations in the same way as countries on the European continent or in Africa. The geographical position of the country allowed it to circumvent the majority of issues concerning illegal alien entry. The only shared land border that Ireland had to concern herself with was the largely unpatrolled and unguarded border between the Free State and Northern Ireland. As such, Britain was the only country that consistently took a heightened interest in Irish refugee and alien admittance. The luck of her geography would spare Ireland the trials of her continental counterparts, yet it would necessitate a close working relationship over alien admittance with Britain. As will be examined in subsequent chapters, Irish/British policy regarding alien admittance changed and evolved along with shifting security concerns.

Archival material held by the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (hereafter referred to as PRONI) was also consulted in an attempt to ascertain the level of communication and interaction between the Stormont government and Dublin concerning refugee issues. The importance of the shared land border between the north and south has already been commented on, and as such Northern Ireland's engagement with refugee aid and admittance is of importance. It is crucial to note, however, that as the government in London controlled refugee admittance into the United Kingdom, the Stormont government did not admit refugees that had not been previously screened and admitted by the Home Office in London. General refugee policy was thus dictated by the government in London, yet Stormont did have control over which refugees were admitted into Northern Ireland from those already admitted into the United Kingdom. Thus an examination of Northern Irish admittance policy is not centered upon policy development on an international level, yet on interactions between the Stormont and London administrations. On occasion, it does prove useful to provide a brief comparative analysis regarding Stormont and Dublin's engagement with various refugee groups, particularly both government's involvement with Jewish refugees in the 1930s and Hungarian refugees in the 1950s. It does not seem that either

state was overly preoccupied with the refugee admittance of the other, yet whenever mention is made regarding such issues, it is stated.

The historiography surrounding Northern Ireland's engagement with refugee issues is scant, with Northern Ireland's involvement usually only garnering mention within works focused on British refugee engagement. Concerning Jewish migration into Northern Ireland, both Dermot Keogh and Cormac Ó'Gráda address Jewish demography in Belfast during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Keogh provides a brief analysis of Belfast's Jewish community during the World War Two, as well as a brief mention of the Millisle farm scheme, which saw eighty children and adults, the majority of whom were German Jews, resident at the farm throughout the war.[31] Northern Ireland's engagement with the refugee situations of the twentieth-century would prove an interesting area for further research.

Every refugee that could be presumed Jewish and who failed gaining entry into Ireland, had their name run through the Yad Vashem database of Holocaust victims.[32] In most of these cases, it was not able to be proven definitively if the person who applied for an Irish visa was a person of similar name listed on that database, yet for those people whose visa applications included such particulars as birth dates, place of birth, etc., an educated assumption can be made. The American Jewish Archives also proved a source of information regarding Irish Jewish involvement with international Jewish organisations, particularly the World Jewish Congress.[33]

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[31] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 165. For further information regarding the Millisle farm refugee scheme, see Marilyn Taylor, 'Millisle, County Down: Haven from Nazi Terror' in *History Ireland*, ix, no. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp 34-37.

[32] Yad Vashem, established in Jerusalem in 1953, is the Israeli state sponsored Holocaust research and remembrance organisation. For more on the establishment of Yad Vashem, and issues regarding the reception of its commemorative and research activites in the 1950s, see Roni Stauber, 'Confronting the Jewish response during the Holocaust: Yad Vashem – A Commemorative and a Research Institute in the 1950s' in *Modern Judaism*, xx, no. 3 (Oct., 2000), pp 277-298; Doron Bar, 'Holocaust Commemoration in Israel during the 1950s: The Holocaust Cellar on Mount Zion' in *Jewish Social Studies, New Series*, xii, no. 1 (Autumn, 2005).

[33] The World Jewish Congress, established in 1936, was an active participant and facilitator of schemes involving Jewish migration in the 1930s, rescue and relief during the war and resettlement afterwards. For a detailed account of the Congress' activity, see *'40 Years in Action: Record of the World Jewish Congress, 1936-1976'* (Geneva, 1976).

Early refugee and alien admittance into Ireland

Modern Irish engagement with refugee admittance can be dated back to the mid-seventeenth century, and it is worth briefly noting who these early refugees were, how their arrival in Ireland was facilitated and how they interacted with the Irish population and government once present in the country. The migration of groups of Huguenot and Palatine refugees into Ireland will be briefly examined, followed by a succinct account of early Jewish migration into the country during the late 1800s and early 1900s. A study of the Irish response to such situations allows for a historic awareness of the development of Irish policy prior to the middle of the twentieth-century. Prior immigrant networks present within the country, not just those of previously arrived refugees but also of economic migrants, proved influential in initiating, as well as encouraging, the movement of refugee groups to Ireland. Tables stating the populations of various nationalities present within Ireland beginning in 1900 will also be included. It is hoped that this brief account of early refugee admittance, as well as the numbers of foreign-born nationals present in Ireland, will allow for this study to be firmly situated within the proper historical context.

It is estimated that between 1680 and 1700, upwards of 200,000 French Protestants fled France due to discriminatory measures passed by Louis XIV.[34] These people, commonly referred to as Huguenots, are considered by many to be the first group of people to which the modern meaning of the word refugee may apply.[35] The Edict of Nantes, issued by Henry IV in the year 1598, had reestablished the rights of French Protestants in an attempt to end the French Wars of Religion. The Edict was revoked in 1685 by Louis XIV, who further increased persecution of the Huguenots by encouraging royal dragoons to terrorise Protestants. Those targeted by the dragoons were forced to either convert, or see their homes and families destroyed.[36] Many Huguenots chose flight, most

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[34] Owen Stanwood, 'Between Eden and Empire: Huguenot Refugees and the Promise of New Worlds' in *American Historical Review*, cxvii, no. 5 (December, 2013), pp 1319.

[35] Atle Grahl-Madsen, 'The European Tradition of Asylum and Development of Refugee Law' in *Journal of Peace Research*, iii, no. 3 (1966), pp 278.

[36] Stanwood, 'Between Eden and Empire', pp 1322.

commonly seeking refuge in the various Protestant states of Europe. Ireland was not initially viewed as an ideal destination for the Huguenots, as various logistical and cultural issues were deemed problematic. Geographically, Ireland was more difficult to reach than the Protestant states of Germany or England[37] and the country, although administrated by Protestants, featured a predominantly Catholic population, which was generally hostile to any substantial Protestant increase.[38] These issues, of geographical isolation and the dominance of Catholicism, would continue to shape the character of refugee admittance into Ireland well into the twentieth-century, and it is telling that they were influencing factors as early as the 1600s.

The Protestant administration within Ireland would have had obvious reasons for encouraging Huguenot entry into Ireland, as they hoped to utilise the refugees in a way economically and politically beneficial to the state.[39] The Huguenot refugees were commonly viewed as refugees able to introduce new industries into the economy, and their religion, as well as the ways in which the international community perceived the role of the Huguenots in seventeenth-century Europe, fit in with the political objectives of the Irish state. There was also a desire to reinforce the place that the Protestant religion held within Ireland, which could benefit from an infusion of respected, middle class Protestant refugees.[40] Through established Huguenot networks throughout Europe, the

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[37] England was experiencing its own issues concerning religion and monarchal leadership during this period, which included the English Civil War, the Restoration, the ascension to the throne of the last Catholic monarch and the Williamite war. These events, particularly within a religious context, most certainly affected how the Huguenots viewed Ireland and England as a possible safe haven.

[38] Raymond Hylton, 'Dublin's Huguenot Refuge: 1662-1817' in *Dublin Historical Record*, xl, no. 1 (December, 1986), pp 15.

[39] An example of this encouragement was an act passed by the Irish Parliament in 1662, entitled 'For Encouraging Protestant Strangers and others to settle and plant in Ireland'. Hylton states that 'the incentives offered by the Act were great, and far more generous than anything held out by the Westminster Parliament. Foreign Protestants were admitted as Freemen of Dublin upon payment of a 20/- fine; more admitted gratis to Guilds and Corporation, more granted free denization and naturalisation; and enjoyed tax-exemption for a seven-year period.' 'Dublin's Huguenot Refuge', pp 16.

[40] Stephen Conway, 'Christians, Catholics, Protestants: The Religious Links of Britain and Ireland with Continental Europe, c.1689-1800' in *English Historical Review*, cxxiv, no. 509 (2009), pp 846.

refugees were also marketed well, and sold to prospective admitting countries as an advantageous and safe group to admit. The 'stateless Huguenots adopted the language of national interest' that quieted a receiving country's worry regarding refugee assimilation.[41] As will be shown, these same tactics would be utilised readily within the twentieth-century, as various refugee groups attempted to establish their perceived usefulness to the state, whether through their ability to contribute to Ireland's economy, or as politicised people whose admittance reinforced the political objectives of the state.

Huguenot admittance remained relatively minimal until the last decade of the seventeenth-century.[42] The Huguenot population in Dublin was cited as 600 in 1695, as 2,100 in 1701 and at least 4,000 in 1720.[43] Domestic opinions and concerns regarding a variety of issues contributed to these low numbers. The prospect of non-nationals monopolising employment opportunities within certain fields was viewed negatively, as well as the any large-scale allocation of land to foreigners. These are all issues that would continue to factor into refugee admittance policy into the twentieth-century. Another similarity rests upon an accepted willingness to engage with refugee admittance and aid if the particular refugee group in question coalesced with either Irish domestic or foreign policy. It is of some importance that these broad similarities regarding the state's motivations and willingness to engage with refugee issues existed as far back as the seventeenth-century, and provided a historical foundation for initial engagement with refugee issues in the twentieth-century.

Irish involvement with the Palatine refugees of the early 1700's also warrants brief mention, as this situation varied from that of the admittance of the Huguenots, and provides an opportunity for further parallels to be drawn with

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[41] Stanwood, 'Between Eden and Empire', pp 1325.

[42] Hylton cites different stages of Huguenot migration to Ireland. The first, the 'Early Ormondite', lasting from 1662 to 1680, was comprised of mostly merchants from Northern France. This group provide highly amenable to assimilation, both culturally and religiously. The next stage, termed the 'Late Ormondite', between 1680 and 1687, saw mainly craftsmen and artisans from Southern France. This group proved less willing to engage with the idea of cultural assimilation, and caused problems when they failed to conform to the Irish brand of Protestantism. 'Dublin's Huguenot Refuge', pp 17-19.

[43] Ibid., pp 21.

later admittance policy. In contrast to the Huguenot refugees, the Palatines, German Protestants who had been displaced by French soldiers, were mainly poor farmers who had agreed to resettlement in England due largely to financial incentives.[44] The Whigs, certain 'that protestants who were forced to flee their native land because of religious persecution, would, if naturalised, increase the wealth and power of Britain', campaigned for their admittance.[45] As has been shown, this was also an incentive for the Irish admittance of Protestant refugees during this period. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century, the admittance of Protestant refugees was utilised in much the same way as the admittance of Catholic refugees would be in the twentieth.

The Palatine refugees that would eventually make their way to Dublin were resettled through a scheme organised by the English government once concerns originated regarding the feasibility of funding and housing the approximately 13,500 Palatines that had poured into London during the spring and autumn of 1709. During September and October of 1709, 3,071 Palatines, comprising 819 families, arrived in Dublin.[46] Resettlement for the Palatines in Ireland proved problematic, as various issues regarding funding, housing, assimilation and communication between refugees and authorities fostered unrest and mistrust in a situation that was to mirror similar planned, large-scale refugee admittance schemes undertaken in the twentieth-century.

Due to a lack of cooperation from the Treasury, initial funding for the Palatines in Ireland was provided through private charity and church collections.[47] When state funding was eventually secured, the amount initially subscribed proved inadequate, and had to be substantially increased.[48] Upon arrival, the Palatines were housed in Dublin Barracks, in which 280 families were housed in

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[44] Conway, 'Christians, Catholics, Protestants', pp 846.

[45] Vivien Hick, 'The Palatine Settlement in Ireland: The Early Years' in *Eighteenth-Century Ireland*, iv (1989), pp 115.

[46] Ibid., pp 120.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

seventy rooms built to house eight soldiers each.[49] Overcrowding and cleanliness were a problem, and it was quickly decided that the dispersal of a number of the refugees outside of the city limits was necessary. This method proved unsuccessful, as of the 2,098 Palatines relocated into the countryside in 1710, 1,368 had moved back to Dublin within the year. Further unrest resulted from an apparent miscommunication, as the Palatines 'seemed to have believed that Her Majesty had lands in Ireland which they were to hold rent-free'.[50] Authorities in Dublin were quick to contribute this unrest to a few individuals, and a representative from London was sent down to quell the discontent. The representative was also tasked with stemming the numbers of Palatines present in Ireland who were returning to England. This measure proved unsuccessful however, as by 1711 60% of the Palatines who had settled in Ireland had left the country.[51]

Similar issues regarding funding, housing, employment, poor communication and refugee discontent and unrest would continue to affect Irish refugee policy well into the twentieth-century, particularly pertaining to any planned, large-scale refugee admittance. The similarities between problems experienced by Irish authorities in 1710 and those experienced in 1956, when Ireland admitted 539 Hungarian refugees, are striking. This brief account of early refugee admittance has also demonstrated that, broadly speaking, the motivations behind the decision to admit refugees had similar root causes. A refugee being of the right religion was paramount, as were the economic benefits of admitting particular refugee groups. Wider Irish interactions with Europe, and the ways in which Ireland would be seen as interacting with European events, also influenced the formation of refugee policy.

As Jewish refugees feature prominently within this study, it is necessary to briefly address Jewish migration into Ireland beginning in the late 1800s, when the first substantial groups began arriving. The following tables include the

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., pp 122.

[51] Ibid., pp 123.

population of Jewish men and women, as well as the percentage increase and decrease in the Jewish population, in the twenty-six counties.[52]

I.1 Jewish population of the twenty-six counties:

Year	Male	Female
1881	215	179
1891	854	652
1901	1,577	1,429
1911	1,941	1,864
1926	1,902	1,784
1936	1,929	1,820
1946	1,987	1,920
1961	1,688	1,567
1971	1,331	1,302

I.2 Percentage increase or decrease in Jewish population of the twenty-six counties:[53]

Year	Male	Female
1901-1911	+23.1	+30.4
1911-1926	-2.0	-4.3
1926-1936	+1.4	+2.0
1936-1946	+3.0	+5.5
1946-1961	-15.0	-18.4

The percentage of increase or decrease within the Jewish population by gender was not included within the 1971 census, yet it was stated that there was an overall 19.1% decrease in Jewish population during this time period.

Initial low levels of Jewish migration to Ireland might be attributed to the common causes of geographic isolation and limited economic prospects. However, by 1880 three distinct groups of Jews were present in Dublin: two families of German and Polish origin that had originally settled in Ireland during the eighteenth century, a small group of Jews from England, Holland, France, Poland, Galicia, Russian and Morocco who settled between 1820 and 1875 and twenty-five Lithuanian Jews who arrived during the late 1870s.[54] This last group, that of the young Lithuanians, would prove influential, as between 1881 and 1891 the Jewish population increased rather dramatically, mainly through the admittance of

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[52] Central Statistics Office. Census 1961, Volume 7, Religion and Birthplaces. Part I: Religion. All stated census material is accessible at http://www.cso.ie/en/census/.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 6.

Lithuanian Jews. Dermot Keogh, in his work *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland: Refugees, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust*, attributes the timing of this influx to the increasingly anti-Semitic legislation taking root in Russia during the 1880s.[55] The assassination of Tsar Alexander II incited pogroms, as well as the discriminatory May Laws of 1882. Cormac Ó'Gráda, in his work *Jewish Ireland in the Age of Joyce*, makes the valid point that, as most of the Jews migrating to Ireland during the 1880s and 1890s were Lithuanian, where violence against Jews was minimal, this may not be an adequate explanation.[56] Ó'Gráda cites both social and economic reasons for Jewish entry into Ireland, particularly the immigrants desire to advance their social standings through educational opportunities. Ó'Gráda also states that the small, preexisting Jewish community in Dublin made the prospect of moving to a new and foreign land more comforting, and that chain migration also reinforced the pattern of movement between eastern Europe and Ireland.[57]

Upon their arrival in Ireland, the Lithuanian Jews were generally poorer, more Orthodox and less willing to assimilate into Irish culture than the more established Jews already present within the country. Tension between the two groups was present, yet this does not seem to have created any major rifts within the Jewish community, and mutual help and encouragement did create strong community connections. The Lithuanian Jews valued education greatly, and sent their children to good schools, thus ensuring that many of the first generation born in Ireland would enter the professional class. There was a focus on social mobility through education within the Jewish community, particularly in Dublin. The Jews that entered Ireland during this time period chose overwhelmingly to live in urban areas, with Ó'Gráda stating that nine out of ten Jewish migrants settled in either Dublin, Belfast or Cork in the pre-World War One era.[58] The majority engaged in

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[55] Ibid., p. 8-11.

[56] Ó'Gráda, *Jewish Ireland in the Age of Joyce*, p. 12.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., p. 94.

self-employment, particularly as peddlers, credit drapers, glaziers, picture-frame sellers and retailers.[59]

Of great importance, particularly for the focus of this study, is the relationship of the Jews present in Ireland with the Catholic majority, particularly within the context of the development of Irish Catholic nationalism. The Irish Jewish community's ability to integrate socially and economically, but also politically, and to be seen to add to the national struggle of the early twentieth-century would have an affect on the willingness of Irish society to admit Jews in the decades following independence. During the twentieth-century, particularly at the height of anti-Semitism in the 1930s, frequently utilised arguments against the admittance of Jews into a state was their inability to assimilate coupled with the assumption that Jewish loyalty lie with international Jewry, not a Jew's country of residency or asylum. As such, the actions of early Jewish residents of Ireland would have affected the public and government's attitudes regarding further admittance.

The Jews that arrived in Ireland during the early and mid-1800s found common cause with the Catholic population, as both groups were politically and socially marginalised, and proved active in the emancipation movement. Keogh states that both groups were brought together through the shared experience of adversity and that 'like their Catholic counterparts, Jews sought to overcome religious and social discrimination through entering the professions'.[60] Interestingly, the Lithuanian Jews of the late 1800s took a markedly difference stance on Irish politics. Ó'Grádá states that

> the Jewish community's loyalties were firmly unionist to begin with. This followed from the rabbinical principle that diaspora Jews be loyal to the country in which they lived. The Jews had come from anti-Semitic, despotic Russia and were presumably relieved and grateful to be in a more tolerant place. They genuinely regarded the British monarch as guarantor of their liberties; moreover, they were suspicious of Home Rule and Roman Catholicism. In eastern European Jewish eyes, nationalism was

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[59] Ibid., p. 84.

[60] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 7.

> almost invariably linked with unbridled xenophobia and anti-Semitism; perhaps Irish nationalism also frightened them on that score.[61]

However, by the 1916 Rising a younger generation of Irish born Jews had become active in nationalistic movements and groups.[62] It is important to note that as a political ideology, Irish Catholic nationalism was not inherently anti-Semitic, and did allow for the participation of Jews within groups such as Sinn Fêin.

There may also have been a sense of shared experience between the Jewish and Protestant community, as both were numerically religious minorities and it was a common practice to send Jewish children to Protestant schools. As Jewish children would spend the majority of their day in school, frequently followed by religious instruction, their exposure to Catholics was somewhat limited on a daily basis.

It is also worth briefly noting the Jewish community in Belfast during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Jewish population of Belfast was small in 1871, with only twenty-one Jews resident in the city. However, the population followed a similar trajectory to that of Dublin, and by 1911 there were 1,139 Jews present in Belfast, mostly of eastern European origin.[63] The influx of eastern European Jews did create tension within the Jewish community, much as it had in Dublin, with similar divisive issues arising regarding different socio-economic and religious backgrounds. The newer arrivals tended to enter into similar occupations as their counterparts in Dublin, and were more likely to interact socially with the Protestant population of Belfast.

The importance of existing communities within a potential host country for foreigners has already been commented on, and as such, information regarding the numerical population of various other nationalities warrants mention. Ó'Gráda cites the following figures regarding foreign-born nationals residing in Ireland between 1841 and 1911.[64]

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[61] Ó'Gráda, *Jewish Ireland in the Age of Joyce*, p. 189.

[62] See Keogh, *Jews*, p. 69-76 for a brief account of Jewish involvement with the 1916 Rising, the War of Independence and the Civil War.

[63] Ó'Gráda, *Jewish Ireland in the Age of Joyce*, p. 119.

[64] Ibid., p. 10.

I.3 Foreign-born nationals residing in Ireland, 1841-1911

Year	Foreign-born (non-UK) population	Percentage of total population
1841	4,471	0.05%
1861	10,420	0.18%
1881	11,210	0.22%
1911	18,905	0.43%

It is further stated that of the 1911 foreign-born population, two-thirds or more would have been American. The remaining one-third included 1,985 Russian natives, 1,104 French natives, 963 German natives, 417 Italian natives, 283 natives of the Low Countries and 312 Scandinavian natives.[65]

The following information, obtained from census records, states the number of German, Austrian, Czechoslovakian, Polish, Hungarian and Union of Soviet Socialist Republican citizens that claimed residency in Ireland between 1920 and 1973.[66] These nationalities were chosen due to their particular relevance to this study, as the majority of refugees to be discussed held one of these nationalities. Although various issues can affect the accuracy of census reports, the included information can provide a general picture of the foreign-born population of Ireland, and thus an awareness of the potential for cultural networks that may have influenced interest abroad of Ireland as a potential host country.

I.4 German population by year of taking up residency:

Year	Male	Female
1920-1929	22	20
1930-1939	31	30
1940-1944	4	6
1945-1949	71	113
1950-1955	130	132
1956-1961	220	197

I.5 Austrian population by year of taking up residency:

Year	Male	Female
1920-1929	2	5
1930-1939	27	28
1940-1944	3	3
1945-1949	8	8
1950-1955	18	17

[65] Ibid.

[66] The following information was obtained from the Central Statistics Office. Census 1961, Volume 7, Religion and Birthrights. Part II: Birthplaces.

1956-1961	13	19

I.6 Czechoslovakian population by year taking up residency:

Year	Male	Female
1920-1929	9	7
1930-1939	12	11
1940-1944	-	2
1945-1949	20	19
1950-1955	15	12
1956-1961	12	8

I.7 Polish population by year of taking up residency:

Year	Male	Female
1920-1929	8	12
1930-1939	12	7
1940-1944	-	1
1945-1949	19	7
1950-1955	23	13
1956-1961	26	23

I.8 Hungarian population by year of taking up residency:

Year	Male	Female
1920-1929	-	1
1930-1939	-	3
1940-1944	1	-
1945-1949	5	5
1950-1955	7	8
1956-1961	32	23

I.9 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by year of taking up residency:

Year	Male	Female
1920-1929	17	18
1930-1939	12	12
1940-1944	7	2
1945-1949	11	21
1950-1955	10	21
1956-1961	14	18

The process through which foreign-born residents were classified shifts for the 1971 census, as instead of listing the numerical value of foreign nationals taking up residency within the stated year or time period, the number of foreign-born nationals of a country present within the state is simply listed. The nationalities listed within the census are limited to: Ireland (Republic), Northern Ireland, England and Wales, Scotland, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,

Italy, the Netherlands, the United States of America and Other Countries.[67] Contextually, the limiting of nationalities specifically listed within the census could be attributed to changing concepts of European nationality, and due to further Irish integration within Europe.

These preexisting alien communities became involved in the facilitation of refugee admittance into the state, particularly in the 1930s and during the war. This involvement will be examined in Chapters One and Two. After the war, the nature of refugee admittance changed, as the government began to engage with refugee issues through the framework of international organisation such as the IRO and the UN. Refugee admittance became less personal; refugees were admitted in larger groups, through internationally organised schemes. The resident alien population of Ireland had less influence on refugee admittance decisions, as the very nature of Ireland's engagement with refugee initiatives changed to fit the new international situation.

Refugee Studies Historiography: An underdeveloped field of study within Irish historiography?

The modern conception of a refugee is a construct of twentieth-century political ideology and societal organisation. Refugees undoubtedly existed before the dawn of the twentieth century, yet within an extremely different world void of strictly enforced national borders, passports, visa requirements and security black lists. The movements of refugees within a world lacking modern day technology, even that of the 1930s, were less restricted and more localized. Seeking refuge in a neighbouring town, village or principality was usually enough to ensure survival. The nature of warfare also differed in such a way as to rarely necessitate the destruction of large civilian populations, as they were usually not at the centre core of conflicts. Claudena Skran states that 'the development of highly destructive military technology and the advent of total war have meant that international conflicts have affected entire populations, not just soldiers'.[68] Of course, there will always be exceptions to the rule, and it is not claimed here that

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[67] Central Statistics Office. Census 1971, Volume 11 Usual Residence and Migration/Birthplaces.

[68] Skran, *Refugees in inter-war Europe*, p. 5.

prior to World War One there were never wars that specifically targeted civilian populations or caused people to seek refuge greatly removed from their homes, yet these were the exceptions, not the norms.

European Context

How has the refugee featured within historical accounts of twentieth-century Europe? A brief overview of the nature of refugee historiography is necessary to set the stage before any in-depth examination of Irish policy can successfully be pursued. There are multiple approaches open to the historian interested in writing about refugee issues in the twentieth century, three of which will be utilised within this study. These approaches are an analysis of refugees resulting from a specific conflict or political regime (i.e. the rise of fascism, the development of Nazi racial ideology, World War Two, the Cold War, decolonization in Africa and Asia), an analysis of the reactions to an increasing number of refugees by both international organisations, as well as individual states, and survey studies which incorporate the first two approaches within a larger scope and context. Survey studies prove extremely useful when attempting to grasp the enormity of refugee issues within the twentieth-century, and allow for an examination of the multitude of influencing factors that created these refugees and attempted to solve the problem. These include Michael Marrus' seminal work *The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War Through the Cold War,*[69] Daniel Gerard Cohen's *In war's wake: Europe's displaced persons in the postwar order,*[70] Katherine Knox and Tony Kushner's *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century*[71] and Karen E. Smith's *Genocide and the Europeans.*[72]

Refugees created during the time period in question, 1935 to 1973, can be roughly divided into four categories: those created by the emergence of fascism in the 1930s, those resulting from World War Two, those resulting from the postwar

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69 Marrus, *The Unwanted.*

70 Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In war's wake: Europe's displaced persons in the postwar order* (Oxford, 2012).

71 Katharine Knox and Tony Kushner, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century* (London, 1999).

72 Karen E. Smith, *Genocide and the Europeans* (Cambridge, 2010).

reorganisation of Europe and early Cold War tensions and the refugees created in Africa and Asia due to European decolonization in the 1960s. The historiography of refugee research within each of these categories shall be briefly commented on here, followed by an account of research conducted on Irish refugee policy over the entire scope of this study.

Refugees fleeing the Nazi regime after 1933 have received considerable attention, and are likely the most thoroughly studied group that will be addressed within this study. The copious literature written concerning the rise of the Nazi Party, the Party's consolidation of power during the 1930s, as well as the state's increasingly hostile attitude toward entire sections of its population, thoroughly documents one of the most serious situations concerning the creation of large numbers of refugees in the inter-war period. Interestingly, the academic literature specifically focusing on the emergence of the international refugee situation in 1930s Europe tends to feature as only a part of the works focusing on Germany in the 1930s. Eminent scholars of Nazi Germany, such as Richard Evans,[73] Ian Kershaw[74] and Richard Overy[75] all provide examinations of the escalating refugee situation, yet as a part of a larger analysis of the development of Nazi policy and racial ideology. Research devoted solely to the refugee situation of the 1930s, such as Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore's (eds.) work *Refugees from Nazi Germany and the liberal European states*[76], Claudena M. Skran's *Refugees in inter-war Europe: the emergence of a regime*[77] and Louise London's *Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British immigration policy, Jewish refugees and the Holocaust*[78] are more of a rarity. Historians, politicians and aid workers writing in the 1930s provide the modern day scholar with a multitude of published articles

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[73] Richard Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (New York, 2003); *The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939* (London, 2005); *The Third Reich at War: 1939-1945* (New York, 2009).

[74] Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (Bloomsburg, 2000); *Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution* (Yale, 2009).

[75] Richard Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia* (London, 2004); *The Inter-war Crisis 1919-1939* (2007) ; *The Origins of the Second World War* (Routledge, 2008).

[76] Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore (eds.), *Refugees from Nazi Germany and the liberal European states* (New York, 2010).

[77] Skran, *Refugees in inter-war.*

[78] Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British immigration policy, Jewish refugees and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, 2000).

that shed light on how the refugee situation was perceived by its contemporaries and are an invaluable source of information.[79] Much of this research tends to focus on Jewish refugees, as well as the international community's reaction to the increase in German Jews seeking resettlement.

The research concerning refugees during the war years features a heavy concentration on the different stages of Nazi Jewish policy, tracing the transition from German focus on forced Jewish emigration to the implementation of the Final Solution. The movements of Jews trapped in Nazi-occupied Europe and their attempts to escape have been extensively researched, as has the international reaction resulting from the confirmation of Nazi Jewish extermination policy.[80] Saul Friedlander provides one of the most comprehensive studies of the Nazi-Jewish question in his work *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945.*[81] Studies also tend to focus on a specific country's policy towards Jewish refugees, usually the United States, Britain or one of the western European neutrals (Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Ireland, the Vatican) that were politically able to make representations to the German authorities on behalf of Jews due to their neutrality. Unsurprisingly, one of the few published books focusing exclusively on Irish refugee policy, Dermot Keogh's *Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland: Refugees, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust,*[82] examines matters concerning the Irish response to the Jewish refugee situation of the 1930s, the resulting genocide and postwar reactions.

The postwar refugee problem has also garnered its fair share of attention, as the end of the war in 1945 brought with it the largest displacement of people that the modern world had ever seen. Refugees, repatriation and resettlement

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79 Walter Adams, 'Refugees in Europe' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* cciii (May, 1939), pp 37-44; Robert W. Ditchburn, 'The Refugee Problem' in *An Irish Quarterly Review,* xxviii, no. 110 (June, 1939), pp 275-292; Egidio Reale, 'The Passport Question' in *Foreign Affairs,* ix, no. 3 (April, 1931); Simpson, 'The Refugee Problem'.

80 Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution* (Yale, 2009); Alex J. Kay, Jeff Rutherford and David Stahel, *Nazi policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: total war, genocide, and radicalization* (Rochester, 2012); Bob Moore, *Survivors: Jewish self-help and rescue in Nazi-occupied Western Europe* (Oxford, 2010).

81 Saul Friedlander, *The years of extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945* (London, 2007).

82 Keogh, *Jews.*

issues became increasingly politicised as Europe was divided into two spheres of influence. Historians have used the refugee issue to facilitate examinations of the increase in Soviet/Western tensions, as well as to explore the increasingly repressive Soviet measures that were occurring in Eastern Europe and other Soviet satellites. As such, the refugee discourse has been used to bolster discussions of the Soviet-Western power relationship and postwar activity. Such studies, such as Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell's *Warlands: Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945-50,*[83] Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White's *The disentanglement of populations: migration, expulsion and displacement in post-war Europe, 1944-9,*[84] Mark Wyman's *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951*[85] and Gerard Daniel Cohen's *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order*[86] place the postwar refugee situation within the political context of the postwar ideological divide.

The focus of refugee research shifts in the late 1950s, as the majority of refugee-creating situations began to occur outside of Europe, centering in Africa and Asia. The refugee discourse in these situations features both international humanitarian concern as well as a charged political pragmatism. Most of these refugees were created due to tensions within countries struggling to gain their independence from European colonial powers. The nationalist movements frequently utilised Cold War power politics in order to influence the responses of both European powers, as well as the UN. Within the historiography, these refugee situations are dealt with as by-products of decolonization within a Cold War and international context. Matthew Connelly examines the Algerian War for Independence with this context in his two articles, 'Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence' and 'Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the

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83 Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell, *Warlands: Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945-50* (United Kingdom, 2009).

84 Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White, *The disentanglement of populations: migration, expulsion and displacement in post-war Europe, 1944-9* (Basingstoke, 2011).

85 Mark Wyman, *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951* (Cornell University, 1989).

86 Cohen, *In War's Wake.*

Algerian War for Independence'.[87] Refugees were viewed as a destabilizing force, and there was a call from the international community to settle refugee issues, as well as to make sure that refugees were not politically influenced by the aid they received. In other words, the West was concerned that any Soviet aid would be used to court African or Asian opinion towards Soviet influence.

Irish Context

Now the question may be asked, how have historians concerned with twentieth-century Irish history dealt with Irish responses to refugee issues and aid? The short answer is rarely and with great specialisation. There are three main works that deal specifically with twentieth-century Irish refugee policy, all of which limited themselves to specific European groups, with the majority of research focusing on the 1930s-1950s. As already mentioned, Dermot Keogh's *Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland* is an in depth examination of Irish Jewish refugee policy and Irish anti-Semitism, beginning with the Limerick pogrom of 1904. The majority of Keogh's research focuses on the Irish response to the development of Nazi racial policy in the 1930s, Irish reaction to international attempts to alleviate the German-Jewish refugee problem, Irish responses to the Holocaust and immediate postwar involvement in Jewish refugee schemes. Gisela Holfter's (ed) *German-speaking exiles in Ireland 1933-1945*[88] provides both an account of Irish government and public reactions to the German refugee crisis of the 1930s and 1940s, as well as 'individual portraits of exiles' and 'personal accounts' told by the exiles themselves. Daniel Leach's account of the Irish admittance of European minority nationalist asylum seekers analyses how Irish asylum policy influenced a variety of domestic and foreign policy concerns, such as Irish sovereignty, the development of its affinity for the West and its emerging

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[87] Matthew Connelly, 'Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence' in *The American Historical Review,* xl, no. 3 (June, 2000), pp 739-769; 'Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence' in *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* xxxiii, no. 2 (May, 2001), pp 221-245.

[88] Holfter, *German-speaking exiles.*

anti-communist credentials.[89] Leach's study, which places Irish refugee and asylum policy firmly within the realm of foreign policy concerns, is the closest parallel to this study.

This study attempts to expand on Keogh, Holfter and Leach's work, providing a new angle from which to research and analyse the development of Irish refugee policy. Holfter limits her study to German-speaking exiles, while Keogh focuses on Jewish refugees exclusively. This research will attempt to examine the state's engagement with refugees of any nationality or religion assuming that there were foreign policy motivations behind admittance or aid. This will expand current knowledge of Irish involvement with the refugee issues of the 20th century, as there has been virtually no research conducted on, for example, Catholic refugees applying for admittance during the 1930s and 1940s, Eastern European refugee groups of the postwar period or the Chilean refugees admitted in 1974. Irish engagement with the refugee schemes of various international organisations, such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, the International Refugee Organization, the World Refugee Year, etc., have not previously been researched. Irish aid to Africa has been addressed, yet mainly focuses on humanitarian aid relief, not specifically on refugee aid and admittance.[90]

The majority of archival material utilised within this research has never been published or extensively examined, particularly that of the later chapters. Issues that have been dealt with elsewhere, such as an examination of Ireland engagement with Jewish rescue plans during the war are reexamined within the context of the state's foreign policy objectives. Other issues that are addressed within this study, such as the interaction between Ireland, Northern Ireland and the Britain concerning refugee aid and admittance has not been previously studied.

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89 Daniel Leach, *Fugitive Ireland: European minority nationalists and Irish political asylum, 1937-2008* (Dublin, 2009).

90 See Kevin O'Sullivan, 'Ireland and sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-75: a changing mission' (Doctoral thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 2008); *Ireland, Africa and the end of empire: small state identity in the Cold War, 1955-75* (Manchester, 2012).

Refugee policy has been addressed in a variety of works concerning various studies of twentieth-century Irish history, usually concerning Irish activity during World War Two.[91] Refugee policy also necessitates mention in a variety of other works as a side effect of the international situation, a peripheral problem that the government had to address periodically. Especially when Irish desire to foster international approval, or at least acceptance, was in question Irish refugee and humanitarian aid was utilised by the government and thus has been commented on by historians concerned with this topic. Historians researching Irish interactions with international organisations, such as the League of Nations, the UN and the European Economic Community will usually touch upon Irish refugee aid, but never in any great detail. There has been some specialised work conducted, usually in the form of published articles or chapters within edited works, including Katrina Goldstone's 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees',[92] Eilis Ward's ''A big show-off to show what we could do': Ireland and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956'[93], Enda Staunton's research concerning Irish interaction with the Nigerian Civil War[94] and Mervyn O'Driscoll's 'The 'Jewish Question', Irish Refugee Policy and Charles Bewley, 1933-39'.[95]

Although specialised work focused exclusively on the formation of refugee policy is rare, research regarding the formation of Irish foreign policy is both substantial and crucial to this research. Placing the formation of refugee policy firmly within the context of the development of foreign policy objectives is a cornerstone of this work, and as such, a brief account of such work is

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91 See Katrina Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees', in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds), *Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966: From Independence to Internationalism* (Dublin, 2000), p. 127 and Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and Europe, 1919-1989: A Diplomatic and Political History* (Cork and Dublin, 1989) for fairly substantial accounts.

92 Katrina Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees'.

93 Eilis Ward, 'A big show-off to show what we could do' – Ireland and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs,* vii (1996), pp 131-141.

94 Enda Staunton, 'The Case of Biafra: Ireland and the Nigerian Civil War' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxi, no. 124 (Nov., 1999), pp 513-534.

95 Mervyn O'Driscoll, 'The 'Jewish Question', Irish Refugee Policy and Charles Bewley, 1933-39' in *Racial Discrimination and Ethnicity in European History* (2004), pp 139-152.

necessitated here. There are various works that examine the development of foreign policy over the course of the 20th century that vary in scope and specific focus, yet offer invaluable insight into developing and evolving foreign policy concerns.[96] Those examining policy development between the founding of the Free State and the outbreak of the war tend to focus on the development of foreign policy within the context of the Anglo-Irish relationship.[97] Irish interactions with the League of Nations, as well as the development of the nascent Irish diplomatic service, also garner attention.[98] During the war years, the brunt of academic attention lay with the analysis of the Irish pursuit of neutrality, and how neutrality affected both Ireland's relations with Britain, as well as the wider international community.[99] After 1945, the majority of work tends to focus on the increase of Irish involvement within the newly emerging international order, namely Irish activity at the UN and the European community.[100] There tends to be

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[96] Noel Dorr, John Doyle, Michael Kennedy and Ben Tonra, *Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin, 2012); Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds.), *Irish foreign policy, 1919-66*; Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*; Patrick Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy.*

[97] Paul Canning, *British policy towards Ireland 1921-1941* (Oxford, 1985). Anglo-Irish relations are crucial to any study of Irish foreign policy, yet Keatinge argues that an overemphasis on this one aspect has affected how other foreign policy developed with the government and accounts for the delayed academic attention given to studies of Irish foreign policy outside of the Anglo-Irish context. Most works concerning Irish foreign policy within an international context have been published within the past twenty years. *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy,* p. 5-7.

[98] Michael Kennedy, *Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919-1946: international relations, diplomacy and politics* (Blackrock, 1996). For work concerning the evolution of the Irish diplomatic services, see Keogh, *Ireland and Europe,* p. 34-62.

[99] Robert Fisk, *'In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality 1939-1945* (Dublin, 1983). For an examination of Irish/British relations during the war years, see Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922* (New York, 1999); *Spying on Ireland: British intelligence and Irish neutrality during the Second World War* (Oxford, 2008).

[100] Jerome Aan de Wiel, Dermot Keogh and Mervyn O'Driscoll, *Ireland through European eyes: western Europe, the EEC and Ireland, 1945-1973* (Cork, 2013); Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon (eds.), *Obligations and responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations, 1955-2005: essays marking fifty years of Ireland's United Nations membership* (Dublin, 2005); Michael Kennedy and Eunan O'Halpin, *Ireland and the Council of Europe: from isolation to integration* (Strasbourg, 2000); Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and the Challenge of European Integration* (Dublin, 1989); Paul Sharp, *Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community: a study of the impact of interdependence on the foreign policy of a small state* (Dartmouth, 1990); Joseph Morrison Skelly, 'Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1945-55: A New Look' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs,* vii (1996), pp 63-80; *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965: national interests and the international order* (Dublin, 1997)

a focus on the expansion of Irish foreign policy concerns within the context of postwar Europe and the increasing tension between the West and East.[101]

[101] Till Geiger, 'Trading with the Enemy: Ireland, the Cold War and East-West Trade, 1945-55' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs,* xix (2008), pp 119-142; Till Geiger and Michael Kennedy (eds.), *Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan* (Dublin, 2004); Paula L. Wylie, *Ireland and the Cold War: diplomacy and recognition, 1949-63* (Dublin, 2006); Bernadette Whelan, 'Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns' in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, viii, no. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp 68-94.

Chapter 1 - Unrest in Europe: the Irish response to refugees resulting from the establishment of the Hitler state and subsequent Nazi expansionism, 1935-1939

Introduction

One ideological development loomed over the inter-war period and would go on to shape the course of international events well into the second half of the twentieth century. This development was the creation, rise and domination of European fascism as a governing political ideology. The absolute devastation of World War One, coupled with the victors' attempt to punish Germany, the perceived main aggressor, through the Treaty of Versailles, would set the stage for the dramatic rise of the fascist state. Versailles crippled Germany's economy, stripped away its military, readjusted its territorial boundaries and, most crucially, decimated the nation's sense of pride and self-respect.[1] Versailles fostered Germany's susceptibility to a right wing, nationalistic, paramilitary political party, which promised to not only restore German economic and military might, but also to give the people back a sense of pride in their homeland. Multiple other factors were at work and aided the rise of fascism. Eric Hobsbawn cites the perceived failure of parliamentary democracy coupled with an increased distrust of the viability of capitalism as a functioning economic system as other contributing factors.[2] The European Right was also terrified of the increased political might of socialism and communism and their appeal to a working class that was becoming increasingly politically mobilised.

The victors' perception of what had led the world to the slaughter of World War One also coloured the inter-war period. A belief developed that the presence of large minority groups within nation-states had caused ethnic tension, which had destabilised Europe and led to conflict.[3] The redrawing of national borders after the war along ethno-linguistic lines both attempted to solve this

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[1] The Versailles Treaty, 28 Jun. 1919. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.

[2] Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: the short twentieth century, 1914-1991* (London, 1995), p. 136.

[3] Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch, 'Refugees and the Nation-State in Europe, 1919-59' in *Journal of Contemporary History,* xlix, no. 3 (2014), pp 477-90.

problem and served to exacerbate the minority issue.[4] The League of Nations was created in part to deal with this issue.[5] However, once it became clear that Germany was bent on non-adherence to Versailles, both the international community and the League promptly forgot their previous commitment to minority issues in an attempt to appease the Germans and prevent the outbreak of a new conflict. Many have cited this as the 'moral failure' of the League; the very issues which the League was created to address, namely the fair and humane treatment of people and the upholding of international humanitarian values, were the very first to be swept under the rug in the face of intimidation.[6]

The inter-war period also saw the establishment of various precedents that paradoxically increased and hindered refugee movements during the 1930s. The establishment of racial ideology as a defining factor in German politics lent itself to the creation of mass refugee groups. Previously, a person had become a refugee due to domestic policy within their state. This was a side effect of their government's policy or the person's non-adherence to stated government ideology. However, in the 1930s the creation of refugees *became* German state sanctioned policy. Also, with an increased focus on the nation-state construct after 1918, states began to use denationalisation as a political tool. A country would denationalise those citizens whom it felt were political enemies, idealistically opposed to the current regime, undesirable, etc., and use the threat of denationalisation to keep citizens in line with government policy.[7] Once a person did become stateless, the problem became the unwillingness of countries to admit them, as they had no recognised nationality and no state could be held responsible for their welfare.[8] The number of states with restrictive refugee policies

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[4] Eric Hobsbawn, *The Age of Extremes*, p. 31.

[5] See Carole Fink, 'The League of Nations and the minorities question' in *World Affairs*, clvii, no. 4 (March 1, 1995), pp 197-205.

[6] For general works regarding the League in the 1930s see Martyn Housden, *The League of Nations and the organisation of peace* (Harlow, 2012); Christoph M. Kimmich, *Germany and the League of Nations* (London, 1976); George Scott, *The rise and fall of the League of Nations* (London, 1973).

[7] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 178-9.

[8] Ibid.

proliferated during the 1930s, and this simply served to reinforce and increase the restrictionism of other states.[9]

The main focus of this chapter will address the Irish response to the refugee crisis created by Nazi racial policy in the mid-to-late 1930s. A brief account of Irish involvement in League of Nations' refugee initiatives, as well as Irish participation in the Evian Conference, will be addressed. The League's engagement with the refugee issues of the 1920s were the first attempts of a modern, global, multinational organisation to solve refugee issues within the context of a complex and contentious international situation. The development of German racial policy is addressed to allow for a proper contextualisation of the situation that German Jews found themselves in during the 1930s. The activity of the Irish Co-ordinating Committee warrants a section and will be examined through its structure and organisation, as well as on a case-by-case basis. Various other methods of application utilised by refugees, particularly those through employment and direct appeals to the government, will also be examined.

Refugee Issues in the 1920s and 1930s

League of Nations, 1921-1938

The League of Nations had a variety of postwar problems to deal with, including the movement and resettlement of refugees created by the Great War. Added to this group were refugees resulting from further conflicts, such as the Russian Revolution and the expulsion of Armenians from territory then controlled by the Ottoman Empire.[10] Following World War One, the nature of the refugee

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[9] Frank and Reinisch in 'Refugees and the Nation-State' cite a paradox of the 1930s: 'Despite the increasingly insularity of states, the refugee problem showed just how inter-connected they actually were. Since the refugee policy of one state had a knock-on effect on another unless appropriate defensive measures were put in place, restrictive policies tended to proliferate and converge. The decade saw co-ordination between states to guard *against* refugees: a negative form of international cooperation based on a sort of competitive restrictionism.' pp 482.

[10] For further information regarding the causes of the Armenian expulsions, subsequent genocide and migrations see Donald Bloxham, 'The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destructive Policy' in *Past & Present*, no. 181 (November, 2003), pp 141-91; Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 74-81; Louise W. Holborn, 'The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* cciii (May, 1939), pp 124-35.

problem changed. Prior to the war, national borders were far more open.[11] The movement of people between countries was far less regulated and restricted. Europe became far more concerned with ideas of statehood and nationalism, and this was reflected within new travel restrictions.[12] The modern concept of a refugee, and how that concept related to the changing ways in which refugees were to be dealt with, was of paramount concern at this time. As such, the League turned its attention to this problem in the 1920s.

The Covenant of the League[13] itself never included any 'specific provision for international aid and protection for refugees'.[14] Special appeals to the League resulted in its rather ad hoc approach to the refugee problems of the 1920s and 1930s. Such an appeal was made to the League by the International Red Cross Committee in February 1921 on behalf of the White Russian refugees fleeing the Bolshevik victory in Russia.[15] Adding additional stress to the situation, the Russian government had passed a law stating that any Russian citizen who had been absent from the country for five years would automatically lose their Russian citizenship.[16] Russian refugees were flooding into places, such as Constantinople, that could ill keep them.[17] In response to this situation, the League created the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, and handed control of the Commission to the famous Norwegian polar explorer, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen. The stated objectives of the Commission were listed as such: 'First, the definition of the legal status of refugees; second, their repatriation to Russia, their

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11 Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe*, p. 14.

12 Simpson, 'The Refugee Problem', pp 609.

13 The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924) The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.

14 Holborn, 'The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem'. Holborn cites that 'references to the general purpose of the League of Nations 'to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security,' and to Articles 23 and 25, have been made by those in favour of the League's accepting responsibility for refugees'. pp 24.

15 Holborn, 'The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem', pp 124.

16 Simpson, 'The Refugee Problem', pp 609. Holborn also states in 'The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem' that 'most of the Russian refugees were either without nationality because of the Soviet decree of December 15, 1921 or without valid papers'. pp 125. Cohen cites that the majority of the 1,500,000 White Russians who had fled Russia were denaturalised and that this was 'the formal punishment meted out then to Russian exiles was the coercive dissolution of their citizenship'. Cohen, *In War's Wake*, p. 23.

17 Holborn, 'The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem', pp 126.

emigration to other countries, or the organization of their employment in the countries where they were residing; and third, the co-ordination of the various efforts already being undertaken for the material relief of the refugees.'[18] The League, though willing to facilitate the organisation of groups and commissions charged with the task of coordinating international cooperation regarding refugee issues, would 'take no responsibility' for actual relief efforts or accept any financial obligations.[19]

Nansen's first step was the issuance of a form of identification to the Russian refugees that would entitle them to freer movement around Europe. Nansen hoped this would encourage countries to offer employment to the refugees, as free movement would negate the worry that the initial admittance of a refugee would equate to the *permanent* resettlement of that refugee into the accepting government's territory.[20] In 1922, Nansen facilitated the international acceptance of an agreement that created a stateless identity and travel document. The more than fifty signatory governments would recognise this passport, which became universally referred to as the Nansen passport. Nansen was not satisfied with a mere travel document, however, and in 1928 increased the rights granted by the possession of a Nansen passport to include various basic rights that were usually obtained by citizenship within a state. Nansen died in 1930, but his work was continued three years later in 1933 with the Geneva Convention. Under the Geneva Convention, more rights were attached to the Nansen passports such as identity certificates, which attested to character and professional qualifications. Resident permits, school admission, employment and other judicial matters relating to the status of refugees were also dealt with in the Convention.

The Irish government did not have much interaction with the Nansen passport scheme until World War Two, although the government had been duly informed of its development. In June 1924, External Affairs received

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[18] Ibid., pp 125.

[19] Ibid. Cohen also states that 'the League of Nations functioned merely as the coordinator of relief operations independently carried out by private philanthropic organizations... the League's covenant simply encouraged member states to cooperate with Red Cross committees or similar charitable bodies'. Cohen, *In War's Wake*, p. 60.

[20] Holborn, 'The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem', pp 125.

communication regarding the establishment of the Nansen passport scheme from the League of Nations. In 1924, the Nansen passport scheme established to deal with the Russian refugees was extended to encompass Armenian refugees due to their worsening situation.[21] Both Armenian and Russian refugees were eventually admitted into the Irish state under this scheme. The memorandum in question stated that the League 'had its attention called to the situation of some thousands of Armenian refugees in various countries, who are gravely handicapped by the lack of documents enabling them to establish their identity, or to travel freely in pursuance of their normal occupation'.[22] Nansen was requested to 'consider the possibility of having the necessary arrangements made for the issue of identity certificates to Armenian refugees'.[23]

The memorandum went on to further state that Dr. Nansen had carefully studied the problem of the Armenian refugees, and had drawn the conclusion that they should be treated in the same way, and with the existing legislation already in place for the Russian refugees. The one suggested change in policy, and this was an important change, was that an 'insertion on the certificate of a space authorizing its use for the purpose of returning to the country issuing it and the inclusion in the plan of a recommendation that such authorization should be given if possible'[24] was to be added. Dr. Nansen envisioned that this would allow for the free movement of refugees.

Not much inter-governmental correspondence is present concerning the actual decision to admit Russian and Armenian refugees into the Irish state. Groups were admitted each year between 1942 and 1945.[25] It has also proven rather difficult to find much information concerning the actual admittance and reception of these refugees. No mention could be found in the Irish newspapers regarding the Nansen passport refugees, and further investigation is needed to

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[21] Ibid., pp 126.

[22] League of Nations (C.L. 72. 1924) Geneva to Minister of External Affairs, 10 June 1924 (National Archives, Ireland, hereafter NAI, DFA/372/1).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Refer to Appendix 1: Nansen Passport refugees admitted into the Irish state for a yearly lists concerning the particulars of Nansen passport recipients.

ascertain exactly what the general public knew concerning the admittance of these refugees.

The League continued its involvement with refugee issues into the 1930s, as it saw fit to establish a High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany in 1933, which prompted not only anger from Germany, but also their resignation from the League three days later.[26] The first High Commissioner, James G. McDonald, resigned in 1935 due to his frustration with the Western community's lack of interest and engagement with the refugee problem. The High Commissioner's stated task was to 'perform the tasks of consular bureaucracies, to review attendant legal problems, and to effect liaison with private organizations pursuing settlement and relief'.[27] League member states were under no obligation or real pressure to reform their immigration quotas or liberalise their refugee policies. In 1936, the League held a further conference pertaining to the work of the High Commissioner. An 'agreement on a provisional arrangement providing a certificate of identity and certain legal guarantees to German fugitives abroad' was secured, yet this only pertained to existing refugees.[28] A further refugee convention was in the drafting stage, and was to be circulated to member states in 1937. The Irish representative to the League, Francis T. Cremins, was instructed by Dublin that Ireland could not accept the draft due to domestic economic, social and security concerns.[29] Nevertheless, the Geneva Convention on Refugees Coming from Germany was ratified in 1938.

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[26] For a concise account of the League's refugee activity in the 1930s see Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 158-66.

[27] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 164.

[28] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 117.

[29] As a point of comparison, London, commenting on British engagement with League refugee initiatives, states that 'from 1933 onwards, however, Britain made efforts to minimise the League's role, limiting its ratification of the 1933 and 1938 League Conventions on refugees, in order to protect British sovereignty over admissions. The League's decision in 1933 to establish a high commissioner for refugees coming from Germany, for example, was acceptable to Britain only on conditions that the high commissioner be separate from the League itself, that his work be financed by private organisations and that he not have power to negotiate with Germany.' London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 83.

German Racial policy, 1933-1938

Academic work devoted to tracing the development of Nazi racial policy during the 1930s is staggering, both in its abundance and thoroughness. As such, only a brief overview of Nazi policy will be included here in order to provide a proper context in which to place the development of Irish policy. Beginning almost immediately upon the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, the regime began to proliferate its racial ideology, gradually introducing legislation that slowly stripped 'undesirables' of their rights and privileges as German citizens. The Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseased Offspring (Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses, 1933) and the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums, 1933) were two early examples of the Nazis state's preoccupation with racial categorisation, which then became manifest within official Nazi policy law.[30] Marrus traces the origins of the increase in stateless refugees to Nazi policy in 1933:

> By a law of 14 July 1933, the new Nazi government assumed the authority to denaturalize citizens whose naturalization was now deemed to have been 'undesirable' and to denationalize Germans living abroad who 'prejudiced German interests by an attitude contrary to the duty of loyalty' toward the Reich. A new generation of stateless persons now began to appear in Europe, for whom the loss of citizenship posed the most serious technical difficulties. Jews were hit particularly hard. From 1933, the Nazis made it clear that racist principles were to be fundamental in determining who was to be denationalized.[31]

The infamous Nuremberg Laws were to follow in 1935, which 'provided the basis for a systematic discrimination against Jews and the removal of citizenship rights'.[32] Jews were not to be considered, legally or otherwise, German citizens with full rights. This was legalised in the Reich Citizenship Law (Reichsbürgergesetz).[33] Mixed marriages and sexual relationships were banned in

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[30] See German History in Documents and Images (German Historical Institute) for full English translations. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org

[31] Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 179.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Evans, *The Third Reich in Power*, p. 544. Also see German History in Documents and Images for a full translation of the law.

the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour as Jews were continually marginalized.[34] The initial reaction to this legalisation of Nazi racial discrimination was that of relief. German Jews felt that with the formalisation of discrimination, clear boundaries would be established, and if one could learn how to function within those boundaries, life would be possible under the Nazi regime. Perhaps the indiscriminate violence would halt, and life would reclaim a semblance of normality.

German encouragement of Jewish emigration during the 1930s was fairly successful, with 150,000 having left the Reich by 1938, which reduced the Jewish population in Germany to approximately 350,000.[35] However, with the continuation of German territorial expansion, more Jews came under Nazi control in the late 1930s. With the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, followed by the incorporation of the Sudetenland in September, German territory experienced an increase of Jews that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A report emanating from the British government in January 1939 claimed that there were 'approximately 600,000 Non-Aryans remaining in Germany, including Austria and the Sudetenland'.[36] Between April and November, upwards of 50,000 Jews fled Austrian territory.[37] Western governments, still strictly adhering to their policy of appeasing Germany in the hope that the territorial acquisitions in Czechoslovakia and Austria would sate German expansionist desires, were also worried that they would be aiding Germany by absorbing its refugee population. Refugees would also bring harm to the Western states as forms of 'Nazi imposed economic liabilities'.[38] German immigration regulations stated that Jews leaving German territory could only take an extremely limited amount of capital with them. What they left behind would be 'Aryanized' by the government.

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[34] Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, *Documents on Nazism: 1919-1945* (New York, 1975).

[35] Evans, *The Third Reich in Power,* p. 555.

[36] 'Rublee- Schacht conversation: Memorandum', 27 Jan. 1939 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/24080).

[37] Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 168.

[38] Ibid., p. 182.

Evian Conference, 1938

By 1938, the refugee situation in central Europe was critical, and as a response to the plight of German, Austrian and Czechoslovakian Jewish refugees, the Evian Conference was held in July of that year, under the initiative of the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Two problems occupied the attention of the Conference: Nazi policy regarding the expropriation of Jewish assets upon their emigration, and possible host countries for the multitude of German/Austrian Jews in flight.[39] Though the Conference was viewed optimistically at its inception, it never led to any solutions. Alderman wrote of this disappointment, stating that 'in a public relations exercise, the rhetoric at the end of the conference stated that states had an obligation to those who lacked membership in a state that would provide protection. States accepted an obligation, unfortunately, only in words, to provide a haven for refugees.'[40] Frank and Reinisch cite the inability to reconcile the 'tension between the international dimensions of the refugee problem and the prerogative of the nation-state' as the predominant failing of Evian.[41] Various states, including Great Britain and France, actively campaigned to limit League refugee initiatives already active in Europe, and called for a restriction of the allocation of League resources to only German and Austrian refugees.[42] Although legally binding policy was not implemented by the Conference, it was still an important gauge as to how certain states were interacting with the refugee problem directly preceding the outbreak of the war.

It is important to examine how the Irish government responded to the Evian Conference, as this statement was the government's publicly stated position on the state's potential engagement with the German and Austrian Jewish refugee crisis. The statement began by thanking the governments of the USA and France for organising the Conference, and stated that the Irish government had been

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[39] 'Evian Conference on Political Refugees' in *Social Service Review,* xii, no. 3 (Sept., 1938), pp 514-18.

[40] Howard Adelman, 'From Refugees to Forced Migration: The UNHCR and Human Security' in *International Migration Review,* xxxv, no. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp 25.

[41] Frank and Reinisch, 'Refugees and the Nation-State', pp 481.

[42] 'Evian Conference on Political Refugees' in *Social Service Review,* xll, no. 3 (Sept., 1938), pp 515.

'happy to accept the invitation extended to them in order to demonstrate their sympathy, even though, for reasons which I [Cremins] shall briefly set out, they are not, to their great regret, in a position to make any substantial contribution to the solution'.[43] The statement then went on to elaborate the reasons why Ireland could not contribute to any proposed solution centred upon refugee admittance into the State:

> Ireland is a small country with jurisdiction over a population of something less than three million people. Notwithstanding the steady progress which has been made in recent years in regard to the creation of new industries, by far the greater part of our people still derive, and will continue to derive, their living from the land. I need not attempt to explain the land problems, which have arisen in Ireland; it is sufficient to say that there is not enough land available to satisfy the needs of our own people.[44]

The problem of Irish industry was also addressed:

> Although every effort is being made by the Government to expedite industrialisation in a country which had been greatly underindustrialised, the new industries are not yet capable of absorbing the regular increase in our population, so that each year numbers of young people are forced by circumstance to emigrate. While such emigration remains imposed upon our national economy, it is obvious that we can make no real contribution to the resettlement of refugees.[45]

Domestic problems that the government was already concerned with were obvious detractors from the State's ability to absorb any large number of refugees. It has to be remembered that while the country was facing high emigration, the public's perception of the government's decision to accept aliens could have been seen as political suicide.

Summing up the government's position, Cremins addressed one of the proposed solutions to the situation, that of settling large numbers of refugees in underdeveloped territory:

> The only alternative solution which has been suggested is the opening-up of new or under- developed territory. The Irish Government have no such

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[43] Statement made on behalf of Ireland by representative Mr. F.T.Cremins, Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian: Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings of the Committee, Resolutions and Reports. 6 to 15 July 1938 (NAI, DFA/243/67).

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

> territory under their control, and they are accordingly reluctant to urge the taking by other Governments of measures in which they themselves could not participate. The Irish delegation, however, ventures to express the earnest hope that, notwithstanding the difficulties, the mass of human suffering involved in the refugee problem may, by some such means, be substantially alleviated.[46]

The state's representatives at the Evian Conference expressed their dearest wishes that the problem be alleviated in some manner, but by someone else. *They* surely could not do anything; it was up to someone else to solve the problem. Katrina Goldstone states that 'it is apparent, however, that the decision to limit the admission of Jewish refugees into Ireland had been made prior to Evian, and there is little evidence to suggest that it was substantially altered after the conference'.[47]

Non-refugee immigration into Ireland during the 1930s

According to the Irish census, between 1930 and 1939 fifty-five Austrian nationals and sixty-one German nationals took up residency in Ireland.[48] The census also stated that 3,749 respondents to the 1936 census stated their religion as Judaism.[49] This section will address how influential the German, Austrian and Jewish populations present in Ireland during the 1930s were regarding the facilitation of refugee admittance into the state. Particular attention will be given to how the establishment of foreign-owned industries affected refugee admittance, as well as how social connections and networks between aliens resident in Ireland and potential refugees were utilised.

Throughout the 1930s, a limited number of German and Austrian nationals were permitted to establish industries in Ireland. Seán Lemass, whom de Valera appointed as the Minister for Industry and Commerce in 1932, did not blindly adhere to Fianna Fáil's preferred policy of economic development, which favoured both protectionism and isolationism. Lemass saw foreign investment as an opportunity, and 'continually reiterated the skills that the aliens had while also

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees', p. 127.

[48] Central Statistics Office. Census 1961, Volume 7, Religion and Birthrights. Part II: Birthplaces.

[49] Ibid.

highlighting the temporary nature of the permits issued to non-nationals'.[50] Lemass facilitated the establishment of various textile factories that were owned and managed by German and Austrian Jews, which would frequently also employ specialists from the continent, many of whom were Jewish.

Debate did occur in the Dáil regarding the employment of foreign nationals. On 14 May 1936, a TD enquired as to the number of aliens employed at the Electricity Supply Board. The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs was also asked to 'state the grounds on which certificates of naturalisation are issued to aliens employed by the Electricity Supply Board'.[51] The same day a further enquiring regarding foreign employees of the Irish Sugar Company was directed at Lemass. The query regarded a visit to the company from Industry and Commerce officers, and asked 'whether the officers in question were informed by the Irish assistant machine masters that certain machinists, stockers, semi-skilled fitters and belt-men could be replaced by Irish workmen…'[52] There was clear concern within the Dáil that foreign labour was not being regulated appropriately, and that jobs that could be performed by Irish nationals were given, instead, to foreign workers. Lemass defended his position in November 1936, when he refuted the claim that aliens had penetrated the Irish job market.[53]

Various letters to the editor were published during the 1930s that also addressed the fear that aliens were monopolising jobs that should have been held by Irish nationals. One letter, published in 1938, stated that

> the number of aliens in Dublin, and for that matter Eire, appears to have increased considerably within the past few months. Are these people who have lost their positions in Germany or Italy? Is Eire a haven for these refugees who obtain appointments here, often key positions, while Irishmen are unemployed? Not many Irish names are seen over business establishments in some of our principal streets. It is time the inrush was stopped.[54]

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50 O'Connor, "The Obliviousness of the Fortunate', p. 100.

51 Mr Patterson, Dáil Debates, 62, 3, 14 May 1936.

52 Ibid.

53 Seán Lemass, Dáil Debates, 64, 4, 18 Nov. 1936.

54 *Irish Independent*

A week later a further letter to the editor was published, expressing a similar position.

> It is indeed time to take notice of the aliens in our midst and their prosperity. Their numbers are increasing daily. The newcomers are provided with work and housing accommodation by their friends already settled here, while our own people are sadly in need of both… with the great number of unemployed, Labour should see that Irish men and women get first preference. As it now is, strangers are penetrating into e very business and profession.[55]

A defence of the employment of aliens was published in the *Irish Times* in February 1939, which drew upon a British parallel:

> …admittance of aliens need not be the means of 'snatching work from British hands,' but may have the direct effect of increasing employment for everyone. The Home Secretary says that 11,000 immigrants have provided employment for 15,000 British workers, who otherwise would have remained unemployed. This is not because many of the refugees came with hoarded cash; but because they brought with them the essential capital in the form of 'skills, knowledge and foreign technical processes.' The gain from the latest influx of aliens has been most marked in the "Special Areas," where permission has been granted for the establishment of 200 new factories by refugee immigrants.[56]

It is important to note that both sides of the debate regarding alien employment and industry in Ireland were represented within the newspapers.

An Austrian national, Emil Hirsch, was granted permission to set up a ribbon factory in Dublin, as well as the Castle Hat Company in Castlebar, Co. Mayo.[57] Hirsch was a proponent of the increased admittance of German and Austrian nationals, and attempted to facilitate the entry of various refugees through the auspices of employment in his factories. Several Czech and Slovak Jewish families were eventually employed at the Castle Hat Factory. Furthermore, in 1938, the Austrian Jew Ernest Clare was issued with an Irish visa, as he was the primary financial backer of a proposed second ribbon factory, which was to be set up in Longford by the Hirsch family. This also resulted in visas being issued for Ernest's wife and son. Once in Ireland, Ernest's son, George Clare, moved to

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[55] *Irish Independent*, 21 Nov. 1938 (MAI, G/X/0304).

[56] *Irish Times*, 25 Feb. 1939.

[57] Keogh, *Jews*, 136.

Longford to aid in the establishment of the ribbon factory along with a small group of other German and Austrian nationals. This group included Robert Hirsch, Ernst Sonnenschein, Alois Gobl and Kende Ludwig.[58]

Les Modes Modernes, another foreign-owned company, opened in Galway in 1938, and was more commonly referred to as the Galway Hat Company. Marcus Witztum, a Polish Jew, oversaw the operations of the company along with his manager, Serge Philipson, who was also Jewish.[59] In January 1939, a solicitor in Galway wrote to External Affairs, requesting that the wife and son of an employee of the Galway Hat Factory be issued visas for Ireland. Theodore Honig, a Polish citizen, was 'anxious to obtain permission for his wife and son to come over here to live with him'.[60] His wife, Elsa, and their fourteen-year-old son Fritz were residing in Vienna. Matters were complicated in February, when Justice informed External Affairs that Honig's Polish citizenship had been cancelled, and that as such, he was to be 'accepted as a permanent resident of this country'.[61] The decision regarding Else and Fritz was stated as such:

> Mrs. Else Honig and her son reside at 18/12 Ferdinandstrasse Vienna II, and are stated to be Jews. It is, therefore, probably that once outside Germany they will not be allowed to return. The Minister will, however, raise no objection to the grant of visas on this ground alone, and I am to ask that you will so inform the Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin.[62]

Here is a clear example of an alien present legally within the state facilitating and aiding the admittance of people that would have been classified as refugees.

Various German and Austrian nationals were employed at Irish-owned firms. An Austrian national, Mr Singer, was head of the Irish Sugar Company.[63] Department of Justice files state that German and Austrian nationals were employed at the Irish Glass Bottle Company, the Electricity Supply Board, the

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58 Ibid., p. 137.

59 Ibid., p. 278, footnote 131.

60 John O'Connell, Solicitor to External Affairs, 25 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/43).

61 Justice to External Affairs, 17 Feb. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/43).

62 Ibid.

63 Wolfgang Muchitsch, 'Austrian Refugees in Ireland 1938-1945' in Holfter (ed), *German-speaking exiles*, p. 81.

Irish Steel Mill and the Irish Oil and Cake mills.[64] Keogh states that the Department of Justice also held files regarding foreign nationals employed as 'theatrical and circus performers, air crews in Shannon, merchant sailors, foreign religious, and musicians in the Radio Éireann orchestra'.[65]

Activity taken on behalf of refugee admittance by the Jewish community in Ireland also necessitates mention. Prominent individuals within the Jewish community, most particularly Robert Briscoe[66] and Rabbi Herzog, were actively engaged with increasing refugee admittance into Ireland, and would act as intermediaries between the government and individual refugees. Briscoe, as the only Jewish member of the government during the 1930s and 1940s, felt that he needed to act with discretion, and felt the need to be 'very careful and selective with the cases he took up'.[67] The Jewish community was generally very guarded concerning whom they endorsed for admittance, as they were worried that any troubles arising from the admittance of Jewish individuals would reflect poorly on their entire community. Interestingly, Briscoe seemed to have experienced this situation first hand with none other than Marcus Witztum, the manager of the Galway Hat Factory. In November 1938, Briscoe wrote to Witztum, stating that

> you appear to forget that you as foreigners came to me on your knees crying and begging humble and humiliated for assistance and protection and you think now because you have associated yourselves with the

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64 Keogh, *Jews*, p. 122. Keogh lists the relevant Department of Justice files as: NAI, DJ 69/2585; DJ 69/682; DJ 69/323; DJ 69/484.

65 Keogh, *Jews*, p. 122.

66 Robert Briscoe, the only Jewish member of Dáil Éireann and a close personal friend of de Valera, hailed from a prominent Irish-Jewish family. He would prove active before, during and after the war in the facilitation of Jewish admission into Ireland. Sources concerning Briscoe's life and political involvement, both within Ireland and the wider international community, are plentiful. He is mentioned in most works regarding Irish humanitarian or refugee policy during the mid-twentieth century. See Gianna Hegarty, 'Robert Briscoe – The Unofficial Political Leader of Ireland's Jewry' in my unpublished Master's thesis 'The Irish Government and Anti-Semitism: A study of Jewish Refugee Policy in Ireland during the Second World War' (M.Phil. thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 2009), pp 35-43 for an account of Briscoe's wartime refugee activity. Also, Kevin McCarthy's recently completed doctoral thesis 'Exploring the Zionist evolution of Robert Briscoe: History and memory' (Doctoral thesis, University College, Cork, 2014). Briscoe also wrote an autobiography entitled *For the Life of Me* (Longmans, 1959). His papers are held by the National Library, Ireland, and offer insight regarding his activity pertaining to Jewish and refugee matters during the 1930s and 1940s.

67 Ibid., p. 124.

> promotion of business, in which one of you is a Director, that you can address yourself to a public representative of the Irish people without a come-back… having been originally responsible for your permission to reside in this country, and having now been asked by several people for an explanation as to some of your activities, I, certainly, will have to take the precaution of protecting myself in making it perfectly clear that I know nothing of your activities nor have I any association whatever with you or your activities in business promotion.[68]

The position that the Jewish community held within Irish society was guardedly protected. Briscoe further stated that

> I am very jealous of the good name that Jews have enjoyed in this country hitherto and the happy manner in which they have been able to live within the community of the people of this country and I am certainly going to make it my business to protect any reactions from your activities bringing about a situation here which already exists on the Continent.[69]

Furthermore, Keogh cites further reasons for the Irish-Jewish community's guarded response to the Jewish refugee crisis of the 1930s. The Jewish community was categorically opposed to breaking any Irish laws, and never used illegal means to facilitate Jewish refugee migration to Ireland. It was known within the community that if Jewish refugees did enter Ireland illegally, and with the help of the Irish Jews, that the illegal immigrants would be quickly located by Irish authorities and that the credibility of the Irish-Jewish community would be tarnished. Also, when approached properly, the government had proved amenable to minimal Jewish admittance, and the admittance of some refugees was better than the admittance of none.[70]

It is also crucial to note that there would have been present within Ireland groups of aliens that would not have viewed the admittance of Jewish refugees kindly, particularly the pro-Nazi group led by Dr Adolf Mahr and the Irish branch of the Italian Fascist Party led by Count Eduardo Tomacelli. There has not been any archival evidence found that would point to either of these groups affecting

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[68] Robert Briscoe to Messrs A & M Witztum, 4 Nov. 1939 (Robert Briscoe papers, NLI, MS 26499 (4) Box 2).

[69] Ibid.

[70] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 128.

the government's refugee policy, yet their presence should not be wholly dismissed. It should also be stated that the majority of the most ardent German supporters of the Nazis present in Ireland during the late 1930s returned to Germany once war had been declared.

Irish Co-Ordinating Committee for Refugees

Committee Organisation and Structure

In 1938, the Department of Justice sent a memorandum to External Affairs outlining their proposed plan for dealing with the critical refugee situation in Europe. The memorandum focused upon the development of the Irish Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees, an umbrella organisation consisting of various groups concerned with the refugee situation, as well as how the Irish state would be reacting to requests of refugee admittance. It was stated that 'various societies in this country which are interested in the refugee problem, representatives of the Churches and members of the Dáil and Seanad'[71] were included within the Committee. These included the Church of Ireland Jews' Society (for Hebrew Christians), The Society of Friends' Germany Emergency Committee, University College Catholic Committee, the Jewish Standing Committee for Refugees and the Irish Committee for Austrian Aid.[72] The chairman was named as Mr Frank Fahy, TD, and the secretary as Dr T.W.T. Dillon. The Committee was meant to 'facilitate the Committee's objectives without compromising the government's policy' but 'it was subordinate to the approval of Department of Justice mandarins, who still controlled the quotas of refugees admitted into Ireland'.[73]

The Co-ordinating Committee put forward three schemes. The first centred upon the admittance into the state of a limited number of non-Aryan Christian refugees from Austria to receive training in agricultural work.[74] It was thought that once these refugees had received their training, they would be moved to a country of permanent resettlement, possibly Australia or Argentina. The Co-

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[71] Justice to External Affairs, 24 Nov. 1938 (NAI, DFA/243/9).

[72] *Irish Independent*, 9 Dec. 1938.

[73] Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees', p. 129.

[74] Justice to External Affairs, 24 Nov. 1938 (NAI, DFA/243/9).

ordinating Committee planned on raising the funds necessary to support these refugees whilst they were in Ireland through fundraising activity organised by their respective organisations. Regarding living arrangements, it was stated that 'two houses for the use of the refugees have already been placed at the disposal of the Committee by private persons for a period of six months and the Committee hope to be able to obtain the use of houses on Land Commission estates when those two houses are no longer available'.[75] It was agreed that fifty people would be issued visas under this scheme.

The second scheme proposed to admit twenty non-Aryan Christian adults whose maintenance would be guaranteed by well-to-do families.[76] It was stated that

> the committee have given an assurance that they will put forward the names only of such persons as do not intend to establish themselves in this country but intend, as soon as possible, to emigrate to some other country. The Committee are prepared to guarantee that those persons will not enter into any trade, profession or employment in competition with nationals.[77]

The third scheme was meant to admit twenty non-Aryan Christian children whose education and maintenance were to be assured by well-to-do families. It was stated that only children who were likely to be taken from Ireland by their parents after their education was completed would be considered, thus ensuring that they would not eventually be in economic competition with Irish nationals. Furthermore, the case of each refugee would be investigated by representatives in Germany of the Society of Friends, the Swedish Mission for Refugees or some similar organisation.

The Co-ordinating Committee used various criteria to screen potential refugees. The Co-ordinating Committee was solely responsible for the selection process, and stated that they would only select 'persons, whom they are satisfied will be suitable in every way'.[78] Industry and Commerce informed the Co-

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[75] Ibid. There is no information present within the relevant archival material regarding the 'well-to-do' families mentioned.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

ordinating Committee that refugees engaged in certain professional occupations, such as doctors and dentists were not to be admitted.[79] Suitable refugees were to be non-Aryan practicing Christians, who would pass background checks that were usually conducted by The Society of Friends international centre in Vienna.[80] If the category that a refugee was being considered for required specific training, such as the refugees admitted to undergo agricultural training, the refugee would have to accept the stated conditions. Unfortunately, the relevant archival material consulted did not contain any of the mentioned background checks or character references. An attempt to ascertain further particulars regarding the actual selection process of the Co-ordinating Committee refugees also proved fruitless.

One of the fundamental assumptions held by the government was that the Co-ordinating Committee would only concern itself with non-Aryan Christians. The existence of this distinction should be noted, as similar groups in other countries, notably in Britain, did not differentiate between practicing and non-practicing Jews in such a manner.[81] The British Co-Ordinating Committee for Refugee was initially formed in May 1938 on the initiative of the Home Office, and also consisted of numerous refugee organisations.[82] Its immediate functions consisted of the following:

> (a) to co-ordinate the activities of the authorised voluntary organisations handling specific refugee cases, (b) to receive and distribute to the appropriate bodies immigration applications received by the Home Office, by voluntary organisations, or by individuals, (c) to form a link between these constitute bodies and obviate overlapping in case work

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 141.

[81] Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees', p. 129.

[82] The British Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees consisted of the following organisations: Catholic Committee for Refugees in Germany, Church of England Committee for Non-Aryan Christians, German Jewish Aid Committee, Inter-Aid Committee for Children coming from Germany, International Student Service, Society of Friends (Germany Emergency and Austrian Committees), Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, Trades Union Congress and Labour Party (International Solidarity Fund), International Hebrew Christian Alliance, Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and the Czech Refugee Committee. Home Office, Aliens Department Minute, 28 Oct. 1938 (TNA, Home Office 213/1636).

> and (d) to discuss together matters of policy affecting the work of the several organisations.[83]

Its organisation and function were very similar to that of the Irish Co-Ordinating Committee, which had been created six months after its British counterpart. As such, it can be confidently assumed that the Irish modeled, at least partially, their committee on the British version. Both Co-ordinating Committees became actively involved with refugee selection and admittance. In Ireland, the Co-Ordinating Committee seemed willing to assume this heightened level of responsibility, yet in Britain the Co-Ordinating Committee felt overwhelmed and understaffed.[84] The number of refugee visa requests in Britain was significantly higher than in Ireland, yet it is interesting to note this differing response. London states that

> as the Government came more and more to realize its own inability to investigate the good faith or the suitability of thousands of applications which poured in, the Home Office, which had originally looked at the Committee as a consultative body, gradually came to rely upon it as an executive arm of the Aliens Department. It even went so far as to undertake not to admit applicants whose claims were not approved by one or other of the constituent bodies on the Co-Ordinating Committee where they fell within the scope of these Committees.[85]

The Irish authorities were also relying almost exclusively on the decisions reached by the Irish Co-Ordinating committee, thus reducing the level of official involvement from the government departments usually involved in refugee matters.[86] The Irish government used this deflection to essentially limit its level of

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83 'Memorandum to the Home Office from the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees, undated (TNA, Home Office 213/1636).

84 London, cites that a 'heavy reliance on volunteers resulted in amateurism and a lack of both systematic administration and effective financial controls' which could have accounted for the Committee's unease concerning the responsibilities imparted on it by the government. London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 68; for a brief account of the exchange between the Committee and the British government regarding levels of responsibility, see London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 81-2.

85 London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, 81.

86 Again, the same could be said for the British government. The decision of their Co-ordinating Committee regarding a refugee's application became the basis for Home Office decisions. London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 79.

official exposure to refugee organisations, and even individual refugees themselves.

Issues concerning the relationship between the British Co-ordinating Committee, the Home Office and the government of Northern Ireland also had to be addressed. By March 1939, the Northern Irish government had 'been receiving from various sources request for information regarding the admission of refugees and suggestions that permission be given for the entering into employment in Northern Ireland of refugees who have already been admitted'.[87] The refugees in question were those already present in the United Kingdom through the work of the British Co-ordinating Committee. Northern Irish officials felt that

> generally speaking, the Home Office does not concern itself as to the proposed destination within the United Kingdom of refugees who come in under the aegis of the Co-ordinating Committee; in other words, so far as they are concerned the problem is a United Kingdom one and they take no note of the fact that some of the refugees may happen to come to Northern Ireland.[88]

This issue dealt with the freedom of movement of refugees present within the United Kingdom. The Home Office did consult with the Northern Irish government if a refugee explicitly stated their intention to engage in employment in Northern Ireland.

> ... this Ministry will be consulted by the Home Office in cases where aliens who have been admitted wish to take gainful employment in Northern Ireland in competition with local residences; and in respect of aliens who, when the period for which they have been admitted has elapsed, wish to reside for a further period in Northern Ireland.[89]

It should be noted that there was no direct reference found in records held at the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland or at the National Archives in Dublin regarding any correspondence between the Dublin and Stormont government concerning cross-border refugee migrations. When Éire's policy was mentioned in Northern Irish records during the 1930s, it usually pertained to a

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[87] Minute sheet, 9 Mar. 1939 (PRONI, HA/8/74).

[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid.

query from a prospective refugee concerning application procedures, and example of which can be found in a letter written by the Lord Mayor's Secretary to a Dr Bernstein in January 1939. It was stated that

> as regards permits – Northern Ireland being part of the United Kingdom, application for permits to enter should be made to the British Home Office, Whitehall, London. So far as Eire, i.e., the Southern portion of Ireland, is concerned, I am not able to give you the correct address, but application should be made to the Government of Eire, Dublin.[90]

As early as 26 November, the Co-ordinating Committee schemes were reported in the Irish newspapers.[91] On 14 December, the *Irish Times* ran an article entitled 'Ireland helps Christian Refugees', which was rather sympathetic to the refugee situation in Europe.[92] The fact that many of these refugees were Christian converts was utilised to elicit an emotional response from the Irish reader, as well as appealing to the reader's sense of justice and morality.[93] As will become clear, this appeal to the specifically Christian character of Irish society was a common ploy used to foster support for refugees in the 1930s. It was also important that the Irish reader should be reassured that any refugees admitted into Ireland, although racially defined by the Nazis as Jewish, were indeed practicing Catholics.

The article went on to address the two issues that were seen as most pressing when considering the admittance of refugees into the state, namely their ability to secure employment and their permanent resettlement. It was stated that Ireland would act as a sort of 'clearing station' for the refugees, who would all go on to further resettlement in other countries, most likely the USA or South America. An appeal was included to 'every man and woman who in the kindness

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[90] Lord Mayor's Secretary to Dr N. Bernstein, 9 Jan. 1939 (PRONI, LA/7/3A/67).

[91] *Irish Press,* 26 Nov. 1938.

[92] *Irish Times,* 14 Dec. 1938.

[93] 'Frontiers have been opened to provide the outcasts with a new home; committees have been working to transfer them into an atmosphere of brotherhood, where Christian charity is doing what it possibly can to assist them in starting a new life. Ireland is willing to help. Men and women of all denominations are co-operating in this work of charity. A moving appeal signed by distinguished men of every kind has been issued. The Government has agreed to permit a certain number of the refugees to enter this country, and has recognised the co-ordinating committee as the channel through which applications for visas for refugees must be presented.' Ibid.

of their hearts desire to help alleviate misery and distress'.[94] The fact that these refugees would not be engaging in any employment was highlighted, as to not cause concern as to the lose of jobs for nationals. 'There is no need to hear that the question of employment will be made harder for Irish workers through letting in these homeless, penniless refugees. It is purely a work of charity. The scheme does not envisage employment; it only provides temporary shelter.'[95]

It is important to realise that the way in which the refugee schemes were being presented to the public was of significance. Tactics, such as an appeal to the Christian spirit of Ireland and emotional sentiment or emotive language, would have been useful when attempting to mollify Irish domestic opinion regarding refugee admittance. A further example of this was an *Irish Independent* article in December 1938. Entitled 'Appeal for Funds: Cardinal MacRory Heads Signatures: Pope's Message', this included an 'appeal on behalf of Christian refugees from Central Europe' and stated that 'Ireland has so far taken a very small number, and should now do her share'.[96] Furthermore, it was stated that

> in former days, when the great Famine and other disasters lay heavy on this land, many of our people sought and received the hospitality of other countries. Let us now show that we, too, can be generous, and prove to the world that Irish people still believe that Christians, of whatever race or blood, are sons of the same Father, whose brotherhood is shown above all in this, that 'they love one another'.[97]

This was an attempt to make the situation that the refugees found themselves in applicable to Irish sentiment. Comparing the displaced Irish citizens of the famine to the current refugees was a clever ploy. Furthermore, on 16 December an article entitled 'Pope Praises Ireland's Work for Refugees' was published in the *Irish Press*, and stated that the Pope 'send his approval of the work that Ireland was doing to take in 'Jewish-Catholic refugees from Austria and Germany''.[98]

As the Irish affinity for Christianity was used as a tool to facilitate refugee admittance into the state, it may have been presumed that Catholic-affiliated

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[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] *Irish Independent,* 9 Dec. 1938.

[97] Ibid.

[98] *Irish Press,* 16 Dec. 1938.

newspapers and publications would have reported on the proposed admittance of non-Aryan Christian refugees. Interestingly, a through examination of the *Irish Catholic*, a weekly Roman Catholic newspaper, found no mention of refugee admittance during 1938 and 1939.[99] The newspaper reported rather extensively on the marginalisation of the Catholic Church within the Nazi state during the late 1930s, yet made no direct mention of any refugee admittance into Ireland, nor the Irish Catholic Church's engagement with refugee issues. Throughout 1938, various articles addressing Nazi persecution of German and Austrian Catholics were published including articles entitled 'In Spite of Persecution, German Catholics Remain Loyal'[100], 'Two German Bishops Speak Out'[101], 'Dark Outlook for Catholic Austria'[102], 'Austrian Schools: Eliminating Church's Influence'[103] and 'Breach of Austrian Concordat: Catholic Marriage Laws Abolished'.[104] Although there were attempts by other newspapers, notably the *Irish Times*, to elicit domestic support for refugee admittance, it would seem that the focus of the *Irish Catholic* was to draw attention to the Nazi persecution of German and Austrian Catholics.

There was one mention, on 9 March 1939, regarding where Jewish refugees could be settled, yet the only countries directly referenced were the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.[105] There was no mention of Ireland as a possible country of admittance. The reporting of Catholic persecution within Germany and Austria continued during 1939, and was increasingly coupled with references regarding Jewish persecution.[106] The lack of reporting in regards to refugee admittance could lend credence to the assertion that, although reassured on occasion, the Irish public was not overly fixated on refugee admittance as a political issue. Public attention may also have been more easily

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99 The *Irish Catholic* is available at the NLI.

100 *Irish Catholic*, 27 Jan. 1938.

101 *Irish Catholic*, 17 Feb. 1938.

102 *Irish Catholic*, 17 Mar. 1938.

103 *Irish Catholic*, 7 July 1938.

104 *Irish Catholic*, 14 July 1938.

105 *Irish Catholic*, 9 Mar. 1939.

106 *Irish Catholic*, 9 Mar. 1939; 27 July 1939; 31 Aug. 1939.

drawn to the plight of fellow German and Austrian Catholics, as this was extensively reported on. As such, the government was able to make its decisions regarding refugee admittance based on other influences and state objectives, including foreign policy concerns.

Pertaining to the actual work of the Co-ordinating Committee, refugees were admitted through the winter of 1938, the first group landing in Ireland during December. By 22 December, there were a total of seventeen refugees present in Ireland through the efforts of the Co-ordinating Committee. Nine adults and two children were being housed in Ardmore, Co. Waterford.[107] Six refugees had arrived on 21 December to be placed in various houses in and around Dublin. However, it was stated that 'they were so eager to spend Christmas together that the Matron of the Convalescent Home in Stillorgan (where they went on arrival) has kindly arranged for them to stay there over the Christmas period'.[108] Three more refugee children were expected to arrive in Dun Laoghaire within the week, and a further ten before the end of the year.

The following March, the Co-ordinating Committee supplied Justice with an update in the form of a report, as well as issuing a request for an increase in the number of issuable permits. The Committee had previously requested the establishment of a separate quota specifically for practicing Jews, yet had been refused. Justice was informed that

> the Committee felt that it might be desirable to ask the Minister for a small increase in the number of permits now, and then ask for a larger increase when some of the cases at present adopted had left the country. On the other hand, it was also felt that the Minister would wish to know what number the Committee consider necessary for the completion of their work.[109]

The Co-ordinating Committee had already issued ninety visas; forty relating to the agricultural training scheme, thirty-four guaranteed adults and sixteen guaranteed children.[110] The state was well able to absorb this small number of

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[107] *Irish Independent,* 22 Dec. 1938.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Irish Co-Ordinating Committee for Refugees to Justice, 7 Mar. 1939 (NAI, DFA/243/9).

[110] Ibid.

refugees, and the Co-ordinating Committee saw this as encouraging. It was stated that, in regard to funding, the Co-ordinating Committee was well able to support these refugees, and felt comfortable increasing the number of visas:

> The response to the appeal, taken in conjunction with the resources promised and held by constituent societies, is sufficient to enable the Committee to be confident that it is capable of carrying out its responsibilities in relation to the cases already adopted. It has, indeed, pursued a somewhat conservative policy in relation to the Agricultural Scheme, for which the cases were adopted in three groups as funds and promises came. The committee is willing to supply the Minister with a confidential statement of its financial position, if he desires it. Here it may be sufficient to state that the private resources greatly exceed the 3,000 pounds received in response to the appeal.[111]

This statement implied that the Irish public was rather generous in their financial support of the appeal made on behalf of the refugees by the Co-ordinating Committee. It is stated that the Methodist Committee raised around £600 for refugee children, the Presbyterian Church had formed a committee and was working on an appeal and that the Pope had given a gift of £1,000 to the President of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul.[112]

This generosity spurred the Co-ordinating Committee to appeal for an increase in visas, as they believed that the Irish public was willing to help support these people. Point 11 of the report, stated that

> the Co-Ordinating Committee therefore requests the Minister to grant further quotas of permits for:-
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> ...
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> B. Cases for which very strict monetary guarantees are available in this country. In relation to (b) it is expected that the guarantees would come either from individuals of secure financial position or from funds such as the Methodist Fund and that supplied by His Holiness. Our view is that regulations for the guarantees should be drawn up after consultation between the legal advisors of the Ministry and of the Co-Ordinating Committee. The committee desire that it should be drawn up as to ensure that funds will be available both for the maintenance and the cost of emigrating the refugee. The committee would also wish, for its own protection, that the regulations in relation to all these cases should be strictly administered.[113]

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111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

It is interesting to note that the Co-ordinating Committee seemed to have thought that if they acted in a rather conservative manner, they might continue to bend the government's ear in the direction of a more liberal refugee policy.

The final issue discussed within the report was that of emigration. The Co-ordinating Committee stated that the *certainty* of emigration was far more important than the date of emigration. As long as it was a certainty that these refugees would move on to a place of final resettlement, it should matter less when this actually happened. One refugee had apparently already been relocated to Brazil. The most likely countries of emigration were listed as Brazil, New Zealand and Australia. Other offers were slow to materialise, but not unheard of. A place for a family of three was offered in Nova Scotia, an offer of employment was made for a married couple in England and a few people had affidavits for the USA.[114] The end result of the enquiry to raise the number of visas was positive, and Justice informed the Co-ordinating Committee that their visa quota would be raised.[115]

In April, a report emanating from Justice highlighted some of the problems faced by the government and the Co-ordinating Committee.[116] The main issue was of screening the potential refugees. It had been arranged that every refugee found acceptable by the Co-ordinating Committee would be additionally vetted by the legation in Berlin. This was causing delays with the issuance of visas to refugees already accepted:

> The Co-ordinating Committee obtains reports from sources in Germany relating to each refugee before they approach this Department for permission to bring in the refugee. In the case of Christian refugees these reports are obtained from the Society of Friends, the Swedish Mission for Refugees or prominent clergymen, and in the case of Jews reports are obtained from various sources. The Co-Ordinating Committee state that they are quite satisfied regarding the good character of each refugee before they submit his case to this Department and they point out that the

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[114] Ibid.

[115] Justice (J.E. Duff) to the Irish Co-Ordinating Committee, undated (NAI, DFA/243/9).

[116] Justice to Walshe, 6 Apr. 1939 (NAI, DFA/243/9).

> enquiries made by the Legation in Berlin have not led to the refusal of a visa to any person.[117]

The report ends by stating that 'we believe that we have secured the good-will and co-operation of the Co-ordinating Committee and we are anxious to avoid making any difficulties for them'.[118] This statement seems to imply that the government was rather concerned with keeping the Co-ordinating Committee in their good graces, and working in their favour.

Charles Bewley, the Irish envoy to Berlin from 1933 until his recall in 1939, infamous for his pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic views, also helped to foster this discord.[119] Mervyn O'Driscoll states that Bewley did not become overtly supportive of the Nazi regime until 1935, when he began to display an obvious affinity for Nazi racial ideology.[120] As such, Bewley was not supportive of any attempts to increase the Jewish population in Ireland, and did his best to delay the application process for Jewish refugees.[121] Reporting in early 1939, Bewley informed External Affairs of the multitude of issues that he felt negatively affected the policy put in place by External Affairs, Justice and the Co-ordinating Committee. He claimed that 'thousands of Jews have been baptized for the purpose of avoiding certain inconveniences to which they were exposed by membership of the Jewish religion'.[122] He made it quite clear that he believed that a date of baptism should be ascertained by the Co-ordinating Committee in order to verify that these 'Christian' Jews were authentic. He then went on to discuss the usual issues surrounding the admittance of refugees into the state, namely

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117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Bewley originated from an old Quaker family but converted to Catholicism while attending Oxford. He was educated in literature and the humanities, as well as law, which he practiced in Dublin during the 1920s. In 1929, Bewley was posted to the new Irish legation at the Vatican, where he would remain until his appointment to Berlin in 1933. Keogh, *Ireland and Europe,* p. 28.

120 Mervyn O'Driscoll, 'Inter-war Irish-German Diplomacy: Continuity, Ambiguity and Appeasement in Irish Foreign Policy' in Kennedy and Skelly (eds) *Irish foreign policy, 1919-66,* p. 82-87; also for a concise account of Bewley activity in Germany see Keogh, *Jews,* p. 99-103.

121 For an account of Bewley's anti-Semitic behaviour while stationed in Berlin, see O'Driscoll, 'The 'Jewish Question''.

122 Bewley to External Affairs, 25 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/243/9).

resettlement and employment. Bewley stated that none of these refugees had been admitted to Ireland with any assurance of further resettlement.[123] He went on to say that he could not imagine a country or territory that would welcome all of the displaced Jews of Europe, and that the Jews admitted to Ireland probably would not want to move to any such place anyway.[124]

Concerning the employment of these refugees, specifically those trained in agricultural work, he felt that 'Jews admitted for the purpose of agriculture abandon their agricultural work at the first opportunity and go to live in the cities'.[125] Bewley ended his report by stating that he

> should much regret if it were thought that I was in any way lacking in sympathy towards Jews desirous of leaving Central Europe. I cannot however help feeling that when their interests are for the reason above set out in obvious conflict with the interests of the people of Ireland, it is my duty, as it is that of all persons concerned, to subordinate all feelings of personal sympathy to the protection of Irish interests.[126]

The fact that Bewley felt compelled to make these remarks, seemingly trying to justify his attitude towards Jewish refugees should have been found sobering. Goldstone states that although 'it is difficult to establish precisely Bewley's role in obstructing or delaying visas' he was nevertheless 'open in his distrust and disdain for Jewish refugees' and most certainly did what he could to arrest their migration to Ireland.[127]

Committee Cases Files

Regarding the selection of the Co-ordinating Committee refugees, a rather specific type of refugee was being sought by the Irish government. It is clear that, although these schemes were created to help people that were being targeted by Nazi oppression, the acceptable refugees were clearly set as Christian Jews. A

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[123] 'I had supposed that further details would be sent to me with regard to the measures to be taken in order to secure that the persons admitted should not be of an undesirable type and that only such persons should be admitted as would be able to leave Ireland after their 'temporary' sojourn and could be deported in the event of their refusing to leave voluntarily'. Ibid.

[124] Bewley to External Affairs, 25 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/243/9).

[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees', p. 133.

memorandum entitled *Refugees*, dated November 1938, stated that 'these proposals relate only to Christians with Jewish blood. The Co-Ordinating Committee are of the opinion that this country should confine its efforts to such persons as there are adequate funds subscribed by the Jewish Communities in other countries to deal with the cases of professing Jews'.[128] Where and how the Irish government ascertained this view is unknown. It was already well known by 1938 that no country was willing to admit a large number of Jews, even countries with relatively large and affluent Jewish populations such as the USA.

A case would be referred to the Committee through various channels. Refugees with family or friends living in Ireland would frequently have their applications forwarded to the Co-ordinating Committee; refugees that applied for Irish visas at various Irish legations in Europe would be referred to the Committee; other refugee organisations would also refer cases. Within the External Affairs' files, quite often the department itself would refer a person, group, or organisation to the Co-ordinating Committee. Once the Co-ordinating Committee was in contact with a possible refugee, the Co-Ordinating Committee application was completed, along with a character assessment or testimony. This was usually seen to by the Swedish Mission for Refugees or representatives in Germany of the Society of Friends.[129] Other aspects of an application could include personal references, any connections with Ireland by the individual, economic considerations and language skills.

The actual application form consisted of the usual questions: name, place and date of birth, ability to speak English, friends or relatives residing in Ireland or England, occupation, health, etc. An applicant was asked to supply their religion, number of non-Aryan grandparents, the church they usually attended, the Pastor (not rabbi), their number and nature of passports, the prospect of their ability to emigrate back to Germany or to another country, if they were prepared for 'very hard work', etc.[130] Once a completed application was received, and a

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128 Ibid.

129 Justice to External Affairs, 24 Nov. 1938 (NAI, DFA/243/9).

130 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee for Refugees' application for Paul Zirbes (NAI, DFA/202/22).

refugee's character established as sound, the recommendation would be given to Justice. A positive recommendation from the Co-ordinating Committee would almost always result in a positive decision from Justice.

Most archival files regarding Co-ordinating Committee cases are rather slim and straight to the point. Not much is contained that speaks to the lives of these people, yet there are a few exceptions. The Secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee received a letter on 16 November 1938 from the President of the Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany, who wished to bring to the attention of the Committee the case of Paul Zirbes. The President of the Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany had received a letter from a Mr Spielmann of Middlesex, outlining Zirbes' predicament. Zirbes had been discriminated against due to his continued involvement within Catholic youth organisations, had been imprisoned in a youth concentration camp and had been shuffled across various international borders.[131] A further letter from Spielmann stated that 'the problem is that he (Zirbes) is coming out of prison at the beginning of January and he has not got any papers, passport, etc. He simply does not know where to go and the Belgians have sent him over the border 4 times. It is really a very urgent case and I would be very, very grateful to you if you could help him or advise me what to do.[132]

Spielmann was then contacted by the Co-ordinating Committee to furnish more information about Zirbes. In two further letters, Spielmann stated that his brother, who was apparently the initial connection with Zirbes, only had limited information concerning his background, and could not get in touch with him, as

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131 'Zirbes is 17 years old 'Aryan' and was a member of the Catholic Youth Movement. He still wore the uniform when it was forbidden and was for this sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. Afterwards he was to go to a sort of concentration camp for youths called 'Erziehungsanstalt' till the age of 21. He managed to escape and went over the border. His second crime is to have left the country without the permission of the military authorities. As he has no passport or any papers he was expelled from Holland and pushed over the border into Belgium. The police got hold of him and pushed him into Holland again and this procedure went on several times. After being expelled from Belgium three times and found again by the police he was sentenced in June this year to 7 months imprisonment for 'vagabondage'. Could your organisation do something for him? He is unquestionably a good Catholic'. Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany to T.W.T. Dillon, 16 Nov. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/22).

132 Spielmann to Irish Co-Ordinating Committee, undated. (NAI, DFA/202/22).

he was still in prison. The information that Spielmann's brother did furnish stated that Zirbes went 'to a secondary school in Dusseldorf and afterwards he went to another school to become a locksmith. The father is dead; his mother is still in Germany and she lived under very poor conditions'.[133] Zirbes' Co-ordinating Committee application is included within the file, and attests to the scant knowledge of his particulars. Most of the questions were left blank, however his name, religion and reason for leaving Germany were filled in. His reason for leaving Germany was stated on the form as incitement to high treason. It was stated that he was prepared for hard work, and that he could not speak English.

On 20 January, Joseph Walshe[134] wrote to the Irish High Commissioner's Office in London, stating that the

> Irish Co-Ordinating Committee has asked the Department if it would be possible to arrange through the Evian Refugee Committee of which the Earl of Winterton is the President to have this alien allowed remain in Belgium until such time as a decision is taken by the Co-Ordinating Committee in his case. The Co-Ordinating Committee is not aware of the prison in which this alien was incarcerated but it may have been in Brussels.[135]

This was a rare instance of the Irish government seeking the assistance of an international body, such as the Evian Refugee Committee, in relation to a refugee's well being. The High Commissioner responded to Walshe, stating that the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (Evian Refugee Committee) could not intervene in the case of individuals.[136] It also proved hard to ascertain Zirbes' actual location in Belgium.

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[133] Spielmann to Irish Co-Ordinating Committee, 13 Dec. 1938. (NAI, DFA/202/22).

[134] Joseph Walshe was the Secretary of the External Affairs from 1922 to 1946. For a thorough account of Walshe's career, see Dermot Keogh, 'Profile of Joseph Walshe, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1922-46' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, iii, no. 2 (1990), pp 59-80. Also, Michael Kennedy, "Nobody Knows and Ever Shall Know from Me That I have Written It': Joseph Walshe, Éamon de Valera and the Execution of Irish Foreign Policy, 1932-8' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, xiv (2003), pp 165-83.

[135] Walshe to High Commissioner, London, 20 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/22).

[136] High Commissioner, London to Walshe, 21 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/22).

The Co-ordinating Committee then turned to the Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany,[137] an English refugee organisation, in the hopes of securing Zirbes a United Kingdom entry visa which would enable him to reach safety while the Co-ordinating Committee gathered all necessary sections of his application. The United Kingdom entry visa was granted, and Zirbes reached the safety of England. Once he had reached England, he was allowed to stay. Although never ending up in Ireland, the Co-ordinating Committee still played a large part in his journey to safety.[138]

The other Co-ordinating case that will be specifically examined is that of Dr. Johannes Hennig. In July 1939, Hennig's application was accepted by both the Co-ordinating Committee and Justice, yet as will be shown, it took Hennig months to actually arrive in Ireland. Hennig encountered problems leaving Germany, and on 23 August 1939, his father-in-law wrote to the Irish legation in Paris, stating 'that it might for the moment not be opportune for Hennig to have in his passport the visa of your Government because the German authorities are not yet familiar with Hennig's intention as to his future plans and should not yet be able to verify such intentions…'[139] The German government, though actively trying to forcibly facilitate emigration of its 'undesirable' population, was also trying to hold onto the educated, Aryan middle class. Hennig might have

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[137] There is scant mention of the Catholic Committee for Refugee from Germany within the British National archives. The one file specifically pertaining to the organisation only contains information concerning the financial maintenance of Committee refugees once they had reached British territory in 1941. (TNA, Unemployment Assistance Boards 11/90).

[138] As an interesting side note, the Paris legation informed External Affairs after Zirbes had reached England that 'the Belgian authorities state that Zirbes who was expelled from Belgium on the 19th June 1937, was sentenced in July 1938 to a period of 7 months imprisonment for theft, the using of a false name and breach of the expulsion order. On the 5th January, he was deported to Germany, via Hergentath since then the Belgian authorities have no knowledge of his whereabout'. Paris legation to External Affairs, 4 Mar. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/22). There had been no pervious mention of theft or the using of a false name as crimes committed by Zirbes. This knowledge might very well have changed the decision of the refugee committees involved, even though such behaviour could easily be contributed to various survival methods within an increasingly hostile Europe. Also, the mention that Zirbes had been deported to Germany is curious, as he was stated to have been in England by 16 March.

[139] Mr F. Meyer to Irish , Paris, 23 Aug. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/417).

encountered various problems had the German government become aware of his visa application prematurely.[140]

Hennig succeeded in exiting Germany a week before the war broke out, and found himself in Belgium. In a letter from Colum Gavan Duffy, the Secretary of the Irish Catholic Council for Refugees, to the Irish High Commissioner's Office in London, yet another of Hennig's problems became apparent. The Co-ordinating Committee had referred him in July 1939 to Justice, which had duly issued a visa. A visa had not been issued for Hennig's wife, however. He was refusing to leave Belgium without her, and thus Duffy was inquiring as to the question of issuing a visa for Mrs. Hennig. Hennig had apparently smuggled his wife into Belgium, and was facing deportation back to Germany.[141] It was further stated that his reception upon re-entering Germany would most likely not be welcoming as he had been in the 'black books' of the Nazis due to his refusal to divorce his non-Aryan wife. Unfortunately, the Irish government was still unwilling to grant his wife a visa, and Hennig remained in Belgium.

On 3 October, the Irish legation in Paris wrote to External Affairs, stating once again that a visa had been issued for Hennig but not his wife.[142] Curiously, a

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[140] It is not stated within the relevant file why Hennig was included within the Co-ordinating Committee visa quota, as he was Aryan. His credentials would have made him a preferable refugee for admittance, as he held a doctorate in Ethics, a German Teacher's Certificate, as well as holding the position of director for a chemical and pharmaceutical company. He had been offered a position at Belvedere College as a German instructor, and had received a work permit from Industry and Commerce. Hennig was also described as a 'violent anti-Nazi'. Various correspondence (NAI, DFA/ 202/417, 'Dr. Johannes Hennig').

[141] 'He himself [Dr. Hennig] has been in Eupen for the past fortnight, and has managed to smuggle his non-Aryan wife illegally into Belgium. The Reverend J.M. O'Connor S.J. Rector of Belvedere College is prepared to vouch as to his absolute integrity and good character, and also to the fact that he is a violent anti-Nazi, and does not in the least desire to join the German army at present... it is most likely that the Belgians will forcibly insist upon him returning to Germany.' Colum Gavan Duffy to Irish High Commissioner, London, 6 Sept. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/417).

[142] 'I had a telegram issued from the Legation to Dr. Hennig informing him that a visa could be issued to him but not to his wife and enquiring whether in those circumstances he wished to obtain a visa. On the 29th ulto. one Mr Lilieblad who had come to Paris on an official mission from the French Embassy in Brussels presented Dr. Hennig's passport at the Legation with a request that an Irish visa should be put on. A visa was accordingly affixed valid for one journey up to the 29th November 1939. The passport was handed back to Mr Lilieblad together with a letter to Dr. Hennig and another letter to the British Passport Control Office at Brussels, requesting that a visa be issued to enable Dr. Hennig to proceed to

week later visas were issued from the Irish government to Mrs. Hennig, as well as the couple's two children. No reason or rationale was stated, simply that the visas should be issued. All arrived safely in Ireland.

Within most of the files concerning the Co-ordinating Committee, the information present is the applicant's name, date of birth, nationality and address. Attempts to locate any of the character inquiries necessary for a refugee's positive referral have thus far proved fruitless. There has also been a general lack of personal and governmental correspondence with the Co-ordinating Committee. The information that is provided is useful in gaining a general understanding of who these people were. Within the External Affairs files, thirty-four cases have been identified as being definitely reviewed by the Co-ordinating Committee, and all but one resulted in positive referrals.[143]

The thirty-four cases give an idea of the kind of refugees that the Co-ordinating Committee was admitting. Out of the thirty-four, ten were eighteen years of age or younger, one was in their twenties, four were in their thirties, five were in their forties, three were in their fifties, one was in their sixties and eleven were without birthdates included in their files.[144] The listed occupations of the individuals are as follows; ten students, one medical doctor, one salesman, two lawyers, one middle school teacher, one farmer/laborer, one chemist, two directors (Chemical/Pharmaceutical, paper mills), one housewife, one University Professor, one silk-cloth printer and fourteen with no listed profession.[145]

Thirteen of the thirty-four individuals can mostly likely be considered Austrian (were listed as born in pre-Anschluss Austrian territory), ten could most likely be considered of German nationality and there was one of Czechoslovakian nationality.[146] All refugees held German passports. One refugee was in

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Ireland through Great Britain.' Irish legation, Paris to External Affairs, 3 Oct. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/417)

[143] For particulars regarding the specifics of Co-ordinating Committee refugees, refer to Appendix 2: Irish Co-ordinating Committee refugees, 1938-1939.

[144] This information was gathered from various Department of Foreign Affairs files, Series DFA/202, NAI.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Ibid.

Yugoslavia at the time of the issuance of his visa, one was in Italy, two were in Belgium and the rest were in German- held territory. Two of the refugees had been held in concentration camps prior to their initial contact with the Co-ordinating Committee, one listed as being interned in Dachau.

International and Domestic Refugee Organisations

The Co-ordinating Committee consisted of a multitude of refugee organisations present in Dublin, and thus was the main body through which refugees applied for Irish visas. However, there are examples of cases that involved other refugee or religious organisations. One such example is the case of Sali Weil, whose case was brought to the attention of the Irish government through the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations in London, led by Rabbi Dr Solomon Schonfeld.[147] Schonfeld was also involved with another organisation, the Religious Emergency Council for German and Austrian Jewry, located in London. In a letter written by Schonfeld, Weil's situation was discussed:

> You no doubt recollect our talk of some weeks ago, concerning the refugee problem. As agreed, I have refrained from giving you any cases of people whose claims are based on nothing else but sympathy. I now, however, have pleasure in forwarding to you one application that seems to me to fall within the bounds of possibilities which Mr. de Valera imagines would be allowed to come to Ireland. Mr. Sali Weil and his family are well known to us as extremely reliable and trustworthy people, whose family abroad possess sufficient means to back them up in their industrial undertaking. If it was felt advisable, they would settle to the West of Eire, and I can vouch that they will stick to the project which they plan, with industry and reliability. This is a clear case where Irish labour would be employed through Mr. Weil's efforts. As regards capital, friends in Eire would join the undertaking as soon as it was established, and arrange that the control shall be within the provisions of your Acts, namely at least 51% Irish.[148]

It is interesting to note Schonfeld's reference of only bringing up cases that were based not solely on sympathy. It is once again clear that even when considering

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[147] Solomon Schonfeld would prove a controversial figure in both Ireland and Britain regarding refugee admittance. See Keogh, *Jews*, p. 175-6 for the Irish government's reaction to Schonfeld. For a brief description of Schonfeld's activities in Britain pertaining to the admittance of Jewish children, see TNA, Home Office 213/1797. Schonfeld will also feature in the next chapter regarding his activity with Jewish rescue schemes during World War Two.

[148] Rabbi Dr Solomon Schonfeld (Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations) to Walshe, 11 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/15).

the admittance of legitimate refugees, the Irish government always had an eye out for refugees that would be advantageous to admit. Refugees who could contribute more to the Irish state than simply enhancing her reputation for humanitarian concern were always preferable. Schonfeld was also aware of the government's willingness to consider refugees who would contribute economically to the state. A proposed industrial undertaking was mentioned, along with an assurance of the financial assistance needed to successfully establish the venture in Éire. The mention that the establishment would provide employment for Irish nationals was also meant to entice a government that was greatly worried about unemployment.

As with most cases submitted by outside organisations, there is a reference in the file to External Affairs recommending that the case be brought to the attention of the Co-ordinating Committee. In the end, Weil's visa request was not granted. Industry and Commerce responded to the query, stating that they were not prepared to allow Weil to establish his factory in Ireland.[149]

Another case involving Schonfeld and the Religious Emergency Council for German and Austrian Jewry was that of Arnold Morducovitch, a German Jew. Schonfeld stated in a letter to Walshe dated 27 February 1939 that he 'was sorry that the first request for an industrialist refugee in Ireland [presumably Sail Weil] was not approved' yet he hoped that Walshe would 'not mind my bothering you with a second application'.[150] Morducovitch was a 'trained expert' whose 'knowledge of meta-work is just the type required by a number of Irish firms'.[151] Once again, a refugee's potential economic value to the state was highlighted. As with the first application from Schonfeld, this refugee was denied entry into Ireland.

Schonfeld again tried to recommend a refugee to the Irish government in June 1939. He stated in a letter to External Affairs that

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[149] Yad Vashem Central Database of Shoah Victims' Names, Sali Weil. Sali Weil's name was searched in the Yad Vashem database. Two men with the name Sali Weil are listed; both were deported and murdered during the war. As there is scant personal information contained within the National Archive's file regarding Sail Weil, it is impossible to ascertain if either of the Sali Weil's listed was the same one discussed in the file.

[150] Rabbi Dr Solomon Schonfeld (Religious Emergency Council for German and Austrian Jewry) to Walshe, 27 Feb. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/115).

[151] Ibid.

> you no doubt recollect that Mr. de Valera intimated to me at our interview that it was a policy of your Government not to exclude experts who could introduce industries into Ireland. I have taken that as my guide in the various applications that are being made. So far, the attitude of the Ministry of Justice does not seem to coincide with the principle laid down by Mr. de Valera.[152]

Schonfeld felt that he was only submitting the kind of cases that would be favourably looked upon, yet was repeatedly given a negative response. It has been well documented that de Valera was far more liberal with refugee applicants than other members of the government, namely those that most usually dealt with refugee applications (i.e. Justice rather than External Affairs). It is probable that Schonfeld was given a more liberal view of refugee policy from de Valera than could be expected from the rest of the government. Schonfeld's character had also been called into question, as he was viewed with skepticism by both Irish authorities and the Irish Jewish community, whom were concerned that he represented an extremely small and Orthodox group.[153] Katrina Goldstone also mentions in a footnote that 'Schonfeld, by the way, was a controversial figure with a reputation for using varied means to help refugees'.[154]

Schonfeld's letter continued, stating that Mr A. Wolff 'would introduce an important leather and skin industry, and no doubt give employment to subjects in Eire' and that he would be 'obliged if you could possibly look into this matter and see whether in this straight-forward case, a favourable decision could not be reached'.[155] Walshe wrote to Schonfeld in July that the application had been reviewed twice, and that the outcome was negative.[156]

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152 Rabbi Dr Schonfeld (Religious Emergency Council for German and Austrian Jewry) to Walshe, 29 June 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/157).

153 Keogh, *Jews*, p. 176.

154 Katrina Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees', p. 126.

155 Rabbi Dr Schonfeld (Religious Emergency Council for German and Austrian Jewry) to Walshe, 29 June 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/157).

156 An enclosed letter, written by Wolff himself, is another classic example of the type of information these pleas contained. 'Please let me know the conditions for receiving a: labour- permit for Ireland. I have the intention to establish myself in Ireland by making a trade in leather. I'm born at Francfort-on-the-Main (Germany), January 9th 1902 and I've had during long years a good business in leather in Germany. You will have the goodness to inform me as early as convenient if it's possible to receive the permission of immigration to Ireland also for my wife, born June 15th 1906 in Paris and for my two children born 1932 &

Another example of a refugee attempting to gain entry into Ireland through an organisation outside of the Co-ordinating Committee was that of Greta Praeger. Her application originated from the UCD based Catholic Committee for Refugees,[157] which was the organisation that had been responsible for the admittance of Austrian refugee students in 1938.[158] Praeger's financial maintenance was guaranteed by a Mrs Doyle, and her professional accomplishments as an educator, as well as her Catholicism, were touted in an attempt to secure admittance. Not only was Praeger a stated Catholic, but she had also been involved with the Teachers Association of Austria, as well as having taught in the Catholic school system. A supposedly prominent Austrian Catholic social worker, Dr Bichl-Mair, also provided a character reference. All of these attributes and assurances, as well as Praeger's claim to be a full Aryan, were enough to secure her admittance.[159]

An interesting case that also originated from the Catholic Committee for Refugees at UCD was that of Caroline Zwanisch. Zwanisch was an Austrian doctor from Vienna.

> I (Coffey) received to-day a telegram from a Viennese lady, a Doctor refugee namely Carla de Zwanisch. She had been accepted by the National University of Ireland in July last to give lectures in her special subject, i.e. microscopic methods of teaching and research, in the Faculty of Medicine, her lectures to be arranged for as to time during Session 1939-40 in respect of a part in Dublin, part in Cork and a part in Galway. She was a

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1934 at Francfort c/M. I've to my disposition in Ireland the sum of: 1200 pounds'. A. Wolff to 'Immigration Department in Ireland', 13 Mar. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/157).

157 The University College, Dublin Catholic Committee for Refugees was actually one of the refugee organisations that was a part of the umbrella Co-ordinating Committee, but as Greta Praeger was an *Aryan* Catholic, she officially fell outside of the scope of refugee usually considered by the Committee. As such, her case had to be brought before the government by the Catholic Committee for Refugees itself, and not through the Co-ordaining Committee.

158 Holfter, *German Speaking Exiles,* p. 78.

159 The full text of the Catholic Committee for Refugees statement concerning Praeger ran as such: 'We have been trying to arrange for the immigration to Ireland of Miss. Greta Praeger, of Tiger-Gasse, 3/12, Vienna 8. She was to have gone to stay with Mrs. Doyle, 55 Merrion Rd, Ballsbridge. Mrs. Doyle was ready to take the full responsibility for her during her stay in Ireland. G. Praeger was recommended to us as a person worthy of every assistance by Dr. Bichl-Mair, S.J. of Vienna, who is a prominent Catholic Social Worker. Miss Praeger had been an official of the Teachers Association of Austria, and a teacher in one of the larger Catholic schools. She lost her post after the annexation of Austria, and she now has no prospect of being further employed as a teacher in Germany. She is a full Aryan.' Catholic Committee for Refugees to External Affairs, 27 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/48).

> Catholic Medical Doctor, University Lecturer in Vienna, but was driven out.[160]

Zwanisch had already been accepted for a position at the National University, but her first request for an Irish entry visa had been denied on 25 September. Within the previously quoted letter, Coffey made a further request for the admission of Zwanisch. 'If is possible to give her a visa I would recommend it strongly, because I think her quite reliable'.[161] A response was garnered from Justice a month later, when it was stated that

> it was generally agreed that, from now on, the only aliens that should be admitted to this country should be technical experts required for industrial purposes and recommended by the Minister for Industry & Commerce. A case might be made for Carla Zawisch [sic], if she could obtain a valid re-entry permit into France or some other country so as to ensure that, if necessary, she could be sent out of this country at any time. This is essential in the case of this alien, as she is at the moment in straitened financial circumstances and the possibility of her becoming a public charge in this country could not be overlooked. If permission was granted for her entry, it would, accordingly, only be on condition that she would remain in this country for the period of her employment with U.C.D., and would return to France or to whatever country she had her re-entry visa for immediately thereafter.[162]

Unsurprisingly, Zwanisch's admittance hung on her ability to secure a re-entry permit for another country to ensure that she would not become a financial burden on the state after her stated term of employment. Justice also required that she obtain a work permit from Industry and Commerce, due to her prospective employment.[163] In most cases, the acceptance of a refugee when pursued through a refugee organisation did not include an employment permit from the Department of Industry and Commerce, but as this alien was clearly coming to Ireland for employment, it was deemed necessary to obtain.

Zwanisch wrote to Coffey in December 1939, informing him of her current position, and the letter proved informative. She stated that 'the 'titre de

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160 Coffey (UCD) to Walshe, 29 Sept. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/424).

161 Ibid.

162 Government Minutes, 25 Oct. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/424).

163 Walshe to Coffey, 2 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/424).

voyage' for Ireland has been refused to me. It was an under-official, who told me, that the new prescriptions which of course I could not know, do not allow the Austrian refugees to travel to any European country they may only go to overseas'.[164] She then went on to say that 'I have learned to see that people look at the neutrality of Eire with other eyes, which are not those of my 'petit bourgeoisie'- point of view: the simple happiness of being left quiet. This is surely not the military one. And that makes you feel just a little awkward'.[165] Here was a mention of how Ireland's neutrality might have been affecting refugees who were trying to work with other governments to get to Ireland.[166] Perhaps, Zwanisch surmises, the authorities were treating her in an especially harsh way due to her wish to gain entry to a country that had made well known its desire to remain neutral in the face of world war.

The Irish legation in Paris wrote to External Affairs at the end of January 1940, further commenting on the French government's position:

> I feel sure from my general knowledge of French practice that a person in her situation has got no rights and only receives whatever facilities are granted as a matter of grace. Dr. ZAAWISCH [sic] is, I understand, an ex-Austrian who does not wish to return to Germany. She is, therefore, in France in the position of a stateless person and would, if a man, come under the regulations (in regard to the obligation to render military service etc…) imposed on foreigners enjoying the right of asylum by the decree law of 12th April 1938. Again if a man she would… have been interned as an enemy alien.[167]

This telling statement presents another reason why the French government might not have been accommodating. Many refugees ran into similar problems when dealing with countries of first asylum. Even if they had conditional permission to enter Ireland, they had an extremely hard time obtaining the necessary documentation or re-entry permits from the countries that they were already present in as refugees.

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164 Carla de Zawisch [sic] to Coffey, 30 Dec. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/424).

165 Ibid.

166 For more regarding Irish neutrality during World War Two and its affect on Irish refugee policy, see Chapter 2, *Neutrality and alien refugee activity*.

167 Irish legation in Paris to External Affairs, 31 Jan. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/424).

The last mention of Zwanisch's case was on 27 February 1940, when the Irish legation in Paris informed External Affairs that she had attempted to get an American visa which would have allowed her to travel to the USA after teaching in Ireland. It was stated that

> she has no hope of obtaining an American visa as the quota within which she would come is full up to 1945 and, as she is out of regular work since 1938, she would not be entitled to a 'Professor's visa'. She has stated that she intends to try to obtain a visa for Canada. I gather that she is at the moment 'busy with the Austrian question' – presumably in connection with the inclusion of the resurrection of Austria among Franco-British war aims in favour of which a number of Austrian organisation seem to be working here.[168]

No further mention of Zwanisch could be found.

One mention was found of the German Jewish Aid Committee, an organisation based in London. The file consists of only one letter from the Committee to the Irish High Commissioner in London, and then, as would be expected, a response from Dublin that the case should be referred to the Co-ordinating Committee. In this case, the children of the refugees concerned, a husband and wife with the surname Hainbach, were already present in Ireland, and were known to be of a high character, as well as being financially secure.[169] The Hainbachs were Viennese Jews involved in the textile industry. It is unknown what decision was finally reached regarding the Hainbachs. There is a listing in the Yad Vashem database of Holocaust victims of a Heinrich Hainbach of a

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168 Irish legation in Paris to External Affairs, 27 Feb. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/424).

169 'Heinrich Hainbach is a German subject, Jewish, living in Vienna, aged 50, well educated. Manufacturer of knitwear. He has a wife also in Vienna. Their two sons are over here. The elder, aged 27, is Manager of Malbay Manufacturing Company, Miltown Malbay, Co. Clare and is known personally to us; the younger son is being trained by us in English. The elder boy, Kurt, wants to bring his parents out of Germany and Dr. Hillery, one of the Directors of the Malbay Manufacturing Company is prepared to guarantee them jointly with the son, who appears to have attained a good financial position. This family seems to belong to that very artistic Viennese knitwear industry which has long had a considerable reputation in the fashion trades; I know, for instance, that there is quite a good American market for its products. Both the sons seem to be young men of exceptionally good character and personality; that is why we are interested in them.' Sir Henry Bunbury, Honorary Director of the German Jewish Aid Committee, 15 Jul. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/382).

similar age, who had been resident in Vienna at the time of his deportation to Latvia in 1941.[170] He was subsequently murdered.

Individual refugee applications outside of refugee organisations

Employment Applications

Another way in which an application could be made to the Irish government from an individual refugee was through an employment application. These occurred in one of two ways; the refugee offered his employment to the state personally or a formal application of employment was made through the potential employer to Industry and Commerce. There have already been examples of a refugee trying to convince the Irish government that their employment was necessary, or would result in the establishment of a new industry in Ireland. Many refugee applications made to the government personally, and even some through refugee organisations, such as Schonfeld's, were made in this way. The other type of employment application will be discussed within this section. One important aspect concerning such applications was the fact that the applicant's status as a refugee was not always initially apparent, and only became confirmed through further research conducted by the legations abroad or the departments of Justice, External Affairs, or Industry and Commerce. It could also be assumed that while examining these employment applications, if the applicant was Austrian or stated to be Jewish, the person was most likely a refugee, as repatriation would have been unable to occur, and the person would thus have had to remain in Ireland indefinitely.

Irish authorities were wary of admitting any substantial number of aliens who would engage in economic competition with nationals. The British

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[170] Yad Vashem Central Database of Shoah Victims' Names, Heinrich Hainbach. The Heinrich Hainbach listed in the database was born in 1887, which would have made him 52 in 1939. The above correspondence refers to a Heinrich Hainbach, aged 50, yet it has been shown how inaccurate information regarding the personal particulars of a refugee could be. Both men were listed as living in Vienna during the war. It is stated that the listed Hainbach was deported to Riga, Lativa on 3 December 1941 on Transport 13 from Vienna. The stated source for the information regarding the Hainbach cited in the database is the Namentliche Erfassung der oöesterreichischen Holocaustopfer, Dokumentationsarchiv des öesterreichischen Widerstandes (Documentation Centre for Austrian Resistance), Wein.

government was also forced to address this issue in 1938, informing the British Co-Ordinating Committee of their policy regarding alien labour:

> This Department requires to be satisfied:-
> (a) that the proposed employment of a foreigner is reasonable in the circumstances;
> (b) that the wages and other conditions of employment proposed for a foreigner are not less favourable than those commonly accorded to British employees for similar work in the trade in the district concerned;
> (c) that the employment of a foreigner will not prejudicially affect the employment of any British subject.[171]

Point (a) and point (c) would resonate with Irish policymakers.

Officials in Northern Ireland also received queries from German and Austrian nationals in the late 1930s regarding their admission policy, particularly as it related to employment and the establishment of new industries. The New Industries (Development) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1937 addressed the issue of the establishment of industries by foreigners, delineating the criteria that any proposed industrial operation would have to meet in order to be considered.[172] Any industry that would create jobs for Northern Irish nationals while not providing competition for domestic industry was seriously considered.

> ... generally speaking the advisory Committee is against assisting refugees except where the amount of additional employment would be substantial and we have some reliable references as to business standing in Austria or Germany, character, etc. In no case will the Committee consider assisting the establishment of new undertakings in industries already well catered for here...[173]

The Committee had also 'recommended assistance in a case where a number of refugees are being organised as departmental managers and key workers in a new industry which is being formed mainly with local capital, but partly with capital (machines) provided by immigrants'.[174]

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171 Home Office to the Secretary of the British Co-ordinating Committee, 12 Sept. 1938 (TNA, Home Office 213/1636).
172 Sgd. W.D. Scott to H.W. Cole, Mines Department, Westminster, 24 Nov. 1938 (PRONI, COM/63/1/56).
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.

The Northern Irish government was also willing to provide grants and loans to those meeting the stated requirements. The aliens in question were required to demonstrate the 'availability of adequate resources to establish successfully a new undertaking. Normally the Committee will expect him or his friends to provide at least 50% of the necessary capital'.[175] If grants or loans were sought, 'the applicants must themselves be in a position to provide an amount of capital not less than that which the Government is asked to contribute'.[176] There was also the opportunity to import machinery duty free for successful applicants.

The policy regarding the issuance of visas and permits to aliens wishing to enter the United Kingdom stated that all such documents had to be procured from the Home Office in London. The Northern Irish Minister of Commerce stated that 'recommendations to the Home Office for permits are only being made by this Ministry in respect of applicants who are in a position to establish a new industry in Northern Ireland, or whose services are necessary in connection therewith'.[177] An Advisory Committee within the Ministry of Commerce was charged with reviewing applications, and when a case was deemed satisfactory, the committee would 'not hesitate to approach the Aliens Department of the Home Office with a view to having a visa expedited'.[178] Only refugees that would contribute to Northern Irish industry were recommended for admission by the Northern Irish government during the late 1930s.

It is interesting to note that there does not seem to have been present any concern from either the Dublin or Stormont governments regarding the illegal entry into either territory of refugees admitted by the other state. The government in Dublin did discuss the cross-border movement of refugees with the government in London, yet Irish concern over this matter seems to have been exclusively addressed through communication with Westminster.

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[175] Ibid.

[176] Sgd. Kerr to Mr Frans Oberländer, 23 Sept. 1938 (PRONI, COM/63/1/56).

[177] Sgd. J. Foster to Mrs Anna Kruh, 20 Sept. 1938 (PRONI, COM/63/1/56).

[178] Sgd. W.D. Scott to H.W. Cole, Mines Department, Westminster, 24 Nov. 1938 (PRONI, COM/63/1/56).

Turning to specific refugee cases, one of note is that of Robert Schuller. Industry and Commerce sent a report on Schuller to External Affairs that stated the particulars of his proposed industrial undertaking:

> The services of this alien are required as a weaving expert in connection with the establishment at Ballina of a factory for the manufacturing of shoddy cloth. The Minister I&C has approved of this project and the promoters desire to employ this alien, who, it is stated, has been, until recently, the proprietor of a small textile factory at Brunn-Maria Enzersdorf, near Vienna and has had long experience in the textile industry and a thorough knowledge of factory organisation and the layout of machinery.[179]

In this case, Industry and Commerce approved of the proposal, and were prepared to admit Schuller 'notwithstanding the difficulties that may arise in regard to repatriation when the permit expires'.[180] The department further requested 'that enquires as to the alien's character and industrial experience' should be carried out by the legation in Berlin.[181]

Bewley reported in January that 'according to a report obtained from the Chamber of Commerce in Vienna this man is not an expert and only devoted himself to the business side of the firm. A report is also being obtained from the Legation's commercial enquiry agency, and as soon as it is received full details will be sent to you'.[182] The Enquiry Agency further added that 'Robert Schuller's original connection with the textile business was as representative and that he has had no technical training. In the course of years he has by contact with the business picked up some technical knowledge'.[183] This type of exchange was fairly common within employment applications. Frequently, an application would attempt to reflect what the applicant believed the Irish government would approve, and after enquiries were made, the applicant's actual employment experience was unclear.

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179 Industry and Commerce to External Affairs, 28 Nov. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/58).

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

182 Bewley to External Affairs, 25 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/58).

183 Bewley to External Affairs, 1 Mar. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/58).

The file concerning Schuller ends with the above report from Bewley, and there is no further information regarding his application for admittance. A Robert Schiller, whose geographical location match the Robert Schuller described by Industry and Commerce was deported from Vienna in 1942 to a camp in Belorussia.[184] He was reportedly murdered four days later. It cannot be definitively ascertained if this Robert Schiller was indeed the man described as Robert Schuller by Irish officials, yet the similarities cannot be overlooked.

Another case of refugee application through employment was that of Dr. Erwin Aron. Industry and Commerce stated on 6 January 1939 that they had received an application

> in respect of the employment by Messrs. Sol Chemical Works Ltd., Patrick's Quay, Cork, for six months from the 9th January, 1939, of Dr. Erwin Aron, a German national, whose address is stated to be 7 Dorotheebgasse, Breslau… I am to state that it is thought likely that the alien is Jewish and that the Minister is not prepared, in this case, to agree to the introduction of an alien who could not be repatriated when the period of employment permitted had terminated.[185]

Here, it was stated that the applicant was probably Jewish, and that as such, the department did not recommend allowing him to enter Ireland, as his repatriation would be impossible. The government had stated, in official government memorandums and documents, that they were only prepared to allow the admittance of refugees for employment if they possessed either special skills, or the ability to set up a new industry in the country that would result in a growing job market. However, as all Jewish refugees were automatically ineligible for repatriation the moment that they left German-occupied territory, their applications were almost always rejected, as the government would strictly enforce the above regulations on this type of refugee. There were non-Jewish

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[184] Yad Vashem Central Database of Shoah Victims' Names, Robert Schiller. Schiller was reportedly deported on 14 Sept. 1942 on Transport 41 from Wien, Vienna, Austria to Maly Trostenets, Camp, Belorussia (USSR). He was reportedly murdered upon arrival, with his listed death as occuring on 18 Sept. 1942. The stated source of information regarding Schiller is listed as the Namentliche Erfassung der öesterreichischen Holocaustopfer, Dokumentationsarchiv des öesterreichischen Widerstandes (Documentation Centre for Austrian Resistance), Wien.

[185] Industry and Commerce to External Affairs, 6 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/84).

refugees that applied for employment in Ireland that were not accepted, quite a few actually, but their chances were automatically greater of gaining acceptance than the Jewish refugees. As would be expected, Aron was denied entry into Ireland.

There were, however, examples of Jewish refugees whose skills were deemed important enough to warrant their acceptance into the state. One such case is that of a German Jew whose application was made through The Tipperary Glove Factory.[186] It was stated that the Minister of Industry and Commerce felt that

> there may be difficulty in regard to repatriation in this case when the permit expires he [the Minister] is satisfied that the need for the services of this alien is sufficiently great to warrant his acceptance as a permanent resident should it transpire that he could not be deported. I am to request therefore that a visa may be issued in this case without any enquiries being made.[187]

This refugee's skill was deemed so beneficial to the state that enquiries were not even to be made. A Garda Siochána report regarding this refugee crucially presents what information the Garda had concerning each refugee, and what it thus deemed important. Various information, including the refugee's place of birth, nationality, passport information, religion, information as to the identification that he received in England and information concerning his parents, who apparently also made it to Ireland, were included within the report.[188]

The obvious preference that the Irish government held for prominent individuals, professionals who were experts in their fields, and thus were highly sought after, can be seen within the case of Dr Viktor Ehrenberg. The National

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186 Industry and Commerce to External Affairs, 22 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/96).

187 Ibid.

188 'To Whom Concerned, This is to certify that Hans Peter KONIGSBERGER born at Burgstadt, Saxony on 11th August 1921 and the holder of German Passport No 19/1936 issued at Burgstadt on 16th April 1936, and of Police Registration Certificate issued at WELLINGTON, SHROPSHIRE, England numbered 615716 is, to the best of my knowledge, the son of Israel Ernst Willy KONIGSBERGER and Sara Gertrud Aguste KONIGSBERGER, I am aware that Israel Ernst Willy Konigsberger and Sara Gertrud Aguste Konigsberger are the holders of German (J) Passports, and landed in Eire as REFUGEES from Germany. Hans Peter KONIGSBERGER resides at present at 25 Henry Street, Tipperary.' An Garda Siochána, Superintendent's Office, Tipperary, 9 Sept. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/96).

University of Ireland contacted Industry and Commerce in August of 1939, stating that

> I beg to inform you that the Senate at its recent meeting decided that Dr. VIKTOR
>
> EHRENBERG who, I believe, is an Austrian refugee (at present of 11 Brunswick Square, London, W.C.1) should be invited to deliver a course of lectures in Ancient History in University Colleges, Dublin, Cork and Galway, during the coming Academic Year, namely, from Octoher (sic) 1939 to June 1940...[189]

A month later, Justice wrote to Industry and Commerce that 'it would seem that Dr. Ehrenberg is a refugee but, nevertheless, if he is a distinguished scholar, and if the Minister for Industry and Commerce is prepared to authorise his employment by the National University, the Minister will raise no objection to this admission to this country'.[190] It should be stated that this refugee had already succeeded in reaching England, and thus safety.

Another prominent academic, Ernst Lewy, a German Jewish philologist, was already resident in Ireland by 1937. In 1938, he was informed by the German legation in Dublin that 'his passport will be extended for not more than a further six months and he will thenceforth be regarded as an emigrant and that his return to German territory will not be desired'.[191] Lewy, a refugee who had been given a financial guarantee from the British-based aid group, the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning,[192] had taken up a position at UCD, and was regarded as a distinguished scholar.[193] Lewy possessed academic skills and knowledge that could be used to greatly elevate the linguistics department at UCD,

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189 N.U.I., Alex A.W. Carthy, to Industry and Commerce, 22 Aug. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/543).

190 Justice to Industry and Commerce, 25 Sept. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/543).

191 Justice to External Affairs, 25 Aug. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

192 For a concise history of the SPSL, see David Zimmerman, 'The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning and the politicization of British Science in the 1930s' in *Minerva: A Review of Science, Learning & Policy,* xliv, no. 1 (March, 2006), pp 25-45.

193 'Dr. Lewy's range includes non-Indo-European dialects, especially the Finnish-Ugrian group. He has published a Grammar of the Tscheremissche Language (1922), and the Folktales in the Mordevinnisch dialect of the same group. He is especially versed in the Slavonic languages, and speaks Russian. The structure and philosophy of language is his subject. His contributions to this are so numerous that it would take some time to furnish a list of them.' R.I. Best, National Library of Ireland to Walshe, 20 Oct. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

and was thus deemed an essential alien. It was irrelevant to the government that Lewy was about to lose his German citizenship, as well as his ability to be repatriated. De Valera had also earmarked Lewy for potential involvement in one of his personal projects, the Institute of Celtic Studies, and as such, was to become personally involved in his case.

Lewy's case allows for a study of three important aspects of German refugee policy in Ireland during the late 1930s: the tension between the government and the Irish legation in Berlin, the special treatment of distinguished individuals and de Valera's personal influence with certain cases. All are recurring themes within a study of refugee policy during this period, and as such need to be properly analysed on an individual case level basis. As Lewy was considered an asset to the Irish state, his case does not focus on his resident status but that of his daughter Esther Britz, who, in 1938, was still living in Berlin.

Initially, Lewy had stated that his daughter's intended reason for visiting Ireland was to help nurse his wife through a knee injury.[194] It quickly became apparent, however, that Britz was attempting to exit German-held territory with the direct objective of permanent resettlement. Lewy had stated that, should his daughter be allowed to enter Ireland for a period of a few months, she would then emigrate to Argentina, where he had a brother and a good friend living in Buenos Aires. Sean Murphy informed Lewy that, should his daughter already possess a visa for Argentina, her passport would be issued with an Irish visa in Berlin immediately.[195] Murphy was quickly informed that due to various difficulties resulting from the distance and time it took correspondence to travel between Ireland and Argentina, Britz did not possess the necessary visa. Her mother than stated in a letter to Murphy that 'in case that she might not get the permit to the Argentine – what I do not believe – she would go over to England where she would be helped by the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning that already is granting our living for two years, and its secretary, Mr. Adams, is also

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194 Justice to External Affairs, 25 Aug. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

195 Walshe to Lewy, 29 Aug. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

informed of our daughter's coming and has no objection to it'.[196] A comment such as this would have worried the Irish officials dealing with this case. Relations with Britain, already strained over various issues such as economic relations and Treaty ports in 1938, were of paramount concern at this point, and the government did not want further friction. If it became an accepted habit that refugees admitted into Ireland should move en masse to British territory, it could prove extremely problematic for the government. Consequently, these situations were usually handled with extreme caution, and usually resulted in a negative response.

However, as Lewy was viewed as such an important addition to the Irish university system, the case continued. Britz's parents were also becoming increasingly worried as to her position in Germany, as her Aryan husband had divorced her and there was a worry that the Gestapo would force her to sell her house.[197] De Valera became involved, and instructed Walshe to see to the matter. Walshe wrote to Justice in September, stating that

> both Professor and Mrs. Lewy assure us that Frau Britz does not intend to stay permanently in Ireland. I do not wish you to attach any particular importance to such promises made by these unfortunate people but my Minister would like special consideration given to Frau Britz's case. Professor Lewy is a distinguished scholar. He was professor of Comparative Linguistics in Berlin, and is said to be one of the most outstanding men in the world in this branch. He is at present studying in Galway at the expense of the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (of London). He is studying Modern Irish. It is my Minister's intention, if it can be managed, to secure his co-operation in building up the Institute of Celtic Studies.[198]

De Valera had intervened personally which resulted in the reversal of a visa decision. Walshe further told Roche that there was a 'danger in establishing precedents, and I think we have to proceed with the greatest of caution. But, at the same time, we can avoid the consequences of having established these precedents by examining all the cases we get in their merits. And, in this connection, I am going to instruct Bewley to report very fully on all cases which come before

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[196] Hedwig Lewy to Sean Murphy, 31 Aug. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

[197] Ernst Lewy to Walshe, 6 Sept. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/.67).

[198] Walshe to Roche, 7 Sept. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

him'.[199] Again, the concern that too many favourable decisions might establish an institutionalised liberal refugee policy was a real worry, and favourable decisions that were allowed to occur were thoroughly explained and legitimised.

Bewley's involvement with the Lewy case further validates the assertion that there was tension between the government and the legation in Berlin. Walshe instructed the legation to issue Britz a visa, yet was then questioned as to the nature of the visa and the validity of issuance.[200] Clearly there was some discord between Bewley and the government over policy objectives. Warnock was worried as to Britz's ultimate intention, and did not believe that she would be willing, or able, to further emigrate once she had arrived in Ireland.[201] At the Consul, Britz had

> originally asked the Legation for information concerning the immigration regulations…she was told that she could not take up employment in Ireland. She then stated that supposing that if she were granted a visa entitling her to enter Ireland, she would, having granted permission, cross to England and seek employment there. She made no mention whatsoever of the Argentine; the Legation knew nothing of her alleged intention to visit that country until the receipt of your minute of the 29th August. Enquiries will be made of the Argentinian (sic) authorities in Berlin in order to ascertain whether in fact she did apply to them for a visa.[202]

Warnock seemed well aware of the promises and assurances that German Jews would employ in order to sway visa decisions, and seemed wary of Britz's position.

Warnock got to the crux of the matter, clearly stating that he wished for the reason for Britz's visa issuance stated in writing: 'I should be very grateful if in your reply you would be good enough to state, for the information of the Legation, the reason for the Minister's decision to admit Mrs. Britz to Ireland. I

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199 Ibid.

200 Walshe to Irish Consul, Berlin, 9 Sept. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

201 William Warnock was recruited in 1935 by External Affairs. Warnock was educated at Trinity College, Dublin and was a member of the Church of Ireland. He was appointed the chargé d'affaires *ad interim* in Berlin after Bewley was recalled in 1939. He held this position until he was replaced by Con Cremins in 1943. 'Cremins certainly had no sympathy for Hitler or National Socialism... Cremin did not share Bewley's prejudice towards Jews.' Keogh, *Ireland and Europe,* 105.

202 Warnock to External Affairs, 10 Sept. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

should like to have this information in anticipation of any suggestion which might be made later on to the effect that influential friends in Dublin had secured the issue of a visa.'[203] This is an interesting comment, as clearly influential friends in Dublin *had* secured her visa. It was not as if the government or the Irish legation were worried that their actions could be construed inaccurately; they were worried that their actions would be recognised for what they were. Warnock was also concerned that various problems might arise if word spread throughout the Jewish community that having influential friends in Ireland could produce a visa. 'As has been pointed out in previous minutes, certain Jewish applicants have alleged that they have acquaintances in Ireland who can obtain almost any concessions from the authorities. The Legation's experience is that news spreads quickly through the Jewish community.'[204] Any action or decision that could lend to an inadvertent liberalising of policy, or even an increased attention from Jews trying to exit German territory, was deemed as harmful.

Bewley felt it necessary to make his feelings concerning the case known, writing a rather scathing account of Britz's case after the legation in Berlin was issued with an order from the government to issue Britz's visa.[205] Commenting on Britz's situation, Bewley wrote that 'the Minister was possibly not aware of the fact that the applicant not only is without visible means of subsistence, but is divorced'.[206] He further stated that, in his opinion, she had lied to the Irish officials concerning her attempt to acquire an Argentinian visa, as he was 'informed by the Argentine Embassy that she had made no application either to the Embassy or to the Consulate. In any event she could never have obtained such a visa, as her passport enables her to be absent from Germany only six months without losing her German nationality'.[207] When dealing with the visa application of someone who could, for all intents and purposes, be considered a refugee, the last thing that an official would have wanted to hear was that there had been

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[203] Ibid.

[204] Ibid.

[205] Telegram sent to Berlin, 13 Sept. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

[206] Bewley to External Affairs, 16 Sept. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

[207] Ibid.

omissions or fabrications concerning the applicant's situation. Bewley saw this lack of proper communication, or artful omission by Lewy, as an overt attempt to deceive the government. 'It must therefore be assumed that Britz's father, the eminent philologist Professor Lewy, deliberately lied to the officials in Ireland when he stated that 'Mrs. Britz does not want to stay permanently in Ireland as she intends to go to the Argentine in the spring'.'[208]

Amidst such hostility, Britz was still able to procure her visa, arriving in Ireland in August 1939.[209] Interestingly, she became the subject of further debate in November, when she attempted to travel to Siam to marry her Siamese fiancée. The outbreak of the war had hindered civilian travel, and Britz would have require various documents to reach her destination. She had arranged to travel by air from Naples to Siam, through India, yet the issue concerned her ability to reach Italy. Once war had broken out, such situations became difficult for a neutral such as Ireland. It could have been deemed an embarrassment if foreign nationals, particularly those affiliated with a belligerent, were granted access to a neutral country and then requested permission to travel back to an Axis power, even one that at this stage was still claiming status as a non-belligerent. It was stated that Britz, who was in possession of a 'normal' German passport, or, in other words, a German passport without a 'J', would need to secure three documents: a British exit permit, a French transit visa and an Italian transit visa.[210]

A neutral country had to proceed with extreme caution concerning belligerent migration, and as such, External Affairs decided to err on the side of caution. Britz had approached the department, enquiring if there could be anything done on her behalf. She was duly informed that 'after careful consideration, the Minister regrets that there is no action which this Department could appropriately or usefully take in connection with the grant of the various visas and permits which you would require for the purposes of your journey'.[211]

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208 Ibid.

209 Government memorandum, signed Belton, 3 Nov. 1939 (N.AI, DFA/202/667).

210 Ibid.

211 Boland to Mrs Britz, 18 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/667).

One very interesting case that highlights various aspects of refugee policy, yet is centred upon the employment of a refugee, is that of Gerhard Schloss, a German Jew. In June 1939, an employment application was received by Industry and Commerce from the Irish Steel Ltd. company in Dublin, concerning the employment of Schloss, whose address was stated as Gries-Str. 64 Hamburg 26.[212] A few weeks later, the Irish legation in Berlin wrote to External Affairs, stating that 'Mr. Gerhard Schloss is a Jew. It may be taken for granted therefore that he would not be readmitted to Germany should he at any time leave the country. In the circumstances a visa should not be granted'.[213] Curiously, later that day a telegram was sent to the legation in Berlin, stating that a visa should be granted immediately. When questioned a few days later by External Affairs as to why Schloss was granted a visa, the legation in Berlin responded that 'Mr. Gerhard Schloss produced a document from the Police Authorities certifying that he would be allowed to re-enter Germany. A visa was granted to him on the 11th July'.[214]

This exchange is interesting for a variety of reasons. It is curious to note the apparent lack of communication between the departments and legations concerned with making refugee admission decisions. External Affairs was seemingly unaware that a visa had been issued, informing the legation in Berlin that 'I am to ask you to be so good as to ensure, in all cases of this type, that the Department is notified when a visa has been issued'.[215] This apparent lack of communication can be seen in various files. One case that illustrates this communication difficulty was that of Maria Antoinette Nedwed, an Austrian who was applying for employment. On 4 February[216] and 4 April,[217] Industry and Commerce asked External Affairs if a visa had been granted to Nedwed. On 18

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212 Industry and Commerce to External Affairs, 13 June 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/605).
213 Irish legation in Berlin (Warnock) to External Affairs, 26 June 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/605).
214 Irish legation in Berlin (Warnock) to External Affairs, 26 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/605).
215 External Affairs to Irish legation in Berlin, 31 June 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/605).
216 Industry and Commerce to External Affairs, 28 Feb. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/119).
217 Industry and Commerce to External Affairs, 4 Apr. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/119).

April,[218] Justice asked External Affairs if a visa had been granted. On 3 May,[219] Industry and Commerce asked External Affairs if a visa had yet been granted. And on 14 June,[220] External Affairs asked the legation in Berlin once more if the visa had been granted. Apparently, no one knew if a visa had been issued.

Returning to Schloss' case, it is also curious that, as a Jew, Schloss obtained documentation from the German government stating that he would be repatriated. This is the first and only mention of this kind of assurance found within this research. The case continued after his arrival in Ireland, as Schloss set about gaining his wide admission into the country.[221] Schloss' employers also became involved, stating that they 'would be very much obliged if this visa [Mrs. Schloss] can be obtained, as we particularly wish to retain the services of Schloss who is very specialised in his particular branch, and whom we would have the greatest difficulty in replacing'.[222] Further, on 11 September, Schloss again wrote to External Affairs, stating 'You can understand that in view of the present situation I am most anxious that my wife should come as soon as possible, and I should be grateful if you would help in this matter'.[223] Two weeks later, Mrs Schloss was granted her visa, and allowed to leave Germany.

A German national, Andreas Dietz, had been issued multiple employment visas throughout 1937 and 1938, and had always returned to Germany after these periods expired. In April 1939, he continued his employment at Siemens Schuckert Ltd., yet was unable to be repatriated after war broke out in September. Justice wrote to External Affairs in May 1940, stating that 'the Minister could, however, alter the condition on which he is allowed to reside here by prohibiting

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218 Justice to External Affairs, 18 Apr. (NAI, DFA/202/119).

219 Industry and Commerce to External Affairs, 3 May 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/119).

220 External Affairs to Irish legation, Berlin, 14 June 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/119).

221 'I have received the Labour Permit, dated 13th June 1939 'to design and draught plans for machinery of rolling mills at Haulbowline up to 8th June 1940' and I should be much obliged if you would write to the Irish Minister in Berlin, in order to obtain a visa for my wife, Elizabeth Charlotte Schloss, nee Wetzel, born on the 4.11.06. My wife has already been in touch with the Irish Legation in Berlin and she has been advised that a visa can be issued only on the recommendation and with the permission of the Department of External Affairs in Dublin.' Gerhard Schloss to External Affairs, 12 Aug. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/605).

222 Irish Steel Ltd. to External Affairs, 5 Sept. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/605).

223 Gerhard Schloss to External Affairs, 11 Sept. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/605).

him from engaging in employment. If the alien then continued in the employment of Siemens Schuckert (Ireland) Ltd., he could be prosecuted for a contravention of the Aliens Order'.[224] External Affairs responded to the above, stating that 'it is not known whether Messrs. Siemens-Schuckert (Ireland) Ltd., are at present in a position to employ Dietz profitably from their own point of view, but, if they are not, the effect of refusing the renew of the permit would be to provide the firm with an easy excuse for disclaiming responsibility for his maintenance while in this country'.[225]

> Dietz's employers then got involved, stating that
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> neither Andreas Dietz or Hermann Eurich perform at present any work which in their absence would be done by Irish Nationals. The two men are at present engaged in more or less cleaning up operations, which work was left over after the completion of the Transformer Contract at Inichore and if these men would not be there, this work would simply not be done.[226]

Dietz's employers were clearly stating that the work that he was engaged in at the time would not get done without his presence and that 'they are by no means fully employed, but in view of the fact that I retained their services when they could have returned to Germany after the outbreak of the war, I have a moral obligation to continue paying them a subsistence allowance until such time as they will be in a position to return to Germany.'[227] It was finally decided to grant Dietz the extension of his employment permit after External Affairs came to the conclusion that

> if he is not allowed to take up any form of employment, he will, when his savings, if any, have run out, be destitute and will either become a public charge or have to be maintained by the German Legation. I personally think that, in the circumstances of this case, it would be better if the Department of Industry and Commerce could be induced to extend the permit in question. It would save a great deal of complications at this stage.[228]

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[224] Justice to External Affairs, 21 May 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/635).

[225] External Affairs to Justice, 7 May 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/635).

[226] H.L. Broekhoven (Siemens-Schuckert) to Industry and Commerce, 21 May 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/635).

[227] Ibid.

[228] External Affairs Minute, 23 Apr. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/635).

Applications directly to the Irish government

The case of Alfred Schick typifies various aspects of an individual application made directly to the government, as it addresses how contact was initially established, how correspondence usually occurred and how decision were normally reached. In a letter sent to External Affairs from the Irish legation in Paris, it was stated that 'a German national, Herr Alfred SCHICK, has informed the Legation that he desires to settle down in Ireland and he enquired as to the procedure to be adopted for this purpose'.[229] What follows is the standard information included within a request for entry:

> Herr Schick is the holder of a German passport issued to him in 1935 and renewed valid by the German Consulate General in Paris until the 18th October 1940. On being questioned he stated that his parents are still residing in Germany, that he is persona non grata with the German authorities as he has never concerned himself with political matters, but that he has no desire to return to Germany as he is a Catholic and does not wish to live under the Nazi regime.[230]

Schick's nationality and passport information were stated, followed by the reason for his proposed travel to Ireland. Stating his religion was a clever move, as he might have expected to gain sympathy from Catholic Ireland. Stating that he was apolitical was another aspect of his character that Schick might have mentioned in an attempt to ingratiate himself to the Irish authorities. Schick then went on to state his financial position, namely that 'he has established business relations with Great Britain, the United States of America and other counties. He has a business turnover of about 25.000 frs/per month. He state (sic) that he has about 2.500 Swiss francs in Bank deposit in Switzerland'.[231] Attempting to convince the officials that he would not become destitute or a charge on the Irish state was also of importance. These people knew what to highlight within their application, and it can be seen time and time again. Financial independence, value to the Irish state and a Christian background were all-important selling points. External Affairs

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229 Irish legation (Paris) to External Affairs, 16 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/14).

230 Ibid.

231 Ibid.

forwarded Schick's application to Justice, which rather quickly stated that 'the Minister desires that a visa should not be granted to Alfred Schick.'[232]

Another fairly typical case is that of Dr. Sinai Novac, a Romanian national who applied in January 1939 for permission to settle in Ireland. Novac, who had already travelled from Romania to Paris, presented himself at the Irish legation there, asking for an interview. Within the report sent from the Paris legate to External Affairs, it was stated that

> according to his statements, Dr. Novac is a Christian Jew and in accordance with the provisions of the anti-semitic laws operating in Roumania, he has lost his post as medical adviser to the Ministry of Health at Bucarest. He still retains, however, a minor appointment in the Department of State which deals with social insurance. During the war he served in the Roumanian Army as a Captain and on the conclusion of peace qualified for the two Government posts mentioned above. He has had therefore practically no opportunity of establishing a private practice and owing to conditions in Roumania at the present time his chances in this respect are extremely remote. He expects to be dismissed at any moment from the one post which he still occupied in the Government service. He states that he has very little money and that unless he shall succeed in obtaining a livelihood abroad, he and his wife and his child will eventually find themselves in very straightened circumstances.[233]

It is made clear that this man was in a hard situation. His government was discriminating against him due solely to his religion, his livelihood had been taken away from him and he had no prospects in Romania. When asked why he wished to move to Ireland specifically, Novac replied 'that he has been informed of the great sympathy displayed by the Irish people for Jews and all persecuted people and he felt that there would be better prospects of his obtaining employment as a medical doctor there then elsewhere, one reason being that Irish doctors were known to have a great preference for practicing in foreign countries'.[234] Two aspects of Novac's application would have greatly contributed to the negative outcome of his query. His readily admitted Judaism would almost certainly have quickly ruled out his entry, as well as his desire to not only live in Ireland, but to work there as well. Novac attempted to explain why he was in such

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[232] Ibid.

[233] Paris legation to External Affairs, 21 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/28).

[234] Ibid.

a situation but by doing so he brought attention to the very aspects of his case that would render a negative outcome. As would be expected, Novac's application was refused.

The case of Julius Zollschan is yet another that allows one to gain a sense of the criteria by which the Irish government was forming their decisions. Zollschan made an application to the legation in Paris, which was then forwarded to External Affairs on 23 January. The application stated that Zollschan was attempting to secure a visa to 'enable him to reside in Ireland for about a year for the purpose of perfecting his knowledge of the English language. The applicant who is of Austrian nationality and a Jew, holds a German passport N 2881 issued to him by the German authorities in Vienna on the 28th September 1938. It will expire on the 28th September 1939'.[235] Through the wording of his application, there was no question that this man was a refugee, seeking to leave Germany, who would mostly likely not be eligible for repatriation under current German law. Zollschan included two references, a businessman and a surgeon, both from Dublin.[236] External Affairs forwarded this application to Justice on 28 January. Three days later their decision was stated. Zollschan would not be receiving a visa. As a would-be refugee who was offering no obvious gain to the Irish government through his acceptance into the state, Zollschan had virtually no chance of gaining admittance.

As these three cases show, there was a standard process through which an application was made to the Irish government from an individual. The individual in question would begin by presenting himself or herself at the closest Irish mission, which for the case of most of the refugees was either the legation in Paris or Berlin. The application was passed to the legation staff, who then ascertained other important information, such as the travel habits of the individual, the possession of re-entry permits, and quite frequently the applicant's religion. The application would then be sent to External Affairs, which would forward the application to Justice. In more case than not, the decision would swiftly follow.

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[235] Paris legation to External Affairs, 23 Jan. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/41).
[236] Ibid.

Analysis

The following chart lists the applications directly referenced within this chapter, including the number of cases accepted, rejected or with unknown outcomes.

1.10 Refugee applications, 1935-1939

Type of application	Number of cases accepted	Number of cases rejected	Number of cases unknown	Total number of cases examined
International Refugee organisations				
Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations	-	1	-	1
Religious Emergency Council for German and Austrian Jewry	-	2	-	2
German Jewish Aid Committee	-	-	1	1
Domestic Refugee Organisations				
Irish Co-ordinating Committee for Refugess	33	1	-	34
University College, Dublin Catholic Committee for Refugees	1	-	1	2
Employment Applications	6	1	1	8
Individuals directly to government	-	3	-	3
Total	**40**	**8**	**3**	**51**

To fully understand Ireland's restrictive admittance policy, reflected in the low number of cases in the above chart, it is crucial to understand the position that Ireland was in politically, economically and socially during this decade. Considering the ability of Ireland to successfully integrate any group of refugees, an issue of the utmost importance was the state of the country's economy, which in the 1930s was one of stagnation. The election in 1932 had transferred political power to Fianna Fáil and de Valera, and both the man and the party were

concerned with pursuing an active economic policy that centred upon the idea of economic isolation and self-sufficiency. Ireland was still a young nation, and as such was eager to assert its independence and sovereignty. De Valera himself worked hard to perpetuate this idea of an independent, Gaelic-nation of self-reliant, small farmers. The pursued economic policy focused more on this ideal than on economic realities and necessity. A shift was encouraged from livestock to tillage farming, which did not benefit many of the small farmers. Especially in the west, where potatoes and oats were the predominant crop, both of which were not subsidized, these economic measures did more harm than good.[237] As such, the main consequences of Fianna Fáil's agriculture policy in the 1930s were a rise in price for consumers, a decline in product quality, a reduction of exports and damage to the small farm economy.[238]

The drive to industrialise Ireland was not focused, and tended to result in a rather ad hoc, scattered attempt to set up industry in smaller towns and villages rather than on a national scale. Cormac Ó'Gráda states that the emphasis was centred upon short-term goals, like increasing employment, and not on a long-term policy based on economic development on an international scale or the establishment of a 'self-supporting Irish industrial sector'.[239] The Control of Manufactures Act 1932-1934 effectively curtailed foreign investment in Ireland.[240] The act stated that half the equity of new firms had to be Irish owned. This had obvious implications for the admittance of aliens, as those looking to set up a new factory or introduce foreign capital into the Irish economy were, in most cases, restricted from doing so. As has been shown, refugees applying for entry into the Irish state during the 1930s who did so from an employment standpoint or inquiry found it very hard to gain admittance, even when the prospective industry could have created jobs and revenue for the state.[241]

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[237] Lee, *Politics and Society*, p. 184.

[238] Ibid.

[239] Cormac Ó' Gráda, *Ireland: A New Economic History, 1780-1939* (Oxford, 1994), p. 398.

[240] Control of Manufacturers Act, 1932 (1932 no. 21) (29 Oct. 1932) The Irish Statute Book.

[241] The British also neglected to take advantage of refugees whose trade or industrial experience might have proved economically advantageous. 'The possible economic benefits of letting in refugees did not lead to any initiatives by the government. In April 1933

Further complicating the economic situation during the 1930s was the economic war with Britain. In 1932, de Valera withheld the land annuities previously paid to Britain, which in turn caused the British government to raise duties on Irish agricultural products.[242]Ireland then raised duties on British coal, and the situation continued on in such a way throughout the decade until the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement[243] brought a stop to the situation in 1938. As this extremely brief examination of the state of the Irish economy in the 1930s shows, Ireland was not in the best position to accept, and successfully integrate, large numbers of refugees. Emigration levels were high throughout the 1930s, and the generally accepted idea was that if Ireland could not financially take care of her own, why should she be expected to take care of others?

The state of Irish politics during the 1930s also influenced the development of refugee policy. Until 1932, Ireland had been governed by the pro-Treaty victors of the Civil War, Cosgrave's Cumann na nGaedheal. This changed when de Valera and Fianna Fáil took office, thus shifting control of the government from the victors to the defeated. As such, de Valera and his government had an interesting role to play, and viewed their goal as creating an 'Irish' Ireland. De Valera believed in an idyllic concept of what Ireland should be. Ireland was the land of fair maidens and handsome farm hands, of wheat and sheep, of large families centred firmly within the doctrine and teachings of the Catholic Church. Irish people should speak Irish, and stand tall when asked about the glories of their homeland. De Valera was, in essence, trying to solidify Irish Catholic nationalism as a way of legitimising the state and Fianna Fáil governance.[244]

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ministers recognised the potential gain from the transfer to the United Kingdom of certain industries, such as Leipzig's fur trade, but the Cabinet committee was dismissive. No action resulted from Cabinet instructions to follow up the idea of offering hospitality to distinguished men unable to continue their careers in Germany. The Home Office, preoccupied with issues of control, was far from seeking to attract additional immigrants.' London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 46.

[242] Lee, *Politics and Society*, p. 178.

[243] Finance (Agreement with United Kingdom) Act, 1938 (1938 no. 12) (16 May 1938). Irish Statute Book.

[244] Keatinge also cites an increasingly independent and expanding foreign policy as another attempt by de Valera to assert Irish sovereignty from Britain. Keatinge, *The Formulation of*

The cultivation of this idealised concept of 'Irishness', although understandable for a newly independent nation, did lend itself to the development of an exclusionist mentality.[245] When a country fosters a sense of nationalism, a common consequence is that anyone outside of the acceptable fold is considered an outsider. The emphasis on Irishness created a barrier for not only refugee admittance, but also alien admittance in general. There is no definitive proof that racism had deeply permeated Irish society during this period, as various groups trying to establish a fascist foothold in Ireland, namely the Blueshirts, never received more than nominal attention, but there was a general undercurrent of unacceptance and exclusion.[246] Religion was obviously a factor, as part of this new Irish identity was its adherence to Catholicism, as not only the recognised majority religion of the state, but also as a societal and moral guide.

Irish Foreign Policy, p. 18. The development of Irish refugee policy during the 1930s needs to be viewed within the context of a new state that was both attempting to distance itself from its former ruler, as well as attempting to build a new and productive relationship with that same country. De Valera had to walk a thin line between asserting sovereignty and acquiescing to various British concerns, namely security issues.

[245] Frank and Reinisch in 'Refugees and the Nation-State' cite 'refugee policy as a crucial product of states' definitions and re-definitions of nationality and citizenship', pp 480.

[246] For further information concerning the Blueshirts, see Maurice Manning, *The Blueshirts* (2006). Also O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland,* p. 112-21.

Chapter 2 - Catastrophe in Europe: World War Two and the Holocaust, 1939-1945

'History will at least record that when our civilization was stained with this blot, the voices of these nations were raised in protest.'[1]

Introduction

Robert W. Ditchburn differentiates a refugee from an ordinary immigrant in his 1939 study *The Refugee Problem*, which stated that the refugee 'is on bad terms with the government of the territory in which he used to reside before he became a refugee. He must be against the government – or rather the government must be against him – to such an extent that life in his former territory is impossible or intolerable'.[2] Ditchburn's article could not have been published at a more pertinent moment then during the summer of 1939. The ascension of Hitler and the Nazi Party to power during the 1930s changed the world for millions of people, a great number of whom suddenly found themselves neatly fitting into Ditchburn's classification of a refugee. These people had to leave German held territory, which continued to expand rapidly during 1938 and 1939.

In September 1939, the situation in Europe finally exploded into an armed confrontation after years of attempted appeasement and the situation for millions of people became increasingly dire. The outbreak of war particularly changed the ways in which refugees could move through Europe and facilitate their migration. New security measures were introduced in a multitude of countries of possible asylum, increasingly restrictive immigration policies proliferated and the feasibility of transport became increasingly difficult as Europe divided itself into multiple camps. The neutrals of Europe became concerned that any increase in the admittance of aliens from either side would

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[1] Rabbi David Freilich, *Memorandum for presentation to the Taoiseach, The Atrocities in Hungary,* undated (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[2] Ditchburn, 'The Refugee Problem', pp 275-92.

threaten the feasibility of their neutrality, while allowing in any significant number of enemy aliens became a real worry for the belligerents. The harsh economics of war also led many countries to adopt restrictive immigration policy throughout Europe, severely limiting countries of possible asylum for refugees.

Much historical research has already been devoted to the massive displacement of people resulting from the war, yet not much research has been conducted concerning the refugees who sought entry into Ireland. This chapter will feature various sections examining how Irish policy was formed, what influenced its development and how the state interacted with the European refugee crisis. The first section examines various concerns regarding alien and refugee activity within Ireland that affected the state's refugee policy during the war. Irish foreign policy was of paramount importance during the war, and the viability and sustainability of neutrality was the main focus of de Valera's government. The attempt to maintain an impression of unbiased neutrality affected whom the government felt comfortable admitting into the state, as well as how it allowed those admitted to act while they were resident within the state.

The government also had to establish protocol regarding the cross-border movements of its citizens and resident aliens with British officials, which could frequently involve policy development on a case-by-case basis through a high level of compromise. This section also allows for an examination of the role played by the military concerning alien issues, particularly that of G2. The relevant military archival files demonstrate that there were varying levels of both cooperation and tension between the government and the military over alien concerns. Various issues such as surveillance, postal censorship, and perceptions of non-neutral alien activity were, at various times, considered the

domain of both organisations.[3] The military became more involved concerning the screening and admittance of refugees than it had been preceding the war, which affected the working relationship between the government and military. Both Dan Bryan and Liam Archer[4] were extremely opposed to the admittance of Austrian and German refugees, as they were convinced that the admittance of such persons could only result in a weakening of the government's neutrality.[5] Even though the Co-ordinating Committee halted the admittance of German and Austrian refugees upon the outbreak of the war, military leadership could not have been pleased with the government's refugee policy in 1938. The military also proved a source of domestic anti-Semitic rhetoric, proving that the government was not alone in its utilisation of mildly anti-Semitic language.

Three groups of refugees warrant specific attention, and shall be analysed within this chapter. Any thorough analysis of refugee policy during the war demands an examination of state policy regarding Jewish refugees.[6] This will occur through an examination of three separate issues: individual and group appeals directly to the government, requests from various international Jewish organisations pertaining to the issuance of neutral visas to Jews still under Nazi control in 1943 and the politics of rescue between 1940 and 1945. Catholic refugees also warrant a separate section. Ireland's status as one of the Catholic

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[3] Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 178-80.

[4] In July 1941, Liam Archer was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff of the Éire Army. Dan Bryan was then appointed the Chief of Military Intelligence. Regarding Bryan and Archer's career's prior to their G2 involvement, O'Halpin states that 'both Archer and Bryan had begun their intelligence careers in the IRA, and Bryan had continued in intelligence during and after the civil war. Archer had also been army director of signals, and consequently appreciated the more technical aspects of communications intelligence, matters which were to become crucial in Anglo-Irish security dialogue'. O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland*, p. 38.

[5] Goldstone, 'Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees', p. 116-36.

[6] As has already been stated, Dermot Keogh provides a thorough examination of Irish Jewish refugee policy in his work *Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland*; Hegarty, 'The Irish Government and Anti-Semitism'.

strongholds of Western Europe resulted in the special treatment of Catholic refugees, and allowed for the admission of Catholic refugee clergy, as well as religious students. It is helpful to juxtapose the treatment of both groups, as religious affiliation was a decisive factor regarding admission during the war.

Irish wartime alien and refugee concerns

Domestic Security

In the summer of 1938, as Europe was teetering on the brink of a second world war, Irish-British relations took a positive turn when the English officially renounced control of the treaty ports of Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly in return for various financial concessions which brought the economic war to a halt.[7] With the return of the ports, Irish neutrality during a European-wide conflict became a realistic possibility. It was always known that neutrality, if possible, would be hard to maintain due to Ireland's close economic, social, geographical and political ties to the United Kingdom. Though fully acknowledging the complexity of the impending situation, de Valera felt that a policy of neutrality was Ireland's best option, as his first responsibility as Taoiseach was the survival of both his country and his people.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, de Valera was quick to inform the Dáil of Ireland's intended neutrality, and to attend to the legislation needed to safeguard such a policy.[8] Of paramount concern was domestic security, particularly the presence of belligerent nationals within Irish territory. Various Acts, such as the Emergency Powers Act,[9] the Defence Forces Act[10] and the Offences Against the State Act,[11] all

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[7] See Robert Fisk, *In Time of War* for a thorough discussion of the Treaty ports' return; also Lee, *Politics and Society,* p. 214. For a brief account of British attitudes regarding the treaty ports after the war broken out, see O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland,* p. 172-73.

[8] Éamon de Valera, Dáil Debates, 77, 1-8, 2 Sept. 1939.

[9] Emergency Powers Act, 1939 (1939 no. 28) (3 Sept. 1939). Irish Statute Book.

[10] Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1939 (1939 no. 7) (22 Mar. 1939). Irish Statute Book.

passed in 1939, as well as the Aliens Act of 1935 and the Aliens Order of 1939,[12] attempted to address this concern. The Emergency Powers Act granted the state a wide range of powers which resulted in the restriction of the personal freedoms of non-nationals.[13] Essentially, the government was given the power it needed to effectively control the alien element of Irish society.[14]

By 1940, there seemed to be a real concern that various refugees could pose security concerns or threaten Irish neutrality. These refugees usually held belligerent nationality, mainly German and Austrian, and had been admitted into Ireland before the war had begun, mostly in the late 1930s. As most of the refugees of German nationality who were accepted before the war had been admitted under the auspices of the Irish Co-ordinating Committee, that was the group under the most scrutiny. Justice wrote to Bryan in May 1940 with various particulars concerning the German and Austrian Co-ordinating Committee refugees still present in Ireland. It was stated that Professor Ditchburn and Dillon, two individuals who had been heavily involved with the functioning of

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[11] Offences Against the State Act, 1939 (1939 no. 13) (14 June 1939) Irish Statute Book.

[12] Aliens Order, 1939 (1939 no. 291) (21 Oct. 1939) Irish Statute Book.

[13] Emergency Powers Act, 1939, granted the state the authority to '(j) authorise and provide for the prohibition, restriction, or control of the entry or departure of persons into or out of the State and the movements of persons within the State; (l) authorise without warrant of persons (other than natural-Irish citizens) whose detention has been ordered or directed by a Minister; (m) authorise the arrest without warrant of persons who are charged with or are suspect of having committed or being about to commit or being or having been concerned in the commission of an offence under any section of this Act or any other specified crime or offence...'. Article 2, 'Emergency Orders'. Irish Statute Book.

[14] It should be noted that Irish citizens also had their movements restricted. Travel permits were required to travel to the United Kingdom, and travel abroad was subject to the approval of the Irish government. For more information regarding travel between Ireland and the United Kingdom, see Enda Delaney, *Demography, state and society: Irish migration to Britain, 1921-1971* (Liverpool, 2000).

the Co-ordinating Committee, could 'not guarantee that all the refugees under the care of the Committee were reliable'.[15]

> They said that except in a few cases they had no real grounds for thinking that the refugees were in any way dangerous, but that two things made them suspicious. One is that many of the refugees are very anxious to get to Dublin (the reason for this may be that most of the refugees are townsmen), and the other is that in a few cases in which the Committee checked up on the particulars given by the refugees regarding their dates and places of birth, business in Germany, etc., they found that incorrect particulars had been given.[16]

The two listed reasons for concern, a preoccupation with getting to Dublin and the providing of inaccurate personal information, could have various explanations, and would not have been a major concern had they not occurred during wartime. It is interesting to note that these concerns originated from Professor Ditchburn and Dillon, two men who had played such a large part in refugee admittance in the 1930s, and who, it could be assumed, still held strong convictions regarding the position of refugees in Ireland. Perhaps in an attempt to mollify government and military concern, the men were willing to admit that there might be some issues regarding the aliens in question.

It was further stated that 'a considerable number of German people, who are not refugees, attend a Social Club for refugees which is held in premises in Hatch Street behind the Court Laundry. Dr Ditchburn cannot say who these people are but most of them seem to know the refugees. Up to the present the Committee did not consider it necessary to do any more than warn the refugees to be careful about their conversations in the Club, but Dr Ditchburn now intends to try to get the names and addresses of all persons who attend the Club'.[17]

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[15] Costigan, Justice to Dan Bryan, G2, Department of Defence, 25 May 1940 (MAI, G/X/0304).

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

Three lists were included within the correspondence between Justice and G2: persons recommended as reliable, persons about whom nothing is known and a special list. The first two lists are included within the appendixes (Appendix 3: Lists of aliens resident in Ireland classified as reliable or about whom nothing is known, Department of Defence, 1940), yet the third is included below in its entirety, as it is a rare and important example of what the government and the military knew concerning resident enemy aliens, as well as what both organisations deemed potentially dangerous.

Special List

1. Dr. Werner Schwartz. Came from Italy. Openly expresses pro-Nazi opinions to several people is able to travel round a good deal and does so.
2. Schulof, Alfred. Sent by Swedish Mission on plea of being threatened with imprisonment applied to the German Legation for renewal of his passport and then stated that he was a Nazi connected with the Youth Movement in Innsbruck. Got his passport renewed without payment of fee. Afterwards told us that his statement to the legation had been untrue. Other reports indicate his pro-Nazi sympathies.
3. Dr. Karrenberg. Was at one time in the German S.S. (the inner Nazi guards) Has been taking down names of refugees without any reason for doing so. Was extremely anxious that his wife should not be in England when war broke out. He came here semi-legally without our request and his antecedents were unknown.
4. Dr. Johann Hennig. Was staying in Aachen when the war broke out. We now know that he had no difficulty in getting in and out of Germany. His wife is said to be Jewish but does not appear to be one. He has some external source of income, which he says is a father – in Belgium. There is no confirmation of this. He got many of the pupils of Clissmann so quickly as to suggest that he got a list from the Legation. He is a very pleasant clever man. He is probably all right but could be very dangerous if he isn't.
5. Abberbach, Robert, is a very troublesome and mildly criminal (petty thefts). He has a strong and very bad influence over his brother who is weak and probably harmless.[18]

[18] Ibid.

Any connections that refugees present in Ireland had to the Nazi Party or German government were viewed as potentially damaging, especially if it could be proven that Irish officials had not known of these connections before admittance. A character such as Dr Karrenberg could pose certain problems for the Irish government if he had, in fact, been a member of the Schutzstaffel. This is not to say that a German initially involved in Nazi activity could not have become a legitimate political refugee, these were just not the refugees that the government was in the business of admitting into the state. Other instances of the providing of false information, for instance an individual who claimed status as a Jewish refugee when, in fact, they were not Jewish, could have further embarrassed the state and raised questions with British authorities as to the validity and efficiency of Irish refugee admission practices and screening processes.

The British, though more concerned with the permeability of the Irish border than any actual enemy alien activity within Irish territory, did internally voice concern regarding enemy infiltration of Ireland during the early war years. The British government worried that the establishment of a Fifth Column in Ireland would aid any German invasion of Ireland, or of Britain herself:

> The number of enemy aliens now proceeding to Eire from this country is negligible; but we have heard unconfirmed reports that Germans are finding their way there by sea through ports on the West Coast of Ireland. It might be easier for the enemy to arrange for 'Fifth Column' co-operation in Eire in the event of his intending to establish a footing there and we suggest that the Departments concerned might be invited to consider as a matter of urgency whether any further measures should be taken to ascertain whether Germans are in fact penetrating into Eire by the direct sea route and to prevent the possible formation of a 'Fifth Column' in that country.[19]

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[19] War Cabinet, 'Invasion of Great Britain: Possible Co-Operation by a 'Fifth Column': Memorandum by the Home Secretary', 17 May 1940 (TNA, CAB 66/8/13).

This worry would prove unnecessary, yet it is crucial to understand that it was present, and did most certainly affect British relations with Ireland during the war years.

Neutrality and resident refugee activity

The gravest problem that a refugee present in Ireland could cause for the Irish government was to impede the pursuit of neutrality. As such, alien refugees involved in any non-neutral activity were dealt with in a serious and swift manner, and were a concern of the government during the war years. As the very definition of a refugee is that of a person unwilling or unable to reside in their home country due to varying levels of persecution, one would assume that at least some of these people would be vocal critics of the system of governance that forced them to leave their homes behind. Although Ireland was neutral, these refugees may also have assumed that any pro-Allied activity would be welcomed in the country so closely aligned geographically, culturally and politically with England. This, however, proved to be a miscalculation, and both the military and the government worked throughout the war to actively suppress any propaganda produced by alien refugees.

In September 1939, the decision was reached to create a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, which was to encompass the Office of the Controller of Censorship.[20] Frank Aiken was named as Minister without portfolio, and was thus effectively in charge of what the Irish public would know concerning the belligerents and war developments. The Emergency Powers Act, 1939, also addressed wartime censorship, granting the state the ability to

> (h) authorise and provide for the censorship, restriction, control or partial or complete suspension of communication by means of all or one or more of the services maintained or controlled by the

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[20] For a full account of censorship in Ireland during the Emergency, see Donal O Drisceoil, *Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: neutrality, politics and society* (Cork, 1996). For more on British monitoring and censorship of Irish communications, see O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland,* p. 60-2.

> Minister for Posts and Telegraphs or by any other means, whether public or private, specified or indicated in such emergency order;
> (i) make provision for preserving and safeguarding the secrecy of official documents and for controlling the publication of official information and for prohibiting the publication or spreading of subversive statements and propaganda, and authorise and provide for the control and censorship of newspapers and periodicals…[21]

As such, there was a working apparatus through which people could be censored and monitored. Foreign aliens in Irish territory were guardedly watched, both by the military and the government, and frequently had their actions questioned by members of both G2 and the Office of the Controller of Censorship. There was also a worry that the British would use alien activity in Ireland as an excuse to increase their presence in the country, or voice their opinion that Ireland was not sufficiently upholding its neutrality. British authorities had access to Irish cable communications, telecommunications and post, thus ensuring that they also had access to any propaganda emanating from Ireland.[22]

Dr Kapeller, an Austrian refugee living in Dublin, was found to be contributing multiple items in German to the Radiodiffusion Nationale in 1940.[23] It was stated that 'both of these are frankly propaganda and while relatively tame in tone and spirit are not the sort of thing that the Germans would regard as a contribution to neutrality'.[24] Interestingly, the remark that apparently struck the official from the Office of the Controller of Censorship concerned the fact that 'Dr. Kapeller is a bit embarrassed by the history of Vienna through the ages but he explains, for French consumption, that by comparison with

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21 Emergency Powers Act, 1939, Article 2, 'Emergency Orders'. Irish Statute Book.

22 Eunan O'Halpin, 'Irish neutrality in the Second World War' in Neville Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 298.

23 Office of the Controller of Censorship to Justice, 4 Apr. 1940 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

24 Ibid.

present-day tyrants Napoleon was quite the gentleman as shown by his desire to do honour to Haydn the musician who would certainly be in a concentration camp if he were alive today'.[25] Such comments were not exactly the pinnacle of hostile anti-Axis propaganda, and it was even stated that 'it is not, however, about the substance of what Dr. Kapeller has written that I feel inclined to complain but rather because of the fact that while enjoying our hospitality he is prepared to take an active part in Allied propaganda'.[26] The content, it would seem, was not as important as the mere fact that propaganda was being produced within Irish borders by aliens willingly admitted into the Irish state. It was thought that Kapeller should be given a warning, and that 'he should be given to understand plainly that he cannot be allowed to do this sort of thing and if you agree perhaps you will take whatever action you consider will be most effective. Let me make it clear again that I don't want Dr. Kepeller (sic) expelled but merely to be made to act with some discretion and consideration for us'.[27]

Curt Werner was another refugee who apparently attempted to concern himself with events on the continent in a way deemed unsatisfactory by the government. Werner had 'offered his services to various Swiss newspapers in the capacity of Irish correspondent saying that he is in a position to give first rate information about all questions – political, cultural and religious – in connection with this country'.[28] An alien from a belligerent country unofficially reporting on Irish political, cultural or religious attitudes during a war in which the country was attempting to remain neutral could have proven disastrous. The Office of the Controller of Censorship held a firm opinion concerning Werner's alleged employment:

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[25] ibid.

[26] ibid.

[27] ibid.

[28] Office of the Controller of Censorship to Justice, 21 Aug. 1940 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

> I do not like the idea of a refugee adopting the trade or calling of a newspaper correspondent, which is a dangerous trade from our point of view, if not from theirs' and, though we are in a position to intercept most of the letters going abroad, it is always possible that a particular communication will slip through the net. If Werner's action is any breach of the undertaking, expressed or implied, by virtue of which he is enjoying our hospitality perhaps you would see that he gets a rap over the knuckles…[29]

The question of the legality of Werner's prospective employment was also an issue that need be addressed. Technically, Werner, as a refugee, was not able to enter into employment within the Irish state without explicit written permission from Industry and Commerce. However, if he was to enter into work with a foreign employer, there was no *employment* legislation present that could halt this. This is where both the Alien Order and the Emergency Powers Act became relevant, as wartime powers did grant the state expanded control over alien activity. It was thought that 'we have full powers to do what we like as regards aliens and if you wish we shall attach a further condition to his stay here that he shall not seek to accept employment as a journalist whether for native or foreign newspapers'.[30]

The Office of the Controller of Censorship seemed well aware of their practical limitations concerning their ability to fully censor international correspondence, and worried that Werner's actions may stir non-neutral sentiment warranting unwanted attention. 'The fact is that we have only a partial censorship of postal communications going abroad and cannot be sure that a particular communication or the correspondence of a particular person will come under notice at all. We can pick up incoming correspondence all right but not outgoing.'[31] Furthermore, the Office felt that 'any alien who claims to have an

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Justice to Office of the Controller of Censorship, 28 Aug. 1940 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

[31] Office of the Controller of Censorship to Justice, 29 Aug. 1940 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

intimate knowledge of our political social and economic life is worth watching… we certainly do not want aliens corresponding with foreign newspapers and the military feel even more strongly on this point'.[32] The issue concerning Werner was concluded upon the issuance of 'an Order under Article 6 of the Aliens Order, 1939, prohibiting Werner from writing any article for publication in any newspaper or magazine, and also from engaging in any correspondence whatsoever with any newspaper or magazine'.[33]

Certain aliens seem to have warranted a more mollified reproach from the government regarding their international publications. Dr Johann Hennig, the German academic discussed in the previous chapter, was also included on the 'Special List' as a refugee who had possibly lied to officials concerning his wife's ethnicity, as well as being 'probably all right but could be very dangerous if he isn't'.[34] Hennig was apparently a contributing writer to the *Catholic Times*, a newspaper based in London. The articles that Hennig submitted were intercepted by the censorship, and it was stated that the office felt that 'aliens of German nationality who have left the Fatherland should be discouraged from carrying on anti-Axis propaganda even of so mild a kind as this contribution from here through the medium of the English press'.[35] Apparently, there was no real animosity towards Hennig contributing to Irish periodicals, it was simply thought inappropriate, as well as unnecessary, for him to write for British publications. It was felt that Hennig should be warned 'off the English papers' and informed that

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Justice to Office of the Controller of Censorship, 16 Sept. 1940 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

[34] Justice to Bryan, G2 Branch, Department of Defence, 25 May 1940 (MAI, G/X/0304).

[35] Office of the Controller of Censorship to Justice, 9 May 1942 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

there would be no objection 'to his occasional contributions on various topics of non-controversial kind to Irish publications'.[36]

The matter, however, did not rest there, as Hennig wrote to the Minister for Justice, promoting his case. He stated that his contributions all 'dealt with religious subjects exclusively' and that 'it would be a very severe handicap to me if I would be no longer permitted to contribute articles on liturgical subjects to the Catholic press in England, and I would be most grateful if the Minister for Justice would mitigate his warning to that effect that, whilst being prohibited to contribute on controversial subjects, I may continue contributing articles on religious subjects'.[37] This proposal was deemed satisfactory, as Defence informed Justice that 'we have no objection to Dr. Hennig's continuing to contribute articles on liturgical subjects to the English Catholic press. I have no doubt that he knows very well the type of stuff we don't want him to write and that the warning he has received will be efficacious'.[38]

Domestic Anti-Semitism

Incidents of anti-Semitism in Ireland during the 1930s and into the war years have been well documented elsewhere, yet necessitate brief mention here. Keogh provides a thorough analysis of the levels and sources of anti-Semitism within Irish society during the early to mid-twentieth century, and should be consulted for a more detailed account.[39] The aim of this section is to establish that although anti-Semitism was present within Ireland during this period, it did not greatly influence the government's refugee admittance policy. Other issues such as security concerns, wartime logistics, Ireland's relationship with Britain and the state's foreign policy objectives should be viewed as the defining factors that resulted in the virtual non-

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Hennig to Minister for Justice, 24 Jun. 1942 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

[38] Defence to Justice, 30 Jun. 1942 (MAI, Office of the Controller of Censorship, 7/31).

[39] Keogh, *Jews*.

admittance of Jews during the war. Broadly speaking, anti-Semitism in wartime Ireland emanated from three sources: the Irish government and military, various fascist-leaning groups within Ireland and Axis legations and nationals.

Although there are examples of anti-Semitism within government and military archival material, there was in actuality no officially sanctioned anti-Semitism, or, perhaps more aptly put, no legally enforceable anti-Semitic legislation. One example of this latent anti-Semitism was the military's response to a perceived increase in Jewish membership. In 1940 it was reported that 'it has come to the notice of this Branch that the Jewish section of the population is making a concerted movement towards enrollment in the Local Security Corps'.[40] Military officials were concerned of the effect that this perception would have on domestic public opinion concerning the Local Security Corp. recruitment.

> It is not necessary and is not intended to attempt to evaluate here the quality of the services of the Jewish community, or the insincerity of their intentions, but it is earnestly pointed out that a concerted movement on the part of any section of the population is bound to have a deleterious effect on recruitment of other circles, less organised, apart entirely from the present wide-spread objection in the civil population to the Jewish community, recently much swollen in numbers.[41]

It was reported that the public had expressed adverse opinions regarding this increase. '... certain responsible citizens, on finding a large number of young Jews in the Local Security Body – one said he thought he had wandered by accident into a synagogue rather than into a Garda Station – immediately abandoned their intention of serving in that Body.'[42]

Nationalised and Irish-born Jews were less likely to provoke a response, but the 'swollen numbers' commented on was a direct

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[40] Department of Defence minute, 'Recruitment for the Defence Forces', 19 June 1940 (MAI, G2/X/0040).

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

reference to recently arrived Jews, most of whom would have been classified as refugees. This prompted the author of the minute to suggest a possible solution:

> It is, therefore, suggested that this grave danger to recruitments could be averted by the drafting of a period of residency clause in the condition of service for the Local Security Corps, a clause which, while excluding at least the majority of the persons with ulterior motives and of only 50 percent loyalty, could be waived in the case of persons unorganised and with a genuine desire to help protect the country from the threat of invasion, from whatsoever quarter it may come.[43]

It seemed to be implied that the proposed residency clause would allow for the exclusion of newly arrived Jews, yet could, and in practice would, be waived for other new arrivals.

There is no archival material pointing to any organised effort undertaken by Irish citizens to undermine Jewish involvement within the Irish security forces. There were infrequent complaints made to military officials, yet this issue never gained widespread public support. The military was concerned that recruitment would decrease, and thought it wise to discourage Jewish membership, yet this never became a major cause for an increase in domestic tension. The government would have been informed of these types of incidents, yet would have been well aware of their sporadic nature and inconsequential significance.

Various fascist-leaning groups in Ireland were also sources of domestic anti-Semitism. The Blueshirt, the Irish Friends of Germany, the People's National Party and the Irish Neutrality League all attempted to establish political footholds within Irish society while espousing classic anti-Semitic arguments.[44] The government and military carefully monitored these groups, yet this attention was mainly due to their pro-Nazi, pro-German tendencies and not their utilisation of

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Keogh, *Jews*, p. 166.

political anti-Semitism. It is crucial to note that Archbishop McQuaid supported the Jewish community in Dublin, and was influential in quelling domestic anti-Semitic activity, as well as limiting Catholic engagement with the fascist-leaning groups.[45] Due to the prominent position held by the Catholic Church within Irish society, the government may have viewed the Church's intolerance of anti-Semitism as further assurance that domestic anti-Semitism would not reach unmanageable levels. As such, government policy regarding the admittance of Jews during the war years would not have been greatly influenced by the fear that domestic anti-Semitism would destablise Irish society.

The staffs of the German and Italian legations, as well as German nationals present within Ireland, were also sources of domestic anti-Semitism. Keogh cites the German legation's *The Weekly Review of the German News-Agency* and the Italian legation's *Radio Stefani-News from Italy* as two of the most anti-Semitic publications within Ireland during the war.[46] The German legations also broadcasted anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi radio programmes. Due to the passing of the Emergency Powers Act, as well as the creation of the Office for the Control of Censorship, Irish authorities were legally entitled to limit, or even ban, these publications and radio broadcasts. The government knew that it had the ability to effectively shut down the production of any material deemed inappropriate, and as such, there was never any real worry that these types of media would greatly influence the Irish public at large. Similarly, the activities of the leading German and Italian fascists in Dublin were carefully monitored, and their activities restricted. Neither group ever achieved widespread support or appeal, and would not have greatly affected the government's views on issues such as refugee admittance.

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[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid., p. 170.

Irish-British border security concerns

Preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the rules governing immigration and cross-border movement between the United Kingdom and Ireland had centred upon the belief that a policy of reciprocal visas was beneficial to ease and simplify migration. 'The realities and mutual conveniences of contiguity had been recognised the two states amicably operated a common travel area after 1922, and there were no movement controls or labour or residency laws to prevent Irish people from moving into and working in the United Kingdom.'[47] The 'control of the entry of aliens was administered as if the United Kingdom and Eire formed a single unit. The control at Eire ports was in the hands of Eire officials and once an alien had been admitted to Eire from outside the British Isles he was free to enter the United Kingdom subject only to the conditions, if any, imposed by the Eire authorities when he was given leave to land'.[48] It was stated that 'Eire authorities acted in close collaboration with our own Immigration Staff and, though the control was less efficient than our own, it worked reasonably well'.[49]

Aliens resident in Ireland, or who held Irish visas, were not exempt from this free movement. However, once Ireland had declared her intention to remain neutral, the very real possibility that Axis aliens would be present within the country for the duration of the war worried British policy makers, and it was thought wise to rescind the previously accepted policy:

> When Eire proclaimed her neutrality immediate arrangements were made to set up a control at the ports in Great Britain against (a) the entry of aliens from Eire and (b) the departure both of aliens and of British subjects to Eire, where diplomatic representatives of the enemy remained in post throughout the war. At the same time the absence of an effective land boundary

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[47] O'Halpin, 'Irish neutrality during World War Two', p. 299.

[48] 'Control of passenger traffic between Great Britain and Ireland', Home Office memorandum, 26 Aug. 1946 (TNA, Home Office 213/1778).

[49] Ibid.

> between Northern Ireland and Eire made it necessary to control travel between Great Britain and Northern Ireland in both directions.[50]

Even the credentials of Irish nationals applying for British work permits worried the British.[51] Their faith in the Irish authorities was not substantial:

> The Irish Free State make no genuine effort, even if requested to do so, to 'vet' these people in the interests of our security. We have a most favourable report from them about one man who was an agitator in this country. We have a letter from the police of Northern Ireland telling us that the reports of the Irish Free State Police regarding persons in the I.F.S. are unlikely to be of value.[52]

If British authorities had this much skepticism regarding the ability of Irish officials to screen their own citizens, they must have been quite worried concerning Irish screening of aliens hailing from belligerents.[53] It could have been assumed that the British would have desired to quickly formulate what they deemed an acceptable cross-border migration policy, yet in reality this issue remained ambiguous through out the war years, and caused frequent speculation on the parts of Irish immigration officials. In December 1939, the government wrote to the

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[50] Ibid.

[51] '... the Security Services represent strongly that in the present time of crisis and in view of the danger of invasion, it is most undesirable that any special facilities should be given to large bodies of Irishmen to come to this country, since there is a risk that such persons may be used as semi-combatants to assist an enemy invader. It is urged that no machinery vcan (sic) be devised to provide an adequate safeguard against dangerous persons coming here since it is impossible to obtain and maintain an adequate check on persons who are brought to this country in large numbers.' Memorandum, 'Supply of Irish Labour', 13 June 1940 (TNA, CAB 67/6/47).

[52] Michael Meaney, Inspector, Wiltshire Constabulary, to Mr A. E. Ravenhall, Superintendent and Chief Clerk, 6 Dec. 1941 (TNA, Home Office 213/1983).

[53] It need be noted that although this was a real worry for the British, the numbers of German nationals present in Irish territory during the war was never very high. O'Halpin cites 306 German nationals were present in Ireland in July 1940; 141 were classified as refugees and thirty were members of religious orders. A low number of politically active Germans would have mollified British attitudes towards Irish immigration policies. O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland,* p. 59-60.

Irish High Commissioner in London[54] requesting a clarification concerning the correct policy regarding aliens travelling from Ireland to Britain. It was stated that 'the information received on this subject from time to time is to a large extent conflicting' and that External Affairs would 'be glad if you would be good enough to take up the matter again with the appropriate British Department with a view to obtaining, if possible, a clear statement as to what the position is'.[55] Two issues arose, the first centring upon the legal standing of Irish naturalised enemy aliens and their ability to travel freely to Britain. This issue, which dealt with issues of common law and the relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom, was at its heart political. Although Ireland was officially still a British dominion, Irish citizenship and naturalisation law negated any British connection. The British had considered applying various registration and alien legislation to Irish naturalised aliens, yet it was acknowledged that

> there would be difficulties in the way of applying the Registration (Former Aliens) Order 1940 to naturalised citizens of Eire who were formerly of enemy alien nationality, as the Order applies only to British subjects and it has been definitely laid down that the acquisition of Eire nationality by naturalisation under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935 does not confer upon the person the status of a British subject under the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Acts 1914 and 1933.[56]

It was stated that the accepted policy had been 'not to require registration as an alien under the Aliens Order 1920 as amended' and that the reason for this was 'both political and practical'.[57] The political reasoning lay with two concerns; that Americans who had undergone Irish naturalisation would be caught up in this registration and that it

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[54] John Dulanty was the Irish High Commissioner in London during the war.
[55] External Affairs to Irish High Commissioner in London, 15 Dec. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/862).
[56] E.N. Copper, Home Office, Aliens Department to T. F. Turner Esq., M.I.5., 3 Apr. 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915).
[57] Ibid.

was 'regarded as undesirable to emphasise the fact that a person who is a citizen of Eire is not at the same time a British subject'.[58] Furthermore, British officials seemed cognisant of the fact that Irish officials would be loath to admit that, as a Dominion, the conference of Irish nationality did imply a link to British nationality. '...that the Eireann Legislation had done something which it did not in fact intend to do; and that, as the legislature of a Dominion, it had in conveying local naturalisation conveyed local British nationality. This, however, is not the view of the Eireann Government and it is not the commonly accepted view of this Department.'[59] Clearly, the Home Office did not adhere to this interpretation of Irish immigration law, yet this was a political issue that British officials had to be mindful of.

In April 1942, a request was issued to British ports and Inspectors to furnish the numbers of Irish naturalised enemy aliens that had entered British territory. Holyhead responded that 'the number of aliens naturalised in Eire who have passed through Holyhead is very small, and there is no record or recollection of any of enemy nationality'.[60] Heysham, in Lancashire, reported similarly that 'no aliens in this category have come under notice at this port so far as can be ascertained'.[61] Liverpool also responded, stating that no such aliens had arrived at the port.[62] As it became clear that there was no massive influx of enemy aliens gaining Irish naturalisation in order to infiltrate Britain, it seemed that the British authorities concluded that the United Kingdom Permit Office in Dublin would under no circumstances issue visas to

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[58] Ibid.

[59] 'Memorandum', unsigned, 6 May 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915).

[60] 'Aliens Naturalised in Eire', H.M. Chief Inspector, Holyhead, 16 Apr. 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915).

[61] 'Aliens Naturalised in Eire', H.M. Chief Inspector, Heysham, 17 Apr. 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915).

[62] 'Aliens Naturalised in Eire', H.M. Chief Inspector, Liverpool, 30 Apr. 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915.

'foreign born naturalised Eire citizens... without reference to the Passport Control Department in London'.[63]

As an interesting side note, the language emanating from MI5 regarding this matter was rather emotive. It seemed as if there was some displeasure that enemy aliens were being treated in such a relaxed fashion. There was apparently a sentiment that these enemy aliens were afforded preferential treatment, even if solely due to the fact that policy regarding their admittance was uncertain. 'If it really does remain the policy of His Majesty's Government to allow persons of enemy alien origin who have acquired Irish but not British nationality to have the best of every known world...'[64] is one example. Furthermore,

> although I can understand that political considerations may require that Eire citizens who are neither British subjects nor aliens should receive treatment equal to the best accorded to either of those classes, I find it impossible to follow why either politics or common-sense should require that they should receive a treatment considerably more favoured than either... Is it beyond the bounds of possibility that we may even at this date arrive at some final composition of the very slight difference which divides us – namely the extraordinary anomaly by which these Eire citizens of alien origin are treated in this country more favourably either than British subjects or the aliens which they in fact are?[65]

The second issue centred upon aliens who were permanent residents of Ireland, or who had arrived in Ireland and were attempting to travel on to Britain, but who did not possess the newly required visa. A case arose which involved two alien employees of the Galway Hat Factory who wished to travel to Britain on business. They were informed by British officials that they 'would have to satisfy the Immigration Officer at the port of arrival in the United Kingdom before receiving leave to land' and that the 'first essential for obtaining leave to land is to be in possession of a visa for which the aliens should apply to

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63 E.N. Cooper to Turner, M.I.5., 16 Jun. 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915).

64 Turner to Cooper, 8 Apr. 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915).

65 Turner to Cooper, 19 Apr. 1942 (TNA, Home Office 213/1915).

the nearest British Consul or Passport Control Officer'.[66] The matter was further complicated when it was ascertained that there was no such authority within Irish territory. As there had never previously been a need for such a service, the official British presence in Ireland was not sanctioned to deal with the allocation of visas. When this specific concern was aired to the British Home Office, they responded that in actuality 'their previous letter had been based on a misapprehension and that the truth was that 'no visas are required by aliens for the journey from Eire to the United Kingdom''.[67] It could be assumed that something such as alien entry into Britain during wartime would have warranted a clearly delineated procedure, especially with a bordering country that had declared neutrality.

A Professor Chauviré[68], presumably a resident of Ireland, was attempting to travel to France via Britain, and as such needed to obtain the requisite British visa. External Affairs was informed by a British Passport Control Officer that if Chauviré was furnished with a letter which stated 'who he is, how long he has been in Ireland, and the nature of his post at the University, he would not experience any difficulty in landing here'.[69] This was an ad hoc individual approach to alien immigration cases that lacked coherent policy development and continuity. The tone of the quoted correspondence expresses a level of frustration and impatience for the development of an established practice:

> Even so far as the British themselves are concerned the whole position is quite uncertain. They seem to have made regulations giving power to the Immigration authorities to refuse leave to

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[66] External Affairs to Irish High Commissioner in London, 15 Dec. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/862).

[67] Ibid.

[68] Roger Chauviré was a French writer and historian who taught at the National University of Ireland. Chauviré was a noted historian, who published numerous articles and book on Irish history and Gaelic tradition. He was also awarded the Grand Prize of the novel by the French Academy in 1933.

[69] Ibid.

> land to all aliens (including those travelling from this country) entering the United Kingdom, but they seem to have forgotten that there is no authority in this country competent to issue British visas so that aliens here are in a worse position than aliens in countries in which there are British Consular representatives.[70]

It could be wondered if the Irish authorities were more frustrated with the lack of policy clarity or with the hindrance of cross-border movements. There seemed to be a fear of inconveniencing American citizens attempting to travel from Ireland to Britain, as well as a genuine grievance that Irish authorities were being called upon to perform British consular duties:

> Needless to say it would be most unsatisfactory for us to have to tell American and other aliens travelling from Ireland to Great Britain that they would have to satisfy the British Immigration authorities at Holyhead or Liverpool before they are allowed l eave to land and that they have no means, by obtaining the British visa here, of making sure beforehand that they will be granted leave. Furthermore it is not appropriate that this Department should be in the position of discharging the functions of a British visa-issuing authority in this country.[71]

It was also acknowledged that, although someone such as Chauviré would not have had a problem obtaining the aforementioned letter, other cases might prove more controversial, and thus more problematic for Irish authorities. 'But in other cases we might have a great deal of difficulty about granting or refusing letters of this kind and we should be very loathe to allow the grant of such letters for the purpose of the British Immigration restrictions to develop into a general practice'.[72]

Problems concerning the presence in Ireland of aliens admitted into England by British authorities also had to be reconciled.[73]

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[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] British officials were also concerned with their nationals traveling to a neutral state: '*The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security* said the he had received applications from two Members of Parliament for permission to travel to

Frequently, an alien who was successful in reaching British shores would be granted leave to remain for up to three months, and would then be faced with the possibility of deportation. There are a few mentions of these aliens, upon reception of an unfavourable decision by British immigration authorities, traveling to Ireland in an attempt to gain permission to reside.[74] One such case was that of Henry Meryn, a Polish national who had entered Britain in January 1939 with permission to remain for three months.[75] Meryn was granted an extension, allowing him to legally remain in Britain until October. He arrived in Ireland during August, and the Garda Siochána were made aware of his presence within a week: 'He was informed immediately that the Minister was not prepared to permit him to take up residence in this country and he was advised to arrange for his immediate departure.'[76] Meryn complied, yet upon his arrival in Liverpool, he was denied entry to enter British territory, and forced by authorities to return to Dublin.

External Affairs was asked to ascertain whether British authorities could be persuaded to reconsider their refusal as 'Meryn was admitted into Great Britain and came here from that country…'[77] This proved a rather lengthy process, as word was received that Meryn would

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Northern Ireland and Eire. In one case, the Minister desired to deliver lectures in Eire on political questions, such as the prospects of Communism in Britain and the future of the Third International. In the other case, the ostensible purpose of the visit was political work in Eire on behalf of the Labour Party and the Seamen's Union... In discussion it was suggested that a clear distinction should be drawn between journeys to Northern Ireland and journeys to Eire, and that applications for leave to travel to Eire should be dealt with on the same basis as applications in respect of any other neutral country. In present circumstances it should be policy of His Majesty's Governments to withhold facilities for travel to any neutral country unless the Government were satisfied that a definite public advantage would be served by the journey, or that the applicant had *bona fide* domestic business to transact in that country which was urgent and important and could not be transacted without a personal visit.' 2 Jul. 1942 (TNA, CAB 65/35/2).

[74] Further archival research is needed to determine exactly how many individuals attempted to evade deportation by illegally crossing into Irish territory.

[75] Justice to External Affairs, 7 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/640).

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

be re-admitted into Britain, but not before almost five months had passed.[78] Meryn's situation during the five months was not clear, and if he had required any kind of assistance, it surely would have originated from the Irish government, and thus an alien admitted into Britain would have become a ward of the Irish state, at least temporarily.

There were also various ambiguities concerning the issuance of Irish visas to refugees trapped in Nazi occupied territories for whom the British authorities were prepared to possibly admit if they were granted German exit permits. Ireland could, in theory, issue neutral visas to Germans that would allow for them to attempt to secure German exit permits, and thus leave German-held territory and travel on to Britain. The problem arose when British authorities would frequently neglect to state that these refugees would, with absolute certainty, be granted permission to enter Britain. Frequently, the Home Office would contact either External Affairs, stating something along the lines of 'I am directed by the Secretary of State to say that he would be prepared to consider the case of Moritz Bloch sympathetically in conjunction with the Jewish Refugee Committee if, and when, Mr. Bloch reaches neutral or allied territory, but while he is in enemy territory it is regretted that facilities cannot be authorised'.[79] The term 'prepared to consider the case… sympathetically' does not inspire absolute confidence, and it would have been perceived as a real risk for Irish officials to grant visas to these Germans.

It was stated, however, that if British officials could be persuaded to make definite and binding guarantees for these refugees, Justice would be prepared to state that the department would support the 'question of granting Irish visas to them' being 'sympathetically considered'.[80] Concerning Bloch's case, the British were apparently

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[78] Irish High Commissioner in London to External Affairs, 5 Jan. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/640).

[79] Home Office to I.M. Butler, Esq., 24 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/703).

[80] Justice to External Affairs, 12 Feb. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/703).

unwilling to say this, and he was denied a visa to enter Ireland.[81] The ambiguities of this situation were eventually resolved, as External Affairs was informed by the Irish High Commissioner that the Home Office had 'pointed out that in the circumstances it will be appreciated that no indication can be given whether any particular refugee would be admitted to the United Kingdom in the event of his being granted an Irish visa and reaching neutral territory on the strength of that visa'.[82] Regarding refugees 'who have reached neutral territory…the only applications which can now be considered are those in respect of wives wishing to join husbands in this country, minor children wishing to join parents, or, in the case of orphan children, their next-of-kin or other close relatives.'[83]

Another point of possible contention resulted from British security concerns that Irish nationals were engaged in travel to belligerent countries, and were thus interacting with Axis nationals or providing sensitive information, whether deliberately or not, to Axis officials.[84] There was an additional worry that Irish citizens, through marriage or other means, could be facilitating the admittance to Ireland of belligerent nationals who would be viewed by the British as a threat. Irish authorities had to approach such issues as a proper neutral state, while simultaneously not antagonising British authorities. The case of Liam Dermot Bergin allows for an examination of how such sensitive issues were managed by the government. Bergin, an Irish citizen, contacted the government in the winter of 1940, enquiring as to the steps he needed to take in order to travel to Germany to marry his

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[81] Justice to External Affairs, 22 Apr. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/703).

[82] Irish High Commissioner in London to External Affairs, 11 Apr. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/703).

[83] Ibid.

[84] O'Halpin states that Irish nationals, as neutral citizens, had the right to travel to Germany or other Axis countries. Those who did travel were monitored by MI5, and specific individuals did warrant a fair share of attention, such as Francis Stuart and John Swift. O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland*, p. 64.

German fiancée.[85] He was informed that, in order to attempt such a feat, he would need to obtain the following permits and visas:

> (1) Mr. Bergin should obtain a new passport endorsed for all European countries.
> (2) He should then get a Belgian entry visa from the Belgian Legation in Dublin.
> (3) He should then apply in London for a British exit permit to Belgium.
> (4) On arrival in Brussels he should apply for a German visa at the German Consulate General there.[86]

There were two issues that could potentially have hindered Bergin's plans, even if all of the above steps were completed. If the British officials became aware that his intended destination was Germany the requisite British exit permit would be denied. Barring that, upon marriage to Bergin, his fiancée would effectively be denied her German nationality, and would officially become stateless and unable to successfully apply for any of the visas and permits that would necessitate her travel to Ireland. External Affairs proposed a possibly solution:

> The only solution I can see to this matter is that the photograph and particulars of Mr. Bergin's fiancée be now added to his new passport as if she were already married. Mr. Bergin has given me assurance that immediately on his return to Ireland his wife will apply for Certificate of Naturalisation. Under the 1935 Act the naturalisation of an alien spouse is a very simple procedure and can be effected within a week.[87]

It was acknowledged that Justice should be consulted, but that there was 'no reason to believe that the Department of Justice would, in the circumstances, refuse the certificate'.[88] If this was the decided approach, Bergin and his wife would only need Belgian visas to get as far as London, and then a 'separate travel document for the purpose of getting

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[85] External Affairs, 'Memorandum for the Secretary', 17 Jan. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/664).
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

a British exit permit to return to this country from London. An Irish travel permit could be issued by the High Commissioner'.[89] Mrs Bergin has also been assured by the German government that following her marriage, she would be granted permission to exit German territory.

Bergin next wrote to External Affairs, stating his worries regarding his proposed travels. He had been prepared to claim that his trip was only to Belgium and due simply to business when requesting an exit permit from the British authorities. Yet Bergin was now concerned that 'filed records of my correspondence between myself and my fiancée may, by some chance have been kept in England' and that this would clearly show that his final destination was Germany on a personal matter:[90]

> Or again, suppose they subjected me to search at Hollyhead (sic) or at Dover, en route, and discovered the necessary certificates I need for marriage, on my person – this, I understand, is possible. Perhaps they would also discover my letter of credentials to the German consulate at Brussels. Another reason why I wish to be careful and thorough in this prospective journey is, that I do not want to embarrass your Department in any way e.g. if the British authorities assumed from my correspondence that I am unmarried.[91]

External Affairs responded, stating that they thought it a remote chance that Bergin would succeed in acquiring the exit visa, and that they were also concerned that 'under Section 17 of the present British Defence Order a British subject travelling to Germany from Great Britain in time of war is liable to sentence of 5 years' on his return to that country'.[92] Bergin, as an Irish citizen, should not have been subject to this Order. It was stated that 'whilst, of course, we do not admit for a moment that Irish Citizens are British subjects we have no effective means of

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[89] Ibid.

[90] Bergin to External Affairs, 25 Jan. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/664).

[91] Ibid.

[92] External Affairs to Bergin, 26 Jan. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/664).

protecting them from being penalised under British Law'.[93] This concern seemed to have had a concrete influence on Irish policy. External Affairs subsequently stated that

> the Minister has reason that, in certain circumstances, the British authorities might presume to regard Irish citizens as British subjects for the purposes of the application of this provision, although their right to do so would, of course, be strongly contested by the Irish Government. The Minister has arranged, so as to avoid unwelcomed difficulties, that in future no passport endorsements for travel to Germany will be granted either by the Passport Office here or by the Offices abroad concerned with the issues of passports, without special reference to this Department.[94]

The British were well aware that any attempt on their part to enforce British immigration policy on Irish citizens would be contested by de Valera. 'Mr. de Valera has already made a public protest to the effect that the Irish Acts determine the national status of all persons born in Ireland and of Irish parentage and, in so far as the British Act of 1914 is applied by British Courts to Irish citizens, it runs counter to all recognised international principles governing such matters.'[95] It is also crucial to understand that the rights which normally would have been openly afforded to the citizens of a neutral, in this case the ability of those citizens to travel to any belligerent nation, were curtailed due to Irish concern regarding British opinion.

Jewish Refugees

The special situation of Jewish refugees must be commented on, as much of this chapter will examine the Irish reaction to the development of Nazi Jewish policy during the war years. From the founding of the Nazi state in 1933, policy had been to facilitate Jewish emigration from Germany by whatever means necessary in the hopes of

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[93] Ibid.

[94] External Affairs to Justice, 6 Feb. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/664).

[95] 'Report for the month of March 1942 for the Dominions. India, Burma and the Colonies and Mandated Territories', Secretary of State for Dominions, 25 Apr. 1942 (TNA., CAB 68/9/22).

freeing the state of all Jewish citizens. Richard Evans states that in 1933 there were 437,000 Jews present in Germany that held German citizenship.[96] By 1939, Jewish organisations stated that there were roughly 187,000 practicing German Jews left within the boundaries of the old German state.[97] For the Jews left in Europe, and those that would come under German occupation through Nazi expansionism, there were to be two stages of the Nazi pursuit of its racial policy goals during the war. The first, 1939 to 1941, saw further efforts to force and encourage Jewish migration out of Nazi territory, as well as the beginning of the implementation of ghettoization in the East. During this period, an estimated 71,500 Jews left the German Reich and a further 500,000 to 600,000 died during the enforced process of ghettoization.[98] The second stage, between 1941 and the end of the war, saw the implementation of the Final Solution. During this period, the majority of Jews were not allowed to exit German-held territory, with Himmler ordering the closure of the German borders to Jews in October 1941. There are a variety of reasons for this shift in policy ranging from the failing Russian campaign in the East to various German domestic concerns, the historiography of which is vast.[99] This shift in policy was coupled by a liberalizing shift in refugee policy from the majority of European countries. The crux of an examination of a European neutral's engagement with the refugee situation during the war lay within the neutral's response to this Nazi policy shift in 1941. The question of the mere survival of the ideological pursuit of neutrality at this point was shifting from uncertainty to assurance, along with the tides of war, as an Allied victory became likely. Neutrality, and having to appease both belligerent camps, was becoming less of an issue. And once the reality

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[96] Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich In Power,* p. 555.

[97] Ibid., p. 599.

[98] Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 218.

[99] See Saul Friedlander's *The years of extermination*, as well as Ian Kershaw's *Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution* for detailed accounts of the development of Nazi Jewish policy during the war.

of the Nazi's Final Solution became clear, many neutrals abandoned, at least partially, the strict adherence to their neutral policies in order to help rescue the remaining Jews of Europe.

Much research has already been completed regarding Jewish refugee policy during World War Two, both in Ireland and elsewhere. In the previous chapter, Jewish admittance into Ireland preceding the outbreak of the war was examined, although mainly restricted to those Christian Jews who were admitted through the work of the Irish Co-ordinating Committee. However, research conducted on refugee policy in Ireland would not be complete without a look at other schemes relating to Jewish refugees and refugee admittance. The Co-ordinating Committee only dealt with certain refugees, refugees deemed appropriate because they met certain criteria. What happened when a Jewish refugee who did not meet these criteria appealed to the state? Who were the people, the organisations and the state officials who made these decisions? How did the Irish government interact with other governments, international aid organisations and international refugee legislation when dealing with the issue of refugee admittance? How did the government respond to refugee situations on the Continent once the murderous intent of the Nazi Final Solution had been well documented and verified? All of these issues will be dealt with in this section, as they relate to Jewish refugees seeking entry into Ireland during World War Two.

Once the war broke out, the Co-ordinating Committee's work came to a halt, and no further refugees were admitted to Ireland under that scheme. The government made the decision in October 1939 that no further German nationals or refugees were to be admitted.[100] Exceptions were made for German legation staff and on occasion German religious personnel. It was deemed to politically risky to continue the admittance of aliens that would have been considered enemy aliens by British

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[100] O'Connor, 'The Obliviousness of the Fortunate', p. 97.

authorities. Although individuals and refugee groups continued to approach the Irish government throughout the war years concerning the admittance of refugees still on the continent, Irish foreign policy concerns would necessitate virtual non-admittance of refugees. Refugees that had succeeded in reaching Britain would on occasion receive Irish visas, and Ireland, as will be shown, was amenable to engagement with international rescue plans that included potential refugee admittance.

The fate of Jewish refugees attempting to flee the Continent was overshadowed by various other wartime concerns until knowledge of the Nazi's extermination policy became widely known within the international community. The following section will feature an analytical study of three Jewish refugee issues as they related to Irish action and governmental policy: the admittance of both Jewish individuals and groups; the issuance of neutral visas to Jews still trapped in Nazi territory; and the politics of Jewish rescue between 1943 and 1945.

Group and Individual appeals

The most common way in which a Jewish individual would apply for admission into Ireland during the war years was through a family member or contact already present in Ireland or Britain. There was no mention within the relevant archival records as to why a refugee would attempt to contact the Irish government through a family member or close friend rather than through a refugee organisation. After the shift in Nazi Jewish policy in 1941, refugee organisations that had previous been active in German-held territory were no longer able to facilitate Jewish refugee migration, which could partially account for this change. The influence that non-national and Jewish residents of Ireland had on the government's admission policy during the 1930s has already been commented on, and it is necessary to note that this practice continued throughout the war years. This type of admission request was rarely

successful during the war, as alien admittance became increasingly politicised. Various wartime realities also hindered the practicality of this type of visa request. As communication between Ireland and the continent became more difficult, and postal censorship was implemented, it became harder to receive information and organise visa applications. The Jewish community continued to selectively engage with refugee admittance during the war, and never attempted to exert any real pressure on the government to increase admittance. Some prominent Jewish individuals did approach the government regarding the extermination of European Jewry in 1944, most notably Robert Briscoe who acted as a liaison between the World Jewish Congress and the government.

Although these attempts almost always failed, but are important for a variety of reasons. They allow for personal stories to come to the forefront, as well as humanising what was happening to hundreds of thousands of people. It is also crucial to possess an adequate understanding of what the government knew concerning events unfolding on the Continent, and how responses and policy were thus formed.[101] The inter-departmental correspondence concerning Jewish refugees provides an insight into Irish knowledge concerning wartime developments, as well as Irish foreign policy goals.

In November 1939, Otto Singer wrote to the Irish government from Somerset requesting that the government allow his parents-in-law and a Miss Elisabeth Werner permission to enter Ireland.[102] He included their particulars as such:

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[101] For an account of when the government was informed of the development of Nazi extermination policy, see Hegarty, 'Irish Government Knowledge of German Anti-Semitic Legislature and Extermination Policies during the War' in 'The Irish Government and Anti-Semitism', pp 44-52.

[102] Otto Singer to 'Government of the Irish Freestate', 7 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/647).

2.1 Gombrich family visa application

Name	Passport	Place of Birth	Date of Birth	Religion
Richard Gombrich	German	Frankfurt am Main	31-5-1873	Roman Catholic
Erna Gombrich	German	Vienna	6-8-1883	Roman Catholic
Elisabeth Werner	German	Vienna	8-3-1893	Roman Catholic

He further stated that

> the three above mentioned were granted the Visa to enter the U.K. by December 1938, but owing to additional taxes they had to pay to the Nazi-Government were unable to leave Austria until the middle of August, 1939. When they at last got their passports and the permission to leave Austria, the Nazi-authorities again stepped in and on the very morning when they were ready to leave for the railway-station their passports were again taken away and they were promised to get them back only under the condition that a new tax was paid to the Government.[103]

Such a statement allows for a further understanding of both Nazi government migration policy, as well as the confusing and almost nonsensical situations that these people found themselves in. One seemingly could not predict Nazi official behaviour, and this created a very dangerous and uncertain situation for many attempting emigration. The outbreak of war had further complicated the situation, hindering communication further: 'We only got the information a few days ago through a neutral country that they have been given the permission to leave at last. The validity of this permission however is expiring by the 15th November and unless they can leave by this date there would be no possibility whatever in the future for them to get out of Nazi-Germany.'[104] Both the Gombrichs and Elisabeth Werner were denied visas to Ireland, as Irish officials had by this time halted the admittance of German and Austrian refugees.[105]

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[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Justice, 12 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/647).

Another man attempting to secure his family entry into Ireland was Siegfried Lewin, a German Jew employed as an engineer in Scotland. In 1940, Lewin wrote a letter to the Irish High Commissioner in London stating that he would 'respectfully submit my case for your sympathetic consideration. I am a German Jew – Refugee from Nazi oppression – and have been given entire freedom while in this country by the Aliens Tribunal.[106] I am desperately anxious to get my parents, sister and aunt out of Germany before they are sent to Poland to work in the mines there under unbearable conditions'.[107]

Lewin went on to address various other issues concerning his family's admittance, including their intended length of stay and financial situation. He requested that his family be granted permission to enter and remain in Ireland for the duration of the war, as it was 'hardly necessary to relate the sufferings and indignities to which they have been subjected by the Nazis, and if they are driven into Poland we cannot expect to see them again'.[108] As far as financial guarantees were concerned, Lewin was able to provide the following information:

> Means of Support while in Ireland: a) 250 pounds cash at my credit in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, USA, and a permanent guarantee for my people from Miss M. Tower, 72, Richmond Road, Worthing, Sussex. Also I can give a weekly contribution of 40/-made up partly of wages

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[106] After the outbreak of the war the British Government established an Enemy Alien Tribunal in order to distinguish between enemy and friendly German/Austrian citizens. It was stated by the Foreign Office that 'any person as to whom a Tribunal specially appointed for the purpose reports that enough is known of his history to show that by his writings or speeches or political or official activities, he has consistently, over a period of years, taken a public and prominent part in opposition to the Nazi System, and is actively friendly towards the Allied Cause' would not be interned. (TNA, Home Office 213/1951). Initially, 64,244 people were cleared by the Tribunal. However, by May 1940 it was decided that mass internment was in the best interest of national security. Public outcry, as well as a number of extremely vocal anti-internment members of government, again shifted policy in July towards release. London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 170-1.

[107] Irish High Commissioner in London to External Affairs, 13 Feb. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/767).

[108] Ibid.

> and partly from my own bank balance. Bank Reference: Royal Bank of Scotland, Alloa.[109]

Miss Tower also wrote directly to the High Commissioner, verifying that she would indeed provide a financial guarantee for the Lewin family.[110]

Furthermore, the Secretary of the Alloa Glass Works Co. Ltd., George A. Manson, visited the High Commissioner in London, as well as wrote him a letter, concerning the admittance of Lewin's family:

> I think it only right that I should confirm the contents of the applications made by Messrs. U. and R. Heymann and S. Lewin for permission for their parents and relatives to enter Eire, temporarily only, during the awful persecution of the Jews which is going on at the present time in Germany. We were asked by friends in the South to do what we could for these gentle-men, and since they came to Alloa, my wife and I have thrown open our homes to them. We can state unhesitatingly that they have shown themselves to be thorough gentlemen, industrious and courteous and it can be readily recognised that they have extremely good parents. In view of all they have already suffered we feel we must do everything possible to help them to get their parents out of Germany before it is too late. Under the very trying circumstances we would beg of you specially to give this matter your very best and sympathetic consideration.[111]

This completed the application for the Lewin family. Siegfried had provided moral justification for his family's admittance, along with multiple financial guarantees, testaments to his character, and thus his families, and assurances that his family would leave Ireland directly following the end of the war. All of the methods by which an individual would attempt to persuade the Irish government to view an admittance appeal positively had been employed. As would prove the norm, the appeal was rejected, and the Lewin family was denied access to Ireland.

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[109] Ibid.

[110] Mary Tower to Irish High Commissioner in London, 14 Feb. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/767).

[111] George A. Manson, Secretary, Alloa Glass Works Co. Ltd., to High Commissioner for Ireland in Britain, 14 Feb. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/767).

This was another example of the unwillingness of the Irish authorities to admit Jewish refugees still present on the continent. Refugees present in Europe, other than in the United Kingdom, were deemed to risky to admit.

There is one situation, which occurred in 1943, that allows for an examination of various aspects of the government's reaction to Jewish refugees during the war. It did not result in the admittance of any refugees into the state, but it allows for an examination of the methods of communication regarding refugee situations, specifically the difficulty of gaining reliable information during wartime. Francoist Spain walked a thin line politically during the early war years. Although ideologically aligning with Hitler, Franco did not allow his fellow dictator to pull Spain into the war or hinder his trade with various Ally nations, mainly the United States and Britain.[112] Due to Spain's land borders, the country experienced various waves of refugees from Europe as the Nazi's swept westward. By 1943, the Allies were concerned that Spain was becoming overwhelmed with this burden, which worried them for a variety of reasons. Spain was a valuable source of Allied information, particularly the refugees present in Spain who had slipped through the Nazi strangleholds. Michael Marrus states that

> illegal entries posed a different problem, but here, too, the Spaniards were not particularly hostile to the refugees. Those caught without the appropriate visas were generally imprisoned and sometimes ended up in the grim Miranda de Ebro concentration camp outside Burgos. But very seldom were they sent back to Vichy or German- occupied territory. One reason may well have been the strong interest shown by the British and American embassies in the care of refugees in Spain. The Allies were primarily concerned with their military personnel who managed to cross the Spanish frontier after having engaged in

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[112] Donald S. Detwiler, 'Spain and the Axis during World War II' in *The Review of Politics,* xxxiii, no. 1 (January, 1971), pp 36-53.

> underground operations, escaped from camps for prisoners of war, or been shot down from the skies over Nazi territory.[113]

Allied pressure clearly affected the treatment that Spain afforded refugees, as well as affecting their admittance policies.

In 1943, the Archbishop of London wrote to the Irish High Commissioner in London, stating that he was 'anxious to enquire from the Secretariat of External Affairs as to the possibilities of the reception in Ireland of a certain number of children refugees for the duration of the War'.[114] The Archbishop made it clear that he was writing to the Irish government on his own initiative, as a Catholic Bishop and 'not even remotely from any national standpoint'.[115] He further stated that members of the French Catholic Hierarchy shared his views, and were anxious to secure some help from the Irish concerning non-Aryan children present in Spain. The rest of his letter will be quoted extensively, as it outlined his plan:

> I.)Would it perhaps be practicable to receive in Ireland as the country of first refuge a certain number of child refugees who have already arrived in or will shortly reach Spain and Portugal from France? I appreciate that this would involve an undertaking from other Powers, the British Commonwealth the United States or Brazil, to receive these children as soon as hostilities are concluded.
> II.) I do not associate myself with any suggestion that adult refugees should be received in Ireland except in so far as a whole family with young children might be permitted to enter in order to preserve that family life by which we all ser (sic) so much store.
> III.) It is to my mind essential that the Irish diplomatic and consular representatives in Spain and Portugal should have an opportunity to examine the political and general record in each case before the granting of a visa. I make this point because I realise that a considerable proportion of the adult refugees, more especially those who are Aryan by race, are likely to be politically unacceptable to the Government of Ireland. In this

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113 Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 261.

114 Archbishop of London to the High Commissioner for Ireland in London, 20 Jan. 1943 (NAI, DFA/243/895).

115 Ibid.

> connection I bear in mind the close relations between the Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It is a sine qua non of any plan that the whole transaction should be carried through by the Irish Government and its representatives.
> ...
> V.) I also consider that the extremely wealthy Jewish communities in the United States and Great Britain should offer a subsidy for the maintenance of the children of Jewish racial origin unless the Government of Ireland might take the view that such a subsidy would in any way limit its own freedom of action.[116]

The Archbishop made sure to state at the beginning of his appeal that any admitted children would not be permanent residents of Ireland. The USA, Brazil and Britain were named as possible homes for these children once the war had ceased. Throughout the 1930s, and the war itself, these three countries were heavily referenced when countries of final resettlement for refugees were discussed. It was stated that only adults included within family units would be considered for admittance. The main issue regarding the suggested admittance revolved around security and screening concerns; it was assumed that the Irish government would not be interested in admitting any adult refugees who were 'Aryan by race'. The wording chosen by the Archbishop to qualify this assumption is of interest, as he cites the close relationship between Great Britain and the Soviet Union as the defining force behind Irish desire to not admit German refugees.

It was also made clear that the Irish government would have the final say in any refugee admittance. It was viewed, especially by a recently independent Ireland, that to assert one's sovereignty, especially that of a small, neutral nation, was important. The Irish state tended to attempt this through the pursuit of what they deemed independent foreign policy, one aspect of which would have been refugee admittance. There was always a worry that someone else, whether it be British

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[116] Ibid.

immigration officials or foreign state officials, would ultimately make decisions regarding the admittance of refugees into Ireland. In his last point, the Archbishop incorporated one of the main arguments for the admittance of Jewish refugees into a country during the war years, mainly that the 'wealth' of the Jewish community abroad, usually stated specifically as American Jews, would cover the cost of maintenance of any Jewish refugees that the State would accept. This argument rarely worked, but was often employed.

On 22 January, the High Commissioner for Ireland wrote to External Affairs, stating that both Sir Malcolm, formerly the British High Commissioner for Refugees, and Archbishop Mathew had called on him to discuss the above situation. They stated that Spain had taken in roughly 12,000 refugees, mainly Austrians and Germans, and that about half of those were Jews and half-Jews. The Spanish government, as would be expected, was experiencing a financial strain due to their liberal refugee policy. The Archbishop 'referred to the valuable and active help which the Church in France had given to succor the refugees and hoped that something might be arranged in Ireland on the basis of temporary accommodation there pending transport to the ultimate destination, which it was thought would be American'.[117]

The next to get involved was E.H. Lewis Crosby, Dean of Christ Church, who wrote to de Valera personally, including within his letter a memorandum written by Neill Malcolm. During the war years, appeals to the government concerning refugees frequently originated from religious personnel. Even just within this correspondence, the Archbishop of London and the Dean of Christ Church were actively involved in bringing attention to the plight of these people. Also of interest is that religious personnel were often bringing their enquires regarding refugee admittance straight to de Valera himself. De Valera

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[117] High Commissioner for Ireland in London to External Affairs, 22 Jan. 1943 (NAI, DFA/243/895).

did hold the External Affairs portfolio during the war, but it is interesting that the proper Minister regarding refugee admittance, in this case the Minister for Justice, was not contacted in such a personal way.

Crosby stated that it was hoped that the position of Spain could be alleviated by
the admittance of small groups of refugees into neutral countries. He further stated that

> so far the Spanish Government have not evacuated those who sought refuge in Spain across the frontier, many of whom I understand are children. If the numbers of new refugees increase largely and nothing is done to relieve Spain of some of those already there it is probable that Spain will be compelled to forcibly evacuate many of the refugees across the frontier. It has been suggested that neutral countries might be willing to admit small parties of refugees and thus relieve the congestion in Spain. I am writing to ask of the Government of Éire would think of admitting a few of these refugees, even of the children. To do so would be an act of kindness worthy of our country.[118]

Apparently Spain was contemplating expelling refugees that had reached safety within its border back into France. At this point, the majority of these refugees would have been Jews fleeing roundups in Vichy France and those otherwise threatened by the German occupation of southern France, including young men the Germans were attempting to conscript and other political opponents of the German occupation in France.[119] By 1943, the Germans were fully committed to the deportation East of all Jews within France and were pressuring the Spanish to halt the entry of any Jews into Spanish territory. Allied pressure surely had an affect on Spanish willingness to rebuff Hitler, and keep open the border even with an increased presence of German patrols along the French border.

As deportation loomed in Vichy France, the position of these refugees if expelled across the border was critical. As a neutral country,

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[118] Dean of Christ Church, E.H. Lewis Crosby to de Valera, 5 Feb. 1943 (NAI, DFA/243/895).

[119] Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 261.

Ireland was seen as a politically realistic location of resettlement for these refugees. The refugees would not have to cross through any Axis-held territory, and could be easily transported to Ireland by sea. The memorandum Crosby included in his letter to de Valera detailed the situation in Spain. It stated that 'as a result of the fresh measures of persecution against and deportation of alien refugees, which began in Unoccupied France in July of this year, there has been a growing movement of illegal escape of these unfortunates towards Switzerland and Spain'.[120] It was further stated that even though the Germans had occupied the Free French Zone, and had increased their frontier presence on the Pyrenees, the illegal entry into Spain has continued almost unabated. The memorandum stated that in December of 1942, between eighty and a hundred refugees arrived per day in Spain illegally and that the total was roughly 10,000. Out of these 10,000, half were Jews. Slightly less than one-third were from Germany and Austria, and were thus stateless. The rest of the refugees were comprised of 'Allied nationals, mostly Poles, Czechs, Belgians, Dutch, Lukenburgers, Yugoslavs etc. The rest is stateless; former Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Romanians, Poles, Russian Nansen passport holders, freshly denationalized French Jews, etc'.[121] The situation was described as dire. To further complicate matters, the further resettlement prospects for the refugees were then stated:

> Re-emigration prospects for the refugees are bad. Present normal US immigration procedure is extremely lengthy and cumbersome and many refugees are not eligible at all. Some US visas made available for children in Unoccupied France whose parents were threatened with deportation or had already been deported may now be used for children having reached Spain, and in some cases also for their mothers. Immigration into Latin America has practically come to a standstill. There are only a few visas for politicals, available from Mexico. Some Palestine immigration certificates are available, but at present transport

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[120] Enclosed memorandum from the High Commissioner for Refugees (NAI, DFA/243/895).
[121] Ibid.

> difficulties are almost insuperable, especially owing to the bottleneck at Lourenco Marques. In Portugal the total number of stranded refugees without end-visas is about 1,000, amongst them 750 Jews, of whom approximately 350 are of German and Austrian origin.[122]

It is important to remember that, although Ireland might not have been in the most optimal position to accept any large number of refugees, the situation was extremely desperate for so many of the people seeking asylum. Interestingly, the assurances given by the Archbishop of London, according to the above statement, were not accurate. Some of the children *might* be allowed into the USA on visas that were meant for others. It was stated that Latin America could not be relied upon as a final destination at the moment, and that it was not certain if, or when, further refugee migration to Latin America would continue. No mention was made of Britain.

The next step was to verify accounts of the situation in Spain, and to this end, a report was requested by External Affairs. It was stated that

> as soon as our enquiries have been completed, and the necessary permission from the Spanish Government obtained, we shall see that a study of the problem is made on the spot. It should then become clear whether Irish help given in Spain might not afford a better, or at least a more immediate, solution than bringing the refugees to this country. The important thing is to give help now in the most expeditious manner.[123]

A willingness to contribute to an international refugee situation by sending material or monetary aid in lieu of refugee admittance would become a common theme throughout subsequent chapters, and typified Irish policy during the postwar years.

The reporting of the actual situation in Spain probably came as a shock to the Irish government. It was stated in a letter from the Spanish

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[122] Ibid.

[123] Walshe to Crosby, 10 Feb. 1943 (NAI, DFA/243/895).

Embassy in London to the High Commissioner for Ireland in London that

> my Government tells me that there are no refugee children in Spain. This confirms the impression I gave you during our talk and your Minister's information from Madrid. My Government informs me also that they very much appreciate your kind offer, but that the Spanish Red Cross has ample funds and takes charge of all refugees whether they are women, children, old or sick people who belong to nationalities having no diplomatic Representatives accredited to Madrid. All the others are taken over by their own diplomatic Representatives.[124]

The situation had been entirely misread by the people who first brought it to the attention of the Irish government. The Spanish government was stating that there were no such refugee children present in Spain, and that, even if there were, they would be taken care of by the Spanish Red Cross. It seems a bit strange that such a situation could have been so grossly misread, which is one reason why this correspondence may be viewed as important. This was a time of world war, and not everything was known, or much information easily attained. To understand this is crucial. Neutral governments were receiving countless reports from a variety of sources, and had to attempt to decide what was accurate information and what was not. To err on the side of caution was not unusual.

The interesting aspect of this correspondence, as it pertained to Irish refugee policy, was that the government seemed to take a real interest in this situation. It seemed as if they would have attempted to admit some of these children into the state, possibly due to heightened Allied interest regarding Spain's position on refugees.[125] It should also

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[124] Spanish Embassy in London to High Commissioner for Ireland in London, 17 Feb. 1943 (NAI, DFA/243/895).

[125] Another possible reason for a positive Irish response to the refugee situation in Spain was British interest in using Spain as a clearing-house for refugees able to cross into Spanish territory from Nazi-occupied Europe. It was felt that if refugees already present in Spain were further resettled, new refugees could be accommodated. British military personnel also utilised these Spanish escape routes to exit Nazi-held territory, which increased British concern regarding the

be noted that Ireland did send over material supplies to Spain for the refugees present there. It needs be remembered that refugee aid was not simply confined to the actual acceptance of a refugee into the State. Sending material aid or monetary assistance could, and did, also make a huge difference, as will be further examined in later chapters.

Issuance of neutral visas

There had been some evidence during the early war years that the Nazi government may have viewed Jews with neutral visas or passports as protected from immediate deportation. Marrus states that during the initial period of Nazi governance in occupied France, the Germans claimed that those Jews 'who had entry visas for neutral and overseas countries could leave for Spain' but that 'the French Ministry of the Interior apparently thought otherwise' and 'did not act on this suggestion'.[126] A few years later, with the Final Solution underway, the Germans were 'prepared to exempt small numbers of Jews from neutral countries from the death factories in Poland provided they were 'repatriated' in short order.'[127] The crucial point raised here is that the Nazis seemed willing only to consider the possible exemption from deportation of those Jews holding neutral *citizenship*, not simply those in possession of neutral visas or documents.

By 1943 the Germans had seemingly reversed this position, informing the governments of Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Portugal and Sweden that their Jewish nationals had to be repatriated by October of that year, after which their citizenship would be revoked, and they would be treated by the Germans as stateless Jews who would be threatened with deportation east.[128] Allied countries were aware of German reluctance to release Jews present within German territory as

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maintenance of the escape routes and continued Spanish good will. London, *Whitehall and the Jews,* p. 211-18.

126 Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 205.

127 Ibid., p. 262.

128 Robert Patterson, 'Ireland, Vichy and Post-liberation France, 1938-50 in Kennedy and Skelly (eds.), *Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966,* p. 105.

early as January 1943, when the Swedish government had attempted to halt the deportation of Norwegian Jews by issuing them Swedish papers.[129] The Germans had refused to recognise that Sweden had any claim on non-Swedish nationals. This attitude would come to typify the German response to such issues.

Out of sheer desperation, numerous governments and aid organisations still attempted to utilise the issuance of neutral visas to Jews as a way to halt deportations. The Agudas Israel World Organisation, (hereafter referred to as Agudas)[130] which would prove to have a contentious relationship with both the government and the Irish Jewish community, initially queried in 1943 whether Irish authorities were amenable to the plan. It is crucial to note that the international aid organisations active in Europe during the war were fully aware of the political position of neutrals, and utilised various strategies in their attempts to engage neutrals in humanitarian initiatives. Organisations developed different tactics which would be utilised to sway neutral opinion, and one was comparing the actions of neutrals: 'When I saw you earlier in May I understood that your Government was sympathetic to any proposals to render assistance to European Jewry. Indeed, this would seem quite neutral and in entire harmony both with the outlook of the Irish State and in conformity to the actions of other neutral countries.'[131]

As the actuality of the Nazi extermination policy was known at this point, one would hope that the fate of European Jewry would be more important to the Irish government than how they would be viewed

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[129] Foreign Office minute, 8 Jan. 1943 (TNA, Foreign Office 188/405); for more in Swedish refugee policy during the war, see the analysis of this chapter, *Comparative analysis of Swedish and Swiss refugee policy.*

[130] For a brief history of the Agudas Israel World Organization, see Jess Olson, 'The Agudah and 'Der Baal Tshuva': The Agudas Israel World Organization, Poltical Orthodoxy and the Interwar American Jewish Community' in *American Jewish History*, xcvii, no. 4 (Oct., 2013), pp 335-66.

[131] Agudas Israel World Organisation to Walshe, 24 Nov. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

by the German government. Agudas was becoming impatient, stating that it had been months since any word from the Irish government had been received, and that the organisation had sent numerous letters and telephone communications but to no avail. Another emotional appeal stated that 'it does seem a pity that this plan is not materializing when a visa involving no obligation, can save the life of a Jewish family'.[132] Discussion between Agudas and the government continued into 1944, when an official from the organisation wrote to John Dulanty, stating that 'it is, I am sure a disappointment to yourself, as it is to the Jewish Organizations in this country that the discussion between your Government and ourselves were not able to be realized'.[133] Walshe, however, did not seem impressed by the Agudas' representative who visited Ireland in October 1944, and this tension may have added to the government's wariness regarding involvement with the organisation.[134]

The WJC contacted Robert Brennan, the Irish representative in Washington, in January 1945, stating the situation in Europe:

> We informed you that during the present war, nearly six million European Jews were killed or starved to death and that from the remaining Jewish population, estimated at one and a half million, approximately five hundred thousand are still in territories occupied or dominated by the German Government, and that these five hundred thousand Jews may die in the period until the end of the war unless extraordinary effort will be made in this twelfth hour to save the remnant of European Jewry.[135]

It was further claimed that at this late stage, when Allied victory was all but assured, perhaps 'the German authorities may be more inclined to

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[132] Ibid.

[133] Agudas Israel World Organization to Dulanty, 17 Mar. 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[134] Keogh, *Jews,* p. 187. Agudas was viewed as a troublesome, ultra-Orthodox group that even other Jewish groups were wary of becoming involved with. Keogh states in a citation that Goodman was known as an extremist, yet was also involved with the BBC and worked for the British Ministry of Information during the war (Keogh, *Jews*, p. 288; citation 105). Schonfeld was also involved with Agudas, among other organisations.

[135] World Jewish Congress to Robert Brennan, 17 Jan. 1945 (AJA, World Jewish Congress Collection, H195, File 23).

take into consideration interventions on the part of the neutral governments'.[136] Two, now familiar, plans were then put forward, in a hope that the Irish government would take action. The first focused upon the distribution of food to Jews still interned in German camps who were in danger of succumbing to starvation before war's end. Both the WJC and the International Red Cross had attempted to persuade the German authorities to allow international aid and supplies into the camps, yet had not been successful. It was hoped that if a neutral government approached the German authorities, they would be more apt to seriously consider the request: 'We therefore wondered if the Government of Ireland could not intervene with the German authorities to have them agree that food parcels may be transmitted by the Red Cross for the Jewish population in such camps and whether representatives of the Red Cross could not be authorized to communicate with the Jewish population in such camps.'[137] The Swiss were also approached to help facilitate this plan, yet practical matters hindered such efforts. A similar plan had been thwarted in 1944 as parcels could not cross 'France owing to the sabotage of railways by French partisans and the bombing of bridges by the Allied Air Forces… and it is very uncertain what can now be sent at all'.[138]

The second plan concerned the issuance of neutral visas. Apparently, the WJC was not aware that this scheme had been tried various times, and had never resulted in the wide-scale halting of deportations. The language utilised made it seem as if this method was tried and proven. 'We informed you about the several thousand documents which were issued by the Governments of Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and many Central and South American countries, and we told you that people in possession of documents could be saved

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136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

138 Mr A.G. Wrightson to the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 18 Jul. 1944 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/42845).

from the danger of deportation by German authorities.'[139] The political implications concerning the issuance of neutral visas will be further addressed in the following section.

Politics of Rescue, 1940 -1945

In the latter years of the war, when full knowledge of Nazi extermination policy was universally accepted as truth, a main focus of various governments, international organisations and prominent individuals was ensuring the survival of the remnant of European Jewry. Allied governments had used Nazi acts of atrocity to rally their populations to the war cause, creating a moral justification for increased military and civilian hardships. As a neutral, Ireland had to step warily around the issue of the morality of the war, as well as political justification for neutrality. These issues have been discussed in this chapter through an examination of domestic security concerns and public opinion, yet how was the Irish government to deal with increasingly focused Allied attention on actions to save European Jews while attempting to maintain a strict neutrality? This section addresses how the government dealt politically with such rescue attempts within the context of Irish foreign policy concerns when the defeat of Germany was all but assured, and the realities of a postwar world fast approaching.

In April 1944, de Valera stated the actions that the Irish government had taken during the war years to facilitate Jewish extraction from Europe:

> We had several times informed the British and American representatives here that the Irish Government were prepared, through the Red Cross, to provide a haven for a certain number of refugee children. The Red Cross Society were prepared to house at least five hundred children (without specifying whether they were to be Jews or Christians) to come to Ireland from some distressed area of France. Our request was refused. At various times during the past year we approached the German Government to allow small groups of Jews to come to Ireland, or

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[139] World Jewish Congress to Robert Brennan, 17 Jan. 1945 (AJA, World Jewish Congress Collection, H195, File 23).

> to allow our representatives to give visas to certain Jews in order to allow them to reach Lisbon whence they would be taken to the United States or some other place of refuge. We had been informed by a Jewish organisation in London that the mere possession of a visa by a Jewish family in the occupied areas of Europe was a guarantee against deportation to Poland, and, although we were unable to discover that any neutral country had given such a visa, we again went to the German Government. The latter replied that we could not give visas to any Jew who had not relatives in Ireland.[140]

The defensive nature of this statement is significant. It is made clear through the archival material that various governments and international aid organisations in contact with the Irish government concerning refugee matters had made statements to the effect that Ireland was not doing her part. As will be addressed in further chapters, a main concern of the government in the immediate postwar world was how neutrality would be perceived, and how this perception would affect Ireland within the context of postwar emerging internationalism. International perceptions of neutrality were a worry throughout the war, yet in the later years a preoccupation with this issue began to develop. As such, were the above offers of Irish asylum for refugees extended through an outpouring of humanitarianism, or were they, in reality, based within a firmly established political reality of pragmatic postwar concerns? Ireland had offered refuge to children knowing full well how difficult it was to actually get refugee children from the Continent. The assertion is not that the government offered to admit these children solely due to their belief that the situation would not actually materialise, yet it should be understood that schemes such as those rarely succeeded during the war years.[141] Was the offer made to increase Irish prestige within the international community and to placate international criticism of Irish neutrality? The practice of offering asylum, rescue or aid to

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[140] Government memorandum, De Valera, 5 Apr. 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[141] London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 193.

refugees through schemes that would most likely never materialise in order to achieve political or propaganda gains was utilised by various Allied powers during the war. British authorities pressed the Swiss to offer admittance to thousands of children in 1943, and viewed German refusal to release the children as the preferable outcome. London cites that 'the primary attraction of the scheme was political. Its practicability was a secondary issue'.

It should be stated that in August 1944, after the feasibility of successfully evacuating any substantial number of children from France had diminished, Irish authorities did respond positively to a request from the American legation in Dublin pertaining to the admittance of Hungarian children.[142] Due to various confusions and concerns revolving around potentially hindering USA rescue attempts, the scheme was never realised.

A preoccupation with international perceptions of Irish neutrality led the government to attach a great amount of attention and importance to the actions of other European neutrals, mainly the Swedes and the Swiss. When an aid organisation or a government approached the Irish authorities regarding a refugee issue, more often than not the internal government discussion included how other neutrals were reacting to the issue in question. Refugee policy, like any other government concern, was political, and could be used as such. The aid organisations knew this wartime reality, and attempted to manipulate it towards their own aims, using Irish preoccupation and concerns regarding what other neutrals were doing to influence Irish policy decisions. Agudas utilised this technique in 1943, stating that

> as you are aware the Swedish Government has recently publicly expressed their preparedness to take all Jewish refugees from Denmark and in fact many thousands have arrived. The Swiss Government in its turn has not only taken tens of thousands of refugees but has also granted visas in a number of cases which

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[142] Dulanty to Walshe, 1 Aug. 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44). Also cited in Keogh, *Jews*, p. 186.

> have prevented the deportation of the individuals concerned. Of the remaining neutrals, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey have done their utmost to relieve the position.[143]

In 1944, it was stated that

> your Government is undoubtedly aware of the efforts which have been made by all the other European neutral countries to assist the refugees from Nazi persecution. Both Sweden and Switzerland have given hospitality to tens of thousands whilst the co-operation of Spain, Portugal and Turkey has also been most valuable. I feel sure that a Government with such high ideals as that of Eire would not wish to refrain from participating in this great endeavor.[144]

Attempting to guilt Ireland into action, both by explicitly stating the stark reality of the situation and stating exactly what other neutrals had done to alleviate the refugee problem, were common ploys.

The controversy concerning the issuance of neutral visas to Jews in danger of deportation East addresses both the preoccupation with the actions of other neutrals, as well as how the Irish government chose, and was asked to, interact with German officials during the last years of war. Initially, Irish officials were concerned that even the mere issuance of such visas could be construed as a non-neutral act. Agudas wrote to Walshe in November 1943, stating that 'I understood that your Government was sympathetic to any proposals to render assistance to European Jewry. Indeed, this would seem quite neutral and in entire harmony both with the outlook of the Irish State and in conformity to the actions of other neutral countries'.[145] It was eventually decided that, if the scheme was proven to be effective, the government would participate, issuing neutral Irish visas to Jews still trapped on the Continent and under Nazi occupation. There did not seem any real

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[143] Agudas Israel World Organisation to Walshe, 24 Nov. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[144] Agudas Israel World Organisation to Dulanty, 17 Mar. 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[145] Agudas Israel World Organisation to Walshe, 24 Nov. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

possibility that these visas would actually be used to facilitate travel or admission to Ireland, and thus were seen as a low risk, and potentially high yielding within the realm of international political opinion. The aim of the plan was not to remove Jews from German-held territory, but to 'ameliorate the treatment which they receive there'.[146]

The next step was viewed as ascertaining the practicalities of the scheme, which included contacting other neutrals, as well as the German government. The Irish legation in Berlin contacted Swedish officials, and was told that a visa would rarely halt a deportation; yet, it was thought that it might be worth trying a few test cases with neutral visas.[147] One such case, that of an individual named Pokarny, was attempted and it was stated that the 'visa did not help him. Police are averse to letting anyone out of Germany; they are afraid that information might leak out…'.[148] German officials claimed that the treatment of Jews under their control was an internal matter and that they did not understand why foreign governments or organisations had any stake in the treatment of German 'citizens'.

In the fall of 1943, the Dutch government appealed to Ireland for help. The Ministerie Can Buitenlandsche Zaken wrote to Ireland stating that between 400 and 450 Dutch Jews had originally been interned by the Germans in a country house near Barneveld, but were now facing imminent deportation, first to Westerbork and then on to Poland where they would be exterminated.[149] The men in question represented the elite of Dutch Jewry, including professors, doctors, lawyers etc. along with their families. The Dutch government-in-exile, based in London, appealed to Irish authorities, stating that they would be 'most grateful if the Government of Eire or perhaps, in regard of the special standing of

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146 External Affairs, 7 Sept. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

147 Telegram from Irish legation in Berlin, via Berne, 18 Nov. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

148 Telegram from Berlin, via Berne, 4 Sept. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

149 Ministerie Can Buitenlandsche Zaken to 'Eire Government', 26 Oct. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

these internees, the National University of Eire, could, in the way that will seem most suitable, approach the German authorities in order to obtain the release or at any rate the safety of the Dutch Jews mentioned above'.[150]

Dulanty wasted no time in contacting External Affairs concerning the matter. On 27 October he stated that the author of the letter, Baron Pallandt (Minister Plenipotentiary acting Head Political Division, Netherlands Foreign Office in exile), had asked whether anything could be done for the above group, and had stated that 'they realised the difficulties of the situation but thought that possibly our Government might see its way to ask the German Minister in Dublin to convey to his Government our hopes that steps might be taken to release these important members of the Dutch Jewish Community'.[151] Dulanty went on to state the situation as he saw it regarding the practicality of Ireland's ability to help. He 'told him that from recent experience it seemed extremely doubtful whether there was any possibility of release since we had been unable to get back some of our own nationals'.[152]

A telegram dated 4 November stated that the group in question was already in a German concentration camp, and further asked the recipient in Berne to ascertain whether the Swiss had had any success with issuing visas to Jews and delaying their deportation.[153] The Irish legation in Berne contacted the legation in Berlin, asking if the issuance of neutral visas would have any affect on the fate of Jews threatened with deportation. The response was as follows. 'Your tel. 186 Jews question regarded as internal matter and authorities will not give any general information stop Each case would be considered individually stop I have asked Swedish Legation what their experience is and they have told me visa is rarely any use stop It might however be interesting

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[150] Ibid.

[151] Dulanty to Secretary of External Affairs, 27 Oct. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[152] Ibid.

[153] Telegram from Dublin to Berne, 4 Nov. 1943 at 5:30 p.m. (NAI, DFA/419/44).

to try few test cases.'[154] This was a common response from the German government when questioned about the fate of Jews held within their territory. The Nazis did not understand why any governments would want any Jews. A year later, Cremin received a similar response from the German Foreign Office when he enquired in Berlin as to the fate of 12,000 Lithuanian Jews who had recently been deported. He was informed that 'the German authorities were anxious to help in every way that affected directly or indirectly Irish interests, but they found it difficult to understand how the question of Lithuanian Jews could affect Ireland particularly.'[155] It seemed that the Swedes had accepted at this point that the issuance of neutral visas to Jewish people would not halt their deportation, yet the general acceptance of this was slow coming to other governments and refugee organisations.

The Irish government was approached from various quarters regarding the treatment of Jews present in Hungary and Lithuania in 1944. Hitler, who had become concerned that Hungary would attempt to broker a separate peace with the Allies, made the decision to invade in 1944.[156] Eichmann wasted no time organizing massive Jewish deportations, and between April and July 1944, approximately 437,000 Hungarian Jews were rounded up, at rates reaching 12,000 people per day. These people were sent to camps in the East, the majority to Auschwitz-Birkenau.[157] Two-thirds of these men, women and children died within hours of their arrival at the camp.[158] The United States' War Refugee Board (hereafter referred to as the WRB), created in 1944,

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154 Irish legation in Berlin to Irish legation in Berne, 18 Nov. 1943 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

155 Keogh, *Jews*, p. 189.

156 Laszlo Borhi, 'Secret Peace Overtures, the Holocaust, and Allied Strategy vis-à-vis Germany: Hungary in the Vortex of World War II' in *Journal of Cold War Studies,* xiv, no. 2 (Spring, 2012), pp 29-67.

157 Eichmann established the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in 1938, and would oversee deportations throughout the Reich.

158 Johan Matz, 'Sweden, the United States, and Raoul Wallenberg's Mission to Hungary in 1944' in *The Journal of Cold War Studies,* xiv, no. 3 (Summer, 2012), pp 97-148.

actively pursued the creation of an organised international outcry regarding the extermination of Hungarian Jewry, approaching the neutral countries of Europe in an attempt to facilitate Jewish rescue.[159] The main recipients of these requests, the Swedes, Swiss, Vatican officials and the Portuguese, had varying responses, ranging from outright refusals to diplomatic missions.[160] The sheer audacity of the international protest against the deportation, and subsequent extermination, of Hungarian Jewry achieved success, as Horthy, under this intense international pressure, halted the deportations in July.[161]

Various governments and organisations joined the WRB in its attempts to reach out to neutrals, and as such, the government was frequently informed of the situation of Hungarian Jewry during 1944, as well as the various attempts by others to assist:

> I beg to confirm my telegram to you of yesterday earnestly asking your intervention with the Hungarian authorities in the matter of the deportation of Hungarian Jews now proceeding to Poland. As you are aware King Gustav of Sweden has made direct approach to the Hungarian Regent. We are in touch with the Vatican on the matter. If you could now add the representation of your Government we would be deeply grateful. The matter is one of urgency.[162]

The above excerpt was sent from Agudas directly to Walshe. The WJC also attempted to persuade the government to become involved,

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[159] For a concise account of the creation and activity of the War Refugee Board, see Monty N. Penkower, 'Jewish Organizations and the Creation of the U.S. War Refugee Board' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Reflections on the Holocaust: Historical, Philosophical, and Educational Dimensions,* cdl, (July, 1980), pp 122-39. The War Refugee Board signaled a liberalising shift in American policy regarding Jewish rescue attempts. The British viewed this development warily, as they did not want to be pushed into a dramatic increase in Jewish admittance. It is important to note the initial British contempt for the WRB, as it could have affected the organisations initial overtures towards the Irish government, and could be one possible reason why Ireland did not receive the same amount of attention as the other neutrals.

[160] Ond response to the WRB's request of an increased diplomatic presence by neutral governments in Budapest, in order to sway the Nazis towards a more sympathetic Jewish policy, was the ill-fated Wallenberg mission.

[161] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 292.

[162] Agudas Israel World Organisation to Walshe, undated (NAI, DFA/419/44).

telegramming Briscoe that viewing 'tragic developments Jewish situation Hungary urge you suggest your Government send special diplomatic or red cross mission to Budapest purpose extending Swedish Wallenberg Mission STOP Also request urgent intervention against German plans wipe out inmates Oswiecim Birkenau Bunhenwalde other camps'.[163] The Irish legation in Washington further forwarded the request of the WJC, telling Dublin that 'particulars have been cabled to Robert Briscoe and London Office of Congress'.[164]

The Vatican, as a European neutral, had fielded queries from the WRB as to the issuance of a public condemnation of the treatment of Hungarian Jews, with the Pope agreeing to 'make representations to the Hungarian Government'.[165] In the summer of 1944, the pope's condemnation of Horthy's deportations seemed to have had the desired affect, as the Admiral put a stop to any further displacement of Hungarian Jewry. Hitler then became concerned as to Horthy's loyalty, which resulted in his removal and the installation of the Nazi sympathiser, Ferenc Szalasi, who quickly fell into line with Nazi racial policy and resumed the deportations.[166] What is crucial to acknowledge is that the Vatican did succeed in helping to halt the deportations, even if only until the Nazis had a chance to reaffirm their control over the domestic politics of Hungary. Successful Vatican overtures meant that Western opinion and pressure could have the ability to save lives, even as late as the summer of 1944. Hungarian Jewry was the last large concentration of Jews in Europe, and the West, while never making the fate of the Jews their paramount concern, did attempt to rescue the remnants of European Jewry if it proved convenient, or politically advantageous.

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163 Leon Kubowitzki, World Jewish Congress, to Robert Briscoe, T.D., 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

164 Irish legation, Washington to Dublin, 20 Oct. 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

165 Rabbi David Freilich to de Valera, 27 Jul. 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

166 Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 292.

It cannot be ascertained from the available archival material if Vatican involvement and obvious Western desire for heightened international condemnation of Nazi policy affected the stance held by the Irish government regarding official statements relating to Hungarian action. Yet, it is interesting to note that the government had, by July 1944, made indirect representations to the Hungarian government concerning Jewish treatment and deportation matters.[167]

Individuals present within Ireland, who had a vested interest in the future of Hungary, and the survival of Hungarian Jewry, approached the Taoiseach directly. Rabbi David Freilich, a Hungarian Jew resident in Ireland, wrote a memorandum on the situation in Hungary for de Valera, entitled *The Atrocities in Hungary.* He stated within the memorandum that he was 'seeking this approach to the Taoiseach in no official capacity, but purely as a private individual'.[168] Public actions and condemnations made by the Swiss and Swedes were then listed: 'The King of Sweden has sent the Hungarian Regent Horthy Miklos a personal message on the subject, and the Swedish people as shown by the references in the popular press, have unanimously approved his actions. All churches in Switzerland have voiced loud protests.'[169] The Rabbi next made an impassioned plea to de Valera:

> I feel that it is to the honour of Eire that her voice too shall be heard in condemnation of these inhuman acts of barbarism. The expressions of opinion uttered by statesmen and leading figures throughout the world played a great part, there can be no doubt, in saving the Holy City of Rome from devastation. In the present calamity, likewise, world opinion may succeed in calling a halt to this frightful persecution, at the least, it may rescue some small remnant before everything is too late. Even if all efforts prove fruitless, it will be a source of satisfaction for all time to the nations that make the protest to know that they did not remain silent in the face of these outrages against all human morality and decency. History will at least record that when our

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167 Rabbi David Freilich to de Valera, 27 Jul. 1944 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

168 Rabbi David Freilich, *Memorandum for presentation to the Taoiseach, The Atrocities in Hungary,* undated (NAI, DFA/419/44).

169 Ibid.

> civilization was stained with this blot, the voices of these nations were raised in protest.[170]

Representatives from a variety of sources were demanding some sort of action from the government.

Within the academic literature concerning the WRB's overtures to European neutrals, Ireland rarely warrants a footnote, yet there is some archival material relating to the Irish response to the Board's requests. The telegram below was received by David Gray, the American minister in Ireland, and was subsequently channeled to Walshe:

> The War Refugee Board together with the Department sends the following message: The United States Government requests that you convey to the appropriate authorities in Eire its appreciation of their humanitarian initiative with regard to threatened Jewish internees of concentration camps in Germany. It would be very much appreciated by the Board and the Department, in this connection, if the German Government could be informed by the Eire Government that the reply to the Eire Government by the authorities in Germany has been noted by the United States Government and that accordingly the United States Government is expecting confidently that the authorities of Germany will not put to death the Jewish and other survivors of these camps and other detention, concentration and labor camps in the Reich and other territory now controlled by Germany. Inasmuch as Birkenau and Oswiecim are so close to the front lines, it is imperative that the German officials receive this message within the shortest possible time.[171]

The American government was trying to elicit a promise from the Germans that they would not put to death any surviving Jews, but as they were still technically at war with Germany, they needed to use a neutral to approach the German authorities. When Gray forwarded this telegram to Walshe, he further stated that:

> The suggestion that the German authorities should not put to death the Jewish and other survivors of the camps in question seems a hardly tactful method of approach, but if in your own way you

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[170] Ibid.

[171] United States Government to David Gray, 22 Jan. 1945 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

> could suggest that you appreciate very much the German assurances that the rumors in question were baseless and that the safety of the inmates of these camps were a matter of concern to your Government, it would be greatly appreciated in Washington.[172]

The next day, Walshe sent Gray a response, stating that 'we wired our Charge d'affaire in Berlin to approach the German authorities at once. I hope that, as a result, we may get some reassuring news'.[173]

The WRB's disregard for Ireland, or Irish ability to contribute to the European refugee catastrophe, was emulated by Allied leadership. A different approach when assessing Irish interaction with rescue attempts in the later war years is to ascertain the level of neglect Ireland experienced from the Allies with regard to participation in refugee rescue schemes. Even a cursory examination of British archival material allows this trend to becoming glaringly obvious. The ability of neutrals to either admit refugees under Allied assurances, or to make representations to the German government, are relentlessly debated and discussed, yet Ireland almost never features into this debate. Sweden and Switzerland were the main focus, with Portugal, Spain and Turkey receiving their fair share of attention. Britain and the United States debated making a formal assurance to all neutrals in 1944, which would have offered both material and financial assistance to neutrals admitting large numbers of refugees, as well as guarantees for their further resettlement upon eventual Allied victory.[174] The archival material concerning this assurance contains many references to neutrals, yet does not mention Ireland. In an American State Department telegram sent to

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[172] David Gray to Walshe, 25 Jan. 1945 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[173] Walshe to Gray, 26 Jan. 1945 (NAI, DFA/419/44).

[174] For more information regarding Allied assurances to neutrals in 1944 see TNA files; Foreign Office 371/42845, Colonial Office 968/166/4, Foreign Office 371/42749. By 1944, British rescue policy focused on Jews able to reach neutral territory, those in hiding or those who were not directly under Nazi control. The Jews 'in the Nazi death trap were beyond the reach of any aid their governments could contemplate. Such humanitarian activities as they envisaged would be directed towards persons who were already refugees or who might escape from occupied to neutral territory'. London, *Whitehall and the Jews,* p. 216.

Lisbon, Madrid and Ankara (all neutral capitals) regarding that 'a joint approach be made to neutrals by the British and American Governments on the subject of policy toward reception and care of refugees', other neutrals that would be receiving a similar telegram were listed.[175] This list included Sweden and Switzerland, thus accounting for all European neutrals in 1944 except for Ireland and the Vatican.

In a letter emanating from the British Foreign Office, it was even stated that 'the only neutral States that could admit more refugees seem to me to be Switzerland, Sweden and Spain'.[176] It could have been argued that had assurances for financial and material maintenance been made to neutral states by the British and Americans, Ireland could have been deemed a very desirable adherent to such an agreement. No such assurance was every formally issued from the Big Three, as the Soviets proved unresponsive to such an initiative due to tension over Polish refugee repatriation, yet it is crucial to recognise how little Ireland factored into these plans. It could be argued, and correctly, that Ireland had disengaged with the war to such an extent that it was no wonder the Allied powers did not try to engage the country in various schemes. Yet it could also be argued that the one realm in which Ireland did seem receptive to Allied involvement was in humanitarian initiatives. Could the realisation in Dublin that the country had been continually overlooked by the international community have pushed for a more active postwar involvement? Exclusion can be utilised as a political tool much in the same way as inclusion, and possibly this was a conscious Allied intention.

One possible reason for the exclusion of Ireland from these debates could have been its special relationship with Britain. Ireland

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[175] United States of America State Department telegram, enclosed within a letter from the American Embassy in London to Foreign Office, 7 Jul. 1944 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/42845).

[176] British Foreign Office to Mrs Barry Robinson, 4 Feb. 1944 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/42751).

was the only neutral that shared a land border with Britain, and thus any large-scale refugee admittance on the part of Irish authorities would have caused issues regarding British domestic security. If the continental neutrals admitted large numbers of refugees, even with Allied assurances regarding funding and further emigration after the war, this would not have affected Britain in the same way from a security standpoint. As Britain and the USA were the driving forces behind any organisation of a large-scale rescue attempt, could the British have left Ireland out of the planning on purpose?

Catholic refugees: 'Emigration to Ireland for a Catholic priest is not out of the question, since Ireland is a Catholic country.'[177]

Judaism was not the only religion actively persecuted by the Nazi state. Catholics were also discriminated against, imprisoned, and on occasions, killed due to their adherence to their faith. Beginning in 1933, Hitler waged a propaganda campaign against the place that Catholicism had held within German society, utilising his policy of Gleichschaltung[178] to establish a strangle hold over all German social institutions. Hitler's Germany would only accept one state religion, and that would be Nazism. During the years of Nazi consolidation, Hitler removed religion, mainly Christianity, from all sections of German social and political life. Religious schools and youth organisations were shut down, and replaced by Nazi ideologically skewed education and the Hitler Youth. Catholic printing presses were first heavily censored, and then banned. Priests and bishops were imprisoned, and relations with the Vatican deteriorated. The 1933 Concordat, an agreement between the Nazi state and the Vatican, attempted to elicit from the Church an assurance that Catholic personnel in Germany would refrain

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[177] Catholic Committee for Refugees to Minister for Ireland, Paris, 10 May 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).

[178] The term 'gleichschaltung' referred to the Nazi policy of bringing every aspect of German culture and society under its influence, thus ensuring the cooperation of the German people with the objectives of the regime.

from political activity in exchange for freedom of religious practice.[179] This proved an ill-advised step for the Catholic hierarchy in Germany, as many priests refused to halt their political activity, and Hitler used the Concordat as an excuse for further Catholic suppression. Key members of the Catholic Centre Party were killed during the Night of the Long Knives in 1934, and the struggle against so called 'political Catholicism' intensified.[180]

Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany

Within such a hostile climate, a number of religious personnel decided to leave Germany, and were naturally attracted to countries with a strong Catholic heritage, such as Ireland. These people were generally considered religious refugees, and various Catholic refugee organisations sprung up during the 1930s in order to facilitate their emigration. It has been estimated that up to thirty percent of those persecuted by the Nazis were Christians.[181] One such organisation, the Catholic Committee for Refugees, founded in 1936, met with limited success, yet shall be discussed here, as the Committee contacted the government in 1939 concerning the possible admittance of refugee priests to Ireland. It need be stated that the Committee, though primarily concerned with Catholics, did actively participate in the international dialogue concerning the German Jewish refugee problem, and did facilitate cooperation between various refugee organisations, governments and prominent individuals.[182] The stated aim of the Committee in 1938 was to raise funds for the migration of Catholic

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[179] Mervyn O'Driscoll, 'Inter-war Irish-German Diplomacy: Continuity, Ambiguity and Appeasement in Irish Foreign Policy', p. 84. Also see Evans, *The Third Reich in Power*, p. 234-320.

[180] Waldemar Gurian, 'Hitler's Undeclared War on the Catholic Church' in *Foreign Affairs*, xvi, No. 2 (Jan., 1938), pp 260-71.

[181] Haim Genizi, 'New York is Big: America is Bigger: The Resettlement of Refugees from Nazism, 1936-1945' in *Jewish Studies,* xxxxvi, No. 1 (Winter, 1984), pp 61-72.

[182] For an example, see *The Tablet: The international Catholic news weekly* issue of 4 Feb. 1939, page 21.

refugees, as well as organising an 'international scheme for settling the refugees in lands that have expressed their willingness to receive them...'[183]

Ireland, considered one of the remaining bastions of Western Christianity, was of paramount interest to the Catholic Committee for Refugees, and was first contacted in 1938 regarding a refugee discussed in the previous chapter, Paul Zirbes.[184] The Catholic Committee made contact with the Irish Co-ordinating Committee regarding Zirbes, and both organisations succeeded in getting him safely to England. Five months later, Patrick O'Bryne, the Deputy-Secretary of the Irish legation in Paris, wrote to Dublin, explaining that he had been approached by the Committee, which had no official representation in France, England or Ireland, as to the possibility of Ireland admitting a small number of refugee priests from Central Europe.[185] O'Bryne explained that 'during the last few years, many German priests – and latterly Czeck – have had to leave their country to avoid imprisonment, or worse, on account of their clerical activities'.[186] The modus operandi of the Committee was then commented on:

> The Committee at Utrecht is engaged, through its branches in the American Continent, in trying to secure their admission to American countries. The Committee in these countries are in touch with the various bishops who are invited to receive refugee priests for work in their dioceses. In the meantime, the refugees have been welcomed in Holland by the authorities who have provided the necessary temporary resident permits. The position of the refugee priests is now, according to the Abbe Berger, endangered by the menace of war which, it is thought in Holland, would involve that country in a conflict with Germany. The Catholic Committee for Refugees is, therefore, concerned to find temporary shelter for the priests in countries further removed from the probable scene of hostilities. The Committee would therefore like to know whether Ireland would take some

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183 *The Tablet: The international Catholic news weekly* issue of 13 Aug. 1938, page 22.

184 See Chapter 1, *Irish Co-ordinating Committee.*

185 Patrick O'Bryne, Paris, 25 Apr. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).

186 Ibid.

of the priests, say 3 or 4.[187]

It was made clear that any refugee priests admitted to Ireland would further emigrate to the United States once permission was granted by American immigration officials.

O'Bryne informed the Committee that the government would have to be contacted directly, and that the ecclesiastical authorities in Dublin would also have to be consulted. He felt, however, that 'if, for instance, one or more religious houses in Ireland were to offer hospitality to the priests in question, it was likely that the Government would not place any obstacle in the way of such an arrangement, provided the priests were genuinely political refugees'.[188]

O'Bryne's initial point of contact with the Committee had been a Dr Otto Berger, a Czechoslovakian citizen who was both a Catholic writer and a Doctor of Philosophy and Theology at Prague.[189] Berger had travelled to Holland, as 'since the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the German laws affecting Catholic teaching and the activities generally of the clergy have been put into operation in that country, and he found it impossible to continue his work'.[190] Initially the priest had made it clear that he himself did not wish to relocate to Ireland, and was corresponding with the government within his capacity as a representative of the Committee.[191] However, the next time Berger is mentioned, it is in connection to his wish to find refuge in Ireland. The Committee wrote to the Irish legation in Paris, expounding Berger's case:

> The priest, who is a refugee, is in due possession of the requisite official documents. He is of Czech nationality and his passport is valid until 1941. The recommendations of his ecclesiastical authorities, too, are in perfect order. It was on our invitation that

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187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.

189 Patrick O'Bryne , Paris, 25 Apr. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).

190 Ibid.

191 Patrick O'Bryne, Paris, 25 Apr. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).

> he came from Czech-Slovakia to Holland. Our idea is to find him a position or a home in a convent, boarding-school or hospital, possibly with nuns, where he can perfect his English. In case he should be certain of a home in Ireland for some years – or at all events some months- it would not be necessary for him to travel onto the U.S.A.[192]

Furthermore, Berger was in possession of permission from his ecclesiastical authorities to settle in another diocese, and it was even stated that he would not be adverse to repatriation as soon as 'the cessation of the present animosity of the Reich to the Church enables him to return to Germany'.[193] Financially, Berger was in the same position as many German refugees; deprived of the majority of their hard currency and easily liquidated assets and only allowed to take a small amount of Reichsmarks out of German held territory. As such, it was proposed that Berger would find necessary 'accommodation free of charge – so a position that will enable him to provide for himself. What he can save from his stipend will be just sufficient to meet his traveling expenses. Up to now we have supplied the means of his maintenance'.[194]

Berger proposed to travel to Dublin for a fourteen-day stay, in order to present himself to ecclesiastical authorities and to discuss his prospects in Ireland.[195] Justice wrote to External Affairs regarding the request, stating that the department would not be prepared to authorize a visa for Berger 'unless arrangements were made for the maintenance of Dr Berger by the Ecclesiastical authorities in this country and application for the admission of Dr Berger was made by those authorities'.[196]

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[192] Catholic Committee for Refugees to Minister for Ireland, Paris, 10 May 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).
[193] Catholic Committee for Refugees to Minister for Ireland, Paris, 20 May 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).
[194] Ibid.
[195] Cremins to External Affairs, 22 May 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).
[196] Justice to External Affairs, 5 Jun. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/275).

The relevant files do not state whether Berger successfully found a place in Ireland, yet there is still much that can be taken from this interaction between the government and the Committee. The most obvious issue would be that of religious favouritism. Ireland was a Catholic country, and no doubt showed an inclination towards the favouring of the admittance of Catholic personnel during the war years. Certain refugees were deemed more acceptable than others. Catholic personnel would have been viewed as easily assimilated and apt to give back to one of the most important aspects of Irish society, the spiritual community. Their admittance would have been viewed as enhancing the community, whereas a Jewish person would have been viewed as a possible threat or destabilising influence. Catholic refugees, religious personnel in particular, were a 'safe bet' as far as refugee admittance, and could be sold to the public as such. It should also be remembered that foreign priests were not uncommon in Ireland, and the admittance of such people would not have been as visible or shocking to the public.

Refugee priests and clerical students

There are also various mentions of the admittance of religious personnel during the war outside the auspices of the Committee, yet it cannot be definitively known if these people were considered refugees by either the government. One can, however, ascertain if an individual *could* have been considered a refugee by their stated citizenship, occupation and listed reason for entry to Ireland. Such persons were admitted into the state in the autumn of 1939, two of whom were Polish Jesuit students, admitted in November. Their names were listed as Marianus Malacek and Miecislaus Novak.[197] Two Belgium canons, Peter Hermanns and Cyril d'Hoine, were also admitted in November 1939.[198]

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[197] Walshe to Irish High Commissioner, London, Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/672).

[198] Belton to Irish High Commissioner, London, 7 Nov. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/672).

Spanish religious personnel were admitted during the war years, and although Spanish nationals were outside of the tradition wartime discourse of the belligerent/non-belligerent categorisations of countries, the admittance of Spanish nationals would still have been a political issue, albeit in a slightly different vein. Franco's official stance was that of 'non-belligerence', although Spain offered financial and material aid to the Axis powers, as well as stating that it supported Axis ideology.[199] The admission of Spanish nationals raised questions of internationally accepted neutrality, wartime alliances, possible hostile alien admittance and British reactions to Irish admittance of such 'non-belligerent' nationals. In September 1939, a Spanish priest named Father Corbella was granted a visa,[200] and in June of 1940, a Reverend Father Gisbert of the Society of Jesus, also a Spanish national, was admitted.[201]

In 1940, three Polish religious students were issued visas. Their particulars were listed as follows:

2.2 Polish religious students, 1940

Name	Position	Date and place of birth	Passport information
Kazimierz Szymurski	Subdeacon	20. Nov. 1916, Wattenscheid	Polish, Nr. 49636/729
Jan Szkatula	Minor Orders	10 Dec. 1915, Skryszow	Polish, Nr. 700555
Pawel Latussek	Minor Orders	6 Jan. 1916, Trebaczow	Polish, Nr. 49622/729

The facilitator of the entry of these students had been Peter L. Gaffney, O.M.I., the rector of the Church of the English Martyrs, based in London.

In 1941, a Franciscan Convent based in Taunton received permission for two members of their order to enter Ireland. The purpose of their journey was listed as entering the Convent of Order at Laurel

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[199] Elena Hernandez-Sandoica and Enrique Moradiellos, 'Spain and the Second World War, 1939-1945' in Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents*, p. 241-67.

[200] Boland, 16 Sept. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/672).

[201] Justice to External Affairs, 6 Jun. 1940 (NAI, DFA/202/6720.

Hill Avenue, Limerick and the duration of their stay was stated as indefinite.[202] Their particulars were listed as such.

2.3 Convent of Order, Limerick, admitted personnel, 1941

Name	Date of birth	Country of origin
Jeanne Ner	13 Oct. 1892	France
Sophie Hopfenzitz	30 Mar. 1877	Germany

Vatican-Irish interactions pertaining to refugee matters

During the war, the Vatican was to remain neutral, only becoming a vocal critic of Nazi policy on rare occasions.[203] Marrus states that 'undoubtedly, the Vatican also found certain aspects of right-wing authoritarian regimes congenial: their opposition to Marxism, their patronage of the Church in several countries, and their frequent championship of traditional social structures'.[204] However, the Vatican did highly disapprove of Nazi racial ideology and policy, particularly once it became clear that Christian Jews were not exempt from persecution. Race as a categoriser was alien to the Catholic Church of the 1930s, as Catholic doctrine accepted anyone into the fold as long as they adhered to Catholic belief. For the Church, a person was not defined by their race, but by their religious adherence. Regardless, the Vatican claimed neutrality, which was subsequent to Mussolini's, and later Hitler's, approval. The Vatican did actively pursue humanitarian objectives during the war, mainly concerned with the situation and treatment of refugees, yet this mostly concerned Catholic refugees, or non-Aryan Catholics. Any public denouncement emanating from the

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202 Irish High Commissioner in London to External Affairs, 7 May 1941 (NAI, DFA/202/672).

203 The level of Vatican denouncements concerning German extermination policy, as well as the actuality of Vatican rescue attempts, is still a hotly debated topic. See Robert F. Drinan's, 'The Christian Response to the Holocaust' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Reflections on the Holocaust: Historical, Philosophical, and Educational Dimensions,* cdl, (July, 1980), pp 179-89 for a concise examination of various historical interpretations concerning Vatican involvement. It should also be noted that within his examination of Christian responses to the Holocaust, Ireland is not mentioned.

204 Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 265.

Pope over the Nazis' treatment of Jews was deemed an unnecessary and inappropriate action by Vatican officials, and thus did not materialise until the last years of the war. Catholic personnel throughout Europe did engage in rescue attempts, yet this was always on a grassroots level, and was never coordinated by the Vatican or leading Church officials. The Church's involvement in these schemes was also always subject to Nazi tolerance.

The majority of Irish interaction with the Vatican over refugee matters occurred in the later war years, when both states became aware, and influenced by, the intense international reaction concerning Nazi treatment of Jews. Throughout the war, Irish authorities followed the development of Vatican policy carefully, and showed concern regarding how Irish policy was perceived by the Church hierarchy. This seemed to have manifested itself into Irish-Vatican cooperation, or attempts thereof, over refugee issues. As early as April 1939, the Nuncio to Ireland, Paschal Robinson, approached the Irish Co-ordinating Committee to enquire whether Ireland would be prepared to admit a number of non-Aryan Christian doctors.[205] Nuncio Robinson had been instructed by the Vatican Secretariat of State to approach the Irish government. One group of people whom the Irish officials were extremely unwilling to admit into the state was professionals, particularly doctors.[206] As such, nothing came of the scheme, and Vatican officials were informed of the state's negative response. It has also been debated whether one of the few instances in which de Valera could have been accused of breaking his strictly enforced neutrality was due to Vatican outcry concerning Hitler's 1940 invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands. De Valera publicly condemned this German action, as did the Vatican, but quickly attempted to seal the breech this action

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[205] Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 109.
[206] Ibid.

created.[207]

The years 1943 to 1945 saw the most frequent Irish-Vatican cooperation concerning refugees. Most of this cooperation focused on saving the remnants of European Jewry, and has already been commented on within the *Jewish Refugees* section, yet necessitate contextualisation within the large scope of Irish/Vatican relations. Two rescue attempts with which Irish authorities showed extreme interest in also happened to have been supported by the Vatican; the proposed admittance of refugee children present in Spain in 1943, and attempts to rescue Hungarian Jews in 1944. Spain and Hungary, both traditionally viewed as Catholic countries, also garnered increased Allied attention in the later war years, as their respective strategic value increased.

The initial request for Irish aid emanated from the Catholic Archbishop of London, who stated that he made the plea in the name of Catholicism, and 'not remotely from any national standpoint'.[208] Interestingly enough, at about the time that this plan was taking shape, Irish authorities were corresponding with their Spanish counterparts for an altogether different reason. In 1942, Spain had shopped around the idea of the creation of an international Catholic bloc, comprising European Catholic powers, the Vatican and various Latin American countries.[209] This plan was greeted with skepticism in Dublin, but not considered outside the realm of possibility. Irish-Spanish communications regarding the formation of a bloc continued on into

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[207] Lee, *Politics and Society,* p. 246; O'Halpin states that 'de Valera used the occasion of a speech in Galway to condemn attacks on neutral European states, a clear reference to German action against Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries. This earned a menacing rebuke from Hempel, who reported back to Berlin that Walshe had been at pains to play down the import of de Valera's remarks and to emphasize that Ireland had no quarrel with Germany. De Valera's speech was arguably intended as much for British as for German ears, lest London be minded to use force to take what Ireland would not offer voluntarily'. O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland*, p. 90.

[208] Archbishop of London to the High Commissioner for Ireland in London, 20 Jan. 1943 (NAI, DFA/243/895).

[209] Keogh, *Ireland and Europe*, p. 171.

1943, with the Spanish 'Plan D'. 'Plan D' called upon the remaining neutrals to group together in an attempt to facilitate peace between the belligerents. Spanish approaches to the Irish government in relation to 'Plan D' centred upon a likening of the two countries, especially pertaining to their respective perceptions, both domestic and foreign, as European Catholic strongholds. As previously stated, the plan to bring refugee children present in Spain to Ireland never materialised, yet what is important is how interested Irish authorities seem to have been in the scheme. Was this due to pressure from the Allies, the Vatican and Irish self-perceptions of its place within the large context of a Catholic Europe?

One of the few public condemnations of Nazi Jewish policy from the Vatican came in 1944 when the Pope called upon the Hungarian government to cease collaboration with the Nazis and halt Jewish deportations to the death camps. Along with intense international pressure, emanating from Allied as well as neutral governments, international aid organisations and a variety of churches, the deportations were halted. This victory, though short lived, showed that by 1944, international pressure could be utilised to influence Axis satellite states, if not the Germans themselves, into mollifying their Jewish policy. Irish authorities became increasingly involved with rescue attempts in 1944, with Irish diplomats in Berlin, the Vatican and Berne contacting German and Hungarian officials, in order to ascertain if anything could be done. In July, Walshe asked Kiernan to have an 'informal conversation' with the Hungarian representative to the Holy See as to the fate of Hungarian Jews. In September, Cremin informed the Dublin government that attempts to intervene in Berlin by the Swedes had not produced any results, and that he was skeptical if anything could be done.[210] December saw an instance of clear Irish-Vatican communication over rescue attempts: 'Thomas J. Kiernan had

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[210] Ibid., p. 187.

earlier requested the Vatican to intervene on behalf of Slovakian Jews; on 9 December Walshe instructed him to see the Slovakian and Hungarian representatives to the Holy See and to support Vatican representatives.'[211]

All three enquires came to nothing, but they were at least occurring. Something was being done by Irish diplomats abroad. Again, how much of this activity can be attributed to the active stance that the Vatican took towards saving the remnant of Hungarian Jewry can not be definitively stated, yet it very well may have factored prominently into Irish actions.

Analysis

'It was not neutrality, but the response of the political culture to neutrality, that mattered.'[212]

One cannot conduct an analysis of the development of Irish refugee policy during the war without addressing the Irish government's position of neutrality, and how this affected attitudes and actions in regard to the admittance of aliens. Neutrality was seen as one of Ireland's first true expressions of sovereignty and, as such, was important not only within the context of the political realities of the decision, but also as an assertion of political independence.[213] Neutrality was a pragmatic policy, seen as a necessity of survival.[214] At the beginning of the war it was impossible to have foreseen the Holocaust, and as such, Ireland's neutrality affected its refugee policy. Neutrality meant that Ireland could not come out and declare the immorality of

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[211] Ibid., p. 189.

[212] Lee, *Politics and Society,* p. 259.

[213] Keatinge makes the point that Ireland was the only Dominion to remain neutral during World War Two, thus further solidifying Ireland's self perpetuated status as a dominion set apart from the others. Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy,* p. 26.

[214] Till Geiger cites de Valera's pursuit of neutrality as a policy of 'moral indifference'. 'A belated discovery of internationalism? Ireland, the United Nations and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-60' in Kennedy and McMahon (eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations,*, p. 25.

Nazi Germany, or make any ethically based public assertions concerning international developments, as much as some might have wanted. The Irish press was not allowed to run atrocity stories during the war, and was subject to strict censorship.[215] It was worried that the reporting of atrocity stories would elicit too strong an emotional reaction from the Irish public, and that this would jeopardise the public's support of neutrality. The public had to be kept ignorant of Nazi racial policy, or the moral justification for Irish neutrality would crumble.

As perceptions of the war changed, namely from a war being fought to defend a state's right of sovereignty to a war fought in the defence of moral and ethical imperatives, the international perception of Irish neutrality changed with it. By the later years of the war, and this could be considered one of the great dark marks of Irish refugee policy, when the attempted extermination of European Jewry was fully comprehended, the government's policy did not undergo any drastic change. Once the tide of the war had clearly turned in favour of the Allies, the government could feasibly have abandoned its preoccupation with the perception of its balanced neutrality and taken a more proactive role in the rescue of the Jews. As will be discussed in this section, various other European neutrals allowed a mollification of their previously restrictive refugee policy once an Allied victory was all but assured. The reality of Irish neutrality was always that of one friendly to the Allies, and there was great compromise on many issues between Ireland and Britain behind the scenes. Once an Allied victory was forthcoming and there was absolutely no danger of a German invasion, the government still did not bow to Allied pressure and liberalise its refugee policy. Debate did occur concerning the feasibility of various schemes beginning in 1943, such as the issuance of neutral visas to Jews

in danger of deportation east, but it was clearly still felt that a conservative policy was best.

Nevertheless, neutrality was Irish policy, and the government went to great lengths to make sure that it was not compromised by perceived infractions on either side.[216] There was a worry, and this can be viewed within archival material, that the admittance of too large a number of German refugees, or people who were turned into refugees through German policy, would upset German authorities.[217] It was thought that this act would be viewed as an admission that the Germans were acting inappropriately. This issue appears within the discussion of the issuance of visas from neutral countries to Jews. This occurred in between 1943 and 1945 when it was known that these people were being deported East and most likely to a death or concentration camp. Even so, the issue seemed to be how the Germans would view the enquiries that the Americans were asking the Irish to make. One would think that at this point, other issues would be considerably more important. Neutrality was used as a justification for inaction in relation to refugee admittance.

Comparative analysis of Swedish and Swiss refugee policy

When analyzing how Irish neutrality affected its refugee policy, it is helpful to include a concise analytical comparison between that of other small, European neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland. The

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216 The British listed their concerns regarding Irish neutrality as such in 1940; 'So long as Eire remains neutral, Germany gains certain advantages which assist her in the general prosecution of the war. The maintenance of diplomatic relations with Germany, involving a German Minister and Staff and diplomatic immunity for correspondence, obviously facilitates intelligence work and the transmission of information. There are firms with German connections: German subjects are not interned: and it is quite impossible to stop completely the leakage of information from Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Eire for re-transmission to Germany.' 'Disadvantages to us of Eire Neutrality', 30 May 1940 (TNA ,CAB 66/8/13).

217 Skran states that 'the presence of refugees in a host country can also complicate its relations with the refugee-producing country. Officially, accepting a refugee is a purely humanitarian response. In fact, assisting refugees is often interpreted by refugee-producing countries as a hostile act'. Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe*, p. 2.

development of Irish policy need be placed within the context of a Europe at war, and it is crucial to possess an adequate understanding of what other countries in similar positions were doing in relation to the refugee crisis and the emerging knowledge of the Nazi's extermination policy. As has been shown in this chapter, Irish refugee policy remained extremely restrictive throughout the war, even after 1941 and the initial implementation of the Final Solution. Irish officials were in contact with various governments, religious bodies and aid organisations concerned with the refugee situation, and this contact led to Irish involvement with various schemes concerned with securing the safety of Jews still on the Continent. How did Irish policy and involvement in these schemes compare to those of other neutrals? Through an examination of such a question, the reasoning behind the Irish government's activity during the war is further clarified.

During the 1930s and into the war years, Ireland and Sweden had quite a few points of comparison regarding their respective situations. Both countries were on the periphery of Europe, laid claim to an extremely small Jewish population and, while adamant about their neutrality, had intimate associations with a main belligerent. Both countries were small democratic states, whose ideological allegiance would have aligned with the West and who felt a strong attachment to the prevailing aspirations of the inter-war period, namely an adherence to liberal internationalism, support for the League of Nations and universal demilitarisation.[218] The Depression years were difficult for Sweden, and a restrictive immigration policy had developed, and was firmly adhered to, much like in Ireland. Sweden would be criticised both during and after the war for its purportedly skewed neutrality that many claimed benefited Germany. Swedish trading with Germany during the war allowed for the Nazis to obtain desperately needed iron ore, as well

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[218] Paul A. Levin, 'Swedish neutrality during the Second World War: tactical success or moral compromise?' in Neville Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents*, p. 309.

as other crucial military supplies. Though obvious differences are apparent, this could be likened to Ireland's friendly neutrality with Britain, and the special privileges that were afforded to Britain and not to Germany. Sweden also had to concern itself with the threat of invasion, as well as how to deal with Allied pressure concerning both her neutrality and her relationship with the Axis powers after any possible threat of invasion had subsided.

As regards Swedish refugee policy during the war, geography was a decisive factor that facilitated refugee movements into Swedish territory. During and after the Winter War, in which the Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, tens of thousands of Finnish refugees entered Swedish territory. In 1940, when the Germans invaded both Denmark and Norway, a new stream of refugees entered Swedish territory. The Swedes, who felt an intense cultural connection to the Norwegians, Finnish and Danish, more or less opened their doors to these refugees. By the end of 1944, 32,000 Norwegian refugees were present in Sweden, along with 10,500 Danish.[219] These numbers were obviously significantly larger than the number of refugees admitted into Ireland during the same time period, yet there were equally obvious reasons for this vast difference. First, Sweden shared land borders with both Finland and Norway, and the channel between Sweden and Denmark was extremely narrow. Sweden also had extremely close cultural ties with all of these countries. Ireland, as an isolated island, had much more control as to who was admitted into the state. Ireland's geographical isolation ensured that there was never a flood of refugees attempting to enter the state upon the German invasion of a country. The level of cultural similarity between Sweden and its neighbor also encouraged migration

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[219] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 271.

into the state. Ireland, with its closest cultural connection being Britain, never had to deal with this situation.[220]

The largest divergence between Swedish and Irish refugee policy during the war pertains to the level of involvement of each country within the international attempt to rescue European Jews after 1941. Ireland, as has been shown, though more receptive to pleas for Jewish assistance and rescue after the tide of war had firmly turned towards an Allied victory, was still wary of overt acts that could be construed as non-neutral. Irish representatives abroad did contact German officials in reference to the fate of groups of Jews, notably the Vittel Jews and the remnants of Hungarian Jewry in 1944, yet even then these attempts seemed restrained. Irish officials, both at home and abroad, did entertain the idea of involvement in various schemes yet this was all done at the behest of the international community, and without much fervor or self-initiative. Irish involvement in these schemes was reactive, as opposed to the active response of the Swedes. The Swedes, though for a variety of reasons and not just for the sake of humanitarianism, did far outreach the Irish in their attempts to save the remaining Jews in Europe during the latter years of the war. Instead of using their neutrality as a way to wash their hands of the Jewish situation, or justify inaction, the Swedes used their neutral status towards the aim of helping surviving Jews.

Swedish representatives abroad interceded with German officials on the behalf of both Norwegian and Danish Jews. In December 1942, Swedish diplomats told German officials that they would be willing to admit all Norwegian Jews who had received deportation orders:[221]

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[220] Frank and Reinisch state that 'within each state, national and local authorities constructed categories of aliens on the basis of certain markers, chiefly ethnicity, race, religion, language or alleged national loyalty. Perceived ethnic or cultural affinities of incoming foreigners were often at the heart of states' immigration policy'. Frank and Reinisch, 'Refugees and the Nation-State', pp 487.

[221] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 288.

> The Swedish Red Cross asked the Norwegian Red Cross to make the offer known to the German authorities in Oslo. Simultaneously the Swedish Minister in Berlin in a verbal approach to the German Government confirmed the offer. The German reply, which was a refusal, was conveyed to the Swedish Red Cross via the German authorities in Oslo and the Norwegian Red Cross.[222]

Although the Germans initially refused the request, the Swedes persisted and ultimately saved approximately 800 Norwegian Jews.[223]

The famous rescue of almost the entirety of Danish Jewry cannot be forgotten, as the Swedes allowed for the evacuation by boat of almost 7,500 persons. When it became clear that the deportation of the Jewish population of Denmark was looming, the Danish ambassador to Washington immediately cabled Stockholm, stating that the Danish would reimburse the Swedes for all costs involved in the rescue attempt. The Swedes then contacted German officials to state that they would be willing to admit all Danish Jews into their territory:

> As soon as the Swedish Government, who had offered to receive the Jews from Denmark, learned that their arrest and deportation was imminent, Monsieur Soderblom had telephoned to the Swedish Minister in Berlin and asked him to request the German Government to issue a dementi. When this was not forthcoming the Swedish Government decided to give publicity to their offer. They had been in serious doubt as to whether this was the wisest course… but it would appear that they had adopted the right course, although of course it could not be proved that the Swedish action had in any way been responsible for the German decision to allow most of the Jews to get away.[224]

The Swedish government knew that the Swedish public would not stand for this, and would become vocally hostile to the Nazi regime. It was repeatedly stated by a variety of sources that 'on several occasions public opinion demanded from the Swedish Government to accept more

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[222] Foreign Office minute sheet, 15 Oct. 1943 (TNA, Foreign Office 188/405).

[223] Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 271.

[224] Telegram, Mr Mallet to Foreign Office, 7 Oct. 1943 (TNA, Foreign Office 188/405).

refugees'[225] and that this domestic pressure was not only appreciated by the Swedish government, but was used as international justification for a liberal refugee policy. The rescue was carried out, and by 1944 there were an estimated 11,600 Jewish refugees present in Sweden.[226]

One needs to be careful when drawing comparisons between the refugee policies of various countries, as it is easy to simplify and overlook glaring differences in situation and circumstance. As has been stated, the Swedish rescue of both Norwegian and Danish Jews would not have been possible had it not been for the luck of geography. It cannot be ascertained what the Irish government would have done had they been placed in a similar situation. Would they have attempted to facilitate the admittance, and thus protection, of British Jews had a Nazis invasion occurred? Differences in the nature of the neutrality of the two countries also begs mentioning. Swedish citizens were aware of the Nazis' extermination policy, and their opinions could be used to influence German treatment of refugees, as has been shown regarding the rescue of Danish Jews.

> Lurid stories told by these refugees of narrow escape from the hands of the Gestapo and of Nazi methods in occupied Denmark have filled the Swedish newspapers and have helped to create the wave of pro-Danish sentiment which is now sweeping across the country. Meetings have been held to raise money for the refugees, and everything has been done to show them hospitality.[227]

The Irish could utilise no such strategy, as one of the main focuses of Irish censorship was to negate any attempt to equate a morality to the war, and thus to a stance of neutrality by the public. To maintain a level of stability at home, and to justify neutrality, the war could not be turned into a moral crusade against an evil regime bent on the ideological

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[225] Adler-Rudel, 'Sweden and the Jewish Refugees, April 1943' enclosed within letter from Foreign Office to British legation in Stockholm, 2 Oct. 1943 (TNA, Foreign Office 188/405).

[226] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 288.

[227] Foreign Office memorandum, 25 Oct. 1943 (TNA, Foreign Office 188/405).

destruction of democracy and the physical destruction of an entire race of people. The Swedes could use that to their advantage when dealing with the Germans and bargaining over refugee matters. Also, the Swedes knew that they could push the Germans in a manner that other neutrals were unwilling and unable to. The Germans needed Swedish iron ore desperately, and this allowed the Swedes to be a bit bolder with their requests regarding Jews and refugee matters.

Switzerland was another small European nation that had to balance its neutrality with humanitarian and refugee issues during the war. Switzerland, with its policy of neutrality firmly ensconced within an established political tradition, still had to balance the wishes of both sides, as well as not losing sight of its own wartime objectives. Swiss refugee policy in the 1930s was rather restrictive, and based on concerns similar to those of the Irish government, mainly the state of the Swiss economy, job competition and anxieties over domestic social and political security.[228] Head of the Swiss Federal Police force, Heinrich Rothmund, was of the opinion that in order to prevent any increase in domestic anti-Semitism, Jews should be discouraged from settling in any substantial number in Switzerland. He also 'pressured the Swiss Jewish community into complying with official asylum policy by obligating its leadership to guarantee the financial support of all Jewish refugees and threatening to close the border if the Swiss Jews were not willing to pay'.[229]

Upon the outbreak of the war, the Swiss became increasingly worried that any substantial increase in its alien population, particularly refugees, would threaten domestic security and cause agitation between its government and those of the belligerents. Rothmund stated in 1942

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228 Neville Wylie, 'Switzerland: a neutral of distinction?' in Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents,* p. 351.

229 Regula Ludi, 'More and Less Deserving Refugees: Shifting Priorities in Swiss Asylum Policy from the Interwar Era to the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956' in *Journal of Contemporary History,* xlix, no. 3 (2014), pp 584.

that 'if we think about the future and of Switzerland's position in the war and are mindful of the fact that asylum means to protect the alien refugees from any foreign intervention from abroad… it is clear that we can only do so if we can maintain strict order…'[230] The Irish had similar concerns, worrying that the mere presence of aliens from either side would irritate the other, and thus endanger their pursuit of neutrality or the maintenance of internal security. As such, Swiss admittance of refugees from 1939 until 1942 was miniscule, with numbers comparable to Ireland. Legal refugee admittance stood at twenty-six in 1940 and 124 in 1941.[231] The Swiss borders were virtually closed, and illegals that did make it across were frequently turned back.[232] Officials were reluctant to admit even those refugees in possession of visas for other countries and with firm prospects of further emigration, as they were aware of wartime travel difficulties and that these refugees would still become wards of the Swiss state.[233] There was also a worry that if Swiss admission practice was seen as liberal, the flood gates would open, and refugees, particularly Jews, would pour into the country.[234]

The clear divergence between Irish and Swiss refugee policy occurred after two developments: the international awareness of Nazi extermination policy in 1941 and the wartime shift towards Allied supremacy around 1942. Swiss neutrality, much like the Swedes, did not necessitate the level of censorship that the Irish brand demanded, and as such, one moving force behind the relaxation of Swiss refugee

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230 'Summary of letter from Dr. Rothmund', enclosed within letter from the High Commissioner for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations to A.W.G. Randall, Esq., British Foreign Office, 15 Sept. 1942 (TNA., Foreign Office 371/32683).

231 Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 254. Alongside the radicalisation of Nazi racial policy in 1942, the numbers of refugees attempting to reach Swiss territory rose steadily, with attempted entries doubling between May and June 1942. Ludi, 'More and Less Deserving Refugees', pp 580.

232 Swiss bordered officials were secretly informed on 13 August 1942 to close Swiss borders to civilian refugees. This remained in effect until July 1944. Ludi, 'More and Less Deserving Refugees', pp 577.

233 Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 254.

234 Ludi, 'More and Less Deserving Refugees', pp 589.

restrictions came from the Swiss public. The Swiss media reported on Nazi extermination policy, and the majority of the Swiss public was well aware of the fate of European Jewry. Newspapers were reporting that refugees in danger of expulsion from Swiss territory 'had fled to avoid deportation to Eastern Europe or arrest as hostages' and that Swiss actions 'represented refusal of the right of asylum traditionally accorded by Switzerland'.[235] Furthermore, 'Swiss Protestant Churches, labor organizations, and liberal politicians brought the issue into national prominence; Swiss newspapers trumpeted the refugee cause, and many of them raised funds for refugee relief.'[236] The public was enraged at Nazi policy, and protested the Swiss government's restrictive refugee policy, as well as the forcible expulsion of those refugees that had illegally entered Swiss territory.[237]

International pressure also came to weigh on the restrictive Swiss policy. The Belgian Government reported in August 1942 that the Swiss authorities were expelling Belgian citizens that had reached Swiss territory and that 'these measures expose to heavy penalties – including death – Belgians who are endeavouring to reach Switzerland via the Occupied Zone'.[238] The exiled Belgian government, quartered in London, queried whether 'instructions could be sent to His Majesty's Minister in Berne to support the representations of his Belgian and Dutch Colleagues with a view to obtaining that the Swiss authorities will no longer refuse access to Swiss territory to the persons above-

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235 Telegram from Berne to Foreign Office, 25 Aug. 1942 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/32683).

236 Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 255.

237 Ludi, 'More and Less Deserving Refugees', pp 579.

238 Belgian Ambassador in London, 19 Aug. 1942 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/32683). It is interesting to note that in 1939, the Swiss, Belgian, Luxembourg and Dutch governments had met in Brussels to discuss how the worsening refugee situation in Europe should be handled. The gathering decided that implementing a highly restrictive refugee admittance policy was the only way to dissuade the Germans from 'dumping' large amounts of refugees into any of their territories. Ludi, 'More or Less Deserving Refugees', pp 590.

mentioned…'[239] The British legation in Berne was issued an order to make representations along the above lines to Swiss officials, and within the span of a week the Swiss held a conference between the 'Swiss Central Association for aid to refugees and similar organisations, which was attended by Chief of Police Section of Federal Department of Justice and Police'.[240] Policy was liberalised, albeit only in specific situations and only for refugees who had reached Swiss territory by 13 August, yet international pressure seems to have directly affected Swiss refugee policy.

Further pressure resulted in the Swiss government opening its borders to Jews fleeing the German occupation of Italy in 1943, as well as granting entry to any Jew able to reach Swiss territory beginning in 1944.[241] The Swiss response to the attempted rescue of Jews in the later war years could be seen as reactive, much like the Irish response. However, even though the Swiss response was a reaction to Allied pressure, it need be stated that the Swiss government did intercede with the German government on the behalf of Jews repeatedly during the later war years. In November 1944, the Swiss government in Berne 'instructed the Swiss Legation at Berlin to make pressing representations to the German Government concerning Jewish deportations and to make it clear that Jewish emigrants could find temporary refuge in Switzerland, have again requested their Legation in Berlin to consider the expediency of a further step on behalf of…8,000 Hungarian Jews…'[242]

It cannot be known if Swiss policy would have undergone such a mollifying process had the Swiss public not been privy to Nazi policy.

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[239] Belgian Ambassador in London, 19 Aug. 1942 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/32683).

[240] Telegram from Berne to Foreign Office, 25 Aug. 1942 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/32683).

[241] Wylie, 'Switzerland: a neutral of distinction?', p. 353.

[242] Foreign Office (Refugee Department) to U.S. Embassy, London, 22 Nov. 1944 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/42822).

There had been Allied pressure put on the Swiss government in regard to refugee admittance, and this did have an affect on the increased numbers admitted in the later war years, but the Swiss never became as proactive as the Swedes. There were levels of anti-Semitism within the Swiss government, comparable to those present within the Irish government. Though not overt, and certainly not anywhere near resembling Nazi racial ideology, there was a worry within the Swiss government that an acute increase in Jews would manifest a variety of unwelcomed outcomes. A worry that any increase would heighten domestic anti-Semitism, and thus threaten domestic security was present, as well as a worry that any increase in any one group of refugees would threaten the hegemony of Swiss culture affected the government's policy development. These worries were also present within the Irish government, and are clearly traced throughout this chapter. It should be stated that however restrictive Swiss policy was at various points of the war, the country did admit a total of 21,600 Jews and a further 55,000 civilian refugees during the war.[243]

The levels of both domestic and foreign pressure placed upon Swiss authorities seemed to have had a direct effect on the pursuit of Swiss refugee policy during the war. This was arguably the most crucial difference between Swiss and Irish engagement with refugee issues during the war. Ireland, due to its strict censorship, lacked the domestic pressure that greatly affected the Swiss government, as Swiss churches, political groups, media and common citizens took up the cause of the refugees. As a continental European neutral, the Swiss had land borders with Germany, Occupied France, Vichy France and Italy in 1942, and had to balance its pursuit of neutrality with humanitarian and refugee concerns. A multitude of governments-in-exile, as well as Allied

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[243] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 255. Estimates regarding the number of refugees denied entry to Switzerland centre around 40,000; this figure includes 24,398 refugees who were expelled from Swiss territory during the war, as well as 14,5000 visa applications that were rejected from refugees between 1938 and 1944. Ludi, 'More and Less Deserving Refugees', pp 580.

leaderships, put pressure on the Swiss to admit and care for a multitude of European nationals, not just those persecuted directly by the Nazis (i.e. European Jews). This was pressure that Ireland, again due to the luck of geography, did not experience. The Swiss hand was forced; the Irish hand was encouraged, or simply overlooked.

Northern Irish refugee admittance, 1939-1945

A brief account of Northern Irish engagement with refugee admittance during the war is also necessary. The Dublin government would have been aware of any significant increase in alien admittance in Northern Ireland, as well as the level of engagement that the Northern Irish government had with various refugee initiatives. Northern Irish authorities were prepared to admit a substantial number of refugees on two separate occasions during the war, one of which did result in large-scale refugee admittance. The first scheme regarded the proposed admittance of approximately 6,000 Dutch, Belgian and French refugees directly from Belgium or Holland.[244] This scheme was initially approved by the Northern Irish government in May 1940, yet by June it was stated that the government had 'arranged to place at the disposal of the Army Authorities the accommodation which we had earmarked for the refugees', and as such it was 'not now possible for us to receive any of these refugees in Northern Ireland'.[245]

The admittance of refugees from Western Europe was again addressed in 1944, when a government memorandum outlined a detailed plan for the possible admittance of up to 10,000 Continental refugees. The memorandum, while addressing such practical issues as transportation and accommodation, also devoted attention to the mental health and well being of the refugees.

> It is also expected that the individuals will have suffered from continuous residence in occupied Europe and from the

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[244] Secretary to the Northern Irish Cabinet to the Home Office, 15 June 1940 (PRONI, MPS2/2/86).

[245] Ibid.

> circumstances in which they will have been taken from their homes. High percentages of under- nourished and invalidism may be expected as well as mental or psychological mal-adjustments due to residence in a Nazi occupied country... Refugees must be assisted to make contacts with the general community as well as enabled to work out their own ideas. Hence, in addition to the co-operation expected in the work of the camp, activities for refugees will need to be planned to cover education in the broadest sense of the term, recreation and the development of their contact with their surroundings.[246]

The special care required by child refugees was also addressed, and it was stated that 'children will require special care, both physical and mental. They must be reaccustomed to life in a free country as well as nursed back to full health after their recent experiences'.[247] It is interesting to note that within the government files regarding Northern Irish admittance of refugees, issues regarding the mental health of refugees was frequently discussed, and clearly a point of concern for the government. This issue will be further addressed when the Northern Irish admittance of Hungarian refugees in 1956 is discussed. The awareness of the possible mental health issues that refugees may have had to deal with was not present within the Dublin government's discussion of refugee group admittance.

The British government, originally stating that this scheme would involve refugees from France, informed Stormont in July 1944 that they instead intended to send Gibraltarian refugees who had originally been evacuated to London in 1940.[248] By 1944, the British government had hoped to begin the repatriation process of the Gibraltarians, but 'the flying bomb campaign made it necessary for

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[246] Northern Ireland Government memorandum, 1944 (PRONI, MPS2/2/86).

[247] Ibid.

[248] For an account of the evacuation of the Gibraltarians to London, see Caroline Norrie, 'The Last Rock in the Empire: Evacuation, Identity and Myth in Gibraltar' in *Oral History Society*, xxxi, no. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp 73-84.

security reasons to postpone their departure'.[249] Accommodation was scarce in London, and as such the British government was requesting that Northern Irish authorities agree to the admittance of between 7,000 and 8,000 refugees.[250] Following the initial request from London, Northern Irish authorities issued the following response that included their concerns.

> (a) While we are anxious to help in every way possible we would much prefer that if the British Government desire us to accommodate refugees here they should adhere to the original arrangement and send those from France rather than the people from Gibraltar.
> (b) There are security objectives to the Gibraltar refugees coming here just as there are if the refugees are sent home.
> (c) We would have great difficulty in helping the refugees from Gibraltar to find suitable employment in Northern Ireland.[251]

A response quickly followed from the Home Office, which stated that it was realised that 'the proposal may nevertheless create local problems or give rise to criticism but I feel confident that I shall not be appealing to you in vain to assist us in a very grave and urgent emergency. You shall be rendering a real service to the war effort'.[252] A special appeal was also issued to the Northern Irish government, stating that the refugee admittance would assist the British government 'in a very grave and urgent emergency' and that 'by taking them off the hands of the British Government for a time a real service would be rendered by Ulster to the war effort'.[253] The pressure from London seemed to have worked, as the Northern Irish Ministry of Health and

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[249] 'Suggested Housing of Refugees from Gibraltar in Northern Ireland', Stormont Castle, 4 July 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).
[250] Home Secretary to the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 5 July 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).
[251] Ibid.
[252] Home Secretary to the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 5 July 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).
[253] Basil Brooke to Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh O'Neill, 10 July 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

Local Government was informed that Prime Minister Brooke had seen 'no alternative but to agree' to the proposal.[254]

Furthermore, it was stated that 'in the present circumstances we ought to accept the inconvenience which the presence of these people will undoubtedly cause us as a contribution to the war effort on our part and as being some small measure of assistance to the Imperial Government in the difficulties which they are experience at the moment'.[255] It should be stated that a major objective of Brooke's government was strengthening the relationship between Northern Ireland and Britain, and as such, agreeing to a proposal such as the resettlement of the Gibraltarians would have fit in with his political objectives. In this case, refugee admittance into Northern Ireland was directly influenced by Brooke's goal of strengthening political ties with another government, and thus refugee policy was utilised to facilitate what could be considered a Northern Irish political objective.

7,000 Gibraltarians arrived from London in July 1944 and were settled throughout Northern Ireland, the majority near Londonderry.[256] Securing employment for the Gibraltarian refugees proved the most problematic issue for the government regarding their settlement. Unemployment levels in Northern Ireland were cited as 14,000 within the locality of the majority of the camps, and it was stated that nationals 'must be given preference for any vacancies received by the Exchange services, and as the Camps which Gibraltarians occupy are all remote from centres of population they are well away from districts where some work might be found for them'.[257] It was decided that arrangements would be made for the

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254 Secretary of the Northern Irish Cabinet to the Ministry of Health and Local Government, 6 July 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

255 Ministry of Health and Local Government to Secretary of the Northern Irish Cabinet, 7 July 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

256 Brian Barton, *Northern Ireland in the Second World War* (Belfast, 1995), p. 132.

257 Ministry of Health and Local Government to Secretary to the Northern Irish Cabinet, 29 July 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

> Local Exchange Managers to visit the Camps in their areas and to register any Gibraltarians who wanted to apply for employment. The main hope seems to be a limited amount of harvest work and possibly also some out work. There is, however, very little out work now being carried on owing to shortage of materials and war time restrictions…The Employment Exchange service will do its best to find work in any other directions for these people, but with all the goodwill in the world, I am afraid that work will not be found for more than a small number of them.[258]

The inability of the Gibraltarian refugees to secure employment exacerbated the government's problem of securing appropriate means to fund the refugees' cash allowances, which were required for their daily upkeep.

> The present cash position amongst the evacuees is causing not merely a good deal of grousing, but a certain amount at any rate of genuine hardship. The conditions at the camps where they are living has led to increased wear of clothing and many of these people are without means to replace boots and other personal necessities for themselves and their children.[259]

It is not stated within the archival material how these issues were resolved, yet it should be noted that the Gibraltarian refugees were repatriated after the war ended.

Interestingly, the archival material concerning the Gibraltarian refugees offers a rare instance of discussion within the Northern Irish government regarding refugee and population movements between Northern Ireland and Éire. In August 1944, an Evacuation Officer in Londonderry wrote to the Ministry of Health and Local Government in Belfast, stating that visitors to the refugee camps from the 'Free State side of Derry' were becoming friendly with the refugees, and being invited into the camps.[260] The Evacuation Officer thought that perhaps it

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[258] Ibid.

[259] Ministry of Health and Local Government to Minister of Health, 29 Aug. 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

[260] Evacuation Officer to Ministry of Health & Local Government, 3 Aug. 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

was necessary to establish a pass system. The Camp Organiser decided that the pass system was unnecessary, but that 'in the case of the two Border camps, however, it would seem reasonable that all visitors other than Gibraltarians must be in possession of British Identity Cards'.[261]

The Camp Organisor was also concerned with the fact that some of the Gibraltarians had expressed a desire to travel to Éire. The Northern Irish authorities did not seem concerned that these refugees intended to travel to Éire in an attempt to permanently settle there, as the refugees had always intended on returning to Gibraltar after the war. The real concern was that Northern Irish officials would be unable to inform the Gibraltarian refugees of their scheduled departure dates if they were in Éire, as wartime restrictions regarding intelligence and security issues were still in effect. It was stated that

> evacuees are strongly advised not to visit Eire and any who go there will do so at their own risk. The Ministry cannot accept any responsibility if as a result of a visit to Eire any evacuee should miss the opportunity or repatriation. The Ministry cannot undertake to advise persons visiting Eire of arrangements being made for repatriation. (emphasis in the original)[262]

There was also an instance in which refugees admitted by the government in Dublin were transferred to a camp in Northern Ireland. In August 1939, twelve Jewish farm labourers had been admitted through the efforts of the Dublin Hebrew Community.[263] The Dublin Hebrew Community was not in possession of appropriate training facilities for the refugees, yet was willing to provide financial support if the Refugee Settlement Farm at Millisle was willing to admit them. Once approval for the transfer was granted by the Home Office in January 1940, the

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261 Camp Organiser to Mr. McAllister, 15 Aug. 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

262 Camp Organiser to All Group Wardens, 29 August 1944 (PRONI, CAB9Y/2/1).

263 Wolfgang Muchitsch, 'Austrian Refugees in Ireland 1938-1945' in Holfter (ed), *German-speaking Exiles*, p. 80.

refugees were moved to the farm in July 1940.[264] The Dublin Hebrew Community donated £1125 to the operational costs of the farm.

The Refugee Settlement Farm at Millisle, Co. Down also warrants brief mention. The farm was estimated to have housed upwards of 300 refugees during its operational period of 1939-1948.[265] The first arrivals in May 1939 consisted of approximately twenty Jewish teenagers and young adults who were members of religious Zionist youth groups.[266] They quickly set about restoring the farm and its building, as well as acquiring livestock and readying the land for planting. The farm was meant to serve as preparation for this groups' final resettlement in Israel, where they would engage in agricultural work. Once the initial restorations were well underway, groups of *Kindertransport* children were transferred from other locations throughout the United Kingdom to the farm, and began arriving in the summer of 1939.[267] The children were given a few weeks rest, but were then expected to attend the local school and were given chores to carry out on the farm. A limited number of adult refugees also took up residency at the farm to act as caregivers, managers, carpenters, etc. Maier cites Eugene Patriasz, a Hungarian agronomist, Dr Franz Kohner, his wife and two small children, and Adolf Mundheim as adult refugees of particular note.[268] The farm was funded by a variety of sources

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264 Ibid.

265 Taylor, 'Millisle, Co. Down', pp 34.

266 Ben Maier, 'From the Irish Archive: The Farm at Millisle' in *Irish Pages*, vi, no. 1 (2009), pp 123-141.

267 Ibid.

Taylor states that the 'Kindertransport rescue operation was unique, in that about 10,000 unaccompanied children from three months to seventeen years of age were permitted entry into the United Kingdom on block visas. Funds were raised, guarantors and foster families found, and the escapes organised, in groups of two and three hundred, by a small but heroic group of volunteers, Jewish and Christian, including Quakers and Methodists, under the auspices of the London-based Refugee Children's Movement'. 'Millisle, Co. Down', pp 34.

268 Kohner acted as the farm's administrator and Mundheim was a German engineer who took charge of the farm's workshop. Maier, 'From the Irish Archive', pp 133.

including the Jewish populations of Dublin and Belfast, various refugee aid organisations and the Northern Irish government.

Archival material regarding the establishment and running of the farm prove scarce. A search of the records held at PRONI did not result in the location of any files specifically regarding the Millisle farm refugees, nor did a similar search at the NAI. The *Irish Times* was searched for any mention of the farm, yet none was found. The student registry from the local Millisle school that the *Kindertransport* children attended is held at the Co. Down Museum, and is available online. This document, though not a complete copy of the school registry, does allow for particulars to be known regarding some of the refugee children.[269]

2.4 Millisle Farm *Kindertransport* refugees

Date of entrance	Name	Last school attended
11 Sept. 1939	Hirsch, Walter	Refugee from Dresden
11 Sept. 1939	Sugar, Robert	Refugee from Vienna
11 Sept. 1939	Jacobwitz, Gert	Refugee from Berlin
10 June 1940	Nachmann, Thomas	Refugee from Berlin
5 June 1944	Cohen, Joseph	St. Enoch's, Belfast
5 June 1944	Cohen, Eric	Antrium

The majority of the refugees housed at Millisle are stated to have left Northern Ireland following the war, yet the overall experience of the refugees, as well as the Northern Irish citizens who came in contact with them, seemed to have been overwhelming positive.

This chapter has provided a survey of Irish refugee policy during World War Two. The main refugee groups that sought entry into Ireland have been examined within the context of both domestic and foreign policy concerns. Irish policy, though restrictive throughout, did soften during the later war years, as international pressure demanded that Irish

[269] Down County Museum, 'The Millisle Farm in Co. Down (http://www.downcountymuseum.com).

authorities, particularly Irish diplomats abroad, take on a more active role in rescue efforts.

Chapter 3 - The Irish response to the postwar refugee crisis and the creation of the modern international refugee organisation, 1945-1951

Introduction

World War Two resulted in the largest displacement of people in modern European history.[1] The basic tenets of Nazi ideology espoused the division of people; people fit for membership within the Reich, those fit only for labour camps, those fit only to die. Millions of people were relocated or deported to work, concentration or death camps. Many never came back, but millions were left at war's end with an uncertain fate. The circumstances and experiences of these survivors varied immensely, and as such they had differing needs. Some wished to return to their prewar homes, yet countless more could not face the thought of returning to the place from which they had been expelled. There were those who had lost everything that had meant home to them, including their entire families.[2] What should be done with these now rootless people? How were the rebuilders of Europe to settle this problem in a way that would not result in another European conflict?

This chapter places the postwar refugee crisis firmly within the context of two of the most crucial international developments to occur after 1945, namely the establishment and growing influence of the UN and the solidification of early Cold War divisions. The crucial role that the UN and its subsidiaries played concerning the repatriation and resettlement of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees will be examined through an analysis of Irish involvement with both the UNRRA and the IRO. How the postwar refugee situation was affected by growing tension, mistrust and unease between the Western Allies and the Soviet leadership will be examined through Irish involvement with Eastern European refugee groups, both through planned admittance and the illegal entry of groups.

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[1] Estimates range from 60 million (M. Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movements* (Illinois, 1956) to 30 million (Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 297).

[2] For a thorough account of the immediate postwar Displaced Persons situation see Mark Wyman, DP's: *Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951* (Cornell, 1989). Wyman also cites self-perception of identity as an issue regarding DP resettlement and repatriation. p. 3.

Postwar Settlements, early Cold War tensions and UN refugee activity

Civilian violence was a core concept of Nazi ideology. The Nazi focus on race and nationality as a classifier and divider of the population carried through to the postwar years, even permeating Allied policy. Population transfers based solely upon ethnicity became accepted practice.[3] They were even officially sanctioned at the Yalta negotiations, as well as within the Potsdam Conference.[4] Tony Judt states that 'Yalta has entered the lexicon of central European politics as a synonym for Western betrayal, the moment when the Western Allies sold out Poland and the other small states between Russia and Germany'.[5] The unquestionable validity of this statement should be paired with an understanding of the political realities surrounding Yalta. Much of what was enshrined within the Yalta agreement had already been decided upon at earlier meetings between the Western Allied leaders and the Soviets, as the complex power relationship between the Big Three became more contentious. The official redrafting of international boundaries, along with the increasingly frantic attempts by both sides to enlarge their spheres of influence, created a situation in which controlling and ideologically influencing large groups of people meant political security.

The war that was fought to liberate Europe, in the name of self-determination and national sovereignty, resulted in an enshrinement of the ideological opposite. In the postwar world, the ideal of national sovereignty was trumped by the Allies' all-encompassing desire for international stability. A shift towards attempts to secure peace not through defined, respected international borders but through international organisations that would quell conflict occurred. The war had also caused the very concepts of European nationality and statehood to alter, and these shifting identities left many in question as to who they were and

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[3] Cohen, *In War's Wake*, p. 7.

[4] The Potsdam Conference, held five months after Yalta, also sought to address similar postwar issues, and formalized postwar population transfers. 'The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference', July 17- Aug. 1945. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.

[5] Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945* (London, 2005), p. 101.

to which nation they belonged. As international borders were redrawn, usually due to Soviet insistence and Allied complacency, millions of people were confronted with a new reality. Many chose flight and displacement over the certainty of further occupation. Issues such as the forcible repatriation of people became an increasingly political matter.[6] American authorities, eager to secure the return of their citizens under Soviet control, agreed to the repatriation of people whom the Soviets deemed 'Russian'.[7] The beginning of the Cold War split could be clearly viewed through Allied and Soviet engagement with the postwar refugee and displaced persons situation.

Entering into this confusing and complex postwar situation was the nascent UN organisation, which was charged with the staggering task of maintaining world order and peace. The Allies saw this as their mission; to settle Europe and place her firmly onto the track of a peaceful internationalism. As such, the resurgence of a pan-European, international organisation, the UN, was a cornerstone of the reconstruction of a fragmented Europe. The Allies were determined to learn the lessons of the failure of the League of Nations and the policy of appeasement. A shift occurred concerning how the Allies and western powers thought it best to secure peace. During the inter-war period, the belief that strengthening the rights of states would safeguard international peace prevailed; after World War Two, this focus shifted to guaranteeing the rights of the individual. The UN, conceptualized as early as 1942, and formally brought into existence in 1945, was a key factor in the creation of this new world order, and was used to facilitate international agreements and conventions concerning the enshrinement of individual rights.[8] As such, UN groups and initiatives proved

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[6] Cohen cites this as one of the first instances of clear Soviet/Western postwar divergence of policy. Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 20.

[7] 'Agreement relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States of America Command', 11 Feb. 1945. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.

[8] Cohen also cites the emerging postwar concept of a 'human rights revolution' as one reason for active UN/international involvement in human rights and aid issues. From 1941 to 1951, the following declarations and arrangements were established: the Atlantic Charter, 1941; the Charter of the United Nations, 1945; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948; the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

influential and would greatly affect how refugee situations in the coming years, and even decades, would be handled. Their advent at the beginning of the most crucial refugee crisis that Europe had ever encountered was not coincidental, and will prove crucial to an understanding of how Europe dealt with resulting refugee situations. Much of the rest of this work will examine in detail how the emergence of these international organisations influenced the development of Irish refugee policy.

Irish postwar concerns: Irish-British immigration and UN membership

'…our back door would be guarded by people working to different instructions from those who were guarding our front door.'[9]

Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, discussions began between British and Irish officials concerning postwar immigration policy. The British proved wary of relinquishing any control concerning traffic between the two countries. They viewed increasing Irish contact with the Continent, as well as the continuing presence in Ireland of aliens that in British eyes were viewed as undesirable to be present either in Ireland *or* the United Kingdom, as reason enough to uphold British travel restrictions and visa requirements:

> The conclusion was that the means of access to Eire was so enormously increased by air travel, not only from America, but direct from Europe, that the conditions were wholly different. Moreover, there were probably many aliens already in Eire who would be most unwelcome here, and others whom we might have expelled, or wish to keep out, but whom the Eire Government would have no interest in excluding…[10]

The British were particularly concerned that a number of German 'agents' who had succeeded in reaching Ireland during the war would, pending the cancellation of visa requirements, be allowed unregulated access to British territory.[11]

1948; the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950; Geneva Convention, 1951. Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 80.

[9] Home Office memorandum, 'Co-operation with the Eire Government as respects the control of aliens', 21 Apr. 1948 (TNA, Home Office 213/1778).

[10] Home Office, 7 Aug. 1946 (TNA, Home Office 213/1778).

[11] For more information regarding British attitudes German agents present in Ireland see TNA, Home Office 213/2140.

> There is also the question of the number of undesirable persons at present in Eire whom we do not wish to admit to this country. One outstanding case of these is the German agents who were picked up in Eire during the war. The Eire authorities promised to keep these men in custody until they could be returned to their proper countries. But without warning to us they have in fact released these people and the matter is now the subject of strong argument with the Eire authorities. Clearly it would be putting our people in an impossible position if we were to allow free access to this country for such people.[12]

British authorities did not have much confidence that Irish authorities would make what the British would have deemed appropriate decisions regarding domestic Irish alien activity and immigration practices. These worries emanated from a variety of sources within the British government. The Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Labour and Scotland Yard all voiced concern:

> From a police point of view, the withdrawal of the control at ports in Great Britain would be a serious matter. Eire is far more accessible than it was before the war, and under present conditions the need to scrutinize incoming aliens both from the point of view of espionage and violence makes reliance on the full and effective co-operation of the Irish Immigration Authorities a more doubtful proposition than in the past.[13]

Various comments were made concerning the worry that Irish immigration practices were not up to an acceptable standard, either due to Irish ineptness or unwillingness to comply with United Kingdom standards. 'It was felt that a control which depended on Eire co-operation was not likely to be very efficient in any case and might be made quite ineffective by some political caprice'[14] and that 'Eire was not yet in a position to operate properly the pre-war system under which they in effect exercised control on our behalf and on the same general lines as ourselves over such entries'.[15]

Would British insistence to maintain some control over Irish immigration have encouraged Irish officials to regard refugee admittance with more political significance? Ireland was actively seeking UN membership as early as 1946, and

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[12] Home Office memorandum, undated (TNA, Home Office 213/1778).

[13] New Scotland Yard to Home Office, Aliens Department, 11 Sept. 1946 (TNA, Home Office 213/1778).

[14] Home Office, 7 Aug. 1946 (TNA, Home Office 213/1778).

[15] Home Office memorandum, undated (TNA., Home Office 213/1778).

this depended, in part, on British good will. It would be foolish to surmise that Irish-British relations rested solely on Irish immigration policies, yet they would undoubtedly have affected such relations. The Irish government was also concerned during the immediate postwar period that perceptions of its wartime neutrality would hinder its acceptance within the emerging international community. If the country was perceived as admitting the wrong 'type' of refugee, it could have damaged Ireland's international reputation. The British were cognisant of how Irish neutrality during the war had affected its security measures after, stating that

> where before the war the general immigration and security aims of Eire and this country were broadly the same, this is no longer true in view of Eire's neutrality during the late war; and (iv) that administrative decisions in Eire are peculiarly liable to be overturned for political reasons, both in general and in particular cases, and that this risk is no less now than it ever was and may indeed be rather greater.[16]

Furthermore, in 1949 a new arrangement was proposed that allowed for a mutual assurance that any undesirable alien that had been legally admitted into Ireland or Britain would, upon their cross border movement, be deported back to the country that had originally admitted them (i.e. an alien resident in Britain, if found in Irish territory, would be deported by Irish authorities and readmitted into British territory).[17] The specifics of the arrangement were reported to the Irish government as such:

> Our authorities will be willing to accept back on deportation from Eire an alien who has entered Eire from Great Britain and cannot be sent elsewhere, provided
> (a) that the Eire authorities did not in fact grant the alien a visa, so that his admission was regular, and did not otherwise regularize his position after his arrival; and
> (b) that the alien had been substantially accepted as a United Kingdom resident before his entry into Eire.[18]

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[16] Home Office to Captain Guy M. Liddell, MI5., 21 Apr. 1948 (TNA, Home Office 213/2065).

[17] Home Office memorandum, 'Arrangement Between the United Kingdom for the Control of Movements of Aliens', Feb. 1947 (TNA, Home Office 213/2065).

[18] Home Office to Boland, undated (TNA, Home Office 213/2065).

This mutual guarantee was initially accepted, as both governments had a variety of concerns regarding any large influx of aliens that had not been admitted by their respective governments. The Irish were concerned that a large number of Poles would attempt to illegally cross the border and settle in Ireland. Although British authorities 'should be glad to see some of the Poles settled in Eire, it is proper that we should receive back any who go there without the prior consent of the Eire Government'.[19] The British were concerned that 'persons from Germany, or other countries in which the Eire Government had no office for the issue of visas, who obtained transit visas through the United Kingdom to Eire claiming that they had been promised a visa for entry into Eire'[20] would use this promise of an Irish visa to gain access to the United Kingdom, with no intention of further travel to Éire. Irish authorities attempted to widen the scope of the arrangement, trying to persuade their British counterparts that 'this Agreement should be extended to accept back any alien who had originally entered its territory, whether legally or illegally, provided that the authorities of the other country detect the alien's presence within a specified time period'.[21] The British refused this suggestion, as they felt that this widened scope would benefit only Irish objectives, and that 'there would be few, if any, cases in which the arrangement would be of any use to us'.[22]

The possibility of an Irish membership bid at the UN also influenced both Irish and British political objectives during the early postwar years.[23] The Irish government did have some valid concerns regarding UN membership including the emerging Great Power divide within the General Assembly, the Security

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[19] Home Office memorandum, 'Irish Immigration Problems', 1 Jan. 1949 (TNA, Home Office 213/2065).

[20] Home Office memorandum, 'Arrangements Between the United Kingdom for the Control of Movements of Aliens', Feb. 1947 (TNA, Home Office 213/2065).

[21] Home Office to Captain Guy M. Liddell, MI5, 21 Apr. 1948 (TNA, Home Office 213/2065).

[22] Ibid.

[23] For a detailed account of the Irish UN membership bid, see Deirdre McMahon, "Our Mendicant Vigil is Over.' Ireland and the United Nations, 1946-55' in Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon (eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations*, p. 5-24. Also, Ronan Fanning, 'The Anglo-American Alliance and the Irish Application for Membership of the United Nations' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, ii, no. 2 (1986), pp 35-61.

Council veto and a general sense of misgiving regarding such international organisations after the utter and complete failure of the League.[24] However,

> the Irish government and the Department of External Affairs endorsed UN membership – and for many good reasons, including Ireland's tradition of involvement in international organisations; its contribution to the Leagueof Nations; the desire to end the isolation imposed by war-time neutrality; the aspiration to foster peace in the post-war world; and the belief that a viable international organisation enhanced Ireland's security. In fact, it is inconceivable that de Valera would have chosen to remain outside the organisation, especially when most other nations were trying to get in.[25]

The British had decided that Irish UN membership would also benefit their interests.[26] 'In general, on Eire's past record as a member of the League of Nations and the general line of her present policy, we should expect to find her generally sympathetic to the Western European attitude on international problems.'[27] By July 1946, British interest in Ireland's UN membership bid had clearly been influenced by the increasing polarisation of the General Assembly:

> The Russians have already got Albania and Outer Mongolia in the field, and we feel that it is important that as many respectable States as possible should also apply for admission this year. Otherwise there is a risk that Albania and Outer Mongolia will get in and that the candidature of our own friends in later years will evoke demands by the Russians for the admission of further Constituent Soviet Republics. It is I am sure in any case very important to bring all respectable States into the United Nations as quickly as possible.[28]

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[24] Interestingly, these issues (Great Power divide and Security Council vetoes) delayed Irish membership until 1955. The Soviet Union, sure that Ireland would align with the Western powers within the UN, vetoed its membership bid in both 1946 and 1947. Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy,* p. 29. Any bid for UN membership had to be accepted by seven of the eleven Security Council members, including the five permanent members (Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and China) and then by two-thirds of the General Assembly.

[25] Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy,* p. 71.

[26] Bernadette Whelan states that 'British support of Irish membership in the UN aimed also to extend Irish foreign policy horizons beyond the confines of partition and provide Britain with an ally on the international stage'. Whelan, 'Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns', pp 73.

[27] Cabinet report, 'Eire and the U.N.O.', Feb. 1946 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/1888).

[28] Secretary of State for the Dominions to the Prime Minister, 'New Admissions to the United Nations: And the Particular Case of Eire', 4 Jul. 1946 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/1894).

John Maffey met de Valera that same month to discuss the Taoiseach's position regarding UN membership. A motion regarding UN membership had been put before the Dáil, and having garnered high levels of support,[29] Maffey viewed that the government was 'solidly against any further continuance of Eire's policy of isolationism'.[30] De Valera informed Maffey that 'this somewhat sudden change over from his previously declared policy of waiting as long as possible before making a move towards U.N.O. had been caused by the news that Sweden and Portugal were applying for admission at once. He did not want to find himself out in the cold with Spain'.[31]

These political considerations lent themselves to the development of very specific foreign policy objectives. At the ministerial level, there was never a question as to Ireland becoming, or attempting to become, a fully functioning member of the newly emerging international community. This chapter aims to examine how Irish engagement with this new community affected the development of its refugee policy. In 1950, it was stated that

> since the end of the war this country has admitted about 925 aliens from the Continent. Of these 355 are domestic servants, 170 are university students, most of whom are admitted on a temporary basis, and about 400 are children, dependent relatives of persons already resident here or aliens who have Irish relatives or some other connection with this country. Authorisations were given for the admission of an additional 450 aliens, but it is unlikely that these will now arrive.[32]

A number of these aliens would have been refugees, and the decision to admit these people will be examined within this chapter, as will refugee aid sent to the Continent.

The United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Agency, 1944-1947

The UNRRA, established in September 1944, was tasked with the immediate goal of caring for the approximate 20 million homeless people

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[29] Dáil Debates 102, 'Motion – Membership of United Nations Organisation', 24 Jul. 1946.

[30] Sir John Maffey, 'Memorandum', 26 Jul. 1946 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/2095).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Justice memorandum, 'Admission of displaced persons under the care of International Refugee Organisation', 4 Sept. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

resulting directly from the war.[33] Between July 1945 and June 1947, the UNRRA spent an estimated $10 billion on relief and repatriation efforts. During its peak operational period, the UNRRA operated 227 camps in Germany, 25 in Austria, with 762 units functioning in Western Europe, mainly comprised of nurses and doctors.[34] In September 1945, the UNRRA was caring for 6,795,000 UN country nationals. The term 'UN country nationals' should be noted, as the UNRRA would have been viewed as the victors' relief organisation. Initially, the intention of the organisation's creators was to limit its aid allocation to the victims of Nazi oppression, thus effectively leaving out millions of displaced Germans and former citizens of Axis countries. Even before the official cessation of hostilities, the nationality of a refugee or displaced person was of importance when decisions regarding aid were considered. As early as 1944, debate concerning the International Red Cross' proposed distribution of food parcels to Axis controlled concentration camps hit upon this very issue. It was queried whether 'Italian (civilians) Spanish, Ukrainian and Russians' should be privy to these food parcels, even though these detainees were imprisoned *by* the Nazis themselves.[35]

The Soviets also proved hesitant regarding the proposed scope of the UNRRA. The Russians were extremely wary of any lose of sovereignty over independent action due to active involvement with an international organisation. This concern was a result of Soviet awareness regarding the incompatibility of their postwar aims with those of the western Allies.[36] Conflict with the West was coming, and the Soviets had to protect their interests. Furthermore, regarding those whom the Russians considered Soviet citizens, there was 'an unspoken further assumption…that anti-Soviet refugees, whatever other views they had, were not to become charges of the United Nations. Recalcitrant Soviets were to be

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[33] Sharif Gemie, Laure Humbert, Fiona Reid, *Outcast Europe: Refugees and Relief Workers in an Era of Total War 1936-48 (*London, 2012).

[34] Judt, *Post-War,* p. 29.

[35] British legation, Berne to Ministry of Economic Welfare, 8 Jul. 1944 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/42845).

[36] Cohen states that UNRRA involvement allowed for initial Soviet/Western cooperation and mutual engagement with the immediate postwar relief situation. Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 30. Issues concerning Soviet participation in international relief organisations would peak with the establishment of the IRO in 1946.

sent home'.[37] This tension concerning the classification of refugees and displaced persons, though already a crucial political factor in 1945, would only gain importance as Europe was pulled into yet another ideological showdown.[38] Allied refugee policy sought to settle, whether through repatriation or resettlement, as many people as possible in the shortest amount of time. In turn, this would increase the stability of Europe, as well as allowing countries to begin to rebuild economic infrastructure. The Soviets were more concerned with the ways in which Soviet refugees could be used as a propaganda tool against Moscow, and thus were focused on gaining control of their dissident population. The disconnect between Allied and Soviet refugee policy would affect the ways in which other countries, including Ireland, approached the refugee situation in 1945.

Within the context of an increasingly divided Europe, it should be noted that there were various classifications of refugees or displaced persons that required attention. Added to the actual victims of Nazi aggression were the Germans themselves, as well as refugees from the belligerent, Axis, and Axis satellite states. By the beginning of 1945, it was estimated that 10 million Germans had been evacuated from their homes, with a further 3.5 million fleeing the Soviet advance westward. Most of these people had been resettled by the Nazis in areas of the Sudetenland and Poland to increase the presence of ethnic Germans and to increase German *lebensraum*.[39] These people flooded into Allied controlled territory, and increased populations to an almost unmanageable level.

As such, the UNRRA was making moral judgments concerning a refugee or displaced persons' right to receive aid. Irish involvement with the organisation could be viewed as one of its first overt and public non-neutral acts, and is

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[37] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 318.

[38] 'The 'battle of refugees' was indeed the first direct confrontation over political dissidents between the two emerging superpowers: human rights politics did not only hastened the end of the Cold War, as commonly assumed, but also led to its outbreak. In front of the international press corps, Eleanor Roosevelt and Andrey Vyshinsky (who would be replaced as the Soviet delegate later that year by Andrey Gromyko) repeatedly sparred in plenary sessions of the UN General Assembly.' Cohen, *In War's Wake*, p. 19.

[39] The Nazi Party used the term 'lebensraum' to refer to the territory that the German people needed in order to live in comfort, as the 1930s saw Germany dealing with overpopulation issues. Lebensraum was used to justify Nazi territorial expansion, as the Party claimed that the German race deserved to acquire land, mainly in the East, due to the racial superiority.

interesting for the mere fact that it was allowed to occur. The discussion of Irish involvement with the UNRRA will centre on specific interactions between the organisation and the government including the formation of an Irish UNRRA medical team, Irish material aid distributed through UNRRA to Hungary and the acceptance into Ireland of refugee Hungarian children. The examination of these three issues will allow for an expansion of the refugee aid discourse, facilitating a discussion of different influences upon the formation of Irish refugee policy, namely religion and the political implications of aid.

Serious debate concerning Irish involvement with UNRRA relief efforts in Europe began in February 1945. A UNRRA appeal for clothing and blankets was received in late 1944, and proved a catalyst for discussion concerning the implications of contributing to UNRRA aid relief. John Leydon of the Department of Supplies wrote to External Affairs on 7 February, stating his department's position regarding the sending of supplies to Europe. He was quick to remind External Affairs that Ireland was still under a strict rationing scheme, and was heavily dependent upon Britain for supplies:

> As far as clothing and textiles are concerned, it would be well to indicate in your reply to Dulanty that there is a very strict rationing scheme in force in this country, that a considerable proportion of our supplies comes to us directly from the British and that we are also indirectly dependent on them, i.e., as regards shipping facilities, for most of the supplies which we obtain from abroad. They are likely, as you know, to object to our serving supplies to the Continent and, in face of this objection, the Minister for Supplies would not be prepared to license export unless on foot of an application which had the support of the British authorities.[40]

During the war, Ireland had been highly dependent economically on Britain, and could not risk ostracising its neighbour in an outpouring of humanitarianism. In early 1945, neutrality was still official Irish policy, and any overt deviation, however well intentioned, would be viewed negatively by Britain, especially if Irish aid went to people of the wrong nationality. Furthermore, it seemed as if British authorities expected any Irish supply surplus to be sent directly to them. In many cases, the British provided these supplies to Ireland, and it was expected

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[40] Department of Supplies to External Affairs, 7 Feb. 1945 (NAI, DFA/232/194).

that they would be returned if not needed. The idea that the Irish would send these supplies to the Continent was not expected to elicit a positive response from the British.

A few other interesting contemporary views can be gleaned from this memorandum. Walshe seemed to think that since 'these countries would get supplies from the U.S.A.' it was not necessary for Ireland to worry about sending relief aid. Assuming that one country, even a great power, could tackle the monumental task of supplying Europe with enough aid reveals a naïve view of the Europe situation. It was also thought that Ireland would not get any recognition for any donations to UNRRA. '… another point to be considered was that we would get no credit for any supplies which we sent through U.N.R.R.A. and that that organisation was not very popular with the Governments of the liberated countries in Europe… anything which we did should be carried out direct with the Governments concerned or through the Red Cross Society'.[41] If the government was going to expend time and energy sending aid to Europe, they might as well gain recognition and a bump in international prestige for their efforts.

With the official cessation of hostilities, the politics of Irish UNRRA involvement shifted. As previously stated, the UNRRA was the victors' relief organisation, and as such, Irish involvement with the organisation was now a possibility. British concerns regarding Irish involvement dissipated, as focus shifted from actually ending the war to the reconstruction of Europe. Western Allied attention quickly shifted to the stabilisation of Europe, which essentially meant settling displaced persons and refugees, restoring a semblance of normalised economic activity and firmly establishing liberal democratic governments. Aid, both monetary and material, would help this process along, and was encouraged.

UNRRA Irish medical teams

The process to send an Irish UNRRA medical team to Europe began in May 1945 when the Director of Health for the UNRRA European Regional Office, Andrew Topping, wrote to Dulanty enquiring as to the government's stance

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[41] Ibid.

regarding the formation of an Irish team.[42] Topping stated that the European Regional Office had permission from UNRRA headquarters in Washington to recruit personnel from Ireland. Unfortunately, there is not much discussion within the relevant archival material as to how the decision to form these teams was reached, or the practical matter of their organisation. An *Irish Press* article stated that 'a special Committee of the Red Cross has been set up, and an advertisement setting out the terms and conditions will be published shortly'.[43] The article also stated multiple times that the people to be helped in Europe were 'foreign workers awaiting repatriation' and 'displaced persons in Germany and Austria who had been taken there from France, Poland, Holland and elsewhere'.[44] It was made clear that those to be helped were *not* Axis citizens. Of course, the reality of the situation would prove much more complicated, as scores of German citizens, amongst other Axis nationals, had been persecuted by their government and sent to camps. How to identify the anti-Nazi Axis nationals and determine what aid they would be provided with would prove problematic.

The appeal proved a success, as two hundred and fifty people applied for the fifty offered positions.[45] Those selected by the Committee, which consisted of members of the Medical Association of Éire and the Irish Nurses' Organisation, along with the Irish Red Cross, were to be sent initially to France to serve a term of one year.[46]

Allocations of UNRRA aid to Hungary: religious concerns

Perhaps the most contentious instance of Irish involvement with the UNRRA concerned the allocation of Irish material aid to Hungary. Hungary, as the last Axis satellite to conclude a ceasefire with the three major Allies, was in a precarious position in 1945. Hungary was occupied by the Soviets, who quickly consolidated their hold over the country by means of the Allied Control

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[42] UNRRA European Regional Office (Topping) to High Commissioner for Ireland in Britain (Dulanty), 11 May 1945 (NAI, DFA/232/194).

[43] *Irish Press,* 25 May 1945.

[44] Ibid.

[45] *Irish Press,* 2 June 1945.

[46] Ibid.

Commission under the chairmanship of Marshal Klementy Voroshilov, with only token American and British representation.

Hungary would prove a case in point as to the challenges of early postwar reconstruction, as tensions mounted between the western Allies and the Soviets. The western Allies quickly came to terms with the reality of their inability to influence Soviet action in Hungary, and grudgingly witnessed increasingly repressive Soviet measures.[47]

As an ex-Axis ally, issues such as war guilt complicated the debate as to what aid organisations could, or should, assist Hungary. Anne Applebaum provides a sobering account of Hungarian economic vitality at war's end:

> In 1945 and 1946, Hungary's GNP was only half of what it had been in 1939. According to one calculation, the final months of the war had destroyed about 40 per cent of the country's economic infrastructure. Budapest, the capital, suffered damage to three quarters of its buildings, of which 4 per cent were totally destroyed and 22 per cent uninhabitable. The population was reduced by a third.[48]

Furthermore, a League of Red Cross Societies report dated from the winter of 1946 described the mass population movements into Hungary:

> As a result of the movement of populations between European countries, Hungary is in course of receiving between 400,000 and 500,000 persons of Hungarian extraction from neighbouring States before March of 1947, 65% of these people are men, 20% women and 15% children. 40% are intellectuals, 30% industrial and commercial technicians, 20% workers and 10% farmers. Some of these people have families to whom they can turn for assistance upon arriving in Hungary, but approximately 120,000 are without family ties; and it is estimated that 30,000 will cross the frontier with less than 50 kilos each of personal belongings.[49]

The Allies were concerned with settling people in the right places. The creation of ethnically homogeneous states was deemed appropriate as it was viewed that the

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[47] see S. Kertesz, 'Soviet and Western Politics in Hungary, 1944-1947' in *The Review of Politics*, xiv, no. 1 (Jan., 1952), pp 47-74 for a concise examination of Soviet/western tensions within Hungary.

[48] Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-56* (London, 2012), p. 11.

[49] League of Red Cross Societies to Irish Red Cross, 25 Nov. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

existence of ethnic minorities within nation states had contributed to the outbreak of both the world wars.

As such, on 8 January 1945 the Central Committee of the UNRRA authorised the disbursement of funds to help displaced and destitute persons in Hungary.[50] The debate concerning Irish donations to UNRRA's aid for Hungary began in late 1945. The main issue, the disbursement of aid, would lead to discussions concerning the murky postwar politics of Hungary, pitting the elite Stalinist communists against home grown Hungarian communists and Western representatives in Hungary. The language of documentation emanating from Western governments, aid organisations and the UNRRA itself show how aid was utilised as a political tool. The Irish decision to contribute to UNRRA aid for Hungary needs to be viewed within this contentious context.

An early plea received by the government, written by a Hungarian-born Irish national, was a typical example of the language utilised within this discourse:

> Hungary is in a particularly difficult position. She has been dragged into the war at the chariot wheels of big powers and is now COMPLETELY UNDER Russian occupation. The Russian Army lives off the land. Reliable reports to hand state that the food ration, which can be maintained only to the middle of January, gives eight hundred calories per day which figure is somewhere very near the German concentration camp ration. In spite of this fact and in spite of the general position Hungarians have dared to vote for the Small-holders and against the Left wing parties, who had strong external backing. Hungarian Communists now openly state that unless Hungary 'atoned' for this election result she could starve. (emphasis in original)[51]

The comparison of living conditions in Hungary to those of the German concentration camps was included to elicit an emotional response from the government, as was the mention of domestic Hungarian opposition to enforced Soviet communism. Included with the letter was a detailed statement entitled

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[50] Extract from Offical Report British House of Commons Debates, 30 Jan. 1945 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

[51] Vera de Rudnyanszky to de Valera, 16 Dec. 1945 (NAI, DFA/ 372/4).

'What Hungary did for Poles between 1939 and 1944'.[52] The language was telling, and was repeated often enough in correspondence received by the government. Hungary could be seen even at this early stage as a theatre on which Cold War tensions were beginning to influence international policy. The Irish government was concerned that any aid sent would fall into the hands of various Soviet-controlled state apparatuses, and ultimately not to the displaced persons, refugees and others in need. This was why the question of *which* aid organisation was getting *what* aid became so important. Debate occurred in the Dáil concerning the merits of various aid organisations, and the efficiency of the UNRRA versus private aid organisations was discussed on various occasions.[53]

As a predominantly Catholic country in which religion was still a major domestic political influence, getting aid to the Catholic refugees in Hungary became a point of concern for the Irish government. It became clear that to achieve this goal, Irish aid had to be disbursed to various aid organisations in Hungary, not just to the UNRRA. In March 1945, Kiernan, still stationed at the Irish legation in Rome, wrote to External Affairs to discuss the realities of Irish aid brought into Hungary through the International Red Cross:

> He (Cardinal Mindszenty) stated that supplies sent through the International Red Cross do not reach a desirable destination in Hungary. The International Red Cross works towards the Hungarian Red Cross organisation in Budapest but the Hungarian Red Cross is merely a name, or a label, covering political, mainly Communist-controlled, groups and interests… even when relief supplies were collected by the Swiss Catholics for the assistance of Catholics in Budapest, the supplies (mainly of cocoa) went perforce to the Hungarian Red Cross which meant distribution according to political adherence i.e. to Communists.[54]

This was not what Dublin wanted to hear. Furthermore, this issue was brought up repeatedly by Cardinal Mindszenty and Dr Imre de Kosinsky, a member of the Catholic Action relief organisation, in subsequent meetings with Kiernan. After enquires were made, it was ascertained that

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[52] Ibid.

[53] For example, see Dáil Debates 101, Vote 72 'Alleviation of Distress', 19 June 1946; Vol. 107, Vote 72, 'Alleviation of Distress', 4 Jul. 1947.

[54] Kiernan (Irish legation in Rome) to External Affairs, 2 Mar. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

> proof that our supplies are reaching the Catholic populations of the Central European countries is afforded by the letters received by the Taoiseach from Cardinal Innitzer and the Bishop of Polten in Austria and from many Catholic organisations in Germany. We have found the International Red Cross most satisfactory and efficient and neither this Department nor the Department of Industry & Commerce would be disposed to recommend any change in the channel of distribution.[55]

Even though this statement was officially accepted by the government, concern can still be detected within further correspondence concerning aid distribution. There was obvious disagreement between the Irish officials involved as to the aid organisations best able to deliver Irish aid in an acceptable way. Even though aid was still channeled through the UNRRA (for example, a further one hundred tons of bacon were sent during the summer of 1949),[56] the question of the effectiveness and validity of giving aid to other organisations was brought into question. The politics of a relief organisation had to be appropriate; the appropriate refugees needed to be getting the aid.

It was decided that aid not earmarked for the UNRRA was to be distributed by the International Red Cross to the Hungarian Red Cross. Half of this aid was to be further distributed to Catholic Action, thus ensuring that 50% of non-UNRRA Irish aid would be received directly by Catholics.[57] Justification for this request was stated as such:

> The Irish Authorities and the Irish Red Cross, however, being aware of the general distress among all sections of the population, do not want its gift limited solely to any one class or creed, but are satisfied if any equitable distribution be made among all, but must insist, in view of the preponderance of the Catholic population in Hungary, that 50% of the goods sent must go to the Catholic Hungarian population. We propose sending our supplies through the International Red Cross for forwarding to the Hungarian Red Cross and it is made a condition of the forwarding of such goods to the Hungarian Red Cross that they hand over 50% to Actio Catholica, Budapest, for distribution as that body think in the best interests

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[55] External Affairs memorandum entitled 'Irish Relief for Hungary', 27 May 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

[56] External Affairs to Finance, 6 Apr. 1949 (NAI, DFA/372/4A).

[57] Irish Red Cross to Minister Dr Antall, President of the Hungarian Red Cross, undated (NAI, DFA/372/4A.

> of all concerned. The remaining 50% is given to the Hungarian Red Cross to distribute as they desire.[58]

It was further stated in a confidential letter from a government official to the Irish Red Cross that 'we should like the Actio Catholic in Hungary to get as large as possible a proportion of the Irish relief supplies which are sent to that country as can be allocated to them without provoking dissatisfaction or opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and the occupying authorities in Hungary'.[59]

This distribution plan was not viewed positively by all, and a delegate of the International Committee in Budapest felt that

> owing to the present opposition of political and ideological conceptions in Hungary, it seems hardly indicated to entrust one sole religious organisation with the distribution of goods in this country. Such an action could indeed, whether willingly or not, be utilised as a means of political propaganda. Hungary is indeed not a free country and is under Russian occupation and control. In fact, the handing over of 500 tons of sugar to Actio Catholica would not only have earned the disapproval of the occupying authorities but caused the possible confiscation of the goods or even a prohibition of importing into Hungary,which might have completely nullified both this relief action and all other under Red Cross auspices.[60]

Seen from this perspective, it could be wondered how much the Irish government knew about how the situation in Hungary was evolving. Was it naivety that led the government to push for specific Catholic allocation of aid? It should not have been difficult to assume that the Soviets would not have been extremely enthusiastic about singling out Catholics for aid. Interestingly, this is not the only instance that would lead one to question the level of Irish intelligence concerning the organisation of postwar Hungary. Kiernan, reporting in March, commented on American and British influence within the Allied Commission: 'With regard to the children, he thought that the Allied Commission could make the necessary arrangements; since the Commission in Budapest is composed of representatives of three Governments, Britain, Russia and the United States, and in a matter of

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[58] Ibid.

[59] Confidential memorandum to Irish Red Cross, 12 July 1946 (NAI, DFA/ 372/4).

[60] M. Moser, 'Note to the Joint Relief Commission for the attention of Mr. Wheeler Secretariat, 20 Nov. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

this kind we could rely on Britain and the United States over-ruling Russian objections.'[61] This assessment of Allied ability to influence any decision brought before the Allied Commission was incorrect, and again shows a lack of ability to grasp the actuality of power disbursement within the Commission.

Various other issues arose concerning aid allocation and distribution. Cardinal Mindszenty wrote to de Valera personally, stating that Irish sugar meant for Catholic Hungarians was only distributed to people in possession of ration cards, and the only people able to obtain such cards were Communists party members.[62] This assertion was refuted a month later, when the Hungarian Minister of Public Welfare wrote to the Irish Red Cross claiming that much of the sugar had, in fact, been distributed to public health institutes, which cared for 'children, infirms, aged, nursing and expecting mothers'.[63] Hardly the type of people one would assume to be hard line communist party members. A rather heated exchange between the government and the International Centre for Relief to Civilian Populations, the organisation that assumed the responsibilities of the Joint Relief Commission upon its liquidation in the winter of 1946, also took place concerning adherence to the government's stipulations concerning aid distribution.[64]

Before concluding this section, it need be mentioned that there had also been discussion concerning the admittance of Hungarian refugee children into Ireland. This seemed to have been one of the instances in which Irish authorities were more than willing to accept refugee children into the state. There is no official documentation concerning the reasoning behind this decision, yet one could surmise that it was affected by the overwhelming fear in the west after the war that communism would fully saturate youth culture in the east. In February 1946, a cable from de Valera to Cardinal Mindszenty stated that 'we shall be very

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[61] Kiernan, 22 Mar. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

[62] Cardinal Mindszenty to de Valera, 23 Sept. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

[63] Hungarian Minister of Public Welfare to the Irish Red Cross, 16 Oct. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

[64] Boland to Centre d'Entraide Internationale Aux Populations civiles, 30 Apr. 1949 (NAI, DFA/372/4A), Centre d'Entraide Internationale Aux Populations civiles to External Affairs, 18th May 1949 (NAI, DFA/372/4A).

glad to receive Hungarian children in Ireland if the authorities concerned in Hungary and in the intermediate countries will allow them to come'.[65] A further telegram stated that 'it is essential that we be put in touch with authority in Hungary which has power make arrangements stop Such projects in past have failed because too vague and without authoritative backing on side of sending country stop We could take two hundred children for start'.[66]

The main issue seemed to rest upon Swiss refusal to grant transit permits to any children exiting Hungary, as they were frightened of angering the Russians. It was also made quite clear that the Swiss, and various other authorities, believed that any accepted offer of refugee admittance would allow for the Russians to get rid of various undesirable elements of their population. This line of reasoning is reminiscent of the 1930s, when various Western powers claimed that liberal refugee policies would allow the Germans to get rid of their undesirable populations, and in fact encourage an increase of refugee movements out of German territory. Along with these various concerns, Irish authorities were concerned with securing children of the appropriate religion. 'Cardinal Mindszenty said that it would strengthen his hand considerably if he had a telegram or letter from the Taoiseach stating that we are prepared to take 200 Catholic children. He stressed that Catholic children should be specified as otherwise we will get 200 Jews.'[67] Due to various issues concerning Russian cooperation, no Hungarian children entered Ireland under this scheme.

The International Refugee Organisation, 1946-1952

In 1947, Patrick Murphy Malin wrote an apt and succinct appraisal of the refugee situation in Europe.[68] Malin, who had been the American Director of the International Migration Service from 1940 to 1942, and had also held the position of Vice-Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, was well placed to possess an intricate knowledge of the actualities, and outright necessities,

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65 De Valera to Cardinal Mindszenty, 23 February 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

66 Irish government telegram to Irish legation, Vatican City, 23 Feb. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/4).

67 Kiernan to External Affairs, undated (NAI, DFA/372/4).

68 Patrick Murphy Malin, 'The Refugee: A problem for International Organization', in *International Organization,* i, no. 3 (Sept., 1947), pp 443-59.

of the refugee problem. While the main analytical focus of Malin's article focused on the emerging IRO, he also extrapolated as to the basic structure of international refugee organisations. He stated that three types of assistance would be needed by refugees: care and maintenance, re-establishment (repatriation and resettlement) and legal/political protection. These services needed to be enacted on two levels, both individual and large-scale administration. Various organisations, such as the UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, had previously attempted to lessen the staggering number of refugees, and had achieved varying levels of success. In 1946, the refugee situation was still far from an absolute resolution, and as such the IRO was created to take the place of the UNRRA, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and the Allied military forces.[69]

The IRO was a specialised, non-permanent UN agency, and its function was stated as such:

> The functions of the Organization to be carried out in accordance with the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, shall be: the repatriation; the identification, registration and classification; the care and assistance; the legal and political protection; the transport; and the re-settlement and re-establishment, in countries able and willing to receive them, of persons who are the concern of the Organization under the provisions of Annex. Such functions shall be exercised with a view:
> (a) to encouraging and assisting in every way possible the early return to their country of nationality, or former habitual residence, of those persons who are the concern of the Organization, having regard to the principles laid down in the resolution on refugees and displaced persons adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 12 February 1946…
> (b) with respect to persons for whom repatriation does not take place under paragraph 1 of this Article to facilitating:
> (i) their re-establishment in countries of temporary residence;
> (ii) the emigration to, re-settlement and re-establishment in other countries of individuals or family units; and
> (iii) as may be necessary and practicable, within available resources and subject to the relevant financial regulations, the investigation, promotion or execution of projects of group re-settlement or large scale re-settlement.[70]

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[69] The IRO was responsible for the settlement of the last one million DPs. This included 400,000 Poles, 150-200,000 Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians, 100-150,000 Ukrainians and 250,000 Jews. Cohen, *In War's Wake*, p. 6.

[70] 'Constitution of the International Refugee Organization', 15 Dec. 1946. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.

The main objective of the IRO was foremost the repatriation of all current refugees, and barring that, their further resettlement.[71] The British firmly believed that the refugee problem was one that could only be solved when approached from an international perspective, and thus 'all those aspects of the problem can only be co-ordinated by an international organisation, which alone will have the authority to bring real pressure to bear on reception countries to admit greater numbers of refugees, and alone will be able to arrange the necessary transport, work out the necessary priorities, and look after the refugees for a reasonable time until they are settled in their new homes'.[72] The British take on IRO objectives, as well as the stated IRO aim, were to cause various problems within an international context, which hindered the organisation's ability to successfully pursue its objective.

The Slavic governments, already firmly ensconced within the Soviet realm of influence, provided the first hurtle for the IRO as they attempted to persuade the Allied authorities to alter the IRO constitution to fit Slavic needs.[73] They were concerned with the facilitation of repatriation, forcible if necessary, of their nationals for two reasons. There were massive labour shortages hindering the ability of their countries to rebuild after the war and the presence of large groups of displeased nationals outside of their national borders was found worrying.[74] Any affirmation of these peoples' refugee status would, in affect, be a

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[71] It should be stated that by the time the IRO took responsibility for the refugees and DPs still present in Europe, those that remained were mostly unwilling to accept repatriation. As such, a main focus of IRO activity centred on permanent resettlement and the assimilation of refugees and DPs into the countries of first asylum. Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 6.

[72] Foreign Office to Political Division, Headquarters Control Commission for Germany, British Element, Berlin, 18 Mar. 1947 (TNA, Foreign Office 188/606).

[73] Arthur Rucker, 'The Work of the International Refugee Organization', in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),* xxv, no.1 (Jan., 1949), pp 66-73.

[74] 'East and West disagreed sharply over which groups were genuine refugees entitled to international assistance. Western countries sought to include large numbers of dissident and anti-Communist elements; Eastern countries tried to exclude those whom they believed were deadly political enemies.' Marrus, *The Unwanted,* p. 341. The two issues mentioned, labour shortages and dissidents outside of national territories, were worries that the Soviet Union instilled within its satellites. Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 23. For more on labour shortages in Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period, see Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 100-25.

condemnation of the home country's actions or policies. When it became clear, however, that the Allied nations would not stand for forced repatriation, the Slavic countries next demanded that international aid be confined to the one purpose of repatriating people willing to return. Once again, this was deemed an unacceptable request. Lastly, the Slavic countries queried if certain groups of people could be excluded from aid and that eligibility for IRO assistance would be rigidly defined and enforced. The acquiescence to this last request was used to mollify the Slavic countries and 'for the sake of general United Nations harmony, and in the hope of insuring a broadly inclusive international refugee organization, its proponents agreed to many wordings which - whatever their logical merit – promise to plague the new organization with administratively impossible hair-splitting'.[75]

After attending the First Session of the Council of the IRO in 1948, Conor Cruise O'Brien summed up the views of Father Killian, an active member of the Vatican Migration Bureau, regarding the IRO constitution for the government. His observations highlighted the tension within the IRO between East and West, and how such tension affected perceptions of the organisation and the politics of membership. O'Brien stated that Killian viewed the main flaws of the organisation as such:

> (a) Its Constitution, prepared in the U.N. under Russian pressure, and giving 'repatriation' rather than 'resettlement' as the principle task of the Organisation.
> ...
> (d) There was a tendency to discriminate against Catholics and in favour of other groups (e.g. Jews) for resettlement priorities.
> (e) There was, or had been, a tendency to act contrary to Christian principles in resettlement (e.g. by breaking up families.)
> 3. There existed already within the Council a group which favoured careful supervision of the Secretariat and resistance to all forms of 'Eastern infiltration' etc.[76]

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[75] Malin, 'The Refugee: A Problem for International Organization', p. 452. It need be stated that most Eastern European countries did withhold participation in the IRO, which further solidified the westernization of the organisation. Salomon, *Refugees in the Cold War*, p. 40.

[76] Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Report of visit to Geneva fro (sic) opening of First Session of the Council of the International Refugee Organisation', 5 Sept. 1948 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).

There is a clear distinction between what was deemed an appropriate influence and what was not. The West worried that the East had too much political power within UN bodies such as the IRO and operational problems were immediately blamed on the evils of Eastern influence. Religion was clearly still a crucial issue, as the now expected observations regarding the discrepancy between the treatment of Jewish and Catholic refugees was present, as well as the issue of how 'Christian principles' should influence international refugee policy. O'Brien continued, stating that the group listed in the above text 'consisted largely of those delegates who had welcomed me (Father Killian warned me however against Sir A. Rucker who he regards as a 'sinister' influence). Ireland's membership would be a very valuable addition to this group'.[77] The Church was wary of the operational practices of the IRO, and this surely would have affected Irish opinion of the organisation. Yet it was stated that the Church was encouraging of Irish participation as a Christian influence, thus aligning the Church's moral position with that of Ireland.

The validity of Father Killian's statement should be questioned, and there is was a possibility that he was exaggerating the level of Eastern and anti-Christian influence within the IRO as a way to persuade Irish authorities of the necessity of their membership. In reality, the IRO consisted of far more Western than Eastern countries, and had 'become the instrument of the Western powers, chiefly the United States, which contributed over half of its operating funds'.[78] Father Killian may very well have been concerned regarding anti-Christian practices, yet he also seemed to have been using this argument to entice Irish involvement with the organisation.

The second hurdle facing the IRO concerned the organisation's finances. As an international, multi-government organisation, the IRO was chronically underfunded. Full member states had financial obligations to the organisation, which could be waived in favour of refugee admittance. This clause would heavily factor into Irish negotiations concerning IRO membership that will be

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[77] Ibid.

[78] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 343.

examined within this section. The budget for the IRO's first fiscal year was set at $5,000,000 for administration costs, $150,000,000 for operational expenses and $5,000,000 for large-scale resettlement expenses.[79] The first two amounts were to be procured solely from member nations' financial obligations, while large-scale resettlement funds were voluntary. The budget was deemed insufficient to those in the know, but it was stated that 'the budgeted figure may well be the largest which could have been attained without wrecking the possibility of having an international refugee body with a membership of more than a few nations, but it nevertheless presages a drastic reduction in the amount of assistance given to the persons who now become the concern of the International Refugee Organization'.[80]

By 1947, the organisation was experiencing financial difficulty, as only $90,000,000 out of the projected $155,860,500 had been collected from member nations, which amounted to one-fourth of yearly membership funds.[81] There were 640,000 people in European and Middle Eastern IRO run camps, while the IRO was also providing legal and administrative assistance to 900,000 further refugees. These were the circumstances in which the Irish government began discussion IRO membership in the summer of 1948.

Politics of IRO membership

The internal governmental discourse concerning IRO membership focused on two issues. The financial obligations of membership were of paramount importance,[82] as was a possible loss of sovereignty concerning refugee admittance.

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[79] Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Report of visit to Geneva fro (sic) opening of First Session of the Council of the International Refugee Organisation', 5 Sept. 1948 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).
[80] Ibid.
[81] International Refugee Organization, in *International Organization,* ii, no. 1 (Feb., 1948), pp 130-32.
[82] Interestingly, the Swedish government engaged in a protracted debate with British, American and French authorities over their monetary contribution as well. 'At the December meeting in London of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees the Swedish representative stated that Sweden would be making its contribution to the Intergovernmental Committee by turning over proceeds of German assets destined for the IGCR pursuant to the Paris Reparation Agreement and ought not to be asked to contribute independently to the IGCR budget. British and United States representatives rejected this point of view. The Swedish Government has now offered 50 million crowns to the IGCR, but on the condition that such payment covers their contribution to the IGCT under the formula

Other factors, which would prove decisive, included international reputation concerns, how involvement in a UN specialised agency could affect potential Irish UN membership, early Cold War tensions and the influence of religious personnel. An analysis of the debate concerning IRO membership sets the stage nicely for issues that will be dealt with in subsequent chapters, mainly how Irish desire to participate in international organisations and the country's Cold War policy directly influenced the formation of its refugee policy.

The Irish financial contribution due upon membership would, it was speculated, amount to between 0.50% and 0.57% of IRO administrative expense and between 0.44% and 0.50% of operational costs.[83] The actual (US) dollar amounts were estimated as $24,000 and $664,667 respectively.[84] If fiscal payment of membership was deemed undesirable, various other payment options were put forward. The IRO stated that in lieu of monetary payment they would accept a credit to purchase Irish foodstuffs or, and this would prove rather controversial, the admittance into Ireland of refugee children if those children were provided a full maintenance by the government:

> It would be the responsibility of the Government of Ireland to find homes for these children and provide them with maintenance and education for a period of up to 10 years from the year of admission. This might make it possible to fund the contributions of the Government of Ireland to IRO for the present fiscal year and the following fiscal year over a 10 year period. For purposes of examination by the Government of Ireland, it is suggested that the annual maintenance cost of the child be calculated at the equivalent of $1000 and the interest rate of the contribution be calculated at 2 ½ 0/0.[85]

Both plans were debated internally, but membership was still deemed an unnecessary risk.

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adopted by the London meeting as well as their contribution to the International Refugee Organization in the event that Sweden becomes a member'. Refugee Department, Foreign Office to American Embassy, London, 26 Feb. 1947 (TNA, Foreign Office 188/606). It is important to understand that various negotiations were held in order to increase IRO membership, the low numbers of which worried American officials.

83 International Refugee Organisation memorandum, 'For the information of Mr. Cruise O'Brien, Observer for Ireland at First Session of the Council of the International Refugee Organization', 14 Sept. 1948 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

A further issue that begged attention was the practicality of Irish IRO membership in lieu of UN membership. Within the IRO constitution this issue was addressed:

> Membership in the Organization is open to Members of the United Nations. Membership is also open to any other peace-loving States, not members of the United Nations, upon recommendation of the Executive Committee, by a two-thirds majority vote of members of the General Council present and voting, subject to the conditions of the agreement between the Organization and the United Nations approved pursuant to Article 3 of this Constitution.[86]

As such, a country concerned with a successful UN membership bid could view membership in a UN specialised agency as a move towards full-fledged membership. Walshe stated in 1949, when discussing Italian IRO membership, that 'Italy, like ourselves, not a member of UNO, is a member of this organisation, and that she appears to regard it as a stepping stone to membership of UNO, and, ultimately, to her complete entry into international activities on the same level as the Western powers'.[87] Furthermore, it was blatantly stated in a government memorandum that 'there may be something to be said for 'showing the flag' at as many of the U.N.O. subsidiary bodies as possible'.[88]

Prospective full UN membership factored into the government's decision-making process, as did the wider issue of international reputation and moral obligation. Cruise O'Brien, while representing Ireland at the opening of the First Session of the Council of the IRO, stated that he was approached following the initial morning session by the Belgium and Canadian delegates, who all 'stressed

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[86] 'Constitution of the International Refugee Organization', 15 Dec. 1946. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.

[87] Walshe to External Affairs, 4 June 1949 (NAI, DFA/2001/43/879). Till Geiger states that Irish involvement with specialised international organisations, as well as UN umbrella organisations, paved the way for eventual Irish UN membership. Furthermore, Ireland was not as isolated as previously thought between 1945 and 1955, participating in the International Labour Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the World Health Organisation. Geiger, 'A belated discovery of internationalism? Ireland, the United Nations and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-60' in Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon (eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations*, p. 30-2.

[88] Government memorandum, 're. Invitation to send Observer to I.R.O. General Council Session', 18 Feb, 1950 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).

that they desired Ireland's participation not because of any direct contribution we would be able to make, but for our "moral influence". By this they seemed to mean that they thought Ireland would support the human side in cases where there might be a conflict between humanity and expediency'.[89] This could be viewed as an early example of Irish foreign policy as it would develop in the 1950s. There existed a dichotomy between what Ireland could actually contribute to refugee aid, monetarily, materially and physically, and what it could provide in an ideological sense through its commitment to humanitarian ideals and its adherence to Western ideology.

Even as the debate drew to its inevitable conclusion, the IRO was due to cease operational duties in 1952, the implications of Irish non-membership were viewed within an international context. 'In a sense we are "sitting pretty" enough. But, as against that, it may well reflect on our national reputation for Christianity and hospitality if we persist to the very end in holding aloof from an Organisation which, if not run as economically as we should like, nevertheless is doing the kind of job our people might be assumed to approve.'[90] Opinion began to sway towards involvement, even as government departments, such as Social Welfare, clearly expressed their grave concerns regarding refugee admittance. The administration of the national Employment Service came under the control of Social Welfare, and as such the Minister wanted to make his opinions known. It was stated that 'there are still large numbers of persons on the Live Registers of the Local Offices of this Department. There are also numbers of citizens resident in Great Britain who would be anxious to return home if employment were available. The admission on any substantial scale of aliens seeking employment is clearly disadvantageous to the prospects of citizens'.[91] These genuine domestic issues

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[89] Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Report of visit to Geneva fro (sic) opening of First Session of the Council of the International Refugee Organisation', undated (NAI, DFA/2001/43/879).

[90] Government memorandum, 're. Invitation to send Observer to I.R.O. General Council Session', 18 Feb, 1950 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).

[91] Social Welfare to Justice, included in Justice memorandum, 'Admission of displaced persons under the care of International Refugee Organisation', 4 Sept. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

were arguably to be swept under the rug in favour of the pervasive need to become established on an international level.

The IRO, through its representative in Dublin, John Dillon, also began to intensify its drive towards securing Irish membership in 1950, resorting to guilt and international perceptions of Ireland to tempt the country into membership:

> The Director-General of the International Refugee Organisation is very much concerned with the question of refugee placement in Ireland. Every country in Europe has been willing to assist in the humanitarian activity of assisting these refugees to start a new and free life, and we should like to be able to publicize the fact that Ireland, too, has opened her doors to some of these unhappy people whose known anti-Communist attitude has made homeless and stateless.[92]

The inclusion of 'these unhappy people whose known anti-Communist attitude has made homeless and stateless' could be considered a classic example of early Cold War rhetoric, would be utilised repeatedly throughout the 1950s to reinforce Cold War ideological entrenchment, as well as to solicit refugee aid. Dillon also repeatedly stressed the Irish government's lethargy in reaching a decision concerning membership, stating that it had been four months since the question had been posed to the government, and that 'should the decision be against the bringing of skilled refugee workers in to Ireland, at least we would then know that it would be better to press out activities elsewhere'.[93]

The Catholic Church also expressed concern regarding Ireland's attitude of 'non-cooperation' towards the IRO. Father Killion, the Field Representative for Germany and Austria of the Vatican Migration Bureau, wrote to Archbishop McQuaid, stating that as 'this office [Vatican Migration Bureau] has been somewhat instrumental in furthering the negotiations between the International Refugee Organization and Eire' he felt it desirous to discuss the Catholic Church's position in Ireland regarding IRO membership. Father Killion stated that the Church in Rome was concerned with the manner of IRO refugee resettlement, as the organisation frequently separated children from their family units. Interestingly, he attributed this directly to English influence within the

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[92] International Refugee Organisation, Dillon, to Costello, 13 Sept. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).
[93] Ibid.

organisation, and referred to the practice of separating families as nefarious.[94] He then called upon an Irish responsibility to essentially infiltrate the IRO, and attempt to instill a sense of Christian morality: 'However, Your Grace, it is for these very reasons that this office is most eager to have the support of Eire as a member-state of the organization. Although, its contribution would be relatively small in actual money, its influence could be very great, united with a few other right-minded members.'[95]

The Irish Bishops did not share the opinion of the Vatican. One stated reason against Irish IRO involvement in 1950 was listed precisely as the Irish hierarchy's reluctance to become further entangled with refugee aid organisations:

> This is not only the view of Departments here, but – from what we have been able to gather – that of the Irish Bishops also. They are plagued with enquiries and appeals from Catholic organisations, displaced Bishops and priests and others – all looking for help towards providing homes in Ireland for refugees and displaced persons. Apart from the few Polish students in the Universities – which are proving quite a problem in themselves – the Bishops here have not felt able to do anything.[96]

Interestingly, even with opposition extending from multiple departments and the domestic Catholic Church, a decision to acquiesce to IRO appeals of refugee admittance occurred in the early 1950s. The deciding factor seemed to be a shift in the IRO approach to Ireland, as it was deemed unnecessary that Irish non-membership should exclude it from participation in refugee resettlement schemes.

The fact that Ireland would be exempt from the monetary responsibilities of IRO membership, and from the 'prospect of finding ourselves morally obligated to admit to this country a vague number of very young children and very old people of foreign nationalities and, possibly, of non-Christian religion' was to change the position of the government,[97] which was invited to the IRO General Council session of 1950, albeit only as observers. Concerning IRO

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[94] Rev. Edward J. Killion, Vatican Migration Bureau, to McQuaid, 13 Sept. 1948 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

[95] Ibid.

[96] Boland to Walshe, 16 Feb. 1950 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).

[97] Government memorandum, 're Invitation to send Observer to I.R.O. General Council Session', 18 Feb. 1950 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).

motivation for such a change in policy, it was felt that 'at the same time, it must be assumed that we are not being invited to what may be one of the last meetings of this Organisation simply for our "beaux yeux". Undoubtedly, it is hoped to prevail upon the Government to participate in a big resettlement scheme which will finally liquidate what remains of one of the most appalling post-war problems'.[98] Discussion occurred as to sending a representative 'empowered, if absolutely necessary, to promise some concessions in the way of admitting refugees to Ireland'.[99] As would prove the norm, only the *right type* of refugee was to be admitted, with a heavy bias towards Catholics:

> Naturally, we should have to insist on excluding Jews, who, in any case, are being welcomed freely enough elsewhere; also we should have to aim at obtaining a large proportion of persons between the ages of 20 and 40 and, as many as possible, of skilled workers. This should not be too difficult to achieve, seeing that a majority of the persons which, the I.R.O. is now trying to settle are Catholics and mostly active adult age. On the other hand, it is not easy to see how we could refuse to take children (Catholic or believed to be of Catholic parents) once we gave in to the principle of accepting any refugees at all.[100]

As would prove a central theme of Irish refugee policy, the religion of a refugee was of the utmost importance, even, it would seem, more so than a person's profession. Feasibly, a profession could be changed or alter upon admittance, yet a person's religion could not.

IRO refugee admittance

The refugees still covered under the IRO mandate in 1950 fell into two categories; those who, due mainly to health issues, were unable to obtain visas for North America and aged, infirmed people who would not actively participate in employment and would require institutional care. The first group consisted of about 75,000 and the second 25,000. In an attempt to entice countries to accept the refugees considered incapacitated, the IRO was willing to offer the resettlement grants included below.

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[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid.

3.1 IRO resettlement grants

[101] Aliment	Grant in US dollars
T.B. cases	1,000
Chronically ill	800
Mental cases	700
Blind totally and partially	650
Persons without the use of one or more limbs	650
Old age cases	500
Dependants of persons in each of the above categories	250

These refugees would still prove a substantial drain on domestic resources, but the grants were viewed as a direct manifestation of the IRO's determination to resolve the lingering refugee situation as quickly as possible, as was their recent decision to allow Ireland to participate in IRO schemes without full membership.

In the case of the infirmed refugees, the government contacted the Red Cross and requested that the society ascertain if any institutional care facilities would be willing to admit any of these refugees. These refugees were not to be admitted as sole dependants of the government, but with guaranteed maintenance from either charitable organisations or the institutions in which they would be resident. Furthermore, 'the Minister of Health has stated that he does not consider that the Irish Red Cross Society should be encouraged to place refugees in any accommodation where they would displace native cases'.[102] The government's final decision regarding the admittance of the infirmed refugees was as such:

> That the Minister for Justice will be prepared to admit any incapacitated displaced persons for whom voluntary institutions in this country are willing to take responsibility, provided that the persons are of classes such as the blind, the senile, the chronically ill, the disabled and the mentally defective, and are not of classes of cases such as tuberculosis cases the available accommodation for which is already taxed to the full… that the Irish Red Cross Society are being asked to approach voluntary institutions in regard to the admission of incapacitated persons, to act as a coordinating committee for the admission of those persons, and if possible

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101 International Refugee Organisation, Feb. 1950 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/879).

102 Justice memorandum, 'Admission of displaced persons under the care of International Refugee Organisation', 4 Sept. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

> – without incurring financial expenses – to help to solve problems of transport, housing, welfare, etc., …[103]

Unfortunately, there is not much archival information concerning the refugees admitted through this scheme. There are mentions within the newspapers, however, and in 1951 various articles commented on the admittance of refugees through the IRO scheme. One such article stated that Ireland 'is the first country to have its Red Cross Society take over the work of the International Refugee Organisation which looks after displaced persons from camps in Europe'.[104] Furthermore, it was stated that Ireland and the USA were the first countries to approve of the admission of the infirmed refugees with only minimum restrictions. The last mention concerning the actual admittance of the hardcore cases dated from October:

> The Society also looks after aged and infirm refugees. Some of these will be housed in 'The Haven' in Clonliffe, which has been opened by the Council of Christian Churches. Next Thursday 17 people for this home will arrive in Dublin Airport, where they will be met by Red Cross ambulances and personnel. This party will include four White Russian couples, who originally escaped to Yugoslavia in 1917 from the revolution in Russia. Soon after the second world war, when Communism came to Yugoslavia, they had to flee again. The rest of the refugees come from the Baltic States.[105]

As regarded refugees from the other category, those actively seeking employment who had been rejected from the USA, Canada and Australia because of 'age, family composition, lack of sponsorship, or minor physical defects', the government was engaged in formulating policy throughout 1950. The pre-existing policy concerning alien employment stated that any alien seeking employment within the state had to be first accepted by Justice and then gain possession of an employment permit from Industry and Commerce. The relevant trade unions also had to be in agreement as to every instance of alien employment. The main issue regarding the employment prospects of this group was their inability to be repatriated if the employment was not successful.

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[103] Cabinet minutes, 26 Sept. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

[104] *Irish Independent*, 16 Jan. 1951.

[105] *Evening Mail*, 12 Oct. 1951.

It was stated that a substantial number of these refugees were 'highly skilled technicians, skilled tradesmen, agricultural workers and unskilled labourers'.[106] Furthermore,

> it may be possible to find employment here for a small number of persons with special skills, but there does not seem to be any likelihood of placing large numbers unless refugees are admitted for employment in the building industry, where there may be shortages of workmen in certain trades. The I.R.O. representative in Dublin has approached building contractors. He states that he believes that he will get some hundreds of offers of employment for them. He has also approached the Irish Trade Union Congress, the Congress of Irish Unions and officers of trade unions in the building trades with a view to ensuring that Unions will not object to the employment of refugees.[107]

To address the various concerns mentioned above, Justice listed three criteria that every successful refugee employment application would have to meet. Every offer of employment would have to be made for a minimum of twelve months, would have to pay the standard wage and, as previously stated, had to be approved of by the trade union in question.

As of October, the following offers of employment had been received by the government:

3.2 Offers of employment for refugees from the public, 1950

[108]**Trade**	**Number of offers received**
Woodworkers	17
Painters	2
Building Workers	14
Tailors	8
Gunsmiths	1
Printing Workers	2
Domestic Workers	19
Farm Master	1
Foundryman	1
Watchmaker	1

106 Justice, 'Admission of displaced persons under the care of International Refugee Organisation', 4 Sept. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

107 Ibid.

108 International Refugee Organisation, 'Notes for press conference', 14 Oct. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

It was further stated by the IRO that the selection process began when a request for a refugee employee was received from a potential employer. The employer then reviewed refugee applicants, and once a decision was made, the completed application was submitted to Industry and Commerce. If the application met with approval, it was subsequently passed on to Justice for review. If this was successful, External Affairs was informed that the appropriate Irish consul should be approached and a visa issued to the refugee in question. The IRO was responsible monetarily for the visa fee and any transportation costs. Furthermore, it was stated that 'at the end of five years, the refugee may apply for Irish citizenship, and so at last find himself again a national of a country to which he is bound by ties of gratitude and appreciation'.[109]

Again, it is necessary to note that once the decision to admit these refugees was reached, scant information exists within the archives as to the refugees actually admitted. This seems to be a reoccurring trend. The process through which the decision to admit refugees is usually documented intricately within the government files, yet the specifics concerning the refugees actually admitted is almost nonexistent. Various reasons for this could be surmised, ranging from weariness of officials to record particulars concerning the entry of rather politicised groups of people such as post-World War Two refugees, to simple administrative oversight. It is, in the very least, an interesting trend to recognise.

Eastern European Refugee Groups

Within this section, various groups of Eastern European refugees attempting to gain entry in Ireland will be examined. These were intensely politicised refugees in the early Cold War years, and as will be discussed, various reasons existed that led the state to seriously consider allowing the admittance of a limited number of Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians and Poles. This section will analyse both planned refugee admittance sanctioned in advance by the state, as well as groups of refugees landing illegally on Irish shores.

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[109] Ibid.

Ukrainian refugee university students

By 1946, Ukrainians had suffered through two famines (1932-33, 1946-47), more than a decade of Stalinist repression and a world war. During the war, the majority of the population cooperated with Soviet forces, with the main Ukrainian army fighting alongside the Red Army. As with many other Eastern European territories, various pro-Nazi groups were also active within Ukrainian territory. Upwards of 80,000 people belonged to the pro-Nazi Ukrainian Liberation Army, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army fought, at various times, the Nazis, the Soviets, the Czechs and the Poles. As such, postwar tensions ran high, as wartime allegiances were murky and many found themselves on the wrong end of a Soviet enquiry. Adding to the general confusion was a war-torn population and a decimated economy. Thus, many Ukrainians were fearful of living in a postwar world under Stalin's thumb and chose flight.

In July, Captain Frolack, the General Secretary of the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, located in London, met with Irish officials to discuss the admittance of Ukrainian refugees into Ireland. Frolack suggested three possible admittance schemes: orphans from camps in British and American zones, students and 'outstanding' scientists.[110] Frolack received the standard response that Ireland had already committed to various groups of children (German, Jewish), that universities were already crowded and that certain types of specialists could be potentially considered.[111]

Once government officials reached out to university administrators, they got rather positive, even passionate, responses in favour of the admittance of Ukrainian students. The president of University College, Cork (hereafter referred to as UCC) employed various arguments in favour of admittance. In his appeal, he equated mass Irish emigration with the forced displacement of refugees:

> But there is another type of relief which at first sight may not be so obviously necessary. When our own people had to emigrate owing to the Famine and the clearance of alien landlords, they went to foreign countries – chiefly Great Britain and the United States – without any leadership

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[110] Cremins, 6 Jul. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

[111] Ibid.

> except that of some Irish priests. They did not include professional and educated men – doctors, lawyers, graduates. Hence it took several generations for them to be able to lift themselves out of the ranks of unskilled labour and to exert their proper influence as Catholics in the life of these countries. To-day citizens of other countries are undergoing a similar diaspora: Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, etc.. Most of them have little prospect of returning safely to their own countries; the tide of totalitarianism must first turn, and it shows no signs of ebbing. So I take it that they will have to settle in England, Australia, Africa – I include only English-speaking localities.[112]

On occasion, Irish sympathy for refugees was expressed as identification with the shared experience of displacement, regardless of the reasons for such displacement (i.e. economic versus political reasons for migration).

Further arguments in favor of liberalising refugee policy were utilised, such as Irish ability to contribute to the postwar humanitarian situation as it was largely untouched by the war. 'And we can help them, in fact we are almost the only people in Europe who can do so.'[113] There was present within this line of reasoning varying shades of guilt felt by the Irish. Ireland had not defended Western ideology during the war, and as such the country had better do its part now to help stabilize Western Europe by accepting refugees. The perceived boost in international prestige was also cited as a reason for student admittance. 'It would also greatly redound to the prestige of our University institutions to take up this international work.'[114]

The next correspondence from UCC President O'Rahilly concerning the Ukrainians stated that due to the enrollment at UCC of a number Polish refugee students, he thought it unwise to accept any Ukrainians, as 'the Poles and the Ukrainians might not pull too well in one place. As you know, the Ukrainians maintain that they suffered a good deal from the Latin Poles'.[115] He was still in favour of Ukrainian admittance to Irish universities in principle, and felt that

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[112] Alfred O'Rahilly, President University College Cork, 'Refugees and the University', 20 Aug. 1947 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid.

[115] O'Railley to Cremin, 29 Aug. 1947 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

perhaps the Polish university students in Galway and Dublin could be moved to Cork, thus opening up room for the Ukrainian students at those universities.

As the Ukrainian students were Catholic, the Vatican levied pressure upon the Irish representatives in Rome.[116] Various priests and religious personnel contacted External Affairs, using rather forcible language concerning the government's slow response.[117] This prompted a proposal, which stated that 'if the Irish hierarchy formed a fund for Catholic refugees, the Minister (External Affairs) would propose to the Government that it should contribute to it'.[118] A question of legality was raised concerning the fact that 'the Government might be precluded from contributing to it by the provision in the Constitution against subsidising any religion'.[119] Special time and consideration were clearly spent considering the 'special case' of Catholic refugees gaining entry to Ireland.

More than a year later, the Bishop of Galway claimed that 'with funds made available to me by the Holy See' he hoped to 'make available the sum of one hundred pounds per annum for six Ukrainian students in University College, Galway'.[120] The one hundred pounds would cover the room and board for each student during term, but the students would need to find employment during holidays to support themselves. This implied that the students would engage in employment while in Ireland, and this was confirmed by a letter from External Affairs to the Irish High Commissioner in London, stating that the visas for the eight Ukrainian students could be processed for 'educational and employment purposes'.[121] The selected students would also have to be academically capable of benefiting from the university's courses, with a sufficient knowledge of English. The issue of tension between the Ukrainian and Polish students was mentioned once again. 'At the present moment there is a number of Polish students in this

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116 Fr. Nicola M. Kohut to Boland, 3 Dec. 2947 (NAI, DFA/372/5); John Buchko, Bishop of Cadi, Apostolic Visitor for the Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe to Rev. Pasquale Robinson, Apostolic Nuncio for Ireland, 26 Feb. 1948 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

117 Irish Government memorandum, 24 Aug. 1947 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Bishop of Galway to Rev. Jos. Jean, 19 Oct. 1948 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

121 External Affairs to Irish High Commissioner, London, 5 Nov. 1948 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

College and it would be necessary that relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians would be harmonious.'[122] The government seemed willing to avail of this plan, and six Ukrainian students were admitted to Ireland.[123] A few points of interest can be ascertained from the visa application of the six admitted students; all were single males with no dependents; all listed the Bishop of Galway as their reference in Ireland; all had listed under the particulars of their passport that their nationality was Ukrainian, and each had crossed that out and written in either Certificate of Identity or A.R.C.

Various conclusions can be drawn from the admittance of the Ukrainian students. Religion was still a crucial factor to consider when the Irish state was formulating its refugee policy. One can hardly imagine the same kind of outside, religiously based pressure having been exerted for, say, Jewish students. And if pressure *had* been applied by the Jewish community in Ireland, it would hardly have been actively engaged with and favourably responded to by the government. Pressure from Rome had a direct affect on Irish policy in this instance. Elements in the government also seemed uncomfortable with the ways in which these decisions were being reached. Boland, at one point, wrote to the Irish Red Cross, reminding them how important 'securing the consent of the Department of Justice' was 'before any commitment as regards the reception of aliens in this country is entered into'.[124] The concern over jurisdiction and internal government tension over such issues was a worry, and Boland was clearly trying to appease all concerned.

There also existed lingering issues concerning the legality of proposed actions concerning refugee aid, as with the instance concerning the government contributing to a domestic, religious refugee aid fund. One would have thought that by 1946, issues such as these would have been addressed. This lends credence to the continuation of an ad hoc Irish approach to refugee policy. Finally, it need be remembered that these students had already reached Britain, and as

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[122] Ibid.

[123] For a list of the particulars regarding the six admitted Ukrainian students, see Appendix 4: Ukrainian refugee student visa applications.

[124] Boland to McNamara, Irish Red Cross, 13 Jul. 1946 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

such, were in less of a dire situation than those still on the Continent. As they had already successfully gained admittance to Britain, they were not deemed a British security threat, and therefore were a way in which the Irish government could be seen as contributing to the settlement of refugees, yet in a way that would not cause contention between the Irish and British governments. If Ireland had sought out and selected its own refugees from those still on continental Europe, they might have chosen the 'wrong' ones so to speak, and angered the British government.

Estonian refugees

Another eastern European country that suffered greatly from repeat occupation during the war (the Soviets from 1940-1; the Germans 1941-4; the Soviets 1944-91) was Estonia. The Soviets had not treated Estonian citizens well in 1940-1, and many people preferred the status of a refugee to the known realities of once again living under Soviet occupation:

> Emigration peaked in Autumn 1944 as Soviet troops were approaching the Baltics… gross estimates can still be provided of the number of refugees and on this basis it is believed that about 70,000-80,000 people left for Western countries during World War II, and as many as 6 to 9 per cent of the them died on the journey. A total of 40,000 people reached Germany, and 27,000 landed in Sweden.[125]

Estonian refugees that succeeded in reaching Sweden and Finland would frequently set sail westward to destinations such as the USA, Canada, South America and the Caribbean. These boats were frequently ill-equipped for a journey across the Atlantic, and a number had to call into Irish and British ports due to bad weather or structural issues. This created a host of problems for the Irish government concerning the formation of official policy to deal with such situations.

By January 1946, Dr Raud, a former Consul-General for Estonia, was present in London working on behalf of Estonian refugees.[126] He prepared a

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[125] Tiit Tammaru, Kaja Kumer-Haukanomm and Kristi Anniste, 'The Formation and Development of the Estonia Diaspora' in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* xxxvi, no. 7 (August, 2010), pp. 1162.

[126] Dr Raud, 'Pro Memoria on Displaced Estonian Nationals', to the Irish government, Jan. 1946 (NAI, DFA/5/372/9).

memorandum explaining the situation of the Estonians, trying to elicit sympathy and support for their plight from the Irish government. Within such reports, early Cold War tensions were clear and issues that were to come to the forefront of the new struggle for the ideological soul of Europe were starkly stated. Raud commented on Soviet atrocities during the first occupation, stating that '1100 Estonians were shot or disappeared and 61,000 persons were deported to Siberia and other remote places of Soviet Russia'and that these actions 'filled the minds of the population with horror and fear of the next occupation'. [127] He then made an astute observation of the only two possibilities for Estonian refugees:

> If the stipulations of the Atlantic Charter solemnely (sic) subscribed by the United Nations are carried out and Estonia re-emerges as an independent and sovereign State, then all Estonian refugees will at once return to their homelands; 2. if, however, Estonia remains under the Soviet rule, then refugees will have to find new countries in which to settle. As it seems fairly certain that this second course is the one to be adopted, Estonians will be forced to plead with other countries who may be willing to accept them as immigrants. It is to be hoped that Eire will see her way to taking a number of these Displaced Persons.[128]

It would have been clear to an informed observer that the western Allies were not going to risk Soviet displeasure and anger by asserting the national sovereignty of any country under Soviet influence. The aforementioned Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt during the summer of 1941, was an idealistic declaration, certainly lacking a pragmatic grounding within contemporary international politics, which stated the ideological dedication both leaders felt towards self determination, national sovereignty, universal peace and non-aggression.[129] Upon the cessation of hostilities, the reality of postwar international organisation became glaringly clear, and this Charter, though important within the context of the emerging UN and other international organisations, was superseded by the realities of an ideologically divided Europe. As such, the only other option for these people was flight. Raud further stated that Estonians were capable

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[127] Ibid.

[128] Ibid.

[129] 'Atlantic Charter', 14 Aug. 1941. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.

farmers, Christians, literate and had appropriate political leanings (i.e. no communist or radical socialist tendencies).

A further plea emanating from the Baltic Humanitarian Association in Stockholm was received in February 1947. This document utilised strong language concerning the Soviet occupation of Estonia, while stating that Estonians who had fled were 'patriots whose democratic beliefs are not tolerated by the despotic regime of the Soviet'.[130] It was further stated that 'although their country's independence be destroyed by the agression (sic) and occupation of their powerful neighbour, they still have faith in the solemn promises of the great democratic Powers, promises brought to the knowledge of all by the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations'.[131] At this stage, many Eastern European countries and leaders still hoped for Western intervention against Soviet oppression. It was felt by many that the West had advertised World War Two as a fight for self-determination and national sovereignty. Now that the fighting was over, how could the West abandon them to intense Soviet repression? The Atlantic Charter and the UN gave hope where, in reality, there should have been none.

The Irish government sent their standard response to the Baltic Humanitarian Association, mainly that Ireland was a country of emigration and that any refugee aliens seeking admittance into the state would prove economic competition for Irish nationals. However, 'the policy of the Irish Government with regard to the admission of alien refugees who would fall within the category of skilled specialists in the industrial sphere is however at present under consideration.'[132] As fate would have it, there would be Estonian refugees admitted into the state, yet not through any special industrial skilled employment schemes.

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130 Baltic Humanitarian Association, Stockholm, 15 Jan. 1947 (NAI, DFA/5/372/9).

131 Ibid.

132 Irish government to Irish Charge d'Affaires in Stockholm, 7 Feb. 1947 (NAI, DFA/5/372/9).

Illegal docking of refugee vessels in Irish ports

Between 1946 and 1949, various refugee laden ships made port in Ireland for a variety of reasons, effectively forcing the government's hand, and causing an ad hoc attempt to formulate policy concerning such incidents. The first recorded instance, in August 1946, concerned 'a number of Estonian refugees who were endeavouring to sail to San Domingo' and 'had been forced back to Kinsale by bad weather. They now requested permission to stay in this country for the winter'.[133] Interestingly, Justice and External Affairs seemed far more concerned as to why two of the Estonian men held British passports than whether or not they should allow the refugees to pass the winter in Ireland. The refugees had also told Irish officials that Baltic refugees did not need visas to enter San Domingo, yet this was refuted by the Irish High Commissioner in London. Regardless, the refugees were granted leave to stay in Ireland during the winter.

A Swedish vessel containing three hundred Estonian refugees requested permission to dock in Sligo in November 1946. The refugees 'were stated to have plenty of money and to be desirous of being allowed to land in Ireland pending proceeding by air from Shannon airport to some country or countries in America'.[134] It was felt within External Affairs that 'the permission to remain in Ireland over the winter, which had been granted to two small parties of Baltic refugees who had already arrived here, seemed to be encouraging other Baltic refugees to come here and we must reckon with the possibility that if these 300 Estonians were allowed to stay more would follow'.[135] Furthermore,

> we must also reckon with the danger that other countries will not admit them and they will remain here permanently. I suggested that the refugees should not be allowed to land until the Government had reached a decision concerning them. The matter was, in my view, one for decision between the Department of Justice and the Department of Industry and Commerce. It would not embarrass this Department if the refugees were refused permission to land.[136]

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133 Irish government memorandum, 29 Aug. 1946 (NAI, DFA/5/372/9).

134 External Affairs memorandum, 24 Nov. 1948 (NAI, DFA/5/372/9).

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

External Affairs' statement that they would have no issue with the refugees being refused permission to land demonstrates a change in policy that was out of step with the previous decisions of the department. During Fianna Fáil's administration, External Affairs had frequently viewed refugee issues more liberally than their counterparts in Justice. Could this be seen as a deviation in policy due to the new government? Or possibly the government wished to make it clear that large numbers of illegal landings would not be tolerated. Regardless, the next day, the situation was resolved, as it was stated that 'the ship will continue on its voyage to Canada after coaling at Sligo. This is satisfactory from our point of view'.[137]

In August 1949, mentions of multiple ships containing Estonian and other Baltic refugees attempting to land in Ireland were reported in the Irish newspapers:

> Anchored at Waterford is a 50-ton yacht, The Chemis, on which are ten people who come from Estonia, Germany, Norway and Sweden. They are bound for Argentina, South America, where they intend to make a new home for themselves. The men, of whom three are Estonians and three Germans, are electrical and mechanical technicians, and they intend to work their trades when they reach their destination. They have been in Great Britain far (sic) about a month, and left Dover seven days ago on the first part of their 6,000 miles voyage.[138]

The *Chemis*' reason for calling at Waterford was to pick up an East Prussian captain, who would take them across the Atlantic. The *Chemis* 'intended to wait in Waterford for a favourable north-west wind'.[139] The article also commented upon the politics of those on board, 'stating that they had been engaged in the campaign against Communism, the members of the party declined to give their names and stated they did not wish to enter into any discussion on the political situation in mid-Europe.'[140] Furthermore, a refugee ship, the *Sarabande*, had recently arrived in Cork from Gothenburg, Sweden. The ship's intended

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137 Ibid.

138 *Irish Times,* 5 Aug. 1949.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

destination was Canada, and once repairs had been made, it was expected to continue on:

> The 260 displaced persons on board are also in need of medical supplies and the Cork branch, Irish Red Cross Society yesterday appealed for gifts of cod liver oil, vitamin tablets, liquid paraffin and antiseptics. About two-thirds of those on board are Estonians and Latvians, nearly all of them Lutherans, and about one-third are Polish Catholics. There are also some Finns and a few Russians. All are hoping to be allowed settle in Canada.[141]

The ship that proved the most problematic for the government was the m.v. *Victory*, a vessel with Norwegian registration that arrived in Cork on 30 September, after departing from Gotenburg with 380 refugees on board. The nationalities of the refugees were listed as such: ninety Poles, one Yugoslav, five Lithuanians, four Latvians, two Russians, thirteen Finns and 265 Estonians.[142] The ship docked at Cork to undergo repairs before it carried on to its final destination, Canada. However, it was thought that 'she put in at Cork for repairs, but there is reason to believe that she would have called there in any event, as the Polish passengers had brought with them Polish and Irish flags, which they made up in Sweden, to present to the people of Cork. Some other refugee ships which called at Cork had been well treated – hence this gesture'.[143]

The immediate concern centred upon the seaworthiness of the *Victory*. Marine vessel experts from Industry and Commerce inspected the ship, finding it had 'no safety certificate. She is quite unsafe for the carriage of passengers. Some of the passengers slept in temporary quarters on deck; these would be swept overboard by one Atlantic wave. The hull is of light structure, quite unsuitable for heavy seas'.[144] As Ireland was party to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the Merchant Shipping Acts,[145] the government felt it had an obligation to detain the ship. A plan was established and the Cork Harbour Master was instructed to berth the ship 'at a place which should make it impossible for

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141 Ibid.

142 Irish Red Cross to Taoiseach, 6 Feb. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

143 Justice memorandum, 'Refugee Ship at Cork', 17 Oct. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

144 Industry and Commerce, 'Memorandum for the Government', 17 Oct. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

145 Merchant Shipping Act, 1947 (1947 no.46)(23 Dec. 1947). Irish Statute Book.

the ship to escape to sea without warning'.[146] Furthermore, 'the Garda Siochána, with the approval of the Department of Justice have agreed to secure as far as possible that no diesel oil will be supplied to the ship at Cork'.[147] There was even discussion concerning the use of warning shots if the ship should persist in departing or that a 'motor torpedo boat could be moored alongside the m.v. 'Victory', but this course is not recommended for a period of more than about twenty-four hours as the crew of the Naval vessel would have to cross and re-cross the 'Victory' and there would be a risk of undesirable intercourse between the crew of that vessel and the crew of the motor torpedo boat'.[148]

Once the decision was made to deny the *Victory* the right to embark, the question of how best to deal with the 380 refugees present in Ireland was dealt with by the government. It was decided that the refugees should be moved to a vacant military camp, Rockgrove, and that the Irish Red Cross would provide them with food and any other supplies that they would need.[149] The conditions on board the ship had been appalling, and the Red Cross had made the decision to move the refugees to Rockgrove without enquiring as to the refugees' funds. As such, the Red Cross took over the financial obligations for the refugees, which amounted to approximately £40 per day.

Twenty-five refugees had visas for Canada upon their arrival in Ireland, and by 17 October, twelve had departed by air: 'ten adults and two children left Cork yesterday to fly to Canada. They all hold visas to enter Canada, and have financial credits there. The party later left Shannon on a trans-Canada plane for Nova-Scotia.'[150] The majority, however, were still present at Rockgrove, and the government began to consider the possibility that the refugees may be present in the state for a longer period of time than was originally thought. Justice stated two objectives that it felt crucial to pursue: '(a) to induce as many as possible of the

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146 Industry and Commerce, 'Memorandum for the Government', 17 Oct. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

147 Ibid.

148 Defence, 'Memorandum for the Minister, Detention of m.v. 'Victory', Oct. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

149 Irish Red Cross to Costello, 7 Oct. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

150 *Irish Times,* 12 Oct. 1949.

aliens to leave the State; (b) to reduce the cost of maintaining the aliens and for this purpose to get as many as possible of them to take up employment.'[151] To achieve these objectives, six steps were listed:

> (a) that any of the aliens who have sufficient means should be required to pay for their maintenance so long as they remain in Rockgrove;
> (b) that any of the aliens who have visas or who succeed in getting them should be compelled to leave and if necessary should be provided by the Red Cross Society or by the State with money to pay their fares to their destinations;
> (c) that the Department of External Affairs should make enquires from the representatives of the Argentine and other South American countries in regard to the possibility of the aliens being admitted to these countries;
> (d) that if it is found that numbers of these aliens will be admitted to any South American State consideration should be given to the question of providing them with such assistance as may be necessary for their journey there, including, if necessary, the chartering of a ship for the purpose;
> (e) that permits should be granted freely for the employment of the aliens so long as they remain in the State;
> (f) that the Department of External Affairs should make representatives to the Swedish Government with a view to persuading that Government not to allow any more unseaworthy vessels to leave Sweden with refugees.[152]

As there had been no conscious, premeditated decision to admit these refugees, it would be assumed that the policy created would prove a bit piecemeal. It is interesting to note that the government felt that refugee alien employment was a lesser evil than substantial government expenditure on social welfare assistance. It might have been thought that alien employment would be less conspicuous, and possibly more accepted by the Irish public than a large expenditure on alien social welfare assistance.

The most obvious solution, that of simply sending the refugees back to Sweden led to a self-assessment of the government's record as regarded refugee admittance:

> Apart from the fact that the Swedish Authorities might refuse to readmit the refugees, sending them back to a country from which they fled on account of terror of the Russians would be an inhuman act. In this connection, the Minister wishes to point out that this country has taken in

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[151] Industry and Commerce, 'Memorandum for the Government', 17 Oct. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).
[152] Ibid.

> fewer displaced persons than nearly any other country in Western Europe. This is largely due to the fact that other countries have been unable to exclude displaced persons, whereas only small numbers have succeeded in making their way as far as Ireland. The fact, however, is that we have taken in less than 500 out of the millions of displaced persons, and that our total alien population (2,000 approximately over 16 years of age) is comparatively small. In the circumstances, the Minister suggests that we should adopt a charitable attitude to these refugees, notwithstanding the fact that this may encourage other refugee ships to call here.[153]

This was an instance of honest governmental self-assessment. The arrival of these refugee ships was an instance in which the government could not choose whether or not to address a refugee issue. Ireland, normally safely ensconced and tucked away in the Atlantic, an island behind an island, did not have to interact with the postwar European refugee situation in the same manner, or to the same degree, as countries on the Continent. It is also interesting to note that this was an instance of the Minister of Justice taking a liberal stance on refugee admittance. Throughout the 1930s and throughout the war, External Affairs espoused liberal, or at least more liberal, refugee policy and Justice would attempt to rein in that policy as much as was deemed feasible.

The next step involved contacting the Canadian authorities in an attempt to ascertain exactly what their criteria would be for the admittance of the Estonians. Upon enquiry, the Canadian government responded that they would be prepared to send to Ireland a four-man immigration team from London, provided that the government would agree '(a) to undertake not to allow those rejected by the Immigration team to go forward to Canada; (b) to make available accommodation and the necessary facilities for the Immigration team; and (c) to provide X-Ray films of chests and Radiologists' reports on applicants'.[154] This plan was promptly accepted, and the Canadians arrived to carry out screening.

On 1 December, the situation was stated as such:

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153 Ibid.

154 David M. Johnson, Acting High Commissioner, Canada, to Sean MacBride, External Affairs, 26 Oct. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

> The examination has been completed, and it is expected that in the near future the Canadians will grant visas to over 300 out of the 367 refugees. A small number are likely to be rejected on security grounds and health grounds. Three hundred and eighty persons arrived on the 'Victory' 16 have already left by air for Canada and 3 children were born in Cork. This leaves 367 in Cork. Of the 367, 147 are males over 16, 132 are females over 13 and 88 are children under 16. They are made up of 85 families, comprising 290 persons, and 77 single persons. About 70 persons have enough money ($150 per head) to pay their fares to Canada. Some of the others have small sums and some are penniless.[155]

It was decided that payment of the fares of those refugees accepted by the Canadians would not be covered by the government for two reasons: '(i) that the State could hardly justify fares for aliens, when no doubt, many Irish people would like to emigrate to Canada if their passages were paid; and (ii) that paying the fares of these refugees might encourage other shiploads of refuges to come from Sweden to Ireland'.[156] The government also wished to make two things very clear to the refugees; the refugees could not expect to be fed indefinitely at Rockgrove Camp and that they were expected to pursue resettlement in other countries, and if this was not possible, they needed to attempt to gain employment within Ireland. It was stated that 75% of the men had been employed previously in an industrial capacity, and that while in Sweden many of them were engaged in agricultural labour.

The government wanted the refugees to either leave the country or become self-sufficient as soon as possible. To achieve these ends, they were willing to allow the refugees to take up employment, a stark contrast to the usually severe measures taken to prevent refugees from entering the country and seeking employment. There was also a discussion concerning reimbursing the Red Cross for their expenditures at Rockgrove, yet it was warned that this should not serve as a precedence:

> The Minister for Finance has no objection to the payment of a grant restricted to the expenditure by the Society on this particular lot of refugees, but he considers that the Society should be informed that the

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[155] Justice memorandum, 'Refugee Ship M.V. 'Victory' at Cork', 1 Dec. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1.
[156] Ibid.

> making of a grant in this particular instance does not imply the acceptance in principle of any obligation by the State to refund to the Society any expenditure which it might incur in respect of refugees in general. [157]

Two weeks later, screening had progressed, and of the 349 refugees remaining in Cork, 223 had been granted Canadian visas. Ninety-nine were still under consideration on medical grounds and twenty-seven had been rejected (fifteen for security reasons and twelve on medical grounds).[158] Canadian policy concerning admittance was that family units were admitted as a whole. If any one member of a family unit was unsuccessful in obtaining a visa, the entire family would be disqualified, which contributed to a higher number of visa refusals.

A further report in late January stated that 125 refugees had left for Canada, with twenty more leaving in mid-February.[159] Forty had been refused Canadian visas, and it was thought that this number might grow as high as fifty. 190 refugees in possession of Canadian visas were unable to pay their fares. As such, Red Cross and government officials were in contact with representatives from various refugee organisations concerning the possibility of financing the refugees' voyage to Canada, namely the IRO and the Lutheran World Federation. A representative from the Lutheran World Federation, David L. Ostergren, visited Rockgrove in the winter of 1949. As the majority of the 'Victory' refugees were Lutherans, it was thought that the Lutheran World Federation could provide funds for the resettlement of those refugees. Ostergren also served as a liaison between the Irish government and the IRO:

> We have put pressure on International Refugee Organisation in Geneva and it looks as if they are genuinly [sic] interested in helping the Refugees from Cork to Canada. Their hands are, however, somewhat tied by the constitution of I.R.O. The people who registered with I.R.O. in Sweden or some other country and who were declared eligible for help by I.R.O. will probably be picked up by one of the I.R.O. ships passing Cork and then brought to Canada.[160]

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[157] Ibid.

[158] Justice memorandum, 'Refugee Ship 'Victory'', 15 Dec. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

[159] Justice memorandum, 'Refugee Ship 'Victory'', 26 Jan. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

[160] David L. Ostergren to Irish Red Cross, 29 Dec. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

It was established that only fourteen of the refugees had registered with the IRO while in Sweden. However, the IRO was willing to provide passage on the ship for a reduced price, and it was hoped that the Lutheran World Federation would contribute to the fares of those Lutheran refugees. It was stated that 'the Lutheran World Federation would advance the fares of the Lutherans, on understandings to repay over a period of years, and that passages would be given to the other refugees on payment of about £30 per head, which is considerably lower than the ordinary fare'.[161] Justice then suggested that the Red Cross supply the fee for the forty or so refugees in possession of visas, but not covered under either the IRO or the Lutheran World Federation, mainly Catholic Poles:

> This group is likely to consist of 40 Poles. There are in the group 23 men, 11 women and 6 children (under 16) and the group is made up of 7 families and 21 single persons. The 7 families include 6 married men with 6 wives and 5 children and 1 widow with 1 child. They are nearly all industrial workers (mechanics, textile workers, etc.) Nearly all of them appear to be penniless with the exception of one widow (with child) who, on arrival, had a credit in the U.S.A. for 120 dollars.[162]

The estimated monetary value of the fares was set at £1,200, and the government stated that it would reimburse the Red Cross at a later date.

The chart below lists the number, nationalities and mode of transport for the refugees that departed for Canada on or before 18 January.

3.3 *Victory* refugees that departed for Canada on or before 18 Jan.

Date	Estonians	Poles	Latvians	Mode of Transport
11.11.49	13	-	-	Air Linger
16.11.49	3	-	-	Air Liner
1.12.49	11	2	-	s/s 'Franconia'
14.12.49	2	3	-	s/s 'Manchester Regt.'
16.12.49	3	-	-	s/s 'Empress of Canada'
19.12.49	2	6	2	s/s 'Torrhead'
20.12.49	12	-	-	s/s 'Newfoundland'
21.12.49	-	9	-	s/s 'Manchester Progress'

[161] Justice memorandum, 'Refugees ship 'Victory', 26 Jan. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).
[162] Ibid.

29.12.49	5	-	-	s/s 'Manchester Skipper'
8.1.50	36	9	-	s/s 'Franconia'
8.1.50	-	1	-	s/s 'Franconia' (stowed away at Cobh)
18.1.50	3	4	-	s/s 'Ranmore Head'
Totals	90	34	2	

As the estimated number of refugees unable to leave Ireland fell, the government became more amenable towards the eventual integration, socially and economically, of those left behind. The twenty-four refugees refused Canadian visas on medical grounds included seven Estonians, two Latvians, eleven Poles and four Lithuanians. Only eight of those refugees were actually refused due to medical issues, the remainder were people included within their family units. All of those rejected for health issues had tuberculosis listed as their reason for exemption. As regarded the question of financial support, it was wondered if it would 'be possible for the Department of Industry & Commerce to issue Temporary Residence Permits for the breadwinners and so let us pass them out of the Camp'.[163]

Eight men had their Canadian visa requests rejected due to security reasons, which also caused the rejection of their dependents, numbering a further seven people. The men included two Poles, two Russians, three Estonians and one Lithuanian.[164]

3.4 *Victory* refugees rejected from Canada due to security concerns

Surname	Forename	Nationality	Number of dependents
Ossowski	Dolega Albert	Polish	2
Wassiljev	Mikall	Russian	-
Romanowski	Arkadi	Russian	-
Jenne	Josef	Polish	1
Remmist	Albert	Estonian	-
Kroonvalk	Emil	Estonian	2
Palango	Victor	Estonian	2
Salys	Jonas	Lithuanian	-

163 Ibid.

164 Ibid.

The stated reason for their rejection seemed to have been that they were suspected of German collaboration.[165] It was made clear that they were not suspected Communists and it is interesting to note that at this point, in late 1949, in certain circumstances the admittance of German collaborators was still viewed as more contentious than suspected communists. Furthermore, 'the police are not apprehensive in regard to those who have been rejected on security grounds. They understand that the Canadians have very little evidence against them but refused visas because they did not wish to take any chances.'[166]

As regarded employment, two of the men rejected for security reasons had succeeded in obtaining employment by February. The Red Cross requested that these two and their families be issued temporary residency permits. A further fifteen refugees had also succeeded in obtaining employment, yet it was not stated if these were refugees in possession of visas but without the means to pay their fares or refugees that were rejected due to a medical issue or as a family member of a refugee with a medical issue.

In March, the Red Cross was informed by General MacEoin that arrangements should be made for 133 of the remaining refugees to leave for Canada on a White Star vessel, the s.s. *Samaria*. The stated cost for the ninety-nine adults, comprising of seventy-two Lutherans and twenty-seven Catholics, was stated as £5,791.10.0. The thirty children, aged between one and twelve, twenty-six of whom were Lutheran and four Catholic, was £877.10.0. The four children under the age of one, all Lutherans, would cost £28.[167] The total cost amounted to £6697.0.0.[168] The Red Cross was not liable for the whole amount, as

> from Lutherans towards their fares..... £1417.13.8
> do. Dr. Ostergren for Lutheran fares..... £ 93.10.0
> do. Catholics toward their fares..... £92.0.0

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165 Justice memorandum, 'Refugee Ship 'Victory'', 15 Dec. 1949 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).
166 Justice memorandum, 'Refugee Ship 'Victory'', 26 Jan. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).
167 Irish Red Cross to the Taoiseach, 23 Mar. 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).
168 Ibid.

> with promises from Dr. Ostergren of loans from Lutheran World Federation of £22.0.0 per adult Lutheran and £11.0.0 per child and 500 dollars from Vatican Migration Bureau, Geneva, for the Catholics.[169]

The last mention of the *Victory* refugees dated from May, and is an early example of issues that would arise during the 1950s when Ireland would again admit a large group of refugees, placing them in camps. The Red Cross wrote to the private secretary for the Taoiseach, stating that after 30 June, they could and would not be responsible for the care of the refugees still present at Rockgrove:

> The general strain on the resources of the Society, financially and otherwise, is considerable, but it is not the strain which has caused the Executive Committee to come to this decision. Among the remaining 57 refugees there is a minority which give considerable trouble and with which the Society have no power to deal. For example, one lady refuses to return to her husband with her family although the husband has found work in Dublin. Others decline to accept necessary medical treatment and one lady is engaged in a profession not regarded here as an honest livelihood. The Committee are of opinion that the refugees must be brought, by means of temporary residence permits or otherwise, under the laws of the ordinary inhabitants of the country… The present system of indecision results in degeneration of the natural inclination among the majority of the refugees to fend for themselves.[170]

Analysis

The years 1945 to 1951 saw an attempt to determine the most effective methods of fully utilising new international organisations such as the UNRRA and IRO, and the international community was left wondering how best to respond to pleas of membership and aid donations. Through an analysis of Irish involvement within the UNRRA and the IRO, as well as with various other Eastern European refugee groups, it becomes clear which criteria was deemed prominent when deciding issues of membership and involvement. Three issues emerge, and will be discussed within this section, the first of which centres upon perceived religious and moral obligations.

It cannot be overstated that Irish neutrality during the war coloured Irish perceptions of duty after the war. One could even go as far as to state that an

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[169] Ibid.

[170] Irish Red Cross to Private Secretary of Taoiseach, 10 May 1950 (NAI, DT/S11007B1).

undercurrent of war guilt existed within the country during the late 1940s. Within this chapter, multiple references are found concerning how comparatively well off Ireland was in relation to the rest of Western Europe postwar, and how they needed to do their part by accepting as many refugees as was possible. This is not to claim that Ireland was in an optimal position to receive large groups of refugees in 1945. De Valera and Fianna Fáil attempted to create and implement a strategy of rapid economic recovery after the war, which achieved varying levels of success. Unemployment and emigration levels remained high (an estimated 30,000 Irish nationals left the island each year between 1945 and 1947),[171] and wartime inflation proved hard to diminish. Both fuel shortages and bread rationing were introduced between 1946 and 1947, and housing proved scarce.[172] The decision to admit refugees had to be viewed, not only within an international context, but within a domestic one as well. However, though never leading to any significant increase in refugee admittance, it is important to understand that this sense of guilt was present, and that it undoubtedly did have an affect on refugee admittance.

Religious influence and pressure from Church organisations also featured prominently within this chapter. Religion was always an important factor for the Irish government when concerning the admittance of a refugee, yet in this chapter the Catholic hierarchy became involved with both the formation of refugee policy and the practical application of that policy. The division between these two issues should be noted. Religious affiliation would always prove decisive when it came to individual refugee admission decisions, yet the Church was not often highly involved in the formation of governmental refugee policy. There also seemed to be an inherent belief, both within the Irish Catholic hierarchy and on a lesser level the government, that Ireland had a moral obligation to influence the postwar world due to its self-perception as a bastion of Christianity and Christian morality. This seems to have been both externally and internally perpetuated, initially perhaps by the larger Catholic Church hierarchy in Rome, but reinforced on a

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[171] Lee, *Politics and Society,* p. 288.
[172] Ibid.

domestic level. Whichever refugee and aid organisations were lauded by the Church, were considered seriously for involvement by the government. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the Church's influence had a strong influence on eventual Irish involvement with the IRO refugee schemes, although the Church should not be deemed as *the* prevailing influence.

The second issue is one that features prominently within this, and subsequent chapters, and is centred on international concerns and perceptions of Ireland. This is the point at which we begin to see an almost over-fixation on utilising refugee admittance and aid in an attempt to boost international Irish prestige. This thinking was present during the late 1930s and during the war, yet the emergence of international organisations, such as the UN, NATO and the Council of Europe among others, created the need to foster an appropriate, and useful, international reputation. This also relates to the aforementioned issue concerning Irish war guilt. What would the Allies, particularly Britain and America, whose opinions were of the utmost importance to Irish politicians, think of Ireland after its non-involvement? The fact that Ireland responded rapidly to initial calls for the dispersal of aid to Europe in 1945 could be viewed as an attempt to begin the mending of Allied opinion.

The concern over international developing attitudes towards Ireland affected the development of Irish refugee policy in two main ways. Firstly, it influenced with which organisations the government chose to interact. UN affiliated groups were viewed as optimal. Even when there existed real concerns as to where and to whom donated aid was being dispersed, as occurred with the UNRRA in Hungary, Ireland continued to donate and deal with the UN bodies involved. There was stated government concern regarding the allocation of aid in Hungary, yet it was allowed to continue. The efficiency of aid was deemed less important than its political implications. It could also be argued that Ireland viewed involvement in UN agencies as a gateway to full UN membership, which would become a focus for the government in the immediate postwar era.

Furthermore, if refugee aid is viewed through the prism of immediate postwar Western/Soviet tension, Irish concern was largely focused on assuring the

Allies of Ireland's loyalty in the developing ideological war *despite* Irish neutrality in the last. As the years 1945 to 1951 are considered the early Cold War, issues such as which refugees to admit were extremely politicised. Reports coming out of Eastern Europe, chronicling Soviet repression and the forced implementation of communist political regimes, shaped the perception of the refugees fleeing Soviet controlled Europe. Even the bestowing upon a person of refugee status who had escaped Soviet territory implicitly implied that the conditions the Soviets were creating for people within their territory were unsatisfactory to the point that the status of a refugee could be applied to these people. That, in and of itself, was a political decision, and accepting any of these refugees, which the Irish did, was in essence condemning Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. Even at this early stage, refugees and displaced persons were being billed as 'anti-Communist migrants', a new and very specific type of political refugee.[173] The mere existence of such a large number of refugees from Russian territory also signaled something else to the western Allies, that of discord and disunity among Russian satellites and territories.[174]

The third issue that need be addressed is the resolution of two different refugee admittance situations: planned admittance schemes and those forced upon the government by illegal entry into the country. As has been discussed, this usually occurred when refugee boats requested permission, for a variety of reasons, to dock at Irish ports, and were then denied the right to further set sail, usually due to structural and safety issues with the vessels. Even though the government was responsible for denying the vessels the right to leave, this was due to humanitarian concern, and still meant that large numbers of refugees were now on Irish soil without prior consent. How the government chose to deal with forced admittance need be examined within the context of the foreign implications of admittance.

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[173] 'From 1946 to 1951, the identification of 'genuine' refugees among Europe's displaced persons served as a testing ground for the granting of political asylum in the Cold War era.' Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 35.

[174] Ibid., p. 3.

In actuality, the government had limited options when it came to dealing with refugees landing upon its shores in ill-equipped vessels. There was a real fear that to allow any ships to remain in the country would set a precedent, causing waves of Eastern Europeans to make the journey and attempt to enter Ireland illegally. It is important to note, however, that various vessels did call at Irish ports, acquire fuel, supplies or even pass a winter, and then set sail to their stated final destinations. Only a limited number attempted to remain in Ireland indefinitely. The *Victory* did present a different problem, as the government had to determine what to do with a larger group of refugees that had landed illegally. The government could not simply have loaded these refugees onto a ship and sent them back to Sweden; that would have proved a diplomatic nightmare. The Swedes were also experiencing an influx of refugees, both through Swedish government policy and illegal crossings, usually by boat or over the Finnish border. Other issues that have been examined within this section, such as the existence of Irish war guilt and a need to impress the Allies and foster a sense of internationalism would also have contributed to the decision to keep these refugees. If the Irish government had callously sent these people back, not even just to Sweden, but to anywhere on the Continent, one could surmise that there would have been international backlash. The main Allied objective was the stabilisation of Europe, and that meant settling as many people as possible by whatever means necessary.

Chapter 4 - Refugee Policy in the 1950s: UN membership, the emerging Cold War and the formation of an Irish international identity

Introduction

As has been shown, the tragedy of World War Two did not end in the spring of 1945, or even by the early 1950s. The number of people that had become either displaced persons or refugees as a direct result of the war, and who had still not been resettled or moved out of the many refugee camps dotting Europe, was still extremely high into the 1950s, as various UN organisations scrambled to find a permanent solution.[1] As a decade, the 1950s would see the emergence and entrenchment of a new hostile world order, the Cold War, and would cause yet more uncertainty for people already unsure of where they belonged in the post-World War II world, as well as creating a whole new cohort of refugees. Frank and Reinisch draw a parallel between the 1950s and 1930s, stating that the 1950s saw a 'narrowing of the scope of co-ordinated international action owing to a deterioration in relations between the principle powers of the time, and alongside this increasing restrictions on the free movement of people through the erection of barriers'.[2] Generally speaking, European countries were economically in a better position than they had been in the 1930s, so the feasibility of integrating refugees into national economies was not the defining factor for restrictive refugee policies.[3] Also, due to the nature of the Cold War, refugees in the 1950s originated from political, or ideological issues, not from ethnic, national or religious standing.[4]

In 1952,[5] an article entitled 'Refugees: An Unsolved Problem' was published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Within this article, the

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[1] The last DP camp closed in 1957. Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 150.

[2] Frank and Reinisch, 'Refugees and the Nation-State', pp 483.

[3] It should be noted that this was not true for Ireland, as the depressed state of the Irish economy led to high levels of emigration. See Delaney, *Demography, state and society.*

[4] Ibid., pp 484.

[5] It should stated that 1951 saw the 'Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees' adopted by the UN. Introductory Note by the Office of the Untied Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, December 2010. (Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; Text of the 1967 Protocol Relationg to the Status of Refugees: Resolution

refugee problem as it appeared in 1952 was discussed. The authors stated that as of early 1952, 400,000 refugees remained in Europe and as such were under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),[6] which had taken over the responsibility for the refugees in 1951 from the IRO.[7] 110,000 to 120,000 of these refugees were living in camps awaiting repatriation or resettlement. This number included an estimated 50,000 present in Austria, 50,000 in Western Germany, 10,000 in Italy, 4,000 in Trieste and 4,500 in Greece. These people had frequently been displaced or in camps for up to seven years. There was a worry that they would pose a threat to the security and stability of a Europe in the early stages of rebuilding. Many were worried that these people would prove easy converts to communist or National Socialist propaganda. It was thought that the future stability of Europe was in some ways dependant on the solution of the refugee problem.

The UN General Assembly created what it thought was a feasible three-point plan to deal with the refugee crisis in January 1952. Point one dealt with the creation of a Refugee Emergency Fund 'designed particularly to take care of that group of people within the community of refugees who cannot fend for themselves'.[8] The second point stated that the migration possibilities of refugees should continue as far as that option was feasible. The third point urged governments in which there were refugees resident to initiate a long-term programme of integration:

> This last point in the programme is probably the most important: for migration, as has already been explained, can no longer be expected to provide an outlet for any considerable numbers; and immediate aid to refugees, though absolutely indispensable, is never a means of solving the

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2198 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly) (UNHCR online archives, www.unhcr.org)

[6] The UNHCR defined a refugee as 'any person... who for reasons of persecution or fear of persecution has left his country of nationality or habitual residence, is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his own Government, and does not fall under certain exclusion clauses of the mandates covering particular groups of refugees'. G.J. and H.G., 'Refugees: An Unsolved Problem' in *The World Today*, viii, no. 8 (August, 1952), pp 324.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., pp 327.

> problem of even one refugee – it is only keeping the man alive until a solution can be found for him.[9]

It was acknowledged that aid was indispensible, yet was not the primary solution to the problem. Countries that were host to refugees had to begin to accept that they might be called upon to integrate these people permanently into their social and economic structures. A call was also placed to countries of the world to discuss the feasibility of admitting even a small number of refugees, as any relief would be welcomed from the besieged countries of Western Europe, most notably Germany and Austria. Thus, in the 1950s the Irish government, responding to this plea, began once again to discuss the reality of its ability to accept and successfully integrate refugees into the state.

The Irish government discussed pleas from the Continent and the UN to accept various groups of refugees, including but not limited to East Germans, Hungarians, European Jews and Russians. The groups specifically mentioned here will be discussed within this chapter. The cases of each will be analysed on two levels; first, the practical issues which arose from the decision to admit a group of refugees into the Irish state and, second, how the refugee situation engaged Ireland in an international context. This will allow a discussion and examination not only of the development of Irish refugee policy, but of Ireland's interactions with various governments and international organisations during a turbulent period in history.

The Irish state and Refugee Admittance in the Early 1950s

The Irish government, summed up its refugee policy in 1953 and divided the postwar period into two periods: 1945-1949 and 1950 onwards. The gist of the early, postwar policy centred upon the possible repatriation of a refugee. This in essence greatly limited the state's ability to serve as a destination for refugees. It was stated that the government would consider admitting 'refugees, stateless aliens and displaced persons and East European nationals only if coming for permanent residence and after suitable scrutiny of credentials on security,

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[9] Ibid.

character and economic grounds'[10] though this practice was scarcely employed. However, by 1950 the formal refugee policy of the state had undergone an extension. As was shown in the previous chapter, in response to an appeal by the IRO the government had liberalized its policy. It was stated that due to this extension of policy, 107 refugees were admitted into the state during the period 1950 to 1952. There were issues that needed to be addressed, particularly 'changes of employment due to illness and unsuitability, lack of housing accommodation, language difficulties, arranging schooling for children, etc'.[11]

Justice, in a report also dating from 1953, stated that employment would be freely given to aliens from Western Europe, as long as they were to be employed in domestic service, as there was a shortage of this type of labour in Ireland. As far as humanitarian issues were concerned:

> The following classes of aliens are admitted freely without real regard to employment or business considerations or to the possibility of repatriating them:-
> (i) any relatives of native-born Irish citizens,
> (ii) aged relatives or dependents of naturalized Irish citizens or aliens established here,
> (iii) children for whose maintenance provision is made by the Irish Red Cross Society or by private persons,
> (iv) stateless aliens attending universities of whose admission to other countries on completion of studies satisfactory assurances have been received,
> (v) savants, scientists and other persons of special distinction,
> (vi) political refugees of countries such as Belgium, France, Spain and the Netherlands.[12]

The clauses concerned with the admittance of aliens with Irish relations were policies already in practice throughout the history of the state. Clauses III, IV, V and VI were policies that, although never formally stated, had been enacted throughout the 1930s and 1940s, though never liberally utilised. A substantial number of political refugees were never admitted from the countries listed in

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[10] Justice memorandum, 28 Feb. 1953 (NAI, DT/S11007 B/2).

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

clause VI and the admittance of foreign students to Irish universities never brought in more than a few hundred, mostly limited to the national universities.[13]

In 1953, there were approximately 2,700 aliens registered as permanent residents in Ireland.[14] This number, however, did not include 'alien children under 16 years of age, aliens who are wives or widows of Irish citizens, and aliens in the country for less than a 3 month period'.[15] Out of the 2,700 listed aliens, 620 could be classified as refugees or stateless persons, of which 170 were students attending Irish universities. There were also present within the state 800 foreign nationals who had undergone naturalisation, of which 300 were formerly refugees or stateless persons.

European Jewish Refugees

Much academic work has already centred upon the plight of Jewish refugees immediately after World War Two.[16] After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, and throughout the period of the most intense refugee crisis the West treated Jewish refugees with indifference. Jewish postwar migration led to an increase in the Jewish population of Central Europe immediately after the fighting ceased, with hundreds of thousands surviving Jews attempting to reach Italy, and from there set sail to Palestine.[17] Due to British concern regarding a dramatic increase in Jewish migration to Palestine, a multitude of these people became the

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[13] Various groups of refugee students were admitted to Irish universities beginning in the 1930s with Austrian students, clerical students during World War Two (see Chapter 2) and Ukrainian and Polish students (see Chapter 3). These students tended to have gained admittance into Britain before applying for Irish visas, and were usually guaranteed monetarily by various refugee organisation. It was understood that they would leave Ireland following the completion of their degrees.

[14] Justice memorandum, 28 Feb. 1953 (NAI, DT/S11007 B/2).

[15] Ibid.

[16] Much of the academic work concerning Jewish movement after the war focuses on Jewish emigration to Palestine, or the return of displaced Jews back to their home countries. See Lynn Rapaport, 'The Cultural and Material Reconstruction of the Jewish Communities in the Federal Republic of Germany' in *Jewish Social Studies*, xlix, no. 2 (Spring, 1987), pp 137-54 for a concise account of Jewish-German postwar relations.

[17] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 335.

wards of the various refugee aid organisations active in Western and Central Europe in the late 1940s and into the 1950s.[18]

Admittance

In 1953, an application was made to the government by the Joint Distribution Committee, with the support of Robert Briscoe, for the admittance of ten Jewish refugee families. Justice prepared a memorandum concerning the proposal, which included an excerpt from a letter written by Briscoe outlining the particulars of the intended scheme:

> There is a small hurriedly constructed temporary camp to house 100 orthodox Jewish families who had escaped from behind the Iron Curtain I nto Austria. They are mostly of Hungarian or Czech-Slovakian origin. Their position is very dangerous and the Joint Distribution Committee, which maintains these people are fearful of the consequences which would follow if by any chance or act they should again come under the power of the Communist Authorities. The Joint Distribution Committee have therefore appealed for temporary accommodation in other countries and the purpose of this letter is to ask if the Government would agree to permit approximately 10 families to enter Ireland as refugees for a maximum period of two years. Their maintenance would be carried out by the Joint Distribution Committee and housing would be found for them as in the case of the 100 children who were allowed in, all of whom have since left the country and have found permanent rehabilitation. As the matter is of extreme urgency, I would be obliged for a decision at the earliest moment. Ten families might amount, approximately, to 40 persons – 20 adults and 20 infants.[19]

This letter was an example of how Cold War politics and considerations were beginning to become part of the rhetoric of international relations and policy formation. The perceived threat of communism and the authorities behind the Iron Curtain were clearly used in this letter to elicit support and sympathy for the refugees. The anti-Semitic policies of the Soviet Union became increasingly clear, as Stalin made no attempt to conceal his contempt for the Jews.

The memorandum went on to state the 'Position of Jews' in Ireland. It stated that there was indeed anti-Semitism present in Ireland, due perhaps to 'the

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[18] Jews were officially recognised as stateless by the UN and the Allies in August 1945 and the IRO supported Jewish emigration to Palestine by 1948. Initially, they were not recognised as a group distinct from other survivors, refugees and DPS. This changed with the publication of the Harrison Report in 1945. Cohen, *In War's Wake*, p. 134.

[19] Department of Justice Memorandum, 28 Feb. 1953 (NAI, D/T S11007 B/2).

fact that the Jews have remained a separate community and have not permitted themselves to be assimilated, and that for their numbers they appear to have disproportionate wealth and influence'.[20] These were classic anti-Semitic arguments that people, including Hitler, had been asserting for centuries in an attempt to justify their persecution of the Jews. The fact that they were being used to deter Jewish admittance into the state was of importance. The level of anti-Semitism in Ireland had always been relatively low, some would even cite this as a reason for keeping the Jewish population in Ireland minuscule, yet apparently a few serious anti-Semitic manifestations occurred that received some international attention. In 1952, a periodical entitled *Fiat* was published in Dublin, and contained such intense anti-Semitic rhetoric, along with 'a number of especially serious and heavy attacks against several high-ranking officials of the United States, including President Truman' that it was brought to the attention of the United States' Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.[21] In the early 1950s, the main goals of Irish foreign policy were to gain acceptance from the West by reversing any negative Western perceptions that might have stemmed from neutrality and to emerge onto the world stage in a positive and productive way. As such, any domestic occurrences that would incite anti-Irish feeling abroad would have been perceived as a threat to Irish national interests, and thus taken very seriously.

It was further stated within the memorandum that 'in the matter of the admission of aliens it has never been the practice to act on racial or religious grounds. An application made in 1939 that part of the overall quota of refugees approved for admission by the Government be allotted to persons of Jewish race and religion was refused. Subsequently, similar approaches were also refused'.[22] Interestingly, the state was claiming that Jews should not have a better chance of *gaining* entry into Ireland due to their religion, but that they should have a better

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Howard A. Cook, Chief, Division of Public Liaison, Department of State, United States of America to Dr Gerhard Jacoby, Assistant, International Affairs Department, American Jewish Congress, 16 Sept. 1952 (AJA, World Jewish Congress Collection, H195, File 24); Dr Gerhard Jacoby to Dean Acheson, United States of America, Secretary of State, 18 Aug. 1952 (AJA, World Jewish Congress Collection, H195, File24).

[22] Ibid.

chance of being *denied* entry due to their religion. The state was not willing to institute any policy that would facilitate the preferential admittance of Jews due simply to their religious adherence.

Justice also felt that

> no reasons have been put forward why this Jewish group should take precedence over the thousands- even millions – of European refugees and stateless persons seeking admission to Western countries other than that a Jewish international society will guarantee their maintenance. The Department of Justice have already refused literally hundreds of applications on behalf of refugees of good character of Catholic and Christian religions whose plight was no less pitiable than that of the group in question now. Some of the Catholic and Christian refugees were sponsored by persons of high standing such as church dignitaries and university professors but they were penniless or non-employable or their employment would have been in conflict with local and trade union interests. Is the fact that international Jewry is present to put up the money to guarantee the State against loss to be regarded as a good and sufficient reason for allowing these people to 'jump the queue'? If priority is to be given for practical reasons to aliens who 'have the money' or can get it is it not relevant to enquire whether there are any of the aliens who want to come here who are in that happy position except the Jews?[23]

There had been various groups of refugees admitted before, during and after the war that had been accepted into the state due directly to their affiliation with the Christian faith. The acceptance into the state of these refugees had been facilitated through Christian faith-based organisations and thus the refugees had been placed in a favourable position in regards to their application for acceptance into the state *due* to their Christianity. The Irish government had clearly made favourable admittance decisions based on a refugee's faith before; it just had to be the *right* faith. It is, of course, true that many refugees of the Christian faith had not been admitted, but their unsuccessful application had been due to criteria applied to all refugees, regardless of their faith, such as their economic standing. The Jewish refugees were not given the chance to even be considered on a level field with other refugees.

The comments concerning international Jewry also must be critiqued. The Christian charity and refugee organisations used money to facilitate the movement

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[23] Ibid.

of 'their' refugees to Ireland. The fact that international Jewry would not be afforded the same opportunity is nonsensical. Surprisingly, especially after such a memorandum, it was decided that five of the ten Jewish families should be admitted into the State for a maximum of two years.[24]

Irish-Jewish postwar identity

An interesting exchange occurred in the late 1950s concerning the Jewish community in Ireland, the WJC and the Conference on Jewish Claims Against Germany. The Claims Conference, as it came to be known, was the organisation through which the West German government paid reparations to the Jewish people, both as individuals and as an ethnic group.[25] It was initially composed of a multitude of Jewish groups, headed by the WJC, and entered into negotiations with Adenauer's West German government in 1951. The Claim Conference was unprecedented within the world of international law and reparations, as normally states were the legal bodies involved in such arrangements, not groups of people. Nationality based on citizenship of a recognised, sovereign state had been the deciding factor concerning reparations in the twentieth century until this point. The fact that the Jews were singled out as a group outside of a nation-state context was telling as to how the group was to be treated within a postwar world, as well as how the international perception of refugee groups were to change post-Holocaust.

The major objectives of the Claims Conference were stated as '(1) to obtain funds for relief of Jewish victims of Nazi persecution, to aid in rebuilding Jewish communities and institutions which Nazi persecution had devastated, and (2) to gain indemnification and restitution for individual victims of Nazi persecution'.[26] Monetarily, West Germany agreed to pay the Claims Conference 450 million DM, as well as 3.5 billion DM to Israel.[27] It should be noted that the

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[24] Cabinet Minutes, 13 Mar. 1953 (NAI, DT/S11007 B/2).

[25] Zweig, 'Politics of Commemoration', pp 157.

[26] Dean Silvers, 'The Future of International Law as Seen through the Jewish Material Claims Conference against Germany' in *Jewish Social Studies*, xlii, no. ¾ (Summer-August, 1980), pp 219.

[27] Rapaport, 'The Cultural and Material Reconstruction of the Jewish Communities', pp 146.

Claims Conference is still a functional and active organisation, with the majority of its funding given to the care and maintenance of elderly Holocaust victims.

Throughout the postwar period, the Irish Jewish community had flirted with the idea of membership within the WJC. The Jewish Representative Council of Éire established a sub-committee to deal with foreign relations and WJC affairs in 1947, and by 1955 the membership policy of the WJC had been amended so that 'those with a Jewish population of over 20,000 being entitled to a Full Member, and the smaller ones to an Associate Member'.[28] As such, Ernest Newman was appointed the Jewish Representative Council of Éire's associate representative to the WJC in May of that year.[29] It was through association with the WJC that the Irish Jewish community first decided to approach the Claims Conference regarding monetary compensation for the schooling of refugee children. Even before Irish membership was secured in 1954, the Secretary for the Jewish Representative Council of Ireland had written to the WJC, enquiring as to the validity of an Irish claim:

> I have been directed by the Executive at a recent meeting; and I have been directed to enquire whether this Community can file a claim for compensation for the money spent in maintaining and educating large numbers of German and other Refugee children ever since the advent of Hitlerism. The resources of our small Community were strained to the utmost to maintain the victims of Nazism, which we were glad to do, as was our duty, and if any of the monies spent can be recouped from German sources we shall be glad to give you details of the monies expended. (emphasis in the original)[30]

The language utilised in the above excerpt is interesting, as it would be a stretch to claim that there had ever been 'large numbers of German and other Refugee children' in Ireland. This could be seen as an example of an Irish group, in this case an Irish Jewish group, exaggerating Irish refugee policy and admission in an

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[28] Dr S. Roth, Executive Secretary, European Executive, World Jewish Congress to H. Good, Jewish Representative Council of Eire, 29 Apr. 1955 (AJA, World Jewish Congress Collection, H195, File 25).

[29] Dr I. Schwarzbart, Director of the Organization Department Member, Executive World Jewish Congress to Ernest Newman, 20 May 1955 (AJA, H195, File 21). Ireland was admitted as an Associate Member.

[30] Julius Isaacson, Secretary, Jewish Representative Council of Ireland to World Jewish Congress, 21 July 1954 (AJA, H195, File 24).

attempt to influence international opinion. Usually this strategy was employed by the government in an attempt to secure Western good graces, yet here we find the leading group of Irish Jewry seemingly attempting to justify their actions during the German persecution of the Jews to an international Jewish group. Issues of identity were at stake. Would the Jews of Ireland attempt to align themselves with international Jewry, or firmly anchor their self-perception with that of their Irishness?

The issue of the Irish claim was seemingly abandoned until 1957, when it reemerged as a factor heavily influencing the Irish discourse concerning both domestic and international perceptions of Irish action, or lack thereof, during the war, as well as international perceptions of the relationship between Ireland and Britain. It seemed that the Irish claim for 'a one-time allocation of 600 Pound Sterlings for its Jewish School that has 10% refugee children (6 or 7)' had been lumped in with British school claims, and tabled for 1957.[31] Contention had already surrounded the Irish claim 'on account of the smallness of the community and because of the absence of direct or indirect damage inflicted upon it during the war'.[32] The fact that the Claim Conference personnel were now automatically including Irish claims within the British application was seen as highly inappropriate by those Irish in the know, as well as some WJC officials.

Maurice Perlzweig, a WJC representative, wrote to Saul Kagan of the Claims Conference concerning Irish claims repeatedly throughout 1957. This exchange allows for an examination of how an issue concerning refugee admittance into Ireland could be analysed within a foreign policy, or international, context. How Ireland was viewed by the international community mattered to the Irish government in the late 1950s. A major concern was becoming an active member of the international community within the country's own right. As such, the dismissal of an Irish claim, and the quick attachment of such a claim to that of Britain, would have been viewed as an affront, and damaged a sense of the

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[31] 're: Ireland. Conversation with Dr. Emmanuel Jacubovits, Chief Rabbi of Ireland, on Friday, Jan. 19, 1957, at 11:00 A.M. at Congress headquarters', 21 Jan. 1957 (AJA, H195, File 21).
[32] Ibid.

validity of the recognition of Irish sovereignty on the international stage. Perlzweig stated that

> Ireland is not part of the United Kingdom, or even of the Commonwealth. Anyone who suggested that there was no difference between Ireland and Britain would be jeopardizing his life, certainly in some New York quarters if not in Dublin. In any case, this application is in no way connected with the unhappy controversy over British schools and should in my judgment be treated separately and on its merit… The situation is very different from that which prevails in Britain. The total Jewish population of Ireland numbers not more than five thousand, and the task of absorbing refugee children is necessarily infinitely more difficult here than in larger and wealthier communities with well established institutions able to expand their operations without serious difficulty.[33]

Presumably, as a man living in New York City, where the WJC headquarters were located, Perlzweig had some concept of how important Irish identity was to Irish-Americans. He also had the insight to comment on the fallacy of equating the situation existing in Ireland and Britain regarding refugee admittance and policy. Both on a legislative and a practical level, comparisons between British and Irish policy, or ability to successfully admit and integrate refugees, were fundamentally different, as were policy goals concerning refugee admittance.

Perlzweig further proved himself a champion of the Irish cause, writing in a WJC internal memorandum that the Irish and British applications should not be consider jointly as 'this is manifestly wrong. Ireland is not Great Britain as Americans should by this time know'.[34] He further felt that 'I am of opinion that we ought to raise this matter, both on the ground of its inherent rightness and because we are dealing with an affiliate. The sum involved is trivial, and could be granted without difficulty'.[35]

This perceived British/Irish link resulted in a heated exchange between Chief Rabbi Dr Jacubovits and Kagan. Jacubovits wrote a rather harshly worded letter to Kagan, outlining the ways in which he felt that Ireland's claim had been unjustly dismissed:

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[33] Maurice L. Perlzweig to Saul Kagan, 20 Sept. 1957 (AJA, H195, File 22).

[34] Maurice Perlzweig, World Jewish Congress memorandum, 18 Nov. 1957 (AJA, H195, File 22).

[35] Ibid.

> In these circumstances I must take great exception to the peremptory manner in which you seek to dismiss our claims and to the cavalier fashion in which I and my community are being treated by the Conference and its spokesmen. Altogether, our application should have been treated on its own merits, and not lumped together with those from schools in Britain which had already received grants for several years. Instead, despite my personal intervention in New York at the time, our application was not, I gather, even brought up at your last Conference, and some of your Directors had no knowledge at all of any request from Ireland ever having been received by you.[36]

Clearly, the Irish Jewish community leaders felt that they were not being taken seriously at the Claims Conference, and there seemed present a disconnect between Irish and international Jewry. This desire to be included within the Claims Conference could have been an attempt to validate the Irish Jewish community, to disseminate any war guilt and identify with the plight of Jewish persecution. Dr Jacubovits further stated in his letter that he believed he had the right to 'expect that Irish Jewry shall be treated with the fairness and respect due to any community'.[37]

The Admittance of White Russians refugees from China

The outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the ensuing Russian Civil War, fought between 1917 and 1921, was yet another example of one of the countless incidents of civil strife within a country during the twentieth century that led to a substantial group of people suddenly finding themselves displaced.[38] White Russians, as opposed to the 'Red' Bolsheviks, were people opposed to the manner in which the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, sought to bring about the communist conversion of Russia. Once the victory of the Reds was secured, countless Whites fled the country, many ending up in China. However, once Mao Zedong came to power in 1949, it meant that many of these Russian immigrants were once again forced to consider flight. By 1953, there was an estimated 15,000 such people in North China who were attempting to flee.[39]

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[36] Chief Rabbi Dr Jacubovits to Saul Kagan, 3 Oct. 1957 (AJA, H195, File 22).

[37] Ibid.

[38] Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (London, 2010), p. 40-77.

[39] External Affairs to Justice, 21 Sept. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

On 18 September 1953, Henry Tremeaud, a UNHCR employee, wrote to Aiken stating that

> the brief matter which I desire to discuss with you is the unfortunate situation of a group of 450 Russian Refugees who are in North China. These people fled from Russia at the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution to North China and settled in different towns, including Shanghai. At the accession to power of Mao Tse Tung they were deprived of all their belongings, including their employment or business. The group of whom I am pleading are hard-core cases – they, as you know, are people who are incapable of earning their own living by reason of age, disease or other physical handicaps. I have visited several countries of Western Europe in an effort to find refuge for some part of these refugees for whom there exists at this moment imminent danger to life. It is our earnest hope that it may be possible, with your good will and active interest aided by the well known humanitarian spirit of your country, to admit and to grant asylum to perhaps 20 of these persons.[40]

As these were people who had fled Russia after the Civil War, they were by this time rather elderly. These would clearly be refugees who would, without a doubt, become wards of the state and need assistance.

As such, Tremeaud went on to further state that 'in the event of the Irish Government admitting to Ireland twenty of these persons, the High Commissioner would for his part be prepared to make available the necessary funds for the purchase of a property, in the surroundings of Dublin, where they could be quite comfortably housed – provided the sum does not exceed 20,000 dollars…'[41] UNHCR would provide for the travel of the refugees, their housing once they had arrived in Ireland and an initial 'settling in' contribution for each refugee, which varied from $500 to $1,000 US dollars. It was understood that Irish aid organisations would provide for the upkeep of the house and the financial maintenance of the refugees after this initial financial assistance.

Upon receiving the above information, External Affairs quickly stated that it would be willing to agree to the admittance of the twenty refugees on 21 September.[42] The resulting exchange was a familiar one; External Affairs, Justice and the Irish Red Cross debated both the negative and positive aspects of

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[40] Henry Tremeaud to Frank Aiken, 18 Sept. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

[41] Ibid.

[42] External Affairs to Justice, 21 Sept. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

admittance, as well as issues concerning the entry of these refugees. Justice, as early as 26 September, had already discussed the admittance of the refugees with members of the Irish Red Cross. Apparently, the Irish Red Cross would be unable to financially sustain the refugees without government assistance. It was stated that the Irish Red Cross estimated the financial assistance needed to support the refugees at about £5,000 per annum, which would need to be provided by the state.[43] Further concerns were stated:

> Members of the Executive Committee of the Society feel that if such a State grant were forthcoming for the maintenance of alien refugees there would, inevitably, be adverse public criticism on the grounds that many estimable Irish citizens in ill-health are suffering through lack of institutional care. The Society will, however, be prepared if asked, to approach voluntary institutions with a view to placing incapacitated refugees in their care… The Society hope to be able to place, say, four to six refugee amongst the voluntary institutions with which they have associations…[44]

Both the government and the aid organisations involved knew that there were various concerns and issues revolving around the admittance of these refugees. There was always the concern that Irish citizens would begrudge the assistance given to non-nationals, which could lead to a public relations issue for the government. However, upon hearing this, Justice stated that, even though it would not be against the admittance of the refugees, it would not 'be prepared to advocate to the Minister for Finance that a grant be given for their upkeep'.[45]

The Department of Defence also became involved, putting forth an alternate plan for the upkeep of the refugees. The department first stated that 'in the interests of national prestige, this country should participate in the international relief action'.[46] This is the first mention within this chapter of the idea that international prestige was a driving force within Irish foreign policy during the 1950s. Mentions such as this should be noted, and will be discussed further and in more detail in subsequent sections.

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[43] Justice to External Affairs, 26 Sept. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Defence to External Affairs, 7 Oct. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

Defence's plan centred on the infirm refugees being integrated into preexisting institutions, which would be beneficial for two reasons. First, it would 'avoid the necessity for providing an elaborate institution for twenty persons of categories who would use if for only a relatively short term of years'.[47] Second, the state would be saved the £5,000 per annum. It was envisaged that the initial $20,000 donation from the UNHCR would be enough to pay for the refugees' care within the already established institutions. The next day, Justice informed External Affairs that it agreed with Defence's scheme as it was acknowledged that the Irish Red Cross 'would not of itself be in a position to supervise the daily care of aged and infirmed people of refugee class'.[48]

The Department of Health also had an issue with the original plan put forth by the UNHCR officer. The Minister felt that

> the Government should be made aware that there may be objection from the local authority in whose functional area the proposed home is established by reason of the fact that the presence in the area of so large a number of infirm persons could, at times, tax the resources, in hospital beds, of that authority and that the cost of hospitalization would fall on the funds of that authority .[49]

Yet another reason why the government seemed to have been leaning toward the scheme put forth by Defence. It was probably thought by many that the Irish government itself would have a better idea of how to successfully integrate these refugees into the state than the UNHRC. The Department of Health's above comment illustrates this, as it had a good idea of the practical implications that the proposed house of infirm refugees might have on the locale in which it was to be placed.

Interestingly, even as most of the relevant government departments seemed to be in agreement as to the need to reform the UNHCR's plan, when the decision was made to admit twenty refugees, it was done so in accordance and compliance with UN plans. In January 1954, the government agreed to use the

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Justice to External Affairs, 8 Oct. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

[49] Health to Justice and External Affairs, 13 Oct. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

$20,000 from the UNHCR to purchase a house, and to approve the £5,000 per annum expense for the upkeep of the house and that of the refugees.

By 1957, twenty White Russian refugees had been moved into a house on Temple Road in Dublin. Of the twenty, fourteen were female. The youngest refugee was sixty-five, the oldest ninety-one with the majority in their seventies. The health of seven of the refugees was described as either 'good', 'normal' or 'healthy'. The rest had, for the most part, no extremely serious medical conditions. Mostly hyper-tension (five), bronchitis (two), arthritis (four), high blood pressure (two) or heart disease (five). Fifteen only spoke Russian, while four were listed as having some English, two as having some French, one with some German and one listed as bilingual in Polish and Russian. Two refugees are listed specifically as 'uneducated'. The occupation of the refugees varies greatly but was not of great importance as there was never a question of this group taking up employment of any kind. Listed occupations included piano teacher, a missionary, nurses, engineers, teachers, housewives, clerks, mechanics, servants and company owners.[50]

As previously stated, it was seen as beneficial for the Irish government to admit a number of these refugees. Within the correspondence pertaining to the admittance of the White Russians, the number of aged refugees that other countries had accepted was listed, seemingly as a sort of incentive or call to action.[51] As this situation resulted from the ascension to power of a communist ruler in China the anti-Soviet, anti-communist sentiment was not as blatant as it might have been regarding a similar situation in a European country. The evils of Stalin's brand of communism were always viewed with the highest disdain by the West.

The Hungarian refugees of 1956

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 began in October, when students protested the dismissal of Imre Nagy who, as Prime Minister, had established a lenient, politically liberal government that was communist in name but not in

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[50] 'List of Refugees Approved for Admission to 'St. Andrews, Temple Road', 30 Jan. 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

[51] External Affairs to Justice, 21 Sept. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/6).

practice. This was viewed negatively by Moscow, which facilitated Nagy's removal and instilled Janos Kadar, a Stalinist communist, as head of the Hungarian government.[52]

The revolution itself has been extensively studied and examined, as has the United Nations' role within the situation. An understudied aspect of the revolution, however, is that of the 539 Hungarian refugees who were admitted to Ireland in 1956 resulting from the critical need to move refugees out of a greatly overwhelmed Austria.[53] As Ireland officially joined the UN in 1955, the first session during which a full Irish delegation attended was in the autumn of 1956, just as the Hungarian Revolution was unfolding.[54] On 6 November, the UN approved a resolution, officially supported by the Irish delegation, that called upon the Soviets to 'desist forthwith from all armed attack on the peoples of Hungary and from any form of intervention, in particular armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary…'[55] Two days later, Ireland along with Cuba, Pakistan, Italy and Peru introduced a further resolution to the General Assembly, which strongly highlighted the inherent right of a country's sovereignty.[56] The resolution was adopted the following day. At this time, the General Assembly

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[52] Stalin's death in 1953 had destabilised the balance of power in Eastern Europe, creating political upheavals in Poland, Hungary and Germany. For more information concerning the Hungarian Revolution, as well as the western response, see Judt, *Postwar*, 309-23; Applebaum, *Iron Curtain*, 482-89; Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 278-88.

[53] Marrus states that 'on 28 October the Austrian government decided to grant asylum to all refugees and mobilized to assist them once they arrived. The Austrian response was remarkable: small and poor and with a population of only seven million, the republic was still caring for 150,000 German expellees and 30,000 additional East European refugees when the Hungarians arrived.' Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 360.

[54] Noel Dorr, 'Ireland at the United Nations: 40 Years On' in *Irish International Affairs,* vii (1996), pp 41-62.

[55] Irish Mission to United Nations, United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/393) Second Emergency Session on 6 Nov. 1956, forwarded to External Affairs, 8 Nov. 1956 (NAI, DFA/419/33/8). On 28 October, the Irish delegation had also informed the Security Council of its support that the UN should concern itself with the situation in Hungary. Britain and the United States welcomed Irish support. Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations,* p. 45.

[56] General Assembly of the United Nations (A/RES/397), 10 Nov. 1956 (NAI, DFA/419/33/8). Boland also remarked in the Assembly that Irish support of UN condemnation regarding Soviet activity in Hungary was due to Irish agreement concerning 'anti-communism; the national character of the Hungarian rebellion; Irish empathy for small nations callously invaded by powerful neighbors; the moral influence of the United Nations'. Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 46.

enjoyed more political prestige within the UN, as it could be seen as a stage upon which Cold War alliances, tensions and ideological battles were waged. Smaller, less politically polar countries, such as Ireland, had the ability to influence discussions, or at the least to lessen tensions.[57] The Irish government was thus taking an active part in condemning the Soviet hostilities on an international level.

The decision to admit hundreds of Hungarian refugees was quickly reached by the government, as well as numerous other Western governments. The Hungarian revolution offered the West, particularly the Americans and British, an opportunity to utilise a refugee situation as Cold War propaganda. Hungary was sold as a classic example of Soviet expansionism and desire to militarily enforce their brand of communism. Frank and Reinisch state that

> the Hungarian refugee crisis became an international demonstration – in a sort of of inverted resemblance to the 1930s – of competitive latitude that did much to expiate the sins of preceding decades and establish the Hungarian case as the normative response to refugee crises, when it was anything but... the Hungarian refugee crisis provided not only a test of international institutions, but also of states' adherence to the rules, regulations and 'spirit' of the international refugee regime to which they had signed up.[58]

Ireland, as a new member of this 'international refugee regime' felt the need to prove itself as an active participant.

It had been decided that the Irish Red Cross would be in charge of the care and maintenance of the refugees, while receiving financial assistance from the government. The Irish Red Cross felt that the most suitable candidates for entry into Ireland would be family units.[59] It was assumed that this scheme would allow the Irish government to absorb the maximum number of refugees, within which a minimum number of people would be seeking employment. Initially, the refugees were to be housed at Knockalisheen Camp, an old army barracks on the outskirts of Limerick City. It was estimated that about £4,000 would be needed to carry out various improvements to the camp, which were deemed necessary to create a

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[57] Dorr, 'Ireland at the United Nations', pp 43.

[58] Frank and Reinisch, 'Refugees and the Nation-State', pp 484.

[59] Defence memorandum, 9 Nov.1956 (NAI, DFA/419/33/8).

more habitable environment for a group of civilians, rather than the normal Army personnel occupants.[60] The refugees would also need various supplies, such as bedding material, cutlery and clothing, the cost of which was estimated at around £9,000.[61] A further £3,000 a month was deemed an appropriate amount for the actual running of the Camp.[62]

Selection

Once these practical issues had been decided upon, the next concern was that of screening the potential refugees. The Austrian government had appealed once again to Irish officials on 15 November, stating that it was essential that refugees be moved immediately out of the overcrowded camps along the Austrian border. Ideally the government would want the opportunity to conduct personal, medical and possibly economic screening on any possible refugees, yet the Austrian government was stating that this would prove ineffective and not help to alleviate the dire situation.[63] The British received a similar plea, in which 'Austrian authorities had implored the United Kingdom Government to take many more than had previously been contemplated and to take them without documentation or interrogation'.[64] Irish authorities decided that the first group of selected refugees, who had to date not gone through any intense screening process, would be allowed to proceed to Ireland immediately, but that all further refugees would be screened by British officials already present in Austria in conjunction with Irish personnel from the Berne legation. As the first group consisted of only sixty refugees, and the Irish had committed to roughly five hundred, this meant that most of the refugees would be screened in some fashion by the officials in Vienna.

One such British screening team in Vienna had already come across 'a number of applicants who are on the British black list and would, consequentially,

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60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Telegram from the Irish legation in Berne to Dublin, 15 Nov. 1956 (NAI, D/T S11007C).

64 Cabinet Conclusions, 'Hungarian Refugees', 26 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

not be allowed in any circumstances into Great Britain'.[65] The British Home Office decided that it would be prudent to offer the services of this screening team to Irish authorities once it became known that Ireland intended on admitting Hungarian refugees, as British officials were not keen on the admittance to Ireland of refugees with what they would have considered questionable backgrounds.[66] Irish authorities readily agreed, stating that 'there should be no objections to this for security purposes as the two islands work together on the question of admission of aliens'.[67] This brings into sharp focus a latent tension within Irish refugee policy. There was a desire to assert Irish sovereignty through various state functions, such as alien admissions, yet much as during World War Two, Irish authorities did not wish to anger their British neighbours due to the admittance of 'inappropriate' refugees. It seems that in this particular instance, security concerns outweighed British involvement with Irish alien screening.

There was also an active interest on the part of Irish authorities as to British engagement with the Hungarian refugee problem. The Irish preoccupation with what other states were doing in relation to refugee schemes which they were involved in, or were considering becoming involved in, has already proven a theme within this study. In the case of the Hungarian refugees, Dublin issued its foreign offices a list of questions that were to put to each respective government. The questions were listed as such:

(1) How many refugees have been received to date?
(2) What ceiling figure, if any, has been fixed?
(3) What arrangements have been made for their registration as aliens, maintenance and employment?
(4) What amounts are being contributed (a) by the Government, (b) by the Red Cross Society, and (c) by other public or private organisations?
(5) How are these amounts being distributed (a) directly to the maintenance of the refugees, (b) to the Austrian Government, (c) to international organisations such as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the United Nations Special Fund of $10 million for the Austrian Government?

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[65] J. Belton to Nolan (Department of Taoiseach) and Morain (Department of Defence), 20 Nov. 1956 (NAI, DFA/419/33/11).

[66] L.B. Walsh Atkins to Mr Swinnerton, 21 Nov. 1956 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[67] Ibid.

(6) What arrangements are being made for resettlement of refugees in other countries such as the U.S.A., Canada and Australia?
(7) Any further or other relevant information.[68]

This was a rather probing questionnaire to ask of other governments, and was clearly intended to ascertain the policy of a variety of countries regarding their admittance plans for the Hungarians. Again, this was the first time that Ireland was dealing with a large group resettlement scheme intended to facilitate permanent resettlement, and any information that could be garnered would have helped. Also, Irish authorities were attempting to gage how their level of response compared with other countries.

Returning to the issue of refugee selection, the Irish representatives in Austria were encountering problems, as there appeared to be a lack of suitable family units present within the refugee population, and those that were found usually did not prefer to travel as far as Ireland. The Irish officials in Austria contacted Dublin, asking if it would be possible to admit refugees not in family units. The response was quick and unwavering: only family units would be considered acceptable. The families that were willing to consider moving to Ireland would usually request some sort of assurance of employment, which the Irish government was hard put to offer. Ultimately, the required number of appropriate refugees was found, and as of January 1957 all were present in Ireland, most within the confines of Knockalisheen Camp.[69] Unsurprisingly, the majority of refugees were in family units. Only thirty-four single men and women were admitted, along with ten married people with no children and ten unaccompanied children. Out of these single people, the vast majority were forty years of age or younger. As this was the largest group of people seeking refuge from the Soviets, young, single men and women, it is obvious that the government held its stance and did not yield regarding its selection of refugees.

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[68] Questionnaire, Irish Embassy, London enclosed within a letter from J.P/ Gibson to W.B. Lyon, Esq., Aliens Department, Home Office, 20 Dec. 1956 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[69] For a chart containing the particulars of the selected Hungarian refugees, refer to Appendix 5: Particulars of Hungarian refugees, admitted 1956.

The most popular professions from amongst the refugee group were listed as such: seventy-two housewives, seventeen textile workers, eleven electricians, ten motor mechanics and nine each of clerks, foundry workers and lorry drivers.[70] Other than those
professions, a further sixty-seven were listed, representing a fairly wide variety of economic and social status ranging anywhere from laborers and farmers to lawyers and engineers. This showed how the revolution had affected all social classes, instead of targeting a specific disenfranchised group, i.e. workers, laborers, the middle class etc. The majority of adults listed their religion as Catholic. Also included within the group were Calvinists, Lutherans, Unitarians, Evangelists, Greek Orthodox and Jews. As such, the refugees at Knockalisheen were a diverse group with diverse needs.

Reception/Camp Life

Once the refugees had arrived in Ireland, it became clear that there were issues that need be addressed. The refugees had various grievances, which culminated in the April 1957 hunger strike. The two main issues causing contention were employment and emigration. Both of these issues were exacerbated by the apparent lack of openness concerning communication between the refugees, the Irish Red Cross administration and the Irish government. As early as December, the government produced a memorandum entitled 'Problems relating to Hungarian Refugees'. Obviously, nothing as complicated as the hasty admittance of a relatively large group of refugees could be expected to go off without a hitch, but it seemed clear from fairly early on that the problems in Ireland had the potential to become rather explosive. Other than the important problems regarding employment and further emigration, various other issues were discussed. For example, the second problem listed in the memorandum was that of the 'United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees'.[71] The

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[70] Questionnaire, Irish Embassy, London enclosed within a letter from J.P/ Gibson to W.B. Lyon, Esq., Aliens Department, Home Office, 20 Dec. 1956 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[71] Government memorandum 'Problems relating to Hungarian Refugees', undated (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

question was whether the Hungarians should be treated 'in accordance with the terms of the Convention'.[72] A varietal laundry list of other concerns were further listed, ranging from the legality of refugee employment, to what benefits refugees were entitled to from the state:

> Their position in relation particularly to the following matters requires consideration:
> (a) Art.17 – (with reservation) – Engaging in Wage-earning Employment (Department of Industry and Commerce)
> (b) Art. 18 – Self-Employment (Department of Industry and Commerce)
> (c) Art. 23 – Public Relief and Assistance (Department of Social Welfare)
> (d) Art. 24 – Social Security (Old Age, Health, Unemployment, Family allowances) (Department of Health, Social Welfare)
> (e) Art. 32 – (with reservations) and 33 – Expulsion (Department of Justice).[73]

These issues were rather important ones and should have been dealt with, one would think, before the arrival of the refugees. It is interesting that the Irish government did not already have in place the necessary legislation to address these issues. Issues such as the regulations regarding refugee employment and social benefits would have been of the utmost importance to the Hungarians arriving in Ireland. From this point on, the development of policy in relation to the Hungarians appears ad hoc and scattered.

As stated, one of the most pressing concerns for the Hungarians was that of employment. The Irish government had been concerned with this issue from the beginning, as that was one of the reasons why the admittance of family units were so sought after. Each family unit would, hopefully, consist of only one person seeking employment. In the December memorandum, issues such as employment in Britain, offers of employment from Irish nationals, the loss of employment and the establishment of home industries were discussed. Once again, the questions were asked but no answers agreed upon. If something had been decided before the selection process took place in Vienna, and had clearly and explicitly been explained to any Hungarians interested in seeking refuge in Ireland, much stress and tension might have been avoided. It is clear that the

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

refugees were enquiring after this issue at every chance, yet were not being given adequate answers by the government. If the refugees had been fully aware, and accepting, of the employment requirements or restrictions, it may have tempered their growing unease and increasing desire to further emigrate, and thus have alleviated pressure concerning this issue as well. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The refugees seemed to not have a clear understanding of what their situation in Ireland would in reality be like, and as they became increasingly disillusioned, tensions rose and tempers flared. The government clearly knew which issues were irritating the Hungarians, and made a seemingly minimal attempt to calm nerves.

The other issue that seemed to cause the most tension was that of emigration, which was also mentioned in the December memorandum. It is interesting that almost from the onset, this was an issue of importance for the Hungarians. This shows that even within the first weeks of residence in Ireland, the refugees were already clamoring for a new home. This could also be seen to lend some support to the refugees' claim that someone in Austria had told them that Ireland was just a stop along their journey to their permanent new homes in the West. The refugees felt that the government was not making the appropriate representations to foreign governments, and that they would be looked over and abandoned in Ireland.

Unrest/Further resettlement

In actuality, the government was indeed making rather frantic inquires concerning the further emigration of the Hungarians, yet this was not adequately expressed to the refugees themselves. One of the first countries to be approached by Irish authorities regarding the further resettlement of the Hungarian refugees present in Ireland was Britain. As early as 6 December, H. J. B. Lintott of the Dominions Commonwealth Relations Office stated that during lunch with the Irish Ambassador, the issue of the resettlement of the Hungarian refugees present in Ireland to Britain was discussed.[74] Two differing schemes were broached by Irish officials: an exchange of able-bodied refugees for those who were infirm and

[74] H.J.B. Lintott to Mr Maclennan, 6 Dec. 1956 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

the admittance of Hungarians for the purpose of obtaining employment in Britain. As about 200 refugees had arrived in Ireland without undergoing a screening process there were 'a number of able-bodied men and women' and as 'there is already a serious unemployment problem in the Irish Republic… the addition of any able-bodied Hungarian workers is an embarrassment to the Government'.[75]

Initially, a plan centring upon an exchange of refugees was considered a real possibility, yet practical problems were viewed as a possible hindrance: 'I am told in confidence that in principle he saw no harm in an exchange of able-bodied refugees for a number of elderly etc: the problem was the practical one, on our side, of finding non-able bodied refugees who would be willing to move on to Ireland.'[76] The British had experienced the same issue as the Irish, mainly that they were unprepared for the composition of the refugee groups admitted into their state. 'The composition of the refugees who come to the United Kingdom was a considerable surprise to us. We had not expected anything like so high a proportion of able-bodied young men.'[77] Irish authorities were not the only ones dealing with a variety of problems relating to a hasty admittance of relatively large numbers of Hungarian refugees.

As such, British authorities concluded that the admittance of Hungarian refugees who had been willingly admitted into Ireland by Irish authorities was not in their best interests. Internally, British authorities felt that this situation necessitated an affirmation of British refugee policy:

> There is also a point of principle here. We have always maintained the position that refugees who have found asylum in another country should not be allowed to come on to the United Kingdom simply because they would prefer to be here or because the country of first asylum would like to be rid of them. Austria has been a special case, owing to the economic and diplomatic dangers to her if she were not relieved; but if, for instance, Hungarian refugees have found asylum in France or Belgium, we should not be willing to let them come here. This is to us a very important

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[75] Shannon to Paice (Aliens Department, Home Office), 7 Dec. 1956 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[76] Handwritten memorandum to Mr Shannon, undated (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[77] Paice to Shannon, 15 Jan. 1957 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

> principle, and acceptance of the Irish Republic's proposal would tend to erode it.[78]

There seemed to be a worry that Ireland viewed itself as an exemption for normal British policy. Also, the mention of a country wanting to be rid of its refugees is interesting, as apparently there was a sense, at least within British circles, that Irish authorities were looking to unburden themselves of their refugee population. The Irish government, aware that this perception might arise from its entreaties to countries of possible further resettlement, had gone to lengths to negate this belief.

The second scheme that had been initially discussed, that of admitting smaller numbers of the Hungarians under employment visas, also experienced various difficulties, and was eventually abandoned. The dialogue concerning this scheme allows for an examination of Irish/British border concerns, and will be commented on briefly here. In January, a few of the Hungarians in Ireland had approached the British Embassy enquiring as to possible admittance into Britain. The response given to the Embassy officials from London was as follows:

> The Passport Office, after consulting London, have been authorised to grant visas where the refugee can show that he has received Ministry of Labour approval. Most of these people, of course, have no proper documents, but visas are being granted upon the Police Registration books issued by the Irish authorities. Surprisingly enough the total number seems to be very few. So far as I know, only three have shown any interest in going to the United Kingdom.[79]

Apparently, British authorities were willing to admit Hungarians into the United Kingdom without proper UK employment permits simply on the merit of their Irish Police Registration documents.

The Ministry of Labour, however, quickly attempted to clarify this policy development, as it caused the Ministry various concerns:

> So far as this Ministry is concerned refugees are in a completely different category to ordinary aliens in respect of whom employers would normally apply to us for a permit to employ a specified person. We have received no applications from employers to engage any Hungarians from camps in Ireland and even if we did we would refer the matter to the Home Office… This Ministry's only action in respect of refugees is to endeavor

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[78] Ibid.

[79] G. Kimber to John Chadwick, Esq., 9 Jan. 1957 (TNA., Dominions Office 35/10204).

> to find them employment once they have been admitted to the country with the approval of the Home Office.[80]

Clearly, discord between governmental departments concerning refugee matters was not the sole burden of the Irish government.

Irish officials stated that 'should any of these refugees become unacceptable to the U.K. they will be readmitted into the Republic'[81] and this assurance apparently mollified
British authorities to an extent, as five Hungarian refugees were admitted into the United Kingdom for the purpose of employment.[82]

In early December, Irish authorities also approached the Canadian government to explore the possibility of relocating some of the refugees to Canada. Thus began a roughly one and a half year correspondence between the Irish and Canadian governments, leading to the eventual resettlement of a majority of the Hungarian refugees resident in Ireland to Canada. The initial telegram, enquiring as to the Canadian government's position regarding the possible resettlement of the Hungarian refugees present in Ireland,[83] received the response that the Canadian government would give preference to applications from Hungarian refugees in Ireland over other applications *from Ireland.*[84] At this stage, there was no mention of the Canadian government giving preference to the refugees in Ireland over possible refugees admitted directly from Austria. It was clear, however, that Canada was in a very different position regarding its ability to accept and absorb refugees. It was apparent by December 1956 that Canada was looking at a labour shortage of 250,000 workers in 1957, and was possibly open to accepting up to 130,000 immigrant workers to fill this demand.[85]

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[80] E. J. Toogood (Ministry of Labour and National Service) to E.R. Sudbury (Commonwealth Relations Office), 7 Feb. 1957 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[81] G. Kimber to John Chadwich, Esq., 9 Jan. 1957 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[82] G. Kimber to J.P. Gibson, Esq., 7 Mar. 1957: those individuals granted visas were listed as Laszlo Somogyi, Rosalia Somogy, Agoston Kiss, Dr Karoly Glos, Laslo Matusz, Istvan Tanczos, Istvanne Tanczos, and Antal Somogyi (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[83] Telegram from Dublin to Irish legation in Ottawa, undated (NAI, DFA/419/33/18).

[84] Irish legation in Ottawa to Dublin, 11 Dec. 1956 (NAI, DFA/419/33/18).

[85] Ibid.

However, in early 1957 the Canadian government, due to their acceptance of a large number of refugees from Austria, had to put a halt to its fairly liberal policy. In January, Irish authorities were informed that the Canadian government had halted all transports of Hungarian refugees until April, except those with Canadian sponsors.[86] The Canadians had also experienced difficulty finding what they deemed 'appropriate' refugees. It is interesting to note that the Canadians were interested in refugees capable or willing to partake in agricultural or pioneering jobs. They had no interest in refugees of a professional nature, as Canada was suffering from a surplus of these kinds of professionals already (i.e. doctors, lawyers, etc.). It was stated that most of the refugees who expressed an interest in traveling to Canada in Austria were of this class of professionals.

A confidential report was received, also in January 1957, concerning the Canadian position. It is useful to note how the situation concerning the admittance of the refugees developed in other countries, as it offers a level of comparison between the situation experienced in Ireland and those of other countries of asylum. Apparently, Canada had also experienced a problem with screening, and had issues with certain refugees who had apparent Communist sympathies:

> At least two of those admitted here have contacted the Soviet Embassy. Others have asked for free passage back to Hungary. At a Hungarian refugee centre in Toronto, a fight started after a refugee claimed that another (Giorgy Boros, 42) was a member of the Hungarian Secret Police and the refugees got a rope to hang the man, who was taken to safety, for investigation, by the police.[87]

It is important to remember that Ireland was not the only country experiencing difficulties with the refugees they had accepted from Hungary.

By the end of January, a positive response had been received from the Canadians, stating that the refugees in Ireland would be among the first transports to Canada in April. This seemed to placate the Hungarians, yet as April came and went without any new information concerning their admittance to Canada, tensions once again rose. The April hunger strike caused the Irish government to

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[86] Telegram from Ottawa Ambassador to Dublin, 12 Jan. 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/18).

[87] External Affairs to Department of the Taoiseach, 19 Jan. 1957 (NAI, D/T S11007D).

press the Canadians for information, and the response was not positive. They were informed in early May that the apparent assurances of the Canadian government may not amount to anything concrete, as it was reported to Dublin that the Hungarian refugees in Ireland were now at the bottom of the list for transport to Canada. This, and the ever-increasing tension within the camp, caused the Irish government to widen its search. Latin America was then considered, and as it was deemed a distinct possibility, the government began to make the appropriate representations.

Various Latin American counties had offered to admit Hungarian refugees yet had not yet met their quotas:

> According to report No. 7 on the Hungarian Refugee Programme issued in Geneva on the 16th December 1956 by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, the following offers of asylum had been made by various Governments in that region:
> Argentina 4,500 persons
> Brazil 3,000 ''
> Chile 1,000 ''
> Colombia 1,000 ''
> Venezuela 1,500 ''
> Bolivia 500 families
> At the date of the report no refugees had been moved to those countries with the exception of 20 to Chile.[88]

Irish officials were asked to contact members of each of the above governments as quickly as possible to ascertain whether any country would be interested in admitting the refugees. It was stated, however, that 'it is hardly necessary to point out that any impression that we are trying to rid ourselves of the refugees should be avoided. We are trying to fall in with the wishes of the refugees themselves who want to leave Ireland. If you are leaving an aide memoire with people it might be well to cover this point'.[89] The government was not only interested in fulfilling the wishes of the refugees, but also of protecting its international reputation. It was deemed unsavory to project the feeling that the government was trying simply to pass along their refugees due to problems arising with their settlement and assimilation in Ireland.

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[88] Telegram to External Affairs from Legal Advisor, undated (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[89] Telegram to Biggar from Legal Advisor, 1 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

The first response received was from the Bolivians. They stated that their offer of asylum had been made directly to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (hereafter referred to as the ICEM), and as such they were not sure how the offer applied to refugees already in Ireland.[90] They also stated that refugees accepted into Bolivia needed to be willing to effectively become farmers and that the refugees would have to be supplied with living expenses by either the Irish government or the Intergovernment Committee for European Migration for their first six months in Bolivia, as this would be the length of time before they would become self-sufficient farmers.[91] In the end, however, the Bolivian government had made a commitment to the ICEM first, and thus had to fulfill that obligation before admitting refugees already present in other countries.[92]

Further responses were received from Venezuela,[93] Chile,[94] Colombia,[95] and Argentina[96] stating that they had made commitments directly to the ICEM, and that those had to be honoured before it would be possible to accommodate refugees already moved out of Austria. The Brazilian consul-general stated that his government was anxious to secure agriculturalists and skilled workers, and that the Brazilian government might well be interested in any refugees with such skills currently in Ireland. Unfortunately, the Brazilian consul-general also brought up the issue of screening. He enquired as to the political screening of the refugees present in Ireland, and wanted a confirmation in writing that this screening had been adequate, which the Irish government clearly did not feel comfortable providing:[97]

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[90] Telegram to Morrissey from Biggar, 1 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[91] The Intergovernment Committee for European Migration was established in 1952 with the objective of facilitating refugee transport and permanent resettlement. The ICEM took over a variety of duties from the IRO, which halted operations in 1952. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 364.

[92] Telegram to Morrissey and Belton from Biggar, 10 May 1957 (NAI, D/FA 419/33/10).

[93] Telegram to Morrissey from Biggar, 2 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[94] Telegram to Belton from Biggar, 30 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[95] Telegram to Morrissey from Biggar, 2 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[96] Letter from Irish legation in Buenos Aires to Dublin, 3 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[97] Telegram to Morrissey from Biggar, 2 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

> Nevertheless, if Brazil is ready to accept some of our refugees and if any of them are prepared to emigrate to Brazil, we shall eventually have to say something on the screening question. It would obviously be desirable to be as reassuring as possible and perhaps therefore you might be turning over in your mind what would be the best line to take. Presumably we shall have to admit that very little screening was done before the refugees arrived in Ireland and perhaps we could say that our experience with them in the four or five months they have been on Irish soil indicated that there are few if any convinced communists amongst them.[98]

It was known that something had to be said on this question, yet the gravest concern clearly lay with facilitating the resettlement of the refugees.

By June, a statement was posted in Knockalisheen Camp to inform the refugees as to the exact situation regarding their further emigration.[99] It provided a good summary as to which countries the refugees could possibly apply, which were not viable options and which had special requirements. The statement claimed that there was a possibility, however slight, for refugees to gain entry into Brazil, Colombia and Chile. Refugees with sponsors would be allowed entry into Argentina, Canada and Australia. Only refugees with close relatives or 'special skills' would be granted access to the United States.

Another important aspect of the situation regarding the final settlement of the refugees was the role that international refugee organisations played. In May, two important visits occurred to help facilitate a positive resolution to the resettlement issue. The first visit was that of Mr Wyrouboff, an official in the London office of the UNHCR. Wyrouboff's instructions from his head office were to assist the Irish government in forming any possible solution to their refugee problem. The government seemed receptive to this visit, which took place on 8 May. Wyrouboff, addressing the four representatives of the Hungarian Camp Council, stated that

> their difficulties were no different to the difficulties of the refugees in other countries, that over 170,000 Hungarians had gone to Austria, that the United Nations had asked all member Governments to accept refugees and that the Government of Ireland generously and spontaneously had accepted some of them. He told them that while he understood that many

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[98] Telegram to Morrissey from Biggar, 4 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[99] Statement posted in Knockalisheen Camp, 6 June 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

> refugees were moved to countries which were not their ultimate destination, that the situation in Austria was such that it was essential to move the refugees there to other countries and that in Ireland they were getting the best possible treatment from the Government.[100]

Wyrouboff further stated that the refugees in Ireland would not be forgotten when it came to finding them a final home, but that the refugees still in Austria had to be given priority treatment at the moment. Ireland, being regarded as a country of second asylum, would be dealt with after the initial crisis in Austria had reached a resolution. The refugees appeared rather appeased after Wyrouboff spoke to them, and were won over when Wyrouboff stated that he himself had once been a refugee.

Although Wyrouboff's visit did not produce any immediate results, it showed the refugees that they had not been forgotten, and seemed to ease tension within the camp. Wyrouboff's suggestions to the government consisted of making representations to the UNHCR as to Ireland's status as a country of second asylum and for External Affairs to continue its efforts to secure the refugees a final settlement.

The second important visit of May was that of Madame Delattre, a representative of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, whose aim it was to facilitate refugee admittance into the USA. The organisation was mainly privately funded, although receiving some monetary support from the United States Escapee Programme, and was not solely interested in Catholic refugees. Delattre was primarily concerned with Hungarian refugees in Ireland who fell into certain categories and would thus satisfy the stringent visa requirements of the United States. The categories mainly consisted of people with close relatives already resident within the US, refugees with 'unusual skills or talents such as those recognised by the National Academy of Sciences screening board presently in Austria'[101] and 'persons whose admission may be considered in the national interest if their coming serves the primary intelligence or psychological warfare

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[100] Memorandum concerning Mr Wyrouboff's visit to Knockalisheen Camp, 10 May 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[101] Policy of Immigration and Naturalization Service for the Processing of Hungarian Refugees (Written by the I&NS), United States Government, undated (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

objectives of the United States'.[102] It was also stated that Hungarians with exit permits, Kadar passports or individuals 'who departed not because they were being persecuted or in fear of persecution but merely because of the belief that their individual economic conditions would be improved by migration to the United States'[103] were automatically disqualified.

The results of Delattre's visit were not known until the following September, when she stated that she believed that only about twenty-eight families would qualify under the scheme. She did, however, make the first mention regarding Hungarian refugees making it successfully from Ireland to the United States, as 'the two Oscsodal, Brother and Sister, Mrs Keves, her daughter, son-in-law and grand child'[104] had been successfully admitted.

By September 1958, only four families remained at Knockalisheen Camp. Approximately 200 of the refugees had proceeded to Canada, with others leaving for the United States, the United Kingdom, various South American countries (mainly Brazil and Argentina), Australia and voluntary repatriation back to Hungary.[105]

Comparative analysis of Northern Ireland's admittance of Hungarian refugees: 'The sum of all our gifts will be a symbol of our collective conscience.'[106]

Initially, the government in London was concerned that Hungarian refugees 'should not reach the under-employed areas. That covers Northern Ireland with six per cent unemployment'.[107] This position changed in January

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[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid. Kadar passports were those issued by the Moscow-installed and militarily backed Kadar government that was suppressing the revolution. If an individual was in possession of Kadar government documents, they were considered a sympathiser with the Kadar regime, and thus would not have qualified as a refugee in the eyes of the West.

[104] National Catholic Welfare Conference (Delattre) to External Affairs, 14 Sept. 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

[105] Marrus cites the number of Hungarian refugees who exited Austrian territory as 154,000, of whom half remained in Europe. Two-thirds of those remaining in Europe were settled in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Switzerland. 35,185 settled in the United States, 22,575 in Canada and 9,458 in Australia. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 361.

[106] Mr. McLaughlin, 'A Statement and an appeal to the United Nations', 23 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB/9/Y/3/1).

[107] Home Office (Kelly) to the Cabinet Secretariat (Gransden), 10 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB/9/Y/3/1).

1957, as 'the question of our receiving a batch of Hungarian refugees has boiled up again. Apparently the authorities in Great Britain are in sore straights for accommodation and we have been approached as to what we can do'.[108] This change of policy was not unwelcomed by Stormont, as the government had been receiving queries from a variety of domestic groups and organisations regarding the admittance of Hungarians into Northern Ireland. Offers of assistance were received from the United Council of Christian Churches and Religions Communions in Ireland,[109] the Belfast Council of Social Welfare,[110] the North Down Unionist Association[111] and the Presbyterian Church in Ireland[112] during November alone.[113] The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in 1956, Sir Basil Brooke, stated that he had

> received very many representations that the Government here should try to overcome the United Kingdom Government's decision about not sending refugees to Northern Ireland. There was a strong feeling that the unemployed people themselves would not object to their being found jobs here, and that the tradition in Ulster since Huguenot times was that we kept an open door for the politically oppressed. He added that the Presbyterian community were very anxious to help in finding homes for refugees...[114]

Stormont also seemed concerned that Northern Ireland be seen to contribute to the solution of the Hungarian refugee crisis, particularly as the

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[108] Cabinet Secretariat (Gransden) to Brookeborough, 1 Jan. 1957 (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

[109] United Council of Christian Churches and Religious Communions in Ireland to Lord Brookeborough, 9 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

[110] Belfast Council of Social Welfare to Dr. John Oliver, undated (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

[111] North Down Unionist Association to Viscount Brookeborough, 19 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

[112] Presbyterian Church in Ireland to Minister of Labour, 21 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

[113] This level of domestic support for the admittance of Hungarian refugees was also present in the Republic, as offers of assistance and solidarity with the Hungarian cause were received from such organisations as the Dublin Trades Union Council (*Irish Times*, 7 Nov. 1956), the Dublin University Players (*Irish Times*, 8 Nov. 1956), the Retail Grocers, Dairy and Allied Trades Association (*Irish Times*, 8 Nov. 1956), the Irish Housewives' Association (*Irish Times*, 10 Nov. 1956), the Dublin Regional Council of the Labour Party (*Irish Times*, 10 Nov. 1956), the Globe Theatre Company (*Irish Times*, 10 Nov. 1956), the Catholic Women's Federation of Secondary Schools Union of Ireland (*Irish Times*, 10 Nov. 1956), University College, Cork (*Irish Times*, 10 Nov. 1956), the International Catholic Girls' Society, Irish Branch (*Irish Times*, 12 Nov. 1956), the Marine, Port and General Workers' Union (*Irish Times*, 12 Nov. 1956).

[114] 'Note: Seen by P.M.', 22 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

government in Dublin made it known that they intended to admit a relatively large number of Hungarians. Brooke surmised that 'having regard to the fact that Eire was accepting a number of them, it would politically be a good move to try and get some accepted here'.[115] The Ministry of Labour and National Insurance seemed to share this opinion, as it was stated that 'the offer of the Shankill Road Mission, in my opinion, gives an excellent opportunity to match the action already taken by the Government of the Republic of Ireland where sixty refugees will arrive at the end of this week and another two hundred and thirty are on the way'.[116]

Regardless of the motivating factors, by May 1957 it was stated that 888 Hungarian refugees had passed through the three camps that had been organised for housing and accommodation purposes (Crofton Hotel Centre, Ballymacormick and Ballykinlar).[117] The brief analysis of Northern Ireland's admittance of Hungarian refugees to follow serves as a useful comparison, as both the Dublin and Stormont governments engaged in similar refugee admittance schemes, yet with greatly differing outcomes. Both states admitted relatively large groups of Hungarians, utilising domestic aid organisations, government departments and their respective armies to administrate the camp system that the refugees were placed into. Both states also facilitated the further resettlement of the refugees, the majority from both states settling in Canada. These general similarities, however, mask the fundamentally different approach that both states utilised in regard to the refugees' assimilation and treatment once in Ireland.

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115 Ibid.

116 Ministry of Labour and National Insurance to Brookeborough, 22 Nov. 1956 (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

117 'The maximum holding at the Crofton Hall Hotel Centre was 157, at Ballymacormick 144 and at Ballykinlar 586. The total number of refugees who passed through the Camps in Northern Ireland was 888 of whom 19 returned at different times to England or Scotland during the operation. The highest number at any one time was 872 with an average of 590 per day over a period of 112 days.' 'Northern Ireland Hungarian Relief Committee. Report on the Hungarian Refugee Operation in Northern Ireland. 31st January to 22nd May, 1957', undated (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

One such difference regarded the awareness of authorities in Northern Ireland to possible psychological issues that might arise due to the experiences of the refugees.

> It was safe to assume from previous experience that the Refugees coming to Northern Ireland would be confused and apprehensive of the future. They would be impatient to get to their final destination and would be mistrustful of authority after twelve years of Communist indoctrination, lying propaganda, unfulfilled promises and deception. Some would be unwilling and others incapable of taking a balanced and rational view of the chain of circumstances which governed their every day lives whilst waiting for their eventual departure to Canada.[118]

Similar awareness of possible psychological issues was not readily present within the Dublin government's frequent internal discussion and debate regarding issues with their Hungarian refugees. A rare mention cited psychological issues as creating discord amongst the Hungarians themselves.

> Communism has done its work to the extent that these people do not trust each other. Nobody can be certain that his neighbour – or even his wife – is not an active Communist. A great many of the Refugees do not agree with the action being taken, but they fear the taunt that they are not good Hungarians.[119]

The concern was not how the refugees would mentally cope with life in Ireland but how issues such as internal distrust might cause further problems for the government.

Furthermore, Northern officials expressed concern that a line of open and honest communication be maintained at all time between themselves and the Hungarians. There are repeated mentions within the relevant government files that this was of the utmost importance, and that there was a need to foster the 'creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence and trust between the administration and the refugees'.[120] The establishment of camp committees in each camp, each comprised of four Hungarians, was meant to

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[118] Northern Ireland Hungarian Relief Committee, 'Report on the Hungarian Refugee Operation in Northern Ireland, 31st January to 22nd May, 1957', undated (PRONI, CAB 9/Y/3/1).

[119] An Garda Siochana report, 1 May 1957 (NAI, D/T S11007D).

[120] Ibid.

> take the initial shock of impact from the shoulders of the administration. The establishment of these camp committees contributed to a great extent to the smooth running of the operation. The establishment of confidence and mutual trust was specially remarkable at the large camp at Ballykinlar. Lr. Col. Thomas held daily meetings with the camp committee which all matters affecting the internal administration of the centre were discussed in front of any refugees who wished to be present. All matters were publicly aired at these meetings, from the probable movement dates to the discussion of a boat built by some budding Hungarian mariners, which in the words of the official report 'did not fulfill the first requirement of a boat in that it sank'. It was of the greatest importance at all times to keep the refugees as fully and accurately briefed as possible of any developments regarding their future, and this procedure has been fully vindicated.[121]

As poor communication proved the primary source of agitation in Knockalisheen, it is interesting to note the Northern government's attempts to secure a level of cooperation and transparency with the refugees.

A camp committee was also established in Knockalisheen, yet instead of proving a useful conduit through which to improve communication between the refugees and administrators, it became the primary platform from which the refugees registered their discontent and complaints. The Knockalisheen committee, which was formed with a similar purpose as its northern counterparts, to 'represent the Hungarian refugees, and to facilitate communication between them and the Red Cross',[122] wrote a strongly worded letter to the Secretary of the Irish Red Cross in January 1957, citing a lack of communication as one of the main problems within the camp.

> Not having received answers to our communications, or any consideration for daily practical suggestions as to our welfare, and with frequent aspect of excessive waste and lack of organisation in front of our eyes… we feel that the confidence and co-operation necessary between the refugees and the camp officials has broken down, and we also feel that it is right and proper to inform you of this… To understand the situation fully, we feel that it is right to explain what has been happening at Knockalisheen since our arrival and very friendly reception. From the first day onwards, the refugees' only communication with this country has been, with one exception, through a series of what we considered to be irresponsible or

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121 Ibid.

122 Hungarian Camp Council to General Secretary Irish Red Cross, 7 Jan. 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

> ineffective interpreters, some of whom informed us immediately that our presence created a burden for Ireland... Not once has a high Red Cross official or member of the Government come to the camp and explained to us in person whether there are plans for our future, and if so, what these plans are.[123]

A level of distrust was also discernible between the government and the elected leader of the camp committee, Laslo Pesthy. The government viewed Pesthy as a troublemaker, who was encouraging discord amongst the refugees and creating agitation within the camp.[124] Pesthy also attempted to publicise Hungarian discontent, traveling to Dublin 'where he went to the Independent Newspapers and there made a long statement on the conditions prevailing in the Camp'.[125] Furthermore, 'on January 7th 1957 Laslo Pesthy circulated to all Embassies in Dublin and to all Irish Daily papers copy of a letter of complaints and demands he had sent to General J. Sweeney...'[126] The newspapers, after consulting with Justice, did not publish the statement, yet this incident could only have fostered an increase of distrust between government officials and Pesthy. Interestingly, once Pesthy had left for Argentina in April 1957, it was stated that 'oddly enough, all concerned are now agreed that he was an influence for good since his position and authority was recognised by the other refugees'.[127] Again, a level of disconnect seem to exist between the actuality of the situation within the camp and the perceptions of government and Red Cross officials.

It could be argued that Northern Irish officials were engaging with a refugee admittance scheme that lacked the ambiguities frequently accompanying the hasty admittance of refugees into a state. The refugees housed in Northern Ireland had already been screened by British authorities and admitted into the United Kingdom. The refugees moved to Northern Ireland also knew that they were to be further resettled in Canada, and that their stay in Northern Ireland was

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123 Ibid.

124 'Conference on Hungarian Refugees, Second Meeting', 21 Jan. 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10); Berry to Belton, 24 Jan. 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

125 Murphy to Sweeney, 4 Jan. 1957 (NAI, DFA/419/33/10).

126 Ibid.

127 Garda Síochána report, 27 Apr. 1957 (NAI, D/T S11007D).

temporary. This knowledge, coupled with the Northern Irish government's focus on establishing open lines of communication, allowed for the development of a mutual trust between the refugees and government officials. Attempts by the Stormont government to assimilate and integrate the refugees into the local population also differed from the policy pursued by the Dublin government. Refugees in Northern Ireland did not have their local travel restricted, and were encouraged to engage with the local residents. They were given access to 'adequate living conditions and recreational, welfare and educational facilities which would give them an interest other than in their own troubles and preoccupations'.[128] The refugees at Knockalisheen had their movements outside of the camp restricted and monitored, and were kept largely isolated from local residents.

Although initial levels of domestic public approval regarding the admittance of Hungarian refugees were high in both Northern Ireland and the Republic, with both governments influenced by similar motives, the outcome of both admittance schemes differed greatly. Interestingly, there is little mention within the relevant archival material of either government showing any acute interest in the refugee camps on the other side of the border. As has been shown, the government in London was cognisant of the problems that the Dublin government was experiencing, and were concerned that refugees admitted into the Republic would cross the border and become wards of the British government. Yet there is no evidence that the Stormont government shared in these concerns. The only mention of the Republic's refugee admittance was in relation to how it would affect perceptions of Northern Ireland if London did not allow Stormont to admit refugees.

East German Refugees

In the early 1950s, a veritable stream of people were making their way from Soviet-held East Germany to the West Germany controlled by the Allied

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[128] Northern Ireland Hungarian Relief Committee, 'Report on the Hungarian Refugee Operation in Northern Ireland, 31st January to 22nd May, 1957', undated (PRONI, CAB/9/Y/3/1).

forces.[129] These people would have been considered political refugees, as their refugee status stemmed from their inability to live and function within Soviet-held, communist territory. International aid was sought for these people, not only to aid in their daily upkeep, but in an attempt to solidify Western political opinion against the Soviet international regime. In January 1953, the Irish government received an appeal from the UNHCR asking for material and monetary aid.[130] Thus began a dialogue both within the Irish government, as well as between the government and aid organisations, which differs greatly from the previously discussed situations regarding the Hungarians and White Russians. The situation regarding these refugees resulted in an in-depth investigation of the emerging polarised state of European politics. The Irish state had admitted German refugees during the war years, the bulk of whom arrived in between 1938 and 1939, and already had a sizeable German presence in Ireland. It was during the 1950s German refugee crisis, however, that new issues came to light.

It was stated in a report written by the UNHCR in February 1953 that there were still 45,000 non-German and 300,000 German refugees present in camps throughout Germany.[131] During 1952, an estimated 118,727 refugees entered West Berlin.[132] The situation was becoming dismal, with resources already stretched extremely thin. At this stage, the UNHCR was not even asking the Irish state to admit any of these refugees, even though such an action would have undoubtedly been appreciated. The current call for aid was that of prefabricated housing material, as these were desperately needed within the camps. Even without the issue of screening refugees, which had previously been a catalyst for a discussion concerning Soviet ideology and communism, these issues arose.

In an Irish legation report emanating from Berne, it was stated that 'when the new policy of actual and potential terrorism recently began in the Soviet Zone

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[129] Estimations are as high as 3.5 million East Germans. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 361.
[130] Telegram to Dublin from the UNHCR, 31 Jan. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/5).
[131] UNHCR to Minister External Affairs, 10 Feb. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/5).
[132] Ibid.

of an extreme scale'[133] it was a purposeful move by the Soviets to rid themselves of a large number of their East German population. Clearly, this rhetoric is quite strong, and leaves no question as to who is committing inappropriate acts against members of their population. It was further stated that the Soviets found this a highly desirable outcome because

> by closing all the borders except in one place, the Russians are… creating an immediate local and extremely difficult position for the administration of the city of Berlin and of the Allied Authorities… all of the property which the refugees leave behind, factories, shops, farms, businesses of all kinds, private houses, are immediately seized and it is the belief of the German people and one which I share, that the Russians will start a plantation of Russians in the East Zone of Germany on a much more cold-bloodedly efficient scale than the Plantation of Ulster.[134]

This statement claimed that not only were the Soviets apparently pushing their 'undesirable' population out, but that they were also repossessing their assets and possibly planning a resettlement of the territory. This must have reminded many in the international community of policy pursued by the Nazis during the 1930s, and left a thoroughly unpleasant impression. Also, the mentioning of the Plantation of Ulster would have been a poignant comparison to the Irish reader. The report goes on to highlight the ideological split that was occurring, stating that 'those of the refugees who are competent industrial or agricultural workers, represent a definite loss but as against that, from the Soviet point of view their departure is not undesirable since for reasons of religion, upbringing or democratic principles they would not fit into the organisation of a fully Sovietised Eastern Germany'.[135] People were beginning to experience a polarisation: them or us, Western or Eastern, communist or democrat.

A further instance of early Cold War mentalities emerging was expressed when the report stated that 'the situation has been deliberately created by the Soviets to embarrass not only Western Germany but all the Western powers. In

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[133] Irish legation in Berne to External Affairs, 11 Feb. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/5).

[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid.

that sense it is an international problem for which an international solution must be found'.[136]

The Irish incentives for participating in the relief effort were mentioned within the report. It was stated that 'a substantial contribution should be made to ease the German problem. Any contribution made now would go a very far way in the cementing and improving of the very close and friendly relations which exist between the two countries'.[137] This apparently proved enough of an initiative, as External Affairs declared its agreement with the allocation of £5,000 to the Irish Red Cross for the purchasing of supplies to be sent to West Germany.[138] In May, the legation in Bonn wrote to External Affairs, stating that:

> I have made numerous enquiries in Hamburg and am now satisfied that there will be no difficulty in obtaining excellent publicity for the Irish Government when the goods actually arrive in Hamburg. What I hope to be able to arrange is
> (1) newspaper write-ups,
> (2) press photographs, and
> (3) a news-reel story.[139]

Clearly positive press was a benefit of providing aid, if not one of the direct incentives. It should be noted that the material aid provided by the Irish Red Cross consisted of towels, sheets, blankets, clothes, shoes and toilet articles.

A further £5,000 was donated through the Irish Red Cross in March 1955, for the purpose of the building of a kindergarten in Herford, Westphalia/Lippe, for the children of refugees.[140]

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[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid. The Americans and British also placed great importance on the stabilisation of Germany, as well as the position of DPs and refugees moving from East to West Germany. Irish participation in such relief efforts would have also been motivated by American and British approval and encouragement of such schemes. American policy was still prefaced on the concept of delivering aid and settling refugees in Europe, with no large-scale immigration of refugees to the USA, and as such, maximum international participation with the refugee problem would have been viewed as optimal. Cohen, *In War's Wake,* p. 17-8.

[138] Sean Nunan to Defence, 31 Mar. 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/5).

[139] Irish legation in Bonn to External Affairs, 12 May 1953 (NAI, DFA/419/33/5).

[140] Report 'Irish Government Relief Abroad, 1943-1954', undated (NAI, DFA/419/1/20/1).

Analysis

Throughout this chapter, an attempt has been made to examine two varying aspects of the refugee situations researched. The first centres upon practical issues concerning the admittance of a group of refugees into a state. This has been examined by researching the actual process through which the Irish state discussed, admitted and provided for the Russian and Hungarian refugees. This examination focused on inter-departmental correspondence and the communication that the government had with various refugee organisations. The practicalities of the situation can be seen as just as important as the international prestige created by the admittance of refugees, more so for the refugees themselves. The second aspect that has been examined is far more abstract, and centres upon the motivation behind the admittance of refugees into the state. The motives attached to such an action, namely the international situation and how Ireland wanted to be perceived within it, are all overriding themes which can be examined through the above research.

As previously stated, an analysis of Irish refugee policy can shed light on many varying aspects of international relations and internal policy development. The three above sections attempt to provide a context within which greater trends and themes may be discussed. The discussion of the German, Russian and Hungarian refugees can be used to view early Cold War tension.[141] These were not just groups of refugees seeking shelter; they were politicised groups of people whose 'saving' leant to an alliance with a certain ideology. Refugees fleeing the tyrannical rule of Russia were deemed worthy of such help, as even seemingly random outbursts of anti-Russian sentiment began to manifest in Dublin. 'As a protest against Russia, dockers refused to unload a Norwegian ship carrying Russian timber even when it was pointed out that the timber had already been paid for. The ship was forced to leave Dublin without unloading.'[142] These were not simply issues of helping people for the sake of humanitarian concern. In this ideologically charged atmosphere, a country's actions mattered and were

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[141] Frank and Reinisch, 'Refugees and the Nation-State', pp 484.

[142] Telegram from 'Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland' to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 6 Dec. 1956 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

interpreted by others within the ideological and political tensions of the period. Through this research, it can be concluded that the two main factors influencing the development of Irish foreign policy, specifically as it related to refugee policy, in the 1950s were Ireland's perceived international/UN reputation and the emerging Cold War polarisation of Europe.

Paul Sharp states that 'problems of credibility with the claim to be acting for a sovereign, independent country dictate that the governments of small states become concerned with the pursuit of some kind of international status'.[143] This statement leads to the issue of motive and it becomes clear once the three refugee situations are examined that a desire for international prestige was a strong motivation to provide aid. Ireland, as a small country, relatively new to the world stage, wanted to make a name for itself. It is stated time and time again that, yes although there are humanitarian concerns and yes, it is the moral thing to do, one of the driving factors behind the decision to help is that of 'what will they think of us'? The formation of a positive and appropriate international reputation was deemed as a high priority during the 1950s. Irish strategic international interests were viewed as 'ending partition, maintaining neutrality, ending protectionism and building prestige in the world system'.[144] It was also clear that the government was well aware of the emerging Cold War split, and wanted no questions to arise as to which side they were aligned.

Ireland was not the only small, neutral European country in the 1950s that was attempting to influence international opinion with its refugee policy. The Swiss, also concerned with Allied perception of their neutrality during the war, as well as domestic unrest regarding wartime refugee policy, were attempting to placate such detractors with active participation in postwar humanitarian initiatives.[145] As with the Irish, the Hungarian refugee crisis provided the perfect opportunity for Swiss engagement with refugee issues in the mid-1950s.

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143 Paul Sharp, *Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community*, p. 34.

144 Paula L. Wylie, *Ireland and the Cold War*, p. 20.

145 This amounted to Swiss UNRRA activity, though Swiss authorities refused to agree to the admission of stateless DPS, as well as the admittance of concentration camp survivors. Ludi, 'More and Less Deserving Refugees', pp 595.

Switzerland admitted approximately 14,000 Hungarians, which was the largest proportion related to overall population of any admitting country.[146] A variety of reasons combined to allow for this extreme liberalisation of Swiss policy. The Swiss economy was doing well, and the possibility of an influx of young, single men would not have been viewed with the same abject horror as in the 1930s. In fact, young, skilled men were the kind of new migrants that Swiss authorities would have welcomed with open arms.

The anti-communist credentials that were, though frequently inappropriately, applied to the Hungarians as a group, also led to high admissions. The 'dominant anticommunism guaranteed public solidarity with the Hungarian insurgents particularly in Switzerland, where the postwar discourse on national identity expressed both citizens' pride in their country's unscathed survival through two world conflicts and their rejection of any kind of totalitarianism[147]'. The Swiss public was ready and willing to accept the admittance of these refugees, as they felt an affinity towards these 'freedom fighters'. Public sentiment regarding refugee issues had also recently been roused in 1954, with the disclosure of information relating to Swiss involvement with the German 'J'-stamp. As such, both the government and the Swiss public were willing to accept the admittance and assimilation of Hungarian refugees in 1956.

The main similarity between the Irish and Swiss decision to admit substantial numbers of Hungarians lay with their neutrality during the war. Both countries were still eager to mollify any residual Western annoyance or hostility over neutrality. Ireland and Switzerland had made it clear that they both wished to extend their wartime military neutrality into the postwar world and this meant that they had to prove their ideological adherence to the West in other ways, one of which was refugee and humanitarian initiatives. Domestic opinion in both countries would have been solidly behind the Hungarian refugees, as the Irish public would have commiserated with the refugees' plight of occupation by a foreign power, as well as the Catholicism of the majority of refugees. Where their

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[146] Ibid., pp 596.

[147] Ibid., pp 597.

situations differed lay with each country's ability to successfully assimilate the refugees. The Irish economy was stagnant during the 1950s, with high rates of emigration. As such, any admission of large numbers of able-bodied, single, young men looking for employment could have been damaging politically for the government. And even when families were targeted for admission, cutting down the number of refugees that would be actively engaged in work, issues regarding employment still caused problems for the government.

There is evidence that the international community was taking notice of Irish engagement with refugee issues, and was positive about encouraging the country to become more internationally involved. During discussions concerning the further resettlement of Hungarian refugees from Ireland to the United Kingdom, British officials were initially supportive of the resettlement, as they wanted to encourage Irish internationalism:

> If there is any possibility of helping out the Irish Republic in this way, we could tell the Embassy in general terms and ask them, if you agree, to explore the details direct with the Home Office. On broad grounds this is a matter in which we should like to help the Irish Republic if we reasonably can. For a long time now they have been very introvert in international affairs, but, now that they have been admitted to the United Nations, their interests may broaden, and it is all to the good that they have taken a hand in extending help to Hungarian refugees.[148]

There was a real hope held by the Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States, that an Ireland actively engaged with the UN, as well as the international community in general, would provide a solid ally concerning Western world objectives.[149] The CIA stated that '... Ireland began to participate more actively in international affairs in 1955, when it was admitted to the UN' and that it was 'Foreign Minister Aiken's position that small nations should use

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[148] Paice to Shannon, 7 Dec. 1956 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10204).

[149] Liam Cosgrave, Minister for External Affairs in 1956, outlined Ireland's UN policy upon initial membership. He stated that three guiding principles would drive Irish UN activity, the first of which simply stated Irish agreement with UN Charter. The second centred on the desire to create an independent stance that was not officially aligned to any power bloc. The third, which seemingly contradicted the second, would see Ireland pursuing policy that lent itself to the preservation of Christian principles, as well as the desire to participate in the halting of the spread of international anti-Communism. Sharp, *Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community*, p. 36. For a further assessment of Cosgrave's Dáil address, see Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 37-9.

the UN to influence the great powers, even if they must sometimes adopt positions which diverge sharply from those of other Western countries'.[150] This staunchly independent stance was to shift in the early 1960s, yet the reality of *early* Irish participation at the UN would not prove the above western assumption correct.[151]

Even baring an outright alignment with Western international policy, it should be stated that although there was never a question as to which ideological camp Ireland would align, it was also clear that Ireland was not trying to make any overt, hostile rapprochements to the Soviet Union.[152] The closest the country would get to this in 1956-57 would be its UN Resolution condemning Soviet aggression and the comments discussed previously condemning Soviet treatment of its citizens. Joseph Skelly states in his work *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations 1945-1965* that Ireland 'could not mediate between the free world and the communist bloc' but that it *was* important for Irish foreign policy to be centred upon moral influences, especially within the realm of the UN.[153] There was a self-perpetuating idea that Ireland could be seen as a moral example to the wider world, which, as has been shown, was further reinforced by outside influences, such as the Catholic Church.[154] This compliments Irish attempts to liberalize refugee policy, and to try to be seen as on the morally enlightened side of international disputes. It could be stated that the Irish government was attempting to use their aid given both to refugees abroad and to refugees allowed to land on their shores, as a moral booster. There seems no hiding this desire either, as it can be seen in various official documents.

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150 Central Intelligence Agency, 'Current Intelligence Weekly Summary: Ireland', 7 Sept. 1961 (NARA, CIA-RDP79-00927A003300080001-8).

151 Two early examples of independent Irish action at the UN are the China Vote of 1957 and the Irish vote for Polish Security Council membership in 1959. Michael Kennedy, "Persuade an alternative European candidate to stand': why Ireland was elected to the United Nations Security Council in 1961' in Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon (eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations*, p. 159.

152 For an account of Costello's UN policy in 1955-56, see Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 29-37.

153 Joseph Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations 1945-1965: national interests and the international order (*Dublin, 1997).

154 In a memorandum dating May 1956, Costello cites Ireland's 'moral influence in the international system' as a guiding principle of Irish international/UN activity. Ibid., p. 34.

There is evidence, not only that this was accepted government policy, but that it was effective, and that positive reinforcement through the development of a positive reputation at the UN continued to affect Irish policy. If something is working, and creating the desired affect, why change policy? In a WJC memorandum, a stated reason for favourably responding to the Irish queries concerning an application made to the Claims Conference was listed as perceived Irish UN influence.'I can say briefly that affiliation could have certain uses in the political field…'[155] Ireland, as a UN middle power, focused on humanitarian issues, would have been a sought after ally for such an organisation as the WJC, whose main UN concerns lay within the humanitarian realm.

In the three discussed refugee emergencies, various similarities exist. In each case, the various government departments concerned discussed the implications of Irish admittance of the refugee group concerned. In most cases throughout the 1950s, the UN and its relevant refugee organisations were in direct contact with the government. The Irish Red Cross, as the prominent refugee organisation within the state, was always involved in the organisation and finance of the refugees' admittance. All of the refugees arrived from the emerging Soviet bloc or communist controlled countries. In each case, it was stated at some point, that one of the main factors in the admittance of these refugees was international prestige.

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[155] Maurice Perlzweig to A. L. Easterman, World Jewish Congress internal memorandum, 18 Nov. 1957 (AJA, H195, File 22).

Chapter 5 - Shifting Realities: The 1960s, Seán Lemass and the Realignment Westwards

Introduction

On 11 July 1961, Liam Cosgrave[1] made a statement in the Dáil pertaining to the ideological concerns of Ireland's foreign policy:

> We have a duty in the free world to show that freedom and justice based on moral principles are the only foundations on which a lasting peace can be built. It would be folly – it would be a fatal error, indeed – to repeat what happened in somewhat similar circumstances prior to the last war when threatened nations, and not only the smallest of them, sought their own safety at the expense of others. In the end, all were over-whelmed in the holocaust. Each nation has a duty to see that the fundamental principles which preserve the liberty and the rights of the individual, of the family and of the national entities are respected.[2]

This statement can be used to discern the shift in Irish foreign policy that was originating in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As seen in the previous chapter, the main factor shaping Irish refugee policy, and thus Irish foreign policy, in the 1950s was Ireland's perceived reputation on the international level, and more specifically, at the UN. The other defining concern was the entrenchment of the Cold War polarisation of Europe, and how Irish foreign policy would align with emerging battle lines. At this stage, Irish concerns lay with its perception as an independent, sovereign nation that could create its own policy, and this was clearly shown to greatly affect its UN policy. Irish concern with international acceptance following the Second World War had allowed for it to assert its sovereignty through the UN, and its successful membership of the Fire Brigade and inclusion with the Middle Powers group highlight this independent stance.

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[1] Liam Cosgrave, a member of Fine Gael, was Minister for External Affairs between 1954 and 1957, as well as Taoiseach from 1973 to 1977.

[2] Liam Cosgrave, Dáil Debates 191, 622-623, 11 July 1961. When Cosgrave made this statement, his party was in opposition, yet it still denotes the aforementioned shift in Irish foreign policy objectives. There is still mention of the Irish adherence to the ideological concepts of freedom and moral justice that typified Irish UN involvement in the mid-to-late 1950s, yet now there seemed an underlying desire to align with the nations that pursued these 'fundamental principles which preserve the liberty and rights' of nations, namely the West. The veiled criticism of Irish neutrality during the war could be viewed as a criticism from an oppositional political party, as Fianna Fáil was the government that pursued neutrality, not Fine Gael.

The decisions that the Irish government was making at the UN clearly secured its place as an independent nation that did not adhere to policy simply due to Western bloc sentiments or pressure.

However, as the above statement suggests, in the early 1960s Irish foreign policy concerns began to tilt decidedly towards increased Western alliance. The strictly independent stance that de Valera and Aiken had created and solidified, initiated in 1957[3] and continually strengthened during Ireland's early years at the UN, began to shift Westward as foreign policy decisions were formed based on a new set of concerns. Mainly this revolved around Ireland creating a non-neutral ideological stance that allowed it to align with the countries that could best secure its national interests and security. As early as 1958, the CIA reported this perceived shift in Irish UN objectives:

> Ireland has taken an unusually active role in international affairs since 1955, when it was admitted to the United Nations, and on several occasions has taken a position which diverges sharply from that of other Western nations. While Irish foreign policy is still directed towards the traditional desire for neutrality and is firmly anti-Communist, the De Valera government is increasingly concerned with the inflexibility of the East-West power blocs and the threat of a general war. Consequently, the government shows a growing tendency to seek compromise through the UN on controversial problems.[4]

Foreign policy concerns listed in the above extract were coupled with domestic developments that also lent themselves to this shift in policy. In 1959, de Valera stepped down from the leadership of Fianna Fáil, and was replaced by Seán Lemass. Lemass would go on to successfully reorganise the Irish economy, and in doing so, shift the focus of Ireland's foreign policy. Foreign policy began to intersect with economic development, and neither was created within a policy vacuum, completely devoid of each other.[5] Various other issues affecting policy

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[3] It need be remembered that Costello was Taoiseach in 1955-56.

[4] Central Intelligence Agency, 'Current Intelligence Weekly Summary: Ireland's Foreign Policy', 16 Oct. 1958 (NARA, CIA-RDP79-00927A001900090001-3).

[5] This is not to state that economic considerations did not influence the foreign policy of earlier governments. Skelly states that Costello engaged with the idea of utilising UN membership to increase foreign investment in Ireland in the mid-1950s. However, the possible level of intersection between economic and foreign policy grew during the 1950s

development were Irish determination to join the EEC, a change in what was the perceived goal of Irish UN policy, evolving economic integration on an international level and a shift in the desired international perception of Ireland.

All of these factors thus affected Irish refugee policy. As the basic tenents of foreign policy shifted, so did the ways in which the Irish state perceived and dealt with refugee issues. As will be seen, throughout the 1960s the conflicts creating refugees also differed from those in the 1950s. Refugee creating situations shifted away from Europe, and towards Asia and Africa, where new battlegrounds for Cold War politics were emerging.[6] The needs of these refugees differed from the European refugees of the preceding decades, as did the ways in which aid was offered. Accepting refugees into Ireland was not usually considered by the government, as both the physical distance most of these refugees were from Ireland and the idea that their perceived cultural differences would impede assimilation were seen as almost insurmountable obstacles. Aid, both monetary and supply-based, was deemed the most viable.

This shift in Irish foreign policy, as it relates to a change of Irish UN policy, will be examined within the context of evolving Irish refugee policy. As such, the focus of this chapter will centre upon Irish refugee policy as it relates to Irish UN policy. At this point in the twentieth century, Ireland was heavily invested in UN humanitarian initiatives, and it would be erroneous to examine Irish refugee policy outside of this international organisational context. The early 1960s saw Freddie Boland take up the Presidency of the General Assembly, as well as Ireland taking up temporary membership of the Security Council during the 1962 session. Irish involvement in various UN sponsored initiatives aimed at refugees, such as the World Refugee Year (hereafter referred to as WRY), will be

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and 1960s as international economic organisation and cooperation grew. Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 35.

[6] Frank and Reinisch in 'Refugees and the Nation-State' that 'by the end of the 1950s a line was supposed to have been drawn under the European refugee problem, as signaled by the United Nations' first World Refugee Year in 1959-60. While this event did not bring an end to the existence of refugees by any means, to contemporary observers it did seem to form a turning point from the identification of an apparently European refugee problem to a global one. Europe had already by this stage become a place of refuge for non-Europeans; thereafter refugees no longer tended to be European in origin'. pp 478.

examined, as will various other refugee creating conflicts that utilised UN initiatives and aid.

UN World Refugee Year Initiative

In 1959, the UNHCR carried out an initiative, originating from the British UN delegation,[7] to help the large number of refugees throughout the world, both those still displaced from World War Two, and those from new conflicts occurring in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. It was stated that 'of the 40,000,000 souls estimated to have become refugees since the end of the Second World War 15,000,000 still remained so, and of these some 2,000,000 were still urgently in need of direct assistance'.[8] The WRY initiative was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1958 by fifty-nine votes in favour, one of which was Ireland. The stated aims of the WRY, were listed as:

> Firstly 'to focus interest on the refugee problem';
> secondly 'to encourage additional financial contributions from Governments,
> voluntary agencies and the general public';
> and thirdly 'to encourage additional opportunities for permanent refugee solutions
> through voluntary repatriation, resettlement and integration. (emphasis in original)[9]

Due to a heightened British involvement, within both the formation of WRY and the drive to increase UN member engagement with the scheme, British officials were in contact with Irish officials regarding their involvement. The telegram sent to the government, which stated that 'whatever the means chosen we hope the Irish Republic will join us in giving a lead to the world in this important humanitarian exercise' was addressed to all Commonwealth nations, British protectorates (Federation of Rhodesia) or recently established republics (Ireland and Malaya).[10] The British were concerned that 'many Governments have been

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[7] See TNA, Dominions Office 35/10740.

[8] *Irish Times,* 19 June 1959.

[9] Gearoid Mac Pharthalain, Third Triennial Convention of the Irish Red Cross Society, Galway, 14 Nov. 1959 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

[10] Telegram, Commonwealth Relations Office to Ghana, Irish Republic, Canada, Austrialia, New Zeland, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Federation of Rhodesia, 5 Mar. 1959 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10740).

disappointingly slow to give any positive support' and that 'it is our earnest hope that your Government will help to make the year a success e.g. by promoting national World Refugee Year campaigns or in other ways in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations' Resolutions'.[11]

The British further discussed Irish lack of initial involvement with their embassy in Dublin, and regarding Irish UN involvement in humanitarian issues, did not seem overly impressed with the state's record to date. It was felt by British officials that perhaps the Irish would increase their level of activity with UN refugee initiatives once it was understood that the British were firmly behind such endeavors. Upon the affirmation of this sentiment, Aiken contacted the Irish Red Cross Society, and began to plan the Irish national appeal for funds. As such, this section will examine three aspects of Irish refugee policy that emerge through a study of Irish involvement in the WRY; firstly through the ways in which various government officials portrayed the initiative, both domestically and abroad; secondly the actual response in Ireland to the appeal; and thirdly, how the government chose to direct the aid collected by the appeal and what this said about the concerns of Irish foreign policy.

Irish response to the appeal

In mid-1959, various government officials and aid organisations worked to publicise the WRY, to both encourage the public's participation, as well as to use the initiative for political clout. Aiken was quoted in an *Irish Times* article extensively concerning the plight of refugees worldwide.[12] He mentioned the dismal conditions many of these refugees were facing, how many had been displaced for years and how any country concerned with humanitarian issues should be actively participating in any scheme attempting to solve the refugee problem. De Valera, having resigned as the political leader of Fianna Fáil in June 1959, utilised his new position as the President of Ireland to broadcast an appeal on Radio Éireann, which once again highlighted the desperate situation of the refugees. De Valera stated that 'I need not attempt to picture for you the intense

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[11] Ibid.

[12] *Irish Times,* 19 June 1959.

suffering the refugees have had to endure. Those who have read history or have followed public events in, say, the last 20 years must themselves realise what war, devastation, persecution, eviction, hunger mean to the individual and to the families affected'.[13] Clearly, high-ranking members of the Irish government were taking an active interest in Ireland's contribution to the WRY, which fit in with the concerns of Irish foreign policy at the time, namely active participation in UN humanitarian aid initiatives. There were even WRY collection boxes placed in the Dáil Éireann bar and restaurant![14] There was also mention in a UNHCR report of the variety of fundraising activities organised in the country, including 'pram-pushing walk from Dublin to Cork, bring-and-buy sales, concerts, whist drives and carol singing by students of University College in Dublin'.[15]

Further attention was garnered for WRY through a speech given by a TD in Galway at the Third Triennial Convention of the Irish Red Cross Society. It was stated that 'it has, as patrons, the President, the Taoiseach and other members of the Government, the Cardinal and the Archbishops, the Archbishops of the Church of Ireland, the heads of other denominations, other distinguished personalities like the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the High Court and representatives of the political parties...'[16] This shows that the involvement of Ireland in WRY was embraced by a wide cross section of Irish society, as well as across the religious spectrum.

The actual response to the appeal in Ireland was impressive. It need be remembered that the 1950s were a time of economic stagnation and high emigration, so monetary aid should not be dismissed as trifling. By May 1960, it was reported by the Irish Red Cross that the public had donated £60,000, and it was even felt by the Society that 'while this is a substantial sum of money I feel

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[13] *Irish Press*, 11 Sept. 1959.

[14] Office of Chairman of Dáil Éireann to Taoiseach, 18 May 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

[15] 'Report to Ireland by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on projects financed from the National Appeal for World Refugee Year organised by the Irish Red Cross', Jan. 1963 (NAI, D/TS/11007G/63).

[16] Gearoid Mac Pharthalain, Third Triennial Convention of the Irish Red Cross Society, Galway, 14 Nov. 1959 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

sure that more could be obtained for this most deserving cause'.[17] This statement proved true, as by August the collection had raised an additional £11,834.[18]

As has been shown previously, communication between the Irish Red Cross and the government was, more often than not, murky. The government had thought that the Irish Red Cross would turn over the collected funds, and that it would be able to distribute the money as it saw fit. This, however, was not what happened:

> The agreement into which I entered with the Red Cross on behalf of the Government was that they would organise the National Collection for the World Refugee Year and that when the total receipts were available 75 % of these would be placed at the disposal of the Government for allocation and the remaining 25% could be allocated by the Red Cross among the refugee charities of its choice. I was surprised therefore when I learned that, in response to a routine enquiry, an officer of my Department was informed that the entire sum collected amounting to 71,834 pounds had been promised directly by the Red Cross on its own responsibility to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.[19]

The agreement outlined above was also relayed to the British Commonwealth Relations Office, so there can be no doubt that the Irish government had been under the impression, rightly or wrongly, that they were entitled to 75% of the collection.[20]

It was stated, however, that the Irish Red Cross did distribute the funds adequately, and that the 'outcome was not unsatisfactory'.[21] As the government did not want to diminish further donations by drawing public attention to this misunderstanding, the issue was only ever discussed internally. The main concern centred on the imbalance between the monetary amounts donated to the European refugees on the one hand, and Palestinian refugees on the other:

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[17] Mrs Barry, Irish Red Cross Society, to Lemass, 12 May 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

[18] External Affairs to Taoiseach, 19 Aug. 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

[19] Ibid.

[20] '... I now have pleasure in informing you that, at the request of the Government, the Irish Red Cross Society has undertaken the organisation of Ireland's private contribution to the Year. It is proposed that 25 per cent of the funds collected should be devoted to projects of the Society's choice and that the remainder should go to the UNHCR/UNWRA Joint Project in Geneva.' Irish Embassy, London to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Commonwealth Relations Office, 19 Jun. 1959 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10740).

[21] External Affairs to Taoiseach, 19 Aug. 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

> A larger sum than I had originally envisaged is placed at the disposal of the High Commissioner while the Palestine refugees, to whose plight this country's delegation has frequently drawn public attention, do not benefit in any way. It is my view that we have now dealt generously with the High Commissioner and that any further financial assistance from Government sources to refugee services should be in the form of an official contribution to the Relief and Works Agency…[22]

This statement is interesting when placed within the context of Irish UN policy in 1960. The fact that the government was still actively concerned to not favour European refugees over those of a more politicised nature, the Palestinians, is a clear example of how policy had not yet converted entirely to a firm pro-West ideological stance. UN action taken on behalf of the Palestinian refugees, or the Palestine situation in general, would not have garnered friendly sentiments from the USA or Britain, and is a prime example of Irish independent action at the UN.[23] In 1958, at the Thirteenth General Assembly, Aiken delivered his plan for peace in the Middle East, which although not overtly anti-Western, would not have garnered much pleasure from the Western bloc.

In his plan, Aiken called for an end to outside involvement (i.e. British, American, etc.) with the internal affairs of the Arab states. He also expressed concern that the Arab states would become pawns in the great power rivalry struggle, and as such, called for further UN involvement in the area. His plan was not overtly anti-Western, and that is not what is being argued here, but it was a measured response of independent stature much in line with Aiken's UN policy up to 1960. Aiken also repeatedly stated that he viewed the refugee situation within Palestine as one of the main factors negating a peaceful resolution in the region.[24]

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Interestingly, in 1958 Aiken had written a statement for the UN concerning Middle East refugee issues that had included a call for Arab recognition of Israel. He had been persuaded to exclude the call for recognition, as it was worried that it would alienate the Arab world and endanger the international perception of Ireland as an independent UN actor. Rory Miller, 'A man with a cause: Frank Aiken, the Palestine refugee issue and the evolution of Ireland's Middle East policy, 1957-69' in Bryce Evans and Stephen Kelly (eds), *Frank Aiken: Nationalist and Internationalist* (Kildare, 2014), p. 294.

[24] Rory Miller, 'A man with a cause', p. 292-94.

The British had previously responded to Aiken's UN activity, as it directly related to British perceived lack of Irish engagement with UN refugee initiatives, reporting that:

> As you know, the Irish Republican Government have not hitherto seen their way to make any contribution to U.N. refugee funds such as U.N.R.W.A. … There have however, over the past year or so, been definite indications that the attitude of the authorities here was mellowing somewhat on the question. There was firstly Mr. Aiken's speech in the General Debate of the General Assembly of 20th September, 1957 when, as part of his wide'disen-gagement' proposals, he suggested the establishment of a U.N. Commission to promote reconciliation and economic development in the Middle East. Mr. Aiken's speech on that occasion made no reference to refugees at all. At the August 1958 Special Session of the General Assembly Mr. Aiken first suggested U.N. compensation as a means of solving the world refugee problem.[25]

This statement, written in the summer of 1959, shows that perhaps the British were concerned with Ireland contributing publically to the right humanitarian campaigns, or more possibly, the ones that they themselves supported. It seems to have been felt by British authorities that British pressure, or influence, could be used to facilitate Irish humanitarian engagement:

> The Department of External Affairs here have told me that the Government's decision to contribute £5,000 to the U.N. Refugee Commissioner, towards the purposes of the World Refugee Year, was made as a result of the atmosphere in the last Session of the U.N. on refugee matters generally and of the Irish Republican Government's reaction to the approach made by the United Kingdom Government through the Irish Ambassador in London…[26]

Yes, the Irish government did use refugee policy to legitimise its sovereignty, yet it also used refugee policy to placate certain crucial groups (the Irish public) or governments (the British). This tension, between the utilisation of refugee policy as a mark of Irish independent international engagement and the government's practice of using refugee policy to strengthen its alliance with its perceived ideological allies, was a constant.

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[25] G.D. Anderson, British Embassy, Dublin, to L.E.T. Storar, Commonwealth Relations Office, 4 Jun. 1959 (TNA, Dominions Office 35/10740).
[26] Ibid.

Regarding the dispersal of Irish WRY funds, in September, External Affairs consulted with the UNHCR representative in Great Britain, engaging in talks in which

> the upshot of these has been that I have reconsidered my earlier decision to leave the matter of the disposal of the proceeds of the National Collection for World Refugee Year entirely to the High Commissioner as it then seemed to me I would be obliged to do as a result of the precipitate action of the Red Cross. Mr. Kelly assures me that there would be no objection to our requesting the High Commissioner to allocate a proportion of the total transmitted to his colleagues in charge of the Palestine Refugees.[27]

The Irish Red Cross was informed of this decision, and it was thought that they 'will not see any objection to the reallocation which, in view of the active role our delegation has played in the debate on the Palestine Refugee problem, is very desirable and which will be agreeable to all the UN Agencies concerned'.[28]

It is also important to note that during WRY the government was to pledge a donation directly to UN refugee funds for the first time. Monetary aid was distributed to both the UN Refugee Fund, which was primarily concerned with the refugees still present in Europe, as well as to the United Nations Relief and Works for the Palestinian refugees (hereafter referred to as UNRWA). In 1959-60, the stated donation was £1,670 to the UN Refugee Fund and £1,000 to the UNRWA.[29] 1960-1 would see £1,670 to the UN Refugee Fund and £2,500 to the UNRWA.[30] A further £1,660 was pledged for 1961-2 to the UN Refugee Fund and it was stated that £2,500 would most likely be paid to the UNRWA as well. This made the total contribution to the UN Refugee Fund and the UNRWA as of 1962 £5,000 and £3,500 respectively.[31]

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[27] External Affairs to Taoiseach, 17 Sept. 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Unsigned memo, 6 July 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid. By the end of 1966, Ireland had donated a total of $126,800 to UNRWA funds. Miller, 'A man with a cause', p. 293.

Projects funded by Irish donation

The money contributed to the UN Refugee Fund was used to facilitate three schemes. The first was the clearing of a refugee camp in Germany, Camp Falkenberg. Irish contributions helped to resolve forty-nine cases, which accounted for 183 people still resident within the camp and cost a total of £86,330. Out of the total cost for clearing Falkenberg, Irish funds provided £26,979.[32] 'The allocation of £26,979 from Irish funds, has covered the High Commissioner's share of the construction costs, as well as furniture rents and counseling services for all those refugees thus far settled'.[33]

The second scheme facilitated by Irish funds was the construction and equipment of apartments for sixteen Armenian refugee families in Greece. The refugees first arrived in Athens due to the Greco-Turkish war of 1922, and many had been living in abject poverty around Athens and Piraeus for years. In 1960, there were still 5,000 Armenians living in terrible conditions awaiting help. As such, funds from WRY were funneled into the construction of apartments to be put at the disposal of the Armenian refugees. £7,428 of Irish money was spent to construct and furnish sixteen apartments, which housed seventy-five persons.[34] The story of one such family is as follows:

> Kirkor T., aged thirty-six, his wife and four children. The six persons had been subsisting in a dark, humid hovel of two rooms without water for their entire lives. Mr. T. earns 1,500 drachma (18 pounds) a month as a bus conductor. His wife tries to supplement their income by running a small newspaper stand. Of the four children, the eldest, a fifteen-year-old

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[32] 'Report to Ireland by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on projects financed from the National Appeal for World Refugee Year organised by the Irish Red Cross', Jan. 1963 (NAI, D/TS/11007G/63). Also included within the UNHCR report was a description of a family who were direct recipients of Irish aid contributed to the Camp Falkenberg scheme. 'Representative of those successfully settled thanks to Irish generosity are the Jakin W. family, numbering seven persons in all. Mr. W. lived in camps for twenty-one years. All five of his children had been born in barracks. In Falkenberg they have been wedged into two rooms with only three beds. There was of course no running water. The communal washroom was an open invitation to pneumonia and tuberculosis. In August 1961, the W's moved into a modern flat of four rooms with kitchen and bath constructed under the High Commissioner's programmes.'

[33] 'Report to Ireland by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on projects financed from the National Appeal for World Refugee Year organised by the Irish Red Cross', Jan. 1963 (NAI, D/TS/11007G/63).

[34] Ibid.

> girl, is mentally retarded. In their new flat they have three rooms with a total surface that is more than twice as large as the space they had in the slum. They also have a bathroom and toilet, which were previously lacking, and a gas stove for cooking. Instead of fronting on a dirt alley, their apartment, which is on the first floor, looks out to the Acropolis.[35]

Again, when examining refugee policy as a facet of foreign policy, it is easy to forget that these were actual people, living in what could be terrible conditions, with real needs. Putting a face to the masses is helpful, and allows the humanity of the situation to not be forgotten.

The third UN Refugee Fund scheme that received Irish WRY donation money was focused on providing counselors for refugees in Italian refugee camps. WRY had indeed had quite an impact on worldwide attitude to refugee admittance. 'New schemes suddenly enabled handicapped refugees, who had been rejected for emigration for years, to move to countries in Europe and overseas. This breakthrough, which developed with unexpected rapidity, was of capital importance in Italy were migration was the solution sought by the vast majority of refugees.'[36] These refugees, however, needed counselors to both inform them of these new developments, as well as help review their cases and facilitate their migration. The Irish contribution allowed for the hiring of 'four highly qualified social workers' for the first six months of 1961. The sum of £2,738 allowed for their employment, travel expenses and secretarial assistance, as well as for half of the expenses for two social workers during the latter half of 1961. The scheme could be deemed rather successful as 'by 31st December 1961 the files of a total of 126 households, comprising 226 persons, could be marked 'closed'. Of these refugees, 173 had emigrated, twenty-six had been settled outside camps in Italy, eleven had been repatriated, and sixteen had disappeared, died or acquired Italian nationality'.[37]

As previously stated, Irish donations to WRY were also given to aid the Palestinian refugees, under the auspices of the UNRWA. Total Irish monetary aid

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

amounted to £15,355, and was used to fund forty-four boys at the Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre near Amman, Jordan:[38]

> They are among more than four hundred trainees living and working in the neat white buildings of this centre. Twenty-four of these beneficiaries of Irish generosity are studying mechanical craftsmanship; a further eighteen are learning to be skilled construction workers and to make shutters. The second allocation of 222.16.2 is helping to cover a two-year course for another boy in the builders/shutterers course. As of 15 October 1962, all forty-three refugees were making satisfactory progress and could be expected to graduate in the summer of 1963. Once they have been awarded the UNRWA diploma they will be able to find employment without difficulty.[39]

Irish involvement with UN refugee initiatives resulting from decolonization, Cold War tension and international instability

In this section, four groups of refugees seeking international aid and assistance will be examined within the context of the dispersal of Irish refugee aid during the 1960s. These groups, the Algerians, the Angolans, the Tibetan and Biafrans, were all engaged in political separatist movements inspired by a nationalistic self-determination that took root within territories that local populations considered occupied by a foreign power.[40] In the case of the Algerians and Angolans, the occupying foreign power was the French and Portuguese respectively; in the case of the Tibetans, that power was Mao Zedong's Communist China; and in the case of the Biafrans, the only conflict in which the purported aggressors were local to the disputed area, a rival tribe backed by foreign powers. Each of these conflicts played out on the international stage, most commonly through a multitude of United Nations' resolutions and

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] It should be noted that three of the four groups listed above were African. A British Foreign Office memorandum dated 1966 stated that 'in recent years, new and serious refugee problems have arisen in Africa. There are now some 700,000 refugees in that continent, chiefly in the area south of the Sahara. The gravity of the position is underlined by the fact that the United Nations High Commissioner is now devoting to it one half of his total current assistance programme... New refugee situations continue to arise. In the past twelve months or so, there has been an increase of about 80,000 in the number of African refugees under the High Commissioner's mandate. Many more Africans have fled from their homes in fear of persecution, but are not under the mandate...'. Foreign Office memorandum, 'Africa', 25 Oct. 1966 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/190126).

General Assembly political maneuvering.[41] The core issues debated on the floor of the General Assembly were those that the Irish delegation felt strongly about, and had since initial Irish UN membership, namely self-determination, national sovereignty and decolonisation.[42] However, as has been stated, the 1960s saw a readjustment of Irish foreign policy goals, and this can be seen through a study of Irish response to the humanitarian initiatives pursued in relation to each of these situations.

Algeria

The Algerian War of Independence, lasting from 1954 to 1962, featured a nationalist liberation movement that struck out at a solidly Western, anti-communist European power at a time when a cleavage of Western solidarity was seen as detrimental to the world at large. At its most basic, the conflict, fought between French colonial forces and the Algerian nationalist army, the Front de Libération Nationale (hereafter referred to as FLN), was an anti-colonial confrontation that utilised Cold War tensions to further its political goals. The Algerians threatened the West with Soviet and Chinese military intervention in an attempt to pressure Western condemnation of French action. This strategy ultimately proved effective, as de Gaulle was forced to the negotiating table, and eventually to a grudging acknowledgement of Algerian right to self-determination.

How countries chose to respond to this assertion of independence at the time of so many other international issues, tensions and conflicts to contend with, helps bring into focus what were deemed as high priority foreign policy goals. This is true of Ireland, as will be shown, which used the Algerian war to further its foreign, specifically UN, policy. Algeria became an issue on which Ireland could take a stand at the UN, and in the late 1950s no situation better exemplified the manifestation of its desired independent stance. Yet it will also be shown that Algeria can be considered as the point in which Irish UN policy made its move Westward.

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[41] Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 67.

[42] Decolonisation was to become a focal point of UN debate in the 1960s, both within the General Assembly, Security Council and within various humanitarian UN bodies, such as UNHCR. Cohen, *In War's Wake*, p. 12.

The involvement of the UN in the Algerian war was significant. The issue was raised in the Security Council in 1955, 1956 and 1957 and in the General Assembly for seven consecutive sessions, beginning in the 10th session (1955).[43] The UN, as well as international perceptions of the conflict, was a crucial aspect of the FLN's foreign policy, which was aimed at destroying France's international reputation and forcing a declaration of Algerian independence from a succession of French governments. The FLN also engaged with various international rivalries, not just the traditional East-West, Cold War dichotomy. All of this affected Irish foreign policy pertaining to the UN, the Algerian situation and, for our purposes, the subsequent actions taken concerning refugee aid.

Irish UN involvement in the Algerian situation began as soon as Ireland joined the organisation.[44] In 1957, Aiken delivered a speech to the General Assembly outlining a prospective solution to the Algerian conflict. His plan incorporated various points, including guarantees of freedom of speech and religion, Arabic *and* French recognised as national languages and official UN monitoring of the situation.[45] Cruise O'Brien concluded rather early on that any possible solution would need to include some sort of international involvement, and that Ireland, as a Middle Power, had the opportunity to sponsor initiatives that could be considered by both the French and the Algerians. This commitment to involvement within the UN to find a solution to the Algeria question continued into 1960, when the issue of refugees became more pressing, and thus attracted attention from the Irish government. Caution was needed when forming Irish UN policy regarding the Algerian war, however, as Irish desire to support the nationalist activity of a territory fighting for its sovereignty had to be weighed against fostering Western approval. The British, whose high level of activity

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[43] Arnold Fraleigh, 'The Algerian War of Independence' in *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969)*, lxi (April 27-29), pp 10. Skelly states that 'when several Afro-Asian delegations raised the matter at the Tenth General Assembly in 1955 the French delegation walked out, claiming that this violated Article 2.7 of the Charter, which prohibited interference in the domestic affairs of Member States'. Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 68.

[44] For an account of Irish interaction with the Algerian issue during 1955 and 1956, see Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 68-72.

[45] Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 125-28.

within UN humanitarian schemes, such as the WRY, have already been commented upon, were anxious to both help the Algerian refugees and appease the French. Their strategy focused upon channeling 'Her Majesty's Government's further contribution through the United Kingdom Committee for the World Refugee Year' which would 'greatly lessen the likelihood of adverse reactions in the French press and public.'[46]

During the 15th session of the General Assembly, Agenda Item 33, entitled 'Assistance to Refugees' stated that

> the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should:
> (a) continue his present actions;
> (b) use his influence to ensure the continuation of the operation carried out jointly by the Office of the High Commissioner and the League of Red Cross Societies, and, should this prove impossible, draw up and execute a programme for the assumption by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of the responsibility for these refugees from 1 July 1961.[47]

The correspondence between External Affairs and the Irish UN representative pertaining to the above item is interesting. The Irish delegation intervened twice as regarded the above. As sub point b would suggest, there had been a debate concerning continued Red Cross involvement, and the Irish delegation quickly made their point of view known:

> The Irish representative spoke in general terms expressing comprehension of the concern of the High Commissioner and of the delegations of Tunisia and Morocco at the League's decision, but also confidence that the League would not in fact take any action calculated to worsen the conditions of persons in distress. Ireland would to the extent of its ability endeavour to ensure that a solution satisfactory to all parties would be arrived at.[48]

Here is an example of the Irish delegation standing firmly behind its commitment to humanitarian concerns, and attempting to secure aid for the refugees.

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[46] British Embassy, Paris, to the Foreign Office, 1 Apr. 1960 (TNA, Foreign Office 371/153690).
[47] UN General Assembly: Fifteenth session, Third Committee, Agenda Item 33 (a), A/C. 3/L.861/Rev.1, 27 Oct. 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).
[48] Marie MacEntee to External Affairs, 8 Dec. 1960 (NAI, D/TS/1007F/95).

Delving a bit further into the nuances of UN policy, it was further stated that

> a minor drafting amendment was also proposed intended to ensure that the text of the relevant resolution could not be taken as exempting host governments from their responsibilities towards the refugees. This was a rather delicate point to make as, of course, the government of Morocco and Tunisia have in fact been extremely generous in this regard. Our precise suggestion was not accepted but the resolution was modified in the sense we desired. The suggestion was made at the request of the representative of the High Commissioner's Office who feared that the resolution in its original form might not get United States support with consequent detriment to the financing of the entire programme.[49]

One can only ascertain that the Irish suggestion alluded to some sort of statement concerning the political implications of either aid, or the general situation in Algeria, if the High Commissioner's Office was concerned as to the reaction it would elicit from the United States. But here we have a solid example of how Irish humanitarian and refugee concerns were affecting its UN policy.

Another letter followed, which stated that 'many delegates, including ours, were perturbed over the dicision (sic) of the League of Red Cross Societies to terminate its assistance to Algerian Refugees on the 30th June, 1961, especially having regard to the dire circumstances of these unfortunate people'.[50] It was also noted that the one vote against the General Assembly Item 33 was the French vote. The French had obvious political reasons for a negative vote on this agenda item, but they were also not doing themselves any favours within the realm of international opinion by voting against an item aimed at refugee aid. It was these kinds of actions, both at the UN, and other international forums, that the FLN used to fuel its attack on French actions, centering upon France's unethical treatment of Algerians. Even a Middle Power such as Ireland was able to take up a politically motivated position that meant something within the General Assembly.

The government received a further plea from the UNHCR six months later, in June 1961, on the stated date on which the League of Red Cross Societies was

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[49] Ibid.

[50] External Affairs to de Barra (I.R.C.) 9 Dec. 1960 (NAI, D/TS/ 1007F/95).

due to suspend their aid. Included within the plea, there are mentions of further Red Cross involvement, but it can be ascertained that this plan was not approved. The Red Cross continued to be active within Algeria and various international organisations on behalf of the Algerian refugees. This new aid request stated that there was a severe supply crisis and that

> the total cost of the relief operation for 1961 will be close to $7 million. However, this joint relief operation now faces an immediate critical shortage of $1.2 million in cash for the purchase in particular of 370 tons of edible oil, 660 tons of sugar, 505 tons of pulses, 210 tons of soap, at least 70,000 blankets and new clothing especially for children. (emphasis in the original)[51]

External Affairs, the recipients of the above correspondence, forwarded the request to the Irish Red Cross, claiming that, although the previous appeals had been answered generously, it was thought that 'this country should make a further special effort to help alleviate the plight of these unfortunate people'.[52] This was realised in December, when the Irish Red Cross donated a further £500 to the relief of the refugees in Tunisia and Morocco.[53]

The next two years proved turbulent in Algeria, with negotiations between de Gaulle and FLN leadership collapsing in May 1961. It would take a further ten months for a ceasefire to be declared, and a further three until an Algerian affirmation of independence was recognised by the French government. The issue was raised for the last time at the UN during its 16th session. As has already been stated, Irish UN policy was in flux at this time, and the delegation was attempting to toe the line between its traditionally independent UN stance and new foreign policy concerns which Lemass had begun to formulate policy around. For example, how was the delegation to reconcile its traditional support of self-determination with its desire to develop and maintain a close relationship with France? Aiken's address to the Assembly on 20 December reflected the shift in policy. Ireland was to endorse self-rule in principle, yet in a sympathetic manner

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51 F. Schnyder, High Commissioner for Refugees, to External Affairs, 30 June 1961 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

52 External Affairs to de Barra (I.R.C.) 16 Aug. 1961 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

53 Irish Red Cross to External Affairs, 8 Dec. 1961 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

mindful of French sentiment. De Gaulle was also praised for establishing direct contact between the French government and the FLN.[54]

This emerging conciliatory attitude towards France and de Gaulle did not change Ireland's dedication to Algerian refugee aid. As much as this involvement can be seen as due to mainly humanitarian concerns, it could also be viewed as a strategic politically motivated move. Ireland was moving away from its traditional independent UN stance, and there is evidence, domestically and abroad, that this was causing contention. Refugee aid was a safe policy for the government. Related issues, such as the recognition of the Provisional Government of Algeria, proved rather divisive, especially when related to the emergence of Irish alignment with the West. Speaking in the Dáil in 1961, Dr Noel C. Browne stated that 'surely the Taoiseach must have personal experience of the moral support which such recognition would give? Would he not give that support to the Algerian Government which the Algerian Government is looking for from our Government? Wait for America, I suppose'.[55] Making sure that the government could point at its refugee aid, while standing firmly upon its traditional support of humanitarian aid, might have been a way to pacify such detractors.

Even after the official cessation of hostilities, the Algerian refugee problem warranted further attention. The repatriation of the refugees was of the outmost concern, and required the combined cooperation of the UN, the various aid organisations and the various governments (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) involved. The UN and the various aid organisations involved would be responsible for moving the refugees to the border and funneling them through various checkpoints.[56] Medical teams would be present at the border crossings to ensure the health of every refugee. Once the refugees were over the border, they would become wards of their own government.

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[54] Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations,* p. 220-21.

[55] Dr Noel C. Browne, Dáil Debates 187, 11, 22 Mar. 1961.

[56] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees outlines preliminary plans for the repatriation of Algerian refugees, U.N. Special Release (SPL/29), 16 Apr. 1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

The main problem quickly became the immediate housing of the refugees upon their return to Algeria. The UNHCR issued an immediate appeal for tents, as 'the tents will be put up by the refugees near their villages, or as close as possibly to the location of their former homesteads, so that they will be able to rebuild their homes while they retill their land… the immediate provision of tents is essential to the urgent start of the repatriation movement'.[57] This appeal was taken up by External Affairs, which in a letter to the Irish Red Cross, stated that:

> A solution for the problems of the Algerian refugees is happily now in sight, every effort should be made by this country to assist in facilitating the High Commissioner in his final task of resettling the refugees as speedily as possible in their former homes. I am well aware of the excellent work which your Society has already done on behalf of these refugees in the past and I should be most grateful if you would consider whether it would be possible at present for your Society to accede to the High Commissioner's request by supporting the appeal of the League of Red Cross Societies if only to a limited extent.[58]

The Irish Red Cross responded with a stated pledge of £500, as no tentage was available for direct donation.[59]

The government, it seems, was not content with just this contribution. In July, External Affairs contacted the Minister for Agriculture to ascertain whether a further donation of perishable supplies could be sent:

> The Minister however feels that in all the circumstances, and particularly as what is involved now is the return of the refugees to an independent Algeria, consideration might be given to the possibility, independently of and without prejudice to the contributions from the Red Cross Society, of making available small proportions of some of the items which are required for the operations, e.g., powdered milk, sugar, blankets and, perhaps, even wheat.[60]

This reference to 'an independent Algeria', and the fact that aid was now being dispensed directly to refugees returning to the newly independent state, instead of

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[57] Repatriation of Refugees to Algeria High Commissioner Appeal for Tents, U.N. Special Release (SPL/32), 26 Apr.1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

[58] External Affairs to Irish Red Cross, 30 Apr. 1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

[59] Irish Red Cross (de Barra) to External Affairs, 3 May 1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

[60] External Affairs to Minister of Agriculture, 16 July 1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

to refugees in asylum in Tunisia and Morocco, was clearly influencing the aid that External Affairs intended to send.

A similar comment was also made in a letter from External Affairs to the Irish Red Cross, in which it was said that 'I need not stress the desirability of following up our earlier efforts on behalf of the Algerian refugees by supporting the programme which is to resettle them in an independent Algeria'.[61] The idea that Algeria was a newly independent state, an actual expression of the right of a nation to triumph over colonialism, and determine its own future, lent itself to the Irish government's support. And again, aid to refugees was a rather apolitical way to offer solidarity. It was a way to get behind the Algerian cause without overly angering the French. Aid was clearly used as a political tool. External Affairs further stated, that although they had no available money with which to purchase foodstuffs for the donation, it was highly desirable that the Department of Agriculture do so, as 'my Minister is strongly of the opinion that for reasons of a humanitarian and political nature it is advisable to make even a small contribution to this relief programme'.[62]

The question was then raised as to whose responsibility it was to provide the proposed aid. External Affairs thought that, as the 'Government's contributions to the World Food Programme and the Freedom from Hunger Campaign were financed from the Vote for your Department, it would appeal to be more appropriate for you to take the usual steps to implement the proposal'.[63] Agriculture did not agree that it was their responsibility to provide financially for these supplies. Even though the aid proposed was foodstuffs, it was considered international aid, and thus fell under the umbrella of External Affairs:

> It is true that the contribution of 10,000 to the Central Costs of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign was charged to our Vote and that the contribution of 840,000 to the World Food Programme is to be met from the same source, but both of these activities are operated through the Food and Agriculture Organisation, this country's annual subscription to which is paid from the Agriculture Vote. Incidentally, the specific approval of

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61 External Affairs to Irish Red Cross, 20 July 1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

62 External Affairs to Agriculture, 13 Sept. 1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

63 Ibid.

> the Government was obtained for the making of both of these contributions. On the other hand, contributions to the United Nations Refugee fund are provided out of the Vote for International Cooperation administered by your Department and it seems to us, in the circumstances, that any donation towards United Nations work for the Algerian refugees whether in the form of foodstuffs or other commodities should appropriately be borne on that Vote.[64]

This shows that between the departments there was a perceived delineation as to which were responsible for what aid contributions.

It is stated in a League of the Red Cross Societies publication, entitled *Relief to Algerian Refugees*, that Ireland contributed in Swiss Francs 6,304.50 in cash and 5,000 in kind, totaling 11,304.50 to Algerian refugee aid.[65]

Angola

The Angolan conflict began in early 1961 with a series of uprisings against the regional colonial power, Portugal. The conflict began as an anti-colonial war waged by a national liberation movement, and ended in a protracted civil war waged between the various Angolan national liberation groups. It was to span thirty-five years, kill half a million people, involve troops from four countries (Angola, Portugal, South Africa and Cuba), elicit multiple superpower assistance (USA, USSR and China) and four rounds of negotiations before peace was achieved.[66] The UN became involved, as would be expected, and in March the Irish delegation voted in favour of putting the question of Angola on the Assembly Agenda.[67] The General Assembly passed a resolution in April, calling upon 'the Government of Portugal to consider urgently the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and in accordance with the Charter of United Nations…'[68] It should be stated that General Assembly resolution 1514 was the Declaration on

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[64] Agriculture to External Affairs, 1 Oct. 1962 (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

[65] League of the Red Cross Societies, *Relief to Algerian Refugees,* undated (NAI, DFA/2002/19/127).

[66] Christine M. Knudsen and I. William Zartman, 'The Large Small War in Angola' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* dxli (Sept., 1995), pp 130-43.

[67] Frank Aiken, Dáil Debates 188, 17, 12 Apr. 1961.

[68] UN General Assembly, Resolution 1603 (XV).

Granting of Independence to Countries and Peoples, which had been adopted in December 1960.[69] This resolution was adopted with eighty-nine votes in favour, none opposed and nine abstentions.[70] A further Security Council resolution was passed in June, with nine in favour and two abstentions, those being France and the UK.

As with such conflicts, the war created the problem of refugees. In May, External Affairs contacted the Irish Red Cross, stating that the estimated number of Angolan refugees in the Congo was about 80,000, and that between 200 and 250 refugees were continuing to arrive daily.[71] The International Red Cross was active in the area, and monetary aid from the British Red Cross had already amounted to £165,000. External Affairs, as in previous cases, contacted the Irish Red Cross, asking if there was anything that could be done:

> I am fully aware of the many calls on the limited resources of your Society and I am most appreciative of your co-operation and response to many previous requests in the past for assistance to relieve the position of refugees in many parts of the world. I, therefore, hesitate to approach you in regard to the Angolan refugees. I feel, however, that their position and the international implications involved are sufficiently grave to warrant an interest on our part. It would, therefore, be a good gesture on Ireland's part if your Society would be so kind as to consider making a contribution through the appropriate channels for relief of the refugees from Angola now in the Congo.[72]

The language is familiar. It was not implied that the decision to aid these refugees was made void of any humanitarian spirit, but there were clearly positive political implications in doing so. The 'international implications' most likely referred to the possibility that such a large group of displaced persons would destabilise the region, especially a region already in a state of great flux, and thus led to an increase in international tension. This was still a great concern of External Affairs and of Aiken in particular, even if, at this point, the shift in Irish foreign policy was in full swing.

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[69] UN General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV).

[70] The nine abstentions consisted of major colonial powers, with the exception of the Dominican Republic.

[71] External Affairs to Irish Red Cross, 28 May 1961 (NAI, DFA/419/33/24).

[72] Ibid.

Interestingly, it was assumed that the Irish public would be well aware of the situation in the Congo, and as such would be desirous to contribute monetarily. The Irish Red Cross was anxious that such contributions be channeled through the Society and that if the Society had in its possession 'a note from the Minister on the desirability of the Irish Red Cross being associated with the relief efforts for the Angolan refugees in the Congo it would considerably facilitate the position of the Society in appealing for funds for this purpose and receiving private donations'.[73]

In any case, the Irish Red Cross did not institute a formal appeal, but instead donated £1,000 specifically to the Angolan refugees in July.[74] It was also stated in Irish Red Cross reports that some of the monetary aid dispensed to the Congo Relief Fund, in connection with the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC), was used to provide relief for the Angolan refugees. As of October 1961, Ireland had contributed £11,000 to this fund. The only available figures state the international totals given to the Congo Relief Fund, and how much of this amount was spent on the Angolan refugees. As such, it cannot be known specifically what amount of Irish money given to the Congo Relief Fund went to the Angolans.[75]

Tibet

In 1949, Mao Zedong succeeded in securing a victory for the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter referred to as the CCP) against the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War. Upon doing so, he made it clear that he considered Tibet as an integral part of a united China, and as such would pursue its successful integration. Two years later, upon the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, Mao deemed this successful integration well underway. However, Mao's disregard of Tibetan cultural heritage and political norms allowed discontent to grow over the proceeding years, and by March 1959, an open anti-Communist, anti-Chinese popular rebellion was fully underway in Lhasa. Military engagements between the

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[73] Unsigned memorandum, 27 June 1961 (NAI, DFA/419/33/24).

[74] Irish Red Cross to External Affairs, 7 July 1961 (NAI, DFA/419/33/24).

[75] Irish Red Cross, Report on the Congo Relief (NAI, DFA/419/33/24).

Chinese People's Liberation Army (hereafter referred to as the PLA) and the Tibetan rebel force began and by May 1959, there were present in India up to 7,000 Tibetan refugees.[76] Refugees also made their way into Nepal. Fighting continued into 1962, but as has been seen time and time again elsewhere, the refugee situation created by the warfare lingered still longer.

The issue of Tibet became a contentious one at the UN, with Ireland playing a crucial role. Ireland, co-sponsoring with Malaysia, introduced a resolution in the General Assembly in October 1959. The resolution, while not explicitly referring to China as the perpetrator, condemned the suppression of the 'cultural and religious heritage of the people of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed'.[77] The resolution further deplored 'the effect of these events in increasing international tension and in embittering the relations between peoples at a time when earnest and positive efforts are being made by responsible leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations'.[78] The resolution passed with forty-five votes in favour, nine against and twenty-six abstentions.[79]

There were various reasons why the Irish delegation took the lead in what would be considered a controversial UN initiative. It was thought that taking a pro-West, anti-Communist stance on this issue would deflect Western criticism concerning the Irish stance on the China Vote.[80] Taking the lead on the Tibetan

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[76] Chen Jian, 'The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union' in *Journal of Cold War Studies,* viii, no.3 (Summer, 2006), pp 54.

[77] UN General Assembly, Resolution 1353 (XIV). Kate O'Malley states that the resolution was 'moderate in scope, confined to the human rights aspects of the situation with no explicit reference to Tibetan independence'. "China is more important to you than Armagh': Frank Aiken and Tibet' in Evans and Kelly (eds), *Frank* Aiken, p. 282.

[78] UN General Assembly, Resolution 1353 (XIV).

[79] O'Malley, 'Frank Aiken and Tibet', p. 283.

[80] In 1957, Aiken voted in favour of opening up discussion concerning the possession of China's UN seat, which continued to be held by Formosa/Tibet and not by the People's Republic of China. This vote shocked western sentiment, most notably the United States, as well as the Catholic Church. Kate O' Malley states that 'Aiken was ultimately a pragmatist... his view was that a vote for discussion was clearly the correct approach, bit this candid arguments did not hold water with his many detractors'. O'Malley, 'Frank Aiken and Tibet', *Frank Aiken,* pg. 278. The Scandinavian countries also voted to discuss China's seat. Norman Macqueen, 'Frank Aiken and Irish Activism at the United Nations, 1957-61' in *The International History Review*, vi, no. 2 (May, 1984), pp 220.

initiative would reinforce Irish anti-communist, pro-West credentials. The initiative also stood for everything that the Irish UN delegation supported in 1959, namely the defence of the sovereignty of small nations, the right to self-determination and the upholding of international humanitarian standards. Here we see an intersection of old and new political concerns; both were conveniently achieved by the same action in this situation. Lemass, concerned with instituting a more pragmatic UN approach, found common ground with what he perceived as Aiken's idealistic UN initiatives.[81] Furthermore, in 1961 Ireland co-sponsored a resolution affirming the right to self-determination of the Tibetan people.[82] This resolution also passed, with a vote of fifty-six in favour, eleven against and twenty-nine abstentions.

As previously stated, the situation in Tibet created thousands of refugees, of whom many ended up in Nepal. The UNHCR got involved, and in 1964 sent out a report concerning the situation of the refugees. The report stated that the International Red Cross had been involved with the refugee problem since 1960, and that at their request UNHCR had donated a total of $129,295 between 1960 and 1963 for the relief of the refugees.[83] The International Red Cross suspended its aid in May 1963 causing the Nepalese government to request further aid from UNHCR. A UNHCR representative visited various refugee centres, reporting that

> there are at present about 11,000 refugees in the country. The Swiss Red Cross is at present providing services such as medical care, distribution of food and welfare generally for some 3,300 of the refugees…some 4,000 refugees are living on the northern border of Nepal to the far west of the country, but little is known about their condition… finally, there are about 3,700 mainly on the Nepal borders to the north and north-east of Kathmandu, who are in immediate need and for whom it may be hoped that practical measures of aid will prove feasible now.[84]

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[81] O'Malley also cites that for Lemass the overriding justification for Irish UN activity regarding Tibet was indeed to placate western opinion regarding the China Vote, but that for Aiken, the cause ran deeper; his past as a revolutionary fighting for the freedom of his country affected how he viewed the Tibetan situation. O'MAlley, 'Frank Aiken and Tibet', *Frank Aiken,* pg. 281.

[82] UN General Assembly, Resolution 1723 (XVI). The affirmation of the Tibetan right to self-determination signaled a radicalisation of Irish language regarding the situation.

[83] UNHCR Report 'Note on the Situation of Refugees in Nepal' (A/AC.96/241), 4 May 1964 (NAI, DFA 2001/43/886).

[84] Ibid.

This was clearly a situation that required international aid, and as Ireland had been so involved previously with the Tibetan cause at the UN, it could have been expected that aid would be forthcoming. What is interesting about this situation is the discussion that arose concerning how aid was to be dispersed to the Tibetan refugees. Examining the following debate concerning the emergence of a new aid committee, and its request that Ireland join, fosters an examination of how the government dealt with the politics concerning other, non-UN international committees concerned with refugee aid.

Discussion began in 1965, when the Irish Red Cross sent a report to Charles Haughey, then the Minister for Agriculture. The Irish Red Cross memorandum concerned a discussion between Leslie de Barra, chairman of both the Irish Red Cross and National Freedom from Hunger Campaign Committee (hereafter referred to as FFHC), and the UNHCR Representative to Ireland and the United Kingdom Mr J.D.R. Kelly, regarding a new initiative meant to aid the Tibetan refugees. Kelly stated that the voluntary organisations of various small European countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands) had decided to form an ad hoc Committee concerned with creating and implementing a FFHC project specifically geared towards Tibetan refugees in Nepal and India.[85] The project focused on the settlement and integration into agriculture of the refugees in their host countries. The committee was due to meet in The Hague in October, and the collection was to be 'secured by a crash programme in all the participating countries from 24th-31st October'.[86] It was further stated that 'as Ireland is one of the small nations of Europe the ad hoc Committee is anxious to have our participation'.[87]

De Barra went on to state that Kelly gave her the following information: the idea originated from one of the four Scandinavian countries and thus not from the UNHCR; the members might not want the involvement of Britain, France or

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[85] Irish Red Cross memorandum (de Barra), 11 June 1965 (NAI, DFA/ 2001/43/886).
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.

Germany as they wished the action to be confined to small European countries; and that he (Kelly) thought it undesirable to mention this to India's Ambassador to Ireland.[88] The preoccupation with the desire that only small European countries would take part in the scheme is not surprising. One can only wonder what action the Irish government would have taken in such a scheme in, say 1958 or 1959. In the period under review in this chapter, the mid-1960s, foreign policy concerns were based more firmly in the pro-West camp, and as such with friendly relations with the larger European countries that are specifically listed as undesirable partners, i.e. Britain, France and Germany.

> De Barra also informed Kelly
>
> (i) that all operations in Ireland for United Nations Agencies were the concern of the Irish Government, so I could not say how the suggestions would be received. I told him that relief for refugees is carried out by the Red Cross either at the request of our Government or at the request of the League of Red Cross Societies.
> (ii) that the ad hoc Committee appeared more or less as a splinter group, a break- away group from Rome and that the idea of working in with it might not be compatible with the method already agreed on by the Irish Government on action projects, i.e. the project to be worked from donor government to receiving government via FAO.[89]

These comments show that de Barra had a relatively solid grasp of Irish foreign policy concerns as they related to refugee aid. She recognised that as a sort of splinter group, one that was not officially sanctioned by either the UNHCR or the International Red Cross, there could be political implications for involvement. As has been shown, since the cessation of World War Two and the immediate refugee crisis in the late 1940s, there had been almost no Irish government involvement with refugee aid organisations *other* than the UNHCR, other UN bodies or the Red Cross. As this group was clearly concerned with some kind of political agenda outside of its obvious humanitarian concerns, it was viewed with rather some skepticism.

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[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

Haughey, concurring with de Barra, thought that before Ireland even thought to get involved, it would be useful to 'temporize along the foregoing lines until a clearer picture emerges of where the proposal outlined by him [Kelly] originated, what precisely it would involve for the Irish F.F.H.C. if it were to give its support and what support was being given to it by the other European countries mentioned'.[90] The usual concern over what other countries were contributing, or getting involved in the project, was present, as well as an apparent confusion regarding the specific organisation of the project.

Haughey was also concerned that the delineation between refugee aid and that of relief of world hunger would become blurred. 'Basically I feel that the concept of aid for refugees, in whatever form the aid is given, is one which is quite distinct from that of the relief of world hunger and that an attempted fusion of both in the mind of the Irish public would not be in the best interests of either.'[91] There was a desire to keep refugee aid as its own entity, especially when the aid came under the auspices of a programme not designed specifically for refugees. Another issue was the fusion of refugee aid and world hunger relief in the minds of the Irish public. It would have been optimal for the public to possess an understanding that public or government funds may be conscripted for both of these issues independently of each other:

> The Irish people have accepted that the Society takes on relief work for refugees
>
> and sufferers from war and natural disasters, solely on the advice and appeal of the International Red Cross Committee or the League of Red Cross Societies. The Society was invited by our Government to undertake the National Collection for two U.N. Agencies: F.A.O. Freedom from Hunger Campaign and the U.N.H.C.R. for World Refugee Year, and our people understood this. Were we to undertake the issue of relief and help on appeals from other sources, we would be inundated, and the main objects of Red Cross work would be overshadowed.[92]

The government had a well-organised system for dealing with refugee aid, and it seemed that they were unwilling to rock the boat.

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[90] Haughey to de Barra, undated (NAI, DFA/2001/43/886).

[91] Ibid.

[92] Haughey to de Barra, 13 July 1965 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/886).

There was also the issue of FFHC funds being channeled towards specific refugee aid, and not that of overall world hunger, as was the campaign's original objective. 'Having regard to the extent of the hunger problem in India, it would hardly be desirable to single out refugees alone for special assistance under the FFHC. However unfortunate their plight, refugees are more the concern of organisations like the Red Cross than of the FFHC.'[93] Furthermore, it was thought that 'the attempt to graft a aid-to-refugees programme on to the FFHC was rather impertinent and was simply an effort to use a well-supported and successful movement like the FFHC to help out a less successful one'.[94] Clearly, the government had quite a few concerns about this proposal.

The above exchange, while interesting as it pertained to the internal debate resulting from the proposed involvement in the appeal, can be considered as superfluous. Kelly informed the government that the new committee was, in fact, not connected to the FFHC, nor the UNHCR. The appeal, however, was picking up steam, and he highly recommended that Ireland consider becoming involved:

> It is not a UNHCR Appeal, but was initiated and is being undertaken by the main voluntary organisations in the five Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands so far, and organisations in many other countries of Europe are expected also to participate. The voluntary organisations will allocate the funds they collect for any refugee project they wish; many already have their own refugee problems in the developing countries, and will no doubt use the funds for and within their own programmes. UNHCR is naturally very pleased to see funds being used for the final settlement of refugee problems, and, as the ad hoc European Working Group has no representative in Ireland, I acted as a kind of unofficial agent for them, to see whether the appropriate authorities in Ireland would be interested in also participating.[95]

The above clarified all points of contention, as well as encouraging Irish participation. Kelly seemed to favour Irish involvement, telling de Barra that 'the European Appeal is gathering momentum, and looks like being a very big movement indeed next year in the field of voluntary European aid to developing

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[93] Unsigned, 28 June 1965 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/886).

[94] Ibid.

[95] J.C.R. Kelly (UNHCR Representative to Ireland and the United Kingdom) to Mrs Barry (IRC), 26 July 1965 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/886).

countries. If all the European countries envisaged do in fact participate, I am sure that, on purely personal grounds, we would neither of us like to see Ireland as the only one outside'.[96]

Even with all of this encouragement, the response was negative. The Irish Red Cross, in agreement with the government, decided to wait before making a final decision. The issue was raised again in November, and the further development of the appeal was discussed. Kelly informed External Affairs that the base of support for the Appeal had widened considerably. Now nine countries of Western Europe (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the UK) were active participants. Austria, France, Sweden, Italy and Luxembourg were also expected to become involved.[97] Interestingly, after multiple assertions that the UN was not in fact involved in the appeal, the UNHCR Executive Committee 'decided also to 'recommend that in 1966, UN Day which is 24 October, be designated as a day dedicated to the cause of refugees''.[98] Apparently, the Danish delegation was considering sponsoring a resolution at the General Assembly, which Kelly hoped that 'the Irish Delegation to the UN will feel itself able to support'.[99]

Indeed, on 7 December at the General Assembly's Twentieth session, resolution 2038 (XX) was passed. The UN expressed its 'keen satisfaction for the action thus undertaken, as well as for the attachment shown by its promoters to the ideals and objectives of the United Nations in choosing 24 October as the launching date for the campaign; 2. Decides that, in 1966, United Nations Day will be dedicated to the cause of refugees'.[100] Interestingly, within six weeks of the above resolution, the Irish government had reversed its previous position, and began to advocate for Irish involvement in the appeal. It could be speculated that UN endorsement of the appeal, coupled with expanded Western European support was enough to push the government into action. Agriculture and External Affairs

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[96] Ibid.

[97] J.C.R. Kelly to Durnin, External Affairs, 16 Nov. 1965 (NAI, DFA/2002/43/886).

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] UN General Assembly, Resolution 2038 (XX).

discussed the implications of involvement and that there was no persuasive reason why Irish participation should be withheld.

The previous sections within this chapter focused on Irish refugee aid as it functioned as a political tool in the UN. This section highlights this aspect of Irish aid, yet differs as to how it allows for analysis. The government's response to a request for refugee aid emanating from a non-UN affiliated appeal is examined and a few conclusions may be drawn. It seems that the government was satisfied with the system that they had in place for the allocation of refugee aid, namely that the government would receive an appeal, pass it on to the Irish Red Cross and allow that organisation to run a government approved appeal. The appeals received by the government were almost exclusively UN initiatives. Clearly, when a non-UN appeal was received, the initial reaction was that of sympathetic inaction. It was almost as if it was assumed that supporting UN refugee aid initiatives was enough, that the state was already doing its part. It could be argued that participating in UN refugee schemes had the double benefit of involvement in humanitarian work *and* of bolstering the Irish UN reputation. A cynic, or some might say a realist, might argue that if a state was to become involved in aid relief, why not get maximum self-benefit.

The Nigerian Civil War and the Biafran refugee crisis

The modern state of Nigeria was formed by the British in the early twentieth century, when a large area containing various tribes was combined to form one large state. In 1954, the state had become a federation, with full independence following in 1963. Nigeria, upon independence, was comprised of three federated regions, all with different ethnic majorities:

> Of the three major regions with which Nigeria began independence, the West was represented at the centre as an embittered opposition while the East and North ruled together in a basically incompatible alliance until, in 1964, they broke apart. For this there was more than one discreditable reason, but the basic cause was the claim of the North, after a disputed census, to a numerical preponderance which, with the great majority of its people voting for tribal rather than political interests, could have put it in permanent control of the Federation.[101]

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[101] Margery Perham, 'Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War' in *International Affairs,* xlvi, no. 2 (April, 1970), pp 232.

A slew of political assassinations and an attempted coup followed in January 1966, with further persecution and ethnically based killings in the North. A further coup occurred in July, perpetrated by Northern military elements. This led to the oil-rich Eastern region signaling its intent to secede from Nigeria, which it did officially on 30 May 1967, declaring itself the new state of Biafra.[102]

At first glance, one might assume that Ireland would have viewed the secession of Biafra as a group of people asserting their right to self-determination, a right that the Irish government had upheld time and time again. However, it must be remembered that the other instances in which Ireland came out strongly for the principle of self-determination, examples of which in this chapter could be the Algerians, Angolans and Tibetans, were within the context of a national struggle against a "ruling" i.e. colonial power. The integrity of national borders, and the right of a group to seceded *within* a sovereign, self-ruling nation was a different story, and held different political implications.

As such, Ireland recognised the Federal Republic of Nigeria *de jure* in September 1967. The government seemed wary of making any pro-Biafran statements, and approached the situation with great caution. One concern was the proportionally large number of Irish Catholic missionary personnel in territory held by both the Biafrans and the Nigerian Federal Government.[103] Further complicating the situation was the nature of the war, and the subsequent claims of Nigerian acts of genocide against the Biafran population, which created outcry amongst both the Irish public, and the opposition government within the Dáil.[104] How Ireland dealt with appeals for refugee aid can be viewed within this complex

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[102] For more concerning the Nigeria-Biafran conflict see Perham, 'Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War', pp 231-46.

[103] 'Nigeria was the showpiece of Ireland's "religious empire". The greatest concentration of Irish missionaries in the entire world was to be found there. Of that country's 850 Catholic priests, more than 500 were Irish; the Irish church ran 2,419 primary schools catering for 561,318 pupils, twice as many as in the remainder of Africa; the 47 religious-run hospitals serving 714,441 patients equaled the figure for the rest of the continent put together.' Staunton, 'The case of Biafra', pp 513.

[104] Staunton states that the Biafran conflict was raised by Fine Gael and Labour (both in opposition) in the Dáil in February, March, April and July 1968. Staunton, 'The Case of Biafra', pp 516.

international context, and illustrates how aid was used as a politically moderating tool.

By 1968, the government had already donated a substantial amount to the International Red Cross for the relief of refugees and displaced persons within Nigeria:[105]

> 100,000 was voted by the Dáil on the 9th July for the purchase of food and medicines in Ireland for dispatch to Nigeria and particularly to the distressed districts in the eastern area. So far 84,890 has been expended by Cumann Croise Deirge na hÉireann; 62,790 for relief supplies dispatched from Ireland to Fernando Po for onwards transmission to the distressed eastern districts; 12,100 for relief supplies for distribution in the distressed areas under Federal control; and 10,000 in cash, recently sent to the International Red Cross to help defray transport costs, which the Society could not meet without obtaining additional donations.[106]

The International Red Cross was viewed by the Nigerian government as the 'only aid organisation without a major credibility problem'.[107] The Irish Red Cross had raised £25,000 from its public appeal and the Irish Catholic hierarchy public appeal had raised £120,000.[108] The newly created Africa Concern organisation,[109] which was to become a diplomatic nightmare for the Irish government, had also raised a further £278,000.[110]

As was illustrated in the last section pertaining to the Tibetan refugees, a claim was leveled against the Irish government as to their fixation on the International Red Cross. In a meeting in April 1969, Aiken met with Alex Modu, formerly attaché at the Nigerian embassy in Dublin and now a representative of

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[105] For an account of International Red Cross aid activity during the Nigerian war, see Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps, ''Organising the unpredictable': the Nigeria-Biafra war and its impact on the ICRC' in *International Review of the Red Cross,* xciv, no. 888 (Dec., 2012), pp 1409-32.

[106] Frank Aiken, Dáil Debates 237, 1885-1886, 4 Dec. 1968.

[107] Staunton, 'The Case of Biafra', pp 518.

[108] Ibid.

[109] One of the most contentious and controversial domestic relief agencies, Africa Concern, now Concern Worldwide, was founded in 1968 in response to humanitarian appeals for aid and intervention resulting from Biafran succession in 1967. The Biafran conflict would prove extremely controversial, as claims of genocide were leveled at Nigerian officials, and debates concerning issues such as self-determination and state sovereignty were played out on the UN stage. Africa Concern became suspected of running guns for the Biafran separatists, as well as possibly illegally removing children from Nigerian territory and bringing them to Ireland.

[110] Staunton, 'The Case of Biafra', pp 518

the Biafran government, and Ignatius Kogbara, head of the Biafran office in London. One topic of conversation concerned aid channels. Kogbara stated his approval for Africa Concern and that he did not understand the Irish governments apparent fixation on the International Red Cross, which he did not consider apolitical in the conflict. Aiken 'pointed out Ireland's aid contribution, some ten times larger per head of population than that of most other countries, including the United States. He defended the government's policy of supporting the Red Cross as dating back long before the war'.[111]

This issue was also raised in the Dáil on various occasions, both by the opposition party and proponents of Biafran support. In July, Cruise O'Brien asked Dr Hillery, who had replaced Aiken as Minister for External Affairs that month upon his retirement from ministerial duties, 'whether the Government are contributing to the present emergency relief operations of Joint Church Aid and Caritas Internationalis'?[112] Hillery responded that the Red Cross had always been the channel through which Irish monetary aid was directed. Cruise O'Brien then asked 'would the Minister agree that the reason the Government are channelling relief exclusively through the Red Cross, and not contributing to the emergency relief operations of Joint Church Aid – which are at present more effective – is that the British Government does not approve of the missionary relief activities in Biafra at present'?[113] Hillery responded, stating that he 'would not agree with this at all. The International Red Cross is the internationally accepted organisation for relief. Our policy from the very beginning has been to channel aid through the Red Cross. This policy was decided on by our Government without any regard to what other Governments think'.[114] There was a concern that, even though the government was clearly concerned with the humanitarian situation in Nigeria, and was willing to send aid, that the aid was becoming politicised. The government's concern, however, would seem rather justified, as it seemed common knowledge

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111 Ibid., pp 523.

112 Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, Dáil Debates 241, 1002-1003, 22 July 1969.

113 Ibid.

114 Dr Hillery, Dáil Debates 241, 1003-1004, 22 July 1969.

that other aid organisations were indeed involved with arms running for the Biafrans.

The UN became involved in relief efforts, yet did not make any assertions concerning the rights of the Biafrans to self-determination. It was felt in this situation that international borders had to be guaranteed, and that this was an internal state matter, not one warranting international intervention by the UN. It must also be remembered that at least three members of the Security Council were supplying arms, the French to Biafra and the British and Russians to the Federal Nigerian government, so any Security Council involvement was nullified.

The UN's involvement with refugees created by the Nigerian war did allow for a discussion of refugee admittance into Ireland. Two UNHCR reports in late August and early September described the situation of Nigerian refugees in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. In Gabon,

> an increasing number of children were receiving generous aid from a number of nongovernmental organizations acting with the support of the Government, the latter appealed for additional assistance from the High Commissioner. In July 1969, the Gabonese Government made a more detailed request to the High Commissioner for an amount of $27,000 to finance the construction of a dormitory with sanitary facilities for 90 children. By the end of July, the total number of children from Nigeria admitted to Gabon was approximately 1,400.[115]

The issue of refugee children, and the possibility of bringing them to Ireland, was to facilitate quite a discussion both within the Dáil, and within the larger international community.

In November, the issue was indeed raised in the Dáil. Dr Byrne of Fine Gael asked if the Minister would consider setting up a refugee camp in Ireland for refugees from Biafra. The response given in the Dáil was a simple no, yet a note attached to the question in the relevant file further explains the government's stance:

> There have been schemes proposed in Britain and elsewhere in the past for bringing Biafran children in large numbers for rehabilitation in Europe and North America. It is generally held that such children would be better off

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[115] UN/GA, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (A/AC.96/INF.96), 27 Aug. 1969 (NAI, DFA/2001/43/141).

> in an environment nearer to home, and there are camps for such children in Gabon and Ivory Coast, in which Caritas and Africa Concern have been involved. Even here it is generally held that only the most needy cases should be moved from their home environment, unless conditions in Biafra become really desperate.[116]

Furthermore, Ben Briscoe, son of Robert Briscoe who had been a proponent of refugee aid, particularly for European Jews, in the 1930s and 1940s, raised the feasibility of setting up a refugee settlement within the state:

> I have a feeling that the people in this country want to do more than just send money to buy food and drugs; I think they want to participate to a greater degree in bringing relief to these people. It has occurred to me that the Minister might consider setting up 'villages of peace'... I am sure there are many people in this country who would be willing to adopt refugees, not necessarily orphans but children who would inevitably starve to death because of the massiveness of the problem confronting those concerned with bringing relief.[117]

Even if these various schemes were never realised, it is important to know that there was discussion concerning the admittance of these refugees, and that were influencing and informing government policy regarding the issue.

Around this time, some refugee children were indeed admitted into Ireland, though there is seemingly no documentation of this within the departmental files of External Affairs or Justice. A press release, dated November 1969, emanating from the Africa Concern aid organisation stated that

> six months ago Africa Concern brought two teenage girls to Ireland to complete their education as secondary schooling had been interrupted by the war. Rosalin and Mary Mercy Effiong have settled in very happily to school life with the Dominican nuns at Cabra. Yesterday their twelve year old brother joined them in Ireland. At Christmas they will all be together in the house of an Irish family in Ballybrack. More recently four children were brought to Ireland for specialist treatment: three of them Biafrans and one a boy from the Ivory Coast. Alice Ijeoma, having had an operation in the Richmond Hospital for damage done to her skull in an airraid is now in a Smyloe home, Helen is in Cappagh Hospital for treatment of tuberculosis of the hip while Mathilda and Pascal are in the girls and boys schools for deaf mutes in Cabra.[118]

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[116] Note, undated (NAI, DFA/2001/43/141).

[117] Ben Briscoe, Dáil Debates 243, 657-658, 5 Dec. 1969.

[118] Africa Concern Ltd. Press Release, 19 Nov. 1969 (NAI, DFA/2001/43/141).

The press release concludes, stating that 'maybe other families would like to take young Biafran boys or teenage girls into their houses and look after them until the end of the war' and that 'all will return to Biafra when conditions have returned to normal'.[119]

There is no further information concerning the above children within the archival files. However, there are mentions of how the government wanted to stop Africa Concern from bringing any more children into the country. There were various political concerns pertaining to the admittance of these children, and it became a rather explosive issue in the spring of 1970.[120] The Irish ambassador to Nigeria, Paul Keating,[121] wrote to a member of External Affairs, stating that it was 'most desirable that Africa Concern be told categorically that under no circumstances may they bring children of the order of 200 to Ireland, and even when there are special health or educational reasons for bringing any children there it should only be done, I feel, with the categorical permission of the children's parents'.[122] Evidently, issues concerning the repatriation of children removed from Biafran territory were becoming problematic. There were also

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[119] Ibid.

[120] The same month that Keating was advising against the admission of Biafran children another potentially problematic issue arose. The British began to worry that Irish authorities would see fit to admit Colonel Ojukwu, the exiled Biafran leader. The British did not want Ojukwu to potentially have access to Britain, and had already decided that he would not be afforded leave to land in UK. 'There is another source of danger. If Colonel Ojukwu were admitted by the Republic of Ireland he would then be free to come to the United Kingdom. If he crossed the land border into Northern Ireland, he would in practice be free of all immigration control for the duration of his stay in the United Kingdom and could come to this country and remain here. I see no way round this. If he came here openly direct from the Republic, we could within 28 days of his arrival require him to submit to examination, refuse him entry on security grounds and send him away. If he came unrecognised from the Republic, and we did not discover his presence here until 28 days had elapsed, I am advised that there is no provision in our law under which we could eject him. The Irish authorities might have admitted him subject to a time restriction, although this is contrary to their normal practice; but, even if they had done so, there is nothing in our law to say that such a condition has effect in the United Kingdom, or that we have power to curtail his stay.' 'Commonwealth Immigration: Colonel Ojukwu: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department', 8 Apr. 1970 (TNA, CAB 129/149/10).

[121] Keating had taken up his post in Lagos in August 1968. He had previously been the first secretary in the political and United Nations section of External Affairs. Staunton, 'The Case of Biafra', pp 519.

[122] Confidential Report (P.12/7/3), Paul Keating, Irish Ambassador to Lagos to O'Tuathail, 30 Apr. 1970 (NAI, DFA/2001/43/141).

reports of missionaries unlawfully removing orphaned children from Nigerian territory, and this was further straining Irish missionary relations with the Nigerian government. Keating further claimed that 'I think it would be most dangerous to bring unclaimed orphans to Ireland. This matter arose to-day in a conversation I had with Father O'Connor of Abakaliki who is extremely upset by Africa Concern's activities and fears very much that they may result in the expulsion of the remaining missionaries from the East-Central State'.[123] As traditional Irish involvement in Nigeria centred upon its Catholic missionary activity, any policy that hindered, or worse yet, threatened to sever this link, was adamantly opposed by the government. As such, the admittance into Ireland of a large number of Biafran children was deemed an unnecessary risk with negative political implications.

Chilean Refugee Admittance

In September of 1970, Salvador Allende of the Popular Unity coalition received 36% of votes in the Chilean presidential election. His leading opponents, the conservative Alessandri and the Christian Democrat Tomic, won 35% and 28% respectively.[124] Due to the failure of any candidate to secure a proper majority, the Chilean Congress was responsible for choosing a candidate. Allende, whose Marxist ideology, radical political platforms and endorsement by communist and socialist circles, was not whom the Congress wanted to place in power. Due to accepted institutional practice however, the Congress felt pressured to elect Allende and thus began the sequence of events that would end in the 1973 military led coup d'état.

Allende instituted various reforms, with the end goal of socialising Chilean political, economic and social organisation. In doing so, he fundamentally altered the function of Chile's political institutions, ruining the prior institutional continuity. Prior to 1970, the Chilean government was organised around the acceptance of compromise as a political tool. The President would openly bargain with the opposition parties to form policy. The government functioned by

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123 Ibid.

124 Peter A. Goldberg, 'The Politics of the Allende Overthrow in Chile' in *Political Science Quarterly,* xc, no. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp 97.

successfully maneuvering a complex system of top party leadership adherence to ideological concerns, while local government dealt with their constituencies through the administration of favours. Interest groups were not broadly, or nationally organised. This all changed fundamentally when Allende took power. Through his attempted socialisation of the economy, he essentially created class cohesion and a national movement that widened in scope and activity until it threatened his government's very survival.[125] The formation and implementation of policy was at a standstill due to Allende's inability to successfully interact with his conservative Congress. The economy, already terribly affected by an American credit embargo, fell into high inflation and civil unrest grew steadily until the coup in September 1973.

Immediately following the initial military coup d'état, a junta was established, and within the year Allende's own general, Augusto Pinochet, was firmly ensconced in power as the new president. The political parties that had formed the Popular Unity coalition were pronounced illegal, and further repressive measures were enacted.

Unsurprisingly, this situation created thousands of refugees, and le d to the first serious consideration of the admittance of a substantial number of refugees into the Irish state for permanent settlement since the late 1950s. The discussion began in December 1973 when the issue was raised in the Dáil. The UN refugee camps were due to close by the end of 1973, and as such, the query concerned bringing Chilean refugees to Ireland: 'The purpose of the question is entirely humanitarian, and the Government did respond when a similar problem arose in Hungary. Is the Minister aware, that, while the official death toll of the coup was 590, information from Santiago alone indicated that 2,796 bodies were recovered 14 days after the coup and that perhaps 20,000 people have been executed?'[126] The Hungarians would serve as a precedent for the admittance of the Chileans. A precedent perhaps, but not an apt comparison, as will be shown. Yes, some similarities between the two situations did beg mention; both conflicts arose from

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[125] Ibid., pp 104-5.

[126] Noel T. Lemass, Dáil Debates 269, 1805-1806, 13 Dec. 1973.

a domestically military-supported overthrow of what was perceived as a 'foreign' communist government. The term 'foreign' is used here not to signify a ruler of actual foreign nationality, yet one that would, and could, have been perceived as alien by a large percentage of the population in question. Yet, differences were plentiful, and the ways in which the Irish authorities chose to handle the Chileans would prove varied from that of the Hungarians.

A memorandum emanating from Foreign Affairs was circulated in February 1974, outlining the situation. It stated that Foreign Affairs had been approached by the UNHCR, Amnesty International, the Irish Order of Franciscans and the President of the European Communities on behalf of the Chilean refugees.[127] The refugees fell into two categories: Chilean nationals and people from other Latin American countries that sought refuge in Chile under the Allende government. 'The precise number of persons in each category is not known but the total number is approximately 14,000. These are at present either in camps in Chile with which the UNHCR is associated or, in the case of Chilean nationals who are not technically refugees until they are outside Chile, in hiding or sheltering in foreign embassies in Santiago.'[128] As is often the case, the memorandum then stated what other European countries were contributing to the refugee crisis. Ireland and Luxembourg were the only countries within the EEC that had not agreed to accept any refugees. Outside of 'the Nine, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand have agreed to accept refugees varying in number from about six in the case of New Zealand to 600 in the case of Sweden'.[129] Clearly, willingness to accept Chilean refugees was proving a popular stance within the international community.

The UN was equally as involved. The General Assembly resolution of 1974, 'Protection of human rights in Chile', used rather damning language, stating that 'notwithstanding all the appeals made by various organs of the United Nations system, gross and massive violations of human rights, such as arbitrary

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[127] Foreign Affairs' 'Memorandum for the Government: Resettlement in Ireland of refugees from Chile, 12 Feb. 1974 (NAI, DFA/2005/7/445).

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid.

arrest, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of political prisoners and detainees, including former members of the Chilean Government and Parliament, continue to be reported…'[130] An ad hoc working group on the 'Situation of Human Rights in Chile' was created, and reported to the UN the following year. From the working groups' report it was ascertained that another resolution was needed to condemn the human rights violations. This resolution called upon the Chilean government to ensure that 'the rights of all persons to liberty and security of person, in particular the rights of those who have been detained without charge or are in prison solely for political reasons… the right to freedom of association… the right to intellectual freedoms'.[131] This clear condemnation of the abuse of human rights in Chile, along with the clear intention of the international community to become actively involved, facilitated the willingness of the Irish government to seriously consider refugee admittance.

As such, the government turned to the problem of practicality. When deciding how many refugees could be successfully assimilated into Ireland, the infamous 1956 Hungarian refugee blunder was discussed. Almost twenty years later, there seems to have still been a sore spot when this incident was remembered, and perhaps also a bit of incorrect institutional memory. It was stated that one difference between the admittance of the Chilean and Hungarian refugee groups was that 'it has to be borne in mind that what is involved is permanent resettlement and not temporary asylum as was the case in 1956 when Ireland accepted 548 Hungarian refugees, virtually all of these leaving within a short time to settle permanently elsewhere'.[132] When the government admitted the Hungarians in the winter of 1956, they thought that it *was* for permanent resettlement in Ireland. The refugees themselves claimed that they were told while still in Austria that Ireland was a country of first asylum on their way to final resettlement in countries such as the USA and Canada. When the Irish authorities

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[130] UN General Assembly, Resolution 3219 (XXIX).

[131] UN General Assembly, Resolution 3448 (XXX).

[132] Foreign Affairs' 'Memorandum for the Government: Resettlement in Ireland of refugees from Chile, 12 Feb. 1974 (NAI, DFA/2005/7/445).

heard this, they were extremely surprised, and hurried to correct the misunderstanding.[133]

The Hungarian experience seem to have made the Irish wary of the admittance of large numbers of foreigners, and it was suggested that due to national unemployment levels and the lack of a preexisting Spanish speaking community, a workable number would consist of twelve heads of families and their dependents. Furthermore, the government seemed to expect that the refugees' admittance would cause 'serious problems of a personal, social and administrative nature'.[134] Upon arrival they would need 'housing, education and health services, and welfare and unemployment benefits'.[135] There was also the question of money, both for the refugees and from the government:

> Above all there will be a question of providing funds for the refugees when they arrive and until such time as they got employment and became self-sufficient. Because they will be arriving in a foreign country, probably destitute, and with no means of support until they get jobs, the refugees will require higher payment than would normally be paid to unemployed Irish people. A supplementary Estimate possibly on the Vote for the Department of Social Welfare will be required. The amounts to be paid to the refugees and the modalities of distribution will need to be established in consultation between the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Finance and the other Departments concerned.[136]

The level of governmental thought and planning preceding the arrival of the refugees far exceeds that of 1956. It may be argued that, although no less important, the urgency of the 1974 refugee problem was not as critical as when hundreds of thousands of Hungarians were fleeing across the border into Austria. Yet it does show a government with a higher level of awareness and understanding of what the successful reception and integration of a group of refugees entails.

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[133] For further information, please refer to the previous Chapter 4, *The Hungarian Refugees of 1956.*

[134] Foreign Affairs' 'Memorandum for the Government Resettlement in Ireland of refugees from Chile, 12 February 1974 (NAI, DFA/2005/7/445).

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid.

The departments of Finance, Justice, Education, Health, Social Welfare, Local Government, Defence and Labour were all in agreement that no objections would be raised to the acceptance of the refugees. Justice insinuated however, that although not stating an actual objection, the department had various reservations. It was thought that due to cultural differences between Ireland and other Western European countries (presumably the countries listed as already having agreed to accept Chilean refugees), integration into Ireland of the refugees would prove more difficult:

> Acceptance of refugees from distant countries with a cultural background very different from an Irish one poses difficulties for this country over and above what would be posed for many other countries, including E.E.C. ones. Our society is less cosmopolitan than that of Western European countries generally and, in consequence, the absorption of even a limited number of foreigners of this kind could prove extremely difficult.[137]

As to convince Foreign Affairs that the above would indeed be the case, the Hungarians were cited as an example:

> The fact is that they failed to settle down and, even when the majority had left for other countries, the few remaining either in Knockalisheen Camp or elsewhere in the country were running into continual trouble to the extent that eventually an ad misericordiam plea had to be made to the relevant British and U.S. authorities (who had already taken their own quota and some of ours) to agree to take them "off our hands".[138]

While it *is* true that the Hungarians did not settle down without incident, and that the majority of them did depart Ireland for the US, Britain and Canada, the set of circumstances that led to this conclusion are not examined, nor will they be fully rehashed here, yet much of the contention arose from miscommunication between the refugees and the government, as well as the lack of established policy before the refugees' arrival.

The political implications of this specific group of refugees were also addressed. Many groups of people with differing political creeds were persecuted under the Pinochet regime, yet it could not be ignored that many of these refugees would indeed be committed communists and/or socialists. In its most basic form,

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[137] Justice to Foreign Affairs, 14 Feb. 1974 (NAI, DFA/2005/7/445).
[138] Ibid.

the military coup of 1973 was to overthrow the socialist government of a self-proclaimed Marxist. Many of these Chileans found themselves as refugees 'because they are Marxists and probably Communists and it is to be assumed that a significant proportion of their number are 'activists''.[139] The other category of refugees, those who were seeking refuge in Chile at the time of the coup, could potentially prove even more problematic. The

> non-Chileans, who appear to be people whose activities led to their having to leave their own countries and who sough refuge in Chile precisely because it had a sympathetic (Communist) President, in contrast to right-wing Government in their own country. It would be reasonable to assume that if they have been political militants they will not change their outlook on arrival in this country and that they are liable sooner or later to engage in political agitation here. There would be no effective sanction against such a person – deportation would not be possible.[140]

Interestingly, the 'political agitation' that these 'militants' would bring to Ireland was then commented on within the context of how these new agitators would interact with the largest subversive force in the Irish state, the IRA: 'Extreme left-wing or other political activities or agitators would be likely to present a far greater problem for this country than for other Western European countries as there is in existence here a relatively large and well organised subversive group towards whom such persons could be expected to gravitate.'[141]

Nevertheless, approximately one hundred and twenty Chilean refugees were admitted into the State and rather scathing condemnation of the Chilean regime emanated from the Dáil.[142] Garret FitzGerald, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, offered his opinion of the Chilean government in late 1974:

> This coup was preceded by considerable unrest and class conflict, for which neither Government nor the Opposition were blameless. The regime of oppression which emerged from this coup showed itself, however, to be one of the most brutal in the world. Many thousands of people were murdered by the new regime. Even today vast numbers of the population are suffering deprivation and want as a result of continued

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[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Ibid.

[142] C.J. Harvey, 'Strangers at the Gate: Human Rights and Refugee Protection' in *Irish Studies in International Affairs,* x (1999), pp 15.

> oppression. In so far as interference from outside Chile contributed to this situation it must be deplored by all who are concerned with human freedom. The concern of Irish people for the fate of the Chilean people has been shown by the work undertaken here to receive refugees from Chile and to help them make a new life in our community, integrating themselves into our society. I should like to congratulate all those who have been concerned with this world which the Government has been glad to facilitate. I should like to tell the Chilean families who have arrive here how warmly welcome they are to our shores.[143]

Analysis

It is interesting to note that this chapter began with an examination of Irish involvement within a UN refugee relief scheme of extremely low political risk and ended with the admittance into the state of potentially communist, left-leaning political refugees from Chile. The various examples of Irish refugee aid that fall between these two extremes help show how it was possible to get from one end of the spectrum to the other. During the 1960s, a definite foreign policy shift was discernible, and it can clearly be viewed through the lens of the government's refugee policy.

When considering the aid given to the Algerians, Tibetans and Biafrans, certain conclusions can be drawn. Aid was politicised, yet in a different way in each case. It could be argued that aid given is aid received, and that Ireland was just standing sturdy upon its decades old root of humanitarian action, yet that would be to sell the story short. Some of the longer conflicts, spanning the years of policy shift, even experienced various changes in how their aid was politicised. During the early years of the Algerian war, Irish UN policy, and by extension its refugee policy, was focused on asserting self-determination as a ruling principle of its international policy. This meant that, even if it were to anger a large, powerful, pro-West, anti-communist power, in this case France, to make that assertion, it would.

Even as late as 1960, the government made it clear that its independent UN stance still encapsulated its aid policy, as was shown by how adamant the government was to contribute a percentage of its WRY funds to the Palestinian

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[143] Dr Garret FitzGerald, Dáil Debates 275, 923-924, 5 Nov. 1974.

refugees, a highly politicised group. A mere two years later, the government had begun its swing westward, and the previous policy position was no longer deemed viable. Irish language at the UN was mollified in an attempt to placate de Gaulle just as the Algerian war was gearing up for its contentious finale. Irish aid continued though, as attempts by the government to ingratiate themselves to the West did not go as far as affecting their dedication to humanitarian concerns. It could also be argued that aid was continued to soften the critics of this swing in Irish foreign policy. Not every one was pleased with this new direction, both abroad and at home. Refugee aid was something that the government could point to, saying that they still cared about issues such as self-determination, even if they were making ideological concessions at the UN.

These developments could be viewed as Ireland increasing its engagement with international power politics. Tibet is an example of this change. Refugee aid was utilised in this instance to placate the West and to further solidify Ireland's standing as an anti-communist ally. Irish support for the China Vote had threatened those pro-Western credentials.[144] The Nigerian war is a further example. The government was careful not to make any pro-Biafran statements or declarations, yet was greatly involved in refugee aid. Many prominent Irish politicians thought that Ireland was turning its ideological back on Biafra, and not supporting its much-revered adherence to the principle of self-determination. As such, aid was used to placate those detractors. The government might not have been giving any political assertions concerning the state of Biafra, but they were heavily involved in relief activity.

It is also important to view the developments examined here within the context of the preceding decade. In the last chapter, Irish refugee policy in the 1950s was determined to have two main influencing factors: perceived

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144 Aiken gave a speech in 1959 condemning unprovoked aggression against small states that directly referenced Tibet, as well as UN activity regarding oppression. O'Malley states that this speech was used to placate American, as well as Catholic, disapproval still lingering over the China Vote. 'Great care was take by Boland and his staff, as well as by the other Irish representatives in the United States, to ensure that the Catholic press in the US received the text of the speech. There was a keen desire to use the opportunity of Tibet to balance the Red scales in Ireland's favour after the negative coverage of the 'China vote' affair.' O'Malley, 'Frank Aiken and Tibet', p. 281.

international and UN reputation, and the emerging Cold War polarisation of Europe. Subsequently, policy was based around the desire to create a perception that Ireland was a sovereign actor on the world stage, and would formulate its international policy as such. The desire was to create a positive international reputation, and this reputation became intertwined with Irish humanitarian aid. Ireland was also attempting to maintain a rather neutral stance relating to Cold War alliances. These basic tenets of Irish foreign policy were to change in the 1960s, as has been shown through the above examination of refugee aid. The Irish government evolved its international concerns, beginning with the desire to create an international reputation, to cultivating and firmly adhering to its independent stance, to shifting its alignment westward.

Different approaches to refugee policy can be discerned when comparing the 1950s and 1960s. Three of the four refugee groups discussed in the previous chapter (European Jews, White Russians in China, Hungarians and East Germans) were seeking admittance into Ireland. One of the four groups discussed in this chapter were seriously considered for settlement in Ireland. This can, of course, be due to various concerns and considerations by both the Irish government and the refugees themselves (i.e. geographic, cultural, etc.), but this does prove curious. When the question of the settlement of Chilean refugees in the state was raised, the discussion turned quickly to the issues that arose in 1956 with the admittance of the Hungarians. As there were countless refugee situations since 1956, it could be argued that the negative experience of the Hungarians sated the government's appetite for refugee admittance on a larger scale.

Alternatively, another explanation could lie in the changing international order. During the 1950s, the main theatre of Cold War hostility was Europe. International attention was focused on Europe and the various acts of Soviet aggression. As such, refugees created by these essentially Eurocentric conflicts were the focus of UN and international attention, and thus refugee aid. Irish affinity for Europe allowed for a serious discussion concerning refugee admittance. Once the main theatre of the Cold War ideological battle shifted to

Asia and Africa, so did the focus of politicised refugee aid. It was easier, and politically safer, to offer monetary and material aid.[145]

A shift in the type of conflict creating refugees is also a factor not to be ignored. In the 1950s, refugee-creating conflicts tended to involve either the ideological conversion of a country's political institutions to communism, whether by Soviet force or domestic assistance. As the geographic center of Cold War hostility shifted to Asia and Africa, the political context in which the Cold War ideological battle was fought changed as well. Instead of instances of straight, often militarily backed, communist conversion, the colonies of Africa fought for their independence utilising classic Cold War animosities.[146] As these struggles usually took place between a national liberation movement and a European colonial power, Ireland felt a special affinity towards these nationalist groups. Decolonisation, as a major UN concern during the 1960s, necessitated the creation of a committee devoted to the issue, which was chaired by Boland in 1958.[147] Ireland's own struggle for national independence was still rather fresh in the minds of its citizens, taking place only around forty years previous. Irish foreign policy had to take into account the public sympathy for those fellow sufferers of the evils of colonialism, while balancing new worries concerning securing approval from said colonial, Western powers.

Concern over domestic sentiment and contemporary attitudes can lead to a further examination of domestic political, social and economic considerations that affected refugee policy during the 1960s. As has already been stated, de Valera retired from Fianna Fáil leadership in 1959 allowing for the ascension of Seán Lemass to party leader. Lemass realigned much Fianna Fáil policy, and is best

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[145] Between 1959 and 1967, Ireland aid amounted to $5,000 per annum to the UNHCR. A further $238,800 had been donated to UNRWA between 1959 and 1968. Miller, 'A man with a cause', p. 302.

[146] For example, see Angela Stent, 'The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph in Realism' in *A Journal of Opinion*, iii, no. 2 (Summer, 1973), pp 43-8 for an account of Soviet utilisation of African conflict within a Cold War context.

[147] Michael Kennedy, "Persuade an alternative European candidate to stand': Why Ireland was elected to the United Nations Security Council in 1961' in Kennedy and McMahon (eds), *Obligations and Responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations*, p. 160. Kennedy cites Boland's successful chairmanship of this committee as an important stepping-stone to his presidency of the General Assembly in 1960.

known for his reorganisation of the Irish economy. What is important for our purposes is how this new economic direction affected foreign policy. Under Lemass, Irish economic planning experienced a willingness to abandon its isolationist and protectionist tendencies. For the first time, foreign investment was encouraged and the development of an export strategy was envisioned.[148] These new realities necessitated a refocus of foreign policy. Lemass was also seen as a break from the old school political leadership that had governed since the founding of the Irish Free State:

> Highly popular with the young, progressive party members, he is somewhat distrusted by the older and more conservative faction, which considers his advocacy of a planned economy too socialistic and deplores not only his moderate approach to the partition problem but also his inclination to orient Ireland's economy towards that of Britain rather than the United States. No immediate change in Irish policy is likely, but new political leaders, not bound by memories of the civil war, will have greater maneuverability in dealing with the country's problems.[149]

To realise these new objectives, Ireland had to integrate itself into the fabric of Europe and the West. This became more important than assertions of international independence. Maurice Fitzgerald argues that this process was one of mainstreaming Irish foreign policy.[150] Pragmatism began to trump idealism, self-interest to overtake altruism. This chapter has shown this shift in Irish UN policy, yet it is interesting to note that this did not seem to apply directly to refugee aid. The politicisation *of* refugee aid allowed for its continuation. As long as it continued to be a useful political tool, whether abroad or at home, it was included within policy development.

This did not necessitate a complete reworking of foreign policy, however. The actual difference between an independent and pro-Western stance lent more to a difference of expression than to a wholly new foreign policy. Ireland still

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[148] Brian Girvin and Gary Murphy, 'Whose Ireland? The Lemass Era' in Brian Girvin and Gary Murphy (eds), *The Lemass era: politics and society in the Ireland of Seán Lemass* (Dublin, 2005), p. 8.

[149] Central Intelligence Agency, 'Current Intelligence Weekly Summary: De Valera Retiring from Irish Presidency', 11 Jun. 1959 (NARA, CIA-RDP79-00927A002300040001-3).

[150] Maurice Fitzgerald, 'The Mainstreaming of Irish foreign policy' in Girvin and Murphy (eds), *The Lemass era*, p. 82-98.

aligned itself to a particular world-view, one in which inherent rights, freedoms and a dedication to liberal democracy were firmly entrenched within the government's ideological platform. The ways in which these views were expressed was what differed. Instead of making UN declarations asserting the right of an African country to self-determination, and essentially angering the European colonial power in question, Ireland began to support countries like the USA, which it saw as a stabilising force within the international world. This was the new way of supporting the ideological principles that defined Irish international concerns.

Perhaps there is none better situated, at this crucial point in Irish foreign policy development, to leave us with some parting remarks than Garret FitzGerald. As the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, FitzGerald expounded for the Dáil the five primary Irish foreign policy concerns in 1973. They clearly delineate the shift in policy focus examined in this chapter, yet also hark back to traditional Irish foreign policy concerns. It is a reiteration of the new aims of policy, yet a reaffirmation of traditional concerns.

The basic objectives of Irish foreign policy, in the view of the Government, are:

(A) to help maintain world peace and reduce tensions between the super-powers, between blocs, and between states;
(B) to resolve, even on a provisional but open-ended basis, the Northern Ireland problem and to pursue relations with the United Kingdom Government to achieve this purpose;
(C) to contribute to the development of the European Communities along lines compatible with Irish aspirations and to the creation within the Community of a stable democratic and healthy society;
(D) to secure Ireland's economic interests abroad, thus facilitating economic and social progress at home, and particularly to secure our interests in the economic, social and regional policies of the EEC;
(E) to contribute to the Third World in a manner and to an extent that will meet our obligations, satisfy the desire of Irish people to play a constructive role in this sphere, and add to our moral authority in seeking to influence constructively the policies of other developed countries towards the Third World. [151]

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[151] Dr Garret FitzGerald, Dáil Debates 265, 742-743, 9 May 1973.

Conclusion

The main assertion of this research is that refugee policy was managed by the Irish government throughout its early, formative decades in order to facilitate the development of its desired foreign policy objectives. The validity of this statement has been proven through an analytical study of how the Irish government responded to the paramount refugee creating situations of the mid-twentieth century. Irish foreign policy objectives shifted over the five decades in question, yet this research has shown that continually refugee policy was utilised by the government as a political tool to influence the ways in which international governments and organisations perceived and related to Ireland on a global level.

Between the 1930s and 1970s, along with rapid developments in technology that greatly improved communication and media capabilities, came the redefinition of political terms such as 'international communities' and 'globalization'. It became harder for any country, even a small island-nation on the edge of Europe, to remain politically isolated from the ever-expanding international community. As a country with just a year of self-rule when she joined the League of Nations in 1923, Ireland emerged onto the European stage at a contentious moment in history. The 1930s proved a veritable minefield of economic disaster and political upheaval, which proved difficult to negotiate for even stronger, politically stable states. World War Two became a black mark on the history of humanity, as the world witnessed the first time that the government of a technologically advanced, western nation-state actively pursued the physical destruction of an entire race of people in an organised and methodical manner. The most massive displacement of people that the world had ever seen followed this war, creating a global humanitarian crisis that took the better part of fifteen years to resolve. A further global crisis, one whose ideological roots stemmed from the 1939-45 war, engulfed the world during the 1950s and 1960s, demanding that even the smallest nation take a carefully calculated ideological stance concerning the superpower showdown that quickly expanded into Asia and Africa. This cold war, coupled with the decolonisation of Africa, produced a new wave of political refugees greatly in need of assistance.

This study has situated Irish refugee assistance and aid within the international situations mentioned above. What general conclusions may be reached regarding the intersection of Irish refugee policy and Irish foreign policy? The most prominent is that Irish preoccupation with the creation of a positive international reputation greatly affected Irish refugee policy. In the 1930s, Irish foreign policy concerns focused on a variety of issues (Anglo-Irish relations, partition, an increased professional diplomatic presence abroad), but were firmly committed to the pursuit and preservation of international, collective security through the League of Nations. These state objectives became clear through Irish League of Nations' activity and response to international situations, such as the increasingly critical refugee situation of the late 1930s. Refugee policy was also used to further assert Irish independence and sovereignty, with both Britain and the wider international community.

Irish pursuit of neutrality during World War Two was a carefully calculated risk, and de Valera's government was fully aware that it was at times viewed with contempt by the Allies, particularly the Americans and British. In an attempt to curry favour with the Allies, Irish authorities instituted a reactive approach to refugee policy during the war. If an Allied nation asked the country to engage with rescue schemes or to make representations to Axis governments on the behalf of endangered people, in most instances the government complied with these requests. Proactive engagement with refugee issues could have been viewed negatively by the Allies, mainly the British, as there would have been a variety of security concerns if Ireland had been admitting large numbers of refugees that were not Allied-approved. The need to seek Allied approval continued to influence Irish policy immediately following the war, when increased Irish participation in European reconstruction and settlement initiatives was used to negate negative perceptions of neutrality. This also accounts for the Irish interest in qualifying its wartime record within the context of the other European neutrals. As long as Ireland's actions could be favourably compared to those of Switzerland or Sweden, than international condemnation would have to be widespread, encompassing *all* neutrals. This is not to claim that the actions of all

neutrals should be automatically equated; yet their perceived neutrality warranted Allied reaction.

Irish UN membership, which was not achieved until 1955, was another focal point of Irish foreign policy after the war that lent itself to an increase in Irish international involvement. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Irish refugee policy concerns were typified by involvement in early UN humanitarian bodies, such as the UNRRA and IRO, which were seen as stepping-stones towards full Irish UN membership. Irish war guilt over neutrality seems to have been another factor, as an attempt was made to mollify postwar international opinion of Irish neutrality through humanitarian objectives. Irish authorities acquiesced to various Allied requests concerning refugee admittance, such as the proposed plan in 1946 concerning the admittance of 500 Hungarian children that was never realised, though this was not due to reluctance from Irish authorities.

Once Ireland's UN membership was secured, much of the country's refugee aid centred upon UN initiatives, and was thus standardised. What was not standardised were the ways in which Ireland was utilising its presence at the UN to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The first UN session that Ireland sat, in 1956, coincided with the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution. Hasty Irish agreement to admit 539 Hungarian refugees, before a proper plan for their selection, admittance and assimilation could be formulated, may have been due to a desire to show the UN that Ireland was capable of contributing to the UN community, as well as to UN initiatives. Broadly speaking, Irish UN activity during its first two decades of membership can be divided into two phases. During the first, between 1955 and 1959, Ireland pursued an independent UN position, with the objective of reinforcing Irish international sovereignty, as well as asserting the Irish ideological affinity for small state rights within the context of a Europe increasingly divided by Cold War hostilities and Super Power polarisation. Interestingly, Irish authorities used refugee aid to mollify the Western response to its independent UN stance on other matters. Refugee aid during this time period was not itself an example of Irish independent UN action, but was used to placate critics of various Irish UN stances, such as the 1957 China Vote. In such a way,

refugee policy was used to help facilitate broader foreign policy objectives. Again, with UN membership, the question moved from which refugee initiatives the government should engage with, to how should Irish involvement in UN refugee initiatives be managed to promote wider Irish policy goals.

The refugee groups that Ireland did take an active interest in during the late 1940s and early 1950s were the groups receiving attention from the West due to their political significance within an early Cold War Europe. This period proved less contentious than the late 1950s and the 1960s, as clear distinctions left over from the world war still classified who was a victim worthy of international aid. Ireland, concerned with solidifying its early UN reputation, did not have to choose between its ideological support of small nations' rights and self-determination, and its attempts to secure Western approval. Both of these objectives coalesced, allowing Ireland to sell itself as a Middle Power, or Fire Brigade member, in the General Assembly. This allowed for Ireland to assert its independent action within a General Assembly divided along Cold War battle lines. It became a bit trickier in the early 1960s to merge these two interests.

The second phase began with the ascension of Seán Lemass to the leadership of Fianna Fáil in June 1959 and extended through the 1960s. This brought an increased importance attached to Western approval of Irish international activity. Ireland, as a country looking to become more economically integrated on an international level, with an eye towards eventual EEC membership, was concerned that Western disapproval of an independent UN stance would inhibit these goals. The refugee initiatives that Ireland chose to engage with continued to be mainly UN-sponsored. Political significance was not attached to which group was given aid, rather to how the aid was portrayed to the Western powers. For example, Irish aid was sent to Algerian refugees, yet Irish political objectives necessitated a broader focus than just concern over the national sovereignty of a country attempting to overthrow an occupying power. Although sympathetic to Algerian national aspirations, Irish authorities did not want to anger France's de Gaulle, and toned down their UN activity regarding Algerian sovereignty accordingly. Ireland still contributed to UN initiatives

directly related to refugee issues, yet what had been perceived as Irish UN policy began to shift away from a purely ideological stance and towards more pragmatic concerns.

Thus, the progression of the Irish utilisation of refugee aid may be summarised in the following manner. The 1930s saw Irish foreign policy focus on developing the sense that Ireland was a sovereign, independent nation that deserved international recognition and respect. The war allowed for a further affirmation of sovereignty through Irish adherence to neutrality despite Allied pressure. The initial postwar period saw Irish authorities concerned with aligning with the right countries, or ideological bloc, such as the UN. This still allowed for Irish policy makers to integrate their ideological ideals into foreign policy development. This alignment though, was further narrowed throughout the 1950s and 1960s, heading towards a pragmatic alliance with the West, which would benefit Irish foreign and domestic policy. This shift of policy focus, from seeking respect and international acknowledgement, to ideological affinity, to practical and pragmatic favouritism can be viewed through Irish refugee policy, and thus lends credence to the assertion that refugee aid was heavily influenced by Irish concerns with international perceptions.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the special consideration that the Irish government had to afford Britain. The British feature prominently within the Irish archival material pertaining to issues such as border control, immigration restrictions and refugee admittance, yet the Irish barely warrant mention in most British files concerning refugee matters.[1] There is ample documentation regarding Irish migrant labour, and the pros and cons of the common travel area also garner attention, yet specific mention or discussion of Irish refugee policy is rare and usually only discussed within a security context. There is virtually no mention of British concern that refugees admitted to Britain would cross the border into Ireland and cause tension between the two governments. There seems to be an

[1] A thorough examination of British Home, Foreign and Dominion Office files garnered rare direct mention of Ireland or Irish refugee activity, the notable exception to this being the years 1939-1947, as well as the one file regarding the Irish admittance of Hungarians in 1956.

assumption that if a refugee was admitted by Britain, why would that refugee *not* be welcomed in Ireland?

The underlying principles that Irish authorities pursued regarding refugee policy and Britain was that policy could, and should, be used to either assert national sovereignty or prove loyalty towards Britain. These two approaches may seem mutually exclusive, yet both were utilised at different times affectively. Refugee policy was never used by the Irish to intentionally cause contention between the two governments. Irish authorities were well aware of the political realities that could result if Britain felt threatened by Irish refugee admittance, especially during the 1930s and 1940s. For their part, the British were aware that the border between the north and the independent state needed attention during the war, and that the Irish need be warned against admitting Communist sympathisers in the 1950s, or sending monetary aid to Biafran gun runners in the 1960s, yet these worries were never the focal point of British policy regarding Ireland. British authorities, though acknowledging at times that Anglo-Irish relations were not perfect, always seemed to assume that the Irish would not disrupt or disregard British policy on these issues.

It was during the 1930s that Ireland used its refugee policy to assert its independence. The British were not pleased with German and Austrian refugee admittance into Ireland during 1938, yet the government pursued the Co-ordinating Committee's schemes. Although British displeasure with the admission of these refugees was mainly due to their apprehension over Irish security and screening capabilities, and not solely due to their refugee status or nationality, it was still present though it did not result in any cessation of the Irish scheme. In 1938, Ireland was still concerned with asserting sovereignty, which it desperately needed the international community to accept and respect if war broke out.

This study has shown that although refugee policy was used to assert Irish independence, there are also numerous examples of Ireland using its refugee policy to foster cooperation and goodwill with the British government. During the war, partially due to a worry of how neutrality would be perceived postwar, Irish authorities responded favourably to British requests pertaining to rescue attempts

and refugee schemes. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, Irish policy was underpinned by sympathy for the West, as well as an emerging set of pragmatic, new foreign policy goals that lent themselves to increased alignment with the West. British support was needed for Irish economic expansion, as well as eventual EEC membership, and as such, British opinion was courted. The archival evidence utilised within this study demonstrated that when the British enquired specifically as to Irish engagement with various refugee initiatives, Irish authorities quickly took the hint and became involved in the initiative in question such as with the World Refugee Year initiative. It need be remembered that generally the main goals of British and Irish refugee policy were similar, namely keeping refugee admittance as restrictive as possible without experiencing any international backlash, and this can help to account for the apparent cooperation between the two nations. Certain groups, such as the Jews of the 1930s and 1940s, were never welcomed into either country with open arms, and if they had, might have very well caused tensions to rise.

Another issue addressed throughout this study is that of letting in refugees of the right religious and political persuasion. Bluntly put, this meant the admittance of practicing Christians with no admitted radical political tendencies. Due to the period in question, Judaism was the most controversial and problematic religion that Irish authorities had to deal with. There were a variety of reasons as to why large numbers of Jews were not admitted into Ireland during the 1930s, which ranged from economic depression, to nationalistic sentiment, to a general, European-wide culture of anti-Semitism. There is no doubt that there were levels of anti-Semitic tendencies within the government. Classic anti-Semitic arguments were present within government files (the supranational character of Jewry, assimilation difficulties, a preponderance of Jews in the field of finance), yet it seems that the crux of the Irish government's anti-Semitism lay with the perception that an increase in the Jewish population would itself create a climate of anti-Semitism within Irish society. Motive aside, it is a fact that Irish officials denied entry to refugees solely due to their religious affiliation. Contextually, this was a common practice in the 1930s, and governments all over

the world were introducing Jewish quotas, or outright ban on Jewish admittance. Irish officials were also busy denying entry to other, non-Jewish refugees, many of them Catholics, yet these people were not denied entry due *solely* to their religion. Excuses may be made, and it is of course important to understand that Jews were denied their German citizenship upon exiting Reich territory, and thus were unable to be repatriated, yet is not the mere definition of a refugee a person who is unwilling, or unable, to live in their country of citizenship?

It is a challenge not to read the history of the 1930s and 1940s backwards, through the prism of the death camps. It could not have been known in the 1930s that Hitler would one day attempt to murder every Jewish man, woman and child within his grasp, yet people were being denied their basic rights. Irish refugee policy was restrictive, yet it was more restrictive for those with the red 'J' on their passports. It should be noted that the government was not guilty of any overt, malicious anti-Semitism (with the notable exception of Charles Bewley), and did respond to a variety of requests for Jewish aid after 1941, even admitting hundreds of Jewish children after the war. Regardless, there was a latent complacency present within Jewish refugee policy, and this should not be overlooked or forgotten.

The admittance of Catholic refugees was also very restrictive, yet Catholic refugees were not dismissed solely due to their religion. There were a variety of reasons why a Catholic refugee would be denied entry to Ireland, yet this usually centred upon valid concerns (i.e. economic standing, character testimonies, etc.) Their applications were processed, and deliberated over, not immediately rejected out of hand. One may argue that it would be hard to keep religion out of refugee admittance during a war that placed an undue amount of importance *on* religion, yet it could also be argued that due to the nature of the war and the Nazi regime, Jews, instead of getting the worse end of the stick, should have had preferential treatment over all other refugees fleeing Nazi territory.

Religion became a defining factor of World War Two, and as such was a defining factor of the development of refugee policy during that period. However, as the world war came to an end, and a new conflict emerged, one based not

within the realm of religion, but that of political ideology, the importance of a refugee's political alignment became of the utmost significance. What had been deemed, grudgingly in many cases, as acceptable political adherence did shift over the period in question. Any connection with the radicalised right in the 1930s was usually deemed as an immediate disqualification, although there were exceptions. Postwar, refugees with left-leaning politics were not deemed as optimal, unless there were other mitigating factors, as in the case of the Chilean refugees. As the ideological soul of Europe was once again threatened by a radical extremism, refugees with ties to the fascist states of the 1930s and the world war were admitted into the West, and the brunt of restrictive refugee policies came down upon the heads of the communists, even those fleeing Russian territory. There were exceptions, but these exceptions had to be deemed politically advantageous. Situations in which the admittance of communist refugees was unavoidable, such as illegal Eastern Europeans in the late 1940s, were dealt with and no real sense of panic or outrage is discernable within government correspondence concerning the forced admittance of these perceived ideological enemies.

A distinction need be made between admitting communist refugees fleeing Russian territory, and refugees with no real affinity to communism who were also fleeing the Russians. If a person's brand of communism did not adhere to that of the Soviet Union, which shifted during the immediate postwar years, and once again with Stalin's death in 1953, then that person could find themselves persecuted to the point that flight became a viable option. The non-communist refugees were escaping Russian territory due to increasingly repressive Russian tendencies and outright hostility towards non-adherents. This situation was not as black and white as it was in the 1930, when the majority of refugees were those being actively persecuted by fascist regimes. By the late 1930s, the very nature of fascism did not allow for varying strains or ideological spin offs; Nazism was an all-encompassing state religion that one either bought into or did not. Hitler, and the party, had spent years entwining Nazism and the very concept of German-ness

into one entity, it became a part of German identity, and what citizen aspires to sever himself from his national identity?

Communism, on the other hand, was viewed as an international movement with its ideological heart firmly established in the Soviet Union. Many saw communism as an insidious ideological weed, taking root in their state in an attempt to push out any home grown political establishment. However, this perception of international communism infecting a state did not necessitate a disenfranchisement of domestically grown communism, and as such, many committed communists who veered away from the Soviet brand became refugees. These were the people that caused the West a problem; should such people, though communist adherents, be admitted into Western states as refugees from Soviet Russia? Ireland, a country courting Western opinion after the war, had to deal with such issues, and the answer was almost always kept in line with Western opinion.

As such, what were Ireland's criteria by which such decisions were being made? The answer unsurprisingly shows a direct correlation between Irish refugee policy and Western political agenda, with a few exceptions. In the 1930s, Irish authorities showed an interest in the increasingly drastic refugee situation, yet did not open their doors to the refugees of fascism as widely as some within the western world would have liked. It could also be surmised that Ireland's refusal to admit German and Austrian Jews would not have been considered ideal by the United States, but they had no way to force the issue. The British, on the other hand, had conflicting interests regarding Irish admittance of German and Austrian Jews in the 1930s. Although concerned with security issues pertaining to which refugees Irish authorities admitted preceding the war, there was also a recognised need to settle as many of the refugees as possible, and preferably not in British territory. However, the British had more pressing matters to attend to in the late 1930s, and never made a point to influence Irish policy.

During the war and the immediate postwar period, the refugees that Irish authorities chose to aid and admit were almost exclusively the refugees deemed worthy of Allied, then Western, assistance. In the late 1950s, and into the 1960s,

there were a few instances of Ireland choosing its ideological dedication to sovereignty and small nation rights over western sentiment, but these never led to the admission of any large number of refugees that would have endangered western opinion of Ireland. Most of these situations resulted from the breakdown of European imperialism, the death throes of which sparked off nationalist movements in a variety of African countries. Ireland had to choose between its publicly stated belief in self-determination and its natural affinity for the Western world. A thin line was walked, between sending aid to these nationalist movements and using the UN to denounce the suppression of a peoples' right to self-determination and pragmatic Irish concerns, which were pursued through a strong relationship with the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western powers.

It is interesting to note that Irish refugee aid during this later time period, when Ireland was attempting to balance its dedication to humanitarian concerns with its desire to foster a positive relationship with the Western powers, was centred on monetary and material aid, not admittance. Again, these refugees were from nations striking out at the dominance of European powers. It need be stated, however, that the reason for non-admittance could be due to other concerns, namely that there were never any large numbers of Algerian, Angolan or Tibetan refugees that desired to move far away from their homelands. These refugees assumed that once these struggles for independence were realised, they would move back to free, newly liberated states that they could help lead. Once possible exception to this could have been the Biafrans, who felt that they were fleeing death, and numbers did seek admission into states outside of Africa.

An estimate of the number of refugees that were admitted into the Irish state during the time period of this study is necessary. The included chart cites the number of refugees that were definitively proven to have entered the state for permanent resettlement within each time period.

C.1 Refugees admitted into Ireland for permanent resettlement, 1935-1973

Date	Type/Organisation	Nationality	Number
1935-39	Irish Co-ordinating Committee	German and Austrian	98
1935-39	UCD Catholic Committee for Refugees	Austrian	1
1935-39	Employment Applications	German and Austrian	13
1939-1945	Religious personnel	Polish, Belgian, French, German	9
1945-1951	International Refugee Organisation	Russian and Baltic	17
1945-1951	Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau	Ukrainian	6
1945-1951	*Victory* refugees	Polish, Russian Estonian, Lithuanian	40
1951-59	Joint Distribution Committee	Hungarian and Czech Jews	20
1951-59	UNHCR	Russian	20
1951-59	UNHCR	Hungarian	539 (majority left for further resettlement)
1960s	African Concern	Biafran	7
1960s	UNHCR	Chilean	120
Total			**890**

Various groups of children admitted directly following the war in 1945 were not included, as they were only admitted for limited periods of time. The number of refugees admitted through employment applications in the 1930s is a tentative figure, as it proved hard to differentiate a refugee from an economic migrant during this period. These figures should also be compared to the foreign-born population resident in Ireland during the corresponding years.[2]

[2] Central Statistics Office. Census 1961, Volume 7, Religion and Birthrights. Part II: Birthplaces.

C.2 Foreign-born population of the twenty-six counties, 1930-1961

Year	Number of aliens taking up residency[3]
1930-39	2,486
1940-44	445
1945-49	1,792
1950-55	2,552
1956-61	5,521

The 1966 census does not include information regarding foreign-born residents. The 1971 census simply states the number of foreign-born residents within the state with no reference to their year of taking up residency. This figure is listed as 27,075.[4]

This study has examined Irish refugee policy within the context of the state's foreign policy objectives. The nature of the study necessitated the exclusion of a variety of interesting, and still under-researched, areas of study that could greatly add to the historiography of Irish refugee aid and policy. An in-depth examination of Irish domestic, public opinion regarding the admittance of refugees and the state expenditure on refugee aid would add greatly to an understanding of how influential the government viewed public sentiment, and to what level it influenced policy development. A study focusing exclusively on Irish interaction with domestic aid organisations, particularly the Irish Red Cross, would also enhance knowledge of how the government was forming refugee policy. It becomes clear through this research that the opinions of the British and Americans weighed heavily on Irish policy makers during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, and as such, a detailed analysis of the Irish relationship with both countries through the prism of humanitarian aid would also prove useful. Many of these areas have been touched upon within this research, yet the broad scope of this study has not allowed for a more detailed, nuanced examination. It is hoped that this research will provide a starting point for further academic research regarding the formation and implementation of Irish refugee policy in the twentieth-century.

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[3] This figure does not include aliens listed under the heading 'England and Wales'.

[4] Central Statistics Office. Census 1971, Volume 11 Usual Residence and Migration/Birthplaces.

Appendix 1: Nansen Passport refugees admitted into the Irish state

1942

[1]Certificate Identity Number	Name	Date of Birth	Place of birth	Nationality	Occupation	Address in Ireland
12	Baxter, Paul Charles	6.5.1900	Broussa, Turkey	Armenian	Seaman	6, Devonshire Street, Cork (Renewal)
62	Goodman, Solomon	19.12.1879	Shavli, Riga	Russian	Hairdresser	3, Ashdale Gardens, Terenure Dublin
63	Waldman, Betsy	1867	Varkovitch	Russian	Widow	66, The Rise, Mount Merrion Dublin
64	Skolnic, Hovsha	18.3.1868	Teveron	Russian	Retired	3, Eaton Road, Terenure, Dublin
65	Skolnic, Dvora	25.2.1874	Wapniarka	Russian	Housewife	Ditto
66	Franklin, Ernest David	26.12.1887	Vilna	Russian	Cabinet maker	438 North Circular Road, Dublin
68	Shapiro, Harry	27.4.1890	Polotzk	Russian	Watchmaker	96, Kenilworth Park, Dublin
69	Verby, Solomon	2.2.1893	Orana	Russian	Gown Manufacturer	31, Victoria Street, Dublin
70	Prager, Rachel	2.4.1892	Kiev	Russian	Housewife	61 Dufferin Avenue, Dublin
73	Zutofsky, Lewis	1869	Chaigove	Russian	None	10, Grey Gates, Mount Merrion Dublin
1/42	Katz, Isaac Maurice	11.12.1912	Sieuli, Lithuania	Russian	Commercial traveler	4, Monera Terrace, Cork
3/42	Zamsky,	25.8.1888	Choderof	Russian	Tailor	10 Ashdale

[1] All of the information regarding the Nansen passport refugees was obtained from NAI, DFA/372/1.

	Joe					Gardens, Terenure
4/42	Rosenberg, Sarah	18.4.1872	Novoselich	Russian	Widow	5, St. Kevin's Parade, Dublin

1943

[2]Certificate of Identity Number	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Nationality	Occupation	Address in Ireland
14/43	Erlickman, Max	20.9.1891	Prolok, Russia	Russian	Tailor	21, Anna Villa, Ranelagh, Dublin
21/43	Cohen, Dora	Oct., 1890	Swinohan, Russia	Russian	Housewife	8, Mayfield Road, Terenure, Dublin
36/43	Lendensky, Vladen	29.4.1912	Denmark	Russian	Laborer	Fisherstown, Clondra, Co. Longford
38/43	Kravitz, Sarah	1.3.1895	Jaffa, Palestine	Russian	Housewife	33, Emorville Avenue, South Circular Road, Dublin
39/43	Rubinstein, Samuel	1887	Ivanitch, Russia	Russian	Laborer	5 Corrib Road, Kimmage, Dublin
47/43	Baxter, Paul Charles	6.5.1900	Broussa, Turkey	Armenian	Seaman	The Square, Ballincollig, Co. Cork

1944

[3]Certificate of Identity Number	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Nationality	Occupation	Address in Ireland	Remar
21/43	Cohen, Dora	Oct. 1890	Swinohan, Russia	Russian	Housewife	8, Mayfield Road, Terenure, Dublin	Renew

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

39/43	Rubinstein, Samuel	1887	Ivanitch, Russia	Russian	Laborer	5, Corrib Road, Kimmage, Dublin	Renewal
55/44	Garlinsky, Harris	16.12. 1882	Chmolnick, Poland	Russian	Cabinet Maker	9, St. Kevin's Road, S.C.R., Dublin	
56/44	Scheller, Rebecca	June, 1873	Brisk	Russian	Housewife	11, Greenville Avenue, S.C.R. Dublin	
62/44	Sliw, Annie	29.3. 1896	Golding, Russia	Russian	Factory Worker	38, Lombard Street, S.C.R. Dublin	
63/44	Cohen, Barnet	1898	Kovno	Russian	Commercial traveler	7, Lower Mountpleasant Avenue, Dublin	
64/44	Zimbach, Isaac	15.12. 1885	Coville	Russian	Tailor	15, Talbot Street, Dublin	

1945

[4]Certificate Identity Number	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Nationality	Occupation	Address in Ireland	Remarks
4/42	Rosenberg, Sarah	18.4.72	Novosclich	Russian	Housewife	5, St. Kevin's Parade, Dublin	Renewal
38/43	Kravitz, Sarah	1.3.95	Jaffa	do.	Housewife	33, Emorville Avenue, Dublin	Renewal
66/45	Cravitz, Jeanie	25.5.03	Hasenpot	Do.	Housewife	8, St. Kevin's Parade, Dublin	
67/45	Roytman, Harry	27.7.11	Vienna	Do.	Cabinet Maker	5a, Dorset Avenue, Dublin	
73/45	Prager, Rachel	2.4.92	Kiev	Do.	Housewife	61 Dufferin Avenue, Dublin	
76/45	Verby, Solomon	2.2.93	Orana	Do.	Manufacturer	31 Victoria Street Dublin	
78/45	Masoff, Clara	11.6.76	Odessa	Do.	None	90, Donore Terrace, Dublin	

[4] Ibid.

80/45	Chajet, Rebecca	1886	Orle	Do.	Housewife	2, Wolseley Street, Dublin
87/45	Ask, Annie	5.9.75	Vilna	Do.	None	104, Crumlin Road, Dublin
89/45	Malkinson, Jacob	1.8.02	Kovna	Do.	Marine Dealer	31, Martin Street, Dublin
90/45	Albert, Isaac	1895	Avegust	Do.	Wood Turner	30, Adelaide Road, Dublin
98/45	Apraxine, Marthe	6.4.13	Simferopol	Do.	Medical Doctor	19, Fitzwilliam Place, Dublin
102/45	Cramer, Samuel	1900	Minsk	Do.	Agent	40 Kimmage

Appendix 2: Irish Co-ordinating Committee refugees

Name	Address	D.O.B.	P.O.B.	Trade	Passport
Uta Bormann Milch	Klosternburg-Buchberggasse 41, Vienna	7th October 1925	Vienna	Student	German
[1]Erich Josef Priebatsch	15 Hindenburgstrasse Herschberg, Reichenberg, Germany	None	None	None	German, in Concentration Camp
[2]Kurt Schwarz	Johannstrasse 58/13, Vienna XV	30th April 1928	Vienna	Student	German
[3]Ignaz Schulz	c/o Fr. Exz. H. Bulk, Ulica, Kraljice Marite, No. 7 T. 9, Zagreb, Yugoslavia	31st August 1899	None	Salesman	31/39N issued at German General Consulate in Zagreb
[4]Karl Menkes	Venedigerau 3, Vienna 2	6th June 1895	Thaya, Austria	Dental Surgeon	German
[5]Valerie Menkes	Venedigerau 3, Vienna 2.	31st October 1895	Mahren Neudorf (Czech)	None	German
[6]Hans Menkes	Venedigerau 3, Vienna 2.	20th December 1928	Vienna	None	German
[7]Richard Wallach	Weimarerstrasse 68, Vienna XIX	30th October 1889	Vienna	Teacher in Mittelschule of German language, history and geography	German
[8]Paul Baumgarten	None	None	None	None	German
[9]Helene Baumgarten	None	None	None	None	German
[10]Gertrud Baumgarten	None	None	None	None	German
[11]Hans Reiss	Mannheim, Luisenring, 13,	19th August	Mannheim, Germany	Student	German

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1 Telegram to Berlin legation from External Affairs, 14 Dec. 1938 (NAI, DFA/202/273).

2 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee for Refugees referral, 25 May 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/281).

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Rome legation to External Affairs, 25 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/281).

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 7 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/378).

	Germany	1922			
[12]Gertie Kulik	Obere Donaustrasse 109, Vienna 2	30th May 1921	Vienna	Student	German
[13]Gerhard Hirschberg	Viale Monte Nero 14, Milano, Italy	2nd March 1903	Lyck, Prussia	Languages, formerly lawyer	German
[14]Grete Nowotny	24/22 Grosse Schiffgasse, Vienna 2	10th June 1922	Vienna	Student	German
[15]Wolfgang Eisenstaedt	19 Bochumerstrasse, Berlin N.W. 21.	15th March 1891	Berlin	Farmer, Labourer	German
[16]Dr. Johannes Hennig	40 Hook, Eupen, Belgium	3rd March 1911	Leipzig	Teacher and Director of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works	German
[17]Alfred Leuchtag	33 Welzergasse, Baden b. Wien	16th August 1876	Vienna	Doctor of Law	German
[18]Anna Platz	c/o Swedish Mission, Vienna IX, Seegasse 16	21st March 1924	Vienna	Student	German
[19]Karl Platz	c/o Swedish Mission, Vienna IX, Seegasse 16	27th July 1927	Vienna	Student	German
[20]Felix Samuel Kahn	Horst Wessel-Strasse, Worms, Germany	31st December 1896	Worms, Germany	Managing Director of Paper Mills	German
[21]Wolfgang Bernheim	3/0 Herzog Park Strasse, Munich 27	7th May 1923	Augsburg	Student	German
[22]Hermann Edelmann	Fritschestrasse 19, Berlin-Charlottenburg	14th January 1900	Berlin	Manufacturing Chemist	German
[23]Ruth Edelmann	Fritschestrasse 19, Berlin-Charlottenburg	23 December 1901	Liegnitz	Housewife	German
[24]Eva Renee	Ob. Danaustr.	23rd July	Vienna	None	German

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12 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 7 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/379).

13 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 17 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/390).

14 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 20 June 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/392).

15 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 20 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/393).

16 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 31 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/417).

17 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 1 Aug. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/418).

18 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 31 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/419).

19 Ibid.

20 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 1 Aug. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/420).

21 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, undated (NAI, DFA/202/421).

22 Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 2 Aug. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/422).

23 Ibid.

Seinfeld	69/15 Vienna 2	1925			
[25]Alfred Schulhof	40/I Innsbruck, Tirol-Germany	None	None	None	German
[26]Annemarie Hofer	Bocklinstrasse 84, Wien 11	None	None	None	German
[27]Nachmann Lischner	Frankfurt a Main, Hebelstrasse 131, Germany	None	None	None	German
[28]Doris Brunn	Wien XIX, Cottagegasse 47, A., Germany	None	None	None	German
[29]Siegfried Dziwientnik	Tubgasse 2a, Vienna 14, Germany	None	None	None	German, had been in Dachau since November 1938.
[30]Erwin Schrodinger	None	12th August 1887	Vienna	University Professor	German
[31]Mrs. Schrodinger	None	None	None	None	German
[32]Franziska Wiedmann	None	None	None	None	German
[33]Klare Hennig	40 Hook, Eupen, Belgium	22nd March 1907	Aachen	None	German

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[24] Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 22 Aug. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/445).

[25] Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 13 Apr. 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/184).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] NAI, DFA/202/525.

[31] Ibid.

[32] NAI, DFA/202/590.

[33] Irish Co-Ordinating Committee referral, 31 July 1939 (NAI, DFA/202/417).

Appendix 3: Lists of aliens resident in Ireland classified as reliable or about whom nothing is known, Department of Defence, 1940

'Persons recommended as reliable.

Bieler
Ehrenberg
Scheyer, (3)
Beisser, G.
Eisendaedt, (but relatives in Germany)
Einaugler
Feldman, Wife and two children, (4)
Fuchs, wife and two children, (4)
Krauss, K.
Marckwald, (2)
Stein, Josefa
Ungar, (relatives in Germany)
Stein, Dr. Aaron, (leaving)
Kawerau, (2), (mother in Germany)
Becker, A. (mother in Germany)
Wallach, (leaving)
Nachman
Jacobi
Boaz
Heyman, (leaving)
Rosanowsky
Storch
Goldstein
Heilfron, (2)

Persons about whom nothing is known.
Adler, (2)
Frankl, B. (wife and two children, 4)
Hirsch, (4)
Hirschberg
Hofer, Annamarie
Horwitz, Anslem
Kapeller, (2)
Karrach, (2)
Liss
Morgenstern
Schlesinger
Schultz
Schwartz, Frau.
Staudt, (relatives in Germany)
Ungar, Kurt.
Stiegwardt, (2)
Strunz, (4)
Werner, (3)
Wiedmann, (2)
Ofner.
Feric.

Steiner, K.
Steiner, R.
Marx
Dubsky
Backer, J.
Mundhein, J.
Kahn, J.
Liffmann, J.
Priebatsch.
Rund, (2).[34]

[34] Justice to Major D. Bryan, G2 Branch, Department of Defence, 25 May 1940 (MAI, G/X/0304).

Appendix 4: Ukrainian refugee student visa applications

Name	Date of Birth	Location of Birth	Course of Study
[35]Joseph Alexander Turks	31.12.1924	Rozdil, W. Ukraine	Faculty of Arts (3 years)
[36]Petro Beznosiuk	10.3.1924	Torun	Faculty of Arts (3 years)
[37]Mykola Oleksander Ohlvk-Romenskyj	11.12.1924	Maniawa, W. Ukraine	Faculty of Arts (3 years)
[38]Bohdan Szuchewycz	13.3.1925	Czernycia, W. Ukraine	Faculty of Medicine (6 years)
[39]Ewhen Lubomyr Kuz	10.9.1923	Lwiw	Faculty of Medicine (6 years)
[40]Zenon Seweryn Kostelnyk	28.2.24	Lwiw	Faculty of Arts (3 years)

35 Application for Visa, Joseph Alexander Turks, 4 Nov. 1948 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

36 Application for Visa, Petro Beznosiuk, 3 Nov. 1948 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

37 Application for Visa, Mykola Oleksander Ohlvk-Romenskyj, 3 Nov. 1948 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

38 Application for Visa, Bohdan Szuchewcz, 3 Nov. 1948 (NAI, DFA/372/5).

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Appendix 5: Particulars of Hungarian refugees, admitted 1956

Groups	Male	Female	Total
Total number of refugees as on 8/12/56	262	199	461
Family Groups			118
Adults	124	101	225
Children	95	87	182
Not included in Family Groups			
Adults (Married)	8	2	10
Adults (Single)	27	7	34
Children	8 (12-15 years)	2 (12-15 years)	10

Age groups of Adults Not Included in Family Groups:

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
Under 20 years	16	1	17
Under 30 years	9	2	11
Under 40 years	7	3	10
Under 50 years	3	2	5
Under 60 years	-	-	-
Under 70 years	-	1	1

Religion of Adults (269)

Catholics 208

Calvinists 45
Lutherans 6
Greek Catholics 2
Greek Orthodox 4
Unitarians 1
Evangelists 1
Jews 2[41]

[41] McCann Report, 7 Dec. 1956 (NAI, DFA/419/33/11).

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G2 Files

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Hegarty, Gianna.'The Irish Government and Anti-Semitism: A study of Jewish Refugee Policy in Ireland during the Second World War' (M.Phil. thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 2009).

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