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University of Dublin

Trinity College

JEHANNE D'ARC
AND
CLAIMS TO DIVINE SANCTION IN ACTS OF WAR

A Double-Edged Sword

by

BRENDA ELIZABETH NOVACK

A dissertation submitted to

the Irish School of Ecumenics for

the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Dublin, Ireland

2013

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SUMMARY

This work conducts a theological exploration and interpretation of the heavily documented life and death of Saint Jehanne d'Arc (Joan of Arc) in the context of claims to divinely sanctioned violence, particularly within the sphere of war. Primary materials pertaining to Jehanne, including trial transcripts, correspondence, and contemporary chronicles, form the main research base, and this is supplemented with a diverse selection of theological and historical secondary sources demonstrating Jehanne's broad relevance.

Jehanne's biography is first presented within historical, religious, and psychological contexts wherein she is determined to be psychologically sound and resonant with the Marian and Christ traditions. She is then interpreted within a framework of Jewish and Christian prophetic mysticism, and it is established that Jehanne's religious experiences and response correspond closely to the Hebrew and Christian prophetic traditions; hence, she is categorized as a bearer of revelation and envoy of God. The requirements and implications of prophetic life in general—and Jehanne's life specifically—are examined in order to apprehend the characteristics and significance of her claim to divinely sanctioned violence. Particular attention is paid to the nature of divine revelation and faith, the tension between human will and divine will, and the practical component of prophetic mystical life wherein one is called to participate directly in earthly affairs in order to effect improvement to the condition of humanity in accordance with divine aspirations. Jehanne is next considered in relation to human evil and ethics, with special attention given to just war theory. It is determined that current ethical practices with respect to war are deficient and a need is identified for a comprehensive strategy in evaluating the call to war and for a recommendation of acceptable human agency in warfare based on a model of righteousness.

Jehanne is cited as a model of righteousness by virtue of her canonization and her impeccable behaviour. Moreover, it is recognized that she constitutes a concrete example of righteousness manifested in the warrior—that is, she represents the divine

warrior. Her example is therefore presented as an instructive model against which claims to divinely sanctioned violence might reasonably be assessed. A model of righteous warfare and human agency is derived from the interpretation of Jehanne consisting in one hundred criteria representative of her behaviour with respect to her faith in and response to the divine call to violence. The criteria are organized within three categories indicative of divine, prophetic calling, divinely sanctioned righteous warfare, and divinely sanctioned human agency.

In order to demonstrate the manner in which the model might be properly utilized and to assess its viability in evaluating the nature of specific claims to divine sanction in warfare, (past, present, or future), it is applied in the form of two case studies. The first case study, which assesses Adolf Hitler's claim to divinely sanctioned violence, demonstrates the falsity of his claim while the second case study, which evaluates Dietrich Bonhoeffer's claim to divinely sanctioned violence, demonstrates significant conformity of the nature of his calling and response to those of Jehanne. The results of the case studies are interpreted as tentatively validating the potential usefulness of the model in assessing claims to divine sanction in acts of war, and it is anticipated that further application of the model will serve to determine its ongoing value to individuals in assessing claims to divine sanction of violence and in responding to such claims thoughtfully and appropriately.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to extend sincere appreciation to the family of Dr. Owen Sheehy-Skeffington and the French Department of Trinity College Dublin for awarding me the Owen Sheehy-Skeffington Travel Grant which enabled me to conduct research in France in support of this work.

I would also like to express deepest thanks to the staff of the Centre Jeanne d'Arc in Orléans, France, particularly Dr. Olivier Bouzy, Assistant Director, for assistance with clarification of discrepancies between various copies and translations of trial transcripts pertaining to Jehanne and for providing me with a typed copy of the Orléans manuscript as well as information concerning other resources.

Special thanks to my Research Supervisor, Dr. Linda Hogan, whose knowledge, guidance, patience, and genuine interest in and enthusiasm for the subject matter of this work were a tremendous support. Thanks also to Dr. Andrew Pierce for valuable insights with respect to the focus and shaping of the material in the early stages.

Most of all, I extend gratitude beyond words to Saint Jehanne for her inspiration, courage, and sacrifice, and to the Spirit which moved me to pursue this topic.

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INTRODUCTION

From very early times, humans have enacted a capacity for violence that is arguably one of the most disturbing and ultimately self-destructive behaviours. Moreover, many have invoked and continue to call upon the name of God, overtly or implicitly, in support of warfare and other forms of violence. This is likely because they either genuinely believe their actions to be divinely motivated and sanctioned or they believe that convincing others of the sanctity of their actions, regardless of their true nature, imparts power to them. In the latter situation, inflation of personal power seems to be the objective while, in the former, deference of personal power in service to a higher, ultimate power is the apparent goal.

Although implicit and overt claims to divine sanction of warfare have operated throughout history, influencing public perception, opinion, and allegiance with respect to issues of violent conflict, it is frequently the case that such claims are not openly acknowledged or critically assessed. Nevertheless, they are potentially powerful, destructive, and particularly dangerous when overlooked or underestimated. It is therefore important to have a strategy in place for identifying and thoughtfully assessing claims to divinely sanctioned violence. This work addresses the need to bring such claims to the forefront by constructing a model by which they might be identified and examined.

While effective evaluation of claims to divine sanction must be conducted from a theological perspective due to the nature of the claims themselves, the implications and practical application of the analysis pertain also to political, social, and environmental spheres within which war operates; as members of communities and a shared world, all are affected by war. Because the issue is essentially theological, however, I approach it from a primarily theological standpoint, writing on the assumption that God exists, since belief in the existence of God grants power to claims of divine sanction. Without such belief, these claims would be impotent and this and all other theological treatises irrelevant, but history has proven claims of this nature to be powerful and consequential instruments in the activity of war. Whether or not one considers the assumption that

God exists valid is of minor relevance since my endeavour is to demonstrate how belief in divinely sanctioned violence can contribute to the genesis and perpetuation of war, as well as its avoidance, and to consider how such sanction might manifest and be employed constructively. It is my central purpose to provide a tool for evaluating claims to divine sanction in acts of war, not to argue for or against the existence of God. There is power in the existence or mere concept of divinity, including power to influence human affairs on individual and collective levels; the matter pertains to theist and atheist alike.

In considering claims to divine sanction in acts of war, I have chosen to approach the topic by careful examination and analysis of the life and death of fifteenth-century warrior-saint and French nationalist, Jehanne d'Arc (Joan of Arc), one of the most thoroughly documented historical figures according to medieval historians Régine Pernoud, Craig Taylor, and Jeremy duQuesnay Adams.[1] "[W]e know more details of her short life than we do of any other human being before her time (including Plato, or Alexander of Macedon, or Julius Caesar, or Jesus Christ) and for several centuries thereafter," duQuesnay Adams remarks.[2] Declaring that she was instructed directly by messengers of God to do so, Jehanne, between the ages of seventeen and eighteen, rallied and led the French army in multiple battles against the united English and Burgundian[3] forces during the Hundred Years' War. Her purpose was to drive the English from France, to relieve the French people of their suffering under English occupation, and to restore French kingship and nationhood. With the possible exception of an ambiguous, highly debatable, temporary lapse while confused and under duress, she maintained throughout her betrayal, captivity, abandonment, unjust condemnation, and death by fire at age nineteen that she acted as a willing agent of God. Based on extensive historical evidence pertaining to her childhood, public activities, trials and death, Jehanne was eventually canonized and accorded her place among the saints of the Catholic tradition.

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[1]Jeremy duQuesnay Adams, preface to *Joan of Arc: Her Story,* by Régine Pernoud and Marie-Véronique Clin, trans. and rev. Jeremy duQuesnay Adams, ed. Bonnie Wheeler (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1999), xvi. Craig Taylor, trans., *Joan of Arc: La Pucelle* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), ix. Régine Pernoud, *Joan of Arc: By Herself and Her Witnesses,* trans. Edward Hyams (Lanham: Scarborough House, 1964), 276. Régine Pernoud and Marie-Véronique Clin, *Joan of Arc: Her Story,* trans. and rev. Jeremy duQuesnay Adams, ed. Bonnie Wheeler (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1999), xii.

[2]duQuesnay Adams, preface to *Joan of Arc: Her Story,* by Pernoud and Clin, xvi.

[3]The Burgundians were French allies of the English against the Armagnacs or French royalist party.

Jehanne fought for the restoration of peace, justice, and equilibrium, demonstrating a preference for peace over war and exerting minimal force appropriate to the task. In fact, her military campaign corresponds to many aspects of just war theory. She also adhered to a fading code of chivalry. Perhaps most significantly, Jehanne demonstrated respect for all human life and exceptional compassion toward all, including the enemy—she acted upon her claim to divine sanction with unfaltering love. This distinguishes her from many who might meet technical criteria associated with 'just war' but who fail to demonstrate compassion for all and uncompromised respect for the value of human life as Jehanne did.

While the term 'just war' (perhaps inadvertently) suggests that a particular war might be considered just in itself, Jehanne's example does not support such a notion. Rather, it suggests that no war is just in and of itself, but particular forms of engagement in warfare or particular acts of violence might be considered acceptable, necessary, just, and righteous in certain circumstances. Moreover, to entertain the possibility of a particular war containing aspects of divine sanction is not to place the entire war within a framework of divine sanction, nor is it to incite war or to glorify any act of war, even those acts that might be considered divinely sanctioned. In fact, Jehanne's example supports the notion that all war and all acts of human violence are intrinsically evil, whether or not participation in them might be considered divinely sanctioned or otherwise justifiable. This exposes a paradox in that a divinely sanctioned act might at once be considered contextually righteous and inherently evil, an issue which is explored throughout this work. At any rate, Jehanne's example does not suggest that war itself might be divinely approved but that particular acts of war—certain manners of participation in pre-existent war—might reasonably be construed as divinely sanctioned.

Her sainthood renders Jehanne an exemplary model of righteous human behaviour according to the standards of the Roman Catholic Church. While the fact of her canonization ought not to form the basis for evaluation of her behaviour with respect to war as her actions must be evaluated in their own right, it serves to reinforce the compelling nature of Jehanne's example when subjected to extensive examination—particularly given that members of the church were responsible for wrongfully condemning her to death by means of a corrupt Inquisitorial trial. The Vatican would not presumably acknowledge such a grave error within the church without due cause. Moreover, a critical distance of nearly five hundred years between

her death and canonization affords a degree of objectivity in viewing her case that might not have been possible immediately following Jehanne's martyrdom. Hence, as a warrior whose claim to divine sanction has been theologically affirmed through a rigorous canonization process, and given that we possess abundant information concerning her, Jehanne constitutes a fertile case study for the matter at hand.

On the conviction that Jehanne's example offers valuable insights concerning questions of divine sanction in warfare, this work examines her case theologically in an attempt to discern her enduring message to humanity with respect to divine revelation and human agency in acts of war. A method for assessing claims to divine sanction in warfare which requires thoughtful and thorough consideration of individual cases is derived from Jehanne's example. It is determined that her message encourages restraint with respect to violence and war, that it confirms restoration of peace and justice as an acceptable end of defensive war, and that it promotes basic respect and compassion as necessary means by which all acts of force ought to be carried out.

If humanity is to avoid sinking into utter depravity in a world in which war has become dangerously depersonalized, a personal model of war, wherein individuals are deemed responsible for their actions and every human life is valued, must be reinstated in the absence of peace. In considering Jehanne's experience in which war was extremely personal and immediate to all participants, and in looking to Jehanne herself as one who exercised conscience and compassion at all times and took full responsibility for her deeds, we might begin to recover some of the values essential to a thriving and respectful humanity for, although these values have been largely abandoned, they are not lost, and although it is easy to declare them irretrievable, such declaration is a sure path to evil.

The work is divided into two parts. Part One discusses source material pertaining to Jehanne, provides a historical overview of the relevant context and aspects of Jehanne's life, and presents a mystical-theological interpretation of Jehanne with a view to ascertaining the nature of her claim to divine sanction in war and the manner of her behaviour with respect to it. Jehanne's mystical relationship with the Divine and how this relationship apparently influenced her life and her role in the lives of others is considered within the context of the Jewish and Christian prophetic traditions. Part Two explores secular-theological considerations with respect to human agency and constructs a model of righteous warfare and human agency, based on Jehanne's example as a faithful servant of God and incorporating aspects of just war theory, against which other

claims to divine sanction might be measured. Insufficiencies of just war theory are also identified. The model stipulates numerous criteria indicative of divine calling and righteous human agency in warfare according to Jehanne's example. In order to test the model's ongoing applicability and to demonstrate how it might be employed effectively, the latter segment of Part Two contains two recent World War II case studies in which the model is applied. It is first applied to the actions of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime and, secondly, to those of Nazi resister, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The conclusion considers the relevance of the model and its potential implications.

As the title of this work suggests, any notion of just or righteous warfare (or divinely sanctioned violence in any form) constitutes a double-edged sword with as many conceivable dangers as benefits. When wielded, such a weapon must be handled with utmost thought, responsibility, and restraint if it is to avoid becoming a source of unnecessary injury and destruction. Nevertheless, since the rampantly destructive sword of unmeasured claims to divine sanction operates among us, it is expedient to consider the possibility of a double-edged sword which measures such claims and advocates restraint and compassion in the face of any supposedly 'necessary' destruction. As Alan Watts points out, "any truth may be dangerous" if employed to evil ends,[4] which is why it is critical to distinguish between truth employed to evil ends and truth in the service of good when assessing claims to divine sanction. Jehanne, who employed her claim to divine sanction in service of ultimate good, serves as a valuable model.

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[4]Alan Watts, *Behold the Spirit: A Study in the Necessity of Mystical Religion* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 147.

PART ONE

JEHANNE D'ARC

CHAPTER 1

JEHANNE D'ARC
HER MISSION IN CONTEXT

Approaching Jehanne

> I have come here to the royal chamber to speak to Robert de Baudricourt, to ask him to escort me, or to have me escorted, to the King. But he pays no attention to me, or to what I say. But all the same, before mid-Lent I must be with the King, even if I have to wear my legs down to the knees. For there is no one on earth, be he king, or duke, or the King of Scotland's daughter, or anyone else, who can restore the kingdom of France, and he will have no help except through me, although I would much prefer to stay with my poor mother and spin, for this is not my station. But I must go, and I must do it, for my Lord wishes me to perform this deed.
>
> —Jehanne d'Arc, nullification trial testimony of Jean de Metz

Jehanne d'Arc was a very powerful and forthright personality—a complex figure who cannot be contained within strict categories of interpretation or rigid structures. Nonetheless, as Nadia Margolis points out, Jehanne "is at the mercy of the intellectuals" and "has been subjected to all manner of appropriation by many factions to the point of disappearance as a real person."[1] Ann Pirruccello concurs, stating that Jehanne "is claimed by so many that we do not know how to recognize her."[2] While it is acknowledged that no single work can incorporate all possible perspectives and that a certain degree of selectivity is inevitable when dealing with an abundance of information, it is critical to the purity of any interpretation to approach the historical record with integrity and to avoid excessive selectivity, yet this is not always the practice. Hence, as an act of invitation to Jehanne to step forward through nearly six hundred years of diverse and sometimes questionable interpretation, I attempt to present her message as clearly as possible while endeavouring to impose as little as possible upon her, (acknowledging that some imposition is inevitable).

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[1]Nadia Margolis, "The 'Joan Phenomenon' and the French Right," in *Fresh Verdicts on Joan of Arc*, ed. Bonnie Wheeler and Charles T. Wood (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), 281.

[2]Ann Pirruccello, "Force or Fragility? Simone Weil and Two Faces of Joan of Arc," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, ed. Ann W. Astell and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 278.

My approach is to observe, acknowledge, and evaluate material represented in the various testimonies and other historical records with minimal extrapolation or distortion. Moreover, I endeavour to emphasize what Jehanne apparently emphasized in the interest of identifying and understanding her purpose. Furthermore, I attempt to eliminate selectivity based on my own personal agenda by incorporating, throughout the course of my interpretation of Jehanne, relevant pieces of information encountered whether or not they accord with my preconceptions of her. In other words, I do not simply discard that which does not fit readily with my interpretation; I adjust my interpretation to fit the evidence rather than adjusting the evidence to fit my interpretation! The method herein employed seeks to access something of Jehanne's essence—her transformative presence—by weaving the various pieces of her story in such a way as to discern her apparent message and ongoing significance to humanity, which may be understood as God's message to humanity expressed through her, as a prophetic mystic.

The main concern and the fundamental, driving question of the investigation is, what insights or wisdom does Jehanne offer regarding claims to divine sanction in acts of war? Hence, Jehanne constitutes the starting point, the basis, and the main context for the enquiry. Nonetheless, she is considered within a number of secondary contexts as well since no-one can be isolated from these entirely. The goal of discerning rather than defining or manipulating Jehanne's apparent message—of allowing her to speak for herself, insofar as possible—is based upon the conviction that, as one who was willing to die a harsh and unwelcome death at a young age in order to maintain the purity of her divine revelation while simultaneously forgiving those who wed her to the stake,[3] hers is a message worth hearing. From the stance that, through her particular style of military engagement and martyrdom, Jehanne delivered a timeless message of peace at the highest personal-temporal cost, I demonstrate the viability and usefulness of the interpretation with respect to evaluating claims to divine sanction in acts of war made even to this day.

Scholars have inherited a wealth of historical data concerning Jehanne due, in part, to the intense scrutiny to which her public life was subjected. Consequently, one is

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[3]Jean Massieu, Jehanne's usher in the Rouen prison, testified that Jehanne forgave and asked forgiveness of all those who stood before her at the stake, an audience which included several of her condemners; in Régine Pernoud, *The Retrial of Joan of Arc: The Evidence for her Vindication*, trans. J.M. Cohen (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1955), 247.

able quite thoroughly to reconstruct a historical account of her life. Although the record of the 1429 Poitiers interrogation (the first extensive theological examination of her character)[4] has been lost or destroyed, the official conclusion of that examination and some valuable eye-witness testimony concerning the process are preserved. The conclusion of the Poitiers examiners is widely published in modern texts, and eye-witness testimony is contained within the nullification trial records.[5]

The official record of the condemnation trial against Jehanne which took place at Rouen in 1431 is extant in the form of three Latin manuscripts authenticated by notary signatures and two French manuscripts, the d'Urfé manuscript and the Orléans manuscript, both of which are possible copies of the original French minutes of the trial recorded by notary Guillaume Manchon. W.S. Scott notes that "a rigorous comparison between the d'Urfé and Orleans manuscripts" was conducted by Father Paul Doncoeur who concluded that "both manuscripts reproduced the original French Minute, and that in the Orleans manuscript we therefore possess the only complete copy of the original text, giving Jeanne's actual words."[6] He observes that the d'Urfé manuscript is "unfortunately incomplete."[7] Pernoud agrees that the Orléans manuscript likely preserves "the least attenuated echo" of Jehanne's own voice.[8] Manchon's minutes were translated into Latin by Thomas de Courcelles and Manchon himself, yielding five authenticated Latin copies.[9]

From 1841 to 1849, Jules Quicherat published a five-volume collection of document reproductions pertaining to Jehanne, including the condemnation and nullification trial documents in Latin. In 1902, T. Douglas Murray published the condemnation trial transcript and nullification trial depositions in English from Quicherat's text. In 1920-21, Pierre Champion published condemnation trial material in two volumes, and between 1960 and 1971, Pierre Tisset and Yvonne Lanhers published

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[4]Jehanne previously underwent a less extensive (and possibly undocumented) examination at Chinon, which included the first of several physical examinations to confirm her virginity. Jean II, Duke of Alençon; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 51. Jean Pasquerel, Jehanne's confessor; in T. Douglas Murray, ed., *Jeanne D'Arc: Maid of Orleans, Deliverer of France: Being the Story of her Life, her Achievements, and her Death, as attested on Oath and Set forth in the Original Documents* (Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger, 1902), 282, and in Pernoud and Clin, 30-1.

[5]The nullification trial investigated the legitimacy of the previous condemnation trial conducted against Jehanne and overturned the verdict of the latter.

[6]W.S. Scott, trans., *The Trial of Joan of Arc: Being the verbatim report of the proceedings from the Orleans Manuscript* (London: The Folio Society, 1956), 18.

[7]Ibid., 16.

[8]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 227.

[9]One authenticated copy is lost, and one was ceremonially "torn and burned" in July, 1456 following pronouncement of the nullification trial verdict; hence, three remain. Daniel Hobbins, trans., *The Trial of Joan of Arc* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), 7, 9.

the condemnation trial transcript in three volumes containing both the Latin and French documents. Subsequent volumes continue to be published. I have utilized Craig Taylor's English translation (2006) produced primarily from the Tisset Latin document, Daniel Hobbins's English translation (2005) produced principally from Champion's Latin text and supplemented from Tisset's French document, W.S. Scott's English translation (1956) from the French Orléans manuscript, and Murray's English translation from Quicherat's Latin text. I have also consulted the works of Tisset, Quicherat, and Doncoeur directly, as well as a typed copy of the Orléans manuscript obtained from the Centre Jeanne d'Arc in Orléans, particularly in clarifying discrepancies between later sources. The reader will notice that some quotations taken from the trial of condemnation are direct, first-person quotations while others are indirect, third-person paraphrases. This is because the notaries switched the manner in which they recorded Jehanne's testimony mid-trial, initially employing direct discourse and then moving to indirect discourse. It is speculated that this action constituted an attempt to subdue the impact of Jehanne's powerful and direct responses to her examiners who preferred to present her in a less persuasive light.[10] Some translators have retained the paraphrased responses while others have translated them back into first person as they would have been spoken by Jehanne.

The official record of the nullification trial (previously referred to as the rehabilitation trial) conducted in 1455-1456, including the preliminary royal inquiry record of 1452, is extant in the form of three original, authenticated manuscripts in Latin—with the exception of a single testimony in French (that of Jehanne's squire, Jean d'Aulon)—bearing notary signatures. Although the first royal inquiry of 1450 conducted by Guillaume Bouillé is not contained in the official record of the nullification trial, it is available in a publication (1956, vol. 3) by Paul Doncoeur and Yvonne Lanhers who published (between 1952 and 1961) five volumes containing documents from the French and Latin manuscripts along with research concerning Jehanne, and it is also included in Murray's text (1902). From 1977 to 1989, Pierre Duparc published a five-volume edition of the nullification trial record and supplementary materials (both Latin and French). I have utilized Murray's English translation and Pernoud's English translations (1955 and 1964) of eyewitness testimony from Quicherat's transcription of the text and Craig Taylor's English translation (2006)

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[10]Pernoud and Clin, 112.

of eyewitness testimony from Duparc's text. Moreover, I have drawn upon the works of Duparc and Quicherat directly. In addition, I have consulted eyewitness testimonies translated by Mathias Gabel and Carlyn Iuzzolino posted on the website of the Saint Joan of Arc Center founded by Virginia Frohlick, available at http://www.stjoan-center.com. In addition to trial information, Taylor and Pernoud include English translations of nine letters dictated by Jehanne, (and Pernoud includes the original French text also), as well as other contemporaneous correspondence and documents concerning her, and I have availed myself of these.

With regard to the material on Jehanne, I focus most heavily on the above-noted primary sources rather than on secondary materials since the former bring one closest to Jehanne's own voice, although authors such as Pernoud[11] and Deborah Fraioli are drawn on considerably with respect to historical information, and they and others are also consulted in relation to the interpretation of Jehanne.[12] My foremost intention, however, is not to summarize or debate at length what others have theorized about Jehanne, but to offer a substantially unique perspective with potentially significant implications. My interpretation is intended to stand essentially on its own.

My focus is primarily theological rather than psychological, philosophical, or strictly historical, although these apply to varying degrees. I identify Jehanne as a mystic based on her own obviously mystical perspective, (that is to say, her belief that individuals can commune with God directly), and I interpret her in light of other primary mystical sources, such as the classic texts of Saint Teresa of Avila and Saint John of the Cross, two prominent sixteenth-century Carmelite mystics and doctors of the church. Since my purpose is not to expound the entirety of mystical theology, I draw significantly from these instructive works which are frequently cited by scholars of western mysticism. In the realm of more recent mystical scholarship, I draw from the

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[11]Bonnie Wheeler praises Pernoud's work with respect to Jehanne, asserting that "[n]o historian in our century [i.e., the twentieth century] has done more to return us to the Joan of documentary history than . . . Pernoud." Bonnie Wheeler, "Joan of Arc's Sword in the Stone," in *Fresh Verdicts on Joan of Arc*, ed. Bonnie Wheeler and Charles T. Wood (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), xvi.

[12]It should be noted that much of the historical record pertaining to Jehanne is derived from sources who were either for her or against her—few sources are neutral. So it is also with interpretations of Jehanne, who continues to be a polemic figure. However, this does not mean that all such evidence or interpretation is inaccurate, but merely that consideration of various perspectives when researching Jehanne's history calls for discernment, as is the case with much of history. Every author writes from a position of limitation and insight, and each offers a particular perspective. For example, Fraioli's historical interpretation concentrates heavily on the early reception of Jehanne and on her position within the context of the Hundred Years' War, whereas Pernoud's historical interpretation is more extensive, offering theoretical analyses of contested issues. Kelly DeVries presents a distinctly military interpretation of Jehanne while Anne Llewellyn Barstow approaches her from a social perspective, and Preston Russell views her through the lens of medicine.

works of reputable theologians and religious scholars who identify as mystics, such as Dorothee Soelle, Simone Weil, Thomas Merton, and Alan Watts since they speak of mysticism first-hand, and also from Søren Kierkegaard in whose work a mystical thread is evident.

My preference for working with primary source material over secondary commentaries is rooted in the fact that primary works draw one directly into the heart of the matter. On the other hand, works by scholars of mysticism such as William James, Nicolas Lash, and Denys Turner, while commendable, do not resonate strongly with my approach to interpreting Jehanne theologically and mystically since their primary focus is either psychological or philosophical (in the analytic vein), and they approach mysticism from the periphery rather than from within; hence, their position is necessarily vicarious and limited. Those who evaluate mysticism from without are, in my view, not the most qualified individuals for the task. Soelle voices her disapproval of such secondary approaches to mysticism. "[T]here is little I can do with the modesty of some scholars of mysticism," she writes. "They steadfastly understand themselves as nonmystics, as persons who have not experienced anything and are only delivering secondhand goods—as if mysticism could occupy one just like any other business."[13] "For many years I have been drawn to and borne by mystical experience and mystical consciousness,"[14] she declares. Moreover, as Watts points out, "[n]o system of philosophy or theology, no precise intellectual structure, can ever fully embrace the mystical experience of God. Not only is the divine Spirit as living and ungraspable as the wind, but the experience itself contains paradoxical elements which no ordinary logical procedure can reconcile."[15] Hence, mystical experience must be viewed in a category of its own if one is to have any hope of evaluating it effectively.

There is value in secondary scholarship, of course, since it allows one to consider a variety of perspectives on a given matter and, in this spirit, secondary sources are consulted throughout this work, but they do not form the basis for my evaluation of Jehanne, nor of her mystical expression. Jehanne defies complete categorization, and it is not my goal to confine her, or her mysticism, within the framework of any particular author or school of thought since to do so would be to distort her message. My intention is to take her at face value, as clearly as possible, to the extent that I can discern her.

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[13]Dorothee Soelle, *The Silent Cry: Mysticism and Resistance*, trans. Barbara and Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 5.

[14]Ibid., 1.

[15]Watts, 127.

Naturally, there will be some who agree with aspects of my interpretation and who approve of my approach and others who will not; such is the nature of academic engagement whose goal is to encourage independent thought and thereby, if it is at all successful, gradually to open modest pathways to truth.

Now, let us turn to our primary subject, Jehanne herself. I will begin by presenting historical information pertaining to Jehanne's life and death since these represent the foundation upon which the entire work is constructed.

Jehanne's Mission in Historical Context

> And if I were to be condemned and saw the fire lit and the wood prepared and the executioner who was to burn me ready to cast me into the fire, still in the fire would I not say anything other than I have said. And I will maintain what I have said until death.
>
> —Jehanne d'Arc, *The Trial of Joan of Arc*

Although the exact date of her birth is unknown, based on her own testimony, it is generally accepted that Jehannette (Jehanne) d'Arc was born on or around January 6, 1412[16] in the village of Domremy (duchy of Lorraine),[17] France during the Hundred Years' War between England and France (1337 to 1453). The climate of Jehanne's childhood was one of strife in which the English had succeeded in conquering the northern region of France and had gained collaboration of that portion of the country known as Burgundy. France was not only divided geographically, but French loyalties were also divided by the war and papal schism. Jehanne belonged to the category of individuals described as "those living toward the end of the war [who] knew that the suffering they witnessed had gone on for generations and that the devastation to France had bled the population nearly dry."[18] This notably lengthy war created a food shortage resulting from a ravaged land and from lack of means to transport goods since roads had

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[16]Jehanne testified on February 21, 1431 "that she was nineteen or thereabouts." Jehanne; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 65.

[17]Jehanne is frequently referred to as being from Lorraine, which carries somewhat ambiguous connotations since Domremy was a border town situated between France and the Holy Roman Empire, the duchy of Lorraine technically owing allegiance to the Empire; however, due to shifting borders, it was (and remains) uncertain to whom Domremy actually belonged, although it was generally regarded as constituting part of France at the time. Siobhan Nash-Marshall, *Joan of Arc: A Spiritual Biography* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1999), 29, 178, n. 2. There were undoubtedly influences from both sides of the border. Pernoud and Clin maintain that Jehanne's spoken French revealed "a strong Lorraine accent." Pernoud and Clin, 223.

[18]Deborah A. Fraioli, *Joan of Arc and the Hundred Years War*, ed. Jane Chance (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), xxviii.

become unsafe to travel. Moreover, the French countryside was prey to plunderers who terrorized the population.[19] In 1425, when Jehanne was thirteen, Domremy was plundered and burned by Anglo-Burgundians who thieved the village cattle.[20] People live on high alert at such times and Jehanne, along with her family and other villagers, found it necessary to flee home periodically, seeking refuge in nearby towns. In July, 1428, Domremy was again attacked by Burgundians who set fire to the crops, at which time Jehanne escaped to Neufchâteau.[21] No-one residing in a war zone is spared from suffering to some degree, and Jehanne was no exception, living in fear and dodging harm.

The Hundred Years' War, which was actually a series of intermittent battles over a period of one hundred and sixteen years rather than a single, continuously sustained war, revolved primarily around a lengthy and complex rivalry for the crown of France and also around longstanding contention over the land of Aquitaine, which both England and France desired to hold and to control. However, many troublesome, contributing factors dating as far back as 1066 had arisen between the two countries prior to the generally accepted start date of the war in 1337.[22] Since details of these and of the early and final stages of the war are available in many history books, the current discussion pertaining to Jehanne will focus primarily on events which occurred during or shortly before her lifetime and, to some extent, after her death. It is pertinent simply to note that the tension between France and England and the strife of French citizens had persisted longer than three and a half centuries when Jehanne took up her sword.

A pivotal event occurred in May of 1418 when Burgundian forces under John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, and Parisian sympathizers took control of Paris, allowing the English entrance to the city and killing approximately two thousand supporters of the French cause. The dauphin, Charles VII, abandoned the capital in haste and sought refuge in less hostile territory.[23] Needless to say, this event significantly strengthened the English position in France and made matters worse for the French royalists.

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[19]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 11.

[20]Nash-Marshall, 35.

[21]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 66. Nash-Marshall, 35.

[22]Fraioli, *Hundred Years War*, xxvii. Fraioli provides specific details regarding contributing factors to the war prior to 1337.

[23]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 6. Craig Taylor, 99, n. 67, 257, n. 42. Paris did not return to French rule until April 13, 1436. Fraioli, *Hundred Years War*, lxvi. Charles VII did not reenter the capital city until 1437. Craig Taylor, 107, n. 81.

In May of 1420, another major event transpired when the Treaty of Troyes was entered into by King Charles VI of France (who was by then suffering recurrent bouts of "insanity" and diminished power over his kingdom), Queen Isabeau (his wife), King Henry V of England, and Duke Philippe the Good of Burgundy.[24] Under provisions of the treaty, Charles and Isabeau disinherited their own son, Charles VII, in favour of Henry V who was to marry their daughter, Catherine. Moreover, they willingly handed over the kingdom of France to Henry and his heirs *for all time*; it was anticipated that England would henceforth rule both the English and French kingdoms under a dual English monarchy.[25] According to Fraioli, the Treaty of Troyes "was conceived as a diplomatic solution to end the Hundred Years War" on the supposition that peace would prevail under a single ruler. Since Henry and Catherine were expected to produce heirs who would be equally French and English, it was held that future kings of the dual monarchy would embody unity between England and France[26]—unity, perhaps, but certainly not equality since, although born of both French and English blood, subsequent monarchs of the dual realm were to reign specifically under the crown of England. Unity based on inequality (if true unity can, indeed, exist within a framework of inequality) is inevitably precarious and, not surprisingly, all did not accept the terms dictated by the Treaty of Troyes, Charles VII being front and center among the dissenters. Supporters of the dauphinist claim to the throne of France formed a military party whose goal was to drive the English from France permanently; they argued that neither could a royal heir be disinherited, nor could a French king "alienate his lands" since he reigned over but did not actually possess them.[27] As Fraioli points out, the conviction that a monarch does not possess the lands over which s/he rules is consistent with the position that Jehanne later asserted in claiming that a king holds "his kingdom . . . as a vassal of God."[28] "Gentle Dauphin," Jehanne declared, "I am called Joan the Maid, and the King of Heaven has sent me to see that you are anointed and crowned in the city of Rheims, and you shall be lieutenant of the King of Heaven, who is King of

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[24]Fraioli, *Hundred Years War*, lx, lxi, lxiii, 144.

[25]Ibid., lxiii, 144.

[26]Ibid., 144. The English ambition for a dual monarchy over England and France did not originate with the Treaty of Troyes but dates back at least as far as 1340, when Edward III of England declared himself king of both domains. Ibid., 18.

[27]Ibid., 144-5. Dauphinist supporters prior to the death of Bernard VII (Count of Armagnac) in 1418 were referred to as Armagnacs, after which they became known as the French party. Ibid., lxiii, 162.

[28]Ibid., 145.

France."[29] Jehanne also informed Robert de Baudricourt, Captain of Vaucouleurs, "that the kingdom did not belong to the Dauphin but to her Lord, and that her Lord wished the Dauphin to be made king, and that He would give him His kingdom to rule."[30] Furthermore, Jehanne notified the King of England, "[Y]ou shall never hold the kingdom of France from God, . . . but King Charles, the true heir, will hold it; for God, the King of Heaven, wishes it so and has revealed this through the Maid."[31] This "revealed" understanding that a divine order existed wherein God determined who could rightfully rule over a given land comprised an essential component of Jehanne's claim to divine sanction in establishing Charles VII as King of France.[32] In fact, the notion of sacred kingship in France has a long history linked to the relationship between church and monarchy established with the baptism of the Merovingian King Clovis in 498, (reign 481-511).[33] Needless to say, the Treaty of Troyes, which violated this tradition, did not effect an end to the Hundred Years' War. Henry V of England and his wife Catherine produced one son (December, 1421) and, with the deaths of Henry V and Charles VI occurring in 1422 just two months apart, the infant Henry VI of England became contender for the French throne against the dauphin, Charles VII of France. And so the battle continued while the young Jehannette, still oblivious to her eventual, critical role in the affair, spun wool with her mother in Domremy.

Amidst the general unrest caused in France (and England) by the Hundred Years' War, the Great Schism of 1378–1417 within the western church saw two popes, one in Avignon and another in Rome, vying for authenticity and authority (with the further complication of a third claimant between 1409 and 1415). This created ongoing instability within the Catholic Church and placed additional strain on the conflict between the French and the English as divisions arose with respect to which pope was legitimate, even after the Schism had ended. In 1429, the year in which Jehanne's active military career began, a papal rivalry persisted between three claimants: Martin V of

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[29]Jehanne; quoted by Pasquerel, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 183.

[30]Jehanne; quoted by Bertrand de Poulengy, squire, Ibid., 102.

[31]Jehanne, letter dated March 22, 1429 to the English; reproduced in Pernoud and Clin in both English and the original Old French, 33-4, 249-50. Quotation is from Pernoud and Clin, 34.

[32]It also resonates with the biblical patriarchal tradition in which God repeatedly designates certain lands to a specified people. "Then the Lord appeared to Abram, and said, 'To your offspring I will give this land.'" Gen. 12:7 NRSV. "On that day the Lord made a covenant with Abram, saying, 'To your descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates.'" Gen. 15:18 NRSV.

[33]Fraioli, *Hundred Years War,* 43-6. Olivier Bouzy of the Centre Jeanne d'Arc in Orléans indicates that the coronation and anointing of the kings of France at Rheims began after 1027. Olivier Bouzy, Centre Jeanne d'Arc, Orléans, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012.

Rome, Clement VIII of Peñiscola, and Benedict XIV (of unknown location).[34] Such religious strife no doubt heightened the attack response of some within the church toward any further perceived threat to ecclesiastical authority and stability and, as we shall see, Jehanne was haplessly to become such a perceived threat.

This was the backdrop against which the youngest daughter of Jacques d'Arc and Isabeau Romée grew up.[35] Jehanne's family were reputable farmers and, as a youth, she sometimes tended the plough and the cattle in addition to performing household tasks.[36] It is estimated that the d'Arc family owned approximately fifty acres of land and, although generally considered peasants, they were "neither rich nor poor."[37] Jehanne had three older brothers and an older sister.[38] She received no formal education but was instructed by her mother in household and religious matters and demonstrated a strong work ethic.[39] Despite her lack of formal education, Jehanne spoke very well[40] and

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[34]A letter from Jean IV, Count of Armagnac, addressed to Jehanne on August 22, 1429 names the three papal claimants. The letter reads: "My very dear lady, I commend myself humbly to you and pray to you before God, considering the division which there is at present in the holy universal Church regarding the matter of the popes, for there are three men contending for the papacy: one dwells at Rome and calls himself Martin V, whom all the Christian kings obey; another dwells at Peñiscola, in the kingdom of Valencia, and calls himself Clement [VIII], no one knows where the third lives unless it is the Cardinal of St. Etienne, and those few men with him, and he calls himself Benedict XIV. The first, who is called Pope Martin, was elected at Constance by the consent of all the Christian nations; the one who is called Clement was elected at Peñiscola after the death of Benedict XIII by three of his cardinals; the third, who is named Pope Benedict XIV, was secretly elected at Peñiscola, also by the Cardinal of St. Etienne. I beseech you to beg Our Lord Jesus Christ that, in His infinite mercy, He might wish to declare to us through you which of the three men is the true pope, and which He would have us obey in future – the one called Martin, or the one called Clement, or the one called Benedict – and in whom we should believe, in secret and in hiding, or publicly and in the open. For we are all ready to do the will and pleasure of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Wholly yours, the Count of Armagnac." Letter reproduced in Craig Taylor, 122-3. Craig Taylor indicates that Benedict XIII "defied the authority of the Council that tried to depose him" in 1417 and that "his successor, Clement VIII [antipope from 1423-1429], did not accept the superior authority of Martin V and resign until 26 July 1429." Craig Taylor, 122.

[35]Jehanne provided testimony regarding the names of herself and her parents on February 21 and March 24, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 138, 204. There are wide discrepancies in the spelling of the paternal surname within the primary texts; variations include "d'Arc", "Darc", "Dars", "Day", "Dai", "Darx", "Dare", "Tarc", "Tard", and "Dart". Pernoud and Clin, 220.

[36]Jean Moreau, Jehanne's godfather, (a merchant); in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 71-2.

[37]Pernoud and Clin, 221. Jehanne's father was village *doyen* and, as such, "was required to promulgate decrees of the village council and of higher authorities, to command the watch day and night, to guard prisoners, and to collect taxes, rents, and dues." He also supervised the village weights and measures as well as bread and wine production. Ibid. Opinions vary as to what class is most appropriately assigned to the d'Arc family. For example, Nash-Marshall maintains that "[t]hey were neither serfs, nor peasants, nor paupers. Nor were they desperate." Nash-Marshall, 35.

[38]Pierre Marot, *Joan the Good Lorrainer at Domremy: The Upper Meuse marches, Joan's mission, Memory and worship of the heroine in her country*, trans. Laure Brissaud (Colmar: Editions S.A.E.P. Ingersheim, 1981), 28. It is, in fact, uncertain which of the daughters was oldest.

[39]Jehanne stated on February 21, 1431 "that her mother taught her the *Pater Noster, Ave Maria* and *Credo*"; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 65. She stated on February 22, 1431 that her mother also taught her to sew and to spin and that she [Jehanne] was particularly adept at these; in Scott, *Trial*, 66. Béatrice, widow of a farmer named d'Estelin, testified to Jehanne's work ethic; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 74, as did Durand

displayed "an admirable prudence in all her words."[41] Jehanne's upbringing was Catholic and, from her youth, she went frequently and voluntarily to church; she was described as being of "sound morals, and . . . such a good girl that almost everyone in Domremy loved her."[42] She was a very pious and kind child who "tended the sick and gave alms to the poor"[43] and who generously gave up her bed to less fortunate folk while she slept by the hearth.[44] She was also known to scold the parish beadle for neglecting to ring the church bells but promised him a gift of wool or baked goods if he would reform this behaviour.[45] Jehanne frequently retreated from play with others and entered into solitary prayer. Indeed, her extreme piety was well-known and earned her the teasing of some of her friends.[46]

At the age of thirteen, Jehanne's spiritual life acquired a dimension with implications reaching far beyond the personal; it actually altered the course of French and English history. She began to experience what she described as visitations by heavenly beings, including the archangels Michael and Gabriel and Saints Catherine and Margaret, as well as other unidentified angels on occasion, all of whom she understood to be messengers of God delivering divine revelation and counsel to her directly. The visitations consisted of voices, often accompanied by a powerful light which sometimes took identifiable form. Although initially frightened by the encounters, Jehanne's fear subsided once she became certain of their divine nature. However, when her divine counsel eventually endowed her with an astonishing mission to lift the siege of Orléans, she protested that she was merely "a poor girl," untrained in riding and warfare. But the voices persisted.[47] Evidently and understandably overwhelmed by such a daunting

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Laxart; in Craig Taylor, 273. Also, Isabellette, wife of Gérardin d'Épinal; in Murray, 221. Also, Jeannette, widow of Thiesselin of Viteaux, formerly clerk at Neufchâteau; Ibid., 217.

[40]Albert d'Ourches, nobleman; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 101.

[41]Perceval de Boulainvilliers, king's councillor and seneschal of Berry, in his letter to the Duke of Milan, Philippe Maria Visconti; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 5, 114-21, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 98.

[42]Moreau; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 71-2.

[43]Simonin Musnier, farmer; Ibid., 79.

[44]Isabellette, wife of Gérardin d'Épinal; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 84. Numerous witnesses at the nullification trial provided testimony regarding Jehanne's kindness and piety.

[45]Perrin Drappier, beadle of Domremy; Ibid., 78, and from Quicherat, vol. 2, 431, in Nash-Marshall, 37.

[46]Jean Waterin, Jehanne's playmate; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 87. Mengette, Jehanne's childhood friend; Ibid., 81. Colin, son of Jean Colin of Greux; Ibid., 79.

[47]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 24, 27, and March 15, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 141-2, 147-8, 152-4, 194-6. Although it is uncertain which Saint Catherine and which Saint Margaret Jehanne identified as her divine counsel, many suppose them to be Catherine of Alexandria and Margaret of Antioch. Pernoud and Clin, 113. While some scholars make scant or no reference to Gabriel as a member of Jehanne's divine counsel, she makes several references to the Archangel. Jehanne stated that she saw the

assignment, Jehanne eventually accepted it. Saint Michael, she said, had explained to her the terrible plight of the kingdom of France and urged her to go to the assistance of the French King, assuring her that she would have God's help.[48] Thus it was that one of the most instrumental claims to divine sanction in war known to us came into being.

Faithful to her divine counsel and having voluntarily pledged her virginity at age thirteen for "as long as it should be pleasing to God,"[49] Jehanne '*la pucelle*' (the Maid) set out from Domremy sometime between October, 1428 and January, 1429 at age sixteen or seventeen to fulfill her astounding mission.[50] Her first task was to secure a means of travelling to de Baudricourt. Jehanne recounted the event as follows:

> She . . . said that she went to find her uncle [Durand Laxart] and that she told him that she wanted to stay with him for a short length of time; and

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Archangel Gabriel with her eyes. Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 166. Jehanne's testimony of March 28, 1431 also names Gabriel as one of *four* angels whom God sent to counsel and comfort her; in Scott, *Trial*, 140. Jehanne also stated on May 9, 1431 that Saint Gabriel comforted her on the day following the public admonition of May 2, 1431, during which she had been threatened with death by fire; Ibid., 152.

[48]Jehanne, testimony of March 15, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 120.

[49]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 104.

[50]Based on eyewitness testimony from de Poulengy containing calendrical clues, Pernoud places Jehanne's first two journeys to Vaucouleurs as occurring in May, 1428 and sometime in the early months of 1429. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 34. de Poulengy states, "Joan the Maid came to Vaucouleurs at the time of the Ascension of our Lord, as I recall it, and there I saw her speak with Robert de Baudricourt who was then captain of the town. She told him that she was come to him, Robert, sent by her Lord to bring word to the Dauphin that he hold himself prepared but make no war on his enemies, for the Lord would aid him before mid-Lent . . . [and] that despite his enemies the Dauphin would be made King and that she would lead him to his coronation. . . . And thereafter, towards the end of Lent, Joan came again to Vaucouleurs . . . ." de Poulengy; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 33-4. Craig Taylor's translation indicates in parentheses that Ascension day fell on May 13 in 1428 and that Jehanne's return to Vaucouleurs occurred "towards the beginning of Lent." de Poulengy; quoted in Craig Taylor, 276. Murray's translation also indicates the beginning of Lent. Murray, 230. It makes more sense that it would have occurred at the beginning of Lent since Jehanne stated that the dauphin would have assistance by mid-Lent. Despite de Poulengy's testimony in relation to the timing of these visits, (which he implies might be inaccurate, stating, "as I recall it"), on the assumption that Jehanne's voices did not reveal her mission to raise the siege of Orléans before it actually began in October of 1428, it would seem that she did not set out for Vaucouleurs prior to that date. Thus, Charles T. Wood positions her initial journey to Vaucouleurs at January, 1429. Charles T. Wood, *Joan of Arc and Richard III: Sex, Saints and Government in the Middle Ages* (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 1988), 131-2. Jehanne indicated during the Rouen trial that her voices instructed her to raise the siege of Orléans prior to her departure from Domremy. Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 142. If one were to assert that Jehanne first travelled to de Baudricourt in May of 1428, prior to the beginning of the siege, one would have to suppose that her voices prophesied the occurrence of the siege and that Jehanne either remained silent on the matter until it manifested or transmitted the prophecy at the risk of being scoffed at. In fact, de Baudricourt did scoff at her and reject her twice prior to accepting her. Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 142. However, given the urgency conveyed by her divine counsel when first instructing Jehanne to raise the siege, (prior to her departure for Vaucouleurs), it would seem that the siege was already underway. Jehanne was told "that she must hurry and go and raise the siege of Orléans." Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 67. Craig Taylor's translation reads as follows: "She also said that the voice told her that she should come into France and that she could no longer stay where she was, and that . . . she would raise the siege positioned around Orléans." Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 142.

> she stayed there for about eight days. She then said to her uncle that it was necessary that she go to Vaucouleurs and her uncle took her there.
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> . . . And Joan said to Robert [de Baudricourt] that she had to travel to France. But Robert twice refused and dismissed her."[51]

Jehanne sought from de Baudricourt an escort to deliver her to the dauphin at Chinon in order that she might declare her divine mission to him, but de Baudricourt advised Laxart to give Jehanne a sound beating and return her to her father.[52]

At that time, following a fourteen-year string of devastating losses to the English, the diminished and discouraged dauphinist party and, indeed, Charles VII himself, were virtually hopeless of regaining French autonomy barring a miracle. The English had laid siege to Orléans and also occupied most of the country north of the Loire, including not only Paris but Rheims. "Surrounded by unscrupulous advisers, his coffers empty, . . . the Dauphin's fortunes were at their lowest ebb," notes Scott.[53] Hence, it is not surprising that, when Jehanne arrived on the scene, prophecies which had been circulating throughout France for years began to resurface in light of the compelling young maiden who proclaimed a divine mission. In fact, Jehanne reportedly identified herself with at least one of these, declaring to de Baudricourt, "Have you not heard the prophecy that France was to be ruined by a woman and restored by a virgin from the marches of Lorraine?" She had previously cited the same prophecy to Laxart with great effect.[54] The prophetic reference to France being "ruined by a woman" is commonly understood as applying to Queen Isabeau of Bavaria (Charles VII's mother) who conspired in the Treaty of Troyes which disinherited her son,[55] but the matter is uncertain.

Association of Jehanne with the fulfillment of prophecy henceforth continued and played a role in the unfolding of subsequent events in her life. Master Jean Érault, a professor of theology who served as one of the Poitiers examiners, identified Jehanne with the prophecy of a woman named Marie d'Avignon who claimed that a maid would don armour and deliver France from its misery.[56] Also, a sixteen-line poem about

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[51]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 142. Laxart was not actually Jehanne's uncle but her first cousin's husband. Craig Taylor, 142, n. 12. Pernoud and Clin, 18. The word "France" in medieval terminology designated the central area of the kingdom exclusive of peripheral regions. Pernoud and Clin, 114.

[52]Laxart; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 33.

[53]Scott, *Trial*, 9.

[54]Jehanne; quoted by Catherine Royer, Jehanne's hostess at Vaucouleurs, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 99. Laxart; in Craig Taylor, 273.

[55]Fraioli, *Hundred Years War*, 58-60, 94. Craig Taylor, 18, n. 56.

[56]Jean Barbin, doctor in law; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 115.

Jehanne entitled *Virgo puellares*, supposedly written by advisers of Charles VII around the time of the 1429 Poitiers Inquiry, was apparently influenced by a prophecy attributed to Merlin which predicted that, "There will be a virgin who will ride in arms against the backs of the English archers, and her sex and the flower of her virginity will keep secret."[57] Fraioli notes that the prophecy associated with Merlin more originally stated simply, "A virgin ascends the backs of the archers / and hides the flower of her virginity."[58] She states that the French, in employing the prophecy in support of Jehanne's mission, interpreted the reference to concealed virginity as an indication that Jehanne would wear armour,[59] (as opposed to the customary and potentially more revealing dress of a woman)—not an altogether unintelligible interpretation of an otherwise obscure statement. The equestrian and English references were presumably added in order to tailor the prophecy more specifically to the situation at hand.[60] Reference was made to a similar (or perhaps the same) prophecy at the nullification trial where it was testified that, during Jehanne's active military campaign, a prophecy foretelling a maid emerging from the Bois Chesnu and riding "on the backs of archers" against the English was transmitted to the imprisoned Earl of Suffolk.[61] Fraioli notes that the added reference to place of origin of the specified virgin was contained in a "popular oral version" of the Merlin prophecy.[62] The term '*Bois Chesnu*', meaning 'Oak Wood', was interpreted as a reference to the oak forest situated near enough to Jehanne's childhood home that it was visible from the door of her father's house. Jehanne testified that people at Chinon associated her with the Bois Chesnu prophecy, but that "she put no faith in it."[63] Scott states that legend anticipated the arrival of a maiden from the *Bois Chesnu* who would accomplish "the healing of nations."[64] Such widespread reference to

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[57]Berne MS 25; quoted in Craig Taylor, 77, n. 21. Craig Taylor, 77. Deborah A. Fraioli, *Joan of Arc: The Early Debate* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2000), 64. Fraioli refers to Berne MS 205 in relation to the French translation of the Merlin prophecy. Ibid., 63.

[58]Taken from Acton Griscom, *The Historia Regum Britanniae of Geoffrey of Monmouth* (New York, 1929), 397; quoted in Fraioli, *Early Debate*, 62. Craig Taylor asserts that the Berne manuscript contains a loose French translation of the Latin prophetic text which predates Geoffrey of Monmouth's Latin version. Craig Taylor, 77.

[59]Fraioli, *Early Debate*, 64.

[60]Ibid., 63.

[61]Jean, Count of Dunois and Bastard of Orléans; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 144.

[62]This addition, Fraioli maintains, was extracted from a different section of the Monmouth text and conflated with the earlier portion of the prophecy at an unknown date. Fraioli, *Early Debate*, 63.

[63]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 76.

[64]Scott, *Trial*, 76, n. *. Bouzy adds that the Merlin prophecy originating in the Monmouth text actually describes "the constellation of the Virgin clashing with the constellation of Sagittarius, and the Bois Chesnu (nemor canutorum) is called the Kanute's Forest (nemor Canuti) in the same text." Bouzy, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012.

prophecy indicates that it carried power in Jehanne's day, and Jehanne's prophetic role will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter.

While we have no definitive explanation for de Baudricourt's change of heart—whether it was due to faith in the prophetic or to something else—it happened that, on Jehanne's third appearance before him, he granted her permission to travel to Chinon and supplied her with a group of men charged with conducting her there safely. Jehanne reported that de Baudricourt offered her some parting advice: "Go, and let come what may," he said.[65] It was at this stage of her mission, in late February, 1429, that Jehanne adopted male clothing appropriate to the task. "She said . . . that when she left Vaucouleurs, she took man's dress, and also a sword which de Baudricourt gave her, but no other armour. And she said she was accompanied by a knight and four other men."[66] Jehanne and her small escort travelled for eleven days over enemy-occupied territory without incident, a feat considered remarkable by some, before reaching Chinon on or around March 4, 1429. One imagines that an aura of the miraculous must have begun to surround her as a result of this unhindered journey.[67]

Jehanne prefaced her arrival at Chinon with letters to Charles VII announcing her forthcoming visit and requesting clearance to enter the city. The letters also indicated that she would recognize Charles without difficulty amidst the many who would be present there, and this she reportedly accomplished.[68] Perhaps Jehanne anticipated that she would be put to the test by the royal court and foretold this act of recognition in order to substantiate the divinity of her mission. She would not have been incorrect in such an assumption since, after hearing Jehanne's claim as to what she intended to achieve (i.e., the lifting of the siege at Orléans and the delivery of Charles to his coronation and anointing at Rheims[69]), Charles subjected her to two examinations in order to have her credibility assessed. The first was carried out by an ecclesiastical team at Chinon, and the second, more extensive inquiry took place at Poitiers.[70] Pernoud notes

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[65]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 68.

[66]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 68.

[67]Several witnesses at the nullification trial testified to their astonishment at the fact that the group crossed such vast enemy territory safely and unhindered. See, for example, the testimonies of de Poulengy and Gobert Thibault, squire to the King of France; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 103, 118. Jehanne also later led Charles VII safely into and across enemy territory to his coronation at Rheims.

[68]Jehanne, testimony of February 22 and 27, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 69, 80-1. Jean Chartier, chronicler, reported the event of recognition in his *Chronicle*, and Simon Charles, president of the royal treasury of France, provided further evidence; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 108 and Pernoud and Clin, 22-3. Moreau supplied similar testimony; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 92.

[69]Reported by S. Charles, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 107-8.

[70]Alençon; in Pernoud and Clin, 27.

that most of the former masters of the University of Paris were then at Poitiers since the "English had filled the places at the University . . . with their own paid creatures,"[71] and it was from this highly qualified group of academic theologians, civil and canon lawyers, bishops, and other clergy that the Poitiers interrogators were drawn. The examination lasted approximately three weeks[72] and concluded with an official declaration that "no evil is to be found in her, only goodness, humility, virginity, devotion, honesty and simplicity." Furthermore, the examiners maintained that "to doubt her, or to dismiss her, without [her showing any] appearance of evil, would be to repel the Holy Spirit."[73] So it was that Jehanne's claim to a divine mission initially became sanctioned officially by the church, a fact that would be completely ignored throughout the condemnatory process to follow at Rouen.

Upon receiving approval at Poitiers and full support from Charles VII, Jehanne was thoroughly equipped and dispatched with an army to Orléans where the raising of the siege on May 8, 1429 in a matter of days was considered a miraculous event, given the nearly impregnable nature of the English forts which had been erected there.[74] This remarkable victory by Jehanne and her companions-at-arms constituted fulfillment of the first aspect of her declared mission, and it was followed by a string of successes: first, the recovery of Jargeau on June 12, followed by Meung-sur-Loire on June 15, then Beaugency on June 17, and Patay on June 18. These victories cleared part of the route for Charles's journey to Rheims, but the English and Burgundians still held many towns along the way. Despite the danger, however, it was said that, "although the King had no

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[71]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 54. Pancrazio Giustiniani, Italian director of a commercial house in Bruges, suggested in a letter written in late 1429 that the University of Paris was then comprised of "enemies of the King" of France; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 102, 104.

[72]François Garivel, counsellor to Charles VII; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 110-1. Seguin Seguin, professor of theology, Dean of the Faculty of Poitiers, Dominican friar, and one of the Poitiers examiners; Ibid., 112.

[73]Poitiers conclusion; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 73-4. Quotations are from Taylor, 73 and 74 respectively.

[74]Alençon; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 155. The battle for the deliverance of Orléans began on May 4, 1429. In addition to horses and armour, Jehanne was equipped with a squire, two pages, and two heralds, as any captain of war would have been. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 60-1. Although it was not unheard of for a siege to be lifted in a matter of days, it must be recognized that every siege is different, with its unique set of circumstances. The siege-works were very strong at Orléans, which had been under siege more than six months, during which time experienced captains and soldiers, and the citizens themselves, had been unable to liberate the city. Pernoud maintains that "[i]t is improbable that a captain as brave as Dunois—who had, with La Hire, brilliantly raised the siege of Montargis two years previously (in 1427)—would not already have done everything in his power to relieve Orléans. When he, a captain used to heroic exploits, speaking of a situation in which his honor was involved—for he had been entrusted with the defense of the place—declares to us that the King's army was not sufficient to offer any further resistance to an attack by the besiegers, we must take his word for it." Pernoud, *Retrial,* 132, n. 3.

money to pay his army, all the knights, esquires, men of war and of the commonality did not refuse to go with and serve him for that journey in the Maid's company, saying that wheresoever she went they would go."[75] It followed that a treaty was entered into with the town of Auxerre, and the towns of Troyes, Châlons, and Rheims subsequently surrendered to the dauphin. The anointing and coronation of Charles VII, King of France, took place at Rheims on July 17, 1429, fulfilling the second element of Jehanne's proclaimed mission. It is quite remarkable that, within a time span of just two and a half months, nine towns were recovered by the French under Jehanne's inspiration and efforts and the dauphin was anointed and crowned, something previously believed unattainable (except by miracle). Moreover, as the coronation party travelled a different return route from Rheims, more towns willingly pledged their obedience to the new king.[76] Pernoud points out that, having received the pivotal sacred anointing that was critical to French kingship, Charles was, from that point onward, regarded as "the Lord's anointed, legitimate heir to the kingdom" by the majority of French people.[77] Jehanne's accomplishments were immediately celebrated by Christine de Pizan, a well-known poet who wrote, "And you Charles, King of France, . . . see your honour exalted by the Pucelle who has laid low your enemies beneath your standard . . . in a short time; for it was believed quite impossible that you should ever recover your country which you were on the point of losing. Now it is manifestly yours."[78]

It should be noted that it was on Jehanne's approach to Rheims with the royal army that Pierre Cauchon, who was then either living in or visiting Rheims (his native city) and serving as Bishop of Beauvais and counsellor to the child-king Henry VI of England, fled the city, being a long-time open supporter of the English cause. He was also later compelled to leave Beauvais when the English and Burgundians were driven out of that city, thereby becoming displaced from his own diocese.[79] These two events undoubtedly placed Jehanne high on Cauchon's enemy list. In fact, it was Cauchon who would later take the lead in orchestrating Jehanne's demise.

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[75]Alençon; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 120.

[76]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 125, 130. *Journal of the Siege of Orléans*, 187, 190; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 130.

[77]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 125.

[78]Christine de Pizan, *Le ditié de Jehanne d'Arc*, ed. and trans. A.J. Kennedy and K. Varty (Oxford, 1977); reproduced in Craig Taylor, trans., *Joan of Arc: La Pucelle* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 99-108. Quotation is from Taylor, 100-1.

[79]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 43, 151. Pernoud and Clin, 209.

Immediately following the coronation, although he then possessed an impressive military advantage, Charles VII began visibly to withdraw support from Jehanne and her military campaign, attempting negotiations at peace with Burgundy. In fact, he secretly began officially negotiating a truce with Burgundy on the day of his coronation at Rheims.[80] Jehanne, however, having previously implored the Duke of Burgundy in at least two letters to make peace with Charles, realized that the utter lack of cooperation on the part of Burgundy necessitated continuation of the war in order to achieve eventual peace.[81] "[P]eace," she predicted, "would not be found except at the end of a lance."[82] It is important to note that this statement does not indicate a preference for war on Jehanne's part but simply a regrettable fact. She did not trust the Burgundians to honour the terms of their truces and correctly estimated that they would use any alleged truce period to strengthen their military capabilities. In fact, thirty-five hundred English reinforcements had already entered northern France and were on their way to Paris at the time of Charles's coronation, unbeknownst to the French party, arriving there on July 25. Pernoud states plainly that the negotiations constituted an act of "fraud" on the part of Burgundy against the King of France and an act of "betrayal" by the latter against Jehanne and her companions-at-arms.[83] On August 5, 1429, Jehanne wrote to the city of Rheims as follows:

> [I]t is true that the King has made truces with the Duke of Burgundy for fifteen days, by which he [Burgundy] must peacefully return the city of Paris at the end of fifteen days. . . . No matter how many truces are made like this, I am not at all happy, and I do not know if I will keep them. But if I do, it will only be to protect the honour of the King, and . . . I will keep together and maintain the army of the King so as to be prepared at the end of those fifteen days, if they do not make peace.[84]

Jehanne evidently did not yet consider her mission completed, which is reasonable enough given that the English forces still constituted a formidable presence throughout much of France and would have to be driven out of the country if it was ever to be united under the autonomous rule of French kingship. Although her suspicions toward Burgundy were validated, for Paris was not handed over as agreed, Charles continued to

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[80]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 128. Fraioli, *Hundred Years War,* 67.

[81]Jehanne's letter of July 17, 1429 to the Duke of Burgundy beseeched him to make peace with Charles VII and made reference to a previous letter sent by her requesting the same, to which she had received no reply; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 95-6.

[82]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 173.

[83]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 129.

[84]Jehanne; letter reproduced in Craig Taylor, 118-9.

negotiate for peace, which effectively undermined the efforts of Jehanne and the royal army to retake Paris[85] and to recover the remainder of the kingdom at that time. In fact, many within Paris had been fortifying the city since June 21 of that year in anticipation of an Armagnac attack,[86] so the longer that Charles stalled the effort to retake it, the stronger became the enemy's ability to defend it. Moreover, it was reported that, although various cities were eager to submit to Charles, he inexplicably failed to approach them.[87] In late August, Charles ordered a truce at Compiègne and a four-month suspension of hostilities against Burgundians in all areas except Paris.[88] He also granted the Duke of Burgundy authorization to govern and defend the capital city in addition to granting him possession of Pont Saint-Maxence, Créil, Senlis, and Compiègne, the latter which refused to recognize the Duke's authority.[89] All four of these towns had just recently surrendered to the King of France.[90] Charles's behaviour was odd, indeed, and it must have been particularly confounding, frustrating, and deeply disappointing to those who had repeatedly risked life and limb to recover his lands and see him crowned.

In spite of the setbacks, Jehanne did not give in to despair but pressed onward. On September 8, 1429, she and her companions were finally in a position to attack Paris, but their offensive met with strong resistance and they eventually retreated after nightfall against Jehanne's will. An arrow had penetrated her thigh during the assault and, unable to walk, her comrades carried her away as they withdrew. She maintained that, had they prolonged the battle, they would have taken the capital that day.[91] Eyewitness to the attack and clerk of the Parlement of Paris, Clément de Fauquembergue, suggested that the inhabitants of Paris opposed the attempt to oust the occupying forces because Charles VII had abandoned them when he fled the city eleven years earlier.[92] However,

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[85]Craig Taylor, 118.

[86]*Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris*, 91-2; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 119-20. Pernoud and Clin also cite the *Journal of the Siege of Orléans* as stating that, following the astounding French victory at Patay, the Parisians undertook immediately to fortify their city against Armagnac attack. Pernoud and Clin, 62.

[87]Enguerrand de Monstrelet, bailly of Compiègne and Burgundian chronicler; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 391, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 133-4.

[88]Craig Taylor, 118.

[89]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 139, 146. Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1999), 140, 161.

[90]DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 140.

[91]Perceval de Cagny, chronicler for the Duke of Alençon; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 25-9, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 137.

[92]Clément de Fauquembergue, *Journal de Clément de Fauquembergue, greffier du Parlement du Paris, 1417-1435*, vol. 2, ed. A. Tuetey and H. Lacaille (Paris, 1903-15), 322-4; quoted in Craig Taylor, trans., *Joan of Arc: La Pucelle* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 125.

it is difficult to believe that all were of a single mind; some Parisians must surely have supported the French cause, as Pernoud suggests.[93]

The following day, Jehanne and the Duke of Alençon, along with some of the other captains, planned to resume the attack on Paris without delay, but they were prohibited from doing so by their increasingly unsupportive king who summoned them to appear before him at Saint-Denis. Charles VII went so far as to have a bridge destroyed during the night which Alençon had built in preparation for the next phase of the assault; Jehanne and her party arrived at the bridge to find it demolished.[94] On September 10, just two days after the failed attack on Paris, Charles ordered the royal army to abandon the assault[95] and, on September 18, he extended the existing truce to include Paris.[96] On September 21, he ordered the dissolution of the royal army.[97] Furthermore, Charles intentionally separated Jehanne from the Duke of Alençon, against their mutual will, sending the Duke to fight in the north of France without her. He had been one of her most ardent companions-at-arms, and the two would henceforth never see each other again. The remaining captains were also scattered in various directions.[98]

Prior to departing Saint-Denis, Jehanne deposited a suit of armour and a sword in the basilica there, an action which, although customary, might also be viewed as a poignant act of resignation on her part. Her wave of military victory in service to God

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[93]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 136.

[94]de Cagny; in Jules Quicherat, ed., *Procès de Condamnation et de Réhabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc Dite la Pucelle*, vol. 4 (Paris: la Société de l'Histoire de France, 1847), 28.

[95]Pernoud and Clin, 173, 270.

[96]Craig Taylor, 118. The fact that Paris was exceptionally well-fortified does not exclude the possibility that it might have been taken by Jehanne and her companions-at-arms had they been permitted to prolong the assault. She and some of the most experienced leaders of the French army, including La Hire, Alençon, the duke of Bourbon, the count of Vendôme, the count of Laval, the lord d'Albreth, the lord de Rais, the lord of Boussac, the two marshals of France, and Ponton de Xantrailles believed in their ability to retake the city. In fact, after the first day of the assault, they were not deterred but intended to renew their efforts the following day. It cannot be reasonably assumed that such a large number of experienced military leaders would have pursued the endeavour to take Paris had they not thought it feasible. DeVries makes the same point and supplies the names of the French military leaders who took part in the attack on Paris. DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 139, 146, 148-9. Moreover, it is possible that some of the citizens of Paris might have joined the French forces had the latter been allowed sufficient opportunity to demonstrate their strength as such defections were not unheard of. DeVries indicates that, on the day after the battle for Paris, Jehanne was met with "the arrival of the count of Montmorency and fifty to sixty 'gentlemen' . . . who had defected from the city, wishing to fight with her and the French army against their former allies." DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 146.

[97]Pernoud and Clin, 173, 270.

[98]de Cagny; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 30, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 141-2. de Cagny; quoted in Pernoud and Clin, 79. Alençon requested that Jehanne be allowed to fight with him in Normandy, but the request was denied. DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 147. DeVries cites de Cagny and Jacques Bouvier (the Berry Herald) as his sources from Quicherat, vol. 4, 30 and 48-9 respectively, as well as Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 141-2. DeVries, 222, n. 66. Pernoud and Clin, 78-9.

and her country was receding. Jehanne was questioned about the matter during the Rouen trial. "Asked why she offered these arms, she answered that this was out of devotion, according to the custom of men-at-arms when they were wounded; and because she had been wounded in front of Paris, she offered them to St Denis, because this was the [battle] cry of France,"[99] yet she had made no similar offering with respect to her wound sustained at Orléans. Taylor explains that "Montjoie Saint Denis" was the definitive battle cry of the French royal army at the time and also "supposedly referred to the mound of stones" which marked the site of Saint Denis' martyrdom.[100] Nash-Marshall speculates that Jehanne's reference to the battle cry in conjunction with her offering of arms constituted a petitionary prayer requesting that she not be forced to abandon the battle for France,[101] but one cannot help wondering if Jehanne had inklings of her own upcoming martyrdom, hence her reference to the battle cry representing the martyred saint and her gesture at the basilica of Saint Denis. The reference was uttered in association with her wound which had forced her withdrawal from the battle for Paris which, she maintained, had ultimately prevented a French victory on that day, a day marking her sole opportunity to retake the capital and her first decisive military loss. Note that Jehanne's reference was to the "cry of France," interpreted by the translator as "the [battle] cry of France."[102] It is certainly a reasonable interpretation, but perhaps Jehanne intended the statement to carry a dual connotation, both as a battle cry (a call to arms), and simply as "the cry of France," that is, the cry of a people and a land, bloodied, ravaged, and burned under long-term foreign occupation and war. Jehanne undoubtedly understood that the failure to regain Paris would prolong the war and result in further suffering for the French people under the oppression of pro-English forces.

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[99]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 199.

[100]Craig Taylor, 199-200, n. 119.

[101]Nash-Marshall, 116.

[102]Like Taylor, Hobbins translates it as "battle cry" and Scott and Murray as "war-cry." Hobbins, 111. Scott, *Trial*, 124. Murray, 89. However, when one consults Tisset, one finds that a literal translation renders "the cry of France" in English. Tisset's French document reads, "le cri de France," while the Latin text reads, "clamor Francie." Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Pierre Tisset and Yvonne Lanhers, trans. *Procès de Condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc*, vol. 1, ed. la Société de l'Histoire de France, Fondation du Département des Vosges (Paris: la Société de l'Histoire de France, 1960), 171 and in Pierre Tisset and Yvonne Lanhers, trans. *Procès de Condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc*, vol. 2, ed. la Société de l'Histoire de France, Fondation du Département des Vosges (Paris: la Société de l'Histoire de France, 1970), 141. The Orléans manuscript also reads, "le cry de France." Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Orléans MS 518, Bibliothèque Municipale d'Orléans (Orléans: c.1498–1515), 137. The d'Urfé manuscript (c.15th century) agrees with the Orléans manuscript according to Doncoeur's comparison. Paul Doncoeur, *La Minute Française des Interrogatoires de Jeanne la Pucelle: d'après le Réquisitoire de Jean d'Estivet et les manuscrits de d'Urfé et d'Orléans* (Melun: Librairie d'Argences, 1952), 194.

Hence, the "cry of France" was conceivably not only a battle cry—in this case, a call to defensive war—but simultaneously a cry against injustice—against foreign occupation and offensive war. In this instance, a call to defensive war and a cry against offensive war are inseparable and operate as one. The "cry of France" thus expresses the dual aspect of Jehanne's mission. In any case, the loss before Paris coupled with the stark orders issued by her king clearly indicated a turning point in Jehanne's mission. She had predicted six months earlier at Chinon that she would "last a year and scarcely more,"[103] suggesting that she was aware from the beginning of her campaign that her mission would be short-lived and that the tide would somehow shift.[104] She might have been symbolically handing over the battle to those who would continue the fight after her. At any rate, Jehanne's ritual offering in the basilica of Saint-Denis seems to represent an awareness of the imminence of an apparently inevitable shift in fortune, a shift into the unknown.

Ordered back to the Loire, Jehanne was assigned the recovery of La Charité, which first required taking Saint-Pierre-le-Moûtier. The latter she accomplished;[105] however, by November 9, 1429, Jehanne was in the position of writing to the citizens of Riom to request military supplies in order that she might continue uniting the kingdom of France. She wrote:

> Dear and good friends, . . . with the help of God I intend to clear out the other places which are hostile to the king. . . . [A]nd because I and my men are poorly prepared to lay siege to La Charité, where we will be going shortly, I pray that you, for as much as you love the good and honour of the king and also that of all the others here, will wish to send aid immediately . . . gunpowder, saltpetre, sulphur, arrows, heavy crossbows and other military supplies.[106]

It was late November and very cold when Jehanne arrived at La Charité with her small company. They remained for a month before the town prior to withdrawing due to lack of assistance from within the town[107] and lack of victuals from Charles.[108]

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[103]Jehanne; quoted by Alençon, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 160.

[104]Jehanne did not apparently know exactly how long her military campaign would last, but she knew it would not last long. In a statement given during the Rouen trial, she indicated that she had anticipated freeing the Duke of Orléans from an English prison and that this would have required more than a year but less than three years, and she did not recall precisely how long her voices indicated it would take. Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 106-7.

[105]Jean d'Aulon, Jehanne's squire; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 172-3.

[106]Jehanne; letter reproduced in Craig Taylor, 130-1.

[107]The Berry Herald; in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 49, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 145.

[108]de Cagny; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 145.

After being detained by the royal court throughout much of the winter, Jehanne, according to a contemporary chronicler, left the king on her own initiative in late March or early April of 1430 and travelled to Lagny-sur-Marne to resume her military efforts independently.[109] She was accompanied by a group of approximately two hundred men-at-arms including her brother, Pierre, and her squire, Jean d'Aulon.[110] In late April, Jehanne was positioned at Melun before proceeding to Crépy-en-Valois and, subsequently, to Compiègne in early May (which was under Burgundian siege). It was during her time at Melun, sometime between April 17 and 22, that Jehanne first received revelation from her voices that she would be captured by the enemy prior to June 24 of that year without any indication of how she might avoid this—on the contrary, her divine counsel indicated that it had to be so. They reiterated this "frequently, almost every day," Jehanne explained. "And she begged her voices that when she should be taken prisoner she might die speedily, without suffering long imprisonment. And they told her that she should take it all in good part; and that it must happen so; but they did not tell her when." She was assured, however, that "God would help her."[111] The unknown was gradually becoming known to Jehanne; the critical shift was about to occur. Jehanne lived with knowledge of her impending capture for a month before it occurred in late May, which must have been a powerful torment, yet she did not abandon the mission to which she felt divinely called. That she struggled during this period is certain. Jehanne maintained that, if her voices had revealed to her (as she often requested) the exact hour of her capture, "she would not have gone," clarifying in the next breath that "she would not have gone willingly. Nevertheless she would have obeyed them in the end, whatever was going to happen to her."[112] Such unfaltering

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[109]That Jehanne was holed up during the winter of 1429-30, possibly at the castle of La Trémoille, at least in part since letters were written by her from there, is noted in DeVries and in Pernoud and Clin. DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 158-9, 224, n. 25. Pernoud and Clin, 82. The contemporary chronicle of Perceval de Cagny indicates that Jehanne took leave of her own accord, without permission from the royal court. de Cagny; in DeVries from Quicherat, vol. 4, 32, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 162. DeVries classifies this move as treasonous, although he does not condemn it. DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 162.

[110]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 147. Two of Jehanne's brothers, Jean and Pierre, had joined their sister's army at Tours in April, 1429 (prior to the deliverance of Orléans). Pernoud, Ibid., 126. DeVries indicates that Jehanne's army grew slightly en route to Compiègne as soldiers at various stops along the way joined her company. DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 162. Once Jehanne's army reached Compiègne, it naturally joined forces with those who were already defending the town, including its captain and citizens who had amassed an impressive array of supplies and weapons and were well-prepared to use them. DeVries, Ibid., 161. Pernoud and Clin, 83.

[111]Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 99. Pernoud and Clin provide the dates. Pernoud and Clin, 90.

[112]Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 99.

commitment to divine will characterized by Jehanne's painful willingness to sacrifice all for a divinely designated purpose constitutes utter defeat of personal agenda which is dissolved in a revealed divine agenda. It is such painful willingness to suffer, rather than enthusiastic willingness, that constitutes a useful marker in assessing claims to divine sanction. This will be discussed at greater length later.

It was during this period, on May 6, 1430, that Charles VII finally acknowledged publicly his error in having trusted the Burgundian peace ploy,[113] but within just two and a half weeks, Jehanne, his "greatest resource . . . whom he had deprived of any effective means of action,"[114] was snatched from the battlefield for all time. She was captured by Burgundians at Compiègne on May 23, 1430 while defending the rear as her party retreated toward the town, for it was Jehanne's custom always to position herself in battle "at the point where the danger was greatest," that is, in the vanguard on attack and the rearguard on retreat.[115] This fact is supported by testimony from d'Aulon, who stated that, during the battle for Orléans, Jehanne and captain La Hire were "before them [i.e., their soldiers] to guard them, [they] couched their lances and were the first to strike among the enemies."[116] Accounts of Jehanne's bravery thus refer even to her earliest military activity at Orléans, and her chivalric behaviour did not elude the enemy. A Burgundian chronicler wrote of her capture that "the Maid . . . took all the brunt, and took great pains to save her company, remaining behind as captain and bravest of her troop." She was consequently pulled from her horse by an archer and taken prisoner along with her brother, Pierre, and her squire.[117] Enguerrand de Monstrelet, bailly of Compiègne and also a Burgundian chronicler, added that "those of the Burgundian party and the English were overjoyed, more pleased than if they had taken five hundred other combatants. Because they did not fear or dread any captain or commander as much as they had always feared this Pucelle until that day."[118] Jehanne's willingness to place herself in as much danger as her soldiers, and more, indicates that she was fully engaged in her mission on every level. She did not withdraw to the background and order others

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[113]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 146, 148-9.

[114]Pernoud and Clin, 84.

[115]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 151.

[116]d'Aulon; quoted in Pernoud, Ibid., 89.

[117]Georges Chastellain, Burgundian chronicler; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 446-7, Ibid., 151-2.

[118]Enguerran[d] de Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justicatives (1400-44),* vol. 4, ed. L. Douët d'Arcq (Paris, 1857-62), 314-5, 353-6, 386-9, 442-7; quoted in Craig Taylor, trans., *Joan of Arc: La Pucelle* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 258.

to conduct her mission on her behalf but participated along with those whom she commanded. Her direct participation in her mission, her courage, and her chivalric behaviour will be relevant to our subsequent discussion of righteous warfare and human agency and should be kept in mind as they will constitute markers in assessing claims to divine sanction.

Many have long held that Jehanne's capture resulted from blatant betrayal on the part of Guillaume de Flavy, who was captain and defender of Compiègne at the time. It is speculated that he raised the drawbridge prematurely, not because the city was in imminent danger since it had several layers of defense of which the drawbridge was outermost, but with the specific intention of blocking Jehanne's retreat into the city.[119] The argument against de Flavy rests primarily on this fact, that it was not strategically necessary to close the drawbridge, which would have been Jehanne's surest means of retreat to safety. Jehanne remained to defend the rear of her company and de Flavy ought to have known that she was accustomed to doing so. The boats that he placed on the Oise River which allowed the escape of some of Jehanne's men served de Flavy's interests in preserving French soldiers for the continued defense of Compiègne following Jehanne's capture.[120] The fact that these boats were placed on the river does not mitigate the fact that it was strategically unnecessary to raise the drawbridge. This lack of necessity, coupled with the fact that Jehanne and her troops were defending his city, renders it unlikely that she and those captured with her expected de Flavy to behave in such an unsupportive manner. Placed at an unexpected and serious disadvantage, they would have been unprepared to deal with the situation effectively.

What motive(s) might such an act of betrayal have served? It is reported that several lords and captains within the French ranks were jealous of Jehanne's military accomplishments and so endeavoured to restrain her by orchestrating her downfall.[121] It is also possible that de Flavy's behaviour was partly motivated by financial gain;

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[119]Pernoud and Clin, 87, 231-3. The author of the late fifteenth- to early sixteenth-century Orléans manuscript acknowledges the possibility that Jehanne was betrayed by a "Frenchman" who prevented her from retreating [into Compiègne]. In Scott, *Trial*, 46. Bouzy indicates that, in 1445, de Flavy was accused of betraying Jehanne "in a trial set up by the descendants of Marchal Rieux whom Flavy had assassinated to take revenge for having been imprisoned by him." Bouzy's argument, however, does not favour the treason theory. Bouzy, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012.

[120]Scott notes that, "[i]n an endeavour to protect her retreating troops, Jeanne led a charge against Baudot and Luxembourg, thus giving time for the main body of the French to reach the boats which the Governor of Compiègne, one Guillaume de Flavy, had ready." W.S. Scott, *Jeanne d'Arc: Her Life, Her Death, and the Myth* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd, 1974), 80.

[121]Scott maintains that de Chartres and La Trémoille were "jealous" of Jehanne. Scott, *Trial*, 44, n.*.

however, Pernoud and Marie-Véronique Clin suggest that he sought as well to extend his power over territories surrounding Compiègne, and Jehanne's mission would have interfered with such aggressive ambition.[122] She feared "nothing except treason," Jehanne declared en route to Rheims at the very climax of her campaign,[123] a retrospectively foreboding statement in its tenor.

Upon capture, Jehanne was temporarily placed under guard at Margny.[124] She was subsequently held in a castle at Beaulieu from which she nearly escaped[125] before being transferred to Beaurevoir for four months. At Beaurevoir, Jehanne made her second escape attempt by jumping from a seventy-foot tower, but she was once again intercepted. Although she suffered injuries from this leap which, remarkably, did not kill her, these quickly healed.[126] In November, 1430, Jehanne's Burgundian captor, Jean

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[122]For documentation of three fifteenth-century written accounts of like-minded opinion, including an accusation of monetary greed on the part of de Flavy as incentive for treason, see Pernoud and Clin, 232-3. The fact that such aspirations for expansion on de Flavy's part, (if they existed), did not materialize might be explained in part by Kelly DeVries's observation that "because of the loss of Joan during his time there [at Compiègne], Guillaume de Flavy's career declined, never to attain even a modicum of his pre-1430 glory. The question of not having done what he could [as captain of Compiègne] to make sure that Joan was not captured, let alone the possibility of his treason in the matter, followed Guillaume de Flavy to his grave." DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 173. Note that DeVries does not support the theory that de Flavy betrayed Jehanne. Ibid., 174.

[123]Jehanne; quoted by Gérardin d'Épinal, farmer, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 84.

[124]Chastellain; in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 446-7, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 151.

[125]Jehanne, testimony of March 15, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 116-7.

[126]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 187. Nash-Marshall places the height of the tower at seventy feet, whereas Scott stipulates eighteen metres. Nash-Marshall, 134. Scott, *Jeanne d'Arc*, 85. Regardless of what the exact height of the tower was, Jehanne's captors clearly considered it high enough that a prisoner would not jump from it in order to escape. Some have speculated that Jehanne did not jump from the tower but faltered in attempting to lower herself from it safely; however, this is incompatible with abundant evidence contained in the condemnation trial records. (Nash-Marshall suggests that Jehanne might have "slipped" while attempting "to climb off the tower." Nash-Marshall, 134. Bouzy suggests that she might have "climbed out of a window" since a chronicler stated that whatever Jehanne "'used to descend broke.'" Bouzy, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012.) The majority of evidence, however, renders the theory unconvincing. On March 3, 1431, during interrogation at Rouen, Jehanne indicated that she jumped from the tower of Beaurevoir against the command of her voices and that her captors initially thought she had died as a result. Scott, *Trial*, 97-8. The trial session of March 14, 1431 opened with Jehanne being questioned as to why "she leaped from the tower of Beaurevoir." She was also "[a]sked whether, when she leaped, she expected to kill herself" and, later that day, she was accused of having thrown "herself down from the tower of Beaurevoir." Scott, *Trial*, 111-2, 115. Article 41 of the initial seventy articles drawn up against Jehanne at the condemnation trial accuses her of attempting to commit suicide "by throwing herself down from the top of a tower . . . ." Murray, 355. Another translation of the article as contained in the trial promoter's notes reads, "Joan tried to throw herself from the top of a high tower and, incited by the devil, purposed in her heart to do this, and attempted and did what she could toward that end. In so casting herself down, she was also driven and led by diabolical suggestion . . . ." Hobbins, 142. Article 37 states that Jehanne "jumped from the tower at Beaurevoir," and Article 64 indicates that she "cast herself from a high tower of the castle of Beaurevoir." Hobbins, 140, 153. The issue was considered important enough to be included in the twelve final articles against Jehanne. Article 8 of these accuses her of throwing "herself from a very high tower, preferring to die . . . ." Craig Taylor, 211. The charge reappeared on May 2, 1431 when Jehanne was officially admonished. Item 6 of the schedule of admonitions refers to "the sin she committed in leaping from the tower of Beaurevoir." Hobbins, 175. Again, on May 23, 1431, when the schedule of Jehanne's alleged

de Luxembourg, sold her to the English who, in collaboration with Cauchon, held her enchained in a secular prison in Rouen, which had been under English domination since 1419, submitting her to an unjust trial without an advocate[127] and condemning her to death by fire on May 30, 1431. She was nineteen years of age.

The myriad injustices of this condemnation trial were apparent to some from the earliest stages of the proceedings. At least two individuals are known to have clearly opposed the tactics of the Rouen court early on. Master Jean Lohier, a Norman cleric, blatantly refused participation in the condemnation trial on the stated basis of its irregularities, injustice, and actual invalidity,[128] and Nicolas de Houppeville, Bachelor in theology, underwent imprisonment for his verbal stance against the inappropriate manner in which the trial was being conducted and was subsequently denied further participation in the process.[129] Moreover, Vice-Inquisitor Jean Lemaître participated reluctantly in the trial proceedings. Jean Massieu, Jehanne's usher in the Rouen prison, testified that Lemaître was given to understand that death would visit him should he fail to take part in the proceedings.[130] Trial notary, Guillaume Manchon, concurred that Lemaître strongly disapproved of the Rouen trial and participated as little as possible.[131] Throughout the process, those who attempted to assist Jehanne in any way or who opposed the corrupt practices of the court were, at best, disregarded and, at worst, subject to the prospects of imprisonment, beating, or drowning.[132] Toward the end of the trial, three assessors, all Bachelors in theology, submitted in writing their reservations concerning the court's ability to judge appropriately the nature of Jehanne's revelations.

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transgressions was read to her, Item 8 indicated that she "leaped from the tower of Beaurevoir, preferring to die rather than be handed over to the English and survive the destruction of Compiègne." Hobbins, 186. Had Jehanne attempted to lower herself from the tower in a relatively safe manner by means of a rope, (or something of that nature), she would surely have raised this in refutation of the charge of attempted suicide repeatedly levelled against her, the accusation that she "threw" herself from the tower, moreover, from the "top" of the tower. But she did not deny jumping from the top of the tower. Rather, she declared, "After leaping, I took confession and asked the Lord for forgiveness." Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; quoted in Hobbins, 104. Also, in stating that she would rather die than be in the hands of the English or live after the destruction of Compiègne, it is clearly indicated that Jehanne's life was at risk in the escape attempt.

[127]Jean Lohier, Norman cleric, retold by Guillaume Manchon, trial notary; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 272. The only counsel that Jehanne was offered during the trial was from among the enemy; she therefore refused. Jehanne, testimony of March 27, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 131.

[128]Lohier, retold by Manchon; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 272-3.

[129]Nicolas de Houppeville, Bachelor in theology; Ibid., 275, 277.

[130]Massieu, testimony of May 12, 1456; in Craig Taylor, 332.

[131]Manchon, testimony of May 12, 1456; Ibid., 325. Other witnesses also testified to Lemaître's reluctance to participate.

[132]Master Guillaume de la Chambre, assessor and physician at the Rouen trial, testified that Lohier and de Houppeville were threatened with drowning for their lack of cooperation in the proceedings; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 229-30.

Their opinion, presented "according to . . . conscience," met with Cauchon's unambiguous disapproval.[133] Moreover, the Bishop of Avranches, Jean de Saint-Avit, was asked to provide his opinion with regard to the case and responded that, in the absence of certainty pertaining to the legitimacy of Jehanne's claims, the case ought to be submitted to the pope. Since this opinion did not accord with Cauchon's wishes, it was conspicuously omitted from the trial record.[134] The following year, Saint-Avit was accused of plotting to liberate Rouen and was consequently imprisoned.[135] Prohibition of favourable attitudes toward Jehanne was not lifted on conclusion of the trial. Several weeks after her death, a Dominican mendicant friar by the name of Pierre Bosquier voiced disapproval of Jehanne's condemnation and, as a result, suffered imprisonment on a diet of bread and water for nearly a year.[136] Furthermore, a woman named Perrinaïc was burned at the stake in Paris for praising Jehanne.[137]

Even the most earnest and rigorous attempt by high-ranking ecclesiastical and academic theologians to discredit Jehanne's claim to divine revelation and divine sanction was evidently insufficient to convince others of equal qualification and position of any fault on her part in this regard. This, coupled with the fact that the conviction of some with respect to her innocence and legitimacy was so strong that they risked severe punishment or death in order to declare it, reinforces the strength of Jehanne's claim at the time when it was made. Such support for her claim is consistent with the approvals previously received at Chinon and, officially, at Poitiers. It is also consistent with the subsequent Inquisitorial nullification trial verdict which vindicated Jehanne and, by extension, her claim to divine sanction, and with the explicit legitimization of her claim through canonization some five hundred years after the fact. Hence, save for those whose purpose was to condemn Jehanne come hell or high water, her claim to divine sanction has met consistently with official and unofficial ecclesiastical approval since its inception.

Concerning the conditions of her imprisonment, it was testified that Jehanne's cell was guarded by five Englishmen "of the lowest sort" who "often mocked her," three

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[133]Richard de Grouchet, Pierre Minier, and Jean Pigache constituted the three assessors who opposed Cauchon on this matter. de Grouchet; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 198. Furthermore, de Grouchet testified that he and the other two men participated in the trial only "out of fear, threats, and terror," and that they had considered fleeing; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 207.

[134]Isambart de la Pierre, Dominican friar and assessor at the Rouen trial; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 282.

[135]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 199.

[136]Ibid., 201, 234. Ibid., *Retrial*, 6.

[137]Ibid., *Retrial*, 6.

of whom remained in her cell at night, the other two being posted outside the cell entrance. "[A]t night she lay chained by the legs with two pairs of irons, and [these were] tightly secured by another chain which passed through the legs of her bed and was attached to a great block of wood five or six foot long, by means of a lock."[138] Furthermore, an iron cage constructed specifically for Jehanne was designed to hold her in a standing position while bound by the neck, hands, and feet, but it is uncertain whether or not she was actually placed in this cage.[139] It is widely asserted that, rather than being held by her enemies in a secular prison, Jehanne could have been kept lawfully in a more respectable, ecclesiastical prison.[140] Pernoud maintains that keeping her in a secular prison was, in fact, illegal given that the charges against her were religious in nature and the court in which she was tried was ecclesiastical; she was, therefore, entitled to be held in an ecclesiastical prison and guarded by women.[141] Moreover, Rouen assessor, André Marguerie, testified that he always considered it "faulty procedure that she should have been kept in a lay prison on a religious charge, and especially after her first sentence, when she was condemned to life imprisonment."[142] Nonetheless, Jehanne was handled as a prisoner of war rather than an alleged heretic.[143] Such conditions would quite thoroughly crush the spirit of many, but Jehanne, no matter how physically strained or emotionally crushed she might have felt, does not appear to have been spiritually crushed. She never apparently lost faith in her divine voices or in the divinity of her mission, and she obviously did not view her own personal comfort, safety, or happiness as necessary conditions of divine calling.

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[138]Massieu; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 210.

[139]Massieu, Pierre Cusquel, mason of Rouen Castle in which Jehanne was imprisoned, and Thomas Marie, Rouen citizen and Benedictine monk; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 211-2.

[140]Jehanne was captured as a prisoner of war but she was tried in an ecclesiastical (Inquisitorial) court on charges of an ecclesiastical nature, not as a prisoner of war in a secular court. The vast majority of charges against her have nothing to do with warfare; rather, they attempt to implicate her in acts of sorcery, heresy, idolatry, invocation of demons, boasting, lying, vanity, inciting others to worship her, seeking personal profit, promiscuity, attempted suicide, failing to submit to the Church Militant, blasphemy, violation of canon law in wearing male clothing and receiving the Eucharist in such clothing, falsely claiming divine sanction, and they relate to issues concerning the various papal claimants, the nature of her divine counsel/revelations, her claim to discernment of spirits, and other 'errors' of faith.

[141]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 215. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 169, 218.

[142]André Marguerie; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 257. The "first sentence" refers to Jehanne's sentencing following alleged abjuration, prior to her alleged relapse. Another assessor, de Courcelles, stated that "many of those present believed . . . that Joan should have been handed over to the Church and [put] into an ecclesiastical prison; but he did not remember that this had been discussed at the time of the consultations." de Courcelles; quoted in Craig Taylor, 293. Bouzy states that, so long as one has not "been sentenced to a punishment that can be inflicted by the Church there is no question of [being held in] a church prison." Bouzy, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012. This suggests that it might have been possible to transfer Jehanne to a church prison following the alleged abjuration.

[143]Pernoud and Clin, 105.

Why was Jehanne treated so harshly? During the fifteen months between her initial arrival at Chinon and the time of her capture, circumstances in France had changed drastically. Not only had the pro-French forces been revived and the siege of Orléans stunningly raised, but English and Burgundian forces had suffered additional defeats and lost considerable territory which they previously occupied in France. Moreover, Charles VII had been anointed and crowned at Rheims. According to Scott, "[t]hat Jeanne should be brought to trial was a political necessity to her enemies: not only must it be shown that the Dauphin's coronation was invalid, but for the morale of the English army it was essential to prove that the French successes had a diabolic source."[144] At any rate, the English were determined that their most feared opponent would not see the light of freedom again. A letter from Henry VI to Cauchon dated January, 1431 stated unequivocally the "intention to retake and regain possession of this Joan [i.e., from those in charge of trying her] if it comes to pass that she is not convicted or found guilty."[145] The English actually had nothing to worry about in this regard since Cauchon, who had been instrumental in negotiating the Treaty of Troyes and who had twice found it necessary to flee the advancing French army, was notably vehement toward Jehanne and more than happy to take the lead in prosecuting and persecuting her.

There were two judges in the Rouen trial, namely Cauchon and Vice-Inquisitor Lemaître, a promoter named Jean d'Estivet, and approximately sixty assessors who played a consultative role. Among this hand-picked panel were many masters and doctors of theology and canon law from the University of Paris.[146] In Pernoud's view, these university men were intensely opposed to Jehanne because she defied their presumed wisdom—"an ignorant peasant girl who behaved as if she knew more than these doctors who held the keys of knowledge; a young girl under twenty who stated that she trusted more in her visions than in the light of their knowledge, than in them, the lights of the Church, who were soon to take on themselves the power of deposing a Pope."[147] These men had been generally partisan with the Avignon papacy against the Roman papacy because the former was conciliar and had afforded them considerable

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[144]Scott, *Trial*, 9.

[145]Henry VI, letter dated January 3, 1431; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 135-6. Quotation is from Taylor, 136.

[146]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 165-6. Scott, *Trial*, 9.

[147]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 14. This refers to the deposition of Pope Eugenius IV in 1439 by the Council of Basel. "Council of Basel," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online* (2012). Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/54798/Council-of-Basel; Internet; accessed 4 December 2012.

decision-making power whereas the latter was not.[148] The Council of Basel, which represented the anti-Rome faction, was established in 1431 and attempted to gain conciliar power over the Roman papacy; it was "led by precisely those men who . . . condemned Joan—by Jean Beaupère, Thomas de Courcelles, Nicolas Midy, Guillaume Érard, and the rest, the whole of the pro-English University of Paris."[149] Since Jehanne stated during questioning at Rouen that she supported the pope in Rome,[150] this contributed to placing her at odds with her judges and assessors, although she may not have been aware of it.[151] Furthermore, since the University was in favour of a dual monarchy under the English King Henry VI, and since that monarchy had been seriously hindered by Jehanne's exploits, particularly by the anointing and crowning of the French king at Rheims, her accusers had reason to believe that the dual monarchy theory would regain strength if they could demonstrate "that the instrument of the French cause was nothing but a wretched heretic and a witch."[152] Jehanne had stepped beyond her allotted position in the social hierarchy and presented a compelling claim to divine sanction in support of a political mission; not surprisingly, she was met with multiple forms of rivalry and enmity.

In addition to the broader political agendas of the day, there are other conceivable reasons why Jehanne's enemies were as ardent as her supporters. Jehanne was an evidently powerful individual, and it is plausible that she was viewed as a threat by some members of a divided and floundering church. In claiming direct communication with the divine realm and rejecting any need for mediation, Jehanne inadvertently and implicitly threatened the authority and power of the Church Militant (i.e., the earthly church) and its representatives, comprised in part by those at Rouen who acted as her judges and assessors. In the first of twelve final articles of accusation drawn up against her at Rouen in April, 1431, it is stated that "she . . . refuses to submit herself, her actions and her words, to the Church militant . . . . And . . . she will not rely upon the

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[148]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 237. Pernoud and Clin, 106-7. George H. Tavard explains that "[c]onciliarism was the theory that a general council of the Church is superior to the pope." George H. Tavard, *The Spiritual Way of St. Jeanne d'Arc* (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1998), 13.

[149]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 21. "Council of Basel," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online* (2012). Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/54798/Council-of-Basel; Internet; accessed 4 December 2012.

[150]Jehanne, testimony of March 1, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 160.

[151]Tavard maintains that Cauchon also supported the Roman pope, but that he and Jehanne were otherwise political rivals. Tavard, 17-8.

[152]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 156-7. Pernoud, *Retrial*, 204.

decision or judgement of any living man but only upon the judgement of God."[153] This accusation reappears in the last of the twelve articles, thereby framing and informing the entire body of accusations against her. The twelfth article declares that "every faithful pilgrim in this world is bound to obey and to submit their actions and words to the Church militant, especially in the matter of faith and what concerns holy doctrine and Church laws."[154] On the basis of Article 12, the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris, on May 19, 1431, declared Jehanne "schismatic" and "apostate."[155] The University's Faculty of Canon Law also condemned her as schismatic, defining schism as "an unlawful separation, due to disobedience, from the unity of the Church" and declaring that "this woman separates herself from the obedience of the Church militant."[156] The Rouen court demanded submission from Jehanne, citing it as her duty and doing everything within its power to coerce her into compliance; this included threat of torture and refusal to bury her in consecrated ground should she die a prisoner. Nonetheless, Jehanne refused to yield, even when confronted with danger to her body and soul.[157] Jehanne was fully committed to her mission based on her claim to divine revelation and permitted nothing to come between her and God; she was not deterred by any human being. Soelle observes that the "extraordinary dimensions of the soul's mystical being" are excluded "from permissible religious communication as it is carried on in the ecclesial institutions established for that purpose. Admittedly, every religion has its mystical component," she concedes, "but only in a form that is manageable and capable of keeping the fire under control."[158] Ongoing ecclesiastical endeavours to restrain the mystical, as noted by Soelle, are evidently rooted in a much older tradition extending backward in excess of half a millennium to Jehanne's day and earlier.

An enigmatic and compelling figure, Jehanne's power defied logic. In fact, her achievements pointed directly to charism, something which her enemies did not embrace in this warrior-maiden who swept the battlefields of France like a dynamic storm. Jehanne's confessor throughout her Rouen imprisonment asserted that, "had she gone

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[153]Twelve Articles, composed April 2 to 5, 1431; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 207-12. Quotation is from Taylor, 208.

[154]Articles reproduced in Craig Taylor, 207-12. Quotation is from Taylor, 212.

[155]Quoted in Craig Taylor, 214.

[156]Ibid.

[157]Jehanne, response to exhortation on April 18, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 146-7. Regarding the threat of torture, see Scott, *Trial*, 151-3.

[158]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 14.

over to the side of the English, she would not have been so [badly] treated,"[159] thereby testifying to the fact that power, though often celebrated in friends, is usually condemned in foes. At least three charismatic powers can be attributed to Jehanne during her lifetime based on existing evidence; they are the discernment of spirits in the matter of her visitations, the ability to prophesy, (such as in the liberation of Orléans and the crowning of Charles VII at Rheims), and the apparently miraculous revival of an infant from death. Sometime in April or May of 1430, Jehanne was called to Lagny to pray for a child who was reportedly stillborn three days earlier and had not received baptism. Several girls had been praying collectively for restoration of life to the child without apparent result; however, with Jehanne's participation, the infant was revived long enough to be baptized before dying (again) and being buried in consecrated ground.[160] Many eyes were on the Maid and many words were spoken about her. A Burgundian chronicler reported "the great renown" of Jehanne and her reputation for performing miraculous deeds.[161] Such charismatic associations combined with her clarity of purpose, intelligence, independence, determination, courage, uncanny military expertise, and general popularity rendered her someone to be reckoned with. Anne Llewellyn Barstow maintains that, during Jehanne's time, the church was attempting to eliminate folk religion and the spiritual powers of individuals which were central to its practice while simultaneously endeavouring to protect the exclusive spiritual power of the (male) priesthood established through the twelfth-century doctrine of transubstantiation.[162] She notes that the bubonic plague of the previous century, which stole so many lives, had diminished people's faith in the efficacy of the sacraments to protect.[163] Hence, when Jehanne appeared on the scene as protectress of France and

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[159]Martin Ladvenu, Jehanne's confessor at Rouen; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 230. Manchon was also of the opinion that, had Jehanne "been of the English party they would not have treated her so [badly], or have started such a case against her." Manchon; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 205. Moreover, Rouen assessor (and physician) Jean Tiphaine cited "a great English lord" as having stated of Jehanne, "She really is a good creature. Why is she not English!" Tiphaine; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 223.

[160]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 172. This event was not included as a miracle in the determination of Jehanne's case for canonization, but this is not surprising since the canonization process examines all questions of miracle very closely, employing medical professionals in questions of a physiological nature, and this would not have been possible with the Lagny incident which occurred approximately five hundred years earlier.

[161]Jean Lefèvre de Saint-Remy, Burgundian chronicler; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 349, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 153.

[162]Anne Llewellyn Barstow, *Joan of Arc: Heretic, Mystic, Shaman* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 18-9, 41.

[163]Ibid., 14.

"daughter of God," as she was frequently addressed by her divine voices,[164] it is little wonder if certain members of the clergy became envious and considered their patriarchal power threatened, a power which resided in the unstable structure of the Church Militant. Moreover, whether one believed Jehanne's powers to be charismatic or diabolic, they nonetheless seemed to extend beyond ordinary human capability and must therefore have appeared unpredictable, uncontrollable, incalculable, and intimidating. With respect to claims to divine sanction, one might cite demonstrated charism, in the full theological sense of the word, as a marker of credibility based on Jehanne's example, but it must be understood that this does not refer simply to a charismatic personality. In speaking of charism theologically, one speaks of spiritual gifts in the form of grace bestowed by the Holy Spirit, such as the ability to prophesy and to accomplish miraculous (i.e., supernatural) deeds. Virginity and martyrdom are also considered charisms (in the post-apostolic period),[165] both of which apply to Jehanne; however, in evaluating claims to divine sanction in acts of war, assessment of the status of an individual's virginity would not be considered socially appropriate in many societies today. Consequently, it is not cited in this work as a criterion of divine sanction. Martyrdom is cited as a relevant criterion, but a particular type of martyrdom based on Jehanne's example is specified.

Envy, fear, and hostility toward Jehanne also lurked on the military front. Chastellain reported that the Burgundian archer who captured her was "angry that a woman . . . should have surpassed so many valiant men."[166] Massieu testified that many felt animosity and fear toward her, particularly among the English.[167] In fact, just days after the liberation of Orléans, letters were issued forbidding desertion by English soldiers, and sanctions were later ordered against any who refused to enter France due to fear of the Maid.[168] A well-informed Burgundian chronicler who fought against Jehanne at Patay, Jean de Wavrin, wrote the following in a letter dated June 8, 1429, exactly one month after the relief of Orléans:

> By the renown of Joan the Maid, the courage of the English was much impaired and fallen off. They saw, it seemed to them, their fortune turn its wheel sharply against them, for they had already lost several towns and

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[164]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 180.

[165]Karl Rahner, s.v. "Charism," in Karl Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi* (Mumbai: St. Pauls, 1975), 184-6.

[166]Chastellain; quoted in Pernoud and Clin, 87.

[167]Massieu, testimony of May 12, 1456; in Craig Taylor, 331.

[168]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 133.

> fortresses which had returned to their obedience to the King of France, principally by the undertakings of the Maid, some by force, others by treaty; they saw their men stricken down and did not now find them of such or so firm and prudent words as they were wont to be. Thus they were all, it seemed to them, very desirous of withdrawing on to the Normandy marches, abandoning what they held in the country of France (en lieu de France) and thereabout.[169]

Pernoud and Clin indicate that, as a result of the great fear with which Jehanne was regarded by the enemy, only two hundred English soldiers could be persuaded (by means of personal threat) to accompany the seven-year-old English king to Calais in November of 1429.[170] Moreover, the English postponed laying siege to the town of Louviers until after Jehanne's death because they believed they would have no success in war while she was alive.[171] Jehanne was feared by the enemy because she was powerful, and perhaps even more so because her power appeared inexplicable except by supernatural cause.

Jealousy evidently contributed to resentment toward Jehanne, not only among the Anglo-Burgundians, but in the French arena as well. Within the French royal court, the archbishop of Rheims, Regnault de Chartres, and Georges de La Trémoïlle, grand chamberlain of France and Charles VII's lieutenant general for Burgundy, were notably hostile toward Jehanne, although de Chartres had initially supported her in his role as examiner at Poitiers.[172] These men, however, were involved in the false truces between Charles VII and Burgundy and, like Charles, had subsequently to face their folly in the matter, as contrasted with Jehanne's wisdom. The archbishop was half-brother to de Flavy, who is the man suspected of having committed a decisive act of betrayal against

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[169]Jean de Wavrin, Burgundian chronicler; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 5, 418, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 112.

[170]They state: "Henry soon landed with 200 men and 'a great supply of livestock and other foodstuffs.' The duke of Bedford encountered difficulties in recruiting this contingent. On two occasions, as he claimed in one of his letters, he delivered personal threats and sent instructions drafting men who refused to go to France 'through fear of the devices of the Maid.'" Pernoud and Clin, 84.

[171]Jean Toutmouillé, friar, and Jean Riquier, priest; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 201-2.

[172]Regnault de Chartres, Archbishop of Rheims and chancellor of France, wrote scathingly of Jehanne following her capture that she, herself, was responsible for having been taken prisoner, allegedly because she rejected the counsel of others, was prideful, wore rich garments, and did not obey divine command. de Chartres, from Quicherat, vol. 5, 168, in Craig Taylor, 21. One wonders if the Archbishop's vestments were less luxurious than those of Jehanne. Jehanne was given gifts of clothing, such as from the imprisoned Duke of Orléans, in thanks for her military services. Pernoud and Clin, 195. Kelly DeVries indicates that "[b]oth the *Journal du siège d'Orléans* (in Quicherat, IV:178-81) and the *Chronique de la Pucelle* (in Quicherat, IV:246-50), the two narrative sources that speak most positively about Joan, decry at length La Trémoille's opposition to her." DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader*, 216-7, n. 9.

Jehanne in closing the drawbridge before her at Compiègne,[173] an interesting fact which adds fuel to the treason theory. Moreover, de Chartres is suspected of having destroyed or otherwise suppressed the record of Jehanne's examination at Poitiers, which was favourable to her cause.[174] Jealousy is also considered by some to have motivated Charles VII's withdrawal of support from Jehanne. Chastellain wrote of Charles, "There were frequent and diverse changes all around his person, for it was his habit . . . when one had been raised high in his company . . . that then he began to be annoyed with him, and at the first occasion . . . he willfully reversed that person from high to low."[175]

Alas, with powerful enemies on both sides, Jehanne was positioned very precariously. Jean Riquier, a fifteen-year-old choirboy at Rouen cathedral at the time of the condemnation trial, later testified that he had overheard several of the canons who were taking part in the trial (Pierre Maurice, Nicolas Loiseleur, and others) state "that a case must quickly be framed against her and that an excuse would be found for putting her to death."[176] In addition to killing Jehanne, it is clear that her accusers also desired to destroy her credibility in order to validate the dual monarchy of Henry VI over both England and France. Justice did not figure in the matter whatsoever; therefore, when Jehanne requested several times during the course of the Rouen trial that her case be heard by the pope in Rome so he might judge it fairly, the request was repeatedly denied.[177] She also offered to submit to the Council of Basel on the understanding that it included members of her own party as well as some of the enemy, (unlike the court

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[173]Pernoud and Clin, 99, 178, 232-3.

[174]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 67.

[175]Chastellain; quoted in Pernoud and Clin, 79. Charles VII reportedly displayed jealousy even toward his own son; "Every time that the dauphin Louis . . . won a victory, Charles would recall him to court immediately in order to neutralize his power." Pernoud and Clin, 79.

[176]Riquier; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 202. de la Pierre also stated, "[I]t is my belief and judgment that the English acted against her out of hatred and malice, and that they had no other purpose than her death"; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 201.

[177]Jehanne requested three times to have her case brought before the pope. She twice asked to be taken to the pope that she might answer him directly, once on March 17 and once on May 2, 1431 and, on May 24, 1431, she asked that the trial documents be sent to the pope for review. Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 202. Jehanne, during public admonition of May 2, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 149. Jehanne, during sentencing at the cemetery of Saint-Ouen at Rouen, May 24, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 217. Witnesses at the nullification trial also testified to having heard Jehanne state during the course of the Rouen trial her desire to have her case submitted to the pope; for example, Pierre Miget, Benedictine and Doctor of theology, de la Chambre, de Grouchet, and de la Pierre; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 231-2, 280. Pernoud maintains that Jehanne's request to have her case brought before the pope was sufficient to remove any doubt that she honoured the Church Militant. Pernoud, *Retrial*, 289-90. Furthermore, it is suggested by the interrogatories of the nullification trial that, when commanded by the Rouen court to submit to the Church Militant, Jehanne understood the said Church to consist of the ecclesiastical judges and assessors who were themselves questioning her and who supported the English cause. Article 8 of the First Interrogatory and Article 17 of the Second Interrogatory, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 293, 297. The truth of the matter is that these more or less corrupt individuals did, in fact, comprise the Church Militant in part.

under which she was being tried, which lacked any pro-French representation in its composition), but this request was flatly refused as well. Moreover, assessor Isambart de la Pierre, who had made the recommendation to Jehanne that she volunteer the latter submission, was harshly rebuked and threatened with death by drowning on account of the gesture.[178] Her case, therefore, was not permitted to advance to any higher level than that of the court staffed by her enemies. Clear to some from the beginning, the objectives of the Rouen court became increasingly obvious as the proceedings progressed.

On May 24, 1431, Jehanne was brought to the cemetery of Saint-Ouen where she allegedly made a public abjuration under threat of immediate death by fire. As with the trial itself, there are irregularities and peculiarities regarding the events which took place there and those that followed which render them suspect. Curiously, two versions of the abjuration document exist, a lengthy, detailed one of forty-seven lines in French (forty-four in Latin), and a much shorter one of approximately six to eight lines.[179] Massieu testified that, after a short document of approximately eight lines was read by him to Jehanne and signed by her, it was substituted with a longer one which was declared official and forms part of the trial record. One of the three notaries, Nicolas Taquel, also testified that the document which Jehanne signed consisted of approximately "six lines" of French script, and Guillaume de la Chambre confirmed that it contained "six or seven lines."[180]

Since a short document was read to and signed by Jehanne, it is reasonable to conclude that the long document contains a falsified signature. The long, detailed abjuration document bears the signature "Jehanne +,"[181] which is how she actually spelled her name in three extant letters containing her original signature,[182] proving that, although illiterate,[183] she was able to sign her name and spelled it with consistency. The

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[178]de la Pierre; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 281.

[179]Bouzy indicates that only copies of the abjuration document are extant, not the original. Bouzy, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012.

[180]Massieu, testimony of May 12, 1456; in Craig Taylor, 334. Nicolas Taquel, notary, and de la Chambre; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 64. The long abjuration document was entered into the official trial record in both Latin and French. Craig Taylor, 218, n. 145. Pernoud and Clin supply the length of the long document in both languages, 131. Miget testified that the abjuration which Jehanne signed was the approximate length of a *Pater Noster*; in Pernoud and Clin, 233.

[181]Document reproduced in Craig Taylor, 218-9.

[182]The fact that three are extant is noted in Pernoud and Clin, 247. These three letters are reproduced in Pernoud and Clin, 257-8, 260. A photograph of the first of these is also provided in Pernoud and Clin as the last of eight pages of illustrations inserted between pages 164 and 165 of the text.

[183]G. Thibault quoted Jehanne as stating that she "did not know A from B"; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 118.

short abjuration document, however, bears the signature "Jhenne +,"[184] an obvious misspelling of her name. Although these facts might initially lead one to suspect that the short document is fraudulent and the long one legitimate, the contrary seems actually more likely, as revealed not only in the eye witness testimonies previously cited, but also in the following details. Jehanne did not completely understand the contents or implications of the document presented to her for signing in the cemetery of Saint-Ouen and, for this reason, she requested that it be examined "by the clerks and by the Church in whose hands" she ought to be transferred in order that they might advise her on the matter, but her accusers did not oblige. Rather, she was threatened with immediate burning if she refused to sign instantly[185] and, indeed, the pyre was already prepared, in view, with the executioner waiting.[186] Jehanne then protested that she did not know how to read or write,[187] which suggests that she did not wish to sign the document since she was, as we know, capable of signing her name as she had done with previous letters. Being ordered to sign, she reportedly made a mark on the paper in an act of mockery, after which her hand was forced by an English official into making a signature. Haimond de Macy described the mark which Jehanne drew on the paper as circular, yet reproductions of the document include only a signature followed by a cross; therefore, it is possible that de Macy was mistaken.[188] The fact that Jehanne's hand was forced in signing the short document, evidently by someone who faltered in the spelling of her name in a state of haste and urgency before a jeering crowd, renders the document more likely "authentic" than does the correct spelling of her name in the long document, since the signature in the latter was not likely forced in haste, and great care would presumably have been taken in spelling Jehanne's name correctly in order to give it the appearance of legitimacy.[189]

Jehanne laughed when signing.[190] This supports de Macy's suggestion that she signed in mockery. Pernoud attributes Jehanne's laughter to irony, given that she "was

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[184]Document reproduced in Craig Taylor, 219 and in Scott, *Trial*, 164.

[185]Massieu; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 237-8. Manchon also testified that Jehanne was pressured to sign; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 62-3.

[186]Jean Monnet, professor of theology and canon of Paris; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 238-9. He also testified that the abjuration document contained "six or seven lines"; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 238.

[187]Haimond de Macy, knight; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 195.

[188]Ibid., 196. Massieu's testimony of May 12, 1456 accords with de Macy's claim that Jehanne was forced to sign the short document; in Craig Taylor, 334.

[189]Pernoud and Clin conclude with respect to the abjuration documents that it is "highly probable that Cauchon ordered the inclusion in the transcript of a text that was not read to" Jehanne; 233.

[190]Manchon, in Pernoud and Clin, 131. His testimony has also been translated as, "She smiled"; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 63. Guillaume du Désert, trial assessor, also stated that Jehanne laughed; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 239.

obliged by the King of England's secretary to sign with a cross" and "that this cross was the sign agreed upon with those of her own side to warn them not to believe the contents of a letter. It was surely curious that the English should now be making her use it to sign a document whose contents she considered false."[191] It is a plausible explanation, but it is also possible that Jehanne placed the cross there herself as an indication of falsity since she did reportedly make a mark on the paper prior to having her hand forced into signing her name. Perhaps what Jehanne laughed at was the misspelling of her name, which might be regarded as technically invalidating the signature—this in addition to the cross of invalidation already placed there, or she might have laughed as she herself drew the cross. At any rate, there is sufficient evidence to warrant belief that Jehanne did not take the abjuration entirely seriously. Nonetheless, it was enough to satisfy the court's purpose; according to Massieu, the short document which she signed stipulated, among other things, that she would henceforth wear only female clothing.[192]

The fact that the text of the short document contained in the Orléans manuscript (which does not comprise part of the "official" trial record in Latin[193]) makes no reference to Jehanne's clothing further complicates the matter of what was actually contained in the short document read to Jehanne. In light of Massieu's testimony, one must admit the possibility that three abjuration documents existed: a short one which made reference to her clothing and which was read to and forcibly signed by Jehanne of which no extant copy is known, as well as both long and short fraudulent documents of which copies exist, but this would lead one to question why the signatures on two fraudulent documents would differ and why two false versions would have been produced. In comparing the official (long) document and the short document of the Orléans manuscript, one finds that the two, in fact, are quite similar. The Orléans manuscript document contains essentially the same beginning and ending as the official long document with an "etc." placed in between, (which might be understood as referring to the middle section of the long document). It appears, therefore, that the Orléans manuscript document is simply an unofficial and abbreviated reproduction of the official (fraudulent) long document. While the truth of the abjuration scene remains shrouded in mystery; what we do know is that Jehanne adopted female clothing

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[191]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 217. Jehanne testified on March 1, 1431 that she sometimes signed letters with a cross in order to indicate to "the person of her party to whom she was writing" that the contents of the letter should not be taken seriously; quoted in Craig Taylor, 160.

[192]Massieu; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 215 and in Craig Taylor, 334.

[193]Craig Taylor, 219.

following the alleged abjuration and that her resumption of male clothing became central to her supposed relapse and final condemnation. It would seem, therefore, that Massieu's recollection about the short document containing reference to Jehanne's clothing was accurate, supporting my three document theory. The possibility of a third, lost document might also explain why de Macy's circle does not appear in either of the two extant versions of the abjuration. Given the uncertainties surrounding the critical abjuration scene, it is important to understanding Jehanne at least to have clarified the possibilities concerning what might have taken place.

Whatever the case, Jehanne was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment.[194] On hearing this, she immediately requested to be transferred out of English hands into an ecclesiastical prison as she was entitled, but Cauchon denied the request outright.[195]

On May 27, 1431, Jehanne resumed male clothing[196] and was declared a relapsed heretic shortly thereafter. When asked to explain her resumption of this attire, she replied that she had done so of her own accord, and that it was practical since she was still in the company of men. Moreover, she firmly renounced the alleged abjuration made three days earlier, indicating "that she never understood that she had made an oath not to resume . . . male clothing," nor had she intended to deny that her voices were those of Saints Catherine and Margaret, and "all that she did [at the time of abjuration], she did out of fear of the fire." She reiterated that "she did not understand what was in the schedule of abjuration."[197] According to Massieu, Jehanne reported that English guards had confiscated her female clothing and refused to return it to her, supplying her, instead, with male attire,[198] and several witnesses indicated that she claimed to have been treated violently by her guards and that an Englishman had attempted to rape her during the night, which prompted her to change clothing.[199] Perhaps it was presumed

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[194]Pernoud; *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 217. Although sentencing varied, the usual prison term for a reformed heretic at the time was three years; therefore, Jehanne might have reasonably expected to be released at some point. Pernoud and Clin, 131.

[195]Manchon; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 241. Convents often served as ecclesiastical prisons for female heretics at the time. Nash-Marshall, 19. It is understandable that this would have been a more appealing alternative to Jehanne than the secular prison in which she was held.

[196]Pernoud and Clin, 132.

[197]Jehanne, testimony of May 28, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 220-2.

[198]Massieu, testimony of May 12, 1456; in Craig Taylor, 335.

[199]Ladvenu; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 242, 279. Cusquel and de la Pierre provided similar testimony; Ibid., 242, 281. It is uncertain why, if her male clothing was confiscated and if a guard attempted to rape her, Jehanne did not apparently mention these matters to her judges but relayed them to others. It should be noted, however, that more than one individual testified that Jehanne was treated violently in her cell, and Jehanne's own testimony hints at the possibility. Moreover, Craig Taylor cites consistency between the testimony of Massieu with respect to the confiscation of her clothing and testimony from Marguerie. Massieu's testimony states that an Englishman nearly struck Marguerie with a lance for inquiring as to

that, in violating her sexually, Jehanne would become sufficiently discouraged with living in a secular prison to cause her to recant the abjuration, thereby choosing death over continued imprisonment. In fact, Jehanne cited as additional cause for her "relapse" the fact that she had not been permitted to hear Mass or receive the Eucharist, nor had she been freed from leg irons following the abjuration; "she would rather die than" remain enchained, she declared. She also stated that Saints Catherine and Margaret had visited her since the abjuration and informed her that God considered it an offense that she had abjured for the sake of sparing her life and that she had placed herself in a state of damnation.[200] Whatever the reason(s) for Jehanne's resumption of male clothing, Siobhan Nash-Marshall points out that she "could not have had access to it unless someone had given it to her." Moreover, it is impossible to put on leggings, which comprised part of Jehanne's male attire, while chained at the ankles as she was, so she would have necessarily required assistance in order to don male clothing.[201]

The evidence is adequate to warrant suspicion that the abjuration and relapse of Jehanne were orchestrated by her enemies in order to entrap her, since only a relapsed heretic could legally be burned.[202] Given that only a relapsed heretic was to suffer the pains of fire, the threat to burn Jehanne during the abjuration scene at Saint-Ouen was

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why Jehanne had resumed male dress. Massieu, testimony of May 12, 1456; in Craig Taylor, 335. "Massieu had told this story of Joan being forced to wear male clothing, and the threats to Marguerie, in March 1450 and May 1452. Giving testimony on the same day, Marguerie confirmed that the English were furious when he asked why Joan had resumed male clothing." Craig Taylor, 335, n. 91. Marguerie was examined on May 9, 1452, December 19, 1455, and May 12, 1456. Murray, 208.

[200]Jehanne, testimony of May 28, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 220-1.

[201]Nash-Marshall, 19, 162-3. Concerning the matter of whether it was the return of Jehanne's voices or her resumption of male clothing that secured her condemnation, on the interpretation herein offered, the real reason that Jehanne was condemned, apart from being an enemy of the English, was that she refused to submit to the Church Militant over her divine counsel. While she persisted in this, Cauchon continued to pursue her condemnation via whatever means he could contrive. The concrete, visible means of ensuring that she would be declared relapsed and thus burned to death for her failure to submit was to have Jehanne promise to leave off her male attire permanently and then trap her into resuming it. The judges presumably would not have included the statement concerning Jehanne's clothing in the abjuration text if it did not somehow serve their purpose of condemning her, nor would they have made such a great issue of the matter throughout the trial proceedings. Several witnesses testified that her resumption of male clothing was the cause of Jehanne's final condemnation. Massieu stated that "many people saw her in man's clothing, and for this she was judged a relapse," while Cusquel asserted that "[p]eople said that the sole cause of her condemnation was that she had resumed male clothes." Massieu; quoted in Craig Taylor, 335. Cusquel; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 242. It was because she resumed male clothing that several assessors rushed to her prison cell to question Jehanne, not because she had declared the return of her voices, which they discovered only in probing her about the clothing. Both issues, however, played a significant role in Jehanne's final condemnation.

[202]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 218. Tavard asserts that Cauchon and his accomplice(s) perpetrated a hoax in order to effect Jehanne's alleged abjuration and relapse. Tavard, 162. Scott doubts that Jehanne actually signed the abjuration or was aware of what she was signing and believes that "her relapse was engineered." Scott, *Trial*, 14, 18. Pernoud refers to "the false abjuration that led to a false relapse." *Retrial*, 285.

premature as she had not yet made an abjuration or relapsed. This was likely a scare tactic employed to pressure her into abjuring publicly, although her accusers were evidently not beyond transgressing the law. It was also testified that, in the aftermath of the supposed relapse, Cauchon very loudly addressed several of the English who were present, declaring, "Farewell, farewell, it is done. Be of good cheer!"—laughing as he did so.[203] Condemning her as relapsed, of course, supported the English cause in denouncing the legitimacy of Charles VII's kingship. Obviously intending to draw this link publicly, Érard stated during the sermon preached by him to Jehanne at Saint-Ouen that the French king was a heretic and schismatic, like she (Jehanne) who had helped him to regain his kingdom.[204]

Following the "relapse" scene, Cauchon consulted forty-two of the assessors for their opinions as to how the judges ought to proceed. All of the assessors consulted acknowledged that she must be deemed a heretic under existing circumstances,[205] but thirty-nine opined that the statement of abjuration should be read to Jehanne again and, this time, its meaning and implications should be explained properly and thoroughly to her.[206] The intention of the assessors in suggesting that the document be re-read and explained to Jehanne is unclear; however, Pernoud indicates that one of the assessors involved, (de la Pierre), insisted that, in re-reading the abjuration document to her, "it should be made perfectly clear to Joan that the matter was one of life or death,"[207] which suggests that the verdict of relapse was not the only alternative at that stage but that it might be reconsidered on grounds that the abjuration process had been faulty. Nonetheless, without heeding the overwhelming majority advice, Jehanne was promptly declared excommunicate, apostate, relapsed, heretic, and schismatic.[208] She was burned in haste at the Old Marketplace of Rouen on May 30, 1431 before a secular sentence

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[203]Ladvenu; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 279. de la Pierre provided nearly identical testimony, stating that Cauchon declared, "Farewell, be of good cheer. It is done." de la Pierre; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 281. de Houppeville also reported that Cauchon "spoke exultingly with great joy, though I did not hear his words." de Houppeville; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 274.

[204]Érard's words reported by de la Pierre, Ladvenu, and Massieu; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 236-7.

[205]Scott, *Trial*, 171. Murray, 140.

[206]Pernoud and Clin, 134-5. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 223-4.

[207]de la Pierre; paraphrased in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 224.

[208]Final sentence reproduced in Craig Taylor, 222-4. Scott's translation of the Orléans manuscript has her declared heretic, excommunicate, and guilty of "schism, idolatry, invocation of devils, and various other wickednesses"; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 172-3. Pernoud's translation reads that she was declared "relapsed, heretic and excommunicate," and guilty of "schism, idolatry, invocation of devils," and heresy; quoted in *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 224, 230.

could be pronounced while a large crowd of spectators looked on.[209] Jehanne was not granted the customary "consideration" of being strangled by the executioner prior to the flames reaching her.[210] It was reported that her body was reduced to ashes by the fire save for her heart, which "remained intact and full of blood," but it was hastily thrown into the Seine with her ashes.[211] And so it was that her enemies managed to eliminate their most feared opponent, but only in body, and this not even completely.

It is uncertain whether or not Charles VII made any attempt to ransom or rescue Jehanne. There is speculation that two of her most devoted comrades-in-arms attempted it. It is suggested that a failed campaign led by the Count of Dunois (Bastard of Orléans) toward Rouen during Jehanne's imprisonment there in 1431 represented one of these efforts and that La Hire's attack on nearby Louviers constituted the other.[212]

While her life and military career were short, Jehanne's inspiration continued to thrive after her death. She had managed to raise a despairing people up, to awaken their hope and invigorate them, and to turn the tide of war in their favour. Once powerfully inspired, these people did not abandon their cause; the fighting continued long after the spectators had departed and the coals from Jehanne's pyre had quietly breathed their last. Although King Henry VI of England was crowned King of France in Paris on December 16, 1431 at age ten,[213] he was never to achieve true victory in France. Peace was established between Duke Philippe the Good of Burgundy and Charles VII in September, 1435 with the signing of the Treaty of Arras, which marked the end of the

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[209]Normal procedure in ecclesiastical trials at the time was that, following pronouncement of the ecclesiastical sentence, the accused was handed over to the secular arm so that a secular sentence could be pronounced, the latter being both *determined and carried out* by the secular authorities. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 230, 251. Witnesses who testified to the lack of proper sentencing include: Laurent Guesdon, lieutenant of the sheriff, Ladvenu, and de la Pierre; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 243-4, 279, 282, as well as Massieu and Maugier Leparmentier, executioner; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 231. de la Pierre was among those who testified that a large crowd of spectators attended; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 282.

[210]Pernoud and Clin, 198. According to Ladvenu, the executioner reported that the English had a high, stone scaffold constructed for Jehanne which prevented him from reaching her and hastening her death; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 280. Apart from considerations of strangulation, Nash-Marshall states that it was also impossible for the executioner even "to place a faggot of green wood, whose smoke would have killed Joan before the flames, at her feet." Nash-Marshall, 15.

[211]Massieu, paraphrasing Jean Fleury, bailiff's clerk and scribe; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 252. de la Pierre also testified that the executioner told him that, although he had applied oil, charcoal, and sulphur to Jehanne's heart and entrails, he was unable to destroy them by fire; Ibid., 283. T. Marie stated that many people told him they had seen "the name of Jesus . . . written in the flames" while she burned; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 252. de la Pierre also related the story of an Englishman who was particularly vehement toward Jehanne but was seemingly transformed upon witnessing "a white dove flying from the direction of France at the moment" of her death; Ibid., 253.

[212]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 134. Étienne de Vignolles, nicknamed "La Hire", was a military captain and one of Jehanne's strongest supporters. At the time of her death, he was a prisoner of war, later ransomed with the assistance of Charles VII. Pernoud and Clin, 187-8.

[213]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 192.

civil war.[214] The Anglo-Burgundian alliance finally broken, French and Burgundian forces were once again united against the English who, by 1453, were completely driven from France except for the small territory of Calais in the north[215] (recovered in 1558).

With the return of Rouen to French rule in 1449, it became possible to access the 1431 trial records, to question eye-witnesses to the proceedings, and to assess the nature of Jehanne's condemnation.[216] In February, 1450, Charles VII initiated an investigation into the Rouen trial but, since it had been an Inquisitorial trial, only the Inquisition could overturn its ruling. Hence, an Inquisitorial trial based on an official request by Jehanne's aged mother and two surviving brothers (Jean and Pierre) ensued, considering the testimony of one hundred and fifteen witnesses[217] in the form of approximately one hundred and sixty statements.[218] This trial, which opened in late 1455 and concluded in July, 1456, annulled Jehanne's condemnation. The nullification trial verdict pronounced that the trial of condemnation contained "deceit, slander, contradiction and manifest error of law and of fact."[219] Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who was to become Pope Pius II (reign: 1458-1464), recorded his opinion of Jehanne's Rouen trial, stating that "[n]othing worthy to be censured was found in her, excepting the male attire which she wore. And that was not judged deserving of the extreme penalty [i.e., death]."[220] Jehanne was canonized by the Roman Catholic Church in 1920, marking her as the only person to be canonized by the church after being excommunicated and martyred by it.[221]

Having been canonized, Jehanne meets the criteria for sainthood as established by the Catholic church, which includes the leading of a holy life and demonstrated ability to prophesy and to perform miracles. de Pizan (c.1364-1430) was one of the first (perhaps *the* first) to write that, if Jehanne's accomplishments "were not so well-known . . . nobody would ever believe it."[222] I would venture to say that the observation still holds true with the minor modification that, if the events of Jehanne's life were not so well-documented and preserved, many today would consider her story unbelievable due

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[214]Fraioli, *Hundred Years War*, lxv.

[215]Ibid., lxvi-lxvii.

[216]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 250, 258.

[217]Ibid., 258-60, 264, 271.

[218]Craig Taylor, x. Some witnesses testified on more than one occasion, hence the discrepancy between the number of witnesses and number of recorded testimonies.

[219]Verdict of July 7, 1456; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 348-9. Quotation is from Taylor, 349.

[220]Pope Pius II, *Memoirs*; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, 517, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 219.

[221]Donald Spoto, *Joan: The Mysterious Life of the Heretic Who Became a Saint* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), xii.

[222]de Pizan, *Le ditié*; quoted in Craig Taylor, 100.

to its extraordinary nature. The fact that her life was so remarkable, powerful, and transformative inspires people to attempt to understand and draw diverse meaning from it while others, no doubt, would prefer that it were fictitious than to be confronted with its complexities.

Several key elements of Jehanne's story stand out as particularly compelling and relevant with respect to claims to divine sanction in warfare. First, she believed strongly enough in the divinity of her mission that she accepted capture by the enemy as well as martyrdom (both which she feared greatly) in order to honour it; this marks her case as worthy of consideration. Second, the rich body of information that we possess concerning her life and death includes much theological content and debate. For example, the Poitiers examination, the Inquisitorial condemnation and nullification trials, and the beatification and canonization processes were all ecclesiastical in nature. Jehanne's military campaign is also extensively documented, making it possible to examine it from a modern theological perspective. Third, anyone who familiarizes him/herself with the details of Jehanne's life and death cannot help but concede that they are at least extraordinarily unusual and uncanny, if not miraculous, and that they openly invite meaningful interpretation. Finally, Jehanne was not an ordinary warrior by any account and one might hope that, if God sanctions participation in war, it would not be an ordinary occurrence; one might, indeed, expect that it would stand out as clearly extraordinary so as to make evident the revelation that God presumably wishes to communicate through such sanctioning and to emphasize the exceptional nature of the occurrence.

Although one might justifiably recoil at the notion of a God who participates in violence, such notions are embedded in the Christian tradition from its earliest Judaic roots through to the Christian book of Revelation. Take, for example, the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah,[223] and also the representation of God as ultimately responsible for the violent death of His own son as a fundamental element of Christianity.[224] The concept that God occasionally sanctions violence is far from anathema to Christian theology in spite of its pacifist teachings. Moreover, anyone who espouses a creationist view of the world cannot logically advocate for a completely

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[223]Gen. 19:24-25 NRSV. Note the following as a further example: "When you go out to war against your enemies, and see horses and chariots, an army larger than your own, you shall not be afraid of them; for the Lord your God is with you . . . 'for it is the Lord your God who goes with you, to fight for you against your enemies, to give you victory.'" Deut. 20:1, 4 NRSV.

[224]Jesus tells Pilate, "You would have no power over me unless it had been given you from above." Jn. 19:11 NRSV.

pacifist God given the violent nature of the food chain. Therefore, it is not surprising that medieval Christians readily conceived of God as participating in war, and one can easily (and often tragically) find evidence that it is not an uncommon perception today. Hence, it is critical to acknowledge and endeavour to understand the impact of this element of Christianity in historical context so that we might begin to apprehend its implications and possibilities for the future of humanity, in the name of survival and peace.

Religious Context

> [T]oo many scholars have not . . . allowed Jeanne to be religious on her own terms. They have willfully mauled her own testament to fit their prejudice, no less than her judges at Rouen in 1431. Therein lies her second tragic destruction.
>
> —Preston Russell, *Lights of Madness*

> [S]he is, like all great saints, a personality of genius. Unlike most of the saints, she defined the Church on her terms, not its own.
>
> —Mary Gordon, *Joan of Arc*

Since Jehanne defined the church on her own terms, it would be inappropriate to interpret her strictly on the church's terms. Her definition of the church, however, was sufficiently compatible with official Catholic doctrine and theology to permit her canonization, so Jehanne's views were evidently not anathema. The challenge is to interpret Jehanne's experience in the religious context within which she apparently understood it, simultaneously recognizing and acknowledging that her ultimate identification was with a source transcendent of all human construct. Nonetheless, it is expedient to consider particular components of Jehanne's religious context and how they might have informed her personal identity, individual experience, and the expression of her mandate which she declared divine in nature.

Jehanne's religious influences were predominantly Christian, but folk religious beliefs and practices, which emphasized the relationship of individuals to the spirit world, were pronounced throughout the French countryside and villages during the early fifteenth century.[225] While Jehanne generally separated herself from folk religion, it conceivably influenced her belief system in claiming the right of individuals to mediate

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[225]Llewellyn Barstow, 3, 18.

divine grace independent of the church. This aspect of Jehanne's thinking seems resonant today. Although the power of Christianity predominated in western culture for centuries, one can now observe a wave of individuals returning to spiritual practices more akin to ancient folk religions as many westerners engage in the so-called "healing arts" and move away from traditional Christian practices which place the church as intermediary between laypersons and the Divine. This movement fosters a potentially receptive atmosphere to the possibility of individuals receiving divine revelation and divine sanction of particular actions, as it was in Jehanne's time. Admittedly, there is much that differs between current and late medieval thought, particularly since the raising of scientific reason to divine status; however, one ought not to be blinded to similarities between them and to possibilities bred by a current diversity of thought.

Another aspect of Jehanne's religious environment was the widespread existence of religious orders. R.W. Southern asserts that these myriad religious communities embodied two notable features which permeated "medieval life: a strong grasp on the things of this world, and an ardent desire for the rewards of eternity. These two conflicting desires, operating simultaneously in the same people, lie behind many of the most important developments in western history," he maintains.[226] Clearly, Jehanne was no exception. While actively involved in earthly matters and clinging strongly to temporal life, Jehanne simultaneously desired eternity and the salvation of her soul. So powerful was the desire that, in spite of her strong will to live, she eventually allowed temporal life to slip from her grasp.

As part of her Catholic heritage, Jehanne displayed a Marian devotion that is frequently overlooked, although evidence of it exists in both the condemnation and nullification trial records. Ann Astell argues that Jehanne self-identified with the Virgin Mary.[227] Two obvious links between Jehanne and Mary are gender and virginity. In the aspect of their virginity, both stood in divine empowerment independent of men. According to the biblical account, Mary bore a divine son without impregnation by a male,[228] and this son became the inspiration for and foundation of Christianity. However, in spite of Mary's key role in the Christian story, the Catholic church has stood as a patriarchal hierarchy which continues to exclude women from the priesthood

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[226]R.W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages*, The Penguin History of the Church, ed. Owen Chadwick, vol. 2 (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 214, 216.

[227]Ann W. Astell, "The Virgin Mary and the 'Voices' of Joan of Arc," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, ed. Ann W. Astell and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 37-8.

[228]Lk. 1:26-38 NRSV.

and higher offices. It seems that, intentionally or unintentionally, Jehanne stepped into position to reclaim the power of Mary and of the individual within the church. By virtue of her claim to divine direction combined with her virginity, her female gender, her male attire, her refusal to take oath in the manner demanded by the Inquisitorial court of Rouen,[229] and her refusal to submit to the Church Militant over God directly, Jehanne challenged the patriarchal, institutional power of the church. Hence, albeit in different respects, both Jehanne and Mary represent the possibility of divine empowerment without an intermediary. Moreover, referring to Mary as "the Queen of prophets," Merton points out that she embodied a sanctity "expressed in . . . the ordinary ways of human existence." He states that, like Jesus, Mary "was in all things human and ordinary, close to her fellow men, simple and unassuming,"[230] yet she might be considered extraordinary in some respects as well, such as by virtue of the claim of divine impregnation attributed to her. Parallels can be found in Jehanne who was of humble upbringing, who was placed as a figure of sanctity in the midst of a troubled people, and who remained essentially humble. Moreover, Pernoud notes the frequency with which nullification trial witnesses to Jehanne's childhood commented that she was "just like the other girls,"[231] thus linking her to Merton's description of Mary as "human and ordinary," and it is also noteworthy that Jehanne was repeatedly described by witnesses as "simple," (though not simple-minded), as in Merton's characterization of Mary as "simple and unassuming."[232] Furthermore, Niels Christian Hvidt links both

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[229]From the first moment of her condemnation trial, Jehanne persistently refused to tell all in the courtroom, resisting the command that she take an oath vowing to tell the truth about all things asked of her, insisting that she did not have permission from her voices to divulge certain information concerning her divine revelations. The procedural controversy is recorded with respect to the trial sessions of February 21, 22, 24, 27, March 1 and 3, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 137-8, 140, 145, 151, 159, 166. When the trial moved from public examination to private examination in Jehanne's cell on March 10, 1431, disagreement concerning the oath ceased to be recorded in the transcript; in fact, the request that she swear an oath is mentioned only with respect to the first private session. Trial session of March 10, 1431; Ibid., 175.

[230]Thomas Merton, *Disputed Questions* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1953), 227.

[231]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 82.

[232]Jehanne was deemed ordinary in her religious upbringing. "Just like the other young girls, she knew the *Credo*, the *Pater Noster* and the *Ave Maria*." She was also described as "honest in her behaviour, just as any similar girl is . . . ." Jean Morel, labourer of Greux; quoted in Craig Taylor, 267. She was repeatedly declared like the other girls of her village in that she performed the ordinary duties of a peasant girl. She "worked just like other young girls. She did the household chores, and spun, and sometimes . . . she watched her father's flocks." Hauviette, Jehanne's childhood friend; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 80. "[S]he did the usual duties of a woman, such as spinning, and other things." Morel; quoted in Murray, 213-4. "We often spun together, and together worked at the ordinary house-duties, whether by day or night." Mengette; quoted in Murray, 222. "She was active in working with the women and the other girls, and she worked well and properly." Michel Lebuin, Jehanne's friend; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 83. Multiple witnesses characterized Jehanne as a "simple" girl. For example, Drappier described her as "a good girl, chaste, simple, and modest." Drappier; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 78. A friend

Mary and Jehanne to the evolving Christian prophetic tradition, placing Jehanne within the powerful reemergence of Christian prophecy of the Middle Ages which manifested widely "in the form of female visionary mysticism," and also pointing to the more recent nineteenth-century and continuing phenomenon of Marian apparitions.[233] Jehanne and Mary also share a common role as recipients of divine revelation and, as Astell notes, as subjects of visitation by Archangel Gabriel.[234] Jehanne's relationship to revelation and prophecy will be discussed in considerable detail in the following chapter.

Jehanne also identified with Jesus, most notably in her martyrdom, wherein she implored that a crucifix be held within her view and called out the name of Jesus as her final word.[235] Recall that Jehanne's divine voices frequently addressed her as "daughter of God."[236] In considering that which Jesus, "son of God," experienced during his earthly life, it is not unreasonable to expect that one referred to as "daughter of God" might undergo similar experiences. Watts maintains that the appellation, "son or child of God" refers to "one who is of the same nature as God."[237] In fact, Jehanne's story shares many similarities with the story of Jesus to the extent that she might be categorized as a Christ figure.[238]

Both Jehanne and Jesus were of humble birth and left their families in order to fulfill a mission proclaimed as divine. Each claimed to be born for the purpose of accomplishing a stated mission. "For this I was born, and for this I came into the world, to testify to the truth,"[239] Jesus stated. Similarly, Jehanne maintained that she was not afraid of encountering the enemy en route to Chinon since "she had God, her Lord, who would clear the way for her" and that she was "born to do this."[240] Both Jesus and Jehanne claimed direct guidance from God without an intermediary and both acquired a

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described her as "a good, simple, sweet girl, and well-behaved." Colin; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 79. Another echoed that she was "a good, simple, sweet girl." Hauviette; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 80. Yet another characterized her as "good and simple and pious." Mengette; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 81. Jehanne was also described as "simple" by S. Charles, Alençon, and Miget. S. Charles, Alençon, and Miget; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 108, 160, and 230 respectively. Jacques Boucher's daughter, Charlotte, with whom Jehanne lodged at Orléans, stated that she "only saw simplicity, humility and chastity" in Jehanne. Charlotte; quoted in Craig Taylor, 289.

[233]Niels Christian Hvidt, *Christian Prophecy: The Post-Biblical Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 305.

[234]Astell, "The Virgin Mary and the Voices of Joan of Arc," 46.

[235]Massieu and Riquier; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 247-8, 250.

[236]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 180.

[237]Watts, 75.

[238]Margolis also views Jehanne as an "analogue of Christ." Nadia Margolis, "The Mortal Body as Divine Proof: A Spiritual-Physical Blazon of Joan of Arc," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, ed. Ann W. Astell and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 11.

[239]Jn. 18:37 NRSV.

[240]Henri Royer, husband of Catherine; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 36.

large following. Both were approached by individuals who desired to touch them or their clothing.[241] Both challenged the existing religious formulae or structures of their day and both were equally loved and despised. Both Jehanne and Jesus were given to prophesying and were themselves considered saviours whose coming was prophesied. Neither Jehanne nor Jesus sought self-fulfillment or earthly riches but gave themselves wholly to a divine purpose. They were both moved to righteous anger on occasion.[242]

Both Jesus and Jehanne were tempted to defy God, Jesus in the desert[243] and Jehanne in the cemetery of Saint-Ouen, where the abjuration scene unfolded. Neither displayed enthusiasm for death but struggled against it prior to accepting it. Jehanne's alleged abjuration, made "only through fear of the fire,"[244] and her leap from the Beaurevoir tower can be likened to Jesus' Gethsemane moment wherein he desired to be spared immense suffering. In fact, Jehanne asked God to grant her escape from prison, but her request was evidently denied,[245] as Jesus asked God to spare his suffering[246] to no avail. Both Jehanne and Jesus ultimately accepted their suffering. Both were betrayed, taken captive, sold, abandoned, judged harshly and unjustly, and subjected to humiliation and cruel, painful martyrdom before a large crowd. Both were courageous in the face of their captors and judges. Both died political deaths for spiritual purposes.[247] Both delivered messages of peace and love and expressed forgiveness toward their enemies on the occasion of their martyrdom.

Furthermore, as Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead,[248] Jehanne was also linked to the restoration of life with respect to the infant at Lagny. The event is interesting in that the number three figures prominently in it: the child was stillborn for three days prior to revival and, upon resuscitation, yawned three times.[249] This resembles accounts of the resurrection of Jesus on the third day of his death. Moreover, Jehanne's supposed abjuration—which equated to a spiritual death of sorts, since her voices indicated that

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[241]Jehanne stated that many women had touched her hands and rings and kissed her clothing. Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 94-5. For biblical accounts of a woman touching Jesus' garments, see Mk. 5:27 and Lk. 8:44 NRSV.

[242]As when Jesus cleared the temple. Mt. 21:12-3. Jehanne was reportedly "furious when she heard soldiers swearing and scolded them fiercely." Alençon; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 160.

[243]Mt. 4:1-10 NRSV.

[244]Jehanne, testimony of May 28, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 170.

[245]Jehanne, testimony of March 15, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 193.

[246] Mt. 26:39 NRSV.

[247]"Jesus died . . . a political death as a rebel, on the cross." Jürgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1993), 69.

[248]Jn. 11:38-44 NRSV.

[249]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 96.

she had offended God in signing—was recanted three days later—which might be understood as a type of resurrection in that the recantation conceivably effected reconciliation with God, although it brought physical death. The view that "martyrdom is equivalent to baptism"[250] reflects the association of Jesus' death with resurrection and new life, just as baptism relates to transformation and new life. On the morning of her execution Jehanne asked a theologian, "[W]here shall I be tonight?" He replied, "Do you not trust in God?" to which she responded that, with God's help, "she would be in Paradise."[251] Jehanne shared the view that, in suffering martyrdom, she might be baptized into new, eternal life which, unfortunately, in her case manifested literally as a baptism by fire. As Jesus' body was reportedly resurrected, Jehanne's heart was reportedly indestructible—a striking parallel.

Cardinal John Wright holds that the saints are the "true disciples" of Jesus, and their "language is sanctity."[252] Jehanne and Jesus are thus also linked in sanctity, as it is with Jehanne and Mary. Jehanne's devotion to and identification with both Mary and Jesus is evident in the fact that she frequently headed her letters with the words "Jhesus Maria." Her standard bore the same words, and they were also inscribed on a ring worn by Jehanne which was a gift from her parents.[253] Astell effectively encapsulates Jehanne's relationship with Mary and Jesus as follows: "She [Jehanne] let God use her in the world; she withheld nothing from him, neither action nor suffering. For Joan, a radical instrumentality—the lonely fulfillment of her mission—became a unique way of holiness that assimilated her to Mary and Jesus."[254] What emerges in Jehanne is an example of one who lived like Jesus and Mary as a divine servant of God directly. That is what being a Christian seems to have meant for Jehanne. She did not declare her mission as mediated through Jesus specifically, nor through the church, nor through Christianity in general, but as a direct command from God (as it was with Jesus and

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[250]Maud Burnett McInerney, *Eloquent Virgins: From Thecla to Joan of Arc*, The New Middle Ages, ed. Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 186. Merton also states that "[m]artyrdom is a second baptism." Thomas Merton, *Thomas Merton: An Introduction to Christian Mysticism: Initiation into the Monastic Tradition 3*, ed. Patrick F. O'Connell, Monastic Wisdom Series, ed. Patrick Hart, no. 13 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 2008), 46.

[251]Jehanne and Pierre Maurice, to whom Jehanne put the question; quoted by Riquier, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 250.

[252]John J. Wright, *The Saints Always Belong To the Present: A Selection from the Sermons, Addresses, and Papers of Cardinal John J. Wright*, ed. R. Stephen Almagno (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985), 35.

[253]Jehanne, testimony of February 27, March 1, and March 17, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 157, 162, 202.

[254]Ann W. Astell, "Joan of Arc and Spirituality," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, ed. Ann W. Astell and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 4.

Mary). In terms of the Christian Trinity, Jehanne seemed to identify with Jesus but to interact with God through the operation of the Holy Spirit.

Being Catholic, Jehanne was familiar with—and clearly identified with—the realm of saints, naming four of them (two also being archangels) as her divine voices. Saints Margaret of Antioch and Catherine of Alexandria are legendary virgin martyrs popular in medieval times[255] whose actual historicity is uncertain.[256] Margaret is described as the daughter of a pagan priest. She became a shepherdess after being ousted from home for adopting Christianity. Margaret was reportedly tortured on declining sexual advances from the governor of Antioch and was then beheaded.[257] Jehanne, although not ousted, was required to leave home in order to fulfill her commitment to God, and Jehanne and Margaret both tended farm animals. Catherine is portrayed as a highly educated and generous young Christian queen whose concern for her oppressed people under a usurping emperor-tyrant prompted her attempt to convert him to Christianity. She is said to have successfully debated against and converted fifty philosophers (summoned by the emperor to defeat her intellect) prior to being tortured and beheaded after rejecting the emperor's sexual advances.[258] Jehanne not only shares in Catherine's generosity and concern for her oppressed people and her movement to rectify the situation but, in an uncanny similarity, Jehanne's solitary defense against the learned Rouen assessors recalls Catherine's debate against the philosophers. And, of course, Jehanne shares the role of virgin martyr with both Margaret and Catherine. In a sense, it was their independent strength of faith sanctified through their autonomy-confirming virginity that led all three women to martyrdom at the hands of men who sought to gain power over them.

Archangel Michael is represented in the Judaeo-Christian tradition as a protector, a heavenly warrior who battled the devil, and as one capable of saving all nature of souls through intercession.[259] Jehanne parallels Michael in her role as protector, and her claim to divine sanction in war affirmed through canonization also places her in the controversial category of heavenly warrior. Archangel Gabriel is associated with

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[255]Burnett McInerney, 167-9.

[256]David Hugh Farmer, *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 95, 344.

[257]Farmer, 344.

[258]Burnett McInerney, 181-7. Farmer, 95.

[259]Farmer, 367-8.

prophecy, the understanding of visions, and annunciation,[260] all of which apply to Jehanne.

It should be noted that, due to her canonization, Jehanne is no longer associated with only the four named saints of her visions and voices but is classified among the entire realm of Christian saints. "The exemplary members of the Church are the saints,"[261] states Wright. Jehanne is thus placed among those viewed within the Catholic tradition as examples to be emulated. One wonders in what manner she is to be emulated; ought one to emulate her actions or her beliefs? It would seem that the two must be taken together since deed, in such profound cases, cannot be adequately understood apart from the belief or faith upon which it is based, and faith that is not manifested in deed is shallow. The saints are models of life conducted in accordance with faith—*exemplary* models of *exemplary* lives lived in *exemplary* faith. Exemplariness in humans, however, does not indicate absolute perfection since all humans are inherently imperfect, but it implies a degree of perfection most high.[262] Such exemplariness warrants attention with respect to Jehanne's claim to divine sanction and her associated behaviour.

Although Jehanne was a practicing Christian, devoutly attending Mass and participating in the sacraments, prayer, and pilgrimages, her focus was more directly on God than on the church. She respected the church and the pope, but she placed God above them (i.e., above church hierarchy and structure and above human directives), which she cannot be legitimately faulted for, yet it was her confidence in divine revelation over her confidence in ecclesiastics on which Jehanne was faulted by her enemies. The fact that the church admitted such a gross error by canonizing her after burning her as a heretic adds strength to Jehanne's position, which implied possible human fallibility within the church hierarchy. Jehanne was a mystic so, while she identified strongly with institutional Christianity, she also transcended it in claiming her right to spiritual autonomy, a right which the church finally and fully acknowledged nearly five centuries after depriving her of it. Jehanne demonstrated that divine truth,

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[260]Ibid., 210.

[261]John J. Wright, 31. P. Molinari states that canonization "infallibly declares the exemplariness of the saint's life," and it is deemed "irrevocable." P. Molinari, s.v. "Canonization of Saints," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 59, 61.

[262]"Saints are canonized not only to intercede before the throne of God but also to afford those on earth models of perfection." Molinari, Ibid., 61.

while it might reside within religious structures to some extent, is not dependent upon them or upon any thing or any human. It is Truth in its own right.

The foregoing represents a glimpse into Jehanne's theological worldview which will become more apparent throughout chapters two and three. Nonetheless, one can begin to appreciate the enduring relevance of her theological perspective rooted and grounded in one of the major world religions. Christianity continues to influence the religious and theological sensibilities of millions globally and, in turn, contributes to the shaping of social and political landscapes. What Jehanne brings to the discussion is her particular system of theological values rooted in tradition but manifested in word and deed through the filter of her individual religious, social, and political experience and perspectives. What she arguably exemplified was appropriate application of appropriate values at an appropriate time in response to the challenging and complex problem of the Hundred Years' War. Light must penetrate darkness in order to eliminate it. Amidst the darkness of war, Jehanne entered the bloodied battlefield as a light of faith, sanctity, compassion, forgiveness, restraint, justice, individual responsibility, and respect for human life. Through her own life and death, she demonstrated a way through darkness, a way which called her to remain focussed on divine light and to become a pillar of reflection beaming that light forth into a bleak corner of humanity. Sanctified light does not shun darkness but illumines it. It is a message that transcends the boundaries of religious particularity, as well as historical and geographical specificity, and it can be applied to situations past, present, and future. With respect to how Jehanne accomplished this, the details are about to unfold and eventually to converge into a model of righteous warfare and human agency.

Psychological Disposition

> What is a saint? A saint is someone who has achieved a remote human possibility. It is impossible to say what that possibility is. I think it has something to do with the energy of love. Contact with this energy results in the exercise of a kind of balance in the chaos of existence. A saint does not dissolve the chaos; . . . I do not think that a saint dissolves the chaos even for himself . . . . It is a kind of balance that is his glory. He rides the drifts like an escaped ski. His course is a caress of the hill. His track is a drawing of the snow in a moment of its particular arrangement with wind and rock. Something in him so loves the world that he gives himself to the laws of gravity and chance. Far from flying with the angels, he traces with the fidelity of a seismograph needle the state of the solid bloody landscape. His house is dangerous and finite, but he is at home in the

> world. He can love the shapes of human beings, the fine and twisted shapes of the heart. It is good to have among us such . . . balancing monsters of love.
>
> — Leonard Cohen, *Beautiful Losers*

It is true that the life of a saint is unusual in some aspect or another, but the state of unusualness is merely a label which shifts according to majority rule; it is not a definitive marker of anything substantial in and of itself. The fact that some are reluctant to admit the unusual into the realm of the acceptable or the desirable demonstrates a narrowness of vision which might itself be just as easily deemed pathological as any other view or experience should the majority shift, rendering it a minority. Abraham Heschel rightly asserts that "[n]eurosis and psychosis are concepts" formulated upon the "cultural patterns of" a "particular society" and that what is perceived as mental disorder might actually constitute "a higher spiritual order."[263] "We now know beyond doubt that large and widely scattered numbers of otherwise sane and sober people have had" mystical experiences, affirms Watts.[264]

It has been the inclination of some to attempt to discredit Jehanne's mystical experiences by attributing the perception of her divine counsel to some pathological cause, either to physical, psychological, or emotional illness, hormonal disturbance, pure imagination, or mere wish fulfillment. It has also been the case, however, that such individuals fail to present even remotely convincing evidence in support of their arguments against Jehanne, formulating their cases on loosely selected pieces of information while disregarding other pertinent historical evidence, thereby rendering the arguments absurd. Take, for example, the suggestion that Jehanne's visions and voices were the result of a "mental aberration" produced by cerebral tuberculosis caused by the imbibing of unpasteurized milk. Spoto retorts that, "if tuberculosis of the brain can produce such marvelous results for a country and a people, we ought immediately to ban the pasteurization of milk."[265] Moreover, one might argue, a multitude of individuals ought to have behaved as Jehanne did if such was the cause of her experiences, thoughts, and actions as she surely did not constitute a minority in drinking raw milk at the time. Another observation by Spoto is worth noting with respect to weak argumentation and

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[263]Abraham J. Heschel, *The Prophets: Part II* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 184, 185.

[264]He refers here to "experiences of 'cosmic consciousness,'" but it is clear that Watts is describing what he frequently categorizes as mystical experience throughout the book. Watts, xiii.

[265]Spoto, 202.

lack of evidence characterizing attribution of Jehanne's claim to a divine mission to non-divine causes:

> In the twentieth century especially, Joan was subjected to a variety of obsessions and passed through the prisms of those with modern preoccupations; thus she was written about and spoken of as if she had been a working-class radical, a warmonger, a closeted lesbian, a biological androgyne, or a pathologically frigid maiden, regardless of the lack of evidence for any such assertions. The English writer Vita Sackville-West, for example, claimed that Joan was obviously homosexual, for the record tells that when accepting hospitality from families, she preferred to sleep with women rather than with men. But in the fifteenth century young and single women routinely shared a bed with one another for mutual protection against attack.[266]

As a matter of fact, one of the charges fabricated against Jehanne during the condemnation trial was that she preferred the service of men over women in the privacy of her room, to which Jehanne responded defensively that she routinely sought to have a woman present when in the confines of a house, and that she slept fully clothed during military campaigns while in the presence of men alone.[267] This evidence supports Spoto's assertion that the social norm of Jehanne's day was for single women to sleep in the company of other women, defeating Sackville-West's apparently skewed interpretation. If it were not the norm for women to share a bed or a room in such circumstances, Jehanne's accusers would surely have faulted her on this.

Since accusations of psychological instability constitute the trump card of numerous individuals seeking to discredit Jehanne, and mystics in general, let us devote a small space to addressing such arguments against Jehanne specifically, drawing heavily on an assessment by medical doctor, Preston Russell.

One of the first among Russell's observations in support of Jehanne's psychological stability is that, "[o]f all the things the Rouen judges accused Jeanne of, 'mania' in its diverse manifestations was not one of them," whereas the madness of King Charles VI of France was openly acknowledged.[268] Pernoud and Clin note that Charles VI's psychological instability, (which manifested intermittently from 1392 until his death in 1422, 1403 being cited as the year in which he first "became incapacitated" as

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[266]Ibid., 201.

[267]The reference is to Article 54 of seventy initial articles drawn up against Jehanne and her recorded response to the accusation contained therein. Seventy Articles, pronounced March 27 and 28, 1431; reproduced in Scott, *Trial*, 132-144. Citation is from Scott, *Trial*, 141-2.

[268]Preston Russell, *Lights of Madness: In Search of Joan of Arc* (Savannah: Frederic C. Beil, 2005), 162.

King), has been "recently diagnosed . . . as schizophrenic in nature."[269] He was eventually dubbed "Charles the Mad."[270] One might certainly expect that, had there been even remotely reasonable ground for such an accusation against Jehanne, her notoriously zealous persecutors would have employed it. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Jehanne experienced scrambled thought or paranoia-inducing voices as with schizophrenia.[271] She was "logical, coherent, extroverted, even full of wit" and vivacity, notes Russell.[272] Also, Jehanne's "visions were more vivid . . . and complex, more profound than a voice merely repeating 'don't act stupid,' or even some recurrent voice thundering 'Obey God!'" as a schizophrenic might experience, and she was able to "think on her feet, reason, question, remember, retort, give as good as she got, feel and express emotions to the core. Schizophrenics are incapable of this."[273] Moreover, schizophrenics are unable to disagree with, argue against, or disobey their voices as Jehanne occasionally did; rather, schizophrenics "are submissive and resigned." Russell maintains that a "whole clinic full of them could not combine to get through one week of Jeanne's documented career."[274] Furthermore, one might bear in mind that modern medications which today allow some schizophrenics to function with little or no outward evidence of pathological manifestation were not available in Jehanne's time; had she been schizophrenic, the condition and its symptoms would have been unmitigated and obvious.

Against the charge that Jehanne suffered from Multiple Personality Disorder, Russell notes that individuals with this condition are not generally capable of superb leadership skills such as those demonstrated by Jehanne.[275] Moreover, the consistency with which Jehanne's character was described by all manner of witnesses at the nullification trial clearly contradicts the notion that Jehanne exhibited more than one personality. Furthermore, Bouzy points out that Jehanne "never [merely] thought she was Joan of Arc – she was Joan of Arc;"[276] in other words, she was not delusional about who she was.

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[269]Pernoud and Clin, 188-9. Also, Nash-Marshall, 33. Fraioli and Nash-Marshall provide the precise date of 1392 as the date of initial onset of Charles VI's mental illness. Fraioli, *Hundred Years War*, lx, lxi. Nash-Marshall, 33.

[270]duQuesnay Adams, prelude to *Joan of Arc: Her Story,* by Pernoud and Clin, 3.

[271]Russell, 202.

[272]Ibid., 204.

[273]Ibid., 219-20.

[274]Ibid., 218.

[275]Ibid., 184.

[276]Bouzy, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012.

In response to the accusation that Jehanne's divine counsel were simply manifestations of her inner will, Russell points out that Jehanne sometimes experienced difficulty in hearing the voices, which implies that they were external to her. Moreover, the voices sometimes contradicted Jehanne's personal desires, and she claimed to have disobeyed them in leaping from her prison tower, again suggesting an external source.[277]

Russell also observes that Jehanne did not apparently demonstrate a history or pattern of "violent mood swings" characteristic of bipolar disorder. "She was quick to both temper and tears, certainly always adamant and impatient, but never depressed without reason."[278] In fact, Pernoud observes that nullification trial witnesses consistently presented Jehanne as displaying a generally happy disposition. According to the testimonies, she "spun, sewed, and did the other household chores gladly, she went to church gladly," and so on; Jehanne was repeatedly characterized by the word "gladly," indicating that she possessed a "joy in life," a "fundamental gaiety" which, for Pernoud, constitutes "evidence" of Jehanne's "good physical and mental balance."[279]

Jehanne experienced no seizures and was not epileptic, Russell insists.[280] Moreover,

> [a]uditory hallucinations in temporal lobe epilepsy are vague to incoherent, short, and generally unpleasant. There is no record in Jeanne's life of loss of consciousness, no sudden and uncontrollable expressions of panic . . . no involuntary smacking of the lips, lolling of the eyes or tongue, spastic limb contortions, loss of bladder control, biting of the tongue. Temporal lobe epilepsy is largely a physical manifestation; the minority who do experience brief hallucinations have the manifestations during the aura that *precedes* a seizure.[281]

Such symptoms do not correspond to the documentary evidence of Jehanne's experience or behaviour.

All scientific attempts to explain Jehanne, Russell concludes, "select only the symptoms needed to make a very narrow case—ignoring a whole complex of related symptoms that would render the latest explanation implausible to impossible. What is dreadful," he asserts, "is that at least some scientists must be fully aware of the game they are playing, off on a historical holiday. Certainly they would never play by this

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[277]Russell, 175-6.
[278]Ibid., 189.
[279]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 82.
[280]Russell, 191.
[281]Ibid.

double standard in dealing with their own live patients."[282] Jehanne simply did not demonstrate multiple symptoms of psychotic criteria such as "maladaptivity, antisocial behavior, inappropriate anger, boredom, apathy, fear of loneliness, histrionic tendencies, narcissism, egocentricity, exhibitionism, vanity, shallowness, exploitativeness, lack of empathy, tendency to be crushed by criticism or defeat, [or] proneness to manipulative suicidal threats."[283] Russell's final analysis is that "Jeanne's unflagging characteristics are not those of schizophrenia, nor of temporal lobe epilepsy, nor do they fit any other modern classification of sustained mental illness."[284] On the contrary, Spoto observes that, with respect to Jehanne's "remarkable physical and emotional courage, it was always complemented by admirable common sense and an unhysterical piety that was rooted in a belief that God cares about" the world.[285] On this note, let us turn our attention to Jehanne's theology rooted in practical, prophetic mysticism.

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[282]Ibid.
[283]Ibid., 222-3.
[284]Ibid., 221.
[285]Spoto, 202.

CHAPTER 2

THE THEOLOGY OF JEHANNE D'ARC
PRACTICAL, PROPHETIC MYSTICISM

> And she says that her revelations come from God, without any intermediary.
>
> —Notary, *The Trial of Joan of Arc*

This chapter explores Jehanne's relationship with the Divine from a mystical theological perspective within the context of Jewish and Christian prophecy. It begins by focusing the mystical discussion, distilling its experiential, prophetic, and practical dimensions. Since mysticism involves an experience of God on some level, let us consider the definition of divine revelation.

Divine revelation can be understood as God's concerned and loving communication to human beings and involvement in human history.[1] Experientially, it is knowledge resulting "from a supernatural encounter with the divine that is not accessible . . . under normal circumstances."[2] Such divine encounters arise as grace, independent of human will.[3] As mystical experience is an experience of divine revelation, it can be said that "mysticism has its origin in God, in the action of the Holy Spirit."[4] "[I]n a certain sense," declares Watts, "the God of the mystics is the Holy Spirit, formless but fiery, impossible to picture or conceive but dynamic in effect."[5]

A multitude of books exists about mysticism and it is not the purpose of this work to conduct a comprehensive survey or a historical analysis of these. Although several authors are herein selected as representative, I do not hesitate to point out that, if the divine nature is infinite, then there is conceivably no limit to the nature of divine revelation and mystical experience. The body of mystical literature demonstrates considerable variation as well as notable consistency in the descriptions of mystical

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[1]Herbert Vorgrimler, *Sacramental Theology*, trans. Linda M. Maloney (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 5-6, 7.

[2]Hvidt, 126.

[3]Watts, xiv.

[4]Ibid., 9.

[5]Ibid., 61.

experience conveyed. A prominent consistency is the assertion that mystical experience is essentially ineffable. In light of this, one must approach mystical texts with open-mindedness and a sense of the abstract in order to benefit most significantly from their insights. If one concentrates on critiquing the expression of mystical experience in an effort to determine its validity, one sorely misses the point that, for the mystic, God is ultimately—and ultimate—Mystery, unpredictable and uncontainable, revealed only partially and mysteriously through mystical experience. Turner, for instance, attempts to systematize mysticism into predictable form, stating that, "[i]f 'mystics' are to be identified as composing a distinct theological genre of Christian writing, we must know how to identify that genre; hence, . . . we may note the vast body of contemporary literature which is preoccupied with the question of *definition*: 'what is mysticism?'"[6] This, however, is akin to asking who or what is God since mysticism is based upon the experience of God. It can only be defined elusively yet, while God cannot be sufficiently or certainly defined, people nonetheless practice religion and theology. Similarly, philosophy seeks to explain the human condition but can do so no more adequately than theology can explain God. Science seeks to understand the universe but does not satisfactorily explain all things. Ultimately, human 'knowledge' rests on belief and is, therefore, theoretical, partial, and tentative. Turner concedes that

> [w]e can, of course, *know* that God is present to us. We can struggle to say what we mean by this. We can live a life centred upon that knowledge. We can experience the world in all sorts of ways consequent upon that knowledge, which would not be available to our experience if we lacked the knowledge of God. And so we can, in a sense, be aware of God, even be 'conscious' of God; but only in that sense in which we can be conscious of the *failure* of our knowledge, not knowing what it is that our knowledge fails to reach.[7]

He allows that "there is such a thing as 'mysticism'" and that the "post-mediaeval genre of distinctively 'mystical' writing is found in texts which form a continuous tradition with medieval apophaticism, for all that no . . . clear-cut identification of 'the mystical' can be found in them."[8] For the mystic who embraces divine mystery, Turner's observations are not essentially problematic; they are problematic only for one who is

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[6]Denys Turner, *The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 260.

[7]Ibid., 264-5.

[8]Ibid., 265-6.

uncomfortable with mystery and seeks to eliminate the partial nature of human knowledge and understanding.

Although mystical experience cannot be adequately expressed fully in the cataphatic, (nor in the apophatic alone—it seems best, if insufficiently, expressed in a combination of the two), this does not mean that mystical experience is not cataphatic, or at least partially so. The apophatic characteristic applies largely to its essential ineffability, the inability to communicate the experience fully to a third party; it does not necessarily refer to the nature of mystical experience itself, except insofar as one can experience an apparent absence of God, yet the experience of absence—indeed, of anything—is itself cataphatic. Moreover, absence can only be experienced in relation to presence, as a lack of presence formerly experienced more fully but now experienced as memory, (i.e., the memory of presence). John O'Donohue views absence not as "vacancy," but as "another form of presence."[9] The experience of absence is thus an awareness of separation, not of non-existence. Turner acknowledges that

> the apophatic is not to be understood as functioning in isolation, so that one could construct some such thing as an 'apophatic theology'. The apophatic . . . is intelligible only as being a moment of negativity within an overall theological strategy which is at once and at every moment both apophatic and cataphatic. If these things are so, then theology in so far as it is theology is 'mystical' and in so far as it is 'mystical' it is theology.[10]

Hence, revelation is both apophatic and cataphatic in that it reveals something, but not everything, of the Divine.

There is currently a widespread trend placing 'objective' experience, such as that purportedly involved in scientific observation, above 'subjective' experience in the hierarchy of knowledge and truth, if the latter is granted a place at all. But can scientific experimentation claim true objectivity while founded upon the physical mechanics and individual thought processes of a mediating subject? It is more likely a matter of degree of subjectivity and objectivity that distinguishes various types of knowledge since an absolute dichotomy is impossible.[11] In any case, there is no definitive proof that either category of knowledge ('subjective' or 'objective') is superior to the other. Moreover,

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[9]John O'Donohue, *To Bless the Space Between Us: A Collection of Invocations and Blessings* (Boulder, Colorado: Sounds True W1197D, 2008), compact disc audio recording, session one, section 2, track 24.

[10]Denys Turner, 265.

[11]Watts argues against the claim that human subjectivity stands in the way of knowledge, asserting that it is, in fact, "the very condition of knowledge." Watts, 120.

there is no proof that mystical experience is necessarily more subjective than other forms of experience.[12] Let us suppose that God has the power to accommodate or transcend human limitation when conveying revelation such that it is possible for divine revelation to be received and transmitted accurately by the recipient, that is, as God intends. This does not negate the assertion that revelation is mediated since to mediate is not necessarily to distort. Furthermore, although some revelation is conveyed through the mediating human body, Saint Teresa and Saint John also describe mystical experiences in which divine revelation is impressed immediately upon the human soul passively and supernaturally (bypassing the physical body), during which time the bodily senses and mental faculties are suspended by God.[13] This supports the notion that some mystical experiences are quite objective in nature, (allowing a possible degree of subjectivity in the soul's mediation of an experience),[14] calling into question popular conceptions of mystical experience as predominantly subjective. Divine revelation might, in fact, be a highly objective human experience in some cases. Saint John describes a type of revelation called "formal locution" in which "distinct" words are received by the soul, "not from itself." Such a locution is produced and impressed "supernaturally" upon the soul "without the use of the senses" and "without intervention of the soul." The words received through a formal locution are at times "very explicit and at other times not."[15] While the comparatively unlimited nature of mystical experience frequently renders it ineffable due to the limited capacity of language, this difficulty is eliminated or far less problematic in conveying divine messages formulated and received within linguistic bounds than in communicating the mystical quality of an experience.[16]

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[12]Hvidt notes that, "[t]here is great theological incertitude with regard to the relationship between divine inspiration and its human expression" such that it is difficult to determine what percentage of "a given prophetic revelation . . . is from God, and what is from the prophet." Hvidt, 127.

[13]Saint Teresa of Avila, *The Collected Works of St. Teresa of Avila*, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez, vol. 1, *The Book of Her Life, Spiritual Testimonies, Soliloquies*, 2nd rev. ed. (Washington: ICS Publications, 1976), 105, 121. Saint Teresa of Avila, *The Collected Works of St. Teresa of Avila*, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez, vol. 2, *The Way of Perfection, Meditations on the Song of Songs, The Interior Castle* (Washington: ICS Publications, 1980), 164. Saint John of the Cross, *The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross*, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington: ICS Publications, 1979), 187-8. Vorgrimler states that "God's self-revelation to human beings requires a mediation that lies within their receptive capacity." Vorgrimler, 6. Note that this does not exclude the receptive capacity of the soul.

[14]Vorgrimler maintains that "the complete disparity between God and the human makes an unmediated presence and communication of God impossible." Vorgrimler, 10.

[15]Saint John of the Cross, 203, 208.

[16]Vorgrimler discusses the role of interpretation in divine revelation, and revelation as originating both within and external to individuals, God being the source in either case. Vorgrimler, 6, 7.

The validity of mysticism is impossible to prove, beyond doubt, to those who situate themselves outside the mystical realm, just as the invalidity of mysticism is impossible to prove, beyond doubt, to those who operate within the mystical realm. Consequently, I do not devote attention to either endeavour but speak of mysticism in the affirmative, treating it as a valid form of experience which allows access to a distinct type of knowledge, (i.e., distinct from ordinary, mental knowledge). Mysticism and theology in general are more strongly faith-based than evidence-based, which is not to deny revelatory phenomena as a form of evidence; however, as Nicholas Lash points out, '"personal experiences" are not repeatable in the way that optical experiments are."[17] Theological 'truths' cannot always or necessarily be verified or falsified; any attempt to do so is an attempt to eliminate the faith aspect of theology. To aim for epistemological certainty in this realm would be futile, if not foolhardy. Kierkegaard agrees that "it is nonsense to" seek "*sensible* certitude of the fact that God exists, since God indeed is spirit."[18] Moreover, as Russell points out, mystical understanding resides in the metaphysical realm, a realm which science generally dismisses as nonexistent.[19] Therefore, in considering mystical knowledge, one entertains a type of knowing that differs from, but is not necessarily less valid than, scientific knowledge. One who seeks to prove God's existence, holds Kierkegaard, "has taken his position outside, he does not treat with God, but his is a treatise about God." Furthermore, he warns, there "comes fear enough when God comes and renders proofs superfluous."[20]

My purpose throughout this chapter is to explore Jehanne's position in relation to mysticism in accordance with the accounts of other mystics and to discern her own mystical teachings. Jehanne's mystical experience and response and the relevance of these to claims of divine sanction in acts of war constitute the main focus of this work. Let us begin by examining the practical components of her mysticism.

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[17]Nicholas Lash, *Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 28.

[18]Søren Kierkegaard, *On Authority and Revelation: The Book on Adler, or a Cycle of Ethico-Religious Essays*, trans. and ed. Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1966), 109.

[19]Russell, 225.

[20]Søren Kierkegaard, *Stages on Life's Way*, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 462.

Practical Mysticism

> Christ has no body now on earth but yours,
> No hands but yours,
> No feet but yours.
> Yours are the eyes through which Christ's compassion
> Is to look out to the earth,
> Yours are the feet by which He is to go about doing good,
> And yours are the hands by which He is to bless us now.
>
> —Saint Teresa of Avila

In spite of the difficulties in defining mystical experience, many have managed to do so. The Latin term, *mysticus*, meaning "full of mystery,"[21] suggests that the mystic is full of God, if God is considered Ultimate Mystery. In Christian terms, mystical experience is "consciousness of the experience of uncreated grace as revelation and self-communication of the triune God."[22] Soelle defines mystical experience as "the experience of God,"[23] explaining that mysticism involves not only love of God for humans but mutual love between divinity and humanity.[24] She also notes that,

> [a]ccording to a famous scholastic definition, mysticism is *cognitio Dei experimentalis* (the knowledge of God through and from experience). What is meant here is the knowledge of God that, instead of being obtained from instruction, tradition, books, and doctrines, comes from one's own life. In terms of this medieval definition, two possible ways of understanding God may be distinguished. There is the ordered way, dogmatically legitimated and hierarchically directed, and the extraordinary one, resting on experiment and experience, which is incapable of being fully institutionalized. That definition represents a concession to the preecclesiastical and the extraecclesiastical reality of religious experience.[25]

For Watts, mysticism is essential to religion, for a religion lacking mystical experience "is only a futile straining to follow a way of life for which one has neither the power nor the grace, and there is no power in a merely theoretical grace which one has allegedly been given but does not feel."[26] He asserts that

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[21]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 16.

[22]Heribert Fischer, s.v. "Mysticism: Nature and History," in Karl Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi* (Mumbai: St. Pauls, 1975), 1004.

[23]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 37.

[24]Ibid., 1-2.

[25]Ibid., 45.

[26]Watts, xvii.

> [k]nowledge of God, the realization of one's union with God, in a word, mysticism, is *necessary*. It is not simply the flower of religion; it is the very seed, lying in the flower as its fulfilment and preceding the root as its origin. There is no "higher religion" without mysticism because there is no apprehension of the meaning of reality without mysticism.[27]

Most individuals, he holds, fail to distinguish between "the meaning of religion" and "its form." By way of example, he explains that the "form of Christianity consists of certain doctrines and precepts based to a great extent on historical events," whereas the "meaning is God himself, the ultimate Reality, not as an idea conceived but as a reality experienced. When apprehended . . . this meaning is a state of consciousness," a "mystical and nearly immediate experience of God."[28] Facts, he declares, "are of little value to us until we know something of their significance, and this lies not in the facts themselves but in the spiritual truths and principles, the eternal nature of God, which they express."[29] Weil similarly asserts that one who has not heard the divine "word, even if he adheres to all the dogmas taught by the Church, has no contact with truth."[30] "The love of institutional religion," she maintains, "although the name of God necessarily comes into it, is not in itself an explicit, but an implicit love of God, for it does not involve direct, immediate contact with him."[31] For Weil, "contact with God is the true sacrament."[32]

Jehanne's notion of divinity appears consistent with these definitions offered by Soelle, Watts, and Weil in that it transcended religious formulae, being derived primarily from direct, mystical experience. What Soelle classifies as the extraordinary way of understanding God corresponds to Jehanne's mysticism, which also transcended institutionalization. Jehanne held her experience-based mystical knowledge of God above all else, including the demands of the Church Militant, such that her particular mysticism opposed the constraints of the church as institution. She did not oppose the church itself; in fact, she loved to hear Mass[33] and partake in the sacraments[34]—the issue

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[27]Ibid., 15-6.

[28]Ibid., xxv.

[29]Ibid., xxvi.

[30]Simone Weil, *Waiting for God*, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 35.

[31]Ibid., 117.

[32]Ibid., 142.

[33]Jean de Metz or de Nouillonpont, squire, d'Aulon, and Louis de Coutes, Jehanne's page; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 98, 173, and 179 respectively.

[34]Jehanne received the Eucharist regularly and "confessed almost every day." Pasquerel; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 184. Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 171. She requested to be heard in confession during the period of her condemnation trial but was denied this until the day of her

was one of limitation and imposition. Moreover, in accordance with Soelle's observation, Jehanne's form of mysticism as unbound by ecclesiastical definition is conceivably timeless. In assessing claims to divine sanction, then, one ought not necessarily to restrict one's view to the dictates of institutional religion as mysticism might be considered a more direct, more specific, and potentially more authoritative means of accessing divine Truth.

Watts, citing a common misconception that mysticism necessarily involves a life of retreat from rather than involvement with the world, asserts the following:

> The truth that religion, to be of any use, must be mystical has always been denied by the seemingly large number of people . . . who do not know what mysticism is. They associate it with ecstatic trances, with the solitary life of the hermit, with purely negative conceptions of God, with keeping one's mind perfectly blank for hours on end, with vague reasoning, with pantheism, with a distaste for action and concrete, physical life.[35]

Such things, however, do not reflect the "essence" of mysticism, which he defines as "consciousness of union with God" wherein negativism arises only "if God is thought of as hostile to the world."[36]

Jehanne exemplified the opposite of the above characteristics cited by Watts as inconsistent with the essence of mysticism. She did not speak of ecstatic trances; if these comprised part of her mystical experience, they were treated as a private matter or as secondary, but we have no basis upon which to suppose that she experienced them. A rare testimony indicates that, when pressed by her king and his associates on one occasion to describe her divine encounters, Jehanne flushed before expressing a feeling of "great joy" and a desire "to be always in that state" which she experienced in the company of her divine counsel. In describing the experience, it was said that Jehanne "exulted in a marvellous fashion, raising her eyes to Heaven."[37] While she found moments of solitude when possible,[38] Jehanne obviously did not retreat into a solitary

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death. Jehanne, testimony of February 21 and March 12, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 139, 180-1. Massieu; in Craig Taylor, 335.

[35]Watts, 5-6.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Dunois; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 110. Heschel observes that the "prophets were not in the habit of dwelling upon their private experiences. A feeling of shyness and reticence may have inhibited them from offering more than slight indications of their private emotions." Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 89. This supports the discussion of Jehanne as a prophet in the following segment.

[38]Jehanne was known to retreat from battle intermittently in order to pray. Dunois; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 139.

lifestyle, placing herself at the center of the battlefields of France as she did. Interestingly, Jehanne spoke very little in a descriptive manner about God, either apophatically or cataphatically, generally describing her divine counsel quite minimally when pressed to do so, usually in a cataphatic manner. She was far more inclined to speak of God's will, insofar as it was revealed to her, than of the divine nature.[39] Moreover, Jehanne's mind was evidently far from blank, occupied with military strategy and the administration of assistance to those in need when not otherwise engaged in prayer. Furthermore, she demonstrated an impressive intellect, capable of reasoning with the best and astounding the Rouen court with the profound wisdom of her responses.[40] Jehanne uttered one of her most famous replies when asked whether or not she considered herself to be in the grace of God. "If I am not, may God put me there; if I am, may He keep me there," she stated. "She said further that if she knew she were not in the grace of God, she would be the most miserable person in the world."[41] Jehanne's interrogators were reportedly "dumbfounded" by this most excellent response.[42] With respect to pantheism, there is little to no evidence that Jehanne embraced it. Her judges at Rouen attempted to associate her with a tree known as "the Fairies' tree" near Domremy in a superstitious manner, but Jehanne's responses indicate that she simply played with other children around this popular tree, made wreaths there, and participated in decorating the tree with garlands on occasion,[43] none of which conclusively demonstrates the attribution of divine qualities to the tree. Finally, Jehanne did not possess a distaste for action but was always willing to do her part, and she also urged others against reluctance. For instance, after persuading a procrastinating Charles VII to proceed to Rheims for coronation following the victory at Patay, Jehanne camped in the fields for two days as an indication of her eagerness to depart.[44]

According to Watts, "the meaning which saint and mystic express in idea and action is God. They think and act as they do because they are in a special way possessed by this life which is God, somewhat as the heart and mind of a dancer are possessed by

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[39]Heschel notes "that the prophet rarely speaks of God as He is in Himself." Rather, the prophet speaks of "God in relation to humanity, in relation to the world." Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 215. This also supports the discussion of Jehanne as a prophet in the following segment.

[40]Nicolas Caval, one of Jehanne's assessors at Rouen, noted the "considerable wisdom" of Jehanne's responses during the condemnation trial as well as her "very good memory," stating that "people were astonished" by these. Nicolas Caval; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 260-1.

[41]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 73.

[42]Boisguillaume, trial notary; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 220.

[43]Jehanne, testimony of February 24 and March 17, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 75, 127.

[44]de Cagny; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 120.

the music" interpreted "in bodily movement."[45] In order that theology not be devoid of sanctity, it must be lived "fully, deeply, [and] in its totality," states Merton.[46] "[E]xterior acts" must correspond to "interior intentions."[47] "God is pure life," Watts asserts, "and we are terrified of such life because we cannot hold it or possess it, and we do not know what it will do to us."[48] "Mystical love for God holds together both what causes us to tremble in fright and what never ceases to fascinate us," Soelle states.[49] In a similar vein, Kierkegaard explains that "the expression of wonder is worship. And wonder is an ambiguous state of mind which comprises fear and bliss. Worship therefore is mingled fear and bliss all at once. Even the most refined and rational worship of God is blissfulness in fear and trembling, confidence in the face of mortal danger."[50] Accordingly, Jehanne both loved and feared God greatly.[51] The following passage by Kierkegaard encapsulates several aspects of Jehanne's relationship with the Divine in this regard:

> [W]as it not fearful . . . that the object sought was so near thee that thou wast not seeking God but God was seeking thee; was it not fearful that thou couldst not move without being in Him, and not be so unobserved but, lo, thou wast in Him, nor flee to the uttermost bounds of the world but that He was there and at every place on the way, nor hide thyself in the abyss but that He was there and at every place on the way, nor say to Him, 'Only an instant,' seeing that He also was in the instant when thou didst say this; was it not fearful when the playfulness of youth and the immaturity of despair became seriousness at the instant when that which thou didst once point at and aspire after . . . then came into existence, yea, was in existence everywhere about thee and embraced thee on every hand! But was it not blissful that the hand of the mighty [the small 'm' in 'mighty' suggests human, not divine, power] could block thee up in the darkest hole and yet not shut out God; was it not blissful that thou couldst fall into the deepest abyss where one can see neither sun nor stars and yet can see God; was it not blissful that thou couldst go astray in the solitary wilderness and yet at once find the way to God . . . . But he who leaves out fear, let him look well to it that he does not also leave out the finding.[52]

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[45]Watts, 12.

[46]Merton, *An Introduction to Christian Mysticism*, 16.

[47]Thomas Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, ed. Patricia A. Burton (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2004), 133.

[48]Watts, 57.

[49]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 127.

[50]Kierkegaard, *Stages*, 458.

[51]Multiple witnesses described Jehanne as God-fearing, such as Musnier, Drappier, and Pasquerel. In Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 17, 19, and in Craig Taylor, 316, respectively.

[52]Kierkegaard, *Stages*, 462.

One of the things which Kierkegaard (presumably inadvertently) captures of Jehanne's experience is the persistence of her divine voices in spite of initial fear and hesitation on her part. Jehanne's divine counsel "said to her two or three times a week that she must leave and go into France" and "that she must hurry."[53] Also in keeping with Kierkegaard's description, Jehanne abandoned the playfulness of youth upon receiving divine revelation, adopting a more serious nature thereafter. "She . . . said that ever since she learned that she must come into France, she played very little, the least that she could."[54] Moreover, Jehanne never lost sight of God, even while suffering the torments of imprisonment or when led astray by the orchestrated abjuration, nor finally throughout her martyrdom. It was the light of God, in fact, that sustained her, for Jehanne frequently spoke of receiving comfort from her divine counsel.[55] As Kierkegaard suggests that one does not effectively seek but is sought by God, Weil also asserts that "[a]ctive searching" leads one away from the Divine, whereas "waiting" for God in an attentive and consenting manner draws God to an individual who longs for God while renouncing all else.[56] One "should do nothing but wait for the good and keep evil away," she advises.[57] Furthermore, Heschel remarks that "biblical religion" is characterized by "an awareness of a God who helps, demands, and calls upon man. It is a sense of being reached, being found, being sought after; a sense of being pursued."[58] Jehanne was evidently attentive to God and claimed clearly to have been approached, pursued, and supported by the Divine.

Mystical life requires considerable courage in encountering God and the world. Courage and fearlessness are not synonymous, of course, as courage cannot arise from an absence of fear. To be courageous is not to be devoid of fear but to confront fear and refuse to be immobilized by it. Courage need not eliminate fear. Where there is no fear, there is no possibility of courage, which is not to say that fearlessness does not have its own merit; perhaps it transcends both fear and courage. At any rate, in spite of her fear of the fire, Jehanne ultimately accepted that dreadful death over the alternative of denying God. Thus, Jehanne's life and death were both marked by courage.

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[53]They also repeatedly informed her of her impending capture. Jehanne, testimony of February 22 and March 10, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 67, 99.

[54]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; Ibid., 75.

[55]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 14, 17 and 28, and May 9, 1431; Ibid., 103, 112, 121, 140-1, 152.

[56]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 126-8.

[57]Ibid., 128.

[58]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 220.

Mysticism as Involvement With the World

In a manner compatible with Watts's notion of "a mystical state wherein religion and everyday life are identical,"[59] Jehanne practiced mysticism as a way of life, a way of involvement with the world. This is what the term 'practical mysticism' refers to in this work, mysticism applied to everyday life, mystical experience and mystical consciousness forming the ongoing basis for behaviour. Jehanne embodied and exemplified practical mysticism by virtue of the fact that she consistently applied her mystical sense to her activities, translating mystical experience and consciousness into practice as divine servantship in the world. Even when she defied her divine counsel in leaping from a prison tower, Jehanne retained her mystical sensibility, commending herself to God in jumping and seeking divine forgiveness thereafter.[60] Practical mysticism can thus be understood as the activity of fully living one's mysticism in the world, allowing it to inform every aspect of one's life and to be the foremost impetus for thought and action. In practical mysticism, mystical experience moves beyond the purely personal into the public realm. Nonetheless, while mystics keep company with God in the world, mysticism is an ultimately solitary endeavour with respect to human relationships as it calls one to individual choice, responsibility, commitment, and endurance in the living of one's faith. Kierkegaard encapsulates the solitary nature of mystical faith below:

> But the true wonder and the true fear one man cannot teach the other. Only when they constrict and expand the soul, thine, precisely thine, thine alone in the whole world, because thou art alone with the Omnipresent, only then do they truly exist for thee. . . . The true wonder and the true fear is [*sic*] there only when he, precisely he, be he the meanest or the greatest of men, finds himself alone with the Omnipresent. The greatness of power and wisdom and performance does not directly determine the magnitude of the God-relationship. . . . [F]ear and wonder, or the fear in wonder together with its bliss determines the magnitude of the God-relationship.[61]

Dorothee Soelle advocates a practical form of mysticism, insisting that mysticism is "love for God" which is inconceivable to her "without political and praxis-oriented actualization . . . directed toward the world."[62] "There is no experience of God," she declares, "that can be so privatized that it becomes and remains the property of one

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[59]Watts, 110.
[60]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 111-2.
[61]Kierkegaard, *Stages*, 463.
[62]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 2.

owner." She holds that mystics can relate to the world in a manner ranging from "withdrawal" to "transformation of the world through revolution." However, whether a mystic practices "renunciation, disagreement, divergence, dissent, reform, resistance, rebellion, or revolution," the mystic voices a distinct "No! to the world as it exists now. . . . For those who want the world to remain as it is have . . . betrayed the love of God and its restlessness before the status quo."[63] Jehanne's mystical life of action in the world proclaimed a powerful "No!" to English occupation and rule in France, to unjust warfare, to social stereotyping, to patriarchal restriction against women, and to ecclesiastical interference with the right of individual spiritual discernment. Soelle points out that mysticism understood as the knowledge of God through and from experience renders it available to all; hence, it is set against the exercise of "power and dominance over" others and can be viewed as "the antiauthoritarian religion."[64] The mystical element of religion, she explains, "directs itself to the will and the action of love."[65]

Jehanne's mysticism contradicts the notion prevalent in some forms of mysticism that love of creature and involvement with the world must be transcended in order for a soul to draw close to God. For example, Saint Teresa refers to "the nothingness of all things" and "the vanity of the world"[66] and speaks of such a strong desire to be with God alone that it produces a detachment "from creatures" and "contempt for the world" along with a desire for death mitigated only by God's wish that she continue to live.[67] She also describes a type of mystical experience wherein "the whole world and its affairs give it [i.e., the soul] pain, and no created thing provides it with company, nor does it want any company but only the Creator; and it sees that having such company is impossible unless it dies."[68] Jehanne demonstrated love of others in all forms of activity in which she engaged in the world, including war, as an essential element of serving and loving God, and there is no evidence or reason to suppose that she was further from God than any other saint or mystic. In Jehanne's mysticism, love of others and loving participation in the world are aspects of, not substitutes for, loving God. Jehanne demonstrated that such active love can prevent excesses of human violence and can serve toward mitigating, if

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[63]Ibid., 3-4.
[64]Ibid., 36, 46.
[65]Ibid., 1.
[66]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, 63.
[67]Ibid., vol. 2, 425-6.
[68]Ibid., vol. 1, 429.

not eradicating, human evil; hence, it is a significant consideration with respect to evaluating claims to divine sanction in warfare.

This brings us to an important consideration in Weil's thought, in which there appears to be a serious discrepancy with respect to her treatment of evil. It is worth mentioning because assertions similar to Weil's occasionally appear without qualification in current dialogues around spirituality. On the one hand, Weil advocates that all human activity comes about as the will of God and therefore commands not only human acceptance and approval, but love. She claims that "all the accomplished facts in the whole universe at the moment and everything that is happening or going to happen later beyond our reach . . . is in accordance with the will of God" and that "we must love absolutely everything, . . . including evil in all its forms."[69] Weil provides no sound basis for this dangerous assumption, and it conceivably fits within the category of "astonishing aberrations" in her thought (residing among its many gems) noted by T.S. Eliot, which he attributes to an "excess of temperament."[70] One of the reasons why Weil's assertion might be considered untenable is that it does not stand up to Irving Greenberg's compelling post-*Shoah* challenge that "No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning children."[71] Contrary to Weil's stated position, Jehanne's mysticism demonstrates a refusal to love evil and the necessity of actively opposing it, even if such necessity demands employing it with restraint, conscience, responsibility, accountability, and compassion in order ultimately to defeat it. It seems that a distinction ought to be drawn between loving the evildoer and loving evil itself whereby one might love an individual who commits an evil deed while refusing to love the deed; this does not constitute a call to love evil. Jehanne did not demonstrate love of evil, but love greater than the evil against which she battled. It is not in loving evil, but in loving greater than evil, that one acquires a capacity to conquer it.[72] Moreover, Weil's statement places the weight of

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[69]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 3.

[70]T.S. Eliot, preface to *The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties towards Mankind*, by Simone Weil, trans. Arthur Wills (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), ix.

[71]Irving Greenberg, "Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire: Judaism, Christianity, and Modernity after the Holocaust," in *Auschwitz: Beginning of a New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust*, Eva Fleischner, ed. (New York: KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 1977), 23. *Shoah*, a Hebrew word meaning 'catastrophe,' is preferred by some over the term 'Holocaust,' meaning 'burnt offering or sacrifice,' to denote the massive, targeted destruction of Jewish people and other individuals under Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime during World War II.

[72]This understanding derives from Caroline Myss's interpretation of John of the Cross's response to suffering the torments of imprisonment, wherein she states that John "discovered that the only way through the suffering was to find a way to love greater than the suffering. . . . He chose to reach for love."

responsibility for the sins or crimes of humanity on God rather than on human beings and expresses little to no concern for human morality. Jehanne, while claiming divine sanction with respect to certain deeds, never held God accountable or responsible for the whole of human activity, nor even the entirety of her own action. "Everything good that I have done, I did by command of the voices," she maintained, thereby excluding the Divine from any sinful deeds that she might have committed.[73]

Weil seems elsewhere to temper her position with respect to evil, stating that humans "have received the power to do good or harm," and that an individual can "be indwelt by God, by the power of evil or merely by the mechanism of the flesh. When he gives or punishes, what he bears within him enters the soul of the other through the bread or the sword."[74] Weil herein draws a distinction between God and evil and acknowledges the power of human free will. She also declares that God "consents not to command" the universe but "leaves two other forces to rule," one being "the blind necessity attaching to matter" and the other being "the autonomy essential to thinking persons. By loving our neighbor," she maintains, "we imitate the divine love which created us and all our fellows. By loving the order of the world we imitate the divine love which created this universe of which we are a part."[75] Furthermore, she notes that "a plant, where everything else is equal, does not grow in the same way in the light as in the dark. The plant does not have any control or choice in the matter of its own growth. As for us, we are like plants that have the one choice of being in or out of the light."[76] "God . . . comes to us," she maintains. "We have the power to consent to receive him or to refuse."[77] This more palatable aspect of Weil's thought, which contradicts her previous controversial statement, is compatible with Jehanne's mysticism and does not violate Greenberg's criterion of credibility.

Weil's position that the sword is capable of transmitting goodness rather than evil, provided it is handled with goodness, is noteworthy. While violence is not ordinarily employed in a beneficent manner, the possibility of such a use of violence is presented, thereby supporting Jehanne's model of behaviour and the potential for a righteous use of force in exceptional circumstances. It is important to note that Jehanne

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Caroline Myss, *Defy Gravity: Healing Beyond the Bounds of Reason* (Carlsbad, California: Hay House, Inc. 13883B - HH, 2009), compact disc audio recording, disc 2, track 6.

[73]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 106.

[74]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 98.

[75]Ibid., 99.

[76]Ibid., 77.

[77]Ibid., 79.

demonstrated neither an affinity for nor desensitization to violence and suffering, (a disturbingly prevalent phenomenon today), but she was greatly disturbed by these. For example, it was testified that Jehanne was "greatly distressed by such slaughter" of the English in the battle for Beaugency. Moreover, upon witnessing an incident in which an English prisoner was struck on the head and left for dead, Jehanne "dismounted [her horse] and received the Englishman's confession, raising his head and comforting him as much as she could."[78] Such behaviour corresponds to Soelle's assertion that "resistance . . . against becoming habituated to death" constitutes an aspect of the mystic's relationship to the world.[79] Jehanne was not a bloodthirsty warrior who willed the destruction of human life, not even that of the enemy, but she obviously accepted the loss of some life as an inevitability of defensive war motivated toward the establishment of peace. Jehanne assured Charles that, "in God's name," she would bring him into the city of Troyes "by love or by strength and force,"[80] implying a preference for love over battle, the latter to be employed as a final resort should the enemy refuse to act in accordance with love.

Knowledge of God and Divine Mystery

Watts holds that there is no method for attaining "knowledge and love of God" since all "knowledge of God is God . . . dwelling in the soul."[81] Consistent with Weil's theology of waiting attentively for God, Watts suggests that "[t]he most we can do is to prepare for his entry, to get out of his way, to remove the barriers." What we may be certain of, he maintains, is that God "acts within us," although we are often unable to recognize this through the barrier of our own attempted impositions on the Divine and divine activity. "We fail to see through the window because we are painting pictures on the glass." In order to know and love God, he advises, one must relinquish all attempts to possess God; in mysticism, one allows oneself, in the manner of passive action, to "be possessed *by* God."[82] "This is why there is no method, no formal technique, for attaining the mystical state and realizing union with God. For a method is an attempt to possess, and has its origin in pride and fear."[83]

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[78]de Coutes; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 179.
[79]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 4.
[80]Jehanne; quoted by Dunois, in Craig Taylor, 283.
[81]Watts, 16.
[82]Ibid., 16-7.
[83]Ibid., 93.

One of Jehanne's notable characteristics is that she presumed very little, if anything, about God. She based her knowledge of divinity upon that which God revealed to her and on the religious instruction which she received as a child. She recounted her revelations without embellishment. She did not claim elaborate understanding of God nor of divine motives, and she refused to place restrictions on divinity, (including restrictions implied by religious dogma or structure). For example, when questioned regarding the ability of her divine counsel to speak given Jehanne's uncertainty as to whether or not they were fully embodied, she replied simply, "I leave that to God." Moreover, when asked if Saint Michael appeared to her naked, she replied, "Do you think that Our Lord has not wherewithal to clothe him?"[84] Also, when asked why God had chosen her above others to fight for the kingdom of France, she responded simply that it "pleased God so to do."[85] On one occasion when Jehanne's assessors, adamant that she should submit to the Church Militant, insisted that she do so, she replied, "I submit myself to God who sent me, to the Blessed Mary and to all the saints of heaven. And it seems to me that God and the Church are one, and no difficulty should be made about this. Why do you make difficulties about this?"[86] Furthermore, asked whether or not God hated the English, she answered that, "as to the love or hate that God has for the English, or what He would do for their souls, she knows nothing; but she is well assured that they will be driven out of France, except those who die there; and that God will send the French victory over the English." She was then asked if God had supported the English when they were victorious in France, to which Jehanne responded "that she did not know whether God hated the French."[87] Jehanne acknowledged and respected divine autonomy and mystery and made no attempt to define God but held herself open to receiving divine revelation at all times. She did not promote a particular doctrine of God but declared what she understood to be the will of God for her as conveyed through her divine counsel. Jehanne thus behaved in accordance with that which Watts deems authentically mystical. He states, "[F]rom my present point of view, all doctrines of God—including atheism—are ultimately false and

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[84]Jehanne, testimony of March 1, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 86, 88.

[85]Jehanne, testimony of March 13, 1431; Ibid., 110.

[86]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 197.

[87]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 123. This testimony implicitly refutes Jane Marie Pinzino's thesis that Jehanne viewed the French as a people chosen by God like the Israelites. Jane Marie Pinzino, "Just War, Joan of Arc, and the Politics of Salvation," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, History of Warfare, ed. Kelly DeVries, vol. 25 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2005), 390-1.

idolatrous, because doctrines are forms of words which can never be more than pointers to mystical vision, and not by any means the best pointers."[88] Similarly, Soelle maintains that "[e]very idea we have of God fails God. Indeed, each idea produces a false familiarity with the divine."[89] Heschel agrees that objectification of God equates to falsification.[90] Jehanne seemed to grasp instinctively that which Watts, Soelle, and Heschel accept as the ultimate transcendental mystery of the Divine. Moreover, Jehanne's approach corresponds to prophetic perceptions of God. The prophet, Heschel explains, abstained "from any claim to comprehend God's *essence*, His inmost being, or even to apprehend His inscrutable thoughts, unrelated to history;" rather, the prophet insisted "upon the ability to understand His presence, expression or manifestation. The prophets experience what He *utters*, not what He *is*."[91] Furthermore, as Kierkegaard points out, an individual whom "God appoints . . . to have divine authority" has such authority only "in relation to what was entrusted to him"[92] or her. Jehanne apparently recognized this and did not overstep the boundary between that which God elected her to do specifically and that which she did of her own accord, between divinely revealed knowledge and knowledge acquired by alternative means. In other words, she did not present herself as possessing divine authority in all matters, but only within a limited sphere.

The idea of union with the Divine forms the essence of many, if not all, mystical formulations. To our knowledge, Jehanne did not employ mystical language; however, neither did she compose mystical treatises. While she is not known to have spoken of "union with God," Jehanne apparently lived it. Her active solidarity with God constituted union in the living of her life sacramentally, as a visible sign of invisible grace. Jehanne's will was united with divine will as she discerned it. The fact that she frequently took Communion with great devotion also indicates a desire for union with God through the Eucharistic sacrament. Alençon reported that Jehanne received the Eucharist twice weekly, often weeping at the sight of it.[93] Her confessor also stated that "she confessed almost every day, and often took Communion."[94] Moreover, Jehanne declared that the only reward she sought through her divine counsel was "salvation of

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[88]Watts, xviii.
[89]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 37.
[90]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 266.
[91]Ibid., 264.
[92]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 112.
[93]Alençon; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 160.
[94]Pasquerel; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 184.

her soul."[95] Concern for her soul's salvation might be understood as a desire for reciprocal love between herself and God for, if her soul were damned, this would presumably be the result of failure on her part to love God adequately, constituting a rejection of God's love for her. Salvation of the soul is thus understood as resulting from full participation in right loving relationship with God. On this view, the desire for salvation is no more or less than the desire to be united in love with God. "[U]nity means love," states Heschel.[96] Accordingly, Watts notes that one who "discerns the activity of a living Spirit" understands salvation as complete "union with and acceptance of this mysterious Spirit."[97] Salvation does not necessarily ensure freedom from suffering or death. In fact, salvation might not be the most appropriate or encompassing term available to express the nature of divine action or intention toward humanity. Perhaps love is the most appropriate word to express this. Love does not ensure freedom from pain; the value of love resides in its own essence, which is independent of, if potentially present within, all other human experience, including suffering. Of course, salvation can be taken to refer exclusively to the soul of an individual, but this does not speak to divine presence or activity in the midst of physical or emotional suffering, whereas love potentially does. Love is conceivably the operative divine salvific principle in all human experience, including salvation of the soul. Let this be our working definition of salvation then, salvation as unity in right-loving relationship of an individual soul with the Divine.

Although the Divine Spirit is mysterious and apparently elusive at times, Watts holds that to seek for God implies that God is not already with us[98] whereas, on his view, divine presence exists within individuals perpetually in the form of "the indwelling Holy Spirit," constituting the "gift of union with God."[99] To attempt "to see God," he explains, "is like trying to look at your own eyes" since God "is nearer to us than we are to ourselves."[100] Hence, one does not "have to *attain* union with God; it is already given as an act of divine love. To try to attain it by our own efforts is to slight that love and, again, to imply that the gift is not given."[101] Nonetheless, the gift of union can presumably be rejected by an individual, the union broken. Hvidt asserts that "God

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[95]Jehanne, testimony of February 22 and March 17, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 69, 124.
[96]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 264.
[97]Watts, 127.
[98]Ibid. 18.
[99]Ibid., 76.
[100]Ibid., 17.
[101]Ibid., 18.

through the prophet seeks . . . to lead" humans back to "original union with God."[102] This view of mysticism seems compatible with Jehanne's mysticism in that she did not apparently seek God by some method; rather, she understood God to be present and accessible always (even if not always clearly responsive) through prayer, the sacraments, and the Mass.[103] In fact, even when utterly deprived of the sacraments, the Mass, and prayerful solitude during imprisonment, Jehanne repeatedly encountered, acknowledged, and responded to divine presence.[104] "God gives his life . . . in symbols and sacraments, but if that life is to be truly lively, it will not stay confined in those forms or in any others. It will use forms; it will express itself in forms; but it will not be held in forms," asserts Watts.[105] Accordingly, Jehanne declared that, even if her judges denied her permission to hear Mass, God had the "power to let her hear it without them, whenever it so pleased Him."[106]

The darkness that mystics frequently encounter in the experience of union with God must also be noted, as Jehanne obviously did not escape this. Watts cites as a requirement of the mystical life "sufficient faith of the will" to enter into an unknown realm which is experienced as "empty, arid and terrifying, an unaccustomed territory where all familiar landmarks are left behind . . . wherein one experiences bitter desolation and comes close to absolute despair."[107] Moreover, the experience frequently "involves temptations against faith."[108] The teachings of John of the Cross, who wrote an entire treatise and mystical poem on this 'dark night of the soul' (frequently referred to simply as 'the dark night'), are pivotal. He describes the soul's journey toward perfection in its "union with God through love," to the extent that such perfection is possible within the constraints of temporal life. According to John, the process by which a soul strives toward perfection consists in "two kinds of spiritual purgation: one, a

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[102]Hvidt, 125.

[103]Watts notes that the church of the Middle Ages differed in some respects from the church today. As Mass was then celebrated in Latin rather than the vernacular, he suggests that it provided "support for pure contemplation" that is not available in the more didactic, vernacular liturgies of today. Watts, xii. It is conceivable that one of the reasons Jehanne loved to hear Mass, which was not conducted in the vernacular in her day, was that it provided an occasion for the type of "pure contemplation" of the divine presence suggested by Watts.

[104]While imprisoned at Rouen, Jehanne was denied the Eucharist until the morning of her death, at which time it was administered by Ladvenu. Ladvenu; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 243. Jehanne also requested to hear Mass while imprisoned but this, too, was denied. Jehanne, testimony of March 15 and 17, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 193-4, 197. Also, on March 25, 1431 she requested to receive the Easter Eucharist and to hear Mass; in Craig Taylor, 204-5.

[105]Watts, 56.

[106]Jehanne, testimony of March 27, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial,* 135.

[107]Watts, 89.

[108]Ibid., 90.

purification of the sensory part; the other, a purification of the spiritual part."[109] This process of purgation entails "affliction and torment" as well as illumination.[110] He describes the night of sense (the first dark night) as "a privation and purgation of all sensible appetites for the external things of the world, the delights of the flesh, and the gratifications of the will." Only by stilling the appetites, he explains, is one released from the pain caused by them.[111] In aridity, the soul moves "with purity in the love of God" since its actions are no longer influenced by pleasure but by the desire to please God alone.[112] The subsequent night of spirit, experienced as divine light or wisdom, is dark and painful because divine wisdom so greatly exceeds the soul's capacity to apprehend it that it powerfully overwhelms both the soul and the intellect such that they become clouded or darkened. The soul "becomes a battlefield" for the conflict between the soul's natural weakness and the infusion of divinity. Moreover, pain is derived from the soul's recognition of its impurity as revealed in contrast to the divine light.[113]

Jehanne undoubtedly underwent darkness characteristic of the dark night of the soul, leaving absolutely everything familiar, including her home, family, friends, and traditional social roles, and venturing into completely unknown roles and territories amidst strangers and extreme dangers. Soelle speaks of "what ancient mysticism called 'being apart,' which is living out concretely one's farewell to the customs and norms of one's culture."[114] Jehanne clearly exemplified this in adopting male attire and accepting a traditionally masculine position as military commander and knight. It was an undertaking which subjected her to much ridicule and scorn; it is little wonder that she preferred to stay in Domremy with her mother.[115] Darkness also descended upon Jehanne in the wake of Charles VII's coronation with the emergence of his contrary behaviour toward her and her campaign, compounded with her first military defeat. Plunged into further darkness by foreknowledge of her captivity, the distress was compounded by her subsequent capture, imprisonment, failed escape attempts, (how disheartening they must have been), corrupt trial, abjuration, recantation, and martyrdom. It seems that Jehanne's tribulations went from exceptionally difficult to extraordinarily difficult to unimaginably so. We have little to no record of how she felt

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[109]Saint John of the Cross, 295.
[110]Ibid., 335.
[111]Ibid., 74.
[112]Ibid., 326.
[113]Ibid., 335-6.
[114]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 92.
[115]de Metz; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 96.

throughout most of these situations, but we have enough to know with certainty that she suffered immensely and that she maintained her love of God, it being the vehicle through which she endured martyrdom.

With respect to Saint John's night of sense, it would seem that Jehanne's instinctive pledge of virginity to God reflected an understanding of and willingness to submit to the mystical process of sensory purgation, for she pledged it on the occasion of her first divine visitation,[116] prior to receiving knowledge of her mission and how her virginity would serve that purpose from a practical point of view. She also ate very little despite the intense activity and physical demands of military life; she was said to be "moderate in eating and drinking,"[117] "very abstemious," often eating "no more than a hunk of bread all day."[118] She also fasted nearly every Friday.[119]

Jehanne sought neither worldly honour nor personal glory and accorded all credit for her army's victories to God.[120] Regarding the matter of individuals kissing her hands, feet, and garments, Jehanne stated that "[m]any people gladly came to see" her but "kissed her clothing as little as she could help. But she said that the poor gladly came to her, because she did them no unkindness, but upheld and helped them as much as she could,"[121] and she reportedly "did everything" in her power "to prevent the people from honoring and glorifying her."[122] Jehanne considered it problematic that people idolized her. "In truth, I would not know how to protect myself from such things, if God does not protect me,"[123] she declared, and she was "very upset and most displeased when some good women came to greet her and showed her signs of adoration."[124] Furthermore, Jehanne maintained that she requested "nothing from her king except good arms, good horses, and money to pay the people of her household . . . [and] that what she had was her king's."[125] Moreover, Jean de Metz frequently gave Jehanne money which she, in turn, gave to others.[126] There is no evidence that Jehanne sought personal privilege through her divine counsel or any reason to suspect it; she merely sought

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[116]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 104.

[117]Raoul de Gaucourt, Grand Master of Charles VII's household; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 117.

[118]de Coutes; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 177.

[119]Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 188.

[120]Jacques l'Esbahy, burgher and citizen of Orléans; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 149. Also, Seguin testified that Jehanne credited God with the victory at Orléans; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 113.

[121]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 94.

[122]l'Esbahy; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 149.

[123]Jehanne; quoted by Barbin, in Craig Taylor, 303-4.

[124]Simon Beaucroix, companion-at-arms to Jehanne; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 121.

[125]Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 101.

[126]de Metz; in Craig Taylor, 273.

advice, and perhaps reassurance.[127] The above-noted behaviours constitute an apparent inclination toward sensory purgation on Jehanne's part. That the process went beyond that which she desired is doubtless since Jehanne did not wish to be captured, although she consented to it in submission to divine will, resolving that, "seeing it so pleased Our Lord, it was best that she should have been captured."[128] The humiliations and hardships of captivity presumably worked further purgation of sense in Jehanne, and her martyrdom constituted the ultimate purgation of sense. It is important to note that the purgatory process does not suggest that God inflicts the suffering entailed by it, but simply that pain constitutes an inevitable element of the process whereby a human soul draws nearer to God.

In terms of Saint John's night of spirit, Jehanne's completely natural fear of imprisonment and death by fire might be considered her "natural weakness" in contrast to the divine wisdom (exceeding human comprehension) which deemed her capture necessary and her sale to the English and martyrdom inevitable.[129] The disturbing foreknowledge of her capture and the alleged abjuration represent the "battlefield" where conflict between Jehanne's natural weakness and the infusion of divinity took place. Nonetheless, in spite of her fear and above all, Jehanne expressed an intense desire to serve God and lived and died according to it, regardless of her suffering in mind, body, and soul. "[I]t is precisely the ability to stand above all personal dispositions, inclinations, and vested interests that marks the essence of prophetic consciousness," notes Heschel,[130] a consciousness with which Jehanne was generously endowed.

The Prophetic as Mystical Calling

If they believe that I am sent from God, they are not deceived.

—Jehanne d'Arc, *The Trial of Joan of Arc*

Practical application of divine revelation in the world was a key element of Jehanne's mysticism; hence, she might be considered a practical mystic, but what of the prophetic element of her mysticism? Let us explore the realm of prophecy, noting that

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[127]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 72.
[128]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 103.
[129]Jehanne, testimony of March 10 and 14, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 175-6, 187, 189.
[130]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 187-8.

the prophetic relates to a particular type of divine calling rooted in the activity of divine revelation.

Revelation is liminal in nature; it is a threshold experience wherein boundaries are obscured and traversed, a condition in which one stands with one foot on earth and the other probing mysterious depths. The Greek word, λιμήν,[131] meaning harbour, suggests a shelter of sorts as well as a place of great possibility; it represents a meeting of worlds where exchange and communication can occur, but it also signifies a place of vulnerability to attack from external forces. This is the place of revelation where divine and human realms meet, where one stands simultaneously in vulnerability and infinite possibility. This is the place of the prophet.

Revelation inevitably requires a witness or recipient since, without one, nothing is actually revealed. In the absence of a witness, one might speak of occurrence or event, but not of revelation. According to Saint Teresa, God longs to reveal God's Self to human beings, but one must be willing to look at God in order for God to be revealed. Although we might turn away from God, God never stops looking at us. "He is not waiting for anything else . . . than that we look at Him."[132] This seems resonant with Jehanne's experience, for she, who always had her attention directed toward God, claimed to have seen angels frequently among individuals who did not see them.[133] While not requisite for the occurrence of revelation, both recognition and comprehension are necessary for the effective receipt of revelation, without which revelation might occur but remain ineffectual. It is important to recognize God in God's act of revelation in order that the divine message contained within such revelation be understood. Herbert Vorgrimler agrees that individuals can be "blind to" or "misinterpret" God's presence, thereby interfering with its operation.[134]

While the mystic is a recipient of divine revelation and all prophets are necessarily mystics, not all mystics are prophets. According to Heschel, prophets receive revelation of the divine will, not the divine self.[135] Moreover, "[p]rophecy arises not from any sudden, spontaneous feeling awakened by an indeterminate, silent, and numinous image, but from an experience of inspiration which has its source in the

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[131]"Limen," in English.
[132]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 2, 134.
[133]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 180.
[134]Vorgrimler, 8.
[135]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 265.

revelation of a divine pathos."[136] The prophetic message is not intended solely for the prophet, but is directed primarily toward others to whom the prophet "is sent with a mandate."[137] Accordingly, Kierkegaard asserts that the divine message communicated to an apostle is not revealed for the sake of the recipient; rather, it is bestowed as a mission upon one who must deliver the message "and exercise authority."[138] The prophet, states Heschel, is thus witness and messenger. "As a messenger, his task is to deliver the [divine] word; as a witness, he must bear testimony that the word is divine."[139] In Merton's language, "[t]he prophet suffers inspiration, or vision. He shoulders the 'burden' of vision that God lays upon him. He bows under the truth and the judgments of God."[140] Moreover, the prophet lives in "perpetual awareness of being perceived, apprehended, [and] noted by God."[141] Jehanne lived in acute awareness of being perpetually perceived by God, and she greatly feared erring in her ways, as evidenced in her deep concern over displeasing her divine counsel.[142] "If a man is to understand his sin essentially," explains Kierkegaard, "he must understand it because he remains alone . . . with the Holy One who knows all things. Only this fear and trembling is the true sort, only the sorrow which the remembrance of God awakens in a man, only the repentance His love fosters."[143]

While all of these indications constitute marks of a prophet, the prophet might be defined as a "'bearer of revelation'" who "claims to be the envoy sent directly by God"[144] and "who tells the truth on the strength of his contact with God."[145] Karl Rahner notes that forms of revelation vary significantly "according to the phase of the history of salvation in which the visionary lives and which he is intended to influence."[146] Merton describes the prophet as

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[136]Ibid., 267.

[137]Karl Rahner, s.v. "Prophetism," in Karl Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi* (Mumbai: St. Pauls, 1975), 1286-7.

[138]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 118. The word "apostle" is understood as referring to one called by God to deliver a divine message as part of a divine mission; in this work it is considered interchangeable in the Kierkegaardian context with the term "prophet."

[139]Abraham J. Heschel, *The Prophets: An Introduction* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 22.

[140]Merton, *Disputed Questions*, 222.

[141]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 263.

[142]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 147.

[143]Kierkegaard, *Stages*, 464.

[144]Rahner, s.v. "Prophetism," in *Encyclopedia of Theology*, 1286.

[145]Joseph Ratzinger, foreword to *Christian Prophecy: The Post-Biblical Tradition*, by Niels Christian Hvidt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), vii.

[146]Karl Rahner, *Inquiries: Inspiration in the Bible, Visions and Prophecies, The Church and the Sacraments, The Episcopate and the Primacy, On Heresy*, trans. Charles H. Henkey et al. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 97.

> one who lives in direct submission to the Holy Spirit in order that, by his life, actions and words, he may at all times be a sign of God in the world . . . . Their [the prophets'] submission to God is not merely a matter of charismatic accident but of perfect fidelity to grace.
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> The prophet is a man of God . . . in the sense that he is consciously and freely obedient to the Holy Spirit, no matter what the price may be.[147]

Jehanne, he notes, had "one of the most extraordinary charismatic missions of all time."[148] However, like Merton, Heschel notes that the "eminence" of the prophet "is not adequately described by the term *charisma.* Not the fact of his having been affected, but the fact of his having received a power to affect others is supreme in his existence. His sense of election and personal endowment is overshadowed by his sense of a history-shaping power."[149] The prophet lives an active mystical life within a community, or sometimes as a pariah, given the frequently polemical nature of the prophetic message. But even pariahs exist in relation to community, though rejected, and it is not unusual for a prophet to be rejected by one community and embraced by another.

"The prominent theme" of the prophet's message, states Heschel, "is exhortation, not mere prediction. While it is true that foretelling is an important ingredient and may serve as a sign of the prophet's authority (Deut. 18:22; Isa. 41:22; 43:9), his essential task is to declare the word of God to the here and now; to disclose the future in order to illumine what is involved in the present."[150] Prophetic messages are not merely "doctrinal propositions," adds Rahner, "but are to be translated into real action," which often positions the prophet as a "leader and organizer of religious and social changes."[151] In fact, Walter Brueggemann holds that the "prophetic task" within an unjust social system "is to maintain a destabilizing presence." Prophetic destabilization, he explains, "takes as its responsibility" the endeavour to oppose "forces of stabilization that are at work among the participants and benefactors of the [existing] social system,"[152] in Jehanne's case, the pro-English forces in France. The prophet exposes "false claimants to power who must be delegitimated."[153] "One may identify a *ground* and an *impetus* for" the prophets' "vocation of destabilization," he maintains, which is the vision of "an alternative . . . social reality that they insist is true . . . . The contrast," notes

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[147]Merton, *Disputed Questions*, 223-4.
[148]Merton, *Introduction to Christian Mysticism*, 195.
[149]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 21.
[150]Ibid., 12.
[151]Rahner, s.v. "Prophetism," in *Encyclopedia of Theology*, 1286-7.
[152]Walter Brueggemann, "The Prophet as a Destabilizing Presence," in *Prophetic Approaches to Israel's Communal Life*, ed. Patrick D. Miller (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 223.
[153]Ibid., 238.

Brueggemann, "may be between the rule of God who liberates and the rule of idols that enslave."[154] Heschel also speaks of the destabilizing role of the prophet "whose activities and appearance are unpredictable, individual, and incalculable."[155] According to Heschel, the prophet "is incapable of isolating the world. There is an interaction between [hu]man and God which to disregard is an act of insolence."[156] Joseph Ratzinger notes that prophecy is rooted in the tradition of Moses, who "spoke with God as with a friend," and it is "operative in all areas of the actualization of Revelation."[157] Hence, the prophet receives revelation and contributes to its fulfillment through the act of prophesying and by cooperating with divine directives communicated via the revelation(s).

Anyone claiming divine sanction of his or her social activities ought theoretically to display characteristics of practical, prophetic mysticism in order to be considered credible since such mysticism constitutes the actively lived social-mystical calling, at least within Jewish and Christian contexts. The truly prophetic mission is synonymous with the legitimate claim to divine sanction of social activity. Hence, it is necessary to consider carefully the nature of prophecy and prophetic life in order to arrive at an understanding of such claims. Jehanne was a practical, prophetic mystic. She was an unlikely and persistent leader of significant social change on the basis of her claim to divine sanction which she openly proclaimed. Like others who underwent a name change representative of divine calling,[158] 'Jehannette' became 'Jehanne *la pucelle*' upon leaving Domremy to embark on her divine mission.[159] Jehanne's "prophetic character," Pernoud and Clin observe, was born of her conviction that she clearly and precisely communicated a divine message without alteration.[160] Indeed, she reiterated her message clearly and consistently, even in her final moments at the stake.[161] As a prophetic mystic who claimed divine sanction with respect to warfare, Jehanne's example is potentially instructive in relation to other such claims.

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[154]Ibid., 223-4.

[155]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 222.

[156]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 16.

[157]Ratzinger, foreword to Hvidt, vii-viii, ix. Hvidt also acknowledges the prophetic experience within other religious traditions. Hvidt, 133.

[158]In the biblical tradition, for example, Abram became Abraham, Sarai became Sarah, and Simon became Peter. Gen. 17:4-5, 15; Jn. 1:42 NRSV.

[159]Jehanne, testimony of February 21, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 64.

[160]Pernoud and Clin, 164.

[161]Ladvenu; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 249.

According to biblical tradition, prophetic revelation manifests in the form of voices and visions wherein God communicates via pictures, symbols, or angels, and it is possible that these phenomena can occur while the visionary is dreaming or in an ecstatic state.[162] Jehanne's revelations were communicated to her via visions and auditions and, although her divine counsel frequently appeared while she was awake, such as when the first voice addressed her in her father's garden,[163] they also communicated with her during sleep. For example, at Orléans Jehanne leapt from her bed upon receipt of revelation directing her to attack the English.[164] She testified that a divine voice also woke her while she was imprisoned and, although the voice spoke while she was asleep, she did not comprehend it until she awoke.[165] Moreover, Jehanne's father had a premonitory dream indicating that she "would go off with the soldiers." The dream occurred "more than two years after" Jehanne began secretly encountering her divine counsel, and her parents took it very seriously and guarded her strictly.[166]

Apart from such phenomena as visions and auditions, the interpretation of sacred scripture is also linked to revelation and will be particularly relevant to the analysis of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in chapter four. As a source of divine guidance, however, revelation in the form of particular, personal instruction is more specifically focused and, as such, is potentially understood more easily than that derived from scripture. Perhaps, in some respects, it is also more powerful; it is certainly more direct. Rahner emphasizes the relative clarity and specificity of private revelation over the generality and ambiguity of individual interpretation and analysis of more generally available information in discerning the divine will in a given situation. "[P]ost-apostolic, private revelations," he asserts, constitute "imperatives" for action within the context of particular, "concrete historical situation[s] . . . . Because what God wishes to be done in certain given circumstances cannot be logically and unequivocally deduced from the general principles of dogma and morals, even with the help of an analysis of the given situation." Although "theoretical considerations may delimit the sphere of the correct and appropriate human action," they cannot determine "which of the various decisions within this sphere is in fact the one God wills at this moment, and how this one can be found. An opposite view would wrongly reduce the concrete and unpredictable

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[162]Rahner, *Inquiries*, 97.
[163]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 141.
[164]d'Aulon; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 166.
[165]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 146.
[166]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 105-6.

character of free human action to universal patterns, and would degrade individual, spiritual reality to a mere instance of universal law."[167] In the absence of clear, divine directives such as those provided via prophetic revelation, moral discernment and moral action within specific social contexts, particularly those which are very complex, can be especially difficult and precarious.

Divine revelation affords us possible insight into the nature and will of God, but how might one discern or recognize it and, in the absence of definitive proof, what constitutes sufficiently compelling evidence of divine revelation? As declared during Jehanne's lifetime, "[I]t is not enough that someone claims purely and simply to be sent from God – this is the claim of all heretics – but it is necessary that he proves this."[168] Rahner holds that supposedly revelatory visions, if not substantiated by a certain mystical grace referred to as "infused contemplation," must be authenticated by an "external miracle," without which they cannot properly demand assent from others.[169] He further states that the quality of humility in a visionary lends credence to the authenticity of revelation. Humility, Rahner holds, does "not so much imply a normal piety, veracity, modesty, discretion, etc., existing independently of the vision . . . as a decisive transformation, a religious deepening of the person that comes with the experience and endures. This, for the investigator [of visions], is much readier and simpler evidence that the . . . experience was accompanied by God's interior work of

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[167]Rahner, *Inquiries*, 108-9.

[168]*De bono et malo spiritu,* a treatise written anonymously by a member of the University of Paris sometime between September 8 and 22, 1429; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 125-30. Quotation is from Taylor, 126.

[169]Rahner, *Inquiries*, 141-2, 162, 164. While it is difficult to locate a succinct definition of infused contemplation, it is generally understood as a form of mystical experience wherein, without initiative on the part of a consenting recipient, God bypasses the bodily senses and acts directly upon a human soul to effect union with it. R. P. Aug. Poulain describes infused contemplation, (also referred to as "*mystic union*," . . . "*mystical . . . contemplation*," . . . or "*passive, extraordinary, or eminent*" contemplation), as a grace "of union with God" wherein "*God Himself*, and God alone, . . . manifests Himself" to an individual without the involvement of external objects. R. P. Aug. Poulain, *The Graces of Interior Prayer (Des Grâces d'Oraison): A Treatise on Mystical Theology*, 6th ed., trans. Leonora L. Yorke Smith (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., 1911), 52-3, 60. Saint Teresa of Avila and Saint John of the Cross speak of infused contemplation but do not explicitly call it that; R. Garrigou-Lagrange indicates that Teresa refers to the experience as "supernatural or passive recollection." He also maintains that when she or John refers to contemplation in an unqualified manner, s/he invariably means infused contemplation. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Prelude of Eternal Life*, trans. M. Timothea Doyle, vol. 2 (St. Louis, Missouri: B. Herder Book Co., 1948), 284, 286, n. 32. Rahner refers to the miraculous as "a divine intervention which partly suspends the laws of nature." Rahner, *Inquiries*, 125, 127. Saint Thomas Aquinas defines miracles as "all things that can be done supernaturally" by divine cause and, "just as the prophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His power." Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1st complete American ed. in 3 vols., vol. 2, q. 178, a. 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947), 1924.

grace in the depths of the spirit, than any psychological description by the seer of his own vision."[170] Hvidt cites the production of "good fruit," (among which miracles are considered most indicative), as an important criterion of "authentic prophecy." Obedience and strength, he adds, follow humility in the hierarchy of visionary qualities affirming revelation.[171]

"[I]t was all for Our Lord," Jehanne declared.[172] Let us take a closer look at the quality of humility in the visionary. Merton describes humility as "an emptiness of heart in which self-assertion has no place." One who "is not empty and undivided in his own inmost soul . . . will be nothing more than an individualist. And in that case, his non-conformity is nothing but an act of rebellion: the substitution of idols and illusions of his own choosing for those chosen by society."[173] While Jehanne was certainly a non-conformist, she was neither an idolater nor merely an individualist in the sense described by Merton. Rather, Astell notes "the spiritual discernment, the charity, and the moral courage" with which Jehanne accepted "a vocation that was without precedent for a woman—one that exposed her to severe trials, that tested her faith, and that required of her great purity of soul and body."[174] Detachment and humility, according to Saint Teresa, are virtues that go hand-in-hand since detachment involves not only detaching from the world, but also a "turning" from oneself. One in possession of these qualities, she maintains, "can easily go out and fight with all hell together and against the whole world and all its occasions of sin. Such a person has no fear of anyone . . . . The only thing he fears is displeasing his God."[175] Humility, which requires detachment from personal will, is thus necessary in the act of surrender to divine will. Jehanne, who fought fearlessly for the kingdom of France but feared displeasing God above all, exemplifies Teresa's notion of humility. "I am much more afraid of failing them [her divine messengers] by saying something that may displease these voices than I am of answering you," she stated to her Rouen assessors.[176]

Jehanne, in fact, displayed a healthy mixture of confidence and humility. (It ought to be noted that confidence is not synonymous with pride, the latter being the opposite of humility.) Jehanne's confidence derived from her faith in God, not faith in

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[170]Rahner, *Inquiries*, 143-4.
[171]Hvidt, 129, 292-3.
[172]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 125.
[173]Merton, *Disputed Questions*, 184.
[174]Astell, "Joan of Arc and Spirituality," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, 4.
[175]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 2, 76-7.
[176]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 147.

herself, and she likewise exhorted others to "hope in God,"[177] (not in her). "[T]he courage of faith is the only humble courage," notes Kierkegaard.[178] While a healthy sense of national pride does not equate to arrogance (excessive pride), the English invasion of France and attempted usurpation of the French crown was commonly regarded as a blatant act of arrogance.[179] According to Saint Teresa, it seems that whoever sins in pride is susceptible to divine correction, for she asserts that God will abandon a soul that has not attained genuine humility in order to teach it that "we have nothing we haven't received."[180] A type of false peace which Teresa identifies is that derived from honour bestowed by the world. Honour, she warns, "is itself lost by desiring it."[181] Indeed, more good can conceivably be accomplished through humility than by pursuing honour bestowed by the world since the world can be dangerously mistaken in its bestowal of honour. In a world that honours indiscriminate warfare, there is no end to bloodshed. Moreover, the quest for honour involves self-interest and, where self-interest reigns, one walks in danger of harming others, whereas humility involves "absolute acceptance of the possibility that everything natural in us should be destroyed."[182] A contemporary commentary notes that Jehanne was not apparently "seeking her own interest with any guile, since she exposes her own body to the supreme peril, in evidence of her faith."[183] In fact, Soelle asserts that "mystical power" seeks the empowerment of others.[184] "[A] person who has genuinely realized union with God is

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[177]Jehanne; quoted by Jean Luillier, burgher of Orléans, in Murray, 246. de Coutes also testified that Jehanne repeatedly instructed her soldiers to place "all their confidence" in God. de Coutes; quoted in Murray, 260.

[178]Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Group, 1985), 87.

[179]In a French ballad of unknown authorship, the English invaders are described as "too arrogant" and "behaving in such a way far too long." A date of 1429 is attributed by some to this ballad. *Ballade contre les Anglais*; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 85. Also, a contemporary of Jehanne, theologian Jean Dupuy, wrote that God "humiliated the proud" by conquering the English through her. Jean Dupuy, *Collectarium historiarum,* (1429); reproduced in Craig Taylor, 89-91. Quotation is from Taylor, 90. Furthermore, Christine de Pizan addressed the English in her famous poem dedicated to Jehanne, stating, "And so, you English, . . . [a] short time ago, when you looked so fierce, you had no inkling that this would be so; but you were not yet treading the path upon which God casts down the proud." de Pizan, *Le ditié*; quoted in Craig Taylor, 104.

[180]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 2, 187.

[181]Ibid., 84.

[182]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 150.

[183]*De mirabili victoria*; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 79-83. Quotation is from Taylor, 80. *De mirabili victoria* was a popular and influential contemporary treatise written about Jehanne. Fraioli, *Early Debate*, 126. The authorship and date of the treatise are uncertain, but it was widely circulated and can reasonably be assigned a date of somewhere between March and September, 1429. Some believe Jean Gerson to be the author, but others dispute this. Craig Taylor, 78.

[184]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 158.

humble just because he sees no difference between himself and others," states Watts.[185] Jehanne demonstrated such humility. While she was lodged at the home of one Marguerite La Touroulde, several women arrived at the house asking Jehanne to touch various religious objects, but Jehanne laughed and told Marguerite, "You touch them! They will be as good from your touch as from mine."[186] "[I]t is one thing to be admired," observes Kierkegaard, and "another to be a guiding star that saves the anguished."[187] Jehanne, who claimed "that she had been sent for the consolation of the poor and destitute,"[188] might be considered such a guiding star.

Furthermore, Jehanne demonstrated qualities suggestive of an infusion of grace. She was uncannily adept at military strategy, possessing all the skills of a military captain without ever having acquired them through formal training. Normally, a knight underwent "rigorous apprenticeship," receiving both military and moral instruction,[189] but Jehanne was appointed commander of war immediately upon receiving ecclesiastical approval. She "was very simple in all her actions," one witness remarked, "except in the conduct of war, in which she was altogether an expert."[190] Another testified that, "in the leading and drawing up of armies and in the conduct of war, in disposing an army for battle and haranguing the soldiers, she behaved like the most experienced captain in all the world, like one with a whole lifetime of experience."[191] Jehanne "took more admirable precautions [at Troyes] than two or three more experienced or famous" captains "would have done,"[192] observed another. "I have seen her ride a horse and wield a lance as well as the finest soldier, and the soldiers themselves were most astonished by this," stated La Touroulde.[193] Alençon expressed similar observations, adding that Jehanne was particularly adept at the strategic placement of artillery.[194] Moreover, it was observed that she bore "the weight and burden of armour [which

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[185]Watts, 224-5.

[186]Jehanne; quoted by Marguerite La Touroulde, Jehanne's hostess in Bourges, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 125.

[187]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 21.

[188]Jehanne; quoted by La Touroulde, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 125.

[189]Fraioli, *Hundred Years War,* 29-30.

[190]S. Charles; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 108.

[191]Thibault d'Armagnac or de Termes, companion-at-arms to Jehanne; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 121.

[192]Dunois; quoted in Craig Taylor, 283. Taylor uses the term "warlords" rather than "captains."

[193]La Touroulde; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 125.

[194]Alençon; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 160-1.

weighed sixty pounds[195]] incredibly well, to such a point that she . . . remained fully armed during six days and nights."[196] These observations are no small matter but are, indeed, something to marvel at in light of the extensive training and experience normally required in order to accomplish that which this young peasant girl achieved so apparently naturally—or supernaturally.[197] It was also considered remarkable that the siege of Orléans was raised in just three days under her efforts whereas, ordinarily, the feat would have been expected to take more than a month.[198] Jehanne also demonstrated great wisdom in her responses to interrogation. Jean Barbin, Royal Advocate in the Parlement of Poitiers and later Paris, testified that he heard the doctors of law and theology who had examined Jehanne at Poitiers state that she replied to their questions with such wisdom that they considered it evidence of "divine inspiration," given that she was uneducated.[199] With respect to the trial at Rouen, it was observed that "[s]uch difficult, subtle, and crafty questions were asked of . . . Jeanne, that the great clerics and learned people present would have found it hard to reply."[200] Moreover, before she was able to answer a question, it was common for another examiner to introduce an additional question so that "she was often hurried and troubled in her answers."[201] Considering also that Jehanne was "fatigued" by the relentless hours of examination to which she was subjected, Manchon declared that she "could not have defended herself before such great Doctors had she not been inspired."[202] Margolis notes that Jehanne's "adamantly evasive and sometimes flippant answers rendered ridiculous" some of the questions asked of her, "making the judges, who sought to discredit her as a diabolical lunatic, look like infidels."[203] Jehanne herself claimed that Saints Catherine and Margaret counseled her with respect to how she ought to respond during the

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[195]Guy Endore and Mary Gordon provide the weight of Jehanne's armour. Guy Endore, *The Sword of God: Jeanne d'Arc* (Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 1931), 82. Mary Gordon, *Joan of Arc* (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 2000), 84.

[196]de Boulainvilliers, in his letter to the Duke of Milan; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, v. 5, 114-121, *By Herself & Her Witnesses,* 98-9.

[197]For a detailed account of the requirements, duties, and responsibilities incumbent upon a military commander in Jehanne's time, see Christine de Pizan, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, trans. Sumner Willard, ed. Charity Cannon Willard (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). The text was written c. 1410, only two years prior to Jehanne's birth; therefore, it is quite contemporaneous with her.

[198]Dupuy, *Collectarium historiarum,* (1429); quoted in Craig Taylor, 90.

[199]Barbin; quoted in Craig Taylor, 303.

[200]de la Pierre; quoted in Murray, 160. Massieu also expressed his surprise at the effectiveness of Jehanne's responses to the sometimes complex, difficult, "subtle and tricky questions" put to her by the Rouen court. Massieu; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 217.

[201]Massieu; quoted in Murray, 171.

[202]Manchon; Ibid., 179-80.

[203]Margolis, "The Mortal Body," 16.

interrogations at Rouen.[204] It is certainly conceivable that Jehanne's multiplicity of uncanny abilities derived from the infusion of grace.

The Nature of Divine Revelation

While one can refer to a plethora of mystical treatises concerning various types of mystical experience and advising on the discernment of spirits, Saints Teresa and John are the main sources consulted in this work for descriptions of experiences of divine revelation accepted by the church as authentic. In fact, according to Hvidt, "mainstream prophetic theology" closely resembles Saint Teresa's theology in particular.[205] Teresa indicates that, when an authentic vision occurs, it is "clearly known,"[206] suggesting that divine visions possess an unmistakably unique, divine quality which sets them apart from all visions not divine in nature. For example, Teresa speaks of a mystical state which she calls "rapture of the spirit." If one were to see saints while in this state, she maintains, one would know "them as well as if he had often spoken with them" since "the eyes of the soul see much better than do we with bodily eyes . . . and without words understanding of some things is given."[207] Elaborating upon divine revelation, Teresa explains that, "In just the difference between the light we see and the one represented there, although all is light, there is no comparison; next to that light the sun's brilliance seems to be something very blurred." The imagination, she asserts, is incapable of representing the nature of this divine light, or of anything that God granted her knowledge of. She adds that, accompanying revealed knowledge, God "bestows . . . a delight so sublime as to be indescribable."[208] Hence, she recommends "experience" over "learning" in recognizing authentic, divine visions,[209] since "there is no appropriate comparison for supernatural things."[210]

According to John of the Cross, revelations are a type of spiritual apprehension belonging to the category of "prophecy." They refer to "the disclosure of some hidden truth, or the manifestation of some secret or mystery" by God who "imparts

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[204]Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 152.

[205]Hvidt, 151.

[206]Saint Teresa of Avila, *The Collected Works of St. Teresa of Avila*, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez, vol. 3, *The Book of Her Foundations, Minor Works: The Constitutions—On Making the Visitation—A Satirical Critique—Response to a Spiritual Challenge—Poetry* (Washington: ICS Publications, 1985), 141.

[207]Ibid., vol. 2, 388-9.

[208]Ibid., vol. 1, 330.

[209]Ibid., vol. 3, 142.

[210]Ibid., vol. 1, 249.

understanding . . . to the intellect." Disclosure might include knowledge of "past, present, or future" divine works, revelations concerning the mystery of the Trinity, divine "promises and threats," as well as "particular facts revealed ordinarily by God about the universe in general, and, in particular, about kingdoms, provinces, states, families, and individuals." Revelations can be conveyed through any or a combination of words, "signs, figures, images," or "likenesses."[211] One might note that Jehanne not only represented the fulfillment of pre-existing prophecy, but she was conceivably a prophecy herself, both to the French in the form of a promise of liberation and to the English in the form of a threat to drive them out of France—a double-edged sword conveying a dual message. In this instance, prophecy and prophet are one, a single instrument delivering, embodying, and fulfilling a divine message.[212]

Saint John describes a type of knowledge disclosed by God consisting in "knowledge of the truth of things in themselves and of" human deeds and events. This information "is so embedded in the soul—without anyone telling it anything—that if someone were to assert the opposite, it would be unable to give interior assent even by force, for it has a spiritual knowledge of this truth which resembles clear vision. This knowledge pertains to the spirit of prophecy and to the grace" referred to as "the discernment of spirits."[213] Jehanne possessed this particular grace,[214] and she went to the stake on the basis of her certainty in this regard, whereas those falsely claiming divine sanction might be expected to falter under such circumstances or mere threat of such circumstances. Jehanne unambiguously maintained that she was "sent by God,"[215] readily admitting that she had never consulted any ecclesiastic regarding her voices and visions.[216] She relied solely upon her own powers of discernment, something of which

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[211]Saint John of the Cross, 193, 200.

[212]Fraioli hints in this direction, observing that, "In Joan's case, her entire mission could be considered a prophecy, her own role an integral part of the divine narrative she announced." Fraioli, *Early Debate*, 56.

[213]Saint John of the Cross, 196.

[214]In light of her canonization, it is evident that the church confirms Jehanne's power of discernment.

[215]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 170. She stated this many times.

[216]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 179. She may have done well to rely on her own discernment since Teresa of Avila reports a period of twenty years in which she was unable to find a confessor who understood her, in spite of her earnest attempt to find one. "This hurt me so much," she declares, "that I often turned back and was . . . completely lost." Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, 67. "It happened to me that I spoke about matters of conscience with a confessor who had gone through the whole course of theology, and he did me a great deal of harm by telling me that some matters didn't amount to anything. I know that he didn't intend to misinform me and had no reason to, but he simply didn't know any more. And the same thing happened to me with two or three others, besides the one I mentioned." Ibid., vol. 2, 59-60

her adversaries did not approve, and the issue was raised repeatedly throughout the course of the condemnation trial.[217] However, it is evident that the Poitiers examiners did not fault her on this matter but, rather, suggested that the Holy Spirit was operational within her.[218] Hence, although Jehanne did not seek ecclesiastical opinion on the discernment of spirits, it was nevertheless provided in the Poitiers commission's approval of her mission. Fraioli points out that "the ecclesiastics at Poitiers handled their investigation of her according to the dictates of the church, as an occurrence appropriate to the application of *discretio spirituum,*" referencing the Hebrew and Christian Bibles and clearly placing Jehanne within the prophetic realm of those traditions.[219] Jehanne's confidence in her divine revelations never wavered. She warned her Rouen assessors, "If you are well informed about me, you would wish that I were out of your hands. I have done nothing save by revelation."[220]

Jehanne's claim to operating under the direct command of God confirms that she drew no distinction between messages delivered by angels and saints on behalf of God and those obtained from God directly, these entities being of the divine realm and, therefore, of God. As Russell perceives it, Jehanne's divine counsel "worked as plural manifestations from a singular above, always."[221] Others might prefer to identify Jehanne's revelations as indirect in the sense that her messengers functioned as intermediaries between her and God, but one cannot deny Jehanne's claim to direct contact with the realm of God on this basis. Accordingly, Rahner maintains that

> God as a free personal being can make himself perceptible to the created spirit, not only through his works but also by his free, personal word. And he can do it in such a manner that this communication of God is not simply himself in the direct vision of the Godhead, or in the dimension of a blessed intellect emptied of all that is finite, but also . . . in such a way that this communication is bound up with a particular place and time, with a concrete word or command, with a finite reality or truth, and so that it occurs with, or is connected with, the "apparition" of an object presented

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[217]Of the initial seventy articles of accusation devised against Jehanne, Article 48 charges her in the matter of not seeking "spiritual advice" with regard to the discernment of spirits; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 139. The article further specifies that "she asks no advice of bishop or curé or anyone else as to belief in her revelations"; Ibid., 140. Furthermore, Article 11 of the twelve final articles remarks that "she assents to, and obeys, their counsels and commands . . . without asking counsel of anyone, such as her father or mother, a priest or prelate, or any other churchman"; quoted in Craig Taylor, 211-2.

[218]Poitiers inquiry conclusion; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 73-4. Citation is from Taylor, 74.

[219]Fraioli, *Early Debate*, 56.

[220]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 66.

[221]Russell, 169.

> to the internal or external senses, which object represents and manifests God, his will, or the like.[222]

When urged by her examiners at Poitiers to provide a sign proving the validity of her claim to divine support, Jehanne declared, "In God's name, I have not come to Poitiers to make signs. But lead me to Orléans, and I will show you the signs I was sent to make."[223] It must be noted, however, that victory alone, especially victory unaccompanied by any substantiated prophetic claim and devoid of miraculous quality, is not sufficient proof of divine sanction in war, for it is not uncommon for both sides in a given conflict to experience some degree of victory over the other and, in the case of the Hundred Years' War, both the pro-English and the French parties claimed divine favour on occasion. For example, in a letter to Charles VII, the Duke of Bedford asserted that, "by the grace of God," Henry VI was the "natural and rightful King of the kingdoms of France and England" and that the power of God stood behind the English forces against the French.[224] Moreover, a letter written by Philippe the Good, Duke of Burgundy, on the day of Jehanne's capture declared, "And by the pleasure of our blessed Creator the thing thus came about and such mercy was vouchsafed us that she who is called the Maid was taken, and with her many captains, knights and esquires and others taken, drowned or dead, of whom at this time we know not yet the names."[225] An English account of the battle of Compiègne also declared that the pro-English victory there and Jehanne's capture were indicative of divine intervention in support of the English cause,[226] as did a letter from Henry VI one month after Jehanne's death which maintained that, "out of great pity and mercy, He [God] chose to allow this woman [Jehanne] to be captured before Compiègne and delivered into our jurisdiction and power."[227] Such claims are problematic, of course, since declaring the mere fact of Jehanne's capture a divine revelation amounting to more than the fact itself, (e.g., amounting to an indication of divine "pity and mercy" toward the English or support of their desire to govern France), allows that any and all merely factual events might be

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[222]Rahner, *Inquiries*, 95-6.

[223]Jehanne; quoted by Seguin, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 113.

[224]Duke of Bedford, letter dated August 7, 1429; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 119-22. Quotation is from Taylor, 119-20.

[225]Philippe the Good, letter dated May 23, 1430; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, v. 5, 166-7, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 153.

[226]F.W.D. Brie, ed., *Brut, or the Chronicles of England*, Early English Text Society, original series, no. 136 (London, 1908), 439; quoted in Craig Taylor, trans., *Joan of Arc: La Pucelle* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 353, n. 4.

[227]Henry VI, letter dated June 28, 1431 to the prelates of France; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 225-8. Quotation is from Taylor, 226.

legitimately construed as revelation indicative of some humanly imagined divine purpose transcending the fact itself. But this is obviously untenable since divine revelation must differ from purely human occurrence in some way which renders it distinguishable from ordinary fact, such as through visions, auditions, or prophetic fulfillment.

It is pertinent to note that, not only did the enemy view Jehanne's capture as divinely ordained, but she also viewed it thus and, therefore, as necessary. "[I]t had always been said to her [by her voices] that it was necessary that she should be a prisoner."[228] However, the fact that she was captured is not a clear indication that God was against her and for the English, nor that the English invasion of France was divinely sanctioned. Divine sanction does not necessarily conform to the personal desires of humans, and merely having what one wants does not constitute proof of divine favour or sanction. "[I]sn't it true . . . that those whom God blesses he damns in the same breath?" prods Kierkegaard, maintaining that "every privilege in the world of spirit . . . can only be purchased in deep pain."[229] "Over the life of a prophet words are invisibly inscribed: All flattery abandon, ye who enter here. To be a prophet is both a distinction and an affliction," Heschel remarks.[230] Saint Teresa declares that hearing the divine Voice "is a greater trial than not hearing it."[231] If these statements ring true, one might suspect that persecution and surrender of personal will to divine will have much to do with the matter and that persecution is as apt an indicator of divine sanction as success. In fact, Hvidt notes a typical "convergence between the role of martyr and prophet."[232]

The most assured way of distinguishing mere fact from revelation is through the quality of experience involved in divine revelation as experienced by the recipient, qualities such as those described by Saints Teresa and John which convey an authority that is known only to the recipient. For the outsider assessing another's claim to divine revelation, such assuredness is elusive. This is where substantiation by previously mentioned indicators must be considered, such as the occurrence of one or more corresponding external miracles, (as in the disclosure of hidden truths, the performance of apparently supernatural deeds, and knowledge of otherwise unknown past, present or future facts or events), production of good fruits, and qualities of humility, obedience,

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[228]Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 175-6.
[229]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 77, 99.
[230]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 17-8.
[231]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 2, 298.
[232]Hvidt, 106.

and strength in the claimant. Naturally, the greater the number of stipulated criteria satisfied by a claimant, the greater the apparent strength of the claim. For example, in evaluating the claim that Jehanne's capture constituted an indication of divine support for the pro-English cause in France, one might note that there was nothing apparently miraculous about her capture given the vast discrepancy in size of the opposing armies at Compiègne on that day[233] and the firm possibility of betrayal from within the French forces; capture was, therefore, neither unlikely nor inexplicable. Furthermore, the only aforementioned indicator which might conceivably apply to the pro-English claim of divine favour with respect to Jehanne's capture is the production of good fruits; however, since the matter of what constitutes good fruits in war is too easily defined by the victor, this criterion cannot reasonably stand alone as an indicator of divine revelation.

There are also after-the-fact indicators which can be taken into account when evaluating the possible legitimacy of claims to divine revelation. One *post factum* indicator might be martyrdom, which will be discussed in some detail later in this chapter. Others might include subsequent fulfillment of prophecy or canonization, including posthumous miracles deemed necessary for canonization which are understood as performed by God through the intercession of the individual in question. Ecclesial investigations into the validity of posthumous miracles in cases put forward for beatification or canonization "are conducted with the utmost rigor, and . . . the Church avails itself of the help of experts in the sciences," including the "medical sciences" in questions of "miraculous medical recoveries."[234] Such indicators, of course, are only useful after the fact with respect to the claim from which they arise; however, they can reinforce the clarity and strength of prior indicators involved in a claim. For example, Jehanne's canonization renders her a model of sanctity; therefore, in examining her

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[233]Gordon indicates that the Burgundian army numbered six thousand and were joined by additional English forces, whereas Jehanne's army numbered only two or three hundred at the battle for Compiègne in which she was captured. Gordon, 78-9. Pernoud and Clin state that Jehanne's army consisted of three hundred to four hundred men. Pernoud and Clin, 86. de Monstrelet places the number of Burgundian combatants at approximately five thousand and Jehanne's army at between four hundred and five hundred. de Monstrelet; in Craig Taylor, 257-8. In any case, the vastness of the discrepancy in size of armies is evident.

[234]Molinari, s.v. "Canonization of Saints," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 59. Posthumous miracles attributed to Jehanne during the canonization process include five healing miracles as follows: two cancer cures, one cure of tuberculosis, one cure of leg ulcers, and the cure of a hole in a woman's foot. The pope also granted dispensation for a further miracle on the basis that Jehanne had saved France. Larissa Juliet Taylor, *The Virgin Warrior: The Life and Death of Joan of Arc* (London: Yale University Press, 2009), 184, 238, n. 3 and n. 4. Virginia Frohlick, founder, Saint Joan of Arc Center (Albuquerque). Available from http://www.stjoan-center.com/FAQ/question7.html; Internet; accessed 8 September 2011.

words and deeds in the various contexts laid out in this work, key elements of her behaviour can be identified as exemplary and formulated into a model of human agency applicable in the evaluation of other cases. Incidentally, Weil ranks Jehanne among the "very few" individuals in history who can be rightfully "associated with real purity."[235] It should be noted that it is impossible to arrive at a system of evaluation enabling one to discern definitively what constitutes divine revelation in general and what does not.[236] To attempt this would effectively be to endeavour to force God into a corner, to restrict God, but one cannot delineate limits with respect to the nature or content of divine revelation. However, one can observe consistencies among cases officially deemed legitimate. For example, respects in which Jehanne's claim and experience correspond to those of biblical prophets within the Hebrew and Christian traditions, as well as Jesus, Mary (mother of Jesus), Saint Teresa, and Saint John, are demonstrated within this work. What can be herein achieved is discernment of what apparently constituted divine revelation, divine sanction, and divine servantship in Jehanne's exemplary case.

Heschel states that "*divine attentiveness* [to] *and concern*" for humanity dominate the prophet's consciousness and, sharing in these, s/he is driven to participate in God's involvement in human history in an attempt to realize divine aspirations for the world.[237] The prophet, he asserts, "feels fiercely."[238] Prophets "care intensely about the moral shape of society," notes Brueggemann, "so they assault every social disorder."[239] "The prophet's word is a scream in the night," Heschel explains. "While the world is at ease and asleep, the prophet feels the blast from heaven."[240] "God has thrust a burden upon his soul," for the "terror" of human agony is beyond human expression, yet prophecy "is the voice that God has lent to the silent agony, . . . to the plundered poor, to the profaned riches of the world. It is a form of living, a crossing point of God and man."[241] Rahner also describes the prophet as "the mouthpiece of God for" humans.[242] "It is sympathy with God," Heschel maintains, "that characterizes the total personality of

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[235]Simone Weil, *The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties towards Mankind*, trans. Arthur Wills (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), 228.

[236]One of the most distinguished medieval theologians, Jean Gerson, agrees, stating "that there is for human beings no general rule or method that can be given always and infallibly to distinguish between revelations that are true and those that are false or deceptive." If there were, there would be no need of faith in such matters, he maintains. Jean Gerson, *Jean Gerson: Early Works*, The Classics of Western Spirituality, trans. Brian Patrick McGuire (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1998), 335.

[237]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 263.

[238]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 5.

[239]Brueggemann, 221.

[240]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 16.

[241]Ibid., 5.

[242]Rahner, *Inquiries*, 97.

the prophet, his inner state as manifested in his utterances, a state not limited to some moments, but affecting all his existence."[243]

As a child, Jehanne was informed "of the misery that was in the kingdom of France" by Saint Michael, who urged her to assist the French King with God's help.[244] Corresponding to the divine sentiment of concern and intensity of feeling stipulated by Heschel, Jehanne's acceptance of this task and continued commitment to fight for the kingdom of France with minimal resources and without the support of her king during the final portion of her campaign demonstrated a deep and persistent concern for her oppressed people. Moreover, she cited her desire to assist those of Compiègne, (who were under Burgundian siege), as a motive for her precarious leap from the tower at Beaurevoir, declaring "that she had heard it said that the people of Compiègne, all up to the age of seven years, were to be put to fire and sword; and that she would rather die than live after such a destruction of good people."[245] Jehanne's inner prophetic state is also reflected in the observation that "there issued from her lips no words that were not virtuous, edifying, and a good example to men."[246]

"[S]he said that she never saw French blood without her hair standing on end."[247] Jehanne was clearly partisan with the French, who constituted the oppressed and violated subjects of foreign occupation in this instance and the ones whom she maintained God appointed her to help, but she displayed genuine concern for humanity at large. It is evident that she greatly respected and valued human life—both her own life and the lives of others. She harboured no death wish and did not desire martyrdom. This is evident in the fact that she hoped to be freed from her enemies, having attempted several escapes, and also in the fact that she lamented her death sentence throughout her final moments. The Orléans manuscript indicates that, upon being sentenced to death by fire, Jehanne "began to weep and lament in such a way that all the people present were themselves moved to tears."[248] Moreover, Jehanne preferred to interpret references by her divine counsel to her "martyrdom" symbolically rather than literally.[249] She wept at

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[243]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 189.

[244]Jehanne, testimony of March 15, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 120.

[245]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; Ibid., 111.

[246]de Gaucourt; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 117.

[247]d'Aulon; Ibid., 167.

[248]Orléans manuscript; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 173. de Houppeville also testified that he witnessed Jehanne "bathed in tears, leaving the castle to be taken to the place of execution"; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 276. Two Rouen assessors, Jean Fabri and Miget, also testified to Jehanne's tearful but pious end; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 249, 250.

[249]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 189.

the sight of spilled blood, be it that of friend or foe, and she comforted dying soldiers, French and English alike. She agonized in the event of anyone dying without receiving the sacrament of confession, demonstrating concern for the spiritual well-being of both English and French soldiers. Following an assault on the Fort of Saint-Loup, a battle in which many English died without confession, Jehanne was greatly afflicted and pitied those English who had died thus.[250] Her "pity for the poor men-at-arms" was such that, "even if they were from the English side, . . . when she saw them dying or wounded she had them confessed."[251] Jehanne did not glorify war; rather, she glorified God and the sanctity of all human life. Honouring the sanctity of life is critical to preventing excessive and 'unnecessary' violence and destruction whereas, in the absence of respect for sanctity, life is treated as something of diminished consequence. Wright maintains that the saints sanctify society and preserve the world. They are "the magnanimous, great-souled people whose minds are big enough to include heaven and whose hearts are large enough to hold all the world—plus God."[252] Similarly, Watts asserts that one who is united with God "will show mercy, love and consideration for others" because s/he is "aware of God in all human persons,"[253] and Soelle holds that "[t]he trivialization of life is perhaps the strongest antimystical force among us," whereas "mysticism is the radical substantiation of the dignity of the human being."[254] Righteousness and partisanship are not mutually exclusive and, although Jehanne's war, like all wars, was necessarily partisan, her righteousness was not. Her message extends beyond partisanship with any particular nation, culture, or religion to express solidarity with oppressed peoples everywhere at all times. Wright notes that

> the saving doctrine of the person has as its heart and center the concept of *vocation.* For the Christian, every life is a *mission.* The life of Saint Joan exemplifies so perfectly this emphasis on vocation, on individual mission as the core of personality, that . . . she has become as relevant . . . in an age of technology as ever she was to her own age . . . . She remains the heroine, the patron of the vocation and the dignity of the person in the face of all the pretensions of public power and the impersonal forces of a standardized culture threatening human personality . . . .[255]

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[250]Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 186.
[251]Pasquerel; quoted in Craig Taylor, 316.
[252]John J. Wright, 36, 42.
[253]Watts, 224.
[254]Soelle, *Silent Cry,* 13, 43.
[255]John J. Wright, 123.

While the prophet lives as divine agent, Wright acknowledges the "moral freedom and responsibility" also embedded within the notion of individual divine mission.[256] One called by God "has principally the single duty of being faithful in his service, which is the performance of his mission," explains Kierkegaard.[257] The "sacrificial character of the apostle's life," he maintains, derives from this necessity of performing the divine mission.[258] It is clear that, with any prophetic mission, the prophet does not call upon God to engage in a particular task but is called BY God, via revelation, to engage in a divinely appointed activity—this is a particularly important consideration with respect to the evaluation of claims to divine sanction and should be kept in mind. "To the prophet, God is always apprehended, experienced, and conceived as a *Subject*, never as an object. He appears as One Who demands, as One Who acts," states Heschel.[259] This is not to say that, once called, a prophet cannot request divine assistance in carrying out the divine assignment. For example, Jehanne indicated that she sometimes presented requests to Saint Catherine, and that Saints Catherine and Margaret would then transmit the request to God who would provide a response.[260] However, it is apparent that a response was not always forthcoming.[261] In fact, no-one, not even a prophet, can effectively command revelation from God, (if s/he would even dare try), but is at the mercy of God's will to bestow it. While the prophet can seek direction or clarification, God is not compelled to oblige. Hence, the prophet is in darkness at times with respect to the divine will, in which case action can, at best, be informed by conscience, moral discernment, and practical considerations. For example, when Jehanne's voices instructed her to attack the English at Orléans, she declared, "In God's name, my Counsel has told me that I must attack the English. But I do not know if I should go to their bastille or against Ffastolf, who is to revictual them."[262] This indicates that Jehanne was sometimes required to make her own military decisions without apprehension of specific, divine instruction, which leads to the related issue of divine ambiguity discussed next.

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[256]Ibid., 124.

[257]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 118.

[258]Ibid., 118-9.

[259]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 265.

[260]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 188.

[261]For example, when Jehanne requested of her divine voices information concerning the specific date of her impending capture, the information was not forthcoming. Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; Ibid., 175.

[262]Jehanne; quoted by d'Aulon, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 166.

Considering Divine Ambiguity

Beneath the overarching ineffability and mystery of God, divine revelation emerges in Jehanne's example, (and others), as affording humans limited knowledge—glimpses—of the Divine. In light of the dually cataphatic and apophatic nature of divine revelation, which produces ambiguity, it was necessary for Jehanne to fill in gaps in order to apply the revelations received to her life, and she apparently did so in terms of her practical human understanding, hence, in linguistic terms in which human understanding is formed, processed, and expressed.[263] Thus, in attempting to view God through Jehanne based on her experiences of revelation, one must allow an element of anthropomorphism in the language concerning God arising from the fact that all language is anthropocentric and all theology, if it is to convey anything, must speak of God as more than the Ineffable while simultaneously respecting divine ambiguity and mystery. A degree of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is inevitable in theological discussion.

There are significant instances of divine ambiguity in Jehanne's story. For example, it is likely that she did not apprehend at the time of her alleged abjuration whether it was more in alignment with divine will that she continue to live, (possibly to be freed and to continue to fight for the liberation of France), or that she give into death rather than abjure, since it was afterwards that the divine voices informed her that, in signing the document in order to save her life, she had damned herself.[264] Moreover, it was apparently not until then that Jehanne fully understood what she had signed.[265] Even at that stage, the divine message was ambiguous. Did it imply divine punishment for denying God? The voices did not declare that God had damned Jehanne, but that she, herself, did. It is possible that the reference to damnation does not suggest divine punishment at all but indicates that Jehanne had fallen into the snare set by Cauchon[266] through which the Inquisitorial Court would damn her and commit her to suffer death by fire, fire constituting a symbolic representation of damnation; the revelation indicates that she damned herself (i.e., her physical self), not her soul. Jehanne's voices had

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[263]Thought (as well as speech) is conducted in linguistic terms.

[264]"Elle répondit que Dieu lui manda par saintes Catherine et Marguerite la grande pitié de cette insigne trahison à laquelle elle, Jeanne, avait consenti en faisant l'abjuration et rétractation pour sauver sa vie, et qu'elle se damnait pour sauver sa vie." Jehanne, testimony of May 28, 1431; quoted in Tisset, vol. 2, 345.

[265]Jehanne, testimony of May 28, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 220-2.

[266]Recall that the trap of the abjuration was that it enabled Jehanne to be declared relapsed, thereby exposing her to execution.

counselled her to answer her accusers boldly at Saint-Ouen[267] but, confused and terrified, she momentarily faltered and signed, clearing the way to her earthly condemnation. Her options were thus reduced to denying God (i.e., the validity of her voices) or affirming God and being burned.

The nature of divine revelation as ambiguous and limited in scope is evident in another example. During her imprisonment, Jehanne's voices informed her that she would be "delivered" and that she would receive divine assistance.[268] "One day I must be freed," she stated plainly.[269] When questioned as to whether or not her voices indicated that she would escape from prison, she responded, "Yes, indeed, they told me I should be delivered. But I know neither the day nor the hour. And [they told me] I must put a bold face on it."[270] Jehanne's testimony conveys that

> she did not know whether this meant being freed from prison or that, during her trial, some disturbance would arise that would allow her to be delivered. And she believed that it would be one or the other. And more often the voices told her that she would be delivered by a great victory, then saying to her: 'Accept everything thankfully, and do not worry about your martyrdom; in the end you will come to the kingdom of heaven.' And the voices told her this simply and definitely, that is to say without faltering. And she called this martyrdom on account of the pain and adversity which she suffered in prison; and she did not know whether she would suffer greater pain, but on this she committed herself to God.[271]

These statements point possibly to her escaping or being rescued from prison or, alternatively, to being liberated from her circumstances through death.[272] Jehanne's testimony (quoted above) reveals that she retained hope in a non-literal interpretation of the word "martyrdom," but it also implies that she was fully aware of the possibility of a literal connotation. The word "martyrdom" is, in fact, very explicit, and Jehanne's voices could have utilized a more ambiguous term, such as "suffering," had ambiguity been the intention, but she chose, at least initially, to apply a metaphorical interpretation to the message. Three weeks prior to her death, Jehanne asked her voices whether or not

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[267]Jehanne, testimony of May 28, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 169.

[268]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 113.

[269]Jehanne, testimony of March 1, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 163.

[270]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 91.

[271]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 189.

[272]Assessing the evidence for Jehanne's vindication, Jean Bréhal, Inquisitor of France, wrote, "She had very good reason always to trust in her voices. For in very truth she was delivered, as they promised, from the prison of the body by martyrdom." Jean Bréhal; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 286. Hvidt notes the case of two early Christian martyrs, Saints Perpetua and Felicitas who reportedly prophesied that they would "be victorious," not realizing "that this referred to their martyrdom, not to their survival." Hvidt, 106-7. The similarity to Jehanne's prophecy is striking.

she would be burned, to which they replied "that she must wait on Our Lord" who "would help her."[273] In this case, the answer is obviously elusive, and Jehanne seemed to hold hope and fear in precarious balance during that period until the outcome became finally and dreadfully clear. She seems, nonetheless, to have been aware on some level from the start that her capture would lead to her demise. During her first imprisonment under the Burgundians (prior to being sold to the English) she stated, "I well know that the English will put me to death, thinking to win the kingdom of France after my death."[274]

Ambiguity, however, allowed Jehanne to maintain hope in an otherwise desperate situation. Since her condemnation and death were orchestrated by her enemies, it is conceivable that, no matter what she said or did once in their hands, her death was nearly inevitable—not necessarily by divine design. If Jehanne had known beyond doubt for three weeks or more that she was to be burned, one can imagine that this would have added significantly to her torment during that time. Therefore, it is possible that ambiguity served to mitigate her suffering until it could no longer be mitigated. In a sense, Jehanne accepted her 'fate' in advance of knowing what it would be by accepting her mission and by continuing to fight in knowledge of her impending capture. Her moving lament on the morning of her death suggests that she did not view God as the instrument of her suffering, but she placed responsibility on the free choices of her mortal enemies. She declared unambiguously to Cauchon, "Bishop, my death is your doing. . . . I appeal against you to God."[275] In appealing to God, Jehanne, as in all things, referred the injustice of her cruel and excruciating death to the highest and only authority that she fully respected and honoured, suggesting that she anticipated some sort of final, divine vindication or justice, which one might suppose the nullification trial verdict followed by her beatification and canonization achieved.

While revelation and prophecy apparently bring humans into more intimate relationship with God and constitute a divine offering of assistance in the conducting of human affairs, God ultimately remains a mystery shrouded in apparent complexity. In fact, divine mystery is intrinsic to the nature of revelation since to reveal is to expose something previously unknown or unseen, something of that which is mysterious. Presuming an infinitely mysterious quality of God, combined with a perpetual divine

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[273]Jehanne, testimony of May 9, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 152.
[274]Jehanne; quoted by de Macy, in Craig Taylor, 320.
[275]Jehanne; quoted by Toutmouillé, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 245.

desire to be apprehended by and involved with humanity, there is reason to posit continuation of divine revelation on the basis that the Infinite Divine Mystery can never be fully conveyed and the possibilities for revelation never fully exhausted; it is potentially limitless in content, quality, quantity, and frequency. Therefore, it is plausible that, through revelation, certain individuals might afford humanity knowledge of God that was previously unknown or inaccessible.[276] "Through the prophet's experience" of divine revelation, Hvidt maintains, "believers are led to the mystery" of God.[277] Experience and knowledge of God are thus inseparable from divine mystery.

Jehanne as Prophet

Jehanne's prophetic record is quite impressive, having prophesied accurately that she would raise the siege of Orléans, that she would have Charles VII anointed and crowned at Rheims, that the King of France would regain Paris, and that Charles, Duke of Orléans, would return from England[278] (where he had been imprisoned since the battle of Agincourt in 1415). Also noteworthy is Jehanne's knowledge of a sword buried behind the altar in the church of Saint Catherine de Fierbois. When an armourer was sent to retrieve it for her, the sword was located underground, behind the altar as stipulated. "Asked how she knew that this sword was there, she replied that this sword was in the earth, rusted, bearing five engraved crosses; and she knew that the sword was there through her voices . . . . She also said that immediately after the sword was found, the churchmen of that place rubbed it and the rust immediately fell off without effort. . . . [S]he certainly loved this sword because it had been found in the church of St Katherine whom she loved greatly."[279] Jehanne also accurately predicted her wound sustained during the battle of Orléans: "Rise tomorrow early in the morning," she advised her confessor, "and . . . be always at my side, for tomorrow I shall have much to do, and more than I ever had, and tomorrow the blood will flow out of my body above my

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[276]Hvidt examines the views of various theologians who "are very open to the possibility of new prophetic revelation that brings forth aspects of God's truth that have not been actualized or realized historically before." Hvidt, 197.

[277]Ibid., 253.

[278]Seguin; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 113. Thibault; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 118. Alençon; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 160. Jehanne also testified to having foretold the liberation of Orléans and Charles' coronation during her testimony of March 27, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 135. Stephen W. Richey provides a useful and concise overview of the key prophecies or missions of Jehanne with related testimonial references in his Appendix A. Stephen W. Richey, *Joan of Arc: The Warrior Saint* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 123-4.

[279]Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 155-6.

breast."[280] With regard to the battle of Patay, she foretold that none or very few of the French would suffer injury or death there and, as predicted, the French army suffered only one fatality[281] while enemy fatalities numbered two thousand.[282] Another instance was Jehanne's encounter with a man in Chinon who swore to God that she would not remain a virgin if he spent a night with her, to which she retorted, "Oh, in God's name, do you take His name in vain when you are so near your death?"[283] The man fell into a river and drowned within an hour of the incident.[284] It is noteworthy that many of Jehanne's prophecies foretold events of the imminent rather than distant future, rendering them almost immediately verifiable. Jehanne's prediction in March of 1429 that she would last barely more than a year[285] also proved true since she entered Orléans on April 29, 1429 and was captured the following May. Furthermore, during the Rouen trial, Jehanne prophesied that the French "will soon win a great action which God will send to them; so much so that it will shake almost the whole realm of France"[286] and "before seven years are past the English will have lost a greater stake than they did before the town of Orleans, for they will have lost all they hold in France."[287] Although these latter prophecies remain ambiguous, they are possible allusions to the fact that the Burgundians united with the French party under the Treaty of Arras in September, 1435, significantly diminishing English power in France, or that Paris was liberated in April, 1436. The fact that the recovery of the remainder of France from England took longer than seven years introduces the problematic inaccuracy (partial or complete) of some prophetic messages, a concern which will be addressed in the following section. The aforementioned constitute only some of Jehanne's prophecies; others pertaining to specific events related to various battles are contained in the nullification trial records. Jehanne also claimed foreknowledge of her capture;[288] however, since she did not share this revelation with anyone until after its fulfillment, it cannot be designated as prophecy. It is the sharing of the prophetic message which establishes the communal

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[280]Jehanne; quoted by Pasquerel, in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 90. Jehanne also testified on February 27, 1431 that she had made this prediction; in Craig Taylor, 158.

[281]T. d'Armagnac; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 121.

[282]Pernoud takes the numbers from Burgundian sources which place the French death toll at three and English fatalities at two thousand. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 119.

[283]Jehanne; quoted by Pasquerel, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 182.

[284]Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 182.

[285]Jehanne; quoted by Alençon, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 160.

[286]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 122.

[287]Jehanne, testimony of March 1, 1431; Ibid., 84. She also alluded to it in her response to Article 22; in Scott, *Trial*, 137.

[288]Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 175.

relationship between the prophet, as prophet, and others, even if the community consists of only the prophet and one other individual. It is the ongoing concerned and faithful prophetic activity which sustains the communal relationship.

Hvidt includes Jehanne among the "classic Christian prophets" of the Catholic tradition:

> It is hard to consider the Catholic church without the prophetic tradition that has accompanied its entire history. Prophetic visions and divine instructions accompanied the founding of the vast majority of its religious orders. The same accounts for most pilgrimage sites, which usually became what they did after apparitions of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, or of an angel to a privileged soul. Much Catholic hagiography has eminent prophetic traits, so that individuals such as Gertrude the Great of Helfta (†1302), Birgitta of Vadstena (†1373), Catherine of Siena (†1380), Joan of Arc (†1431), Julian of Norwich (†c.1416), and Margaret Mary Alacoque (†1690) all come across as classic Christian prophets.[289]

Furthermore, he points out that, when the church canonizes a "prophetic personality," [such as Jehanne], that individual's prophetic authenticity is indirectly established.[290] By placing Jehanne within the Christian tradition, she is also placed within the Hebrew tradition insofar as it was adopted by Christians and incorporated into Christian theology. The prophetic stream of Judaism is central to Christian theology which views Jesus—a Jew—as the fulfillment of Hebrew prophecy such that Hebrew prophecy and Christian revelation are inextricably entwined in the Christian tradition. Hence, one who is connected to the Christian prophetic tradition is linked to Judaism, and one who is linked with the Hebrew prophets can also be linked with Christianity.[291] While Jehanne resonates with Jesus, she also has much in common with the Hebrew prophets as the bearer of a theological-political message, that is, a political message rooted in theological concerns. Hvidt also likens Jehanne to the Hebrew prophets, stating that, "in crucial periods in the history of the church, mostly women with a prophetic profile, such as Birgitta of Vadstena, Catherine of Siena, and Joan of Arc, stood up much like the Old Testament prophets and called the people of God to live in accordance with his

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[289]Hvidt, 13. For other discussions concerning Jehanne in relation to prophecy, one might consult the following: Burnett McInerney, *Eloquent Virgins*; Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism* (London: Vintage, 1981); and Fraioli, *Early Debate*.

[290]Hvidt, 295.

[291]The fact that the Christian tradition has advanced a strongly supersessionistic theology almost exclusively, with a few recent exceptions, is merely acknowledged here and does not represent the theological view of the author, nor does it promote supersessionism.

Word."[292] He describes Jehanne as a prophet whose "entire prophetic activity stemmed from a dialogue with her heavenly interlocutors and" who "sought to act on behalf of these divine instructions in order to carry out a task that was far beyond her own capacities."[293]

Hvidt identifies the following prophetic characteristics within the Hebrew tradition, all of which apply to Jehanne: (i) receipt of divine revelation [cf. Jehanne's visions and auditions]; (ii) a critical moment of divine calling to a particular mission which "separates the prophet's life into 'before' and 'after'" [cf. Jehanne not only left childhood playfulness behind upon receiving the divine command to venture into France but, on leaving Domremy, she left all familiarity. Upon departing Vaucouleurs for Chinon, Jehanne's life changed even more drastically as she donned male clothing and prepared to become a warrior]; (iii) resistance to divine calling [cf. Jehanne delayed for some time before embarking on her divine mission, and her voices urged her repeatedly to depart[294]]; (iv) feelings of unworthiness to carry out the divine mission accompanied by assurance of divine assistance creating a dependency on God [cf. Jehanne protested that she was merely a peasant girl and not qualified for the task but agreed to the mission on the promise of divine assistance]; (v) operates under obedience to divine authority [cf. Jehanne considered her divine voices more authoritative than any other]; (vi) functions as a friend of God, sharing in God's plans, happiness and sadness[295] [cf. Jehanne shared in God's displeasure over the misery to which the kingdom of France was subjected under English domination and applied herself to rectifying the situation]. Based on Jehanne's divine calling, one might also cite the following as possible prophetic characteristics: (i) apparent absurdity [Liberation of the city of Orléans seemed an impossible task given the circumstances at the time, even more so by the instigation of a militarily untrained and inexperienced peasant girl]; (ii) prior lack of inclination, skill, or capacity to behave in the manner required [Jehanne was not normally a violent person and did not demonstrate any ambition to become a warrior prior to her divine calling.[296] She wept at the sight of spilled blood and was a most unlikely candidate, in

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[292]Hvidt, 305. Wright likewise states that "we are the brothers and sisters of the saints and are called to walk with them." John J. Wright, 36.

[293]Hvidt, 104.

[294]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 67. According to G. Thibault, Jehanne stated "that her Counsel had told her she should have gone more quickly to the King [Charles VII]." G. Thibault; quoted in Murray, 265.

[295]Hvidt, 36-9.

[296]On the contrary, it was reported by numerous witnesses at the nullification trial that Jehanne was very pleasant and kind. For example, Hauviette recalled that she was "gentle" and "good"; Laxart

practical terms, for the mission to which she was called—unlikely except with respect to her exceptional faith]; (iii) risk to one's personal safety [The risks to Jehanne's life as a warrior are self-evident, but she also risked her well-being as a lone female among thousands of armed men]; (iv) necessity of faith and courage in accomplishing the task bestowed [These are obvious in Jehanne's case; faith was required in order to believe in the absurd and nearly impossible, and courage is required of all warriors].

Jehanne's courage in fulfilling her divine mission was remarkable given her circumstances as a young girl living in a patriarchal society during a time when soldiering did not constitute a common social role for females and when unattached female involvement with soldiers was generally regarded as promiscuous in the extreme. Moreover, Jehanne was not only expected to engage in military activity, but she was charged with the task of *leading* her army to victory. Kelly DeVries, a specialist in medieval military history, notes that "[n]o troops of the Hundred Years War had ever followed a woman into battle [prior to Jehanne's exploits], . . . and those few occasions in earlier medieval history of women leading soldiers were not well known, were thought to be mythological, or were, at best, a distant historical memory."[297] DeVries maintains that he has uncovered "no evidence of late-medieval women warriors" except for Jehanne.[298] During the Rouen trial, when pressed for information regarding her revelations, Jehanne cited a popular saying that "people are often hanged for telling the truth."[299] The statement alludes to the inherent dangers of prophetic life,[300] dangers which, in Jehanne's case, were compounded with the dangers of an active military vocation and which ultimately materialized in her martyrdom.

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described her as "patient" and "of good disposition," and C. Royer also considered Jehanne "gentle, respectful, [and] well-conducted." Quoted in Murray, 219, 226, 227.

[297]Kelly DeVries, "A Woman as Leader of Men: Joan of Arc's Military Career," in *Fresh Verdicts on Joan of Arc*, ed. Bonnie Wheeler and Charles T. Wood (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), 4. Given the reluctance of many authors to acknowledge the significance of Jehanne's military activities and accomplishments, it is encouraging to observe that DeVries displays no such reluctance, admitting Jehanne's full participation in the leading of her soldiers in battle, noting that she sometimes accomplished this by contradicting the orders of "her noble superiors." Ibid., 5-6, 8.

[298]Ibid., 13, n. 4.

[299]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 73.

[300]Warner, acknowledging the dangers of a prophetic "vocation," asserts that the "Church has always found the rightful place of personal divine guidance a problem." Warner, 88. Moreover, "the function of the prophet cannot be institutionalized," states Ratzinger, ". . . because the place of prophecy is eminently the place God reserves for Himself to intervene personally and anew each time, taking the initiative." Joseph Ratzinger, "Das Problem der Christlichen Prophetie: Niels Christian Hvidt im Gespräch mit Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger," *Communio* 2 (1999) : 181; quoted in Niels Christian Hvidt, *Christian Prophecy: The Post-Biblical Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 80. "Prophecy is a corrective factor to the extent that institution and prophecy at times become opposite entities." Hvidt, 173.

It has been noted that the role of a consenting human will aligned with divine concern for humanity is central to the fulfillment of prophetic revelation. Karl Barth maintains that "[t]heology is . . . a *theoretical* work" which sometimes "loses sight of the concrete relationship between true God and true [hu]man."[301] It is a substantial relationship that is established and sustained between God and humans through divine revelation and prophetic mysticism; it is a relationship rooted in deepest human faith and trust in God, and one in which God extends God's self to humans in a meaningful and "concrete" manner. The impact of divine revelation spans ecclesiastical, social, political, and personal spheres of human affairs and should not be underestimated. Now that we have explored the nature of practical, prophetic mysticism and situated Jehanne within its context, let us delve more deeply into its operative elements and the nature of prophetic response.

Answering the Call
Operative Elements of Practical, Prophetic Mysticism

The wars they will
be fought again
The holy dove
be caught again
bought and sold
and bought again;
the dove is never free.

—Leonard Cohen, "Anthem"

The prophet is a disciple of God, and Jehanne's vision of discipleship involved absolute obedience to the Divine, regardless of personal cost, with a view to salvation of her country (as preservation and liberation from suffering) and possible salvation of her soul. The call to discipleship might, therefore, be viewed as a call to mediate salvation since the prophetic call characteristically urges improvement to the condition of humanity. Hvidt maintains that the message of Christian prophets is centered on the edification of the people "through purification," warning and diverting people "from ways that are in opposition to God's truth."[302] In claiming freedom to obey God as she deemed appropriate, Jehanne's implicit challenge to the authority of the Church Militant

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[301]Karl Barth, *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction*, trans. Grover Foley (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1963), 140.

[302]Hvidt, 170, 260.

threatened the view of salvation as exclusively mediated by the church through the ongoing dispensation of grace via the sacraments.[303] Jehanne held that God alone delivers salvation, believing in the possibility of her own salvation even when excommunicated by the church,[304] and apparently believing that God might effect salvation of any kind through any individual or any means (not necessarily excluding the church) that God desires. For instance, asked why she was chosen over others to drive the English back, Jehanne replied that it was God's will to act through "a simple maid."[305] If her claim to divine sanction is viewed as legitimate and as effecting salvation of a sort for France, (i.e., salvation as preservation and liberation), then Jehanne might be considered a mediator of grace functioning with a sacramental quality, as anyone who mediates divine grace might be thought to operate sacramentally in the moment of mediation. Hvidt emphasizes "that the experience of the prophet is . . . always a part of a larger ensemble of edifying operations of the Spirit—prophecy is never . . . without . . . grace backing its performance of the divine designs."[306] During the Poitiers interrogations it was stated that, if God wished the people of France to be liberated from their suffering, God did not require soldiers in order to accomplish this, to which Jehanne responded, "In God's name, the soldiers will fight, and God will give them the victory."[307] Pernoud and Clin note that "[e]xpertly trained theologians could hardly have given a better account of the delicate distinction between the action of grace and its temporal means."[308] "[I]f not for the grace of God," stated Jehanne, "she could do nothing."[309]

Two operative elements of the prophet's mediation of grace are faith and free will.[310] Biblically speaking, free will can be traced to the beginning of humanity in the story of Adam and Eve and, whether one interprets the account literally, mythologically,

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[303]Malcolm Vale notes that the "search for a more deeply personal relationship with God, mediated through the saints, was a common phenomenon in the later Middle Ages. Heretics [or those so deemed], while seeking such a relationship, erred in the eyes of the Church because too often the clergy were eliminated or their significance greatly reduced as sacramental mediators between man and God." Malcolm Vale, "The Civilization of Courts and Cities in the North: 1200–1500," in *The Oxford History of Medieval Europe*, ed. George Holmes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 312.

[304]Jehanne hoped to enter "Paradise" without delay on the day of her execution, in spite of the fact that she was declared excommunicate by the earthly church; Riquier, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 250.

[305]Jehanne, testimony of March 13, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 110.

[306]Hvidt, 293. Margolis also acknowledges Jehanne's "sacramental role." Margolis, "The Mortal Body," 12.

[307]Jehanne; quoted by Seguin, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 113.

[308]Pernoud and Clin, 29.

[309]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Hobbins, 60.

[310]Whether a prophet receives divine revelation in a mediated or unmediated manner, s/he nonetheless acts as mediator of grace in delivering and acting upon the divine message received.

or otherwise, (or refers to it at all), human free will has conceivably existed as long as humans have, although we cannot arrive at a definitive account of it. It seems to be an innate human characteristic. The fact that our vocabulary contains terms such as 'choice' and 'free will' suggests that these comprise aspects of human experience as we apprehend them, apprehension being the basis of experience; not to apprehend something is not to experience it. Moreover, since to advocate the non-existence of free will is to abdicate the concepts of human responsibility and morality, and since life without freedom of choice would be apparently meaningless as people would be reduced to automatons,[311] the position taken in this work—in alignment with Jehanne's example—is that free will exists.

If human free will exists, then God presumably honours it, which leads to the question of whether or not the notion of human freedom can accommodate the concept of divine omnipotence. Thinkers such as C.S. Lewis and William of Ockham marry notions of divine omnipotence with divine Self-limitation by asserting that God, having once been omnipotent, eliminated certain available actions [e.g., controlling humanity and the world] by choosing others in the course of creation [e.g., granting humans freedom to act in the world].[312] Such a view is compatible with a free-will account of human evil, which holds that abuse or misuse of a good thing, such as human freedom, can produce evil[313]—compatible, that is, provided that one does not maintain the ongoing omnipotence of a benevolent deity in the face of divine Self-limitation. In fact, one is prompted to consider why notions of ongoing divine omnipotence have been so strongly held throughout the centuries. Perhaps anthropomorphism is at work through the attribution to God of a human desire for power over others. Perhaps, also, the idea of divine omnipotence provides humans an escape route from the burden of responsibility for the misdeeds of humanity. It is possible that both are true. At any rate, there is a common tendency to attribute acts of human evil to an omnipotent deity, but such a position must be questioned. It is by acknowledging responsibility for our deeds and exercising moral accountability that humanity might end the self-inflicted plague of human violence. Sallie McFague agrees that the idea of an omnipotent God is "a very

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[311]Within the model of a monarchical God ruling over the world absolutely, notes Sallie McFague, "God can be God only if we are nothing." Sallie McFague, *Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 63-4.

[312]Alister E. McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction*, 5th ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 209-11.

[313]Saint Augustine propounded such a view. McGrath, 224-5.

dangerous one" since, [in denying human responsibility in the crucifixion of Jesus], it supports a view of salvation as "sacrificial, substitutionary atonement" whereby humans are presumed forgiven for our sins and reconciled with God rather than being called to account for our depravities.[314] McFague suspects that the "simplistic" perception of God as an absolute monarch persists "in spite of its limitations" because it helps people to feel good about themselves and God, but she rejects it due to "its inability to serve as the imaginative framework for an understanding of the gospel as a destabilizing, inclusive, nonhierarchical vision of fulfillment for all of creation."[315] Even the notion of an omnipotent and benevolent God is dangerous, she asserts, in that it suggests that humans need do nothing toward preserving the world and humanity because all is presumed well in God's almighty hands; hence, it encourages human passivity and irresponsibility.[316] McFague proposes a model of God which places human free will in relationship with divine concern for the world whereby humans "can choose to become partners with God in . . . care of the world" or can oppose divine aspirations.[317] Soelle maintains that the notion of an omnipotent and benevolent deity who is incomprehensible in the face of suffering offers nothing that humans can grasp and is conducive to atheism; such a "God is dead," she asserts. Furthermore, she remarks that an "all-powerful God who imposes suffering . . . must be a sadist" and that "a theology which conceives such a supreme governor, organizer, responsible cause and creator reflects the sadism of those who" devise it.[318] Soelle perceives models of divine omnipotence as deriving from patriarchal theology and rejects them completely on the basis that "the God who is self-sufficient, changeless, eternal, beyond need and vulnerability, can answer the question of human suffering either not at all or only cynically."[319] She favours a view of God as loving but not omnipotent, as one who stands in solidarity with victims of human evil and is not impassible.[320] In fact, some theologians argue that the notion of an impassible God seeped "inappropriately" into Christian theology from classical Greek thought, in defiance of biblical passages suggesting the contrary, and remained highly influential throughout the patristic and medieval eras. In the wake of the First World War,

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[314]McFague, *Models of God*, 64.
[315]Ibid., 64-5.
[316]Ibid., 69.
[317]Ibid., 72, 76.
[318]Dorothee Soelle, *Theology for Skeptics: Reflections on God*, trans. Joyce L. Irwin (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1995), 64-5.
[319]Ibid., 71.
[320]Ibid., 65-6.

however, Christian theology veered toward the notion of a God who suffers with the world as more closely aligned with the gospel texts.[321]

Faith and Free Will in Light of the *Shoah*

If World War I provided impetus for theological reevaluation, the Second World War did no less. Numerous beliefs concerning the divine-human relationship have been articulated in response to the *Shoah* and we will consider the views of several Jewish theologians in this regard, particularly with respect to the status of human freedom and divine omnipotence, in our attempt to arrive at a viable understanding of these issues insofar as they relate to notions of divine sanction and human agency in warfare.

For many, the *Shoah* stands as one of the tallest, bleakest, darkest walls looming between humanity and God that one dare imagine—but one need not imagine it, for it is real. Built from the bones of millions, the wall is darkened by the smoke and ash of millions more whose lives were snuffed out by the hand of human being upon human being. Now humanity stands before this monstrosity wondering what to make of it. Did God construct the wall from the deeds of humankind so that God might no longer look upon a humanity so bent on wretchedness? Did God construct the wall from our deeds in order to force humanity to confront our own depravity so that we might seek ways not of tearing down the wall, for what is done cannot be undone, but of scaling the wall and rising above it that we might retrieve God and once again incorporate divinity into our vision of life and the world? Or did humans construct the wall in a conscious attempt to sever God from the world so that human power might reign? Perhaps humans constructed the wall inadvertently, not troubling to realize that our actions amounted to a blatant rejection of God until it was done and we realized how dark our world had become, how shut off from the light we were. Or did God construct the wall together with humans, mutually declaring that there is no longer any common ground between us? Finally, one is compelled to ask, is there anything beyond the wall? Is there a place for God in a world capable of the *Shoah*, or is the *Shoah* evidence that no God exists? These are some of the questions smouldering among the ashes of Auschwitz.

In response to the *Shoah*, Steven L. Jacobs rejects the idea of God as an active force in world history and proposes a God who became limited following the act of creation. Whether God chose limitation or otherwise encountered it is of little relevance

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[321]McGrath, *Christian Theology*, 203-5.

to Jacobs. Through divine limitation, he postulates, humans acquired freedom to choose good or evil, thereby rendering God incapable of preventing the *Shoah*. No appeal to God, he warns, "rational or emotional—will now overcome our technological fury" if we "choose to unleash it."[322] Irving Greenberg offers a theory of divine Self-limitation, suggesting that humans can move toward perfecting the world through the exercise of human freedom in emulating the Divine.[323] In order for a truly loving relationship to exist between God and humanity, he insists, God must refrain from exercising greater power than humans are capable of since true love cannot accommodate an imbalance of power.[324] Michael Berenbaum's post-*Shoah* theology also emphasizes the need for humans to work toward improving the world, acting as our own redeemer. He rejects the notion of divine messianic intervention on the basis that a God who did not intervene in the *Shoah* "should be ashamed to act now."[325] This brings us to Peter Haas's observation that people often demand of God in relation to the *Shoah* what is otherwise not expected:

> We are generally not prepared to assume that God will routinely intervene miraculously in individual human affairs. If I am flying an aircraft which I have failed to fill with sufficient fuel, the plane will crash. . . . None of us would either [1] expect a Divine miracle to occur . . . or [2] feel that God needed to be blamed or justified for the ensuing and totally foreseeable crash. Acts have consequences . . . .[326]

He notes that the *Shoah* consisted of "a series of individual decisions and acts, coordinated . . . by a bureaucracy, but nonetheless individual acts which as a rule had precisely the outcome anybody would normally expect that they would."[327] Haas allows that "God may be benevolent and active in history in some way, but we ought to expect our deeds to bear their natural consequences."[328] Heschel also rejects the practice of

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[322]Steven L. Jacobs, "Judaism and Christianity After Auschwitz," in *Contemporary Jewish Religious Responses to the Shoah*, Studies in the Shoah, ed. Steven L. Jacobs, vol. 5 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 2, 18.

[323]Irving Greenberg, "Voluntary Covenant," in *Contemporary Jewish Religious Responses to the Shoah*, Studies in the Shoah, ed. Steven L. Jacobs, vol. 5 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 78.

[324]Ibid., 97.

[325]Michael Berenbaum, "In a World Without a Redeemer, Redeem!" in *Contemporary Jewish Religious Responses to the Shoah*, Studies in the Shoah, ed. Steven L. Jacobs, vol. 5 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 30-1.

[326]Peter J. Haas, "Auschwitz: Re-Envisioning the Role of God," in *Contemporary Jewish Religious Responses to the Shoah*, Studies in the Shoah, ed. Steven L. Jacobs, vol. 5 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 115.

[327]Ibid.

[328]Ibid., 116.

holding God responsible for or indifferent to human iniquity. Such practice, he asserts, amounts to conceiving of God "as a watchman hired to prevent us from using our loaded guns. Having failed us in this, He is now thought of as the ultimate Scapegoat."[329]

Haas maintains the apparent irreconcilability of an omnipotent and benevolent God with the "utter evil" of the *Shoah*,[330] arguing that the removal of God "as an active force in the shaping of Western thinking" made the *Shoah* possible, the catastrophe itself reflecting an "eclipse . . . of religion . . . as a source of morality" such that the supposedly Christian institutions involved conducted themselves in a secular manner, "despite their claims to the contrary. They . . . abandoned the moral field to the scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats of the secular Nazi ideology. God had, in effect, ceased to function as a meaning-generating concept for" many "despite the continuity of Christian bureaucratic institutions."[331] "The mere invocation of God's name or the use of certain rituals," he emphasizes, "does not amount to religious faith,"[332] or to ethical behaviour, one might add. The actions of those members of the church who condemned Jehanne, as contrasted with those who canonized her, might be cited in this regard. While it is obvious that both religious and secular individuals can behave morally or immorally, Haas points out that, when the Divine is removed from one's ethical frame of reference, no place remains in which God can act.[333] "God is not silent," declares Heschel. "He has been silenced." Humans have "expelled" God from the world, betrayed God's truth and defied God's will. In Heschel's language, we have slammed the doors of the world on God. "*God is in exile*."[334]

Faith, Free Will, and Jehanne

Evidently, there are many theories pertaining to human free will and divine omnipotence, not all of which can be discussed within the scope of this work. The theory that I propose is consistent with various aspects of the aforementioned theories and differs in other respects; it is offered as a possibility among many in light of the

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[329]Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Hiding God," in *Wrestling With God: Jewish Theological Responses during and after the Holocaust*, ed. Steven T. Katz, Shlomo Biderman, and Gershon Greenberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 378.

[330]Haas, 108.

[331]Ibid., 108-9. Haas acknowledges those "believing Christians" who rejected "the Nazi version" of reality and who sometimes "risked life and limb to defy" it, but who constituted a minority. Ibid., 109.

[332]Ibid., 203, n. 3.

[333]Ibid., 120. Greenberg suggests that fear of God can serve to restrain human immorality whereas, in the absence of such fear, "there are no limits." Greenberg, "Cloud of Smoke," 46-7.

[334]Heschel, "The Hiding God," 378-9.

divine complexity encountered by humans. Karl Barth concedes the inadequacy of all theology in fully understanding God, stating that "even the best theology is in itself and, as such, a *human* work, sinful, imperfect, in fact corrupt and subject to the powers of destruction."[335] Nonetheless, he recognizes the importance of the endeavour. "I am only asking *questions*," he writes. "But they are urgent questions which, by the very fact that they arise and cannot simply be brushed aside, represent a form of the wrath of God by which all that we produce as theology is assailed."[336] Barth thereby stresses the necessity of continuing to question and to produce ideas, of challenging the status quo on matters of faith. Indeed, Arthur Cohen asserts that "the God who emerges as possible to thought beyond the *tremendum* [an alternative term for the *Shoah*] is no longer the God of traditional theology."[337] "Our profound need for a powerful, attractive [and] imaginative picture of the way God is related to our world demands that we not only deconstruct but reconstruct our metaphors," states McFague.[338]

In that spirit, let us consider the possible nature and origin of human free will. Beginning with the basic premise of divine Self-limitation, one might suppose that God was once omnipotent and chose to grant humans free will, thereby relinquishing a portion of divine power. God conceivably exchanged power for the possibility of mutual love between divinity and humanity. The notion that God remains omnipotent while Self-limited constitutes a contradiction in terms since to be limited in any sense is to be less than omnipotent. The idea that God, having chosen Self-limitation, might choose at any time to reverse the decision is incoherent in that omnipotence cannot be exercised from a position of limitation. I propose that God remains limited in the presence of non-conforming human wills, unable forcibly to reclaim free will bestowed upon humans, on the assumption that human will is as powerful as divine will since, if it were not, it would be ineffective. On this theory, God cannot appropriate human free will but it can be surrendered to God. Hence, the more that human will cooperates with divine will, the more divine power is restored, which leads to the question of whether or not there is a tipping point at which divine power might become sufficiently strong to overpower and appropriate the balance of human power should God desire to do so. One can only speculate. At any rate, it does not appear to be the case at present that

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[335]Barth, *Evangelical Theology*, 137.

[336]Ibid., 142.

[337]Arthur A. Cohen, "The *Tremendum*," in *Wrestling With God: Jewish Theological Responses during and after the Holocaust*, ed. Steven T. Katz, Shlomo Biderman, and Gershon Greenberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 568.

[338]McFague, *Models of God*, 78.

humans have surrendered the majority of our wills to divine will such that human free will is in imminent danger of extinction. It is also conceivable that God would not wish to usurp human power since power that is willingly returned to God might be perceived as a more justly acquired and, therefore, more dignified form of divine power than omnipotent power exercised over human beings against our wills; as such, voluntarily surrendered power is conceivably preferable to both God and humans. Perhaps the ultimate, ideal, potential end of the entire free will dynamic is for humans voluntarily to restore divine omnipotence through surrender of human will to divine will. Support for the proposed theory can be located in Watts, who states that human "freedom is a delegation of the very freedom of God. Evil is an act which the creature commits with God's own power. He must use God to refuse God."[339] Weil similarly asserts that, "[o]n God's part creation is not an act of self-expansion but of restraint and renunciation. . . . God accepted this diminution. He emptied a part of his being from himself. . . . God denied himself for our sakes in order to give us the possibility of denying ourselves for him."[340] Theoretically, divine dependency on humans resulting from the delegation of free will to humanity is reversed at the moment of human surrender to divine will. At this point, the human conceivably returns willingly to his or her original state in the divine-human relationship, that is, a state of dependency on God, except that the human is now voluntarily dependent on God. Such an understanding of the divine-human relationship wherein God seeks human cooperation but does not coerce is consistent with the prophetic perception of God as concerned for and intimately involved with human affairs whereas, as McFague points out, notions of imposed divine omnipotence present images of a deity operating external to and distant from humanity and the world.[341] In the "classical Western monarchical model" of God, she explains, the relationship between king and subject is necessarily distant since royalty is regarded as "untouchable." On this view, "God as king" remains in God's "kingdom—which is not of this earth—and we remain in another place . . . [such that] God is worldless and the world is Godless."[342] In any case, to claim that God is not omnipotent is not to declare God powerless but merely limited in the exercise of power. So long as human free will remains intact, the matter of its surrender is an ongoing human choice and divine concern. However, God's dependency on humanity is mitigated by God's freedom to

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[339]Watts, 68, n. 3.
[340]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 89.
[341]McFague, *Models of God*, 64.
[342]Ibid., 65.

dispense grace and to reveal God's Self to human beings at any time and in any way. Humans cannot control the revelatory event, only our response to it.

Some might argue that divine revelation constitutes interference with human will by imposition of divine will in the act of revelation itself. If this were true, it would be necessary to regard all unsolicited divine revelation as interference and/or imposition. Nonetheless, humans have the choice of accepting or denying God's revelation, of embracing or rejecting it, which clears God of the imposition charge and negates the interference theory, unless one considers the mere existence of something (i.e., revelation) and, therefore, of everything as constituting a form of interference. Humans are capable of actively opposing divine will at every moment whereas God cannot simultaneously grant human free will and violate it. In granting humans free will, God does not eliminate the divine will, but the divine right to enforce divine will, that is, to control human affairs, although God apparently retains the ability to participate in those affairs via revelation and grace. Hence, although prophetic revelation urges and prompts in a powerful manner, it is not, presumably, an explicit imposition of divine will over and against human will. Divine revelation might be regarded as an offering, an opportunity to experience God more fully by entering into more substantial relationship with God. "Act, and God will act," Jehanne prompted Alençon, her "gentle Duke," when he was once reluctant to engage in battle. "When God pleases, the hour is ripe."[343] If one accepts the invitation to act in accordance with divine revelation, God can act through us but, unless we are willing conduits for the activity of divine grace, we can block its operation through us.

We cannot adequately discuss human free will and divine omnipotence without consideration of the crucifixion event. Contrary to the teachings of traditional Christology, there is no compelling reason to suppose that God—if, in fact, God could do so—suspended human free will (either temporarily or permanently) in the matter of the death of Jesus (or at any other time) in favour of a divine plan which was to arrive at inevitable fulfillment through divinely-coerced individuals. It seems more likely that the death of Jesus resulted from human choice and action in the exercise of free will.[344] Perhaps misinterpretation and/or misapplication of the crucifixion of Jesus and concomitant notions of salvation have created a theological worldview which has

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[343]Jehanne; quoted by Alençon, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 157.

[344]Jesus' plea on the cross, "Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing," suggests that it was not by divine design that his executioners acted but by their own wills; otherwise, there would be nothing to forgive them for with respect to this deed. Lk. 23:34 NRSV.

provided leeway for individuals to abandon, with relatively untroubled conscience, a sense of personal responsibility and accountability in the maintenance of social justice. Jacobs suggests that, as Judaism must rethink notions of God, covenant, "and the Jewish people," it ought to be a task of post-*Shoah* Christian theology to reevaluate the "notion of God the Father, His Son Jesus the Christ, and the relationship of that Christ to this unredeemed world."[345] "[E]ven in historic Christianity the bitterness of the cross was not maintained in the recollection of believers or in the reality presented by the church," states Jürgen Moltmann. "[T]he more the church of the crucified Christ became the prevailing religion of society, and set about satisfying the personal and public needs of this society, the more it left the cross behind it, and gilded the cross with the expectations and ideas of salvation," he declares.[346] Soelle criticizes traditional Christology as promoting a "sado-masochistic theo-ideology of God as a hangman"—as "the supreme hangman" who "carried out the blood sacrifice" of Jesus.[347]

> It is not difficult to establish sadistic traits in the picture of God . . . as it has been passed down. A kind of metaphysics of the death penalty is celebrated there, and the God who decrees suffering is praised. It has to be God himself there who crucifies poor Jesus or "hands him over." God can only forgive there when blood has flowed. In such theology the cross expresses above all the relationship between the Father and the Son; the fact that it was an instrument of the power of Imperial Rome is deemed incidental.[348]

She argues that "we misunderstand the cross when we make it into a necrophilic, death-seeking symbol."[349] "It is not God who makes us suffer," she asserts. "But love has its price."[350] For Soelle, the cross is more appropriately regarded as "a symbol of the love of life in justice. It expresses love for the endangered, threatened life of God in our world."[351] René Girard also rejects traditional Christological teachings and interprets the death of Jesus as a human act of murder rather than a sacrifice offered by the Divine. "The Gospels," he points out, "only speak of *sacrifices* in order to reject them and deny them any validity. . . . There is nothing in the Gospels to suggest that the death of Jesus is a sacrifice, whatever definition (expiation, substitution, etc.) we may give for that

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[345]Jacobs, 20.
[346]Moltmann, 40-1.
[347]Soelle, *Theology for Skeptics*, 100.
[348]Ibid.
[349]Ibid., 103.
[350]Ibid., 102-3.
[351]Ibid., 103-4.

sacrifice."[352] Moreover, Girard asserts, the Gospel texts contradict the "practice of making the deity responsible for all the evils that can afflict humanity."[353] He maintains that sacrificial interpretation of the crucifixion results from a tremendous "misunderstanding" which reflects a human failure to comprehend our own violence and permits us to shun responsibility for our violent activities.[354] On Girard's view, while caused entirely by humans and not required or demanded by God, Jesus' death conveys a divine imperative to end sacrificial violence.[355]

Let us further explore the possibility that humans perpetrated the crucifixion of Jesus with neither divine consent nor assistance. Let us also suppose that the purpose of God incarnate in Jesus was to end humanly-created suffering by teaching us to love one another as God loves us, but that humans, in a blatant rejection of this message, employed free will and killed Jesus[356]—and there was nothing God could do to prevent it. Having crucified the human aspect of Jesus—his divine aspect being indestructible—humanity continues to suffer at our own hands, reenacting our rejection of the divine message of love. I herein distinguish between the idea of a "crucified God" (cited by Moltmann as a "monstrous phrase" adopted by Luther from the Middle Ages)[357] and Jesus as a crucified human, (versus Christ as eternal deity). In other words, I separate the humanity and divinity of Jesus at the moment of death. I reject the possibility of a literal crucifixion of God, although I maintain that God is symbolically crucified on a regular basis by humans as we engage in acts of human evil, such as martyring saints and sending children to gas chambers. It is pertinent to recall that Jehanne held her mortal enemies, not God, responsible for her martyrdom.[358] The divinity of Jesus conceivably suffered in and with his human aspect to the point of death, after which God continues to suffer with, but not in, humanity as a result of human godlessness. In this sense, the crucifixion can be understood as representative of the joint suffering of God and human. Free will allows humanity the possibility of self-

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[352]René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 180.

[353]Ibid., 183.

[354]Ibid., 180, 213.

[355]Ibid., 210, 213.

[356]One might postulate that Jesus foresaw this, (just as Jehanne received indications of her upcoming martyrdom), and thus spoke of resurrection and the forthcoming gift of the Holy Spirit. Mt. 16:21; Jn. 14:26 NRSV.

[357]Moltmann, 47.

[358]Toutmouillé, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 245.

redemption in raising ourselves to the level of choosing to end violence[359] and abuse perpetrated against each other and against God but, to the extent that we apply our wills to contrary ends, we can expect to suffer.

A lack of human cooperation with divine will might reasonably account for discrepancies between prophecies and their fulfillment. One might thus suppose that human will also accounts for the ambiguity of some prophecy, insofar as, in allowing humans free will, God might offer tentative predictions about human events in instances where the outcome of such predictions is contingent upon human co-operation with divine will.[360] Jehanne's testimony provides an example of such an event wherein human will apparently interfered with divine will. Although Jehanne's voices instructed her to remain at nearby Saint-Denis following the battle for Paris, on account of her limited mobility due to injury, she was unable to prevent her comrades-in-arms from taking her with them as they returned to the Loire.[361] One can only speculate as to how history might have unfolded had Jehanne remained near Paris as instructed. "There is no *a priori* pattern to which history can be reduced," notes Jörg Splett, "since it is the expression of freedom, as between man and man, or between man and God."[362] Jean Bréhal, Inquisitor of France at the time of Jehanne's nullification trial, suggested that, had her parents been aware of Jehanne's plan to leave Domremy, they likely would have prevented or delayed her departure and thus contravened divine will.[363] This is not an

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[359]This does not rule out the possibility of employing minimal violence in ending violence.

[360]Saint John of the Cross suggests that divine revelations whose outcomes "are dependent on human, changeable causes" should not be treated as literal predictions. Saint John of the Cross, 171. Hvidt states that there is "an 'if' that renders the prophetic predictions plastic and open to human intervention. . . . Thus, the fulfillment of . . . prophecy is always predicated on the free response to the call for conversion, prayer, and sacrifice from the faithful." Hvidt, 110. Heschel likewise maintains that "[t]he prophet's predictions can always be proved wrong by a change in" human conduct. Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 16.

[361]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 69. Also, de Cagny; quoted in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 25-9, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 137. Jehanne later added that her divine counsel *permitted* her to depart Saint-Denis. Jehanne, testimony of March 28, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 139. It should be noted that being granted permission due to the fact that she was unable to exercise free will in obedience to a divine command does not negate the fact that the command was nonetheless dishonoured by the free will of others. That Jehanne's voices instructed her to maintain her position at Saint-Denis, along with her declaration that she would have obeyed them in going to Compiègne even had she known it to be the location of her capture, indicates that she was not entirely without divine instruction (as many have suggested) concerning the latter part of her military campaign (post-coronation), at least with respect to movement. Jehanne, testimony of February 22 and March 10, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 69, 99. For example, Astell writes, "In winter 1429 and spring 1430, Joan no longer enjoyed the sure guidance of her Voices." Ann W. Astell, *Joan of Arc and Sacrificial Authorship* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), xv.

[362]Jörg Splett, s.v. "Saints," in Karl Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi* (Mumbai: St. Pauls, 1975), 1497.

[363]Jane Marie Pinzino, "Joan of Arc and *Lex Privata*: A Spirit of Freedom in the Law," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, ed. Ann W. Astell and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 102.

unlikely assumption since Jehanne stated that, in light of the distress caused by her father's prophetic dream, "she greatly feared that they [her parents] would lose their minds when she left" for Vaucouleurs.[364] Moreover, Jehanne advised Charles VII on the way to Rheims that he would recover his entire kingdom if he proceeded boldly and courageously[365] but, in choosing to negotiate with Burgundy, Charles conceivably delayed complete recovery of his kingdom. Jehanne's example thus supports a view of God as limited or supported by human will, as the case may be, but not as omnipotent. It might be noted that, while dissenting human will can potentially interfere with the fulfillment of divine will, an assenting will aligned with divine will can conceivably allow the suspension of human limitation through the operation of grace in order to cause extraordinary events deemed miraculous to occur.

There is an important benefit to be derived from a degree of prophetic inaccuracy, which is that it might serve to prevent idolization or worship of humans. If prophets were completely accurate in their utterances, the fact that they are vehicles of God and not gods themselves might be overlooked. Our fallibility as human beings whose source of grace derives from elsewhere, that is, from a non-human, divine source, might be forgotten. Hence, such inaccuracies demand that human words and deeds always be thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated responsibly and that humans never be mistaken for gods.

Heschel describes God as one "Whose intention is to give righteousness and peace rather than to receive homage or adoration, Whose desire is to bestow rather than to obtain. In all that the prophet knows about God, he never finds in God a desire which does not bear upon man."[366] "Sympathy is the prophet's answer to inspiration, the correlative to revelation," he maintains, describing prophetic sympathy as "the assimilation of the prophet's emotional life to the divine, an assimilation of function, not of being." The prophet thus "lives not only his personal life, but also the life of God. The prophet hears God's voice and feels His heart."[367] Soelle suggests that mystics view the world through the "borrowed" eyes of God. "God calls upon the soul to give away its own ears and eyes and to let itself be given those of God."[368] "Being called is always

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[364]Jehanne, testimony of March 12, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 106.
[365]S. Charles; in Craig Taylor, 319.
[366]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 265.
[367]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 26.
[368]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 293.

also letting oneself be called."[369] "Mysticism is an action in the passive," states Watts.[370] Weil asserts that, if one accepts God into one's life, God places a seed within us "without our knowing what" the seed contains. It eventually becomes apparent that, "[i]f we had known, we should not have said yes at the first moment" since "the growth of the seed within us is painful." In accepting the growth, she explains, one "cannot avoid destroying whatever gets in its way."[371] "We can only consent to give up our own feelings so as to allow free passage in our soul for . . . love" of God. "That is the meaning of denying oneself," she maintains. "We are created for this consent, and for this alone."[372] Weil's statement conjures the echo of Jehanne's proclamation: "I was born to do this,"[373] reflecting the single-hearted and single-minded dedication with which she approached her divine mission.

Persistent in her claim to have obeyed the command of God,[374] Jehanne considered it

> . . . impossible that she revoke what she had done or said, as declared to the trial, on the subject of her visions and the revelations that she said that she had had from God; and she would not revoke them for anything. She would not stop doing what God made, commanded and would command her to do for any man alive. And it would be impossible for her to revoke these . . . ; and if the Church wished to make her do anything else contrary to the command that she said had been given by God, she would not do it for anything.[375]

So strongly was she compelled to act in accordance with divine will that, for Jehanne, to act contrarily was nearly inconceivable.[376] "The attention turned with love towards God (or in a lesser degree, towards anything which is truly beautiful)," states Weil, "makes certain things impossible for us. Such is the non-acting action of prayer in the soul. There are ways of behaviour which would veil such attention should they be indulged in and which, reciprocally, this attention puts out of the question."[377] Soelle quotes a pertinent passage from C.S. Lewis describing a mystical encounter:

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[369]Ibid., 296.
[370]Watts, 17.
[371]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 79-80.
[372]Ibid., 80.
[373]Jehanne; quoted by H. Royer in Murray, 228.
[374]Jehanne, testimony of February 27 and May 2, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 79, 148-9.
[375]Jehanne, testimony of March 31, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 206.
[376]As mentioned earlier, Jehanne disobeyed her divine voices in leaping from the Beaurevoir tower. Jehanne, testimony of March 15, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 121.
[377]Simone Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), 119.

> The odd thing was that before God closed in on me, I was in fact offered what now appears a moment of wholly free choice. . . . I became aware that I was holding something at bay, or shutting something out. . . . I felt myself being, there and then, given a free choice. I could open the door or keep it shut . . . . Neither choice was presented as a duty; no threat or promise was attached to either, though I know that to open the door . . . meant the incalculable. The choice appeared to be momentous but it was also strangely unemotional. I was moved by no desire or fears. In a sense I was not moved by anything. I chose to open . . . . I say "I chose," yet it did not really seem possible to do the opposite. On the other hand, I was aware of no motives. You could argue that I was not a free agent, but I am more inclined to think that this came nearer to being a perfectly free act than most that I have ever done. Necessity may not be the opposite of freedom, and perhaps a man is most free when, instead of producing motives, he could only say "I am what I do."[378]

Lewis's statement that "[n]either choice was presented as a duty; no threat or promise was attached to either," conceivably represents the initial moment of choice whereby one surrenders personal will to divine will from which unknown and "incalculable" consequences ensue with respect to which one may not be offered further choice, the consequences flowing naturally from and constituting a part of the initial choice, or with respect to which any subsequent choice might not be entirely free, (i.e., unbound by threat or promise).[379] Such acceptance of unknown consequences constitutes a significant aspect of faith. The experience of choosing while simultaneously feeling that it is impossible "to do the opposite" corresponds to Heschel's dualistic categorization of the prophetic experience. The prophet "is both active and passive, free and forced," Heschel explains. "He is free to respond to the content of the moment; he is forced to experience the moment, to accept the burden of his mission. Thus the effect of the impact of inspiration is to evoke in him both a sense of freedom and a feeling of coercion, an act of spontaneity and an awareness of enforced receptivity."[380] Lewis's assertion that "[n]ecessity may not be the opposite of freedom" suggests that one is free to act in accordance with necessity when unbound by personal motives, however vaguely known or completely unknown necessity might be, where the necessary

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[378]C.S. Lewis, *Surprised by Joy* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955), 211-2; quoted in Dorothee Soelle, *The Silent Cry: Mysticism and Resistance*, trans. Barbara and Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 23.

[379]Heschel maintains that the event of prophetic inspiration, wherein God powerfully communicates a divine message to the prophet, contains "an element of will . . . expressed in the initial decision" of the prophet. The "subsequent direction and development is merely the unfolding of what is given in the moment of decision." Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 223.

[380]Ibid., 225. Note that to accept the burden of the mission is not equivalent to accepting the mission itself.

precedes the choice and also constitutes its result. "We have to consent to be subject to necessity," states Weil.[381] "To be willing to go as far as possible is to pray to be impelled [by God], but without knowing whither."[382] Weil characterizes acting from necessity not as "an action but a sort of passivity. Inactive action."[383] For Soelle, "[f]reedom and necessity become one; choosing the way and being chosen are the same and the experience gathers itself in the sentence 'I am what I do.'"[384] "Spiritual freedom occurs when we become aware of our limits through leaving them behind,"[385] she explains; it requires "an immanence that opens itself to transcendence and takes part in it."[386] "[H]e who loves God without faith reflects on himself," notes Kierkegaard, "while the person who loves God reflects on God."[387]

When asked what her divine voices taught her with respect to the salvation of her soul, Jehanne replied that they first told her to behave well and attend church frequently and later instructed her to go into France and raise the siege of Orléans.[388] Thus it seems that Jehanne's mission was considered necessary for the salvation of her soul, which prompts one to consider whether she exercised free will, submitted to divine will, or both. It is likely that Jehanne consented to do God's will prior to receiving instruction to go into France since the particulars of her mission were not revealed immediately. (The mission would thus constitute an incalculable consequence stemming from an original choice in accordance with Lewis's account.) Jehanne did voluntarily pledge her virginity on her first encounter with the voices, indicating total commitment to God. That being the case, coupled with the fact that she was an extraordinarily pious child, it is reasonable to suspect that she committed herself to divine service at an early stage of the revelatory encounters.[389] Having submitted to divine will, Jehanne would have considered it necessary to cooperate once the particulars of her mission were unveiled, necessary at least to the accomplishment of divine will and to the salvation of her soul. Based on Jehanne's example, it seems possible for an individual to turn away from God having once submitted, but not without potential adverse consequences to the state of

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[381]Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, 43.
[382]Ibid., 44.
[383]Ibid., 45.
[384]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 24.
[385]Ibid., 28.
[386]Ibid., 29.
[387]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 40.
[388]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 67.
[389]To say that she was "extraordinarily pious" is to say that she possessed an ordinary human character trait in an extraordinary degree. Jehanne was thus both an ordinary human being and an extraordinary one.

one's soul. Perhaps, for example, Jehanne could have avoided imprisonment and martyrdom had she chosen to abandon her mission and return to Domremy upon learning of her impending capture, but she might have suffered spiritual affliction as a result. This scenario constitutes a possible example wherein freedom and necessity are not opposites, where choosing and being chosen are one.

Jehanne did not claim that God requested anything of her but that God commanded her,[390] yet she did not apparently view this relationship as oppressive, conceivably because she had consented to divine will. She stated, "I wait upon God my Creator in all. I love Him with all my heart. . . . I trust in my judge, that is the King of Heaven and earth."[391] Having accepted the divine call, Jehanne understood her role as divine servant. One "is called by a revelation to go out into the world to proclaim the word, to labor and to suffer, to lead an unremittingly active life as God's messenger," states Kierkegaard.[392] Jehanne was fully human, not superhuman and, as such, she was immune to nothing within the realm of human experience, yet she surrendered her will fully to God over the earthly church and placed the pope second to God. The essence of Jehanne's spirituality was her utter commitment to "God being served first" in all things.[393]

When one surrenders one's will to divine will, one does so in faith, faith which acknowledges human limitation. Reciprocity appears to be at work in the affairs of the world; as God conceivably limited God's Self in granting humans free will, we can likewise limit ourselves by giving our wills to God. Although faith acknowledges human limitation, it does not advocate human powerlessness or thoughtlessness since one is not necessarily guided clearly, specifically, directly, and entirely by God at every breath and step of one's life, no matter how strong one's faith. In fact, Moltmann observes that, "[a]ccording to their own experience, the greatest Christian saints were also the most profoundly abandoned by God."[394] Moreover, faith and surrender of one's personal will to divine will are perpetual choices requiring ongoing thought. Jehanne was clear, strong, and unshakable in her faith, and she also clearly thought for herself. As testimony to her faith, Jehanne declared to her Poitiers examiners, "There is more in

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[390]"Everything I have done is by the command of the Lord." Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 154.

[391]Jehanne, testimony of May 2, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 148.

[392]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 121.

[393]Jehanne, testimony of March 31, 1431 and during sentencing of May 24, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 206, 217.

[394]Moltmann, 55.

our Lord's books than in yours,"[395] which speaks to the expansive mystery of God and the limited knowledge of humans. Nonetheless, she exercised her power of thought in formulating military strategies, in twice attempting to escape, and in responding to the questions of her various ecclesiastical examiners, to cite a few instances.

Jehanne's faith in her revelations was sufficiently strong that she was willing to place herself at the center of the battlefield completely confident of victory. However, to be confident of victory and to be confident of one's personal survival are different matters, and Jehanne did not perceive herself as immune to death in battle. Confronted with the accusation that her courage derived from divine assurance that she would not die in combat, Jehanne argued that she had no more guarantee of that than any other.[396] In fact, she was wounded several times in battle.[397] Nonetheless, Jehanne reassured her army at the battle of Jargeau that they ought not to fear the English since "God was conducting their campaign. She said that if she were not sure that God was conducting their campaign, she would rather keep her sheep than expose herself to dangers like these."[398] This comes across more as a confession of faith and declaration that only God is worthy of such risk-taking than as a claim to divine protection. In fact, upon incurring her first battle wound, Jehanne stated that she knew she must die some day, but she did not know when, where, or how this would occur.[399] The only one to whom Jehanne is known to have promised invulnerability to death in his battles with her is Alençon, whom she promised to return safely to his wife, and she kept her word, warning him at Jargeau to move from a particular location in order to avoid being killed by a piece of artillery. The Duke heeded her advice and escaped untimely death, but a less fortunate man was killed in the place which Alençon had vacated by the artillery which Jehanne had specified.[400] Also, Jehanne participated in battles during the latter part of her campaign with respect to which she did not claim divine guidance,[401] although she

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[395]Jehanne; quoted by La Touroulde, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 124. Pasquerel provided similar testimony, quoting Jehanne as stating, "My Lord has a book in which no clerk has ever read." Jehanne; quoted by Pasquerel, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 190.

[396]La Touroulde; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 124.

[397]Of Jehanne's battle wounds, two were notably serious. The first of these was incurred when an arrow penetrated her neck during the raising of the siege at Orléans. Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 158. Her second serious wound was sustained during the attempt to take Paris when a crossbow bolt or arrow entered her thigh. Jehanne, testimony of February 22 and March 17, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 145, 199. Also, Craig Taylor, 145, n. 23.

[398]Jehanne; quoted by Alençon, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 156.

[399]Jehanne; quoted by Pasquerel, Ibid., 189.

[400]Alençon; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 157.

[401]Jehanne testified that her battle for Paris was not undertaken on the basis of revelation but at the discretion of herself and her comrades. Jehanne, testimony of March 13 and 15, 1431; in Craig Taylor,

conceivably regarded these as supportive of her divine mission. Nonetheless, in such instances she would have had no apparent grounds to presume herself subject to divine protection.

Jehanne displayed faith beyond reason. Regarding the failure of her first escape attempt, she concluded that it did not appear to be "God's will that she should escape."[402] Such faith embraces divine mystery and accepts chaos, paradox, and personal suffering as possible components of a life lived in faith. Jehanne drew courage from the faith which sustained her. Ann Astell and Bonnie Wheeler identify her as an embodiment and symbol of "the active consequences of living out (and out of) profound religious faith."[403] The personal consequences arising from Jehanne's life of faith unfolded gradually and frighteningly, yet she did not run from them, demonstrating deep awareness that true surrender cannot be partial but must be complete.

Kierkegaard on Faith and Violence

No theological discourse on the subject of faith and violence would be complete without reference to Kierkegaard, particularly his assessment of the nature of faith in his *Fear and Trembling*. In this work, Kierkegaard examines the *Aqedah*, the biblical account of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his young son, Isaac, by divine command. As the story goes, at the moment when Abraham is about to slay his son, an angel of God orders him to stop, sparing the boy.[404] The *Aqedah*, too, is an example of faith beyond reason and, whether or not one believes in the authenticity of the tale, Kierkegaard's evaluation of it offers many insights into the nature of faith, grace, and claims to divinely sanctioned violence.

For Kierkegaard, the *Aqedah* presents faith as a "monstrous . . . paradox capable of making a murder into a holy act well pleasing to God,"[405] capable, one presumes, depending upon the interpretation applied to the story. "The ethical expression for what

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186, 195. She also stated that she participated in an assault at La Charité, not by the command of God, but on the recommendation of her companions-at-arms. Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 13, and 15, 1431; Ibid., 173, 186, 195. Jehanne further testified that she had no divine command to sally forth from Compiègne on the day of her capture. Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; Ibid., 176. After learning of her impending capture, it became Jehanne's practice to defer to the military decisions of the other captains. Jehanne, testimony of March 13 and 15, 1431; Ibid., 186, 195.

[402]Jehanne, testimony of March 15, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 117.

[403]Astell and Wheeler, "Joan of Arc and Spirituality," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, 2.

[404]Gen. 22:1-13 NRSV. *Aqedah* means "binding" and is the name given in Hebrew sources to the biblical story of the binding of Isaac by Abraham. Bruce Chilton, *Abraham's Curse: The Roots of Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 2.

[405]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 61.

Abraham did," he notes, "is that he was willing to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he was willing to sacrifice Isaac; but in this contradiction lies the very anguish that can . . . make one sleepless."[406] Indeed, the words "murder" and "sacrifice" are merely two words for essentially the same deed, one word condemning the act, the other sanctifying it. "Can one speak unreservedly of Abraham," Kierkegaard asks, "without risking that someone will go off the rails and do likewise?" He points out, however, that "it is only in respect of faith that one achieves resemblance to Abraham, not murder."[407] Moreover, Joseph Blenkinsopp advises "that the ethical teaching of the prophets must . . . be explained with reference to the social contexts in which the message was uttered;"[408] hence, the particular divine directive of the prophet is not necessarily to be construed as universal. Because any specific divine directive can only definitively apply to the specific individual to whom it is given in the specific context in which it is given, one cannot resemble the recipient of such a directive with respect to the directive unless one receives a similar specific directive oneself. Otherwise, one can resemble one such as Abraham only with respect to his faith in receiving and responding to a divine directive. Likewise, the model of righteous warfare and human agency derived from Jehanne's claim to divine sanction in the following chapter does not urge individuals to participate in war; rather, in addition to providing standards against which claims to divine sanction might be measured, it encourages individuals who do engage in warfare (for whatever reasons they deem fit, be it divine calling, moral imperative, or otherwise) to emulate her behaviour in war, grounded in her faith in God and its expression in terms of the divine concern for humanity revealed through the prophets, hence, its expression in compassion. The supposition is that Jehanne was called to engage in the Hundred Years' War not only to initiate its end, but to demonstrate how such an undertaking might be accomplished in accordance with revealed divine aspirations. This interpretation is in keeping with the conception of saints as models for humanity.

Abraham's action, Kierkegaard explains, suspends the ethical in relation to "a higher *telos*" residing outside of the ethical and apart from the universal.[409] When the ethical is teleologically suspended in an individual, that individual "exists as the

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[406]Ibid., 31.

[407]Ibid., 32.

[408]Joseph Blenkinsopp. *A History of Prophecy in Israel*, rev. and enl. ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 39.

[409]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 69.

particular in opposition to the universal."[410] "[T]he knight of faith renounces the universal in order to be the particular."[411] Hvidt explains that the prophet, [who qualifies as a knight of faith], operates within the liminal and, within this realm, "the individual or group exists apart from and does things differently from normal society [i.e., the universal]."[412] Moreover, the "classifications on which order normally depends are annulled or obscured—other symbols designate temporary antinomic liberation from behavioral norms and cognitive rules."[413] The "character of universality" is "lost" in the limen.[414] "Someone who believes it is a simple enough matter to be the individual can always be certain that he is not the knight of faith,"[415] asserts Kierkegaard. "The knight of faith has only himself, and it is there the terrible lies . . . [for] the knight of faith is alone about everything."[416] "The true knight of faith is the individual, absolutely nothing but the individual . . . who, in cosmic isolation, hears never a [human] voice but walks alone with his dreadful responsibility."[417] Saint Teresa declares, "[I]n falling I had many friends to help me; but in rising I found myself so alone that I am now amazed I did not remain ever fallen. And I praise the mercy of God, for it was He alone who gave me His hand."[418] Although Jehanne had an army of followers, she stood alone before God and before her captors, judges, and executioner. "Only someone who finds the courage to be different from others can ultimately exist for 'others', for otherwise he exists only with those who are like him. And this is not much help to them," explains Moltmann.[419]

According to Kierkegaard, faith manifests as paradox in the life of the individual who acts "on the strength of the absurd," the paradox itself constituting absurdity.[420] The paradox of faith, he explains, is

> that the single individual as the particular is higher than the universal, is justified before the latter . . . in such a way . . . that it is the single

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[410]Ibid., 72.

[411]Ibid., 90.

[412]Hvidt, 265.

[413]Victor Witter Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, The Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures (New York: de Gruyter, 1995), 193; quoted in Niels Christian Hvidt, *Christian Prophecy: The Post-Biblical Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 265.

[414]Alessandro Toniolo, "Nostalgia delle Origini: Profezia o Anarchia Celebrativa?" *Rivista Liturgica* 84 (1997), 806; quoted in Niels Christian Hvidt, *Christian Prophecy: The Post-Biblical Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 265. This is consistent with Rahner's position that divine revelation can contradict universal law. Rahner, *Inquiries*, 108-9.

[415]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 90.

[416]Ibid., 94.

[417]Ibid., 95-6.

[418]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, 94.

[419]Moltmann, 16.

[420]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 65.

> individual who, having been subordinate to the universal as the particular, now by means of the universal becomes that individual who, as the particular, stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. This position cannot be mediated, for all mediation occurs precisely by virtue of the universal; it is and remains in all eternity a paradox. . . . And yet faith *is* this paradox.[421]

Paradox, however, is not easily grasped by all, and true faith is often perceived as madness, particularly to those devoid of faith. Kierkegaard characterizes Abraham, biblical "father" of faith, as "great in that hope whose outward form is insanity,[422] also referencing "divine madness."[423] In what does this "insanity" or "madness" consist? Suspending one's faith in human vision in favour of faith in divine vision qualifies as madness defined in relation to that which the human mind ordinarily deems sane in the absence of divine considerations. Heschel describes the prophet as one "who suffers from a profound maladjustment to the spirit of society, with its conventional lies, with its concessions to man's weakness. Compromise is an attitude the prophet abhors," he maintains.[424] This was evident in Jehanne's disapproval of Charles VII's attempted negotiations with Burgundy[425] through which pieces of France were voluntarily handed to the enemy rather than being reclaimed. Heschel postulates that the prophet views compromise as a corruptive force against humanity. The prophet's soul, he argues, is completely "insurgent against indifference to aberrations. The prophet's maladaptation to his environment may be characterized as *moral madness* (as distinguished from madness in a psychological sense)."[426] Since the prophet does not receive support from the universal, "the movement of faith must be made continually on the strength of the absurd,"[427] but, Kierkegaard advises, "no one has the right to . . . let others suppose that faith is something inferior or that it is an easy matter, when in fact it is the greatest and most difficult of all."[428]

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[421]Ibid., 64. "[B]y means of the universal" in the quoted passage can be clarified with reference to the statement that, "having been in the universal, the single individual" becomes situated apart from the universal. Ibid., 63. In other words, one can only exist apart from the universal in relation to the universal; one can only be particular in relation to the non-particular. Kierkegaard's view that the position of being "in an absolute relation to the absolute . . . cannot be mediated" is compatible with the possibility of completely unmediated realms of mystical experience; that is, unmediated by institutional religion and perhaps even by the body.

[422]Ibid., 16.

[423]Ibid., 24.

[424]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 188.

[425]Jehanne, letter dated August 5, 1429 to the citizens of Rheims; in Craig Taylor, 118-9.

[426]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 188.

[427]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 41.

[428]Ibid., 59.

What is the higher *telos* of the *Aqedah*? Peering through the madness of the story, which at first glance appears to sanction human violence and sacrifice, one discovers that the *Aqedah* demonstrates divine disapproval of sacrificial violence—an angel stops Abraham from sacrificing the child. If God commanded Abraham to perform human sacrifice, the story suggests, it was in order to teach humanity not to do it.

> You who build these altars now
> to sacrifice the children,
> you must not do it any more.
> A scheme is not a vision
> and you never have been tempted
> by a demon or a god.
> You who stand above them now,
> your hatchets blunt and bloody,
> you were not there before:
> when I lay upon a mountain
> and my father's hand was trembling
> with the beauty of the word.
>
> Leonard Cohen,
> "Story of Isaac"

The tenets of the *Aqedah* speak to what is conceivably the only legitimate example of human willingness to engage in a faith-based act of human sacrifice, and it is conceivably legitimate only because it was pre-ordained NOT to succeed.[429] The *Aqedah* urges not only faith in God, but faith in the goodness of God; Kierkegaard's evaluation of the story advocates "that God is love."[430] Paradoxically, the command to sacrifice Isaac has a revelatory purpose to condemn sacrificial murder, deeming it a human act displeasing to God rather than a holy act pleasing to God. If God sanctions violence, it is presumably out of necessity in engaging in human affairs in such a manner as ultimately to defeat human violence. On this view, divinely sanctioned killing is not considered sacrifice and remains displeasing to God. Recall Kierkegaard's assertion that it is faith, not murder, which constitutes the worthiness of Abraham's deed.[431] The *Aqedah* and Jehanne's mission are both paradoxical in apparently condoning engagement in violence with a view to ending it. "[T]o express the sublime in the pedestrian absolutely," states Kierkegaard, "is something only the knight of faith can

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[429]Any other story following the same tenets would be viewed likewise.
[430]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 36.
[431]Ibid., 32.

do."[432] Hence, with respect to assessing claims to divine sanction in warfare, one might look for expression of the sublime absolutely in a claimant's activities—one might note Jehanne's undifferentiated compassion in warfare in this regard. Moreover, Kierkegaard considers "how it comes about that a new point of departure is created in relation to the established order."[433] "[I]t comes about," he suggests,

> by the fact that *the point of departure is* FROM ABOVE, *from God,* and *the formula is this paradox that an individual is employed.* Humanly understood, an individual . . . is infinitely nothing in comparison with the established order (the universal), so it is a paradox that the individual is the stronger. This can be explained only by the fact that it is God who makes use of him, God who stands behind him; but just for this reason one sees God again, just because the situation is a paradox. When there are hundreds of men, what comes to pass is explained simply by the activity of the hundreds of men, but the paradox compels us (insofar as freedom can be compelled) to take notice of God, that he is taking part in it.[434]

Lex Privata, Kierkegaard, and Jehanne

The theological concept of *lex privata* as explained by Jane Marie Pinzino is compatible with Kierkegaard's notion of a divinely sanctioned teleological suspension of the ethical. Pinzino describes the operation of *lex privata* upon and within an individual as an infusion of grace independent of conscience permitting personal suspension of public (and canon) law and commanding obedience to divine law revealed through "private, mystical experience."[435] In the case of Jehanne, this does not suggest that she did not engage conscience, but that the operation of conscience functions on a different level than prophetic revelation. If conscience was not employed directly in the matter of discerning and obeying her divine instructions, it was apparently employed in her manner of carrying out those instructions. In fact, Pinzino explains that, in the medieval application of *lex privata*, "chosenness . . . increased one's personal responsibility rather than decreased it—[it was considered] a freedom *for* service to a greater mission rather than a freedom *from* the constraints of an onerous personal obligation."[436] "[A] vocation bestowed by *lex privata* demanded that an individual develop inward disciplines and capacities of moral discernment and sound judgment, forms of self-denial and strengths of . . . character that bear fruit in the form of judicious actions serving the repair of the

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[432]Ibid., 45.
[433]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 192.
[434]Ibid., 192-3.
[435]Pinzino, "Joan of Arc and *Lex Privata*," 86, 95.
[436]Ibid., 90.

world. *Lex privata*," she observes, "emerged from the nullification trial discussion scarcely as an antinomian warrant, and more substantially as a self-sacrificial commitment to a greater cause and the common good."[437] The view of *lex privata* as arising from God rather than from the individual distinguishes it from the "secular individualism" that is common today, she asserts.[438] The divine instructions which Jehanne claimed to have received were conceivably aligned (to some extent) with the dictates of her conscience, although the fact that the infusion of grace occurs independently of conscience implies that it can contradict conscience. *Lex privata* does not appear to encourage suspension of conscience but to condone faith in revelation that transcends it, whether or not the revelation contradicts conscience. In Jehanne's case, although she was averse to bloodshed, the violence in which she participated would not necessarily have contradicted her conscience completely if viewed as a moral necessity in expelling the English and ending the war. Jehanne's was a divine directive that one can more easily wrap one's conscience around than was Abraham's in the absence of foreknowledge of the outcome.[439]

Pinzino emphasizes that, while *lex privata* transcends *lex publica*, it is still "a matter of law—divine law to be obeyed."[440] She points out that, before the Rouen court, Jehanne "defended her illicit actions and behaviors as minor transgressions allowed by God . . . for the sake of a greater cause, the liberation of the French kingdom. She explained that it was her primary obligation to obey the law directly mandated to her by heaven over the law of the Church, a law she normally upheld and obeyed." In so doing, Pinzino states, Jehanne demonstrated an "implicit sense of moral empowerment akin to the principle of *lex privata*."[441] Regarding her male clothing, Jehanne stated, "Since I do this by the command of God and in His service, I do not think that I am doing wrong; and this clothing will be set aside immediately when God chooses to command it."[442] The canonists at Jehanne's nullification trial cited *lex privata* in support of her activities, appealing to the irresistible workings of the Holy Spirit in compelling action in the

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[437]Ibid., 95. The nullification trial to which Pinzino refers is that pertaining to Jehanne's condemnation.

[438]Ibid.

[439]The *Aqedah* was referenced among other biblical stories in support of the nullification of Jehanne's condemnation. Ibid.," 96.

[440]Ibid., 95.

[441]Ibid., 92.

[442]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 192.

faithful such that, in Jehanne's case, she "knew no alternative that would give her spirit rest."[443]

In terms of Kierkegaard's analysis, Jehanne evidently viewed herself as standing "in an absolute relation to the absolute,"[444] refusing submission to the Rouen court over God.[445] When instructed by her judges to choose one of her (enemy) assessors as advisor, Jehanne stated, "And for your offer of counsel, I have no intention of departing from the advice of Our Lord."[446] Moreover, the following excerpt from the condemnation trial transcript is telling:

> She said also that she submits to God her Creator, Who caused her to do what she did; and refers it to Him in His own Person.
>
> Asked if she means that she has no judge on earth, and our Holy Father the Pope is not her judge,
>
> She replied: I will tell you nothing else. I have a good Master, Our Lord, in Whom I trust for everything, and not in any other.
>
> She was told that if she did not wish to believe in the Church . . . she would be a heretic . . . and that she would be punished by other judges who would sentence her to be burned.
>
> She answered: I will tell you nothing else.[447]

"No movement, no individual, ever had power without some kind of creed," declares Watts, "something believed so intensely as to be worth dying for. Ethical principles do not inspire such devotion, for the thing believed in must have far more reality than a mode of behaviour or an abstract social system."[448] Furthermore, he maintains, "creed and sacrament are only fully intelligible in terms of the mystical life."[449]

Further resonance arises between Kierkegaard's interpretation of the *Aqedah* and Jehanne's life and mission in several apparent contradictions which might be considered paradoxical or absurd. They are: (i) that she was both an active warrior and a compassionate saint; (ii) that she was untrained in military matters and yet extremely adept militarily; (iii) that she was a young maiden leading experienced men at arms in battle, turning the tide of war in favour of the French when they had all but lost conclusively;[450] (iv) that she transcended the gender boundary while simultaneously

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[443]Pinzino, "Joan of Arc and *Lex Privata*," 97.

[444]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 64.

[445]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 197.

[446]Jehanne, testimony of March 27, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 131.

[447]Jehanne, response during public admonition of May 2, 1431; Ibid., 149.

[448]Watts, 10.

[449]Ibid., 15.

[450]What occurred cannot be adequately attributed solely to "the activity of the hundreds of men" (to employ Kierkegaard's analogy) who fought with Jehanne since their efforts were quite ineffective at

maintaining it by adopting a male role while self-identifying as Jehanne *la pucelle*, a distinctively female appellation; (v) that she was unschooled theologically or otherwise and was yet able to stump her learned judges and assessors at Rouen even though bishops and doctors of theology and law were among them; (vi) that the church was responsible for both her execution and her canonization, first declaring her a heretic and then a saint; (vii) that she underwent the paradox of martyrdom itself, which is that the most faithful servants of God often die wretched deaths on account of their faith in a God who does not or cannot spare them their suffering. Leonard Cohen ponders Jehanne's martyrdom: "Myself, I long for love and light, / but must it come so cruel, must it be so bright!"[451] Parodox indeed.

"Faith is the highest passion in a human being," states Kierkegaard. "Many in every generation may not come that far, but none comes further."[452] Jehanne was a most faithful servant of God; for her, to fulfill her divine mission was to fulfill her life. Ridiculed, denounced, called a whore,[453] wounded, betrayed, scorned, abused, and burned, Jehanne suffered and sacrificed all in the name of faith. She operated from a position of absolute persistence and conviction. "[S]he would rather die than turn back from what God had made her do."[454]

The Cost of Practical, Prophetic Mysticism

> A soul that God permits to advance . . . before the eyes of the world can well prepare itself for martyrdom at the hands of this world; because if it doesn't want to die to the world, the world will itself put it to death.
>
> —Saint Teresa of Avila, *Collected Works,* vol. 1

It was said that a change swept over many who watched and listened to Jehanne praying as she died, her eyes gazing through the flames upon the crucifix that she had pleaded to have held before her. "Being in the flames, she ceased not to call in a loud

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that point without her. Pernoud and Clin note that the population of Orléans was, in fact, on the verge of surrendering to Burgundy when Jehanne presented herself in their defense. Pernoud and Clin, 13.

[451]Leonard Cohen, "Joan of Arc," *Stranger Music: Selected Poems and Songs* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1993), 148.

[452]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 151.

[453]de Metz initially teased Jehanne, suggesting that perhaps the French were all fated to become English. de Metz; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 96. de Baudricourt initially denounced Jehanne's claim to a divine mission, recommending that she be beaten and returned to Domremy. Laxart; in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 33. The English called Jehanne a whore, offending her greatly and inciting her to tears. Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 187.

[454]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 198. She reiterated this on March 27, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 135.

voice the Holy Name of Jesus, imploring and invoking without ceasing the aid of the Saints in Paradise."[455] Jehanne also beseeched the priests who were present to say Mass for her.[456]

> She uttered pious and devout lamentations and called on the Blessed Trinity, and on the blessed and glorious Virgin Mary . . . in her devotions, her lamentations, and her true confession of faith. Also she most humbly begged all manner of people, of whatever condition or rank they might be, and whether of her party or of the other, for their pardon and asked them kindly to pray for her, at the same time pardoning them any harm they had done her. This she continued to do for a very long time, perhaps for half an hour, and until the end. The judges who were present, and even several of the English, were moved by this to great tears and weeping, and indeed they wept most bitterly. Some, and several of these same English, recognized God's hand and made professions of faith when they saw her make so remarkable an end. . . . When she was handed over by the Church, I remained with her, and she asked most fervently to be given a cross. And when an Englishman who was present heard this he made her a little one out of wood from the end of a stick, and handed it to her. She received it and kissed it most devotedly, uttering pious lamentations and acknowledging God our Redeemer . . . . Then she put that cross on her breast between her body and her clothes and humbly asked me to let her have the crucifix from the church so that she could gaze on it continuously until her death. . . . When it was brought, she embraced it closely and long and clung to it until she was tied to the stake. . . . And . . . while she was still uttering devoted praise and lamentations to God and the saints, she was led off and tied to the stake. And her last word, as she died, was a loud cry of "Jesus".[457]

The testimonies of Jehanne's death relate a profound and transformative demonstration of enduring faith, courage, and forgiveness.[458] She exhibited extreme piety, humility, and grace in extreme suffering. Indeed, the story of her martyrdom retains its force in the retelling nearly six centuries later; condemnation of the innocent is a powerful phenomenon. "We are all lost," the King of England's secretary lamented after

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[455]de la Pierre: quoted in Murray, 161.

[456]Fabri; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 249.

[457]Massieu; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 246-8. de la Pierre confirmed that, in response to Jehanne's "pitiful, devout, and Catholic words" uttered at the execution scene, "those who saw her in great numbers wept, and . . . the Cardinal of England and many other English were forced to weep and to feel compassion." de la Pierre; quoted in Murray, 161. de la Pierre's testimony also confirms Jehanne's request to have the church crucifix held within direct view and her calling upon the name of Jesus in her final moments. de la Pierre; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 283. Pierre Boucher's testimony estimates that "perhaps ten thousand" people were present at Jehanne's martyrdom. Pierre Boucher; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 249. de la Chambre noted that, although many who were present wept, "some of the English laughed." de la Chambre; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 250.

[458]The papal decree advancing the cause of Jehanne's canonization notes the transformative power of her martyrdom, stating that "Men then began to repent of the deed, and in the very place of execution to venerate the sanctity of the Maid;" quoted in Warner, 29.

departing the execution scene, "for it is a good and saintly person that has been burned."[459] Moreover, on the day of Jehanne's death, the executioner confessed that he considered himself damned for having "burned a saint."[460] So extraordinary was the event that trial notary Manchon wept for an entire month after witnessing Jehanne's death. He declared, "I never wept as much for anything that befell me . . . . With a part of the money that I was paid for the case, I bought a little missal, which I still possess, to remind me to pray for her."[461]

Ladvenu testified that, "Right up to the end" Jehanne "maintained and asseverated that the voices she heard were of God, and that all that she had done she had done at God's command, and that she did not believe that she had been deceived by her voices, and that the revelations she had received were from God."[462] Jehanne thus confirmed and reasserted the validity of her divine revelations and mission before the crowd who had assembled to witness the spectacle of her death, communicating that which she regarded as the most significant message she could offer and nullifying for all time the alleged abjuration.

Evidently, the cost of practical, prophetic mysticism can be extremely high. The decision to suffer at the hands of earthly authority as a result of one's mystical witnessing rather than to avoid suffering by submitting to such authority, for Soelle, constitutes a definitive "mark" of authentic mystical life.[463] "Death is not excluded from love," she asserts, "and death excludes no one from love."[464] In fact, martyrdom is identified as "a perfect sacrifice of love, a total giving of oneself" to God.[465] Let us consider Soelle's understanding of the term 'sacrifice':

> In what others call "fate," acceptance finds the suffering God and calls her/him "Love," and thus the accepting person becomes a participating subject instead of remaining a mere object of the power of fate. Acceptance deprives icy meaninglessness of its power because it clings to God's warmth also in suffering. In this context, sacrifice does not mean that a God hostile to life and humans has to be placated with blood, or that a saving quality accrues to suffering as such. Rather, that concept [sacrifice] expresses the participation of humans who do not acquiesce but

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[459]Jean Tressard; quoted by Cusquel, in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 251.
[460]The executioner was Geoffroy Therage; quoted by de la Pierre in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 253, 283.
[461]Manchon; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 254.
[462]Ladvenu; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 249.
[463]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 141.
[464]Ibid., 288.
[465]Merton, *Introduction to Christian Mysticism*, 43.

> who, in mystical defiance, insist through their suffering that nothing become lost.[466]

Soelle's description corresponds to Jehanne's ultimate sacrifice in that Jehanne apprehended "the suffering God" in her own suffering, clinging to the crucifix as Soelle's subject also "clings to God's warmth . . . in suffering." Moreover, Jehanne acted "in mystical defiance" by refusing to submit to those who would have her deny the validity of her mystical experiences; in so doing, she ensured that the message of her divine revelations might endure and not "become lost." Jehanne sacrificed her life, suffering an excruciating and humiliating public death in order to honor and sustain the truth of God's message delivered through her. "She let God use her in the world; she withheld nothing from him, neither action nor suffering," states Astell. For Jehanne, "the lonely fulfillment of her mission" constituted "a radical instrumentality" which was her "way of holiness."[467] This is the epitome of practical, prophetic mysticism.

Sacrifice contains an inherent aspect of struggle, being difficult in proportion to the degree of self-deprivation or pain contained within it. Kierkegaard suggests that it is only when one's action on behalf of God absolutely contradicts one's feeling that the action constitutes a sacrifice.[468] Martyrdom constitutes the ultimate self-sacrifice and the ultimate witnessing.[469] Jehanne did not desire martyrdom and struggled fiercely with accepting it, which renders hers a true sacrifice according to Kierkegaard's criterion. It has been noted that "[d]eath is always death despite all mysticism."[470] As Jehanne wept over the death of others, she was no happier with the prospect of her own demise.

> Alas, am I to be so cruelly and horribly treated that my pure and unblemished body, which has never been corrupted, must today be consumed and burned to ashes! Oh, I had rather be seven times beheaded than be burned like this. Alas, if only I had been in the prisons of the Church to which I have submitted, if I had been guarded by churchmen and not by my enemies and foes, I should not have come to this miserable end. Oh, I call upon God, the great Judge, to see the great wrongs and griefs that are done me.[471]

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[466]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 148-9.

[467]Astell, "Joan of Arc and Spirituality," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, 4.

[468]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 88.

[469]The word "martyr" in Greek is synonymous with the word "witness." Langenscheidt's Pocket Greek Dictionary Greek-English.

[470]Pedro Casaldáliga, "Mystik der Befreiung," in Teófilo Cabastrero, *Mystik der Befreiung: Ein Portrait des Bischofs Pedro Casaldáliga n Brasilien* (Wuppertal, 1981), 83-4; quoted in Dorothee Soelle, *Silent Cry: Mysticism and Resistance*, trans. Barbara and Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 287.

[471]Jehanne; quoted by Toutmouillé, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 245. If any of Jehanne's prison guards attempted to rape her following the alleged abjuration, they were apparently unsuccessful in light of

Jehanne loved both life and God, not viewing them as mutually exclusive, (unlike those mystics who regard the material order and earthly life with disdain[472]). Weil asserts:

> We can . . . be almost certain that those whose love of God has caused the disappearance of the pure loves belonging to our life here below are no true friends of God.
>
> Our neighbor, our friends, religious ceremonies, and the beauty of the world do not fall to the level of unrealities after the soul has had direct contact with God. On the contrary, it is only then that these things become real. Previously they were half dreams. Previously they had no reality.[473]

While death is not unwelcome to all those classified as 'martyrs,' a distinction is herein drawn between those who seek and gladly welcome martyrdom and those who reluctantly accept it as a necessary consequence of lived faith. On Jehanne's model, life is a means of serving God. The word 'sacred' is defined as "holy," or "set apart . . . for the service or worship of God."[474] Hence, if life is viewed as sacred, it is understood as fundamentally designated for divine service or worship, or worship *in* service. Viewing life as sacred, one does not desire its destruction or treat it as something to be cast away readily, but as something to be sacrificed reluctantly and only out of necessity in the expression of, commitment to, and living of faith should such necessity arise. Therefore, when one chooses to end one's life not as a matter of absolute necessity in faith, one chooses to terminate one's service and worship of God as manifested in one's life. However, when one accepts unwelcome death as a matter of necessity in faith, one effects service and worship of God. On this understanding, the martyr's death constitutes an effective sacrifice only if the martyr recognizes life as sacred, in which case s/he submits to martyrdom only as a matter of necessity in faith. Willingness to accept an unwelcome death thus separates Jehanne (and one might add Jesus) from those who orchestrate their own deaths in the name of faith. "In case a teacher is . . . enthusiastically conscious that he himself in his existence is expressing and has expressed by the sacrifice of everything the doctrine he preaches, this consciousness may well give him a sure and firm spirit, but it does not give him authority."[475] Real authority, asserts Kierkegaard, "is a specific quality which comes from another place and

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Jehanne's references to her physical purity. Nonetheless, this does not rule out the possibility that she was mauled or otherwise violated.

[472]Watts cites "Erigena, the Victorines, St Francis, Eckhart, Tauler, [and] St. Bonaventure" in this regard, all of whom he maintains were "at heart despisers of the world which 'God so loved,' and of the flesh which the Eternal Word became." Watts, 38.

[473]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 142.

[474]The New Lexicon Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, 1988 Can. ed.

[475]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 110.

makes itself felt."[476] Sacrifice alone does not constitute proof of divine sanction, although it can strengthen one's case. In the unwelcome death of a martyr, it is the very unwelcomeness which constitutes a compelling seal of faith. "[O]ne who does not know how to die does not know how to live," states Watts.[477] In recognizing life as sacred in death, one recognizes it as sacred in general. One is thus unable to commit murder or suicide lightly. Merton states that martyrdom provides a direct path to God;[478] but this does not suggest that it ought to be sought. On the interpretation herein offered, true martyrdom is not sought or suicidal. This is an important distinction in considering martyrdom as a possible indicator of legitimacy with respect to claims to divine sanction. Watts cautions against "the danger that the imitation of Christ may become monkey business" and emphasizes the importance of "not so much the outward form of Christ as his inner spiritual state. Humanly speaking, his inner state, the cause of his outward glory, was precisely his realization of the inescapable presence . . . of God and union with him."[479] Perhaps one of the dangers of the imitation of Christ to which Watts refers is sought martyrdom, which focuses on the outward event of the physical death of Jesus while failing to recognize his aversion toward martyrdom as demonstrated in the garden of Gethsemane.[480] "To seek out suffering," Watts holds, is to engage in "false moral heroics."[481]

Without seeking it, the prophet is one upon whom considerable suffering almost inevitably falls since s/he speaks with a powerful, polemical voice and is often feared, rejected, despised, and opposed by many, even if embraced by others. The prophetic "ministry of destabilization brings hostility as part of the territory," notes Brueggemann.[482] In light of this, the notion of physical well-being as an indication of divine sanction does not hold water since the prophet is frequently persecuted. As Martin Le Franc argued, that one might die "shamefully" is no reliable indication of the state of one's soul, citing Jesus as a case in point.[483] Moltmann notes that "Jesus was folly to the wise, a scandal to the devout and a disturber of the peace in the eyes of the

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[476]Ibid.

[477]Watts, 25.

[478]Merton, *Introduction to Christian Mysticism*, 46.

[479]Watts, 97-8.

[480]Jesus states, "I am deeply grieved." Mt. 26:38 NRSV. "My Father," he pleads, "if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not what I want but what you want." Mt. 26:39 NRSV.

[481]Watts, 245.

[482]Brueggemann, 242.

[483]Martin Le Franc, *Le champion des dames*, vol. 4, ed. R. Deschaux (Paris: 1999), 90-104; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 245-9. Quotation is from Taylor, 248-9. The poem was written between 1440 and 1442. Craig Taylor, 245.

mighty. That is why he was crucified. If anyone identifies with him, . . . [h]e becomes alienated from the wisdom, religion and power politics of his society. The crucified Christ became the brother of the despised, abandoned and oppressed."[484] The truly great, observes Kierkegaard, do not require admiration from the world and are not "relieved of the distress, the agony, and the paradox," but these stand at the heart of their greatness.[485] "They shall all be remembered," he reflects, "but everyone was great in proportion to the magnitude of what he *strove with.* For he who strove with the world became great by conquering the world, and he who strove with himself became greater by conquering himself; but he who strove with God became greater than all."[486] Jehanne evidently strove with the world (her pro-English enemies), with herself (her fear of the fire), and with God (her forbidden escape attempt); it is the path of the prophetic mystic. Reflecting on Kierkegaard's words, one understands that it is possible to conquer the world and oneself, but one does not conquer God; rather, one strives with God in conquering the world and oneself. Having conquered the world and oneself, there is nothing left to conquer—only God remains. This seems a fitting interpretation of martyrdom.

Merton speaks of the prophet as "one who bears the burden of the divine mercy—a burden which is a gift to [hu]mankind, but which remains a burden to the prophet in so far as no one will take it from him."[487] It is in rejection of the divine gift that the prophet is sometimes martyred; Jehanne, whose divine gift of peace, justice, and compassion was rejected by those who killed her, is such a case. In assessing claims to divine sanction, one might ask, what merciful gift does the claimant offer? If such a gift cannot be identified, one might rightly view the claim with suspicion.

Kierkegaard describes martyrs as

> those mighty dead who are able to do what no living man can do who lets men be cut down by thousands, what these mighty dead themselves could not do while they lived but are able to do only as dead men: to constrain to obedience a furious mob, just because this furious mob in disobedience took the liberty of slaying the martyrs. . . . [H]e conquers best who conquers last . . . by being put to death—an eternally certain conquest! And this sacrifice is the sacrifice of obedience, wherefore God looks with delight upon him, the obedient man, who offers himself as a sacrifice, whereas he gathers his wrath against disobedience which slays the

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[484]Moltmann, 24.
[485]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 77.
[486]Ibid., 15-6.
[487]Merton, *Disputed Questions*, 223.

> sacrifice—this sacrifice, the victor, is the martyr; for not everyone who is put to death is a martyr.[488]

Kierkegaard's description presents martyrdom as murder of the faithful (by humans) on account of their faith, a murder which is not, in itself, pleasing to God. Rather, the faith in and love of God in the heart of the martyr which drives the martyr's agonizing decision to suffer and die over the alternative of betraying God is potentially the most powerful gift that a human can offer God. On Kierkegaard's view, "God looks with delight upon" the martyr, but not the murder contained within martyrdom, upon the gift, but not the means.

Asked by the Rouen court on March 1, 1431 if her saints had promised her anything other than that "her King would be restored in his kingdom," and that they would lead her to heaven, Jehanne replied that she would reveal the other promise to them "within three months."[489] Jehanne was martyred on May 30, 1431, just two days short of three months from the date when she made the prediction, which suggests that her martyrdom itself constituted the revelation to which Jehanne had alluded, although she may not have known it. Moreover, when asked what sign she had shown Charles VII in order to convince him of the legitimacy and divinity of her mission, Jehanne responded, "[T]he sign that you need is for God to deliver me from your hands and that is the most certain sign that He knows to send to you."[490] Given that Jehanne's divine counsel referred to her martyrdom as deliverance, Jehanne's reference to her deliverance as a sign also conceivably refers to her martyrdom. Stated on March 10, only nine days after her promise to reveal a divine message within three months, the latter statement seems to constitute a second allusion to her martyrdom, although she was likely still grappling with the intended meaning behind the word 'deliverance' herself. The statements reinforce the notion of martyrdom as a sign, as revelation, but I propose the term 'inadvertent revelation' to denote a human event which, although not presumably initiated or necessarily condoned by God, nonetheless inadvertently serves to reveal something of God as a result of human witnessing combined with God's presence and

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[488]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, lix-lx.

[489]Jehanne, testimony of March 1, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 163.

[490]Jehanne, testimony of March 10, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 178. The sign which convinced Charles of the legitimacy of Jehanne's mission and of his legitimacy to the French throne, although never specifically revealed to anyone by Jehanne, was reported by several intimates of Charles; it is said that she revealed to him the content of his silent prayer concerning his doubts over the aforementioned matters. Pernoud, *Retrial,* 162. Pasquerel testified that, according to Jehanne, Charles informed others who were then present at Chinon that she had revealed to him "a certain secret that nobody knew or could know but God." Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 183.

participation in the event, as in the suffering of a martyr. The martyr succumbs to death by persisting in faith and persists in faith by succumbing to death.

Martyrdom is a powerful phenomenon which engraves its divine message on the world almost indelibly. In Jehanne's case, without her willingness to die for God and the obvious importance of her mortal destruction to the enemy, those inclined to portray her as a self-directed virago who managed to accomplish some military feats or, contrary to eyewitness testimony, as one who simply acted as a token presence on the battlefield while others conducted the real business of war, would have an easier time of it. Margolis holds that Jehanne's "lone mortal body, in war and in death, . . . offered the ultimate proof of her divine inspiration."[491] "Clearly," maintains Henry Ansgar Kelly, "she was an extraordinarily pious person throughout her military campaigns on behalf of her king. But would that have been enough for canonization, without the 'martyrdom' that she suffered later, that is, the witness of heroic fortitude and faith that she manifested during her persecution . . . ?"[492] In essence, Jehanne's martyrdom strengthened the legitimacy of her claim to divine sanction and her message to the world. "[O]utside of martyrdom," states Splett, "every other form of saintly witness remains, in a sense, only partial. It has not the unequivocal finality of martyrdom."[493]

The message of Jehanne's martyrdom contains both vocal and visceral components. The message revealed through her final words is manifold: (i) that God speaks to individuals; (ii) that humans err and are in need of forgiveness [It was an extraordinary act of forgiveness on Jehanne's part to absolve those responsible for sending her to the stake when the flames were only moments from consuming her.] and that even those acting at God's command require both divine and human forgiveness [In addition to forgiving others, Jehanne also requested their forgiveness and prayers for her soul. This suggests that Jehanne was fully aware that her participation in war inevitably contributed to the suffering of others, even if it was considered 'necessary' suffering, and demonstrates acceptance of personal responsibility toward others and toward God in her deeds.]; (iii) that physical suffering is not an indication of the absence of God [In fact, Jehanne invoked the Trinity and identified with Jesus (God incarnate) in her

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[491]Margolis, "The Mortal Body," 10. Merton states that saints do not accept suffering because they enjoy it and "may well hate suffering as much as anybody else," but are willing to prove their love for the divine "by any suffering." Thomas Merton, *No Man Is an Island* (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 1955), 79.

[492]Henry Ansgar Kelly, "Saint Joan and Confession: Internal and External Forum," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, ed. Ann W. Astell and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 78.

[493]Splett, 1497.

suffering.]; (iv) that God suffers with humans, [as suggested by Jehanne's request for and embracing of the crucifix]. The message delivered through Jehanne's burning body is: (i) that devotion to God does not provide immunity against earthly suffering; (ii) that faith requires not only surrender of personal will to God but surrender to earthly consequences as well; (iii) that no price is too high for the deliverance of divine Truth;[494] (iv) that God is worth dying for; (v) that love surpasses all.

Soelle asks whether or not mystical love can "sustain itself . . . in suffering,"[495] that is, in the apparent "midst of Godforsakenness."[496] Without doubt, Jehanne demonstrated that it can. Weil writes accordingly:

> The outward results of true affliction are nearly always bad. We lie when we try to disguise this. It is in affliction itself that the splendor of God's mercy shines, from its very depths, in the heart of its inconsolable bitterness. If still persevering in our love, we fall to the point where the soul cannot keep back the cry "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" if we remain at this point without ceasing to love, we end by touching something that is not affliction, not joy, something that is the central essence, necessary and pure, something not of the senses, common to joy and sorrow: the very love of God.[497]

"Dying in the same way as Jesus died, for the same reasons as he did, the martyrs multiply the revelation of the founding violence," asserts Girard.[498] One wonders how many martyrs humankind requires before we recognize and heed the revelation of love. How many must we cut down before we raise ourselves up? Are humans so averse to loving one another? Is it because this requires us to relinquish greed, selfishness, and the quest for worldly power and dominance? These questions must be asked in the interest of human freedom, integrity, and perhaps the very survival of humanity.

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[494]Moltmann describes the death "of the martyrs" as "a testimony of the truth against the lords of the lie." Moltmann, 64.

[495]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 133.

[496]Ibid., 137.

[497]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 43-4.

[498]Girard, *Things Hidden*, 173.

PART TWO

RIGHTEOUS WARFARE AND ITS APPLICABILITY

CHAPTER 3

RIGHTEOUS WARFARE AND HUMAN AGENCY

> Whatever makes a soldier sad
> will make a killer smile.
>
> —Leonard Cohen, "The Captain"

This chapter begins by exploring secular-theological issues pertaining to human agency in warfare. It also considers the main tenets of just war theory prior to constructing a model of righteous warfare and human agency based on Jehanne's example. Let us draw some preliminary observations.

In Jehanne's time, people paid attention to visionaries as there was a general receptivity to mystical phenomena—even medieval kings consulted visionaries.[1] Now heads of state speak the language of visionaries and prophets without accompanying characteristics of a visionary prophet and win widespread support, while anyone who might display visionary traits is susceptible to being branded insane or absurd. There is an obvious need for discernment in the matter. If one is to pay serious attention to appeals to divine sanction in acts of war—and they ought to be regarded seriously given their demonstrated impact—then it is expedient to acknowledge the possibility of legitimate mystical experience without which one could not receive communication of a divine nature and all such claims could simply be disregarded. This work does not endeavour to prove the validity of Jehanne's claim to divine sanction since that cannot be done; rather, she is taken as a compelling example of one who fulfilled an authentic prophetic mission on the strength of evidence presented and evaluated in previous chapters. It is not so much the nature of her claim that is considered since the claim itself is straightforward, but it is the nature of the calling experienced by her and her response to it which are most instructive for the purpose of constructing a model of righteous warfare and human agency.

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[1]Llewellyn Barstow, 61.

In speaking of war and God, Caroline Myss associates war with external power and God with internal power, stating that humans live between the two realms.[2] It seems, however, that Jehanne lived directly in both realms simultaneously, exerting external power by means of internal power (e.g., infused grace) derived from God. This is perhaps the only possible placement of a divine warrior, not positioned between extremities but with one foot firmly planted in each realm, corresponding to Cohen's "balance in the chaos of existence" attributed to the saint.[3] A warrior positioned otherwise would not conceivably qualify as a divine warrior. Tavard observes that

> Jeanne lived in two worlds at the same time, on earth with its miseries and struggles and in what she called paradise with the angels and saints of God. The second world was as real to her as the first. In terms of their objective dignity, however, the kingdom of paradise was first and earth was second. Everything that is good on earth reflects something of heaven. . . . Thus Jeanne's inner life is inseparable from her actions.[4]

Secular-Theological Considerations Regarding Human Agency

> If you want others to be happy, practice compassion.
> If you want to be happy, practice compassion.
>
> —14th Dalai Lama

Within the context of this work, the term 'secular-theological considerations' denotes areas of inquiry that are confined neither to the theological nor the secular realm of understanding but are potentially relevant to both. While the issues raised cannot be treated exhaustively within the scope of this work, they are presented in their most pertinent aspects to understanding Jehanne and claims to divine sanction. The topics under consideration include human evil, ethics, chivalry, conscience, and compassion.

Evil is a complex matter and, while most individuals have some sense or notion of its existence, there is no general agreement with respect to its constitution; definitions, theories, and categories of evil abound. It is not my purpose to conduct a historical survey of the so-called 'problem of evil.' Rather, various definitions and categories of evil are identified and discussed as they arise in relation to our further exploration of claims to divine sanction in war. Let us begin with some definitions.

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[2]Caroline Myss, *Keynote address: OMEGA Being Fearless Conference* (New York: April 12, 2008). Available from http://www.myss.com/CMED/media/; Internet; accessed 13 March 2009.

[3]L. Cohen, *Beautiful Losers*, 99.

[4]Tavard, 70.

"[E]vil is not an abstraction; it is a powerful reality,"[5] states Lawrence S. Cunningham, engaging a longstanding debate. That evil is real appears self-evident, but reality and abstraction are not necessarily mutually exclusive; rather, reality and abstraction represent two aspects of evil—evil manifests concretely in experienced events and exists abstractly as a capacity, quality, or intention. On this view, evil is not reducible to pure abstraction. Nonetheless, the privation doctrine of evil holds that moral evil does not exist independently but only implicitly, as privation of goodness or "right order" resulting from a will turned away from God. Origen conceived of human evil in this way, and the concept was later propounded by Plotinus and Saint Augustine.[6] Arendt, however, considers it a "philosophical prejudice" to assert "that evil is no more than a privative *modus* of the good, that good can come out of evil; that, in short, evil is but a temporary manifestation of a still-hidden good. Such time-honoured opinions have become dangerous," she warns. "They are shared by many . . . for the simple reason that they inspire hope and dispel fear—a treacherous hope used to dispel legitimate fear,"[7] fear of evil as an actual reality. Moreover, she maintains that violence "cannot be derived from its opposite"[8] and, on the same premise, one might suppose that evil cannot be derived from good. Furthermore, it should be noted that evil conceived as privation does not necessarily render it a nonentity. Darkness exists although it is an absence of light. It is equally true to state that light is an absence of darkness; therefore, one might just as easily argue that goodness is an absence of evil, turning the whole privation argument concerning evil on its head. Lack in opposites is a reciprocal inevitability. To be devoid of one thing is to be another; such absence does not entail utter non-existence, but only non-existence of a particular quality in a given entity or phenomenon. For example, thoughtlessness denotes lack of thought of a particular kind, such as consideration for others, but it implies thought of another kind, such as narcissistic thought. Evil as a reality lacking the quality of goodness is a more useful concept than evil as a nonentity, as mere illusion, since nonentities cannot exert power in the world. Evil conceived as a nonentity demands that all experiences of evil be denied validity, yet one can neither justifiably nor logically deny the existence of evil any more than one can

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[5]Lawrence S. Cunningham, *The Catholic Heritage: Martyrs, Ascetics, Pilgrims, Warriors, Mystics, Theologians, Artists, Humanists, Activists, Outsiders, and Saints* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1983), 25.

[6]Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, *Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Image Books, 1950), 27, 84-5.

[7]Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 1969), 56.

[8]Ibid.

justifiably or logically deny the existence of good. While evil might be characterized as lacking certain qualities, it cannot arise from lack since something does not arise from nothing. Evil can arise in conditions of lack and conceivably requires certain conditions of lack for its existence, but it does not consist in lack.

Peter van Inwagen maintains that "the word 'evil' . . . has at least two meanings: 'bad things' and 'the extreme reaches of moral depravity,'" which he equates with the terms "ordinary evil" and "radical evil" respectively. He notes that evil understood as "radical evil" has constituted the predominant definition for centuries.[9] (This work will not address natural evil, which might be defined as suffering not inflicted by humans but by apparently uncontrollable natural forces such as natural disasters, illness, or the inherent violence of the food chain.) R.S. Downie defines human or moral evil as "suffering which results from morally wrong human choices, especially when the moral wrong is of an extreme kind." He identifies several types of moral evil. The "evil of fanaticism," he explains, arises when "sincerely held beliefs, such as political ideologies or religious fundamentalism," create "evil effects" while ignoring the suffering of individuals. Downie also identifies "self-interest" as a potential form of evil. "The pursuit of self-interest at the expense of others," he argues, "is a common form of moral wrongdoing, but when the others are made to suffer in outstandingly bad ways," self-interest enters the terrain of "moral evil." Another type of moral evil, he asserts, is satisfaction obtained through "the infliction of suffering for its own sake." This includes [but is not limited to] humiliation [or dehumanization] of others. Downie also cites "the will of political rulers" specifically as a possible source of moral evil since "the social and political conditions of a regime" can encourage or permit evil deeds. For Downie, "failure in moral imagination" constitutes a form of moral evil as well, such as when one fails to imagine the sufferings of a remote victim to one's actions.[10]

There is no evidence that Jehanne participated in any of the identified forms of moral evil. She neither inflicted suffering for its own sake nor treated anyone's suffering lightly. She forbade unnecessary evil. She demonstrated an extreme absence of self-interest and sought to align her will with divine will, operating first and foremost from that position rather than from the will of any political leader. In fact, she never hesitated to voice disagreement with those in authority, including the King of France.

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[9]Peter van Inwagen, *The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13-4.

[10]R.S. Downie, s.v. "Evil, human," in Ted Honderich, ed., *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 273.

Consistently extending compassion to all victims, Jehanne was not lacking in moral imagination. On all counts, she defied moral evil, which might be summarily understood as the unnecessary (intentional or thoughtless) infliction of suffering.

An obvious manifestation of evil is the calculated use of torture—obvious, yet still widely practiced and somewhat overlooked. Arendt reminds us that death is not the worst possible fate.[11] The fact that humankind employs torture ought to be the cause of gravest moral concern, yet there is a degree of acceptance with regard to this blatantly evil practice. Daniel Hobbins, for example, comments that the use of torture to extract confessions became "regulated . . . in ecclesiastical trials after abuses occurred,"[12] betraying a startling disregard for the fact that all torture constitutes abuse, even "regulated" torture. The fact that something is permitted or regulated does not render it morally acceptable. At any rate, the use of torture is not supported by Jehanne's model of behaviour.

If humans possess free will, then each of us is capable of goodness and evil alike. Accordingly, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn maintains that "the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being."[13] If evil endures in humanity, goodness can also endure. Jehanne represents the possibility of engaging evil actively from a position of goodness, with love and compassion. In this way, evil is not completely divorced from goodness and is denied the ability to reign freely. In the presence of goodness evil is mitigated insofar as it must accommodate the good, even if only by conceding it space, so to speak. In such circumstances evil, rather than being granted the upper hand, must contend with goodness, but where evil is overlooked it grows unchecked. The recommendation that evil be left to its own devices in hope that it will be transformed by example or by love alone has proven an unrealistic and unreliable strategy. Moral indifference (the failure to be moved by moral evil) is also treacherous, and Heschel warns against this:

> There is an evil which most of us condone and are even guilty of: indifference to evil. We remain neutral, impartial, and not easily moved by the wrongs done unto other people. Indifference to evil is more insidious than evil itself; it is more universal, more contagious, more

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[11]Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1965), 12.

[12]Hobbins, 16.

[13]Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation I-II*, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (London: Collins & Harvill Press, 1973), 168.

> dangerous. A silent justification, it makes possible an evil erupting as an exception becoming the rule and being in turn accepted.[14]

Also, Saint Teresa notes that "unrighteous persons are incited to make their evil known so that evil becomes so customary it seems socially justified."[15] Passivity, whether born of indifference or conviction, is a powerful phenomenon that can contribute to the growth of evil whereas evil can sometimes be checked by combative force (counter-evil).[16] For the prophet of God, recognition of and active opposition to evil are absolute imperatives.

> Indeed, the sort of crimes and even the amount of delinquency that fill the prophets of Israel with dismay do not go beyond that which we regard as normal, as typical ingredients of social dynamics . . . .
>
> Their breathless impatience with injustice may strike us as hysteria. We ourselves witness continually acts of injustice, manifestations of hypocrisy, falsehood, outrage, misery, but we rarely grow indignant or overly excited. To the prophets even a minor injustice assumes cosmic proportions.
>
> . . . But if such deep sensitivity to evil is to be called hysterical, what name should be given to the abysmal indifference to evil which the prophet bewails?[17]

The prophets' railing against societal corruption accords with Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's claim that "they who do not lose their mind over certain things have no mind to lose."[18]

When one recognizes one's capacity for and participation in evil there is less basis upon which to demonize others. The importance of acknowledging all evil as pure and unqualified rather than attempting to separate it into categories of 'greater' or 'lesser' evil cannot be overstated since such qualification allows one to participate in evil while demonizing others as 'more evil.' Michael Ignatieff advances the idea of a lesser evil. "To insist that justified exercises of coercion can be defined as a lesser evil is to say that evil can be qualified," he explains, but "it is essential to the idea of a lesser evil that one can justify resort to it without denying that it is evil, justifiable only because other means would be insufficient or unavailable."[19] One either fights "evil with evil" or succumbs, he asserts. In resorting to this "lesser evil," Ignatieff reiterates, one

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[14]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 64.

[15]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, 93.

[16]Watts holds that "inaction is merely an indirect form of action." Watts, 93.

[17]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 4-5.

[18]Lessing's statement is taken from Soelle. Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 255.

[19]Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror* (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2004), 18.

should recognize "that evil is involved" and "should act under a demonstrable state of necessity."[20] Perhaps Ignatieff means to qualify evil with respect to intent and not to quality or essence, but this would constitute a contradiction since to qualify evil in any respect qualifies its quality or essence. The terminology of a "lesser evil" is dangerous in that it diminishes ('lessens') awareness of the consistent degree of transparency, awareness, responsibility, accountability, and gravity with which all evil must be viewed. Moreover, the concept of degrees of good is inferred from the concept of degrees of evil which implies that, if an event or action is not purely evil, (i.e., evil in the highest degree), then it is evil in part and must also be either partly good or partly neutral. This, however, is in league with the privation doctrine of evil and is susceptible to similar criticisms. As Weil maintains, "[g]ood is essentially other than evil."[21] To contemplate degrees of evil and degrees of good confounds the two and obscures the essential nature of each. Evil is, by its nature, unqualified.

It is consistent with Jehanne's example to view all war and all acts of human violence as inherently evil, whether or not participation in them might be considered divinely sanctioned or otherwise justifiable. As a warrior, Jehanne was not completely opposed to the use of violence, but she held restrictions on how and when it ought to be employed, and she was not indifferent to the violence in which she participated. During the condemnatory trial, she indicated that she liked a particular sword because it "was a good sword for war, and good for giving hard clouts and strong blows."[22] However, when questioned as to whether she preferred her sword or her standard, she replied that she preferred her standard by far, and that she carried it during battle "in order to avoid killing anyone," adding "that she had never killed anyone at all."[23] She once indirectly consented to the killing of a Burgundian mercenary captain who had admitted to murder, theft, and treason—so long as he deserved it. Jehanne had requested the man's exchange for a French prisoner; however, on learning that the latter was dead, she advised the bailly to do with the Burgundian whatever justice demanded. The man was tried for two weeks and judged guilty by the bailly and other legal officials, so she did not play a direct role in the matter.[24] Nonetheless, in engaging in war Jehanne was involved in the

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[20]Ignatieff, 19.

[21]Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, 70.

[22]Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 156-7.

[23]Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 82. Jehanne's testimony on this matter is supported by that of Seguin; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 114.

[24]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 190. Franquet d'Arras was the name of the Burgundian captain in question.

business of killing, contrary to her aversion to bloodshed. In examining her conscience regularly, partaking in the sacrament of confession, and praying for forgiveness, she demonstrated acute awareness of the nature and implications of her deeds. "Not only modern war but every war employs arms that turn against those who wield them," states Emmanuel Levinas.[25] Weil asserts that

> [c]ontact with the sword causes the same defilement whether it be through the handle or the point. For him who loves, its metallic coldness will not destroy love, but will give the impression of being abandoned by God. . . . Murder freezes the soul of the man who loves only with a pure love, whether he be the author or the victim, so likewise does everything which, without going so far as actual death, constitutes violence.[26]

Defilement comprises part of the unwholesome burden borne by one who employs divinely sanctioned violence. While Jehanne justified her actions on the basis of divine command, there is no indication that she attempted to qualify them or those of her soldiers—war was war, bloodshed was bloodshed, evil was evil, and accountability was accountability. She neither sought concealment of her deeds in collective anonymity nor raised her claim to divine sanction as a shield against individual responsibility. During sentencing at Rouen, Jehanne stated "that she charged no one with her deeds and words, neither her King nor anyone else; and if there were any fault, it was hers alone."[27]

Merton notes that

> [t]here are crimes which no one would commit as an individual which he willingly . . . commits when acting in the name of his society, because he has been (too easily) convinced that evil is entirely different when it is done "for the common good." . . . [Such individuals] have acquired a special deformity of conscience as a result of their identification with their group, their immersion in their particular society. This deformation is the price they pay to forget and to exorcise that solitude which seems to them to be a demon.[28]

Pernoud holds that the "amnesiac is no more a complete person than an irresponsible person is; neither one enjoys the full exercise of his faculties, which alone allow man true freedom without endangering himself or his peers."[29] Arne Johan Vetlesen maintains that the practice of "[c]ollectivizing human agency . . . is tantamount to

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[25]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 21.

[26]Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, 63.

[27]Jehanne, testimony of May 24, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 217.

[28]Merton, *Disputed Questions*, 183.

[29]Régine Pernoud, *Those Terrible Middle Ages! Debunking the Myths*, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 173.

obliterating the morally and legally crucial distinction between individual and group,"[30] while Kierkegaard describes the effectiveness of vague, collective concepts in the advancement of political agendas. "'[T]he multitude,' an absurd monster or a monstrous absurdity, which nevertheless is physically in possession of power," is actually an "abstraction," he points out, "an inhuman something, the power of which is, to be sure, prodigious, but it is a prodigious power which cannot be defined in human terms, but more properly as one defines the power of a machine, . . . [as] horsepower. . . . This abstraction, whether you will call it the public or the multitude or the majority or the senseless people—this abstraction is used politically to bring about movement."[31] Jehanne did not operate from such collective abstractions, clearly identifying herself as Jehanne *la pucelle* and stating her purpose and method unambiguously.

George Kren identifies a common failure among late twentieth-century ethicists to come to terms with the notion of holding individuals responsible for evil actions committed under the official sanction of a nation or state.[32] "Where all are guilty, no one is," observes Arendt. "[C]onfessions of collective guilt are the best possible safeguard against the discovery of culprits, and the very magnitude of the crime the best excuse for doing nothing."[33] Kren notes, for example, that pilots who bomb cities are seldom, if ever, held responsible or accountable for the resultant deaths. Similarly, opponents of the death penalty criticize the law but do not normally hold executioners responsible for their deeds.[34] Arendt declares that "about nothing does public opinion everywhere seem to be in happier agreement than that no one has the right to judge somebody else. What public opinion permits us to judge and even to condemn are trends, or whole groups of people . . . in short, something so general that distinctions can no longer be made, names no longer be named."[35] While one might argue that individuals do judge the actions of other individuals, such judgment is relatively inconsequential unless enacted in an official capacity, whereby it ceases to constitute individual judgment in the eyes of the public but becomes collective judgment under the law of a people as enforced by the

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[30]Arne Johan Vetlesen, "Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the Bystander," in *Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 361.

[31]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 193.

[32]George M. Kren, "The Holocaust: Moral Theory and Immoral Acts," in *Echoes From the Holocaust: Philosophical Reflections on a Dark Time*, ed. Alan Rosenberg and Gerald E. Myers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 247.

[33]Arendt, *On Violence*, 65.

[34]Kren, 247-8.

[35]Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 296.

state. Even judgment, then, is generally perceived as a collective behaviour in that one is considered to be judged by the legal system as a whole. As Guy Adams and Danny Balfour point out, however, ethical behaviour is not properly defined as "doing things" legally, efficiently, effectively, and professionally since this does not necessarily ensure "the well-being of individuals," particularly those who are most vulnerable in a given society.[36] Free will and individual responsibility go hand in hand, (the former implies the latter), and individual responsibility cannot be appropriately or legitimately dissolved within collective rules or notions of collective responsibility. Jehanne took seriously her personal role in the maintenance of social justice, acknowledging the ethical responsibility which rests upon individuals regardless of the general disposition of the society within which they operate. "[T]he lonely courage of Joan of Arc means that no one who simply follows the crowd can be said to follow her," asserts Astell.[37]

Another form of ethical failure is the attempt to conceal the true intentions motivating an evil deed. Consider former American President George Bush's oft-repeated slogan that the United States of America and its allies had launched a "war on terror" by invading Afghanistan and Iraq following the 2001 attacks on the U.S.A. Countless individuals latched onto the term, drank it in and spewed it out without apparently pausing to acknowledge that war *is* terror! It is a nonsensical expression; the terror caused by Bush's directives is synonymous with the terror which he purportedly aimed to eradicate, but there was an apparent absence of clarity and honesty surrounding the affair. The contradiction in terms ought to be obvious to anyone giving the phrase a moment's thought but, unfortunately, a moment's thought seems more than many are willing to devote to destructive and consequential human activities, and therein lies much of the problem. Contrary to Bush's use of the word, Jim Forest cites Merton's frequent reference to "terrorism" not as indicating clandestine activities of a violent group, but as denoting "the acceptance by governments of tactics of war that result in large numbers of noncombatant" deaths.[38] There is obviously a case to be made that both forms of activity constitute terrorism. The purpose of this discussion is not to dispel the viable argument that it is sometimes acceptable to engage in violence in order to end it; it is to stress the need for clarity, honesty, and integrity in all such activities. Jehanne

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[36]Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, *Unmasking Administrative Evil* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1998), 170.

[37]Astell, "Joan of Arc and Spirituality," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, 4.

[38]Jim Forest, foreword to *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, by Thomas Merton, ed. Patricia A. Burton (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2004), xix.

was an extremely forthright and honest person; she did not attempt to convince anyone that what she engaged in was something other than what it actually was. She expressed her intentions clearly and publicly, in plain language, employing a direct manner of speech; in fact, she is described as "disarming in her straightforwardness."[39]

The use of "poorly understood and emotionally loaded clichés" to justify belligerent actions[40] is also demonstrated by Bush's vague but influential term, "axis of evil," intended to demonize others in an attempt to legitimize further his country's offensive actions.[41] Jehanne did not utilize such language and did not demonize the enemy. She did not claim French superiority, (not even militarily since she attributed their military success to God), but simply identified the pro-English offenses, demanded rectification, and declared it God's will that the English leave France. She did not portray the English as 'other' in terms of the inhuman, subhuman or demonic; rather, she fought an invader of her land and oppressor of her people, not one construed as an enemy in any other sense. "[W]ar becomes unlimited," suggests John von Heyking, "when participants view each other as unequal, whether as heretics, heathens, devils, or simply 'lesser breeds without the law.'"[42] Yet "[i]nternational human rights conventions" remind us "that even . . . enemies have rights, which are not dependent upon reciprocity or good conduct," states Ignatieff.[43] Weil defines justice as "love for one's neighbor."[44] "We have invented the distinction between justice and charity," she asserts.[45] As we know, Jehanne was a charitable individual, and the following passage by Tavard captures her undiscriminating charity:

> Jeanne's mission was to be a virgin soul. Only a virgin soul can engage in the struggle for justice without feeling hatred for the unjust, can obtain victory without taking pride in success, can be the innocent victim of a political and ecclesiastical machine bent on destroying her without acrimony toward those who have engineered her condemnation, can face the threat of torture with equanimity, and can go to death by fire with full confidence in God.[46]

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[39]Pernoud and Clin, 224.

[40]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 19.

[41]Forest labels the term propagandist. Forest, xx.

[42]John von Heyking, "Taming Warriors in Classical and Early Medieval Political Theory," in *Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 15.

[43]Ignatieff, ix.

[44]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 24.

[45]Ibid., 85.

[46]Tavard, 51. Pope Benedict XVI explains that "[v]irginity of soul is the *state of grace*, a supreme value, for her [Jehanne] more precious than life. It is a gift of God which is to be received and preserved

"The supernatural virtue of justice" requires "behaving exactly as though there were equality when one is the stronger in an unequal relationship," Weil explains,[47] but how might the notion of divine chosenness be understood in relation to equality? Theoretically, divine chosenness is not necessarily a matter of individual or collective favouritism or unconditional, perpetual selection, but it might be viewed as election to a cause—such as the cause of justice (and concomitant peace). Upon restoration of justice, the chosenness factor in such instances conceivably dissolves or all become 'chosen.' This is not to suggest that one can divest oneself of accountability for past deeds simply by altering one's course, but it discourages the casting of a people as good or evil based on claims to perpetual divine chosenness. Hence, the prophet might speak of election to a task and the oppressed of divine assistance without invoking the notion of chosenness, which can carry a connotation of permanence that is incompatible with Jehanne's treatment of the matter.

A further concern must be addressed. Against the sanctity of life, killing stands as intrinsically evil, but to what category of evil does killing in defense of self or others belong? It is not natural evil, nor is it moral evil in any of the senses discussed. I propose that it be categorized as 'morally necessary evil,' designating necessary, minimal, defensive actions in accordance with conscience as well as divinely sanctioned actions in accordance with prophetic revelation. Needless to say, the term 'morally necessary evil' ought not to be flaunted lightly and it is recommended that it be applied only in conjunction with the model of righteous warfare and human agency herein proposed.

It is not the purpose of this work to conduct a thorough evaluation of traditional moral systems[48] but it is expedient to note some insufficiencies and to consider a possible alternative or complementary form of morality. It is a mystical form of morality which transcends ordinary morality in certain extraordinary circumstances and corresponds to the idea of morally necessary evil. Mystical morality is not necessarily a morality applicable to all situations at all times, but it is applicable to claims to divine sanction since it is based on faith in and obedience to divine revelation. The human

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with humility and trust." Pope Benedict XVI, "Saint Joan of Arc," General Audience, Paul VI Audience Hall, January 26, 2011 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2011). Available from http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2011/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20110126_en.html; Internet; accessed 8 September 2011.

[47]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 87.

[48]Utilitarianism will be given particular consideration.

"sense of injustice is a poor analogy to God's sense of injustice," states Heschel.[49] While disregard for human morality is risky, morality itself is also potentially dangerous since, in attempting to engage it, one risks erring. History demonstrates the ongoing failure of human morality. Certainly, no humanly constructed ethical system is infallible or completely sufficient.

Teleological ethics specifies a desired outcome against which actions are judged to be right or wrong, assigning "a standard of value to the consequences of . . . actions." Actions which fulfill the standard are deemed right while those which deviate from it are considered wrong. It should be noted that teleological ethical systems define the consequences of an action as consisting in "*all* the effects which the action has in the future of the world." In circumstances where a consequence is judged as neither good nor bad but neutral, it is considered to have no bearing on determination of the rightness or wrongness of the action from which it arises. However, even the slightest degree of goodness or badness in a consequence is to be factored into the calculation of whether the action which gives rise to it is to be considered right or wrong.[50] Immediately one apprehends absurdity in the assumption that humans are able even to approach accuracy in predictive calculations of this sort. Nevertheless, elements of a system of teleological ethics known as utilitarianism are commonly employed.[51] According to utilitarianism, utility is the standard against which rightness or wrongness of an action is measured, wherein utility is considered the bringing about of "a *desirable* or *good* end," one with "*intrinsic value*." Intrinsic value refers to the value of something as an end in itself, as valuable for its own sake, whereas that which is valuable as a means to an end is considered instrumentally valuable. In the latter instance, the means would not be considered valuable if the end were not so considered; the value of the means is thus derived from the value of the end. That which is considered intrinsically valuable is said

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[49]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 64.

[50]Paul W. Taylor, *Principles of Ethics: An Introduction* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1975), 56.

[51]Utilitarianism can be divided into two categories: act utilitarianism (unrestricted), and rule utilitarianism (restricted). Act utilitarians hold that the consequences of an individual's particular action determine its rightness or wrongness while rule utilitarians hold that right action conforms to a set of rules governing conduct which bring about the best possible consequences for everyone when followed. In rule utilitarianism, the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by its conformity to or deviation from a utilitarian rule or set of rules. Such rules include requirements to act in a specific manner (positive rules) and prohibitions against specific action or sorts of action (negative rules), and all are applicable to everyone in circumstances where one can freely choose one's behaviour. The essential issue separating act and rule utilitarians is whether utility should function as the standard for directly judging the morality of particular acts or whether its proper function is to determine morally acceptable social rules and practices. Ibid., 63-4, 66, 69.

to be nonderivative. Utilitarianism acknowledges that some things might possess one kind of value alone while others might possess both; something can be considered simultaneously good intrinsically and instrumentally or simultaneously bad in both respects.[52]

Since the fundamental principle of utilitarianism maintains that "*the right depends on the good,*" it is necessary to assess the goodness or badness of the consequences of an action prior to performing it. According to utilitarianism, the "moral rightness of an act is not itself an intrinsic value," but "an act is right only when it is instrumentally good and its rightness consists in its instrumental goodness." As goodness in the utilitarian sense refers to pleasure, happiness, or intrinsic goodness, right action is defined as that which promotes these states while wrong action is construed as that which promotes displeasure, pain, unhappiness, or intrinsic evil.[53] On this view, "no act is [considered] morally wrong in itself. Its wrongness depends entirely on its consequences."[54]

One might wonder among whom utility is to be calculated. While the utilitarian response is that "*everyone's* pleasure, happiness, or intrinsic good" must be equally considered,[55] such pan-inclusivity is impossible. Who, then, is to be excluded from the calculation and on what basis? There is no simple answer. Moreover, one might note that the calculation is based on personal values which are highly subjective; we do not all share the same definition of pleasure, happiness, or intrinsic goodness. Consequently, the universally representative calculation that utilitarians aim to achieve is impracticable, if honourable.

The basic utilitarian formula for ethical evaluation recommends the following: (i) Consider all possible courses of action; (ii) Calculate as accurately as possible the likely consequences of each possible course of action. This involves estimating, for each alternative, the quantity or degree of probable positive and negative consequences to everyone affected; (iii) Compare the predicted consequences of each action in order to determine which one points to the greatest overall amount of pleasure, happiness, and intrinsic goodness and the least overall amount of displeasure, unhappiness, and intrinsic evil; and (iv) Act in accordance with the action which is determined likely to yield the maximum intrinsic value and the least intrinsic disvalue; this act is deemed the only

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[52]Ibid., 59-60.
[53]Ibid., 60.
[54]Ibid., 62.
[55]Ibid., 61.

morally acceptable one. That the calculation is to be performed completely impartially[56] represents an obvious difficulty since it is highly unlikely and probably impossible that one will maintain impartiality on both the conscious and subconscious levels while conducting such an assessment. Hence, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the utilitarian formula is most likely to be applied partially, in which case it can be used to 'justify' anything depending on one's perspective; it could even 'justify' opposing sides of a single dilemma. Michael Walzer critically discusses the utilitarian approach adopted by the United States government in detonating two atomic bombs over Japan in 1945 with the purported goal of ending World War II.[57] Walzer notes that, "had the Japanese exploded an atomic bomb over an American city, killing tens of thousands of civilians and thereby shortening the agony of war, the action would clearly have been [considered] a crime" by the American government[58] rather than an acceptable utilitarian means to an end. Furthermore, one is prompted to ask why two atomic bombs rather than one were employed against Japan if the aim was to demonstrate the capacity for destruction possessed by the American forces and to instill fear for the purpose of terminating all opposition. One such horrific bomb would surely have accomplished this as effectively as two—which is not to condone the use even of one but to cite an obvious weakness in the rationale offered for the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Acknowledging that detailed utilitarian calculations are cumbersome and not easily applied to all possible ethical dilemmas arising in everyday life, utilitarians advocate acting in accordance with habit derived from past experience when precedents are available.[59] The problem with this is that precedent does not always serve morality—take, for example, the nuclear bombing of Japan mentioned above; even in retrospect, some people maintain that it was necessary and, on utilitarian grounds, would condone repetition of similar atrocities in kind or scale. Moreover, deference to precedent can too easily become habit, a lazy or convenient way of avoiding responsible ethical decision-making.

In light of the problem of identifying with certainty, or even probability, all who would be affected by a given action and what the various effects would be in the future of the world, one must inevitably consider over what period of time (how many

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[56]Ibid., 61-2.

[57]Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 263-8.

[58]Ibid., 264.

[59]Paul Taylor, 62.

generations) effect might reasonably be calculated, but this is an arbitrary decision at best. If one had attempted to calculate in advance the total or net effect of Hitler's "final solution," would the (questionable) guilt and shame assumed by subsequent generations of Germans have been factored into the calculation? And what of the Jewish children (born and unborn) who were murdered, and the unconceived progeny of those who died? The value of that which is not permitted to come into existence or to grow cannot be accurately estimated. Moreover, quantity is not necessarily more valuable, desirable or advantageous than quality. What if the one person killed to save the many in a given situation might have (or might have produced a child who might have) helped save the world or found a cure for cancer or a solution to poverty, environmental devastation, or war for that matter? Such possibilities cannot be factored into the utilitarian equation since what might be cannot be attributed certainty or even expectability, and it is sometimes the unexpected which has the most intrinsic or instrumental value. "Predictions," states Arendt, ". . . are never anything but projections of present automatic processes and procedures, that is, of occurrences that are likely to come to pass if men do not act and if nothing unexpected happens; every action . . . and every accident necessarily destroys the whole pattern in whose frame the prediction moves and where it finds its evidence."[60] "It is the function . . . of all action," she points out, ". . . to interrupt what otherwise would have proceeded automatically and therefore predictably."[61] "Since the end of human action . . . can never be reliably predicted, the means used to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals."[62]

The fact that utilitarianism fails to provide certainty in ethical calculation is not its most outstanding danger since legitimate certainty is seldom, if ever, attainable in moral evaluation except, perhaps, in hindsight. What is more dangerous is the illusion of certainty in performing ethical calculations, supposition that one can accurately predict outcomes and oblivion to or disregard for the possibility—indeed, the likelihood—of error. Utilitarian ethics, with its notably mathematical language of formula, calculation, net utility, positive result, negative result, greatest number, least number, problem, and solution, is susceptible to illusions of certainty, precision, accuracy, completeness, and appropriateness, whereas human ethical calculation is never

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[60]Arendt, *On Violence*, 7.
[61]Ibid., 30-1.
[62]Ibid., 4.

as precise or reliable as mathematics. We need only recall the implications of the term "final solution" during World War II in order to grasp the potentially insidious power lurking within such mathematical language employed in the field of moral reasoning. One of the dangers of predictive theories, Arendt warns, is that "they have a hypnotic effect; they put to sleep our common sense, which is nothing else but our mental organ for perceiving, understanding, and dealing with reality and factuality."[63] Merton observes that scientifically objective consideration of moral issues, which "reduces human persons to statistical anonymity . . . and calculates how many millions we can lose 'and still get along,' . . . contributes to the . . . blunting of humane and moral sensibility and it accustoms minds to" indifference.[64] Moral reflection based on "pragmatic principles" is not only "vague" and "fluid," he insists, but also produces "opportunistic choices based on short term guesses of possible consequences."[65]

In light of these observations, let us return to the concept of 'lesser evil,' which is utilitarian in nature and thus similarly flawed. It is a notably mathematical term which suggests precision of calculation and, like other utilitarian claims, the possibility of accurately and objectively measuring evil in its past, present, and future manifestations but, as previously pointed out, this is impossible to accomplish. The evaluation of "greater" and "lesser evil" is skewed by human subjectivity, which is to say that one seldom counts the destruction of oneself or one's people as a lesser evil than that of a perceived enemy, (or even an equal evil), regardless of the numbers involved. For instance, Merton observes that, during the cold war, fellow-Americans were "almost ready to permit any outrage, any excess, any horror" on grounds of "lesser evil" deemed "'necessary' to save" their nation.[66] Such biased allegiance and activity are not uncommon and can clearly hinder moral reasoning.

Although we have explored just one form of ethics, it is sufficient to establish awareness of the potential for gross miscalculation inherent in human ethical systems; hence, it is not terribly unnerving to contemplate a teleological suspension of the ethical as described by Kierkegaard in situations involving divine sanction. In fact, temporary suspension of the notion of ethical systems as authoritative seems not only appropriate but morally desirable in situations of divine revelation in the sense that it is neither expedient to apply moral laws to nor to derive them from individual mystical directives

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[63]Ibid., 8.
[64]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 14.
[65]Ibid., 65.
[66]Ibid., 60.

which are case specific, such as the *Aqedah.* Nonetheless, case specific directives can serve a general pedagogical moral purpose when properly understood and applied to subsequent events; they might, for example, suggest emulation of some aspect of attitude or behaviour, such as the aspect of faith in the *Aqedah,* (not murder).

Kierkegaard's notion of teleological suspension of the ethical in obedience to divine revelation qualifies as an ethic of faith, contrary to purely utilitarian ethics, which is not to suggest that it is devoid of utilitarian purpose but that it is derived from and grounded in faith; any utilitarian purpose that it might serve would presumably be a divine purpose which may or may not be aligned with a calculated human purpose. The notion of teleological ethical suspension is supported by Watts's claim that "[m]orality is a by-product of union with God."[67] One must, of course, employ utmost discretion in interpreting and applying the notion of ethical suspension in order to avoid misappropriating it. For example, moral vacuity employed to evil ends such as genocide constitutes teleological suspension of the ethical, but the example is not representative of Kierkegaard's knight of faith who, in teleologically suspending the ethical, does so on the basis of faith and in a position of absolute relation to the Absolute and all that this entails. It is the absolute relationship of absolute faith in the Absolute that constitutes the fundamental pedagogical element of Kierkegaard's teaching on the subject and that must be assessed in considering various claims to divine sanction involving teleological suspension of the ethical. One who suspends the ethical but does not stand in an absolute relation to the Divine while claiming to do so constitutes a false knight of faith. The model of righteous warfare and human agency derived from Jehanne will assist in distinguishing between the true knight of faith (the prophet) and the false knight of faith (the false prophet).

While teleological suspension of the ethical cannot serve alone as an indicator of divine sanction, it constitutes a possible aspect of divine sanction. Heschel explains that the "prophets did not conceive of the ethos as an autonomous idea, as a sovereign essence, higher in the scale of reality than God Himself, standing above him like a supreme force. God to them was more than a moral principle. . . . [T]he relation between God and man cannot be simply equated with the value of the moral idea."[68] It was observed during Jehanne's active military career and with respect to it that, "when divine virtue operates, it establishes the means according to its aim; hence, it is not safe

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[67]Watts, 187.

[68]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 217.

to disparage or to find fault . . . with those things which are from God."[69] During the Rouen trial, Jehanne insisted "that she came from God, and ought not to be [t]here; and . . . that they should remit her into the hands of God, from Whom she came."[70] The statement not only suggests that she ought more appropriately to be held in an ecclesiastical prison than a secular one, but that she ought not to be judged by human standards of morality or tried in human courts at all since she was an agent of God subject to divine law and judgment. At Jehanne's nullification trial, several canonists upheld the "authority of divine revelation over established legal codes in the obedience required of every Christian in meeting the demands of faith."[71] *Dignitatis Humanae* declares that everyone is "bound to obey" his or her conscience and must answer to God in such matters and also notes that the apostles "were not afraid to speak out against public authority when it opposed God's holy will: 'We must obey God rather than men' (Acts 5:29)," it recommends. "This is the path which innumerable martyrs and faithful have followed through the centuries all over the world."[72]

To ignore private divine revelation on the basis that it might contravene *lex publica* could endanger public welfare since private revelation can have a beneficial impact on the public domain. Also, since *lex publica* is humanly constructed, it is subject to error or omission and, as such, is presumably inferior to *lex privata* when the latter is genuinely divinely sanctioned, constituting divine law (*lex divina*). Moreover, Aquinas holds that *lex humana* does not necessarily carry the binding force of conscience since it is possible for human law to be unjust, whereas conscience is informed by divine law and, therefore, infallible.[73] Merton distinguishes "between the general abstract formulation of moral law, and the living, personal, concrete manifestation of God's will in our own lives."[74] A fully engaged "moral conscience," he asserts, "derives its strength and its light not from external directives alone but above all from an inner spiritual connaturality with the deepest values of nature and grace."[75] Hence, there is considerable support for the concept of a teleological suspension of the ethical corresponding to the notion of *lex privata* as manifested in Jehanne's behaviour.

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[69]*De mirabili victoria*; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 79-83. Quotation is from Taylor, 83.

[70]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 71.

[71]Pinzino, "Joan of Arc and *Lex Privata*," 87.

[72]Second Vatican Council, *Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae*, 7 December, 1965, a. 11, 808-9.

[73]Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1st complete American ed. in 3 vols., vol. 1, q. 96, a. 4, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947), 1020.

[74]Merton, *No Man Is an Island*, 39.

[75]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 149.

Wright notes that, "always and everywhere, . . . [Jehanne] . . . speaks . . . of the primacy of the spiritual, of the supremacy of conscience, of the dignity of the person, of the reality of personal vocation, and of the duty to follow that vocation which comes to each of us from God."[76]

The concept of duty can be viewed in a threefold manner, that is, with respect to duty to God, duty to self, and duty to others, yet it is conceivable that the latter two are contained within the first, which is to say that, in fulfilling one's duty to God, one inevitably fulfills one's duty to self and others. On this view, duty to God is granted supremacy because its fulfillment ensures the fulfillment of all duty. Kierkegaard describes duty as "the expression of God's will" such that the ethical might exist paradoxically in a manner which "can cause the knight of faith to give his love of his neighbour the opposite expression to that which is his duty ethically speaking,"[77] (i.e., that which would normally be considered his/her ethical duty in terms of a universal ethic). For example, when Jehanne raised her sword against the enemies of France, the ethical precept to refrain from killing was paradoxically overridden by her individual ethical duty to participate in war by divine command, an activity which involved the necessity of killing the neighbour. Ending the ongoing suffering caused by the Hundred Years' War and restoring peace and justice constituted obvious benefits served by the higher ethic of Jehanne's mission; however, one might consider the more subtle possibility that her campaign also prevented the English from 'sinning' indefinitely in the invasion of France, that is, from committing further acts of violence and oppression (arguably not divinely sanctioned) for which they might be held accountable before God. It is therefore conceivable that, while risking defilement of her soul through participation in violence, Jehanne (wittingly or unwittingly) assisted the English by intercepting the self-inflicted defilement of their souls.[78] Jehanne also fulfilled her duty to the enemy (constituting part of her duty to God) by warning Cauchon of the risk to which he exposed his soul in taking it upon himself to judge her. "You say that you are my judge; take care what you are doing because, in truth, I have been sent by God and you put yourself in great danger."[79] She later added, "And I warn you so that if God punishes

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[76]John J. Wright, 121.

[77]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 70, 83.

[78]Nash-Marshall believes the English were aware that, if Jehanne's mission was divinely sanctioned, then the English "attempt to seize the French throne was not only doomed, it was also sinful, and put their eternal souls in peril." Nash-Marshall, 140.

[79]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 146. She uttered a similar warning two days earlier, on February 22, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 140.

you, I am doing my duty in telling you this."[80] Moreover, when the Rouen court threatened her soul with "everlasting fire" and her body with "the flames of this world," Jehanne issued another warning: "You will not do as you say against me without suffering evil, both of body and soul."[81] (Although questionable, some take it as prophetic fulfillment that sudden death overtook Cauchon while he was being groomed by a barber, that Jean d'Estivet's body was found in a gutter following his disappearance, and that Nicolas Midy contracted leprosy and died in a leper house. They were three of the most prominent participants in the corrupt case against Jehanne.[82])

If one were to set aside all considerations of divine sanction, a reasonable moral argument could still be built for Jehanne's case of going to war, most notably on the basis of self-defense and defending the wrongly oppressed. Moreover, Jehanne adhered to an ethical code of chivalry, an honour-based behavioural code formulated around the mid-twelfth century among feudal knights which, although it changed through time, consistently forbade any knight ever to take "unfair advantage of another knight."[83] The code governed the "capture, treatment and ransoming" of knights.[84] Common chivalric values included honour, courtesy, generosity, courage, loyalty, piety, defense of the weak, respect for women, protection of the king, and maintenance of social order. The church supported chivalric knighthood insofar as it promoted justice, protected the poor, and defended the faith.[85] Eventually, knights gained a reputation as "pious, magnanimous, charitable, learned, polite, . . . cultured, . . . brave" individuals and excellent warriors.[86] Pernoud describes chivalry as "a demanding ideal" which required that knights be both able-bodied and good-souled. "We would be naïve to believe that all knights respected this high ideal," she admits, but the ideal thrived "for at least three centuries."[87]

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[80]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 188.

[81]Jehanne, stated during the Public Admonition of May 2, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 151.

[82]Pernoud, *Retrial*, 7. Pernoud and Clin indicate that Cauchon "died suddenly . . . while being bled by his barber-surgeon." Pernoud and Clin, 155. Cauchon died eleven and a half years after Jehanne's death, in December, 1442. Midy died around the same time as Cauchon, whereas d'Estivet died earlier, in October, 1438. Ibid., 155-6.

[83]Clifford R. Backman, *The Worlds of Medieval Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2003), 179.

[84]Alex J. Bellamy, *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 1.

[85]Backman, 180.

[86]Ibid., 252.

[87]Régine Pernoud, "Epilogue: Joan of Arc or the Survival of a People," in *Fresh Verdicts on Joan of Arc*, ed. Bonnie Wheeler and Charles T. Wood (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), 290.

At the commencement of Jehanne's military career, chivalry was on the decline,[88] as demonstrated by the murders of Louis of Orléans and John the Fearless of Burgundy in 1407 and 1419 respectively, both of which blatantly violated the chivalric code.[89] Also, duQuesnay Adams notes that the Hundred Years' War was fought almost exclusively on French soil and the "vast majority of . . . casualties were French civilians. The ferocity of the conflict," he explains, "banished the restraints of chivalric warfare, which for several centuries had sought profitable prisoners rather than mere bloodshed."[90] Moreover, Jehanne maintained that God refused to tolerate enemy possession of both "the Duke [of Orléans] and his town" simultaneously—[an act which flouted chivalric ethics]—and was thus moved by pity to assist the people of Orléans.[91] The English had also pillaged and destroyed the sanctuary of Notre Dame de Cléry prior to besieging the city, which constituted another chivalric violation,[92] and further transgression ensued when they took one of Jehanne's heralds prisoner[93] in spite of the fact that heralds were to be treated with immunity.[94] Nonetheless, Jehanne upheld the chivalric ideal as apprehended with her deepest ethical conscience; in fact, Pernoud credits her with reviving "chivalric fervor" although she also marked its end.[95]

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[88]Pernoud indicates that "the memory of chivalry persisted up to Joan of Arc's age, at least among the common folk." Ibid., 291. In de Pizan's treatise concerning warfare (c. 1410), it is stated "that no longer are the noble early rights preserved that the valiant warriors observed. Those who follow the military custom in the present time abuse it through the enormous greed that overcomes them." de Pizan, *Deeds of Arms and Chivalry*, 177.

[89]Louis of Orléans was ambushed and brutally murdered by John the Fearless of Burgundy while on his way home. Fraioli, *Hundred Years War,* lxi. Duke John the Fearless was murdered in retaliation by an agent of Charles VII during an encounter between the duke and dauphin that was supposed to be peaceful. Ibid., lxiii. The meeting consisted in an unsuccessful peace negotiation that escalated into a violent clash as the Burgundian and Armagnac representatives were departing, which culminated in the death of the Duke of Burgundy. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 129. Charles was blamed for the crime. "[T]hrough your fault and connivance, that most horrible, detestable and cruel murder was committed, against every law and the honour of chivalry, against the person of our late very dear and very well beloved father, Duke John of Burgundy." Duke of Bedford, letter to Charles VII dated August 7, 1429; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 119-22. Quotation is from Taylor, 121. Fraioli is of the opinion that it is for this reason that his parents disinherited Charles VII. Fraioli, *Hundred Years War,* lxiii, 144. It seems that the equally "detestable and cruel murder" of Louis of Orléans was all but forgotten or ignored by Charles's opponents.

[90]duQuesnay Adams, prelude to *Joan of Arc: Her Story,* by Pernoud and Clin, 4. Military innovations at the turn of the fourteenth century forced the abandonment of certain chivalric practices which became outmoded and impractical. If wars were to be won, it was necessary to employ "[s]trategy, speed, prudence, practicality," and a certain amount of cunning; hence, chivalry gradually gave way to a different type of warfare, including the reinstatement of raids and siege warfare, which resulted in an increase in civilian suffering and casualties. Fraioli, *Hundred Years War,* 32-9.

[91]Jehanne; quoted by Dunois, in Murray, 234.

[92]Pernoud, *Retrial,* 130.

[93]Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 187.

[94]Pernoud and Clin, 38. Also, Nash-Marshall, 81. Violation of safe-conduct is discussed in de Pizan. de Pizan, *Deeds of Arms and Chivalry*, 189.

[95]Pernoud, "Epilogue," in *Fresh Verdicts*, 292-3.

In accordance with military custom and chivalric behaviour, Jehanne entreated the English several times to leave France peacefully, warning of her impending attack should they refuse to comply. "You Englishmen, who have no right in this realm of France," she wrote, "the King of Heaven commands and bids you by me, Joan the Maid, to leave your forts and return into your own country. Otherwise I will give you such a harrying that no one will ever forget it. This I write to you for the third and last time, and I shall not write again."[96] She also granted those besieging the town of Jargeau the option of leaving peacefully rather than being "taken by assault."[97] Jehanne "would never let any of her company loot anything"[98] and refused to eat stolen food knowingly or willingly, even when food was scarce,[99] nor would she permit "immoral women" to keep company with the soldiers, driving them away unless the men were willing to marry them.[100] According to Pasquerel, Jehanne feared that God would withhold victory from the French should they engage in such "sins,"[101] and she scolded them harshly for inappropriate behaviour.[102] She not only forbade her soldiers and the other captains to swear,[103] but she forbade anyone to swear or to denounce God. A citizen of Orléans recounted the following:

> I remember well to have seen and heard, one day, a great lord, walking along the street, begin to swear and blaspheme God; which, when Jeanne saw and heard, she was much perturbed, and went up to the lord who was swearing, and, taking him by the neck, said, "Ah! master, do you deny Our Lord and Master? In God's Name, you shall unsay your words before I leave you." And then, as I saw, the said lord repented and amended his ways, at the exhortation of the said Maid.[104]

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[96]Jehanne; quoted by Pasquerel, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 187. This third letter was dated May 5, 1429. Craig Taylor, 314. Jehanne's first letter to the English was dated March 22, 1429. There is no known record of the second letter. Murray, 287.

[97]Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 158.

[98]Beaucroix; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 120.

[99]Pasquerel; in Craig Taylor, 316. Also, Beaucroix; in Craig Taylor, 302.

[100]Beaucroix; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 120. Alençon reported having witnessed Jehanne chase such a woman from the army with her sword drawn, maintaining that the sword was broken in the incident. (This occurred at Saint-Denis.) Alençon; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 160 and in Craig Taylor, 309. Jehanne's page described what is likely the same incident "near the town of Château Thierry" (which is near Saint-Denis). He stated that Jehanne pursued the mistress of one of her soldiers "with a naked sword. But she did not strike the woman." Rather, she warned her never to be found among the soldiers again. de Coutes; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 180. Also in Craig Taylor, 298.

[101]Pasquerel; quoted in Craig Taylor, 314. Pernoud's translation states that Jehanne believed God had been allowing the French to lose the war as a result of "such sins." Pasquerel; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 187. The latter translation would imply that the English army was not behaving in similar fashion.

[102]S. Charles; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 109.

[103]Seguin; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 114. Alençon; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 160. de Coutes; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 179-80. Beaucroix; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 120.

[104]Reginalde, a widow of Orléans; quoted in Murray, 251. Murray names two others who provided testimony to the same incident. Murray, 251.

It was said that the "soldiers considered her a saint, for she behaved in such a godly way when with the army, both in her deeds and her words, that no one could have uttered a reproach against her."[105] While passing through the town of Sainte-Catherine-de-Fierbois en route to Chinon, Jehanne heard Mass three times in a single day,[106] and she regularly encouraged her soldiers to attend as well.[107] Once, when the English were preparing to attack on a Sunday, Jehanne had a table brought to the scene to serve as an altar along with the appropriate religious paraphernalia and ordered that two Masses be said which were heard by herself and the entire army. The English subsequently departed without incident.[108]

Jehanne modeled chivalric courage, but hers was an exceptionally faithful courage corresponding to her courageous faith. Upon sustaining her first (and serious) battle wound, Jehanne adamantly refused the practice of a customary healing charm, declaring a preference for death over that which she considered sinful.[109] An arrow had penetrated "for a depth of six inches" between her neck and shoulder but "she did not retire from the battle and took no remedy against the wound," recalled Dunois.[110] Furthermore, in knowledge of her impending capture, Jehanne continued to assume battle positions that enabled her to protect her comrades-in-arms but endangered herself.[111] She also charged into battle highly visible (and thus vulnerable) by her banner and colourful clothing, which facilitated her capture, for the enemy reportedly "dragged her to one side by her cloth-of-gold cloak and pulled her from her horse, throwing her flat on the ground."[112] Nash-Marshall suggests that Jehanne made herself visible for the benefit of her soldiers, so that they might easily locate her for instruction or courage.[113] "[I]t goes against the very nature of self-interest to be enlightened," observes Arendt.[114]

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[105]Barbin; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 115.

[106]Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 155.

[107]Pasquerel sang the Mass to Jehanne and her soldiers. Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 188.

[108]Jean de Champeaux, burgher; in Craig Taylor, 289. Murray indicates that seven others provided like testimony. Murray, 249.

[109]Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 189.

[110]Dunois; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 138. Pasquerel indicated that a crossbow bolt penetrated right through her shoulder "from one side to the other." Pasquerel; quoted in Craig Taylor, 316. Jehanne's testimony indicates that an arrow or crossbolt penetrated her neck. Jehanne, testimony of February 27, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 158. de Coutes also testified to the event. de Coutes; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 178.

[111]d'Aulon; in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 165, 168. Chastellain; in Pernoud from Quicherat, vol. 4, 446-7, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 151-2.

[112]Chastellain; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 151.

[113]Nash-Marshall, 129. Pernoud and Clin explain that a "tabard [tunic] was worn [over armour] so as to be recognized by soldiers of one's own company and to weaken the sun's blinding reflections." Pernoud and Clin, 195.

[114]Arendt, *On Violence*, 78.

Let us look more closely at the role of conscience in Jehanne's life. Conscience is an ambiguous term understood in various ways, none of which can be proven definitively. Merton describes it as "the light by which we interpret the will of God in our . . . lives."[115] "Without [an engaged] conscience," he asserts, "freedom never knows what to do with itself."[116] For Merton, a properly-functioning conscience is grounded in love, compassion, charity, and benevolence.[117] Such "an inner ground of deep faith and purity of conscience" requires true self-sacrifice, without which self-interest remains an impediment, he explains.[118]

> Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells him inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. His dignity lies in observing this law, and by it he will be judged. His conscience is man's most secret core, and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths. By conscience, . . . that law is made known which is fulfilled in the love of God and of one's neighbor.[119]

Dignitatis Humanae asserts that humans are "bound" to God "in conscience but not coerced."[120] Nonetheless, the workings of conscience can be a compelling force, and Jehanne preferred to die than to act against divine will.[121]

Conscience might be viewed as a faculty of human awareness that enables receptivity to promptings by divine grace which serve to inform and instruct individual human behaviour in all instances of moral decision-making provided it is not blocked by some aspect of the individual. On this view, conscience (unless it is suppressed) guides morality, functioning as a vehicle through which divine impulses, urgings, and inclinations are received and processed. Moral disposition is thus regarded as comprising one's response—in the form of thought, emotion, decision, and deed (action or inaction)—to the revelations of conscience. From this perspective, conscience is not equated with moral discernment but facilitates it. Rudolf Hofmann agrees that

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[115]Merton, *No Man Is an Island*, 30.
[116]Ibid., 27.
[117]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 149.
[118]Ibid., 150-1.
[119]Second Vatican Council, *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes*, 7 December, 1965, a. 16, 916.
[120]*Dignitatis Humanae*, a. 11, 807.
[121]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 198.

"[c]onscience itself cannot be taken as being equivalent to moral evaluation or moral knowledge."[122] He asserts that

> [t]heology must reject all attempts to restrict the understanding of conscience to the sphere of the moral, even though this can in fact set the limits for the experience of conscience by the unbeliever. The conscience of the Christian will fulfil its function only when every dawning value is deeply experienced as a gracious approach of the divine perfection and every situation of decision as . . . a gift and a call of God, as a possibility of Christian loyalty in the presence of the divine "Thou".
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> . . . Conscience brings to mind the objective moral norm in its relation to the concrete decision to be made in the present situation. Since the role of conscience is thus an intermediary one, it does not set the moral norms itself in an autonomous sense. This is true even though this receptivity of conscience can by no means be regarded as merely passive, and no matter how creatively active in personal reverence and love conscience is in discovering with delicate sensitivity the good that is to be done . . . , and no matter how much it brings to bear the entire extent of personal knowledge and experience of life in moral matters. It interiorizes . . . the objective norms. . . . The objective "law" is the will and order of God in his creation and this is made known in the conscience of man . . . .[123]

Thus Christianity has often conceived of "conscience as the site of the encounter between the individual and God, or of conscience as the voice of God."[124] Conscience therefore represents an ongoing experience of revelation calling forth human behaviour that is aligned with divine aspirations for the world.[125] In the Hebrew Bible, the concept of conscience is often expressed as "heart" or "reins" and relates to hearing the divine word, acceptance of divine will, and awareness of individual accountability before God and subjection to divine judgment.[126] (It is from the Jewish tradition that Christians adopted the metaphor of the heart to express the idea of conscience.[127]) Conscience is thus an abstract and ethereal, albeit distinct and significant, aspect of human experience which is liminal in nature. It is a mystical force. Like other forms of revelation, it can be obeyed or rejected. To operate from an engaged conscience does not entail always or inevitably choosing the good, but it entails the experience of guilt, shame, and/or fear of

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[122]Rudolf Hofmann, s.v. "Conscience," in Karl Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi* (Mumbai: St. Pauls, 1975), 286.

[123]Hofmann, 286-7.

[124]Linda Hogan, *Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition* (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2000), 23-4.

[125]Hogan asserts that "[f]or Christians conscience has a double orientation. It is the human realization of value, under the guidance of the Spirit of God." Ibid., 24. On the view of conscience presented in this work, however, conscience calls forth (rather than constitutes) the human realization of value under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

[126]Hofmann, 285.

[127]Hogan, 55.

God, (i.e., a 'bad conscience'), in cases where the good is not chosen and enacted. Suppression of conscience consists in a turning away from conscience such that the Divine is no longer engaged through it and morality no longer informed by it. However, so long as conscience is engaged in the process of moral discernment, it need not be recognized as divinely informed in order to serve effectively; in other words, the activity of conscience is not contingent upon human comprehension of its source or its functioning.

On the proposed model,[128] the individual who operates from a pure and fully-engaged conscience can reflect and serve divine aspirations for the world. Participation in war, even if divinely sanctioned or morally necessary, requires cleansing of conscience because war itself is not conceivably aligned with divine aspirations for humanity but is an inherently evil human activity.[129] Prophetic revelation might override the 'usual' dictates of conscience by sanctioning participation in war, but it in no sense eliminates conscience which continues to inform one's behaviour in warfare. Jehanne did not go to war on the basis of conscience but on the basis of prophetic revelation, yet her conscience was not suppressed and presumably served to reinforce the fact that war is intrinsically evil. Merton holds that,

> whether in warfare or in pacifism the Christian is bound to act according to . . . conscience. There are very strict limits set upon his exercise of the right to defend himself and his nation by force, and there are also strict limits upon his willing submission to [the use of] evil and violence.
>
> . . . The Christian is not only bound to avoid certain evils, but . . . is responsible for very great goods. . . . [N]o Christian is ever allowed to be indifferent to man's fate. Whoever believes that Christ is the Word made flesh believes that every [hu]man must in some sense be regarded as Christ. For all are at least potentially members of the Mystical Christ.[130]

Merton's claim encapsulates much of what Jehanne exemplified, namely the necessity of always engaging conscience and acknowledging that violent self-defense constitutes a form of evil demanding restraint, that one's responsibility to God and to others includes a commitment to benevolence, and that the dignity and sanctity of all human life must be recognized and respected everywhere and at all times. Wright maintains that Jehanne's death testified "to the Christian concept of conscience and to the Christian idea of

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[128]For a multifaceted treatment of conscience, see Linda Hogan, *Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition* (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2000).

[129]"Higher experiences of the spiritual life move often at the margin of the certain conscience." Hofmann, 287.

[130]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 10.

personal vocation,"[131] citing her as proof that conscience "binds us to a duty, summons us to an obligation, commands us to a martyrdom."[132] Jehanne, he asserts, "reminds us that neither conscience nor authority amount to anything except as means to an end greater than either or both, and that end is *sanctity*, the sanctity that *conscience* must *seek always* and that *authority* must always serve."[133]

It seems that God permeated the entire experience of Jehanne's life from the time of initial visitation by her voices and arguably earlier. Conscience and the sacrament of confession were vital to her and went hand-in-hand. She maintained that one could not cleanse one's conscience too much.[134] On Aquinas's understanding, absolution through the sacrament of confession is granted by God alone; hence, the sacrament does not produce grace but initiates a process within the individual whereby s/he opens to divine grace in a manner which effects the removal of guilt. However, an individual remains in perpetual danger of closing inwardly to God.[135] We know that Jehanne confessed regularly when possible and believed that her divine counsel would not speak to her if she were in a state of "mortal sin."[136] "She was accustomed, before going to an assault, to take account of her conscience," observed one witness.[137] Pasquerel testified that Jehanne was very pious and confessed and took communion frequently,[138] while another confessor stated that she "had a good soul and tender conscience."[139] Jehanne also frequently urged her companions-at-arms to cleanse their consciences through confession. Several witnesses testified "that she induced the soldiers to confess their sins,"[140] and another recalled that Jehanne "advised all the men-at-arms to make confession."[141] Jehanne also frequently had her company of priests assembled to lead the army in singing antiphons and hymns; she allowed only those who first confessed to take part in the gatherings and made the priests available to hear the confessions of all who

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[131]John J. Wright, 127.

[132]Ibid., 129.

[133]Ibid., 130.

[134]Jehanne, testimony of March 14, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 190.

[135]Vorgrimler, 209-10.

[136]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 73-4.

[137]Charlotte, daughter of Jacques Boucher in whose home Jehanne was lodged at Orléans; in Murray, 251.

[138]Pasquerel; in Craig Taylor, 312. Also, Orléans manuscript; in Scott, *Trial*, 40.

[139]Robert Baignart; quoted by T. d'Armagnac, in Murray, 293.

[140]Maître Pierre Compaing, Canon of Saint-Aignan; quoted in Murray, 250. de Coutes recalled that Jehanne continually urged her soldiers "to confess their sins." de Coutes; quoted in Murray, 260. Also, Pasquerel; in Craig Taylor, 314.

[141]Beaucroix; quoted in Craig Taylor, 300.

wished to participate.[142] Furthermore, on Ascension Day at Orléans, "she ordered that no one should go out of the town to the attack . . . without first making confession."[143] Jehanne, like Soelle, apprehended that attending to conscience cannot "be postponed to a later day."[144]

Saint Teresa describes the false peace experienced by one who is not remorseful. She maintains that, in order to advance toward God, the soul must understand its error and experience interior conflict as a result.[145] She allows that it is "impossible for us to be angels here below because such is not our nature. In fact," she states, "a soul doesn't disturb me when I see it with great temptations. If love and fear of our Lord are present, the soul will gain very much . . . . If I see a soul always quiet and without any war . . . I always fear even if I do not see it offending the Lord."[146] This corresponds to Arendt's suggestion "that a 'good conscience' is enjoyed as a rule only by really bad people, criminals and such, while only 'good people' are capable of having a bad conscience."[147] Lack of a fully-engaged conscience and a consequent lack of remorse enable one to commit offenses against God, others, and one's own soul without suffering the pangs of discomfort or anguish that would afflict one with a fully-engaged conscience. The distinction is not between possessing and utterly lacking conscience, but the variable consists in the state of one's conscience, in whether or not it is engaged and the extent to which it is engaged. "We do not have to create a conscience for ourselves," states Merton. "We are born with one, and no matter how much we may ignore it, we cannot silence its insistent demand that we do good and avoid evil."[148] While all are arguably born with a conscience, Merton's assertion that it cannot be silenced is debatable since people who willingly commit repeated atrocities would not likely be able or willing to do so without a suppressed conscience. Silencing of conscience differs from the act of ignoring it—in order to ignore, one must first be aware and then choose to disregard, whereas silencing involves suppression such that conscience is no longer perceived. Silencing, in this sense, has a numbing effect. Hofmann maintains that "the ordination to the good, which is present in the structure of conscience, can, through faulty training,

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[142]Pasquerel; quoted in Pernoud and Clin, 37.

[143]Pasquerel; quoted in Murray, 286.

[144]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 267.

[145]Saint Teresa, *Collected Works*, vol. 2, 222-3.

[146]Ibid., 223.

[147]Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, one-volume ed., vol. 1, *Thinking* (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 1978), 5.

[148]Merton, *No Man Is an Island*, 41-2.

not indeed be made false in itself, but weakened to the point of being practically ineffective."[149] Silencing of conscience likely produced the false peace observed by Saint Teresa, but the problem is not specific to her time. "In a world of power politics, there is no question that conscience is a great nuisance," states Merton,[150] and Heschel warns against the insidious nature of widespread suppression of conscience:

> Modern thought tends to extenuate personal responsibility. Understanding the complexity of human nature, the interrelationship of individual and society, of consciousness and the subconscious, we find it difficult to isolate the deed from those circumstances in which it was done. But new insights may obscure essential vision, and . . . conscience grow scales: excuses, pretense, self-pity. Guilt may disappear; no crime is absolute, no sin devoid of apology. Within the limits of the human mind, relativity is true and merciful.[151]

Suppression of conscience is facilitated by immersion in a society which systematically displaces it. Rainer Baum asserts that "modern society" fails "to generate demand for the exercise of conscience" and, in fact, "discourages" it.[152] He explains that, in a society which compartmentalizes labour, "[c]onscientiousness can take the place of conscience very easily."[153] The division of labour, he suggests, "generates moral indifference" in that one is not generally expected to concern oneself "with consequences of action that reverberate beyond" one's "specific sphere of competence and control," based on the assumption that "other relevant experts" will attend to such considerations.[154] Moltmann asserts "that in a technocratic society all human relationships are reduced to the level of things, and general apathy is spreading on an epidemic scale."[155] Wright expresses concern that "poetry and prayer, love and thought may become casualties of the intellectual and spiritual paralysis of a civilization depersonalized, automated, seduced by statistics and controlled by computers, with a consequent fatal enfeebling of the sense of the spiritual, the meaning of the person, the thrust of vocation."[156] Indeed, in a recent interview, American Judge David Cobos described monitoring devices affixed by truant

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[149]Hofmann, 284.

[150]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 48.

[151]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 14.

[152]Rainer C. Baum, "Holocaust: Moral Indifference as *the* Form of Modern Evil," in *Echoes from the Holocaust: Philosophical Reflections on a Dark Time*, ed. Alan Rosenberg and Gerald E. Myers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 56, 59.

[153]Ibid., 56, 81.

[154]Ibid., 57-8.

[155]Moltmann, 62.

[156]John J. Wright, 122.

officers to delinquent school children in Midland, Texas as serving the purpose of "an electronic conscience."[157]

A society that interferes with the operation of conscience by creating distance between individuals and the consequences of their behaviour, or by any means, such as the use of deceptive language, places itself at risk of moral collapse. Consider the term 'collateral damage,' prominent in modern military vocabulary, which serves to diminish linguistically the significance and severity of destruction involved in the actualities to which it refers. The word 'damage' constitutes an understatement when referring to civilian deaths arising from military action. Moreover, 'collateral' frequently denotes property and generally positions its subject in a place of secondary significance. In fact, it is defined in one instance as "odds and ends of trash: rubbish" and as "a miscellaneous clutter of personal belongings."[158] Such connotations diminish the value of that which is destroyed under the umbrella of 'collateral damage.'

Thoughtlessness also facilitates suppression of conscience by permitting deception, flawed judgment, and indifference with respect to whether a situation constitutes a matter of conscience or not. Situations in which the voice of conscience is normally heard might thus be discarded as morally irrelevant. However, Arendt insists that, if the ability to distinguish between right and wrong is connected to the ability to think, "then we must be able to 'demand' its exercise from every sane person, no matter how erudite or ignorant, intelligent or stupid" that individual is,[159] thought being one of the few possessions of which one cannot easily be robbed provided that one is committed to retaining it. Hence, it is the responsibility of individuals to exercise thoughtful discernment with respect to the engagement of conscience. While thoughtfulness is no guarantee of benevolence, Arendt suggests that thoughtlessness creates conditions in which evil can take root.[160] Similarly, John Mackie suggests that a vice requires distorted understanding for its existence and is unable to withstand honest

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[157]The monitors are used to track the movement of students who are under court order to attend school. David Cobos, interview by Anna Maria Tremonti, 2 December 2010, CBC Radio's *The Current*. A press release by Omnilink Systems, the company which provides the electronic bracelets worn by the students, offers further details. "Midland County Texas Uses Omnilink's Electronic Monitoring Solution To Get Students Back in School" (Atlanta: March 25, 2008). Available from http://www.omnilink.com/Omnilink_News/PressReleases/PR032508.html; Internet; accessed 9 April 2011.

[158]Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, 1964.

[159]Arendt, *Life of the Mind*, vol. 1, 13.

[160]Ibid.

reflection on its own nature.[161] Although many evil deeds are thoughtfully planned, it is moral thoughtlessness which apparently enables their planning and facilitates their performance.

One might wonder what role thought plays in obedience to conscience or other forms of divine revelation. Since few individuals claim the type of clear, direct, specific divine guidance that Jehanne claimed, most rely on conscience or on independent moral discernment as a guide to moral behaviour. However, even in cases involving a claim to specific divine instruction, the claimant does not dispense with thought, but thought plays a potential role in discerning the authenticity of revelation. For example, had Jehanne's voices instructed her to perform deeds which completely violated her moral sensibilities, she might have been inclined to reject them. However, since the mission to which she was called accorded with her considered notion of justice, this allowed her to proceed with confidence and with a clearer conscience than had she been called to act in a manner which she regarded as unjust.[162] Meister Eckhart declares that, for those who are just, "the pursuit of justice is so imperative that if God were not just, they would not give a fig for God."[163] Hence, even when prompted by conscience or other forms of revelation to behave in a particular manner, if it is more than a small matter one generally considers it thoughtfully prior to acting and, indeed, one must choose whether or not to engage divine revelation at all and, subsequently, whether or not to act in accordance with it in each instance.

Jehanne neither ignored nor suppressed conscience but engaged it. In the following passage, Heschel contrasts those who neglect conscience with the prophets who live so keenly by it:

> So many deeds of charity are done, so much decency radiates day and night; yet to the prophet satiety of the conscience is prudery and flight from responsibility. Our standards are modest; our sense of injustice tolerable, timid; our moral indignation impermanent; yet human violence is interminable, unbearable, permanent. To us life is often serene, in the prophet's eye the world reels in confusion. The prophet makes no

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[161]John Mackie, "Virtue," in *Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics*, ed. Christina Hoff Sommers (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985), 225-6.

[162]Jehanne indicated that she believed in the apparitions of Saint Michael which she experienced because he provided "good counsel, comfort and sound doctrine." Jehanne; testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 121. Moreover, she wrote to the citizens of Tournai, "May God watch over you and grant you grace to uphold the just cause of the kingdom of France." Jehanne, letter to the city of Tournai dated June 25, 1429; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 94.

[163]Meister Eckhart, *Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*. The Classics of Western Spirituality, trans. Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn (Mahwah: Paulist Press, Inc., 1981), 186.

> concession to man's capacity. Exhibiting little understanding for human weakness, he seems unable to extenuate the culpability of man.[164]

Justice is central to the prophetic mission, but the prophet's commitment to justice triggers resentment among perpetrators of injustice; the words of the prophet "burn" in others "where conscience ends," states Heschel.[165] Hence, the familiar persecution of the prophet.

Considerations of justice inevitably lead to debate over pacifism and violence. However, while it might seem counterintuitive, pacifism and war are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Pacifism in its variant (extreme) form of unmitigated refusal to employ aggressive and sometimes violent means against evil can amount to a form of evil itself—the evil of willing complicity. Therefore, whether one opposes evil with evil or passively refuses to confront evil, one conceivably participates in evil, the distinction being one of kind, between active and passive evil or active and passive participation in violence. Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan point out that the decision not to challenge by force the 1994 genocide in Rwanda did not constitute a "morally neutral" choice on the part of the international community.[166] A more viable understanding of pacifism includes the possibility of actively combating evil by its own means, as minimally and justly as possible, as a last resort, and with a view to peace. "Non-violence is no good unless it is effective," Weil concedes.[167] However, one ought to "strive" toward non-violence, she advises, acknowledging that this depends on the adversary as well.[168] Merton, who is considered a pacifist, also denies a purely pacifist stance against war, maintaining that "a 'just war' is at least a theoretical possibility" where self-defense is required.[169] He asserts that one is not morally obliged to render oneself "helpless in the face of an overwhelming enemy power."[170] Nor does Hans Küng recommend the renunciation of power but maintains that, "wherever individuals or whole groups remember that power exists for service and not for domination, they contribute to the humanizing of the all-round human competitive struggle."[171] It should

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[164]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 9.

[165]Ibid., 10.

[166]Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2007), 24.

[167]Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, 85.

[168]Ibid., 86.

[169]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 4.

[170]Ibid., 17.

[171]Hans Küng, *On Being a Christian*, trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1976), 593-4.

be noted that, while power and violence are not synonymous, the exercise of power sometimes takes the form of violence.[172]

Jehanne was a warrior by necessity, but she was a pacifist at heart, and I am inclined to classify her as a 'pacifist-warrior.' In a letter to the citizens of Troyes she declared that she and the royal army would "enter, with God's help, all the towns that should belong to the holy kingdom [of France], and establish a good, firm peace there," regardless of who opposed them.[173] Thus was her goal of peace pronounced—war was the means, not the end. Moreover, when questioned as to whether or not she was present at a certain battle wherein some of the English were killed, Jehanne replied, "Yes, in God's name, I was. . . . Why did they not leave France and go home to their own country?"[174] One senses a deep sincerity in the question. Had the English agreed to withdraw peacefully from French soil there would have been no need to vanquish them, for Jehanne neither expressed nor displayed any desire to dominate them in their own land.

The truly pacifist warrior as manifested in Jehanne operates from compassion. O'Donohue identifies compassion as "the dividing frontier between barbarity and civility."[175] To be actively compassionate is not necessarily to spare another's suffering but to be genuinely sympathetic, to attempt to alleviate the suffering of others, and to provide comfort insofar as possible. Several ways in which one might exercise compassion in war are by causing minimal destruction, permitting retreat or taking prisoners for exchange as preferential to killing, and refraining from targeting noncombatants and from engaging in acts of torture or other forms of cruelty—in essence, by conducting defensive war as humanely as possible. According to Augustine, the "real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable

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[172]Arendt maintains that "one of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence is that power always stands in need of numbers, whereas violence up to a point can manage without them because it relies on implements." Arendt, *On Violence*, 41-2.

[173]Jehanne, letter to the city of Troyes dated July 4, 1429; reproduced in Craig Taylor, 94-5. Quotation is from Taylor, 95.

[174]Jehanne; quoted by Tiphaine, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 223. "En nom Dieu si ay. Comme vous parlez doucement! Pourquoi ne quittaient-ils pas la France et n'allaient-ils pas dans leur patrie?" Jehanne; quoted by Tiphaine, in Pierre Duparc, trans., *Procès en Nullité de la Condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc*, vol. 4, ed. la Société de l'Histoire de France, Fondation du Département des Vosges (Paris: la Société de l'Histoire de France, 1986), 33. One might also translate the statement as, "Why were they not leaving France and going to their own country?" or more loosely as, "Why would they not leave France and go to their own country?"

[175]John O'Donohue, *Beauty: The Invisible Embrace* (Boulder, Colorado: Sounds True W77OD, 2004), compact disc audio recording, disc 3, session 6, track 10.

enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like."[176] Jehanne's constant, undifferentiated compassion among the soldiers marks her as an exceptional warrior. Indeed, one wonders how many warriors or war-mongers actually engage compassionately with their victim(s). She was greatly afflicted on account of the many English who died without confession while defending their position at the Fort of Saint-Loup, after which she confessed immediately and compelled her entire army to do likewise and to thank God for the victory on threat of her otherwise abandoning them.[177] In another incident, Jehanne declared to an English commander who had insulted her, "You have called me a whore, but I have great pity for your soul and your men's souls." Shortly afterward, the commander and his soldiers fell fully armed into the river and drowned, and Jehanne wept because they had died without confession.[178] Moreover, as the English army fled Orléans with the French in pursuit, Jehanne ordered, "Let the English go, do not kill them. They are going. Their flight is enough for me."[179] "Christian identification with the crucified Christ means solidarity with the sufferings of the poor and the misery both of the oppressed and the oppressors," asserts Moltmann.[180] One does not merely speak compassion, one experiences it and extends it. Weil offers an interesting perspective; in the act of compassion, she states, one is voluntarily "diminished by concentrating on an expenditure of energy" which does not increase one's personal power but confers "existence" upon another individual.[181] There is thus an element of self-sacrifice in the act of compassion. O'Donohue maintains that compassion humanizes the person who receives it,[182] and I would suggest that it also humanizes the one who extends it. Weil explains that compassion "is not a compensation for, but a spiritualization of, the sufferings being undergone; it is able to transfigure even the most purely physical sufferings." Moreover, it "is able, without hindrance, to cross frontiers [and] extend itself over all countries" since it "is by its

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[176]Saint Augustine, *Reply to Faustus the Manichaean* 12.75, The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, repr. 1989), 4:301; quoted in Jane Marie Pinzino, "Joan of Arc and *Lex Privata*: A Spirit of Freedom in the Law," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, ed. Ann W. Astell and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 105.

[177]Pasquerel; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 186.

[178]Jehanne; quoted by Pasquerel, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 189. The commander was William Glansdale or Glasdale.

[179]Jehanne; quoted by Beaucroix, in Craig Taylor, 301. Dunois provided similar testimony; in Murray, 237.

[180]Moltmann, 25.

[181]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 90.

[182]O'Donohue, *Beauty: The Invisible Embrace*, disc 3, session 6, track 10.

nature universal."[183] "Generosity and compassion are inseparable," she asserts, "and both have their model in God."[184]

This brings us to the subject of charity and Jehanne's expression of it. According to Weil, "[p]reference for some human being is necessarily a different thing from charity. Charity does not discriminate. If it is found more abundantly in any special quarter, it is because affliction has chanced to provide an occasion there for the exchange of compassion and gratitude."[185] When asked whether or not she hated the Burgundians, Jehanne replied that she did not like them ever since she learned that God supported the king of France.[186] She stated that she had known only one Burgundian in Domremy "whose head she would have wished to be cut off, that is, if this had pleased God."[187] The Burgundian in question was a farmer of Épinal named Gérardin who testified at the nullification trial that, just prior to her departure for Vaucouleurs and apparently alluding to her mission, Jehanne stated to him, "Friend, if you were not a Burgundian, there is something I would tell you." She subsequently met Gérardin on the road to Rheims with other villagers of Domremy who were attending Charles's coronation, and it was to him that she confided her fear of treason.[188] The testimony suggests that Jehanne was on very friendly terms with this man in spite of the fact that he was Burgundian, for she had not divulged her imminent mission to anyone,[189] yet she was inclined to do so to him were it not for his political sympathies. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Jehanne wished literally for Gérardin's beheading, and it seems that he was not staunchly committed to the Burgundian cause given that he attended the dauphin's coronation. While Jehanne was undoubtedly displeased by the fact that

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[183]Weil, *Need for Roots*, 172.

[184]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 90.

[185]Ibid., 131.

[186]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; in Craig Taylor, 149. Scott translates it as she did not "love" the Burgundians; in Scott, *Trial*, 74. The Orléans manuscript reads as follows: "Interroguee se la voix luy dist en sa jeunesse qu'elle hayst les Bourguygnons, respond que, depuis qu'elle entendit que les voix estoyent pour le roy de France, elle n'a point aymé les Bourguygnons." Orléans MS 518, 77. Bouzy notes that, although the word "aymé" might refer either to love or friendship, it is likely that Jehanne confessed a dislike—not a lack of love—for the Burgundians. He bases this interpretation on the fact that, had Jehanne declared a lack of Christian love for anyone, the condemnation trial judges would presumably have cited such a statement as evidence against her, and we have no indication of this occurring. Bouzy, conversation with author, 7 May 2011, Centre Jeanne d'Arc, Orléans. Whatever the accurate translation—which remains elusive—the University of Paris, unlike the trial judges, did accuse Jehanne of transgressing "God's commandment to love one's neighbour" in the context of the statement in question. Censure of the University of Paris, pertaining to Article 10 of the twelve final articles drawn up against Jehanne; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 158.

[187]Jehanne, testimony of February 24, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 149.

[188]Jehanne; quoted by G. Épinal, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 84. It was Burgundians who eventually captured Jehanne and fatally sold her to the English.

[189]She had only hinted at it to her friend, Lebuin. Lebuin, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 83.

Gérardin sympathized with Burgundy, she regarded him as a friend and made no motion toward harming him. Jehanne also warned Dunois that she would have his head cut off should he fail to inform her of the arrival of the English captain, Ffastolf, at the siege of Orléans.[190] She did not, however, follow through on the threat when he failed to inform her, and it seems simply to be an expression which she employed occasionally without genuine intent.[191] "The words of the prophet are stern, sour, stinging. But behind his austerity is love and compassion for [hu]mankind."[192] As far as we know, Jehanne never declared hatred toward the enemy or anyone else.

Jehanne's occasionally harsh words seem more aligned with righteous anger than hatred, an anger which was conceivably necessary to the accomplishment of her mission. Heschel reminds us that anger may be "reprehensible when associated with malice, [but] morally necessary as resistance to malice." There are situations in which "anger alone can conquer evil," he asserts. "It is after mildness and kindness have failed that anger is proclaimed."[193] Anger is, in effect, a double-edged sword. Its total suppression in the face of evil might qualify as "surrender and capitulation" and serve to stultify "moral sensibility. Patience," explains Heschel, is "a quality of holiness, [but it] may be sloth in the soul when associated with the lack of righteous indignation." On the other hand, unrestrained anger can also prove disastrous.[194] Heschel notes that, in the model of divinity represented by the prophets, anger and mercy function inseparably.[195] "The prophet . . . holds God's love as well as God's anger in his soul, enraptured or enfevered."[196] "The anger of God," he insists, "must not be treated in isolation, but as an aspect of the divine pathos . . . aroused by" human sin.[197] "The prophet's angry words cry. The wrath of God is a lamentation."[198] "Divine sympathy for the victims of human cruelty is the motive of [God's] anger."[199] Moreover, divine anger is an ephemeral condition, not "a habit or a disposition."[200] "[B]eyond justice and anger lies the mystery of compassion."[201] Soelle maintains that the "nausea caused by this world of injustice

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[190]d'Aulon; Ibid., 166.
[191]A similar expression today is, "I'll have your head if . . . ."
[192]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 12.
[193]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 61, 77.
[194]Ibid., 61. Heschel defines righteous indignation as "impatience with evil." Ibid., 63.
[195]Ibid., 63, 77.
[196]Ibid., 92.
[197]Ibid., 62.
[198]Ibid., 64.
[199]Ibid., 68.
[200]Ibid., 69.
[201]Ibid., 67.

and violence ought at least to be perceptible; it ought to increase to the point of physical vomiting, as is told about so many highly gifted women from Catherine of Siena to Simone Weil. That kind of nausea is an experience of compassio[n]."[202] The statement suggests that violently inflicted suffering is so contrary to essential human nature that the true witnessing of it automatically induces a purgative, cathartic process. In Jehanne's case, weeping conceivably constituted that process. "This kind of suffering is not imposed," notes Soelle, ". . . nor is it chosen . . . . It arises from a relationship to the world that is not immersed in the I [ego] alone."[203] Soelle's account corresponds to Heschel's description of sympathy with the divine pathos: "The prophet is a person who is inwardly transformed: his interior life is formed by the pathos of God, it is *theomorphic*. Sympathy, which takes place for the sake of the divine will, and in which a divine concern becomes a human passion, is fulfillment of transcendence."[204] "Pathos . . . is suffering in the sense of compassion or in the sense of moral indignation."[205] "First," states Merton, "we must argue by our example: and when we are totally devoted to God then we can speak truth, which is not our own opinion, but the truth we would rather die [for] than violate or corrupt – and then we will either keep silent, or only talk to praise what is good and true. . . . The world is full of evil, and it is our duty to fight evil and teach truth."[206] Heschel reassures us that nearly "every prophet brings consolation, promise, and the hope of reconciliation along with censure and castigation,"[207] and this dual message is reflected in Jehanne's famous (first) letter to the English:

> King of England, . . . [h]and over to the Pucelle, who is sent from God the King of Heaven, the keys of all the towns which you have taken and ravaged in France. She is come here on God's behalf to restore the blood royal. She is quite ready to make peace, if you are willing to do right, that is, to leave France, and to make amends for the injuries you have done, and to hand back the monies you have received all the time that you have been here.
>
> And you, archers, soldiers, gentlemen and others who are now besieging the town of Orleans, get you back in God's Name into your own country. And if you will not do so, then expect to hear from the Pucelle, who will shortly encounter you, to your very great hurt.

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[202]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 140.
[203]Ibid., 140.
[204]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 99.
[205]Ibid., 100.
[206]Thomas Merton, *Run to the Mountain: The Story of a Vocation*, ed. Patrick Hart, *The Journals of Thomas Merton*, vol. 1, *1939-1941* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995), 460.
[207]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 12.

> King of England, if you do not do so, . . . wherever I find your people in France, I shall fight them and drive them out; and shall make them go, whether they will or no; and if they will not obey, I shall have them put to death. I am sent here by God the King of Heaven to fight them and to drive them out of France. And if they will obey, I will have mercy on them. And do not think that you will stay here any longer, for you do not hold the realm of France from God the King of Heaven, son of the Virgin Mary. For he who will thus hold it is Charles, the true heir, for God the King of Heaven so desires. And it is revealed to him by the Pucelle that very shortly he will enter Paris with a good company. And if you do not believe the message of God and the Pucelle, I inform you that wherever we find you, we will fight you, and will make so great a . . . [*hay-hay*] there that not for a thousand years has France had one so great. And firmly believe that the King of Heaven will send such strength to the Pucelle that neither you nor your soldiers will be able to repel either her or her forces. And when it comes to blows we shall see who has the better right.
>
> And you, Duke of Bedford, who now besiege Orleans, the Pucelle begs that you will not compel her to destroy you. . . .
>
> And I beg you, if you desire to make peace, to answer me in the city of Orleans, where we hope to be very shortly; and if you do not do so, you will remember it by reason of your great sufferings.[208]

"There is a cruelty which pardons," notes Heschel, "just as there is a pity which punishes. Severity must tame whom love cannot win."[209] The relationship between compassion and violence as embodied by Jehanne can serve as a paradigm in instances wherein violence is deemed divinely sanctioned or otherwise necessary. Compassion might, in fact, be one of humanity's best defenses against self-destruction. Compassion, which involves sympathy, contradicts insidious indifference that allows individuals to commit horrendous acts of violence while retaining the ability to sleep undisturbed.

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[208]Jehanne, letter dated March 22, 1429; reproduced in Scott, *Trial*, 30-1. Bouzy explains that the term, '*hay-hay*'"is a cry, maybe a battle cry, perhaps coming from *Adjuda Deus* (God help), the battle cry of the Franks." Bouzy, email correspondence to author dated December 1, 2012.

[209]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 76.

The Relevance of Just War Theory

> We asked for signs
> the signs were sent:
> the birth betrayed,
> the marriage spent;
> the widowhood
> of every government —
> signs for all to see.
>
> —Leonard Cohen, "Anthem"

While the theory of just war plays a long and important role in the history of human affairs,[210] the just war tradition will be treated here only in its aspects which are most relevant to claims to divine sanction in warfare, particularly to Jehanne's claim. I will not present a comprehensive survey of the tradition or argue for one form of the theory over another, nor will I conduct a complete and detailed analysis of the tradition. Rather, my intention is to assess how the fundamental components of just war theory correspond to or contradict Jehanne's example and to determine whether or not anything can be gained from her example which might be useful in addressing current insufficiencies within the just war model.

The notion of just war is represented by an evolving tradition with roots in diverse religions and cultures such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, ancient Greece, Rome, and Egypt. Just war theory aims at delineating what constitutes morally justifiable war. Merton describes just war theory as supposing "a *defensive* war in which force is strictly limited and the greatest care is taken to protect the rights and the lives of noncombatants and even of combatants."[211] Henrik Syse and Gregory Reichberg maintain that the term 'just war' does not refer simply to a theory or set of rules but encompasses "an ideal of the 'just warrior'" as expressed through medieval notions of chivalric honour and virtue. This ideal pertains not only to military personnel, they assert, but to all individuals "who make decisions and perform fateful actions as the use of armed force is being contemplated or actually takes place."[212] Two major aspects of just war theory are known as *jus ad bellum*, concerning that which is

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[210]The just war tradition can be traced back approximately two thousand years. Bellamy, 2.

[211]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 68.

[212]Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg, eds., *Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 2.

deemed just reason for engaging in war, and *jus in bello*, concerning that which is considered just behaviour (right conduct) in war. There is some variance in the number and arrangement of criteria stipulated within each category and, recently, some theorists have recommended inclusion of a third category, *jus post bellum*, intended to address the after-effects of war, suggesting that aftermath conditions ought to factor into the decision of whether or not to go to war.[213] *Jus post bellum* is also concerned with the post-war behaviour of victors.[214] The addition of this category demonstrates the evolving nature of the just war tradition in the ongoing attempt to address contemporary values. According to just war theory, all of the criteria set out within the designated categories must be satisfied in order for engagement in war to be considered just. However, Alex J. Bellamy maintains that the various criteria are seldom weighted equally in practice, and it is questionable whether or not all criteria are satisfied in all cases to which the notion of just war is applied.[215] Some theorists stipulate that *jus in bello* criteria are irrelevant unless *jus ad bellum* criteria are first satisfied.[216] Since all criteria are theoretically granted equal consideration, (at least within each category if not overall), the order in which they are presented here does not designate priority.

Jus ad bellum stipulates that war is to be undertaken by a lawful or sovereign authority, not by individual citizens. This criterion traditionally refers to the authority of a sovereign ruler or governing body without a superior. On this precept, it rests upon the authoritative individual or body to discern "just cause, to avoid evil intentions, and to achieve the end of peace" in service to the communal good.[217] This presents an obvious problem in light of the fact that sovereign authorities do not always behave lawfully or justly and do not necessarily serve the collective good, which is itself subjectively defined. On the other hand, an individual or group of citizens lacking lawful authority might behave justly in opposing sovereign authority and, in doing so, might provide a great moral service to the immediate and broader communities. Human authority is not synonymous with justice; therefore, to insist that just war can be undertaken only by an earthly sovereign is untenable given the potential for abuse of lawful authority. Since

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[213]Guthrie and Quinlan, 26, 43.

[214]Bellamy, 121.

[215]Ibid., 121-2.

[216]Ibid., 128.

[217]This interpretation of lawful authority is based on the work of Aquinas. James Turner Johnson, "Thinking Morally about War in the Middle Ages and Today," in *Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 6.

every free person is responsible for his or her behaviour, each bears the responsibility of choosing whether or not to support the decisions of lawful authorities. Ultimate moral accountability resides with the individual.

While Jehanne's military endeavours enjoyed lawful support from the dauphin, she also claimed support from the most sovereign authority possible—divine authority.[218] In fact, from a theological perspective God might be considered the only sovereign authority, in which case divine sanction of warfare might be held as the only (or at least the most) legitimate sanction of warfare. With respect to the just war tradition's interpretation of legitimate authority, Cicero (106-43 BCE) maintained that certain pagan priests of Rome were able to discern the will of the gods with respect to warfare and, upon their recommendation, the Roman Senate was authorized to declare war.[219] Ambrose (340-97 CE) asserted that the right to wage war rested with the state rather than the church but allowed that the Hebrew prophets of old legitimately proclaimed war by divine command.[220] Both Ambrose and Augustine (354-430 CE), however, relegated this prophetic role to the distant past and viewed earthly sovereigns as divine representatives in matters of war.[221] Gratian of Bologna held (c.1140 CE) that God can directly command war through the voice of the pope in defense of the church both materially and doctrinally.[222] Hence, the possibility of God sanctioning participation in war through prophetic figures was abandoned by mainstream just war theorists long before Jehanne proclaimed her mission. Although some theorists acknowledge two types of justice—"objective or true justice (knowable to God)" and "subjective justice (knowable to humans),"[223]—they do not address the possibility that lay individuals might acquire knowledge of objective justice directly through divine revelation. Jehanne's situation, wherein an 'ordinary' citizen of humble social status and a member of the church laity raised the sword against a political enemy in the name of God, does not apparently conform to the general expectations of just war theorists with respect to legitimate authority, although the fact that her military campaign was approved by the rightful heir to the throne of France does conform.

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[218]Jehanne declared God her "rightful and sovereign Lord." Jehanne, letter to Philippe the Good dated July 17, 1429; reproduced in Pernoud and Clin, 67-8, 253-4. Quotation is from Pernoud and Clin, 67.

[219]John Mark Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War* (New York: Continuum, 2006), 16-7, 74, 77.

[220]Ibid., 77.

[221]Ibid.

[222]Bellamy, 32-3.

[223]Ibid., 122.

Given what we know of her, it is extremely unlikely that Jehanne would have engaged in war had she not apprehended divine revelation instructing her to do so; approval or instruction by royal authority itself would not likely have moved her to military action. She considered it "better to obey and serve her sovereign Lord, that is God, than men."[224] Jehanne agreed to fight on the basis of direct divine authority alone; the dauphin's approval was sought later, also by the instruction of her divine counsel. It might have been difficult for Jehanne initially to gain support from the soldiers without the political and financial backing of Charles VII, so it was a practical matter as well as a customary matter which accorded due respect to earthly sovereignty in accordance with chivalric practices and a medieval worldview.

Jus ad bellum also holds that war is to be undertaken with just and proportionate cause, but the criterion of just cause is ambiguous since it does not clearly specify what constitutes just cause.[225] Perhaps the most commonly declared and accepted case for just cause in warfare is self-defense or defense of an ally against unwarranted aggression or oppression. Punishment has sometimes been cited as just cause,[226] but this is certainly debatable, and the line between punishment and vengeance is easily obscured. A useful distinction between vengeance and self-defense is raised by de Pizan, who suggests that the difference depends upon a lapse of time. Self-defense is an immediate response to violation whereas vengeance occurs as a delayed, [and therefore premeditated], response to violation. Self-defense is considered just but vengeance is not.[227] Self-defense thus constitutes an immediate response to an immediate threat, but it should be recognized that an immediate threat need not necessarily be of short duration but can be ongoing; it cannot, however, be something entirely historical. Moreover, a response need not occur in the moment of initial violation in the case of ongoing violation in order for it to be immediate, so long as the violation is ongoing at the time when defensive response is undertaken. To assert that a past threat or violation, because it once occurred, constitutes an ongoing threat by virtue of the fact that it might recur, cannot be viewed as a legitimate case of immediate threat or violation unless there is obvious evidence of imminent recurrence. In other words, the mere possibility of threat, which exists everywhere and at all times, cannot rightly be construed as imminent threat justifying

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[224]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 92.

[225]Some maintain that just cause is to be assessed relatively such that it becomes 'sufficient cause'; rather than determining just cause, one is thereby required to establish a "more or less" just cause, that is, "sufficiently just cause to legitimize the actions" intended. Bellamy, 123.

[226]Mattox, 9, 74.

[227]de Pizan, *Deeds of Arms and Chivalry*, 161-2.

violent response. *Gaudium et Spes* establishes that armies might be utilized for defensive purposes but ought not to be used in the interest of acquiring territory or advantage. Military personnel should view themselves as "custodians of the security and freedom of their" compatriots. As long as they fulfill this role "properly, they are contributing to the maintenance of peace."[228]

One might wonder whether the primary commitment of just war ought to be to peace or to justice. According to Augustine, the primary objective of war is peace.[229] Arendt states that "[t]he end of war—end taken in its twofold meaning—is peace or victory; but to the question And what is the end of peace? there is no answer. Peace is an absolute."[230] Since notions of justice are highly perspectival and debatable, it is difficult if not impossible to establish justice as the central goal of war in a generally applicable sense. Peace, on the other hand, is more uniformly understood and can be broadly designated as a goal of war. This is not to assert, of course, that justice plays no role in just war; rather, justice is implicit in peace since true peace cannot exist without justice. Therefore, to establish peace is to achieve justice as well. Augustine distinguishes between "the just peace of God" and the "peace of the unjust," which is no peace at all.[231] A peaceful society demands more than an absence of war; it also requires the presence of justice. Jehanne's declaration that peace in France would only be achieved at the point of a lance[232] encapsulates the just war perspective with peace as the stipulated objective. The statement expresses Jehanne's ultimate purpose (peace), her means of achieving it (by lance), and the necessity of the means in that it was the only effective option available (last resort). Her commitment to justice and her pursuit of peace were components of a single endeavour. That she aimed to oust a longtime aggressive invader in defense of her country and its citizens places Jehanne's cause firmly within the realm of just cause.

Although just cause and proportionate cause are often treated separately, given that disproportionate cause is unjust, proportionate cause seems an inevitable aspect of just cause. The criterion of proportionate cause requires that the proportion of good to

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[228]*Gaudium et Spes*, a. 79, 989.

[229]Saint Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, vol. 6, books 18.36-20, trans. William Chase Greene, Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, no. 416 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 165. Mattox lists "peace as the ultimate objective of war" as a separate *jus ad bellum* principle [criterion]. Mattox, 10.

[230]Arendt, *On Violence*, 51.

[231]Augustine, *City of God*, 171. He notes that conquerors often seek "to impose" on their newly-acquired subjects "the laws of their own [brand of pseudo-] peace." Ibid., 167.

[232]Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 173.

be achieved (intended) outweighs the proportion of evil manifested in achieving it. Guthrie and Quinlan note, for example, that it would not constitute proportionate cause if a nation were to wage war on another for robbing one of its citizens, insulting its flag, or offending its head of state.[233] Jehanne demonstrated proportionate cause by engaging in an already existing war, employing customary tactics already in use by the offending party, and refraining from violence in excess of that which she sought to eliminate. The good that she aimed to achieve, that is, an end to war that had persisted over ninety-two years and the establishment of lasting peace, outweighed the minimally necessary (albeit considerable) violence employed.

In many instances, estimation of proportionate cause is difficult in the same manner in which all utilitarian calculation is difficult, the problem being uncertainty. Expected outcomes do not always correspond to actual outcomes, and calculation of proportionality runs the risk of subjectivity and partiality. We need not revisit these issues in great detail at this time but ought to acknowledge them and to note that Jehanne's faith in divine revelation eliminated such problems of uncertainty for her.

Jus ad bellum further indicates that war is to be undertaken as a last resort. This criterion requires not that every other possible option be exhausted prior to engaging in war, but that every other potentially effective option be first considered and tried, if possible. 'Last,' in this context, indicates least-preferred.[234]

The kingdom of France was on the verge of being lost entirely, and perhaps permanently, to the English when Jehanne undertook her military campaign. Her involvement in the war was regarded as France's only hope. Certainly, ample time had elapsed for the conflict to be resolved without her participation, but this had not come to pass. Moreover, Jehanne delayed acting on the instructions of her voices as long as possible before finally departing for Vaucouleurs.[235] Furthermore, she thrice entreated the enemy to leave peacefully rather than compel her to engage in battle. Clearly, she approached warfare as a last resort.

Jus ad bellum also demands that a formal declaration of war be issued allowing the opponent an opportunity to correct the offensive behaviour. The requirement of advance warning or ultimatum by means of formal declaration supports the criterion of

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[233]Guthrie and Quinlan, 12.
[234]Ibid., 13, 33.
[235]Jehanne, testimony of February 22, 1431; in Scott, *Trial*, 67. G. Thibault; in Murray, 265.

last resort.[236] As we have seen, Jehanne's ultimatum to the English (comprised of several letters) declared her unambiguous intention to attack should they refuse to leave France and, in fact, exhorted them to do so.[237]

Also under the rubric of *jus ad bellum* is the stipulation that war must be undertaken with a reasonable probability of success. Success is not, in this context, measured in terms of military victory alone, but in terms of the total consequences of a particular action. For example, an enemy might not be entirely defeated but might be significantly weakened or prevented from succeeding in a very destructive endeavour.[238] In calculating likely outcomes and reasonable probability of success, the utilitarian problem of impossible accuracy again rears its head. Moreover, as Merton points out, in an era of nuclear weaponry, [and this applies to biological and chemical weaponry as well], it is increasingly difficult to measure, or even to hope for, favourable outcomes in the matter of war,[239] rendering the criterion somewhat obsolete.

At any rate, Jehanne defied the criterion of "reasonable" probability of success since the likelihood of an untrained and inexperienced young woman leading an army and paving the way to victory for a party that was all but completely defeated in a seemingly interminable war was, by all reasonable assessment, almost nil. Hence, Jehanne's example testifies to the serious inadequacy of utilitarian calculation of probability.[240] The fact that her case for engaging in war was founded on faith rather than reason meant that her situation was not bound by the limits of human reason; hence, the miraculous was free to occur. Human activity directed by reason alone can impose restrictions on the activity of grace, blocking its operation through a refusal to engage it.

Finally, *jus ad bellum* insists that war must be undertaken with right intention. The issue of right intention is a complex matter, but it is generally agreed that one who acts for the sake of peace, justice, and the common good acts with right intention, whereas one who acts in the name of hatred, revenge, oppression of others, or the

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[236]Mattox indicates that, according to Cicero's conception of just war, "a public declaration of war or the issuance of an ultimatum constitutes the last resort for peaceful resolution." Mattox, 78.

[237]Jehanne, letter to the English dated March 22, 1429; reproduced in Scott, *Trial*, 30-1. Jehanne, letter to the English dated May 5, 1429. Pasquerel, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 187, and in Craig Taylor, 314.

[238]Guthrie and Quinlan, 32.

[239]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 142.

[240]Another such example emerges in the story of Jan Baalsrud, a Norwegian soldier whose escape from Nazi-occupied Norway during World War II required high-risk involvement of many individuals. Against the odds, Baalsrud survived ongoing pursuit by the Nazis and, of the many who assisted him throughout his ordeal at extremely high risk to their own well-being and, in some cases, that of their families, none suffered adverse consequences. For the complete story, see David Howarth, *We Die Alone* (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 1999).

extension of one's power or territory acts with wrong intent. There is obviously a strong connection between right intention and just cause, as well as between last resort and right intention.[241] According to Guthrie and Quinlan, right intention aims "to create a better, more just and more lasting subsequent peace" for all involved than if war is not undertaken. Naturally, extermination of an entire people does not qualify as proper intention.[242] Again, terms such as 'better' and 'more just' are subjective and therefore problematic, but what Guthrie and Quinlan seem ultimately to suggest in this statement is that peace without justice is not true peace and that true peace is the real aspiration of right intention. It should be noted that, not only is it sometimes difficult to discern the real intentions of others,[243] but it is often the case that governments act with partiality rather than in the interest of all concerned as recommended by the concept of right intention. "[N]ot only do political and military leaders consistently display national partiality," states Bellamy, but "more often that [*sic*] not their societies *expect* them to do so. Societies tend to expect their governments to expend more energy protecting fellow citizens . . . than protecting foreign non-combatants."[244]

As we know, Jehanne was very explicit about her intentions in going to war. She was not motivated by vengeance and did not seek to expand, but to restore, the kingdom of France. Moreover, she attempted to eliminate, not to engage in, oppression and sought to gain nothing from the enemy but freedom. Jehanne's goal was to establish enduring peace and its necessary component, justice. In the process, she displayed respect and concern for all alike.

According to *jus in bello*, war must be practiced with discrimination. This criterion deems it impermissible to attack noncombatants deliberately, and the risk to noncombatants must be as minimal as possible.[245] This, of course, becomes a complex matter in instances where there is no clear division between the geographical position of combatants and noncombatants. *Gaudium et Spes* asserts that "[e]very act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal

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[241]Mattox indicates that, under the Augustinian model of just war, right intention demands that "[t]hose who wage war must view war as a stern necessity." Mattox, 76. The notion of "stern necessity" evidently corresponds to the idea of last resort.

[242]Guthrie and Quinlan, 12-3, 24-5.

[243]Bellamy points out that "something approximating intentions" can be ascertained from the actions of others. Bellamy, 125.

[244]Ibid., 119.

[245]Guthrie and Quinlan, 14, 39.

condemnation."[246] Also under the category of discrimination is prohibition against the targeted destruction of property, monuments, religious buildings, food, and water supplies. Unfortunately, mass bombing often eliminates such distinctions in matters of destruction. Harm to captives, ambassadors, or those seeking asylum is also forbidden, as is the violation of corpses, and the rights of conscientious objectors and religious professionals must also be respected. Minimal force is not to be exceeded.

Jehanne did not target noncombatants[247] and unequivocally forbade pillaging.[248] She also granted asylum to religious professionals.[249] Moreover, given the extent of her piety, it is unthinkable that she would have allowed the destruction of religious buildings, and it is equally inconceivable in light of her character and her compassion toward the wounded enemy that she would have permitted the violation of corpses. There is no evidence of transgressions such as these on Jehanne's part, and even her most hateful, disparaging, and determined accusers in Rouen did not charge her with anything of this nature.

Jus in bello also requires that proportionality be observed, which is to say that the means of war must be proportional to the end. This criterion corresponds to the *jus ad bellum* requirement of proportionate cause and stipulates that the means of war must not constitute a greater evil than that which it seeks to eliminate but that more good than evil should be the fairly estimated result of the action. All foreseeable incidental harm is to be included in the evaluation and only minimal necessary force is permitted.[250] At the risk of monotony, it must be observed that such utilitarian predictions are impossible to perform with certainty and constitute cause for concern. More precisely, this criterion traditionally placed restrictions on the types of weaponry considered acceptable and also prohibits the use of torture.[251]

The points cited with respect to Jehanne's military campaign in relation to proportionate cause (*jus ad bellum*) pertain to proportionality *in bello* as well. One might add that, since the destruction caused by medieval warfare was more containable

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[246]*Gaudium et Spes*, a. 80, 990.

[247]This is not to claim that noncombatants did not sometimes die inadvertently as a result of battles in which she participated.

[248]Beaucroix; in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 120. Pasquerel; in Craig Taylor, 316.

[249]de Coutes; in Murray, 262.

[250]Guthrie and Quinlan, 14, 39-41.

[251]Mattox, 10.

than that caused by modern bombs, proportionality *in bello* is increasingly difficult to estimate and to achieve as warfare technology advances.[252]

It is evident that several aspects of just war theory rely heavily upon utilitarian calculation which is inherently flawed, rendering application of the theory problematic and its reliability precarious.[253] "Every act," Weil recommends, "should be considered from the point of view not of its object but of its impulsion. The question is not 'What is the aim?' It is 'What is the origin?'"[254] "We should not take one step, *even in the direction of what is good*," she advises, "beyond that to which we are irresistibly impelled by God."[255] While extreme, Weil's position conceivably derives from acute awareness of the fallibility of all human moral evaluation. With respect to technological advances in warfare, the potential efficacy of just war theory has become stymied in some important respects since every war must now consider the possibility that chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons might be launched, the consequences of which are inestimable short of total destruction. Let us not forget that the atomic bomb has already been intentionally detonated twice over civilian populations. When such tactics are employed, the distinction between combatant and noncombatant is impossible to observe, as is the proscription against destruction of food, water, religious buildings, monuments, and property. Furthermore, in Jehanne's day, "the means of defence were . . . very superior to the means of attack,"[256] but this is no longer true. In fact, the means of attack often far exceed the means of defense in modern warfare, not only by virtue of the fact that there is no reliable defense against nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and little to no effective means of limiting or controlling their devastation once unleashed,[257] but also with respect to the fact that civilians do not generally have access to weapons akin to those employed against them. All things considered, Merton holds that the notion of a just war "was not altogether absurd" and "was capable of working in ages less destructive than our own"; however, where the distinction between combatant

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[252]Saint Augustine seems to include "good faith" as a criterion under the *jus in bello* category, stipulating that pledges (including those made to the enemy) must be honoured but that it is otherwise acceptable to engage in deceptive military strategy directed against the enemy in a just war. Mattox, 11, 64-5, 84.

[253]Bellamy notes that the "*jus ad bellum* criteria" in particular "afford considerable latitude to political leaders." Bellamy, 131.

[254]Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, 45.

[255]Ibid., 44.

[256]Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses,* 107.

[257]Merton makes the same point. Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 69.

and civilian has been obliterated, the possibility of a just use of force is questionable.[258] Arendt asserts that "[t]he very substance of violent action is ruled by the means-end category, whose chief characteristic, if applied to human affairs, has always been that the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the means which it justifies and which are needed to reach it."[259] Consequently, Merton advises that, "[s]ince any large scale war is likely to turn without warning into a global nuclear cataclysm, we can no longer afford to ignore our obligation to work for the abolition of war as a means of solving international problems."[260]

While Merton and Arendt are correct in their assertions, the problem remains that war exists and demands response. Guthrie and Quinlan maintain that, in spite of its shortcomings, just war theory serves as "a systematic reminder of moral questions which we ought to think about when we consider embarking upon armed conflict or when we engage in it."[261] Although this is true, it is not sufficient; there is an obvious need for an alternative, more comprehensive theory of acceptable warfare. Jean Bethke Elshtain notes that current just war theory assumes "the existence of universal moral dispositions, if not convictions — hence, the possibility of a nonrelativist ethic," as well as "the need for moral judgments of who/what is aggressor/victim, just/unjust, acceptable/unacceptable," and also "the potential efficacy of moral appeals and arguments to stay the hand of force."[262] Elshtain refrains from passing judgment on whether or not the assumptions are reasonable or realistic,[263] but it should be noted that Jehanne's example demonstrates possible suspension of a universal ethic, deference of human judgment to divine judgment, and a declared necessity for violence in opposing a particular aggression. What Elshtain does offer is her opinion that, in times of war, it appears "likely that many" just war criteria "will go unheeded. They *may* have sufficient force," she allows, "to give war-makers a bad conscience, and they offer men and women a 'voice' in and through which to register their objections and their moral distress."[264] Nonetheless, she cautions against "the crusading impulse lurking in the interstices of just-war discourse. The language of good and evil, just and unjust, may

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[258]Ibid., 43, 59.

[259]Arendt, *On Violence*, 4.

[260]Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era*, 5.

[261]Guthrie and Quinlan, 46.

[262]Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Epilogue: Continuing Implications of the Just War Tradition," in *Just War Theory*, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 324.

[263]Ibid., 325.

[264]Ibid., 329.

. . . turn people out as judges who sometimes become executioners. Should this happen, the preponderant force of 'official' just-war discourse may not have sufficient strength to hold in check the 'heretical' crusading offshoot."[265]

Just war theory does not specifically address individual claims to divine sanction, yet amid the excessively destructive, sophisticated weaponry of today, perhaps divinely sanctioned warfare is the only conceivably justifiable warfare. "Every creature which attains perfect obedience [to God] constitutes a special, unique, irreplaceable form of the presence, knowledge and operation of God in the world," states Weil.[266] Perhaps the key to the abolition of war, or at least the reduction or mitigation of evil in war, lies in the essential values manifested in Jehanne's conduct as divine servant. It is certainly worth considering in light of what is at stake.

Daughter of God
Presenting a Model of Righteous Warfare and Human Agency

> She showed pity not only to the French, but also to the enemy. I know that, for I was with her for a long time . . . .
>
> — Simon Beaucroix, companion-at-arms to Jehanne

Jehanne represents the reconciliation of warrior and saint—a troubling prospect for some; nevertheless, the duality constitutes the significant factor. She was not a warrior alone but a warrior-saint, which is to say that she was no ordinary warrior but an extraordinary one, a warrior *par excellence* by virtue not only of her remarkable military proficiencies but also—and not least of all—by virtue of her saintliness, her exceptionally virtuous character. Yet it must be remembered that Jehanne was fully human and, as such, not immune to human susceptibilities, but she surmounted these, excepting the inevitable insurmountability of death. As fully human, Jehanne serves as a potential model for others. "She is lifted up as an icon of peace in a time of turmoil and war," states Tavard. "Humankind will need her example as long as it is pushed to war."[267]

Above all, Jehanne's life and death demonstrate the nature, significance, and impact within human history of a deeply lived divine-human relationship. The task

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[265]Ibid., 330.

[266]Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, 48.

[267]Tavard, 171. The statement suggests that, in the face of all war, the goal of peace must always be kept in view and striven toward.

before us, insofar as possible, is to delineate Jehanne's divinely-mandated prophetic agency within this relationship. Jehanne did not simply fight a 'just war'—a war deemed just by human reasoning (although it might be reasonably considered just)—but she fought a war allegedly by divine command. This places her agency in a category that I have chosen to define as righteous in order to distinguish it from the just war category which does not necessarily make reference or appeal to divinity, (although it has at times done so indirectly[268]), and to distinguish it as a model based on Jehanne specifically. Within the model of righteous warfare and human agency herein proposed, divine sanction figures as the central characteristic and righteousness as a defining and necessary behavioural quality; human conduct is prescribed in accordance with presumed divine principles as apprehended through Jehanne's example. While just war theory rests on human ability to distinguish between moral and immoral behaviour, the notion of righteous warfare rests primarily on faith in a form of morality discerned through processes of ongoing divine revelation. Since war thrives unchecked in the absence of righteousness, righteousness in matters of war can serve to mitigate or discourage warfare to the benefit of humanity and the planet. It should be noted, of course, that we are speaking of righteousness and not self-righteousness; the latter honours the ego, whereas the former (in the sense that we employ it[269]) denies it.

A distinction should also be drawn between 'righteous warfare' and 'holy war.' Whereas 'holy war' is directed against a perceived religious enemy, (that is, one identified as an enemy by virtue of adherence to a particular religion or as a threat to a particular religion), Jehanne did not view the English or Burgundians as religious enemies since they, like the French royalists, were Christian. In fact, she granted immunity to English ecclesiastics at Orléans.[270] Her stated purpose was neither religious conversion nor elimination of a religious group; hence, she did not engage in 'holy war.'[271]

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[268]In such instances, the church, or the pope specifically, were often regarded as divine representatives or spokespersons on behalf of war. Bellamy, 33, 35, 42, 44, 46-8.

[269]Righteousness, in the context of righteous warfare herein described, derives from faith in the Divine and commitment to divine servantship, hence, surrender of personal will (ego-based) to divine will.

[270]de Coutes; in Murray, 262.

[271]In a letter to the Hussites, written and signed by Pasquerel, Jehanne's confessor, he presumes to write in Jehanne's voice against the Hussites. The language and style of this letter are notably inconsistent with nine extant letters actually dictated by Jehanne. Moreover, the letter presents Jehanne as threatening to abandon her campaign against the English in France in order to embark on a holy war against the Hussites—a highly unlikely scenario given Jehanne's utter devotion to her divine mission in France. Moreover, at the time Pasquerel's letter was written on March 23, 1430, Jehanne was signing letters in her own hand, as evidenced in two letters to the city of Rheims dated March 16 and 28, 1430 and a letter to

Riom dated November 9 of the previous year, all extant in the original. In fact, none of Jehanne's existing letters is signed in Pasquerel's name. Jehanne's letters are reproduced in Pernoud and Clin, 33-4, 45, 67-8, 248-60. Pasquerel's letter to the Hussites is reproduced in Pernoud and Clin, 259; the authors state that this letter "was not dictated" by Jehanne. Pernoud and Clin, 258. The aforementioned letters are also reproduced in Craig Taylor, who comments that Pasquerel's letter was not written in Jehanne's style and, furthermore, that it was composed in Latin, [a language in which Jehanne was presumably unskilled, given that she was not formally educated and was illiterate]. Craig Taylor, 132. In fact, her letters were written in French. Furthermore, a comment contained in Jehanne's first letter to the English has often been interpreted as a reference to crusade, but this is in no way obvious. The letter addresses the Duke of Bedford as follows: "Et se vous luy faictes la raison, encoires pourrez-vous venir veoir que les Francoys feront le plus beau fait qui oncques fut faict pour la chrestiente." Jehanne, letter dated March 22, 1429; Orléans MS 518, 14. A literal translation renders, "And if you do right, you can someday [or "eventually", "still", or "furthermore"] come to witness [or "to see"] the French perform the fairest deed ever performed for Christianity." The statement is obviously vague and any interpretation is inevitably and entirely speculative. Moreover, it makes no explicit reference to crusade—or to war for that matter. In fact, all evidence relating Jehanne directly to war does so specifically in the context of expelling the English from France by claim of divine command. Since it is my intention to impose as little as possible of personal agenda on Jehanne, I advance no firm interpretation of her reference to performing a great deed for Christendom, although I point out that the prospect of a united French people living peacefully alongside its neighbour in a country formerly ravaged by war between these two Christian nations for nearly a century (at that time) might be considered a great Christian deed. It is critical to remember that peace was Jehanne's stated purpose, not war. Jehanne, testimony of March 3, 1431; quoted in Craig Taylor, 173. Alternative versions of Jehanne's comment to Bedford do not correspond entirely to the text of the Orléans Manuscript; the following lends itself more readily, (though not definitively), to crusade-related interpretation: "If you will settle your account, you can come to join her [the Maid's] company, in which the French will achieve the finest feat ever accomplished in Christendom." Jehanne, letter to the English dated March 22, 1429; reproduced in Pernoud and Clin, 33-4, 249-50. Quotation is from Pernoud and Clin, 34. The text of the Orléans Manuscript, on the other hand, does not invite the English to join the French or to go anywhere with them, (as crusade activity would suggest), or even to come into France (i.e., if one were to read the text as indicating physical movement) in order to witness something. Rather, to come to see or to witness something does not likely suggest physical movement at all in this context but suggests an eventual realization or apprehension of something. Such an interpretation supports the possibility that Jehanne's comment referred to eventual peaceful relations between a unified and restored France and the English (content in their own country), with the seemingly interminable war and cause of so much suffering and loss to all parties involved finally ended. Given that the English, Burgundians, and Armagnacs were all Christian, this might have seemed a remarkable feat to Jehanne who, as indicated below in her letter to the Duke of Burgundy, was distressed by the fact that Christians were warring with each other. No doubt, there are those who would have liked Jehanne to participate in the crusade movement or who are otherwise inclined to associate her with it; however, there are sound reasons to reject such notions. First is the lack of compelling evidence in relation to the thesis that Jehanne genuinely supported crusade activity. It must be noted that she once uttered a crusade-related comment in a letter dictated to the Duke of Burgundy, but the comment is peripheral to the main thrust of the letter, which is that Christians ought not to war with one another. The letter reads, "High and dread prince, duke of Burgundy, the Maid calls upon you by the King of Heaven, . . . to make a firm and lasting peace with the king of France. You two must pardon one another fully with a sincere heart, as loyal Christians should; and if it pleases you to make war, go and wage it on the Saracens. . . . I pray you, . . . make war no more on the holy kingdom of France. . . ." Jehanne, letter dated July 17, 1429; reproduced in Pernoud and Clin, 67-8, 253-4. Quotation is from Pernoud and Clin, 67. The statement can be interpreted as an approbation of crusade activity for those inclined to war. If Jehanne did not utterly disapprove of crusade, (and we do not know what the movement represented to her), it is conceivably due to the fact that crusading for recovery of the Holy Land was viewed officially by the Christian church as a just war, and it carried the sanction of many popes over the years. Backman, 219. Jehanne might, therefore, have accepted it as a legitimate cause, but she did not, according to existing evidence, declare it divinely sanctioned, and she did not participate in it or express any explicit desire to do so. Nor is there any testimony suggesting that she actively rallied others to that end. Craig Taylor interprets Jehanne's reference to the Saracens as a warning, or a taunt of sorts. Jehanne's letter goes on to declare that the Duke of Burgundy will not win any further battles against the French royalists, who have Jesus on their side; hence, (Taylor infers), the duke would do better to fight the Saracens. Taylor categorizes the statement as military "crusading rhetoric" "typical" of the time. C. Taylor, 4, 19-20, 76, n. 20. If this is the case, then it need not be

My position, (like that of Aquinas), is that there is no such thing as a truly just war since war inevitably contains elements of injustice, although it might contain elements of justice or justifiability as well.[272] Righteous warfare as herein defined might be considered just in many respects, but it is not characterized fundamentally by justice but by righteousness, which presumably corresponds to justice, albeit divine justice which cannot necessarily be fully comprehended or articulated in human terms. Since human notions of justice and morality are elusive, (fluid and subjective), it must be admitted that all theories based fundamentally on these concepts are somewhat deficient and tentative although necessary, potentially meaningful, and no doubt useful. In righteous warfare, one appeals to divine justice, to a higher authority than human authority and, in so doing, engages Divine Mystery, agrees to play by divine rules—which one is not necessarily privy to—and follows a path which could lead one straight into martyrdom. Astell and Wheeler observe that Jehanne "transcends a merely nationalist agenda and has become a global figure of heroic sanctity." She "shaped her life, mission, and goals at the direction of her 'heavenly voices' . . . [and] saw her life as animated by her spirituality: a just war, for her . . . , was a form of prayer. . . . She . . . embodies and symbolizes the active consequences of living out (and out of) profound religious faith."[273]

Documentary evidence portrays Jehanne as one who was authentic and constant. She was authentic in that she simply was who she was, no matter what she was engaged in or in whose company. Her behaviour was not rooted in pride, self-importance, or a desire to impress others. She was not given to pretense and did not put on airs. She possessed a genuine essence which predominated. Pernoud and Clin observe that the testimonies of those who were most familiar with Jehanne conveyed the "dominant impression" of one who was transparent. "[S]he had a particular limpidity, a clear

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accorded great significance. Secondly, testimony indicates that Jehanne longed to return to her peasant life in Domremy once her military mission in France was complete. Following the coronation of Charles VII at Rheims, she declared, "[P]lease God my Creator that I may now retire, and lay down my arms, and go to serve my father and mother and keep their sheep, with my brothers and my sister, who will be glad to see me again." Jehanne; quoted by Dunois, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 144. Such was not the case, however, and Jehanne continued to fight for the liberation of France and an end to the Hundred Years' War. Thirdly, Jehanne took up arms by order of what she perceived to be very specific divine command; since all accounts of her divine purpose are devoid of any reference to crusade, there is no reason to suppose that she would have undertaken such a campaign.

[272]Aquinas maintains that killing is never entirely just and, therefore, neither is war, although varying degrees of justice might be manifest in war. Bellamy, 38-9.

[273]Astell and Wheeler, "Joan of Arc and Spirituality," in *Joan of Arc and Spirituality*, 2.

reflection of that invisible world with which she felt herself in touch."[274] Yet there is an ineffable quality to Jehanne as well; perhaps Robert Bresson touched it in stating (with respect to her) that one "does not explain greatness, [but] one tries to attune oneself to it."[275] Indeed, "whatever truly is great is available equally for all,"[276] maintains Kierkegaard, so no-one is off the hook in terms of the demands on individual character. "It is against my nature," he reflects, "to do what people so often do, talk inhumanly about the great as though some thousands of years were a huge distance; I prefer to talk about it humanly as though it happened yesterday and let only the greatness itself be the distance that either exalts or condemns."[277]

Jehanne's exemplary teaching by means of lived witnessing of faith revealed how one rises to the occasion of serving God in the context of war, for surely there are means of serving God in all possible human contexts (though not necessarily all human activities within a given context). She fulfilled the requirements of active, practical, prophetic mysticism in all its unpredictable, uncompromising, unyielding, solitary, and terrifying aspects as well as its ultimate, intrinsic dignity, sanctity, and beauty. Anyone claiming divine sanction in acts of war whose behaviour does not correspond to Jehanne's behaviour cannot be considered in league with her, nor with the Jewish and Christian prophetic traditions in which she participates. In fact, such a one might be suspected of false prophecy, at least within the parameters of those traditions.

Although some might be inclined to cast Jehanne as a Christian zealot pursuing a purely personal-political agenda by means of a false claim to divine sanction, the evidence does not support such characterization of her. First, her defiance of the Church Militant disqualifies her as a Christian zealot. Furthermore, that she continued to fight in knowledge of her impending capture—and in spite of her great fear of capture and death by enemy hands—demonstrates an obvious absence of personal agenda. As Heschel points out, the content of legitimate prophetic messages often directly opposes the "hopes and inclinations" of the prophet.[278]

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[274]Pernoud and Clin, 163-4.

[275]Robert Bresson, French film producer; quoted in Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 277. Pernoud explains that Bresson was "the first French film-producer to devote a film to the history of Joan of Arc: asked whether his work would offer an 'explanation' of the heroine," this was his reply. Pernoud, *By Herself and Her Witnesses*, 277.

[276]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 96.

[277]Ibid., 37.

[278]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 208.

Since arbitrary evidence in support of divine sanction cannot reasonably command credence from others, random claims to isolated incidents as constituting evidence of divine sanction must be held in suspicion. This is not to say that God cannot sanction whatever God wishes in whatever manner God wishes, but it is to state that, based on Jehanne's model, multiple, related, identifying characteristics were present and, while an isolated event might very well be divinely sanctioned, isolated incidents simply do not provide sufficient or reasonable evidence on which others can formulate sound judgment with respect to a given claim.

While there is no definitive proof of divine sanction, Kierkegaard suggests that willingness to suffer [at the hands of others] constitutes the divinely elected apostle's strongest evidence of his or her claim, with respect to which "his speech will be brief: 'I am called by God; do with me now as you will, scourge me, persecute me; but my last word is my first: I am called by God, and I make you eternally responsible for what you do to me.'"[279] The words fit Jehanne like a glove. Recall that she held Cauchon responsible for her death and accountable to God.[280] Moreover, on being threatened with torture, she responded, "Truly, if you were to tear me limb from limb and make my soul leave my body, I would not say to you anything else. [And if you force me to do so], then afterwards I shall say that you made me say so by force."[281] With respect to her mission, Jehanne's last word was, indeed, her first, that she was called by God.

It cannot be concluded from Jehanne's example that God sanctions indiscriminate warfare or war in and of itself. She was involved in a specific war for a specific purpose under specific circumstances and conducted herself in a specific manner. In order to determine what God conceivably sanctioned through her conduct, a comprehensive model stipulating criteria which might be taken together as constituting righteous warfare and human agency is necessary so that various elements of Jehanne's behaviour and circumstances are not seized upon and misapplied in isolation from other crucial aspects. Constructing such a model is our next endeavour.

From the foregoing examination of Jehanne's life and death, one hundred criteria emerge as essential to or potentially indicative of divine sanction in accordance with her claim; since divine call and response could conceivably vary, not all criteria are cited as essential. It is expedient to divide the criteria into three major categories as follows:

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[279]Kierkegaard, *Authority and Revelation*, 117-8.
[280]Jehanne; quoted by Toutmouillé, in Pernoud, *Retrial,* 245.
[281]Jehanne, May 9, 1431; quoted in the Orleans Manuscript, in Scott, *Trial*, 151.

(i) twenty-two criteria (twelve essential and ten non-essential) indicative of divine, prophetic calling; (ii) sixteen criteria (all essential) indicative of divinely sanctioned righteous warfare; and (iii) sixty-two criteria (forty-seven essential and fifteen non-essential) indicative of divinely sanctioned human agency. The criteria are delineated below and, in the interest of clarity, functionality, and practicality, a clear, concise, and user-friendly enumerated chart is also included as an appendix at the end of this work. The appendix serves as an accessible, simple, and portable tool for evaluating claims to divinely sanctioned violence. The shaded numbers within the appendix indicate criteria of critical importance (i.e., essential criteria), while unshaded enumerations represent typical and therefore highly indicative, but non-essential, criteria. The numbers themselves do not designate priority. Moreover, since all of the criteria are drawn from material previously cited, discussed, and referenced, they are henceforth presented more succinctly and reference data are omitted.

It is crucial to emphasize that sporadic satisfaction of criteria is insufficient to render a claim potentially legitimate under this model. Rather, all essential criteria in a given category must be either met, indeterminate, or inapplicable in order for that category to be considered satisfied with respect to a particular claim; moreover, a majority of these must be met rather than indeterminate or inapplicable in order for an evaluation to be considered authoritative. Even though it is not possible in every situation (due to lack of available information) to determine whether or not all essential criteria are met, application of all available information to the model nonetheless enables one to discern a certain degree of conformity or lack of conformity of a claim to Jehanne's example; this is the best that can be achieved in limiting circumstances. In some cases, blatant violation of several criteria might be sufficient to determine illegitimacy of a claim under the model. Even if all pertinent facts are known in applying the model (which can be used to assess one's own potential deeds as well as those of others), it is unlikely that conformity to all essential criteria will be established in most cases. Regardless, the assessment can assist in evaluating the extent to which a claim might be considered divinely sanctioned (aligned with divine aspirations for the world) against the extent to which it does not presumably conform to divine aspirations.[282] The model thus serves to facilitate evaluation of diverse claims within

[282]While divine aspirations cannot necessarily be invariably known to humans, apparent divine aspirations can be reasonably extrapolated from the examples of saints and prophetic figures, or allegedly divine figures such as Jesus.

diverse contexts and can assist one in developing an informed response to any claim. If one chooses to support a claim that does not satisfy all essential criteria,[283] then one ought ideally to endeavour to increase the level of overall conformity by striving to conduct oneself in accordance with the prescribed model (the one hundred criteria) and by encouraging other participants to do likewise. In responding supportively to a claim of divine sanction, one should view such a response as a commitment to live in witness to one's faith and all that it entails, in full recognition of one's personal choice and responsibility in the matter. Therefore, in following another, one ought first to determine whether or not the particular act of following is in accordance with one's own path as faithful witness.

The first segment of the model of righteous warfare and human agency—that encompassing aspects of divine, prophetic calling—is comprised of the following essential and non-essential criteria extracted from Jehanne's example. The essential criteria include a claim to receipt of divine revelation in some form (e.g., visions or auditions) calling one to a specified task, an ability to discern spirits (charism), the offering of oneself as an instrument of God and willing conduit for divine grace, active engagement in divine servantship by which one operates under willing obedience to divine (versus human) authority and surrenders one's personal will to divine will, viewing oneself as being in an absolute relation to the Divine, submitting to divine judgment and living in constant awareness of this judgment, sharing in God's happiness, sadness, concern, sympathy, and aspirations for the world, displaying an active concern for humanity and acting as a destabilizing presence in an unjust social system, exhortation to improve the condition of humanity serving the repair of the world and the common good, lived witnessing of faith in God, courage in responding to a divine directive, general attentiveness, humility, and production of good fruit.

The non-essential criteria indicated by Jehanne's example with respect to divine, prophetic calling include initial hesitation, reluctance, resistance, fear, doubt, apprehension of apparent absurdity with respect to the task to which one is called requiring faith in God, prior lack of inclination, skill, or capacity to behave in the required manner, feelings of inadequacy and unworthiness with respect to carrying out one's mission, accompanied by assurance of divine assistance and creating a dependency on God, severe disruption to or break from one's previous lifestyle, exposure to personal

[283]This is not a recommendation that one do so, but simply an acknowledgment that one might do so.

risk, hostility, and/or persecution as a result of one's prophetic ministry, the experience of intense solitude and the necessity of standing as the particular against the status quo, ability to prophesy (charism), and ability to perform miracles (charism).

The second segment of the model—that encompassing aspects of divinely sanctioned righteous warfare—consists entirely of the following essential criteria derived from Jehanne's example: appeal to the most sovereign authority (i.e., divinity), participation in defensive war only (not offensive war), avoidance of pre-emptive warfare/violence, fighting only as a last resort, entreating the enemy to desist peacefully or issuing an ultimatum, avoidance of killing for its own sake, aiming to establish just peace, operating on proportionate cause, refraining from acting on vengeance or hatred, abstaining from conquering new territory and from oppressing others, refraining from engagement in holy war, issuing a formal declaration of intent to engage in war (warning), employment of minimal appropriate force (proportionality) and minimal bloodshed, avoidance of targeting noncombatants, refraining from employing torture or inflicting suffering for its own sake, and refusing to permit looting.

The third and final segment of the model—that encompassing aspects of divinely sanctioned human agency—is comprised of the following essential and non-essential criteria. The characteristics demonstrated by Jehanne that are designated essential in this category are numerous. Jehanne extended undifferentiated compassion, mercy, and forgiveness, she honoured the sanctity of all life, respected the dignity of the person, and operated from a fully-engaged conscience and driving force of love. She demonstrated love of human dignity, of peace, of justice, of compassion, of integrity, of conscience, of charity, of freedom, of life, of service, of humility, of courage, of sanctity, of faith and, above all, love of God. Love was the animating force which operated through her with respect to all else; it coursed through her veins.[284] She was genuinely distressed by all bloodshed and displayed a deep sensitivity to violence and suffering. She acted from an acute sense of duty to God on the premise that God must be served first in all things. She was extremely pious, demonstrating not only love of God, but also fear of God. Jehanne permitted no wedge between herself and the Divine, accepting no human deterrent from her proclaimed divine mission. She operated from conviction, determination, persistence, endurance, and uncompromised, singular commitment to her mission. Jehanne's mystical relationship transcended institutionalization and religious

[284]"As with all other gifts, the charism of prophecy must first serve *Love*." Hvidt, 69.

formulae and required mystical defiance on her part. Moreover, she did not engage in or encourage suicide and did not seek suffering or martyrdom. Jehanne reluctantly accepted suffering and martyrdom as necessary to her mystical witnessing, clinging through the end to her steadfast faith in God and divine revelation. She apprehended the intrinsically evil nature of human violence and war and did not attempt to qualify evil. She also recognized personal defilement sustained through the use of violence and displayed a deep sensitivity to evil (versus indifference). Jehanne was of righteous character, impatient with injustice, and prone to righteous anger, and she conducted herself according to an ethical code of chivalry. She exercised moral discernment, holding herself and others to a high ethical standard of behaviour, and normally upheld customary moral laws. Moreover, Jehanne taught by example over doctrine. She demonstrated a strong, service-oriented work ethic and disinclination toward idleness or sloth. Jehanne honoured personal responsibility in the maintenance of social justice and refused to love evil; rather, she actively opposed it. She sought to empower the disenfranchised, defending the wrongly oppressed at great cost to herself and participating directly in her mission in a position of vulnerability. She preferred peace to war and non-violence to violence, glorifying neither war nor violence. Jehanne displayed genuine concern for the spiritual welfare of others as well as herself, apprehending spiritual implications arising from human deeds. She demonstrated benevolence, kindness, generosity, and charity and did not engage in cruelty. She rejected personal glorification and idolization and was not motivated by self-fulfillment or material gain, refusing to benefit from anything unjustly acquired. Jehanne also demonstrated clarity of purpose, sincerity, authenticity, and integrity. She treated God as a Subject, not an object to be bent to human will, and she did not define or claim elaborate understanding of God but accepted Divine Mystery. She also accepted unknown consequences and uncertainty. She did not hold God responsible for human evil and did not claim divine sanction with respect to all of her activities, but only those founded on divine revelation; she exercised personal responsibility and accountability before God and others. She exercised independent thought as well. Jehanne offered a merciful gift which was multifold. Her gift contained peace, justice, freedom, courage, charity, compassion, forgiveness, faith, hope, love, grace, and the promise of a better future.

Jehanne also demonstrated important characteristics that can be deemed non-essential but potentially indicative of divinely sanctioned human agency when essential

criteria are also fulfilled. She did not proclaim divine condemnation of others, she engaged in temporary suspension of a universal ethic (prohibition against killing another human being) in favour of a higher *telos* perceived as divinely sanctioned (the achievement of just peace), she was charismatic, demonstrating spiritual gifts and uncanny abilities, and she embodied paradox. Jehanne was also reliable, consistent, constant, honest, transparent, and forthright, utilizing straightforward language. Moreover, she issued an unambiguous public statement of her purpose and method. Jehanne strove with the world, with herself, and with God. She expressed the sublime absolutely in the pedestrian, bringing the sublime qualities of compassion, humility, gratitude, charity, respect, dignity, nobility, justice, conscience, sanctity, and love to all manner of activity in which she engaged. She demonstrated wisdom and sound judgment. Jehanne struggled with pain and suffering and experienced the mystical 'dark night,' but she also demonstrated grace in extreme suffering. Posthumous miracles are attributed to her, and she has been canonized and is thus considered holy. Jehanne was also associated with particular, well-established prophecy, indicating a possible lack of arbitrariness.

These three categories of criteria constitute a comprehensive model of righteous warfare and human agency derived from Jehanne. As Jehanne did not teach by doctrine primarily but demonstrated a way, the model distills one hundred significant characteristics of her way, a way that might be considered divinely sanctioned. "[T]he main task of prophetic thinking is to bring the world into divine focus," states Heschel,[285] while Hvidt indicates that the prophet calls people from a wayward path by demonstrating "the right one."[286] In applying the model, it is recommended that the enumerated appendix be utilized in assessing a given claim against each criterion, and the method by which one might proceed in doing this is demonstrated and discussed in the following chapter.

The model provides an accessible tool for reflecting upon prophetic claims by identifying and categorizing numerous indicative aspects of Jehanne's prophetic task. It is prescriptive as well as evaluative, meaning that it is instructive both in terms of evaluating claims to divine sanction and in suggesting how one ought to behave in warfare if it is to be considered righteous. It is not essentially a predictive model, which is to say that it does not rely on human predictive capabilities as does, for instance,

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[285]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 24.
[286]Hvidt, 161.

utilitarianism. While the model contains prophetic elements (which are not grounded in human predictive capabilities) and demonstrates aspects of proportionality, these do not constitute the basis for going to war in view of the model.

The model does not provide scientific grounds for the evaluation of claims to divine sanction since no definitive proof exists with respect to evaluating such claims; it does, however, offer a reasoned approach to discerning the apparent strength or weakness of a claim. Not sanctioning warfare in any general sense, the model sanctions only that which might be considered divinely sanctioned based on Jehanne's example, thereby serving as a potential guide to righteous behaviour in warfare and in general. Direct and specific divine calling is the most definitive form of divine sanction, and a claim of specific and direct divine revelation produces a less ambiguous case than one in which an indirect and less specific form of divine sanction (such as scriptural interpretation) is claimed. This does not mean, however, that the latter cannot be legitimate or the former illegitimate. The determining factor is whether or not a claim is sufficiently substantiated by the satisfaction of other essential criteria.

It might be noted that, since Jehanne's claim was founded upon mystical experience and, given that mysticism constitutes a component of many religious traditions, the model might prove useful not only within Judaism and Christianity but within other religious contexts as well. Moreover, the model is so comprehensive as to contain minimal potential for abuse. It is conceivably less susceptible to abuse than just war theory, utilitarianism, or the notion of lesser evil, all of which are commonly employed with little to no acknowledgement of the significant potential for (and history of) abuse derived from them. Divine prophecy and false prophecy are potentially powerful phenomena, and failure to distinguish between them can be devastating. It is critical to discern who is calling whom in claims to divine sanction of war. Is God calling a prophet or is a false prophet invoking the name of God? Application of the model in the following chapter will demonstrate its enduring relevance and applicability in answering this question.

CHAPTER 4

APPLYING THE MODEL

> And draw us near
> and bind us tight,
> all your children here
> in their rags of light;
> in our rags of light,
> all dressed to kill;
> and end this night,
> if it be your will.
>
> —Leonard Cohen, "If it Be Your Will"

Theological exploration of Jehanne's claim to divinely sanctioned violence in previous chapters has yielded a comprehensive model of righteous warfare and human agency against which other such claims might be measured. It has been determined that Jehanne's claim and related behaviour place her within the Jewish and Christian prophetic traditions; hence, she can be classified as a practical, prophetic mystic. Indeed, anyone claiming divine sanction of violence is presumably either a prophet or a false prophet, and it is the purpose of the model to help distinguish between these.

In this chapter, practical application of the model in the form of two case studies demonstrates its usefulness in assessing the call to violence and in responding to such a call, bearing in mind that inaction is also a response. The criteria stipulated in the model are applied first to the activities of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime during World War II, and secondly to those of Dietrich Bonhoeffer who conspired to have Hitler assassinated. The first case study evidences voracious and unrestrained violent action while the second involves reluctant and restrained violent action, both within a shared context and both employing references to divinely inspired motivation. While neither Hitler nor Bonhoeffer claimed clear and direct divine instruction with respect to their activities in question, their invocation of and/or appeal to divinity is readily discernible. Since claims to explicit divine revelation with respect to warfare or other forms of violence are quite rare, it is critical to assess implicit examples such as these in order to

ascertain how they operate and their potential effects. Moreover, the cases demonstrate the model's applicability within the context of political violence against a state as well as within the context of warfare.

Since both cases under consideration are retrospective in nature, ample information exists on which to perform relatively thorough assessments, rendering these cases optimally useful in demonstrating how the model ought to be applied with respect to each criterion. The fact that they are historical and that relevant information has come to light publicly in subsequent decades following occurrence of the events offers the opportunity to conduct not only a more thorough assessment of the cases but a potentially more accurate one than might have been conducted at an earlier stage. Clearly, the more information at one's disposal when performing an evaluation, the more potentially effective the assessment will be. However, this does not mean that only retrospective evaluations can be performed effectively since there will always be a certain amount of information available upon which a claim can be assessed. Regarding Hitler, for example, although many details of his case came to light publicly following the war, much of the information or evidence upon which his case is assessed was available prior to or during the war—most notably his publications, speeches, aggressive military campaigns, and numerous atrocities, which means that a fairly thorough and useful analysis could have been performed via the model had it existed at that time. Moreover, some information that was available historically might have subsequently become lost. In fact, the model is useful in determining whether or not sufficient information exists to evaluate a claim effectively. In laying out numerous criteria as it does, the model facilitates identification of gaps in the available information and suggests areas of inquiry that might be pursued in order to conduct a more complete assessment. If adequate information is not available to conduct a proper assessment, then one might prudently withhold judgment and refrain from acting upon a claimant's agenda, if possible, until sufficient information is obtained to assess a majority of criteria in each category. Nonetheless, even evaluation of minimal information can be tentatively useful pending further investigation (provided it is not construed as thorough and definitive), or of a single category, as all assessments are informative to some extent. Although minimal information could quite readily yield a definitive verdict of disqualification, in order for an affirmative verdict to be reached, a great quantity of evidence is required. This constitutes an intrinsic strength of the model.

The stories of Bonhoeffer and Hitler cannot be recounted here entirely; however, each case is interpreted in the context of each criterion. In some instances a criterion is applied in a few words while others require more lengthy consideration; the concern is practicality rather than aesthetic balance. Moreover, the analyses contain numerous direct quotations since it is more effective to assess individuals based on their own words and expressions than on paraphrases. The criteria are addressed in enumerated form corresponding to the appendix in order to facilitate reference between the appendix and the case studies, and also to enable convenient comparison between the two cases. All bold-typed enumerations represent essential criteria (corresponding to those shaded in the appendix).

As with Jehanne, the evaluations of Hitler and Bonhoeffer are based largely on primary source material supplemented with secondary sources. The first case study draws heavily from Hitler's speeches and publications, and also from the testimony of various members of his Nazi regime. The second case study draws heavily from Bonhoeffer's correspondence and published works (including books, sermons, and lectures), and also from testimonials of those who knew him, as well as from Eberhard Bethge's definitive biography. Let us now delve into these rich wells of material.

Case Study One – Adolf Hitler et al.

> Can't run no more
> with that lawless crowd
> while the killers in high places
> say their prayers out loud.
> But they've summoned up
> a thundercloud
> They're going to hear from me.
>
> —Leonard Cohen, "Anthem"

"*Gott mit uns*" ("God is with us") reads a belt buckle worn by German soldiers under the bloody dictatorship of Adolf Hitler, while a medallion of the "Holy German Reich" proclaims, "One Reich, One People, One Führer."[1] Hitler was born in Braunau am Inn, Austria in 1889. From youth, he fervently desired to become an artist but was

[1]Jack Pia, *Nazi Regalia* (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1971), 15, 110. Hitler employed the term "Holy German Reich" as a matter of course. See, for example, his speech of March 18, 1938; in Joachim von Halasz, ed., *Hitler Speeches and Quotes: First Published in 1938 as 'Adolf Hitler From Speeches 1933-1938.'* World Propaganda Classics (Series) (London: World Propaganda Classics, 2008), 25.

rejected by the Vienna Academy's school of painting, an experience which struck him like a thunderbolt (according to his own description), so certain was he of his artistic ability. His interest subsequently turned to architecture, but a lack of requisite credentials ruled out architectural study.[2] After spending five years as a labourer in Vienna following the death of his parents, Hitler moved to Germany in 1913, a young man in his early twenties. He served throughout World War I as a German soldier. Germany's loss in that war impacted him significantly as he considered it a "degradation of a great people to a second class nation."[3] He eventually joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP or Nazi Party) contrary to his preference for founding a political party of his own[4] and, in 1923, he unsuccessfully attempted to seize state power by means of a putsch. He was consequently imprisoned in 1924 but served only a portion of the term.[5]

During his imprisonment, Hitler composed and dictated most of the first volume of his two-volume work, *Mein Kampf*,[6] expounding his racial theory and political ideology. He sought alignment of the entire German people, (i.e., race, not population), under his will and power so that this unified people might conquer other nations out of self-interest:

> [T]ransformation of a general, philosophical, ideal conception of the highest truth into a definitely delimited, tightly organized political community of faith and struggle, unified in spirit and will, is the most significant achievement, since on its happy solution alone the possibility of the victory of an idea depends. From the army of often millions of men, who as individuals more or less clearly and definitely sense these truths, and in part perhaps comprehend them, *one* man must step forward who with apodictic force will form granite principles from the wavering idea-world of the broad masses and take up the struggle for their sole correctness, until from the shifting waves of a free thought-world there will arise a brazen cliff of solid unity in faith and will.[7]

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[2]Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), 9, 17, 19-20.

[3]Hitler, May 17, 1933; quoted in von Halasz, 8.

[4]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 220, 224.

[5]Patrick Romane; in *The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary*, by Max Domarus, ed. Patrick Romane (Wauconda, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc., 2007), 833-4. Romane indicates that Hitler served eight months of a five-year sentence. Romane, 834.

[6]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, vii. Also, Konrad Heiden, introduction to *Mein Kampf*, by Adolf Hitler, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), xvii.

[7]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 381.

Hitler viewed the 'Aryan race'[8] (which he identified with German National Socialists) as supreme, as "the founder of all higher humanity," that is, as the creator of "human culture, . . . art, science, and technology,"[9] and he sought to promote this 'master race'—which he represented as uniquely sacred—at the expense of all others.

> Human culture and civilization on this continent are inseparably bound up with the presence of the Aryan. If he dies out or declines, the dark veils of an age without culture will again descend on this globe.
> . . . Anyone who dares to lay hands on the highest image of the Lord [i.e., the Aryan] commits sacrilege against the benevolent creator of this miracle and contributes to the expulsion from paradise.[10]

Racial purity was the cornerstone of Hitler's ideology. With his characteristically skewed application of theological concepts, he had no qualms about claiming that "*[b]lood sin and desecration of the* [Aryan] *race are the original sin in this world and the end of a humanity which surrenders to it.*"[11] Moreover, in Hitler's ideology the "mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew."[12] "[I]n his vileness he becomes so gigantic that no one need be surprised if . . . the personification of the devil as the symbol of all evil assumes the living shape of the Jew," he asserted.[13] It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a harsher anti-Semitism than that to which Hitler's voice and deeds gave expression.

In 1925, Hitler reorganized the NSDAP. Gradually gaining prominence, he became Chancellor of Germany in 1933 and also assumed the office of President in 1934, thereby securing autocratic rule. He subsequently launched an aggressive military campaign for the expansion of German territory, initiating World War II. His intentions were to address overpopulation in Germany and to support aspirations for an expanded German race[14] with a view to exterminating non-Aryans.[15] He was opposed to

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[8]In Hitler's usage, the term 'Aryan' indicates an individual who is "non-Jewish, Polish, or Czech or 'alien,' 'non-Marxian' (i.e. non-social democratic, non-communist, non-trade unionist)." Robert A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1937), 150. It should be noted that, in addition to the aforementioned disqualifying criteria, Hitler did not generally associate the term 'Aryan' with anyone of non-German blood. Heather Pringle explains that the Aryans—conceived of as "a tall, slim, muscular master race with golden hair and cornflower blue eyes"—are actually "a mythical race" with a lengthy history which pre-dates Nazi Germany. Heather Pringle, *The Master Plan: Himmler's Scholars and the Holocaust* (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), 27-8.

[9]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 290.

[10]Ibid., 383.

[11]Ibid., 249.

[12]Ibid., 300.

[13]Ibid., 324.

[14]Hitler, 1936; in von Halasz, 48.

[15]Hitler, January 30 and September 30, 1942, and February 24, 1943; in Domarus, 400-1, 405, 410.

assimilation of conquered populations based on his theory that interbreeding weakens victors and eventually causes their defeat.[16]

In the interest of accomplishing his agenda, Hitler implemented the "psychological preparation" of the people.[17] "The aim of this leadership is to mould the people in accordance with the political beliefs and principles of National Socialism," he explained,[18] observing that "[i]t is often much more difficult for a nationalist to bring his nation to a sense of reason than to do the contrary."[19] Hence, Hitler injected religious symbolism into many of his public discourses. For example, his proclaimed mission was to guarantee the German people their "daily bread,"[20] to ensure their "resurrection" in the aftermath of World War I,[21] to bring about "salvation of the Reich,"[22] and to prove the "eternal" worth of German culture,[23] thus to accomplish a "miracle."[24] While Hitler feigned to encourage reason among the German populace,[25] history demonstrates that his propaganda bred unreasoned hatred, indifference, and brutality toward others.

While the foregoing historical sketch is brief, further details of Hitler's life and mission will emerge as the model of righteous warfare and human agency is applied to him. Let us proceed with application of the first segment of the model pertaining to divine, prophetic calling.

Divine, Prophetic Calling Criteria

(1) *Receipt of divine revelation (e.g., visions, auditions) calling one to a specified task.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler's claim to divine sanction was clearly implicit, resting on mere belief and devoid of reference to divine revelation. "I believe that it was . . . God's will that from here [Austria] a boy was to be sent into the Reich, allowed to mature, and elevated to become the nation's Führer," he stated.[26] "Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: *by defending myself against the Jew, I*

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[16]Hitler, May 21, 1935; in von Halasz, 17.
[17]Hitler, March 7, 1936; quoted in von Halasz, 20.
[18]Hitler, 1935; Ibid., 74.
[19]Hitler, March 7, 1936; Ibid., 21.
[20]Hitler, October 22, 1933; Ibid., 16-7.
[21]Hitler, May 3, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 200.
[22]Hitler, February 1, 1933; Ibid., 211. Also, Hitler, February 20, 1938; in von Halasz, 37.
[23]Hitler, 1936; quoted in von Halasz, 35.
[24]Hitler, May 3, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 200. Also, Hitler, 1936; in von Halasz, 36-7, 73-4.
[25]Hitler, March 7, 1936; in von Halasz, 21.
[26]Hitler, April 9, 1938; quoted in Domarus, 22, 162.

am fighting for the work of the Lord."[27] "I follow the path assigned to me by Providence with the instinctive sureness of a sleepwalker."[28] "[T]his has not been the work of man alone. Had Providence not guided us, I surely would often have been unable to follow these dizzying paths."[29] "I have a right to believe that Providence has chosen me to fulfill this task."[30] Hitler had a "right," but no compelling reason, to believe in the divinity of his mission since success alone is not indicative of divine sanction. A right to believe does not constitute the substance of divine calling. In fact, Hitler spoke as one who calls God to a human task rather than as one called by God to a divine task. "Where will and faith so fervently join forces, Heaven cannot withhold its approval," he asserted,[31] further claiming that "it cannot be that Providence will allow this Volk [i.e., the German nation] to perish."[32] Hitler's ideology and theology were thus fundamentally egocentric and ethnocentric rather than theocentric. National Socialism "places the Volk at the center of its entire way of thinking," he declared. "For it, this Volk is a revelation conditioned by blood, in which it recognizes the God-given building block of human society."[33] But he provided no basis for considering the Volk "a revelation." "[W]e believe our actions correspond to the will of the Almighty," he stated,[34] while also declaring that "he who personifies Germany's highest peak receives his calling from the German Volk and is obligated to it alone!"[35] In other words, Hitler admitted responding to a human calling (not a divine one) which he construed as being in alignment with divine will, thus relegating God to a back seat.

(2) *Discernment of spirits (charism).* ***(indeterminate)***

Since Hitler did not claim to operate on the basis of spirit communication, (visions, auditions, and the like), there are no grounds upon which to assess this criterion with respect to him.

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[27]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 65.
[28]Hitler, March 14, 1936; quoted in Domarus, 22.
[29]Hitler, June 27, 1937; Ibid., 22, 153.
[30]Hitler, February 24, 1943; Ibid., 408.
[31]Hitler, October 6, 1936; Ibid., 22.
[32]Hitler, February 24, 1940; Ibid., 161.
[33]Hitler, October 1, 1933; Ibid., 150.
[34]Hitler, June 27, 1937; Ibid., 153.
[35]Hitler, January 30, 1934; Ibid., 256.

(3) *Offers oneself as an instrument of God and willing conduit for divine grace, (decision aspect).* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler declared, "I will bow to one single commandment only, a commandment that has compelled me ever since I was born: Deutschland!"[36] He thereby implicitly shunned the Decalogue and any notion of a personal divine command. "It is in this [German] Volk that we believe, for this Volk we fight; and . . . to this Volk that we are willing . . . to commit ourselves body and soul," he emphasized.[37] It is not evident that Hitler offered himself as an instrument of God or a willing conduit for grace, but he painted his will and earthly successes in the colours of traditional religious faith as demonstrated above, and that apparently constituted the extent of Hitler's perceived relationship with God. For example, with respect to his first aggressive war campaigns, he proclaimed:

> Providence blessed our work time and time again. The more brave we were, the greater were the blessings accorded us by Providence. And within the last six years, Providence was constantly on our side, believe me: some call it luck, some have another name for it, but in the end such great works cannot be accomplished without its approval. And . . . I myself bore profound testimony to the workings of Providence which stands by mankind and assigns it missions to be fulfilled.[38]

Hitler regularly declared himself an instrument of God before and for the German people but provided no compelling evidence in support of the claim or any indication that he understood the requirements and implications of divine servantship. Yet he audaciously designated the physical manifestation of his will, embodied in the Third Reich, "the new German kingdom of greatness and power and glory and justice. Amen."[39]

(4) *Actively engages in divine servantship, operates under willing obedience to divine (vs. human) authority, surrender of personal will to divine will, views oneself as being in an absolute relation to the Divine.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

As noted above, Hitler demonstrated no inclination to surrender his will but frequently invoked God publicly. "May God give us that greatness of spirit which will enable us to formulate our plans in a manner worthy of our national greatness," he stated,[40] granting no concession to divine plans. "[W]e are convinced that in the

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[36]Hitler, April 3, 1938; Ibid., 157.
[37]Hitler, summer, 1932; Ibid., 300.
[38]Hitler, February 24, 1940; Ibid., 161.
[39]Hitler, February 10, 1933; Ibid., 146.
[40]Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 88.

political sphere we have discovered a fitting mode of expression for the nature and will of our people," he asserted.[41] "And we shall succeed in this work, for behind us there stands not merely the *weltanschauung* [worldview] of a movement that is master of Germany but also our will."[42] "Who can deny that the National Socialist Movement has become the omnipotent master over the German Reich?" he asked,[43] displacing all notions of divine power. "Trust in a leadership that knows only the thought of winning this battle, that subordinates all other concerns to this, that is suffused with the fanatical will to do everything and to risk everything for success in this battle, . . . [and] at the helm of the Reich there stands a leadership which night and day knows only the one thought: to force victory under any circumstances!"[44] Hitler later reminded the nation: "I taught you this fanaticism. Please rest assured that I am today inspired by the same fanaticism, which will never leave me as long as I live."[45] (It is instructive to recall that, according to Downie, fanaticism constitutes a form of moral evil when convictions produce evil consequences while displaying no regard for human suffering.[46])

Hitler's megalomania is notorious. "Today we have the absolute power to enforce our will everywhere," he declared. "All power lies in the authority of the Reich."[47] As leader of the Reich, Hitler demanded "absolute obedience" to his "absolute authority,"[48] but only God has absolute authority in the eyes of the divine servant. "I cannot conceive of any task on this earth more marvelous and glorious than to serve this Volk," Hitler declared.[49] The statement suggests that he could not imagine anything more delightful than to serve his own purpose since the *Volk* was subject to his will. "My will . . . is your faith!" he rallied the people,[50] encouraging them to maintain a position of "zealous blind will."[51] "More than ever before it is necessary that the entire party stand behind the leadership in blind obedience as one man."[52] The only absolute relationship with the Divine that was apparently conceivable to Hitler was the notion that his absolute will reflected divine will absolutely, but there is nothing of the mystical

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[41]Hitler, 1935; Ibid., 85.
[42]Hitler, 1934; Ibid., 81.
[43]Hitler, September 5, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 308.
[44]Hitler, May 3, 1940; Ibid., 201-2.
[45]Hitler, February 24, 1943; Ibid., 408.
[46]Downie, 273.
[47]Hitler, July 6, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 254.
[48]Hitler, November 22, 1937; Ibid., 316.
[49]Hitler, May 1, 1935; Ibid., 139.
[50]Ibid.
[51]Hitler, November 22, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 316.
[52]Hitler, March 28, 1933; Ibid., 380.

sense of an absolute faith-based relationship with God in that, wherein one takes one's instruction from God and not vice versa.

(5) *Submits to divine judgment and lives in constant awareness of this judgment.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

With respect to World War I, Hitler wrote:

> I had so often sung '*Deutschland über Alles*' [Germany above all] and shouted '*Heil*' at the top of my lungs, that it seemed to me almost a belated act of grace to be allowed to stand as a witness in the divine court of the eternal judge and proclaim the sincerity of this conviction. For from the first hour I was convinced that in case of a war — which seemed to me inevitable — in one way or another I would at once leave my books. Likewise I knew that my place would then be where my inner voice directed me.[53]

If Hitler genuinely believed in divine judgment and considered himself subject to it throughout the Second World War, he must have conceived of an extremely lenient and/or violent God or been unperturbed by or oblivious to the possibility of divine condemnation as a result of his blood lust.

(6) *Shares in God's happiness, sadness, concern, sympathy, and aspirations for the world, active concern for humanity.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler's concern was not for humanity but for his notion of the German *Volk* specifically. Following the invasion of Poland, he had nearly two million Poles slaughtered in order to clear the land for German settlement.[54] He maintained that "God continues to bestow His grace only on him who continues to merit it. But whoever speaks and acts in the name of a people, which is a part of God's handiwork, will continue to discharge his mandate only so long as he does not sin against the existence or future of that part of God's creation that has been entrusted to his care."[55] Hitler thus distinguished between peoples against whom he presumed it acceptable or unacceptable to sin.

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[53]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 163.

[54]Patrick Romane, preface to *The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary*, by Max Domarus, ed. Patrick Romane (Wauconda, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc., 2007), xvii.

[55]Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 75.

(7) *Destabilizing presence in an unjust social system, exhortation to improve condition of humanity, serves the repair of the world and the common good.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

While he was certainly a destabilizing presence, Hitler and his Reich constituted an unjust social system. His notion of improving the condition of humanity involved exterminating a large portion of humanity. He did not strive for the common good but for the distinctly German good at the expense of others. "The earth is there for him who takes it. It is a challenge cup that is taken from those peoples who become weak," he asserted. "Strength determines right on this soil."[56] So reads the law of Hitler; the concept of a common good extending beyond the German people, (i.e., those who were strong and able), eluded him completely.

Brueggemann explains that social systems organize social power by ordering, defining, valuing, and legitimating life and seeking "to contain and monopolize all social meanings and all social possibilities." The social system "inclines to be effective at delivery of a 'good life' for those who participate in and support the system" and "works well for all those who accept its definitions of reality." It purports to solve all social needs and aspirations to such an extent that the system itself may be "assigned ontological status as the embodiment of" divine intention. Any alternative concept of reality threatens such a system whose "managers" and "benefactors" seek to stabilize it "so that it is not noticed that it is a system, so that it seems it is the only . . . possible, thinkable reality. And if no other social reality is thinkable or possible, then criticism of this one tends to be precluded."[57]

Brueggemann's description reflects the nature of the Third Reich. Hitler repeatedly declared his social system an embodiment of divine intention: "It was not the point of the actions of Providence that have accompanied and blessed our miraculous [National Socialist] path that now . . . the fruits of this struggle should be lost."[58] "I cannot close . . . without thanking the Lord for the help that He always allowed the leadership and the Volk to find, as well as for the power He gave us."[59] Moreover, Hitler tolerated no critics of his rule[60] but sought "to install an authority to which each and

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[56]Hitler; quoted in Domarus, 192.

[57]Brueggemann, 222-3. The concept of social system as solution conjures Hitler's 'Final Solution to the Jewish question,' a program of extermination forming part of his unjust social system.

[58]Hitler, September 10, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 312.

[59]Hitler, January 1, 1945; Ibid., 425.

[60]Romane; in Domarus, 258.

every man submits in joyful obedience,"[61] thereby displacing individual obedience to God directly or to the dictates of conscience. Opposition to his authority could result in death. On June 30 and July 1, 1934 Hitler had numerous Party members and other individuals executed in an event known as the 'Röhm Purge' or 'Night of the Long Knives.' At least twelve leaders of the SA (Nazi storm troopers) were among the victims who numbered in excess of two hundred.[62] Following the occurrence, Hitler warned, "Every person should know for all time that, if he raises his hand to strike out at the state, certain death will be his lot."[63]

(8) *Lived witnessing of faith in God.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Despite his claims to divine assistance, Hitler advocated faith in himself and the *Volk* over faith in God. "German Volk, I have taught you to have faith, now give me your faith!" he demanded.[64] "Our Volk is the only thing on which we can depend. The only thing upon which we can build. Everything we have accomplished to date we owe only to its quality, its capabilities, its loyalty, its decency, its diligence, its sense of order."[65] Hitler's pronouncement of faith in the German people, (himself included), omitted any mention of God. "[W]e should once more declare our belief in our nation with all our hearts," he recommended. "We cannot often enough renew our confession of faith that it is our desire to belong to this nation and to serve it."[66] "[T]he Party must have full belief and confidence in itself," he asserted.[67] Moreover, he indicated that "[r]everence for great men [not God?] must be instilled . . . in German youth as a sacred inheritance."[68]

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[61]Hitler, July 13, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 261.

[62]Max Domarus, *The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary*, ed. Patrick Romane (Wauconda, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc., 2007), 72, 258. Also, Romane; in Domarus, 258. Hitler acknowledged seventy-seven deaths in the incident but the Ministry of Justice placed the figure at two hundred and seven. Eberhard Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography*, rev. ed., trans. Eric Mosbacher, Peter and Betty Ross, Frank Clarke, and William Glen-Doepel, ed. Victoria J. Barnett (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 373. The information from the Ministry of Justice derives from a statement by Julius Rieger. Rieger; in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 373.

[63]Hitler, July 13, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 258.

[64]Hitler, March 20, 1936; Ibid., 23.

[65]Hitler, May 1, 1935; Ibid., 138.

[66]Hitler, May 1, 1937; quoted in von Halasz, 65.

[67]Hitler, 1935; Ibid., 75.

[68]Hitler, March 23, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 230.

(9) *Courage (inner strength) in responding to divine directive (accomplishing task).* ***(indeterminate)***

A case can no doubt be made that it required courage on Hitler's part to campaign boldly, to rise to power from obscurity, and to lead his country in aggressive war against other nations, but his courage failed when Germany's military defeat became inevitable and he chose to end his life rather than fall to the enemy.[69] The courage which he possessed was not unfailing. Moreover, since Hitler conveyed the impression of following his own directives above all, it is difficult to perform a reliable assessment of his courage in response to a divine directive.

(10) *General attentiveness.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

While Hitler was undoubtedly attentive to many details,[70] successfully leading an unprecedented campaign of mechanized mass murder, he was not generally attentive toward others. Moreover, it was crucial to the accomplishment of his task that his supporters and collaborators be grossly inattentive to many blatant facts and critical details. The following comment by a Nazi regarding his experience of the crematorium at Auschwitz concentration camp is revealing: "There was a horrible smell," he recalled, "[b]ut you get so used to it that you could eat your sandwiches in there too."[71] In fact, Richard Overy indicates that "[n]othing was denied more vehemently in the interrogation rooms at Nuremberg than the persecution of the Jews."[72] Of course, in Hitler, the Nazis had a model of inattentiveness to factual reality. Many of his supporters and collaborators apparently ignored the fact that he lied habitually. "We ourselves have experienced the dreadfulness of war. None of us wants it," Hitler claimed. "None of us wants foreign property."[73] These were obvious falsehoods in light of the fact that he launched an aggressive military campaign against other countries in order to secure foreign lands for Germany. Moreover, Patrick Romane notes that Hitler's "account of the National Socialist Revolution ignored the fact that many people had simply disappeared or somehow ended up dead. Nevertheless, Hitler was clear: the enemies of National Socialism simply faded away—and no one should mention them

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[69]Hitler, final Political Testament dated April 29, 1945; in Domarus, 805.

[70]Albert Speer attests to Hitler's sharp memory for detail. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1970), 231.

[71]Eugen Horak, interpreter with the Reich Security head office, November 3, 1945; quoted in Richard Overy, *Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945*, uncorrected proof (London: Penguin Group, 2001), 373.

[72]Overy, 178.

[73]Hitler, August 27, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 164.

again!"[74] Furthermore, Hitler's racist ideology is replete with generalizations and assumptions based on extremely scanty or absolutely no factual evidence, betraying a blatant inattentiveness to reality. His claim that the Jewish people sought "the extermination of all European and Aryan peoples"[75] represents one such example of this negligence. It is therefore clear that Hitler was only selectively attentive, not generally so.

(11) *Humility.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler clearly lacked humility, presenting himself as a god figure and presuming to grant Germany "absolution for the sins of the past," (i.e., those which occurred prior to his rule), and to consecrate the flags of the SA and SS (Nazi paramilitary).[76] "May Heaven be our witness: the guilt of our Volk is extinguished, the crimes punished, the disgrace blotted out!" he declared.[77] Hitler presented himself as master of destinies: "The Führer is the Party and the Party is the Führer . . . and as the supreme master of German destinies, it is the mission of the Party to supply the Führer for the Nation and therefore for the Reich."[78] Hitler derived great personal pride from the Party which he had fashioned to serve him. "The National Socialist German Worker's Party is the greatest organization man has ever built!" he proclaimed.[79] "Who can take it amiss if all of us who have shared in this work gaze in proud satisfaction on these achievements[?]"[80] "[W]e are able . . . proudly [to] acknowledge: there is no Volk better on this earth than the German one."[81] Hitler also took pride in the notion that others feared him.

> I was aware of the fact that the gentlemen are afraid of me. But that the gentlemen were so afraid of me and that they were so scared stiff that they turned out down to the last man—that I did not expect. Actually, we can all be proud of that. After a struggle of barely twelve years, we have performed this miracle: that they have such an utter respect for a movement and, I am proud to say, for one man, [i.e., Hitler], that they abandon principles and pledges and memories and traditions to take up the single cry: It's every man for himself.[82]

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[74]Romane; in Domarus, 178.
[75]Hitler, January 30, 1942; quoted in Domarus, 33.
[76]Domarus, 146-7.
[77]Hitler, September 3, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 147.
[78]Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 76-7.
[79]Hitler; quoted in Domarus, 184.
[80]Hitler, 1936; quoted in von Halasz, 36.
[81]Hitler, May 3, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 199.
[82]Hitler, March 15, 1932; in Domarus, 295.

One might note that fear and respect are not synonymous as Hitler presumed.

In light of Hitler's braggadocio, his occasional claim to absolute humility seems false. "We stand in complete and unconditional humility before the divine laws as revealed to man," he stated. "These laws we respect, and our prayer is one of brave fulfillment of the duties entailed."[83] In reality, however, Hitler operated from his own dictatorial laws.

(12) *Production of good fruit.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Charles W. Syndor, Jr. speaks in the opinion of many when he writes of Hitler that "[n]o other figure in modern history had such a profound, and profoundly malevolent, influence upon humankind, or came nearly as close to achieving the destruction of civilization as he did,"[84] while Romane maintains that Hitler instigated "more deaths than any other person in history." His was "a campaign of destruction."[85] Baum describes the *Shoah* as "state-administered destruction of politically designated surplus populations, . . . mass murder . . . accomplished as work."[86]

(13) *Initial hesitation, reluctance, resistance, fear, doubt.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler did not hesitate to publish his shocking racial ideology and agenda in *Mein Kampf* for the entire world to read. He expressed no doubt about the correctness of his views or his objectives but propagated them unhesitatingly and rigidly. Consider the following passages from his work:

> With satanic joy in his face, the black-haired Jewish youth lurks in wait for the unsuspecting girl whom he defiles with his blood, thus stealing her from her people. . . . It was and it is Jews who bring the Negroes into the Rhineland, always with the same secret thought and clear aim of ruining the hated white race by the necessarily resulting bastardization, throwing it down from its cultural and political height, and himself rising to be its master.[87]

> *What we must fight for is to safeguard the existence and reproduction of our race and our people, the sustenance of our children and the purity of our blood, the freedom and independence of the fatherland, so that our people may mature for the fulfillment of the mission allotted it by the creator of the universe.*

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[83]Hitler, April 3, 1938; quoted in Domarus, 160.

[84]Charles W. Syndor, Jr., foreword to *The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary*, by Max Domarus, ed. Patrick Romane (Wauconda, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc., 2007), v.

[85]Romane, xiv-xv.

[86]Baum, 58.

[87]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 325.

> Every thought and every idea, every doctrine and all knowledge, must serve this purpose. And everything must be examined from this point of view and used or rejected according to its utility.[88]

Fear did not apparently hold Hitler back. He eventually feared that someone would usurp his power,[89] but anyone suspected of it was dealt with harshly.

(14) *Apparent absurdity requiring faith in God.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

In Jehanne's example, faith is required by the individual called to a divine mission in order that s/he might believe in the feasibility of the absurd and seemingly impossible task to which s/he is called whereas, in Hitler's case, his proclaimed mission did not apparently appear absurd to him but completely reasonable and feasible. In fact, he believed his Reich would endure for a millennium. "There will not be another revolution in Germany for the next thousand years!" he proclaimed.[90] "Above all individuals, the weak as well as the strong, the [National Socialist] Party will continue successfully to shape the future of the German nation. That I believe and know."[91] Moreover, Hitler dismissed that which he perceived as absurd. "You cannot expect or demand of one that he abide by principles that seem absurd," he stated.[92]

The absurdity in Hitler's aggressive campaign of destruction consisted in his assumption that the world would comply with his objectives or simply be defeated. The degree of compliance and complicity with which his objectives were met within Germany was also absurd—tragic, but absurd. Nonetheless, the absurdity to which this criterion points is apparent absurdity of the task apprehended by the individual called to fulfill it, not utter absurdity of the task to which the individual called is oblivious or absurdity of the response of others to the task.

(15) *Prior lack of inclination, skill, or capacity to behave in required manner.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Robert Gellately maintains that, throughout Hitler's early years, he displayed "little or no indication of the fanatical nationalist, rabid anti-Semite, and heartless warmonger he was to become."[93] Gellately holds that no conclusive evidence of Hitler's

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[88]Ibid., 214-5.
[89]Domarus, 273.
[90]Hitler, September 5, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 308.
[91]Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 77.
[92]Hitler, January 30, 1939; quoted in Domarus, 181.
[93]Robert Gellately. *Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 81.

anti-Semitism existed prior to 1919 but that this developed as a result of the first world war.[94] However, a lack of indication does not necessarily entail a lack of inclination and it seems, in fact, that indications of racial intolerance and aggression emerged much earlier. Hitler's self-description indicates that, as a boy, he was inclined to certain behaviours for which he would become notorious as dictatorial leader of Germany. For example, he claimed that his "oratorical talent was being developed in the form of more or less violent arguments with . . . schoolmates. I had become a little ringleader," he boasted. He described himself as a "pugnacious," "persistent," "recalcitrant" boy, as "anything but 'good' in the usual sense of the word," and as refusing to be swayed from his own will. "Neither persuasion nor 'serious' arguments made any impression on my resistance," he noted.[95] Decades later, during the Nuremberg trials, one of his military generals stated, "If you talked for two hours [to Hitler] and you thought that finally you had convinced him of something, he began where you had started just as if you had never said a word."[96] Hitler also relayed how, as a child, he became enamoured with war after discovering books and periodicals on the subject in his father's library; it became his favourite reading material. "It was not long before the great heroic struggle had become my greatest inner experience," he wrote. "From then on, I became more and more enthusiastic about everything that was in any way connected with war."[97]

It was during his secondary school years that Hitler identified as a "fanatical 'German Nationalist'" and began engaging in pro-German activities,[98] becoming a "revolutionary" according to his own assessment.[99] Also during this period, he perceived "the poison of foreign nations" which "gnawed at the body of . . . German nationality."[100] The statement represents an obvious indication of early racial intolerance and possible xenophobia on Hitler's part. It was during his time in Vienna (1908–1913) that he reportedly developed a disdain for "Marxism and Jewry."[101]

In terms of skill, Konrad Heiden indicates that, when he wrote *Mein Kampf* (in the 1920s), Hitler "lacked the experience, the responsibilities, [and] the knowledge" that

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[94]Ibid., 81-2.

[95]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 6, 8.

[96]Ewald von Kleist, June 25, 1946; quoted in Leon Goldensohn, *The Nuremberg Interviews: An American Psychiatrist's Conversations with the Defendants and Witnesses*, ed. Robert Gellately (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 347.

[97]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 6.

[98]Ibid., 10, 12-3.

[99]Ibid., 15.

[100]Ibid.

[101]Ibid., 21.

he would later acquire as Führer.[102] But it would be remiss to overlook the fact that, during the five years in which he lived in Vienna, Hitler spent most of his free time educating himself through extensive reading.[103] After moving to Munich and joining the NSDAP, his involvement with the Party undoubtedly allowed him to acquire political experience and to develop political skills gradually (over the course of roughly a decade) prior to attaining a position of power within the German government, so he was not entirely unprepared.

(16) *Feelings of inadequacy.* ***(indeterminate)***

Desiring to engage in political leadership and contemplating whether or not to join the National Socialist German Workers' Party, Hitler expressed concern over the possibility of being viewed by others as inadequate for the task.[104] He was, after all, "poor and without means," unknown in the realm of national politics, and relatively uneducated. How would the formally educated world "confront" him?[105] Whether or not Hitler regarded himself as inadequately qualified at the time is uncertain, but it seems likely, given his "two days of agonized pondering and reflection" on the matter.[106] It is reasonable to suppose that, had he felt completely confident in his ability to prove his potential detractors wrong, the decision would not have presented such difficulty. At any rate, if he did experience feelings of inadequacy, they apparently did not last. Albert Speer indicates that Hitler demonstrated a "growing belief in his superhuman abilities."[107]

(17) *Feelings of unworthiness to carry out the mission, accompanied by assurance of divine assistance and creating a dependency on God.* ***(indeterminate)***

Hitler did not normally express feelings of unworthiness before God but felt assured of "the blessing of Providence" provided that he fought his battle relentlessly and courageously.[108] While he sometimes claimed dependency on God in the matter of his political achievements, Hitler provided no compelling evidence of divine assistance, merely citing the attainment of his goals as indicative of divine support. Without the "blessings" of "Providence," he reasoned, he "would never have been able to set out on

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[102]Heiden, xix-xx.
[103]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 22, 35, 37.
[104]Ibid., 222-4.
[105]Ibid., 224.
[106]Ibid.
[107]Speer, 243.
[108]Hitler, June 26, 1944; in Speer, 555, n. 13.

the path leading . . . across so many hurdles and through so many attacks to the takeover of power and, finally, to this struggle which has been crowned by victories . . . but . . . has also been weighed down by many worries which would have broken many weaker characters."[109] He also stated that he "was blessed by Providence in having a sworn community around" him "in such hours."[110] Generally, that which seemed advantageous to Hitler he credited to Providence while he attributed his troubles to "the devil."[111] Jehanne, on the other hand, was willing to attribute to divine will events which seemed disadvantageous to her, such as her capture and failed escape attempts, drawing on divine support in times of trial. Whatever Hitler's notion of divine assistance, it did not apparently correspond to feelings of unworthiness on his part, nor did his claim to dependency seem tied to such feelings; however, we cannot be certain.

(18) *Severe disruption to or break from previous lifestyle.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Hitler's rise to absolute power constituted a considerable change in lifestyle since he was relatively unknown prior to that time, after which he secured a place in world history. "I was a lonely and unknown man," he recalled.[112] He went from being lonely to being surrounded by millions, the center of attention, and he also rose from meager financial means to considerable wealth.

(19) *Personal risk, encounters hostility and/or persecution as a result of prophetic ministry.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Anyone who engages in controversial politics publicly places oneself at risk of hostility and persecution, and Hitler was no exception as several attempts were made on his life. Hitler made a concerted effort to minimize personal risk to himself, employing brutal force against those who opposed him or were suspected of it. In July, 1944 he had "thousands of Germans who were under suspicion" hanged in relation to a failed assassination attempt against him.[113] Utilizing the event to his advantage, Hitler declared his survival a "miraculous rescue" indicative of "the warning finger of God" directed at others.[114]

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[109]Hitler, February 24, 1943; quoted in Domarus, 408-9.
[110]Ibid., 409.
[111]Hitler, June 26, 1944; quoted in Speer, 555, n. 13.
[112]Hitler, February 24, 1943; quoted in Domarus, 407.
[113]Domarus, 129.
[114]Hitler, 1944; quoted in Domarus, 129.

(20) *Experiences intense solitude, stands as the particular against the status quo.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler succeeded in transforming the status quo in accordance with his will, employing psychological conditioning to influence the masses. He gained millions of supporters in this way. "The [National Socialist] Movement will continue to present its ideas to the people over and over again until they are under our spell," he resolved.[115] Adolf Eichmann was one of many who fell under Hitler's spell, serving to organize transportation of millions of Jewish people to concentration and extermination camps. Arendt classifies him as a "joiner" who was always seeking membership in one group or another, which was a lifestyle he had known since childhood.[116] As leader of the Reich, Hitler always had committed supporters who, in his words, stood by him "in devoted faithfulness" and loyalty.[117] He did not stand alone, not even in death, for he and his new bride, Eva Braun, committed suicide together.[118]

(21) *Ability to prophesy (charism).* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Addressing domestic opponents prior to his rise to power, Hitler stated, "I have been a prophet so often in my lifetime, and you have not believed but instead ridiculed and mocked me. Once again, I will be a prophet."[119] "And I desire to be nothing other than what I have been in the past: the warner of my Volk, the instructor of my Volk, the Führer of my Volk!"[120] Hitler cast himself as a prophetic figure, frequently attempting to prophesy but failing miserably.[121] His predictions were generally inaccurate, such as in the case of his annual New Year's forecasts.[122] Moreover, he declared, "I predicted . . . —and I am careful to refrain from rash prophecies—that . . . the result of this war will be the annihilation of the Jewish race."[123] Thankfully, he was wrong in spite of his strides in that direction. Hitler also prophesied that the allied landings in northern France in

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[115]Hitler, January 4, 1933; Ibid., 145.

[116]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 32.

[117]Hitler, February 24, 1943; quoted in Domarus, 409.

[118]Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1973), 551-2, 567-8.

[119]Hitler, February 24, 1935; quoted in Domarus, 134. Hitler repeated these claims on January 30, 1939; in Domarus, 399.

[120]Hitler, April 3, 1938; quoted in Domarus, 157.

[121]Domarus, 32, 48, 61, 317.

[122]Ibid., 119, 122.

[123]Hitler, January 30, 1942; quoted in Domarus, 33. Hitler had previously forecasted the annihilation of "the Jewish race in Europe" on January 30, 1939. Hitler; Ibid., 399. He reiterated it in February, 1942. "My prophecy will be fulfilled that this war will . . . exterminate the Jew." Hitler, February 24, 1942; Ibid., 319.

June, 1944 would be unsuccessful,[124] but this proved to be a blatant miscalculation. It was typical of Hitler's prophecies to fail, and one might reasonably conclude that they were not divinely inspired but merely declarations of his will stated as inevitable fact—a mark of the false prophet.

(22) *Ability to perform miracles (charism).* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

There is nothing apparently miraculous about Hitler's achievements—shocking, but not miraculous. No laws of nature were evidently suspended in the accomplishment of his goals. Hitler's ability to influence the masses of German people—his techniques were largely ineffective in moving the international community[125]—was primarily the result of a carefully calculated, rehearsed, and perfected process of manipulation. He utilized all means conceivable to him of manipulating an audience. For example, he took into consideration the location and "temperature of the venue" of his speeches and preferred to speak later in the day when people's "mental resistance had waned" than in the morning when they were more likely to be alert and independently critical.[126] "The outstanding oratorical art of a commanding Messianic figure will more easily succeed in winning over for a new cause people whose powers of resistance have already been weakened in the most natural way, than those who are still in full possession of their spiritual and mental resilience," he advised.[127] It was artifice, not miracle, which served Hitler in this regard. Nevertheless, he claimed as miraculous the large number of people who convened to support him.[128]

Summary Assessment – Divine, Prophetic Calling

Of the twenty-two criteria indicative of divine, prophetic calling, Hitler satisfies three (one essential and two non-essential), he fails to satisfy fifteen (nine essential and six non-essential), and four are indeterminate (two essential and two non-essential). Of the twelve essential criteria, only one is met. Of the ten non-essential criteria, only two are met. On this assessment, Hitler's case cannot reasonably be viewed as representative

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[124]Domarus, 129.

[125]Joachim von Halasz, ed., introduction to *Hitler Speeches and Quotes: First Published in 1938 as 'Adolf Hitler From Speeches 1933-1938,'* World Propaganda Classics (Series) (London: World Propaganda Classics, 2008), 2.

[126]Ibid. Also, Domarus, 56.

[127]Hitler; quoted in Domarus, 56.

[128]Hitler, September 11, 1936; in Domarus, 151.

of divine, prophetic calling in accordance with the model. Let us continue in order to determine how he fares in the other two categories.

Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare Criteria

(1) *Appeal to most sovereign authority (divinity).* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Hitler considered himself the sovereign authority of the German people but invoked God in support of his agenda. "All power and authority in the state is now in the hands of this organization [i.e., the National Socialist Party]," he declared. "Millions of people voluntarily subjected themselves to it, and millions of others were brought into line."[129] "God formed this Volk, and it has become what it should according to God's will, and according to our will, it shall remain, nevermore to fade!"[130] "Work such as ours that has received the blessings of the Omnipotent can never again be undone by mere mortals," he claimed.[131]

Hitler's public prayers were often petitionary, of the wish fulfillment variety, and he viewed the fulfillment of his wishes as answered prayers. "It is our unshakable will to restore . . . inner unity of the nation . . . . For fifteen years this goal has been all at once our wish, our prayer, and our idea, and today we can say that our prayer has been answered, our wish fulfilled. . . . Today those around us are talking about terror in Germany, about violence. That is neither terror nor violence; it is destiny."[132] Such 'prayer,' however, does not seek direction or instruction from the Divine but lays one's personal agenda on God. Hitler appealed to his own desires which he attempted to qualify (sincerely or insincerely) through invocation of divine authority.

(2) *Defensive, not offensive.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler declared, "I have never waited for others to begin the offensive; I myself initiate the attack."[133] Nonetheless, he claimed to be fighting a defensive, spiritual war. "Jews, Freemasons, and their allies, the ideological opponents of National Socialism, are the authors of the war presently directed against the Reich," he declared. "The systematic spiritual struggle against these powers is a necessary war mission."[134] Moreover, Hitler believed that all people of German blood belonged within German

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[129]Hitler, May 1, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 176.
[130]Hitler, July 31, 1937; Ibid., 22.
[131]Hitler, June 6, 1937; Ibid., 22, 152.
[132]Hitler, August 27, 1933; Ibid., 164.
[133]Hitler, September 7, 1932; Ibid., 303.
[134]Hitler, March 1, 1942; Ibid., 402.

borders and that, should Germany be too small to accommodate this, then it would be her "moral right to acquire foreign soil" in order to mitigate the "distress" of the German people.[135]

(3) *Not pre-emptive.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Prior to his aggressive campaign against Russia, Hitler stated, "If the United States and Russia enter the war, [it will create] a very great burden for our military. So any possibility of such a threat must be precluded from the start."[136] The attack on Russia thus exemplifies Hitler's pre-emptive tactics which he considered perfectly acceptable. Even in situations dominated by other motives for aggression, Hitler claimed pre-emption as justification. For example, with respect to his planned attacks on Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland in order "to gain as large an area as possible" to be utilized "as a base for conducting a promising air and sea war against England," he maintained that "[t]he cover explanation for these preparations must be that they are merely precautionary measures in view of the threatening concentration of French and English forces on the French-Luxembourg and French-Belgian borders."[137] Hitler frequently characterized his aggressive, offensive wars and other violent activities as pre-emptive, whether or not the perceived threat which he sought to eliminate was real or imagined and whether or not he actually perceived a threat at all.

(4) *Last resort, entreats the enemy to leave or desist peacefully, issues ultimatum. Not killing for its own sake, (i.e., killing as an end in itself).* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler did not operate on the principle of last resort. Aggression and violence were the primary methods by which he pursued his goals. "You either stick a fellow into a concentration camp or you kill him," he advised. "These days, the latter is more important for the sake of deterrence. If you want to set an example, you must also hit all fellow travelers!"[138] It seems that Hitler advocated killing as a first resort and not the last. He offered no ultimatum and no opportunity for the alleged enemy to withdraw peacefully. This is evident in the fact that it was considered a punishable offense to safeguard Jewish people or to help them escape Germany and the prospect of the Nazi death camps.

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[135]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 3.
[136]Hitler, January 8 or 9, 1941; quoted in Domarus, 747.
[137]Hitler, October 9, 1939; Ibid., 724-5.
[138]Hitler, February 8, 1942; Ibid., 284.

It must be stated, however, that Hitler did not normally employ killing for its own sake but as a means to an end, on the basis of some motivation such as deterrence, vengeance, the desire to eradicate populations in order to acquire living space and to ensure blood purity of the German race, or simply to eliminate opposition to his power. He often proceeded from fear, hatred, or a combination of the two. "Hitler was always afraid: his fears revolved around his obsession that a vast secret conspiracy of all Jews was in control of most governments," Romane explains.[139] Whereas the two components of this criterion might normally be expected to support each other, the fact that Hitler refrained from killing for its own sake did not ensure that he killed only as a last resort, which is the main thrust of the criterion.

(5) *Aims to establish just peace.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

"If we have said it once, we have said it a hundred times: we want peace with the rest of the world."[140] In spite of his words, however, Hitler proved a tremendous threat to world peace. He was, in fact, a warmonger. "The programmatic principles of my party are its doctrine on the racial problem and its fight against pacifism and internationalism," he asserted.[141] The only kind of 'peace' that Hitler apparently aspired to was unjust peace, that is, peace established and enforced on his iniquitous, dictatorial terms, which is no peace at all and which involved confiscation of foreign lands and the attempted annihilation of targeted populations. He considered it a "fact . . . that ultimate justice resides in power,"[142] in other words, that 'might is right.'

(6) *Proportionate cause.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Baum points to the "utterly unprecedented disproportionality between the evil committed and the motivation leading to it" which characterized the actions of Eichmann and other members of the Hitler regime.[143] Josef Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda minister, described the situation from a Nazi perspective:

> Jews are now being deported to the east . . . . Here will be used a fairly barbarous method that one can't come close to describing; not much will remain of the Jews themselves. On the whole, it can be determined that sixty percent of them will have to be liquidated, only forty percent being usable for the purposes of labor. The former district leader of Vienna,

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[139]Romane, 372.
[140]Hitler, August 27, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 164.
[141]Hitler; quoted by Heiden, xx.
[142]Hitler, November 22, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 314.
[143]Baum, 55.

> who is in charge of the action, is showing a good deal of circumspection in following a method that does not attract a lot of attention. Justice is being meted out to the Jews; although it is barbarous, they fully deserve it. . . . If we did not defend ourselves against the Jews, they would destroy us.[144]

Hitler bred the evil of genocide on the basis of mere suspicion that the Jewish population was internationally organized politically, was determined to destroy Germany (and the world), and was capable of doing so.[145]

(7) *Does not operate from vengeance or hatred.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler directed hatred toward many people including Communists, Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Serbs, Russians, and French[146] and sought to eliminate them. He also operated from vengeance, having people who opposed him murdered. "[W]e want to . . . ensure that those who attempt to injure the German Volk receive their due," he explained.[147] When the Reichstag (German legislative building) was burned, Hitler vowed "to avenge this crime as quickly as possible by having the [allegedly] guilty arsonist and his accomplices publicly executed!"[148] "In the future," he asserted, "high treason and betrayal of the Volk will be ruthlessly eradicated."[149] Moreover, in planning his offensive against England, Hitler stated, "I reserve for myself the decision on terror attacks as a means of reprisal."[150]

(8) *Does not seek to acquire new territory but might protect or recover rightful lands.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

One of the main goals of Hitler's military campaign against other nations was "to gain space for the German Volk in the East."[151]

(9) *Does not seek domination of others (oppression).* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler implemented laws that violated the German constitution—[such as the Nuremberg laws which deprived Jewish citizens of many civil rights]—and, in effect, eventually eliminated the German parliament.[152] This contradicted his pledge to "rule

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[144]Josef Goebbels, March 27, 1942; quoted in Domarus, 403-4.

[145]Hitler referred to "the Jewish-international enemy of the world" bent on destroying Europe and exterminating its nations. Hitler, January 1, 1945; quoted in Domarus, 425.

[146]Romane, xv.

[147]Hitler, March 20, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 222.

[148]Hitler, March 23, 1933; Ibid., 226.

[149]Ibid., 231.

[150]Hitler, August 1, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 744.

[151]Hitler, April 29, 1945; Ibid., 812.

[152]Domarus, 265-6, 292.

strictly in compliance with the constitution" and to "amend it in a strictly constitutional manner!"[153] Hitler's oppressive tactics also extended beyond German borders, and he maintained that a "state which in this age of racial poisoning dedicates itself to the care of its best racial elements must some day become lord of the earth."[154] The statement represents his aspirations for the National Socialist state of which he was aspirant leader and "lord."

(10) *Does not engage in holy war.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler despised Jehovah's Witnesses and consequently had them imprisoned; only a signed renunciation of their faith could secure their release from concentration camps. Of approximately ten thousand who were imprisoned, twenty-five to fifty percent died.[155] Such activity obviously qualifies as an act of holy war. One might suppose that Hitler also waged holy war against the Jewish people if it were not for the fact that he did not regard them as a religious group but as a race. "[T]heir whole existence is based on one single great lie, to wit, that they are a religious community while actually they are a race. . . . The Jew has always been a people with definite racial characteristics and never a religion," he maintained.[156]

(11) *Formal declaration of intent to engage in war, warning.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler frequently attacked countries without first declaring war or issuing any warning, such as in the case of the invasions of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.[157] In fact, Domarus indicates that, of all the countries he invaded or otherwise opposed, Hitler issued only one "formal declaration of war," that of December 11, 1941 against the United States of America.[158]

(12) *Employs minimal appropriate force (proportionality), minimal bloodshed, forbids unnecessary evil or excessive force.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler vowed that his regime would "break terror with ten-times-greater terror" and would "exterminate traitors no matter who they might be."[159] He perpetrated

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[153]Hitler, September 7, 1932; quoted in Domarus, 301.

[154]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 688.

[155]Romane, xvii. The commandant of Auschwitz concentration camp, Rudolf Hoess, also testified to the internment of Jehovah's Witnesses at that camp. Rudolf Hoess; in Goldensohn, 313.

[156]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 232, 306.

[157]Domarus, 106-7.

[158]Ibid., 118.

[159]Hitler, February 24, 1943; quoted in Domarus, 409.

unrestrained violence, promising to "employ every means" in support of his cause.[160] "In questions of foreign policy," he declared, "I shall never admit that I am tied by anything."[161] Domarus notes that Hitler's "campaign aiming at . . . eradication of the Polish intelligentsia, . . . the Polish Catholic clergy, and . . . the Polish Jews . . . surpassed anything the world had previously seen. . . . It was on Hitler's orders that his cohorts in the SS indulged in an unprecedented murder spree among a small people left virtually defenseless" under German occupation.[162] As Heiden points out, all paths leading from Hitler led to bloodshed. It required minimal provocation or none at all for Hitler to employ maximum, murderous force, and he did so with alarming "light-heartedness."[163] As Wilhelm Frick, Hitler's minister of the interior, put it, Hitler "recognized no limits."[164]

(13) *Does not target noncombatants.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler had millions of noncombatants deliberately and systematically murdered, including an estimated six million Jewish people [men, women, and children of all ages], nearly two million Poles, up to half a million gypsies, up to a quarter of a million individuals whom he categorized as genetically inferior, and thousands of others.[165]

(14) *Does not employ torture.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

The Nazis conducted infamous medical experiments on thousands of prisoners, inflicting unnecessary, inhumane suffering. These included atrocities such as "freezing experiments" which utilized prisoners in the testing of possible hypothermia treatments, "bone-grafting experiments," subjection to "mustard gas in order to test possible antidotes," and so on ad nauseam.[166]

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[160]Hitler, March 23, 1933; quoted in von Halasz, 12.

[161]Hitler; quoted by Heiden, xx.

[162]Domarus, 278-9.

[163]Heiden, xx.

[164]Wilhelm Frick, March 10, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 44.

[165]Romane, xvi-xvii. Hoess testified "that he exterminated men, women, and children of all ages." Goldensohn, 113.

[166]United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, s.v. "Nazi Medical Experiments," in *Holocaust Encyclopedia* (Washington, D.C.: January 6, 2011). Available from http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005168; Internet; accessed 8 July 2011. For details concerning the Nazi medical experiments and unnecessary operations conducted on prisoners, see affidavit of Franz Blaha, Dachau concentration camp doctor, dated January 9, 1946; reproduced in Overy, 374-381. It is also known that several members of the conspiracy against Hitler (to be discussed in greater detail in the context of Case Study Two) were tortured in Nazi prisons. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 900, 907.

(15) *Does not inflict suffering for its own sake.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

One might argue that, since the massive suffering caused by the implementation of Hitler's agenda was largely a by-product of the killings ordered by him, which were apparently conducted for reasons other than killing for its own sake, then the resultant suffering was not inflicted for its own sake but for the same reasons that the killings were conducted. The absolute cruelty with which so much of the killing was carried out, however, suggests otherwise. If one wanted to murder people as a means of achieving some practical (albeit reproachable) end, one could do so without first humiliating and taunting them or inflicting additional physical suffering as the Nazis frequently did. Take, for example, the following testimony:

> I was present in Vienna when they were loading up people for one of those mass evacuations. Hundreds were crammed into wagons, which normally took a couple of cows. And they were thoroughly beaten up as well. I went up to a young SS man and asked if the beating up was really necessary. He laughed and said they were only scum anyway. You know the whole thing was so unnecessary and one could well have got along without it . . . what was the purpose of all that beating up? I have nothing at all against the gas chambers. A time can come when it is useful to the race to eliminate certain elements. Extermination is one thing, but there is no need to torture your victims beforehand.[167]

(16) *Forbids looting.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler exploited populations and territories that he conquered, forcing people to perform labour for a pittance in Germany or in their own conquered lands.[168] The Nazi regime confiscated hundreds of paintings from primarily Jewish owners which Hitler placed in his favourite galleries.[169] It is also known that Jewish capital was confiscated by the Nazis in Denmark from January of 1944 onward.[170] Moreover, prisoners in concentration and extermination camps were often stripped of personal belongings. Once killed, even their gold teeth were extracted. Oswald Pohl, who was in charge of the SS economic and administrative main office, testified that such articles as rings, watches, money, and gold bars—"everything a man has on him that might be made of gold"—were confiscated and deposited in the Reichsbank.[171]

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[167]Horak, November 3, 1945; quoted in Overy, 372.

[168]Martin Bormann, Hitler's Chief of Staff; in Domarus, 364-5.

[169]Speer, 178.

[170]Goldensohn, 379.

[171]Oswald Pohl, June 5, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 401. Gold eyeglass frames were also seized. Goldensohn, 90-1. Payne states that, in the hurried preparations for their wedding, the gold bands

Summary Assessment – Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare

Of the sixteen criteria—all essential—indicative of divinely sanctioned righteous warfare, Hitler satisfies only one, consisting in his appeal to divine authority. He fails to satisfy fifteen. He cannot, therefore, be construed as having engaged in divinely sanctioned righteous warfare on the basis of this model. One category remains on which to assess Hitler's claim. Let us proceed in that direction.

Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency Criteria

(1) *Undifferentiated compassion, mercy, forgiveness.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler is said by one of his closest associates to have possessed a "general contempt for all persons."[172] He demonstrated an extreme and consistent lack of compassion toward others and vowed to declare "merciless war" on his perceived enemies,[173] most notably Communists and Jews.[174] In fact, he insisted that the German state be "merciless against all adversaries, against all religious fragmentation, [and] against all fragmentation into parties."[175] "Those who base their politics on subversive activities shall be mercilessly exterminated," he warned.[176] The concept of forgiveness seems quite foreign to Hitler's character.

(2) *Honours the sanctity of life.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler described "the Jew" as "only and always a *parasite* in the body of other peoples."[177] Such dehumanization obviously fails to respect the sanctity of human life, as does any policy of extermination. "When I take a look at the intellectual classes we have—unfortunately, I suppose, they are necessary; otherwise one could one day, I don't know, exterminate them," Hitler reflected.[178] His general opinion concerning people for

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that Hitler and Braun were to exchange "were found in a small locked treasury belonging to the SS. They had probably been torn off the fingers of dead Jews in one of the concentration camps," he surmises. Payne, 552.

[172]Speer, 94.

[173]Hitler, February 1, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 212.

[174]Max Domarus notes that, for Hitler, "[i]f it was not the Jews, then it was the Communists who were the source of all evil." Domarus, 218. In fact, Hitler at times conflated the two, declaring, "For we know what the Jewish Bolshevist menace is, as it threatens the world to-day [*sic*]." Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 92.

[175]Hitler, November 22, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 314.

[176]Hitler, March 29, 1938; Ibid., 165.

[177]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 304.

[178]Hitler, November 10, 1938; quoted in Domarus, 18.

whom he had little or no use was that they ought to be exterminated. "[A] human life was not worth much in his eyes," Hermann Goering recalled at Nuremberg.[179]

(3) *Respects the dignity of the person.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

According to Hitler, "[a]ll who are not of good race in this world are chaff."[180] "When we read of the concentration camps, the gulags, the police states, and the death squads, we see forces which attack the very nature of human dignity and truth," notes Cunningham.[181] A former prisoner of the Nazis, Simon Wiesenthal, reports that "every day there were deaths in the camp; Jews were strung up, trampled underfoot, bitten by trained dogs, whipped and humiliated in every conceivable manner. Many who could bear it no longer voluntarily put an end to their lives."[182]

(4) *Fully-engaged conscience.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler asserted that, "[o]nly when an epoch ceases to be haunted by the shadow of its own consciousness of guilt will it achieve the inner calm and outward strength brutally and ruthlessly to prune off the wild shoots and tear out the weeds [read 'non-Aryans']."[183] This was his recommendation for cultivating national pride and dominance in which conscience played no role. Hitler represented conscience as something that could be determined by the will of another person, implicitly denying that conscience impresses itself upon each individual. "The Party represents the political conscience and the political will," he asserted, and the people must be brought into line with these.[184] Hitler thus employed the term 'conscience' falsely, albeit effectively, in convincing others of the validity of his notion of a collective conscience. As Eichmann confirms, "the most potent factor in the soothing of his . . . conscience was the simple fact that he could see no one, no one at all, who actually was against the Final Solution."[185]

(5) *Operates from a driving force of love.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Syndor notes that "[h]atred was the emotion most natural to Hitler, the staple of his character. His capacity for hatred was unlimited and was never satiated."[186] Hitler

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[179]Hermann Goering, president of the Reichstag, May 24, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 112.
[180]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 296.
[181]Cunningham, *Catholic Heritage*, 25.
[182]Simon Wiesenthal, *The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness*, rev. and exp. ed., ed. Harry James Cargas and Bonny V. Fetterman (New York: Schocken Books Inc., 1998) 11.
[183]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 30.
[184]Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 74.
[185]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 116.
[186]Syndor, vii.

actively and intentionally bred hatred; it was the driving force from which he operated. "Anti-Semitism will be fed in every prisoner-of-war camp, in every family," he stated,[187] asseverating that "[*s*]*ocial activity must never and on no account be directed toward philanthropic flim-flam.*"[188]

(6) *Genuine distress concerning all bloodshed, not desensitized to violence or suffering.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

"I do not want to be misunderstood," Hitler insisted. "[I]f the course of this [National Socialist] revolution was bloodless [which it was not[189]], it was not because we were not men enough to stand the sight of blood. For four years, I was a soldier in the bloodiest war of all time. I never once lost my nerve throughout, no matter what the situation or what I was confronted with."[190] It is reported that Hitler "pronounced death sentences with the greatest calm, and without a trace of sentiment."[191] Given the millions who were tormented and whose blood was shed at his command, it is evident that Hitler consorted comfortably with murder.

(7) *Sense of duty to God, God served first in all things.* ***(indeterminate)***

In strengthening the German army, Hitler purported to operate from a sense of responsibility to God and his own conscience,[192] citing the army as a symbol of "honour" and its restoration as a providential event.[193] Hitler viewed himself as "the most independent man, beholden to no one, subordinate to no one, owing thanks to no one, answerable to" his "conscience alone."[194] But he also stated, "There is but one commander of this conscience of mine — namely, the nation — the German nation and the pick of it that is united in the Movement, in the National-Socialist Party. In everything that I do this is the only commander [not God] to which I feel myself responsible."[195] Hitler likewise asserted that "the only duty" citizens "owe is to the nation."[196] It is unclear whether Hitler genuinely believed himself and the Party to be

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[187]Hitler, January 30, 1942; quoted in Domarus, 401.
[188]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 29-30.
[189]Romane, 178.
[190]Hitler, January 30, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 178.
[191]Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, September 1, 1945; quoted in Overy, 213.
[192]Hitler, May 21, 1935; in von Halasz, 14.
[193]Hitler, 1935; Ibid., 15.
[194]Hitler, October 6, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 59.
[195]Ibid.
[196]Ibid., 58.

acting in accordance with a sense of duty to God or whether this was a piece of propaganda.

(8) *Love of God, piety.* ***(indeterminate)***

"I may be no pious churchgoer," Hitler declared, "but deep within me I am nevertheless a devout man."[197] Hitler did not demonstrate exceptional piety but occasionally participated in religious practices. Romane suggests that he "willingly appeared to be religious at times but . . . saw organized religion as a threat to his power."[198] To assert that Hitler did not love God or was not devoted to God would be to impose a particular concept of God on the interpretation; it is possible that he loved and was devoted to God as he defined God and as he claimed to, even if his notion of God does not conform to any commonly accepted notion of God. Domarus holds that Hitler "actually believed in a god, but it was not the same God who has been worshipped by the peoples of this planet for millennia as the preserver and protector of all life: it was even less the God whose highest commandment requires one to love one's neighbour."[199]

(9) *Fear of God.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Since Hitler presumed his will to be at one with divine will and presumed his deeds to be backed by divine approval, there is no compelling reason to suppose that he feared God. He did not demonstrate or speak of any such fear. Even when his war failed to progress as planned, Hitler maintained that "he who fights valiantly obeying the laws which a god has established and who never capitulates but instead gathers his forces time after time and always pushes forward—such a man will not be abandoned by the Lawgiver. Rather, he will ultimately receive the blessing of Providence."[200]

(10) *Permits nothing to come between self and God, accepts no human deterrent.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

This is true if Hitler genuinely believed the goals of National Socialism under his dictatorship to be divinely inspired and ordained, as he claimed. He willingly accepted

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[197]Hitler, June 26, 1944; quoted in Speer, 555, n. 13.
[198]Romane, 426.
[199]Domarus, 21.
[200]Hitler, June 26, 1944; quoted in Speer, 555, n. 13.

no human deterrent from his declared mission but vowed "to employ all means—down to the last—" in the struggle to save the German *Volk*.[201]

(11) *Mystical relationship transcends institutionalization or religious formulae, mystical defiance.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler did not practice, but openly rejected, mysticism. "[W]e have no desire of instilling in the Volk a mysticism that transcends the purpose and goals of our teachings," he declared. National Socialism, he added, "does not advocate mystic cults" but concerns itself with "considerations of an exclusively racial nature." Furthermore, Hitler made it clear that his Party would "not tolerate subversion by occult mystics in search of an afterlife." Such individuals, he asserted, represented something that had "nothing to do with" National Socialism.[202] Mysticism, he maintained, produced "mysterious dark forces" which violated "the will of man."[203] Hitler considered National Socialism "a cool and highly-reasoned approach to reality based upon the greatest of scientific knowledge and its spiritual expression."[204]

Apart from Hitler's personal views on the matter, Nazi leaders Alfred Rosenberg and Heinrich Himmler advocated an allegedly mystical ideology,[205] (employing the term 'mystical' very loosely). It is presumably to these men whom Soelle refers in writing that "[t]he Nazis not only seized upon many traditions of German mysticism from Meister Eckhart to Jacob Böhme, they also had their own revelations and sacred writings, rituals and consecrated places; they had the cults of blood and soil, fire and wind, martyrs, gurus, and the *Führer*."[206] Heschel notes, however, that "the prophet speaks with derision of those who combine ritual with iniquity"[207] and, indeed, Soelle recognizes "Nazi-mysticism" as "false mysticism."[208] Nonetheless, I am inclined to caution against employment of the term "Nazi-mysticism," particularly in isolation from a qualifying term such as 'false mysticism' or 'pseudo-mysticism.' At any rate, Hitler defied Himmler's 'mystical' notions: "What nonsense!" he insisted. "Here we have at last reached an age that has left all mysticism behind it, and now he wants to start that all

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[201]Hitler, December 18, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 746.
[202]Hitler, September 6, 1938; Ibid., 159.
[203]Ibid., 158.
[204]Ibid., 159.
[205]Domarus, 158.
[206]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 53.
[207]The statement is taken from Heschel's commentary on the prophet Amos. Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 31.
[208]Soelle, *Silent Cry*, 53.

over again. We might just as well have stayed with the church. At least it had tradition. To think that I may some day be turned into an SS saint! Can you imagine it? I would turn over in my grave."[209] He likewise denounced Rosenberg's attempts at a mystical interpretation of National Socialism and German history.[210] "God have mercy on him who attempts to subvert our Movement and our state by insisting upon convoluted orders or introducing vague mystical elements to them," the Führer warned his stray sheep.[211]

Although he never officially left the Catholic Church, Hitler believed that Christianity was quite incompatible with National Socialism.[212] This did not prevent him, however, from publicly proclaiming Christianity as the moral basis of National Socialism. "The national government will . . . regard it as its first and foremost duty to reestablish the unity of spirit and will of our Volk," he assured. "It will preserve and defend the foundations upon which the power of our nation rests. It will extend its strong, protecting hand over Christianity as the basis of our entire morality."[213]

(12) *Conviction, determination, persistence, endurance, uncompromised, singular commitment to declared mission.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler demonstrated these qualities clearly except with respect to his suicide. "My will is tough, unrestrained, and unshakable," he declared.[214] He asserted, moreover, that the "future of a movement is conditioned by the fanaticism, . . . the intolerance, with which its adherents uphold it as the sole correct movement, and push it past other formations of a similar sort."[215] "[T]he Party must have full belief and confidence in itself and must not allow itself to be deflected from its line of action by any criticism or doubts as to the correctness of the undertaking on which it is engaged."[216] "Persevere and above all be persistent,"[217] he advised. Although Hitler did not persevere in the end but took his own life, he held firm until the last minute, when "enemy shells literally exploded on the doorstep of the Reich Chancellery" building which housed his

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[209]Hitler; quoted in Speer, 94.

[210]Speer, 95-6.

[211]Hitler, September 6, 1938; quoted in Domarus, 160.

[212]Speer, 96. Domarus indicates that Hitler effectively severed "all ties to the Catholic faith." Domarus, 182.

[213]Hitler, February 1, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 211.

[214]Hitler, September 7, 1932; Ibid., 303.

[215]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 349-50.

[216]Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 75.

[217]Hitler, May 3, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 204.

bunker.[218] Nevertheless, he bailed out in that most critical of moments wherein one is pushed either to stand firm as witness to one's faith or to bear testimony to a lie.

(13) *Does not engage in or encourage suicide, does not seek suffering or martyrdom.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

On April 30, 1945, when defeat was inevitable, Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin bunker. It was not a rash decision; he had stated as early as 1932, "If the party ever falls apart, I will take a gun and end it all in a minute."[219] Furthermore, Hitler provided poison to his secretaries in order that they might also commit suicide.[220]

(14) *Reluctantly accepts suffering or martyrdom if necessary to mystical witnessing.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

According to his own testament, Hitler killed himself in order "to avoid the disgrace of defeat or capitulation,"[221] and also because he feared more serious repercussions should he fall into enemy hands. "The consequences would be unimaginable," he remarked to his pilot, Hans Baur, "if they [the Russians] captured me alive."[222] Hitler thereby failed to demonstrate mystical witnessing.

(15) *Steadfast faith in God and divine revelation.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler declared belief in God—a god fashioned after his own ideals; he was not unlike many in this regard. However, it is not apparent that his faith was steadfast, and he did not actually claim receipt of divine revelation. When Hitler committed suicide, he thought it possible that the war and the National Socialist state might persist; he appointed a successor and named an entire cabinet to carry out the work of the Reich following his death.[223] If he believed it his divine mission to lead the German nation, it seems that he abandoned this mission prematurely when things failed to develop as planned. Hitler asked and ordered his appointed successors not to commit suicide along with him, but to hold firm and continue the struggle in his stead.[224] There is no indication of steadfast faith in such behaviour. Moreover, both his final Political

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[218]Domarus, 131.

[219]Hitler, 1932; quoted in Domarus, 66.

[220]Domarus, 811.

[221]Hitler, Private Testament dated April 29, 1945; reproduced in Payne, 553-4. Quotation is from Payne, 554.

[222]Hitler, April 29, 1945 (one day prior to his suicide); quoted by Hans Baur, in Payne, 564.

[223]See Hitler's Political Testament dated April 29, 1945; reproduced in Domarus, 804-8. Reference is from Domarus, 806-8.

[224]Hitler's Political Testament; in Domarus, 806-7.

Testament and his final Personal Testament,[225] signed only hours before his planned death and comprising several pages, are devoid of any reference to God. Apparently, God had no significance to Hitler in death; at least he gave no public testimony to his alleged faith during his final hours. He did not bear witness to God in death.

(16) *Apprehension of the intrinsically evil nature of human violence and war, does not attempt to qualify evil.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler apparently failed to apprehend the intrinsically evil nature of human violence and war, given that he unreservedly authored so much of both unnecessarily. In fact, Nazism associated killing with honour rather than evil. This is apparent in the "Blood and Honour" inscription on the knife carried by members of the Hitler Youth (National Socialist youth movement), which included males and females as young as age ten.[226] An SS service dagger bore the inscription, "My honour is my pledge."[227] The gilt Cross of Honour of the German Mother was instituted by the Nazi regime recognizing "the outstanding achievement of a mother who had borne eight or more children to serve the Nazi state." Six or seven children fetched a silver cross while bronze was awarded for four or five offspring.[228] Honour was thus associated with the Nazi cause through provision of able-bodied people to carry out Hitler's agenda, an agenda of aggressive war and mass murder. Such "honour" was not only considered laudable but was sanctified by Hitler who stated, "The national honour, the honour of our army and the ideal of freedom must . . . become sacred to the German people!"[229] Since he failed to recognize evil, it would be pointless to discuss qualification of evil in relation to Hitler who did not draw such fine ethical distinctions.

(17) *Recognition of personal defilement sustained through the use of violence.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler did not display hesitation or regret, nor did he attribute guilt or defilement to himself, with respect to the violence which he orchestrated. In his final Political Testament, he blamed the Jewish people for the war and for the resultant destruction and suffering,[230] neglecting to mention that he had an estimated six million of them, (all

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[225]Hitler's Personal Testament dated April 29, 1945 is reproduced in Domarus, 809.

[226]Pia, 17, 101, 129.

[227]Ibid., 20.

[228]Alan Wykes, "Symbols of Tyranny," introduction to *Nazi Regalia*, by Jack Pia (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1971), 5-6.

[229]Hitler, March 23, 1933; quoted in von Halasz, 12.

[230]Hitler; in Domarus, 804-5.

civilians), slaughtered throughout the course of the war. "It is untrue that I or any other person in Germany wanted war in the year 1939," he claimed. "It was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who are either of Jewish origin or work for Jewish interests."[231]

(18) *Deep sensitivity to evil vs. indifference.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitlerism produced a tremendous degree of indifference to evil, particularly in Nazi Germany. Hitler's "deadly cocktail of uncritical prejudice, moral abdication and reflexive violence produced a casual indifference to suffering and an easy familiarity with the pervasive morbidity of the [concentration and extermination] camps," notes Overy.[232] A member of Hitler's propaganda team, Hans Fritzsche, admitted as much. "Unfortunately," he stated, "too many of us were indifferent."[233]

(19) *Impatient with injustice, prone to righteous anger.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler engaged in tremendous injustices and was prone to self-righteous anger, but not apparently to truly righteous anger. His fits of rage toward anyone who defied him were notorious, although they were sometimes reportedly staged.[234]

(20) *Righteous character (not self-righteous), ethical code of conduct (e.g., chivalry), moral discernment, holds self and others to high ethical standard of behaviour.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

In contemplating future leadership of the German *Volk*, Hitler denounced morality. "As a social phenomenon this new selection of leadership has to be divorced from the numerous prejudices that I can only term phony and profoundly nonsensical social morals," he declared.[235] "[T]he Reich government intends to undertake a thorough moral purging of German society," he advised,[236] promoting a scathing view toward "the loathsome humanitarian morality."[237] "There can be no talk of humanitarianism regarding the Jews," he asserted. "Jewry must be thrown to the ground."[238] Hitler's 'might is right' stance advocated that "visible success is ultimately decisive for the

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[231]Hitler, April 29, 1945; quoted in Domarus, 804.
[232]Overy, 198.
[233]Hans Fritzsche, propaganda official, May 8, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 67.
[234]Speer, 97-8.
[235]Hitler, January 30, 1939; quoted in Domarus, 181.
[236]Hitler, March 23, 1933; Ibid., 229.
[237]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 42.
[238]Hitler, April 16 or 17, 1943; quoted by Goebbels, in Domarus, 413.

correctness of a principle,"[239] and he boasted that the German state observed "no . . . social morals."[240]

(21) *Teaches by example over doctrine.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler declared it the mission of the National Socialist Party "to construct and consolidate its own internal organization and make it an impregnable and enduring shrine of National-Socialist doctrine" and "to educate the entire nation along the lines of that doctrine."[241] Hitler thrust his doctrine upon the nation and demanded conformity; doctrine was paramount to his impact on others and to his success. Since his example corresponded to his doctrine, one could rightly assert that Hitler taught by example as well as doctrine, but it was doctrine which provided context and gave meaning and power to his example without which the latter would conceivably have been impotent. Hitler's indoctrination of others convinced many of the legitimacy of his cause, which proved effective in gaining their cooperation. For example, Rudolf Hoess, commandant of Auschwitz extermination camp, indicated that he had approved of the events which transpired at the camp on the grounds that "if the Jews were not exterminated at that time, then the German people would be exterminated for all time by the Jews," echoing Hitler's main thesis.[242] We saw earlier that Goebbels cited the same as justification for persecution of the Jewish people.[243] On the basis of such evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the power of Hitler's teaching rested primarily on his doctrine.

(22) *Service-oriented, work ethic, disinclination toward idleness or sloth.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Hitler was committed to work and service and created a state in which all were expected to serve him and to work toward the concrete manifestation of his ideals, and he also worked tirelessly in that direction. "In this state, everyone is called upon to fight and work in some way or another," he advised.[244] "The earth is not there for cowardly peoples, not for weak ones, not for lazy ones. The earth is there for him who takes it and who industriously labors upon it and thereby fashions his life. That is the will of

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[239]Hitler, May 1, 1935; quoted in Domarus, 137. Hitler likewise declared that there "is no attitude that does not have its ultimate justification in the resulting advantages for the community." Hitler, January 30, 1939; Ibid., 181.

[240]Hitler, January 30, 1939; Ibid., 182.

[241]Hitler, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 76.

[242]Rudolf, Hoess, April 8, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 296.

[243]See criterion six in the Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare category.

[244]Hitler, August 17, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 170.

Providence," he claimed.[245] At the end of his life, Hitler wrote, "In these three decades, all my thoughts, actions, and life have been guided by my love for and loyalty to the Volk. . . . I have used up my time, my working power, and my health in these three decades."[246] Indeed, Goering testified to the deterioration of the Führer's health, indicating that "Hitler's nerves were kaput. His left hand trembled and he was physically rocked."[247]

(23) *Seeks to empower the disenfranchised, partisan with the wrongly oppressed.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler's philosophy was unequivocal and simple: "He who cannot assert himself does not deserve to live."[248] He was an oppressor of many and, despising disadvantaged peoples such as "the chronically ill, the lame, [and] the deformed," Hitler moved to have them eliminated.[249] He considered such individuals a "heavy burden" and believed that they threatened the German *Volk* with "gradual disintegration."[250] If anyone should "fail" or "become weak" in the "struggle for survival," he maintained, "then Providence will not rush to his aid. Instead, it will sentence him to death. And rightly so. Other men will come. The space will not remain empty. . . . And life continues . . . without consideration for the weakling."[251] Hitler's Chief of Staff, Martin Bormann, reported that, on the occupation of Poland, "the Führer underlined that there must be but one master for the Poles, and this is the German. . . . Never must we elevate them to greater heights."[252] Under Hitler's order, all "Polish 'masters'" were to "be killed."[253]

(24) *Honours personal responsibility in maintenance of social justice.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler violated social justice on many counts. "There is a divine will, and all we are is [*sic*] its instruments," he asserted,[254] implicitly denying human freedom of action and, by extension, rejecting personal responsibility for his deeds. Group membership often permits and encourages—sometimes also commands—one to refrain from thinking independently and taking responsibility for one's actions, and many of Hitler's

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[245]Hitler, May 3, 1940; Ibid., 195.
[246]Hitler, final Political Testament dated April 29, 1945; Ibid., 804.
[247]Goering, May 24, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 112.
[248]Hitler, May 3, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 195.
[249]Romane, xv.
[250]Hitler, January 30, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 257.
[251]Hitler, May 3, 1940; Ibid., 195-6.
[252]Bormann; quoted in Domarus, 363-4.
[253]Bormann; Ibid., 363.
[254]Hitler, April 9, 1938; quoted in Domarus, 162.

accomplices operated in such fashion. Eichmann's testimony that the fact that so many others supported the 'Final Solution' created "a kind of Pontius Pilate feeling" which freed him from any sense of guilt[255] is one such example. Kren points out that the *Shoah* would not have been possible without "persons who were willing to permit others in authority to make ethical decisions for them"[256] and, indeed, it was Hitler's claim to absolute authority which demanded submission from others that allowed gross irresponsibility and large-scale social injustice to occur under his rule.

(25) *Protects, defends others at potential cost to self.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler claimed to act in defense of the German people,[257] but he did not protect or defend millions who were his intentional and innocent victims, including those of German citizenship who were not considered of Aryan stock and also those German citizens who opposed him, whether or not they fit the 'Aryan' bill. His alleged goal was to safeguard the Aryan race,[258] but such a race as Hitler conceived it did not actually exist.[259] Moreover, by inciting aggressive war, Hitler subjected millions of soldiers to death in service to the German nation. His war also brought air raids upon German cities, causing incalculable civilian deaths while he withdrew to the relative safety of his bunker.

(26) *Direct participation in mission in a position of vulnerability.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler amassed power and governed through delegation, (although as he became increasingly obsessed with his work and his power, he delegated less and less administratively[260]). Nonetheless, he did not directly engage in the hands-on aspects of combat[261] or extermination. Apart from an occasional visit to the front, Hitler issued orders from a relatively safe distance to be carried out in the camps and on the battlefields,[262] in spite of the fact that he declared himself invincible. "I . . . have the

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[255]Eichmann; quoted by Arendt, *Eichmann*, 114.

[256]Kren, 255.

[257]His declared purpose was "equality of rights" for Germany. Hitler, January 30, 1934; quoted in von Halasz, 13. The claim was repeated throughout various of his speeches.

[258]"This fight will not end with the planned annihilation of the Aryan but with the extermination of the Jew in Europe," Hitler declared. Hitler, February 24, 1943; quoted in Domarus, 410.

[259]Pringle, 27-8.

[260]Speer, 294.

[261]We are speaking of WWII, not WWI.

[262]Speer indicates that he and General Schmundt, Hitler's armed forces adjutant, proposed "bringing young frontline officers to Hitler, in order to introduce a little of the mood of the outside world into the stale, hermetic atmosphere of the headquarters." Speer, 295.

conviction and the certain feeling that nothing can happen to me, for I know that Providence has chosen me to fulfill my task," he stated.[263] Nonetheless, Hitler had the added security of a protective bunker. Moreover, from mid-March until mid-July of 1944, while the war which he had initiated raged throughout Europe, Hitler vacationed in the Bavarian Alps.[264]

(27) *Refuses to love evil, actively opposes evil.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler has frequently been characterized as 'evil incarnate' or 'the personification of evil.' Indeed, there is hardly a compelling case to be made for the notion that he in any way opposed it; he labelled his victims evil, but unjustifiably. Hitler orchestrated and commanded some of the most horrific, calculated, pervasive, and extensive evil known to humankind—he not only embodied evil but enthusiastically bred it and created conditions in which it flourished. He seemed obsessed with it and possessed by it, yet he did not apparently recognize it. Hitler externalized his own evil by projecting it onto others in a tremendous act of scapegoating. He displayed no remorse over his actions but only pride. In discussing the *Shoah* with Goebbels, he stated:

> One should not get sentimental here. The Jews deserve the catastrophe that they are experiencing today. With the annihilation of our enemies, they will experience their own annihilation. We must speed up this process with cold brutality. With this, we render mankind an invaluable service, since it has suffered under and has been tortured by Jewry for millennia.[265]

Perhaps the act of externalization served to convince Hitler that he could control evil.

(28) *Prefers peace to war and non-violence to violence.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

In spite of Hitler's repeated claims to embrace peace, these simply cannot be believed given his extensive warmongering activities. "Our love of peace is perhaps greater than that of other nations . . . . No one of us has the intention of threatening anybody," he announced.[266] "The nation is united in a yearning for peace and determined to defend German liberty. We want nothing but to coexist with other

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[263]Hitler, September 7, 1932; quoted in Domarus, 303.

[264]Domarus, 128-9. Speer indicates that, even when Hitler took vacations, he relocated his headquarters to the vacation location and remained fully involved in his work. Speer, 294. It is difficult to ascertain whose perspective is more accurate, that of Domarus who disapproved of Hitler, or that of Speer who was devoted to the Führer. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between the two interpretations; that Hitler took a 'working vacation' seems plausible.

[265]Hitler, February 14, 1942; quoted in Domarus, 401.

[266]Hitler, May 21, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 13.

peoples in mutual respect. We do not wish to threaten the peace of any people."[267] Contrary to his words, however, Hitler demonstrated a strong propensity for war and violence.

(29) *Does not glorify violence or war.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler regarded his soldier's uniform as "the holiest and dearest."[268] He was not averse to violence or war, nor did he hesitate to glorify them. Addressing a group of officer cadets, Hitler encouraged them to aspire toward the achievement of military glory.[269] The following passage demonstrates his attitude:

> Our soldiers have emerged victorious from this greatest battle of all time.
> In a few weeks, we have taken over 1.2 million enemies as prisoners of war. Holland and Belgium have capitulated. The British Expeditionary Force has been largely destroyed, the remainder either taken prisoner or driven from the continent. Three French armies no longer exist. The danger of enemy penetration into the Ruhr territory has been eliminated for good.
> German Volk!
> Your soldiers have fought bloodily for this most glorious deed in history.[270]

Hitler displayed no remorse or regret over the destruction of war but revelled in it.

(30) *Concern for spiritual welfare of self and others, apprehension of spiritual implications.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler addressed the German churches as follows: "[L]et one thing be quite clear: the churches may determine the fate of the German being in the next world, but in this world the German nation, by way of its leaders, is determining the fate of the German being." He insisted on this "clear and clear-cut division,"[271] apparently conceiving of no consequential relationship between earthly life and any possible afterlife. In other words, Hitler demonstrated no awareness of or concern for spiritual consequences deriving from earthly deeds. "The religions and the churches will maintain their freedom," he asserted. "But we are in charge of politics."[272]

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[267]Hitler, February 24, 1935; quoted in Domarus, 135.
[268]Hitler; quoted in Domarus, 618.
[269]Hitler, May 3, 1940; in Domarus, 206.
[270]Hitler, June 5, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 737-8.
[271]Hitler, November 22, 1937; Ibid., 315.
[272]Hitler, July 16, 1933; Ibid., 430.

(31) *Benevolence, kindness, does not engage in cruelty.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler engaged in enormous cruelties and demonstrated extreme deficiencies in kindness and benevolence. Suffice it to note that approximately twenty thousand mentally and physically challenged children were starved to death by the Nazis under his rule.[273]

(32) *Generosity, charity.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler was not of evidently charitable disposition. Rather, one of his associates stated that he "was progressively self-centered as time went on."[274] He displayed an insatiable lust for blood and power and considered it justifiable to rob other countries and peoples of all they had—their land, their dignity, their very existence—in order to benefit the German nation and feed his drives. Anticipating victory in Russia, Hitler remarked, "We'll be getting our granite and marble from there, in any quantities we want."[275]

(33) *Rejects personal glorification and idolization.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler was not averse to glorifying himself or seeking glorification from others. "I fought as a decent German soldier," he declared.

> Then, after the end of the War [WWI], I went on my way through Germany and won this dearest land of all for myself, finding hundreds of thousands and millions who believed in me because I in turn believed un [*sic*] them. At a time when all began to have doubts of Germany because the need in which she lay was so great, I was proud to be a German, I clung fast to this people, I fought and struggled for it, and won its confidence. . . .
>
> . . . [M]y name will remain as that of one of the greatest sons of this country. . . .
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> I now proclaim for this land [Austria] its new mission.[276]

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[273]Leni Yahil. *The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945*, trans. Ina Friedman and Haya Galai (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1990), 309.

[274]Erhard Milch, general field marshal and armaments chief of the German air force, February 28, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 364.

[275]Hitler; quoted in Speer, 180.

[276]Hitler, April 9, 1938; quoted in von Halasz, 26-7. The mission of Austria, according to Hitler, was to become a part of Germany, but his attempts to convince Austria of this failed. Hitler, April 9, 1938; in von Halasz, 27. "German-Austria must return to the great German mother country." Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 3.

Hitler thus presented himself as god-like in assigning a mission to others. Furthermore, he declared, "It is my ambition to establish a memorial to myself within the German Volk."[277] His desire for preservation and idolization in history is evident:

> We . . . have been chosen by fate to make history in the loftiest sense of the word. What millions of people are deprived of has been given to us by Providence. Even most distant posterity will be reminded of us by our work. . . .
>
> One day, a page in world history will be devoted to us, the men from the National Socialist Party and the German army . . . . One day we will stand . . . immortalized in the pantheon of history . . . .[278]

Note that the term 'pantheon' also suggests divine qualities.

(34) *Is not motivated by self-fulfillment or material gain.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler strove single-mindedly and relentlessly toward the acquisition of power and fulfillment of his personal will. "I thought originally when Hitler came to power that he was thoughtful about the people's welfare," stated an air force chief. "But soon it became obvious that Hitler cared about nothing except more and more personal victories."[279] The situation was similar with Eichmann who, according to Arendt, "had no motives at all" for participating in mass murder, apart from "an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement."[280]

Hitler became a wealthy man through his racial ideology and his position as Führer. His wealth derived partly from sales of *Mein Kampf*[281] and also from scheming, such as claiming royalties for reproduction of his image on postage stamps.[282]

(35) *Refuses to benefit from anything unjustly acquired.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler's entire war campaign consisted in a program of expansion of German territory and exploitation (or extermination) of peoples[283] and foreign resources. "Dunkirk has fallen!" he exclaimed. Forty thousand "Frenchmen and Englishmen have been taken prisoner . . . . Immeasurable amounts of material have been taken."[284] "In

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[277]Hitler, March 1, 1936; quoted in Domarus, 28.

[278]Hitler, September 16, 1935; Ibid., 310-1.

[279]Milch; quoted in Goldensohn, 362.

[280]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 287.

[281]Heiden, xix.

[282]Speer, 87.

[283]In planning the *Shoah*, the Nazis estimated that forty percent of the Jewish population would be forcefully committed to slave labour and the remainder exterminated. Goebbels, March 27, 1942; in Domarus, 403.

[284]Hitler, June 5, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 738.

order to establish the conditions necessary for the final conquest of England, I intend to continue the air and naval war against the English homeland more intensively than heretofore," he announced.[285] It was also Hitler's intention to invade Russia for the purpose of acquiring land "by the German sword" for the German nation.[286] "Once Russia is defeated, . . . [t]he master of Europe and the Balkans will . . . be Germany," he maintained.[287]

(36) *Clarity of purpose.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Hitler demonstrated clarity of purpose, first delineating his intentions in *Mein Kampf* and then carrying them out unwaveringly to the utmost of his ability. His goals were clear and rigid. Domarus notes that by the age of thirty, Hitler "already had a clear picture of his foreign policy plans and refused to the end to relinquish or revise these aims."[288] "[W]e National Socialists must keep an unshakable hold on our political aims, namely of securing the land and soil rightfully belonging to the German Volk on this earth," Hitler advised, rejecting the notion that such activity violated human rights. "We are . . . setting our sights on the land in the east," he resolved.[289]

(37) *Sincerity, authenticity.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler was not authentic but orchestrated and rehearsed the delivery of his speeches (before a full-length mirror) in order to convey a specific impression to his audience, taking pains even to alter his accent depending on which German audience he was addressing.[290]

> He wrote all his own speeches, the important orations requiring days of elaborate preparation. He developed and rehearsed exaggerated but powerfully effective techniques that included operatic gestures, alternating cadences of speech, levels of voice, sarcasm and irony, and the uncanny timing that charged his performances with electrifying tones of menace, fury, and hatred.[291]

Hitler did not, therefore, present himself naturally and authentically publicly; rather, the public forum was his theatre, and Hitler was the star actor of the performance.

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[285]Hitler, August 2, 1940; Ibid., 743.
[286]Hitler; Ibid., 44.
[287]Hitler, July 31, 1940; quoted by Franz Halder, Colonel General, in Domarus, 742.
[288]Domarus, 41.
[289]Hitler; quoted in Domarus, 41.
[290]Domarus, 54-5, 57.
[291]Syndor, vii.

Hitler was also hypocritical, frequently misrepresenting himself and the National Socialist agenda publicly. "Germany wants nothing for herself which she is not prepared to give to others,"[292] he claimed. "Germany desires nothing except an equal right to live and equal freedom."[293] Yet his drive for ultimate superiority of the German nation (Aryan race) over all others necessarily excluded those branded inferior; his goal was superiority rather than equality. Furthermore, Hitler denounced those who employ religion for political purposes but did so himself in creating a state-ruled German Christian Reich Church. The term "German Christian" (abbreviated from "Faith Movement of German Christians") refers to the "church-party" supported and ruled by the Nazi state.[294] German Christians touted Hitler's arrival as "a new divine hour for Germany and urged full coordination and cooperation" with his initiatives,[295] advocating "a synthesis between Nazism and Christianity, [thus] identifying religious aims with national aims."[296] The German Christian Church permitted Aryan membership exclusively and operated under a national Reich Bishop approved by Hitler; the position of Reich Bishop was an allegedly spiritual authoritarian office.[297] The German Christian Church promoted the Führer's racist ideology under the guise of religion, proclaiming a "godless fellow-countryman . . . nearer to" them "than one of another race, even if he sings the same hymn or prays the same prayer."[298] It was Hitler's intention that the Reich Church would replace the existing Protestant churches.[299] Hitler's practice thus failed to accord with his assertion that

> [w]orst of all . . . is the devastation wrought by the misuse of religious conviction for political ends. In truth, we cannot sharply enough attack those wretched crooks who would like to make religion an implement to perform political or rather business services for them. . . . For a single political swindle . . . they are willing to sell the heart of a whole religion . . . .[300]

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[292]Hitler, May 17, 1933; quoted in von Halasz, 12.

[293]Hitler, May 21, 1935; Ibid.

[294]H. Martin Rumscheidt, "A Portrait of Karl Barth," *Touchstone* 4, no. 1, (January 1986) : 48.

[295]Ibid.

[296]Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth: His life from letters and autobiographical texts*, trans. John Bowden, 2nd rev. ed. (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1976), 224.

[297]Karl Barth, *Theological Existence Today: A Plea for Theological Freedom*, trans. R. Birch Hoyle (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1933), 30-1, 34-5, 48-9.

[298]Joachim Hossenfelder, German Christian leader; quoted by Franz Hildebrandt in a 1933 pamphlet, reproduced in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords: letters, lectures and notes 1928–1936*, trans. John Bowden and Eberhard Bethge, ed. Edwin H. Robertson (London: The Fontana Library, 1970), 205-8. Quotation is from Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 205-6.

[299]Hitler, July 22, 1933; in Domarus, 430.

[300]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 268.

(38) *Integrity.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler lacked integrity. "May no man doubt my determination to put my plans once conceived into action no matter how," he announced.[301] He did not respect ethical boundaries but believed that his ends justified any means. Thus, he was not averse to breaking his word. "We National Socialists . . . have no desire for our Army to be used to force on other nations something that they have no wish for," he declared prior to launching aggressive war on several countries.[302] Hitler just as readily violated signed agreements, such as his 1939 non-aggression treaty with the USSR, and his regime also contravened international law,[303] as confirmed by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

(39) *Treats God as a Subject, not an object to be bent to one's will.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler spoke frequently on God's behalf, apparently from his own convictions rather than from any claim to divine revelation or from the tenets of any religious tradition. For example, he stated, "I believe in God, and I am convinced that He will not desert 67 million Germans who have worked so hard to regain their rightful position in the world."[304] He did not hesitate to declare racial interbreeding a "sin against the will of the eternal creator"[305] and the "original sin of racial poisoning,"[306] thereby distorting the traditional doctrine of original sin. The state must "begin by raising marriage from the level of a continuous defilement of the [Aryan] race," he asserted, "and give it the consecration of an institution which is called upon to produce images of the Lord [i.e., the pure Aryan] and not monstrosities halfway between man and ape."[307] Hitler thus presumed to apprehend an accurate image of a God who conformed to his notion of the Aryan. The would-be artist thus fashioned an Aryan image of the Divine which he sought to impress upon the world and to impose upon God.

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[301]Hitler, February 20, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 50.
[302]Hitler, 1936; quoted in von Halasz, 16.
[303]Domarus, 191-2.
[304]Hitler; quoted in Domarus, 21.
[305]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 286.
[306]Ibid., 405.
[307]Ibid., 402.

(40) *Does not define or claim elaborate understanding of God, accepts Divine Mystery.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler did not appear to approach God in an inquiring manner, seeking to ascertain what the divine position might be on a given matter; rather, he expressed his convictions concerning God with little or no reservation. It seems that Hitler's god was quite predictable. "If we adhere to this path, decent, industrious, and honest, if we do our duty so bravely and loyally, it is my belief that the Lord will help us again and again in the future," Hitler asserted. "He does not abandon decent people for any length of time! While He may sometimes put them to the test or send them trials, in the long run He will always allow His sun to shine upon them and ultimately give them His blessing."[308] "I know that the fruits of human labor are hard-won and transitory if they are not blessed by the Almighty," Hitler stated, assuring the people that no "enemy alive, no matter how powerful," would be able to deprive them of their God-given success.[309] However, he also held that "there are times when Providence demonstrates the deepest love it has for its creatures in an act of punishment."[310] With regard to his intention to confiscate foreign lands in order to secure living space for the German people, Hitler declared, "[T]his action is the only one which, before God and our German posterity, would allow an investment of blood to appear justified."[311] Moreover, he deemed the concept of basic equality among human beings "a sin against the will of the Eternal Creator."[312] Hitler consistently spoke with assurance about the divine nature, divine motives, and divine judgment but did not speak of or apparently apprehend Divine Mystery.

(41) *Does not hold God responsible for human evil.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler frequently proclaimed his evil will to be the will of God, but he did not apparently view it as evil. That which he represented as evil he deemed an abomination before God, such as racial interbreeding or breeding between healthy and unhealthy individuals, which he viewed as a "sin against the image of the Lord" producing "a rotten brood of bastards" or "physically botched and . . . spiritually degenerate rabble."[313] However, we cannot take Hitler's perception of evil as the ground for our

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[308]Hitler, October 3, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 155.
[309]Hitler, June 6, 1937; Ibid., 152.
[310]Hitler, September 13, 1937; Ibid., 154.
[311]Hitler; Ibid., 41.
[312]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 430.
[313]Ibid., 402-3.

assessment. While he did not attribute to God that which he regarded as evil, Hitler did attribute to God that which he did not consider evil but which constitutes evil according to commonly accepted definitions of the word—that is, his own deeds.

(42) *Does not claim divine sanction with respect to all of one's actions but only those founded on divine revelation.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler demonstrated the converse of this criterion, indiscriminately claiming divine support of his overall agenda and activities while not claiming receipt of divine revelation specifically.

(43) *Exercises personal responsibility and accountability before God and others.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler declared himself "responsible to God and . . . [his] own conscience"[314] but did not always accept liability for his deeds. For example, he attempted to dodge responsibility for the events of November 9 and 10, 1938, (known as *Kristallnacht* or Crystal Night), when the Nazis wreaked destruction on Jewish property throughout Germany, arrested thirty thousand Jewish citizens, and killed at least ninety-one. Hitler cited his storm troopers (SA), whom he strongly disliked, and the general public as responsible for the affair,[315] contrary to his (subsequent) assertion that "[i]t is one of the most uplifting tasks of leadership to allow one's followers to mark only the victory, and to take upon oneself the entire responsibility at critical moments, to step in front of one's followers to shield them against this responsibility."[316]

Hitler did not condone individuality, individual responsibility, or individual conscience but urged the German people to submission. "[A]s you stand here gathered together before me, may you one and all forget what life has made out of you as individuals, may you remember that in spite of all these barriers you are members of the one nation, and that you are so not by human will but by God's will."[317] "It is of no importance whether the individual among us lives—what must live is our Volk!"[318] Apparently pleased with his success in swaying millions to this point of view, Hitler observed, "[W]e have convinced this nation that it can only exist as a nation and not as a

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[314]Hitler, May 21, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 14.
[315]Domarus, 279, 394-5. Gellately, 326, 635, n. 44.
[316]Hitler, May 3, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 205.
[317]Hitler, May 1, 1935; quoted in von Halasz, 66.
[318]Hitler, May 3, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 202.

collection of individuals,"[319] as a machine, in other words, but not as a group of free-thinking, responsible people. The "unity of a nation's spirit and will are worth far more than the freedom of the spirit and will of an individual," he maintained.[320] Hitler's authoritarian rule sought to establish Germany as a nation under "one authority" with "*one* will" to which all were expected to submit. All were expected "to move as one man" when ordered to do so.[321] Hence, it is not surprising that Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments and War Production, was the only senior officer of the Reich at Nuremberg to accept responsibility for his deeds. Nonetheless, Hogan notes that, while acknowledging his personal responsibility, Speer attempted "to deceive himself and others about the extent and nature of his involvement" in the *Shoah*.[322] The commandant of Treblinka extermination camp, Franz Stangl, declared his conscience clear, noting that he had never hurt anyone himself.[323] Hoess estimated that two and a half million Jewish people were executed at Auschwitz, yet when questioned as to whether or not he had ever protested, he indicated that he had to accept the order given him. "Don't you have a mind or opinion of your own?" asked the interrogator. "Yes," replied Hoess, "but when Himmler told us something, it was so correct and so natural we just blindly obeyed it."[324] Thus, Hitler's will was served by the Nazi machine which completely disregarded individual responsibility and moral accountability. In fact, the one who issued the order to kill was often far removed from the one who operated the instrument of murder,[325] and it was frequently the inmates and victims themselves who were forced to inflict death or to perform other reprehensible tasks.[326] Such practice effectively blurred the defining lines of moral responsibility and accountability.

(44) *Accepts unknown consequences, uncertainty.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Whether or not he harboured doubts, Hitler frequently claimed certainty with respect to outcomes. "I do not doubt for a second," he stated, "that we will secure our vital rights outside the country in exactly the same way as we were able to lead it

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[319]Hitler, October 3, 1937; quoted in von Halasz, 39.

[320]Hitler, October 1, 1933; Ibid., 62.

[321]Hitler, October 3, 1937; quoted in von Halasz, 39.

[322]Hogan, 158-9.

[323]Kren, 248.

[324]Hoess; quoted in Goldensohn, 296. The interrogator was the author, Dr. Leon Goldensohn, psychiatrist.

[325]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 246-7.

[326]Ibid., 246. When asked who was responsible for extracting gold teeth from gas chamber corpses, Hoess replied, "Internees, mostly dentists who worked there. We usually saved doctors, dentists, and nurses from the gas chambers in order to use them in technical positions." Hoess, April 9, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 305.

onwards within."[327] Jehanne claimed certainty with respect to the outcome of particular events based on her apprehension of divine revelation, but she accepted imminent capture without foreknowledge of the consequences, and this is the type of acceptance which is relevant in evaluating claims to divine sanction, that is, acceptance of unknown personal consequences—of an undisclosed cost to self. Hitler did not accept such unknown personal consequences but escaped them through self-inflicted death.

(45) *Exercises independent thought.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Although Hitler exercised independent thought, he relied upon others to abandon free thought and surrender willingly to his ideas. Albert Speer writes, "My inclination to be relieved of having to think, particularly about unpleasant facts, helped to sway the balance [in deciding to join the Nazi Party]. In this I did not differ from millions of others. Such mental slackness above all facilitated, established, and finally assured the success of the National Socialist system."[328] Similarly, Eichmann considered it appropriate to allow others to think for him. He claimed merely to have followed orders, declaring that he was not "master of his own deeds."[329] The fact remains, however, that Hitler was an independent thinker.

(46) *Offers a merciful gift, promise of a better future.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler presented himself as a messianic figure, as creator and leader of a new age. "The new age has already come," he proclaimed, "and we welcome its arrival: the new age is the new German Volk that we have created!"[330] He predicted that, after accomplishment of his mission to exterminate the Jewish people, "a long era of international understanding, and therefore of true peace, will come over the suffering world. . . . What used to be our party program is now the basis of a new and improving world."[331] While Hitler promised "a new and better order"[332] for Germany and the world, that which he offered was not merciful, nor was it better in the eyes of moral humanity. In actuality, he delivered death and destruction while refusing "to

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[327]Hitler; quoted in Domarus, 46.
[328]Speer, 20.
[329]Eichmann; quoted in Arendt, *Eichmann*, 136.
[330]Hitler, September 7, 1932; quoted in Domarus, 301.
[331]Hitler, February 24, 1942; Ibid., 319.
[332]Hitler, July 13, 1934; Ibid., 261.

acknowledge authorship of the unheard-of catastrophe into which he had plunged Germany and the entire world," as Domarus notes.[333]

(47) *Normally upholds customary moral laws.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

The Nazis fabricated and enforced a code of conduct which violated traditional and customary moral laws. As Adams and Balfour point out, Hitler created a "morally inverted" order.[334] Morality was effectively turned on its head such that, where it would normally be expected to operate, there existed instead a moral vacuum. Acts of kindness, (e.g., protecting Jews), were condemned whereas acts of evil, (e.g., murdering Jews), were lauded.

(48) *Does not proclaim divine condemnation of others.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler condemned those whom he perceived as foes and repeatedly claimed divine support in his condemnatory activities.[335] He warned against "the devilish plan of the Jewish international criminals" which he maintained could bring about the destruction of "all European peoples."[336] "After the death of his victim," Hitler fantasized, "the vampire [the Jew] sooner or later dies too."[337] He held that Karl Marx "recognized in the morass of a slowly decomposing world the most essential poisons, extracted them, and, like a wizard, prepared them into a concentrated solution for the swifter annihilation of the independent existence of free nations on this earth. . . . Marxism . . . systematically plans to hand the world over to the Jews"[338] who "made a pact with the devil," he insisted.[339] Such characterization of others as devilish, vampiric, as sorcerers dealing in poison, and as committed to the devil is typical in Hitler's expression.

(49) *Possible temporary suspension of universal ethic in some regard in relation to a divinely sanctioned higher telos.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler did not aim to suspend a universal ethic temporarily but to obliterate it permanently in favour of his own laws by which he intended, for one thing, to

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[333]Domarus, 131.
[334]Adams and Balfour, 167.
[335]The first criterion with respect to divine, prophetic calling above provides examples of this.
[336]Hitler, February 24, 1943; quoted in Domarus, 407.
[337]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 327.
[338]Ibid., 382.
[339]Ibid., 311.

exterminate European Jewry for a period of at least a millennium.[340] "I believe in the eternity of this Reich," he declared.[341]

The notion of a teleological suspension of the ethical has been viewed in the context of suspension of *lex publica* in favour of *lex divina.* However, when Hitler suspended *lex publica* in Germany, he simply created a new *lex publica.* The National Socialist Party, he stated, was "a corporation under public law" whose statutes were "to be determined by the Führer,"[342] (not God). Nevertheless, Hitler invoked the notion of a teleological suspension of the ethical in favour of a divine *telos.* "The Almighty has allowed us to take this wonderful path and will continue to bless us," he announced. "For we are fighting here for a higher right, for a higher truth and for a higher human decency."[343] "[A] man who feels it his duty . . . to assume the leadership of his people is not responsible to the laws of parliamentary usage or to a particular democratic conception, but solely to the mission placed upon him."[344] "Here I believe in a higher and eternal justice. It is imparted to him who proves himself worthy of it."[345]

Hitler's claim to divinely sanctioned teleological suspension of the ethical is not supported by compelling evidence of his having been in an absolute relation to the Absolute (to employ Kierkegaard's terminology), which is essential if any such suspension is to be considered divinely inspired. Moreover, Hitler's claim to divine sanction and his ethical suspension were broad and general, supposing that whatever Hitler succeeded in doing was *ipso facto* a result of Providence, whereas teleological suspension of the ethical in favour of a divine *telos* is typically represented as more finely focused and specifically directed.

Finally, it must be emphasized that, within the context of the model, teleological suspension of the ethical might be considered indicative of divine sanction only when all essential criteria are satisfied (unless indeterminate or not applicable). The criterion must never be cited as indicative on its own. In fact, no single criterion should ever be considered sufficient in assessing a claim.

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[340]Hitler, January 30, 1942; in Domarus, 400-1.
[341]Hitler, July 19, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 495.
[342]Hitler, December 1, 1933; Ibid., 255.
[343]Hitler, September 10, 1937; Ibid., 312.
[344]Hitler, February 20, 1938; quoted in von Halasz, 37-8.
[345]Hitler, February 24, 1940; quoted in Domarus, 161.

(50) *Charism, spiritual gifts, uncanny abilities (including but not limited to those cited under the category of Divine, Prophetic Calling), mediates grace.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler evidently had charisma among the German people, but mere social or political charisma falls short of theological charism which is traditionally linked with Christian virtues.[346] One might argue that Hitler's oratorical strength was, in fact, charismatic but that he abused it by exercising it in isolation from Christian virtues; however, divorced from virtue, such ability cannot be deemed truly charismatic. Hence, a spiritual gift is not presumably charismatic in and of itself but only when employed in a virtuous manner under the power of divine grace. Moreover, psychiatrist Leon Goldensohn refers to the "myth of the magnetism of Hitler" which grew out of the Nuremberg trials.[347] This notion of myth suggests that Hitler did not possess a genuinely magnetic personality but that such characterization was merely an excuse fabricated by Nuremberg defendants in a possible attempt to obtain exemption from personal accountability on the supposition that they involuntarily succumbed to some supernatural force. Moreover, Hitler not only lacked charismata but seems to have denied their existence, asserting that "[n]o one can ever master what he has not already learned and trained himself up to."[348]

(51) *Honest disposition, transparency.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler was a pathological liar whose speeches are replete with falsity. "National Socialism does not harbour the slightest aggressive intent towards any European nation," he declared,[349] and then proceeded to invade Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia. Hitler also stated, "I abide by what I sign. What I cannot abide by, I will never sign."[350] "The German Reich government . . . will . . . scrupulously comply with every treaty signed," he reiterated,[351] but his invasion of Russia proved this claim false.[352]

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[346]Rahner, s.v. "Charism," in Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology*, 185.

[347]Goldensohn, 184.

[348]Hitler, 1934; quoted in von Halasz, 78. As we know, Jehanne was a military expert having undergone none of the many years of training ordinarily required for that vocation.

[349]Hitler, 1935; in von Halasz, 16.

[350]Hitler, October 18, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 87.

[351]Hitler, May 21, 1935; Ibid., 88.

[352]Domarus, 657.

(52) *Straightforward, honest language, forthrightness.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler implemented deceptive language rules which aimed to conceal, disguise (albeit thinly), and deny the depravity of Nazi activities by addressing them in relatively benign terms; carefully selected words cloaked hideous truths with more palatable lies. In fact, as Arendt points out, the "term 'language rule' (*Sprachregelung*)" was itself a deceptive expression intended to mask that which is ordinarily termed lying.[353] Expulsion was called "forced emigration,"[354] concentration camps were spoken of "in terms of 'administration'" while extermination camps were referred to "in terms of 'economy,'"[355] and "the official code name for extermination was . . . 'Final Solution.'"[356] The words "evacuation" and "special treatment" denoted killing,[357] with the phrase "granting . . . a mercy death" referring explicitly to death by gassing which was construed as "the humane way" of killing and of avoiding "unnecessary hardships."[358] Deportation to concentration or extermination camps was referred to as "change of residence, . . . resettlement, . . . and labor in the East."[359] Gassing centers were called "Charitable Foundations for Institutional Care."[360] This was all considered "objective" as opposed to "emotional" language.[361] The Nazis apparently had no tolerance for the emotional which they dodged behind a shield of deception.[362] "I could not have carried on as an administrative officer if I had let myself be swayed emotionally," stated Pohl.[363] This unemotional language proved sufficiently effective to convince Eichmann's defense lawyer, sixteen years after the fact, that the murder of millions by gas constituted a "medical matter."[364] The term conveys an attempted sanitization of murder rather than outright denial. In fact, Arendt asserts that the language rules did not deceive the Nazis about what they were doing but kept them from

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[353]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 85.
[354]Ibid., 43.
[355]Ibid., 69.
[356]Ibid., 84-5.
[357]Ibid., 85.
[358]Ibid., 108.
[359]Ibid., 85.
[360]Ibid., 109.
[361]Ibid., 69.
[362]Adams and Balfour note that euphemisms can distance one emotionally from the reality of one's actions, and it is certainly conceivable that they functioned in this manner within the Nazi regime. Adams and Balfour, 14-5.
[363]Pohl, June 5, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 408.
[364]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 69. Arendt notes that Eichmann's lawyer, Dr. Robert Servatius, had never been a Nazi himself. Ibid.

associating it "with their old, 'normal' knowledge of murder and lies."[365] Berel Lang agrees that the coded language was intended largely for internal use "as a conscious attempt to disguise or misrepresent something it would have been dangerous or morally wrong to address more directly."[366] As with all lies, he explains, the perverse vocabulary was accompanied by knowing affirmation of what was false and constituted a moral violation consisting not in the falsity itself but in the activities which it facilitated. Falsity, Lang concedes, is not necessarily unethical depending on its purpose and the circumstances in which it is employed.[367]

(53) *Unambiguous public statement of purpose and method.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

As noted in criterion thirteen of the Divine, Prophetic Calling category, before rising to power in 1933, Hitler declared his agenda publicly in his book, *Mein Kampf*, (first published in 1925), clearly exposing his racist political ideology and intentions. As Heiden points out, "in its pages Hitler announced — long before he came to power — a program of blood and terror in a self-revelation of such overwhelming frankness that few among its readers had the courage to believe it."[368]

(54) *Reliability, consistency, constancy.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

As observed by Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler was extremely unreliable, frequently doing "the exact opposite to what he . . . said before and [he] did not consider himself tied by any promises or agreement."[369] One obvious example is his assertion that the German army would not "wage wars of aggression" or "rob other nations of their freedom."[370] Moreover, Hitler claimed, "The German Reich government is guided by the hope of possibly being able to bring about . . . a framework within which the German Volk would be in a position to establish tolerable relations with the Jewish people."[371] Meanwhile, he had been declaring for ten years that the Jewish people ought to be exterminated and proceeded to act on the conviction.[372] Furthermore, Hitler had an

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[365]Ibid., 86.

[366]Berel Lang, "Language and Genocide," in *Echoes from the Holocaust: Philosophical Reflections on a Dark Time*, ed. Alan Rosenberg and Gerald E. Myers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 347.

[367]Ibid., 350.

[368]Heiden, xv.

[369]Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank until 1939, September 1, 1945; quoted in Overy, 213.

[370]Hitler, 1933; quoted in von Halasz, 15.

[371]Hitler, September 15, 1935; quoted in Domarus, 269.

[372]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 169.

erratic personality. He "had a brutal side to him as well as a decent side," stated Joachim von Ribbentrop. "[H]e would be most friendly and affectionate on one day, and the very next time I saw him he would criticize me and even accuse me of betraying him."[373]

(55) *Strives with the world, with self, and with God.* ***(indeterminate)***

Hitler obviously strove against the world. Whether or not he strove with himself is indeterminate. He does not seem to have striven earnestly with God but presumed God's will (and everyone else's) subject to his own. He declared himself in right relationship with God and did not appear to entertain the possibility that the situation might be otherwise, but we cannot be entirely certain since he would not likely have confessed such inner struggles if they existed.

(56) *Expression of the sublime absolutely in the pedestrian.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

While there was something ostensibly subliminal about Hitler's effect on the millions who threw their support behind him, it was more likely due to his psychological tactics (e.g., brainwashing and fear mongering) than to the expression of sublime qualities on his part. On the contrary, Hitler lacked the sublime qualities of compassion, humility, charity, and sanctity, operating in a Machiavellian manner. He was a master of manipulation who recognized "the importance of physical terror toward the individual and the masses. Here, too, the psychological effect can be calculated with precision," he explained. "*Terror at the place of employment, in the factory, in the meeting hall, and on the occasion of mass demonstrations will always be successful unless opposed by equal terror.*"[374] Hitler thus introduced terror, not subliminal qualities, to the pedestrian; it permeated the most ordinary aspects of human life such that taking a shower might result in fatal poisoning and labour could consist in extracting gold teeth from corpses.

(57) *Wisdom, sound judgment.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler repeatedly demonstrated poor judgment, particularly with respect to foreign politics, grossly miscalculating international response to his National Socialist agenda. For example, his expectation of an alliance with Britain proved unrealistic.[375] In

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[373]Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister, June 23, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 190.
[374]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 44.
[375]Domarus, 109-13, 276.

fact, Britain vowed "to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime."[376] Moreover, he failed to anticipate accurately the results of his campaign against Russia, which refused to surrender according to his plans.[377] Hitler's offensive in Russia also demonstrated a lack of wisdom in that German troops were ill-prepared for the harsh winter climate encountered there.[378] "The Russians were five times superior to us . . . Germans, both in numbers and in the superiority of their equipment," explained one of Hitler's generals. "My immediate commander was Hitler himself. Unfortunately, Hitler's advice in those critical periods was invariably lousy."[379] Furthermore, his campaign of expansion failed to take into account the fact that Germany had limited resources with which to maintain control of conquered lands.[380] Domarus concludes that Hitler held a "distorted" view of international politics[381] and that all "his theories and ideas with which he had operated since 1919" were "wrong without exception."[382] When members of the Reich realized that "Hitler was merely improvising," several of them either fled Germany, committed suicide, or searched for an alternate exit route.[383]

(58) *Undergoes mystical "dark night," struggle with pain and suffering.* ***(indeterminate)***

Hitler conceivably avoided a great deal of pain and suffering by taking his life before it became unbearable, notwithstanding the fact that the decision to take his life likely involved suffering. Moreover, he suffered the gradual failure of his regime, (although he was reluctant to acknowledge it). Speer indicates that, as the war progressed, Hitler suffered from "[o]verwork and isolation [which] led to a peculiar state of petrifaction and rigor. He suffered from spells of mental torpor and was permanently caustic and irritable."[384] We have little indication that Hitler's struggles were mystical in nature, although the following statement interprets them in that context: "I often feel that we will have to undergo all the trials the devil and hell can devise before we achieve Final Victory," Hitler stated.[385] Our information is insufficient to assess properly the nature of Hitler's inner struggles.

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[376]Winston Churchill, June 22, 1941; quoted in Domarus, 115.
[377]Domarus, 117-8.
[378]Ibid., 722, 726.
[379]von Kleist, June 25, 1946; quoted in Goldensohn, 345-6.
[380]Domarus, 282.
[381]Ibid., 112.
[382]Ibid., 131.
[383]Ibid., 276.
[384]Speer, 294.
[385]Hitler, June 26, 1944; quoted by Speer, 555, n. 13.

(59) *Demonstrates grace in extreme suffering.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Again, it must be pointed out that Hitler killed himself in anticipation of extreme suffering. While he undoubtedly suffered the hardships and humiliations of defeat in the aftermath of World War I, he failed to demonstrate grace in that context but sought to dominate the world at all costs in retaliation.

(60) *Embodies paradox.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler did not evidently embody any striking paradox; he despised and sought to oppress others and acted accordingly, moving to eliminate and/or subdue them by manipulation or ruthless force. He was not a man of light navigating in darkness, but a man of dark intentions who carried them out darkly.

(61) *Canonization, holiness, posthumous miracles.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

Hitler has not been canonized, has not been attributed posthumous miracles, and is not generally associated with holiness.

(62) *Identification with a particular, well-established prophecy.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Hitler has been associated with the cryptic prophecies of sixteenth-century French seer, Nostradamus (Michel de Nostredame).[386] Moreover, Hitler associated himself with Nietzsche's notion of the *Übermensch* (Superman or Overman who embodies raw power and transcends human nature) and also identified his ideological Aryan race with a race of world rulers prophesied by Nietzsche.[387] Furthermore, Nietzsche penned a prophecy just prior to Hitler's birth which reads, "I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous—a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience, a decision that was conjured up *against* everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far."[388] One might easily associate such Nietzschean predictions with Hitler, and many

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[386]The prophecy foretells the reign of an Antichrist subsequently interpreted as Hitler. Rosemary Ellen Guiley, s.v. "Nostradamus (1503-1566)," in Rosemary Ellen Guiley, *Encyclopedia of Mystical and Paranormal Experience* (London: Grange Books, 1991), 407-9.

[387]The Nietzschean work referred to is *The Will to Power*. Eric Metaxas, *Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy: A Righteous Gentile vs. the Third Reich* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 168.

[388]Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 782. The work was written in 1888 and Hitler was born in 1889.

have.[389] Hitler has also been associated with prophecies by Heinrich Heine who stated, "[W]hen you hear a crashing such as never before has been heard in the world's history, then you know that the German thunderbolt has fallen at last. . . . A play will be performed in Germany which will make the French Revolution look like an innocent idyll."[390]

Summary Assessment – Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency

Of the sixty-two criteria indicative of divinely sanctioned human agency, Hitler satisfies six (four essential and two non-essential), he fails to satisfy fifty-two (forty-one essential and eleven non-essential), and four are indeterminate (two essential and two non-essential.) Of the forty-seven essential criteria, only four are met. Of the fifteen non-essential criteria, only two are met. Given that he fails to satisfy the vast majority of criteria in this category, Hitler cannot be deemed to have engaged in divinely sanctioned human agency in accordance with the model. A summing up of the three categories with respect to Hitler's case is in order.

Case Study One Results

Having conducted an extensive assessment of Hitler's claim to divinely sanctioned warfare, it has been determined that he fails to meet the requirements of each category of evaluation. Of the one hundred criteria evaluated in three categories, Hitler satisfies ten (six essential and four non-essential), he fails to satisfy eighty-two (sixty-five essential and seventeen non-essential), and eight are indeterminate (four essential and four non-essential). Of the seventy-five essential criteria, only six are met. Of the twenty-five non-essential criteria, only four are met. Hence, on the basis of Jehanne's example, Hitler cannot be deemed a practical, prophetic mystic in receipt of divine revelation or divine calling, nor can his war or his behaviour be construed as righteous or divinely sanctioned. In fact, one might reasonably classify Hitler as a false prophet and Nazism as an unjust social system against which the truly divine prophet rails.

Hitler was exceedingly detailed, organized, thorough, and dedicated in his application of evil, and it is perhaps for this reason that he has become a modern icon of hate. The association is warranted since it is based upon factual evidence; hence, it is

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[389]Robert G.L. Waite, *The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977), 319-21. Waite notes, however, that Nietzsche was strongly opposed to anti-Semitism. Waite, 321.

[390]Heinrich Heine; quoted in Metaxas, 164.

not a problematic factor in the evaluation of his case as it does not conflict or interfere with factual reality. Given Hitler's reputation for evil, it might be argued that the results of his case are obvious from the outset and an assessment via the model is therefore unnecessary, but the fact that millions of individuals heeded his call, without whom he could not have accomplished the massive destruction for which he is notorious, suggests otherwise. What is tragically obvious to some is overlooked by or hidden to others; some view the world with open eyes while others view it with eyes half shut. Moreover, despite the obvious evil perpetrated by the Hitler regime, Nazism remains alive, and humanity must remain vigilant. As Weil suggests, regardless of any judgments against Hitler, these "will not stop, in twenty, fifty, a hundred or two hundred years' time, some solitary little dreamer, whether German or otherwise, from seeing in Hitler a superb figure, with a superb destiny from beginning to end, and desiring with all his soul to have a similar destiny. In which case, woe betide his contemporaries."[391] Alongside Hitler's example, let us raise Jehanne's model as an alternative form of extraordinariness so that solitary dreamers might consider their options varied.

Case Study Two – Dietrich Bonhoeffer

> The solitary is one who is called to make one of the most terrible decisions possible to man: the decision to disagree completely with those who imagine that the call to diversion and self-deception is the voice of truth and who can summon the full authority of their own prejudice to prove it. He is therefore bound to sweat blood in anguish, in order to be loyal to God, to the Mystical Christ, and to humanity as a whole, rather than to the idol which is offered to him, for his homage, by a particular group. He must renounce the blessing of every convenient illusion that absolves him from responsibility when he is untrue to his deepest self and to his inmost truth—the image of God in his own soul.
>
> —Thomas Merton, *Disputed Questions*

Barth identifies as a fundamental danger of improper (false) theology that it might serve "the Antichrist instead of . . . Jesus Christ."[392] "Often what masquerades as orthodoxy is highly unorthodox," notes O'Donohue. "When this has the voice of

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[391] Weil, *Need for Roots*, 224.
[392] Barth, *Evangelical Theology*, 143.

authority, sanction and censure behind it, people do not actually notice that it is unorthodox."[393] Weil confesses:

> What frightens me is the Church as a social structure. Not only on account of its blemishes, but from the very fact that it is something social. It is not that I am of a very individualistic temperament. I am afraid for the opposite reason. I am aware of very strong gregarious tendencies in myself. My natural disposition is to be very easily influenced, too much influenced, and above all by anything collective. I know that if at this moment I had before me a group of twenty young Germans singing Nazi songs in chorus, a part of my soul would instantly become Nazi. That is a very great weakness, but that is how I am. I think that it is useless to fight directly against natural weaknesses. One has to force oneself to act as though one did not have them in circumstances where a duty makes it imperative; and in the ordinary course of life one has to know these weaknesses, prudently take them into account, and strive to turn them to good purpose.[394]

Weil's statement recalls Arendt's characterization of Eichmann as one who possessed strong gregarious tendencies.[395] Weil continues:

> By social I do not mean everything connected with citizenship, but only collective emotions.
>
> I am well aware that the Church must inevitably be a social structure; otherwise it would not exist. But in so far as it is a social structure, it belongs to the Prince of this World. It is because it is an organ for the preservation and transmission of truth that there is an extreme danger for those who, like me, are excessively open to social influences. For in this way what is purest and what is most defiling look very much the same, and confused under the same words, make an almost undecomposable mixture.[396]

These problems highlight the significance of mysticism, its solitary path of discernment, and the importance of the templates which saints and mystics throughout the ages have provided as illumination to others.

Weil's concerns regarding the church as social structure are affirmed by the politics of Hitlerite Germany. "At the bottom of our hearts," declared Hitler, "we National Socialists are religious,"[397] while Eichmann dubbed several prominent Nazis

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[393]John O'Donohue, *The Four Elements: Reflections on Nature* (London: Transworld Ireland, 2010), 123.

[394]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 11-2. Weil died in 1943, so it is possible that she was unaware of the full extent of the Nazi atrocities committed under Hitler.

[395]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 32.

[396]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 12-3.

[397]Hitler, November 22, 1937; quoted in Domarus, 315.

"the Popes of the Third Reich."[398] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a German-born[399] Lutheran pastor and theologian (with ecumenical interests), recognized such dangers as they manifested before him in Nazi Germany. "The prophet knew that religion could distort what the Lord demanded of man, that priests themselves had committed perjury by bearing false witness, condoning violence, tolerating hatred, calling for ceremonies instead of bursting forth with wrath and indignation at cruelty, deceit, idolatry, and violence,"[400] states Heschel. Bonhoeffer maintained that it is the proper purpose of the church to make "confession to Christ its life."[401] Hence, he became a leading member of the 'Confessing Church' which sprung up in opposition to the Nazi-ruled 'German Christian Church' in Hitler's Germany.[402] "The word of the church is the word of the present Christ, it is gospel and commandment," he emphasized.[403] Hvidt reminds us that "the task of the [Christian] prophet is . . . to encourage the church to live the Gospel and to guide it through the rough waters of history; pointing out dangers and admonishing the faithful to keep in union with God and his truth."[404] It is to this task that Bonhoeffer applied himself, defying the German Christians, Nazism, and Hitler himself. Along with several family members, he entered a conspiracy to assassinate the destructive and fanatical Führer[405] and to organize a coup d'état involving several of Germany's military generals.[406] By January of 1938, the vociferous Bonhoeffer was forbidden to maintain residence in Berlin.[407] With war in view, he made a troubled decision to leave Germany in June of 1939 for an academic post in the United States, wishing to avoid conscription to fight an aggressive and unjust war.[408] "I am thinking of leaving Germany sometime," he wrote. "The main reason is the compulsory military service to which the men of my

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[398]Eichmann; quoted in Arendt, *Eichmann*, 114.

[399]Bonhoeffer was born in Breslau in 1906.

[400]Heschel, *Prophets: Introduction*, 11.

[401]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 213.

[402]Gerhard Leibholz, "Memoir," in *The Cost of Discipleship*, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. R.H. Fuller and Irmgard Booth (London: SCM Press, 2001), xvi.

[403]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 157.

[404]Hvidt, 111.

[405]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 671. Bonhoeffer's father, Karl Bonhoeffer, who was a professor of psychiatry and neurology and a practicing psychiatrist, expressed reservations about Hitler's leadership from the beginning, partly on account of the Führer's "psychopathic symptoms" observed by psychiatric colleagues. These concerns were shared by the entire Bonhoeffer family. Ibid., 3, 15-6. Karl Bonhoeffer; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 258.

[406]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 630, 672, 897. The conspiracy also attempted to gain support from England for a coup in Germany. Ibid., 904.

[407]Ibid., 597-8.

[408]G. Leibholz, xvi. Bonhoeffer was offered a position as summer lecturer at Union Theological Seminary in New York, and arrangements were also being made for further employment opportunities in America. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 651.

age will be called up this year. It seems to me conscientiously impossible to join in a war under the present circumstances. . . . Perhaps the worst thing of all is the military oath which I should have to swear [to Hitler]."[409] But Bonhoeffer was not at ease in America, knowing that the situation in his country was extremely precarious, and he soon returned to Germany[410] where he obtained exemption from conscription by alternative arrangement. Through family connections, he was employed by the *Abwehr* (German military intelligence office) to work as a secret agent on the pretext that his abundant personal and professional connections in Germany and abroad would serve the National Socialist state, but Bonhoeffer actually utilized his *Abwehr* travels to further the resistance to Hitler.[411]

In 1940, Bonhoeffer was banned from public speaking in Germany, he was forbidden to publish, preach, or teach, and he was required to report regularly to the Gestapo (Nazi secret police) who closed his underground seminary.[412] Bonhoeffer's involvement in the conspiracy continued nonetheless. He became engaged to Maria von Wedemeyer in January of 1943 and was arrested and imprisoned shortly thereafter, on April 5, 1943. The arrest was not due to his participation in the conspiracy, which had not yet become apparent to the Nazis, but Bonhoeffer had publicly railed against the National Socialist state and the collaborating German Christian Church, he had operated underground seminaries of the Confessing Church, he had avoided conscription, and he had helped to smuggle fourteen Jewish people across the German border into Switzerland.[413] Eventually, incriminating evidence concerning the conspiracy came to

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[409]Bonhoeffer, letter to George K.A. Bell, Bishop of Chichester, dated March 25, 1939; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 637.

[410]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 652-3.

[411]Ibid., 793. Also, Ruth-Alice von Bismarck, preface to *Love Letters From Cell 92: The Correspondence Between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Maria von Wedemeyer 1943–45*, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Maria von Wedemeyer, trans. John Brownjohn, ed. Ruth-Alice von Bismarck and Ulrich Kabitz (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 9. Also, Ulrich Kabitz, in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 326.

[412]Bonhoeffer wrote of the public speaking ban and the requirement to report. Bonhoeffer, outline of letter to Judge Advocate Roeder; in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, enlarged ed., trans. Reginald Fuller, Frank Clark et al., and John Bowden, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1971), 56. The prohibition against preaching is noted by E. Bethge. E. Bethge, in Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers,* 366, n. 69. Bonhoeffer referred to his last sermons of summer, 1940. Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 8, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 347. The injunction against publishing is noted by E. Bethge. Eberhard Bethge, preface to the First Through the Fifth German Editions of *Ethics*, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Neville Horton Smith, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1955), 11. John W. Doberstein notes the closure of Bonhoeffer's underground seminary and his being banned from teaching. John W. Doberstein, introduction to *Life Together*, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. John W. Doberstein (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1954), 11-2.

[413]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 817.

light,[414] which led to the execution of Bonhoeffer, his brother Klaus, two of their brothers-in-law, and several other conspirators. Bonhoeffer was hanged by the Nazis on April 9, 1945 at Flossenbürg concentration camp at age thirty-nine, just days before the camp was liberated[415] and only three weeks before Hitler's suicide. For his faith, his solidarity with the oppressed, and his active stance against evil, Bonhoeffer paid with his life.

Kierkegaard once observed, "Not just in commerce but in the world of ideas too our age is putting on a veritable clearance sale. Everything can be had so dirt cheap that one begins to wonder whether in the end anyone will want to make a bid."[416] The statement resonates with Bonhoeffer's concept of 'cheap grace.'

> Cheap grace means grace sold on the market like cheapjack's wares. The sacraments, the forgiveness of sin, and the consolations of religion are thrown away at cut prices. Grace is represented as the Church's inexhaustible treasury, from which she showers blessings with generous hands, without asking questions or fixing limits. Grace without price; grace without cost! The essence of grace, we suppose, is that the account has been paid in advance; and, because it has been paid, everything can be had for nothing. Since the cost was infinite, the possibilities of using and spending it are infinite. What would grace be if it were not cheap?
>
> Cheap grace means grace as doctrine, a principle, a system. It means forgiveness of sins proclaimed as a general truth . . . . An intellectual assent to that idea is held to be of itself sufficient to secure remission of sins. The Church which holds the correct doctrine of grace has, it is supposed, *ipso facto* a part in that grace. In such a Church the world finds a cheap covering for its sins; no contrition is required, still less any real desire to be delivered from sin. . . .
>
> Cheap grace means the justification of sin without the justification of the sinner. Grace does everything, they say, and so everything can remain as it was before. . . . Cheap grace is the grace we bestow on ourselves.
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> . . . Cheap grace is grace without discipleship, grace without the cross, grace without Jesus Christ, living and incarnate.[417]

In Nazi Germany, Bonhoeffer was extremely familiar with the concrete results of 'cheap grace' and recognized the necessity of opposing such falsity. Hence, contending with cheap grace is Bonhoeffer's concept of 'costly grace,' "the only genuine kind of grace" conceivable to him.[418]

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[414]Ibid., 897, 935.

[415]G. Leibholz, xx.

[416]Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 3.

[417]Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship*, trans. R.H. Fuller and Irmgard Booth (London: SCM Press, 2001), 3-4. First published in 1937, several years after Hitler's rise to power.

[418]Ibid., 12.

> Costly grace . . . is the call of Jesus Christ at which the disciple leaves his nets and follows him. . . .
>
> Such grace is *costly* because it calls us to follow, and it is *grace* because it calls us to follow *Jesus Christ*. It is costly because it costs a man his life, and it is grace because it gives a man the only true life. . . . Costly grace is the Incarnation of God.[419]

This is the concept by which Bonhoeffer lived and died. Let us apply the model in order to ascertain whether or not his example corresponds to that of Jehanne.

Divine, Prophetic Calling Criteria

(1) *Receipt of divine revelation (e.g., visions, auditions) calling one to a specified task.* ***(indeterminate)***

"My calling is quite clear to me," wrote Bonhoeffer at the dawn of 1936. "What God will make of it I do not know. . . . I must follow the path. Perhaps it will not be such a long one. . . . But it is a fine thing to have realized my calling. . . . I believe that the nobility of this calling will become plain to us only in the times and events to come. If only we can hold out!"[420] The prophetic accuracy of the words is stunning; however, the words themselves do not reveal the means by which Bonhoeffer discerned his potentially divine calling.

We know that Bonhoeffer interpreted scripture with a view to revelation. Informing his actions through scriptural passages, being Christian for him required following Christ to the utmost of one's ability in accordance with the gospel texts. It is not necessary to be the recipient of "personal revelation" in order to "hear the call of Jesus," he maintained, since Jesus now speaks through scripture and sacrament.[421] Nevertheless, he approached the Bible meditatively[422] on the belief that it speaks personally to each individual. Bonhoeffer thus advised his students to view "Holy Scripture" as "a love letter from God directed very personally" to each of them.[423] He once inquired of a fellow conspirator, "Is it . . . intelligible to you if I say I am not at any point willing to sacrifice the Bible . . . , that on the contrary, I ask with all my strength what God is trying to say to us through it? Every other place outside the Bible has become too uncertain for me. I fear that there I will only bump into my own divine

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[419]Ibid., 4-5.
[420]Bonhoeffer, letter dated January 27, 1936; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 205.
[421]Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 165.
[422]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 204.
[423]Bonhoeffer, 1932; quoted by J. Kanitz, in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 204.

Doppelgänger."[424] Hence, in seeking divine direction, Bonhoeffer sometimes approached the Bible in oracular fashion, consulting the established daily readings in relation to specific events and current concerns.

Hvidt indicates that prophets have often called people to live in accordance with truths revealed through important scriptural passages.[425] Nonetheless, scripture is potentially dangerous as a source of divine authority since it can be interpreted to almost any end. However, when one finds oneself in a pressing ethical dilemma in the absence of specific divine revelation, scripture might reasonably be consulted as a potential form of divine guidance. While it is impossible to determine whether or not Bonhoeffer received specific divine direction through scripture or other means, he apparently believed that he did, and the possibility cannot be ruled out.

(2) *Discernment of spirits (charism).* ***(indeterminate)***

Bonhoeffer wrote that the Holy Spirit shines "in the necessary decision of the moment,"[426] alluding to divine guidance in spirit form. He believed in the numinous and drew comfort from what he described as "benevolent spirits."[427] "I live in a great, unseen realm of whose real existence I'm in no doubt," he wrote, adding that adults as well as children are in need of "preservation . . . by kindly, unseen powers."[428] Commenting on the solitary nature of imprisonment, his friend, Eberhard Bethge, conceded that Bonhoeffer was "alone in the situation" but added, "you also live, feel and think in other dimensions – and in a very lively way."[429] "The beyond," wrote Bonhoeffer, "is not what is infinitely remote, but what is nearest at hand."[430] However convinced one might be of Bonhoeffer's ability to discern spirits, one cannot be certain and, as he has not undergone a process of canonization which rigorously examines such matters, the issue remains indeterminate.

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[424]Bonhoeffer, letter to Rüdiger Schleicher dated April, 1936; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 206.

[425]Hvidt, 249.

[426]Bonhoeffer, 1928; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 119.

[427]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated December 1, 1943, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Maria von Wedemeyer, *Love Letters From Cell 92: The Correspondence Between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Maria von Wedemeyer 1943–45*, trans. John Brownjohn, ed. Ruth-Alice von Bismarck and Ulrich Kabitz (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 127.

[428]Bonhoeffer, final letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated December 19, 1944. Ibid., 269.

[429]E. Bethge, letter to Bonhoeffer dated June 8, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 330. Eberhard Bethge was Bonhoeffer's student, close friend, nephew-in-law, co-conspirator, and biographer.

[430]Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 376.

(3) *Offers oneself as an instrument of God and willing conduit for divine grace, (decision aspect).* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"We are not lords, but instruments in the hand of the Lord of history," Bonhoeffer asserted.[431] He offered himself as an instrument of God and, in the possible absence of specific divine directives with respect to the ongoing situation in Germany, did his utmost to discern God's will for him through scripture, through conscience, and by remaining open to divine grace. When one acts from a position of responsibility, Bonhoeffer explained, "[h]e does not do this in the insolent presumptuousness of his own power, but he does it in the knowledge that this liberty is forced upon him and that in this liberty he is dependent on grace. Before other men the man of free responsibility is justified by necessity; before himself he is acquitted by his conscience; but before God he hopes only for mercy."[432] The idea that "liberty is forced upon" humans suggests that human free will might be viewed not only as a gift, but also as a divine imposition—imposition of the great burden of human choice and corresponding responsibility and consequence.[433] In the context of clear and specific divine revelation, one must choose whether or not to obey the divine instruction received. In the absence of such a directive, one must decide how to proceed in uncertainty. In either situation, a decision is required. Bonhoeffer desired to be "quite prepared for the last thing, for eternity, and yet wholly present for the task, the beauties and the troubles of this earth." He wished "to receive what God bestows . . . with open, outstretched hands" and, "with a quiet heart," to "sacrifice what God does not yet grant . . . or takes away."[434]

(4) *Actively engages in divine servantship, operates under willing obedience to divine (vs. human) authority, surrender of personal will to divine will, views oneself as being in an absolute relation to the Divine.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

The fact that he was a pastor placed Bonhoeffer in the arena of divine servantship in one sense, but he also engaged in divine servantship as a theologian and, above all, as a disciple. Bonhoeffer held that it is "obedience to the word . . ." of God, ". . . the practical doing of what is commanded," that forms the basis of discipleship, and this

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[431]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, Ibid., 14.

[432]Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, trans. Neville Horton Smith, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1955), 244.

[433]Bonhoeffer draws the correlation between freedom and responsibility, stating that "responsibility presupposes freedom and freedom can consist only in responsibility." Ibid., 244.

[434]Bonhoeffer, letter to Ruth von Wedemeyer (his fiancée's mother) dated April 10, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 247.

cannot be derived from any "religious formula."[435] "If we inquire the will of God, free from all doubt and all mistrust, we shall discover it," he asserted.[436] "[T]he main thing is that we keep step with God, and do not keep pressing on a few steps ahead – nor keep dawdling a step behind."[437]

Bonhoeffer distinguished between the "penultimate authority" of humans and the "ultimate, indescribable authority . . . of God."[438] "I must be able to know for certain that I am in God's hands, not in men's," he explained. "Then everything becomes easy."[439] He could bear things in faith so long as he believed they were willed by God. "We can have abundant life, even though many wishes remain unfulfilled," he resolved.[440] After a year in prison, Bonhoeffer wrote, "Everything seems to have taken its natural course, and to be determined necessarily and straightforwardly by a higher providence."[441] In spite of captivity, he did not "for a moment" regret returning to Germany from New York in 1939, as he indicated on more than one occasion. "I knew quite well what I was doing," he affirmed, "and I acted with a clear conscience."[442] Bonhoeffer viewed himself as being in an absolute relation to the Divine, stating that "the individual knows himself to be completely alone" before the ultimate authority of God.[443]

(5) *Submits to divine judgment and lives in constant awareness of this judgment.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

The following lines from a prayer written by Bonhoeffer reflect an awareness of divine judgment. "O holy and merciful God, / my Creator and Redeemer, / my Judge and Saviour, / You know me and all that I do."[444] Bonhoeffer accepted personal guilt in transgressing (via participation in the conspiracy) the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," and placed himself at the mercy and judgment of God alone. The deep struggle, the process of discernment, and the weight of responsibility unleashed by the question of

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[435]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Ralf K. Wüstenberg, *A Theology of Life: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Religionless Christianity*, trans. Doug Stott (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), 14.

[436]Bonhoeffer, October 18, 1942; quoted by Maria von Wedemeyer, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 332.

[437]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 169.

[438]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 199.

[439]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 22, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 174.

[440]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated March 19, 1944, Ibid., 234.

[441]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 22, 1944, Ibid., 276.

[442]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 22, 1943, Ibid., 174. Again, he wrote, "Nor have I ever regretted my decision in the summer of 1939." Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 11, 1944, Ibid., 272.

[443]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 199.

[444]Bonhoeffer, morning prayer for prisoners, Christmas, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 140.

whether or not he should return to Germany in 1939 (from New York) and to his involvement in the conspiracy are evident in the following passage:

> The decision has been made. . . . It probably means more for me than I can see at the moment. God alone knows what. It is remarkable how I am never quite clear about the motives for any of my decisions. Is that a sign of confusion, of inner dishonesty, or is it a sign that we are guided without our knowing, or is it both? . . . Today's scripture reading speaks dreadfully harshly of God's incorruptible judgement. He certainly sees how much personal feeling, how much anxiety, there is in today's decision [to return to Germany], however brave it may seem. The reasons that one gives for an action to others and to one's self are certainly inadequate. One can give a reason for everything. In the last resort one acts from a level which remains hidden from us. So we can only ask God to judge us and forgive us. . . . At the end of the day I can only ask God to give a merciful judgement on today and all its decisions. It is now in his hands.[445]

Bonhoeffer's earnest attempt to discern the direction in which he was being called in the name of Christian discipleship is apparent. From prison, he later wrote, "While the bombs are falling . . . all round the building, I cannot help thinking of God, his judgment, his hand stretched out and his anger not turned away . . . , and of my own unpreparedness."[446]

(6) *Shares in God's happiness, sadness, concern, sympathy, and aspirations for the world, active concern for humanity.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

While in prison, Bonhoeffer wrote to his fiancée, "Our marriage must be a 'yes' to God's earth. It must strengthen our resolve to do and accomplish something on earth. I fear that Christians who venture to stand on earth on only one leg will stand in heaven on only one leg too."[447] Christians, he maintained, carry "God and the whole world" within themselves.[448] Bonhoeffer held that it is

> only by living completely in this world that one learns to have faith. One must completely abandon any attempt to make something of oneself, whether it be a saint, or a converted sinner, or a churchman . . . , a righteous man or an unrighteous one, a sick man or a healthy one. By this-worldliness I mean living unreservedly in life's duties, problems, successes and failures, experiences and perplexities. In so doing we throw

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[445]Bonhoeffer, June 20, 1939; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 653. Perhaps the hidden level to which Bonhoeffer refers is the level of conscience and promptings by divine grace.

[446]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated January 29 and 30, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 199.

[447]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated August 12, 1943. Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 64.

[448]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated May 29, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 310.

> ourselves completely into the arms of God, taking seriously, not our own sufferings, but those of God in the world.[449]

Bonhoeffer also wrote that "Christians stand by God in his hour of grieving."[450] "Jesus asked in Gethsemane, 'Could you not watch with me one hour?' . . . Man is summoned to share in God's sufferings at the hands of a godless world," he asserted.[451] For Bonhoeffer, the true Christian recognizes godlessness and suffers as a result of it at the side of a suffering God. "It is not the religious act that makes the Christian," he maintained, "but participation in the sufferings of God in the secular life."[452] He described Christian discipleship as "not in the first place thinking about one's own needs, problems, sins, and fears, but allowing oneself to be caught up into the way of Jesus Christ, into the messianic event."[453]

> We are not Christ, but if we want to be Christians, we must have some share in Christ's large-heartedness by acting with responsibility and in freedom when the hour of danger comes, and by showing a real sympathy that springs . . . from the . . . love of Christ for all who suffer. Mere waiting and looking on is not Christian behaviour. The Christian is called to sympathy and action, not in the first place by his own sufferings, but by the sufferings of his brethren.[454]

Bonhoeffer lived these words to the fullest. He displayed great concern for others and was actively committed to improving their circumstances. After a year at Tegel prison, he prepared a report on injustices and inadequacies in the treatment of prisoners with the intention that it might lead to eventual improvements.[455] He also attempted "to have a quiet word with" some abusive guards concerning their treatment "of all the other prisoners," but to no avail.[456] Following an air raid in which part of the prison wall was destroyed, Bonhoeffer prepared a report of the incident with recommendations for improved medical treatment during such attacks,[457] resolving that, upon his (anticipated) release, he would "make some suggestions about improving the organization . . . for

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[449]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 21, 1944, Ibid., 369-70.

[450]Bonhoeffer, poem entitled, "Christians and Pagans," 1944, Ibid., 349.

[451]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 18, 1944, Ibid., 361.

[452]Ibid.

[453]Ibid., 361-2.

[454]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 14.

[455]Bonhoeffer, Report on Prison Life after One Year in Tegel, Ibid., 248-252. Also, Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 850.

[456]Bonhoeffer, Report on Prison Life after One Year in Tegel, *Letters and Papers*, 250.

[457]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 28, 1943, Ibid., 147. Damage to the prison wall is noted in Bonhoeffer's incident report dated November 28, 1943 and in his letter to his parents written the same day, Ibid., 151-2.

incidents of that kind."[458] He also committed one hour daily to "studying the [prison] manual for medical staff, for any eventuality."[459]

(7) *Destabilizing presence in an unjust social system, exhortation to improve condition of humanity, serves the repair of the world and the common good.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer was an outspoken, destabilizing presence in the unjust social system of Nazism. Bethge describes a scene which followed Hitler's rise to power in 1933. "A forest of swastika flags surrounded the altar of Magdeburg Cathedral."[460] "It has simply become the symbol of German hope," explained the cathedral dean. "Whoever reviles this symbol is reviling our Germany. . . . The swastika flags round the altar radiate hope—hope that the day is at last about to dawn."[461] In fact, Hitler's intention in incorporating the swastika in the National Socialist flag was to signify "the mission of the struggle for the victory of the Aryan man, and, by the same token, the victory of the idea of creative work, which as such always has been and always will be anti-Semitic," he maintained.[462] Bonhoeffer spoke out against such outrage, preaching that

> [t]he church has only *one* altar, the altar of the Almighty . . . before which all creatures must kneel. . . . Whoever seeks something other than this must keep away; he cannot join us in the house of God. . . . The church has only *one* pulpit, and from that pulpit, faith in God will be preached, and no other faith, and no other will than the will of God . . . .[463]

This is but one example of the many occasions on which Bonhoeffer openly opposed National Socialist aims. Nearly six months following his arrest and imprisonment, Bonhoeffer was charged with "[u]ndermining the morale of the armed forces"[464] because several lawyers had convinced the chief investigator to refrain from imposing charges of treason.[465]

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[458]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated November 28, 1943, Ibid., 152.
[459]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge mailed January 18, 1944, Ibid., 189.
[460]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 257.
[461]Ernst Martin; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 257.
[462]Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 497.
[463]Bonhoeffer, February 26, 1933; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 257.
[464]Kabitz; in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 87, n. 2.
[465]Ibid., n. 1.

(8) *Lived witnessing of faith in God.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Only he who cries out for the Jews may sing Gregorian chants," Bonhoeffer announced.[466] He considered divine worship empty unless accompanied by lived witnessing of faith in God, faith which he described as "existence for others . . . through participation in the being of Jesus."[467] It is such fullness of commitment to an active life of discipleship that places one in the arena of Bonhoeffer's "costly grace," grace which is accessed through the whole-hearted endeavour to live in accordance with Christ, no matter how difficult the call. "Lord, whatever this day may bring," he wrote, "Your name be praised."[468] Bonhoeffer urged Bethge, "Don't worry about me if something worse [than imprisonment] happens. Others of the brethren have already been through that."[469] A fellow prisoner wrote of Bonhoeffer, "He was one of the very few men that I have ever met to whom his God was real and ever close."[470] The observation accords with Bonhoeffer's own statement: "I'm not religious by nature, but I can't help thinking all the time of God, of Christ."[471]

(9) *Courage (inner strength) in responding to divine directive (accomplishing task).* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Faint not nor fear, but go out to the storm and the action, / trusting in God whose commandment you faithfully follow," wrote Bonhoeffer.[472] "We are neither of us dare-devils," he told Bethge, "but that has nothing to do with the courage that comes from the grace of God."[473] "What lies behind the complaint about the dearth of civil courage?" he pondered. "In recent years we have seen a great deal of bravery and self-sacrifice, but civil courage hardly anywhere."[474] He was one of the exceptions. For Bonhoeffer's open defiance of the Hitler regime he suffered imprisonment for two years prior to his execution. He demonstrated unshakable faith and courage in his active opposition to the Nazi state and throughout his subsequent tribulations. "I'm sure that it

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[466]Bonhoeffer, 1935; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 607.

[467]Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 381.

[468]Bonhoeffer, morning prayer for prisoners, Christmas, 1943, Ibid., 141.

[469]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 22, 1943, Ibid., 173.

[470]S. Payne Best, *The Venlo Incident: A True Story of Double-Dealing, Captivity, and a Murderous Nazi Plot* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009), 180.

[471]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated June 25, 1942; quoted by Kabitz, in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 327.

[472]Bonhoeffer, Stations on the Road to Freedom, *Letters and Papers*, 371.

[473]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 5, 1943, Ibid., 156.

[474]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, Ibid., 5-6.

is good for me personally to undergo all this," he assured his parents from prison.[475] He also had words of strength for his fiancée:

> Stifter once put it very beautifully: "Pain is the holiest angel, who reveals treasures that would otherwise have remained hidden in the depths for ever. People have become greater through it than through all the world's joys." It is so, as I keep telling myself in my present predicament: the pain of deprivation, which is often physically perceptible, must exist, and we should not and need not argue it away. But it has to be overcome anew every time, so there is an even holier angel than pain, and that is joy in God.[476]

"All we can do is to wait as patiently as may be, without getting bitter," he counselled.[477]

During interrogation by the Gestapo following his transfer from Tegel prison to Gestapo headquarters, Bonhoeffer stood courageously, declaring frankly "that he was an enemy of National Socialism. His attitude, so he . . . stated, was rooted in his Christian convictions."[478] Moreover, also during his term at the Gestapo prison, Bonhoeffer displayed courage in the following incident relayed by a fellow inmate:

> When we returned after an air-raid warning from our cement shelter, his brother-in-law lay on a stretcher in his cell, paralysed in both legs. With an alacrity that nobody would have believed him capable of, Dietrich Bonhoeffer suddenly dived into the open cell of his brother-in-law. It seemed a miracle that none of the warders saw it. But Dietrich also succeeded in the more difficult part of his venture, in emerging from Dohnanyi's cell unnoticed and getting into line with the column of prisoners who were filing along the corridor. That same evening he told me that he had agreed with Dohnanyi upon all essential points of their further testimony.[479]

(10) *General attentiveness.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

It is said that Bonhoeffer "listened attentively and attached great value to dealing politely with other people," always directing his gaze fully toward the individual to whom he spoke.[480] "He was as ready to listen as to speak"[481] and "was courteous by

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[475]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents written May 5, 1943 (incorrectly dated April 5), Ibid., 29.

[476]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated November 21, 1943. Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 118.

[477]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated June 14, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 54.

[478]Fabian von Schlabrendorff, "In Prison with Dietrich Bonhoeffer," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 229.

[479]Ibid., 228-9.

[480]Sabine Leibholz, (Bonhoeffer's twin sister), "Childhood and Home," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 33. Bethge also describes Bonhoeffer as "a good listener." Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 361.

nature."[482] Even in prison, Bonhoeffer was attentive to others. "My thoughts go out to . . . the many unknown people in this building who are bearing their fate in silence," he wrote. "I repeatedly find that these and other thoughts keep me from taking my own little hardships too seriously; that would be very wrong and ungrateful."[483] Paul Lehmann notes that "Bonhoeffer was a 'man for others', taken captive by him whom he" celebrated "as '*the* man for others' [i.e., Jesus]."[484]

Memory plays a role in attentiveness, and Bonhoeffer viewed "memory, the recalling of lessons . . . learnt," as a "part of responsible living"[485] and recognized "mental alertness" as conducive to sympathy.[486] He and his associates paid careful attention to the events transpiring in Nazi Germany and beyond while millions turned a relatively blind eye. "Where is this 'memory' today?" he asked.[487]

> Is not the loss of this 'moral memory' (a horrid expression) responsible for the ruin of all obligations, of love, marriage, friendship, and loyalty? Nothing sticks fast, nothing holds firm; everything is here today and gone tomorrow. But the good things of life – truth, justice, and beauty – all great accomplishments need time, constancy, and 'memory', or they degenerate. The man who feels neither responsibility towards the past nor desire to shape the future is one who 'forgets', and I don't know how one can really get at such a person and bring him to his senses.[488]

(11) *Humility.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer advocated "modesty" over "snobbery"[489] and was characterized by a fellow inmate as "all humility and sweetness."[490] He was happy to mitigate the burden of others and, since he thought it would please Bethge to hear it, he confided that fellow inmates were fabricating excuses to visit the sick bay while he (Bonhoeffer) was there so that they might chat with him, but he instructed Bethge not to "let it get around."[491]

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[481]Paul Lehmann, "Paradox of Discipleship," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 45.

[482]Emmi Bonhoeffer, "Professors' Children as Neighbours," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 34. Emmi was Dietrich's childhood friend and wife of his brother, Klaus.

[483]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated June 4, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 50.

[484]Lehmann, 45.

[485]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 3.

[486]Ibid., 13.

[487]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated February 1, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 203.

[488]Ibid.

[489]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 13.

[490]Best, *Venlo Incident*, 180.

[491]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 172. Bonhoeffer suffered from lumbago, rheumatism, stomach problems, and several bouts of influenza while incarcerated, but he also administered to others in the sick bay on the occasion of air attacks. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 848,

Also, when the latter informed Bonhoeffer that his son might be named Dietrich, Bonhoeffer replied, "The name is good, the model less so."[492] "Nothing goes more against prayer than vanity," he maintained.[493]

Bonhoeffer understood that it is "very easy to overestimate the importance of our own achievements in comparison with what we owe to others."[494] "The wish to be independent in everything is false pride," he asserted, "and any attempt to calculate what we have 'earned' for ourselves and what we owe to other people is certainly not Christian, and is, moreover, a futile undertaking."[495] Furthermore, he advised, "We may have to face events and changes that take no account of our wishes and our rights. But if so, we shall not give way to embittered and barren pride, but consciously submit to divine judgment."[496] These were not empty words; Bonhoeffer lived them.

(12) *Production of good fruit.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

As a martyr, Bonhoeffer offers an example of faith witnessed to the ultimate degree, and he also exemplifies the activity of social conscience, civil courage, respect, compassion, generosity, fortitude, and patience; hence, he might serve as a model to others. In addition, he bestowed on posterity his insightful and stimulating theological works. Furthermore, he helped to save fourteen lives that would otherwise likely have been snuffed out by the Nazis. Moreover, Bonhoeffer and his fellow conspirators prove that not all Germans supported or acquiesced to the Hitler regime but that some were so strongly committed to peace, justice, and human decency as to stake their lives for these values. This represents a great gift of hope to humanity.

(13) *Initial hesitation, reluctance, resistance, fear, doubt.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer's decision in 1939 to accept a temporary academic position in New York and thereby to suspend his direct involvement in the German resistance movement

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853. Bonhoeffer wrote on several occasions of his lumbago and other illnesses. For example, Bonhoeffer, letters to parents dated July 3 and August 24, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 74, 96. He mentioned bandaging prisoners until 1:00 a.m. following an air attack. Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 27, 1943, Ibid., 146. A fellow inmate wrote that Bonhoeffer "was often allowed to go down to the sick bay, where he met many friends, or he was able to visit prisoners who sought his spiritual help." Professor Gaetano Latmiral, Italian officer, letter to Gerhard Leibholz dated March or April, 1946; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 851.

[492]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 25, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 177.

[493]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 100.

[494]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated September 13, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 109.

[495]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 30, 1943, Ibid., 150.

[496]Bonhoeffer, Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, May, 1944, Ibid., 299.

against Hitler encompassed elements of hesitation, reluctance, resistance, possibly fear, and certainly doubt with respect to his perceived divine calling. Bethge explains that, apart from his desire to avoid conscription under Hitler, "Bonhoeffer had a growing sense that if he remained in Germany, he would be drawn more deeply into the conspiracy" against the Führer. He was disappointed by failed attempts to overthrow the nation's leader and needed to consider whether or not it was "right for him as a pastor and theologian to go beyond the role of accessory, to . . . participate [more directly] in such a conspiracy."[497] There was much to consider and Bonhoeffer was confused and, perhaps, as Bethge suggests, desirous subconsciously of evading the whole dilemma. Could he not serve God more effectively abroad?[498] Bonhoeffer felt confronted with "great conscientious difficulties."[499] He left Germany in early June of 1939 plagued by doubt. "If only the doubts about my own course had been overcome," he wrote.[500] Shortly after his arrival in New York, struggling with the decision of whether or not to remain in America as planned, Bonhoeffer realized that avoidance of conscription had been a secondary consideration in his decision to leave Europe.[501] By July 7, he was on a ship heading back to Germany.[502]

(14) *Apparent absurdity requiring faith in God.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

One might consider it absurd that a Christian minister committed to the Ten Commandments would feel divinely called to violate one of them by participating in a conspiracy to kill another human being; however, this criterion is not primarily concerned with how others view the prophetic task but with whether or not the individual called views the divine mission as absurd, perhaps to the point of impossibility in the absence of divine assistance. Since it was Bonhoeffer's conviction that the church "must share in the secular problems of ordinary human life,"[503] he did not apparently regard his participation in the conspiracy as absurd but as regrettably necessary. "Even the Sermon on the Mount may not become the letter of the law," he maintained. "In its commandments it is the demonstration of what God's commandment can be, not what it is" in the particular, present moment to which God speaks. "The

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[497]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 636.
[498]Ibid., 636-8.
[499]Bonhoeffer, letter to Bell dated April 13, 1939; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 639.
[500]Bonhoeffer, June, 1939; Ibid., 650.
[501]Bonhoeffer, letter to Henry Smith Leiper dated June 15, 1939; in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 637.
[502]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 661.
[503]Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 382.

commandment is not there once and for all," he explained, "but it is given afresh, again and again. Only in this way are we free from the law, which interposes itself between us and God; only in this way do we hear God."[504] It was not his involvement in the action against Hitler which Bonhoeffer considered absurd; on the contrary, he viewed attempts to convert Hitler as absurd. "The Oxford Movement has been naïve enough to try to convert Hitler," he wrote, "a ridiculous failure to understand what is going on."[505] He thought it feasible that the conspiracy would succeed and regarded it as a viable solution to a critical problem.

(15) *Prior lack of inclination, skill, or capacity to behave in required manner.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bethge tells us that Bonhoeffer's "voice grew softer, not louder" whenever he became angry.[506] Participation in an assassination plot requires receptivity to violence, which appears inconsistent with Bonhoeffer's inclination given that, prior to the full emergence of Nazi brutality, he held a strongly pacifist stance. "The weapons [of Christianity] are faith and love, purified by suffering," he wrote. "The pure love, which first seeks God and God's commandments, prefers to see a defenseless brother slain to seeing" him and his soul "stained with blood," he maintained.[507] In his book, *The Cost of Discipleship*, published in 1937, Bonhoeffer wrote that Christians must "renounce all violence" for the sake of peace.[508] In attempting to defeat Hitler, however, Bonhoeffer eventually resorted to (restrained) violence. From prison he wrote of *Discipleship*, "Today I can see the dangers of that book . . . ."[509]

(16) *Feelings of inadequacy.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

In the early days of struggle between the Confessing Church (still in its seminal form as the Pastors' Emergency League[510]) and Nazi state, when Bonhoeffer found himself standing alone even among fellow opponents of Nazism who invariably seemed

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[504]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 161.

[505]Bonhoeffer, letter to Erwin Sutz dated September 11, 1934; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 470. Bonhoeffer's frustration with the Oxford Movement parallels Jehanne's frustration with Charles VII in his attempts to negotiate with the Burgundians who were duping him.

[506]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, xviii.

[507]Bonhoeffer, lecture on "Christ and Peace" delivered to the Berlin Student Christian Movement, 1932; quoted by student Jürgen Winterhager, in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 210. Martin Rumscheidt indicates that the statement should be translated as "him and his soul" rather than "us and our souls" as in the Bethge English text. Email correspondence to author dated November 2, 2012.

[508]Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 65. The book was originally published in German as *Nachfolge* (Discipleship).

[509]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 21, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 369.

[510]On the formation of the Pastors' Emergency League, see Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 309-11.

too soft on the matter of how German pastors ought to respond to Hitler's Reich Church,[511] he began to question his own convictions. "All this has frightened me and shaken my confidence so that I began to fear that dogmatism might be leading me astray—since there seemed no particular reason why my own view in these matters should be any better, any more right, than the views of many really capable pastors whom I sincerely respect," he confided to Barth.[512] During this period, Bonhoeffer felt inadequate to determine the validity of his position. There were other occasions when he expressed feelings of inadequacy, particularly with respect to his imprisonment and the restrictions which it placed on his ability to assist others. "If only one could help other people more!" he wrote.[513] "One tries to help and is oneself the person most in need of help."[514]

(17) *Feelings of unworthiness to carry out the mission, accompanied by assurance of divine assistance and creating a dependency on God.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer recognized the unworthiness of all humans before God, (himself included), taking the apostle Peter as his example.

> Is he [Peter] of such heroic nature that he towers over the others [i.e., the other disciples]? He is not. Is he endowed with such unheard-of strength of character? He is not. Is he gifted with unshakable loyalty? He is not. Peter is nothing, nothing but a man confessing his faith, a man who has been confronted by Christ and who has recognised Christ, and who now confesses his faith in him, and this confessing Peter is called the rock on which Christ will build his church. . . .
>
> But Peter's church—this is not something which one could say with untroubled pride. Peter, the confessing, believing disciple, Peter denied his Lord on the same night as Judas betrayed him; in that night he stood at the fire and felt ashamed when Christ stood before the High Priest; he is the man of little faith, the timid man who sinks into the sea; Peter is the disciple whom Jesus threatened: 'Get thee behind me Satan'; it is he who later was again and again overcome by weakness, who again and again denied and fell, a weak, vacillating man, given over to the whim of the moment. . . .
>
> But Peter is also the man of whom we read: 'He went out and wept bitterly.' . . . Peter's church is not only the church which confesses its faith, nor only the church which denies its Lord; it is the church which can still weep. . . .

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[511]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 325.
[512]Bonhoeffer, letter to Karl Barth dated October 24, 1933; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 325-6.
[513]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated July 3, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 73.
[514]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated May 21, 1944, Ibid., 305.

> [W]e are all Peter; . . . all of us, who simply live from our confession of faith in Christ, as the timid, faithless, faint-hearted, and yet who live as men sustained by God.[515]

Bonhoeffer relied on divine assistance and felt a dependency on God. "I believe that God will give us all the strength we need to help us to resist in all time of distress," he wrote. "But he never gives it in advance, lest we should rely on ourselves and not on him alone."[516] Bonhoeffer's brother-in-law, Gerhard Leibholz states that, from faith, Bonhoeffer derived "constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, love of suffering humanity and of truth, justice and goodness. But it was not enough for him to seek justice, truth, honesty and goodness for their own sake and patiently to suffer for them." For Bonhoeffer, one must "do so in loyal obedience to" God "who is the source . . . of all goodness, justice and truth and on whom he felt absolutely dependent."[517]

(18) *Severe disruption to or break from previous lifestyle.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bethge cites the establishment of Hitler's leadership over Germany in January, 1933 as a distinctive turning point in Bonhoeffer's life which transported him from a relatively private existence into a more public realm and which also prompted the severance of meaningful friendships between Bonhoeffer and those who abided National Socialist policy.[518] Furthermore, Bonhoeffer's work for the Confessing Church and the conspiracy turned his life upside down. He went from living legally to living illegally (i.e., illegally in relation to the laws of a corrupt state), teaching in underground seminaries, smuggling Jewish people out of Germany, and engaging in other clandestine operations against the Hitler regime, not least of which was the conspiracy. He went from living honestly to living dishonestly, feigning to work for the *Abwehr* while actually working for the German resistance movement. Moreover, Bonhoeffer's arrest and imprisonment—a consequence of his active participation in his perceived divine calling—constituted a marked break from his former lifestyle. "A violent mental upheaval such as is produced by a sudden arrest brings with it the need to take one's mental bearings and come to terms with an entirely new situation," he explained.[519]

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[515]Bonhoeffer, sermon of July 23, 1933, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 210-2.
[516]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 11.
[517]G. Leibholz, xxi.
[518]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 258-9.
[519]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated April 14, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 21.

(19) *Personal risk, encounters hostility and/or persecution as a result of prophetic ministry.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

On the possibility of being held in a concentration camp for his active opposition to the National Socialist state, Bonhoeffer remarked, "I'm really not at all worried about what happens to me personally."[520] "[W]e must think about things much more important to us than life itself."[521] Bethge notes that, on entering the resistance movement against Hitler, one abandoned "all outer and inner security . . . [and] renounced command, applause, and the backing of general opinion." One accepted condemnation "before everything and everybody."[522] The situation was such that there had been "a diabolical reversal of all values" and "the most conscientious person was the one who had to accept disgrace" and be branded treasonous.[523] For example, when Bonhoeffer addressed a group of clergy, proclaiming it a Christian duty to defend persecuted Jews against the Nazi state, several individuals left the room defiantly.[524] Moreover, while Bonhoeffer was under Nazi persecution, the Confessing Church of which he was a leading member declined to place his name on the intercession list.[525] When he was executed, his own church did not recognize Bonhoeffer as a martyr due to his participation in the conspiracy, although it hailed as a martyr another who died as a result of anti-Nazi preaching.[526] The prophet is always a pariah in the eyes of some.

(20) *Experiences intense solitude, stands as the particular against the status quo.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

As noted above, even within the Confessing Church, Bonhoeffer stood alone in many respects. "I feel that in some way I don't understand, I find myself in radical opposition to all my friends; I became increasingly isolated with my views of things, even though I was and remain personally close to these people," he explained.[527] In defending "decency and order" against the status quo, Bonhoeffer later resolved, one must simply "put up with" accusations of self-interest or "anti-social" behaviour.[528]

Bonhoeffer's imprisonment also brought intense solitude to his life. "You wouldn't believe how much I miss every one of them," he wrote to his fiancée of their

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[520]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated February 14, 1944, Ibid., 213.
[521]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated May 29, 1944, Ibid., 311.
[522]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 794-5.
[523]Ibid., 675.
[524]Kabitz, in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 320.
[525]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 794.
[526]Ibid., 659, 931.
[527]Bonhoeffer, letter to Barth dated October 24, 1933; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 325.
[528]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 12.

relatives. "I positively hunger for people after so many months of solitude."[529] In some respects, however, Bonhoeffer learned to appreciate solitary life. "I've got so used to the silence of solitude by now that after a short time I long for it again. . . . I would certainly like to have a good talk with someone, but aimless gossip gets on my nerves terribly."[530] Nonetheless, the solitude of imprisonment was so intense that visits by family and friends left Bonhoeffer nearly ecstatic. Following a brief visit from Bethge, his parents, and his fiancée, he wrote:

> So it really came off! Only for a moment, but that doesn't matter so much; even a few hours would be far too little, and when we are isolated here we can take in so much that even a few minutes gives us something to think about for a long time afterwards. It will be with me for a long time now – the memory of having the four people who are nearest and dearest to me with me for a brief moment. When I got back to my cell afterwards, I paced up and down for a whole hour, while my dinner stood there and got cold, so that at last I couldn't help laughing at myself when I found myself repeating over and over again, 'That was really great!' I always hesitate to use the word 'indescribable' about anything, . . . but at the moment that is just what this morning seems to be.[531]

(21) *Ability to prophesy (charism).* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"I won't live beyond thirty-seven," Bonhoeffer predicted.[532] Given that he died at thirty-nine, he was not far off the mark. At age fourteen he had stated more ambiguously that he anticipated "an early death."[533] Bonhoeffer demonstrated prophetic vision on many occasions. Bethge cites as "prophetic" a statement from a 1932 sermon (prior to Hitler's installation to power in 1933) in which Bonhoeffer forecasted that difficult times requiring martyrdom would return, adding that "this blood . . . will not be so innocent and dear as that of the first who testified. On our blood a great guilt would lie: that of the useless servant who is cast into the outer darkness."[534] It is prophetic in that Bonhoeffer was martyred several years later and went to death guilty of conspiracy to kill, both conditions arising from the darkness in which Germany had become enveloped under Hitler. Moreover, as early as 1934, Bonhoeffer branded Hitler "guilty

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[529]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated December 1, 1943. Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 128.

[530]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 11, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 271.

[531]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 26, 1943, Ibid., 144-5.

[532]Bonhoeffer; quoted by von Bismarck, preface to *Love Letters From Cell 92*, 9.

[533]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 661.

[534]Bonhoeffer, 1932; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 795.

of the next war!"[535] In a letter to Bethge written from prison in December of 1943, Bonhoeffer asked, "[D]o you remember that I prophesied to you last March about what the year would bring?"[536] Although the letter does not stipulate the content of the prophecy, the statement implies that it was accurate, perhaps even predicting his own arrest of that year. Sometime between mid-November, 1943 and early October, 1944, Bonhoeffer confided to a fellow Tegel prisoner "that he was not sure that he would see the end [of Hitler], for he feared that he would . . . be taken to a concentration camp where he would be killed along with other political prisoners. In that case he hoped that he would be able to accept death without fear, in the belief that it was in a just cause."[537] That is, in fact, what occurred. Furthermore, in February of 1944, while Bethge was serving as a conscripted soldier stationed in Italy, Bonhoeffer wrote to him, "[S]ince one day you will be called to write my biography, I want to put the most complete material possible at your disposal!"[538] In spite of the fact that Bethge was also involved in the dangerous conspiracy against Hitler and was exposed to the additional perils of wartime military service, Bonhoeffer foresaw that he would predecease his friend. He was also evidently aware that his life and thought would be viewed posthumously as significant. In April, 1944, Bonhoeffer wrote to Bethge:

> I have such a strong feeling that great events are moving the world every day and could change all our personal relationships, that I should like to write to you much oftener, partly because I don't know how much longer I shall be able to . . . . I'm firmly convinced that, by the time you get this letter, great decisions will already be setting things moving on all fronts. During the coming weeks we shall have to keep a stout heart . . . . We shall have to keep all our wits about us, so as to let nothing scare us. In view of what is coming, . . . I feel that I 'long to look' . . . to see how God is going to solve the apparently insoluble.[539]

In fact, the subsequent twelve months ushered in the death of Hitler with the end of the war following on its heels, but not without first seeing the imprisonment (in October, 1944) of Bonhoeffer's brother Klaus, his sister Christine, his brother-in-law Rüdiger Schleicher, Bethge, and others involved in the conspiracy.[540] Also within the year,

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[535]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Sutz dated September 11, 1934; Ibid., 358.

[536]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 22, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 174.

[537]Bonhoeffer; quoted by Latmiral, letter to G. Leibholz dated 1946, in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 851.

[538]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated February 1, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 202.

[539]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 30, 1944, Ibid., 278-9.

[540]Hans von Dohnanyi, (husband to Bonhoeffer's sister, Christine), had been arrested on the same day that (Dietrich) Bonhoeffer was arrested, but they were held in separate prisons for the most part. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 785, 800.

Bonhoeffer, his brother Klaus, and their brothers-in-law, Schleicher and Hans von Dohnanyi, were murdered by the Nazis along with several other conspirators. Bethge survived both military service and Nazi imprisonment and, indeed, wrote Bonhoeffer's biography of approximately one thousand pages, which was published in 1967 and remains in print today.[541]

(22) *Ability to perform miracles (charism).* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

There are no indications that Bonhoeffer was a thaumaturge.

Summary Assessment – Divine, Prophetic Calling

Of the twenty-two criteria indicative of divine, prophetic calling, Bonhoeffer satisfies eighteen (ten essential and eight non-essential), he fails to satisfy two (both non-essential), and two are indeterminate (both essential). Of the twelve essential criteria, ten are met and two are indeterminate. Of the ten non-essential criteria, eight are met. Thus, Bonhoeffer satisfies the vast majority of both essential and non-essential criteria in this category. Moreover, of all the essential criteria, he does not violate any. Hence, the results of this assessment indicate that Bonhoeffer's case can be viewed as representative of divine, prophetic calling in accordance with Jehanne's model, but two categories remain to be assessed before an overall determination can be made.

Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare Criteria

(1) *Appeal to most sovereign authority (divinity).* ***(criterion satisfied)***

For Bonhoeffer, biblical scripture was the authority to which he turned since he considered it an available revelation of God's word to him, and he viewed the daily scripture readings in this light. For example, while attempting to discern the most appropriate time for him to return to Germany from New York, he consulted the reading for June 26, 1939 and found, "Do your best to come before winter."[542] Bonhoeffer considered this a personal revelation. "[I]t is not a misuse of scripture if I apply that to myself. If God gives me grace to do it," he resolved.[543] On the voyage home to Germany and war, Bonhoeffer wrote, "Since I have been on the ship my inner uncertainty about the future has ceased. I can think of my shortened time in America

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[541]Moreover, criterion one in this section contains Bonhoeffer's prophetically accurate description of his perceived calling.

[542]2 Tim. 4:21 NRSV. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 655.

[543]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 656.

without reproaches. Reading: 'It is good for me that I was afflicted, that I might learn thy statutes' (Psalm 119:71)."[544] Again, the daily text spoke to Bonhoeffer's immediate situation. Hence, God was the sovereign authority to whom Bonhoeffer appealed for divine guidance, seeking God's response in biblical texts.

(2) *Defensive, not offensive.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer's stance was defensive rather than offensive since he moved to eliminate one who routinely oppressed, tortured, and murdered innocent people. Bonhoeffer also took a defensive stance against Nazi infiltration and control of the German church.

(3) *Not pre-emptive.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer had ongoing access to detailed information concerning atrocities committed by the Nazi state through his brother-in-law, von Dohnanyi, a lawyer appointed to the Reich Ministry of Justice who was also a member of the conspiracy against Hitler.[545] It was in this knowledge that Bonhoeffer chose to participate in the plot to eliminate the Führer, as a response to evil that was not merely a possibility, but an ongoing manifest reality. He did not, therefore, act pre-emptively but responsively.

(4) *Last resort, entreats the enemy to leave or desist peacefully, issues ultimatum. Not killing for its own sake, (i.e., killing as an end in itself).* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer did not engage in killing for its own sake but for the preservation of others. Moreover, the Confessing Church unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the conflict with the German Christians (Reich Church) diplomatically on several occasions and, in 1936, members issued a memorandum to Hitler citing concerns over National Socialist activities within and beyond the realm of the church. The purpose was to allow the Führer to respond to questions and charges raised, including the charge of propagating anti-Semitism, and the document also voiced disapproval of concentration camps and Gestapo activities. "Because of Hitler's mentality," Bethge explains, "an effort was made to present the truth in such a way that the door was left open for discussion."[546] In essence, the memo provided an opportunity for the adversary to desist peacefully, but there was no reasoning with Hitler who did not trouble himself to

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[544]Ibid., 661.

[545]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 127, 167, 264, 373, 436, 449, 623-5, 672-3.

[546]Although he was not an official signatory to the document, Bonhoeffer was involved in its preparation and stood behind the memorandum. Ibid., 531-9.

respond.[547] Hence, if the Führer was to be stopped, it would not be by diplomatic means. "Hitler ought to and cannot hear; he is obdurate," Bonhoeffer rightly observed.[548] An ultimatum from the conspirators would, therefore, have been no more effective in altering the Führer's position than the memorandum from the Confessing Church had been. Moreover, issuance of an outright ultimatum would have defeated the purpose of conspiracy, which was viewed as the only possibly effective means against Hitler.[549] (Ultimatum, while applicable to declarations of war, is not compatible with the nature of conspiracy.)

(5) *Aims to establish just peace.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Today God's commandment for us is the order of *international peace*," Bonhoeffer asserted,[550] adding that "[t]here can only be a community of peace when it does not rest on *lies* and on *injustice*."[551] "[T]here is no peace unless righteousness and truth are preserved," he emphasized.[552] Where this fails to be the case, "the community of peace must be broken and battle joined"[553] as "[t]here can be a peace which is *worse than struggle*."[554] "In this world there is peace only in the struggle for truth and right," he maintained.[555]

Bonhoeffer's goal in opposing Hitler was to establish just peace by defending the rights of the wrongly oppressed, by seeking to secure the proper role of the church against a corrupt, state-dominated church, and by attempting to prevent World War II and then seeking to end it by overthrowing the Nazi government. Shortly before Hitler's rise to power, Bonhoeffer described the church as "the community of those who are terrified by the signs of the time, who have heard a ringing call in the midst of the fear of the night. They know it is the Lord, but is he coming to help or to judge?"[556] The statement demonstrates the foresight and foreboding with which Bonhoeffer viewed the situation and his recognition of a need for preparation within the church to stand firm against anticipated difficulties. "The church has an unconditional obligation to the victims of any ordering of society, even if they do not belong to the Christian

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[547]Ibid., 533.
[548]Bonhoeffer, letter to Sutz dated September 11, 1934; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 358.
[549]See E. Bethge quotation under criterion eleven of this section below.
[550]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 163.
[551]Ibid., 164.
[552]Ibid., 183.
[553]Ibid., 164.
[554]Ibid., 183.
[555]Ibid., 184.
[556]Bonhoeffer, August, 1932, Ibid., 180.

community," he asserted.[557] Bonhoeffer saw a "reality dominated by hate, enmity, and power. It is as though all the powers of the world had conspired together against peace; . . . indeed, even love for the Fatherland" has "been pressed into the service of hate," he observed. "Events are coming to a head more terribly than ever before," he predicted. Bonhoeffer perceived "powers of darkness" which "could break out at any moment."[558] In light of these anticipated events, he emphasized the necessity of concentrating on the Biblical Word rather than on personal agendas. "We are concerned with Christ and nothing else," he asserted. "Let Christ be Christ."[559]

Later, amidst the evil which he had prophesied, Bonhoeffer implored, "How will peace come about? Who will call for peace so that the world hears—is compelled to hear?"[560] It is "only from tranquil hearts that tranquility and peace will one day spread across the world," he resolved.[561] "[O]ne feels such a tremendous longing for real peace, in which all the misery and injustice, the lying and cowardice will come to an end."[562] Bonhoeffer clearly understood that 'peace' without justice is not true peace.

(6) *Proportionate cause.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Proportionate cause was not violated in this instance; a specific individual (Hitler) was targeted in an attempt to prevent the murder of millions. While small bombs were utilized in several assassination attempts, which endangered members of Hitler's immediate entourage, the potential (and actual) damage[563] was isolated and limited and did not remotely approach the degree of destruction caused by the Hitler regime which the would-be assassins sought to disable.

(7) *Does not operate from vengeance or hatred.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer was not hateful or vengeful. In his opposition to the Nazis, he did not seek to subject them to suffering or to even a score but to stop their destructive activities. The conspiracy did not aim to torture or otherwise torment Hitler but to have him speedily assassinated. Moreover, one of Bonhoeffer's fellow inmates indicated that

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[557]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 221.

[558]Bonhoeffer, August, 1932, Ibid., 182.

[559]Ibid., 180-1.

[560]Bonhoeffer, August, 1934; quoted by Kabitz, in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 322.

[561]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated January 31, 1944, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 174.

[562]Bonhoeffer, letter to G. Leibholz dated November 23, 1933; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 331.

[563]Several people died as a result of the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler. Domarus, 778.

he and Bonhoeffer were of like mind in asserting that their concentration camp guards warranted greater pity than they themselves did.[564]

(8) *Does not seek to acquire new territory but might protect or recover rightful lands.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer had no intention of acquiring new territory but sought to protect his country from an internal enemy, the National Socialist state. He travelled extensively and established many friendships and professional contacts abroad. He took a genuine interest in other cultures and sought to learn from them, not to dominate them.[565] He was also a pioneer of the ecumenical movement which fostered mutual understanding between the world churches.[566] He was thus on friendly, not hostile, terms with other nations.

(9) *Does not seek domination of others (oppression).* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Bonhoeffer detested binding men to himself; perhaps for that very reason so many were drawn to him," wrote Albrecht Schönherr.[567] Bonhoeffer also wrote, "I try, and have always tried, to guide people to complete freedom under the Word and not to bind them to myself."[568] He rejected the imposition of "know-it-all dogmatism" on others.[569] While he could not conscientiously perform active duty as a soldier in defense of Hitlerite Germany, he did not condemn those who did so[570] and knew many friends, relatives, and former seminary students who fought for their country in spite of the fact that Hitler was leading it. The day before his execution, a fellow prisoner requested that Bonhoeffer hold a morning service among a small group of prisoners, but he initially declined because some were Catholic and one was atheist and he did not wish to offend or impose upon them. All consented, however, and Bonhoeffer delivered his final service, immediately after which the door unexpectedly opened and two men appeared

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[564]Best, letter to S. Leibholz dated March 2, 1951; in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 920.

[565]For example, Bonhoeffer was deeply interested in the life and culture of the black community of Harlem, New York and was particularly moved by their literature and spiritual music. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 150.

[566]Kabitz notes that Bonhoeffer's "name and role are inseparable from the history of ecumenism." Kabitz, in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 317.

[567]Albrecht Schönherr, "The Single-heartedness of the Provoked," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 126.

[568]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 229.

[569]Bonhoeffer, 1933 lecture; quoted by Kabitz, in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 315.

[570]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 637.

to take him away.[571] Bonhoeffer was not oppressive but sacrificed his life in defense of the wrongly oppressed.

(10) *Does not engage in holy war.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer did not engage in holy war since it was on the basis of Hitler's deeds and not his religious convictions that Bonhoeffer acted against him. His goal was to stop a destructive warmonger and mass murderer.

(11) *Formal declaration of intent to engage in war, warning.* ***(criterion not applicable)***

It was not warfare in which Bonhoeffer participated but an attempt to assassinate an individual at the head of his own country. In fact, his involvement in the conspiracy against Hitler began prior to the outbreak of war. Moreover, the nature of Bonhoeffer's mission differed from that of all-out war in that open disclosure of his intentions would have ensured their failure. As Bethge points out,

> Any responsible resistance under the conditions that existed under Hitler had to take the form of a conspiracy. A spontaneous uprising . . . could not be expected to occur. The spontaneous actions of individuals might be brave, but took no responsibility for the future; and there was not the homogeneous group necessary for a revolution with the eruptive force to lead to new social structures.[572]

(12) *Employs minimal appropriate force (proportionality), minimal bloodshed, forbids unnecessary evil or excessive force.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Since Hitler was unshakable in his beliefs and in his determination to carry them out, drastic measures were necessary if he was to be removed from power and National Socialism defeated. The assassination plot against him was specifically targeted—no attempt was made to destroy the entire National Socialist party membership. Hence, while the measure taken was severe, it was also minimal.

(13) *Does not target noncombatants.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer disapproved of arbitrary killing, such as in the targeting of noncombatants. "One must speak of arbitrary killing wherever innocent life is deliberately destroyed," he noted. "[I]t would be arbitrary to kill defenceless prisoners or wounded men who can no longer render themselves guilty of an attack on" another's

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[571]Ibid., 924, 926-7. Also, Best, *Venlo Incident*, 200.
[572]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 793.

life.[573] Bonhoeffer's sole target was Hitler; if he were to fall, it was conceivable that the entire regime might crumble. Hitler launched World War II and was at the helm of the German military; he issued the directives to attack and, in this sense, can be categorized as a combatant—in any case, he was not an innocent civilian. Civilians were not specifically targeted in the assassination attempts.

(14) *Does not employ torture.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer did not employ torture and asserted that no right to "the use of torture may be derived from the necessity of legal procedures in human society."[574] He considered torture "un-Christian."[575]

(15) *Does not inflict suffering for its own sake.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer did not inflict suffering for its own sake. His purpose in participating in the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler was not to cause affliction but to relieve the suffering of millions.

(16) *Forbids looting.* ***(criterion not applicable)***

This criterion is not applicable to Bonhoeffer's situation since he was not engaged in combat; nonetheless, he did not demonstrate a thieving nature but was generous and inclined to share.[576]

Summary Assessment – Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare

Of the sixteen criteria—all essential—indicative of divinely sanctioned righteous warfare, two are not applicable to Bonhoeffer's case and the remaining fourteen are satisfied. Hence, Bonhoeffer's involvement in violence accords with divinely sanctioned righteous warfare as exemplified by Jehanne in the context of the model. Let us now apply the final category of criteria to Bonhoeffer's case.

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[573]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 158.
[574]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 166, 183.
[575]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 94.
[576]See criterion thirty-two below with respect to Bonhoeffer's generosity.

Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency Criteria

(1) *Undifferentiated compassion, mercy, forgiveness.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

In Bonhoeffer's seminary, enemies were prayed for.[577] Bonhoeffer considered the most essential element of sympathy to be "large-heartedness,"[578] and he demonstrated this quality on many occasions. He was quite selfless and described how, during air attacks near the prison, while bombs were dropping "all round the building" and he was contemplating his unpreparedness for 'meeting his maker,' he thought of loved ones and resolved, "better me than one of them."[579] Bonhoeffer was also perpetually concerned about the worries and troubles which his imprisonment caused others, such as his parents and fiancée.[580] Not wanting them to suffer his predicament any more than necessary, he frequently emphasized the more positive aspects of the experience, such as his ability to continue reading and writing,[581] his gratitude for care packages received,[582] and fond recollections of the past.[583] "I wish you much joy and don't want you to be disturbed by any thoughts about me," he assured Bethge. "I have every reason to be so infinitely grateful about everything."[584] Bethge, however, could see beyond his friend's efforts to reassure others. "I was astonished to find you so cheerful on Friday and looking so well," he wrote to Bonhoeffer. "Cheerful, fresh, not at all pale, and in everything, as usual, in command of the situation, a little concerned to communicate comfort and confidence about your situation to us, no matter what."[585] Bonhoeffer confided his inner struggles with imprisonment more openly to Bethge than to others. "I must spare my parents and also Maria [his fiancée], but you I will not deceive in any way," he vowed.[586] "I should have to start telling you that, in spite of everything that I've written so far, things here are revolting, that my grim experiences often pursue me into the night and that I can shake them off only by reciting one hymn after another, and that I'm apt to wake up with a sigh rather than with a hymn of praise

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[577]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 464.

[578]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 13.

[579]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated January 29 and 30, 1944, Ibid., 199. Bonhoeffer did not consider himself "completely selfless." Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated May 30, 1944, Ibid., 312.

[580]For example, see Bonhoeffer, letters to parents dated April 14 and 25, 1943, Ibid., 22, 27. There are numerous such examples throughout his prison correspondence.

[581]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated May 15, 1943, Ibid., 39-40.

[582]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated June 14, 1943, Ibid., 54.

[583]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated May 15, 1943, Ibid., 38.

[584]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 20, 1943, Ibid., 134.

[585]Bethge, letter to Bonhoeffer dated November 30, 1943, Ibid., 153-4.

[586]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 22, 1943, Ibid., 173.

to God."[587] But it was Bonhoeffer's belief that "the calmness and joy with which we meet what is laid on us are as infectious as the terror . . . . People need some constant factor to guide them," he explained,[588] living, as always, for others.

With respect to forgiveness, Bonhoeffer did not begrudge his prison guards but conceded that theirs was "a hard job."[589] "He never demanded the impossible of them, since he could see that they too were in a nervous state," explains Bethge.[590] He did, however, distinguish between their malevolent and benevolent behaviours. "The tone is set by those warders who behave in the most evil and brutal way towards the prisoners," he reported. "The whole building resounds with vile and insulting abuse, so that the quieter and more fair-minded warders, too, are nauseated by it, but they can hardly exercise any influence."[591] "I must not omit to say that a number of the warders are even-tempered, matter-of-fact, and as far as possible, friendly towards the prisoners."[592] Bonhoeffer held that "it is only when God's wrath and vengeance are hanging as grim realities over the heads of one's enemies that something of what it means to love and forgive them can touch our hearts."[593] This is consistent with Jehanne's concern for the spiritual welfare of her enemies, particularly with respect to the state of their souls upon death.

With some success, Bonhoeffer made a concerted (though admittedly strained) effort to respond mercifully toward a member of the enemy. While imprisoned, a Nazi party leader accompanied him for a time on his daily half-hour walk outdoors. "He has completely gone to pieces here," Bonhoeffer reported, "and clings to me just like a child, consulting me about every little thing, telling me whenever he has cried, etc. After being very cool with him for several weeks, I'm now able to ease things for him a little; his gratitude is quite touching, and he tells me again and again how glad he is to have met a man like me here."[594] Approximately two weeks later, Bonhoeffer wrote of the same

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[587]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 15, 1943, Ibid., 161-2.

[588]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 5, 1943, Ibid., 156.

[589]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated April 25, 1943, Ibid., 25.

[590]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 908.

[591]Bonhoeffer, Report on Prison Life after One Year in Tegel, *Letters and Papers*, 249.

[592]Ibid., 250. E. Bethge indicates that it is because of the "humanity of a few guards" that a great many of Bonhoeffer's writings from Tegel prison have survived, for it was guards who smuggled correspondence between Bonhoeffer and Bethge. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 847-8. Correspondence between Bonhoeffer and his fiancée was also smuggled between the months of March and October, 1944. Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 222-266.

[593]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 5, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 157. Bonhoeffer embraced both first and second testament texts; hence, he did not discount the concept of a vengeful and wrathful, (as well as forgiving), God.

[594]Ibid., 157-8.

man, "The propagandist with whom I walk every day is really getting more and more difficult to put up with. Whereas most people here do try to keep control of themselves, even in the most difficult cases, he has completely gone to pieces, and cuts a really sorry figure. I try to be as nice as I can to him, and talk to him as if he were a child."[595] A month later, however, the man triggered Bonhoeffer's righteous anger:

> I've had to take a new line with the companion of my daily walks. Although he has done his best to ingratiate himself with me, he let fall a remark about the Gert [Jewish] problem, etc., lately that has made me more offhanded and cool to him than I have ever been to anyone before; I've also arranged for him to be deprived promptly of all little comforts. Now he feels obliged to go round whimpering for a time, but it leaves me – I am surprised myself, but interested too – absolutely cold. He really is a pitiful figure.[596]

It seems unlikely that Bonhoeffer intended this as an act of cruelty but more likely as an act of punishment and instruction. The man behaved as a child and was punished as a child in order to convey a lesson—in this case, a very critical lesson as anti-Semitism is not mere child's play. In fact, it was not for Bonhoeffer to forgive the man's offenses against the Jewish people as it is for one to forgive only what is done to oneself, not to others. Moreover, Bonhoeffer perceived an urgent need for humans to develop a "less corruptible" view "of generosity, humanity, justice and mercy,"[597] and his walking companion fell severely short in this respect. Soon after the incident, Bonhoeffer had occasion to upbraid the man for his extreme cowardice during air attacks, and for whining about it, as though all prisoners in the building were not exposed to the same danger.[598] "I don't really think I find it easy to despise anyone in trouble, . . . but I can only regard that [i.e., the man's behaviour] as contemptible," he wrote. "[T]here is a kind of weakness that Christianity does not hold with, but which people insist on claiming as Christian, and then sling mud at it. So we must take care that the contours do

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[595]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 172.

[596]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge (and Bethge's wife Renate, Bonhoeffer's niece) dated January 23, 1944, Ibid., 194-5. E. Bethge indicates that the comforts of which Bonhoeffer had the man deprived were concessions which he had received at Bonhoeffer's request. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 850.

[597]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 17.

[598]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated February 2, 1944, Ibid., 204-5. "When the bombs come shrieking down," Bonhoeffer later wrote to E. Bethge who was on conscripted military duty in Italy, "I always think how trivial it all is compared with what you're going through out there. It often makes me downright angry to see how some people behave in such situations, and how little they think of what is happening to other people. The danger here never lasts more than a few minutes." Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 25, 1944, Ibid., 372.

not get blurred," he explained.[599] Indeed, one who considers it a duty to God courageously to defend the oppressed would not wish to encourage, but rather actively to discourage, racism and cowardice. "It is weakness rather than wickedness that perverts a man and drags him down," Bonhoeffer maintained.[600] Again, his response to the fellow was instructional, not unlike the manner in which Jesus expelled the money changers from the temple,[601] and few would characterize Jesus as lacking in compassion.

It is important to remember that Jehanne was also stern with those who behaved offensively and that she disliked Burgundians, although this did not remove them from her sphere of compassion where circumstances warranted it, such as when they were wounded or died without confession. It was arguably similar with Bonhoeffer since it was the man's offensive attitude and behaviour which repulsed him as these did not warrant compassion in his eyes, whereas something such as physical injury would conceivably have drawn a more merciful response. Bonhoeffer held that "patience and joy and gratitude and serenity and forgiveness must keep fighting and prevailing over all forms of opposition,"[602] and it seems unlikely that the offender was cast beyond his sphere of compassion entirely; in fact, Bonhoeffer pitied him. Given his forgiving attitude toward his warders and his general disposition of kindness, coupled with the fact that undifferentiated compassion does not rule out the possibility of a reproachful or sternly disapproving attitude toward others, this criterion can be considered satisfied.

(2) *Honours the sanctity of life.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer believed that "it is only when one loves life and the earth so much that without them everything seems to be over that one may believe in the resurrection and a new world."[603] Moreover, in order to honour the sanctity of the lives of others, he relinquished all personal security.

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[599]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated February 2, 1944, Ibid., 205.

[600]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated August 10, 1944, Ibid., 384. Bonhoeffer's assertion is compatible with Arendt's general characterization of Eichmann. See Arendt, *Eichmann.* "The sins of weakness are the really human sins," Bonhoeffer explained, "whereas the wilful sins are diabolical." Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated August 21, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 392. One might associate Bonhoeffer's category of wilful, diabolical sin with Hitler.

[601]"Then Jesus entered the temple and drove out all who were selling and buying in the temple, and he overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who sold doves. He said to them, 'It is written, "My house shall be called a house of prayer"; but you are making it a den of robbers.'" Mt. 21:12-3 NRSV.

[602]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated August 20, 1943, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 69.

[603]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 5, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 157.

(3) *Respects the dignity of the person.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

During Bonhoeffer's first trip to America (1930-1931), he became friends with an Afro-American student named Frank Fisher. It happened that, when the two attempted to dine together at a fine restaurant, Fisher was refused the customary service shown to patrons on account of his ethnicity. Bonhoeffer responded by "ostentatiously" leaving the establishment.[604] He considered it the duty of Christianity to "defend passionately human dignity and reserve,"[605] and he did this to the death.

(4) *Fully-engaged conscience.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

A colleague described Bonhoeffer as "one of those who are prepared to accept any sufferings but cannot in conscience remain in the New [Nazified German Christian] Church."[606] Bonhoeffer knew intimately the power of an engaged conscience. "[T]he summons of conscience . . . remains irresistible," he wrote.[607] In 1939, when Bonhoeffer arrived in New York, did an about-face, and headed back to Germany, it was, in large part, conscience which compelled him to do so. "To be here" (in New York), he wrote, "during a catastrophe [in Germany] is simply unthinkable, unless things are so ordained. But to be guilty of it myself, and to have to reproach myself that I left [Germany] unnecessarily, is certainly devastating."[608] The guilt related to participation in the conspiracy had to be weighed against the opposing guilt of inaction. Bonhoeffer apparently experienced a conflict of conscience, that is, "the conjunction of conflicting obligations" wherein "conscience can show no possibility of action that does not entail sin."[609] This can occur only when one's conscience is fully engaged.

(5) *Operates from a driving force of love.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

According to one of his associates, "[r]eal faith and love were identical" to Bonhoeffer and comprised "the very heart and core" of his existence.[610] Bonhoeffer operated from a driving force of love, recognizing a distinction between emotional, personal love and less personal, spiritual love. "Because spiritual love does not desire

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[604]Eberhard Bethge, "Friends," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 49.

[605]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 12.

[606]H.L. Henriod, letter to Bell dated October 3, 1933; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 356.

[607]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 243.

[608]Bonhoeffer, June 22, 1939; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 654.

[609]Rudolf Hofmann, s.v. "Conscience," in Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology*, 287.

[610]Wilhelm Rott, "Something Always Occurred to Him," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 134.

but rather serves, it loves an enemy as a brother," he explained. "It originates neither in the brother nor in the enemy but in Christ and his Word. Human love can never understand spiritual love, for spiritual love is from above; it is something completely strange . . . and incomprehensible to all earthly love."[611] "Almost all the people that I find in my present surroundings [i.e., prison] cling to their own desires," he observed, "and so have no interest in others; they no longer listen, and they're incapable of loving their neighbour. I think that even in this place we ought to live as if we had no wishes and no future, and just be our true selves," he reflected.[612] Bonhoeffer's ongoing effort to assist others (whether through consoling fellow prisoners, helping people escape Nazi Germany, or attempting to eliminate Hitler himself) demonstrated genuine, spiritual love; his concern for others dominated any concern over his own physical well-being.

(6) *Genuine distress concerning all bloodshed, not desensitized to violence or suffering.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer was evidently distressed over human bloodshed; the murderous practices of the Nazi regime distressed him sufficiently to compel him to lay his life on the line in opposition. Even the prospect of shedding the blood of the individual at the helm of Nazi brutality troubled him, and he sought pacifist solutions prior to entering the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler.[613] "The destruction of the life of another may be undertaken only on the basis of an unconditional necessity," he asserted.[614]

After his first year in prison, Bonhoeffer pondered the distinction between "the growth of insensitivity" and "the clarification of experience." It is toward unimportant things that one becomes insensitive, he concluded, while important experiences become ingrained and create "convictions, resolutions, and plans, and as such they're important for our lives in the future."[615] "Today I can take a calmer view of other people, their predicaments and needs," he explained, "and so I'm better able to help them. I would speak of clarification [in this instance] rather than of insensitiveness." It is important to "keep a warm heart as well as a cool head," he advised.[616]

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[611]Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Life Together*, trans. John W. Doberstein (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1954), 35.

[612]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated March 19, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 233-4.

[613]Bethge indicates that, in 1934, "it was still unthinkable to Bonhoeffer to join a conspiracy against Hitler; he sought a prototype for passive resistance that could induce changes without violence." In fact, Bonhoeffer hoped to visit Gandhi in order to learn the Indian method of non-violent resistance to despotic rule. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 409.

[614]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 159.

[615]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated April 26, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 277.

[616]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 22, 1944, Ibid., 276.

(7) *Sense of duty to God, God served first in all things.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bishop George K. A. Bell of Chichester, who knew Bonhoeffer well, stated that, when the latter visited him in 1942 "as an emissary from the Opposition [to Hitler], he was . . . completely candid, completely regardless of personal safety, while deeply moved by the shame of the country he loved [i.e., Germany]." He was consistently "undaunted, detached from himself, devoted to his friends, to his home, to his country as God meant it to be, to his Church, to his Master."[617] Bonhoeffer found it extremely difficult to desire Germany's defeat under Hitler, but he also regarded it as necessary since the "Nazis had a fanatically tragic will to involve everyone in the catastrophe"[618] they were creating. Bonhoeffer held that in "light of the great purpose all our privations and disappointments are trivial. . . . However thankful we may be for all our personal pleasures, we mustn't for a moment lose sight of the great things that we're living for."[619]

(8) *Love of God, piety.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Lehmann described Bonhoeffer as a man of "quiet piety,"[620] while Reinhold Niebuhr noted his special blend of "sophisticated theology and simple piety."[621] According to Bethge, Bonhoeffer's students sometimes viewed his piety as "too fervent" but simultaneously "impressive . . . because it was accompanied by theological rigor and a broad cultural background."[622]

Bonhoeffer was devoted to God both in his ordained ministry and his academic theology but, above all, in his daily life. In prison, he wrote of reading psalms and hymns as part of his daily routine.[623] "I am reading the Bible straight through from cover to cover . . . . I read the Psalms every day, as I have done for years; I know them and love them more than any other book."[624] "When the bells rang this morning, I longed to go to church," he reported, "but instead I did as John did on the island of Patmos, and

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[617]George K.A. Bell, Bishop of Chichester, foreword to *The Cost of Discipleship*, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. R.H. Fuller and Irmgard Booth (London: SCM Press, 2001), xi.

[618]Latmiral, letter to G. Leibholz dated 1946; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 851.

[619]Bonhoeffer, letter to Renate and Eberhard Bethge dated May 9, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 289-90.

[620]Lehmann, 45.

[621]Reinhold Niebuhr, "To America and Back," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 165.

[622]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 204.

[623]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated April 25, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 27.

[624]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated May 15, 1943, Ibid., 40.

had such a splendid service of my own, that I did not feel lonely at all."[625] "It's remarkable what power church bells have over human beings, and how deeply they can affect us," he marvelled.[626] Moreover, Bonhoeffer implored Bethge, "after these long months without worship, penitence and eucharist and without the *consolatio fratrum* – once again be my pastor as you have so often been in the past, and listen to me."[627]

(9) *Fear of God.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer's fear and love of God are reflected in a message written for his godchild explaining "that the world lies under the wrath and grace of God" and that the child would be taught "to fear and love God above everything, and to do the will of Jesus Christ."[628] In 1932, Bonhoeffer warned against false piety and misappropriation of the divine name, declaring that, in such situations, "the more pious we are, the less we let ourselves be told that God is dangerous, that God will not be mocked."[629]

(10) *Permits nothing to come between self and God, accepts no human deterrent.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

When Bonhoeffer concluded that it was God's will that he return to Germany from America in the summer of 1939, it was against the wishes of friends who were rightly concerned for his safety in Germany.[630] "There . . . happen to be things that are worth an uncompromising stand. And it seems to me that peace and social justice, or Christ himself, are such things," he had resolved years earlier.[631] The prospect of imprisonment—or worse—did not deter Bonhoeffer from his mission or from faith in God. Bonhoeffer assured von Dohnanyi, who was also imprisoned, "[Y]ou must know that there is not even an atom of reproach or bitterness in me about what has befallen the two of us."[632]

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[625]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated June 14, 1943, Ibid., 53.

[626]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated July 3, 1943, Ibid., 73. Jehanne was also deeply moved by church bells. "When she was in the fields, she used to go down on her knees every time she heard the bell tolled," a playmate testified. Waterin; quoted in Pernoud, *Retrial*, 87.

[627]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 128.

[628]Bonhoeffer, Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, May, 1944, Ibid., 296-7.

[629]Bonhoeffer, sermon of June 12, 1932; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 236.

[630]Bethge indicates that Bonhoeffer's friends in New York realized that he "was in danger and must be rescued" and that, when he decided to return to Germany, his friend, Paul Lehmann, "in gloomy foreboding, would all too gladly have changed Bonhoeffer's mind." Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 651, 656. Bonhoeffer wrote on the day he boarded the ship for Germany, "The last day. Paul is still trying to keep me back." Bonhoeffer, diary entry dated July 7, 1939; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 657.

[631]Bonhoeffer, letter dated January, 1935; Ibid., 206.

[632]Bonhoeffer, letter to von Dohnanyi written May 5, 1943 (incorrectly dated April 5), *Letters and Papers*, 32.

(11) *Mystical relationship transcends institutionalization or religious formulae, mystical defiance.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

While Bonhoeffer may not have self-identified as a mystic, he nonetheless thought, behaved, lived and died as one in many respects. Bethge relates that Bonhoeffer longed "to feel divine grace active in his life."[633] Bonhoeffer evidently believed that one's individual relationship with God in the world transcends institutionalization and religious formulae. He disapprovingly characterized nineteenth- and twentieth-century religion as "the so-called quiet room to which one gladly withdraws for a couple of hours before returning to the office"[634] and, on the conviction that religion can impede true discipleship, advocated a "religionless Christianity"[635] whereby "[t]he church is the incarnate, judged human being in Christ who has been awakened to new life. . . . [I]t has essentially nothing to do with the so-called religious functions of human beings, but with the whole person in that person's existence in the world with all its relationships," he explained.[636] The term "nonreligious Christianity" thus represents a distinction between religion and Christianity. In suffering with God in faith, Bonhoeffer maintained, "[t]here is nothing of religious method . . . . The 'religious act' is always something partial; 'faith' is something whole, involving the whole of one's life. Jesus calls men, not to a new religion, but to life."[637] He cautioned, however, that, "[w]hen we speak of God in a 'non-religious' way, we must speak . . . in such a way that the godlessness of the world is not in some way concealed, but rather revealed, and thus exposed to an unexpected light."[638] Bonhoeffer indicated that his "fear and distrust of 'religiosity'" had intensified with the experience of imprisonment.[639]

An individual who does not conform to the dictates of a particular religious or moral system inevitably steps (or is cast) outside of it in some way. This does not mean that such an individual must abandon all aspects of his or her religious practice but that s/he must be willing to transcend ordinary boundaries of religion if necessary. Jehanne maintained her primary commitment to the "Church Triumphant on high"[640] and thus stepped beyond the earthly church. She was consequently cast out (declared

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[633]Bethge, "Friends," 48.
[634]Bonhoeffer, lecture of December, 1928; quoted in Wüstenberg, 3.
[635]Wüstenberg, 75.
[636]Bonhoeffer, letter dated June 25, 1942; quoted in Wüstenberg, 18.
[637]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 18, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 362.
[638]Ibid.
[639]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 21, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 135.
[640]Jehanne, testimony of March 17, 1431; quoted in Scott, *Trial*, 122.

excommunicate) by some for her form of discipleship. Bonhoeffer's concept of religionless Christianity and his participation in the conspiracy likewise transcended ordinary religious boundaries and render(ed) his form of discipleship anathema to some.[641]

(12) *Conviction, determination, persistence, endurance, uncompromised, singular commitment to declared mission.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bell described Bonhoeffer as "crystal clear in his convictions; and young as he was, and humble-minded as he was, he saw the truth, and spoke it with a complete absence of fear."[642] "I have no wish to live in any other time than our own," Bonhoeffer wrote from prison, "even though it is so inconsiderate of our outward well-being."[643] "[M]y attitude towards my case is unquestionably one of faith . . . . I can (I hope) bear all things 'in faith', even my condemnation, and even the other consequences that I fear."[644] Bonhoeffer often reminded his fellow inmates "that the only fight which is lost is that which we give up."[645] In spite of his tribulations and the bleak darkness which permeated Nazi Germany, Bonhoeffer never gave up but persisted, in faith, to the end.

(13) *Does not engage in or encourage suicide, does not seek suffering or martyrdom.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Even as a prisoner, Bonhoeffer was described as demonstrating "deep gratitude for the mere fact that he was alive."[646] Bonhoeffer believed "that we ought so to love and trust God in our *lives*, and in all the good things that he sends us, that when the time comes (but not before!) we may go to him with love, trust, and joy."[647] The "not before" qualification suggests a disapprobation of suicide confirmed by the following passage:

> The freedom in which man possesses his bodily life requires him to accept this life freely, and at the same time it directs his attention to what lies beyond this bodily life and impels him to regard the life of his body as a gift that is to be preserved and as a sacrifice that is to be offered. . . .
>
> In his liberty to die, man is given a unique power which can easily lead to abuse. Man can indeed by its means become the master of his earthly destiny, for he can by his own free decision seek death in order to avoid defeat. . . .

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[641]See criterion nineteen above under the heading of Divine, Prophetic Calling.

[642]Bell, xi.

[643]Bonhoeffer, Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, May, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 297.

[644]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 22, 1943, Ibid., 173.

[645]Bonhoeffer; quoted by von Schlabrendorff, in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 228.

[646]Best, *Venlo Incident*, 180.

[647]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 168.

> A man who takes his own life incurs guilt solely towards God . . . . It is because there is a living God that suicide is wrongful as a sin of lack of faith.[648]

Bonhoeffer did not seek suffering but accepted it as a consequence of the living of his faith and, although he may at times have appeared to carry the burden with ease, he did, indeed, suffer deeply. "Joy is a thing that we want very badly in this solemn building, where one never hears a laugh," he remarked, "and we exhaust all our reserves of it from within and without."[649] He described the situation further:

> It's possible to get used to physical hardships, and to live for months out of the body, so to speak – almost too much so – but one doesn't get used to the psychological strain; on the contrary, I have the feeling that everything that I see and hear is putting years on me, and I'm often finding the world nauseating and burdensome. . . . I often wonder who I really am – the man who goes on squirming under these ghastly experiences in wretchedness that cries to heaven, or the man who scourges himself and pretends to others (and even to himself) that he is placid, cheerful, composed, and in control of himself, and allows people to admire him for it (i.e. for playing the part – or is it not playing a part?) What does one's attitude mean, anyway? In short, I know less than ever about myself, and I'm no longer attaching any importance to it. I've had more than enough psychology, and I'm less and less inclined to analyse the state of my soul. . . . There is something more at stake than self-knowledge.[650]

Bonhoeffer experienced episodes of acedia while imprisoned. He wrote to Bethge, "You are the only person who knows how often *accidie*, *tristitia*, with all its menacing consequences, has lain in wait for me."[651] "It would probably not be true to say that we welcome death," he had reflected earlier, "(although we all know that weariness which we ought to avoid like the plague); . . . we should like to see something more of the meaning of our life's broken fragments."[652] "I sometimes feel as if my life were more or less over, and as if all I had to do now were to finish my *Ethics*," he confided to his

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[648]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 164-6.

[649]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated June 4, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 49.

[650]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 15, 1943, Ibid., 162. Bonhoeffer had previously written, "There are two ways of dealing psychically with adversities. One way, the easier, is to try to ignore them; that is about as far as I have got. The other and more difficult way is to face them deliberately and overcome them; I'm not equal to that yet, but one must learn to do it, for the first way is a slight, though, I believe, a permissible, piece of self-deception." Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 5, 1943, Ibid., 159.

[651]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 18, 1943, Ibid., 129.

[652]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, Ibid., 16.

friend from prison. "But you know, when I feel like this, there comes over me a longing (unlike any other that I experience) to have a child and not to vanish without a trace."[653]

In April, 1945, during a prison transport in which Bonhoeffer and fifteen other captives did not know to where or what they were destined, the driver of the van in which they were travelling was signaled by two police officers to stop. Several prisoners were commanded by name to go with the officers,[654] at which time, it is reported, "Bonhoeffer leaned back so as not to be seen."[655] It was assumed by the remaining prisoners that those who had departed were to be executed,[656] and Bonhoeffer evidently did not wish to offer himself up for martyrdom unnecessarily. In spite of his afflictions, he had every intention of enduring.

(14) *Reluctantly accepts suffering or martyrdom if necessary to mystical witnessing.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"When Christ calls a man," wrote Bonhoeffer, "he bids him come and die."[657]

> It is infinitely easier to suffer in obedience to a human command than in the freedom of one's own responsibility. It is infinitely easier to suffer with others than to suffer alone. It is infinitely easier to suffer publicly and honourably than apart and ignominiously. It is infinitely easier to suffer through staking one's life than to suffer spiritually. Christ suffered as a free man alone, apart and in ignominy, in body and spirit; and since then many Christians have suffered with him.[658]

"It is we ourselves," Bonhoeffer maintained, "and not outward circumstances, who make death what it can be, a death freely and voluntarily accepted."[659]

Bonhoeffer's eldest brother wrote to his children in June of 1945, "Uncle Dietrich spoke to someone at length on 5 April, in the neighbourhood of Passau. From there he is said to have gone to the concentration camp at Flossenbürg. Why isn't he here yet?"[660]

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[653]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 15, 1943, Ibid., 163. Bonhoeffer died before finishing his *Ethics*. E. Bethge later retrieved parts of the unfinished manuscript which had been hidden from the Nazis, (other parts were confiscated), compiled and organized the work, and had it published in 1949. Bethge, preface to the First Through the Fifth German Editions of *Ethics*, 11-4.

[654]Best, *Venlo Incident*, 190, 192.

[655]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 922.

[656]Best, *Venlo Incident*, 192.

[657]Bonhoeffer; quoted by Doberstein, 8.

[658]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 14.

[659]Ibid., 16.

[660]Karl-Friedrich Bonhoeffer, letter to his children dated June, 1945; reproduced in Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 409-10. Quotation is from Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 410. E. Bethge explains that, on April 5, 1945, a stop was made at the Regensburg prison while Bonhoeffer was being transported. E. Bethge; in Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 410. Although he was martyred in early April, Bonhoeffer's fiancée and family did not learn of his death until months later. Ibid., 411.

> On the morning of that day [April 9, 1945] between five and six o'clock the prisoners . . . were taken from their cells, and the verdicts of the court martial read out to them. Through the half-open door in one room of the huts I saw Pastor Bonhoeffer, before taking off his prison garb, kneeling on the floor praying fervently to his God. I was most deeply moved by the way this lovable man prayed, so devout and so certain that God heard his prayer. At the place of execution, he again said a short prayer and then climbed the steps to the gallows, brave and composed. His death ensued after a few seconds. In the almost fifty years that I worked as a doctor, I have hardly ever seen a man die so entirely submissive to the will of God.[661]

Bonhoeffer knew that to respond affirmatively to what he perceived as his divine calling in the face of Nazi power in Germany was to risk his life.[662] He did not wish to die as a result of this action and maintained hope that he would one day be released from prison,[663] but he accepted the consequences when death arrived to take him. His last known words were, "This is the end. For me the beginning of life. . . ."[664]

(15) *Steadfast faith in God and divine revelation.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer wrote to his fiancée regarding his imprisonment: "[I]t daily and deeply moves me that God . . . so clearly meant me to bring you grief and sorrow, . . . to endow our love with the proper foundation and the proper strength."[665] "I am convinced that this experience is good for the two of us, even if it is still so incomprehensible," he resolved.[666] Bonhoeffer advocated "faith that endures *in* the world and loves and remains true to that world in spite of all the hardships it brings."[667] To fellow-prisoner, von

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[661]H. Fischer-Hüllstrung, "A Report from Flossenbürg," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 232. Fischer-Hüllstrung was a doctor at Flossenbürg concentration camp. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 927.

[662]Bonhoeffer's father wrote of the execution by the Nazis of his sons, Dietrich and Klaus, that they were "fully aware of what they could expect if the plot miscarried, and had resolved if necessary to lay down their lives." Karl Bonhoeffer; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 933.

[663]While in prison, Bonhoeffer anticipated marriage and wrote frequently to his parents of his hope for reunion with them. "Here in the quietness I hope that one day we shall all be together to celebrate my and Maria's wedding day – when? At the moment that seems fanciful, but it's a splendid hope and a great one." Bonhoeffer, letter to parents written May 5, 1943 (incorrectly dated April 5), *Letters and Papers*, 30. "The day when we shall meet again in freedom gets closer and closer, and it will be one of those days which we shall never forget all our lives." Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated August 17, 1943, Ibid., 95.

[664]Bonhoeffer, April 8, 1945, on being summoned for execution; quoted by Best, *Venlo Incident*, 200.

[665]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated August 12, 1943. Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 63.

[666]The reference is to his engagement and imprisonment shortly thereafter. Bonhoeffer, letter to von Dohnanyi written May 5, 1943 (incorrectly dated April 5), *Letters and Papers*, 32.

[667]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated August 12, 1943. Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 64.

Dohnanyi, he wrote, "What we cannot do, we must now simply let go of and limit ourselves to what we can and should do, that is, be manly and strong in trust in God in the midst of our suffering."[668] Bonhoeffer also firmly believed that Bethge's "ways" were "being directed from above and that this is better than everything that we undertake. Certainly one must try everything, but only to become more certain what God's way is," he advised,[669] adding that, "[i]n suffering, . . . deliverance consists in our being allowed to put the matter out of our own hands into God's hands."[670]

(16) *Apprehension of the intrinsically evil nature of human violence and war, does not attempt to qualify evil.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer recognized violence as intrinsically evil. "[Stanley] Baldwin was right," he asserted, "when he said that there was only one greater evil than violence and that this was violence as a principle, as a law and a standard."[671] This does not, however, negate the possibility of an "extraordinary and abnormal necessity of the use of violence" in unusual circumstances, he added.[672]

Bonhoeffer held that "[w]hat is worse than doing evil is being evil."[673] This does not suggest a qualification of evil but a distinction between the good person who commits evil and the evil person who commits evil. The qualification is in the quality of the agent and not in that of the activity; evil remains evil, unqualified. The implication is that it is worse when an evil person commits evil than when a good person commits evil. One can understand this in the sense that, when an evil person commits evil, evil intent dominates the situation and compounds the presence of evil whereas, when a good person commits evil (out of necessity), qualities of goodness, such as restraint or compassion, are brought to bear upon the evil action and serve to mitigate the situation in which evil is present. A potential quantitative (but not qualitative) distinction thus arises between evil committed with evil intent and evil committed with good intent, thereby impacting the quality of the overall situation in which evil arises.

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[668]Bonhoeffer, letter to von Dohnanyi written May 5, 1943 (incorrectly dated April 5), *Letters and Papers*, 32.

[669]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated June 5, 1944, Ibid., 320.

[670]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 28, 1944, Ibid., 375. Bonhoeffer's faith in divine revelation is discussed under criterion one of the Divine, Prophetic Calling category above.

[671]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 235.

[672]Ibid.

[673]Ibid., 67.

(17) *Recognition of personal defilement sustained through the use of violence.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Evil dwells in the heart of the criminal without being felt there. It is felt in the heart of the man who is afflicted and innocent,"[674] states Weil. Bonhoeffer observed that, when confronted with evil, people sometimes "flee from public altercation into the sanctuary of private *virtuousness*." But a person who behaves in this manner must become silent and blind to the surrounding injustice. "Only at the cost of self-deception," he maintained, can such an individual "keep himself pure from the contamination arising from responsible action."[675] Bonhoeffer asserted that one who values one's "personal innocence" over one's responsibility toward others is oblivious to the guilt acquired in such activity. "[R]eal innocence," he asserted, arises when one incurs "guilt for the sake of" others.[676] "[I]f . . . I refuse to bear guilt for charity's sake, then my action is in contradiction to my responsibility."[677] "Civil courage," he maintained, ". . . depends on a God who demands responsible action in a bold venture of faith, and who promises forgiveness and consolation to the man who becomes a sinner in that venture."[678] Bonhoeffer clearly recognized the personal defilement that accompanies participation in violence toward another human being.

(18) *Deep sensitivity to evil vs. indifference.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

In the context of Nazi rule, Bonhoeffer held that "the world is controlled by forces against which reason can do nothing."[679] Contemplating the response of individuals to the reign of evil in Nazi Germany, Bonhoeffer asked, "Who stands fast? Only the man . . . who is ready to sacrifice all . . . when he is called to obedient and responsible action in faith and in exclusive allegiance to God—the responsible man, who tries to make his whole life an answer to the question and call of God. Where are these responsible people?"[680] "I see that composure isn't part of my nature," he conceded, "but that I have to acquire it at the cost of repeated effort. In fact, natural composure is probably in most cases nothing but a euphemism for indifference and indolence, and to

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[674]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 70.

[675]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 5.

[676]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 238.

[677]Ibid., 241.

[678]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 6.

[679]Bonhoeffer, Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, May, 1944, Ibid., 298.

[680]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, Ibid., 5.

that extent it's not very estimable."[681] Bonhoeffer was extremely sensitive to the depth and breadth of evil which surrounded him.

(19) *Impatient with injustice, prone to righteous anger.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer considered "prayer and righteous action" to be core Christian activities.[682] When he was sixteen, Bonhoeffer responded with righteous anger to the assassination of Germany's Foreign Minister, a Jewish man named Walther Rathenau. A friend recalled "Bonhoeffer's passionate indignation, his deep and spontaneous anger" at the incident, and the fact that he knew "exactly where he stood" on the matter.[683] Much later, when Bonhoeffer was in prison, his righteous anger flared in circumstances of lesser magnitude.

> Two or three times here I've given people a quite colossal dressing down for indulging in only the slightest rudeness, and they were so disconcerted that they have behaved very correctly since then. I thoroughly enjoy this sort of thing, but I know it's really an impossible over-sensitiveness that I can hardly get rid of . . . . It makes me furious to see quite defenceless people being unjustly shouted at and insulted. These petty tormentors, who can rage like that and whom one finds everywhere, get me worked up for hours on end.[684]

Observing that several young prisoners in lengthy solitary confinement were unable to cope, Bonhoeffer was again angered. "That's another idiotic thing," he wrote, "locking these people in for months on end with nothing to do; it's absolutely demoralizing in every possible way."[685] Righteousness was an aspect of his character and Bonhoeffer perceived and was angered by an entire spectrum of injustices.

(20) *Righteous character (not self-righteous), ethical code of conduct (e.g., chivalry), moral discernment, holds self and others to high ethical standard of behaviour.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

There are many examples of Bonhoeffer's righteous character. For instance, he declined appointment to a pastorate in Berlin in 1933 because, "in view of the so-called 'Aryanization' of the clergy under the Nazi laws, . . . he could not be in a ministry which had become a racial privilege. I cannot recall or imagine any other man to have taken

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[681]Bonhoeffer, letter to Renate and Eberhard Bethge dated January 23, 1944, Ibid., 191.

[682]Bonhoeffer, Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, May, 1944, Ibid., 300.

[683]Peter H. Olden, 1946; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 33.

[684]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 22, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 136.

[685]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 15, 1943, Ibid., 164.

this line of solidarity with those of us who had to resign their pastorates under the legislation," wrote Franz Hildebrandt.[686]

Bonhoeffer disapproved of 'total war,' which he described as employing "all conceivable means which may possibly serve the purpose of national self-preservation."[687] "[T]here remain only a few 'last survivors of the age of chivalry,'" he observed,[688] and Bonhoeffer himself reportedly possessed "inborn chivalry."[689] "[I]n the place of a chivalrous war between Christian peoples . . . there comes total war," he explained, "war of destruction, in which everything, even crime, is [considered] justified."[690]

Bonhoeffer practiced moral discernment with intensity. "One may ask whether there have ever before in human history been people with so little ground under their feet – people to whom every available alternative seemed equally intolerable, repugnant, and futile," he wrote against a backdrop of war, genocide, and conspiracy.[691] As Arendt describes it, the climate of Nazi Germany constituted "the moral debacle of a whole nation,"[692] a "stifling, poisoned atmosphere"[693] which caused widespread moral decay with notably few exceptions.[694] Bonhoeffer was exceptional in recognizing the situation for what it was. "The great masquerade of evil has played havoc with all our ethical concepts," he stated. "For evil to appear disguised as light, charity, historical necessity, or social justice is quite bewildering to anyone brought up on our traditional ethical concepts, while for the Christian who bases his life on the Bible it merely confirms the fundamental wickedness of evil."[695] It is the responsibility of a state to create "law and order," not "lawlessness and disorder," he maintained,[696] and it is within the purview of the individual Christian to proclaim the inhumanity of a corrupt state.[697] Hitler fanatically blamed the world's problems, (and those of Germany in particular), on the Jewish people and the malicious, clandestine, Jewish world government that did not

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[686]Franz Hildebrandt, "An Oasis of Freedom," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 39.

[687]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 93-4.

[688]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 30, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 280.

[689]G. Leibholz, xiii. Bonhoeffer was described even in childhood as "a very chivalrous boy." S. Leibholz, 27.

[690]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 94.

[691]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 3.

[692]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 110.

[693]Ibid., 123.

[694]Ibid., 122-3.

[695]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 4.

[696]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 219.

[697]Ibid., 220.

exist save in the imagination.[698] But Bonhoeffer recognized the danger and misguided nature of "moral *fanaticism*. The fanatic thinks that his single-minded principles qualify him to do battle with the powers of evil; but like a bull he rushes at the red cloak instead of the person who is holding it."[699]

Bonhoeffer not only engaged in moral discernment but incited others to practice and act in accordance with it as well. In a letter to a colleague, he stated, "[I]f we're really honest with ourselves, we do know . . . what is right and what is wrong. Someone has got to show the way, fearlessly and unflinchingly—why not you? . . . Christ is looking down at us and asking whether there is anyone who still confesses him."[700] Bonhoeffer thus viewed his high ethical standard of behaviour as applicable to others as well as himself.

(21) *Teaches by example over doctrine.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer taught by example over doctrine. As an academic theologian and as pastor and director of a seminary, he taught doctrine, but he also questioned it in many cases and formulated his own original thought, encouraging others to do likewise.[701] Moreover, he held that doctrine ought to be accompanied by concrete action in the world. Recall that his concept of cheap grace cites as insufficient the notion of grace as doctrine alone and that he advocated costly grace as the true path of Christian discipleship.[702] Bonhoeffer taught ultimately by example, which is to say that he 'practiced what he preached' and preached only what he was willing to practice.

(22) *Service-oriented, work ethic, disinclination toward idleness or sloth.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Bonhoeffer's work habits were especially remarkable," notes Bethge. "He accomplished in two or three hours what to someone else would have seemed a normal day's work."[703] Bonhoeffer had a strong, service-oriented work ethic and even utilized his time in prison to the utmost. "The stormy happenings in the world . . . go right

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[698]Romane, 373, 384, 390. Domarus, 373, 384, 393. "[W]e now have a clique of Jewish men of letters, professors and profiteers inciting the world against us while millions of our own *Volksgenossen* [people] are unemployed and degenerating." Hitler, March 28, 1933; quoted in Domarus, 376.

[699]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 4. Also, Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 68.

[700]Bonhoeffer, letter to Henriod dated April 7, 1934; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 368-9. The letter urges Henriod, a leading ecumenical representative in Switzerland, to break with the German Christian Reich Church.

[701]"In the seminary . . . he approved of trial sermons if they were good, though they might be very different from the way he would have composed them." Schönherr, 128.

[702]Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 3-5.

[703]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 429.

through one, and I wish I could be doing useful service somewhere or other, but at present that 'somewhere' must be in the prison cell," he resolved.[704] "Our day lasts fourteen hours, of which I spend about three walking up and down the cell – several kilometers a day," he explained, "besides half an hour in the yard. I read, learn, and work."[705] He regularly requested that books be delivered to him in prison by family members and also availed himself of the Tegel prison library.[706] "I've never had a moment's boredom in the five months and more that I've been here," he wrote early on. "My time is always fully occupied."[707] A month later, he reported, "I've again been doing a good deal of writing lately, and for the work that I have set myself to do, the day is often too short, so that sometimes, comically enough, I even feel that I have 'no time' here for this or that less important matter!"[708] After fifteen months in prison, Bonhoeffer again wrote, "I'm doing as much writing and composing as much poetry as my strength allows."[709] "You've no idea how liberated I . . . would feel if I were once more able to work for others instead of solely for myself," he stated.[710]

(23) *Seeks to empower the disenfranchised, partisan with the wrongly oppressed.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"[W]here the world oppresses," Bonhoeffer wrote, the Christian "will stoop down and raise up the oppressed."[711] While studying in New York in 1930-31, Bonhoeffer befriended and gained the trust of members of the black community in the impoverished Harlem district, a remarkable feat, as Bethge points out, given the degree of racism against black Americans by white Americans at the time. "He had a gift for restoring pride and self-confidence to the vulnerable and the sensitive," explains

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[704]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated September 13, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 109.

[705]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents written May 5, 1943 (incorrectly dated April 5), Ibid., 29. There are numerous references throughout his correspondence to Bonhoeffer's academic work conducted in prison. E. Bethge provides a categorized appendix of the titles comprising Bonhoeffer's extensive reading list during his two-year captivity. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 943-6. Bethge explains that Bonhoeffer exercised (walked) in prison so as to maintain health in the interest of holding out under possible torture in order not to betray the conspiracy or its members. Ibid., 811. Bonhoeffer was actually threatened with torture during interrogation and was warned that his parents, fiancée, and sisters would be arrested if he did not confess. von Schlabrendorff; in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 227-9.

[706]Bonhoeffer, letters to parents dated April 14 and 25, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 22, 27. (Bonhoeffer made many subsequent book requests.)

[707]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated September 13, 1943, Ibid., 109.

[708]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated October 13, 1943, Ibid., 119.

[709]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 16, 1944, Ibid., 358.

[710]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated August 13, 1944, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 260.

[711]Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 194.

Bethge.[712] Moreover, Bonhoeffer's involvement in the escape of several Jewish citizens from Nazi Germany[713] exemplified his partisanship with the disenfranchised. He also spoke out when Jewish citizens were banned from church and state,[714] from professional posts, and from university education, and when the Nazis vandalized their property, boycotted their businesses, and murdered them in concentration camps. The state fails "in its function of creating law and order" when it produces an excess or a deficiency of law and order, Bonhoeffer asserted. "There would be too little law if any group of subjects were deprived of their rights, too much where the state intervened in the character of the church and its proclamation, e.g. in the forced exclusion of baptised Jews from our Christian congregations."[715] Bonhoeffer's criticism spoke directly to Nazi oppression of the Jewish population and the introduction of anti-Semitic laws within the state-run Reich Church—a brave pronouncement in support of the outcast.

(24) *Honours personal responsibility in maintenance of social justice.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer believed that humans bear strict "responsibility for one another"[716] and that this responsibility derives not from an attempt "to escape from the world, but" from hearing "in it the call of Christ in faith and obedience," and from knowledge of personal responsibility "to the world through this call.[717] "Nobility arises from and exists by sacrifice, courage, and a clear sense of duty to oneself and society," he maintained, "and it shows an equally natural regard for others, whether they are of higher or of lower degree."[718] Hence, in the face of Nazism, Bonhoeffer announced, "We are called upon to make a decision from which we cannot escape."[719] Bonhoeffer chose his course of action based on a sense of responsibility toward his victimized neighbour, believing that, "as a pastor it was his duty not just to comfort the victims of the man who drove down a busy street like a maniac, but to try to stop him."[720] One must acquire "courage to enter public

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[712]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 155.

[713]Ibid., 817.

[714]The 'Aryan clause,' implemented by the Nazi state in 1933, prohibited all Jewish individuals, including those who had received Christian baptism, and their spouses from holding appointments in the Christian church or the state. Ibid., 335. Edwin H. Robertson; in Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 217.

[715]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 221.

[716]Ibid., 199.

[717]Ibid., 181.

[718]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 13.

[719]Bonhoeffer, sermon of July 23, 1933, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 209.

[720]Bonhoeffer; paraphrased by Latmiral, letter to G. Leibholz dated 1946, in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 851.

life," he counselled,[721] apparently aware of an all-too-common tendency to cast personal responsibility onto others. But Bonhoeffer did not condone such practice and exposed the dynamic publicly. "The authority of the Leader [Führer] means for the individual the free choice of obedience, [and] radical renunciation of his right as an individual . . . . [A]uthority which I accord to another person over me is ultimately only my own authority. . . . [T]he authority of the Leader is . . . in the hands of his followers."[722] Hence, we are all responsible in choice, whether we claim to exercise or to abdicate personal responsibility.

(25) *Protects, defends others at potential cost to self.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

In response to National Socialist persecution of non-Aryans, Bonhoeffer insisted, "This is the time when we must be radical upon all points . . . without any fear of the disagreeable consequences for ourselves."[723] A former student stated that, for Bonhoeffer, "the substance of God's actions and the substance of man's responsibility for his fellow-men was the idea of deputyship; he therefore staked his life for the liberation of Germany and the world from the curse of murderous tyranny."[724] Indeed, protecting and defending others was Bonhoeffer's mandate which cost him his life. "I feel that my own personal future is of quite secondary importance compared with the general situation," he explained.[725] As a result of his opposition to the Hitler regime (which he viewed as an enemy of Christianity), Bonhoeffer suffered imprisonment and death, but he accepted these as part of his divine mission. From prison he wrote, "I regard my being kept here . . . as being involved in Germany's fate, as I was resolved to be. I don't look back on the past and accept the present reproachfully. . . . All we can do is to live in assurance and faith."[726]

(26) *Direct participation in mission in a position of vulnerability.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

In religion, Bonhoeffer asserted, the "devout want to be among themselves," whereas Christ calls "us to be in the midst of our enemies, just as he was."[727] During the summer of 1939, when Bonhoeffer made the decision to return to the dangers of

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[721]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 13.

[722]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 196-7.

[723]Bonhoeffer, letter to Martin Niemöller dated December 15, 1933; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 337.

[724]Schönherr, 129.

[725]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated March 25, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 239.

[726]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 22, 1943, Ibid., 174-5.

[727]Bonhoeffer, 1938 sermon; quoted in Wüstenberg, 13.

Germany from the relative safety of America, he wrote, "It is as if we were soldiers on leave who then return to action despite everything that awaits them. We cannot get away from it. Not as if we were essential, as if we were needed (by God?!), but simply because that is where our life is, and because we leave our life behind, we destroy it, if we are not back there."[728] He viewed it as no less than his life's mission to fight injustice where it confronted him.

(27) *Refuses to love evil, actively opposes evil.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

His active opposition to Hitler placed Bonhoeffer in a minority in Nazi Germany, but he refused to bow to evil and unequivocally took his difficult place against the status quo. Leibholz explains that, "to refrain from taking any part in the attempt to overcome the National Socialist regime conflicted . . . deeply with his [Bonhoeffer's] view that Christian principles must . . . be translated into human life and that it is in the sphere of the material, in state and society, that responsible love" must manifest.[729]

(28) *Prefers peace to war and non-violence to violence.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer did not desire war but worked to have Hitler deposed before the initiation of a second world war.[730] "Today there must be no more war," he urged. "War in its present form annihilates the creation of God."[731] The "next war must be utterly *rejected*," he insisted. We should "make peace to overcome war."[732] "The church of Christ stands against war for peace among men, between nations, classes and races," he advised.[733] At a 1934 conference in Denmark, Bonhoeffer strongly advocated peace over war as the ultimate path of Christian discipleship.[734] Amidst the reality of war, however, Leibholz notes that Bonhoeffer "did not take the [purely] pacifist line, although his aristocratic noble-mindedness and charming gentleness made him, at the bottom of his heart, a pacifist."[735] Bonhoeffer strove for ultimate peace and non-violence.

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[728]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 655.
[729]G. Leibholz, xxvii.
[730]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 636.
[731]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 183.
[732]Ibid., 166.
[733]Ibid., 183.
[734]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 387-9.
[735]G. Leibholz, xxvii.

(29) *Does not glorify violence or war.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

The fact that Bonhoeffer wished to avoid conscription indicates that he did not glorify war or violence; he was unwilling to participate in war for its own sake. He glorified God, not violence.

(30) *Concern for spiritual welfare of self and others, apprehension of spiritual implications.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"If I were prison chaplain here," Bonhoeffer reflected, "I should spend the whole time from morning till night . . . going through the cells; a good deal would happen."[736] "[A]t the moment I'm trying to write some prayers for prisoners; it's surprising that there are none, and perhaps these may be distributed at Christmas," he wrote.[737] In his report on prison conditions, Bonhoeffer noted:

> There are no projects for work that would be useful for all the 700 prisoners, such as, for instance, the construction of air-raid shelters. There are no religious services. The prisoners, some of whom are very young . . . are bound to suffer in body and soul from the lack of occupation and of supervision, particularly during a long, solitary confinement.[738]

"I think a long imprisonment is extremely dangerous for very young people as far as their spiritual development is concerned," he stated. "The impressions come with such violence that they may well sweep a great deal overboard."[739] Bonhoeffer unofficially "became the pastor of his fellow prisoners, and even, increasingly, of his warders." This activity occurred largely during air raids and during "exercises in the prison yard,"[740] when contact with others was possible. "It will be the task of our generation," he advised, "not to 'seek great things', but to save and preserve our souls out of the chaos, and to realize that it is the only thing we can carry as a 'prize' from the burning building."[741]

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[736]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated June 14, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 53.

[737]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 18, 1943, Ibid., 130.

[738]Bonhoeffer, Report on Prison Life after One Year in Tegel, 1944, Ibid., 251.

[739]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated April 26, 1944, Ibid., 277.

[740]Harald Poelchau, "The Freedom of the Prisoner," in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, ed. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. Käthe Gregor Smith (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 222. Poelchau was a prison chaplain.

[741]Bonhoeffer, Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, May, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 297.

(31) *Benevolence, kindness, does not engage in cruelty.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Never did I discover in him anything low, undisciplined, mean," wrote Schönherr of Bonhoeffer.[742] Indeed, Bonhoeffer was a benevolent individual concerned with helping others, even when he shared in their troubled circumstances or was in an otherwise difficult predicament. For example, in late 1943 when air raids over Berlin were frequent and he and his fellow inmates were essentially 'sitting ducks,'[743] Bonhoeffer asserted that the "only really unbearable privation is one's inability to help others in these difficult times; no one who has not experienced it can have any idea of that situation."[744] Bonhoeffer routinely encouraged others. "He always cheered me up and comforted me . . . . Many little notes he slipped into my hands on which he had written biblical words of comfort and hope,"[745] wrote a fellow prisoner, while another reported that Bonhoeffer "did a great deal to keep some of the weaker brethren from depression and anxiety."[746] He did not engage in cruelty, never seeking to inflict harm on others for pleasure's sake.

(32) *Generosity, charity.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer was notoriously generous, sharing his food in prison in spite of scarcity. "My cell is being cleaned out for me," he wrote, "and while it's being done, I can give the cleaner something to eat."[747] "Too many of the inmates here are plain hungry, and it's one of my greatest pleasures to be able to help occasionally."[748] A fellow prisoner recalled Bonhoeffer's generosity: "Each Wednesday he received his laundry parcel [from his parents] which also contained cigars, apples or bread, and he never omitted to share them with me the same evening when we were not watched."[749] Moreover, Bonhoeffer repeatedly encouraged Bethge to help himself to his bank account and other resources. "[I]f you need money, feel free to draw 1000 marks of mine," he

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[742]Schönherr, 126.

[743]von Dohnanyi's cell was bombed during a raid in November, 1943 and he suffered cerebral embolism as a result. Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 807.

[744]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated December 1, 1943, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 127.

[745]von Schlabrendorff; in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 228.

[746]Hugh Falconer, British officer, letter to S. Leibholz dated October 1, 1945; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 924.

[747]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 20, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 134.

[748]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated May 29, 1944, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 247.

[749]von Schlabrendorff; in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 229.

wrote.[750] "Please at least help yourself occasionally to some of my bacon."[751] "If there is anything that would help Renate in her present condition [Bethge's wife was pregnant], and you need money for it, please simply take as much as you need without saying any more about it. And of course that applies all the more afterwards."[752] On another occasion, he insisted, "If you need money, *please* just take it. As much as you want."[753] Bethge described Bonhoeffer as "always . . . very generous."[754] Indeed, it was not only his closest friends or family whom Bonhoeffer assisted in this manner, but he is known to have covered legal expenses for a fellow prisoner and arranged legal representation for several others.[755] He also attempted to organize a twelve-day retreat for a kindly but sickly prison guard at a property belonging to his future in-laws, but the request was denied due to apparently unspecified "misgivings."[756] Bonhoeffer was disappointed by the refusal. "People of our class are so often inhibited from taking action by 'misgivings,'" he wrote. "I think that the weakness of our class stems mainly from its misgivings, whether justified or unjustified. Simple folk are different in that respect: they make more mistakes, but they also do more good because the road to action doesn't traverse so many misgivings."[757]

(33) *Rejects personal glorification and idolization.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bethge states that Bonhoeffer neither engaged in self-pity nor sought recognition,[758] and a brother-in-law indicates that he shunned "ambition and vanity."[759] We know that Bonhoeffer did not like to "bind" others to himself.[760] In fact, he "liked to keep his distance, and he did not permit any undue familiarity."[761] Bethge explains that Bonhoeffer "kept a certain distance from others out of respect for their privacy, and he saw to it that he was treated likewise."[762] He was obviously not interested in personal glorification.

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[750]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 131.
[751]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 20, 1943, Ibid., 135.
[752]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 22, 1943, Ibid., 136.
[753]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 26, 1943, Ibid., 178.
[754]E. Bethge, letter to Bonhoeffer dated January 9, 1944, Ibid., 183.
[755]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 849.
[756]Bonhoeffer, letters to Maria von Wedemeyer dated April 23, 1944 and a later letter (undated), Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 224, 231.
[757]Bonhoeffer, undated letter to Maria von Wedemeyer, Ibid., 231.
[758]E. Bethge, letter to Bonhoeffer dated June 6, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 324.
[759]G. Leibholz, xxii.
[760]See criterion nine above under the Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare category.
[761]Schönherr, 128.
[762]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, xviii.

(34) *Is not motivated by self-fulfillment or material gain.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer advocated "moderation" over "extravagance."[763] Furthermore, he warned, "[w]hen we tolerate impudence for the sake of material comforts, then we abandon our self-respect, the flood-gates are opened, chaos bursts the dam that we were to defend; and we are responsible for it all."[764] In Hitlerite Germany, Bonhoeffer was branded treasonous. "Throughout the world," explains Bethge, "'treason' is normally viewed as a horrible sentiment, characterized by speculation for personal advantage and the intent to injure one's own country," but "[t]he opposite was true of . . . Bonhoeffer" and his co-conspirators.[765] Abroad, in England, Winston Churchill characterized the German conspirators as "militarists, simply a case of the highest personalities in the German Reich murdering one another."[766] Bonhoeffer's role in the conspiracy promised neither popularity, material gain, nor personal or professional advancement but required that he risk everything.

(35) *Refuses to benefit from anything unjustly acquired.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

During the first twelve days of imprisonment, Bonhoeffer was treated harshly; however, once staff at Tegel prison learned that he was related to the prison commandant, he received better treatment.[767] Bonhoeffer was conscientious about the matter, refusing any benefit that would place fellow prisoners at a disadvantage. "I was offered larger rations," he reported, "which I always refused, as they would have been at the expense of the other prisoners."[768] Moreover, Bonhoeffer's cell was initially located on the top floor of the building and, when it became extremely hot during the summer of 1943, he wrote to his parents, "I don't want to ask to be moved to another floor, as that would not be fair to the other prisoner who would have to come into my cell."[769]

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[763]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 13.

[764]Ibid., 12.

[765]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 675.

[766]Winston Churchill, in *The New English Weekly*, vol. 26, no. 1, 6; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 895.

[767]Bethge explains that the City Commandant of Berlin, General Paul von Hase, "who was also responsible for the military prisons," was a cousin to Bonhoeffer's mother, and he had inquired at the prison about Bonhoeffer. von Hase was executed by the Nazis in August, 1944. Bethge, in *Letters and Papers*, 268, n. 184, 366, n. 61. Also, Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 623.

[768]Bonhoeffer, Report on Prison Life after One Year in Tegel, *Letters and Papers*, 249.

[769]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated August 3, 1943, Ibid., 87.

(36) *Clarity of purpose.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer was unequivocal on the matter of defending the Jewish people against Nazi persecution. In a public pronouncement concerning "The Church and the Jewish Question," he declared it the responsibility of the church "not just to bandage the victims under the wheel, but to" halt "the wheel itself."[770] Bonhoeffer's position was clear: the church is obliged to question the activities of an unjust state, must help the victims of such a state, and must actively oppose it,[771] while individual Christians might "accuse the state of offenses against morality."[772]

(37) *Sincerity, authenticity.* ***(indeterminate)***

"I'm greatly devoted to sincerity, to life, liberty and mercy—it's just their religious trappings that make me uneasy," wrote Bonhoeffer.[773] He was clearly a sincere and authentic individual with strong moral convictions and a genuine concern for others, yet his false work for the *Abwehr* also placed Bonhoeffer in the realm of inauthenticity in the context of counter-intelligence specifically wherein Bonhoeffer feigned to be doing one thing while actually doing another. His conspiratorial work was case-specific and considered a moral necessity, yet the reasons for Bonhoeffer's contextualized dishonest behaviour[774] in feigning to serve the intelligence interests of the National Socialist state while actually furthering the conspiratorial cause do not negate the element of insincerity and inauthenticity in this instance which contended with his generally outspoken and authentic character. While his conspiratorial motives were sincere and authentic, his method was not entirely so. In order to serve his perceived divine mission sincerely and authentically, Bonhoeffer considered it necessary to deceive the enemy.[775] Given that he can be classified neither as entirely authentic in light of this instance nor as completely—or even predominantly—inauthentic, and since his circumstances, which arguably necessitated conspiratorial (i.e., dishonest) activity,

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[770]Bonhoeffer, April, 1933, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 221.

[771]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 275.

[772]Bonhoeffer, April, 1933, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 219.

[773]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated June 25, 1942; quoted by Kabitz, in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 327.

[774]Bonhoeffer discussed the relationship between deception and responsibility in the context of war. Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 235, 257.

[775]"There is no decent place to stand in a massacre." L. Cohen, "The Captain," *Stranger Music*, 342.

muddy the waters with respect to the application of this criterion, an indeterminate outcome seems most appropriate.[776]

(38) *Integrity.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer operated from a position of integrity. For example, in October of 1944, plans were made for his escape from prison but he cancelled the arrangement because he did not wish to endanger his fiancée, his relatives, or anyone else who might be arrested or otherwise afflicted on account of his actions.[777] "To encounter Dietrich was, above all else, to encounter a person to whom humanity was natural," wrote Lehmann. "Utterly without obsequiousness, he was without a trace of status-seeking or of pretence . . . . Dietrich manifested a contagious freedom, openness and integrity in relating to all sorts and conditions of men, to people as *human* beings."[778]

(39) *Treats God as a Subject, not an object to be bent to one's will.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

It ought to be remembered, Bonhoeffer asserted, "that God is not a general principle, but the living God who has" bestowed life upon humans "and who demands service" of us.[779] Bonhoeffer found much of value in the Hebrew Bible, not least of which was "the unutterability of the name of God."[780] "The fact that the Israelites *never* uttered the name of God always makes me think," he declared, "and I can understand it better as I go on."[781] Respect for the unutterability of the divine name represents a refusal to objectify God. At any rate, he asserted, the "way of Jesus Christ, and . . . the way of all Christian thinking, leads not from the world to God but from God to the world."[782] Moreover, in formulating his religionless Christianity, Bonhoeffer described

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[776]This corresponds to criterion fifty-three below, (unambiguous public statement of purpose and method), which is also judged indeterminate since Bonhoeffer clearly stated his opposition to National Socialist aims and policies but, in the context of conspiracy, did not declare his method publicly. Criterion eleven of the Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare section, however, (formal declaration of intent to engage in war, warning), has been deemed not applicable primarily on the clearly factual basis that Bonhoeffer did not engage in warfare. In the absence of such clarity which would enable a definitive determination of not applicable with respect to criteria thirty-seven and fifty-three, they are deemed indeterminate on the basis of conflicting elements.

[777]G. Leibholz, xxiv. Also, Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 827-8. Poelchau indicates that Bonhoeffer did not want to inflict "himself on somebody who had to hide him." Poelchau, 222-3.

[778]Lehmann, 45.

[779]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 359.

[780]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 5, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 156-7.

[781]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 21, 1943, Ibid., 135.

[782]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 351.

Christ not as "an object of religion, but something quite different, [as] . . . Lord of the world."[783]

(40) *Does not define or claim elaborate understanding of God, accepts Divine Mystery.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer held that "[t]he God who lets us live in the world without the working hypothesis of God is the God before whom we stand continually."[784] "The religious path from human beings to God leads to the idol of our hearts which we have formed after our own image," he asserted. "Neither knowledge, nor morality, nor religion leads to God. . . . If human beings and God are to come together," he maintained, "there can be but one path: God's path to human beings."[785] Bonhoeffer viewed religion as anthropocentric rather than theocentric, which is to say that human beings are at the center of religious reflection on God. "An idea of Christ, a doctrinal system, general religious knowledge of grace or of the forgiveness of sins makes discipleship unnecessary, indeed, in truth it excludes it, and is hostile to discipleship," he explained.[786] "Christianity without discipleship is always Christianity without Jesus Christ; it is idea, myth."[787] True discipleship must therefore transcend religion.

Bonhoeffer believed that, before God, "there can only be subjection, perseverance, patience – and gratitude. So every question 'Why?' falls silent."[788] "I do not understand your ways, / But you know the way for me," he wrote.[789] Pondering the course of future events, Bonhoeffer resolved, "I cannot tell, we mustn't anticipate God's ways, but we do at least know that he never abandons us, even in hard times."[790]

(41) *Does not hold God responsible for human evil.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer maintained that "God lets himself be pushed out of the world on the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world . . . ." Humans are not assisted by divine "omnipotence," he asserted, but by divine "weakness and suffering. . . . Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress to the power of God in the world [but] . . . [t]he

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[783]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 30, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 280-1.

[784]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 16, 1944, Ibid., 360.

[785]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Wüstenberg, 3.

[786]Ibid., 15.

[787]Ibid., 168, n. 63. Wüstenberg notes that this statement mirrors a statement by Kierkegaard in the latter's published diary selections. Wüstenberg, 168, n. 63.

[788]Bonhoeffer, letter to von Dohnanyi written May 5, 1943 (incorrectly dated April 5), *Letters and Papers*, 32.

[789]Bonhoeffer, morning prayer for prisoners, Christmas, 1943, Ibid., 139.

[790]Bonhoeffer, letter to Maria von Wedemeyer dated November 10, 1943, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 112.

Bible directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering."[791] Hence, if God cannot (can no longer, or cannot at this time) exercise omnipotence in the world, then human evil cannot necessarily be attributed to God.

Bonhoeffer asserted that "[t]he church is a bit of the world, a lost, godless world, under the curse, a complacent, evil world. And the church is the evil world to the highest degree because in it the name of God is misused, because in it God is made a plaything, man's idol."[792] He therein demonstrated awareness of the dangers inherent in according human deeds to God and the importance of distinguishing between the two.

(42) *Does not claim divine sanction with respect to all of one's actions but only those founded on divine revelation.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer did not claim divine guidance in everything that he did. For example, when he realized that he had erred in going to America in 1939, he bore full responsibility. "The whole burden of self-reproach because of a wrong decision comes back again and almost overwhelms me," he wrote.[793] Hence, he did not claim divine guidance in leaving Germany.

(43) *Exercises personal responsibility and accountability before God and others.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer declared individuals "responsible before God."[794] Moreover, he held that "the true concept of community . . . rests on responsibility, on the recognition that individuals belong responsibly one to another."[795] The "structure of responsible action," he explained, "includes both readiness to accept guilt and freedom."[796] "When a man takes guilt upon himself in responsibility, and no responsible man can avoid this, he imputes this guilt to himself and to no one else; he answers for it; he accepts responsibility for it."[797] "Alone before God, man becomes what he is, free and committed in responsibility at the same time."[798] Bonhoeffer accepted responsibility

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[791]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 16, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 360-1. Bonhoeffer suggested that one might view "the God of the Bible" as gaining "power . . . in the world by his weakness." Ibid., 361. This is compatible with the notion of a God who has surrendered omnipotence in granting humans free will and who can, in turn, exercise and regain power through human beings who surrender their wills to divine will.

[792]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 149.

[793]Bonhoeffer, diary entry of June 15, 1939; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 652.

[794]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 199.

[795]Ibid., 195.

[796]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 236.

[797]Ibid., 244.

[798]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 199.

before God for his actions—most notably his participation in a conspiracy to kill,[799] acknowledging "that anyone who lays violent hands on" another human being "is infringing eternal laws."[800]

(44) *Accepts unknown consequences, uncertainty.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"Christians in Germany will face the terrible alternative of either willing the defeat of their nation in order that Christian civilization may survive, or willing the victory of their nation and thereby destroying our civilization. I know which of these alternatives I must choose; but I cannot make that choice in security," stated Bonhoeffer.[801]

From prison he wrote, "I believe that nothing that happens to me is meaningless, and that it is good for us all that it should be so, even if it runs counter to our own wishes. As I see it, I'm here for some purpose, and I only hope I may fulfil it."[802] Hence, prisoner Bonhoeffer maintained a tranquil composure, "quite calm and normal, seemingly perfectly at his ease."[803]

(45) *Exercises independent thought.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bethge indicates that Bonhoeffer "did not want (nor would he have allowed) anyone else to tell him how or when he should act."[804] Schönherr stated that Bonhoeffer "thought sharply, logically," and "willed what he thought."[805] A fellow student observed that he was an exceptionally "free, critical and independent" thinker who unreservedly challenged his professors' ideas when they conflicted with his own.[806] Moreover, Bonhoeffer recognized the relationship between independent thought and human responsibility, referring to "the responsible thinking people."[807] He distinguished "between thinking personally and thinking objectively," observing that the decisions of those who fail to think objectively are often based on "some more or less fortuitous

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[799]This is evident in Bonhoeffer's reflection on his decision to leave America in the summer of 1939 and to return to Germany and his role in the conspiracy. Bonhoeffer; in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 653. See criterion five of the Divine, Prophetic Calling section above.

[800]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 199.

[801]Bonhoeffer, letter to Reinhold Niebuhr dated 1939; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 655.

[802]Bonhoeffer, letter to Renate and Eberhard Bethge dated May 9, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 289.

[803]Best, letter to S. Leibholz dated March 2, 1951; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 920.

[804]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 326.

[805]Schönherr, 128.

[806]Helmut Goes, letter dated July 29, 1946; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 67.

[807]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 4.

minor circumstance."[808] (Such personal thinking calls to mind Eichmann's participation in the *Shoah* for purposes of notoriety and career advancement.) "It is the nature, and the advantage, of strong people that they can bring out the crucial questions and form a clear opinion about them," noted Bonhoeffer. "The weak always have to decide between alternatives that are not their own."[809] In fact, Bonhoeffer's independent thought isolated him from others[810] as it was not always convenient, "even to the brethren of the Confessing Church."[811] But some understood him. "I now know that a man like Dietrich, who truly feels he has an inner mission to help his country and is a personality capable of forming an objective opinion, is right to be useful to Germany in another way and avoiding military service," wrote his fiancée. "And it's very responsible of him to seek out the genuinely right course of action."[812]

(46) *Offers a merciful gift, promise of a better future.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"The ultimate question for a responsible man to ask is . . . how the coming generation is to live," wrote Bonhoeffer.[813] "Thinking and acting for the sake of the coming generation, but being ready to go [i.e., to die] any day without fear or anxiety – that, in practice, is the spirit in which we are forced to live. It is not easy to be brave and keep that spirit alive," he acknowledged, "but it is imperative."[814] Bonhoeffer was committed to the possibility of a better future for his country and the world, and he was not only committed to the idea but to transforming it into reality.

His experience as a prisoner also inspired Bonhoeffer to work toward the establishment of an improved penal system, and he hoped that his ideas might "be turned to account some day."[815]

> I think a lengthy confinement is demoralizing in *every* way for most people. I've been thinking out an alternative penal system on the principle of making the punishment fit the crime; e.g., for absence without leave, the cancelling of leave; for unauthorized wearing of medals, longer service at the front; for robbing other soldiers, the temporary labelling of a man as a thief; for dealing in the black market, a reduction of rations; and so on.

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[808]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated February 1, 1944, Ibid., 204.
[809]Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 375.
[810]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 325.
[811]Schönherr, 128.
[812]Maria von Wedemeyer, October 16, 1942, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 332.
[813]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 7.
[814]Ibid., 15.
[815]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 171.

> Why does the Old Testament law never punish anyone by depriving him of his freedom?[816]

The hope of helping to create a better future for all seemed ever-present to Bonhoeffer. "The fact that the horrors of war are now coming home to us with such force will no doubt, if we survive, provide us with the necessary basis for making it possible to reconstruct the life of the nations, both spiritually and materially, on Christian principles," he maintained.[817] To his newborn godchild and great-nephew, Bonhoeffer pledged, "[W]e do want to preserve for you, the rising generation, what will make it possible for you to plan, build up, and shape a new and better life."[818]

(47) *Normally upholds customary moral laws.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

It is important to distinguish between Bonhoeffer's willingness to violate a scriptural law forbidding killing in a specific instance and transgression that arbitrarily disposes of the law. Bonhoeffer's participation in the conspiracy did not constitute an arbitrary disposal of the law; rather, he recognized the law as valid but considered it necessary to break it in the extreme and particular circumstances which confronted him. He did not assume that the action would be forgiven but accepted God's impending judgment upon him; hence, he did not advocate utter disregard for a law which he regarded as generally legitimate and otherwise upheld.

> It is true that all historically important action is constantly overstepping the limits set by these laws [i.e., "the permanent laws of human social life"]. But it makes all the difference whether such overstepping . . . is regarded in principle as the superseding of them, and is therefore given out to be a law of a special kind, or whether the overstepping is deliberately regarded as a fault which is perhaps unavoidable, justified only if the law and the limit are re-established and respected as soon as possible. It is not necessarily hypocrisy if the declared aim of political action is the restoration of the law, and not mere self-preservation.[819]

One detects a paradoxical element in Bonhoeffer's notion of a permissible transgression of the law in order to restore it which parallels the paradoxical activity of engaging in war in order to establish peace. It also corresponds to Kierkegaard's notion of a temporary suspension of the ethical in service to a higher, divine *telos*. "The immanent

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[816]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 20, 1943, Ibid., 134.

[817]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 27, 1943, Ibid., 146.

[818]Bonhoeffer, Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, May, 1944, Ibid., 297.

[819]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, Ibid., 10-1.

righteousness of history rewards and punishes only men's deeds," he asserted, "but the eternal righteousness of God tries and judges their hearts."[820]

(48) *Does not proclaim divine condemnation of others.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

In the heated struggle between the Confessing Church and the German Christian Church, Bonhoeffer once declared, "He who deliberately separates himself from the Confessing Church in Germany, separates himself from salvation."[821] The statement was apparently directed toward the Nazified German Christians and, in discussing the controversial remark with seminary students, Bonhoeffer maintained, "Once the gunpowder smoke has dissolved, everybody who thinks objectively and dispassionately must agree with me."[822] Since Bonhoeffer was strongly ecumenical in his views and a prominent figure in the ecumenical movement, he was not inclined to demonize those of differing faiths;[823] however, he did condemn that which he perceived as godless. The statement at issue implies divine condemnation of an opponent, contrary to his assertion that "[i]t is always for God to judge."[824]

(49) *Possible temporary suspension of universal ethic in some regard in relation to a divinely sanctioned higher telos.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"*Any order*—however ancient and sacred it may be—*can be dissolved*, and must be dissolved when it closes itself up in itself, grows rigid and no longer permits the proclamation of revelation," Bonhoeffer asserted.[825] "For the sake of God and of men Jesus became a breaker of the law. . . . Thus it is Jesus Christ who sets conscience free for the service of God and of our neighbour."[826] "The dogmatically correct delivery of the Christian proclamation is not enough," he explained, "nor are general ethical principles; what is needed is concrete instruction in the concrete situation. The spiritual forces which sustain the Church are not yet exhausted."[827]

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[820]Ibid., 11.

[821]Bonhoeffer, 1936; quoted in Schönherr, 128. Also, in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 494.

[822]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Rott, 134.

[823]The day before his death, Bonhoeffer conveyed a final message to Best for the Bishop of Chichester confirming his belief "in the principle of our Universal Christian brotherhood which rises above all national interests . . . ." Bonhoeffer, April 8, 1945; quoted by Bell, in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 1022, n. 54.

[824]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 236.

[825]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 163.

[826]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 240.

[827]Ibid., 349.

Bonhoeffer warned that "religion and morality can become the most dangerous enemy of God's advent among human beings."[828] The problem is that religion grants people power to fashion a transient god who satisfies fluctuating human desires or alleviates ever-changing fears. In other words, it enables humans to construct false gods that can be modeled to suit any purpose or any humanly-defined code of morality. In fact, Bonhoeffer witnessed this in the supportive stance taken by the German Christian Church toward Hitler. However, while religion and morality can facilitate destructive attitudes and behaviours, they do not necessarily produce these in every individual or in all instances.

> As long as goodness is successful, we can afford the luxury of regarding it as having no ethical significance; it is when success is achieved by evil means that the problem arises. In the face of such a situation we find that it cannot be adequately dealt with, either by theoretical dogmatic arm-chair criticism, which means a refusal to face the facts, or by opportunism, which means giving up the struggle and surrendering to success. We will not and must not be either outraged critics or opportunists, but must take our share of responsibility for the moulding of history in every situation and at every moment, whether we are the victors or the vanquished. One who will not allow any occurrence whatever to deprive him of his responsibility for the course of history—because he knows that it has been laid on him by God—will thereafter achieve a more fruitful relation to the events of history than that of barren criticism and equally barren opportunism.[829]

Moreover, Bonhoeffer recognized that extraordinary circumstances might arise in which no human law can govern adequately.

> In the course of historical life there comes a point where the exact observance of the formal law of a state, of a commercial undertaking, of a family, . . . suddenly finds itself in violent conflict with the ineluctable necessities of the lives of men; at this point responsible and pertinent action leaves behind it the domain of principle and convention, the domain of the normal and regular, and is confronted by the extraordinary situation of ultimate necessities, a situation which no law can control. . . . But it is equally certain that these necessities . . . cannot . . . constitute a law. . . . [T]hey are by nature peripheral and abnormal events.[830]

These passages pertain to the situation which confronted Bonhoeffer in Nazi Germany and which prompted him temporarily to suspend a universal ethic in favour of a perceived higher divine *telos*, that is, to participate in a conspiracy to assassinate an

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[828]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Wüstenberg, 3.
[829]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 7.
[830]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 234-5.

individual in order to end a reign of terror, destruction, and extermination of designated populations wrought by that individual. Bonhoeffer stressed, however, that,

> [p]recisely in this breaking of the law the validity of the law, [e.g., 'Thou shalt not kill'], is acknowledged, and . . . one's own decision and deed are entrusted unreservedly to the divine governance of history.
>
> There can be no theoretical answer to the question whether in historical action the ultimate goal is the eternal law or free responsibility in the face of all law but before God. . . . [I]n either case man becomes guilty and in either case he can live only by the grace of God and by forgiveness."[831]

(50) *Charism, spiritual gifts, uncanny abilities (including but not limited to those cited under the category of Divine, Prophetic Calling), mediates grace.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

A prison chaplain noted that Bonhoeffer had a "gift for meeting every kind of person in the right spirit."[832] Bonhoeffer had an uncanny ability to soften others, even harsh SS prison guards. Bethge explains that prisoners were often forced "to humble themselves before some brute in order to avoid" harsh treatment.[833] However, to the astonishment of fellow prisoner Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Bonhoeffer was "always good-tempered, always of the same kindliness and politeness towards everybody" such that he was not long in winning over hostile guards.[834] One warder even apologized to Bonhoeffer for locking his cell door.[835] Moreover, it has been noted in criterion twenty-one of the Divine, Prophetic Calling section that Bonhoeffer demonstrated prophetic ability; he therefore fulfills this criterion.

(51) *Honest disposition, transparency.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

This criterion refers to an individual's disposition and not to exceptional circumstances wherein dishonesty might be more just or sensible than truthfulness, such as when Jehanne repeatedly refused to swear to tell the truth in all matters asked of her before the Rouen court since she was unwilling to reveal information concerning the King of France. It might be noted, incidentally, that she was honest in declaring her potential dishonesty with respect to the matter. At any rate, there are circumstances in which lying might be considered ethically permissible or, indeed, desirable,[836] and the

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[831]Ibid., 236.

[832]Poelchau, 224.

[833]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 908.

[834]von Schlabrendorff; in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 228.

[835]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 848.

[836]Take, for example, a situation in which a terrorist pursues an individual in order to harm him or her and asks another individual where the intended victim can be found. In this instance, it might be

criterion concerning honesty must be judged in exclusion of such exceptional circumstances.

Bonhoeffer advocated "*ultimate* honesty"[837] and considered "decency, honesty, simplicity and a lack of pomposity" to be "admirable character traits."[838] He operated from an honest disposition, was outspoken, and presented his views clearly and straightforwardly, devoid of deceptive, manipulative language.[839] Moreover, he considered it the duty of individuals to be honest with ourselves[840] and, to this end, Bonhoeffer engaged in serious self-reflection as evidenced in his extant diary entries and letters.[841] He accorded theological significance to the lie, viewing it as "the denial of God" manifest in the world.[842] This is comprehensible in the context of a God who is associated with truth rather than falsehood. "[T]he lie is the denial, the negation and the conscious and deliberate destruction of the reality which is created by God and which consists in God, no matter whether this purpose is achieved by speech or by silence," he maintained.[843]

(52) *Straightforward, honest language, forthrightness.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

A former seminary student recalled that Bonhoeffer "hated" to produce "a psychological effect" on others and avoided rhetorical speech.[844] Bonhoeffer recognized a need for straightforward, honest, forthright communication and demonstrated these qualities in his publications, lectures, and sermons, often inciting controversy as a result. Consider the following:

> We have been silent witnesses of evil deeds; we have been drenched by many storms; we have learnt the arts of equivocation and pretence; experience has made us suspicious of others and kept us from being truthful and open; intolerable conflicts have worn us down and even made us cynical. Are we still of any use? What we shall need is not geniuses, or cynics, or misanthropes, or clever tacticians, but plain, honest,

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considered ethically permissible and desirable for the person queried to indicate that s/he does not know the whereabouts of the potential victim, even if this is untrue.

[837]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 16, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 360.

[838]Bonhoeffer; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 107.

[839]See the following criterion for further details.

[840]Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 382.

[841]For example, Bonhoeffer wrote, "I believe I know that inwardly I shall be clear and honest with myself only if I truly begin to take seriously the Sermon on the Mount. That is the only source of power capable of blowing up the whole phantasmagoria [i.e., the Nazi illusion] once and for all." Bonhoeffer, letter to his brother, Karl-Friedrich Bonhoeffer, dated January, 1935; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 205.

[842]Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 364.

[843]Ibid.

[844]Schönherr, 128.

> straightforward men. Will our inward power of resistance be strong enough, and our honesty with ourselves remorseless enough, for us to find our way back to simplicity and straightforwardness?[845]

Bonhoeffer stated things as he saw and experienced them. In fact, Bethge describes some of Bonhoeffer's sermons as "startling in their directness"[846] and notes that "[h]is first application for a pastorate . . . failed" because "[h]e was too young, his preaching too severe, and the demands he made on his congregation too strange."[847]

(53) *Unambiguous public statement of purpose and method.* ***(indeterminate)***

Bonhoeffer publicly stated his opposition to the Hitler regime, preaching, lecturing, and writing against the Nazi agenda. For example, two days after Hitler came to power in Germany, Bonhoeffer spoke on public radio, intending to finish his talk with a declaration that, if a Führer

> does not continually tell his followers quite clearly of the limited nature of his task and of their own responsibility, if he allows himself to surrender to the wishes of his followers, who would always make him their idol—then the image of the Leader [Führer] will pass over into the image of the misleader, and he will be acting in a criminal way . . . . Leaders or offices which set themselves up as gods mock God and the individual who stands alone before him."[848]

The broadcast was terminated, however, before Bonhoeffer could voice these final, critical points. In order not to be misconstrued, he subsequently published the entire content of his talk in a German newspaper and delivered an expanded version at the local College of Political Science and also at a technical university.[849] Bonhoeffer was therefore very open about declaring his position. However, as with criterion thirty-seven above, the fact that he participated in a conspiracy and did not publicly declare his method must also be acknowledged.[850] Hence, his purpose was clear but his method was not, although it might have been morally necessary. It would seem inappropriate to disqualify Bonhoeffer on the basis of circumstantial moral necessity and to ignore the fact that he satisfies the rest of the criterion, yet it also seems inappropriate to ignore the fact that he did not declare his method publicly; therefore, this criterion is rendered

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[845]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 16-7.
[846]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 444.
[847]Ibid., 232.
[848]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 198, 200.
[849]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 259-60, 968, n. 12.
[850]In spite of his internal connections, it seems odd that Bonhoeffer was permitted to work for the *Abwehr* at all given his public opposition to the Hitler regime.

indeterminate. In the unusual context of morally necessary conspiracy, this aspect of the criterion might best be viewed as inapplicable.

(54) *Reliability, consistency, constancy.* ***(indeterminate)***

Bonhoeffer was consistent in the matter of the struggle between church and state. Hildebrandt wrote that "[t]he course for the church was clear to him from the beginning and remained clear to the end; there could be no compromise with . . . Nazism."[851] One year before his death, Bonhoeffer wrote, "I'm firmly convinced – however strange it may seem – that my life has followed a straight and unbroken course, at any rate in its outward conduct."[852] Of his character, a fellow prisoner wrote, "He was always cheerful, always consistently friendly and obliging."[853] Another wrote, "He was cheerful, ready to respond to a joke."[854] After encountering him in prison, von Dohnanyi wrote, "I have seen Dietrich; he looks cheerful."[855] In fact, Bonhoeffer was described as cheerful on numerous occasions throughout his imprisonment. To be consistently cheerful toward others throughout two years of Nazi incarceration, being a reliable and uplifting presence to others, is no insignificant feat.

As for his theology, it remained a work in progress when he died. As such, one can locate some inconsistency if one compares Bonhoeffer's early theological convictions with his practical, experiential application of theology during later years. For example, although his ultimate goal of peace was constant, the degree of pacifism which he advocated varied. Compare, for example, his 1934 declaration that Christians "may not use weapons against one another"[856] with the following from 1942:

> He [Bonhoeffer] said it was a tradition with us [Germans] that young men should volunteer for military service and lay down their lives for a cause of which they mightn't approve at all. But there must also be people able to fight from conviction alone. If they approved of the grounds for war, well and good. If not, they could best serve the Fatherland by operating on the internal front, perhaps even by working against the regime. It would thus be their task to avoid serving in the armed forces for as long as possible—and even, under certain circumstances, if they

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[851]Hildebrandt, 38.

[852]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 11, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 272.

[853]von Schlabrendorff; quoted in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 267.

[854]Best, letter to S. Leibholz dated March 2, 1951; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 919.

[855]von Dohnanyi, note to his wife (Christine) dated February 25, 1945; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 908.

[856]Bonhoeffer, August, 1934; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 388.

> couldn't reconcile it with their conscience, to be conscientious objectors.[857]

One can, of course, conceive of several explanations for the discrepancy. In 1934, Bonhoeffer was wholeheartedly attempting to prevent a second world war and thus declared his position in strong and certain terms whereas, in 1942, war was manifest and a general condemnation of the use of arms would have been unrealistic and ineffective. Moreover, it is arguably to his credit that Bonhoeffer allowed his theology to be informed and shaped by changing circumstances and life experiences. In fact, the extraordinarily evil events perpetrated by the Hitler regime have wreaked havoc on theology since their occurrence—as they should. There is, however, substantial consistency throughout Bonhoeffer's theology with respect to many basic tenets and, indeed, Bethge maintains that "Bonhoeffer's theological development showed an intrinsic consistency and continuity."[858] He demonstrates how the theology produced by Bonhoeffer in 1944 can be linked "to particular ideas from his early period that he in part had retained and in part given new accents."[859] Bethge attributes the difference between Bonhoeffer's theological message of 1932 and that of 1944 to the fact that the former was informed primarily by "a young, critical intellect" while the latter also drew on "experience full to the brim."[860] Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that some inconsistency exists between Bonhoeffer's early and late theologies. However, in terms of his character, his core values, his ultimate goals, and his "outward conduct" (as mentioned above), Bonhoeffer was reliable, consistent and constant. It would seem inappropriate to disqualify him on the basis of a degree of justifiable theological inconsistency, yet this should not be ignored; hence, the criterion is best declared indeterminate.

(55) *Strives with the world, with self, and with God.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer clearly strove with the world in his active opposition to the Hitler regime and in his imprisonment. From his cell, he wrote, "[T]here are some lines that

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[857]Bonhoeffer, October 15, 1942; paraphrased by Maria von Wedemeyer (diary entry), in Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 331-2.

[858]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 460.

[859]Ibid., 856.

[860]Ibid., 890.

say '. . . that we remember what we would forget, that this poor earth is not our home.'"[861]

Bonhoeffer also strove with himself. During his first Christmas season in prison, he wrote of homesickness and longing.

> The first result of such longing is always a wish to neglect the ordinary daily routine in some way or other, and that means that our lives become disordered. I used to be tempted sometimes to stay in bed after six in the morning . . . . Up to now I've always been able to force myself not to do this; I realized that it would have been the first stage of capitulation, and that worse would probably have followed. . . . Above all, we must never give way to self-pity."[862]

Bonhoeffer strove with God as well. Of his long imprisonment, which followed on the heels of his engagement, he wrote, "When a man enters on a supremely happy marriage and has thanked God for it, it is a terrible blow to discover that the same God who established the marriage now demands of us a period of such great deprivation. In my experience nothing tortures us more than longing."[863] Nonetheless, he maintained, "We ought to find and love God in what he actually gives us."[864] Bonhoeffer conceded, however, that "not everything that happens is simply 'God's will.'"[865]

(56) *Expression of the sublime absolutely in the pedestrian.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

An account by a fellow prisoner indicates that, in spite of dire circumstances, "Bonhoeffer . . . always seemed to diffuse an atmosphere of happiness, of joy in every smallest event in life, and of deep gratitude for the mere fact that he was alive."[866] Bonhoeffer expressed a desire to be a blessing unto others. "A blessing," he wrote, "is the visible, perceptible, effective proximity of God. A blessing demands to be passed on—it communicates itself to other people. . . . That someone should be a blessing to others is the greatest thing of all."[867] Bonhoeffer carried God within. After nearly two years in prison, he did "not look in the least like a man who had spent months in prison and who went in fear of his life."[868] Moreover, during the worst air raid on Berlin, which "turned the city . . . into a heap of rubble," as Bonhoeffer stood in a shelter with other

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[861]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated December 18, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 168.
[862]Ibid.
[863]Ibid., 167.
[864]Ibid., 168.
[865]Ibid., 167.
[866]Best, letter to S. Leibholz dated March 2, 1951; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 920.
[867]Bonhoeffer, undated letter to Maria von Wedemeyer, Bonhoeffer and von Wedemeyer, 240-1.
[868]Best, letter to S. Leibholz dated March 2, 1951; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 907.

prisoners while the whole structure reverberated from a direct hit and threatened to crash in on them, he "remained quite calm . . . [and] did not move a muscle, but stood motionless and relaxed as if nothing had happened."[869] While a bomb blast can hardly be described as 'pedestrian,' the incident demonstrates the consistency with which Bonhoeffer displayed sublime qualities, regardless of circumstance.

(57) *Wisdom, sound judgment.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer possessed wisdom in the midst of widespread naïveté. "While we . . . thought that all was more or less well with Church and State . . . ," wrote Hildebrandt, "he had no illusions about the impending doom."[870] "He was one of the very few people who, as early as January 1933 [when Hitler came to power], saw with absolute clarity what was happening."[871] Bonhoeffer demonstrated a considerable degree of wisdom concerning stupidity, (which contradicts sound judgment). Stupidity "is a more dangerous enemy to the good than evil. One can protest against evil; it can be unmasked and, if need be, prevented by force. Evil always carries the seeds of its own destruction, as it makes people, at the least, uncomfortable. Against" stupidity "we have no defence. Neither protests nor force can touch it; reasoning is no use; facts that contradict personal prejudices can simply be disbelieved – indeed, the" stupid person "can counter by criticizing them, and if they are undeniable, they can just be pushed aside as trivial exceptions. So the" stupid person, "as distinct from the scoundrel, is completely self-satisfied; in fact, he can easily become dangerous, as it does not take much to make him aggressive."[872] On Bonhoeffer's assessment, one can grasp how widespread "stupidity" conceivably contributed to the reign of evil in Nazi Germany and the vast extent to which Hitler apparently relied on it—"the power of some needs the" stupidity of "others." Stupidity, Bonhoeffer explained, "is a moral rather than an intellectual defect. There are people who are mentally agile but" stupid, "and people who are mentally slow but very far from" stupid. One gets "the impression," Bonhoeffer maintained, that stupidity "is likely to be . . . acquired in certain circumstances where

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[869]von Schlabrendorff; in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 229-30. The air raid occurred on February 3, 1945. Ibid., 229. It was in order to keep prisoners alive until sought information was extracted that they benefited from the protection of bomb shelters while incarcerated at the Gestapo headquarters, not out of concern for the prisoners themselves. Ibid., 226-7.

[870]Hildebrandt, 38.

[871]Schönherr, 129.

[872]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 8. M. Rumscheidt indicates that the word, "*dummheit*," in Bonhoeffer's text is correctly translated in English as "stupidity" rather than "folly", as it is rendered in the quoted text. The German, "*narrheit*," he advises, means "folly." Email correspondence to author dated November 2, 2012. I have adjusted the translation accordingly.

people *make*" themselves stupid "or allow others to make" them stupid.[873] Stupidity, in this context, is closely linked with thoughtlessness. "It is not that certain human capacities, intellectual capacities for instance, become stunted or destroyed," Bonhoeffer asserted, "but rather that the upsurge of power makes such an overwhelming impression that men . . . give up trying to assess the new state of affairs for themselves."[874] When speaking with a stupid individual, he observed, it seems as though "one is dealing, not with the man himself, but with slogans, catchwords, and the like, which have taken hold of him. He is under a spell."[875] Bonhoeffer's description is consistent with Arendt's assessment of Eichmann, who relied heavily on clichés and slogans.[876] "Having thus become a passive instrument, the" stupid person "will be capable of any evil and at the same time incapable of [or averse to] seeing that it is evil. Here lies the danger of a diabolical exploitation that can do irreparable damage to human beings," warned Bonhoeffer,[877] whose wisdom in the matter proved true. Stupidity "can be overcome" only by living "a responsible life before God," he insisted,[878] adding that stupidity and wisdom "are not ethically indifferent."[879]

(58) *Undergoes mystical "dark night," struggle with pain and suffering.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"I wonder why it is that we find some days so much more oppressive than others, for no apparent reason," Bonhoeffer pondered. "Is it growing pains – or spiritual trial? Once they're over, the world looks quite a different place again."[880] Imprisonment brought mystical darkness, pain, and suffering to Bonhoeffer's door. He described the experience in the following passage:

> I'm sure I never realized as clearly as I do here [in prison] what the Bible and Luther mean by 'temptation'. Quite suddenly, and for no apparent physical or psychological reason, the peace and composure that were supporting one are jarred, and the heart becomes, in Jeremiah's expressive phrase, 'deceitful above all things, and desperately corrupt; who can understand it?' It feels like an invasion from outside, as if by evil powers

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[873]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 8.
[874]Ibid., 8-9.
[875]Ibid., 9.
[876]Arendt, *Eichmann*, 48-9, 55, 252.
[877]Bonhoeffer, Christmas, 1942, *Letters and Papers*, 9.
[878]Ibid.
[879]Ibid., 10.
[880]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 22, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 276.

> trying to rob one of what is most vital. But no doubt these experiences are good and necessary, as they teach one to understand human life better.[881]

The next passage from a poem written by Bonhoeffer in prison is equally revealing:

> Am I then really all that which other men tell of?
> Or am I only what I know of myself,
> restless and longing and sick, like a bird in a cage,
> struggling for breath, as though hands were compressing my throat,
> yearning for colours, for flowers, for the voices of birds,
> thirsting for words of kindness, for neighbourliness,
> trembling with anger at despotisms and petty humiliation,
> tossing in expectation of great events,
> powerlessly trembling for friends at an infinite distance,
> weary and empty at praying, at thinking, at making,
> faint, and ready to say farewell to it all?
>
> Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
> "Who Am I?"[882]

The inner conflict and confusion described by Bonhoeffer and his struggle to overcome debilitating darkness point to the mystical dark night of the soul, particularly the night of spirit.[883] "While he was in the body, the fight between flesh and spirit, Adam and Christ, was going on in him," notes Leibholz. "Sometimes he seemed to have become a riddle to himself."[884]

(59) *Demonstrates grace in extreme suffering.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

"He was, without exception, the finest and most lovable man I have ever met. . . . [H]is soul really shone in the dark desperation of our prison,"[885] wrote a fellow inmate from Bonhoeffer's period of incarceration at Buchenwald concentration camp. Another fellow prisoner speculated that Bonhoeffer's "noble and pure soul must have suffered

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[881]Bonhoeffer, letter to parents dated May 15, 1943, Ibid., 39. It was unusual for Bonhoeffer to relay such difficult aspects of his imprisonment to his parents but, given that his father was a psychiatrist, it is understandable that he would confide such an experience to him. Moreover, it was not until much later in the year of 1943 that the smuggled correspondence between Bonhoeffer and Bethge (his confidant) began.

[882]Bonhoeffer, poem reproduced in *Letters and Papers*, 347-8. Quotation is from *Letters and Papers*, 348.

[883]Recall that the night of spirit occurs when the soul and intellect are overwhelmed by a divine wisdom which surpasses the capacity of the soul to apprehend it. The soul and intellect become clouded or darkened as conflict occurs between the soul's natural weakness and the infusion of divinity. Saint John of the Cross, 335-6.

[884]G. Leibholz, xviii.

[885]Best, letter to S. Leibholz dated March 2, 1951; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 920.

deeply" under brutal Gestapo interrogation but that "he betrayed no sign of it."[886] And another declared, "He was always so interesting and good-humored. He was the best and the most gifted man I have ever met."[887] Furthermore, Bonhoeffer wrote to Bethge, "Perhaps it will please you to hear that the prisoners and the guards here keep saying how they are 'amazed' (?!) at my tranquillity and cheerfulness. I myself am always amazed about remarks of this kind."[888] On a later occasion, he wrote, "People here keep on telling me . . . that I'm 'radiating so much peace around me', and that I'm 'always so cheerful', – so that the feelings that I sometimes have to the contrary must, I suppose, rest on an illusion (not that I really believe that at all!)."[889]

Bonhoeffer's gracious disposition rendered him popular with others. Guards at Tegel prison supplied him with writing paper and flowers, delivered secret correspondence on his behalf, and even helped to plan his escape. Several requested to be photographed with him, and some arranged their guard duties in order to be assigned to the vicinity of his cell so that they might speak with him; in fact, the demand for his time in prison was so great that it interfered with Bonhoeffer's own work.[890] Moreover, on his birthday in 1944, fellow inmates picked him a "heartening little nosegay of flowers."[891]

(60) *Embodies paradox.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer embodied paradox in that he was an ordained minister of the church but advocated a religionless Christianity which ultimately transcends ecclesiology. "The church is the presence of God in the world," he wrote. "Really in the world, really the presence of God. The church is not a consecrated sanctuary, but the world, called by God to God; therefore there is only *one* church in all the world."[892] He also expressed paradox in the assertion that, "Before God and with God we live without God,"[893] referring to a God who is present but largely incapacitated to act in the world. Moreover, an element of paradox was cited in criterion forty-eight above with respect to

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[886]von Schlabrendorff; in *I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 228.

[887]Latmiral, letter to G. Leibholz dated 1946; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 851.

[888]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated November 20, 1943, *Letters and Papers*, 134.

[889]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated April 30, 1944, Ibid., 279.

[890]Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 848.

[891]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated February 5, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 209.

[892]Bonhoeffer, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, *No Rusty Swords*, 150.

[893]Bonhoeffer, letter to E. Bethge dated July 16, 1944, *Letters and Papers*, 360. Paul M. van Buren offers an exposition of this paradox. Paul M. van Buren, "Bonhoeffer's Paradox: Living With God Without God, A Hypothetical Investigation," in *Bonhoeffer in a World Come of Age*, by Paul M. van Buren, Paul L. Lehmann, Eberhard Bethge, Maria von Wedemeyer-Weller, and John D. Godsey, ed. Peter Vorkink, II (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), 1-24.

Bonhoeffer's notion of a permissible violation of a law in order to restore it and engagement in war in order to attain peace.[894]

Lehmann maintains that Bonhoeffer "exhibited in his life . . . *the paradox of discipleship*."[895] He identifies three indications of this paradox, the most substantial being that Bonhoeffer possessed a "combination . . . of conservative and revolutionary passions and concerns" and that he advocated the "hiddenness" of Christian life.[896] The latter, notes Lehmann, was evident in the fact that Bonhoeffer "never allowed one to overlook the fact that he was a Christian, although he never wore his Christianity on his sleeve. His discipleship was at once open and hidden."[897] One might cite Bonhoeffer's notion of a religionless Christianity as both conservative and revolutionary —revolutionary in the sense that Christianity has long been considered a religion and conservative in the sense that Bonhoeffer's religionless Christianity aimed at reclaiming and conserving the original Christian message of the gospel texts.

(61) *Canonization, holiness, posthumous miracles.* ***(criterion satisfied)***

Bonhoeffer is viewed as a saint by some, regardless of the fact that the Reformation repudiated the veneration of saints.[898] "He was a good and saintly man," wrote S. Payne Best,[899] while the Bishop of Chichester considered him "holy and humble and brave."[900] "[A]mong and before" their fellow human beings, the saints are witnesses to the love of God. Martyrdom is considered the "first and supreme form of this testimony," being the most complete and unequivocal, explains Splett. The "history of the veneration of saints began with the cult of the martyrs."[901] Moreover, the "great saints point out . . . new ways of answering the demands of the world, new ways of answering God's call for the total dedication of man as he finds himself in this or that place and time."[902] Splett cites Jehanne as such a figure.[903] Likewise, Bonhoeffer

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[894]Under criterion forty-nine above, Bonhoeffer also speaks paradoxically with respect to a teleological ethical suspension in stating that, in such a violation of an ethical law, its validity is acknowledged.

[895]Lehmann, 42. Lehmann was an American theologian.

[896]Ibid., 44-5. The first of Lehmann's criteria characterizes Bonhoeffer as "an 'un-German German.'" Lehmann notes the ways in which Bonhoeffer conforms to and defies Lehmann's stereotypical notion of German people. Ibid., 42-4.

[897]Ibid., 45.

[898]Splett, s.v. "Saints," in Rahner, ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology*, 1498.

[899]Best, *Venlo Incident*, 191.

[900]Bell, July 27, 1945; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 931.

[901]Splett, 1496-7.

[902]Ibid., 1497.

[903]Ibid., 1497-8.

confessed Christ (God in the world) in an unprecedented situation in human history and was martyred as a result. Since "the special call of God for a given historical period can find expression in . . . representatives of Christian holiness" "outside the [Catholic] Church," "one can speak of saints in Protestantism."[904] On this understanding, although he has not been canonized, Bonhoeffer might be categorized as a saint, or at least as holy. We have no evidence of posthumous miracles attributed to him, but these often become evident during the canonization process which does not generally occur in Protestantism; hence, Bonhoeffer should not be disqualified on this account.

(62) *Identification with a particular, well-established prophecy.* ***(criterion not satisfied)***

It is not evident that Bonhoeffer was associated with any well-established prophecy.

Summary Assessment – Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency

Of the sixty-two criteria indicative of divinely sanctioned human agency, Bonhoeffer satisfies fifty-seven (forty-six essential and eleven non-essential), he fails to satisfy two (both non-essential), and three are indeterminate (one essential and two non-essential.) Of the forty-seven essential criteria, forty-six are met and one is indeterminate. Of the fifteen non-essential criteria, eleven are met. Disregarding the three indeterminate criteria and the two unmet, non-essential criteria, fifty-seven remain, all of which Bonhoeffer satisfies. It can therefore be concluded that Bonhoeffer's human agency corresponds to divinely sanctioned human agency as stipulated in Jehanne's model. It is time to draw an overall conclusion with respect to his case.

Case Study Two Results

We have thoroughly assessed Bonhoeffer's implicit claim to divinely sanctioned violence and determined that he meets the requirements of each category of evaluation. Of the one hundred criteria evaluated in three categories, Bonhoeffer satisfies eighty-nine (seventy essential and nineteen non-essential), he fails to satisfy four (all non-essential), and seven are indeterminate or inapplicable (five essential and two non-essential). Of the seventy-five essential criteria, seventy are met and five are indeterminate or inapplicable; he does not violate any of these. Of the twenty-five non-essential criteria, nineteen are met. Disregarding the seven indeterminate or inapplicable

[904]Ibid., 1498.

criteria and the four unmet, non-essential criteria, eighty-nine remain, all of which Bonhoeffer satisfies. The results clearly indicate that, on the basis of this model, Bonhoeffer can be deemed a practical, prophetic mystic in receipt of divine calling. Moreover, his participation in violence and his manner of behaviour can be viewed as righteous and divinely sanctioned in accordance with Jehanne's example.

At a memorial service held shortly after Bonhoeffer's death, it was noted that, "[a]s one of a noble company of martyrs of differing traditions, he represents both the resistance of the believing soul, in the name of God, to the assault of evil, and also the moral and political revolt of the human conscience against injustice and cruelty. He and his fellows [co-conspirators] are indeed built upon the foundation of the Apostles and the Prophets."[905] Like Jehanne, Bonhoeffer heeded the call to live an extraordinary, mystical life of divine servantship.

Application of the model demonstrates compatibility between the theologies of Jehanne and Bonhoeffer. This common ground constitutes an ecumenical aspect in the concrete expression of Catholic and Protestant experiential, practical, prophetic, mystical theology. The similarities—consisting in the criteria derived from Jehanne which Bonhoeffer satisfies—reflect various aspects of divine servantship that are potentially constant, transcending barriers of time, gender, social class, and denomination. This is noteworthy from a theological perspective, and from a practical one as it directs attention to what might be considered some of the most basic, enduring, and fundamental features, expectations, and requirements of active, concrete, faithful engagement in the world in the form of divine servantship. The fact that this case study confirms the ecumenical nature and applicability of the model lends strength to the model itself.

As mysticism is experiential in nature, experiential mysticism is the only possible form of real mysticism, as distinct from mysticism as pure doctrine, (i.e., theoretical and/or analytical treatment of mysticism). Bonhoeffer's case demonstrates that the experiential is more instructive than a purely or primarily theoretical or analytical approach to mysticism. When confronted with facts, when it became necessary to apply theory to concrete reality, Bonhoeffer found it necessary to revise theoretical theology and transform it into experiential theology. It is such applied theology that is most instructive in evaluating claims to divine sanction in acts of war since these are concrete

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[905]Bell, July 27, 1945; quoted in Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 931.

situations requiring the application of theory which, in the process, becomes transformed into experiential knowledge. Theory alone is limited and cannot actually provide knowledge since knowledge derives from experience; hence, theory serves as a substitute for knowledge in the absence of experience.

Brief Reflection on the Case Studies and the Model

We have examined and applied the model to two case studies revolving around the same event and found that one claimant (Bonhoeffer) emerges as a prophet and the other (Hitler) as a false prophet. These case studies demonstrate the thoroughness with which claims to divine sanction ought to be evaluated, and they also suggest accuracy in the evaluations conducted since the results seem to concur with general reasoned opinion insofar as Hitler is more commonly associated with evil than goodness and Bonhoeffer is more widely viewed as benevolent than malevolent. This indicates that the one hundred criteria constitute a potentially effective measuring device with respect to claims of divinely sanctioned violence given that the model was constructed external to the case studies and, to that extent, provides an objective means of evaluation. Objectivity is also afforded by the model in that, under it, all claims are subject to the same scrutiny, (i.e., the same criteria). Hence, the model provides a systematized and standardized approach to assessing claims of divinely sanctioned violence. While emotional responses are likely to arise with respect to a given case, (and these are not necessarily irrelevant[906]), the model serves to focus the evaluation process on facts pertaining to the stipulated criteria and thereby prevents the process from being overwhelmed entirely by emotional considerations.

The case studies demonstrate that, with respect to their involvement in the events of World War II, Bonhoeffer and Hitler viewed (or represented) themselves as acting in accordance with some form of divine sanction (as they understood or employed it), but with extremely different intentions and consequences. These studies should set off an alarm in view of the fact that Hitler, whose claim to divine sanction is clearly repudiated by the assessment, acquired a following of millions complicit in his evil while Bonhoeffer, whose claim to divine sanction is confirmed by the assessment, was supported by a small minority. Weil recognizes the critical dynamic of such situations,

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[906]Emotions can serve a useful purpose when triggered by sympathy, conscience, or righteous considerations. Recall that the suppression of emotions facilitated the perpetration of Nazi atrocities.

pointing to the facility with which the social can be mistaken for the religious, "as a false diamond is like a real one, so that those who have no spiritual discernment are effectively taken in."[907]

> The trap of traps, the almost inevitable trap, is the social one. Everywhere, always, in everything, the social feeling produces a perfect imitation of faith, that is to say perfectly deceptive. This imitation has the great advantage of satisfying every part of the soul. That which longs for goodness believes it is fed. . . .
>
> It is almost impossible to distinguish faith from its social imitation. All the more so because the soul can contain one part of true faith and one of imitation faith. It is almost but not quite impossible.[908]

Jehanne's model, when carefully and correctly employed, can facilitate this nearly impossible yet critical task described by Weil, serving to distinguish faith from its social imitation, as the case studies demonstrate. In light of the tragic consequences evidenced by history of the failure to draw this distinction, the model constitutes a valuable tool.

In addition to evaluating claims to divine sanction in general, the model can also serve in assessing claims invoking Jehanne specifically in support of a given agenda. Lawrence Cunningham points out that "both the Nazi-backed Vichy government and the Gaullist government in exile" invoked Jehanne in support of their opposing causes during World War II,[909] and Hitler himself vowed that the National Socialist state would "wage a hundred years' war, if necessary, to stamp out and destroy every last trace within its boundaries of" internal resistance[910]—a possible allusion to Jehanne's mission to rid France of every single one of the occupying enemy and to break Burgundian (i.e., internal) opposition to the French king.[911] It is strongly recommended that no such invocation of Jehanne be considered apart from the model of righteous warfare and human agency by which it can be appropriately measured.

A further achievement of the case studies and the model is that they demonstrate and draw attention to the personal nature of war, of engaged conscience, and of responsibility, even amidst a profoundly impersonal, industrial, mechanistic process of human evil, because all these things are fundamentally and essentially personal, no matter what face is put on them.

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[907]Weil, *Waiting for God*, 5.

[908]Ibid., 129.

[909]Cunningham, *Catholic Heritage*, 77.

[910]Hitler, July 13, 1934; quoted in Domarus, 260.

[911]Jehanne, letter to the English dated March 22, 1429; reproduced in Pernoud and Clin, 33-4. Citation is from Pernoud and Clin, 34.

It should be noted that the case studies reveal individuals who either satisfy or fail to satisfy all three categories. It might happen, however, that an individual will be found to satisfy one category but not the other two, or two categories but not the other one. This is also instructive as it might indicate an individual in receipt of divine, prophetic calling who fails to respond righteously to some extent, or it could indicate one who behaves righteously in the absence of divine prophetic calling as outlined by the criteria. In any case, the model (when applied properly) serves to contextualize the activities of its subject and helps to provide insight and clarity with respect to those activities.

It should also be noted that, although a relatively detailed written analysis has been performed in the context of each case study in order to demonstrate the process of applying the model appropriately, it is not necessary that one compose such lengthy, written analyses in implementing the model, although one might find it useful to do so. One might instead utilize the appendix as a concise checklist for evaluating claims to divine sanction by placing an 'X' through those criteria which are not fulfilled and a diagonal line through those that are indeterminate or inapplicable in a given case, allowing one to evaluate degree of conformity quite simply. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that considerable thought must nevertheless be exercised in performing all assessments via the model, whether written or not—this is inevitable if one is to evaluate such important issues comprehensively, seriously, and effectively.

What we have is a model which constitutes a tool for thoroughly assessing claims to divinely sanctioned violence and whose accuracy has been tentatively substantiated via two test-runs. The model provides a systematic, standardized, extensive approach to evaluating claims to divine sanction in warfare in a relatively objective and potentially ecumenical manner, serving to discourage a purely emotional response to a given claim. It also serves to distinguish between mystical-social calls to violence and the purely social call, between faith and its imitation, between prophecy and false prophecy, by contextualizing the activities of a claimant in a useful format for understanding them. Moreover, it exposes the personal nature of war, conscience, and responsibility and calls individuals to recognize this and to respond appropriately. Finally, the model serves not only to facilitate the assessment of claims to divine sanction in general, but it also serves in evaluating invocations of Jehanne specifically in support of violence. All of these are very useful accomplishments. It is now time to

consider the achievements and implications not only of the model but of the entire undertaking to comprehend Jehanne's claim to divine sanction and its ongoing significance with respect to human violence. To that end, let us proceed to a final conclusion.

CONCLUSION

We set out to determine what insights and wisdom Jehanne's example offers regarding evaluation of claims to divine sanction in acts of war and found that she fits within the Jewish and Christian prophetic traditions as a mystic who perceived and heeded a divine call to participate actively in the establishment of just peace at a particular time and place in human history at great cost to herself. While Jehanne's behaviour was found to resonate with many traditional just war criteria, it was established that her example encompasses a greater number of critical aspects than those stipulated within the just war model, not least of which are the characteristic righteousness and uncompromising appeal to divinity which dominated her activities. Moreover, just war theory was found to rely upon utilitarian calculation, which serves a human purpose and is inherently fallible and susceptible to abuse, whereas Jehanne relied upon guidance in the form of divine revelation and trusted in incalculable outcomes on the basis of faith in a divine purpose. As a saint, Jehanne is considered an exemplar, and a concrete model constructed in the form of one hundred criteria extracted from her example has proven tenable in evaluating claims to divinely sanctioned violence presented by Adolf Hitler and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer (presumably inadvertently) mirrored Jehanne's behaviour closely with respect to the stipulated criteria while Hitler failed to accord with ninety percent of the criteria. In essence, Hitler and Bonhoeffer were found to constitute a double-edged sword, representing opposite sides of the same event.

The model provides a comprehensive and potentially effective basis for discernment with respect to claims of divine sanction in acts of war. In addition to being evaluative, it is also prescriptive in suggesting that one who engages in necessary acts of violence ought to do so in accordance with Jehanne's example insofar as possible. For instance, Jehanne's model of righteous behaviour encompasses such essential characteristics as the necessity of exercising undifferentiated compassion and respect for the sanctity of life when applying any necessary, minimal force against others while also acknowledging human free will and individual responsibility. The model does not

constitute a moral aberration but supports many commonly held ethical values with respect to obligations and prohibitions, values that are too frequently violated, such as the obligation to respect human dignity and prohibition against torture. Hence, in addition to its strictly theological (and ecumenical) elements, the model serves to identify, compile, organize, concentrate, and contain many traditionally shared (secular-theological) moral values, formulating them into a powerful and compelling whole which renders them difficult to overlook or ignore. In fact, given that the model substantially represents shared values and calls individuals to account in the preservation of these values, one might be considered remiss in ignoring it. The theological component of the evaluation of Jehanne is equally important as it demonstrates that the compelling claim to divine sanction takes shape in the life of a prophet and affects the prophet's life in some specific and significant ways (stipulated in the first segment of the model). The fact that there is a general pattern to the unfolding of prophetic life which renders it identifiable serves in discerning the sincerity or insincerity of prophetic claims—this must not be ignored.

It is quite irrelevant whether or not an individual assessing another's claim to divinely sanctioned violence believes in God or not; the fact that the claimant must believe in God in order for a claim to have any merit is absolutely essential, and the assessor must know at least how to identify not only such belief, but the depth of such belief. The model serves to facilitate discernment in this regard, not only with respect to the indicators of divine, prophetic calling, but also in relation to the prophet's manner of engaging in righteous warfare and human agency in general. The three segments of the model thus comprise a functioning unity representative of the practical, prophetic mystic's manner of divine servantship.

Jehanne's example was chosen because it is compelling, it is exceptionally well-documented, it is theologically supported and ecclesiastically validated (through canonization), and it is enduring. I did not set out to identify a particular number of criteria but to examine Jehanne's story thoroughly and to extract aspects of her life, experience, thought, character, and behaviour indicative of her faith manifested in relationship with God and its expression in her relationship with fellow humans, granting particular attention to her military activities. That one hundred criteria were identified was a serendipitous outcome given that it facilitates calculation of percentage

of conformity to the model.[1] That this endeavour yielded such a large number of criteria, rendering the model extremely comprehensive, is a result of the abundant material available concerning Jehanne's short but active life. It is also a consequence of my commitment to discerning and representing Jehanne's message as thoroughly as possible.

It should be emphasized that the model is based entirely upon Jehanne's example—which is evident in the citation of sources throughout the first three chapters—and that the case studies did not influence the model as they were necessarily conducted after the model was created, and it would have defeated my entire purpose of honouring Jehanne's message to allow the case studies to influence the model. The results of the case studies were not, therefore, predetermined or manipulated; they, too, are thoroughly referenced, indicating that they were conducted with integrity. In selecting the case studies for examination, it was anticipated that Bonhoeffer would fare better than Hitler in the assessment and this was considered beneficial in demonstrating application of the model to diverse cases. However, it was not known in advance to what extent either individual would conform or fail to conform to the model until the detailed evaluations were completed. Moreover, regardless of any anticipated outcome, the facts speak for themselves in applying the model; hence, any such anticipation does not constitute a liability in carrying out an assessment. Rather, it is a function of the model to confirm or deny anticipated outcomes.

With respect to how it was determined which criteria should be considered essential and which ones non-essential but potentially indicative of divine sanction, the matter was approached from a logical perspective. While the majority of the criteria (seventy-five percent) are recognized as essential, allowance was made for divine autonomy, for recognition of the fact that God is not predictable, that human knowledge cannot be complete or entirely accurate in such matters, and that different circumstances might warrant different attitudes and behaviours. It was necessary that I proceed on my own discretion in selecting which criteria ought to be designated non-essential. The decision was made individually in each of the twenty-five instances wherein a criterion was deemed non-essential and, therefore, each has a potentially different rationale behind it. For instance, it does not seem essential that an individual demonstrate initial hesitation, reluctance, resistance, fear, or doubt with respect to divine calling since lack

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[1]Note that this is not a predictive calculation of the utilitarian type; it is a factual calculation.

of such a response would not likely have any negative bearing on fulfillment of the prophetic task; although these constitute characteristics of the prophetic response in the Jewish and Christian prophetic traditions and are also exemplified by Jehanne, it is conceivable that a prophet might not respond in such a manner to divine calling and this would not necessarily render the calling or the response invalid, less effective, or less appropriate. On the other hand, lack of humility might interfere significantly with a prophet's ability to fulfill a divine calling effectively; hence, humility is deemed an essential criterion.

The case studies demonstrate the ongoing relevance of Jehanne's example; this is consistent with the notion that divine revelation offers perpetually relevant and applicable wisdom and that Truth (divine truth) is unchanging and eternal. In other words, if something is True (in the divine sense of ultimate truth) then, presumably, it is, always has been, and always will be so. Heschel maintains that "the manner in which the prophets dealt with the issues of their own time and . . . the solutions they propounded seem to be relevant for all times,"[2] and Watts holds that "[t]he predisposition and action of God towards humanity is ever the same, for his nature does not change, and an event in time and space does not alter his attitude to us; it simply reveals his attitude."[3] Likewise, human behaviour has arguably remained essentially unchanged throughout history, although we are capable of changing it. "While we may learn from the past," Ronald Wright observes, "we don't seem to learn much," and every time that "history repeats itself, the price goes up."[4] He notes, for example, that the death toll from the wars of the twentieth century surpasses one hundred million, twice the population of the former Roman Empire at its peak, which eventually collapsed.[5] Humanity's "best chance for avoiding the fate of past societies," Wright asserts, "is that we know about those past societies. We can see how and why they went wrong." If we fail to learn from the past, he predicts, "this new century will not grow very old before we enter an age of chaos and collapse that will dwarf all the dark ages in our past."[6] History repeats itself and is therefore circular as well as linear, unless humanity chooses to learn from past experience and alter our course.

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[2]Heschel, *Prophets: Part II*, 184.

[3]Watts, 78.

[4]Ronald Wright, *A Short History of Progress* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc., 2004), 107, 120.

[5]Ronald Wright, 82, 121.

[6]Ronald Wright, 131-2.

Indeed, in many respects, looking at history is like gazing into a mirror. However, in addition to seeing how past societies erred, history also offers an opportunity to observe what past societies or individuals did well, how wars and other destructive behaviours were prevented or stopped. It is this possibility of learning from the past, combined with awareness of the power of individuals in shaping human experience and history, which constitutes perhaps the greatest ongoing relevance of history and of Jehanne in particular, who altered the course of history by restoring French autonomy and initiating the end of the Hundred Years' War. Should one wish to label Jehanne anachronistic and, as such, irrelevant in spite of the obvious ongoing relevance of history, then one must ask how true this must also be of Plato, Jesus, Galileo and, in fact, the whole of history extending back more than a few years.

This work does not claim to achieve the impossible, that is, to prove the authenticity of Jehanne's claim (or any claim) to divine sanction, but it presents the compelling nature of her claim[7] and its compatibility with established prophetic traditions and with commonly held human values and internationally recognized human rights. Moreover, it examines Jehanne's role in the achievement of just peace during her era and demonstrates the applicability of her example with respect to active opposition to the evil which raged throughout Europe under Hitler some five hundred years later, suggesting that, should her example be emulated, (not in isolated aspects, but quite thoroughly), it might be employed constructively by individuals to the benefit of humanity in the promotion of justice and peace currently and in the future. The model derived from Jehanne might be viewed as a proposition capable of promoting goodness, as one hundred security checks against false prophecy and evil. In fact, it is more than a proposition; it is a call to critical reflection and responsibility in responding to claims of divinely sanctioned violence.

The model is so straightforward, comprehensive, and contained that, if applied properly, (i.e., with thoroughness, integrity, and thoughtfulness), it poses relatively little danger. In fact, the Bible seems more susceptible to abuse than the model, ambiguous and internally contradictory as it is. We have seen that ethical norms are also potentially dangerous and susceptible to abuse; that something is normative does not render it necessarily good or sufficient, yet the fact that it is normative might imbue it with a false sense of correctness or goodness. Take, for example, the fact that slavery was once

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[7]Similarly, Jesus' claim cannot be proven legitimate but has been taken as compelling by many.

normative and considered appropriate. Furthermore, we have observed that utilitarian-based ethical systems (which rely on impossible calculation and lack security against self-serving application) are insufficient and susceptible to abuse. Hence, the model is not more dangerous than what is commonplace in human society; all human systems are fallible. It is conceivable that Jehanne's model might serve to safeguard against many insufficiencies and abuses of current 'ethical' practice and, in that regard, it might pose an inconvenience, and possibly a hindrance, to those who do not wish their activities to be closely scrutinized.

As informative as the Hitler and Bonhoeffer assessments are, the model will need to be applied properly and thoroughly to more than two cases in order for its merits to be adequately validated and any possible shortcomings exposed. The case studies do, however, confirm the values advocated by the model and thus provide foundational evidence of the model's potential viability and its usefulness in distinguishing between more and less compelling claims to divine sanction. It is anticipated that, the more the model is applied appropriately to such claims, the more its internal integrity, value, and usefulness will be demonstrated; in fact, the model invites individuals to utilize it and to test its ongoing viability. It might, for example, be applied to such cases as that of Alice Auma (Lakwena) of Uganda whose claim to divine sanction of war in the nineteen-eighties led to establishment of the Lord's Resistance Army, or to the case of the American-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Of course, its optimal purpose is to serve in the evaluation of claims as they arise so that they might be responded to appropriately.

As the model can be employed by many individuals with respect to a given case, it might serve to open critical dialogue around a claim such that any discrepancies between assessments by various individuals might be resolved, or at least challenged, where misapplication of the model appears to have taken place. The model calls for thoroughness in the evaluation of claims to divinely sanctioned violence by steering assessments in the direction of the numerous criteria, and it assists in recognizing and unpacking the language of those claiming divine sanction, revealing critical differences between prophet and false prophet, between one who is willing to sacrifice all that belongs to him/herself personally in the call to violence and one who is willing to sacrifice only others (little or nothing personally) in the call to violence, between one who desires to liberate and one who desires to oppress, one who desires justice and one

who thrives on injustice, one who ultimately seeks peace and an end to war and one who initiates war as a first resort.

In addition to its evaluative and prescriptive elements, Jehanne's model is also potentially remedial, which is to say that, if humanity were to act in accordance with it, there would be less warfare and a reduction of evil in war. "Her holiness is a beautiful example for lay people engaged in politics," writes Benedict XVI, "especially in the most difficult situations. . . . St Joan of Arc invites us to a high standard of Christian living: to make prayer the guiding motive of our days; to have full trust in doing God's will, . . . to live charity without favouritism, without limits and drawing" from divine love.[8] The model offers a method for measuring conformity to Jehanne's exemplary standard of living. In light of nuclear technology and the fact that many have called upon and continue to utter the name of God in support of violence, it is imperative, if humans are to have reasonable hope of avoiding unnecessary destruction and possible annihilation at our own hands, that we do not ignore but identify and consider very thoughtfully and systematically all claims to divinely sanctioned violence.

[8]Benedict XVI, "Saint Joan of Arc," General Audience, January 26, 2011.

APPENDIX

MODEL OF RIGHTEOUS WARFARE AND HUMAN AGENCY

Divine, Prophetic Calling Criteria		Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency Criteria			
1	receipt of divine revelation (e.g., visions, auditions) calling one to a specified task	1	undifferentiated compassion/mercy/ forgiveness	40	does not define or claim elaborate understanding of God/ accepts Divine Mystery
2	discernment of spirits (charism)	2	honours the sanctity of life	41	does not hold God responsible for human evil
3	offers oneself as an instrument of God and willing conduit for divine grace (decision aspect)	3	respects the dignity of the person	42	does not claim divine sanction with respect to all of one's actions but only those founded on divine revelation
4	actively engages in divine servantship/ operates under willing obedience to divine (vs. human) authority/ surrender of personal will to divine will/ views oneself as being in an absolute relation to the Divine	4	fully-engaged conscience	43	exercises personal responsibility and accountability before God and others
5	submits to divine judgment and lives in constant awareness of this judgment	5	operates from a driving force of love§	44	accepts unknown consequences/ uncertainty
6	shares in God's happiness, sadness, concern, sympathy, and aspirations for the world/active concern for humanity	6	genuine distress concerning all bloodshed/not desensitized to violence or suffering	45	exercises independent thought
7	destabilizing presence in an unjust social system/exhortation to improve condition of humanity/serves the repair of the world and the common good	7	sense of duty to God/ God served first in all things	46	offers a merciful gift/ promise of a better future§§
8	lived witnessing of faith in God	8	love of God/piety	47	normally upholds customary moral laws

Divine, Prophetic Calling (continued)		Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency (continued)			
9	courage (inner strength) in responding to divine directive/accomplishing task	9	fear of God	48	does not proclaim divine condemnation of others
10	general attentiveness	10	permits nothing to come between self and God/accepts no human deterrent	49	possible temporary suspension of universal ethic in some regard in relation to a divinely sanctioned higher *telos*
11	humility	11	mystical relationship transcends institutionalization or religious formulae/ mystical defiance	50	charism/spiritual gifts/uncanny abilities (including but not limited to those cited under Divine, Prophetic Calling column)/mediates grace
12	production of good fruit	12	conviction/ determination/ persistence/endurance/ uncompromised, singular commitment to declared mission	51	honest disposition/ transparency
13	initial hesitation/ reluctance/resistance/ fear/doubt	13	does not engage in or encourage suicide/ does not seek suffering or martyrdom	52	straightforward, honest language/forthrightness
14	apparent absurdity requiring faith in God	14	reluctantly accepts suffering or martyrdom if necessary to mystical witnessing	53	unambiguous public statement of purpose and method
15	prior lack of inclination, skill, or capacity to behave in required manner	15	steadfast faith in God and divine revelation	54	reliability/consistency/ constancy
16	feelings of inadequacy	16	apprehension of the intrinsically evil nature of human violence and war/does not attempt to qualify evil	55	strives with the world, with self, and with God

Divine, Prophetic Calling (continued)		Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency (continued)			
17	feelings of unworthiness to carry out the mission, accompanied by assurance of divine assistance and creating a dependency on God	17	recognition of personal defilement sustained through the use of violence	56	expression of the sublime absolutely in the pedestrian‡
18	severe disruption to or break from previous lifestyle	18	deep sensitivity to evil vs. indifference	57	wisdom/ sound judgment
19	personal risk/ encounters hostility/persecution as a result of prophetic ministry	19	impatient with injustice/prone to righteous anger	58	undergoes mystical 'dark night'/struggle with pain and suffering
20	experiences intense solitude/stands as the particular against the status quo	20	righteous character (not self-righteous)/ ethical code of conduct (e.g., chivalry)/moral discernment/holds self and others to high ethical standard of behaviour	59	demonstrates grace in extreme suffering
21	ability to prophesy (charism)	21	teaches by example over doctrine	60	embodies paradox
22	ability to perform miracles (charism)	22	service-oriented/ work ethic/ disinclination toward idleness or sloth	61	canonization/holiness/ posthumous miracles
Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare Criteria		23	seeks to empower the disenfranchised/ partisan with the wrongly oppressed	62	identification with a particular, well-established prophecy‡‡
1	appeal to most sovereign authority (divinity)	24	honours personal responsibility in maintenance of social justice	§ Jehanne demonstrated a love of human dignity, love of peace, love of justice, love of compassion, love of integrity, love of conscience, love of charity, love of freedom, love of life, love of service, love of humility, love of courage, love of sanctity, love of faith, . . . and, above all, love of God. Love was the animating force which operated through her with respect to all else; it coursed through her veins.	
2	defensive, not offensive	25	protects/defends others at potential cost to self		
3	not pre-emptive	26	direct participation in mission in a position of vulnerability		
4	last resort/entreats the enemy to leave or desist peacefully/ ultimatum	27	refuses to love evil/ actively opposes evil		

Divinely Sanctioned Righteous Warfare (continued)		Divinely Sanctioned Human Agency (continued)		§§ Jehanne's gift was multifold: peace, justice, freedom, courage, charity, compassion, forgiveness, faith, hope, love, grace . . . ‡ Jehanne brought the sublime qualities of compassion, humility, gratitude, charity, respect, dignity, nobility, justice, conscience, sanctity, and love to all manner of activity in which she engaged. ‡‡ This refers to association with long-existent prophecy, demonstrating a lack of arbitrariness.
5	aims to establish just peace	28	prefers peace to war and non-violence to violence	
6	proportionate cause	29	does not glorify violence or war	
7	does not operate from vengeance or hatred	30	concern for spiritual welfare of self and others/apprehension of spiritual implications	
8	does not seek to acquire new territory but might protect or recover rightful lands	31	benevolence/kindness/ does not engage in cruelty	
9	does not seek domination of others (oppression)	32	generosity/charity	
10	does not engage in holy war	33	rejects personal glorification and idolization	
11	formal declaration of intent to engage in war/warning	34	is not motivated by self-fulfillment or material gain	
12	employs minimal appropriate force (proportionality)/ minimal bloodshed/ forbids unnecessary evil/excessive force	35	refuses to benefit from anything unjustly acquired	
13	does not target noncombatants	36	clarity of purpose	
14	does not employ torture	37	sincerity/authenticity	
15	does not inflict suffering for its own sake	38	integrity	
16	forbids looting	39	treats God as a Subject, not an object to be bent to one's will	

	Essential criteria
	Non-essential criteria

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