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Vigilantes, anti-drug movements, and community empowerment: A Dublin case study

by

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at
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under the direction and supervision of
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

Erin S. Nugent

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Summary

The Dublin anti-drug movement was a response to the escalation of the overt heroin problem in inner-city areas. In the early 1980's, Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD) became a citywide network whose intention was to empower local communities to tackle the problem themselves. The movement's ideals surfaced again in the mid-1990's when the Coalition of Communities Against Drugs (COCAD) formed to address the second wave of the heroin epidemic in disadvantaged areas.

However, one article by Bennett (1988) on the surveillance techniques of CPAD remains the only published research on the movement. Short references to CPAD also exist in various books which examine community, crime, or drug-related issues. These mention the anti-drug movement as a 'social' movement which exercised social control in inner-city areas. CPAD was also frequently presented as a 'vigilante' movement in the media during the 1980's, as was COCAD a decade later. Furthermore, the existing literature and early interviews indicated that the anti-drug movement was closely associated with two agencies: Sinn Féin and the Inner-City Organisations Network (ICON).

The above issues provide unique opportunities for further exploration. Accordingly, this research set out to investigate the anti-drug movement during its two key phases. In light of both social movement and vigilante theory, it investigates the pre-conditions, and participants' rationale, for mobilization. It also examines the tactics and methods used by the movement to address the heroin problem in order to determine whether it acted both as a social control agent and as a vigilante movement. The anti-drug movement's relationship with Sinn Féin and ICON were explored in order to determine the role they may have played in both resourcing and institutionalizing the movement.

Non-probability samplings (purposive and 'snowball') were used to conduct a total of twenty-three (n=23) interviews. Twenty one (n=21) were conducted face to face with

individuals residing and/or working in the north inner-city during one or both of the movement's phases. Two (n=2) telephone interviews were conducted. Furthermore, there was documentary analysis of governmental records and reports, media accounts of CPAD and COCAD, as well as community literature.

This research indicates that certain pre-conditions of mobilization existed which helped give birth to the movement. Long term disadvantage in the area, coupled with long-held feelings of government neglect, led an underclass to try to tackle the heroin issue themselves, thus challenging the beliefs of theorists like Peillon (1982) and Skogan (1990) who believe the disadvantaged lack the will and capacity to mobilize. Earlier successful community activism over housing decentralisation in the 1980's (and resulting networks) also proved vital for future anti-drug mobilization efforts.

This research also indicates that while the anti-drug movement was a social movement, it took a particular form of activity which focused on crime control and deviance. It acted as a social control agent in the north inner-city and manifested characteristics traditionally associated with vigilantism. Indirect governmental resourcing of the movement through local agencies however challenges Johnston's (1996) belief that vigilante movements operate without the government's authority or support.

Sinn Féin and ICON's relationship to the anti-drug movement has proved to be both a negative and positive relationship. On the one hand, the vigilante tag of the movement affected people's perception of these organisations. On the other hand, this research indicates these movements helped to greatly institutionalise the community's overall political needs.

This research provides unique insight into two phases of an Irish urban movement which has, for the most part, remained un-researched despite its outstanding achievements. It is hoped by this author that the work will contribute to urban movement literature well as encouraging a new look at vigilantism.

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Glossary

***Alliance for Work Forum* (AWF)**
Formed in 1989 by community members in response to the Docklands Development Programme to ensure benefits for Dublin's north inner-city.

***Coalition of Communities Against Drugs* (COCAD)**
Formed in 1996, COCAD is an umbrella organisation of community based anti-drugs groups working to address the problem at a grassroots level. It is considered the second phase of the anti-drug movement in Dublin.

Community Development Programme
Set up in 1990 by the then Minister for Social Welfare to provide core funding for community development resource centres and projects in communities experiencing social and economic disadvantage.

***Community Policing Forum* (CPF)**
Formed in 1999 to help improve communication between the community and the police on drug related matters. The CPF operates in the area from Marlborough St. to the Royal Canal and from Dorset St. to Amiens St. in Dublin 1. (See Appendix 1).

***Concerned Parents Against Drugs* (CPAD)**
The first phase of the anti-drug movement, CPAD was a community based anti-drugs group thought to have started in St. Theresa's Gardens, Dublin 8, in 1983. The name 'Concerned Parents' was soon adopted by other community based groups including those in the north inner-city.

***Dublin City Wide Drugs Crisis Campaign* (Citywide)**
Formed in 1995 to provide communities from across the city with a forum to address policy issues around drugs.

***Dublin Inner City Partnership* (DICP)**
Initiated in April 1991, as part of the general Partnership programme, to respond to long-term unemployment by linking the community with governmental and business groups.

***Inter-Agency Drugs Project* (IADP)**
Formed in 1995 by Inner City Organisations Network (ICON) as an inter-agency (statutory and NGO) approach to specifically address the drug problem in the north inner-city.

Inner City Organisations Network **(ICON)**
Formed in 1993 as a network for community groups in the Dublin's north inner city.

Inner City Renewal Group **(ICRG)**
Born in 1990 from the Alliance for Work Forum and Voluntary and Statutory Group (V&S). Its aim is to address issues of revitalisation for the north inner-city. Set up and funded under the Department of Social Welfare Community Development Programme.

Lourdes & Youth Community Service **(LYCS)**
Set up in the mid-1980s as a skills and work training facility for the north inner-city community.

Macushla
A bingo hall situated at the corner of Amiens St. and Lower Buckingham St. used for large community anti-drugs meetings in 1996 and 1997. Now demolished.

National Drugs Strategy Team **(NDST)**
Formed in 1997 to ensure effective planning and co-ordination of policy between Government departments. The NDST also makes recommendations for funding. The NDST operates under the Minister of State for Social Inclusion and Local Development.

North City Centre Community Arts Project **(NCCCAP)**
Project set up in the mid-1980s to foster the arts in the north inner city. The project currently resides in the Fire Station Artists Studio on Lower Buckingham St.

North Inner-City Communities Against Drugs **(NICCAD)**
Formed in 1997 to locally address the drugs problem in East Wall and North Wall. Affiliated to COCAD.

North Inner-City Drugs Task Force **(NICDTF)**
Formed in 1997 as one of 14 Local Drugs Task Forces that are based in Dublin and Cork which were set up as part of the National Drugs Strategy to facilitate a more effective response to problems in the areas most affected by heroin use. The Task Forces are overseen by the National Drugs Strategy Team (NDST).

Operation Dochas
A Gardaí initiative set up in 1997 to tackle the supply of drugs in the centre of Dublin. It mainly targeted street dealers. Street CCTV was brought in as part of this initiative.

***Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development* (RAPID)**
A 2001 Government initiative to target the 25 most concentrated areas of disadvantage in Ireland. Priority attention is to be given to such areas by Government departments dealing with disadvantage and local development under the National Development Plan. RAPID still has to be implemented.

***Voluntary and Statutory Groups* (V&S)**
Set up in 1989 by voluntary and statutory youth workers in the north inner-city to address the needs of children and youth at risk. It was one of the first attempts at partnership in the north inner-city.

Additional Terms

***Benzodiazepines* ('Benzos')**
A group of drugs prescribed for anti-anxiety, depression, and insomnia.

City Clinic
Local Eastern Regional Health Authority methadone clinic dealing with clients from Dublin 1 area only.

***Diconal* ('Dike')**
Morphine based drug once prescribed to treat severe pain. Only available for hospital use now. Along with Palfium, Diconal is widely considered to be one of the first opiate based drug of abuse in Dublin.

***Methadone* ('Meth')**
A synthetic substitute for heroin. Under the 1998 Methadone Protocol, it replaced Physeptone® as the maintenance drug dispensed by drug treatment centres.

***Palfium* ('Palf')**
Like Diconal, Palfium is a morphine based drug once prescribed to treat severe pain. Only available for hospital use now.

***Physeptone*® ('Phy')**
Synthetic substitute for heroin once used in Dublin drug clinics for treating heroin addiction. The Eastern Regional Health Authority now uses Methadone in its clinics.

1981	Lourdes Youth and Community Service	
1982	The "Gregory Deal"	
1983	Formation of CPAD	1ST WAVE OF DRUG EPIDEMIC *CPAD RESPONSE*
1984	North City Centre Community Arts Project	
1985		
1986		
1987		
1988		
1989	Alliance for Work Forum Voluntary and Statutory Group	
1990	Inner City Renewal Group Community Development Programme	
1991	Dublin Inner City Partnership	
1992		
1993	ICON	
1994		
1995	Citywide Inter-Agency Drug Project	2ND WAVE OF DRUG EPIDEMIC *COCAD RESPONSE*
1996	Formation of COCAD Death of journalist Veronica Guerin Enactment of Proceeds of Crime Act 1st Report of Ministerial Task Force to Reduce Demand for Drugs	
1997	Development of Local Drugs Task Forces Enactment of Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act	
1998		
1999	Community Policing Forum Pilot Project	
2000		
2001	Development of RAPID Programme	

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Prologue

On March 27th, 2000, sidebar news snippets appeared in the Irish Times and Irish Independent on the kneecapping of two youths in Hardwicke Street in Dublin's north inner-city. The news items had followed several others in the previous year which, as in these cases, remained confined to three or four sentences documenting similar acts of violence against young men in inner-city Dublin with no context or suggestion of possible motives.[1]

A few days after the Hardwicke Street shootings were reported, I met two young men who had come into a drop-in centre located at my place of work. Knowing them to be from the Hardwicke Street area, I asked them if they had heard about the shootings. 'Yeah,' one replied, 'That's the vigos.'[2]

I had been struck - as one would be - by the overtones of Northern Ireland paramilitary punishment beatings and I ventured further to understand their perceptions of the incident. Our brief discussion disclosed the men's belief that the shootings had been carried out by anti-drug vigilantes on two known heroin dealers in the area. The incident, it seemed, was not uncommon although the method was; the men felt the usual style involved more stock implements such as hurleys, hammers, and occasionally, baseball bats.

Most community workers in the area would have been aware of the general anti-drug activity that manifested itself in large protest marches on homes of suspected drug dealers around the north inner-city. In the mid-1990's I had, on several occasions, witnessed the marches while on work-related home visits. Out of curiosity, I had also attended two of the large public meetings held directly before the marches. Community workers in the area would also have known the topic of anti-drug activity to surface frequently and passionately amongst the residents. Feelings ran high between those

[1] I would later find out during the process of this research that this was not confined to newspapers in the Republic; Kennedy (1994) also found Northern Irish newspapers unwilling or unable to offer much contextual information on similar incidents.

[2] Pronounced 'vij'ohs.'

who supported the activists and those who did not. While the anti-drug activity in the area had already captured my interest, it was my conversation with these two men which left me wanting to investigate the un-researched arena of anti-drug activism in the north inner-city.

1.1 Introduction

This research set out to examine the anti-drug movement in Dublin's north inner-city. A disadvantaged area with a strong history of activism, the north inner-city provides a unique opportunity for a case study into one community's response to a heroin epidemic.

Characterised by high unemployment, social disadvantage, and decay (Alliance for Work Forum 1988; Department of Social Welfare 1996), Dublin's north inner-city[3] has benefitted little from urban renewal (Inner-City Organisations Network 1994; Punch 1998). When heroin epidemics took hold in the 1980's and 1990's, inner-city residents formed Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD) and the Coalition of Communities Against Drugs (COCAD) respectively. Their attempts to mobilize local communities against individuals deemed to be selling drugs were managed at grassroots level and addressed the growing conflict between alleged drug dealers and the communities they lived in. While their policies included drug prevention and education, CPAD and COCAD are perhaps better known for community self-policing.

There is scant formal literature about these Dublin anti-drugs organisations. Only one published research article (Don Bennett 1988) exists solely devoted to CPAD. Social commentaries have been made by Cullen (1990) on CPAD in the context of community development. Short references to CPAD also exist in various books and research articles which endeavour to examine crime and drug related issues (see McCullagh 1996; Ffrench O'Carroll 1997; Connolly 2003).[4]

Accordingly, no in-depth formal analysis on CPAD has been attempted. Furthermore, at the time of writing, this researcher could not locate any formal research on COCAD. Neither could she find any social commentaries on COCAD bar that presented by the

[3] Population 15,517 males and 15,203 females. This covers the electoral divisions of: Rotunda A and B, North Dock A,B, and C, Ballybough A and B, Mountjoy A and B, and North City (Central Statistics Office, Population Census 2002).

[4] Brief personal perspectives on the movement have been offered by Malone (1984) and Martin (1984) in books such as O'Donaghue and Richardson's (1984) *Pure Murder: A Book about Drug Use*. Connolly's (2003) study is on the quality of life in Dublin's northeast inner-city.

media and COCAD itself. Given the major problem presented by heroin in inner-city communities, such academic neglect is difficult to understand.

In the north inner-city, an anti-drug movement was organised by local residents. The area, ravaged by heroin and the spread of HIV, had not generated a 'moral panic' in the same manner that middle class areas might have done. It had instead produced an everyday social issue for parents in the inner-city. In order to protect their children, parents tried to address the issue themselves, initially engaging in a "clean-up" type of activity. The movement however demonstrated its own trajectory and the object of this thesis is to outline this trajectory along its two key phases of activism. It explains this activism in terms of key sociological frameworks derived from the sources of social movement and vigilante literature.

Further, it analyses the anti-drug movement in Dublin in its socio-economic and historical context. It locates the area in the context of a de-industrialized, ex-docklands region threatened by a housing policy which would have removed residents while gentrifying the area. The community's successful resistance against this governmental proposal galvanized the community to later take action against drug dealers who were threatening the social fabric of the community. The underclass context from which this social movement emerged gave the movement a particular form and set the context and boundaries within which the social actors had to operate. This context influenced their resources, and their tactics, as well as the outcomes of the movement.

1.2 Background issues

Two phases of anti-drug activism - Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD) and the Coalition of Communities Against Drugs (COCAD) - existed during the 1980's and 1990's respectively. An 1988 journal article by Don Bennett on the surveillance techniques of CPAD stands as the only formal research published on the movement. Bennett's article (1988) offers a unique insight into the surveillance techniques used by CPAD. His study however is informal - no methodology is stated and little theory is

provided. The activity conducted by CPAD prompts Bennett to ask, 'Are they always right?' (1988: 22), referring to the decisions made by the activists to spy on, and then target, specific individuals suspected of drug dealing. His answer 'the Dublin Concerned Parents during their first four years established proof flawlessly' (1988: 37)[5] and his statement, 'Thus far, they have always been right' (1988: 38), are noteworthy considering the wide spread sphere of activity across the whole of Dublin city. Bennett's confidence in the movement's ability to always be right stimulates this researcher to analyse this movement further.

CPAD and COCAD as social movements

Bennett (1988) and Cullen (1990) briefly refer to CPAD as a social movement; however, they do not elaborate on this. Observing the Concerned Parents Against Drugs organisation in the 1980's, Cullen (1990) described the organisation as having features of a social movement, including having mass participation around issues that posed a threat to communities. He argues that the potential of the organisation to broaden its agenda and adopt wider social and economic issues was evident, but not fruitful. Bennett (1988) focusing on how CPAD covertly gathered information on drug dealers discloses some inner workings of the organisation[6] and initially refers to CPAD as an 'extensive' movement and a 'mass movement' (1988: 22) but does not investigate these terms further. McCullagh (1996) briefly addresses community policing, firmly pulling threads from Bennett's (1988) work, but like Bennett does not address CPAD specifically in the context of a social movement. Rather McCullagh (1996) views CPAD more as a crime prevention initiative.

Furthermore the works of Bennett (1988) and Cullen (1990), which first brought sociological attention to the movement, did not address the standing of CPAD as an organisation of the urban disadvantaged nor the relevant implications of this. Equally so, there was no attention given to the role which economic and social conditions may have

[5] That is, proof of guilt.

[6] Bennett was given access to CPAD's central committee and its workings, claiming to be the first outsider to be allowed to do so.

played in determining the formation of CPAD and COCAD. Della Porta and Diani (1995) view these 'pre-conditions' as highly significant factors of social movement mobilization.

The question of whether movements of the poor and disadvantaged can, or are willing, to organise at all has been asked by theorists such as Rosenbaum (1988), Skogan (1990), and Lurigio and Davis (1992). Early interviews with respondents indicated that CPAD and COCAD were unquestioningly formed by inner-city residents in historically disadvantaged areas. The interviews also surfaced information on two particular aspects which required further investigation. Firstly, many respondents identified certain social factors and behaviours which hinted at the existence of an underclass in the north inner-city. This demanded further research as authors like Piven and Cloward (1977), Roach and Roach (1978), and Cress and Snow (1996) are of the understanding that movement's of the poor and disadvantaged have peculiar traits and difficulties separate from that of middle class orientated movements. Secondly, respondents overwhelming identified the anti-drug movement's strong relationships with two particular organisations which supported the movement - the political party Sinn Féin and the Inner-City Organisations Network (ICON).

Much public attention was also drawn (predominantly by the media) to the organisation's association with Sinn Féin and to the possibility of alternative agendas (Cullen 1990). Yet Bennett (1988) declines to even refer to this angle, even though he acknowledges that social control (an aspect commonly associated with Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland) 'is sociologically what Concerned Parents do' (1988: 37). The underlying agenda of both CPAD and COCAD has been questioned by the media (see Irish Times 1999b; Irish Times 2000b; O'Kelly 2001). The anti-drug movement has continued to be associated with Sinn Féin and the IRA, not only by the media (see Anderson 2001; Guerin 2002a; Hannon 2002; Hayes 2002) but by Sinn Féin itself (Sinn Féin 2000). Furthermore, there is increasing media coverage of Sinn Féin and IRA vigilante activity especially in relation to drugs (see Mulqueen 2001; Guerin 2002b; Kealy 2002).[7]

[7] *Independent* and *Sunday Independent* journalists in particular seemed to have maintained an anti-Sinn Féin slant in their writing.

ICON, which formed in 1993, existed during the second phase of the anti-drug movement. Little formal documentation exists on its association with the anti-drug movement. However, the organisation's archival records indicate a close working relationship with the movement.

Processes of resourcing and institutionalization figure highly in social movement literature, even moreso in the case of poor people's social movements. These processes can determine the operations and success levels of such movements according to authors such as Piven and Cloward (1977), Morris (1984), Jenkins and Eckert (1986), and Meyer and Tarrow (1998). It is worth then exploring the extent to which Sinn Féin and ICON may have resourced and institutionalized CPAD and COCAD.

Accordingly, this research will investigate CPAD's and COCAD's standing as an urban social movement and will explore the pre-existing social and economic conditions to provide the context within which this anti-drug movement emerged. It will also explore the movement's relationship with Sinn Féin and ICON with a view to determining their impact on the movement's operations and success levels. In reference to Giugni (1998) and Andrews (2001) who have pointed out that outcomes of movements are grossly under researched, the overall impact which the anti-drug movement had on the community itself will also be explored.

CPAD and COCAD as vigilante movements

The question of CPAD as a vigilante group is only briefly addressed (and defended) in Bennett's (1988) work despite the extensive labeling which CPAD received. This topic was a prominent, inescapable issue presented in the media during that time, yet Bennett neglected to provide even a superficial rationale for such assertions. Similarly, social commentaries by Cullen (1990) and McCullagh (1996) present concepts surrounding social control and vigilantism (such as self-policing and community crime control) applying these concepts to CPAD.[8]

[8] Although he mentions vigilantism and citizen patrols as two separate aspects of self-policing, McCullagh (1996) chooses to subsume CPAD under a type of citizen patrol.

The anxiety which ensued in the north inner-city after a series of drug related deaths in both the 1980's and 1990's called for a stronger social control apparatus than the government was providing. The anti-drug movement aided participation in the movement by relying heavily on it own mechanisms of social control. One could assume that those who participated in these anti-drug groups moved somewhat in consensus, seeing drug selling and drug using as unwanted behaviours in the community. As a group, anti-drug activists engaged in actions that were intended to not only shape the behaviour of individuals in their community but also to create 'a culture of opposition to the culture of drug abuse' (COCAD 1999a: 22).

Ideas on the creation and maintenance of such conformity can be found in theories on social control, as can societal reactions to deviant behaviour. The critical perspective on social control includes the role of power in defining who is deviant; it is intrinsically value-based (Janowitz 1975; Davis and Stasz 1990). Most would agree that illegal drugs - especially heroin - add little to an individual's or a community's overall welfare (Conklin 1975; Currie 1993).

Throughout CPAD's duration, the processes used by the organisation to enforce compliance were deemed by the media to be of a 'vigilante' nature. Martin (1984), a co-founder of CPAD, states, 'If the media wished to call us vigilantes, taking the law into our own hands, then let them think so. We knew better. We had lived with the problem for four years' (1984: 74).

Bennett, also acknowledged that the term 'vigilante' was applied to CPAD but defended what he deemed an insinuation that CPAD were 'uncontrolled, dangerous, and arbitrary' (1988: 37). Instead he states:

> International drug traffickers are not supposed to be catchable by mailmen, homemakers, unemployed labourers, and waitresses. Crime control, and social control generally are possible according to general orthodoxy - despite textbook homage to informal controls and natural order - only via the vast apparatus and vast technology of the state. This

> can be seen in that the vigilante, with all the ideological and linguistic loading this term carries, occupies all of the discursive space outside that apparatus. What does not occur officially becomes condemned as 'taking the law into their own hands (1988: 39).

Earlier on he had stated in general:

> A local community group which is prepared to watch, to patrol, and to take minimum necessary action to protect the people of the community are not vigilantes, at least in the bad sense of the word. To patrol the community is simply to watch for things, to guard, to police in that sense...it must be a good thing when the able-bodied of the community are willing to protect the weaker (Bennett 1983: 254).

McCullagh (1996) carries the vigilante theme onwards stating the CPAD formed as a response to the 'perceived failure of Gardaí and statutory agencies to respond adequately to the drugs problem' (1996: 168).

COCAD gained the insinuation of vigilantism also (see Irish Times 1999a; Irish Times, 1999b; Irish Times 2000a) when it drew more specific attention from the media through the 1996 death of Josie Dwyer, a HIV positive drug addict suspected of dealing drugs. Ffrench-OCarroll (1997) described Dwyer as having been 'beaten to death by an angry mob' and viewed the incident as 'a return to the days of punishment beatings of the '80's' (149). The subsequent legal convictions of four COCAD members in his death highlighted the growing tense co-existence between anti-drug activists and those living in local communities and raise the question as to whether COCAD was indeed a vigilante movement.

While Berger (1963) does not mention social control 'movements', Johnston (1996) puts forward the argument that vigilantism is a 'rudimentary social movement' which comes about as changes occur in people's expectations of citizenship and of the security people believe citizenship should provide (232). Johnston does not discuss the concept further here, however in his earlier work on private policing he notes that there is debate among theorists as to whether vigilantism 'is a movement or a mere reaction' (1992:160).

This debate is clearly manifested in the terms used to describe a body of people who have undertaken vigilante acts. As well as being described as having engaged in vigilante 'movements' (see Culberson 1990; Abrahams 1998) and extra legal movements (see Brown 1975, 1976), they have been named as 'groups' (see Madison 1973; Burrows 1976; Abrahams 1987, Arguillas 1989), or 'committees' (see Burrows 1976; Phillips 1989). In some cases, the behaviour, rather than the group, is framed and described as vigilante 'episodes' (see Girling *et al.* 1998) or 'attacks' (see Marx and Archer 1971). There is a lack of clarity then around whether social movements and vigilante movements hold peculiar or shared characteristics.

What is of interest to this researcher are the consistent methods employed by the anti-drugs movement both in the 1980's and 1990's to ensure compliance in communities. Also of interest is where these methods lie in terms of legal or extra-legal structures. The historical and current vigilante tag that both CPAD and COCAD have been labeled with supports the argument that these organisations should be formally investigated in the light of social control and vigilantism theories. Particular attention will be paid to the works of Berger (1963) and Johnston (1996), both of whom provided seminal work on the characteristics of social control and vigilantism respectively.[9] This thesis will explore the activities of CPAD and COCAD to see to what extent Berger's and Johnston's theoretical models are supported by the evidence of this research. It will also seek to determine whether vigilantism is a type of social movement or another distinct reaction to a perceived social problem.

1.3 Purpose and aims of this study

The lack of formal research on the two phases of the anti-drug movement in the north inner-city - indeed in general - has meant that the area is ripe for examination. Both Bennett (1988) and Cullen's (1990) differing perspectives on the movement bring

[9] This author acknowledges that theories of social control and vigilantism vary considerably and have different specifications of why such acts are necessary and how these acts are manifested. For the purpose of this research, the works of Berger and Johnston were chosen as theoretical plumblines since both men have, unlike many in their fields, ventured to provide specific characteristics and elements which help to define social control and vigilantism respectively.

some sociological attention to the subject. Yet many essential facets of the movement have remained arcane.

Although the anti-drug movement operated citywide, especially during its second phase under the banner of COCAD, this researcher decided to focus solely on the north inner-city for this research. Many of the communities which witnessed anti-drug activism share certain characteristics which might yield similar results in terms of the impact that such activism would have. However, the north inner-city's fervent historical activism coupled with its community development ethos provides a unique platform on which to view its anti-drug accomplishments. Three particular facets of the anti-drug movement are of interest to this researcher and merit investigation.

- The role that the anti-drug movement took in relation to policing the community and in devising its own social control mechanisms to inhibit drug selling and anti-social behaviour in Dublin's north inner-city.
- The role of local agencies in relation to the anti-drug movement.[10]
- The outcomes and impact of the anti-drug movement.

In light of what has been presented, this research aims to:

1) Provide a structural, historical, and social context for the anti-drug mobilization in Dublin's north inner-city.
2) Examine anti-drug activism against both social movement and social control/ vigilante theory in order to determine possible distinctions between social movements and vigilante movements.
4) Examine the relationship between the anti-drug movement and local agencies and investigate the impact these agencies had on the movement.
5) Explore the movement's outcomes and their impact on the north inner-city.

[10] The term 'local agencies' is presented in Johnston's (1996:234) article on the characteristics of vigilantism and refers to relevant agencies which may co-exist with a particular vigilante group.

As there are no formally written reports of the anti-drugs movement and little on the history of community activism in the north inner-city, I have included the views and experiences of respondents who provide rich and insightful details.[11] Quotes from interviews are given in parenthesis and note the date of individual interviews.

These interviews are also contextualised within data extracted from a variety of documentary, parliamentary, and community literature. These sources help to connect the north inner-city's activities with the broader social and political agendas of the time.

It is however, a study of the period between 1980 and 2000, a period located within one of great social change in Dublin. Furthermore, the inner-city movements as described in this thesis have led to greater institutionalization of the inner-city's political needs. The electoral isolation of this group testifies to the value of researching the anti-drug movement with its attendant outcomes.

This study will make a contribution to urban inner-city literature. On a more conceptual academic level, one of the key concerns of this research will be to locate the movement theoretically. For example, is it best described as a social movement? As the thesis unfolds the analysis will demonstrate that while it is indeed a social movement, it took a particular form of activity traditionally characterised as vigilantism. The use of this concept in a contemporary urban context might seem unusual but characteristics of vigilantism are to be found in the movement.

This study is not out to defend or reproach vigilantism. Rather it will show that given the underclass culture in the north inner-city, and the pre-conditions to the movement, vigilantism may have been the only form this social movement could have taken in order

[11] This particular style is based on referencing used by J.D. Brewer (1991) in his book *Inside the RUC: Routine Policing in a Divided Society.* Due to the sensitivity of his research matter, Brewer used details from his interviews to provide information which could not be formally sourced. In providing the date of the interview as an identifier (instead of attributing a number to the respondent), Brewer provided an extra layer of confidentiality for the respondent. The political and sensitive nature of this research coupled with the relatively small sample demands that additional measures to preserve confidentiality are taken. Accordingly, the above method employed by Brewer was chosen for this research in relation to all quotes from respondents.

for it to be effective in combatting the heroin problem that was ravaging the area. The following chapter will now outline the relevant theories that will assist this analysis.

CHAPTER 2

Literature review

2.1 Introduction

This literature review will first examine social movement theory, including the definitions of social movements, their rationales, and pre-conditions for mobilisation. This will be followed by a specific look at urban social movements and will focus on responses to particular urban concerns.

The review will then look at poverty and deprivation and examine how these factors may influence particular social responses in urban communities. This will also include an examination of the relationship between poverty and illegal drug use. This review will then investigate Irish, U.S., and British debates on the underclass.

Theoretical perspectives of social control, with a particular focus on its characteristics as defined by Berger (1963), will then be presented. This will be followed by an overview of theories on vigilantism, encompassing types of vigilante movements and the characteristics of vigilantism as defined by Johnston (1996). The review will conclude with an examination of the pre-conditions necessary for vigilantism along with an explanation of the relevancy of the above theories to the analysis of the anti-drug movement.

2.2 Social movements: definitions

Social movements remain one of the most prominent areas in sociology (Oberschall 1973; Johnston and Klandersman 1995; Maheu 1995; Della Porta and Diani 1999). As a result, definitions of social movements are wide-ranging and according to Crossley (2002: 2) 'problematic'. Some definitions he states:

> ...are too broad, such as they include phenomena which we would not wish to call social movements, and yet any attempt to narrow the definition down seems destined to exclude certain movements or at least the range of their forms and activities. In addition, every definition includes terms which themselves require definition (2002: 2).

This according to Giddens (1997) is due to the variety of differences between types of movements. Some authors like Klandersman (1997: 2) prefer to use dictionary based definitions centred around 'sharing collective goals and a collective identity' and 'engaging in disruptive collective action', rather than add to 'the already far too long list.' However, many authors do offer terse descriptions of this complex area.

Giddens (1997) himself defines a social movement as a 'collective attempt to further a common interest or secure a common goal, through collective action outside the sphere of established institutions' (1997: 511). Similarly, Tarrow (1994: 4) describes social movements as 'collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.' McAdam (1999) too suggests that:

> Social movements are not a form of irrational behavior but rather a tactical response to the harsh realities of a closed and coercive political system. Viewed in this light, the distinction between movement behavior and institutionalized politics disappears. Both should be seen as rational attempts to pursue collective interests...social movements should be seen as rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through noninstitutionalized politics (1999: 20).

Kuechler and Dalton (1990) echo this, believing that social movements consist of rational responses of groups and organizations with various levels of formalization, linked in patterns of interaction which run from the fairly centralized to the totally decentralized, from the co-operative to the directly hostile. Social movements they declare, are 'a collectivity of people united by common belief (ideology) and a determination to challenge the existing order in the pursuit of these beliefs outside institutionalized channels of interest intermediation' (1990: 278). Della Porta (1999) is also of the belief that social movements can take a variety of forms, from benign to aggressive.

McCarthy *et al.* (1973: 20) have presented a more inclusive definition of social movements which they view as 'a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward

distribution, or both, of a society.' Maheu (1995) believes that social movements reflect 'the will for social change for personal and collective emancipation' and includes the individual's capacity to 'do otherwise' (25). If meaningful change is to occur then, a person's will to change social situations needs to be accompanied by the actual ability of the individual to commit to, and follow through with, the aims and objectives of the movement. The aim of changing a social situation is foremost in many definitions of social movements (see for example, Morrison 1978; Morris 1984; Moser and Peake 1987; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Della Porta and Diani 1999). Social movements though can also seek to change belief systems, ideologies, and discourses (Garner and Tenuto 1997: 42).

2.2.1 Mobilization in social movements

Klandersman (1992) points out that despite the vast amount of literature on social movements, we know little about why people participate in social movements and ask, with McAdam's definition of a social movement in mind, why people engage in social movements rather than institutionalized politics. Melucci (1989) has claimed that people engage in social movements because they have particular individual agendas especially when feelings of injustice are involved. Morrison (1978) and Gamson (1988) similarly believe that groups choose to mobilize when individuals come to recognise where they lie in socio-economic stratifications. In other words, they recognise their lot as well as existing power differentiations and come to the realisation that there is indeed an "us" and "them." While economic concerns often stand out as reasons for mobilizing, social deprivations such as ties and status can be equally important in determining the birth of social movements (Eder 1993).

Feelings of deprivation, however, are subjective and changeable. The deprivation itself may be constant or intermittent. According to Jenkins and Perrow (1977), the type of argument put forward by Morrison (1978) and Gamson's (1988) often leads to 'circular reasoning' since often the only evidence for deprivation is the social movement itself. (34). Maheu (1995) disagrees also with their views, stating that it is impossible to condense the very essence of social movements to the simple dictum of an "us" and

"them" relationship. He argues that it is equally impossible to reduce all forms of social action to social groups that are objectively confronted with a widening gap between what they expect and what they will eventually receive. Maheu also questions why the social conditions of relative deprivation have failed to mobilize larger sectors of the population or why indeed when mobilisation takes place why the main participants turn out to be the least affected by social deprivation (1995). In order for Maheu to ask this question, he would have to believe that discernible and definable deprivation indicators exist which testify to the emergence of an "us" versus 'them" relationship, a viewpoint this research will later explore.

Shared Beliefs, Grievances, and Experiences

Smelser (1971) argues that social movements arise as side effects of over rapid social transformation reflecting the inability of institutions and social control mechanisms to reproduce social cohesion. Often there is what Smelser (1962) refers to as an 'initiating event,' that is, a particular event or series of events which can motivate people to mobilize and which can then kickstart a social movement. For example, Rosa Parks' refusal to give up her bus seat to a white man initiated the civil rights movement in the United States. Similarly, the Polish Solidarity Movement came about as a result of widespread feeling towards the unfair dismissal of Anna Walentynowicz, a shipyard welder (Sakwa 1989). Della Porta and Diani (1999) also argue that certain sensitivities (predominantly the dissatisfaction of individuals) gives ground to collective action especially when there is an assumption that the targeted institution is unyielding towards the collective need. Such personal agendas often involve a sense of being aggrieved (McAdam *et al.* 1996). However, one aggrieved person does not constitute a social movement.

Classical social movement theorists argue that movements form to relieve various forms of emotional strain and distress, that is, individuals experience social movements on a emotional level (Oberschall 1973; Ferree and Miller 1985).[12] Kornhauser (1998)

[12] This is typified by Frustration Aggression Theory, Mass Society Theory and Structural Strain Theory.

for example, suggests there is a strong link between culture and personality and if an individual is feeling estranged - leading to a feeling of 'personal impotence' (1998: 108) - he or she is more primed for activist solutions. In this instance, the aggrieved individual, and the emotional consequences of such aggrievement are central to mobilisation.

Other theorists, however, focus more on the relevance of shared beliefs and grievances. Diani (1992) is of the opinion that 'collectivity requires a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belongingness' (8). He makes the point that definitions such as that provided by McCarthy *et al.* which identify social movements as 'a set of opinions and beliefs' do not 'necessarily imply the presence of shared feelings of belongness' (Diani 1992: 8).

Feminist theorists in particular have paid great attention to the role shared beliefs and grievances play in determining social movements. For example, Basu (1995) states of the feminist movement:

> What initially motivates many women to organize is not necessarily a belief in the distinctive nature of their problems but rather a sense of shared oppression with other groups that have been denied their rights (Basu 1995:10).[13]

A similar view is held by Freeman (1984) who highlights the importance of 'consciousness raising' among women which encourages them to share feelings and express emotions around particular issues:

> With the public sharing of experiences comes the realization that what each thought was individual is in fact common, that what each considered a personal problem has a social cause and probably a political solution (Freeman 1984: 546).

Shared grievances themselves do not imply singular thinking on particular issues; individuals can share mutual grievances but disagree on how these grievances should be addressed. This can prove problematic then for participants considering joining a

[13] Conversely, Marx and Archer (1971) suggest that the opportunity 'to act out machismo fantasies' may occasionally encourage people to get involved in activism (1971: 47).

social movement. An individual's understanding of (and agreement with) the tactics adopted by the movement should usually be secured prior to the individual's participation. However, this may not always be the case (Rhomberg 2004). In fact, it is these tensions which can later bring about divisions in the movement.

Networks

Within social movement theory, much emphasis is placed on the role that networks play in the mobilization process. With this comes the assumption that formal or informal interactions have previously taken place between actors. That is, participants may have formal ties with organisations or informal ties with family friends or acquaintances who can exert a measure of influence over the particular individual (Giddens 1985; Passy 2003; McAdam 1999).

Networks provide the foundation for many social movements, helping to ease individuals into collective action (Harvey 1985). But, as people are very much influenced by structural networks, these networks can make or break an individual's attempt to participate in a movement (Hannon 1990; Tarrow 1994). Friedman and McAdam (1992) and Melucci (1995) agree, stating that individuals are drawn to those networks which they are familiar and comfortable with, which they may have previously experienced, and which reflect their own personal beliefs. In turn, these informal and close networks inadvertently offer a locale and 'preconditions for mobilization' (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 15; see also Diani 1992).

Gould (2003) recognises that social ties do not necessarily act as an incentive for people to join social movements. Citing the example of a friendship, he notes that any pressure exerted on one party by another party is most likely to destroy any existing ties; the friendship is unlikely to survive when one individual feels he or she is being forced to conform. On the other hand, mutual responses to a social situation can forge strong feelings of solidarity. Social ties then, can have a constraining effect on both recruitment and participation (Snow *et al.* 1980; Della Porta and Diani 1999).

Networks can also influence the intensity of engagement in a social movement (Passy 2003). The civil rights movement in the U.S., for example, began with extremely tight networks born from the solid attendance of African Americans at local churches and social clubs. This in turn cultivated a mutual sense of togetherness and belonging which translated into a widespread commitment to the civil rights cause (Morris 1984). In the same manner, the networks set up to combat the isolation felt by poor 1950's farmworkers in the mid east of the U.S. ensured fervent movement participation (Jenkins and Perrow 1977).

Institutionalization

Gurr (1968) describes institutionalization as the 'existence of a stable, enduring and strong association and solidarity beyond the primary group level' (1105). For Gurr, such groups provide members with an opportunity to obtain what they think they are entitled to. Meyer and Tarrow (1998) have provided a well rounded look at the role institutionalization plays within the realm of social movements. They see institutionalization as a process in which 'the relevant actors can resort to well established and familiar routines' (21) which although can negate uncertainty and instability, can ultimately suppress the unlimited scope for development and possibilities. They believe institutionalization is composed of three main but distinct components:

> Firstly, the routinization of collective action, such as that challengers and authorities can both adhere to a common script, recognizing familiar patterns as well as potentially dangerous deviations. Secondly, inclusion and marginalization, whereby challengers who are willing to adhere to established routines will be granted access to political changes in mainstream institutions, while those who refuse to accept them can be shut out of conversations through either repression or neglect, Thirdly, co-optation which means that challengers alter their claims and tactics to ones that can be pursued without disrupting the normal practice of politics (Mayer and Tarrow 1998: 21).

Meyer and Tarrow (1998) have stated that the process of institutionalizing a group can

act as a courting venture for the authorities in order that they may ultimately and effectively manage any potential disruption - the latter being an effective tool, particularly of the poor, Piven and Cloward (1977) claim. Jenkins and Eckert (1986) agree, citing how corporate foundations and governmental agencies, in order to channel black insurgency, sponsored African Americans during the civil rights movement who were involved in disruptive protests.

Mayer and Tarrow (1998) have also noted three recent developments in the institutionalizing process. Firstly, activists have learned to be flexible, adopting different strategies in order to obtain particular results. They cite, for example, the civil rights movement in the U.S. which made the transition from more policy orientated strategies to more grassroot activities such as marches and sit-ins which courted more media attention. Similarly, the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980's broke the usual labour mould by increasingly including intellectuals and white collar workers whom participants believed were also at the mercy of a command economy (Sakwa 1989).

Secondly, Meyer and Tarrow (1998) mention the increasing facilitative role of the police in relation to social movements. It is widely accepted that the presence of police at certain events can affect not only the dynamics of the event but also the outcomes (Walker 1993). Historically, the police have maintained a rather defiant stance in the face of protest, opting to quash the demonstration in its early stages before any potential damaging disorder takes place.[14] Meyer and Tarrow (1998) believe that Western police forces are now adopting a more 'apolitical' and tolerant approach to protesting. This approach was evident, for example, in the run up to the G8 Summit in Edinburg in 2005 where a large anti-globalization protest was expected. The Lothian and Borders Police issued the following statement on its web-site:

> We aim to police demonstrations and protests so as to facilitate the right to free speech, whilst ensuring public safety and public order. In keeping the peace, we mean to maintain the security and integrity of the palace of Holyroodhouse, the Scottish parliament, the business community, and

[14] Platt (1971) and Wilson (1973) offer examples of this type of police reaction, concentrating on unemployment, labour, and civil rights movements in the U.S.

> the city's many historic and iconic locations. In this regard, we welcome the opportunity to consult with the protest organisers so that we can work together to achieve these aims.[15]

The police can often offer assistance to a movement by protecting protesters from possible countermovements. This dynamic is frequently presented in demonstrations which involve emotion laden stances on matters such as fascism, racism, or abortion (Turner and Killian 1987). In turn, the pre-determined presence of the police at an event can often incite protesters to abandon earlier aims to concentrate on engaging in conflict with the police. The U.K. Poll Tax movement which formed in the late 1980's in response to a Thatcher inspired policy, saw many protesters clash with police who arrived prior to the first protest with riot shields. The riot shields were seen by many protesters as a sign indicating the intention of the police to engage in violence (Burns 1992).

Thirdly, Meyer and Tarrow (1998) state that there is an increasing overlap of tactics employed by institutionalized and non-institutionalized groups. That is to say, one group can employ tactics traditionally associated with the other group. For example, in her writing on social movements in Germany and Italy, Della Porta (1995) notes that those once mainly engaged in political violence are now more likely to participate in political partnerships. (Given recent political events in Northern Ireland, this is proving to be true). Despite Della Porta's optimism, she cautiously notes it is unlikely that the violence and disruption option of these movements will ever be fully abandoned. Similarly, McCabe (1999) acknowledges that for many social movements, contention is now more routine and quasi-institutionalized.

2.2.2 Urban social movements

According to Castells (1977) it is a mistake to consider urban movements as purely local or geographical responses to a social problem. Rather, their focus is on the role of the government in providing relevant services. While meeting the needs of urban based

[15] www.lbp.police.uk

people, urban social movements still contribute to wider sociological change (Castells 1983). Participants must see themselves as an urban movement with specific urban concerns. Offering a Marxist perspective, Castells states that the conflict between the state and social movements lie in the capitalism and collective consumption dynamic which ensures the reproduction of a labour force (1977). Subsequent writings of Herbert and Smith (1989) addressed Castells definition of cities as 'spaces for collective consumption' arguing that urban problems lead to concerns - peculiar to the city - which centre around improving social and physical conditions.

Logan and Molotch (1987) are in agreement with Castells that urban life is affected by economic development and macro forces but they acknowledge that these forces are channelled through familiar local agencies. They draw attention to those who profiteer from commercial development in inner-cities without demonstrating any concern for the consequences for residents. This neglect, they argue, often helps to sow seeds of resistance which often grow into social movements. Housing is also to the fore of Castells argument which emphasises the power of state regulation in relation to welfare housing which allows the needs of property developers to usurp those of the disadvantaged.

Basu (1995) also focuses on housing situations which can act as a litmus test to determine other economic difficulties faced by those living in disadvantaged areas. Increasingly, urban social movements centred around affordable housing are involving more women who are on the 'emotional and economic brink' (Sweeney 1994:7).

> Each urban struggle must have its structural content specified in terms of the role it plays vis-a-vis the various social classes involved. Then we will know what we are talking about (Castells 1977: 376).

It is argued that there is a need for the disadvantaged to participate in changing their environment (Lamb 1975; Castells 1978; Oberschall 1993; Cress and Snow 1996; Andrews 2001). Movements which seek to highlight the needs of the disadvantaged are often attempts by urban societies reacting to crisis situations (Tilly 1978; Lowe

1986; Inglehart 1990; Bagguley 1991).

Piven and Cloward (1977) have examined a wide range of case studies concerning organisations who they have deemed to have successfully mobilized around issues relevant to the disadvantaged and marginalized such as welfare rights, civil rights, trade unionism and unemployment. In an earlier work, Piven and Cloward (1971) stated their belief that the organized, agitated, and disruptive poor are capable of achieving much more than the poor who simply recognise their lot but look to others to act on their behalf either within a movement or otherwise. This belief has been corroborated by Morris (1984) who cites the example of urban and disadvantaged African-Americans who organised in the 1970's to challenge poverty in inner-city areas. The movement came to a demise, but was eventually resurrected by white well-off suburban residents who never managed to equal the achievements of the earlier phase, perhaps because they did not hold the same vested interests.

Resources

It should come as no surprise that the notion of resources plays a pivotal part in the discussion of poor people's movements (Hall 1995). Oberschall (1973) even reduces the problem of mobilizing to 'resource management' (158). Piven and Cloward, however, are of the opinion that the role of resourcing fluctuates between irrelevancy and relevancy. For example, they cite the example of the U.S. Industrial Workers' movement in the 1930's which became a successful long-term movement purely on the grounds that 'Labour won from elites the resources necessary to sustain a mass organization because the enormous disruptive power of the strike had to be contained' (Piven and Cloward 1977: 174). It should be noted here that Piven and Cloward do not give attention to the fact that the act of striking itself has long been a powerful and effective resource for poorer people. Nor do they consider, as this research will, what happens when such actions are not an option for those who are marginalized and who feel unable to draw attention to their plight.

The role of disruption and its perceived importance noted by Piven and Cloward (1977) is contested by Roach and Roach (1978) and Gamson and Schmeidler (1984) who place greater stress on the importance of organisation and the resourcing of a social movement of the poor. Stating that Piven and Cloward have 'animus' towards organisation, Gamson and Schmeidler (1984: 567) argue that Piven and Cloward and their supporters have neglected to see the framework of rationality that resource mobilisation theory brings to the overall debate. Roach and Roach (1978) concur stating that the authors are simply 'not interested in the nuances of community organizational theory and practice' (1978: 160) and state that it is unlikely that poor people who act independently will improve their status and that to reach their objectives the poor will have to work in conjunction with established labour structures.

Cress and Snow (1996) too emphasise the importance of economic solidarities, claiming that "benefactors" allow groups to mobilize and operate more productively (1104). Benefactors, they claim, are in agreement with the groups objectives and offer resources - material or financial - to ensure the groups survival. The vital role of providing meeting spaces in particular should not be underestimated (Cress and Snow 1996). Interdependence on resources (which for the disadvantaged are mostly in short supply) highlight the importance of tight, pre-existing networks (Stack 1997). As a result of this interdependence, networks among the disadvantaged are often stronger and more stable than those among the middle class (Friedman and McAdam 1992). The resourcing of a social movement inevitably brings to light the question of whether a movement remains uninstitutionalized or indeed graduates into a more conventional mode of operating.

The management of resources is debated. Diani (1992) identifies the role of networks to 'promote the circulation of essential resources for action (information, expertise, material resources) as well as broader systems of meaning.' (7-8). Others such as Harvey (1985) and Sakwa (1989) see the management of resources as solely being centralised or decentralised with networks playing a lesser role. The fact that resources can be blocked by non-sympathisers is an important point Oberschall (1973) draws

attention to, highlighting the fragile nature of the resource dynamic.

Anti-drug mobilization

Some theorists in crime prevention have noted that the incentive to mobilize is unlikely to originate in disadvantaged urban areas (Lavrakas 1985; Rosenbaum 1988; Skogan 1990). Rather, initiatives are often initiated by 'outsiders' who, having observed the negative impact of crime on a neighbourhood, want to contribute positively to the community by organising anti-crime responses (Skogan 1990).

Lurigio and Davis' (1992) empirical research on community anti-drugs responses however, published findings contrary to the existing theories of Rosenbaum (1988) and Skogan (1990). Their research indicates that those living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods were not only willing to initiate anti-crime programmes but they also participated in operating and evaluating them. They found that anti-crime programmes registered significant changes in the perceptions of people in communities, reducing fear of crime, giving individuals a sense of social control and cohesion, and increasing feelings of empowerment. Such movements would also go someway to lessening the physical signs of disadvantage in neighbourhoods such as dilapidated housing and infrastructure.

In extensive research on anti-drug responses in the U.S., Davis and Lurigio (1996) investigated and evaluated anti-drug initiatives and conclude that while police crackdowns may temporarily upset the local drug market, citizen involvement is vital in forcing drug dealers to become mobile, thus halting the market process. In organising constant street patrols, 'block watches,' and by targeting drug houses, citizens can disrupt drug businesses in the long term, in effect wearing out the possibilities for drug sales. Modifying the routine activity theory of Mesch and Schwirian (1996) which states that crime happens when an offender and a victim come together in the absence of a competent guardian, Davis and Lurigio (1996) argue that citizens can either act as guardians (since they know the lay of the land and can effectively target drug sellers) or they can engage in operations such as stings or busts which can remove either buyers

or sellers from the equation.

Davis and Lurigio (1996) recognise that disadvantages exist in community anti-drugs efforts also. Firstly, drug dealers may simply be displaced by citizen action, as suggested by McCullagh (1996). While this may offer a sense of ease to the previous community, it provides no relief to the new district of trade. Secondly, increases in the numbers of those involved in drug offenses puts stress on resources such as courts and detention facilities. As a result, revolving door polices are often put in operation, much to the consternation of the general public. Thirdly, attempts to curb drug selling may inadvertently infringe on civil liberties. Practices such as 'stop-and-search' and anti-loitering laws can grate the sensibilities of those with a finely tuned sense of social justice. As Davis and Lurigio have stated, most residents do look for assertive enforcement of laws. Likewise, Rosenbaum (1986) found that many residents in areas affected by drug dealing felt the end justified the means and were willing to accept minor infringements on civil rights in order to ensure public safety.

Davis and Lurigio's (1996) study concludes that evicting drug dealers from local communities should take priority over the medical treatment of addicts or indeed drug prevention programmes. Lacking an investigation into how the methods of such programmes may be more of a hindrance than a help in tackling a community drug problem, their research does not consider the complexities of a person being a member of the community which she or he is dealing drugs in. In Ireland, this has notable implications considering that many drug users sell heroin and other drugs in their own communities to support their habit (Coveney *et al.* 1999). While examining reactions of disadvantaged urban communities to crime, Davis and Lurigio's study does not attempt to investigate any statutory and non-statutory relationships in crime deterrence.

2.3 Deprivation, poverty, and disadvantage

Urban movements often represent a fragile social system which is born from poverty and disadvantage (Body-Gendrol 2000). Changes in economic circumstances and

outcomes have been responsible for a growing number of urban poor people's movements (Roth 2000). While the concept of 'poverty' has been in the sociological arena since the early 20th century,[16] it was the increasing discrepancy between the rich and poor in Ireland during the late 1970's and the 1980's which led political economists and sociologists to address the issue and in some cases open public debate[17] as to the definition, causes, and consequences of poverty. Central to the establishment of an overseeing organisation was a 1971 Bishops Council for Social Welfare conference in Kilkenny. Concerned individuals - both religious and secular - gathered to discuss the growing numbers of those presenting to welfare agencies. It was here that the development of an agency to directly address poverty issues was envisaged, and the foundation for the Combat Poverty Agency laid. The following year, Walshe (1972) offered a research perspective on poverty, building on O'Cinneide's (1970) look at the poor in Ireland and his review of social services. These factors, alongside Labour and Fine Gael's 1973 policy report and recommendations on poverty provided the ground work for all future discussions on the issue.

In 1989, over 90% of Irish people interviewed saw poverty as an election issue (Combat Poverty Agency 1989b: 20). This trend was somewhat reversed in the 1990's, yet compared to other European countries, Ireland still witnesses economic inequality (Atkinson 1995). In 2001, 24% of Irish people interviewed considered themselves poor (Harvey 2003).

Sean McDermott Street, in the heart of the north inner-city had in 1969 been sited as being economically the polar opposite of the affluent Ailesbury Road in Dublin 4 (Nusight 1969). The north inner-city still remains one of the most proclaimed disadvantaged areas in Ireland, having been identified in 2000 by the Programme of Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment, and Development (RAPID) a

[16] Many early sociological accounts of economic hardship came to the fore as a result of problems posed by the great Depression in the United States. See Angell (1936) and Bakke (1934).
[17] See Callen *et al.* (1989) who debates the relativity of poverty. According to Donnison (1991), 'Those who believe that the relativists won the argument tend to feel that poverty, in the relative sense, causes intolerable and preventable human suffering - or matters for other reasons. Their opponents regards the relative definitions as a measure of inequality which should be frankly presented as such, not as evidence of a social problem calling for a solution' (1989: 5).

governmental initiative targeting the 25 most concentrated areas of disadvantage in the country.[18]

2.3.1 Definitions of deprivation and poverty

Scientific and statistical work on deprivation seems to have been prompted by the growing volume of interest in the use of social indicators for purposes of information, analysis and planning (see Cassals 1986; Ferge and Miller 1987; Callan *et al.* 1994a; Callan *et al.* 1994b; Beresford 1999). As with poverty, many definitions and measurements of deprivation have been offered.

In 1979, Peter Townsend presented one of the first operational definitions of deprivation. This heralded a shift in sociological thinking as poverty had been previously and predominantly viewed as income related. Basing it loosely on the British Department of the Environment's research on British households, Townsend devised an index which reflected lifestyle characteristics of British citizens and used these as indicators to score aspects of deprivation.[19]

Offering a more general definition, Townsend states that deprivation 'may be defined as a state of observable and demonstrable disadvantage relative to the local community' (1987: 125). Arguing that deprivation can take many forms, Townsend distinguishes between *specific conditions* of disadvantage which are observable and

[18] According to the fact sheet issued to inner-city residents, 'up to £15 billion has been earmarked for social inclusion measures, to be spent on development measures over the next five years. The RAPID Programme will prioritise the 25 identified areas and frontload a significant share of this money to them over the next three years.' At the time of this research submission, the programme still has not been initiated.

[19] This includes: 1). Percentage of economically active persons who are unemployed; 2). Percentage of households defined as overcrowded; 3). Percentage of household with a single parent family; 4). Percentage of households lacking exclusive use of two basic amenities; 5). Percentage of pensioners living alone; 6). Percentage of population change; 7). Standardised mortality rate; 8). Percentage of households in which the head was born in the Commonwealth or Pakistan (Townsend 1979). In contrast to Townsend's 1979 deprivation index which reflected quite specific facets of the typical British lifestyle, Mack and Lansley (1985) developed a deprivation index which incorporated aspects deemed *necessary* by early research respondents. Some aspects which arose included being able to afford a one week holiday away from home and being able to purchase new (not second-hand) clothes.

demonstrable such as physical, environmental, social states or circumstances and *general resources* which an individual would have access to (1987: 125). In effect, people can be said to be deprived if they lack types of clothing, food, housing and housing facilities, heating, and the social conditions in the societies to which they belong. Individuals may not only fall below the standard of living of the *majority* of the national population, but also what *could* be the standard of living if resources were distributed more fairly (Fitzgerald 2000).[20]

It is generally agreed that multi-deprivations can exist and these can include the inability to maintain an acceptable former standard of living (Nolan 1991; Atkinson 1995; Allen 1998). In turn, deprivation can impact on both health and emotional functioning (Marmot and McDowell 1986; Kessler *et al.* 1989). While people can experience one or more forms of deprivation, they are not necessarily in *poverty*. Poverty begins when the scale of a individual's income and resources descends and becomes disproportionate to further loss of resources (Desai 1986). This highlights the question of whether a deprivation threshold exists, an aspect which remains hotly debated. Desai (1986) believes a threshold does exist, allowing for 'objections about tastes, about variations within income classes, linear or non-linear relations' (18).

Mack and Lansey (1985) have pointed out the importance of examining the relationship between deprivation indicators. This has been echoed by Irish researchers and theorists who not only view this as an integral procedure when looking at the measurement and effects of deprivation but who also devise research to 'construct a more reliable measure of poverty by combining low income with suitable direct indicators of deprivation' (Layte *et al.* 2000). Callen *et al.* (1994a)[21] for example state:

[20] Townsend *et al.* (1987) acknowledge that while social deprivation is more difficult to measure, it is none-the-less distinct from material deprivation and they cite the condition of those who cannot enter into ordinary forms of family and other social relationships. Social deprivation would include: 1) Rights to employment 2) Family activities 3) Integration into the community 4) Formal participation in social institutions 5) Recreation 6). Education.

[21] Callen *et al.* (1994a) suggest that in order to examine the relationship between indicators it would first be useful to categorise three groupings of items; 1). A basic life-style dimension, consisting of items such as food and clothes; 2). A housing and durables dimension, consisting of items related to housing quality and facilities; 3). Other aspects of life-style consisting of items such as social participation and leisure activities and having a car or telephone (1994a: 51).

> Previous research employing deprivation indicators has generally relied on summary indices of this type, using a sub-set of items chosen on the basis of the extent to which they are possessed or regarded as necessities by most of the sample. The relationship between the indicators has been given little attention in effect, a single underlying dimension of deprivation has been assumed...when they affect a person's way of life, the relationship between the items is of central importance (1994a: 50).

Callen *et al.* (1994a) also state that when addressing the relationship between indicators, that it should be taken into consideration:

> ...the possibility that the relationship between possessions or activities and income or wider resources may vary across different types of items or different household types. Simply adding together items relating to everyday activities with those related to the possession of consumer durables or the quality of housing may also be unsatisfactory as a measure of current living standards or resource constraints (1994a: 46-47).

While theorists like Townsend and Desai remain convinced that deprivation exists separately from poverty, it is clear that many theorists intertwine the two concepts when looking at disadvantage. Ringen (1988) has argued that poverty should be understood as a state of *generalised* deprivation, characterised by a low standard of consumption and a low level of income (1988: 354).

The definition of poverty 'has been one of the sticking points about poverty' (Beresford 1999: 49) and remains one of the most important challenges in relation to research (Callan and Nolan 1994). The measuring of poverty is equally challenging (Jencks and Mayer 1990; MacLaren 1991; Layte and Whelan 2000).

While views differ on how poverty should be defined, most attempts centre on distinguishing the poor from the non-poor (Mayers and Jencks 1988; Callen *et al.* 1994b; Layte *et al.* 2000). However, as MacLaren (1999) states:

> The poor do not constitute an identifiably separate group which is identifiably different from the rest of the community in terms of their

> attitudes, assumptions, norms and expectations. They are simply those who are excluded from full participation in society, primarily because they are deprived in terms of the economic dimension of well-being (179).

This distinction has proved to be popular in poverty theory especially in relation to purposely including average and wealthy families within research on poverty. Such families should be welcomed into, and become, as Donnison *et al.* (1991) state, 'part of the agenda' (1991: 3).

Peter Townsend (1979) contributed an early definition of poverty which remains germane in research, perhaps due to its well-rounded applicability. He states:

> Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged, or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns and customs (31).

It has been argued that poverty is the deprivation of necessities (Morgenroth 2001), though these themselves are ill-defined (Lawson and Garrod 2000). Donnison *et al.* (1991) offer a European Community based definition of poverty, defining the 'poor' as 'those living in households falling below a relative measure of equivalent disposable income' (3). Within this definition lie four basic units of measurements. Firstly, there must be a household in which an individual lives alone or shares the same space and facilities. Secondly, the concept of income would include monies that are 'disposable' (including welfare, excluding taxes). Thirdly, the income must be addressed in terms of needs and acknowledge that while one adult can be viewed as a single unit, additional adults (or children) living in the same household will not necessarily represent the same need as the one individual. Finally, the equivalent income required to keep people out of poverty is not absolute but a proportion of the average equivalent income (1991: 3). Callen *et al.* (1994a) while agreeing with using income as a starting point when investigating poverty, are clear that it should not have prevalence. They state:

> However, focusing simply on income has limitations, because income, current or annual, is not the sole determinant of command over resources and living standards. Some people have access to other resources, such as savings or family support, that enable them to smooth out the effects that income fluctuations would otherwise have on consumption and living standards. On the other hand, some people far from having such resources, may have accumulated debts that mean that the impact of income fluctuations on living standards are immediate and unavoidable, if not magnified. For this reason, it is valuable to complement income measures with direct indicators of the extent and nature of deprivation and exclusion being experienced by households (1994a: 43).[22]

Processes of impoverishment also change in contexts where there is increasing instability of family and community support networks (Lister 1990). The intervention of state welfare, it is argued, exists to help stabilise these individuals. It is understood that welfare programmes were developed to try and address poverty and, using resources gained from economic growth, integrate those ostracised through the labour market (Urry 1981; Morris 1989; Spicker 1990). However, as Wilson (1987a) has argued, welfare recipients reflect only one aspect of poverty in urban areas. The features that characterise urban disadvantage - the concentration of individuals, structural decay, high rates of homelessness - all promote a type of social exclusion unlikely to be truly affected (or indeed changed) by any governmental intervention. This concentration, Duggan and Ronayne (1991) state, 'has been accompanied by a decline in both the relative and absolute living conditions of those adversely affected' (1991: 2). Such exclusion may also be characterised by a change in social behaviour as these individuals become increasingly detached from the system and the benefits it purports to provide. These behaviours - to be discussed below - have forced theorists to examine the possibility that another disadvantaged class may exist outside the 'working class' framework consisting of individuals who are identifiable by the lack of not only financial but social stability.

[22] Piachaud (1981; 1987) has pointed out, that preferences and choices should be taken into consideration when examining poverty, that is, there is a differentiation between those that are constrained in what they can afford and those who could afford materials or services but *chose* not to purchase or avail of them. Therefore preferences and choices are correlates which can be changed unlike the consequences of poverty which will be steadfast unless poverty is eradicated.

2.3.2 Poverty and drugs

As Gossop (1998) points out, the use of drugs is nothing new; they have been used since time began to alter states of consciousness. Drug use and selling are for the most part, viewed as both criminal and socially deviant behaviours. The roots of this can be safely traced back to the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Act in the U.S. which prevented narcotics from being sold from general food stores or from non-medical persons. Doctors could now only prescribe opiates or narcotics for legitimate reasons; addicts could no longer be medically maintained on controlled drugs. Willis (1969: 25) acknowledges that 'this was a formidable piece of legislation which had the effect of virtually outlawing anyone who was an opiate addict; thus the attitude of the public and the medical profession became a negative one directed towards the addict who was automatically identified as a criminal.' Illegal drug use - especially that of heroin - has evolved to become highly associated with poverty and disadvantage globally, particularly in inner-cities (Stimson 1998).

Research has shown then, unsurprisingly, that there is a corresponding link between heroin use in Ireland and social disadvantage (O'Higgins 1998) and that the relationship between social class and drug use is complex (Hartnoll 1995). The first major examination of the drug problem in Dublin, a 1983 report, commissioned by the Medio-Socio Research Board, indicated that fifteen percent of those aged between fifteen and twenty-four years old were using heroin in the north inner-city,[23] a considerably worse statistic than a previous study conducted in a similar sized New York inner-city district. All the community worker respondents mentioned the 'Bradshaw Report' [24] and stated how pivotal it was in understanding the severity of the drug problem in their area. Two stated:

> *We realised in '83 that it wasn't just isolated dabbling in heroin that was going on but that it was an epidemic. The Bradshaw Report came out which validated that, which said that fifteen percent of young people under twenty-five were on heroin in this area, in the Sean McDermott Street area, which was huge. It was higher than Harlem. We didn't know what to*

[23] The research in Dublin was conducted in Mountjoy A District.
[24] The report was in fact conducted by Dean *et al.* (1983).

do. We were inspired by Theresa's Gardens when we heard there was a series of public meetings. The Concerned Parents came about then (3/8/01).

The Bradshaw report showed the extent of the problem. So there were people that were then seeing it in the broader context. At the start, like anything else, you look back now and say, "God, it should have been clear to people that the problem was going to become so bad and that people would succumb to it." But you don't see that at the time, you know, 'cause it is only one other issue that people are having to deal with. It's only in hindsight that you can say, "That's where the problem started to get out of control. That's when the problem started to escalate in the area." That's just hindsight really (22/5/01).

The research also found that the respondents were from a designated disadvantaged area, had low educational attainment, and that one third of respondents were from families who experienced alcohol problems. One third had one or two parents who were deceased, and three fifths had been previously arrested (Dean *et al.* 1983). Later research conducted by Moran *et al.* (1997), Butler (1997), Hogan (1997), McCarthy and McCarthy (1997), and Coveney *et al.* (1999) does not deviate too much from these findings.[25] An overall look at trends in treated drug misuse from 1996 to 2000 states that the numbers of those who had left school before the age of 15 remained relatively high at over one-quarter, indicating the 'social disadvantage of drug users' (Health Research Board 2003).

A specific north inner-city based study conducted by Coveney *et al.* (1999) found only one out of sixteen respondents to be employed. The respondents, the researcher concluded, were 'seriously marginalized' not only as a result of their residency by also because of their heroin use (1999: 32). The numbers of those in drug treatment in the north inner-city were double of those in the south inner-city (n= 443 and n= 214 respectively).[26]

[25] For a extensive review of literature on poverty and drug use see O'Higgins (1998).

[26] O'Higgins (1998) makes the point that up until 1998 drug treatment figures were dependent only on those submitted by some treatment centres and therefore 'bear little relationship to the actual number of opiate users in Dublin' (1998: v).

A strong link exists between drugs and crime. The disinhibiting effects of drug use can lead to anti-social and criminal behaviour, upsetting local communities. The supply aspect of drug selling is rife with 'turf wars' and accompanying corruption and violence (Goldstein 1985; Parker and Auerhahn 1998). Crimes are also committed to support individual drug habits as disadvantaged youth often engage in the sale and distribution of drugs to earn money, soon learning that it is a relatively profitable and low risk activity (Johnson *et al.* 1990; Davis and Lurigio 1996).[27]

Overt drug use and selling then are unwelcome behaviours in most communities. Inherent in illegal drug use are the negative implications of crime, violence, and anti-social behaviour. According to Skogan and Lurigio (1992), it is the 'visible and disruptive nature' of drugs which would lead one to expect some type of neighbourhood activism (1992: 510).

As stated above, the behaviours associated with drug use have long been perceived as deviant and criminal (see also Lemert 1951; Simmons 1965) and as we already know, deviance is something frequently reacted to (Melossi 1990; Sumner 1994). Drug users' experiences with homelessness, sex work, crime, and prison ensure they remain isolated from the broader community. It is understandable then that some theorists consider drug users to be part of an 'underclass' which exists outside mainstream society and benefits little from what is has to offer (see Ifill 1993; Dixon and Maher 2002).

2.4 The underclass debate in Ireland

There has been little discussion on the underclass in Ireland. Arguments for and against the existence of an underclass centre around behaviours and elements of class stratifications and internal divisions of these stratifications.

Peillon (1986), for example, makes no mention of an Irish underclass in his look at stratification and class. Rather, definitions of stratification are all determined by levels of

[27] Nurco *et al.* (1993) reminds us that in many cases, drug users were involved in crime before they developed a drug habit.

skill as well as employment. In an earlier work however, Peillon (1982) attributes to the working class the same characteristics some theorists use to describe the underclass. However, they do so with less pronounced judgment. For example, he writes on a 'division' of the working class which exhibit certain behaviours:

> Parents... who consider school a waste of time, are not prepared to make sacrifices to educate their children, and parents and children alike look forward to the day when the child can leave school and earn some money. Even at school, the children are irregular attenders, and prefer to find occasional employment. Their social ambitions are limited, or unrealistic; moreover to continue at school would mean cutting themselves off from their friends and provoking the hostility of peers. The parents exercise little control over their children who, even at a young age are allowed to roam the streets, or hang around the local shop, until late at night. Juvenile delinquency is endemic in such social conditions, and young people, left to themselves, become sexually active early on. Teenage marriages in turn lead yet again to frequent pregnancies, large families in overcrowded living conditions, in already densely populated urban areas where seem to be concentrated all the poverty and all the problems of the country. This social group...exists very much on the periphery of Irish society and remains marginal in every sense of the word, situated on the edge of a stable society, and a constant source of embarrassment. Nevertheless Irish society continues to spawn this sub-proletariat, and there are no signs that it will cease to do so, or that there is any danger of social revolution from this particular source (39).

Peillon's description of teenage marriage would, to many social surveyors, now seem a little optimistic as would his belief that work is central in the minds of this particular group. Considering Ireland was heading into the depth of economic depression in the early 1980's, Peillon's lack of attention to long-term unemployment and welfare recipients is surprising. Over a decade later, Whelan (1994) adopted a similar view to that of Peillon, viewing this marginalized group as a sub-division of the working class who experience more poverty than usual. Referring to this group as the 'marginalized working class' (9), Whelan forgoes providing an explanation for the types of behaviours illustrated by Auletta (1982) and indeed Peillon (1982).

Drudy (1995) enlightens the debate and reminds us of the 'declassed' - those outside

the class structure for example: those on home duties or in retirement who are unable to work because of illness or disability (307). These can be individuals who represent all conventional class stratifications. Further classification comes with further examination of the individual's recent employment before their situation changed due to unemployment or disability (308). Drudy pointedly notes that such people, 'because they do not have occupations, and because a very significant proportion are now long-term unemployed...disappear from social surveys (312). She does not however acknowledge an underclass who are better defined by behaviours and lifestyle and continued disadvantage rather than their position on an employment scale.

Tovey and Share (2000) on the other hand, acknowledge that Ireland possesses an underclass made up of the poor, the long-term unemployed, substance users and marginalized groups. However, they do not expand on the concept. This is unfortunate as they hint - with the inclusion of the long-term unemployed and substance users - that there are groups that lie outside the well worn framework of employment: those who have never worked, who will never work, and whose children may never work through either choice or socio-economic factors.[28]

2.4.1 The wider underclass debate

Outside of Ireland, the underclass debate has raged, particularly in the U.S. and Britain. While studies on social exclusion and poverty were escalating in Europe in the early 1980's, discussions on the existence of a U.S. 'underclass' were beginning, an attempt to explain an emergence of inner-city populations characterised by high unemployment, high levels of teenage pregnancies, drug use, and crime.[29] Some theorists, like Jessop

[28] Within this author's working realm, second generation drug users are now frequently presenting. Like their parent (s) they have little education, no skills, and they have never worked. With a continued addiction problem they will be unlikely to work in the future. The introduction of Methadone maintenance programmes - intended to 'stabilise' active drug users - has made little impact on assisting drug users into the workplace; the system requires attendance for urine samples, counselling sessions, meetings with doctors and clinic psychiatrists as well as daily, twice weekly, or weekly Methadone collections. (For an interesting insight into further difficulties drug users face within Methadone programmes see Reaper and O'Reilly (2005).

[29] Myrdal (1963) was an early flag waver over this emergence. He noted 'an underprivileged class of unemployed, unemployable and underemployed who are more set apart from the nation at large and do not share in its life, its ambitions, and its achievements' (1963: 10).

(1994) believe it was the transition from a Keynesian Welfare State to a Schumpeterian Workfare State which birthed a free market economy. The structural changes involved in this transition led to the formation of a group whose skills (if any) either ill-fitted or were surplus to the society. These processes may have worked together to produce growing levels of poverty, social exclusion, inequality, and inadequate services in particular urban areas (Rex 1988; Mingione 1996). Similar beliefs are held by Nightingale (1994) who cites post-World War II structural changes and deindustrialization as causes of urban black poverty. Massey and Fischer (2000) provide a detailed description of the U.S. experience:

> The structural formation of the U.S. economy from good production to service production generated a strong demand for workers with high and low levels of schooling, but offered few opportunities for those with modest education and training. Central cities lost hundreds and thousands of high paying unionised manufacturing jobs and these were replaced by non-union service positions that paid high salaries to expanding class of managers and professionals, but low wages to displaced factory workers and new job seekers who lacked educational credentials. In the post-industrial economy that emerged after 1973, labor unions withered, the middle class bifurcated, income equality grew and poverty deepened.[30] This new stratification in the socio-economic sphere was accompanied by growing spatial separation between classes in the spatial sphere (2000: 670).

Opinions on the term 'underclass' and its actual definition vary greatly (Ricketts and Sawhill 1988; Field 1989; Bagguley and Mann 1992). The term has been loosely defined, highly criticised for its dramatic inference of the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor and subservient, deviant overtones (Gans 1995) and embraced as the sole identifier of the new urban poor (Auletta 1982; Wilson 1987b). With such wide ranging beliefs surrounding the term, and the resulting malleability, 'underclass' is thus viewed as both a pejorative and non-pejorative term (Borchet 1999).[31]

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[30] Research by Coulton and Pandey (1990) indicated that the concentration of poverty in Cleveland, Ohio more than doubled in less than a decade.

[31] In his examination of the lives of the 'persistently poor', Davis (1995: 8) offers a crude example. 'Under what?' he asks, 'under the rest of us of course.'

Debate surrounding the underclass falls into conservative and liberal camps[32] both underpinned by the understanding that long-term social welfare dependence is by far the most common characteristic of the underclass[33] (Gallie 1994; Katz 1995; Model 1998; Buck 1999). Moving away from poverty based suppositions, some underclass theorists began to focus on the common *behaviours* - transcending structure - which were manifested by these populations. The resulting effect was that:

> The word underclass conjured up a mysterious wilderness in the heart of American cities: a terrain of violence and despair, a collectivity outside politics and social structure, beyond the usual language of class and stratum, unable to protest or revolt (Katz 1993: 4).[34]

This conservative camp, willingly championed by Charles Murray, argues that federal policies, along with massive welfare spending, have served to subsidise dependent behaviour that keeps people poor and inadvertently creates and perpetuates a 'culture of poverty.' [35] These states of affairs are due to cultural models that undermine work, ethic and family values, resulting in crime, illegitimacy, and economic inactivity (Murray 1984: 2). Sullivan (1993) also agrees that the role of culture is important when examining the underclass and states it is somewhat neglected when addressing social change:

> The neglect of culture leaves us in the dark as to how people deal collectively with economic disadvantage, prejudice and the dilemmas of procreating and raising families under such conditions. Lacking such an understanding we are left with two sorts of explanatory framework: structural and individual, both of which beg crucial questions on how people in real communities devise collective responses to their problems. Too extreme an emphasis on individual causation ignores growing evidence of the proliferation of low-wage jobs and increasing joblessness in inner-city labour markets. Too much emphasis on structural causation ignores evidence that postponing childbearing leads to greater

[32] Lee (1994) provides a helpful explanatory table of leading commentaries.
[33] Vergara (1995) suggests the existence of underclass 'hyperghettos', areas where more than 40% of individuals are living below the poverty level, and therefore accessing welfare.
[34] This was typified in television media with the emergence of police-based dramas such as *Cagney and Lacey, Starsky and Hutch*, and *Hill Street Blues* which unlike their predecessors, dealt with more gritty street level issues such as drug addiction, prostitution, homelessness, and indeed the welfare system.
[35] This irony of this conservative viewpoint, Jencks (1992) points out, is not the fact that a welfare system fails, but the disgruntled belief that it succeeds.

occupational success even within inner-city populations (1993: 66-67).

The idea of an underclass and the resultant 'culture of poverty' mentioned by Murray (1996) is a latter comment on Oscar Lewis' (1968) focus on personal pathologies, such as undervaluing education and employment which affect a person's ability to rise out of poverty. Kane (1987) rightly believes there is no automatic transmission of social status from parents to children; Lewis believes it is more common than not:

> The culture of poverty, however, is not only an adaptation to a set of objective conditions to a larger society. Once it comes into existence, it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effects on the children. By the time slum children are aged six or seven, they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of their changing conditions or increased opportunities that may occur in their lifetime (1968: 188).

While the culture of poverty argument is heralded by more liberal critics as a moral one which attributes blame to the poor in society for their own circumstances (Buck 1999), Murray unreservedly states that the behaviours he deems anti-social - willingly becoming a one parent family, long-term dependence on social welfare, and anything criminal - are volitional.[36] Addressing the individual citizen, Murray states that while there will always be a need for governments to safeguard their citizens, such security should not be guaranteed unless individuals 'take responsibility for the consequences of your own voluntary behaviour' (Murray 1984: 32).

It comes as no surprise that Murray has his critics, though in fairness he has willingly put forth his work for scrutiny.[37] Foremost are disputes with Murray's interpretation of family trends (and his analysis of causes), and his overgeneralisations. In a commentary on Murray's convictions on the existence of a British underclass, David (1996) states 'his arguments about the characteristics and consequences of the growth in the underclass

[36] Walker (1990) argues that such behaviours override the level of poverty the individual experiences; it is not necessarily the poorest that engage in anti-social behaviours.

[37] See *Charles Murray and the Underclass: The Developing Debate* (Murray 1996) in which Murray invites discussion on his 1990 publication *The Emerging British Underclass.* (London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit). See also Greenstein's (1985) reply to Murray's *Losing Ground* (1984).

are completely fallacious and misrepresented in this paper, leading to a gross form of caricature or stereotyping' (1996: 53). Intrinsic problems exist when 'translating definitions of marginality and exclusion from one society to another' (Buck 1999: 297). Accordingly, critics have noted that the application of Murray' s US racial framework of the underclass scarcely reflects British societal trends[38] (Lister 1996) or indeed Irish ones.

The effectiveness of welfare assistance is also challenged. Whereas Murray contests it leads to a dependency culture where recipients remain unmotivated to make more positive life changes, others conclude that it is the inefficiency and discriminatory aspects of some welfare services which prevent recipients from stepping out of the poverty trap (McFate *et al.* 1995; Mingione 1999).[39] In accordance with this, Buck (1999) cites research which found that countries (such as those in Scandinavia) which had a more structured but prevalent welfare system, had less poverty than countries such as the US and Italy where there were fewer welfare recipients but more real, and marked poverty.

Another prominent concern is the 'imagined knowledge' of labeling which occurs when theorists neglect to address the conditions that cause poverty (Gans 1995: 29). Gans explains how the tendency of labeling - and blaming - may have been born from the turmoil which engulfed the U.S. in the 1960's. The spotlight on protesting black communities helped to galvanize white fears, with the result that blacks were blamed 'for their actual or imagined behaviour' (1995: 29).

Also rejecting the conservative thesis, William Julius Wilson calls for the refocusing of the liberal perspective. While liberals defending existing welfare programmes argue that large numbers of people who receive welfare are only on it for a short time (Bane and Ellwood 1986), Wilson (1997) questions the liberal approach which denies the existence of an underclass and the social pathologies which categorise it. While stressing

[38]There seems to be little linkage between US underclass and British studies of social exclusion; studies on comparative underclass have very little in common (Mingione 1999). Lee (1994) points out that early British commentaries on underclass did, like those in the United States, have race overtones such as Giddens (1973) and Rex (1983). Murray believes that British racial underclass theory began to decline in the late 1980's as more complex and determined economic problems began to emerge.

[39] Heath (1992) and Gallie (1994) found no evidence to support that welfare recipients had attitudes of alienation from work or family values. Also, Bradshaw (2001) makes the point that the very existence of poverty in inner-city areas is a testimony to the welfare system's lack of success.

the importance of structural views and situational factors, Wilson does not dismiss cultural factors nor the importance of a more holistic approach to understanding the workings of inner-cities:

> Cultural factors do play a role but any adequate explanation should take other variables into account. Social psychological variables - a set of factors absent from the current debate - must be integrated with social structural and cultural variables. We need a broader vision that includes all of the major variables, and even more important, reveals their relative significance and their interaction in determining the experiences and life chances of inner-city residents (1997: xiv).

Ten years earlier, in *The Truly Disadvantaged,* Wilson (1987) asserted that the terms 'lower class' and 'working class' did not encapsulate the recent transformations in America's cities which resulted in increased concentrations of poverty. The role of these concentrations has been identified as one of the underlying factors of the underclass (Guano, 2003; Dangschat 2004). A distinctive culture was emerging which mirrored the economic marginality and which propagated distinguished, collective behaviours. Wilson (1987) and Phillips (1990) recognise this culture's isolation from other groups and emphasis its spacial segregation from other classes.[40]

Fahey and Williams (2000) have too suggested that disadvantaged areas should not be regarded as having equable composition which does not allow for variations among sub-cultures within them. Neither does the geographical and physical location of such areas give a 'guarantee of positive social interaction or a sense of commonality between them' (2000: 241). Likewise, pockets of poverty are not necessarily confined solely to urban areas (Nolan *et al.* 1991; Nolan *et al.* 2000).

Frequently examined in analyses of poverty and disadvantage, is the commonality of particular traits and characteristics.[41] Primary are observations that a relationship exists between the underclass and 'deviant' behaviour. Traditionally poor people are thought

[40] Lee (1994) offers a fine detailed look at the role housing plays in social and spatial detachment.

[41] Others like Whelan (1994) focus solely on examining the possibility of an underclass in light of labour market marginality and long-term unemployment. They argues that rather than seeing an emergence of an underclass in Ireland, we are only witnessing different types of working class marginalization.

of as deviant, holding different values from those not so impoverished (Kane 1987; Buckingham 1999). Since there is a perception that poorer people do not seem to value education or mainstream employment, there is also a belief that these people develop alternative cultures which assist them in obtaining control over their lives and give them some sense of purpose (Hayes and Nutman 1981; Kane 1987). Edensor (2000) also acknowledges this adaptation, adopting the Gramscian notion that working class people are self aware actors and active agents who 'construct their own rather creative ways of dealing with adversary' (2000: 805). Such deprivation often reflects the 'darker side' of the entire lifestyle of a people (Townsend 1987: 26).

Indeed, a widely shared perception of the underclass is that it is a threatening subculture which continually corrodes society and which may even need particular policing (Cohen 1979; Marshall 1992; Campbell 1993; Reiner 1997).[42] Such conditions within inner-cities, Katz (1993) states, are often felt to 'menace the rest of us' (1993: 3). Cohen (1972) and Ungars (2001) have both investigated the concept of social anxieties and have agreed that the perception of deviance is frequently linked to moral panics.[43] It has has even been suggested that urban planners regard areas which house the underclass as dangerous and that any planning is seldom begun without acknowledging the proximity of these areas (Gans 1995). Interestingly, the Irish Council for Social Housing warns of the creation of an underclass due to the lack of housing in Dublin (Melia 2003).

Braving to move away from the racial concepts of other theorists of the time,[44] Auletta (1982) includes (along with Tovey and Share 2000) drug users as part of the underclass. They belong to one of four categories representative of those who Auletta considers to be separate from mainstream society. Firstly, there are the long-term social welfare recipients who he terms the *passive poor.* Secondly, there are the *hustlers,* who participate in an underground economy. Thirdly are the *hostile* street criminals, for example drug addicts, who commit crimes which affect the general population. Finally,

[42] An earlier examination of fearing the poor can be seen in Morris' (1949) *Dangerous Classes.*
[43] Reiner (2000) reminds us that the fear of crime is relatively new in research due to the increase in victim surveys like those conducted by local crime watch groups.
[44] For example, Suttles (1968).

Auletta identifies the *traumatised,* a term embracing alcoholics, the homeless,[45] and those with mental health problems who remain detached from any medical assistance (1982: xvi).

The picture that the underclass theorists present is dark. Historical and structural factors and economic and political processes have shaped the social conditions that allow such a group to increase in numbers and yet become increasing marginalized. The underclass live their lives in an almost parallel universe devoid of meaningful and sustained outside interactions and interventions. When worlds do collide it is at welfare offices, homeless agencies, and drug clinics. The underclass have little education, existing in concentrated areas of disadvantage, long-term unemployment, and poverty.

Yet they benefit little from the social policy changes intended to improve their plight. As Jackson (1993) has wryly stated, such policies are often 'long on rhetoric and short on results' (407). Political systems have not embraced the underclass as for the most part, they do not vote. They continue to be excluded from the political process in a manner which reflects consensualist thinking on behalf of most politicians; that is, the middle class is the best judge to tell the underclass what their needs are and what political changes will benefit them.[46]

If the underclass remain impervious to the political system, then they should be equally resistant to an established justice system. Inner-cities experience high levels of crime and social disorder. Drug use and drug dealing continues to grow in these areas (Stimson 1998) as illegal drugs become a profitable business in areas of high unemployment. As Davis and Lurigio (1996) put it:

> Drug sales provide poorly educated, unemployable, and impoverished youths with a steady "job" that is easy to learn, highly profitable, and

[45] Bartelt (1993) considers housing conditions and homelessness as an integral part of the impoverishment of those considered to be part of the underclass.

[46] Drudy and Lynch (1993) have coined the term 'consensualism' to describe a concept which views society as an "undifferentiated whole" (50). It assumes that universal agreement to values exist in any given society. With consensualist thinking there is little, if no, recognition of differences. Consensualism they argue, mirrors middle class interests and ideals (49).

> relatively low risk in terms of arrest and incarceration. Drug habits may force young men and women into prostitution or drug sales. An entire generation of inner-city inhabitants are being lured away from mainstream employment into the drug trade which leads many to prison or premature death. In short, the drug trade has had destructive effect on people's lives. It introduces them to crime as a way of life, increases their risk of drug abuse, and attenuates their prospects for legitimate employment (37).

A scene is set then where, as Rosenbaum 1988 and Skogan 1990 state, high levels of unemployment, public disorder, non-nuclear families, transiency and drug use contribute to the psychological helplessness of local residents. This is surely compounded by a mistrust of a policing and justice system which has ignored, for the most part, Murray's (1984) call for it to safeguard its citizens. How then can residents respond to the growing drug problem in their communities when established social control systems are no longer an option?

Sampson and Morenoff (2006) have suggested that while poverty can undermine social organisation, disadvantaged communities can, and will, engage in social control when faced with a problem of social disorder. In a study of 80 Chicago neighbourhoods, they found that people living in segregated and stigmatised areas, and who mistrusted mainstream institutions, had higher expectations for social control than those who did not live in such areas or hold such sentiments. Residents in these areas shared a willingness to intervene in situations that affected social order and the sustainability of the community.

Sampson and Morenoff (2006) also found the level of 'collective efficacy,' the cohesion among neighbourhood residents, existed relative to specific tasks such as crime control or maintaining public order (185). The stronger the level of cohesion within communities, the higher the level of shared expectations of social control. This they state, signifies an emphasis on their belief in their neighbours' communal capability for action to achieve an intended effect. The willingness of individuals to engage in informal acts of social control has also proved to have a stabilizing and bonding effect on disadvantaged neighbourhoods which have experienced high levels of crime and disorder but which may not have previously experienced a high level of efficacy (see for example

Bandura 1997).

2.5 Social control: theoretical perspectives

Johnston (1996) acknowledges that social control is a key component of vigilantism but that 'vigilantism is not merely a synonym for social control' (231). As we have already seen, some social commentators believed the anti-drug movement exercised a type of social control over inner-city areas in order to curb the drug problem. An understanding of social control and some of its characteristics may help to shed more light on the anti-drug movement and its possible relationship to vigilantism.

As a concept, social control remains foremost in sociology. Emerging in American sociology in the early 20th century, the term has been attributed to Edward A. Ross, who, in 1901, published a volume of papers on the subject entitled *Social Control.* Concerned with how institutions regulate behaviour, Ross focused simply on the importance of conforming to norms and values to ensure the smooth functioning of social systems. Robert Ezra Park, from The Chicago School of the 1920's, began to simultaneously tease out the concept alongside William Burgess. Their joint publication *Introduction to the Science of Society* (1924) recognises the centrality of control in sociology stating 'all social problems turn out finally to be problems of social control' (quoted, Cohen and Scull 1983: 5). William Graham Sumner's earlier *Folkways* (1906) examined similar notions of behaviour regulation, particularly addressing the degree of importance of individual customs and the degrees of sanctions for non-compliance. Today, the notion of social control has evolved to encompass many complex social processes such as internalisation and socialisation, as well as crime control (Gibbs 1982; Cohen 1985; Davis and Stasz 1990; Sumner 1997; Crossley 2002).

Social control then embraces a wide range of definitions. According to Blomberg and Cohen (1994: 4) 'Social control is one of those terms that appear in the sociological discourse without any corresponding everyday usage.' However, it is generally agreed that social control is vital for the management of social systems (Lemery 1967; Mayer

1983; Phofl 1985; Scheerer and Hess 1996), and that the foundations for possibilities of control lay in our day-to-day interactions with each other. As Goode (1972) states, 'We all interact with others, engage in a flow of transactions with others; and whatever we do has some effect on others, to our advantage or not, in conformity with our wishes or not, and whether or not we will it so' (1972: 507). Blomberg and Cohen (2003) suggest that 'social control' is:

> ...a generic term for a variety of institutionalized practices designed to set limits to individual action in the interest of the collectivity's proclaimed ideals of social and criminal justice as instanced in law and dominant ideologies (119).

Berger (1963) too notes that no society can effectively operate without some social control and that control can be successfully exercised despite the size of the group, be it large or small. Social control has at once an effectiveness and yet a remoteness that can induce a feeling of helplessness and separation. For example, Berger notes the "them and us" psyche often adopted by the working class which reflects more concrete feelings about the overall system in which they feel little part of. This impersonal structure is circumscribed by the social milieu into which people are born. Regardless, demands are continually made by society and these demands, according to Berger, are met by certain control devices.

An effective device is that which somehow coerces, or as Berger (1963) states, 'persuades' the individual to conform, winning the individual's loyalty. This involves manipulating a person's belief system in such a way that somehow the individual sees his or her view as contributing to the overall good of the group. Giving a rather dubious example of the progression route of cannibals reaching consensus over the consumption of close relatives, Berger offers the notion that intrinsically linked to persuasion is the individual's desire to be accepted by the control agent. In wanting to be a member of, and participate in, a group, the individual may in turn refine, or even completely change, his or her beliefs.

Berger (1963) also states that compliance can be achieved through *ostracism.* Often

used as an alternative by those unwilling to engage in other devices (especially violence) ostracism can see a person removed, or having to remove his/herself, from a group or community. A case in point is the Amish act of 'shunning' which Berger views as a far more punishing tool of control than violence. In such cases, the threat of ostracism is usually sufficient to maintain some semblance of order.

Ridicule and *gossip* as means of possible dislike or disaffection are also mentioned by Berger (1963) as devices of social control. Essentially a veiled threat to withdraw affection, ridicule often depends on the non-response of the individual to a certain challenge. If the outcome of the challenge is potential ridicule then the individual is highly likely to comply. In this manner it is rather easy to control beliefs of behaviour. For example, Berger notes the importance of 'kidding' among Blacks in the American south to achieve pliancy (1963: 88). Gossip, he states, 'hardly needs elaboration' but is 'essential for the maintenance of the social fabric' (1963: 88).

Berger (1963) speaks of the use of *fraud* as a device for social control. The ability to manipulate and deceive in order to determine new behaviours, he argues, involves a certain level of intelligence:

> A little boy can exercise considerable control over his peer group by having a big brother who, if need be, can be called upon to beat up any opponents. In the absence of such a brother, however, it is possible to invent one. It will then be a question of the public-relations talents of the little boy as to whether he will succeed in translating his invention into actual control (1963: 89).

What cannot be achieved by force then, can be achieved by deception, and this can act as an effective constraint. As Berger points out, fraudulent deeds often accompany other acts of social control.

2.5.1 Social control and deviance

It is not possible to address social control without addressing deviance (Glaser 1971;

Pfohl 1985; Cohen and Scull 1983). To consider deviance at its most abstract and elementary level, two components must be considered. Firstly, there needs to exist an agent or authority that has some power (Cohen 1985), and secondly, some event or occurrence that enables those in authority to label the person as deviant (Becker 1963; Cohen 1981). Howard Becker (1963) offers a good general definition:

> The central fact about deviance...is that it is created by society. I do not mean this in the way it is ordinarily understood, in which the causes of deviance are located in the social situation of the deviant or in 'social factors' which prompt his action. I mean, rather, that social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender". The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label (1963: 8-9).

Sumner (1994: 203) gives a good overview of the labeling perspective arguing that the 1960's 'registered the importance and the political in the labeling of deviance.' (Lemert (1967) however, had earlier acknowledged that the process of labeling was indeed a political process). In the 1960's there was a move however towards seeing deviance as something which interferes with established mores. Deviants being resocialised were then, according to Sumner:

> ...the same old historical faces: the faces of the underclass, the inner-city poor, the lower-class immigrant, the avant-garde, the homosexual, the bohemian drug culture, the sexually deviant female and rebellious young men..bias rooted in long standing economic, political and ideological value-judgments (Sumner 1994: 203).

Davis and Stasz (1990) state that the escalation of deviance, in the case of drugs and drug use, is primarily promoted by the construction of moral panics:

> A moral panic occurs when the official reaction to a person, groups of persons, or series of events builds a consensus about the presence and seriousness of a perceived threat. Experts such as police chiefs, judges,

> politicians and editors begin to speak in identical terms, and appear to talk with one voice. Newspapers, radio, and television generate stories about increasing rates of addiction, dire prognoses, and the need for drastic solutions. They speak of "sudden and dramatic" increases in numbers of persons involved which in fact are above and beyond that which a realistic appraisal could sustain. Thus, the moral panic is a perfect foil for the emergence of "new" social problems and a strengthened control apparatus (129).

However, Conklin (1975) believes that it is crime itself which ultimately provides cohesion for some communities. Stating this to be a 'Durkheimian' view, he notes deviance as being the factor which causes community members to define what is objectionable behaviour. Deviance, he argues, can act as a positive function in strengthening community bonds, providing the incentive for community members to organise when they feel their families or properties are under threat.

The social history of heroin control has moved from acknowledging the drug as a 'private indulgence' to more of a 'public evil' (Davis and Stasz 1990: 130). Negative perceptions of drug users are further solidified since, as previously noted in this thesis, poorer people are already thought of as deviant (see Kane 1987; Buckingham 1999).

The level of response to such perceived deviance (the decisions people make and the actions they then take) can vary greatly as can the tactics used by individuals or groups to reclaim the common good. Vigilantism has been seen as one of the more extreme forms of social control especially in relation to perceived deviance.

2.6 Vigilantism: theoretical perspectives

Vigilantism has been a continual theme in the history of social control especially in the U.S. (Burrows 1976). However, vigilantism is prevalent in many societies (see Ayers 1989; Linden 1989; Harris 1989; Kalmanowiecki 1991; Abrahams 1998; Silke and Taylor 2000). Vigilantism is, of course, a concept which has both positive and negative connotations. As Burrows (1976) states, 'The vigilante reaction then is a complicated

one and not easily suited to generalisations. It has brought order and destroyed it, consumed guilty and innocent alike, and been invoked by men with the most honourable of intentions and with the meanest' (1976: 23).[47] Taken from the Latin 'vigilant' meaning 'watchful', the term 'vigilante' is rooted in the 19th century Vigilance Committees of the North American West. Composed of volunteer groups of citizens acting without legal authority to pursue and punish those suspected of being criminals or possible offenders, these vigilance committees became most prominent during the Goldrush when much lawlessness abided (Towle 1966). Vigilantism, almost considered a way of life in North Western America at this time manifested itself in the late 19th century in over 300 distinct country-wide organisations (Little and Sheffield 1983).

By engaging in acts of vigilantism, many individuals believed they contributed to the overall common good. Although representative of all social classes, these vigilante groups were mostly led by more wealthy business men and farmers. Protection of life and property remained a pressing issue for property and non-property owners alike (Brown 1975).

However, not everyone held these beliefs; there did exist a 'contraculture.' According to Brown, this group, composed of 'shiftless' poor whites, held differing values which conflicted with norms of the time (1975: 104). Exhibiting behaviours of a type of underclass, this group engaged in behaviours deemed anti-social; this contraculture somewhat brazenly rejected the predominant values. The precariousness of these new communities granted them an opportunity to disrupt what semblance of order communities had. Accordingly, new groups assembled to challenge the non-

[47] There seems to be little documentation of the roles of women in vigilante movements. Abrahams (1998) offers a brief chapter on the participation of women in the Ku Klux Klan. Towle (1966) in *Vigilante Woman* examines seven women who lived in America's mid-west during the 19th century. Her focus is not on how these women engaged in social control but rather on how they survived turbulent and lawless times. Towle notably mentions the role of 'Sob Sisters', women of the town whose emotional outbursts and sentimentality would sway judges from hanging men who were on murder charges. Such was the chaos caused by these events that women were eventually barred from vigilante committees. Silverman and Wilson in their research on anti-paedophile action, have noted a high involvement of working class women in such protests. These women orchestrated marches in which they were highly vocal about the actions that should be taken against paedophiles. In one instance, some placards being carried in a march read, "Kill all paedophiles" (quoted, Evans 2003).

conformists.

Variations on crime control can be seen on a continuum based on a society's relationship to an established legal system (Little and Sheffield 1983). The North American system, for example, moved outside the formal system completely. Unlike the English who observed a more traditional-based and fairly stable legal system, frontier people in the America had no particular foothold in law despite having strong moral convictions. The uncertainty of new territories, coupled with a lack of an accepted (and most importantly historical) legal structure, gave these communities 'methods for enforcement of these convictions relatively free rein' (1983: 807).

In examining the English and North American systems of the 19th century, Little and Sheffield (1983) found distinct comparisons. Firstly, as one would expect, dissatisfaction with the local social control apparatus existed within those particular frontier communities. Secondly, local elites were responsible for both initiating, organising, and operating relevant groups. Thirdly, these movements, widespread and not confined to just a few areas, tended to dissolve when the State exercised more pronounced authority. Finally, the motivation for their respective responses had an economic basis; they had developed a cheaper and faster means of dealing with criminals and their behaviour (Little and Sheffield 1983).

Differences in responses, Little and Sheffield found, lay mostly with the North American mindset. As stated earlier, few frontier Americans were prepared to work in conjunction with the established legal system. Little and Sheffield point out that unlike the English system, which had little to do with self-protection, the North American system involved a type of symbolic behaviour that warned potential infractors that swift consequences awaited those whose actions were deemed wrong. This, they argue, most likely mirrored the American revolutionary heritage which held the belief that such extra-legal means justified the ends. Interestingly, overthrowing the existing system never seemed an option despite the grave reservations held by frontier citizens (Little and Sheffield 1983).

Brown (1975) in an exploration of legal and behavioural perspectives on American vigilantism examines the responses of the legal profession of the time. Emphasising the distinction between legal and extra legal practices, Brown makes a very important point: reforming and modifying existing laws are two distinct processes. Brown sees vigilantism not in terms of legal versus extra-legal crime control but legal and extra-legal crime control practices versus due process. That is, the depth or severity of the reaction is secondary to whether or not the reaction occurred within an established legal framework.

Clearly, people simply wanted to control crime. Many legal professionals in the 19th century, Brown states, saw no problem with the lack of due process. Indeed many participated in lynch mobs while still maintaining legal status within the community. This type of legal/lay person collaboration, rife in North America at the time, has continued to be a theme in vigilante theory (Harris 1989; Phillips 1989; Ackers 2000).[48]

2.6.1 Types and characteristics of vigilante movements

Rosenbaum and Sedeberg (1976) have offered three types of vigilante movements. Firstly, as acknowledged by other authors (see Bennett 1988; Rees 1994; Hudson

[48] Historical writing on indigenous movements have noted that vigilante-type groups had been operating in Ireland a century before those which formed in North America. The prominent Whiteboy movement of 1761-1765 whose members rebelled against the exactions of tithes on corn and potatoes as well as the enclosure of common land, was a strong response to a feeling of overwhelming oppression at the time (Donnelly 1977). So-called because of their ritual of wearing white shirts over their clothes, the Whiteboys would mobilize to perform acts of defiance, including the destruction of fences which surrounded common land, torching the homes of landlords, maiming cattle and increasingly, violence towards those either promoting tithes or the enclosure of land. Whiteboys often engaged in symbolic threatening gestures. One infamous incident involved the 'trial' of a horse belonging to a local magistrate who had succeeded in imprisoning a number of Whiteboys. The horse, found guilty, was grossly tortured before being shot (Foster 1988). Numbering in their thousands, the Whiteboys were strongest in Tipperary, although they had representatives in most counties of the South East and South West (Lydon 1998). Donnelly (1977) and Lydon (1998) agree that the Whiteboy movement coincided with a period of agricultural prosperity which helped clearly define the have and have-nots in rural areas. Dominated by the Catholic landless, the Whiteboys tended to appear on what Foster (1988) terms 'the invisible network of settlement frontiers' that is, areas which held high concentrations of wealthy Protestants as a result of colonisation (1988: 124). Resentment at the dealings of the more prosperous led to these men taking matters into their own hands. Existing networks were particularly important to the Whiteboys who, because of their lack of wealth, were forced to share resources.

1997), the most popular view of vigilantism is that which concerns crime control. As defined by those living on the American frontier, these vigilante groups target those who overtly defy or break government sanctioned laws. This definition helps to somewhat clarify the point that Johnston (1996) makes in relation to the 'overlap' of crime control and social control. In this instance, institutionalized laws (rather than say, mores or norms) are being defied.

Secondly, vigilantism can be 'establishment violence directed against groups which are competing for or advocating a redistribution of values within the system' (Rosenbaum and Sedeberg 1976: 12). Giving the example of the Ku Klux Klan attempts to counteract any movement towards Black equality in the early and middle 20th century, Rosenbaum and Sedeberg argue that violence exercised against a certain group can be the utmost form of social control.

Thirdly, 'regime-control' vigilantism is violence intended to alter a political regime in order to make the superstructure into a more effective guardian. This would include political assassinations by private agents who support and want to therefore promote a regime such as commonly seen in South America. Research into the area of political vigilantism upholds the belief that vigilantes exercise more independence from the government as opposed to death squads which can often be drawn from the military itself. As Linden (1989) views it, vigilantism can often be seen as a favourable option where political exasperation exists; death squads are usually not. Vigilantes, while having elementary social organisation, can form a 'counter-organisation' to a popular movement without necessarily seeking to eradicate it (1989: xviii).

It is worth noting that some authors differentiate vigilantes from other subversives within second and third world countries according to the group's primary objectives. Bandits, for example, target processes of development such as schools and clinics which are directed by revolutionary governments (Linden 1989; Harris 1989). Death squads, on the other hand, set out to weaken and destroy popular forms of organisational aspects of a country which are not traditional and which threaten traditional standings (Arguillas

1989; Caceres 1989).

Vigilante activity can also be used to exercise the internal control of a group. Research undertaken by Harris (1989) observed an 'unprecedented' rise in levels of vigilantism activities in South Africa in the late 1980's when local tribes vied for membership (1989: 3). Ireland too has also witnessed 'internal control' vigilantism particularly in paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland (see Munck 1988; Kennedy 1994; Abrahams 1998).

Here it would be useful to examine the often quoted definition of vigilantism offered by Johnston (1996) whose work is germane to this research. According to Johnston, 'Everyone has an opinion on what vigilantism is but no-one has taken the trouble to define it' (220). Challenging the lack of attention given to unpacking the term, he states:

> Vigilantism is a social movement giving rise to premeditated acts of force - or threatened force - by autonomous citizens. It arises as a reaction to the transgression of institutionalized norms by individuals or groups or to their potential or imputed transgression. Such acts are focused upon crime control and/or social control and aim to offer assurances (or guarantees) of security both to participants and to other members of a given established order (1996: 232).

Although vigilantism embraces a broad range of activities, Johnston (1996) presents six elements which he deems are necessary features of vigilantism: '(i) it involves planning and pre-meditation by those engaging in it; (ii) its participants are private citizens whose engagement is voluntary; (iii) it is a form of 'autonomous citizenship' and as such, constitutes a social movement; (iv) it uses or threatens the use of force; (v) it arises when an established order is under threat from the transgression, the potential transgression, or the imputed transgression of institutionalized norms; (vi) it aims to control crime or other social infractions by offering assurances (or 'guarantees') of security both to participants and to others' (220).

A minimal amount of planning and organisation has to occur before an agent embarks on a course of action. For example, short or long-term surveillance of a person or a location

can take place in order to determine whether or not some act of deviance has transpired. Such an act of premeditation (however basic), Johnston argues, should distinguish vigilantism from an act of self-defense. Johnston (1996) cites, for example, the case of Tony Evans, whose gun discharged, apparently accidentally, during his struggle with a burglar. Since Evans was not charged with the offense, Johnston suggests the legal system did not deem Evan's actions as planned or pre-meditated (223).

In a separate incident (not cited by Johnston) Tony Martin, an isolated English farmer who shot an intruder in the back with a rifle, was subsequently jailed for attempted murder.[49] While it might be argued that the presence of a rifle constitutes 'preparation', it is unlikely that the murder was truly premeditated. However, in this case, Johnston (1996) might argue that such preparation may 'indicate a commitment to vigilantist principles of self-protection' (223). In the same vein, the footballer Eric Cantona's infamous karate kick to a taunting fan in the crowd could hardly be termed a vigilante act even though the fan might have breached Cantona's own code of conduct.

According to Johnston (1996) this remains as true for the individual as for a larger grouping of people. Citing the 1992 case of Stephen Owen, an Englishman who shot an unlicensed lorry driver who knocked down and killed his son, Johnston states that some activities are 'one-off' events involving isolated individuals (223). In this situation, Owen would have had to determine the whereabouts of the lorry driver, chose a method of harm, decide a time of operation, arm himself, and then carry out the act.

Some events involve much higher levels of organisation. Johnston states that the paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland involved in punishment beatings are such examples. An established form of organisation for a collective end, these squads involve recurrent initiatives (Brewer 1998). As Johnston (1996) points out, motivated individuals could also embark on a similar sustained course of action.

A second element of vigilantism is that it is *undertaken by private agents.* Here,

[49] Martin was sentenced for five years and was released after four. His plight - and that of his victim - was highlighted on UTV's *Tonight* programme hosted by Trevor McDonald, July 28th, 2003.

Johnston briefly counters the claims of Rosenbaum and Sedeberg (1976) and Bowden (1978)[50] who believe that state agencies and public institutions can also engage in acts of vigilantism. They argue that state agents can act in a private manner. Johnston (1996) cites examples where a member of the police can exercise unnecessary force when arresting an individual, harassing a suspect, or engaging in unauthorized surveillance.

Johnston argues that state agents cannot act as private agents since they still operate with full authoritative powers. Clastres (1989) intimates this view and argues that the private enterprise of state agents is almost undeterminable since parameters of their public and private realms are blurred. This is quite an important point. The phrase 'taking the law into their own hands' is synonymous with vigilantism. It implies the law being enforced by those is not state authorized. However, in many cases of vigilantism the law is far from implemented (Burrows 1976). So called justice is often meted out in a form of an unlawful punishment (as in the case of Stephen Owen).

Johnston's argument that commercial security firms cannot be classified as a vigilante group because they 'still function within the legal ambit of the State' (1996: 225) has been challenged by Sharpe and Wilson (1992). They cite the case of *'Household Security,'* a firm run by a known ex-offender, which safeguards private dwellings. Clients, well aware of his background, simply believed that his previous experience as a criminal would, ironically, enhance the firm's integrity. More importantly, they knew that the firm could conduct 'business' with a would-be intruder in a matter quite different from that of the police. Indeed this became the primary selling point of the firm, leading Sharpe and Wilson (1992) to suggest that that the growth in such firms arises from the consensus that such firms can successfully operate precisely because of the perception that these firms can operate independently of the State.

Private citizens acting to protect their communities remains a somewhat controversial issue. Proactive interventions by community residents inadvertently calls into question the effectiveness of the police in both offensive and defensive crime control. However,

[50] Cited by Johnston (1996).

some efforts, such as engaging in efforts with the police in 'Neighbourhood Watch' programmes or in citizen's patrols, are viewed more favourably since they offer a more partnership based approach (Bennett 1989). The involvement of residents in community crime prevention is seen as a highly effective means of combating crime in local communities (Podolefsky and Dubow 1981; Rosenbaum 1986; Skogan 1988). Such action can be seen as a form of social control, endorsed by the state (Clastres 1989). Ironically, the failure of such purposely benign schemes is seen by Dariansmith (1993) as an opportunity for vigilante activity when communities seek security which traditional communities can no longer provide.

A third characteristic of vigilantism is what Johnston (1996) describes as '*autonomous citizenship*' that is, actions taken by 'private voluntary agents' without state support or authority (1996: 226). Johnston makes some differentiations:

> Vigilantism does not include similar acts undertaken by companies on behalf of citizens for commercial profit. Nor does it include similar acts undertaken by 'responsible' citizens who have the backing of the state's authority (226).

The question of whether the actions of vigilantes are taken by private and voluntary agents without the state's endorsement surfaces a further question from Johnston (1996) in relation to vigilante groups: 'How do they relate to local agencies' (234)? This is a matter which this research also hopes to later address.

Johnston determines *the use or threatened use of force* as a fourth feature of vigilantism, rightly arguing that this remains a prominent feature in media interpretation. Johnston states that organisations such as Neighbourhood Watch cannot be termed vigilantist as the use of force or the threat of force does not come into the equation. Accordingly, Johnston claims the Guardian Angels to be vigilantes as they are trained and thus prepared to engage in the use of force. Hope (1988), Dariansmith (1993), and Bellair (2000) researching the Neighbourhood Watch system in Britain all argue that while such programmes are state authorised, they have the potential to promote alternative forms of social justice. For example, individuals may become increasingly frustrated with a lack

of, or quality of, police interventions wanting instead a more informal and punitive response to crime.

Berger (1963) argues that the most common and fundamental social control device relies particularly on violence, through either the threat of injury or actual act of violence. This reliance is common to both sophisticated and primitive societies. Police officials of a modern state are unique within the general population insofar as they have the legitimate right to engage in violence to bring order and stability to the community. Violence, however, may not always work since in most cases outward manifestations exist only to appease the control-exercising agent, generating an anathema relationship. The simplicity of violence as a device is somewhat muted by the fact that it would simply be 'impractical' to employ it as a sole and consistent means of control (Berger 1963: 85). And, as Crossley (2002) points out, the use of violence may have a negative effect on any objectives, mobilizing those opposed to violence against the control-exercising agent. However, the use of violence can have a 'far-reaching and paralysing effect' (Linden 1989: xviii).

Goode (1972) touches on some of the issues that Berger had brought up nine years previously. He specifically focuses on the use of force as a means of social control, seeing it in terms of more comprehensive social systems:

> Force constitutes one of the major foundations of all social structures. The process by which the command of force is expended, exchanged, accumulated, or lost, are universal in social interaction, because force is one of the fundamental resources people and groups need to elicit co-operation, help, and conformity to one another (1972: 507).

Seeing social control as a process, Goode (1972) believes that all social systems are, in effect, some kind of force systems. Often the use of force is indicative of the individual's opposition to current social systems and the unwillingness by those in authority in the system to be flexible. Like Berger (1963), Goode suggests that 'overt force' is unlikely to bring about true willingness to adhere to norms, and while the use of force 'can command the external trappings of honour and deference' (Goode 1972:

508), respect - which is more likely to encourage compliance - is by far a more important objective in meeting goals. Goode points out that compliance cannot solely come forth from some internalized 'normative commitment' (508 - 509). Support for the control system, he states, often comes about simply as a reaction to us weighing up the consequences of resistance.

The fifth element of vigilantism according to Johnston is that it is *a reaction to criminal or social deviance*. Referring to the analysis of Brown (1975), Johnston distinguishes between 'classic vigilantism' a more crime orientated approach pre-1900's which targeted thieves, outlaws, and rural lower classes, and 'neo-vigilantism' which occurred post-1900 and was more concerned with the social control of Catholics, Jews, Blacks and labour leaders and less with deviant behaviours (1996: 228). According to Becker (1963), a given characteristic of every community is the existence of rules and conventions that individuals are not allowed to flout. Johnston (1996) agrees, suggesting it is the transgression (or perceived transgression) of these conventions that gives rise to vigilantism.

Finally, Johnston identifies *personal and collective security* as being key factors in vigilantism. Security, he argues, is a rather 'undeveloped concept' which may involve aspects of *autonomous citizenship* and a *reaction to deviance* (1996: 230). Lacey and Zedner (1995) recognise that security involves specific events and that safety is assured when these events do not occur. In order to gain this assurance there has to be, according to Johnston, the simple 'desire to do something' about achieving security (1996: 231). Johnston (1996) states that vigilantism:

> ....is a popularly initiated strategy, arising as a reaction to social deviance (real, threatened or imputed), whose aim is to offer people the assurance that an established system of order will prevail. Its focus is invariably local and in the majority of forms of vigilante engagement there is a concern to minimize objective threat to persons, property, or values and to reduce associated fear (231).

Johnston further states that security is something that 'the average citizen demands as a

condition of life in a civilized society' (232). This expectation is important to note as these demands immediately set up the state's institutions and their relevant authorities as targets for the outpouring of grievances if these authorities demonstrate a lack of an adequate response when personal or collective security has been threatened.

Abrahams (1998: 9) states that Johnston provides 'reasonably good coverage' of the character of vigilantism. While Abrahams suggests that it is an 'ideal' rather than a 'substantive' look at vigilantism and asks the reader to 'pay close attention to the implications of such phrases as 'potential' or 'imputed' and 'crime...and/ or social control' (1996: 9), he does not offer a reason for this. (This statement seems to refer to the complexities of the terms rather than Johnston's neglect in defining them; since Johnston rightly assumes that an individual's perception of an event is always going to be subjective; he offers examples to differentiate between social and crime control).

Agreeing with Johnston that there are difficulties applying a working definition to the term 'vigilante,' Abrahams states that 'as a concept for comparative study, vigilantism is not easy to define in rigorous authoritative terms even if one uses more figurative uses of the term (1998: 6). Although Abrahams does not offer characteristics of vigilantism he offers some useful perspectives to consider when defining vigilantism and comparing it with other aspects related to types of social control.

Abrahams (1998) believes that defining vigilantism is difficult since the behaviour of the vigilante is often covert and as a result differing definitions must exist. Believing that vigilantes often operate on a moral agenda, Abrahams acknowledges they must have first determined a behaviour to have breached some collective code. Inherent in this, is the vigilante's feeling that the legitimacy of the state is in decline since it can no longer provide citizens with the security they feel they need.[51] The interests of vigilantes lie in the 'shadows rather than the bright lights of legitimacy and consensus' and it is the 'highly personalised' nature of their activity which adds to the difficulty and highlights the legality (or in some cases illegality) of actions (1998: 7).

[51] Anderson (2002) suggests that increased vigilantism in urban areas often occurs during political transitions when there is more insecurity and the need to protect citizens more evident.

2.6.2 Pre-conditions for vigilante mobilization

Johnston (1996) presents six characteristics which he sees as fundamental to vigilantism. Other theorists have offered a more general look at why activists of this nature group together. Most prominent is the perception of the group or community that their concerns are ignored by particular governments and their agencies (Marx and Archer 1971, 1976; Burrows 1976; Etzioni 1996; Abrahams 1998). Feelings of abandonment cannot stand as the sole reason for vigilantism however. Most social movements consist of aggrieved people with a confined focus on a social issue. Their relationships with relevant governments and agencies are usually tentative at best, and while many may result in civil disobedience or even violence, seldom do they result in the kind of activity associated with vigilantism.

Abrahams endeavors to briefly explain the conditions needed for vigilantism to take place, acknowledging that vigilantes find dissatisfaction with elements of the government:

> Vigilantism typically appears in frontier zones where the state is viewed as ineffective or corrupt, and it often constitutes a criticism of the failure of state machinery to meet the needs of those who resort to it. It is a form of self-help, with varying degrees of violence which is activated instead of such machinery, against criminals and others whom the actors perceive as undesirables, deviants, and 'public enemies' (1998: 9).

The importance of frontiers in relation to social control and vigilantism as noted by Foster (1988) and Abrahams (1998) is quite prominent (Glaser 1971; Spitzer and Scull 1977; Little and Sheffield 1983). In the case of North America, vigilantism arose as a response to a typical problem - the absence of law and order in frontier regions. This was also emphasised by the Chicago School who recognised that transition zones lacking control were often due to the absence of authority figures and role models (Hudson 1997). The frontier was often an unstable place where places of order - churches, schools and other social structures - were absent or ineffective (Brown 1975). The historical role of gangsterism, piracy, and general opportunism was evident in the conquest of frontier areas. Lawlessness abided in frontier culture and while social legislation was brought in to

curb this, it did nothing more than promote individualism which in turn paved the way for eventual white collar crime (Burrows 1976).

Frontiers are not necessarily geographical or spatial. Little and Sheffield (1983) add that frontiers can exist between major social forms and reforms and these frontiers can encourage criminal activity.[52] For example, England under went a transformation as it moved from being an agricultural based society to one of urban industry thus contributing to increasing levels of crime 'whether out of social disorganisation, anomie, or alienation' (1983: 797). Deeming the legal system of the time inept, dissatisfied citizens formed private prosecution societies. These societies were considered middle ground in that they fell outside of both extralegal activity and vigilantism. By pooling resources, members provided a fund by which those who became victims of property crime could draw to cover the expenses of apprehending, and then prosecuting, the perpetrator through the formal system.

Abrahams (1998) notes that state power is often unevenly distributed across the state's territory and frontiers 'where power is significantly diluted' (1998: 24). He explains two models of frontiers or edges of state power. The first model is a spatial one which has both a centre and a periphery. Where there is a low population and when distances between towns are great and communication is poor, the state tends to run most effectively from its power base. An example of this would be the expanding frontier of the American mid-west which, if it had regional agencies of authority, would have been much more difficult to control from the capital since these agencies may have adopted differing and maybe conflicting agendas.

The second model is what Abrahams (1998) calls 'a no-go area', describing areas which might be in close proximity with state power and authority but which are not easily accessible to representatives from the state. Inner-city areas often resist state authorities such as the police and fire services, deeming them unwanted intruders. In turn, this may encourage feelings of alienation.

[52] Melbin (1978) states that frontiers can also be *temporal*, suggesting that night-time is a type of frontier in which criminal activity is more likely to occur (referred to by Little and Sheffield 1983).

For all intent and purposes, Abrahams (1998) is describing what other theorists have termed 'underclass' areas - those areas which have remained separate from mainstream society and which often seem to operate an alternative justice system.[53] According to Crowther (2000), 'it has been a truism for quite some time that most police activity has been and continues to be orientated towards an 'underclass' (162), but it is also true in some instances that such communities 'have either been under-policed or forgotten.' (163).

2.7 Presenting questions

These theories then beg the question as to what structural or social factors contributed to influencing Dublin's north inner-city residents to mobilize into what would be eventually termed not only a 'social movement' but also a 'vigilante movement.' These interchangable descriptions of CPAD and COCAD underscore the need to examine these organisations in light of both social movement and vigilante theory in order to determine whether they held characteristics of one, or perhaps both, of these types of responses. CPAD's and COCAD's standing as inner-city groups responding to a localised problem also calls into question the role that urban economic and social factors play in determining such responses.

Therefore, the following chapters will first examine how social conditions impacted on the community's willingness and capacity to mobilize in order to address the drug problem. For example, what were the pre-conditions of mobilisation and what were the participants expectations not only of the government but also of themselves as a community? How might these pre-conditions have influenced the avenues both CPAD and COCAD took in relation to the heroin epidemic?

CPAD and COCAD will then be discussed within the social movement framework

[53] Jencks (1992) makes the valid point that it is easy to use terms such as "middle class" and "underclass"" and assign stereotypical characteristics to them. Many people, he argues, 'are middle class in some respects, working class in others, and underclass in still others' (201). This is true, but simplistic as it does not take into account the level of life chances that these classes represent. A teacher, for example, may be unemployed and may be a single parent, but his or her options will always be greater than those with little or no education or resources.

presented earlier. For the purpose of this thesis, social movements can be broadly defined as 'a collective attempt to further a common interest or secure a common goal outside the sphere of established institutions.' The forms that social movements take can vary. This thesis will elaborate on the form taken by one particular urban based anti-drug movement. It will first argue that there were certain pre-conditions in place for community mobilisation and eventual resourcing of the movement. The thesis will then elaborate on mobilisation and engagement processes (that is, the rationale, objectives, and tactics) of these organisations. Using this empirical case study, this research will examine the relationship between social movements and vigilantism and question whether vigilantism might be best understood as a particular kind of social movement.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology

3.1 Research strategy

This research set out to investigate the anti-drug movement in Dublin's north inner-city, the social conditions which gave birth to it, the mechanisms it employed, and its outcomes. Having worked in a community based organisation within the north inner-city for twelve years, this researcher has acted as a participant observer within the area, knowledgeable in relation to its structures and familiar with high profile individuals living and working in the community. This knowledge, coupled with her familiarity of general issues affecting the area, instilled in this researcher the confidence to broach the issue of the anti-drug movement with residents and workers in the area. It also helped to ensure a comfortableness with respondents.

Qualitative research methods, in the form of interviews, were chosen for this study as the subject matter, indicated by the literature review, is sensitive and emotionally laden. Topics with these qualities are best approached in a qualitative fashion as this allows for better accessibility to attitudes and for sensitivity to contextual variations in meaning (Seale 1988). Interviews provide a richness to research and encourage a more comprehensive examination of complex situations (Marshall and Rossman 1989; Sherman and Reid 1998). Also, the initial contact that this researcher had with the candid men mentioned in the *prologue* helped to determine that face-to-face qualitative interviews with those living or working in the inner-city would provide the best avenue for ascertaining information about the north inner-city and the anti-drug movement.

Using an emergent research design in qualitative research has been recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1985). With such a design, data collection and data analysis are conducted simultaneously. This provides for a more free-flow gathering of important data as it surfaces, allowing the researcher to compare and contrast this information in light of future data collection.

3.2 Sampling frame and access

Since no sampling frame would exist for this study, the researcher had to rely on two non-probability sampling methods, relying on purposeful sampling which according to Patton (1990), seeks cases which may provide rich sources of information which can be examined in depth. Non-probability sampling also meliorates research when special populations are being investigated (Sudman and Kalton 1986).

Firstly, it was this researcher's intention to set out to interview certain high profile individuals living and/or working in the north inner-city. These included established community leaders, known leaders of the anti-drug movement, and individuals working in major drug related organisations, the Gardaí, politics, and Dublin Corporation (now Dublin City Council). Although familiar with many of these individuals due to working in the Dublin 1 area, the researcher had to seek out the names of priests in Hardwicke Street, Sean McDermott Street, and Sheriff Street parishes[54] as well as the name of a possible respondent from Dublin County Council (DCC). Two individual community leaders kindly furnished these names.

Secondly, it was also important that a representation of drug users, general community residents, as well as those active in - but not at the front of - the anti-drug movement, were represented within the research. Hence, both purposive and 'snowball' samplings were used. In the second instance, respondents were asked if they knew anyone else who might be interested in participating in an interview on the anti-drug movement. This type of sampling works well in sensitive subject areas and is good for shared experience situations (Boulton and Hammersly 1996). However, 'snowballing' has been criticised for being a subjective means of gathering information since it prevents

[54] During the course of this research, the role of priests in the anti-drug movement surfaced frequently among respondents. Despite repeated attempts by this researcher to secure interviews from priests who were active in the movement, no responses from these individuals were forthcoming. The reasons for the continued lack of response is unknown. It is possible that these individuals may have felt compromised in light of the mantle of violence which the movement eventually took on. It is the belief of this researcher that any information which may have have been given by these potential respondents was unlikely to alter the course of this research. However, their personal perspectives on the anti-drug movement (and the reasons for their involvement in it) would have been interesting to explore.

the researcher making inferences about the general population and may promote little validity and credibility due to selection bias (Lofland and Lofland 1984).

While recognising this view, the researcher's knowledge of, and intimacy with, the north inner-city meant that these sampling methods proved fruitful in terms of gleaning respondents who would be willing to discuss a sensitive topic. Where possible, the researcher asked if respondents knew someone who might hold a differing view to them in relation to anti-drug activism.

In addition, given the sampling method, the participant's quotes were not related to profile characteristics, only the general identifier that they themselves agreed upon, for example, 'community worker', 'drug user', 'community leader', or 'anti-drug activist.' [55] All respondents bar one (a member of the Gardaí[56]) were sent letters requesting permission to interview. The letters varied slightly according to the individual and his or her occupation or community standing. Containing a standard introduction and explanation of the research, the letters also included a short topic guide. The topic guide remained the same for all respondents except for four who were interviewed about relevant specific subjects.[57] Respondents were asked to contact the researcher if they were interested in participating in the research. (See Appendix 2 for an example of the standard letter and Appendix 3 for an example of topic specific questions).

In some instances, initial contact was made by telephone when the researcher suspected there might have been a problem in relation to literacy. Once contact was made in this manner, it was then explained to potential respondents that, with their permission, a letter reiterating the outline of the interviews would be sent to them. They would then receive the standard letter.

[55] These identifiers are only occasionally used instead of "respondent" when knowledge of the role or background of the individual may help shed further light on his or her views or experiences.
[56] In this instance another Gardaí suggested the researcher contact this person directly by telephone.
[57] This included : 1). A member of the Gardaí interviewed in relation to particular anti-drug protests outside Gardaí stations; 2). A staff member of Combat Poverty interviewed in relation to Combat Poverty's historical relationship with the north inner-city; 3). A Dublin City Council Estate Management staff member who was interviewed in relation to DCC's anti-social behaviour policies and; 4). A women who was interviewed in relation to being marched on by anti-drug activists (her story had appeared in a local newsletter). In these instances, the topic guide was specific.

Once a potential respondent contacted the researcher, the rationale behind the research was explained. While the researcher felt this research would contribute to knowledge about the effects of community based social movements and to new understandings of community conflict, the initial reason for this research was simply to document, for the first time, the history, workings, and impact of the anti-drug movement in the north inner-city. It is this more audience friendly explanation which was offered to all potential respondents.

3.3 Profile of respondents

Twenty-one face to face interviews and two telephone interviews were conducted. Of the twenty-three respondents, six were female and seventeen were male. As stated earlier, key respondents were deliberately sought out by this researcher either through direct contact or through the process of snowballing. According to the self-identifiers given by the respondents, seven wished to be referred to as 'current or ex-drug users', four as 'community leaders' in the north inner-city, and an additional four as 'community workers' in the north inner-city. Two respondents are members of the Garda Síochána and were happy to be referred to as such. Another two wanted to be known as 'anti-drug activists' and one respondent as a 'community resident'. Three individuals from Sinn Féin, Combat Poverty Agency, and Dublin City Council chose to be a 'representative' of their respective organisations.

It is very important to note that these were the self-identifiers requested by the respondents at the time of each interview. Further information on self-perceived roles were revealed during the interviews. (Section 3.9 below discusses this further). Also, in many cases the identifier given did not reflect the multiplicity of roles for these individuals. For example, according to the interviews all the 'community leaders' were, at one time, anti-drug activists. In the same manner, the 'community workers' are also residents in the area. Some 'community leaders' and 'community workers' stated they were involved in Sinn Féin.

Of the twenty-three respondents, the ages of twenty were ascertained. The researcher

did not ascertain the age of the female respondent from Combat Poverty, a male respondent from Dublin City Council nor one of the Garda Síochána members. Of the remaining five females, one was aged between 30 and 40 years old. The other four females all fell within the 41-50 years age bracket. Of the fifteen males whose ages were ascertained, two were aged between 30-40 years, seven were aged between 41 and 50 years, and the remaining six were aged between 51 and 60 years.

3.4 Instrument

As stated above, respondents were - prior to their interviews - issued with a short topic guide covering areas of interest to the researcher.[58] The researcher began each interview asking the respondent about his or her background and then respondents were asked to explore the following:

1) Their perceptions of general community activism in the north inner-city
2) Their perceptions of the drug culture in the north inner-city
3) Their understanding of statutory and voluntary responses to the drug problem
4) Their understanding of the history and effects of anti-drug activism

The issues explored by this study were initially identified through informal dialogue with community workers and community residents (all non-respondents) and then through a media and literature review. Participants were informed that the interview would last between one and one and a half hours and, with their permission, tape-recorded with a variable speed recorder. Only one face to face participant (a statutory worker) did not wish to be tape recorded. In this instance notes were taken during the interview.

3.5 Location

Twenty-one face to face interviews took place in a variety of locations between November 2000 and January 2003.[59] In each case, respondents were asked to state a

[58] As stated earlier, four out of the twenty-three participants discussed topic specific questions only.
[59] The two telephone interviews took place in July 2001 and May 2003.

preferred venue. Out of these twenty-one interviews, ten were held in the respondent's place of work, seven were conducted in the homes of the respondents, two were conducted in the researcher's place of work and one was conducted in Trinity College. One was conducted in the researcher's own home. This was at the request of an ex-member of the Gardaí Drug Squad who had contacted the researcher while she was at home. He had been passing by the area and wanting to avail of a window period of opportunity, suggesting it was more convenient for him to come to the researcher's home.

3.6 Data analysis

The grounded theory/constant comparative method advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Glaser (1995) was used to analyse the data. The purpose of this method is to isolate patterns and themes which reflect the lives of respondents which can then be presented in the form of propositions (Lincoln and Guba 1985).

To maximise reliability of findings, all interviews were tape recorded and fully transcribed. This process aided familiarity with the interviews which then were read twice. The short topic guide which had been provided to all respondents acted as a framework in which a list of themes could be constructed and the relationships between and within the themes elaborated upon. Consequently some new themes emerged. Where gaps existed in the researcher's knowledge (for example the history of the drug problem in Dublin or the history of activism in the north inner-city) the researcher looked for replication of information in order to help create a more accurate description of each.

In some instances, events and responses to the anti-drug movement were further categorised according to whether they were perceived as beneficial or non beneficial to the north inner-city. Relevant parts of the transcripts were categorised under all listed themes.

There was further documentary analysis of statutory and non-statutory records and

reports. These included publications and reports of the Government of Ireland (including Departmental reports and Dáil Eireann parliamentary debates), the Combat Poverty Agency, Dublin Corporation/Dublin City Council as well as archival records of organisations affiliated to ICON. As the section below will also note, community and anti-drugs literature were also analysed for triangulation purposes. Also, the extensive media coverage of the Josie Dwyer case provided a further opportunity for data analysis.

3.7 Objectivity and credibility

Since this research was community based, it was important to establish a degree of objectivity and credibility in the approach taken. The researcher hoped that seeking out feedback from those working and living in the community prior to the formal interviews would allow her to test the waters in relation to interviewing people on a subject that was already proving to be controversial. This helped immensely when both framing questions and presenting them to individuals possibly unfamiliar with sociological language and concepts. Accordingly, it was hoped that this would motivate respondents to answer questions more accurately and confidently, a vital aspect in research (Altheide and Johnson 1998).

In addition, while there are well documented problems with face to face interviews, such an interview method has shown to be suitable for potentially emotion laden subjects, capable of producing useful and reliable data on sensitive issues (Horowitz 1986; Anderson and Jack 1991).

Triangulation as a method, while sometimes controversial (see Massey and Walford 1999), is generally seen as the method appropriate strategy to help secure a level of credibility in qualitative analysis (Denzin 1978; Silverman 1985; Devault 1990). During the course of this research, many specific events and incidences began to emerge within the interviews. In order to corroborate this information the researcher studied newspapers, community newsletters, literature produced by the anti-drug movement as

well as minutes and archival records kept by local community groups. In two particular cases, information noted in the researcher's personal diary was used.[60] Also, the researcher took the opportunity whilst interviewing a member of the Gardaí and a previous member of Combat Poverty to verify some information which had surfaced in a newspaper and within another interview respectively.

Finally it is the researcher's experience that given the nature of drug use, drug users may present themselves over-medicated or under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs to an appointment. Therefore, prior to this research it was determined that respondents who presented for interviewing and who exhibited recognisable signs of recent drug or alcohol use would, with permission, be re-scheduled. During this research, no such action had to be taken.

3.8 Limitations and researcher effects

It is well recognised that research data which emerges from a small non-random sample cannot necessarily generalise to the greater population. In qualitative studies, issues arise not only as a result of the questioning process itself (for example how questions are phrased or delivered) but also out of the participant's own objectives for the research. Although confidentiality was assured, respondents may have refined responses according to any apprehensions they may have had in relation to the research; therefore, full and accurate information may have been compromised.

Myrdal (1969: 48) suggests that our views and opinions 'normally come from political interests that dominate the society in which we live.' (See also Bollen and Paxton 1998; Altheide and Johnson 1998). There is a need therefore for this researcher to acknowledge the potential for biases influencing the findings in this work as a result of her working within the Dublin 1 area.

[60] These are appropriately noted.

3.9 Ethics and confidentiality

A key issue in this research was the utmost preservation of confidentiality and anonymity given the topic of complex relations in the north inner-city, a relatively intimate community. However as this researcher found out, the two aspects differ. McGivern (2003) states, confidentiality and anonymity

> ... are often confused and sometimes taken to be the same thing...if you promise confidentiality it means that while you can identify a particular response with a particular respondent, you agree not to do so publicly. If however, you promise anonymity, it means you cannot identify a response with a particular respondent (2003: 354-355).

In this research, only confidentiality could be assured since this researcher knew the names and the responses of participants; therefore they could not remain anonymous. It was expected by this researcher that perhaps the process of snowballing might eventually indicate an individual's request not to be named. For example, a person who had been interviewed might secure (and even help to arrange) another interview with a different individual on the condition that the new person did not have to give his or her name. This did not occur in the snowballing process; names were forwarded freely. In the instances when the researcher was contacted, respondents willingly identified themselves.[61]

Consequently, participants of this research were informed that information which may distinguish them would be coded and known only to the researcher and that all interview tapes would be safely secured. Secondly, they were told that any information used within the thesis would also be separately coded - in this case by the date of the interview. Also, in allowing respondents to use self-identifiers, a further level of confidentiality was reached.

Respondents who agreed to be recorded were informed they would be provided with

[61] This is not to deny that an individual could have chosen to give a false name. However, in all cases bar one, the name given by the referee was the same as that used by the individual to identify himself or herself. In an isolated case, the referee did not offer a name but instead took a contact number from the researcher and forwarded it to his contact.

a full transcript of their interview so that they could peruse, and verify both the interviewer's questions and their own responses.[62] In addition, respondents were asked to contact the researcher if they felt clarifications, comments, or omissions were deemed necessary. This researcher chose to do this simply because it was felt that in doing so, participants may feel more comfortable disclosing personal information, experiences, and anecdotes if they felt they could later retract the information.

While this decision may have seemed somewhat of a gamble in that rich information may have eventually been withdrawn, it proved very fruitful in that the interviews brimmed with personal insights. Only one respondent asked for omissions, both pieces of information the researcher had already deemed very interesting but not relevant to the research. Also, a member of the Garda Síochána did not want a copy of the transcript as he was confident that he had said nothing which he would want to retract or clarify.

[62] Those with a suspected literacy problem were provided with a transcript. The researcher then offered to "go through the interview" with them, with the intention of reading the transcript outloud and asking for the respondent's feedback. No respondent took up the offer; however, one respondent stated she would ask her mother to read the transcript to her.

CHAPTER 4

Pre-conditions of anti-drug mobilization

4.1 Introduction

The social basis of collective action is both historically and economically determined (Eder 1985). In the north inner-city, the grassroots activism of a few individuals around housing and unemployment issues of the late 1970's and early 1980's (mirroring activism around Dublin at the time inspired by a growing sense of poverty and general urban decay) kick-started a response to increasing marginalisation in the area. Those involved in directing this response would eventually be at the helm during the anti-drug movement's two phases. Experiences gained during this journey are worth documenting since the skills gained along the way were then effectively used by these individuals to impact on policy and orchestrate mechanisms they believed would help control the supply and demand of drugs in the north inner-city.

The following chapter will provide an overview of the economic and social conditions which existed prior to both phases of anti-drug activism in the north inner-city. This will provide the context within which this inner-city anti-drug movement emerged.

4.2 Early community activism

The early 1970's saw employment expansion and the return of many emigrants to Ireland. However, the oil crisis of the 1973 and related recessions led to a worldwide economic downturn (Cassells 1986) and forced Ireland down a complicated route from the optimism of the 1970's to more of a dour economic outlook (Byrne 1989; Sexton 1986). In the mid-1980's, Ireland was one of the top five debtor countries in the world as a result of slow growth and tax policies forced by free trade and enterprise. In a classic case of dependent relations Ireland experienced slow growth and foreign intervention, with resultant negative economic growth and inevitable rising disparities (O'Hearn 1989). Although this trend was somewhat reversed in the 1990's, compared to other European countries, Ireland still witnessed static inequality (Combat Poverty Agency 1990; Atkinson 1995; Nolan and Whelan 1999).

A trend towards suburbanisation in Irish cities which began in the late 1950's escalated in the 1970's.[63] Dublin's north inner-city in particular experienced a relatively large scale policy of depopulation - relocating inner-city tenants to suburbs - in order to furnish commercial development of the area.[64]

Georgian tenements in upper and lower Gardiner Street, Sean McDermott Street, and Summerhill (although in terrible disrepair had supported rich and vibrant communities) were to be demolished and tenants moved out to northside areas such as Blanchardstown, Cabra, Finglas, and Ballymun. While these suburbs were afforded relevant community friendly amenities such as shopping areas and pubs, many lacked more immediate and important services related to education and health (Ffrench 1997).

Community workers, many of whom were born in the north inner-city, recognised the need for people to be re-housed locally. It would not have been unusual for four generations of individual families to be living in a particular tenement and community leaders noted that any attempt to relocate families to the suburbs would be detrimental to the support of family networks and communities. More importantly perhaps community leaders, having witnessed substantial redevelopment south of the Liffey,[65] became increasingly aware of the implications surrounding the overt attempts by the relevant stake holders to repossess north inner-city land.

> *From the '70's on, the feeling was that the rich wanted this area back but didn't know quite how to get it... It wasn't a hidden agenda* (3/8/01).

As a result, leading community members advocated a response to what became

[63] According to Blackwell (1988) this was due to the large amount of private investment in housing in the Dublin region during the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's. Accordingly, Dublin Corporation remained the sole developer of housing in the north inner-city at this time. Bannon (1988: 2) also states that suburbanisation was favoured 'through infrastructural investments and by a recurring policy emphasis giving preference to new development over rehabilitation, renewal, or infill development.'

[64] Displacement of the poor for commercial or institutional purposes is a dominant urban development pattern identified by Feinstein *et al.* (1987).

[65] McKeown (1991) states that south side Georgian dwellings, which once housed wealthier persons, had been converted for professional and commercial use in the beginning of the 20th century, maintaining 'the physical and architectural fabric of some parts of the south inner-city' (1991: 3). On the other hand, Georgian dwellings in the north inner-city had been adapted mainly for tenement use.

simply known to many as the 'housing crisis,' a crisis, we have seen, common to urban movements (see Logan and Molotch 1987). Previously, leaders had brought to the Government's attention problems surrounding education facilities and infrastructure, namely through the North Centre City Community Action Project (NCCCAP) which had been funded in 1987 under the Committee of Pilot Schemes to Combat Poverty, the forerunner of the Combat Poverty Agency.[66] However, the housing issue was generally considered to be the first major campaign by north inner-city residents to address issues directly affecting them (14/2/01; 27/2/01; 3/8/01). Central to the cause was the belief of residents that their voice was not being listened to:

> *The architects and the planners really were divorced in many ways from what people wanted or from taking on board people's experiences. That whole area of urban regeneration and community development was the thing we were trying to develop* (30/1/03).

And in the words of another community leader:

> *Dublin Corporation decided to depopulate the north inner-city and commercially develop it because the south inner-city had been developed as far as it would go without invading Ballsbridge, and there was no way that was going to happen. They weren't going to knock down their houses to build office blocks. So the Corporation dreamed this idea up of depopulating the area and there was resistance and we got an alternative plan drawn up and we campaigned on that issue and I became actively involved in that* (27/2/01).

This alternative plan brought together - in 1979 - community leaders and sympathetic civic planning architects who would design a plan for the Summerhill area which would keep the façade of Georgian buildings and redesign interiors to accommodate a range of families and elderly individuals. Central to the plan was the idea that no individual would be forced to relocate as a result of the renewal process. The plan was ultimately rejected

[66] The functions of the Combat Poverty Agency as stated in its Act of 1996 are: 1) Advising and making recommendations to the Minister for Social Welfare on all aspects of economic and social planning in relation to poverty in the State. 2) The initiation of measures aimed at overcoming poverty in the State and the evaluation of such measures. 3) The examination of the nature, causes, and the extent of poverty in the State and for that purpose, the promotion, commission, and the interpretation of research. 4) The promotion of greater public understanding of the nature, causes, and the extent of poverty in the State and the measures necessary to overcome such poverty.

by Dublin Corporation and their architects. However, the Corporation agreed to add an extra 223 housing units (Combat Poverty Agency 1999: 125).

Simultaneously, community leaders resorted to grassroots measures, holding very small protests which would disrupt traffic in the local area. In one particular incident, all seven protesters were arrested. One respondent described the position of the justice system.

> *Seven of us were arrested. Now politically the message was sent around the police stations saying. "Forget about it. It would only make these marchers feel stronger." But I lived in Cabra, so the police in Cabra never got the message. So one morning at 7:00 am there was a knock at the door. I was taken away down to the Bridewell. I was up before the court for breach of the peace. I said, "I am happy to say that I plead guilty to obstructing the traffic" - which we did during the march - but we weren't in breach of the peace. It was a peaceful march; we informed people we were doing it. I apologised, no trouble. But I refused to sign the bit about the peace. So I went up to the 'Joy*[67] *then for a couple of days. When I got out, we marched again* (30/1/03).

These local housing protests, while supported by the greater community, did not initially mobilize as many participants as the anti-drug marches eventually would. The above respondent suggested that the broader and complicated agenda that the community leaders held - in terms of specific urban planning, both geographical and social - may have isolated residents whose sole motive was simply not to move out of the area (30/1/03).

The housing crisis moved the community leaders into new realms of action. It helped to solidify local networks and was unknowingly to provide a type of 'dry run' for future anti-drug mobilisation. The crisis also created an energy among the leaders providing them with the opportunity to embark on a more analytical journey. Although this 'hard core' of individuals, as one respondent noted, had grown up together under the shadow of a growing political crisis in Northern Ireland, they remained separate from any ideals. It forced one community leader to think more critically:

[67] Mountjoy Prison, Dublin.

> *The concept of class didn't make sense to me, just as the concept of "nation" didn't make sense to me. But the idea of a group of people who lived in the same area, the same vicinity, sharing the same economic and social forces I suppose, that did make sense, you know? The first time I ever heard the concept of inner-city was through that* (housing) *process. It was the first time I ever heard "multi-disadvantaged." These were useful concepts in coming to form some strategy* (3/8/01).

This change in thinking was an important landmark in community activism. In trying to reconcile the plight of inner-city residents with government apathy, community leaders quickly learned to articulate the greater problem facing the community: that of power differentiations between community - the local - and the state, or as Morrison (1978) and Gamson (1988) put it, the "us" and 'them." The respondent's focus on the community's "shared" forces is a further indication of the growing sense of separation that was being felt by some residents. A further landmark in activism occurred with the 'Gregory Deal', a political manoeuvre which effortlessly ushered the community leaders into the working realm of the policy makers.

4.3 The 'Gregory Deal'

The strategy developed by the community leaders eventually received endorsement from residents who mobilized to form individual tenant associations in order to assist the community leaders. A young local councillor, Tony Gregory, adopted the housing cause as his primary electoral issue and was subsequently elected to the Dáil[68] in his second attempt. Holding the balance of power in his first year in government as an Independent,[69] Gregory became the pivotal figure forcing the housing issue onto the political agenda. The 1982 'Gregory Deal' succeeded in getting the government not so much to renege on the policy of re-location but to provide optional new housing within the north inner-city itself. The success of this political manoeuvre came as much as a surprise to the community as had Gregory's election to the Dáil. Expectations of a win had been so low that one community leader stated that when Gregory proposed that

[68] Representing the constituency of Dublin Central.

[69] Gregory was elected on the non-party "Community" ticket. This term would change the following year to "Independent."

he stand for election, he would have had more confidence *'putting forward Kermit the Frog'* (3/8/01).[70]

It is clear from the interviews that behind the 'Gregory Deal' lay the groundwork of the 'hardcore' who brought together their consummate experience and learning to the negotiation table. Within this small group, only Gregory seemed interested in taking the political route. The other leaders still hold similar beliefs about the political process, somewhat cynical of the ability of mainstream politics to be able to deliver change. Though recognising Gregory as an issue based 'supreme' politician, one respondent gave his views on other politicians and their constraints:

> *The thing is, you have to have your clinics. You have to go to every meeting. You are only good as your last meeting. If you don't show up, they are like, "Where was he"? They compete with each other like children for publicity; it's embarrassing at times* (3/8/01).

Another noted:

> *I always felt that if you do that you get involved in that particular system and generally you are very powerless. It must be very frustrating. I always felt for Gregory who has kept at it. I have great admiration for him doing it over the years* (30/1/03).

This same respondent also stated that he recognised the 'Gregory Deal' to be a fluke

[70] The issues to which Deputy Charles Haughey committed himself included: 1). A major increase in Dublin Corporation's housing programme, with the allocation of £91 million for housing in 1982, and a commitment to reach 2,000 houses by 1984. Construction of four hundred new houses in the north centre city area would also be started that year. Gregory was assured a further allocation of £20 million to Dublin Corporation's budget for this year; 2). An immediate work force of 500 men costing £4 million for a corporation environmental works scheme and more than 150 additional craftsmen at a cost of £1,500,000 were to be employed to give a major boost to the Corporation's repairs and maintenance service; 3). A commitment to nationalise Clondalkin Paper Mills to save the jobs of 500 men if no other option presenting itself immediately was given; 4). The controversial and destructive motor way plan would not now be proceeded with; 5). The vital 27 acres on the Port and Docks Board site would be nationalised and developed along lines geared to the needs of centre city communities; 6). In the field of education a major commitment to pre-school education along with the provision of a £3 million community school for the neglected city centre area was given, this being part of the designation of the central city area as an educational priority area; 7). Advances in the taxing of derelict sites, office developments, financial institutions and development land were agreed to; 8). A national community development agency would be set up for a budget of £2 million to replace and continue the work of the Combat Poverty Committee (Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates 1982). Gregory also promoted moves towards protecting the environment with the introduction of lead-free petrol (Lambe 2002).

and that it was completely circumstantial that change occurred:

> *Gregory was in a unique position at the time because of the Gregory Deal and he got phenomenal publicity. The publicity on him was absolutely phenomenal. I mean, that made him a national figure. All the recognition is so important. He would have been known from cartoon pictures of him in the paper, "Tony Gregory holds the country to ransom" and all this. But it didn't matter. It was all publicity. If the Deal had not of happened, Gregory would have gone in, he would have put all the work in. We would have been out supporting him but the influence he would have had would have been far, far, less. If I was to have made a choice before hand, if I would have been guaranteed to get the same level of media coverage and publicity and everything else, then you could say it was worth it. I think it was an historical opportunity that was there, but it was a chance event. My original assessment was that in doing all this, there may be other ways of changing things, other ways of developing things* (30/1/03).

These ways would include forming broader coalitions politically - particularly with the Labour party and Trade Union movement which would help facilitate the voice of those at the coal face and relieve them of the more tedious constraints of the political system. However, this interviewee wryly noted that:

> *That sounds grand, and ideally that is the way it should be. But when you get into the reality of politics it becomes very much that you might be in Labour and that you would have an interest in keeping your bloody seat and the broader vision of politics often gets lost* (30/1/03).

The community leaders, quick to persuade the main party leaders of the needs peculiar to the north inner-city, had no qualms about the wheeling and dealing behind the scenes. Armed with Combat Poverty Agency reports which designated the north inner-city as the most disadvantaged area in Dublin, they argued that prioritisation of funding was needed to address four main areas: housing, health, unemployment, and education. To them, any deal would not be just a constituency deal. Any political ground they might gain would be deemed a victory for many disadvantaged areas. This in some way reflects Castell's (1983) understanding that urban movements can contribute to wider sociological change. Extreme left-wing supporters of Tony Gregory were relatively few

compared to those supporters who were hoping to promote a community development agenda.[71]

Two respondents were present alongside Gregory and his brother, Noel, when negotiations occurred with Haughey. This same party met formally three times in the Spring, Summer, and Autumn of 1982. One community leader noted the phenomenal rise of the drug problem that year stating that the issue of drugs was not on the agenda for the first meeting in February, but by July it had been considered a priority. In his maiden speech to the Dáil, Gregory acknowledged the work done by his north inner-city partners in these negotiations and outlined his reasons for supporting the nomination of Charles Haughey as Taoiseach:[72]

> Since my election to the Dáil my advisers and I have had extensive talks with Deputy Fitzgerald, Deputy Haughey, Deputy O'Leary and the other Independent groups. At all these meetings we presented the contenders with the same basic proposals. These proposals were exact and specific developments of the issues for which I stood in the election. Two major considerations dictated our approach to these negotiations: first, to try to get clear commitments from a future Taoiseach on tackling the issues with which we are concerned and on which I was elected; secondly, we were conscious of the responsibilities placed upon us to interpret the balance of political forces in the Dáil and to make a decision that would encourage the development of progressive and class politics. This was no easy task. I interpreted the result of the election and my own election in particular as demonstrating that the two main political parties have failed to respond to the needs of our society. I had no illusions about the differences between the main political parties. Policies, not personalities, influenced my decision. The decision I have come to has not been taken lightly and certainly not with a view to maintaining any particular party in power. My decision is purely tactical and based on achieving as many as possible of the issues that I was elected on. Specifically, my decision is based on a

[71] The Government decided that a development authority would be established for the inner-city with wide-ranging responsibility and a budget of £2 million. With a provision of £0.3 million for this general purpose in the Book of Estimates the balance of £1.7 million would be provided as capital funds. According to Ray McSharry, it was 'envisaged that the lessons learned in Dublin will serve as guidelines for urban renewal programmes in other towns and cities.' (Dáil Eireann, Volume 333, March 25th, 1982).

[72] Haughey eventually won by 86 to 79 votes.

> clear difference in response from Deputy Haughey and Deputy Fitzgerald. Given the commitment by Deputy Haughey, witnessed and signed by the General Secretary of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union, I had no alternative but to support a Fianna Fáil Taoiseach.[73]

Recognising now that new-comer Gregory had successfully circumvented the normal progression (and probably angst) of most parliamentarians, and that he had achieved concessions that most could only dream of in a life-time of politics, those in office gave voice. One of the most supportive of Gregory was Oliver J. Flannigan (Fine Gael) who credited Gregory and acknowledged the importance of his objectives, especially in relation to housing initiatives:

> Dublin is not the property of the people of Dublin but of Ireland and its people. That is why we are glad to see that some steps will be taken to restore the city to what it was. The city of Dublin has been allowed to vanish before our eyes. I hope that as a result of the united efforts of Deputy Gregory and of all Dublin Deputies of all parties - the Lord Mayor has an important part which I am sure he will play in this matter - Dublin will be built up and that instead of huge office blocks, many of them foreign-financed and foreign-owned, we will have thousand of homes so that Dublin people will be able to enjoy living in their own city.[74]

Others were not so gracious. Gregory, in securing new local housing for his constituents, had tread on the toes of Dublin Corporation, the primary governmental housing agency. Jim Mitchell (Fine Gael), also representing the Dublin Central constituency, made known his views on Gregory's almost effortless rise to the realm of the big decision makers:

> Having heard the maiden speech of a Deputy from this city, I very much regret announcements which usurp the authority of Dublin Corporation, of which I am a member. The powers of local authorities have already been significantly usurped and I appeal to the incoming Minister for the Environment to implement necessary local government reforms, especially in the Dublin region. Each member of Dublin Corporation represents the same number of people as an average county council.

[73] Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, Volume 333, March 9th, 1982.
[74] Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, Volume 333, March 9th, 1982.

> This is a problem which should not be lightly treated. I protest very strongly that a Deputy in his maiden speech should be permitted to say what will or will not happen in the Dublin region when that decision should be a matter for the local authority. I urge the Minister to consider local government reform at an early date.[75]

The Government was only to last eight months before another general election was called after a vote of no-confidence. On the eve of the election, Dick Spring (Labour) representing Kerry South took the opportunity to express his concern at the role Gregory played earlier in the year, no doubt worried about a potential parallel action of another Independent representative:

> I cannot and I will not declare confidence in a Government who only came to power by paying a massive price for the support of some Independent Deputy. Let me make my position quite clear in that regard. I would like to place on the record of the House that I do not attach any blame to Deputy Gregory, as some do, in pressing home his political advantage on behalf of the poor of the inner-city. I fault the basic political approach of the Taoiseach to the question of Government. I am sure Deputy Gregory would have settled for much less than he asked for yet anything he asked for seemed to be considered without any thought for the consequences of this action.[76]

When Fine Gael, Labour, and the Workers' Party united to bring about a no-confidence vote in the Government, Gregory abstained from voting, claiming dissatisfaction with the Government's economic and social policies and funding cutbacks which he deemed would affect disadvantaged areas especially during the current recession. In light of the opposition he had recently faced, Gregory exclaimed to his colleagues at this time:

> It is... with some relief that I am conscious today that my vote will not be a determining factor. I would never have involved myself in discussions with either Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael but for the enormous moral responsibility placed on me as an elected representative from central Dublin holding the balance of power. I make no apology whatever for my actions. I would do it all over again, and if there is to be an election I will fight it on the basis of my commitment to those on whose behalf I have worked as best I could.

[75] Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, Volume 333, March 9th, 1982.
[76] Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, Volume 338, November 4th, 1982.

> No matter what Opposition politicians might say, the various concessions made by Deputy Haughey's Government, particularly in the inner-city of Dublin, the most disadvantaged urban area in this country, were worth while and morally essential. If any future Government deliberately wind down those measures they will do so to their own eternal disgrace.[77]

Gregory successfully retained his seat and and has not lost it in any subsequent election. The importance of his initial win, and the concessions he gained, cannot be over emphasised. Gregory had assisted the community leaders in reaching their objectives relatively quickly, but more importantly, because he had a foothold in both the political and community fields, he was able to introduce these activists to structures and resources hitherto unknown to them. The individuals who had held-up traffic as a protest in the north east inner-city were, in a very short space of time, allowed access to political party leaders to negotiate the future of a small geographical area. Though community leaders had continually employed disruptive and non-routine measures to challenge the authorities about housing policy, meaningful change for the north inner-city ultimately came about through one circumstantial event.[78]

4.4 Community development

Dublin Corporation - the agency responsible for public housing - replaced the tenements with new flat complexes and houses. The particular structures of the flat complexes, many with communal balconies facing each other, provided residents with a sense of shared space and community, much like that they had experienced in the tenements. With the housing issue considered to be somewhat successfully addressed, community energies in the 1980's were soon to focus on development projects rather than on specific tenant projects (3/8/01).

Dublin experienced social changes, after the waning economic high of the late 1970's. Skilled workers moved from once thriving inner-city areas to secure jobs in expanding suburban areas leaving behind a relatively unskilled workforce (Cullen 1990). Now

[77] Dáil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, Volume 338, November 4th, 1982

[78] Gamson (1990) provides good insight into non-routine protest strategies intended to challenge the uses of governmental power.

dealing with high unemployment and low demand housing, these inner-city areas would eventually become fertile ground for a drug problem to take root (Ffrench 1997).[79]

In order to address the growing problem of urban dereliction, the government produced The Urban Renewal Act of 1986, its principle provision being the establishment of the Custom's House Dock Development Authority (CHDDA), a high profile, government backed programme which promoted waterfront development and renewal in the north inner-city by offering financial incentives to investors. (These incentives were formalised by the Finance Act of the same year). Given governmental approval to 'acquire, hold, and manage' land, the CHDDA purchased twenty-seven acres which represented the largest area destined for redevelopment at that time (Benson 1991: 91).

Dublin Corporation, in its 1987 Draft Development plan, had as its element the policy to 'extend and accelerate the programme of rehabilitating Corporation housing stock, especially the large number of inner-city flat blocks' (Dublin Corporation 1990: 41). In effect, this meant that this reversed the trend of moving inner-city residents to outer suburbs. Future monies would now be spent rejuvenating inner-city areas (Drudy and Punch 1999).

In 1990 the Department of Social Welfare, now Department of Social and Family Affairs, overseen by a National Advisory Committee instigated the Community Development Programme to provide insight into poverty and disadvantage. Its brief was to work from community development principles and methods, acting as a resource in the community, providing co-ordination and co-operation between community, voluntary, and statutory organisations in specific areas. Simultaneously, the Designated Areas Scheme, which targeted specific areas for redevelopment and further investment was in operation. Along with the Custom's House Docks area, three other inner-city areas were to benefit from the scheme: the Liffey Quays, Henrietta Street, and the north

[79] This is not to say that those living in suburbs did not experience problems. As McKeown (1991) points out, local authorities built most of the suburban housing estates and housed residents from the inner-city who often brought with them the same economic difficulties they had while residing in their former dwellings. Research undertaken by Bannon *et al.* (1981) indicates that many suburban areas at this time experienced similar deprivation as the north inner-city.

east inner-city. The initiative was to have profound effects, especially on the north inner-city (McKeown 1991) and 'undoubtedly influenced significant residential development in central Dublin' (Drudy & MacLaren 1996: 1). This action was later acknowledged to be somewhat of a red herring, 'giving the impression that something is being done, that the state really does care for the inner-city community' (MacLaren 1991: 191).

Those who had led the community through the critical housing situation of the 1970's and 1980's were quick to identify the potential opportunities for their communities during a time of high unemployment. They had, with the assistance of the Pilot Committee of Schemes to Combat Poverty, set up the North Centre City Community Action Project (NCCCAP) in 1981.[80]

The first project to specifically employ local people, the NCCCAP was an important milestone in the north inner-city and had been campaigned for quite some time. One community leader remembers a turning point which motivated him to push for the development of the NCCCAP.

> *I held a public meeting at the North Star Hotel and invited anyone that was active in Sheriff Street - schools, priests, doctors, everything that we could identify - youth clubs, anything that moved in Sheriff Street. I would say about fifty or sixty people came, which was great, all the different groups, public health nurses etc. When we went into the particular room of fifty or sixty and - I have the records somewhere - four of them were from the area. The rest, everybody from the youth clubs, voluntary organisations, football clubs etc., practically everybody there was non-local* (30/1/03).

The NCCCAP, according to this same respondent, was established despite political opposition from the major political parties who felt the community development perspective was born from 'left-wing' agitators. Realising that the industrial base of the north inner-city was slowly waning, community leaders focused on the provision of skills which would meet the challenges offered by new office developments in the area. As a

[80] The criteria of Combat Poverty Agency at the time included that a project should display: 1). Originality defining a particular need; 2). A multidisciplinary approach; 3). A information and educational aspect; 4). A capacity for planning, reporting, and analysis; 5). An ability to relate aims of a project to existing plans and services; 6). An understanding of financial and personal requirements; 7). An acknowledgment of the possibility of replication elsewhere (Combat Poverty Agency 1980: 46).

result, a course on office and secretarial procedures was the first training opportunity provided by the NCCCAP. The second training course - considered radical at the time because it exemplified the perfect blend between an individual and a lifestyle - was the 'Coaching for Sport' course. Targeting out-of-school youth and unemployed men from the area, the NCCCAP gathered individuals whose hobby was football and offered them courses in order for them to become qualified football trainers and referees. Schoolboy soccer practice at the weekends meant that individuals could supplement any weekday income.

Community leaders, having successfully launched the NCCCAP, now turned their sights to developing a more long term strategic plan for the area. They approached the CHDDA to review the possibilities for engagement. While aware they were unlikely to experience a relative painless victory as that heralded by the Gregory Deal in 1982, community leaders none-the-less remained optimistic about securing benefits. However, it soon became clear that barriers existed between the developers and long time north inner-city residents concerned with the overall economic future of their area.

This was mirrored by the lack of community inclusion seen in the overall objectives of the CHDDA which only noted 'downstream secondary jobs' for the immediate community (Benson 1988: 97). Community frustration was evident:

> *Every time you went to a meeting with them, it was like the Grand National. You would get over one hurdle and they'd put up another one. You'd get over that and they would put up another one and when you'd finally jump the last one, you'd be heading for the line and they'd say, "Hang on a minute, you don't represent anybody. You've no mandate"* (27/2/01).

An attempt by community workshops in the area to provide themselves with the required mandate to negotiate with the CHDDA came with the establishment of the Alliance for Work Forum in 1988 (27/2/01; 3/8/01). The organisation's primary function was to ensure benefits for residents in the areas affected by redevelopment (3/8/01). Secondary was the documentation of oral and written stories and traditions of the north

inner-city conducted by its Folklore Project. The growing socio-economic problems of their area prompted representatives from these three organisations to apply, in 1989, to the 3rd European Community Programme to Combat Poverty for funding to enable them to develop strategies for revitalising the area.

The numbers of applications received far exceeded that which the programme could fund. The high quality of proposals prompted the Combat Poverty Agency to approach the Labour Minister of Health, Frank McClusky, to ask for further funding to enable organisations they had identified as worthwhile to progress with their objectives (Combat Poverty Agency 1989a; 3/8/01). To compensate, the Department of Social Welfare sponsored the 1990 Community Development Programme which facilitated many of the initial rejected proposals. The proposal submitted by the Alliance for Work Forum was accepted and as a result, the Inner-City Renewal Group (ICRG) was formed. Primarily a training organisation, the aim of the ICRG was to develop an area-based response to the new economy and opportunities arising in the north inner-city. Monitored and supported by Combat Poverty Agency, the ICRG was to ensure that local people got 'measurable' benefit from development in the area (3/8/01).[81]

4.5 The partnership process

This move reflected the now pervasive feeling that a more cohesive approach was needed to address problems directly related to issues of poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion. The idea of 'Partnership', models and structures set up to develop effective networking relationships between communities, governmental and business entities, began to grow not only in Dublin but in the broader spectrum of Europe (see Carroll 1997; Bartley 1998; Hardiman 2000). Its aim was to 'harness energy, skills, and resources of the key players who develop and implement local regeneration strategies' (Geddes 1997: 2).

[81] Research conducted by Collins et *al.* (1996) indicates that only 7.7% of people working in the docklands area in the mid 1990's were residents living in the District Electoral Divisions of North Dock A, B, and C.

The north inner-city had already seen attempts at partnership in the form of the Voluntary and Statutory group, a committee set up by youth workers which addressed the needs of children and youth at risk. Known locally as the 'V and S,' it was regarded by community leaders as the first community effort to bring together people who worked in the community on a voluntary or statutory basis.

> *It was a group of voluntary organisations and statutory services. There was some kind of umbrella residents', tenants', grouping of localised associations, stuff like that. So part of it was looking at revitalising those and bringing the two of those things together and then being aware of the setting up of these new structures within the Partnership. I suppose the overall prime objective around it was to be a strong voice, a strong uncompromising voice for this particular area, focusing around social deprivation, exclusion, marginalisation, and disadvantage* (14/2/01).

The Dublin Inner-City Partnership (DICP) pilot phase existed in 1992-1993 and served to address the issues of unemployment and overall needs of those residing in the inner-city (Dublin Inner-City Partnership 1999). Partnerships were to include state agencies,[82] employers and trade unions. The strategies of the DICP were to target social development, access employment opportunities, support enterprise, and promote local organisation and participation. In its first two years, the DICP provided direct benefits for over 5000 people and provided £10,000 to the south and north inner-cities. Resources were jumped up between 1994-1995 when £1.3 million was distributed in 70 individual actions, benefiting 10,000 individuals (Dublin Inner-City Partnership 1999).

Later on in the '90s, the DICP included the growing drug problem in its strategies, aware that the Celtic Tiger had not benefitted every citizen:

> The economy is healthier. Unemployment rates are falling and the country is experiencing a positive surge of energy. Yet beneath this appearance, the age old problems persist and new ones have emerged: home ownership is becoming an increasingly unattainable idea and the private

[82]Agencies included FÁS, The Vocational Education Committee, the Department of Social Welfare, the Department of an Taoiseach, the Eastern Health Board, and Dublin Corporation. Those in the employment sector included Dublin City Business Association and the Construction Industry Federation as well as the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed.

> sector is rife with its own problems, homelessness is at an all time high, the important issue of childcare remains unresolved, drug addiction continues to destroy lives and communities in the inner-city, and poverty is a daily reality for many people (Hely-Hutchinson 1998: *foreword*).

The notion of partnership and the potential social and economic profits for the north inner-city was duly noted by community leaders. It was recognised that this idea of partnership could also be effective among community groups who, in effect, had almost parallel agendas. In the words of a community leader:

> *In the very late 1980's, and beginning of the 1990's, we were approached with this new idea called 'partnership' and the idea was that people with a concern about these poor areas would get together, and sort out all the problems in a joint co-operative way. Although there were lots of doubts, we said, "Well hang on a minute; we're fifteen and twenty years at this work, and conflict is getting us nowhere, so, ok, why not give this 'partnership' deal a shot?* (27/2/01).

A community worker also stated:

> *I suppose the biggest difference at the time initially would have been that the things that were happening were much more uncoordinated. You know, the idea of partnership and networking and integration had really only come in the '90's really. In the '80's everyone was doing their own thing* (22/6/01).

While individual projects produced fruitful outcomes in their respective aims and objectives, community leaders felt that as long as they continued to work separately from each other, the more broader issues around economic development and employment would be neglected.

Community leaders shared an understanding that the north inner-city was an active participant in a welfare state. The area had been characterised by high unemployment, social disadvantage and urban decay (Bannon *et al.* 1981; McKeown 1991). While employment levels in the early 1990's had been rising and unemployment falling nationally, the north inner-city had continued to experience rising unemployment. A lack of educational attainment and suitable training played a significant part in accounting for

the high levels. Without suitable skills, local communities found it difficult to avail of the job opportunities offered by new businesses promoted by the CHDDA.

As new industries began operating in suburbs, there was a decline in the traditional employment in the dockland area (Alliance for Work Forum 1988). As one interviewee pointed out, the economic conditions had never been good in the north inner-city:

> *There would have been a lot of unskilled labour, low education qualifications for labour required. That was changing...You had a situation where these people were in poor conditions but at least there was employment. It gradually came to be that the unemployment situation in the '70's got worse in the '80's. There was very high unemployment then. In some areas, unemployment reached ridiculous heights, sixty to eighty percent in some blocks of flats* (30/1/03).

Apparent to community leaders that without resourcing, they could not go forward with their aim to secure more jobs for their community, the idea of partnership came almost as a welcome relief. In addition, community leaders wanted to embark on developing models of provision in education, health, justice and other social services. The Integrated Services Initiative, formed in 1995, provided the community with its first formal partnership. Its purpose was for the community and the state to jointly analyse systems operating in the north inner-city and to put forward relevant proposals.

Duggan and Ronayne (1991) in examining the relationship between the community sector and the State stress this vital role of the state in the partnership process:

> This dependence on State income characterises contemporary processes of social polarisation and the experience of social and economic disadvantage. It is within this context also that multiple actor models of welfare delivery specifically arise. Relevant to the other potential partners in the welfare mix, therefore, the community sector represents those individuals, households, and localities already most economically and socially disadvantaged. Their participation in the delivery of welfare or as partners in local development strategies is dependent upon the extent to which they are facilitated to undertake this role (1991: 5).

The role of the government though is not just about resourcing the community in order for

it to participate, it is also about providing the community with relevant key roles in any newly co-ordinated systems (O'Carroll 1997).

4.6 The Inner-City Organisations Network (ICON)

Community leaders and workers quickly realised that these key roles were omitted from the partnership process in the north inner-city. The sense that the government was simply appeasing them when asking for their insights and experiences was overwhelming. So much so that they determined to approach the process from a new angle, strengthening bonds between themselves instead. Speaking about the community groups who were asked to participate in the process, one community worker explained:

> *They all went in separately and basically they were all played off each other and they got nothing, you know? They got nothing out of it. And it was from that, I think, that the whole genesis of ICON came about.* (They saw) *that there was a lot of different groupings and a lot of different organisations and they saw as long as they were going to work separately from each other they weren't going to get anywhere in terms of looking at the broader issues around economic development and employment and all that. And the roots of ICON were in that* (22/5/01).

After facilitating a number of community meetings, members of the Inner-City Renewal Group formed the Inner City Organisation Network (ICON) in the spring of 1992. While initially led by community leaders active in the 1970's and 1980's, ICON's membership was open to non-government organisations and individuals in ten electoral divisions of the north inner-city.[83]

President Mary Robinson officially launched ICON on February 12th, 1993 in the Fire Station, a community building hosting the North City Centre Community Action Project.

[83] These Electoral Divisions were Rotunda A&B, North Dock A,B,&C,Ballybough A&B, Mountjoy A&B, and the North City.

Initially there were nine interest groups,[84] a general steering committee representing these groups, a chairperson and secretary. The steering group met monthly, and held general meetings every three months to facilitate non-members who may have wanted to bring concerns to the community agenda. Statutory representatives would be invited to Annual General Meetings for information sharing purposes.

The primary aim of ICON was to provide a forum for debate and policy making as well as a platform for lobbying and campaigning on arising issues as identified, most importantly, by the community itself (ICON 1999). In order to facilitate this, ICON would promote the sharing of information and resources between community projects. Its job would also be to ascertain general community concerns and bring them to the attention of statutory bodies. ICON's structure and its approach to mobilizing people in the area differentiated it from other umbrella groups. Whilst representing the member groups it was serving, ICON held itself firmly accountable to the general north inner-city community, giving birth to a 'new and complicated form of democracy' (ICON 1998a: 8).

Members of ICON considered it important that any participation by groups or individuals be voluntary. Financial independence, leaders believed, would allow the network to critically examine existing governmental bodies and policies without repercussions (14/2/01; 27/2/01). Such critique however, would not diminish the need for ICON to work in conjunction with statutory agencies:

> We in ICON have been critical but are willing to take responsibility for reform in the knowledge that unless a creative holistic approach involving genuine partnerships between the statutory, business, and voluntary sectors is adopted, the on-going suffering inflicted on many individuals and families will continue indefinitely (ICON 1993).

Although existing community groups were tackling issues of social deprivation and marginalisation, ICON was seen to provide a 'more sophisticated response' to the growing problems in the north inner-city by providing a strong networking structure

[84] Initial interest groups centered on Women, Elderly, Sports and Leisure, Arts and Culture, Education and Training, Youth/Childcare/ Family Support, Employment and Enterprise, Welfare Rights and Community Development. A working group focusing on drug issues would be added later.

(3/8/01).

One of ICON's first tasks was to monitor the expansion of the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). Its development had encroached on the Sheriff Street area; 445 flats in the area were to be demolished and residents moved to adjacent newly built houses. While the new housing deal provided an alternative to overcrowding and unsafe living conditions, the support structures, which the community had fought hard to protect, did not go untouched by the process of redevelopment and revitalisation. Adjusting to relocation presented a different kind of problem for the Sheriff Street residents. A community worker, talking about the repercussions on residents stated:

> *Even though they were only moving across the road, there were huge insecurities for people moving from the flats, where they had been, into houses. The women, funnily enough, experienced that worse in lots of ways because a lot of women went through a lot of depression when they moved because the flats are very communal kind of living, you know, a lot of the day is spent on the balconies and people were very much in touch with each other* (22/5/01).

While providing support structures to help the community deal with the consequences of housing relocation, ICON remained in negotiation with relevant bodies to secure partnership initiatives which would promote local development and address the high unemployment situation in the area.

As an effective network, ICON keeps its ear firmly to the ground and few relevant issues circumvent those in the organisation. It is unsurprising then that when heroin began making inroads once again into the community ICON reacted swiftly, organising information meetings and a dedicated drugs subcommittee. Its established and well recognised history of networking and partnership provided the blueprint for anti-drug activism. ICON worked in developing, sustaining, and then aiding the demise of the second phase of the anti-drug movement. Its role in anti-drug activism is highly significant, and therefore will be examined more closely in a following chapter.

4.7 The existing underclass of the north inner-city

Many residents in Dublin's north inner-city have been on welfare for a considerable time and do not work. There are also those who engage in work but also remain illegally on social welfare.[85] It should come as no surprise that there is a high representation of those from disadvantaged areas in the criminal courts. Bacik and O'Connell (1998) have concluded that:

> The role of economic determinism must also be introduced into the debate on crime. If the rate of offending[86] in a particular area may be linked to the economic status of that area, then crime and criminality may be seen, at least partially, as economic matters. To put it another way, the economic deprivation of a particular community may be seen as a partial cause of crime within that community (1998: 25).

Throughout their political journey, the community leaders in the north inner-city articulated that poverty and disadvantage were central to the community's problems. They acknowledged as Wilson (1997) has, the structural constraints and limited opportunities of such a disadvantaged area. They saw the north inner-city during the 1980's and 1990's as a segregated entity that was not benefitting from the changes and transformations in Irish society. They recognised the many long-term unemployed and welfare dependent members of their community, disagreeing that welfare brings to the community the kind of stability mentioned by Morris (1989) and Spicker (1990). On the contrary they, along with other respondents, have given a rich insight into the criminal element that is part and parcel of the north inner-city as a result of long term governmental neglect. Their views are not so far removed from those of Charles Murray which were criticised by more liberal thinkers. One community leader when describing the formation of the anti-drugs group in the north inner-city stated:

> *But you couldn't run anything that big here without someone having a criminal background! I mean, for fuck's sake! We make up thirty-five*

[85] In October 2003, the Department of Social and Family Affairs clampdown led to a clawing back of 10.36 million from fraudulent claims in Dublin North (www.gov.ie).

[86] Bacik and O'Connell (1998) found that 73% of Dublin District Court defendants were from the most economically deprived areas in Dublin.

percent of the population of Mountjoy at any given time. I couldn't do my job without talking to people with criminal backgrounds, you know. Eh...(LAUGHS)...it just couldn't be done! (27/2/01).

An anti-drugs activist acknowledged the indigence in the area which leads to crime:

Well, I would have been born and reared in the north inner-city area which would have been regarded as one of the most deprived areas of Dublin, on the north side, you know? From kickoff, we would have been well used to grief and problems. In the early stages, me growing up, the problems that was there was poverty and, you know, problems with the police. There was that much poverty around there that ninety percent of the kids would be out robbing or something. Not robbing at a very high level but, you know, just to keep surviving and to bring food and stuff onto the table...Well, a very high percentage of activists would have been involved in crime at some stage, would have been well known to the police. Even meself, I would have been known to the police, you know? (30/8/01).

The money which the sale of drugs generates would also eventually figure in the north inner-city economy, giving an indication of some resident's existing inclination towards criminal activity. For example, a respondent described what happened when he received money for a claim as a result of losing a lung and kidney in a construction site accident when he was a child:

I was awarded it when I was twelve and a half. So I got it when I was eighteen. Here's a kid at eighteen receiving £50,000 in among a load of drug dealers. Family members were pushing it down my throat. They were saying that if you put two grand into it you will get five or six grand back and all of this. They were trying to educate me into the importation of heroin. I didn't want any part of it. One thing I could never respect was a drug dealer, living on other people's misery. I could never take to it. So for personal reasons, I never got into dealing (5/2/02).

Another respondent stated:

There was so many people intermingled into the drug situation whereas parents of drug pushers, they wouldn't be actually involved in selling it but they would have been beneficiaries of the money generated through drugs. They would accept this money in the context of "Oh, it was coming

from somewhere else." They would be convincing themselves it wasn't drug money. That's why you had a lot of pro-drug people in the area, in our communities, if you can understand what I mean (30/8/01).

One respondent nicely echoed Lurigio and Davis' (1996) belief that disadvantaged youth are enticed to such lucrative dealings:

> *I don't see how we could successfully address the supply side. I mean, if you had that mug full of heroin (POINTING TO MUG) you'd never have to work again. If that was full of pure heroin you'd never have to work again. You know what I mean? The temptation in a place where there hasn't been bleedin' work for forty years when we can trace the decline of the local economy back to the beginning of the bleedin' nineteenth century, you know? Eh...it was too easy. It was too tempting and then they become role models for the other kids because they are the ones with the flash cars and the jewellry and the foreign holidays and all that. They become the role models* (27/2/01).

Underground economies in which Auletta's *hustlers* engage remain prevalent in areas of disadvantage, especially where illicit drug use is prominent (Currie 1993).[87] Drug use helps foster such an economy as many drug users will sell stolen goods for hard cash to purchase drugs. Such economies are by no means a new phenomenon. Piracy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Ireland was widespread and helped to supplement the local economy in many ways. Goods obtained from ships were traded for necessities on shore with women often acting as the mediators for distribution. According to Appleby (1991):

> Much of this activity was relatively unsophisticated in character. It usually involved short distance raids along the coasts, to nearby islands, or upon isolated and vulnerable merchant shipping. There was nothing glamorous about these ventures; they were merely part of a broader struggle to survive in a difficult, sometimes inhospitable, environment. In an area where the opportunities for profitable farming were restricted by bog and rock, piracy was but one way of reaping an alternative harvest from the wealth of the sea (1991: 56).

Three centuries later, underground economies are operating for similar purposes. It has

[87] Hartnoll (1995) reminds us that the relationship between social class and drug use is 'complex ' (11).

been suggested by Kearns and Parkinson (2001: 2105) that disadvantaged communities, acutely aware of their social exclusion, 'engage in a high degree of mutually supportive behaviour.' They state that it is this feeling of isolation, rather than the behaviour itself, that bonds such communities.

However, a north inner-city resident and participant in an underground economy, argues differently, and describes the functioning of the underground economy in his local pub:

> While the other pubs that line the Parade also cater for working class people in the immediate area (*pub's name*) primarily acts as a sort of conduit for an underground economy that supports people living in many inner-city areas. This economy allows goods, and sometimes services, to be bought and sold at prices way below those of the established economy. Clothes, electrical items, cigarettes and leisure items, illegally obtained, are supplied to those who otherwise might not be able to afford them. As with the legitimate economy, competition is prevalent. As a result of its high profile, (pub's name) attracts a particular element of people within the community, nurturing a "wheeling and dealing" mentality accepted by local participants and non-participants alike. (*Pub's name*) patrons are very familiar with each other. Many are related or would have grown up together in the north inner-city. It is in some ways like a rural pub. Strangers are highly noticeable and because of the workings of the pub, they are viewed suspiciously. Acceptance of someone new into the pub occurs when a local person can somehow vouch that the person is "one of us." This would not necessarily mean that the person was working class but rather that they understood the workings of the pub and were trustworthy in relation to them.[88]

What has been neglected in other arguments on the underclass has been the aspect of choice identified by Charles Murray. A person may make enough money to live a comfortable lifestyle but if he or she chooses to spend all wages on drugs or alcohol, at the expense of paying rent or maintaining a healthy diet, is he or she really in poverty? Likewise, are those who choose to participate in an underground economy and who maintain an acceptable lifestyle because of it also deemed to be disadvantaged? Lee (1994) attempts to address these complexities stating that:

[88] From a paper entitled 'Analysis of a Photograph' submitted by a respondent to the Trinity College Access Programme, Spring 2001 (with permission).

> The underclass according to the perspectives from the right, such as Murray's is not the same as poverty, but a particular 'type' of poverty which needs to be explained. Furthermore, the underclass may not be in poverty at all. "Criminal classes" with high earnings from drug activities, for example, may not be in poverty and may lie out with the intersection of underclass and poverty, whilst specific poverty 'types' lie within the intersection of poverty and the underclass (1994: 197).

Some respondents believed that prior to the drug problem, people engaged in crime not necessarily for the high lucrative earnings but as the above respondent articulated, "*just to keep surviving and to bring food and stuff onto the table.*"

As well as emphasising the behaviours of the underclass, Wilson (1987) and Phillips (1990) have also noted the underclass' spacial segregation from other classes. However, spatial segregation can also occur *within* disadvantaged areas themselves. Sheriff Street, located beside the north docks in Dublin 1, remains geographically isolated from both the Amiens Street and East Wall areas. It was noted by two interviewees as almost a separate 'no-go' area even for other north inner-city residents:

> *It is like a town of its own. I mean it's not only for the people going down there. I mean I was born in Sheriff Street but I would be an outsider walking down there now. And they'd know you'd be an outsider, and they'd be looking at you like, "Who's she coming down here to see?" You know what I mean? They want it like that* (14/5/01a).

> *Sheriff Street is like a little village. Even the police won't go down there*[89] (14/5/01b).

A community worker conveyed the separateness felt by Sheriff Street residents themselves:

> *(It is)... a very inward looking community; it still is, you know? It's still very difficult to get anything going down there because there is this sense*

[89] Interestingly, the Community Policing Forum (CPF), a statutory body which formed in 1999 to encourage local tenants groups to play a role in the protection of their communities from drug dealing and related anti-social behaviour, covers all Dublin 1 areas except Sheriff Street and its adjacent streets. Therefore, there is no Forum representation from this area. The role of the police will be discussed in a further chapter

that...I'm aware they're isolated...I can remember when the local employment service was set up first here on Amiens Street. Like the people in Sheriff Street said they should have their own one because, why should they be expected to walk up as far as Amiens Street?[90] (22/5/01).

Cultural factors were seen by other respondents to be also at work in the north inner-city. Reflecting Lewis' (1968) theory on the culture of poverty, one respondent captured the transmission of the community's basic values from his own childhood perspective:

You kind of look up as a kid at these older fellas because they have new runners and you are living in a poverty stricken area. They are out robbing so they can buy these runners; they can buy these clothes. So you look up to that. But even though it was only that, it was something we hadn't got. To look at someone's 'Slickers' and all these cheap ones for £6.99 that we would buy at the time. When you seen someone wearing a pair of 'Nike', you'd be like, "Wow! They are gorgeous! I'd love a pair of them! How did you get them?" "Well, I went around the corner, smashed a car window, pulled a radio out, sold that and was able to buy them!" That's how easy it is and that was put into a child's head at ten and eleven (5/2/02).

It remains hard to ignore Auletta's (1992) and Wilson's (1997) understanding that there are those who do not fit into working class definitions. They remain two of the few underclass theorists who acknowledge the permanency of those who have formed a new social stratum which is not necessarily linked to poverty but rather interlinked by behaviours considered for the most part to be anti-social. The admission by one activist that he and his co-activists *'would have been well known to the police'* is an indication of the complexities surrounding the anti-drug movement. The north inner-city with its workings and social structures and its 'no-go' areas represents in part an underclass who, for the most part, remain 'outsiders' impervious to welfare or legal restraints.

4.8 Presenting questions

The north inner-city, throughout the early 1980's and 1990's, had made tremendous

[90] The distance between Lower Sheriff Street and Amiens Street is about 50 metres.

leaps and bounds in terms of political opportunity. The 'housing crisis' (a particularly localised problem) mobilized some individuals, with the encouragement of community leaders, to form tenant committees. This was, according to respondents, the community's first attempt to guard its collective interests, at least during their lifetime. It also set in place networks which would prove vital to future anti-drug mobilisation. More importantly, it gave an early indication that this inner-city community had not only the will to mobilize to address a specific concern, but also the capacity.

'The Gregory Deal' too soon heralded a new era for community leaders who left behind the activities of street protests and tenant committees choosing instead the negotiation table and community development and partnership processes. Although tensions and suspicions (most likely mutual) existed between the community and the government, the community leaders did not abandon these processes and resort to previous protest activities (for example low-key disruption) when faced with their increasing frustration with economic obstacles. Instead the leaders opted to maintain the status quo, perhaps due to the increasing resources and incentives the community was receiving and being given from statutory agencies.

Trends in the decentralisation of power from the state to communities were in evidence at this time. With such a trend comes the ability of communities to engage in processes which were once in the hands of both local and national governments (O'Malley 1992; Rose 1996). The question that must be asked in light of this is why then, when the drug problem presented in the 1980's and again in the 1990's, did community leaders abandon the partnership route the community had taken favouring instead a more independent approach to this new social problem it was experiencing? Furthermore, what differing conditions - if any - led the community leaders to forego diplomacy and engage members of the community in acts deemed by many to be of a vigilante nature? And how did a group of 'outsiders', many with criminal backgrounds and supposedly disempowered by long-term unemployment and welfare dependency, manage to successfully mobilize and tackle the heroin problem in Dublin's inner-cities?

CHAPTER 5

Anti-drug mobilization and engagement

5.1 Introduction

The anti-drug movement in Dublin existed in two phases. Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD) was the first response to the new heroin epidemic which quickly enveloped inner-city areas in the early 1980's. The second phase of the movement, COCAD, occurred in the mid-1990's when a more devastating heroin problem resurfaced. As stated earlier, there is a dearth of information on CPAD and COCAD so there is little theoretical ground on which to build.

Accordingly, this chapter will examine the anti-drug movement in order to provide a relevant theoretical framework for the movement. It will first provide a brief overview of the drug problem in Dublin. The chapter will then trace the path both CPAD and COCAD took in addressing the drug problem and will examine the rationale for community anti-drug mobilisation, as well as the movement's rationale, objectives and tactics. Finally, the chapter will discuss the movement in light of social movement theories.

5.2 A brief overview of the drug problem in Dublin

Many definitions for drug misuse exist (Gossop 1998), often causing dissent over the inclusion of alcohol, tobacco, and prescribed medications (Loughran 1999). The Department of Health (1991: 4) offers a good modified definition suitable in the context of this thesis:

> The taking of a legal and or illegal drug or drugs (excluding alcohol and tobacco) which harm the physical, mental, or social well-being of the individual, the group or society.

Cullen (1998: 12) expands on this, proposing a more holistic definition:

> When a person's use of drugs has serious consequences for their capacity to work, their involvement with serious crime, their ability to partake in society at a level that most others rightly take for granted, and

> their capacity to avoid premature death. Drug problems also have serious and often catastrophic consequences for the immediate families and communities of those who are most directly affected including extraordinary levels of crime and lawlessness, community disintegration and widespread and emotional trauma.

Both these explanations underpin a more refined definition that will be used in this research. The term 'drug user' will refer to those respondents who use one or more of the following opiates: heroin, Methadone (legally prescribed or illegally purchased or gained) or Morphine Sulphate tablets (illegally purchased or gained). The status of an individual's drug use will be indicated by "former" or "current."

The last estimation of the number of opiate users in Dublin is thought to be 13,460 (Comiskey 1999). The overall number in Ireland was recently estimated at 14,452 (DRUGNET 2003). In 1996, 79%, (n= 3,840) of those presenting for drug treatment in the Republic of Ireland were opiate users. 88% (n= 3,384) of these used heroin. In 2000, the numbers of individuals nationwide presenting to treatment centres with an opiate problem rose to 5,333 of which 4,942 (92.7%) were using heroin (Drug Misuse Research Division 2003).

In the former Eastern Health Board Region[91] which represented Dublin, Kildare and Wicklow counties, 88%, (n= 3,774) of those presenting for drug treatment in 1996 named opiates as their main problem drug. Of those presenting for opiate problems 88% (n= 3,324) were heroin users. Three years later in 1999, 94%, (n= 5,045) presented with an opiate problem. Of these, 93% (n= 4,685) were heroin users (Drug Misuse Research Division 2002).

These figures indicate that Ireland has 3-5 problem drug users per 1000 population between 15-64 years, less than the United Kingdom but equivalent to Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Spain, and Norway (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs

[91] Under the *Eastern Regional Health Authority* Health Act of 1999, the Eastern Health Board dissolved and three new Health Boards were formed: Northern Area Health Board, East Coast Area Health Board and South Western Health Board. At the time of writing, this new structure is under review and about to undergo change.

and Drug Addiction 2001: 10). The Irish gender distribution of opiate users is 70/30 male to female, the proportion of females over twice that seen in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. Ireland is also deemed to have the youngest population of problem drug users (2001: 15).

Routine HIV testing for drug users began in 1985. Subsequently, 19% of those tested were HIV positive (Corrigan 1986). HIV rates among drug users are continuing to rise despite national prevention efforts. The recent trend of intravenous cocaine use among previous heroin users has been acknowledged as a factor.[92] Many intravenous drug users are infected with Hepatitis C. In one study conducted at the National Drug Treatment Centre, the rate of attendees living with Hepatitis C was documented at 84% (Smyth *et al.* 1995).

Ireland was not considered to have a drug problem until the late 1960's. Cannabis and LSD seemed to be the drugs of choice (Department of Health 1971) and confined to a minority of the student population at the time (5/4/01). The Gardaí Drug Squad which had formed in 1968 remained relatively inactive.

It is widely accepted that the drug problem in Dublin did not begin with heroin but rather with the misuse of Palfium and Diconal, prescribed painkillers illegally obtained (Malone 1984; Martin 1984). The introduction of Palfium and Diconal occurred when a well known crime family moved from armed bank robberies to breaking and entering of chemists when it was realised that the market for drugs proved more lucrative. One particular theft netted £300,000 worth of the drugs which quickly flooded inner-city areas (Flynn and Yeates 1985). Young people became increasingly dependent on "Palf" and "Dike", crushing them and using them intravenously. As a result, addicts began to engage in robbing chemists themselves, forging prescriptions, and 'hitting' doctors with untrue stories of coping with intense back or limb pain in the hope of being prescribed the painkillers.

[92] Dr. Des Crowley, GP Co-ordinator, Northern Area Health Board. *HIV Services Network Conference*, April, 2002, Dublin Castle, Dublin.

The availability of Palfium and Diconal created a black market for drugs which allowed for the introduction of heroin to these inner-city communities. A respondent, a drug user in the 1970's and 1980's, stated that the very early heroin scene which existed prior to the introduction of Palfium and Diconal was limited to a small area in the centre of Dublin, mainly the Grafton Street and St. Stephen's Green areas, with a smaller scene in Dun Laoghaire.

Irish emigrants were returning from Britain, many with a drug habit. Having been treated by a medical profession in Great Britain which prescribed heroin and other opiates to addicts, emigrants quickly realised Ireland did not provide such services and in turn engaged in the growing heroin scene. In 1979, the out-patient unit at Jervis Street Hospital became The National Advisory and Treatment Centre, the first statutory out-patient treatment centre for drug users. The escalation of the problem was reflected in the growing numbers seeking help for addiction; in 1979, 416 individuals presented for treatment. In 1983, this rose to 1, 515 (Corrigan 1986).

Major crime families began to capitalise on the growing drug problem by importing heroin. However, there was, as yet, no sub-culture which facilitated addicts in obtaining heroin on the streets. Young people and the returning emigrants did not know how to access the drug. "Runners", younger local men and women who were willing to mediate between the addict and the drug sellers for a price, became frequent in numbers. However, as time went on, the runners themselves began to experiment with heroin and many eventually became addicted. This addict-dealer persona, common in the drug using culture (Coveney *et al.* 1999; D'Arcy 2000; Valdez and Sifanek 2002) eventually became one of the most contentious issues for the anti-drug movement. While some consider this persona worthy of some sympathy believing 'victims create victims' (Citywide 2003: 2), others disagree citing the devastation drug dealing causes to communities regardless.

With heroin now becoming more available, the modus operandi of drug users changed dramatically. Once able to access drugs directly through theft and bogus prescriptions,

addicts now had to focus on obtaining money in order to purchase heroin. Accordingly, petty crime and housebreaking offenses rose dramatically. In 1979, 5 people were arrested for heroin related offenses. By 1983, the number had risen to 449 (An Garda Síochána 1983). Organisations supporting prisoners' rights, along with independent local housing committees, made their concerns known, attempting to bring the drug issue to light. However, they never managed to create a orchestrated plan of action (Cullen 1990).

Since the early 1980's heroin use has continued to rise. Although the drug problem abated somewhat in the late 1980's, it was still considered 'a grave' problem (National Economic and Social Council 1990: 1). A second more dramatic surge occurred in the early 1990's resulting in the rise of community based treatment centres in Dublin which dispensed Physeptone®, a heroin substitute. To cope with the growing numbers of those on waiting lists to enter treatment clinics and those unwilling to engage in a full Physeptone® treatment programme, the Eastern Health Board set up a mobile clinic in 1996 serving inner-city areas and suburbs. The mobile clinic allowed a low daily dose of Physeptone® (20 mls) and promoted a needle exchange service.

In 1998, the Department of Health and Children introduced the Methadone Protocol Scheme in an attempt to tighten up procedures of dispensing. Prior to its introduction, individuals could obtain Physeptone® through a drug treatment centre or mobile bus, through the Methadone Pilot Project which encouraged GP's to prescribe to the more stabilised addicts, and through private doctors. On the recommendations of the Methadone Protocol Scheme Implementation Committee, Physeptone® would be replaced with Methadone.[93] All individuals would have to be registered on a Central Drug Treatment List [94] and carry a valid ID card. If not availing of treatment in a drug clinic, addicts would be allocated a GP, who, as part of the Protocol, has to undergo specific training with the Irish College of General Practitioners (Department of Health and Children 1997).

[93] Methadone is two and a half times the strength of Physeptone®, and therefore is dispensed in smaller quantities. Also, Methadone does not have the high sugar content of Physeptone® deemed at the time to cause teeth and mouth problems in addicts.

[94] This was in order to avoid duplication of dispensing.

The introduction of Physeptone® was welcomed as a stabilising medication for drug addicts as it was believed by the medical profession that addicts would no longer have to buy heroin if their withdrawals were now being kept at bay. This in turn would lead to less crime since individuals would no longer have to support a drug habit. However, research conducted by UISCE (2003) has indicated that many drug users are involved in poly-drug use and therefore may be engaging in crime to support a benzodiazepine or cocaine habit. This therefore encourages a street market for these drugs.[95]

5.3 The first phase of the anti-drug movement: The Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD)

It was not until the formation of Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD) that community activism specifically targeting the drug situation developed clear objectives and tactics. The origins of CPAD, and its name, is disputed with both northside and southside inner-city residents staking claims. However, it is generally agreed that the movement had its beginnings in St. Theresa's Gardens, a south inner-city flat complex. Martin (1984), a local community worker in St. Theresa's Gardens, reported that three young married women approached him in the summer of 1983 with the idea of holding meetings to discuss drug use and drug selling in the complex. A respondent, living in St. Theresa's Gardens at the time, believed the women's concern resulted from an incident when a drug user was found injecting on a stairwell surrounded by children. Parents of the children confronted the addict and a fracas ensued. This seemingly was not uncommon:

> *People were sick of it. They didn't like the look of forty maybe fifty addicts sitting on a wall. Some of them would actually be using syringes the odd time which would actually be pretty scary* (20/6/01).

Residual anger from this particular incident soon led to a community meeting in the local Parish Hall. Those involved organised quickly and determined the root cause of the problem to be the dealers who were supplying drugs to the community. Their priority

[95] It should be noted here that UISCE's (2003) research was a peer-led informal study of the effects of the Methadone Protocol on drug users.

would soon be to target dealers and remove them from the community. The names of alleged dealers were brought to the fore by residents, and suspects were often called to appear before their peers in the community to give an account of their actions.

Malone (1984) a north inner-city community activist, acknowledges that some names of individuals may have been falsely given because of community politics. That is, those holding grudges towards, or jealous of, certain individuals, could cause havoc by presenting these individuals as drug dealers to the wider community. This conflicts with Bennett's (1988) belief that CPAD were always "right" in their actions.

Bennett (1988) points out that the CPAD depended on a community of informants. Information was usually gleaned surreptitiously. Taxi men, milkmen, and others with good access to public viewing acted as prime informants, over long periods of time, on suspected drug dealers. A respondent concurred with this, stating that many hackney taxi businesses were run by members of Concerned Parents for the purpose of ascertaining pertinent information (20/6/01).

Decisions which arose from the early CPAD meetings came from a committee formed as a result of elections held in St. Theresa's Gardens and in the local parish hall (20/6/01). Elections were held to determine leadership but their legitimacy remained dubious:

> *People would say, "Oh, I'll be chairman," "Ok, I'll be a committee member." I couldn't believe this. The people would more or less elect themselves. Every time someone elected themselves there would be a cheer of approval from the genuine women who were actually concerned about the drug problem. The meetings were like a law unto themselves* (20/6/01).

This sentiment is not unusual. From the beginning, CPAD invited criticism for harbouring an element which seemed to focus less on the drug problem than it did on wielding power within the community. Two respondents believed that some people joined CPAD believing it offered them some immunity from any potential marching by the

organisation. It was also their impression that relatives of those involved with CPAD enjoyed this immunity, with family members continuing to sell drugs with little interruption (5/4/01; 20/6/01). However, CPAD, for many, remained an unquestionable force within a community that was buckling under the weight of a serious drug problem. The community stood up and took notice when suspected dealers began leaving the area.

While CPAD gained momentum in the south inner-city, the north inner-city had been experiencing similar frustrations. Malone (1984) recalls the birth of the movement on the north side as being similar to its counterpart on the south side. A group of women, concerned with the heroin selling in the area and the anti-social behaviour that accompanied it, began holding meetings in a local flat complex. One respondent however, believed that CPAD began with a small committee in Hardwicke Street, Dublin 1, with the encouragement of the local parish priest (1/8/01).

The most overt method employed by this anti-drugs group was the galvanisation of crowds at public meetings which according to Bennett (1988) was the 'single greatest institution' of Concerned Parents Against Drugs (1988: 27). Held in local community or church halls, these meetings would help surface the feelings of the community and allow gathered information on suspects to be shared and discussed. Alleged dealers would often be summoned to defend themselves against accusations in what COCAD would later term 'oral hearings' (Lyder 2000).

Following most general public meetings were marches on the homes of suspected drug dealers. According to Johnson (1999) the act of marching came about when Gardaí and local authorities failed to take action against those deemed to be involved in the supply of drugs. The intent of the marches was to highlight for the community the drug activities of certain individuals and to ultimately force their eviction (Bennett 1988). Marching also occurred on Dáil Eireann and inner-city police stations to protest the government's lack of action in relation to the drug problem. These marches soon abated when the community realised the quick results their own anti-drug tactics were achieving.

As with the south side, open drug selling and using was taking its toll on the small

community. Addicts would often form early morning queues outside particular flats where heroin would be sold and distributed through windows. Locals, unused to such agitated behaviour, were frightened into remaining in their homes during these times. Initially, five suspected dealers were targeted. Tony Felloni, a fledgling dealer in the 1980's resided in Hardwicke Street Flats and was by far CPAD's initial centre of attention (27/2/01). Flaunting his wealth, Felloni made little attempt, in the eyes of the community, to hide his operations. Currently serving a 20 year sentence for drug importation and selling, Felloni was later nicknamed "King Scum" by the tabloid media, for upscaling his operations in the 1990's and for allegedly encouraging his teenage children to both use, and sell, heroin.

The concept of community opposition to drugs took hold and by the end of 1983, CPAD groups had formed and were active in many inner-city and suburban working class areas (Cullen 1990). While CPAD never formally published literature on their policies, they did issue several newsletters, aimed at community members, which contained references to their aims and objectives. CPAD stated:

> Our principle aim is to stop heroin and other addictive drugs being pushed in our communities. We believe that prevention of drug abuse is necessary and an important part of our programme is education of parents and youth. Meanwhile, we feel it is important to help the addicts, and work hard in this respect when ever it is possible (CPAD 1988: 4).

CPAD also aimed to offer 'the maximum support possible for addicts, recovering addicts, and their families' (CPAD 1988: 2).

According to a respondent, CPAD - at least on the north side - was never funded by the government nor did it ever seek funding (27/2/01). From its inception, each CPAD group operated independently, managing problems peculiar to its own community (Bennett 1988; Cullen 1990). However, communities began networking closely in relation to preventing an evicted person residing in another community and in exchanging information on individuals (CPAD b). This networking led to the formation of a CPAD central committee in late 1984. Member groups designated individuals to

represent the group at the central committee level.

While the central committee provided a more efficient means of communication between independent CPAD groups around the city, it slowly began to push its ethos on other member groups. A pivotal change occurred within the structure of CPAD when the central committee began to promote a policy of non co-operation with the police. Any information obtained on individuals was not to be handed over to the police but rather held for internal use. Meeting attendees were frequently reminded of this policy (Bennett 1988) and so stringent was the policy that the central committee in 1985 expelled a member group that refused to comply. Areas forming new Concerned Parents Against Drugs were only accepted as members if they accepted and adhered to this policy (CPAD a).

Despite this internal conflict, the central committee seemed to have its finger on the pulse in relation to relevant issues for drug users. As a result, it remained progressive in its approach to problem solving, well able to articulate the underlying reason for its convictions. A letter from representatives of the central committee to the Editor of the Irish Press in early 1988 noted the observations of the committee and offered suggestions on how to tackle the intricacies of the drug situation. The letter called for an increase in accessible detoxification units, education programmes for primary school children and, perhaps more controversially, the introduction of a needle exchange scheme. CPAD's central committee also condemned a proposed compulsory testing for AIDS (sic)[96] programme, arguing that such a programme would only result in pushing people at risk of developing AIDS more underground and further stigmatise drug addicts and their families (Flaherty & Cahill 1988). On September 23rd, 1987, the central committee organised a march to the Department of Justice to draw attention to the problem that compulsory HIV testing was posing for urban and rural prisoners (CPAD c). Awareness of such beliefs and contentions remained mainly confined to CPAD members in affected communities.

However, in late 1984, CPAD received negative national publicity when a south inner-

[96] As AIDS is a syndrome, there is no specific AIDS test, only a test for HIV antibodies.

city family (with drug using siblings) was attacked in their family home (Cullen 1990). The father of the family subsequently died of a heart attack. Incidences like this - and others which were to eventually surface - most likely encouraged the media to label CPAD 'vigilantes,' Repercussions were inevitable. An editorial by the central committee mentions these early days:

> The attacks were crude, referring to us (by quoting Gardaí or ministerial sources) as vigilantes, mobs, and thugs who would eventually wreak anarchy on the community (CPAD 1988).

Regardless of the authenticity of these verbal attacks, CPAD participation decreased in the late 1980's, amidst a growing reputation for carrying out vigilante style attacks on alleged dealers and their families. In not shifting from its policy of non co-operation with the police, CPAD did little to instill public confidence that it had no associations with Sinn Féin or the IRA. It did however, provide the structural mantle for the Coalition of Communities Against Drugs, which later was a shoulder when a second, and more devastating, heroin epidemic hit Dublin in the 1990's. A respondent who had known a family involved in major drug dealing in the 1980's stated that the patriarch of the family had said, on his way to prison, '*Do you think we're bad? Wait 'til you see what comes after us*' (3/8/01), a prophesy unfortunately fulfilled.

5.4 The second phase of the anti-drug movement: The Coalition of Communities Against Drugs (COCAD)

In the north inner-city, anti-drugs groups in the mid 1990's were formed in local communities such as Hardwicke Street, Ballybough, Summerhill, and East Wall before they amalgamated into what became COCAD, a city-wide network of anti-drug groups. In the eyes of the community, drug use had escalated to the extent that it now seemed to warrant the same kind of attention, and problem solving ideas, that it had ten years previously. Former means of tackling the issue were raised in community settings. Most notably was the recall, at the Annual General Meeting of ICON, of the movement which had formed in response to the drugs crisis of the mid-1980's:

> The Concerned Parents Against Drugs movement and individual tenant groups were once effective in dealing with aspects of problems. However, it has not operated for some years and people are now wary of taking action for fear of being labeled "vigilante" or being singled out (Inner-City Organisations Network 1993: 25).

ICON, recognising the need for the community to take some sort of similar visible action to deal with the drug problem had, in 1994, assisted in setting up similar groups in Wicklow and Galway encouraging these groups to develop support structures and undertake similar routes of liaising with local tenant groups (Inner-City Organisations Network 1997a). Unlike CPAD in the 1980's, ICON encouraged ties with the Gardaí, although some activists were unhappy with this. Prior to this, ICON remained confined to issues of support and networking (Inner-City Organisations Network 1997b). It had not, as yet, attempted to resolve the issue of the supply and control of drugs in communities, a step taken by the community in the 1980's which led to the overt measures employed by CPAD.

In July 1995, five consecutive drug related deaths of young people in the area prompted an ICON meeting in the North Star Hotel in the north inner-city (ICON 1997c). Overt drug selling, particularly at the Buckingham Street and Killarney Street junction, was escalating and causing concern once again for local residents. A second meeting held the following month in Lourdes Church in Sean McDermott Street heralded the beginning of a street campaign, organised by the Drugs Working Group, a sub-committee in ICON (ICON 1997a). Families were now witnessing drugs being sold openly in local pubs, snooker halls, and cafés.

As a result of the meeting, local anti-drug committees were set up in the northeast inner-city with the intention of developing a more open and visible response to drug selling in the area. The first response would be candlelight marches on Store Street Garda station to highlight Gardaí responsibility in dealing with the problem. Increased marches occurred on local Gardaí Stations where written grievances about certain individuals drug dealing in the area were handed in for the police to investigate.

Community leaders then chose to make a more public statement by organising a march to Dáil Eireann. October 4th, 1995, became ICON's 'Day of Action.' An estimated eight hundred to a thousand people from the north inner-city marched to the Dáil, as 'a community consumed by grief and rage' (ICON 1998a: 10). To symbolise the growing number of drug related deaths in the community, participants carried a hundred white crosses.

Increasing the number of places on the local Methadone maintenance programme was high on the list of demands presented to the government (ICON 1998b). The City Clinic, a statutory agency run by the Eastern Health Board, (now Eastern Regional Health Authority), had a long waiting list; families witnessing the chaotic life style of other family members affected by drug use despaired. Some parents resorted to buying drugs in order to alleviate their son or daughter's drug sickness:

> *I was personally affected and that's when I got educated on how you had to get Methadone and I actually had to go out and buy it. I used to have to travel all over the place to make sure I got this Methadone because you get into a fixation that it's you who needs it. If you don't get it, your child is going to be doing all sorts of things, going to be going out and doing anything to get heroin. So, I mean, in the whole household, I mean there is two daughters...they were dragged into this problem... "Oh Dad, did you get his Methadone ?"* (30/8/01).

> *In the beginning I bought heroin because I was told by professionals again to do that. They told us he would have to have a dirty urine*[97] *if he wanted help and I couldn't believe that. I said to them, "Are you telling me I have to go and buy my son drugs?" They said, "Yeah." He needed to have a dirty urine so we went out for three months and we bought heroin* (14/5/01a).

> *I mean what mother can sit there and watch her child going through pain? I couldn't. I mean, I went out and bought cancer pain tablets because I thought I was doing good. And it's all that kind of education. I didn't know;*

[97] In Methadone clinics, urines which are opiate positive are colloquially referred to by staff and clients alike as "dirty"; opiate negative urines are seen as "clean." In this instance, the doctor was indicating that the clinic would need proof of heroin use before an individual could be put on a Methadone course. Addicts addicted solely to Methadone bought on the street cannot avail of a clinic programme.

*we went out and bought Methadone, we bought heroin, we bought tablets (*14/5/01b).

It was felt that the "Day of Action" march drew attention to the gravity of the situation and therefore it was deemed a success (ICON 1998a). The march had helped to spur the First Ministerial Report on Drug Use (Department of the Taoiseach 1996) which found, unsurprisingly, that the drug problem 'is most acute in the areas of the greatest social and economic disadvantage' and the 'problem of heroin abuse represents not only the most pressing issue confronting the health service and other relevant agencies but a crisis for the communities concerned and for Irish society as a whole' (1996: 39). The report also formally recognised that a large number of addicts will in turn probably became dealers themselves in order to support their habit (1996: 39-40). This understanding, while put forth sympathetically by the government, was not deemed so by the community at large.

The street campaign had, since its beginning, been fairly sporadic with small marches and meetings happening only occasionally. However, by the autumn of 1996 it had gained momentum mainly due - to what Smelser (1962) terms - an 'initiating event'. This incident helped further galvanise the community against drug dealers.[98] On October 11th, 1996, a suspected drug dealer was raided by the Drug Squad in Mountainview Court, a Summerhill flat complex. The raid, loud and active, drew the attention of many other residents. As the alleged dealer was led to an awaiting police van, residents began shouting obscenities and anti-drug sentiments at the suspect. The police, mistaking the shouting for harassment, called for back up from both Store Street and Fitzgibbon Street stations. As the numbers of locals drawn by the noise and confusion increased, the police, armed with batons and accompanied by the Gardaí Dog unit, rushed the long open balconies of the complex. A riot ensued and several police officers and residents were injured. The "Mountainview riot" accentuated the mounting anger of the community towards drug dealers and the police. While community relations with the police had never been healthy, the incident seemed to justify people's belief that the police were unsupportive of community anti-drug action.

[98] This incident was observed by this researcher during a work-related home visit and documented in a personal diary and is corroborated by Tony Gregory (Sunday Independent 2003).

The day after the riot, ICON called an emergency community meeting in Rutland Street school where people vented their anger and looked for a more concerted anti-drug effort. The over capacity attendance at the meeting indicated that the anti-drug fervour had now grown beyond a few organised activists. Names of other alleged heroin dealers surfaced at the meeting and it became apparent that people wanted to resume marching on the homes of drug "pushers."

Within the following week, local flat complex committees in Ballybough, Summerhill, Hardwicke Street, Sean McDermott Street, Sheriff Street, and East Wall had set up 24 hour vigils outside the complexes. Temporary huts erected in many of the areas, along with scrap wood burning in iron barrels, provided shelter and warmth for those on vigil during the winter. Volunteers would take it in turns to monitor people entering and leaving the flat complex.[99] Residents suspected of dealing in heroin or other drugs would not be allowed 'visitors' whose intentions were unknown. For flat complexes with multiple entries, walkie-talkies were often used among the volunteers to communicate relevant information (2/12/00). Tenants were encouraged to participate in the vigils and in some cases rosters were drawn up and individuals put forth without their consultation. This proved to be a somewhat divisive action on the part of the more avid activists.

Large weekly public meetings continued to be held in the larger venue of Macushla Bingo Hall on Lower Buckingham Street. While initially being nameless, this movement eventually came under the umbrella of COCAD, with offshoots such as East Wall Against Drugs and Ballybough Against Drugs. Leaning on the earlier aims of CPAD, members of COCAD (2000: 3) stated their objectives to be:

1) To highlight activities of those involved in the drugs trade.
2) To develop treatment, rehabilitation, and aftercare services for those who have succumbed to drug addiction.
3) To develop facilities and services for young people.
4) To move the drugs problem and its effect on communities up the political

[99] Marx and Archer (1973) found that such patrols are more likely to be successful in lower income groups and among the less educated.

agenda.

5) To secure a more effective response to the problem from the State and its agencies.

Although policy formation is not formally mentioned, it is recognised by COCAD as not being the 'sole preserve of civil servants, academics, or professionals in the various statutory and non-statutory agencies' (COCAD 2000: 24).

Leaders of ICON remained on the front platform of COCAD and helped to orchestrate large marches following each meeting. People were encouraged to come forward, either at the meetings or to those leading the marches, with the names of alleged dealers who, in turn, would be investigated by a smaller committee of community members. Those named were given an opportunity to appear before the community and defend themselves against the allegations. If a person was deemed to be selling drugs and refused to come forward, a march would occur on that person's home. It was not uncommon for three or four homes to be marched on in one evening. Often, alleged dealers were given twenty-four to forty-eight hours to leave their home, though consequences were seldom stated.

ICON had adopted the slogan "Addicts we care: Pushers beware" (NICCAD 1999 a&b). But what if an addict sold heroin? Coveney *et al.* (1999) in their extensive research of drug users in the north inner-city, found that a large proportion of those they interviewed had, at one time or another, sold heroin and other drugs in order to maintain their habit. Was a "pusher" just the profit making individual or was it also the addict who sold drugs to support his or her addiction? This was the first question ICON had to face now that the community was taking action.

Although the leaders of ICON never formally made a distinction between addict and non-addict dealers, it was felt that these long standing community activists did try and focus the communities' attention on the larger scale dealers alleged to be in operation (14/2/01; 3/8/01). The numbers of those behind the scene were fewer than those known for actually selling heroin and it wasn't long before the street dealers were

targeted and their names given forward to the local anti-drugs committee.

Some dealers chose to appear before the community, more often than not claiming their addiction and lack of Methadone maintenance to be the reason for their involvement in selling heroin. Promises of addicts to halt selling and to be proactive in seeking help for addiction were usually looked upon favourably by those attending the general meetings. Many were given an opportunity to prove themselves without facing the consequence of marches on their homes. The promises of addicts to stop selling, however, were not always kept and a dilemma was posed for the community when marches were directed on the homes of addicts. People in the community held differing beliefs as to whether addicts themselves should be targeted for marches. The lack of clarity around these tactics signified early divisions within the movement.

For one respondent, personal experience helped clarify the matter:

> *It got a bit petty I thought then, the street campaign, where we were marching on houses of addict dealers. I mean that's not what we were about. That's not what we wanted...I mean, my kids were using drugs. They could have been selling drugs. I didn't know what they were doing so it could have been my house. People held back then and said, "No, this is not what we want. We want to march on drug barons but we certainly don't want to march on parents' home who were already devastated. It's bad enough to know your children are on drugs without having thousands of people marching on your door* (14/5/01a).

A respondent explained a common belief among those opposed to the marching:

> *They knew who was taking heroin before they marched. They knew who was doing what and who wasn't doing anything. It got to the stage that they knocked it so much underground that they didn't know who was doing what. So people that were innocent were getting blamed on taking it. People stopped selling, ordinary addicts that were selling for habits, they were the people that had to get out and sell for their habits. You won't see a drug baron on the corner selling heroin. You'll see somebody strung out feeding their habit. Yet these are the same people that are targeted morning, noon, and night by committees and the police and the rest of them* (5/2/02).

For another respondent, the distinction remained blurred:

> *If your kids are turned on to heroin you don't give a fuck whether the guy who turned them on was doing it for the money or whether he was doing it to feed his own habit* (27/2/01).

Respondents also emphasised the difficulty that marching posed for families and the impact it had on a tight knit community:

> *Obviously people were also aware that there were some heavy hitters, by and large dealers who were strongly associated with this area born and bred in this area. Yet some of them had come through the youth projects, some who would have been very active even at that point. They had people who died, brothers and sisters* (14/2/01).

> *I felt there was a lot of time when heads were kept down because, someone who may have been your closest friend, maybe the best man at your wedding, your cousin, might have been the new heroin dealer in the flats complex. There weren't lots of strangers who came in and were drug dealers. These were people whose forefathers would have mixed with your forefathers, whose fathers, mothers, and grannies would have probably walked the same streets with your father and mother. There is a historical relationship there* (28/11/01).

For some in the community, the manifestation of the drug problem could be seen most clearly in the general environment. In a purposely ironic homage, the Tenant Committee of Hardwicke Street issued a leaflet to residents advertising the sale of a local "flat":

> For sale: Two bed top floor flat, op. main inner-city nightclub. On call drug pushers.
> Suit: Any knacker who does not give a F**K. (sic)
> Features include: Wall to wall graffiti, urine and vomit on stairwells, roaming gangs of pushers...
> Must be seen to be believed. Price negotiable.

The "flat" is then contrasted with one which is not for sale:

> Inner city Apartment in Cul de Sac, op. two main hospitals and all central schools and colleges, shopping and transportation.

> Features include: Double glazing, central heating, security gates to clean and freshly painted stairwells, designated green areas. New all weather football pitch, new community centre with a wide range of facilities. New roof with no access for vandals. Large open park area. Cobble lock paving and private garden spaces on ground floor.
> Facilities will include: Resource centre and a project that allows most kids from the area to go to a college or get an apprenticeship.

The community was highly aware also of Buckingham Street, notorious for the "deals on wheels", young men on bicycles, selling quarter grammes of heroin, who would wander the area even in daylight hours in order to be noticed by potential clients.[100] A community leader offered a wry example of the all-out approach by the dealers. Explaining that the 1993 official launch of ICON had just occurred, with President Mary Robinson opening the ceremony in a local arts building, he stated:

> *When she came down, the cops cleared all the users off the street.* (Laughs) *Tony Gregory was there and I was walking with him up to the Mansion House and of course he had, for over a decade, been an anti-drug activist so to speak. We were walking and the cops had gone and we were walking up and he was offered heroin or hash. He was offered it because the person selling didn't give a fuck who they offered it to* (30/1/03).

As its reputation grew, Buckingham Street attracted drug users even from the south inner-city, adding to the community's feeling of hopelessness. Recognising however that behind the "deals on wheels" were other less conspicuous local participators in the drug trade, the community again turned its attention to those who they perceived to reveal not only the rewards of the drug trade but an indifference to the harm caused to the community:

> *There would have been a lot of major drug dealers in the area. It was very frustrating for parents to look at them and then to look at these animals driving around in big cars and laughing at your children who you would have nurtured and raised properly. And these things were dragged up and that was very frustrating, I think, for parents. They were bragging and shoving their wealth into your face, if you like* (14/5/01a).

[100] This was prior to the introduction of the mobile phone which changed the dynamics of drug selling dramatically.

There's different ways of looking at it. I mean, they are still enjoying their life on the back of all the kids that we lost in this area. I mean, there's nearly a hundred and thirty children who have died in this area that we know of. There is more. But we would have the names of over a hundred and thirty kids who died in this area (14/5/01b).[101]

Those who lived in the community who displayed wealth not conducive with their trade, or indeed unemployment, experienced the first marches on homes. Individuals who had moved out of the inner-city into more affluent areas were also targeted. In one instance, a community worker described how his friend lived next door to a known dealer in the affluent Temple Bar area. A large group of people marched on the building and met the man's partner, who apparently had no idea about her partner's "work." Other residents, horrified at the intimidation, were mystified as to why such a charming man was the focus of an angry mob (14/2/01).

Like the earlier observers of CPAD, some respondents who witnessed the actions of local anti-drugs groups in the north inner-city in the 1990's felt that a power structure had formed within the main anti-drugs body which openly condoned violence. In an almost parallel event of the 1980's, COCAD (which now had become an umbrella for all smaller local anti-drugs groups around the city, including those in the north inner-city) experienced an incident which gained a far higher media profile than the incident involving CPAD allegedly breaking into a family home to punish a drug dealer.

The much publicised 1996 death of Josie Dwyer, an HIV positive drug addict suspected of dealing drugs, and the subsequent legal convictions of two COCAD members in his death (McDermott 2000), highlighted the growing tense co-existence between drug addicts and anti-drug activists in communities. Josie and his friend Alan Byrne had been attacked in the south inner-city when set upon by a group of men allegedly returning from an anti-drugs meeting in the Dolphin Barn area. Both Dwyer and Byrne were physically assaulted, Dwyer later dying of his injuries. Twelve men were charged and four were ultimately convicted. Most interestingly, three of the twelve men went to trial in the Special Criminal Court, a non-jury court traditionally reserved for those

[101] In 2000, a memorial to those who had died as a result of drug misuse or related illnesses was erected at the junction of Buckingham Street and Sean McDermott Street. It is called "Home."

involved in paramilitary activities.[102]

Following the death of Dwyer, participation in local anti-drugs groups dwindled gradually although marches on the homes of alleged drug dealers would continue sporadically until 2000. Some respondents felt the trial of Dwyer, three years later, sounded the death knell of the anti-drug movement when distressing details emerged from the trial, surfacing for the general public the darker side of anti-drug activism (20/6/01; 24/7/01; 5/2/02).

Soon after Dwyer's death in 1996, ICON proposed the Citywide Drugs Crisis Campaign,[103] a Dublin based approach committed to lobbying on the general drug issues surfacing beyond the north inner-city. Initially operating on a voluntary basis, the campaign eventually secured funding in 1997 under the Community Development Programme.

It was felt that the murder of the journalist Veronica Guerin and the resulting implications for the Department of Justice opened up the monies and made the funding of such a drug-related project more palatable for the State authorities.[104] Citywide, committed to democratic means (Citywide 1996), intended to come from a 'peaceful community development perspective' (3/8/01). It would eventually come to displace COCAD as a more policy based, and less grassroots response by the community to the on-going drug situation. Citywide, in turn, has become highly proactive in ascertaining and disseminating information in communities affected by drug use. It has worked to harness community knowledge by holding frequent workshops where topical issues - for example the Government's 2001 to 2008 Drug Strategy or upcoming elections - can be debated with politicians and other stake holders.[105]

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[102] This case will be examined more closely in the next chapter.

[103] Citywide is backed both by Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union and the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (Hedges 1997: 9).

[104] This is mentioned by the four community leaders.

[105] See for example, Citywide Drugs Crisis Campaign (2001): 'Communities, Families, and Drug Users - Our Role in the Implementation of the New Drugs Strategy 2001 - 2008', Briefing Document on Conference held in Dublin Castle, December 11th. Also Citywide (2004b) 'The Drugs Crisis in Local Communities - How the Political Parties Respond' (Leaflet).

COCAD strikingly maintained a far more conservative view towards the drug problem than its predecessor CPAD. COCAD leaders had also called for a drugs tsar - such as seen in the U.S. and Britain during that time - who would oversee and direct anti-drug operations in Ireland; both the UK and US tsars were viewed as traditionally anti-liberal, primarily evoking punitive measures to combat the drug problem (Campbell 1999; Johnston 2000).

Unlike CPAD, COCAD did not promote needle exchanges and it resisted any attempt to normalise drug use such as 'consumption rooms,' government sanctioned rooms where drug users could avail of clean injecting paraphernalia and inject under the watchful eyes of medical personnel (see Brass Munkie 2000: 41). COCAD criticised the government's belief that Methadone is a socially and medically stabilising substitution for heroin (a belief held by, and more importantly fought for, by CPAD). Commenting on the introduction of a pilot project for a specialised Drugs Court, COCAD wryly declared, 'It remains to be seen how the courts will be resourced and what treatment philosophy will be embraced - drug free or free drugs,' (COCAD 1999c).

COCAD's general sentiments were not far removed from those of Charles Murray who draws attention to the relationship between personal responsibility and poverty.[106] In its major policy report, COCAD underscored the point that if individuals continued to be involved in drug-use behaviour, they would make *themselves* homeless (COCAD 2000). Peer workers, drug users who work on behalf of other drug users, are described as 'users who never end up on their ass' (COCAD 1999b). In a statement reminiscent of Oscar Lewis on the culture of poverty, COCAD state:

> The importance of developing in affected communities a culture of opposition to the culture of drug abuse should be recognised. Anti-drug meetings, marches, rallies, and newsletters are all important in this regard. Local community and anti-drugs groups are encouraged to maintain as

[106] This is by no means confined to those with a conservative agenda. Rose (1996) argues that there is a 'new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals' which has more to do with personal choices made by 'autonomous actors in the context of their particular commitments to families and communities' and which have more influence on society than that of the government itself (1996: 326).

> much high profile activity in this regard as possible. We firmly believe that the twelve year old that participates in an anti-drugs march today is less likely to experiment with drugs tomorrow than the one who has never seen an anti-drugs march in their community (COCAD 2000: 22).

Noticeable too is the flexibility of rhetoric which COCAD, rather than CPAD, employed. Leaflets distributed door to door in communities informally addressed the readers and contained much colloquial language, especially when in reference to dealers in the area.

> "Another piece of shit is *(name)* who was seen in Sheriff Street and East Wall."[107]

> "Another piece of filth still selling and wholesaling in the inner city is *(name).*[108]

> "The misery that you scum have inflicted on our communities will take years to undo."[109]

This contrasts greatly with publications of *The Drugs Agenda,* COCAD's newsletter which received funding from the Combat Poverty Agency.[110] In these newsletters far more sophisticated language is used in conjunction with a sociological slant. The simplicity of the COCAD leaflets is substituted for dense coverage of recent statutory research and political events.[111] Each newsletter contains thoughtful analysis on both. Unlike the leaflets, *The Drugs Agenda* was not delivered door to door; instead, people were invited to subscribe at no cost. COCAD then seemed to have identified two

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[107] NICCAD (1999b).
[108] NICCAD (1999b).
[109] NICCAD (1999a).
[110] Eighteen months after forming, COCAD received £15,000 from Combat Poverty in 1999 (Combat Poverty 1999: 54). As well as publishing several issues of *The Drugs Agenda*, COCAD used this money to employ a part-time worker from September 1998 until October 1999 to facilitate its capacity building activities, to organise a seminar on Estate Management, and to draft a number of submissions to the government and other statutory agencies. COCAD stated that they had, over the grant period, learned that: 1). Developing policy involved reading, studying, and communicating information as to interest other groups. 2). Agreeing a unified policy required a lot of discussion and reiteration. 3). Policy issues associated with drug treatment were more complex than others and took longer to consider. 4). There was a need to increase awareness, through education, among affiliated groups (Combat Poverty 2001: 26).
[111] For example, Issue One headlines, and presents with detail, the research and ethos behind the proposed introduction of the new drug courts which allow addicts convicted of a low-level drug-related crime to attend rehabilitation courses rather than be sentenced (COCAD 1999a). Issue Two presents the findings of recent research on the children of drug users published by Trinity College's Children's Research Unit (COCAD 1999b)

different audiences: residents in communities affected by a drug problem and professionals. In producing the newsletter, COCAD may have gained legitimacy from those otherwise unaware of its more grassroots orientations.

5.5 The anti-drug movement as a social movement

A positive correlation exists between historical neighbourhood activism and anti-drug activism in communities (Donnelly and Majka 1998), a factor born out in this research. Early signs of the formation of a social movement in the north inner-city were shown when collective action manifested during the housing crisis which affected many in the community. This action had secured informal networks and individuals skilled in protest, signifying the pre-conditions for anti-drug mobilisation a decade later. These networks would later prove vital to the functioning of the anti-drug movement not only within local areas where people already knew each other well but also across the city and beyond to other counties like Wicklow and Kerry (COCAD 2000).

Like the activism which centred on the housing crisis, the activism which focused on the heroin problem developed clear objectives and tactics. Both organisations aimed for major social change.[112] They saw these tactics as necessary to oust alleged drug dealers but as ultimately beneficial to the community overall (CPAD (b); NICCAD 1999a; NICCAD 1999b; COCAD 2000). However, dispute erupted over whether drug users who sell drugs to support their habits should also be the target of these tactics. This dilemma proved costly to the membership of the movement. It emphasises that not only should tactics be agreed on prior to engagement as Rhomberg (2004) has stated, but also the definition of opponents - who they are and why they are opponents - should first be clarified and, more importantly, agreed upon.

Both CPAD and COCAD defined the consumption and distribution of drugs in local communities as a social problem and a crisis issue which was affecting all of the community and destroying the social fabric; this was unmistakably a shared belief among

[112] Other manifestations of social change promoted by these organisations will be discussed in further chapters.

the whole community and not just its leaders. The intimacy of the area, or in Diani's (1992) words, the 'belongingess' felt by people, guaranteed the drug situation would be communally experienced and most likely responded to. They had, after all, demonstrated their willingness and capacity for mobilization during the housing crisis.

In saying this, it is also true that for many, the drugs crisis became a highly personal and emotive issue as individuals witnessed the chaotic effects of drug use on their own families. Although this shared belief existed among residents, mobilisation for some individuals was intrinsically motivated. Freeman (1984) has articulated the significance of the 'personal problem' translating into communal action and the resulting depth of the individuals's commitment to the cause as a result.

CPAD and COCAD also demonstrated social movement tendencies when they secured an undisputed and common citywide goal of ridding communtities of drug dealing. In defining the problem, both CPAD and COCAD note the physical and economic conditions of disadvantaged areas and the macro forces which allow illegal drug use to flourish and disrupt the social system of a particular community. Both organisations shared the belief that their existence was due to the destructive impact of illegal drugs on their communities. This would include the fear generated by loitering groups of addicts, discarded syringes in public places, increasing local crime, and the devastating results of having an addict in the family (CPAD (a);[113] Martin 1984; North Inner-City Communities Against Drugs 1999a[114]). Consequently, CPAD and COCAD became primarily concerned with the supply of drugs and the methods to curtail distribution in local communities. Secondary concerns of the organisations would be the provision of drug prevention programmes and treatment facilities. However, these objectives took quickly to the sideline when the street activism showed such promising results.

The political response of both CPAD and COCAD to the drugs situation mirrored their grievances and increasing frustration at the lack of political attention to the drugs problem

[113] Earlier CPAD newsletters were not dated. For referencing purposes, the alphabet will be used.
[114] Also known as NICCAD.

which directly affected their communities (CPAD (a),(b), and (c); NICCAD 1999a; NICCAD 1999b; COCAD 2000). This sense of being disenfranchised was heightened in the 1980's by high unemployment and later on by the so-called Celtic Tiger which gave the general public a sense of economic optimism while neglecting to highlight the growing drug problem that was devastating disadvantaged communities. In the words of one COCAD activist, 'we were left largely on our own' (Johnson 1999: 2). In the eyes of activists, the 'Mountainview Riot' seemed to justify their feelings towards police apathy inadvertently becoming a milestone for the anti-drug movement. Despite the misinterpretation of the event, the emotion-laden incident none-the-less signaled the intention and willingness of the police to engage in conflict with the community itself during the community's own protest. This type of police/citizen dynamic often presents in the arena of social movements inadvertently creating further citizen solidarity and bolstering anti-police attitudes (Turner and Killian 1987).

Participants perceived that the drugs problem was only taken seriously when these organisations flagged the government by mobilising and highlighting specific issues and when they themselves started dealing with the problems that the 'experts were employed to cope with' (Malone 1984: 81). The intimacy of these communities not just geographically but also socially, warrants Ross *et al.*'s (2001) belief that:

> Life in such neighborhoods becomes a part of one's personal history, exacerbating feelings of powerlessness, thereby intensifying perceptions of threat (569).

This perceived threat coupled with feelings of isolation placed what Rose (1996) terms 'a new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families, and their communities, for their own future and well-being and upon their own obligation to take active steps to secure this' (327-328).

Up to this point, this researcher has traced the beginnings of the anti-drug movement in the 1980's from the advent of CPAD through to its successor COCAD which came to prominence in the mid-1990's. This researcher has also given a descriptive account of the structure and internal workings of both groups as well as tactics used by these

groups in order to create and maintain drug free communities. This chapter has also provided an overview of the anti-drug movement and the social theories this author believes may help in its analysis. It can be confidently said then at this point that both CPAD and COCAD operated as a social movement given this thesis' definition of a social movement as 'a collective attempt to further a common interest or secure a common goal outside the sphere of established institutions.'

What has yet to be determined is CPAD's and COCAD's standing as a vigilante movement and whether vigilante movements exist as a particular reaction to a social problem within, or separate from, a social movement framework. As we have seen, the vigilante tag was hung over both organisations throughout their duration by participants, social commentators, and the media. Yet this aspect was never investigated. Accordingly, the following chapter will now examine the anti-drug movement in light of vigilante theory firstly by determining the anti-drug movement as a social control agent.

CHAPTER 6

The anti-drug movement as a social control agent and vigilante movement

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will investigate the anti-drug movement firstly in terms of social control theory and will determine whether the anti-drug movement acted as a social control agent in Dublin's north inner-city. This analysis will rely on Berger's (1963) characteristics of social control. Following this analysis, the movement will be viewed in light of vigilante theory. Johnston's (1996) characteristics, or elements, of vigilantism will assist this analysis.

The chapter will conclude with an overview and examination of a critical incident that occurred during the second phase of the anti-drug movement. The death of Josie Dwyer in 1996 and the subsequent trial of anti-drug activists in 1999 has proved to be a further milestone in the history of the anti-drug movement.

6.2 The anti-drug movement as a social control agent

Social control is as much about encouraging behaviour seen as acceptable as well as suppressing behaviour seen as deviant. It can be state or non-state sponsored (Colson 1975; Coser 1982; Hudson 1997). Control can be exercised by one or more individuals to manipulate the behaviour of one or more other individuals when requests are ignored or commands disobeyed (Gibbs 1982).

Many respondents felt that the anti-drug movement had identified certain anti-social behaviours in the community at large, and expected a certain kind of uniformity as a result. More than that, it was believed that the movement was willing to impose this uniformity in many ways, and at any cost. The movement facilitated female participation in the marches and on housing committees, but it remained clearly led by men who ascertained information, conducted surveillance, and orchestrated the marches and patrols. A community worker believed that the social control exercised was intrinsically linked to the perceived role the men had in their own community:

They were particularly sort of that group of men, older, more middle aged

men, most of whom would have had criminal backgrounds, who earlier in their lives would have been seen as hard men or would have had that status of some sort in the community. Not all of them, but some of those would have. I think there was something about this movement and the power it gave people over people. It was like a return to that sense of being important within the community. I think it's linked in with all that stuff about... I mean a huge thing about the role of men in an area like this is that in a relatively short space of time they went from being the breadwinners and the key people and the ones who were the heads of the family and people looked up to them and respected them. And even in terms of crime, you know there was a sense of somebody being important because they were involved in that. A lot of that was lost very quickly for that generation of men. You know, the sense that men were the breadwinners and being at the centre of stuff, that kind of changed very, very, quickly due to the economic collapse in the area (22/5/01).

As noted earlier, Berger (1963) has defined characteristics of social control which may prove beneficial in determining the anti-drug movement's status as a social control agent. These include *persuasion*, *ostracism*, *ridicule*, *gossip*, and *fraud*. The next section will present the anti-drug movement in light of these characteristics.

Persuasion

The anti-drug movement relied on persuasion in the hope of propelling its aims. This could be seen most clearly in the literature which was distributed to homes calling for community participation in the marches. The literature proclaimed an apocalyptic vision of the community's future which lay ahead if everyone did not engage in anti-drug activism. INTACT, the splinter group of North Inner-City Communities Against Drugs (NICCAD), issued leaflets door to door which basically equated non-participation in marches with a lack of concern for both children and the community as a whole. An INTACT leaflet distributed in late 1998 states, 'If you care about your children, you will turn up at this meeting' amongst other anti-drugs rhetoric that had been previously seen in leaflets.[115] This strategy may have backfired in this particular instance; this researcher turned up at

[115] From leaflet entitled 'Important Community Meeting ' (no date).

the meeting held in Rutland Street School annex on November 22nd, 1998 and only three older women turned up. The three leaders of INTACT then decided to cancel the gathering. A later leaflet would more pointedly ask the community to own responsibility and assume blame for the deaths and destruction in the community.[116]

Similar rhetoric was seen in *The Hardwicke News,* a community newsletter published by the Hardwicke Street Tenants' Development Board. Local activists seemingly addressing community skepticism about their role challenged the community:

> A lot of people in places like Hardwicke Street don't care. They don't care about living in a drug infested kip, and they don't care about their children growing up in a drug infested kip. To care would interfere with their television or drinking time. They foolishly think there is someone else to care, and that is part of what is going wrong in places like Hardwicke Street (Hardwicke Street Tenants' Development Board 1999a).[117]

Respondents who participated in the marches and other anti-drug activism were no doubt intrinsically motivated; they had witnessed, first hand, the devastation caused by drugs. Some had even experienced intimidation from drug dealers and their families whose lifestyles were under threat by the actions of the activists.

> *We took to the streets and did numerous things. Well, I mean we had nothing to lose. Now, at the early stages there was a group of us; there was death threats put on us because we took on all the drug barons. We had a lot of support at the time, you know?* (30/8/01).

Sedgwick (1982) suggests that the pressure to contribute to the good of society is often more difficult for people in intimate communities since there is more of a communal watchful eye kept on individuals and their reactions to social events. Similarly, these events - especially if they are deemed to be detrimental to a particular social group - are often factors which bind these groups and help them to mobilize (Piven and Cloward 1977).

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[116] From leaflet entitled 'RIP' (no date).

[117] In their next newsletter, the Tenant Development Board states that - for the first time - the issue of the drug problem will not be mentioned as 'the people of Hardwicke Street have made it apparently clear that they have little or interest in the drug crisis' (The Hardwicke Street Tenants Development Board 1999b: 1).

This research supports this assertion. Respondents made it clear that the intimacy of the community allowed for an individual's participation or non-participation in the movement to be clearly noted by community leaders and those orchestrating the marches. Most felt they had, at any given time, good knowledge of those in their area who did and did not participate in anti-drug activity. Many times the front and back balconies of flat complexes allowed for communal viewing of who was and who wasn't marching (as well as who was being marched on).

Some respondents felt that other signs of anti-drug activism - people standing guard at flat complex entrances, those patrolling with walkie talkies, anti-drug graffiti, and signs outside flat complexes - all acted as reminders to members of the community that they were actively being watched by other members whether purposely or inadvertently. These respondents felt that any sort of negative or anti-social behaviour - such as drunkenness or fighting - would also be noted by activists who could use these behaviours against them using the 1997 Housing Act as leverage.[118]

Respondents also frequently named those 'at the front of the marches,' indicating that these individuals were the movers and shakers of the anti-drug movement in the north inner-city. Those who chose not to participate often had to weigh up the guilt of their non-participation in the movement against the guilt of engaging in actions which they would have deemed unfair, such as evictions and 'squealing'. Some felt their non-participation was seen by others in the community - especially the leaders of the marches - as an endorsement of drug selling and using, and an abandonment of the community's ideals.

Also, some interviewees reported the behind-the-scene activities that occurred in which those who had publicly marched apologised in private to those who had been marched on. This outer conformity did, as Berger (1963) suggests a forced action can, create an anathema relationship between some community residents and anti-drug activists since actions were only done begrudgingly to appease the leading activists and perhaps

[118] The Housing Act allowed for tenant participation in vetting procedures. The act, and the implications it had for the community, will be discussed in a further chapter. Brehm and Niou (1997) found similar operations in China and Russia.

neighbours who were also involved. The interviews also suggested that the vigilance patrols were not always voluntary as Johnston (1999) claims. [119]

Ostracism

This device was used by members of the anti-drug movement quite effectively. Those who were marched on reported feeling socially isolated and hurt after the event. One respondent was ostracised in the street where she, her parents, and both maternal and paternal grandparents, had lived for generations.

> *The people that lived around me started passing me by, saying things to the kids and the kids would come up and tell me so I would go out and say things back to them* (12/4/01).

Another respondent had to leave her flat due to flooding and relocate to another complex. She was informed by Dublin Corporation's housing section that they had received twenty-four separate calls from those living in the complex where she was due to be relocated requesting the Corporation to rehouse her elsewhere. Although the Corporation were willing to give her a probationary period in the new flat, she chose not to avail of the offer. Instead she remained in her flat in unsanitary conditions until one became available in another area (14/5/01).[120]

The impact of the respondent's internalization of such measures taken by their local community has been great. It is also understandable. Although community factions would have always existed, the deliberate targeting of individuals for isolation left many of these people unconnected to the social structure which had provided them with a measure of protection and a sense of belonging. The removal of these, Foster (1990)

[119] Similarly, on a work-related home visit in the late autumn of 1996, this researcher was told by a woman that her drug-using husband had felt compelled to participate in the patrolling of Mountainview Court flats because he was afraid 'the door would be kicked in' otherwise. To compensate for his inner turmoil, and to defy the true activists, he secretly drank alcohol, smoked marijuana, and even had heroin fixes while on 'duty.'

[120] The respondent was unsure as to how residents found out about her move to the new complex. She suggested that the information could have been forwarded by Dublin Corporation to the housing committee where it was then shared informally with people in the immediate area. She admitted her brother's drug dealing might have been the reason for individuals not wanting her in the area.

assures us, can be devastating for people living in such intimate communities.

Ridicule and Gossip

The policy of "naming and shaming" remained one of the most consistent methods employed by CPAD to oust dealers from communities. Known drug users were asked to name their suppliers to CPAD. Names were then circulated in the community either in leaflet form or in CPAD newsletters. Pressure was also brought to bear when CPAD began marching on the homes of suspected dealers. Forced evictions often occurred as a result of these ad hoc judicial gatherings; dealers often left their homes of their own accord (unable to tolerate the accentuated attention and continual "slagging") or as a result of a Dublin Corporation eviction, sometimes with just forty-eight hours notice. In some cases, the community would publicly remove the furniture and belongings of alleged dealers who would then return home to find their flats boarded up. Whether family members of an alleged dealer were allowed to stay on in the house remained a matter for CPAD leaders to decide.

The "name and shame" policy of CPAD was again rekindled in the mid 1990's with leaflets distributed to homes identifying alleged dealers. Local newsletters such as *The Hardwicke News* offered personal and often derisive information on these individuals. In actions reminiscent of the Wild West, "Wanted for Murder" posters with photographs of alleged dealers were posted on flat complexes, street lamps, and construction boarding (see Appendix 4).

As stated earlier, Johnston (1999) believes that the naming and shaming tactic used by COCAD was seen by activists to be the most effective means of disturbing the work of drug dealers and motivating individuals to come forward and repent at the community meetings. For the most part, respondents were more cynical, believing that alleged dealers ignored attempts to draw attention to them save for recruiting family members to tear down the "Wanted for Murder" posters.

However, in 1999 a suspected dealer, Robert Harrison, offered a public rebuttal to the accusations that he dealt drugs in the community. In a newsletter distributed on the street and to flats in the immediate area of his own home, Harrison protests his innocence and calls on the community to educate their children on the need to abandon violence and bullying in the community (insinuating that he himself was a victim of this). Considered by some in the community as a unique and brave response to the accusations, the newsletter came back to haunt Harrison. Two years later, Harrison was charged (and later convicted) in connection with a large cocaine seizure at his flat (Irish Times 2001).[121]

The continued communal action of bringing the private into the public domain allowed both CPAD and COCAD the advantage over dealers in the community since their once covert activities were now exposed. This would not have been so in the absence of social cohesion. It is precisely because the local communities within the north inner-city were tightly knit that the "naming and shaming" actions were seen by activists to work well. After all, anonymity could not exist; people knew the suspected dealers and their families well and these names were passed on in the community through the same social networks that had fostered earlier housing activism. This same social intimacy is mirrored in many Northern Ireland communities where similar actions are taken to expose individuals who are seen to be threatening the status quo (see for example, McGarry and O'Leary 1995; Thompson and Mullholland 1995; Brewer *et al.* 1998).

Fraud

The use of fraud as as social control device within the anti-drug movement seems to be confined to some actors questionably allying themselves to either ICON or Sinn Féin in order to somehow legitimise their actions or enhance their perceived power within the movement. [122]

[121] It is this researcher's knowledge that at this time, cocaine was viewed by many in the north inner-city as a party drug, unlike heroin which was demonized as the drug responsible for ruining lives. It is possible that Harrison himself differentiated between the two when writing his defense. With the current rise of crack cocaine use and intravenous cocaine use in the inner-city, there seems to be little differentiation now in the eyes of the community (see Citywide 2004a).

[122] This point is not to pronounce judgment on the actions of such individuals or to declare the actions right or wrong; it is to highlight the choices these individuals made and the consequences of these choices.

Activists seemingly facilitated associations by publicly putting themselves under the banner of ICON, perhaps due to the legitimacy that ICON offered in terms of the resourcing and partnership-like structures that it provided. Those who did this were independent and had no historical roots in ICON; they had never been active organisation representatives within the network. More importantly, these individuals were viewed as previously having had a strong but negative presence in the community. This did not seem to prove a problem in the infancy of the movement. ICON seemed happy to host the movement - and these individuals - as part of its own brief on the drugs issue; the frequent presence of community leaders at the marches and community meetings confirmed this. While the anti-drug movement association eventually became a leaded weight on ICON due to the increasing violent aspect, activists seemed initially happy to cultivate the perceived union:

> *But what I'm saying is that an awful lot of changes has been done through the work of the movement. It's hard to single out individuals so you just have to use the name ICON. You can say an awful lot of work has been done by* (name) *and* (name)*, this or that, but we always say ICON* (30/8/01).

> *But they said they were the same element that went under the banner of ICON. ICON was a splendid body to address all of the social issues in this area and they done the best they could in relation to calling for facilities and treatment centres* (1/8/01).

Similarly, a small group of individuals within the movement seemed to have falsely aligned themselves with Sinn Féin. According to an active member of the party, these men were involved in the more violent aspect of the movement and he disputed their claims.

> *There was a small element who were not, let me tell you, members of Sinn Féin, because I'll name them. But they were thugs and they were in it for their own selfish ends and they were going under the umbrella of the Republican movement... As far as people out there were concerned... They were attacking some...they were targeted some unfortunate drug addicts in this area and would stop them on the street and give them a beating and empty their pockets. I deplore that. I absolutely condemn that*

and ostracise myself from such thuggery within a movement. They would drop the hint, you know, "We're Sinn Fein." [123]

Drugs users also engaged in deception. Because of the patrols, marches, and police informing, drug users themselves were forced to adhere to norms by hiding their drug use and selling. They did in fact find other ways to cope. Soon facilitated by mobile phones, drug users who once had to adhere to traditional places and times for drug exchanges (for example in the earlier days of Hardwicke Street and Buckingham Street) were now able to work on an 'anywhere and anytime' basis. They became knowledgeable about the role of CCTV cameras in inner-city areas, taking advantage of areas not under surveillance.[124] While the drug culture remained alive and well - and just displaced as McCullagh (1996) has suggested - some in the community believed the drug problem to be subsiding and pulled away from the movement as a result (30/11/00).

Behind the more overt social control characteristics defined by Berger (1963) and employed by the anti-drug movement, lay more insidious actions which in effect had far more life-changing results than merely cloaking drug-related behaviours. Bergali and Sumner (1996) differentiate between informal social control (such as that exercised by teachers and mothers) and the more formal social control which is specifically employed in response to deviance resulting in a far greater impact on a person's self-concept, identity, and life chances. One underlying theme in many interviews was the control exercised by local housing committees who could determine whether an individual was housed in a housing or flat complex, authority bestowed by the 1997 Housing Act.

There's issues I think particularly around the re-housing of people who are in treatment; there's still quite a bit of control out there in terms of who gets houses and stuff, that they've an input into that. There's tensions around that in terms of decisions being made, "Well, if somebody was dealing

[123] Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the following chapter.

[124] One of the first new venues of drug selling after the marching in the north inner-city began was at the corner of O'Connell Street and Aston Quay, in Dublin's city centre. Drug users who were also sellers realised that deals were less likely to be noticed when done in crowds of people. Before, such transaction would have stood out on their local streets. Dealing on the junction ceased, and was displaced, when CCTV cameras were erected on either side of O'Connell Street bridge.

drugs two years ago, they're not coming back in here." How do you harness that in a way to make sure it doesn't get out of control? Because it always does. It always does. And it always ends up with people using that power for different ends. It always does go out of control. I don't know any examples; no-one has ever convinced me that you can do that without it ending up with it going out of control in some way, you know? That's difficult, you know? (22/5/01).

Another apparent belief was that the major actors in the movement could determine - with consequences - right and wrong conduct. Bauman (2000) deliberates this concept stating that 'concern with order and norm signals, as a rule, that not everything is as it should be, and that not everything that is can be left in its present state. The very ideas of order and norm are born of that sense of (rectifiable) imperfection and of the urge to do something about it' (2000: 206). Referring to those wishing to obtain housing, one respondent voiced his concern about the moral stand taken by those on such committees[125] and another, his understanding of the possible mutually beneficial relationship between potential residents and the housing committees:

They are coming against a committee of their own people, their own peers, their own culture. It's like China - the People's Court. Whatever those six people say has a bearing on this young one and young fella with their baby looking for a flat in the community. Puritans need only apply (29/1/01).

To this day, like, still it's the same procedure. If you want a flat on the northside, you still go through these people. If you know them and happen to friendly with them - if you are after doing anything to support their marches or anything like that, especially if you go to any flat complex - you'd get a flat but you'd be asked if you'd be willing to help out on the committee (20/6/01).

A common perception among some of the respondents was that both CPAD and COCAD overlooked some of the major dealers because of their own family connections and that affiliation offered some safety:

[125] This theme was taken up in *The Brass Munkie*, a magazine for current and ex-drug users. In an article entitled 'Wakey Wakey Time,' the contributor begins an attack on the anti-drug movement with a quote from David Trimble's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. In this speech, Trimble refers to 'that form of evil that wants to perfect a person' (see Arkins 2000b: 38).

But there was a fair bit of abuse of power in that they were almost given franchises to deal to certain people. There were always some people who were dealing who were never ever approached or marched on or anything like that. It was because they were connected to the Concerned Parents (5/4/01).

So a lot of people decided to jump on the band wagon, you know, more or less joined the Concerned Parents and then they were safe. Mothers had approached them and said, right, their sons had been using but they supported Concerned Parents and could Concerned Parents actually get help for them. They approached Jervis Street[126] *and some place in France and actually got a few people onto detoxes* (20/6/01).

There was a lot of people who marched on me who had family members on drugs. So they kept with all these top vigos, they kept with them, right? So that their families wouldn't get marched on. There was people that marched on me, right, that I used to buy drugs off their brothers and sisters and they were still doing it, still up to today they're doing it and like there's nothing happening to them because the families are sticking with the marchers. There's nothing happening, you know what I mean? They are getting backed up all the way. If I had been on the marches with them, and saying, "Ah, yeah we'll march on this or we'll march on that" or "She's doing drugs or he's doing drugs" there would be nothing said to me for being on drugs. If I was selling they wouldn't have said anything to me (12/4/01).

As this research has proved, the anti-drug movement did exercise social control not only in order to rid the area of the drug problem but also to coerce members of the community to participate in the activities of the movement. The small geographical area along with the long established intimacy of the area ensured that these mechanisms were far more effective than if they had been employed over a larger area with people disengaged from their neighbours. For example, the movement seemed quite successful in convincing residents of the area to band together to fight the heroin scourge for the common good of the area. This collective - and sometimes forced - reaction to the drug problem was a particularly useful social control device since it inadvertently identified non-participants of the movement in a rather glaring manner. Similarly, the devices of ostracism, ridicule, and gossip as employed by the movement simply would

[126] A pre-fab located in Jervis Street in 1979 was the first drug clinic in Dublin.

not have been as productive in an area where there was a weak social network or where there were little familial bonds.

Berger (1963) states that 'different classes in our society not only live differently quantitatively, they live in different styles qualitatively' (96) and that in any class milieu external controls can be enforced. He believes very little can alter the fact that different social mileus prioritise different pressures to exert on their participants. According to Cohen and Scull (1983) though, the participation by members of working class communities in this type of collective action, though not wholly uncommon, may be seen as somewhat unique since overwhelmingly, many social control mechanisms - especially policing - have always been at the hands of the state.

Mayer (1983) accepts that the concept of social control has become the dominant paradigm for describing not only simple reform movements but also inter-class relationships. The anti-drug movement clearly saw the culture of drugs as an unwelcome component of the north inner-city and as a result exercised various forms of social control during both its phases. Respondents indicated that these actions proved to be a significant shift away from the norm, disturbing the sense of security members of the community once shared with each other. In effect, the "them versus us" mentality mentioned by Berger (1963) and indeed social movement theorists such as Morrison (1978) and Gamson (1988), had now become "us versus us", an aspect Field (1989) might view as an uncommon characteristic of the working class (and no doubt underclass). Yet it is one which several respondents believed - with sadness and unease - had been newly adopted within the community.

In view of this research, it is worth reminding ourselves of the early deductions made regarding the anti-drug movement. 'Social control' Bennett (1988: 37) stated, 'is sociologically, what Concerned Parents do.' That is true. However, as regards to this research calling them vigilantes 'with the intention of labeling them uncontrolled, dangerous, and arbitrary,' (Bennett 1988), that is clearly untrue. To present the anti-drug movement solely in terms of this would be unfair because of the complexities which

have surfaced in the structural, social/historical, and class contexts of the movement.

6.3 The anti-drug movement as a vigilante movement

As discussed earlier, the anti-drug movement throughout the 1980's and 1990's was labeled a 'vigilante' group both by social commentators and the media due to the nature of its activities. Patrolling communities, marching on the homes of alleged drug dealers (ousting them where possible), ad-hoc 'judicial' meetings, and "naming and shaming" remained consistently used methods of the movement which were frequently accounted for in leaflets and magazines produced by both CPAD and COCAD. Details of violent encounters such as that involving Josie Dwyer, however, remain confined to the media. Many respondents used the term 'vigilante', 'viggie', and 'vigo' to describe themselves or those participating in the movement.

> *I would have been regarded as a vigilante, you know? But I mean, if your kids are dying from drugs...if this is what it takes to be called a vigilante...They used to write slogans and all. It was part and parcel of taking on these people* (30/8/01).

> *Within the players responding you had local people who themselves may have been involved in criminal activity who would have been in favour of a vigilante approach ie: pushers...drive up in a car, in a balaclava, and beat them up. But within the north inner-city, even though at different times some of what you might call the "vigilante" support or people who were in favour of that* (30/1/03).

The police, through the media, would have a go at the local community. The word "vigilante" was used a lot. No doubt there were vigilantes at the time (28/11/01).

Respondents also employed terms and phrases traditionally associated with vigilantism:

> *Like a recognition (of drug addiction) needs to be fostered and supported rather than sentencing of people or kangaroo courts and stuff like that* (14/2/01).

There was a friend of mine and he was brought down to a - this is the name - the kangaroo court, he was brought there and this chap was badly strung out (12/4/01).

There was a bit of a lynch mob mentality about it, "We'll give you a fair trial before we hang you" kind of thing. It was like the Wild West (30/11/00).

Action needed to be taken. I mean, by the police and the police department and everything that goes with it. Not by people taking the law into their own hands as in a vigilante movement (20/6/01).

Vigilantism is also noted in two of Citywide's reports. 'The vigilantes' were mentioned as one aspect requiring exploration in a workshop (Citywide 1999). In The *Drugs Crisis in Local Communities*, feedback from those attending the conference noted 'there is a fear of an emergence of vigilantism' (Citywide 2003).

It has been stated that vigilante groups form when members believe their concerns are ignored by particular governments and their agencies (Marx and Archer 1971, 1976; Etzioni 1996; Abrahams 1998). This is evidently true of those living in the north inner-city. According to respondents, the government and its law enforcement apparatus had long been neglectful of their area, failing to act on its behalf when called upon to do so.[127] Residents had become resigned to the government's inaction on poverty, unemployment, housing and unsafe infrastructure. So it came as no surprise then when the government appeared to do - or understand - very little when the first and second waves of heroin dealing hit the inner-city:

We did get statutory bodies to accept they weren't doing a sufficient job and that they were negligent. To them, it was a 9 to 5 job. They would be available on the phone but they didn't realise it was a 24 hour problem. Basically, all the deaths you see now, and the problem, is constant negligence on behalf of successive governments over a period of 30 year. There was no state recognition that there was a problem. You could look at that probably from two points of view, that they even knew there

[127] These beliefs are later echoed in Connolly's (2003) study on the quality of life in Dublin's northeast inner-city. In a brief look at participation in the anti-drug movement, the study indicates that 68% (n=26) of respondents stated they had participated in the anti-drug movement. Reasons given reflect those stated in this research: anger and frustration with government inaction.

was a problem and they were prepared to do nothing about it, or that there was a problem and they didn't know how to tackle it. They never anticipated or they didn't foresee the level it could reach and the damage it could do (30/11/00).

Another activist spoke about the powerlessness felt when requesting a stronger police presence in Buckingham Street:

No police were ever there. You could ring them from one end of the day to another. The business community, the Dublin Business Men's Association, I think that's the right name for them, when they'd make a call that there would be someone selling fireworks or anything like that, you'd have a stream of police down there to stop it. So that disparity between the community having to call on police resources and probably a more powerful lobby like the Business Men's Association would call, the issues weren't prioritised. It was the more powerful group that made the phone call who got a response (28/11/01).

Activists re-iterated feelings of separation from mainstream society. For example, COCAD, in the preface to their 2000 policy document, note a differentiation in wealth which it believes to be somewhat responsible for escalating social problems:

> We would note, as others have, that Irish society has changed rapidly over recent decades. While overall living standards have increased, this has been accompanied by a growing gap between the "haves" and the "have nots," a marked increase in materialism and individualism, and a shift away from traditional value systems (COCAD 2000: 2).

Similarly, a group calling itself "Working Class Action" issued a pre-election press release in 2002 challenging political neglect:

> WCA point out that the absolute failure of previous governments to genuinely seek to redress the imbalance in Irish society. Through corruption and cronyism they have succeeded in widening the gap between the have and have nots...We have been constantly told that Ireland is basking in the success of the Celtic Tiger. For ordinary people, the reality has been vastly different. Working class communities in Dublin continue to face massive social and economic neglect due to the lack of

> any productive investment by successive governments (Working Class Action 2002a).

These statements help to emphasise Johnston's (1996) point that vigilantism is often a result of 'changed expectations' (232). That is to say, in the same way citizens might expect government provision of security (seeing it as a 'right'), so too can citizens expect equal bounty when social transformations occur. The statement also invokes the type of economic division, or 'invisible' frontier, that Donnelly (1977) and Lydon (1998) believe gave rise to historical acts of vigilantism in Ireland.

As already stated, Johnston (1996) presents six elements of vigilantism claiming: '(i) it involves planning and pre-meditation by those engaging in it; (ii) its participants are private citizens whose engagement is voluntary; (iii) it is a form of 'autonomous citizenship' and as such, constitutes a social movement; (iv) it uses or threatens the use of force; (v) it arises when an established order is under threat from the transgression, the potential transgression, or the imputed transgression of institutionalized norms; (vi) it aims to control crime or other social infractions by offering assurances (or 'guarantees') of security both to participants and to others' (220). For the purpose of this research, the anti-drug movement will now be investigated in light of these elements.

Planning and organisation

An element of planning and organisation existed within the anti-drug movement conducted by an elite who were given responsibility by the majority to develop strategies. Information filtered down through the community through general meetings and leaflets. However, names of those about to be marched on were not made public until the beginning of the actual march. This holding back of information proved to be an effective strategy for control as seen by one respondent:

> *It was almost like the Grand Old Duke of York kind of thing. You could see some of these people leading off on these marches were really taking that very naked power of the mob going very determinedly somewhere. They were getting off on that* (14/2/01).

Surveillance mechanisms in the first phase, as noted by Don Bennett (1988) did occur in the second phase also. In most cases community informants were used to ascertain pertinent information which would then be assessed and acted upon. The second phase revealed a more sophisticated method; personal video cameras were often used to document the activities of drug users who may have been dealing (14/2/01).[128]

Drug users exiting syringe exchanges or pharmacies were often approached by activists who had them under observation. Confrontations often resulted with threats being issued by the activists. Occasionally, anti-drug activists would relieve addicts of their recently obtained new syringes or empty their bottles of Methadone, thus leaving the addicts without clean injecting equipment or indeed in drug withdrawal.

Organisation and planning was also evident when affiliates of CPAD and COCAD were bussed in from other areas to support local marches. According to one woman, her new home was mistakenly targeted by activists. Several buses of 'outsiders' had arrived 'to make up the numbers' in the march (cited in Brass Munkie 1999: 40). Sometimes spontaneous events did happen. For example, activists engaged with alleged dealers on a chance basis (often meeting on the street or at local social events). Such encounters proved to be hostile; often armed with weapons, activists would take advantage of such meetings, occasionally waiting for the alleged dealer to get off side in order that threats or punishments could be administered more privately (12/4/01; 29/1/00). Such spontaneous events Johnston (1996: 222) would argue, still require 'predisposition and premeditation.'

Undertaken by Private Agents

The membership of the anti-drug movement consisted of private agents who voluntarily engaged in acts of vigilantism. Whether it was the leadership who conducted 'oral hearings' with accused drug dealers, the element who employed violence, or the

[128] The mobile Health Board Methadone bus, parked daily behind St. Joseph's Mansions (now Killarney Court) became a well known target for videotaping addicts receiving their daily dose of Methadone. Those attending the bus would be more chaotic in their drug use thus attracting potential dealers.

numerous individuals who marched on the homes with the intent of forcing an eviction, due process was not exercised. In fact, great attention was often paid to not involving the police; all ascertained information on suspects was held internally within CPAD and COCAD. Only with the advent of the 1997 Housing Act was such information willingly handed to a government authority (interestingly, still circumventing the police).

Unlike the south inner-city, the north inner-city CPAD actively encouraged politicians to lend support by participating in the marches against alleged dealers. John Stafford (Fianna Fáil), Michael Keating (Fine Gael), Joe Costello (Labour), Christy Burke (Sinn Féin), and Tony Gregory (Independent) frequently led marches on the homes of alleged dealers in the north inner-city at this time (27/2/01; 12/4/01; 1/8/01). Costello, Burke, and Gregory would continue to march in the 1990's under the banner of COCAD, according to several respondents.

Anti-drug committees and meetings consisted of interested parties mainly associated with specific flat complexes or streets. Priests in the area also became involved once again, participating in marches and giving over churches and church halls for meetings. The north inner-city parish priests engaged more in the meetings and marching process than priests in the south inner-city whose involvement seemed to be confined to the giving over of church halls for large meetings (5/4/01; 20/6/01). The north side priests in the parishes in Sheriff Street, Sean McDermott Street, and Gardner Street retained a particularly high profile involvement in supporting CPAD.

> *We got the church involved; a lot of priests were involved on a local community level because they saw what was happening in their neighbourhoods and generally speaking, to be fair to them, they rallied behind their own people instead of taking this strict "Hands off. I'll have nothing to do with this" kind of an attitude, you know?* (27/2/01).

> *I'm talking about fifty people in a church where we used to meet. The clergy had no problem giving churches, church halls over to meetings. And there would be fifty people around the table putting in ideas and proposals as to how we should approach heroin addiction* (1/8/01).

While the participation of these governmental and church servants was warmly greeted by those active and non-active in the movement, some saw things differently:

> (Name of TD)? *I couldn't turn to him. Because he is the same man that would stand outside my home and chant for an addict, a recovering addict even, to get out of their home. Including their mother, their sisters and all of their family that probably never took it. Because of one black sheep of the family, he wanted them all ousted. So nobody really turns to him for help. To be honest, I don't know how the man is a TD* (5/2/02).

> *People got sick of it - a priest standing up and ousting people, you know? I'm not going to tell a priest what his job should be because that man should know what his job is already. It shouldn't take a little ol' fella like me to tell him. He should know his role - not to be telling poor old addicts to get out of their mothers' houses* (28/11/01).

Although some politicians participated in the oral hearings and marches, they acted as private citizens since the state neither called for their participation nor openly gave its stamp of approval to their actions. Priests who facilitated large meetings not only within church halls but within the churches themselves and who also participated in marching did so also as private agents. Yet their presence - as with local politicians - added a sense of legitimacy to the movement's aims and objectives. Their actions extend beyond what Johnston (1996) frames as 'responsible citizenship', that is, organisations such as 'Neighbourhood Watch' whose benign endeavours are 'both sanctioned and sponsored by the state' (1996: 226).

Autonomous citizenship

Johnston (1996) has stated that acts of vigilantism are undertaken by 'active citizens' ...without the state's authority or support' (226). This research has surfaced some complex issues in relation to this definition. The inactive role of the police during both phases of the movement, the indirect governmental resources given to the movement coupled with non-governmental resources all have contributed to a problem with this definition.

Johnston's concept of autonomous citizenship was first explained in his 1992 book, *The Rebirth of Private Policing*. It involves, he states, 'citizens in autonomous forms of self policing: those which are undertaken, in the main, without the co-operation or involvement of public police organizations' (159). The police are not mentioned in his brief 1996 assessment of the concept.

Having experienced much marginalisation in the wake of urban transformation, the north inner-city (like many neglected urban and suburban disadvantaged areas) remains resistant to any police intervention. Police were not welcome in most of the community anti-drug meetings. If they did venture in, talk of anti-drug activity would subside in exchange for more mundane conversation. Explaining the dynamics between the main actors in the north inner-city, one interviewee highlights the 'damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't' position of the police when trying to deal with the more aggressive participants of the movement:

> *That kind of activity seemed to singularly bring out a lot of police hostility also, which people were well aware of. But confrontation with the police was as desirable as confrontation with anybody alleged of dealing drugs* (14/2/01).

In preventing police intervention, crime continues to remain unchecked and since there is little state authority exercised in the area, the community is pretty much left to its own devices in terms of any crime control. While an accepted underground economy exists and is availed of by many, issues such as theft, assault, and domestic violence which occur within the community seldom get reported to the police. Rather, these issues are usually addressed and dealt with by family networks which, in many cases, are quite strong and numerous. Police interventions which do occur in the north inner-city tend to be what Shenkman (2000) terms the 'cuff 'em and stuff 'em' kind, that is, the police lean towards being reactive towards crime rather than proactive in building up community relations. Any crime control that is exercised is usually for the benefit of people living outside the community who may be at risk, or indeed a victim, of some crime.

The role of the police during the anti-drug movement's active phases was, for the most

part, viewed by some respondents as benign or audacious.

> *There is a long, long history going back over a hundred years, even longer, of no particular relations or definitely no trust between the community and the police. A lot of people say that the police turned a blind eye to the development of the whole heroin trade and the whole gamut of drugs in this area and it was almost a compromise in terms of the mid-80's where it was more that the cops were more concerned about getting shot in armed bank robberies* (14/2/01).

> *All the addicts out of the flats were always brought in for strip searches because the police see them as easy targets. They'd pull them in, the addicts are sick, and they'd say,"Give us a couple of names. We'll give you a drop of Phy."* [129] *People are vulnerable. You can't go in and say that even though the desk sergeant that particular day is the person that is in charge of you. Even though you might go to him and say, "Listen, they're giving me a hard time telling me to give names or I won't get this Phy. They won't give me a doctor." They can't go against their colleague* (5/2/02).

Acknowledging the bad relations between the community and the police, an activist also wanted it to be known that some in the movement were willing to meet the police halfway:

> *The police, yeah... So it was a slagging match. At the public meetings the police would be harangued from the altar or the community stage or whatever. It was a slagging match. We knew that was going nowhere. Ok, you got it off your chest, your frustrations about the police but something had to be done to bring the police and community together and break that historic divide. People would be called up from the group in the halls to speak and they would speak at length about how the police were a shower of bastards and that they don't do anything. We always got up and said, "Listen, fine, this community has been let down for generations in how it's been policed. The safety and welfare of the people in the north inner-city has not been a priority for the police. But we feel the only way to change that is not just to keep slagging indefinitely but to try and set up a structure that would bring us together in some way, where we can share ideas and views and maybe in a more formal and creative way, and in a*

[129] Physeptone®, a heroin substitute used in drug treatment clinics prior to the introduction of the Methadone Protocol in 1998.

constructive way tell each other exactly what we think of each other, how we can move on from that, you know (28/11/01).

Some believed that the anti-drug movement used the police to bring attention to the homes of alleged dealers thus galvanising community suspicion. Anonymous callers to police stations would falsely inform Gardaí about stolen goods or arms in a particular household. The police would then raid the house, sometimes several times. The community at large, not knowing what the police were looking for, assumed these raids were drug related thus labeling the householders as drug dealers. In time, activists would then march on the house, either forcing the occupants to move or drawing so much attention to the house that Dublin Corporation would evict the occupants under the 1997 Housing Act.

They are sitting around where she's living and they are ringing the police. The girl is getting four or five raids a week and even the police said they are fed up coming down and finding nothing in her place. But they said, "We just have to do it when we get a phone call." The girl knows who it is.... four people that were involved with the march on me (14/5/01).

In two instances, the people being marched on believed they were wrongly targeted in order that the leaders of the anti-drug movement could be seen as functioning during a recent drought of protest activity:

They really needed someone quick. I'd never got a raid off the police or anything like that up to this stage. Suddenly, I was being raided every week. In a period of 12 weeks, I had been raided 10 times in 12 weeks. The last week was actually two raids in a row. On inspection of these warrants when they were produced at the doors, sometimes it was hard to get the warrants off the police and they just thrown you aside like you were a piece of rubbish and you'd have the kids on the street and everything else (29/1/01).

My wife said we were being threatened. The police came up and stood there and observed every march there was to my house. I had no previous convictions at the time or anything, yet they would come with warrants, like, for electrical equipment, stolen goods, and I wasn't on for any of that activity at all. They came one day and actually dug up half the

garden looking for arms which I definitely wasn't involved in, you know, having experience with arms in the army. I'd hate to see arms falling into the wrong hands. But, like, I was actually raided but this was more-or-less attention... to bring attention to my home because they were at the bottom of the barrel (20/6/01).

The vast majority felt the police observed the movement from the sidelines, neither assisting the members of the movement to weed out the dealers nor intervening to insist on due process when families were being marched out of their homes. Within the interviews there were many testimonies to Gardaí inaction while threats or forced evictions were being carried out against alleged dealers. A member of the force explained it thus:

The police perspective of it all, on that side of it, would be very clear: if they don't break the law, they won't have a problem (26/7/01).

Other respondents stated:

The police took a sort of sideline view of it. They would accompany the marches but they wouldn't interfere (3/11/00).

(The police) were just standing at the door in case anything happened. But it did happen. Like, there was bricks thrown through me window. Bricks came through me window so the police really didn't do anything at that stage. They just stood there. So they were there all night, the police, thinking that I was going to leave. But I didn't leave (14/5/01).

It must be remembered that even within the confines of the law, acts of harassment or threats to harm an individual or the property of an individual (for what ever reason) are unlawful.[130] Likewise, the law does not require the removal of housing as a punishment for an offense. Thus in forced evictions and indeed with the marching itself, activists were not 'taking the law into their own hands'; they were simply intimidating and harassing individuals unhampered by any lawful intervention.

It has been suggested that police may in fact fear underclass areas, often opting to forego normal law enforcement procedures. The ability of the police to turn a blind eye

[130] See the 1994 Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, Part Two, sections 5, 6, and 9.

to certain suspect events may even reflect an unspoken agreement between the two parties (Jefferson 1990). Certainly, the historical conflict between the police and the underclass in Dublin has done little to facilitate a normative response to crime in disadvantaged areas. In fact, Gardaí openly shirked what Johnston (1999) sees as an inclination of the police to mobilize private citizens in relation to crime control. Johnston acknowledges that once the police bring such citizen groups into the fold, they then have the ability to 'eradicate what are perceived to be isolated and pathological outbreaks of vigilantism,' (1999: 163). This was not the case with the anti-drug movement.

Why the police remained mostly apathetic during the two phases of the movement is unclear. Perhaps they viewed it as a domestic dispute in an intimate community, only involving themselves when the law was deemed to be dramatically challenged. Perhaps there was a lack of resources to deal with the many pockets of vigilante activity that was occurring in the area. The cycle of such an historically negative relationship between the community itself and the police may remain impenetrable and immune from attempts to disrupt it.[131] Members of the Gardaí may have even adopted what many underclass and working class individuals see as a rampant middle class view towards them (which validates a lack of action): 'let them kill themselves off.' [132]

It is important to recognise at this point that any police force remains an organic entity. To expect a standard reaction to any event is unrealistic. Reiner (2000) states:

> The culture of the police - the values, norms, perspectives, and craft rules that inform their conduct - is neither monolithic, universal or unchanging. There are differences of outlook within police forces, according to such individual variables as personality, generation, or career trajectory, and structured variations according to rank, assignment,and specialization. The organizational styles and cultures of police forces may vary between different places and periods. Informal rules are not clear cut and articulated, but are embedded in specific practices and nuances according to particular concrete situations and the interactional processes of each encounter (87).

[131] Such a cycle, Dixon and Maher (2002) argue, is shaped by political and social exclusion and characterized - and made more complex by - cultural and economic dimensions.
[132] This was certainly an underlying theme in several of the interviews.

The inertia of the Gardaí in responding to the actions of the anti-drug activists oiled the social control mechanisms of the movement and increased the powerlessness felt by those accused of drug dealing. Due process was creatively avoided while an alternative justice system fluently operated under the watch of the Gardaí. This supplements the notion held by Ackers (2000) that vigilantism cannot exist very long without police approval. The seemingly neutral stance the Gardaí took when individuals were engaging in unlawful activities inadvertently allowed private voluntary agents to engage in vigilantism. Such a factor is not accounted for in Johnston's (1996) definition of autonomous citizenship. The relationship of vigilante groups to law enforcement agencies is briefly mentioned in his seminal article and is an aspect which needs further investigation (234).

The autonomy of the anti-drug movement is further challenged since the movement received funding and resources from government funded agencies. This ensured the movement's ease in communication and development. The £15,000 allocated from Combat Poverty allowed COCAD to employ a part-time administrator and editor for *The Drugs Agenda* (COCAD 2000). As suggested earlier, the movement helped itself to garner more mainstream support by presenting the sophisticated research rhetoric of *The Drugs Agenda* to potential funders rather than the more vernacular leaflets distributed solely to community residents.

More direct government support of the anti-drug movement came in the form of Dublin Corporation offering its assistance by giving over specific flats for the leaders of the anti-drug movement to congregate and devise action plans (these flats also served as the locale for oral hearings). Perhaps the most well known of all these flats was the "War Office" located in Hardwicke Street Flats. So named by the activists who patrolled the area, the War Office became synonymous with interrogations, threats and violence (14/2/0; 5/2/02). The long duration of the War Office - and indeed other such designated flats - during the second phase suggests that there was little government monitoring of the flats' usage.

Non-government sponsorship occurred when ICON helped to institutionalize the movement by allowing the leaders of the movement access to all ICON's material and financial resources, a concept clearly understood by a respondent:

> *I said, "You are giving these people the use of your phones, your electricity." They had them across the road and there were people going in to ICON looking for known republicans to talk to about housing issues. They thought it was so easy to go in and do that. Oh definitely, definitely. Yeah. They were well covered in ICON. ICON is sponsored by the government thereby implying that if they are using the phones and electricity and offices then by definition the government is sponsoring these people* (29/1/00).

Another respondent found it difficult to believe that people being paid by the Health Board could fully represent the interests of the community:

> *But I had a huge difficulty in believing that somebody who derives their whole family income from the Health Board can in any way be objective in tackling them. As far as I was concerned, the Health Board was running the strategy of the anti-drugs movement. Because if you have ICON people who are a paid employee at a fairly high level, not just your token pound here and there, but very senior people on good salaries, you don't bite the hand that feeds you* (27/7/01).

This research has highlighted three important points in relation to *autonomous citizenship* as explained by Johnston (1996). Firstly, acts of vigilantism may take place not necessarily as a result of the state's incapacity to police but rather as a result of its representatives *choosing* not to police. While it is understandable that the police cannot be present everywhere at all times, this research has indicated that many participants felt that the police - literally - stood by and did nothing while people were being marched on, intimidated, and forcefully evicted from their homes. This was interpreted by at least three participants as tacit approval of these measures (29/1/01; 30/1/03; 5/2/02). It should be noted that this scenario differs from one which the alleged dealer or drug user reports a particular threatening or violent incident to the Gardai. According to this research, only a small minority of individuals officially reported acts of intimidation and violence. Why this is so is unclear. There is a possibility that some of these individuals

were themselves - as the media would put it - "known to the police" and did not want to invite further investigation into their lives. More than likely however, the lack of reporting was just a continuing manifestation of the historically negative police/community relationship and a further indication of the community's tendency towards self-policing.

Secondly, government backing for vigilantism may be given *indirectly*. This can be seen most clearly in the role that the government funded Combat Poverty and ICON organisations played in resourcing the anti-drug movement. While Piven and Cloward (1992; 1998) have downplayed the role of resources in protest activities stating that it is the shared grievances (and the extent of them) which ultimately are the driving forces behind the mobilization of the poor, Cress and Snow (1996) believe that while few resources might be needed (especially for street campaigns), resources are none-the-less an important factor in securing viability for any movement. This would no doubt be more true for a movement birthed in a highly disadvantaged area and for a movement dependent on leaflets, newsletters and other information related materials to help educate and mobilize community members.

Thirdly, a government's nod to vigilantism does not necessarily have to come through the most obvious of its establishments. The role of DCC in relation to giving over at least one flat (in mostly all of the flat complexes) to members of the anti-drug movement in order for them to devise operations confirms this. It should also not be underestimated. The designated flats were vital to the operations of the movement, helping members of the movement to maintain a more orchestrated watch on the community. They facilitated residents in each flat complex to network and plan both local and general anti-drug activities. DCC's actions, while seemingly empowering the community, seem all the more surprising considering the spaces offered to the anti-drug movement could have been offered to those genuinely in need of housing. (And, as the next chapter will highlight, DCC's actions inadvertently contributed to more homelessness and social disruption).

A group or community's relationship to the state is 'crucial for the emergence of

vigilantism' (Buur and Jensen 2004: 140). Moreso, it is thought - or even accepted - that this relationship is usually fraught with tension and animosity. There is little to suggest in the research that there was much direct conflict with members of the movement and the Gardai save for some verbal spats at community meetings. The "Mountain View Riot" which helped birth the second wave of anti-drug activism in the north inner-city was perhaps the most obvious altercation which transpired and the most notable since it happened before the advent of the more intimidating and violent behaviours associated with elements of the movement. Neither was there much anti-government protest after ICON's initial 'Day of Action.' Once the movement gained momentum and started to police the community, the renegotiation of boundaries had very little to do with the government. Rather, the government seemingly ignored the anti-drug movement's challenge to the state's monopoly on policing and more importantly, how its sanctioned resources were indirectly sponsoring vigilante activities.

The Use or Threatened Use of Force

Respondents have made it very clear that the anti-drug movement used both the threat of force and actual force to achieve its objectives. The anti-drug movement used force successfully as a mechanism to control the supply and demand of drugs and more importantly to illicit a degree of compliance from the community. While it was not the sole method employed by the movement, it was by far the most effective and economic (and therefore most practical) method used. The most common characteristics attributed, by far, to the anti-drug movement were intimidation and violence. All respondents bar one - including those who were active participants in the movement - acknowledged that there was an element to the movement in the north inner-city which exercised violence (or the threat of violence) - to control drug use and drug dealing. The respondent who did not acknowledge any violent or threatening behaviour by the north inner-city anti-drug movement was mentioned (by name) by four community workers, three active drug users, and one member of the Garda Síochána, as being one of the main ringleaders in the violent element.

According to respondents, the recipients of the violence were mostly drug users who may or may not have been dealing heroin. It is important to understand that many respondents understood a hierarchy to exist within the drug trade. Those who import and distribute heroin for weighing and 'dancing' (mixing with other ingredients to yield a higher profit) and those who distribute to dealers on the ground are seen as the bigger players by many in communities. But these players often live in suburban areas away from the active heroin scene. While most of the anti-drug movement's attention was focused on local dealers - the individuals selling directly to addicts - the movement very occasionally targeted those outside the area who were deemed to be living off the proceeds of drug selling. A participant in the marches stated:

> *I mean, some of them would have been living in more affluent areas if you want, like yer man up in* (name of housing area) *there on the Malahide Road. So it was kind of bringing awareness to the areas that these people were living in that area that they were selling drugs and that they were making big money out of drugs* (14/5/01).

For one interviewee, his attention was also directed towards the known suppliers which the media had courted by attributing them with pseudonyms:

> *In the '90's, they knew what they were dealing. It could be argued that the first wave of dealers weren't absolutely sure. But the second wave of dealers knew what they were dealing, that they were dealing addiction. They were dealing AIDS. They were dealing and they knew. All those guys with funny names like "The Penguin," "The Boxer," and all those guys, "The Footballer." They knew and they were ruthless and they exploited young people* (3/8/01).

Conflict surrounds the question of whether there was consistent marching on the suburban homes of alleged dealers who had never lived in communities affected by heroin use. There is little anecdotal evidence of this in comparison to the many documented marches[133] which occurred on council houses and flats in the north inner-city. One participant who marched on those outside the community acknowledged that the hierarchy of the drugs trade eventually came to the fore, with those on the bottom rung figuring more highly than before:

[133] ICON (1998a).

When you got rid of the big guys, (name, name, name) *people like that, where do you go? If your only focus is campaigning on the supply side, where do you go after that? There is no where to go except to the addict dealer. Most drugs addicts would be dealers at some stage in their life not out of choice but out of necessity* (27/2/01).

Another interviewee expressed similar views:

You won't see a drug baron on the corner selling heroin. You'll see somebody strung out feeding their habit. Yet these are the same people that are targeted morning, noon, and night by committees and the police and the rest of them. Yes, they need to take these drug dealers off the corners but get them help also (5/2/02).

This was a consistent theme within the interviews and as noted earlier, a major point of contention within the movement. A young mother, for example, states:

I was sitting in with me babysitter. We was sitting in and a van came at the door so again I got up to open the door, the door came in on top of me and there was four people came in with balaclavas on them...poles. My babysitter was there; she's an elderly woman and the kids was there and the kids was screaming. They said. "We gave you 24 hours and you didn't listen. We're not giving you 24 hours anymore. We want you out in the matter of an hour." So I said, "I'm getting out."

After quickly relocating to her mother's flat two streets away she:

...heard someone roaring saying, "All the furniture is out, the furniture is out". So at that stage a policeman knocked and said to me mother, he says, "The flat...they're after taking all of the furniture out of it and thrown it over to burn it". So we went down with the police to have a look. At this

stage, I had a brother that was there and he had a camcorder and he taped it. He taped the whole lot. And all me furniture was in a big pile ready to be burned, well most of it was. They smashed most of it but me suite, telly, video, things expensive was put into a van and taken. They weren't burned. They took all them. So the flat was destroyed anyway....And then it started getting worse. I was pulled then by two people...I knew the two people. There was after being a march in a

different part of the area and they were coming back from the march when they seen me. Two stayed on one side and two came over the other side, and he pulled a gun out and put it to my head and told me not to go back near the flat or not to fight for my flat back. So, the police came and I told the police who they were. They caught them about ten minutes later. They caught them up the road (12/4/01).

Another respondent described the treatment meted out to her late brother:

And he was out himself looking for heroin that morning and he was dragged into a van and brought down there into a room, no lights, and he said there was about six people with sticks, whatever, gave him a hiding and then after giving him a hiding, they put a bottle of Methadone in front of him and told him he could have the bottle of Methadone if he went out and went to someone that was selling gear and they'd follow him and set the person up. So, he had no choice; he was dying sick. When he seen the Methadone, the only choice he had was to go and set someone up. So they followed him and he went...they even gave him the money to buy the drugs and he went and he bought them off a young fella. And that young fella was taken then. He bought them; he went away. He was brought back and he was told to go back to there and he was given the bottle of Methadone and the young fella that was selling the drugs, he ended up in hospital with his legs broke (14/5/01).

A respondent described another common tactic used by some in the movement:

I remember bodies hanging over balconies, like, and women, women actually screaming, "Drop him, drop him, drop him." In the part of the eviction of (name), *people were screaming "Drop him, drop him, drop him"* (20/6/01).

Those that opposed the movement's tactics were also targeted:

One night (wife's name) *and I were over in the flats visiting some family that was after being marched on. The husband had some involvement in drugs and had AIDS from drug use, and was out of the house selling drugs. I wouldn't deny that. Those gangs, after the pub, stoned his flat. He wasn't there. His wife was there with three or four young children. We went over to see them once we heard about this. A number of people came to - I wouldn't say kill me - but a number of them were armed and they had come after me, but I got away. We were prepared to stand up and say*

that this is wrong. I mean, a huge amount of people stopped talking to us (24/7/01).

For the most part, respondents understood the movement to have exercised what Lister (1998) terms the 'defending, promoting, and extending of rights' (229), with participation in the movement seen as a manifestation of these rights and augmentation of other community efforts to provide a more acceptable living environment. There remains a perception that the anti-drug movement, though born from legitimate fears, had its initial aims and objectives subsumed by those superimposed by individuals with a different agenda. The objective of cleaning up the drug activity in areas seem to actually matter very little.

> *In the beginning it brought more and more people into it and again I think the same thing happened - bullies took over and once they were given the power it was impossible to take it back. They just started to terrorise people. Well, particularly drug users. A lot of the big dealers were never touched. Small drug users were being evicted, just being bullied, bottles of Methadone being taken off them and smashed and it was just a bunch of bullies who managed to get into this power. As well there was always the threat of paramilitary back-up, that they could back it all up* (5/4/01).

> *The real concerned parents, the genuine people, were edged out when they seen the violence of the other people coming in. So the first genuine Concerned Parents were hijacked. They seen these people slowly coming in and taking over the Chair and the Chair would take over the meeting through intimidation. Just look at these people. You can see it in their eyes. They are very hard to look at without being frightened so you can understand the real Concerned Parents being edged out. My sister was on a committee and she was edged out in East Wall* (29/1/00).

> *There was a difference there. I suppose there was a different element of people who hijacked a lot of the marches from the public meetings. The public meetings became a sort of platform for people to demand direct action and say "Let's go now; these are the names and addresses of these people and let's go." It escalated into violence and people were attacked. There would be pick axe handles and balaclava kind of shit. I mean I know people who were fucked out of Hardwicke Street. That's a really aggressive and concentrated element there* (14/2/01).

There was one group I would say without a doubt who were using it to kind of enforce a kind of control over an area. Doors were getting kicked in and people were (beaten) up, not always for the right reasons, you know? The people that were doing this themselves would have dubious backgrounds and long criminal records you know? I think they were masquerading under a cloak of anti-drugs to give themselves a kind of power base (30/11/00).

The above respondents disagreed as to whether the reigns of the movement were willingly handed over by the more benign activists or deliberately taken by those who supported a more aggressive approach. Disagreement also occurred as to the reasons why these changes may have happened though suggestions included firstly that the benign (or founding) activists were bullied by the more aggressive element into handing over governance of the movement. Secondly, the benign activists willingly - but naively - allowed the other element to usurp their leadership roles in order to promote greater movement participation. Thirdly, the benign activists, realising the potential consequences of inducting a more radical element knowingly permitted the new element to secure these leadership roles. Respondents remained in concordance, although once the more militant individuals began steering the movement and making major decisions, there was little hope of restructuring or even reviewing the now established hierarchy.

In a meeting called by ICON at the local North Star Hotel in 1995 the issue of violence had already surfaced in a panel discussion on the aims, objectives, and tactics of the anti-drug movement. The question, 'Can violent activity by vigilante groups against drug dealers ever be justified?' was asked of the panel. One participant, a leading criminologist claimed, 'The simple answer is no. However, the anti-drug movement is admirable. Why did they have to take it to the streets? Basically the justice system ignored areas of Dublin for years and people assumed the role of policing' (ICON 1998a).[134]

It is on this point precisely which the vigilante tag of the anti-drug movement hangs and which differentiates the movement from being one which simply exercised methods of social control to being one which informally policed the community without implementing

[134] It is unknown by current ICON staff whether this was a direct or paraphrased quote.

due process. The violence meted out by some members of the movement conflicts with Johnston's (1996) belief that citizen street patrols are usually more focused on prevention measures and 'rarely involve acts of punishment' (233). Punishing acts occurred in many guises as in the case of the above respondent who lost her furniture and other possessions or in the incidences of activists smashing bottles containing Methadone medication leaving the owners in drug withdrawals (and therefore in a more primed position to score heroin).

It was this very blatancy of the force and violence exercised by the anti-drug movement which led to the division within the community, signifying a decrease in overall support for the movement and the movement's eventual demise. It greatly affected the psyche of the north inner-city and it most probably prompted community residents to adopt the term 'vigo' as an all encompassing term for any anti-drug activist.

A Reaction to Criminal or Social Deviance

Such was the perceived effect of drugs on the area, that it instigated a movement that was a reaction to the manifestation of these deviant behaviours. Several respondents mentioned the fear provoked by the new and raw display of drug use behaviour during the first phase of the heroin epidemic. Young people walked around zombie-like, unable to engage in conversations or everyday activities. Respondents noted additional aberrant behaviour in the growing number of young people stealing from family, friends, and neighbours to support their drug habits. Considered by the community as an act of 'shitting on your own doorstep,' this new phenomenon flouted one of the most important internal codes of inner city communities and, along with the drug users stoned behaviour, signaled to the north inner-city that something was seriously awry. One activist explained, poignantly, the first sign of drug use he noticed in his home:

> *I take a few drinks and you'd come in and see so many things missing. I built up a collection of crystal, you know, from me travels all over the place. I'd be saying to me wife, "Jesus, that's gone." The wife would automatically cover up and say I'm imagining it; it caused much conflict and what have you. But this is what actually happens in households* (30/8/01).

The community, now clearly frightened and at a loss, began to mobilize. Irrespective of this, many continued to participate in the underground economy which inadvertently fueled these new acts of deviance[135] normally associated with an underclass. Ungars (2001) believes the moral panic surrounding drugs can inadvertently create a subculture of addicts and an underground economy. The trauma that the community faced in the early days of the epidemic, the first hand experiences of witnessing a drug epidemic or a young teenager's overdose, needs little facilitation or an "official reaction" which Davis and Stasz (1990) have suggested is needed to instill apprehension and fear.

A series of drug deaths in the north inner-city in both the 1980's and 1990's, as noted earlier, prompted the community to take anti-drug action. Members of the community were mutually brought face to face with a problem that seemed unlikely to go away without some major intervention. The drug problem completely stood out from accepted acts of criminality in the area precisely because it was seen as a life or death situation for many families. With continuing support from the media in terms of the publication of drug-related stories and statistics (see Balls 1983), the anti-drug movement did react to this new phenomenon and indeed devised a control apparatus overtly forcing decentralisation of control from the government to itself.

Personal and Collective Security

The anti-drug movement went to great lengths to convince residents of the north inner-city that both their personal and collective security was threatened by the supply of and the demand for heroin and other drugs. Anti-drugs literature referred frequently to 'our children,' 'our lives,' 'our community' and voraciously targeted the fence sitters in the community.

[135] An underground economy which already existed in the north inner-city was certainly fueled by the rising number of individuals who were funding their drug habits by selling stolen goods at low prices or indeed, stealing to order. Two participants noted that the underground economy which existed before the 1980's tended to be used mostly to access necessary items such as food and clothing, or items deemed important such as household goods or toys. Since the advent of the drug problem, the focus seemed to be on getting cash either for drugs or for to buy more materialistic goods such as TV's,VCR's, and video games (14/5/01 A&B).

> We have let the drug dealers back into our areas. We must regain the old community spirit of supporting each other and once again reclaim our communities. We as communities sat back and watched it all happen. We allowed our kids to die. We allowed the destruction. We too are to blame.[136]

Accordingly, community meetings brimmed with reiterations on the destruction caused by drug dealers (and users) operating in the north inner-city. The patrolling of flat complexes, the military language of some of the anti-drug leaflets, the competing anti-drug and anti-vigilante graffiti in the area, and the clear disintegration of family relationships over drug use left some feeling they were in a 'war zone' (2/12/00; 24/7/01).[137] (Hardwicke Street's "War Office" was another manifestation of this). The "them and us" mentality - noted by Berger (1963) - did not now solely reflect the working class/middle class division. Division had now occurred within the working class and underclass themselves causing a greater disruption to the social fabric than perhaps any other problems that the community had previously faced.

As Johnston (1996) has pointed out, vigilantism occurs 'within a particular context of social change' and if anything it is 'a rudimentary social movement reflecting changed expectations' (232). The drug situation - and its implications for the security of the community - helped to redirect thinking. Official policing once scoffed at, was now dramatically invited and welcomed into the area and the Gardai were now being held more accountable for inaction in the community.

> *Basically we were doing what the police should have been doing. If the police had of been doing their job, we wouldn't have had to take to the streets* (30/8/01).

The growing sense of physical and psychological insecurity within the community over the effects of the drug culture on the social fabric of the north inner-city most likely was the main factor which instigated the anti-drug movement.

[136] From an INTACT leaflet lealfet entitled "RIP."

[137] Garbarino *et al.* (1991) believe that most underclass districts are already war zones untouched by sound economic and social structures.

This research then indicates that the anti-drug movement manifested Johnston's (1996) six characteristics of vigilantism. It has also highlighted that these elements are often inter-dependent. To recap, planning and organisation occurred in order for the movement to achieve its aims of targeting suspected drug dealers, orchestrating marches and street patrols, and conducting surveillance. Individuals, although they may have been associated with institutions, did not formally represent them when participating in the movement and as a result acted as private agents.

The anti-drug movement operated without the state's direct authority or support but compromised its autonomy by accepting indirect funding and resources from government funded agencies, an aspect not considered by Johnston (1996). Whether the government departments which funded these agencies understood the implications of secondary resourcing remains unclear. It is unlikely that Dublin Corporation officials, for example, knew of the activities which respondents claimed were realized in the "War Office." Nor is it likely that ICON fully briefed its funders on the more darker side of its anti-drug activities, choosing perhaps to present its association with the movement as just another action of mainstream community support. Similarly, the death of Josie Dwyer and the subsequent convictions of COCAD members probably did not sit well with the Combat Poverty Agency who had been funding the organisation's newsletter. It is also uncertain whether the Combat Poverty Agency recognised the paradox of its agency funding an organisation which, as a result of its activities, was inadvertently creating more homelessness and poverty for many families.

Johnston claims there are 'good grounds for subsuming vigilantism under the concept of 'autonomous citizenship' (226) and differentiates between voluntary and commercial practices. No overt commercial motives existed for the anti-drug movement; and participation was for the most part voluntary (except when individuals may have bowed to community pressure; even then there was no fiscal reward). The government's indirect resourcing allowed the movement to be much more effective, and coupled with the Garda Síochána's seeming indifference to many of the movement's actions

(committed without due process), may have fostered longevity in both its phases. Furthermore, state funded workers who directed their time and experience towards the movement also helped ensured its viability.

This indirect funding and resourcing would have probably not been so much in question had it not been for the type of behaviour exercised by the participants in the movement. After all, many community agencies are beneficiaries of government funding and accountability for this funding is usually self-reported, allowing for incongruities. However, funding and resourcing of the movement became unsettling to some in light of the overt intimidation violence, and threats of violence, exercised by some participants in the movement. Regardless of whether members of the community had witnessed specific events themselves or whether they heard of them through the local grapevine or media, the vigilante aspect of the movement became further pronounced through its relationship with these resourcing agencies; vigilantism therefore became more solidified in the public consciousness.

In turn this prompted members of the community to remember that drug using and dealing were threatening their personal and collective security and that action needed to be taken in order to protect the community's interests.[138] Whereas before the community had shunned interference from the police - and was in a sense providing its own internal security - it now felt such unease that it willingly invited (and challenged) the Gardai to engage in policing the area.

Finally, the perceived deviance of drug use and dealing was a new phenomenon which caught the community off guard and unnerved it entirely. Hines (1998) believes that vigilantes see such deviants as living outside the social and communal ties that bond society together and that infraction of these norms causes vigilantes to not only want to right the social order but also see the infractors somehow punished. This was so with the

[138] A community's sense of security, Lacey and Zedner (1995) have argued, is often disrupted by new phenomenon such as a drug problem. The reaction to such a problem can inadvertently create more apprehension as individuals are consistently reminded by these reactions that there is a problem to be feared.

anti-drug movement which sought to remove the perceived deviants from the area either by forcibly evicting them from their homes, by threatening or using both verbal and physical violence, or by simply shaming them into leaving the area.

6.4 The case of Josie Dwyer

Insight into people's reasoning on such fairness has surfaced in research conducted by Skitka and Houston (2001). They suggest that individuals have their own moral mandates which influence their thinking on fair legal processes. In examining courtroom dynamics, they found that procedures only mattered when defendant's guilt was 'ambiguous' (2001: 305). That is to say, the level of fairness in the investigation had no influence on whether the respondents felt that it was unfair to have convicted a defendant believed to be innocent or acquitted an individual believed to be guilty. More interestingly, Skitka and Houston found that the death of someone who was guilty of a crime was seen as fair by the respondents, whether it was through the death penalty or through vigilantism.

The transition from the self-protection motives of the anti-drug movement to those more punishment based was most pronounced in the 1996 death of Josie Dwyer, an HIV positive drug addict suspected of dealing drugs. His death remains a milestone which helped surface feelings held by disadvantaged communities towards anti-drug activists and the media. The incident not only highlighted the growing tense coexistence between drug addicts and anti-drug activists in communities but the increasing community division between those who did or did not support the anti-drug movement.

The *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* expressly used the term 'vigilantes' during the coverage of this case. Dwyer and his friend Alan Byrne had been attacked in the south inner-city when set upon by a group of men allegedly returning from an anti-drugs meeting in the Dolphin Barn area. Both Dwyer and Byrne were physically assaulted with an array of weapons;[139] Dwyer soon died of a ruptured spleen.[140] Twelve men were

[139] Hammers, lump hammers, and baseball bats (Irish Times 1999a).
[140] Irish Times (2000a) and (2000b).

charged with manslaughter and four were ultimately convicted.[141] Nine of these activists were tried in the Circuit Court on October 5th,1999. On January 26th, 2000, the three remaining men went to trial in the Special Criminal Court, a non-jury court traditionally reserved for those involved in paramilitary activities.[142] This was brought to public attention by a senior Garda who stated that it was common knowledge that IRA supporters were infiltrating community groups in inner-city flats and that Gardaí were concerned about 'vigilante movements' in the district.[143]

Members of COCAD picketed the court protesting the use of the Special Criminal Court for three of its members.[144] In an interview with *An Phoblacht,* COCAD representative Hughie McGeown stated that the State had given no reason why the Special Criminal Court was deemed necessary in order to try COCAD members. Stating that there was a 'hidden agenda' which had tried 'to break the anti-drugs movement and deliver areas back to the drug lords,' McGeown believed there was an attempt to link COCAD with paramilitaries in order to 'criminalise it' (Pierse 1998). It was not uncommon to see signs protesting the use of the Special Criminal Court outside flat complexes (for example, see Appendix 5).

The prosecution had indicated that several incidents of disorder had taken place on the evening of May 14th, 1996 resulting in the death of Dwyer. Although these incidents took place in three distinct geographical areas, the prosecution believed they culminated in one event. On being sentenced for seven and a half years for manslaughter, one of the men gave a clenched fist salute and shouted 'Up the Concerned Parents,' an action

[141] Thirteen men were originally charged in connection with the incident. Prior to the trial, one of these men was stabbed to death in Dolphin House, a flat complex adjacent to where Dwyer was initially assaulted.

[142] It was the intention of this researcher to determine the reasons why the DPP chose the Special Criminal Court to try three of the accused in the case of Josie Dwyer. A long term effort yielded little if no results. After numerous phone calls and referrals, no-one in the DPP's office or the office responsible for the Special Criminal Court could pinpoint the reasons why this court was chosen. More worringly, no-one could (or would) identify whose responsibility it was to make such a decision.

[143] Irish Times (2000c).

[144] Irish Times (2000a).

that was not lost on one respondent:[145]

> *Do you want me to give you a fact about Josie Dwyer? Six and a half stone, HIV positive, grandfather of forty three,*[146] *kicked to death by thirteen animals. Thirteen vicious animals, but thirteen of my culture, taken advantage of, riled up. Three of them got done in in the Special Criminal Court but yet there were people cheering these people who were convicted of kicking a six and a half stone heroin addict to death* (2/12/00).

A local nun who appeared as character witness for some of the accused stated that the Gardaí had approved of the anti-drugs patrols and stated that some local women had to receive individual and group therapy after being questioned by Gardaí in relation to the incident. She also had been on anti-drugs patrols but stated there was 'nothing sinister' in their approaches.[147] Tony Gregory, the Independent TD, also gave evidence in the Special Criminal Court on behalf of one of those who was being tried in relation to assault and violent disorder. Gregory stated that heroin had 'ravaged' inner-city communities for twenty years and that he 'knew of entire families wiped out by heroin.[148] The court also heard that one of the accused, William Kenny, who later lost his appeal, 'worked tirelessly to help the community in Dolphin's Barn and Fatima Mansions' (Hayes 2003). The complexities of the situation, and how people felt, surfaced in the interviews. One respondent, who witnessed some of the event, gave a detailed version of the incident and the residual effects in the local community:

> *It was a mixed reaction. As regards to people being with the Concerned Parents movement, some agreed with what was happening, some didn't want vigilante activity in it and their idea of getting rid of anyone who had anything to do with drugs was by petitioning with placards with chants like "Pushers Out" and things like that, which wasn't bad. It conveyed a good message and helped people feel safe in their homes. But with Josie*

[145] Irish Times (1999a). It is interesting to note that that the man referred to 'Concerned Parents' and not 'COCAD' during this salute. This surfaces the question as to why there was a name change during the second phase. The change may have been an attempt to distance the second phase from the more negative attention the first phase received. In this instance, the man may have seen CPAD and COCAD as one and the same organisation or he may have been deliberately trying to offset from COCAD the negative attention that the Dwyer case was no doubt bringing.

[146] Dwyer was in fact 41 years old.

[147] Irish Times (2000d).

[148] Irish Times (2000e).

Dwyer it was completely different.

Josie was cutting through Dolphin House where people had just been to a meeting. They were all riled up. Most of these people attended these meetings, being committee members would actually get up to speak, and not being used to speaking publicly, would actually go to the local pub and load themselves up with whatever alcohol they were into. That would bring anger and aggression into it. People weren't qualified to speak. Their games were more-or-less mind games. They'd get a couple of people together and plan to topple someone that was possibly a year or two into addiction. They just thrown the book at them and blamed them on everything. You had other members who would actually stand up and back them up. If you were there on your own, it was like something you'd see in the Westerns, like something you'd see in the cowboy films. That's the way things were carried out. Hard luck if you feel hard done by. And that was the case with Josie Dwyer where he was cutting through Dolphin House and they all came riled up. Half of them were pissed drunk. He'd been kicked and beaten - not all the way from Dolphin House - but from Dolphin House he kept bumping into different groups. People had gone out in cars chasing him and all that. People had gone on foot. There was one girl in particular who was actually defending him, who didn't agree with this vigilante activity and was actually stopping Josie from being kicked to death. There was really a big break-up there in Dolphin House from the Concerned Parents. Over that incident in particular. And people who wanted genuine petitions didn't want vigilante activity. Nobody particularly wanted Josie Dwyer dead but they had this group of people who expressed themselves through the community, their voice to be heard, looking to be a hero and going along and getting drunk and being aggressive. They were vigilantes that chased Josie Dwyer which ended up in Marrowbone Lane. There was an incident on the way to Marrowbone Lane where he had to cut through his own flats where he had been born and reared in Fatima Mansions. All the women in the flats actually took up for Josie Dwyer and said, "Hold on, leave him alone. No matter what he's done, he doesn't deserve to be dealt with like that by being kicked, and boxed and punched."

If they were Concerned Parents, I don't know why they would bring weapons to a meeting, the likes of hammers and claws and baseball bats and things like that. There is evidence to show they were actually used. They were found, after the initial murder of Josie Dwyer in Marrowbone Lane. People were raided the next day - anyone that was here and these

weapons were found and they were brought for DNA testing and it all came out then in the Book of Evidence (20/6/01).

A community worker also understood the intricacies of the situation and tried to relay these to participants in the north inner-city anti-drug movement, which had been indirectly affected by the negative repercussions of Dwyer's death on the south side.

Josie Dwyer... there was a lot of people and there was a lot of anger. Local people at the big public meetings would have been happy enough to go out and beat up pushers and just users. We would have been trying to say, "Look, it's very complicated because with drug using families, some of them may be selling, maybe pushing drugs, some of them may have been opposed to pushing drugs. It's a community problem. We have got to try and come up with answers and those answers have to be based on sense and humanity. Beating up people isn't going to solve anything. The State is supposed to take responsibility for criminal activity. Why isn't the State dealing with this?" (30/8/01).

Two respondents both expressed a lack of surprise at the occurrence:

I think it was more a revelation for the community at large than to drug users. It wasn't a big deal for drug users; they knew this as going on anyway and drug users are being murdered all the time. It was just an act of barbarism but it was something that was inevitable. Everyone knew this was going to happen eventually. But I think the general public was horrified by it and I think it was one of the things that helped to destroy the vigilante movement (5/4/01).

You wouldn't treat a dog like that but that's the way he was treated. I'm delighted it came out because that's the way it always was and it always would have ended up that someone was going to be killed (20/6/01).

The trial was covered in two issues of COCAD's publication *The Drugs Agenda,* a quarterly newsletter which aimed to promote debate and awareness on and of drug-related policies. Combat Poverty funded the newsletter and four issues had already been published before coverage of the trial began. The front page headline entitled

Josie Dwyer Case: The Trials Commence, details the technicalities of the trial and other related issues which it accused the media of either overlooking or unnecessarily highlighting.[149]

Foremost, COCAD identified the media's unwillingness to examine why three of the twelve accused were referred to the Special Criminal Court by the DPP, a court which had been criticised by international Human Rights bodies. COCAD also expressed major concern about the 'inflammatory and prejudicial media coverage' which followed Dwyer's death (COCAD 1999c: 1). Veronica Guerin, mentioned as a 'unique' journalist, was cited as having opposed such emotive writing. COCAD believed the irresponsibility of the media was revealed when it failed to include the State Pathologist's report that Dwyer's spleen was five times the normal size due to his HIV status and would have ruptured easily with 'minimal force' and also when the media neglected to state that Alan Byrne had not sought medical attention for his injuries (COCAD 1999: 1). A number of witnesses who had retracted their statements were referred to in the article. Reasons given for contesting the statements included individuals having been under the influence of drugs when making statements, and that the Gardaí had pressured alleged witnesses while in the station. COCAD also published a two-page leaflet which it distributed in homes and on the streets in the south and north inner-city. Headlined *Act Now Before It's Too Late,* the leaflet devoted the front page to concerns about the escalating availability of drugs in areas outside of Dublin and its commitment to supporting these communities.[150]

Its back page contained a highly detailed call to oppose the use of Special Criminal Courts in this trial. The leaflet reiterated COCAD's unhappiness with the media's coverage of the trial, the lack of civil liberties for the accused as well as the State Pathologist's report on the condition of Dwyer's spleen.[151] It offered opinions not given in *The Drugs Agenda.*

[149] The inability of the media to find a balance in situations like this seems to be a common trait (see Tichenor 1980).

[150] COCAD (b).

[151] The leaflet argued that Dwyer's spleen was already in a very unhealthy state due to the fact he had AIDS and that 'it would not have required a blow of any great force to rupture it' (COCAD b).

> COCAD would like to point out that it was a consequence of years of official neglect and indifference to their plight that communities across Dublin in 1996 were left with no alternative but to patrol the (sic) their Housing Estates and flat complexes in an attempt to provide some sort of safe environment for children[152] and the elderly, bringing them inevitably into conflict with drug dealers. This in itself was a great injustice. This injustice was compounded in the south inner-city when the Garda Síochána, embarrassed by community action, seized upon the tragic death of Josie Dwyer to try and break the anti-drugs campaign and incarcerate as many anti-drugs activists from the areas as possible, irrespective of whether they had anything to do with the matter or not. The decision to forward three of the twelve accused to the special criminal court for trial is in line with this approach, demonstrating a lack of faith in securing conviction by jury and a desire to create as much suspicion as possible around all twelve defendants by associating the case with paramilitary activity (COCAD a).

In the leaflet, COCAD resumed challenging the Gardaí and the State, a measure which had begun very early on in its campaign but which had not been reflected in *The Drugs Agenda* by the editors. The organisation made it clear that communities had been abandoned by the government and that residents had no choice but to devise their own control mechanisms. Referring to the activists who had been charged, COCAD stated:

> These men were the only thing standing between their communities and the drug dealers who were threatening to completely overrun the two complexes. In putting themselves on the line and trying to protect their communities in conditions of complete state indifference these men were motivated only by a commendable sense of social responsibility (COCAD b).

COCAD approached both Citywide and ICON for support during the trial, but the gravity of the incident proved too much for the co-ordinators of these agencies who were apprehensive about lending their names to such a high profile case. Prior to the incident, COCAD had been involved with both organisations, mostly on local committees and sub-committees. Leading members of the organisations were well

[152] This issue was also raised by COCAD in an interview with An Phoblacht. COCAD's Chairperson, Hughie McGeown stated, 'Where the State negates its responsibilities for the protection of its children, then parents are perfectly entitled to protect their families' (Pierse 1998).

acquainted with each other. The request however proved to be the first step in the demise of both Citywide's and ICON's relationship with COCAD.[153]

> *Oh, actually, you know, what would have been the point in which they finally stopped coming now that I think of it? It was after Josie Dwyer's case when three of them were to be tried in the Special Criminal Court and COCAD asked for a meeting with Citywide and we had a meeting down the road. I remember about twelve of them came to the meeting. Talk about your ultimate 'trying to intimidate'! Eleven men and one woman they brought along. They basically wanted Citywide to join them in what they were calling a campaign of "mass disobedience" and all of this to protest against the fact that these three innocent men had to go to a special criminal court. I remember at the meeting,* (name of COCAD co-ordinator) *was doing the really reasonable stuff, which he always did and he was saying, "Look, what happened was dreadful and this is nothing to do with what happened and it's not about what people's views are. This is a civil rights issue about the use of the Special Criminal Court." And he was being clever because he knew people would say "yes" to that kind of thing, you know? But then, he was being all reasonable and a couple of the others just came in and basically said this is about smashing heroin, police, and the State. And somebody made a comment that Josie would have died anyway. Behind the reasonable façade, all that stuff came out - "Oh well, he was going to die anyway and all he got was a few belts and sure...", you know. So at the end of the day anyway, Citywide said that they would make a statement about the Special Criminal Court not being appropriate but they weren't going to get involved in a joint campaign with COCAD because we didn't feel we had the same views on the thing. And from there on, from their perspective, Citywide had sold out and I think that was last time we had any kind of formal contact with them* (22/5/01).

A representative of ICON stated:

> *COCAD asked us for a meeting and we agreed to meet them. The ICON drugs committee met them. And they wanted support for a campaign against this "harassment" as they called it, of community activists in the anti-drugs movement. I said. "Look, we need to know exactly what you have in mind". Because I had heard people talking in the meeting about sitting down and blocking the airport roundabout, sitting down*

[153] Other reasons for this demise also existed; these will be discussed in a later chapter.

outside Mountjoy police station and picketing police stations. And I put in clear, "Are we talking about an anti-police campaign here?" I was told, "They're the ones who are the problem". I said, "Forget about it. There is no possible fucking way that I can deliver ICON to an anti-police campaign. I couldn't! I mean you're talking about nuns, school teachers, you know, social workers, the kind of people who are involved in community-based organisations, the people in the after-school projects, the people in the training workshops. There is no way I could ever get them involved in an anti-police campaign." But they also didn't understand the nature of ICON; that surely proved it. They didn't understand what ICON was about. ICON never claimed to represent the local community... never (27/2/01).

COCAD proceeded with the campaign without the support of Citywide and ICON. Pickets were placed on major police stations in the north and south inner-city during the trial. The organisation continued to publish many leaflets which it delivered door to door in inner-city areas. The leaflets contained the dates and times of public meetings and reiterated the call to communities to support the accused and protest the use of the Special Criminal Court. Notably, a reoccurring statement in all the leaflets included, for the first time, other anti-social behaviours besides drug dealing:

> We would point out that the situation in many communities is going downhill rapidly. Open drug dealing in many areas has reached record levels and gangs of youth are engaged in joyriding etc. and are running riot. It is important that the community stands together to address these issues for the sake of their children. It is also important that the communities stand with the 12 men who are facing long prison sentences as a result of their commitment to their community.[154]

Shifting away from solely addressing drug dealing to targeting other anti-social behaviours, COCAD's significant change in its strategy mirrored that of Northern Ireland enclaves. For communities, it brought to light the growing need for control in working class areas and in simultaneously, and vociferously, questioning the effectiveness of the

[154] For example, seen in leaflets entitled, *'Public Meeting, School Street School, Tuesday 14th September at 8:15 pm'* and *'Major Anti-Drug March South Inner-City - A Fair Trial for Anti-Drug Activists, 5th October 1999.'*

State,[155] COCAD paved the way for these communities to easily accept the notion of self-policing.

Dwyer's death, and the media furore surrounding it, prompted a north inner-city anti-drugs activist (self-described) to write an article entitled *"Vigilantism or Class Prejudice?"* which was published in *The Drugs Agenda.* A commentary on the middle class, the article attempts to interpret the reaction of the general (middle class) public to Dwyer's death. By offering an analysis of the situation, it greatly differs from the mostly policy and statistics orientated articles found within other previous and indeed later newsletters. The author sees the death of Dwyer in the same manner as other COCAD literature had, but sophisticatedly ventures to include a class perspective.

> Through middle class eyes, the Concerned Parents, marching on heroin dealers in deprived areas of Dublin, were most likely drunken wife-beaters who enjoyed victimising helpless addicts. Social deprivation, equaling ignorance and a harsh environment seemed synonymous with brutal, violent individuals. Secure in the knowledge that their own children were unlikely to be offered heroin so far from the affected areas, those who wrote the news could afford much generosity of spirit towards the whining of ostracised drug dealers. Under a constant barrage of media hysteria, anti-drugs marches started to offer assurances that "we are not vigilantes." This was not for the benefit of people attending such demonstrations, who are under no illusions, but rather for the journalists sniffing around the gathering (COCAD 1999b: 8).[156]

The Garda Síochána, judges, and the media are seen as the main representatives of the middle class with which the anti-drug movement most frequently interact, yet feels most isolated from. The rural backgrounds of some of the Gardaí working in Dublin and the supposed wealth of judges are seen as barriers to them having a true understanding of inner-city conditions. The media portray 'lovable urchins standing against the background of a rundown flat complex' eliciting pity among the elite 'on their way to well paid jobs' (1999b: 8).

[155] COCAD frequently named and challenged individual members of the Garda Síochána and their stations, seen for example, in the leaflet entitled, *'Jail the Pushers - Not the Anti-Drug Activists.'*
[156] During the trial, one of the accused stated in court that another 'vigilante' threatened to burn down his house if he named other people involved in the attack (O'Driscoll 2000).

The author is in accordance with Johnston's (1996) belief that security is not only personal, but collective. Yet, unlike other formal statements which COCAD had previously issued on its dissatisfaction with government action, the author presents an extra-legal dimension, challenging the government as the sole justice system:

> The dogmatic and self righteous conviction continuously alluded to is: that the state is the only structure capable of administering justice. This is in spite of the fact that the communities being lectured to had for generations taught its children right from wrong (1996: 8).

Whether or not the author was suggesting that the government and communities should power-share is not clarified. However, the statement's connotations of 'we know best' reflects what Culberson (1990) believes to be that aspect of vigilantism which sees the government as unable to understand or relate to its citizens' sense of civic responsibility.

Crime control is difficult in situations where members of the community themselves are believed to engage in deviant behaviours such as drug use. In the north inner-city, tensions existed between those who felt that drug addicts needed understanding and support, and those who saw drug addicts as drug dealers who were wreaking havoc in the community. This tension made the anti-drug movement more vulnerable to being taken over by some who although purporting to be anti-drugs, may have also had other more power-based aspirations. The resourcing and institutionalization of the anti-drug movement was to have a great impact on this element; it would also influence the route anti-drug activism would eventually take. These dynamics will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 7

Local agencies: Resourcing and institutionalization of the anti-drug movement

7.1 Introduction

The media's co-existence with vigilante groups remains one of the most dynamic aspects in vigilante theory. Within sociological research, however, little attention has been paid to the relationships between vigilante groups and local agencies (Johnston 1996). The anti-drug movement in the north inner-city functioned prominently alongside three major agencies during its lifespan. The movement carried out its more public activities in the sight of the Garda Síochána who, for the most part, remained detached from the movement. (Its relationship with the anti-drug movement has been discussed in the previous chapter). Two other organisations, the Inner City Organisations Network (ICON) and the political party of Sinn Féin became particularly outspoken in their support for the anti-drug activists, actively participating in the meetings and marches. These strong connections are noteworthy and challenge the notion that vigilante groups operate in isolation (see for example, Cutler 1969, Brown 1975, and Agamben 2000) Every respondent in this research offered unsolicited views on ICON or Sinn Féin (in most cases, on both), indicating clearly the perceived alliances.

In the mid 1990's, prominent drug selling, and the increasing number of drug-related deaths (and the impact of these deaths on local projects) began to affect ICON's initial brief (14/2/01). The issue of drugs as a community problem formally emerged and was documented, at ICON's first seminar held in Kilkenny in March 1993.[157] Sinn Féin, on the other hand, has adopted the drugs issue since it first came to the fore. The first wave of the drug endemic in Dublin in the 1980's sent working class communities reeling and Sinn Féin had a high profile in local CPAD anti-drug meetings and marches.

While some anti-drug activists held legitimate membership of both organisations, ICON and Sinn Féin operated separately, occasionally joining forces to back certain drug related policy changes. United in championing the underclass and working class, ICON and Sinn Féin subsequently facilitated the north inner-city in developing - and exercising

[157] Concerns raised included the need for the community to be more supportive of drug users while encouraging them to strive to develop social responsibility. Addressing the misuse of alcohol was also seen as a challenge for the community (ICON 1993).

- its own social control mechanisms to combat the problems surrounding drug use in the community. They also highly influenced government responses to the problem.

As this chapter will now detail, these agencies remained integral to not only the success of the movement but also to its ultimate demise. Both organisations were fraught with difficulties which surfaced as a result of the perceptions of some in the community who challenged ICON and Sinn Féin's involvement with the anti-drug movement. However, they jointly provided a secure platform for the anti-drug movement and the community at large to become more politicised. Ultimately, this has proved highly beneficial to the north inner-city.

7.2 ICON and the anti-drug movement

Responding to this growing worry of the community, ICON formed the Drugs Working Group to provide links, information, and support around the issues associated with problem drug use (ICON 1993). Bringing the total of ICON's working groups now to ten, the Drugs Working Group consisted of local residents and activists, many of whom were parents whose children were personally affected by drug use. The Drugs Working Group first attempted to identify and prioritise community needs (14/5/01). Under its direction, tenant groups began to galvanise and focus not on external relations with Dublin Corporation, as they had previously, but on the increasingly difficult local relations caused by residents involved in the distribution and consumption of heroin.

Finding itself increasingly consumed by the agenda of the Drugs Working Group (with other local directives temporarily taking a back seat), ICON formed the Inter-Agency Drug Project (IADP) in 1995 to formally divest ICON of the drugs issue. Community leaders felt that the community networking begun by the Drugs Working Group should now incorporate State agencies to provide a more holistic approach to the drug issue. Targeted for co-option in the IADP were the Garda Síochána, the Department of Education, FÁS, and Eastern Health Board (now Health Service Executive).

Unlike the Drugs Working Group, the IADP focused on the broader issues of policy and devised more long term objectives. It applied itself to issues concerning the supply and control of drugs in the north inner-city, estate management, community policing, and the setting up of a statutory agency which would target illegally gained assets of those involved in the drug trade and reinvest these monies back into the communities most affected by drug use[158] (O'Brien and Moran 1998). The following year, the Government passed The Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996, allowing the formation of the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) which could meet this objective.[159] The collective action approach of the IADP was regarded as a far more effectual method of achieving community objectives. The 1996 Interim Report of the IADP acknowledged the 'sparse and uncoordinated manner in which the (drug) problem has been tackled in the past' (IADP 1996: 3).

While the IADP continued to build on partnerships, the Drugs Working Group remained very much at grassroots level networking with other community groups in Dublin who were experiencing similar frustrations. In July 1995, five consecutive drug related deaths of young people in the area prompted an ICON meeting in the North Star Hotel in the north inner-city (ICON 1997c). Despite using the IADP as a buffer to allow it to resume its initial agenda, ICON also heard the community call for more drastic measures to be taken.

In the same month, ICON had organised a further meeting in the North Star Hotel, this time an all city debate on the legalisation of cannabis (27/2/01). Attended by representatives of statutory and non-government organisations as well as community members, the debate was intended to be a fairly straightforward affair. However, the topic was soon displaced when audience members began stating what they felt were far more relevant issues: Methadone maintenance and the open drug selling in their local areas. As families from across Dublin shared their personal stories the discussion on cannabis abated and it became evident to ICON that a widespread response was

[158] IADP was nominated for a World Health Organisation Multi-City Programme on Drugs study as a result of its perceived success as a partnership.

[159] Five respondents mentioned the 1996 murder of journalist Veronica Guerin as a pivotal incident which spurred the government into hastily forming CAB.

needed.

7.2.1 The Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997

Community leaders and ICON remained realistic about the task ahead:

> We were quite convinced that no-one could stop heroin from getting into the island. Drugs are too readily available and the problems are too great...we insisted that there was a problem of both supply and demand, and we must consider very closely where the demand is coming from (Lambe 2002: 45).

In the eyes of many, the supply came from those residing in the north inner-city itself. Prominent drug dealing, and the chaos it was causing in particular flat and housing complexes communities, led the leaders of ICON to consider a more legal means of controlling the distribution of drugs. Accordingly, community leaders pressured the Government to provide support for Dublin Corporation to enable it to easily evict tenants who were involved in drug dealing. The Government responded by enacting the Housing Provision Act of 1997 which would allow Dublin Corporation to evict tenants for anti-social behaviour.[160]

From the start, the Act received criticism from voluntary agencies who had been working with drug users as well as those working in disadvantaged areas (Kelly 1997; Cox and Lawless 1999; Costello and Howley 2001). Primary was the concern that the Act provided little or no measures for those evicted to obtain other housing; the route back to Corporation housing remained difficult, uncertain, and more worringly, subjective. This seemed in mark contrast to the rationale behind the provision of the Act. According to

[160] Section 1(1) of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 defines 'anti-social behaviour' within the following two categories:
a) The manufacture, production, preparation, importation, exportation, sale, supply, possession for the purposes of sale or supply, or distribution of a controlled drug (within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Acts of 1997 and 1984).
b) Any behaviour which causes or is likely to cause any significant or persistent danger, injury, damage, loss or fear to any person living, working or otherwise lawfully in or in the vicinity of a housing authority under the Housing Acts, 1966 to 1997, or a housing estate in which the house is situated and, without prejudice to the foregoing, includes violence, threats, intimidation, coercion, harassment or serious obstruction of any person.

Rourke (2001: 5):

> It was considered that the provisions within this bill would provide local authorities with the legal device to evict drug dealers and other persons involved in serious anti-social activity/behaviour from their local authority housing units. Through the provisions contained in this Bill, the local authorities would be complementing the work of An Garda Síochána and local community groups/organisations and would be helping to ensure that evictions take place within a solid legal and constitutional framework (rather than people being evicted as a result of marches on their houses/flats and being given no recourse to due process or fair procedures).[161]

Also in contention was the differentiation between drug users and drug dealers of where 'this fine line drawn by communities, local authority officials, and the Gardaí is not fixed' (Memery and Kerrins 2000: 32).

The question of the balance of power between DCC and the Gardaí in relation to engaging in Estate Management surfaced in four interviews. The concept of "Estate Management" was brought about in 1996, prior to the Housing Act of 1997. It was devised in conjunction with the North Inner-City Drugs Task Force which was created to unite statutory and community representatives to deal with the escalating drug problem in the north inner-city. Such was the drug problem that certain complexes became "no-go" areas. For example, St. Joseph's Mansions, at the height of the drug problem in the 1990's, had 160 empty dwellings due to the lack of "take-up" among potential tenants. Individuals simply did not want to be housed in an area affected by so much drug use and selling.[162] The 1997 Act gave power to local tenants to form committees which could act as vetting mechanisms for potential tenants. It also gave Gardaí and the DCC the right to access and exchange information on tenants without having to go through formal

[161] Rourke (2001) was commissioned by Dublin Corporation and the Eastern Health Board (now Eastern Regional Health Authority) to examine the effects on people evicted from Dublin Corporation in 1997 and 1998 for anti-social behaviour.

[162] The close proximity of many flat complexes in the north inner-city (in comparison with the south inner-city) may help facilitate a more fluent drug economy. For example, on Dublin's south side, the flat complexes of St. Teresa's Gardens, St. Michan's, or St. Michael's have no nearby complexes. Whereas the large flat complexes of Mary's Mansions, Lourdes House, Liberty House, Sean O'Casey, Mountainview Court, Matt Talbot, and Avonmore in the north inner-city are all within five minutes walking distance of each other.

due process. DCC only have to prove breach of tenancy in order to secure an eviction.

An interview with a DCC staff member located in the north inner-city sub-division provided rich insight into the behind the scenes workings of the Act. According to the respondent, the vast majority of anti-social behaviour is drug related. The DCC do not view excessive noise levels, loud partying, or incidents of domestic violence or drunkenness as anti-social. However incidents of bullying and intimidation, attributed to drug behaviour are deemed so, as is joyriding. The DCC works closely with the Gardaí as well as the Community Policing Forum (CPF), a north inner-city community and police partnership in which the general community formally acts as informants on drug dealing and other anti-social behaviour. DCC and the Gardaí regularly exchange information on individuals or families by requesting information - in written form - under the provision of the 1997 Housing Act. This exchange, according to the respondent, is increasingly including the CPF in a third party capacity. Providing Gardaí with a flat or house solely for the purpose of surveillance is a common practice for the DCC.[163] When it is decided by DCC to pursue an individual or family under the Act, the following procedures take place.

Firstly, DCC has to receive a complaint about a tenant from the Gardaí or other tenants. Secondly, the tenant is then written to and invited to a meeting to discuss the complaints. (Non-attendance without excuse is frowned upon by DCC and may lead to eviction even before an informal hearing). Thirdly, DCC will then listen to the tenant's defense. If reason for/denial of anti-social behaviour is not accepted or believed by the DCC, the DCC may at this stage give written warning to the tenant or serve notice to quit. If drugs are found on the premises (deemed to be for sale or distribution),[164] there is no appeal

[163] Two weeks prior to this interview, Gardaí netted €40,000 of hashish from a flat in Sheriff Street. DCC had provided the Gardaí with a flat for long term surveillance of the area. At the time of this interview, six families in Sheriff Street had been identified as 'anti-social' and three had been served notice to quit (27/1/03).

[164] While Section 3 of the Act relates to drugs for personal use, Section 15 of the Act relates to possession with intent to sell or distribute; this is what the DCC and Gardaí predominantly focus on. However, it is difficult to access amounts worth over €100.00. Whether a drugs find is seen as a Section 3 or Section 15 is up to the Gardaí. Methadone is not 'usually' considered in these cases although excess amounts of any prescription drugs is considered a possible violation (27/1/03).

process. Feedback from the Gardaí weighs heavily; a notice to quit is seldom over-ruled.

A person's re-entry to the DCC system after an eviction is taken on an individual basis and there is no set time before re-entry is allowed. The DCC will look for a documented change in the behaviour that is deemed anti-social. If there is re-entry, there is a probation period; again there is no standard time frame. The respondent offered a recent example: a woman evicted for anti-social behaviour had secured a place on a Methadone programme and when she was found to be free of convictions and warrants, she was re-housed with an unspecified probation period (27/1/03).

The attempt at networking by DCC to ensure a curb on drug dealing has had several notable implications. Cox and Lawless (2000) stated that there has been a significant increase in the number of evictions of drug users as a result of 'anti-social behaviour.' These evictions, mostly leading to homelessness, affect not only the alleged drug dealers but also family members, including children residing in the household. Jim Mitchell, Fine Gael, in a Dáil debate on the Act noted the inherent complexities:

> There is a major gap in the Act because the first thing a mother or father hears is the notice to quit because of the behaviour of the child. There is no provision for binding them to the peace and no steps to assist the family with counselling or treatment for the child. There is a case where the parents may be evicted while the offender is still pushing drugs in the area (Dáil Eireann 1999).

A respondent reported such an incident. He described how his best friend's presence at his own family's house resulted in eviction.

> *Some of his family was after being thrown out several months before hand and he came around. He was a drug taker himself but never convicted. He came around at Christmas to see his mother. Somebody seen him going into the home and that woman was thrown out because her son came to see her at Christmas for a half hour. He didn't come into the area with drugs, he only came to see his mother. He seen her and then left. She got a letter a week and a half later and was ousted out of them flats* (5/2/02).

Since the 1997 Act sanctioned information exchange between DCC and the various health boards, rent subsidies can now be terminated if someone has been evicted from DCC housing for anti-social behaviour. Therefore, the chances of getting private rented accommodation for evictees are very low. When asked if any support systems were available to those who have been evicted, the DCC representative stated that people who were evicted or who were threatened with eviction, knew their way around the system and were knowledgeable about their rights and entitlements; therefore they would need little support (27/1/03).

A community worker stressed the difficulties of distinguishing between a drug dealer and a drug user. While the Act focuses predominantly on drug dealing, the term 'anti-social behaviour' encompasses many behaviours:

> *I mean, that housing act was something the communities were campaigning for. It was something that people were looking for, the power to be able to evict people from local authority housing because of drug dealing. I suppose again at the time people didn't think all that clearly about the fact, well, that a lot of anti-social behaviour would be associated with drug use as well as drug dealing so if you are saying they should be evicted for anti-social behaviour, you're saying they should be evicted for drug use...I suppose it wasn't thought out. The 1997 Housing Act looked like something that might work but what does it do? It throws people with lots of problems out of their house* (22/5/01).

However, at the time, concern was expressed by some community residents that DCC wasn't doing enough to enforce the Housing Act. When asked about ICON's reaction to the Housing Act being implemented, a participant responded that it was 'mixed', mainly due to the opposing viewpoints of the residents and community workers in the area:

> *I remember there being a discussion and local people were in favour of much stricter housing legislation, anti-social behaviour and throwing people out etc. I remember chairing a very interesting meeting - I happened to be chairing the Task Force at this stage - and there were no community reps there but we had discussed the issue before. At the particular meeting naturally enough, people who were working in drugs projects and who were working with the homeless people were saying the Housing*

Act was too draconian. I felt as chair I had to defend that because I knew the views of the community. People were saying (the act) was "too easy" and complaining "There hasn't been one eviction of anti-social behaviour over all the years. We need much tighter and stronger laws in relation to this." That would still be there I'd suggest. Local people would feel it isn't strong enough (30/1/03).

This has been confirmed through Working Class Action's response to the National Crime Council Consultation Report of 2002:

> In regards to the vetting of prospective tenants there have been cases of relevant information being withheld from residents groups. In some cases anti-social tenants who were found to be unacceptable to residents groups in the area were placed in other communities undoubtedly by concealing this fact. We would call for the increased and consistent use of the Housing Miscellaneous Act. This provides for the eviction of anti-social tenants and is strongly supported by most residents and community groups (Working Class Action 2002b: 1).

The role of the Gardaí in deciding who does or does not get tenancy in the north inner-city was made clear by the DCC representative. He cited the example of the refurbishment of St. Joseph's Mansions (now Killarney Court) by CLUAID, a social housing agency. The respondent stated that round table discussions on possible tenants were held over a four day period in Store Street Gardaí Station between Gardaí, members of ICON, and DCC. CLUAID, in effect, had contracted DCC to help it in the vetting process to secure reputable tenants. The Gardaí (where possible) had provided information on all prospective tenants called for interviews. While the function of the Gardaí as providers of background information on individuals is seen as a vital instrument in curbing potential problems, their role clearly halts at the eviction process. A Gardaí respondent explains:

> *No, you see the Corpo is responsible for Corporation houses, the same as a landlord is responsible for his own house. If you had somebody living here who was wrecking the place upstairs, or using it for drug dealing, it's a matter for the landlord to shift. I'd say that it happens that the police are contacted in relation to these kinds of things, and they'd know what's happening. Well, it's really primary a role for the Corporation The*

Corporation would be under hassle, a lot of hassle, for not doing it. A lot of people who are living in certain blocks of flats and certain houses, or estates are not doing anything about them. So, it is a preferable thing that the Corporation do something about them (26/7/01).

Surfacing issues motivated, in 1998, the North Inner-City Drugs Task Force and the Inter-agency Drug Project to host a conference on housing. Concerns raised included the increasing numbers of families affected by drug use presenting at homeless agencies (such as Focus Ireland and the Simon Community) and families remaining in a cycle of homelessness with which they were unlikely to disengage. Accepted also was the notion that drug users present many problems for services due to lifestyle behaviours. The recommendation that a statutory/NGO case management system be in place for evicted drug users was agreed by all attending but the responsibility for the development of the system remained in question (North Inner-City Drugs Task Force and The Inter-Agency Drugs Project 1998). Such a system still has not been devised at the time of writing (2004) and evicted drug users remain for the most part, out of the loop with no support services and little understanding of how to re-engage in the Dublin City Council system.[165]

The conflict between anti-drug activists, NGO's, and the local community over the lack of support came to a head - rather publicly - at Combat Poverty Agency's 2000 Conference on Poverty, Drugs, and Policy, attended by this researcher.[166] A workshop debate between Merchants Quay Ireland[167] and COCAD over the Housing Act led to a more heated exchange between individuals and families who had been directly or indirectly affected by the Act and COCAD representatives. The argument culminated in one inner-city resident pointing accusingly at the Combat Poverty representative and - referring to COCAD's marches on homes - asking him if he realised that Combat

[165] This has been borne out by this researcher's work-related data which indicates that individuals are provided with no information on eviction. Many are surprised at their local Health Board's refusal to pay rent allowance once private accommodation is secured. Individuals remain unsure as to the time frame for re-application. This seems to conflict with the DCC's respondent's view that such individuals need little support or information.

[166] *'Poverty, Drugs, and Policy'*, Dublin Castle, February 2000.

[167] Ireland's largest NGO supporting drug users.

Poverty had funded her son's homelessness.[168]

Calls have been made for the review of the Housing Act. At a 2001 ICON Conference,[169] a workshop on housing issues revealed that some residents believed the original premise of the Act to have been compromised by community attention to non-drug related anti-social behaviour. Complaints arose in relation to residents using the Act to help evict neighbours for behaviours deemed more irritating than anti-social. In one example given, a neighbour of a conference attendee threatened her with eviction (citing the Act) because he felt the women's children should not be kicking a ball against his outside wall in the evenings. There was a general consensus in the workshop that a review and evaluation of the Act should take place. To date, this has not happened.

7.2.2 Disengagement

ICON, instrumental to the provision of the Act, undertook a prominent caretaker's role in overseeing local housing committees, providing them with resources and technical support. Having also supported the marches and anti-drug meetings, ICON then became vulnerable to community suspicion about its motives. Once heralded as a fine working community network, ICON was now seen by many in the community as the movers and shakers of the anti-drug movement, the organisation that decided who was marched on, and who lived where. More importantly ICON and its members, in the eyes of many, became synonymous with the violence and intimidation which became associated with the anti-drug movement:

> *I was asked, I was dictated, to go to a meeting with ICON in ICON's office. When I walked in there there was nine or so ICON members including* (name) *who is now head of* (organisation) *as well as three known paramilitaries in the area, failed gangsters, sitting with ICON, holding hands. It was crazy to see that, crazy to see that. I told* (name of ICON chairperson) *that* (29/1/00).

[168] This was a direct reference to the Combat Poverty Agency's £15,000 funding of COCAD. The incident was witnessed by this researcher.
[169] "Rights, Responsibilities and Resources" Conference, 1st-3rd November, Ard Ri Hotel, Waterford.

In the *Brass Munkie*, a magazine produced by current or ex-drug users,[170] 'TC', was interviewed about her experience of being marched on one night by anti-drug activists.[171] She estimated over a hundred people outside her door shouting "Pushers out!" Worringly, she recognised her own mother in the crowd. On seeing her, TC realised that her mother had joined the crowd unaware of where the crowd was heading. Realising who they were about to march on, her mother began screaming at the leaders to stop. Her mother defended her, claiming that TC had only been a resident of the flat for a couple of months and that she wasn't a drug dealer. TC states:

> The leaders realised they had made a mistake. Then they told me that they would print 3000 leaflets to be delivered to every home in the area with apologies to me that they they had made a mistake. In the crowds I had seen a member of ICON's steering committee and there were pictures being taken. I asked the ICON member for the pictures not be used. I went to bed that night terrified; I couldn't sleep. I was thinking strongly about going back on the gear[172] after the incident (Brass Munkie 1999: 40).

The article concludes with the postscript:

> It has been eight weeks since this incident and no apologies from the activists have been forthcoming. Also, the photographs taken at the scene have not been given to TC despite repeated requests.

Another manifestation of the belief that ICON and the anti-drug movement were one and the same and therefore held similar powers could be seen in the community's approach to ICON; some proactively went to ICON to avoid being targeted by the movement:

> *You know, in the ICON office when it was up there in the old office at the time, like, day after day they had people coming in on behalf of their family members just totally... They didn't know what to do, terrified they were going to be marched on, mothers saying, "I don't know what to do, I*

[170] Circulation 2,000.

[171] This incident was corroborated by the researcher who observed this march and who, with the facilitation of the Brass Munkie editor, met TC to discuss this Brass Munkie interview and interview her about relevant issues.

[172] Colloquial term for heroin.

know my child is using drugs but..." People began to see very quickly the effect ICON was having (22/5/01).

The leaders of ICON, on the other hand, recognised that the legitimacy of ICON as a holistic community network was threatened by an element that was starting to draw much unwanted attention to the organisation. From the onset of the violence, ICON leaders made known their stand:

> *There was the street marches to show pushers that the community was fed up etc. But within that there was a whole volatile mix of people. We generally kept the line about non-violence. People who broke the line broke it without the 'go-ahead' of ICON. It was never ICON's policy* (30/1/03).

If the marching and other anti-drug events were still to continue, then ICON would use the opportunity to educate the activists on policy issues:

> *Yeah, obviously, but we kept plugging away at it because they knew they were going to get their pound of flesh when we went on the march. They knew they were going to get some satisfaction by marching into a flat and telling this person he was wrong in what he was doing. But while they were there they would listen to what we were trying to do which was to highlight the bigger argument. A lot of people, I believe, were much more informed after many months of this* (28/11/01).

As the violence and the ICON/anti-drug movement association grew, ICON made a more determined attempt to distance itself from the rogue element. The argument for this lay in the leaders' veering towards a more policy driven objective that would address not only supply and control mechanisms but also those of drug treatment and rehabilitation. As one community leader put it, '*We became too involved in activism to the detriment of developing policies*' (3/8/01).

There seems no doubt that the leaders of ICON undertook specific measures to steer the movement away from the power base it had assumed under ICON once it became clear that its initial objectives were being jeopardised. From its first seminar in Kilkenny in 1993 when the vigilante tag was mentioned as a reason for not resurrecting CPAD, until

later seminars in Cavan,[173] and Dundalk,[174] after the street campaign had been very active, documentation exists which testifies to the constant conflict in the community in relation to an aggressive component. The diligent record keeping of ICON administrators on AGM's, seminars, conferences, and meetings allows good insight into the internal struggle of the community over the activities of the anti-drug movement. Frequently recurring themes of praising those involved with the street campaign whilst reiterating ICON's non-violent approach is indicative of the balance that ICON leaders were continually trying to achieve.

> It has been a very difficult time for communities and the people involved in the street campaign, patrols and marching have put in a lot of work. However, ICON has always had the slogan, "Pushers Beware; Addicts we care" and been committed to a peaceful campaign.[175]

The process of separation did not come easily. The conflict between those who wanted to maintain the marching and patrols and those shifting to policy ideals led to ICON forming the Citywide Drugs Crisis Campaign[176] in order to offset the grassroots approach which it had initially resourced and supported. Simultaneously, the more prominent anti-drug activists purposely moved away from ICON - seeing it as having sold out - to join COCAD. One community worker stated that he advised the activists against this move as he felt that Citywide was the more fruitful direction to now take (3/8/01).

The existing tension in the community, the need to re-examine the future of the movement, and the need not to lose sight of the democratic approach surfaced at the 1997 Cavan conference. While some argued for a more militant approach to dealing with drug peddlers, others wanted a more peaceful campaign. The conflict had come to a head when the issues of grassroots versus policy were discussed, illustrating the intimacy of the community itself. Referring to the dissident element, a community worker stated:

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[173] ICON Seminar, February 14th -16th, 1997, Cavan
[174] 4th ICON Conference, October 15th - 17th. 1998, Dundalk
[175] ICON Annual General Meeting, October 23rd, 1997, Dublin
[176] Known as 'Citywide.'

They (anti-drug activists) *would have been known under this ICON banner. I remember really difficult meetings somewhere in the middle of '96 or '97 at an ICON conference. Somewhere around this there seemed to be some sort of a kind of ceasefire called. There was a stop, or a pause at least, around the marching... It was very, very heavy. There was this woman who was trying to evaluate, or she was facilitating this with* (activist name), (activist name), (activist name) *and it was very hot and heavy. I remember very late at night ending up getting threatened over something completely...something else, you know. Someone threatened to shoot me or whatever and was getting very het up about it, but this was over something stupid. We all had far too much to drink; it was nothing to do with drugs or anything. It seemed to be the fallback position if any disagreement broke out. There was some kind of a pause thereafter then. The pause would have been deliberately elongated as the community leadership regained control or something like that. So that you had this NICCAD emerge. You had a collection of different groupings such as Ballybough Against Drugs*[177] (14/2/01).

COCAD gained its own momentum, galvanising all the street based anti-drug organisations across the city, eventually achieving a far higher profile in anti-drug activism than ICON ever did. However unintentionally, the legacy of ICON is its perceived alliance with the anti-drug movement. Many would argue that the organisation worked alongside the community to rid the north inner-city of the visible chaos of drug use. This it undoubtedly did; but the means by which it was deemed to do so remains a contentious issue within the community.

The organisation also gave the anti-drug movement an official stamp of approval when its own leaders maintained a dual role of ICON representative and anti-drug activist. They were, after all, present at all of the meetings and marches, often acting as facilitators and in some cases mediators between the activists and potential evictees. This was confirmed by seven respondents who either attended the meetings or who were indeed marched on.

However, the question remains as to why the leaders of ICON had not acted more

[177] Both North Inner City Communities Against Drugs and Ballybough Against Drugs were affiliated to COCAD.

quickly to control the aggressive element. One activist, who stated he was not involved with this element within the movement, offered what seems to be a commonly held view among non-ICON respondents: that the leaders of ICON in a voracious attempt to be seen to address the drugs situation became blinkered to the activities being carried out in its name.

> *I suspect that ICON kind of created the monster. They found after a while they weren't able to control the monster. So they kind of started distancing themselves* (30/11/00).

A former ICON chair disputes this, arguing that the leaders helped prevent the escalation of violence:

> *We were aware that a lot of people wanted to do it and I am sure if it had happened it would have got public support, if it happened on a big scale. Of course it did happen. We would have arguments and rows etc. It could have been taken over and that was due to the skill of the people involved. It was a very testing time because if you were chairing a meeting, a smaller group or steering group, some of the people wanted to be more militant* (30/8/01).

The tension which existed within the community, and the role that ICON played in trying to restrain the aggressive element are not unusual elements in the dynamics of vigilantism. The post-Cherokee war era in the south east of the America in the 1760's saw a growing number of criminal outlaw groups who were running rampant during this period of instability. In order to counteract the activities of these men, another group (mostly composed of yeomen) formed in the states of North and South Carolina. Known as the 'Regulators', they initially sought reforms within the tax system and in the political representation of those living in more rural areas but then began to target rogue elements in the area. Increasingly, an inner-group within the Regulators attempted to eradicate these anti-social elements through violent and often sadistic means (Cutler 1969; Johnston 1992).

In order to counteract the arbitrary and violent activities of the Regulators (who had begun to punish those who disagreed with their stance on moral issues), a counter-

group emerged. The 'Moderators', as the name suggests, formed in order to temper and subdue members of the Regulators. Both groups claimed the same goals - to end lawlessness and bring stability to communities in the Carolina states. The bloody conflict between the two groups over a two decade period (compounded by the activities of the original outlaw groups) was not likely to have contributed to stability of any kind. However, their civil war did eventually force the centralised government to give in and establish local court systems (Little and Sheffield 1983).

Well-meaning vigilante leaders who lose control to aggressive followers are not unusual and, according to Burrows (1976) should sometimes be even expected given the often volatile situations which surface as a result of local conflict. Despite ICON's own seemingly tenacious attempts to control the perceived "monster" it had created locally, it never managed to fully persuade the men at the fore of the anti-drug movement to abandon their more aggressive tactics. ICON's energy was eventually channeled into a more macro-level approach. The formation of the Citywide Drugs Crisis Campaign in 1995, which held a more policy-based stance, stood as a manifestation of ICON's final attempt to gather in and harness the activities of the street activists whilst still promoting a single goal - the curbing of the heroin problem in Dublin. The leaders of the anti-drug movement responded by distancing themselves from Citywide, instead strengthening their partnerships with similar, like-minded grassroot groups around Dublin.

ICON seems to have left two opposing legacies which both united and divided parts of the north inner-city. It played a pivotal role in gathering in and emotionally arming the community to fight the drug problem. Many of those who came under its wing had not much experience dealing with governmental agencies and ICON provided them with the opportunity to meet face to face with the movers and shakers in drug policy development. A prominent anti-drug activist clarified how ICON gave encouragement to those who had become a little war weary in the battle against drugs:

> *At that time, statutory bodies would barely speak to you on the phone never mind sit around tables. But as a result of ICON and a lot of decent people, fairly intelligent people, we got together and challenged all the*

statutory bodies and outlined and exposed the services, or rather the non-existent services that were there. Eventually we did get the statutory bodies responsible for this to sit around, through fairly educated people on ICON, notably (ICON chairperson name). *He'd have been...I know him...not saying he'd been an inspiration to me, but he gave us a lot of confidence. He'd often used to say. "Look, you are more intelligent than these people" so eventually we did get the structures in place and we did get statutory bodies to accept they weren't doing a sufficient job and that they were negligent* (30/8/01).

Despite its exhaustive effort to galvanise the community, probably the over-riding result of ICON's involvement with the anti-drug movement is the community division it was deemed to have encouraged through its promotion of the marches and evictions and its inability to successfully disassociate itself from the rogue element who unfortunately became the more recognisable face of ICON. In the eyes of many, ICON had failed to really help the community distinguish between the bigger players of drug dealing - those making a profit and living well outside the community - and those dealing drugs to support their own habits. After all, these were the individuals who were still residing in the community, still living with their families, still someone's son or daughter, father or mother. As the drug agenda overtook ICON, it impacted on all of its other activities. The ground work ICON had begun with children, the elderly, local parks, and training projects became lost as the community began to equate ICON solely with drugs and then with vigilantism. According to an ICON representative, '*that did us severe damage*' (27/2/01).

7.3 Sinn Féin and the anti-drug movement

By the end of the 1980's, CPAD was experiencing failing support due to what its members regarded as people's inability to get beyond the organisation's political affiliations and its policy of non-cooperation with the police; associations with Sinn Féin and the IRA were there from the beginning (See CPAD 1988; Sinn Féin 1996). Political articles and television programmes of the time highlighted the alleged associations for the public (Munck 1988; Cullen 1990). The vast majority of interviewees - those active and not active in the anti-drug movement - believed Sinn Féin and the IRA played a

major role in anti-drug activity. Higgins and McElrath (2000) have found similar thinking in their study on young drug users in Northern Ireland.

Cullen (1990) argues that Sinn Féin did take advantage of CPAD and its popular stance. The party's representatives attended meetings more frequently, especially those of the central committee where major planning decisions were being made. 'There is little doubt' he says, 'that this suited Sinn Féin's electoral strategy' (287). Cullen (1990) also argues that the prominence of Sinn Féin in these meetings led to the exclusion of other individuals who, in supporting left wing groups such as the Workers Party may not have agreed with Sinn Féin's particular brief and objectives. Antagonism from the Workers Party in relation to their perception of Sinn Féin's involvement in the drugs issue would still be in evidence in the mid-1990's (see Workers Solidarity 1996). For one respondent active in CPAD, the association then was irrelevant:

> *First of all we were accused of being a Provo front, a Sinn Féin front, which was just an easy way out for politicians who were doing nothing. My argument was that if there were members of Sinn Féin involved in the Concerned Parents, fair play to them. It just showed up why are the others not involved? I didn't see it as a negative thing at all. I saw it as a very positive thing that people interested in politics were getting involved in the campaign. I said Fianna Fáil should be involved in this Concerned Parents, Fine Gael, and everybody else. So I didn't take the negative stuff* (27/2/01).

Some journalists believe that the alleged activities which first came to light occurred in order to boost the election chances of Sinn Féin representatives (BBC1 2001; Reilly 2002). Nicky Kehoe, a north inner-city Sinn Féin councillor, was put forward as a mayoral candidate. Leaflets delivered to the community highlighted his views on drug dealing in the area as well as Sinn Féin's policy of actively working to combat anti-social behaviour (see Sinn Féin 2000; Sinn Féin, 2002). It was clear that the party was adopting local politics as a guiding principle in its campaign. Kehoe lost the mayoral position but made a significant impact in the national elections where he marginally lost to Michael Fitzgerald, a Fianna Fáil Dublin Central candidate who was nominated late in the campaign.

A more marginal defeat occurred in Kerry North when Sinn Féin's Martin Ferris won a seat and Dick Spring lost his in a traditionally Labour stronghold (Sheehan 2002). Spring himself later mentioned the topical Sinn Féin and anti-drug affiliation:

> I find it hard to take the Sinn Féin line on drugs. They are up to their necks in peddling drugs in other parts of the island and on the other hand they're pretending they are going to save the country from drugs (Sunday Independent 2002).

Johnston (1992) maintains that political ambition can often be found hiding behind orchestrated moral panics. Citing the incidence of the San Francisco Vigilance Committee of 1856, Johnston states this neo-vigilante committee had formed to combat crime despite the fact that another successful vigilante group, operating several years earlier, had significantly controlled crime rates in the area. 'In reality,' Johnston states, 'the vigilantes were concerned with a different set of issues: political corruption and fiscal reform. In effect, the aim of the movement was to wrest control of government from the dominant group of Irish democrats' (1992: 15-16).

It is understandable that Sinn Féin's electoral strategy should encompass the drug problem. Heroin was, after all, a factor deeply affecting working class communities in multi-faceted ways and which has helped to create a section of the underclass: a second generation of drug users who have had, like their parents, little formal education and who have never worked. The lack of attention paid by other political parties to the issue at the time only serves to demonstrate that Sinn Féin had its ear closer to the electoral ground. However, the integrity of Sinn Féin's decision to adopt the issue has been questioned by some participants:

> *People like Sinn Féin were looking for a platform in the south to make them relevant because most people down here don't care what happens to Northern Ireland. You know they could fucking sell it to the Russians and most people wouldn't care. So the big thing at that time apart from stuff like unemployment was drugs and it was a way they could force themselves in and make themselves relevant. I remember some Sinn Féin activists actually saying, with smugness, "We'll sort out the drug problem and then we'll sort out unemployment and all the other issues", and it was like they were going to solve all of society problems by*

marching and brute force and that worried a lot of people especially with the thuggery and violence that was coming with it (5/4/01).

In Donore Avenue, two Sinn Féin blokes were done for drugs and guns. They get protection off the drug dealers and they can take over the operation. That's what I am saying, that's the paramilitaries. They are feeding my culture with drugs. They've taken over now. It's a multi-million pound industry (29/1/00).

They didn't give a bollox about the drug problem...they only wanted votes (12/4/01).

Community feelings towards the drug problem in the north inner-city could scarcely be termed a moral panic. Justifiably, people remained highly concerned about the social destruction heroin was causing. The anti-drug movement did cultivate a gloomy outlook if there was inaction on the part of the community, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Sinn Féin's particular role in this remains unclear. However, the seriousness of the drug problem existed solely and firmly without any orchestration of a moral panic. Sinn Féin's response to the issue - putting it to the fore of its political agenda - is no more unacceptable and suspicious than another political party choosing a topical electoral mandate.

Suspicion about Sinn Féin's motive in supporting the movement may have been exacerbated by CPAD's strict policy of non-cooperation with the police which mirrored Sinn Féin's own historical policy. The policy led somewhat to a siege mentality amongst members of CPAD. Its newsletters frequently contained legal advice to its members on solicitors, court procedures, house raids, and means of negotiating interactions with the Gardaí:

> Remember that if you have any type of conversation, no matter how innocent it is, you may be supplying the Gardaí with ammunition for use against yourself, your neighbours and CPAD members. Never sign anything in a Garda Station other than your bail bond... If on a vigil, do not be provoked by the Gardaí into violent action as this is what they want. Similarly if on a picket on a Gardaí station do not be provoked by members of the public being instigated by the Gardaí or local pushers

into causing trouble (CPAD (c): 8).

CPAD also anticipated more in-house conflict and what to do in the case of "grassing:"

> If they (Gardaí) produce documents that they say incriminate you or evidence by someone else against you, incriminating you, do not be alarmed as it may be false. Even if it is not false, stick with your line of reply as accomplice evidence is not enough to convict you unless the person involved is willing to go to court and swear it under oath (CPAD (c): 8).

A Sinn Féin representative believed the police had ulterior motives for their own involvement in anti-drug activity. Many parts of the interview reflected these sentiments:

> *It wasn't about heroin dealing as far as the Special Branch were concerned; it was about smashing the Concerned Parents. They began to see us grow in numbers. They began to see the success in areas and what they were afraid of was that next week it could be something else that would turn into votes... that Sinn Féin would get their people elected. And that was the only agenda that they were working from... the coalition government of Labour and Fine Gael. And that was the reality of that exercise. Well, they introduced a political squad of the Special Branch and what they would do, the Special Branch, they would attend and sit outside large public meetings in relation to heroin. They would arrest people, constituents going to it, and put the fear of God up them, that this was a Sinn Féin tactic and that their homes would be raided and they would be charged, that they were supporting Sinn Féin. And it put some people off* (1/8/01).

A community worker in the north inner-city also believed that the police targeted Concerned Parents simply because the organisation was considered to be a Sinn Féin front.

> *There were many Sinn Féin people involved in CPAD. My recollection is that their involvement was honourable* (3/8/01).

Sinn Féin state that the government was unsettled at the power which CPAD was giving to working class communities and that through using the Gardaí (amongst its other arms) it was responsible for CPAD's destruction. Sinn Féin accuses the Gardaí of trying

to 'break the spirit' of anti-drugs activists and calls for rediversion of Gardaí resources 'away from the political intelligence gathering towards anti-drugs and community policing' (Sinn Féin 1996: 10).

The anti-police line was adopted by the second wave of anti-drug activism in the 1990's. It continued to be promoted in literature that was delivered door-to-door in the community. Gardaí stations were often targeted for protests when anti-drug activists were arrested. One particularly large protest occurred when seven men were arrested under Section 30 in connection with the murder of P.J. Judge, a well known crime lord. The day of the protests, there was a 7:00 am raid by Gardaí at various locations around the north side of Dublin including the north inner-city, Finglas, and Cabra. Those arrested were individually brought for questioning to seven different Gardaí stations: Clontarf, Raheny, Coolock, Whitehall, Cabra, Finglas, and Howth. According to a Gardaí respondent, at least two of the men arrested were known Sinn Féin members and one of these men, arrested in Finglas, was brought to Raheny where the respondent was stationed. At lunch time, supporters of the seven men arrived at Raheny Station carrying COCAD banners. According to the respondent, there were approximately fifteen protesters who stayed for approximately one hour, chanting anti-drug slogans with loud-speakers (20/7/01).

Unlike Concerned Parents in the 1980's, COCAD and its relevant umbrella groups specifically sought the support of other agencies - both drug and non drug related - to bring to the fore the problems they deemed the police themselves were creating. The parallel between COCAD's non co-operation with the police policy and that of Sinn Féin's own policy no doubt added to suspicions that membership of the two were somehow intermingled. Community organisations dependent on government funding were, as a result, hesitant to support COCAD in the anti-police policy even though many of their workers were involved in the marches on people's homes.

Another respondent believed the Sinn Féin and anti-drug activism connection throughout both phases of the movement to be more negative in its repercussions in the 1980's

than in the 1990's.

> *I mean the politicians of the day - and again it's the same thing that's come up this time around the Sinn Féin thing you know - that was all thrown at them. "The involvement of Sinn Féin..." blah, blah. It was a very strong reaction by politicians, by the Gardaí, with state agencies demonising it. Which in many ways was a pity. I think the Sinn Féin thing was quite strong, because again, even though that happened this time around, back in the '80's the sense that ...Sinn Féin as being dangerous - it would have been much stronger than it is now. Now, if you like, with the peace process and all this...they've kind of come into the fold a bit. I mean, back in the 1980's, they'd have been still sort of pariahs....from the State's perspective, yeah. Once they saw Sinn Féin involvement, that that was it. They couldn't see the positive stuff in it. I think that was a big pity, as I say, there was quite a number of people involved who did want to look at more long term issues* (22/5/01).

The longest serving chairperson of COCAD, Cecil Johnson, declined to publicly address the issue, instead offering a non-committal statement during an estate management seminar:

> Subsequently, there has been a lot of innuendo and propaganda suggesting that the anti-drugs movement is a front for this or that or whatever. It's used as an excuse because we are bringing uncomfortable pressure for change unto the agencies that we believe are responsible in some ways for dealing with these issues (Johnson 1999: 5).

The election of Gerry Adams as an MP and changes in Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act allowed Sinn Féin to get its viewpoints across more widely and these were deemed by a Sinn Féin representative to be pivotal moments in terms of legitimising the voice of Sinn Féin. According to this respondent, once Adams was elected there was a national drive to set up constituency committees to look seriously at local politics in light of upcoming elections since the national issue - through the peace process - was being dealt with (1/8/01). The drugs problem was clearly becoming an issue peculiar to working class areas. An emotive issue, it provided a platform for easier galvanisation of the community and increasingly, Sinn Féin became more vocal about its attempts to

deal with the problem.

In 1996, Sinn Féin issued a document entitled *Empowering Communities: A Sinn Féin Response to the Drugs Epidemic* which was a response to the Eastern Health Board Report of 1994 which profiled problem drug users. Unsurprisingly, the report indicated they were mostly male, undereducated, unemployed, and living in disadvantaged areas. The document presents the stark reality faced by those living in communities affected by drug use. Linking drug use to working class isolation and disadvantage, Sinn Féin lays the blame for the problem clearly at the feet of successive governments whose response it claims, was 'both shameful and neglectful' (Sinn Féin 1996: 2).

A resultant self-policing agenda has been at the forefront of anti-drug activism throughout the 1980's and 1990's and this is mirrored in the document. Acknowledging that drug dealing is only one of many anti-social behaviours seen in working class communities Sinn Féin calls for the establishment of local committees in the south to deal with these behaviours (such as those already working in the six counties). Reverting to earlier anti-police themes in its literature, Sinn Féin points out that the RUC 'has in the past hounded local ad-hoc and elected committees to the point they were unable to function' (1996: 11). Its stance on the south diverges from that of the north; in a pre-general election campaign newsletter, Nicky Kehoe, Sinn Féin's Dublin Central candidate, called for 'real' community policing and the recruitment of working class people from working class areas (Sinn Féin 2000: 1).

7.3.1 Sinn Féin, the IRA, and the drug issue

As stated earlier, the IRA response to the drug situation was known to have been carried out by various groups going under the name of Direct Action Against Drugs (Nicholas and Mollan 1993; Thomas and Mulholland 1994; The Guardian 2000) who used such actions against drug dealers. Punishment beatings rose significantly in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday agreement in 1996 but decreased slightly around 2002 perhaps due to upcoming local elections. Interestingly, sensitivities to the issue

were shown when Sinn Féin did not want punishment beatings included in the British proposed Independent Ceasefire Monitor (Cusack 2002).

In late 2001 and 2002 media in the south were quick to report on alleged anti-drug and vigilante activity by elected Sinn Féin officials in North Kerry and Dublin West. This led to these specific issues and other Sinn Féin related vigilante activity being reported by journalists (see for example O'Kelly 2001; Dudley-Edwards 2002; Hayes 2002; Kealy 2002; Walshe 2002; Collins 2004).

Other political parties, namely Labour and Fianna Fáil were quick to point out the growing problem of suburban working class housing complexes mirroring those of West Belfast. In Tallaght, the number of houses with gables displaying large IRA murals next to anti-drug graffiti was increasing, a situation brought to the attention of DCC by Labour TD for Tallaght West, Pat Rabbitte. In response, DCC outlawed the murals (Ulster Television 2002).

Associations of an alliance between Sinn Féin and the anti-drug movement were strengthened through *An Phoblacht,* the Republican newspaper. An Phoblacht consistently monitored and publicised the activities of COCAD and COCAD leadership frequently conducted, and participated in, interviews about the drug problem in working class areas. (See for example, An Phoblacht 1998; An Phoblacht 1999a; An Phoblacht 1999b). Anti-police rhetoric was again common with An Phoblacht which detailed alleged Gardai harassment of anti-drug activists. An Phoblacht was vocally cynical about COCAD members being tried in the Special Criminal Court (Pierse 1998) and they welcomed the dismissal of a case in which three anti-drug activists were charged with assault (Marshall 1997).[178]

In teasing out the relationship between Sinn Féin and the anti-drug movement in an interview, a former detective of the Drug Squad, stated simply, '*COCAD was definitely Sinn Féin and Citywide was definitely not*' (26/7/01). Other interviewees also believed

[178] This was a separate incident to the one involving Josie Dwyer.

there were underlying connections between Sinn Féin, the IRA, and the anti-drug movement. These links were known to have made during the early days of the Concerned Parents Against Drugs and remained in existence during the movement's second phase with COCAD. In reference to the second phase one respondent stated:

> *A lot of these people would have Republican associations and would be probably more supportive of the dissident elements now. For what particular reason or not I don't know. I would see it more as being in their own self interests than anything else. That climate of chaos allows them to carry on in their own various ways* (14/2/01).

Another two respondents insinuate the political connection of the movement:

> *I really don't like these people. I really don't like what they are doing to the community. I particularly dislike Sinn Féin for showing them the tactics and techniques that they learned in the last 30 years to fight the war up north* (2/12/00).

> *There would have been a Sinn Féin paramilitary part of that. There would have been some people like, who had dubious backgrounds, coming from criminal backgrounds* (30/11/00).

Another more personal example of the perceived authority that Sinn Féin have in working class areas surfaced in an interview. A respondent, having been marched on for drug selling (which he strenuously denied) and raided by the police several times over a period of a month, sought help from a local Sinn Féin member who agreed to introduce him to the local Sinn Féin representative. An appointment was arranged in Hardwicke Street flats and on meeting the representative, the respondent explained his predicament. The representative then contacted one of the local leading anti-drug activists, an action which surprised the respondent:

> *I mean, I was going to him, he was a politician, and he's actually ringing a member of the public to get an opinion on me. So I thought that very odd (20/6/01).*

The meeting ended acrimoniously with the respondent being threatened with repercussions if he had anything to do with drugs in the area. The Sinn Féin

representative stated he would talk to him again when he could get more clarity on the matter and the respondent was asked to attend a total of six meetings with anti-drug activists to defend himself against the accusations. At the last of these meetings, the Sinn Féin representative - who he had initially hoped would come to his aid - asked for a private meeting in anticipation of an upcoming anti-drugs meeting due to be attended by the media. The respondent stated that the politician said to him:

> *"Look, we're being singled out here as infiltrating Concerned Parents and more-or-less taking over and running it. I would like you to understand that there may be Sinn Féin members, which there are in all areas, but they just participate on the line as just ordinary concerned parents. They may be a member of Sinn Féin, but they are going as a concerned parent. The fact that they have anything to do with Sinn Féin is irrelevant to what they are actually doing against drug abuse. The police will be there next week. There will possibly be media coverage. As far as I know, you're ok. I checked out your story. You've been checked out a hundred percent and you got to keep this to yourself. You are going to be asked a question while you are at the meeting - Do you know any of the three people that are members of Sinn Féin that will be at next meeting?" One was* (name) *and another two that were actually in this office at the time. All these had an input at the first meeting when all the roaring and aggression was going on, they all had an input into it. Kind of bullying tactics, you know, standing up in front of you and screaming in both ears and pulling your face, but apparently everything was going to be forgiven now! Once I agreed to say that Sinn Féin had nothing to do with it, nothing to do with me. I'd never contacted any of them; I'd never seen any of them. They were actually asking me to lie, that I'd never actually seen them before* (20/6/01).

On the condition that the respondent agreed not to acknowledge the three Sinn Féin members as anti-drug activists, the activists agreed to overlook his drug use and allow him to stay in his house. When he attended the meeting (attended also by politicians and the media) and was asked whether he could identify any of the men in the room as Sinn Féin members, he lied.

> *I lied for the safety of my wife, of my daughter, for everything I worked for. I served in this country, I served six years in the army. As far as I was concerned I was on the border. Like that was the way I was brought up. I*

was on the border and if there was a war or anything I was there or would be there, no matter what ever happens. I didn't know much about Sinn Féin at all, I didn't know the power they had. I knew by the fifth meeting their power because everything was explained to me and I was terrified I was going to lose me legs, was going to be shot, and I was in fear for me wife and me daughter. So I lied. Still, to this day, I live in terror because of their power (20/6/01).

As with the leadership of ICON, there seems to have been a recognition on the part of Sinn Féin that some of its members may not have been acting in the organisation's best interest. A delegate believed that 'loose cannons' did exist within the party but the sizeable representation of Sinn Féin in the north inner-city meant that these individuals were difficult to monitor. Furthermore, he stated:

> *There was a small element who were not, let me tell you, members of Sinn Féin, because I will name them. They were thugs and they were in it for their own selfish ends and they were going under the umbrella of the Republican movement. They were targeting some unfortunate drug addicts in this area and would stop them on the street and give them a beating and empty their pockets. I deplore that. I absolutely condemn that and ostracise myself from such thuggery within a movement* (1/8/01).

Sinn Féin's desire to distance itself from the thug element seems to have been attempted at a more low key, less proactive level than that of ICON, preferring instead to tackle the issue with members of the community who openly challenged the party on its alleged affiliation with an aggressive anti-drug element.

7.3.2 The IRA, social control, and vigilantism

The anti-drug movement had become increasingly associated with using similar tactics for social control as the IRA, and loyalist paramilitary organisations are known to use.[179] This 'alternative' or 'popular' justice has developed within Northern nationalist communities to combat anti-social behaviour. Early public manifestations of this were

[179] For detailed accounts see Nicholas and Mollan 1993; Thompson and Mulholland 1994; Thompson and Mulholland 1995; Kennedy 1994; McKittrick 2004.

frequently witnessed in the 1970's when nationalist women who fraternised with British soldiers were 'tarred and feathered' and left openly for the community to view.[180]

Recognising that nationalists have turned their backs on the legitimate policing service, Munck (1988) argues that 'partly out of practical necessity but more through community pressure the IRA was thrown into the role of community police in nationalist areas' (1988 : 43). Threats to law and order within these communities, he argues, are met with the IRA's enforcement of its own internal codes of conduct[181] and these methods of enforcement are widely accepted by the greater nationalist population[182] who often turn to the IRA when they deem justice is needed. Primarily used are 'punishment beatings' or kneecappings to ward off youths engaged in crimes affecting the community such as theft and joyriding.[183] Any deviation from supporting the IRA is also seen as worthy of punishment. Thus:

> A local politician who speaks out against paramilitary activities may be beaten because his actions are perceived by the paramilitaries as a threat to their authority. Likewise, a local woman who refuses to sign a petition may find her property vandalised because this too is seen as a threat. Neither of these activities would be seen by the community as a crime but they are seen as such by paramilitaries and many have been punished for such behaviour in recent years. Thus the guilt or innocence of the victims of paramilitary vigilantism is not a straightforward issue. All that observers can - and should - notice is that the issue of 'guilt' was straightforward for the paramilitaries and only for them (Munck 1988: 252).

A respondent who described himself as a former member of the Official Republican movement stated:

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[180] For an in-depth look at the role of shame in crime control see Brathwaite (1989).

[181] An Phoblacht has mirrored this acceptance, referring to 'Nationalist Community Policing caseloads.' (Gallagher 1997). Also, violation of internal codes within Loyalist organisations have been met with equal if not more severe measures. Most notably, the Shankhill Butchers, a very small but highly active anti-Catholic group of men, meted out extreme punishments to Protestants who vocally opposed them (Boyd 1987).

[182] Brewer *et al.* (1998) point out that the very evidence of anti-social behaviour - especially in light of the punishment given - suggests that some values are not necessarily commonly held.

[183] The IRA seem to target more youth for punishment beatings than do loyalist paramilitaries. The deliberate attempt of loyalist paramilitary groups to proactively absorb teens into the ranks may be one of the reasons why this is so (Silke and Taylor 2000).

Yeah, there was a deliberate strategy. If you look at what happened in Belfast...people should look at, in a sense, the debate over the RUC. The debate over the RUC has nothing to do with the badges or emblems, the introduction or the implementation of Patten. Those are sideshows. What this is about is the same as what it's about in this community: the control of people. The Provisionals have used military power to control the people in the North. That's why there is no real public dissent. The answer to dissent, is what they dealt to (name) *and have dealt to 30 people in the North since 1994 even though they're on ceasefire. People who are considered to be expendable have been shot dead by them!* (24/7/01).[184]

Lack of confidence in the police and the resultant popular justice enacted is not confined to nationalists living in the north. Interviews indicated there is prevalent thinking that Sinn Féin and the IRA exercise informal social control in Dublin working class areas not only in relation to crime but also in relation to violation of both internal and external Sinn Féin and IRA codes. The perception that there is a lack of a strong effective police role in the north inner-city and growing popular justice led the same respondent to formally approach the Gardaí about the situation:

We wrote from this resident's association to the Superintendent of Fitzgibbon Street in 1996 saying there could only be one police force and that either the police were prepared to do their job or they should publicly acknowledge that they had given over areas of policing to the control of the Provisionals. And that's what has happened. One woman only approached me last week and seemed proud when she was telling me this: that her house had been robbed and she had reported it to the local Sinn Féin office. I said to her, "Surely Fitzgibbon Street or Store Street [185] is where you should have been reporting it? You wouldn't have gone to the local Fianna Fáil office to report it. So why did you go the Provisionals?" "Ah well, they'll get it back" (24/7/01).

Research conducted by Munck (1988) and Sluka (1989) found that many individuals in nationalist areas in Northern Ireland welcomed such vigilante activity, seeing it as a necessary action in light of the absence of any legitimate policing system in their areas. In

[184] The view of this respondent may be seen as unsurprising given his standing as a former member of the Official Republican Movement.
[185] North inner-city Gardaí stations.

some cases, the IRA were criticised for not doing enough to curtail anti-social behaviour. Similarly, loyalist paramilitary activity is sometimes seen as acceptable. David McNarry, David Trimble's advisor in the Ulster Unionist Party states 'There arguably remains a potential role for loyalist paramilitaries, because of the running down of the security forces, loyalists paramilitaries may be needed in respect of defending local communities' (McKay 2003).

An occurrence of great significance in the north inner-city mentioned by several interviewees was the death of Thomas "Tomo" Byrne, a well known figure within the Sheriff Street area. Byrne was shot dead outside "O'Neill's" pub in Summerhill on Easter Monday, 1999. His funeral is acknowledged by many to have been one of the most well attended services ever seen in the area. The media reported that a prominent member of the IRA living in East Wall, an area adjacent to Sheriff Street, was responsible for the murder (O'Loughlin 2002). The murder was seen by one respondent to be more than a single action of retribution:

> *This man was shot in the back of the head sitting on the stool with the sun shining. Now I left the pub two hours earlier and was questioned about it though I wasn't there. He was shot in the back of the head with such impunity, in front of a nine-year old child. What that man who pulled the trigger was saying and what the people who made that decision were saying - the IRA Army Council has to sanction all assassinations - "We are not only doing that to him but we are doing that to the whole community. We are telling you that we will take no fucking shit off you"* (2/12/00).

A similar conviction was discovered by this author while proofreading an essay for a student of the Trinity Access Programme in 2001. A resident of the north inner-city, he entitled the paper "An Analysis of a Photograph" offering a behind the scenes look at the photograph published by the Daily Star on May 1st, 1999 which depicted the aftermath of Byrne's murder. The student gave personal insight into the murder of his childhood friend counteracting what he believed 'outsiders' would believe about yet another inner-city shooting:

> *Tomo was murdered not for involvement with huge drug rings, owing money, or in retaliation for another murder. He had simply been shot for*

winning a fist fight against a man who is a prominent member of a paramilitary organisation. We in the community as a whole are acutely aware of this but the nation is probably not.[186]

The respondent who was a former member of the Official Republican movement simply stated of the IRA:

The shooting of Tomo Byrne outside of Belton's[187] *a number of years ago had their involvement* (24/7/01).

These perceptions that the IRA were responsible for Byrne's death may have helped further cement within the north inner-city the idea that force can and will be used to advance the organisation's ideal not just for a united Ireland but for working class and underclass communities. The exceptionally large turnout at Byrne's funeral was seen by two respondents to signify a silent (and safer) testimony to anti-paramilitary feeling among the wider community (2/12/00; 5/2/02).

A more detailed reason for IRA involvement in the anti-drug movement was offered by the former member of the Official Republican movement. In his explanation, the role of the peace process[188] in Northern Ireland is highlighted:

People should look at 1996 very carefully. If we look at the evolution of the Provisionals from being a revolutionary movement to being a constitutional nationalist party, well....after 1994 they needed to tell their volunteers there was still a war on and they needed to distract those people from questioning the political direction of their movement. Anybody who rationally and honestly sits down and looks at the cartwheels, and the manifestations, and different shifts in policies that the Provisionals have come through over the past ten or fifteen years, you know, it's unbelievable in modern politics. They needed to have their volunteers. If you imagine any military movement who are involved in surveillance, robberies, finance, logistical operations whether it's moving weaponry around or generally training or even this army where they take

[186] Essay submitted to the Trinity Access Programme, Trinity College Dublin, Spring 2001 (used with permission). A similar situation involving a 'civilian' murdered by a member of the Provisional IRA for personal reasons has been documented by English (2003).

[187] The previous name of O'Neill's pub in Summerhill.

[188] The Northern Ireland peace process began in May 1994 and lasted until February, 1996. It stopped for 16 months and resumed in June 1997.

orders, they are used to that way of life. They need something to do. You can't move from a military footing to a civilian footing automatically, so they needed to bring them down slowly and the way to do that was the anti-drugs movement. Hence we saw the vigilante movement emerging where the Provisionals led all these marches around and attacked anybody who they claimed was a drug dealer. In many cases perhaps they were right. But they targeted the people who were obviously drug dealers or who obviously had some involvement with drugs whether it was users or petty sellers. They didn't, for instance, go after main drug dealers. There is no need to bandy names, but in general people know who they targeted and who they didn't. It became a bigger movement with the emergence of COCAD, which is a Provo front. If you look at COCAD, their south Dublin leadership were all convicted of manslaughter[189] *and are serving time in the Provisionals' compound. They are in Castlerea.*[190] *They were accepted onto the Provisionals landing. They were tried as members of the Provisionals; they were tried in the Special Criminal Court. So for them to be named as having no involvement is a bit of nonsense* (24/7/01).

Silke and Taylor (2000) reflect similar sentiments in their research on paramilitary vigilantism in the north. They discovered much higher levels of vigilante activity during the ceasefire years, drawing the conclusion that paramilitary time and energies needed some sort of channelling.[191] Moving away from using guns to administer traditional kneecappings, the IRA resorted to using baseball bats, hurling sticks and other heavy implements for punishment beatings. This, Silke and Taylor suggest, may have been due to the media sensitivity of the IRA using guns during a technical ceasefire. It is reasonable to believe then, as English (2003) does, that 'it would have been a naive observer who expected the IRA's violence to fizzle out immediately' (2003: 322).

Harris (1989) found in his research on vigilante groups in South Africa a similar phenomenon as suggested by the above respondent. Groups of well trained, once highly active individuals found themselves increasingly becoming redundant due to

[189] In relation to the death of Josie Dwyer.

[190] Castlerea prison, located in County Roscommon.

[191] Between 1991 - 1994 there were 292 officially registered punishment beatings carried out by Republicans in Northern Ireland. Between 1999 -2002, ceasefire years, there were 398 (RTE 2004). At the end of 1995, Direct Action Against Drugs were believed to have murdered six alleged drug dealers (English 2003).

political changes within their geographical regions. Despite the fact that the sole objectives they had fought for had more or less been met, they frequently turned to other causes in which their skills could be used. Interestingly, incidents of domestic violence significantly increased when these men withdrew from their activities.

White (1989) has suggested that support for the IRA may be inadvertently generated by a perceived feeling that the state looks unfavourably on any type of collective action against it. That is, sympathy for collective action may be gained not because the movement's objectives are acceptable but simply because they represent anti-government sentiments. When questioned in relation to the effect that such suspicions might have had on Sinn Féin's involvement in the anti-drug movement, an activist responded:

> *I stood up at many a meeting at midnight, going on until two or three in the morning, and said, "Look, as a Sinn Féin activist, and identified by the media and Gardaí, maybe in the interest of everything I should withdraw". There used to be an uproar! People would say, "No way! We want you here. We want you to stay and we don't want you moving off anywhere." So it was the people's decisions. They didn't give a shit. But what they wanted was guidance, leadership, help to put wording together, how to present the documents, how to say, "Here's our demands," go to the government and say, "Here's our demands", go on radio and say, "Here's the problem." That's what they wanted. But they had the determination and conviction to stand on a vigil with lamps in their hands outside the drug dealer's home. I've seen them stand seventy two hours. I've seen it. I've seen mothers carrying coffins of sons and daughters instead of the other way around. I've seen one family with five kids. I pulled two kids out of a derelict flat some years ago, lying in the kitchen dead, needles in their arms the two of them from the same family. How do you go along and say to them people, "Listen, the cops are saying because I'm a Sinn Féin activist I shouldn't be with you?"* (1/8/01).

The violence deemed to be directed against its own has alerted these communities that the IRA and indeed any of its off-shoots are choosing to create and establish their own norms. According to Bauman (2000):

> Any order is a choice, and so is the norm; but the choice of certain kinds of order limits the range of tolerable behavioural patterns and privileges and

> certain kinds of conduct as normal, while casting all other sorts as abnormal. 'Abnormal' stands for any departure from the favoured pattern; it turns to 'deviation', which is an extreme case of abnormality, a conduct calling for therapeutic or penal intervention - if the conduct in question does not differ somewhat from the preferred pattern, but transcends the boundary of tolerable choices. The distinction between mere abnormality, a matter of attention, treatment, and cure and the much more sinister 'deviation', is never clearly drawn and when drawn tends to be always hotly contested; just like the question of the limits to tolerance, that attitude which makes the difference between them (2000: 206).

Along with the creation of such norms comes the expectation that they will be fully adhered to. In the instances where violence or the threat of violence is exercised to ensure compliance, intrinsic motivation is unlikely. For as Goode (1972) states, 'Overt force can command the external trappings of honour and deference...but it cannot by fiat elicit respect in those subjects 'minds' (1972: 508). Regardless of whether respect exists or not, if there is a general perception within disadvantaged areas that paramilitary elements act as overseers and internal crime control actors, then the introduction of a social problem like heroin, where the main participants are seen as deviant, is sure to complicate matters.

7.4 Local resources

ICON and Sinn Féin clearly supported and resourced the anti-drug movement when attempting to develop a more cohesive approach to tackling the drugs issue in the north inner-city. The ideals of the movement were continually promoted through leaflets and newsletters distributed to the community by ICON as well as through An Phoblacht and other Sinn Féin related materials which reached a wider audience than that of the north inner-city. Office space and supplies were also offered by both groups, giving the movement strategic, functional bases in which to organise the street campaigns.

The practical materials and space ICON and Sinn Féin offered to the anti-drug movement allowed the leaders of the movement to network with the community at large and distribute information effectively. However, it was the assigned human resources

from both organisations which probably proved the most beneficial to the overall objective of the movement.[192] Prominent respected members of ICON and Sinn Féin orchestrated other members to mobilize and participate in the street campaigns, in turn raising the number of participants and helping to legitimize the anti-drug movement in the eyes of the community. More importantly perhaps, the individuals which both organisations lent to the movement played a vital role in drawing attention to the threat heroin was posing to the collective security of the community.

Could the anti-drug movement have survived for as long without the support and resourcing from these organisations? Perhaps they could have, on a practical but less effective level, if participants had pooled their own monies and resources. It is unlikely though that the ICON and Sinn Féin non affiliates would have had the same foothold in governmental departments afforded to these organisations nor perhaps the cultural and social capital required to negotiate policy changes. A community representative on the North Inner-City Drugs Task Force, for example, highlighted this difficulty:

> *It takes a long time to understand what the Task Force does, how it works, to understand the language that's used. You know the way that every group that comes together has its own language. It's very much designed towards professionals; all the language is professional. You know, they talk about "bench marking", and "ring fencing"- stuff that has no meaning to ordinary people...They are intimidated by the language. I think everybody who gets involved with the Task Force should be given a dictionary. You know, what the fuck all these terms...or what they mean because I think a lot of the people on the Task Force don't know what they mean. I know I don't, and I find myself agreeing to things and not really sure what I'm agreeing to. I would be too embarrassed to ask. Otherwise you'd be putting up your... "What does this mean?". There's loads of initials for various initiatives going on, that they just talk about the initials and you know...you want to ask but at the same time you don't want to be all the time... "What are you talking about, what are you talking about?" That's the way it is* (5/4/01).

Several interviewees acknowledged the imparted knowledge given to them by

[192] Cress and Snow (1996) emphasising the importance of resources neglect to acknowledge this type of resource.

representatives of ICON in particular. Sinn Féin's own ethos of working to educate the community on political issues affecting them was also a welcomed action (14/5/01a;1/8/01).

7.8 Local control

In tackling the drug problem head on, ICON and Sinn Féin usurped governmental control and jointly established mechanisms which worked particularly well in removing the distasteful face of drug activity from the street. More importantly, they both successfully motivated members of the community to engage these mechanisms in order to contribute to the overall good of the area.[193]

Groups choosing to govern themselves, inadvertently forcing transitions from state control to local control, are not unusual according to Cohen and Scull (1983). Whereas the leadership of ICON were neophytes in relation to this transference, Sinn Féin has a long history of operating a parallel governing system, albeit more overtly in the north of Ireland.

But complexities surround Sinn Féin's standing within the north inner-city. On the one hand, the party has had a sure and steady footing within some parts the community. It has, like ICON, remained highly faithful to championing working class and underclass causes and it has acted as an effective fluent political conduit between those who have, and those who have not. The party's escalating success in local and national elections attests to this, and to the fact Sinn Féin is becoming increasingly more appealing to the middle class.

On the other hand, some members of the community seem to view Sinn Féin predominantly as a social control agent, which directs the more informal local politics in a

[193] Sedgwick (1982) notes that it is far more difficult for whole communities to buckle under the pressure to operate social control devises than it is for individuals to do so, especially if social control is non state sponsored. In light of this, the anti-drug movement may be seen as particularly successful as it did initially harness the energies of a large amount of individuals in the north inner-city (prior to the escalation of violent tactics which caused many to then disengage from the movement).

highly intimate community sphere. This research indicates that legitimate members of ICON and Sinn Féin were just some of many in the community who engaged in the less aggressive social control tactics such as the marching, "naming and shaming", citizen patrols, and surveillance. However, the threats and the violence associated with the anti-drug movement have been attributed more to Sinn Féin and the IRA than to ICON. While the use of the Special Criminal Court in the Josie Dwyer case may somewhat support this connection, much uncertainty remains as to whether the perpetrators in the north inner-city were indeed members of Sinn Féin or the IRA or whether they were engaging in fraud as suggested by the Sinn Féin representative.

A question remains as to why individuals would create an illusion of association or membership with one or both organisations. Certainly, such associations would lend a certain air of credibility to individuals, preventing them being identified as loose cannons. They may even bolster the chances of an individual achieving more personal objectives. (Some interviewees, for example, inferred that historical inter-family feuds - rather than anti-drug sentiments - may have been the motivating factor for an individual roughing up a drug addict or perceived drug dealer).

The reasoning behind these fraudulent associations may lie more in Berger's (1963) concept of the little boy who exercises a type of social control by inventing a big (but unseen) brother to help fend off threats from his peers. There is no escaping the fact that Sinn Féin and the IRA have - for acceptable or unacceptable reasons - exercised social control in communities.

Local grapevines have ensured that this notion is kept in the public consciousness. In some communities, this means of communication is embedded in the local social structure (Brewer *et al.* 1998). If this type of information management, which according to Scheerer and Hess (1996) is still 'a favourite means of active social control' (107) so too then, must be the individual's capacity to either promote or censor information about himself or herself. Individuals who allowed members of the community to falsely perceive them as part of Sinn Féin or IRA fraternities (and who would not refute

allegations of associations) may have deliberately nurtured the notion that a bigger and more powerful and protective force was waiting behind the scenes. Though unlike Berger's example of an invented big brother, the unseen force is real and not conjured up. It is just the individual's ties with the force that are dubious. Such fraud would have given activists free reign in using violence to deal with the drug problem whilst simultaneously offering them immunity from reprisals. This was alluded to, if rather enigmatically, by the member of the Gardai Drug Squad:

> *There is a shadow there isn't there? What's behind the shadow? But it's the shadow and what's behind the shadow...there might be nothing behind the shadow but the perspective of there being something behind the shadow allowed for those who were in fear of drug pushers to decide to become involved in the anti-drug movement. Expecting that if there were problems, the shadow people were going to take a hand.*

As the interviews indicate, the perceived roles of Sinn Féin and the IRA in relation to self-policing the community remains both welcomed and feared. Sinn Fein's exceptionally open and strong ties with the anti-drug movement amplifies a conundrum which has resulted in the polarization of the community. In the absence of respect for the state's authority, informal crime management offered by the organisations can provide a a sense of collective security. The mechanisms perceived to be employed to help ensure this can, paradoxically, create an environment laden with undertones of instability and uncertainty. This may make the area more conducive to what Johnston (1992) refers to as 'moral' or 'social' policing (6) where deviant behaviour such as drug use or selling is more likely to be controlled through acts of vigilantism. The irony of social control, Bergalli and Sumner (1996) believe, is that it can sometimes bring about unintended consequences. It can 'backfire causing resentment and resistance' (25). ICON, Sinn Féin, and the IRA's role within the anti-drug movement whether real or perceived centred on social control and ultimately divided the community, leaving ICON with a new legacy and Sinn Féin and the IRA with perhaps a more honed public identity.

CHAPTER 8

Outcomes of the anti-drug movement

8.1 The decline of participation and activities in CPAD and COCAD

Both CPAD and COCAD experienced a slow demise in participation and activity. Participants gradually withdrew as the use of violence became more commonplace, leaving a small core group of frontline activists at the end of both phases.

Simultaneously, CPAD's and COCAD's association with Sinn Féin and the IRA fostered suspicion and it was thought by many that its initial drugs related agenda was subsumed by the more power based agenda of these core activists. Cullen (1990) suggests too that CPAD's lack of condemnation over alleged physical assaults on drug users and their families was not looked upon favourably.[194] Sinn Féin and the IRA's connection with the anti-drug movement was also thought true not only within the communities themselves but also within the political realm. These associations are generally not thought to be the cause of dwindling support for the movement, neither is the belief that CPAD and COCAD had fully done their job of tackling the demand for, and supply of, drugs in disadvantaged areas.

Some respondents felt that the energy put in to anti-drug activism by volunteers could not be sustained over a long period, especially without adequate resources.[195] Two stated:

> *It was impossible to sustain that type of momentum. Impossible. I remember there was thirty of us who used to meet in the Village.*[196] *That was our base. Marching, watching, and not getting paid. The pressure...we always knew it wasn't going to be sustainable. I knew* (30/8/01).

> *I think for anything to survive you need resources, I really believe that. I mean Citywide when it started up in '96, you can check that out yourself, they had proper funding for staff, a building, phones, all the resources. You need to keep an organisation going, stationary, postage. Without*

[194] Cullen (1990) does acknowledge that such attacks may have been falsely carried out in the name of CPAD.

[195] This may have been a call for funding and resources independent of ICON or other local agencies who clearly could not extend their resources in order to secure a base or wages for activists.

[196] Buckingham Village, a block of privately rented apartments located on Buckingham Street.

> *that, no matter how good the organisation is, no matter how worthwhile their ideals, it will not be sustained, because voluntary commitment does ultimately burn out in many ways, at that level. If you expect a huge level of commitment like Citywide Drugs Crisis Campaign did or the Concerned Parents did, it will dwindle. So the resources need to be there to replace people as they fall away* (28/11/01).

Another respondent agreed but, unlike other participants, viewed the changing role of the Gardaí as an accompanying factor:

> *I think for the same reasons it went into decline. You can't continue marching indefinitely. The problem itself went underground for a while. The cops began - although not taking on all of our demands - the cops began to become a bit active and I think the demand for heroin stopped a bit because people were seeing the consequences* (3/8/01).

Perhaps the most likely cause of the demise of the second phase of the anti-drug movement within the north inner-city was the move made by community leaders to steer the movement towards more policy orientated and democratic processes. By diligently doing so they, in effect, withdrew the covering that the more hard core front-line activists had come to depend on, even hide behind. Although COCAD and its affiliates in the north inner-city managed to independently operate for two years (that is, without seeking support from ICON and Citywide), the street activities of the movement were greatly reduced.[197] In this time, COCAD attempted to present a more polished image to the public by drafting a substantial policy document (see COCAD 2000) and producing a research and policy based newsletter. However, it never regained its initial momentum.

8.2 Outcomes of the anti-drug movement

Research into the success or failure of social movements is underdeveloped (Giugni 1998,1999). Like Giugni (1998), Marwell and Oliver (1984) specify that outcomes are often difficult to determine because of the complexities in differentiating clearly between

[197] Although COCAD held its last major gathering in 2000 (a policy launch), respondents generally felt that COCAD's street activities declined around 1998.

a single collective action geared towards a specific social change goal and the objectives of a social movement which may involve a "collective campaign," a set of ongoing smaller but connected campaigns involving many varied participants undertaking various activities. Adding to the difficulties of determining a movement's success or failure are the actions of potential countermovements who disagree with the main objectives of the movement (Rucht and Friedhelm 1998).

Agreeing with Melucci (1989) that social movements play a strategic role in the transformation of power, Castells (1983) points out that the processes involved in urban movements are often so complicated that their results may sometimes be overshadowed. Similarly, the ability of marginalized and disenfranchised groups to mobilize at all has been scrutinized by researchers and commentators who have disagreed over the potential of such groups to be successful in their aims (see for example, Roach and Roach 1978; Klandersman 1984; Roy 1994; Andrews 2001).

The anti-drug movement challenges the notion that disadvantaged groups cannot successfully mobilize or be successful in achieving their objectives. The movement in the north inner-city brought about distinct and relevant outcomes. It is generally agreed among respondents that the anti-drug movement, in both phases, impacted greatly on the community at large. The ease of access to local communities and to relevant government officials (through agencies like the North Inner-City Drugs Task Force) guaranteed that anti-drug activists (especially those under the umbrella of ICON and Sinn Féin) could not only publicise these outcomes but use them as a testimony to their commitment to the north inner-city.

Respondents identified the following outcomes. However, it is important to note at this point that the outcomes achieved remain subjective in terms of whether they were seen by respondents as beneficial or detrimental to initial aims and objectives. For example, while some heralded the government's new anti-social behaviour housing policy as a highly positive and surprisingly knowledgeable action on behalf of the government, those who experienced evictions as a result did not see it as such. On the other hand,

some outcomes reflected almost full consensus.

1) It is believed by most respondents that the anti-drug movement in the 1980's did in fact curb the drug problem (30/11/01; 27/2/01; 14/2/01;1/8/01). The enormity of the second wave, when it hit in the mid-1990's, emphasised the deceleration that had occurred. The "clearing up" of open drug selling on the streets was seen as one of the most prominent results of the movement. The in-your-face selling and attitude of drug dealers had been considered by many respondents to be one of the most frustrating aspects of the whole drug problem. This manifestation acted as a constant reminder to the community that the situation was out of control and it highlighted the community's own inefficacy:

> *The menace of all the open dealing that was going on in the streets had, as a result of all the activity that had gone on, largely disappeared. There was a greater sense of freedom of being able to walk around the streets. It was palpable. You could see people wandering about very idly and stuff like that. You would really notice it with older people and all that kind of stuff as well. Where young people were about on the street you weren't immediately checking yourself or wondering if there was some kind of running going on, back and forth, stuff like that. There was almost a kind of normalisation (*14/2/01).

2) The majority of respondents felt the anti-drug movement left a hurtful division within the north inner-city community. Throughout this research, this author discovered the word 'community' has been widely used by respondents describing not only a particular locality (for example 'Sheriff Street', 'East Wall', or 'north inner-city'), but to differentiate the area's working class and underclass ethos' from modes of thinking deemed to be middle class. Mostly, respondents felt it important to mention the type of communities they felt existed before heroin use became a problem. They painted a picture of communal areas where keys could be left in doors, where neighbours frequently borrowed and lent goods, where informal gatherings on balconies were common and 'squealing' on neighbours uncommon.

> *Neighbours helped you. They were able to turn to people. I mean if you*

needed a bit of sugar, a drop of milk or were short of a nappy, believe me, you would get it on the balcony where you lived. Today you will not get that. Because these same people they watched these people going down to another person's door and march on them. A lot of people are afraid to say anything in case they are marched on. They might have people who are unstable from drugs or drink. They are afraid to either say something about it or that they might fall out with the neighbour over it. So they just don't get involved. They are staying behind their door now and they are just looking after their own (5/2/02).

Some participants framed the north inner-city's pre-drug crisis landscape as almost idyllic. However, Kearns (1994) suggests that historically, the north inner-city was not immune from the elements which envelop other urban areas: unemployment, poverty, crime, violence, and disease. If anything, the north inner-city had more than its share with its greater number of tenements and higher density population (Wall 1974). The north inner-city was particularly known in the 1930's and 1940's for its red-light 'Monto' district and the 'animal gangs' of men who formed into large warring and violent factions.

Kearns (1994) acknowledges the difference between these two impressions of life in the north inner-city: 'In dramatic contrast to this stereotypically dark and dismal image of tenement life there also existed a marvellously vibrant close-knit community in which the poor found great security and happiness' (4). The participants' emphasis on the uplifting side of life in the north inner-city prior to the drug problem may stem more from the severe disruption the problem caused to the area's way of life rather than the participant's unwillingness to regard the more darker aspects of living in the area. For example, Colson (1975) suggests that communities may focus on their more favourable traits and characteristics therefore crystalizing their views about what it is that is preventing them from realising their vision of a good society.

The acts of stealing from one's relatives and friends, squealing on neighbours, and falling into dispute with them would have existed in the north inner-city prior to the 1980's. The interviews suggest however, that these actions must have increased significantly (most likely with greater consequences) as a result of the drug problem. The rose-tinted perspective offered by participants may have simply been born from a more

heightened awareness of these divisive behaviours.

Suttles (1972) points out that when one talks of community, there are two main assumptions. Firstly, there must be a belief that a community exists when there is total consensus on the identification and membership of its residents[198] and secondly, that members continue to strive to maintain this unit. These assumptions, he contests, lead to romantic images which reflect little more than residential solidarity. Most respondents in this research felt the need to highlight how the anti-drug movement divided both their local, and the overall north inner-city, community. In doing so, they create a different framework of community than the one Suttles would suggest.

The intimacy of the north inner-city cannot be over emphasised. The same families have lived there for generations, in and out of each others lives. They share what Etzioni (1996) terms a 'commitment' to the same values, history and identity. But now a polarization has occurred between members of the community over the anti-drug movement and the actions it took to rid the area of drug dealing, underscoring the notion that within this community there exists unshared values also.

Several reasons for the division were offered by respondents. One of the most common reasons given was in reference to the violence inflicted by some individuals in the movement. This division initially occurred within the movement itself.

> *When I saw addicts being beaten up...you know, that's not what I am about. I mean, our motto was "Pushers beware, addicts we care." But the addicts were being beaten up. And that wasn't my scene at all. So I kind of opted out then* (14/5/01a).

However, the general community felt the ripples. Some members of the community who weren't active in the movement condoned the aggressive tactics. In turn, there were others outside the movement who felt strongly that such measures should not have been taken. All the community leaders who were interviewed felt that there was a turning point when they personally had to make a stand, pull back, stop marching and help turn

[198] See also Brodskey *et al.* (1999).

the movement towards more democratic processes. Some had even approached COCAD to persuade its leaders to abandon the hardhanded tactics:

> (Community leader) *was trying to say to them, "Look, the Concerned Parents Against Drugs made a mistake in the past. If we want to win this and get effective change rather than be just an unsuccessful campaigning group we have to win public opinion. We have to make sensible arguments. Despite the anger, frustration, and annoyance of people, we have to totally condemn vigilantism, even though we know that people who are tired, fed up, and angry might even support that* (30/1/03).

Another reason for the division was the belief that those active in the movement did not differentiate between a drug seller making a living out of dealing and the drug user who is dealing to fund his or her drug habit. There were those who believed the movement's sole target should have been those obviously making substantial money from drug dealing. A very personal experience influenced one respondent in this manner:

> *They were local fucking families, generally speaking, very young. You know what I mean. There was a contradiction there. You're campaigning against them but how far can you take this? You walk along...a mother's door, a respectable member of the community, been here all their life for fucking generations and you're walking up to her and her husband and saying, "Throw your fucking son out or we'll throw him out." Hugely divisive. And the bitterness is still there, Erin. There is a lot of bitterness and we had to address it. And I mean I remember coming home from a march one night crying. Crying. I've two kids; they are ten and seven now but at this stage they would have been around seven and four, younger even. I was walking home one night. We had marched to this house and the guy had a reputation. He was nothing ever...petty pusher. He might be making a living out of it but he certainly wasn't fucking rich or anything like that, you know. But anyway, he was a pusher. No doubt about it, in my mind he was a pusher. But he wasn't there was he? His wife and the two or three kids he had...the children were screaming, "Mammy, Mammy. Mammy. Don't let them in." I cried me fucking eyes out - I'm not telling you a word of a lie - on me way home. The damage we were doing to those kids and the fucker wasn't even there. You know what I mean?* (PAUSE) *Sorry* (27/2/01).

In conjunction with this, the leader's expectation that whole families, including children,

should be evicted if a member of the household was deemed to be dealing was not looked upon sympathetically by many in the community.

The role of ICON in helping to resource the movement has also proven to be a divisive factor. It must be remembered that those fronting ICON at the time were long standing community activists who are very well known within the inner-city. When ICON's role in supporting the movement came to the fore, some people within the community pointed an accusatory finger at the legitimate ICON representatives. Interviews within this research indicate that many hold these individuals accountable for the actions of the anti-drug movement. There are strong feelings that ICON could have done more to protect the community from the type of behaviour that was clearly causing division in the community. By way of contrast, interviews with these community leaders attest to the hard work that was being done behind the scenes to try and arrest the threats, intimidation and violence. The general community seems unaware of this labouring. It is this researcher's understanding that no formal structure was put in place to allow this information to be publicly put forth. Non-legitimate ICON affiliates who led the marching were also targeted for community disdain. A respondent noted the extremely poor turn out (by inner-city standards) at the 2001 funeral of one of the more well-known anti-drug activists. She deemed this a manifestation of people's anger towards the leadership of the movement (22/5/01).

Perhaps the most resonant effect of the anti-drug movement is the genuine feeling of hurt that was experienced when neighbour marched on neighbour, and family on family. As one respondent stated:

> *You see, the difficulty in an area like this is that this is an area of extended families, of integration you know? The integration factor would be huge. I think we are like the Royal family. They are all related. Everyone is related. I mean, where is the success, you know? A lot of people got hurt and a lot of families got hurt* (30/11/01).

Although some of the community leaders stated they had witnessed some healing within the community, most respondents felt that the north inner-city would never fully

recover from the consequences of this internal conflict.

> *The community is now divided. The community is irredeemable to me as a cohesive community. It's gone crazy; the community is divided. As I keep reiterating, if you knew of the politics and the intimacy of the family and the extended family. Families are affected. There is no reconciliation ever going to take place in this generation or the generation that is coming* (29/1/01)

The rage that people felt concerning the disintegration of their community and the deaths of so many young people through the drug problem led many to engage in the anti-drug movement. Yet the close social and familial ties between residents has meant the negation of anonymity, an aspect often protected within social movements. Those who marched, and who were marched on, were known to the vast majority of the community. Those who experienced threats and intimidation knew the perpetrators and their families. In one instance, a respondent received threats from his childhood friend's father who he states, '*almost helped rear me as a child*' (22/6/01).

It was not only after the demise of COCAD that the community began to take stock of the repercussions of anti-drug activity. Pervading the general community at the height of the second phase was a sense of foreboding. Interestingly, this has been documented by drug addicts and anti-drug activists themselves and published in group specific magazines such as UISCE and the Drugs Agenda respectively. In issue 2 of the Drugs Agenda, concern is expressed that evicted drug addicts might retaliate by intimidating activists (COCAD 1999c: 2). The phenomenon of 'squealing' on neighbours (once a taboo subject for these communities) was in evidence and the resulting polarisation has been recognised by both groups. COCAD states that it exists because those involved with drugs have destroyed the community (Johnson 1999; NICCAD 1999a,1999b). The drug addicts however, view the situation differently. In the words of one member of the community, 'How many heroin addicts have we buried who died, not as a result of the drug itself but by the conditions they were hunted into because some people in our culture lack compassion and understanding? We are not going to redeem our culture through division' (Arkins 2000b).

3) Despite people's personal feelings towards the division they deemed the movement to have caused, anti-drug activism helped to bring about three distinct changes in government policy, heralding a new era for this movement. Firstly, the framework of the 1997 Housing Act amendment, which had stood originally in isolation to the anti-drug movement was adopted, and quickly built upon, by the movement. Voracious lobbying by activists for more community control in estate management helped to accelerate the amendment process and politically mainstream the vetting procedures which the movement was already using within local flat complexes and housing estates.

Secondly, from the first wave of the heroin problem in the 1980's, anti-drug activists in the north inner-city proposed the setting up of a government department which could legally monitor the finances of those suspected of dealing drugs (1/8/01). Those active in the second phase of the movement undertook to resume pressing the government to identify proceeds gained from the supply of drugs. While the blueprint of the 1996 Criminal Assets Bureau Act included all criminal activity,[199] the anti-drug movement actively worked to have its own objectives interposed. When petitioning the government, activists made it clear that the communities affected by a drug problem should be recipients of any assets seized since these communities bore the brunt of the scourge. The idea of monies being given back to communities was tepidly welcomed by the government in light of the death of journalist Veronica Guerin. To date, calls for the transference of funds to local communities have not been acknowledged by the government and this has remained a great source of anger to community leaders (ICON 2001).

Thirdly, the Community Policing Forum (CPF) was created in 1999 in order to formalise structures of communication that were already in process in the north inner-city during the

[199] The Criminal Assets Bureau is a statutory investigating agency. According to Section Four of the Act, its objectives are: A). The identification of assets wherever situated of persons which derive or are suspected to derive directly or indirectly from criminal activity. B). The taking of appropriate action under the law to deprive or to deny those persons of the assets or the benefits of such assets, in whole or in part, as may be appropriate. C). The pursuit of any investigation or the doing of any preparatory work in relation to any proceedings arising from the objectives mentioned in paragraphs (A) and (B).

second phase of the anti-drug movement.[200] Local meetings are held in which residents of the north inner-city[201] can meet directly with Gardaí and Dublin City Council to discuss drug related activity in the area. Or alternatively, residents can bring their concerns to the Chairperson[202] who will then meet with these government officials (Action on Inclusion 1999). The CPF works with those who are willing to name the dealers and their activities in the area. Unlike CPAD and COCAD, any information gleaned is handed over willingly to the police and to Dublin City Council who are then expected by the CPF to respond accordingly (Action on Inclusion 1999). The formation of the CPF was not greeted by all anti-drug activists, some of whom were unwilling to pass over control of their particular communities to the Gardaí.

The Hardwicke Street Tenants Development Board (1999b: 1) for example, questioned the rationale for the CPF. They stated, 'But our view is the police know the problems of Hardwicke Street over the past few years, as do the Corporation, so why do we need a forum to debate it?' Echoing the CPF's brief is the recently established Cabra Against Drugs confidential hotline, run from Cabra Gardaí station, which encourages people to expose dealers operating in the area (Healy 2004).

4) The movement solidified and refined mobilization mechanisms which, since the housing crisis of the late 1970's and early 1980's, had been fairly inactive. The most obvious manifestation of this was the response of Sheriff Street and East Wall residents to the presence of Father Ivan Payne, a convicted paedophile residing in an apartment within the Irish Financial Services Centre, overlooking Sheriff Street.
Nearby residents mobilized and demanded his removal.[203] Of primary concern was the high number of children in Lower Sheriff Street who played in the playground overshadowed by the apartment complex in which the priest was living. The mechanisms previously used by the anti-drug movement - 'naming and shaming', the

[200] Although the leaders of COCAD maintained an anti-police stance, more moderate activists eventually became willing to work in conjunction with the police.
[201] Those residing in the area from Marlborough Street to the Royal Canal and from Dorset Street to Amiens Street in Dublin 1 (see Appendix 1). Sheriff Street and the East Wall area are not included in its brief.
[202] Nominated by the North Inner-City Drugs Task Force.
[203] See Holland (2002).

distribution of leaflets, community meetings, and marching - were quickly reemployed. The subsequent media attention brought by the marching and protests most probably was responsible for the priest's relatively quick departure from the area.

The leaders of this protest had previously been active in the anti-drug movement.[204] The first of two protests occurred within twenty-four hours of the priest's presence coming to the attention of residents. Calling themselves "Working Class Action," the group stated in a celebratory leaflet to the community, 'We were not a mob nor were we vigilantes. We were and still are a group of concerned residents' (Cummings and Fleming - *No date*).[205] The media however echoed similar concerns to those it had raised during the anti-drug activism in the 1990's; they questioned the aggressive approach taken by Working Class Action (see Sheridan 2002).[206] The incident would later be recalled in the debate over the introduction of a sex offenders register (Brady 2004). Although such strategies remain questionable, the community's ability to network and mobilize quickly and efficiently in this instance was clearly honed during the two phases of the anti-drug movement.

5) In response to the anti-drug movement, drug users themselves began to mobilize and address the issues that were coming to the fore as a result of anti-drug activism. Most notable was the concern about the level of violence perpetrated by anti-drug activists. *The Brass Munkie*[207] magazine produced by and for drug users often contained articles challenging anti-drug activity and policies. The 'Letters' pages included personal experiences of anti-drug activism.

The Brass Munkie and its views remained confined to the drug using culture. However, several members of its editorial team understood the need to promote the views of drug users (on all relevant issues) within the realm of the policy makers. As a result, UISCE (the Union for Improved Services, Communication, and Education) was

[204] Two of whom were interviewed for this research.
[205] The leaflet also made it clear that the group held the State responsible for deciding to 'dump' the priest in the north inner-city.
[206] Some are in agreement with such tactics; see Moore (2000).
[207] Street slang for "junkie."

space of time, in five years. We were laughing about this a few weeks ago; we went down to Waterford or somewhere. And in the car on the way down, people were having this detailed discussion about the merits of naltraxone[210] *versus Methadone and loflexadine*[211] *and they were laughing at themselves. This is* (name) *and a couple of other women. They were saying, "Christ, almighty!" Just the level of knowledge that people have now around the issue is huge compared to five years ago* (22/5/01).[212]

Such knowledge, coupled with personal experience is a productive combination which has allowed many of the previous anti-drug activists to be now involved in policy orientated organisations such as Citywide and the North Inner-City Drugs Task Force.[213] Dublin's south inner-city also experienced this crossover. One activist, who served 20 months for assaulting Josie Dwyer, currently runs a local community centre and is active in many local and statutory committees (O'Brien 2003).

[210] A substance used for heroin detoxification.

[211] As above.

[212] Interestingly, a CPAD newsletter stated in 1988, 'Members of our committee don't profess to having degrees or diplomas in relation to drug treatment etc., but what we do have is a genuine care and in a lot of cases, the experience of living within an environment with a terrible drug abuse problem' (CPAD 1988).

[213] Johnson (1999) concurs, but states that residence in an area affected by a drug problem supersedes knowledge gained only as a result of working there. He admits though, that 'knowing a drug dealer in the area doesn't take a rocket scientist' (1999: 2).

CHAPTER 9

Conclusions

9. Conclusions

This research set out to formally examine the anti-drug movement and to present a case study of the movement in Dublin's north inner-city. The movement consisted of two phases organised by two groups - the Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD) in the 1980's, and the Coalition of Communities Against Drugs (COCAD) in the 1990's.

Research conducted by Bennett (1988) and brief social commentaries by Cullen (1990) and McCullagh (1996) on CPAD, raised particular issues surrounding the movement's status as a 'social movement' as well as CPAD's propensity towards social control and vigilantism in inner-city communities. The movement's associations with Sinn Féin and later on, in its second phase, with the Inner City Organisations Network (ICON) raised questions about the resourcing and institutionalization of the anti-drug movement. This also demanded further investigation.

The movement arose within a particular socio-historical context. Interviewees helped provide a social and structural context for the anti-drug movement, outlining the pre-conditions for mobilization. They also described particular social factors and behaviours which seemed peculiar to their position. As a marginalized inner-city community, their mobilization took a particular form. Accordingly, theories on social movements, the underclass, social control and vigilantism, have provided a framework for the analysis and documentation of the anti-drug movement.

This research has indicated that there were certain pre-conditions in place which helped give rise to and facilitate the anti-drug movement. Governmental aims in relation to area redevelopment were initially met with counter responses from a small group of activists within the area who adopted the role of 'community leaders' and helped to galvanise the community in early acts of low-key disruption and protest. Their reaction to welfare housing and decentralisation in particular formed the basis for early community mobilisation. The initial lobbying which was conducted by these activists set the agenda for future confrontations with the government; it equipped this community with the skills

and knowledge necessary for them to take on broader social issues like unemployment and education, and engage in anti-drug activism. This affirms Chong's (1991) research which indicates that such 'dry runs' are not uncommon in community mobilization and that the level of success in these often determine the outcomes of further protest. Accordingly, this research has shown that there is a positive correlation between anti-drug activism and earlier activism as Donnelly and Majka (1998) have similarly found in other communities.

These leaders also helped set in place 'tenant committees' which would act as important networks in their anti-government response to housing decentralisation. These networks would later provide the blueprint for future anti-drug mobilization, confirming McAdam (1999) and Melucci's (1995) belief that individuals are drawn to networks which they are familiar with and which they have already experienced.

Community leaders would have certainly headed into anti-drug mobilization fairly confidently, having successfully fought off the unwanted consequences of the government's housing plan for the area. These few individuals, tenacious in trying to secure benefits for the area, proactively formed community development organisations such as the Alliance for Work Forum, the Inner-City Renewal Group and the Inner-City Organisations Network in order to protect community interests. These organisations paved the way for eventual non government organisations and statutory partnerships.

The underclass

One of the most important pre-conditions however was the existence of an underclass in the north inner-city. While debates rage in Ireland over the existence of an underclass, this author stands firmly in the belief that there is a thriving one which exhibits distinguished, collective behaviours as defined by Wilson (1987) and Phillips (1990). This consists of the long-term unemployed and welfare dependent individuals, many who engage in crime, albeit at different levels and for different reasons. Seemingly disproportional representation of its residents within the welfare, court, and prison

systems testifies to this (see for example, Coveney *et al.* (1999). This underclass remains separate from mainstream society and for the most part, operates outside its justice system. It exists distinctly from Ireland's 'working class' and its subdivisions as defined by Peillon (1982) and Whelan (1994).

Individuals who understand the social conditions that impact negatively on them - such as poverty or joblessness - are more likely to engage in a response to them, inadvertently highlighting what disadvantaged people will do to improve their lot. The pre-conditions for this type of civil strife, as indicated by Gurr (1968) certainly were in existence in the north inner-city. Respondents across the board recognised the deprivation and disadvantage the area had historically experienced and the threads of this understanding were certainly intertwined with their motivation to mobilize.

Whereas the first phase of the movement formed during the bleak economic period in the 1980's, the second phase of the movement formed on the frontier of the Celtic Tiger which, as this research shows, highlighted for disadvantaged communities the disparity between the 'haves' and 'have nots.' Long term poverty and social disadvantage has meant that many in the area hold the general impression that there has been long standing governmental neglect of the north inner-city.[214] This led to an even more militant and conservative approach during the COCAD phase of the anti-drug movement, contrasting with Piachaud (1981) and Gordon's (1991) belief that the welfare system can stabilise individuals and act as an insurance against revolt.

The research also indicates that illegal drug use is more easily facilitated in these areas, the drug economy itself enticing unhappy and marginalized - and most importantly impoverished - individuals into both the demand and supply facets. The concentrated drug problem in the area over the last two decades has been fed by the social disorder already in existence. It has also added to it by creating a subculture often defined by chaos, crime, homelessness and general anti-social behaviour. This subculture - often defined by the term 'underclass' in turn is often the reason why urban neighbourhoods

[214] Any government and NGO partnerships which did occur were viewed by community leaders as mostly superficial and tokenistic.

decide to engage in collective action (Davis 1991).

Furthermore, the lifestyles of heroin users, often criminal, can separate them from those even in their own communities. In classic terms, they are neither wage earners nor producers of wealth or services. If anything, they can act as a disruptive force to the legitimate economy yet at the same time remaining vital instruments in ensuring the success of the underground economy. For the most part, these individuals were the targets of the anti-drug movement and in many cases the movement helped to further promote an underclass by making some people homeless (see for example, Cox and Lawless (1999) and Rourke (2001).

And although it has been stated that 'powerless groups can never mobilize as effectively as dominant groups in a society' (Andrews 2001: 74), the anti-drug movement in Dublin's north inner-city, mobilized effectively to tackle the drug issue despite the fact that for many generations it has suffered high levels of poverty and unemployment. Although the area has been occasionally targeted for governmental partnerships and funding, it has never quite managed to secure meaningful, long term benefits. The anti-drug movement's origins, as elaborated on in this thesis, confounds the research conducted by Rosenbaum (1988) and Skogan (1990) which conclude that solid community crime prevention initiatives are not likely to be instigated by locals nor founded in disadvantaged areas. This research indicates that the anti-drug movement was not initiated by sympathetic outsiders or 'johnny-do-gooders' who wished to help the community orchestrate a response to the problem.[215] Those mostly affected by the drug problem, namely mothers and fathers themselves initiated anti-drug activities soon getting the community leaders (also residents) on board. This research therefore replicates that conducted by Lurigio and Davis (1992) which found that disadvantaged communities were more than willing to initiate and participate in anti-crime activity. This research also indicates that Dublin's inner-city communities were willing to resurrect the movement ten years later in the 1990's when a second heroin epidemic hit the area.

[215] Interestingly, Burrows (1976) believes there is increasing impatience with liberal "do-gooders" such as social workers who may not fully understand the plight or sheer frustration of disadvantaged neighbourhoods who experience high levels of anti-social behaviour and crime.

Social movements

Bennett (1988) and Cullen (1990) both have labeled CPAD and COCAD as social movements without presenting a rationale for this term. For example, they may have easily called both organisations 'pressure' or 'protest' groups. This study has confirmed that there exists grounds for calling this kind of activism a social movement. Firstly, the activism was birthed from a crisis, which as many social movements theorists agree, is usually the foundation for any response. Similarly, active participants were aggrieved at a lack of government action on a particular issue, not an unexpected reason given by theorists such as Melucci (1989) Tarrow (1994) for the formation of a social movement. Secondly, participants sought a particular change in a social situation, which was the eradication of drug dealing and drug use in the area. Such a collective focus on wanting, and expecting, change is also indicative of a social movement (Della Porta and Diani 1999; Giddons 1997). Thirdly, the anti-drug activism, particularly that which occurred on the street, was intended to disrupt the drugs trade which was believed to be devastating the area. The intent to disrupt is a prominent feature of social movements according to Piven and Cloward (1992), Della Porta and Diani (1999) and Klandersman (1997). Even though McCullagh (1996) has argued that the disruption caused by CPAD merely led to the displacement of the drug situation, none-the-less both CPAD and COCAD helped, at the time, to rid the north inner-city of the overt drug activity which was causing the community so much angst. It remains unclear in this research as to whether the displacement of the drug activity to another at risk area actually bothered or upset north inner-city residents.

Where the anti-drug movement deviates so significantly from other social movements lies in the common theory, as exemplified by Smelser (1971), which states that social movements are a response to an element of a social system ignored or downplayed by an elite or other authorities. Save for a few protests at Dáil Eireann or local police stations conducted over the two phases, the energy of the anti-drug movement was firmly directed inwards towards members of the community. Since most of the recipients of the activities were chaotic heroin users - who as Coveney *et al.* (1999) and D'Arcy

(2000) have stated are often drug dealers - the focus of the movement was hardly on an elite. In fact, given the dire circumstances most heroin users from a disadvantaged background find themselves in, they probably represented the most powerless and vulnerable members in the community.

Furthermore, many individuals who participated in the movement may also be considered part of the underclass by definitions given by Wilson (1987) and Murray (1990). That is, they remain excluded economically, socially, and politically and live with the familiar 'disorders' of the underclass such as long term unemployment and single parenthood, and of course crime. To reiterate what one of the anti-drug activists maintained, '*A very high percentage of activists would have been involved with crime at some stage'* (30/8/01). They can also hold values alien to mainstream society seen, for example, in the open embracement of an underground economy such as that indicated by this research. It is this marginalisation and separateness that Piven and Cloward (1977) have stated is often the linchpin which encourages the poor to mobilize. The poor, they have argued, remain so insignificant to the general (legitimate) economy that the government, scarcely needing them for any co-operative effort, simply leaves them be with little interference. This is of course, the type of governmental neglect which Brown (1975), Burrows (1976), and Abrahams (1990) believe gives birth to vigilante movements or as Rucht and Friedhelm (1998) contend, other acts of dissent. It is also what members of the north inner-city community claimed they experienced prior to both phases of the anti-drug movement.

What has also surfaced indicates that an underclass of Dublin's north inner-city mobilized as never before to address an issue they felt was greatly impacting on their communities. The north inner-city, to all intents and purposes, has remained a 'no-go' area. Like the American frontier of the 19th century, there is little authority exercised by the state in terms of crime control and very few interactions with, or interventions by, outside communities. So although feelings of discontent and governmental neglect were by no means new to the north inner-city, the heroin problem seemed to bring these latent feelings quickly and aggressively to the surface. The deaths of young

people in the area rocked this community. The inaction of the government in this circumstance surfaced new and far more personal grievances, the kind that Freeman (1984) believes that, once shared, will result in a social movement.

The core of historical vigilantism, as noted by Abraham's (1998), is also marked by grievances. A lack of trust and confidence in the government to provide security in relation to crime control is foremost. The environment in which the anti-drug movement mobilized remains no different from other scenarios where vigilantism has thrived. It came about as a result of the people's lack of faith in the government's ability to take control of the drug situation in local inner-city communities. Feeling neglected, communities began to set in place their own rules, regulations and punishment strategies.

It may be possible that the economic frontiers which defined the working and non-working in the unemployment laden 1980's and which heralded the advent of the 'Celtic Tiger' here in Ireland in the mid-1990's spurred the disfranchised and those not benefitting from the economic upturn to mobilize and independently tackle the problem that was devastating their communities. Davis (1969) and Piven and Cloward (1977) have argued that periods of rapid economic change lead to increased expectations and if these are not met, feelings of well-being decrease, leading to discontent and possible mobilization. This point has also been flagged by Johnston (1996) who, as we have seen, terms vigilantism, 'a rudimentary social movement reflecting...change expectations' (232).

The evolution of the drug problem in the north inner-city while complex, is nonetheless unsurprising considering these economic transitions. Like many neglected and disadvantaged urban areas it has succumbed to the ravages of heroin, amongst other social problems. Rosenbaum (1986; 1988), Skogan (1988), and Ross and Jang (2000) in researching urban communities have documented the powerlessness felt by such communities faced with drug issues as well as the communities' expectations that the government should act to address the problem.

Della Porta and Diani (1999) believe that the micro feelings of individuals give way to micro phenomena of something like social movements. But do situations of frustration, rootlessness, deprivation, and social crisis automatically produce revolts? No. The 1970's housing crisis, as pertinent of an issue as it was to those living in the north inner-city, did not lead to the same kind of mobilization or tactics that the anti-drug movement did. And yet comparatively, the housing issue would have effected far more people directly than the drugs issue ever would have. The focus of the housing activists was solely the government and its relocation policies. The focus of the anti-drug movement, however, were people residing in their own communities who were deemed anti-social and destructive. The reaction which ensued coupled with the participants' frustration and anger led to the 'street fighting imagery' which Castells (1978) believed social movements were moving away from in the late 1970's (1978: 171). It also signified a shift away from the movement's initial motives of crime control to those more social control orientated.

The sensitivity of the community leaders to the social and economic environment of the area coupled with the front-line experiences of parents witnessing unwanted behaviour in their families and communities ensured there was going to be a response to the drug problem. The north inner-city's historical relationship with the police - seemingly based on suspicion and mistrust - warranted a self-policing agenda; such a conceptual combination is far from uncommon and often leads to vigilante-type behaviour (see for example, Gale 1996).

Social Control

The movement came forth as a result of a communally recognized need for informal social control in the area. Underpinning this recognition was the overt drug dealing and using behaviours which were emotionally draining the community. The decision by leaders of the community to enact certain mechanisms was welcomed by anti-drug activists. The anti-drug movement (at least the ground activists who were marching and

conducting street patrols) did not focus their energies on trying to change the social conditions that had helped foster such an epidemic. This aspect would be left to the community leaders, who were already in the social policy groove and thus more experienced. In this manner the movement did incorporate the control of social conditions also.

This research examined characteristics of social control as identified by Berger (1963) and has concluded that all these elements were manifested within the anti-drug movement. The movement used the method of persuasion to gather in the residents of the community, relying heavily on the social ties and bonds already in existence to ensure conformity. Interestingly, Murray's (1984) call for the individualisation of responsibility was sidestepped by residents in favour of a more communal approach to responsibility. The "we" rhetoric used in anti-drug literature, for example, reflects this. These actions inadvertently induced an outer conformity, as members of the community engaged in anti-drug activities solely to prevent a backlash from other participants in this closely knit community. Similarly, the actions of others brought to the surface feelings of guilt as residents struggled between wanting to participate and yet not wanting to engage in the more uncomfortable activities that were occurring such as the evictions of alleged dealers.

The social control mechanisms of ostracism and ridicule were particularly successful for the movement and, like the mechanism of persuasion, were more effective because of the existing social ties and the framework that they impose. Simply, individuals already isolated from mainstream society did not want their once neutral standing in the community to be shaken by allegations (true or otherwise). Neither did they want to estrange themselves from the system that was providing them with some sense of security and inclusion. The importance of such security for the disadvantaged cannot be over emphasised (Piven and Cloward 1977).

Finally, the devices of fraud and manipulation as noted by Berger (1963) were used to enable individuals to carry out activities with spurious authority. Leaders of ICON and

Sinn Féin agree that a minority of participants in the movement falsely aligned themselves to their organisations and that these individuals were "loose cannons" and primarily the perpetrators of the threats and violence which took place. The complexities surrounding why individuals choose to present these false associations are evident but it would probably be safe to say that both organisations offered a sense of legitimacy to the actions of the individuals and, as already mentioned, a degree of protection. The portrayal (purposely or otherwise) of a collective dimension to what is essentially an individual action is not uncommon in vigilante history (see Brown 1975) nor in social movement theory (see for example, Piven and Cloward (1977), Mayer (1983), and Tarrow (1994).

Davis and Lurigio (1996) view social cohesion as a natural by-product of crime reduction. Smelser (1971) has explained that social movements reflect the inability of institutions to replicate this kind of social cohesion. The tight networks which quickly formed to confront alleged drug dealers were indicative of the social cohesion which existed before the drug problem. The movement did not involve itself with a sustained attack on the government whose polices or resourcing, for example in relation to policing, may have contributed to the drug problem. Rather the cohesion which did exist, and which probably had been reproducing more effectively by and through the community itself, was eroded by a type of social cannibalization as a result of the community looking inwards for the causes of instability.

The informal social control methods used by the anti-drug movement did reduce the level of drug dealing in the area but it did not bring the type of social cohesion as put forward by Davis and Lurigio (1996). In fact, it created huge community conflict between families and a division which some respondents believe is irreparable. In particular, the violence employed by some members of the movement caused such divisiveness that other participants began to withdraw from anti-drug activities. Drug users who were thought to be dealers became the targets for the violence.

Neither Davis and Lurigio (1996), nor Rosenbaum (1988) or Skogan (1990), address

the effect of the drug user/dealer persona and the resulting implications for the community where such an individual may be a member of a close-knit community with strong family networks. Yet this issue surfaced prominently in this research, becoming the crux which eventually determined the extent of people's loyalty to the movement. When the attention of the community turned inwards solely towards drug users and when violence came to be perpetrated against them, the demise of the movement began. Standing family loyalties and social networks added further complications as individuals struggled with contradictory tendencies of their sympathies for their drug using neighbours and their outrage at drug dealing. It is important to note that the initial strategies used to deter drug dealing - citizen patrols and marching - were welcomed by most of the community and in accordance with Rosenbaum (1986), they felt the end justified the means even if it led to uncomfortable scenarios such as marching on a neighbour or having to give an account of themselves to a citizen's patrol when entering a flat complex. It was only when the transition was made to more aggressive vigilante type of behaviour, that this support quickly waned and people began to see such activities as an infringement of their rights. These intended disruptions to the then social patterns indicate that the movement wasn't waiting passively, or optimistically, for conditions to improve as Rusbult (1991) suggests some movements are prone to.

Vigilantism

Both CPAD and COCAD were shown in this research to have employed self-policing devices to control the supply of, and demand for, drugs in the north inner-city. The anti-drug movement, during both phases, identified anti-social behaviours and put mechanisms in place to control them. This sustained and astute use of social control mechanisms primed the anti-drug movement for true vigilante activity. However, categorizing the movement further in these terms could only be achieved by investigating both CPAD and COCAD in light of the six elements of vigilantism as presented by Johnston (1996). He presents six elements which he deems necessary features of vigilantism: (i) it involves planning and pre-meditation by those engaging in it; (ii) its participants are private citizens whose engagement is voluntary; (iii) it is a form of

'autonomous citizenship' and as such, constitutes a social movement; (iv) it uses or threatens the use of force; (v) it arises when an established order is under threat from the transgression, the potential transgression, or the imputed transgression of institutionalized norms; (vi) it aims to control crime or other social infractions by offering assurances (or 'guarantees') of security both to participants and to others (220).

Even at the most superficial level, the anti-drug movement manifested behaviours and thinking in accordance with his criteria. Within CPAD and COCAD, planning and organisation occurred. While Bennett (1988) initially captured these aspects in his investigation into the surveillance techniques of CPAD, this research has shown the decision making processes needed to orchestrate the ground level activity in order to organise the numerous street patrols as well as the marches on the homes of alleged drug dealers. Also, the finding that individuals were willing to engage in informal surveillance of illegal drug activities (and also in reporting them) clearly contradicts research that suggests that informal surveillance increases people's perception of fear and risk thus discouraging them from participating in programmes which call for such measures (see Bellair 2000).

Equally, the strong networking system which provided more efficient communication channels for citywide anti-drug affiliates required much strategic planning. This sustained effort during the phases of both CPAD and COCAD define the movement as being a vigilante movement and not just a series of vigilante 'episodes.'[216]

Individuals who acted as private agents participated in the anti-drug movement. This research has shown that while most of these individuals were local residents unconnected to any establishment, those, like the politicians and priests who participated in and helped to resource the movement, acted in a personal capacity and did not claim to formally represent their respective institutions. Furthermore, the complete lack of a commercial slant to the anti-drug activities underpins the fact that they were undertaken

[216] Burrows (1976: 7) emphasizes that "vigilante movements" are rare and describes activities as "reactions" instead. However, CPAD and COCAD's ten year long reign in communities saw high levels of co-ordination, networking, and planning - aspects Burrows argues are absent in reactionary vigilante phenomenon.

voluntarily, a criterion which Johnston (1996) and Hines (1998) regard as integral to vigilantism.

Like Johnston (1996), Burrows (1976) also reminds us that certain accepted structures or social frameworks have to first be in place before a perceived infringement can take place. This research has established that two elements of vigilantism - perceived deviancy and threats to personal and collective security - became interconnecting factors as unfamiliar behaviours prompted the movement to believe that the consequences of these acts would somehow threaten the community's stability. Historically, the north inner-city would not have been unused to elements of anti-social behaviour (see for example, Kearns 1994). However, new drug using behaviours being witnessed in the community for the first time led to much anxiety and unease. For example, respondents stated that the 'stoned' behaviour of the youth in the community coupled with the increasing amount of drug users who were stealing from family, friends, and neighbours to fund their drug habits upset the norm. The general community's willingness to mobilize over this issue (as compared to the earlier housing issue) is a telling sign that individuals declared the drug problem to be a great threat to the community. Simply, they viewed the drug problem as a life or death situation.

This research indicates that the element of the threat or use of force as denoted by Johnston (1996) was manifested in the violence employed by some of the front-line members of the anti-drug movement. The violence came often in the form of punishing acts rather than preventative measures taken in relation to crime control. Drug users, and not the more upscale players in the drug trade, were predominantly the targets of anti-drug aggression. The violence involved was often physical and sometimes included the use of implements as seen in the case of Josie Dwyer, a drug addict who died as a result of beatings received from participants leaving a COCAD meeting. Respondents also noted the use of guns to threaten alleged dealers, and occasionally, their friends and family.

Berger (1963) has suggested that the use of violence or the threat of violence is often

'impractical' as a social control device and not likely to encourage conformity (85). This did not prove true in this research. This device became the most familiar and effective deterrent to drug dealing, clearly differentiating it from purely 'establishment' or 'political' violence as conceptualised by Rosenbaum and Sedeberg (1976) and Abrahams (1998). This research shows that respondents viewed the violence employed as the main crime control factor, which not only divided the community but the anti-drug movement itself as participants became increasingly uncomfortable with the level of violence and force exercised. Ironically, some social control efforts produce surprising side effects or even effects which counter their original intentions (Sumner 1997). It is doubtful that the anti-drug movement would have been as effective if it had not been for this element, as violence is what Burrows (1976) believes gives vigilante groups their "social bite" (xiii). Far more efficient in cleaning up the area than the Gardaí had ever been, anti-drug activists who engaged in such activities offered a more economical approach to achieving the movement's objectives.

This research sheds some unique light on Johnston's (1996) final characteristic of vigilantism - autonomous citizenship. As we have seen, Johnston (1996) has argued that vigilante groups 'operate without the state's authority or support' (226). This is true of the anti-drug movement up to a point. There was never any firsthand government involvement in the movement, that is to say, the movement did not receive specific, allocated funding or resources directly from any government department. However, indirect resourcing of the movement did take place. This possibility is not considered by Johnston (1996) who seems to focus only on direct governmental sponsorship. This research indicates the agencies funded by the government such as ICON and Combat Poverty did allocate their vital resources and funding to the movement in its second phase. For example, ICON offered the movement office space and the use of stationary and photocopying equipment in order to produce newsletters and information leaflets on meetings and marches. Combat Poverty allocated £15,000 to COCAD in order for the organisation to employ a part-time administrator who would produce its newsletter, *The Drugs Agenda.*

The anti-drug movement in its second phase received more direct government support through Dublin City Council which allocated rent-free flats to members of the movement specifically to co-ordinate tenant vetting.[217] This would have reflected the ethos of Dublin City Council following the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions Act) of 1997 which gave local residents almost equal control in curbing anti-social behaviour in communities. This type of community/government housing partnership is not unusual and has been seen in other cities such as Miami, Philadelphia, and Washington (see for example Garofalo and McLeod (1986) and Davis *et al.* (1991).

Indirect governmental support inadvertently came through the inaction of the Gardaí in relation to the more questionable tactics of the movement during both its phases. The failure of the Gardaí to police the activities which were taking place suggests that its members did not feel a compulsion to challenge the community's self-policing agenda. The Gardaí's inaction may seem to give credence to Meyer and Tarrow's (1998) stance on the police force institutionalizing protest by taking a more apolitical and tolerant approach. However, the fact that individuals were being threatened and harassed in the process negates this standpoint.

A willing hand-over of control from the police to local communities is somewhat unusual according to Kennedy (1994) since the dynamic usually involves the community energetically trying to wrest such power from the hands of the police in the first place. But as this research has shown, the relationship between these inner-city residents and the Gardaí has been mostly fraught with unease and mistrust. This has inadvertently led the general community to avoid approaching the police when a criminal act has taken place opting instead to deal with the situation internally. This research suggests that the lack of formal governance in the area has created 'no-go' enclaves such as described by Abrahams (1998) which are devoid of positive outside interventions. Along with high unemployment levels and a long-term welfare dependent population, these areas promote high levels of criminal activity which help foster a healthy underground economy, all underlying factors suggesting the existence of an underclass.

[217] According to respondents in this research, these flats were also used by anti-drug activists to plan meetings and marches and to interrogate alleged dealers.

It can be safely said that the anti-drug movement in both its phases stood as a vigilante movement which exercised particular social control mechanisms in the hope of ensuring the compliance of the community and the eradication of the drug problem. The movement is unique for several reasons.

Firstly, as stated above, the anti-drug movement in the north inner-city was a vigilante movement which was indirectly funded and resourced by the government during the movement's second phase. Secondly, there was an absence of an elite and non-elite dynamic which is seen repeatedly in vigilantism. Classic crime control vigilantism as described by Brown (1975) and Abrahams (1998) sees the "haves" confront the "have nots" or as Burrows (1976) puts it, the upper segment of society feeling threatened by the lower segment. This research has shown that such polarization did not exist with the anti-drug movement. Many of those who participated in the movement could be considered part of an underclass as could the targets of vigilante activity who were predominantly vulnerable and powerless drug users. Such was this internal focus that even the government (whose inaction on the supply and control of drugs clearly exacerbated the problem) eventually became incidental to the movement. Thirdly, the movement's total duration over a ten year period challenges far shorter time-frames given to vigilante groups by Little and Sheffield (1983), McCullagh (1996), and Abrahams (1998) who estimate vigilante groups to usually last between one and three years. In the case of both CPAD and COCAD, their average length each was five years, in which time they were noticeably active. The reasons for this may lie in the tenacity of its members as well as in the fact that both organisations were resourced and well supported by various organisations and individuals over the two decades. These included Sinn Féin and local politicians and priests who supported CPAD from its very beginning in the 1980's through to ICON, Combat Poverty, and Dublin City Council who resourced COCAD in the 1990's.

This case study of vigilantism did not end as other vigilante groups have, when the state decides to become active and regain control (as proposed by Little and Sheffield 1983). Although both CPAD and COCAD lasted a considerably long time,

respondents who were at the front-line of the activism claimed that general burn-out was the reason that the movement went into demise in both phases. The organisation of the marching and street patrols in particular were seen by respondents as wearisome activities. It must be remembered however that many individuals withdrew from the movement over the issue of violence, so a loss of momentum became inevitable. Towards the end of the COCAD phase, overt drug activity in the streets and flat complexes had almost come to a complete halt. Respondents believed that this aim was solely achieved by the movement and not by any meaningful governmental intervention. It became apparent in this research that the formation of Citywide, a more policy driven organisation, signaled the beginning of a new community approach to the drug problem. Compared to the anti-drug movement, it has become a more significant thorn in the government's side since it operates *within* the political realm.

Johnston's (1996) work on vigilantism calls for the examination of relationships between local agencies and vigilante groups. Similarly, social movement theory inadvertently requires investigation into agencies which may resource or institutionalize a social movement. Accordingly, this research undertook to explore the agencies which functioned alongside the anti-drug movement. The Garda Síochána, ICON, and Sinn Féin have all provided certain functions which enabled the movement to operate more efficiently. As we have seen, the inactive, passive role of the Gardai, backed by the resident's resistance to involving the Gardai in the community's internal affairs, secured an obstacle free environment which allowed members of the movement to do, for the most part, as they pleased.

This research has also established that there is a very strong perception among respondents that ICON and Sinn Féin were connected closely with the anti-drug movement (Sinn Féin during both phases, ICON only during the latter). Their proactive work in supporting the movement challenges the theories of authors like Cutler (1969), Brown (1975), and Agamben (2000) who declare vigilante movements to operate in isolation from other established groups or organisations. The success of the movement depended on its leaders' ability to oscillate between grassroot tactics and negotiations

with these organisations. Both ICON and Sinn Féin readily adopted the drugs issue and placed it at the fore of their respective agendas; they have consistently needled acting governments over the issue. In addition to this, they both fostered collective action among the disadvantaged and promoted working class interests, matters Piven and Cloward (1992) believe some organisations are hesitant to do.

The unexplained use of the Special Criminal Court during the Josie Dwyer trial testifies to the state's belief that the IRA was somehow involved in anti-drug activism. However, it is the respondents' day to day knowledge about Sinn Féin and IRA membership in the north inner-city and corresponding membership of the anti-drug movement which has affirmed the connection in the mind of the community. This research has also demonstrated that some residents believe that the tactics employed by the IRA in Northern Ireland, such as punishment beatings and murders, are also evident in the north inner-city. Some also felt there may be more sinister reasons behind Sinn Féin's open adoption of the drug issue, suggesting that Sinn Féin and the IRA may want to oversee the supply of drugs in order for their members to benefit from lucrative earnings. The strong connection between Sinn Féin, the IRA and anti-drug activity has also proven to be a prominent and long held belief in Northern Ireland according to research conducted by Higgins and McElrath (2000).

Some similarities can be drawn between ICON, Sinn Féin and historical vigilante patterns. For example, ICON's function in trying to reign in the aggressive element of the movement without disrupting its normal activities mirrors the role of the "Moderators" who sought to achieve the same aim with the "Regulators," vigilantes who had slipped into more violent activities in order to curb anti-social behaviour in North and South Carolina.[218]

Similarly, behind Sinn Féin's crime control policies lay an obvious (and understandable) political agenda, not an uncommon occurrence in vigilante history.[219] Its attempts to shy away from these associations may be redundant as this research,

[218] See for example Cutler (1969) and Brown (1975).
[219] As in the case of the 1856 San Francisco Vigilance Committee, as cited by Johnston (1992).

along with that of Munck (1988) and Kennedy's (1994), suggests that people in disadvantaged areas may welcome extra legal practices in relation to crime control when they feel the system has failed them.

Despite the negativity surrounding Sinn Féin's involvement with the anti-drug movement and alleged vigilantism, the party has made astounding strides within the political sphere, a testimony to its tenacity in addressing the issues that other political parties may neglect. Sinn Féin's willingness to embrace the political realm in the manner that it has offers some hope to those who remain marginalized.

This research has shown that ICON and Sinn Féin's overt participation in, and promotion of, the anti-drug movement helped to greatly resource it. These resources extended not only to the use of materials and space but also to knowledge, labour and, in an Phoblacht's case, the media. Whether the movement could have survived for as long as it did without these resources is uncertain. What is clear is that ICON and Sinn Féin acted as what Cress and Snow (1996) term "benefactors" to the anti-drug movement. That is, these organisations, in full agreement with the movement's objectives, made efforts to resource the movement in order to help ensure its survival. It is important to note that ICON and SInn Féin were not benign benefactors as some theorists may imagine; they were also active participants in the movement. This remains a dynamic needing further exploration.

Gurr (1968) has described institutionalization as 'the existence of a stable, enduring, and strong solidarity with groups and organisations beyond primary group level' (1105). With this in mind, ICON and Sinn Féin lent a sense of legitimacy to the anti-drug movement which no doubt encouraged outsiders to be a little more sympathetic to their cause. Their strong connection with the movement certainly would have helped to galvanize the community's "fence-sitters" who may have felt more encouraged in supporting the efforts of an already established organisation. Institutionalization assists groups in accessing support at a higher political level (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). In having a foot in the door of agencies which truly have the ability and

capacity to elicit change, groups obviously have a greater opportunity to exercise influence over policy makers.

ICON in particular helped institutionalize the anti-drug movement by giving it access to mainstream institutions such as the Inter-Agency Drugs Project and by securing co-optation possibilities with the North Inner City Drugs Task Force. It also assisted COCAD, along with other local and tenant groups, to press the government to form an amendment to the Housing Act of 1966 through 1992. That residents of inner-city Dublin mobilized to produce such a consequential change should be recognised, the success reflecting Lister's (1998) view that community activism is often about 'placing private matters in the public agenda' (230).

Furthermore, the formation of the Citywide organisation by ICON was a deliberate attempt to manage the violent element of the anti-drug movement. This kind of deliberate management of disruption is seen as a governmental or elite activity, as Gurr (1968) has stated. However in this instance, ICON's decision to form Citywide in order to institutionalize the movement and encourage the street activists to take the policy orientated route indicates that movements themselves can devise internal management strategies to curb disruption.

Finally, this research examined the outcomes of the anti-drug movement. Castells (1983) states that social movements often go for 'unattainable' objectives (331) but as Klandersman (1997) reminds us, 'protest is staged by hopeful, not hopeless people' (211). The anti-drug movement and its achievements contests Castells thinking. The movement's primary aim of ridding the streets of the chaotic behaviour surrounding drug dealing and using was accomplished during both phases. There is general agreement among respondents that these anti-social behaviours, although still manifesting in the area, do not mirror the distressing levels once witnessed. There is also agreement that activists achieved what they set out to do. But were they always right as Bennett (1988) has posited? Not according to some respondents who maintain that they, their friends, or family were wrongly targeted by activists who had an agenda (separate to that of the

anti-drug movement) which they deemed personal and historical.[220] These beliefs were held by respondents who witnessed the activities of CPAD and/or COCAD. Malone (1984) a north inner-city activist also believes CPAD to have been prone to making false allegations for these reasons.

COCAD built on the work started by CPAD in looking for specific legal and policy changes to address facets which seemed to facilitate drug dealers. The introduction of the 1996 Criminal Assets Bureau Act and the 1997 Housing Act, along with the formation of the Community Policing Forum in 1999 was no doubt hastened by the staunch petitioning of the movement.

Other outcomes include the skills and information gained during both phases which has allowed members of the movement to now participate in other organisations and social partnerships. The experiences and knowledge acquired through this type of community activism has ensured that structures are now in place for future mobilization. The movement also secured a counter-response from drug users in the form of UISCE (the Union for Improved Services and Education), an organisation who responded to the anti-drug movement by actively seeking partnership with the North Inner-City Drugs Task Force.

The shadow cast by the violent and intimidating acts of some anti-drug activists then must not be allowed to overshadow the effective and positive outcomes of the anti-drug movement. It met its initial objective of cleaning up the drug activity on the streets which was causing such despair to residents. With the assistance of ICON and Sinn Féin the movement became institutionalized during its second phase as COCAD, embracing the wider social and economic issues which Cullen (1990) believes CPAD could not adopt. Furthermore, the political rise of Sinn Féin, with its focus on the drug issue, has signaled to this community that the north inner-city is indeed an area of political importance and thus worthy of attention.

[220] It must be remembered of course that Bennett (1988) only interviewed members of CPAD and not those who were on the receiving end of their surveillance activities. On the other hand, individuals interviewed for this research who were on the receiving end (or knew someone else who was) were equally open to subjective thinking and remarks.

Vigilante groups often establish some goals but usually enough grievances are left unaddressed adding further resentment in relation to a particular social problem (Hines 1998). The re-emergence of the anti-drug movement in the north inner-city is regarded as unlikely by some participants who felt that the community leaders and activists suffered 'burn-out' from their activity during both phases. The lack of adequate resources was seen as a contributing factor to this activism fatigue. Other participants were unsure as to whether the movement could be resurrected if another drug epidemic hit the area. In light of the political processes which took place, these statements are significant as they may indicate that the community leaders' rationale for institutionalization may not have been fully comprehended by the community at large.

At the time of writing, cocaine has replaced heroin use as the intravenous drug of choice. This has presented communities with a new and worrying type of dynamic (see National Advisory Committee on Drugs 2003; Citywide 2004). Whether or not the politicisation of the anti-drug movement will truly inhibit a vigilante type response from some members of the community remains to be seen. For despite the best efforts of community leaders to usher the north inner-city into the political arena, an underclass still persists.

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Appendices

Appendix 1



Map of Dublin's North Inner-City

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Appendix 2

August 14th, 2001

Dear ,

My name is Erin Nugent and I am currently doing a PhD in Sociology in Trinity College, researching anti-drug activism. My supervisor is Dr. Evelyn Mahon.

At the moment I am concentrating on the north inner-city and I was wondering if I could interview you as part of this research. I am aware that you were a central figure in the anti-drugs movement in the north inner-city (your name was mentioned by a speaker during the unveiling of the Buckingham Street memorial). I feel your insights would be very valuable. The interview would take about an hour and would be confidential. It would be coded for filing purposes.

A rough outline would include:

- Your personal background (brief life history, history of your community work). *Specific details will not be included in the research; this information is only for validity purposes.*
- Your perceptions of the drug culture in the north city.
- Your perceptions of general community activism in the north city.
- Responses to the drug problem (statutory, voluntary).
- History and effects of anti-drug activism.

I imagine you are very busy, but I would really appreciate it if you would consider this request. You can contact me, or leave a message, at either of the telephone numbers below. Thank you.

_____

Erin Nugent

(H): (_____)

(W): (_____)

Example of standard letter

Appendix 3

Dear ,

Thank you for considering this request. Just to reiterate, I am currently doing a Ph.D. in Sociology in Trinity College researching community drug issues and activism. My supervisor is Dr. Evelyn Mahon.

At the moment I am concentrating on the north inner-city and as I stated to _____, I was wondering if I could interview you as part of this research. Many participants that I have interviewed already mentioned the importance of Combat Poverty in funding local groups in the north inner-city. Some areas are a little unclear and I need to clarify some issues. Dates, if possible, would be very much appreciated! Also, I am interested in your personal perspective on some issues. The telephone interview would be confidential and any information that might possibly identify you will be coded for filing purposes. Should you agree to this interview, I will refer to you only as an active committee member of Combat Poverty. Please let me know if you would like to be referred to by another title.

I am interested in the following:

- A brief history/aims and objectives of the Combat Poverty Programme (including The Committee of Pilot Schemes to Combat Poverty)
- The relationship between Combat Poverty and the Community Development Programme (which I think started in 1990)
- The role of Combat Poverty in relation to funding projects in the north inner-city in the 1980's and 1990's. (Some of the earlier projects which have been mentioned include the North City Community Council, and The Voluntary and Statutory Organisation/The Alliance for Work Forum). Were there other projects funded?
- What criteria did the projects meet to merit funding? Did the north inner-city projects stand out in any way in comparison to other projects applying for funding?
- What were/are your general perceptions of the north inner-city?
- What (if any) are your perceptions of community activism in the north inner-city during the 1980s and 1990s?
- What (if any) are your perceptions of the drug culture/ community responses in the north inner-city during the 1980's and 1990's?

I know you are very busy; thank you so much for your time. I am looking forward to hearing from you.

_____
Erin Nugent

(H): ( )
(W): ( )

Example of topic specific letter

Appendix 4



"Wanted For Murder" Poster, Sean MacDermott Street

Appendix 5



Special Criminal Court Protest Sign, Ballybough