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The social and economic impact of the Williamite war on Ireland, 1689–91

Alan J. Smyth

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

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Summary

Events during the Williamite war in Ireland (1689–91) such as the siege of Derry, the battle of the Boyne and the signing of the treaty of Limerick, remain well-known incidents in popular Irish history, while the Jacobite defeat ensured the privileged status of Protestants in Ireland and subsequently enabled the passing of the Penal Laws. The main events and course of this important conflict have previously been well documented, but the more immediate impact of the war, specifically its social and economic effects on the general population, has remained largely unexplored.

The initial outbreak of the war was in Ulster, and the motivation behind the armed resistance of the province's large Protestant population to James's rule is assessed. Jacobite attempts to subdue these groups failed, and during their withdrawal from the siege of Derry they engaged in the deliberate destruction of property across central and southern Ulster. The civilians that remained in Derry during the siege endured significant hardship, resulting in various attempts to secure emergency supplies of food and fuel for the city and its environs. The arrival of a Williamite expeditionary force secured the province for the remainder of the war, although other problems remained, such as actions by rapparees and tensions between Williamite soldiers and the civilian population.

The heightened religious tensions across Ireland during James's reign were particularly evident in Dublin city, where friction due to changes to the religious structures of society, such as the army and civic bodies, was evident on the city's streets. Eyewitness testimony details how these tensions were heightened with the outbreak of the war, as restrictions on Protestants gradually increased until the Jacobite defeat at the battle of the Boyne. Dublin was very fortunate to largely escape destructive military action or plundering following the battle, and the city came back into Williamite hands and under Protestant control. The impact of these transfers of power was a significant factor in the experience of the war for both Catholics and Protestants.

Following the battle of the Boyne the Jacobite army and its supporters retreated towards Limerick, with poor discipline resulting in much plundering of

civilians on the main routes to the city, as recorded in detail by members of the Quaker community. Detailed first-hand evidence such as this is quite rare, and their accounts are thoroughly assessed. For the remainder of the conflict the country was divided in two along the line of the river Shannon, and civilians living along this frontier saw significant hardship. This region bore a substantial burden of quartering troops from both sides, with associated frictions between soldiers and the civilians they were billeted with. The importance of this relationship between soldiers and civilians means it is investigated in depth, particularly during the long winter periods between campaigning seasons.

The irregular forces known as rapparees were particularly active in this region, targeting Williamite soldiers, but also plundering civilians. Their composition, activities and motivations are assessed, as are the Williamite attempts to counter these rapparees, which resulted in further restrictions on ordinary Catholics, especially in these frontier areas. A major factor in civilians' experience of the war was the overwhelming burden of having to supply these two large armies with food, supplies, horses and fodder, with the compulsory purchase of goods and other restrictions becoming commonplace. In the reduced Jacobite territory, primarily around Connacht, the impact was particularly severe. This resulted in high prices and food shortages, and the impact of the final year of the war in this area is examined from several perspectives.

The extended impact of these various issues is assessed through the examination of various landed estates across the country, as landlords attempted to recover from the war's adverse effects even prior to its conclusion. They were hampered by the destruction and dangerous environment caused by the conflict, which had driven many tenants from their homes and caused them to abandon their leases. The attempt by Derry corporation to use the positive view of their city's contribution to the Williamite war effort as leverage to secure grants and help the area's recovery is explored, as is the large Ormond estate across Kilkenny and Tipperary, which demonstrated the varying levels of destruction and disruption to normal life caused by the war in different areas. These case studies are complemented by an analysis of the hearth tax records for each county over a twenty-year period, which help to quantify the significant regional impact caused by the Williamite war on the people of Ireland.

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David Dickson has supervised my research in TCD since I began my MPhil thesis in late 2007. I was fortunate enough to continue to work with him on my PhD research, where his knowledge of source material across the period was indispensible for a project of this nature, while his advice and guidance throughout have been very much appreciated. The structure of the TCC programme meant I was also privileged to have the input of two additional supervisors, Robert Armstrong and Pádraig Lenihan. Both have been very generous with their time and encouragement, and have given me invaluable feedback on various chapters and ideas.

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Introduction

The Williamite war in Ireland (1689–91) formed part of the larger European Nine Years' War (1688–97), with a Grand Alliance of European nations uniting to counter the threat from the powerful French state of Louis XIV. The warfare in Ireland involved troops from across the continent, including French, Dutch, Danes and Germans, but the main consequence of the Irish dimension of the conflict was the securing of the English, Scottish and Irish crowns for the Protestant King William III, following his usurpation of the Catholic King James II in December 1688. The Williamite victory and resulting land settlement are also regarded as laying the foundations for the political and social dominance of Protestantism in Ireland throughout the following two centuries. These political, dynastic and international aspects of the war have tended to overshadow histories of the period, resulting in a disproportionate emphasis being placed on the politics behind the conflict and the main engagements of the military campaign itself. As a result it has been noted that 'the war of the foot-soldier, the rapparee and the ordinary civilian still awaits its historian', and this thesis aims to address some of these historiographical deficiencies.[1]

The position of the war and its status within overall Irish historiography has long influenced the treatment of the more mundane issues relating to its immediate impact. The Williamite war tends to form the conclusion to histories of the seventeenth century, with its consequences often relegated to the status of an epilogue. In studies of Ireland during the eighteenth century it is often used in an introductory manner, while the wide-reaching political and social effects of the immediate aftermath of the war—such as the Treaty of Limerick, the subsequent land settlement, and the beginnings of the Penal Law system—tend to shape the historical perspective and overall treatment of the conflict. Indeed, the war's status as a social and political turning point has been quite dominant in the historiography of the period. This is epitomised by the contemporary Gaelic poet Dáibhí Ó Bruadair's oft-quoted analogy, in which he described the social and political status of Catholics within Ireland in the aftermath of the war as a

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[1] Ian McBride, *Eighteenth Century Ireland* (Dublin, 2009), p. 180.

'shipwreck'.[2] This is undoubtedly an extremely important issue, and one of long-term importance to Irish society, which is thereby deserving of its widespread treatment by the historical community. However, this societal 'shipwreck' for Irish Catholics, and the long-term social and political changes brought about by the war, have tended to overshadow the actual physical destruction, personal hardship, social tensions and localised devastation inflicted across the country, on ordinary people of all faiths during the conflict, in the manner of any other war across Europe during the early modern era.

J.G. Simms is widely viewed as the foremost historian of the Jacobite period in Ireland, and indeed the most comprehensive study of Ireland across the entire period from James II's accession to the signing of the Treaty of Limerick remains his 1969 work, *Jacobite Ireland*.[3] It gives an overview of the political and social environment in Ireland in 1685, an analysis of the king's policies during the early years of his reign, and a political and military survey of the war itself. However, while *Jacobite Ireland* provides excellent political context and background to the period, other issues remain underexplored, such as the wartime experience for ordinary civilians and soldiers, or the more general activities of the two armies, particularly during the lengthy winter periods that fell between the campaigning seasons. Simms' work on the period was by no means limited to this volume, and his doctoral research formed the basis for his 1956 analysis of the Williamite land settlement.[4] He also produced a wide range of articles on the war itself, dealing with individual figures such as Patrick Sarsfield, or specific issues such as the peace negotiations at the end of the war. Many of these articles referred to the impact of the war in specific counties or geographical areas, and were published in a variety of local history journals.[5] They provide a good basis for discussing the effects of the war on a regional basis, although there has been no attempt to link any of these individual discussions together to look at the social effects of the war. Similarly, the focus of the majority of these articles remains predominately on military and political

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[2] J.G. Simms, *Jacobite Ireland, 1685–91* (second edition, Dublin, 2000), p. 267; McBride, *Eighteenth Century Ireland*, p. 160.
[3] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland.*
[4] J.G. Simms, *The Williamite confiscation in Ireland 1690–1703* (London, 1956).
[5] Many of these articles have been collected and reprinted in J.G. Simms, *War and politics in Ireland, 1649–1730*, ed. by David Hayton and Gerard O'Brien (London, 1986).

affairs, rather than social or economic factors. In addition, Simms' large contribution to the study of the 1680s and 1690s in Ireland likely dissuaded other authors from focusing on the period. James McGuire was the main contributor to this period of Irish history for several decades following Simms, until the more recent emergence of scholars such as Ivar McGrath, John Bergin and Patrick Walsh, although again these authors have primarily written from a political perspective.[6]

The lasting historical significance of the war and the popularity of military history has meant that there are a wide variety of works focusing on its military course and political consequences, the majority of which have focused on the conflict itself, with detailed descriptions of battles and sieges dominating their narratives.[7] However, recent works by Pádraig Lenihan have expanded on these more traditional elements of military history by examining in detail the experience of ordinary soldiers at specific events, such as at the battle of the Boyne and the ill-fated Williamite camp at Dundalk.[8] While the course and outcome of the war are obviously very important, both politically and historically, the direct impact of its major events on the lives of the majority of ordinary people across the country at the time was quite small. Pitched battles such as the Boyne and Aughrim were fought away from main centres of population, while only a select number of Irish towns were actually besieged or directly involved in large-scale military activity, specifically Derry, Athlone, Sligo, Galway and Limerick.

This military dimension is the dominant focus of one of the most recent accounts of the war, that written by John Childs, which is the most

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[6] Relevant works on the period by these authors include: James McGuire, 'The Irish Parliament of 1692', in Thomas Bartlett and David W. Hayton (eds), *Penal Era and Golden Age: Essays in Irish history, 1690–1800* (Belfast, 1979), pp 1–31; Charles Ivar McGrath, *The making of the eighteenth-century Irish constitution: Government, parliament and the revenue, 1692–1714* (Dublin, 2000); John Bergin, 'The Irish Quaker lobby and its influence on Irish legislation, 1692–1705' in *Eighteenth-century Ireland*, xix (2004), pp 9–36; Patrick Walsh, *The making of the Irish Protestant Ascendency: The life of William Conolly, 1662–1729* (Woodbridge, 2010).

[7] Examples of these include W. A. Maguire (ed.) *Kings in conflict: the revolutionary war in Ireland and its aftermath* (Belfast, 1990); Piers Wauchope, *Patrick Sarsfield and the Williamite war* (Blackrock, 1992); Richard Doherty, *The Williamite war in Ireland, 1688–91* (Dublin, 1998); Kjeld Hald Galster, *Danish troops in the Williamite army in Ireland, 1689–91: for king and coffers* (Dublin, 2012).

[8] Pádraig Lenihan, *1690 Battle of the Boyne* (Stroud, 2005); Pádraig Lenihan, 'Unhappy campers: Dundalk (1689) and after' in Tony Pollard and Iain Banks (eds), *Scorched earth: Studies in the archaeology of conflict* (Leiden, 2008), pp 197–216.

comprehensive study of this nature to date.[9] He pays close attention to the military engagements and campaigning periods of the war to give a very detailed record of its main events. He also makes ample use of printed pamphlets and the contemporary accounts of men such as George Story to recount many of the military skirmishes and rapparee raids that took place outside the main battles and campaign seasons. This is worthwhile and it extends the chronology of the war, bringing to light many of the numerous engagements that the two sides were involved in during the non-campaigning winter months. Unfortunately, Childs largely tends to ignore the impact of the war on the ordinary civilian population, or indeed the ordinary soldier, and in particular the impact of these on-going minor military engagements and rapparee attacks.

Research into the conduct of wars across Europe during the seventeenth century and their subsequent impact on civilians has been more widespread than that undertaken specifically on Ireland. Studies into early modern warfare have encompassed themes such as the changing nature of war during the period; the increase in army size and the process of recruitment; what it was like to be a soldier in an early-modern army; as well as the links and tensions between soldiers and civilians.[10] David Parrott has examined the composition and financing of armies, in particular the role of private enterprise in the conduct of war, and he has integrated elements of this work into the long-standing debate on the early modern 'military revolution'.[11] Other recent scholarship has focused on specific issues such as military discipline and its impact on military-civilian

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[9] John Childs, *The Williamite Wars in Ireland, 1688–91* (London, 2007); Childs has previously written on the war itself, with this study building on other articles on the period, see John Childs, 'The Williamite war, 1689–91', in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds), *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), pp 188–210; John Childs, 'The laws of war in seventeenth-century Europe and their application during the Jacobite war in Ireland, 1688–91' in David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan and Clodagh Tait (eds), *Age of atrocity: Violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2007), pp 283–300.

[10] I.A.A. Thompson, '"Money, money and yet more money!" Finance, the fiscal-state and the military revolution: Spain 1500–1650' in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The military revolution debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe* (Oxford, 2004), pp 273–298; Julius R. Ruff, *Violence in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2001); Frank Tallett, *War and society in early-modern Europe, 1495–1715* (London, 1992).

[11] David Parrott, *The business of war: Military enterprise and military revolution in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012); David Parrott, 'From military enterprise to standing armies: war, state and society in western Europe, 1600–1700' in Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (eds), *European warfare: 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 2010), pp 74–95; David Parrott, 'Strategy and tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The "military revolution"' in Rogers (ed.), *The military revolution debate*, pp 227–251.

relations, as well as the conduct of soldiers during periods away from combat, although there remains significant scope for more work in these areas.[12]

From the Irish perspective, a number of historians have examined issues relating to the links between war and society across this period, focusing on the mid-century conflicts in particular. In Pádraig Lenihan's study of the Confederate Catholic war effort in the 1640s he examined the means by which the civilian population had to provide supplies for large numbers of soldiers, and how these armies were paid, which often involved extensive taxation or the outright plundering of civilians.[13] Charles Carlton has written more specifically about the social affects of war during the civil war period in Britain and Ireland.[14] This included the experience of being a soldier during the period, with a discussion of the associated dangers and hardships, but also the specific impact of the conflict on civilians.[15] Peter Edwards has addressed corresponding issues such as the process of supplying soldiers with wages, food, weapons and other supplies, in his examination of logistics and supply in these same conflicts.[16] James Scott Wheeler has taken a similar approach to examining logistics during the wars of the seventeenth century, looking specifically at the efforts of English forces to raise sufficient funds to pay for their armies during the Elizabethan, the Cromwellian, and the Williamite expeditions to Ireland.[17] Other authors have focused on the economic impact of war on the country during the seventeenth century, notably Raymond Gillespie, who has examined this issue primarily

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[12] Markus Meumann, 'Civilians, the French army and military justice during the reign of Louis XIV, circa 1640–1715' in Erica Charters, Eve Rosenhaft and Hannah Smith (eds), *Civilians and war in Europe, 1618–1815* (Liverpool, 2012), pp 100–117; Stephen Conway, 'British soldiers at home: The civilian experience in wartime, 1740–1783' in Charters, Rosenhaft and Smith (eds), *Civilians and war in Europe, 1618–1815*, pp 129–143.

[13] Pádraig Lenihan, *Confederate Catholics at war, 1641–49* (Cork, 2001).

[14] Charles Carlton, *Going to the wars: The experience of the British civil wars 1638–1651* (London, 1992).

[15] Charles Carlton, 'Civilians' in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *The civil wars: A military history of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638–1660* (Oxford, 1998), pp 272–305.

[16] Peter Edwards, 'Logistics and supply', in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer (eds), *The civil wars,* pp 234–271.

[17] James Scott Wheeler, 'The logistics of conquest' in Pádraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and resistance: War in seventeenth century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001), p. 177–210.

through the wars of the 1640s, while Louis Cullen has included an assessment of the impact of war in his surveys of Irish economic history.[18]

Despite this substantial body of research on this issue relating to wars in Ireland during the seventeenth century, the fact remains that the majority of these studies tend to focus primarily on either the Nine Years' War or the decades of conflict in the 1640s and 1650s, with the Williamite war largely being treated as more of an afterthought, or used mainly for comparative purposes. Ian McBride, while discussing the Williamite war in his recent history of Ireland in the long eighteenth century, explicitly noted how 'the impact of the war on civilians is hard to gauge'.[19] Despite this, McBride did attempt to address issues such as military attacks on the civilian population and religious tensions during the Williamite war, but the broad nature of this work means that these could not be explored in detail.[20] Gillespie has similarly described the study of the impact that 'military action had on the wider social and economic world of Ireland' as being 'elusive'.[21] To this end he has attempted to examine the effect of war on localised areas across the country, specifically urban areas, which he deemed to be more manageable areas for studies of this nature.[22] Within these parameters, Gillespie's analysis of the impact of the Williamite war tended to be subordinate to the activities of the 1640s and 1650s, with both his studies on this topic focusing primarily on these mid-century wars. Kenneth Ferguson did explicitly refer to issues such as the indiscipline of soldiers and problems in supplying them with food or forage during the Williamite war in his 1981 thesis on the army in Ireland, although unfortunately these issues were treated only very briefly.[23]

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[18] Raymond Gillespie, 'The Irish economy at war, 1641–52' in Jane Ohlmeyer (ed.), *Ireland from independence to occupation, 1641–60* (Cambridge, 1995), pp 160–80; L.M. Cullen, *Anglo-Irish Trade* (Manchester, 1968); L.M. Cullen, *An economic history of Ireland since 1660* (London, 1972).
[19] Ian McBride, *Eighteenth century Ireland* (Dublin, 2009), p. 176.
[20] For McBride's perspective on the social impact of the war, see: McBride, *Eighteenth century Ireland*, pp 174–80.
[21] Raymond Gillespie, 'War and the Irish town: The early modern experience' in Pádraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and resistance: War in seventeenth-century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001), p. 293.
[22] Raymond Gillespie, 'Urban destruction by war in early modern Ireland' in Martin Körner (ed.), *Destruction and reconstruction of towns: Destruction by the Lord's power, internal troubles and war*, vol. 2 (Bern, 2000), pp 275–88; Gillespie, 'War and the Irish town', pp 293–316.
[23] Kenneth P. Ferguson, 'The army in Ireland from the Restoration to the Act of Union' (PhD thesis, TCD, 1981).

The most likely contributing factor to the overall lack of historical treatment of the social or economic impact of the Williamite war is the widespread assumption that the effect of the war in these physical, social and economic aspects was quite small. Gillespie has described the 'immediate consequences' of the Williamite war as being 'nowhere near as traumatic as those of previous conflicts', noting how it had been a 'shorter, more focused campaign', and 'unlike the 1650s, the country had not experienced the problems of epidemic disease in its aftermath'.[24] He did, however, acknowledge that 'the effects of the war were heavily regional, and recovery was patchy'.[25] This same regional dimension has been highlighted by other authors, such as David Dickson, who specifically acknowledged the physical impact of the war on civilian homes and livestock, particularly that inflicted by irregular elements of both armies, as well as the greater impact on the 'marcher' areas of the war.[26] Unfortunately, much like McBride or Ferguson, the broad nature of this study did not allow for a detailed examination of these issues. When directly compared to the other conflicts in Ireland throughout the seventeenth century, and in particular the lengthy and highly destructive military engagements of the 1640s and 1650s, the Williamite war was not as destructive, nor as disruptive to the civilian population. Nevertheless, simply dismissing these physical and personal effects of the war due to the perception that they were less severe than those of conflicts several decades before does not tell the whole story.

To this end, the aim of this thesis is to investigate these previously under-explored social and economic aspects of the Williamite war in Ireland. During the war the activities of soldiers and rapparees outside of the main campaigning seasons had a much greater personal impact on local populations than the periods when armies were on the move and famous battles were being fought. The official policies of both sides regarding the provisioning and billeting of their forces, or the grazing of their cavalry, directly affected civilians across the country. Unofficial activities of soldiers and their social interactions with the ordinary people among who they lived were influenced by levels of pay, food supply and discipline, and often resulted in incidents of looting or violence. The

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[24] Raymond Gillespie, *Seventeenth century Ireland: Making Ireland modern* (Dublin, 2006), p. 299.
[25] Gillespie, *Seventeenth century Ireland*, p. 299.
[26] David Dickson, *New foundations: Ireland 1660–1800* (second edition, Dublin, 2000), pp 39–42.

activities of irregular forces, known as rapparees, were also largely directed against the civilian population rather than military targets, with consequently high levels of violence and theft. These factors combined to cause significant physical and social disruption and upheaval during the Williamite war, including shortages of food and supplies, the flight of civilians from their homes, and the general destruction of property.

Contemporary histories of the Williamite war tended to concentrate primarily on the military and political perspectives of the war, although this is to be expected given the nature of key eyewitness accounts of the conflict by figures such as George Story or James Stevens, both of whom served directly with the Williamite and Jacobite armies respectively.[27] While these contemporary accounts of the war itself remain important sources for this period, a variety of other sources must also be used in order to address more social issues such as these, which are, by their nature, quite disparate. Estate records and associated correspondence give the perspective of both landowners and their tenants, which is particularly useful as those from the latter group tend to reflect a broader range of the general population than is usually possible from other sources. More official records, such as proclamations and the correspondence of high-ranking officials reflect issues encountered on the ground in their responses to them, such as efforts to counter rapparee activities or orders to prevent plundering of civilians by soldiers. Local government records and the records of administrative bodies are also useful, although in a lot of these cases the records for the period of the Williamite war are no longer extant. The destruction of the records of the parliament that was called at Dublin by James in March 1689 are the most famous example, but in many other cases the records from the period of Catholic dominance of official bodies, such as corporations, were expunged shortly after their reconstitution under Williamite control, leaving unfortunate gaps in otherwise useful records.[28] Nevertheless, making use

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[27] George Story, *An impartial history of the affairs of Ireland during the last two years* (London, 1691); Robert H. Murray (ed.), *The Journal of John Stevens, containing a brief account of the war in Ireland, 1689–91* (Oxford, 1912).

[28] The records from the Jacobite period of the vast majority of corporations across the country have been destroyed, including Belfast, Coleraine, Derry, Drogheda, Dublin, Galway, Trim, Waterford and Youghal.

of a wide variety of sources enables a study of this nature to examine issues that tend to be overlooked.

Drawing on many of these sources, the first chapter of the thesis centres on Ulster, and notes the religious tensions across the country that were heightened following the accession of James II and became even more strained by the policies enacted by the Duke of Tyrconnell. These tensions were most pronounced in Ulster, where the subsequent arming of Protestant and Catholics alike led to the commencement of open conflict at the beginning of the war. The initial military campaign also centred on the province, with the strategic importance and civilian hardship caused by the siege of Derry dominating the historiography of this period of the war. This is examined along with the movement of Jacobite forces across the province, and in particular their actions during their withdrawal from Derry towards Leinster, which caused significant damage to property and land throughout large areas of Ulster. The position of Dublin city is the focus of the second chapter, which further explores the social and religious tensions brought about by the policies of James and Tyrconnell, which caused emigration of Protestants and significant alterations to the social order. This societal shift saw restrictions placed on Protestants in the city upon the outbreak of the war, which gradually increased until their dramatic reversal in July 1690 following the Williamite victory at the battle of the Boyne, and were soon replaced by similar restrictions on the city's Catholic population. The lack of physical damage done to the city in the aftermath of the Boyne is noted and explained, as are the interactions between the city's population and the soldiers from both sides.

This latter issue is the main focus of the third chapter, which examines the relationship between soldiers and civilians across the country, but particularly in the midlands region. For nine months, from September 1690 until May 1691, the area along the frontline between these two regions was heavily occupied by soldiers from both sides, and the interaction between soldiers and civilians would have defined the experience of the war for many ordinary people. The nature of the frontier between the Jacobite and Williamite areas of control during the winter of 1690–91 resulted in an increase in attacks against civilian and military targets by rapparees. The composition and activities of this

disparate group throughout the war are assessed in chapter four, including their relationship with the Jacobite authorities, their impact on civilians and the measures taken to curb their actions. The destruction of the war and the large numbers of soldiers present in the country put pressure on the supply of food and other provisions as the conflict continued. The resulting shortages are assessed in chapter five, along with the heightened difficulties of this nature for the Jacobite authorities and civilians living west of the Shannon in the final year of the war. Finally, the immediate aftermath of the war is examined in chapter six, particularly relating to attempts to repair damage caused by the conflict. The efforts of various landlords to recover and reset their estates even while the war was still being fought is outlined, while the large Ormond estate across Tipperary and Kilkenny allows the impact on tenants and ordinary people to be examined in detail, including the numbers that remained on their land by 1693 and the reasons why others fled their homes during the war. The various elements of this chapter reflect the consequences of many of the factors discussed during the thesis, giving a view of the impact that the Williamite war had on the ordinary people of Ireland, especially on a regional level.

Chapter 1 — Ulster: Origins of the conflict

Introduction

The province of Ulster was unique in Ireland in 1688 in the religious makeup of its population and their political persuasion. With a proportionally higher population of Protestants of the established faith and non-conformists than any other area of Ireland, with the exception of certain urban areas such as Dublin city, the pro-Catholic reforms of King James II and his lord deputy the earl of Tyrconnell were less welcomed in Ulster than elsewhere in Ireland. It subsequently became the starting point for James's military campaign at the outset of the Williamite war. A series of declarations by various Protestant associations against James from January 1689 culminated in the closing of the gates of Derry to him personally on 18 April. The next five months would see the Jacobite army engaged in fighting a variety of Protestant militias across the province and undertaking a full-scale siege of the city of Derry. The main Williamite force under the Duke of Schomberg did not arrive in Carrickfergus until 13 August 1689; two weeks after the siege had been lifted. By this stage control of the vast majority of Ulster had been lost to James and the war moved away from the province as the rest of the country gradually succumbed to William's forces over the next two years.

Despite Ulster being somewhat removed from the main conflicts of the war from this point onwards, significant damage had been caused to parts of the province during the brief Jacobite campaign. The west of Ulster, particularly the areas around Derry and Enniskillen, had seen much fighting, and the damage caused to both property and person was severe. Similarly, the withdrawal of the Jacobite forces from Derry toward Leinster had resulted in significant levels of destruction in counties such as Tyrone and Armagh, while the area to the south-east, near the border with Leinster in counties Armagh and Down saw destruction by military forces from both sides and a flight of the local population. This chapter will aim to examine this damage in detail, as well as the impact of attacks and looting by rapparee groups and theft and destruction by official soldiers from both the Jacobite and Williamite armies. Particular attention will

be given to the city of Derry and its environs through the involvement of the city's corporation, and their initial attempts to commence the recovery of the city in the aftermath of the siege. While Ulster was largely removed from the main actions of the war from the winter of 1689–90 onwards, the damage sustained in this initial period of the war was extensive, and the province's recovery from this period was largely dependent on the extent of the damage in various areas.

Ulster: The basis of Protestant resistance

Given the well-defined religious divisions among the support for the Jacobite and Williamite causes in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1688, the proportion of Protestants in Ulster compared to the rest of Ireland meant that it unsurprisingly acted as the main area of resistance to James II's authority. William Petty's contemporary attempt to gauge the population of Ireland in 1672 estimated the total population at 1.1 million people, with approximately 800,000 Catholics, 200,000 'English', which he divided into 100,000 members of the established faith and 100,000 others, and 100,000 Scots, the majority of whom he accepted were dissenters.[1] The number of adherents to the established church was at its highest in Dublin, which Petty estimated was home to 50,000, leaving a similar number dispersed throughout the rest of the country.[2] The intensive settlement and plantation of Ulster over the course of the seventeenth century had resulted in the proportions of non-Catholics to Catholics outside the capital being at their highest in parts of Ulster, such as Antrim (3:1) and Down (2:1), ranging to significant minorities in counties Monaghan (1:2) and Cavan (1:3).[3] Like the rest of the country the proportion of land owned by Catholics in Ulster was significantly less than non-Catholics, with only 4% of land in Cavan and 2% in Monaghan still remaining in Catholic hands by 1688.[4] The numbers of Protestants in these areas continued to increase, with William J. Smyth noting

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[1] William Petty, *The Political Anatomy of Ireland* (London, 1691) in Charles Henry Hull (ed.), *The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty* (London, 1899), pp 141–2. While Petty's figures have been refined by subsequent authors, these are valid as contemporary estimates and have proven to be reasonably accurate, if perhaps slight underestimates.

[2] See chapter two for an analysis of the religious tensions within Dublin city prior to and during the war itself.

[3] Ian McBride, *Eighteenth century Ireland* (Dublin, 2009), p. 162.

[4] J.G. Simms, 'The Williamite war in south Ulster' in *Clogher Record*, x, no. 1 (1979), p. 155.

that by 1732 the population of parts of Antrim and Down was over 90% Protestant.[5]

Among these non-Catholic settlers there were significant divisions, particularly between the members of the established church and the rapidly growing Presbyterian community in Ulster, as well as other factional and social divides, although by the outbreak of the Williamite war these differences had been largely set aside in favour of a united Protestantism.[6] Raymond Gillespie has suggested that there was less initial hostility among Irish Protestants towards the new Catholic king than among their counterparts in England, as uncertainty regarding the constitutional status of Ireland in relation to England, along with other issues, contributed to some degree of open-mindedness upon his accession in February 1685.[7] Actions highlighted by Gillespie such as the sending of declarations of loyalty to the newly crowned king by corporations in Waterford, Youghal, Dublin and Drogheda, or the lighting of bonfires to celebrate the defeat of the Duke of Monmouth's rebellion in England, suggest that this may have been the case. However, it is more likely that a degree of pragmatism was inherent in these actions, with corporation members being anxious to curry favour with the new monarch and to be seen to be loyal.

In a similar manner, it is likely that the few members of the Irish Protestant elite who continued to support James following the arrival of William to England in December 1688, such as Lord Mountjoy, and the earls of Granard and Longford, were hedging their bets in an attempt to safeguard their personal lands in advance of any prospective repeal of the Restoration land settlement. William had announced his intention to secure 'the Protestant and British interest' in Ireland as part of his *Declaration of Reasons* in September.[8] Support for James was largely absent among less well-off members of the Protestant community, especially among Presbyterians and other Protestant minorities that were particularly populous in Ulster, with the Presbyterian ministers and

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[5] William J. Smyth, *Map-making, landscapes and memory: A geography of colonial and early modern Ireland* c. *1530–1750* (Cork, 2006), p. 409.
[6] Raymond Gillespie, 'The Irish Protestants and James II, 1688–90' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxviii, no. 110 (Nov., 1992), pp 124–33.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Tim Harris, *Revolution: The great crisis of the British monarchy, 1685–1720* (London, 2006), p. 429.

gentlemen from the province sending a delegate to appeal for William's help in November.[9] Even nominal levels of support for James had been largely absent in Ulster in the preceding years, where the greater proportion of non-Catholics may have made Protestants feel more secure within their communities, and thereby bolstered their open opposition to the new king. Indeed, the examples Gillespie includes that demonstrate Protestant resistance to James all seem to come from Ulster, such as the tearing down of the proclamation announcing his accession in Belfast. Likewise, the silencing of the Presbyterian minister David Houston, who had been preaching 'that the accession of a Catholic king removed bonds of loyalty and invited rebellion', shows the lengths to which Protestant authorities went in order to avoid any outward displays of dissatisfaction with the new regime.[10]

Any unease Irish Protestants may have felt at the accession of James would have been heightened by several of his decisions in the early months of his reign. The elevation of Richard Talbot to the earldom of Tyrconnell in May gave significant power to a man with lofty ambitions for the advancement of his fellow Catholics.[11] These feelings of suspicion among Protestants were reciprocated by Tyrconnell, particularly during the period of the Monmouth rebellion in June and July 1685, when 'the government grew jealous of the Protestants of the North' and ordered the disarmament of the province's militia.[12] Tensions between the communities were heightened by incidents such as a fire that broke out in Enniskillen in July that was blamed on 'treachery', and initial reports of rapparee activity in rural parts of Ulster, while a proclamation against the spreading of false news that was issued in July helps to show the level of suspicion and rumour that was becoming prevalent.[13] Under the new king it was clear that James wanted Catholics to play a role within the Irish military and administration, areas that they had previously been excluded from, although the

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[9] Harris, *Revolution*, p. 429.
[10] Gillespie, 'The Irish Protestants and James II', pp 127–9.
[11] Éamonn Ó Ciardha notes the growing awareness among Irish Catholics of the significant improvements in their position within society under James's rule and Tyrconnell's government in particular; see Éamonn Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite cause, 1685–1766* (Dublin, 2004), pp 58–61.
[12] William Colles's diary of events, Dublin, 18 June 1685, in *Ormonde MSS* (H.M.C., London), n.s., viii, p. 343.
[13] Colles's diary, 11 & 17 July 1685, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 343.

extent to which this occurred was subject to much debate and was a further cause of unease. The appointment of the earl of Clarendon as viceroy in 1686 was seen as a measured step in the direction of moderate reform and was a brief check to Protestant fears.[14]

Tyrconnell held significant power within the Irish administration, however, and his role continued to expand over the coming years. His first main area of reform was the Irish army, service in which had been previously off limits to Catholics. Protestant officers and soldiers were cashiered by Tyrconnell and replaced by Catholics, resulting in 5,043 of the official number of 7,485 soldiers being Catholic by September 1686.[15] Protestant observers exhibited their unease at these changes, as well as their negative opinion of these new recruits, in describing them as 'the very scum of the people'.[16] The newly-appointed soldiers did not take kindly to jibes directed at their new position by ordinary Protestants, leading to scuffles on the capital's streets as 'the Popish officers bid the men beat any that jeered them'.[17] Meanwhile, Catholics began to be admitted as Justices of the Peace and to administrative bodies such as corporations across the country, as well as to nationally important political bodies such as the Privy Council. Official toleration of the Catholic church itself came about more slowly, but gradual advancements in this area were made over the next two years.[18]

In Ulster these relaxations in restrictions for Catholics were accompanied by further tension and acts of violence. In 1686, on the annual anniversary of the outbreak of the 1641 rebellion on 23 October, 'many Protestant houses in the country [were] searched for arms, and several robberies were committed and some very barbarous murders'.[19] Tyrconnell's appointment as lord deputy in January 1687 sped up the reform process and increased levels of fear and rumour among Protestants across the country. There is evidence of Catholics using the uncertainty upon the death of Charles II in order to stop paying their

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[14] Colles's diary, 9 Jan. 1686, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 345; For more information on Clarendon's role as viceroy, see: Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, pp 22–28.
[15] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 25.
[16] Colles's diary, 1 July 1686, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 346.
[17] Ibid; See also Paul Rycaut to John Cooke, Dublin Castle, 18 July 1686, in 'Sir Paul Rycaut's memoranda and letters from Ireland, 1686–87', ed. Patrick Melvin, *Analecta Hibernica*, xxvii (1972), p. 155.
[18] For more on the situation of the Catholic church see chapter two.
[19] Colles's diary, 23 Oct. 1686, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 346.

rent, with an agent for the Barrett family in Clones, county Monaghan, informing his employer just after James's coronation in February that 'there's noe money now stirring in the country. I have not received one farthing from the tenants since the King's death and to drive these Catholics is to noe purpose. I am ashamed to tell you how much they are in arrear'.[20] The ensuing outcome of this uncertainty and violence was the flight of Protestant capital from the country, as merchants and wealthy families sought to move their assets to a more secure location. As early as 1687 'great sums were transmitted into England', which increased inflation to such an extent that 'guineas were at twenty-four shillings apiece, and exchange at twelve per cent'.[21] Some of this capital was accompanied by its owners as a small number of Protestants sought safety abroad, although the numbers of those leaving continued to rise slowly over the coming years. In February, news reached Dublin that Mary of Modena was pregnant, with the feelings of Protestants clear on the matter: 'the thoughts of a Protestant successor being more terrible than doomsday, and what rendered it more suspicious was the confidence that the Papists had that it was a boy'.[22] By the time of the child's birth in October rumours were already prevalent concerning 'the Prince of Orange's designs', but by this stage Tyrconnell had consolidated his control over the army and the apparatus of the state.

Stories of Catholic hatred of William were frequently recounted among Irish Protestants, with both the stories themselves and their dissemination among Protestants showing the distrust between ordinary people on both sides. Examples of these include the ceremony where 'they made the effigy of the Prince of Orange, and having formally cursed it after their manner, they cut it in pieces and cursed every piece and spit on it, and then burned it'; a description that evokes traditional intra-religious enmity and stereotypes from both Ireland and the continent throughout the early modern period.[23] Other rumours

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[20] Fletcher to Dacre Barrett, 21 Feb. 1685 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), quoted in Denis Carolan Rushe, *History of Monaghan for two hundred years, 1660–1860* (2nd ed., Monaghan, 1996), p. 9.

[21] Colles's diary, 19 Jan. 1687, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 347; Guineas usually traded for between 20 and 21 shillings each, although this was subject to currency fluctuations; for more on the impact these events had on the Irish economy, such as the ensuing fall in the rental and purchase price of land, see L.M. Cullen, *An economic history of Ireland since 1660* (London, 1972), pp 21–22.

[22] Colles's diary, 2 Feb. 1688, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 352.

[23] Colles's diary, 15 Nov. 1688, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 355.

circulated among the Protestant community concerning planned massacres by Catholics, such as a potential one scheduled for 9 December 1688, but which came to nothing, while similar stories were spread concerning designs by Protestants 'to cut the Roman Catholic's throats'.[24] The flight of James to France in December 1688 and the accession of William and Mary, Tyrconnell's efforts saw the Irish administration largely remain loyal to James, while Protestant sympathies, particularly in Ulster, lay with William. The latter group had been arming themselves during the preceding period, and James's reluctance to allow Tyrconnell to disarm them resulted in Ulster becoming the main area of opposition to the Lord Deputy and the Irish Jacobites.

The main reason given by Protestants for amassing these arms was to defend themselves from attack by rapparees. By February 1689 there were reports of how 'the people in the North are continually alarmed by their Popish neighbours, who, by the persuasion of the Priests, have all left their farms, and betaken themselves to mountains [...] where they at present live by their cattle, and what they can steal, and exercise themselves in their arms'.[25] Reports among Protestants claimed that in addition to encouragement given to them by Catholic priests, the rapparees operating in Ulster were being supplied with arms by the Jacobite authorities, such as the two companies from Dublin that approached Enniskillen on 15 December 1688 and who were said to have 'brought with them two or three horse loads of spare arms, to arm a numerous rabble of the country Irish that flocked to them from all hands'.[26] While it is unlikely that the resource-starved Jacobite army would have had many spare weapons with which to arm irregular forces, it appeared that the numbers of active rapparees had increased in rural areas since James came to power. Clarendon had issued a proclamation against the apparent increase in rapparee activity as early as December 1686, but apart from a reissuing of this the following February by Tyrconnell, there are no further mentions of rapparee activity among official sources. Instead, one of the primary concerns of the Jacobite authorities over the following two years was to stop the spread of 'false news' and 'malicious slanders', that they felt were

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[24] Colles's diary, Dec. 1688, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 356.
[25] *The present dangerous condition of the Protestants in Ireland, with a new order of Tyrconnell's, in a letter from Dublin, 19 February 1689* (London, 1689), p. 1.
[26] Andrew Hamilton, *A true relation of the actions of the Inniskilling men* (London, 1690), pp 3–4.

intended to 'create an universal dissatisfaction in the minds of the people, and to sow sedition', particularly concerning the false reports suggesting that 'his Majesty's Protestant subjects here were to be massacred by his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects of this kingdom.[27] A proclamation to this effect had been issued as early as February 1687, guaranteeing freedom of religion and suggesting that the false reports and rumours had been 'heightened and encouraged by some few fiery spirits in the pulpits, by taking upon them to treat of matters that do not lie within their province; for which aspersions there was not the least ground'.[28]

There are in fact very few eyewitness accounts of rapparee attacks on people and property from the months prior to the outbreak of the war.[29] Most of the reports from this period concerns a general tone of fear and overall lawlessness, such as one Protestant commentator who noted how 'the Judges have been appointed their Circuits as usual, but everybody laughs at them'.[30] There did appear to be an increase in lawlessness of this nature, but the Jacobite authorities blamed the formation of these Protestant paramilitary groups for this upsurge in rapparee activity, noting in January 1689 that:

> ...from these irregular and unwarranted proceedings of the associators aforesaid, manifold and great inconveniences already have and more are daily like to ensue by several thieves and robbers who in confidence of impunity do frequently despoil and rob his Majesty's subjects by stealing their cattle in greater numbers than for many years last past hath been known.[31]

It is likely that Irish Protestants had been exaggerating the threat of rapparees and general lawlessness across Ulster in particular, with the aim of undermining the legitimacy of Tyrconnell's government, particularly in the context of their strained loyalties following the arrival of William and Mary in England. Similarly, there may well have been enhanced levels of lawlessness across the province in the months prior to the outbreak of the war, as a resurgent Catholic population took advantage of changes at local government level to try to attack and plunder

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[27] 'Promotion of sedition and animosities', 15 Oct. 1688; 'Propagation of false news', 7 Dec. 1688, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, pp 387–89.
[28] 'False reports and malicious insinuations', 21 Jan. 1687, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, p. 371.
[29] For further discussion of rapparee activity across Ireland see chapter four.
[30] *The present dangerous condition*, p. 1.
[31] 'Acts of hostility', 25 Jan. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, pp 390–91.

Protestants, although if this was the case it was more likely for economic rather than religious reasons. The reality is most likely to be somewhere between these two extremes, although Protestant authors writing after the war particularly stressed this issue, noting how Catholics had 'for a long time before employed all the smiths of their sort, in making skeens [...] and pikeheads, wherewith to arm themselves privately'.[32] Similarly, William King specifically noted the actions of the rapparees in his defence of Protestant actions following the war, noting how they 'committed many outrages and devastations on their Protestant neighbours, insomuch that they could not be safe in their houses'.[33]

The situation in Dublin remained somewhat less volatile than that in Ulster, as leaders on both sides such as Tyrconnell and the Protestant Lords Granard and Mountjoy urged restraint and tried to allay Protestant fears.[34] These appeals had little effect outside of the capital as Protestants from elsewhere in the country, particularly those living in isolated rural areas, abandoned their homes and fled either abroad or northwards towards their religious brethren in Ulster. Contemporary accounts described counties Meath, Westmeath, Longford and Louth being among the worst affected. Reports emerged of Protestants 'daily mak[ing] their escapes into the North, leaving all their substances to the disposal of the insatiable, ravenous Irish, who would impudently in the day time drive horses and cows, with thousands of sheep, from thee owners thereof before their faces'.[35] Many other Protestants fled the country entirely, heading 'into England, Scotland and the Isle of Man for safety, carrying with them what they conveniently could'.[36] The earl of Granard, despite his outward support for James, alarmed Protestants by arranging for his wife to travel to England, with this seen to undermine confidence in his ability to reason with Tyrconnell or to promote a peaceful solution to the crisis.[37]

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[32] William McCarmick, *A farther impartial account of the actions of the Inniskilling men* (London, 1691), p. 2.
[33] William King, *State of the Protestants*, p. 91.
[34] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 49; see chapter two for the contemporary situation in Dublin.
[35] Captain Joseph Bennett, *A true and impartial account of the most material passages in Ireland, since December 1688, with a particular relation of the forces of Londonderry* (London, 1689) pp 4–5.
[36] *A true and impartial account*, p. 4.
[37] *The present dangerous condition*, p. 2.

Significant numbers of large landowners retreated to England and later hired agents to try to administer their properties on their behalf.[38] Kean O'Hara, a landowner from Sligo, had fled as far as Dublin, but returned to his property in March 1689, while sending his mother to safety in England.[39] The flight of the wealthy section of society proved advantageous for rapparees as well as for opportunistic ordinary tenants, large numbers of whom ceased paying their rent throughout this period of disturbance. Members of the military also benefitted, such as the French Commissar, Fumeron, who noted how 'since the arrival of the King of England in this said town of Cork, the grandest and wealthiest amongst the inhabitants of this town and its environs of the Protestant religion, have left to go to England'. This proved useful for the man tasked with procuring food for the French troops, as 'they have left their houses full of merchandise of all types of provisions, with grain, wine, salted meat, and these provision have been taken to be distributed among the troops'.[40] The extent of this emigration caused Tyrconnell to pass a proclamation in February declaring that any ships that came to Ireland simply to carry passengers abroad and arrived with no cargo of goods to trade, would be forbidden from doing so, thereby ensuring that if large numbers of the population were to leave the country at least the kingdom would benefit from having greater access to goods that were in short supply due to the crisis, such as coal.[41]

The only substantial attempts by local populations outside of Ulster to form an organised armed resistance to the Jacobite government in the spring of 1689 were in county Cork and King's County. Captain Richard Coote managed to gather around 400 Protestants at Birr, but the lack of assistance from anywhere closer than Sligo, combined with threats from Tyrconnell, forced him to stand down.[42] In Bandon, the town gates were closed to General Justin Macarty and his six infantry companies, while other minor acts of defiance in the area were led by the earl of Inchiquin and Henry Boyle. These were prompted in part by the

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[38] Examples of these include Colonel Thomas Flower in Queen's County and Dacre Barrett in Clones, Co. Monaghan; for more information on these men and their experiences see chapter five.
[39] John Fleming to Kean O'Hara, unknown, 10 Mar. 1689 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/3/10.
[40] M. Fumeron to M. de Louvois, Bantry, 19 May 1689, in Sheila Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence* (3 vols, Dublin, 1984) iii, no. 1806.
[41] *The present dangerous condition*, p. 2.
[42] Ibid., p. 1.

plundering of horses and other goods from Protestants in the area, such as the £2,000 worth of horses that Boyle had reported stolen.[43] However, Macarty used his numerical advantage over the town's inhabitants to good effect and managed to persuade the leaders of the various groups to submit peacefully, while fining the people of Bandon £1,000 and ordering the town walls to be dismantled.[44] These events removed the future prospect of any armed resistance to Jacobite authority from the general population outside of Ulster, and also left whatever Protestant residents that remained in their homes vulnerable to attacks by rapparees and abuses by Jacobite troops.[45] These tended to be the less well off members of the community, as most people with the means or finances to be able to leave had already done so by the outbreak of the war. Those that remained frequently resented those that had chosen to flee, with authors sensationally commenting how it was impossible for those that had fled to 'know the state of Ireland, and the great danger and necessity of the Protestants, whose throats they have left under the knife'.[46]

The commencement of open conflict

The beginnings of open armed resistance in Ulster to Tyrconnell's forces stemmed from this supposed lack of law and order across the country and the province in particular, as leading Protestants across Ulster formed themselves into localised defence associations, which included raising companies of infantry and cavalry. Members of the gentry and upper classes in counties Down and Antrim came together on 7 January 1689 and elected Lord Mountalexander as their leader. Similar meetings saw a group formed between counties Armagh and Monaghan, who elected William, third Baron Blayney, while another was formed by Protestants from across counties Londonderry, Donegal and Tyrone, who chose Robert Lundy, the governor of Derry, as their leader.[47] The uncertain political environment and Protestant distrust of Tyrconnell's administration in

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[43] David Dickson, 'The account book of a Kerry revenue official, 1687–89' in *Journal of the Kerry archaeological and historical society*, no. 6 (1973), p. 82.
[44] Childs, *Williamite Wars*, p. 52.
[45] See chapters three and four for the wartime experiences of rural civilians outside of Ulster.
[46] *The present dangerous condition*, p. 2.
[47] John Mackenzie, *A narrative of the siege of Londonderry: Or the late memorable transactions of that city* (London, 1690), p. 11.

Dublin were undoubtedly major factors in the formation of these groups, and from the beginning they were viewed as being openly sympathetic to the Williamite cause, and even sent envoys to England to address William.[48] However, the volatile rural conditions and physical danger in the countryside posed by unsuppressed rapparees were given as a primary reason for the formation of these associations, with one Protestant gentleman still resident in the province describing how 'all over the north the tenants do insult so much by reason that we have no civil government amongst us. The strongest hand carries all here'.[49]

Figure 1.1: Map of the Ulster region, with relevant towns and locations noted.

Several of the initial military engagements in Ulster at the beginning of the war directly followed the formation of these groups. At Loughbrickland, just north of Newry, a skirmish between some foraging Protestant cavalry and

[48] Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, pp 10–11; Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 50.
[49] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 16 Mar. 1689 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 108.

Jacobite dragoons led to the deaths of a Protestant captain and eight of his men at the end of February.[50] In early March, Catholic soldiers, emboldened by news that a large army was marching northwards from Dublin towards county Down, took advantage of the disorderly environment and began to plunder Protestant homes around Armagh and Charlemont fort.[51] Protestant civilians from the area retreated to Monaghan town and later fell back to Glaslough, as across the province Protestants began to retreat northwards towards more easily defensible positions such as Derry. Shortly afterwards the Protestant occupants of Monaghan town withdrew as far as Glaslough, allowing Jacobite forces to occupy the area. The subsequent incident clearly demonstrates the difficulties posed by competing versions of events from Jacobite and Williamite commentators, while furthering the religious dimension of the war. The established Williamite version of events, which has been repeated in recent histories of the period, recounts how Major John McKenna pursued the retreating Protestants to Glaslough, where he occupied the nearby earthworks at Drumbanagher with 600 men from the Jacobite garrison at Charlemont.[52] He is said to have used this position to cut off the Protestants in the village 'and intended to seize the Lady Blayney, and some other persons of quality in the castle'.[53] On 14 March the Protestant forces, led by local landowner Captain Matthew Anketell, sallied from Glaslough and assaulted the Jacobite positions, resulting in Jacobite losses that vary in the different accounts between 89 and 200 officers and men, while Captain Anketell was recorded as the sole casualty on the Williamite side, being 'unfortunately shot by a fellow that lay in a bush'.[54]

While these casualty figures have been acknowledged as being especially suspect, other versions of the encounter provide an entirely different course of events.[55] These accounts stress specific local circumstances, particularly the disapproval by local Protestants of John McKenna's appointment as High Sheriff

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[50] Childs, *Williamite wars*, p. 49.
[51] Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, pp 13–15; Childs, *Williamite wars*, p. 55.
[52] Williamite versions of events are found in: Hamilton, *A true relation of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, p. 35; Bennett, *A particular relation of the forces of Londonderry*, p. 15; Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, pp 13–15; Childs, *Williamite wars*, pp 55–56.
[53] Bennett, *A particular relation of the forces of Londonderry*, p. 15.
[54] Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 15.
[55] I am indebted to Séamus McCluskey for bringing the alternative accounts of this incident to my attention; see also Séamus McCluskey, 'Opening shots of the Williamite wars' in *The Northern Standard*, 30 Apr. 2009.

of Monaghan by Tyrconnell the previous year.[56] Upon the Protestant retreat to Glaslough, and emboldened by reinforcements sent by Blayney from Armagh, an attempt was made to arrest McKenna at his home at nearby Monmurray. Several of his companions were killed in the ensuing scuffle, which resulted in McKenna being arrested and later executed in Glaslough. In this version Anketell remains the sole casualty on the Williamite side, but he is described as being murdered by a discharged servant in the immediate aftermath of the incident, a fate that may have contributed to the idea of his being shot by a 'fellow that lay in a bush'. The lack of contemporary source material for this account allows for the possibility that local Jacobites may have fabricated their version of events at a later date in order to cover up a particularly embarrassing military defeat, but this account is less sensationalist and consequently more likely than that recorded by Williamite authors. It also reflects the religious tensions across the province at a local level, with McKenna's arrest demonstrating the resentment among high-ranking Protestants at Catholic advancement under Tyrconnell. Similarly, the subsequent murder of Anketell shows the corresponding animosity among ordinary Catholics towards members of the local Protestant landowning class, feelings that would have become heightened during the Jacobite period and that began to boil over in early 1689.

Being able to compare sources from both sides of the conflict is the obviously preferable position in attempting to document the events and assess the religious tensions of this period. Naturally, this is frequently impossible, and the main sources for this early period of the war are printed works by Ulster Protestants that were published in its immediate aftermath. The main engagements in this period prior to the start of the siege of Derry involved local people and were fought between locally raised paramilitary forces, such as the Protestant defence associations or recently formed Catholic companies. This means that established local biases often colour the accounts of these initial months of the war, with more objective observers, such as Jacobite or Williamite army officials—in particular those from outside the country—only arriving during the siege of Derry in the case of the former, or in August 1689 in the case of the latter. These accounts by local observers, who in most cases were directly

[56] Rushe, *History of Monaghan*, pp 8–9.

involved in leadership roles at either Derry or Enniskillen, were largely written after the war, at a point when demonstrating loyalty to the new monarchs and portraying their personal involvement in the war, or that of their community, in a good light may have been overriding factors.[57] Examples of these issues include the specific reference to how as soon as the news of the English Convention Parliament's decision to officially sanction William and Mary's reign reached Enniskillen, Protestants in the town 'were obliged to behave ourselves as their subjects, our allegiance being transferred', when in reality there would likely have been more debate on this contentious issue, particularly among members of the established church.[58]

Similarly, open and detailed references were made to actions by Catholics deemed to be cruel or inhumane, such as the murder of an elderly woman by Jacobite troops near Derry in April, to which the author of the account devotes two pages; while incidents involving the actions of Protestants are referred to very briefly if at all, such as the expulsion of all Catholics from Enniskillen in December, which is described in a single sentence.[59] The politicised nature of these accounts even led to disputes between their authors as to whose version was factually correct, such as that between the Anglican clergyman George Walker and the Presbyterian minister John Mackenzie concerning the siege of Derry.[60] The close links between the Presbyterian population in Ulster and their brethren in Scotland ensured that reports of this nature were widely recounted in Scotland.[61] Overall, while the tone of these accounts and some of the specific issues that the authors chose to concentrate on may have been intentionally quite selective, the general course of events is most likely quite accurate and these sources remain useful for exploring these early months of the conflict.

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[57] The credibility of these accounts by men such as George Walker has been questioned by previous historians, see Jim Smyth, 'Siege, myth and history: Derry 1688–1998' in William Kelly (ed.), *The Sieges of Derry* (Dublin, 2001), pp 19–22.

[58] Hamilton, *A true relation of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, p. 8.

[59] Ibid., pp 16–17; McCarmick, *A farther impartial account of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, p. 6.

[60] George Walker, *A true account of the siege of Londonderry* (London, 1689); John Mackenzie, *A narrative of the siege of Londonderry, or the late memorable transactions of that city, faithfully represented, to rectify the mistakes and supply the omissions of Mr Walker's account* (London, 1690); see John Bergin, 'Walker, George (1643?–1690)' and Linde Lunney, 'Mackenzie, John (1649?–1696?)' in *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge, 2009).

[61] John R. Young, 'The Scottish response to the siege of Londonderry, 1689–90' in William Kelly (ed.), *The sieges of Derry* (Dublin, 2001), pp 61–3.

In the immediate aftermath of the skirmish at Glaslough, the Protestants that had gathered in the town withdrew northwards towards Enniskillen and Derry. In December, the inhabitants of Enniskillen had prevented two companies of Catholic soldiers from being posted to the town, while they had also expelled all Catholic civilians from the town and its vicinity.[62] Andrew Hamilton, a resident of Enniskillen, noted how a large number of Protestants from county Cavan arrived on 20 March, having fled and in many cases supposedly burned their own homes ahead of the arrival of a force of Jacobite cavalry under Lord Galmoy.[63] While the majority of this group from Cavan decided to continue their flight northwards to reinforce Colonel Lundy at Derry, Enniskillen remained the second-largest Protestant stronghold in the province, attracting civilians from across west and south Ulster who had abandoned their property as a result of rapparee attacks.[64] During the following months the Protestants that had converged on the town inflicted a series of embarrassing defeats on Jacobite forces led by Justin MacCarthy, spurred on by anti-Catholic sentiment and cries of 'no popery'.[65] Their success in holding Enniskillen itself, as well as other strongpoints along the Erne river and its upper and lower loughs, such as Ballyshannon, Belleek, Crom castle, Castle Hume and Mullick house, provided the Williamites with a secure defensive barrier in south-west Ulster for the remainder of the war.

On 14 March, the same day as the skirmish at Glaslough, Arthur Rawdon's *ad hoc* Protestant force was routed by a Jacobite army led by Richard Hamilton, just south of Lisburn at Dromore in county Down.[66] This 'break of Dromore' resulted in the occupation of east Ulster by Jacobite forces, which advanced as far north as Coleraine before meeting resistance along the banks of the river Bann, where local Protestants had destroyed as many of the boats along the river as they could, as well as burning the bridge at Portglenone.[67] Recently formed Protestant military groups retreated from strongpoints such as Dungannon and

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[62] McCarmick, *A farther impartial account of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, p. 6; Hamilton, *A true relation of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, p. 3.
[63] Hamilton, *A true relation of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, pp 9–10.
[64] Ibid., pp 6, 11.
[65] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, pp 113–119; Simms, 'The Williamite war in south Ulster', pp 155–162; Hamilton, *A true relation of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, p. 40.
[66] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 4.
[67] Bennett, *A particular relation of the forces of Londonderry*, p. 14.

Armagh towards Derry, with a corresponding flight of Protestant civilians from these areas.[68] Protestants in counties Down and Antrim that were unable or unwilling to retreat westwards or to flee to England instead accepted protections from Hamilton's Jacobite force.[69] As would become a feature of the war over the following two years these protections were not very reliable, as rapparee attacks continued and the Jacobite army itself was accused of getting 'great plunder, especially in Lisnegarvy [Lisburn], Belfast and Antrim'.[70] In April, the sight of what was thought to be a Williamite invasion fleet off the coast of county Down resulted in many Protestants who had accepted protections taking up arms, but this turned out not to be the case, with 'many of them' killed as a result.[71] Overall, the theft and destruction of civilian property in the east of the province appears to have been less than that elsewhere, although a more comprehensive account of the fate of these areas would be revealed by observers participating in the withdrawal of the Jacobite army from the failed siege of Derry and the advance of the Williamite army southwards towards Dundalk from August. Rumours of atrocities from these few weeks were widely reported and were representative of tensions between the two communities during the war, such as the rumour that reached Dublin on 20 March that described how several hundred Protestant civilians who were attempting to retreat from Loughbrickland had been massacred.[72]

The Protestant inhabitants of Sligo voted to abandon the town on 22 March, and despite the resistance of the Protestant forces around Enniskillen, the gradual advance of the Jacobite army towards Derry saw the area under Protestant control steadily decrease prior to the start of the siege in April. The siege of Derry remains one of the most discussed and commemorated episodes of the entire war. Indeed, it was one of the events from the war in Ireland that received significant attention in England and Scotland at the time, with detailed accounts of the siege featuring prominently in reports on the war. A range of contemporary pamphlets praised the townspeople and soldiers, such as the

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[68] Hamilton, *A true relation of the actions of the Inniskilling men*, p. 9.
[69] Childs, *Williamite wars*, p. 57.
[70] Bennett, *A particular relation of the forces of Londonderry*, p. 14.
[71] Colles's diary, 25 Apr. 1689, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 363.
[72] Colles's diary, 20 Mar. 1689, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 362.

Reverend George Walker and Major General Kirke, upon their successful defence of the city.[73] Diaries of the 105-day siege such as Walker's and Mackenzie's show the poor conditions the city's garrison and inhabitants endured, particularly during its final weeks. These accounts detail the military chronology of the siege as well as referring to the hardships endured by the Protestant civilians that had chosen to take shelter within its walls. Some of these have become infamous in their own right, such as the table of prices that various foodstuffs were selling for within the walls at the end of July, as recounted by George Walker, which listed prices for horse flesh, dogs, cats, rats and mice, and that were described as being 'fattened by eating the bodies of the slain Irish'.[74] Another incident saw the Jacobite forces drive 'thousands' of Protestant civilians to the city walls, in the hope that the garrison would admit them and thereby stretch the dwindling food supplies yet further.[75]

These accounts also record the almost daily Jacobite bombardments of the city, which totalled 587 artillery rounds by 22 July.[76] While the extent of the bombardment suffered by Derry has been described as 'desultory' by contemporary European standards—such as the 60,000 rounds fired by the French during the siege of Namur in 1692—the physical damage done to the city and its environs by the siege was quite substantial, and significant efforts would be made by Derry's corporation to procure funds to rebuild the town over the following years.[77] A dispute over the pay of soldiers that had served in the city during the siege dragged on for thirty years after its relief, as the garrison claimed that they never received either their wages for the duration of the siege or the money owed to them for buying arms and repairing property, totalling

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[73] Anon, *An Account of the great and glorious actions of Mr. Walker, the Protestant governor, at the siege of London-derry* (London, 3 June, 1689); Anon, *An Account of Major General Kirck's safe arrival at London-derry* (London, 21 June, 1689); Anon, *An Account of Major General Kirck, and London-derry with a geographical account of the river he sail'd down, and the various forts on it, perticularly [sic] that of Kulmore* (London, 1689); Anon, *The substance of another speech of the Reverend and valiant Dr. Walker to his soldiers in Londonderry* (London, 1689); Anon, *An Account from General Kirk of the relieving of Londonderry* (Edinburgh, 1689).

[74] Walker, *A true account of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 39.

[75] Ibid., p. 35.

[76] Mackenzie, *A narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 63.

[77] Childs, *Williamite wars*, p. 135; For more on the efforts made by Derry corporation to aid the recovery of the city following the war see chapter five.

£333,440.[78] Pamphlets written to further their case made frequent references to the poor conditions they endured during the siege, such as the 'putrefied' state of the city, in which 'dead carcasses lay stinking almost in every cellar, people died so fast that the living could not or would not bury the dead'.[79] The petitioners focused on the constant threat to their lives and the inhumane conditions the inhabitants had to endure:

> ...they were swept away daily, in great numbers, by a malignant fever, that then raged among them, occasioned from the base food, and ill lodging, want of rest, the noisome stench and dismal sights, noise of cannon and cries of the sick and wounded, continual fear of death or of famine, or falling into their enemies hands, the daily loss of their nearest relations and friends before their eyes, whom they were not able to help, nor women to support their poor infants; and other miseries they were under that cannot be expressed, that they died so fast, at length, as there could scarce be found room to inter them, even the backsides and gardens were filled up with graves, and some thrown in cellars; some whole families were entirely extinct, and others from many, brought to a very few, and those in a very miserable condition.[80]

While the aim of these petitions must be taken into account when considering the above descriptions, it is clear that the conditions within the city of Derry during the siege were among the worst of any area during the entire war. Unfortunately, no accurate figure for the numbers of civilians killed during the siege has emerged. This is clearly in part due to the chaotic conditions in the city during the siege, but attempts to accurately estimate the numbers are also hampered by the disputes between eyewitness accounts and other uncertainties over source material. The contemporary Scottish Williamite, John Dalrymple, estimated the number of civilian deaths at between 7,000 and 8,000, while

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[78] Ian McBride, *The siege of Derry in Ulster Protestant mythology* (Dublin, 1997), p. 19; there are also a variety of pamphlets relating to this petition, including: *A short view of the faithful service performed by his Majesty's forces who defended the city of Londonderry in Ireland, against the prevailing power of the late King James, his French and Irish army, in that memorable siege, in the year 1689: Being a humble remonstrance of those officers and soldiers who have not received their pay for that most hazardous and gallant service* (1700); *The personal sufferings in the siege of London-Derry, being but generally touch'd in the Petition and Case, it may be unfit to take some further view thereof in the heads that here follow* (London, 1698); *The Derry complaint; or the humble petition, case and personal sufferings of the mayor, commonalty and citizens of London-Derry in Ireland* (Dublin, 1699).

[79] *A short view of the faithful service performed by his Majesty's forces*, p. 9.

[80] *The personal sufferings in the siege of London-derry.*

noting that approximately 2,500 of the 7,000 soldiers who served within the city during the siege also perished.[81] Given the politically sensitive nature of the siege, it would be unwise to take these figures at face value, and it is unlikely that a more accurate modern estimate of the number of soldiers or civilians killed at Derry will emerge.

Jacobite withdrawal and Williamite consolidation

The siege of Derry was eventually lifted at the end of July, as the breaking of the boom across the river Foyle by the merchant ship *The Mountjoy* allowed General Percy Kirke's relief force to bring reinforcements and supplies into the barricaded city. On the night of the 31 July the besieging Jacobite force 'burnt all the tents and huts of their camp around the city, and before the daylight had gone off towards Lifford and Strabane', with similar destruction inflicted on parts of eastern Donegal.[82] The Jacobite withdrawal from Derry was disrupted by the news of the decisive defeat of General Justin MacCarthy's force by the Enniskillen Protestants at Newtownbutler on the same day.[83] In order to speed up their retreat towards Dundalk, the main Jacobite army 'burst some of their big guns, threw wagons of arms into the river, and left many of their army that were sick behind them'.[84] Walker estimated the losses of the besieging Jacobite force at between eight or nine thousand men, noting that 'most of these fell by the sword, the rest of fevers and flux'.[85] These figures are almost certainly overestimates, particularly if the majority of these casualties were supposedly inflicted through combat rather than disease. The long siege had, however, taken its toll on the Jacobite force, as shown by reports of the first regiments to arrive back at Dublin. Commanded by General Rosen, they arrived on 13 August and were described as

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[81] John Dalrymple, 'The Siege of Derry, from Sir John Dalrymple's Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland' in G. Douglas (ed.), *Derriana: A collection of papers relative to the Siege of Derry, and illustrative of the revolution of 1688* (Londonderry, 1794), p. 124; Douglas's *Derriana*, compiled a collection of useful primary source material relating to the siege for its centenary, but the changing political circumstances of the 1790s must be considered when using it as a source, see Smyth, 'Siege, myth and history: Derry 1688–1998', p. 25.
[82] Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 46.
[83] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, pp 116–17.
[84] Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 46.
[85] Walker, *A true account of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 42.

being 'extremely shattered and thin, some but three hundred, some four hundred in a regiment, nor had they much plunder, though they destroyed all the North'.[86]

While the latter comment is clearly hyperbolic in tone, the destruction of the Ulster countryside during the Jacobite retreat was a policy designed by the French General Rosen, in his position as overall military commander, in conjunction with the Duke of Berwick. Rosen had already advocated a scorched earth policy in Ulster during the siege, which he felt would diminish Protestant resistance across the province and hinder the activities of any prospective Williamite relief force. He wrote to James on 30 June, outlining how:

> ...the obstinacy and opinionatedness of these rebels has been pushed so far that they are not worthy of receiving any clemency that your Majesty should feel for them and it merits that we make them die of hunger and that next, with the country pillaged and burned, the English troops who will want to descend here, not finding any subsistence or retreat, will perish miserably here and we will be in a position to be masters of the rest of the kingdom.[87]

This plan was not approved by James at the time but was put into effect by Rosen immediately upon the Jacobite withdrawal from Derry. He ordered several detachments of cavalry to remain behind the main army 'in order to ruin and burn the windmills and those places suitable for making retreats. We also took all the livestock that we could from the coast of Londonderry. Mr. le duc de Berwick did the same thing beyond the Finn river'.[88] The French commissioner Fumeron was not entirely satisfied with the levels of burning of wheat and oats in the area, however, feeling that the Williamites would 'be able to harvest, our troops having ruined almost nothing'.[89]

By 4 August the Williamite force at Derry was obliged to gather together a force of between 200 and 300 men 'to go out into the county at large, to preserve the houses of the Protestants from being burnt'.[90] Despite Fumeron's reservations, these Jacobite actions contributed to the severe food shortages in Derry immediately after the raising of the siege, as Kirke's relief supplies were

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[86] Colles's diary, 13 Aug. 1689, *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 369.
[87] M. Rosen to James II, 30 June 1689, in 'Franco-Irish Correspondence in the Archives Nationales, Paris: Dépôt de la Guerre', ed. Lillian Tate, in *Analecta Hibernica*, no. 21 (1959), no. 232.
[88] M. Fumeron to Louvois, 13 Aug. 1689, in 'Franco-Irish Correspondence', ed. Lillian Tate, no. 242.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 46.

not sufficient for the population of the city enlarged by refugees from the surrounding area. A series of harsh proclamations were made by Kirke at this point, including one stating 'that all persons not in arms, that had fled to that place, should now leave the city, the country now being clear, and repair to their respective habitations, without taking any of their goods with them'.[91] When they returned many of them found their homes burnt and their cattle driven off, if not by the Jacobites then by Kirke's forces, who had ordered all livestock in the region driven to the town 'upon pretence of their belonging to the enemy'.[92] Tensions between the Protestant population of Ulster and the military sent to protect them increased as the war continued, but Kirke was also quite ruthless with his own men, with Mackenzie noting that 'the weak and sick soldiers had nothing allowed them to subsist on out of the stores, whereby they were forced to travel and beg their bread in the country, which being extremely depopulated many of them perished for want'.[93]

[91] Mackenzie, *Narrative of the siege of Londonderry*, p. 46.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid., p. 47.

Figure 1.2: Map of route taken by Jacobite forces upon their retreat from Derry, August 1689.

The Jacobites continued with this policy of destruction throughout their retreat towards Dundalk. From Derry they moved southwards through the towns of Strabane and Omagh, before travelling eastwards towards Dungannon, and finally turning south towards Dundalk, via Charlemont fort, Armagh and Newry.[94] This largely followed the main trunk roadway to Derry from Armagh, which went via Dungannon and Omagh to avoid the Sperrin mountains.[95] Along this route the Jacobite force proceeded to burn crops, destroy homes and buildings, and desecrate Protestant churches, with cavalry used to raid the surrounding areas. Between the actions of the Jacobite army and the rapparees, livestock in Ulster were stolen to such an extent that Rosen recounted how he had 'let 50 or 60 thousand livestock pass' into Leinster, where they could graze

[94] See figure 1.2.
[95] For a map of the main roads of Ireland towards the end of the seventeenth century, see Smyth, *Map-making, landscapes and memory*, p. 406.

on 'the best fields of grain, oats and prairies'.[96] In November, Rosen described the extent of the destruction carried out by his men and rapparees in the province, while again noting that this destruction was not sanctioned by James: 'the province of Ulster is a canton largely ruined by the destruction which I had done against the wishes and the desire of the King, as much by the troops as by rapparees, while withdrawing from Derry, by burning a large part, and ruining the countryside'.[97] What proportion of this damage was done by rapparee forces as opposed to the regular army is unknown, but this shows that rapparee activities, and specifically their contribution towards sowing disorder within enemy quarters, were appreciated—if not quite officially sanctioned—by senior Jacobite officials at this stage of the conflict.

The arrival of the main Williamite force under the duke of Schomberg at Carrickfergus on 13 August saw the almost immediate retreat of the remaining Jacobite forces in the east of the province. Upon their arrival, Schomberg's forces were heartily welcomed by local Protestants 'falling on their knees with tears in their eyes and thanking God and the English for their deliverance'.[98] The only remaining Jacobite strongpoint in the eastern part of Ulster was a small garrison at Carrickfergus. After a short siege the Jacobite force agreed terms with Schomberg and marched out of the town, under the guard of Captain William Russell and a troop of Williamite cavalry. The reaction of the local civilians gathered outside the walls upon the emergence of the Jacobite soldiers and their families, shows the hatred that existed between the communities and the extent to which this had been heightened by the actions of the previous year. The local people 'stript most part of the women, and forced a great many arms from the men', while Schomberg himself was personally obliged 'to ride in among them, with his pistol in his hand, to keep the Irish from being murdered'.[99] The Williamite author George Story, who had only just arrived in the country with Schomberg's force, was quite shocked at the level of animosity evident in this incident, describing how 'the poor Irish were forced to fly to the soldiers for

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[96] M. Rosen to M. de Louvois, Dublin, 20 Nov. 1689, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, iii, no. 1924.
[97] Ibid.
[98] *Great news from Ireland*, quoted in Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 122.
[99] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 10.

protection, else the country people would certainly have used them most severely; so angry were they one at another, tho[ugh] they live all in a country'.[100]

As Schomberg's force began to advance southwards from Belfast they began to encounter evidence of the disturbance caused by the initial period of the war and the Jacobite military occupation of the area since March, such as deserted homes and farms. At Dromore, the site of the previous Protestant defeat, 'the inhabitants had all or most of them left the town and there was not so much as a sheep or a cow to be seen', while further south at Loughbrickland 'the inhabitants had deserted this place also, and the rest was spoiled for want of management'.[101] While there had been significant numbers of Protestants still resident in county Antrim and the northerly areas of Down and Armagh, and who celebrated Schomberg's arrival in Ireland, areas to the south of this region that had seen military engagements between the Ulster Protestant forces and the Jacobite army saw high levels of depopulation. Anywhere that the Protestant Associations had withdrawn from in preparation of the initial Jacobite advance seemed to have been particularly badly affected, with less depopulation evident to the north of this area. This suggests that the protections offered by Richard Hamilton and other Jacobites upon their occupation of east Ulster may have persuaded Protestants that had not already fled their homes to remain, despite the continued threat posed by rapparees and indiscipline by Jacobite soldiers. It also suggests that the fear of rapparee attacks and of Tyrconnell's Catholic army—that was widespread throughout the country and Ulster in particular—was a significant push factor in encouraging people to leave their homes and was worse than the actual experience of living under Jacobite control.

By the time Schomberg reached the outskirts of Newry on 5 September, Berwick had burned the town to the ground and withdrawn south of the Moyry Pass to Dundalk, ordering his troops to damage the roads and causeways en route to hinder the Williamite advance. The destruction of the town of Newry prompted Schomberg to send a trumpeter to the Jacobite force, threatening that 'if they continued to burn as they had done in Newry he would exercise twice the

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[100] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 10.
[101] Ibid., p. 12.

cruelty towards Catholics and particularly on the prisoners in Enniskillen'.[102] This seemed to have the desired effect as the Jacobites withdrew to the south of Dundalk, leaving it largely undamaged while permitting Schomberg to encamp the majority of his army on the northern fringes of the town on 7 September. The Jacobite army temporarily withdrew from the area entirely before returning to take up positions a few miles south of Dundalk. This temporary withdrawal caused local Protestants in the town of Ardee to show loyalty to the Williamite cause as they began to stockpile 'great quantities of ale, bread and other provisions, for the soldiers', only for these goods to be seized by the Jacobites upon their return a few days later.[103]

The large Williamite camp at Dundalk would become notorious for the number of soldiers that died by disease over its ten-week duration.[104] Modern historical calculations put the figure at between 6,000 and 8,000 deaths, through a combination of 'flux' and 'fever', or what Pádraig Lenihan has found to be dysentery and typhus.[105] While the specific conditions within the camp, such as the poor weather, the unsanitary conditions and the concentration of a large number of soldiers in such a small area, appear to have brought about this epidemic, it is unlikely that local people in Dundalk and the surrounding area managed to avoid being affected by these abnormally high levels of disease. The civilian population of the places to which sick troops were evacuated, such as Carlingford, Belfast or Schomberg's headquarters at Lisburn, was also adversely affected by these epidemics. Story noted in December that 'the fever was very violent at this time all the North of Ireland, insomuch that it was impossible to come into any house but some were sick or dead'.[106] Lenihan does not directly connect the specific epidemic at Dundalk with the outbreaks of disease at towns such as Belfast and Lisburn as the winter continued, but notes that increased civilian deaths by disease were frequent consequences of the presence of large numbers of troops among local populations, such as at Lisburn where the

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[102] M. Rosen to M. de Louvois, Ardee, 18 Oct. 1689, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, iii, no. 1909.
[103] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 17.
[104] See J.G. Simms, 'Schomberg at Dundalk' in J.G. Simms, *War and politics in Ireland, 1649–1730*, ed. by David Hayton and Gerard O'Brien (London, 1686), pp 91–104.
[105] Pádraig Lenihan, 'Unhappy campers: Dundalk (1689) and after' in *Journal of conflict archaeology*, iii (2008), pp 203–07.
[106] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 50.

'background civilian mortality more than doubled' in this period, with civilians and soldiers dying from symptoms common to pneumonia, pleurisy and 'a secondary form of pneumonia associated with typhus'.[107] The general environment of the camp and the number of deaths among the army in these few months meant that soldiers became noticeably desensitised to the level of death around them, and in one instance a group of soldiers trying to stay warm around a fire 'pulled in the two dead men to make seats of'.[108] Despite the ill-fated nature of this Williamite camp, the positions adopted by the two armies in September largely remained the same for the duration of the winter season, and only changed significantly with the arrival of William to Ireland the following June. The civilians living in the area between the two armies for these winter months were caught between both sides, vulnerable to forays by Williamite troops such as in January when a detachment of 500 men 'went from Rostrevor and Newry beyond the mountains towards Dundalk and Carlingford, burning most of the cabbins where the Irish sheltered themselves, and took a considerable prey of cattle'.[109]

While the main focus of the war during this period was on Schomberg's advance southwards towards Dundalk, military engagements of various sorts were also underway across south Ulster and north Connacht. The Protestant inhabitants of Sligo had chosen to abandon the town in March and retreat to either Derry or Enniskillen, but Williamite forces had retaken it following the withdrawal of Patrick Sarsfield's Jacobite detachment in the aftermath of MacCarthy's decisive defeat at Newtownbutler. The fact that the town was not walled meant that it was not easy to defend, and it was temporarily used as a base from which Colonel Thomas Lloyd's cavalry raided Jacobite positions in Roscommon and Leitrim, such as Boyle. Following a siege at the end of October it was retaken by a Jacobite force led by Sarsfield once again and remained in Jacobite hands for the next two years.[110] The defeat of MacCarthy had been an important victory for the security of the Williamite cause in south Ulster, and it also led to their capture of additional territory around Clones shortly

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[107] Lenihan, 'Unhappy campers: Dundalk (1689) and after', pp 207–209.
[108] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 36.
[109] Ibid., p. 52.
[110] J.G. Simms, 'Sligo in the Jacobite war, 1689–91' in *The Irish Sword*, vii (1965–66), pp 126–9.

afterwards.[111] Some small Jacobite garrisons at isolated locations in county Cavan, such as Killeshandra and Bellanacargy, managed to remain in position until the following April, when they were attacked by Williamites under Colonel William Wolseley.[112]

Elsewhere, Jacobites in Monaghan gradually withdrew from the county, while the force led by Colonel MacMahon at Castleblayney managed to move secretly through bogs and rough terrain across into Armagh, to reinforce Teague O'Regan's garrison at Charlemont fort.[113] The modern fortification at Charlemont, located at the north of the county on the border with Tyrone at the river Blackwater, just seven miles from Armagh city, was the only major position in Ulster that would remain in Jacobite hands throughout the winter of 1689–90. Despite being kept under observation by Williamite forces, its garrison posed a threat to the local area for the duration of the winter, and managed to sporadically raid the local area for supplies, including burning Dungannon in November.[114] Williamite forces posted to the nearby area were aware of the threat posed by the Charlemont garrison, as a colonel warned the Swiss gentleman soldier Jean Francois de Morsier that he ran the risk of being captured by a patrol from the fort while separated from his regiment.[115] By the time O'Regan came to terms with the Williamites and marched out of the fort the following May, his garrison 'had also burnt and destroyed all the country around about it, being well inhabited formerly. The town of Charlemont stood by the castle, as we were told, but the Irish has so levelled it, that nothing remained to show that ever there had been any such thing'.[116]

The tumultuous nature of these military maneouvers and the various transfers of power in the region would have had a severely negative impact on the local population. As seen in south Down and Armagh, the withdrawal of the military force of each side was usually accompanied by the flight of significant numbers of civilians. The plundering of local residents by a withdrawing or

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[111] Pilip Ó Mórda, 'Clones in the Williamite wars, 1689–92' in *Clogher Record*, x, no. 2 (1980), p. 259.
[112] Simms, 'The Williamite war in south Ulster', p. 162.
[113] Ibid., p. 161.
[114] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 48.
[115] Pádraig Lenihan and Geraldine Sheridan (eds), 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland, 1689–90' in *Irish Studies Review*, xiii, no. 4 (2005), p. 485.
[116] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 60.

advancing force was also commonplace, while the absence of law and order inherent in the transfer of power from one side to another provided a particularly fertile environment for rapparees. In addition, the higher proportion of Catholics among the populations of counties such as Monaghan and Cavan raises the issue of their treatment across the province during the period. The widespread support among ordinary Catholics for James II and their general support for the Jacobite army were clear, but what level of security this would have provided from widespread destruction undertaken during the retreat from Derry is questionable. While on an individual basis the property of Protestants would have been specifically targeted by Jacobite forces, the speed of their withdrawal and the scale of the destruction meant that either deliberate or unintentional damage to Catholic property would have been unavoidable. In the burning of the town of Newry, for example, the destruction of the predominately Protestant town would also have affected its Catholic inhabitants given the severe extent of the destruction in this case, with only one stone tower and 'not above five or six houses more' left standing.[117] Similarly, the policy of burning crops to deny them to the Williamite forces would have been difficult to confine to Protestant land alone, with a retreating army unlikely to ask too many questions regarding land occupancy or the ownership of stock while engaged in such activities.

Just as Protestant civilians had fled their property with the advance of the Jacobites, so too did Catholics retreat southwards before the arrival of the Williamite force. In the area around Newry 'the corn also was either lying, and rotting on the ground, or else was shaken by the violent winds, for the people were all gone, the Protestants the March before, and the Irish now, at the retreating of their army, some fled for fear, and those that had a mind to stay, were forced away by the army, with all their cattel, and whatever else was portable'.[118] Of course, far from all Catholics abandoned their property in this manner. While at Carlingford, Story described how a rumour reached the town that the Jacobites had taken Newry, which was 'very observable with what joy the little boys, as well as the silly old women, received the news, running

[117] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 13.
[118] Ibid., p. 13.

together and whispering; nor was it possible for them to conceal their inward satisfaction'.[119] These religious tensions and outward displays of sympathy for the relevant army would have been a pointed cause for dispute with occupying forces, one that would have been heightened by the more equal proportion of Protestants to Catholics in Ulster compared to elsewhere in the country.

In this context it is unsurprising that the decision by Schomberg to post the Enniskillen cavalry to winter quarters in the predominately Catholic county of Monaghan caused more problems, given the reputation for plundering of the Enniskillen men and their well-established enmity and local prejudices towards Catholics, while the majority of the Williamite army was billeted in more hospitable territory in east Ulster for the duration of the winter.[120] One of the regiments quartered to the area were the dragoons of Colonel James Wynne, which was one of the original three mounted regiments formed by local Protestants at Enniskillen in February 1689. They had been quartered around Monaghan and by March 1690 reports reached Schomberg of acts of theft and violence that had been committed by officers and men within the regiment. These included Captain Galbreth, who 'committed many great disorders upon the country about Monaghan', while two of his men had 'entered into one John Crosier's house within 4 miles of Enniskillen and without any provocation killed the said John Crosier'.[121] The fact that these accusations were being made against an officer and that they had come to the attention of the overall army commander suggests that they were far from isolated incidents. Schomberg's attempts to follow up on these accusations were seemingly hampered by Wynne himself, as subsequent letters make clear that his requests were not being heeded, and again point to indiscipline among the forces from Enniskillen as being significantly more relaxed than in other Williamite regiments.[122] While not

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[119] Story, *Impartial history*, pp 21–22.
[120] Ibid., p. 38.
[121] Duke of Schomberg to Colonel James Wynne, Lisburn, 7 & 27 March 1689/90 (PRONI, Wynne Papers, D429/7).
[122] Schomberg again wrote to Wynne concerning Galbreth, ordering that he '...should send him forthwith to the head quarters in safe custody since which I have received several more complaints against him of the highest nature, and therefore desire that you will forthwith upon the receipt hereof, as you will answer the contrary at your peril, cause him forthwith to be apprehended and sent hither in safe custody to answer to such things as shall be objected against him'; Duke of Schomberg to Colonel James Wynne, Lisburn, 12 March 1689/90 (PRONI, Wynne Papers, D429/7).

specifying any particular area of the province, Story directly referred to the varying levels of welcome the army received across their winter quarters, which he described as 'but very indifferent; and what with coming to warm firesides with some, and others having little or no shelter to secure them, and very little provisions, the country being all wasted and destroyed'.[123] Aside from these small advances by the Williamites in the spring of 1690, the boundary between the two sides remained largely the same until the final months of the war. While the main Williamite army advanced southwards from Newry into Leinster the following summer, a network of garrisons at towns such as Cavan, Belturbet, Enniskillen and Ballyshannon gave them control of the natural defensive barrier of the Erne river and loughs, and ensured that Ulster remained in Williamite hands for the remainder of the war.

Assessing the damage across the province

While Ulster would remain largely removed from the main actions of the war after the Jacobite withdrawal in the autumn of 1689 and was comparatively secure compared to the rest of the country, the damage caused across the province during this initial year of the conflict was quite severe in places. It is clear that the area around Derry, including nearby parts of Donegal, was particularly badly affected, as were the areas through which the Jacobite force withdrew from the failed siege. The south of the province also suffered significantly from the effects of military activity and rapparee raids, including south Armagh and Down and counties Monaghan, Cavan and Fermanagh. The records from the Barrett-Lennard estate in Clones, county Monaghan, clearly outline the widespread damage caused by the war in that part of Ulster. Resident in Essex during the war, Dacre Barrett was dependent on his land agents William Westgarth and Walter Dawson for any information on the condition of his estate at Clones. The town had served as both a Jacobite and a Williamite garrison, being occupied by the Jacobites at the beginning of the war before coming under Williamite control in August 1689 following the battle of Newtownbutler, and

[123] Story, *Impartial history*, pp 37–38.

the letters written to Barrett make the poor conditions caused by all this military activity quite clear.

Dawson, who received reports in Belfast directly from Clones during the war period, summed up the widespread destruction throughout the surrounding region in March 1690, stating: 'I do protest solemnly I cannot express the deplorable condition the counties of Monaghan and Cavan and Fermanagh is in. Most of all the town of Clonnish is pulled down and burned and by much adoe the castle was saved'.[124] The countryside in the area was still very dangerous, as he noted how 'a man cannot travel between Monaghan and Clonnish for the enemy with a great convoy which is very changeable', with the enemy in this instance likely referring to both regular Jacobite forces and rapparees.[125] In one instance Dawson had managed to persuade some of the tenants to buy horses to allow them to begin to plough in the spring of 1690, but 'they had no sooner begun but some of the army came up and swopped [sic] all the poor people'.[126] It is left unclear whether the culprits in this case were Jacobite or Williamite soldiers, but two months later he explicitly described the adverse impact the Williamite forces themselves had on the region. In discussing Barrett's mills just outside Clones that had been left 'mightily out of order' after the events of the previous year, Dawson noted that while he had plans to rebuild them there would be no point in doing so until 'our army marches forward. There is nothing to be done while many of the army is thereabouts. If I should employ men to draw timber to the mill they would certainly take it from there and burn it'.[127] The discipline of the Williamite troops quartered in this area—which from Schomberg's orders were members of the Enniskillen regiments—seems to have been very lax, with even attempts to lodge complaints with their officers being 'but in vain'.[128]

Westgarth's correspondence complements Dawson's account of the poor state of the area, and it outlines how the harvest in 1690 was expected to be very

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[124] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 16 Mar. 1689/90 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 108.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 12 May 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 113.
[128] Ibid.

poor as a result, with 'a deal of fallow but no corn this year'.[129] The local area around Clones and Cavan towns he described as a 'wilderness', while noting that 'the cabins are much ruined but most of these in the country standing, those in the town that were ruined in it are much destroyed by the people for firing'.[130] This suggests that in this area the damage to urban property was worse than that done to rural homes, most likely due to the influence of soldiers billeted to the town, as well as local people who identified abandoned homes in their area and dismantled them for firewood. Westgarth later recommended that Barrett should petition the King for compensation for the destruction caused to his property and land, but it is unknown if he was successful in this or not.[131] In May 1690 Dawson was able to inform Barrett of the recent Williamite successes in taking the Jacobite position at Ballenecargy Castle in Cavan as well as the surrender of O'Regan's force at Charlemont.[132] While the area became more secure after these events, the damage caused to the property in the locality still remained an issue, with homes that had been abandoned by their tenants burned to the ground. The area had seen a large drop in population as 'most of the tenants that are alive have left Clonnish and came down to the North for fear of the enemy, and am afraid it will be difficult to get them to return again'.[133] This flight of tenants from the estate is unsurprising given the extent of the damage caused to the region and the levels of violence and disorder being committed against ordinary civilians by rapparees as well as soldiers from both the Jacobite and Williamite armies. Efforts were made by both agents and Barrett himself to entice tenants back to the estate over the next few years, although the damage done to the area made this difficult without offering significantly improved terms to potential tenants compared to pre-war rates.[134]

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[129] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 8 July 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 66.
[130] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 31 July 1691 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 69.
[131] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 13 Aug. 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 70.
[132] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 12 May 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 113.
[133] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 14 Apr. 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 124B.
[134] The efforts to reset Barrett's estate in the aftermath of the war are discussed in chapter five.

The language used by Westgarth and Dawson in discussing the state of the area around Clones in the aftermath of the fighting is reminiscent of that used by other authors to describe other parts of the province, such as Rosen's comments concerning the destruction done to mid-Ulster during the Jacobite retreat from Derry, or Story's descriptions of deserted homes and destroyed buildings near Newry. William King, who was consecrated as bishop of Derry on 25 January 1691, gave a similar report on the state of his new diocese upon his first visit following his appointment, describing it as:

> ...much disordered and neglected. I found the land almost desolate, country houses and dwellings burnt: on inquiry being made I ascertained that there were in the diocese of Derry, before the troubles, about 250,000 head of cattle, there were left, after the siege was raised, about 300; out of 460,000 horses 2 horses remained, lame and wounded, with 7 sheep, and 2 pigs, but no fowl, whence the miserable state of that province was sufficiently manifest.[135]

While the incredibly specific figures of livestock that had been lost and had survived the conflict are clearly exaggerated, King's overall description of the desolation of the Derry region in the aftermath of the war evokes the language used in the above descriptions.

Fortunately it is not entirely necessary to rely solely on broad statements such as these in assessing the damage caused by the war, as more specific accounts remain extant regarding the abuses inflicted on civilians in Ulster. The records of Quaker sufferings, recorded by individual meetings across the country and sent to the national committee at Dublin, provide more accurate descriptions of what property and goods were stolen from civilians in specific accounts of attacks by members of both the Jacobite and Williamite military, as well as rapparees and other groups, on individual homes across the country during the war.[136] These records had been compiled since the beginning of the Quaker movement in Ireland in the 1650s, and their original purpose had been to document instances of persecution or violence against members of the Quaker

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[135] William King, 'Quaedam Vitae Meae Insigniora', in Charles Simeon King (ed.), *A Great Archbishop of Dublin: William King, D.D. 1650–1729: his autobiography, family and a selection from his correspondence* (London, 1906), p. 32.

[136] These records have often been overlooked in the study of the Williamite war, with the most detailed modern analysis of them to date undertaken in Bernadette Whelan, 'Women and warfare, 1641–1691' in Pádraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and resistance: War in seventeenth century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001), pp 317–343.

community, such as instances of goods being distrained from them in lieu of paying tithes to the established church. During the Williamite war period they continued in this manner, but the number of occasions when goods were seized from members of Quaker congregations or violent acts were committed against them increased significantly. The noted tendency of the Quakers to 'trust the Lord with their life and substance' by remaining in their homes during this period—as opposed to members of the established church, significant numbers of whom had abandoned their properties—meant that many were present in the countryside during the war, and were therefore vulnerable to attacks by soldiers or rapparees, but could also bear witness to their actions.[137]

During James II's reign the Quaker community had been able to take advantage of his moves towards religious plurality. Quakers in England had benefitted from the king's declaration of indulgence in April 1687, which had suspended the effects of the penal laws, and their positive attitude and cooperation with these new policies helped to legitimise James's stance on religious issues.[138] They also welcomed his policy changes in Ireland, taking up positions on various corporations and other bodies, although their seeming *volte-face* in finally agreeing to do so under a Catholic government as opposed to a Protestant one was derided by members of the established church.[139] With the outbreak of war in Ireland other groups of Protestants treated them with further suspicion. Story explicitly referred to the general Williamite distrust of Quakers and the rumours that they had 'been very serviceable' to the Jacobite cause, which included 'maintain[ing] a Regiment at their own cost; besides several presents of value that they made to the late King'.[140] However, it is difficult to estimate how much of an influence this perceived pro-Jacobite stance would have had on individual Quakers when dealing with rapparees or soldiers from either army. It is unlikely that rapparees or Jacobite soldiers would have treated members of the Quaker community any differently from other Protestants, particularly as these groups were also known to plunder Catholic civilians whose

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[137] Thomas Wight and John Rutty, *A history of the rise and progress of the people called the Quakers in Ireland* (Dublin, 1751), p. 156.
[138] Harris, *Revolution*, pp 211–18.
[139] Ibid., p. 135.
[140] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 50.

loyalty to the Jacobite cause would have been assumed. Similarly, Quakers would have been vulnerable to actions by Williamite soldiers as well, especially regarding the quartering and supplying of troops. As a result this leaves the Quakers as very relevant and reasonably impartial subjects for comparing the actions of rapparees and troops from both sides.

The small community of Quakers based at Belturbet in county Cavan provides an excellent example of the variety of threats faced by civilians in rural Ireland during the war period. In two letters they list their losses during the period, which began in March 1689 with the Irish army's initial advance into the county under Galmoy, the action that had precipitated the initial retreat of many of the Protestants from the county towards Enniskillen. This initial event resulted in the theft of cattle worth £19 and a variety of household goods. As the war continued the community continued to be a target for attacks by a wide range of culprits, including 'Irish robbers', the 'soldiers of King James', 'robbers that follow the English army', and the 'soldiers at the fight with Duke Barrick [Berwick]', as well as a variety of less specific groups such as 'raperes', 'robers', and 'rabell [rabble]'.[141] This suggests that there were extensive numbers of rapparees operating in the region in this period, while the evidence of goods being stolen by Williamite forces suggests that Catholic civilians would also have been targeted in this manner. Overall this small Quaker community in Cavan had goods totaling £76, 15s stolen or destroyed by February 1691, in addition to 'other great losses both of our rents and landes by these tymes, which ly all desolate and wast and noe releefe [relief] to be had out of them'.[142]

This group at Cavan was only one of several Quaker communities across Ulster during the period, and the records from meetings in counties Derry, Antrim, Tyrone and Armagh are also still extant. The accounts list the incidents of plundering commencing primarily in January 1689, while 'onely the sufferings of the meeting neer Charliamont were some of them before that time, by reason that they lived beside that garrison'.[143] Indeed, the meeting at Ballyhagan near Charlemont fort seems to have suffered more severely than elsewhere in this period. In the initial batch of reports compiled in May 1689, possessions to the

[141] Quaker Sufferings, no. 9, Cavan, 1689–91 (Friends Historical Library, Dublin: portfolio 18).
[142] Ibid.
[143] Documents relating to the Suffering of Quaker Families in Ulster, 1689–91 (PRONI, D2224/1).

value of £1,315 were reported as being stolen or destroyed since January.[144] Of this figure, £871 was attributed to Ballyhagan, with the remainder split between five meetings at Lisburn and Grange in county Antrim, Lurgan in county Armagh, and two others in Derry and Tyrone. The individual claimants in each of these areas are listed along with the value of goods lost. The average amount claimed in this period per person at the five meetings was between £2 and £5 while at Ballyhagan this was £17 per person, indicating that significantly more property was stolen from people in this area than elsewhere. Among those at Ballyhagan, several people had losses in excess of £20 each, while others lost larger amounts, including Luke Peele (£59) and Thomas Calvert (£95).

This account attributes these losses to 'the Irish, some of them knowne to be officers and souldyers in the Kings army and other pretended to be souldyers', as well as to 'plunderers in the day time and robbers and theeves in the night'.[145] The items stolen include household goods such as food, clothes, bedding and money, but the primary losses were livestock, including cattle, horses and sheep. The high value of cattle and the fact that they were portable, in that they could be easily driven off a person's property, made them popular targets for thieves on the move. Horses were of course particularly valuable, and the shortage of cavalry mounts meant that they were taken not only by Jacobite forces but also by groups from Enniskillen, who received praise from Williamite commanders for their cavalry prowess but obviously needed mounts for this purpose. From May 1689 the accounts explicitly list 61 horses or mares being seized by the Jacobite army or rapparees, while 39 were taken by the Williamite army or by men from Enniskillen, not counting those seized during the confusion of the initial months of the war. The records also note that all these recorded losses did not cover the 'continual charge of free quarters to the souldyers', a duty that was expected of householders by both the Jacobite and Williamite forces. Indeed, those living in the east of the province specifically record having goods taken from them 'by the English army since they landed', while Quakers in Antrim had £300 worth of property 'plundered by the Irish in James time', another £94

[144] Documents relating to the Suffering of Quaker Families in Ulster, 1689–91 (PRONI, D2224/1).
[145] Ibid.

worth of goods and livestock, including 21 horses and mares, were taken by the Williamites in the immediate aftermath of their landing under Schomberg.[146]

The people at Ballyhagan continued to be targeted after their initial submission in May 1689, with a large list of losses totaling £464 extant for the remainder of that year and the following year. Several of these thefts were directly attributed to the Jacobite garrison of Charlemont fort, while all the losses were blamed on various Jacobite groups, such as 'Irish plunderers' or 'Irish soulders'. Despite this, the people at Ballyhagen were also 'great sufferers by the English army'.[147] They decided against including their losses at the hands of the Williamite forces as 'the high sherife of the county haveing orders from Dublin the last yeare to take the Cuntrys accounts there of', and they were attempting instead to deal directly with him for compensation for these losses, although it is unclear how successful they were in this.[148] The Quaker meetings in other areas did keep a record of their losses at the hands of Williamite soldiers, with thefts being directly attributed to the 'Scotch and English army (before the siege of Derry)', the 'British army', the 'Duke [of] Schomberg G[u]ards' and the 'Enniskillen dragoons', along with frequent references to 'Irish' groups as well.[149]

As these accounts were primarily concerned with recording the goods lost and their monetary value, they recount little regarding the actual conduct of the soldiers and thieves in these encounters with the civilians. Considering how these armed groups stole often-large amounts of property and livestock from their owners it is clear that these encounters were not exactly civil. While in some instances the driving off of livestock was done at night, with the owner unaware of their losses until the following morning, most of the incidents would have involved interaction and altercation between the two groups. In the case of John Neill, a Quaker living in county Antrim, his encounter with the 'halfe-pike men of the Irish army' must have been quite fraught and would have taken a significant amount of time given the sheer amount of goods he had stolen.[150] These included three horses, four sheep, meal, butter, cheese, clothes, bedding

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[146] A valuation of goods that were taken, stolen and plundered by the Irish in James's time, county of Antrim 1689 (PRONI, D2224/2).
[147] A short account of Friends sufferings belonging to the Ballihagen meeting (PRONI, D2224/3).
[148] Ibid.
[149] Losses of the province of Ulster by the Irish etc., 1690 (PRONI, D2224/5).
[150] Ibid.

and thirty loads of hay with a combined value of over £28. Of course, these losses may well have been sustained in several raids, but the loss of household goods in this manner meant the rapparees must have gained entry to his home, while the large amount of hay stolen would have required either a large number of horses grazing in situ on his land, or else carts and other equipment to carry it away.

Numerous accounts feature references to household goods being stolen in this manner, particularly food and bedding, while some specify that the goods were 'forcably [sic] taken'. The Quakers in county Tyrone appear to have been badly affected by the destruction of property, with eight out of the twelve petitioners from the Tyrone meeting claiming that their homes had been either 'burnt' or 'pulled down'.[151] This level of destruction of property is significantly higher than that recorded at any of the other meetings, where the burning of buildings hardly featured at all, and is likely a symptom of Rosen's policy of destruction of the countryside upon the Jacobite withdrawal from Derry. Another of these Quakers, named Thomas Greer, was 'shot to death in at the house doore' by rapparees, in the only instance of a Quaker householder being killed in Ulster throughout these accounts. In counties Antrim and Derry meanwhile there are frequent references to civilians being 'stript'. Of thirteen petitioners in Antrim, two were recorded as being stripped of their clothes, while in Derry this figure was higher, at five instances of stripping out of fourteen attacks.[152] While this practice was undoubtedly humiliating for the victims and would have left them in danger of exposure to the elements, the monetary value of clothing tended to be the main incentive for stripping, rather than any form of sectarian enmity.

The losses and destruction evident in these Quaker accounts not only give specific examples of attacks on civilians by rapparees and military forces, but they also indicate the extent of the damage caused to property across central Ulster. A survey of part of this region, specifically the dioceses of Armagh and Derry, was undertaken in 1693, just two years after the conclusion of the conflict. Compiled by the respective bishops for these dioceses, Archbishop Michael Boyle and Bishop William King, they give an account of each parish under their

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[151] Documents relating to the Suffering of Quaker Families in Ulster, 1689–91 (PRONI, D2224/5).
[152] Ibid.

jurisdiction, outlining the status of each cure and the condition of every church, chapel and other ecclesiastical buildings in the diocese.[153] Anglican church buildings would have been particularly obvious targets for destruction by Jacobite forces, particularly during their withdrawal from the province after being frustrated by the outcome of the siege of Derry, although the level of damage caused to these buildings may also be an indicator of the level of general destruction in the surrounding area. In these visitations the level of damage caused specifically by the war and the amount of damage still extant in the region is clearly evident. Boyle described how 'most of the churches in the Diocese of Armagh were before these late troubles in extraordinary good order and repair, being all either rebuilt or repaired since the Restoration, but many of them have suffered in the late times'.[154]

The typical good order of the diocese, the seat of the Primate of All Ireland, was disturbed significantly by the war, with 'the greatest part of the Archbishopric of Armagh having been laid waste by the garrison of Charlemont, the inhabitants are so impoverished that they are not yet able to do what they ought towards the repairing and adorning of their several churches'.[155] Indeed, in line with the Quaker accounts these visitation records show that the area around Charlemont fort was one of the worst affected parts of the diocese, and it was specifically noted that the church at Aghalow near the fort had its 'roofe of shingles burnt by the soldiers of the garrison of Charlemont'.[156] Boyle lists nine churches that suffered significant damage explicitly as a result of the war, which is 16 per cent of the 56 churches across the entire diocese. This figure is likely an underrepresentation, as 21 churches were listed as 'badly damaged' or 'in need of repair', but only 6 of these were explicitly recorded as being damaged as a result of the war. While it can be assumed that there were some churches that had fallen into disrepair before the war through having an insufficient congregation or clergy to support them, the actual figure of churches damaged

[153] State of the dioceses of Armagh and Derry in the year 1693 (PRONI, Armagh diocesan papers, DIO/4/28/2/1); see figure 1.3 for map of the locations of both dioceses.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.

during the war is almost certainly significantly higher than this figure of 16 per cent.

Figure 1.3: Map of outline of dioceses across Ulster and the north of Ireland.

The other part of the diocese of Armagh that suffered significantly during the war was county Louth, the northerly half of which was very much involved in the war in Ulster. Louth also contained 27 of the total number of 56 churches in the Armagh diocese at the time of the visitation. The county fell permanently into Williamite hands following the Battle of the Boyne, but as noted it provided the location for the winter quarters for both the Williamite and Jacobite armies at different stages during the previous winter. Several of the churches in the county are specifically listed as suffering significant damage during the war, including the church in Dundalk which had been 'a large fabricke [sic] and built before the last war, but when the camp was at Dundalk [it] was destroyed'.[157] Boyle also

[157] State of the diocese of Armagh in the year 1693 (PRONI, Armagh diocesan papers, DIO/4/28/2/1); this refers to the ill-fated Williamite camp at Dundalk in the winter of 1689.

refers to the poor condition of the town in the aftermath of the war, stating that 'by reason of the poverty of the parishioners, if I had not contributed, nothing would have b[ee]n done towards' the repair of the church.[158] Louth also features a higher percentage of churches in the category of 'badly damaged' or 'in need of repair' than elsewhere. Of the total of 27 churches in Louth, 48 per cent were in this 'badly damaged' category, compared to 28 per cent of the churches in the remainder of the diocese. Louth had been the frontier between the two main armies from September 1689 until a few days before the battle of the Boyne. The damage caused by the Williamite camp at Dundalk was exacerbated by Jacobite efforts to destroy 'all the forage, in order to inconvenience the enemy in case they wanted to come by the Dundalk coast, so that they would not find anything left for their subsistence'.[159] The extent of the damage caused to this area led a French observer to comment that 'the misery is so great in this country that one generally sees peasants eating grass like horses. Every day one finds dead bodies on the sides of the roads, where they had made holes to withdraw into like foxes'.[160]

William King was quicker than his Archbishop to explicitly blame the destruction caused by the Jacobites for the poor state of his diocese. Of a total of 52 churches across the diocese of Derry, King lists 29 (56 per cent) as being defaced or destroyed by the war.[161] Most of the damage caused to the churches was categorised as being 'defaced', although this term was quite broad. In the case of Aghanloo, near Limavady, and Cappagh, north-west of Dungannon, it meant that the entire roof of the church had been destroyed, while another church in this category, Kehiagh, had its bell 'taken away by the Papists'.[162] Several churches are listed as having had their communion 'utensils' stolen, while King specifically praised the ministers of two parishes on the Donegal side of the Foyle—Camus and Fahan—for saving their valuable communion ware.

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[158] State of the diocese of Armagh in the year 1693 (PRONI, Armagh diocesan papers, DIO/4/28/2/1); this refers to the ill-fated Williamite camp at Dundalk in the winter of 1689.
[159] M. de Lauzun to M. de Louvois, Roche castle, Dundalk, 1 July [?] 1690, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, i, no. 863.
[160] M. d'Esgrigny to M. de Louvois, Dundalk, 2 July [?] 1690, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, i, no. 864.
[161] State of the diocese of Derry in the year 1693 (PRONI, Armagh diocesan papers, DIO/4/28/2/1).
[162] Ibid.

Unsuprisingly, however, the worst of the damage across the diocese was done to the area around the city of Derry itself. The city's cathedral had the lead set aside for its steeple melted down and turned into bullets during the siege. Almost all the churches in the city's hinterland suffered significant damage, such as the chapel at Culmore at the mouth of the Foyle, the church at Clondermot just across the river from Derry, and the church at Leckpatrick near Strabane, which were all burnt down by the Jacobite forces.

Overall, the damage caused by the Williamite war across the diocese of Derry was significantly worse than that in Armagh. The records of visitations for other dioceses in Ulster in this period have not survived, and in the case of Down and Connor a visitation was not undertaken in the first place, due to the absence of its then Bishop, the notorious Thomas Hackett.[163] The lack of a similar survey of the remainder of the province is regrettable, particularly so in assessing the level of damage caused to the east of the province and the Belfast area in particular. Compared to the areas discussed in records such as those of the Quakers and diocesan accounts, there are significantly less references to destruction and disturbances in east Ulster throughout the war period. While this is in part due to the nature of the source material, in that the diocesan accounts for the east of the province are no longer extant and Quaker meetings were confined to quite localised areas, it does appear to have suffered less physical damage than elsewhere in Ulster. A large element of this is down to the fact that Protestants in the area submitted quite quickly at the beginning of the conflict and it therefore did not see much military action or widespread occupation by Jacobite forces, who moved quickly through the area on their way to Coleraine and Derry. The path of widespread destruction by the Jacobite army as they withdrew from Derry also avoided the area, whilst the lower proportion of Catholics among the population of counties such as Antrim meant that there was a smaller population from which rapparees could be recruited.

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[163] Hackett was appointed bishop of Down and Connor in 1672, and while he spent the next few years resident in his diocese, by 1680 he had moved to England and never returned to live in Ireland, thereby earning the facetious nickname the 'Bishop of Hammersmith'. Following an investigation by William King and Anthony Dopping, a sentence of deprivation was passed on him in 1694, whereby the full extent of his mismanagement of the diocese was revealed. This included simony, the usurpation of his authority by his wife and several others, as well as frequent instances of absenteeism by several clergymen; see John Bergin, 'Hackett, Thomas (d. 1697)' in *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge, 2009).

It is also clear that it was not only Jacobite soldiers or rapparees that were accused of stealing and destroying civilian property during the war, with frequent incidents of indiscipline common among Williamite soldiers, such as the instances among the Quaker community in Antrim. The fact that Schomberg landed in east Ulster meant that the area had to accommodate the large Williamite army for several months until it was broken up into its winter quarters. This force was quite cohesive, in that for the duration of the campaign it largely moved en masse as a single army as it moved southwards. There were of course frequent incidents of interaction between people that lived locally along the army's route and near to its camps, as officers and ordinary soldiers such as Story and de Morsier often strayed from where they were supposed to in search of food and other supplies.[164] Similarly, there were incidents of theft by Williamite soldiers in the area upon their initial arrival, particularly of livestock and horses, while the increased number of deaths by disease in this area was a clear consequence of such a large concentration of troops.[165] However, compared to the smaller groups of men or troops of cavalry that were used to garrison the west and south of the province, the discipline within this large body of men was quite tight. These smaller detachments also had to largely fend for themselves for food and forage due to difficulties supplying troops some distance from the sea. Schomberg organised a system of supply for his troops, which involved being supplied with meal by sea and having this baked into bread using ovens that were rebuilt when the army encamped.[166] This system had significant problems of its own and was prone to corruption and incompetence among its officials, such as the commissary agent in Chester, John Shales, who was unable to provide adequate shipping to bring the army's draught horses and supply wagons to Ireland.[167] Nevertheless, this system did provide a significant

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[164] In his diary De Morsier recorded an encounter he had with an Irish family that he spent a night with on his way to rejoin his regiment at Moneymore, following his period of recovery at Carlingford from the sickness he had picked up at the camp at Dundalk. He remarked how the man had initially given him a cold welcome as he thought he was French, but through conversing in Latin he was able to tell his host that he was Swiss, which resulted in him getting 'wheaten bread instead of oat bread' for his supper; see Lenihan and Sheridan, 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland', p. 487.

[165] Lenihan, 'Unhappy campers: Dundalk (1689) and after', p. 208.

[166] Ibid., p. 198.

[167] James Scott Wheeler, 'The logistics of conquest' in Pádraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and resistance: War in seventeenth century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001), p. 204.

proportion of the food needed for Schomberg's main army, as shown by the ovens at Dundalk, which were made operational within four days of the army's arrival.[168]

In Derry, for example, the strain of supporting the troops stationed in the area quickly became a burden on the local population once the siege had been lifted and the immediate Jacobite threat had passed. A substantial garrison of Williamite troops remained at Derry following the siege, and supply difficulties during the winter of 1689–90 resulted in the city's garrison not being paid. The then governor and commanding officer of the garrison, Colonel Fletcher, asked Derry's corporation to pay the wages of his troops until the money was sent from headquarters. They agreed to provide £50 for this purpose, which was a significant amount of money, particularly amidst the poverty following the siege. However, Fletcher suggested that providing the funds would 'prevent any outrages, or abuses, to the inhabitants by reason of the souldiers present want of their pay'.[169] Fear of acts of indiscipline such as looting or violence from the soldiers if they went without pay was likely the corporation's main motivation in this regard, as the damage the garrison could potentially inflict on the town still reeling from the siege could have been significant. The fact that their commanding officer admitted as much to the corporation suggests that the discipline of the Williamite forces was a problem, particularly when they were in winter quarters.

In addition to paying their wages, the job of billeting the soldiers in the garrison also fell on the people of Derry. By September 1690 the corporation reported receiving:

> ...many sad complaints of the poor inhabitants of this place, who have ever since the latter end of May last, quartered four companies of Colonel Deerings Regiment and paid them after the rate of 3 pence per diem for each Soldier, for each Drummer & Corporal 4d ½ per Diem and 5s 3d weekly to each Serjeant, whereby the poore people of the towne are exhausted of any money they had, ingaged [sic] in debt many of them...[170]

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[168] Lenihan, 'Unhappy campers: Dundalk (1689) and after', p. 198.
[169] Minute books of Londonderry corporation 1673–1841, 20 Mar. 1690 (PRONI, MIC 440).
[170] Londonderry corporation, 11 Sep. 1690.

Clearly the situation could not continue in this manner, and in November the corporation included reference to the hardship being suffered by its citizens in its petition for reparations from the crown.[171] At the same meeting in November 1690 the corporation outlined yet another strain that was placed on civil government by the military campaign, stating how the 'common gaol of this city and county is wholly employed, and so taken up by the prisoners of war, and their guards, that traitors, felons, prisoners on executions out of their Majesties courts or that otherwise shall be committed, cannot be secured in order to publick Justice'.[172] To solve this problem it wanted the prisoners of war to be taken into the custody of the garrison. It is not clear from the records how the overcrowding within the jail in Derry was rectified, or at what stage.

Derry city: Post-siege recovery

The attempt by Derry's corporation to deal with the problems caused by the Williamite forces in the region was just one area in which they were heavily involved in the aftermath of the siege. The damage done to Derry and its environs during the siege was quite severe, with significant destruction of property within and without the city walls, the burning of most of the churches in the region, and the substantial losses of goods and livestock by local residents. Derry's corporation took a large proportion of responsibility for the recovery of the city in the aftermath of the siege. The corporation was set up in 1623 by James I as part of his granting the county of Derry to members of the London livery companies, known as the Honourable Irish Society. It governed Derry consistently from its foundation until 12 October 1688, when Tyrconnell ordered the replacement of the sheriff and all other officers and members of the corporation with Jacobite supporters.[173] An entirely new corporation was appointed, including a mayor, sheriffs, a chamberlain, aldermen and burgesses, and in accordance with Tyrconnell's policies at the time the majority of these were Catholics. With the exception of a list of its initial members the records of this temporary body have been destroyed, but considering the city closed its

[171] Londonderry corporation, 27 Nov. 1690.
[172] Ibid., 27 Nov. 1690.
[173] Douglas (ed.), *Derriana*, p. 199.

gates to deny entry to Lord Antrim's Jacobite forces just two months after this new body was appointed, it is likely that this incarnation of the corporation had little or no input into the actual governance of the city. Several civilian and military governors took charge of the city for the duration of the siege, but the corporation met again on 27 August 1689 to elect new members and officers.[174]

The minute books of Derry corporation are still extant from this period, and show that it met regularly, with an average of fourteen meetings held per annum during the decade. The level of detail in the minutes is impressive, with the vast majority of meetings consisting of at least one large page of minutes taken in a fine script, dealing with everything from the election of MPs to the disposal of waste. The two other corporations in the province that still have surviving minute books for this decade are Belfast and Coleraine.[175] The records of Coleraine corporation are less detailed than those of Derry, and in addition all of its records from December 1691 to May 1697 have been lost. The Belfast records are complete for the period, and an edited version of them has been published, but they are also less detailed in their day-to-day records. Almost immediately after its revival, Derry corporation took up the task of leading the recovery of the city. At the second meeting of the corporation after the siege it was agreed that they would petition the duke of Schomberg for 'some subsistence for ye poor inhabitants of this city, that remained here all the siege and are now alive in it'.[176] This shortage of food is unsurprising given the damage done to the city and the surrounding area in particular, a problem that was exacerbated by the enlarged number of civilians that had retreated to the city and the nearby area since March.

It was at the next meeting on 26 September that they launched the first of what would be many attempts to get reparations for damage suffered by the inhabitants during the siege. The corporation's initial campaigning on this matter would be led by their solicitor John Mogridge and by their legal agent William Conolly, who served the corporation in this capacity from 1690 until 1710.[177]

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[174] Londonderry corporation, 27 Aug. 1689.
[175] Robert M. Young (ed.), *The Town Book of the Corporation of Belfast, 1613–1816* (Belfast, 1892); Corporation minute books of the borough of Coleraine, 1672–1707 (PRONI, T.3380/1).
[176] Londonderry corporation, 19 Sep. 1689.
[177] Patrick Walsh, 'The Career of William Conolly, 1689–1729' (PhD thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2008), p. 64; Conolly was a lawyer who came to prominence through his acquisition of

This issue would come to the fore in the corporation's dealings over the following years but their more immediate concern was providing sufficient supplies for the people of Derry. On 7 November the corporation received word that Schomberg had allocated 1,000 bushels of wheat for the subsistence of the civilian population, but the promised supplies had still not reached the city by 6 January.[178] It took until 4 February for Schomberg to finally announce to the corporation that he had officially ordered the delivery of 250 barrels of wheat to the city. He also granted them several other concessions, including setting aside four tons of cheese from the stores at Belfast for the use of the people of Derry; a grant of £500 worth of coal for disbursement in the city without fees or duties; a grant of between £20 and £30 directly to the corporation for the repair of the Roewater bridge; and an order to the governor of Culmore fort that no ships were to be stopped from entering the port of Derry and that no duties were to be levied on any ship carrying supplies for the city.[179] The latter was presumably designed to encourage trade and to increase the city's supply of food, while Schomberg's other concessions also illustrate the problems that still affected the city six months after the raising of the siege, notably difficulties in both feeding and providing the population with adequate heating fuel for the winter months, as well as repairing essential infrastructure damaged during the fighting.

The Irish Society of London also contributed emergency supplies to the city during this period. Following a petition to the Society by Walker at London in person on 6 September 1689, outlining the destruction of the city and the poor state of its inhabitants, the Society wrote to Mayor Gervais Squire and Colonel John Mitchelburne on 18 December 1689 in which they requested that commissioners be appointed to oversee the distribution of £500 they had collected from the London Companies for the 'relief of the poor' of Derry.[180] This

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confiscated estates across Ireland in the aftermath of the Williamite wars, eventually leading to him becoming one of Ireland's wealthiest landowners and the speaker of the Irish House of Commons: see Patrick Walsh, *The making of the Irish Protestant Ascendency: The life of William Conolly, 1662–1729* (Woodbridge, 2010); Patrick McNally, 'Conolly, William (1662–1729)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004).

[178] Londonderry corporation, 7 Nov. 1689 & 6 Jan. 1690.

[179] Ibid., 4 Feb. 1690.

[180] Irish Society, *A concise view of the origin, constitution and proceedings of the Honourable Society of the Governor and Assistants of London, of the new plantation in Ulster, within the realm of Ireland, commonly called the Irish Society* (London, 1822), p. 74; John E. Davies (ed.), 'Original Documents Illustrative of Irish History. No. 4. Instructions Given to the Commissioners Appointed

sum was to be the first instalment of £1,200 raised by the twelve London companies 'for the present necessities of the said inhabitants, and to encourage them to the rebuilding of their respective houses', with the initial amount designed purely 'for the relief of such whose indigence and pressing necessity renders them fit objects of Charity'.[181] They attached several restrictions to this grant, requesting that a list be drawn up of citizens eligible for relief due to their having dwelled in Derry before October 1688 and asking that particular attention be paid to the widows and orphans of men killed defending the city during the siege.[182] This money was by no means meant to reduce overall poverty in the city, simply poverty caused by the siege, as the corporation's appointed commissioners were ordered to give 'preference to such as have lived in better quality and are now reduced to poverty; and, on the other hand, you may be less bountiful to such whose former manner of living has been in lower degree'.[183]

The corporation played a key role in both negotiating and implementing these concessions to the city. Four members of the corporation were tasked with providing a 'list of the inhabitants names, children, and servants within their respective wards' to facilitate the equitable disbursement of the supplies.[184] The aforementioned John Mogridge was also tasked with shipping the four tons of cheese from the stores in Belfast along the coast to Derry, after which he was to return directly with the £500 granted by Schomberg to buy coal. The Chamberlain was asked by the corporation to 'agree with two able and honest men, to go immediately to Belfast, as a guard for Mr. Mogridge in his return from thence, with the money under his charge', which was a necessary precaution given the still dangerous state of the countryside during this period.[185] Mogridge managed to return safely to Derry at the end of February and the money he brought with him was duly used to procure coal from Scotland. The corporation's responsibilities also stretched to regulating the dockworkers at the city's port.

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to Distribute the Bounty of the Irish Society of London among the Distressed Inhabitants of Londonderry, in 1689', in *Ulster Journal of Archaeology* (First series, vol. 3, 1855), pp 165–171.

[181] Davies (ed.), 'Instructions given to the Commissioners', p. 166.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Ibid.

[184] Londonderry corporation, 4 Feb. 1690.

[185] Ibid., 17 Feb. 1690.

Given the need for the city to get resupplied and to encourage trade in this crucial period they swiftly dealt with perceived profiteering amongst these workers, decreeing that 'for what loads they draw from the Quay [to] the length of the Market place, they shall receive no more than one penny half penny; and beyond the Guardhouse two pence, being the former rates'.[186]

References in the records to requests for emergency supplies of food for the population all but disappear from March 1690 onwards, suggesting that by this stage the local economy had begun to recover and that the food and money granted to them had been distributed out among the people of Derry. The members of the corporation were drawn from the middle and upper levels of society, with a high proportion of merchants among the membership. Despite this, the corporation was not totally oblivious to the needs of the poor, as the minutes feature irregular mentions of charity being given to poorer members of the city's population as well as an annual list of the city's pensioners eligible for charity being drawn up. Therefore, while the decline in the corporation's campaign for emergency supplies and funding for Derry by no means indicates that the day-to-day living conditions of all the city's citizens had improved by this point, from Spring 1690 day-to-day life for the majority of the population was likely more secure than it had been at any point since the raising of the siege. With this decline in the need for emergency supplies came an upsurge in references to the need to repair the physical damage done to the city during the siege. On 20 March it was ordered that any owners of livestock within the city and liberties had to repair the fences and ditches around their property in order to prevent their livestock grazing on other people's land.[187] The issue of grazing by animals was a contentious one across the country, particularly in the context of the damage caused by overgrazing of cavalry and other military horses.[188] William King recounted how, during the siege, 'owing to the deficiency of beasts, grass and herbage increased in a wonderful manner, and having being set on fire great tracts of land were burnt up, so that the same fire spread 18 miles and ran over almost all the neighbouring regions'.[189] The damage caused to the pasture

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[186] Londonderry corporation, 20 Mar. 1690.
[187] Ibid.
[188] See chapter three for more information on the adverse effects of overgrazing during the war.
[189] King, 'Quaedam Vitae', p. 32.

meant that when warmer weather returned in the spring of 1690 the new growth was very valuable, necessitating this tightening of grazing rights.

Infrequent meetings of the corporation meant that it was July 1690 before the issue of widespread damage caused to the city was raised, which resulted in a letter being drawn up to ask for the assistance of the Irish Society in London once again:

> 'concerning the ruinous state and condition of this city by reason of the late siege and the utter inability of many of the inhabitants therein to repair their respective tenements, much less to rebuild those that are now beat down by the bombs. As also concerning the want of a Market House, it lending much to the inconveniences both of the said city and country adjacent'.[190]

The Irish Society seemed to be quite slow in providing the next instalment of money promised in 1689 to assist the corporation with their rebuilding projects, as Mogridge was ordered to write to them again two years later asking them 'to advance and pay him, what moneys they should be pleased to lay out, in building the Market house, and assuring them that what sum he should accordingly receive should be here truly applied and made good to the use intended'.[191] The timing of this letter may also be significant as it was to be sent just two weeks after the decisive Williamite victory at the battle of Aughrim, perhaps suggesting that the Irish Society was reluctant to invest money to rebuild property in Derry until the military and political situation in Ireland had begun to stabilise. In December 1691 Mogridge was asked to write to them again, to give 'thanks for the two hundred pounds which they advanced him, reminding them of the five hundred pounds remaining on their letter, dated the 18th of December 1689'.[192] This is a reference to the Irish Society's letter sent on that date as outlined above, suggesting that the final £500 out of the promised £1,200 never actually made it to Derry.[193] This disappearance of the £500 is ironic given the lengths the Irish Society went to in their letter to insist the corporation 'endeavor to obviate all frauds that may be designed...for attaining any part of this benevolence contrary to the true intent and meaning thereof'.[194] Nevertheless, by the time Mogridge

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[190] Londonderry corporation, 1 July 1690.
[191] Ibid., 27 July 1691.
[192] Ibid., 17 Dec. 1691.
[193] Davies (ed.), 'Instructions given to the Commissioners', pp 165–171.
[194] Davies (ed.), 'Instructions given to the Commissioners', p. 167.

was being asked to write the above letter of thanks, rebuilding work had commenced, as he asked the Irish Society for assistance in procuring additional timber for use in the construction of the Market house.[195] This demonstrates a clear difficulty in sourcing suitable construction materials due to a sharp increase in demand for supplies such as timber, resulting from the large amount of rebuilding works being engaged in around the country in the aftermath of the war.

Conclusion

These accounts from Derry show the severe impact of the war on this area of Ulster, with most buildings within the town damaged or destroyed and the local countryside burned or otherwise ruined to such an extent that food shortages remained a problem until the following year. This siege was the military focus of the Jacobite campaign during the early months of the war and the high level of damage to the city and its environs was a direct consequence of this. The withdrawal of the Jacobite forces from Derry toward Leinster in August was characterised by an official policy of destruction of property by the Jacobite commander Rosen. This exacerbated the damage around Derry itself and resulted in a path of destruction of homes, churches and other property across Tyrone and Armagh, as shown through the Quaker sufferings and diocesan records. Elsewhere in the province, the regions to the south including Cavan, Monaghan, parts of Armagh and Down, along with the accompanying territory in Sligo and north Louth suffered extensively during this period, particularly in the following winter of 1689–90. These areas formed the boundary between Williamite and Jacobite positions during the long break between campaigning seasons, and the ongoing skirmishes and rapparee activity adversely affected property, such as that reported in detail at Clones, and caused a flight of civilians from these areas. The other area that suffered significantly during this period was the immediate environs of Charlemont fort on the border of Armagh and Tyrone. The threat posed by the fort's Jacobite garrison was well known by Williamite forces posted to the locality, while civilians in the area were

[195] Londonderry corporation, 17 Dec. 1691.

extensively raided and harassed throughout 1689 and the spring of 1690, as shown by the Quaker community at nearby Ballyhagan. The civilians in east Ulster did not escape attacks or plundering by Jacobite forces or rapparees either, although the damage done in this area was less severe than elsewhere in the province. Antrim and Down were the first areas in Ulster to come under the control of the Schomberg's Williamite expeditionary force, and his troops were certainly not immune to stealing from civilians. This was the case across Ulster as the army was quartered for the winter of 1689–90, with the Enniskillen forces quartered to Monaghan and Cavan being particularly notorious and Derry being especially affected given its continued poor state following the siege.



Figure 1.4: Map of the frontier between the Jacobite and Williamite armies during the winter of 1689–90. Territory within the shaded area changed hands during the winter months or acted as no-man's-land between the two armies.

The main source of encouragement for the inhabitants of the province was the fact that it remained largely removed from the main military

engagements of the war from September 1689 onwards. Small engagements were still fought over the next two years in counties at the fringes of Williamite control, such as Cavan, while rapparee attacks remained frequent occurrences in the tense wartime conditions across the province. The military campaign in Ulster had been quite destructive, but also quite brief. Coming under Williamite control and being removed from the main events and destruction that affected elsewhere in Ireland over the next two years was undoubtedly an advantage for residents of the province. This meant that Ulster had an opportunity to begin its recovery from the conflict while other parts of Ireland were still very much involved in the fighting, and the more lightly damaged area around Belfast and counties Antrim and Down were in a very good position to be able to benefit from the ongoing war. As the Williamites consolidated their control over Ulster the focus of the war shifted southwards towards Leinster and Connacht, in east Ulster 'conditions once again favoured entrepreneurs, and a number of minor traders, already settled in Ulster, made enough capital to set themselves up as merchants'.[196] Compared to the situation in Derry, where the corporation was having difficulties even acquiring enough food to feed its citizens and was appealing to the government for assistance, Belfast and the east of the province had escaped relatively unscathed from the physical destruction wrought by the war. The economic impact of the war as a whole was still felt even in these areas, however, and landlords across the province were left at the mercy of the free market to try to entice new tenants to their land following the destruction of the war.[197]

Just as Ulster was the first area of Ireland to come under Williamite military control, the initial engagements of the war had begun there as well. Resistance among Protestants to James II's authority, and disapproval of the actions taken by Tyrconnell in his name, were evident across Ulster, but this was often restrained by pragmatism or fear. As pro-Catholic policies began to threaten Protestant positions of power and influence, an apparent breakdown in law and order in the countryside and attacks by rapparees on persons and property, and led to an upsurge in sectarian fear among Protestants across the

[196] Jean Agnew, *Belfast merchant families in the seventeenth century* (Dublin, 1996), p. 12.
[197] For more on the impact of the war on the rental market across the country and the attempts by landlords to reset their property see chapter five.

country. However, it was the Protestants in Ulster who successfully began to arm themselves and form 'defence associations', resulting in the province becoming the main area of resistance to Jacobite authority and the location for the initial military engagements of the Williamite war. It is possible that without the distrust of Tyrconnell's government that was prevalent among Protestants in Ulster, and which led to them arming and organising themselves in the manner in which they did, their ability to resist the Jacobite army through the initial skirmishes around Enniskillen and Derry would not have been as effective, and may have had a profound impact on the course of the war itself. As it was, these initial engagements caused many Protestants to flee their homes, while the Jacobite retreat from the province a few months later would see a reciprocal flight of Catholic civilians. Many Protestants elsewhere in Ireland had fled to Ulster in advance of the outbreak of the war, and the interactions between those that had stayed and their Catholic neighbours would play a big part in the experiences of civilians in Ireland during the remainder of the war. The Williamite war had begun in Ulster and had taken a severe toll on the people of the province. From the spring of 1690 and the landing of William III at Carrickfergus in June, the focus of the war began shift southwards, beginning with William's advance through county Louth towards the Boyne.

Chapter 2 — Dublin: Transfers of Power

Introduction

Dublin's position as capital city and its strategic importance in the seventeenth century as the centre of royal control over the whole of Ireland, in many ways set it apart from the rest of the country. As the second biggest city in Britain or Ireland after London, it was also an important urban centre and Ireland's busiest trading port. During the Williamite war period, Dublin was used as the centre of power by both sides while in their possession. Despite this strategic importance, Dublin suffered little physical damage as a result of the Williamite war, particularly compared to areas like Ulster and the midlands, which saw significant disruption caused by factors such as the activities of irregular forces and the movement of large-scale armies from both sides. As the city was by and large unaffected by physical conflict, it instead felt the impact of the war through occupation by both sides. There was no siege of Dublin, nor was the city even formally surrendered, as it was simply abandoned by the Jacobite forces in the immediate aftermath of the battle of the Boyne. Rather, the main impact of the war on Dublin was the period of Jacobite occupation, when the social order of the city was turned on its head, and the subsequent reestablishment of Williamite control that saw these changes reversed once again. These periods of social change are therefore crucial for understanding of the impact of the war on the city.

These changes in the social hierarchy of Dublin began to have an effect before the war began, with the accession of James II and Tyrconnell's subsequent rise to power. The changes brought about during this period and the impact they had on both the Protestant and Catholic people of Dublin need to be assessed, including issues such as religious tensions and violence, emigration and the steady transfer of power. With the defeat of the Jacobite forces at the Boyne the political situation was turned on its head almost overnight. The fact that Dublin was not subjected to violence and looting by Jacobite forces following their defeat at the Boyne and their withdrawal from the city left it in a good position to be able to recover from the economic damage caused by the changes under the

Jacobite regime. This reestablishment of control by authorities loyal to the Williamite cause did not solve the social or economic difficulties caused by the war, nor did it significantly decrease the tensions between Catholics and Protestants, as laws and policies that had been used by the Jacobite authorities to control members of the Protestant community were reversed and applied to Catholics. The social impact of these changes, as well as the general consequences of living in a city at wartime, with the associated inflation, food shortages, uncertainty and fear, are also crucially important factors in examining Dublin during this period.

The coming of James II to the throne in 1685 brought about significant changes in Ireland, particularly in the fortunes of Irish Catholics, for whom the period following his coronation has been described as one 'of anxiety for Protestants and of fluctuating hopes for Catholics'.[1] Analysis of bills of mortality and hearth tax records suggest that Dublin supported a population of between 50,000 and 60,000 in 1685, a figure that represented a three-fold increase in the city's population since 1660.[2] With the growth in the city's size came intensive physical and economic development. During the reign of Charles II, Dublin's growth was driven in large part by the strengthening of the city's economic position in relation to the rest of the country. In 1685 William Petty estimated that Dublin was 'responsible for nearly forty per cent of the total customs revenue'.[3] Dublin's rising dominance in trade nationally saw its merchants dealing in agricultural produce or manufactured goods that were produced some distance from the capital, in regions closer to other ports, serving as third party merchants between local traders and international markets.

The city's economic growth since the Restoration is also shown through its physical expansion, as throughout this period the development of several urban estates by various landlords and bodies changed the shape of the city.[4] This meant that a growing majority of the city's increasing population were living outside the medieval city walls, in suburbs developed either by private landowners such as the Aungier estate to the south of the old city or James

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[1] J.G. Simms, 'Dublin in 1685' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xiv, no. 55 (Mar., 1965), p. 212.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., p. 217.
[4] Colm Lennon, *Dublin: Part II 1610–1756* (Dublin, 2008), p. 3.

Edkins's Newmarket development in the Donore liberty to the south-west. Dublin's corporation also facilitated the physical expansion of the city through initiatives such as setting two of the city's commonages at fee farm for development for ninety-nine year leases. Following a survey in 1664 St Stephen's Green was divided up into ninety plots and leased by lot to freemen of the city.[5] By the 1680s the square had developed into a fashionable area with approximately fifty fine houses. A similar method was used to develop the area around Oxmantown Green on the north side of the Liffey, with ninety-nine plots being set out and leased to city freemen. While the initiative did bring development to the area, the failure of the Duke of Ormonde to take up residence in Oxmantown as expected, combined with the development of 'institutional buildings and facilities may have deterred more affluent private residents from setting up home in the district in the longer term'.[6] Another useful indicator of economic expansion during this period is the building of bridges. Prior to 1670 the city was served by only one bridge across the Liffey, but the next dozen years saw the building of Bloody, Essex, Arran and Ormond bridges.[7] The building of these four new bridges in such a short period of time demonstrates the improvements in infrastructure and the remarkable economic expansion of Dublin in the years immediately prior to the Williamite war.

Of course, Dublin's position as capital of Ireland and the site of the vice-regal court was perhaps the most important reason for its growth in this period. In the aftermath of the Restoration settlement the city's legal services were in high demand, as Catholics and Protestants attempted to either regain or hold onto land that had been confiscated from them or granted to them as a result of the mid-century conflict. Ormond's wealth allowed him to set extravagant standards in the city during his long periods in residence as lord-lieutenant, raising expectations among the upper classes and attracting them to the capital. Eager to compete with each other for positions at court, having both a town and a country seat became more popular for the landowning classes, who demonstrated their worth and ambition through lavish spending and imported

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[5] Rowena Dudley, 'St. Stephen's Green: The early years, 1664–1730' in *Dublin Historical Record,* liii, no. 2 (Autumn, 2000) p. 157.
[6] Lennon, *Dublin 1610–1756*, p. 3.
[7] Ibid., p. 4.

luxury goods.[8] Their arrival in Dublin seeking patronage and administrative jobs, as well as access to the fashionable new society that was beginning to develop in the city, had a significant input into the development of new areas of the city as outlined above. Through their presence and their high levels of expenditure that boosted the city's commercial economy, the landowning class was one of the main groups of people that contributed to Dublin's population growth during the period. Immigration during the reign of Charles II saw increases in the population of other groups within the city. Dutch, German, and particularly French Huguenot immigration brought skilled workers to the community, such as merchants, craftsmen and seamen. More Protestant immigrants arrived in large numbers from England in the period, bringing with them skills in industries such as the manufacturing of wool and linen.[9] Other religious groups, particularly Presbyterians and Quakers, also saw population increases at the same time, in spite of varying levels of official tolerance amongst civic authorities.[10] Despite living under many religious restrictions, ranging from constraints on practicing their faith through to their inability to hold almost any civic office due to the requirement to swear the oath of supremacy, Dublin's Catholic community more than doubled in size between 1671 and 1682, as people flocked to Dublin looking for work and opportunity in the rapidly-expanding city. Estimates of the proportion of Catholics living in Dublin at the accession of James II varied between one half and one third of the overall population.[11]

Dublin under Jacobite control

The dominance of Irish society by members of the Established Church during the reign of Charles II was clearly evident in Dublin. The oath of supremacy meant that Catholics were excluded from serving on the corporation, the main civic authority, or from becoming freemen of the city, with these policies further restricting their membership of the city's merchant or professional classes.[12] The

[8] Simms, 'Dublin in 1685', p. 217.
[9] Ibid., p. 216.
[10] Ibid., p. 225.
[11] Ibid., p. 217.
[12] Ibid., p. 219.

economic expansion and growth of Dublin during the preceding decades were almost exclusively the preserve of Protestants, in large part thanks to their close links to the national administration at Dublin Castle and to the ruling classes in England.[13] Following the accession of James II in 1685, his choice of Tyrconnell as head of the army and the latter's appointment of Catholic officers across several regiments gave an indication of the king's future policies concerning Catholics.[14] The religious tensions that emerged across the country in the aftermath of James's accession were repeated in Dublin, and the urban environment and the close proximity of people of both Catholic and Protestant persuasions in their homes and on the streets meant that these tensions were often heightened. In July 1685 when news reached the city of the defeat of the Protestant Duke of Monmouth's rebellion and his subsequent beheading, Catholic crowds celebrated on the streets in the city's liberties, lit celebratory bonfires and burned the duke in effigy.[15] In October, amidst frequent accusations of treason against Protestants, a man sentenced to time in the pillory 'had two hundred eggs flung by a Popish boy at him, many of the Papists encouraging their servants to it'.[16] This developed into a riot in which a man was killed outside Christ Church cathedral at Skinners Row, until the crowd was dispersed by armed soldiers. These tensions increased further as Tyrconnell gradually increased Catholic numbers in the military and enacted further pro-Catholic reforms. In July 1686 there were reports of scuffles between freshly appointed Catholic soldiers in Tyrconnell's Irish army and a Protestant 'rabble' on the streets of the capital. Paul Rycaut, the secretary to then Lord Lieutenant, the earl of Clarendon, noted how 'the fears and rumours in these matters cause great disturbances in the minds of the people, so that all trade is at a stand'.[17]

These 'fears and rumours' denote the uneasiness of the city's Protestant population at the sudden reversal of the established social and religious norms,

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[13] Simms, 'Dublin in 1685', p. 226.

[14] For more on the relationship between Tyrconnell and James during this period, and particularly the former's role in shaping James's policies regarding the expansion of the rights and position of Catholics within Irish society, see John Miller, 'The earl of Tyrconnell and James II's Irish policy, 1685–1688', in *Historical Journal*, xx, no. 4 (Dec., 1977), pp 803–23.

[15] William Colles's diary of events, Dublin, 14 July 1685, in *Ormonde MSS* (H.M.C., London), new series, viii, 343.

[16] Colles's diary, Oct. 1685, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 344.

[17] Paul Rycaut to John Cooke, Dublin Castle, 18 July 1686, in 'Sir Paul Rycaut's memoranda and letters from Ireland, 1686–87', ed. Patrick Melvin, *Analecta Hibernica* xxvii (1972), p. 155.

which resulted in restrictions being placed on various elements of their lives, such as their ability to bear arms, while their Catholic neighbours entered positions of power within the community to which they had previously been excluded. During the earl of Clarendon's tenure as lord lieutenant the oath of supremacy was abolished as a prerequisite for gaining the freedom of the city, opening this up to Catholics and non-Conformists. Tyrconnell's rise to the position of lord deputy in 1687 saw him enact a more wide-ranging pro-Catholic agenda, particularly through the appointment of civic officials such as sheriffs, an office which had previously been the sole preserve of members of the established faith.[18] The new administration began to dismantle the old Protestant civic order, which in Dublin resulted in the issuing of a new charter for the city's corporation in November 1687.[19] This radically changed the religious composition of every aspect of the corporation, as the lord mayor and other key offices were given to Catholics, while only ten of the twenty-four aldermen and fifteen of the city's forty-eight burgesses were Protestants under the corporation's new charter.[20] Whilst two prominent Quakers and two other nonconformists were also appointed among the aldermen, power had clearly shifted to the Catholic community of the city, in line with James's policies for the entire country.[21]

Tyrconnell's appointment as lord deputy in January 1687 'put the city into great consternation', with jubilant Catholics accused of frequent robberies to the extent that 'hardly a night passed but some house was assaulted'.[22] The resulting panic among Dublin's Protestant population from these acts of theft and violence, combined with the prospect of continued Catholic advancement, 'discouraged the English Protestants, and put a great stop to all trade, so that money became very scarce, and many houses empty', as 'very many families prepared to remove for England'.[23] The national economy did indeed begin to falter in 1687, as both

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[18] J.G. Simms, *Jacobite Ireland* (2nd ed., Dublin, 2000), p. 35.
[19] John T. Gilbert, *Calendar of ancient records of Dublin*, v (Dublin, 1895), p. xlvi.
[20] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 35.
[21] Tim Harris, *Revolution: The great crisis of the British monarchy, 1685–1720* (London, 2006), pp 135–6.
[22] Colles's diary, 7 Jan. 1687, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 347.
[23] Ibid.

the rental value and purchase price of land fell.[24] In addition, rumours abounded that upon Tyrconnell's arrival he would 'put a stop to people leaving the kingdom and carrying away their effects', and that soldiers would be quartered on private houses in the city.[25] These reports hastened the flight of Protestants from Dublin, with eleven of the fifteen Protestant burgesses in the newly re-chartered corporation failing to take their seats at its first meeting due to their being absent from the country.[26] The widespread changes to civic society that were being made in this period were being driven by Tyrconnell but done in James's name, and it is unlikely that either the Protestants that fled to England or those that chose to remain in Ireland were able to disassociate these changes from the Catholic king, and much less the religious tension, fear and violence that accompanied them.

Around 1,500 Protestants were said to have fled Dublin in the wake of the departure of Clarendon in 1687 while another 3,000 had left by December 1688.[27] In the aftermath of the Williamite victory at the Boyne, William King commented that one third of the city's inhabitants had fled to England during the Jacobite period.[28] While this estimate is very high, he also noted that those that left were the 'most substantial' members of Dublin's population. While again this may be a reflection of King's hyperbolic writing style, the wealthy section of the community was the most likely to leave as they could afford the passage to England. Their wealth and influence would also distort the impact of their departure, as King noted that the departing Protestants left empty homes and businesses that Catholics swiftly moved to take over, furthering the transfer of power within the city. Dublin saw proportionally more emigration in advance of the war than anywhere else in the country, with 25 per cent of Protestant emigrants in 1688 coming from Dublin.[29] This high proportion for 1688 could be attributed to the more volatile environment in rural areas in the preceding years,

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[24] L.M. Cullen, *An economic history of Ireland since 1660* (London, 1972), p. 22.
[25] Colles's diary, 19 Jan. 1687, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 347.
[26] Rowena Dudley, 'Dublin's Parishes 1660–1729: The Church of Ireland parishes and their role in the civic administration of the city' (PhD thesis, TCD, 1995), p. 35.
[27] Ibid., p. 30.
[28] William King's observations on the state of Dublin and King William's army after the Battle of the Boyne, c. 1690 (TCD, William King papers, Ms 1955–2008, no. 2310).
[29] Raymond Gillespie, 'The Irish Protestants and James II' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxviii, no. 110 (Nov., 1992) p. 129.

with frequent incidents of rapparee activity and attacks on isolated rural homes meaning that vulnerable or anxious Protestants from outside Dublin had already left prior to this period. This percentage is also perhaps simply representative if Petty's figures for the population distribution of the members of the established church are accepted as reasonably accurate. Nevertheless, it is essential that both the Dublin-centric nature of many commentators and the social class of many of these emigrants must be borne in mind when dealing with the flight of Protestants from the country during this period.

Even a cursory glance at the church records of Protestant parishes in Dublin during this period shows a significant demographic disturbance for the years of the Williamite war. The marriage records for the parishes of St. Andrew, St. Audeon and St. Bride begin to show signs of reduced religious activity by Protestants from 1688 onwards.[30] The general age profile of potential candidates for marriage would have been quite young, meaning they were perhaps able to emigrate more easily. Similarly, the fall off in marriage rates may indicate that there was a shortage of available Protestant clergy to perform the ceremony or that people did not wish to get married in times of such uncertainty. These three parishes were on the south side of the Liffey, with St. Audeon's encompassing part of the old walled city and lands to its west, while St. Andrew's and St. Bride's were situated to the east and south-east of this area respectively. All three parishes show a sharp drop in the numbers of Protestants who were either still in the city or who were willing to marry in these uncertain circumstances (see Table 2.1). The total number of marriages conducted in these three parishes was running at an average of 21.875 per annum in the eight years prior to 1688. In that year only four couples were married, all of them in the parish of St. Audeon's, while the average of all three parishes for the five years from 1688–92 was only eight marriages per annum, or a drop of over sixty per cent. The numbers begin to notably increase again from 1693 onwards, when nineteen couples were wed, and the average number of marriages for the eight years after this period rose once again to 27.125 per annum.

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[30] D.A. Chart (ed.), *Marriage entries from the registers of St. Andrew, St. Anne, St. Audeon and St. Bride (Dublin), 1632–1800* (Dublin, 1913).

Table 2.1: Number of Marriages in Dublin Parishes per annum, 1680–1700.

Year	St. Andrew	St. Audeon	St. Bride	Annual Total		St. Patrick's (Huguenot)
1680	15	8	6	29		1
1681	9	15	5	29		0
1682	10	7	6	23		2
1683	1	9	10	20		5
1684	3	11	4	18		2
1685	6	8	3	17		3
1686	4	8	10	22		1
1687	3	4	10	17		1
1688	0	4	0	4		0
1689	0	20	2	22		0
1690	3	0	0	3		1
1691	1	0	4	5		0
1692	1	4	1	6		1
1693	4	6	9	19		7
1694	6	10	6	22		6
1695	15	12	6	33		6
1696	9	9	6	24		8
1697	13	11	8	32		3
1698	16	13	3	22		5
1699	20	5	7	32		17
1700	24	6	3	33		14

Figures from: D.A. Chart (ed.), *Marriage entries from the registers of St. Andrew, St. Anne, St. Audeon and St. Bride (Dublin), 1632–1800* (Dublin, 1913); J.J. Digges La Touche, *Registers of the French conformed churches of St. Patrick and St. Mary, Dublin* (Dublin, 1893).

Dublin's Huguenot community, many of whom had only recently settled in Ireland to escape persecution in France, was also very intimidated by this large-scale transfer of power to Catholics. Two hundred and eighty Huguenot families left Dublin between 1687 and 1690, with reports of them leaving several houses lying empty as early as January 1687.[31] The situation in the above three Anglican parishes was replicated among the members of Dublin's Huguenot community who worshipped at the Lady Chapel in St. Patrick's cathedral.[32] While the available sample is obviously a lot smaller given the smaller community, marriages amongst Huguenots in this Dublin parish all but stopped between 1686 and 1692, with an average of only 0.57 marriage ceremonies performed per annum during these seven years. This compares to an average of 2.6 per

[31] Dudley, 'Dublin's Parishes', p. 44.
[32] J.J. Digges La Touche, *Registers of the French conformed churches of St. Patrick and St. Mary, Dublin* (Dublin, 1893).

annum in the six years prior to this and 4.375 in the six subsequent years. The extended period of disturbance shown by these figures fits in with the examples above in which emigration amongst the Huguenot community in Dublin began very soon after the more relaxed policies towards Catholics began to be implemented under James II.

Reports suggested that over thirty ships left Dublin from 7 to 9 December 1688, 'laden mostly with women and children and such goods as they could get on board'.[33] Members of the clergy were among those that left during these months, such as Narcissus Marsh, then bishop of Ferns and Leighlin, who left the city at the end of February.[34] The Dean of Christ Church along with most of the chapter of the cathedral fled just before James's triumphal arrival at Dublin in March 1689.[35] This exodus demonstrates the impossible situation many Protestant clerics felt they were in, choosing to abandon their parishes in the face of persecution. Those that remained tried to protect their churches and their property as best they could, in a similar manner to that of the previous generation during the wars of the 1640s.[36] The Proctor of Christ Church, Michael Jephson, removed the cathedral's valuable gold and silver utensils, valued at almost £400, and managed to keep them hidden for the duration of the Jacobite period, only through employing a series of hiding places, including burying them beneath the coffin of the recently interred Bishop of Chester.[37] Jephson was fortunate to even be in a position to arrange for the securing of the church plate as during the Jacobite period the authorities imprisoned several other clerics, including William King. Many of the leaders of Dublin's Protestant community had either chosen to flee or had been imprisoned by the outbreak of the war in

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[33] Colles's diary, 6 Dec. 1688, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 356.
[34] Raymond Gillespie (ed.), *Scholar Bishop, The recollections and diary of Narcissus Marsh, 1638–1696* (Cork, 2003), p. 24.
[35] John L. Robinson, 'Christ Church cathedral, Dublin, Proctor's accounts, 1689–90' in *The Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland,* i, no. 3 (Sept, 1911), p. 260.
[36] Similar levels of sectarian fear had been felt among the inhabitants of Dublin following the outbreak of war in October 1641 and the flight of Protestants from rural areas across the country to Dublin. Rising tensions within the city had led to violence and resulted in the majority of Dublin's Protestant clergy having fled by the beginning of 1642. The records of Christ Church were taken to Dublin Castle for safekeeping and rumours abounded of Catholic desires to say mass within the cathedral: see Raymond Gillespie, 'War and the Irish town: The early modern experience' in Pádraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and resistance: War in seventeenth-century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001), pp 307–8.
[37] Robinson, 'Christ Church cathedral, Proctor's accounts', pp 260–66.

the spring of 1689. Those that remained and continued to act in a leadership role included Anthony Dopping, bishop of Meath, who was regarded as the most able of the four Protestant bishops who took their seats in James's 1689 parliament and acted as an unofficial leader of the opposition.[38]

While it is clear that a significant number of Dublin's Protestants had left the city before the outbreak of the war, the majority of them were either unwilling or unable to do so, for financial or other reasons. Those that remained resident in the city, such as Jephson and many others, had to adapt to the changed social environment, which included tensions between different communities, fear at the stories of rapparee activity coming from the countryside, as well as a significantly altered civic government. Representation on bodies such as the corporation or appointments to positions such as judges of the assizes were split between Catholics and Protestants.[39] This led to accusations of religious bias in court decisions, with King later noting how 'no Protestant, tho he had ever so good evidence against a Papist, durst prosecute him, for he was sure to be acquitted'.[40] James recognised the importance of the Catholic clerical hierarchy in Ireland, and in 1686 had allowed them to publically wear their 'episcopal dress' and granted modest state payments of between £150 and £300 to the dozen most senior Catholic bishops.[41] In April 1687 the king issued a declaration of indulgence, which removed restrictions not only for Catholics but also Presbyterians, Quakers and other non-conformists.[42] Further episodes of officially sanctioned advances for the Catholic church were evident under Tyrconnell.[43] Mass was said in the chapel of the new Kilmainham military hospital and a house on Ship Street was 'consecrated to the nuns', while members of Catholic orders appeared openly in the capital attired in full religious garb, only to be 'laughed at by the boys' on the city's streets.[44] In October 1688, a Protestant 'rabble' were recorded as 'break[ing] the Mass House

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[38] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, pp 76–7.
[39] Colles's diary, 15 & 19 Feb. 1687, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 349.
[40] King, *State of the Protestants*, pp 66–67.
[41] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 27.
[42] S.J. Connolly, *Divided Kingdom: Ireland 1630–1800* (Oxford, 2008), p. 179.
[43] For a comprehensive examination of the Catholic revival in Dublin during this period, see: Liam Chambers, *Michael Moore, c.1639–1726* (Dublin, 2005), chapter 2, 'A dangerous subject: the Catholic revival in Dublin, 1686–90', pp 41–60.
[44] Colles's diary, 31 Mar., 8 Aug., 1687 & 2 Feb., 1688, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 350–52.

at Lime Street', with this incident demonstrating how ordinary Protestants were not immune to starting religiously motivated disturbances, even with the ascendant position of Catholics within the city.[45] Despite these advances, factionalism and internal disputes among the Catholic clerical hierarchy brought about by their increased power, as well as James's resistance to the idea of an established Catholic church, tended to reduce their overall influence during the years of Jacobite control.[46]

Since his accession in 1685 James had tried to advance the cause of his Catholic co-religionists in Ireland but at the same time not alienate Protestants in England by overly restricting the scope of the established Church of Ireland.[47] Still hopeful of a triumphant return to the English throne, this remained his policy even after the events of 1688. James could not, however, prevent ill feeling between the recently appointed Catholic authorities in Dublin and the Protestant members of the community. This was clear in incidents such as the imprisonment of Christ Church cathedral's two bell ringers, Flood and Wolfe, who were sent to the stocks in October 1688 because the lord mayor 'fancied they did not make the bells ring merrily enough for the birth of the Prince of Wales'.[48] While church bells were a part of day-to-day life throughout the early modern period, they began to be used during the seventeenth century to mark events in the 'new calendar of secular, dynastic and patriotic anniversaries which overlaid the traditional cycle of the Christian year', and were 'harnessed to the propaganda requirements of the ruling regime'.[49] In England bells were rung to celebrate several major events during the reign of James II, such as Monmouth's defeat and the birth of the Prince of Wales, but the political preference of Protestant churchmen across that country was clear in the vigour with which they were rung for events during the new regime of William and Mary.[50] In light of this it is not unusual that the church bells in Dublin's main Protestant churches consequently became a source of dispute between the Jacobite authorities and

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[45] Colles's diary, 30 Oct. 1688, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 354.
[46] Chambers, *Michael Moore*, p. 60.
[47] See: Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, pp 86–9.
[48] King, *State of the Protestants*, p. 91.
[49] David Cressy, *Bonfires & bells: National memory and the Protestant calendar in Elizabethan and Stuart England* (2nd ed., Stroud, 2004) pp 69–70.
[50] Cressy, *Bonfires and bells*, p. 79.

the Protestant clergy during these years. Similarly, the annual commemoration of the anniversary of the 1641 rebellion in October was a specific cause for conflict throughout this entire period. In 1687 Tyrconnell forbid the traditional firing of the city's guns in salute and 'at night a rabble of Popish soldiers with drawn swords and a crowd of other rabble ran about to put out bonfires'.[51] Following this Tyrconnell actually outlawed the making of bonfires in the streets, for the stated reason that 'the great concourse of idle people gathering about these fires hath of late occasioned several riots, quarrels and other great disorders', although similar scuffles rather inevitably broke out the following year.[52]

Wartime Tensions

The strained environment and religious tensions within Dublin increased significantly following events in England at the end of 1688, as the 'Glorious Revolution' saw James replaced on the throne by William and Mary. Tyrconnell's actions in the previous years had essentially set Dublin up as the capital of a Jacobite state, and James's attempt to use Ireland as a springboard from which to try and regain the English throne saw him sail to Kinsale from France in March 1689. He arrived in Dublin on Palm Sunday, 24 March, and was greeted 'by the lord mayor, Sir Michael Creagh, and aldermen, in their formalities, by the principles of the city, and by the garrison under arms, while the bells rang, the cannons roared, and the music on stages erected in the streets harmoniously played'.[53] This level of ceremony was usually reserved for the arrival of the viceroy into the city, although a Protestant eyewitness noted that the king 'came with far less splendor than the lord deputy used to do, [...] he was very courteous to all as he passed and it is said that he wept as he entered the Castle'.[54] The celebrations among Dublin's Catholics at the arrival of their king, the cause of a significant improvement in their fortunes, showed their high expectations for their continued success under his rule.

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[51] Colles's diary, 23 Oct. 1687 & 30 Oct, 1688, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 351 & 354.
[52] 'Bonfires and fires in the streets', 31 Oct. 1687, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 376.
[53] J.T. Gilbert, *A Jacobite narrative of the war in Ireland* (Dublin, 1892), p. 47.
[54] Colles's diary, 24 Mar. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 361.

While one of James's first acts upon arrival in the city was to pass 'a proclamation declaring freedom of religion for all', in reality life for Protestants in Dublin continued to be difficult.[55] On 24 February, shortly before James's arrival, Tyrconnell had ordered the disarming of the Protestants across Ireland. In Dublin up to ten Jacobite regiments had been moved to the city over the previous week, and on the appointed day:

> [Tyrconnell] filled all the Streets and Lanes with Foot and Horse; and then for so much of the City as lies within the Walls, he sent the City Officers to signify to every House, that if they did not send in every Sword and Bayonet, as well as Fire-Arms in their possession into the Churches, (which were generally seized for this use and filled with Soldiers,) they should be left to the Mercy and Discretion of the Soldiers, both as to their Lives and Goods.[56]

This is how the disarmament of Dublin's Protestants was described by William King. King had served as Dean of St. Patrick's cathedral in Dublin since February 1689, and was shortly afterwards entrusted with responsibility for the diocese of Dublin by archbishop Francis Marsh as he withdrew to England. This left King and Anthony Dopping, bishop of Meath, as *de facto* leaders of the Church of Ireland, and the Irish Protestant community looked to them for guidance. King attempted to placate Tyrconnell's government while at the same time giving secret support to the Williamite authorities in London.[57] He was clearly not trusted by the Jacobite authorities and was imprisoned in Dublin Castle from July to December 1689.[58] In the aftermath of the Williamite recovery of Dublin, King wrote *The State of the Protestants in Ireland under the late King James's government*, regarded as the most extensive and well-known defence of Protestants who remained in Ireland under Jacobite rule, as well as including information concerning life in Dublin during the period. King's experiences under the Jacobites, his position as a High Churchman, his well-known opposition to Catholics and more particularly Dissenters, all colour this work.

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[55] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 64.
[56] King, *State of the Protestants*, pp 111–112.
[57] Andrew Carpenter, 'William King and the threats to the Church of Ireland during the reign of James II', *Irish Historical Studies*, xviii, no. 69 (March, 1972), p. 22.
[58] Hugh Jackson Lawlor, 'Diary of William King, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin, during his imprisonment in Dublin Castle' in *The journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, fifth series, xxxiii, no. 2 (30 June 1903), pp 119–52.

Nevertheless, despite the clear pro-Williamite agenda inherent in King's *State of the Protestants*, examples from numerous other sources tend to support the general tone of fear and repression felt by Protestants within Dublin at the time as recounted by King.[59] Frequent reports of rapparee attacks on Protestant property across the country caused fear of widespread looting within the city itself, as well as rumours that this would escalate to 'stripping and knocking on the head'.[60] One particular rumour concerning a potential organised massacre of Protestants on 9 December 1688 gained particular traction, specifically that on that day the Catholics were to 'fall on, to kill and murder man, wife and child, and to spare none'.[61] Many rumours such as these echoed the language and nature of the 1641 rebellion, playing on already established fears and prejudices. King noted how Protestants feared that their disarmament 'at first looked like a design to put in execution (what they long feared), a general massacre'.[62] Being without arms and unable to defend themselves played into these fears and also left themselves powerless 'to preserve their goods, which were every day robb'd, and their houses that were every night broken open, but likewise to secure their persons, that were daily assaulted'.[63] This disarmament was so comprehensive that by the time the victorious Williamite army arrived at the city following the battle of the Boyne, the city's population met them 'in a rather strange manner, as regards their weapons, because they formed a guard of honour armed only with rusty old halberds, stakes and pitchforks', with this odd collection of implements being all the arms the disarmed Protestants had to hand.[64]

This incident also precipitated the flight of further people from the city, such as the provost of Trinity College, Robert Huntington, along with most of the college's Fellows. They had already been living in poor conditions due to the absence of rental income from the college's country properties, but they abandoned the college on 1 March 1689 in the wake of the general disarmament

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[59] Gillespie, 'The Irish Protestants and James II', p. 129.
[60] *The present dangerous condition of the Protestants in Ireland, with a new order of Tyrconnell's, in a letter from Dublin, 19 February 1689* (London, 1689), p. 1.
[61] Rev. George Hill (ed.), *The Montgomery Manuscripts, 1603–1706* (Belfast, 1869) f.n. 46, p. 271.
[62] King, *State of the Protestants*, p. 112.
[63] Ibid., p. 112.
[64] Pádraig Lenihan and Geraldine Sheridan (eds), 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland, 1689–90' in *Irish Studies Review*, xiii, no.4 (2005), p. 487.

the previous week.[65] Further incidents occurred in the city throughout the summer of 1689. Throughout this period Dublin was busy with Jacobite officers and troops, who were assembling before marching north towards the conflict in Ulster.[66] In May it was reported that 'the town begins to be crowded with French officers', while frequent reports reached the city of events in the north.[67] Relations between Jacobite soldiers and civilians in the city were often tense, with the confidence of the soldiers contributing to an environment where 'it was usual for any soldier to stop gentlemen, and take his horse, and make him go on foot, though on the road, and though he had a pass or a protection in his pocket, which if he produced they would tear and scorn at it, and carry away the horse'.[68] Throughout the summer there were reports of scuffles between both Catholics and Protestants with members of the Jacobite army, suggesting a lack of discipline among elements of the Jacobite forces, while various 'Protestants of note' were temporarily imprisoned at various locations across the city, including the Blue Coat school, Trinity College and St Thomas's Court.[69]

The remaining fellows and scholars of Trinity College were evicted on 16 September as the college was commandeered for use as a military barracks and prison, with mass being celebrated in the chapel before it was assigned as a gunpowder store.[70] Father Michael Moore has been credited with preserving the college's books and manuscript material during this period, although the soldiers quartered in the college caused widespread damage to its buildings and their contents.[71] Several searches were made of Christ Church cathedral towards the end of the summer, and a general seizure was made of all Protestant churches in the city on 6 September.[72] On 26 October the cathedral was seized again, this time by one of James's private chaplains, Father Alexius Stafford, who celebrated mass there the following day. The cathedral remained in the hands of the Catholic clergy for the remainder of the period of Jacobite control of the city.

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[65] R.B. McDowell and D.A. Webb, *Trinity College Dublin 1592–1952: An academic history* (Cambridge, 1982), pp 28–29.
[66] Colles's diary, 25 May 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 364.
[67] Colles's diary, 15 May 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 364.
[68] Colles's diary, 24 June 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 366.
[69] Colles's diary, 24 June, 18 July, 1 Aug., 9 Sept., 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 366–71.
[70] Chambers, *Michael Moore*, p. 47.
[71] Ibid., p. 47; McDowell and Webb, *Trinity College Dublin*, p. 29.
[72] Robinson, 'Christ Church cathedral, Proctor's accounts', p. 263.

James also appointed Catholic figures to positions associated with the cathedral, such as the dean, chancellor and other members of the chapter of Christ Church.[73] This overthrow of Protestants, not just from civic bodies but also from religious ones, represents the steady increase of Jacobite power in Dublin during the period.

One of the new elements to city life brought about by James was the introduction of a new coinage. There was a significant shortage of coin in Ireland, caused in part by the large amounts of capital brought with them by Protestants as they left Ireland in the preceding period.[74] This caused James to initially revalue 'all English and foreign gold and silver coins' in circulation in Ireland the day after his arrival in Dublin.[75] While this helped to ease the administration's financial problems temporarily, it required significantly more funds in order to fit-out and keep its substantial army in the field, costs that Tyrconnell estimated were around £100,000 a month.[76] Following the convening of the Jacobite Parliament at the King's Inns in Dublin on 7 May, a money bill was passed granting the king revenue of £20,000 per month, collected in the form of a levy on tenants across the country, which 'must have been particularly unwelcome to tenants who were enjoying rent-free occupation as a result of the flight of the landlords'.[77] Despite this there was still a massive shortfall in funds needed to pay for the army, even before taking into account the severe problems encountered in collecting the full revenue across the country. The coining of brass and copper money was only intended as a temporary solution, with a proclamation from Dublin Castle on 18 June stating that the authorities 'have caused the said copper and brass money to be made currant [sic] for the present necessity and therefore do not intend that the same shall continue for any long time'.[78] However, given these significant financial problems, the minting of new coinage continued apace at both the Deanery in Limerick and at premises on Capel Street in Dublin, where the press was operated in two twelve hour shifts,

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[73] Robinson, 'Christ Church cathedral, Proctor's accounts', p. 264.
[74] L.M. Cullen, *Anglo-Irish Trade* (Manchester, 1968), p. 39.
[75] Arthur E. J. Went, 'James II's money of necessity often called gunmoney' in *Dublin Historical Review*, xvi (1960–61), p. 16.
[76] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 90.
[77] Ibid., p. 90.
[78] Went, 'James II's money of necessity', p. 16.

day and night.[79] From August 1689 until May 1690 it is estimated that the press in Dublin produced coins initially valued at over £750,000.[80]

This new coinage was not adopted very enthusiastically by the general population, particularly the Protestants, in large part because it was unlike most other contemporary currency in that its nominal value was far greater than the value of the metal used to mint it. This factor caused massive fluctuations in the value of the new coinage. Despite this, the new coin was credited with keeping commerce in the country liquid, ensuring that 'the poor did not want, and buying and selling was brisk for the first half-year'.[81] Problems arose when 'people began to fear the power of England' with the arrival of the Williamite force to Ulster under the Duke of Schomberg in August 1689.[82] The value of the new coinage had recovered by October, as the English Jacobite John Stevens described how 'the brass money passed as current and was of equal value with silver' at the main Jacobite camp near Ardee, the strong value of which 'made the camp so plentiful of provisions that I have seen'.[83] The fluctuations in the value of this brass and copper coinage are indicative of the varying levels of confidence among the Jacobites during the period, with its value rising and falling with military success and failure.

As the military campaigns in Ulster were winding down for the winter, the Jacobites 'were cheerful enough, as having not received so great a loss from the army of marshal de Schomberg as they at first apprehended'.[84] Emboldened by their success in holding off the Williamite forces, spirits were high amongst the troops quartered around Dublin. Even officers not officially posted to the city managed to make their way to the capital, as 'nothwithstanding His Majesty's repeated orders for all officers to repair to their commands the city swarmed with them', all eager to gain the favour of the king.[85] Williamite writers bemoaned the high spirits among the Jacobite forces in the city as 'the money ill gotten was ill spent in all manner of debauchery, luxury and riot', turning Dublin

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[79] Went, 'James II's money of necessity', p. 17.
[80] Ibid., p. 19.
[81] Gilbert (ed.), *Jacobite narrative*, p. 54.
[82] Ibid., p. 54.
[83] John Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens, containing a brief account of the war in Ireland, 1689–91*, ed. Robert H. Murray (Oxford, 1912), pp 83–4.
[84] Gilbert (ed.), *Jacobite narrative*, p. 89.
[85] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 92.

into 'a seminary of vice, an academy of luxury or rather a sink of corruption, and living emblem of Sodom'.[86] While Jacobite officers may have been confident going into their winter quarters, morale began to slip among the lesser ranks, particularly following the arrival of French troops under Lauzun in March 1690. This saw regiments that had previously been quartered on the ordinary citizens of Dublin, 'removed to the outskirts of the city and the neighbouring villages'.[87] In many cases these troops were billeted in deserted or ruined houses and therefore had to purchase their own food rather than be provided with it by the householder. This was made more difficult as the silver coin that was paid to the French soldiers caused 'excessive dearness of provisions and all manner of necessaries, not from any scarcity but from contempt of the coin'.[88]

If the soldiers were finding prices excessively high then the same applied to the ordinary citizens of the city, both Catholic and Protestant alike. As early as November 'all things but meat grow scarce, even brass money itself'.[89] The new coinage had been in use for almost a full year and many people, particularly among the poorer sections of society, would not have had any reserves of pre-Jacobite coinage to help alleviate the high commodity prices. Many Protestant and Catholic households also had to billet a range of Jacobite soldiers. Those that were exempt were subjected to other costs in lieu, such as providing 'one, two or three featherbeds with necessary good blankets, or in default of such beds two, three or four pounds according to the value of his house or humour of those that were to impose the rates'.[90] The vague nature of these charges left them very much open to corruption and 'underhand charges', as outlined by Stevens:

> 'By this means were levied about five hundred good beds, besides a vast sum of money, all as was pretended to furnish conveniences for soldiers in waste houses that they might not be burdensome to the inhabitants. In truth all this served only to enrich some few private persons through whose hands it went and who made a prey of the city under colour of easing it'.[91]

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[86] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 93.
[87] Ibid., pp 102–3.
[88] Ibid., p. 102.
[89] Colles's diary, 2 Nov. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 372.
[90] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 103.
[91] Ibid.

These beds were collected at an office at Cork Hill and they were used 'to lodge the army in the College and empty houses'.[92] Shortages of fuel caused 'the soldiers and poor to pull down empty houses', while the authorities attempted to deal with these shortages by issuing a proclamation to forbid it and another 'encouraging bringing in hay, oats, straw and coals'.[93]

These problems would continue for the duration of the winter and spring of 1690. Schomberg's subsequent retreat from his ill-fated winter camp at Dundalk caused the value of the brass money to rise, with a corresponding increase in inflation.[94] Further proclamations were issued in January to encourage 'farmers to being in provision to the markets' and to encourage the sowing of new crops.[95] However, within a few days a 'great disturbance' took place in the city, when 'the soldiers fell a-taking all the baker's and huxter's bread in the city, as also the oatmeal and other edible things, and stealing the baker's money found in the shops, and committed many offences'. It is likely that this incident was recorded by our diarist simply because in this case the offences were investigated and the guilty men were punished, with seven being made to run the gauntlet and another seven hanged.[96] Food shortages continued through March, when 'great complaints were made for want of bread, which continued till the 29th, and then a proclamation was published for raising the price of grain', in an attempt to encourage farmers who had been hoarding or hiding stocks of grain for themselves to release it into the wider market in order to alleviate the shortages.[97] Inflation saw the brass money double in value by April, as bread shortages continued.[98] The extent of these food shortages and high prices would have had a very harsh impact on the ordinary people of the city, despite their relative safety from attack by rapparee forces compared to their compatriots in rural areas.

The detailed accounts of sufferings by the members of the Quaker community in Dublin during this period complement the above examples of

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[92] Colles's diary, 11 Nov. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 373.
[93] Colles's diary, 24 Nov. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 374.
[94] Colles's diary, 10 Dec. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 374.
[95] Colles's diary, 21 Jan. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 375.
[96] Colles's diary, 25 Jan. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 375.
[97] Colles's diary, 25 Mar. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 379.
[98] Colles's diary, 8 Apr. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 380.

disorder and corruption. These records include many examples of instances where money or goods were seized 'under pretence [sic] for the Late King James'.[99] Losses included goods such as '200 stones of good fleece wool', goat and leather hides, tallow, several horses, barrels of malt, and a range of other goods. Some Quakers were told they would simply be robbed by the soldiers if they did not willingly hand over goods as requested, while in several cases they were 'promised payment but got nothing'.[100] The skills of Quakers involved in manufacturing and the linen trade, such as the wealthy and influential Anthony Sharp, were also pressed into service for the Jacobite cause.[101] Sharp and another weaver, Joseph Inman, were at different times both 'forced to make cloth for the late King James at a lower rate then it was his own, by reason he could not for conscience sake receive their wool seized from his neighbours', with both men making substantial losses on the work as a result.[102] The two men were most likely making uniforms for the Jacobite army as it had been very poorly turned out the previous summer, with the majority of the troops described as being 'almost naked, or at least very ragged and ill shod'.[103] While the Quakers were seen as being one of the religious groups that fared better under the Jacobite regime, the evidence in this document shows that they were still subjected to harassment and economic hardship during this period. By the spring of 1690, 'the distempers that the kingdom laboured under' had caused a general shortage of capital that left the economy of Dublin and the entire country in a very poor state.[104]

While Sharp and Inman had been engaged in making uniforms for portions of the army, in general the Jacobite commanders failed to make positive use of the break in the campaign for the winter. One of their own supporters bemoaned the fact that during the winter 'there was no augmentation of troops

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[99] Losses by Dublin Friends, 1690 (Friends Historical Library, portfolio 18, no. 4).
[100] Ibid.
[101] Sharp had lived in Dublin since 1668 and had risen to become the city's most prominent weaver, employing over 500 people in 1680 and becoming Master of the Weaver's Guild in 1688. Consequently a large landowner in the city, he was one of the two Quakers chosen as aldermen under the new Jacobite city charter in 1687. See: Olive M. Goodbody, 'Anthony Sharp: a Quaker merchant of the Liberties' in *Dublin Historical Record*, xiv (1955), pp 12–19; and Richard L. Greaves, *Dublin's Merchant-Quaker: Anthony Sharp and the community of Friends, 1643–1707* (Stanford, 1998).
[102] Losses by Dublin Friends, 1690.
[103] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 79.
[104] Ibid., p. 103.

made...no care taken in exercising the army in their respective quarters; in providing arms and apparel; in fortifying towns, and filling them with ammunition and victuals'.[105] While some of this type of preparation was done, such as basic entrenchments being dug around Dundalk and Dublin and some arms manufacturing taking place in Dublin and Kilkenny, on the whole the Jacobite preparations were not very comprehensive.[106] Aside from the addition of the new French troops as outlined above, this level of inactivity remained the case right up until the main army was assembled at Oxmantown Green in May and marched northwards to defend the Jacobite front line near Dundalk.

Throughout the winter frequent reports of disturbances in the countryside reached the citizens in Dublin, with one inhabitant remarking how 'the Rogues are so numerous and mischievous that murders and Burning houses in the dayly news wee receive from the Country'.[107] With the arrival of William III in Ireland on 11 June the tensions within the city were heightened even further. Word of his landing reached the city on 13 June, with the news actually being welcomed by Catholics, who 'triumphed and rejoiced as if they had got King William in a pound, and the day were their own'.[108] William's arrival did little to allay the fears of Dublin's Protestants, who were still firmly under the control of the Jacobite powers in Dublin. Further Protestants were imprisoned during this period, with William King again spending time confined in Dublin Castle from 2 June. The confident air of the Catholics in the city seemed to dampen the spirits of the Protestants, many of whom 'were so open, as to tell their Protestant friends very lately, that they would be glad to go to Mass within this twelve month, with several other expressions of the like nature'.[109] Even if William was successful the city's Protestants had other concerns, mainly 'how they should be preserved from being plundered and burnt, in case of the defeat of the Irish army'.[110] This was a very real concern, particularly given the firm grip Jacobite authorities had on the city and the fact that many of the previous

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[105] Gilbert (ed.), *Jacobite narrative*, p. 89.
[106] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 133.
[107] Peter Goodwin to Col. Thomas Flower, Dublin, 21 Mar. 1690 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472).
[108] Samuel Mullenaux, *A journal of the three months royal campaign of His Majesty in Ireland* (London, 1690), p. 11.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.

Jacobite actions and attitudes towards Protestants had been tempered by James's desire not to offend his Protestant subjects in England, whose allegiance he still wished to win back. In the event of a rout and the possibility of a breakdown in military discipline, the situation for the Protestant inhabitants of Dublin could have been very dangerous indeed. Further restrictions were placed on Protestants in the city towards the end of the month. On 19 June 'the Governor ordered all persons walking the streets without swords or bayonets, which was the sign of the Protestants, to be taken up and secured in parades', from which places a selection of them were imprisoned in Trinity College.[111] The next day restrictions were placed on Protestants' right to associate, with a proclamation limiting the number of Protestants that could meet in any one place to a maximum of five, 'on pain of death'.[112] At this point the remaining churches still in Protestant hands were also seized.

Williamite Recovery

Of course, these rapid increases in the levels of persecution of the Protestant citizens of Dublin did not last long, and could be viewed among the final actions of the Jacobite authorities in the capital. Word of William's victory at the Boyne on 1 July took time to reach the city. Aware that a battle was taking place, that morning the Jacobite authorities had ensured that 'the gates of the city were kept strictly guarded, and the Protestants kept in their houses'.[113] Rumours abounded about the outcome of the battle until around 'five that afternoon, some that had made their escape on tired horses, told the Protestants the Irish were much worsted; and others at six, that they were totally defeated'.[114] Defeated Jacobite soldiers arrived at the city in small numbers, with James himself entering the city around ten o'clock that night. The main body of the army under the command of the duke of Berwick began to arrive from around midnight. They set up camp at the northerly outskirts of the city, surprising Protestants who had heard reports of a complete rout by the Williamite forces. Tensions were still high among the population as the next day the remnants of the Jacobite army marched through

[111] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, p. 11.
[112] Ibid., p. 12.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.

the city, across Bloody Bridge, to camp at Kilmainham that night, before leaving Dublin the following day for what would be the final time.[115]

In the few hours between James's arrival at Dublin and his departure southwards towards Wexford for passage to France, he gave a general speech bemoaning his defeat at the Boyne, but also ordering his troops and supporters to 'neither rifle the city by plunder, nor destroy it by fire, which in all Kingdoms will be judged very barbarous, and must be believed to be done by my orders'.[116] While James's self-interest in not wanting any potential atrocities to be blamed on him is obvious, it is questionable to what extent this declaration helped to convince Jacobites leaving the city to do so relatively peacefully and without recrimination. It is more likely that a simple desire to flee the city before the victorious Williamite army arrived was more important. Various accounts of these chaotic few days immediately after the Boyne included references to the movements of the Williamite force, with many false reports that the army would soon 'draw nigh' to the city.[117] These reports were no doubt compounded by the speed with which many of the Jacobite forces were said to have retreated from the battle, with Stevens noting how 'though the action was not till noon several foot soldiers made such haste that they were seen in Dublin before three of the clock, having in that short time run twenty miles', even though 'it was only their fear that pursued them'.[118] Similarly, some members of the cavalry were said to have made it as far as Clare by the following day, only then feeling at a safe distance from the pursuit of the Williamites.[119]

What the city's inhabitants and many of the retreating Jacobite force were not aware of, was that the Williamite force was not pursuing the defeated army by the time they reached Dublin. Following the exertions of combat and having endured a forced 'marching pace over the two long days preceding the battle', William's infantry were in no fit state to join in the pursuit of the retreating army, instead stopping to loot the abandoned Jacobite camp at Duleek.[120] Rearguard actions fought by the Jacobites, notably their French contingent, had managed to

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[115] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 130.
[116] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, p. 13.
[117] Ibid., p. 12.
[118] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 129.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Pádraig Lenihan, *1690 Battle of the Boyne* (Stroud, 2005), p. 171.

hold off the pursuing Williamite cavalry until they broke off their pursuit at the river Naul, approximately thirty kilometers north of Dublin.[121] It is of course unclear to what extent the Jacobite soldiers would have been aware that the immediate danger had passed. While most of the Jacobite regiments were significantly depleted, for the most part the remaining forces kept their discipline and avoided confrontation with people in Dublin, before they began their retreat towards Limerick on the orders of Tyrconnell. Once on the road to Limerick however, the army rapidly began to disintegrate, as officers and men alike deserted and fled either to the countryside or to Dublin.[122] Viscount Kilmallock's regiment was among those that joined the defeated Jacobite army on the march to Limerick.[123] As it had been the regiment left behind by James to garrison Dublin during the main army's engagement at the Boyne, its withdrawal marked the hand-over of the city to the Williamites.

As the Jacobite military abandoned Dublin, they were joined by a significant number of civilians. From the morning following the battle, 'nothing was to be seen in Dublin but officers and carriages, and the principal persons of the town, their wives and families going away'.[124] The retreating army was followed southwards by 'a great number of gentlemen, who had no military employments, and of the clergy, of farmers and tradesmen, as also of ladies, and inferior women with their children, they having an aversion to stay at home under the arbitrary comportment of an heretical or infidel army'.[125] In their haste to leave the city, the Jacobite authorities 'left £16,000 brass money in the treasury, and a great quantity of French peices [sic] called souses [sic]'.[126] While the value of the brass money could be called into question in light of the above discussion, the value of the French coin remained constant, and the fact this very significant amount of money was simply left behind is indicative of the rushed nature of the Jacobite withdrawal. This exodus from the city shows how the Catholic people in Dublin were just as fearful of recrimination by the victorious Williamite force and the reinvigorated Protestant citizenry, as the latter had

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[121] Lenihan, *1690 Battle of the Boyne*, pp 167–71.
[122] Ibid., p. 176.
[123] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 131.
[124] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, p. 13.
[125] Gilbert (ed.), *Jacobite narrative*, pp 103–4.
[126] George Story, *An impartial history of the affairs of Ireland* (London, 1691), p. 93.

been of the retreating Jacobites. Dublin's Protestants would have been quite easy targets for recriminatory acts of violence thanks to their lack of arms, but the urgency with which many Jacobite civilians fled the city before the expected arrival of the main Williamite army ensured that direct confrontation was minimal.

By the time the first Williamite forces began to enter the city, one of their number recounted how bands of relieved Protestant citizens gave the soldiers a very cordial welcome, as the townspeople 'plied our soldiers with beer and brandy to celebrate their deliverance'.[127] Since the day immediately after the battle, amidst the chaos of the Jacobite retreat from the city, prominent Protestant citizens had taken charge and gone about putting order on the city once again. The removal of the Jacobite guard on Trinity College saw the Protestants imprisoned there released, including Robert Fitzgerald, son of the earl of Kildare, who then proceeded to take 'the lead in forming a provisional government'.[128] Over the next few hours the keys to the Council Chamber and the Custom House were secured, the now deserted Dublin Castle was 'seized for their Majesties service', and guards were placed on the gates to the city.[129] This transition did not come about entirely peacefully, as the relief felt by the ordinary Dublin Protestants at the flight of the Jacobite authorities and many of their Catholic supporters from the city manifested itself in excited mobs that were 'intent on looting the houses abandoned by the Catholics'.[130] Only the actions of Fitzgerald and others prevented much arson and vandalism. This violence was in part an expression of revenge against the Jacobites targeted at their abandoned properties, such as the direct attack by a crowd on Patrick Sarsfield's house that Fitzgerald had to 'exercise his authority with cane and sword' in order to disperse.[131] It can also be looked at in the context of the 'rabble' that assembled in the yard of Dublin Castle after the Jacobite garrison had withdrawn, who forced 'open the store-house doors [and] committed very great outrages'.[132] These scenes appear to be more like opportunistic looting and

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[127] Lenihan and Sheridan, 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland', p. 487.
[128] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 156.
[129] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, pp 13–14.
[130] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 156.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, p. 14.

probably show the poor state that some of the ordinary people of the city were in following a full winter of supporting and billeting a large number of Jacobite soldiers. Further recriminations against Jacobite civilians who had followed the army towards Limerick took place in areas outside the city, where 'the enemy afterwards plundered their houses, took away what cattle they left behind, and seized on their estates and farms'.[133]

Following their victory at the Boyne, the main Williamite force regrouped and secured the town of Drogheda before marching southwards.[134] They arrived at Balbriggan on Thursday 3 July, and from there William sent the duke of Ormond's cavalry and his own Dutch Guards to take possession of Dublin. The excited welcome they received from the townspeople as outlined above was replicated by the 'above 300 citizens [who] came out from Dublin, to wait upon the King, and to welcome our camp'.[135] The closest the main body of Williamite troops came to Dublin was Finglas, on the city's outskirts, where they camped on Saturday 5 July. While William entered the city the next day to hear William King preach in St. Patrick's cathedral, the main body of troops were forbidden from doing so, with the king 'not suffering any soldiers to come into the city, except a few for Guards'.[136] This policy was most likely an attempt to enforce discipline in the army and prevent desertion, which would have been easier to do in a city than while encamped on its outskirts, but it also served to protect Dublin's citizens from unruly behaviour by troops fresh from a victorious battle, and in particular it meant that they did not have to billet troops nor contribute to their upkeep.

While this policy was quite successful in protecting the city itself, the land on which the army camped fared quite differently. The Williamite command chose to encamp the majority of their force—which numbered over 30,000 men, plus their horses and an unknown number of camp-followers—at Finglas Wood House, two and a half miles north of the city on the banks of the river Tolka.[137]

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[133] Gilbert (ed.), *Jacobite narrative*, p. 103.
[134] Story, *An impartial history*, pp 89–91.
[135] Ibid., p. 91.
[136] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, p. 15.
[137] George Story puts the size of the Williamite army at this stage at 30,330 foot, cavalry and dragoons, citing a review of the army taken at Finglas on 7–8 July; see Story, *An impartial history*, pp 95–97.

The property was owned by Colonel Thomas Flower, of Castle Durrow in Queen's County, and his Finglas home was personally occupied by Prince George of Denmark during the camp.[138] The damage caused by Williamite army from 5 to 9 July resulted in the house and land being 'in a common and is as beare as the high way since the camp'.[139] The property had been let to a tenant named Wilson, who felt that he was unable to profitably repair the land himself and continue to pay his rent to Flower, and therefore decided to abandon the property. Flower was prepared to abate three years of rent in respect of the 'damage in the camp time', but Wilson thought this would be insufficient and proceeded to flee to England while Flower obtained a warrant for his arrest.[140] The damage was also evident at the adjacent area of Scribblestown where the army had also 'destroyed most of all the grass', but had also 'got into the old house burnt all the priceless chimney points and everything almost was burnable and have pulled up some of the boards and would, I am confident, have burned the roof itself if they had stayed'.[141] The result of this camp demonstrates the severe toll that a seventeenth-century army on the march had on land, crops and property. The agricultural land that the army had been encamped on for just five days was severely spoiled and Flower's agent later estimated that it would take between at least £10 and £20 to repair damage to the house alone.[142]

Before the arrival of the Williamite troops, rumours circulated within the city suggesting that 'the Irish and French were coming back', which likely stayed the hand of some of the Protestant community.[143] Only when the Williamites approached the city did the Protestant citizens feel secure in their position once again. Of course this resulted in raucous scenes as 'the streets were filled with crowds and shouts, and the Roman Catholicks [sic] now lay in the same terrors as they had done some few days before'.[144] The balance of power in Dublin had been reversed once again, this time in the space of a few days. Feeling secure

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[138] Peirce Evans to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 12 July. 1690 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472).
[139] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 2 Aug. 1690 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472).
[140] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 11 Feb. 1691 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472).
[141] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 8 July 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 66; Scribblestown house is situated just north of the Tolka river at Ashtown, adjacent to Finglas and within the area of the Williamite camp.
[142] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 15 Mar. 1691 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472).
[143] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, p. 14.
[144] Ibid.

under the protection of the Williamite army, the Protestants began to reassert their positions within the civic government. The day after King William had been in the city for service in St. Patrick's, he was petitioned by a group of eleven men that had served as Aldermen under the pre-Jacobite charter. They claimed that they had been 'laid aside by the late government' and wanted him to reinstate them and the corporation's charter.[145] William subsequently gave his assent and Dublin's corporation was re-established under Walter Mottley as lord mayor. This marked a significant restoration of power for the Protestant community in Dublin, which began to reassert its control over the city once again. The clergy retook possession of Christ Church cathedral, with the bells being rung in celebration for 'three days and a night for K. William'.[146] The city assembly met later that month and began to address the problems facing the city.

Upon his release from captivity, William King drew up a list of 'observations on the state of Dublin' in the aftermath of the Jacobite occupation. King's fiery rhetoric and his dislike of both Catholics and Dissenters are well known, and it is unsurprising that part of his commentary focuses on the need for the Protestant authorities to reassert control over the Catholic people of the city. He is quite scathing, remarking how 'the RCs of Dublin are very high, talk big and have mighty hopes'.[147] He was concerned how there had been 'no sufficient care yet taken to disarm them', demonstrating the full reversal of the two sides once again as arms were taken from the Catholics and given to the previously disarmed Protestants.[148] He was also concerned about the long term impact of the period of Catholic control, as he noted the gains made by Catholics at the expense of Protestants, and worried that 'if no sufficient care be taken the trade of Dublin will continue in Papist hands and twill [sic] be more a Popish town than ever'.[149] His religious fervour is particularly prominent however in his remarks concerning the interactions between members of both religions during the Jacobite period. He notes how 'most of the most obnoxious RCs have obliged some Protestant or another', fearing that whatever small favours that certain

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[145] Gilbert, *Calendar of ancient records of Dublin*, v, lviii.
[146] Robinson, 'Christ Church cathedral, Proctor's accounts', p. 266.
[147] William King's observations on the state of Dublin and King William's army after the Battle of the Boyne, c. 1690 (TCD, William King papers, Ms 1955–2008, no. 2310).
[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid.

Catholics may have done for Protestants during the Jacobite period would reflect positively on them and possibly result in them escaping punishment, 'notwithstanding the many and multiplied mischiefs they have done'.[150] The fact that King commented on this suggests that there had been elements of positive interaction between the two communities during the period of Jacobite control and that this did not fit with either his own intense dislike of Catholicism or with the desire of the Protestant authorities to regain their level of dominance from the pre-Jacobite period. To this end the corporation passed an act to disfranchise all Roman Catholic freemen in Dublin who had combined to 'set up a new charter and government for themselves'.[151] In addition, before the end of the year, the corporation attempted to get property granted to the city that had belonged to Catholics that 'it was anticipated, might be outlawed for having acted under the charter of James II, or for hostility to the government of William and Mary'.[152]

King also outlined several more mundane problems facing Dublin in the aftermath of the Jacobite withdrawal. One of these concerned the damage done by the army to pastures in the outskirts of the city, such as that done at Finglas, noting how 'there is a great destruction of hay and grass about this town, so great that there can be no sufficient provision for the winter'.[153] He also referred to fears among the city's population for another element of their food supply, as rumours were spread that 'King William will soon be beaten back and that he will burn all the corn and country as he runs away'.[154] Linked to this was the dramatic fall in the value of the Jacobite brass money, which had all but ceased to circulate and was being 'bought up at £10 for a hundred'.[155] The high prices of food and other commodities were a key difficulty facing the city's ordinary inhabitants. One of the reasons used by the aldermen in their petition to King William to justify their takeover of Dublin's civic government was 'so peace and order may be justly observed, and the excessive rates of all manner of provisions may be regulated, and that all exactions on the necessities of the poor of this city

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[150] William King's observations.
[151] Gilbert, *Calendar of ancient records of Dublin*, v, lix.
[152] Ibid.
[153] William King's observations.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

may rightly and duly suppressed'.[156] This situation suggests that upon the reestablishment of Williamite control the city faced several economic problems similar to those that had been encountered by the Jacobite authorities, particularly high prices for foodstuffs. There was a shortage of fuel, particularly coal, with offers of protection made to any mariners or merchants who would import coal to the city.[157] Food prices remained an issue throughout the war period, and as late as September 1691 a proclamation was passed to prohibit the export of beef, pork and butter for six months.[158] These restrictions were a response to shortages of these staple foods, in large part due to the massive loss of livestock during the war, and these increased prices would have caused severe difficulties among Dublin's poorer people.

The presence of significant numbers of Catholics within Dublin remained a concern to the Williamite authorities, including King, who feared that they would be involved in espionage, in assisting rapparees, or would be a general threat to the city's security. Levels of distrust of Catholics were high among many Dublin Protestants, some of whom believed the 'romans in Dublin are as bould and as high as ever they weare, those that are left of them'.[159] On 22 November 1690 the Lords Justices announced that 'all Papists, who have not been noted housekeepers in the city of Dublin for the three months last past, were within forty-eight hours to depart at least ten miles from the city', while no more than five Catholics were permitted to meet together at the same time and they were also subject to a nine o'clock curfew each night.[160] These orders were direct replicas of proclamations made by the Jacobite authorities the previous June.[161] Just two days later a plot was uncovered whereby a group of Catholics had left Dublin with 'a supply of meal, salt, tobacco, brandy and several other things' bound for Jacobite-controlled territory.[162] A letter was found, supposedly dropped in a woman's petticoat as she fled the scene, which was used as

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[156] Gilbert, *Calendar of ancient records of Dublin*, v, 635.
[157] Story, *An impartial history*, p. 139.
[158] Cullen, *Anglo-Irish Trade*, p. 40.
[159] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 2 Aug. 1690 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472).
[160] 'Ordering Catholics other than resident housekeepers to depart Dublin' in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations issued during the reigns of William and Mary and William III, 1689–1702* (2013, forthcoming), no. 32.
[161] Mullenaux, *A journal of his Majesty in Ireland*, p. 12; Colles's diary, 19 June 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 385.
[162] Story, *An impartial history*, p. 150.

evidence of the movement of letters and information from Catholics in Williamite-held territory to the Jacobite authorities. This incident was used as the catalyst for a 'general search' of the entire city, during which 'most of the Papists were secured', in a similar fashion to the securing of the Protestants by the Jacobite authorities earlier in the year. A further proclamation was published on 12 December, forbidding any Catholic from keeping a 'Public House in or about the city of Dublin, after the 25th of December next', for fear that they would be used as meeting places for plotting against the Williamite authorities or for arranging the passing of information to spies.[163]

A broad range of businesses were included under this legislation, including 'all Vintners, Ale-house-keepers, Inn-keepers, or Coffee-sellers Natives of this Kingdom and Papists'.[164] As the war was very much still on-going, this fear among the authorities in Dublin that Catholics with Jacobite sympathies could be a source of information and supplies for the Jacobite military was somewhat justified, particularly given the large Catholic population still resident in the city. Despite these security concerns, these restrictions may also have been motivated in part by more material concerns among Dublin's Protestant elite, who it is likely may have welcomed legislation such as this as a means of reasserting their control over areas of commerce within the city. In the eyes of Dublin's Protestants the passing of legislation such as this would have gone some way to putting down Catholic hopes and remedying the changes in their fortunes made under the city's Jacobite regime. There is also evidence of Protestants trying to profit from these restrictions on Catholics by offering to falsify documents to say that the latter had taken the oath, when in fact they had not.[165] This would have made it easier for Catholics to hold onto their new public offices, but another proclamation was passed against this practice in December and one Humphrey Jervis was jailed and fined 300 marks.[166]

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[163] Story, *An impartial history*, p. 155; see also 'Proscribing Catholics from selling alcohol and trading as vintners' in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 37.
[164] *Dublin Intelligence*, 16–23 Dec. 1690 (NLI, reel 59).
[165] 'Regulating the tendering of the oath of fidelity' in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 38.
[166] Story, *An impartial history*, p. 157.

Conclusion

Throughout the rest of the war Dublin's citizens naturally kept a keen interest in the ongoing military engagements and social disturbances throughout Ireland, as shown by the detailed reports from the Williamite forces published in the *Dublin Intelligence* newspaper.[167] These reports also included events within the city itself as well as the comings and goings of various high-ranking government officials to the city, such as the Lords Justices, whose appointment was celebrated by the people of Dublin in December, 'by their making of bonfires, ringing of bells, and other demonstrations of joy for the same'.[168] In October the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1641 rebellion had been cause for particular celebration, and was marked by an official ceremony in St Patrick's cathedral, a banquet in Dublin Castle and the 'ringing of bells, bonfires, and other demonstrations of public joy' across the city.[169] The fact that the marking of this anniversary had been banned under the Jacobite authorities was certainly a major reason for the celebrations, but in addition the propaganda value of commemorating previous Catholic atrocities against Protestants in the context of the on-going war was not lost on the city's authorities. King William's birthday on 4 November was also similarly celebrated 'with all the splendour that place could afford', while the Lords Justices declared a day of thanksgiving for the 'deliverance of [William's] Protestant subjects' for 16 November.[170] Celebrations and commemorations such as these demonstrated the loyalty of the city's Protestant citizens to the Williamites, and stressed the importance to Dublin of its continuing role as Ireland's administrative capital, with the financial benefits this entailed.

While the later prosperity of Dublin towards the end of the 1690s marked a continuation of the economic growth that had occurred during the reign of Charles II, the accession of James II had marked the beginning of a break in this cycle. Beginning with a relaxation in anti-Catholic legislation, the Jacobite period

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[167] The *Dublin Intelligence* newspaper was officially sanctioned by the Williamite administration. It was printed by Andrew Crook at College Green from September 1690, and later from premises on Ormond Quay. See: *Dublin Intelligence*, 30 Sept. 1690 (NLI, reel 59).
[168] *Dublin Intelligence*, 23–30 Dec. 1690.
[169] Ibid., 18–25 Oct. 1690.
[170] Story, *An impartial history*, p. 148; 'Announcing a day of public thanksgiving on 16 November 1690' in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations,* no. 29.

brought demographic changes to Dublin, with many Protestants emigrating to England in fear of Jacobite control. While Protestants fled their homes all across the country in fear at the increasing Catholic dominance and the possibility of war, the size and proportion of Dublin's Protestant population and its strategic position as capital of the country caused major tensions. It also brought about changes to the city's social hierarchy, with Catholics taking control of the corporation, guilds and even Protestant churches towards the end of the occupation. Religious tensions in Dublin were high for the duration of this period, with resentment and fear among Protestants at the ascendant position of Catholics made worse by reports from elsewhere in the country of rapparee attacks and violence. The general disarmament and temporary imprisonment of Protestants also contributed to the volatile situation in the capital, which occasionally boiled over into the city's streets in the form of clashes with soldiers or other scuffles.

The following summer, despite being a main focus of attention for both armies, the city managed to avoid being the location for a siege or the background to a battle, and consequently escaped much in the way of physical destruction, unlike other urban areas around the country that were either besieged or directly involved in the war, such as Derry, Limerick, Athlone, Sligo or Cork. The rapid transfer of power in Dublin following the Jacobite defeat at the Boyne was remarkably peaceful, as within a few days the entire social hierarchy of the city had been largely returned to the status quo, with Protestants regaining control of the city's government. Retrospectively it could be said that the battle of the Boyne had been the battle for control of Dublin and the east coast of the country. While it was feasible that James could have regrouped his army following their defeat and made a further stand on the outskirts of the city, his flight to France and the decision to abandon Dublin for what the remaining Jacobite leaders felt was a stronger defensive position at Limerick, meant instead that the city and its hinterland was simply surrendered to the Williamites. The swift withdrawal of the Jacobite forces meant that they had no time to loot large amounts of moveable property or to do significant damage to the city before they left. The breakdown of military discipline within the Jacobite army only began in earnest following its departure from Dublin, further reducing the damage done

to the city. Similarly, William's decision not to permit the main body of his force to enter the city following his victory at the Boyne, instead leaving them encamped on the outskirts, resulted in significantly less interference to the city or its population than otherwise would have been the case.

This lack of physical damage to Dublin's property and infrastructure meant that it did not have to invest as much time or funds in rebuilding as did other areas. Similarly, the fact that the Williamites had taken Dublin by July 1690, combined with the city's position away from the front line, meant that it would not be threatened by Jacobite forces for the remainder of the war. The city's size also meant it was not a viable target for attack by rapparees or other irregular forces. This comparative security, combined with the city's strategic position on the east coast, where it acted as a both an administrative base and as a conduit for communications between the Williamite army and London, put Dublin in a good position to be able to capitalise on the economic gains brought by the war. The increased numbers of troops, particularly officers, in the city would have been of immediate benefit to taverns and other retailers, while increased trade in supplies of food and materials through Dublin's port would have been a boon to the city's merchants. While customs figures are not extant for the war period itself, the records from 1693–95 show that the amount of imports into the country remained high, representing the goods needed to help the country to recover and rebuild.[171] Given Dublin's position as Ireland's busiest port and its ability to both supply the army during the war and to handle increased trading capacity, due to its low levels of physical disruption as outlined above, meant that a significant proportion of these imports would have passed through Dublin port.

While Dublin was fortunate to escape physical destruction and a full-scale military engagement as lightly as it did, in other ways the experiences of its inhabitants were quite typical of events during the war. The period following the outbreak of war, and particularly the challenges brought by winter of 1689–90, proved to be very difficult for the population, with both Protestant and Catholic alike having to billet troops or provide money in lieu, often at high rates thanks to corruption among officials. Increasing food prices and the fluctuating value of

[171] Cullen, *Anglo-Irish Trade*, table 7, p. 40.

the new Jacobite coinage, resulted in volatile economic conditions in the city, particularly towards the end of the period. Many of these difficulties were repeated under the reinstated Williamite authorities, while the Jacobite discrimination against Protestants was reversed and many of the very same restrictions repeated against Catholics. In this manner the experiences of ordinary people in Dublin during the Williamite war was quite similar to that during the wars of 1641–52, during which a lack of heavy artillery and other up-to-date siege equipment meant that military engagements tended to avoid urban areas, with the result that the country's limited 'urban fabric was not so much destroyed as debilitated'.[172] Inflation, food shortages and the billeting of troops were some of the issues that affected the general population across Ireland during the war, with rural areas having the added threat of attack by rapparees.

[172] Raymond Gillespie, 'Urban destruction by war in early modern Ireland' in Martin Körner (ed.), *Destruction and reconstruction of towns: Destruction by the Lord's power, internal troubles and war*, ii (Bern, 2000), p. 286.

Chapter 3 — Zones of conflict: Civilian-military relations

Introduction

Perhaps the single most important issue that defined the experience of the Williamite war for the people of Ireland was their interaction with the members of the Jacobite and Williamite armies. Not only did the actions of the soldiers seriously disrupt their daily life by their prosecution of the war, but the armies were also governed by a different legal system and a different moral code, one which tended to result in frequent abuses being committed against civilians by soldiers from both sides. During the wartime period soldiers were quartered on civilian homes for up to several months at a time, with positive and negative consequences and interactions. While these interactions were a daily occurrence throughout the war, they were intensified during periods of winter quarters, when soldiers were dispatched to various parts of Ireland to live among civilian communities. The people living on the frontiers between the two sides often bore the brunt of this responsibility, although efforts were made to try and spread the burden across the territory of each army through quartering and supplying food and other provisions.

In the aftermath of the Jacobite defeat at the battle of the Boyne and the Williamite seizure of control of the east coast, the focus of the Williamite war rapidly shifted westwards. The movement of both armies through the midland counties towards the new Jacobite point of resistance at Limerick saw much looting of civilians and general disorder by troops on both sides. This was just the beginning of a difficult period for people living in this area, as the Williamites' failure to capture Limerick in August 1690 resulted in the two armies retreating into separate regions of control on either side of the river Shannon. The winter of 1690–91 was the period of most intensive interaction, as a long frontier that stretched from Sligo, into Ulster, through the midlands and down to west Cork, divided Ireland in two. The burden of housing and supplying these troops largely fell to the people along this frontier, and the relationship between the soldiers and their hosts was frequently very difficult. This remained the case for nine months until full-scale military operations recommenced the following summer.

Previous authors have tended to largely overlook this period of the war, apart from occasionally describing the rapparee activity that was a noted feature of the war as a whole.[1]

In order to fully address the relationship between soldiers from both sides, several major issues must be addressed. These include the impact of general plundering and looting by soldiers, particularly the Jacobite troops during the chaotic retreat from the Boyne; the impact of having to billet troops for long periods of time, particularly during the winter season of 1690–91, and the day-to-day experience of this; the attempts by both sides to enforce order amongst their soldiers, and an assessment of how successful they actually were at this in reality. These issues were all directly evident during the winter of 1690–91, although relevant examples from throughout the war will be used in order to try and fully address the full scale of these interactions, and their effect on the civilian population across Ireland during the war.

Jacobite retreat from the Boyne

The looting and plundering of civilians by military forces was inherent during periods of conflict in early-modern Europe.[2] A variety of factors contributed to an environment in which this became commonplace, such as a lack of basic pay or supplies that resulted in soldiers taking it upon themselves to seize their own food or wages through plunder, or factional or religious differences between soldiers and the population they were living among leading to violence of a sectarian nature. Poor discipline among an army, through an absence of leadership or other factors, was usually a major factor in acts of disorder such as looting and plundering. These acts were occasionally officially sanctioned, or indeed explicitly ordered, in an attempt to destroy food and shelter for their enemies, to punish or subdue a local population, or to make a political or

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[1] See the introduction for a more detailed look at previous scholarship on the Williamite war, including J.G. Simms, *Jacobite Ireland, 1685–91* (2nd ed., Dublin, 2000); W. A. Maguire (ed.) *Kings in conflict: the revolutionary war in Ireland and its aftermath* (Belfast, 1990); Richard Doherty, *The Williamite war in Ireland, 1688–91* (Dublin, 1998); Kjeld Hald Galster, *Danish troops in the Williamite army in Ireland, 1689–91: for king and coffers* (Dublin, 2012).

[2] See: I.A.A. Thompson, '"Money, money and yet more money!" Finance, the fiscal-state and the military revolution: Spain 1500–1650' in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The military revolution debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe* (Oxford, 2004), pp 289–90; Ruff, *Violence in early modern Europe*, pp 63–4; Tallett, *War and society*, pp 115, 125, 148–50.

religious statement. Examples of these factors were evident during the initial months of the Williamite war in Ulster, such as when official Jacobite policy caused widespread destruction across large parts of the province, while poor discipline and lack of supplies among the Williamite forces caused confrontation with local people. Conversely, Dublin's citizens benefitted from tighter discipline of troops in the vicinity of the capital, such as William's decision to forbid his army from entering the city after their victory at the Boyne, when soldiers flush with victory would have been very difficult to keep in good order within an urban environment.

While Dublin largely escaped significant damage in this period, other parts of the country were not as fortunate. The main Jacobite force had retreated in a rather disorderly fashion to Dublin following their defeat at the battle of the Boyne. Once Tyrconnell had given the order to continue the retreat towards Limerick, however, the army began to disintegrate yet further. The chaos and disorganisation that followed over the subsequent days has been recorded in some detail by John Stevens, an English Catholic who served as a captain in Henry Fitzjames's regiment.[3] His personal account of the journey of the Jacobite forces from Dublin to Limerick over the next week demonstrates the problems that faced the retreating forces and the subsequent impact this had on ordinary people in the region. While Stevens had noted how his regiment had been depleted by deserters in the immediate aftermath of the defeat at the Boyne, shortly after departing Dublin the problem became much worse, as the numbers of soldiers remaining in his regiment were 'reduced to only twenty men with the colours'.[4] Considering that the nominal wartime strength of a regiment at this time was a total of almost 800 officers and enlisted men, and even allowing for the reported reality that regiments were usually only around 400 strong prior to the battle of the Boyne, this indicates a complete collapse of order within the

[3] Henry Fitzjames, the Lord Grand Prior, was the youngest of the five children James II had with Arabella Churchill, the sister of the Duke of Marlborough. In 1689, at age sixteen, he had accompanied his father from France to Ireland and was given command of a regiment, before returning to France with James following the Boyne. His regiment was commanded by Nicholas Fitzgerald for the remainder of the war.
[4] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 131.

Jacobite ranks during the retreat to Limerick.[5] Indeed, Stevens' regiment had become so small that, upon being separated from its remaining members that evening in Naas, county Kildare, he was unable to ascertain their whereabouts, even 'in a town where there are not above twenty or thirty houses and but three good ones'.[6]

While a significant proportion of these missing troops would eventually rejoin their units at Limerick and participate in its defence several weeks later, this breakdown in discipline and wholesale scattering of Jacobite troops across the countryside to the south-west of Dublin caused significant problems for the inhabitants of the region. Instances of theft, violence and other attacks against civilians had of course been features of the Williamite war prior to the battle of the Boyne, but attacks such as these increased notably in the midlands area in the immediate aftermath of the battle. The records of Quaker sufferings for this period contain dozens of instances where horses, livestock or other goods were stolen from Quakers across the midland region, often combined with violence against the victims.[7] In the same manner as the recording of losses among the Quakers in Ulster, each individual meeting compiled comprehensive lists of property, goods and livestock that had been stolen or destroyed during the war. Among these accounts for 1690 there were a considerable number of references to goods being taken 'by the Irish Army at their retreat from the Boyne', 'lost at the break of the Boyn by King Jameses soldiers' or stolen 'by the Irish army and Ulsters etc. about and after the time of their break and run at the Boyne in the fifth month 1690'.[8] William Edmundson, regarded as the founder of Quakerism in Ireland, described how, 'at the Boyne fight, the Irish army being beaten, many of them fled our road, and plundered many in our parts'.[9]

Direct references to post-Boyne attacks such as these occurred at Quaker

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[5] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 62; for more on the organisation of the Jacobite army during the period and for a discussion of regiment strengths, see: Diarmuid and Harman Murtagh, 'The Irish Jacobite army, 1689–91', in *The Irish Sword*, xviii (1992) pp 32–48.

[6] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 133.

[7] List of sufferings of Friends (Friends Historical Library, Dublin: portfolio 18); hereafter: Quaker Sufferings.

[8] Quaker Sufferings (no. 3, Newgarden, Co. Carlow, 1690; no. 14, Edenderry, Co. Offaly, 1690; no. 12, Mountmellick, Queen's County, 1690).

[9] William Edmundson, *A journal of the life, travels, sufferings, and labour of love in the work of the ministry, of that worthy elder and faithful servant of Jesus Christ, William Edmundson* (London, 1829), p. 128; see also Lawrence William White and Jessica March, 'Edmundson, William (1627–1712)' in *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge, 2009).

meetings across the midlands, in the area between Westmeath, Tipperary and Wexford. In Kildare, Carlow, King's and Queen's counties there was a particularly strong concentration of incidents, as noted in the records of the Quaker meetings at Edenderry, Kilteel, Mountmellick and Newgarden respectively. These are all counties through which retreating Jacobite troops would have marched en route from Dublin towards Limerick, with some such as Stevens choosing to make the journey via Kilkenny.[10] Edmundson's home near Mountmellick was right in the centre of this area, and he described how the Jacobite soldiers 'plundered my house several times over, and we were in great jeopardy of our lives, for they were wicked and bloody'.[11] Of the £4034 worth of goods that the Quaker community in Leinster had reported stolen from them in the six months prior to November 1690, a loss of £1469 was recorded by the Dublin and Kildare meetings combined, £789 by the Mountmellick meeting and £1267 by the Newgarden meeting in north Carlow.[12] While these records are obviously confined to members of the Quaker community in this region, they are representative of attacks on civilians of all faiths. The extent of the disarray in which the Jacobite soldiers were retreating through this area during these few days meant it was highly unlikely they were specifically targeting only one small religious minority. Again, the position of the Quakers as dissenting Protestants meant that they were not seen as being particularly loyal by either the Jacobite or Williamite forces. Members of the established church were likely to have been particularly badly affected, although their numbers would have been proportionally small compared to Catholics in most of these areas. Members of the Catholic community—the majority of whom would have been sympathetic to the Jacobite cause—are unlikely to have escaped the worst excesses of this period, given the total breakdown of military structures in these few weeks and the sheer desperation of the ill-equipped Jacobite troops, eager to withdraw to the safety of places such as Limerick.

[10] See figure 3.1 for a map of the area through which the majority of the Jacobite soldiers retreated in the aftermath of the battle of the Boyne.
[11] Edmundson, *A journal of the life*, p. 128.
[12] Quaker Sufferings (no. 15, Leinster, 1690).



Figure 3.1: Map of the Jacobite retreat from the Boyne, July 1690.[13]

[13] This map shows the area through which Jacobite troops retreated in the aftermath of the battle of the Boyne, including urban areas and the four main Quaker meetings that were affected during the period. The main road towards Galway went northwest via Maynooth and Mullingar, before veering south to Athlone, while the main route south went through Naas and Carlow, before dividing towards either Limerick or Cork cities; see William Smyth, *Map-making, landscapes and memory: A geography of colonial and early modern Ireland c. 1530–1750* (Cork, 2006), p. 406.

In Kildare, the first county the soldiers entered upon leaving Dublin, the most comprehensive individual account of losses by a Quaker is that of James Ashton. His farm was in Kilteel, situated around six miles due east of Naas, just inside the Kildare border with both Dublin and Wicklow, and less than twelve miles from the centre of the capital. As the main Jacobite force began to disintegrate as soon as it left Dublin, Ashton's farm would have been in a very convenient location for deserters scavenging for food or other goods to steal. This is shown by Ashton's account, in which he provides a comprehensive list of every item stolen from him 'two days after the break of the Boyne'.[14] Livestock was the most valuable category of goods seized by the soldiers, with Ashton losing seven horses and three mares worth £13, as well as a herd of eleven cows, four heifers, three 'fat' calves and three 'fat' swine, worth a total of £26. Large amounts of agricultural produce were seized, such as barrels of oatmeal, and over thirty yards of various cloths such as linen and twenty stone of wool. He also had significant amounts of smaller moveable goods and personal items stolen, such as a dozen large cheeses, five pounds of sugar, a quart of honey and other foodstuffs; drinking tankards, a toasting iron and a frying pan; nine pewter spoons and assorted other tableware; as well as an array of bedding such as blankets, rugs, sheets and pillows. Clothing such as shirts, waistcoats, aprons, petticoats, boots and hats were also taken, along with his home's curtains, a large looking glass and his razor. So extensive was the amount of items stolen in this short space of time that Ashton remarked in his account that 'they rifled me not laving [sic] me a shoo [sic] to my foot nor any thing to eat or drink, but a littill [sic] maslin we found and boyld [sic] it and drank watter [sic]'.[15] He totalled his losses for all goods stolen during this period at £218/-8/-6.

This comprehensive list of items suggests that the soldiers ransacked Ashton's entire house, likely over a period of several hours, with different groups of men coming across his property and procuring for themselves the most useful or valuable of the remaining items in the house. While the monetary value of many of these goods is very low, their theft needs to be viewed in the context of

[14] Quaker Sufferings (no. 16, Kilteel, Co. Kildare).
[15] Ibid; Maslin is a mix of oats and peas or of two types of corn.

the Jacobite retreat from the Boyne. In their haste to outrun the pursuing Williamites in their initial retreat, the remnants of the 25,000-strong Jacobite army had abandoned their tents and baggage at the village of Donore—where they had camped the night before the battle—leaving each man with only whatever possessions he had carried into battle that morning.[16] Following the swift Jacobite withdrawal to Dublin and the subsequent orders to head towards Limerick, civilians in the midlands were left severely vulnerable to thousands of men who were desperate to gather whatever food, extra clothing or bedding that was essential for them on their journey to Limerick and the west. Livestock such as cattle, sheep and pigs had been targeted by thieves and rapparees throughout the war, while any available horses would obviously have been very useful in the soldiers' haste towards the south-west.

Of course not every member of the Quaker community that recorded instances of thieving by soldiers in the wake of the Boyne was as badly affected as James Ashton but, in line with his experience, many of the witnesses detailed the theft of smaller items such as cheese, bedding and clothing. It is likely that many of them also chose not to include these smaller items in their accounts and listed only their most valuable losses, such as horses and other livestock. This was the policy followed by John Winter, a member of the meeting at Ballyhagan in county Armagh, who listed items such as cattle, corn and household goods in his account from the previous summer, but also referred to the theft of 'severall other things too tedious to sett downe here'.[17] Horses were one of the most common things stolen by the Jacobite soldiers during this period, as soldiers desperate to outrun the Williamite forces and get to Limerick seized valuable mounts wherever they could find them. Indeed, many witnesses listed a single horse as being the only item stolen from them, while in other cases the soldiers were also recorded as stealing items that they needed to ride their new horses to Limerick, with several mentions of horseshoes and saddles being stolen, and even an 'iron bound car with tacklings' being taken from Joseph Carter.[18] Horses had been seized from civilians for the use of the Jacobite army since before the beginning of the war, with [large numbers] seized as mounts for the newly

[16] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 84.
[17] Documents relating to the Suffering of Quaker Families in Ulster, 1689–91 (PRONI, D2224/3).
[18] Quaker Sufferings (no. 12, Mountmellick, Queen's County, 1690).

formed companies of cavalry and dragoons raised by Tyrconnell.[19]

So widespread had the theft of horses by members of the Jacobite army become, that in June 1689 a proclamation was made explicitly forbidding the seizure of horses by Jacobite soldiers and officers, upon pain of being 'hanged up' or immediately cashiered respectively; directives that were unlikely to ever have been fully implemented, and ones that would indeed have become unenforceable during the chaotic retreat from the Boyne.[20] In his account from the perspective of a Jacobite soldier, Stevens freely admitted to participating in actions such as these, recounting how in his desperation to continue his flight towards Limerick, he and a fellow Jacobite infantryman 'attacked a village' in county Kildare, 'with design to force away a horse under the colour of pressing, but in reality was not much better than robbing'.[21] With this description Stevens explicitly noted the blurring of the lines between soldiers commandeering items that were needed for the war effort and simply engaged in common theft, distinctions that were often non-existent. The difficulties the Jacobites had been having in paying their army earlier in the war, combined with the dramatic fall in the value of the brass money that had been used to pay the soldiers' wages following the Boyne defeat, would have also meant that many Jacobite troops would have been keen to compensate themselves for their efforts by whatever means necessary, including plundering local civilians.

While plundering in this manner was clearly widespread across the midlands in this period, in this specific instance Stevens was surprisingly unsuccessful. The people living in the local area managed to come together and fend him and his companion off using half-pikes, leaving them 'obliged to quit our pretensions and march off without horses', suggesting that the soldiers were not always successful in their attempts at plundering civilians.[22] The following day, near Athy in the south of the county, he finally succeeded in procuring a horse for himself by using his rank to commandeer one from a Jacobite lieutenant. He also obtained one for his travelling companion by seizing it from a

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[19] A proclamation was issued in June 1689 to finally ensure the payment compensation to the owners of horses seized for this purpose, see 'Measures for the satisfaction of persons...', 14 June 1689, *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 399.
[20] 'Taking of horse', 24 June 1689, *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 401.
[21] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 134.
[22] Ibid.

local landowner, this time using a pistol to scare off those who attempted to stop him, before the pair set off in the direction of Kilkenny. The large number of horses stolen from Quakers during these few days right across the region seem particularly high, considering that around the country many horses had already been pressed into Jacobite military service. For instance, members of the Quaker meeting at Mountmellick, in north Queen's County, claimed they had a total of forty-six horses stolen from them during this period.[23]

While horses were the most frequently stolen item across the region during these few days they were not the most valuable of losses by the Quakers. Despite the haste with which the Jacobite troops were attempting to move through the area in anticipation of a pursuit by William's forces, the lure of large herds of livestock proved too tempting for many, and again the lines between commandeering necessary subsistence and engaging in blatant theft were blurred. The ease with which armed men could drive off cattle resulted in the theft of hundreds of animals from the region during these few days. Examples include Thomas Cuppage from Carlow, who had 124 black cattle, 130 sheep and various other animals driven off to the value of £245, while Robert Lackey lost 300 sheep, 74 black cattle and ten horses valued at £186.[24] Overall in the region the Quaker records show the members of their community losing over 600 cattle and 1,100 sheep, directly attributed to Jacobite soldiers fleeing from the Boyne. On top of these, a plethora of household goods of varying value was taken from the majority of the witnesses, which ranged from clothes, food and money, to hives of bees.

The unfortunate situation many of the Jacobite soldiers found themselves in is again personified by John Stevens, who used his newly commandeered horse to make for Kilkenny, whereupon his arrival he found all the shops and public houses closed up to try and prevent them from being looted. He also encountered a crowd of Jacobite soldiers at Kilkenny castle, where the stores had been broken open, 'and much bread and drink given out' to the starved men.[25] Along with the other military structures, the Jacobite supply train had simply stopped functioning as a result of the general retreat, leaving the soldiers

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[23] Quaker Sufferings (no. 12, Mountmellick, Queen's County, 1690).
[24] Quaker Sufferings (no. 23, Newgarden, Co. Carlow, 1690).
[25] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 135.

desperate for food and with little option but to prey on the local population. Stevens subsequently lamented the fact that as soon as the Jacobite forces left Kilkenny and continued their journey towards Limerick, 'the town and stores were sold for £300, which a great officer of ours put into his own pocket, when good men were perishing with hunger and weariness, and what was left to the enemy might have plentifully relieved their wants'.[26] The shortage of supplies was also evident in Cashel where, after finding no food in the town, Stevens and a group of Jacobites 'travelled five miles to a gentleman's house upon the road, where was plenty of all provisions'.[27] Even here, however, there was a dearth of leadership or organisation among the Jacobite forces, as 'some few of our stray officers, being got in before, endeavoured to make good the house against us'.[28] This lack of discipline, even amongst the officer corps of the army, resulted in Stevens and the others having to force their way into the house, 'where was such plenty as might have contented an entire regiment, much more about a dozen that we were in all, and yet those few first possessors thought all too little for themselves'.[29]

The breakdown in discipline and the self-interest shown by Jacobite officers in these two instances is further demonstrated by the looting of the officer's baggage that had been sent to Dublin for safekeeping prior to the battle of the Boyne. When news of the defeat had reached the city, the baggage was 'much plundered by those who were appointed to preserve it, and most of what they left ransacked by our own dragoons, and even by some of our officers, who being well mounted were swiftest to overtake it'.[30] This shows not only indiscipline among the Jacobite army, but a full-scale disintegration of its command structures in the aftermath of the defeat, as officers took to looting their own comrade's baggage and selling off large stores of food and supplies for their own personal gain, despite the shortages of food amongst the army at the time. In light of these examples from their superiors it is no wonder that many ordinary Jacobite soldiers decided to steal from the civilians of the midlands area

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[26] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 136.
[27] Ibid., p. 137.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., p. 142.

in order to sustain themselves on their way to Limerick, resulting in a relatively short but intensely difficult period of disturbance for the local population.

With the withdrawal of the Jacobite military from the midlands towards Limerick, control of the region passed to the Williamite forces over the next few weeks, although this transition was certainly not as smooth as the transfer of power had been in Dublin. Edmundson, still resident at his home in Mountmellick, lamented the fact that 'the English army did not come near us for some time, and, to look outwardly, we were exposed to the wills of cruel blood-thirsty men'.[31] In the wake of this Jacobite retreat and the brief period of chaos it had brought to the region, the Williamites moved westwards, gradually seeing the extent of the damage caused by the retreating Jacobite forces for themselves. Upon his arrival at Kilcullen, in east Kildare, the Danish Williamite officer Lieutenant-Colonel Walter described the state of the countryside as it was found by the advancing army, outlining how 'King James has removed nearly all the inhabitants and animals, so that our army cannot make use of them and all our bread must come from the Dublin stores by cart'.[32] This tallies with the descriptions of theft and destruction as outlined above, as people fled their homes in the wake of the widespread Jacobite looting, leaving supplies scarce for the advancing Williamite force.

On 9 July William divided his army into two at Dublin, taking the main portion of the force south-west towards Kilkenny, while leaving fifteen regiments under the command of Lieutenant-General James Douglas, with orders to head west towards Athlone.[33] By Friday 11 July Douglas's troops had reached Cloncurry in north Kildare, an area that had already been badly affected by the actions of the retreating Jacobites.[34] Despite Douglas's orders to the contrary, members of his force, as they moved further westwards towards Mullingar, began to follow the Jacobite lead and plunder civilians in the area, suggesting that the citizens of Dublin had been fortunate that William had limited their

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[31] Edmundson, *A journal of the life*, p. 128.
[32] Walter to Harboe, Kilcullen Bridge, 13 July 1690, in K. Danaher and J.G. Simms (eds), *The Danish Force in Ireland 1690–1691* (Dublin, 1962), no. 35.
[33] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 99; Again these two forces followed the main trunk roads towards Athlone and Kilkenny, see Smyth, *Map-making, landscapes and memory*, p. 406.
[34] Story's reference is to a place called 'Glencurry', which he describes as being five miles from 'Manouth' [Maynooth]. Cloncurry is a parish and small settlement approximately five miles west of Maynooth on the road to Mullingar; see Story, *Impartial History*, p. 99.

access to the city over the previous few days. While Douglas was at Mullingar various groups of Catholics came to the camp seeking protections. While he granted many of these requests, the protections they received were largely worthless. One group of 500 Catholics had come east from Longford and were recorded as getting a guarantee of protection from Douglas. Following this assurance they marched back towards their homes with the advancing army, but 'most of them were plundered afterwards'.[35]

Indiscipline among Douglas's force, in the form of attacking and stealing from Catholics in the area, was extensive.[36] One of his officers seemed disappointed by the levels of looting among the troops, but placed the blame on a lack of proper supplies for the army, remarking how he was:

> ...uneasy here with the disorders of our own men, which has been so great in our march to all without distinction, that tis a shame to speake of it and was not in my power nor the other Colonel, to prevent it, having neither bread nor money to give them, which had I had, I would have hang'd them to the last man, but I would have reclaimed them.[37]

Towards the end of July Douglas became more strict regarding discipline and the plundering of Catholics, forbidding men to 'stir out of their ranks on pain of death', and executing a man found to have disobeyed this order.[38] This use of capital punishment for crimes of this nature was common military practice across Europe at the time, with the executions carried out in view of the entire regiment in order to act as a deterrent to others.[39] Douglas's stance on discipline with his men remained quite changeable however, as on 5 August, just before linking back up with William's main force, a further shortage of bread resulted in him giving his troops permission to 'take what they pleased for their sustenance' from the inhabitants of Holycross, three miles south of Thurles.[40] The remaining members of the Protestant and Quaker communities across the midlands were relieved to see the arrival of the Williamite army to their local areas, and were

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[35] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 100.
[36] Edmundson, *A journal of the life*, p. 129.
[37] William Wolseley to Clarke, from his Majesties camp near Mullingar, 10 Aug. 1690 (Clarke war correspondence, TCD Ms 749, i, no. 110); hereafter: Clarke war corr.; Clarke served as the Williamite secretary-at-war for Ireland during the period.
[38] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 100.
[39] Ruff, *Violence in early modern Europe*, p. 63; Tallett, *War and society*, p. 123.
[40] Story, *Impartial History*, pp 105–6.

largely protected from any looting by Douglas's force. However, any open cooperation with the Williamites by these communities subsequently had a negative impact on any protections they had previously negotiated with the Jacobites, requiring them to leave their homes and follow the Williamite force for their own safety, thereby 'leaving all their harvest at that time ready to cut down' and their property vulnerable to attacks by rapparees.[41]

King William's main force had meanwhile travelled south-west from Dublin towards Kilkenny, following in the wake of large numbers of Jacobite soldiers such as John Stevens. William was much stricter with his men than Douglas, executing fifteen of his English soldiers for various acts of theft and violence against the local population in the first few days of the march.[42] This strict stance was in line with his existing policies towards the Catholic Irish, who he had been trying to win over since February 1689, shortly after his arrival in England. His aims with this policy were to try to reduce the impact of the Jacobite fifth column in the form of rapparees and, more importantly from his own perspective, to try and conclude the war in Ireland as early as possible.[43] Following his victory at the Boyne, William had commissioned a report by his secretary of state for Ireland, Sir Robert Southwell, asking 'what is fit to be done for drawing in and protecting the Irish and others now in rebellion'?[44] The report recommended providing benevolent terms to non-propertied Catholics who would give up their arms, but provided no security of property to landowners. The resulting declaration of Finglas, given on 7 July 1690, decreed that terms would be given to 'all poor labourers, common soldiers, country farmers, ploughmen and cottiers', as well as those 'citizens, townsmen, tradesmen, and artificers' that gave up their arms and returned to their homes before 1 August.[45] Jacobite leaders and landowners were not included under these terms, with the Williamites resolved to 'leave them to the event of war'; but this 'attempt to drive

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[41] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 104.
[42] Würtemberg to Christian V, Carlow, 16 July 1690, in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 36.
[43] J.G. Simms, 'Williamite peace tactics, 1690–91', in *Irish Historical Studies*, viii, no. 32 (Sep. 1953), pp 303–4.
[44] Ibid., p. 305.
[45] 'Declaration of Finglas promising of royal pardon and protection to those who accept Williamite authority', 7 July 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations issued during the reigns of William and Mary and William III* (forthcoming, 2013), no. 10.

a wedge between the common people and the landed classes' eventually came to nothing.[46] William's firm belief in this strategy is shown in his personal attitude towards the ordinary Catholics in the midlands region. His views on the matter were such that in one instance where he personally came across one of his soldiers robbing a woman near Naas, it 'inraged [sic] his Majesty so much that he beat him with his cane', and ordered him to be executed.[47] His intense desire to end the war as quickly as possible, in order to free up both himself and his army for use in the on-going war in his homeland, was likely a significant factor in the personal affront he took to events such as this, which he would have seen as hampering his efforts.

Overall from the extant accounts, William's portion of the army appears to have been much better disciplined than Douglas's, in large part due to William's tolerant stance towards the ordinary Catholics, and the subsequent steps he took in order to curb lapses in discipline, such as the enforcement of capital punishment of offenders. However, the impact of Douglas's force being hampered by a poor supply train must also be stressed. Soldiers were much easier to keep in line when they were properly paid and fed, which was not the case among Douglas's men during this initial advance. Hardships such as lack of sufficient food and shelter, arrears of pay, the constant threat of attack by irregular forces and other factors were common contributors to an increase in disorder against civilians, but also to desertion and mutiny.[48] The Williamite army could little afford to lose many men to either of the latter two actions, particularly when combined with the pressure of trying to quickly complete the conquest of Ireland before the autumn, a situation that may have led commanders such as Douglas to turn a blind eye to abuses committed by his soldiers as long as they remained with their units.[49] The importance of proper food and lodgings for the discipline of troops would become particularly apparent when the two armies were in their winter quarters, a time when the

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[46] 'Declaration of Finglas', 7 July 1690 in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 10; Simms, 'Williamite peace tactics, 1690–91', p. 306.
[47] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 107.
[48] Ruff, *Violence in early modern Europe*, pp 63–4; Tallett, *War and society*, pp 115–18.
[49] Desertion was a issue for the Williamite army, with a proclamation passed by the Lords Justices in September specifically noting that 'several souldiers of their majesties army in Ireland do dayly desert their colours'; see 'Ordering ships captains not to transport deserters', 19 Sep. 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 23.

immediacy of the military campaign was replaced with the boredom of the garrison.

Quartering the armies: Winter 1690–91

By the end of August the regrouped Jacobite army had managed to repulse the Williamite attack on Limerick, aided by almost incessant rain for the last week of the month that had severely hampered the Williamite siege works. William broke off the siege and had returned to England by 10 September. The Williamites retreated eastwards towards Leinster, leaving a front line between the two armies that stretched from Sligo in the north, and then followed the line of the river Shannon as far south as Tipperary. From there the Williamites controlled the towns of Thurles, Cashel, Cahir and Clonmel along the river Suir, as well as most of county Waterford, as far south as Youghal in east Cork. Aside from the Williamite gains made by the Duke of Marlborough along the Cork coast as far west as Castlehaven in October, this front line remained almost fully intact for the next nine months, until the recommencement of the full military campaign the following June.[50] The Jacobite sphere of influence encompassed Limerick, Clare, Kerry and most of Connacht, with its army headquarters based in Limerick city. Both sides garrisoned the areas along this frontier, with the Jacobites holding onto key crossing points over the river Shannon, such as at Athlone, in addition to well-placed towns such as Nenagh in east Tipperary and Ballymore in Westmeath.[51]

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[50] Story lists the following towns as forming part of the Williamite front line from Cork to Donegal: Castlehaven, Macroom, Mallow, Ballyhooly, Fermoy-Bridge, Cappaquin, Cahir, Golden-bridge, Cashel, Thurles, Roscrea, Birr, Mullingar, Longford, Castleforbes, Fenagh, Cavan, Belturbet, Enniskillen, Belleek and Ballyshannon; see Story, *A continuation*, pp 46–7.

[51] See figure 3.2 for a map of the frontier between Jacobite and Williamite territory during the winter of 1690–91.



Figure 3.2: Map of the frontier between Jacobite and Williamite territory during the winter of 1690–91. The shaded region refers to an area where disturbances would have been particularly high, notably on the eastern bank of the river Shannon.

During the Williamite war, this winter period of 1690–91 saw the most significant and widespread interactions between civilians and military forces of the entire conflict. Across early-modern Europe the long break between campaigning seasons each winter was traditionally when closer relationships developed between soldiers and civilians, as armies were dispersed from their summer formations and quartered among civilian homes across the countryside.[52] At these times the soldiers were often significantly under-employed, with poor winter weather meaning it was impossible to undertake many activities beyond scouting missions and the garrison defence of areas held by each side. This inactivity would have resulted in an erosion of military discipline and a consequent rise in boredom among the men, which often led to excessive consumption of alcohol, acts of violence, or attempts to steal from nearby civilian homes in order to supplement their often-meagre winter rations. The soldiers would also have spent long periods of time with their host families among whom they were quartered, and therefore had more opportunities for interaction with them, of both a positive and negative nature. The tendancy among seventeenth-century European armies, particularly during the Thirty Years' War, to rely on monetary contributions exacted from local civilian populations to sustain them during the winter months, further increased tensions of this nature.[53]

The division of Ireland along the line of the Shannon meant that two large armies had to be quartered among the ordinary people on either side of the river. During the previous winter the Jacobite army had been able to call upon the resources of the majority of the island to supply their troops, as they had been in possession of the provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connacht, but by the winter of 1690 this had been reduced to a much-smaller area around Connacht and north Munster. At this point the Jacobite army was still a significantly large

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[52] Soldiers serving in garrisons across Europe were known to have taken part-time jobs in order to supplement their income or to insulate themselves against periods of arrears of pay, a situation that would have helped to integrate them with the local civilian population; see Tallett, *War and society*, p. 113; Periods of winter quarters were also traditionally used to resupply and recruit fresh troops, with local people expected to contribute to this task through goods or money, see David Parrott, *The business of war: Military enterprise and military revolution in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), pp 188–9.

[53] Parrott, *The business of war*, pp 113–22; also, see below, chapter 5.

fighting force, with an estimated 30,000 men under its command, albeit with significantly variable levels of regimental cohesion. Food shortages and difficulties in supplying the army had been evident the previous winter, such as the problems that had arisen in Dublin during the period. This reduced area of occupation caused significant strains on resources and further difficulties supplying enough food and forage to these men, with the result that an even heavier burden was placed on local people during this period.

On the Williamite side of the Shannon, the number of troops stationed in Ireland during this period was significantly higher than that quartered in Ulster under Schomberg the previous winter, particularly considering the high proportion of the Williamite army killed by disease in the autumn of 1689 that had considerably reduced the army size to be quartered on the province. The Williamite soldiers who had been in Ireland the previous winter had also been quartered largely in predominately Protestant areas. The gratitude of Ulster Protestants at the arrival of the Williamite army and their more friendly disposition towards them in general would have been of benefit to both the ordinary soldiers as well as to the army's quartermasters, despite the toll the war had taken on the province during the preceding period of conflict. By the following winter, however, the expansion of Williamite control into Leinster, and their quartering in more predominately Catholic areas, would have resulted in a different and more confrontational experience for both soldier and civilian alike. Throughout these months the constant threat of rapparee activity along the border between the two armies, and often further afield, would also have heightened these tensions significantly.[54]

Following the Williamite withdrawal from Limerick in September 1690, both armies began to disperse their forces amongst the areas under their control. The quartering of troops was a contentious issue, and as the Williamites wound down their campaign for the winter, quarters had to be found across the region under their control for a force of *c.* 20,000 infantry and cavalry. Significant numbers had to be positioned along the front line in order to prevent any Jacobite winter offensives and to counter the rapparee threat, and were posted

[54] See chapter four for an analysis of rapparee activity during the war, particularly in the midlands region in this period.

to towns along the frontier from Ballyshannon to Castlehaven as outlined above. Many other soldiers were more fortunate and ended up billeted far away from the potential danger, in counties such as Antrim or Down.[55] Conversely, Jacobite quarters were largely concentrated on the major urban strongpoints of Limerick and Galway, with efforts undertaken throughout the winter to improve the fortifications of both these positions to enable them to withstand the anticipated sieges by Williamite forces the following year.[56] Smaller numbers of Jacobite soldiers were dispersed around Connacht and north Munster, and at strategically important locations such as Athlone, although roving detachments of cavalry were largely used as the main form of defence along the Shannon frontier throughout the winter months.

The quartering of troops involved regiments being assigned to specific geographic areas, such as towns or counties, by their respective commanders. Upon their arrival they were dispersed among the population of each area, with smaller groups of soldiers being billeted with individual households. The areas to which Williamite forces were quartered across the province of Ulster during the winter of 1690–91 are listed in table 3.1:

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[55] For specific information on where individual Williamite regiments were quartered during this period see: A listing of the army's projected winter quarters (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 209); Allotment of winter quarters, *c.* 23 September 1690, in K. Danaher and J.G. Simms (eds), *The Danish Force in Ireland 1690–1691* (Dublin, 1962), no. 62a.

[56] Stevens was billeted in Limerick city in October and remained there for the duration of the winter, helping to make significant augmentations to the city's fortifications from February to April by acting as a translator between French engineers and Irish soldiers, see Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, pp 191, 195–6. The city walls at Galway were less extensive than those at Limerick, although efforts were made to modernise them during this period as well, see Harman Murtagh, 'Galway and the Jacobite war' in *The Journal of the Military History Society of Ireland*, xii, no. 46 (1975), pp 3–4.

Table 3.1: A list of the Williamite quarters troops in Ulster, 19 Jan. 1691.

Williamite regiments	**Locations where quartered**
2 Troops of Guards and 2 of Grenadiers	Portadown, Lurgan, (Machrilinn), Moyra, Portmore and parish of Ballenderry, (Machriegalla)
Wolseley's Regiment of Horse	From Belturbet all up Lough Erne to Lauderstown and Crevenidy
Russell's Regiment of Horse	The county of Derry and part of the Lagan
Wynn's Dragoons	5 Troops in the Barony of Raphoe, 2 Troops at Ballyshannon, Beleek and Castle (Strum), 1 Troop Warringstown to attend my orders
Cunningham's Dragoons	5 Troops in the Barony of Kilmacrenach, 2 at Cavan and 1 Killybegs
Douglas's Regiment of Foot	Legacory, Lochgall, Drumolie, Castleree, Hamilton's Bawn
Bellasye's Regiment of Foot	Tandragee, Newry, Drummore lochans, Hillsborough
Stewart's Regiment of Foot	Glenevie, Ballenderry, Cromlin, Machrigall
St. John's Regiment of Foot	Armagh, Tynan, Glaslough, Monaghan, Clones, Carrickmacross, Dungannon, Augher, Clogher and Aughnacloy
Tyffin's Regiment of Foot	6 Companies Ballyshannon and Beleek, 7 at Enniskillen
Mitchelsburn's Regiment	Omagh and Strabane
Gustavus Hamilton's Regiment of Foot	Belturbet
Daring's Regiment of Foot	Lisburn 3 Companies, Carrickfergus 4, Londonderry 4, Charlemont 2.

A list of the quarters of the troops in the Province of Ulster, 19 Jan. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 400).

The civilians with whom troops were billeted were expected to give them shelter, provide them with food, and help to supply them with forage in the case of cavalry or dragoons. This was a significant burden to place on a populace that was already trying to cope with the effects of an on-going war and threats from rapparees, and although some efforts were made in order to procure food and supplies from other areas, the main burden fell on the individual households. While the authorities on both sides attempted to provide some of the food and provisions required by soldiers using a centralised system of supply—notably their daily ration of bread—this tended to be haphazard at best, and soldiers were dependent upon the local people for all other supplies.[57] In Jacobite

[57] See chapter five for more on the burden of supplying the army that was placed on civilians.

territory, the flight of civilians from the area around Limerick meant that 'most of the garrison was quartered by companies or greater numbers in empty houses, only the officers quartering in those that were inhabited'.[58] This suggests that being billeted with civilians was a more pleasant experience than simply sheltering in abandoned homes, with the officer's hosts expected to provide additional food or home comforts such as bedding or warm fires. Of course it is also likely that civilians preferred quartering smaller numbers of officers rather than catering to the whims of groups of enlisted men, with a crowd of ordinary Jacobite soldiers gathered together in 'some poor thatched cottages' at Sixmilebridge in county Limerick on 7 October being described as 'very boisterous'.[59]

While individual quarters were arranged at a local level, there is evidence to suggest that influence was exerted and efforts were made at the highest levels of the Williamite hierarchy in order to try to sway where troops were quartered. Not only did Williamite officers want to ensure the best possible quarters for their own men, but appeals were also made by landowners to dissuade the authorities from billeting troops on their land as much as possible. In one case Lt. Colonel Coote wrote to Clarke in November from Mullingar—where he was posted with his regiment and which he described as 'the most miserable place that ever was'—concerning his property in Kilkenny.[60] He claimed that both Ginkel and Major-General Scravenmore had assured him that his property was to be exempt from quartering, but in fact he had received word that a dozen troops were in fact lodging in his house at Tullaghmaine. The lengths he had clearly gone to in order to try and prevent having troops quartered on his land—such as speaking with the overall Williamite army commander and another senior general, in addition to writing to the secretary at war—indicates that being obliged to quarter troops was obviously recognised as being a severe burden on property, and worth going to significant lengths to avoid.

While landowners and residents tried to avoid having to quarter large numbers of soldiers, officers attempted to secure good quarters for their own men. This became a contentious issue within the army, with those serving in

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[58] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 192.
[59] Ibid., p. 188.
[60] Lt Colonel Coote to Clarke, Mullingar, 30 Nov. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 314).

frontier garrisons forced to tolerate significantly worse conditions than those based further east. Colonel Thomas Erle wrote to Clarke in November, explicitly noting the difficulties faced by men 'in frontier quarters where they endure all sorts of hardships and are forct [sic] to a continuall duty, which must ruin them unless they are relieved'.[61] These difficult conditions lasted right the way through the winter months and into spring, with Clarke receiving reports from officers such as Captain Gerken, who described conditions for his 330 infantry, 25 dragoons and other officers based at Streamstown in Westmeath. Not far from the Jacobite-controlled Shannon crossing at Athlone, this would have been a particularly active area for rapparees, with Gerken describing how 'we are confined within our walls, the enemy having a horse sentry within a quarter of a mile of us', who quickly summoned reinforcements if any attempt was made to leave their quarters.[62] Being unable to venture far from the town meant that food supplies and forage for the dragoons' horses were very hard to come by, leaving Gerken no option but to ask for some supplies of meat and cheese with the next delivery of bread from the stores, 'else I doubt the men will grow weake and unfitt for service'.[63] Other men serving on the frontier at Clonmel were described in February 1691 as having 'perished in their quarters for want of subsistance', while the 'officers have not received but one month's pay since the first of April, and for the Common soldiers I can assure you many of them at the muster appeared without either shoes or stockings'.[64] Poor conditions for garrison troops were common in contemporary European armies, with the local population often left to cover the shortfall between what food and materials were needed by the soldiers and what was supplied by the army authorities.[65]

A variety of eyewitness accounts are extant that describe the personal experience of troops being billeted among the local population, from both the soldiers' and the civilians' perspective. For members of the military, being billeted with a household was probably the most preferable form of

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[61] Colonel Thomas Erle to Clarke, unknown (received at Dublin), 26 Nov. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 307).
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Daniel Butts to William Robinson, Wexford, 27 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 490a); Butts was the English commissary assigned to the Danish contingent within the Williamite army, and was well placed to comment on issues of food and equipment shortages.
[65] Tallett, *War and society*, p. 113.

accommodation, compared to staying in vacant homes, being confined in cramped conditions within barracks or, of course, sleeping outside in huts, tents, or simply under the stars. Throughout Stevens' account of his two years of service in Ireland as a lieutenant with the Jacobite army, there are frequent references to the wide variety of places in which he was quartered or otherwise spent the night. The transient nature of an army on campaign meant that securing proper quarters was often impossible, with the army frequently forced to spend the night in 'open fields without tents'.[66] If they were to be encamped for several days or if the weather was poor then makeshift huts were built, with soldiers occasionally having to carry the wood to build these shelters with them from their previous camp.[67] Where possible Stevens and his companions tried to lodge with local people, with varying degrees of success. In one farmhouse about a mile from Limerick city, he and his companions 'found good entertainment and, what was very pleasing, civil reception, in this place as many others, which was a dainty, the best drink was milk and water'.[68] At another billet in the nearby village of Carrigogunnell he was equally impressed by his quarters, which he described as being 'very refreshing after our long fatigue'.[69] While there he was treated to a variety of food, including 'plenty of meat and barley bread baked in cakes over or before the fire and [an] abundance of milk and butter, but no sort of drink'.[70]

On other occasions Stevens did not receive as warm a welcome, such as an encounter within two weeks of his arrival in Ireland the previous year, when he had difficulty persuading the proprietor of an inn near Naas, in county Kildare, to serve him and his comrades. The said innkeeper:

> ...refused not only beds, but fire and meat and drink for our money, till finding the perverseness of the people we possessed ourselves of a room, broke open the cellar doors, and took out meat, wine, and whatever we found for our use; our landlord having made his complaint to the sovereign, and, meeting a rebuke instead of redress, served, and attended us for the future with great diligence.[71]

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[66] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, pp 45–46, 76.
[67] Ibid., pp 76, 81.
[68] Ibid., p. 138.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid., pp 138–9.
[71] Ibid., p. 50.

During the winter of 1689–90, Stevens was billeted at Dublin in the buildings of Trinity College. After the scholars had been 'turned out' it was used as a barracks for the Jacobite force, and his regiment was the second to have been quartered there since their eviction. His disapproval of some of the less morally righteous acts committed within Dublin that winter have already been noted, although the soldiers also had problems finding enough fuel to heat their quarters during the cold winter months, with many of them forced to resort to 'breaking up waste houses for timber, cutting all the trees and destroying the hedges near the town'.[72]

The Swiss Huguenot, Jean Francois de Morsier, was an educated gentleman who volunteered to serve as an infantryman with the Williamite army. He described several encounters with local people across the country, such as his stay with a Protestant wigmaker near Charlemont in county Armagh, with whom he conversed in Latin and managed to assure that he was Swiss rather than French.[73] While there he slept on the floor by the fire and was given wheaten bread and 'griddle cakes' by his host. De Morsier also spent time in the Williamite field hospital at Carlingford in the aftermath of the disastrous camp at Dundalk, which was so overcrowded that he could only find space to sleep in a pigeon-loft with several other cadets.[74] While at Carlingford he was able to buy additional food for himself from sailors and local peasants in order to supplement his daily rations of two bowls of gruel, which helped him to regain his strength. The following summer he recuperated from another injury in the more comfortable surroundings of the purpose-built military hospital at Kilmainham, the construction of which had been completed in 1684. He stayed for a month 'in quite a good room' and described it as being 'a very fine building'.[75] Again, this differs from other billets described by him, such as a kitchen in Newry where he 'slept on cowhides' and 'couldn't get near the fire because of the great crowd of soldiers'.[76]

While de Morsier managed to travel to England to spend the winter of

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[72] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, pp 89–90; See chapter two for an analysis of Stevens' verdict on life in Dublin during the winter of 1689–90.
[73] Lenihan and Sheridan (eds), 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland, 1689–90', p. 485.
[74] Ibid., p. 484.
[75] Ibid., p. 489.
[76] Ibid., p. 485.

1689–90, for the month before his departure he had been billeted in the home of 'a poor peasant' at Moneymore, on the border of counties Tyrone and Derry. The man's house 'consisted of a kind of entrance hall that served as a kitchen, a miserable little room next to this where he slept with his family, and beyond that, a byre for his cow was partitioned off by a wattle screen'.[77] De Morsier and a 'handful' of soldiers from his regiment remained with the family for a month, sleeping on straw and ripping up their tents to use as sheets. Their relations with the local people appear to have been quite positive, with nearby neighbours bringing bread to sell to the troops, suggesting that small-scale commerce between soldiers and civilians may have proved advantageous to both sides. He does describe how one of the men billeted with them, named La Loubière, 'died of a raging fever', and in the account of this incident it seems that relations between the soldiers and the people they were quartered with were quite positive. The night La Loubière died he was described as 'singing in his sleep, though feebly, having listened to us singing at the fireside earlier', indicating that there was ample camaraderie within the small house, while the following day the family gave the soldiers an old pine chest in which to bury their comrade.[78]

The length of time the Williamite army remained in quarters during this period would also have encouraged positive interaction between soldiers and civilians. It went into winter quarters in September 1690 and only began to reassemble for the upcoming campaign in April. This eight-month period would have meant that the soldiers became a permanent sight on the streets of towns and villages across Ulster and Leinster, with ample time for relationships or bonds to form between them and the local people, particularly in areas where their discipline remained tight and the soldiers committed fewer offences. The physical presence of large numbers of bored young men living in very close proximity to small communities of ordinary people would also have resulted in high levels of interaction with local women and girls, although whether the fathers of these girls considered these as 'positive' interactions or not is likely a matter of some debate. Again, Stevens' disgust at the actions of the Jacobite forces in Dublin during the winter of 1689–90 included references to the city's

[77] Lenihan and Sheridan (eds), 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland, 1689–90', p. 485.
[78] Ibid.

women being 'so suitable to the times that they rather enticed men to lewdness than carried the least face of modesty, in so much that in every corner of the town might be said to be a public stew'.[79] Prostitution was such an accepted part of military life in the early-modern period that comments like these are certainly not unusual.[80] Indeed, Stevens had remarked on similar 'liberality' among the Jacobite troops at Quimper in Brittany, prior to their departure for Ireland with James, although he also noted that the French women appeared to get the upper hand in their dealings with the soldiers, as 'the crafty females admitted their addresses, refused not their treats, received their presents, and by several wiles drained their pockets [and] laughed at their ignorance'.[81]

The most obvious way in which civilians appreciated the presence of troops in their areas was through the protection they offered to local populations that had previously felt threatened by enemy forces or attacks from rapparees. In many cases the initial group of soldiers to arrive in an area were warmly welcomed by the local civilian population, such as the welcome given to the Williamite force upon their arrival in Ulster, the attempt of the Protestants at Ardee to stockpile supplies for the army's use, or the widespread celebrations among Dublin's Protestants at the arrival of William in the days following his victory at the Boyne. However, having soldiers billeted in your home also served as protection against the depredations of their comrades. Upon Stevens' arrival at Limerick in July 1690 he found the best quarters within the city already occupied by 'principal officers', and was forced to withdraw to a farmhouse about a mile from the town. He remained quartered with the family for a few days but he and his hosts suffered 'hourly and furious assaults on our quarters from all who passed that way', as yet more Jacobite troops reached the Limerick area, all of them desperate to secure supplies and decent quarters.[82] Similarly, while staying with a Catholic family at Clonmel and trying to recover from an injury sustained at the first siege of Limerick, de Morsier had to present himself at the doorstep to protect the family, and of course his own comfortable living

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[79] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 93.
[80] Tallett notes that 'a traditional perk of the soldier was the relatively easy availability of recreational sex'; see Tallett, *War and society*, p. 131.
[81] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 38.
[82] Ibid., p. 138.

arrangement, 'whenever anyone hammered on his door'.[83] This clearly demonstrates the regular danger posed to local residents by passing soldiers, but also the benefits to households of having protection of this sort, which added to the incentives to treat billeted soldiers or those staying nearby as generously as possible.

Discipline and disorder

From the above examples, the fact that one of the advantages to billeting troops was their ability to protect the household with whom they were staying from abuses by other soldiers clearly indicates that interactions between these two groups were not entirely amicable. Incidents of indiscipline and disorder by Jacobite and Williamite soldiers had been evident across Ireland since the beginning of the war, from the tumultuous behaviour of the Jacobites quartered in Dublin the previous winter, to the thefts from Protestants in east Ulster by the Williamite soldiers who had supposedly come to their aid. Inherent in all accounts of the war is the fact that positive encounters between soldiers and civilians were much less likely to be recorded than negative ones. While civilians would have attempted to complain to the authorities if soldiers plundered from them or committed acts of violence against them, they were much less likely to record positive experiences such as profiting from the sale of food or supplies, or the blossoming of good-natured relationships. Similarly, aside from the work of authors such as Stevens and de Morsier, eyewitness accounts from the soldiers' perspective of their routine interactions with local people are few and far between. What records Jacobite or Williamite soldiers did keep were more likely to include complaints about the poor quality of food or accommodation, as opposed to praising local people for their hospitality, or acknowledging the efforts gone to by officers to secure comfortable billets for their men.

While acknowledging this bias towards reporting negative interactions between the two groups, the fact remains that small-scale plundering and general theft by soldiers of civilians' food and goods were widespread across the country throughout the war, with more severe crimes also being committed. For

[83] Lenihan and Sheridan (eds), 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland, 1689–90', p. 489.

many people these negative encounters would have defined their experience of the conflict, through their physical, personal or financial impact. The negative experiences of the Quaker population of the midlands in the immediate aftermath of the battle of the Boyne were among the worst excesses of this plundering. However, their experiences during that period were also examples, albeit extreme ones, of abuses that were perpetrated by both Jacobite and Williamite soldiers on a daily basis. If soldiers were not being supplied with adequate food or supplies during wartime, their natural instinct was to simply take them from civilians, regardless of whether they were operating in friendly or hostile territory.

The Quaker community of Ballyhagan in county Armagh clearly demonstrates the negative aspects of quartering troops in a very detailed letter to Anthony Sharpe in August 1690, explaining their experiences at the hands of rapparees, Jacobite and Williamite troops during the first half of the war.[84] In the first few months of the war they had been frequently attacked by rapparees, but were encouraged to remain on their land by General Hamilton's issuing of protections. They subsequently endured a 'very uncomfortable living we had all the last summer, during the time that King James his army was marching to and fro to Derry, and also at their last return, scarce leaving us any thing to eat in our houses'.[85] They were again heartened by the arrival of the Williamite force under Schomberg, 'but they being such a great army and had so little room to quarter in we also lying so near Charlemont we have had a very uncomfortable winter'. They were first forced to quarter a group of English dragoons under Colonel Leveston in November, under whom they 'suffered very much'. These were replaced by a French regiment for the remainder of the winter period, with these soldiers staying quartered among the people until William assembled his army the following June.

According to their account, their experiences with these troops and other members of the Williamite army were overwhelmingly negative. The initial group of thirty dragoons only stayed for two nights, although the Quakers had to provide full food and forage for the men and their horses, while 'only the

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[84] Quakers at Ballyhagan, county Armagh, to Anthony Sharp, 4 Aug. 1690, in Anthony Sharp Mss, (Friends Historical Library, Dublin, vol. S.7), f. 6r–11r.
[85] Ibid.

lieutenant payed for five pecks of oats he had for his own horses'. These were replaced by a company of Danish soldiers, who were billeted 'about ten or twelve in a house', paying twelve pence per man for their week's food and shelter. After feeding them for a week and refusing to provide them with any more food, a 'part of them came every day for about three weeks and searched the houses and took when they could find to eat and payed nothing, save that some of the best payed twelve pence for the second week'. A series of dragoons were quartered on the area over the next few weeks, with each successive group taking 'hay and oats at their pleasure', in addition to various amounts of food and other provisions. One of these groups, numbering forty dragoons in total, caused the householders to run out of hay by the second night, upon which 'they took sheaf corn and other corn at their pleasure, so that the said three nights they spent about fifty pecks of oats, twenty quarts, besides the heap to every peck, and besides most of their diet, and paid nothing'.[86] Following this the French soldiers arrived, numbering thirty men and staying for over six months. Upon their initial arrival 'they paid for most of what they got but afterwards very little they killed also our cows at theyr pleasure and payed what they pleased for them'. Their boredom during the winter period saw two soldiers decide to 'sett up brewing in the meeting house'. This new endeavour required firewood to heat the brewing vessels, so 'they burnt many of the meeting house forms, sawn boards, gates, bars, doors and hovil [sic] timber wattles and sheds of our barns and cow house walls and any other timber they could get'. The Quakers were also at the mercy of the soldiers for the duration of their stay, and the authors noted how if the troops 'were angry then gett and take up two cows or other cattle to kill at one time'. After the soldiers had killed all the beef cattle in the area, the community 'bought two carcasses of beef for them in four weeks' and sold the meat to them at a loss of two shillings per pound of beef, in order to prevent the men from killing their dairy cows.

The experiences of this one group of people from Armagh are representative of general experiences of quartering troops across the country. A variety of factors influenced the behaviour of soldiers both on the march and also during periods of winter quarters. One of these was the manner in which the

[86] A peck is a measurement of dried goods and is equal to approximately nine litres in volume.

concept of law and order within the army was different to civilian law. Armies were governed largely by unwritten laws or customs of war, as well as more formal Articles of War, which were enforced by the military command structure rather than civilian codes.[87] This meant that the army was a separate entity from the rest of society, which consequently often made it difficult even for civilians to know who to report abuses to. The sentences for disobeying military law were often very harsh, with stealing or plundering usually punishable by death, while under a Jacobite wartime directive, cavalry or dragoon privates who allowed their horses to graze in meadows specifically preserved for forage, officially left themselves open to be executed.[88] However, these severe penalties often meant that officers correspondingly turned a blind eye to many but the most severe offences, with looting food or other provisions from civilians coming quite low on their list of priorities. Similarly, while unauthorised plundering was expressly forbidden in these codes, looting in this manner was often used as a military tactic in itself, such as the destruction ordered by General Rosen during the Jacobite retreat from Derry. In addition, property captured from the enemy was also viewed as a legitimate target, such as the Jacobite baggage at Donore that was openly looted following the battle of the Boyne, or the division of a large flock of sheep captured from rapparees by the Williamites on 19 July 1690, which William ordered divided among his army at the rate of one sheep for every twelve men.[89] Plunder was viewed as a legitimate perk of life as a soldier, and the markedly different moral code within army life meant that young men who might previously have been law-abiding citizens, felt instead 'that access to the good things around them was their only due, a just recompense for the hardships and dangers to who they were exposed'.[90]

There were a series of proclamations published concerning the discipline of troops by both the Jacobite and Williamite authorities throughout the war,

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[87] John Childs, 'The laws of war in seventeenth-century Europe and their application during the Jacobite war in Ireland, 1688–91' in David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan and Clodagh Tait (eds), *Age of atrocity: Violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2007), pp 283–4, 293–4; Tallett, *War and society*, pp 123–25.

[88] 'Meadows and pasture grounds', 15 Apr. 1690, *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 434.

[89] Extract from Würtemberg's diary, enclosed to Christian V in letter 53, Limerick, 29 Aug. 1690, in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 53a.

[90] Conway, 'British soldiers at home' in Charters, Rosenhaft and Smith (eds), *Civilians and war in Europe, 1618–1815*, p. 140; see also Tallett, *War and society*, p. 125; Charles Carlton, 'Civilians' in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer (eds), *The civil wars*, p. 297.

listing the official policies on these matters. Of the 63 proclamations issued by the Jacobite authorities from February 1689 until their flight from Dublin after the battle of the Boyne in July 1690, eight were primarily concerned with the discipline of their officers and men.[91] Similarly, of the 72 proclamations made on behalf of William and Mary from their official accession in February 1689 until the end of the war in October 1691, eighteen directly related to their army's discipline.[92] On the Jacobite side these directives included orders that:

> '...no officer or soldier do upon any pretence whatsoever, commit, or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or violence, or exact any provisions, victuals or money from any of his Majesty's subjects, without paying duly for the same, that they do not presume to outrage, insult, or offer affront either by word or deed to any, but behave themselves modestly and civilly...'.[93]

These proclamations also concerned soldiers who had deserted their regiments, in one instance giving them fifteen days to return to their posts before being 'proceeded against as deserters and runaways'.[94] Fifteen days was a very generous amount of time to allow deserters to return to their regiments in exchange for a full pardon, and this would have allowed the soldiers plenty of opportunities to continue to plunder civilians, before returning to their colours with little adverse consequences. The timing of this proclamation sheds more light on the motivations behind this generosity, however, as it was published on 27 July 1689, at which time the Jacobite authorities in Dublin would have been aware of the Williamite force assembling at Chester under Schomberg. Therefore, the Jacobites would have been attempting to gather their own forces in preparation for Schomberg's imminent arrival in Ireland, and consequently they would have been very eager to see as many men as possible who may have left the ranks of the army over the previous months, return to their positions, regardless of their conduct in the intervening period.

The Williamite army was also affected by similar problems. One of their early proclamations designed to address issues of indiscipline within the army, passed by George Clarke on 19 June 1690 just prior to the battle of the Boyne,

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[91] *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 392–438.
[92] James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, nos 1–72.
[93] 'Maintenance of military discipline', 2 Feb. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 392.
[94] 'Orders to officers', 27 July 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 406–7.

ordered that:

> 'all officers, soldiers and others belonging to our army, do so carry themselves in both garrison, quarters and wheresoever they shall march, as persons ought to be who are under military discipline, and that they do not presume upon any account to spoil or rob any parks or warrens, plunder the houses, do violence to, or export or take any horses, cows, or other cattle from the inhabitants of the towns of quarters'.[95]

The frequency of these proclamations, and the language used in them, are good indications of how widespread the plundering of civilians by poorly disciplined soldiers was throughout the war. Just as importantly, the fact that the same instructions were so often repeated and reissued by the leadership of both sides indicates that these proclamations were not very successful in getting soldiers to refrain from these activities, and that it is unlikely they were very well enforced by senior officers on either side.

Indeed, the attitude of senior officers on both sides had an important impact on the discipline of the ordinary soldiers. Instances such as the actions of Jacobite officers looting their comrades' baggage during the retreat from the Boyne, or specific references to their conduct in proclamations concerning military discipline, suggest that many officers were not adverse to engaging in theft from local people or other violations of military protocol, thereby setting a poor example to the men under their command. Other more explicit examples of this exist, such as the case of the Williamite Captain Lowder, who was set to be court-martialled for executing a prisoner that had been in his custody at Cork in January 1691.[96] One of Lowder's main excuses for his behaviour concerned how he 'had so great a pattern [set] by his own Colonel, who has hanged up several of the same prisoners without any force of law, either civil or military. And the Major of the same Regiment very lately hanged a poore innocent woman at Ballymagooly by his Colonel's example'.[97] Not only does this directly suggest that bad examples set by officers may have led to poor discipline on behalf of their troops, but in this instance Lowder escaped the consequences of his actions by disappearing the night before he was due to be put on trial, with the same officer

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[95] Proclamation by William III, 19 June 1690 (Clarke war corr., i, no. 25).
[96] [Col. Francis Hastings?] to Clarke, Cork, 20 Jan. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 404).
[97] Ibid.

that he was said to be imitating, Colonel Hales, reported to be 'actually aiding and abetting his escape'.[98] Various other Williamite commanders were accused of being lax with disciplining their men, such as Albert Conyngham at Clonmel, who wrote to George Clarke to deny accusations of misconduct by the soldiers under his command, insisting that 'upon my reputation I restrain skampering and plundering in my regiment to the utmost of my power'.[99] Indeed, in one of the proclamations aimed at curbing acts of disorder by Williamite troops against civilians, it was decided that if the 'commander in chief in the quarter where such offences shall be committed, shall not use his utmost endeavours to bring such offender to condign punishment, then the satisfaction to the parties shall be made out of the officers pay commanding in chief as aforesaid', in an effort to persuade them to correctly enforce discipline within their areas.[100]

While some officers were not setting a good example to their men, many others were simply absent from their regiments during the lengthy winter break between campaigning seasons. Many senior Williamite officers, particularly of the level of major and above, seemed to be absent from the country during the winter months, with records showing that officers posted at Portadown in county Armagh, and also at Cork, were in London and therefore absent from their regiments in January and February respectively.[101] The absence of senior officers such as these would have had a seriously detrimental impact on discipline. The punishment of serious breaches of military conduct by rank and file soldiers were the responsibility of these officers, and their absence left NCOs and more junior officers unsupported in disciplining offences of this nature. An order from Whitehall in March noted how some officers had been 'permitted to come into this Kingdom, as well as for providing recruits and necessarys for their respective regiments troops and companys, as for taking care of their own private affairs'.[102] While the aforementioned Colonel Hales had been absent from Cork there were reports of 'very great disorders committed by the soldiers, by

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[98] Col. Francis Hastings, Cork, 29 Jan. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 415).
[99] Sir Albert Conyngham, Roscrea, 15 Sep. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 165).
[100] 'Ordering soldiers not to engage in theft and robbery', 6 Feb. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 42.
[101] Matthew Compton to Clarke, Portadown, 7 Jan. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 381); Col. Francis Hastings to Clarke, Cork, 21 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 481).
[102] Order for all officers to return to their command in Ireland, William Blathwayt, Whitehall, 7 Mar. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 517).

robbing both the town and country'. In March, this order from Whitehall directed all absent officers to return to their respective commands by the beginning of April, likely in light of complaints made in their absence and so they could ready themselves and their units for the coming campaigning season.

The problem of officers being absent from their regiments was significantly worse among the Jacobite army. Again, among the 63 proclamations issued by the Jacobite authorities between February 1689 and June 1690, there were five that specifically ordered all officers 'not to be absent from their several and respective commands without leave from the superior officer'.[103] It was further noted that 'by their bad example many soldiers as well as of the companies of the said officers as others in all our armies have deserted and run away from their colours'.[104] This high rate of desertion was notable in the lenient terms the army were later forced to give to their men in order to entice them to return to the ranks. The first two of these orders to the army's officer corps were given during the campaigning season, which would have been particularly detrimental to its proper functioning. The other three proclamations were issued during the winter months, when, in the same manner as the Williamite force, senior ranks such as 'Colonels and other officers of our army do take upon them to depart from the several quarters and garrisons assigned them, contrary to their duty'.[105] While it was often the responsibility of senior officers to recruit additional troops to replace wastage in their companies or regiments while an army was in winter quarters, the tone of all these proclamations, combined with the reports of the convivial environment around Dublin in particular during the winter of 1689–90, suggest that fresh recruitment was not the first thing on the minds of these officers during their lengthy periods of absence from their commands.

Amidst the widespread reports of opportunistic plundering across the country there were also cases where soldiers were accused of significantly more serious crimes, with reports of premeditated and violent attacks on ordinary

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[103] 'Orders to officers', 27 July 1689; 'Attendance of officers', 2 Sep. 1689; 'Officers and regiments', 31 Oct. 1689; 'Orders to commissioned officers', 12 Nov. 1689; 'Absent officers', 19 Mar. 1690 in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 406, 411, 415, 416, 431.
[104] 'Orders to officers', 27 July 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 406.
[105] 'Orders to commissioned officers', 12 Nov. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 416.

people raising issues of a complete lack of discipline within individual units. In one instance a civilian named Thomas Cleere wrote how a troop of Williamite soldiers from Cashel made a night raid on his land, describing how they 'seized all my tenants and bound them, lest they should send me any notice, and then carryed away the remainder of what hay I had there, and corne, and plundered my tenants of their poultry, cadows and sheets, with what other things they liked'.[106] An attack such as this, in which the soldiers systematically tied people up in order to prevent them from raising the alarm while they stole from them, demonstrates a complete breakdown in discipline within elements of the Williamite army. Attacks against government officials were also recorded, notably officers of the revenue, who were described as having 'been opposed in the execution of their dutys, and roughly used by the Danes and other soldiers of the army', to such an extent that an official complaint was made by revenue officials to George Clarke, asking for better protection for their representatives.[107]

The portion of the Williamite army that its succession of commanders seemed to have the most difficulty keeping in order were the troops from Ulster, particularly the men who had been adopted into the army from the Protestant associations around Enniskillen. Stevens, in his discussion of the actions of the troops under General Douglas, described how 'the plundering went on still, especially amongst the Northern men, who are very dextrous at that sport'.[108] Specific examples were recorded by other observers, such as the Duke of Würtemberg—the commander of the Danish troops in William's army—who noted how on Saturday 12 July at Kilcullen, his provost-marshal had 'brought in a lieutenant of the Inniskillings who had taken a number of sheep and cattle from the people', whereupon he was handed over to William for punishment.[109] Enniskillen men were also singled out in the Quaker sufferings, with William Walpoole attributing the loss of ten shillings worth of plunder and food to their

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[106] Thomas Cleere to Clarke, Clonmel, 13 Dec. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 341).
[107] The officials listed in this petition included Charles Meredith, John Lowther, William Culliford and Bartholomew Van Homrigh; see Revenue officials to Clarke, Customs House, Dublin, 6 Dec. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 328).
[108] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 99.
[109] Extract from Würtemberg's Diary, written before Limerick, 29 August 1690, in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 53a.

actions.[110] Other references to thieves from Ulster also feature, with Quakers in the Kildare area such as James Sharp were raided by 'Ulsters' throughout 1689 and 1690, with Sharp personally losing forty barrels of oats, twenty of barley and sixteen of wheat, all directly attributed to Ulstermen.[111] Whether this referred to Catholic rapparees that were clearly from Ulster, or to members of the Williamite force such as the Enniskillen men, is unclear. Despite this propensity to plunder, these men from Enniskillen appeared to get significant latitude from their commanders compared to other elements of the Williamite army, with their usefulness at plundering actually praised on occasion. They also praised other skills, including their proficiency on horseback, their local knowledge of the terrain, and their ability to use it to their strategic advantage. These are quite similar to the skills exhibited by the rapparees, and indeed Story reported that the Williamites tolerated the actions of 'Protestant rapparees from the north and other places, that we can at least set against theirs'.[112]

The French troops serving in the Jacobite army were also often singled out as committing frequent acts of disorder, with one instance at Dublin in April 1690, when sixty were 'quartered in Lazy Hill for three nights, in which time they murdered one or two women and ravished one or two', as well as thieving and plundering from the homes in which they were quartered.[113] These are among the very few references to rape by soldiers during the period, with two other instances being recorded in a pamphlet by Richard Baldwin, one perpetrated in Ulster by Jacobite dragoons under the command of General Galmoy and the other by dragoons in county Tipperary.[114] The general tone of Baldwin's account is so sensationalised that it is difficult to fully accept his version of events, particularly as the former of these two incidents he freely admits he could 'not positively assert as a truth'.[115] While both these episodes are of a particularly disturbing nature, the fact that these are the only two incidents of rape present in his whole account, which is specifically dedicated to chronicling Jacobite abuses for

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[110] Quaker Sufferings (no. 7, Mountmellick, 1690).
[111] Quaker Sufferings (no. 11, James Sharp, 1690).
[112] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 161; for more on the activities of rapparees see chapter five.
[113] Colles's diary, 10 Apr. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 380.
[114] Richard Baldwin, *A true narrative of the murders, cruelties and oppressions perpetrated on the Protestants in Ireland by the late King James's agents since his arrival there* (London, 1690), p. 25.
[115] Baldwin, *A true narrative*, p. 25.

propaganda purposes, is perhaps an indicator that it may not have been particularly prevalent. Historians of the wars of the 1640s also take this view; although some authors have argued that rape during wartime was so rampant that it was underreported.[116] Historians such as John A. Lynn agree with this view that sexual violence was commonplace throughout European warfare in the early modern period, with women being viewed as being a legitimate form of 'plunder' for soldiers.[117] However, reports of the worst excesses of crimes of this nature appear to have taken place in the aftermath of sieges, specifically during the chaotic few hours following the fall of a city. Again, this is where the lack of any significant siege during the Williamite war that ended with a successful military attack, may have spared Irish civilians from widespread atrocities such as these. There is also the possibility that the shame traditionally associated with the victims of this crime may have contributed to a general tendency to avoid reporting it, with the two accounts recorded by Baldwin being included due to their particularly gruesome nature, as well as the fact that in both cases the victims subsequently died. Overall, the evidence that remains extant from eyewitness accounts does not suggest that rape was particularly widespread during the Williamite war; however, it would of course be naïve to suggest that it was absent from the conflict altogether.

Incidents where civilians were stripped of their clothes were significantly more common, although this seemed to be designed more to humiliate the victims and for the monetary value of their garments, rather than as an element of sexual crime. In only one instance in the Quaker records was a woman recorded as being stripped 'stark naked', with all other references to this crime usually leaving their victims in their underclothes.[118] This crime was more frequently attributed to rapparees rather than soldiers, although William Edmundson recounted how Williamite troops had taken several Irish civilians prisoner, including one man whom they had 'stripped out of his clothes, in order

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[116] Bernadette Whelan, 'Women and warfare, 1641–1691' in Pádraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and resistance: War in seventeenth century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001), p. 326; Charles Carlton, 'Civilians' in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *The civil wars: A military history of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638–1660* (Oxford, 1998), pp 292–95.

[117] John A. Lynn, *Women, armies and warfare in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2008), pp 150–59.

[118] Quaker Sufferings (no. 7, Mountmellick, Queen's County, 1690).

to hang him, having suspicion that he was a rapparee'.[119] Edmundson noted how he argued with the soldiers on this point, eventually resulting in the man's release, saying that 'it was unmanly and not like a soldier, to strip men in that manner; for I had been a soldier myself, and would have scorned such a base action, besides it might be a precedent to the Irish to strip the English'.[120] Despite these scenarios of severe indiscipline by soldiers and their officers alike, military justice was served to many soldiers during the course of the war. Examples included the soldiers executed on William's personal orders for their participation in plundering in the weeks before and after the Boyne; the Jacobite soldiers executed on Oxmantown Green in Dublin for desertion; those made to run the gauntlet at the same place for 'refusing the bread given them now after the French fashion, that is made of leaven'; or the lieutenant and soldier that 'were hanged in Thomas Street, on a sign-post at the end of New Row, for pressing horses and selling them'.[121] These examples may have helped to dissuade soldiers from committing more heinous crimes against unarmed civilians, such as murder or rape, but they were certainly not enough to deter a significant proportion of them from engaging in bouts of looting or plundering.

The language used in the proclamations concerning military indiscipline gives the official perspective on the incidents discussed above, such as the attacks on the Quakers and the countless other negative encounters between soldiers and civilians throughout the war. They all stress that, ostensibly, abuses against civilians would not be tolerated. They succinctly sum up the categories of attacks, such as the theft of livestock or provisions, the destruction of property, the spoiling of crops, or the use of violence in the prosecuting of any of these activities. From the civilian perspective given in the eyewitness accounts, however, a much different view is obviously quite evident. On a personal level, these actions would obviously have been extremely harmful and caused significant distress. The conduct of soldiers while quartered with civilians or in

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[119] Edmundson, *A journal of the life*, p. 129.
[120] Ibid., pp 130–31.
[121] Running the gauntlet was a punishment whereby a soldier was stripped to the waist and had to pass between two rows of his comrades, who had to repeatedly strike him with blunt weapons until he reached the end of the 'gauntlet'; Colles's diary, 27 June, 19 Aug., 18 Sep. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 366, 369, 371; Extract from Würtemberg's diary, enclosed to Christian V in letter 53, Limerick, 29 August 1690, in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 53a.

committing acts of disorder against them also had a broader impact on civilians across the country. This general climate of disorder, in which ordinary civilians felt unable to trust the military in addition to worrying about attacks by rapparee groups, contributed to a general climate of fear. In discussing his quarters at the village of Carrigogunnell in county Limerick, Stevens described his hosts as 'being generally very kind, as some thought partly for love, but in my opinion most through fear'.[122] Fear of the large numbers of armed men roaming around the country and taking free quarters among the population was natural. Stevens appreciated the viewpoint of the civilians he stayed with, noting how 'for most certain it is few are fond of such guests as soldiers are upon free quarter, especially such as ours were ravenous and unruly, but it is the wisest course to make a virtue of necessity, and offer that freely which otherwise would be extorted forcibly'.[123] On top of these obvious fears, people also had to adjust their day-to-day activities, such as the King's County woman who noted how she sold sheep at below market rates 'for fear of losing them', while she was also burdened with the cost of paying £12 to have a guard put on her livestock.[124] This environment of fear was prevalent throughout society, regardless of religion. Throughout these experiences of disorder against civilians by troops from both sides, the religion of the victims tended not to be very important, with the experiences of the Quakers certainly not untypical, particularly in rural areas. Jacobite troops opportunistically stole from Catholics and were frequently uncivil when quartered with them. Similarly, Williamite soldiers had few qualms about doing the same against Protestants, with the Lords Justices explicitly forbidding troops from perpetrating 'mischiefs and disorders upon any of their majesties Protestant or Popish subjects'.[125]

John Childs has compared the general actions of the Williamite and Jacobite soldiers throughout 1690 and 1691 as being similar to the contemporary activities by the French military in the Palatinate during the winter of 1688 and 1689, while Ian McBride has also referenced this as a

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[122] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 138.
[123] Ibid., p. 138.
[124] Quaker Sufferings (no. 27, Jane Barcroft, 1690).
[125] 'Ordering soldiers not to engage in theft and robbery', 6 Feb. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 42.

relevant comparison for events in Ireland.[126] Contemporaries regarded the devastation inflicted by French soldiers on this area—located on the eastern bank of the river Rhine around the cities of Heidelberg and Mannheim—as the most infamous incident of direct devastation and destruction of civilian property across continental Europe since the close of the Thirty Years' War.[127] It involved a considered policy of destruction of civilian property in these areas, with the local population given several days advance notice to vacate their homes, before they were systematically demolished by French forces. The marquis de Chamlay, a key advisor to the French minister of war Louvois, outlined how he would 'put the city [of Mannheim] to the sword and plough it under'.[128] Over twenty substantial towns and cities were destroyed in this manner, with areas that had once been thriving towns being completely levelled and left 'like a field'.[129]

The general actions of soldiers from both sides throughout the war in Ireland, such as their indiscipline during winter quarters and their plundering of civilians, does not appear to directly correlate with the extreme policy of organised destruction as undertaken in the Palatinate. The army of Louis XIV had specifically targeted a localised civilian population several times prior to the attack on the Palatinate, such as their laying waste to parts of the Dutch Netherlands during the Dutch war (1672–78), Louis's Marshal General Turenne's destruction of the area between the rivers Main and Neckar in 1674, or the similar tactics used against civilians near the river Meuse in 1677.[130] In all these instances, however, the French army had attempted to lay waste to areas in hostile territory that would both harm their enemy's economy as well as act as a buffer, designed to hamper enemy advances against French lands. This was not the case in Ireland, where both sides hope to assert their dominance over the entire country, with the deliberate destruction of towns not the ideal method of winning over the civilian population. However, a more apt comparison to the infamous French actions in German territory appears to be the orders given by

[126] Childs, *Williamite wars*, p. 266; McBride, *Eighteenth-century Ireland*, p. 176.
[127] John A. Lynn, 'A brutal necessity? The devastation of the Palatinate, 1688–89' in Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (eds), *Civilians in the path of war* (Lincoln, 2002), pp 86–7.
[128] Lynn, 'A brutal necessity?', p. 83.
[129] Ibid., p. 85.
[130] Ibid., p. 88.

General Rosen to the Jacobite army upon their retreat from the siege of Derry.[131] As a French general, Rosen was following contemporary French military tactics by ordering his men to destroy as much property and supplies along their route through central Ulster. While the level of destruction in this instance was nowhere near as severe as that inflicted by French forces the previous winter, his aims were largely the same. Rosen did not expect the Jacobite army to be able to quickly retake Ulster, so instead he wanted to destroy as much shelter and food supplies as possible in order to deny them to Schomberg's Williamite force, as well as hamper any attempt by General Kirke's forces at Derry to pursue them southwards.

Of course Rosen was not the only representative of a continental army to be under arms in Ireland during the war, and it is not surprising that another significant cause of wartime tensions was the presence of large numbers of foreign troops from countries across Europe in both the Jacobite and Williamite armies. The two biggest individual groups were the large detachment of French officers and men that served in the Jacobite army and the 5,000 Danish soldiers that had been loaned to William by the Danish King Christian V, partly to strengthen his ties to the new English king and partly to give a section of his army some combat experience, while reducing his bill for wages.[132] The senior French officers sent by Louis XIV to accompany James back to Ireland in 1689, and those that landed with the newly appointed Jacobite commander, General St Ruth, in May 1691, proved to be a useful addition to James's army.[133] The detachment of 6,666 men sent to Ireland in March 1690 in exchange for an Irish Brigade of 5,387 led by Major General Justin Macarty, were less successful.[134] Commanded by the militarily inexperienced Comte de Lauzun, they were far from elite fighting men and were a mixture of Catholic and Protestant Walloons, Dutch, Swiss, Germans and other nationalities.

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[131] See chapter one.

[132] For a full exposition of the Danish force that served in Ireland under William, see Kjeld Hald Galster, *Danish troops in the Williamite army in Ireland, 1689–91* (Dublin, 2012).

[133] This initial group included a variety of experienced senior officers such as General Rosen, as well as valuable artillery officers and engineers such as Pointis. St Ruth was an experienced general who had been involved in abuses against Protestants in France following the revocation of the edict of Nantes in 1685. His contribution to the Jacobite cause was viewed quite favourably, but he met an unfortunate end at the battle of Aughrim on 12 July 1691, being decapitated by a cannonball; see Childs, *Williamite wars*, pp 53–4, 309, 333–37.

[134] Childs, *Williamite wars*, pp 196–7.

Some of the Irish soldiers were already negatively disposed towards the French given the former's dislike for the latter's leaven-style bread, but upon arrival of Lauzun's force in Dublin these feelings would have significantly worsened, as Irish Jacobite soldiers were removed from their billets in the city and had their places taken by the French.[135] The conduct of the troops during their stay in the city was also very poor, such as the aforementioned actions of the troops at Lazy Hill. On 5 May 1690 a proclamation was published in French specifically 'forbidding all French soldiers to take anything without payment on pain of death, or the officers on pain of cashiering, and forbidding them to disturb any churches or public meetings of Protestants, on pain of severe punishment', which a local Dublin resident described as 'necessary, they having been rude in this kind'.[136] Even the French officers who had arrived with James the previous year had managed to get on the wrong side of their Irish comrades, with Irish officers 'discontented at the advancement of the French, and some of the soldiers refused to follow the French'.[137] Of course the fact that the French soldiers would have been such a distinct and recognisable group on the streets of Dublin and across Ireland during this period may have been a factor in the number of negative reports specifically citing their involvement, but it is likely that this only added to their already disorderly nature. The Comte de Lauzun's French detachment ultimately left Ireland from Galway on 12 September 1690 after a seven-month stay, in which they had participated in the battle of the Boyne, but ultimately contributed little else to the Jacobite cause, bar causing significant frictions both within the army and with the country's civilians.

The Danish troops, under the command of the German Duke of Würtemberg-Neustadt, arrived in Ireland along with William in 1690 and served in the country until the end of the war. They proved their worth during the campaign, being involved in all of the war's major actions, from the battle of the Boyne to both sieges of Limerick, and were also central to Marlborough's attack on Cork and the attempt to subdue Kerry in January 1691. While they were largely praised for their efforts in these actions, reports on their discipline varied,

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[135] See chapter two for more discussion of this situation regarding billets in Dublin city during the winter period of 1689–90.
[136] Colles's diary, 5 May 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 381–2.
[137] Colles's diary, 20 June 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, 366.

particularly when it came to interactions with local people. During the winter period the Danish force was assigned to the south of the country, with eight battalions of infantry and eleven squadrons of cavalry to be quartered in counties Tipperary, Waterford, Wexford and Cork.[138] At Waterford, Daniel Butts—the English Commissary to the Danish force, who would have been well aware of the actions of the Danish troops—reported that 'the Danes robe the cuntry people in the face of the whole town and sware publickly they'le plunder the towne; and by what Colonel Slater tells me (when he came from thence last night) they had done it'.[139] They caused problems within their own ranks, such as an incident shortly after their arrival in Ireland, whereby a number of them 'would not accept their pay and permitted themselves to use mutinous language', resulting in two soldiers being arrested, one of whom was executed.[140] During the winter of 1690–91 they were quartered in north Munster after their actions on the south coast. Foreign soldiers proved so unpopular with the local population that Thomas Flower's land agent, Edmond Doyne, asked 'that I may have a party of English foot to be quarterd there if I have any, for in truth if I have Dutch foott it will be as bad of the other side, for they are all alike', suggesting that the poor discipline of these Dutch soldiers would be as detrimental to their quarters as Jacobite soldiers would.[141]

Clonmel case study

One of the towns along the winter frontier of 1690–91 that billeted large numbers of troops during the period, including many of William's Danish troops, was Clonmel. Described as 'one of the prettiest towns' he had ever seen by the Jacobite John Stevens, Clonmel was 'a handsome town house much about the centre of it, the streets clean, and the houses well built'.[142] A significant amount of correspondence concerning the town is still extant among the letters of George Clarke, undoubtedly helped by his stay there during August and September 1690,

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[138] Allotment of winter quarters, *c.* 23 Sep. 1690, in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 62a.
[139] Daniel Butts to Clarke, Clonmel, 23 Jan. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 412).
[140] Extract from Würtemberg's Diary, enclosed to Christian V in letter 53, Limerick, 29 Aug. 1690, in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 53a.
[141] Edmond Doyne to Mr Goodwin, Kilkenny, 10 Mar. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[142] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 42.

prior to his relocation in October to the army's winter headquarters at Kilkenny. During this period he would have befriended many of the local gentlemen, such as the High Sheriff of Tipperary Samuel Blount, who wrote to him regularly concerning happenings in the town during the following year. Throughout the winter and spring of 1690–91 Clonmel was used as 'the place of their Majesties stores and provisions', which saw it become a hive of activity, and made it essential that 'waggoners, bakers and others, being soe great a thorough fare, must have continuall recourse thither'.[143] Much of these supplies were gathered from people in county Tipperary, as outlined elsewhere, but there is evidence of supplies being procured from across the country to be sent into storage at Clonmel, with John Fennell, a Quaker from Dublin, having corn and hay seized to be sent to the town, valued at over £143.[144] Local people also attempted to reduce the army's dependence on them by suggesting other places from where supplies could be procured, with Blount drawing particular attention to neighbouring counties Kilkenny and Waterford, where he suggested there was 'a considerable quantity' of hay and oats respectively.[145] This further demonstrates how people living in areas on the direct frontier were worse off than those further behind the lines, and the efforts that were undertaken to try and redress this imbalance.

Clonmel was also used as a military hospital during both sieges of Limerick, something that was not particularly welcomed by its inhabitants as it saw 'great numbers of sick men sent thither and places in severall houses where they could not have such necessaryes as was requisite'.[146] As an end result of this 'being thronged together for want of conveniences, an infection was soon occasioned thereby and the death of very many, both of the army and inhabitants, ensued'.[147] One house in the town, in the possession of Valerie Blunt, is specifically recorded as having been 'made an hospital', but after the war was

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[143] Petition by inhabitants of Clonmel to Ginkel, 10 Aug. 1691 (Clarke war corr., x, no. 1004).
[144] Quaker Sufferings (no. 18, John Fennell, Dublin, 1690).
[145] Samuel Blount to Clarke, Clonmel, 10 Oct. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 225).
[146] For references to Clonmel's use as a hospital, see: Petition by inhabitants of Clonmel to Ginkel, 10 Aug. 1691 (Clarke war corr., x, no. 1004); Henry Bellasyse to Clarke, Galway, 14 Aug. 1691 (Clarke war corr., x, no. 1018).
[147] Petition by inhabitants of Clonmel to Ginkel, 10 Aug. 1691 (Clarke war corr., x, no. 1004).

noted as being 'destroyed by the Danes and others'.[148] The Williamite soldier de Morsier described being treated at Clonmel after he was shot through the lower abdomen during the first siege of Limerick. He noted how, rather than staying in the overcrowded 'place where the wounded were tended, [where] the only space left was on the floor', he convinced a recently returned Catholic family to permit him to lodge with them, in exchange for acting as 'a safeguard, of sorts, against their being abused by soldiers'.[149] A language barrier with his Irish-speaking Catholic host was alleviated by his English-speaking daughter, and de Morsier stayed with the family, having his wound dressed at the house twice a day by an army surgeon, until he was well enough to travel to Waterford. With soldiers living in such close proximity to ordinary people in circumstances such as this it is no wonder that disease was such a worry among the local population. It was also in this weakened state that de Morsier had to present himself at the door of the residence in order to fend off fellow Williamite troops from entering the house and helping themselves to food or other goods.

In addition to providing supplies and a location for a military hospital, Clonmel was also chosen to quarter a contingent of the Danish corps of William's army during the winter months. There were regular difficulties in the town between the troops and the local people, with the mayor writing to Clarke informing him of the 'violences and injuries offered by the souldiers to the poore inhabitants of this towne which were many and great', and had increased in number since Clarke's departure.[150] This included violence and thefts from homes within the town, the destruction of buildings such as the home of Valerie Blunt, as well as the organised theft of livestock. In one instance a group of up to twenty soldiers collaborated in a large operation in which several of them subdued the locals who were standing guard over a flock of sheep, while the remainder drove off over 600 sheep in one night. This incident was reminiscent of the organised theft of goods from civilians just outside Cashel, which was also perpetrated most likely by Danish forces. In the incident at Clonmel some of the

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[148] Estate receivers accounts, Mr Carleton (NLI, Ormond papers, Ms 2561), f. 34.
[149] Pádraig Lenihan and Geraldine Sheridan (eds), 'A Swiss soldier in Ireland, 1689–90' in *Irish Studies Review*, xiii, no. 4 (2005), pp 488–9.
[150] Mayor Richard Carleton to Clarke, Clonmel, 21 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 482).

stolen animals were later 'found in the soldier's possession in the west suburbs', clearly placing the blame on the Danes.[151]

The situation came to a head in February, when on a 'Sunday night 4 or 5 ale houses [were] broke open and robb'd and 5 or 6 attempted, all concluded to be dun by the soldiers, tho plaine proof cannot be made against them all'.[152] The same week the Mayor was personally involved in an altercation with some of the soldiers and a senior Danish officer, as he was asked to intervene in a dispute between a Danish sergeant named Fresehhousen and the Cook family, with whom he was quartered. Several separate depositions described the events, which began with Fresehhousen assaulting Eleanor Cook after she was too slow in fulfilling his demand for a quart of ale.[153] Her sister-in-law Margaret became involved and was also struck by the soldier, who in a rage proceeded to break down the internal partition walls in the house, while Margaret went to inform the mayor of the incident. The mayor accompanied her to the Danish governor Colonel Haxthousen's house, where he informed the Colonel of the disturbances, and 'desyred him that he would not suffer the poor inhabitants to be ruined in town for what the soldiers had almost undone'.[154] At this comment the Danish Colonel flew into a rage, 'drew his sword and made at the mayor', with one of the local sergeants managing to 'hold the said Governor by the body [and] hindered him from injuring the mayor'.[155] This heated incident provides an excellent insight into the tensions between local people and the soldiers quartered upon them, with factors such as the close proximity between both sides in the houses obviously straining relations significantly. Fresehhousen's demand for ale from Eleanor Cook suggests that the consumption of alcohol also played a significant part in the initial confrontation. Drunkenness amongst the soldiers was fairly common, particularly in light of their breaking and entering into the alehouses, and this would have clearly further exacerbated tensions between them and the town's inhabitants.

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[151] Mayor Richard Carleton to Clarke, Clonmel, 21 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 482).
[152] Ibid.
[153] Depositions of Richard Bond, Margaret Cook and Eleanor Cook, taken at Clonmel, 19 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 477).
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

The attitude of Colonel Haxthousen in his confrontation with the mayor is especially interesting, as such a strong reaction to a relatively minor matter indicates either severe disregard for military discipline or else extreme frustration on the Colonel's part. The latter suggests that frequent complaints by the mayor concerning the soldiers may have finally pushed the Colonel to breaking point, or that it was a consequence of his exasperation at the poor conditions in which the soldiers had to live. The poor standard of the conditions are clear from other correspondence during this period, with a letter from Daniel Butts written in the same week recounting complaints made to him by Haxthousen and the other officers, in which they:

> ...beg'd of me to acquaint you that they are in a miserable condition, many of them wishing they may be damn'd if they had two pence to buy a quart of ale with, and they wondered the Lords Justices should put out such a Proclamation when neither they nor their soldiers had a penny to help themselves with. In short I gave them all the satisfaction I could and was really glad when I was got out of the roome, and thought I was obliged to acquaint you with it.[156]

Butts' relief at getting 'out of the roome' suggests that the officers were particularly angry about their situation at this point, as reports of poor conditions for the Danish troops across the southern region had been coming to light since September. Würtemberg described how 'both officers and common soldiers are falling sick and dying at a great rate', while another officer (Munchgaar) complained that they had only received '14 days pay and are owed nearly four months', while 'sometimes the common soldiers have been three or four days without bread'.[157] By November complaints were made specifically about the poor quality of the Danish troops' quarters, 'in which half of them have no beds, [and] many more will probably die'.[158] Between poor quarters, rampant bouts of disease and significant arrears of pay, it is unsurprising that many of the rank and file soldiers 'now know the difference between Denmark and other

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[156] Daniel Butts to Clarke, Clonmel, 12 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 459a).
[157] Würtemberg to Christian V, near Tipperary, 9 Sep. 1690 in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 57; Munchgaar to Harboe, Cahir, 18 Sep. 1690 in Danaher and J.G. Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 61.
[158] Würtemberg to Christian V, Waterford, 12 Nov. 1690 in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 72.

countries [and] most of them wish they were on the way home'.[159] Living in such close proximity to the soldiers and suffering their anger at the poor conditions, in addition to being short of food and vulnerable to the same diseases, it is highly likely that, regardless of the soldiers' actions to counter the on-going rapparee threat, many of the local people in and around Clonmel and elsewhere had the same wish as the Danes themselves.

Clonmel was also the setting chosen for *Vertue Rewarded; or, the Irish Princess*, a novel set in Ireland during the Williamite war period and published in 1693, just a few years after the conflict.[160] The central plot is a heroic romance narrative concerning the desire of a German prince named 'S-------g' to win the heart of a beautiful local woman named Marinda, during his stay in Clonmel around the time of the first siege of Limerick in August 1690. The choice of Clonmel is particularly interesting, as *Vertue Rewarded* is credited as being one of the earliest examples of the emerging genre of the novel, and its setting in such a provincial Irish location was quite extraordinary. The editors note that 'Clonmel was unusual among seventeenth-century Irish towns in having a High Street', and the fact that High Street is mentioned in two separate instances in the text leads them to believe that the author had first-hand knowledge of the town.[161] While it is possible that the author had either visited Clonmel previously, or was drawing 'on local knowledge of Clonmel during the Williamite wars', it is questionable whether he or she were present in the town during the war period itself, as the text does not refer to the poor conditions faced by the townspeople or soldiers as outlined above, nor to the town's role as a field hospital during the siege, which would have been especially notable.[162] Rather, the unknown author seems to have based his or her knowledge of the war on the detailed accounts written by George Story, which had just recently been published.[163]

As a result *Vertue Rewarded* provides no explicit first-hand information concerning conditions in the town during the war period. Nevertheless, the

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[159] Munchgaar to Harboe, Cahir, 18 Sep. 1690 in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 61.
[160] [Anon], *Vertue Rewarded; or, the Irish Princess*, eds Ian Campbell Ross and Anne Markey (Dublin, 2010).
[161] *Vertue Rewarded*, pp 41 and 48; f.n. to p. 41.
[162] Ibid., p. 25.
[163] Ibid., p. 12.

author succeeds in situating the work in the context of the war, following Story's chronology of the conflict and inserting several references to military engagements such as the siege of Limerick and Sarsfield's raid on the Williamite siege train at Ballyneety. The author also makes use of a rapparee attack as a major narrative device when, in the few days following the raising of the siege, the prince happens upon two men fending off a dozen rapparees from two women in a wood.[164] The depiction of this encounter features references to contemporary weaponry and military attire, with the prince and his cavalry companion unable to properly pursue the fleeing rapparees on foot through the wood due to their cumbersome jackboots. Similarly, the Spaniard's use of a half-pike to fend off the initial attack by a dozen rapparees, is reminiscent of how the Jacobite officer John Stevens and his companion were driven off by locals armed with the same weapon in Kildare.[165] The timing of the attack, just after the raising of the siege, is also quite convincing, as rapparee activity increased significantly following the Williamite withdrawal, as noted above and also evident from Story's narrative.

In addition to the general context of the novel, several of the scenarios in the text are certainly reflective of the interactions between ordinary people and the soldiers quartered on them around the country during the war. During their stay in Clonmel the soldiers were billeted throughout the town, and on the first night of their stay the prince gave 'orders concerning the good behaviour of his soldiers, gave them leave to repair to their several quarters, whilst he by the head officers was conducted to his'.[166] This reference to the behaviour of the prince's troops is perhaps a subtle acknowledgement that the Williamite troops were known to have caused a certain amount of disruption within the local community during their stay. In another scenario, as the prince and his men had been ordered to wait in the town until the arrival of King William's main force on its way to Limerick, he asked three of his officers how they should make use of the intervening time, with one proposing 'training the souldiers, another the tavern, and the third a consort of musick'.[167] These three suggestions reflect

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[164] *Vertue Rewarded*, p. 117.
[165] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, p. 134.
[166] *Vertue Rewarded*, p. 43.
[167] Ibid., p. 43.

several of the previously discussed problems the local people had with the quartered soldiers, with the training and discipline of troops seemingly overlooked in favour of other activities—in this case hosting a ball—while the problem of soldiers paying frequent visits to the local taverns has also been noted. The idea of holding a ball was indeed the first suggestion to be pursued, with a local gentleman's 'large country house...[being] pitched upon for the ball'.[168] While this depiction of a large ball in a lavish setting was perhaps quite exaggerated, it is representative of the good-natured socialising that would have gone on throughout the war between both Williamite officers and well-placed locals, or enlisted soldiers and ordinary civilians, particularly during periods of winter quarters. Similarly, the prince was not the only character to become involved in the romantic pursuit of ladies from the local area, with other officers including Celadon doing likewise. This reflects an element of interaction between the soldiers and the local people that goes largely unremarked in other sources, with romantic involvement between local women and the soldiers staying in the area an unavoidable consequence of large numbers of young men being quartered in family homes.

The treatment in the novel of the townspeople's reaction to the Williamite advance is also worthy of note. The depiction of the prince's initial entry to the town described how the main street was 'fill'd all along with people, who crowded thither to see those arms which were to secure them from the enemies of their liberty and religion'.[169] While this description is quite hyperbolic and fits with the clear bias towards the Williamite cause as seen throughout the novel, it is likely that upon their initial arrival in the town the soldiers would have been welcomed by local Protestants with open arms, particularly in light of the chaos following the recent Jacobite retreat and the uncertainties they had experienced during the previous few years of social change and uncertainty under Tyrconnell, as outlined in the previous chapter. The range of nationalities featured in the novel, being 'imaginatively populated by an Irish gentlewoman, a princely German hero, his English commander of the horse, a Dutch king, an Antisuyan noblewoman, and her Spanish *conquistador* lover', also fits with the

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[168] *Vertue Rewarded*, pp 43–4.
[169] Ibid., p. 41.

cosmopolitan nature of the Danish force that was billeted in Clonmel during the winter months, whose officer corps was described by William's ambassador to Denmark as being 'for the most part strangers of all countries whom choice or fortune brings there: Germans, Poles, Courlanders, Dutch, Swedes, Scotch, Irish, and now and then an English seaman whom they make drunk after a long voyage'.[170] Overall, the depiction of life in Clonmel during this period as seen in *Vertue Rewarded* is in many ways reflective of life under military occupation, and furthers our understanding of the relationships between the soldiers and their hosts in several ways. Indeed, many of the experiences of the people of Clonmel relating to the Williamite soldiers were replicated among people living across the Williamite-controlled areas of the frontier between the two sides during this period, such as Cork, Westmeath, Longford, Leitrim, Cavan, Fermanagh and King's County.

Conclusion

From April 1691, Williamite forces began to ready themselves for the forthcoming summer campaign, with much of George Clarke's correspondence containing many references to fresh recruits arriving to their regiments, arms being repaired and ammunition being stockpiled. Around this time there was a significant drop in the number of references in the surviving correspondence to theft or violent actions by Williamite forces across the country. This is likely to have been due to a combination of factors, including these significant improvements in the supply of food and other necessities, as well as a tightening up of discipline by senior Williamite officers in preparation for the army's forthcoming campaign. Ginkel had issued orders in March further requesting that commanding officers take care 'to prevent any disorders for the future in the garrisons', with the Williamite commander at Cork, Francis Hastings, requesting an order for the execution of one of his soldiers who had 'indeavored to corrupt severall of the souldyers to comit roberyes'.[171] Combined with forcing the absent officers to return to their posts, Ginkel's stricter stance was likely both a

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[170] Ian Campbell Ross, 'Mapping Ireland in Early Fiction' in *Irish University Review*, xli, no. 1 (2011), p. 12; Robert Molesworth, King William's ambassador to Denmark, quoted in: Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, p. 11.

[171] Francis Hastings to Clarke, Cork, 11 Mar. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 523).

response to the abuses committed by the soldiers over the winter and spring, while also designed to reduce Catholic hostility towards the Williamites in light of the coming campaign.

The onset of the summer campaigning season meant an influx of new recruits to regiments across the country, in addition to new supplies of food and arms. This improvement in provisions resulted in a complete turnaround in soldiers' attitudes towards their stay in Ireland and the campaign as a whole. Würtemberg, whose Danish troops had been particularly vocal about their poor conditions during the winter months, as discussed above, noted in April how:

> Officers who have seen other campaigns, if they tell the truth, will never have seen a less arduous one than this. In the first place we have had abundance of meat throughout the campaign. We were short of bread for only six days, but we had wheat, barley, peas, beans and potatoes in plenty. We have had no severe mortality. The diseases there have been have been caused by eating too much meat... It is almost a matter of course for officers to complain even if they had twice as much money as they have. I know cavalry captains who have lost 600 guineas at gaming and after that they complain...[172]

This is quite a turnaround from the complaints made by Danish commanders a few months before, and while Würtemberg's rank would have sheltered him from the majority of the harsher realities faced by less senior officers and of course regular enlisted men, his comments point to a much improved situation for the Williamite forces by April 1691. Having supplies of food readily available left less of an incentive for soldiers to steal from local people, and this, combined with the pressure placed on officers to return to their regiments, meant that by April, the attempts to curb indiscipline that had been on-going throughout the winter finally met with some success. Again, this raises the issue of how seriously the official proclamations against plundering of civilians and other crimes were taken by individual officers on the ground during periods of winter quarters, with the need to reform and instil discipline in regiments only being taken fully seriously when a summer campaign was imminent, and when the discipline and good order of soldiers would be tested in battle.

Their interactions and relationships with members of the military of both

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[172] Würtemberg to Harboe, Waterford, 8 Apr. 1691 in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 100.

sides would have defined the experience of the war for the majority of civilians across the country, and for those who lived close to one of the frontiers between the two sides this was even more relevant. While the activities of the rapparees amidst the varying states of law and disorder prevalent during wartime were of course extremely disruptive, these tended to be quite sporadic in nature, whereas the soldiers of both sides often had more of an involvement with civilians on a day-to-day basis. The most traumatic of these experiences usually involved acts of plundering, with occasional examples of violence, although the tightening of military codes and discipline that had occurred across Europe in the decades since the signing of the peace of Westphalia had tended to reduce these, with a notable improvement in conduct compared to the experiences in Ireland during the wars of the 1640s. Of course, these encounters were not all of a negative nature, and interaction between civilians and soldiers could benefit both sides. Soldiers occasionally struck up a rapport with the civilians with whom they were quartered, ensuring better rations, such as in the case of the Swiss soldier Jean de Morsier. They were also known to act as protection for their hosts from the depredations of fellow soldiers, such as in the case of John Stevens. The long periods of time that the same small groups of soldiers could occasionally be quartered with the same families could result in close relationships forming between soldiers and civilians, as viewed through the prism of *Vertue Rewarded*, or the outcome could be the exact opposite, such as with the unruly Frenchmen quartered among the Quakers at Ballyhagan. The variety of interactions between the two groups, of both a positive and a negative nature, was broad, but it was these sorts of encounters that represented the view of the Williamite war to the majority of the ordinary people of Ireland, rather than battles like the Boyne or Aughrim.

Chapter 4 — Zones of conflict: Rapparees

Introduction

One of the most frequently mentioned elements of the Williamite war were the large numbers of irregular forces, known as rapparees, that operated across the country. Groups of outlaws such as rapparees and tories had been prominent across Ireland throughout the seventeenth century, and would indeed remain so well into the eighteenth, with individual figures becoming well known through proclamations, news reports and Irish-language poetry.[1] This 'cult' of the rapparee was particularly prominent during the Williamite war, with the disorderly conditions caused by the war providing a fertile environment for activities of this nature. This proliferation of irregular groups of bandits and brigands during wartime was symptomatic of the early modern period, with Hobsbawm noting how the instability of war provided 'far greater opportunities for robbery than at other times. The era of the seventeenth-century wars in Germany, like the era of the French revolutionary wars, was the golden age of the robber bands'.[2]

Rapparees or their equivalents were mentioned by almost all contemporary authors on the Williamite war, and while most hesitated even try to estimate their numbers, they were always described as being incredibly numerous and widespread. Several previous authors have referred to the five categories of rapparees that were identified by Lord Longford in 1691.[3] These were 'first the general Irish rapparees, secondly, some of the Irish army, thirdly, some of the English army, fourthly, some of the militia, fifthly, some English men

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[1] Éamonn Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite Cause, 1685–1766* (Dublin, 2004), p. 37; Even during the war period itself, several individuals were named as wanted outlaws in Williamite proclamations, see 'Reward for the apprehension of Father Christopher Browne and others for the murder at Mulhuddart church', 15 Apr. 1691; 'Offering a reward for the apprehension of John McCabe', 24 July 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations issued during the reigns of William and Mary and William III* (forthcoming, 2013), nos 50 & 68.

[2] Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (4th ed., London, 2001), p. 17; For more on the proliferation of bandits and other irregular forces during the French revolutionary wars, see Michael Broers, *Napoleon's other war: Bandits, rebels and their pursuers in the age of revolutions* (Oxford, 2010).

[3] John Childs, *The Williamite wars in Ireland, 1688–91* (London, 2007), p. 27; Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite Cause*, p. 73.

that fled from the county of Limerick for shelter...'.[4] While only the first of these groups denote the traditional view of rapparees as disaffected Irish Catholics or irregular forces fighting for King James, Longford's list includes the variety of groups that frequently stole from civilians across the country during the war. Throughout the war, ordinary soldiers from both the Jacobite and Williamite armies did as much plundering of civilians as traditional rapparees, although this was less reported by official sources from both sides. The Williamite militia was also known to frequently abuse its power within its local areas for their own advantage. Deserters from Williamite forces would also have been guilty of stealing from civilians upon leaving the army—although this would have been much less frequent—while deserters from the Jacobite army would have been generally indistinguishable from the common rapparees.

The typical *modus operandi* of a traditional rapparee consisted mainly of raiding civilian property at night and carrying off whatever livestock or other goods they could, in a similar manner to the previously described plundering by Jacobite and Williamite soldiers, except rapparees tended to use the cover of darkness to conceal their approach and escape. George Story described one of the rapparee's main skills as being able to quickly discard their arms and appear like civilians, outlining how:

> When the rapparees have no mind to show themselves upon the bogs, they commonly sink down between two or three little hills, grown over with long grass, so that you may as soon find a hair as one of them. They conceal their arms thus, they take off the [fire]lock and put it in their pocket, or hide it in some dry place; they stop the [muzzle] close with a cork, and the touchhole with a small quill, and then throw the piece itself into a running water or pond. You may see a hundred of them without arms, who look like the poorest humblest slaves in the world, and you may search till you are weary before you can find one gun: but yet when they have a mind to do mischief, they can all be ready in an hours warning.[5]

This ability to melt back into their surroundings made the rapparees a very difficult proposition for the Williamite forces to deal with. It also meant they

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[4] Letter from Lord Longford, 25 Apr. 1691, in 'Letters of Lord Longford and others on Irish affairs, 1689–1702', ed. Patrick Melvin, in *Analecta Hibernica*, xxxii (1985), p. 75.
[5] Story, *Impartial history*, pp 152–53.

were a particular threat in areas adjacent to areas of inhospitable terrain, such as mountains or bogs. Most sources distinguish another variant of rapparees, known as *creaghts*, although some authors use the two words interchangeably. The word *creaght* was primarily a medieval concept, and signified 'a herd of miscellaneous livestock, with its attendants, grazing or passing through other people's lands'.[6] Living in this manner had become a way of life for many in the early seventeenth century, and 'a *creaght* could be formed by the settled population of a district temporarily displaced in times of war, moving as a train of refugees, or aggressive migrants', with the concept becoming popular during the wars of the 1640s and 1650s, particularly among Ulster forces.[7] This term was used during the Williamite war to describe groups such as these, who were predominantly from Ulster, although it also described larger groups of general rapparees that had plundered significant numbers of cattle as they moved across the country. Much like the two armies were accused of causing immense damage to pasture through overgrazing of horses, the large number of cattle contained in many *creaghts* meant that they were also frequently decried for the same reason.

The activities of rapparees and *creaghts* were often exaggerated by authors, with a French observer noting that due to 'the pillage which has been committed by Catholics on Protestants, [...] three quarters of livestock have been killed for their skin alone'.[8] The Jacobite officer John Stevens gave a similarly exaggerated opinion of the rapparees, noting that:

> most men reckoned the whole nation, every poor country fellow having armed himself with a skeine as they call it or dagger, or a ropery like a half pike, weapons fit only to please themselves, or else to put them in a posture of robbing and plundering the whole country, under pretence of suppressing the rebellious Protestants. The insolences committed by this sort of people, commonly called Rapparees, were such that having overstocked themselves with other men's cattle they destroyed millions throughout the kingdom only for their hides or tallow, and sometimes only to exercise their malice, leaving the

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[6] Katherine Simms, 'Nomadry in Medieval Ireland: The origins of the *Creaght* or *Caoraigheacht*' in *Peritia*, v (1986) p. 379.
[7] Simms, 'Nomadry in Medieval Ireland', p. 379; Pádraig Lenihan, *Confederate Catholics at war, 1641–49* (Cork, 2001), p. 62.
[8] M. d'Esgrigny to M. de Louvois, Dublin, 6 June 1690, in Sheila Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, i (Dublin, 1984), no. 843.

carcasses to rot in the fields.[9]

It was likely that a significant proportion of the civilian population had attempted to arm themselves in some manner, such as Protestants through their fear of the new Jacobite state at the beginning of the war; Catholics at the behest of Jacobite proclamations to do so prior to Schomberg's arrival in Ireland; or more generally in a simple attempt to defend themselves from the attacks of idle soldiers or outlaws. However, Stevens' description of an entire nation of armed people out for plunder was rooted in the general tone of the time, and it is indicative of the fear that would have been generated by the war itself, and by the widely reported actions of rapparees.

Widespread plundering and disorder by rapparees across Ireland, and particularly in Ulster, was the primary excuse used by pro-Williamite Protestants for their amassing of arms in the period prior to the war, and for their formation of defence associations in January 1689.[10] For this reason the activities of rapparees have always been viewed as especially important in the months before the war, and indeed it is likely that there were some levels of theft of livestock and other looting by various opportunistic groups of people in these areas, who had decided to profit from perceived weaknesses at local government level. However, few specific examples of rapparee activity are extant from before the period of the war itself. The Quaker suffering material, which provides the most detailed and impartial account of plundering of civilians by rapparees and troops from all sides, suggests that only from March 1689 onwards were widespread attempts made to plunder livestock and goods from homes across the province. This was when the Jacobite army began to advance into Ulster, in the form of General Richard Hamilton's men moving to engage the Protestant force at Dromore, and Galmoy's regiment advancing into Cavan. Prior to this, the only Quakers that reported being plundered were those that lived near the Jacobite garrison at Charlemont fort, who had livestock and goods robbed 'before those troublesome times begun'.[11] The Quaker meeting at Cavan recorded that Thomas Phillips at Belturbet had his cattle plundered 'by the Irish the same day that Galmoy came into our towne aforesaid, with his army to prosecute the English

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[9] Stevens, *The Journal of John Stevens*, pp 61–62.

[10] For more on the motivations of Protestants in the months prior to the war, see chapter one.

[11] Documents relating to the suffering of Quaker families in Ulster, 1689–91 (PRONI, D2224/1).

and Scotch that fled away to Crum and Iniskillen, upon his approach being about the 18th day of the month called March 1689'.[12] These cattle were his largest loss of property for the duration of the war, but he also noted the theft of 'a new featherbed, and many other particular household goods, lost at several times by both parties, which we cannot give a [...] account or relation of'.[13]

The culprits behind this lawlessness were described as a combination of 'plunderers in the day time and robbers and theeves in the night', while others were 'known to be officers and souldyers in the Kings army and other pretended to be souldyers though to us unknown whether they were souldyers or not'.[14] Indeed, the majority of the goods stolen from the Quakers in Ulster during this initial year of the war seem to have been taken by Jacobite soldiers, with other goods taken by Williamite soldiers as well as general rapparees. From the accounts it seems that distinctions between the different groups were not always high on the victim's list of priorities, with one describing how they lost their goods 'by way of plunder and robbery by the Irish, some being soulders and some not'.[15] Undoubtedly the initial year of war in Ulster was a difficult one for its population, and this is borne out by the levels of destruction across the province, as well as the records of goods plundered in the Quaker records. However, with the securing of the province by Schomberg's troops in August 1689 and the efforts of local Protestant forces at Enniskillen, references to plundering in the Quaker records for Ulster begin to taper off. While there are still some references to plundering in 1690, the majority of this is attributed to 'the English army since they landed'.[16]

Elsewhere in Ireland, reports of plundering were also quite widespread in the first year of the war. While the single largest element of this plundering from this early period was the seizing of horses by Jacobite soldiers, there were also references to goods being taken by 'theeves and rapparees', who stole livestock and a wide variety of other goods.[17] The unfortunate James Ashton from Kildare,

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[12] Quaker Sufferings (no. 9, Cavan, 1689).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Documents relating to the suffering of Quaker families in Ulster, 1689–91 (PRONI, D2224/1).
[15] A short account of Friends sufferings belonging to the Ballihagen meeting (PRONI, D2224/3).
[16] A valuation of goods that were taken, stolen and plundered by the Irish in James's time, county of Antrim 1689 (PRONI, D2224/2).
[17] Quaker Sufferings (no. 30, Munster, 1689).

who would later be badly affected by the disorderly Jacobite soldiers as they retreated from the battle of the Boyne, provided a very detailed account of his encounters with rapparees from this early period. He described how on 12 March 1689 'the theefs [thieves] wear braking my house, there wear about tenn of them near a hour, and when they saw they could not get in they tooke with them 8 of my cows and 2 heffers'.[18] He had three sheep and a mare stolen by rapparees that May, while in September:

> the Crea[gh]ts came and did settle as I think one thousand head of cattle on my land, destroyed my hay, broke my sta[c]ks of corne in the f[i]eld, pul[le]d it of[f] the cars as it came home, did take it out of the haggard, and after it was threshed did take it from be destroyed my firing, pul[le]d a iron bound cart to peecis [pieces] and burnt it, destroyed my gardens, did take and burn 4 cars, destroyd my timber, and had meat and drink at their pleasure: sum of my land they kept for 3 mo[n]ths all to the value of £60.[19]

This indicates that the destruction caused by having a *creaght* move into an area was comparable to that done by having to quarter a significant body of mounted soldiers, with their demands for food and provisions, as well as the severe drain they caused to pasture. However, during this period Ashton also describes having livestock and horses stolen by dragoons, having Jacobite soldiers quartered on him 'sumtimes 10 or 20 at a time', and being badly affected by 'the armies marching upon the road', as his home was close to the main route southwest from Dublin.[20]

There was a substantial increase in reports of general plundering of Quakers across the country from 1690 onwards, particularly after the battle of the Boyne. This was of course precipitated by the breakdown in discipline among the Jacobite army during their flight towards Limerick in July, and a significant proportion of the entries directly refer to soldiers plundering goods in the context of this disorderly retreat. The members of the various Quaker meetings across the midland region claimed to have lost livestock, goods and property valued at £4034 in the six months from June to November 1690, which is a significant amount of money, particularly given the small Quaker population

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[18] Quaker Sufferings (no. 16, Kilteel, Co. Kildare).
[19] Quaker Sufferings (no. 16, Kilteel, Co. Kildare); A haggard was a yard or otherwise enclosed area of a farm, usually near the byre and generally used to house animals.
[20] Quaker Sufferings (no. 16, Kilteel, Co. Kildare).

across Ireland at the time.[21] However, the severe losses from this period were not exclusively blamed on Jacobite soldiers, with rapparees and other thieves also being held responsible. These references to rapparees became more prominent as the winter wore on, and at the Mountmellick meeting alone, the losses from raids from November 1690 to April 1691 totalled £1145, with the vast majority of these losses attributed directly to rapparees. During the previous six months, which included the flight from the Boyne, the amount lost by the same group of Quakers was actually less than this, at £789. This suggests that the period when traditional rapparee groups were most active across the country was during the winter of 1690–91.

Winter 1690–91: The nature of rapparee attacks

When assessing the impact of rapparees during the Williamite war, the winter break between the military campaigns in the summers of 1690 and 1691 is once again particularly important. The failure of the Williamites to capture the city of Limerick in the summer of 1690 led to the withdrawal of their forces towards Leinster and into winter quarters among the local civilian population. At this time, several Protestants and Williamite sympathisers who were resident across Connacht, Munster and midland areas, appealed to the authorities for permission to move their families and livestock eastwards, for fear of attacks by rapparees and Jacobite forces, while many others had simply accompanied the army as it withdrew.[22] One Mr Landers from Cashel appealed to the secretary at war, George Clarke, through an intermediary on 10 September, outlining how 'he shall not be able to keepe his [live]stocke in this country, [and] is desirous to remoove it neerer Dublin', showing the fear of attack felt by people living at the frontiers of both armies.[23] Their fears were justified, as the long frontier between the two sides, primarily on the eastern bank of the Shannon, very quickly became a no man's land, into which rapparee forces launched regular attacks against civilians and Williamite forces.

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[21] Quaker Sufferings (no. 15, Leinster, 1690).
[22] Story, *Impartial History*, p. 133.
[23] Samuel Blount to Clarke, Cashel, 10 September 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 156); see also Éamonn Ó Ciardha, 'Clarke, George (1661–1736)' in *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge, 2009).

The Jacobites had managed to hold onto all the strategically important positions directly on or near to the Shannon from Jamestown in Roscommon as far south as Limerick, such as Lanesborough, Athlone and Nenagh. In the north, the Williamites had garrisoned towns such as Cavan, Belturbet, Enniskillen, Belleek and Ballyshannon, which gave them control of the natural defensive barrier of the Erne river and lough, and consequently prevented large numbers of rapparees from crossing into their territory along this stretch of the frontier.[24] Meanwhile, villages across south Limerick, north Cork and parts of Tipperary had been attacked in October by regular Jacobite forces led by the Duke of Berwick, whose 'scorched earth' policy saw much property and crops burned in order to hinder Williamite activities in the area.[25] He was accused of having caused 'damage to the country to the value of several millions and [having] burned down more than twelve fine towns and very many beautiful castles, including Charleville, which was the finest in Ireland, and all such places in the counties of Cork and Tipperary'.[26] So extreme were his actions that the Williamite commander Ginkel contacted him, threatening that 'if he continued burning, the Irish prisoners, including the officers of whom there are great numbers, would be burned alive'.[27] The aim of Berwick's extreme actions had been to deny shelter and forage to the Williamites in this area, in order to further secure this section of the Jacobite defensive line where there was no single river to act as a barrier between the two sides, and where a series of mountain ranges, including the Boggerahs and the Galtees, instead provided a more fluid boundary between the two armies.

The ease with which rapparees could cross the Shannon and launch attacks on Williamite territory from towns like Lanesborough, Athlone and Nenagh, before retreating back across with their stolen goods and livestock, was only made possible by the Jacobite control of the crossing points along the

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[24] For a detailed account of the exact frontier during this period, as defined by the Williamites, and listing the towns along it they had garrisoned, see 'Assuring those on the military frontier who live peaceably of the king's protection', 9 May 1691 in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 43; see also figure 3.2 for a map of the frontier.
[25] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 145.
[26] Munchgaar to Harboe, Cork, 29 September 1690, in K. Danaher and J.G. Simms (eds), *The Danish Force in Ireland 1690–1691* (Dublin, 1962), no. 65.
[27] Ibid.

river.[28] This was a crucial factor in increasing the frequency of rapparee activities in the midlands and south of the country during this period, as opposed to along the more secure frontier in Ulster, and it was in the counties of Longford, Westmeath, King's and Tipperary, along the eastern bank of the river Shannon, that was worst affected by rapparee attacks throughout the entire war. In some places this has left a legacy through to the modern day, such as the placename of Rappareehill, situated just a few miles east of Lanesborough in county Longford. Other natural features also played a big factor in this high level of rapparee activity, with mountainous areas and bogs providing excellent terrain from which to launch attacks on both soldiers and civilians.[29] Again, this was a common feature of bandits and brigands across Europe, with Hobsbawm noting how 'brigands flourish in remote and inaccessible areas such as mountains, trackless plains, fenland, forest or estuaries with their labyrinth of creeks and waterways'.[30]

Thomas Kinge from Ballinaclash, situated at the southeastern edge of the Wicklow mountains near Rathdrum, specifically mentioned the local terrain in an appeal to King William, in which he asked for permission to raise a company of foot to defend the people of the area from Jacobites, who 'have not only plundered the poor Protestants there, but likewise have murthered a great part of them, and does continue still soe to doe, hiding and lurcking themselves in the glynns, woods and mountains'.[31] The vulnerable area to the east of the Shannon was weakened further by the large expanse of the Bog of Allen in King's County, which provided an excellent location from which rapparees could raid the surrounding counties.[32] From there, rapparees managed to raid to within twelve miles of Dublin, which was particularly alarming for the authorities, whose aim had been to 'keep the body of the enemies army on the other side [of] the Shannon'.[33] News of rapparee attacks and clashes with regular forces was disseminated throughout the Williamite-controlled parts of the country in

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[28] Story, *A continuation*, p. 46.
[29] See figure 4.1 for a map of the main areas of boggy or mountainous terrain across Ireland, and the path of the river Shannon.
[30] Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, p. 24.
[31] Petition of Thomas Kinge to King William, Ballinaclash, 10 July 1690 (Clarke war corr., i, no. 64).
[32] Story, *A continuation*, pp 48–9.
[33] *Dublin Intelligence*, 30 Sept. 1690 (NLI, reel 59).

periodicals such as the *Dublin Intelligence*. The issue dated 18 October 1690 led with news from King's County of skirmishes between Williamite forces and rapparees, and subsequent issues over the following months frequently contained accounts of rapparee attacks or attempts by the army to prevent them, the vast majority of which concerned the midland area.[34]

[34] *Dublin Intelligence*, 18 Oct. 1690 (NLI, reel 59); see also *Dublin Intelligence*, 28 Oct. 1690, 16 Dec. 1690, 23 Dec. 1690, 3 Feb. 1690/1, 10 Feb. 1690/1, 17 Feb. 1690/1 and 10 Mar. 1691.

Figure 4.1: Physical map of Ireland, indicating the location of important physical features of the Irish landscape such as the river Shannon and its lakes, the bog of Allen and areas of mountainous terrain.

Many of these attacks throughout the winter of 1690–91 were outlined in detail by authors such as George Story, who recorded dozens of examples of rapparee raids and skirmishes against civilians and regular Williamite forces, across his two-part history of the period.[35] The Quaker suffering records also

[35] See: Story, *Impartial history*, pp 137–57; and Story, *A continuation*, pp 42–73.

note high levels of rapparee activity during the winter period, with examples including John Fennell of Kildare, who recorded having eight cows taken by rapparees in October 1690, but 103 black cattle, 24 large oxen, 30 milch cows, 30 yearlings and 53 steers and heifers stolen the following month.[36] The small Quaker community in Tipperary recorded losing livestock, money and goods totalling £133 to rapparees in the months following the Boyne.[37] James Waseley and his son-in-law Joseph Robinson had £72 of livestock and household goods stolen from their home in Westmeath, in April 1691, by a group of rapparees led by Morgan McLaughlin.[38] In this instance their loss was made much worse by Robinson's attempts to recover the stolen animals, as he was shot and killed by the rapparees, leaving his father-in-law to take care of his two small children. During this winter period the rapparees expanded their activities, augmenting their opportunistic thefts and assaults on isolated homes with larger-scale attacks, such as the assault and burning of villages during daylight hours.[39] The Protestant population in particular felt very threatened by these increased levels of activity, with one south-Tipperary man commenting that he was 'afraid to stir abroad' due to 'the rapparees being grown so impudent that they frequently at day time come near his house'.[40] Würtemberg informed the Danish King Christian V that 'the whole country is in arms', but also noted the rapparees' lack of discipline, and how 'the best thing is that few of them have much heart in the business', with his latter comment reflecting the opportunistic nature of the majority of the rapparees.[41]

The Williamites saw theft and destruction as being two of the main characteristics of rapparees, with the consequence that they were generally viewed as common thieves rather than proper soldiers. A officer posted at Mullingar, an area which saw much rapparee activity, was clear in this view: 'they are no soldiers, nor have any commission for what they do, and therefore I conceive are not to be treated otherwise than Tories and Highwaymen, and

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[36] Quaker Sufferings (no. 18, John Fennell, Dublin, 1691).
[37] Quaker Sufferings (no. 20, Tipperary, 1690).
[38] Quaker Sufferings (no. 31, James Waseley, 1691).
[39] Sam Blount to Clarke, Clonmel, 1 Feb. 1691: (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 434).
[40] Richard Carleton to Clarke, Clonmel, 28 Jan. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 423).
[41] Würtemberg to Christian V, Clogheen, 23 Sep. 1690, in Danaher and Simms, *Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 62.

therefore I have a great mind to hang them'.[42] Éamonn Ó Ciardha has taken issue with this depiction of the rapparees as mere bandits, but his suggestion that the increase in the numbers and activities of 'pikemen, tories and rapparees provided the most visible manifestation of Irish popular Jacobitism between the invasion of Schomberg and the treaty of Limerick', is quite difficult to believe.[43] The Jacobite army had recruited men from across the country in very large numbers, and was constantly affected by desertion, deaths from combat or disease, as well as other forms of attrition. Any Irish Catholic with a strong enough conviction to want to fight for their Catholic King James could have quite easily secured a position for themselves in the Jacobite army. Those who chose to remain outside these military structures, and instead take up arms in these bands of irregular forces, were more likely motivated by the potential to profit from the war than any political stance.

The quasi-military force of Hugh Balldearg O'Donnell in Ulster remained largely removed from these official structures, with his pragmatic stance eventually leading to him agreeing to change sides and join the Williamite army under Ginkel in August 1691.[44] While some of his men were unwilling to make this switch, many others were content to do so, thereby severely undermining their dedication to the Jacobite cause, even in the initial years of the war. Similarly, while rapparees proved themselves to be useful in hampering the Williamite army's activities during this winter period, a French observer was particularly scathing of their discipline and motivation during an attack on 300 Williamite soldiers that were escorting the movement of gunpowder near Birr, King's County, in January 1691. The rapparees used the element of surprise to overwhelm the Williamite force and inflict approximately forty casualties, but the observer noted how 'if the rapparees had not been amusing themselves with pillaging, they [the Williamites] would have all been taken dead'.[45] Instead, the Williamites managed to regroup, drive the rapparees away, and retake the supply of gunpowder.

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[42] William Wolseley to Clarke, Mullingar, 10 August 1690 (Clarke war corr., i, no. 110).
[43] Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite Cause*, p. 68.
[44] Childs, *Williamite wars*, pp 26–27; J.G. Simms, 'Sligo in the Jacobite war, 1689–91' in *The Irish Sword*, vii (1965–66) pp 133–4.
[45] M. de Santons Boullain to M. de Louvois, Portumna, 12 Jan. 1691, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1236.

Other authors described additional factors that caused people to become rapparees during this period. The Williamite author George Story referred to the impact of the actions of the Williamite soldiers while at Birr, in September 1690. He noted how 'the soldiers, either by the bad example of others, or by making the scarcity of bread a pretence, they begun to strip and rob most of the Irish that had got Protections; which made it natural for them, after this, to turn rapparees, and do us all the mischief they could. And it did not stop here; for there was scarce any distinction made of Papist or Protestant in this affair'.[46] Similarly, acts of indiscipline among the Jacobite army, and the resulting plundering of civilians, could have also had a comparable impact on the population, with people who had suffered significant losses of goods or property at the hands of Jacobite soldiers perhaps forced to leave their homes and engage in plundering for primarily economic reasons. The fact that James ordered the formation of a Catholic militia in July and August 1689, commanding 'all our Roman Catholic men of Ireland, from the age of sixteen years to sixty, that are not now of our army, to arm themselves in the best manner they can', has also been suggested as an implicit endorsement of rapparee activities.[47] This is contrary to the stated intention of these proclamations, among others, that these men would essentially act as a fifth column against Williamite military forces following the imminent landing of Schomberg's invasion force, as opposed to engaging in the acts of plunder and violence against civilians that the rapparee groups became known for. Official Jacobite policy during the winter of 1689–90 remained that 'all the said persons so armed [...] do not presume to commit any disorder, or use any violence towards any of our faithful subjects'.[48] In fact, James himself seemed to be less tolerant of rapparee activity than others among the Jacobite military commanders, likely due to his continuing desire not to overly alienate his Protestant subjects in England through his actions in Ireland, in the hope that he would eventually regain control of the English throne.

In the aftermath of James's flight from Ireland in July 1690, rapparees began to be tolerated more openly by the Jacobite army. The desperate military

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[46] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 130.
[47] 'Measures against invasion', 30 July 1689; 'Arming of Roman Catholics and Militia', 5 Aug. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 407–8; Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite Cause*, p. 64.
[48] 'Monition to subjects', 3 Sep. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 412.

situation during the first siege of Limerick meant that any operations undertaken by irregular forces, that could help to distract the Williamite army, would have been appreciated. Similarly, during the following winter of 1690–91, the nature of the frontier between the two sides, and the fact that the Jacobites had managed to hold onto the main crossing points over the river Shannon, meant that they could easily permit rapparees to launch raids into Williamite territory in Leinster and north Munster. Their complicity with them in this manner was likely due not only to the distraction these raids provided to the Williamite forces garrisoning the frontier areas, but it also gave these paramilitary groups an outlet for their activities that did not adversely impact on civilians or food supplies in Jacobite territory. During the previous winter, the fact that the vast majority of the country was in Jacobite hands would have meant that rapparee raids on civilians across Ireland, regardless of their faith, would have negatively impacted on their efforts to supply their army, and to keep the prices of food and other provisions sufficiently low. During this period, one of the Jacobite army's French officers noted how 'the raparees distress the enemies. They set on them at the moment they least expect. They are unable to go from one of their refuges to the other without huge escorts'.[49]

To further encourage activities such as these the Jacobite authorities began to formalise the status of the rapparees, at least nominally, by giving them military passes for use in the event of their capture.[50] This tolerance towards the rapparees extended into the following summer, when the concentration of the Jacobite force at Aughrim, and later at the cities of Galway and Limerick, meant that whatever actions or general disorder the rapparees engaged in elsewhere in the country would have acted as a distraction to the Williamite army and militia. George Story recorded the actions of the rapparee leader 'Galloping Hogan', who had supposedly amassed a group of around one hundred rapparees and 'got much plunder by robbing the sutlers and other people that came into his power'.[51] By September 1691, he and his band of rapparees had become 'so bold as to set upon a party of carrs' that were bringing supplies to the Williamite

[49] M. de Santons Boullain to M. de Louvois, Portumna, 12 Jan. 1691, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1236.
[50] Story, *A continuation*, p. 50.
[51] Ibid., p. 229.

camp on the outskirts of Limerick, while killing seven dragoons from the Williamite militia in an encounter at Roscrea at the end of the month, showing that rapparee groups continued to hamper the Williamite war effort right up to the end of the war.[52]

During the winter period of 1690–91, the lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants of each county under Jacobite control were asked to 'bring or cause to be brought in within fifteen days after the date hereof, twenty beefe out of every hundred head of black cattle which shall be found in the possession of any of the said *creaghts* within your county'.[53] This order noted that 'the country is overstockt with cattle belonging to the *creaghts*, which range about in such great numbers will quickly destroy the fodder'.[54] However, the more pressing incentive for making this request was that it was seen as 'very necessary to make great provisions of salt beefe for the use of his Majesties army now that the season of salting beefe is come'.[55] Theobald Dillon, who served as the Jacobite Lord Lieutenant of Roscommon during the war, in addition to his military post as Lieutenant Colonel in the earl of Clanricard's regiment, was specifically asked to 'provide beeves [cattle] and weathers [sheep], aswell for the subsistence of the army as to victuall the towne of Gallway with provisions for a siege'.[56] He was to supply 'five hundred beeves and nine hundred weathers, whereof the Keeriaghts [*creaghts*] in the said county are to beare a reasonable proportion with due regard to their stocks'.[57]

This direct appeal to the rapparee groups that were sheltering in Jacobite controlled Connacht to give up a twenty per cent share of their cattle for the Jacobite war effort is an indicator of the official toleration and indeed cooperation between the Jacobite military and rapparees at this stage of the war. However, it was also anticipated that the 'Head or Chief of every *creaght*' was unlikely to freely comply with this request, as the Jacobite officials were told that

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[52] Story, *A continuation*, pp 229, 236–7.
[53] Order from the Lords Commissioners appointed for managing civil affairs, signed by Clanricarde, Gormanston, Riverston and 'Marquis d'Albyville' [Ignatius White], to the Lord Lieutenant and Deputy Lieutenants of county Mayo, written at Galway, 15 Sep. 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/4/11).
[54] Order from the Lords Commissioners, 15 Sep. 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/4/11).
[55] Ibid.
[56] Proclamation by Tyrconnell to the Lord Lieutenant and Deputy Lieutenant of the county of Roscommon, written at Galway, 16 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Dillon (Clonbrock) papers, n.5208 p.5312).
[57] Ibid.

'in case of opposition you are to apply yourself to the officer commanding in chief in the next garrison to you, who is hereby required to be aiding and assisting to you as occasion shall require'.[58] This stresses the cattle raiding culture that was inherent among many of the rapparee groups. Also, the fact that they were not expected to be very forthcoming with supplying the beef needed by the Jacobite army, suggests that the primary motivation of a significant proportion of the rapparees was not assisting the Jacobite cause, but rather profiting from the confusion of the war period for their own gain.

While plundering in this manner was the chief aim of the vast majority of rapparee groups, there are also a number of references to incidents of violence and murder. Within the Quaker sufferings, while soldiers from both sides frequently used the threat of violence in order to convince civilians to part with their possessions, the more extreme or barbaric accusations tended to be levied against the rapparees. Among the thousands of encounters with rapparees, Jacobite, or Williamite soldiers that were recorded by the Quakers, there were two murders recorded, the first in Tyrone in 1690 when Thomas Greer was shot at the door of his home, and the other in the spring of 1691, when the aforementioned Joseph Robinson was killed at Moate in Westmeath.[59] Non-lethal violence was also used, such as in May 1689, when 'robbers' broke into the house of Thomas Eves in county Wicklow and stole £50 worth of livestock and goods. His wife, who was at home on her own at the time, was '7 or 8 times layed on the doore sill in a tirryfieing manner' as the rapparees threatened 'to cut of her head with an ax'.[60] The rapparees also occasionally burned the homes and outbuildings of their victims after they had taken their goods, or stripped the clothes from the victims, although in a similar manner to incidents of this nature involving soldiers, this seemed to be more for the monetary value of the clothes and perhaps for humiliation purposes rather than anything more sinister.[61]

While rapparees were certainly known to plunder the homes of Catholic civilians, there were instances of sectarian enmity in many of their more violent attacks, with it being reported that they gave 'no quarter to English Protestants,

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[58] Order from the Lords Commissioners, 15 Sep. 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/4/11).
[59] Quaker Sufferings (no. 31, James Waseley, 1691).
[60] Quaker Sufferings (no. 5, Leinster, 1689).
[61] Quaker Sufferings (no. 7, Mountmellick, Queen's County, 1690).

but they spare the Danes, Dutch and French'.[62] In one instance a party of rapparees captured a 'land constable' and a Danish trooper near Dungarvan in January 1691. Despite the constable offering them '100 pounds if they let him live so long that he might write to his wife; they would not allow it but said he must die, as he was a Protestant. They spared the trooper and set free a little servant of the constable, as he was an Irish Catholic'.[63] Events such as this reinforce the religious element of the conflict, and this tension was particularly evident in all towns along the frontier, such as Clonmel, which was described as 'so wicked a little towne and has so many spyes in it that it is almost impossible to stir, be it never so private'.[64] This religious tension was heightened by detailed reports of rapparee atrocities, such as the description the *Dublin Intelligence* gave on 14 February of an attack near Birr:

> On Thursday last, the rapparees catching a soldier of Colonel Hamilton's Regiment two miles distant from this place, ripp'd up his belly, drew out his gutts, and put one end of them in his hand, as appeared when he was found; cut off his other arm, and both the calves of his legs, put out one of his eyes, and cut off his privy-members and put them in his mouth; our men found him dead, and thus barbarously mangled.[65]

The savage nature of incidents such as this one are reminiscent of the reporting of atrocities perpetrated during the 1641 Rebellion, and attributing actions such as these to Catholics rapparees furthered the religious context of the war. It is possible that barbaric reports of this nature were exaggerated by pro-Williamite sources, particularly during the winter period when rapparees also frequently engaged in small-scale encounters with Williamite soldiers, which usually constituted of abducting or murdering isolated infantry or cavalrymen who had strayed too far from the safety of their camp or unit.

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[62] Munchgaar to Harboe, Waterford, 10 Jan. 1691, in Danaher and Simms, *The Danish Force in Ireland*, no. 80.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Morgan Ryane to Clark, Cashel, 12 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 654).
[65] *Dublin Intelligence*, 17 Feb. 1691 (NLI, reel 59).

Countering the rapparee threat

Frequent military encounters and skirmishes took place between Williamite troops and rapparees throughout the winter and spring of 1690–91. The Williamite army launched raids into no-man's-land or across the Shannon, attempting to engage bodies of rapparees, and to restrict their ability to enter Williamite territory. These parties burned fortified houses and other buildings that the rapparees were using to launch their raids, as well as destroying any crops or capturing any livestock they found in Jacobite territory.[66] Occasionally these raids resulted in damage to areas under Williamite control, such as the £26 of goods that the aforementioned James Waseley had destroyed by a 'party of the English which came to burne the towne of Motegrange', further demonstrating the danger posed to people living in these contested areas by both sides.[67] The Williamites were also just as adept at capturing 'preys' of cattle as the rapparees were, generally trying to herd as many as possible back into their own quarters for the army's use. In some circumstances this was not possible, as Colonel Barrow described to Clarke how, following an engagement with rapparees at Lanesborough, his detachment 'took a considerable number of cattle, but having other business to mind wee did make noe division of them, but let the soldiers kill what was necessary'.[68] However, some of the Williamite officers were just as eager as the rapparees were to make use of the disorder of this period to line their own pockets, as some of the 'officers and some country gentlemen conveyed away the greatest part of them to their owne estates', much to Barrow's chagrin.[69]

The Williamite army's single largest attempt to restrain rapparee activity during the war was their expedition into Kerry in early January 1691. Ginkel outlined how their quarters were 'so infested with raparies [sic] and parties of the Enemies force...[that] some care must be taken to secure the line and put it

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[66] For examples of raids by Williamite forces into Jacobite territory during this period see: Colenbine to Clarke, Roscrea, 14 Nov. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 295); Thomas Cleese to Clarke, 5 Dec. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 324); Samuel Blount to Clarke, Clonmel, 13 Jan. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 389.); Samuel Blount to Clarke, Clonmel, 2 March 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 506a.).

[67] Quaker Sufferings (no. 31, James Waseley, 1691).

[68] Colonel Barrow to Clarke, Mullingar, 9 Feb. 1690 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 447).

[69] Ibid.

into a better posture of defence than at present it is'.[70] The failure of several Williamite attempts to seize crossing points on the Shannon, and their relative security behind the Erne in Ulster as outlined above, meant that Kerry was the only area along the frontier into which the Williamites could attempt to bring large numbers of troops to bear on the rapparees in a bid to curb their activities. This expedition into Kerry was primarily entrusted to the Danish troops under Ginkel's command, with the German general Julius von Tettau managing to march his Danish troops as far as Killarney, before being forced to turn back for fear of becoming isolated. The civilians along this frontier suffered at the hands of both sides, with the Williamites described as having 'ruined a good part of the county of Limerick' while the Jacobites burned castles and villages along the Cork-Limerick border.[71]

Williamite officers and authors frequently blamed Catholic civilians living in Williamite territory for supplying rapparees with intelligence concerning their movements. Colonel Gustavus Hamilton claimed that surprise raids on known rapparee hiding places around Birr were impossible, noting that one of his planned raids was foiled because 'the enemy had intelligence, for they removed but the evening before, nor is it possible to prevent it whilst wee have soe many papists among us'.[72] The same advanced warning was given to rapparees at nearby Mountmellick, where there had 'been about 10 or 12 some soldiers and others of the English inhabitants of this place taken within a mile of the towne and murde[re]d'.[73] In this instance, however, the source of the information was discovered based on evidence given by the sister of one of the murdered inhabitants of the town, who had been captured by rapparees along with her brother, but had been allowed to go free because she was female. She identified one Florence Flynn as being the person who had sent them out of the town on the false errand that had led to their capture. Flynn and three other Catholic men from the town were subsequently arrested as spies and were accused of luring other men to their death at the hands of the rapparees.

An incident on the outskirts of Dublin demonstrated the threat posed by

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[70] Ginkel to Lt. General Douglas, Dublin, 15 Nov. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 297).
[71] Ginkel to Clarke, Ballylanderry, 4 Jan. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 376a).
[72] Gustavus Hamilton, Birr, 8 Dec. 1690: (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 330).
[73] John Rider to General Kirke, Mountmellick, 15 Apr. 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 594).

rapparees to the authorities and the potential collaboration of local Catholics, as the bodies of eight Williamite soldiers were found buried together in their uniforms near Castleknock.[74] In this case, the local inhabitants were blamed for the murders, and while one of them confessed to digging the grave, the actual culprits or the potential extent of rapparee involvement in the incident remained unclear. Over 200 local Catholics were arrested and one of them was sentenced to be hanged each day until the culprit confessed.[75] In April 1691 this incident was being referred to in a Williamite proclamation that directly named several rapparees, led by a Catholic priest named Christopher Browne, that were wanted by the authorities.[76] It offered a reward of £50 for information leading to their capture, with the high value of this reward suggesting that a big incentive was needed in order to persuade the local population to cooperate with the Williamite authorities in this manner, although it is unclear whether this was because of connivance between local Catholics and the rapparees in their area, or was instead due to the potential repercussions that ordinary civilians could face at the hands of rapparees for cooperating with the Williamites. While the accounts of the incident seem to place the blame for the murders directly on the local people, it is more likely that a group of rapparees were in fact the culprits, although perhaps one that was raised from the local area. It is unclear whether the authorities knew this and had rounded up the 200 civilians in the hope of obtaining a confession, or they were simply trying to persuade some of them to give information concerning the rapparee group, but the latter appears much more likely. In this context, threatening to hang one of them a day seems quite extreme, although it is unclear how many were actually executed apart from the one person who confessed to having helped dig the grave.

This incident must have been viewed as such a barbaric encounter that it remained sufficiently raw among the locality's social memory by the 1740s, when it was recorded by the astrologer and antiquarian Isaac Butler during one of his surveys on behalf of the Physico-Historical Society.[77] Butler noted that the

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[74] Peter Goodwin to Col. Thomas Flower, Dublin, 21 Mar. 1691 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11474).
[75] Ibid.
[76] 'Reward for the apprehension of Fr. Christopher Browne and others for involvement in a murder at Mulhuddart', 15 Apr. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 50.
[77] Isaac Butler, 'A journey to Lough Derg', *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 22 (1892), pp 14–15.

soldiers in question had belonged to Colonel John Foulke's regiment, who were one of two regiments quartered on Dublin during the winter of 1690–91. They were said to have gone into Mulhuddart church 'for shelter, but were all of them murdered in cold blood before the morning [...] by some of the neighbouring inhabitants'.[78] He lists the name of one man who was executed for the crime and that of two others who managed to escape. Regardless of the specific date of the encounter, it is a good example of the type of incident that would have plagued the Williamite army throughout this winter period, with the fact that it took place within a few miles of the centre of Dublin likely ensuring that it was more widely reported than other incidents of this nature, particularly compared to areas closer to the frontier.[79]

While this incident received significant coverage at the time, complaints of supposed collaboration between Catholic civilians and rapparees were common, with the Williamite authorities responding by enacting a series of laws that placed restrictions on Catholic civilians living in their territory. They had began addressing this perceived threat in the immediate aftermath of the battle of the Boyne, by ordering them 'either to continue in, or return to their respective dwellings, and to give up their arms, and follow their several trades and callings'.[80] Once each army's winter quarters had been defined, these restrictions placed on Catholics in Williamite areas were expanded further, with four separate proclamations being issued at the end of September 1690. These restricted the freedom of movement of Catholic civilians by forbidding them to 'depart or travel out of the parish where they respectively inhabit or dwell, unless to the market town next to their dwelling', and forbade people living in their territory from sheltering or harbouring any 'of their majesties enemies or rebels' from Connacht or Munster.[81] In addition, they exiled the 'wives, childres and familys [sic]' of any person in arms among the Jacobite army, or indeed

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[78] Butler, 'A journey to Lough Derg', p. 15.

[79] Several different versions of this account appear to exist, although it seems that they all refer to the same incident. The Flower papers' version suggests that the attack happened at Castleknock in March 1691, while the proclamation in April specifies the church at nearby Mulhuddart. Butler's version of events dates the encounter to September 1690, although the fifty-year gap from the event itself until Butler's visit could easily excuse this discrepancy.

[80] 'Reaffirming that Catholics surrender all arms', 31 July 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 15.

[81] 'Restricting the freedom of movement of Catholics', 18 Sep. 1690; 'Proscribing the shelter of rebels in Connaught and Munster', 26 Sep. 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, nos 22 & 24.

killed in Jacobite service, to the west of the river Shannon, or otherwise out of the area of Williamite control.[82] They even set up an exclusion zone from 14 October, forbidding any Catholic from remaining in their home if it was 'within ten miles of any of their majesties frontier garrisons, nor within ten miles of the river Shannon'.[83] These latter two provisions, in particular, would have forced countless Catholic families from their homes across Leinster and Ulster, but particularly in the frontier areas.

A fifth proclamation issued at the same time noted how people bought 'from suspitious persons in private places such stolen and plundered goods, cattle and horses', and attempted to outlaw this trade in stolen goods, which was seemingly prevalent across Williamite territory.[84] This suggests that rapparees were easily able to find buyers for their stolen property, even among supposedly 'loyal subjects', for whom the faith of the thieves, victims, or buyers was likely not an issue, once there was a chance to profit from the war. In November, the reputed connection between local Catholics and rapparees was brought to a new level, as Catholics were said to 'transgress all their laws, and destroy their good Protestant subjects, and such of them as are not actually rapparees, robbers or tories, do excite and encourage others to be so, and connive at, and countenance their proceedings'.[85] This link was confirmed by the Williamite authorities by ordering 'the Papists in each county [to] repair the losses which the Protestants shall suffer from any of their companions', thereby making them liable for any rapparee activity within their area, while all Catholics from any county where rapparees were active were also to be expelled from their homes. It is unclear how well enforced this proclamation actually was, as while creating a *cordon sanitaire* along the frontier was good military practice, enforcing evictions of this scale would have been very difficult, and it is likely that it was used more as a threat than anything else.

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[82] 'Ordering sheriffs and justices of the peace to search for family members of those killed in rebellion who continue to succour the king's enemies', 26 Sep. 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 25.
[83] 'Limiting the locations where Catholics can reside on the military frontier', 26 Sep. 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 26.
[84] 'Preventing the sale of stolen goods and the apprehension of those who possess them', 30 Sep. 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 27.
[85] 'Measures to penalise Catholics arising from rapparee activity', 19 Nov. 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 31.

This array of proclamations undoubtedly caused severe disruption and upheaval for ordinary Catholics, particularly those living in frontier areas. In addition, ordinary Catholics were often doubly affected by rapparee activity in their area, with even Protestant landowners wondering 'how it is possible for poore farmers or cottiers to avoyde ruin'?[86] Nicholas Plunkett, the contemporary historian and county Dublin landowner, described the catch-22 scenario facing the majority of ordinary Catholics in areas where rapparees operated, as follows:

> There is an enemy in the Kingdom, and as many freebooters besides as in any nation of the world, and yet if any of those enemies or freebooters doo a mischief to any of the English army, the poore unarmed parrisshioners must goe to the pott. If those writched cretures oppose the rapperies, or discover them, or give an allarm of theire being amongst them, then they are knockt in the head by these rapperies, theire houses burnt and theire families within them, and if they doo not then are they rekoned as spies and enemies by the Protestants and accordingly prossicuted by the sword or the gallowes.[87]

Ordinary Catholics suffered extensively at the hands of both sides during the period, as outlined by Plunkett. The regular Williamite army and militia accused them of being spies and attacked them in response to rapparee raids, while in turn the rapparees frequently accused them of collaborating with Williamite forces and retaliated violently against them in due course. Any Catholics who openly sided with the Williamites were even worse off, with themselves and their families becoming *persona non grata* among anyone with Jacobite sympathies. In one case Morgan Ryan, who wrote to Clarke in May following his cooperation with the Williamite army, lamented how 'there is not a relation of mine this side Lymerick but is barbarously dealt with upon my account, several considerable sums offered for my head, and many ambushes laid for me'.[88]

Plunkett blamed a lack of proper enforcement of the Williamite protections given to Catholics for the increases in the number of rapparees, in the same manner as the protections issued by General Douglas during his advance to Mullingar in July 1690, were often proven to be worthless the very

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[86] Nicholas Plunkett to Col. Thomas Flower, *c.* May 1691 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472); see also: Patrick A. Walsh, 'Plunkett, Nicholas (*c.*1629–1718)' in *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge, 2009).
[87] Nicholas Plunkett to Col. Thomas Flower, *c.* May 1691 (Flower papers, NLI Ms 11472).
[88] Morgan Ryane to Clarke, Cashel, 12 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 654).

next day. While more stringent enforcement of these protections would have in no way completely removed the threat posed by the rapparees, it would undoubtedly have had a beneficial impact. Despite this, further attempts were made by the Williamite authorities to try and appeal to the Catholics living in their territory, such as Ginkel's declaration on 4 February which proclaimed that William and Mary had 'no design to oppress their Roman-Catholic subjects of this Kingdom, either by persecuting them for their Religion, ruining them in their Estates and Fortunes, or enslaving them in their Liberty'.[89] This was a deliberate departure from the earlier Finglas Declaration and was designed to try and gain support among the wealthier Catholics. Of course declarations such as these clearly had little influence on rapparees themselves, whose activities would not cease unless the environment that enabled them to operate also changed, something which would not begin to happen until the commencement of the military campaign the following summer.

By April 1691, when the regular Williamite army was beginning to prepare for the forthcoming campaign, much of the responsibility for protecting civilians and property in Williamite areas fell primarily to local militia forces. The militia was a geographically defined fighting force that was recruited from the one area, such as a county. It included well-off members of the community or local gentry as officers and usually raised the majority of the money necessary to run it from people from the same area. It had been in operation in many areas throughout the winter months, actively seeking to engage rapparee groups or being posted to defend towns, passes or other strategically important locations as outlined above, but in most instances on quite a small scale. Rapparee hunting was one of the tasks often given to local militia forces during the period, as their knowledge of the local area was useful for this task, while their severe animosity towards rapparees—given that in many cases their families and neighbours were among those being attacked—ensured a steady stream of volunteers for orders of this nature, rather than being posted as sentries to defend passes or towns. Indeed, the militia's punitive attitude towards the rapparees is further evidence of the local people's fear and disgust towards them, such as on 28 February at Mountrath in Queen's County, where members of the militia

[89] *Dublin Intelligence*, 10 Feb. 1691 (NLI, reel 59).

captured a party of rapparees. All of the prisoners were hanged, in a demonstration of how the militia were 'usually more severe upon those sorts of people than the army was'.[90]

Story noted that the militia totalled 12,000 men in January 1691, although this was more likely a nominal strength rather than an actual useable force. Throughout the period there were tensions between local militia groups and members of the regular army posted to the same area, usually caused by indiscipline among under-trained men or by bad decision making among the local gentry who were leading the militia, frequently for their own self-interest. In November, Major William Culliford complained about the small militia force raised by Sir David Colyeare at Enniskean, a small town on the river Bandon in west Cork. Colyeare recruited approximately one hundred local men and mounted them on geldings, 'which he has taken most of them from the plough, and these men rydeing up and downe the country, will leave no forridge to subsist Colonel Colys Regiment and my detachment'.[91] Not only was Colyeare commandeering horses that would have otherwise been used for agricultural purposes, but by overgrazing them in the local area his men were ruining whatever forage was available for regular army units, something that would become very scarce during the winter months. He was also gathering 'about him all the corne in the country soe that all the forridge will be distroyed in a little whyle', with the 'notion of keeping old Ruined Castles'.[92]

Culliford's concern at the lack of long-term thinking by Colyeare in his haste to raise a militia force was evident elsewhere, but other problems relating to a largely under-trained militia were also of concern to other Williamite commanders. As outlined above the militia were often quite brutal in their dealings with rapparees, but there is evidence of them also mistreating the ordinary people of their areas as well. Another Williamite officer, George Hamilton, writing from Bandon in county Cork, requested that the militia in the area be:

> ...absolutlie taken away, to prevent the roberies and violencies dayly committed by them, for under pretence of distraineing for their bygone rents, they drive

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[90] Story, *A continuation*, p. 58.
[91] Major William Culliford to Clarke, Enniskean, 22 Nov. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 303).
[92] Ibid.

away every thing they have, so that the poor people are forced to run away for mere necessitie.[93]

In cases such as this the militia failed to abide by protections given by the Williamite authorities and simply used their newfound martial power for their own economic gain. However, towards the end of spring when the regular Williamite army was beginning to prepare for the coming campaign, the local militia forces were expected to take over as the primary line of defence of their respective areas. This resulted in an increased urgency among the local landowners to improve both the size and quality of the militia in their areas, especially in areas vulnerable to rapparee attacks, such as King's County and Longford, as outlined above.

In some parts of the country the militia appeared to be quite well-organised and well-equipped. In November 1690, the 2,500 militiamen from Dublin that paraded through the streets were described as having good arms and uniforms, while in county Cork Richard Cox announced that he had managed to raise three regiments of horse and two of foot across the county by the spring of 1691.[94] Other areas were slower at raising adequate numbers of men or had difficulty in adequately equipping them. At the end of April a group of landowners and influential persons from King's County lodged a petition with the Lords Justices, outlining the 'deplorable condition' the county was in and the severe threat posed by rapparees in the area.[95] They described how only the towns of Birr and Philipstown, the village of Edenderry and a handful of 'gentlemen's houses' remained in Williamite hands, with the rest of the county 'thus falling under the power of the enemie, they burnt and laid it waste'.[96] Their argument to the Lords Justices was that this devastation had caused the majority of the county's 'Protestant inhabitants to abandon their houses, and betake themselves to other places of abode', resulting in King's County being

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[93] George Hamilton to Clarke, Enniskean, 23 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 484).
[94] Kenneth P. Ferguson, 'The army in Ireland from the Restoration to the Act of Union' (PhD thesis, TCD, 1981), p. 45.
[95] Petition to the Lords Justices by the Justices of the Peace and other gentlemen of King's County, including Duke Gifford, Fred Vaughan, John Baldwin, William Nellson, et al., *c.* 24 Apr. 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 612).
[96] Ibid.

'incapacitated...from raising, or subsisting, a militia'.[97] As a result they were appealing for continued assistance from the regular army to not only protect the remainder of the county but 'to garrison those passes wee have in our hands', claiming that 'the securitie of other countyes very much depending upon them, they being inletts into the countyes of Kildare and Dublin'.[98] This concurs with the depiction of King's County as being ravaged by rapparee attacks through its proximity to the Jacobite-controlled river Shannon and by the problems posed by the Bog of Allen, as discussed above.

A similar petition was made by members of the gentry from Queen's County, who supplied the Lords Justices with a list of towns, houses and castles that they felt needed to be garrisoned across the county, complete with the numbers of men required to secure each place, totalling 1,130 infantry, cavalry and dragoons.[99] Of this figure, they claimed to be able to call upon only 450 'dependable' militiamen, requiring the remainder to be supplied from the regular army. They also outlined what funds they felt would be needed to pay the men, broken down by rank, which totalled a cost of £124/-4 per week. To pay for this they proposed placing an additional tax on the people of the county, which was based on social rank and ability to pay. Under their proposals an earl was asked to pay three pounds and a lord two pounds, down to a yeoman who was asked to contribute two shillings and six pence, and labourers or servants each asked for one shilling.[100] The Lords Justices seemingly baulked at their request to support the shortfall in both troops and wages, sending the group of gentlemen the corresponding proposal from their counterparts in Meath for protecting and funding the militia of that county, to demonstrate that they viewed their request as excessive in comparison.[101] While it is unclear if they were eventually successful in their appeal, they argued the point that 'the circumstances of the county of Meath and this county exceedingly differ', citing the fact that Queen's

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[97] Petition to the Lords Justices by the Justices of the Peace and other gentlemen of King's County... *c.* 24 Apr. 1691 (Clarke war corr., vol. vi, no. 612).
[98] Ibid.
[99] Proposals humbly offered to the Lords Justices by severall of the Gents of Queen's County for the guarding of the County against their Majesties enemyes dureing the time their Majesties Army shall bee in the field. c. 24 Apr. 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 613).
[100] Ibid.
[101] Gentlemen of Queen's County to Clarke, Maryborough, 5 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 636).

County was closer to the Jacobite frontier and that this necessitated a militia twice the strength of that proposed for Meath.[102] It also meant that the 'wastes and poverty' caused to Queen's County by the rapparees were much more severe than any damage inflicted on Meath, resulting in the inhabitants of the former county being less able to support the militia than those in the latter. This further demonstrates the difference in the impact of the rapparee and military activities during the winter and spring of 1690–91, as well as the burden of billeting additional troops, between counties along the frontier and those further to the east, as discussed above.

The prospect of the movement of the regular army away from the frontier areas acted as a spur for action for people within these communities. It also changed the attitude of many people in these areas towards the Williamite forces who had been imposed upon them throughout the winter and spring, aided by the improvement in the supply of food to the troops. Rather than complaining about their conduct and having to support them, the people in these areas became fearful at the prospect of them moving away and leaving themselves open to attack by the ever-present rapparees. In Longford, a local landowner named Charles Fox appealed to Clarke in May, requesting that 'the militia of some other county sent hither, and well subsisted, or part of the army left to defend the county, [otherwise] it will be overrun with the enemy'.[103] This represents a substantial change from the letters written to the Williamite army authorities when regions were initially being chosen to quarter part of the army, following their withdrawal from Limerick the previous September. Fox was still stressing the inability of the county to support these troops, either financially or otherwise, saying that 'there can be no money raised, the greater part of this county being waste, and what inhabitants are in it, are so poor that they have not a weeks provision of bread'.[104] He had also received a copy of the proposals relating to Meath from the Lords Justices, and he again reiterated the differences between the situations of Meath and his own county, arguing that it was

[102] Gentlemen of Queen's County to Clarke, Maryborough, 5 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 636).
[103] Charles Fox to Clarke, Foxhall, co. Longford, 9 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 648).
[104] Ibid.

necessary that a 'speedy course may be taken for the preservation of this county, before the army marches, or it will be lost'.[105]

It is also clear that self-interest on behalf of these landowners may also have played a part in their lobbying on these issues. While getting additional military protection for their counties at as little a cost as possible would have had obvious advantages in itself, they seemed to take care to ensure that their own property and homes were explicitly included in the places to be garrisoned and were well protected. When asked by the Lords Justices for a list of 'the properest places for garrisons in this county of Longford', Fox consulted with the local militia officers to suggest seven locations, namely Castleforbes, Longford, Canglas, Lisard, Killinlassreah [Kilashee], Foxhall and Tinehicke.[106] Of these he selected his own home, Foxhall, as the best location for a magazine, arguing that it was 'much in the center and the properest place for it and the stores'.[107] In this instance Fox was being somewhat economical with the truth as Foxhall was situated in the extreme southeast of the county and not in a very central position relative to the other locations mentioned, nor was it on a direct route to Mullingar or other Williamite positions from where it was likely that supplies would come. Similarly, getting assistance to fund the local militia would not only reduce the financial burden on themselves but also on their tenants, with the landowners possibly hoping that limiting the amount of money their tenants had to pay to support the militia would result in them having more money to contribute to pay their rents.

Overall, the main incentive for people in these areas for supporting the militia and campaigning for the deployment of additional regular troops was the fear of rapparee attacks during the period of uncertainty that was expected during the first few weeks of the forthcoming military campaign. A warning from the Lords Justices in May summed this up, threatening that once the army commenced its march, 'if anythinge happens amisse to your country it will lye at your owne doores'.[108] In spite of warnings such as this and the great efforts that

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[105] Charles Fox to Clarke, Foxhall, co. Longford, 9 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vi, no. 648).
[106] Charles Fox to Clarke, Foxhall, co. Longford, 18 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vii, no. 671).
[107] Ibid.
[108] Secretary Davis to the Sheriffs of several counties, Dublin Castle, 23 May 1691 (Clarke war corr., vii, no. 686).

had been undertaken in order to try and prepare and supply the militia, by the beginning of the campaign in June many of them were still under-paid, under-supplied and in a generally poor condition, leading the High Sheriff of Westmeath, George Peyton, to ask 'who would not rather be a carter, waggoner, conducter, cutler, soldier, or anything, rather than a militia man, in this wasted country'.[109] During the Williamite advance on Athlone some of the Westmeath militia were observed running 'after the army to get plunder', suggesting that many of these problems, as well as previous issues concerning the militia such as their discipline and conduct, remained unresolved.[110] The start of the campaign also saw a repeat of instances of plundering by the standing army, which was said to 'strip the people night and day...[as] the king does not pay subsistence'.[111] These were not recorded in anywhere near as frequent numbers as abuses by soldiers during the winter period had been, suggesting that the Williamite desire to finally end the war saw stricter discipline of their troops and better supply chains put in place to dissuade the need for the army to live off the people. The fact they were operating largely in areas that had been under Jacobite control is another possible reason for this however, as the long winter spent living behind a dangerous frontier and being raided by rapparees may have engendered feelings among the soldiers that anyone living to the west of the Shannon was hostile to the Williamite cause, therefore reducing their need to treat them respectfully.

Conclusion

With the end of the war in the autumn of 1691, rapparee attacks began to diminish as well, with many former rapparees choosing to take up the terms of the treaty of Limerick and leave Ireland that winter.[112] Many more took up the opportunity presented by offers of pardon from the Williamite government,

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[109] George Peyton to Ginkel, Mullingar, 14 June 1691 (Clarke war corr., vii, no. 747a).
[110] An extract of part of Colonel Stanley's letter of the 24th of June 1691 (Clarke war corr., vii, no. 784).
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite cause*, p. 76.

presented in two proclamations in September and October 1691.[113] These offered any 'idle and dissolute persons [who] have of late deserted their habitations and become tories, thieves and rapparees, committing most outrageous robberies, burglaries and thefts, and may therefore justly look on their estate as desperate', a full pardon if they took the oath of allegiance to William and Mary by 5 November.[114] However, despite these opportunities, there were still a significant number of men who had profited from their activities as rapparees during the war, and whose land or property could have been so badly damaged during the war so as to make it more economically viable for them not to return to it, even in light of this offer of pardon. Similarly, the more severe crimes of the rapparees, such as murder, do not seem to have been pardoned by these proclamations, meaning that the most desperate and violent of the rapparees from the war period had little option but to remain outside the law. The idea that 'many rapparees availed of the terms of the Treaty of Limerick provided ultimate proof of their close links with the Jacobite war effort' is also difficult to believe, and it is more likely that rapparees who chose to avail of the Treaty and join Irish Jacobite forces on the continent again did so for financial or other reasons, rather than blind loyalty to the Jacobite cause.[115]

The rapparees that chose to remain in Ireland and refused to comply with these Williamite laws remained a threat across the country. In Ulster, Bishop William King, who on the one hand had complained bitterly about the billeting of soldiers on members of the clergy in the barony of Inishowen, agreed with Robert Southwell in bemoaning the reduction in the militia numbers in the face of rapparee activity.[116] Southwell wrote to King in December 1691, informing him of 3000 men who had gone to serve William in France, who would be missed in combating the rapparees, describing them as a 'great loss and detriment to Ireland'.[117] As late as 1696 rapparees were still causing problems in areas of Monaghan, Cavan and Fermanagh. John Smith informed Dacre Barrett how

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[113] 'Offer of a pardon to tories and rapparees that take the oath of fidelity within one month', 18 Sep. 1691; 'Reiterating the pardon previously offered tories and rapparees who submit within a month', 14 Oct. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, nos 71 & 74.
[114] 'Reiterating the pardon previously offered tories and rapparees who submit within a month', 14 Oct. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 74.
[115] Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite Cause*, p. 76.
[116] Francis Hamilton to William King, 7 Jan. 1692 (TCD, King papers, Ms 1995-2008), no. 199.
[117] Robert Southwell to William King, 15 Dec. 1691 (TCD, King papers, Ms 1995-2008), no. 194.

'beyond Cavan the Irish drive away people's cattle as they did in the late war. Madam Napper had 60 sheep taken from her the other night. A gentleman her neighbour had 40 bullocks and several others have lost considerably'.[118] In post-war Ireland, day-to-day law enforcement was primarily in civilian hands through the justices of the peace and the militia, but the soldiers garrisoned around the province provided a deterrent and were used to combat rapparees in certain circumstances.[119] Indeed, rapparee groups of varying sizes remained active across the country for the remainder of the decade.[120]

The activities of rapparees were widely reported throughout the war and commented on by authors in its aftermath. The atrocities attributed to them were often exaggerated, particularly in the months immediately before the outbreak of the war when Protestants were coming to terms with James's replacement on the throne by William and Mary. The period when rapparee groups were in fact at their most active was the winter of 1690–91, when the poor strategic situation that the Jacobites found themselves in led to some rapparee groups being officially tolerated, and permitted to cross the Shannon in order to raid into Williamite territory. The counties along the river's eastern bank saw the worst of these activities, and correspondingly the most encounters between Williamite forces and rapparee groups. Among the biggest impacts the rapparees had on civilians across the country were actually the consequences of the Williamite response to their activities. Proclamations designed to curb their attacks left Catholics living in certain parts of the country little option but to leave their homes, while Catholics elsewhere were subject to other restrictions, such as not being able to freely associate. Catholics that actually cooperated with the Williamite authorities were in danger of reprisals by rapparee forces, which tended to leave many of them in a precarious situation. The actions of the local Williamite militia in combating their activities were quite heavy handed, and they were accused of using their power against civilians for their own personal gain. However, the threat of attack induced the local gentry from counties across the country, and particularly in the midlands, into getting involved in the formation of local militia groups. This in turn assisted the Williamite military

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[118] John Smith to Dacre Barrett, 26 Nov. 1696 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 104.
[119] McBride, *Eighteenth century Ireland*, p. 330.
[120] Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite cause*, pp 89–95.

cause and took some of the pressure off the regular Williamite army regarding protecting the countryside during the summer campaign of 1691.

The status of rapparees as opportunistic bandits or Jacobite partisans remains disputed. Eric Hobsbawm's broad analysis of 'social' banditry distinguished it from common brigandage or mere criminality. Under the latter, 'underworld robbers and raiders regard the peasants as their prey and know them to be hostile; the robbed in turn regard the attackers as criminals in their sense of the term and not merely by official law'.[121] In certain instances, Catholics who had enjoyed or hoped to profit from the potential benefits that could accrue under a king of their own faith, would have approved of many of the rapparees' anti-Williamite activities. Many of the rapparee incursions into Williamite territory, or actions against their military forces, were advantageous to the Jacobite cause in that they acted as a significant distraction and hindrance to Williamite activities and their supply train. However, the motivation behind the majority of these incidents was far more likely the possibility of plunder or an attempt to profit from the opportunities presented by war, rather than loyalty to King James. Early-modern theatres of war were frequently beset by widespread disorder and social unrest, as a variety of groups took advantage of the breakdown in law and order for their own personal gain. These were especially prevalent in the traditional breeding grounds of thieves, smugglers and brigands, such as areas of no-man's-land between countries or competing military forces, or in regions of inhospitable terrain.[122] Therefore, with the activites of the rapparees, the Williamite war exhibits a further parallel with other conflicts across continental Europe throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century.

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[121] Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, p. 20.
[122] Ibid., pp 16–17, 24–27; Broers, *Napoleon's other war*, pp 53–56, 183–98.

Chapter 5 — Supplies and shortages

Introduction

Of all the factors that influenced the behaviour of military forces during the early-modern period, regardless of their nationality, religion, leadership or codes of discipline, one of the most important was how well the soldiers were fed and supplied. The armies involved in prosecuting the Williamite war were the largest ever assembled in Ireland. During the war, estimates suggest that the total Jacobite army varied in size between *c.* 36,000 men in 1689 and *c.* 30,500 in 1691, with an even larger figure suggested for 1690 when Lauzun's French contingent were included.[1] Of course, even during the main campaigns these men were not all in the field at once, with a significant minority of them posted to garrison duties around the country. William managed to bring a force of around 36,000 men to bear against James at the Boyne, in addition to smaller numbers of local forces left to guard the Ulster frontier. By the campaign the following summer, General Ginkel was fit to command around 20,000 Williamite troops at the battle of Aughrim, again in addition to the soldiers and local militia that had been left to guard the countryside against rapparees and Jacobite raids elsewhere. The combined size of these armies would have been similar to the entire population of Dublin at the time, and simply supplying food for this amount of people was a significant task, while the burden of doing so had various adverse consequences for the civilian population.

Food was not the only resource that the armies were reliant on local civilians for across Ireland. Horses were widely needed, not only for cavalry or dragoons, but simply to transport goods, ammunition or siege equipment. The high amounts of forage required by the horses within both armies was also a significant issue, and one which impacted not only on relations with civilians, but also directly affected the grazing of livestock and the national food supply. The burden of providing all these goods and supplies to two very large armies, particularly given the other distractions and interruptions to the usual peacetime

[1] Diarmuid and Harman Murtagh, 'The Irish Jacobite army, 1689–91', in *The Irish Sword*, xviii (1992) p. 33.

economy, such as damage to land, livestock and crops; problems bringing goods to market; difficulties in getting enough labour to help with the harvest; as well as the generally unsafe environment; all became heightened as the war continued. By the final period of the war, the Jacobite authorities were having particular problems obtaining sufficient supplies for their army, with resulting strains on the food supply for civilians living in their territory as well. Being essentially confined to the west of the Shannon, the large Jacobite army, as well as the large numbers of refugees that had arrived from elsewhere in the country, meant that this final period of the war was particularly difficult for those soldiers and civilians living in Jacobite territory.

Food and provisions

The main source of food for soldiers across Europe at the time was a daily ration of bread or hard biscuit. This formed the basis for their diet, and both the Jacobite and Williamite armies employed civilian contractors to manufacture and supply this bread or biscuit to the troops across the country, with the Williamite contract stipulating that their Dutch suppliers were obligated to provide 36,000 loaves of bread for the army each day.[2] This system worked reasonably well, but the sheer scale of the operation and the poor state of the Irish roads and general transport network, particularly when compared with other more urbanised theatres of war across the continent, meant that difficulties and delays were common.[3] While at Birr, King's County, in September 1690, George Story remarked that 'by making the scarcity of bread a pretence, they [the Williamite soldiers] begun to strip and rob most of the Irish that had got protections'.[4] However, he had become quite positive about the supply situation by January 1691, noting that 'for though we have not had our accounts stated for some time, yet we have still received money upon account, and the soldiers have constantly

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[2] Childs, *Williamite wars*, pp 18–21; for more on civilian contractors to European military powers, see David Parrott, 'From military enterprise to standing armies: war, state and society in western Europe, 1600–1700' in Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (eds), *European warfare: 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 2010), pp 74–95.

[3] While the Williamite army was preparing to besiege Limerick for the second time in July 1691, Story noted how 'six hundred wagons being then ordered to bring up bread and other provisions from the stores', thereby demonstrating the massive scale of the operation needed to keep an army on the march; see Story, *A continuation*, pp 148–9.

[4] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 138.

been supplied with bread and other provisions'.[5] Similarly, Colonel John Foulkes, whose regiment was one of two quartered in Dublin during the winter of 1690–91, noted in February 1691 how they 'have not received bread for the Regiment since our arrival in this place, neither have we subsistence or credit for the soldiers'.[6] Despite these inconsistencies, the Williamite supplier of bread had been significantly more successful than the Jacobite one, who had lost a substantial amount of money by the end of his contract in December 1689, resulting in the provision of bread to the Jacobite army in this manner being impossible for the remainder of the war. Apart from these supplies of bread, military equipment and other war *matériel* were shipped in from England and France for both sides, although Jacobite shipments tended to be quite infrequent. Clearly bread alone was an inadequate diet, and for all other foodstuffs both sides were heavily reliant on the local population.

The behaviour of soldiers on both sides, and their interactions with civilians, had a corresponding effect on the supply of provisions in this manner. Threatening behaviour by troops was occasionally rewarded, such as the general disorderly conduct among the Williamite troops upon their retreat from the first siege of Limerick in October 1690, when 'it was proposed by several Justices of the Peace, and Deputy Lieutenants in the Country, that if the soldiers would be quiet, and not take things at their own hands, the country should find them with meat and drink, with whatever else they could reasonable think on'.[7] As with any form of plundering, threats of violence usually ensured that civilians quickly handed over whatever food or supplies sought by the soldiers on an individual level. Overall, however, abuses committed by soldiers hampered the production of food across the country. The Williamite Lords Justices were extremely concerned at how:

> ...several officers and soldiers of their majesties army [...] have robbed, and daily do rob and plunder many of their majesties good and lawful subjects of their cattle, corn, and other goods; have destroyed improvements, cut down trees, and have exacted and levied money from some, and from others have taken oxen and horses out of ploughs, whereby much land lies waste and untilled. The kingdom

[5] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 162.
[6] John Foulke to Clarke, Dublin, 9 Feb. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 449).
[7] Story, *Impartial history*, pp 139–40.

> in general is much impoverished, trade much decayed, property invaded, the king's revenue extreamly impaired, and a famine is likely to ensue, unless some present stop be put thereunto.[8]

The theft of beef or dairy cattle, as well as draught animals such as oxen and horses, severely hampered the production of food, while the destruction of crops or grazing land, or the theft of the seed corn needed to sow crops for the following year, had similar adverse consequences.

One of the primary reasons behind the issuing of many of these proclamations concerning the discipline of troops was not to prevent abuses against civilians simply for the sake of it, but rather to protect the army's access to resources. In a proclamation issued on 9 October 1690, the Williamite commander General Ginkel noted his regret at the 'disorders and robberies committed in divers parts of this Kingdome by several soldiers of the army, which tend to the ruine of that part of the country which is under their Majesty's obedience, and depriving the forces of what is necessary for their subsistence'.[9] The latter part of this clause was of course the primary aim of the proclamation, and the importance of supply to the army was shown in the overall numbers of proclamations issued by both sides relating to supply. Of the 72 Williamite proclamations issued, 19 primarily concerned the supply of the army or preventing abuses by soldiers from hampering the army's supply chain, while the Jacobite authorities issued a total of 16 relating to supply or forage out of a total of 63. For both sides, these numbers of proclamations relating to supply represented the largest single category issued throughout the entire war, indicating the importance of the supply of the army relative to other issues.

The indiscipline of soldiers not only negatively impacted on the civilian producers of food. The sutlers who attached themselves to the army—who acted as travelling traders and profited from supplying provisions such as food, clothing, tobacco, unlicensed alcohol and other items to the troops—were usually one of the easiest targets for ill-affected soldiers, through a combination of their constant presence at the rear of the army, as well as ill-feeling over their

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[8] 'Ordering soldiers not to engage in theft and robbery', 6 Feb. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations issued during the reigns of William and Mary and William III* (forthcoming, 2013), no. 42.

[9] Proclamation by Ginkel, Kilkenny, 9 Oct. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 224).

propensity to try and gouge high prices for their wares in what was frequently an uncompetitive marketplace.[10] This indeed proved to be the case in Ireland, as while the Williamite army assembled in June 1690, prior to their advance southwards from Ulster towards the Boyne, a proclamation was passed 'commanding all persons, upon pain of death, not to steal or take away, from any sutler or person whatsoever, any horses, cows, sheep, meat, drink, or other sort of thing or provision that may be of service to our said army'.[11] The same problem arose the following year as the army began to be recalled from their winter quarters in April 1691, when the men were specifically ordered 'not to molest or disturb any sutler or other person, [...] to take care that the officers and soldiers do pay for all such things as the said sutlers and persons shall furnish them with, [...nor to] use any violence against them'.[12] The provisions provided by the sutlers were vital to the army and also allowed the soldiers to sell on any property they managed to 'acquire', with few questions asked, again indicating the unofficially ambiguous stance taken on plundering by authorities on both sides.[13]

While attempting to safeguard the production of food by civilian farmers was important, securing sufficient quantities of these goods were supplied to the army was just as vital. This tended to come in two forms, either by civilians directly feeding the troops that were quartered with them, or else by their bringing supplies to central markets, where they would be purchased by members of the army commissariat before being redistributed among the soldiers. The burden of billeting troops was clearly a heavy one. Even if they remained in good order, did not steal, or damage person or property, the cost to the householder of having to feed several soldiers for periods of up to six months would have been substantial, as noted above. Ostensibly, soldiers billeted with civilians were supposed to pay their hosts in full for the supplies they or their horses consumed, although this rarely happened. Usually officers tended to contribute some money for what they personally had consumed, although most

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[10] Lynn, *Women, armies and warfare*, p. 135; Tallett, *War and society*, p. 115.
[11] 'Instruction to the army not to commit violence or to steal', 24 June 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 9.
[12] 'For the encouragement and protection of sutlers to the army', 27 Apr. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 52.
[13] Lynn, *Women, armies and warfare*, pp 142–43.

appeared reticent about forcing their subordinates to do likewise. Occasionally paper tickets were issued by the troops that supposedly entitled the householders to reimbursement from the army at a later date, although getting these honoured after the war was difficult and, in the case of the Jacobite army, almost impossible.

The significant monetary, and indeed personal burden of having to quarter troops, tended to have a disproportionate impact on civilians in certain areas. Regions that formed the frontiers between the two armies during the winter seasons were usually the worst affected.[14] These areas had to be defended by troops from both sides and this involved soldiers being quartered on the same people for long periods, such as the French soldiers who lived among the Quakers at Ballyhagen for six months between winter 1689 and spring 1690. Once again, however, the winter of 1690–91 saw the focus of the war shift to the midlands, with a corresponding impact on civilians in the area. This increased burden was at least acknowledged by the Williamite authorities, if perhaps not fully addressed. In October 1690, shortly after the initial allocations of quarters had been made for the winter period, Lord Justice Thomas Coningsby responded to a query by the people of Tipperary, a county that had a very large proportion of the army quartered in frontier towns such as Roscrea, Thurles, Cashel, Cahir and Clonmel. He acknowledged that 'the inhabitants of such places are over-burdened with the quartering of soldiers, whilst other parts of the same county and other countys [sic] more removed from the said frontline towns and places, have no soldiers quartered on them'.[15] To compensate for this, a public charge was to be levied on people in the remainder of Williamite-controlled territory, so that 'each person that quarters a soldier may receive the said five pence per week for affording him the aforesaid conveniences', which were said to include food, candles, salt and vinegar.[16] Whether these proposals were fully enacted or not is unclear, but the difficulties the troops had in obtaining sufficient food supplies throughout the winter, combined with reports of how 'the poor people are not able to subsist them longer', meant that the likelihood

[14] Tallett, *War and society*, p. 150.
[15] Lord Justice Coningsby to the Sheriff of county Tipperary, Clancarty House, Dublin, 2 Oct. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 213).
[16] Ibid.

that such a charge was levied, and then distributed successfully, is highly unlikely.[17]

The main method of addressing this inequality consisted of purchasing food and other goods from civilians at designated markets across the country, and redistributing this food among the army. Markets for this purpose were set up at towns such as Cashel, where 'all persons of the county of Tipperary within twelve miles of the said city' were obliged to 'bring in such corne as they have by them to the market aforesaid, where they shall receive for all that shall be bought up for their Majesty's use, the summe of fifteen shillings a barrell to be pay'd upon the delivery thereof'.[18] In addition to this corn, the people of Tipperary were asked to provide a total of 700 barrels of coal, 424lbs of candles and 45 barrels of salt for the stores in the town, with similar amounts requested from Clonmel, Fethard and Thurles.[19] Failure to comply with these regulations, or to accept these set prices for commodities, would result in the objectors being 'proceeded against as enemies to the same, not only by imprisoning their persons, but confiscating to their Majesty's use all such corne as shall be found to be in their possession as aforesaid'.[20] As both a positive incentive to comply with these regulations, and to encourage better discipline within the army's ranks, anyone that complied was to be specifically protected from looting or theft by Williamite soldiers, with any proven breaches of this supposedly entitling 'the party wronged [to] receive three times the price of the same from the officer commanding the troop or company to which the said soldier belongs'.[21] Of course in many cases these regulations were not complied with, as reports emerged of some officers who, 'for their own gains sake, ordered the country-people to bring in most of their corn to such and such places, and secured it for their own private use, allowing the soldiers in the mean time to do what they would'.[22] Regardless of whether the official regulations were followed or not, the proportion of troops stationed in the frontier regions placed a higher burden on

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[17] Daniel Butts to William Robinson, Wexford, 27 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 490a).
[18] Proclamation by George Clarke, Cashel, 17 Sep. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 180).
[19] Ginkel to Samuel Blount (High Sheriff of Tipperary), Cashel, 24 Sep. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 196).
[20] Proclamation by George Clarke, Cashel, 17 Sep. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 180).
[21] Ibid.
[22] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 140.

the local populations of these areas than elsewhere. Following the destruction caused by the summer's campaign and the Jacobite retreat, this stretched the available resources in the midlands and other frontier areas even further, to the clear detriment of its inhabitants.

This policy of persuading civilians to bring goods to official markets was also used extensively by the Jacobite authorities throughout the war. Their less organised system of central supply, and the problems they had in providing basics such as bread or biscuit for their soldiers, meant that they relied heavily on purchasing supplies from local people across the country. From April 1689 the Jacobite authorities had been passing proclamations 'for the better encouragement of the country to bring provisions for the support of our said army', by assuring those 'persons who shall bring in any provisions to our said army shall be protected in their persons and goods, and shall be paid in ready money and reasonable rates for their said provisions'.[23] The promise that civilian producers who brought their goods to these markets 'shall be paid for the same' features in several other proclamations of this nature, and suggests that the seizure of goods without payment had been so commonplace that civilians had been thereby dissuaded from complying with these orders.[24] Similarly, the fact that civilians bringing provisions to official markets in this manner had to be explicitly protected from plunder by the army, again points to significant indiscipline within the ranks. The procurement of other goods, such as wine and brandy, was also explicitly encouraged. That these two commodities specifically were to be 'exempted from the payment of any duty, custom, excise, or licence-money', indicates that there were severe shortages of goods of this nature, a situation that would certainly not have been appreciated by the army's officer corps, or indeed by the Jacobite court at Dublin.[25]

Another major resource that both sides were heavily reliant on civilians for was their horses. An early-modern army was reliant on horses not only for its mounted troops, but also for transporting food, supplies, siege equipment and other goods. This large demand for horses meant that civilians had a difficult time trying to hold on to their animals, as both the Jacobite and Williamite

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[23] 'Provisions for troops in Ulster', 1 Apr. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 399.
[24] 'Supplies for the camp', 14 Sep. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 413.
[25] Ibid.

armies constantly required additional numbers. The frequency with which soldiers from both sides plundered horses is an indication of their value to the army, but of course they were also essential for farming and other civilian tasks. Proclamations from both sides discouraged the unauthorised pressing of horses, particularly 'plough-horses or plough-oxen', in order to not hinder civilians in their attempts to continue to farm the land.[26] Jacobite soldiers had been sporadically pressing large numbers of horses into their service since the outbreak of the war. Official Jacobite policy in March 1689 gave their soldiers 'orders for seizing all the arms and serviceable horses in particular men's hands within the most parts of this kingdom'.[27] The 'particular' men in this instance were predominately Protestants, although it is likely that Catholics that were not directly participating in the war effort had horses seized under this directive as well. However, this order was not very efficiently executed, with soldiers inclined to use it as an excuse to generally press horses and other livestock from civilians across the country. It directly led to a large upsurge in the numbers of horses being pressed, with the majority of the total monetary losses claimed by Quakers in 1689 being due to the theft of horses, with other livestock occasionally seized as well.[28]

In March, Patrick Sarsfield sent a declaration concerning the seizures of horses to Colonel Henry Dillon, the deputy lieutenant of county Roscommon, suggesting that an effort to make these seizures more official was made at a local level. He was required to collect 'all the horses and arms that have beene seized upon by any officers soldiers or other persons whatsoever in the county of Mayo and Roscommon', in order to calculate the number of horses seized for the army's use and to return to their owners any that were deemed to be too small for military use.[29] It seems that this was not very successful, and as the war continued the scale of these arbitrary seizures had become so widespread that a

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[26] 'Protection for husbandry and tillage', 21 Jan. 1690 in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 425; 'Forbidding the army from seizing horses and carts without authorisation', 20 June 1690; 'Maintaining market activity in Dublin', 16 Sep. 1690; 'Prohibiting unauthorised pressing of horses and carts', 27 Apr. 1691; 'Making horse-stealing a capital offence', 12 May 1691 in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, nos 8, 19, 51 & 55.
[27] 'Precautions in Dublin', 9 Mar. 1689 in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 393–95.
[28] Quaker Sufferings (no. 6, Leinster and Munster; no. 25, Mountmellick; no. 30, Munster).
[29] Order from Tyrconnell to Colonel Henry Dillon, Dublin, 7 Mar. 1689 (NLI, Dillon (Clonbrock) papers, n.5208 p.5312).

proclamation was passed to explicitly forbid the pressing of horses by Jacobite soldiers or anyone else. These contained rather extreme penalties, with culprits liable to be 'immediately hanged up where they shall be apprehended and found guilty'.[30] The change in Jacobite fortunes meant that the large numbers of horses stolen during their retreat from the Boyne would not be returned to their owners. Williamite authorities issued similar proclamations forbidding the unauthorised pressing of horses by their soldiers, although their penalties were less severe, with officers being dismissed, a cavalry trooper having to 'stand three times on the picquett', while dragoons or ordinary soldiers had to 'run the gauntlet thrice through the whole regiment', although horse-stealing seemingly became such a common offence that it was eventually made a capital crime in May 1691.[31]

The Williamites also had problems with their army's horses during the war. Again, several proclamations were passed to this effect, with one simply ordering that military horses that had been 'taken away by divers persons, and used by them, without license or permission' be returned, while another addressed the army's need for additional help moving their supplies of food and munitions prior to the recommencement of the campaign in May 1691.[32] They also pressed significant numbers of horses for military use, such as the organised rounding up of horses in March 1691. This involved the sheriffs of various counties under Williamite control being ordered by the Lords Justices to press a certain number of geldings from the people of each county, so they could be purchased for the army on specific days during the first three weeks of April.[33] Everyone in each county, 'as well Protestants as Papists', was expected to cooperate with the sheriff in this regard, and those that did not were liable to have their horses seized by force and without any monetary compensation.

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[30] 'Taking of horses', 24 June 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 401.

[31] 'Forbidding the army from seizing horses and carts without authorisation', 20 June 1690; 'Making horse-stealing a capital offence', 12 May 1691 in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, nos. 8 & 55; The picquet was a form of punishment whereby the victim had to balance barefoot atop a pointed stake in the ground, while one of his thumbs were tied to a tree above him; this extremely uncomfortable posture often had to be held for several hours.

[32] 'Ordering the return of horses for military use', 31 Dec. 1690; 'Instruction to population to provide horses, cars and drivers to assist the army', 9 May 1691 in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, nos 39 & 54.

[33] Lords Justices to the Sheriffs, Dublin Castle, 20 Mar. 1690 (Clarke war corr,. v, no. 548).

Table 5.1: A list of the horses to be pressed from various counties by the Williamite authorities, April 1691.

Countys Names	Places for bringing in horses	Days when	Numbers to be brought
Carlow	At Carlow	1st April	Fifty
Kilkenny Barony of (Jdough?)	At Carlow	The same day	Fifty
Queens County	At Abby Leix	7th April	One hundred
Wexford	At Rosse	14th April	Fifty
Downe	Downpatrick	3rd April	One hundred
Downe	Hillsborough	8th April	One hundred
Antrim	Lisburne	11th April	Ninety
Antrim	Antrim	15th April	Ninety
Ardmagh	Ardmagh	21st April	Twenty
Londonderry	Coleraine	1st April	Fifty
Tyrone	Strabane	6th April	Fifty
Donegall	Lifford	8th April	Fifty
Fermanagh	Eniskillin	13th April	Fifty
Cavan	Belturbet	17th April	Fifty

A list of places where horses are to be brought and how many are required, likely enclosed with letter no. 548 (Clarke war corr., v, no. 549).

The number of horses that the Lords Justices expected each county to be able to provide is a likely indicator of the toll that the war had taken on counties across the country. The heaviest burden fell on the northeast, with counties Down and Antrim being requested to provide two hundred and one hundred and eighty horses respectively. As previously discussed these two counties largely escaped significant damage during the period of war in Ulster and were also removed from areas of rapparee activity. Counties Monaghan, Louth, Meath, Kildare, Tipperary, Wicklow and King's County were exempted from providing any horses at all, with most of these counties featuring on the frontier between the two sides during winter quarters (Louth, Monaghan, King's and Tipperary), being badly affected by rapparee or other general plundering (King's and Kildare) or being the location for a major military encounter (Meath and Louth).

The large number of horses used by both sides and their importance to the war effort is most clearly demonstrated in the demand for fodder throughout the country for the duration of the war. Horses needed a vast amount of fodder,

with an average troop of seventy horses requiring '13.5 tons of hay, 271 bushels of oats, and 5 bushels of pulse' on a monthly basis.[34] As a result, securing adequate forage for the horses from each army was a large task, while spoiling grass and meadows in enemy territory was a common military tactic. Shortages of forage meant that the Williamite army was obliged to transport fodder to Ireland by boat on several occasions, such as in the spring of 1690, when the government agreed to halve the additional cost of transporting this fodder with the individual soldiers.[35]

In a similar manner to securing food and other supplies for the army, forage was another resource that civilians were urged to protect and gather in order to better supply the army. A Jacobite proclamation in August 1689 ordered 'all farmers, innkeepers, and others used to make and provide hay, oats and straw, that they provide the same as they were accustomed to do'.[36] Troopers were expected to pay for fodder for their horses out of their daily wage, although clearly this was not always complied with. Efforts to dissuade soldiers from simply seizing forage from civilians involved the use of severe penalties, with private soldiers ordered to 'not presume to take any oats, hay or straw, for subsisting their horses or any provision or other goods without paying for the same, upon pain of death'.[37] Of course, in the same manner as the variety of other proclamations issued against plundering of civilians, it is highly unlikely that these severe penalties against unauthorised seizing of fodder were actually enforced, but the fact they were passed suggests that it was a problem the army was anxious to address. Again, a range of similar proclamations were also passed by the Williamite authorities, which included setting a price for hay of 12d per hundredweight and asking landowners to 'lay up as much meadow or other ground fit to be laid up for meadow, as aforesaid, as possibly they can, fencing it

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[34] Peter Edwards, 'Logistics and supply', in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *The civil wars: A military history of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638–1660* (Oxford, 1998), p. 257; for more on the nutritional demands of horses during the period, and the problems gathering forage of sufficient quantity and quality to feed them, see Erik A. Lund, *War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1680–1740* (Westport, CT, 1999), p. 75.
[35] Kenneth P. Ferguson, 'The army in Ireland from the Restoration to the Act of Union' (PhD thesis, TCD, 1981), p. 40.
[36] 'Supplies from farmers', 20 Aug. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 410.
[37] 'Forage for troops', 2 Nov. 1689, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 416.

in well and preserving it as carefully as they are able'.[38] This echoes another Jacobite proclamation whereby civilians in possession of 'meadow-grounds' were asked to 'fence in and preserve the same in due season'.[39]

At a local level, evidence from the Quaker sufferings shows that disorganisation among Williamite forces was causing damage to grazing, with one Daniel White having 'his meadows cut and the grass carried away, and the rest trodden and spoyled by King Williams army', while the army was at Carlow, to a total value of twenty tons of forage.[40] Landowners around Derry frequently complained about the excessive grazing of cavalry horses on their land. In December 1690 the corporation decided to grant Alderman William Squire an abatement for the full rent due on his Longmoore property for that year, 'if no satisfaction be made by the Officers of the Garrison, who grazed their horses thereon'.[41] Similarly, the damage caused to the grazing by the Williamite army while encamped at Finglas, was so severe that it had caused the tenant named Wilson to abandon his lease and flee to England.[42] The contentious nature of forage among members of the army itself is shown by an incident recounted by George Story on the day after the battle of the Boyne, in which the French Williamite officer Cambon:

> ...had almost set his own and my Lord Drogheda's Regiment by the ears, by ordering a detachment of his men to take away by force the grass from the rear of the other regiment: The matter came so high that both parties were charging their pieces [pistols], but my Lord Drogheda ordered his men to their tents, and Lieut. Gen. Douglas ordered Mounsieur Cambon to desist his pretensions.[43]

The idea that officers within the same army would almost come to blows over perceived misallocations of grazing gives some indication as to how important fodder was deemed to be within an early-modern army, and also shows how easily its provision could become yet another point of conflict between soldiers and civilians across the country.

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[38] 'Ordering the population to supply provisions to feed the army in winter quarters', 14 Nov. 1690; 'Reassuring tenants occupying land forfeited to the Crown', 27 Feb. 1691; 'Encouraging tenants on forfeited lands to make hay', 15 July 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, nos 30, 47 & 60.
[39] 'Protection for husbandry and tillage', 21 Jan. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 425.
[40] Quaker Sufferings (no. 3, Newgarden, co. Carlow, 1690).
[41] Londonderry Corporation, 18 Dec 1690.
[42] See chapter two for more information on Wilson and the property at Finglas.
[43] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 90.

Wages, Prices and Profiteering

The obvious high demand created by the large armies on both sides, for food, provisions, horses and other supplies, naturally caused price increases and instances of profiteering. Jacobite customs officials attempted to profit from the situation, as it was alleged that they 'under the pretext of their treaty, pillage everywhere, raise the price on all the merchandise that they find in the country, as well as that which comes from outside, they then sell it at an excessive price to those who have need of it'.[44] Of course this situation may have benefitted the small number of farmers or merchants who had managed to stockpile goods and were now in a position to sell them. This had been the case since the first year of the war, as in November 1689, Schomberg 'summoned all the gentlemen in the country to meet him at Lisburn, where they presented him with an address; and agreed upon rates for all sorts of provisions, which were commanded to be very disagreeable to the country people, who had made us pay treble the rates before for every thing we had from them'.[45]

Profiteering during wartime in this manner was natural, if particularly odious, and price rises of this nature would have been very detrimental to the ordinary members of society. This was acknowledged by a Jacobite proclamation on 3 January 1690, which noted that:

> ...several private persons, by forestalling the markets and other undue ways, have of late bought great quantities of wheat and oats, which they have put up in granaries and other places, with an intention to sell them at excessive rates, and so to gain to themselves unreasonable profit; which actings of theirs are not only contrary to law, but have occasioned those sorts of grains to grow very dear, whereby the soldiers of our army, and the poorest sort of people are like to suffer extremely, if this mischief be not timely prevented.[46]

While it is likely that the impact this situation was having on the army was of more importance to the Jacobite officials than its impact on the 'poorest sort of people', this was the first of many attempts to deal with profiteering in this manner. They also directly addressed the inflation that was prevalent during the period, and made several attempts to control the value of coin in order to curb

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[44] M. d'Esgrigny to M. de Louvois, Dublin, 6 June 1690, in Sheila Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence* (Dublin, 1984), i, no. 843.
[45] Story, *Impartial history*, p. 48.
[46] 'Speculators in corn', 3 Jan. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, p. 424.

inflation, such as James's orders to set the price of French coinage relative to the copper money throughout the summer of 1690.[47]

The official response to this inflation and profiteering was to try and set compulsory prices for goods. In February 1690 the Jacobites set fixed prices for a variety of goods, including 'corn, meal, wool, leather and other commodities', while compelling anyone with stocks of these goods over and above 'a sufficient proportion thereof for the subsistence of them and their families', to bring them to official markets for purchase.[48] This was not universally welcomed, with a Protestant commentator in Dublin noting in March that, as a result of these proclamations, 'the Protestant farmers that had anything left had their corn seized for the King at twenty shillings per barrel, but the Papists might sell theirs at their own rate, which was a notable device to enrich the Papists, and to carry on the grain of the Protestants'.[49] The actual enforcement of these fixed prices was quite difficult, as shown by the 'great disturbance in the market about corn' on 19 March, when people refused to sell their corn for less than 46 shillings per barrel as opposed to the decreed price of 20 shillings.[50] This led to a standoff, whereby the merchants and farmers 'would sell none, pretending it was all sold', leading the lord mayor to station 'a guard in the market, and would let none go out, or be set up, but what was sworn to be bought and sold, and so kept them there until they sold it so'.[51] These set prices were refined the following month, with the price of a barrel of wheat set at 25 shillings if sold in counties Dublin, Meath, Westmeath, Wicklow and Kildare, and only 17 shillings if sold elsewhere in the country, likely as an attempt to address the higher demand in these areas and these resulting disturbances.[52] High prices and rationing remained as a constant during the remainder of the war within Jacobite-controlled territory, with shortages gradually becoming more severe, particularly during the winter of 1690–91.[53] The level of supply within Williamite territory did not reach quite

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[47] M. de Lauzun to M. de Louvois, Dublin, 26 June 1690, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, i, no. 859.
[48] 'Rates for corn and other commodities', 28 Feb. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, pp 430–1.
[49] Colles's diary, 5 Mar. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 378.
[50] Colles's diary, 19 Mar. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, n.s., viii, p. 379.
[51] Ibid.
[52] 'Rates for wheat and barley', 25 Mar. 1690, in *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, pp 431–2.
[53] John Towler, 'The transformation of Galway: an urban history of a port town, 1600–1700' (PhD thesis, GMIT, 2011), p. 333.

the same level of crisis, but from November 1690 they too were forced to set compulsory prices for goods such as wheat, oats, mutton, beef, butter, beer, brandy and hay.[54] These rates were reiterated the following June, indicating that shortages were still very much evident at this stage.[55]

While these policies applied to the large quantities of produce being centrally bought by officials from both sides, they mattered less on a day-to-day basis. Instead, the actual payment of soldiers by both sides during the war was a very significant issue, and one that would have seriously impacted on their relations with civilians across the country. Instances of large arrears of pay for officers and ordinary soldiers alike were fairly commonplace, particularly on the Jacobite side. Despite the issuing of brass money to help pay for the war, delays and arrears of pay for Jacobite soldiers were frequently noted as being a major cause of indiscipline or plundering by troops. Shortly after his arrival to Ireland in March 1689, General Rosen noted how 'the troops that we have laid off, not having been paid, pillage and steal', with this remaining a problem during the siege of Derry, when he remarked how 'the troops continue to pillage and steal due to a lack of payment'.[56] By February 1691 the Jacobite position had become so grave that Tyrconnell admitted that they could no longer pay the troops at all, resorting instead to trying to 'furnish them with a bit of meat during the season which allows for it', in an effort to prevent the worst excesses of plundering by the soldiers.[57]

Williamite forces were also subject to frequent delays in getting paid, with the garrison of troops that had served at Derry during the siege not being fully reimbursed until thirty years later. Significant amounts of money were raised in

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[54] 'Ordering the population to supply provisions to feed the army in winter quarters', 14 Nov. 1690, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations*, no. 30; Unfortunately, the rates for goods set by the Williamite authorities use the Winchester unit of measurement, while the Jacobite proclamation decreed that barrels sized using the Bristol measurement should be supplied, making direct comparisons between the prices agreed by both sides quite difficult.

[55] 'Licensing sutlers in an attempt to control prices', 17 June 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations issued during the reigns of William and Mary and William III, 1689–1702* (forthcoming, 2013), no. 60.

[56] M. Rosen to Louvois, 26 Mar. & 20 May 1689, in 'Franco-Irish Correspondence in the Archives Nationales, Paris: Dépôt de la Guerre', ed. Lillian Tate, in *Analecta Hibernica*, no. 21 (1959), letter nos 172 & 197.

[57] Tyrconnell to Louvois, 10 Feb. 1691, in 'Franco-Irish Correspondence in the Archives Nationales, Paris: Dépôt de la Guerre', ed. Lillian Tate, in *Analecta Hibernica*, no. 21 (1959), letter no. 289.

England to pay for the Williamite army, with over £4 million voted by Parliament in October 1690. This was split between the navy and the army, with the army allocated £2,296,000 of the total supply.[58] While the money was voted there may have been problems securing this amount, as £1 million of the total was to be raised 'by sale of the forfeited lands in Ireland', £1.6 million in taxes and the remainder by excise and customs, figures which may have been difficult to achieve in the context of the economic difficulties caused by the on-going war.[59] The well-documented corruption amongst the Williamite army commissioner-general, John Shales, and its paymaster, William Harbord, undoubtedly contributed to significant delays in pay during the first year of the war, although the system was far from efficient even after their removal.[60] There is evidence to show that some of the money raised in England for the army arrived in Ireland, such as the shipment of £25,000 sent in August 1690 or that of 50,000 guineas that was sent in February 1691.[61] While parts of these shipments may have been apportioned off for other military uses besides wages, it is likely that the amount sent was simply insufficient for the number of soldiers serving in the country, resulting in the payment of the army remaining an issue right through until the new military campaign began the following summer. One Williamite officer described in July 1691 how his men were 'now thirteen weeks behind of subsistence since the first of January', but despite this he was still making an effort to try and pay the wages of the soldiers under his command.[62]

The impact of the arrears of wages on discipline within the army was even commented on in London, with Thomas Clarges receiving 'great complaints of the disorders of the army in Ireland', leading him to compare the situation in Ireland and the conduct of the army before the Restoration, when it 'was then unpayed for two years and a half', yet still managed to 'very well subsist without

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[58] William Robinson to Clarke, Dublin, 21 Oct. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 251).
[59] Thomas Clarges to Clarke, 18 Dec. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 346).
[60] Shales had neglected his duties regarding securing supplies of food and arms for Schomberg's force, being bribed to accept faulty muskets and poor quality food, for which he was arrested in May 1690. Harbord had falsified muster records, withheld wages from soldiers and generally defrauded the government, to the extent that his records were found to be running an astonishing deficit of £406,000, and he was eventually removed from his post in April 1690. For more see Childs, *Williamite wars*, pp 18–19.
[61] William Blathwayt to Clarke, Whitehall, 23 Aug. 1690 (Clarke war corr., ii, no. 127); William Blathwayt to Clarke, Whitehall, 10 Feb. 1691 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 453).
[62] David Colyear to Clarke, Kilkenny, 10 July 1691 (Clarke war corr., ix, no. 857).

imposing upon the people, but rather keeping and protecting them from violence and oppression'.[63] It is questionable how realistic Clarges' comparison actually was, but some attempts were made by the army authorities to reduce tensions within the Williamite quarters through the more prompt payment of wages. By February 1691, problems with non-payment had reached a point where Ginkel had to explicitly order 'the Receivers and Paymasters General of their Majesties Revenue' to issue two weeks worth of wages to all Williamite soldiers in Ireland. This same order also featured a rather vague commitment to continue to pay the wages, 'for such proportion of time, as you shall conceive most convenient for their Majesties service, and as duly and constantly as their Majesties affaires, and your receipt of money for the use of the forces shall enable you to doe'.[64] This suggests that individual paymasters had significant discretion regarding the issuing of wages to troops in their region, and also points to a general shortage of funds for this purpose throughout the country.

Even when the soldiers were being properly and promptly paid, the arrival of large numbers of soldiers into an area, with ready money to spend, would have noticeably increased demand, and therefore also inflated prices of a variety of goods. Soldiers were unlikely to save much of their wages, meaning that whatever salary they received was usually spent wherever they were billeted. A proportion of this would have gone on food and other necessaries in order to supplement their rations, with this amount increasing if the soldier had a wife or other dependants among the army's camp followers. In most cases, however, a sizeable amount of each man's salary would have been spent on the other essentials of military life, particularly alcohol. Alcoholic beverages such as beer, ale and cider, as well as imported brandy and home-distilled spirits, were the primary elements of excise duty, although commodities such as soap were also subject to this tax, while others were added later in the decade, such as wine, salt, seaborne coal, leather, glassware and tobacco pipes.[65] While the proceeds of the tax may have been going to different sides of the conflict, it continued to be

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[63] Thomas Clarges to Clarke, 18 Dec. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iii, no. 346).
[64] Order from Ginkel to the receivers and paymasters general of their majesties revenue and forces in Ireland, their deputy or deputies, Dublin, 2 Feb. 1690 (Clarke war corr., iv, no. 435).
[65] J.V. Beckett, 'Land tax or excise: The levying of taxation in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England' in *The English Historical Review*, 100, no. 395 (Apr. 1985), pp 297–98.

collected across Ireland throughout the war, although this was of course became very difficult in areas where there was a significant danger posed by military action or rapparees. The amount of excise duty collected in each customs district for the years 1690–93 are shown in table 5.2. The percentage changes, year-on-year, in the excise returns for each area, are also shown in table 5.3:

Table 5.2: Excise Returns by District, 1690–91.

DISTRICTS	Total Excise 1690	Total Excise 1691	Total Excise 1692	Total Excise 1693
Armagh	1251:6:9 1/4	949:17:3 3/4	1322:18:1 3/4	1977:3:6 1/8
Athlone	557:2:2 1/8	582:2:0 1/2	1095:8:4 1/8	1026:12:4
Baltimore	31:14:0 1/4	39:3:9	212:18:2	251:0:6 5/8
Cavan	578:0:2 1/2	812:15:2 3/4	793:8: 2 1/4	1208:2:2 1/2
Clonmel	1788:19:6 1/2	2906:14:10	2190:3:3 7/8	1865:10:1 7/8
Coleraine	965:5:0	1039:10:2 3/4	1373:9:11 1/2	1557:12:4
Cork	3515:14:9 3/4	6665:11:10 3/4	5671:10:3 5/8	5332:5:11 1/4
Donaghadee	649:5:1/4	402:9:0 3/4	1533:9:7 3/4	729:15:11 1/8
Drogheda	1005:18:5 3/4	1584:12:9 3/4	1716:18:10	2143:13:11 3/4
Dublin City	22138:16:3 3/4	23989:17:10	24134:3:1 3/4	28122:3:3 1/2
Dublin County	2208:7:3 1/2	2645:16:8 1/2	2590:9:6 1/4	2915:0:0 1/2
Dundalk	187:2:5 1/4	409:0:4	553:6:4	880:1:4 3/4
Ennis	498:2:11 1/2	116:5:5 1/2	1047:11:6 5/8	1222:0:10 3/4
Foxford	44:17:2 1/2	31:11:1	385:1:11 5/8	683:7:5 1/2
Galway	457:17:3 1/4	1096:15:3 7/8	2710:8:6 3/8	2419:10:8 1/4
Kilkenny	2690:13:8	3994:2:1	3920:16:5	4399:9:0 1/8
Killybegs	180:3:3 3/4	270:18:8 3/4	215:12:4 1/2	293:2:10 1/2
Kinsale	822:4:6 1/8	1415:17:4 3/4	1119:1:6 3/8	1570:3:3 1/2
Limerick	875:14:5 3/4	139:5:5	1303:5:9 5/8	1563:1:11 3/8
Lisburn	4742:7:11 3/4	3321:10:5 1/4	3682:8:11 1/4	4341:0:11 3/8
Londonderry	823:19:6	858:18:2 3/4	1057:16:2 1/2	1261:1:4 3/8
Mallow	678:7:3 7/8	169:11:7 1/2	1198:17:11 7/8	1178:10:7 3/4
Maryborough	1443:13:9 1/2	1235:17:3/4	1709:5:4 3/4	1718:14:9 3/8
Naas	2350:13:10 5/8	2947:0:11 1/2	3036:16:11 3/4	3258:6:7 5/8
Ross	291:2:7 1/8	597:4:8 1/4	665:11:6 1/2	800:8:3 7/8
Sligo	213:12:3	236:4:11 1/2	1054:14:3 1/4	1321:14:5 5/8
Strabane	707:10:6 3/4	808:8:7	1070:12:3 3/4	1291:10:10 3/4
Strangford	545:8:10	389:7:3 1/2	406:1:4 1/4	482:17:4 1/4
Tralee	219:0:7 7/8	33:13:0 3/4	659:13:4 7/8	551:12:1
Trim	1479:17:9	1890:7:5 1/2	2057:17:3 1/2	2294:19:7
Wexford	620:8:9 1/2	873:17:10	1060:1:8	1826:19:3
Wicklow	1113:2:6 1/2	1315:6:3 3/4	1553:3:8 7/8	1849:9:3 1/8
Youghal	1191:2:0 1/8	1753:6:2 3/4	1411:2:2 7/8	1641:5:0
National Total	56867:14:0 3/8	65523:2:5 3/4	73514:5:4 1/2	83882:8:5 5/8

John Evelyn papers relating to the Revenue in Ireland (British Library, Add. Mss. 78451, ff 129v–130r).

Table 5.3: Excise returns in pounds by district, annual percentage increase compared with 1690.

Customs Districts	% Change 1690 to 1691	% Change 1690 to 1692	% Change 1690 to 1693
Armagh	-24%	6%	58%
Athlone	4%	97%	84%
Baltimore	26%	584%	710%
Cavan	40%	37%	109%
Clonmel	63%	22%	4%
Coleraine	8%	42%	61%
Cork	90%	61%	52%
Donaghadee	-38%	136%	12%
Drogheda	58%	71%	113%
Dublin City	8%	9%	27%
Dublin County	20%	17%	32%
Dundalk	119%	196%	371%
Ennis	-77%	110%	145%
Foxford	-30%	775%	1452%
Galway	140%	493%	429%
Kilkenny	48%	46%	64%
Killybegs	50%	19%	63%
Kinsale	72%	36%	91%
Limerick	-84%	49%	79%
Lisburn	-30%	-22%	-8%
Londonderry	4%	28%	53%
Mallow	-75%	77%	74%
Maryborough	-14%	18%	19%
Naas	25%	29%	39%
Ross	105%	129%	175%
Sligo	11%	395%	520%
Strabane	14%	51%	83%
Strangford	-29%	-26%	-12%
Tralee	-85%	201%	152%
Trim	28%	39%	55%
Wexford	41%	71%	195%
Wicklow	18%	40%	66%
Youghal	47%	18%	38%
National Total	15%	29%	48%

John Evelyn papers relating to the Revenue in Ireland (British Library, Add. Mss. 78451, ff 129v–130r); figures used to calculate these percentages have been rounded off to the nearest pound.

Given the high proportion of excise tax that came from alcohol, the additional money that the soldiers would have brought into an area is shown in these figures by the increase in revenue between 1690 and 1691 in towns such as Clonmel, Cork, Kinsale and Ross. These were towns that would have quartered significant numbers of Williamite soldiers during the winter of 1690–91, with the extra spending by these troops resulting in a significantly higher excise tax take between these two years. The Danish troops billeted in Clonmel may have had difficulties getting their wages on time, but they contributed to a 63% increase in the excise collected in 1691 compared to the previous year, when the annual national increase was only 15%. The same applied to Cork and Kinsale, where Marlborough's success in capturing these two towns and the subsequent quartering of large numbers of troops, led to an increase of 90% and 72% respectively. In a similar manner, the area in Ulster that had been under Williamite control from 1689–90, as demonstrated by towns such as Armagh, Donaghadee, Lisburn and Strangford, saw a significant drop in the excise tax collected. Again, this was most likely due to the fall-off in the consumption of excise-heavy commodities such as beer and ale, as a result of the movement of the Williamite army southwards as the war continued. Lisburn had been the headquarters of Schomberg's army during the initial winter period of the war, and the amount of officers and men billeted or stationed in this area during this period would have significantly increased spending on alcohol and other commodities. Indeed, the amount of excise collected in the Lisburn district remained 8% below this 1690 level even in 1693, when the total excise collected nationwide had risen to 48% above that collected in 1690. The situation was the same in Strangford, which encompassed the area in east Down that Schomberg's army had originally landed in, where many of them had been billeted during the winter of 1689–90, and where William's reinforcements had arrived the following summer.

These statistics also show the general recovery in consumption in areas across the country as they became further removed from the war. The area around Dundalk had been badly affected during the winter of 1689–90, through its use as a buffer between Jacobite and Williamite territory, and which had

resulted in the widespread burning of crops and destruction of property. It saw significantly higher excise returns for the following years compared to elsewhere in the country, totalling 119%, 196% and 371% for 1691–93 respectively, compared to the clearly below average returns for 1690. The neighbouring area around Drogheda also saw above average excise returns for these years, although seeing how it had not been as badly affected as Dundalk these increases were not as spectacular, totalling 58%, 71% and 113% for the same years. Similarly, areas that were on the frontier between the two sides during the following winter saw corresponding drops in the amount of excise collected, likely either through reduced economic activity generally, or more likely due to the inability of customs officials to properly police the tax due to these areas being too dangerous to operate in. Tralee and Mallow saw particularly large drops in 1691 of 85% and 75% respectively, likely due to their position between the two armies along the disputed southern frontier. Indeed, there is evidence of Chidley Brooks, the revenue official for the Dingle region, which included Tralee, ceasing to collect revenue in his area as early as April 1689, although it remains unclear whether this is due to him fleeing the area, being killed, or simply feeling unsafe in fulfilling his duties.[66] Despite its strategic position on the main frontier of the river Shannon, Athlone actually managed to record a slight increase in the excise collected in the same period, although this is likely due to its occupation by Jacobite troops for the winter period as opposed to being left as neutral territory as in the case of north Cork and Kerry. The increases in excise returns for areas such as Dublin city and county, Naas, Trim and Wicklow, remained largely in line with the national totals for the three years, which fits with their being situated away from the main points of conflict and far from either the 1689–90 or 1690–91 frontiers between the two sides.

West of the Shannon: Jacobite loss of control

One of the other main trends that is clear from these excise returns is how the area that remained under Jacobite control for the final year of the war saw significantly reduced economic activity throughout the period from September

[66] David Dickson, 'The account book of a Kerry revenue official, 1687–89' in *Journal of the Kerry archaeological and historical society*, no. 6 (1973), p. 77.

1690 until September 1691. Areas situated within Jacobite territory such as Limerick, Ennis in county Clare and Foxford in county Mayo all recorded large drops in excise revenue of 84%, 77% and 30% respectively, between 1690 and 1691. These sharp falls in revenue may be due to less efficient enforcement of excise duties by the Jacobite authorities during this period, but they also suggest that the economy in these areas was severely depressed during the final year of the war, and that the Jacobite soldiers in these areas must not have had much wages to spend on luxuries such as beer. However, these figures are representative of a much more general social and economic crisis across the Jacobite-controlled west of Ireland during this final year of the war. Of course, Connacht and the west of Ireland had suffered earlier in the war, in the same manner as any other area that had not directly been on a frontier between the two armies. As early as November 1688 there were reports of Protestant mills being burnt in county Clare, while there were reports from county Galway of ordinary tenants refusing to pay their rent, with 'most of the common people flocked to the mountain to the n[um]ber of 300 men as I understand, where they are resolved not to be distrained by any body'.[67] Following the summer of 1690, however, this situation would become much more difficult.

The large amount of territory that the Jacobite army conceded to the Williamites in the chaotic aftermath of the battle of the Boyne saw the area under their control shrink from almost the entire three provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connacht, down to most of Connacht and part of north Munster, in the space of a few weeks from 1 July 1690. It was this significantly reduced area that the entire Jacobite army, with its associated sutlers, camp followers and other dependants, was confined throughout the winter of 1690–91. These were followed by 'the inhabitants of other provinces, [who] have withdrawn their livestock into that of Connaught', many of whom had left their homes elsewhere in country in fear of the Williamite forces, with others moved westwards as a result of the Williamite policies regarding rapparees and their restrictions on

[67] Sir Donough O'Brien to Richard Wilson, Dromoland, 19 Nov. 1688 (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45118/7); [Mar?] Morris to John Browne, Galway, 14 June 1689 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/2/1).

Catholics living to the east of the Shannon.[68] Tyrconnell's description of Connacht as 'the smallest and the least fertile of the four provinces that make up Ireland' was quite accurate, and securing food and supplies for the enhanced population that was now living to the west of the Shannon did indeed prove very difficult.[69] This was exacerbated by the damage done to parts of the region, such as the area around Limerick city in the aftermath of the first siege. A local resident noted how there had been 'a great destruction in the county of Lim[erick], Broof [Bruff] demolished, Balligriana [Ballyagran] walls, Carraffa, Carless house all burnt, and all our woole to be seized to stop breaches at Limerick, and at the best to send for France in exchange'.[70] Tyrconnell was quite pessimistic in general about the region that the Jacobite forces had been forced to withdraw to, noting that:

> The country where they are quartered supplies them with water and beef for a while; moreover there is neither wheat, nor oats, nor flour in a province which is full of mountains and where no one works at all; where there is neither wine, nor whiskey; neither silk, nor sheets, to clothe oneself; neither arms, nor steel, nor iron, nor any workers.[71]

While his worries about shortages of silk would not prove overly detrimental to the success or otherwise of the Jacobite cause, the other issues raised were all legitimate concerns. Just ten days prior to the departure of the majority of the French officers and men from Galway on 12 September, one of them described the situation for the Jacobites in Ireland as being 'absolutely unsustainable, lacking not only grain, but even windmills for making flour, and generally all those things which are necessary for supporting a war'.[72]

Shortages of both food supplies and money to pay their men were the two major problems facing the Jacobites. These were two elements that had already caused difficulties throughout the war period, but from August 1690 onwards they became significantly worse, with the added issue of each problem exacerbating the other. Following the Williamite victory at the Boyne, the value

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[68] Memoir of Tyrconell on the loss of Ireland, [Nov. 1690], in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, iii, no. 2038.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Thomas Hickman to Donough O'Brien, 22 July 1690 (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45302/3).
[71] Memoir of Tyrconell on the loss of Ireland, [Nov. 1690], in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, iii, no. 2038.
[72] M. de La Hoguette to M. de Louvois, Galway, 2 Sep. 1690 in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1046.

of the copper and brass money completely collapsed. Jacobite attempts to devalue these new coins in order to try and keep them in circulation failed, and it was described as being 'so distrusted that nobody could buy anything with that currency any more, and all the menaces and punishments were unable to force anyone to accept it'.[73] As this new coinage had been the main means of paying the Jacobite army, the collapse in its value meant that for the duration of the war the Jacobite soldiers' pay was significantly curtailed. Tyrconnell wrote in February 1691 of being 'unable to pay them, even in copper', and noted how they were instead 'furnishing them with a bit of meat while the season permits it, that season will only last until the end of the month, due to a lack of forage and grass to feed the cows and sheep'.[74] The demand on forage in the region was being stretched even further thanks to the large number of livestock that had been brought across with the army, and by the rapparees, which placed a further demand on the requirement for supplies of oats and wheat to supplement the diet of the Jacobite horses.[75] This had an adverse impact on the animals themselves, as the horses were 'feeding on grass all this winter due to a lack of forage, which has made them quite weak, and will not be able to improve until the first spring grass, which will not be fertile enough to fatten them until the end of May'.[76]

The lack of money remained a key problem, with one of the proposed solutions being an attempt to confiscate any quantities of French coins that were in circulation, in order to use the funds to pay for the army's wages and other necessary supplies. In February it was ordered that 'all of those who have the above currency should bring it to the treasury on 15 March coming, and that tickets of the sums that are owed to them will be given to them, in order to be reimbursed for the said currency on the previous weight when the king will be re-established on his throne'.[77] It is unclear how successful this blatant attempt to confiscate money from civilians across the region actually was, although

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[73] Duke of Tyrconnell to M. de Louvois, Limerick, 10 Feb. 1691 in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1241.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Memoir of Tyrconnell on the loss of Ireland, [Nov. 1690], in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, iii, no. 2038.
[76] Duke of Tyrconnell to M. de Louvois, Limerick, 10 Feb. 1691 in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1241.
[77] Ibid.

currency was significantly easier to hide than crops or livestock, and the main contribution of civilians to the Jacobite war effort remained in the area of food and provisions. Of course, the combination of this monetary crisis with the severe shortages of food and provisions caused the prices for certain goods to increase significantly. In Limerick city in November 1690, a quart of beer cost three shillings, a loaf of bread that would have cost one sol in France was sold for five shillings, while a piece of frieze cloth that had cost one shilling a few months before was now trading at fifty shillings, with the same eyewitness noting how he, a captain in the army, only had five shillings to spend per day.[78] A full list of prices that various commodities were selling for within Jacobite territory, in both traditional currency as well as the ill-fated copper money, is given in table 5.4:

[78] Sir Mihau (Captain in Felix O'Neill's regiment) to M. de Louvois, Limerick, 6 Nov. 1690, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1989.

Table 5.4: Table of prices of provisions in Ireland, *c.* February 1691, given in 'good' money and copper money.

Commodity	Price in Good Money	Price in Copper Money
Pound of bread	3s	£3
Jug of wine	24s	£24
Jug of whiskey	48s	£48
Jug of beer	8s	£8
Pound of meat	2s, 6d	50s
Pound of butter	4s	£4
Pound of cheese	8s	£8
Pound of salt	3s	£3
Pint of milk	2s	£2
Pound of pepper	£4	£80
Pound of tobacco	30s	£30
Pound of soap	10s	£10
A pair of shoes	£3	£60
A hat	£3	£60
A yard of frieze	15s	£15
A pair of large stockings	£2	£40
A load of firewood	6s	£6
A load of turf	5s	£5
A bushel of oats	30s	£30

State of the price of provisions in Ireland, and of other items of great necessity for the subsistence and maintenance of the troops' officers and soldiers, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1243.

The prices of goods soaring to such extremes would have had a severe impact on ordinary civilians, the majority of whose incomes would have already been badly affected by the war. Similarly, these astonishingly high prices would undoubtedly have enticed people to attempt to bring supplies across from Williamite controlled territory in order to make as much money as possible. Indeed, this could account for a significant proportion of the smuggling of goods out of Williamite areas that the authorities in those parts attributed to people with Jacobite sympathies. Within these prices, the fact that a pound of meat was actually selling for less than a pound of bread reflects the problems the Jacobites had in securing sufficient wheat and other crops, while the large numbers of

cattle that had been taken across the Shannon kept the price of meat relatively low. Another impact of these high prices would have been an increase in looting, as soldiers that were living on reduced rations and could not afford to buy any additional provisions to top them up simply took them from civilians or merchants. By January in Limerick it was noted that 'the merchants [...] have closed their shops and hidden their merchandise and nobody any longer brings things here from the countryside to sell'.[79]

These severe problems with the Jacobite army's food supply during the period were clearly another reason why rapparee groups, and *creaghts* in particular, were tolerated within Jacobite territory during the winter of 1690–91 as they were.[80] The *creaghts* were expected to contribute a proportion of their cattle to the Jacobite war effort during this period, but in exchange for this they seemingly had concessions concerning their movements and their exemption from having to quarter troops. A letter written to Kean and Charles O'Hara in Sligo noted that several *creaghts* were on their way towards the O'Hara's land, and that 'they may be about 9 or 10 dayes, dureing which time I intreat you will not suffer them to wronged or abused by any, nor to send any soldiers to quarter on them, for I believe they will hardly stay longer than 2 or 3 nights in one place'.[81] Disorder by rapparees and soldiers alike, was quite common. The underemployed, undersupplied and underpaid Jacobite troops were naturally quite indisciplined during this winter period. At Ennis, Thomas Conway wrote to Donough O'Brien, noting how:

> ...the Court House will be totally destroyed by the Guards, they have burned all the [furnishings]... broke the most parte of the barrs, broke downe the Kings coate of armes, the glass, and are now beginning to burne some of the floor, I know not how to prevent it, unless your Honour will take some measures for the future to preserve what is left, for here the[y] spare neither timber, houses or trees, but cutt them down and burne them; the soldiers that were committed in Goale [Gaol] burned one of the doores and tooke away the hinges...[82]

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[79] Commissaire Fumeron to M. de Louvois, Limerick, 28 Jan. 1691, in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1238.
[80] See chapter four for more on the collaboration between the Jacobite authorities and rapparee groups during this period.
[81] [James?] Donnelly to Kean and Charles O'Hara, 4 May 1691 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/24.
[82] Thomas Conway to Donough O'Brien, Ennis, 20 Dec. 1690 (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45302/5).

That soldiers that were supposed to be imprisoned, likely for offences against civilians, were able to burn the doors of their cells and remove the hinges does not reflect very highly on the level of discipline among the Jacobite army. The following month, the French Commissary Jean Francois de Fumeron described how difficult it was 'to prevent the thefts and banditry of the troops, and of the raparees, who are groups of peasants who pillage and ruin the whole country. In short, everything is in such great confusion that it will be difficult to remedy the situation entirely'.[83]

Within the area under Jacobite control almost every element of society became connected to the war effort during the final year of the conflict. From quartering troops; supplying food to the army; contributing a certain proportion of their livestock to feed them; or even enlisting in newly raised military units, the inhabitants of the area were expected to subordinate their own interests to those of the Jacobite cause. In August, a list of all the inhabitants that were not directly enlisted in the army was to be sent to the army's headquarters at Limerick, together with 'the condition and circumstances [...] of theyr respective abodes, and the value of their estates. And what each of them will doe for the King's service by himselfe, his interest in his county, armes, horses, men and subsistence for them; that hereafter none may pretend to serve the King that will not now show it'.[84] This desperation extended to pressing civilians directly into service for the army, either by taking up arms or by assisting the war effort in other ways. In August 1690 the lord lieutenant of Mayo was asked to 'summon a convenient number of the ablest men in that county' for service with the Jacobite army.[85] In December, the duke of Berwick ordered that 'soo many Cloathyers and Weavers to be sent out of the County of Mayo as can be found there, into the towne of Galway, together with their loomes and other necessaryes to worke', in order to make uniforms for the army.[86] As late as 31 May 1691, a proclamation issued by Patrick Sarsfield at Athlone requested that 'the several Gentlemen of

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[83] Commissaire Fumeron to M. de Louvois, Limerick, 28 Jan. 1691 in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1238.
[84] Duke of Tyrconnell to the Lord Lieut. of county Mayo [Lord Athenry], 16 Aug 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/3/14).
[85] Ibid.
[86] Duke of Berwick to the Lord Lieutenant of County Mayo, Galway, 13 Dec. 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/3/7).

the countys of Sligoe, Mayoe, Gallway and Roscommon should send one or two or more of theire servants, tennants or followers well armed and clothed to serve his Majesty under the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel John Bodkin'.[87] Bodkin was forming an additional regiment for the army and needed extra 'men, well armed and clothed for the use afforded'. The timing of this request, less than a month prior to the siege of Athlone, suggested that the Jacobite army was nervous about the coming campaign. The fact that these additional men were to be 'well armed and clothed' also fits with the view that shortages of arms had not been alleviated by the beginnings of the final summer's campaign.[88]

The main manner in which civilians were obliged to help the Jacobite war effort was in providing food for the troops. The food shortages and generally poor economic situation obliged the Jacobite authorities to order the lord lieutenants of each county still under their control to provide a certain number of cattle and sheep for the army's use and to provide supplies to sustain the towns of Galway and Limerick in the event of a siege the following summer.[89] They were ordered to seize the required number of animals and deliver them to one of the two towns, with the *creaghts* living on the land in each county expected to contribute to these totals. These requests also came with the threat that 'in case of any fayler [failure] wee shall send a competent force of horse and foot into the county to live there at discretion, and withall to drive and bring away double that number of beeves [cattle] and weathers [sheep] for his Majesties service', which indicates the priority this was, as well as how desperate the Jacobite army was for provisions at this time.[90] The same policy applied in county Mayo, where Tyrconnell ordered the seizure of 800 cattle and 1,500 sheep in August 1690 for the stores at Galway.[91] Civilians in the county were also ordered to 'applot by equall proportion on each acre of profitable land in the severall barronies of the county of Mayo, sufficient quantity of hay, oates, butter, meale, wheat and mault,

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[87] Proclamation by Lucan [Patrick Sarsfield], Athlone, 31 May 1691 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/25.
[88] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 197.
[89] See chapter four for more information on this policy.
[90] Proclamation by Tyrconnell to the Lord Lieutenant and Deputy Lieutenant of the county of Roscommon, written at Galway, 16 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Dillon (Clonbrock) papers, n.5208 p.5312).
[91] Duke of Tyrconnell to Lord Lieut and Deputy Lieut of Co Mayo, Galway, 16 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/3/13).

and cause the same to be delivered into his Majesties stores'.[92] The proceeds of this included 600 barrels of meal to be sent to Sligo, 200 to the island of Inishbofin for the garrison there, and 200 to be stockpiled in Mayo.[93]

This requirement on each civilian within Jacobite territory to hand over a proportion of their crops or other agricultural produce to the army's central stores is similar to the *kontributionssystem* that was widely used across Germany during the Thirty Years' War, and had its origins in the first half of the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Netherlands.[94] This involved soldiers being given 'licence to exact cash payments from enemy, neutral and ultimately, friendly territory at well above the rates required for the basic subsistence of the army'.[95] It resulted in occupied territory being 'systematically milked of its resources', in order to 'preserve the productive capacity of the territory intact, while tapping it for the army's benefit'.[96] During the winter of 1690–91, this change in policy differed from the compulsory purchase of food and supplies that had been Jacobite policy earlier in the war, and that remained official Williamite policy throughout this winter period. It meant that civilians across Connacht and north Munster were simply expected to contribute supplies to the war effort for no monetary return, with the threat of having their livestock and property seized from them by force if they did not comply, in line with the continental policy of *brandschatzen*.[97]

Kean O'Hara, who acted as the Jacobite storekeeper at Sligo during the war, was ordered to send some of the supplies that had been stockpiled in the town down to Galway in October 1690.[98] In relation to the slaughtering and salting of beef he was explicitly ordered to 'take care of the hides in preserving

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[92] Duke of Tyrconnell to Edward Lord Athenry, Col John Browne, Col Thomas Burke, George Browne and Capt Peter Moore, Galway, 24 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/3/15).
[93] Duke of Berwick to the Lord Lieutenant of County Mayo, Galway, 22 & 23 Dec. 1690 (NLI, Westport papers, Ms 40899/3/9–10).
[94] Ruff, *Violence in early modern Europe*, pp 63–64; Tallett, *War and society*, pp 55–56; Childs, 'The laws of war and the Jacobite war', p. 287; Parrott, *The business of war*, pp 113–122.
[95] David Parrott, 'Strategy and tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The "military revolution"' in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The military revolution debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe* (Oxford, 2004), p. 241.
[96] Tallett, *War and society*, p. 56.
[97] This was when soldiers would burn down civilian homes if the deadline set for their handing over of supplies to the army was not met; see Childs, 'The laws of war and the Jacobite war', pp 287–8.
[98] Rowland [Helels?] to Kean O'Hara, Limerick, 4 Oct. 1690 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/7.

them, as allsoe the tallow, and keep a particular account of the same', perhaps indicating that Jacobite officials had been attempting to personally profit from the sale of hides and tallow from cattle that had been slaughtered to feed the army. It does seem clear that O'Hara was using his position as Jacobite storekeeper and deputy governor of county Sligo to help lessen the impact of the war on certain areas of the county, most likely part of his own property or that of his tenants. In October 1690, Con O'Donnell wrote from Dromahair, on the Sligo-Leitrim border, that he:

> ...had provisions from all parts of the county of Sligoe, the haulfe barrony of Cullavin [Coolavin] onely excepted, having noe other reason to refuse it but that they have (as they give out) instructions from you to that affect, which I cannot yet believe for it is a very incredible thing that a man under your circumstances should obstruct a matter that imported the Kings [James] service as our being hear does. I am confident the country people are not soe void of consideration as not to be sensible how serviceable we are to they. Sir, I shall therefore beseech you to order the people to pay their proportion of the provision.[99]

O'Hara had seemingly given permission for the residents of the barony of Coolavin to not contribute to the gathering of resources for the Jacobite war effort, with O'Donnell quite indignant at this decision.

By the following January the matter had been resolved, but it seems that O'Hara had managed to get some concessions from the Jacobite authorities, as Galmoy wrote to him noting:

> In hopes that the corne that is due of the country will the sooner be sent in, I have stopt Lieutenant Cornell Fleming from quartering in them places you mention, but always intended yours and your sisters house to be exempted. I shall take a course to free the country of them disorderly dragoons who under pretence of sicmen[?] are amongst them, pray hasten in the oats, and the horses for Galway.[100]

In exchange for his cooperation in collecting corn from the countryside and sending it to the stores at Galway, O'Hara had managed to get certain areas exempt from having to quarter Jacobite troops. Given the heavy toll that quartering troops took on civilians, and the particularly poor situation that the

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[99] Con O'Donnell to Henry Dillon, or in his absence Kean O'Hara, Drumahear [Dromahair, county Sligo], 10 Oct. 1690 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/9.
[100] Galmoy to Kean O'Hara, 10 Jan. 1691 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/15.

Jacobite army was in during this period, being exempted from quartering was quite a generous concession. Galmoy's remark that he had 'always intended' for O'Hara's family to be exempted from quartering troops is another example of the preferential treatment that influential families received from the Jacobites during the war, particularly if they were of use to the war effort.

O'Hara's position as storekeeper for the Sligo area proved to be particularly advantageous for him at the very end of the war. By early September 1691 the Williamite army had occupied most of county Sligo and had heavily besieged Sligo town itself, prior to its surrender on 14 September.[101] Two days earlier, the Williamite commander in this area, the earl of Granard, had sent a message to O'Hara that was to be communicated to the 'rest of the Gentlemen of the county'.[102] In the same manner as they had been victualing the Jacobite forces, Granard wanted these 'gentlemen' of Sligo to 'applott upon the several barronys of your county as many fat beeves, mutton, meale, bread and all other provisions your county can afford, as will supply their Majesties campe before Sligo, consisting of 3000 men'.[103] The necessity of securing sufficient supplies for the Williamite army was obviously a major concern, and ordering large landowners from the local area to secure supplies from their areas was likely the most efficient way of securing the necessary supplies. These landowners' pre-existing relationships with local people, and their established systems of collection, would have been a much more straightforward method of securing supplies than having to devote a portion of the army to scouring the country and round up supplies from people by force.

At this point of the conflict the outcome was more or less assured in the Williamites' favour, and any local landowner with any instinct for self-preservation—either in the short term from potential plundering by Williamite soldiers, or in the long term regarding holding onto their land—would have made an effort to cooperate with this request, as it seems O'Hara did. In the immediate aftermath of the war he went a step further to prove his loyalty to King William and the Irish Protestant interest, by obtaining a declaration by

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[101] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, pp 238–9.
[102] Earl of Granard to Kean O'Hara, the camp at Ballysaday [Ballysadare, county Sligo], 12 Sep. 1691 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/29.
[103] Ibid.

Roger Jones and fourteen other local Protestants as to his loyalty, on 16 October 1691.[104] These men vouched for O'Hara's 'kindness', as well as his 'readyness to serve the Protestants of our county dureing the late trouble'. There actually was 'talk' in subsequent years of attempting to attain O'Hara due to his heavy involvement with the Jacobites during the war, but he managed to avoid this, perhaps due to these attempts to belatedly cooperate with the Williamites and prove his loyalty; although it is likely that the influence of his stepfather Richard Aldworth, who was appointed Chief Secretary of Ireland in 1695, was also a significant advantage in this matter.[105]

The pragmatism shown by many of the Protestant landowners that chose to remain on their lands throughout the Jacobite period, such as Kean O'Hara, is also demonstrated by the stance of Sir Donough O'Brien. O'Brien had been created first Baronet of Leamanegh and Dromoland by James II in November 1686. Despite being resident at his home at Dromoland in county Clare throughout the war, he allegedly managed to avoid directly declaring for either the Jacobite or Williamite side.[106] He kept himself on good terms with the Jacobite authorities, serving as high sheriff for county Clare in 1689, and through this position he was responsible for raising a troop of twenty dragoons for the county's militia in May 1690. He stressed that this militia was primarily to protect 'the said malefactors and disturbers of the peace [who] will be encouraged to comitt more disorders', thereby accentuating the idea of this troop as acting as security for the local people of the area from rapparees rather than seeing it as a contribution to the Jacobite war effort.[107] As a result of this pragmatic interaction O'Brien had managed to ensure a protection for himself from Tyrconnell, who ordered the Jacobite army 'to forbear troubling, molesting, seizing, taking away or otherwise embezzelling any sheep, cows, horses, or any corn or other goods or chattle whatsoever belonging to him, within the said

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[104] Declaration by Roger Jones and fourteen other Protestants to the loyalty of Kean O'Hara, Sligo, 16 October 1691 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/31.
[105] Thomas Bartlett, 'The O'Haras of Annaghmore *c.*1600–*c.*1800' in *Irish Economic and Social History*, ix (1982) p. 39.
[106] Brian Kirby (ed.), Inchiquin papers, NLI collection list no. 143 (2009), p. 9.
[107] Order from the King to the High Sheriff of county Clare about a troop of dragoons in every county to be maintained and quartered by the county, Dublin Castle, May 1690 (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45318/4).

county of Clare'.[108] While it is questionable how valuable this protection was, particularly as O'Brien's property was still very much open to attack by rapparees and other thieves, it shows how well he had managed to ingratiate himself with the Jacobite authorities, particularly as this proclamation was given personally by Tyrconnell at O'Brien's home in Dromoland, just eleven days before the duke departed Ireland for France.

Undoubtedly O'Brien's position within the community helped his case, as did the desperation of the Jacobites to ensure the cooperation of people within their territory for the upcoming winter period. In the aftermath of the war, O'Brien managed to rekindle his loyalty to the Williamite cause, in the same manner as O'Hara. Part of his efforts in this regard included the compilation of a list of 'Names of Protestant families that I have supported in these troublesome times', which included 27 families and a total of 149 people.[109] For Protestants that had chosen to remain in Ireland under Jacobite rule during the war period, proving that they had only done so in order to help their neighbouring co-religionists, or that they had played no part in the Jacobite war effort, would form a large element of their defence against allegations of collaboration with the Jacobite powers. In reality, O'Brien had written to the earl of Limerick in his capacity as High Sheriff in April 1690, in which he had enclosed 'a list of the chief gents and ablest persons in this county [Clare], whose names I have returned to the respective High Constables to be summoned to bring in their ablest horses without any delay to go to Corke for his Majesties service'.[110] He had ordered his troop of dragoons to go around the county rounding up the horses that were required by the Jacobite army, and gave the excuse that 'it is the want of horses generally throughout this County which have been taken from the people by dragoons and others, [it is] that and not the want of a good will to serve his Majesty with all they have that makes this county soe backwards in sending their horses'.[111] While this may have been a pragmatic attempt by O'Brien to

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[108] Order from Tyrconnell to officers civil and military for the protection of Sir Donough O'Brien, Dromoland, 1 Sep. 1690 (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45318/7).
[109] 'Names of Protestant families that I [Sir Donough O'Brien] have supported in these troublesome times', undated (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45318/9).
[110] Donough O'Brien to William Dongan, earl of Limerick, 26 Apr. 1690 (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45302/1).
[111] Ibid.

cooperate with the Jacobites, it appears to be a case of fairly clear cooperation with the Jacobite military, and a letter that it is surprising to find extant within his personal archive.

In the aftermath of the summer of 1690, however, when the Jacobite cause had suffered the significant setback of the Boyne, and the mood among many of its leaders—particularly the French officers such as Lauzun—was largely negative, it seems as if O'Brien had begun to prepare for the inevitable Williamite victory, as it is likely that the granting of Tyrconnell's personal protection was designed to placate him into continuing to cooperate as High Sheriff for county Clare. The following summer Donough's cousin Mort O'Brien informed him that he had heard rumours that he was passing information to the Williamites in the aftermath of the fall of Athlone.[112] It is unclear if this was the case or not, but it would fit with O'Brien's policy of trying to endear himself to the winning side. He was ultimately successful in his efforts, as he had no land confiscated under the Williamite land settlement, and in fact managed to purchase an additional 614 acres of land in county Clare from the Commissioners for the Sale of Forfeited Estates in 1702–3.[113]

Conclusion

Despite the multitude of efforts by the Jacobite military during the winter period, and the consequent hardship inflicted upon the inhabitants of the area to the west of the Shannon, by the summer campaign of 1691 the Jacobite army was still hampered by supply problems. These were clear from comments by Tyrconnell, made at Galway in April 1691, where he noted how they were 'now in the depths of despondency, and as it were, all our garrisons are dying from hunger [...] I have tried all methods to remedy this shortage, but finding none which can sufficiently feed our soldiers without bread'.[114] While his language was hyperbolic in tone, and was likely tailored in order to try and persuade its recipient—the French secretary for war, Louvois—to send over additional

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[112] Mort O'Brien to Sir Donough O'Brien, *c.* Aug. 1691 (NLI, Inchiquin papers, Ms 45302/7).
[113] Brian Kirby (ed.), Inchiquin papers, NLI collection list no. 143 (2009), p. 9.
[114] Tyrconnell to Louvois, 11 Apr. 1691, in 'Franco-Irish Correspondence in the Archives Nationales, Paris: Dépôt de la Guerre', ed. Lillian Tate, in *Analecta Hibernica*, no. 21 (1959), letter no. 293.

supplies, it is reflective of the poor conditions across the region during the period. The French general St Ruth arrived at Limerick on 9 May 1691, and brought with him a variety of food supplies, as well as arms and ammunition.[115] However, these were wholly insufficient to meet the army's demands for provisions, and by June Tyrconnell was forced to reverse his previous decision to give the soldiers a payment of one sol per day, and instead used this money to buy cattle in order to provide them with a daily ration of meat.[116]

The poor situation among the army suggests that the civilian population across the region were also extremely badly affected. The negative experiences of war that had been common across the country during the war, such as the supply of food and other provisions; profiteering; high prices; and the constant pressure on pasture and forage; all became significantly worse within the Jacobite-controlled territory in the aftermath of their retreat westwards in July 1690. By January 1692 the region around Limerick was still very much suffering from the after-effects of the previous year and a half of economic stagnation, the burden of having to subsist a large proportion of the Jacobite army, and the after-effects of two large-scale sieges in the space of a single year. Story noted how 'great quantities of wheat, and other grain, were ordered from Cork and Kinsale to furnish the stores of Limerick, that part of the country being now very much put to it for want of bread, as being the fear of war this two year's past'.[117] These emergency supplies seem to have been similar to those sent by Schomberg to Derry over two years earlier, and would surely have helped alleviate the food shortages for the ordinary people of Limerick and its surrounding area.

While the depredations of soldiers and rapparees were widespread across Ireland during the Williamite war, not every civilian would be directly affected by incidents of theft or violence in this manner. Similarly, while the majority of households would have had to billet soldiers in some manner during one of the several phases of the war, this would not have been entirely universal. However, the constant drain that the two armies placed on the resources of the country, through their intense need for food, fodder and provisions, and the

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[115] Simms, *Jacobite Ireland*, p. 203.
[116] Commissaire Fumeron to M. de Louvois, at Limerick, 10 June 1691 in Mulloy (ed.), *Franco-Irish Correspondence*, ii, no. 1238.
[117] Story, *A continuation*, p. 297.

corresponding impact this had on inflating prices for goods and reducing their availability, would have impacted upon the entire population of Ireland. Of course, those who were well off would naturally have been better able to cope with these challenging economic conditions, and similarly people in rural areas who had the capacity to produce their own food may have been able to resist the worst of these shortages. In a similar manner, these conditions created an environment with the potential for profit, such as through hoarding goods with the intention of selling them later at a higher price, or by smuggling provisions from one area to another, where prices for them were higher and the potential for profit even greater, in spite of the risks involved.

The changes in fortunes for the Jacobite and Williamite armies as the war progressed are also evident in their attitudes towards supplies. When Schomberg initially arrived in Ireland one of his chief priorities was securing provisions from the local people, which involved negotiating with local landowners for more reasonable prices for goods; encouraging civilians to stockpile provisions in advance of his army's arrival, such as at Ardee; or trying to deal with the corruption that was inherent among his own commissary corps. Meanwhile, during the winter of 1689–90, several observers noted the debauched behaviour of the Jacobite forces that had gathered around Dublin. Their dominance over the majority of the country meant that they were not overly concerned with supplies and preparations for the forthcoming campaign, particularly as the large wage bills for their soldiers were being met by the minting of new brass and copper coinage. This would change dramatically with the following summer's campaign, as the Jacobite retreat and confinement to the western part of the island, hampered by poor systems of supply and the collapse in the value of their new coinage, caused a myriad of problems that were not solved even by the end of the war. This resulted in ever-increasing demands, requirements and restrictions on the civilians living in these areas, whose liberties they were supposedly fighting for. During the same period, the Williamite system of supply became more organised, with specified markets and rules concerning prices, yet it still placed a heavy burden on civilians living in their territory, in the form of billeting troops, their propensity to supplement their own rations through plundering, and the compulsory purchase of supplies

for the army. They were further hampered throughout the winter of 1690–91 by the actions of the rapparees, whose raids across the Shannon stole livestock, burned crops and even threatened their soldiers. Regardless of how well the fighting was going for either side, their demand for provisions remained constant, although whether these supplies were obtained in an organised or a chaotic manner said a lot about the progress of the war.

Chapter 6 — Strategies for Recovery

Introduction

In the aftermath of the destruction and social disruption caused throughout Ireland during the war, efforts had to be made to commence the national recovery from this state. The primary responsibility for this lay with the owners of property, as across the country tenants fled their holdings in the face of mounting rental arrears, debts that many of them would find impossible to repay given both the damage caused to their properties and the poor economic conditions nationwide. This was the proprietorial challenge that faced landlords and local bodies, and it involved addressing the hardships of tenants through financial assistance and rent abatements, while balancing this with trying to recover their own losses, as well as securing sufficient income to enable them to repair the damage done to their personal property. In order to assess how this was undertaken, the difficulties facing landlords and their tenants across Ireland, as a result of the impact of the Williamite war, must be examined.

Initially, the challenges facing three different proprietors will be looked at through estate correspondence—one each from the regions of Ulster, the midlands and the west—with the issues facing the landowners or their agents, and their responses to these challenges, examined in turn. This is followed by an investigation into the response of Derry corporation to the severe challenges that faced the city and its environs in the aftermath of the siege. This concerned not only the corporation's relationship with its tenants, but also its attempts to look to other sources for assistance in beginning the city's recovery, such as its use of Derry's specific circumstances to further its appeals to the London Society and the crown for reparations, in order to repair the damage caused during the war. Bishop William King's efforts to aid the recovery of his new diocese in the same area are also addressed, as is the impact on the Brownlow estate in northeast Armagh. Finally, the Duke of Ormond's enormous estate, centred on counties Kilkenny and Tipperary, which were within the area that was badly affected by the winter of 1690–91, will be examined. Paying particular attention to the arrears due on leases across his properties as a result of the war will allow

an analysis of the impact of the war on the transfer of ownership of land and tenant mobility, as well as regional variations of war damage within more localised areas. This discussion of the attempts to commence the recovery from the war will also complement the previous descriptions of the threats posed to civilians and landowners across the country, as in the vast majority of cases a landlord's record of individual leases is the only evidence extant concerning the fate of ordinary people across Ireland during the war.

Commencing the recovery

The Williamite war in Ireland caused much violence and destruction to ordinary people and their property during the war period, with the flight of people from the land as a result. While very aware of the dangers of this period, efforts were being made by some landlords to reassert their control over their property, even while the Williamite war was still very much on-going. The lands of Colonel Thomas Flower in north Dublin have been discussed previously, as his property at Finglas was severely spoiled due to its use as the site of the main Williamite army camp in the week following the battle of the Boyne.[1] The main portion of Flower's property interests were based in Queen's County, a region that was severely affected by both the Jacobite army's retreat from the Boyne, as well as the military skirmishes and rapparee attacks throughout the area during the winter of 1690–91. It was in this context that Flower employed Edmond Doyne to travel to Ireland to act as his agent and to attempt to put his affairs in order. Arriving in Dublin from Chester just two weeks after the battle of the Boyne, Doyne spent his initial period based in the capital, amidst the transfer of governance of the city to the Williamites, where he tried to locate friends and to get the ear of influential figures such as Robert Rochfort, who agreed to give him a letter of assistance.[2] Doyne's initial correspondence with his employer demonstrates the confusion and disorderly environment in which he was attempting to work, with letters to Flower during this period written from

[1] See chapter two; Thomas Flower was married to Mary Temple, daughter of Sir John Temple who served as William III's attorney general in Ireland. The Flower lands were based primarily in Queen's County, with the seat of the family at Durrow.

[2] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Dublin, 22 July 1690; Finglas, 2 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473); See below for more information on Rochfort.

Dublin city, the Flower property at Finglas, the seat of the family at Durrow in Queen's County, as well as from Waterford city.[3] These letters frequently repeated the same information and asked the same questions of his employer, showing Doyne's uncertainty regarding Flower's instructions and demonstrating the weakened position Doyne was in by being merely a land agent, rather than having the full personal authority and connections that came with being the actual landowner. They also clearly show the difficulties that arose due to the agent receiving no reciprocal correspondence at all from his employer for a full six months, until February 1691.[4]

These letters also show the consequences of the breakdown in law and order across the country during the war. In the initial period after his arrival, Doyne's priority was to recover as much of Flower's stolen livestock and goods as possible amidst a very challenging environment, and he had managed to secure 20 sows and 30 young cattle at the family home at Durrow by August.[5] He also travelled to Kilkenny and Waterford in an attempt to recover 76 bags of wool that had been seized from Flower's estate, supposedly for King James's use, only to discover that 50 of the bags had already been shipped from the port prior to the Jacobite defeat at the Boyne.[6] These issues highlight the negative impact of Flower's absence from his estate during the war, as the family were among the Protestants that had fled Ireland prior to the outbreak of the conflict. Given the seizure of goods by Jacobite forces, and the widespread plundering by rapparees and soldiers from both sides, it is questionable whether Flower would have been able to preserve many of these possessions even if he had personally remained on his property. Nevertheless, his absence would have meant that his home and estate were particularly easy targets, as he was unable to protect them through either the use of physical force or through negotiation with Jacobite officials, leaving Doyne with the difficult task of attempting to recover as much of these losses as he could. In his letters Doyne frequently referred to the difficulties he had in employing trustworthy men to assist him in looking after livestock or

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[3] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 2 Aug. 1690; Durrow, 18 Aug. 1690; Waterford, 26 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[4] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 14 Feb. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[5] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Durrow, 18 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[6] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Waterford, 26 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).

putting Flower's property in order during this period, lamenting how he 'cannot gett one of these rougues to work one dayes work for me unless I pay them every day'; this was a simple enough request that proved problematic given the lack of rental income to pay these wages.[7] The absence of men that he felt he could trust also reflects the volatile conditions throughout the countryside, with rapparee activity posing a threat to the estate and likely discouraging ordinary people from assisting the efforts of Williamite supporters. This shortage of labour had further consequences, as he was unable to get assistance in harvesting what little corn or other crops that remained unspoilt on the estate—the majority of which was 'wast[e] and common as all the co[u]ntry is'—thereby reducing his supply of food and the funds available to facilitate his recovery efforts.[8]

The previously outlined difficult circumstances throughout the midlands are also very evident in the correspondence. It was claimed that in Flower's absence several of his tenants had taken advantage of this period of instability and had proven themselves to be 'greatt rougues' by driving off livestock and stealing other goods from the estate.[9] The greater threat to Flower's property was from soldiers and rapparees, and Doyne gives first hand accounts of their activities in his letters. Rapparee raids and opportunistic thefts by both Irish and English alike hampered recovery efforts during this initial period, with the area plagued by 'so many raperies of the English as well as of the Irish that I can hardly stir from whatt little stock that you have here, for when the English comes I doe stope them from them, but at night I am forced to have 3 or foure to watch for feare of the Irish'.[10] This additional expense of having to provide watchmen for Flower's livestock each night was a further drain on Doyne's limited finances, and he subsequently lamented to Flower how his outgoings were 'perhaps a great deale more then you thinke'.[11] During one of his visits to Dublin, where he continued to try to ingratiate himself with military officers and government officials, Doyne wrote of being concerned for the estate at Durrow during his absence, feeling unable to trust any of his employees and 'afraid that I shall lose

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[7] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Durrow, 18 Aug. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Dublin, 27 Nov. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).

sufficient by being here [in Dublin] this fortnight, what with Rapparees and with troopers that [are] quartered in your house in Durrow'.[12] The latter refers to a troop of thirteen Dutch cavalrymen that were quartered in Flower's house during the period, with their demands for food and forage—which resulted in Doyne being forced to buy oats to feed their horses—served as yet another drain on the estate, and echoed previous accounts of having to quarter soldiers. The presence and conduct of the army in the area led him to express his fear that he would 'not save much of whatt I have gott here together, for the armey are so unruley'.[13] Even the army's attempts to curb rapparee activity caused problems for the local population, as 'the English burns and destroy all wherever they come in pursuite of them'.[14]

While thefts of livestock and the physical damage caused to the estate were significant problems, the non-payment of rent and the mounting arrears from the previous two years was perhaps an even bigger issue. Doyne encountered severe problems in trying to secure rent from Flower's tenants, and by October he wrote that he had 'not gott one farthing of your rent as yett'.[15] Dismayed by this, Doyne reports having asked 'Sarjeant Eclin whatt cours[e] I should take about rent, and he told me as for protestants I should not be hard on them as yett, for there will be a rule for there paying of rent very soone, but as for the papists I may take what cours[e] I think fitt'.[16] This advice clearly shows the religious tensions that were very much evident across the country during this period, and reinforces how ordinary Catholics were disproportionately affected by religious prejudice and policies upon the reestablishment of Williamite control across the country. However, this comment also shows how stagnant the rental sector of the Irish economy had become in general, with rent arrears not expected from Protestant tenants and payment only conceivable from Catholic tenants if the landlord was in a strong enough position to be able to force the issue, which very few were during the winter of 1690–91.

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[12] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Dublin, 27 Nov. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[13] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Durrow, 4 Dec. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[14] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 15 Jan. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[15] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 4 Oct. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[16] Ibid.

Not only was Doyne unable to collect rent from his tenants during this period, but by the winter he was being pressurised by Flower's own creditors for the payment of rent due to them, and from whom a substantial portion of the estate was leased. In December, Doyne wrote to Flower to inform him that:

> My lord Bishop [Francis Marsh, Archbishop of Dublin] is very earnest for rent and so is Aland [Jonathan Aland] and doctor Fitzpatrick, but as for your great landlord, my Lord of Ormond, his receivers summoned me there several times, but it was not my luck to be at Durrow, but I spoke to Mr Smith, he bid me never heed them but to go and hear what they say'.[17]

This demonstrates the other side of the issue, with Flower being squeezed for payment from above by his own landlords, all the while trying to press his own tenants to pay what they owed to him. The importance of land and the rental market to the Irish economy during the period meant that this breakdown in the transfer of wealth was a major problem, and one that was widespread throughout the country. The most earnest of Flower's creditors was Archbishop Marsh, who in May 1691 ordered his agent Thomas Ashe to attempt to distrain Flower's lands as he was in arrears for rents for the years 1687–90, with Doyne managing to compromise with Ashe by agreeing to pay the rents for 1687 and 1688 but getting an abatement for the other two years.[18]

By spring 1691 Doyne was beginning to get elements of the estate somewhat more organised, tending to more mundane matters that would have been common during a normal year, such as employing someone to tend to the fruit trees, addressing the small amount of livestock killed by cold weather in March, and the need to purchase a stallion to breed with the horses that remained on the estate.[19] Nevertheless, rapparees remained a threat to the estate throughout the spring of 1691, with the Dutch troopers quartered at Durrow managing to fight off an attack in March, but not before the rapparees

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[17] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Durrow, 20 Dec. 1690 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473); Jonathan Aland (d. 1691) was the grandson and heir of Captain Henry Aland, a member of Colonel Henry Prittie's regiment of horse that had fought for Cromwell in Ireland in 1649. Henry Aland was granted land in Waterford, Kildare and Queen's County as a result, and managed to have these grants confirmed under the Restoration Settlement. Jonathan died in 1691 and the land was inherited by his daughter Sarah, and subsequently passed onto her son John Fortescue Aland; see: PRONI Introduction to Villiers-Stuart papers (http://www.proni.gov.uk/introduction_villiers-stuart_papers.pdf).

[18] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 8 May 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).

[19] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 14 Feb. & 15 Mar. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).

managed to 'sett fire in the stable and the black cassell [castle] of Durrow, soe that they have burned all whatt corn and wooll and other goods I had there, and foure of the Dutch geldings, a little nagg and a fine colt'.[20] Doyne's efforts to restock the estate were disrupted further that summer with the recommencement of the military campaign, as he had to procure 'an order from the General for securing what fewe sheep you have yourself and other cattle that the tenants has on your lands in Durrow from the Army, being now all moving towards the Enemy', for fear that they would be seized by the army on the march.[21] He was also well aware of the poor state of the economy during the war, and the low price for commodities such as wool, which in August he noted 'beares noe rate as yet, soe that I hope to preserve it until it beares something'.[22]

By the summer Doyne had still not managed to get any substantial payment of rent from the tenants at Durrow, save a total of £20 for grazing rights and 'some small drybls [dribbles] that serves to maintain us'.[23] He had more success with Flower's other properties, managing to set the previously desolate land at Finglas to some Quakers for fourteen shillings per acre, and to rent out a townhouse in Kilkenny to 'a very responsible man, Alderman Cornock, for 3 years at the rent of £12 per annum'.[24] The location of these properties clearly made them much easier to lease, with a house in the relative security of a town such as Kilkenny, or land within a few miles of the capital, proving more attractive to tenants than rural properties closer to the Jacobite frontier and therefore vulnerable to rapparee raids. Doyne's difficulties in getting tenants to pay their debts continued following the end of the war, with some trying to persuade him to take into account what they had paid 'in brass money and in hay and butter and cheese' during the war[25]. Other tenants who owed money to several landlords, such as the neighbouring Plunkett family, had to weigh up which landowner was going to be harder on them, with one tenant at Kildownane 'afraid that your honour will fall on him for your rent, so that the

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[20] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Kilkenny, 10 Mar. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[21] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 19 May 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[22] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Clonmel, 12 Aug. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[23] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 8 May & 25 July 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[24] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 8 & 19 May 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[25] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 10 Nov. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).

tenant would rather pay his rent to your honour then to Madam Plunkett'.[26] Doyne was performing a similar balancing act between Flower's creditors, as he attempted to repay debts due to the Bishop of Ossory among others.[27]

Over the following year Doyne regularly assured Flower that his affairs were 'in good order in this country', although information concerning the actual amount of rent that he had succeeded in gathering from his tenants is scarce in the correspondence.[28] What comments he did make concerning rents were largely negative, such as in March 1692 when he wrote that 'I have got no rent from the tenants at Finglas as yet', and he described how negotiations were particularly difficult with one of these tenants, Mr Gray, for reasons unconnected with the conflict, as 'he is doting and does not know what he says'.[29] He also noted that it was unlikely he would be able to get as lucrative a lease for the vacant lands at Finglas as ones agreed before the war, remarking 'if I can set it I fear it will not answer anything like this is'.[30] Rather than discussing leases, Doyne focused his correspondence on Flower's agricultural concerns, such as his successful shearing of his 1072 sheep and the birth of 456 lambs in the spring of 1692.[31] Comments such as this show the gradual recovery of agriculture in the aftermath of the war, with the profits from the sale of Flower's wool helping to keep the estate solvent during a difficult period. Doyne also continued to try to recover as much of his employer's lost livestock as possible, and did his best to take advantage of the opportunity presented by one of the 'raparees who came in according to articles and informed me that, if I would be kind, that he would tell me where there is a parsell of your black stock'.[32] Making use of his military contacts, he enlisted Captain Forth to appeal to the Lord Chancellor for permission to go into Connacht to try and recover the '40 or 50 or more cattle', but he was unsuccessful in this appeal.[33]

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[26] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 20 Nov. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[27] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 31 Oct. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[28] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 29 Mar. 1692 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 14 May 1692 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[31] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 2 July 1692 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[32] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 19 Dec. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).
[33] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 26 Dec. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473); While the authorities were receptive to Doyne's request they would only grant him leave to pursue the stolen cattle if he could give monetary security to both the Chancery and the Sheriff of the county in which the cattle had been taken, in line with the legal concept of replevin. This was

Despite these difficulties, the opportunities presented by the end of the war were not lost on Doyne, who was aware of the potential for Flower to expand his holdings at the expense of 'all the Irish propritors [that] come home not, but are not restored to their estates as yet'.[34] The lands confiscated from Catholics during and after the war became mired in various degrees of legal disarray over the next decade, but at the close of the war they were rightly viewed as potentially very lucrative. While Flower was ultimately unsuccessful in securing any of these lands, towards the end of the decade many other landlords and speculators were, with this policy of land confiscation resulting in the percentage of land owned by Catholics across Ireland falling from 22 per cent in 1688 to 14 per cent in 1703.[35] Overall, a range of factors severely hampered Doyne's initial efforts to reassert control over Flower's estate, including the physically dangerous environment; the fluctuating political and military situation in the country; the effort required to simply safeguard Flower's livestock and portable property from plundering by soldiers or rapparees; the lack of communications or specific instructions from his employer; and the pressure being exerted by Flower's own creditors to pay his rent. These were issues that impacted upon any landlord as they tried to reassert control over their property during this period, but Flower's attempt to do this from England made it even more difficult.

Unlike Flower, Kean O'Hara was resident at his estate in county Sligo for the majority of the war period. He had been staying in Dublin at the beginning of 1689, a period he later described as 'being very troublesome and Protestants under great hardships about their estates and goods'.[36] Following his mother's flight to England in March he returned to his estate in Sligo, and took personal control of it for the remainder of the war, living for the majority of this period under Jacobite control.[37] Within two months of his return to Sligo he had lost

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impossible given the shortage of money on the estate combined with neither Doyne nor his rapparee informer being certain as to the exact whereabouts of the stolen livestock.

[34] Edmond Doyne to Col. Thomas Flower, Finglas, 31 Oct. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11473).

[35] J.G. Simms, *The Williamite confiscation in Ireland, 1690–1703* (London, 1956), p. 160.

[36] Kean O'Hara to John Edwards, Templehouse, 22 May 1697 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/210.

[37] John Fleming to Kean O'Hara, unknown, 10 Mar. 1689 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/3/10; After the death of Kean's father, his mother Rose had married Sir Richard Aldworth,

£600 worth of horses and livestock, through a combination of rapparee activity and stock taken for the Jacobite army, but he was also appointed deputy governor of Sligo for the duration of the war period.[38] His pragmatic cooperation with the Jacobites helped him to cope financially throughout the war, despite his difficulties with his tenants.[39] Prior to his return to Sligo, several of his tenants had already fled their holdings, while the Perceval family from 'Templehouse, hath taken out your boat upon the lough, and are carrying what little things they have into the islands, and keepe the boat at the islande every night this weeke, and as they pretend its for feare of Sligoe people'.[40] With this level of fear among the local gentry it is unsurprising that O'Hara, like Flower, had extreme difficulties getting his tenants to pay rent during the war period. In the face of 'such stealing in the co[u]ntry that noe man can count himself secure', O'Hara and his agents attempted to convince the departed tenants to return, but many had fled 'to the county of Roscommon, some to the county of Mayo, and disperst up and down to save their cattle, that few of them tends their ploughing.'[41] This comment specifically highlights the large numbers of the ordinary population across the country that abandoned their homes during the conflict, either in fear of plundering at the hands of the military or rapparees; in an attempt to recover valuable livestock; or more simply due to economic hardship.

Of O'Hara's tenants that remained resident on the land, his agent John Fleming was not very confident that any would pay their rent, writing how he thought that 'a great many thinks to pay none'.[42] Indeed, this was the case for the duration of the war, not only on O'Hara's own estate but also on his mother's property in the area. His half-sister Mary wrote to him from England at the close of the conflict, bemoaning how she had 'not received any rent from thence this three years', and asking him to 'inquire how affairs are amongst them what tenants are living, what rents they are in arrears and how near their leases are

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a landowner from Cork who served as Chief Secretary of Ireland from 1695–6; see: www.thepeerage.com/p25755.htm.

[38] Kean O'Hara to John Edwards, Templehouse, 22 May 1697 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/210.

[39] See chapter five for more on O'Hara's involvement with the Jacobite war effort and his attempts to switch his allegiance to the Williamites in September 1691.

[40] John Fleming to Kean O'Hara, unknown, 10 Mar. 1689 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/3/10.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

expiring'.[43] O'Hara's first-hand view of the estate by remaining resident on it during the war was an advantage in this area, as he did not have to rely on letters from an agent as Flower did, but his presence meant that he was used in this manner by his mother to manage her property. Seemingly unaware of the extent of the problems landlords in Ireland were having securing rent for the war period, Kean's mother accused him of 'unjust dealings' in her affairs after receiving significantly less rent than she had been expecting.[44] He took offence to these accusations, however, writing of 'the paines I tooke to gett you the little money I sent you and to sett as much of your land as I could for this present year, to the utmost I could gett for it'.[45] He explained to his mother the problems other property owners in the area were having, such as Sir Edward Crofton, who felt it necessary to grant an abatement for all his tenants from 1688 until All Hallows' 1692, and who was:

> ...glad to sett long leases of as much of his land as hee could get tenants to take for less than haulfe the old rent, and nothwithstanding great part of his estate here is wast, that hee could not sett at near haulfe the old rent, and tis the same case with all the gentlemen in my Countrey that have lands here and will bee soe, till some tenants come from the north or other places to inhabitt this Countrey, for there is not haulfe people enough at present in it to take haulfe the land that is wast... [and] what land it sett, is at soe low a rent.[46]

In this letter O'Hara specifically outlines the variety of problems affecting landlords across the country during the period that are also clear from other sources, such as the damage caused to the land by the war, the flight of tenants from the land and the scarcity of replacement tenants who were willing to sign new leases at anything more than significantly reduced rent levels.

Additionally, much like Flower, O'Hara was being squeezed by his own landlords, particularly the Bishop of Clogher, Richard Tennison. In November 1692, Tennison wrote to O'Hara to tell him that 'I see no reason why I should abate anything of what you owe me, for I could have had £250 ready money for

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[43] Mary Aldworth to Kean O'Hara, Stanleks, 29 Oct. 1691 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/33.
[44] Kean O'Hara to Rose Peyton, unknown, 3 Mar. 1693 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/68.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

your lease, and then enjoyed the lands in the late troubles'.[47] In this instance Tennison appears to be referring to arrears that had been accrued on the estate before the war period, debts that landlords were not inclined to abate. With debts that were due from the war period itself Tennison seems to have been more understanding, with Fleming noting that he was 'glad to heare that the Bishop is soe kind to you, and that you have such incouragement in your affairs there', suggesting that an arrangement had been made for an abatement for this period.[48]

O'Hara was making a great effort to get any remaining tenants to stay on the land and to try to get them 'to continue in there farmes and cutt there turfs and neglect none of there business'.[49] He was also well aware that the tenants themselves were 'fearing arrears', and that they were all too conscious of the possibility of getting 'lands cheap enough else where'.[50] He took steps to try and protect his tenants from rapparees that were still active in the area as late as 1693, when he wrote to his stepfather Richard Aldworth to ask for his assistance in having a troop of dragoons from Sligo town posted to the area around his property and 'quartered in such places as the sheriff and Justices of the Peace shall think fittest for reducing of their mischief'.[51] Aldworth could find 'no precedent' for this 'extraordinary request' and was unable to grant it, but promised to secure orders to have dragoons 'march thither and suppish [suppress] these Rapperes, or make them fly the country'.[52] Unfortunately, as with the Flower estate, it is impossible to quantify specifically how successful O'Hara was with these efforts to protect his tenants and reset his estate, given the absence of a definitive rent roll for the property. However, the family correspondence suggests that, at least on his mother's property, the fallout from the war period was still evident as late as 1695, when Aldworth informed O'Hara that he had sacked his agent and that he was not going to renew the lease of any

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[47] Richard Tennison to Kean O'Hara, Dublin, 30 Nov. 1692 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/58.
[48] John Fleming to Kean O'Hara, unknown, 7 June 1692 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/45.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Richard Aldworth to Kean O'Hara, Dublin Castle, 5 Sep. 1693 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/84.
[52] Ibid.

of his tenants unless they had cleared their arrears still extant from before the war.[53] In April, Aldworth also noted that he had sacked his agent, again pointing to the difficulties that non-resident landlords had keeping their estates in order during this turbulent period.[54] O'Hara's personal presence on the estate was likely a help in its management, as was his family connection to a figure such as Aldworth, which would have been helpful in his negotiations with creditors and in other matters. Indeed, the value of this ready-made family connection is particularly evident when compared to the efforts Doyne had to go to in order to cultivate similar connections in Dublin during the war.

Another estate on which the landlord was absent for the duration of the war period was the property of Dacre Barrett at Clones in county Monaghan. While Doyne had faced a variety of problems in his management of the Flower property in Queen's County and Dublin, including widespread property damage and theft, the management of the Barrett property appears to have been even more problematic. The damage caused by the war to parts of Cavan and Monaghan has been noted previously, specifically around Clones, with Barrett's agent William Westgarth visiting the area during the winter of 1689–90, but feeling that it was 'too hazardous to live there at present'.[55] Westgarth had in fact taken over responsibility for Barrett's concerns from the previous agent, Walter Dawson, and had agreed to do the job for the same annual rate of £50 that Dawson had received.[56] One of Barrett's main reasons for replacing Dawson was the latter's supposed lack of communication with his employer concerning his estate. Dawson disputed this and recounted in detail the various letters he had sent to his employer during the spring of 1690.[57] Given the chaotic nature of communications during the war—as already demonstrated by the difficulties between Doyne and Flower, in addition to documented complaints about the ineptitude and 'ill-management of the post office' in Ireland—it is certainly

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[53] Richard Aldworth to Kean O'Hara, Dublin Castle, 24 Jan. 1695 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/134.
[54] Richard Aldworth to Kean O'Hara, Dublin Castle, 27 Apr. 1695 (NLI, O'Hara Papers, Ms. 20,277), T2812/4/141.
[55] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 28 Dec. 1689 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 62.
[56] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 14 Feb. 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 63.
[57] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 19 Jun. 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 112.

possible that none of Dawson's letters reached Barrett in Essex.[58] Nevertheless, in this instance the poor performance of Barrett's estate during the period was a more likely reason for Dawson's dismissal, with Barrett dissatisfied with his mounting rental arrears and looking for someone to blame. Dawson, rather legitimately in the context of the situation on the Flower and O'Hara estates, placed the blame for his inability to secure the rents on the disorder of the war period and the damage caused to the region by attacks by Jacobite troops, which had been particularly severe in this part of Ulster. He also noted that 'all over the north the tenants do insult so much by reason that we have no civil government amongst us. The strongest hand carries all here'.[59] The collapse of the usual mechanisms of law and order meant that it had become impossible to force the few tenants who were still resident on their property to pay their rents, as Doyne discovered in Queen's County the following winter.

By June 1690 the number of tenants left on Barrett's entire estate had been significantly depleted.[60] Those that had stayed or recently returned to the land were swift to try and negotiate better terms for themselves under the circumstances, with some asking for the security of leases longer than ones Barrett had been previously willing to agree to, while others simply requested reduced rents.[61] Seemingly loath to give in to these demands, Barrett enlisted the services of Westgarth to replace Dawson, despite the latter outlining his plans to 'build up the mill which [was] quick destroyed by the Irish', and to try and set as much of the lands as possible.[62] Dawson also alleged that this dispute between the two men, as to which of them was responsible for the estate during the

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[58] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 28 Dec. 1689 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 62; The negative impact of the war on the postal system across Ireland was acknowledged by a proclamation from the Jacobite court in November 1689, admitting that 'several postmasters have been disabled from keeping horses and servants sufficient for this purpose, by reason of their being burthened with quartering of soldiers, which if not remedied may prove a great hindrance to our service', see 'Posts and mails', 30 Nov. 1689, *Ormonde MSS*, o.s., ii, 417–18; 'Affirming the exemptions provided the postal service to ensure the conveyance of letters and packets', 28 Feb. 1691, in James Kelly (ed.), *Proclamations issued during the reigns of William and Mary and William III* (forthcoming, 2013), no. 48.

[59] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 16 Mar. 1689 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 108.

[60] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 19 June 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 64.

[61] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 12 Mar. 1689 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 108.

[62] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 2 Jan. 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 110.

handover period, had resulted in '50 houses being quite destroyed by the country people for firing, and for this reason several of the old tenants would have come on their former habitations where they had before the wars, but that they found there would be a dispute between Mr. Westgarth and me'.[63] He was disheartened at being replaced by Westgarth, who he bitterly alleged would simply farm out the running of the estate to someone else, to the detriment of both Barrett's finances and his tenants.[64]

Westgarth commenced his attempts to set the estate in the aftermath of the battle of the Boyne in July 1690. He encountered the same problems that had been noted by Dawson, and described the estate as 'waste except Mr Hamilton's lands and one Andersons which they lie on'.[65] The tenants that remained were 'moaning for an abatement' and it was clear to Westgarth that he would need to give prospective tenants more attractive terms in order to encourage them to settle on the land.[66] He wrote to Barrett, informing him that there would be 'a necessity of enlarging your order to 5 [if] not 7 years for setting, for I am sure nothing will sit down upon the encouragement of barely 3 years', thereby requiring Barrett to agree to offer potential tenants longer leases than he had previously been willing to consider.[67] This is representative of the fluid market that faced landlords during and immediately after the war, as a dearth of available tenants left landlords in a poor bargaining position when trying to set their lands, while potential tenants used the damage caused to property and the countryside as additional leverage in these negotiations.

In 1691 Barrett moved to Clones from Essex, following his failed attempt to prosecute a commission of lunacy against his father. While living in Clones he managed to secure a position on the Monaghan commission of the peace and was elected MP for the county.[68] It is likely that his presence on the estate during this

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[63] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 2 Jan. 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 110.
[64] Walter Dawson to Dacre Barrett, 19 Jun. 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 112.
[65] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 31 July 1691 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 69.
[66] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 19 July 1690, no. 68 & 31 July 1690 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 69.
[67] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 31 July 1691 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6), no. 69.
[68] PRONI introduction to the Barrett-Lennard papers (Nov. 2007) p. 5.

period and the influence he cultivated locally helped in its recovery during the years following the war, with the result that he had had 'good success' in setting the estate by the summer of 1692, despite still being owed some outstanding arrears of rent by some tenants from 1690.[69] By 1696 Barrett had returned to London upon the death of his estranged father and he asked Westgarth for a full overview of the current condition of the estate. By this time things had picked up further, with Westgarth describing the estate at Clones as 'near got up and more than fully dispersed'.[70] This timeframe for resetting the majority of the estate largely fits in with that experienced on both the Flower and O'Hara properties, with land on all three estates largely re-set to tenants by the middle of the decade. This does not mean that the proprietors were as comfortable financially as they had been before the war period, as evidence from all three indicates that in order to set the land they had to agree to less financially lucrative leases than they had been getting before the war.

The three estates faced largely similar difficulties during this period, such as the need to repair physical damage caused by the war, the threat of rapparee attacks, and the need to strike a balance in recouping rental arrears from before and after the war period, while not overly hampering the recovery of their tenants. The difficulty of addressing these issues appears to have been heightened in cases where the proprietor was not resident on the estate, and this may have been a factor in cases where families not involved in land confiscations were unable to extricate themselves from financial predicament and decided to sell their estates in Ireland in the aftermath of the war.[71] The success of these three families in overcoming the problems caused by the Williamite war meant that in each case their estates would remain in the hands of their direct descendants until at least the nineteenth century.

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[69] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 3 and 10 May 1692 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 76 and 78.
[70] William Westgarth to Dacre Barrett, 24 Aug. 1696 (PRONI, Barrett-Lennard papers, T2529/6) no. 89.
[71] Patrick Walsh, *The making of the Irish Protestant Ascendency: The life of William Conolly, 1662–1729* (Woodbridge, 2010), p. 68.

Derry Corporation and the recovery in Ulster

The variety of problems facing the family properties of the Flower, O'Hara and Barrett families were also experienced by other landowners across the country, such as Derry corporation. In addition to the corporation's official role in governing the city and its affairs, it was also a significant landowner, responsible for properties and tenements within the city walls as well as additional land in the surrounding area. The area around Derry had suffered extensively during the initial year of the war, as previously noted, particularly with the siege of the city in the spring and summer of 1689. In the winter of 1690 the corporation set about examining the rental accounts of the properties under their control in order to assess the damage caused to their finances by the siege. By December the committee appointed for this purpose delivered its report and pledged to try to secure all rental arrears outstanding prior to 25 December 1688, but to abate all rent due for the following year until November 1689, 'by reason of the great devastation happened therein'.[72] For the subsequent year ending November 1690 the corporation's tenants were asked to pay five-eighths of the rent previously due, with this rising to six-eighths for 1691. This report provides a simplified timeline for the state of the economy in the area around Derry during and after the siege, with its complete disruption reflected in the total abatement of rent for the length of the siege and the five months immediately afterwards. The slight recovery in the subsequent year was equated with a thirty-eight per cent reduction in rent, with a twenty per cent discount permitted for the forthcoming year. These initial estimates were made while the war was still ongoing, and they turned out to be quite optimistic, with a subsequent report in February 1692 noting that there were several accounts still in arrears to the corporation by this stage and fifteen separate leaseholders who were still getting rental discounts of between eighteen and forty per cent on the rates they had been paying prior to the war.[73]

In addition to these general guidelines, the corporation also included a list of 33 separate accounts that were examined in detail. Several of these had outstanding debt in arrears dating to before the siege, where others were

[72] Londonderry Corporation, 18 Dec. 1690.
[73] Ibid., 22 Feb. 1692.

granted abatements of rent in excess of the general discounts outlined above, usually due to excessive damage caused to these properties. For example, Humphrey Torry was only asked to pay thirty per cent of the full rent due on his land for 1690 due to him 'having ploughed only 3 acres thereof and grazed no more than 3 cows thereon'.[74] The thirty-three rental accounts outlined in the report include records of a number of new leases being granted. Most of these were for tenements within the city walls, and in the majority of them the previous tenant is indicated as being deceased, having died during the period of the siege. These are among a few brief references in the minutes of the corporation to citizens of the city having died during the siege, with the large death toll seemingly glossed over in the records in favour of a focus on the revival of the city as a whole. This element of renewal within the city is furthered by some of the conditions placed upon the new tenants in several of these cases. Roger Austin and James Foster were to be leased a tenement each at a cost of 5s per annum. Both had belonged to citizens who had recently died and in both cases the lease was only to be finalised when they 'put a slate or tile roof thereon'.[75] This directly shows the damage still extant due to the siege and the efforts made by both the corporation and the citizens to rebuild their city.

Given the extensive damage done to Derry during the siege, any assistance the corporation or the city's inhabitants could get in repairing property or infrastructure would have been very welcome. The corporation had taken the lead in this regard in the immediate aftermath of the siege, procuring grants of food and supplies for the city, in addition to the aforementioned grant of £700 in two instalments from the Irish Society in London, as well as the abatement of rent on the various tax farms.[76] However, the corporation made further efforts in this regard, and in August 1690 a committee had been formed 'for considering of ways and means for petitioning their Majesties for reparation of the damages sustained in Londonderry, upon account of the defence thereof since the beginning of October 1688'.[77] This was the beginning of what would be

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[74] Londonderry Corporation, 18 Dec. 1690.
[75] Ibid.
[76] See chapter one for more information on this initial grant from the Irish Society and the corporation's actions in the immediate aftermath of the siege.
[77] Londonderry Corporation, 1 Aug. 1690.

a concerted effort to petition directly to the crown for reparations in this manner. Two weeks later it was agreed by the committee that the corporation would petition the crown for compensation for the 'losses sustained by the inhabitants of this city and others in the neighbourhood, [which] have much impoverished the richest, and undone many poor families'.[78] The language used in this decision points to the distress that the siege caused to the city's inhabitants, with the idea of poor families becoming 'undone' suggesting severe levels of poverty, particularly amongst the lower social classes. Whether the corporation's efforts to appeal for reparations would have been as intensive as they were had the wealthier elements of society not also been 'impoverished' by the war is a moot point, but one worth noting given the background of the corporation members as noted above.

The composition of the corporation's members from within the upper levels of provincial society did, however, mean that they were able to draw upon several politically well-connected friends and colleagues to help lobby on their behalf. On 15 August 1690 it was decided that in relation to petitioning the crown for assistance, William Conolly should 'attend the Lord [sic] Rochfort and all other friends that will advise and assist with their friendship and countenance'.[79] Robert Rochfort, a successful lawyer who served as Recorder for Derry from 1680 until 1707, represented the corporation's interests in Dublin and London.[80] The other key figure in these efforts was David Cairnes who, as a lawyer and a burgess on Derry corporation since 1680, had also played a key part during the siege, travelling twice to London in 1689 to petition William III and parliament for military assistance.[81] The Irish Society later appointed both Rochfort and Cairnes as commissioners for overseeing the rebuilding of Derry and Coleraine in June 1692.[82] Rochfort and Cairnes joined William Conolly and John Mogridge as the corporation's main lobbyists during the period, and the

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[78] Londonderry Corporation, 14 Aug. 1690.
[79] Ibid., 15 Aug. 1690.
[80] Rochfort was elected MP for Westmeath in 1692 and later rose to become speaker of the house in 1695 on the back of his involvement with Capel's court party; see: C. I. McGrath, 'Rochfort, Robert (1652–1727)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004).
[81] Cairns was later elected MP for Derry in 1692 and 1695; see: Piers Wauchope, 'Cairnes, David (1645–1722)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004).
[82] Irish Society, *Proceedings of the Honourable Society*, p. 77.

communication of grievances and the request for reparations for the city was primarily entrusted to them.[83]

Mogridge was sent to London to present a petition to the crown following a meeting on 14 November 1690.[84] At the same meeting it was decided that the corporation would ask the citizens of Derry 'to signify unto [the Chamberlain] the utmost that they will be willing to contribute and advance towards the defraying of the charge' of sending Mogridge to London and to settle solicitor's charges associated with their petition.[85] This is the sole instance in the minutes from the period in which the corporation had to raise funds in this manner, which reinforces the fact that the corporation's finances were in a very poor condition by this stage. There was seemingly not a very enthusiastic response by the general population to this request, however, as on 18 December it was agreed that the members of the corporation would contribute extra funds themselves, with all Aldermen asked to provide one and a half guineas each and every Burgess a single guinea.[86] While the potential benefits of government assistance to the city and consequently to the members of the corporation are obvious, the latter's willingness to put forth their own money for this task, at a time when everyone in the city had their own personal economic difficulties, shows how serious and valid they considered their grievances to be, and suggests a confidence that the crown would come to their aid. On 27 November it was decided that Mogridge was too ill and that the weather was too cold for him to travel to London as planned, so the grievances were to be sent to Rochfort and Cairnes in Dublin instead.[87] Rochfort replied to the corporation within a few weeks, suggesting that they draw up a list of estates convenient to the city that had been forfeited by their owners as a result of the war.[88] If Rochfort could succeed in getting one of these estates leased to the corporation the revenue generated would compensate the city for the war damage and hopefully provide them with a long-term source of income.

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[83] See chapter one for information concerning the responsibilities of John Mogridge and William Conolly.
[84] Londonderry Corporation, 14 Nov. 1690.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid., 18 Dec. 1690.
[87] Ibid., 27 Nov. 1690.
[88] Ibid., 18 Dec. 1690.

On 27 January 1691 several properties that could potentially be granted to the corporation were suggested by Conolly. Conolly had much experience in this area and would later become very well known for laying 'the foundation for his future fortune by speculating in and acting as an agent for the sale of forfeited Jacobite estates in the 1690s'.[89] The three properties mentioned were the Earl of Antrim's estate in Derry and Antrim, Sir John Bedlow's estate in Louth, and Shan O'Donneghy and Tomlin O'Mullan's land in Derry.[90] The Earl of Antrim's property emerges as the preferred choice, with the corporation requesting that a portion of his land with a rental value of £2,000 per annum be granted to the corporation, with the latter's Chamberlain, William Crookshanks, willing to act as lessee and trustee.[91] On 14 February Crookshanks was asked to travel to Dublin to finalise the deal, whereby on behalf of the corporation he and Conolly would be appointed lessees of lands in the barony of Glenarm and the liberties of Coleraine respectively, with an annual combined rental value of £1,300.[92] An agreement within the corporation meant that the financial risk involved in taking up the lease on this property was shared among 'the whole Chamber, and [that the] revenue of this city, shall be also by Common Seale obliged, and made over for and towards the said security' of the lease.[93]

The corporation had obtained their grant of land, but in August 1691 they had further good news when it was announced that the Queen:

> '...taking into her consideration the eminent services performed by the inhabitants of the said city in their defence of the same, when it was besieged in 1689, and being informed that during the siege their great church, the town hall, school house, main guard house, gates, and other public buildings were ruined, or very much shattered, and require rebuilding and repairing – is pleased for that end, to grant to the said Mayor and Commonalty the sum of £1,500 part of the rents payable to the Crown'.[94]

The goodwill towards Derry as shown in this grant was widespread in the aftermath of the siege, with the Lords Justices asked earlier in the same year to

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[89] Patrick McNally, 'Conolly, William (1662–1729)' in *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge, 2009).
[90] Londonderry Corporation, 27 Jan. 1691.
[91] Ibid., 27 Jan. 1691.
[92] Ibid., 14 Feb. 1691.
[93] Ibid., 5 Mar. 1691.
[94] Warrant to the Lords-Justices of Ireland, 21 Aug. 1691 (*CSPD, 1691*, p. 497).

'recommend it to the Irish Parliament, when called, to establish some particular immunities and privileges for Londonderry and Enniskillen'.[95] The corporation's efforts to get reparations for the damage caused by the siege was helped by this benevolence towards Derry, and news of the Queen's abatement of the £1,500 of rent was very well received.

It did not fully satisfy the corporation's demands however, and in October they launched another campaign for yet more reparations. Rochfort, Cairnes and Mogridge were again selected to prosecute this attempt, and they were to be allowed one sixth, or 3s 4d out of every £1 they procured from the government.[96] In December the corporation petitioned for more forfeited lands or, failing that, 'a sum yearly out of the customs, and imported excise of Londonderry, till we shall be satisfied', citing their poor financial circumstances once again, claiming that they 'never had any lands from the crown, for supporting the Magistracy of this city. That what little profits or revenue we had, is clearly sunk, by debts contracted, in defence of our charter in the last reign'.[97] They were even more ambitious in this attempt, requesting 'their Majesties letters patent for [the] coining of ten thousand pounds in copper half pence, their Majesties effigies on the one side, and the City arms on the other'.[98] These were ambitious demands, and despite the corporation's sense of entitlement regarding reparations for their actions, there is no record of them having success in realising any of them.

The corporation soon found that their new grants of land were not as profitable as they had hoped, even taking into consideration the Queen's abatement of £1,500 of the rent due on the property. Conolly informed them on 15 January 1692 that their new lease of the liberties of Coleraine 'is found to be set at a full rack rent to the tenants returned in the book of forfeitures, and that their being greatly harassed by the army, after their coming to winter quarters, will force most of them to remove, unless encouraged by a considerable abatement, to stay thereon'.[99] This is symptomatic of the economic difficulties faced by landholders such as Flower, O'Hara and Barrett in the period after the

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[95] Considerations concerning Ireland, 1691 (*CSPD, 1691*, pp 65–7).
[96] Londonderry Corporation, 8 Oct. 1691.
[97] Ibid., 17 Dec. 1691.
[98] Ibid., 17 Dec. 1691.
[99] Ibid., 15 Jan. 1692.

war. A combination of poor economic conditions and tenants' willingness to break their leases to take advantage of a surplus of leaseholds across the country meant that meeting annual rental payments was difficult for both landlords and tenants alike. In June 1693 the corporation received a letter on behalf of the revenue commissioners, questioning the financial status and viability of their farm of the Coleraine property.[100] They sent Alderman Lecky to Dublin to 'endeavour the clearing [of] the bonds to the Crown, and that he allow Mr Buthe to discharge as much of our bonds and rents to the Crown as he can by the bills of the army'.[101] The corporation was clearly having difficulties turning a profit on the land they had campaigned so hard to get, and their goodwill had clearly been exhausted among the authorities in Dublin.

Antrim's former property caused other major difficulties for the corporation. The Earl's lands had been confiscated by outlawry proceedings in England in 1689 on account of his support for James during the war.[102] From the summer of 1691 he claimed that his estates fell under the articles of Limerick, and from 1692 the corporation, led in this case by William Conolly, engaged in legal proceedings to keep the property at Coleraine.[103] In July 1693 a resident of the town informed the corporation that 'the tenants of the Long Liberties of Coleraine are warned by the Lord of Antrim to pay to him, the said Lord, their May Rent'.[104] From this point onwards the corporation had further difficulties collecting the rent from the Coleraine property, with tenants unsure of whom they should be paying their rent to.[105] In December 1694 creditors of the Earl of Antrim succeeded in taking £218, 13s, 6d from the corporation from the rent of his former property, a sum they actually had to borrow in order to repay.[106] The corporation was simultaneously engaged in costly legal wranglings with Antrim over the land. The latter would eventually get his entire estate officially returned to him under the articles of Limerick, and he was included among the successful

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[100] Londonderry Corporation, 27 June 1693.
[101] Ibid., 27 June 1693.
[102] Simms, *The Williamite confiscation*, pp 31–2.
[103] Walsh, 'The career of William Conolly', p. 66.
[104] Londonderry Corporation, 20 July 1693.
[105] Ibid., 4 Aug. 1693.
[106] Ibid., 11 Dec. 1694, 31 Jan. 1695.

claimants by the inquiry commission in 1699, while the corporation had already given up their claim on the liberties of Coleraine before this.[107]

Derry corporation later launched two further unsuccessful attempts through David Cairnes to solicit reparations from the crown in 1696 and 1697.[108] The problems and delays in getting funding to assist the rebuilding of property and economic assets destroyed by the siege meant that the recovery of Derry after the war was slower than it otherwise would have been. The rents of the tax farms, such as the position of clerk of the market, did not recover to their pre-war levels until well into the second half of the decade, a time when the east of the province, and the area around Belfast particularly, was able to take advantage of the economic opportunities that arose in the aftermath of the war. A complaint was made to the corporation in 1695 that butchers were slaughtering animals within the city walls due to there being no slaughterhouses outside the walls 'as the late siege hath ruined the suburbs', showing how the property damage was still widespread even six years after the raising of the siege.[109] The corporation's accounts were still substantially in arrears well into the second half of the decade, with all the salaries of the corporation's officers reduced by half annually from 1695 until 1698, and other cutbacks in expenditure made to help reduce the debt.[110] While the damage caused to Belfast by the war was far less than the devastation suffered by Derry, the goodwill to help the latter recover had been far greater than elsewhere in the country, aided by the dissemination of its heroic story and its position within the country's Protestant heartland in Ulster.[111] While this helped in the initial aftermath of the siege, such as with the grant by Queen Mary to the city in 1691, this goodwill soon faded, as shown by the lengthy dispute over the non-payment of the substantial amount of wages owed to the city's garrison during the siege that were never paid, despite a lengthy campaign of petitioning. The end result of this was that the recovery in Derry in the years following the Williamite war was no swifter than anywhere else in the country.

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[107] Simms, *The Williamite confiscation*, p. 46.
[108] Londonderry Corporation, 2 Jan. 1696, 19 July 1697.
[109] Ibid., 10 Sep. 1695.
[110] Ibid., 20 Feb. 1695, 3 Feb. 1696, 3 Feb. 1697, 10 May 1698.
[111] Agnew, *Belfast merchant families*, p. 90.

During the post-war period Bishop William King was engaged in rebuilding efforts of his own within the Derry diocese. He was particularly thorough in his assessment of the state of the diocese in his 1693 visitation, which lists the damage caused to churches and church property across the province during the war.[112] As bishop, it was his responsibility to lead the church's recovery in the area, and his attempts to rebuild and revitalise the Anglican faith in Derry upon his appointment have been previously examined by other scholars.[113] In the summer of 1691 he travelled extensively across the diocese, visiting 'two churches every day and sometimes three'.[114] The need for him to commit so much energy to this task was due to a combination of the level of destruction caused to the diocese by King James's forces and the correspondingly low numbers of clergy who had remained in or returned to their parishes following the war. Only ten beneficed clergy remained resident in their parishes in 1691 and nine of these were pluralists.[115] Two years later King complained to his close friend Samuel Foley that 'I am in ill circumstances here, my absentees and pluralists care not whom they employ and there take Scotch curates, as gentlemen used to take Irish servants merely because [they were] cheaper than others. Five pound in the salary would prefer a Turk to the best man, as I had an instance lately'.[116] King sought help from Anthony Dopping, Bishop of Meath and a member of the Privy Council, in his attempts to improve the diocese in the aftermath of the war, as his difficulties in attracting sufficient qualified clergymen to take up positions within the diocese were made worse by the lasting economic impact the war had on the region. In the introduction to his visitation he pays particular attention to the fall in clerical incomes, stating that he has 'given no valuation of livings at present because some are not yet risen to the 4th part of the value they bore before the wars, some not to the 3rd & a few to the halfe (sic) and hardly any above 2/3'.[117] These rather bleak figures are

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[112] See chapter one for further analysis of this destruction.
[113] See: J.C. Beckett, 'William King's administration of the diocese of Derry, 1691–1703' in *Irish Historical Studies*, iv, no. 14 (Sep., 1944), pp 164–180.
[114] William King to Samuel Foley, 12 June 1691 (TCD, King papers, Ms 1995–2008), no. 136.
[115] Beckett, 'King's administration of the diocese of Derry', p. 167.
[116] William King to Samuel Foley, 21 Mar. 1693 (TCD, King papers, Ms 1995–2008), no. 263.
[117] State of the diocese of Derry in the year 1693 (PRONI, Armagh diocesan papers, DIO/4/28/2/1).

symptomatic of the economic conditions across eastern and mid-Ulster in the years immediately following the war.

King's correspondence, such as the letters written by Sir Arthur Langford, also highlights his efforts to manage church property within the diocese. Langford held land at Kilmackedrett, on the Antrim-Londonderry border, and was a tenant of the bishop of Derry.[118] He wrote to King shortly after his appointment as bishop, enclosing £51, 10s in rent, but also bemoaning the state of his property in the hope of getting a large abatement from King, saying how:

> ...tenants here never so much wanted good encouragement from their Landlords as now, and unless I be enabled to give what is suitable to the present exigency of affairs, a great part of this concern is like to lie waste and unplanted, for the mills were burnt and many houses and former inhabitants destroyed and all the tenants in general greatly impoverished.[119]

Imagery such as this fits in with other descriptions of Ulster during the war period, and it is clear that there was significant property damage on the Langford estate. Langford's appeal for an abatement of rent is also similar to the Doyne's negotiations with Flower's creditors such as Archbishop Marsh, and also the Bishop of Clogher, Richard Tennison's pursuit of Kean O'Hara for rental arrears that were still extant from before the war.

However, rather than simply granting this abatement, further correspondence between the two men reveals that King believed that it was mismanagement of the estate had led to many of the problems the family found themselves in.[120] Through personally interviewing tenants in the town of Maghera on the estate, King ascertained that Langford's policies towards his tenants 'looks like a design to keep them waste, they do not so much as build one house or keep any cattle for fear of being distrained for all the arrears and full growing rents'.[121] King felt that Langford was attempting to cash in on the disturbances caused by the war for his own gain, by looking for rent abatements for himself but still trying to recoup rent arrears from his own long-term tenants.

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[118] Arthur Langford (*c.*1652–1716), second baronet Langford, in George E. Cokayne (ed.), *Complete Baronetage, vol. iv, 1665–1707* (Exeter, 1904), p. 204.
[119] Arthur Langford to William King, 3 Apr. 1691 (TCD, King papers, Ms 1995–2008), no. 117.
[120] Arthur Langford to William King, 9 July 1691 (TCD, King papers, Ms 1995–2008), no. 148.
[121] Ibid.

Evidence from other estates suggests that while Langford's lack of funds to rebuild houses on the estate was not a major indictment of his management of the property, his policies of distraining cattle and other goods from tenants who were trying to recover from the war most certainly were, and these would have impeded long-term recovery on the estate. Across the country, proprietors such as Langford had to accept that they would not receive the full rent due for the war period from their tenants. In this instance there is room to suggest that perhaps King was also at fault, as complementary allowances for this would have to be made to proprietors by the ultimate landowner, which in this case was the church and King specifically.

This period of dislocation of rents is evident in other estates and holdings in Ulster, such as on the property of the Draper's Society in London. Their agent, William Conyngham, recorded that he was unable to collect any rent or make any payments to his employers from their land held in south Londonderry from December 1688 until June 1692.[122] While his usual annual wage for this position is recorded as being £60 per annum, this was reduced to £20 in both 1688 and 1691 on account of this absence of rental income, and he received no salary at all from the society for either 1689 or 1690.[123] Conyngham later attempted to collect arrears for this three-year period, and his accounts from 1695 show that for the three years from 1686–88 he collected £1288, 4s, 7d in rent arrears, while he only managed to recoup £1085, 10s, 4d for the society for the five years from 1690–95. This suggests that the society had decided to grant a rent abatement for 1689 as a result of the war, but it also shows that significantly less rent was collected on their property in the years after the war than those prior to it. Of the arrears collected by Conyngham he managed to recoup an average of £429, 3s, 4d for each of the three years before the war but only £217, 10d for each of the five subsequent years. This was a massive reduction in revenue, and it is a rough financial indicator of what was happening in the rental accounts of other estates across the province as a result of the war.

The property of Arthur Brownlow at Lurgan in northeast Armagh gives another perspective on this period in Ulster. The Brownlow estate was extremely

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[122] Mr. Cunningham's account for Drapers proportion, 1685–1695 (PRONI, O'Neill papers, D1470/6/1).
[123] Ibid.

fortunate, as its leasebook 'gives little evidence of rebuilding which suggests that the town was little affected, and likewise there is no evidence that the improvements in the surrounding countryside suffered any serious setback'.[124] The east of Ulster was not as badly affected by physical destruction as elsewhere in the province, due to it being largely out of the path of the main Jacobite force on its march to and from Derry, as well as also being the first area to be retaken by the Williamite forces, with the corresponding decrease in rapparee activity that this protection, combined with the area's geographic location, would have provided. Despite this, the more easterly areas of Ulster by no means escaped the effects of the war, and they was just as susceptible to the significant economic disturbances and subsequent upheaval within the rental market as anywhere else in the country.

Table 6.1: Takings and Entry Fines on the Brownlow Estate, 1660–1709.

Year	No. of Takings	Total Entry Fine	Entry Fine Per Taking	Entry Fine Index
1660–69	37	£42.66	£1.15	100
1670–79	28	£166.75	£5.96	518
1680–89	13	£112.50	£8.65	752
1690–99	25	£35.95	£1.44	125
1700–09	13	£135.25	£10.40	904

Table adapted from two tables in Gillespie (ed.), *Settlement and Survival*, pp xxi–xxii.

Table 6.1 clearly shows the significant reduction in the entry fines being paid during the 1690s in order to take out a lease on property in the Brownlow estate. This reduction is a product of the poor economic conditions in the aftermath of the war, as Brownlow had to significantly reduce the entry fine he charged on new leases in order to attract new tenants in this challenging economic environment, in line with the experiences of proprietors such as Barrett, Flower and O'Hara in the post-war setting of their estates. Additionally, the comparatively high number of leases agreed on the estate in the decade compared to either the previous or subsequent decades, is a numerical indicator of the high levels of tenant displacement during the 1690s. As the Brownlow estate did not suffer much physical damage during the war, this high level of

[124] R.G. Gillespie (ed.), *Settlement and Survival on an Ulster Estate, The Brownlow Leasebook 1667–1711* (Belfast, 1988), pp lxiii–lxiv.

tenant mobility is likely down to tenants taking advantage of the poor economic conditions to switch to a more favourable lease, either with Brownlow on their existing land, or with other proprietors elsewhere.

Ormond estate

Large series of data concerning the post-Williamite war rental environment that are still extant in sources such as the Brownlow leasebook are particularly valuable in trying to quantify the impact all these disturbances had on estates across the country. The largest source for information such as this in the period is found in the records of the Ormond estate. This estate was inherited by James Butler, second Duke of Ormond, upon his grandfather's death in 1688, and was the largest in Ireland, rivalled only by that of the Boyles, earls of Cork and Burlington.[125] Centred on the family home at Kilkenny castle, the property included large tracts of land across counties Tipperary and Kilkenny, as well as in counties such as Waterford, Wexford, Queen's, Kildare and Kerry among others. In addition to this extensive estate, the second duke also inherited his grandfather's colossal debts, which in May 1688 totalled £98,500, with interest payments on this debt reaching £6,000 per annum.[126] This figure had arisen in spite of the duke's substantial income from both his property holdings and his wide-ranging political appointments. It was the result of a combination of his general largess, as well as several decades of mismanagement of the estate by commissioners who he had appointed to manage his affairs, several of whom had granted 'leases to themselves and their relations from whom they were lax in demanding rent repayments'.[127] As a result of these financial difficulties, the second duke found himself forced to permit his lands to come under the control of a commission headed by Lord Longford in 1691. While the duke retained ownership of the properties during this period, the commission took charge of resetting the lands, with the aim of putting the finances of the estate in order.

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[125] D.W. Hayton, 'Dependence, clientage and affinity: the political following of the second Duke of Ormonde' in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (eds), *The Dukes of Ormonde 1610–1745* (Woodbridge, 2000), p. 211.
[126] Thomas P. Power, *Land, politics and society in eighteenth-century Tipperary* (Oxford, 1993), p. 120.
[127] Ibid., p. 120.

The majority of the Ormond lands were located within the midlands region that had suffered significantly at the hands of both armies and the rapparees. The commissioners found themselves faced with an estate upon which 'most tenants had abandoned their holdings, were unaccounted for, or were dead leaving a large arrear of rent and little assets or stock from which distress could be had'.[128] This corresponds with other accounts from the region, including the situation on the Flower estate, with the damage caused to property and assets such as livestock, comparable to that explicitly outlined in the records of Quaker sufferings. The sheer size of the Ormond estate, particularly compared to the other properties examined above that were personally managed by a single family or agent, is particularly apparent when the colossal level of rental arrears absorbed by the estate over the three years of the war period are noted, as shown in table 6.2:

Table 6.2: Rental Arrears on the estate of the Duke of Ormond, both solvent and insolvent, for years 1688–91.

Agent	Arrears (2 years, ending Spring 1690)	Arrears (year ending Spring 1691)
Mr Gosling	£2,525, 4s, 3¼d	£1,414, 18s, 10¾⅛d
Mr Crawford	£2,134, 19s, ½d	£1,478, 16s, 10d
Mr Read	£1,911, 14s, 6d	£1,456, 10s, 8½d
Mr Carleton	£2,325, 15s, 2¾d	£1,572, 12s, 5⅛d
Mr Robbins	£4,495, 6s, 11d	£2,200, 5s, 4¾d
Mr Barkeley	£2,808, 19s, 8¾d	£1,763, 3s, 4d
Mr Waring	£3,336, 11s, 2d	£1,183, 2s, 3¼d
Mr Barr	£6,003, 2s, 9½d	£3,665, 16s, 5d
Total (Entire estate)	£25,511, 13s, 10¾d	£14,735, 6s, 3½d

Estate receivers' accounts (NLI, Ormond papers, Ms 2561).

As the commissioners' reports were compiled in 1693, these figures actually include any rental arrears subsequently paid or abated in the intervening years, meaning the actual level of non-payment of rent during the war period itself would have been significantly higher than this. In the context of the annual income of the estate, which was later estimated to be worth at its height between £22,500 and £25,000 per annum, a figure of over £40,000 of extant rental

[128] Power, *Land, politics and society*, p. 120.

arrears from the three years of the Williamite war is quite striking.[129] Indeed, such a large sum also points to the wider economic issues that the war would have caused, with such a large amount of money being removed from the national economy on one estate reflective of a wider economic upheaval; a monetary loss that even the funds that were being pumped into the economy through the war effort, via soldiers' wages and to pay for supplies, would have had difficulty matching.

As well as the total levels of arrears accumulated during the conflict, the detailed records of the commission include significantly more information. The report was compiled by eight separate commissioners, each of whom produced two separate sets of accounts for their areas of responsibility, one for the two years ending spring 1690 and the other for the subsequent year ending spring 1691. The main geographic areas across the estate for which each commissioner was responsible are listed in table 6.3 below, with the baronies in the main area of the Ormond lands illustrated in figure 6.1.

Table 6.3: List of areas of responsibility for Ormond estate receivers.

Mr Gosling	**Mr Crawford**	**Mr Read**	**Mr Carleton**
Kilkenny	Town of Ross	Town of Carrick-on-Suir	Town of Clonmel
Kilkenny city	Bar. of Knocktopher (KK)	Bar. of Slievardagh (TY)	Bar. of Iffa and Offa (TY)
	Bar. of Kells (KK)	Waterford city	
	Bar. of Ida (KK)	Bar. of Iverk (KK)	
Mr Robbins	**Mr Barkeley**	**Mr Waring**	**Mr Barr**
Bar. of Middlethird (TY)	Bar. of Eliogarthy (TY)	Bar. of Clarmallagh (LS)	Bar. of Ikeath and Oughterany (KE)
Town of Cashel	Bar. of Lower Ormond (TY)	Bar. of Ikerrin (TY)	North-west county Dublin
	Town of Nenagh	Owenstown* (KE)	Dunboyne* (MH)
	Town of Thurles		Town of Arklow*

[129] Hayton, 'Dependence, clientage and affinity', p. 211.

Figure 6.1: Map of baronies within main area of Ormond estate.

The location of the majority of these properties is particularly relevant given the detailed account of the disturbances and destruction caused to the midlands area, especially during the winter of 1690–91. Within the records themselves each lease is given its own entry, with the categories relating to each lease standardised throughout by the eight different commissioners. The categories listed include basic information such as the name of the leaseholder, the location of the property in question, and various columns listing the amount of rental arrears incurred by the tenant and how much (if any) of this they had managed to pay back or had been abated. Each entry also includes a section giving the 'Reasons why in arrears and other observations', which provides especially valuable additional information, such as explaining if the tenant had been killed during the war, or they remained resident on the property and were in the process of paying back their arrears.

While these records are specific listings of the rental arrears on the Ormond estate during the Williamite war period, as opposed to the full rental accounts, the evidence from other estates clearly shows that the vast majority of properties fell behind on their rents during this period, indicating that these records are quite an accurate reflection of the condition of the entire estate during the Williamite war. For the purposes of this analysis the initial set of accounts for the two years ending in spring 1690 has been used, with the data being analysed using two separate sets of indices. The first looks at the continuity of tenants on the Ormond estate from before and after the war, while the second attempts to calculate the specific impact of the war on the tenants. These two methods allow the examination of issues such as the dislocation of the estate's tenants, the transfer of ownership of land and leases, the ratios of tenants that were killed during the war period and a variety of other factors. Categories of events such as these were grouped together and combined into a variety of indices, which were then analysed accordingly.

In examining the accounts, the entries were also split into two main categories based on the amount of arrears accrued during the period. This gives a nominal indication of the size of the holdings, with accounts in arrears of less than £20 being classed as small and those accruing debts of over £20 categorised as large. A significant number of the 'small' properties are small single houses within urban environments, representing less well-off members of the population. Additionally, many of the leases listed in the 'large' category are sizeable tracts of land let to a single tenant, who subsequently sublet this property out to smaller tenants. Part of the Flower estate at Durrow fell into this latter category, with Captain Flower being specifically mentioned in Mr Waring's account as owing £200 in rental arrears.[130] In this way the two different categories of lease can be used as a loose indicator for the impact of the war on the more comfortable members of society against those from a poorer economic background. Similarly, entries relating to arrears of tithes or chief rents have been omitted from the analysis, as the nature of these charges and their often

[130] Estate receivers accounts, Mr Waring (NLI, Ormond papers, Ms 2561), f. 65.

very small monetary values would distort the remainder of the data, which is composed primarily of traditional leases of varying sizes.[131]

The first way in which the 366 relevant leases in these accounts were analysed was simply to determine the levels of continuity of leases and the corresponding displacement of tenants across the estate, with the total findings compiled in Table 6.4.[132]

Table 6.4: Continuity of tenancy on the Ormond estate (Totals).

	Large (>£20)	%	Small (<£20)	%
Property remains in same hands	68	44%	93	44%
Property set to new tenant	62	41%	56	26%
Property vacant/Waste	18	12%	54	25%
Unknown/Other	5	3%	10	5%
Total number of properties	153		213	

The amount of land on the estate left abandoned after the war has been described by other authors as 'more extensive than the tenanted', and the calculation that only 44% of both large and small properties remained occupied by the same tenant at the end of the war as they had been prior to it confirms that this was indeed the case.[133] However, by the time the commissioners were compiling their report in 1693, 41% of the large and 26% of the small properties on the estate had been set to new tenants, with the greater success in setting the larger properties was most likely down to more of an effort being made to lease these more valuable properties. This level of success in attracting replacement tenants was an admirable achievement, particularly given the difficulties other proprietors had in doing the same across the country during the period. However, in order to achieve this, Longford and his fellow commissioners had to offer prospective tenants 'long leases at the 1687 level of rent, cushioned by a system of short-term abatements', usually for '31 years or three lives at the old rent, with a recommendation for abatement for 4 or 5 years'.[134] While the value of the leases signed by the new tenants is not recorded in these accounts, the

[131] Entries relating to tithes have been omitted from the accounts of Mr Carleton while entries for chief rents, which were small annual sums payable on freehold properties, have been omitted from the accounts of Mr Crawford, Mr Read and Mr Robbin.
[132] See tables 6.4, 6.6 and 6.7.
[133] Power, *Land, politics and society*, p. 120.
[134] Ibid., p. 121.

purpose of the policy centred on the idea that 'tenanted lands at moderate rents were preferable to untenanted ones yielding no revenue'.[135] The long-term negative effects of this emergency resetting of the Ormond estate would be exacerbated by actions later in the decade, when Ormond's spiralling debts saw the commission seek a short-term influx of money in the form of fines. These once-off payments would be made by leaseholders in exchange for significantly extending the terms of their lease, specifically by granting those holding leases for lives a 'perpetual term in the form of leases for lives renewable forever', while those with leases for a fixed number of years were upgraded to having tenures for lives.[136] As these fines were generally in the range of four times the annual rent, this policy provided the estate with a much-needed injection of capital in the short term, but at the significant cost of reduced income from rents and entry fines, as well as less control over many of its properties in the long term.[137]

In general, these rental accounts demonstrate how successful the policies of granting abatements and longer leases were in attracting tenants back to the estate in the aftermath of the war. However, they also make clear the intensely localised nature of the disturbances caused by the conflict, with neighbouring baronies, even within the same county, often faring markedly differently. This is clear when the number of properties that were still vacant in certain parts of the estate are analysed. On average, 12% of all the large properties and 25% of all the small properties were still waste or without a tenant by 1693, but these figures were significantly higher in the accounts of Mr Read and Mr Barkeley. Read was responsible for land on the Tipperary-Kilkenny border and within the town of Carrick-on-Suir, as well as properties in Waterford city. By 1693 he had still to set 33% of the large properties across this area and 31% of the small ones. The vast majority of these smaller properties were in Carrick-on-Suir, suggesting that the town suffered significantly during the period, while the larger rural properties within the barony of Slievardagh also suffered greatly, likely due to

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[135] Power, *Land, politics and society*, p. 122.
[136] Ibid., p. 123; Having a tenure for lives entitled the leaseholder to rent the land for an annual rent until the death of the person (or in some cases up to three persons) named in the lease.
[137] For more on the long term impact of this policy of offering perpetual leases on the Ormond estate, and the effect this had on both lessees and landowners across Ireland, see: Power, *Land, politics and society*, pp 120–26.

rapparee activity in the local mountainous terrain. Meanwhile, Barkeley had responsibility for the Ormond properties around the town of Thurles in the barony of Eliogarthy and the barony of Lower Ormond, which was situated in the northwest of the county along the eastern banks of the Shannon and Lough Derg. The severe impact of the war on this latter region has already been discussed, with the barony acting as no-man's-land for the winter of 1690–91 between the Jacobite controlled Shannon and the Williamite forward garrison at Birr. Between these two areas he had failed to find tenants for 30% of the large properties and for a significant 72% of the smaller ones. His task was made more difficult by the small numbers of existing tenants who had remained on the land, with only 23% and 7% of the large and small properties respectively being occupied under the same lease by 1693 as they had been before the war. This represents a massive flight of people from across the social spectrum, particularly when it is considered that the ordinary inhabitants of the town of Nenagh are not included in these figures. In this case the entire town had been sublet to Anthony Hamilton, who had fled to France with the Jacobite forces leaving arrears of £645 and 'the towne burnt and the land lay waste', suggesting that the majority of the town's inhabitants had also fled their homes.[138]

While the number of tenants that remained resident on their properties by 1693 is a useful indicator of the severity of disruption caused by the war to the midlands region, the additional information in the accounts allows this disruption to be analysed even further. The entry on each lease that gives the 'Reasons why in arrears and other observations', allows a further index to be compiled to examine some of the specific impacts the war had on people on the estate. This was divided into seven categories, which include whether the tenant had been killed during the war, if they had sided with the Jacobites and perhaps fled for France, if they had left their property waste either as a result of the war or indeed prior to it, or if they remained resident on the property and were in the process of paying back their arrears. The categories and the total number of instances across the entire estate are listed in table 6.5 below:

[138] Estate receivers accounts, Mr Barkeley (NLI, Ormond papers, Ms 2561), f. 61.

Table 6.5: Fate of tenants on the Ormond estate (Totals).

	Large (>£20)	%	Small (<£20)	%
Tenant Killed/Dead	26	17%	35	16%
Tenant sided with Jacobites	13	8%	14	7%
Land waste/Tenant fled - Wartime	41	27%	53	25%
Land waste/Vacant - Pre-war	5	3%	14	7%
Tenant trying to pay/Renegotiating	33	22%	35	16%
Arrears paid in full/Abated	32	21%	53	25%
Other/Unknown	3	2%	9	4%
Total number of properties	153		213	

The breakdown of these figures across the eight different accounts is found in tables 6.8 and 6.9.[139] Again some of the regions selected above are notable in these instances, such as those of Read and Barkeley. The percentages of tenants explicitly listed as being killed during the conflict in Barkeley's account of the barony of Lower Ormond is—rather surprisingly given its precarious location—in line with the average on the estate as a whole, with 15% and 14% of large and small tenants being killed during the period. The percentage of tenants being killed is much higher in the other major area of disturbance in the southeast of the county, where Read lists 33% and 30% of both groups of tenants as being killed during the war, which is twice the overall average. Indeed, of the 35 lessees of small properties that are listed as being killed across the entire estate, 16 (or 45%) of these are listed in Read's account.

The flight of tenants from the barony of Lower Ormond is also clearly evident from Barkeley's account, with 54% and 57% of large and small tenants respectively listed as abandoning their lands in the area during the war. In this case the impact on larger lessees is particularly notable, as the aforementioned Anthony Hamilton was not the only large lessee in this area to be badly affected by the war, with 2 of the 13 large tenants listed in this category being killed and a further 7 (54%) abandoning their lands. This percentage of attrition for large tenants is clearly down to the location of the barony, and the rates of attrition of large leaseholders are only comparable to Crawford's account of the three southern Kilkenny baronies of Kells, Knocktopher and Ida, where 59% of the 17 large lessees abandoned their holdings during the war. In this instance the lack of any large town within these three large baronies, apart from New Ross, which

[139] See end of chapter.

was located on the extreme southerly edge of the region, is a possible reason for this disruption. The garrisoning of troops in towns across the region during the winter months meant that rural properties situated far from urban areas would have been more difficult to defend from rapparee attacks than those that were less isolated from this support. Each of the other accounts featuring rural properties in Tipperary or Kilkenny were centred on a large town, such as Kilkenny city in Gosling's account, Clonmel in Carleton's case or Cashel in Robbin's. In each of these areas notably lower numbers of large landowners abandoned their properties, with only 20%, 18% and 17% doing so in these three areas respectively.

These records of arrears can also be used to help examine the impact of the war on female members of the community. This is a topic that is difficult to address, so any possibility to examine it needs to be investigated. Throughout the accounts there are 11 specific references to the fate of the widows of tenants killed during the siege, representing 18% of the 61 tenants listed as being killed during the conflict. Of these 11 widows, 5 were removed from their homes and their former property was set to new tenants, with one of these women in Waterford city having her possessions seized and sold off to repay part of her husband's arrears before being ejected from the property, while another widow in the village of Garrynerehy in Kilkenny was described as being 'quite ruined by our army', but nevertheless also evicted.[140] Of the five that were permitted to remain on their land, one is described as being 'worth nothing', while another in Carrick-on-Suir was simply 'left in the house to keep it up'.[141] In the lone positive case, the widow of Anstas Comerford was granted a new lease for her late husband's property and not held liable for the arrears from the previous lease.[142] In the final remaining instance it is left unclear if the deceased tenant's widow was permitted to remain on the property, and this is also the only instance of the widow of a large landowner being mentioned, with total debts of £142, 18s, 4½d. Resident in Clonmel, the tenant William Cochran had been 'killed by the rapparees' and is described as leaving 'a wife and a stock of small children but no

[140] Estate receivers accounts, Mr Read (NLI, Ormond papers, Ms 2561), f. 26 & 28.
[141] Ibid., f. 24 & 23.
[142] Ibid., f. 25.

assets'.[143] These 11 instances show a general disregard for the plight of families left widowed and destitute by the war, but this seemingly callous attitude is not exclusive to widows of former tenants, and is comparable to the general policies of the commissioners to other tenants who had been badly affected or 'ruined' by the conflict, which resulted in them being unable to pay their arrears and consequently having their lands reset.

The negative outlook for the above areas, particularly in Lower Ormond and south Kilkenny, is balanced by less war damage and displacement in other parts of the estate. Compared to these regions, the sufferings of tenants in the south of Tipperary around Clonmel, those living in areas near the Tipperary-Queen's County border, and others who were resident further east in counties such as Kildare, Meath and Dublin, does appear to have been less severe. On the lands managed by Carleton around Clonmel, 58% and 72% of the large and small properties were still in the same hands by 1693. Within Waring's area of responsibility in Tipperary and Queen's County these figures were 60% and 66%, and they reached similar heights of 63% and 50% among Barr's properties further eastwards towards Dublin. Indeed, Waring had managed to ensure that none of the 22 large properties that he was responsible for were without a tenant by 1693. These figures reinforce the idea that those civilians resident near the frontline between the two armies during the winter of 1690–91 were considerably worse off than those further removed from this area, but they also make it clear that even in less affected regions the war had enough of an impact to cause a significant changeover of tenants, with the corresponding economic consequences for each area and the entire Ormond estate that this caused.

Conclusion

While these rental accounts give us an overall understanding of the difficulties facing the inhabitants of the midlands region, they are also indicative of circumstances across the country. The inhabitants of west and northwest Tipperary and south Kilkenny had their lives disrupted far more during the war period than those closer to Dublin, much in the same manner as people and

[143] Estate receivers accounts, Mr Carleton (NLI, Ormond papers, Ms 2561), f. 37.

property in west and south Ulster suffered significantly more damage than those in the east of the province. Proprietors in these areas faced similar problems in securing arrears and finding new tenants for their estates in the years immediately following the war, with concessions made concerning the abatement of rental arrears or the granting of longer leases by the Ormond commissioners, or by individual landlords such as Kean O'Hara or Dacre Barrett, making this task less difficult. Despite these regional differences regarding areas directly damaged by the war, the nationwide rental market was adversely impacted, with reductions in rent levels and increased tenant mobility clearly evident in estates such as Arthur Brownlow's at Lurgan, despite his property escaping the worst excesses of the physical war damage. The importance of the rental market to the Irish economy meant that this was a crucial element in the recovery of the country in the aftermath of the war. Resetting estates and repopulating the land were important not only for their role in the rental economy, but also in increasing agricultural production that had been disturbed by the war in many parts of the country.

In the midst of the unstable period towards the end of the war and in its immediate aftermath, bodies such as Derry corporation tried to increase their landholdings, nominally as part of their attempt to pay for their recovery from the conflict, but in reality as an attempt to simply increase the areas under their control. Rebuilding efforts by landlords and tenants of all sizes and means were needed in the recovery effort. Landlords were largely responsible for these efforts, either through directly repairing local amenities such as mills at Clones or bridges at Derry, granting rental abatements to enable tenants to rebuild their own property, or including clauses in new leases that specifically obliged tenants to undertake repairs to their property. The relationship between landlords such as Ormond with those discussed in the remainder of the chapter is also noteworthy. While the Ormond commissioners had to deal personally with 213 small tenants across the estate, proprietors such as Flower were among those that held the 153 large leases. As each of these large leases tended to sublet large amounts of their property, the vast majority of ordinary people dealt with individual landlords or their agents such as Edmund Doyne, who were in turn being harried into getting their accounts in order and paying as much of their

arrears as possible. The pressure for payment from above was a large factor in how generous an individual landlord was regarding abatements and new leases, with many agreeing to abatements for several years worth of rent and letting land for significantly longer terms than they would previously have countenanced. This was not always the case, as demonstrated by the conflict between William King and Arthur Langford, when King accused the latter of trying to profit from the misfortune of his tenants to the long-term detriment of his property.

Overall, the above extensive examples clearly outline the efforts various landlords across Ireland went to in order to recover from the damage caused by soldiers, rapparees and general social disturbances during the war period. This began while the war was still on-going, with attempts made early on by landlords and their agents, such as Edmond Doyne, Kean O'Hara and Dacre Barrett, to address the various issues caused by the war. These early attempts were important in securing estate property and returning confidence in their tenants, but a more stable recovery had to wait until after the war, when a combination of abatements, new leases and other incentives were needed to entice tenants back to the land. The statistics from the Ormond estate provide a rare insight into the issues that faced local people in areas of conflict during the war period, particularly the number of tenants killed or fleeing their property giving a good indication of the level of violence in these areas. They also show more specifically the levels of rental abatements needed in order to attract new tenants or retain existing ones, with a corresponding demonstration of the transfer of ownership of property among the lower levels of society as a result of the war. The proprietorial challenge faced by landlords was vitally important for the recovery of the country following the war, but an examination of this issue just as importantly gives an insight into the impact of the Williamite war on the lives of ordinary people across Ireland.

Table 6.6: Continuity of tenancy on the Ormond estate by region (Number of instances).

	Mr Gosling		Mr Crawford		Mr Read		Mr Carleton		Mr Robbin		Mr Barkeley		Mr Waring		Mr Barr	
	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small
Property remains in same hands	7	23	5	6	2	16	7	28	14	4	3	1	13	2	17	13
Property set to new tenant	9	21	11	5	8	17	5	4	8	2	5	3	9	1	7	3
Property vacant/Waste	1	9	1	3	5	16	0	7	5	3	4	10	0	0	2	6
Unknown/Other	3	3	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4
Total Number of Properties	20	56	17	15	15	51	12	39	27	9	13	14	22	3	27	26

Table 6.7: Continuity of tenancy on the Ormond estate by region (Percentage of instances).

	Mr Gosling		Mr Crawford		Mr Read		Mr Carleton		Mr Robbin		Mr Barkeley		Mr Waring		Mr Barr	
	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small
Total Number of Properties	20	56	17	15	15	51	12	39	27	9	13	14	22	3	27	26
Property remains in same hands	35%	41%	30%	40%	13%	31%	58%	72%	52%	44%	23%	7%	60%	66%	63%	50%
Property set to new tenant	45%	38%	65%	33%	53%	33%	42%	10%	30%	22%	38%	21%	40%	33%	26%	11%
Property vacant/Waste	5%	16%	5%	20%	33%	31%	0%	18%	18%	33%	30%	72%	0%	0%	7%	24%
Unknown/Other	15%	5%	0%	7%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	4%	15%

Table 6.8: Fate of tenants on the Ormond estate by region (Number of instances).

	Mr Gosling		Mr Crawford		Mr Read		Mr Carleton		Mr Robbin		Mr Barkeley		Mr Waring		Mr Barr	
	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small
Tenant Killed/Dead	3	6	0	2	5	16	4	4	6	1	2	2	5	1	1	3
Tenant sided with Jacobites	3	3	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	2
Land waste/Tenant fled - Wartime	4	16	10	3	6	18	2	5	5	1	7	8	2	0	5	2
Land waste/Vacant - Pre-war	1	5	0	1	1	3	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	2
Tenant trying to pay/Renegotiating	4	7	2	1	0	6	1	7	8	3	2	1	10	1	6	9
Arrears paid in full/Abated	2	16	3	4	1	4	5	22	6	2	1	0	3	1	11	4
Other/Unknown	3	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Total number of properties	20	56	17	15	15	51	12	39	27	9	13	14	22	3	27	26

Table 6.9: Fate of tenants on the Ormond estate by region (Percentage of instances)

	Mr Gosling		Mr Crawford		Mr Read		Mr Carleton		Mr Robbin		Mr Barkeley		Mr Waring		Mr Barr	
	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small	Large	Small
Total number of properties	20	56	17	15	15	51	12	39	27	9	13	14	22	3	27	26
Tenant Killed/Dead	15%	10%	0%	13%	33%	30%	33%	10%	22%	11%	15%	14%	23%	33%	4%	12%
Tenant sided with Jacobites	15%	5%	12%	20%	13%	6%	0%	0%	7%	11%	7%	14%	5%	0%	7%	8%
Land waste/Tenant fled - Wartime	20%	29%	59%	20%	40%	35%	17%	13%	18%	11%	54%	57%	9%	0%	19%	8%
Land waste/Vacant - Pre-war	5%	9%	0%	7%	7%	6%	0%	3%	0%	11%	0%	7%	5%	0%	7%	8%
Tenant trying to pay/Renegotiating	20%	12%	12%	7%	0%	12%	8%	18%	30%	33%	15%	7%	45%	33%	22%	35%
Arrears paid in full/Abated	10%	29%	17%	26%	7%	8%	42%	56%	22%	22%	7%	0%	14%	33%	41%	15%
Other/Unknown	15%	5%	0%	7%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	15%

Conclusion

This thesis has set out to look at the Williamite war in Ireland from a social and economic perspective, specifically by examining its impact on the ordinary people across the country. The lack of source material from the viewpoint of the ordinary civilian means that looking at this directly is quite difficult, but the examination of major issues of the war provides a means of doing so. These include factors such as the interactions of civilians with soldiers and rapparees; the depredations committed by these latter two groups upon civilian homes and property; the frequent shortages and often exorbitantly high prices for food; the efforts undertaken by the military and civilian authorities to obtain supplies and provisions for both armies; the levels of damage and destruction caused to property at a regional level across the country; the efforts gone to in order to repair this damage; and the flight of tenants from several estates in different regions. When taken together, these factors provide a means of examining the war from the civilian perspective, one that is frequently overlooked or under-examined.

The short length of the early-modern military campaigning season meant that the period of winter quarters had particular significance. The military engagements started quite early in 1689, with initial Jacobite offensives against Ulster Protestants beginning in March, but the conflict began to wind down by the end of August. The recommencement of the main campaign in 1690 was delayed until William's arrival in June of that year, and the two sides began to settle into their winter quarters in early September, following William's defeat at Limerick and his departure back to England, apart from Marlborough's rapid campaign in Cork in October. The two sides did not take to the field properly again until the following June, with the urgency to end the war among the Williamites seeing the fighting drag on, and not officially conclude until the beginning of October 1691. Even during these periods of the main campaign, large parts of Ireland remained quite removed from the fighting. In 1689 the main engagements were confined to Ulster, resulting in widespread damage to Derry and its immediate environs, as well as through mid-Ulster. The rest of the

country saw little physical disturbance, apart from the sporadic actions of rapparees aiming to take advantage of the war period for their own personal gain. In 1690, the main engagements of the war were at the Boyne in county Louth, and at Limerick, with the environs of the latter being significantly spoiled. While Dublin largely managed to escape the chaos that followed the Jacobite retreat westwards, the area in the midlands was particularly badly affected by disorder among troops from both sides, but particularly the Jacobites in the immediate aftermath of the defeat. Elsewhere, the country remained relatively calm. Ulster was securely in Williamite possession, Connacht was defended by the Jacobite forces around Sligo and along the Shannon, while the southeast was not heavily occupied by troops from either side. In 1691 the campaign was confined to the area of Connacht and north Munster that the Jacobites had managed to retain the previous summer, with the rest of the country quite removed from any military operations.

It was during these periods between campaigning seasons, when these large armies were broken up and quartered on the civilian population, that larger-scale social effects were felt. These often had a far more detrimental impact on the local civilian population than the battles or sieges during the summer months. This was certainly the case in the midland region, and the two main factors that defined the experience of the war among the civilians living on the eastern bank of the Shannon during the long nine months between September 1690 and May 1691, were their relationship with the large numbers of Williamite and Jacobite troops that were quartered upon them, as well as the threat of rapparee attack. The area that had served as the frontier for the previous winter, in north Louth and through the southern Ulster counties of Armagh, Monaghan, Cavan and Fermanagh, experienced destruction of property and a flight of population.

The impact on these areas is evident in the hearth tax returns for each county from before and after the war. Hearth tax was initially granted to Charles II in perpetuity in 1662/3, and was a charge of two shillings to be levied on each hearth in a dwelling, when a single hearth was the sole source of heat for the vast

majority of homes.[1] It was amended in 1666 to reduce the number of households exempt from the tax to those that were dependant on alms or to poor widows. William and Mary fully repealed the hearth tax in England in 1689, but this decision did not apply to Ireland, where it was collected until the early nineteenth century. The nature of the tax has provided historians with a method of estimating population levels across Ireland throughout the period, as well as investigating other factors. While various ambiguities are inherent in the tax, it provides a useful guide to the economic dislocation as a result of the Williamite war.[2] The annual records of the value of the hearth tax for each county that are still extant from 1672–1700 have been reproduced in table 7.1 below.[3] These give the annual total tax take for each county, with the totals for each province and the yearly national total. These figures give a good representation of the number of homes in each county. For the purposes of calculating the impact of the war the exact number of homes is less important than the percentage change in the annual tax take, which is representative of the economic impact of the war. These percentage changes are given in tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 below.

The right to collect the tax for each individual county was farmed out annually, a process that involved bids being placed by potential tax farmers at an annual public auction, or 'cant', at Dublin.[4] This meant that the amount that had been bid for some counties for 1692 might have been either too high or too low, with the revised figures for 1693 likely proving to be more accurate as the

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[1] For more on the origins of the hearth tax see J.G. Simms, 'The Restoration, 1660–85' in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne (eds), *A new history of Ireland III: Early modern Ireland 1534–1691* (Oxford, 1976), pp 439–40; David Dickson, Cormac Ó Gráda and Stuart Daultrey, 'Hearth tax, household size and Irish population change, 1672–1821' in *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, vol. 82C (1982), pp 125–160, 162–181.

[2] These ambiguities include the manner in which the tax was collected, with debates over how evenly the law was applied between each geographic area and by each individual collector. Even the exact definition of each 'house' being taxed is also unclear, specifically whether it related to the building itself or to the household, with the terms family, house and household likely being interchangeable. Previous analysis has shown that these limitations do not overly-distort the data, and that the county totals are sufficiently robust in order to be considered further. For discussion of problems using tax records for purposes such as this, see: Dickson *et al.*, 'Hearth tax, household size and Irish population change', p. 129–32; J.H. Andrews, 'Land and people, *c.* 1685', in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne (eds), *A new history of Ireland* iii, *Early modern Ireland 1534–1691* (Oxford, 1976), p. 458.

[3] See end of chapter for tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4.

[4] Dickson *et al.*, 'Hearth tax, household size and Irish population change', pp 131–33, 156.

bidders had the actual returns from the previous year to guide them.[5] While it is clear that the economy of Ireland had been severely impacted generally by the Williamite war, from the figures for 1693 the disproportionate impact of the war on the areas described seems quite clear, and they reinforce the idea that the main impact of the war across Ireland was very localised. The counties along the Ulster frontier during the winter of 1689–90 feature prominently at the top of the table, including Cavan, Monaghan, Fermanagh, Louth and Armagh, with Dacre Barrett's problems securing tenants at Clones being understandable in this context. These counties are joined by Tyrone, which was badly affected during the Williamite retreat from the siege of Derry. Indeed, while Derry itself might have been expected to suffer a higher fall in revenue, this could be an indicator that the efforts of bodies such as the city's corporation may have been having a positive effect.

The other counties that feature notable drops in their hearth tax returns in 1693 are mostly from the midlands region that formed the frontier during the winter of 1690–91, including Tipperary, Longford, King's and Westmeath. Previously these sharp falls in hearth tax income in these areas have been attributed to the general economic damage and the underdeveloped nature of most of these counties, particularly their reliance on livestock for subsistence.[6] This was most certainly a factor, but it was the location of these counties along the frontiers between the two armies during either of the two periods of winter quarters between the major campaigns that caused this theft of livestock, in addition to destruction of property and a flight of people from the land. These figures are also borne out by the records of tenants that remained on their properties from the Ormond estate. The records from the baronies of Eliogarthy and Lower Ormond, both of which were in the northwest of county Tipperary along the eastern banks of the Shannon, saw only 23% of their large tenants and 7% of their smaller ones still resident on their land by 1693. This is compared to a county for which the hearth tax returns were not as poor, such as Queen's

[5] Table 7.4 gives the difference in the bids for 1692 and 1693, indicating counties where bidders thought the damage and dislocation caused by the war would have been either worse or else not as extensive.

[6] Dickson *et al.*, 'Hearth tax, household size and Irish population change', p. 160.

County, where 60% of large and 66% of smaller tenants living in the Ormond lands in the south of the county remained on their properties by the same year.

Of the counties that were forced to quarter the entire Jacobite army during the winter of 1690–91, Limerick unsurprisingly emerges as the worst off, along with Mayo and Sligo. The majority of the counties that are below the national average fall of 52% are from Leinster, and the southeast in particular, such as Wexford and Wicklow. Several counties that were badly affected by the chaotic Jacobite retreat from the Boyne also feature here, such as Kildare, Carlow and Queen's County, which suggests that while the experiences of those few weeks may have been personally quite traumatic for the local inhabitants, this brief period of plundering did not have as lasting an impact as having to quarter large numbers of troops close to the military frontier. Another result of these well-defined frontiers between the two sides was that there was significantly less damage caused to crops and grazing across the entire country than there had been during the wars of the 1640s. The dispersed nature of the military forces during the early stages of these wars in particular, with Royalist troops stationed in garrisons scattered across the country, combined with the deliberate scorched earth policy adopted by both the Royalists and Confederates, had significantly affected food production nationally.[7] There were instances of significant destruction of pasture and property across mid-Ulster, Londonderry, north Louth and parts of the midlands, but these instances were severely debilitating at a local level, but had less of a national impact.

Considering the sizes of the armies involved in the Williamite war were the largest ever assembled in Ireland, the actual number of people killed during the war was actually quite low. George Story estimated the number of casualties at around 12,000 on the Jacobite side and 7,000 on the Williamite, although it is impossible to verify these estimates, and more precise figures will never be known.[8] Similarly, while estimating the number of civilians killed is impossible, it was also reasonably low, particularly compared to the numbers killed during the wars earlier in the century. Violence against civilians was less tolerated among the more tightly disciplined soldiers of the late seventeenth century than it had

[7] Lenihan, *Confederate Catholics at war*, pp 57–72.
[8] Story, *A continuation*, p. 317.

been earlier, particularly during the Thirty Years' War.[9] While violent acts were still prevalent in the aftermath of a lengthy siege, where soldiers' bloodlust following the fall of a city often led to much violence, the main military engagements during the Williamite war were pitched battles far from large centres of population, such as the Boyne or at Aughrim. While the sieges of Derry and Limerick were among the defining encounters of the conflict, in neither instance were these towns taken by assault, and they were either relieved by friendly forces as happened at Derry, they managed to outlast their besiegers such as at the first siege of Limerick, or they surrendered through a negotiated settlement, such as the latter's second siege in 1691. Many of the more notable acts of violence against civilians were actually inflicted by the more irregular forces from both sides, such as the pro-Jacobite rapparees, or the Williamite army's Enniskillen detachments. These were less bound by the restrictions of military discipline, with the rapparees largely remaining outside the law of both sides, and the Enniskillen cavalry being given leeway by Williamite commanders, particularly Schomberg, due to their military usefulness. However, while the actions of rapparees were certainly prevalent during the war, compared to the depredations of the troops from both sides and the massive pressure on civilians to supply and quarter the army, their actions appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. This is particularly the case in the months prior to the war, when Protestant authors played up their influence as an excuse to arm themselves and in order to justify their support for William over James.

While the extreme example of the devastation inflicted on the Palatinate may not be the most accurate comparison for the events in Ireland, the course of the Williamite war, and specifically the Irish population's experiences of it, had much in common with contemporary European warfare. Not only did it involve isolated examples of the more brutal elements of war, such as the targeted destruction of civilian property as practiced by the French at the time, but the experience of the ordinary civilians were largely defined by how dependent both sides were on the civilian population for the maintenance and subsistence of these large armies, as well as the widespread plundering by soldiers from both sides and irregular rapparee forces. The sheer size of both the Jacobite and

[9] Childs, 'The laws of war and the Jacobite war', pp 284, 294–5.

Williamite armies, and the demand for food, shelter, horses, forage and a range of other provisions and needs, meant that supplying the men of both sides was a large drain on the resources of the country. The extreme strain this put on civilian food producers led to high prices and food shortages, to the clear detriment of the general population. At the same time, these offered opportunities, as canny civilian merchants or farmers could take advantage of high demand and high prices in order to make a quick profit from the army's presence. The general plundering during the war by soldiers was widespread, through a combination of varying levels of discipline, shortages of pay and supplies, as well as local factors. Again, the areas that saw the worst of these acts of plundering and upon whom the burden of quartering troops was the greatest, were those living along the frontiers, many of whom had to quarter and feed soldiers for months at a time, as well as put up with their frequently unruly behaviour.

The experience of the Williamite war for many people across Ireland is personified by the experiences of Margaret Marshall, from Durrow in Queen's County. She gave her perspective on the war in a letter to her landlord, Colonel Thomas Flower, in January 1691. She begins by noting that 'It hate beene my sad misfortne to bee rob[be]d of all the mon[e]y I had left', while later notes how she had 'a good house, fitt for a gentleman, though the out houses are burned', thereby indicating the widespread plundering and destruction throughout the countryside.[10] Her purpose for writing was to address her arrears of rent from the war period, for which Flower's agent, Mr Doyne, had seized her corn, 'soe that I have not any thing to support one with'. Instead, she suggested handing over the cattle that she still had left to Flower's agent, and even offering to pay for their grazing in the meantime. She noted that 'by the rule of other landlords in these parts, they doe abate aboute halfe the rent by reason of the times', clearly hoping for an abatement herself, in line with a policy that many landlords were obliged to do in order to keep their tenants and replace those that had left. To further her case she recounted how she and her husband 'after the route of the Boyne tooke care of your stocke, and the neighbors thretened his life for it',

[10] Margaret Marshall to Col. Thomas Flower, Durrow, 21 Jan. 1691 (NLI, Flower papers, Ms 11474, no. 10).

showing how they had attempted to protect Flower's cattle in the chaotic period of the Jacobite retreat, but how this cooperation with a pro-Williamite landlord was not appreciated by many of her neighbours; a decision that could have caused her problems with the rapparees. She also noted the plight of one of her relations, recounting how 'poore Betty Marshall is a widow, her husband was taken by the rapparees and shott through the belly and lost £15 in money but was released; but since he dyed', in an example of a fatal encounter with a group of plundering rapparees.

Of course, the primary aim of Margaret Marshall's letter is to get sympathy from her landlord to whom she owes rental arrears. However, amidst her pleading she addresses several of the most common effects of the Williamite war on ordinary civilians across the country. These include the thefts and violence by rapparees and soldiers; the destruction of property; the tensions within civilian communities; the arrears of rent that many tenants found themselves in by the end of the war; and the efforts by landlords to recover as much of this as possible. Marshall's letter is one of the very few extant examples of a source that actually gives a personal perspective of this nature on the events of the war, and its individual nature goes some way to bridging the gap between the large scale of the conflict itself and the personal impact it had on civilians across the country.

Counties	1672	1676	1682	1683	1684	1685	1692	1693	1694	[1695?]	1696	1697	1700
Carlow	345	350	370	370	375	382	240	282	300	320	354	370	378
Dublin	2230	2695	2973	2980	3725	3699	3100	2200	2460	2870	2519	2621	3198
Kildare	640	735	775	810	820	820	500	650	670	660	700	704	699
Kilkenny	890	971	1020	1021	1051	1000	700	620	750	650	873	900	922
King's Co.	530	568	645	650	640	600	400	150	330	170	442	460	500
Longford	305	342	400	410	420	420	200	85	100	181	241	305	396
Louth	580	644	613	635	638	679	450	205	300	340	446	495	503
Meath	1217	1396	1275	1296	1330	1330	1000	900	1000	1000	900	963	965
Queen's Co.	600	530	605	650	665	665	460	435	470	465	600	640	641
Westmeath	720	715	747	762	762	762	400	300	410	355	501	516	547
Wexford	891	891	920	920	942	955	700	770	850	820	976	1040	961
Wicklow	457	546	570	580	600	610	400	440	500	500	613	661	585
Leinster	**9405**	**10383**	**10913**	**11084**	**11968**	**11922**	**8550**	**7037**	**8140**	**8331**	**9165**	**9675**	**10295**
Clare	605	710	755	780	810	820	500	500	530	550	661	770	785
Cork	2760	3170	3365	3338	3375	3402	1500	1500	1700	1850	2511	3004	3380
Kerry	600	750	850	830	830	800	500	425.3	500	500	577	751	870
Limerick	1020	1230	1365	1410	1410	1403	500	490	520	550	792	1023	1255
Tipperary	1298	1426	1506	1529	1563	1572	900	300	400	500	831	969	1290
Waterford	673	700	785	796	815	818	650	520	620	650	654	758	897
Munster	**6956**	**7986**	**8626**	**8683**	**8803**	**8815**	**4550**	**3735.3**	**4270**	**4600**	**6026**	**7275**	**8477**
Galway	1349	1260	1466	1550	1580	1590	1200	715	820	800	1312	1465	1450
Leitrim	288	308	352	360	364	370	200	100	150	190	255	279	321
Mayo	520	580	700	710	746	760	500	300	380	350	650	761	829
Roscommon	615	690	735	805	820	825	500	240	300	300	631	710	784
Sligo	415	541	590	608	615	615	350	250	320	300	417	480	560
Connacht	**3187**	**3379**	**3843**	**4033**	**4125**	**4160**	**2750**	**1605**	**1970**	**1940**	**3265**	**3695**	**3944**
Antrim	1353	1440	1620	1662	1712	1737	1400	1030	1170	1150	1466	1552	1535
Armagh	517	480	567	574	621	671	370	250	380	300	484	503	541
Cavan	460	525	609	643	654	634	300	100	160	130	332	401	492
Londonderry	705	768	880	887	897	900	500	530	640	540	710	731	844
Donegal	605	741	880	913	914	941	450	420	490	440	671	754	853
Down	1105	1190	1365	1408	1458	1481	1200	825	960	1050	1161	1164	1256
Fermanagh	350	400	444	478	489	445	250	131.1	170	180	280	326	420
Monaghan	355	395	379	402	424	474	270	92	130	100	290	291	383
Tyrone	563	738	868	879	879	907	400	210	250	260	522	525	673
Ulster	**6013**	**6677**	**7612**	**7846**	**8048**	**8190**	**5140**	**3588.1**	**4350**	**4150**	**5916**	**6247**	**6997**
National	**25561**	**28425**	**30994**	**31646**	**32944**	**33087**	**20990**	**15965.4**	**18730**	**19021**	**24372**	**26892**	**29713**

Table 7.1: County hearth-tax revenue totals 1676–1700

Sources: 1672, 1676, 1682–85, 1696–7 and 1700: Dickson *et al.*, 'Hearth tax, household size and Irish population change', p. 179; 1692–95: John Evelyn papers relating to the Revenue in Ireland (British Library, Add Mss 78452); I am indebted to David Dickson for unearthing these additional annual statistics. The figures for 1685 are also in the Evelyn papers and were found to correspond correctly for each county, while the figures for Dublin city and county from 1692–95 have been combined in line with the format from the other years.

Table 7.2: Percentage change of Hearth-Tax returns between 1685 and estimated returns in 1692.

Counties	% 1685–92
Limerick	-64%
Cork	-56%
Tyrone	-56%
Cavan	-53%
Longford	-52%
Donegal	-52%
Munster	**-48%**
Westmeath	-48%
Leitrim	-46%
Armagh	-45%
Londonderry	-44%
Fermanagh	-44%
Sligo	-43%
Monaghan	-43%
Tipperary	-43%
Roscommon	-39%
Kildare	-39%
Clare	-39%
Kerry	-38%
Ulster	**-37%**
Carlow	-37%
National	**-37%**
Wicklow	-34%
Mayo	-34%
Connacht	**-34%**
Louth	-34%
King's Co.	-33%
Queen's Co.	-31%
Kilkenny	-30%
Leinster	**-28%**
Wexford	-27%
Meath	-25%
Galway	-25%
Waterford	-21%
Antrim	-19%
Down	-19%
Dublin	-16%

Table 7.3: Percentage change of Hearth-Tax returns between 1685 and farmed returns in 1693.

Counties	% 1685–93
Cavan	-84%
Tipperary	-81%
Monaghan	-81%
Longford	-80%
Tyrone	-77%
King's Co.	-75%
Leitrim	-73%
Roscommon	-71%
Fermanagh	-71%
Louth	-70%
Limerick	-65%
Armagh	-63%
Connacht	**-61%**
Westmeath	-61%
Mayo	-61%
Sligo	-59%
Munster	**-58%**
Ulster	**-56%**
Cork	-56%
Donegal	-55%
Galway	-55%
National	**-52%**
Kerry	-47%
Down	-44%
Londonderry	-41%
Leinster	**-41%**
Antrim	-41%
Dublin	-41%
Clare	-39%
Kilkenny	-38%
Waterford	-36%
Queen's Co.	-35%
Meath	-32%
Wicklow	-28%
Carlow	-26%
Kildare	-21%
Wexford	-19%

Table 7.4: Percentage change of Hearth-Tax returns between estimated returns in 1692 and farmed returns in 1693.

Counties	% 1692–93
Tipperary	-67%
Cavan	-67%
Monaghan	-66%
King's Co.	-63%
Longford	-58%
Louth	-54%
Roscommon	-52%
Leitrim	-50%
Fermanagh	-48%
Tyrone	-48%
Connacht	-42%
Galway	-40%
Mayo	-40%
Armagh	-32%
Down	-31%
Ulster	-30%
Dublin	-29%
Sligo	-29%
Antrim	-26%
Westmeath	-25%
National	-24%
Waterford	-20%
Munster	-18%
Leinster	-18%
Kerry	-15%
Kilkenny	-11%
Meath	-10%
Donegal	-7%
Queen's Co.	-5%
Limerick	-2%
Clare	0%
Cork	0%
Londonderry	6%
Wexford	10%
Wicklow	10%
Carlow	18%
Kildare	30%

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