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IMAGING THE BYZANTINES:
LATIN PERCEPTIONS, REPRESENTATIONS, AND MEMORY, C. 1095–C. 1230

Savvas Neocleous

A Thesis Presented to the University of Dublin, Trinity College, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


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Summary

On 16 April 1204, Constantinople fell to the armies of the Fourth Crusade and the Byzantine Empire was dismembered among its conquerors. More than six hundred years later, a controversy over the diversion of the Fourth Crusade broke out among scholars. To this day, a century and a half after its beginning, the controversy has not yet been resolved satisfactorily.

By focusing on the Latin attitudes towards and perceptions of the Byzantines in the period from the eve of the First Crusade to the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, this project approaches the 'diversion debate' from a new angle in an attempt to offer an original interpretation of the evidence, based on the primary sources. By studying the complex relationship between Latins and Byzantines in the period c. 1095-c. 1230, and by building up a critical and analytical picture of how the Byzantines were perceived by the Latins and how they were represented and remembered in the Latin narratives and accounts, my research revisits the question of what led to the capture and sack of Constantinople by the armies of the Fourth Crusade in 1204.

The main research question and its subsidiary questions are answered through a close, and fresh, critical analysis of the data provided by the primary accounts written between the late eleventh century, following the First Crusade, and the early thirteenth century, in the wake of the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople. Therefore, my research is based primarily on contemporary accounts of the period under examination. The survey of primary sources is followed by a discussion of the main debates, research, and modern scholarship in the field.

The Introduction to the thesis provides an overview of the current debates around '1204', outlines the aims and objectives, central research questions, and methodology of the present thesis, and concludes with a brief survey of the first encounter between the Latin and Greek worlds in Antiquity.

Five chapters unfold in chronological sequence, tracing the development of ideas and images over time. Chapter 1 examines the image of the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I (1081-1118) and the Byzantine people in the Latin historiography of the First Crusade, the Crusade of 1101, and the Norman 'crusade' against the Western territories of the Byzantine Empire in 1107-8.

Chapter 2 deals with Latin perceptions of the Emperor Manuel I (1143-1180) and the Byzantines, first at the time of the Second Crusade and its immediate aftermath, i.e. the early

years of Manuel's reign, and secondly in the period following the Second Crusade, i.e. from the 1150s onwards.

Chapter 3 covers the period from the massacre of the Italian residents of Constantinople in 1182 to the Third Crusade, examining the portrayal of the Emperor Andronikos I (1183-5), the Emperor Isaak II (1185-95, 1203-4), the 'Emperor' of Cyprus Isaak Komnenos (1184-91), and the Byzantines in contemporary Latin accounts.

Chapter 4 deals with Western attitudes and perceptions of the Byzantine emperors Alexios III (1195-1203), Alexios IV (1203-4), and Alexios V (1204), and the Greeks in general from the German Crusade of 1197 to the Fourth Crusade and the Latin conquest of Constantinople. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the Latin reactions to and aftermath of 1204.

The Conclusions underlines that the diversion of the Fourth Crusade and the capture and sack of Constantinople was indeed the result of 'a series of accidents', as argued by Queller, but also highlights that the Byzantine Empire was a power firmly assimilated to the political system of twelfth-century Christendom, contrasting the view that 'anti-Byzantine' sentiment swept Western Europe during the twelfth century.

Based on medieval documentary evidence, I have challenged several traditional views in modern scholarship, including the theses that: 1. the Latin historiography of the First Crusade is 'anti-Byzantine'; 2. there was widespread anti-Byzantine feeling in the West in the aftermath of the Second Crusade; 3. a Franco-Sicilian expedition against the Byzantine Empire was planned on the aftermath of the ill-fated Second Crusade; 4. the massacre of the Italian merchants in Constantinople in 1182 had great impact in the West; 5. there was an alliance between Isaak II and Saladin against the German expedition of the Third Crusade; 6. the promised submission of the Church of Constantinople to that of Rome had a strong appeal to the Fourth Crusaders; 7. Innocent III (1198-1216) yearned for a Latin conquest of Constantinople; and 8. most importantly, there was growing ill-feeling towards the Greeks in the twelfth-century Latin world and it was this that inevitably led to the capture and sack of the Byzantine capital in 1204. Further, I have made the significant breakthrough in discovering that an important letter, allegedly written by Marquis Conrad of Montferrat to Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury in 1188 is in fact a fake. This false letter has been occasionally used by several modern scholars to support various theses, one of them being that the letter was intended to arouse anti-Byzantine feelings in Western Europe.

To my parents

With the greatest gratitude for all their loving support

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments xiii
List of Abbreviations xv
Introduction 1
The Current Debates around '1204' 1
'Imaging the Byzantines: Latin Perceptions, Representations, and Memory, c. 1095–c. 1230': Aims and Objectives, Central Research Questions and Methodology 5
Latin West and Greek East: the First Contacts 7
Chapter 1: Alexios I Komnenos and the Byzantines in the Latin Historiography of the First Crusade and its Aftermath 15
The Sources 15
'*Magnificus imperator*' or '*tyrannus insolens*'? Re-Constructing the Image of Alexios I Komnenos 20
The 'People's Crusade' 20
The Princes' Armies: the March through the Byzantine Empire and the Arrival at Constantinople 24
The Princes' Armies: from Nicaea to Jerusalem 44
The Crusade of 1101 60
Bohemond's 'Crusade' 72
Conclusions 81
The Western View of the Byzantines 86
The Byzantines in the Latin Accounts Composed in the First Four Decades of the Twelfth Century 86
The Byzantines in William of Tyre's Account of the First Crusade and its Aftermath 100
Chapter 2: Manuel I Komnenos and the Byzantines through a Latin Lens 103
The Sources 104
Manuel and the Byzantines in the Latin Accounts of the Second Crusade and its Aftermath 107
Manuel, the Byzantines, and the French Crusading Expedition in Odo of Deuil's *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem* 107
Graecorum culpa?: the End of the Second Crusade and the Attribution of Blame 133
Conclusions 151
The Crusading Project of 1150 155
Manuel's 'New Image': Development of Ties between the Byzantine Empire and the Latin World 160
Manuel and the Latin *Outremer* 160
Manuel and the Latin West 164
The Emergence of Manuel's 'New Image' and Legend 167
Conclusions 172

Chapter 3: From the 1182 Massacre to the Third Crusade: the Portrayal of Andronikos I, the Two Isaaks, and the Byzantines in Accounts by Latin Authors 174
The Sources 175
Andronikos I, the Byzantines, and the Impact of the 1182 Massacre on the Latin World 178
Isaak II, the Byzantines, and the German Expedition of the Third Crusade 188
From Nuremberg to Philippopolis: towards a Crisis 188
The Germans at Philippopolis: Deepening Crisis and Conflict 194
Frederick's Impatience, Patriarch Dositheos's Beliefs, and the Spread of Religious Propaganda 204
Enemy at the Gates 207
The Question of the Alliance between the Byzantine Empire and Saladin 212
The Western Sense of Christian Fellowship and the Rescue of Constantinople 231
Isaak II as Frederick I's Counter-Image in the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris* 235
Isaak Komnenos of Cyprus, the Cypriots, and the English Expedition of the Third Crusade 236
Isaak Komnenos of Cyprus 238
The Cypriots 246
Richard's Conquest of Cyprus as Seen by Western Authors 251
Conclusions 253
Chapter 4: From the German Crusade of 1197 to the Fourth Crusade and the Latin Conquest of Constantinople 256
The Sources 256
The Crusade of Henry VI: a Threat to Byzantium 260
Pope Innocent's Vision and Byzantium's Place within It 263
'The Devil ... Caused You to Make War against Your Brothers': Crusading Attack on Zara and Papal Reaction 271
New Dissension within the Crusade: *la boine acoison, li traitres,* and *li drois oirs* 273
The Crusaders at Constantinople: First Siege 286
Alexios IV and the Greek-Latin Co-Existence 295
The Fragile Byzantine-Latin Alliance 295
'He Abandons Us - He upon Whom We Had Conferred So Many Benefits': the Termination of the Byzantine-Latin Alliance 303
Morchofles li traitres 310
'Through This You Might Camouflage Your Digression Rather Than That the Daughter Return to the Mother': Pope Innocent's Distrust of the Crusaders' Motives... 314
Capture and Sack of Constantinople 318
'They Should Not Be at All Afraid to Attack the Greeks, For They Were the Enemies of God': Legitimisation of the Attack on Constantinople 318
'Since the History of This World Was Told, So Great, Noble and Rich a Treasure Was Never Seen Nor Won': the Sack of Constantinople 323

Conclusions....326
Chapter 5: Reactions to and Aftermath of 1204....328
The Sources....328
Western View of the Latin Conquest of Constantinople....329
'Divine Goodness ... So Arranged ... That the Western Church, Illuminated By the Inviolable Relics ... Should Rejoice Forever': *translatio reliquiarum* from Constantinople to the West....329
Super omnia mirabilia mirabile....331
High Expectations: the Daughter's Return to the Mother and the Union of the Churches....344
High Hopes: 'the Greek Church ... Might Liberate its Two Sisters'....347
Disillusion: 'By That from Which We Appeared to Have Profited Up to Now We Are Impoverished'....349
Latin Emperors: 'Emperors of the Greeks'?....355
Chronicles of the Fourth Crusade: 'Venom against the Greeks'?....362
Conclusions....368
Conclusions: 1204: The Culmination of a Century of Growing Mistrust and Hostility *or* the Result of a Series of Accidents?....370
Bibliography....378

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And therefore I have sailed the seas and come

To the holy city of Byzantium.

(W. B. Yeats, 'Sailing to Byzantium')

Abbreviations

Abu Shama, *Le Livre des deux jardins*	Abu Shama. *Le Livre des deux jardins: histoire des deux règnes, celui de Nour ed-Dîn et celui de Salah ed-Dîn*, *RHC Or.*, 4, 3-522.
Albert of Aachen, *Historia*	Albert of Aachen. *Historia Ierosolimitana, History of the Journey to Jerusalem*, ed. and trans. Susan B. Edgington (Oxford, 2007).
Ambroise, *Holy War*	Ambroise. *The History of the Holy War*, eds Marianne Ailes and Malcolm Barber, and trans. Marianne Ailes, 2 vols (Woodbridge, 2003).
Anonymous of Soissons	*The Anonymous of Soissons*, in *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, trans. A. J. Andrea (Leiden, 2000), 223-38.
Baha'al-Din ibn Shaddad, *History*	Baha'al-Din ibn Shaddad. *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, trans. Donald Sidney Richards (Aldershot, 2001).
Baldric of Dol, *Historia*	Baldric of Dol. *Historia Jerosolimitana*, *RHC Oc.*, 4, 1-111.
Bernold of Constance, *Chronicon*	Bernold of Constance. *Chronicon*, in *Die Chroniken Bertholds von Reichenau und Bernolds von Konstanz*, ed. Ian S. Robinson, *MGH, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum*, nova series 14 (Hanover, 2003), 383-540.
Cicero, *Pro Flacco*	Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *In Catilinam I-IV, Pro Murena, Pro Sulla, Pro Flacco*, ed. and trans. C. Macdonald (London; Cambridge, 1977).
Cicero, *Letters*	Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *Letters to His Brother Quintus and Others*, trans. W. Glynn Williams, M. Cary, and Mary Henderson (Cambridge, 1989).
Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*	Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King (London; New York, 1927).
Clari, *Conquête*	Robert de Clari. *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. and trans. Peter Noble (Edinburgh, 2005).
Deeds of Pope Innocent III	*The Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, trans. James M. Powell (Washington, DC, 2004).
Deeds of the Bishops of Halberstadt	*The Deeds of the Bishops of Halberstadt*, in *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, trans. A. J. Andrea (Leiden, 2000), 239-64.
Devastatio Constantinopolitana	*The Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, in *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, trans. A. J. Andrea (Leiden, 2000), 205-21.

Die Register	*Die Register Innocenz III*, eds Othmar Hageneder et al., 7 vols (Graz; Cologne, 1964-99).
Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolomyta*	Ekkehard of Aura. *Hierosolomyta*, *RHC Oc.*, 5, 1-40.
Epistolae Stephani	Stephen of Blois. *Epistolae Stephani, Comitis Carnotensis*, *RHC Oc.*, 3, 885-90.
Eustathios of Thessaloniki, *Capture*	Eustathios of Thessaloniki. *The Capture of Thessaloniki*, trans. John R. Melville Jones, *Byzantina Australiensia*, 8 (Canberra, 1988).
Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*	Fulcher of Chartres. *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem 1095-1127*, ed. Harold S. Fink, trans. Frances Rita Ryan (Knoxville, TN, 1960).
Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia*	Fulcher of Chartres. *Historia Hierosolymitana*, *RHC Oc.*, 3, 311-485.
Gerhoh Reichersbergensis, *De investigatione*	Gerhoh praepositus Reichersbergensis. *De investigatione Antichristi liber I*, ed. Ernst Sackur, in *MGH Libelli de Lite*, 3 (Hanover, 1897), 304-95.
Gesta Francorum	*Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, trans. Rosalind Hill (London, 1962).
Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle*	Gilbert of Mons. *Chronicle of Hainaut*, trans. Laura Napran (Woodbridge, 2005).
Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*	Guibert of Nogent. *The Deeds of God through the Franks*, trans. Robert Levine (Woodbridge, 1997).
Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*	Guibert de Nogent. *Dei gesta per Francos*, ed. Robert Burchard Constantijn Huygens, *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 127A (Turnhout, 1996).
Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*	Guillaume de Tyr. *Chronique*, ed. Robert Burchard Constantijn Huygens, *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 63-63A (Turnhout, 1986).
Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*	Gunther of Pairis. *The Capture of Constantinople: the* Hystoria Constantinopolitana *of Gunther of Pairis*, trans. Alfred J. Andrea (Philadelphia, PA, 1997).
Gunther of Pairis,	Gunther of Pairis. *Hystoria Constantinopolitana*, ed. Ausgabe von

Hystoria	Peter Orth (Hildesheim, 1994).
Helmold, *Chronicle*	Helmold. *The Chronicle of the Slavs*, trans. Francis Tschan (New York, 1935).
Henri de Valenciennes, *Histoire*	Henri de Valenciennes. *Histoire de l'Empereur Henri de Constantinople*, ed. Jean Longnon (Paris, 1948).
Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia*	Henry of Huntingdon. *Historia Anglorum: The History of the English People*, ed. and trans. Diana Greenway (Oxford, 1996).
Historia de expeditione	*Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, in *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I*, ed. Anton Chroust, *MGH, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum*, nova series 5 (Berlin, 1928), 1-115.
History of the expedition	Wilcox, Chester Edward. 'A Translation with Introduction and Notes of 'Ansbert''s *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*', M.A. Thesis, University of Nebraska (1951).
Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*	Hugh of Saint Pol. *Count Hugh of Saint Pol's Report to the West*, in *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, trans. A. J. Andrea (Leiden, 2000), 177-201.
John of Salisbury, *Historia*	John of Salisbury. *Historia pontificalis*, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford, 1986).
John of Salisbury, *Letters*	John of Salisbury. *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, ed. and trans. W. J. Millor and C. N. L. Brooke, 2 vols (Oxford, 1979), 2.
Juvenal, *Satires*	Juvenal and Persius. *Satires*, trans. G. G. Ramsay (London; Cambridge, 1979).
Kinnamos, *Deeds*	Kinnamos, John. *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus*, trans. Charles M. Brand (New York, 1976).
Komnena, *Alexiad*	Anna Komnena. *The Alexiad*, trans. E. R. A. Sewter (London, 1969).
Komnena, *Alexiade*	Anna Komnena. *Alexiade X-XIV*, *RHC Gr.*, 1, 2, 3-204.
Liudprand of Cremona, *Relatio*	Liudprand of Cremona. *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*, ed. and trans. Brian Scott (London; Bristol, 1993).
Maragone, *Annales*	Maragone, Bernardo. *Annales pisani*, ed. Michele Lupo Gentile, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 2nd edn, 6, 2 (Bologne, 1936).
Michael the Syrian,	Michael the Syrian. *Chronique*, trans. J.-B. Chabot, 4 vols (Paris,

Chronique	1899-1910).
Neophytos the Recluse, *De calamitatibus*	Neophytos the Recluse. *De calamitatibus Cypri: Περὶ τῶν κατὰ χώραν Κύπρου σκαιῶν*, in *Excerpta Cypria: Materials for a History of Cyprus*, trans. Claude Delaval Cobham (Cambridge, 1908), 10-13.
Niketas Choniates, *Annals*	Niketas Choniates. *O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates,* trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1984).
Niketas Choniates, *Historia*	Niketas Choniates. *Historia*, ed. Jan Louis van Dieten (Berlin; New York, 1975).
Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*	Odo of Deuil. *De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem*, ed. and trans. Virginia Gingerick Berry (New York, 1948).
Orderic Vitalis, *History*	Orderic Vitalis. *The Ecclesiastical History*, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols (Oxford, 1969-80).
Otto of Freising, *Chronica*	Otto of Freising. *Chronica sive Historia de Duabus Civitatibus*, ed. Adolf Hofmeister, *MGH, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis separatim editi*, 45 (Hanover, 1912).
Otto of Freising, *Deeds*	Otto of Freising. *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*, trans. Charles Christopher Mierow (Toronto, 1953).
Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*	Otto of Freising. *The Two Cities: a Chronicle of Universal History to the Year 1146 A.D.*, eds Austin P. Evans and Charles Knapp, trans. Charles Christopher Mierow (New York, 2002).
Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*	Otto of Saint Blasien. *Chronica*, ed. Adolf Hofmeister, *MGH, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis recusi*, 47 (Hanover, 1912).
PL	Migne, J. P. *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*, 221 vols (Paris, 1844-55).
Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*	Ralph of Caen. *Gesta Tancredi in expeditione Hierosolymitana*, *RHC Oc.*, 3, 587-716.
Ralph of Caen, *History*	Ralph of Caen. *Gesta Tancredi: a History of the Normans on the First Crusade*, trans. Bernard S. Bachrach and David Steward Bachrach (Aldershot, 2005).
Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicle*	Ralph of Coggeshall. *Chronicle*, in *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, trans. A. J. Andrea (Leiden, 2000), 277-90.

Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*	Ralph of Coggeshall. *Chronicon Anglicanum*, ed. Joseph Stevenson, *Rolls Series*, 66 (London, 1875).
Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*	Ralph of Diceto. *Opera Historica*, ed. William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, 68, 2 vols (London, 1876).
Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*	France, John. 'A Critical Edition of the *Historia Francorum* of Raymond of Aguilers', PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham (1967).
Raymond of Aguilers, *History*	Raymond of Aguilers. *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, trans. John Hugh Hill and Laurita L. Hill (Philadelphia, PA, 1968).
RHC Gr.	*Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Grecs*, 2 vols (Paris, 1875-81).
RHC Oc.	*Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, 5 vols (Paris, 1844-95).
RHGF	*Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, 24 vols (Paris, 1738-1904).
Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*	Richard de Templo. *Chronicle of the Third Crusade: a Translation of the Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi*, trans. Helen J. Nicholson (Aldershot, 1997).
Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*	Richard de Templo. *Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi*, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, ed. William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, 38, 2 vols (London, 1864-5), 1.
Richard of Devizes, *Chronicle*	Richard of Devizes. *Chronicle of the Time of King Richard the First*, ed. and trans. John Tate Appleby (London, 1963).
Robert of Torigni, *Chronica*	Robert of Torigni. *Chronica*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. Richard Howlett, *Rolls Series*, 82, 4 vols (London, 1884-9), 4.
Robert the Monk, *Historia*	Robert the Monk. *Historia Iherosolimitana*, *RHC Oc.*, 3, 717-882.
Robert the Monk, *History*	Robert the Monk. *History of the First Crusade*, trans. Carol Sweetenham (Aldershot, 2005).
Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*	Roger of Hoveden. *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, trans. Henry T. Riley, 2 vols (London, 1853).
Roger of Hoveden,	Roger of Hoveden. *Chronica*, ed. William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, 51,

Chronica	4 vols (London, 1868-71).
Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*	Roger of Hoveden. *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*, ed. William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, 49, 2 vols (London, 1867).
Roger of Wendover, *Flores*	Roger of Wendover. *Flores Historiarum*, ed. Henry Gay Hewlett, *Rolls Series*, 84, 3 vols (London, 1886-9).
Saint Bernard, *De Consideratione*	Saint Bernard. *De Consideratione*, trans. George Lewis (Oxford, 1908).
Tagenonis decani Pataviensis descriptio	*Tagenonis decani Pataviensis descriptio expeditionis Asiaticae contra Turcas Friderici imperatoris*, in *Germanicarum rerum scriptores aliquot insignes*, ed. Burkhard Gotthelf Struve (Argentorati, 1717), 407-416.
The Registers	*The Registers of Innocent III*, in *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, trans. A. J. Andrea (Leiden, 2000), 7-176.
Villehardouin, *Conquest*	Geoffrey of Villehardouin. *The Conquest of Constantinople*, in *Chronicles of the Crusades*, trans. M. R. B. Shaw (London, 1963), 29-160.
Villehardouin, *Conquête*	Geoffroy de Villehardouin. *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Edmond Faral, 2 vols (Paris, 1961).
Virgil, *Aeneid*	Virgil. *Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid I-VI*, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (London; Cambridge, 1978).
Walter Map, *De nugis*	Walter Map. *De nugis curialium*, ed. and trans. Montague Rhodes James, revised Christopher Brooke and Roger Aubrey Baskerville (Oxford, 1983).
William of Malmesbury, *Gesta*	William of Malmesbury. *Gesta Regum Anglorum*, eds and trans. Roger Aubrey Baskerville Mynors, Rodney Malcolm Thomson and Michael Winterbottom, 2 vols (Oxford, 1998-99).
William of Newburgh, *English Affairs: Book I*	William of Newburgh. *The History of English Affairs: Book I*, ed. and trans. Patrick Gerard Walsh and M. J. Kennedy (Warminster, 1988).
William of Newburgh, *English Affairs: Book II*	William of Newburgh. *The History of English Affairs: Book II*, ed. and trans. Patrick Gerard Walsh and M. J. Kennedy (Oxford, 2007).
William of Newburgh, *Historia*	William of Newburgh. *Historia rerum Anglicarum*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. Richard Howlett, *Rolls Series*, 82, 4 vols (London, 1884-9), 1-2.

William of Newburgh, *History*	William of Newburgh. *The History of William of Newburgh (1066-1194)*, trans. Joseph Stevenson (London, 1856).
William of Tyre, *Deeds*	William of Tyre. *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, trans. Emily Atwater Babcock and August Charles Krey, 2 vols (New York, 1943).

INTRODUCTION

The Current Debates around '1204'

On 16 April 1204, the celebrated city of Constantinople, the greatest metropolis in Christendom, fell to the armies of the Fourth Crusade and the ancient Byzantine Empire was dismembered among its conquerors. As the aim of the crusade was Egypt, the stop at Constantinople constituted a 'diversion' in the route. More than six hundred years later, and more specifically in the second half of the nineteenth century, a controversy over the diversion of the Fourth Crusade broke out among scholars.[1] To this day, a century and a half after its beginning, the controversy has not yet been resolved satisfactorily.

In the course of the diversion controversy, and particularly until the 1980s, the conspiracy theories enjoyed great currency. The conspiracy theorists pinned the blame for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade on one or the other of several individuals: the doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, the German candidate to the Western imperial throne, Philip of Swabia, the leader of the Fourth Crusade, Boniface of Montferrat, and even Innocent III (1198-1216), the pope who proclaimed the crusade. All the conspiracy theories, however, have been discredited and are today out of favour.

With the conspiracy theories having lost credibility, there remain two main schools of thought. The first sees the events of 1204 as the inevitable result of a 'clash of civilizations' between the Catholic Latin West and the Greek Orthodox East. According to the proponents of this school of thought, the conquest and sack of Constantinople were the culmination of a century of growing mistrust and hostility between the two halves of medieval Christendom. The crusades of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries brought the Latin West and the Greek East into closer contact than they had been for centuries. The encounter and

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[1] For a discussion of the controversy and the variety of views on the diversion, see D. E. Queller and S. J. Stratton, 'A Century of Controversy on the Fourth Crusade', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 6 (1969), 235-77; T. F. Madden, 'Outside and Inside the Fourth Crusade', *The International History Review*, 17 (1995), 726-43; A. J. Andrea, 'Essay on Literature', in *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, 2nd edn (Philadelphia, PA, 1997), 318-24; M. Balard, 'L'Historiographie occidentale de la quatrième croisade', in *Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, la IVe Croisade et ses conséquences. Proceedings of an International Conference Organized by the Academy of Athens and Held March 9-12, 2004*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Paris, 2005), 161-74; J. Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades* (London, 2003), xiv-xvii.

interaction, however, engendered Latin resentment and hatred for the Greeks that inevitably led to the events of 1204.

As early as 1894, Munro claimed that, 'the hatred accumulated for more than a century will vent itself in the sack of Constantinople'[2] in 1204. As Ostrogorsky put it succinctly in 1952, 'the diversion of the Fourth Crusade against Constantinople ... was the almost inevitable result of early developments ... Since the beginning of the crusading movement, hostility towards Byzantium had been growing in the West'.[3] In his article 'Byzantium and the Crusades', published in 1986, but being in fact a summary of his treatment of the subject in his *History of the Crusades*, Runciman stated: 'so we come to the tragedy of 1204, the grand ambitious revenge of Venice on Byzantium, but a revenge that could not have been organised had it not been for the mounting dislike and suspicion that all Western Christendom now felt toward the Byzantines'.[4] In 1987, Fine asserted that 'it seemed probable that it was only a matter of time before the West attacked schismatic and (probably more important) wealthy Constantinople'.[5] In 1992, Barber claimed that 'neither side [the Latin or the Greek] needed much persuasion to believe the worst of the other after a century of deteriorating relations, largely stemming from the crusades themselves'.[6] As this scholar argues, 'the crusades had helped create a public opinion which was bitterly hostile to Byzantium' and, thus, 'the ability of the Venetians to manipulate the army between 1202 and 1204 was greatly helped by the predisposition of many crusaders to believe ill of the Greeks. By 1204 a stereotyped Greek - violent, perfidious, effeminate and a religious deviant - was firmly implanted in the Western mind'.[7] In 1996, Ciggaar backed the thesis that in the twelfth century 'relations between East and West became more intense and eventually more hostile and resulted in the capture of

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[2] D. C. Munro, 'Letters of the Crusaders Written from the Holy Land', in *Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History,* 1, 4 (Philadelphia, PA, 1894), 19.

[3] G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey (Oxford, 1956), 368. The same thesis is repeated *verbatim* in the revised edition, see G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1968), 414.

[4] S. Runciman, 'Byzantium and the Crusades', in *The Meeting of two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades*, ed. V. P. Goss and C. V. Bornstein (Kalamazoo, MI, 1986), 22.

[5] J. V. A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1987), 60.

[6] M. Barber, *The Two Cities: Medieval Europe, 1050-1320* (London, 1992), 131. The same view is expressed in the revised edition, see M. Barber, *The Two Cities: Medieval Europe, 1050-1320*, 2nd edn (London, 2004), 123.

[7] Ibid., 496. The same thesis is repeated *verbatim* in the revised edition, see Barber, 2004, 451.

Constantinople'.[8] In 1997, Dupront argued that the diversion of the Fourth Crusade was 'the purgation of bad tempers re-stinging the Greeks of Byzantium for a century'.[9]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the theory has not lost its currency. On the back cover of Angold's book *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context*, published in 2003, it is averred that 'this is the story of one of the great clashes of medieval civilizations'.[10] According to Angold, 'the soldiers of the Fourth Crusade were heirs to the suspicion and contempt that the Latin world had displayed towards the Greeks ... the direct contacts between the West and Byzantium established by the crusade had had the effect of intensifying Latin distrust of the Greeks'.[11] In her article 'Byzantium and the Crusades in the Twelfth Century: Why was the Fourth Crusade Late in Coming', published in 2005, Laiou argued that 'the attack on Constantinople in 1204 was probably made more palatable by the long history of hostilities on the ground'.[12] An extended quotation from an entry included in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, published in 2007, elaborates this view more fully:

> The diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople and the atrocities committed by the crusaders and the Venetians after the capture of the Byzantine capital can be fully explained if Byzantine-Latin relations of the recent past are taken into consideration. There is no doubt that the crusaders and the Venetians wanted their debts to be paid by the Byzantines, but apart from this, a significant role in the events of 1204 was played by the antipathy that had been cultivated for decades in the West against Byzantium because of the lack of commitment of the Byzantine emperors to the aims of the crusaders. Further contributory factors were the schism between the Latin and Greek Orthodox Churches, the imperialistic policy of Emperor Manuel I toward the West, the anti-Latin policy of Emperor Andronikos I, and finally long-standing Western ambitions to conquer Constantinople, which had been an aim of the Norman kings of Sicily in the eleventh century, and may well have been considered by Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa and his son Emperor Henry VI in the twelfth century.[13]

In 2003, Harris advanced yet 'another view', according to which,

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[8] K. N. Ciggaar, *Western Travellers to Constantinople. The West and Byzantium, 962-1204: Cultural and Political Relations* (Leiden; New York; Köln, 1996), 101.
[9] A. Dupront, *Le mythe de croisade,* 4 vols (Paris, 1997), 1, 36.
[10] M. Angold, *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context* (Harlow, 2003).
[11] Ibid., 60.
[12] A. E. Laiou, 'Byzantium and the Crusades in the Twelfth Century: Why Was the Fourth Crusade Late in Coming?', in *Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, la IVe Croisade et ses Conséquences. Proceedings of an International Conference Organized by the Academy of Athens and Held March 9-12, 2004*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Paris, 2005), 39.
[13] A. Papayianni, 'Byzantine Empire', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 vols (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1, 194.

> the Byzantines succeeded in giving the impression that the empire was failing to participate in the pious cause of defending Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the common Muslim foe. Western attempts after 1187 to extort what they considered to be the rightful Byzantine financial contribution to the enterprise led directly to the events of April 1204.[14]

Harris's interpretation departs considerably from the 'consensus' of scholars who support the thesis that the diversion of the Fourth Crusade was the inevitable outcome of more than a century of growing ill feeling between the Latins and the Greeks. However, Harris's view still sees the events of 1204 as *inevitable*, the result of Western perceptions of Byzantium: 'the rulers of Byzantium appeared to be betraying the cause of the crusade and colluding with the infidel. That perception prompted crusade leaders first to demand Byzantine money to supply their armies, then to attack and occupy Byzantine territory when it was not forthcoming'.[15]

In opposition to the proponents of the theory that the events of 1204 were the inevitable outcome of friction between the Latin West and the Greek East, Queller, the doyen of the scholars of the Fourth Crusade, advanced the 'theory of accidents', according to which a complex chain of connected, unforeseen events led to the Latin conquest of Constantinople.[16] In other words, Queller favoured the thesis that the Fourth Crusade came about as an accident. Amongst the most eminent proponents of Queller's view are Madden,[17] Housley,[18] Jotischky,[19] and the world's leading Crusade historian Riley-Smith. In his *The Crusades: A Short History*, published in 1987 and being considered the standard authoritative account of the history of the Crusades, Riley-Smith argued that 'the capture of Constantinople seems to have been the result of a series of accidents ... There is no need even to explain the crusade in terms of the long history of bad relations between crusaders and Greeks'.[20]

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[14] Harris, 2003, xvii.
[15] Ibid., 184.
[16] D. E. Queller and G. W. Day, 'Some Arguments in Defense of the Venetians on the Fourth Crusade', *The American Historical Review*, 81 (1976), 718; D. E. Queller, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, 1201-1204* (Philadelphia, PA, 1977); D. E. Queller and T. F. Madden, 'Some Further Arguments in Defense of the Venetians on the Fourth Crusade', *Byzantion*, 62 (1992), 467.
[17] Madden, 1995, 726-43.
[18] N. Housley, 'The Thirteenth-Century Crusades in the Mediterranean', *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, 5, ed. D. Abulafia (Cambridge, 1999), 572.
[19] A. Jotischky, *Crusading and the Crusader States* (Harlow, 2004), 163.
[20] J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A Short History* (London, 1987), 130. The same view is expressed in the revised edition, see J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 2nd edn (London, 2005), 160.

'Imaging the Byzantines: Latin Perceptions, Representations, and Memory, c. 1095–c. 1230': Aims and Objectives, Central Research Questions, Methodology

With the exponents of the two schools of thought vigorously defending their views, the controversy over the diversion of the Fourth Crusade seems not to have lost anything of its intensity since its beginning. This Ph.D. dissertation, entitled 'Imaging the Byzantines: Latin Perceptions, Representations, and Memory, c. 1095–c. 1230', makes the challenge to approach the controversy from a new angle. As indicated by its title, the Ph.D. thesis studies the Latin attitudes and perceptions of the Byzantines in the period from the eve of the First Crusade to the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. It examines how the individual Byzantine emperors, the Byzantine Church, and the Byzantine people as a whole were viewed, represented, and remembered in narratives and accounts written by authors belonging to different periods of the time-span under examination and to various parts of the Latin world. Although the investigation focuses on attitudes and perceptions, which consist of images, representations, beliefs, judgements, prejudices, and emotions, the factual data is by no means dismissed: the way an author selects and treats the data provides us with a significant insight into his attitudes and perceptions.

The term 'Latin' is a complex one and its usage in my thesis must be clarified at the outset. To use the words of a chronicler and participant in the Fourth Crusade, *Latins* are *tous chiax de le loy de Romme* ('all those of the law of Rome').[21] In other words, in the context of my thesis, the term 'Latins' designates those who unequivocally accepted the ultimate authority of Rome in spiritual matters. It should be emphasised that the term 'Westerners' is not equivalent to the term 'Latins' since Latins also inhabited Syria and Palestine after the foundation of the crusader states in the same geographical area, following the First Crusade. It must also be stressed that not all of our Latin authors wrote in Latin. Some of our sources of the last quarter of the twelfth century were composed in Old French or Italian.

By studying the complex relationship between Latins and Byzantines in the period c. 1095 -c. 1230, and by building up a critical and analytical picture of the Latin perceptions and representations of the Byzantines, my research attempts to revisit the question of what led to the capture and sack of Constantinople by the armies of the Fourth Crusade in 1204. Was it the result of a series of accidents *or* of a 'clash of cultures', a clash between the Latin West and

[21] Clari, *Conquête*, 22, 40.

the Greek East? Was the capture of Constantinople by the armies of the Fourth Crusade inevitable, the anticipated result of an encounter and antagonism which spanned over a hundred years and resulted in the Latins regarding the Greeks as hateful opponents, traitors, and heretics? Or was it an unforeseen and surprising episode, in which the fact that the Byzantines were *not* Latins but Greeks played little or no role? In other words, did the Latin perceptions of the Byzantines and the contact between Western and Eastern Christendom during the first four crusades have any part in the events of 1204? Was the contact and interaction between Latins and Greeks so negative as to inevitably lead to the capture of the Byzantine capital? Finally, what was the impact of the Latin conquest of Constantinople on Latin Christendom? And what was the Latin reaction to the conquest of the Byzantine capital?

To support the view that there was ill feeling against the Byzantines in the West ever since the immediate aftermath of the First Crusade, several scholars have employed certain late eleventh-century and twelfth-century sources which they have labelled as 'anti-Byzantine' and understood as reflecting and representing Latin opinion. Are these accounts as 'anti-Byzantine' as they might seem at first glance? And to what extent do they mirror and represent Latin popular opinion? Did they ever gain a wide circulation? Is there any evidence that they informed later developments, i.e. the diversion to Constantinople and the capture of the city in 1204? Moreover, do other narrative sources, which have been relatively overlooked by scholars, reveal a different, neutral, or even, positive view of the Byzantines? Is there any evidence that testifies to positive Latin attitudes towards the Byzantines and peaceful co-habitation between Latins and Greeks in the Byzantine Empire during the twelfth century and at the beginning of the thirteenth up to the immediate aftermath of the Latin conquest of Constantinople?

The above questions can only be answered through a close, and fresh, critical analysis of the data provided by the primary accounts written between the late eleventh century, following the First Crusade, and the early thirteenth century, in the wake of the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople. Therefore, my research is based primarily on contemporary accounts of the period under examination. The survey of primary sources is followed by a discussion of the main debates, research, and modern scholarship in the field. Different views supported by contemporary scholars are measured up against the primary sources to evaluate their aptness and legitimacy. My research questions are in fact asked and addressed through primary and secondary material. I quote and analyze different parts of the primary texts and different

modern critical interpretations. Selected quotations are used to variously illustrate and exemplify my arguments, through close critical analysis of the collated data. By critiquing, exploring, analysing, and evaluating the secondary literature, and using the works of modern commentators either to disagree with, or to establish and back up my own case, my personal argumentation and contribution is engaged critically in an informed dialogue with contemporary scholarship.

Five chapters unfold in chronological sequence, tracing the development of ideas and images over time. Chapter 1 examines the image of the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I (1081-1118) and the Byzantine people in the Latin historiography of the First Crusade, the Crusade of 1101, and the Norman 'crusade' against the Western territories of the Byzantine Empire in 1107-8. Chapter 2 deals with Latin perceptions of the Emperor Manuel I (1143-1180) and the Byzantines, first at the time of the Second Crusade and its immediate aftermath, i.e. the early years of Manuel's reign, and secondly in the period following the Second Crusade, i.e. from the 1150s onwards. Chapter 3 covers the period from the massacre of the Italian residents of Constantinople in 1182 to the Third Crusade, examining the portrayal of the Emperor Andronikos I (1183-5), the Emperor Isaak II (1185-95, 1203-4), the 'Emperor' of Cyprus Isaak Komnenos (1184-91), and the Byzantines in contemporary Latin accounts. Chapter 4 deals with Western attitudes and perceptions of the Byzantine emperors Alexios III (1195-1203), Alexios IV (1203-4), and Alexios V (1204), and the Greeks in general from the German Crusade of 1197 to the Fourth Crusade and the Latin conquest of Constantinople. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the Latin reactions to and aftermath of 1204.

Latin West and Greek East: the First Contacts

Before embarking on our investigation of the contact between Latin West and Greek East from the late eleventh to the early thirteenth centuries, we should briefly survey the first encounter between the Latin and Greek worlds, an encounter that took place in Antiquity. At this time, the Romans encountered the Greeks during their expansion first to southern Italy and Sicily, a geographical area known as *Magna Graecia*, and then to Greece itself. The Greek cities in the Italian peninsula yielded to Roman and Italic control very early. The last significant centre of Greek culture in southern Italy, Tarentum, was besieged, captured and pillaged by the Romans

in 209 BCE.[22] Syracuse in Sicily, besieged from 213 to 211 BCE, was opened to the Romans by treachery and was plundered.[23] After they finally defeated the Carthaginians in 202 BCE, the Romans turned to Greece and gradually conquered it. At Kynoskephalai in Thessaly in 197 BCE the Consul T. Quinctius Flamininus defeated the Macedonians and compelled their king, Philip V, to be confined to Macedonia, abandoning southern Greece and Asia Minor.[24] At Pydna in southern Macedonia in 168 BCE the legions of the Consul L. Aemilius Paullis overcame the Macedonians for a second time. Perseas, the last Macedonian king, was captured by the Romans while trying to escape to Asia Minor.[25] Finally, in 146 BCE Macedonia was converted into a Roman province. In the same year Lucius Mummius captured Corinth and dissolved the Achaean League. Southern Greece was put under the supervision of the Roman praetor of the *Provincia macedonica*.[26]

During the time of the gradual subjection of *Magna Graecia* and Greece, the Romans came into significant contact with the Greeks and their culture.[27] The awe that the Romans felt for Greek civilization together with their resistance to its highly influential power resulted in an obvious jealousy and hostility against the Greeks.[28] From the third century BCE onwards, the Romans sought to affirm their identity as different from that of the Greeks.[29] Ethnic stereotypes of the Greeks were used by Latin authors, whose works aimed to define Roman identity by contrasting the Romans with the Greeks. Since the authors of some of the medieval accounts used in this thesis were trained in and informed by Classical Latin literature, an examination of the Latin view of the Greeks in Classical Latin texts is an essential premiss to their study.

Treachery

One of the main traits that the Romans attributed to the Greeks was treachery. Cicero, in his first letter to his brother Quintus, advises him to be on his guard against the Greeks since

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[22] H. H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 BC*, 4nd edn (London, 2002), 140-1, 224.
[23] Ibid., 216-19.
[24] Ibid., 2002, 248-55.
[25] Ibid., 2002, 279-83.
[26] Ibid., 289-91.
[27] Ibid., 361-6; J. J. Pollitt, *Art in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, 1986), 153-9.
[28] N. Petrocheilos, *Roman Attitudes to the Greeks* (Athens, 1974), 15-16.
[29] Y. Syed, *Vergil's* Aeneid *and the Roman Self: Subject and Nation in Literary Discourse* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2005), 213-14.

'there are a great many who are deceitful (*fallaces*) and unstable (*leves*)'.[30] In accord with the first letter, Cicero's second letter to Quintus attributes to the Greek 'nation ... a natural aptitude for deceit (*ad fallendum*)'.[31] In Virgil's *Aeneid*, Laocoon's words to the Trojans, 'think ye any gifts of the Greeks are free from treachery (*dolis*)? ... I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts (*timeo Danaos et dona ferentis*)'[32] are perhaps the most famous passage implying strong criticism of the treachery of the Greeks who captured Troy using a wooden horse. Sinon, the Greek spy who persuaded the Trojans to take the horse into their city, was a man 'schooled in Pelasgian [i.e. Greek] guile (*dolis*) and craft (*arte*)'.[33] The Trojan hero Aeneas introduces Sinon to the queen of Carthage, Dido, as a paradigm of the entire Greek race: 'Hear now the treachery of the Greeks (*Danaum insidias*) and from one learn the wickedness (*crimen*) of all'.[34] The Romans considered the Trojans as their ancestors since Romulus, the legendary founder of Rome, was, according to myth, descendant of Aeneas. In sharp contrast to the deceitful Greeks, the Trojans, with whom the Romans identified themselves, were 'strangers ... to wickedness (*scelera*) ... and to Pelasgian guile (*ars*)'.[35]

Perjury

In his speech for Flaccus, Cicero describes the Greeks as 'a nation [which] has never cultivated a scrupulous regard for honesty when giving evidence'.[36] Some lines later Cicero repeats his reproach: 'it could be endless if I wanted to display the untrustworthiness (*levitatem*) of the whole [Greek] nation in giving evidence'.[37] As regards the Greek witnesses at Flaccus's trial, 'their oath ... is a joke, their evidence ... a game'.[38] On the contrary, according to Cicero, 'when one of us Romans gives evidence, what self-restraint he shows, what control over his language, what fear that he may display self-interest or ill-temper, or that he may say too little or too much!'.[39] The perfect example of Greek perjury was Sinon. In order to prove his truthfulness to the Trojans and thus to make them believe his story and take

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[30] Cicero, *Letters*, 404-5.
[31] Ibid., 442-3.
[32] Virgil, *Aeneid*, 296-7.
[33] Ibid., 304-5.
[34] Ibid., 298-9.
[35] Ibid., 300-1.
[36] Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, 450-1.
[37] Ibid., 454-5.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.

the wooden horse into their city, he assured King Priam of Troy: 'Surely, ... whatever befalls, I will tell thee all truly, ... This first I own; nor, if Fortune has moulded Sinon for misery, will she also in her spite mould him as false and lying'.[40] With these words the *perjurus*[41] Greek convinced the Trojans of his 'honesty' and the wooden horse was eventually brought into Troy. Since the Greeks were perjurers and did not expect themselves to keep their promises and oaths, they 'learned to swear by someone else's head',[42] an accusation made in Juvenal's sixth Satire.

Extravagance, Self-indulgence, and Laziness

The luxury and sophistication of the Greek way of life was one of the things that deeply impressed the Romans. To some, however, the Greek lifestyle was synonymous with decadence and immorality. In Titus Maccius Plautus's play *The Haunted House,* Grumio says to Tranio: 'Get fuddled day and night, live like Greeks, buy girls and set 'em free, feed parasites, go in for fancy catering!'.[43] Before long, he adds to his earlier statement: 'Drink, live like Greeks, eat, gorge yourselves, kill the fatted calf!'.[44] In a speech ascribed to him by Livy, the Roman statesman Cato (234-149 BCE) describes 'avarice and luxury' (*avaritia et luxuria*) as 'two opposing evils, ... which have been the destruction of every great empire'[45] and warns the Romans against Greece, characterising it as a place 'filled with all the allurements of vice'.[46] Even the Greek statues which were transferred from Syracuse to Rome after the capture of the Sicilian city are described by Cato as 'tokens of danger'.[47] Additionally, the Roman censor reproaches those of the Romans 'praising the baubles of Corinth and Athens and laughing at the fictile antefixes of our Roman gods'.[48] In his speech for Flaccus, Cicero refers to the people of Apollonis as 'the most thrifty and honest men in the whole of Asia, completely untouched by the extravagance (*luxuria*) and unreliability (*levitate*)

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[40] Virgil, *Aeneid*, 299-300.
[41] Ibid., 306.
[42] Juvenal, *Satires*, 84-5.
[43] T. M. Plautus, *The Merchant, The Braggart Warrior, The Haunted House, The Persian*, trans. P. Nixon (London; Cambridge, 1970), 292-3.
[44] Ibid., 294-5.
[45] Livy, *Books XXXI-XXXIV*, trans. E. T. Sage (London; Cambridge, 1985), 420-1.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., 420-3.

of Greeks'.[49] From a Roman perspective, the luxurious life of the Greeks had led them to sloth and decadence. In the second speech against Gaius Verres, Cicero says of the Sicilians: 'They have none of the failings found elsewhere among Greeks; neither sloth (*desidia*) nor extravagance (*luxuries*)'.[50] With Greek luxury, the Romans contrasted the simplicity of their ancestors. Quintilian comments that 'luxury (*luxuria*) was regarded as a crime (*crimen*) by the ancient Romans'[51] and rhetorically inquires of his audience, 'who will teach ... simplicity ... better than [the illustrious Roman] men'?[52]

Military Weakness and Slyness in Warfare

Undoubtedly, for the Romans the luxurious lifestyle of the Greeks was associated with the military weakness that they attributed to them. Livy refers to the 'cowardice' of the Greeks who 'refused to risk an engagement'.[53] In Caesar's *De Bello Alexandrino*, Euphranor, the commander of the Rhodian squadron, is described as a man who, 'in greatness (*magnitudine*) and power (*virtute*) of character', 'deserved comparison with our people [the Romans] rather than with the Greeks'.[54] In Livy, during a discussion in the senate, some of the senators contrasted the 'Roman scrupulousness' (*religio Romana*) with the 'Greek slyness' (*calliditas Graeca*)[55] in warfare, since among the Greeks 'it has been more praiseworthy to deceive (*fallere*) an enemy than to conquer by force'.[56] On the contrary, as Cicero asserts, the Romans in the art of war 'have proved their superiority by valour as well as to an even greater degree by discipline'.[57]

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[49] Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, 520-1.
[50] M. T. Cicero, *The Verrine Orations*, trans. L. H. G. Greenwood, 1 (London; Cambridge, 1966), 300-1. I made amendments to Greenwood's translation.
[51] Quintilian, *The Institutio Oratoria, Books I-III*, trans. H. E. Butler (London; Cambridge, 1920), 476-7.
[52] Quintilian, *The Institutio Oratoria, Books X-XII*, trans. H. E. Butler (London; Cambridge, 1922), 236-7. I did not adopt Butler's translation.
[53] Livy, *Books V-VII*, trans. B.O. Foster (London; New York, 1924), 446-7.
[54] Caesar, Julius. *Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars*, trans. A.G. Way (London; Cambridge, 1955), 30-1. I made amendments to Way's translation.
[55] Livy, *Books XL-XLII*, trans. E. T. Sage and A. C. Schlesinger (London; Cambridge, 1938), 434-5.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 4-5.

Flattery and Insincerity

Other traits ascribed to the Greeks by the Romans were flattery and insincerity. Cicero advises his brother to beware of the Greeks since 'there are a great many who are … trained by a long course of servitude to show an excess of sycophancy (*assentatio*)'.[58] In Juvenal's third Satire, Umbricius, a poor and honourable Roman citizen, claims that the Greeks 'are experts in flattery (*adulandi*), and will commend the talk of an illiterate, or the beauty of a deformed, … or go into ecstasies over a squeaky voice not more melodious than that of a cock when he pecks his spouse the hen'.[59] Further, according to Umbricius, a Greek is 'ready at any moment, by night or by day, to take his expression from another man's face'.[60] To explain: 'if you smile, your Greek will split his sides with laughter; if he sees his friend drop a tear, he weeps, though without grieving'.[61] Umbricius's opinion of the Greeks' hypocrisy is condensed into a few words: 'they [the Greeks] are a nation of play-actors' (*natio comoeda est*),[62] a witticism referring to the Greek theatre.

The Greeks as a Threat to the mos maiorum

For the more conservative of the Romans, the Greeks and their civilization posed a serious threat to the Romans and their custom, the *mos maiorum*.[63] This belief unquestionably reveals a deep mistrust and fear of the Greeks and their culture. For example, the Greek statues which were transferred from Syracuse to Rome after the capture of the Sicilian city were described by Cato as 'tokens of danger'. The perception that the Greeks and their civilization threatened not only the *mos maiorum*, but even the Romans themselves can be clearly observed in Cato's words to his son Marcus. In an outburst of Graecophobia, the puritan Roman censor cautions his son:

> They [the Greeks] are a quite worthless (*nequissimum*) people, and an intractable (*indocile*) one, and you must consider my words prophetic. When that race gives us its literature it will corrupt all things, and even all the more if it sends hither its

[58] Cicero, *Letters*, 404-5.
[59] Juvenal, *Satires*, 38-9.
[60] Ibid., 38-41.
[61] Ibid., 38-9.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Scullard, 2002, pp. 361-6.

> physicians. They have conspired together to murder all foreigners with their physic, but this very thing they do for a fee, to gain credit and to destroy us easily.[64]

Such was Cato's mistrust of the Greeks that he was imagining they conspired to murder and destroy the Romans through their physicians.

Despite Roman resistance to it, the Greek civilization exerted a profound influence on the Romans. In Horace's words, 'Greece, the captive, made her savage victor [i.e. the Romans] captive, and brought the arts into rustic Latium'.[65] This was not denied even by Cicero. As he conceded in his letter to his brother: 'I shall not be ashamed to assert that I am indebted for whatever I have accomplished to the arts and studies transmitted to us in the records and philosophic teachings of Greece ... it seems to me that we owe a special debt to that race of men [i.e. the Greeks] ... whose precepts have rescued us from barbarism'.[66] Cicero's assertion comes as no surprise. As the influence of Greek civilization on the Romans increased with time, the Romans' need to draw differentiating boundaries between themselves and the Greeks naturally grew stronger. To satisfy this need, the Romans resorted to (subjectively perceived) character traits. As Cicero claims, 'when we come to natural gifts (*natura*) apart from book-learning (*litteris*) they [*nostri*, i.e. the Romans] are above comparison with the Greeks'.[67] The Roman statesman and writer proceeds to enumerate the supposedly uniquely Roman attributes: *gravitas* (earnestness), *constantia* (firmness), *magnitudo animi* (greatness of soul), *probitas* (honesty), *fides* (loyalty), *excellens in omni genere virtus* (surpassing merit in every field).[68]

Conclusion

Our brief survey of Classical Latin sources demonstrated that the Romans constructed the Greeks as the Other who embodied all the characteristics which the Romans considered as non-Roman, that is, as non-typical of themselves. By comparison with and opposition to the

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[64] Pliny, *Natural History, Books XXVIII- XXXII*, trans. W.H.S. Jones (London, 1975), 190-3.
[65] Horace, *Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica*, trans. H. R. Fairclough (London; Cambridge, 1978), 408-9.
[66] Cicero, *Letters*, 418-9.
[67] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 4-5.
[68] Ibid.

Greeks, the Roman self-identity was more sharply defined.[69] While the Greeks were treacherous, deceitful, crafty, wicked, untrustworthy and unreliable, the Romans were honest, scrupulous and loyal. The Greeks were self-indulgent, leading a life of luxury, extravagance and sloth; the Romans were frugal, living a life of simplicity and regarding luxury as a crime. While the Greeks were cowards and used sly means in warfare to conquer their enemies, the Romans were valorous and overcame their foes by their force. By contrasting their own characteristics with those of the Greeks, the Romans strove to strengthen their own identity.

The association of the Greeks with negative traits gradually resulted in the formation of negative ethnic stereotypes and the development of a tradition of literary *topoi* in Classical Latin literature. This tradition was to be turned into an instrument of rhetorical *inventio* by learned medieval authors, who drew their systematics of Greek character from the reservoir formed by the Classical Latin literary *topoi*.

[69] Petrocheilos, 1974, 15-16, 55-62; Syed, 2005, 204-5.

Chapter 1

ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS AND THE BYZANTINES IN THE LATIN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST CRUSADE AND ITS AFTERMATH

In March 1095 an embassy of the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118) arrived in Piacenza, where Pope Urban II (1088-99) was presiding at his council.[70] The Byzantine ambassadors appealed for aid in recruiting mercenaries to help the empire *contra paganos*. Although exaggerating the Turkish threat, Alexios in fact intended to use the Westerners to exploit the breaking up of the empire of the Seljuk Turks to reconquer Asia Minor for Byzantium.[71] In November 1095 at the Council of Clermont Urban proclaimed the expedition known as the First Crusade. Its objective was twofold: to help the Eastern Christians and to regain Jerusalem for Christianity.[72]

This chapter explores the image of the Emperor Alexios I and the Byzantines as a whole in the Latin historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first one deals with the Latin perceptions of Alexios and is subdivided into five parts examining the 'People's Crusade', the journey of the main armies of the First Crusade through the Balkans and their arrival at Constantinople, the marching of the main armies from Nicaea to Jerusalem, the Crusade of 1101, and Bohemond's 'Crusade'. The second section investigates the way the Latins viewed the Byzantines as a whole and is subdivided into two parts. The first one explores the Latin perceptions of the Greeks in the Latin accounts written in the first four decades of the twelfth century, while the second examines the image of the Greeks in the *Historia* of William of Tyre.

The Sources

The successful outcome of the First Crusade seems to be the key factor for the relatively large number of Western accounts of the expedition. Several of these accounts were written in the

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[70] Bernold of Constance, *Chronicon*, 520. Cf. J. France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom, 1000-1714* (London, 2005), 44; Riley-Smith, 2005, 1. France's reference to Bernold of Constance, however, draws on the 1844 *MGH* edition [Bernold, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 5, 385-467] rather than the 2003 edition by Robinson.

[71] France, 2005, 20.

[72] H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'Pope Urban II's Preaching of the First Crusade', *History*, 55 (1970), 177-88; T. Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History* (London, 2004), 33.

immediate aftermath of the crusade, while others were composed later in the twelfth century. Before we embark on our project, an overview of the primary sources under investigation is deemed necessary.

The *Gesta Francorum* and the accounts of Raymond of Aguilers, and Fulcher of Chartres have been aptly described by Susan Edgington as 'the holy trinity of First Crusade Sources'.[73] They are the three Latin narrative accounts generally accepted to have been written by eye-witnesses. The author of the *Gesta Francorum* is anonymous. He was probably a knight or a priest, in the army of Bohemond of Taranto until Antioch, whence he continued on to Jerusalem with the main crusading army. The Anonymous completed the greater part of his text shortly after the conquest of Jerusalem in July 1099. In the twelfth century, the *Gesta Francorum* enjoyed an extraordinary popularity, and almost every other contemporary narrative of the First Crusade was directly or indirectly influenced by it.[74]

The *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem* was authored by Raymond of Aguilers, a chaplain to Count Raymond of Toulouse. The main strength of this work is that its author, due to his position, was privy to the councils of the leaders. The work, composed in the early 1100s, was completed before 1105. Although Raymond of Aguilers used the *Gesta Francorum* for some details, his account is considered as an independent source. Raymond, like the anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum*, finished his narrative with the crusaders' victory at the battle of Ascalon (1099), a victory that marked the end of the First Crusade.[75]

The *Historia Hierosolymitana* was composed by Fulcher of Chartres (ca 1058-1128), who joined the First Crusade initially as chaplain of Stephen of Blois and later, in October 1097, of Baldwin of Boulogne. Fulcher followed Baldwin to Edessa and therefore he was not a witness to the sieges of Antioch and Jerusalem. Consequently, for his account of the events after early 1098, he relied on the narratives of others, including the *Gesta Francorum.* The first version of Fulcher's chronicle was written between 1100 and 1106, and a final version in 1127. Unlike the anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum* and Raymond of Aguilers, Fulcher continued

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[73] S. Edgington, 'Albert of Aachen Reappraised', in *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies 1095-1500*, ed. Alan V. Murray (Turnhout, 1998), 55.

[74] *Gesta Francorum*, ix-xvi; S. Edgington, 'The First Crusade: Reviewing the Evidence', in *The First Crusade, Origins and Impact*, ed. Jonathan Phillips (Manchester, 1997), 55-6; P. Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades* (Abingdon, 2006), 229; J. France, 'The Use of the Anonymous *Gesta Francorum* in the Early Twelfth-Century Sources for the First Crusade', in *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies 1095-1500*, ed. Alan V. Murray (Turnhout, 1998), 29, 35-6.

[75] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 1-8; S. Edgington, 'Raymond of Aguilers', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1009; Edgington, 1997, 56; Lock, 2006, 248; France, 1998, 30.

his narrative after the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Book II of his *Historia Hierosolymitana* covers the reign of King Baldwin I (1100-1118) and Book III covers the reign of King Baldwin II (1118-31) until 1127.[76]

The *Gesta Tancredi* and the *Hierosolomyta* are two sources written by persons who were in the Holy Land shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Ralph of Caen, author of the *Gesta Tancredi*, joined Bohemond's entourage as chaplain in 1107. He went out to the Levant in 1108 and there he took service with Bohemond's nephew, Tancred of Hauteville, who in the same year had succeeded his uncle as prince of Antioch. Ralph began to compose the *Gesta Tancredi* after Tancred's death in December 1112, and his work was completed before April 1118. Although the *Gesta Tancredi* covers the period 1096-1105, the focus is on the military campaigns of the First Crusade. Ralph's main interest is in Tancred's career, and his work, written in *prosimetrum*, constitutes a panegyric of his lord. Most of Ralph's information was obtained from Bohemond, Tancred, and their followers. The main strength of this work is that it is considered as an independent source.[77]

The *Hierosolomyta* was composed by the Benedictine monk Ekkehard of Aura (ca 1050-1126). Ekkehard participated in the Crusade of 1101, and subsequently became abbot of the monastery of Aura. Between 1103 and 1125 he authored his *Chronicon Universale*. In 1105-January 1106, he wrote the recension of his history narrating his experiences on the Crusade of 1101. The section of his chronicle concerning the First Crusade and the Crusade of 1101 was eventually issued as a short independent volume called *Hierosolomyta*.[78]

The *Gesta Dei per Francos*, the *Historia Hierosolimitana*, and the *Historia Iherosolimitana* constitute the accounts of the three earliest rewriters of the *Gesta Francorum* in the West, all French Benedictine monks. The *Gesta Dei per Francos* was written by Guibert of Nogent (1053-1125). The author, elected abbot of Nogent in 1104, composed his account between 1106 and 1109. Although Guibert depended on the *Gesta Francorum* for his particulars, he composed his own analysis of the events. The *Gesta Dei* also incorporates

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[76] Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 3-46; S. Edgington, 'Fulcher of Chartres', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 2 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 489-90; Edgington, 1997, 56-7; Lock, 2006, 236; France, 1998, 30.

[77] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 1-15; P. Orth, 'Radulph of Caen', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1001; Edgington, 1997, 60.

[78] A. Mulinder, 'Ekkehard of Aura', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 2 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 392; Edgington, 1997, 60.

information that Guibert obtained from returning crusaders.[79] The *Historia Hierosolimitana* was authored in 1110 by Baldric of Dol. Baldric was abbot of Bourgueil for eighteen years before becoming archbishop of Dol in 1107. Although he relied heavily upon the *Gesta Francorum*, Baldric gave a more literary and dramatic form to his work. The *Historia Hierosolimitana* offers limited but valuable additional material derived from oral sources.[80] The *Historia Iherosolimitana* was composed by Robert, a monk at the abbey of Saint Remi at Rheims, either before 1107 or between 1110 and 1118. For his information Robert depended on the *Gesta Francorum*, but gave his own interpretation which is guided by his strong theological viewpoint. Moreover, Robert's account includes some original material which the author possibly obtained from eyewitnesses. The fact that Robert's narrative of the First Crusade survives today in over 120 manuscripts attests to its popularity.[81]

An invaluable account that provides a view of the events of the First Crusade independent of the *Gesta Francorum* is the *Historia Ierosolimitana* of Albert, chancellor of the Church of Aachen. Albert's account not only constitutes the most complete and detailed narrative of the First Crusade but also contains material on the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem down to 1120. The chronicler compiled his work from oral and written information, obtained from surviving witnesses. Albert's account, having been begun sometime between 1100 and 1119, was probably completed by the 1120s and definitely by the 1140s.[82]

In addition to the above sources, four Western general histories will be examined. The *De gestis regum Anglorum* was composed by William (d. c. 1143), a Benedictine monk at the abbey of Malmesbury in England. Completed in 1126, the work includes interesting materials on the First Crusade and its aftermath. Although the author drew on the chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and the *Gesta Francorum*, he also provides much independent information probably obtained from returned crusaders.[83] The *Historia Ecclesiastica* is the life work of the

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[79] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 1-15; K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, 'Guibert of Nogent', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 2 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 548; Edgington, 1997, 59; Lock, 2006, 238.

[80] K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, 'Baldric of Dol', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 1 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 130. Baldric of Dol's *Historia Hierosolimitana* is a very interesting but much under-researched history of the First Crusade. Steven Biddlecombe is preparing a new edition of the text, having already discovered several hitherto unknown manuscripts to add to the seven that we knew about before.

[81] P. Orth, 'Robert of Rheims', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1042-3; Robert the Monk, *History*, 1-68; Edgington, 1997, 59-60.

[82] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, xxi-xxi; Edgington, 1997, 61-73; Edgington, 1998, 55-67; Lock, 2006, 228; France, 1998, 29, 39.

[83] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta*, II, xxxvii-xxxviii, xlii; R. M. Thomson, 'William of Malmesbury', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1279-80.

Anglo-Norman monk and chronicler Orderic Vitalis (1075–c. 1141). The bulk of this monumental history was composed between 1123 and 1137. Book IX, which in its final form dates from 1135, extends from the Council of Clermont to the battle of Ascalon, while certain chapters of Book X, written in 1135, and Book XI, written between 1135 and 1137, provide interesting evidence concerning the aftermath of the First Crusade. Although a substantial part of the account of the First Crusade is derived from the *Historia Ierosolimitana* of Baldric of Dol, Orderic's work offers much independent and unique material. Much of Orderic's information derived from oral sources. This information, which the historian received directly from pilgrims and knights returning from the East, is discussed in our study.[84] The third general history explored is the *Historia Anglorum* of Henry, archdeacon of Huntingdon (c. 1088-1156/60). The *Historia Anglorum*, composed between c. 1130 and c. 1155, contains an account of the First Crusade based on the *Gesta Francorum* and oral information.[85] The fourth general history investigated is the *Chronica siue Historia de Duabus Ciuitatibus*, the masterwork of Otto of Freising (ca. 1115-1158). The *Chronica* was authored between 1143 and 1147, and substantially revised in or before 1157. The chronicler's brief account of the First Crusade and its aftermath derived from the work of Ekkehard.[86]

Finally, the *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* of William of Tyre (ca 1130-1185) can not be excluded from our investigation. Completed in 1184, William's history is the only one of the sources under examination which was written in the second half of the twelfth century. Born in Palestine, the author became chancellor of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1174 and archbishop of Tyre a year later. The *Historia* is considered by modern scholars as the first complete history of the crusades and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. William worked on it from around 1170 until 1184. The first eight out of the twenty-three books of the *Historia* deal with the history of the First Crusade. The rest of the books carry the narrative up to 1184. For his history of the First Crusade William drew upon the written accounts of the Anonymous, Raymond of Aguilers, Fulcher of Chartres, Albert of Aachen, and Baldric of Dol. Unlike most chroniclers of the period, William avoided copying verbatim or abbreviating his sources, but

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[84] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, I, 31-2, 46-7, V, xii-xix; K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, 'Orderic Vitalis', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 3 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 899-900; Lock, 2006, 229.

[85] K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, 'Henry of Huntingdon', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 2 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 573.

[86] Otto of Freising, *Two* Cities, xi- xxvi.

compared them and drew his own conclusions. He also combined the written accounts with oral tradition.[87]

'Magnificus imperator' or *'tyrannus insolens'*?
Re-Constructing the Image of Alexios I Komnenos

The 'People's Crusade'[88]

Urban's speech at Clermont found a great echo in Western Europe. About 100,000 people of all social classes and occupations were inspired to take the cross. The crusading troops were to begin their eastward journey after harvest time in 1096 and to gather in Constantinople. In July 1096 two contingents led by Walter Sans-Avoir and Peter the Hermit arrived in the imperial capital. This first wave of crusaders has become known as 'the People's Crusade' or 'the Peasants' Crusade'. This is, however, a misnomer, due to the fact that these forces included fewer nobles and mounted knights than the later armies.

When Walter Sans-Avoir reached Constantinople, he asked the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I permission to remain in Byzantine territory and the right to buy everything that his soldiers needed until Peter the Hermit and his men would arrive in the imperial capital, and the two crusading armies would join.[89] According to Albert of Aachen, Alexios 'graciously responded and granted everything he [Walter] sought'.[90] As regards Peter the Hermit, once in Byzantine territory, he struggled to impose discipline on his soldiers, but his efforts met with little success: the outskirts of Nish, one of the chief towns on the way south, were ravaged by the unruly crusaders. As related by Albert, imperial emissaries were sent to Peter and, despite reproaching him for his men's disorderly conduct, they informed him that 'because you [Peter]

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[87] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 3-37; A. V. Murray, 'William of Tyre', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1281-2; P. W. Edbury and J. G. Rowe, *William of Tyre: Historian of the Latin East* (Cambridge, 1988), 13-58; Lock, 2006, 253.

[88] H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, trans. John Gillingham, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1988), 38-41; S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 1 (Cambridge, 1951), 121-33; Riley-Smith, 2005, 26-9; S. Lloyd, 'The Crusading Movement 1096-1274', in *The Oxford History of the Crusades*, ed. Jonathan Riley-Smith (Oxford, 1999), 35-6; F. Duncalf, 'The First Crusade: Clermont to Constantinople', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 1 (Madison; London, 1969), 259-62; S. Runciman, 'The First Crusade: Constantinople to Antioch', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 1 (Madison; London, 1969), 280-4; Lock, 2006, 139-40; Asbridge, 2004, 100-3; M. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204: A Political History*, 2nd edn (London, 1997), 160; C. Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (London, 2006), 94-100; T. F. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (Lanham; Oxford, 2005), 15-19.

[89] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 13.

[90] Ibid.

are a Christian and your companions are Christians' the emperor was 'instructing all the cities through which you will pass that they should sell all things peacefully to you and your men'.[91] Upon receiving the emperor's message, 'Peter was not a little glad and ... gave thanks to God who ... had now given him and his men grace in the eyes of so magnificent and renowned an emperor (*magnificus et nominatissimus imperator*)'.[92]

On his arrival at Constantinople, Peter was led into the presence of Alexios. When asked what he might desire, Peter requested from the Byzantine sovereign alms for him and his men. According to Albert, 'the emperor was moved by pity ... and ordered two hundred golden bezants to be given to him [Peter]'.[93] William of Tyre records that 'the kindness of the emperor roused them [the crusaders] to a more hopeful frame of mind'.[94] Moreover, as the author of the *Gesta Francorum* admits, Alexios strongly advised the crusaders in these terms: 'Do not cross the Hellespont until the great army of the Christians arrives, for there are not enough of you to fight against the Turks'.[95] Our *Gesta*-derivatives, i.e. the accounts of Guibert of Nogent, Robert the Monk, and Baldric of Dol all repeat the emperor's advice.[96]

The crusaders were only allowed to enter Constantinople in small groups, for the purpose of visiting the sights. Their numbers were controlled by strict supervision. According to Robert the Monk, 'the emperor denied them [the crusaders] all permission to enter the city because he was always suspicious about the strength of the Christian soldiers and more so the Franks'.[97] This interpretation of Alexios's behaviour is largely informed by prejudice. In point of fact, the emperor could not allow the crusaders to enter Constantinople, since they had already 'pillaged and made discord in his territory',[98] and he was therefore rightly afraid that the imperial capital would suffer the same fate, if the crusaders were permitted to enter it. Alexios's decision was right, and Robert the Monk was doubtless well aware of the emperor's true reasons, but his blatant prejudices against the Byzantine ruler prevailed over his judgement. As the author of the *Gesta Francorum* concedes, 'those Christians ['the People's Crusade'] behaved abominably, sacking and burning the palaces [in the suburbs] of the city [i.e. Constantinople], and stealing the lead from the roofs of churches and selling it to the

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[91] Ibid., 28-9.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid., 31
[94] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 105.
[95] *Gesta Francorum*, 3.
[96] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 48-9; Robert the Monk, *History*, 84; Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 18.
[97] Robert the Monk, *History*, 84.
[98] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 29.

Greeks'.[99] The accusation recurs in the *Gesta*-derivatives, including Robert's account.[100] Guibert adds that the crusaders 'were not held back by the decency of the people of the province, nor were they mollified by the emperor's affability'.[101]

As Baldric of Dol relates, 'when the emperor heard of this [the crusaders' disorderly conduct] he was extremely enraged, because he saw that they [the crusaders] had abused his kindness'.[102] The disordered contingents' plundering activities around Constantinople led Alexios to deport the crusaders across the Bosporus on 6-7 August. At the shores of Bithynia in Asia Minor they were to wait for the arrival of the major crusading armies. There, as the author of the *Gesta Francorum* admits, the crusaders 'did not cease from their misdeeds, and they burned and they laid waste both houses and churches'.[103] The charge is repeated by Robert the Monk, Guibert of Nogent, and Baldric of Dol.[104]

Albert of Aachen records that while the crusaders were encamped at Kibotos at the shores of Bithynia, 'messengers of the most Christian (*Christianissimus*) emperor [Alexios] arrived who forbade Peter and all his army to travel towards the mountainous regions of the city of Nicaea, because of ambushes and attacks from the Turks'.[105] Following Albert, William of Tyre acknowledges that 'frequent admonitory letters came from the emperor. He bade them [the crusaders] not to venture far afield or to provoke the enemy against them'.[106] Nevertheless, despite Alexios's warning, a large group of German and Italian crusaders seized a fort at Xerigordos near Nicaea. There they were trapped by a force of Nicaean Turks, who eventually broke in, massacring or enslaving the crusaders. When the French at Kibotos heard the news of this disaster, they demanded revenge. Despite their leaders' pleas for caution, they marched on Nicaea on 21 October. They fell into an ambush and were annihilated by the Turks, who subsequently attacked the crusaders' camp at Kibotos with pitiless brutality. Some three hundred people who managed to escape the bloody massacre arrived at a castle which stood by the sea. There, they struggled to beat off the attacks of the Turks who had surrounded them. According to Albert, when Peter was informed of the annihilation of the crusaders and of the Turks' besieging the men who had survived, he 'begged the emperor humbly ... to help

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[99] *Gesta Francorum*, 3.
[100] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 49; Robert the Monk, *History*, 84-5; Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 18.
[101] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 49.
[102] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 18.
[103] *Gesta Francorum*, 3.
[104] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 49; Robert the Monk, *History*, 85; Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 18.
[105] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 31.
[106] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 106.

the few poor pilgrims who were left out of so many thousands'.[107] As Albert reports, 'the emperor moved by pity, ... summoned his Turcopoles ... and ordered them to go ... across the straits to assist the Christians who had fled and were besieged'.[108] In the knowledge of the emperor's order, the Turks lifted the siege of the castle and retreated.[109] The surviving crusaders were shipped back to Constantinople.

The Anonymous records that when Alexios heard of the annihilation of the crusaders by the Turks, 'he rejoiced greatly'.[110] This groundless charge recurs in the accounts of Guibert and Robert, who go one step further. The former decries the emperor as *perfidus* ('treacherous') and *nequam* ('wicked'),[111] the latter as *nequissimus* ('most wicked').[112] Given Alexios's earlier 'admonitory letters' as well as his immediate action to rescue the crusaders, as recorded by Albert, the testimonies of the *Gesta* and of the two of its derivatives are proved to be only too affected by downright prejudice. When the surviving crusaders were ferried back to Constantinople and Alexios ordered them to be completely disarmed, Robert, highly prejudiced against the emperor, interpreted that he did so in order 'to render them defenseless'.[113] However, the actual reason was that Alexios wanted to render the crusaders harmless to his capital and his subjects. Given the crusaders' earlier behaviour, Alexios had no choice but to disarm them. Remaining impartial, Baldric of Dol explains that 'being unarmed, they [the crusaders] would be less capable of injuring his [Alexios's] people'.[114]

Alexios had been evidently prepared to protect and assist 'the People's Crusade' to the extent that it did not pose a danger to his empire and subjects. Nevertheless, when the subsequent crusading armies were outside Nicaea after its surrender to the Byzantines on 19 June 1097, manifestly unfair criticism of Alexios's behaviour towards 'the People's Crusade' seems to have begun to circulate, at least among a faction of crusaders dissatisfied with the emperor. Raymond of Aguilers appears to have been one of those. Having hurled abuse at Alexios, the chronicler proceeds to record that after the surrender of Nicaea, the crusaders 'learned that when Peter the Hermit and his peasant hordes had arrived in Constantinople ...

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[107] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 45.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid. The information that Alexios sent a relief force to rescue the remnants of the crusading army is substantiated by the Byzantine historian Anna Komnena, Alexios's daughter. Komnena, *Alexiad*, 312-13. The *Gesta Francorum* fails, possibly deliberately, to provide this information.
[110] *Gesta Francorum*, 5.
[111] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 128.
[112] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 736.
[113] Robert the Monk, *History*, 88.
[114] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 20.

Alexios had betrayed Peter by forcing him and his followers, unfamiliar with both the locale and the art of war, to cross the Straits with no defense against the Turks. So the Nicene Turks, sensing an easy kill, rapidly and easily butchered sixty thousand peasants'.[115] No reference is made to the crusaders' disorderly conduct which compelled Alexios to ferry them across the Bosporus, or to the fact that the crusaders provoked the Turks against them, despite the emperor's warnings. The crusaders who wanted to malign Alexios seem to have conveniently forgotten this information, and to have had good memory only for negative information about the Byzantine emperor.

The Princes' Armies: the March through the Byzantine Empire and the Arrival at Constantinople[116]

Between November 1096 and mid-May 1097 the main crusading armies of the First Crusade reached Constantinople. They were commanded by a papal legate, Adhemar of Le Puy, and some of Western Europe's most powerful princes: Raymond IV, Count of Toulouse (1093-1105), the first to have taken the cross at Clermont; Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lorraine (1087-1100); Robert, Duke of Normandy (1087-1106); Robert II, Count of Flanders (1093-1111); Stephen, Count of Blois (1089-1102); Hugh, Count of Vermandois (1085-1101); and Bohemond of Taranto (d. 1111).

Hugh of Vermandois

Hugh of Vermandois was the first crusading prince to arrive in Byzantine territory. After a violent storm that destroyed the small flotilla crossing him from Bari to the Byzantine Empire, Hugh of Vermandois was washed ashore somewhere between Dyrrachium and Cape Palli, to the north of Dyrrrachium. Emissaries of John Komnenos, Alexios's nephew and governor of the city, found Hugh bemused and disheveled, and led him to their master. John fed,

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[115] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 27.

[116] Mayer, 1988, 41-6; Runciman, 1951, I, 142-71; Riley-Smith, 2005, 29-35; Tyerman, 2006, 106-22; Duncalf, 1969, 266-79; Runciman, 1969, 284-8; Lock, 2006, 140; Asbridge, 2004, 103-13; Madden, 2005, 19-24; J. France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge, 1994), 102-21; Angold, 1997, 160-1; R. B. Yewdale, *Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch* (Princeton, 1924), 38-45; R. L. Nicholson, *Tancred: A History of His Life and Career* (Chicago, 1940), 22-8; W. B. McQueen, 'Relations between the Normans and Byzantium, 1071-1112', *Byzantion*, 56 (1986), 451-3; R.-J. Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096-1204*, trans. J. C. Morris and Jean E. Ridings (Oxford, 1993), 4-28; J. Shepard, 'When Greek Meets Greek: Alexius Comnenus and Bohemond in 1097-98', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 12 (1988), 185-277.

reequipped and showed every regard for the Western prince, whom he kept however under strict observation. This gave rise to the Latin belief that the prince had been kept a prisoner. Before long, this view went down in crusading historiography. The Anonymous recounts that John Komnenos 'hearing that ... [Hugh of Vermandois and his army] were arriving [in Dyrrachium], immediately devised a treacherous plan (*mala cogitatio*), and he arrested them and sent them under guard to the emperor at Constantinople'.[117] Robert the Monk goes even further. According to his wild accusation which lacks truth and seems to have been made with the intention of defaming Alexios, 'the treacherous (*subdolus*) emperor had decreed that all crusaders should be taken captive and brought to him in Constantinople'.[118]

In November 1096 Hugh reached Constantinople, escorted by the admiral Manuel Butumites. He was the first of the crusading princes to arrive in the imperial city. He was received by Alexios with honour, accorded the dignities befitted a prince of his rank, and showered with sumptuous gifts.[119] Nevertheless, Alexios kept Hugh under strict surveillance and, before long, rumours began to circulate about the emperor holding the prince 'in prison and in chains'.[120] Alexios was determined to assert his dominance over the crusading leaders and make their expedition serve the interests of his empire. Hence, Hugh, like the rest of the crusading leaders who arrived in Constantinople after him, was called for an audience with Alexios. There, he was required to swear an oath of fealty to the Byzantine Emperor and pledge himself to hand over to him any captured territory which had formerly belonged to the Byzantine Empire. In return, Alexios promised to supply the crusaders with provisions and war equipment.[121] Hugh of Vermandois willingly took the oath of fealty to the emperor.

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[117] *Gesta Francorum*, 6.

[118] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 742; Robert the Monk, *History*, 93. I made an amendment to Sweetenham's translation.

[119] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 315.

[120] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 73.

[121] For detailed discussions of the oath to the emperor, see F. L. Ganshof, 'Recherches sur le lien juridique qui unissait les chefs de la première Croisade à l'empereur byzantin', in *Mélanges offerts à M. Paul E. Martin* (Geneva, 1961), 49-63; J. H. Pryor, 'The Oaths of the Leaders of the First Crusade to the Emperor Alexius I Comnenus: Fealty, Homage – πίστις, δουλεία', *Parergon*, new series, 2 (1984), 111-32; Lilie, 1993, 18-28; France, 1994, 115-18.

Godfrey of Bouillon

Robert the Monk alleges that 'the tricks (*fraudes*) of the emperor first came to light in the treatment of these two men',[122] i.e. Hugh of Vermandois who was taken 'prisoner', and Godfrey of Bouillon, the second crusading leader to arrive in Constantinople on 23 December. Godfrey's army pitched camp in the suburbs of the imperial city, where quarters were assigned to him according to the orders of the emperor, who is described by the Anonymous as 'wicked' (*iniquus*).[123] Alexios without delay dispatched Hugh to Godfrey to persuade Godfrey to go to the imperial palace for an audience with the Byzantine sovereign. Hugh's readiness to take on the mission not only refutes the allegations that he was kept as a prisoner, but also testifies to the fact that the prince was far from dissatisfied with his treatment by Alexios.

As we are informed by Albert of Aachen,

> hardly had the duke [Godfrey] received this legation when certain strangers from the land of the Franks arrived secretly in the duke's camp, and they warned him very seriously to beware the tricks (*uersutias*) and poisoned garments (*uenenatas uestes*) of the emperor, and his deceitful words (*uerba dolosa*), and under no circumstances to go into his presence, no matter what coaxing promises he gave, but to sit outside the walls and, in safety, mistrust everything he offered to them. The duke, therefore, warned by the strangers in this way and well schooled in the Greeks' deceptions (*Grecorum deceptiones edoctus*), did not go into the emperor's presence at all.[124]

When Godfrey rejected his invitation to meet at the imperial palace, Alexios cut off supplies. Godfrey's brother Baldwin of Boulogne immediately raided the suburbs till Alexios lifted the blockade.[125] In January 1097, Godfrey was once more invited to the palace but refused again to visit the emperor, stating: 'I would come to you and contemplate the honours and riches of your court, but I am afraid because of many evil things (*plurima mala*) I have heard about you: nevertheless, I do not know if these things have been invented and broadcast because of envy (*inuidia*) or hatred (*odio*) towards you'.[126] Despite the fact that Alexios immediately 'absolved

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[122] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 743; Robert the Monk, *History*, 93.
[123] *Gesta Francorum*, 6.
[124] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 74-5.
[125] Ibid., 76-7.
[126] Ibid., 78-9.

himself from most of the charges', Godfrey 'still did not believe the emperor's honeyed promises' and persisted in refusing to meet him.[127]

Albert of Aachen does not provide us with more information about the 'strangers' who vilified Alexios. Runciman suggests that the 'strangers' were remnants of 'the People's Crusade', who ascribed their disaster to Alexios's perfidy in order to justify it.[128] Although this may well be the case, it is difficult to establish with certainty the identity and motives of the 'strangers'. What is important to underline is that already by the late 1096 Alexios had been portrayed, at least by a number of Westerners, as an enemy of the crusaders. The Byzantine emperor was accused of *uersutias*, *uerba dolosa*, and *uenenatas uestes*, a charge associated with the classical Nessus shirt of Heracles, the poison-garment tale *par excellence*.[129] Nevertheless, it must be stressed that these charges were not taken at face value by all Westerners: Albert's Godfrey concedes that the accusations against Alexios may well have been the result of *inuidia* or *odium* towards the emperor. The *Grecorum deceptiones*, of which, according to Albert, Godfrey had been informed thoroughly, serve as a figure of speech, a literary *topos*, which follows the wave of accusations against the Byzantine emperor, but obviously does *not* affect Albert's positive view of Alexios or the Greeks as a whole.

As soon as Godfrey rejected Alexios's second invitation, the emperor cut off supplies again in order to force the duke into obedience. Once more Baldwin responded by raiding the suburbs, and a conflict followed between the raiders and the emperor's Petcheneg police. Baldwin set an ambush for the emperor's Petchenegs and captured sixty men. Encouraged by his success, Godfrey pillaged Pera, encamped outside the city walls, and began to attack the palace of Blachernae on 13 January 1097. The crusaders' assault was, however, beaten off by the imperial troops.[130]

Apart from Albert of Aachen, the crusading chroniclers evade referring to Baldwin's raids, which they present as peaceful foraging. Similarly, the author of the *Gesta Francorum* and, by extension, Guibert, Robert, and Baldric fail to refer to the crusaders' plunders of Pera and their assault on Constantinople; we should not exclude the possibility that the informants of the Anonymous, who was not an eye-witness to the events narrated at this point, concealed

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[127] Ibid.
[128] Runciman, 1951, I, 149.
[129] For the classical Nessus shirt and other poison-garment legends, see A. Mayor, 'The Nessus Shirt in the New World: Smallpox Blankets in History and Legend', *The Journal of American Folklore*, 108 (1995), 54-77.
[130] Madden, 2005, 21-2; Tyerman, 2006, 109-10.

this information. Nevertheless, the *Gesta* and its derivatives do not fail to refer to Alexios's reaction; the Latin authors and their informants tended to remember information consistent with their negative stereotypes of Alexios. The Anonymous recounts that 'the wicked (*iniquus*) Emperor Alexios ordered his Turcopoles and Petchenegs to attack and kill them [the crusaders]', who were dispatched by Godfrey 'to get straw and other things necessary for their horses'.[131] Similarly, Guibert of Nogent records that 'the most wicked prince (*princeps nequissimus*) [Alexios] secretly ordered the men around him to kill, without making any distinctions, all of the men', who tried to get 'whatever was necessary for their horses'.[132] Alexios's action is described by Robert the Monk as 'wickedness' (*nequitia*), while the emperor himself is denounced by the same chronicler as 'treacherous' (*subdolus*) and 'deceitful' (*dolosus*).[133]

Having realised that force could not yield any results and after hostages had been exchanged, Godfrey and his leading followers took the oath of fealty to Alexios. The solemn ceremony of oath-taking took place around 20 January 1097.[134] The Byzantine emperor was undoubtedly determined to overawe the Western knights with splendour and magnificence, and show off his wealth. Albert describes Alexios as being 'seated, as was his custom, looking powerful on the throne of his sovereignty, and ... the duke [Godfrey] bowed down with bended knee, and his men also bowed down to kiss the exceedingly glorious and powerful emperor (*gloriosus et potentissimus imperator*)'.[135] According to Albert, following Alexios's speech, Godfrey 'was pleased and beguiled by the emperor's peaceful and affectionate words'.[136] After the ceremony, 'priceless gifts were taken from the emperor's treasury for the duke and all who had gathered there, as much in gold as in silver and in purple of many kinds, in mules and horses'.[137] Having undertaken diplomatic missions to the court at Constantinople in 1168 and in 1179-80, William of Tyre, unlike Albert, was no stranger to Byzantine diplomacy. In fact, he was well-placed to discern its ends and means in Alexios's conduct. As the historian records, 'the emperor [Alexios] desired that, loaded to the limit with gifts by his great

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[131] *Gesta Francorum*, 6. I made an amendment to Hill's translation.
[132] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 130; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 53.
[133] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 743.
[134] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 84-7. Cf. Tyerman, 2006, 110.
[135] Ibid., 84-5.
[136] Ibid., 86-7.
[137] Ibid.

generosity, they [Godfrey and his knights] should marvel at the incomparable quantity of his riches and the munificence of his imperial majesty'.[138]

After the ceremonial, Godfrey and his men were shipped across the Bosporus. According to Baldric of Dol, Alexios, who was 'a far-sighted and politic man' (*vir perspicax et industrius*), moved Godfrey and his armies to the Asiatic shores of Bosporus 'to prevent his being influenced by the counsel and aid of the princes who would arrive [in Constantinople]'.[139] This view is repeated more elaborately by William of Tyre, who relates that the emperor's persuading Godfrey to cross the Bosporus 'did not proceed from sincerity and good faith. On the contrary, with his usual trickery (*fraude solita*), he [Alexios] circumvented the duke in order that the latter's forces might not unite with the others when they arrived'.[140] The historian of *Outremer* adds that the Byzantine emperor, 'with the same subtlety, compelled the others who followed later to cross over one by one, so that two armies were never together before the city at the same time'.[141] In fact, this seems to have been Alexios's policy. Although criticised by William of Tyre, it was a reasonable precaution enabling the Byzantine ruler to deal individually and, thus, more effectively with each Western prince arriving in the imperial capital.

Bohemond of Taranto

The Norman Bohemond of Taranto was the third crusading leader to arrive in Constantinople on 9 April. He had delayed his departure from southern Italy because he needed some time to prepare his forces. On 26 October 1096, the Norman expedition crossed from Bari to Epiros. Bohemond, anxious to make a good impression on Alexios, ensured that his men were on their best behaviour.[142] A little before Christmas, the Normans arrived in Castoria, in western Macedonia. Then they marched eastward towards the river Vardar. Before reaching the river, Bohemond received an imperial embassy.[143] According to William of Tyre, Alexios requested the Norman leader to restrain his men from any 'violence, rapine, and fires',[144] and invited

[138] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 132.
[139] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 22.
[140] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 177; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 133.
[141] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 133.
[142] *Gesta Francorum*, 8.
[143] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 135. See also Shepard, 1988, 202. The scholar argues that the gist of Alexios's letter which occurs in William of Tyre's *Historia* should not be doubted.
[144] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 135.

him to go 'as speedily as possible to ... [the emperor's] presence' to 'enjoy the many honours and favours' that the emperor did 'intend to bestow upon'[145] him.

William of Tyre, whose interpretation of Alexios's behaviour is constantly coloured by prejudice, rhetorically declares that the imperial envoys 'were commanded to address him [Bohemond] with pacific words, subtly concealing the real guile beneath, and to make every effort to deceive him ... Although on the surface these words of the emperor seemed to contain much kindness, yet they were imbued with poison (*virus*)'.[146] From William's standpoint, Alexios was 'a crafty (*subdolus*) man, thoroughly skilled in concealing and disguising his purposes'.[147] The historian goes even further, portraying Bohemond to share his own deep distrust of Alexios. As he alleges, the Norman leader 'was well aware of the emperor's malice (*maliciam*)', but he 'hid his feelings ... and returned thanks to the monarch'.[148]

In the middle of February 1097, the Normans reached the river Vardar. The main part of the army crossed it promptly. However, a small party delayed on the western bank of the river and was thus attacked by Petcheneg and Turcopole soldiers who were ordered by the Byzantine emperor to make sure that the crusaders never stayed in the same place more than three days. Upon hearing of the fight, Tancred of Hauteville, Bohemond's nephew, immediately recrossed the river with two thousand men and went to the crusaders' rescue. He defeated the Petchenegs and captured some of them, whom Bohemond questioned. According to the author of the *Gesta Francorum*, they replied 'we cannot do anything else. We are at the emperor's command, and whatever he orders, that we must do'.[149]

When the Norman army was on the road to Serres, Norman envoys who had been earlier dispatched to the Byzantine emperor met Bohemond while they were returning from Constantinople. They brought with them a high official of the imperial household. The Anonymous reports that the Byzantine official was commanded by Alexios to guide the Normans safely through the Byzantine Empire until they arrived to the imperial capital. He adds: 'whenever we passed by any of their [the Byzantines'] cities this man used to tell the people of the land to bring us provisions'.[150] Nevertheless, prejudice made the Anonymous

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[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid., 135-6; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 179.
[147] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 178; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 135.
[148] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 179; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 136.
[149] *Gesta Francorum*, 9.
[150] Ibid., 10.

persist in branding Alexios as 'the wretched (*infelix*) emperor'[151] and led Robert the Monk to view the emperor's behaviour in the worst possible light, as only 'a good pretence ... [Alexios] was not doing all this out of friendly motives but out of secret hypocrisy of his heart (*secreta cordis simulatione*)'.[152]

On 1 April the Norman army reached Roussa in Thrace. Here Bohemond left his army under Tancred's command and hurried on to Constantinople together with a few knights. The Norman leader did so at Alexios's request.[153] William of Tyre is imagining that 'Bohemond hesitated for a while ... for he suspected the emperor of evil intentions'.[154] Ralph of Caen quotes the letter allegedly written by Emperor Alexios to Bohemond. It seems that Ralph had access to this letter when he wrote the *Gesta Tancredi* fifteen to twenty years later.[155] In this letter, the Byzantine emperor informed the Norman leader that he had received news of his arrival 'with paternal pleasure' (*paternis visceribus*).[156] Alexios further informed Bohemond that, while the other crusading leaders 'have been granted generous gifts', he would receive 'even greater gifts'.[157] With some hyperbole, the emperor enticingly told the Norman leader that

> here [in Constantinople], there are garments, gold, horses and all the remaining abundance of the treasury for you. Whatever you have seen anywhere else, it is as nothing in comparison to what is collected here ... You will find a font of gold such that however much you seek to consume, you will find this much again and it can be consumed over and over again without any difficulty.[158]

Alexios also told Bohemond that everything in the imperial capital was ready for him 'as if for a son' (*tanquam filio*) under the condition that Bohemond should 'be good and faithful to [Alexios] ... like a son (*tanquam filius*)'.[159]

Within Alexios's letter to Bohemond, we can clearly observe some basic principles of Byzantine diplomacy. The Byzantine emperor spared no gifts of any type or price to promote his imperial interests. Hugh of Vermandois and Godfrey of Bouillon had already been

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[151] Ibid.
[152] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 747; Robert the Monk, *History*, 97. I made an amendment to Sweetenham's translation.
[153] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 30-1; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 136.
[154] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 136-7.
[155] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 31, n. 26.
[156] Ibid., 30; Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 611.
[157] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 31.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.; Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 611.

showered with sumptuous gifts upon offering the oath of fealty to Alexios. Bohemond, Alexios's old enemy, who had participated in the Norman attacks on the Byzantine Empire in the 1080s, was to receive even 'greater gifts' in order to comply with the emperor's will. Simultaneously, since wealth was synonymous with power, by showing off his fabulous riches, Alexios aimed to dazzle Bohemond and the other crusading leaders into submission.

Bohemond's designation as Alexios's son aimed to assert the Norman leader's dependence on the Byzantine emperor. The dependence of certain foreign rulers on the Byzantine sovereign was frequently expressed in terms of ties of kindred: the other potentates were addressed as 'sons' of the emperor. This sonship, however, was spiritual.[160] Concerning the crusading leaders specifically, Bohemond was not the only one to have received imperial letters addressing him as son of Alexios. Raymond of Aguilers relates that while passing through the Byzantine Empire, Count Raymond of Toulouse received imperial letters 'concerning security and brotherhood (*de fraternitate*), and I may say of sonship (*de filiatione*)'.[161] Once the crusading princes arrived in Constantinople, Alexios sealed the 'sonship' and consequently the leaders' dependence on him with a solemn ceremony. According to Albert of Aachen, during the ceremony of the oath-taking by Godfrey of Bouillon, Alexios also adopted the French duke. The emperor told Godfrey: 'I am taking you as my adopted son (*filium adoptiuum*)'.[162] Albert comments that Godfrey's adoption by the emperor was in conformity with 'the custom (*mos*) of that land [the Byzantine Empire]'.[163] Likewise, Ekkehard of Aura describes the adoption by Alexios as 'his custom' (*more suo*).[164] During the middle and later eleventh century prominent Byzantines were quite often adopted by reigning monarchs of Byzantium. However, as Shepard argues, Alexios appears to have been the first Byzantine emperor to have formally adopted a foreign ruler or nobleman as his son.[165]

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[160] A. Grabar, 'God and the "Family of Princes" Presided over by the Byzantine Emperor', *Harvard Slavic Studies*, 2 (1954), 117-23; D. Obolensky, 'The Principles and Methods of Byzantine Diplomacy', in *Actes du XII^e Congrès International d' Etudes Byzantines, Ochride 10-16 Septembre 1961*, 1 (Belgrade, 1963), 59.

[161] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 11; Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 18.

[162] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 86-7.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolomyta*, 29.

[165] J. Shepard, "Father' or 'Scorpion'? Style and Substance in Alexios's Diplomacy', in *Alexios I Komnenos. Papers of the Second Belfast Byzantine International Colloquium, 14-16 April 1989*, eds Margaret Mullett and Dion Smythe (Belfast, 1996), 80-2, 108-13.

From Ralph of Caen's point of view, Alexios, by his letter to Bohemond, 'strove to tangle in nets the lions [i.e. the Normans] whom he dared not attack with a hunting spear'.[166] The rhetorical language that Ralph uses to describe the imperial embassy and the words of Alexios is almost identical to that employed by William of Tyre when reviling the first imperial delegation and letter of the emperor. As Ralph records, the Byzantine envoys who were dispatched to the Norman leader had been loaded by the emperor 'with ruses and went with blandishments ... to meet Bohemond ... [Those messengers] were instructed by Alexios in lies beyond their own skills'.[167] In this connection it is important to draw a parallel between Ralph's and William of Tyre's rhetorical denunciation of Alexios's letters to Bohemond. According to Ralph, Bohemond 'captivated by the superficial sweetness of these words [of Alexios], did not sense the poison (*venenum*) hidden below the surface'.[168] As we have seen, referring to the emperor's first letter to the Norman leader, William had asserted that 'although on the surface these words of the emperor seemed to contain much kindness, yet they were imbued with poison'.[169] Despite the fact that Ralph composed his work at the beginning and William at the end of the twelfth century, the similarity between the two authors' rhetorical style in denouncing Alexios is striking.

Once Bohemond arrived in Constantinople, he was 'received with proper ceremony',[170] was summoned to a private audience with Alexios and readily took the oath of fealty.[171] The emperor kept his promise to offer the Norman leader 'even greater gifts' than those received by the other princes. According to Albert of Aachen, the gifts to Bohemond were 'valuable in their workmanship and adornment and far more splendid than anyone can imagine'.[172] The Byzantine historian Anna Komnena, Alexios's daughter, relates that 'after the ceremony was over Alexios set aside a room in the palace precincts and had the floor covered with all kinds of wealth: clothes, gold and silver coins, objects of lesser value filled the place so completely that it was impossible for anyone to walk in it'.[173] To make an even better impression on the

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[166] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 30.
[167] Ibid., 30-1.
[168] Ibid., 31; Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 612.
[169] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 135-6.
[170] *Gesta Francorum*, 11.
[171] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 328. Cf. Shepard, 1988, 203-4.
[172] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 91.
[173] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 328.

Norman prince, Alexios 'ordered the man deputed to show Bohemond these riches to open the doors suddenly. Bohemond was amazed at the sight'.[174]

Raymond IV of Toulouse

In early February 1097 the army of Raymond IV, Count of Toulouse, reached the Byzantine frontier north of Dyrrachium. William of Tyre is imagining that 'the emperor felt many misgivings in regard to the count's coming, because the prince was a wise and magnificent man and was leading with him a very large force'.[175] In Dyrrachium imperial ambassadors and a Petcheneg police were waiting to guide the crusading army to Constantinople. The surveillance that the Petchenegs imposed upon the crusaders to avert pillaging was so strict that it led to the killing of two crusading barons, the wounding of the papal legate, Adhemar of Puy, and an attack on Raymond of Toulouse himself. Raymond of Aguilers, unsurprisingly inclined to pass over the crusaders' indiscipline, puts the whole blame for these ugly incidents on the Byzantine emperor. As the chronicler records, 'the enemy completely surrounded us [the crusaders] through the emperor's deceit (*dolis*)'.[176]

In April 1097, while at Rodosto, Count Raymond met his envoys who were returning from Constantinople where they had previously been dispatched to announce the count's arrival in Byzantine territory. The ambassadors brought friendly messages urging Raymond to hurry ahead to Constantinople with a few followers - Raymond of Aguilers, disposed to ascribe the worst possible behaviour to Alexios, alleges that the envoys 'brought rosy reports of Byzantine promises largely because the emperor bribed them'.[177] Accepting Alexios's invitation, Raymond of Toulouse left his troops and hastened to the imperial capital which he reached on 21 April. As admitted by Raymond of Aguilers, in Constantinople, Count Raymond was given 'the most honourable reception ... by Alexios and his princes'.[178] The emperor asked the count to offer the oath of fealty as the other crusading leaders had done. Raymond resisted by declaring his devotion to God as his only Lord. He proposed, however, that Alexios should become the leader of the crusaders and march with them to Jerusalem. As Raymond of Aguilers records disapprovingly, 'Alexios temporised by excusing himself from

[174] Ibid.
[175] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 141.
[176] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 12-13.
[177] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 22.
[178] Ibid., 23.

the march on the grounds that he was afraid that the Germans [*sic*], Hungarians, Kumans, and other fierce people would plunder his empire if he undertook the march with the pilgrims'.[179] Similarly, William of Tyre's prejudice against Alexios makes him disbelieve the emperor's excuse for rejecting the leadership of the crusade. Adopting once more his hysterical anti-Alexian tone, the historian unfairly paints the Byzantine emperor in the most negative terms as envious of the crusaders, and therefore unwilling to assist them and even keen to obstruct their progress. As William avers, 'all that he [Alexios] said was a device (*dolus*) and a deceit (*circumventio*). He alleged this on his own behalf simply because, jealous (*invidens*) of our departure, he sought any pretext whereby he might withdraw his assistance from our people and, in every possible way, hinder their progress'.[180]

From the crusaders' standpoint, Alexios should become the commander-in-chief of the crusade, and therefore his rejection of the leadership disappointed many of the crusaders.[181] This notion is well expressed in the *Gesta Tancredi.* After the surrender of Nicaea to Alexios, the emperor insisted on an oath of fealty from those senior crusaders who had not taken it. One of these was Tancred.[182] According to Ralph of Caen, when the Norman was brought before Alexios, he said to the emperor: 'if you wish to rule, strive to serve and you can be certain of Tancred's service when you have made clear that the army of Christ is your own. If you are the common leader (*omnium minister*) ... I will not refuse to serve you'.[183]

Once Raymond of Toulouse had hurried on to Constantinople, his army, without the count's restraining control, was in complete disorder and began immediately to plunder the countryside. A division of the Byzantine army attacked the raiders who were overwhelmed and fled. The event is attributed by Raymond of Aguilers to 'the most fraudulent (*fraudulentissimam*) and abominable (*detestabilem*) treachery (*dolositatem*) of the emperor's counsel (*ammonitionis*)'.[184] The unhappy incident gave William of Tyre another excuse to denigrate Alexios. The historian alleges that 'the emperor, indignant that the count should decline to do him homage as had the others, surreptitiously ordered the chiefs of his legions ... to make a sudden attack on the count's forces. They were directed to make every effort to

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[179] Ibid.
[180] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 190; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 147. I made amendments to the translation by Babcock and Krey.
[181] Shepard, 1996, 74-5; J. Shepard, 'Cross-Purposes: Alexios Comnenus and the First Crusade', in *The First Crusade, Origins and Impact*, ed. Jonathan Phillips (Manchester, 1997), 121.
[182] Nicholson, 1940, 32-4.
[183] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 618; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 41.
[184] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 15; Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 22-3.

harass them, even to the extent of massacre'.[185] William takes his spurious argument a stage further, claiming that 'the emperor dared to make this attempt [attack Raymond's army] because the other leaders had bound themselves to him by the oath of fealty. Moreover, all their armies had now crossed the sea and could not easily be brought back'.[186] The historian concludes his discussion of the incident by levelling exceedingly grave but totally unfounded accusations against Alexios. William rhetorically claims that 'thus, more and more, day by day, the trickery (*dolus*) of the Greeks and the treachery (*fraus*) of the emperor were revealed. There was now no one of the chiefs to whom it was not plain, in fact clearer than the sun at midday, that Alexios was pursuing our people with intense hatred (*odio*) and that he detested (*haberet invisum*) the whole Latin race (*omne Latinorum genus*)'.[187]

When Raymond's army finally arrived at Constantinople, the emperor heightened the pressure on the count to take the oath. However, according to Raymond of Aguilers, Raymond of Toulouse 'brooded over revenge for unjust treatment of himself and his men and sought means to remove the shame of such ill fame'.[188] Guibert of Nogent contrasts Alexios, 'the insolent tyrant' (*tirannus insolens*), to Raymond, 'the glorious count' (*gloriosus comes*), and the emperor's 'cunning' (*astutia*), which demanded the oath of fealty, to the count's 'wisdom' (*prudentia*), which 'set about devising a way to take vengeance against the envy (*invidiam*) of the most wicked (*nequissimus*) [emperor]'.[189] The demonised Alexios thus becomes the negative imprint of Raymond. Although Raymond of Toulouse was determined to have recourse to arms, the other crusading leaders disapproved of his intentions.[190] Eventually, on 26 April, Raymond took a modified oath, promising 'that he would respect the life and honour of Alexios, and neither destroy them nor permit anyone else to do so'.[191]

Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois

Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois were the last crusading leaders to reach Constantinople. According to William of Tyre, they 'were received with great honour by his

[185] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 143.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid., 146; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 189.
[188] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 24. Cf. *Gesta Francorum*, 13; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 61; Robert the Monk, *History*, 99.
[189] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 143; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 61. I made amendments to Levine's translation.
[190] *Gesta Francorum*, 13; Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 24. See also W. M. Daly, 'Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders and the Security of Constantinople', *Medieval Studies*, 22 (1960), 55-6.
[191] *Gesta Francorum*, 13.

majesty [the Emperor Alexios] and the illustrious men who surrounded him',[192] and took the oath of fealty. William records that 'the treasury was opened, and they were given presents of marvellous value such as they had never before seen - gifts of gold, precious vestments, vases worthy of admiration for both material and workmanship, and silken fabrics'.[193] The historian's evidence is corroborated by a letter that Stephen of Blois himself wrote to his wife Adela,[194] daughter of William I the Conqueror (1066-87), after the capture of Nicaea (19 June 1097). Stephen enthusiastically recounts: 'the emperor, verily, received me with dignity and honour and with the greatest affection, as if I were his own son (*quasi filium suum*), and he loaded me with most bountiful and precious gifts'.[195] As William of Tyre puts it, 'the generosity of the emperor dazzled the minds even of the recipients'.[196] This is evidenced by Stephen's letter . The count assured his wife that 'in truth, ... there is no man today like him [Alexios] under heaven, for he is enriching all our princes most bountifully, is relieving all our knights with gifts and refreshing all the poor with feasts ... in our times ... there has not been a prince so distinguished for general integrity of character (*non fuit princeps universa morum honestate adeo praeclarus*)'.[197] Finally, William recounts that Alexios's 'gifts surpass anything of ours [of the Latins], both in character and value'.[198] Correspondingly, Stephen says to his wife: 'your father [William I], my beloved, gave many and large gifts, but he was almost as nothing in comparison with this man'.[199]

The Princes' Oath of Fealty to Alexios I

The oath of fealty that Alexios asked the crusading leaders to pay him increased several chroniclers' hostility towards the Byzantine emperor. The Anonymous alleges that the crusading leaders, when asked by the emperor to pay him an oath of fealty, 'flatly refused to do [this]', since they considered it 'unworthy' (*indignum*) of them and 'unjust' (*iustum nullatenus*).[200] Guibert of Nogent claims that when the crusading 'leaders learned of this [i.e.

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[192] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 149.
[193] Ibid.
[194] *Epistolae Stephani*, 885-7. Part of the letter is translated in A. C. Krey (ed.) *The First Crusade. Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants* (Princeton, NJ, 1921), 100-1.
[195] *Epistolae Stephani*, 885. Krey, 1921, 100.
[196] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 149.
[197] *Epistolae Stephani*, 885-6; Krey, 1921, 100-1.
[198] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 149-50.
[199] *Epistolae Stephani*, 886; Krey, 1921, 101.
[200] *Gesta Francorum*, 11-12.

the oath demanded by Alexios], they showed great contempt and scorn', and declared that 'to swear an oath would be to ... [their] eternal shame (*sempiterne pudendum*)'.[201]

From Ralph of Caen's viewpoint, the oath of fealty to the emperor was 'a yoke' (*jugum*).[202] The chronicler makes Tancred condemn Alexios's heart as 'perfidious' (*perfidum*) and creates a pun by contrasting the emperor's heart, *ad nocendum impudens* ('shameless in harming'), with Bohemond's, *ad cognoscendum imprudens* ('neglectful in investigating').[203] Tancred, or rather Ralph, sustains the accusations of perfidy against Alexios by rhetorically stating that Bohemond had 'been summoned as a son (*nomine filii*) to receive riches, to be embraced in paternal favour ... He comes [to Alexios] so that he might rise higher'.[204] However, upon arriving in Constantinople, the Norman leader 'finds a yoke. ... he is forced to subsume himself among others. He has been made more humble'.[205] To justify Bohemond's positive response to Alexios's proposal to hasten to Constantinople, Ralph, through Tancred's mouth, assures his audience that 'certainly, he [Bohemond] was ignorant of the [emperor's] deceit (*fraudis*). He believed the [emperor's] deceitful blandishments (*blanditiis fraudulentis*)'.[206] Despite all the rhetorical ornamentation in Tancred's lamentation, the truth is that Bohemond not only willingly took the oath of fealty to Alexios, but also threatened those who refused to take the oath and considered taking military action against the emperor, such as, for example, Raymond of Toulouse.[207] It is very probable that Ralph alleges that Bohemond was beguiled by Alexios and 'was forced to accept this yoke [the oath]'[208] in order to justify the fact that the Norman leader broke his oath later.

From William of Malmesbury's perspective, the leaders were 'purchasing another man's advantage at the risk of their own lives'[209] by taking the oath of fealty to Alexios and, more specifically, by pledging themselves to hand over to the emperor any captured territory which had formerly belonged to the Byzantine Empire. Concerning the latter provision of the treaty between Alexios and the princes, Ralph of Caen advances two arguments against it. First, the

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[201] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 142; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 60.
[202] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 612, 613; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 32-3. The homage is described as *jugum* in *capitula* X-XII.
[203] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 612. Here I completely depart from the free translation by Bachrach and Bachrach.
[204] Ibid.; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 32.
[205] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 32.
[206] Ibid., 32-3; Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 612-3. I made minor amendments to the translation by Bachrach and Bachrach.
[207] *Gesta Francorum*, 13.
[208] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 32.
[209] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta*, I, 611.

Byzantines were militarily incapable and therefore only the Westerners could effectively protect the territories captured from the Turks.[210] This argument is invalid, based on the old, well-worn Western stereotype of Byzantines as militarily incapable and cowardly, rather than on a careful evaluation of the Byzantine Empire's strengthened military position at the time of the First Crusade and its aftermath.[211] Ralph's second argument is that 'it was not possible to serve two lords, namely the common good (*res publica*) and the king of the Greeks'.[212] The chronicler is implying here that the restoration of the conquered cities to Alexios would have been contrary to the common good. This is another biased view. Both arguments by Ralph of Caen mainly intended to demonstrate that the establishment of the crusader states in the Near East, and especially the foundation of the Norman Principality of Antioch - rather than the restoration of Antioch to the Byzantines - were fully justified.

Tancred, as the author of his *Gesta* reports, 'reflected on the means by which he could avoid this [i.e. swearing the oath of fealty to Alexios] ... and with which of his strengths he might punish the deceits (*dolos*) of the perfidious (*perfidi*) king [Alexios]'.[213] However, the Norman second-in-command soon realised that he could not match the Byzantine emperor. According to Ralph of Caen, Tancred appreciated that his boldness and his few men stood in total contrast to the emperor's deceits (*dolos*), riches, power, and multitude of soldiers.[214]

In order to justify the fact that the princes finally did swear the oath, the Anonymous claims that 'driven by desperate need', the leaders 'had to humble themselves willy-nilly to do what that most wicked (*nequissimus*) emperor [Alexios] wanted'.[215] With the same intention of defending the leaders who 'relaxed their firmness by swearing oaths to the tyrant (*tiranno*) [Alexios]', Guibert explains that they 'were helping their fellow soldiers in God out of necessity, for they would have been in dire poverty if they had been denied their pay'.[216] Additionally, as Guibert points out, the fact that Hugh of Vermandois first swore the oath to the emperor 'compelled by necessity and the enticement of money'[217] 'weakened the courage of the great leaders who came after him'.[218] From the same chronicler's viewpoint, Hugh's

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[210] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 40-1.
[211] Angold, 1997, 157.
[212] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 618; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 41.
[213] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 612; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 32. I made changes in the translation by Bachrach and Bachrach.
[214] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 612; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 32.
[215] *Gesta Francorum*, 12. I made an amendment to Hill's translation.
[216] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 143; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 61.
[217] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 61. .
[218] Ibid., 56.

oath set a precedent and 'the craftiness (*astutia*) of the treacherous prince (*principis fraudulenti*) [Alexios] compelled the others, either by force (*vi*), or in secret (*clam*), or by entreaties (*precario*), to do what he [Hugh] had done'.[219] There appears to be an element of truth in the accounts of the Anonymous and Guibert in that Godfrey of Bouillon and later Raymond of Toulouse initially refused to offer an oath to Alexios. Nevertheless, despite the chroniclers' allegations, the vast majority of the crusading princes willingly offered the oath of fealty.

In contrast to the testimonies of the Anonymous, Guibert, and Ralph, Robert the Monk does not mention any objections to taking the oath raised by the leaders. He records that Alexios's demand for oaths 'found favour with just about all [the leaders]'.[220] On this issue, Robert appears to be unbiased and objective, in direct contradiction to those chroniclers that give their audience to understand that almost all the leaders strongly deplored the oath-taking. In addition, Robert attempts to rationalise the fact that the emperor's demand was supported by the leaders, and he does so without hurling abuse at the emperor. As the chronicler relates, 'thinking it through rationally - it becomes clear that they [the leaders] in fact had no alternative. After all they were about to enter a deserted and trackless land ... and they knew that those not getting their daily ration cannot cope with a day's work. The agreement on homage was made on account of necessity of this kind'.[221] Similarly, Fulcher of Chartres acknowledges that 'it was essential that all [leaders] establish friendship with the emperor since without his aid and counsel ... [the crusaders] could not easily make the journey ... To them indeed the emperor himself offered ... the horses and money which they needed for making such a journey'.[222]

To take his argument a stage further, Robert the Monk relates that 'the agreement reached in the homage would have sufficed if the emperor's assertion could have been trusted'.[223] In other words, the chronicler makes it clear that he does not disapprove of the oath-taking provided each part fulfilled its obligations. Alexios eventually does not escape Robert's fulminations. As the chronicler claims, 'deceitful planning (*fraudulenta factio*) always abided in the emperor's mind'.[224] Robert now brings a new and graver accusation against Alexios:

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[219] Ibid.; Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 135. I made amendments to Levine's translation.
[220] Robert the Monk, *History*, 99.
[221] Ibid., 100.
[222] Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 80.
[223] Robert the Monk, *History*, 100.
[224] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 749. Here I do not adopt Sweetenham's free translation.

that of perjury. As he records, 'whatever he [Alexios] ... promised, he went back on it ... and chose to incur the fault of perjury (*perjurii noxam*)'.[225] Alexios seems to be charged with perjury because he subsequently failed to provide military assistance for the crusaders during the siege of Antioch. However, as will become clear, the responsibility for his failure to do so did not rest solely on him. Robert was well aware of this matter but seems to conveniently forget it at this point.

Alexios's Alleged Emotions and Thoughts

The emotions and thoughts of the Emperor Alexios during the crusading leaders' march and arrival at Constantinople are an issue discussed by the Latin chroniclers of the First Crusade. As the Anonymous alleges, 'the emperor, who was troubled in mind (*anxians*) and fairly seething with rage (*bulliens ira*)' at the massive influx of crusaders into his empire, 'was planning how to cunningly and deceitfully (*callide fraudulenterque*) entrap these Christian knights [the crusaders], but by God's grace neither he nor his men found place or time to harm them'.[226]

The Anonymous's allegation was taken and expanded by Guibert of Nogent and Robert the Monk. Guibert of Nogent avers that when Godfrey of Bouillon arrived in Constantinople, Alexios was 'frightened' (*territus*) and 'offered formal, but grudging signs of respect'.[227] Apart from conveying the notion of Alexios's fear at the arrival of a Western prince, Guibert grasps the opportunity to contrast 'the most illustrious duke' (*clarissimus dux*) Godfrey of Bouillon with 'the treacherous emperor' (*perfidus imperator*) Alexios.[228] The previous supposed eagerness of the 'perfidious Alexios' 'for support against the Turks'[229] was perceived by Guibert to stand in total contrast to the emperor's anger at the arrival of the crusaders at Constantinople and his consideration of 'a means to bring about the total destruction of the large [crusading] army'.[230] From Guibert's standpoint, Alexios sought to destroy the crusading army because it 'was, as he thought, about to attack him'.[231]

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[225] Ibid., 750; Robert the Monk, *History*, 100.
[226] *Gesta Francorum*, 11. I made changes in Hill's translation.
[227] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 129-30; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 53.
[228] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 129-30.
[229] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 60.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid.

Robert avows that the sight of the assembling crusaders roused the vehement anger (*ira vehementi*) of the treacherous (*subdolus*) Emperor Alexios, who is condemned as 'lacking in courage (*inops animi*), devoid of sense (*expers sensus*) and short on wisdom (*pauper consilii*)'.[232] In accord with Guibert's perspective, Robert asserts that Alexios 'was terrified (*timebat*) in case such a large army with so many soldiers might turn upon him'.[233] Robert quotes the Petchenegs who were captured by Bohemond's army in the skirmish at the river Vardar as saying that the 'emperor is more frightened (*magis perhorrescit*) of your armies than of storms in heaven, because his view is that you are more interested in taking his kingdom from him (*eum regno suo privare*) than in pilgrimage; that is why he never ceases to plot (*malum machinari*) against you'.[234] Robert goes as far as to attempt to rationalise the emperor's fear of a crusading attack against Constantinople; the chronicler, displaying a constant bias against Alexios, states that 'a deceitful mind (*mens fraude plena*) is always on edge and worried about falling prey into the same traps it sets for others (*quod machinatur alteri ... sibi machinari*)'.[235]

William of Malmesbury relates that the Byzantine emperor, who 'was notoriously unreliable, and never did anything noteworthy except by ... trick (*dolo*)', 'was terrified (*territus*) by the arrival of these great men [the crusaders]'.[236] Likewise, Orderic Vitalis records that Alexios 'was greatly terrified (*nimis territus*) at the news of the coming of such mighty lords and, choosing a course of action that might turn aside the danger, he attempted to deceive them ... He was wily (*callidus*) and eloquent (*facundus*), a prolific (*largus*) and ingenious (*ingeniosus*) master of deception (*fallendi artifex*)'.[237]

Revising the final version of his *Historia* several decades later in the 1180s, William of Tyre alleged that Alexios 'viewed the coming of our [the crusading] armies with misgiving and regarded their concentration as still more dangerous'.[238] Taking his argument a step further, and ever inclined to put the worst possible interpretation on Alexios's behaviour, the historian claims that the emperor's 'lavish liberality toward the leaders did not proceed from generosity or good will, but from desperate fear (*timoris desperati*) and deceitful craft

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[232] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 748; Robert the Monk, *History*, 99.
[233] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 748; Robert the Monk, *History*, 99.
[234] Ibid., 97; Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 746. I made minor amendments to Sweetenham's translation.
[235] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 748; Robert the Monk, *History*, 99.
[236] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta*, I, 610-11.
[237] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, V, 46-7. I made minor amendments to Chibnall's translation.
[238] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 144.

(*fraudulente versutie*)'.[239] William eventually concludes by stating that since Alexios 'had displayed munificence and pretended good will toward them [the crusading leaders] so bountifully', 'it was very difficult to convince them of malice (*malicia*) of the Greeks and the wicked deception (*nequam fraus*) and persistent trickery (*circumventio pertinax*) of the emperor'.[240]

Identification of the emotions and thoughts of Alexios at receiving news of the defeat and capture of his Petchenegs by Baldwin of Boulogne outside Constantinople and by Bohemond in Vardar is also attempted by some Latin chroniclers. When the Byzantine ruler, 'the impious emperor' (*impius imperator*),[241] as described by Guibert, learned that Baldwin captured sixty Petchenegs, he was, in Robert's words, 'furious (*iratus*), realising that the French had discovered his cunning plans (*dolositates*)'.[242] As alleged by Baldric, 'hearing this [the capture of his Petchenegs], the emperor Alexios was very angry and plotted incessantly in his mind how to harm the army of Christ'.[243] After receiving the news of the defeat in Vardar, Alexios, according to Robert the Monk, 'boiled with rage and, becoming anxious, began to mull over plans for treachery'.[244] Ralph of Caen asserts that 'after the cunning (*versutus*) emperor was stunned by this news, he conceives new deceits in his heart (*novos corde dolos*)'.[245]

It is clear that from the standpoint of the majority of the Latin chroniclers of the First Crusade, the arrival of the crusaders in Byzantine territory filled Alexios with feelings of desperate fear and rage. As a result, a demonised Byzantine emperor began mulling over cunning plans to deceive or even sabotage the crusaders. The attempted identification of Alexios's emotions and treacherous thoughts is manifestly guided by the Latin chroniclers' prejudice against the Byzantine ruler. Nevertheless, a degree of anxiety and fear at the arrival of waves of Western crusaders in the Byzantine Empire must have been naturally felt by Alexios. As his daughter, Anna, relates, Alexios 'dreaded their arrival ... So far from despairing, however, he made every effort to prepare for war *if need arose*'.[246] This, of course, does not mean that the Byzantine ruler did endeavour to destroy the Westerners. His objective

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[239] Ibid; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 187.
[240] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 187; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 144. I made an amendment to the translation by Babcock and Krey.
[241] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 130; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 53.
[242] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 744; Robert the Monk, *History*, 94.
[243] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 22.
[244] Robert the Monk, *History*, 97.
[245] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 611; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 30. I made changes in the translation by Bachrach and Bachrach.
[246] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 308-9. Emphasis added.

was obviously to establish his control over them and create the conditions which would allow him to exploit their expedition in the best interests of his empire.

As to the assertion of Robert the Monk that Alexios' 'view is that you [the crusaders] are more interested in taking his kingdom from him than in pilgrimage', we must be very skeptical of its legitimacy. It is unlikely that this view was shared by the Byzantine ruler himself. What we know, however, is that this was the belief of Alexios's daughter. According to Anna, the crusaders 'were all of one mind and in order to fulfill their dream of taking Constantinople they adopted a common policy ... to all appearances they were on pilgrimage to Jerusalem; in reality they planned to dethrone Alexios and seize the capital'.[247] As regards Bohemond more specifically, Anna alleges that 'apparently he left to worship at the Holy Sepulchre, but in reality to win power for himself – or rather, if possible, to seize the Roman Empire itself as his father had suggested'.[248] At first sight it may appear that Anna's testimony corroborates Robert's allegation that Alexios's view was that the crusaders were more interested in conquering the Byzantine Empire than in crusading. Anna's work, however, is written with hindsight and her perspective was doubtless coloured by Bohemond's invasion of the Byzantine Empire in 1107, which led the princess to believe that the crusaders, and especially Bohemond, were ostensibly on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, but in fact planned to topple Alexios and seize Constantinople. On the other hand, the Western chroniclers appear to have come to believe that Alexios's view was that the crusaders were 'interested in taking his kingdom', in their effort to rationalise what they considered to be the emperor's hostile behaviour towards the crusaders.

The Princes' Armies: from Nicaea to Jerusalem[249]

Nicaea

Alexios could pride himself on the way he had dealt with the crusade: he had established his control over its foremost leaders, thus creating the conditions to make the most of the

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[247] Ibid., 319.
[248] Ibid., 329.
[249] Mayer, 1988, 46-57; Runciman, 1951, I, 175-314; Riley-Smith, 2005, 34-44; Tyerman, 2006, 124-64; Runciman, 1969, 288-99; S. Runciman, 'The First Crusade: Antioch to Ascalon', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 1 (Madison; London, 1969), 308-41; Lock, 2006, 140-1; Asbridge, 2004, 118-327; France, 1994, 122-366; Angold, 1997, 161-3; Yewdale, 1924, 46-84; Lilie, 1993, 28-60; Shepard, 1988, 185-277; Madden, 2005, 24-35.

expedition. On 14 May a joint force of Byzantines and crusaders laid siege to Nicaea, the Seljuk capital of Asia Minor. The Seljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan, who was away in the east, hurried back and engaged the crusaders in pitched battle on 21 May. He was overwhelmed and forced to withdraw. However, while the Ascanian Lake which lay along the western perimeter of Nicaea remained open, the city could not be surrendered; supplies were still carried into the city from this water route. Alexios was asked by the crusaders to dispatch ships overland and then refloat them on the lake so as to complete the blockade. As the *Gesta Francorum* and its derivatives admit, 'the emperor had this done immediately'.[250]

During the siege of Nicaea, Alexios provided the crusaders with plentiful supplies. Fulcher records that 'as long as ... [the crusaders] besieged the city of Nicaea food was brought in by ocean ships with the consent of the emperor'.[251] According to Albert of Aachen, 'on imperial orders sailing merchants were striving to race across the sea with ships full of rations, corn, meat, wine and barley and oil; they dropped anchor at the port of Kibotos where crowds of the faithful procured all sorts of provisions ... they [the crusaders] enjoyed and rejoiced in this abundance of food'.[252] In his letter to his wife, Stephen of Blois recounts that through Kibotos the 'emperor's own ships rush by night and day to Constantinople, whence they carry food to the camp, where it is distributed daily among the countless poor'.[253] The Anonymous relates that the crusaders, who reached Nicaea on 6 May 1097, were 'short of food'[254] at the early stage. However, shortly afterwards Bohemond, who had stayed behind in Constantinople to negotiate with the emperor about the provisioning of the crusaders, arrived at Nicaea and 'plenty of provisions ... poured in both by land and sea, and all Christ's army enjoyed great abundance'.[255] Robert the Monk, constantly seeking a pretext to criticise Alexios, alleges that the lack of provisions in the early stages at Nicaea was due to the fact that 'the emperor procrastinated interminably on fulfilling his promise'.[256]

The garrison of Nicaea eventually yielded to the Byzantine admiral Boutoumites on 18-19 June. Although the crusaders were prohibited from entering and sacking the city where the majority of the population was Christian, Alexios rewarded them handsomely. As Stephen of

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[250] *Gesta Francorum*, 16; Robert the Monk, *History*, 104; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 64; Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 29.
[251] Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 82.
[252] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 111.
[253] *Epistolae Stephani*, 886; Krey, 1921, 100-1.
[254] *Gesta Francorum*, 14.
[255] Ibid.
[256] Robert the Monk, *History*, 103.

Blois affirms, 'the venerable (*venerabilis*) ... [and] great (*magnus*) emperor ordered that the knights have what was more precious from the spoils of the city of Nicaea, that is gold, gems, silver, cloths, horses and such, all the provisions be distributed to footsoldiers; and he enriched all the princes from his own treasures'.[257] According to Fulcher of Chartres, 'the emperor ordered gifts to be presented to our leaders, gifts of gold and silver and raiment; and to the foot-soldiers he distributed copper coins'.[258] Although admitting that Alexios 'gave our [the crusader] leaders countless gifts' and 'also made substantial charitable contributions to all the poorest people',[259] Guibert insists on branding the Byzantine ruler as 'the tyrannical prince' (*tirannicus princeps*).[260] Referring to the alms given to the poor of the army by order of Alexios, Robert the Monk remarks that after all 'the emperor was not completely blind to his huge gain',[261] a comment that can hardly be seen as favourable. Baldric of Dol, on the other hand, relates that Alexios 'gave many gifts to the poor among the Christians' but sees this action as a trick (*machinatio*) which aimed at disguising the emperor's real intentions.[262]

The fact that the crusaders were not permitted to plunder Nicaea after its surrender seems to have aroused a degree of discontent among a number of the Westerners. Raymond of Aguilers was one of them. Ever prejudiced against Alexios, ill informed and possibly dissatisfied with his share of the imperial contributions, the chronicler launches into a tirade of abuse against the Byzantine ruler. He mistakenly claims that Alexios 'had pledged to the princes and the Frankish people that he would hand over to them all of the gold, silver, horses, and effects of all kinds which were in Nicaea'.[263] Despite this pledge, and his having 'promised to give so much to every person in the army that every soldier would wish to serve him at all times', Alexios, always according to Raymond, 'once in possession of Nicaea, ... acted as such an ingrate to the army that as long as he might live people would ever revile (*maledicat*) him and call him traitor (*proditorem*)'.[264]

Raymond's evidence is developed more fully in William of Tyre's *Historia* which paints Alexios as an oath-breaker. William claims that, under the provisions of the treaty between the

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[257] *Epistolae Stephani*, 887.
[258] Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 83. William of Malmesbury similarly records that the emperor 'did ... give orders for a distribution of gold and silver to the *optimates*, and of bronze coins to the *inferiores*. See William of Malmesbury, *Gesta*, I, 628-9.
[259] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 65.
[260] Ibid.; Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 153.
[261] Robert the Monk, *History*, 106.
[262] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 30.
[263] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 26.
[264] Ibid., 26-7; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 23.

Byzantine ruler and the princes, if the crusaders 'should chance to take any one of the cities which had formerly belonged to his [Alexios's] empire, that city with its adjacent dependencies should be restored to the emperor; but the booty, the spoils, and everything else should be handed over intact to the armies'.[265] From William's partisan perspective, Alexios did 'act contrary to ... [the] treaty'[266] and 'turn into his own private purse and treasury the spoils which according to the compact were to become public property'.[267] The historian's allegation is totally unfounded and is not substantiated by any contemporary accounts of the First Crusade. But even if, for the sake of argument, we accept that there was a provision in the treaty regarding the booty and the spoils, Alexios had not violated it, since Nicaea was not captured by the crusaders, but was surrendered to the emperor. Nevertheless, William alleges that, after the surrender of the city, the crusading leaders 'consistently maintained that the emperor had acted treacherously in respect to the provisions of the treaty',[268] while 'the people and the men of second rank were greatly incensed'.[269]

Baldric of Dol is the only source among the *Gesta* and its derivatives which asserts that the crusaders were displeased with the emperor's command 'that the property of this city [Nicaea] was not to be made public'.[270] As the archbishop of Dol records, the crusaders 'regretted the long siege, since they had not been able to have their will in the town as is customary in a captured city ... They did not readily accept Alexios's order, but because they were then powerless they kept silent for the time being'.[271] To Baldric's mind, the surrender of Nicaea marked the watershed in the relations between the crusaders and Alexios. According to the high-ranking ecclesiastic, 'here [in Nicaea] was the first seeding-ground of hatred (*odiorum*), here appeared a hotbed of enmity (*inimicitiarum*). Here incentives for quarrels (*discordiarum*) began to sprout, here the shapes of animosity (*simultatum*) grew. For since Alexios had not treated them [the crusaders] justly (*recte*) they began to think of vengeance (*ultione*) on him'.[272]

This piece of information has received little or no attention by modern scholars. Is this evidence substantiated by any other sources? Raymond of Aguilers's scathing comment that

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[265] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 167.
[266] Ibid., 168.
[267] Ibid., 167.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 30.
[271] Ibid., 30-1.
[272] Ibid., 31.

'once in possession of Nicaea, Alexios acted as such an ingrate to the army that as long as he might live people would ever revile him and call him traitor' testifies to the animosity of a number of crusaders toward the Byzantine ruler. This sentiment, however, must have mainly applied to 'middle-class' crusaders, a conclusion supported by the evidence provided by Guibert of Nogent, who records that Alexios's *munificentia* overlooked the *mediocres personae*.[273] In Stephen of Blois's words, the knights (*milites*) received 'what was more precious from the spoils of the city of Nicaea' and *all* (*cuncti*) *principes* were enriched from the emperor's treasury. Since almost all the sources agree that the knights and princes of the army were handsomely rewarded by Alexios after the surrender of Nicaea, it is reasonable to assume that Stephen's letter reflects the sentiment of at least the vast majority of the high-ranking crusaders. Similarly, the poor (*pauperes*) on the crusade must have been content enough with the Byzantine ruler's generosity, as testified by the sources. Therefore, Baldric's generalised statement that the crusaders felt unjustly treated by Alexios and 'began to think of vengeance on him' proves to be misleading.

After the capture of Nicaea, the Turks of the city were given the option to enroll in the Byzantine army or return safely to their lands. According to Anna, 'those Turks who were eager to serve him [Alexios] received numerous benefits; those who desired to go home were permitted to follow their own inclination – and they too departed with not a few gifts'.[274] During his reign, Alexios depended heavily upon foreigners for military service.[275] After Robert Guiscard's death in 1085, a wave of Normans entered Alexios's service.[276] As Orderic Vitalis informs us, the Normans who deserted Bohemond's army during his expedition to Albania in 1107-8 were received by Alexios, who 'gave them the free choice of remaining to serve under him or going wherever they liked'.[277] The Turks of Nicaea in 1097 were offered the same choices as the Normans. However, in Latin eyes, the Turks were 'infidels' and therefore their favourable treatment on the part of Alexios deepened the resentment of some Latin chroniclers toward the Byzantine ruler. Disposed to attribute the worst possible motives to Alexios's conduct, the Anonymous alleges that the emperor 'kept them [the Turks] carefully so that he could have them ready to injure the Franks and obstruct their crusade'.[278]

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[273] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 153.
[274] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 339-40.
[275] Shepard, 1996, 102-3.
[276] McQueen, 1986, 445.
[277] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 103.
[278] *Gesta Francorum*, 17.

Guibert of Nogent recounts that 'the tyrant' (*tirannus*), Alexios, not only left the Turks unpunished, but also 'brought them to Constantinople ... [with] one principal object ... in case of disagreement with the Franks, he would advantageously have men with whom to oppose them'.[279] Using almost identical terms, Robert the Monk 'reveals' Alexios's 'trickery (*fraudem*), aimed at bringing forth iniquity (*iniquitatem*)'.[280] However, Baldric of Dol is more moderate in his remarks. He twice emphasises that 'it is said' – this evidences that he does not necessarily share the view - that Alexios would use the Turks 'against the Christians at an opportune time and, by means of them, he would revolt against those whom he envied [i.e. the crusaders]'.[281] Nevertheless, the chronicler offers the alternative, reasonable, suggestion that Alexios's good treatment of the Turks of Nicaea was due to the fact that the emperor wanted to entice other cities in Turkish hands to surrender.

Antioch

From Nicaea the crusaders began their journey across Asia Minor. Alexios provided them with a small force led by his commander Tatikios. On 1 July the crusaders overwhelmed a Seljuk army under Kilij Arslan at Dorylaion. Then they continued to Antioch, where they arrived at the end of October. Without delay, they besieged the city, which was held by Yaghi-Siyan. The siege of Antioch was to last from 21 October 1097 to 3 June 1098.

The crusaders' situation became difficult soon after the beginning of the siege. Famine was the most serious problem. Ralph of Caen admits that the Byzantine territories, specifically Cyprus and some Aegean islands, made great efforts to provide supplies to the crusaders. The chronicler even concedes that 'Emperor Alexios's herald was also there [in Antioch] urging people to bring grain by land and by sea'.[282] The supplies reached the camp before Antioch via the harbour of Saint Simeon. However, the transport from the harbour to the camp soon came up against grave difficulties due to Turkish harassment.[283] In another case, Ralph records that Duke Robert of Normandy, who was summoned to Byzantine Latakia by the Varangian garrison of the city, sent supplies to the crusading army at Antioch; Latakia was being

[279] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 152; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 65.
[280] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 758. I did not adopt Sweetenham's translation.
[281] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 30.
[282] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 81.
[283] Lilie, 1993, 32-3.

supplied by Cyprus with 'wine, grain and great number of cattle'.[284] The admission that Alexios fulfilled his duty to provide supplies for the crusaders during the earlier stages of the siege of Antioch is rare amongst Western chroniclers.

During the winter the crusading host suffered many hardships. In February 1098 the Byzantine commander Tatikios abandoned the siege in order to seek provisions and reinforcements for the siege.[285] He offered to 'swear faithfully to do all this'[286] and he even left behind him all his possessions as evidence that he would return. Tatikios had acted in good faith, but, for reasons that will become apparent, he never returned to the siege of Antioch.

Writing with the benefit of hindsight, the vast majority of Latin chroniclers were hostile towards Tatikios. The Anonymous goes as far as to refer to Tatikios not only as 'liar' but also as 'enemy' (*inimicus*)[287] of the crusaders. His promises to arrange for the sending of provisions and horses, promises which were never to be fulfilled, are described as 'all sorts of lies' (*omnia falsa*).[288] His departure was ascribed to cowardice due to the news of the approach of a Turkish relief force led by Ridwan of Aleppo. Employing language similar to that of the Anonymous, Guibert of Nogent portrays Tatikios as 'a skilled liar, [who] compelled by fear of the Turks as well as driven by the danger of starvation',[289] announced that he would return to Constantinople to arrange for supplies and reinforcements to be dispatched to the crusaders in Antioch. However, 'having fabricated a complete lie, he never afterwards gave a thought to what he had promised'.[290] As the chronicler stresses, Tatikios acted so, 'not at all fearing what punishment his perjury might incur'.[291] Likewise, Robert the Monk accuses Tatikios of failing to 'keep his oath and … fulfil his promise',[292] while Baldric of Dol denounces the Byzantine

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[284] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 84.
[285] Anna Komnena recounts that Bohemond deceived Tatikios into departing. See Komnena, *Alexiad*, 343. F. Chalandon, S. Runciman, W. B. McQueen, and J. Shepard accept Anna's testimony. See F. Chalandon, *Essai sur le Règne d'Alexis I^er^ Comnène (1081-1118)* (Paris, 1900), 200-3; Runciman, 1951, I, 224; McQueen, 1986, 454; Shepard, 1988, 193-7, 270-6. R. B. Yewdale, and R.-J. Lilie convincingly argue against Anna's version. See Yewdale, 1924, 59-63; Lilie, 1993, 35-7. R.-J. Lilie argues very persuasively that Tatikios left Antioch in order to arrange for supplies and urge Alexios to spring to the crusaders' assistance. See Lilie, 1993, 34-5. M. Angold, and T. Asbridge also favour the view that Tatikios left Antioch in search of provisions and reinforcements for the siege. See Asbridge, 2004, 179; Angold, 1997, 162.
[286] *Gesta Francorum*, 35.
[287] Ibid.
[288] Ibid., 34.
[289] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 81.
[290] Ibid., 82.
[291] Ibid.
[292] Robert the Monk, *History*, 129.

general as 'a wicked perjurer' (*male perjurus*), who abandoned the crusaders 'fearing for his life'.[293]

Consistent with the above Latin sources, Raymond of Aguilers and Albert of Aachen claim that the motivation behind Tatikios's departure was cowardice. Raymond alleges that Tatikios was 'anxious for an excuse to run away'.[294] Albert recounts that at the beginning of the siege of Antioch, Tatikios 'pitched his tent a little further from the city ... all the time intending to flee'.[295] This is definitely another baseless accusation. In reality, Tatikios's position, facing towards the road to the Iron Bridge and Aleppo, was a vulnerable one to any Turkish counter-attack.[296] Eventually, according to Albert, Tatikios, 'terror-stricken ... had withdrawn in false faith from the allies to that same emperor [Alexios], to carry a message about the promised relief, which he had not done faithfully at all, since he did return to Antioch again'.[297] Likewise, Raymond records that 'under the pretence of joining the army of Alexios, Tatikios broke camp, [and] abandoned his followers'.[298] As most other Western chroniclers, Raymond accuses the Byzantine general of committing 'perjury (*periurio*) and betrayal of friends (*proditione sociorum*) by hastening away in flight'.[299] The chronicler's account concludes that by his action Tatikios not only 'left with God's curse (*maledictione*)' but he also 'brought eternal shame to himself and his men'.[300]

As one might expect, Tatikios does not escape William of Tyre's invective. The historian describes the Byzantine general as 'a wicked (*nequam*) and treacherous (*perfidus*) man, whose slit nostrils were a sign of his evil (*perverse*) mind'.[301] A rhetorical flourish was deemed necessary to complete Tatikios's picture: the Byzantine general 'had joined our leaders, that there might be a goose to cackle loudly among the swans and an evil snake among the eels'.[302] William is even imagining that the crusading leaders 'from the very first, recognised Tatikios's crafty (*subdolam*) and treacherous (*fallacem*) character'.[303] Having already presented Alexios in the worst light, the historian now portrays Tatikios as the emperor's

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[293] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 44-5.
[294] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 37.
[295] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 201.
[296] Shepard, 1988, 269.
[297] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 311-13.
[298] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 37.
[299] Ibid.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 52.
[300] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 52; Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 37.
[301] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 193; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 150.
[302] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 150.
[303] Ibid., 219; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 263.

reliable disciple, whose malevolence was greatly appreciated by his master. According to William, 'the emperor relied greatly (*plurimum*) upon his malice (*malicia*) and unscrupulous duplicity (*perplexa dolositate*)'.[304] Tending to view Alexios with the utmost distrust, the historian claims that Tatikios 'received from his master, through frequent messengers who went back and forth between them, outlines of schemes and deceit (*fraudis*)'.[305] William further agrees with the other chroniclers that Tatikios's departure from Antioch was due to his cowardice. The fact that the general left behind 'his tents and the greater part of his following' was interpreted, or rather misinterpreted, as an evil action 'to conceal his treachery (*fraudem*) and guile (*commentum*) under some show of truth'.[306] William eventually concludes his account of Tatikios by declaring that the Byzantine general, 'a faithless (*infidelis*) and wicked (*nequam*) man', 'deserves to be condemned to everlasting death'.[307]

Although the crusaders eventually captured Antioch on 3 June 1098, the citadel of the city was still held by Shams ad-Daula, Yaghi-Siyan's son. On the very next day, 4 June, the crusaders' situation became desperate, since they found themselves under siege by a relieving force commanded by Kerbogha, the Turkish Atabeg of Mosul. During the following stressful period of twenty-five days, the crusading army was badly affected by desertions, including that of Stephen of Blois.

By early June, Alexios with the bulk of his army had departed from Constantinople and marched to Philomelium to meet John Doukas, who had already recaptured the greater part of western Asia Minor and opened the road to Adalia. In mid-June 1098, the emperor arrived in Philomelium. Anna Komnena stresses that her father 'was ready to march to the aid of the Kelts [the crusaders] in the Antioch region'.[308] The majority of modern historians trusts Anna's testimony.[309] However, others have questioned its reliability arguing that Alexios possibly never intended to advance to Antioch unless the crusaders had first captured and secured the city; thus the emperor would have been able to claim it from them. Taking their

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[304] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 193; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 150.
[305] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 193; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 150.
[306] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 263; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 219.
[307] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 263; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 219.
[308] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 348.
[309] Runciman, 1951, I, 239; Yewdale, 1924, 69-70; Lilie, 1993, 38; Harris, 2003, 68.

argument a step further, these historians support the thesis that from Alexios's viewpoint it was more sensible to hold his ground in Asia Minor.[310]

Whether Alexios intended to march to Antioch is outside our research's scope. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that the emperor never intended to make an immediate move to Antioch, in Latin historical memory the Byzantine ruler was recognised as ready to advance to the city to assist the crusaders. Ralph of Caen records that Alexios 'was hurrying to the aid of the Franks'[311] having with him Byzantine as well as French troops. As said by Albert of Aachen, Alexios, 'the Christian emperor of the Greeks (*Christianus imperator Grecorum*) had arrived at the city of Philomelium with a great company of men and much equipment to assist the pilgrims, as he had promised faithfully when they were joined to him in friendship by an oath and agreed treaty'.[312] The Anonymous, Robert the Monk, and Baldric of Dol also point to this conclusion.[313] Similarly, Guibert of Nogent confirms that Alexios 'had quickly set out in that direction [of Antioch] with many troops'.[314] However, constantly disposed to view Alexios's actions in the most unfavourable terms possible, the chronicler falsely alleges that 'the tyrannical emperor' (*imperator tirannicus*) and 'most greedy prince' (*princeps cupidissimus*) started off marching to Antioch after its capture had been made known to him, 'thinking that he would undoubtedly be given the town by the Franks'.[315]

Albert tells us that Tatikios accompanied Alexios to Philomelium.[316] The Latin chroniclers' bitter diatribe against the Byzantine general thus proves to be unfair. Tatikios appears to have kept his promises. Not only did some provisions come from Byzantine Cyprus where Tatikios had sailed in February,[317] but the army of Alexios had marched to the aid of the crusaders. Nevertheless, the Byzantine army was never to arrive in Antioch. As both the Western sources and Anna Komnena testify, around 20 June, while at Philomelium, the emperor encountered Stephen of Blois and other deserters who had joined up with him.

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[310] France, 1994, 299-302; Asbridge, 2004, 228; Tyerman, 2006, 147. J. Shepard thinks that it is 'an open question whether Alexios led his army to Philomelium to hasten to the crusaders' relief or primarily to consolidate the gains which Doukas had made'. See Shepard, 1996, 126.

[311] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 96.

[312] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 310-11.

[313] *Gesta Francorum*, 63-5; Robert the Monk, *History*, 158-60; Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 71.

[314] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 105.

[315] Ibid.; Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 229.

[316] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 311.

[317] J. France, 'The Departure of Tatikios from the Crusader Army', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 44 (1971), 146; Shepard, 1988, 272.

Stephen painted a gloomy picture of the crusaders' situation in Antioch.[318] Nevertheless, according to Anna, 'the emperor was all the more anxious to hurry to their aid'.[319] This information is corroborated by Ralph of Caen, who records that 'this account at first made him [the emperor] want to press on to provide aid. But he gave this up after being discouraged by the one [i.e. Stephen] who ought to have urged him on'.[320]

Being constantly suspicious of Alexios, Guibert goes as far as imagining that, when the emperor listened to Stephen's report of the crusader's position in Antioch, 'this most perfidious (*perfidissimus*) [emperor] was undoubtedly pleased with himself, because he had heard that those whom he hated no less than the Turks had been killed'.[321] In sharp contrast to Guibert's allegations, Robert the Monk records that 'on hearing this [i.e. Stephen's report] the emperor was extremely sad (*valde tristis*). He repeated ... to his princes and magistrates what had been said to him ... All were saddened and wept for the death of our men [the crusaders]'.[322] The fact that Robert pictures Alexios and his officials weeping for the death of the crusaders would have struck the chronicler's audience as odd given Robert's tendency to ascribe persistently anti-Latin feelings to the emperor. After all, although *dolosus*, Alexios was not inhuman.

In addition to Stephen's grim report, Anna recounts that there was news that a Seljuk force had been sent to prevent Alexios from advancing to Antioch.[323] The discouraging information eventually led the emperor to turn back to the safety of Constantinople. It is remarkable that Alexios's retreat did not provoke a stream of anti-Alexian abuse by the Latin chroniclers. On the contrary, it was on Stephen of Blois that almost all the blame was put for the emperor's withdrawal and withering scorn was poured by most chroniclers.

Against all the odds, on 28 June 1098 the crusaders finally overwhelmed Kerbogha before the walls of Antioch and the citadel subsequently surrendered. As Baldric reasons, 'had the Emperor Alexios arrived and overcome the Turks, the triumph would have been ascribed to his nation, not to the army of God; it would have been attributed to the multitude of the Greeks

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[318] *Gesta Francorum*, 63; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 96; Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 310-13; Robert the Monk, *History*, 158-9; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 105; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 275-7.
[319] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 349.
[320] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 96.
[321] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 230; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 105. I made a minor amendment to Levine's translation.
[322] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 816; Robert the Monk, *History*, 159. I made a minor amendment to Sweetenham's translation.
[323] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 349.

(*Græcorum multitudini*) not to the valour of the Franks (*Francorum fortitudini*)'.[324] The chronicler invites his audience to regard Alexios's withdrawal as part of the divine plan, 'done according to the orderly arrangement of God ... who ordains everything properly'.[325] William of Tyre elaborates that, according to God's plan, 'those who had toiled faithfully and devotedly under hardships without number should gather in the fruit of their labor and win the title of victory'.[326]

Following its surrender, Antioch should have been restored to Alexios, according to the oaths to the Byzantine emperor. However, that was unfeasible since Alexios's representative, Tatikios, was absent. Furthermore, at the end of May 1098, while the crusading army was still besieging the city, Bohemond had managed to secure the agreement of the other princes except Raymond of Toulouse to surrender the city to him unless the Byzantine emperor arrived to the crusaders' aid and fulfilled all his obligations.[327] Although Alexios never came to the crusaders' relief in Antioch, the princes still respected their oaths to him. Therefore, they dispatched Hugh of Vermandois to Constantinople in July 1098 - following the surrender of the citadel of Antioch - to invite the Byzantine ruler 'to come and take over the city and fulfil the obligations (*conuentiones*) which he had undertaken towards them'.[328] What the crusaders seem to have considered as Alexios's obligations at this point was to assist them financially, logistically, and militarily to achieve their ultimate goal, i.e. the capture of Jerusalem.

At the end of July 1098, Hugh of Vermandois spoke with Alexios and communicated the crusading leader's message to him. In the beginning the emperor did not react at all. As Lilie convincingly argues, Alexios possibly considered it very dangerous to leave Constantinople with his entire army once more, to march to Jerusalem and to fight both Seljuks and Egyptians.[329] The emperor did not intend to take such a risk.

Robert the Monk puts his own partisan interpretation on the Byzantine ruler's failure to respond to the crusading leaders' embassy. As he alleges, 'the foxy (*vulpinus*) emperor of Constantinople did not dare to come and receive such a great city [i.e. Antioch]'.[330] The

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[324] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 73.
[325] Ibid.
[326] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 278.
[327] *Gesta Francorum*, 45.
[328] Ibid., 72.
[329] Lilie, 1993, 42.
[330] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 837; Robert the Monk, *History*, 176. I made minor amendments to Sweetenham's translation.

reason, according to Robert, was that the emperor had 'realised full well that he had violated faith (*fidem ... se violasse*) with the Franks both in the oath sworn on the sacraments and in the tokens given and had not kept his promise'.[331] Going even further, the chronicler declares that Alexios had thus appreciated that 'all agreements reached between them [the emperor and the crusading leaders] were void'.[332] Robert's allegations are far from mirroring Alexios's actual assessment and intentions. They reflect how the chronicler would like Alexios to think rather than how the emperor actually thought – the Byzantine ruler and his successors were not prepared to give up their claims over Antioch.[333] Nevertheless, it is significant that up to this point, Robert, as the other chroniclers, had not blamed Alexios for retreating from Philomelium. We saw that, like most of the Latin accounts of Philomelium, Robert's is quite sympathetic to Alexios and reviles Stephen of Blois whose gloomy report resulted in the emperor's retreat. France's thesis that events at Philomelium created 'anti-Byzantine feelings'[334] is not correct. It was the Byzantine ruler's failure to respond to Hugh's embassy that made Robert the Monk reassess Philomelium and see it in a new way: as Alexios's violation of his oath.

From 5 to 18 November, a council was held in the Cathedral of Saint Peter at Antioch to decide the future of the city and plan the renewal of the march to Jerusalem.[335] The matter of Antioch should be settled in order that the march of the army southwards could resume. Bohemond claimed Antioch for himself, while Raymond of Toulouse insisted that the city belonged to Alexios by right. Some modern scholars favour the thesis that most of the princes were in support of giving Antioch to Bohemond.[336] However, a close examination of the evidence does not support this view. Raymond of Aguilers and Albert of Aachen explicitly state that the senior princes, namely Godfrey of Bouillon, Robert of Flanders, and Robert of Normandy, 'did not want to violate the treaty and solemn promise they had made to the emperor of Constantinople'.[337] Only a number of lesser princes and knights appear to have

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[331] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 837; Robert the Monk, *History*, 176.
[332] Robert the Monk, *History*, 176.
[333] For a thoroughgoing study of Byzantine claims over Antioch, see Lilie, 1993.
[334] J. France, 'Byzantium in Western Chronicles before the First Crusade', in *Knighthoods of Christ. Essays on the History of the Crusades and the Knights Templar, Presented to Malcolm Barber*, ed. Norman Housley (Aldershot, 2007), 6, 15.
[335] Lock, 2006, 23.
[336] Ibid.; Tyerman, 2006, 149.
[337] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 340-1. Cf. Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 75. The *Gesta Francorum* evidences that the other princes seem not to have taken sides in the quarrel between Raymond and Bohemond. See *Gesta Francorum*, 75-6.

been openly in favour of giving Antioch to Bohemond.[338] Their growing disappointment and resentment against Alexios was expressed during the November council. According to Raymond of Aguilers, they declared that 'Alexios will not come; remember he fled when he heard Kerbogha besieged us, because he had no confidence in his strength or his huge army. Shall we await him longer? Certainly, he, who forced our brothers and those coming to God's aid to retreat, will not come to support us'.[339]

By November, the mounting displeasure with Alexios actively shaped the way a number of the crusaders remembered and interpreted his withdrawal from Philomelium. The emperor was now reproved for fleeing and was also accused of forcing the Westerners who followed him to retreat. France's view that when 'the crusading leaders ... learned of Philomelium ... real hostility to Alexios emerged'[340] as well as Tyerman's assertion that Alexios's 'withdrawal, when known by the army at Antioch, was interpreted as a cowardly abandonment of his allies' and 'inexplicable treachery'[341] are extreme, overgeneralised, and unsupported by the evidence. It was Alexios's failure to respond to Hugh's embassy that made a number of princes, yet *not* the senior leaders, re-evaluate the incident in Philomelium and see it in a new, negative light.

It should be mentioned at this point that, in contrast to the evidence from the *Gesta Francorum*, Albert of Aachen recounts that the purpose of Hugh's embassy to Alexios was 'to find out from him the reason why he had acted so wickedly (*impie*) towards the people of God, and why when they were in such great difficulty [in Antioch] the emperor had failed to produce the assistance he had promised'.[342] According to Albert, the aim of the embassy was further 'to point out to that same emperor that the princes of the army were released from any promise or oath because at the prompting of fearful and fugitive men he lied about all the things he had promised'.[343] No reference is made to the real purpose of Hugh's embassy.

Although inaccurate,[344] the testimony of Albert is worthy of attention, since, as I would suggest, it gives us a rank-and-file view of Hugh's embassy. Albert's informants on this

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[338] In Raymond of Aguilers's words, 'some of the holders of castles and rents in the environs of Antioch'. Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 74.
[339] Ibid., 74.
[340] France, 2007, 15.
[341] Tyerman, 2006, 120, 147.
[342] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 340-1.
[343] Ibid., 340-3.
[344] There are two compelling arguments against Albert's testimony. First, news of Alexios's encounter with Stephen of Blois and his withdrawal from Philomelium must have reached the crusaders in Antioch *after* Hugh left the city. See France, 1994, 299. Secondly, Albert contradicts himself by stating a few lines earlier that the

occasion must have been crusaders in the ranks of the army, who were aware of Hugh's embassy to Alexios, but not of its purpose. Having never seen Alexios arriving to claim Antioch from July until November - as he had done earlier with Nicaea - and with the hindsight that Bohemond became the master of the city, a number of crusaders in the ranks, where speculation flourished and gossip flowed free, must have logically assumed that the purpose of Hugh's embassy to the Byzantine court was to renounce the crusaders' alliance with the emperor. The reason, as they seem to have naturally concluded, was that with his withdrawal from Philomelium and his failure to assist the besieged crusaders, Alexios had broken his promises and thus the crusaders were released from their oaths.

Even after the negotiations of November, a solution to the dispute over Antioch was nowhere in sight. However, the pressure of the crusading masses forced the leaders to an uneasy peace, and subsequently the crusaders besieged Marrat, which was sacked on 12 December. As the conflict between Bohemond and Raymond intensified, the Norman returned to Antioch, from where he drove the last of Raymond's men, while Raymond, accompanied by Robert of Normandy and Tancred, marched south from Marrat. After capturing the fortification of Hisn al-Akras, they laid siege to Arqua in mid-February. About 14 March, they were joined by Robert of Flanders and Godfrey of Bouillon.[345]

In March 1099 an imperial embassy was finally dispatched to Antioch to require Bohemond to restore the city to Alexios, but the Norman leader rejected the demand. Then the envoys travelled southwards and, at the beginning of April, arrived before the besieged Arqua. The Byzantine envoys made complaints against 'Bohemond's possession of Antioch in contradiction of oaths made to the Basileus',[346] and strove to convince the princes to wait for Alexios to arrive by the end of July 'so that he could journey with them to Jerusalem'.[347] As an enticement, the envoys promised 'large sums of gold and silver'.[348]

The Byzantine ambassadors' proposal immediately divided the princes and knights. *Multi* (many) - the most prominent amongst them being Raymond of Toulouse - favoured waiting for the emperor.[349] In order to support their view, they advanced four arguments: first, they 'shall have his gifts'; secondly, the emperor's 'presence will assure trade by land and sea';

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senior princes 'did not want to violate the treaty and solemn promise they had made to the emperor of Constantinople'. See Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 340-1.

[345] Asbridge, 2004, 258-94; Tyerman, 2006, 149-52.

[346] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 105.

[347] Ibid.

[348] Ibid.

[349] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 264.

thirdly, the crusaders 'shall be united under his leadership'; and lastly, the 'crusaders, broken by long and constant adversities, would, if they reached Jerusalem, prefer to return to their homes as soon as they had seen its walls'.[350] In this case, the Christian empire of the East, the Byzantine Empire, would be the only power upon which the crusaders could rely for the safeguard of their conquests. Thus the maintenance of friendly relations with the emperor was essential.[351] The strength of these arguments is indisputable. Of critical importance to our study is the fact that, even at this stage, there were still *multi* crusaders who could trust Alexios.

However, the confidence of *alii* crusading leaders and knights in the Byzantine emperor had been seriously undermined. According to Raymond of Aguilers, they declared: 'the emperor has always harmed, deceived, and connived against us ... Let those he has often offended by words and acts beware of vain trust in him. Let us renew our march to Jerusalem, place our trust in Christ ... who has ... shielded us from the deeds and deceits (*fraudes*) of Alexios'.[352] Their statement is extreme. The crusaders were possibly justified to doubt Alexios and feel that he had to a great extent failed to fulfill his obligations towards them. However, it was a wild exaggeration to maintain that the emperor had harmed the crusaders and had conspired against them. It is more than likely that this accusation was never made by the leaders and knights, but was put into their mouths by the prejudiced chronicler Raymond of Aguilers, who constantly tends to present Alexios as an enemy of the crusade.

To the Byzantine ambassadors' protestations that 'contrary to the terms of the agreement and the oath of fealty which he had taken, he [Bohemond] was presuming to retain possession of Antioch', William of Tyre makes the leaders respond that Alexios 'had been the first to violate the terms agreed upon'.[353] According to the historian, the crusading princes declared that the emperor 'had fraudulently neglected to fulfil' both terms of the treaty, i.e. to follow the crusaders with his army and provide supplies.[354] 'Hence, it was only right that he should suffer the loss of whatever might be due to him under the terms of the treaty, for it would be unfair that faith be kept with one who tried to act contrary to the pact'.[355] As in the case of Nicaea, Alexios is once more portrayed as oath-breaker by William who uses the crusading

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[350] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 106.
[351] Lilie, 1993, 50.
[352] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 265-6; Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 106.
[353] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 327.
[354] Ibid.
[355] Ibid.

leaders as a vehicle for his propaganda. By painting the Byzantine ruler as a perjurer, the historian becomes an apologist for the creation of the principality of Antioch in defiance of the crusading princes' oaths to Alexios.

Those in support of rejection of the Byzantine ambassadors' proposal finally predominated – the fact that they also had the backing of the ordinary crusaders who insisted upon marching on Jerusalem was of critical importance. The crusaders raised the siege of Arqa and marched southwards. On 7 June 1099, they reached Jerusalem. The city fell to their hands on 15 July 1099. On 22 July Godfrey of Bouillon was elected Advocate of the Holy Sepulchre. At Ascalon, on 12 August 1099, the crusaders overpowered a relief force under the Vizier of Egypt Al-Afdal. Raymond of Aguilers alleges that after the battle of Ascalon the crusaders found Alexios's correspondence with the sultan of Egypt in the Egyptian camp. The emperor's letters purportedly disclosed why the Egyptians had rejected the crusaders' earlier proposals about Jerusalem: the sultan 'knew that our [the crusading] army was small and that the emperor [Alexios] plotted our destruction'.[356] Although some scholars have taken Raymond's report at face value,[357] Lilie has convincingly challenged its credibility.[358] Nevertheless, the *mere* fact that Raymond of Aguilers accuses Alexios of plotting with the Egyptian sultan to exterminate the crusaders exposes the extent of certain crusaders' deep distrust and suspicion of the Byzantine emperor. As early as in the course of the First Crusade, a number of Westerners, susceptible to conspiracy theories of powerful and treacherous enemies, were imagining the Byzantine ruler as conspiring with the 'infidels' against the crusaders.

The Crusade of 1101[359]

In December 1100 Pope Paschal II (1099-1118) addressed an encyclical to the clergy of France directing them to preach a new crusade to assist the Christians now occupying the Holy Land. The pope further threatened to excommunicate those who had not yet fulfilled their

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[356] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 210; Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 90. '*imperator Alexius usque ad mortem nobis inimicabatur*'.
[357] Runciman, 1951, I, 273.
[358] Lilie, 1993, 57-9.
[359] J. L. Cate, 'The Crusade of 1101', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 1 (Madison; London, 1969), 343-67; Runciman, 1951, II, 18-31; Riley-Smith, 2005, 44-6; J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (London, 1986), 120-34; Lock, 2006, 142-4; Angold, 1997, 163; Tyerman, 2006, 170-5; Madden, 2005, 40-1; A. Mulinder, 'Crusade of 1101', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 1 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 304-7.

crusading vows taken earlier as well as those who had deserted during the crusade. The preaching of a new crusade and the spread of the news of the success of the First Crusade in Western Europe led thousands of men and women in France, Italy and Germany to take the cross. Three armies were to congregate in Constantinople and march to Syria.

The Franco-Lombard Army

The first army under Anselm, archbishop of Milan, and Albert, count of Biandrate, reached Constantinople in late February 1101. Upon entering Byzantine territory, the crusaders had dispatched envoys to Alexios, 'asking that by his favour ... they might buy necessary provisions in ... his kingdom'.[360] The emperor 'granted everything they asked, but on this condition ... that so great an assembly would not by the use of any violence destroy those places which were under his jurisdiction'.[361] Nevertheless, the crusaders' passage through Byzantine lands had been accompanied by plundering and disorder. Albert of Aachen denounces the crusaders' conduct: they 'did not listen to the leaders and princes of the army, but plundered everything without restraint or reason, without offering anything of their own to the Bulgars and Greeks in exchange, ravaging their cattle and fowls ... They even violated chapels of the pious (*pius*) emperor himself in the aforesaid places and towns, on account of their desire for the things which had been hidden in them'.[362] Even later, during their two-month stay outside Constantinople, the crusaders, always according to a critical Albert, 'provoked the emperor himself to hatred and anger (*ad odium et iram*) by many injuries (*plurimis iniuriis*), as they had done all along. The emperor, who was frequently annoyed by their many harmful deeds (*plurimis iniuriis*), was fearful lest ... they would attack and wage war on the city of Constantinople'.[363]

An alarmed Alexios attempted to ferry the crusaders across the Bosporus. At their refusal to cross the strait, the emperor withdrew market privileges. In response, the crusaders attacked the imperial palace of Blachernae, where they killed a pet lion and a relative of Alexios.[364] The riot finally came to an end after the crusading leaders' intervention. As Albert of Aachen relates, the emperor 'with all the graciousness (*beniuolentia*) of his heart forgave the pilgrims

[360] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 587.
[361] Ibid.
[362] Ibid., 589.
[363] Ibid, 588-91.
[364] Ibid., 591.

everything they had done to him'.[365] The Bosporus crossing eventually took place in late April. The crusaders pitched camp at Nicomedia, where they were joined by some German and French contingents in May. The French forces were led by Stephen of Blois and noblemen from Burgundy, and the German by Conrad, marshal of the German Emperor Henry IV (1056-1106). According to Albert, upon arrival in Constantinople, Conrad 'found favour in his [Alexios's] eyes, being preferred to all others and honoured with splendid gifts'.[366]

At the crusaders' request, the Byzantine general Tsitas and Raymond of Toulouse, who had been in Constantinople since September 1100, were charged with acting as advisers to the crusading army. Moreover, the emperor provided the crusaders with a force of five hundred Turcopoles to function as guides. In June 1101 the crusaders decided not to await the arrival of the other armies as Alexios had advised. Besides, while Raymond of Toulouse and Stephen of Blois made every effort to convince them to follow the route of 1097, the crusaders insisted on invading Pontus in order to release Bohemond, who had been taken prisoner by Malik-Ghazi ibn-Danishmend in August 1100.

Leaving Nikomedia around 9 June, the crusaders set off for Ankara, which they captured on 23 June. They restored the city to the Byzantines in accordance with their oath to Alexios. Then they turned north-east to Gangra and thence east. In early August the crusade was annihilated by a Turkish army. Only a few of its leaders escaped and returned to Constantinople, where, as Albert of Aachen informs us, the emperor 'graciously received' them and 'took pity of all, and those who had been plundered and were empty-handed of all riches he relieved with splendid gifts'.[367]

Albert reports that, when on Easter Sunday, 6 April 1102, remnants of the Crusade of 1101 and other Latin settlers of *Outremer* gathered in Jerusalem to celebrate the Resurrection, they advised Baldwin of Boulogne, who had succeeded his brother as King Baldwin I of Jerusalem,

> that in the most humble way he could, and with mild entreaties, he should appeal to the emperor of Constantinople about the Christians' miseries, that is to say, the emperor should stop ruining and betraying Christians (*a perditione et a traditione Christianorum cessaret*), should assist the church in Jerusalem, should not listen to

[365] Ibid., 592-3.
[366] Ibid., 593.
[367] Ibid., 617.

> Turks and Saracens, and should not refuse to allow fully and faithfully all the trade in provisions from the islands and districts of his kingdom to Jerusalem.[368]

As Albert explains, the crusaders counselled Baldwin to request these things because, in fact,

> there was a rumour among the Christian people that on the secret and treacherous advice (*occultis et perfidies consiliis*) of the emperor himself the army of Lombards had been led by Count Raymond and the Turcopole soldiers through the deserts and out-of-the-way places and waste lands of Paphlagonia so that they could easily be overcome by the Turks there, worn out as they were by hunger and thirst, and killed.[369]

The rumour that Alexios had betrayed the Lombards seems to have gained wide currency. When, however, Baldwin finally dispatched an embassy to Alexios 'to confirm their treaty (*foedus*) and friendship (*amicicia*)', the emperor, 'making a solemn oath in God's name, ... absolved himself from all suspicion (*suspicio*) which the Christians held against him with regard to the death of the Lombards, promising that he would show mercy to all from then on, and that he wanted to honour and love King Baldwin'.[370] The rumour that Alexios had orchestrated the destruction of the Lombards' army is also repudiated by Albert of Aachen himself, who documents that,

> in truth, as is reported by truthful and distinguished men (*a ueridicis et nobilibus uiris*), he [Alexios] was not to be blamed for this crime at all, for he frequently warned and informed the army about the wastelands and shortages and Turkish ambushes in the out-of-the-way places of Paphlagonia, and he told them that for these reasons they could not march securely and safely along this route.[371]

Even the strongly anti-Alexian Guibert of Nogent concedes that the Byzantine emperor himself 'truthfully told them [the Lombards] that they did not have enough horsemen to take a route different from that of the first expedition'.[372] However, being adamant, the crusaders requested market privileges as they passed through Byzantine territory and Alexios consented to their request. Ever inclined to interpret Alexios's behaviour in the most negative way possible, Guibert records that, finally, the emperor 'happily agreed to their [the crusaders']

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[368] Ibid., 634-5.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid., 636-7.
[371] Ibid., 634-7.
[372] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 147.

error', because 'he foresaw clearly' that, 'in their insolence, they were in effect bringing about their own ruin'.[373]

The Aquitanian-Bavarian Army

The second army of the Crusade of 1101 under William IX, duke of Aquitaine (1086-1126), and Welf IV, duke of Bavaria (1070-7 and 1096-1101), reached Constantinople in early June 1101. Their passage through the European territories of the Byzantine Empire had been marked by disorder and skirmishes with the Petchenegs who closely policed the crusaders. Ekkehard of Aura, travelling with a German contingent that followed Welf's army, complains bitterly that for twenty days the Petchenegs harassed the crusaders. Disregarding his fellows' disorder, the chronicler protests that the Petchenegs attacked the crusaders from every direction by day, and fell upon their camp by night.[374]

Upon arrival in Constantinople, the leaders of the army were presented with 'very many gifts of necessary provisions and the license to buy supplies'.[375] In return, they took an oath of fealty to Alexios, as the leaders of the First Crusade had done. Subsequently, the princes had daily conferences with the emperor, while their men were deported without delay across the Bosporus. On the eastern shore of the straits, the German crusaders became distrustful of Alexios. As Ekkehard records, 'a rumour appeared that the detested (*invisus*) emperor favoured the Turks rather than the Christians', and, having appraised the crusaders' situation, encouraged the Turks against them with frequent messengers[376] – one should ask himself if the Turks really needed letters and encouragement from Alexios to attack the 'infidel' invaders of their territories. A wave of panic was spread through the German crusaders and pilgrims, who accused Alexios of usurpation of the imperial throne and condemned him as perfidious (*perfidus*). They went even further, imagining that the Byzantine ruler said 'he is causing the Franks to fight the Turks in the same way as dog eats dog'.[377] Consequently, some of the panicked Germans decided to travel to the Holy Land by sea. However, always according to Ekkehard, they heard that Alexios 'had set an ambush for the pilgrims even in the sea, and that

[373] Ibid., 148.
[374] Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolomyta*, 29.
[375] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 617.
[376] Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolomyta*, 30.
[377] Ibid.

he had recently sunk many ships by the same evil means'.[378] A number of those who had already embarked left the ships and decided to travel overland, as was initially planned. Ekkehard relates that 'all abused and cursed Alexios, all tongues called him not emperor but traitor (*traditorem*)'.[379] Ekkehard's account is an eloquent testimony to the extent of the anti-Alexian hysteria and the conspiracy thinking that prevailed among certain crusaders - presumably among those in the ranks of the army rather than the princes. Ekkehard himself, with a substantial portion of the German army, finally decided to travel by ship. Despite the rumours of Alexios's sea ambushes, the crusaders disembarked safely at Jaffa after a journey of six weeks.

The more significant German leaders and the greater part of their army elected to advance with the French. In the middle of July, the crusaders crossed into Asia Minor. Alexios provided them with a force of Turcopoles to act as guides. The Aquitanian-Bavarian army followed the route of the First Crusade. In his account of the journey, Ekkehard grasps the opportunity to revile the Byzantine emperor by reporting that 'the perjurer (*perjurus*) Alexios had devastated those regions, when he did not dare to bring aid, as he had sworn, to our men who besieged Antioch a while ago, being certainly suspicious (*suspectus*) of the Franks so much as of the Turks'.[380] The change in remembrance of the events of Antioch is remarkable. Stephen of Blois's report that deterred Alexios from marching onto Antioch to assist the crusaders was forgotten, and what was remembered was distorted so as to conform with the emperor's negative image.

The Aquitanian-Bavarian army was finally annihilated by Kilij Arslan's army near Heraklea in September 1101. Predictably, Ekkehard blames the Byzantine emperor for the destruction of the crusaders in 'places which were narrow, inaccessible, and uninhabitable, familiar to the enemies, unfamiliar to us [the crusaders], where the machinations of the traitor Alexios (*Alexii traditoris machinamenta*) confined the people of God'.[381] Likewise, in his *Chronica siue Historia de Duabus Ciuitatibus*, Otto of Freising, who drew on Ekkehard, reproaches Alexios for having 'treacherously (*fraudolenter*) exposed them [the Aquitanian-Bavarian crusaders] in narrow passes and cruelly (*crudeliter*) killed almost all of them'.[382]

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[378] Ibid.
[379] Ibid.
[380] Ibid., 31.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 317; Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*, 411.

Ekkehard was not alone in claiming that Alexios encouraged the Turks against the crusaders. The rumours of a conspiracy between the Byzantine ruler and the 'infidels' against the Aquitanian-Bavarian crusaders soon spread in the West creating their own version of events. Guibert of Nogent alleges that before the crusaders had left Constantinople Alexios 'informed the Turks by letters ... [that] "the fattest sheep from France are moving in your direction, led by a foolish shepherd [i.e. William IX of Aquitaine]"'.[383] For his alleged action, the emperor is once again labelled as a *tirannus* as well as a 'most wicked traitor' (*proditor nequissimus*) and the 'most treacherous of men' (*perfidissimus hominum*).[384] William of Malmesbury similarly claims that Alexios was behind the Turkish attacks on the crusaders. According to the historian, the emperor 'led William [IX] ... into an ambush set by the Turks and, having stripped him of sixty thousand armed men, left him to escape almost alone'.[385]

The French Army

The third crusading army, led by William of Nevers, arrived in the imperial capital on 14 June 1101. William's route had been by Thessalonica. During his passage through the empire, William had taken care to prevent any theft and pillage under the threat of the death penalty.[386] Upon reaching Constantinople, William 'was graciously and honourably received by the emperor'.[387] Three days after their arrival in the imperial capital, the crusaders were ferried across the strait. They encamped on the Asiatic shore, and remained there a fortnight. As Albert of Aachen relates, during this time, William visited Alexios daily and returned to his camp 'honoured and favoured with no few gifts. The same emperor used often to send to the pilgrims and humble people, to support life, money'.[388] William of Nevers's army finally advanced to Ankara and thence turned south towards Iconium to regain the route of 1097. After his failure to capture Iconium, William moved on to Heraklea where his army was also destroyed by the Turks.

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[383] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 147.
[384] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 313.
[385] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta*, I, 611.
[386] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 619.
[387] Ibid.
[388] Ibid.

The Crusade of 1101: from Rumours to Tales and 'New Versions of Events'

The conspiracy theories according to which Alexios had betrayed the Crusade of 1101 to the Turks proved particularly appealing to Westerners who needed an explanation for the disaster of the Crusade of 1101 only two years after the successful outcome of the First Crusade. The conspiracy rumours circulated widely, stirring up the imagination of the Westerners. Having been eagerly accepted as true, the rumours subsequently experienced major embellishments, generating fanciful accounts of the Crusade of 1101. A highly fictitious account of the doomed crusade is found in the work of Orderic Vitalis. Although the account is inaccurate, its importance should not be diminished, since it provides us with ample evidence to examine Western remembrance of the Crusade of 1101 and, especially, of Alexios's role in it.

Orderic fails to distinguish the three different expeditions of the Crusade of 1101 thus creating the impression that a single army marched into Asia Minor. The historian recounts that Alexios 'lavished huge gifts on the leaders'[389] once they arrived in the imperial capital and then conveyed them into Cappadocia [*sic*]. However, having appreciated how dangerous it would be to traverse Asia Minor without an adviser, the princes dispatched envoys to Alexios to request that Raymond of Toulouse be sent to them to act as their leader. Always according to Orderic's account, once the emperor, at Raymond's request, rejected the leaders' demand, William IX of Aquitaine incited the other crusaders to arm themselves and tenaciously besiege Constantinople until they had 'either slain the perfidious (*perfidum*) emperor or else extorted by force his unwilling consent to ... [the crusaders'] demands'.[390] The duke of Aquitaine is further quoted as proclaiming that by killing Alexios the crusaders would 'offer a sacrifice acceptable to God' since the emperor 'has destroyed countless thousands of the faithful by his deceits (*fraudulentiis*)'.[391] Although fictitious, Orderic's story provides a revealing insight into the extent of Alexios's demonisation: the Byzantine emperor was not only unwilling to assist the crusaders, but, allegedly, he also positively attempted, with much success, to destroy them. Nevertheless, these accusations against Alexios were not taken seriously by all Westerners. Orderic's story has Stephen of Blois – remember the count's letter to his wife in which he extols Alexios - and *alii modesti barones* neither subscribing to William IX's opinion of the Byzantine ruler nor agreeing with his proposal to attack Constantinople, but 'reasonably

[389] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, V, 327.
[390] Ibid., 331.
[391] Ibid., 330-1.

(*rationabiliter*) challenge it [the duce's proclamation] by putting forward arguments of sound truth (*sinceræ ueritatis*)'.[392]

The counsels of the *modesti barones* fell on deaf ears. William IX with his men laid siege to Constantinople. Alexios defended the city walls with 'three fierce lions and seven leopards' instead of 'human force',[393] a choice that causes Orderic's deprecating comments. The crusaders eventually defeated the wild animals, and Alexios dispatched envoys in order to conciliate and convince them to abandon the attack on Constantinople. The Westerners withdrew and finally returned to Cappadocia, after the emperor had been bound under oath to send them Raymond of Toulouse and a force of Turcopoles. Obviously, the attack by the Lombard army on the imperial palace of Blachernae and the killing of a pet lion of the emperor offered the background material for this tale – a tale originating in returning crusaders' oral accounts and rooted in Western imaginative ignorance.

It should not go unnoticed that Orderic himself strongly disapproves of the crusaders' attack on Constantinople. He casts William IX as a *proteruus dux* ('impudence duce') and condemns his *iuuenilis impudentia*.[394] The chronicler portrays Alexios as denouncing the *insolentia Francorum*, which 'dared to attack ... the imperial city which is the capital of the East (*caput orientis*)' and 'violated the authority of the holy Empire' (*celsitudinem sancti imperii uiolauit*).[395] Similarly, Orderic has Raymond be 'deeply grieved ... for the injury done to the holy empire (*sancto imperio*)' and decry the *nefaria temeritas* of the insolent (*improbi*) crusaders.[396] By putting into the mouths of Alexios and Raymond such discourses as he himself deemed to be appropriate, Orderic not only expresses his disapproval of the crusaders' attack on the Byzantine capital, but also reveals his view of the Byzantine Empire as *sanctum imperium* and of the *regia urbs*, i.e. Constantinople, as *caput orientis*.

Orderic's story includes the most elaborate synthesis of the alleged conspiracy between Alexios and the Turks against the Crusade of 1101, a conspiracy that provokes the chronicler's most scathing remarks about the Byzantine ruler. According to it, Alexios sent ships loaded with tarterons and ordered them to be distributed to the crusaders. By doing so, Alexios, 'the crafty investigator (*vafer explorator*)' to use Orderic's language, wanted to reckon up the

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[392] Ibid. I made some changes in Chibnall's translation.
[393] Ibid.
[394] Ibid.
[395] Ibid., 332-3. I made some amendments to Chibnall's translation.
[396] Ibid.

numbers of crusaders.[397] The pilgrims 'eagerly accepted the emperor's gifts, ignorant of the deceit (*dolum*) and evil machinations (*uersutasque malignitates*) of this worst of traitors (*pessimi traditoris*)'.[398] Subsequently, Alexios 'sent an estimate of their numbers to the Danishmend and Kilij-Arslan and other Turkish princes, and advised them to gather the forces of the whole pagan world and compel them to give battle in Paphlagonia'.[399] The crusaders were eventually overpowered. Raymond of Toulouse and the Turcopoles returned to Constantinople where, according to Orderic, 'they greatly delighted the emperor with their account of the tragic fate of the Christians'.[400] According to Orderic's elaborate conspiracy theory, after their triumph, the Turks 'restored in full to the emperor the great number of tarterons that he had deceitfully given to the Christians under pretence of kindness. They also sent to him half the plunder they had taken from the conquered enemy'.[401] Orderic's concluding remarks are highly critical of Alexios: 'so the perfidious traitor (*perfidus traditor*) made a bargain with the Turks and in this way sold the faithful to the infidel. Receiving a great quantity of tarterons as the price of his betrayal (*proditionis*) in exchange for the blood of the Christians, he gloried in his folly'.[402]

Despite several Western chroniclers' allegations that Alexios was to blame for the annihilation of the Crusade of 1101, the real causes of the catastrophe were others. Since several armies failed to keep the rendezvous at Constantinople, they had to march separately through Turkish territory and thus were more vulnerable to enemy attacks. The Turkish princes who had been divided and thus weaker at the time of the First Crusade were now in alliance. The leaders of the crusade were inadequate, and lacked knowledge of the enemy territory and Turkish tactics.[403] As Cate points out, 'the crusaders of 1101 had no organisation, no system, no luck'.[404] Although Alexios had provided assistance to the crusaders, and as concerns the first army more specifically, he had tried in vain to persuade its leaders to follow the route of 1097 and not to invade Pontus, he was, finally, unfairly made a scapegoat for the disaster by many Latins receptive to conspiracy theories. After all, Alexios had no reasons to sabotage the Crusade of 1101. He had nothing to gain from its failure. On the contrary, since

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[397] Ibid., 334-5.
[398] Ibid.
[399] Ibid.
[400] Ibid., 339.
[401] Ibid.
[402] Ibid., 338-9. I made an amendment to Chibnall's translation.
[403] Cate, 1969, 367.
[404] Ibid.

he had secured the loyalty of its leaders, he would have certainly profited from a successful outcome of the crusade as he had done by the achievements of the First Crusade.

Although Alexios cannot be held responsible for the destruction of the armies of 1101, starting at the beginning of the twelfth century, Latin historians participated in the process of transmitting and legitimising the myth that the Byzantine emperor and the Turks were in league against the Crusade of 1101. Writing several decades after the ill-fated expedition, William of Tyre records that, when the leaders of the crusading armies had arrived in Constantinople, Alexios 'showered them liberally with rich gifts'.[405] However, as the historian alleges, the emperor 'meant to do them [the crusaders] harm'.[406] In an attempt to rationalise Alexios's purportedly wicked intentions, William claims that the emperor 'envied the success of the Christians'.[407] As Ekkehard and Guibert, William asserts that Alexios 'kept sending emissaries to the Turks, begging them to destroy the pilgrims. By numerous letters as well as by word of mouth through these messengers, he informed the Turks of the pilgrims' approach and admonished them in advance that for their own protection they ought not to suffer this large company to pass freely'.[408] The historian concludes by drawing a parallel between the Byzantine emperor and the scorpion 'which when met face to face is harmless, but the tail of which is armed with a poisonous sting'.[409]

Although the allegations of Alexios's collusion with the Turks are baseless, they take on great significance when investigated in the context of conspiracy theories blaming Byzantine rulers for secretly allying with the 'infidels' against the crusaders. As examined, these conspiracy theories began emerging already during the First Crusade, and more specifically after the battle at Ascalon, where, according to Raymond of Aguilers's allegations, the crusaders found Alexios's correspondence with the sultan of Egypt. However, although there is only one reference to conspiracy relating to the First Crusade and in only one source, the references concerning the Crusade of 1101 obviously multiply.

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[405] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 432.
[406] Ibid.
[407] Ibid.
[408] Ibid.
[409] Ibid.

The Remnants of the Crusade of 1101

Survivors from the several expeditions of the Crusade of 1101 eventually assembled in Antioch and by the end of February 1102 the newly-formed army was ready to march southward. The crusaders attacked Tortosa and after a short siege the town was captured and given to Raymond. The capture of Tortosa was the only achievement of the crusade. Of the thousands who had departed from Western Europe only a few hundred arrived in Jerusalem on 31 March.

Several of the survivors of the Crusade of 1101 fought at the side of Baldwin I at the battle of Ramla on 17 May 1102, where the crusaders were overwhelmed by a Fatimid army. A number of crusading leaders and many knights were taken captives and were led to Cairo in Egypt. Three years later they were set free through Alexios's intervention. According to Anna Komnena, a Byzantine official was sent with 'sums of money' and a letter from Alexios to the 'Babylonian',[410] i.e. the Fatimid caliph or the vizier who ruled in his name. In his letter, the emperor 'demanded the release of the counts and promised many favours if they were set free from their bonds and allowed to go'.[411] As soon as he received Alexios's message, the Fatimid released the prisoners and sent them to Constantinople. At the imperial capital, as Anna tells us, 'they were at once treated with much kindness; money was given them; all kinds of raiment were provided for them; they were invited to the baths and in every way attempts were made to ensure their recovery'.[412] Subsequently, the crusading knights were offered the choice to stay in Constantinople or to go away. After they stayed in the imperial capital for a while, Alexios 'presented the ... counts with magnificent presents and sent them home'.[413]

Conrad, the marshal of Henry IV, and Arpin of Bourges, a French knight, were amongst the Westerners who were set free from Egyptian captivity through Alexios's intervention. According to Albert of Aachen, Alexios, at the request of Henry IV, sent an embassy to the Fatimid caliph to secure Conrad's release. Conrad 'was brought forth from prison and fetters and on account of love and mutual obligation [between the Byzantine emperor and the caliph] was restored to Alexios the great king of the Greeks (*regi magno Grecorum*). King Alexios rejoiced greatly to receive Conrad alive and unharmed, and he honoured him with splendid

[410] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 370.
[411] Ibid.
[412] Ibid.
[413] Ibid., 371.

gifts and sent him back to Henry'.[414] Orderic Vitalis records that Arpin of Bourges sent a message to Alexios requesting of him 'to intercede with the emir to free him from the sufferings of captivity'.[415] Upon receiving the message, Alexios 'felt great compassion for the noble Frenchman',[416] and commanded his release. Arpin was freed and sent to Constantinople. The knight 'after receiving a reward from him [Alexios I] returned to France'.[417] The Byzantine emperor turned out to be the saviour and benefactor of several Western nobles rather than a 'scorpion'.

Bohemond's 'Crusade'[418]

Bohemond in the West and his 'Anti-Alexian' Propaganda Campaign

In March 1099 an imperial delegation was sent to Antioch requiring Bohemond to restore the city to Alexios. The Norman leader rejected the demand. In early 1100, a Byzantine army was sent to recover the ports of Cilicia and northern Syria from Bohemond, and thus isolate Antioch. In mid-August 1100, Bohemond was taken captive by the Danishmend Turks in the city of Melitene. He was only ransomed three years later, in May 1103. In the autumn of 1103, Alexios dispatched another expedition to northern Syria after reiterating demands for the return of Antioch. Bohemond came to regard the Byzantine emperor as his major threat in the East. Thus, in August 1104, having left Tancred in charge of Antioch, he sailed for Western Europe to prepare the invasion of Byzantine Albania.

The majority of modern scholars, including Yewdale,[419] Runciman,[420] Angold,[421] McQueen,[422] Laiou,[423] and Edgington[424] accept that, in Rome, the Norman leader succeeded in

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[414] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 755.
[415] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, V, 351.
[416] Ibid.
[417] Ibid., 353.
[418] Yewdale, 1924, 106-34; Runciman, 1951, II, 46-51; H. S. Fink, 'The Foundation of the Latin States, 1099-1118', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 1 (Madison; London, 1969), 390-2; J. G. Rowe, 'Paschal II, Bohemund of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire', *Bulletin of John Rylands Library*, 49 (1966), 165-202; McQueen, 1986, 458-67; Lock, 2006, 142-4; Angold, 1997, 163-4; Harris, 2003, 78-80; Riley-Smith, 2005, 117-19; Tyerman, 2006, 193, 261-3.
[419] Yewdale, 1924, 107-8.
[420] Runciman, 1951, II, 48.
[421] Angold, 1997, 164.
[422] McQueen, 1986, 458-63.
[423] Laiou, 2005, 18.

receiving the support of Pope Paschal II (1099-1118) for a crusade against the Byzantine emperor. However, Rowe has very convincingly argued, despite McQueen's protestation to the contrary, that Bohemond had deceived Paschal into sanctioning what was ostensibly a crusade against the Muslims, which the Norman leader himself then turned against Alexios.[425]

During his tour through Italy and France, Bohemond, the most heroic figure of the First Crusade, was given an enthusiastic welcome wherever he went. He travelled as far as Flanders and the south-western part of France. The Norman leader fully exploited the crowds' fervent admiration for him to get their support for a crusade to Jerusalem via an attack on Alexios. While in France, Bohemond succeeded in arranging a marriage with Constance, daughter of the French King Philip I (1060-1108). The marriage was celebrated at Chartres, where a great crowd gathered to attend the ceremony; 'the king of France attended with a great retinue'.[426] As Orderic relates, Bohemond 'mounted the pulpit ... and there related to the huge throng that had assembled all his deeds and adventures, urged all who bore arms to attack the Emperor [Alexios I] with him, and promised his chosen adjutants wealthy towns and castles'.[427] The speech of the Norman leader had a strong influence on his audience. However, it is significant to underline that, in the minds of those who took the cross, the expedition's primary objective was to provide military aid to the Latins of *Outremer*. The overthrow of Alexios *en route* to the East was a subsidiary matter. As reported by Orderic, 'many were kindled by his [Bohemond's] words ... and set out *on the road for Jerusalem* (*iter in Ierusalem*) like men hastening to a feast'.[428]

Bohemond's propaganda against Alexios seems to have been twofold: first, the Byzantine emperor was accused of usurpation. Alexios had seized the imperial throne in 1182 by deposing the previous emperor, Nikephoros III (1078-81). As already seen, accusations of usurpation of the throne were levelled at Alexios by a number of crusaders in the ranks of the German army of 1101. Similarly, Guibert of Nogent invited his audience to

> note that this emperor had received the purple not by legitimate succession (*non ex legitima successione*), but because he had been one of the officers of the palace ...

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[424] S. Edgington, 'Bohemund I of Antioch', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 1 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 176.
[425] Rowe, 1966, 176-202. Blumenthal subscribes to Rowe's thesis. See U.-R. Blumenthal, 'Paschal II', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 3 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 933.
[426] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 71.
[427] Ibid.
[428] Ibid. Emphasis added.

> Gathering boldness from the men he commanded, he undertook a coup against his own prince. Invading the city of Constantinople, he captured his ruler [Nicephoros III], cruelly deprived him of his eyes [*sic*], and placed him under close guard in a certain town. Then he usurped imperial power entirely without legal right (*totius expers iuris*).[429]

Likewise, William of Tyre recounts that Alexios, 'a wicked (*nequam*) and crafty (*subdolus*) man, ... treacherously (*maliciose*) rebelled against his benefactor [Nicephoros III]; he had driven out his lord and seized the empire and was now presuming to hold it by force'.[430] From a Latin perspective, Alexios was an illegitimate usurper of the imperial throne.

The Westerners conceived that the legitimacy of a potentate derived from his physical descent, and regarded the usurpation of the throne by an outsider as treachery. The rightful ruler was one who came to power on the basis of being his father's son.[431] However, in Byzantium, the hereditary transmission of imperial power was indeed a custom but it was not legally consolidated. The usurpation of the throne by persons with or even without any consanguinity to the reigning dynasty was a frequent phenomenon and was legitimised at the expense of hereditary succession.[432] In Byzantium, an emperor who had been an ordinary man before coming to the throne by force was no less legitimate than an emperor who succeeded to the throne on the strength of being his father's son. Byzantine political ideology was unwilling to recognise the hereditary character of the imperial office.[433] From the time when someone had ascended the Byzantine imperial throne, either by force or by automatic succession, his sovereignty proceeded directly from God.[434] At least, Alexios I had ascended the imperial throne without murdering or mutilating the previous emperor, Nicephoros III, as was usually the norm.

On his tour of France, Bohemond was accompanied by a pretender to the Byzantine throne, allegedly a son of the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV (1068-71), and other eminent Byzantines. As we are informed by Orderic Vitalis, their 'suit against the Emperor Alexios for treacherously (*per proditionem*) depriving them of the dignities of their ancestors

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[429] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 105; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 38.
[430] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 167; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 123.
[431] A. Toynbee, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus and his World* (London, 1973),12-13.
[432] Ibid.; G. Dagron, *Emperor and Priest. The Imperial Office in Byzantium*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge, 2003), 14-5, 37-8, 45; W. Ensslin, 'The Government and Administration of the Byzantine Empire', in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, 4, 2, ed. Joan M. Hussey (Cambridge, 1967), 6; H. St. L. B. Moss, 'The Formation of the East Roman Empire, 330-717', in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, 4, 1, ed. Joan M. Hussey (Cambridge, 1966), 14.
[433] Toynbee, 1973, 12-14; Dagron, 2003, 14-5, 37-8, 45; Ensslin, 1967, 2-6.
[434] Ensslin, 1967, 6-9; Moss, 1966, 14.

(*antecessorum stemmata suorum*) further stirred up the warlike Franks to fury against him'.[435] This information is occasionally forgotten or its significance is minimised by modern scholars, who are thus being led to view Bohemond's propaganda and 'crusade' as 'anti-Byzantine'.[436] The Norman's ostensible aim was to topple his enemy, Alexios, and install a regime in Constantinople that would be friendly to him. Bohemond's propaganda was anti-Alexian, not anti-Byzantine.

The second, and more important, accusation thrown at Alexios was that he was a close ally of the infidels, an enemy of the crusaders, and was responsible for the ill-treatment of pilgrims who passed through his empire on their journey to Jerusalem. As evidenced by our primary sources this must have been the central tenet of Bohemond's propaganda against the Byzantine ruler, and this was certainly what made the greatest impact on the Latins and was remembered by them. The success of the Norman's anti-Alexian propaganda is reflected in the work of Fulcher of Chartres. The chronicler, whose account of the First Crusade is unbiased towards Alexios, employs a completely different tone in his narrative of Bohemond's expedition. As Fulcher records, the Norman leader invaded the Byzantine Empire because Alexios 'at that time was strongly opposed to our people (*genti nostræ valde contrarius*), and by hidden trickery (*fraude clandestina*) or open violence (*violentia manifesta*) thwarted or tyrannised (*erat tyrannus*) over the pilgrims going to Jerusalem by land or sea'.[437]

Other chroniclers, already inclined to regard Alexios unfavourably, employ language similar to that of Fulcher. William of Malmesbury claims that 'Bohemond himself moved against him [Alexios] to avenge wrongs (*iniurias*) suffered by the pilgrims',[438] 'for which he [Alexios] was notorious (*perinfamis*)'.[439] Reporting on Bohemond's journey to the West, Ekkehard of Aura attacks Alexios virulently. He describes the emperor as 'envious (*invidus*) and so far hidden persecutor of the church (*ecclesiæ persecutor*)', who finally 'unsheathed the long-concealed poisonous fury of his perfidy (*perfidiæ*)'.[440] A barrage of accusations against Alexios follows. First, he reconciled himself with the Turks, for whom there had been no hope of ruling in the Orient again, and gave back to them Nicaea, which had been recently regained with much Christian blood. Referring to Alexios's alleged surrender of Nicaea to the Turks,

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[435] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 70-1.
[436] France, 2007, 7.
[437] Fulcher of Chartres. *Historia*, 418; Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 192. I made minor amendments to Ryan's translation.
[438] William, *Gesta Regum*, I, 610-11.
[439] Ibid., 692-3.
[440] Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolomyta*, 37.

Ekkehard exclaims: 'o crime most repulsive'.[441] Nevertheless, despite the chronicler's allegation, Nicaea actually remained under Byzantine control until 1330. Secondly, Alexios was accused of inspiring the king of Egypt against the crusaders with frequent messages. This accusation, which also appears to be false, seems to have been drawn from the account of Raymond of Aguilers, whom Ekkehard had used, reporting on Alexios's letters supposedly found in the Egyptian camp after the battle of Ascalon. The third charge against Alexios is one that occurs frequently in Latin sources: the emperor set up sentries to prevent the transit of the pilgrims by land and sea to Palestine. Finally, the Byzantine sovereign is accused of dispatching a fleet against Antioch which, however, was overwhelmed. A naval battle between the Byzantines and the Normans of Antioch also appears to be a figment of Ekkehard's imagination. The chronicler eventually concludes by reporting Bohemond's reaction to Alexios's 'perfidy': the Norman sailed to the West to muster an army against the 'tyrant'.[442]

Despite being groundless, not to say fictitious, Ekkehard's accusations against the Byzantine emperor are an eloquent testimony to the extent of the anti-Alexian sentiment among certain Occidental circles. Being already ill-disposed towards Alexios and prepared to believe the worst about him, Ekkehard unquestionably accepted Bohemond's propaganda against the Byzantine emperor. Some of Ekkehard's charges were taken at face value and reproduced by later chroniclers. In his *Chronica*, Otto of Freising brands Alexios a 'most treacherous (*perfidissimus*) emperor' who was 'no longer able to conceal the evil scheme (*malitiam*) long before conceived in his heart'.[443] Therefore, he 'most shamefully (*turpissime*) entered upon an alliance (*federatur*) with the Turks ... and most impiously (*impiissime*) delivered over to them Nicaea, which had been won at the cost of the shedding of so much blood of our people'.[444] Otto eventually invites his audience to 'mark the grievous times in which two emperors - one in the East, one in the West - were enemies to God (*Deo contrarii*)'.[445] The Western emperor was Henry IV who died excommunicated in 1106.[446] The emperor in the East was Alexios I. His designation as 'enemy to God' is probably the most offensive we have encountered so far. It is worth noting that the emperor finally came to be

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[441] Ibid.
[442] Ibid., 37-8.
[443] Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 322; Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*, 416.
[444] Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 322; Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*, 416.
[445] Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 322; Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*, 416.
[446] Barber, 2004, 184.

described in the same way the sources of the First Crusade describe the Turks.[447] However, it is also essential to underline that Alexios is not denounced as 'enemy to God' because he was Byzantine or Orthodox. The Latin Catholic Henry was condemned in exactly the same terms as his Byzantine counterpart. Furthermore, the fact that Otto denounces Alexios does not mean that he was 'anti-Byzantine': by this same logic, the German historian should also be labelled as 'anti-German' since he condemns the German emperor.

William of Tyre relates that 'not merely once or twice did he [Alexios] employ ... foul play against the Christians; nay, as often as an opportunity of causing them loss or ruin occurred, he regarded it as a gain for himself'.[448] In an attempt to rationalise Alexios's behaviour, the same historian alleges that the emperor 'in general ... looked upon the advance of the Latins with suspicion and did not suffer their strength to be augmented or their power extended when it was possible to prevent it'.[449] Additionally, William provides his own partisan explanation as to why Alexios 'gave them [the crusaders] kindly answers and showered them abundantly with gifts',[450] when they were in his presence: namely, 'in order that he might more readily deceive them'.[451] Taking his argument one stage further, the historian of *Outremer* claims that Alexios 'thus upheld the proverbial reputation of his nation'.[452] A famous quotation from Virgil's *Aeneid* follows: 'I fear the Greeks even when they bear gifts'.[453] After his rhetorical embellishments, William eventually concludes that 'these wrongs were still fresh in Bohemond's mind'[454] on the eve of his invasion of the Byzantine Empire. From the historian's standpoint, by attacking Alexios, Bohemond was 'to advance the cause of all the Latins'.[455]

Bohemond's Invasion of the Byzantine Empire and his Defeat

Bohemond's army crossed the Adriatic, and landed in Epirus on 9 October 1107. After capturing Avlona, Bohemond's troops laid siege to Dyrrachium. From William of Tyre's point of view, Bohemond was getting ready 'by the help of God, to wipe out the wrongs of the

[447] *Gesta Francorum*, 22, 32.
[448] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 470.
[449] Ibid., 470-1.
[450] Ibid., 470.
[451] Ibid.
[452] Ibid.
[453] Ibid. See also Introduction, 8-9.
[454] Ibid.
[455] Ibid.

Latins'.[456] Despite the alleged divine help, the Norman leader's ambitious plans were met with no success. Almost immediately, the Byzantine fleet cut off Bohemond's communications with southern Italy and thus supplies ceased reaching his army. Bohemond was eventually compelled to be surrendered to the emperor. In September 1108 a treaty was drawn up between Alexios and Bohemond in Devol.[457]

Referring to Bohemond's defeat by Alexios, William of Malmesbury reports that the Norman leader was finally overwhelmed because he was 'deceived by the cunning (*astutia*) of the adroit (*sollers*) emperor'[458] – the language employed to describe the Byzantine ruler is not particularly strong: he is *sollers* rather than *perfidus*. The historian alleges that Alexios deprived Bohemond of his knights by employing two means. The first - and obviously fanciful - one was 'his familiar tricks (*notae artes*) of putting poison (*toxica*) into the streams or on their [the knights'] garments';[459] the exotic myth of Alexios's contaminating garments, already encountered in the account of Albert of Aachen, seems to have stimulated the imagination of the Westerners. According to William, the Byzantine ruler's second means of robbing Bohemond of his generals was 'by binding them [the generals] to himself with presents'.[460] Albert of Aachen and Orderic Vitalis in Book XI of his *Historia Ecclesiastica* provide more information on this issue. Albert records that Guy, William Claret and other leaders of Bohemond's army, 'bribed by the emperor with money and flattery', tried to persuade the Norman prince, offering various pretexts, to abandon the siege of Dyrrachium and seek terms from Alexios.[461] In agreement with Albert, Orderic relates that Bohemond's 'brother Guy and Robert of Montfort ... went over ... to the emperor's side and, dazzled by the huge gifts of money sent by the emperor, ... thwarted the plans of their prince. When ... [Bohemond] had determined to storm the city [Dyrrachium] on a fixed day, they asked for a truce ... offering pretexts of some kind'.[462] Orderic adds that Guy and Robert of Montfort went even further, and 'privately informed the enemy of what measures to take to counter the danger that was imminent'.[463]

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[456] Ibid., 471.
[457] On the so-called Treaty of Devol, see Yewdale, 1924, 127-30; Harris, 2003, 79-80.
[458] William, *Gesta Regum*, I, 692-3.
[459] Ibid., 610-11.
[460] Ibid., 693.
[461] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 759.
[462] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 103.
[463] Ibid.

Apart from those of Bohemond's closest companions who remained in his camp and 'for a long time'[464] acted secretly in Alexios's interests, many of the Norman leader's followers began deserting openly to the emperor, after the Byzantines' blockade and the consequent famine and plague that weakened the invaders. As said by Orderic, 'unable to endure the severe famine, they [Bohemond's followers] withdrew gradually, ... and made peace with the emperor... Many of them accepted large gifts at his hand'.[465] Alexios 'gave them the free choice of remaining to serve under him or going wherever they liked'.[466] In accord with Orderic, Albert relates that Bohemond saw 'that his men had trickled away, that very many had gone over to reinforce the emperor'.[467]

Although Fulcher, Ekkehard, William of Malmesbury, and William of Tyre accepted Bohemond's propaganda that he invaded the Byzantine Empire because Alexios's hindered the pilgrims' journey to Jerusalem, Albert and Orderic, who treat Bohemond's invasion with much more detail, do not seem to have been convinced by the Norman's story or supported his undertaking. While Albert remains relatively impartial, Orderic criticises Bohemond for his invasion of the Byzantine Empire and reveals the real motives behind the Norman's expedition. The chronicler portrays Bohemond's companions as saying to him: 'no hereditary right drew us to this bold enterprise; no prophet roused us with a message from heaven; only lust to rule in the dominions of another induced you to undertake the difficult task and, on our side, greed of gain lured us on to suffer an intolerable burden of toil and peril'.[468] In sharp contradiction to William of Tyre's assertion that the Norman invasion had divine assistance, Orderic, in Book V of his history which was written around seven years before Book XI, relates that 'by the just providence of God the attempt of men greedy to seize the property of their neighbours was brought to nothing, so that the proud army of ambitious men secured

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[464] Ibid.
[465] Ibid.
[466] Ibid.
[467] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 759. William Claret, who, if we are to believe Albert, initially remained in Bohemond's camp and acted secretly in Alexios's interests, finally deserted openly to the emperor. According to Anna, William 'saw that the whole Keltic [Bohemond's] force was being wiped out by famine and plague ... and for his own safety deserted to the emperor with fifty horses ... He was ... rewarded with the title of *nobilissimus* and showered with gifts and favours'. Komnena, *Alexiad*, 417. Although McQueen argues that Guy also deserted to Alexios, the evidence does not sustain this argument. See McQueen, 1986, 464-5. Guy was present in Bohemond's camp until the Treaty of Devol was drawn up. As Anna informs us, when Bohemond departed for the conference with Alexios, Guy guarded the emperor's dignitaries who had been sent to the Norman leader as hostages for his safety. Komnena, *Alexiad*, 420. Furthermore, Orderic records that only on his deathbed, Guy 'openly confessed the treason he had committed, but could never win forgiveness from his brother'. Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 105.
[468] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 103.

none of the things that they had vainly imagined to be within their grasp'.[469] Likewise, in Book XI, the chronicler quotes Bohemond's knights as admitting that 'because God is not mocked and does not overturn justice or destroy what is just, he has lent a favourable ear to the prayers of just men [the Byzantines] who cry out to him against us in Greece and has scattered our armies, weakening them not by war but by famine'.[470]

Orderic was not the only Westerner to denounce Bohemond's expedition. Alexios, who had been well aware of Bohemond's propaganda in the West, immediately took measures to counteract it. Anna relates that, upon hearing of the Norman leaders' accusations against him, the emperor presented lavish gifts to the crusading knights, who had been released from Egyptian captivity through his intervention and were being 'treated with much kindness'[471] in Constantinople, and sent them back to the West. According to the princess, Alexios did so 'for two reasons: they [the knights] were now themselves earnestly looking forward to the homeward voyage, and they would personally refute Bohemond's calumnies against himself'.[472] On arrival in the West, these crusaders 'furnished undeniable evidence against Bohemond. They stigmatised him as a charlatan, incapable of telling the truth ... on many occasions they convicted him to his face and in every quarter denounced him, bringing forward witnesses worthy of credence - themselves'.[473]

The treaty that was drawn up between Alexios and Bohemond in September 1108 in Devol signalled the end of the Norman's plans and career. The pact was incorporated in two documents.[474] The first one, which has been preserved in its entirety in the *Alexiad*, was signed by Bohemond and handed over to Alexios. Under its main provisions, the Norman leader became the liegeman of the emperor and of his son John, and was left in possession of Antioch and some lands nearby. Any other territories which formerly belonged to the Byzantine Empire and had been conquered by Bohemond had to be returned to Alexios. The second document, a chrysobull drawn up by Alexios and given to Bohemond, contained an enumeration of the emperor's grants and concessions to the Norman. Alexios conferred on Bohemond the title of *sebastos* and also agreed to protect the pilgrims and crusaders passing through his empire.

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[469] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, III, 183.
[470] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 103-5.
[471] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 370.
[472] Ibid., 371.
[473] Ibid.
[474] Yewdale, 1924, 127-30.

Fulcher of Chartres highlights Alexios's concessions to Bohemond while minimising the significance of the Norman's oath of homage to the emperor, thus presenting Bohemond's humiliating defeat as a success. The chronicler relates that Alexios 'swearing upon the most precious relics, promised Bohemond that the pilgrims ... would from that day forward be safe and unharmed by land and sea as far as the emperor's power extended, and that no one of them should be seized or maltreated. Bohemond on his part swore to observe peace and loyalty to the emperor in all things'.[475] Fulcher, who wrote in the East, doubtless obtained his information from those who served in Bohemond's army and subsequently proceeded to Jerusalem, where they reported on the Norman's expedition against Alexios to the Latins of *Outremer*, glossing over his humiliating defeat. Alexios's agreeing to protect the pilgrims and the crusaders passing through his empire seems to have been exploited by Bohemond as evidence that the Byzantine ruler had indeed maltreated crusaders in the past. Furthermore, the Norman made the most of Alexios's concession to convince the Latins, including those who had served in his army, that his expedition had successfully achieved its prime target. Bohemond's campaign eventually went down in Latin historiography of *Outremer* as a great accomplishment. Several decades after the event William of Tyre recounted that

> the emperor agreed that thenceforward, in good faith without fraud or evil intent, he would furnish advice and aid to the faithful of Christ who desired to pass to the Orient and would not suffer any impediment to be placed in their way by those whom he was able to control. When these terms had been agreed upon and confirmed by the giving of an oath, Bohemond also promised under solemn oath to observe friendship and fidelity to the emperor forever.[476]

Conclusions

The above detailed study of the image of Alexios Komnenos in twelfth-century crusading historiography aims to answer the main question of this section: *magnificus imperator* or *tyrannus insolens*? Our examination of a wide range of chronicles demonstrates that the majority of Latin historiographers are hostile towards Alexios. First, the Byzantine emperor is vilified by the Anonymous, Raymond of Aguilers, and Ekkehard of Aura, who were eye-witnesses and participants in many of the events they describe. Robert the Monk, Guibert of

[475] Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 193.
[476] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 471-2.

Nogent, and William of Tyre, whose rhetorically sophisticated narratives are heavily dependent on the *Gesta Francorum*, or in William's case on both the *Gesta Francorum* and Raymond of Aguilers's account, are even more hostile towards Alexios, letting loose streams of abuse at the Byzantine sovereign. Predictably, Alexios is also defamed by Ralph of Caen, whose rhetorically inflated work is a panegyric of his lord Tancred, who vigorously opposed the Byzantine emperor's designs on Antioch for a decade. Finally, William of Malmesbury, whose information seems to have derived from oral sources, speaks ill of Alexios.

The Latin chroniclers who are hostile towards Alexios perceived almost every action of the Byzantine emperor as evidence of an unfriendly and treacherous behaviour towards the crusaders: the harshness of the imperial troops of Petchenegs and Turcopoles who had orders to intimidate the crusaders and restrict their movements to the main arteries as they passed through Byzantine lands; Alexios's tenacious demand for an oath of allegiance from each crusading prince - an oath-taking perceived by several Latin chroniclers as unworthy of the leaders and unjust; the fact that the crusading throngs were denied entrance to Constantinople; and the crusaders' swift transfer across the Bosporus once they arrived at the imperial capital. The Latins and their historiography conveniently overlooked the crusaders' indiscipline that led to both ugly clashes with the imperial forces and their immediate transfer across the Bosporus upon arrival in Constantinople. The whole blame was almost always pinned on the Byzantine emperor.

In their attempts to rationalise Alexios's alleged enmity and treachery, the Latin chroniclers concluded that the emperor envied the crusaders and their successes, feared their valour, was suspicious of their strength, and was frightened of loosing his empire to them. For these reasons, from the Latin chroniclers' point of view, Alexios sought to thwart the crusade. Consequently, all the actions of the emperor were interpreted in the worst possible way and were perceived to have had the same aim, i.e. the obstruction of the crusade. Such was certain chroniclers' suspicion of Alexios that they pictured him rejoicing at any disaster that befell the crusaders, especially any defeat that they suffered by the Turks, e.g. annihilation of the 'People's Crusade' and the Crusade of 1101.

The fact that Alexios, after the capture of Nicaea, gave the Turks of the city the choice to sign on in the imperial army increased certain Latins' mistrust of the Byzantine emperor. Alexios was now charged with intending to use the infidels against the Latins. By the end of the First Crusade the first rumours emerged that the Byzantine ruler conspired with the infidels

against the crusaders. Rumours of this kind multiplied in the course and aftermath of the inglorious Crusade of 1101. Alexios was perceived by the Westerners to be a powerful monarch. While the crusaders were in Constantinople, the Byzantine emperor did his best to overawe them and convey his power and wealth. However, a powerful emperor was certainly perceived by the Westerners to have the capacity to shape events and was therefore very likely to be blamed for a catastrophe such as the Crusade of 1101. In addition, the Westerners were prone to believe in conspiracies, and a very influential sovereign like Alexios was certainly liable to be accused of being involved in a complex one.

In addition to the above charges, the Byzantine emperor stood accused of perjury. In the eyes of the anti-Alexian Latin chroniclers, Alexios failed to fulfil his legal obligations as the crusading leaders' feudal lord. The Latins appear to have most bitterly resented the emperor's failure to take over the leadership of the crusade. On the whole, the crusaders had expected much more assistance than that which was offered by a ruler who had presented himself as so powerful and wealthy. However, although Alexios was willing to support the crusaders, he would by no means sacrifice his empire for their expedition. The protection and promotion of the interests of the *Oikoumene* remained the sovereign's primary concern to the Westerners' great disappointment and resentment.

The conventional means of Byzantine diplomacy, which had made a very positive contribution to Alexios's success in persuading the leaders to take the oath of fealty, naturally provoked the unfavourable comments of anti-Alexian authors like Ralph of Caen and William of Tyre. In their rhetorically exuberant accounts, the emperor's words and great generosity are denounced. Alexios's lavish gifts that were distributed abundantly to the leaders were perceived to have been insincere and to have aimed to dazzle them so that the emperor could more readily deceive them.

Besides these accusations, we have encountered charges against the Byzantine sovereign that were rooted in the Westerners' imaginative ignorance. The mythical representation of the powerful Byzantine emperor, alien to the ordinary and profoundly ignorant Westerner, involved Occidental visions of Alexios's poisoning garments and defending his capital with wild animals.

Many of the Latin historiographers hostile towards Alexios were evidently poisoned against the emperor by a single work, the *Gesta Francorum*. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that *not* all Western authors whose account of the First Crusade was based upon the

Gesta Francorum adopt this anti-Alexian attitude. Henry of Huntingdon's account of the First Crusade dismisses in one sentence the crusaders' alleged sufferings through Alexios's perfidy while in the European territories of the Byzantine Empire or in Constantinople. The chronicler only reports that 'when Alexios was emperor at Constantinople, all the nobles [already] mentioned were gathered there with the emperor's consent, which he gave either willingly or by compulsion (*siue uolentis siue obedientis*)'.[477] Henry's hesitation in condemning Alexios evidences that the chronicler did not uncritically accept the accusations made against the Byzantine ruler by the prejudiced author of the *Gesta*.

Several authors, whose works have been examined, are either neutral or in favour of the Byzantine ruler. While Fulcher of Chartres's attitude towards Alexios is neutral, Albert of Aachen is well disposed towards the emperor, whom he describes as *magnificum*, *nominatissimum*, *gloriosum*, *potentissimum*, *pium* and *Christianissimum*. Albert's account paints Alexios as a mighty but at the same time generous, thoughtful, compassionate and merciful ruler. Since Albert compiled his work from oral and written information that he had obtained from surviving witnesses, we can safely infer that the Latin opinion of the Byzantine emperor was not always as negative as it is usually assumed. As regards the third and most under-researched *Gesta*-derivative, the account of Baldric of Dol, although its author relied heavily upon the *Gesta*, he does not echo their ardently anti-Alexian attitude. Unlike the authors of the *Gesta* and the other two *Gesta*-derivatives, Baldric normally chooses to give a matter-of-fact description of the First Crusade, avoiding derogatory comments on Alexios's conduct and not using abusive epithets against the emperor. Given the fact that all the rewriters of the *Gesta* were French Benedictine monks, we could safely draw the conclusion that there was not a consensus of anti-Alexian feeling even within the Benedictine Order.

Evidently, there were Westerners who held Alexios in high esteem. Many of these, especially nobles, had experienced the refined pleasures of the imperial court of Constantinople and were treated with the utmost generosity by the emperor. Stephen of Blois's letter to his wife after the capture of Nicaea conveys the crusading leader's deep reverence for Alexios, the *venerabilis* and *magnus imperator*. During the negotiations before Arqa, upon receiving the imperial message, 'many' of the crusading leaders who still trusted Alexios's word, favoured waiting for the emperor's arrival. In the West, *nobiles viri* absolved Alexios of any blame for the destruction of the Crusade of 1101. The Western knights who had been set

[477] Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia*, 422-3.

free from Egyptian captivity through Alexios's intervention and had been treated with the greatest generosity and thoughtfulness by the emperor in Constantinople, upon returning to the West, took up cudgels on behalf of Alexios and denounced Bohemond and his propaganda.

Orderic Vitalis's *Historia Ecclesiastica* is a paradigm of the divergence of Western opinion of Alexios. Laiou, who drew attention to 'the contradictory portrait of Alexios I' in Orderic's account, rightly advised that the Anglo-Norman author should be 'the barometer'[478] of Western attitude towards the Byzantine ruler. Book IX which extends from the Council of Clermont to the battle of Ascalon is substantially derived from the *Historia Ierosolimitana* of Baldric of Dol. However, while Baldric normally avoids vilifying Alexios, Orderic cannot help but criticise the *dolos* and *nequitiam* of that 'ingenious master of deception', the Byzantine emperor.[479] Orderic's hostility towards the Byzantine emperor reaches its climax in his narrative of the Crusade of 1101 in Book X, for which the chronicler relied on oral sources. Nevertheless, Orderic deplores any attack on the *sanctum imperium*. As examined, the chronicler condemns the assault of the Lombard crusaders on Constantinople in 1101 and, when relating in detail Bohemond's 'Crusade' in Book XI or refering to it briefly in Book V, strongly disapproves of the Norman's expedition against the Byzantine Empire, revealing the real motives behind it and indicating that justice was on the emperor's side. Even more surprisingly, Alexios, who is labelled in Book X as *pessimus traditor*, is described in Book VII as 'a man of great wisdom, merciful to the poor, a brave and illustrious warrior who was genial to his soldiers, open-handed in giving, and a most diligent servant of the divine law ... a man defended and cherished by God'.[480] Orderic evidently drew on both hostile and sympathetic sources towards Alexios. Therefore, his work testifies to the dissenting Western opinion of Alexios. While a number of Latins undoubtedly regarded Alexios as an 'insolent tyrant', in others' eyes, the Byzantine emperor was a 'magnificent emperor'.

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[478] Laiou, 2005, 25.
[479] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, V, 42, 46.
[480] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, IV, 14-17.

The Western View of the Byzantines

The Byzantines in the Latin Accounts Composed in the First Four Decades of the Twelfth Century[481]

Several scholars have labelled the Western historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath as anti-Byzantine or anti-Greek. Cate favours the view that 'most of the Western sources [are] written in an atmosphere unfriendly toward the Greeks'.[482] McQueen advises to 'remember that the Western chroniclers were vehemently anti-Greek'.[483] France argues that 'most of the Latin writers on the First Crusade were in any case hostile to the Byzantines'.[484] Edgington refers to 'the consistently anti-Byzantine narratives of the Latin eye-witness accounts'.[485] Lock is talking of 'anti-Byzantine comments ... amongst the First Crusaders'.[486] Angold maintains that 'the contemporary Western accounts of the First Crusade ... treated Byzantium as a necessary evil'.[487] Runciman suggests that the *Gesta Francorum* reflects 'anti-Greek views';[488] Harris supports the thesis that 'the *Gesta Francorum* ... is characterised by its virulent anti-Byzantine bias';[489] Sweetenham asserts that 'Robert [the Monk] constantly vilifies the Byzantines';[490] and Rowe writes that 'the *Hierosolymita* of Ekkehard still conveys the flavour of Latin hatred for the Greeks in its first burst of strength'.[491]

Our examination of the twelfth-century Latin historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath demonstrated that a large number of historiographers let loose streams of abuse at the Byzantine Emperor Alexios, while almost all of them virulently criticise Tatikios,[492] the imperial representative at the siege of Antioch. This, however, is not sufficient to justify the designation of the Latin historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath as anti-Byzantine

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[481] A slightly amended version of this section is forthcoming. S. Neocleous, 'Is the Contemporary Latin Historiography of the First Crusade and its Aftermath Anti-Byzantine?', in *Papers from the First and Second Postgraduate Forums in Byzantine Studies:* Sailing to Byzantium, *Trinity College Dublin, 16-17 April 2007 and 15-16 May 2008*, ed. Savvas Neocleous (Cambridge Scholars Publishing).
[482] Cate, 1969, 357.
[483] McQueen, 1986, 444.
[484] France, 1971, 137.
[485] Edgington, 1998, 64.
[486] Lock, 2006, 363.
[487] Angold, 1997, 10-11.
[488] Runciman, 1986, 20.
[489] Harris, 2003, 98.
[490] Robert the Monk, *History*, 7.
[491] Rowe, 1966, 170-1.
[492] Tatikios was of Saracen, perhaps Turkish origin, according to Anna. See Komnena, *Alexiad*, 141.

or anti-Greek. In this section, using the historiographical evidence provided by the Latin sources authored in the first four decades of the twelfth century, we examine the Westerners' view of the Byzantines in general in order to determine whether the Latin historiography of the First Crusade is in actual fact anti-Byzantine or merely anti-Alexian.

Christian Fraternity

One of the primary objectives of the First Crusade was the liberation and protection of the Eastern Christians against the Muslims. In all five versions of Pope Urban II's preaching of the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont in 1095, the need to aid the fellow Christians in the East is stressed.[493] Fulcher was possibly an eyewitness to the council.[494] According to his version, the pope urged the Westerners to 'hasten to carry aid to your brethren (*confratres vestri*) dwelling in the East' and warned them that 'reproaches will be charged against you by the Lord Himself if you have not helped those who are counted like yourselves of the Christian faith'.[495] Baldric of Dol may also have been an eyewitness to the council.[496] His version of Urban's preaching is probably the most dramatic among the five. Baldric relates that Urban described to the Westerners 'how, with great hurt and dire sufferings our Christian brothers (*Christiani fratres nostri*), members in Christ, are scourged, oppressed, and injured in Jerusalem, in Antioch, and the other cities of the East'.[497] According to the same chronicler, the pope described the Eastern Christians to the Western as 'your own blood-brothers (*germani fratres vestri*), your companions (*contubernales vestri*), your associates (*couterini vestri*)', explaining that they were both 'sons (*filii*) of the same Christ and the same Church (*Ecclesia*)' and stating dramatically that 'Christian blood, redeemed by the blood of Christ, has been shed, and Christian flesh, akin to the flesh of Christ, has been subjected to unspeakable degradation and servitude'.[498] Eventually, as Baldric reports, Urban declared that the war against Muslims 'is the only warfare that is righteous, for it is charity to risk your life

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[493] D. C. Munro, 'The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont, 1095', *American Historical Review* 11 (1906), 236, 242; Daly, 1960, 49. The five versions of Pope Urban II's preaching are found in the accounts of Fulcher of Chartres, Robert the Monk, Baldric of Dol, Guibert of Nogent, and William of Malmesbury.
[494] Cowdrey, 1970, 177.
[495] Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 65-6; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia*, 323.
[496] Cowdrey, 1970, 177.
[497] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 12; Krey, 1921, 33.
[498] Baldric, *Historia*, 12-13; Krey, 1921, 33.

for your brothers (*pro fratribus*)'.[499] Baldric may well have dramatised the papal speech. However, his version achieves great significance when we examine it in the context of the Christian fellowship. The fact that Baldric, a Latin archbishop, deemed it necessary to emphasise the brotherhood of Western and Eastern Christians is of vital importance to our study.

Urban's stressing of Christian brotherhood at the Council of Clermont found an echo in the hearts of the Westerners, especially of the clergy and nobility, as evidenced by the Western historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath. Guibert of Nogent censures the Westerners of 'the People's Crusade' for their disorderly conduct and pillages at the shores of Bithynia: as the chronicler underlines, 'those who had taken a vow to fight against the pagans fought with brutality against men of our own faith (*contra nostrae fidei homines*), destroying churches everywhere, and stealing the possessions of Christians'.[500] The Byzantines were evidently perceived by the vehemently anti-Alexian Guibert as fellow Christians, people of the same faith as the Westerners.

Raymond of Aguilers relates that when the crusaders of Count Raymond of Toulouse reached the Byzantine Empire, 'we were confident that we were in our land (*patria nostra*), because we believed that Alexios and his followers were our Christian brothers and confederates (*nobis fratres et coadiutores*)'.[501] The crusaders, however, were soon to become disillusioned due to the stern surveillance that the emperor's Petcheneg police imposed upon them.

According to the author of the *Gesta Francorum*, when the Norman expedition crossed from Bari to Epiros in October 1096, Bohemond warned his men 'to be courteous and refrain from plundering that land, which belonged to Christians'.[502] Guibert of Nogent portrays the Norman leader as 'ordering all his men alike who were about to pass through the territory of Christian peoples (*christianas gentes*) to behave peacefully and virtuously, and not to depopulate the land of those for whose rights (*pro suffragio*) they had come'.[503] Baldric of Dol quotes Bohemond as instructing his men: 'we are *Christi milites*: let us restrain rapacious

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[499] Baldric, *Historia*, 15; Krey, 1921, 35.
[500] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 123; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 49. I made minor amendments to Levine's translation.
[501] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, 9-10; Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 18.
[502] *Gesta Francorum*, 8.
[503] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 139; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 58. I made major amendments to Levine's translation.

hands from plundering the homes of Christians ... the land on which we are belongs to Christians and therefore it is not lawful to pillage it'.[504]

When his men proposed attacking a Byzantine town, Bohemond did not consent, as the Anonymous explains, *pro iustitia terrae*,[505] a set phrase denoting the inviolability of Christian territory from the crusading troops; on the contrary, the Norman leader had earlier permitted his men to attack and devastate a town of heretics, probably Paulicians.[506] While Bohemond's army was at Serres, the Norman leader ordered that all the beasts, which his men had stolen on their journey, be restored to the Byzantines, *pro iustitia terrae*[507] again.

When Raymond of Toulouse suggested a crusading attack on Constantinople in late April 1097, the other crusading leaders, as the Anonymous relates, 'told him that it would be improper (*iniustum fore*) to fight against ... Christians (*contra Christianos*)'.[508] Likewise, Raymond of Aguilers recounts that the rest of the princes 'deplored such [Count Raymond's] thoughts, saying that it was the height of folly for Christians to fight Christians'.[509] Even Guibert of Nogent allows that the other leaders 'said that they would never take up arms against someone who was considered to be a Christian',[510] while Baldric of Dol was embarrassed even to mention Raymond's proposal.

According to Albert of Aachen, during the fighting between Alexios and Godfrey outside Constantinople in the middle of January 1097, the French prince received envoys from Bohemond, who suggested a joint attack on Constantinople. Godfrey declined Bohemond's proposal, stating that 'he had not left his homeland and family for the sake of profit or for the destruction of Christians, but had embarked on the journey to Jerusalem in the name of Christ'.[511] Some modern scholars have ignored this passage.[512] It has, however, aroused controversy amongst others. Yewdale[513] rejected Albert's testimony, contrasting with it the policy of friendship toward the emperor that Bohemond had inaugurated as soon as he arrived in Byzantine territory. Shepard argued that 'it is most probable that Bohemond was too well aware of the difficulties which a siege of Constantinople would have posed for the Crusaders

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[504] Baldric of Dol, *Historia*, 22.
[505] *Gesta Francorum*, 10.
[506] Ibid., 8.
[507] Ibid., 10.
[508] Ibid., 13.
[509] Raymond of Aguilers, *History*, 24.
[510] Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 61.
[511] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 2007, 83.
[512] McQueen, 1986, 427-76; Runciman, 1951, I, 142-71; Runciman, 1969, 284-8.
[513] Yewdale, 1924, 42.

to have proposed an attack'.[514] These arguments are convincing. Moreover, it should be added that, according to Albert, when Bohemond made the proposal to Godfrey in the middle of January, he was still in Apulia. However, at this time Bohemond was in actual fact in the Byzantine Empire marching to Constantinople. He had already crossed from Bari to Avlona on 26 October 1096.

In contrast, several scholars appear to accept Albert's word. Edgington maintains that 'such a message is very much in character for Bohemond,'[515] an inadequate explanation, it is felt. France uses Anna's account to corroborate Albert's evidence. The Byzantine princess records that Alexios intercepted communication between Godfrey and Bohemond or *vice versa*. France understands that the emperor did so, because he had been aware of Bohemond's proposal to Godfrey, and thus he wanted to cut off any further communication of this sort.[516] However, if this were the case, Anna, who is always keen to demonstrate the Westerner's aspiration to seize Constantinople, would have taken pains to recount Bohemond's proposal. Furthermore, Bohemond's later treatment at Alexios's hands in Constantinople does not support France's view. Lilie argues that despite the fact that Bohemond's letter is not corroborated by other accounts, there 'is no reason to disbelieve it since Bohemond would hardly have made his proposal generally known, even in his own army, in case of failure'.[517]

All the aforementioned scholars have not taken into consideration Bohemond's similar proposal, which is related by Orderic Vitalis. According to the historian, the Norman leader

> urged his companions to besiege Constantinople with determination, offering many convincing reasons why this was the best course to pursue. The Franks, however, said, 'we have abandoned our worldly wealth and set out on a pilgrimage by our own choice, in order to throw back the pagans and free the Christians for the love of Christ. The Greeks are Christians too (*Greci autem Christiani sunt*)'.[518]

The information about Bohemond's proposal for an assault on Constantinople - information provided both by Albert and Orderic - derived from oral sources.

It is interesting that Albert of Aachen fails to mention Raymond of Toulouse's refusal to take the oath of fealty to Alexios, and the count's proposal for an attack on Constantinople.

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[514] Shepard, 1988, 203, n. 55.
[515] Edgington, 1997, 67.
[516] France, 1994, 116.
[517] Lilie, 1993, 5.
[518] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, V, 46-9.

The chronicler erroneously recounts that Raymond became 'favoured and esteemed by Alexios,' 'became the emperor's man on his honour and solemn oath,'[519] and 'was closely allied to him'.[520] On the contrary, according to Albert, initially Bohemond had even refused to 'enter the [Byzantine] court and hear what the emperor had to say'[521] and did so only through the agency of Godfrey. However, during the leaders' stay in Constantinople, it is Bohemond, and definitely not Raymond, who seems to have been the leader 'favoured and esteemed by Alexios,' who willingly took the oath of allegiance to the emperor, and who was closely allied to him.[522]

By the time the First Crusade ended and the First Crusaders began returning to the West, conditions were radically different. Raymond was on intimate terms with Alexios, while Bohemond had broken faith with the emperor. We could, therefore, presume that some crusaders of the rank and file of the army or some pilgrims, who only knew by hearsay that a leader had proposed an attack on Constantinople assumed that Bohemond was the one who did so. Therefore, upon returning to the West, they may have circulated various stories, according to which Bohemond suggested an assault on the imperial capital. These rumoured stories must have easily gained credence, given the serious deterioration in relations between Alexios and Bohemond following the crusaders' capture of Antioch - a deterioration which ultimately led to the Norman's attack on the Byzantine Empire in 1107.

It should also be noticed that the Anonymous, when referring to the leaders who opposed Raymond's suggestion, makes special reference, by name, firstly to Godfrey of Bouillon and secondly to Robert of Flanders.[523] In Albert's story it is again Godfrey of Bouillon who rejects the proposal for an attack on Constantinople. This cannot be accidental, and supports our view that Bohemond replaced Raymond in the stories that circulated in the West in the aftermath of the First Crusade.

Of greatest significance to our study is the fact that, irrespective of either Raymond or Bohemond suggesting an assault on the imperial capital, there appears to be extensive unanimity in the chronicles concerning the reply of the rest of the leaders. The proposal was firmly rejected on the grounds that the Byzantines were Christians: they were regarded as Christian brethren. It should also be mentioned here that as regards Alexios's supposed fear of

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[519] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 93.
[520] Ibid., 103.
[521] Ibid., 89.
[522] Shepard, 1988, 203-4; Tyerman, 2006, 113.
[523] *Gesta Francorum*, 13.

a crusading attack on Constantinople, Robert the Monk makes it clear that the crusaders had no intention of attacking the Byzantines, 'as they had no desire to fight against Christians'.[524]

In the late summer of 1099, a Pisan fleet of 120 ships under the command of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa, arrived off the coast by Antioch. Bohemond immediately made an approach to Daimbert and the Pisan captains and succeeded in gaining naval support for an attack on Byzantine Latakia.[525] Albert of Aachen recounts that Bohemond 'told them [the Pisans] all sorts of evil and severe slanders against the citizens of Latakia, and that they were criminal opponents of the Christians'.[526] The same author has Archbishop Daimbert report Bohemond as propagating 'that the citizens of Latakia were false Christians (*falsi Christiani*), and always opposed to the Christian brothers (*confratres*), and ... they had been in an extreme degree traitors (*traditores*) of the pilgrims among the Turks and Saracens'.[527] The Norman prince's story, 'something quite other than the truth'[528] as Albert says, excited the Pisans' hatred towards the inhabitants of Latakia.

In September 1099 Latakia was besieged by Bohemond and the Pisan fleet. In the meantime, after the battle of Ascalon on 12 August 1099, a considerable part of the crusading army, under Raymond of Toulouse, Robert of Normandy, and Robert of Flanders began their march northwards. At Jabala the leaders discovered that Bohemond laid siege to Latakia. As Albert relates, they dispatched envoys to the Norman leader asking him 'to withdraw from the siege of the city and not to inflict any further injustice on Christians'.[529] Additionally, the princes reproached Daimbert for having 'unfairly exerted force against Christian citizens, namely those of Latakia'.[530] Nevertheless, Bohemond rejected the other leaders' demand. Once they were informed of this rejection, the princes prepared themselves for battle, while Daimbert, having conceded that 'he and his men had done wrong in complete ignorance,'[531] withdrew the support of the Pisan fleet. Having found himself isolated, Bohemond finally raised the siege of Latakia.

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[524] Robert the Monk, *History*, 99.
[525] Lilie, 1993, 62-3; Runciman, 1951, I, 300-1; Yewdale, 1924, 87-8.
[526] *Omne malum et grande nefas de ciuibus Laodicie referebat, et hos noxios Christianorum calumniatores.* Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 476-7. I made some changes in Edgington's translation. The scholar inaccurately translates this as 'told them that the Latakians were entirely bad and really evil, and that they were criminal opponents of the Christians'.
[527] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 480-1.
[528] Ibid., 477.
[529] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 479.
[530] Ibid., 481.
[531] Ibid.

Some modern scholars referring to the incident fail even to mention that, once the crusading leaders learned of the siege of Latakia, they warned Bohemond to avoid any offence against Christians. Lilie simply states that 'considering the old enmity between the Count of Toulouse and Bohemond it is not surprising that Raymond tried his best to put an end to the siege'.[532] The scholar's remark eliminates firstly the role that the two Roberts and secondly the part that the leaders' devotion to the ideal of Christian fraternity had played in the opposition to Bohemond's plans. It is possible that the three princes, especially Raymond, might have also had ulterior motives in opposing the Norman's plans over Latakia. However, the leaders' religious concerns and attachment to the ideal of Christian fellowship – which are actually the only concerns displayed by Albert's account and cannot therefore be overlooked by the historian - almost certainly played a major role in the princes' decision to oppose Bohemond. It must not be forgotten that the crusaders essentially perceived their role as that of *milites Christi*, and other Christians were therefore regarded by them as brothers in Christ. Concerning Robert of Flanders in particular, it was not the first time that the powerful count demonstrated his commitment to the ideal of Christian fraternity. The Anonymous makes special reference, by name, to Robert of Flanders, when referring to the princes who opposed Raymond of Toulouse's earlier proposal for an attack on Constantinople on the grounds that 'it would be improper to fight *contra Christianos*'.[533]

We should not fail to underline here that Albert of Aachen, a staunch supporter of the ideal of Christian fraternity, also reproaches Bohemond. He describes the Norman as 'cunning ... and greedy' 'for aggrandisement and acquisition' whose account that was 'something quite other than the truth' gained the Pisans' naval support for an attack on 'a city inhabited by Greek Christians (*catholici Greci*)'.[534] From Albert's perspective, Westerners and Byzantines were members of the one catholic Christian Church.

Following the raising of the siege of Latakia, Raymond of Toulouse, Robert of Flanders, and Robert of Normandy entered the city with the citizens' approval. The governor of Cyprus gave his sanction and offered to provide Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy with free transport to Constantinople, from where they would continue their homeward journey. The governor's offer was thankfully accepted.[535]

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[532] Lilie, 1993, 63.
[533] *Gesta Francorum*, 13.
[534] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 476-7.
[535] Lilie, 1993, 63; Runciman, 1951, I, 301; Yewdale, 1924, 88-9.

According to Orderic Vitalis's version, the citizens of Latakia, and not the governor of Cyprus, offered to 'make ready a fleet of the best ships for you [the two Roberts], [which] will escort you and all who choose to follow you to the emperor at Constantinople without charging any fare, and will supply you plentifully with bread and wine and everything you need on the way'.[536] Although Orderic's version is incorrect, it gives us an interesting insight into the Western sense of Christian fraternity. As recounted by the historian, the crusading princes acknowledged that they 'have no ships in which to sail home, and the only land route is through the emperor's territory'.[537] Therefore, they decided to 'accept the promises of the Greeks, crafty (*uersipelles*) though they are, *since they are Christians too* (*quoniam Christiani sunt*), and thankfully take what they offer in peace, for we might have had to beg and implore them for these very things'.[538] The sense of Christian fellowship finally prevailed over the old, well-worn stereotype of the *uersipelles* Greeks. The crusading princes were not to regret their decision, since the Greeks 'faithfully carried out their undertakings' according to Orderic.[539]

Finally, we should not fail to mention a last episode reported by Orderic that also evidences clearly the Westerners' commitment to the notion of religious affinity between Western and Eastern Christians. When the crusaders broke into Jerusalem on 15 July 1099, the Greeks as well as the Armenians and Syrians of the city fled to the church of the Holy Sepulchre, where they prayed, awaiting the outcome of events. Upon entering the church with his forces, Tancred 'realised that these men were worshippers of Christ'.[540] Orderic has the Norman prince declare that 'these men ... are Christians' and instruct his soldiers that 'none of you therefore should harm them in any way. We did not come here to harm the servants of Christ, but to free them from their cruel persecutors. They are our brothers and friends (*fratres nostri sunt et amici*); faithful (*fideles*) [Christians] up to now through many tribulations'.[541]

The Western strict adherence to the ideal of Christian fraternity is not surprising given the circumstances surrounding the plea for the First Crusade made by Urban II. Hadn't the pope dramatically stressed the religious affinity between Eastern and Western Christians in his emotional speech at Clermont? Hadn't he described Eastern and Western Christians as

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[536] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, V, 275.
[537] Ibid.
[538] Ibid., 274-7. Emphasis added. I made a minor change in Chibnall's translation.
[539] Ibid., 277.
[540] Ibid., 169.
[541] Ibid., 168-71.

germani fratres, and *filii* of the same, *and only one*, *Ecclesia*? Hadn't he inculcated Western Christians with the idea of combat in the noble cause of liberating their Eastern brethren?

Byzantine Deceit

As has been seen, Greek craftiness is once mentioned in Orderic's account only to be immediately overshadowed by the strong belief in the notion of Christian fellowship. Nevertheless, Greek deceit is more strongly criticised by Ralph of Caen. As has been said, the Norman expedition of the First Crusade crossed from Bari to Epiros only on 26 October 1096. Bohemond's delay in departing from southern Italy was occasioned by his need for time to prepare his forces. However, Ralph provides his own distorted explanation. Presumably having in view the ugly incident between the Normans and the imperial mercenary troops on the River Vardar, the chronicler claims that Bohemond delayed his passage to the Byzantine Empire because 'he feared the ambushes of the Greeks (*Græcorum insidiæ*) since they had a habit of attacking even those whom they had earlier invited as guests'.[542]

As we have seen, when the Norman army reached Roussa on 1 April 1097, Bohemond received an imperial letter that concluded by urging the Norman leader to hasten to Constantinople together with a few men. Bohemond agreed to Alexios's proposal, and left his army under the command of his nephew Tancred, whom Ralph pictures as he 'shuddered at these events as being the false friendship of the Greeks (*fraudulenta Graecorum familiaritas*)'.[543] Ralph's account is coloured by hindsight. From the chronicle's biased standpoint, Alexios had deceitfully invited Bohemond to hurry on to Constantinople with only a few men in order to force him to take the oath of allegiance to him. Despite the fact that Bohemond had very readily sworn the oath to the Byzantine ruler,[544] Ralph, who considered the oath-taking degrading and humiliating, imagined that the Norman prince was forced and tricked into swearing it. It is also very likely that Ralph claims that Bohemond was beguiled by Alexios into accepting 'this yoke',[545] i.e. the oath, in order to excuse the Norman leader for breaking his oath later.

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[542] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 606; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 23.
[543] Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 612; Ralph of Caen, *History*, 31. I made minor changes in the translation of B. S. Bachrach and D. S. Bachrach. The scholars translate *fraudulenta Graecorum familiaritas* as 'the familiar deceit of the Greeks'.
[544] Shepard, 1988, 203-4.
[545] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 32.

Apart from Ralph of Caen, the rest of the Latin chroniclers of the First Crusade and its aftermath under investigation *do not* refer to or denounce the Greeks as deceitful. But even when Ralph decries 'the ambushes' and 'the false friendship of the Greeks,' Alexios is implicitly the target of criticism while, in the same context, the reference to the Greeks serves a purely rhetorical function; Greek deceit was in fact a *topos* that went back to Antiquity.[546]

Byzantine Military Inability, Effeminacy and Laziness

One of the traits the Westerners ascribed to the Greeks since Antiquity was military inability and cowardice.[547] This trait, which had become a *topos*, also occurs in certain chronicles of the First Crusade. A different but to a great extent inaccurate account of the skirmish at the river Vardar is given by Ralph of Caen. In his *Gesta Tancredi*, the Petchenegs who attacked the Normans who delayed crossing the Vardar were replaced by Greeks assailing the Normans on both banks of the river. According to Ralph's tale, 'a multitude of [Greek] ambushers,' to whom 'the small size of the Latin force became clear,' attacked the Normans who had first crossed Vardar. Before long, however, 'these pitiable men [the Greeks] were headed for immediate flight or to their deaths ... This weak people was struck down and was taught not to make any further assumptions based on the small number of Franks. Rather, they learned that 100 of them were not equal to one'.[548] After this battle, and as soon as the main army with the Norman leaders had crossed the river, 'the Greeks, who had been sent to follow the trail of the Latins, ... rushed upon the remaining men in order to wet their swords with blood just as wolves slaughter sheep who have been deprived of their shepherd and dogs'.[549] Without delay, however, Tancred recrossed the river and the enemy was put to flight.

Ralph's variation on the incident in Vardar seems to have had a twofold aim. First, the substitution of Greeks for Petchenegs must have been a rhetorical artifice. Given the strained relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Principality of Antioch during Bohemond's reign and Tancred's regency, relations characterised by conflict and even an expedition against the western frontier of the Byzantine Empire, Ralph could have better served his rhetorical purposes by 'staging' a battle between Latins and Greeks rather than between Latins

[546] See Introduction, 8-9.
[547] See Introduction, 11.
[548] Ralph of Caen, *History*, 25.
[549] Ibid., 26.

and Petchenegs. Secondly, by setting 'a multitude' of Greeks attacking on both banks of the river and eventually being defeated by 'the small size of the Latin force,' Ralph overemphasised the military capacity of the Westerners in direct contradiction to the inability and cowardice of the Greeks. This further served Ralph's rhetoric of panegyric of his lord Tancred and the Latins in general.

With reference to the oath of fealty to Alexios and the crusading leaders' pledge to hand over to the emperor any captured territory which had formerly belonged to the Byzantine Empire, Ralph of Caen comments that 'it was not appropriate to hand over these captured cities to such defenders as the Greeks. It was the Franks who alone were capable of this type of protection. In general, restoring the cities and towns to the Greeks would be tantamount to restoring them to the Turks'.[550] This argument is spurious, resting on the clichéd Western stereotype of the Byzantines as militarily incompetent and unwarlike, rather than on an assessment of the Byzantine Empire's actual military situation at the turn of the twelfth century. The underlining of Byzantine military inability by Ralph not only functions as a literary *topos* but also seeks to demonstrate that Latin military intervention, i.e. the crusades, and Latin presence in the East, i.e. the Latin states, were indispensable to the Christian faith.

Even Albert of Aachen, who is very well disposed towards the Greek Christians, does not fail to refer to Byzantine military incapacity and effeminacy. On one occasion, the chronicler actually cites a speech by Kilij Arslan. According to Albert's quotation of the Seljuk Sultan, 'the Byzantine imperial army is made up of soft and effeminate Greeks (*gens Grecorum mollis et effeminata*), who have rarely been troubled by the exercise of wars, and could easily be overcome by the strength of hard men'.[551] On a second occasion, Albert refers to an incident taking place in late 1113.[552] Approximately forty Western crusaders, who were in Palestine and desired to return to their lands, followed the road through Asia Minor. They arrived in Mirra, 'where they were very kindly welcomed by the Greeks, *Christian men* (*viri Christiani*), with all provision of supplies'[553] - we should note here that Albert does not fail to reaffirm the Christian identity of the Greeks at every opportunity. At this time, Shahinshah, sultan of Rum, raided into Byzantine territory up to the walls of Nicaea. The Turks besieged Mirra and after some days attacked the principal gate of the town. According to Albert, 'the soldiers of the

[550] Ibid., 40-1; Ralph of Caen, *Gesta*, 618. Bachrach and Bachrach omitted to translate the last sentence of this quotation.
[551] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 254-5.
[552] Ibid., 846-7.
[553] Ibid. Emphasis added.

Greeks, effeminate men (*viri effeminati*)' put up only 'little resistance'[554] and were soon exhausted by the fighting. Thus, the Turks eventually gained entrance to Mirra from the gate that the Greeks had failed to defend effectively and massacred or took captives the citizens of the town. The crusaders who were in Mirra were beheaded. However, despite these denunciations of Greek effeminacy and military weakness, Albert does not fail to describe the Greeks as skilful at fighting 'with bow and arrow,' when he is describing the composition of Alexios's army marching to Antioch to assist the crusaders.[555]

Effeminacy is also attributed to the Byzantines by Kerbogha in the accounts of the Anonymous, Guibert of Nogent, and Robert the Monk. The Anonymous makes the Turkish Atabeg declare that he came with his army to the rescue of the Turks of Antioch because they were 'scandalised to think that those [crusader] leaders and commanders ... should lay claim to the land which ... [the Turks] have conquered by an effeminate people (*effeminatae gentes*) [the Byzantines]'.[556] Likewise, Guibert has Kerbogha proclaim that the Turks had 'every right to the land' which they had captured 'from a nation [the Byzantines] scarcely better than women (*natio vix feminas equiperans*)'.[557] In Robert's version, the Turkish prince states that the crusaders 'did not follow a sensible policy in taking arms against us [the Turks] on behalf of an effeminate race (*effeminata gens*)'.[558]

Laziness had also been a trait imputed to the Greeks since Antiquity,[559] along with effeminacy, cowardice, and military weakness. These four traits were obviously interrelated. Guibert of Nogent does not fail to ascribe laziness to the Byzantines. According to the chronicler, Hugh of Vermandois's 'unbounded fame as the brother of the King of France preceded him', 'particularly among the Greeks, who are the laziest of men' (*presertim apud inertissimos hominum Graecos*).[560] With respect to the oath of allegiance to Alexios, although the majority of the crusading leaders readily took it, the biased chronicler Guibert who perceived the oath-taking as unworthy of the Western princes and unjust makes them say: 'the

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[554] Ibid.
[555] Ibid., 310.
[556] *Gesta Francorum*, 67.
[557] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 235; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 108.
[558] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 826; Robert the Monk, *History*, 166.
[559] See Introduction, 10-11.
[560] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 135; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 55.

fact that we had been compelled by the puny Greeks (*per Graeculos*),[561] laziest of all people (*omnium inertissimos*), to swear an oath would be to our eternal shame'.[562]

The above assessments of the Byzantines as militarily incapable, effeminate and lazy not only are obviously very few, given the large number of Latin accounts of the First Crusade, but also reflect generalised stereotypes or, at the very most, a slight contempt, rather than specific identifiable criticism, condemnation or anti-Byzantine sentiment.

Conclusion

From what we have already seen, it becomes obvious that, on the whole, in the Latin historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath, which was composed in the first four decades of the twelfth century, there are no feelings of hostility towards the Byzantines. The Greeks, who lived within or outside the confines of the Byzantine Empire, were considered as Christian brethren. Stereotypes going back to Antiquity, i.e. laziness, effeminacy, cowardice and military inability, were only sporadically attributed to them, or very rarely the Greeks were portrayed as deceitful. However, even in the case where the *fraudulenta Graecorum familiaritas* is denounced by Ralph of Caen, Alexios is implicitly the target of criticism while the reference to the Greeks only functions as rhetorical embellishment.

The argument that the Western historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath is anti-Byzantine or anti-Greek does not really stand up to close scrutiny. Although the Western historiography of the first forty years of the twelfth century is to a great extent anti-Alexian, it bears no evidence of negative feelings towards the Byzantine people on the whole. On the contrary, the Byzantines seem to have been perceived as the Westerners' Christian brethren. After all, the liberation and protection of the Eastern Christians against the Muslims was one of the two primary objectives of the First Crusade as established in the dramatic speech of Urban II at Clermont.

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[561] For a survey on the use of the term *Graeculus* by Latin classical authors, see Petrocheilos, 1974, 48-53. As Petrocheilos concludes, *Graeculus* is thus a word of unique type, a diminutive formed from an ethnic name; it reflects the special quality of the relationship of Roman and Greek; by virtue of being a diminutive it can express a variety of attitudes from the mildly patronising to the openly contemptuous', ibid., 53. In medieval texts, the term *Graeculus* seems to be used in a pejorative, though not strongly condemnatory, sense.

[562] Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 142; Guibert of Nogent, *Deeds*, 60.

The Byzantines in William of Tyre's Account of the First Crusade and its Aftermath

The Latin historiography of the First Crusade and its aftermath written in the first forty years of the twelfth century demonstrates no feelings of hostility towards the Byzantines. But what about William of Tyre's narrative of the First Crusade, an account completed in 1184? In William's *Historia*, the feelings towards the Greeks are actually very different. The sense of Christian fraternity that we have observed in the vast majority of the other primary sources is eliminated in William of Tyre's account of the period 1096-1108. The historian deliberately omits to mention that once Bohemond entered the Byzantine Empire in 1096, he warned his men 'to be courteous and refrain from plundering that land, which belonged to Christians'.[563] In William's history, when Raymond of Toulouse suggests an attack on Constantinople, the other crusading leaders feel 'that it was not a fitting time or place to demand revenge', and argue that 'in pursuit of revenge, he [Raymond of Toulouse] should undo the work of many days and prove a hindrance to those who wished to proceed on the way of the Lord'.[564] William consciously fails to relate that the leaders declared 'that it would be improper to fight against fellow Christians'.[565]

In the *Historia*, when Bohemond sends a message to Godfrey proposing an assault on Constantinople, William portrays the Norman leader as asserting, amongst other things, the following statements in order to vindicate his proposal: 'I have known that the malice (*maliciam*) and hatred (*odium*) of the Greeks for the Latin name is deep-seated (*pertinax*) and persistent (*obstinatum*)'.[566] Needless to say that in Albert of Aachen's version of the story, from which that of William is drawn, Bohemond makes no reference to the Greeks. In Albert's account, as has been seen, Godfrey declined Bohemond's suggestion, stating frankly that 'he had not left his homeland and family for the sake of profit or for the destruction of Christians'.[567] William of Tyre's Godfrey similarly declares that he does 'shrink from turning against a Christian people the arms which are pledged to combat the infidel'.[568] However, the prince states this only after an outbreak of anti-Greek frenzy. William quotes Godfrey as assuring Bohemond: 'I know, beloved brother, and long ago was apprised by report, that with

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[563] *Gesta Francorum*, 8.
[564] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 145.
[565] *Gesta Francorum*, 13.
[566] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 173; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 130.
[567] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 83.
[568] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 130.

inexorable hatred (*odio inexorabili*) the race of the Greeks ever ardently desires to persecute our people ... I do not question that you are moved against them by righteous zeal (*iusto zelo*) and that your instinctive feeling about their wickedness (*nequicia*) is correct'.[569] It is evident that William not only did not consider the Byzantines as Christian brothers, but also perceived them to have deeply hated the Latins and fervently desired to persecute them, just as their emperor, whose purpose, according to William's Bohemond, 'is to deceive and, in every way possible, to pursue even to the death (*ad mortem*) every Latin nation'.[570]

From William's standpoint, all the Byzantines were treacherous, in the same way as their emperor was. Soon after their arrival in Constantinople, Godfrey and his men 'discovered the treachery (*fraudem*) of the emperor *and his people* (*suorum*)'.[571] Referring to the attack of the Byzantine troops on Raymond of Toulouse's army that went pillaging after its leader's departure on 18 April 1097, William asserts that 'more and more, day by day, *the trickery of the Greeks* (*Grecorum dolus*) and the treachery of the emperor were revealed.[572] William further claims that since Alexios had treated the crusading princes with great generosity and kindness during their stay in Constantinople, 'it was very difficult to convince them of malice of the Greeks (*Grecorum malicia*) and the wicked deception and persistent trickery of the emperor'.[573] Finally, as we have seen, the historian does not fail to find an opportunity to quote the famous Virgilian passage that strongly criticises the treachery of the Greeks: 'I fear the Greeks even when they bear gifts'.[574]

Obviously, profound hatred of the Byzantines, and of everything Byzantine in general, pervades William of Tyre's account of the First Crusade and its aftermath. The question that naturally arises is: why is the Latin historian of *Outremer* ardently hostile towards the Byzantines in general? I would suggest that William's hostility to the Greeks is due to the massacre of the Italian inhabitants of Constantinople in 1182. The slaughter had a great impact on William's attitude towards the Byzantines: in his account of the massacre, the historian launches a vitriolic diatribe against the Greeks.[575] The fact that William made extensive

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[569] Ibid.; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 174.
[570] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 173; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 129.
[571] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 173; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 129. Emphasis added.
[572] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 189; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 146. Emphasis added.
[573] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 187; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 144. I made an amendment to the translation by Babcock and Krey. Emphasis added.
[574] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 471.
[575] See Chapter 3, 179-82.

revisions to the draft of his *Historia* from 1180 until 1184[576] permits us to advance the suggestion that the historian also reworked the passages of his account of the First Crusade and its aftermath that referred to the Byzantines. William's anti-Byzantine stance when writing of the First Crusade could not be explained otherwise than as being resulted from the events of 1182.

[576] Edbury and Rowe, 1988, 27-8.

Chapter 2

MANUEL I KOMNENOS AND THE BYZANTINES THROUGH A LATIN LENS

On 24 December 1144, Zengi, the Turkish ruler of Mosul and Aleppo (1128-46), captured Edessa, the capital of the County of Edessa, the first crusader state established during the First Crusade. In response, Pope Eugenius III (1145-53) called for a fresh crusade by issuing the first crusading bull ever, *Quantum praedecessores*. The bull included a short narrative of the successful First Crusade, exhorted the Westerners to defend the land that their fathers had conquered, and explained in detail the privileges of crusaders. Unlike Urban II, Eugenius enrolled two eminent Western monarchs, Louis VII of France (1137-80) and Conrad III of Germany (1138-52). Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux (1090-1153), preached effectively the crusade in France, Flanders, and the Rhineland in 1146-7. In his bull *Divina dispensatione*, issued on 13 April 1147, Eugenius referred to crusades against the Muslims in Spain, and the pagan Wends in north-east Germany in the same context as the crusade against the Muslims in the East. An Anglo-Flemish naval force, travelling East, contributed significantly to the capture of Lisbon (1147) and Tortosa (1148). The great expedition in the East, however, was to end in complete failure, while the crusade against the Wends met with only inconspicuous success.[577]

The Latin historiography of the period from Bohemond's expedition against Alexios to the Second Crusade is largely indifferent to the Byzantine Empire and the Byzantines. During the Second Crusade, however, Byzantium and the West once again came into closer contact as a result of the passage of the German and French crusading armies through the territories of the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, the Byzantines reappear in Latin chronicles and annals. This chapter builds up a picture of the Western view of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I (1143-80), and of the Byzantines, from the time of the Second Crusade to the end of Manuel's reign. It is divided into three main sections. The first one deals with the Latin perceptions of Manuel and

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[577] For the Second Crusade and Byzantium, see, in general, Angold, 1997, 194-200; Lilie, 1993, 145-63; Lock, 2006, 147-50; P. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143-1180* (Cambridge, 1993), 46-53; Mayer, 1988, 93-106; J. Phillips and M. Hoch, 'Introduction', in *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, ed. Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester, 2001), 1-14; J. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119-1187* (Oxford, 1996), 73-99; Riley-Smith, 2005, 121-31; Runciman, 1951, II, 247-288; Tyerman, 2006, 304-38; Madden, 2005, 52-61; V. G. Berry, 'The Second Crusade', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 1 (Madison; London, 1969), 463-512; J. Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (New Haven; London, 2007).

the Byzantines in the Latin accounts of the Second Crusade and its aftermath, and is subdivided into two parts. The first one examines the *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, our only source that exclusively concentrates on the Second Crusade to the East, while the second part explores the Latin reactions to the ill-fated crusade, with the focus mainly placed on the Byzantines. The second section of this chapter investigates the so-called crusading project of 1150 and its objectives. The third section studies the development of ties between the Byzantine Empire and the Latin world at the post-crusade period, and it is subdivided into three parts, examining the relations between Manuel and the Latin *Outremer*, the relations between Manuel and the Latin West, and the emergence of the Byzantine emperor's 'new image' and legend among the Latins.

The Sources

In sharp contrast to the First Crusade, the disastrous outcome of the Second Crusade discouraged contemporaries from composing histories of the expedition. The crusade only got brief mentions in Western annals and chronicles. The only exception amongst the Western historians is the French Odo of Deuil, the author of the most important contemporary eyewitness narrative of the Second Crusade, the *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*. Odo was a monk of the monastery of Saint Denis in Paris. In 1147, he left France accompanying King Louis VII as royal chaplain for the Second Crusade. In the course of the expedition the historian remained in the king's entourage and, in late 1149, returned to France with him. In 1151, Odo became abbot of Saint Denis, an office of great stature. He died in 1162.[578]

In his *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem* Odo relates the journey of the French crusading army as far as Antioch in the spring of 1148. Odo's work is a eulogy to the French king as well as a source of information on the French crusading expedition and the hardships that the French troops suffered in the East so as to function as a guide for future French crusaders. Odo was either a witness or a participant in most of the events he describes. Due to his position as royal chaplain, Odo maintained a close association with Louis and therefore gained access to a vast amount of information. He was privy to the councils where negotiations were conducted and decisions were made about the progress of the crusade. He

[578] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, xiv-xvi; J. Phillips, 'Odo of Deuil's *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem* as a source for the Second Crusade', in *The Experience of Crusading 1: Western Approaches*, ed. Marcus Bull and Norman Housley (Cambridge, 2003), 80-4.

observed the official messages delivered by foreign envoys and reports made to the French king. His important position must have also provided him with access to the diplomatic documents that arrived to the royal camp. In addition, the historian obtained supplementary information from witnesses - for instance information about the progress of the German expedition. As a result, Odo's *De profectione*, the only history exclusively devoted to the Second Crusade, claims great authority, and is generally considered reliable. Portions of it are corroborated by other contemporary sources mentioning the expedition. Odo's narrative, composed in the spring or summer of 1148, ends with Louis and his troops reaching Antioch in the spring of 1148. The latter stage of the crusade is not related. Whether the account remained incomplete or whether the rest of it has been lost is hard to say.[579]

Other contemporary sources provide additional information on the Second Crusade. Unfortunately, the notable historian and bishop, Otto of Freising, half-brother of the German King Conrad III and one of the leaders of the German army on the crusade, fails to relate his experiences on the expedition. Since, as he says, he 'purposed this time to write not a tragedy but a joyous history', he did 'leave this [the expedition to the Holy Land] to be related by others elsewhere'.[580] Only in a small number of passages in his *Gesta Friderici* does Otto refer to the crusade.[581]

In his *Chronica Slavorum*, written about 1167/8, the German historian Helmold of Bosau (c. 1125-after 1177) treats the origins of the Second Crusade and devotes a chapter to each of the crusading expeditions.[582] In his *Historia Pontificalis*, which covers the years 1148-52, the English author John of Salisbury (c. 1120-80) includes an account of the Second Crusade compiled from oral information obtained most likely from someone in Louis VII's entourage, and probably from Count Thierry of Flanders and one of the cardinal legates.[583] Our knowledge of the crusade is also enlarged by the following sources: the *Historia Anglorum* of Henry of Huntingdon,[584] the *Historia rerum Anglicarum* of William of Newburgh (c. 1136-c. 1198),[585] the *De investigatione Antichristi liber I* of Gerhoh of Reichersberg,[586] the *Annales*

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[579] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, xvi-xxxii; G. Constable, 'The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries', *Traditio*, 9 (1953), 217-18.
[580] Otto of Freising, *Deeds*, 79.
[581] Constable, 1953, 219-20; Otto of Freising, *Deeds*, 70-81, 101-8.
[582] Constable, 1953, 223; Helmold, *Chronicle*, 170-81.
[583] John of Salisbury, *Historia*, xxxvii-xxxviii, xlii-xlv, 52-61.
[584] Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia*, 751-3.
[585] William of Newburgh, *English Affairs: Book I*, 92-5. For Books I-II of William of Newburgh's *Historia rerum Anglicarum*, I use the editions and translations by Walsh and Kennedy, published in 1988 (Book I) and 2007

Egmundani,[587] the *Annales Herbipolenses* (of Würzburg),[588] the *Annales Magdeburgenses*,[589] the *Historia Welforum Weingartensis*,[590] the *Chronicon Mauriniacense*,[591] the *Ex anonymo Blandinensi Appendicula ad Sigebertum usque in annum 1152*,[592] the *Casus monasterii Petrishusensis*,[593] the Gembloux continuation of Sigebert,[594] the Premonstratensian continuator of Sigebert,[595] the *Chronicon* of Richard of Poitiers,[596] the *Chronicon* of Geoffrey of Vigeois,[597] the *Historia* of William of Tyre,[598] the *Annales* of Romuald II (1153-81), Archbishop of Salerno,[599] the *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, authored by the Norman chronicler Robert of Torigni (*c.* 1110-1186), who became abbot of Mont-Saint-Michel in 1154,[600] the *Historia* of Lambert of Ardres (c. 1160-after 1220),[601] and contemporary letters. Valuable material for understanding the Latin perceptions of Manuel is also provided by the Anchin continuation of Sigebert's chronicle;[602] the *Chronicon* of the French Premonstratensian Robert of Auxerre (d. 1211);[603] a chronicle of the Fourth Crusade composed by the early thirteenth-century French chronicler Robert of Clari, a poor knight from Picardy, who participated in the Fourth Crusade;[604] and the jumble known as *De nugis curialium*, authored by Walter Map (c. 1130-c. 1209), a Welsh secular clerk who became archdeacon of Oxford in 1196. Walter was a court satirist, not a historian, and his work was strongly influenced by Juvenal and Horace. In his *De nugis curialium*, Walter gives a very

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(Book II). For Books III-V, I use the 1184-5 edition (*Rolls Series*) by Howlett and the 1856 translation by Stevenson.

[586] Gerhoh Reichersbergensis, *De investigatione*, 374-8.

[587] *Annales Egmundani*, *MGH SS*, 16, 456.

[588] *Annales Herbipolenses*, *MGH SS*, 16, 3-8.

[589] *Annales Magdeburgenses*, *MGH SS*, 16, 188-90.

[590] *Historia Welforum Weingartensis*, *MGH SS*, 21, 468.

[591] *Chronicon Mauriniacense*, *RHGF*, 12, 88.

[592] *Ex anonymo Blandinensi Appendicula ad Sigebertum usque in annum 1152*, *RHGF*, 14, 20.

[593] *Casus monasterii Petrishusensis*, *MGH SS*, 20, 674.

[594] *Sigeberti Continuatio Gemblacensis*, *MGH SS*, 6, 389-90.

[595] *Sigeberti Continuatio Praemonstratensis*, *MGH SS*, 6, 453-4.

[596] Richard of Poitiers, *Chronicon*, *RHGF*, 12, 416.

[597] Geoffrey of Vigeois, *Chronicon*, *RHGF*, 12, 436.

[598] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 163-96.

[599] Romuald II of Salerno, *Annales*, *MGH SS*, 19, 424-25.

[600] Robert of Torigni, *Chronica*, 154-5.

[601] Lambert of Ardres, *Historia*, *MGH SS*, 24, 633-4.

[602] *Continuatio Aquicinctina Sigeberti Gemblacensis*, *MGH SS*, 6, 421.

[603] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 246.

[604] Clari, *Conquête*, 20-5. From 1936 to 2005, the most widely used translation of Robert of Clari was the translation by McNeal [Robert of Clari, *The Conquest of Constantinople,* trans. Edgar Holmes McNeal (New York, 1936)]. In 2005, a new edition with English translation on facing pages by Noble appeared [Robert de Clari. *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. and trans. Peter Noble (Edinburgh, 2005)]. Noble's edition and translation are used in my thesis. Nevertheless, McNeal's introduction and notes on the 1941 translation are still of great importance to a researcher.

confused but interesting account of twelfth-century Byzantine history up to 1183. Map's garbled narrative of Byzantine history was written shortly after 1185.[605]

Manuel and the Byzantines in the Latin Accounts of the Second Crusade and its Aftermath

Manuel, the Byzantines, and the French Crusading Expedition in Odo of Deuil's *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*

The French Expedition and its March to Constantinople

In spring 1146, a year before the Second Crusade to the East would depart, Louis VII wrote to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I describing the crusading plans and asking for market privileges and free passage through Byzantine territory. Manuel replied indicating that he was keen to aid the crusaders in securing food supplies and crossing over to Asia Minor. Early next year, on 16 February 1147, the French crusaders met at Étampes to decide whether they would accept the proposal of Roger II (1130-54), king of Sicily, to transport the French crusading army by water or whether the crusaders would follow the overland route marching through the Byzantine Empire.[606]

Amongst the French, a party, headed by Bishop Godfrey of Langres, favoured the Norman proposal, distrusting the Byzantines. Odo of Deuil recounts that the member of this faction argued 'that the Greeks, as they had learned either by reading or by experience, were deceitful (*fraudulentos*)'.[607] Evidently, even before the French crusaders began their journey to the East, an anti-Byzantine party had emerged amongst them. The real reasons for the faction's anti-Byzantine stance are not clear. Some of its members may well have read anti-Alexian accounts of the First Crusade or even classical works such as the *Aeneid*. We know, for example, that Odo had studied chronicles of the expedition.[608] Some others, as will become clear, resented the Byzantine emperors' attempts to impose their protectorate over Antioch.

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[605] Walter Map, *De nugis*, xiii, xxv, xxxv-xxxvi; A. Gransden, *Historical Writing in England, c.550 to c.1307* (London, 1974), 221-2, 242-4.
[606] For the assembly at Étampes, see Tyerman, 2006, 289-92; Phillips, 2007, 115-19.
[607] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 12-13.
[608] Phillips, 2007, 185.

The anti-Byzantine party's attempts to convince the French assembly with its arguments failed. Louis VII and the majority of the French magnates turned down the Norman offer and decided to follow the overland route. Sympathising with the anti-Byzantine faction, Odo rhetorically laments: 'would that the king and his men, who were right in fearing the strength of no nation, had entertained some fear of deceitful wiles (*fraudes*)'.[609] As the chronicler alleges, the envoys of Roger II who were present at the meeting at Étamps withdrew 'confounded ... foretelling to us the Greek trickery (*dolis Graecorum*) which we later experienced'.[610] That the Norman ambassadors departed dismayed is understandable, given that the offer of their king had been rejected. It may well be true as well that they had also propagandised against the Byzantines: Roger was a sworn enemy of Byzantium and must have had great concerns lest in Constantinople Manuel manipulated Louis into agreeing to a Byzantine-French alliance against Sicily. The Sicilian's fears were well grounded. When Manuel and Louis later met on the eastern shore of the Bosporus, the Byzantine ruler did attempt to persuade the French to enter into an alliance against Roger. As Odo relates, 'if the emperor could have gained our king as his ally against Roger, he would have lavished on him all the wealth in the treasury'.[611] Although there is certainly an element of exaggeration in Odo's testimony, Manuel undoubtedly offered enormous financial inducements. No expense was spared to safeguard and promote the interests of the *Oikoumene*. The emperor's attempts, however, met with no success. Louis was unwilling to get involved in the Byzantine-Sicilian conflict.

In June 1147, the French army gathered at Metz and departed for Constantinople. At Regensburg the French king gave audience to the Byzantine envoys, who delivered letters from Manuel. The first part of the letters sought to secure the crusaders' good will, as Odo sharply remarks, 'with such inept humility ... that I should say the words, too affectionate because they were not sprung from affection, were such as to disgrace not only an emperor, but even a buffoon'.[612] The chronicler comments that 'French flatterers, even if they wish, cannot equal the Greeks', and grasps the opportunity to cite the famous Virgilian passage condemning Greek treachery, 'I fear the Greeks, even when they bear gifts', a proverb which,

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[609] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 12-13.
[610] Ibid., 14-15.
[611] Ibid., 83.
[612] Ibid., 27.

as Odo claims, 'has always been well-known, even among certain laymen'[613] – normally, it was the clergymen who were educated and thus more likely to know a Classical proverb. For Odo, whose viewpoint is heavily coloured by hindsight, the bombastic language of the Byzantine imperial chancery confirmed the stereotype of the Greek as a treacherous flatterer.

The last part of the imperial letters contained two provisions that Manuel had earlier revealed to Pope Eugenius: Louis should not attack Byzantine territory and should promise to restore to Manuel any cities captured by the crusaders from the Turks which had originally belonged to the Byzantine Empire.[614] The French king and his magnates agreed not to seize any city or stronghold in Manuel's territory. However, disagreement arose on the second stipulation. One party amongst the French asked that Manuel's 'domain should be defined, so that a future quarrel could not be excited by the indefinite statement'.[615] This was a sensible request. However, the anti-Byzantine faction promptly rejected the stipulation.[616] Eventually, some of the French magnates swore on behalf of Louis to guarantee the security of the Byzantine Empire. In return, the Byzantine envoys promised an adequate market and fair exchange rate. Consideration of the second stipulation was postponed until Louis's arrival at Constantinople and his summit with Manuel.[617]

Dissatisfied with the exchange rate finally offered by the Byzantines upon the French entering their empire, Odo of Deuil accuses the Greeks of perjury (*periurium*).[618] Moreover, the chronicler relates that the supplies of food provided by the Byzantines were insufficient. This resulted in the French crusaders' resorting to plunder and pillage. However, Odo concedes that the inadequacy of the food supplies and the Byzantine mistrust of the French was due to the fact that the German crusading army, which had preceded the French, had consumed the available provisions and furthermore had committed excesses. As the chronicler eventually acknowledges, 'the Germans disturbed everything as they proceeded, and the Greeks therefore fled our peaceful king [Louis VII], who followed after'.[619] Odo does not fail to admit that 'the Germans were unbearable even to us [the French]'.[620] The chronicler reports that the advance part of the French crusading expedition, the Lorrainers, who had reached

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[613] Ibid.
[614] Ibid., 26-9.
[615] Ibid., 29.
[616] Ibid.
[617] Ibid.
[618] Ibid., 40-1.
[619] Ibid., 45. Cf. Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 60-7. For the German disorderly conduct in the Byzantine Empire, see also Runciman, 1951, II, 260-1, 266-7; Berry, 1969, 484-6; Mayer, 1988, 100; Magdalino, 1993, 49.
[620] Ibid., 43.

Constantinople while Louis VII was still in Philippopolis, 'could not endure the Germans' and 'were awaiting the arrival of the peaceful prince [Louis]'.[621] Since Odo rejects both the Greeks and the Germans while exalting the French and their *pacificus* king, Schuster is very right to point out that the *De profectione* 'illustrates how national identity came into being on crusade'.[622] From Odo's viewpoint, both Greek and Germans were the 'Others'. At the same time as the chronicler created a category called *noster*[623] ('our men'), another category of *illi*[624] ('they') was created in contrast. The pronouns *noster* and *illi* powerfully influenced Odo's perception. The chronicler unavoidably thought of *illi*, the *Alemanni* and the *Graeci*, as different from, and inferior to, *noster*, the *Franci*.

The army of Lorraine was forced by Manuel to cross the Bosporus before the rest of the French crusading expedition arrived in Constantinople, an act criticised by Odo.[625] A few Lorrainers, who refused to cross the Bosporus, were consequently attacked by Byzantine mercenary troops, composed of Petchenegs and Cumans. Passing over the disobedience of the French, Odo describes the attack as a 'wily crime' (*dolosum scelus*).[626] The Byzantine mercenaries being 'infidels', i.e. Petchenegs and Cumans, intensified the bitterness of the chronicler, who proceeds to condemn the fact that Christians 'were assailed by infidels in a Christian city'.[627] Eventually, peace was restored and a market was given to the French crusaders. Odo rhetorically states that 'this outcome would have satisfied the messengers if they had not judged one crime in the light of another (*scelus ex scelere*)'.[628] A hail of accusations against Manuel and the Byzantines is to follow.

As Odo reports, while at Constantinople, the French ambassadors learned that Manuel had concluded a treaty with the Turkish sultan of Iconium a few months earlier. Odo resentfully declares that 'the very man [Manuel] who had written to our king [Louis] that he was going to accompany him in fighting the infidels and had won a recent and renowned victory over them had actually confirmed a twelve-year armistice with them'.[629] Odo seems to have been aware of the contents of Manuel's letter to Louis dated August 1146. In this letter, the Byzantine

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[621] Ibid., 51.
[622] B. Schuster, 'The Strange Pilgrimage of Odo of Deuil', in *Medieval Concepts of the Past: Ritual, Memory, Historiography*, ed. Gerd Althoff, Johannes Fried and Patrick J. Geary (Cambridge, 2002), 254.
[623] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 42.
[624] Ibid.
[625] Ibid., 50-3.
[626] Ibid., 52-3.
[627] Ibid.
[628] Ibid., 54-5.
[629] Ibid.

ruler informed the French king that he was well disposed towards him and hostile to the Turks, against whom he was marching with the aid of God.[630] In the summer of 1146 Manuel had in actual fact declared war on the sultan of Iconium and marched on his capital which he besieged. After several months, the emperor retreated, with the intention to come back the following year. However, the participation of the German king in the Second Crusade and the growing number of Western crusaders who were to enter the Byzantine Empire in the summer of 1147 compelled Manuel to agree to the sultan's proposal for a truce in the spring of the same year. As most modern commentators rightly argue, Manuel wished to have his hands free to deal with the crusaders.[631] However, in the eyes of the anti-Byzantine faction amongst the French, the Byzantine emperor had betrayed the Christian cause.

Odo proceeds to record that Manuel's 'treachery (*perfidia*) was increased and made manifest by the fact that only a great number could get through his realm in safety; ... for from the time when we [the French crusaders] entered his territory we endured the robberies which his people perpetrated on us'.[632] However, as the chronicler himself admits, 'it could have been said that we [the French] deserved the evils which we suffered on account of the evils which we had committed'.[633] Odo's frank admission of guilt, which actually excuses Manuel's alleged *perfidia*, is immediately followed by accusations of *blasphemia*[634] ('blasphemy') against the Greeks. Simmering with resentment against the Byzantines, the chronicler begins enumerating what he considers as their *haereses*[635] ('heresies'): the Greek priests' purifying altars on which Latin priests celebrated mass, and the Greeks' re-baptising Latins who married Greeks. Odo states that the latter 'ill usage of theirs... should be expiated by death'.[636] The chronicler then mentions 'other heresies of theirs ... both concerning their treatment of the Eucharist and concerning the procession of the Holy Ghost'.[637] However, he does not discuss the two issues in more detail, even though the Byzantines' objection to the *Filioque* clause and

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[630] *RHGF*, 15, 9.
[631] S. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the XI^th^ and XII^th^ Centuries* (Oxford, 1955), 124-5; Harris, 2003, 99; Tyerman, 2006, 319; Laiou, 2005, 31. Phillips cites Roger's attack on the Byzantine Empire as a reason for Manuel's accepting the sultan's peace offer. However, the Norman attack occurred after the truce between Manuel and the sultan was signed. Phillips, 2007, 189-190.
[632] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 54-5.
[633] Ibid.
[634] Ibid., 54.
[635] Ibid., 56.
[636] Ibid., 57.
[637] Ibid.

their use of leavened bread had been the two main subjects of debate between the Latin and Greek Churches during the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.[638]

In terms of number of words written by Odo, rebaptism and purification of the altars outstrip the Byzantine 'treatment of the Eucharist' and the procession of the Holy Spirit. The Greek use of leavened bread and their objection to the *Filioque* were not considered insulting and, most likely, went unnoticed, at least by laymen and ordinary believers. On the contrary, Odo and the Latins in general regarded the rebaptism and purification of the altars by the Byzantines as deeply offensive. This is clearly testified by the fact that although Pope Innocent III accepted Greek customs and rites at the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215, he did not consent to these two practices.[639]

Odo, to a great extent, rightfully felt insulted by the narrow attitude of the Greek Church on the issues of rebaptism and purification of the altars. The chronicler concludes that 'actually, it was for these reasons that the Greeks had incurred the hatred of our men, for their error (*error*) had become known even among the lay people. Because of this they were judged not to be Christians, and the Franks considered killing them a matter of no importance'.[640] Odo's anti-Greek views and attitude may have been shared by a number of French, especially of the anti-Byzantine faction. However, as will become clear, the majority of the French, including the French king, far from adopting Odo's extreme views, considered the Greeks as Christian brethren and opposed slaughtering them. Louis himself was doubtless flattered by the fact that while marching through the Byzantine Empire, 'the congregations of the churches and the entire clergy always received him with due reverence and honour issuing forth from their cities with icons and other Greek paraphernalia'.[641] Subsequently, the French who were admitted within the walls of Constantinople visited the churches of the city 'out of faithful devotion' (*devotione fideli*).[642] They do not appear to have been deterred by the theological differences outlined by Odo.

Odo's severe criticism of the Byzantines does not come to an end with the enumeration of their 'heresies'. The set language employed by the Byzantine imperial chancery in the correspondence with the French king comes for a second time under Odo's attack. According

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[638] Runciman, 1955, 76-7, 108-10, 113-19.
[639] A. J. Andrea, 'Innocent III and the Byzantine Rite, 1198-1216', in *Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, la IVe Croisade et ses conséquences. Proceedings of an International Conference Organized by the Academy of Athens and Held March 9-12, 2004*, ed. A. E. Laiou (Paris, 2005), 112-15.
[640] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 56-7.
[641] Ibid., 45.
[642] Ibid., 66.

to the chronicler's claim, the Byzantine ambassadors 'always reported good news, but they never showed any proof of it, and they were the less believed because on every occasion all used the same prefatory flattery'.[643] As to the French king, Odo claims that he 'accepted but considered of slight value'[644] the *polychroniae*[645] of the Byzantine envoys. So overwhelming was Odo's anti-Byzantine prejudice that he transferred his own sentiments to Louis.

Resorting to the well-worn Classical stereotype of the effeminate Greeks, Odo makes a link between the Greeks' supposed effeminacy and their alleged perjury and lack of self-respect. As the chronicler recounts, 'the Greeks degenerated entirely into women (*in feminas*); putting aside all manly vigor, both of words and of spirit, they lightly swore whatever they thought would please us [the Franks], but they neither kept faith with us nor maintained respect for themselves'.[646] Odo, however, once more fails to support his allegation, which therefore seems implausible and based on sheer prejudice. Eventually, the chronicler takes his argument to the conclusion that 'in general they [the Byzantines] really have the opinion that anything which is done for the holy empire (*sacrum imperium*) cannot be considered perjury (*periurium*)'.[647] Odo's final statement has certainly an element of truth. The promotion and protection of the interests of the *Oikoumene*, the sole universal Christian Empire, in Byzantine eyes,[648] was the greatest preoccupation of Byzantine diplomacy. To this end a policy of calculated *Realpolitik* was pursued, which frequently entailed compromising on ideological principles. Indeed, at around the same time as Odo composed his work, Anna Komnena bluntly stated that 'so far as we know, a general's supreme task is to win, not merely by force of arms, but also by relying on treaties; and there is another way - sometimes, when the chance offers itself; an enemy can be beaten by fraud (*'ραδιουργοῦντα τὸν ἐχθρὸν καταγωνίζεσθαι*)'.[649]

After this outburst of anti-Byzantine rage, Odo strives to convince his audience that he is not prejudiced against the Byzantines. The chronicler invites his reader not to 'think that I am attacking a race of men hateful (*odiosum genus hominum*) to me and that because of hatred (*odio*) for them I am inventing somebody I have not seen'.[650] To assure his readership of his

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[643] Ibid., 57.
[644] Ibid.
[645] Ibid., 56. Ritual cheering by which the Byzantines wished long life to their emperors and certain nobles.
[646] Ibid., 56-7.
[647] Ibid.
[648] Obolensky, 1963, 52-3.
[649] Komnena, *Alexiade*, 135; Komnena, *Alexiad*, 405. Cf. 477.
[650] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 56-7. I made some amendments to Berry's translation.

objectivity, the chronicler rhetorically claims that 'whoever has known the Greeks will, if asked, say that when they are afraid they become despicable in their excessive debasement and when they have the upper hand they are arrogant in their severe violence to those subjected to them'.[651] Odo manifestly considered that, with regard to Louis VII, the Byzantines had become contemptible in their degradation as a result of their fear of the French king and his army. It is true that Manuel tried to flatter the French king and cajole him into agreeing to bypass the imperial capital and to cross the Dardanelles.[652] Roger's attack on the Byzantine Empire in the autumn of 1147,[653] which coincided with the passage of the crusading armies, may well have increased Manuel's unease at the approach of the French and intensified his attempts to divert the French crusaders away from Constantinople – just as he had tried to do with the Germans.[654] Nevertheless, the underscoring of Manuel's fear of the French by Odo and, especially, the majority of modern scholars[655] seems unreasonable. An examination of the available Byzantine sources demonstrates that Manuel and the Byzantines regarded the Germans, *not* the French, as posing a serious threat to Constantinople.[656] As Laiou correctly pointed out, 'the Byzantine sources ... say absolutely nothing about any danger coming from the French army'.[657] What is more, the Byzantine historian John Kinnamos, the secretary of Manuel, was even well disposed to Louis, despite the fact that he derived bitter satisfaction from the defeat of the German crusaders in Asia Minor.[658]

When the French crusading expedition was a day's journey from Constantinople, Louis met his envoys who informed him of Manuel's truce with the Seljuk sultan of Iconium and of the skirmish between the group of French crusaders and the emperor's mercenary troops. The anti-Byzantine party amongst the army immediately advised Louis to retreat and to begin

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[651] Ibid., 56-9.
[652] Ibid., 58-9.
[653] For Roger II's attack on the Byzantine Empire, see Angold, 1997, 200-1; Magdalino, 1993, 51; Runciman, 1951, II, 275.
[654] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 46-7.
[655] Angold, 1997, 194; Riley-Smith, 2005, 127; Lock, 2006, 149; Tyerman, 2006, 319, 322-3; Phillips, 2007, 190-1 , 205.
[656] In one of his poems, probably an imperial commission, the poet Manganeios Prodromos, who was writing very close to the event, has a personified Constantinople state: 'the wild beasts [i.e. the Germans of the Second Crusade] came to attack and devour me'. E. Jeffreys and M. Jeffreys, 'Immediate Literary Reactions in Byzantium to the Second Crusade', in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, eds Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, DC, 2001), 102, 104, n. 8: quotation of verses 8-13 from poem 24 of Manganeios Prodromos, verses 8-9: *Πεσόντας τοὺς ὀδόντας μου μαθόντα τὰ θηρία ἦλθον ὡς ἂν θηρεύσωσι καὶ καταφάγωσί με*. Cf. Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 58-72; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 38-40.
[657] Laiou, 2005, 29.
[658] Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 68-9.

seizing the lands of the Byzantine Empire and meanwhile to write to Roger II of Sicily, proposing a joint attack on Constantinople itself. The proposal, however, was rejected by the majority of the French, to Odo's resentment. Considering the Byzantines as the guilty party for the misfortunes of the Western crusading armies in Asia Minor, the chronicler exclaims that 'alas for us, nay, for all Saint Peter's subjects [i.e. the Latins], their [the anti-Byzantine party's] words did not prevail'.[659]

The French Crusaders at Constantinople

On 4 October 1147 Louis and the French army reached Constantinople. As reported by Odo, 'all its nobles and wealthy men, clerics as well as lay people, trooped out to meet the king and received him with due honour'.[660] In a letter written at Constantinople and addressed to his regent and adviser Abbot Suger of Saint Denis, Louis himself related that the crusaders reached Constantinople 'with every success and delight', and everything was 'joyful and prosperous' with them.[661] In another letter written at Antioch, the king recounted to Suger that the French arrived in the imperial capital 'in good health and unharmed ... and ... with our whole army safe and in excellent spirits'.[662] Louis's correspondence obviously contradicts Odo's allegations of *periurium* and *perfidia* against Manuel and the Byzantines. Upon arrival outside the walls of Constantinople, the French king responded positively to Manuel's request that he enter the imperial capital with a few of his men. Once there, Louis was received in the palace, where he had an audience with the emperor. As the king later related to Suger, 'there we were joyfully and honourably received by the emperor'.[663]

Unlike Robert the Monk, who had reviled Alexios I for prohibiting the unruly 'People's Crusaders' to enter Constantinople, Odo justifies the fact that Manuel did not allow the crusading throng to come into the imperial capital. Much to our surprise, the chronicler concedes that 'it was not held against the Greeks that they closed the city gates to the throng, since it had burned many of their houses and olive trees, either for want of wood or by reason

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[659] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 59.
[660] Ibid.
[661] *RHGF*, 15, 488.
[662] *RHGF*, 15, 495-6. Translated in G. A. Loud, 'Five Letters Concerning the Second Crusade', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1298-1301, at 1299-1300.
[663] Ibid., 496.

of arrogance and the drunkenness of fools'.[664] Louis often punished offenders by mutilation, yet he could not keep his army under control. The extent of the pillage is evidenced by Odo's statement that 'one of two things was necessary, either to kill many thousands at one time or to put up with their numerous evil deeds'.[665]

The French king was lodged at the suburban palace of Philopatium, near the land walls of Constantinople. He was conducted by Manuel around the palaces, churches and shrines of the capital and he was entertained at a banquet conducted with all due pomp and ceremony at the imperial palace at Blachernae. An impressed Odo relates that the 'banquet afforded pleasure to the ear, mouth, and eye with pomp as marvelous, viands as delicate, and pastimes as pleasant as the guests were illustrious'.[666] Although some of Louis' men, presumably of the anti-Byzantine faction, allegedly entertained fears of the king's being poisoned, Louis himself, according to Odo, 'feared nothing at all'.[667] On 9 October, on the Feast of Saint Dionysius, which was celebrated by both Westerners and Byzantines, Manuel sent over to Louis a group of his clergy.[668] The emperor must have sought not only to please and impress the crusaders but also to stress the religious affinity between the Byzantines and the French. Odo recounts that the Byzantine clergy 'made a favourable impression because of their sweet chanting; for the mingling of voices ... softened the hearts of the Franks. Also, they gave the onlookers pleasure by their graceful bearing and gentle clapping of hands and genuflexions'.[669] The Greek clergy had succeeded in impressing the French crusaders. Even Odo could not conceal his wonder at the spectacle.

Odo admits that during the French crusaders' stay at Constantinople, 'the Greeks furnished us no proof of perfidy (*nullum argumentum perfidia*)'.[670] Nevertheless, the chronicler interprets Manuel's and the Byzantines' behaviour in the light of the disasters that befell the French crusaders in Asia Minor and for which, from Odo's perspective, the Byzantine emperor was to blame. In the chronicler's eyes, Manuel's friendliness was only a ruse, aimed at 'concealing the wrongs which were to be avenged after we [the crusaders]

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[664] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 67.
[665] Ibid.
[666] Ibid.
[667] Ibid.
[668] For the Feast of Saint Denis (Saint Dionysios) and the liturgical relations between the monastery of Saint Denis in Paris and the Byzantine world, see H. Mayr-Harting, 'Odo of Deuil, the Second Crusade and the Monastery of Saint-Denis', in *The Culture of Christendom. Essays in Medieval History in Memory of Denis L. T. Bethel*, ed. Marc C. Meyer (London, 1993), 238-40.
[669] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 69.
[670] Ibid, 66-7. I made some amendments to Berry's translation.

crossed the Arm [i.e. Bosporus]'.[671] Viewing the Byzantines' behaviour in the most negative terms, Odo asserts in the first person that, 'I believe that they [the Byzantines] would not have exhibited such unremitting servitude if they had had good intentions'.[672]

Although Odo seems to have taken great pleasure in describing the imperial banquet and the Byzantines' chanting, he was anxious lest his reader notice some inconsistency in his attitude towards the Greeks or, even worst, conclude that the Greeks were not as bad as the prejudiced chronicler claimed – as has been seen, Odo is at great pains to convince his audience that he is not biased against the Greeks. Therefore, the chronicler invents the excuse that he recalls the favourable treatment of the French by the emperor in order that 'there may be manifest the treachery (*dolus*) of him [Manuel] who simulated the friendship (*affectum*) which we are accustomed to show only to our most intimate friends, while he harbored a feeling which we could not have appeased save by our very death'.[673]

While the French crusading army was at Constantinople and seemingly without provocation, Godfrey of Langres, the spokesman of the anti-Byzantine party, once again proposed an attack on Constantinople, alleging that the city was Christian only in name.[674] To support his claim and inflame anti-Byzantine sentiment, the bishop of Langres advanced three arguments, playing upon the French sense of *Christianitas*, including reverence for the pope, and veneration of the Holy Sepulchre. First, in 1137 the Emperor John I (1118-43), Manuel's father, had captured Anazarba, Tarsus, and Mamistra from the Franks, installing Greek bishops,[675] or, in Godfrey of Langres's words, *haereticis episcopis*.[676] Secondly, John had attacked Raymond of Poitiers (1136-49), prince of Antioch.[677] In 1137 John had laid siege to Antioch and compelled Prince Raymond to declare himself vassal of the emperor.[678] In 1142 the same emperor had led a second campaign against Antioch and demanded from Raymond the surrender of the city, its citadel, and all defences.[679] Godfrey of Langres propagandised that 'although it was his [John's] duty to ward off the nearby infidels by uniting the Christian forces, with the aid of the infidels [i.e. non-Christian mercenaries in the Byzantine army] he

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[671] Ibid.
[672] Ibid.
[673] Ibid., 68- 69.
[674] Ibid.
[675] Lilie, 1993, 105-7, 117-19; Phillips, 1996, 68.
[676] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 68-9.
[677] Ibid.
[678] Lilie, 1993, 120-1; Phillips, 1996, 69.
[679] Lilie, 1993, 136-7.

strove to destroy the Christians'.[680] Thirdly, in 1145 Manuel, 'the heir of that ... crime (*crimen*)',[681] had extracted homage from Raymond together with an agreement to install a Greek patriarch in Antioch,[682] thus 'scorning Peter's patriarch',[683] i.e. the pope, as Godfrey of Langres propagandised. Godfrey concluded his philippic against the Byzantines by inviting his hearers to decide 'whether you ought to spare the man [Manuel] under whose rule the cross and sepulchre of Christ are not at all safe and after whose destruction nothing would be hostile to them'.[684] In his ardently anti-Byzantine speech, the French bishop had portrayed the Byzantines as both heretics and enemies of the Christians, acting in collusion with the infidels.

Odo informs us that after Godfrey of Langres advanced his arguments, his proposal 'found favour with some' (*aliqui*).[685] Many (*plures*),[686] however, rejected Godfrey's proposal putting forward their own arguments against those of the bishop. As regards Godfrey's claim that the Byzantines were not Christians, the majority party replied that 'about their faith we are not able to judge, being ignorant of ... [canon] law'.[687] Concerning Byzantine attacks against Antioch, the moderates said that, although it was 'wicked' (*malum*), the emperor 'could have had justifiable reasons (*causas iustitiae*) which we do not know'.[688] In other words, the majority party manifestly took the view that it would be wrong to interfere in the dispute between Constantinople and Antioch. It should be mentioned in this connection that there were Westerners who explicitly allowed Byzantine claims on Antioch. Writing less than a decade earlier, Orderic Vitalis portrays King Fulk of Jerusalem (1131-43) as acknowledging that

> Antioch is part of the empire of Constantinople, and that it was wrested from the Emperor [Alexios I] by the Turks ... the Emperor's [John's] claims about the treaties of our ancestors[689] are true (*uera*) ... he [Raymond of Antioch] should make peace with the Emperor, and at my bidding receive the city from him to

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[680] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 70-1.
[681] Ibid.
[682] Lilie, 1993, 145, 155, n. 52; Magdalino, 1993, 42.
[683] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 70-1.
[684] Ibid.
[685] Ibid.
[686] Ibid., 70.
[687] Daly, 1960, 66. In my opinion, Daly's translation of the passage *De fide istorum non possumus iudicare legis ignari* is preferable to that of Berry: 'Without knowledge of the law we cannot judge about their good faith', Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 70-1.
[688] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 70-1.
[689] A reference to the oaths taken by the crusaders in 1097.

> whom it justly belongs (*cuius iuris est*) and so hold it rightfully (*legaliter*). For the Emperor is a Christian who has far-reaching power.[690]

This telling statement not only demonstrates that, for a number of Latins, Antioch rightfully belonged to the Byzantines, but also provides insight into how the Byzantine sovereign was perceived by the Latins: as *Christianus ... magnaeque potentiae*.[691]

The majority party's main counter-argument against an attack on Constantinople was that the Byzantines were fellow Christians. As they argued, when Pope Eugenius III had conferred with the French king, he had not instructed or advised him to fight against Christians. The crusaders' duty was 'to visit the Holy Sepulcher and, by the command of the supreme pontiff [Pope Eugenius], to wipe out our sins with the blood or the conversion of the infidels'.[692] From the majority party's viewpoint, the Byzantines were *Christiani*, and they rhetorically invited their audience to fight only 'if slaughtering Christians (*caedes Christianorum*) wipes out our sins' and if on the crusade 'it is as important to die for the sake of gaining money as it is to maintain our vow and our obedience to the supreme pontiff'.[693] Clearly, the majority party did not view the Byzantines as *haereticis*, but as Christian brethren, and implicitly criticised the anti-Byzantine faction, by suggesting that the real motivation behind its proposal was a desire to gain money by capturing Constantinople, the 'richest city of the Christians'.[694] The views of the majority party finally prevailed. The anti-Byzantine group once again lost the debate.

The evidence provided by Odo convincingly demonstrates that the ideal of Christian fraternity, an ideal shared *by the majority of the French*, played the most important role in the prevention of an attack on Constantinople. This explanation is fully adopted by Daly.[695] Other scholars, however, give different explanations as to the reasons that prevented the French crusaders from attacking the imperial capital. Lilie claims that 'seeing clearly that an attack on Constantinople ... offered little chance of success',[696] *Louis* (as if the king alone had made the decision) rejected the proposal. Moreover, he argues that 'above all, the furtherance of the crusade which was his [Louis's] main concern would be jeopardised by war with

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[690] Orderic Vitalis, *History*, VI, 506-9.
[691] Ibid., 508.
[692] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 70-1.
[693] Ibid., 70-1.
[694] Ibid., 70. '*urbem Christianorum ditissimam*'. I made amendments to Berry's translation.
[695] Daly, 1960, 61, 66-7.
[696] Lilie, 1993, 155.

Byzantium'.[697] Although Lilie's arguments seem rational, they *completely* overlook the evidence provided by Odo and, to the best of my knowledge, are not supported by any primary sources.

Runciman's explanations also disregard Odo's evidence. In his major work, *History of the Crusades*, the historian declares that the French king, content with his reception by Manuel and influenced by the humanist Bishop Arnulf of Lisieux, rejected Godfrey's proposal.[698] In his later work, *The Eastern Schism*, Runciman gives sole credit to Arnulf for having dissuaded the king from attacking Constantinople.[699] Runciman's first argument is reasonable. The kind treatment at Manuel's hands and the warm reception given to him by the Byzantines upon arrival in Constantinople may well have played an important role in Louis's rejection of Godfrey's proposal. However, Runciman's second argument, namely that Arnulf of Lisieux dissuaded the king from attacking Constantinople, is not supported by the evidence. Runciman's and Lilie's disregard for Odo's evidence is so utter that they both attribute the rejection of Godfrey's proposal solely to the French king. If Louis alone, however, had blocked Godfrey's proposal, as Runciman and Lilie argue, why did Odo not report this? Why did the chronicler record that the *plures* had rejected it? In fact, Odo makes not even a passing reference to the king when mentioning the debate about the proposal. Besides, Louis's authority was not actually very strong, as is evident in the *De profectione*.[700] As I stressed in Chapter 1, the crusaders' religious concerns and devotion to the ideal of Christian fraternity cannot be ignored by the historian;[701] these are actually the only concerns displayed by Odo's account and certainly played a major role in averting an attack on Constantinople.

In his work, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, Phillips, like Runciman, favoured the thesis that Louis, satisfied by the good treatment at Manuel's hands, and moreover not feeling 'sufficiently hostile to the Orthodox', was not persuaded into attacking Constantinople. In addition, Phillips argued that the strong defences of the imperial capital and the inadequate supplies of the crusaders may also have discouraged the crusaders from attacking the city.[702] The arguments advanced by Phillips are also rational. Although the part that the ideal of Christian fellowship played in the rejection of Godfrey's proposal was ignored by Phillips, it

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[697] Ibid., 155-6.
[698] Runciman, 1951, II, 269.
[699] Runciman, 1955, 126.
[700] Phillips, 2003, 91-2.
[701] Chapter 1, 93.
[702] Phillips, 2003, 87-8.

has been fully acknowledged in the scholar's recently published *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom*.[703]

While Louis was awaiting the French crusading forces that had left the main army at Worms and were traveling to Constantinople via Brindisi, rumours began to circulate about huge German successes in Asia Minor. According to Odo, the rumours were spread by the Byzantines in order to rush the French into crossing the straits.[704] The French, who, as the chronicler relates, envied the wealth and fame of the Germans, mounted pressure on their king to accelerate the army's transfer across the Bosporus.[705] Louis finally agreed to cross the straits before the French forces, which he had been awaiting, arrived. The allegedly Byzantine plan is described by Odo as treachery (*dolus*).[706] Runciman fails to refer to the rumours, while Lilie argues that 'whether this account is correct or not is uncertain'.[707] Riley-Smith mentions the rumours but avoids imputing their circulation to the Byzantines.[708] Adopting Odo's theory, Mayer relates that Manuel spread the rumours.[709] The same is implied by Berry,[710] and suggested as probable by Phillips.[711]

It is indeed highly probable that the rumours were a Byzantine device, and there is a logical explanation for this. The same rumours had it that Conrad had written to Manuel inviting him to hasten to Asia Minor to 'take possession of what had been conquered' by the Germans[712] - 'without effort on his part',[713] as Odo adds with indignation. It is only too logical that the rumours were spread by the Byzantines, since they incorporated the cardinal principle of Byzantine diplomacy that any territory conquered by the Westerners in Asia Minor should be restored to the Byzantine emperor. Moreover, given Manuel's anxiety to ship the crusaders across the Bosporus, it is almost certain that the Byzantines were responsible for the rumours.

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[703] Phillips, 2007, 195.
[704] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 72-3.
[705] Ibid.
[706] Ibid.
[707] Lilie, 1993, 156.
[708] Riley-Smith, 2005, 128.
[709] Mayer, 1988, 101.
[710] Berry, 1969, 491.
[711] Phillips, 2007, 193.
[712] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 72-3.
[713] Ibid.

Once established on the eastern shore of the Bosporus, the French, as Odo maintains, endured 'the craftiness (*versutias*) of the Greeks. They [the Byzantines] now had the opportunity which they had anticipated, and they dared to disclose their intentions'.[714] In fact, after a riot caused by certain crusaders, Manuel cut off supplies. Odo is honest enough to record that 'many (*plures*) have characterised the Greeks' actions towards us as revenge (*vindicta*), not malice (*malitia*)'.[715] However, the prejudiced chronicler does not adopt the majority's view. Being convinced that the Byzantine motivation was *malitia*, he criticises the crusaders' 'folly' (*vesania*), arguing that it enabled the Greeks 'to conceal their wickedness (*nequitia*)'[716] under the pretence of revenge. Odo was always able to construct an argument to oppose those *plures* who exonerated the Byzantines.

Bishop Arnulf and the chancellor Bartholomew were dispatched to Manuel as envoys to request the restoration of the market to the crusaders. The French ambassadors were led into the presence of Manuel the day after they arrived at Constantinople. Odo relates of the hardships allegedly suffered by the envoys - 'looking at pictures took the place of food, and at night the marble pavement was a substitute for a mattress or bed'[717] – and denounces the Byzantine ruler as 'impious' (*profanus*)'[718] and an 'idol' (*idolum*).[719] As Berry suggests, Manuel's designation as *idolum* is probably due to the fact that the emperor was treated as God's representative on earth, garbed in his fancy jeweled vestments, and surrounded by glittering ceremony and great pomp, thus reminding Odo of an idol.[720] The scholar's explanation is only too convincing.[721]

Having branded Manuel as *profanus* and *idolum*, Odo employs serpentine imagery, with its connotations of evil, to further defame the emperor. The chronicler relates that the eloquent Bishop Arnulf 'would have rendered the emperor tractable if that serpent (*serpens*) could have been charmed by anyone; but, deaf and swollen with poison as an adder, he had changed from

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[714] Ibid. I made minor amendments to Berry's translation.
[715] Ibid.
[716] Ibid.
[717] Ibid., 76-7.
[718] Ibid.
[719] Ibid.
[720] Ibid., 76, n. 34.
[721] The term *idolum* seems to have found currency in the twelfth century acquiring a variety of meanings. The term was used to mean a substitute when applied by the popes and their supporters to the anti-popes. See M. Stroll, *Symbols as Power: The Papacy Following the Investiture Contest* (Leiden; New York, 1991), 38-9.

the man whom they had seen before'.[722] Or 'more correctly', as the chronicler hastens to add rhetorically, 'the man stood revealed whom they had not known previously because he was hidden behind a veil of deceit (*doli tegmen*)'.[723]

Manuel finally supplied the French with a market and declared that he would soon send an embassy to Louis. From Odo's distorted point of view, 'the emperor still feigned kindness in order to be the more harmful'.[724] As the chronicler explains, the market was scanty, and Manuel delayed conferring with the French king. When the emperor finally dispatched envoys to Louis, he demanded that the French barons should pay homage to him and proposed a marriage alliance between one of his nephews and a kinswoman of the French king. In return, the emperor offered munificent gifts, fair rate of exchange, guides, markets, and the right to plunder where markets were not made available.

When Manuel's demands became known, the anti-Byzantine party represented by the bishop of Langres once again urged an attack on Constantinople. To stir up hatred towards Manuel, the aggressive faction attempted to exploit the French nobility's sense of honour, going as far as to label the Byzantine emperor as *impius* (impious) and *infidelis* (infidel).[725] They mainly argued that Manuel 'asks homage from you [the French nobles], whose subordinate he might have been ... let us place honour before convenience; let us acquire by force the advantages he promises us ... When we already have such a noble lord [Louis VII], it is certainly disgraceful to do homage to an infidel'.[726]

The anti-Byzantine party once more failed to prevail upon the king and the rest of the army to attack the imperial capital. Those opposing an attack against Constantinople, 'whose number (*numerus*) and reasoning (*ratio*) prevailed',[727] as Odo states with honesty, refuted the spurious argument advanced by the anti-Byzantine party. The majority party carried the day by putting up two forceful arguments. In France it was a custom (*consuetudo*) for homage to be paid in some circumstances to several lords, but first and foremost the vassals observed loyalty (*fides*) to the king of France.[728] The majority added with a hint of sarcasm: 'if we think this shameful, let us destroy the custom'.[729] Moreover, having appreciated that Manuel asked

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[722] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 76-7.
[723] Ibid.
[724] Ibid.
[725] Ibid., 78.
[726] Ibid., 78-9.
[727] Ibid.
[728] Ibid. Cf. Lilie, 1993, 25.
[729] Ibid.

for *hominium* from the French nobles, 'fearing for his own interests',[730] the majority party shrewdly suggested refusing to pay homage to the Byzantine sovereign only 'if it is dishonourable to do for the emperor what we do for lesser lords',[731] a powerful statement testifying to Manuel's being held in high esteem by the majority of the French nobility. Urging their fellow crusaders to observe their custom and take the oath of loyalty to Manuel, those of the majority party stated that this 'neither injures the king nor disgraces us'.[732] Taking their argument a stage further, they pointed out the necessity for cooperation with the Byzantine emperor 'in order to gain advantages for ourselves', namely supplies and guides.[733]

The majority party's second argument against an attack on Constantinople is a familiar one. They declared that 'we are marching against the pagans (*contra paganos*); with Christians let us be at peace'.[734] The Byzantines were still considered as Christian brethren by the majority of the French crusaders and the sense of Christian fraternity once more played a major part in the prevention of an attack on the imperial capital.

Manuel and Louis finally met and an agreement was reached between the two monarchs. According to it, the French king would not seize any city or stronghold which was under the Byzantine emperor's jurisdiction, a stipulation perceived by Odo as 'reasonable and modest' (*rationalis et modesta*).[735] As has been seen, the same request had been made by Manuel in his letters delivered to Louis at Regensburg, and the king and his magnates had agreed. Secondly, the emperor would provide the French crusaders with two or three of his nobles to act as guides and to furnish markets on the way. This provision is described by Odo as 'generous, but false' (*liberalis sed fallax*).[736] Having been cast as *sacrilegus* ('impious'), Manuel is accused by the French chronicler of having 'sullied with a new breach of faith, ... [having] stayed behind, procuring for only a few days the market which was needed for a long time and never sending the guides which he had promised'.[737] Several scholars concur that this accusation is unreasonable, since the Byzantine Empire was not in a position to provide sufficient food-supplies for two exceptionally large armies, especially in Asia Minor which

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[730] Ibid., 78-81.
[731] Ibid., 80-1.
[732] Ibid.
[733] Ibid.
[734] Ibid.
[735] Ibid., 80-3.
[736] Ibid., 82-3.
[737] Ibid.

was in a very bad state under the Komnenoi.[738] It is for this reason that the agreement between Manuel and Louis included the clause that the crusaders would have the right to plunder where markets were unavailable.[739]

Following the agreement between the two sovereigns, the French barons took an oath of loyalty to the Byzantine emperor, and both they and their king were, in Odo's words, 'honoured with gifts which were imperial in their generosity'.[740] Nevertheless, as several of the chroniclers of the First Crusade, Odo of Deuil perceived the taking of an oath of loyalty to the Byzantine emperor as unworthy of the French nobles. He even misinterpreted Louis's emotions to suit his own prejudices. The chronicler has the French king 'hardly endure the emperor's demand for homage from his men'.[741] In order to excuse Louis for agreeing to Manuel's request, Odo claims that the French king 'thought ... that his acquiescence would be advantageous to the service of God ... Since the king was excited about speeding against the pagans ... he preferred to alter his firm purpose to fit in with the emperor's will, rather than to retard the service of God in any way'.[742] That the furtherance of the crusade was Louis's major concern is doubtless true. However, it is unlikely that the king reluctantly agreed to Manuel's demand for *hominium*, since this neither contravened *mos nostrae consuetudinis* nor *regi facit iniuriam*.[743] It should finally be noted that, referring to the Byzantine emperor's demand for homage, Odo does not fail to express his own biased views on the subject and to dispute Manuel's *Christianitas*, by rhetorically arguing that 'if the emperor had been a Christian, he would have been under obligation to serve God without making any demands for himself'.[744]

After referring to the stipulations of the treaty between Manuel and Louis, Odo proceeds to connect a semi-eclipse of the sun with the alleged 'crime' (*scelus*)[745] of the Byzantine ruler. The chronicler, unable to see the eclipse in purely naturalistic terms, alleges that it happened because the sun saw Manuel's *scelus* 'which it could not endure'.[746] According to Odo, the French army identified Louis with the sun and 'feared that the king ... had been deprived of

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[738] Runciman, 1951, II, 274; Lilie, 1993, 158-9; Phillips, 2007, 196.
[739] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 83.
[740] Ibid.
[741] Ibid., 81.
[742] Ibid.
[743] Ibid., 80
[744] Ibid., 81.
[745] Ibid., 82-3.
[746] Ibid.

some part of his light by the treachery of the Greeks (*proditio Graecorum*)'.[747] It is reasonable to assume that this interpretation was put forward by the anti-Byzantine party in the army and was by no means shared by all the French crusaders. Eventually, after the French were informed that the German crusaders had been defeated in Asia Minor,[748] they 'explained the heavenly phenomenon more correctly',[749] as Odo relates. According to the 'right' explanation, the French 'king and the German emperor were one sun, since they shone with the light of one faith, and that half of the sun shone and half hid its rays because the Germans retreated while the king was proceeding with customary zeal'.[750] At least the 'correct' interpretation did not involve Byzantine treachery. It exalted the French king at the expense of the German ruler.

Closing Book IV of the *De profectione* with the 'correct' interpretation of the eclipse, Odo opens Book V with a blistering attack on Constantinople, which is personified as a female figure, in the Classical tradition. Accusations of arrogance, treachery and corrupt faith are thrown at the personified imperial capital: *Constantinopolis superba divitiis, moribus subdola, fide corrupta*; 'just as she [Constantinople] fears everyone on account of her wealth, she is dreaded by everyone because of her treachery (*dolis*) and faithlessness (*infidelitate*)'.[751] Only after his vitriolic vilification of Constantinople, Odo feels that he can proceed to describe the march of the French crusading expedition in Asia Minor.

The March of the French Crusading Expedition in Asia Minor

At the beginning of November 1147 Conrad and Louis met and consulted together at Nicaea. The French king agreed to wait for Conrad and the remnants of the German crusading expedition at Lopardium. In the meantime, markets became scarcer and the French had recourse to plunder. The Greek inhabitants reacted by harassing and sometimes killing crusaders of the weakened German troops who followed after. Odo does not fail to grasp the opportunity to fulminate against the Byzantines, lamenting the 'pitiable fortune' of the 'fierce' Germans who 'had now perished so miserably because of the treachery of the indolent Greeks

[747] Ibid.
[748] For the Germans' advance in Asia Minor and their annihilation, see Runciman, 1951, II, 267-8; Berry, 1969, 495-6; Phillips, 2007, 178-81.
[749] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 85.
[750] Ibid.
[751] Ibid., 86-7

(*dolis Graecorum inertium*)'.[752] Odo further prepares his audience for 'the fall of the Franks' to follow in his narrative, and invites the sons of both the Franks and the Germans to 'avenge their parents' death'.[753]

Schuster is right to point out that after the German annihilation Odo suddenly changed his attitude towards the Germans, feeling pity for them.[754] The same scholar favours the idea that this change occurred because Odo did not envy the Germans' fame and successes any longer.[755] It could be further added that after the German defeat Odo seems to have recategorised the Germans. He now regarded them as generally more likeable, and similar to himself, describing them as *noster socii* (our companions).[756] The chronicler changed his perception of two groups (*noster* and *illi*) to a perception of only one (*nos*), to which the Byzantines were now the 'Other'. As Odo records, 'to us (*nobis*, i.e. the French and Germans) who suffered the Greeks' evil deeds (*Graecorum scelera*) ... divine justice, and the fact that our people are not accustomed to endure shameful injuries for long, give hope of vengeance (*vindicta*)'.[757] Odo is now revealing one of the main objectives of his chronicle: 'so that posterity may know about the Greeks' treacherous actions (*Graecorum dolosa facinora*)'.[758]

The joint crusading army reached Esseron in November. There, the crusaders decided to march through Byzantine territory along the coast, a longer but better-supplied passage. Food, however, was expensive and many crusaders embarked Byzantine ships, in the words of Odo, 'without regard for the twofold danger', i.e. 'the Greeks' trickery (*Graecorum fraus*) or the winter storm'.[759] At Ephesus the German emperor became ill and left for Constantinople to recuperate. Byzantine ambassadors arrived to warn Louis that the Turks were gathering to fight against the crusaders and urged him to take refuge in the Byzantine fortresses. The French king ignored the imperial message and pressed on.[760] On 24 December 1147, the crusaders defeated the Turks in a skirmish near Ephesus. Hostile towards the crusaders, presumably due to their plundering during their passage, some of the Greek inhabitants had

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[752] Ibid., 98-9.
[753] Ibid.
[754] Schuster, 2002, 258.
[755] Ibid., 258-9.
[756] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 90.
[757] Ibid., 98-9.
[758] Ibid.
[759] Ibid., 106-7
[760] Ibid., 106-9.

cooperated with the Turks.[761] It is surprising, however, that on this occasion Odo does not hurl the usual abuse at the Greeks. Presumably satisfied by the outcome of the skirmish, the French chronicler felt no need to condemn the Byzantines.

At Decervium, the Turks reappeared and began harrying the crusaders. Eventually after a pitched battle the Turks were defeated and took refuge at Pisidian Antioch, a Byzantine fortress. Odo grasps the opportunity to vilify once more Manuel, who, in the chronicler's words, 'transformed himself from a wily traitor (*dolosus proditor*) to an avowed enemy (*apertus inimicus*)'.[762] Odo's accusation against Manuel, however, is baseless. The Byzantine emperor would hardly have given his consent to, or even have been aware of, the bargain made between the Turks and some of the inhabitants or the garrison of Pisidian Antioch, 'a poor little town',[763] as Odo himself describes it. This view is favoured by both Berry and Runciman. The former argues that Manuel 'was probably unaware' of the incident and 'certainly not responsible' for it,[764] while the latter writes that 'it is unlikely that the emperor himself had sanctioned the plan'.[765] Runciman's hypothesis that 'the local garrison had made some private arrangement with the infidel' sounds perfectly plausible.[766]

The crusading army arrived at Laodicea on the Lycus on 3 or 4 January 1148. Odo relates that the crusaders had marched along the border between Turks and Greeks, claiming that 'we knew that both were our common enemies (*unanimes inimici*)'.[767] From Laodicea the French began their march to Adalia. During their journey to the town, where they finally arrived on 20 January, the French found themselves confronted by many adversities. They suffered heavy losses from Turkish harrying attacks. Some Greeks, incensed at the crusaders' plundering activities, had allied themselves with the Turks. As Odo relates, the French were 'both preceded and followed on the road by Turks and Greeks'.[768] In addition, the crusaders were short of supplies, since the Turks and Greeks had burned the food stocks and destroyed the crops in the fields and the pasture.

Odo reports that 'the Turks and the Greeks were planning our [French] destruction in many different ways. For, although they were formerly enemies, they entered into an

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[761] Ibid., 108-9. *Turci Graecis ductoribus*. 'Turks under Greek guides' or 'Turks guided by Greeks' are in my opinion preferable translations to the one made by Berry: 'Turks under Greek leadership'.
[762] Ibid., 112-13.
[763] Ibid.
[764] Ibid., 112, n. 13.
[765] Runciman, 1951, II, 271.
[766] Ibid.
[767] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 112-13.
[768] Ibid., 115.

agreement for this very purpose'.[769] Runciman argues that it was indifferent to the local Greek inhabitants whether their food stocks and flocks were stolen by the crusaders or by the Seljuks, and naturally preferred the latter.[770] Lilie describes Runciman's argument as 'incomprehensible', and argues that it might have been all the same to the Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor by whom they were ill-treated but, ultimately, *the Turks* posed the greater danger.[771] The same historian, however, fails to explain why the local Greeks finally made common cause with the Seljuks. Further, both Runciman's and Lilie's arguments rest on the assumption that the Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor were relentlessly maltreated by the Turks. More recently, Phillips favoured the thesis that the Greeks may have cooperated with the Seljuks in order 'to conciliate' them: 'the crusaders would pass by but the Turks would remain and they could not afford to alienate them'.[772] Phillips's argument is convincing but incomplete. It should be added that, although on a political level the Byzantine Empire and the Seljuk Sultanate of Iconium were traditional enemies in Asia Minor, in the long run, the continuous contact between Greeks and Turks in the upper Meander valley led to the development of good relations at a local level between the two groups.[773] On the contrary, the French march in Asia Minor had been marked by looting and pillages. At Ephesus the Byzantine ambassadors set forth the damages (*damna*) inflicted by the crusaders on the Greeks in Asia Minor.[774] The insolence (*importunitas*) of the crusaders is criticised even by Odo himself.[775] This explains practically why a number of local Greeks decided to make common cause with the Seljuks against the French.

The crusaders finally reached Adalia on 20 January. There, supplies were available but at high prices. However, the crusaders were not able to obtain grain for their horses, and many French, looking at the bare land, said that 'the Greeks acted deceitfully (*dolose*) in this respect'.[776] This charge against the Greeks, however, was unfair, revealing an ignorance of the *status quo* in Adalia. In his *Historia*, when referring to the French crusaders' arrival at Adalia, William of Tyre, who was well aware of the political situation in the area, records that the town 'is subject to the emperor of Constantinople' and 'possesses very rich fields, which are,

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[769] Ibid., 127.
[770] Runciman, 1951, II, 276.
[771] Lilie, 1993, 159. Emphasis added.
[772] Phillips, 2007, 206.
[773] Magdalino, 1993, 124, 131-2.
[774] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 108-9.
[775] Ibid., 106-7.
[776] Ibid., 128-9. I made amendments to Berry's translation.

nevertheless, of no advantage to the townspeople, for they are surrounded by enemies on all sides who hinder their cultivation. Therefore, the fertile soil lies fallow, since there is no one to work it... [Thus] the grain supply is brought from overseas'.[777]

At Adalia the French barons recommended travelling to Antioch by ship, a fleet which the Greeks had promised to gather, in order to avoid the hazardous overland route.[778] Louis proposed that the non-combatants be sent by sea and himself and his knights follow the route of the men on the First Crusade. The king's proposal, however, met with resistance from the French barons. They declared that 'events went more easily for them [the men on the First Crusade] than they have thus far for us'.[779] According to Odo, the barons explained that the First Crusaders, once in Asia Minor, had to fight only against the Turks, while 'we met with the deceitful Greeks (*Graeci fraudulenti*), whom, much to our own harm, we treated with forbearance as if they were Christians'.[780] In addition, however, the French barons blamed their disasters on their own idleness as well as on weariness and molestations.

Berry argues that the speech of the French noblemen testifies to the fact 'that the anti-Greek feeling was strong'[781] at this point. This statement requires some examination. The crusading nobles manifestly ascribed part of their misfortunes in Asia Minor to the uncooperative and hostile behaviour of local Greeks. Nevertheless, as the French themselves admitted, they had spared these locals *since they considered them Christians*. Moreover, the nobles appear to have appreciated that the Byzantine emperor was not to blame for the behaviour of those local Greeks and, therefore, made no accusation against him. In addition, the fact that the French barons were inclined to depend on the Greeks to collect a fleet in order to transfer the army to Antioch demonstrates that not only cooperation between crusaders and Byzantines still remained close, but also that the French still trusted the Greeks. The anti-Greek feeling does not seem to have been as strong as Berry assumes. Undoubtedly, some Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor, infuriated by the crusaders' plundering, had been hostile towards the French and some of them had apparently gone as far as to cooperate with the Turks. Others, however, and above all the Byzantine authorities of Adalia were ready to cooperate with the crusaders.

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[777] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 178.
[778] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 131.
[779] Ibid., 133.
[780] Ibid., 132. *Graecos fraudulentos ... invenimus, quibus (malo nostro) velut Christianis pepercimus.* In my opinion this translation is preferable to the one made by Berry: 'we met with the wily Greeks, whom we spared, to our bad lack, as if they were Christians'.
[781] Ibid., 132, n. 15.

Since the barons' proposal finally prevailed, the French asked the Byzantines to provide the fleet. The latter promised enough ships to transfer the entire army. While the French were awaiting the fleet, prices soared even higher. Odo accused the Greeks that 'they performed all the evil deeds (*omnis malitia*) which they could, robbing us of goods in the market'.[782] When the ships finally arrived, they were so few that only the king, the barons and the bishops could sail. A long wait for more ships followed, during which prices in Adalia remained skyrocketed, and, as Odo resentfully reports, 'the Greeks ... robbed both classes [wealthy and poor] of their possessions'.[783] Odo's charges are once more unreasonable. The French crusading expedition was very large and the food in Adalia was increasingly becoming scarce. As William of Tyre records, 'at Adalia the king of the Franks and his people suffered from a serious shortage of food brought on by the great number of people who had come thither'.[784] As Runciman rightly points out, the scarcity of food inevitably led to price increases.[785] It is worth noting that even the French king himself conceded that food was more expensive on account of the many non-combatant pilgrims in the crusading expedition.[786]

Eventually, it was realised that no more vessels were coming and, therefore, the larger part of the army had no alternative but to march on to Antioch. Odo accuses the Greeks that they 'had lied about the ships'.[787] The evidence suggests that this was the prevailing view amongst the paupers of the army, who had to take the overland route to Antioch. Weary, starving, and anxious, they allegedly told the French king that 'it will be easier to endure the Turk's sword than the treachery (*dolus*) of these natives (*cives*) [of Adalia] after your departure'.[788] Their disappointment is understandable at one level. However, as modern historians have argued, it would have been very difficult for the Greeks to assemble a sufficient number of ships in Adalia to transport the whole French army, especially in mid-winter.[789]

In late February 1148, Louis and the French barons and clergy sailed to Antioch. Odo of Deuil was amongst them, and henceforth his information is reported second-hand. The morning after the king's departure, the Turks made a sudden attack on the crusaders, but were

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[782] Ibid., 132-3.
[783] Ibid., 135.
[784] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 179.
[785] Runciman, 1951, II, 274.
[786] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 131.
[787] Ibid., 137.
[788] Ibid.
[789] Runciman, 1951, II, 273-4; Lilie, 1993, 158-9.

beaten off. Odo charges the Greeks with having informed the Turks of Louis's departure.[790] The chronicler's accusation, however, seems to be once again groundless and based on downright prejudice. Since Adalia bordered very closely on Turkish territory,[791] the Turks doubtless monitored enemy troop movements. They certainly did not need to wait for the Greeks to inform them.

The part of the army that had remained behind eventually began its march to Antioch. The Turks annihilated the bulk of this army and only a remnant finally reached the city in the late spring. Odo recounts that, as he had heard, after a crushing defeat of the crusaders by the Turks 'by the blood of these soldiers [the crusaders] the Turks' thirst was quenched ... the Turks returned to see the survivors and then gave generous alms to the sick and the poor'.[792] On the contrary, according to Odo, 'the Greeks' treachery (*dolus*) was transformed into violence (*violentia*) ... the Greeks robbed those who had anything left'.[793] Odo records that many crusaders eventually entered into the service of Greeks or, preferably, Turks. In the chronicler's words, 'avoiding the fellow-believers (*socii fidei*) who were so cruel (*crudeles*) to them, the Franks went safely among the unbelievers (*infideles*), who had compassion on them'.[794] The source of this information is not obvious. Odo could have obtained it from the small number of crusaders who finally managed to arrive at Antioch. It is possible that this information is reliable. The French's pillages and *importunitas*[795] in Byzantine Asia Minor must have naturally resulted in the Greeks' awaiting an opportunity for revenge. What is worth noting is that, even while condemning the Greeks, Odo eventually admits that they were indeed *socii fidei* (fellows in faith) to the French. The contradiction is apparent between this admission of *societas fidei* with the Greeks and Odo's earlier accusations of *haereses* and *fides corrupta* against them.

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[790] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 139.
[791] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 178.
[792] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 140-1.
[793] Ibid.
[794] Ibid.
[795] Ibid., 106.

Graecorum culpa?: the End of the Second Crusade and the Attribution of Blame

On 19 March Louis arrived at Antioch. While in the city, the French king decided to march southwards to Jerusalem without further delay.[796] Conrad, having travelled with a Byzantine fleet, landed at Acre in the middle of April. The crusading leadership and the High Court of Jerusalem met at Acre on 24 June 1148. After some debate the assembly decided to attack Damascus, a city of unquestionable military importance which however did not threaten the Latin States at that time. The attack failed completely and earned the Latins the enmity of the inhabitants of Damascus. The fiasco at Damascus caused bitterness while accusations of treachery were hurled at various individuals and groups.[797]

Conrad III left Palestine on 8 September 1148 on a ship bound for Thessalonika, where Manuel and the German king made an alliance against Roger II of Sicily. The alliance was sealed by the marriage of Conrad's half-brother, Henry of Austria, and Theodora, Manuel's niece. While Conrad experienced a full measure of Byzantine hospitality, Louis lingered on in Palestine. In the early summer of 1149 the French king finally left Palestine in a Sicilian vessel. However, since the Byzantine-Sicilian war was still in progress at that time, the ship containing the French king was attacked and nearly captured by part of the Byzantine fleet. Another ship on which many of Louis's followers were travelling was seized, and the queen was detained for a time by the Byzantines.[798]

The Second Crusade in the East had ended in utter failure. According to Runciman, 'the whole episode of the Second Crusade marked an important and disastrous turning-point in the relations between the peoples of Western and Eastern Christendom. The Westerners returned thinking that the Byzantines had been treacherous and disloyal to the Faith'.[799] Lilie argues that 'it is understandable that, in the West, the Byzantines should be blamed for this spectacular failure'.[800] Angold favours the view that 'the fate of the Second Crusade confirmed the worst prejudices that Westerners had about the Byzantines. They were

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[796] For Louis' stay in Antioch and his decision to march southwards to Jerusalem - a much-debated issue by scholars - see Runciman, 1951, II, 278-9; Berry, 1969, 503-4; Phillips, 1996, 90-6; Tyerman, 2006, 329-31; Phillips, 2007, 207-12.

[797] For the siege of Damascus, see Runciman, 1951, II, 279-85; Berry, 1969, 504-11; Tyerman, 2006, 332-5; Phillips, 2007, 213-27.

[798] Angold, 1997, 197; Tyerman, 2006, 335-6.

[799] Runciman, 1955, 128.

[800] Lilie, 1993, 158.

malicious and hypocritical, to which were added religious differences'.[801] Madden advocated the thesis that, after the Second Crusade, 'the perception that the Byzantines were part of the problem rather than the solution became widespread ... the crusades were driving East and West farther apart'.[802] Even more recently, in *The Crusades: An Encyclopaedia*, Morris argued that 'the failure of the crusade left a legacy of bitterness toward Byzantium in the West, as reflected in the account of Odo of Deuil'.[803]

On the other hand, in 1953 Giles Constable supported the thesis that 'all Western Europe did not believe that the Greeks had betrayed the crusade'.[804] In 1997 the same scholar added more explicitly that Manuel 'was widely considered responsible for the failure of the Second Crusade'.[805] Likewise, most recently Jonathan Harris has favoured the view that 'it was widely, though by no means universally, believed in the West that the crusade failed at least partly thanks to Byzantine machinations'.[806] Which of these views, however, are consistent with the evidence provided by the primary sources?

God's Will, Devil's Work, and Crusaders' Sins

A small number of writers, like Bernard of Clairvaux, ascribed the failure of the Second Crusade completely to the inscrutable Divine Will. Bernard, in the opening portion of the second book of his work, *De Consideratione*, argues that 'we all know that the judgements of the Lord are true ... Still, how strange it is that men are so rash as to dare to reprehend what they cannot possibly comprehend! Let us call to mind the judgements of former times, which have been since the world began, if haply find consolation in them'.[807] Quite similarly, Otto of Freising attributes the failure of the crusade to human sinfulness and chiefly to the hidden ways of God.[808] From Otto's standpoint, although the expedition 'was not good for the

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[801] Angold, 1997, 199.
[802] Madden, 2005, 61.
[803] R. Morris, 'Manuel I Komnenos', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 3 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 796.
[804] Constable, 1953, 273.
[805] G. Constable, 'The Crusading Project of 1150', in *Montjoie: Studies in Crusade History in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayer*, eds Benjamin Z. Kedar, Jonathan Riley-Smith, and Rudolph Hiestand (Aldershot, 1997), 67.
[806] Harris, 2003, 100.
[807] Saint Bernard, *De Consideratione*, 38. For Saint Bernard's apologia for the Second Crusade included in the *De Consideratione*, see also E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading: 1095-1274* (Oxford, 1985), 79-80.
[808] Otto of Freising, *Deeds*, 79, 103-6.

enlargement of boundaries or for the advantage of bodies, yet it was good for the salvation of many souls'.[809]

On the contrary, some other writers, such as Gerhoh of Reichersberg, and the author of the *Annales Herbipolenses* (of Würzburg) regarded the entire expedition as the work of the Devil.[810] Gerhoh of Reichersberg discusses the crusade under the general title *De investigatione Antichristi liber I.*[811] The Würzburg annalist relates that 'God permitted the Western Church to be afflicted, because of its sins. As a result, certain pseudo-prophets emerged, sons of Belial, witnesses of Anti-Christ, who seduced the Christians by stupid words, and by false preaching induced all sorts of men to march against the Saracens for the liberation of Jerusalem'.[812] The implication is clear: from the Würzburg annalist's perspective, Bernard of Clairvaux, the foremost advocate of the Second Crusade, authorised by Pope Eugenius III to preach it, was a pseudo-prophet. In the aftermath of the disastrous expedition to the East, the authority of Bernard and the Church of Rome had been fatally undermined. Criticisms were levelled at both the abbot of Clairvaux and the papacy.[813] In the second book of his *De Consideratione*, Bernard says: 'I gladly welcome the tongues that speak against me, and the poisoned darts of blasphemers, if only they may not reach Him [God]'.[814] Writing to Louis VII in 1159, Pope Adrian IV (1154-9) reminded the French king

> how great a disaster and cost resulted therefrom [after the Second Crusade] to the Church of God and to almost the entire Christian people. And the Holy Roman Church, since she had given you advice and support in this matter, was not a little weakened by this; and everyone cried out against her in great indignation, saying that she was the author of so great a peril.[815]

The majority of Western writers believed that God caused the catastrophe, but at the same time they attempted to provide an explanation for the divine punishment. The most usual explanation was that the crusaders' sins provoked the wrath of God, who thus withdrew his

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[809] Ibid., 105-6.
[810] Constable, 1953, 268; M. Hoch, 'The Price of Failure: The Second Crusade as a Turning-Point in the History of the Latin East', in *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, ed. Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester, 2001), 184.
[811] Gerhoh Reichersbergensis, *De investigatione*, 304-95.
[812] *Annales Herbipolenses*, *MGH SS*, 16, 3.
[813] R. Hiestand, 'The Papacy and the Second Crusade', in *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, ed. Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester, 2001), 46-7.
[814] Saint Bernard, *De Consideratione*, 41.
[815] *PL* 188: 1616. The translation follows Constable, 1953, 275.

favour.[816] Henry of Huntingdon relates that 'the armies of the emperor of Germany and the French king, which marched out with great pride .... came to nothing ... For their incontinence, which they practised in open fornication, rose up in the sight of God. They also greatly displeased God by their adulteries. Lastly in robberies and all kinds of crimes'.[817] As a result, according to Henry, the crusaders 'were laid low, first by the treachery (*proditio*) of the emperor of Constantinople, and later by the swords of the enemy'.[818] The historian then proceeds to contrast the Second Crusade to the Holy Land with the successful Spanish Crusade. As he explains, the Spanish Crusade 'was made up of ordinary, rather than powerful, men, and was not supported by any great leader, except Almighty God'.[819] Nevertheless, these crusaders 'prospered a great deal better, because they set out in humility'.[820] Finally, Henry contrasts the Second Crusade to Palestine with the First Crusade, and observes that 'the armies of the French king [Louis] and the emperor [Conrad] had been more splendid and larger than that which earlier had conquered Jerusalem, and yet they were crushed by very much smaller forces and were destroyed like a spider's web'. The reason was that, as the chronicler quotes from the first epistle of Saint Peter, 'God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble'.[821] Obviously, the crusaders' *superbia* was viewed by Henry as much more to blame for the failure of the crusade than Manuel's *proditio*.

Similarly, the Gembloux continuation of Sigebert reports that the armies of Conrad and Louis were worn out by misfortunes, famine and death, which befell them through divine judgment. Since many sins and many unlawful and shameful acts were committed by the crusaders, the wrath of God ascended against them, and all their effort yielded nothing.[822]

According to the *Casus monasterii Petrishusensis*, at the beginning the crusaders proceeded humbly and peacefully with the fear of God, and therefore their efforts met with success. However, since they afterwards began plundering, elevated by arrogance, they were stricken by diverse disasters. Proceeding through the desert, they found no provisions, and thus many perished from famine, while others either were killed by the Turks or died in captivity.[823] The *Ex anonymo Blandinensi Appendicula ad Sigebertum usque in annum 1152*

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[816] Siberry, 1985, 77-8; Constable, 1953, 270-1.
[817] Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia*, 752-3.
[818] Ibid.
[819] Ibid.
[820] Ibid.
[821] Ibid.; 1 Peter 5:5.
[822] *Sigeberti Continuatio Gemblacensis*, *MGH SS*, 6, 390.
[823] *Casus monasterii Petrishusensis*, *MGH SS*, 20, 674.

mentions that the struggle of the crusaders was vain, because God was not with them. Thus, many were captured and killed by the Turks, while innumerable others died from famine and hardships.[824]

The *Annales Egmundani* relates that the disaster of the crusade was the result of the treachery of wicked Christians – but it does not specify whether these were Greeks, as well as of the attacks of the pagans, the error in the choice of route, and the hardships. Nevertheless, the annalist of Egmond, unable to comprehend the catastrophe in completely naturalistic terms, explains that it was due to the fact that the crusaders had confidence not in God but in their own strength. After their ruin, they learned that a man cannot trust in his own strength, since his enemies fear only God.[825] This very belief is corroborated by the evidence provided by Odo of Deuil. As the French chronicler records, the Germans, after their defeat in Asia Minor, 'first accused themselves, because, trusting too much in their own powers, they were offending God more often and to a greater extent than usual'.[826] Odo does not fail to pass judgment on the behaviour of the Germans, saying that 'rightly enough' they blamed their misfortunes on their overconfidence and pride that offended God.[827]

William of Newburgh recounts that 'after entering Asia Minor ... they [the crusaders] experienced the treachery (*perfidia*) of the Greek emperor'.[828] The historian, however, endeavours to make an objective assessment of the situation, recording that the Westerners 'had indulged in certain excesses, and had incurred his [Manuel's] displeasure'.[829] The crusaders are reproached for the fact that 'though they were in the territory of a Christian emperor (*Christianus imperator*) with whom they had struck a treaty and at whose orders plentiful provisions were available to them, they did not refrain from plundering'.[830] William remarks that, as a direct result of the crusaders' disorderly conduct, 'the emperor became hostile, and inflicted hunger on them ... and unleashed enemies (*hostem*)'.[831] As regards the identity of the enemy, no information is provided. It seems, however, that, from William's point of view, Manuel had finally gone too far. Having criticised the crusaders for plundering the territory of a Christian emperor - it is notable that Manuel's *Christianitas* is fully

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[824] *Ex anonymo Blandinensi Appendicula ad Sigebertum usque in annum 1152*, *RHGF*, 14, 20.
[825] *Annales Egmundani*, *MGH SS*, 16, 456.
[826] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 91.
[827] Ibid.
[828] William of Newburgh, *English Affairs: Book I*, 92-3.
[829] Ibid., 93. Emphasis added.
[830] Ibid., 94-5.
[831] Ibid.

acknowledged, William now proceeds to castigate the Byzantine ruler for the fact that 'though he was a Christian, he did not recoil from the risk of shedding all that Christian blood'.[832] To the chronicler, the most scandalous aspect of the Byzantine ruler's 'shedding ... Christian blood' was precisely that he was a Christian emperor.

From William of Newburgh's standpoint the disaster of the crusade was not only due to Manuel's avenging fury. It was also the result of enemy ambushes and, above all, of the behaviour of the crusaders that provoked the wrath of God. Therefore, William's reproaches against the crusaders do not only concern their disorder in Byzantine lands that aroused Manuel's resentment. Being in line with several contemporary historians, William relates that 'by their arrogant and uncontrolled behaviour they [the crusaders] had fired the anger of almighty God .... against them'.[833] As to the crusaders' allegedly immoral behaviour, the historian reports that

> in that army of ours such great abuses had arisen which were contrary to Christian discipline as much as to that of the camp, that it is not surprising that divine favour did not smile at all on the troops, as they were defiled and unclean ... our camp was not chaste, for the lusts of many spurted forth in that place especially, with a disastrous licentiousness.[834]

After disapproving of the Westerners' dissolute behaviour, William goes on to censure their overconfidence and conceit. The historian records that the crusaders 'placed reliance on the numbers and equipment of their forces, arrogantly accounting the flesh as their strength, and putting less reliance on the mercy and the power of the Lord, on whose behalf their efforts were supposedly directed'.[835] William quotes the same passage from the first epistle of Saint Peter that Henry of Huntingdon had used, declaring that the outcome of the expedition to the East made 'it ... clear that "God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble"'.[836] In the historian's eyes, even the bad climatic conditions that 'removed more of our army than was consumed by enemy swords' were the result of divine judgment. As William explains, 'the anger of heaven ... did not fail to punish these arrogant and impure men [the crusaders]'.[837]

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[832] Ibid.
[833] Ibid., 93.
[834] Ibid., 95.
[835] Ibid.
[836] Ibid.; 1 Peter 5:5.
[837] William of Newburgh, *English Affairs: Book I*, 95.

Geoffrey of Vigeois claims that once in the Byzantine Empire, Conrad and Louis clearly discerned that Manuel was acting secretly and setting traps for them.[838] No further clarification, however, is provided regarding this issue and, more to the point, Geoffrey does not ascribe the failure of the expedition to Manuel's supposed treachery. According to the chronicler, the crusading armies perished having accomplished nothing at all, because they had acted in a disorderly manner and, chiefly, because of their injustice and arrogance, that incurred the wrath of God. Geoffrey explains that, before the expedition, the crusading leaders, promising false bails, seized the treasures of the churches and harassed the powerless people with dreadful taxes.[839] Then, adds Geoffrey, the crusaders proceeded to the Holy Land, to the 'humble Christ', with pomp and arrogance. The subsequent inglorious outcome of the crusade is attributed by the same chronicler to the 'humblest Justice'.[840] A thesis similar to that of Geoffrey of Vigeois is advanced by Robert of Torigni, who ascribes the ignominious debacle of the expedition to the disgraceful 'robbery of the poor and spoliation of the churches'.[841]

Several writers, however, did not view the catastrophe as the result of divine punishment, but sought an explanation for the disaster only in natural causes. According to the *Historia Welforum Weingartensis*, almost all the crusading army perished because of starvation, bad weather, unfamiliarity of foods, and the attacks of the Turks.[842] In his *Chronicon*, when referring to the devastation of the crusaders in Asia Minor, Richard of Poitiers relates that others were captured by the Turks, innumerable others were killed by sword, and others still perished by famine and exhaustion on the way.[843] No accusations against Manuel and the Byzantines occur either in the *Historia Welforum Weingartensis* or in Richard's *Chronicon*.

John of Salisbury records that 'besides the misfortunes that befell the Christians through the deceit (*dolo*) of the Byzantine Emperor and the forces of the Turks, their army was weakened by the jealousy of princes and the wrangling of priests'.[844] Apart from this passing reference to the disasters that allegedly fell upon the crusaders through Manuel's treachery, John says nothing about the emperor's supposed role in the failure of the Second Crusade. In

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[838] Geoffrey of Vigeois, *Chronicon*, *RHGF*, 12, 436.
[839] Ibid. For the first royal crusading tax levied by the French King Louis VII in 1146 to finance the Second Crusade, see Siberry, 1985, 118-19.
[840] Ibid.
[841] Robert of Torigni, *Chronica*, 154.
[842] *Historia Welforum Weingartensis*, *MGH SS*, 21, 468.
[843] Richard of Poitiers, *Chronicon*, *RHGF*, 12, 416.
[844] John of Salisbury, *Historia*, 54.

fact, as will be seen below, the evidence from the *Historia Pontificalis* demonstrates clearly that, from John of Salisbury's viewpoint, the crusaders themselves and their leadership were by far more responsible for the disastrous outcome of the expedition than was the Byzantine emperor.

Manuel and the German Crusading Army

Odo of Deuil considered that the Byzantines and, above all, their emperor were mostly to blame for the disasters that befell not only the French but also the Germans in Asia Minor. In the last book of his *De profectione* the chronicler rhetorically asks 'how will a just judge, either God or man, spare the Greek emperor, who by cunning cruelty (*dolosa crudelitate*) killed so many Christians in both the German and the Frankish armies'?[845] Odo alleges that after their annihilation in Asia Minor the German crusaders 'cursed the idol of Constantinople [Manuel]', who had given them 'a treacherous guide' (*conductorem et traditorem*).[846] As the chronicler claims, the guide that Manuel provided the Germans with had ordered them while at Nicaea to supply themselves with provisions for eight days only, then led them astray into inaccessible mountains, and eventually fled and summoned the Turks 'to the prey', i.e. the hungry and exhausted Germans.[847]

As in the case of the ill-fated Crusade of 1101, the crusaders in the ranks of the German expedition of the Second Crusade, being attracted to conspiracy theories and essentially looking for someone to blame for their failure, scapegoated Manuel and their Byzantine guide. Manuel was perceived by the Germans as a powerful ruler; the Byzantine emperor had doubtless made sure of this, when the German crusaders were in Constantinople. After all, it was an aim of Byzantine diplomacy 'to impress "barbarian" outsiders with the special nature of the emperor, his city and his empire',[848] to use the words of a modern commentator. The fact that Manuel was regarded by the Germans as all-powerful, and thus as able to dictate the course of events, resulted in the Byzantine emperor's being blamed by German crusaders for their defeat in Asia Minor. Although Lilie argued that the accusation of betrayal against the

[845] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 136-7.
[846] Ibid., 90-1.
[847] Ibid.
[848] Harris, 2003, 26.

Byzantines 'seems to have been a later addition by the chroniclers',[849] the evidence from Odo does not support the scholar's view. Although in fact conspiratorial myths, the allegations of treason against the Byzantine emperor began to circulate amongst members of the rank and file of the German crusading expedition immediately after the Germans' annihilation in Asia Minor.

Odo accuses Manuel that, by providing the Germans with a *conductorem et traditorem*, he 'had done as much as he could to prostrate the Christian faith, strengthen paganism, encourage the timid pagans, and cool our [the crusaders'] ardour'.[850] The wildest accusations against the Byzantine sovereign found in certain narratives of the Crusade of 1101 were revived by Odo: Manuel, like his grandfather Alexios, was an ally of the Muslims and consequently an enemy of the crusade and by extension of the Christian faith. We should examine, however, what other Latin historians and annalists say about Manuel and the German crusading expedition in order to understand whether the view that the Byzantine sovereign had betrayed the Germans to the Turks was widespread among the Latins.

The *Annales Magdeburgenses* relate that Conrad was kindly received by Manuel, but was deceitfully (*subdole*) taken out of the way by the Byzantine ruler and was led away into deserted and pathless regions, where his army died from famine, thirst, and Turkish attacks.[851] Gerhoh of Reichersberg reports that while at Constantinople the German emperor was craftily deceived (*callide circumventus est*) by the Greeks and was led by his guides into a desert, where his army was devastated by hardships, famine and thirst.[852] The writer, however, does not imply that the guides were acting under instructions from Manuel. Gerhoh specifically records that the guides had been bribed with gold and money into leading the Germans to a desert,[853] but does not mention who bribed them. In general, Gerhoh refers only vaguely and in passing to the purported Greek deception of Conrad. From the perspective of the chronicler, author of the *De investigatione Antichristi*, the blame for the inglorious outcome of the Second Crusade laid at the door of the Western Church and the Franks of *Outremer*. Similarly, Helmold writes that, 'led into a very great desert through the treachery of a legate of the king of Greece, ... [the Germans] all perished of hunger and thirst'.[854] The chronicler, however,

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[849] Lilie, 1993, 154.
[850] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 90-1.
[851] *Annales Magdeburgenses*, *MGH SS*, 16, 188.
[852] Gerhoh Reichersbergensis, *De investigatione*, 375.
[853] Ibid.
[854] Helmold, *Chronicle*, 174.

does *not* consider the Byzantine sovereign responsible for his legate's allegedly treacherous action. Furthermore, it must be underlined that neither the *Annales Magdeburgenses* nor Gerhoh or Helmold record or imply that the Byzantines had acted in league with the Turks.

Persistently eager to revile the Byzantines, William of Tyre relates that the Greek guides, 'led by innate malice (*innata malicia*) and customary hatred (*consueto odio*) for our men [i.e. the Latins] ... purposely led the legions by unfrequented routes and drew them into places which offered the enemy favourable opportunities to attack and overcome a credulous people'.[855] Subsequently, they fled overnight. William casts the guides as *pestilentes viri*[856] and denounces their *fraus*, *malicia*, and *perfidia*,[857] 'which led the betrayed army to descend into the abyss of death'.[858] The historian recounts that the Byzantine guides drew the Germans into remote places, 'either because commanded by their master (*de mandato domini*) or because bribed by the Turks'.[859] As William further adds, 'it was common talk (*dicebatur publice*), and probably quite true, that these perilous wanderings [of the Germans] were devised with the knowledge and at the command (*de conscientia et mandato*) of the Greek emperor',[860] who, according to the Latin historian's explanation, 'envies the successful advance of our men [i.e. the Latins']'.[861] Taking his argument one stage further, William alleges that 'the Greeks are said to have always looked with distrust (*suspectum*) on all increase of our [the Latins'] power, especially of that of the Teutons, as rivals of the empire (*imperium emulantes*). They take it ill (*moleste ferunt*) that the king of the Teutons calls himself the emperor of the Romans'.[862]

That the Byzantines mistrusted the Westerners' increasing power has a ring of truth. This however was only too natural, since many Western powers had threatened the territorial integrity, the interests, and the political ideology of the *Oikoumene*. William was well aware of the *Zweikaiserproblem* and of the fact that the Byzantines resented the German emperor's designating himself as *Romanorum imperator*, an action regarded as a disgraceful usurpation

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[855] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 744; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 168. I made amendments to the translation by Babcock and Krey.
[856] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 744.
[857] Ibid., 745.
[858] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 169.
[859] Ibid., 168; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 744.
[860] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 745-6; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 170.
[861] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 746; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 170. I made amendments to the translation by Babcock and Krey.
[862] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 746; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 170. I made amendments to the translation of Babcock and Krey.

of their own title. In Byzantine eyes, the Byzantine emperor was the sole legitimate emperor of the Romans. As we are informed by Liudprand of Cremona, ambassador of the German Emperor Otto I (962-73) to the court of the Byzantine Emperor Nicephoros (963-9) in 968, a letter of Pope John XIII (965-72) was sent to Nicephoros on 15 August of the same year, addressing the Byzantine ruler as *imperatorem Graecorum* ('emperor of the Greeks') and designating Otto as *imperatorem Romanorum* ('emperor of the Romans').[863] When the papal letter was read,

> the Greeks cursed the sea, and heaped imprecations on the waves, amazed beyond measure that the element could have supported something so sinful, and that the seething sea did not engulf the ship carrying it [the letter]. They exclaimed: 'The sheer audacity of calling the universal emperor of the Romans (*universalem Romanorum*), the august, the unrivalled Nicephorus, "emperor of the Greeks", and calling some poverty-stricken barbarian "emperor of the Romans". Ye Heaven, earth and sea![864]

Even Liudprand was amazed that 'this word and superscription, so wicked and arrogant in the eyes of the Greeks, did not prove a death warrant for the messenger who brought it, ... it did not cause his extinction even before the letter was read'.[865]

In the twelfth century, the *Zweikaiserproblem* was still there. In a letter sent to Conrad in 1142 or 1143, the Byzantine Emperor John I styled himself as *imperator Romanorum* and addressed the German king as *rex*.[866] In a letter to Manuel in 1145, Conrad called himself *imperator Romanorum* and the Byzantine emperor *rex Grecorum*.[867] William of Tyre correctly observed that for the Byzantines the German emperor 'seems to detract too much from the prestige of their own emperor, whom they [the Byzantines] themselves call monarch (*monarcha*), that is, the one who rules supreme over all and therefore is the one and only emperor of the Romans (*Romanorum unicus et solus imperator*)'.[868] Although William shows great perception in his assessment of Byzantine cosmic theory, the fact that the German king styled himself *imperator Romanorum* was not a reason for the Byzantines to sabotage the German crusading expedition as William of Tyre seems to have believed.

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[863] Liudprand of Cremona. *Relatio*, 17.
[864] Ibid., 17-18, 47.
[865] Ibid., 47.
[866] Otto of Freising, *Deeds*, 56-7.
[867] Ibid., 57-9.
[868] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 746; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 170.

A different accusation against Manuel is advanced by Romuald II, Archbishop of Salerno. In his *Annales*, the high-ranking prelate of the Kingdom of Sicily relates that Conrad was honourably received in Constantinople by Manuel, who exhibited himself to the German king as kind and bounteous, showering him with many gifts and promising to provide guides and necessary provisions for the Germans' journey. However, Romuald reports a rumour that when Conrad had crossed the Bosporus with his army, the provisions were withdrawn by the emperor's orders. Since the food supplies ran out, the army began growing weak and weary. The Turks, having learned this, powerfully attacked the German crusaders, who, deprived of the power to act due to the famine and the suffering of the journey, were annihilated. After relating that the French suffered a similar fate, Romuald concludes that Conrad and Louis, with their armies lost, were unable to profit the Christian name due to the malice of the Greeks.[869] The annalist's source of information is not apparent. Nevertheless, as far as I know, his claim, that once the German crusaders had crossed the Bosporus the provisions were withdrawn by the emperor's orders, is not substantiated by other sources. It was probably based on rumour circumscribed to southern Italy.

Manuel and/or the Byzantine guides were indeed considered by a number of Latin annalists and historians to have been responsible for the disasters of the German crusaders, but clearly no annalist or historian seems to have shared Odo's extreme views. What is more, the Byzantine emperor appears to have been held in high esteem by some other Western authors on the immediate aftermath of the Second Crusade. The *Annales Herbipolenses* quote Manuel as explaining to Conrad the grave dangers and difficulties of a march to Iconium and advising him to choose a few thousands of all his army and hurry on directly to Jerusalem, 'to fight against those who committed regular villainy against Christians'.[870] When Conrad persisted in marching to Iconium, Manuel provided him with military equipment. The annalist makes no reference to Byzantine treachery. Helmold has a compassionate Byzantine emperor bewail at the sight of the crusaders who were about to cross the Bosporus: 'wherefore, o Lord God, hast Thou led these many people [the German crusaders] from their homes? Verily they need Thy strong arm that they may again see the pleasant land, I say, the land of their birth'.[871]

For John of Salisbury, the German crusaders themselves were to blame for their annihilation in Asia Minor. The historian censures the Germans for proceeding to combat the

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[869] Romuald II of Salerno, *Annales*, *MGH SS*, 19, 424-25.
[870] *Annales Herbipolenses*, *MGH SS*, 16, 4-5.
[871] Helmold, *Chronicle*, 174.

Turks without awaiting the French who were following behind. As John adds, 'pressing on in the full flush of pride they [the Germans] were so tortured by starvation in the desert that many died'.[872] No accusation is levelled at Manuel for the Germans' ruin in Asia Minor.

It should now be examined what the German king himself says about Manuel and the Byzantines. The allegations of Odo, Gerhoh, Helmold, and William against the Byzantine guides are not sustained by the evidence provided by a letter of Conrad himself and a speech of the German king quoted by Odo. In his letter of January/February 1148 to his 'minister of foreign affairs', Abbot Wibald of Stavelot and Korvey, Conrad does not make any reference to treachery on the part of the Byzantine guides in his account of the disaster.[873] The king's letter not only does not sustain the aforementioned authors' evidence, but even contradicts it. Conrad relates that the Germans had set off towards Iconium carrying with them as many provisions as they could – he mentions neither that the German crusaders had been ordered by their guide to supply themselves with provisions for eight days only, as Odo claims, nor that, once they had crossed the Bosporus, the provisions were withdrawn by imperial orders, as alleged by Archbishop Romuald. The German sovereign recounts that, in order to complete the expedition promptly, he had set off towards Iconium on the direct route; nowhere does he accuse the Byzantine guides of leading the Germans astray. Moreover, Conrad makes no reference to the departure of the guides; neither does he charge them with betraying the Germans to the Turks.

In a speech by Conrad, which was delivered immediately after the annihilation of the Germans in Asia Minor and is quoted by Odo of Deuil, the German king blames his 'evil misfortunes' on the foolishness of himself and his people.[874] He accuses himself of not having rendered the proper thanks to God when he had left Germany with his army, and of not having corrected his way of life.[875] In addition, the German king lays the blame for the German disasters on his own arrogance. As he declares, 'when reckoning on victories over the Turks, if I had not been puffed up on account of my large army, but had placed my hope humbly in the God of hosts, God would not have subdued an arrogance, which would not have existed'.[876] Conrad makes no accusations whatsoever against the Byzantines. Had he done so, the vehemently anti-Byzantine Odo would certainly have been only too pleased to report them.

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[872] John of Salisbury, *Historia*, 54.
[873] *RHGF*, 15, 533. Translated in Loud, 2006, 1299.
[874] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 100.
[875] Ibid., 100-1.
[876] Ibid., 101.

Like the German king, Otto of Freising fails to blame the Byzantine guides for the German defeat. Both Conrad and Otto were in a privileged position in knowing whether the Byzantines had sabotaged the German expedition. The evidence supports the thesis that none of them considered the Byzantines responsible for the catastrophe. Moreover, although Conrad and Otto could have absolved themselves of responsibility by shifting the blame for their failure onto their Byzantine guides, they did not try to do so.

In his letter of January/February 1148 to Wibald, Conrad himself speaks about his 'brother [Manuel] the emperor of the Greeks' with great affection.[877] Moreover, the fact that, when he became ill at Ephesus, Conrad willingly accepted Manuel's invitation to return to the imperial capital to recuperate, supports the view that the German king did not consider the Byzantine sovereign to have betrayed the German crusading expedition in Asia Minor. In addition, the fact that Conrad cemented a close alliance with Manuel after the crusade argues against a Byzantine double-cross. As Lilie rightly argues, 'it ... seems improbable that German self-respect would have permitted such a direct Byzantine affront – to describe such treachery mildly – to be accepted without question'.[878]

Manuel and the French Crusading Army

We have seen that Odo attributed the blame for the disasters of the French in Asia Minor to Manuel and the Byzantines. But what do other Latin historians and annalists record about the Byzantines and the French crusading expedition? Are there any authors sharing Odo's views?

The anonymous Premonstratensian continuator of Sigebert's chronicle relates that through Asia Minor the French suffered great losses because of the deceit (*dolo*) and guile (*astu*) of the Greeks and the repeated attacks of the Turks.[879] However, no lucid definition of the precise nature of the supposedly Byzantine deception is provided. Archbishop Romuald of Salerno reports that Manuel deceived the French king, who crossed the Bosporus having believed the emperor's promise that he would find the necessary provisions for himself and his army. According to Romuald, since the food supplies ceased to be available once the French had been shipped across the straits, Louis lost many of his men, who perished by famine or slain by the Turks. As the same annalist claims, on account of the malice of the Greeks, the French

[877] *RHGF*, 15, 533; Loud, 2006, 1299.
[878] Lilie, 1993, 160.
[879] *Sigeberti Continuatio Praemonstratensis*, *MGH SS*, 6, 453.

king failed to promote 'the honour of the Christian name'.[880] As has been seen, however, Romuald's allegation is not corroborated by other accounts and seems to have been based on rumour which was spread in southern Italy – in any case, the rumour does not appear to have been widely circulating.

Lambert of Ardres records that in Constantinople the French Crusaders endured much inconvenience and sensed that the Byzantine emperor was treacherous (*infidelem*) and deceitful (*insidiosum*).[881] Lambert's claim, however, is contradicted not only by the two letters written by King Louis to Suger while at Constantinople and Antioch, but even by Odo, who admitted that, when the French were at Constantinople, 'the Greeks furnished us no proof of *perfidia*'. What strikes us as odd is that Lambert does not blame at all the Byzantines for the misfortunes of the French crusaders in Asia Minor. He records that in Adalia the French army underwent many disasters and misfortunes; many perished from famine, many from the harshness of the weather, many from ambushes and attacks, many from illness of the body, many from sickness.[882] No mention is made of Manuel and the Byzantines. Lambert's father was among those French who had perished in Asia Minor. As the chronicler relates, his father had died weakened by an illness of the body and devoid of all strength. According to Lambert, certain people asserted falsely that he had died from famine.[883] This evidence demonstrates that the chronicler's information derived, to a certain extent, from oral sources. It is remarkable that, although reporting the French as enduring much inconvenience and as sensing treachery and deceit on Manuel's part while in Constantinople, these oral sources did not blame the Byzantine emperor and the Byzantines for the disasters of the French in Asia Minor.

Equally surprising is that, not even William of Tyre, who is only too keen to censure the Greeks at every opportunity, blames the Byzantines for the hardships of the French crusading expedition.[884] As has been seen, William only relates that 'it was common talk' (*dicebatur publice*) that the Byzantines had betrayed the *German* crusading expedition in Asia Minor. The phrase *dicebatur publice* requires examination. As we know, William studied in Western Europe over a period of twenty years, not returning to the kingdom of Jerusalem until 1165. The historian spent sixteen years studying at the universities of Paris and Orléans; the

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[880] Romuald II of Salerno, *Annales*, *MGH SS*, 19, 424-25.
[881] Lambert of Ardres, *Historia*, *MGH SS*, 24, 633-4.
[882] Ibid.
[883] Ibid.
[884] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 174-9.

remaining years he studied at Bologna.[885] A question naturally arises; where this *dicebatur publice* took place: in France, where William was from c. 1146–c. 1162, or in the Latin East? If we accept that it was in France, we are faced with an unlikely scenario: *dicebatur publice* in Paris and Orléans that the Byzantines had sabotaged the German expedition, but nothing was said about the alleged Byzantine obstruction of the French. This permits us to safely conclude that *dicebatur publice* happened in the Latin East, and *not* in France. How did William know this, since he was not in *Outremer* at the time? As the historian himself informs us, for his account of the Second Crusade, he 'often interviewed wise men [Latins of *Outremer*] and those whose memory of those times is still fresh'.[886] These men doubtless informed William of the rumours that the Byzantines had betrayed the German expedition. These unfounded rumours, originating in the ranks of the German expedition, seem to have circulated in the East in the aftermath of the Second Crusade, and were even believed in certain Byzantine circles - they are recorded as true by the Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates.[887] Nevertheless, in the collective memory of the Latin East the Byzantines were not held responsible for the disasters that overtook the French in Anatolia. Furthermore, what is of utmost importance is that, while in France from c. 1146–c. 1162, William seems to have heard nothing about the alleged Byzantine obstruction of the Second Crusade.

For some authors, the responsibility for the disasters of the French army rested squarely on its leadership. The author of the *Chronicon Mauriniacense* throws the blame on the French king himself. As the chronicler records, Louis unwisely accepted advice which was not appropriate and marching on a road that was unfrequented did not provide for the difficulties of an overland march. No reference is made to treason on Manuel's part. According to the same chronicler, after the French army had been devastated, Louis finally reached Jerusalem with difficulty, and he lingered there for one year without accomplishing anything profitable, anything to be remembered, or anything worthy of France.[888] Like the author of the *Chronicon Mauriniacense*, John of Salisbury considered the French leadership responsible for the adversities of the French crusading expedition in Asia Minor. The historian reports that the French army, which 'had neither military discipline nor a strong hand to dispense justice and

[885] Edbury and Rowe, 1988, 13-15.
[886] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 193.
[887] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 39.
[888] *Chronicon Mauriniacense*, *RHGF*, 12, 88.

correct faults, lost all hope of ordered strategy'.[889] Concerning the bishops Arnulf of Lisieux and Godfrey of Langres, John explains that 'few if any have brought more harm on the Christian army and whole community'.[890]

At this point, it remains for us to see what the French king himself tells us of the French catastrophe in Asia Minor. Although in his letter to Suger written at Antioch Louis relates that the French 'were joyfully and honourably received by the emperor' in Constantinople, he nevertheless also states that the crusaders suffered much damage in Asia Minor 'through the treachery (*fraude*) of the [Byzantine] emperor', since 'the Turks, ... with the emperor's permission entered his lands to harry the soldiery of Christ'.[891] Nonetheless, the French king does not fail to admit that the disasters of the French were also due to their own faults, the constant ambushes of bandits, the serious difficulties of the route, and in many places the lack of necessary food supplies that soon led to famine. Louis does not blame Manuel for this lack of provisions; neither does he mention that once the crusaders had crossed the Bosporus, the emperor commanded that provisions be withdrawn, as Archbishop Romuald reports. Moreover, when referring to Adalia, the king does not accuse the Byzantines of betrayal as his chaplain does. As Mayr-Harting correctly points out, Louis gives Manuel's supposed treason only very little emphasis in his letter.[892] Moreover, it is worth noting that in the speech addressed to his barons in Adalia and quoted by Odo, Louis makes no reference to Byzantine perfidy. Considering the non-combatant pilgrims in the French expedition as the major hindrance to his crusade, the king suggested separating the military forces from the non-combatant mob, which 'has always harmed us and on whose account food is more expensive and progress slower'.[893]

Was, nonetheless, Louis's accusation that Manuel had permitted the Turks to enter his empire to harass the crusaders founded? Runciman argued that Manuel was not able to provide sufficient forces to cover his long frontier in Asia Minor, especially since he was engaged in war against Roger of Sicily. He could not therefore thwart the incursion of Turkish bands into Anatolia.[894] Runciman's argument is logical and convincing. Later scholars such as Magdalino and Phillips also stressed the limitations of the authority of Manuel in the frontiers between

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[889] John of Salisbury, *Historia*, 54.
[890] Ibid., 55.
[891] *RHGF*, 15, 496; Loud, 2006, 1299-300.
[892] Mayr-Harting, 1993, 229, 234-5.
[893] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 131.
[894] Runciman, 1951, II, 275-6.

the Byzantine and the Seljuk empires.[895] Overall, the French king seems to have overestimated Manuel's control of the situation in western Asia Minor. It is notable that, although Louis charged Manuel with permitting the Turks to enter his empire, this accusation seems not to have gained prominence among the French army, and, what is more, never went down in the chronicles. Not even Odo explicitly accuses the Byzantine ruler of having allowed the Turks to enter his territories to assail the French. Harris's statement that 'Odo's most serious claim ... [is] that Manuel actively encouraged the Turks to attack the crusaders as they passed through Asia Minor'[896] is based on a false assumption.

The Franks of Outremer *and the Second Crusade*

From Conrad's perspective, the crusading expedition to the East had been sabotaged not by Manuel but by the Latin settlers in Syria. In a letter to Wibald written in September 1148, following the failure at Damascus, the German king fulminates against the Franks in Syria, whom he accuses of deceiving the Westerners.[897] This accusation is found in the accounts of several other Western authors. Gerhoh of Reichersberg is the most representative amongst them. In Book 1 of his *De investigatione Antichristi* the chronicler relates bitterly that in the siege of Damascus it became clear why the Jerusalemites roused all Western Europe to an expedition which resulted in the loss of so many Christians, who died from the swords and arrows of the gentiles, famine, cold, illness, floods, and storms. According to Gerhoh, the Jerusalemites sought not peace but to multiply their treasures of gold and money. The chronicler accuses the Franks of *Outremer* of having been bribed by the besieged inhabitants of Damascus in order to raise the siege of Damascus. Gerhoh eventually fulminates against a personified Jerusalem, drawing a parallel between her and Judas: the same avarice that induced Judas to sell Christ for thirty silver coins motivated Jerusalem to sell at a worthless price so much Christian blood, leading to death innumerable thousands of Christians.[898]

Using almost identical terms, William of Tyre condemns the nobles of Jerusalem who did not scruple 'to assume the role of the traitor Judas and ...on assurance of receiving a great sum of money ... to endeavor to raise the siege [of Damascus]. Led on by avarice, the root of all

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[895] Magdalino, 1993, 49-52; Phillips, 2007, 178, 194.
[896] Harris, 2003, 99.
[897] *RHGF*, 15, 534-5. Translated in Loud, 2006, 1300.
[898] Gerhoh Reichersbergensis, *De investigatione*, 377-8.

evil, these men allowed themselves to be so corrupted by bribes and promises that they descended into the depths of crime'.[899] Conrad's feeling of abhorrence for the Latins of *Outremer* was doubtless shared by all the leaders of the Second Crusade. As William informs us,

> all [the Western princes] too clearly ... perceived the treachery of those to whose loyalty they had entrusted their lives and interests and abhorred the perfidy by which they had been deceived. ... Henceforward, as long as they remained in the Orient, and, indeed, ever after, they looked askance on all the ways of our leaders [of the Kingdom of Jerusalem]. They justly declined all their plans as treacherous and showed utter indifference about the affairs of the kingdom [of Jerusalem]. Even when permitted to return to their own lands, the memory of the wrongs which they had suffered still rankled, and they regarded with abhorrence the wicked conduct of those nobles [of Jerusalem].[900]

William's testimony of the events of Damascus and their aftermath is one of great authority and should be considered highly credible, since the author, as quoted above, 'often interviewed wise men and those whose memory of those times is still fresh'.[901] Apart from Gerhoh and William, other Latin writers in the West, like Robert of Torigni, condemn the *dolus* (treachery) of the leadership of the Franks of *Outremer*.[902] Nevertheless, none of these authors is so outspoken as Gerhoh and William.

Conclusions

The above analysis of the primary accounts of the Second Crusade demonstrates clearly that, firstly, not all Latins believed that the Second Crusade had been betrayed by the Byzantine emperor and the Byzantines and, secondly, the anti-Byzantine feeling in the West in the aftermath of the Second Crusade was by no means as widespread as Odo's account might indicate. As has been seen, several writers make no reference at all to Byzantine treason, while those who do usually give it little emphasis, while stressing other factors in the crusading failure, such as the crusaders' allegedly immoral behaviour and arrogance that enraged God, their incompetent leadership, the inadequacy of food supplies that led to famine, the bad

[899] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 191.
[900] Ibid., 192-3.
[901] Ibid., 193.
[902] Robert of Torigni, *Chronica*, 155.

climatic conditions, the enemy attacks, and even the perfidy of the Franks of *Outremer*. In the case of the account of William of Newburgh, Manuel's enmity is blamed on the disorderly conduct of the crusaders themselves, while in Henry of Huntingdon's narrative the Byzantine emperor emerges as a means of divine punishment for the crusaders' behaviour. Furthermore, it appears that the Church of Rome, Bernard of Clairvaux - the leading preacher of the crusade - and the Latin settlers of Syria were doubtless more severely criticised by many in the West and the Latin East than the Byzantines in the aftermath of the disastrous expedition. Finally, it should be remembered that there were even some Western authors who not only did not blame the Byzantine emperor for the disasters of the crusaders, but on the contrary were favourably disposed towards him, an attitude that to a certain extent reflects the amicable relations established between the empires of Manuel and Conrad during and in the immediate aftermath of the Second Crusade.

Our examination has shown that in the West and the Latin East not only there was no general consensus that the Byzantines had sabotaged the crusade, but also the sources that do mention Byzantine treason are not in agreement on this issue. A few of them mention, in passing, treachery on the part of Manuel while either the French or the German crusaders were at Constantinople, without however defining the exact nature of the supposed perfidy. Some sources relate that the Byzantine guides provided by Manuel to the German crusading expedition had led the Germans astray either carrying out imperial instructions or on their own account. Hardly any chronicler claims that the French suffered damages in Asia Minor through the deceit of the Byzantines. Other accounts, which fail to dissociate the two Western crusading expeditions, make only a passing reference to the disasters that allegedly befell the crusaders through the deceit of Manuel, without providing further information. Furthermore, in contrast to the Crusade of 1101, hardly any chronicler of the Second Crusade charges the Byzantine ruler with acting in league with the Turks. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, only Odo and William of Tyre accuse the Byzantine guides of betraying the Germans to the 'pagans'. Still, elaborate conspiracy theories involving imperial messagers and letters to the Turks are not found in the accounts of the Second Crusade.

Finally, it should be stressed that the criticism of the majority of the authors, who do denounce Manuel's or the Byzantine guides' supposed treachery, is by no means levelled at all the Byzantines. Therefore, views such as those of Runciman, Angold, and Madden, who aver that the outcome of the Second Crusade had a devastating effect on the relations between

Western and Eastern Christians, confirming the Westerners' worst prejudices against the Byzantines, are not really sustained by the evidence. As to Morris's view that the account of Odo of Deuil reflects Western bitterness toward Byzantium, our investigation has shown that the French chronicler's extreme anti-Byzantine views are not representative of Latin opinion. The mere fact that Odo's work survives only in a single manuscript demonstrates not only that it never enjoyed extraordinary popularity, but also that it was hardly known during the Middle Ages.

To end with, we will examine whether the Byzantine sovereign had any reasons to sabotage the Second Crusade. Scholars unanimously agree that the Second Crusade was unwelcome to Byzantium.[903] Were the expedition to be successful, it would strengthen the crusader states and consequently weaken the position of the Byzantine Empire in Syria. The control over Antioch in particular was a matter of the greatest importance to Byzantium. In 1145 the Byzantines had succeeded in imposing their authority on Raymond, ruler of the city. The crusade might have created an opportunity for him to reshape his relations with the Byzantines and throw off the overlordship of the emperor.

Phillips and Harris have employed the evidence provided by primary non-Latin Christian sources to demonstrate 'that Manuel actively encouraged the Turks to attack the crusaders as they passed through Asia Minor'.[904] The two sources are Syriac, written by the Jacobite Patriarch Michael the Syrian (1166-99), and Mar Simon. Both authors record that the Byzantine emperor had treacherously sent the crusaders in remote regions where many died from thirst and hunger, while many others were slain by the Turks.[905] As has been seen, this accusation, also found in some Western sources, is groundless. Michael the Syrian further charges Manuel with having 'acted in concert with the Turks' and having 'hindered them [the crusaders] by various schemes over a period of two years'.[906] How reliable, however, is the patriarch's account of the First Crusade? First, Michael the Syrian wrote in the late twelfth century, i.e. long after the Second Crusade. Secondly, the crusading armies entered Byzantine territory in July and August 1147. The German crusaders were defeated in November of the same year, while the French left Byzantine Adalia in February 1148. The crusaders were in

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[903] Runciman, 1951, II, 274-5; Berry, 1969, 470-1; Lilie, 1993, 148; Phillips, 1996, 88-90, 99; Tyerman, 2006, 325; Madden, 2005, 57.
[904] Harris, 2003, 99; Phillips, 1996, 90; Phillips, 2007, 206.
[905] Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, III, 276; W.R. Taylor, 'A New Syriac Fragment Dealing with Incidents in the Second Crusade', *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Reasearch,* 11 (1929-30), 123.
[906] Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, III, 275.

Byzantine territory for only seven months. How could Manuel hinder them for two years, as Michael claims? Thirdly, although the patriarch accuses Manuel of allying himself with the Turks, no elucidation is given as to the extent or nature of the alleged collusion. As we have seen, Manuel's betraying the German crusaders was rumoured in the Latin East and even in the Byzantine Empire. Michael doubtless heard part of that rumour, which he recorded as fact.

The third non-Latin source employed by Phillips and Harris is that of the Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates, who records that

> the emperor's purpose was neither in doubt nor was it cast in the shadow of the curtain of falsehood; ... In short, every ill the emperor himself had contrived was present, and he commanded others to inflict such harm so that these things should be indelible memorials for posterity and seeds of alarm, seeds bringing about the movement against the Romans (*τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων κίνησιν*). It also occurred to the Turks to act similarly against the Germans once Manuel had stirred them up with letters and incited them to make war.[907]

We should ask ourselves, however, how reliable Choniates's account of the Second Crusade is, before we take it at face value. Choniates possibly began his *Historia* before 1204, but he completed and revised it after that day, i.e. approximately half a century after the Second Crusade. The capture and sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade was a disaster that affected his view of Byzantine history. From his standpoint, the Second Crusade alienated Byzantium from the West and eventually led to the disaster of 1204. Because of this, Choniates was predisposed to blame Manuel for his handling of the Second Crusade.[908] In his attempt to rationalise the reason why the army of the Fourth Crusade captured and sacked Constantinople, Nicetas viewed Manuel's actions with regard to the Second Crusade as 'indelible memorials for posterity, deterrents against attacking the Romans [in 1204]'. In addition to the fact that Niketas's view is heavily coloured by hindsight, there are a number of errors and omissions in his account of the Second Crusade.[909] All these factors argue against the reliability of his testimony. Nicetas's allegation that 'Manuel had stirred them [the Turks]

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[907] Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 67; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 39. I made changes in Magoulias's translation. '*βασιλέως βούλευμα ἦν οὐκ ἀμφίλογον οὐδὲ ψεύδους παραπετάσματι σκιαζόμενον ... καὶ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἀπῆν τῶν δεινῶν, ὃ οὐκ ἦν αὐτὸς ἐπιτεχνώμενος βασιλεὺς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δρᾶν διακελευόμενος, ὡς ἂν εἴη ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν ὀψιγόνοις μνημεῖα δήπουθεν ἀνεξάλειπτα καὶ δέους σπέρματα τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐκτρέποντα κίνησιν. Παρόμοια δὲ καὶ τοῖς Τούρκοις ἐπῆλθε ποιεῖν κατὰ τῶν Ἀλαμανῶν, τοῦ Μανουὴλ αὐτοὺς ἐπαλείφοντος γράμμασι καὶ διανιστῶντος εἰς πόλεμον*'.

[908] Angold, 1997, 6, 199.

[909] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, xvii.

up with letters and incited them to make war' against the Germans is totally unfounded. As Lilie rightly argues, 'the Germans could not be helped. Their advance on Dorylaeum inevitably brought them out of Byzantine territory to confront the Seljuk forces, who must have considered themselves to be directly threatened. For this there was no need for letters from the emperor to the sultan'.[910] Manuel's betraying the Germans was a myth that circulated in the East after the Second Crusade. A version of the myth simply found its way into Choniates's account.

Magdalino rightly remarks that 'Manuel must have known that it was hardly in his interests for the crusade to fail through Greek sabotage'.[911] Indeed, the Byzantine emperor must have known that this would have certainly earned him the enmity of the Western kingdoms and the papacy. In addition, had not Manuel warned Conrad against the difficulties and perils of a march to Iconium and advised him to choose a few thousands of all his army and hurry on directly to Jerusalem? Had the Byzantine sovereign not warned the French king while at Ephesus that the Turks were gathering to fight against the crusaders and urged him to take refuge in the Byzantine fortresses? Certainly, Lilie is right to point out that 'Manuel could have contributed much more to the success of the undertaking. This he did not wish to do'.[912] It is true that the Second Crusade did not receive any substantial support from the Byzantine emperor in Asia Minor.[913] This, however, does not mean that Manuel obstructed the expedition. His policy seems to have been to observe and wait so that he could bend events to his advantage.

The Crusading Project of 1150

The utter failure of the Second Crusade was followed by the death of Prince Raymond of Antioch on 29 June 1149 in battle against Nur ed-Din, sultan of Aleppo, at Inab. The death of the prince was a crushing blow to the Latins of *Outremer*. After the disastrous crusade in the East, the Muslim strength threateningly increased. Thus, the Latin settlers of Syria once again turned to the West, and especially to Louis and the French nobility, for assistance. Letters were dispatched to Western Europe, intended to prompt a fresh crusade. In early 1150 Suger

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[910] Lilie, 1993, 160.
[911] Magdalino, 1993, 52.
[912] Lilie, 1993, 160. Cf. Runciman, 1951, II, 276-7.
[913] Berry, 1969, 492, 502.

of Saint Denis undertook the organisation of the new expedition, while Bernard of Clairvaux played a major part in promoting it. Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, also had a key role in the discussions of the new crusade.[914]

The crusading project of 1150 eventually fell through. There were various reasons for the wreck of the plan. Phillips has exhaustively discussed all these reasons in a section devoted to the 1150 Crusade which is included in his work, *Defenders of the Holy Land*.[915] In brief, the reasons were the low morale that prevailed in the West after the miserable end of the Second Crusade, the high cost of an expedition to the East, the exhaustion of the knights who had returned to France from the Levant less than six months earlier, Pope Eugenius's extreme cautiousness about a new undertaking lest it suffer the same fate as the Second Crusade, the Cistercians' lack of enthusiasm for the plan, the apathy among the French bishops, and the political situation in northern Europe.

The actual target of the projected crusade has been a subject of considerable debate among scholars. Runciman, Lilie, and Magdalino have argued that the proposed expedition was intended to wreak vengeance on the Byzantines who had allegedly betrayed the Second Crusade.[916] Berry and Riley-Smith favour the view that the projected undertaking was aimed at providing military assistance to the crusader states but also taking revenge on the Byzantines *en route* to the East.[917] Mayr-Harting supports the thesis that the proposed crusade was twofold: while a French army would operate in Syria against Nur ed-Din, Roger II of Sicily would attack the Byzantine Empire.[918] Constable has talked of two parallel but independent projects: the crusading project of 1150 which was intended to provide military assistance to the crusader states and the scheme that 'was based on an alliance between Louis VII of France and Roger II of Sicily and was directed against the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Komnenos, who was widely considered responsible for the failure of the Second Crusade'.[919] Laiou has similarly advocated the view that two different 'crusades' were planned, but going a stage further, this scholar has argued that 'doubtless, the two campaigns would have

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[914] For the crusading project of 1150, see Runciman, 1951, II, 286-7; Berry, 1969, 511-12; Riley-Smith, 1987, 129-30; Mayer, 1988, 104; Lilie, 1993, 162; Magdalino, 1993, 52; Phillips, 1996, 100-18; Constable, 1997, 67-75; T. Reuter, 'The "non-Crusade" of 1149-50', in *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, ed. Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester, 2001), 150-63; Mayr-Harting, 1993, 230-8; Lock, 2006, 150-1; Laiou, 2005, 33-4.

[915] Phillips, 1996, 100-18.

[916] Runciman, 1951, II, 286-7; Lilie, 1993, 162; Magdalino, 1993, 52.

[917] Berry, 1969, 511-12; Riley-Smith, 2005, 129-30.

[918] Mayr-Harting, 1993, 231, 234.

[919] Constable, 1997, 67, 75.

merged'.[920] Phillips, who carefully studied the mass of correspondence between Suger, Bernard, Peter the Venerable, and King Louis, has convincingly argued that the new crusade was *only* intended to help the Latin East. It was *not* aimed at proceeding against the Byzantine Empire. However, according to the same historian, it would be risky to reject completely the idea of a Franco-Sicilian expedition against Byzantium.[921]

Since Constable and Phillips have very convincingly argued that the crusading project of 1150 was *only* intended to provide military aid to the Franks of *Outremer*, it remains to be examined whether a parallel Franco-Sicilian expedition against the Byzantine Empire was planned, as the two scholars suggest. In fact, there are only two surviving letters referring to an expedition against the Byzantine Empire. The first one is a letter from Peter the Venerable to King Roger II of Sicily, written in late 1149 or early 1150, before the appeals of the Latins of *Outremer* for military aid reached the West leading to the discussions about a new crusade.[922] In his letter, Peter offered to act as an intermediary between the Norman king and Conrad, Manuel's close ally. The abbot of Cluny seems to have considered that if Roger and Conrad made peace, the Norman king could proceed undisturbed to attack the Byzantine Empire in order to exact revenge for 'the wicked, unheard of, and disgraceful betrayal (*pessima, inaudita et lamentabilis proditio*) by the Greeks and their wicked (*nequam*) king of our pilgrims, that is, those in the army of God'.[923] Peter declared that he himself 'would not refuse to perish, if the justice of God would, through the death of one of his men [i.e. Peter], revenge that of so many men, both nobles and commoners, indeed the flower of almost the whole of France and Germany, destroyed by wretched treason (*miserabili fraude*)'.[924] Having expressed his own determination to take revenge on the allegedly deceitful Byzantines, the abbot of Cluny proceeded to invite Roger to act similarly: to 'rise up … to revenge so many insults, injuries, and deaths, and such effusion of blood in the army of God, shed so impiously (*impie*)'.[925]

Peter the Venerable's outbreak of anti-Byzantine frenzy demonstrates clearly that in the aftermath of the Second Crusade the abbot of Cluny had come round completely to the position of the French anti-Byzantine faction. Like Odo of Deuil, Peter appears to have

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[920] Laiou, 2005, 33-4.
[921] Phillips, 1996, 112-18. A brief discussion is also included in Phillips, 2007, 274-6.
[922] Reuter, 2001, 154.
[923] Peter the Venerable, *The Letters of Peter the Venerable*, ed. Giles Constable, 1 (Cambridge, 1967), 395. Translated in Loud, 2006, 1300-1.
[924] Ibid.
[925] Ibid.

attributed all the blame for the failure of the Second Crusade on Manuel and the Byzantines. For that reason, he wrote to Roger to incite him to attack the Byzantine Empire. The abbot of Cluny assured the Norman king in these words: 'I can see no Christian prince under heaven through whom this work [an attack on Byzantium] can be carried out who is better, more suitable, nor more effective than yourself ... you are wiser of mind, better endowed with riches, and more practiced in courage than other princes, and furthermore you are physically closer to this place [the Byzantine Empire]'.[926] Peter undoubtedly considered that a proposal for an undertaking against Byzantium would appeal to Roger given his open hostility towards the Byzantine Empire and his recent struggles with Manuel. The abbot of Cluny's suggestion, however, was not brought to fruition.

The second surviving document referring to an expedition against the Byzantine Empire is a letter, dated April 1150, from King Conrad to his sister-in-law, Empress Irene, the wife of Manuel Komnenos. The German king reported that he had been informed that 'the whole nation of the Franks, with its king, has conspired and arranged to make war' against Manuel 'under the advice and incitement of the tyrant of Sicily'.[927] Despite Conrad's assertion, there is no mention whatsoever of a campaign against the Eastern Empire in the correspondence between the leading men of France.[928]

Reuter has openly challenged the reliability of Conrad's source of information.[929] This scholar's assertion, however, requires some elucidation. In the aftermath of the Second Crusade, there must have been an anti-Byzantine faction in France that remained in favour of an undertaking against Byzantium. This party must have consisted approximately of the same French individuals who had suggested attacking Constantinople in 1147. Peter the Venerable had obviously fallen into line with them. As we have seen, the anti-Byzantine group had failed several times to impose its views on the French king and the majority of the French clerics and nobles. The supposed French expedition against Constantinople, to which Conrad referred in his letter to Irene, seems to have been another endeavour of the French anti-Byzantine party to direct an attack on Byzantium. Since its exhortations to Louis and the French nobles to lead an attack on the Byzantine Empire fell on deaf ears, the faction, as Peter's letter to Roger evidences, turned to the Norman king. It saw in him the 'prince ... through whom this work

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[926] Ibid.
[927] *RHGF*, 15, 536.
[928] Phillips, 1996, 113.
[929] Reuter, 2001, 159.

can be carried out'. Distorted rumours of these negotiations and the discussions in France of the new crusade, which was *only* aimed at providing military aid to the crusader states, must have reached the ears of the German king. Conrad's statement that the French king arranged to make war against Manuel 'under the advice and incitement of the tyrant of Sicily' seems to have been more likely based on pure speculation, and finally proved totally unfounded. Peter's letter to Roger evidences that the instigator of an attack on Byzantium was *not* the Norman king, but the abbot of Cluny, doubtless the spokesman for the French anti-Byzantine party.

There is not a scrap of evidence to substantiate the idea of a Franco-Sicilian undertaking against the Eastern Empire. Peter the Venerable's letter to Roger neither mentions nor suggests an alliance between Louis and the Norman king against the Byzantines. In contrast, as the abbot's letter clearly demonstrates, had Roger decided to make war against Byzantium, he would have had to lead the expedition *alone*. The only support coming from France would possibly have been that of a few individuals from the anti-Byzantine party, including Peter himself. If 'the whole nation of the Franks, with its king' was to make war against Manuel, as Conrad claimed, it is extremely striking that Peter did not make even a passing reference to the supposed plan in his letter to Roger. On the whole, Conrad's letter to Irene is totally unreliable as a source of information. While Peter, in his letter to Roger, instigates the Norman king to an attack on Byzantium, Conrad, in his letter to Irene, alleges that Roger incited Louis VII to an assault on the Eastern Empire. Obviously, the evidence provided by Peter's letter invalidates – rather than corroborates, as is often sustained - Conrad's allegation. Finally, as our examination has demonstrated, the anti-Byzantine sentiment in Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second Crusade was by no means so strong as to justify an attack against Byzantium. Consequently, a joint Franco-Sicilian undertaking against Byzantium remained an impossible proposition.[930]

[930] In 2006 Madden argued that 'throughout, he [Louis] blamed Manuel and the Byzantines for his misfortunes [during the Second Crusade], and he meant to make them pay ... he proclaimed his firm intention to once again take up the cross and, with his Norman allies, crush the real enemy of Christ, the Byzantine Empire'. Madden, 2005, 61. This passage is not only unfounded and misleading. It is also dangerous, representing a fundamental distortion of the primary evidence, by an otherwise eminent historian in the field.

Manuel's 'New Image': Development of Ties between the Byzantine Empire and the Latin World[931]

Manuel and the Latin *Outremer*

On 4 May 1150, Joscelin II (1113-59) of Edessa was captured by the Muhammadans and was imprisoned at Aleppo until his death nine years later. Manuel immediately grasped the opportunity to take possession of the remains of the County of Edessa. He sent an embassy to Countess Beatrice, Joscelin's wife, offering her a munificent life annuity for herself and her children in return for possession of the remainder of the County. Manuel's offer was accepted and the fortresses of the county were surrendered to the Greeks, or, in William of Tyre's words, 'to effeminate and soft men' (*viris effeminatis et mollibus*).[932] Within a year, however, they were lost to Nur ed-Din, who, as William reports, attacked, 'taking advantage of the softness of the Greeks (*de Grecorum mollicie*)'.[933] Despite the chronicler's prejudiced statement, the blame for the loss of the County did not lie with the Byzantines. When the Byzantines took possession of it, the County was extremely vulnerable. Even William admits that King Baldwin III of Jerusalem (1152-63) agreed to the sale of Edessa because 'he preferred that disaster should overtake it while it was under their [the Byzantines'] power rather than that the downfall ... and the ruin of their imperilled country should be laid to him'.[934] The fate of Edessa had been sealed before the County was sold to the Byzantines.

William is persistently inclined to resort to the clichéd stereotype of the effeminate Greeks when it comes to the question of crusader territory being handed over to the Byzantines. When John Komnenos demanded the citadel of Antioch in May 1138,[935] William declared that 'it seemed a very harsh and serious matter that the city ... should fall into the hands of the effeminate Greeks'.[936] The historian, however, contradicted himself immediately by admitting 'that it would be difficult to resist him [John] if he should be inclined to use force'.[937] Likewise, when the same Byzantine sovereign demanded the surrender of Antioch,

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[931] Lilie, 1993, 163-221; Phillips, 1996, 118-245; Angold, 1997, 215-21.
[932] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 782.
[933] Ibid., 785.
[934] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 209.
[935] Lilie, 1993, 128-30; Angold, 1997, p.188.
[936] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 98.
[937] Ibid.

its citadel, and all fortifications in 1142,[938] William alleged that 'the result of such action would be that through the indolence (*per ignaviam*) of the Greeks the city, together with the whole region, would fall into the hands of the enemy'.[939] On the other hand, however, the historian conceded that 'seemingly no kingdom of the world could withstand' the Byzantine army.[940] William's inconsistency is apparent. His stereotypes of the Greeks cannot be reconciled with his rational assessment of the situation from the perspective of the historian.

Phillips rightly points out that, beginning with the sale of Edessa to Manuel, conditions for the establishment of closer links between the Byzantines and the Latins of Syria came into existence. In the face of the rise of Nur ed-Din's power on the one hand, and the lack of response to the post-crusade appeals to the West for assistance on the other, the Latin settlers in *Outremer* had realised that they could not expect much from the Westerners, and therefore they had to seek assistance from their Christian neighbours, i.e. from Byzantium.[941]

In pursuing a policy of closer ties with the Byzantine Empire, Baldwin III sent an embassy to Constantinople in September 1157. Its mission was to seek a Byzantine bride for the young king of Jerusalem. As William of Tyre relates, the nobility and clergy of the Kingdom of Jerusalem unanimously agreed about a marriage alliance between their kingdom and the Byzantine Empire.[942] By deciding to turn to Constantinople to find a royal bride, whereas in the past they had almost always turned to the Latin West,[943] the Latins of *Outremer* did an about-face, inaugurating a new era in the relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Latin East. By the 1150s, the Frank settlers of Syro-Palestine had fully realised that it would be in their best interests to ally themselves with the emperor of Byzantium, who, in their eyes, to use William's words, was 'the most powerful (*potentissimus*) and wealthy (*locupletior*) prince of the world'.[944] The Latins of *Outremer* had trusted that Manuel was able 'to relieve from his own abundance the distress under which our realm [the Kingdom of Jerusalem] was suffering and to change our poverty into superabundance'.[945] Although the Byzantine Empire was militarily and economically the superpower in Europe, and its emperor was certainly held in high esteem, a more practical reason may also explain why the

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[938] Lilie, 1993, 135-7; Angold, 1997, pp.188-9.
[939] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 702; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 125.
[940] Ibid., 124.
[941] Phillips, 1996, 123-4.
[942] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 265.
[943] Phillips, 1996, 133.
[944] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 834; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 265.
[945] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 265.

Jerusalemites placed their hopes for survival on Byzantium: the Eastern Empire was physically the closest to the crusader states.

The negotiations in Constantinople between the envoys of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Byzantines were not easy. William caustically reports 'numberless delays and equivocal answers expressed in mystifying circumlocutions such as the ... Greeks delight in and usually employ'.[946] It is small wonder that the negotiations dragged on. The alliance with the Kingdom of Jerusalem was too important to allow hasty decisions. From the Latin historian's perspective, however, the Byzantine delay confirmed the stereotype of the ambiguous Greek.

An agreement was finally reached. Theodora, a niece of Manuel, was chosen as the bride. In September 1158, she was married to Baldwin and crowned queen in Jerusalem. In April 1159, Manuel and Baldwin met in Cilicia. William of Tyre describes a cordial relationship. Baldwin 'won great favour with the emperor and his nobles'[947] and, as William 'learned from certain people whose testimony is entirely reliable',[948] Manuel showered countless munificent gifts on the king of Jerusalem and his followers. When Baldwin was injured in a hunting accident, the emperor himself acted as the king's surgeon 'with the most gracious sympathy ... he knelt down by the king and attentively ministered to him, as if he himself were merely an ordinary person ... Indeed, he could scarcely have shown more solicitude had Baldwin been his own son'.[949] Byzantine prestige in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was increasingly reaching a high level.

In 1159 Manuel's empress died. It was now the Byzantine emperor's turn to turn to the king of Jerusalem for a bride. Angold rightly argues that the decision of the Byzantine sovereign evidences 'how highly Manuel valued his alliance with the Franks of *Outremer*'.[950] The Byzantine envoys nominated two candidates: Melissende, sister of Raymond III of Tripoli (1152-87), and Maria, sister of Bohemond, the minor heir to the Principality of Antioch. Manuel left the definitive choice to Baldwin, who decided in Melissende's favour. The Byzantine sovereign, however, made no definitive reply. William reports sharply that 'as always ... the Greeks gave evasive answers and tried to drag the matter along still longer'.[951] The long delay once more provoked the pointed comments of the Latin historian, who remarks

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[946] Ibid., 274.
[947] Ibid., 278.
[948] Ibid., 279.
[949] Ibid., 280.
[950] Angold, 1997, 217.
[951] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 289.

that the king of Jerusalem eventually dispatched an emissary to Constantinople 'to checkmate their [the Byzantines'] complicated designs'.[952]

Manuel finally replied rejecting Melissende. The Byzantine sovereign had decided on Maria of Antioch, whom he married in the autumn of 1161. The reason for Manuel's sudden change of mind, as modern historians suggest, was the situation in Antioch.[953] After the Byzantine ambassadors had left Constantinople, Manuel was informed that Reynald of Châtillon, acting prince of Antioch since 1153, had been captured by Nur ed-Din's forces, leaving the principality in urgent need for a protector. The emperor therefore considered that a marriage alliance between him and Maria of Antioch would be more advantageous to the *Oikoumene*. By 1165 Bohemond III of Antioch (1163-1201), Manuel's brother-in-law, was firmly allied with the Byzantines and very much in the emperor's debt: in August 1164, the prince had been captured by the Muslims, and Manuel paid the ransoms for the release.[954]

Amalric (1163-74), who succeeded his brother Baldwin on the throne of Jerusalem in 1163, seems not to have approached Constantinople during the first three years of his reign.[955] Eventually, however, he realised that the survival of the crusader states depended on Byzantine aid, and thus decided to pursue a policy of closer relations with Constantinople. In late 1165 an embassy was sent to the imperial capital to seek a bride from the imperial family. Maria, daughter of a nephew of Manuel, was selected. Amalric and Maria were married on 29 August 1167.[956] The marriage alliance was followed by a joint Latin-Byzantine expedition to conquer Egypt. The combined forces arrived before Damietta at the end of October 1169. The ambitious campaign, however, ended in disaster due to delays and lack of provisions.[957]

In December 1170 Saladin, Nur ed-Din's lieutenant, besieged the fortress of Daron. The growing Muslim threat forced Amalric to dispatch embassies to both the West and Constantinople. Amalric decided to lead himself the embassy to Byzantium. This was the first time that a king of Jerusalem was to leave his kingdom in search for military assistance.[958] The reason, as William of Tyre informs us, was that the king considered the mission to the

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[952] Ibid.; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 857. I made a minor amendment to the translation by Babcock and Krey.
[953] Lilie, 1993, 185; Magdalino, 1993, 72; Angold, 1997, 217.
[954] Phillips, 1996, 147-8, 154-5; Magdalino, 1993, 72-3.
[955] Phillips, 1996, 141.
[956] Angold, 1997, 218-9; Phillips, 1996, 154-6; Lilie, 1993, 192-3, 196-7; Magdalino, 1993, 73-4.
[957] Angold, 1997, 219-20; Phillips, 1996, 166; Lilie, 1993, 198-202; Magdalino, 1993, 74-5.
[958] Phillips, 1996, 210-12; Lilie, 1993, 204-9.

Byzantine imperial capital of great importance.[959] In the historian's words, 'since he [Manuel] was much nearer (*vicinior*) to us [the Kingdom of Jerusalem] and was besides far richer than the others [the Western princes] (*ceteris longe opulentior*), he could more easily furnish the desired aid'.[960] The Latins of *Outremer* were becoming progressively more dependent on Byzantium.

Amalric was lavishly received at Constantinople. All the time-honoured means of Byzantine diplomacy were employed in order to impress the high-ranking visitor and his retinue: pomp, ceremonial, display of wealth and splendour, entertainments, visits to the sacred relics preserved in the imperial capital. During Amalric's visit, the Byzantine emperor and the king of Jerusalem renewed their alliance for a campaign against Egypt. After Manuel showered countless generous gifts on them, the king and his retinue returned to Jerusalem. From William's standpoint, the mission had been successfully accomplished.[961] Nothing, however, came of Amalric's visit to the imperial capital.[962]

King Amalric died in 1174 and was succeeded by his thirteen-year-old son Baldwin IV (1174-85). In the winter of 1176, Reynald of Châtillon, very close adviser of King Baldwin IV, was sent to Constantinople to negotiate the Latin-Byzantine undertaking against Egypt that had been agreed in 1171. Manuel was willing to carry out his promises to Amalric. In August 1177 a Byzantine fleet of seventy galleys arrived in Acre for the expedition against Egypt. Count Philip of Flanders, who had also arrived in Jerusalem in the same month, was unwilling to participate in the campaign and the whole undertaking was abandoned. The Byzantine fleet returned to Constantinople. In spite of this incident, contact between Byzantium and Jerusalem as well as Antioch remained close until Manuel's death in 1180.[963]

Manuel and the Latin West

The death of King Roger of Sicily in 1154, combined with uprisings against the rule of his successor William I (1154-66), provided Manuel with an opportunity for action in Italy. In 1155 Byzantine forces invaded Apulia. Initially, the Byzantine invasion met with spectacular success. Bari and a number of other littoral towns were surrendered to the Byzantines.

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[959] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 378.
[960] Ibid., 377; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 941.
[961] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 379-83.
[962] Edbury and Rowe, 1988, 147.
[963] Phillips, 1996, 230-6, 243-5; Lilie, 1993, 214-16; Angold, 1997, 220; Magdalino, 1993, 97.

However, the situation was soon reversed. The Byzantine defeat at Brindisi in May 1156 put an end to Byzantine plans in southern Italy. In 1158 a peace treaty was concluded between Manuel and William: Byzantine interests in the north of the Italian peninsula were threatened by a new enemy, the German Emperor Fredrick I (1155-90).[964]

In 1159 a schism was provoked in the Western Church. Although Cardinal Roland was elected pope as Alexander III (1159-81) by the vast majority of cardinals, Cardinal Octavian was chosen as Victor IV by a minority. In 1160 Fredrick I presided over a council at Pavia, which declared Victor IV as the rightful pope.[965] The schism, which would last until 1178, was seen by Manuel as an opportunity to increase his influence in the West. The Byzantine ruler intervened in the conflict by actively encouraging and supporting the coalition of Pope Alexander and the Lombard cities in their struggle against Frederick. Negotiations were also opened between Manuel and the pope for the union of the Western and Eastern Churches. In return for Byzantine recognition of papal primacy, Manuel was to be acknowledged as emperor in the West. These negotiations, however, reached a deadlock, and achieved neither the Byzantine ruler's recognition as sole Roman emperor nor the union of the two churches. Nevertheless, relations between Manuel and Alexander remained generally harmonious until the end of Manuel's reign.[966]

At the later years of his reign, Manuel took initiatives to project a crusading image and form new alliances in Western Europe. In late 1175 or early 1176, the Byzantine sovereign sent a letter to Pope Alexander in which he stated that he had reoccupied Dorylaion and constructed a town, where 'Latins and Greeks'[967] together were stationed to defend it. Therefore, as the emperor stressed, the road to the Holy Sepulchre had been rendered secure for both 'Latins and Greeks'.[968] Furthermore, Manuel declared that he intended to continue the fight against the Turks of Iconium, and requested assistance from the Western Christians.[969] Manuel's letter was a fine piece of Byzantine propaganda. First, by mentioning that he had placed Latins and Greeks in the town he had constructed in order to defend it, Manuel alluded to the harmonious cooperation between the two groups in the Byzantine Empire. Secondly, by his reference to the Holy Sepulchre, place of worship for both Latins and Greeks, the emperor

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[964] Angold, 1997, 200-4; Magdalino, 1993, 57-61.
[965] Barber, 2004, 99.
[966] Magdalino, 1993, 62-6, 83-95; Angold, 1997, 210-15; C. H. MacEvitt, *The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance* (Philadelphia, Pa; Bristol, 2007), 160.
[967] *RHGF*, 15, 952.
[968] Ibid., 953.
[969] Ibid. Cf. Lilie, 1993, 211-12; Phillips, 1996, 229-30; Angold, 1997, 220; Magdalino, 1993, 95-7.

stressed the religious affinity between Western and Eastern Christians. Thirdly, Manuel deliberately played upon Western Christians' religious feeling in order to secure military assistance against the Turks. Fourthly, by emphasising the facts that through his efforts the Holy Sepulchre, the pilgrimage destination *par excellence*, had been rendered secure for the Christians and that he intended to continue the fight against the Turks, the Byzantine emperor aimed to present himself as a successful and devoted crusader, and thus true Christian emperor.

In response to the appeal of the Byzantine sovereign, Pope Alexander III wrote to his legate in northern France instructing him 'to promote his [Manuel's] pious proposal', by encouraging King Louis and the French nobility to help 'our dearest son in Christ, the illustrious emperor of Constantinople' in his campaign against the sultan of Iconium.[970] No response, however, was elicited from the French king or his nobles and the hopes of Latin-Byzantine cooperation faded away.[971] Eventually, Manuel with his army marched against the Seljuks in the summer of 1176. In September 1176, however, the imperial army was defeated by the forces of Kilij Arslan.[972] Despite his defeat, Manuel appears to have successfully projected himself, at least to the Latins of *Outremer*, as a champion of the Christian faith: referring to Manuel's expedition, William of Tyre records that 'in a praiseworthy gesture of piety (*pietatis commendabili motu*) he [Manuel] is fighting against the monstrous race of the Turks and their wicked leader, the sultan of Iconium, to extend the Christian name'.[973]

Between 1176 and 1178 Manuel exchanged several delegations with Henry II (1154-89) of England.[974] In a letter to Henry dating in 1176, the Byzantine emperor assured the English king that 'from the very earliest period of our coronation, our imperial office nourished hatred in our heart against the Persians [the Muslims], the enemies of God, when it beheld them vaunting over the Christians, triumphing over the name of God, and holding sway over the lands of the Christians'.[975] The Byzantine sovereign further declared that 'as to the exploits which were frequently performed by it [our imperial office], to their [the Muslims'] humiliation and loss, our imperial office entertains a belief that the same have not escaped the

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[970] Ibid., 952-3.
[971] Phillips, 1996, 230; Lilie, 1993, 212; Angold, 1997, 220
[972] Phillips, 1996, 230; Lilie, 1993, 212-14; Magdalino, 1993, 98; Angold, 1997, 223-5.
[973] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 977; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 414. I made amendments to the translation by Babcock and Krey.
[974] Magdalino, 1993, 100.
[975] Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*, I, 419.

notice of your highness'.[976] This crusading tone of Byzantine propaganda aimed to boost the Byzantine ruler's crusading profile in an attempt to secure new allies in the West.

In 1178, Manuel dispatched emissaries in the French court to negotiate a marriage alliance between the royal house of Capet and the imperial house of Komnenoi. Louis VII agreed to the proposal, and in 1179 his daughter Agnes was sent to Constantinople. In March 1180, the French princess, officially renamed Anna, was betrothed to Manuel's son Alexios.[977] As Magdalino observes 'it was the most distinguished foreign match which a Byzantine emperor had made for generations'.[978] The marriage alliance raised even more Manuel's profile in the West, where, as Malcolm Barber points out, 'the Capetians emerged as the true defenders of Christendom, "the most Christian kings" as the popes called them, protectors of the papacy, valiant crusaders and hammers of heretics and Jews'.[979] In 1179, Manuel's 'purple-born' daughter Maria had been married to Renier of Montferrat. The house of Monferrat, from which Renier came, was the greatest house of northern Italy and was related to both the Hohenstaufen and Capetian dynasties.[980]

The Emergence of Manuel's 'New Image' and Legend

Manuel's foreign policy towards the Latin East earned him the respect of at least a large section of the Latin settlers in Syria. William of Tyre extols Manuel as 'a most magnificent man, wise, discreet and worthy of praise in every respect',[981] and 'the most powerful prince and the wealthiest among mortals'.[982] The Byzantine ruler's munificent gifts which were showered on his high-ranking visitors from the Latin *Outremer* did not fail to win the admiration of the recipients, establishing the emperor's reputation for generosity. According to William, Manuel's 'favours and most liberal munificence nearly everyone had experienced'.[983] Referring to the emperor's death, the historian records that 'the most munificent of all the princes of the land laid aside the burden of the flesh and rendered his soul

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[976] Ibid.
[977] Magdalino, 1993, 100-1; Angold, 1997, 295.
[978] Magdalino, 1993, 101.
[979] Barber, 2004, 247.
[980] Ibid., 100-1; Angold, 1997, 295.
[981] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 942. '*vir magnificentissimus, providus et discretus et per omnia commendabilis*'.
[982] Ibid., 834. '*princeps potentissimus et inter mortales locupletior*'.
[983] Ibid., 977; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 414. '*cuius beneficia et liberalitatem eximiam universus pene sentit mundus*'.

to heaven. His memory will ever be held in benediction by all the assembly of the saints because of his alms and liberal benefactions'.[984] William's words convey his deep reverence for Manuel. The historian's view of the Byzantine emperor must have been shared by at least the majority of the Frank settlers in Syria. From 1157-8 Manuel not only ceased claiming direct lordship over their states, but also became one of their staunchest allies and provided them with substantial assistance.[985]

In this connection, we should point out that Manuel was not the only Byzantine to be positively perceived by William of Tyre. The *Protosebastos* John, Manuel's nephew, was also held in high esteem by the prominent historian of *Outremer*. He is portrayed as 'one of the most illustrious nobles of the sacred palace',[986] and 'a man of distinguished liberality and noteworthy munificence'.[987] When describing Amalric's visit to Constantinople, William records that, apart from Manuel, John 'also showed great generosity toward the entire embassy'.[988] The historian even admits that 'the same spirit inspired the other princes also; they vied with each other in munificent offerings to the king, wherein elegance of material and fine workmanship were not lacking as evidence of their good will'.[989] As to King Baldwin III, William allows that he 'won great favour with the emperor *and his nobles*, whose hearts were drawn to him by ties of deep affection; in fact, ever after, as long as he lived, he was cherished by them as a son'.[990] Nevertheless, despite these favourable comments, William of Tyre does not seem to have changed his negative perceptions of the Greeks. Manuel, John, and the nobles who had demonstrated affection and generosity to the Latins appear to have been considered as exceptions to the rule and provided no incentive to influence or dispel the stereotypes that William had about the Greeks in general. On certain occasions when the historian was displeased with Manuel, he evaded criticising the emperor whom he admired directly, finding it easier to censure 'the Greeks' in his place in a deliberately vague manner. As examined, when describing the long delays during the negotiations for a marriage alliance between Manuel and Baldwin III in 1157-8, and between Manuel and the house of Tripoli in 1160-1, William does not condemn the Byzantine ruler. The historian was content

[984] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 452.
[985] Lilie, 1993, 293, 296-7; Phillips, 1996, 244.
[986] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 379.
[987] Ibid., 414.
[988] Ibid., 383.
[989] Ibid.
[990] Ibid., 278. Emphasis added.

with criticising the Greeks' evasive and equivocal answers and wily designs, although he certainly knew that Manuel was on both occasions responsible for the delays.

During Manuel's reign, there were many Latins at the Byzantine court, who were extensively employed by the emperor in missions to the courts of Western Europe and the Latin East. Moreover, attracted by the valour and loyalty of Western chivalry, Manuel attached to his personal service a force of Western knights, bound to him by liege homage.[991] The fact that the Byzantine ruler had Latins in his service made him even more popular amongst the Latins of both *Outremer* and Western Europe. As William of Tyre recounts, 'during the reign of Manuel ... the Latins had found great favour with him ... because of their loyalty and valour. The emperor ... relied ... implicitly on their fidelity and ability'.[992] In his *Chronicon*, Robert of Auxerre relates that Manuel 'valued so much the Latins that he conducted his campaigns only with them and distinguished them with the highest honours in the [imperial] palace'.[993] As we are further informed by William of Tyre, 'since he [Manuel] held them [the Latins] in such high esteem and showed toward them such lavish generosity, men of the Latin race from all over the world, nobles and men of lesser degree as well, regarded him as their great benefactor (*benefactorem precipuum*) and eagerly flocked to his court.[994] On the influx of Latins into the Byzantine Empire, Walter Map similarly records that 'now there were living in Constantinople, on Manuel's invitation, people whom they [the Greeks] named Franks - really driven from almost every [Western] nation'.[995] According to William, 'as the result of this eager deference, his [Manuel's] affection towards the Latins increased more and more, and he was constantly improving their status'.[996]

However popular Manuel may have been amongst the Latins of both Western Europe and *Outremer*, it was amongst the Latin residents of Constantinople that he enjoyed the highest reputation, being remembered as the richest, most powerful, and most generous ruler worldwide. In his chronicle, Robert of Clari describes Manuel in the most laudatory terms. The chronicler's source of information were the Latin inhabitants of Constantinople. Clari praises Manuel as 'a very worthy man and the most powerful (*plus rikes*) of all the Christians

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[991] Angold, 1997, 234, 236, 241.
[992] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 461.
[993] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 246.
[994] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1020; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 461.
[995] Walter Map, *De nugis*, 178-9.
[996] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 461.

there ever were and the most generous (*plus larges*)'.[997] As the French chronicler avers, 'this emperor loved the Franks very much and trusted them greatly'.[998] According to 'the story that we have heard', relates Clari, 'never did anyone belonging to the Roman Church [i.e. Latin] ... ask him [Manuel] for anything that was his without being given one hundred marks.'[999] In issues of major political significance, such as the marriage of his son Alexios, Manuel is presented by Clari as deciding 'on the advice of the Franks who were around him',[1000] and favoured a marriage alliance between the Komnenoi and the French royal house of Capet.

The impressive embassy sent by Manuel to the French court in 1178 to negotiate the marriage alliance with Louis VII was perceived and remembered by the Latins of Constantinople as a testimony to Manuel's power and wealth. Clari remarks that the envoys 'were very high-ranking men and they went in great state; never did anyone see people going in greater or more noble state than they did, so that the King of France and his people marvelled at the great splendour which the messengers displayed'.[1001] It is doubtful whether Clari himself had perceived that this was precisely the objective of the messengers, but dazzling foreign courts and inspiring their admiration and respect was a common tactic of Byzantine diplomacy. To this end, the Byzantine embassies dispatched abroad aimed to impress: the envoys were persuasive, schooled in communication and the highest etiquette, their gifts were splendid and costly. The objective was to remind the foreigners of the wealth, power and prestige of the Byzantine Empire, and to gain sympathisers amongst them.[1002] As Clari relates, when Louis took counsel on Manuel's proposal, he was advised by his barons to send his daughter 'to a man who was so powerful (*si rike*) and so high-ranking (*si haut homme*) as the emperor was'.[1003] The Byzantine embassy of 1178 had doubtless fascinated the Capetian court, but it was amongst the Latins of Constantinople that the Byzantine delegation to France seems to have become a cause célèbre and eventually a romanticised story, told with admiration. Its importance is largely due to its yielding valuable insight into the perception of Manuel's status and prestige by the Latins of Constantinople.

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[997] Clari, *Conquête*, 20-1.
[998] Ibid.
[999] Ibid.
[1000] Ibid., 22-3.
[1001] Ibid., 24-5.
[1002] R. Cormack, 'But is it Art?', in *Byzantine Diplomacy. Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990*, eds Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Aldershot, 1992), 219-21, 228-36; J. Lowden, 'The Luxury Book as Diplomatic Gift', in ibid., 249; J. Shepard, 'Byzantine Diplomacy, A.D. 800-1204: Means and Ends', in ibid., 57.
[1003] Clari, *Conquête*, 24-5.

Manuel had eventually become a legend for his deep affection for the Latins, whom he supposedly valued even more than his own subjects. William of Tyre asserts that Manuel depended so entirely on the Latins 'that he passed over the Greeks (*Greculi*[1004]) as soft (*molles*) and effeminate (*effeminati*) and entrusted important affairs to the Latins alone'.[1005] In the West, the Anchin continuator of Sigebert's chronicle claimed that Manuel 'spurned the Greeks and loved the Latins; he used their advice and was aided by their help, the knowledge of the [Latin] clergy and the uprightness of the [Latin] laity'.[1006] In the Byzantine Empire, Manuel's allegedly holding the Latins in more esteem and affection than the Greeks gave rise to fanciful anecdotes among the Latin inhabitants of Constantinople. According to an anecdote recorded by Clari, Manuel's people and counsellors 'criticised him very much, indeed they had blamed him for this many times, because he was so generous and he loved the Franks so much'.[1007] To silence these complaints, the emperor pretended to dismiss all the Latins in his retinue and staff, much to the delight of the Greeks. Subsequently, in collusion with the Latins, Manuel staged a clash between Latins and Greeks, in which the latter fled, abandoning the emperor.[1008] The anecdote ends with Manuel summoning his men and saying in a didactic tone:

> Lords, now it can be seen clearly in whom I should put my trust ... I command you that not one of you be so daring or so bold ever again that he speaks of my generosity nor of the fact that I favour the Franks, for I like them and put more trust in them than in you; and therefore I will give them more than I have given them.[1009]

Manuel's reputation for favouring the Latins, much to the resentment of his own subjects, has an element of truth, although not only Latins, but also other foreigners found favour with the emperor.[1010] As Niketas Choniates relates with some bitterness, Manuel attracted to his court people from diverse 'foreign-language nations',[1011] willingly granted them 'their every request', and 'to some of these the means of livelihood flowed so profusely that they swam in

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[1004] For the pejorative use of the term *Graeculus*, see n. 561.
[1005] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1021; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 461.
[1006] *Continuatio Aquicinctina Sigeberti Gemblacensis*, *MGH SS*, 6, 421.
[1007] Clari, *Conquête*, 20-1.
[1008] Ibid., 20-3.
[1009] Ibid., 23.
[1010] Magdalino, 1993, 107-8, 221; A. Kazhdan, 'Latins and Franks in Byzantium: Perception and Reality from the Eleventh to the Twelfth Century', in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, eds Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, DC, 2001), 95.
[1011] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 116.

rivers of money'.[1012] Moreover, adds Choniates, as Manuel was 'fully confident in these men as his most loyal and devoted servants, he not only entrusted them with the highest offices but also appointed them judges'.[1013] In addition, according to the Byzantine historian, these foreigners were preferred for the registration of taxable lands in some particular provinces.[1014]

From a Western viewpoint, the fact that Manuel contracted marriage alliances almost exclusively in the Latin Christian world[1015] was another testimony to his affection for the Latins. Robert of Auxerre asserts that, due to his esteem for the Latins, the emperor himself married Maria of Antioch and married his son Alexios to the daughter of the French king.[1016] Clari was so pleased that Manuel sought a marriage alliance with Louis that he devoted a considerable part of his account to the marriage negotiations and to Agnes's reception at Constantinople.[1017]

Conclusions

The Second Crusade had to some extent damaged Manuel's reputation at least amongst a number of Latins. Nevertheless, during the later years of his reign, Manuel had succeeded in being perceived by the Latins in *omni orbe* as their *benefactor precipuus*. Any bad memories of the crusade had melted away. Writing to Manuel in 1169, Louis of France addressed the Byzantine ruler as 'venerable brother and dearest friend' and acknowledged him as *illustris et gloriosus Romanorum Imperator*, the title which the Byzantine emperors always went to great pains to defend as their own but was denied to them by the papacy and the German rulers - Manuel must have gained great satisfaction from reading the French king's letter. As Louis further assured the Byzantine ruler, 'the honour that you showed to our pilgrims in God near you [when the French crusaders were in Constantinople] ... was never erased from our memory'.[1018]

Even long after his death, Manuel was remembered with great affection and respect by the Latins. In the collective memory of the Latins of Constantinople, he was 'the most powerful of

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[1012] Ibid.
[1013] Ibid.
[1014] Ibid.
[1015] R. Macrides, 'Dynastic Marriages and Political Kinship', in *Byzantine Diplomacy. Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990*, eds Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Aldershot, 1992), 271-2.
[1016] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 246-7.
[1017] Clari, *Conquête*, 22-5.
[1018] *RHGF*, 16, 149-50.

all the Christians there ever were and the most generous'. In the Kingdom of Jerusalem, he was remembered as a ruler 'worthy of praise in every respect'. In the West, he was extolled as a *piissimus imperator*.[1019] In the historical memory of the papacy, he was the Byzantine emperor *par excellence*, a paradigm for succeeding Byzantine rulers to copy. In his letter dated 21 February 1201, Pope Innocent III urged the Byzantine Emperor Alexios III (1195-1203) 'to imitate in word and deed the devotion to the Apostolic See of your illustrious predecessor, the Emperor Manuel of glorious memory'.[1020]

[1019] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 75.
[1020] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 93.

Chapter 3

FROM THE 1182 MASSACRE TO THE THIRD CRUSADE: THE PORTRAYAL OF ANDRONIKOS I, THE TWO ISAAKS, AND THE BYZANTINES IN ACCOUNTS BY LATIN AUTHORS

At Manuel's death in 1180, his son and heir Alexios II (1180-3) was only twelve years old. Therefore, the regency was officially assumed by Alexios's mother, Maria of Antioch. The *Protosebastos* Alexios Komnenos, a nephew of Manuel, became Maria's lover and the effective ruler of the Byzantine Empire. The *protosebastos* remained committed to Manuel's Western-oriented foreign policy and relied heavily upon the assistance and counsel of the Latins.[1021] In the spring of 1182 Andronikos Komnenos, a cousin of Manuel who had received the governorship of most of Paphlagonia, advanced upon the imperial capital on the pretext of protecting the interests of young Alexios. The empress Maria and the *Protosebastos* Alexios Komnenos, abandoned by their supporters, were captured and handed over to Andronikos, who seized control of Constantinople. During his seizure of power, the Italian residents of the imperial capital were massacred. The massacre was perpetrated by Andronikos's troops - consisting to a large extent of Paphlagonian mercenaries - and the mob of Constantinople. Andronikos had given his permission. Shortly afterwards the empress Maria of Antioch was strangled. In September 1183 Andronikos was proclaimed co-emperor along with Alexios II, whom he eventually had strangled. Andronikos's reign, which lasted from 1183 to 1185, was one of terror. The new emperor's purges were directed against members of the imperial family and the palace bureaucracy. Andronikos was finally overthrown and butchered to death by a maddened Constantinopolitan mob on 12 September 1185, and was succeeded by Isaak II Angelos (1185-95), a member of the aristocracy.[1022]

This chapter examines the portrayal of the Byzantine rulers and people of the period from the 1182 massacre to the Third Crusade through contemporary and quasi-contemporary accounts authored by Latins. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first one discusses the Latin view of Andronikos and the impact of the 1182 massacre on the Latin world. The second part deals with the reign of Isaak, focusing on the encounter between the

[1021] Angold, 1997, 295-6; Brand, 1968, 31-8.
[1022] Angold, 1997, 296-302; Brand, 1968, 38-73; Harris, 2003, 111-20.

Byzantines and the Germans of the Third Crusade travelling through the Byzantine Empire on their way to the Holy Land. This part is subdivided into eight parts, examining the first stages of the expedition which brought German-Byzantine relations to a crisis point, the deepening of the crisis and the military and ideological conflict between the Germans and the Byzantines, the spread of religious propaganda by Patriarch Dositheos (1189-91), the triumph of the Germans and the capitulation of the Byzantine emperor, the question of the so-called alliance between the Byzantine Empire and Saladin (1174-93), sultan of Egypt and Syria, the Western sense of Christian fellowship and the rescue of Constantinople, and the construction of Isaak as Frederick's counter-image in the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris.* The third section of this chapter treats the conquest of the Christian island of Cyprus by the English expedition of the Third Crusade, and is subdivided into three parts, investigating the Western view, first, of Isaak Komnenos, ruler of Cyprus (1184-91), secondly, of the Greek population of Cyprus, and, thirdly, of the conquest of the island by King Richard I of England (1189-99).

The Sources

Several of the accounts used in the present chapter have already figured in previous chapters: William of Tyre's *Historia*, Robert of Torigni's *Chronica*, William of Newburgh's *Historia rerum Anglicarum*, Robert of Auxerre's *Chronicon*, Walter Map's *De nugis curialium*, and Robert of Clari's account of the Fourth Crusade. In addition to these narratives, a number of other accounts are examined.

The *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris* is the best known German source concentrating on the German expedition of the Third Crusade. Its author remains anonymous but the work was originally ascribed to a certain Ansbert. The first draft of the *Historia* was mainly drawn from three dispatches to Germany from the German crusading expedition: the first sent back in November 1189, the second in March 1190, and the third immediately after the German emperor's drowning on 10 June 1190. All three dispatches were probably written by one man, a cleric who was near or in the imperial chancery and therefore had access to documents. Apart from these dispatches, several other original sources were available to the compiler of the first draft, which was formed after the end of 1190. In 1197 a second draft was written by a different author. This second and enlarged draft incorporated the English and French expeditions of the Third Crusade as well as the history of Henry VI of Germany (1190-

7) and Leopold V of Austria (1177-94) up to 1197. It took final form after 1202 in the monastery of the Holy Cross in Austria. The *Historia de expeditione* constitutes the main original source for the German crusading expedition from Regensburg to the Saleph (11 May 1188–10 June 1190).[1023]

The Old French poem *Estoire de la guerre sainte* is a precious eyewitness narrative of the English expedition of the Third Crusade. It was composed towards the end of the twelfth century by the Norman Ambroise. Ailes and Barber have recently challenged the belief, traditionally held by scholars, that Ambroise was 'jongleur' or professional poet, suggesting rather that he was a cleric in the train of King Richard I of England. What is most important, however, is that he was an eyewitness and participant in the events he describes. The *Estoire de la guerre sainte* of Ambroise, whose primary concern was to recite the *gestes* of his king, is generally regarded as 'the best source for the crusade of Richard'.[1024]

The Latin prose chronicle *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* is probably the most controversial account of the Third Crusade. The *Itinerarium* (=IP2) as published by Stubbs in 1864 and translated by Nicholson as recently as 1997 is a compilation of several accounts, including primarily an original version of the *Itinerarium* (=IP1, published by Mayer in 1962) and a Latin translation of Ambroise's *Estoire*. Mayer suggested that IP1, which breaks off in November 1190, was written between 1 August 1191 and 2 September 1192 by an English Templar chaplain in Tyre, while IP2 was compiled between 1217 and 1222 by Richard de Templo, prior of the Augustinian priory of Holy Trinity in London from 1222 to 1248/50. Richard may well have taken part in the Third Crusade. More recently, Nicholson argued convincingly that even the writer of IP1 was a compiler rather than a completely original author, and his chronicle was drawn from oral information obtained from crusaders as well as from two written accounts, one of the German expedition of the Third Crusade and one of the siege of Acre. In the present study, we use IP2, which, as Nicholson argues, 'gives the most comprehensive and detailed account of events'.[1025] IP2 is generally regarded by modern

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[1023] *History of the Expedition*, 31-8.

[1024] Ambroise, *The Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart*, trans. Merton Jerome Hubert and John L. La Monte (New York, 1941), 3-5, 18-19, 22-5; Gransden, 1974, 238-9; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 1-3, 12-13, 16, 19. From 1941 to 2003, the most widely used translation of Ambroise's *Estoire de la guerre sainte* was the verse translation by Hubert with notes by La Monte. In 2003, in their verse edition *but* prose translation of Ambroise's *Estoire*, Ailes and Barber rightly argued that 'the exigencies of the verse greatly reduce the accuracy of the translation; what is gained in charm is lost in accuracy', Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 23. The edition and translation by Ailes and Barber are used in my thesis. Nevertheless, the introduction and notes of the 1941 translation are still valuable to a researcher.

[1025] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, foreword.

researchers as a reliable, first-hand account of the Third Crusade. It is significant to mention that Richard de Templo endeavours to impress his sophisticated target audience by frequently quoting classical authors.[1026]

The *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi et Ricardi Primi* and the *Chronica* of the English chronicler and royal clerk Roger of Hoveden (d. 1201) are regarded by scholars as objective accounts of English and foreign affairs. Since Roger accompanied King Richard I on the Third Crusade to the Holy Land, his narrative of the events from August 1190 to 25 August 1191, when the chronicler left for the West in the entourage of King Philip II of France (1180-23), is considered as reliable, accurate and valuable.[1027]

English contemporary or near contemporary sources containing second-hand information on Richard's crusading expedition are: the *Ymagines Historiarum* of Ralph of Diceto (d. 1199/1200), Dean of Saint Paul's Cathedral, London, who was provided information by his chaplain who participated in the crusade;[1028] the parts of the *Chronicon Anglicanum* authored by Ralph of Coggeshall (d. 1227 or shortly thereafter), abbot of the Cistercian abbey of Coggeshall in Essex, who derived his information from participants in the crusade;[1029] the previously discussed *Historia rerum Anglicarum* of William of Newburgh, who appears to have had access to information of a high level of reliability;[1030] and the *Cronicon de Tempore Regis Richardi Primi* of Richard of Devizes, a monk at Saint Swithun's at Winchester, whose account on the crusade, based on information obtained from several participants, although readable and amusing, is not particularly reliable.[1031] Apart from material on Richard's crusading expedition, these English sources provide information on the German expedition of the Third Crusade and the period under examination in this chapter in general.

[1026] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 6-15; Gransden, 1974, 239-42; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 13-14.
[1027] J. Gillingham, 'Roger of Howden', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1046; D. M. Stenton, 'Roger of Howden and Benedict', *English Historical Review* 68 (1953), 574-82; J. Gillingham, 'Roger of Howden on Crusade', in *Richard Cœur de Lion: Kingship, Chivalry, and War in the Twelfth Century* (London, 1994), 143, 148. As demonstrated by modern commentators, the *Gesta Regis*, once attributed to Benedict of Peterborough, is the first draft of the later revised and completed *Chronica*.
[1028] H. Nicholson, 'Ralph of Diceto', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1002-3; Gransden, 1974, 230-6.
[1029] B. E. Whalen, 'Ralph of Coggeshall', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1002; Gransden, 1974, 322-31.
[1030] Gransden, 1974, 263-8.
[1031] H. Nicholson, 'Richard of Devizes', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1035; Gransden, 1974, 248-52.

Other primary sources of information on the period are as follows: Geoffrey of Vigeois's *Pars altera chronici lemovicensis*, written in 1183-4;[1032] the *Annales Pisani* of Bernardo and Salem Maragone - Salem continued the chronicle of his father Bernardo who ceased writing in 1175 and, his work, which is preserved in an Italian version, stops in the year 1183;[1033] the *Annales mellicenses Continuatio Zwetlensis Altera*;[1034] the work of the German Benedictine Otto (d. 1223), abbot of Saint Blasien, who continued Otto of Freising's *Chronica* from 1146 until 1209;[1035] the *Chronica Slavorum*, authored between the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries by Arnold, abbot of the monastery of Saint John at Lübeck (d. 1211/14) – a continuation of the *Chronica Slavorum* of Helmold of Bosau, Arnold's work covers the 1172 to 1209;[1036] the *Chronicon Montis Sereni*, composed in the mid-1220s;[1037] and the *Chronica*, written from 1227 and 1251 by Alberic, a Cistercian monk of the abbey of Trois-Fontaines at Chalôns-sur-Marne in Champagne (d. c. 1252).[1038] Finally, in addition to the narrative accounts, a number of contemporary letters are also examined in this study.

Andronikos I, The Byzantines, and the Impact of the 1182 Massacre on the Latin World

Several modern historians argue that the massacre of Italian residents, mainly Genoese and Pisans, during Andronikos's seizure of power in 1182 earned Andronikos and the Byzantines the enmity of the Latins. Runciman supports the thesis that 'the massacre of the Latins at Constantinople was something that the West could not forgive'.[1039] Brand argues that 'the Latin massacre of April 1182 ... [was] a landmark in the developing hostility of East and West'.[1040] Angold seems unable to make up his mind: at one point he favours the idea that 'the massacre of Latins in 1182 ... made a great impression in the West, and there seemed little chance of any reconciliation between Byzantium and the West'.[1041] Elsewhere he suggests that

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[1032] Geoffrey of Vigeois, *Pars altera chronici lemovicensis*, *RHGF*, 18, 216-17.
[1033] Maragone, *Annales*, 73; Ch. M. Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180-1204* (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 291.
[1034] *Annales mellicenses Continuatio Zwetlensis Altera*, *MGH SS*, 9, 542, 544.
[1035] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*.
[1036] Arnold of Lübeck, *MGH SS*, 21, 192-3, 198.
[1037] *Chronicon Montis Sereni*, *MGH SS*, 23, 161.
[1038] Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, *RHGF*, 18, 753.
[1039] Runciman, 1955, 131.
[1040] Brand, 1968, 41.
[1041] Angold, 1997, 319.

the massacre had not 'made much impression on Western opinion'.[1042] Harris advocates that 'the patient work of Manuel I over thirty years was undone in a day ... In the long term, the episode was a disaster for Byzantine relations with Western Europe, the Papacy and the crusader states ... in 1182, Andronikos had effectively destroyed the empire's standing in the West'.[1043] Are these theses, however, sufficiently supported by evidence? A closer examination of the primary sources is necessary for answering this question.

William of Tyre gives a detailed and horrific account of the massacre of the Italian merchants in Constantinople. The Byzantines slaughtered 'women and children, the aged and the sick', while 'monks and priests were the especial victims of their madness'.[1044] Cardinal John, the pope's emissary, was one of the victims; he was murdered and his head was cut off and dragged through the streets fastened to the tail of a dog. The Latin churches together with those who had taken refuge in them were burnt, corpses were exhumed and dragged through the streets, and four thousand Latins were sold into slavery to the Turks.[1045]

The 1182 massacre was perpetrated by Andronikos's troops and the mob of Constantinople. Troops and mob were always inclined to commit plunder within Constantinople during or immediately after a political upheaval. In 1185, during the events of Andronikos's overthrow and Isaak's accession to the imperial throne, the Constantinopolitan mob pillaged the imperial palace, and even the churches and chapels within the palace area were looted.[1046] In 1187, once Alexios Branas's coup against Isaak II was suppressed, the Latin troops that had crushed the revolt together with the Constantinopolitan mob attacked wealth and property in the imperial capital. Monasteries and houses were plundered.[1047] Likewise, in 1182, Andronikos's assumption of power was accompanied by an attack on the wealthy Italian merchants.

Brand and Harris are certainly right to argue that the Constantinopolitan populace deeply resented the Italian merchants living in the city.[1048] This resentment doubtless played a role in the attack on the Genoese and Pisans in 1182.[1049] Andronikos's propaganda against the Latins must have also played an important part: as the Byzantine author Eustathios, Archbishop of

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[1042] Angold, 2003, 59.
[1043] Harris, 2003, 120, 125.
[1044] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 464-5.
[1045] Ibid.
[1046] Brand, 1968, 72.
[1047] Ibid., 81-3; Angold, 1997, 301-2.
[1048] Brand, 1968, 83; Harris, 2003, 113-16.
[1049] Harris, 2003, 116.

Thessaloniki (d. 1198), recounts, Andronikos and his Paphlagonian henchmen accused the Latins 'that they were on the side of the *Protosebastos* and the empress Xene [Maria of Antioch], and that through them they were planning harm for the Greeks'.[1050] It is also true that a religious element soon entered into the slaughter.[1051] Nonetheless, the main motivation behind the activities of the Constantinopolitan mob must have been its greed for the wealth of the Italian merchants rather than any other reason. As regards the nobles of Constantinople, not only did they not participate in the attack, but, according to the Byzantine historian Choniates, they provided Italians with asylum.[1052]

Nevertheless, from William's standpoint, the attack on the Italian merchants was an attack of *all* Byzantines on *all* Latins: according to the historian, the motivation behind this atrocity was purely Byzantine hatred of the Latins. William records that after Manuel's death 'the principal nobles (*maiores*) and the people (*populus*) of that city [Constantinople] accordingly felt that an opportunity had come to carry into effect what they had maliciously (*maligne*) formed against our people [the Latins]'.[1053] In an attempt to rationalise the violent episode, the Latin historian records that the Greek *nobiles* as well as the rest of the people 'conceived an insatiable hatred (*odium insaciabile*) toward us ... and were ever seeking an opportunity ... to destroy utterly the hated race of the Latins (*invisum Latinorum populum*) ... that in this way they might satisfy their inexorable animosity (*odium inexorabile*)'.[1054]

For William, there were two main reasons for the Byzantine supposed hatred for the Latins. The first reason was that the Latins had gained much power and influence in the Byzantine Empire under Manuel Komnenos, and the second one was 'the difference between our [the Roman Church's] sacraments and those of their [the Byzantine] church'.[1055] William immediately launches into a tirade of abuse against the Byzantine Church. As he asserts, the Byzantines, 'arrogant (*arrogantes*) beyond measure and insolently separated (*per insolentiam separati*) from the Church of Rome, look upon everyone who does not follow their foolish traditions (*frivolas traditiones*) as a heretic (*hereticum*)'.[1056]

[1050] Eustathios of Thessaloniki, *Capture*, 32-3.
[1051] Angold, 1997, 297.
[1052] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 141.
[1053] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1020; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 461. I made amendments to the translation by Babcock and Krey.
[1054] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1021; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 461-2.
[1055] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 461-2.
[1056] Ibid., 462; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1021. I made amendments to the translation by Babcock and Krey.

William's overgeneralised statement that the Byzantines regarded the Latins as heretics is certainly an exaggeration. In the last years of the Komnenoi, although there were Byzantines who considered the Latins as heretics, there were also Byzantines who did not share this view.[1057] William proceeds to declare that 'it was they [the Byzantines] themselves ... who deserved the name of heretics, because they had either created or followed new and pernicious beliefs contrary to the Roman Church and the faith of the apostles Peter and Paul'.[1058] The historian, however, fails to provide further elucidation of the Byzantines' alleged *novas et pestilentes opiniones*[1059] in order to sustain the new accusation, that of heresy, which he brings against them. Therefore, his claim remains vague. What seems to have triggered off William's diatribe against the Byzantine Church is the fact that Byzantine priests and monks had allegedly participated in the assault on the Latins.[1060]

William ends his account of the 1182 slaughter with a venomous invective against the Greeks:

> In such fashion did the wicked (*impius*) Greek nation, a brood of vipers, like a serpent in the bosom or a mouse in the wardrobe evilly (*male*) requite their guests - those who had not deserved such treatment and were far from anticipating anything of the kind; those to whom they had given their daughters, nieces, and sisters as wives and who, by long living together, had become their friends (*familiares*).[1061]

William of Tyre relates with apparent satisfaction the Latin sack of Byzantine towns and monasteries in reprisal for the massacre in Constantinople. The Latin inhabitants of the imperial capital who escaped the attack embarked on vessels, many of which were Byzantine warships provided by the *Protosebastos* Alexios to fight against Andronikos. Many towns and monasteries on the islands and coasts of the Marmara and the Aegean were immediately pillaged and sacked by the Latins in revenge. A satisfied William records: 'in retaliation for the blood of their brethren, they [the Latins] slew all those [Byzantine] pseudo-monks

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[1057] T. M. Kolbaba, 'Byzantine Perceptions of Latin Religious "Errors": Themes and Changes from 850 to 1350', in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, eds Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, DC, 2001), 139.
[1058] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 462.
[1059] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1021.
[1060] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 465.
[1061] Ibid.; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1024. I made a minor amendment to the translation by Babcock and Krey.

(*pseudomonachos*) and sacrilegious priests (*sacrilegos sacerdotes*) and burned the monasteries together with the refugees who had fled thither'.[1062]

The massacre of 1182 obviously aroused William of Tyre's hatred for the Greeks that pervades his *Historia*.[1063] The slaughter manifestly made a great impression in the Latin East. However, what was its impact on the Latin West? Walter Map mistakenly records that Andronikos Komnenos, 'whose wickedness equaled, if it did not surpass, that of Nero',[1064] had wheedled aid from the Turks, thus denying Christ the third time, and with a great force of Saracens had seized control of Constantinople in 1182.[1065] It should be examined what the truth of this tale is. Before 1182, Andronikos had had a very turbulent life. He had been imprisoned by Manuel, had escaped, and had wandered in the East. He had fled to Nur ed-Din at Damascus and finally found refuge with Saltuch, the Turkish emir of Koloneia.[1066] It appears that Andronikos's fleeing to those two Muslim princes was regarded by Walter as the Byzantine emperor's first two denials of Christ. In 1182, however, Andronikos did not assume control of Constantinople with Turkish aid, as Walter claims. This seems to have been part of the gossip paddled in the West after 1182. Andronikos had enlisted Paphlagonian mercenaries into his army, regarded as wicked and barbarian by the Byzantines themselves.[1067] These Paphlagonians appear to have been replaced by Turks and Saracens in the stories that circulated in the West in the aftermath of Andronikos's accession to the throne.

Walter records that 'the Greeks ... persecuted with extreme hate (*odium pessimum*)' the *Francos* 'living in Constantinople, on Manuel's invitation'.[1068] The Greek persecution of the Latins mentioned by the Welsh satirist is almost certainly a reference to the 1182 attack on the Italian merchants. Walter argues that the motivation behind it was envy (*inuidia*).[1069] Like William of Tyre, the author of the *De nugis* appears to share the perception that the Byzantines felt nothing but hatred and jealousy for the Latins. The Welsh court satirist goes on to interpret the Greeks' *inuidia*: 'to such extent was their strength drained away by the Trojan war that since Ajax ... there is nothing in any Greek to be proud of, nothing excellent: so weak are they that even the dregs of all nations and the very abjects of the people are an object of envy to

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[1062] Ibid., 466; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 1025.
[1063] See also Chapter 1, 100-2.
[1064] Walter Map, *De nugis*, 411.
[1065] Ibid., 177.
[1066] Angold, 1997, 252-4; Brand, 1968, 17-18.
[1067] Eustathios of Thessaloniki, *Capture*, 34-5.
[1068] Walter Map, *De nugis*, 178-9.
[1069] Ibid.

them'.[1070] According to Walter, the class of the Greek *milites* 'has degenerated in knightly practice since the destruction of the army of Troy, and nothing of soldierly honour has appeared among them since the days of Achilles, Ajax, and the son of Tydeus'.[1071]

Walter uses a wide range of clichéd stereotypes to describe the Byzantines: they are 'soft (*molles*) and womanly (*feminei*), voluble (*loquaces*) and deceitful (*dolosi*), of no constancy and valour against an enemy'.[1072] The Welsh satirist's 'anti-Greek' discourse was evidently influenced by the writings of classical authors, notably the satirist Juvenal - it should be kept in mind that Walter's work is in fact a collection of satirical jibes, strongly informed by the classics.[1073] Walter's insulting remarks about the Byzantines should, therefore, be seen in the context of the satirical tradition, rather than be considered as evidence of a widespread anti-Byzantine sentiment in Western Europe. Further, the Greeks' decline underlined by Walter was itself a *topos*, used since Roman antiquity by Latin authors,[1074] whose works had exerted a strong influence on the Welsh writer.[1075]

The French chronicler Robert of Auxerre relates that when Andronikos assumed power, he began to stir the Greeks up against the Latins, declaring 'that the Greeks would be expelled by the Latins, unless the Latins were expelled by the Greeks'.[1076] Eventually the incited Greeks attacked the Latins, and a fight broke out between the two groups. The Greeks slaughtered the Latins or drove them out of the imperial capital.[1077] Although Robert charges the Byzantines with the massacre of the Latins, he does not revile them at all. It is significant that the same author does not ascribe the Byzantine attack on the Latins to pre-existing ill feelings towards them, as William of Tyre and Walter Map do. He rather implies that the Byzantines were the victims of Andronikos's black propaganda. Andronikos manipulated the Greeks into believing that the Latins posed a major threat to them, and this resulted in their massacre and expulsion from Constantinople. The information that Andronikos had

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[1070] Ibid.
[1071] Ibid.
[1072] Ibid.
[1073] Gransden, 1974, 243.
[1074] In his letter to his brother Quintus, Cicero asserted that there are 'very few, if any, [Greeks] who are worthty of ancient Greece'. Cicero, *Letters*, 405. See also Petrocheilos, 1974, 63-7.
[1075] In his discussion of Map's 'assessment of Byzantium' in his work *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context*, Michael Angold fails to take into consideration the literary genre of the *De nugis* and the fact that it was strongly influenced by classical writings. Further, his conclusion that 'the Byzantine reliance on foreigners was proof of their decadence' is not supported by the evidence. See Angold, 2003, 61-2.
[1076] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 247.
[1077] Ibid.

propagandised against the Latins is, as has been seen, substantiated by the account of Eustathios of Thessaloniki.

The Norman chronicler Robert of Torigni records that Andronikos, resenting Alexios II's having many Latin companions, wanted to expel them from the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, employing the Sultan of Iconium and many Saracens, he deceitfully entered Constantinople, seized power tyrannically, and cruelly killed many Latins. Cardinal John was slain by the perfidious Greeks (*Græci perfidi*) and, tied to a dog, was dragged through the streets. His corpse was burned in a pit.[1078] Nevertheless, it is notable that Robert does not adopt William's hysterical anti-Byzantine tone. Furthermore, the chronicler charges *only* Andronikos openly with the massacre of the Latins, while the *Græci perfidi* stand directly accused only of Cardinal John's murder.

The chronicler Geoffrey of Vigeois reports that, in his struggle against the *Protosebastos* Alexios, Andronikos had the help of the Sultan of Iconium and many Greek nobles.[1079] According to Geoffrey, the Greeks consented to Adronikos's seizure of the *imperium* since they hated Alexios II for the reason that he held the Franks in very high esteem.[1080] Despite Geoffrey's claim, Alexios II had never played a significant part in the Byzantine political scene, and it was in actual fact the *Protosebastos* Alexios who depended greatly on the Latins for help and counsel. Nevertheless, the opposition to his regime was due to his arrogance and monopoly of power[1081] rather than to his reliance upon the Latins. Although Geoffrey recounts that Andronikos's seizure of power was accompanied by the massacre of 'countless people of the Gauls [i.e. French [*sic*]]', he does not accuse the Byzantines of the slaughter. In general, nowhere does the chronicler fulminate against the Byzantines or charge them with the 1182 massacre.

According to the Italian author Salem Maragone, Andronikos, who had done 'many evils together with the Turks', invaded Constantinople and entered the imperial palace 'with trickery and slyness' (*con inganno et astutia*).[1082] Having seen this, the Latin inhabitants of Constantinople boarded galleys, provided by the Byzantine emperor and his court, in order to escape. Andronikos killed all Latins who stayed behind: 'clerics and laymen, young and old women'. In revenge, those who escaped 'devastated [Byzantine] cities and many villages, and

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[1078] Robert of Torigni, *Chronica*, 301-2, 307.
[1079] Geoffrey of Vigeois, *Pars altera chronici lemovicensis*, *RHGF*, 18, 216.
[1080] Ibid.
[1081] Brand, 1968, 32-4.
[1082] Maragone, *Annales*, 73.

many castles, and killed the clerics, monks and nuns, men, women, and children with sword and fire'. As Salem declares in an assertive tone, there was never before such persecution and slaughter of Latin and Greek people.[1083] Nevertheless, the author seems to have borne no resentment towards the Greeks. His hatred is directed towards Andronikos, who is denounced as 'the worst enemy of the Christian name' (*pezzimo* [*sic*] *inimico del nome Christiano*).[1084]

The *Annales Mellicenses Continuatio Zwetlensis Altera* records that Andronikos seized Constantinople with the help of the Turks, with whom he consorted, thus denying the name of Christianity. The Byzantine ruler killed an endless multitude of Latins as well as Greeks, profaned sanctuaries, blinded nobles and their wives, and sent them into exile. Both Latins and Greeks are portrayed as the *tyrannus* Andronikos's victims by the same annalist.[1085]

William of Newburgh relates that Andronikos I seized the *imperium* contrary to the custom. The emperor is described by William as a criminal (*sceleratus*), a most wicked and most accursed man (*homo nequissimus*, *homo scelestissimus*), and a most cruel tyrant (*tyrannus ferocissimus*)[1086] – note the Byzantine historian Choniates asserts that Andronikos 'surpassed by far all tyrants who ever lived'.[1087] Like William of Newburgh, Ralph of Diceto portrays Andronikos as a usurper of the *imperium*,[1088] while Roger of Hoveden records that when this ruler ascended the throne, he 'exercised great tyranny over the people; and not only over the people, for all the nobles of the empire as well he either put to death, or, depriving them of their eyes and their virility, drove them out of the empire'.[1089] Roger emphasises three times that Andronikos exercised *tyrannis* over the Byzantines, which resulted in his becoming hateful (*odiosus*) to them.[1090] Roger's magicians who foretell Andronikos's downfall categorically declare to the emperor that he had been overtaken by his sins (*peccata*), namely his 'oppressing the innocent and condemning the just blood without a cause'.[1091] Roger quotes the Constantinopolitan mob as declaring that 'we should expel this perfidious Androneous [*sic*], who is destroying us and our nation'.[1092] The account of Andronikos's deposition is

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[1083] Ibid.
[1084] Ibid.
[1085] *Annales mellicenses Continuatio Zwetlensis Altera*, *MGH SS*, 9, 542.
[1086] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 224-5.
[1087] Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 321; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 177. '*τυράννους ὑπερελάσας τοὺς πώποτε*'.
[1088] Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 12.
[1089] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, I, 254; Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*, I, 526.
[1090] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, I, 254-7; Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*, I, 526-8.
[1091] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, I, 257-8; Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*, I, 529. Cf. Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 187-8.
[1092] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, I, 258; Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*, I, 530.

followed by a description of his gruesome death, which, however, does not correspond to that of Choniates.

Ralph of Coggeshall condemns Andronikos for holding Alexios II with treachery (*dolo*) and killing him deceitfully (*dolose*): the chronicler reports that Andronikos sank the ship on which Alexios was, 'as it is said', information obviously based on gossip.[1093] After he had Alexios strangled, Andronikos, who had a reputation as a womaniser,[1094] married the Empress Anna. Scandalous stories were to be later ventilated in the West. Ralph accuses the Byzantine ruler of dishonouring Anna through 'abominable sexual intercourses', keeping her 'violently among his numerous concubines', and thoroughly depriving her of 'imperial dignity'.[1095] The emperor's 'inhumanity and insolence' was such that he stripped the men of all ranks in the palace off their mantles and had them stand up in his presence like slaves.[1096] According to Ralph, since Andronikos seized the *imperium* unjustly, he viewed all the Byzantines with suspicion and thus created a loyal army composed of men of a 'different nation'[1097] – this evidence is substantially consistent with the account of Choniates, who records that Andronikos 'was escorted by his bodyguard of barbarian units, pestilent fellows ... most of whom did not understand the Hellenic tongue'.[1098] As Ralph explains, on account of 'the excessive impudence of his actions and the insolence of his inhuman heart', Andronikos, 'by the judgement of Just God', was arrested by the nobles and the people of Constantinople and suffered 'a horrible and most cruel death': dragged away from the palace, he was tied on the necks of untamed horses and torn to pieces, and, groaning, breathed out his 'miserable spirit' - as in the case of Roger of Hoveden, Ralph's account of the manner of Andronikos's killing is incorrect. More importantly, however, in the chronicler's opinion, Andronikos deserved to die 'with such horrible torture', since his 'life was spiteful and hateful to nearly everybody'.[1099]

Like Map, Robert of Torigni, Geoffrey of Vigeois, and the writer of the *Annales Mellicenses Continuatio Zwetlensis Altera*, the anonymous author of the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris* relates that Andronikos invaded the Byzantine Empire 'with

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[1093] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 75.
[1094] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 177. According to Choniates, Andronikos 'was followed by his ladyloves, like a cock by barnyard hens, or a he-goat leading the she-goats of the herd, or like ... Dionysos escorting the Thyades, Sobades, Maenads, and Bacchantes ... Madly ravenous for sexual intercourse, he truly emulated Herakles in his despoiling of the fifty-one daughters of Thyestes'.
[1095] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 75.
[1096] Ibid., 75-6
[1097] Ibid., 76.
[1098] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 177.
[1099] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 75-6.

the help of Turks and other tribes'.[1100] The same author denounces the Byzantine ruler as 'an irreverent and wicked tyrant' (*impius et scelestus tyrannus*), who 'exercised tyranny (*tyrannidem*) over Greece' and, 'drawn by cruelty (*crudelitate*) or envy (*invidia*), was ferreting out almost all the princes of the realm [the Byzantine Empire] in order to put them to death'.[1101]

In his account of the Fourth Crusade, the knight and chronicler Robert of Clari constantly describes Andronikos as 'traitor (*traitres, traiteur*)',[1102] due to his usurpation of the imperial throne. Referring to Andronikos's reign, Robert records that 'he [Andronikos] had all those arrested whom he knew to be upset that he was emperor; he had their eyes put out and had them killed and they died shamefully'.[1103] The chronicler reaches the crescendo of his negative description of Andronikos when he records that 'he acted so disloyally that never was there any traitor or any murderer who did as much as he did'.[1104] Clari describes in much detail the events which, according to his information, led to Isaak's accession to the throne of Constantinople and Andronikos's arrest and delivery to the Constantinopolitan lynch-mob for gruesome death by torture.[1105] Clari's description of Andronikos's torture and death at the hands of the frenzied mob tallies with Choniates's account of the events, although the latter supplies far more repulsive details.[1106] It is very important to emphasise that Clari's source of information was Greek and Latin residents of Constantinople. The fact that Clari makes no reference at all to the Latin massacre of 1182 evidences that the incident was erased even from the historical memory of the Latins of Constantinople.

Finally, the anonymous Latin author of a letter composed in 1189 in the *ultramarini partes*, i.e. Palestine, sent to the West, and preserved today in the *Chronicon* of the German monk Magnus of Reichersberg (d. 1195),[1107] does not make any reference to the Latin massacre of 1182, when mentioning Andronikos's seizure of power. Had the author been aware of the slaughter, he would certainly have taken pains to record it. Instead, like several chroniclers, he only refers to the emperor's purges against *his own* Byzantine subjects: 'he

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[1100] *History of the Expedition*, 44.
[1101] Ibid., 41, 44-5; *Historia de expeditione*, 30, 31-2. I made minor amendments to Wilcox's translation.
[1102] Clari, *Conquête*, 24-7, 34-5.
[1103] Ibid., 24-7.
[1104] Ibid., 26-7.
[1105] Ibid., 26-35.
[1106] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 192-3.
[1107] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 511-12.

blinded some, drowned others, condemned several to perpetual imprisonment or exile'.[1108] It seems that by 1189 the massacre had also disappeared from the collective memory of *Outremer*.

From our analysis of the above primary sources referring to Andronikos's seizure of power and rule, we can safely draw some conclusions. All the accounts we have examined evidence that Andronikos was much disliked by the Latins. It is, however, important that many of our authors do not even make a passing reference to the Latin massacre of 1182; they were doubtless unaware of it. Instead, they were fully aware of and refer to Andronikos's means of accession to the throne and reign of terror against the Byzantine themselves, and revile him for his conduct and regime as well as for his alleged collusion with the Turks. The attack on the Latins in 1182 seems neither to have made a significant impact on the Latins nor to have had the far-reaching repercussions for the Byzantine Empire that several modern commentators suggest. Further, it is worth underlining that among the authors referring to the massacre only William of Tyre condemns the Greeks by adopting a vehemently anti-Byzantine tone, while the rest generally hurl abuse at Andronikos, whom they personally considered as the main culprit for the slaughter. Interestingly, the emperor's reign of terror against the Byzantines seems to have made a greater impression in the West than the attack on the Italian merchants ever did.

Isaak II, the Byzantines, and the German Expedition of the Third Crusade

From Nuremberg to Philippopolis: towards a Crisis

Isaak II Angelos ascended the imperial throne in 1185. One of the most important historical events that occurred during his reign was the Third Crusade.[1109] On 4 July 1187 the field army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was destroyed by Saladin at the battle of Hattin. From July to

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[1108] Ibid., 511.

[1109] For the Third Crusade, see Lock, 2006, 151-5; Mayer, 1988, 137-49; Riley-Smith, 2005, 137-46; Runciman, 1951, III, 3-75; Madden, 2005, 74-95; E. N. Johnson, 'The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, vol. 2 (Madison - London, 1969), 87-116; S. Painter, 'The Third Crusade: Richard the Lionhearted and Philip Augustus', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 2 (Madison; London, 1969), 45-85; P. Munz, *Frederick Barbarossa: A Study in Medieval Politics* (London, 1969), 370-96; J. Gillingham, *Richard I* (London, 1999), 123-221; J. Flori, *Richard the Lionheart: King and Knight*, trans. Jean Birrell (Edinburgh, 2006), 63-154; Ostrogorsky, 1968, 406-7; P. Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204* (Cambridge, 2000), 294-300; Harris, 2003, 127-43; Brand, 1968, 176-88; Lilie, 1993, 230-2.

September the towns and castles of the kingdom were surrendered to the sultan, who finally laid siege to Jerusalem on 20 September. Less than two weeks later the city was surrendered to the Muslim leader. Western Christendom shuddered at the news of the fall of Jerusalem. On 29 October Pope Gregory VIII (1187) issued an encyclical calling for a new crusade. The response was massive. By March 1188, the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, King Philip II of France, and King Henry II of England, as well as many of their prominent nobles had taken the cross.

The Germans decided that their crusading expedition would travel by land to Palestine, following the example of the First and Second Crusades. Frederick I opened negotiations with the rulers whose realms his army was to pass through. One of those was Isaak II. In the middle of 1188 an embassy was sent to Constantinople to arrange free passage through the Byzantine Empire. Isaak's *logothete of the drome*, John Doukas Kamateros, was dispatched to Nuremberg in Germany. According to the author of the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, the Byzantine ambassador conveyed Isaak's distrust of the crusade, which the emperor suspected to be 'a hostile invasion into his realm'.[1110] Isaak had some good reasons to mistrust his German counterpart. As has been seen, Frederick and Byzantium had been adversaries in the past decades, especially during Manuel's reign. In addition, before beginning his march, the German ruler had approached the Seljuk Sultan of Iconium and, possibly, the Grand Zupan of Serbia, both enemies of the Byzantine Empire, to negotiate for passage through their territories. Further, in 1186 Frederick had married his son Henry to Constance, aunt of the Sicilian King William II (1166-89), and thus peace between the empire's most formidable Western enemies had been consolidated.[1111]

Unless Frederick could dispel his fears, Isaak would refuse the Germans entrance through his empire and 'in all ways'[1112] oppose them. Having understood the Byzantines' concern, the German emperor willingly agreed to free them from their suspicions, by the oath of three distinguished German princes. In return, the Byzantine ambassador and his associates vowed, on behalf of their sovereign, 'true and steadfast friendship for the Lord Emperor [Frederick] and the whole army of Christ', and promised to provide the Germans with guides through the Byzantine Empire, to make markets available, and to ferry the crusaders across the straits to

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[1110] *History of the Expedition*, 25.
[1111] Lilie, 1993, 236, 241; Angold, 1997, 318; Daly, 1960, 72; Laiou, 2005, 35; Johnson, 1969, 91; Barber, 2004, 221.
[1112] *History of the Expedition*, 25.

Asia Minor.[1113] The German princes finally vowed that 'as long as the Greeks kept the agreement to which they had sworn, the entrance of our men into their land would be peaceful and quiet'.[1114] A German embassy was dispatched ahead to Constantinople to make sure that everything that the Byzantines had promised would duly be carried out.

Writing with the benefit of hindsight, the author of the *Historia de expeditione* states that the Byzantine envoys 'lied ... for nothing they vowed did they afterwards perform'.[1115] The author's scathing remark recalls that of Odo of Deuil when referring to the agreements between Louis VII and the Byzantines at Ratisbon.[1116] Not failing to use biblical quotations where they can have the greatest rhetorical effect, the anonymous writer records that 'the poison of asps was under their [the envoys'] lips'.[1117] As to the German ambassadors who had been dispatched ahead to Constantinople, where they were arrested and imprisoned by Isaak, the anonymous writer laments that 'neither the prudent Emperor [Frederick] nor the simple and faithful legates knew that "they were being sent as sheep in the midst of wolves"'.[1118]

On 11 May 1189 the German army finally began its overland journey to the Holy Land. Passing through Hungary was easy. However, upon entering Byzantine territory at Branits on 2 July, the crusaders were to be confronted with a very different situation. The Byzantine *doux* of Branits diverted the crusaders from the main route onto minor roads which he had previously blocked in order to prevent the march of the Germans.[1119] When the crusaders later reached Nish, a Byzantine envoy arrived and condemned the *doux* of Branits for 'not guiding them [the crusaders] reliably' and 'not rendering him [Frederick] the service his lord [Isaak] has agreed upon'.[1120] However, the author of the *Historia de expeditione* was unconvinced, perhaps justifiably, that the *doux*'s actions were independent of the Constantinopolitan government. Thus, he maintains that the governor of Branits had acted under orders of Isaak, and denounces not only him but 'all Greeks' (*omnes Greci*) as 'treacherous' (*subdoli*) and 'most wicked' (*nequissimi*).[1121]

[1113] Ibid., 26.
[1114] Ibid.
[1115] Ibid.
[1116] 'on a long scroll the emperor [Manuel] inscribed extravagant flattery and, calling our king his "holy friend and brother", made a great many promises which he did not fulfill'. Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 11.
[1117] *History of the Expedition*, 26; Romans 3:13.
[1118] *History of the Expedition*, 26-7; Matthew 10:16
[1119] *History of the Expedition*, 38. Cf. Stephenson, 2000, 295.
[1120] Ibid., 47.
[1121] *Historia de expeditione*, 27.

In his largely inaccurate, but interesting, account of the German crusade, Arnold of Lübeck has the governor of Branits, 'who envies the servants of Christ', hurry ahead to Constantinople and say to Isaak that the eye of the 'wicked people', i.e. the Germans, 'does not refrain from any city or town ... [the Germans,] ravaging everything, subject it to their authority'.[1122] In addition, Arnold makes the *doux* warn the Byzantine emperor that if the crusaders entered his territories, they would overthrow him and occupy his empire. As a result of the governor's counsel, Isaak was 'stricken with terror' and ordered that Frederick's envoys at Constantinople be arrested. Subsequently, as the crusaders approached, all the inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire, also 'stricken with terror', abandoned their cities.[1123] As will become clear, Arnold was only too right about Isaak being in a state of panic at the crusaders' approach. Nevertheless, the governor of Branits was not to blame for the Byzantine ruler's fear that the Germans planned to conquer his empire.

During their march from Branits to Nish, the Germans came under sudden attacks by Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and Vlachs.[1124] As argued by modern historians, it is unlikely that all these attacks were instigated by the Byzantine authorities.[1125] Besides, Serbs, Bulgars, and Vlachs were in rebellion against Isaak.[1126] Some of the attackers may well have acted independently of any Byzantine directives. Nevertheless, some of them carried out orders of the Byzantine ruler: 'when seized, [they] confessed that they had been forced to do these things by order of their lord the duke of Branits, and chiefly because of an edict of the emperor of the Greeks'.[1127] The author of the *Historia de expeditione* views the attacks as a testimony to the Byzantine 'malice' (*malicia*).[1128] Subsequently, during the Germans' march from Nish to Sofia, the crusaders were ambushed by Greeks and Vlachs, who, as the anonymous states, were 'instigated - as is known - by Isaak, the emperor of the Greeks'.[1129] In a letter dated 16 November 1189, which Frederick wrote from Philippopolis to his son Henry in Germany, the German ruler also painted the Byzantine sovereign as the instigator of these attacks.[1130] Before long, this accusation against Isaak passed into Western chronicles. The English compiler

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[1122] Arnold of Lübeck, *MGH SS*, 21, 192.
[1123] Ibid.
[1124] *History of the Expedition*, 38.
[1125] Johnson, 1969, 97; Munz, 1969, 391-2.
[1126] Stephenson, 2000, 274, 288-94; Angold, 1997, 304-7.
[1127] *History of the Expedition*, 38-9.
[1128] *Historia de expeditione*, 28.
[1129] *History of the Expedition*, 50.
[1130] Ibid., 59-60. The letter is reproduced by the anonymous author of the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*.

Richard de Templo records that 'the villainous (*nequissimus*) emperor Isaak of Constantinople' had dispatched Balkan bandits, 'Huns and Alans, Bulgarians and Petchenegs', to 'crush or impede the advancing army'.[1131] Similarly, the author of the *Chronicon Montis Sereni* recounts that the Byzantine emperor 'inflicted many evils upon them [the Germans], firstly by attacking the pilgrims crossing the Bulgarian forest through bands of robbers night and day'.[1132]

At Nish, Frederick met a Byzantine embassy, which, in the words of the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, 'hypocritically greeted the lord emperor'.[1133] The embassy promised the German ruler sufficient guides and markets through the Byzantine Empire, provided that his army would march peacefully. However, as the anonymous writer remarks disapprovingly, the Byzantine envoys 'mouthed one thing and meant another'.[1134]

On 27 July, while Frederick was still at Nish, Stephan Nemanya, the Grand Zupan of Serbia, appeared before the German ruler. Stephan was struggling for independence from the Byzantine emperor, whose suzerainty he had until recently recognised.[1135] Determined to derive maximum benefit from the passage of the German crusading expedition, Stephan with other Serb leaders 'offered homage and fealty' to Frederick and asked to receive from the hand of the German monarch their recent conquests from the Byzantine Empire,[1136] obviously in order to legitimise them.[1137] Further, the Serbs proposed joint German-Serbian military action against Byzantium. Frederick, however, rejected the Serbian proposal, stating that 'for the love of Christ he had undertaken a toilsome pilgrimage against the oppressors of the land of Jerusalem, and that out of price or any ambition he was designing no evil against any Christian king whatever, including the king of Greece'.[1138] The ideal of Christian affinity between Westerners and Byzantines once more prevailed, thus preventing an attack on the Eastern Empire. However, there was only one condition: Isaak should 'supply for the army trustworthy guidance and an adequate market, as he had repeatedly promised'.[1139] If he failed to keep his promises, he would be regarded as a false Christian, against whom military action would be legitimate. According to the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, Frederick

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[1131] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 56; Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 45.
[1132] *Chronicon Montis Sereni*, *MGH SS*, 23, 161.
[1133] *History of the Expedition*, 47.
[1134] Ibid., 47-8.
[1135] Stephenson, 2000, 267-9, 274.
[1136] *History of the Expedition*, 42.
[1137] Stephenson, 2000, 299-300.
[1138] *History of the Expedition*, 43.
[1139] Ibid.

declared 'that he was prepared to fight against false Christians (*falsi christiani*) who waylay against the pilgrims of Christ as against pagans'.[1140]

When the Germans reached Sofia on 13 August, they found the town 'empty and destitute of every satisfaction for human wants'.[1141] More severe accusations are now thrown against the Byzantine sovereign: the author of the *Historia de expeditione* relates that 'the tricks and perjury (*doli et periuria*) of the Greek emperor and his men then began to be clearly evident. The perjurer (*periurus*) emperor had ordered the market and money-exchange, which had been promised under oath, withdrawn'.[1142] The same accusation is repeated by Otto of Saint Blasien, who denounces the Greeks as 'more inhuman than the Bulgarians', and condemns them for having 'robbed the soldiers of the Holy Sepulchre [i.e. the crusaders] of the necessities of life' by taking away from them 'the supplies of things for sale by order of the emperor of Constantinople'.[1143] As the author of the *Historia de expeditione* further recounts, under Isaak's directives, several roads had been blocked 'by treacherous Greek craft (*dolosis Grecorum artificiis*)', and the fortifications of the pass of Wasilitza had been strengthened.[1144] According to the anonymous author, by strengthening the fortifications, Isaak attempted 'to slaughter the pilgrims of Christ and to dishonour God'.[1145]

In Frederick's letter to Henry, the main charges against Isaak are repeated: he broke every vow he had made, withdrew market and money-exchange, blocked roads, and strengthened the ramparts of all Bulgaria 'in order to destroy us and all Christians contrary to the honour of God and of the holy, living cross'.[1146] The old accusations against the Byzantine emperors, found in certain chronicles of previous crusades, are revived. Isaak, as his predecessors, is explicitly portrayed as an enemy of the crusaders and, by extension, of the Christian faith and God. In the present instance, however, charges are hurled not only by chroniclers but also by the German emperor himself and, what is more, they were entirely justified. The main accusations against Isaak are substantiated by Choniates,[1147] who was governor of Philippopolis at that time. His account is authenticated by the historian's status as an eyewitness and participant.

[1140] Ibid.; *Historia de expeditione*, 31.
[1141] *History of the Expedition*, 53.
[1142] Ibid.; *Historia de expeditione*, 37. I made a minor amendment to Wilcox's translation.
[1143] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*, 47.
[1144] *Historia de expeditione*, 38; *History of the Expedition*, 54-5. Cf. Stephenson, 2000, 296.
[1145] *History of the Expedition*, 54.
[1146] Ibid., 60.
[1147] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 221-2.

Otto of Saint Blasien recounts that, 'hardly tolerating suffering these things [withdrawal of markets and money-exchange and blocking of roads] from *Christians*, Frederick gave the army the freedom to plunder and decreed to treat the Greeks as if pagans'.[1148] The German emperor seems to have begun to carry out his threat to fight against *falsi christiani* as against pagans. As to Otto of Saint Blasien, although he acknowledges the Greeks as *christiani*, from his perspective, 'by their actions they [the Greeks] showed themselves to be supporters (*fautores*) of the pagans'.[1149]

The Germans at Philippopolis: Deepening Crisis and Conflict

'Those Who Used to Be Fountains Are Now Trickles, Or Rather Dry and Exhausted Hollows': the Degeneration of the Greeks

On 24 August, the German crusaders approached Philippopolis, which, as in the case of Sofia, they found 'empty and abandoned by the Greeks'.[1150] The anonymous author records that the reason why the Byzantines had deserted the city was 'fear of us [the Germans]'.[1151] The same explanation is provided by Richard de Templo. The Greeks abandoned Philippopolis 'in great fear where no fear was due',[1152] the English writer quotes from the Psalms. As Richard explains, 'the Latins ... had not taken up arms against the Faithful (*adversus fideles*), for they were persecuting the errors of the unbelieving Gentiles'.[1153] The Greeks were evidently regarded by the English writer as Christian brethren. Going a stage further, however, Richard attempts to rationalise the Byzantine fear of the Latins. As he asserts, 'the Greeks only had one reason for fear: they feared them because they did not love them ... this was that ancient and inexorable hatred (*antiquum illud et inexorabile odium*) which the Greeks conceived long ago against the Latins and which had now with the relentless passing of time descended into their posterity'.[1154]

[1148] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*, 47. Emphasis added.
[1149] Ibid.
[1150] *History of the Expedition*, 56.
[1151] Ibid.
[1152] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 57; Psalm 53:5.
[1153] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 45; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 57.
[1154] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 45; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 57.

The English author proceeds to elaborate his argument by putting a rhetorical question to his audience: 'do you wish to know what sparked off this hatred?'[1155] As the chronicler alleges, 'whereas the Latins are equally proficient in knowledge and arms, the Greeks know that they themselves are completely ignorant and unwarlike'.[1156] To the old, well-worn stereotype of the unwarlike Greeks, in marked contrast to the martial Latins, a new, sharp distinction between the two groups is drawn: the Greeks were ignorant while the Latins were knowledgeable. The Greeks' alleged inferiority to the Latins, as Richard avers, 'sparked off their [the Greeks'] hatred (*odium*), and they are wasting away, envious (*invidi*) of the good they see in others'.[1157] As in the case of Walter Map, Richard perceived that the Greeks felt *odium* for the Latins owing to *inuidia*.

Given the fact that the Greeks were regarded by Richard as Christian confederates, the stream of abuse immediately poured out against them is at first glance unexpected and surprising. The Greeks are now condemned as 'perfidious people, wicked and altogether degenerate generation (*gens perfida, generatio nequam, et omnino degenerans*)'.[1158] As the English writer declares, 'their decline is the more extraordinary because they used to be so illustrious. It is as if gold were transformed into slag, grain into chaff, purity into dung or glory into confusion'.[1159] To further elucidate his point, Richard goes on to contrast the Classical and contemporary Greeks:

> the Ancient Greeks undertook many military enterprises (*arma*), and pursued many studies (*studia*), but all that burning virtue has gone cold in their descendants ... Those who used to be fountains are now trickles, or rather dry and exhausted hollows. There is no modern successor for the virtues of the Ancient Greeks, instead all are successors of their crimes, the deceits (*figmenta*) of Sinon and the tricks (*fallacia*) of Ulysses; and they continue the atrocities (*atrocitas*) of Atreus. As for their military skills, they fight with artifice, not arms (*arte, non armis*). As for their good faith, they do you more damage as friend than as enemy.[1160]

The English chronicler seems to perceive the difference between the classical and his contemporary world of Greece as a shameful decline in military ability, studies, and virtues. Since Richard was influenced by classical authors and was concerned to impress his audience

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[1155] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 57.
[1156] Ibid.
[1157] Ibid.; Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 45. I made amendments to Nicholson's translation.
[1158] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 45; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 57.
[1159] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 57.
[1160] Ibid.; Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 46.

with his classical knowledge, his detailed description of the decline of the Greeks, a theme of classical Latin literature, is not unanticipated. It is worthwhile to note that in order to validate his claim of Latin superiority to the Byzantines, Richard argues that the passion for *virtutes*, namely the *studia* and *arma* 'moved [from the Greeks] over into the Latin world'.[1161] In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, the ideology of *translationes* was redeveloped and reused in Western Europe. Two of these 'tranfers' were the *translatio studii* and the *translatio militiae*.[1162] In the work of Richard de Templo, the idea of these two *translationes* is clearly and eloquently expressed, lending legitimacy to the Latins' claim to the Classical Greek heritage.

Misunderstanding and Military Conflict

On 25 August, Frederick received letters from Isaak, which, as the author of the *Historia de expeditione* records, were 'full of pride and arrogance' (*fastu et arrogantia plenas*).[1163] Likewise, as the German emperor informed his son Henry, the Byzantine emperor's letters 'written with great arrogance (*magno fastu*), sang equally of threats, blandishments, and craft (*minas blandimenta et dolos*)'.[1164] Isaak's distrust of Frederick seems to have been intensified once the Byzantine emperor was informed of Stephan Nemanya's approach to the German ruler. As the anonymous author reports, Isaak accused Frederick that he had given lands of the Byzantine Empire 'as a benefice (*in beneficio*) to the Grand Count of Serbia'.[1165] More information on Isaak's embassy is provided by a letter of Bishop Dietpold of Passau to Duke Leopold of Austria, which is preserved in the *Chronicon* of Magnus of Reichersberg. Misunderstanding actually occurred once the Byzantine emperor's letter was read and translated. Dietpold, manifestly ignorant of Isaak's surname of *Ἄγγελος* (*Angelus*), fulminates against the Byzantine emperor who 'haughtily and arrogantly referred to himself as an angel (*angelus*) of God, the origin of our faith'.[1166] According to Dietpold, in his letters, Isaak 'said that the friendship, which he had heard had united the lord emperor [Frederick] and the great

[1161] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 46; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 57.
[1162] Ciggaar, 1996, 93-101.
[1163] *Historia de expeditione*, 39; *History of the Expedition*, 56.
[1164] *Historia de expeditione*, 41; *History of the Expedition*, 60. I made minor changes in Wilcox's translation.
[1165] *Historia de expeditione*, 46; *History of the Expedition*, 68.
[1166] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 510; Harris, 2003, 134.

count [of Serbia], seemed to him greatly grave and suspicious'.[1167] The Byzantine sovereign even charged his German counterpart with conspiring to capture and 'transfer the [Byzantine] Empire to the rule of his son [Frederick VI] the duke of Swabia [(1167-91)]',[1168] who accompanied his father on the Third Crusade. Isaak's fear of the Germans was genuine.[1169] Nevertheless, having failed to appreciate this, the author of the *Historia de expeditione* puts the worst possible interpretation on the Byzantine ruler's motivation behind his accusations against Frederick: 'that chameleon had devised these pretenses or captious arguments against us to excuse his excuses for his offenses, and to obscure his wickedness (*nequitiam*) and treacherous captivity (*fraudulentam captivitatem*) of the innocent envoys of the emperor'.[1170]

On 26 August 1189 the Germans, having been denied passage across the Bosporus, occupied Philippopolis. The deepening crisis finally developed into an open conflict. A Byzantine army that was stationed near Philippopolis was defeated and put to flight by Duke Frederick of Swabia, and, subsequently, the Germans began to conquer the surrounding territory. It was around the same time that Frederick was finally informed of the arrest of his ambassadors in the Byzantine capital. To use the words of an authority in this field, 'Isaak ... foolishly tried to bring pressure to bear by arresting Frederick's ambassadors in Constantinople and holding them as hostages'.[1171]

The Byzantine emperor's arrest and imprisonment of the German envoys made a great impression on the Westerners, and was naturally viewed and interpreted by them in the most unfavourable light. The anonymous author denounces it as an 'unprecedented crime, one contrary to the law and usage of all nations – not only of those which fight for the Christian religion but even of barbarian ones'.[1172] Almost the same language is adopted by the German emperor himself in his letter to his son in Germany.[1173] Dietpold of Passau reports that the ambassadors 'were tormented, ... robbed of their things, disgracefully and inhumanly treated ...

[1167] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 510.
[1168] Ibid.
[1169] In fact, the Byzantine paranoid belief that Frederick coveted the Byzantine Empire dated back to the 1160s. Kinnamos three times refers to this subject. According to the Greek historian, in 1161 'a rumour was current that Frederick ... was setting his whole nation in motion to attack the Romans' land'. With the increase of the German emperor's power in Italy in the middle 1160s, 'Manuel himself became concerned as to how he could check his [Frederick's] advance, lest his unexpected success should turn him against the Romans' land, at which from a long time back he had cast a greedy eye'. Fear of Frederick reached such heights that the Byzantines imagined that 'as he [Frederick] intended to invade the Romans' land ... he commenced to divide it among his followers'. Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 154, 172, 197.
[1170] *History of the Expedition*, 68-9.
[1171] Riley-Smith, 2005, 139.
[1172] *Historia de expeditione*, 46; *History of the Expedition*, 57.
[1173] *History of the Expedition*, 61.

[and] abandoned in the filth of prisons'.[1174] The *Annales mellicenses Continuatio Zwetlensis Altera* records that, although he had made peace with the Germans through his envoys in Nuremberg, the Byzantine ruler imprisoned and treated the German ambassadors contrary to the respect due to them.[1175] Richard de Templo also deplores the conduct of Isaak, 'that most villainous and cruel tyrant' (*nequissimus et crudelis tyrannus*), who 'did not shrink from violating the immunity of ambassadors, which is sanctified by antiquity even among Barbarians, and approved by custom and commended by honour'.[1176] From the viewpoint of Frederick and the anonymous author, by his action, Isaak not only violated the diplomatic immunity but also, since the emissaries were crusaders, insulted God, offended the Holy Cross, and dishonoured all Christianity.[1177]

The captive German ambassadors were finally liberated on 28 October, in the anonymous's words, 'after many subterfuges and deceitful falsehoods (*dolosa figmenta*) in letters and from envoys of the Greeks'.[1178] The German envoys reached Philippopolis accompanied by a Byzantine embassy with a letter from Isaak. According to the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, in his letter to the German ruler, 'a letter full of lies and guile (*fallaciis et dolis*)',[1179] Isaak 'deceitfully' (*in dolo*)[1180] promised transfer across the Hellespont to Asia Minor, provision of a market, and a fair exchange rate. As the anonymous author records, Frederick 'gave no credence at all to their [the Byzantines'] deceitful falsehoods (*dolosis figmentis*)'.[1181] Isaak's hostility to the German crusaders had naturally resulted in the German emperor mistrusting the Byzantine ruler. As Frederick wrote to his son Henry from Philippopolis, Isaak 'craftily (*artificiose*) continued the guile (*dolum*) he had long since conceived against Our Benevolence, by prolonging our passage until the harshness of the winter'.[1182] The same accusation against 'the deceitful (*subdolus*) Greek emperor'[1183] is repeated by the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, mixed in with a conspiracy theory: the delay would win Isaak time to plan the annihilation of the Germans.

[1174] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 510.
[1175] *Annales mellicenses Continuatio Zwetlensis Altera*, *MGH SS*, 9, 544.
[1176] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 46; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 58.
[1177] *History of the Expedition*, 57, 61.
[1178] *Historia de expeditione*, 47; *History of the Expedition*, 69. I made amendments to Wilcox's translation.
[1179] *Historia de expeditione*, 49; *History of the Expedition*, 73.
[1180] *Historia de expeditione*, 48; *History of the Expedition*, 70.
[1181] *Historia de expeditione*, 48; *History of the Expedition*, 72.
[1182] *Historia de expeditione*, 41-2; *History of the Expedition*, 61.
[1183] *Historia de expeditione*, 48; *History of the Expedition*, 70.

The anonymous author alleges that the Byzantine ruler had 'prepared his Turks and Cumans to lay three ambushes' for the Germans as they crossed the straits. The German army was 'to be attacked ... from both sides of the Arm of Saint George ... while ... [Byzantine] galleys ... were to surround and give it to slaughter'.[1184] Thus, as the anonymous author claims, the Byzantines 'prepared the snares of their deceit (*tendiculas suae fraudis*) for us'.[1185] Nevertheless, according to the same writer, 'the tricks (*doli*) of the Greeks were not hidden from us ... the Armenians forewarned the most victorious emperor with much evidence'.[1186] This information is simply unbelievable. Had Isaak made such a plan, he would hardly have made it generally known, even to his own men, let alone to the Armenians. Besides, Isaak was afraid for Constantinople and his throne. Once the Germans would be embarked in ships and ferried across the straits, the Byzantine ruler would have no reasons to destroy them.

Contemporary sources of great authority such as that of Geoffrey of Villehardouin attest to the fact that 'the Armenians ... detested the Greeks'.[1187] The reason consisted in religious differences. Choniates relates that the Armenians 'look upon the pass of the Germans ... as the advent of friends because the Germans have dealings with the Armenians and they agree with one another in most of their heresies'.[1188] It is, therefore, almost certain that the Armenians mentioned by the author of the *Historia de expeditione* attempted to spread malicious propaganda against the Byzantines by claiming that their emperor was scheming with the infidels, Turks and Cumans, to destroy the Christian Germans. Due to the fact that Isaak had shown himself hostile to the German expedition, the Armenians' story seems to have easily gained credence among the crusaders. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Germans were eventually ferried across the Hellespont without incident proves the falsity of the Armenians' allegations and testimony.

Ideological Clash: the Zweikaiserproblem *Revived*

Isaak's letter of late October to the German emperor brought the *Zweikaiserproblem* to the fore once again in a most serious fashion. What in fact followed the reading of the letter

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[1184] *History of the Expedition*, 70-1.
[1185] Ibid., 71-2 *Historia de expeditione*, 48.
[1186] *Historia de expeditione*, 48; *History of the Expedition*, 72.
[1187] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 109.
[1188] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 222.

evokes Liudprand's *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*,[1189] with the only difference that this time the angry reaction came from the Germans, not the Byzantines; the balance of power seems to have shifted from the Eastern to the Western empire. As the anonymous Latin author records, 'at the beginning of the salutation of that letter, he [Isaak] greatly offended the ears of all who heard. For that *Graeculus*,[1190] with his usual arrogance (*solito fastu*), lyingly (*mendose*) proclaimed himself to be the "emperor of the Romans" (*imperator Romanorum*), and our most serene august Lord himself to be not emperor of the Romans, but only "king of Alamannia" (*rex Alamanniae*)'.[1191] According to the same author, 'the rash pride (*temerarius fastus*) of the foolish (*stulti*) king [Isaak] and the title, "emperor of the Romans" (*imperator Romeon*),[1192] which he had falsely assumed'[1193] did not go unnoticed by Frederick. The German sovereign averred that 'there is one monarch the Emperor of the Romans (*imperator Romanorum*)',[1194] namely Frederick himself, and immediately went on providing arguments to support his assertion.

According to the anonymous author, Frederick first buttressed his claim to the Roman emperorship by referring to his coronation as emperor of the Romans by Pope Hadrian IV (1154-9) in Rome, in 1155.[1195] The German ruler stated that he had 'held the sceptre of the Roman Empire for more than thirty years', and had 'been anointed and elevated with the imperial blessing by the supreme pontiff in the city of Rome'.[1196] Nevertheless, Frederick was well aware that his claim on the Roman imperial title required much more support. Thus, he resorted to the *translatio imperii* theory and traced his legitimacy back to Charlemagne. In the eyes of the Westerners, when Charles the Great was crowned emperor by Pope Leo III (795-816) in Rome, in 800, the *imperium* had been transferred from Constantinople back to Rome. Frederick declared: 'my predecessors, emperors of the Romans for more than four hundred years, have handed on this monarchy to me with glory'.[1197] A lecture on the Western conception of the *translatio imperii* theory was subsequently delivered by the German emperor: 'by the acclamation of the Romans, of the princes of the Empire, and by the

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[1189] Chapter 2, 142-3.
[1190] See n. 561 and 1004.
[1191] *Historia de expeditione*, 49; *History of the Expedition*, 73. I made minor amendments to Wilcox's translation.
[1192] It is interesting to note that the anonymous author transliterates, instead of translating, the Greek word *'Ρωμαίων* (*Romanorum*).
[1193] *Historia de expeditione*, 49; *History of the Expedition*, 74.
[1194] *Historia de expeditione*, 49; *History of the Expedition*, 74.
[1195] Barber, 2004, 189-91.
[1196] *History of the Expedition*, 74.
[1197] Ibid.

authority also of the supreme pontiff [Leo III] and of the holy Catholic Church, this monarchy [i.e. *imperium Romanorum*] was translated from the city of Constantinople to Rome, the original seat of the Empire and head of the world (*caput orbis*)'.[1198]

The incident of Frederick's angry reaction to Isaak's letter is also reported by Dietpold of Passau.[1199] The German bishop's version adds to that of the author of the *Historia de expeditione*. According to Dietpold, to support the legitimacy of his claim on the *imperium Romanorum*, Frederick declared that his 'predecessor of blessed memory Charles ... obtained the monarchy of the city of Rome, and more than five hundred years [*sic*] without interruption down to our times continuously passed'.[1200] As to himself, the German emperor avowed that, 'by the authority of God and the free election of the princes', he had been 'glorying in the greatness and rule of the Holy Roman Empire for nearly thirty-eight years [*sic*]'.[1201] Frederick's reference to his own coronation and anointment, as preserved in Dietpold's letter, contains elements of political and ideological propaganda not found in the anonymous author. According to the bishop of Passau, Frederick asserted that 'in the city of Rome, which is called the ruler and head of the world (*domina et caput orbis*), we accepted the crown and the rule of the whole Christendom (*imperium totius christianitatis*) from the altar of the blessed Peter, prince of the apostles, anointed with oil by the lord Pope Hadrian, successor of Peter'.[1202] The German ruler's words can be interpreted as a blow to the Byzantine cosmic theory which considered the Byzantine emperor as the supreme ruler of Christendom.[1203] The references to the *Petrinity* of the Roman Church and the pope clearly served to further legitimise Frederick's claims. As regards the designation of Rome as *caput orbis* in the versions of both Dietpold and the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, that was a direct challenge to the Byzantine ideology that Constantinople was the Queen of Cities (*Βασιλεύουσα*), holding a supreme place in Christendom, over and above Rome.[1204]

From Frederick's standpoint, the justification for the *translatio imperii* was 'the tardy and fruitless help of the emperor of Constantinople against the *tyrants* of the Church'.[1205] The tyrants of the Church implied by Frederick are either the Roman nobles, who seized and ill-

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[1198] Ibid.; *Historia de expeditione*, 50.
[1199] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 509-10.
[1200] Ibid.
[1201] Ibid.
[1202] Ibid.
[1203] See Harris, 2003, 23.
[1204] See Harris, 2003, 12-13.
[1205] *History of the Expedition*, 74. Emphasis added.

treated Pope Leo III in 798, or most probably the Lombards, who had threatened the papacy in the eighth century. Alarmed at the Lombard danger and without any hope of Byzantine aid after the fall of Ravenna to the Lombards in 751, the popes turned to the Carolingian rulers of the Frankish kingdom.[1206] Frederick's explanation recalls the argumentation of Liudprand of Cremona, who, in his attempt to support the legitimacy of Otto as *imperator Romanorum* during an altercation he allegedly had with Emperor Nikephoros, declared that the German monarch 'freed ... [Rome] from the yoke of a *tyrant*, or rather *tyrants*', since the Byzantines had 'neglected to do this'; their power 'was asleep at that time'.[1207] The idea that the *translatio imperii* had been made necessary by the Byzantine emperors' inability to provide protection for Rome and the papacy against 'the tyrants' seems to have been well established by the late twelfth century.

As has been seen, the ideology of *translationes* was redeveloped and reused in twelfth-century Western Europe. The theory of the *translatio imperii*, effected by the authority of the Pope and the acclamations of the Romans, had been redeveloped in the *Historia de duabus civitatibus* of Otto of Freising, uncle of Frederick.[1208] According to Otto's political theory, Charlemagne

> was relieved by the supreme pontiff of the title of patrician and was called Emperor and Augustus ... As he was being crowned all the people shouted thrice, 'To Charles Augustus, crowned by God, the great and peace-bringing emperor of the Romans, long life and victory!' Hence the government of the Romans, which from Constantine [I, the Great] down to this time [800] was centered in the royal city – that is Constantinople – was transferred to the Franks.[1209]

Otto's ideology had evidently played an important part in determining Frederick's outlook.

Having advanced his arguments to buttress his legitimacy as the sole Emperor of the Romans and ruler of *totius christianitatis*, Frederick eventually concluded by declaring that 'it is greatly to be wondered at, why ... the emperor of Constantinople should usurp this futile and undeserved title, and should glory foolishly in an honour which is by all odds not his, since he

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[1206] G. Ostrogorsky, 'The Byzantine Background of the Moravian Mission', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 19 (1965), 12.

[1207] Liudprand of Cremona, *Relatio*, 29. Emphasis added. Cf. William of Malmesbury, *Gesta*, I, 101. Referring to the anointing of King Pippin (751-68) by Pope Stephen II (752-57) in 754, William relates that, 'since the emperors of Constantinople had lapsed long before from their accustomed valour, and brought no aid to Italy and the Roman Church, which had for many years groaned under the tyranny of the Lombards, that same pope [Stephen II] appealed to the power of the Franks to end this wrongdoing'.

[1208] Ciggaar, 1996, 93-4.

[1209] Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*, 353.

clearly understands that I am "Frederick, the ever august Emperor of the Romans (*Romanorum imperator*)" both in name and in fact'.[1210] As Barber has argued, 'Otto [of Freising] thought that he perceived at last, in Frederick, a prince truly worthy to succeed the Romans and Charlemagne, and he set about imbuing his nephew with a sense of imperial destiny more intense than any seen since the days of the Ottonians'.[1211] Frederick's argumentation before the Byzantine ambassadors demonstrates Otto's success.

In the presence of the Byzantine embassy the German sovereign did not fail to denounce Isaak's mistreatment of the German envoys, simultaneously mocking aspects of Byzantine political theory. The Byzantine emperor was traditionally termed *ἅγιος/sanctus* by reason of the divine unction that, according to Byzantine ideology, the ruler received directly from God at the moment of his coronation.[1212] As Dietpold informs us, Frederick observed that Isaak 'calls himself holy (*sanctus*)' only to immediately add with heavy sarcasm that 'strange is the sanctity which is accustomed at once to imprison and exhaust to death, with starvation and bareness, holy men, honest and pious ... faithful envoys'.[1213] Further, in their correspondence, the Western and Eastern emperors traditionally addressed each other as 'brothers' and sent 'brotherly love'.[1214] This tradition went back to 812 when Charlemagne was granted a status of spiritual brotherhood with the universal emperor in Constantinople in the *Familie der Könige*, the Byzantine imperial hierarchy of princes.[1215] The long-established pattern was followed by Isaak in his missives to Frederick. However, according to the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, the German monarch remarked ironically that Isaak 'greets me in his letters with the fellowship of brotherly affection, although he has completely excluded himself from brotherly faith, ... since ... he robbed my faithful envoys, noblemen, ... of their things, took them prisoners and jailed them, tormented them with hunger and insulted them in various ways'.[1216] From Frederick's standpoint, Isaak had excluded himself not only from fraternal

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[1210] *History of the Expedition*, 74-5.
[1211] Barber, 2004, 189.
[1212] Dagron, 2003, 154-5; Ensslin, 1967, 8-9.
[1213] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 510.
[1214] Cf. King Conrad's letter to Emperor John I, John's letter to Conrad, and Conrad's letter to Manuel, reproduced in Otto of Freising, *Deeds*, 54-9; and the letter of Emperor Michael II (820-9) to Louis the Pious (813-40), translated in D. J. Geanakoplos, *Byzantium: Church, Society, and Civilization Seen through Contemporary Eyes* (Chicago; London, 1984), 356-7.
[1215] D. Nicol, 'The Byzantine View of Western Europe', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 8 (1967), 320-2.
[1216] *History of the Expedition*, 75.

faith but 'even from the obligations of Christian piety (*christianae pietatis religio*)' since the German envoys ill-treated by him were 'Christ's pilgrims'.[1217]

Eventually, in the presence of the Byzantine embassy, an indignant Frederick threatened to 'unhesitatingly cut ... [his] way through with the sword' unless three conditions were satisfied: the Byzantine emperor should restore to the German envoys that had been kept captive at Constantinople their possessions and should make satisfaction for the injury he had done them; prominent Byzantine nobles should be sent as hostages to the Germans to guarantee a reliable passage across the straits and fair exchange rate and market; and, in his correspondence with Frederick, Isaak should address the German emperor 'with due respect by the name of Roman emperor (*Romanus imperator*)'.[1218]

A subtle settlement over the delicate *Zweikaiserproblem* was to be eventually reached. In a letter dispatched to him in January 1190, Frederick was acknowledged with the title of *imperator*, but only 'of Alamannia' (*Alamanniae*) not 'of the Romans'.[1219] In a letter in February 1190, and in subsequent correspondence, the German sovereign was finally addressed as 'emperor of Ancient Rome' (*imperator antiquae Romae*), while Isaak was designated as 'heir of the crown of Constantine the Great and governor of the Romans' (*her[es] coronae Constantini magni et moderator Romeon*).[1220] It was a technicality that maintained the Byzantine sense of supremacy. By designating himself as the heir of the crown of Constantine, the first Christian Roman emperor and symbol of imperial legitimacy,[1221] Isaak implicitly demonstrated to Frederick that he was the legitimate ruler of the Romans. At the same time, he challenged the legality of the Western claim that the *imperium* was transferred from Constantinople back to Rome in 800 and thus that the German kings, from Charlemagne onwards, were legitimately Roman emperors.

[1217] Ibid.; *Historia de expeditione*, 50.
[1218] *Historia de expeditione*, 50; *History of the Expedition*, 75.
[1219] *Historia de expeditione*, 51; *History of the Expedition*, 76.
[1220] *Historia de expeditione*, 51; *History of the Expedition*, 76-7.
[1221] P. Magdalino, 'Introduction', in *New Constantines: The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th centuries: Papers of the Twenty-sixth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, St. Andrews, March 1992*, ed. Paul Magdalino (Aldershot, 1994), 3.

Frederick's Impatience, Patriarch Dositheos's Beliefs, and the Spread of Religious Propaganda

By 16 November 1189, a settlement between Isaak and the Germans was still nowhere in sight. Frederick had run out of patience with the Byzantine ruler. In the letter to his son Henry, he stated that he had 'no further faith in Greek vows and pretensions' and ordered the prince to dispatch envoys to the Italian maritime cities in order to supply him with a fleet for a combined attack against Constantinople.[1222] According to the plan, the German crusaders would besiege the city by land and the fleet by sea. Henry was also instructed to write to Pope Clement III (1187-91) 'to send some monks to the different provinces to exhort the people of God against the enemies of the cross, and especially against the Greeks'.[1223] In other words, Frederick ordered his son to encourage the pope to preach a crusade against the Byzantines. In order to justify requesting papal blessing for an attack on Constantinople, Henry was commanded to inform Clement that, while the German envoys were in the imperial capital, the Patriarch of Constantinople Dositheos 'publicly proclaimed in the church of Saint Sophia, that any Greek who killed one hundred pilgrims would secure a pardon from the Lord, even if he were charged with murdering ten Greeks'.[1224] According to the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, when the German ambassadors had been released, in addition to this accusation, they also claimed that, in a sermon, Dositheos, who is condemned as a *pseudo-apostolus*, 'called Christ's pilgrims "dogs"'.[1225]

The accusations against the patriarch of Constantinople are certainly worthy of some investigation. Choniates records that 'Dositheos, as though speaking from a tripod, said that the king [Frederick] never proposed to take possession of Palestine, but that his intention was to march against the queen of cities [Constantinople], which he would undoubtedly enter through the so-called Xylokerkos postern'.[1226] In other words, the patriarch had predicted that Frederick would conquer Constantinople.

Dositheos's beliefs were nothing new. During the course of the twelfth century, there had always been circles in the imperial capital who regarded the crusades as a sinister plot against

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[1222] *History of the Expedition*, 61-2.
[1223] Ibid., 63-4.
[1224] Ibid., 64.
[1225] Ibid., 72-3; *Historia de expeditione*, 49.
[1226] Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 404; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 222. '*μηδέποτε προθέσθαι τὸν ῥῆγα τὴν Παλαιστίνην καταλαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔφεσιν τρέφειν καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν κατὰ τῆς βασιλίδος τῶν πόλεων, καὶ μέλλειν ἐκ τοῦ δῆθεν ἀναμφιλέκτου διὰ τῆς λεγομένης Ξυλοκέρκου πυλίδος τῆς πόλεως ἔνδοθι γενέσθαι*'.

the Byzantine Empire. Just to remind what Anna Komnena believed about the First Crusaders: 'to all appearances they were on pilgrimage to Jerusalem; in reality they planned to dethrone Alexios and seize the capital'.[1227] Referring to the Second Crusade, Kinnamos avowed that 'the whole Western array had been set in motion, on the handy excuse that they were going to cross from Europe to Asia to fight the Turks en route and recover the church in Palestine and seek the holy places, but truly to gain possession of the Romans' land by assault'.[1228]

During the march of the German expedition of the Third Crusade, the person who embodied the notion that the Westerners coveted the Byzantine Empire was the very patriarch of Constantinople. Dositheos made his views public, and these reached the ears of the German envoys, most likely in a distorted fashion and mixed with scandalous misinformation - it is very hard to believe that the patriarch went so far as to declare that any Byzantine who killed one hundred Germans would be forgiven by God, even if he had murdered ten Byzantines. Nevertheless, the hostility of Dositheos as well as of other Byzantine clergy to the Germans is well attested by the sources. Bishop Dietpold reported to Leopold of Austria that 'the Greeks call us heretics. Clerks and monks most particularly attack us with words and actions'.[1229] It seems that the irrational suspicion or hatred of the Latins on the part of the Byzantine clergy led them to launch into vehement tirades against the German crusaders condemning them as heretics, whose suppression and even extermination was justified. Religious fanaticism had thus entered into the conflict.

Did the Westerners, however, perceive the Greeks as heretics? In fact, our only writer who dedicates part of his work to mentioning and discussing ecclesiastical and theological issues is the anonymous of the *Historia de expeditione*. He records: 'we have considered it worthwhile to note briefly how the faith (*fides*) of their [the Greeks'] doctrine (*quorum dogmatis*) differs from that of the universal church, that is from the holy Roman Church'.[1230] From the Western author's point of view, the Byzantines 'broke away from obedience (*subiectio*) to the holy Roman Church a long time ago'[1231] – a precise date is not specified. Concerning the *Filioque*, the author asserts that the Byzantines 'err (*aberrant*) in their doctrine of the Holy Trinity, since their dogma declares that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father

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[1227] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 319.
[1228] Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 58.
[1229] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 510.
[1230] *Historia de expeditione*, 75; *History of the Expedition*, 118. I made minor amendments to Wilcox's translation.
[1231] *Historia de expeditione*, 76; *History of the Expedition*, 119.

only, not from the Son'.[1232] The anonymous also makes reference to the Byzantine use of leavened bread 'in their sacrifice' and to a few other minor issues.[1233] What is more to the point, however, is that neither does the anonymous author condemn the Byzantines as heretics nor does he adopt Odo of Deuil's and William of Tyre's extreme anti-Byzantine tone in their denunciation of the Greek *haereses*, *fides corrupta* and *pestilentes opiniones*. The author of the *Historia de expeditione* seems to agree with his emperor that the Byzantines were Christian fellows. When Constantinople finally escaped German attack, the anonymous author expressed his relief that 'the agitation for starting a war of this kind [had] ceased'.[1234]

Enemy at the Gates

While certain bishops of the German crusading expedition remained in Philippopolis to hold it, the main army departed for Adrianople, which was found abandoned and was occupied on 22 November. Several cities in Thrace were subsequently captured by the Germans. The fights between the crusading army and Byzantine forces continued almost without interruption until the whole of Thrace was controlled by the Germans up to the very walls of Constantinople. In the words of Otto of Saint Blasien, 'the Roman and German power (*potencia*) overcame the Greek craftiness (*astucia*)'.[1235] Meanwhile, clashes also continued in the neighbourhood of Philippopolis between the troops of the bishops who had stayed there and Byzantine forces.[1236]

During this time, rumours that the Byzantines conspired to destroy the Germans with poison began to circulate giving rise to fanciful stories - as has already been seen, the mythical representation of the Byzantine Empire in the West involved visions of it as a place where deadly poisons were widely used. The author of the *Historia de expeditione* relates that at Demotica, captured by the Germans on 24 December, 'a huge jar was found ... filled with wine ... and mixed with the most deadly poison'.[1237] The fact that the crusaders who drank of the wine remained unharmed did not disconfirm the anonymous' belief that the brew had been poisoned, but was rather ascribed to 'divine mercy'.[1238] According to the same story, a Greek who was forced to drink of the same wine fell to the ground half dead. Similarly, when a castle

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[1232] *Historia de expeditione*, 75; *History of the Expedition*, 118.
[1233] *History of the Expedition*, 118-19.
[1234] Ibid., 107.
[1235] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*, 47.
[1236] Munz, 1969, 392.
[1237] *History of the Expedition*, 81-2.
[1238] Ibid., 82.

was conquered by the crusaders in Thrace, imaginative stories about Byzantine poisons once again circulated. As the anonymous claims, the castle with the surrounding area was 'known to serve the emperor of Constantinople in the making of toxics and poisons'.[1239] The German crusaders who seized the castle were supposedly 'warned by their guides or Greek interpreters to avoid very carefully the wine of that land, because of the common knowledge of poison, and because, moreover, this had been published in a public edict'.[1240] However, the crusaders, disregarding the warning, 'boldly drank the wine ... and were in no way harmed'.[1241] Again, a Greek who was subsequently compelled to drink of the brew purportedly 'turned pale, foamed, and wildly rolled his eyes'.[1242]

The two stories sound very far-fetched. First of all, that the allegedly poisoned wine did not harm the Germans, but almost killed the Greeks is simply unbelievable. Secondly, even the Germans themselves did not seem to have taken seriously the warning that the brew was poisoned. Had they done so, they would never have tasted it. The two stories smack of sensationalism. The wine was certainly not poisoned. Circulation of exaggerated stories, soldiers boasting about their boldness in the presence of their fellows, and propaganda intending to degrade the enemy – the stories were aimed at contrasting the strong constitution of the Germans with the weak one of the enemy - have never been absent from a military camp. Crusaders, such as the anonymous author, upon hearing the accounts of their fellows gave credence to them. Subsequently, their fear that the Byzantines conspired to exterminate the Germans with poison bordered on obsession.

For a cleric like the author of the *Historia de expeditione* the fact that the allegedly poisoned wine killed the Greeks but not the Germans was nothing less than a miracle. He therefore draws an analogy between the poisoned drink and one of the Ten Plagues which, according to the biblical story related in the Book of Exodus, were inflicted upon Egypt by God in order to compel Pharaoh to let the Israelites leave his kingdom.[1243] The first of the Ten Plagues, which of course did not affect the Israelites, was that of blood: all water resources used by the Egyptians were turned to blood.[1244] According to the anonymous chronicler, as 'in the ten plagues of Egypt the waters of Egypt became thick blood for the Egyptians, but clear

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[1239] Ibid.
[1240] Ibid., 83.
[1241] Ibid.
[1242] Ibid.
[1243] Exodus 7:14-12:36.
[1244] Exodus 7:14-25.

waters for the Hebrews', likewise 'by no less of a miracle, the wine of the Greeks, steeped in poison and prepared for the destruction of our men [the Germans], was deadly for the Greeks, but a healthy drink for our men [the Germans]'.[1245] Since the Israelites were God's chosen people in the Old Testament, by drawing this parallel, the anonymous author clearly intended to demonstrate that the German crusaders, 'the army of Christ and of the holy cross',[1246] were God's new chosen people. Their cruel persecutors, namely the Byzantines, were, like the Egyptians, opposed to and eventually punished by God.

On 7 December, Berthold, Duke of Dalmatia, was dispatched by Frederick from Adrianople back to Philippopolis and was ordered to negotiate with Stephan Nemanya a joint German-Serbian military action against the Byzantine capital, 'if perchance war should be declared against Constantinople'.[1247] While Stephan's earlier proposal for an attack on Byzantium had been rejected by Frederick, the German emperor, whose patience finally gave out, decided to approach the Serbian grand zupan to negotiate an alliance against Isaak.

Despite the fact that in his letter to his son Henry he had discussed an attack on Constantinople, and although he had made contact with Stephan Nemanya, Frederick still hoped for a peaceful arrangement with Isaak. By 24 December negotiations between the two emperors seemed to be finally proceeding positively.[1248] When the Vlach chieftain Peter, one of the two leaders of the Vlach-Bulgarian rebellion against the Byzantine Empire, 'urgently requested Frederick ... to place on his head the imperial crown of the kingdom of Greece' promising in return strong military support against Constantinople, the German emperor kindly rejected the proposal.[1249]

The negotiations between Frederick and Isaak, while apparently converging towards an arrangement, suddenly broke off over the question of hostages.[1250] The anonymous author accuses the Byzantine envoys, who, 'with their usual shifting and inconsistency, shrank from the promised conditions, and rejected the terms of certain articles'.[1251] The Germans were disturbed and sent Isaak a declaration of further war. As the anonymous remarks, 'thereafter the indignation (*indignatio*) of our men towards the Greeks boiled up more and more',[1252] their

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[1245] *History of the Expedition*, 83.
[1246] Ibid., 67.
[1247] Ibid., 84.
[1248] Brand, 1968, 184; Johnson, 1969, 107.
[1249] *History of the Expedition*, 88-9.
[1250] Brand, 1968, 184-5.
[1251] *History of the Expedition*, 88.
[1252] Ibid.; *Historia de expeditione*, 58.

'excitement ... was fanned to a higher pitch day by day'.[1253] The ongoing conflict had naturally generated very negative feelings towards the Byzantines. Murder and pillage increased to such a degree that even the author of the *Historia de expeditione* deplores the Germans' conduct.[1254] Around 15 January 1190, the German crusaders who had remained in Philippopolis departed after having destroyed the city by fire in order 'to show their hatred of the Greeks (*in odium Grecorum*)'.[1255] The city of Berrhoea was pillaged and also given 'to the avenging flames'.[1256]

Finally, Isaak was forced to capitulate. An embassy was dispatched to Adrianople on 21 January 1190. The Byzantine sovereign promised a market and ships for the transportation of the crusaders across the Hellespont, and agreed to dispatch eminent Byzantine nobles as hostages to guarantee the fulfillment of his undertakings.[1257] However, according to the anonymous author, since 'trust could still not be put in their [the envoys'] words', certain German nobles were appointed 'to investigate carefully the truth of the promises'.[1258]

On 14 February a treaty was finally concluded between Isaak and Frederick.[1259] Although its terms were moderate, in the eyes of the author of the *Historia de expeditione* the Byzantine emperor had been disgracefully humiliated. In a didactic tone, the anonymous chronicler contrasts Isaak's former pride with his subsequent humiliation:

> that emperor of Constantinople, who had shortly before been swollen with pride (*tumidus*), who had, in his extremely impudent letters (*scriptis suis admodum infronitis*), haughtily (*fastuose*) extended his favour to the most victorious and ever august Emperor of the Romans, ... this emperor who foolishly boasted (*stulte gloriabatur*) that all Christ's pilgrims were caught in his net, and ... had, by lying and empty excuses, utterly refused passage to the army of the living cross; now, after his land had been monstrously devastated and his forces had been horribly massacred, [he] put aside his usual pride (*solito fastu*) ... and suffered in silence all the insults inflicted upon him.[1260]

To the same author, the devastation of the Byzantine Empire and the defeats of the Byzantine army were disasters inflicted upon Isaak by God. The chronicler draws an analogy between

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[1253] *History of the Expedition*, 91.
[1254] Ibid., 91-2.
[1255] Ibid., 96. *Historia de expeditione*, 62.
[1256] *History of the Expedition*, 96.
[1257] Ibid., 93.
[1258] Ibid., 94.
[1259] Ibid., 99-103; Brand, 1968, 185-7; Johnson, 1969, 108-9.
[1260] *Historia de expeditione*, 68; *History of the Expedition*, 105-6.

the Byzantine sovereign and the Pharaoh of Exodus, who let the Israelites leave Egypt only after the Ten Plagues were unleashed on his kingdom: 'like Pharaoh, when struck by divine blows, he [Isaak] asked that the march of God's people (*populus dei*), to wit of Christ's crusaders (*signati Christi*), whom he had thought to afflict or destroy from the earth, be hastened'.[1261] By this parallel, the anonymous chronicler finally makes his point crystal clear: the German crusaders were the new *populus dei.*

On 1 March the German crusaders departed Adrianople. Twenty days later they reached Gallipoli. There, in response to the orders that Frederick gave to Henry in his letter of 16 November 1189, Pisan envoys arrived and offered the German emperor 'ships and galleys with which to besiege Constantinople'.[1262] Frederick's reply is not recorded by the anonymous chronicler. The ambassadors, however, must have been dismissed. From 22 until 28 March the German crusading expedition crossed the Hellespont. As in the case of the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, Arnold of Lübeck draws a parallel between the experience of the German crusade and the biblical story of Exodus by describing the transfer of the Germans, the new *populus Domini*, across the Hellespont as a release from the 'chain of Pharaoh'.[1263] Drawing a comparison between Isaak and the biblical Pharaoh of Exodus, and between the Germans and the Israelites was very apt and seems to have been particularly appealing to German chroniclers.

The march of the Germans through Byzantine territory in Asia Minor lasted one month and was not without difficulties. As the author of the *Historia de expeditione* recounts, 'the Greeks ... harassed the more careless of our men, killed some who were not armed, and stole the goods of those who were killed'.[1264] The chronicler accuses the Byzantines that 'with their accustomed treachery (*solita perfidia*) ... [they] violated the peace-pact'.[1265] It is unlikely, however, that the ugly incidents were instigated by the Byzantine authorities. As Johnson correctly remarks, the Germans appear to have overestimated the Byzantine government's ability to control Asia Minor, which swiftly descended into anarchy.[1266] It should be further added that as soon as the Germans were across the Hellespont, Isaak was relieved. He had not had to worry about his capital any longer and further action against the crusaders was

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[1261] *Historia de expeditione*, 68; *History of the Expedition*, 106. Cf. Exodus 12:30-3.
[1262] *History of the Expedition*, 112.
[1263] Arnold of Lübeck, *MGH SS*, 21, 193.
[1264] *History of the Expedition*, 114.
[1265] Ibid.; *Historia de expeditione*, 72.
[1266] Johnson, 1969, 110.

unnecessary. A tent and golden goblet sent to Frederick by Isaak as gifts, while the German ruler was in Asia Minor,[1267] are indicative of the Byzantine emperor's changing attitude to his Western counterpart.

The Question of the Alliance between the Byzantine Empire and Saladin[1268]

As in the case of the Crusade of 1101 and the Second Crusade, the Byzantine emperor at the time of the Third Crusade was accused by Latins of conspiring with the 'infidel' against the crusaders. The question of the alliance between the Byzantine Empire and Saladin has been the subject of a heated and ongoing debate among modern scholars. In his 1962 article 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade',[1269] Brand was the first to deal extensively with this question, arguing in favour of the existence of complicity between the Byzantines and Saladin against the crusader states and particularly, as indicated by the title, against the Third Crusade. Brand's paper has exerted a strong influence on several commentators and is still cited as authoritative by scholars who support the view that the Byzantine Emperor Isaak and Saladin were operating in collusion against the Third Crusade. The purpose of this part of my thesis is to reconsider the question of the so-called Byzantine-Muslim alliance through a fresh examination of the primary material available.

The Alleged Alliance between the Byzantines and Saladin against the Crusader States

In the autumn of 1181 an embassy sent by the *Protosebastos* Alexios Komnenos to Saladin arrived in Egypt. After prolonged negotiations a truce was concluded with the sultan, designed to create a balance of power against the Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor. In 1185 Saladin and the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos signed a formal treaty with the same aim, and probably by 1186, the Emperor Isaak dispatched yet another embassy to the sultan to renew the alliance.[1270]

[1267] *History of the Expedition*, 115.

[1268] A slightly amended version of this section is forthcoming. S. Neocleous, 'The Byzantines and Saladin: Opponents of the Third Crusade?', *Crusades*, 9 (2010).

[1269] Ch. M. Brand, 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade', *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 167-81.

[1270] Phillips, 1996, 251; Lilie, 1993, 224-32, 240; Brand, 1962, 168-70.

As has been seen, in his *Chronicon*, Magnus of Reichersberg preserves a letter that had been composed by an anonymous correspondent in *Outremer*, and dispatched to Western Europe.[1271] The letter has no addressee and breaks off abruptly. Brand argues that it was written in the late summer or fall 1188.[1272] According to this missive, the 1185 treaty between the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos and Saladin stipulated the conquest not only of the Sultanate of Iconium, but also of the crusader states, as well as the subsequent division of the conquered areas between the emperor and the sultan. Jerusalem and the Syro-Palestinian coast were to be held by Saladin as a fief of the Byzantine ruler, since the sultan would pay homage to the emperor.[1273] As Andronikos was overthrown, this pact could no longer be acted out.

The anonymous author of the letter claims that upon ascending the imperial throne, Isaak maintained the alliance between his predecessor and Saladin, 'because he felt hatred for the Latins and feared them'.[1274] When, on his way to Constantinople, Isaak's brother Alexios was captured in Acre by the Latin settlers of *Outremer*, the emperor ordered the sultan 'to rise powerfully against the Christians from overseas who are the greatest enemies of both' and release his brother.[1275] The Byzantine sovereign himself would also attack the Latin settlers, so that their land could be divided according to the terms outlined in the Byzantine-Muslim treaty. Moreover, always according to the anonymous correspondent, Isaak dispatched eighty galleys to the assistance of Saladin, but the fleet was destroyed off Cyprus by the Norman admiral Margaritone. The sultan went to war with the Kingdom of Jerusalem, annihilated the Franks at Hattin, and usurped almost all their land. As reported by the anonymous author, after his triumph, Saladin sent Isaak munificent gifts 'in order to rejoice at his victory'.[1276] The sultan's envoys were honourably received by the emperor in Constantinople and were lodged at a very splendid palace such as Latin ambassadors had never, or rarely, been offered. The treaty between the two parties was renewed and, in return, Isaak sent the sultan generous gifts and a crown, and expressed his gratitude for his brother's release from the Latins.[1277]

The weight given to the evidence contained in this letter is fundamental to the question of the alliance between Byzantium and Saladin against the Latin settlers of *Outremer* as discussed in much detail by Brand, Lilie, and Harris. On his part, Brand relied heavily on the

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[1271] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 511-12.
[1272] Brand, 1962, 181.
[1273] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 511; Lilie, 1993, 231; Harris, 2003, 122-3.
[1274] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 511.
[1275] Ibid.
[1276] Ibid.
[1277] Ibid., 511-12.

anonymous letter incorporated in Magnus's *Chronicon*, and thereby he has been led to assert that both Andronikos and Isaak in turn 'allied themselves with the crusaders' mightiest opponent [Saladin], and even strove to eliminate Latin power from the Orient'.[1278] Lilie also concedes that Andronikos had concluded an alliance with Saladin, directed both against the Seljuks of Iconium and against the Franks of Syria and Palestine: the Byzantine emperor wanted 'to punish [the latter] for their recalcitrance' and 'preserve Byzantine claims in Syria and Palestine'.[1279] Lilie offers a convincing interpretation of the text of the treaty preserved in the letter in Magnus's *Chronicon* stating that, under it, 'the emperor could not only achieve direct rule over Antioch, Cilicia, and parts of Asia Minor once more, but, in the case of Jerusalem, would improve on the legal position of 1171-80, except that now Saladin would take the place of the Franks'.[1280] While the logic of the agreement may thus be clarified, its evidence still begs closer questioning. *Had* such a treaty between Andronikos and Saladin ever been concluded? And if so, had the two rulers really succeeded in forming an alliance against the Franks of *Outremer*?

The likelihood of the existence of such a military alliance against the Latin settlers has recently been examined by Harris. He suggests that there may well have been an agreement between the two rulers to the effect that, had Saladin conquered Jerusalem, he would recognise Andronikos as protector of the Holy Land and of its Christian inhabitants. This agreement was then interpreted by the Latins as a sinister conspiracy against the Franks of *Outremer*.[1281] Harris's suggestion, however intriguing, does not find support in the evidence. After Saladin's conquest of Jerusalem in 1187, the sultan in fact never renewed the ancient Byzantine protectorship over the Holy Land.[1282] The exclusive source of the existence of the treaty, which is *not* substantiated by any other contemporary account,[1283] leads Harris to doubt its attendibility and to argue against the fact of a military alliance between Andronikos and Saladin against the Latin settlers. This is an important step forward in scholarly opinion on this matter. Further, as Harris rightly argues, the allegation that Saladin, the leader of the Jihad

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[1278] Brand, 1962, 167.
[1279] Lilie, 1993, 230.
[1280] Ibid., 232.
[1281] Harris, 2003, 123-4.
[1282] D. Jacoby, 'Diplomacy, Trade, Shipping and Espionage between Byzantium and Egypt in the Twelfth Century', in *Πολύπλευρος νους: Miscellanea für Peter Schreiner zu seinem 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Cordula Scholz and Georgios Makris (Munich, 2000), 100.
[1283] Harris, 2003, 120-1; Lilie, 1993, 232-3.

against the Christians, had agreed under oath (*iuramenta*) to hold Jerusalem and the Syro-Palestinian littoral as the vassal of a Christian emperor stands contrary to reason.[1284]

As regards the accusations of the anonymous writer of the letter against Isaak, these are also baseless. In 1186 the Byzantine sovereign had indeed sent a fleet of seventy ships to the eastern Mediterranean and was truly defeated by Margaritone. Its target, however, was *not* the Kingdom of Jerusalem but the secessionist island of Cyprus, which, since 1184, had been ruled independently by Isaak Komnenos, a member of the former imperial dynasty, who had proclaimed himself emperor.[1285] The allegation that Saladin attacked the Latin settlers because he had been ordered by Isaak to do so with the aim of releasing his brother is not only untrue, but even, on reflection, utterly foolish. The sultan, in reality, went to war with the Kingdom of Jerusalem in response to Latin provocations.[1286] His intentions, as well as the real objective of the Byzantine fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, were doubtlessly known among the Latin settlers of *Outremer*.

The jumble of facts and fiction in the letter preserved in Magnus's *Chronicon* testifies to its author's ignorance of eastern affairs. I would suggest that Magnus's correspondent was a Westerner who had newly arrived in the East, rather than a Latin inhabitant of *Outremer*, as Harris supposes,[1287] or 'an author who knows Byzantium',[1288] as claimed by Magdalino. His report was based on oral testimony, distorted information, ignorance and prejudice. His rendering and interpretation of past events in the most anti-Byzantine light and the barrage of unfounded accusations against the Byzantine emperors attest to an intense and irrational suspicion and distrust of the Byzantines. The question that naturally arises is what the cause of such paranoid suspicion and distrust might have been.

The Supposed Alliance between Isaak II and Saladin against the Third Crusade

We should now consider what modern scholars have argued about the supposed alliance between Isaak and Saladin against the German expedition of the Third Crusade that took the overland route to Jerusalem and marched through the territory of the Byzantine Empire from

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[1284] Harris, 2003, 121.
[1285] Lilie, 1993, 235; Harris, 2003, 128.
[1286] Harris, 2003, 128; Brand, 1962, 170.
[1287] Harris, 2003, 123.
[1288] P. Magdalino, 'Isaak II, Saladin and Venice', in *The Expansion of Orthodox Europe: Byzantium, the Balkans and Russia*, ed. Jonathan Shepard (Aldershot, 2007), 95.

July 1189 to April 1190. Brand asserted that at the news of the gathering of the Third Crusade, the sultan and the emperor strengthened their ties. The Byzantine ruler agreed to delay and destroy the German crusading expedition.[1289] The same thesis is adopted by Ostrogorsky,[1290] Riley-Smith,[1291] Lilie,[1292] and more recently Angold,[1293] Magdalino,[1294] Jotischky,[1295] Madden,[1296] and Angelov.[1297]

The issue of the Byzantine-Muslim alliance is treated at greater length by Brand, Lilie, Harris, and Magdalino, while the supposedly 'domestic opposition to Byzantium's alliance with Saladin' is discussed extensively by Angelov. Brand advocated the idea that Isaak's aggression on the Germans marching through his empire was due to his alliance with Saladin.[1298] Lilie argued that there was a treaty between the two rulers and, under its provisions, the Byzantine emperor would prevent the Germans' march, *but* this was not the reason for German-Byzantine clashes. Given the rivalry between the German and Byzantine Empires in the previous decades, there was no need of any particular alliance that would turn the distrust into armed conflict. Lilie favoured the view that Isaak, in his dealings with Saladin, claimed that their alliance was the reason for Byzantine hostility to the Germans in order to make the maximum capital out of the situation.[1299]

In 2003, Harris emphatically argued that there was *not* a formal military alliance between Isaak and Saladin to molest the German crusaders.[1300] In actual fact, the Byzantine ruler, mistrustful of the German Emperor Frederick, was determined to weaken, and if possible destroy, the German army to ensure that it did not pose a danger to Constantinople.[1301] However, in his dealings with Saladin, Isaak pretended to act in the sultan's interests.[1302] The Byzantine ruler's policy, however, eventually backfired. Isaak's motives became clear even to Saladin and his advisers. As Al-Fadil, Saladin's foreign minister, asserted, 'the Greek king

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[1289] Brand, 1968, 177.
[1290] Ostrogorsky, 1968, 406-7.
[1291] Riley-Smith, 1987, 111.
[1292] Lilie, 1993, 241.
[1293] Angold, 2003, 36, 64-5.
[1294] P. Magdalino, 'The Byzantine Empire 1118-1204', *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, 4, 2, eds David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith (Cambridge, 2004), 631-2; Magdalino, 2007, 94-8, 103-5.
[1295] Jotischky, 2004, 159.
[1296] Madden, 2005, 80-2.
[1297] D. G. Angelov, 'Domestic Opposition to Byzantium's Alliance with Saladin: Niketas Choniates and his Epiphany Oration of 1190', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 30 (2006), 49-51, 54-5, 59-65.
[1298] Brand, 1962, 178-81.
[1299] Lilie, 1993, 236, 241-2.
[1300] Harris, 2003, 128, 134, 136.
[1301] Ibid., 132-3.
[1302] Baha'al-Din Ibn Shaddad, *History*, 121-2; Abu Shama, *Le Livre des deux jardins*, 437-8, 470-1, 508-9.

fears greatly the Franks because of his empire and he wants to repel them; if he succeeds in this completely, he will claim that it is in our interest'.[1303]

Most historians have tended not to agree with Harris.[1304] In 2006, having fully embraced Brand's argument and views that Isaak and Saladin were operating in collusion against the German expedition of the Third Crusade, Angelov went as far as to interpret an oration in praise of Isaak delivered by the Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates on 6 January 1190 as an exhortation to the emperor to abandon his alliance with Saladin.[1305] In actual fact, in paragraph XVII of his oration, in which standard characteristics of imperial panegyric featured prominently, Choniates urges Isaak to crush the Muslims and expand the Asiatic frontiers of the Byzantine Empire to their seventh-century extent. Extended quotation from paragraph XVII of the speech is necessary.

> A Nisaean or an Arabian horse will carry the Roman [i.e. the Byzantine] soldier, and the eternal phalanxes of the Romans will draw water from the Euphrates and drink from the Tigris and will feast between the two rivers. Washing your [Isaak's] hair jubilantly in the river Jordan and being tempered in bravery, like a sword by sharpening, you [Isaak] will not only observe Palestine, but having expelled the pagans you will give Palestine to them [the Byzantines] as their hereditary allotment, just as Joshua had once done with the Israelites. For it is necessary that you, the high-flying eagle that makes every eye turn toward him, fly also thither where Christ redeemed the fall of nature by his own fall, and that assailing the Persians, those many-tongued ravens, you frighten them by the sole motion of your wings.[1306]

Angelov understands this as an expression of dissatisfaction with 'Isaak's fruitless alliance with Saladin' and as an exhortation to the Byzantine ruler 'to adopt an aggressive policy toward Saladin'.[1307] Such an interpretation, however, is inadequately supported by the evidence and thus far-fetched.

As recently as 2007, Magdalino repeated the thesis that Isaak's hostility to the German crusaders was due to his alliance with Saladin, through which the Byzantine emperor hoped to obtain territorial gains in Syro-Palestine, and more particularly the coastal region, as stipulated

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[1303] Abu Shama, *Le Livre des deux jardins*, 509.
[1304] Angold, 2003, 36, 64-5; Magdalino, 2004, 631-2; Magdalino, 2007, 94-8, 103-5; Jotischky, 2004, 159; Madden, 2005, 80-2; Angelov, "Domestic Opposition," 49-51, 54-5, 59-65.
[1305] Angelov, 2006, 59-65.
[1306] Niketas Choniates, *Orationes et Epistulae*, ed. Jan Louis van Dieten (Berlin; New York, 1973), 85-101, at 94. English translation of paragraph XVII of the oration in Angelov, 2006, 59-60.
[1307] Angelov, 2006, 61, 65.

in the Byzantine-Muslim treaty preserved in the letter incorporated in the chronicle of Magnus of Reichersberg.[1308] Defending Brand's views, Magdalino eventually concludes that 'the interpretation of Charles Brand turns out to be substantially correct'.[1309]

Sources

In their discussions of the alleged alliance between emperor and sultan against the Third Crusade, Brand, Lilie, and Harris have employed three Latin sources. The sources are, in order of importance attributed to them by these scholars, the anonymous letter in Magnus of Reichersberg's *Chronicon*, the letter of Conrad of Montferrat from Tyre, preserved in Roger of Wendover's *Flores Historiarum*,[1310] and dated, according to Brand, 20 September 1188, and the report of a French embassy to Constantinople, written, as Brand claims, between September and November 1188, and cited in the *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* of Roger of Hoveden,[1311] and also in the *Ymagines Historiarum* of Ralph of Diceto.[1312] Harris has also used a fourth source: a letter written in 1189 by Queen Sibylla of Jerusalem (1186-90) and addressed to the Emperor Frederick.[1313] As regards Magdalino, he relies mainly on the testimony of Magnus of Reichersberg.[1314]

A re-evaluation of the question of the alleged alliance between Saladin and Isaak II against the Third Crusade involves a new analysis of the four relevant Latin sources. The

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[1308] Magdalino, 2007, 94-8, 103. To support his thesis Magdalino uses three Byzantine texts: 1. the already examined oration delivered by Choniates before Isaak II on 6 January 1190; 2. Choniates's *Historia* in which the Byzantine historian reports that Isaak dreamed of liberating Palestine, 'plundering the Ismaelites beyond the Euphrates', and eventually becoming universal ruler, see Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 237-8; 3. an epigram in which a bishop of Sidon prays that, through Isaak and the patriarch of Constantinople, God would destroy 'the barbarians' and liberate Palestine, including Sidon, see Magdalino, 2007, 95-6. Isaak II may well have dreamed of annihilating 'the barbarians' and conquering the former eastern provinces of the Byzantine Empire, including Palestine and the Holy Land. But this is one thing and it is quite another to claim that Palestine was to be readily handed over to Isaak by Saladin, the leader of the Jihad against the Christians, in return for destroying the German crusaders.

[1309] Ibid., 104.

[1310] Roger of Wendover, *Flores*, I, 153-4; Roger of Wendover, *Flowers of History: Comprising the History of England from the Descent of the Saxons to A.D. 1235*, trans. J.A. Giles, 2 (London, 1849), 71-2. Roger of Wendover (d. 1236) was a monk at Saint Albans Abbey. His *Flores Historiarum* was compiled from well-known authorities from the Creation to the year 1202. See Gransden, 1974, 359-60.

[1311] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 51-3.

[1312] Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 58-60.

[1313] *Tagenonis decani Pataviensis descriptio*, 410. Translated in D. C. Munro, 'Letters of the Crusaders Written from the Holy Land', in *Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History*, 1, 4 (Philadelphia, PA, 1900), 20-21.

[1314] Magdalino, 2007, 94-6.

sources are examined here in the order that best suits the argument of this essay, as will become clear.

1. The anonymous letter in Magnus of Reichersberg's *Chronicon*

The anonymous author of the letter preserved in Magnus of Reichersberg's *Chronicon* portrays the Byzantine emperors as enemies not only of the crusader states but also of the Third Crusade. As he reports, upon hearing about the approach of the Western princes of the Third Crusade, Saladin dispatched envoys to Isaak with munificent gifts, as well as poisoned flour and grain, and a cask of poisoned wine, which were to be used by the Byzantine ruler for the extermination of the crusaders. When Isaak wanted to test the wine, he summoned a Latin Christian in the presence of the Muslim envoys and ordered him to open the cask. Having opened it, the Latin died at once.[1315] Although doubtlessly appealing to medieval Westerners, this exotic story of poison smacks of absurdity not unlike similar stories analysed above.

Magnus's correspondent further reported that Saladin sent a *maumeria* to Constantinople which the emperor would 'set up and order to be venerated for the honour of the Saracens'.[1316] The *maumeria* has been identified by modern scholars as a 'mimbar' or pulpit which was to be installed in the mosque in Constantinople.[1317] Since the eighth century there existed a mosque in the cosmopolitan Byzantine capital. Saladin, greatly concerned about the maintenance of Muslim worship in Constantinople, requested the construction of a new one, which was built in 1188.[1318] From the perspective of the Western crusader, the very existence of a place of Muslim worship in a Christian city constituted itself an outrageous betrayal of Christianity. Richard de Templo, asserts that 'it would have been fitting for that city [Constantinople] to have been razed to the ground. If rumour is to be believed, it had recently been polluted by the construction of mosques, which the perfidious emperor [Isaak] had allowed to be built. He was obliged to do this by the terms of a treaty he had made with the Turks'. [1319] Byzantine judgments and actions were governed by the welfare of the state rather than the zeal of the cross. To the Western crusader, however, this was inconceivable.

[1315] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 512.
[1316] Ibid.
[1317] Brand, 1962, 172, n. 13. For a detailed treatment of Isaak's agreement to the installation of a 'mimbar' in the Constantinopolitan mosque, the journey of the pulpit to Constantinople, its capture by Genoese pirates, and the dispatch of a second 'mimbar' see Jacoby, 2000, 94-8.
[1318] See Lilie, 1993, 237; Jacoby, 2000, 96.
[1319] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 58.

2. Queen Sibylla's letter to Frederick I

The basic accusations against Isaak in the missive preserved in Magnus of Reichersberg's chronicle are almost identical with those hurled against the Byzantine sovereign by Queen Sibylla. In a letter that reached Emperor Frederick while he was marching to Palestine through the Byzantine Empire, the queen denounced Isaak as 'persecutor of the church of God ... [and] of the holy Name' (*Ecclesie Dei ... et sancti nominis persecutor*) and charged him with having 'entered into a conspiracy (*coniuratio*) with Saladin, the seducer and destroyer of the holy Name'.[1320] Both emperor and sultan are represented as equally relentless enemies of Christianity. As Sibylla asserted, Saladin dispatched to Isaak 'many presents very pleasing to mortals, in order to make a compact and agreement (*prauam concordiam et reconciliationem*). And for the slaughter and destruction of the Christians ... he sent 600 measures of poisoned grain and added a very large vase of wine, filled with such a malignant poison that when he wanted to try its efficacy he called a man who was killed by the odor alone when the vase was opened'.[1321]

The imaginative stories according to which Isaak had attempted to eliminate the crusaders with poison provided by Saladin appear to have had wide circulation and to have gained credibility and currency among the Latins. As we have seen, in late autumn 1189, while the German crusaders were marching through the territories of the Byzantine Empire, suffering Byzantine attacks, rumours that Isaak II had been prepared to exterminate them by means of deadly poison began to circulate.

Queen Sibylla of Jerusalem concluded her letter to Frederick by cautioning the sovereign that he 'should never believe the Grecian emperor'.[1322] It is little wonder Sibylla was so openly hostile towards Isaak. First, the queen's consort Guy de Lusignan, who became *de jure uxoris* king of Jerusalem in 1186, had always opposed association with the Byzantine Empire.[1323] Further, in the aftermath of the fall of Jerusalem and the capture of almost all her kingdom by Saladin in 1187, Queen Sibylla needed a scapegoat for the disaster. The development of mutual cooperation and friendly relations between the Byzantine emperors and Saladin in the 1180s fitted Byzantium perfectly for the task. Finally, and most

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[1320] *Tagenonis decani Pataviensis descriptio*, 410; Munro, 1900, 20.
[1321] *Tagenonis decani Pataviensis descriptio*, 410; Munro, 1900, 20.
[1322] *Tagenonis decani Pataviensis descriptio*, 410; Munro, 1900, 21.
[1323] Lilie, 1993, 217, 225; Harris, 2003, 123-4.

importantly, Isaak's manifest hostility to the German crusading expedition marching through his empire must have been naturally viewed by Sibylla as evidence of an elaborate conspiracy between Saladin and the Byzantine ruler against the Third Crusade and the Latins in general.

3. The report of the French envoys to Constantinople

The two full versions of the alleged report of an embassy of King Philip II to Isaak II, given by Roger of Hoveden in his *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* and Ralph of Diceto in his *Ymagines Historiarum*, are almost identical; nonetheless, it should be underlined that the works of the two chroniclers are independent of each other.[1324] Lilie uses neither in his discussion in *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, but employs a version preserved in Roger of Hoveden's *Chronica*.[1325] The same choice of version is made by Angold in his book, *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context*. The latter, however, is only an abridged version of the full report, which was given by Roger in his earlier work *Gesta Regis*. The version preserved in the *Gesta Regis* should therefore be preferred.[1326]

Brand and Harris make reference to the full version of the report in Roger's *Gesta Regis*. Although aware of the version in Ralph's *Ymagines Historiarum*, Brand favours and chooses to cite the one in Roger's work.[1327] Harris, on the other hand, completely disregards Ralph's version.[1328] In Roger's work the report is given with the following preface, 'At the same time the envoys of King Philip [II] of France, who had been dispatched to the emperor of Constantinople, who was called Isaak, have written to the king of France in this fashion'.[1329] Modern scholars have taken Roger's testimony at face value.[1330] However, there is absolutely no reference, direct or indirect, in the report itself to substantiate Roger's statement. Quite the contrary. The appeal to the reader's attention - *notate fratres* - found in both full versions of the report leads to the inescapable conclusion that the addressee was not the French king. I

[1324] Gransden, 1974, 232.
[1325] Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, II, 355-6; Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*, II, 99-100.
[1326] Lilie and Angold ignore both full versions of the report given by Roger of Hoveden and Ralph of Diceto. Angold who in his work *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context* refers to Ralph of Diceto's 'succinct and largely accurate account of Andronikos Komnenos's usurpation' mistakenly claims that 'Ralph of Diceto has nothing else on contemporary Byzantine history'. Angold immediately proceeds to discuss the abridged version of the report of the French envoys, as preserved in the *Chronica*. Angold, 2003, 63.
[1327] Brand, 1962, 172, n. 13, 173, n. 14, 181; Brand, 1968, 358, n. 5.
[1328] Harris, 2003, 214, n. 9.
[1329] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 51.
[1330] Brand, 1962, 172, 181; Lilie, 1993, 237; Harris, 2003, 129; Jacoby, 2000, 95; Magdalino, 2007, 94, n. 4, 97, n. 17; Angelov, 2006, 50, n. 4, 61, n. 51; Angold, 2003, 64-5.

would argue that, as in the case of the anonymous letter preserved in Magnus of Reichersberg's *Chronicon*, the report was written by an anonymous Westerner in the East and was sent to the West, and I will henceforth refer to it as the 'anonymous report'. The fact that the report was *not* written to King Philip II by his ambassadors to Isaak II deprives it of much of the authority ascribed to it by modern scholars.

The writer of the anonymous report observed resentfully that 'in the palace of the emperor of Constantinople more honour was paid to the envoys of Saladin than to any other persons of the very highest dignity'.[1331] The remark recalls the equally bitter comment of Magnus's informant about the lavish palace provided to the Muslim envoys in the Byzantine capital. In addition, according to the anonymous report, there was a close friendship (*familiaritas*) between Saladin and Isaak, 'to whom the said Saladin has delivered all the churches of the Land of Promise that sacred rites may be performed in them by his followers after the Greek custom'.[1332] Lilie argues that 'it is entirely probable that Saladin handed over the Latin churches in his conquered areas to the Greeks',[1333] while Magdalino writes that the sultan 'might have agreed to give the Orthodox clergy exclusive control of the churches in the Holy Land'.[1334] Angelov is more assertive, stating that 'after conquering Jerusalem Saladin transferred the administration of the churches in Jerusalem to the local Orthodox population'.[1335] However, contrary to what the three scholars argue, only in May 1192 Isaak explicitly requested the transfer of the ecclesiastical institutions of Jerusalem to the jurisdiction of the Greek Church *but* his demand was turned down by Saladin.[1336] The claim of the anonymous reporter was, therefore, groundless.

The author of the anonymous report further alleged that 'Saladin, by consent of the emperor of Constantinople, sent his idol (*idolum*) to Constantinople to be publicly worshipped there'.[1337] The *idolum* mentioned by the report should be identified with the *maumeria* mentioned by Magnus's correspondent.[1338] The so-called *idolum* was in fact nothing more than the 'mimbar' or pulpit which was to be installed in the mosque in Constantinople, as mentioned earlier. However, in the imagination of the Western reporter, profoundly ignorant

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[1331] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 52; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 59.
[1332] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 52; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 59-60.
[1333] Lilie, 1993, 237.
[1334] Magdalino, 2007, 94.
[1335] Angelov, 2006, 56.
[1336] Baha'al-Din Ibn Shaddad, *History*, 201-2. See also Jacoby, 2000, 100.
[1337] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 52; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 60.
[1338] Brand, 1962, 172.

about Muslim religious practices, the pulpit seems to have taken the form of an image of Saladin that would be worshipped as a god in Constantinople.

The wildest accusations against the Byzantine emperor were to follow. Isaak was reported to have promised the sultan a hundred galleys, and 'Saladin has given him [Isaak] the entire Land of Promise [Holy Land], if he will obstruct the march of the Franks [i.e. the Third Crusade]'.[1339] Moreover, according to the report, 'if anyone at Constantinople takes the cross, he is immediately captured and thrown into prison'.[1340] Finally, the anonymous correspondent recorded that on the very day he left Constantinople, Isaak ordered the expulsion of all Latins from the Byzantine Empire.[1341] The Byzantine sovereign is once again painted as a close ally of Saladin in an unholy conspiracy against the Third Crusade.

Almost all the accusations thrown at Isaak by the anonymous reporter are totally unfounded. As Lilie observes, the Byzantine ruler was not in a position to provide Saladin with a fleet, since he did not possess one.[1342] The accusation that the sultan would hand the Holy Land over to Isaak if the emperor hampered the Third Crusade is totally preposterous. Saladin would never have promised to hand the Holy Land, the focus of the jihad pietistic propaganda, over to the Byzantines. Such an action – if at all conceivable - would have certainly led to his downfall. As regards the accusation that Isaak ordered the expulsion of all the Latins from the Byzantine Empire, this is not corroborated by other accounts. Besides, as Brand points out, numerous Latin traders, mercenaries, and civil servants were staying in Constantinople during the Third Crusade.[1343] The allegation that the Byzantine ruler imprisoned crusaders in Constantinople is admittedly confirmed by the evidence. In his letter of 16 November 1189 to Henry in Germany, the Emperor Frederick I himself reported that 'many of the pilgrims from our empire ... who went to Constantinople to meet us, are held captive there'.[1344]

[1339] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 52; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 60.
[1340] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 52; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 60.
[1341] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 53; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 60.
[1342] Lilie, 1993, 238.
[1343] Brand, 1962, 173.
[1344] *History of the Expedition*, 64.

4. Conrad of Montferrat's letter to Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury

Let us now consider the so-called letter of Conrad of Montferrat, preserved in Roger of Wendover's *Flores Historiarum*, and used extensively by Brand, Lilie, and Harris in their discussions. What will in fact be demonstrated below is that such a letter had *not* been written by Conrad of Montferrat. The addressee of the 'letter' is allegedly Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury. In his 'letter', Conrad first laments the sad state of affairs in *three* of the four patriarchates in the East: 'the see of Jerusalem is separated from the apostolic see [of Rome] ... [since] Jerusalem has become extinct, and the inactivity of the Christians is most worthlessly discussed by the Saracens ... the see of Constantinople shows no reverence for the see of Rome. The see of Antioch indeed is known to be in extreme distress'.[1345] Then, Conrad implores the archbishop to 'encourage kings, [and] impress upon the faithful' the need to come to the rescue of the Holy Land and deliver it from the 'infidels'.[1346] Finally, Conrad repeats *almost verbatim almost all* the accusations against Isaak found in the anonymous report, i.e. the alleged report of the French envoys. Brand and Harris do not comment on the fact that a great part of the anonymous report is repeated almost *verbatim* in Conrad's 'letter'. Lilie mistakenly treats Conrad's 'letter', as preserved in Roger of Wendover's *Flores Historiarum*, as the more important source and argues that the alleged report of the French 'obviously takes account of it'.[1347]

The key to solve the enigma is found in Ralph of Diceto's *Ymagines Historiarum*, a work disregarded by all the aforementioned commentators. As already said, Ralph cites the anonymous report without a preface. Tacked on to the end of the report is a letter of Conrad of Montferrat to Archbishop Baldwin.[1348] The letter was written in Tyre on 20 September 1188 or 1189.[1349] This is a *different* version of Conrad's letter to the one preserved in Roger of Wendover's *Flores Historiarum*. Nevertheless, part of Conrad's letter in Ralph of Diceto's *Ymagines Historiarum* is repeated *verbatim* in the alleged letter of Conrad in Roger of Wendover's *Flores Historiarum*.

[1345] Roger of Wendover, *Flores*, 153.
[1346] Ibid.
[1347] Lilie, 1993, 237.
[1348] Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 60-2.
[1349] The editor of the *Ymagines Historiarum* ascribed the letter to 1188. Edbury has argued that the letter was composed either in 1188 or in 1189. See P. W. Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in Translation* (Aldershot, 1996), 167-9.

In the letter preserved in Ralph of Diceto's work, Conrad states that 'as the scheme of the world is believed to consist of four elements, likewise the faith of the orthodox was considered to be governed by four sees [i.e. the four Eastern patriarchates] through the glorious apostolic [see of Rome]'.[1350] However, 'the see of Alexandria has ended, and its blossoms thoroughly dried up', 'the see of Jerusalem is separated from the apostolic see [of Rome] ... [since] Jerusalem has become extinct ... The see of Antioch indeed is known to be in extreme distress. The see of Constantinople obviously shows no reverence for the see of Rome'.[1351] Conrad concludes that 'the apostolic see obviously endures maximum loss of rights, when it loses cities and freedoms and is deprived of its right', and he puts forward the rhetorical question: 'it [the see of Rome] obviously lost its branches, how will it carry fruits?'[1352] Conrad then proceeds to describe the desolation of Jerusalem and how he had saved Tyre and incurred the enmity of King Guy and the knights Templars. Finally, he requests Archbishop Baldwin to encourage kings and stir up people to come to the rescue of the Holy Land. *No* accusations are levelled against Isaak, while the reference to the disobedience of the Church of Constantinople to that of Rome was *not* intended to arouse anti-Byzantine sentiment; obviously, it merely served Conrad's rhetorical argumentation. The letter's purpose was to encourage recruitment for the Third Crusade, *not* to accuse the Byzantines.

Thus it is not difficult to discover what happened. It is known that Roger of Wendover had the work of the earlier chronicler Ralph of Diceto in his study as he wrote, and drew upon it.[1353] In Ralph's *Ymagines Historiarum*, the *genuine* letter of Conrad to Archbishop Baldwin is tacked on to the end of the alleged report of the French, which, as we have seen, remains an anonymous composition without identifying preface. Roger of Wendover assumed that the report was part of Conrad's letter to Baldwin. Thus having selected, and copied *verbatim*, part of the anonymous report and part of Conrad's genuine letter to Baldwin, he constructed a new, spurious 'letter' of Conrad to the archbishop. All arguments advanced by modern scholars based on this fake letter are therefore invalid.[1354] In his article 'The Unromantic Death of

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[1350] Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 60.
[1351] Ibid., 60-1.
[1352] Ibid., 61.
[1353] Gransden, 1974, 359-60; F. M. Powicke, 'Roger of Wendover and the Coggeshall Chronicle', *English Historical Review* 21 (1906), 287, 289, 293.
[1354] Some of the modern scholars who use the allegedly 'important' letter in their discussions are Brand, 1962, 172, 179, n. 25, 181; Lilie, 1993, 237-9; Harris, 2003, 129-31; Angelov, 2006, 50, n. 4, 61, n. 51.

Richard I', published in 1979, Gillingham was right to advise us to be suspicious of 'Roger of Wendover whom even schoolboys are now taught to distrust'.[1355]

The fact that the letter in Roger's *Flores Historiarum* is spurious deprives the commentators who argue that a Muslim-Byzantine alliance against the Third Crusade existed of one of their principal sources used to substantiate their thesis. At the same time, the view that an alliance between Isaak and Saladin against the crusaders did *not* exist is further corroborated.

A Medieval Popular Myth: 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade'

Isaak did *not* attempt to weaken the German army in order to promote and protect Saladin's interests or to keep his side of a bargain struck between himself and the sultan. Rather he did so only to make sure the Germans could not pose a danger to Constantinople's security.[1356] Isaak could not understand Frederick's artless sincerity and honesty, and was convinced that the German's objective was not as much to recapture Jerusalem, as to conquer the Byzantine Empire.[1357]

With the very recent exception of Magdalino,[1358] modern historians have paid little or no attention to the fact that Isaak was particularly prone to superstition and fateful prophecies. This is plainly evidenced in the account of Isaak's first and second reign by the Byzantine historian Choniates.[1359] We have seen that, while the German crusading expedition was marching on Jerusalem through Europe, Patriarch Dositheos, who exerted an extraordinary influence on Isaak,[1360] prophesied that Frederick would march against Constantinople, 'which he would undoubtedly enter through the so-called Xylokerkos postern'.[1361] Further, according to the author of the alleged report of King Philip II's envoys, 'a certain old man, a Greek by birth, from Astralix, had said that the prophecy was about to be fulfilled which was written on the Golden Gate ... "When the Yellow-haired King of the West shall come, then shall I open of my own accord, and then shall the Latins reign, and hold rule in the city of

[1355] J. Gillingham, 'The Unromantic Death of Richard I', *Speculum* 54 (1979), 20.
[1356] Harris, 2003, 132-3.
[1357] Munz, 1969, 392.
[1358] Magdalino, 2007, 96-100.
[1359] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 222, 305.
[1360] Magdalino, 2007, 99.
[1361] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 222.

Constantinople"'.[1362] Amidst prophecies of this kind, Isaak, overtaken by panic, 'blocked up the [Xylokerkos] postern with lime and baked bricks'.[1363]

The German emperor's negotiations with the Serbian and Seljuk rulers before setting out for his eastward journey heightened Isaak's suspicions and fears. The Byzantine ruler's imagination ran wild. He pictured Frederick giving lands of the Byzantine Empire 'as a benefice to the Grand Count of Serbia'[1364] and conspiring to capture and 'transfer the [Byzantine] Empire to the rule of his son [Frederick VI] of Swabia'.[1365] With his fear bordering on paranoia, Isaak decided to stop the Germans using all the means he could.

Since the German crusaders genuinely and sincerely intended to liberate Jerusalem, and *not* to conquer Constantinople, they failed to appreciate that Isaak's hostility to them was due to the fact that he regarded the German army as a threat to the safety of the Byzantine capital. In their attempt to rationalise Isaak's hostile behaviour, the Germans naturally concluded that the Byzantine sovereign was acting in collusion with Saladin. The anonymous author of the *Historia de expeditione* discloses what was in his eyes the motivation behind Isaak's arrest and imprisonment of the German envoys who had been dispatched ahead to Constantinople to make sure that the assistance promised to the Germans by a previous Byzantine embassy to Nuremberg would be implemented fully. As the anonymous author alleges, the Byzantine sovereign 'desired to offer this favour to his friend and confederate (*amico et confederato*) Saladin the Saracen, the enemy of the cross and of all Christians'.[1366] The Germans' belief that Isaak was in league with Saladin was doubtless formed once the Byzantine ruler's hostility to the crusaders had become manifest at the end of August 1189. By October, as Choniates informs us, 'the Germans contended that nothing else could have convinced the emperor of the Romans [Isaak] to disregard the solemn oaths of the Western Christians except that he had concluded a peace with the ruler of the Saracens, and that, in accordance with their prevailing

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[1362] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 52; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 60. In his discussion in his article *Prophecies on the Fall of Constantinople*, Magdalino uses none of the two versions of the French envoys' report, preserved in Roger's *Gesta Regis* and Ralph's *Ymagines Historiarum* respectively, but employs the version preserved in Roger's *Chronica*. This led the same scholar to argue that the prophecy was reported by Roger 'ca. 1200'. See, P. Magdalino, 'Prophecies on the Fall of Constantinople', in *Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, la IVe Croisade et ses conséquences. Proceedings of an International Conference Organized by the Academy of Athens and Held March 9-12, 2004*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Paris, 2005), 51-2.

[1363] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 222.

[1364] *History of the Expedition*, 68.

[1365] Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 17, 510.

[1366] *Historia de expeditione*, 39; *History of the Expedition*, 57.

custom regarding friendship, they had both opened a vein on their chests and offered to each other the blood flowing out therefrom to drink'.[1367]

The date of the letter preserved in Magnus of Reichersberg's chronicle, of Sibylla's letter, and of the anonymous report, that is the alleged report of the French, further invalidates the conviction that a conspiracy to destroy the Germans existed between Isaak and Saladin. In Ralph of Diceto the anonymous report is placed under the year 1189. As has been seen, Brand, who disregards Ralph's account, has conveniently dated the report between September and November 1188.[1368] The same commentator dated the letter in Magnus of Reichersberg in summer or fall 1188 - he did so based on the fake letter of Conrad which he dated 20 September 1188. Brand's dating of the documents served his false argument: a Byzantine-Muslim alliance existed and 'in the autumn of 1188 ... became public knowledge in Western Europe';[1369] according to the provisions of this alliance, Isaak had to destroy the Germans who would march through his empire.

In actual fact, there is no particular reason to date the letter preserved in Magnus's chronicle to 1188. I would suggest that, as in the case of the anonymous report, this document was written in 1189. Magnus interpolated it after an account of the German expedition's difficulties in the European territories of the Byzantine Empire, under the year 1189. In addition, Saladin's envoys mentioned by both Magnus's informant and the anonymous report were doubtless the same emissaries mentioned by the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, i.e. the sultan's ambassadors who were in Constantinople in June 1189, to whom Isaak had allegedly given the confiscated horses of the arrested German envoys.[1370]

I would argue that the letter in Magnus's *Chronicon*, the anonymous report and Sibylla's letter, were written *in late 1189*, i.e. *after* Isaak's hostility to the German crusaders became manifest. This dating would explain, first, Magnus's correspondent's charge against Isaak that he hated and feared the Latins, and secondly the striking similarity between the accusations against the Byzantine ruler found in the three documents (namely the letter in Magnus's chronicle, the anonymous report and Sibylla's letter) and those occurring in the eyewitness *Historia de expeditione*: Isaak's friendship and alliance with Saladin, the emperor's favourable

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[1367] Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 409-10; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 225. '*φασιν οἱ Ἀλαμανοὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ πεῖσαν τὸν βασιλέα Ῥωμαίων τὰ τῶν ἑσπερίων Χριστιανῶν ὅρκια παραβλέψασθαι ἢ τὸ μετὰ τοῦ τῶν Σαρακηνῶν ἄρχοντος σπείσασθαι καὶ κατὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς περὶ φιλίας κρατοῦν ἔθιμον ἀμφοτέρους σχάσαι φλέβα τὴν ἐπιστήθιον καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν ἐκρυὲν αἷμα ἑκάτερον εἰς πόσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀντιπροτείνασθαι*'.

[1368] Cf. Jacoby, 2007, 95, who favours a date in summer 1189.

[1369] Brand, 1962, 172.

[1370] *History of the Expedition*, 72.

treatment of the sultan's envoys, his imprisonment of crusaders, and his use of poison to eliminate the Germans.[1371] The fact that the anonymous report, the missive in Magnus's *Chronicon*, and Sibylla's letter were written *after* Isaak attacked the Germans supports the thesis that I am attempting to defend in this chapter: the purported Byzantine-Muslim collusion against the Third Crusade was a myth created by the Latins to make sense of Isaak's efforts to destroy the Germans. The letter in Magnus's chronicle, the anonymous report and Sibylla's letter are nothing more than three elaborate versions of this imaginative medieval myth, aimed at explaining the Byzantine ruler's behaviour and eventually enshrined as truth.

While modern scholars were quick to accept the myth that Isaak had allied himself with Saladin against the Germans, Frederick himself had given no credence to the circulating rumours that his Byzantine counterpart 'had concluded a peace with the ruler of the Saracens'.[1372] As we have seen, in his letter of 16 November 1189 to Henry in Germany, Frederick ordered his son to send ambassadors to the Italian maritime cities so as to supply him with a fleet for an attack on Constantinople, and to write to the pope to preach a crusade against the Byzantines. In order to justify requesting papal blessing for an assault on the Byzantine capital, Henry was instructed to inform Clement of the vehemently anti-Latin speech delivered by Patriarch Dositheos in the church of *Hagia Sophia*. An accusation against Isaak of collusion with the 'infidel' would further justify the German emperor's demanding the preaching of a crusade against the Byzantine Empire. Nevertheless, nowhere in his letter does Frederick charge the Byzantine ruler with having connived with Saladin against the Germans. The failure of the German emperor's letter to accuse Isaak of alliance with the 'infidel' is of considerable weight. Frederick was certainly in a better position than any other 'Latin' to know if an alliance existed between Isaak and Saladin.

Further, as has been seen, as soon as the Germans were across the Hellespont a relieved Isaak changed his attitude to Frederick to whom he sent a tent and golden goblet as gifts.[1373] The Byzantine emperor did not have to worry about the safety of his capital any longer and further action against the crusaders was unnecessary. Isaak's fear for the safety of Constantinople was the sole reason for his hostility to the Germans marching through the European territories of his empire. Had the Byzantine sovereign been concerned with Saladin's interests, he would have continued being aggressive to Frederick.

[1371] Ibid., 57, 64, 72, 81-3.
[1372] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 222.
[1373] Ibid., 115.

Despite the fact that Isaak never agreed with Saladin to destroy the Germans, the story of the alleged connivance between the Byzantine and Muslim rulers seems to have circulated widely among the Latins and ultimately found its way into the pages of the Western chroniclers of the German expedition of the Third Crusade. In his *Historia rerum Anglicarum*, William of Newburgh informs us that Isaak, 'as it is reported (*ut dicitur*), after Jerusalem was taken, made a treaty (*fœdus*) with Saladin, that most atrocious enemy of the Christian name, promising that, by land and sea, he would, in his dominions, prohibit the passage of the Latins into Syria'.[1374] William of Newburgh labels Isaak as 'more faithful to Saladin than to Christ', and quotes Frederick as denouncing the Byzantine ruler as 'one equal to, or rather worse than Saladin'.[1375] Fanciful accounts of the so-called conspiracy between the Byzantine and Muslim rulers against the German crusading army continued to circulate in the West decades after the Third Crusade. According to the *Chronicon Montis Sereni*, authored between 1224 and 1225, Isaak, 'who had allied himself with Saladin against the Christians, having received from him [the sultan] eight hundred Turkish archers in assistance, intended to prevent by all means the emperor [Frederick] from marching through his empire, despite the fact that peace had been concluded between them by oath'.[1376] Thus, Isaak went down in Western medieval historiography as an ally of Saladin against the Third Crusade.

Conclusion

In 1962, Brand's article 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade' legitimised a medieval myth. In 2003, Harris rejected it. However, he failed to adequately support his view and therefore many scholars have remained unconvinced. Angold,[1377] Magdalino,[1378] Jotischky,[1379] Madden,[1380] and Angelov[1381] continued to maintain the false conviction that an alliance had existed between Isaak and Saladin against the German army of the Third Crusade. In this section of my thesis I have analyzed, discussed and checked the authenticity and dating of the Latin sources that allegedly evidence the existence of a

[1374] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 326; William of Newburgh, *History*, 573-4.
[1375] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 326; William of Newburgh, *History*, 574.
[1376] *Chronicon Montis Sereni*, *MGH SS*, 23, 161.
[1377] Angold, 2003, 36, 64-5.
[1378] Magdalino, 2004, 631-2; Magdalino, 2007, 94-8, 103-5.
[1379] Jotischky, 2004, 159.
[1380] Madden, 2005, 80-2.
[1381] Angelov, 2006, 49-51, 54-5, 59-65.

Byzantine-Muslim alliance. My purpose is to invalidate Brand's theory and reinforce the thesis that there was *no* complicity between the Byzantine and the Muslim rulers. The supposed conspiracy was a popular Latin myth developed in an attempt to explain Isaak's efforts to destroy the German expedition of the Third Crusade.

The Western Sense of Christian Fellowship and the Rescue of Constantinople

With the transfer of the Germans across the Hellespont in March 1190, the Byzantine capital had narrowly escaped from an attack by the crusaders. As the situation had developed from August 1189 to February 1190, a growing party of German knights naturally urged Frederick 'to take Constantinople by storm'.[1382] As Richard de Templo reports, in February 1190 the German ruler preferred to conclude a treaty with Isaak, despite the fact that 'many of his people considered it undesirable to make any peace with the tyrant'.[1383] Which are, however, the reasons that prevented Frederick from an attack on the imperial capital?

Daly and Johnson are probably right to argue that Frederick was well aware of the difficulties of an assault on the Byzantine capital.[1384] It is not less true that the papacy was hardly likely to give its blessing to an attack on Constantinople.[1385] Johnson's argument that naval support for a siege of the sea walls of Constantinople would take a long time to arrive is not altogether correct, since soon enough Pisan envoys met Fredrick at Gallipoli and offered him 'ships and galleys with which to besiege Constantinople'. That the German emperor preferred to resume his crusade is evidenced by the contemporary accounts. On December 1189, Frederick reassured Isaak that, once he secured transfer across the straits, 'the army of Christ would immediately and peacefully leave his land, and go on in a strong band to free the land of promise'.[1386] The author of the *Historia de expeditione* reports that, 'although he [Frederick] was far superior in the war against the Greek emperor, a war which the Greek had foolishly imposed upon himself, [he] remembered ... his sole purpose of fighting against the

[1382] *History of the Expedition*, 107. See Daly, 1960, 77; Munz, 1969, 392-3.
[1383] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 59.
[1384] Johnson, 1969, 104; Daly, 1960, 76.
[1385] Johnson, 1969, 104.
[1386] *History of the Expedition*, 87.

invaders of the holy city of Jerusalem'.[1387] According to Richard de Templo, Frederick preferred to make peace with Isaak 'rather than delay his journey'.[1388]

In addition to Frederick's anxiety to fight 'the invaders of the holy city of Jerusalem', there is another equally important factor that motivated the German emperor to pursue with determination peace negotiations with Isaak. This factor was underplayed, if not ignored, by the vast majority of modern scholars. To the best of my knowledge, only Daly has drawn attention to it.[1389] This crucial factor needs to be discussed and amplified a little further in the present study.

Frederick was particularly sensitive to the concept of Christian fraternity, and this concept played an important role in preventing an assault on the Byzantine capital. As has been seen, the German emperor had rejected Stephan's proposal for an anti-Byzantine alliance, declaring that 'he had undertaken a toilsome pilgrimage against the oppressors of the land of Jerusalem, and that ... he was designing no evil against any Christian king whatsoever'. The author of the *Historia de expeditione* records that Frederick 'inwardly abhorred the pouring out of Christian blood – which had, nevertheless, whether he [Frederick] wished or not, unavoidably to be shed in these dangers', i.e. the battles between Byzantines and Germans.[1390] Further, according to the anonymous chronicler, the German emperor was very unwilling (*invitum admodum*) to besiege Constantinople, even if he was allegedly well prepared for a siege.[1391]

The author of the *Historia de expeditione* records that when, in April 1190, the Germans attacked the gate of Byzantine Philadelphia in Asia Minor in response to Byzantine provocations and robberies, the governor of the city immediately cleared himself of blame for what had happened. He charged 'certain foolish youths' with causing the disturbances and pledged himself to hand them over to Frederick to punish them for their impudence.[1392] Further, the governor of Philadelphia appealed to the German emperor's religious sentiment and sense of Christian fellowship in order to save his city. As the anonymous author informs us, the governor argued 'that all Christians ought to be moved with mercy on the ... city, seeing, that it, old and alone, had till now resisted the neighbouring Turks and other peoples, and thus was guarding the cultivation and honour of Christian doctrine (*christiani dogmatis*

[1387] Ibid., 87. See also ibid., 58.
[1388] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 59.
[1389] Daly, 1960, 75-8.
[1390] *History of the Expedition*, 87.
[1391] Ibid., 107; *Historia de Expeditione*, 68.
[1392] *History of the Expedition*, 116.

cultum et honorem)'.[1393] The governor's words must have to a certain extent affected Frederick's decision to order his men to retreat.

The claim of the author of the *Historia de expeditione*, namely that Frederick abhorred the shedding of Christian blood, is corroborated by Niketas Choniates's account. In Byzantine Laodicea on the Lycus the Germans 'were welcomed with such an unusual show of warmth and hospitality that they prayed that the Laodiceans might receive all good things from God'.[1394] According to Choniates, Frederick, in a dramatic gesture, 'lifted his hands to heaven, raised his eyes upwards, and fell on his knees as he beseeched God the Father and Protector of all to send down upon them [the Laodiceans] whatever was beneficial to life and salutary to the soul'.[1395] The German ruler added that if the Byzantine Empire 'abounded in such Christians who welcomed the soldiers of Christ with such kindness, ... they [the Germans] would have crossed the ... borders [of the Byzantine Empire] long before, their lances at rest in their sheaths, without tasting the blood of Christians'.[1396]

The German emperor's words and actions while in the Byzantine Empire evidence his commitment to the ideal of Christian brotherhood. This ideal was shared by several Western authors. As we have seen, the author of the *Historia de expeditione* seems to have subscribed to his emperor's view that the Byzantines were Christian fellows. Although Richard de Templo denounces the Greeks as *generatio nequam et omnino degenerans*, he still acknowledges them as *fideles* against whom the Latins had not taken arms. William of Newburgh's treatment of the ideal of Christian fraternity between Latins and Byzantines is probably the most systematic and elaborate in crusading literature. In his account of the German expedition of the Third Crusade, the chronicler records that Frederick 'was desirous to obtain the favour of that Christian monarch (*Christianus princeps*) [Isaak], in this most Christian expedition (*negotium Christianissimum*) [i.e. the crusade]'.[1397] Therefore, 'the Latin emperor [Frederick], by his messengers, sought as a Christian from the Greek emperor [Isaak] another Christian'[1398] permission to pass through his empire. From William's perspective, the Greeks and their emperor were *Christiani*, just like the Latins, and therefore had a duty to

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[1393] Ibid.; *Historia de Expeditione*, 74.
[1394] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 226.
[1395] Ibid.
[1396] Ibid., 227.
[1397] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 326; William of Newburgh, *History*, 573. I made changes in Stevenson's translation.
[1398] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 326; William of Newburgh, *History*, 574. '*imperator Latinus a Græco, Christianus scilicet a Christiano*'.

participate *in negotio Christianissimo*. However, according to the chronicler, even 'though the Greeks are Christians, yet they are known to abominate (*abominari*) the Latins, not less, nay, even rather more ferociously (*ferocius*) than the Saracens'.[1399] As has been seen, the conviction that the Greeks detested the Latins was shared by Latin authors such as William of Tyre in *Outremer*, as well as Map and Richard de Templo, who, as in the case of William of Newburgh, wrote in England at the end of the twelfth century. From a Western viewpoint, the alleged alliance between Isaak and Saladin seems to have lent credit to that belief.

A modern authority on historical writing in England comments on William of Newburgh's 'critical acumen', 'rational approach to history', and 'power of dispassionate judgment'.[1400] These qualities are best seen in William's account of the German expedition of the Third Crusade. Although William did not approve of Isaak's supposedly allying himself with Saladin and prohibiting the Germans from passing through his empire, he did not hold either with Frederick's opening his 'way with the sword'.[1401] As the chronicler avers in the first person,

> I certainly am not, by any means, of the opinion that this [German] movement, and attack upon Christian, even if those Christians acted in a manner far from brotherly (*fraterne*), can be approved, especially as these [this movement and attack] were made by Christians who had taken arms against Pagans; neither, on the other side, was it right that Christians should have refused to concede a harmless passage to Christians.[1402]

To support his view that Frederick should have avoided attacking the Greeks, William turns to the Old Testament, and more specifically, to the Book of Numbers. The chronicler relates that in invading the Byzantine Empire in response to the passage denied them, the Germans possibly followed the precedent of Moses, who attacked and conquered the territories of Sihon, king of the Amorites, who had denied a passage to the Israelites.[1403] However, 'as I think' (*ut credo*), declares William, Frederick 'ought rather ... to have given attention to another precedent'.[1404] According to the Book of Numbers, although Moses twice asked permission from the king of Edom to pass through his territories, the king refused.

[1399] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 326; William of Newburgh, *History*, 573.
[1400] Gransden, 1974, 264-5.
[1401] William of Newburgh, *History*, 574, 575.
[1402] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 327; William of Newburgh, *History*, 574. I made amendments to Stevenson's translation.
[1403] Numbers 21:21-35.
[1404] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 327; William of Newburgh, *History*, 574.

Nonetheless, the Israelites bypassed Edom avoiding attacking the Edomites, who were the descendants of Esau, the fraternal twin brother of Jacob, whose descendants were the Israelites.[1405] As William of Newburgh states, although the Israelites 'twice suffered a repulse from their brethren (*fratres*), the sons of Esau, ... they were not impelled by that fraternal (*fraternus*) affront to seek revenge, or to open a passage with the sword; but wisely, as if they did not remember the injury, they turned away from their ungrateful brethren (*ingrati fratres*)'.[1406] By drawing an analogy between Latins and Greeks on the one side, and Israelites and Edomites on the other, William makes his point clear: despite the fact that the Greeks were *ingrati*, they were still the fraternal twin brothers of the Latins and therefore attacking them was deplorable. Living up to his reputation for 'judicious impartiality',[1407] William firmly and clearly states that 'the Christian emperor [Frederick] would have acted more wisely if he had turned away from the emperor [Isaak], who, though disobliging, was yet a Christian; and had sought another passage into Syria'.[1408] Obviously, even at the end of the twelfth century the ideal of Christian brotherhood between Westerners and Byzantines was alive.

Isaak II as Frederick I's Counter-Image in the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*

Despite his hostility to the Germans, Isaak II was still regarded by Frederick as his imperial brother. In his letter to his son Henry, the German emperor described the Byzantine ruler as *frater nostri*.[1409] In the presence of the Byzantine envoys, Frederick referred to Isaak as *frater meus*.[1410] Likewise, the author of the *Historia de expeditione* describes the Byzantine emperor as *frater imperii eius [Friderici]* ('brother of his [Frederick's] empire').[1411] Nevertheless, throughout the *Historia de expeditione* Isaak is portrayed as Frederick's counter-image. While the Byzantine emperor is associated only with negative attributes, his *frater* has only positive characteristics. Frederick is described as *invictus*,[1412] *strenuissimus*,[1413] *victoriosissimus*,[1414]

[1405] Numbers 20:14-21.
[1406] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 328; William of Newburgh, *History*, 574-5. I made amendments to Stevenson's translation.
[1407] Gransden, 1974, 265.
[1408] William of Newburgh, *History*, 575.
[1409] *Historia de expeditione*, 40.
[1410] Ibid., 50.
[1411] Ibid., 69.
[1412] Ibid., 16, 64.
[1413] Ibid., 67.

providus,[1415] *prudens*,[1416] *piissimus*,[1417] *fidelissimus*,[1418] *serenissimus*,[1419] *illustrissimus*,[1420] and *gloriosus*.[1421] The German ruler was 'a true lover of peace' (*verus pacis amator*).[1422] His *largitas*[1423] and *benevolentia*[1424] are praised. On the other hand, Isaak is described as *stultus* (foolish),[1425] *tumidus* (puffed up with pride),[1426] and *subdolus* (deceitful).[1427] He was a 'violator of oath' (*iurisiurandi transgressor*).[1428] His *solitus fastus* (usual arrogance)[1429] and *obstinatio* (obstinacy),[1430] his *doli et periuria* (tricks and perjury)[1431] are condemned. Frederick's reception of Isaak's missives in Philippopolis at the end of August is the most typical case in which the German emperor's image is enhanced by the creation of a dichotomy to contrast him to his Byzantine colleague: Frederick 'with his accustomed modesty (*solita modestia*), received letters ... full of pride and arrogance (*fastu et arrogantia plenas*). Yet he set his own complete humility (*omnimoda humilitas*) over against the insufferable insolence (*infronita superbia*) of the Greek emperor'.[1432] A demonised Isaak clearly becomes the negative foil for an idealised Frederick.

Isaak Komnenos of Cyprus, the Cypriots, and the English Expedition of the Third Crusade[1433]

In July 1190 King Philip II of France and King Richard I England departed from Vézelay on the Third Crusade. The two sovereigns separated in Lyon, and were reunited in September at

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[1414] Ibid., 17, 48, 68.
[1415] Ibid., 68.
[1416] Ibid., 16, 48.
[1417] Ibid., 68, 74.
[1418] Ibid., 67.
[1419] Ibid., 46, 49, 65, 68.
[1420] Ibid., 67.
[1421] Ibid., 27, 64.
[1422] Ibid., 16.
[1423] Ibid., 27.
[1424] Ibid., 74.
[1425] Ibid., 49.
[1426] Ibid., 68.
[1427] Ibid., 48.
[1428] Ibid., 68.
[1429] Ibid., 49, 68.
[1430] Ibid., 68.
[1431] Ibid., 37.
[1432] Ibid., 39; *History of the Expedition*, 56.
[1433] A slightly amended version of this section is forthcoming. S. Neocleous, 'Imaging Isaak of Cyprus and the Cypriots: Evidence from the Western Historiography of the Third Crusade', in *From Holy War to Peaceful Co-Habitation: Diversity of Crusading and the Military Orders* (Central European University).

Messina in Sicily, where they wintered. On 30 March 1191 Philip set sail for Acre, where he arrived on 20 April. Richard, who sailed on 10 April, reached Palestine only on 6 June. The delay of the king of England was due to his conquering the island of Cyprus.[1434]

Cyprus had formed part of the Byzantine Empire until 1184, when Isaak Komnenos, a member of the former imperial dynasty, proclaimed himself emperor and ruled the island independently.[1435] On 12 April 1191 a storm scattered the fleet of Richard I of England, while it was sailing to Palestine. Some of Richard's ships were driven to the coast of Cyprus, and two or three of them were wrecked off Limassol on 24 April. Isaak immediately robbed and imprisoned the crusaders who were cast on his shore. Upon entering the harbour of Limassol on 6 May, Richard sent an embassy demanding that the ruler of Cyprus liberate the prisoners and return their belongings. Isaak refused and consequently the king of England landed with his men. A fight took place, and the army of the ruler of Cyprus was defeated and fled. The following day Richard attacked the camp of Isaak, who once again took flight together with his men. On 11 May the Byzantine ruler decided to negotiate a peace settlement with Richard. He swore an oath of allegiance to the king of England and accepted to pay a large sum of money in compensation for the crusaders who had been ill-treated and to accompany Richard to the Holy Land with a body of troops. Richard was to hold Isaak's castles in pledge. Towards evening, however, the ruler of Cyprus left abruptly. Consequently the fleet and land forces of the king of England proceeded to the conquest of the island.

The majority of modern scholars accept Richard's conquest of Cyprus in 1191 as an incidental episode of the Third Crusade.[1436] Some commentators, however, have questioned the accidental aspect of the conquest, claiming that 'the conquest of Cyprus must have been in Richard's mind from the outset'.[1437] This view is not adequately supported by the evidence: the primary sources unanimously agree that the king of England proceeded to a conquest of

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[1434] For Richard's conquest of Cyprus, see Tyerman, 2006, 443-6; Painter, 1969, 62-4; Gillingham, 1999, 140-54; E. Ch. Furber, 'The Kingdom of Cyprus, 1191-1291', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 2 (Madison; London, 1969), 599-602; Flori, 2006, 113-18; P. W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991), 5-12; W. H. R. Collenberg, 'L'Empereur Isaak de Chypre et sa Fille, 1155-1207', *Byzantion*, 38 (1968), 147-51; A. Nicolaou-Konnari, 'The Conquest of Cyprus by Richard the Lionheart and Its Aftermath: A Study of Sources and Legend, Politics and Attitudes in the Year 1191-1192', *Επετηρίδα του Κέντρου Επιστημονικών Ερευνών*, 26 (2000), 39-59.

[1435] Runciman, 1951, III, 43; Collenberg, 1968, 123-47; Angold, 1997, 308-9; M. Angold, 'The State of Research. The Road to 1204: The Byzantine Background to the Fourth Crusade', *Journal of Medieval History*, 25 (1999), 276; Harris, 2003, 141-2; Edbury, 1991, 3-4.

[1436] Riley-Smith, 2005, 142; Runciman, 43-7; Painter, 1969, 62-4; Flori, 2006, 113-118; Madden, 2005, 87; Tyerman, 2006, 446.

[1437] J. O. Prestwich, 'Richard Coeur de Lion: *Rex Bellicosus*', in *Richard Cœur de Lion in History and Myth*, ed. Janet Laughland Nelson (London, 1992), 9; Gillingham, 1999, 145, 153-4; Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 38.

Cyprus only after he had been provoked. How far one gives credence to the thesis that Richard I's original intent was to capture the island on his way to Palestine partly depends on the degree to which one subscribes to 'conspiracy theory' explanations of historical causation. Nonetheless, whether or not the conquest of Cyprus had been planned from the outset by Richard I is outside the scope of this section, the purpose of which is to examine the image of Isaak Komnenos and the people of Cyprus in the contemporary Western historiography of the Third Crusade, and investigate how the conquest of the island was viewed and remembered in the Western narratives and accounts.

Isaak Komnenos of Cyprus

In his monumental work *Historia*, the historian of *Outremer*, William of Tyre, acknowledged that Cyprus 'had always been useful and friendly to our realm [the Kingdom of Jerusalem]'.[1438] This testimony is corroborated by Ambroise, who recounts that 'the well-endowed island of Cyprus ... used to bring it [the Kingdom of Jerusalem] much aid'.[1439] However, as the Norman author claims, since Isaak Komnenos seized control of Cyprus, the island 'did nothing on its behalf'.[1440] Ambroise denounces the Byzantine ruler as 'a false (*faus*) and perfidious (*failli*) emperor', and makes a pun on *empereur* (=emperor) and *empireur*, a word which the writer forms from the verb *empirer* (=harm).[1441] Isaak is further vilified by the author of the *Estoire* as 'a tyrant (*tirant*) who leaned only towards evil. He was more treacherous (*plus traïtor*) and more evil (*plus felon*) than Judas or Ganelon',[1442] the two arch-traitors in the New Testament and the *Chanson de Roland* respectively. The ruler of Cyprus is accused of 'never [having] ceased to commit evil and pursue evil ends, ... and to pursue the Christians of God'.[1443]

Since Isaak Komnenos had supposedly assured initially the safety of the shipwrecked crusaders in Richard's army, their subsequent imprisonment is denounced by Ambroise as 'treachery' (*traïr*) on the part of the ruler of Cyprus, 'whose word should never be trusted'.[1444]

[1438] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 253.
[1439] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 50.
[1440] Ibid., 50.
[1441] Ibid., 53; Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 23 verses 1392-3, 25 verse 1559. On the *Estoire* as literature, see Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 20-3.
[1442] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 23 verses 1382-5; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 50.
[1443] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 51.
[1444] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 23 verse 1403; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 51.

Once Isaak fled after swearing an oath of fealty to Richard, a new charge was added to his negative image, that of perjury; thus the ruler of Cyprus is branded as a perjurer (*perjure*) and traitor (*traitor*).[1445] However, the most serious accusation hurled by the author of the *Estoire* against Isaak is that of collusion with the 'infidel' Saladin. As the writer alleges, the ruler of Cyprus 'turned away from Christians and was the intimate friend (*privez*) of Saladin. It was said with some certainty that they had drunk each other's blood as a sign of their alliance (*aliance*), and this was later known to be true'.[1446] From Ambroise's perspective, Isaak eventually met his doom 'on account of his sins'.[1447]

The charges levelled against Isaak by Ambroise are repeated and amplified by Richard de Templo. As the author of the *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* relates, 'the land of Jerusalem used to receive no little benefit each year' from Cyprus until Isaak 'usurped the imperial power ... and refused to give anything [to the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem]'.[1448] The Byzantine ruler is cast as a *tyrannus* and labelled as 'the most wicked of all bad men (*omnium malorum nequissimus*)', who 'surpassed Judas in faithlessness (*perfidia*) and Ganelon in treachery (*proditio*)'.[1449] He is accused of allegedly pursuing 'all who professed the Christian religion with shameless determination' and capturing 'all the pilgrims who came to the island [Cyprus]'.[1450] Isaak is of course condemned as being 'friendly with Saladin' and mingling his blood with that of the sultan 'as a sign and witness that they were allies (*confoederatio*)'.[1451]

On 1 May, the vessel bearing Joanna, Richard I's sister and Queen of Sicily (1177-89), and Berengaria of Navarre, the king's fiancée, anchored outside the port of Limassol. As recorded by Richard de Templo, Isaak tried deceit (*fallaciis*) to convince the two noblewomen to disembark in order to seize them.[1452] The ruler's intention must indeed have been to arrest the two royal women, and subsequently demand a large ransom for their release. Joanna and Berengaria politely declined the invitation of the ruler of Cyprus. According to the explanation of Richard de Templo, who does not fail to malign Isaak at every opportunity, the two royal women did not disembark as they were 'afraid of the cruelty (*sævitia*) and treachery (*perfidia*)

[1445] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 30 verse 1863; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 57.
[1446] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 23 verses 1386-91; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 50-1.
[1447] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 60.
[1448] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 179.
[1449] Ibid.; Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 183.
[1450] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 177, 179.
[1451] Ibid., 179; Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 183.
[1452] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 187.

of the emperor'.[1453] In actual fact, Joanna and Berengaria were aware of Isaak's mistreatment of the shipwrecked crusaders, but above all they must have been fully conscious that two women of royal rank had a very high risk of being taken as hostages by any foreign ruler, who could hold them to ransom or use them as bargaining chips to achieve other aims.

The stories circulating about Isaak's supposed hatred for the Latins eventually reached unbelievable proportions. Roger of Hoveden claims that the Byzantine ruler killed his only son because he had confessed that he loved the Latins.[1454] The chronicler denounces Isaak's cruelty to the shipwrecked crusaders and portrays Richard as inspiring to his men, saying: 'Arm yourselves and follow me to avenge the injuries which this perfidious [emperor] has done to God and to ourselves ... I have full confidence in God, that He will this day grant us the victory over this emperor and his people'.[1455] This propaganda speech aims to paint the *perfidus* Isaak as an enemy not only of the crusaders but also of God. Injury to the crusaders amounted to injury to God.

William of Newburgh casts Isaak as a *tyrannus* and condemns him as usurping the imperial title, pressing Cyprus with savage domination, and allying himself with Saladin 'the enemy of the Christian name'.[1456] As the same chronicler relates, the weary crusaders were forced by the storm to divert to Cyprus so as to obtain secure and true hospitality, and to be treated with kindness by the Christian inhabitants. However, they suffered more hardships there than at sea. The reason was that the *tyrannus* Isaak, considering the crusaders hardly worthy of living, treated them cruelly and dishonourably.[1457] By escaping immediately after he gave an oath of allegiance to King Richard, Isaak, 'the violator of the pacts, added perfidy (*perfidiam*) to his previous evils (*prioribus malis*)'.[1458]

Ralph of Diceto's account is very concise. The chronicler accuses Isaak of imprisoning and robbing the shipwrecked crusaders and attempting to prevent Richard's entering the harbour of Limassol.[1459] A slightly different version of the events is given by Ralph of Coggeshall. According to the chronicler, Richard landed on Cyprus for the sake of refreshing himself and his army and gathering provisions. However, Isaak, who had usurped the imperial name, forbade the king of England from entering his territory and prohibited his subjects from

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[1453] Ibid., 186; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 182.
[1454] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, I, 261.
[1455] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 163.
[1456] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 350.
[1457] Ibid.
[1458] Ibid., 351.
[1459] Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 91-2.

selling provisions to the crusading army. The Byzantine ruler's 'animosity and detestable churlishness' resulted in Richard's attack on Cyprus.[1460]

Although the accounts of the English authors are generally detailed, the continental chroniclers make only a passing reference to Richard's conquest of Cyprus. The anonymous author of the *Historia de expeditione* records that Isaak 'usurped the imperial dignity' and 'seized all Cyprus for his dominion'.[1461] According to the anonymous author, Richard 'could not endure the overbearing behaviour and ill-will which Isaak is said to have exercised towards poor pilgrims' and therefore conquered the island.[1462] Although largely inaccurate, Arnold of Lübeck's brief report is also interesting to consider. Arnold mistakenly presumed that Isaak Komnenos was initially a loyal king to the Byzantine emperor, to whom he paid the tax due. According to the chronicler, Cyprus 'was under the king of Constantinople' and paid him an annual tax.[1463] Later, 'however, the king of this land [Cyprus], growing strong in wealth and elevated in arrogance, receded from the king of Constantinople and from the Christian faith (*fide catholica*)'.[1464]

Isaak's negative image is complemented by information on his arrogance (*superbia*) and oppressive regime. This data is provided by Roger of Hoveden. The chronicler relates that Isaak exceeded the limits of imperial authority by calling himself *sanctum imperatorem*.[1465] As the same author records, the Byzantine ruler was of such folly, that he ordered statues of him made of gold and silver to be erected and worshipped in several churches, the walls of which were painted with frescoes commemorating his deeds. On Good Friday the ruler went to a major church of Cyprus and, sitting before the altar, where the cross was placed for worship, had his clergy and people worshiping himself. He was extravagantly garbed in silk interwoven with gold. Nobody had the courage to talk to him, unless he had been granted permission to do so. When Isaak was crossing a village on horseback, no door or window opened, and if a cleric or layman met the ruler and failed to fall immediately prostrate and worship him, he was beaten. Further, if anybody remaining in Cyprus sought to leave the

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[1460] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 31.
[1461] *History of the Expedition*, 46, 155.
[1462] Ibid., 155.
[1463] Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica Slavorum*, *MGH SS*, 21, 198.
[1464] Ibid.
[1465] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, I, 261.

island, he had his leg cut off. From Roger of Hoveden's standpoint, Richard's conquest of Cyprus was divine retribution for Isaak's behaviour.[1466]

Isaak was manifestly demonised by all the accounts written by Westerners. Let us now, however, discuss what two Greek contemporary authors say about the ruler of Cyprus. The Cypriot hermit Neophytos the Recluse, an eye-witness in the events preceding and following Richard's conquest of Cyprus, reports that Isaak 'not only utterly despoiled the land [Cyprus], and perpetually harassed the lives of its rich men, but every day he hounded and oppressed its nobles, so that all lived in distress, and sought how by any means they might protect themselves against him'.[1467] Choniates describes Isaak as a 'tyrant', an 'accursed wretch', an 'inhuman and implacable destroyer', 'an evildoer as no other ... a flooding sea of calamities'.[1468] According to this historian,

> Once he [Isaak] felt secure in his rule, he did not cease from perpetrating countless wicked deeds against the inhabitants of the island. He defiled himself by committing unjustifiable murders by the hour and became the maimer of human bodies, inflicting, like some instrument of disaster, penalties and punishments that led to death. The hideous and accursed lecher illicitly defiled marriage beds and despoiled virgins. He irresponsibly robbed once prosperous households of all their belongings, and those indigenous inhabitants who but yesterday and the day before were admired and rivaled Job in riches, he drove to beggary with famine and nakedness, as many, that is, whom the hot-tempered wretch did not cut down with the sword.[1469]

Choniates even compares Isaak with the contemporary Byzantine Emperor Andronikos, who, as we have seen, was remembered by the Westerners for his reign of terror against his Byzantine subjects. Choniates concludes that the ruler of Cyprus 'exceeded Andronikos in obdurateness and implacability'.[1470] Thus, Roger of Hoveden's description of Isaak's brutal regime over the Cypriots should not simply be dismissed as propaganda, intended to defame the ruler of Cyprus. The information provided by Neophytos and Choniates corroborates Roger's evidence and adds to it further details. Nevertheless, Roger's account of Isaak's supposed *superbia* was probably exaggerated. Modern commentators have demonstrated that Isaak considered himself a legitimate emperor and his behaviour was 'largely in accordance

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[1466] Ibid., 261-2.
[1467] Neophytos the Recluse, *De calamitatibus*, 12.
[1468] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 161, 187, 204, 229, 255.
[1469] Ibid., 161. Cf. ibid., 187, 204.
[1470] Ibid.; Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 291. '*Καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐς τὸ τοῦ ἤθους ἀκαμπὲς καὶ ἀμείλικτον Ἀνδρόνικον ὑπερέβαλεν*'.

with Byzantine imperial etiquette'.[1471] Fine and lavish garments were an important component of the Byzantine sovereign's image. The concept of the sanctity of the Byzantine emperor, God's delegate on earth, had found expression in the acclamations and in art. The Byzantine emperor was acclaimed as *Hagios Basileus* (*sanctus imperator*) and was represented in churches and illuminated manuscripts with a halo, a sign of the sanctity bestowed on him through the sacred character of the imperial office.[1472] Representations of imperial images were even acclaimed in the churches of Constantinople.[1473] Isaak Komnenos had obviously adopted a full-scale imperial Byzantine style, considering himself entitled to all imperial prerogatives and rights. Genuine information as well as distorted accounts of Isaak's behaviour seem to have circulated amongst the crusaders in Richard's army. The accounts were embellished, and eventually enshrined as truth. Isaak's conduct was interpreted as *magna superbia* and was condemned. Ignorant about Byzantine imperial etiquette, the crusaders went as far as to imagine gold and silver statues of Isaak being worshipped by his subjects.

How valid, however, are the rest of the grave accusations hurled by the Latin authors against Isaak? What is more to the point, did the Byzantine ruler hate the Latins? And was he in alliance with Saladin? In 1186 Isaak formed an alliance with King William II of Sicily and with the assistance of the Norman admiral Margaritone defeated the Byzantine fleet that was sent against him the same year.[1474] The ruler of Cyprus also employed Normans as mercenaries.[1475] In addition, he seems to have had dealings in support of the faction of Conrad of Montferrat against that of Guy de Lusignan in Palestine.[1476] As Ambroise informs us, the evening when peace was concluded between Richard and Isaak 'there was with the emperor a slanderous knight', namely Lord Pagan of Haifa, a very important noble of Jerusalem and an ally of Conrad.[1477] It should be also added that Isaak's first wife was half French, while his presumed second wife was a sister of William II of Sicily.[1478] The Byzantine ruler evidently did *not* detest the Latins. This accusation against Isaak is unfounded and seems to have been created and developed into a propaganda campaign against him during and after Richard's

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[1471] Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 85; Collenberg, 1968, 136-40.
[1472] Ensslin, 1967, 8; A. Eastmond, 'Between Icon and Idol: The Uncertainty of Imperial Images', in *Icon and Word: The Power of Images in Byzantium*, ed. Antony Eastmond (Aldershot, 2003), 77-8.
[1473] Collenberg, 1968, 137, n. 1.
[1474] Ibid., 141; Lilie, 1993, 235; Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 35; Harris, 2003, 128.
[1475] Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 35.
[1476] Ibid., 36; Collenberg, 1968, 143; Painter, 1969, 62.
[1477] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 57.
[1478] Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 36.

conquest of Cyprus. It most probably originated in Isaak's maltreatment of the shipwrecked crusaders of Richard I's army.

Late in 1189 the Byzantine Emperor Isaak II and Saladin agreed on a joint attack against Isaak Komnenos.[1479] Although nothing came of it, the agreement between the Byzantine and Muslim rulers demonstrates that Saladin was an enemy of Isaak of Cyprus rather than an ally. Moreover, Isaak Komnenos's association with the faction of Conrad of Montferrat makes it improbable that an alliance between the Byzantine ruler and Saladin existed. It seems that Isaak turned to the sultan only after Richard went to war against him. As Saladin's foreign minister, Al-Fadil, recorded, Isaak sent ambassadors to the sultan to inform him that 'he revolted against the king of England and he openly declared war on him. He also wrote to the sultan ... in order to offer him his services, his submission to his orders and his alliance against the king of England'.[1480] During Richard's campaign, Isaak continued to communicate with Saladin 'without interruption'.[1481] He informed the sultan that he 'burned and overloaded the ports in Cyprus and cut the supplies of goods to the Syrian coast'.[1482] According to Al-Fadil, Saladin did 'welcome the proposal of the king [Isaak Komnenos] ... and encourage him in his rupture [with Richard I]', reassuring him that 'he should attribute no importance to our negotiations with the master of Constantinople [Isaak II] concerning the support we ought to lend him against Cyprus'.[1483]

What in fact Isaak Komnenos seems to have tried to do was to play his two rivals, Richard and Saladin, off against each other. He knew that his enemy Richard was also Saladin's enemy. Therefore, once he realised that he was no match for the king of England at battle, he turned to the sultan – a sign of the desperate situation in which he was. He had no other choice. His only ally, William II, had died in 1189. The emperor in Constantinople regarded him as a hateful secessionist who should be suppressed and punished. Significant support against Richard could not be expected from Conrad or his protégé Philip II, even if the kings of France and England were not on best terms. Saladin, therefore, was Isaak's only hope. What is more, the sultan was physically very near. In his correspondence with Saladin, the Byzantine ruler pretended to act in the sultan's interest, hoping to extract military support against Richard. Saladin encouraged him wholeheartedly, since a delay of the king of England

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[1479] Brand, 1962, 174.
[1480] Abu Shama, *Le livre des deux jardins*, 509.
[1481] Ibid., 509-10.
[1482] Ibid.
[1483] Ibid., 510.

in reaching Palestine would be to his benefit. The sultan, however, never sent military assistance against Richard in Cyprus.

The alleged firm alliance between Isaak of Cyprus and Saladin mentioned by the Western sources does not seem to have existed. It is important to point out that the king of England himself does not appear to have subscribed to the rumours of the alleged alliance between the Byzantine ruler and the sultan. In a letter dated 6 August 1191 to Bishop William Longchamp of Ely, Richard refers to the *tyrannus* Isaak's hostility to the king of England's crusading expedition and maltreatment of his shipwrecked men, which resulted in Richard's resorting to violence.[1484] The failure of the king's letter to accuse the ruler of Cyprus of alliance with the 'infidel' is of considerable weight. Richard was certainly in a better position than his men to know if an alliance existed between Isaak and Saladin.

Let us now examine how the crusaders in Richard's army came to believe that the ruler of Cyprus was an ally of Saladin. It is highly unlikely that the Westerners became aware of Isaak's approach to Saladin during Richard's campaign and took it for granted that the two rulers had been allies since Isaak's seizure of Cyprus. What seems to have happened is that, in their attempt to rationalise Isaak's hostility to Richard's crusading expedition, the crusaders naturally concluded that the Byzantine ruler was in league with the sultan. The crusaders' paranoia reached such a feverish peak that they imagined the sultan and the ruler of Cyprus 'drinking one another's blood'. Like Isaak II, Isaak of Cyprus went down in Western medieval historiography as an ally of Saladin. In his *Chronica*, authored from 1227 to 1251, Alberic of Trois-Fontaines repeats all the main accusations against Isaak, including his alleged collusion with Saladin. The ruler of Cyprus is denounced as a *tyrannus* and a perjurer and is charged with being allied with Saladin and committing grave nuisance to the Christians.[1485]

As in the case of the accusation of alliance with the 'infidel', Ambroise's charge that, once in control of Cyprus, Isaak Komnenos refused to send provisions to the Holy Land also seems to be baseless. The fact that the Byzantine ruler most probably had relations with a political party in Palestine contradicts this allegation. It is true that while Richard was in Cyprus, Isaak informed Saladin that he 'cut the supplies of goods to the Syrian coast'. Isaak had probably cut the provisions in May 1191 in order to entice the sultan into providing

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[1484] *Epistolæ Cantuarienses*, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, ed. William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, 38, 2 (London, 1864-5), 347. Translated in Edbury, 1996, 178-9.
[1485] Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chronicon*, *RHGF*, 18, 753.

support for him against the king of England. His action, however, only gave rise to the belief that he had always denied supplies to the Latins in *Outremer*.

The Cypriots

Having examined the image of Isaak Komnenos in the Western sources, we should now proceed to investigate the way the people of Cyprus were perceived by the Westerners. Ambroise usually refers to the population of the island as *Griau* (=Greeks) or *Grifon*, an epithet widely used to describe the Greeks.[1486] Obviously, for Ambroise, the people of Cyprus were not singled out from the rest of the Greeks. This is not surprising, given that the Cypriots spoke the Greek language. When describing military battles between the crusaders and the Greeks of Cyprus, Ambroise denounces the Cypriots as 'vile' (*colverte*), 'accursed' (*maudiz*), and 'evil' (*de male nature*).[1487] He vilifies them as 'spellbound by cowardice (*coardise*)', 'who fled shamefully (*a honte*)' before their enemies, and perceived them as the binary opposite of the 'valiant' (*vaillant*) and 'brave Franks' (*Francs adurez*).[1488]

As in the case of Ambroise, Richard de Templo refers to the population of Cyprus as *Graeci* and *Griffones*. Although Richard does not use Ambroise's derogatory epithets against the Cypriots, he is not less hostile to them when he refers to their maltreatment of the shipwrecked and of other crusaders in Richard's army who disembarked in Cyprus. The writer accuses the 'locals' (*indigenae*) of having 'joyfully allowed those who escaped from the shipwreck to land, pretending that their intentions were peaceful'.[1489] The provisions that the crusaders on board sent to their imprisoned fellows were 'plundered by the Griffons', who 'deceived them [the prisoners] with flattery and deceitful words ... deceitfully promising to provide them with all their necessities'.[1490] Further, the Cypriot 'magnates of the province' are charged with conspiring to 'take as many of the pilgrims captive as they could by trickery

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[1486] According to the belief traditionally held by scholars, the epithet *Grif(f)on* was used pejoratively to describe the Greeks. Recently, Nicolaou-Konnari has challenged this belief. As demonstrated by this historian, the term, when used in texts hostile to the Greeks, does not convey more negative connotations than the other forms of *Greek* employed in the same texts. Besides, this ethnic name is also used in texts that are *not* hostile to the Greeks and where it conveys no negative connotations. The term *Grif(f)on* was simply another ethnic name describing the Greeks. See A. Nicolaou-Konnari, 'Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of the Ethnic Name *Griffon* and the Western Perception of the Greeks, Twelfth – Fourteenth Centuries', *Bizantinistica: Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*,4 (2002), 184-5, 187, 189-91.

[1487] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 23 verse 1431, 28 verse 1757, 30 verse 1821; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 51, 56, 57.

[1488] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 25 verse 1548, 26 verse 1632, 27 verse 1663, 31 verse 1915; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 53, 54, 58.

[1489] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 184; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 180.

[1490] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 181.

(*dolo*) and kill them'.[1491] In his description of the episode in which the imprisoned crusaders tried to escape and the *indigenae* began to kill them, Richard de Templo denounces the killers as *infideles Christianorum persecutores*, thus effectively identifying them with the Muslims.[1492] It is worth noting that the same author does not hesitate to acknowledge the Cypriots' skill in naval warfare (*navalis praelii perita*).[1493] Nevertheless, the Greeks of Cyprus could not withstand the assault (*impetum*) of the crusaders and, allegedly, Isaak was soon made aware of the crusaders' boldness (*nostrorum audacia*) as diametrically opposed to his men's attitude to flight (*suorum fugam*).[1494]

Roger of Hoveden uses the epithet *Griffones* to describe the Cypriots. The only accusation that the chronicler makes against them is that 'they were nearly all utterly unskilled in the art of warfare' (*indocti ad praelium*).[1495] William of Newburgh, Ralph of Coggeshall, and Ralph of Diceto do not employ any ethnic epithets to designate the Cypriots. Although reviling Isaak, these authors are *not* hostile towards the Greeks of Cyprus. Even William of Newburgh's contrasting of Greek softness (*Graeca mollities*) with the vigour (*impetum*) of the Latins with reference to a battle between the crusaders and the *tyrannus* Isaak can hardly be considered as a sign of hostility to the inhabitants of Cyprus.[1496]

Richard of Devizes refers to the Cypriots as *Ciprii*.[1497] This is the same ethnic epithet that is used by William of Tyre, the historian of *Outremer*, to describe the people of Cyprus. However, it should be emphasised that the two historians employed the epithet for completely different reasons. William had a very positive attitude towards the people of Cyprus. He portrayed the incursion of the acting prince of Antioch, Reynald of Châtillon, into the Byzantine island of Cyprus in 1155 as 'a shameful act' (*flagicium*) and condemned the prince of Antioch who 'had wreaked his fury upon the innocent *Cyprians* and had perpetrated upon them and upon their wives and children outrages abominable in the sight of both God and men'.[1498] In William's eyes, the Cypriots were Christian brethren. The historian of *Outremer* emphasised that Cyprus 'had a large faithful (*fideles*) population', and fulminated against Reynald who 'treated them as if they had been enemies of the faith and detestable

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[1491] Ibid.; Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 185.
[1492] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 185.
[1493] Ibid., 190; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 184.
[1494] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 191, 193.
[1495] Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, III, 107; Roger of Hoveden, *Annals*, II, 201.
[1496] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 350.
[1497] Richard of Devizes, *Chronicle*, 36-8.
[1498] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 824; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 276. Emphasis added.

parricides'.[1499] Edbury and Rowe understand that the incursion of Raynald of Châtillon into the Byzantine island of Cyprus in 1155 elicited William's 'sympathy for the Greeks'.[1500] This statement, however, requires some closer examination.

William had constantly been well-disposed towards the people of Cyprus who, as he records, 'had always been useful and friendly to our realm [the Kingdom of Jerusalem]'.[1501] Even in his stridently anti-Greek narrative of the First Crusade, the Latin historian still describes the Cypriots as faithful (*fideles*).[1502] It should be stressed, however, that *nowhere* in his account is William referring to the Cypriots as Greeks. He refers to them consistently as *Cyprii*.[1503] William's sympathy for the Cypriots was certainly not a 'sympathy for the Greeks', as Edbury and Rowe argued. William was certainly well aware that the people of Cyprus spoke the Greek language and were Orthodox. However, the inhabitants of the island represented positive qualities and characteristics, which, from William's perspective, were not typically associated with the *Graeci*. In other words, stereotypes applied to the *Graeci* did not seem to apply to the Greek population of Cyprus. Motivated to keep his stereotypes for the *Graeci* intact and safe in the face of evidence that challenged them, William subtyped the inhabitants of *Cyprus* into an individuated subcategory, referring to them using the ethnic name *Cyprii*. This enabled the historian to maintain his stereotypes for the *Graeci*.

Richard of Devizes, however, employs the epithet *Ciprii* for a totally different reason. The historian seems to have been ignorant of the Greek identity of the inhabitants of Cyprus. Since their island was called *Ciprus*, he referred to its inhabitants as *Ciprii*. Although Richard's account of the king of England's conquest of Cyprus is roughly accurate, nevertheless he imagines that the *Ciprii* were pirates, a warlike race (*gens bellicose*) 'accustomed to live by plunder', whose master (*piratarum princeps*) was Isaak Komnenos.[1504] According to Richard, since the Cypriots had maltreated and killed many crusaders in the king of England's army, 'God willed that this accursed people should receive the punishment for their sins' from King Richard.[1505] Despite fighting valiantly (*uiriliter*) and bitterly (*acriter*) against the Westerners, the *bellicosi Ciprii* were eventually defeated.[1506]

[1499] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 824; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 276.
[1500] Edbury and Rowe, 1988, 142.
[1501] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 253.
[1502] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63, 375; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, I, 334.
[1503] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 824, 845.
[1504] Richard of Devizes, *Chronicle*, 36, 38.
[1505] Ibid., 36.
[1506] Ibid., 37-8.

Ambroise, Richard de Templo, Roger of Hoveden, and William of Newburgh attest that the majority of the Cypriots not only did not assist their ruler in fighting Richard, but collaborated with the king of England. As Ambroise relates, one of the reasons compelling Isaak to come to terms with Richard on 11 May was that 'he was greatly hated in his land'.[1507] Similarly, Richard de Templo records that Isaak 'could not rely on receiving assistance from the locals, because they hated him'.[1508] According to Roger of Hoveden, the ruler of Cyprus offered peace to the king of England, because he saw 'that he was left destitute of all valour and assistance of his people'.[1509] Ambroise further informs us that when Richard subsequently entered Nicosia, 'the townspeople ... came to the king from all directions, taking him as their rightful lord; they came to him as to a father'.[1510] The king of England 'accepted the homage of the most valiant and the most wise, who willingly turned from the emperor, whom they hated'.[1511] Likewise, Richard de Templo recounts that 'all the citizens of Nicosia came out to welcome the king and admitted him as their lord ... The king received homage from the most noble Greeks, who seemed to throw off the emperor's yoke of their own volition'.[1512] The information on the Cypriot *archontes*' homage to Richard is corroborated by Roger of Hoveden. The chronicler reports that many Cypriot nobles, to whom he refers in feudal terminology as *comites* and *barones*, 'came to the king of England, and became his men (*homines*), and swore him fealty (*fidelitas*) against the emperor'.[1513]

On 31 May 1191, Isaak finally surrendered. As Ambroise reports, 'what had mortally injured and ruined him [Isaak] was that all his people had abandoned him'.[1514] According to Richard de Templo, the Byzantine ruler realised that 'his subjects had long been alienated from him so that he was tolerated rather than loved'.[1515] William of Newburgh gives a different version of Isaak's capture, which is false, yet it is interesting since it demonstrates the extent of the Cypriots' hatred for their ruler, as perceived by the Westerners. Isaak allegedly went into hiding in a monastery but 'was betrayed by certain islanders (*insulani*) by whom he was deservedly detested'.[1516] According to William, after Isaak's capture, 'the entire

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[1507] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 56.
[1508] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 189-90.
[1509] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 165.
[1510] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 59.
[1511] Ibid., 59.
[1512] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 193.
[1513] Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, II, 164-5.
[1514] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 60.
[1515] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 194.
[1516] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 351.

island, hurt by tyrannical conduct (*tyrannicis moribus*), willingly conceded authority and allegiance (*devotio*) to the king [Richard]'.[1517]

That the population of Cyprus collaborated with Richard is once more substantiated by the account of the Cypriot hermit Neophytos the Recluse, an eye-witness in the events preceding and following the king of England's conquest. Neophytos records that when Richard arrived in Cyprus, 'forthwith all ran unto him! Then the king [Isaak], abandoned by his people, gave himself also unto the hands of the English [king]'.[1518] The Cypriots' attitude is hardly surprising, considering Isaak's reign of terror in the island so eloquently described by contemporary authors as Choniates, Neophytos, and Roger of Hoveden.

Tyerman asserted that 'the Cypriots were demonised as treacherous and malign' by 'Richard's panegyrists', while Nicolaou-Konnari claimed that, 'for *all* contemporary writers, the Cypriots are the "Graecos" or "Griffons", as bad as the rest of the people from "Griffonie"'.[1519] As has been made clear, *not* all Western authors regarded the population of Cyprus as Greeks, and certainly *not* all were hostile to them. In fact, of the writers examined, only Ambroise and Richard de Templo do refer to the people of Cyprus using the ethnic names *Graeci* and *Griffons* while also expressing hostility towards them. Richard of Devizes, although holding the Cypriots in antipathy, did not regard them as *Graeci* but as *Cyprii*; this chronicler had a particularly distorted impression of the people of Cyprus, imagining them as warlike brigands. But even Ambroise and Richard de Templo do *not* seem to have been hostile to *all* Cypriots. The two authors abuse only those *Graeci* or *Griffons* who ill-treated and killed shipwrecked crusaders and fought on the side of the *tyrannus* Isaak. In marked contrast, the Greeks of the island who collaborated with Richard are respected and described by Ambroise as *vaillanz* and *sages*.[1520] The same writer seems to have sympathised not only with the Westerners, but also with the Cypriots who admitted Richard as their lord, both groups equally maltreated by an enraged Isaak 'when he could get hold of them. He had their feet or hands chopped off, their eyes put out, or their nose cut off'.[1521] Tyerman's and Nicolaou-Konnari's statements are overgeneralised and hardly supported by the evidence.

It should be finally noted that the Western chroniclers make no reference to any theological or doctrinal differences between Latins and Greeks. Neither does any of our

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[1517] Ibid.
[1518] Neophytos the Recluse, *De calamitatibus*, 12.
[1519] Tyerman, 2006, 446; Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 88. Emphasis added.
[1520] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 32, verse 1957.
[1521] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 60.

writers report that Richard's military campaign in Cyprus was accompanied by religious propaganda against the Greeks of the island. On the contrary, as has been seen, the Cypriots were recognised as *Christiani* and no distinction was made between them and the Latin Christians.

Richard's Conquest of Cyprus as Seen by Western Authors

Cyprus was the first Christian-held territory seized by a crusading army.[1522] Harris supports the view that Richard's conquest of Cyprus was an attack on Byzantine territory.[1523] Nicolaou-Konnari, however, rightly argues that 'the English king did not attack Byzantine territory'.[1524] Cyprus had ceased to form part of the Byzantine Empire in 1184. Nevertheless, although not part of the Byzantine Empire, Cyprus was still a Christian land that had been seized by a crusading army. However, in the eyes of King Richard himself and in the opinion of the Western chroniclers, the conquest of the island was fully legitimate. Both the Western authors and the king of England in his letter to William Longchamp emphasise that the *casus belli* was provided by the *tyrannus* Isaak Komnenos. Richard naturally reacted under the provocation of the ruler of Cyprus. For Richard and most of the Western chroniclers, the *tyrannus*'s hostility to and maltreatment of the crusaders in the king of England's army was enough justification for an attack on him and the capture of his land. Some chroniclers, however, felt that further justification was required.

On c. 19 May 1191, while in Famagusta, King Richard received envoys from King Philip with the urgent request to move on immediately to Acre.[1525] Richard de Templo records that the ambassadors of the French king reproved Richard for 'arrogantly persecuting innocent Christians (*Christiani innocui*) when close by there were still so many thousands of Saracens whom he should be attacking'.[1526] To the envoys' argument that the Cypriots were *Christiani* and thus King Richard should withdraw from their island, Richard de Templo advances a forceful counter-argument: 'it seemed very much in the general interest to subjugate the island of Cyprus because it is so indispensable for the land of Jerusalem'.[1527] The same view is

[1522] Nicolaou-Konnari, 2006, 86; Harris, 2003, 141-2.
[1523] Harris, 2003, 141-2.
[1524] Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 37.
[1525] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 58; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 192.
[1526] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 200; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 192.
[1527] Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 192.

expressed by Ambroise.[1528] However, while for Richard de Templo the subjugation of Cyprus was in the common interest (*ad rem publicam*), for Ambroise the conquest of the island was 'in the interests of God' (*a oes Deu*).[1529] To the author of the *Estoire*, what was in the interests of the crusaders and the crusader states was automatically in God's interest.

The conquest of Cyprus had immediate beneficial effects on the Third Crusade. After an enumeration of the 'treasures and riches' acquired by the crusaders from the captured island, Ambroise reports that Richard 'conquered all this for the service of God (*a ues Deu*), to put at the disposal of His land'.[1530] According to William of Newburgh, the king of England allocated the huge booty taken from Cyprus 'to the reinforcement of the Christian expedition'; therefore, his 'splendid success' should be commended rather than disparaged.[1531] As Ralph of Coggeshall reports, upon hearing that the crusaders in Palestine were oppressed by hunger, the king of England hastened to their aid with plenty of provisions from the newly conquered Cyprus.[1532] According to Ambroise, on his arrival at Acre, Richard was given a tumultuous welcome by the crusaders besieging the city 'for it had brought great joy to the army that the king had taken Cyprus, whence came so much food, which sustained the whole army'.[1533] Similarly, Ralph of Coggeshall relates that when Richard reached Acre, the crusading army was made more valiant due to the abundance of provisions arrived there.[1534]

Apart from the immediate benefits, the capture of Cyprus had long-term positive effects on the crusader states of *Outremer*. Gillingham observes that 'in terms of military strategy in the service of the Hoy Land the conquest of Cyprus turned out to be a master stroke'.[1535] Although Harris argues that 'it is likely from the Western point of view ... that the significance of the capture of Cyprus was not immediately appreciated', his thesis is not backed by the evidence.[1536] As we have seen, Ambroise and Richard de Templo were shrewd enough to

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[1528] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 58. Nicolaou-Konnari has argued that this is Richard's reply to the envoys of Philip II. See Nicolaou-Konnari, 2000, 38. However, a close examination of the texts, Ambroise's *Estoire* and Richard de Templo's *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, does not support this interpretation. Besides, in his letter to William Longchamp, King Richard did not advance the vital importance of Cyprus as a reason for his conquest of the island.

[1529] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 200; Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 33 verse 2063.

[1530] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 34 verses 2078-9; Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 61. I made minor changes in Ailes's translation.

[1531] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 351.

[1532] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 31-2.

[1533] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 66.

[1534] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 32.

[1535] Gillingham, 1999, 153.

[1536] Harris, 2003, 142.

realise that the island was *terrae Jerosolimitanae tam necessariam* and thus its subjugation was *ad rem publicam* or, as Ambroise puts it, *a oes Deu*.[1537]

The Western chroniclers who appreciated the importance of Cyprus to the crusaders and the crusader states perceived Divine Providence to have been the moving force behind King Richard's coming to and capture of the island. Ambroise claims that 'God brought him [Richard] to shore before Cyprus near the land that God gave him in conquest'.[1538] According to the author of the *Estoire*, the king of England was the instrument of God's will:

> Aveit Deus l'ovre destine
> Qu'il voleit que li reis feïst....[1539]

After the author of *Estoire*, Richard de Templo records that the king of England was brought to the island by God (*Deo deductus*).[1540] William of Newburgh alleges that, *Dei ordinatissima provisione*, a storm compelled the crusading fleet to divert to Cyprus, while Ralph of Coggeshall alleges that Richard was landed onto the island by *Dei judicio*.[1541] From the Westerners' viewpoint, the conquest of Cyprus was not simply justified. It was legitimated by divine order.

Conclusions

On 31 July 1191, Philip II of France left Palestine, and on 9 October of the following year, Richard I finally sailed from Acre. The Third Crusade had failed in its objective to recapture Jerusalem. What was, however, its impact on the Western perceptions of the Byzantines?

We have seen that Alexios I and Manuel had dealt with the passage of the First and Second Crusades respectively with great subtlety. When the Germans of the Third Crusade, however, marched through Byzantine territory, the ruler of the empire, Isaak, adopted quite a different policy to handle the situation. Having failed to appreciate Frederick's good faith, honesty and singleness of purpose, and the purity of his motives, but rather being convinced that the German emperor's real intention was to conquer the Byzantine Empire, Isaak decided

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[1537] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 200; Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 33 verse 2063, 34 verses 2078-9.
[1538] Ambroise, *Holy War*, II, 50.
[1539] Ambroise, *Holy War*, I, 23 verses 1437-8.
[1540] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 188.
[1541] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 350; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 31.

to destroy the German expedition. His efforts, however, were doomed to failure: the tottering Byzantine Empire was no match for the Germans. As Tyerman correctly points out, 'the net result of Isaak's policy, if such a farrago of myopic expedience and folly can be so described, was to provoke Frederick into contemplating precisely what the Greek feared most, an attack on Constantinople'.[1542]

During the passage of the First and Second Crusade through the European territories of the Byzantine Empire, there were minor clashes between crusaders and Byzantine troops. During the passing of the Third Crusade, there was an open war between Germans and Byzantines, a war that Isaak provoked. The consequences were serious. Not only had the whole of Thrace to the walls of Constantinople been subjected to and devastated by the Germans, but also Frederick's easy success against the Byzantines revealed the weakness of their empire. Angold had argued that 'by the turn of the twelfth century Byzantium had become the "Sick Man of Europe"'.[1543] The experience of the Third Crusade had certainly made this plain. Further, in their attempt to explain Isaak's hostility to them, the German crusaders concluded that the Byzantine sovereign acted in collusion with Saladin and was therefore a traitor to the Christian cause. His imprisonment and maltreatment of the German envoys caused a great scandal among the Latins and was severely condemned by Western authors. In addition, the religious propaganda spread by Patriarch Dositheos and other Byzantine clergy demonstrated to the Germans that the Greeks regarded them as anything but Christian fellows. As Laiou put it succinctly, 'the Byzantine emperor, Patriarch Dositheos, and the imperial officials were criminally provocative. Isaak II played the most stupid diplomatic games with the old emperor, the victor of the Italian wars and so many others'.[1544]

Although Frederick finally spared Christian Constantinople and left the Byzantine Empire once he secured transfer across the Hellespont, in the case of another Western ruler, Richard, material considerations outweighed religious affinity. This resulted in the conquest of Christian Cyprus by the English crusading expedition. Isaak Komnenos's hostility to Richard's expedition earned him the hatred of the crusaders in the following of the king of England. The enmity of Isaak was interpreted by the Westerners as a sign of collusion with Saladin and, as in the case of Isaak II, the ruler of Cyprus was imagined to have exchanged blood with the sultan. A monstrous image of Isaak Komnenos emerged during and

[1542] Tyerman, 2006, 422.
[1543] Angold, 1997, 316.
[1544] Laiou, 2005, 36.

immediately after Richard's campaign in Cyprus. This image, painted as a lurid mixture of treachery, inhuman cruelty, and extreme anti-Latin hatred, eventually found its way into Western chronicles.

The open hostility of Isaak II and Isaak Komnenos to the crusaders had provoked two wars, the first in the Byzantine Empire and the second in the independently ruled island of Cyprus. Both Greek rulers, however, had badly miscalculated the power of their opponents and had failed to consider the wider implications of their actions. Both were defeated. Isaak Komnenos in actual fact brought about his own ruin. He lost his kingdom and was imprisoned. For Richard of England, a Christian ruler's hostility to the crusaders constituted a *casus belli* that justified and legitimised not only attack but also permanent conquest. This view is shared by the majority of the Western chroniclers who deal with the king of England's expedition in Cyprus. Most of these authors, however, add more arguments to lend further legitimacy to the conquest, such as Isaak Komnenos's usurpation of the imperial title and illegitimacy, his tyranny, his reign of terror against the Cypriots, his *magna superbia* and cruelty, his alleged alliance with Saladin, his purported hatred for the Latins, and his supposed unwillingness to provide assistance for the Franks of *Outremer* – an assistance which was to be, and proved to be, vital and positive once Cyprus came under Latin rule.

Chapter 4

FROM THE GERMAN CRUSADE OF 1197 TO THE FOURTH CRUSADE AND THE LATIN CONQUEST OF CONSTANTINOPLE

1204 marked a watershed in Byzantium's history: the capital of the Byzantine Empire was captured and sacked by the armies of the Fourth Crusade. This chapter deals with the period from the German Crusade of 1197 to the Fourth Crusade and the Latin conquest of Constantinople. It is divided into nine sections: the first deals with the German Crusade of 1197 and the threat that it posed to the Byzantine Empire; the second discusses Pope Innocent's vision of the Christian Church and the Crusade, and Byzantium's place within it; the third briefly surveys the attack of the Fourth Crusade on Zara and Innocent's reaction to it; the fourth investigates the debate that preceded the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople; the fifth deals with the first siege of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade; the sixth examines the brief reign of Alexios IV and is subdivided into two parts, the first exploring the Greek-Latin alliance, and the second its termination; the seventh discusses the reign of Alexios V; the eighth surveys Innocent's assessment of the crusaders' motives; and the ninth studies the second capture of Constantinople and is subdivided into two parts, the first investigating the legitimisation of the attack on the Byzantine capital, and the second the sack of the city.

The Sources[1545]

The two major Western sources for the fall of Constantinople to the armies of the Fourth Crusade are Geoffrey of Villehardouin's and Robert of Clari's accounts, the first prose histories authored in the French vernacular. Geoffrey of Villehardouin, participant in the Fourth Crusade, already bore the title of Marshal of Champagne when he took the cross in late 1199. Being always amongst the most important knights of the crusading host, he was centrally involved in the events he describes, both in the first line of battle as one of the

[1545] On page 7 of his work *The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context* Angold states that 'the conquest of Constantinople in 1204 ... produced a veritable torrent of contemporary narratives and comments ... Perhaps the only comparable event of the Middle Ages hitherto had been the crusader conquest of Jerusalem in 1099'. On page 116 of the same work, the scholar underlines 'its [the Fourth Crusade's] comparative neglect in western chronicles' (!). See Angold, 2003, 7, 116. The truth lies somewhere in the middle.

commanders and in taking major strategic and tactical decisions as one of the most trusted advisers among the leaders. Furthermore, his insight into the aftermath of the conquest is due to his appointment to the high office of Marshal of the Latin Empire of Constantinople, an important position which must have provided him with access to official archives. As a result, Villehardouin's testimony is one of great authority, and is generally considered as accurate and honest. The chronicler's detailed and dispassionate account, written at the earliest in 1208, follows the development of the crusade from its inception until the death of Boniface of Montferrat on 4 September 1207.[1546]

Robert of Clari came from a very different background. A poor knight from Picardy, Robert participated in the Fourth Crusade as a vassal of Pierre d'Amiens. Being a lesser knight, he was never involved in the decisions of the leaders. Therefore, he depended for information on the rumours circulating in the ranks where he himself was. His work reflects the attitude of the ordinary soldier in the field and his way of thinking, frank and unused to any diplomacy, reveals aspects of the history that Villehardouin's account avoids. Clari's account attempts to follow the course of the crusade from its beginning. However, as already seen in previous chapters (and as we will see again below), Robert's narrative also includes digressions on subjects which interested him or his potential audience in the West, e.g. Manuel's alleged favour towards the Latins or Andronikos I's treachery.[1547] Clari also devotes a great part of his narrative to colourful descriptions of the many riches and holy relics of Constantinople, an interest which is lacking in Villehardouin, who is almost exclusively concerned with the military and political sides of the campaign. Work on Clari's chronicle was possibly in progress by 1206, with the last few paragraphs, which refer summarily to events after this date, being added in 1216 after the death of Henry, Latin emperor of Constantinople

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[1546] A. J. Andrea, 'Essay on Primary Sources', in *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople,* Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, 2nd edn (Philadelphia, PA, 1997), 299-302; C. W. Aspland (ed.), *A Medieval French Reader* (Oxford, 1979), 239-40; C. Morris, 'Geoffroy de Villehardouin and the Conquest of Constantinople', *History*, 53 (1968), 24-34; P. S. Noble, 'The Importance of Old French Chronicles as Historical Sources of the Fourth Crusade and the Early Latin Empire of Constantinople', *Journal of Medieval History*, 27 (2001), 399-416; P. S. Noble, 'Villehardouin, Robert de Clari and Henri de Valenciennes: Their Different Approaches to the Fourth Crusade', in *The Medieval Chronicle. Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Medieval Chronicle, Driebergen/Utrecht 13-16 July 1996*, ed. Erik Kooper (Amsterdam-Atlanta, 1999), 202-11; P. S. Noble, 'Geoffrey of Villehardouin (the Marshal)', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 2 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 507; Godefreidou Billardouinou, *Η Κατάκτηση της Κωνσταντινούπολης*, trans. Kostas Antypas, 3rd edn (Athens, 2002), 225-8; Angold, 2003, 11-13.

[1547] Chapter 2, 169-71; Chapter 3, 187.

(1206-16), the last event recorded by the chronicler. However, that Clari wrote the entire text nearer 1216 is a possibility that cannot be discounted.[1548]

A short, eyewitness account of the Fourth Crusade is the *Devastatio constantinopolitana*, covering the period 1198-1204. This narrative was composed by an anonymous author, probably a low-ranking ecclesiastical administrator, from the German Rhineland. The *Devastatio* brims with accurate facts and figures and thus complements the accounts of Villehardouin and Clari. In addition, as in the case of Clari, the anonymous author's viewpoint was that of a *pauper Christi*, a crusader poor, biased against the rich and powerful crusaders.[1549]

A different viewpoint on the crusade is provided in the histories of three high-level clerics who participated in the Fourth Crusade. The longer and most important of the three histories is the *Hystoria Constantinopolitana*, authored by the Cistercian monk Gunther of Pairis (c. 1150-after 1210). In his work, Gunther recounts his Abbot Martin's participation in the Fourth Crusade. The writer, who came from the Upper Rhine, entered the Alsatian abbey of Pairis around 1203, following a career as a secular cleric and scholar. He essentially composed his *Hystoria* in the second half of 1205, after the return of his Abbot Martin, who, following the fall of Constantinople, devoted himself to the acquisition of sacred relics. Gunther's work seems to have been commissioned by Martin himself, who provided oral information on the crusade. Andrea, the English translator of the *Hystoria*, has aptly described the work as 'the Latin West's most sophisticated literary and theological defense of the tragedy of 1204'.[1550] Gunther not only defended Martin's stealing of relics, but also justified the Latin conquest of Constantinople as the result of Divine Providence. It is finally important to mention two essential points: first, Gunther's work is informed by classical Latin literature and, second, each of the *Hystoria*'s chapters, written in prose, is followed by a poem.[1551]

As in the case of Gunther, the purpose of the cleric of the cathedral of Halberstadt in Saxony, known as the Anonymous of Halberstadt, was to justify the actions of Conrad of

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[1548] Andrea, 1997, 302-3; Aspland, 1979, 233-4; Noble, 2001, 399-416; Noble, 1999, 202-11; Angold, 2003, 13, 15; Robert of Clari, *The Conquest of Constantinople,* trans. Edgar Holmes McNeal (New York, 1936), 3-7, 12-23; Clari, *Conquête*, xxii-xxviii; P. S. Noble, 'Robert of Clari', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 4 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 1040-1; Robertou tou Klari, *Η Κατάκτηση της Κωνσταντινούπολης*, trans. Mpampes Lykoudes (Athens, 1990), 19-30.

[1549] Andrea, 1997, 303-4; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 205-12; Angold, 2003, 18.

[1550] A. J. Andrea, 'The *Historia Constantinopolitana*: An Early Thirteenth-Century Cistercian Looks at Byzantium', *Analecta Cisterciensia*, 36 (1980), 302.

[1551] Andrea, 1997, 304-6; Andrea, 1980, 276-9; F. R. Swietek, 'Gunther of Pairis and the *Historia Constantinopolitana*', *Speculum*, 53 (1978), 70-1, 76-9; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 5-60; Angold, 2003, 16-17.

Krosigk, bishop of Halberstadt (1202-8). Conrad was the highest ranking German cleric who partook in the Fourth Crusade and, like Martin, brought back to Germany sacred relics from Constantinople. For his story, written in late 1208 or early 1209 and incorporated into the final pages of the *Gesta episcoporum Halberstadensium*, the Anonymous of Halberstadt depended on the eyewitness account of Conrad. The unnamed author's intention was to vindicate Conrad's translation of relics from Constantinople to Halberstadt and to assure his audience that these relics were tokens of heavenly favour. The Anonymous of Halberstadt's account is considered by modern scholars as a fairly trustworthy account.[1552]

A third major clerical account to catalogue and justify the relics taken in the sack of Constantinople is the *De terre Iherosolimitana et quomodo ab urbe Constantinopolitana ad hanc ecclesiam allate sunt reliquie.* Its anonymous author, known as the Anonymous of Soissons, is likely to have been a canon of Soissons cathedral. His source of information was Nevelon de Chérisy, bishop of Soissons (1176-1207) and one of the leading prelates of the army of the Fourth Crusade. The Anonymous began writing his account after June 1205 and he likely completed it before September 1207.[1553]

Another important source for the Fourth Crusade is the *Gesta Innocentii Papae III*, composed in the years from about 1204 to 1209 by an anonymous author who was an official of the papal curia. The *Gesta*, of which the readership were mostly members of the curia, reflects the curial angle and absolves Pope Innocent III of any responsibility for the diversion of the crusade to Constantinople and the sack of the Byzantine capital. Further, in order to exculpate the crusaders, the anonymous author pins the blame for the diversion of the crusade and the capture of the imperial capital on the Venetians.[1554] The basis of the narrative found in the *Gesta* is provided by Innocent's letters to the crusaders. These missives, which provide a valuable insight into the papal policies and postures, were copied in bound volumes which are known as *registers*.[1555]

Three surviving letters which were sent to the West by the crusade leadership are also used in our investigation. Two were composed following the first siege of Constantinople in August 1203 while the third was written after the Latin conquest of the Byzantine capital.[1556] One of the two letters composed after the first siege of Constantinople was dispatched to the

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[1552] Andrea, 1997, 306-7; *Deeds of the Bishops of Halberstadt*, 239-46; Angold, 2003, 17.
[1553] Andrea, 1997, 307; *Anonymous of Soissons*, 223-30; Angold, 2003, 17-18.
[1554] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, xi-xvii; Andrea, 1997, 307-8; Angold, 2003, 16.
[1555] Andrea, 1997, 307-8; *The Registers*, 7-9; Angold, 2003, 16.
[1556] Andrea, 1997, 309-10; Angold, 2003, 20-2.

West in the names of the counts Baldwin of Flanders, Hugh of Saint Pol, and Louis of Blois. One of the recipients was Pope Innocent.[1557] The second was a letter of Hugh of Saint Pol, which survives in three versions. The best and fullest of the three was dispatched to Hugh's vassal R. de Balues.[1558] The letter sent to the West after the conquest of Constantinople was written by the new Latin emperor of the city, Baldwin of Flanders.[1559] The importance of the three baronial letters is due to the fact that, unlike other sources, they were composed shortly after the events they describe.

Along with the aforementioned primary sources, we will examine two substantial minor accounts for the Fourth Crusade, which were composed in Western Europe after 1204. These are incorporated in the chronicles of the French Premonstratensian Robert of Auxerre and the English Cistercian Ralph of Coggeshall. Although, the two authors were near enough to the events they describe and thus relatively well informed, the accounts' greater value is in revealing how the Fourth Crusade and the Byzantines were perceived in the West by contemporaries. Apart from oral sources, the chroniclers had access to the letters written by Baldwin I and Hugh of Saint Pol. Robert makes full use of the letter of Baldwin I, while Ralph relies on Hugh's letter for his account of the first capture of Constantinople and commends both Hugh's and Baldwin's letters to his readers wishing to know more about the crusade. As expected, therefore, the two chroniclers' understanding of the crusade is significantly influenced by these letters.[1560]

The Crusade of Henry VI: a Threat to Byzantium

After Frederick I's death in the course of the Third Crusade, his son Henry VI succeeded to the throne of Germany and in 1191 was crowned emperor by Pope Celestine III (1191-8). In November 1189 William II of Sicily had died without a direct male heir. Since Henry had married Constance, William's aunt, in 1186, the old German imperial claim to the Norman Kingdom of southern Italy and Sicily was now reinforced. On 20 November 1194 Henry entered Palermo, where he was crowned on Christmas Day. In the city, the German emperor found Irene, daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Isaak II and widow of Roger, co-king of

[1557] *Die Register*, VI, 358-61; *The Registers*, 79-85.
[1558] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 177-201.
[1559] *Die Register*, VII, 253-62; *The Registers*, 98-112.
[1560] Angold, 2003, 115-6; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicle*, 265-75.

Sicily (1192-3).[1561] In late 1194 or early 1195, Henry betrothed Irene to his brother Philip of Swabia, thus linking the Hohenstaufen with the Byzantine imperial family.[1562]

By the beginning of 1195, Henry VI had succeeded in imposing his authority on the Kingdom of Sicily. The German's imperialist ambitions, however, were not limited to the Sicilian kingdom. Henry had been imbued by his tutor Godfrey of Viterbo with grandiose notions of universal sovereignty.[1563] On 31 March 1195 Henry VI took the cross at Bari and two days later proclaimed a crusade.[1564] In June the German emperor departed for Germany to organise the expedition, and in August Pope Celestine called upon the German clergy to preach it. In February 1195, Henry had sent an embassy to the Byzantine Emperor Isaak. As the new ruler of the former Norman kingdom, the German emperor demanded the cession of the territory between Durazzo and Thessaloniki that William II had temporarily conquered in 1185. Further, Henry enumerated the 'afflictions' allegedly suffered by his father in Italy and Thrace thanks to Manuel I and Isaak II respectively, and demanded that the Byzantine emperor 'purchase peace at a huge price [five thousand gold pounds] or prepare to meet him in battle at once'.[1565] Finally, Henry asked that the Byzantine Empire provide naval support for his forthcoming crusade. In the face of these excessive demands, Isaak reacted by dispatching an envoy to mollify the powerful German emperor.[1566]

On 8 April 1195 Isaak was overthrown and blinded by his brother Alexios, who succeeded to the Byzantine throne as Alexios III (1195-1203). In December 1196 another German embassy reached Constantinople. Henry had finally agreed to modify his demands, asking the Byzantines only for money, which was to be used for his forthcoming crusade. The amount, however, was huge.[1567] At an audience on Christmas Day, Alexios had recourse to the traditional tactic of Byzantine diplomacy to overawe foreign envoys with pomp and splendour: 'he donned his imperial robe set with precious stones and commanded the rest to put on their garments with the broad purple stripe and interwoven with gold'.[1568] At this time, however,

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[1561] Roger was the son of King Tancred (1189-94) of Sicily, the illegitimate son of William I's elder brother, Roger, Duke of Apulia. Following William II's death, Tancred, with the support of a group of leading magnates, was crowned king of Sicily. See Barber, 2004, 221-2.
[1562] Barber, 2004, 195-6; Brand, 1968, 190-91.
[1563] Barber, 2004, 196.
[1564] Ibid., 196-8; Lock, 2006, 155; Mayer, 1988, 149-51; Riley-Smith, 2005, 146-7; Johnson, 1969, 116-122; Tyerman, 2006, 488-94.
[1565] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 261.
[1566] Brand, 1968, 191.
[1567] Ibid.; Johnson, 1969, 119.
[1568] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 262.

the Byzantine strategy badly misfired. Alexios is criticised by Choniates for 'extolling the wealth of the Roman Empire', a move not 'suited to the times'.[1569] The historian was right. Before him, the Byzantine emperor had the embassy of the most powerful and ambitious Christian monarch, who had recently added to his territories the Kingdom of Sicily and knew from the experience of his father during the Third Crusade that the rapidly declining Byzantine Empire was no match for the German Empire. To the Byzantines who, in Choniates's words, were 'adorned by precious stones like meadows in bloom',[1570] the blasé German envoys contemptuously declared:

> The Germans have neither need of such spectacles, nor do they wish to become worshipers of ornaments and garments secured by brooches suited only for women whose painted faces, headdresses, and glittering earrings are especially pleasing to men ... The time has now come to take off effeminate garments and brooches and to put on iron instead of gold.[1571]

Byzantine wealth which had once overawed petty rulers and their ambassadors in Constantinople was now dismissed by the envoys of the powerful German emperor. The German ambassadors threatened war if the money demanded were not paid. Alexios made no show of defiance, but dispatched an envoy to Henry to negotiate a reduction in the amount of the levy. The Byzantine mission succeeded in achieving the reduction of the original sum demanded by more than two-thirds. To meet the required sum Alexios instituted a special tax called *Alamanikon* (=German levy). Eventually, Henry's sudden death on 28 September 1197 prevented the shipment of the levy to Sicily.[1572] The mere fact, however, that the Byzantine ruler was forced to purchase protection from a German attack revealed the weakness of the Eastern Empire. As Choniates reports, the fact that the Byzantine emperor 'consented to pay money in return for peace [was] something which had never been done up to this time'.[1573] The formerly powerful Byzantine Empire became, to use Brand's term, a 'tributary state' of the German Empire.[1574]

Henry's grandiose ambition was to win the leadership of Christendom. Thus, he endeavoured to secure recognition of his authority as feudal overlord of other Christian rulers.

[1569] Ibid., 261.
[1570] Ibid., 262.
[1571] Ibid.
[1572] Brand, 1968, 192-3.
[1573] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 261.
[1574] Brand, 1968, 189.

During his brief reign, he struggled, with partial success, to establish his suzerainty over France, England, and Aragon in the West, and Armenia, Cyprus, and the Holy Land in the East. Henry's universalist ambitions doubtless included the imposing of his overlordship over the weakened Byzantine Empire.[1575] Brand argued that 'Henry VI had ample grounds for hatred of the Byzantines'.[1576] According to Brand, the German emperor's attitude to the Byzantine Empire was informed by Isaak's hostility to the German crusaders in 1189-90, Manuel's helping and encouraging the coalition of the Lombard cities and the papacy in its struggle against Frederick in the 1160s, and 'centuries of hostility between the two empires'.[1577] The fact that the first two considerations were used by Henry as pretexts when he made his enormous demands on Isaak in February 1195 does not necessarily mean that they influenced the German emperor's attitudes to Byzantium. Henry's ambitions were motivated by imperial interests and by no means by hatred towards the Byzantines. Nevertheless, his death in 1197 forestalled the accomplishment of his design and relieved the Byzantines.

Pope Innocent's Vision and Byzantium's Place within It

In 22 February 1198 Lothar of Segni became pope as Innocent III. The Byzantine Emperor Alexios III sent a mission to the new pope to congratulate him and to invite him to dispatch an embassy to Constantinople. Innocent III was a pope deeply committed to both the promotion of the crusade and to ecclesiastical unity under papal leadership.[1578] He responded to Alexios's mission by sending an embassy to Constantinople, informing the emperor, in the words of the Anonymous *Gesta Innocentii*, 'of his intention to aid the Holy Land, to whose cries the emperor among all Christian Princes should respond because of the abundance of his wealth and his proximity'.[1579]

That the Christian Byzantine ruler was the natural protector of the crusader states - because, first, his empire was physically closest and, second, because of his economic power - was a notion that possessed great currency among the Latin settlers of *Outremer* during the greater part of Manuel's reign, more specifically from 1157 onwards.[1580] Pope Innocent shared

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[1575] Ibid., 193; Barber, 2004, 196.
[1576] Brand, 1968, 190.
[1577] Ibid.
[1578] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III,* xxx.
[1579] Ibid., 77.
[1580] Chapter 2, 160-4.

this viewpoint. Despite the unfavourable impression that Isaak's hostile treatment of the crusade of Frederick I appears to have made in certain areas of Western Europe, mainly Germany and England, Byzantium, at the turn of the twelfth century, was still regarded as a Christian power which was expected to protect the crusader states and contribute to the crusading movement like other Christian powers - or even to a greater degree. The capture and partition of this very empire by a crusade only six years later was obvious to nobody in 1198 and, certainly, it was *not* inevitable.

Innocent's envoys further called upon Alexios III to 'lead the Greek Church back to the obedience of the Apostolic See, its mother, from whose *magisterium* [i.e. teaching authority] it had withdrawn, persevering for a long time in its contumacy'.[1581] The eleventh-century reforming popes' conception of all individual Christian churches, including the Church of Constantinople, being daughters of the Church of Rome[1582] was vigorously revived again. The rebellious Constantinopolitan Church was summoned to return to the obedience of the Roman Church as a faithful daughter. Innocent's call was an emphatic reassertion of the reforming view of the papal primacy.

Between spring 1198 and spring/summer 1202, several embassies and letters were exchanged between the papal curia and the Byzantine imperial court.[1583] In the meantime, Innocent preached a new eastern expedition in August 1198. Alexios III had subtly avoided any commitment to Innocent's crusade.[1584] Consequently, in a missive sent to the Byzantine emperor on 13 November 1199, Innocent wondered why the ruler 'has apparently not yet given a sign of a commitment to the recovery of the Holy Land' and asserted that 'without your help the Lord's sepulcher could not be freed from the hands of the Saracens'.[1585] The pope claimed that Alexios should 'move ... arms against the pagans and work for the liberation of the province of Jerusalem, since the Lord has given us the task to free the unhappy Christian people and his inheritance from the hands of the Saracens'.[1586]

As it becomes clear from Innocent's correspondence with Alexios, regardless of its rapid decline after Manuel's death and the damage to its image in the West following the Third Crusade, Byzantium was still respected and regarded by the papacy as a considerable Christian

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[1581] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III,* 77.
[1582] I. S. Robinson, *Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest: The Polemical Literature of the Late Eleventh Century* (Manchester, 1978), 20-1, 25-7.
[1583] *The Registers*, 33.
[1584] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III,* xxx.
[1585] Ibid., 78.
[1586] Ibid., 79.

power and figured in the pope's ambitious crusading plans. The Eastern Empire's support and contribution to the crusading enterprise was considered by Innocent to be of vital importance to the survival of the crusader states and the success of his planned crusade.

In his letter of 13 November 1199 to Alexios and in a letter to the Patriarch John X of Constantinople (1198-1206) dated 12 November 1199, Innocent further deals with the subject of church unity. The pope's two letters were a firm reassertion of the conception of Roman primacy and of the reformers' view of the Church as an organic whole, the individual Christian churches being members of a body of which the Church of Rome was the head.[1587] In Innocent's words, 'the Roman Church is not only by synodal but by Divine Constitution the head and mother of all the churches'.[1588] The pope instructed that the patriarch of Constantinople 'should obey us [the Roman Church] kindly and devotedly as his head according to the ancient and canonical constitution'.[1589] The Church of Constantinople's recognition of the Roman *principatus* was considered by Innocent as a matter of the utmost importance; indeed it was regarded as 'doctrinal: namely that the member [i.e. the Constantinopolitan Church] should return to the head [the Roman Church] and the daughter to the mother'.[1590]

Innocent's treatment of papal primacy is much more extensive in his letter to the patriarch than in that to Alexios. The pope begins his missive by asserting that 'the primacy of the Apostolic See, which no man, but God, indeed the very God-man, has established, has been proven by much evangelical and Apostolic evidence, from which later canonical constitutions have proceeded'.[1591] The ecclesiology of Innocent's letter to John X drew on the Roman tradition of the primacy of Peter, quoting biblical texts referring to Christ's commission to Peter, i.e. Matthew 16:18-19, and Luke 22:32, and interpreting them as evidence that 'the Holy Roman Church, consecrated to Saint Peter, the prince of the apostles, is preeminent over others as teacher and mother'.[1592] Innocent deemed it necessary not to leave any doubt about the validity of his claim that the Church of Rome was superior to that of Constantinople, which was purportedly founded by Saint Andrew who had been chosen an Apostle by Christ before Peter. As the pope explained, 'the Roman Church is called mother not because of her

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[1587] Robinson, 1978, 20-1.
[1588] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III,* 88. Cf. ibid., 80.
[1589] Ibid., 80. Cf. ibid., 88.
[1590] Ibid. Cf. J. Gill, 'Innocent III and the Greeks: Aggressor or Apostle?', in *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages*, ed. Derek Baker (Edinburgh, 1973), 97.
[1591] Ibid., 81.
[1592] Ibid.

age but rather because of her dignity – for, even if ... Andrew preceded Peter in the faith, still Peter was over Andrew, since he is always put first in the listing of the apostles, not because Peter was first in time, but because he was first in dignity'.[1593]

In November 1199, i.e. the same month Innocent dispatched his letters to both the Byzantine emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople, recruitment of crusaders for the forthcoming eastern expedition began in Northern France.[1594] The first to take the cross were the Counts Thibald of Champagne and Louis of Blois on 28 November. Many of their vassals followed their example. In February 1200, Count Baldwin of Flanders and many of his vassals also vowed to crusade. In June, a meeting between the principal leaders at Compiègne decided to take the sea route to the East, and to attack and conquer Egypt and use it as a base to recapture Jerusalem. Further, six envoys were appointed to negotiate the crusaders' transport with the Republic of Venice.

While these developments were taking place in the West, Innocent kept negotiations with Alexios open. Despite Alexios's evident unwillingness to contribute to the upcoming crusade, the pope was determined not to give up endeavouring to persuade the Byzantine ruler to participate in his eastern expedition.[1595] In his letter dated 21 February 1201, Innocent wrote to Alexios that he had invited him 'to nothing other than the unity of the Church and aid for the land of Jerusalem', and urged the Byzantine ruler 'to imitate in word and deed the devotion to the Apostolic See of ... Emperor Manuel'.[1596] Undoubtedly, what Innocent had in mind was Manuel's support for the crusader states of *Outremer*, and his negotiations with Pope Alexander for the union of the churches.[1597] Despite all his words and efforts, however, Innocent's expectations from Alexios of ecclesiastical union and Byzantine support for the upcoming crusade were to meet with frustration.

In April 1201, the six crusading delegates finalised arrangements with the doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo (1192-1205), for the transport of the crusading army to Egypt. The agreement specified a total of forty-five hundred knights and their horses, nine thousand squires, and

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[1593] Ibid., 87.
[1594] For the Fourth Crusade, see Riley-Smith, 2005, 149-60; Mayer, 1988, 196-204; E. H. McNeal and R. L. Wolff, 'The Fourth Crusade', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 2 (Madison ; London, 1969), 153-85; Runciman, III, 107-31; Lock, 2006, 156-61; Madden, 2005, 97-120; Harris, 2003, 145-62; Brand, 1968, 232-69; Tyerman, 2006, 495-560; Angold, 2003; D. E. Queller and T. F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople,* 2nd edn (Philadelphia, PA, 1997); J. Phillips, *The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople* (London, 2004).
[1595] *The Registers*, 34.
[1596] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III,* 93.
[1597] Chapter 2, 160-5.

twenty thousand foot soldiers, for whom a sum of eighty-five thousand Cologne marks was to be paid by April 1202, once the crusaders had assembled in Venice. The crusaders' departure was planned for 29 June 1202. In the meantime, Count Thibald of Champagne died in May 1201, and the command of the whole crusading army was offered to Marquis Boniface of Montferrat, who accepted the cross at Soissons in the late summer of 1201.

The situation was soon to become even more complicated because of the young Alexios Angelos, son of the deposed Byzantine emperor, Isaak II. In the second half of 1201, the prince escaped to Italy from where he fled to the court of Philip of Swabia at Hagenau to appeal for aid in order to overthrow his uncle Alexios III and restore himself and his father to the Byzantine throne. Philip, brother-in-law of the young Alexios through marriage to his sister Irene, was one of the two contestants for the German kingship and the Western Roman Empire - the rival claimant was Otto of Brunswick, who was supported by Pope Innocent.[1598] During Christmas of 1201, both Prince Alexios and Boniface of Montferrat, leader of the forthcoming crusade and vassal of Philip of Swabia, appear to have been present at Philip's court at Hagenau.[1599]

In late February 1202, Prince Alexios visited Pope Innocent in an attempt to secure papal support for the cause of using the crusade to restore himself and his father to the Byzantine throne. Alexios's appeal was rejected. Innocent remained committed to his policy of conciliation with Alexios III. The pope would by no means divert his crusade, to which he was so deeply dedicated, to place on the Byzantine throne a young prince, who, besides, was the brother-in-law of the excommunicated Hohenstaufen Philip of Swabia. When in March 1202 Boniface of Montferrat went to Rome, he also tried to win papal support for a diversion to Constantinople. However, as in the case of Prince Alexios, he met with a flat refusal.[1600]

The crusaders began arriving at Venice in the middle of the summer of 1202. However, when only one-third of the expected 33,500 crusaders finally assembled there, these were left owing the Venetians 34,000 silver marks. At this stage, the doge suggested that the crusaders could postpone their payment, if they helped him recapture the town of Zara on the Dalmatian coast from King Emeric of Hungary (1196-1204), who had also taken the cross in 1200. The proposal for an attack on the Christian Zara aroused much disagreement among the crusading

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[1598] Barber, 2004, 103; Phillips, 2004, 90

[1599] J. Folda, 'The Fourth Crusade, 1201-1203: Some Reconsiderations', *Byzantinoslavica*, 26 (1965), 285.

[1600] Ibid., 285-6; *The Registers*, 34; Queller and Madden, 1997, 37-8; Phillips, 2004, 93-4.

army. Many poor as well as some of the richer crusaders abandoned the expedition.[1601] However, the crusading leaders eventually accepted Doge Dandolo's proposal. In the meantime, in September 1202, while the crusaders were in Venice, another development took place. Prince Alexios sent an embassy to the leaders of the expedition and requested their support for his cause.[1602]

The papal legate Cardinal Peter Capuano, having been rejected by the Venetians as legate, left Venice and returned to Rome, where he informed Innocent of the crusade's plan to attack Zara. Further, he was instructed by the leaders of the army to discover the pope's wishes concerning Prince Alexios's proposal. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1202, Innocent had received a letter from an alarmed Alexios III. The Byzantine emperor had learnt that Philip of Swabia had persuaded Boniface of Montferrat to aid Prince Alexios to seize the Byzantine throne.[1603] The now-lost letter of Alexios III is summarised in the letter with which Innocent answered the Byzantine ruler on 16 November 1202. Alexios had appealed to Innocent's sense of Christian fraternity in order to prevent a diversion of the crusade. According to the Byzantine ruler's rhetoric of religious affinity,

> since the army of Christians which is about to come to the aid of the Holy Land proposed to invade [the Byzantine Empire] ... and to use weapons against Christians, it was appropriate [for the pope to] ... call them back from such a plan, lest, perchance, befouling their hands with the slaughter of Christians, they then commit an offense before God and become so greatly weakened that they are unable to attack in any way the enemies of Christ.[1604]

In addition, Alexios III reminded Innocent of the fact that the 'Emperor Frederick [I] greatly offended the Roman Church and persecuted it with unjust enmity, and ... his sons, following in the father's footsteps, have aggravated it not a little'.[1605] Therefore, the pope 'should lend neither aid nor favour to the ... duke of Swabia that would enable him to gain the kingdom [i.e. the Byzantine Empire] by some means or other'.[1606] What Alexios III was trying to imply was that support of Philip's protégé, Prince Alexios, would result in the strengthening of the position of Philip himself, since the Byzantine Empire was to be converted into a protectorate

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[1601] Queller and Madden, 1997, 62.
[1602] Ibid., 63-4; Folda, 1965, 287.
[1603] *The Registers*, 34-5; A. J. Andrea, 'Pope Innocent III and the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade Army to Zara', *Byzantinoslavica*, 33 (1972), 13-14.
[1604] *The Registers*, 35. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 130.
[1605] Ibid.
[1606] Ibid., 35-6.

of the duke of Swabia. Whether and to what extent Alexios III's rhetoric of Christian affinity and anti-Hohenstaufen propaganda exerted any influence on Innocent is hard to say: in fact, the Byzantine emperor was preaching to the converted. As seen, the pope had already turned down Prince Alexios's appeal and had explicitly forbidden the leader of the crusade, Boniface of Montferrat, to use the expedition to install the young prince.

In his letter of 16 November 1202, Innocent informed Alexios III about Prince Alexios's visit to Rome and the accusations he threw against his uncle, his subsequent return to his brother-in-law Philip in Germany, and his embassy to the crusading leadership in Venice. According to Innocent, the young prince had promised that if the crusaders aided him to recover the Byzantine throne, 'he would repay them handsomely both with assistance in the Holy Land and with expense money and gifts. Moreover, he was prepared to obey all of our [the pope's] orders ... he was willing to honour the Most Holy Roman Church in every way that he could and to carry out those actions that might be pleasing to our will'.[1607] Innocent informed Alexios III that the crusading leaders could not act without his 'mandate and authority' and therefore sent Peter Capuano to consult him concerning Prince Alexios's proposal.

By enumerating Prince Alexios's pledges, the pope doubtless wanted to send Alexios III the message that his nephew had promised the crusading leadership and the papacy what the Byzantine ruler had so far failed to provide and fulfill: assistance to the Holy Land and reunion of the churches. The pope had the authority - or so he believed - to decide whether to accept Prince Alexios's proposal or not and, as he reassured Alexios III, he had 'made a decision that should deservedly please [the Byzantine ruler]'.[1608] And this even though - as the pope took pains to mention - 'many might assert that ... [he] should kindly show favour to an appeal of this sort made on behalf of him [Prince Alexios] because the Greek Church is scarcely obedient and devoted (*minus obediens et devota*) to the Apostolic See'.[1609] Further, in his letter, Innocent referred to his support for Otto of Brunswick for the Western emperorship and told Alexios III that, 'by reason of [the pope's] ... zeal and mediating diligence',[1610] Philip of Swabia had not prevailed. Innocent proceeded to remind the Byzantine emperor that if 'Philip had obtained the imperial throne, many troubles would have befallen

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[1607] Ibid., 37. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III,* 131.
[1608] Ibid.
[1609] Ibid. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III,* 131.
[1610] Ibid., 38; *Die Register*, V, 242.

you [Alexios III] and your empire, inasmuch as he could have easily mounted an attack on your empire ... just as Henry [VI], his brother and former emperor, had planned to seize your empire'.[1611] Although Henry VI basically sought to extract from the Byzantine emperors material assistance for his crusade, the fact that his diplomatic exchanges with Constantinople were accompanied by threats of military intervention resulted in his being remembered in the West as planning to conquest the Byzantine Empire.

Innocent concluded his letter by complaining bitterly that 'from the time of Manuel of honoured memory ... the empire of Constantinople has not deserved such as we ought [otherwise] to have effected because it has always answered us and our predecessors with words and not backed them up with deeds'.[1612] The pope advised Alexios III that 'when you have considered the favour of how much we have done for you, you ought all the more quickly to correct what has thus far been less prudently neglected by you and your predecessors'.[1613] Innocent eventually declared: 'we entreat, instruct, counsel, and exhort your Imperial Excellency ... that ... you take care to respond to us with deeds and not words because we have been careful to demonstrate the love that we have for you in action and result'.[1614]

Innocent's letter to Alexios has been variously interpreted by modern commentators. Powell described the tone of the letter as 'almost threatening',[1615] while Harris claimed that the papal letter 'amounted to a thinly veiled threat'.[1616] Andrea asserted that in his letter the pope used the 'threatened diversion to blackmail Alexios III' into coming to terms with the Church of Rome.[1617] Queller and Madden favoured the thesis that the letter 'contained both a friendly response and a thinly veiled threat'.[1618] Folda supported the view that in his letter Innocent 'vividly portrayed his consistent support of Alexios III'.[1619] Which of these interpretations, however, is valid? Our close examination of the letter points to the conclusion that Folda's thesis is the most convincing. The letter demonstrated Innocent's strong and consistent support of Alexios III. Nonetheless, this argument should be elaborated.

[1611] *The Registers*, 38.
[1612] Ibid.
[1613] Ibid.
[1614] Ibid., 38-9.
[1615] J. M. Powell, 'Innocent III and Alexius III: A Crusade Plan that Failed', in *The Experience of Crusading*, 1 (Cambridge, 2003), 101.
[1616] Harris, 2003, 150.
[1617] Andrea, 1972, 17.
[1618] Queller and Madden, 1997, 67.
[1619] Folda, 1965, 284.

Innocent's assessment of the two rivals for the German kingship and the Western Roman Empire was based on their willingness to conform to the pope's Italian and Sicilian policy. Otto of Brunswick appeared to be agreeable to Innocent's political views.[1620] This was the sole reason that the pope favoured Otto against Philip of Swabia. As regards his crusade, Innocent was so strongly committed to it that he would have never accepted to sanction its use for promoting the interests of a young prince, who, what is more, was Philip of Swabia's protégé. In fact, in his letter of 16 November, Innocent made a last attempt to persuade Alexios III to join the crusade and promote the union of the churches. The pope tried to do so by claiming that the reason he favoured Otto against Philip and Alexios III against Prince Alexios was to oblige his ally, the Byzantine emperor. Since the pope had demonstrated his 'favour' and 'love' for Alexios III 'in action and result', it was now the emperor's turn 'to respond ... with deeds and not words'.

Innocent's letter to Alexios III contained neither threat nor blackmail but appealed to Alexios's sense of right and duty. Innocent believed that Alexios, appreciative of the pope's consistent support of him, would accede to papal wishes. As Powel very rightly points out, it was 'a last-ditch effort on the part of Innocent to preserve the policy for which he strove during the previous four years'.[1621] The pope remained deeply committed to his vision of ecclesiastical unity and of a united Christian front to pursue the Lord's War under the banner of the papacy. Alexios III, however, had no time to respond to Innocent's entreaties and exhortations to action. Only eight months later, Innocent's crusade, which took an unforeseen course with the pope having lost control over it, overthrew the papal ally in Constantinople.

'The Devil ... Caused You to Make War against Your Brothers': Crusading Attack on Zara and Papal Reaction

On 1 October 1202, the crusaders left Venice having as their destination not Egypt, as initially agreed, but Zara, where they arrived on 11 November. In Rome, Innocent had been informed of this development by Peter Capuano. Deeply disturbed by this turn of events, the pope sent a now-lost letter to the crusaders. The author of the *Gesta* reports that, in his letter, Innocent was 'strictly forbidding them [the crusaders] to attack the lands of Christians, and by name, Zara ...

[1620] Barber, 2004, 103.
[1621] Powel, 2003, 101.

otherwise, they should know that they would be bound with the chain of anathema'.[1622] Already in 1201, the pope had warned the crusaders 'not [to] injure Christians, unless perhaps they wrongfully impeded in their journey, or for some other just and necessary reason they could not act otherwise, but only with the approval of the legate of the Apostolic See'.[1623]

Innocent's letter was read to the crusaders at Zara by the Cistercian Abbot Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, who exclaimed, 'in the name of the Pope of Rome I forbid you to attack this city'.[1624] The abbot had recourse to the ideal of Christian fraternity to prevent an assault on Zara, instructing the crusaders that 'the people in it are Christians, and you wear the sign of the cross'.[1625] The crusading leaders found themselves in a terrible dilemma. The powerful French baron Simon of Montfort, his vassals, relatives, and friends refused to fight and deserted the army.[1626] Nevertheless, despite the threat of papal excommunication, the crusaders finally attacked Zara, which was captured and sacked on 24 November.

When Innocent learnt of the capture and sack of the Dalmatian city, he was horrified and outraged.[1627] In a letter dated late December 1202 or early January 1203, the pope severely chastised the crusaders for their 'very wicked' action, dramatically stating that 'the Devil and Satan ... caused you [the crusaders] to make war against your brothers and to unfurl your battle standards initially against people of the Faith, so that you might ... pour out for demons both your own and your brothers' blood'.[1628] The pope further reminded the crusaders that 'the authority of the Apostolic See, ... took care to prohibit you strictly from attempting to invade or violate the lands of Christians ... Those who presumed to contravene it [the prohibition], we ruled they would be bound by the chain of excommunication'.[1629] Eventually, Innocent concluded his letter by explicitly notifying the crusaders that 'you should realise that you lie under the sentence of excommunication'.[1630]

Finally realising that their attack on Zara incurred the ban of excommunication, the Frankish crusaders dispatched an embassy to Rome to beg for papal forgiveness.[1631] Consequently, in a letter written in January or early February 1203, Innocent became more

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[1622] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 139-40.
[1623] Ibid., 132.
[1624] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 48. Cf. *The Registers*, 44.
[1625] Ibid.
[1626] Andrea, 1972, 15-18 ; Queller and Madden, 1997, 74-6 ; Phillips, 2004, 116-18; Madden, 2005, 104-5.
[1627] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 140.
[1628] *The Registers*, 42-3. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 140-1.
[1629] Ibid., 43-4. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 141.
[1630] Ibid., 45.
[1631] Andrea, 1972, 18-9.

temperate, but he still rebuked the crusaders in that 'although you bore the Cross for Christ, you later turned your arms against Him, and you, who should have attacked the land of the Saracens, occupied Christian Zara'.[1632] The pope eventually granted absolution to the Franks, but he *did* expressly 'warn everyone in the host that you fully guard against similar actions in the future: neither invading nor violating the lands of Christians in any manner unless, perchance, they wickedly impede your journey or another just or necessary cause should, perhaps, arise, on account of which you would be empowered to act otherwise according to the guidance offered by the Apostolic See'.[1633] The papal orders were very clear.

New Dissension within the Crusade: *la boine acoison, li traitres,* and *li drois oirs*

In late December 1202, while the crusaders were wintering at Zara, they were approached by envoys from Philip of Swabia. The envoys delivered a proposal made jointly by Philip and Prince Alexios: if the crusade on its way to the East were to restore Alexios and his father Isaak to the throne of Byzantium, the patriarchate of Constantinople would be obliged to submit to the Roman Church, 200,000 silver marks would be given to the crusaders, and the Byzantines would supply the crusading army with food for an extra year. Moreover, Alexios would join the crusade on to its final destination, or would provide it with an army of ten thousand men, and, in addition, would maintain five hundred Byzantine troops in Palestine at his own expense for the duration of his life.[1634]

The Doge Dandolo and the crusading leaders called an assembly of the nobles and the prelates to discuss Alexios's proposal. As Villehardouin concedes, 'there was a great divergence of opinion in the assembly'.[1635] Both laymen and clerics, especially those of the order of Citeaux, were divided among themselves. Nevertheless, Gunther of Pairis, in chapter eight of his *Hystoria*, wants his audience to believe that 'the greater part (*maior pars*) of our [the crusading] army had already begun to lean in favour of the young man [Prince Alexios]' and only 'few' (*pauci*) opposed his proposal.[1636] In chapter eleven, the chronicler contradicts himself by reporting that 'it happened that all unanimously (*omnes unanimiter*) found in

[1632] *The Registers*, 46.
[1633] Ibid., 48.
[1634] Queller and Madden, 1997, 83.
[1635] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 51.
[1636] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 128; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 83.

favour of the young man'.[1637] The fact that Gunther minimises the size and determination of the opposition voices, only to eventually eliminate them, serves the author's apologetic purposes and highlights the need for researchers to be cautious when using the *Hystoria* as a source for the Fourth Crusade. Gunther's work should be treated as what it is: an apologia for the Latin conquest of Constantinople.

The party which opposed the diversion to Constantinople, the spokesperson of which was Abbot Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, 'declared they would never give their consent [to the plan], since it would mean marching against Christians',[1638] and insisted upon proceeding directly to Jerusalem. The ideal of Christian fraternity, an ideal that played a major role in preventing an attack against Constantinople during the previous crusades - *but* had lately failed to prevent a crusading attack on Zara - came to the fore once again. According to Gunther of Pairis's account, the party that opposed the diversion argued 'that in no way could the aforementioned youth [Prince Alexios] be reinstated without violence and bloodshed ... without a good deal of carnage *on one side and, possibly, on both*'.[1639] The party was not only concerned about the casualties that the crusading side might suffer in an attack on Constantinople; it also shrank from shedding Greek Christian blood.

Gunther informs us that those against the detour to Constantinople, being indifferent to Prince Alexios's cause, put forward a second argument in support of their position: 'it seemed to them foolish and wrong for a small band of pilgrims ... to forsake their intended holy pilgrimage and to declare war ... on such a city [Constantinople], so fortified and populous, in order to accommodate a stranger [Prince Alexios]'.[1640] The party in opposition to the diversion enjoyed the support of the rank and file crusaders, who, as the author of the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* records, 'gathered together and, after having made a compact, swore they would never go there [to Constantinople]'.[1641]

The faction that favoured Alexios's proposal seems to have also advanced two main arguments in support of its view: Alexios's promising material assistance which was very generous and highly needed for the success of the crusade, and the legitimacy of the prince's claim on the throne of Byzantium. As reported by Villehardouin, during the assembly of the leaders and prelates, those in favour of Prince Alexios highlighted the strategic importance of

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[1637] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 137; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 91.
[1638] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 51.
[1639] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 83. Emphasis added.
[1640] Ibid.
[1641] *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 216.

the Byzantine Empire for the recovery of Jerusalem. They claimed that 'only by way of Egypt and Greece can we hope to recover the land oversea'.[1642] The prelates of the faction - Abbot Simon of Loos was the most vociferous amongst them - exhorted the crusaders to 'accept the proposed agreement, because ... it offered the best chance of winning back the land oversea'.[1643] From their point of view, the installation of a Byzantine ruler who was prepared to maintain friendly relations with the crusaders and provide them with vital assistance for the Lord's War was fundamental to the success of the expedition.

The legitimacy of Alexios's claim on the Byzantine throne was advanced and underscored by both Philip of Swabia's embassy and the party that favoured the prince's cause. When the envoys from Philip came to Zara, they impressed upon the crusading leaders that, since the crusaders were 'on the march in the service of God, and for right and justice', they should therefore 'restore their possessions to those who have been wrongfully dispossessed',[1644] i.e. the deposed Isaak and his son Alexios. The envoys immediately proceeded to enumerate what the young prince had pledged himself to do, if the crusaders were 'to restore his inheritance to him'.[1645]

The view that Alexios III was an illegitimate and treacherous usurper while Prince Alexios was the legitimate heir to the Byzantine throne was shared by crusading nobles, prelates, and rank-and-file knights. Villehardouin, a member of the nobility, records that Alexios III had 'taken his brother prisoner and torn out his eyes, and by such treachery had made himself emperor in Isaak's place'.[1646] As related by the chronicler, the French barons who met with the envoys from young Alexios at Venice informed them that they 'will help him [Alexios] to regain his empire which ... has wrongfully been taken from him and his father'.[1647] In their letter to Western Europe, dated to late August 1203, the counts Baldwin of Flanders, Hugh of Saint Pol, and Louis of Blois denounced Alexios III as 'the exceedingly cruel usurper of his lord's throne', and 'the tyrant who, by committing parricide against a brother, had polluted the imperial high office, which he illegitimately held for so long'.[1648] Hugh of Saint Pol attempts to explain the motivations behind Alexios III's 'usurpation': 'due

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[1642] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 51.
[1643] Ibid., 50.
[1644] Ibid.
[1645] Ibid.
[1646] Ibid., 44.
[1647] Ibid., 45.
[1648] *The Registers*, 81-2.

to imperial ambition ... and, driven by avarice', he 'usurped and unjustly held ... [the Byzantine] throne'.[1649]

Prince Alexios's legitimacy was endorsed by those bishops in the crusading army who favoured the diversion to Constantinople – these appear to have been the majority of the prelates.[1650] According to Clari, when 'asked if it would be a sin to go there [to Constantinople]', 'the bishops replied, saying that it would not be a sin at all. Rather it would be a very charitable deed, since, as they had the rightful heir (*droit oir*) who had been disinherited, they could certainly help him to conquer his rights (*droit*)'.[1651] Clari himself, who gives the viewpoint of the lesser knights of the crusading army, asserts that Alexios III 'did ... treacherously (*par traïson*) seize him [Isaak] and put out his eyes'.[1652] In this way he 'betrayed [Isaak] ... and made himself emperor through treason (*par traïson*)'.[1653] As the chronicler affirms, Prince Alexios 'was more the rightful heir (*plus drois oirs*) than his uncle Alexios was'.[1654]

Clari's account not only manifests the extent of the Westerners' attachment to the principle of the *drois oirs*; it simultaneously provides us with valuable information on the rank-and-file version of events. Clari believed that the crusading leaders were the *first* to approach the young Alexios offering him their support to seize the Byzantine throne. As the chronicler records, since the crusaders 'had neither provisions nor money with which they could support themselves', Doge Dandolo stated that 'in Greece [i.e. the Byzantine Empire] there is a very rich land, very well supplied; if we could find a reasonable excuse (*raisnaule acoison*) to go there and to take provisions ... we could surely go to the Holy Land'.[1655] Boniface of Montferrat is portrayed as replying that when he was at Philip of Swabia's court, he met Prince Alexios, 'the son of the emperor Isaak of Constantinople, whose brother had treacherously (*par traïson*) stolen the empire from him. Whoever could have this young man on his side ... could surely go the land of Constantinople and take stores and anything else, for the young man is the rightful heir (*drois oirs*)'.[1656] After Boniface illustrated 'that whoever held the youth ... would have a good reason (*boine acoison*) to go to Constantinople and

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[1649] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 187-8.
[1650] Daly, 1960, 86-7; Queller and Madden, 1997, 87.
[1651] Clari, *Conquête*, 48-9.
[1652] Ibid., 36-7.
[1653] Ibid.
[1654] Ibid.
[1655] Ibid., 20-1.
[1656] Ibid.

reprovision',[1657] the crusading leaders, 'on the advice of the Marquis',[1658] dispatched an embassy to the court of Philip of Swabia. The envoys 'informed him [Prince Alexios] that they [the crusaders] would help him conquer what was rightfully his (*sen droit*)'.[1659] The young 'was very happy' and 'said that he would take advice from the emperor [Philip of Swabia] ... When the emperor heard him, he answered the young man that a stroke of luck had come his way; he ... told him that he would never win any of his inheritance (*sen hyretage*) except with the help of God and the crusaders'.[1660] Alexios accepted the crusaders' proposal and made his way to their camp. Subsequently, all the crusading barons and the Venetians assembled and the Doge Dandolo declared that 'now we have found a reason to go to Constantinople, if you approve; for we have the true heir (*droit oir*)'.[1661] From the perspective of the poor knight in the ranks of the army, Prince Alexios's legitimacy, which is of course unquestioned, provided Doge Dandolo and Boniface of Montferrat the *boine acoison* they sought to go to Constantinople.

Robert portrays Boniface of Montferrat as making 'greater efforts than anyone else ... to go to Constantinople, because he wanted to avenge an injury which the Emperor [Alexios III] ... had done him'.[1662] The chronicler undertakes in a digression to 'tell you about the wrong for which the marquis hated the Emperor of Constantinople'.[1663] The story, recorded by Clari, is based on historical facts that took place in the Byzantine Empire in 1187. These facts, however, are interwoven with fiction in the chronicler's account. In order to distinguish between fact and fiction in Robert's story, we first have to consider Choniates's authoritative account of the 1187 events in the Byzantine Empire.

In 1187, Constantinople was being besieged by the Byzantine general Alexios Branas, who was making his bid for the imperial throne. Boniface's brother, Conrad of Montferrat, was in the imperial capital in the service of Isaak II. Choniates criticises Isaak because he 'neglected to make preparations for battle, resting all his hopes on the panoply of the Spirit' and 'prayed ... to God ... not to allow the sovereignty to pass over, or to fly off, to another'.[1664]

[1657] Ibid., 37.
[1658] Ibid.
[1659] Ibid.
[1660] Ibid., 37-9.
[1661] Ibid., 39.
[1662] Ibid., 41.
[1663] Ibid.
[1664] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 210.

Conrad, however, 'would often awake him [Isaak] from sleep and prod him to rise up'.[1665] Isaak finally 'woke from his torpor, threw off his apathy, and began to collect an auxiliary force'.[1666] When the imperial army finally arrayed outside Constantinople, the emperor was in command of the right wing, Manuel Kamytzes of the left, and Conrad of the centre which was composed of both infantry and cavalry 'gathered from among the Latins in the City'.[1667] Conrad and his Latins were the first to attack and defeated and killed Branas.[1668] However, in Constantinople, the marquis did not receive the privileges that he considered befitted his status and that of his imperial marital connection - he was in fact brother-in-law of the emperor - and, therefore, set sail for Palestine.[1669]

Let us, now, consider Clari's version. In his account, Branas 'had besieged the emperor in Constantinople, so that the emperor did not dare go out of the city'.[1670] Conrad 'asked how it came about that the other [Branas] had besieged him [the emperor] so closely nor did the emperor dare to fight against him'.[1671] At the request of the marquis, 'the emperor summoned all the Latins in the city ... [and] commanded that they should all arm themselves'.[1672] It was agreed that, in the battle against Branas, Conrad and the Latins were to take the vanguard while the emperor and 'his own people' would follow behind. However, 'as soon as the marquis was outside the gate with all his squadron, the emperor turned back and had the gate shut behind him';[1673] obviously, this is an imaginative addition to the story. Although in the battle that followed Conrad and the Latins defeated Branas, the Byzantine emperor is denounced as *li traitres* (traitor)[1674] for shutting the gate behind the Latins. To add to his perfidy, 'shortly after [the incident] the emperor and his traitors (*traiteur*) plotted a great act of treachery (*grant traïson*) because he wanted to have the marquis killed'.[1675] However, always according to Clari, an old man informed Conrad of the *grant traïson*, thus saving the life of the marquis, who immediately fled from Constantinople. That the Byzantine emperor wanted to kill Conrad is another fictitious addition to the story. What is most interesting is that,

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[1665] Ibid.
[1666] Ibid.
[1667] Ibid., 211.
[1668] Ibid., 212-13.
[1669] Ibid., 217.
[1670] Clari, *Conquête*, 41.
[1671] Ibid.
[1672] Ibid.
[1673] Ibid.
[1674] Ibid., 43.
[1675] Ibid.

according to Clari's account, the emperor of Constantinople at the time was Alexios III. This is not due to a mistake by the chronicler, as scholars often assume.[1676] Clari must have heard his version of Branas's rebellion from Latin inhabitants of Constantinople. It should be noted that a quite similar version of the story is found in the Lyon version of the Old French Continuation of William of Tyre,[1677] which was composed in the Latin East and reached its present form in the 1240s if not later.[1678] This suggests that, according to various versions of a myth circulating in the East and accepted by the Latins leaving there, Alexios was emperor at the time of Branas's revolt, and he subsequently decided to eliminate Conrad.

By incorporating the story about the 'injury' that Alexios had done Boniface, Clari aimed, first, to demonstrate why the marquis allegedly hated Alexios III and passionately advocated the detour to Constantinople; secondly, to further highlight Alexios III's treacherous nature; and thirdly, to stress the military capacity and bravery of Conrad and the Latins, as opposed to the inability and cowardice of the Byzantine emperor and his men. Although Clari's belief that Dandolo and particularly Boniface endeavoured to find a *raisnaule acoison* to divert the crusade to Constantinople is mistaken, the chronicler's account furnishes us with interesting insights into how a member of the rank and file, which depended on rumours and gossip for information, perceived and explained the detour to Constantinople.

The perceived illegitimacy of Alexios III as opposed to Prince Alexios's legitimacy was soon to be stressed by Western non-participants in the Fourth Crusade. Robert of Auxerre relates that Alexios III 'was so puffed up that he did not accept to be inferior to his brother in political power'.[1679] Since he desired for himself 'the privilege of the crown and the title of the [imperial] office', and 'stirred up by envy', Alexios 'rebelled against his brother and lord', and having deposed Isaak, 'he disgracefully usurps the title of the emperor'.[1680] The Byzantine ruler is denounced by Robert as 'the most worthless murderer',[1681] a 'wicked traitor and tyrant'.[1682] Ralph of Coggeshall describes Alexios III as a 'false emperor, who has iniquitously blinded his own brother, Emperor Kirisak [*sic*]'.[1683] Gunther of Pairis does not fail to describe, in his verse chapters, Prince Alexios as 'the kingdom's legitimate heir' (*legittimum regni*

[1676] Ibid., 137, n. 56; Phillips, 2004, 132.
[1677] Translated in Edbury, 1996, 23-4, 51-2.
[1678] Edbury, 1996, 3-7.
[1679] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 265.
[1680] Ibid.
[1681] Ibid.
[1682] Ibid., 266.
[1683] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicle*, 283 [Кут Isaak].

heredem)[1684] and Alexios III as 'the usurper who sat upon his brother's throne'.[1685] Poem twelve of his *Historia*, however, is a vehemently hostile diatribe against Alexios III, combining invective address with rhetorical questions. Gunther's classical Latin background and rhetorical training is clearly reflected in the poem:

> What are you doing, you coward, king most undeserving of *regalia*?
> What are you doing, you subverter of laws, basest of kings,
> Oppressor of rights? Now and in the future
> A despised name, a polluted token of a name!
> You have the name Alexios, you filthy disease on humanity,
> ... a deceitful man full of tricks.
> ... so debased, so horrid,
> ... who perpetrated such a crime,
> Who blinded a brother, who consecrated to yourself a brother's *regalia*.[1686]

As has been seen in previous chapters, the usurpation of the imperial power was nothing new in the long history of the Byzantine Empire. The contemporary Byzantine Niketas Choniates refers to 'the Roman emperors' frequent practice of ascending the throne through murder and bloodshed'.[1687] However, what was considered fully legitimate in Byzantium constituted betrayal for the Westerners. From a feudal, Latin perspective, a potentate derived his legitimacy from his physical descent. Thus, the usurpation of the throne was perceived by the Westerners as treason, a disturbance of the natural order of things. To Western minds, by installing 'the legitimate heir' on his throne, the crusaders would restore order and justice and perform a chivalrous deed.[1688]

It is worth mentioning that Clari asserts that Alexios III blinded Isaak and 'put him in prison without anyone knowing anything about it ... In this way he led them to believe that his brother was dead, and had himself crowned emperor by force'.[1689] Clari's allegation that Alexios concealed Isaak's imprisonment and propagated instead his death is inaccurate and reflects a typically Western perception of a monarch's accession to the throne. For Westerners, a new ruler succeeded naturally to the throne if the previous one was dead. This perception never prevailed in Byzantium. A successful coup proclaimed its own legitimacy, and therefore

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[1684] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 137; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 90.
[1685] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 93.
[1686] Ibid.
[1687] Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 246; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 139. '*τὸ διὰ φόνων ἀεὶ καὶ προχύσεως αἵματος τοὺς πλείους τῶν βασιλέων τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς ἐπιβαίνειν ἀρχῆς*'.
[1688] Phillips, 2004, 134; Madden, 2005, 106.
[1689] Clari, *Conquête*, 37.

Alexios did not need to pretend that Isaak had died to justify his accession to the throne. Furthermore, the fact that Isaak was still alive did not undermine Alexios's legitimacy as emperor. Emperors who were deposed in coups were not always killed. Some of them retired into monasteries while others suffered mutilation. Isaak was not considered to constitute a threat to Alexios's throne. He had significant freedom and people were able to visit him safely.[1690] We can therefore conclude that Clari's perception of Byzantium is guided, or rather misguided, by his particularly Western viewpoint.

The debate between those in the crusading army in support of the detour to Constantinople and those who opposed it was heated. Despite the general opposition, twelve of the leading barons – including Boniface of Montferrat, Baldwin of Flanders, Louis of Blois, and Hugh of Saint Pol – finally accepted Prince Alexios's terms and signed a treaty with him.[1691] Despite the fact that the treaty was confirmed, Villehardouin 'can assure you that the hearts of our people were not at peace',[1692] since the opposition to the detour to Constantinople remained stubbornly strong. Hundreds left the crusade either to make their own way to Palestine or to return home.[1693] 'Our forces dwindled seriously from day to day',[1694] records Villehardouin. The crusade was soon to suffer another terrible blow. The Flemish fleet under John of Nesles, which was to rendezvous with the main crusading army, when informed of the plan to stop off at Constantinople, strongly disapproved and sailed directly to Palestine.[1695] The majority of the Western crusaders were bitterly opposed to the idea of a diversion of the crusade. However, even those who supported the plan did not do so out of hatred for the Byzantines. They did not consider themselves to be directing against the Greeks but against Alexios III, the perceived illegitimate usurper of the Byzantine throne. Their only plan was to reinstate the legitimate ruler, whose arrival at Constantinople, according to 'believable rumours and arguments ... the stronger city faction (and the bulk of the empire) longed for'.[1696]

On 20 April 1203 the main crusading fleet sailed from Zara to the Byzantine island of Corfu, while Boniface and Dandolo stayed behind to await Prince Alexios. The young prince arrived on 25 April and those crusaders who had remained at Zara set sail to rejoin the rest of the army. Alexios was received with great honour and his tent was raised in the middle of the

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[1690] Queller and Madden, 1997, 34; Robertou tou Klari, 1990, 77-8, n. 193;
[1691] Phillips, 2004, 133-4; Madden, 2005, 106.
[1692] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 52.
[1693] Madden, 2005, 106.
[1694] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 52.
[1695] Ibid., 52-3.
[1696] *The Registers*, 81. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 153.

crusading army. Nevertheless, a new conflict over the Constantinopolitan plan soon erupted among the host. A large number of crusaders - among them a group of senior French nobles – declared once more their opposition to the detour to Constantinople.[1697] In his letter to R. of Balues, Hugh of Saint Pol related that 'a good deal of disagreement was engendered in our army, and there was an enormous uproar and grumbling'.[1698] As Hugh admitted, 'everyone was shouting that we should make haste for Acre, and there were not more than ten who spoke in favour of the journey to Constantinople'.[1699] The diversion to the Byzantine capital was still far from acceptable to the majority of the crusaders.

As reported by Clari, those crusaders 'who were not at all in agreement with going to Constantinople' declared amongst others: 'we have our pilgrimage to complete and also we intended to go to Cairo or Alexandria'.[1700] The faction in support of the diversion resorted to the argument that the crusaders lacked money and supplies and therefore could not sail to Egypt or Palestine. According to Clari, the party declared:

> what will we do in Cairo or Alexandria, when we have no supplies or money to go there? Much better before going there [to Egypt], to get supplies and money on reasonable grounds than to go there to die of hunger. Then we will be able to do something, and he [Prince Alexios] is offering to accompany us, to support our navy and our fleet for another year at his expense.[1701]

Clari's testimony is corroborated by the two baronial letters sent to the West in late August 1203. In his letter to R. of Balues, Hugh of Saint Pol related that the faction favouring the Constantinopolitan plan 'clearly demonstrated to the entire army that the journey to Jerusalem was fruitless and injurious for everyone, insofar as they were destitute and low on provisions, and no one among them could retain the services of the knights and pay the men-at-arms'.[1702] Similarly, in their letter to Innocent, the counts Baldwin of Flanders, Hugh of Saint Pol, and Louis of Blois claimed that 'lacking all foodstuffs and supplies, we appeared to be bearing a burden to the Holy Land ... rather than bringing some sort of aid, and ... we did not believe that, given such extreme poverty, we could effectively land in the territory of the

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[1697] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 55-6; Clari, *Conquête*, 39-41. Cf. Queller and Madden, 1997, 97-9; Phillips, 2004, 137-41.
[1698] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 188.
[1699] Ibid.
[1700] Clari, *Conquête*, 39-41.
[1701] Ibid.
[1702] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 188-9.

Saracens'.[1703] This argument was the strongest weapon of the faction in support of the diversion and seems to have gained credence amongst Western authors non-participant in the expedition. In a nice rhetorical flourish Robert of Auxerre records that the crusaders had to accept Alexios's proposal 'because a great number of people among them, being oppressed by poverty, would rather inflict trouble than bring help to the Holy Land (*gravamen essent potius illaturi quam allaturi subsidium*)'.[1704]

It is significant to point out that the party that favoured Alexios's proposal does not seem to have especially advanced the argument that the Church of Constantinople would submit to that of Rome to support its view. As has been demonstrated, the main arguments put forward were the need for Alexios's promised assistance and the legitimacy of the pretender. Schmandt's thesis that a 'major factor of a religious nature counted for much with the crusaders at this point of the expedition'[1705] is not valid. To support his claim the same scholar used Gunther's account. Not being an eyewitness and writing with hindsight in a very sophisticated style, Gunther in fact identifies five reasons for the acceptance of Alexios's proposition. Two of them are those mentioned in the other sources examined: 'it seemed to them [the crusaders] right ... to restore the kingdom's legitimate heir to his throne, from which he had been cruelly deposed; then also ... if he were restored, he would be able, both then and afterward, to offer significant assistance to all pilgrims'.[1706] The other reasons identified by the chronicler are 'the influence of King Philip [of Swabia]', Venetian greed for money and 'sovereign mastery over that entire sea',[1707] and, what is of utmost importance for our research, 'that this very city [Constantinople] was rebellious and offensive (*rebellis et odiosa*) to the Holy Roman Church'.[1708] Gunther's latter statement should by no means be taken at face value. It represents his own perception of Constantinople rather than being a factor that influenced the crusaders' decision to adopt Alexios's scheme. Proclamations, or more aptly propaganda, portraying Constantinople as *rebellis et odiosa* to the Roman Church, were only much later issued to justify the second crusading attack against Constantinople.

[1703] *The Registers*, 81.
[1704] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 265-6.
[1705] R. H. Schmandt, 'The Fourth Crusade and the Just War Theory', *Catholic Historical Review*, 61 (1975), 211.
[1706] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 90.
[1707] Several scholars have similarly blamed Venice for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade. The most vociferous amongst them is Donald M. Nicol. See D. M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), 119-20, 127, 134-6. However, Donald E. Queller, Gerald W. Day, and Thomas F. Madden have convincingly argued against this view. See Queller and Day, 1976, 717-37; Queller and Madden, 1992, 433-73.
[1708] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 137; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 90-1.

Schmandt's thesis that the young Alexios's promise to 'place his whole empire under the authority of Rome'[1709] 'undoubtedly had a powerful appeal'[1710] to the average crusader, the leaders, and the clergy is also not adequately supported by the evidence. The prelates viewed the detour to Constantinople as 'a very charitable deed' because they would assist the *droit oir* 'to conquer his rights'. No mention of the submission of the Church of Constantinople to that of Rome was made. As to the leaders and lesser knights, they do not seem to have particularly cared about the submission of the Church of Constantinople to that of Rome. After all, in their eyes, the Greeks were Christians. To support his view Schmandt used only one source, Hugh of Saint Pol's letter, in which the count reported that 'the chief reason why we captured Constantinople' was 'that the Eastern Church (whose head is Constantinople), along with the emperor and his entire empire, reunited with its head, the Roman Pontiff (as was the case in antiquity), acknowledges itself to be the daughter of the Roman Church'.[1711] This, however, is not enough evidence to back Schmandt's thesis. As Andrea correctly pointed out, 'Hugh's letters were aimed at marshaling approval in the West for the crusaders' actions at Constantinople'.[1712] Hugh's adoption of the reformers' language – undoubtedly the workmanship of a learned cleric in the crusading army - is a clear indication of the propagandistic intention of his letter rather than of the fact that the promised submission of the Church of Constantinople had a strong appeal to all the crusaders, as Schmandt maintains. It is critical to stress that Clari does not make even a passing reference to the submission of the Eastern Church to the Western, when enumerating what Prince Alexios promised the crusaders in return for restoring him to the throne. The chronicler, as well as the majority of the crusaders, must have been ignorant of this stipulation of the treaty between Prince Alexios and the crusading leaders.

Despite all the efforts of the faction in favour of the Constantinopolitan adventure, the majority of the crusaders withdrew from the camp and announced that they would stay behind at Corfu and arrange transportation to the Holy Land. Only after Boniface, Baldwin, Louis and Hugh threw themselves at the feet of their fellow-crusaders weeping and begging them not to abandon the army, did the dissidents agree to stay with the army until 29 September 1203.[1713]

[1709] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 50.
[1710] Schmandt, 1975, 212.
[1711] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 199-200.
[1712] Ibid., 179.
[1713] Queller and Madden, 1997, 98; Phillips, 2004, 139; Daly, 1960, 87.

The crusaders' stay on Corfu was not without further incidents. Relations between the Greeks of the island and the crusaders were initially good, but, upon being asked to acknowledge young Alexios's authority, the inhabitants attacked the Venetian fleet. The crusaders responded by laying waste part of the island.[1714] The fact that the incident is mentioned only by one account, which is not eyewitness, suggests that the conflict was not significant. However, it was both a clear manifestation of the Byzantines' opposition to their 'rightful' emperor's authority and a bad omen for the reception of young Alexios in Constantinople. Claims of 'rightful inheritance' did not appeal to the Byzantines. The young pretender had to fight his way to the throne as several previous pretenders had done. I would not, therefore, go so far as Queller and Madden, who argue that 'in this conflict ... the historian ... can easily discern the real depth of the bitterness between East and West and the hostility that any Latin-supported pretender would enkindle among some Byzantines'.[1715] Prince Alexios could have met with the opposition of the inhabitants of Corfu even if he had not had Latin support. The opposition was against young Alexios's authority, not against the Latins. The crusaders were well-received on Corfu at first. Conflict broke out only when Prince Alexios as 'the heir of the king of the Greeks'[1716] advanced claims on the island.

It is also worthwhile to note here that while the crusaders were tarrying on Corfu, the archbishop of the island invited some of the Latin prelates for lunch. As the anonymous author of Halberstadt records, 'they debated among themselves and especially disagreed over the issue of the primacy of the Roman See'.[1717] The Greek archbishop commented sarcastically that 'he knew of no other basis for the Roman See's primacy or preference other than the fact that Roman soldiers had crucified Christ'.[1718] As this episode reveals, the papal claims of primacy over the Byzantine Church remained the main obstacle to the relations between the Eastern and Western Church. Further, as Queller and Madden rightly remark, the incident on Corfu demonstrates that the Byzantine Church was not prepared to 'accept the submission to the pope that Alexios ... had so glibly promised'.[1719]

The crusading army finally left Corfu on 24 May 1203. The open dissension within the army, the Byzantines' unwillingness to submit to their 'rightful' emperor, and the Byzantine

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[1714] *Deeds of the Bishops of Halberstadt*, 254.
[1715] Queller and Madden, 1997, 97.
[1716] *Deeds of the Bishops of Halberstadt*, 254.
[1717] Ibid.
[1718] Ibid.
[1719] Queller and Madden, 1997, 97.

clergy's refusal to accept papal primacy over their church did not bode well for the crusade's future.

The Crusaders at Constantinople: First Siege

While the crusading fleet was en route to the Byzantine capital, back in Rome Innocent had already been informed of the crusaders' decision to help Prince Alexios to the throne. The pope must have been bitterly disappointed with the crusaders' ongoing disobedience to his commands. In March 1202 he had expressly forbidden the leader of the crusade to help Alexios and in January or early February 1203, following the capture of Zara, he had warned the crusaders not to attack Christian territory again. Close to 20 June 1203 Innocent wrote another letter to the army, in which he explicitly warned the crusaders that

> not one of you should rashly flatter himself that he is allowed to attack or pillage the land of the Greeks because it might be too little obedient (*minus subiecta*) to the Apostolic See and because the emperor of Constantinople usurped the empire by deposing and also blinding his brother. Truly, however much so this same emperor and the people committed to his jurisdiction did wrong in this or other matters, it is still not your business to judge their crimes.[1720]

Innocent was very clear. His letter aimed at refuting a potential argument that action against the Byzantines was legitimate since the Church of Constantinople was disobedient to that of Rome. Similarly, the oft-repeated and telling argument that the diversion was 'a very charitable deed' because it would install the 'rightful heir' on the Byzantine throne was severely undermined and negated by the papal letter. Innocent declared to the army that 'it was not for this, in order to avenge this injury [Isaak's deposition and blinding], that you assumed the emblem of the Cross, but rather to avenge the dishonour done the Crucified One, to whose service you have specially appointed yourselves'.[1721] Further, the pope reminded the Westerners that the Muslims were their enemies while the Byzantines were their Christian brethren: the crusaders were exhorted to 'sail across in aid of the Holy Land and avenge the injury done to the Cross, taking from the spoils of the *enemy* those items that, if you were to tarry in the regions of Romania, you might perhaps need to wrest from *brothers* (*a*

[1720] *Die Register*, VI, 164; *The Registers*, 62-3. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 152. I made changes in Andrea's translation.
[1721] *The Registers*, 63.

fratribus)'.[1722] Innocent concluded his letter by reminding the crusaders of his earlier prohibition against invading or violating lands of Christians under the ban of excommunication, and 'warn [them] ... not to contravene this prohibition lightly'.[1723]

In a letter that the pope wrote at about the same time, i.e. around 20 June 1203, he informed the crusaders that if they lacked provisions, he would 'write to our beloved son in Christ, the emperor of Constantinople, that ... he make sure that food is supplied you'.[1724] Believing that at last Alexios III would be shamed into supporting the papal eastern expedition, Innocent made it clear to his soldiers that he considered the Byzantine emperor as an ally Christian prince. Therefore the crusading army should not direct against him. It was too late, however. While the papal letters were being composed, the crusade ships were sailing through the Sea of Marmara.

On 23 June 1203 the crusade fleet entered the Bosporus. The crusaders were stunned at the sight of Constantinople. The glamorous image of the Byzantine imperial capital had never failed to impress Western visitors to the city. The French cleric and chronicler of the First Crusade, Fulcher of Chartres, who arrived in Constantinople in 1097, had recorded:

> Oh what a noble and beautiful city ... How many monasteries and palaces it contains, constructed with wonderful skill! How many remarkable things may be seen in the principal avenues and even in the lesser streets! It would be very tedious to enumerate the wealth that is there of every kind, of gold, of silver, or robes of many kinds, and of holy relics.[1725]

As in the case of Fulcher, both Villehardouin and Clari, our two main chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade, were deeply impressed by the imperial capital and continually refer to its size and wealth, its walls and towers, its palaces and churches. Villehardouin

> can assure you that all those who had never seen Constantinople before gazed very intently at the city, having never imagined there could be so fine a place in all the world. They noted the high walls and lofty towers encircling it, and its rich palaces and tall churches, of which there were so many that no one would have believed it to be true if he had not seen it with his own eyes, and viewed the length and breadth of that city which reigns supreme over all others.[1726]

[1722] Ibid.; *Die Register*, VI, 165. Emphasis added.
[1723] *The Registers*, 63.
[1724] Ibid., 67.
[1725] Fulcher of Chartres, *Expedition*, 79.
[1726] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 58-9.

This extract from Villehardouin is characteristic of the awe and admiration felt by the crusaders at the first sight of Constantinople, and reflects the prominent place occupied by the imperial city among all other cities in Western consciousness. By medieval standards the size of Constantinople was immense. In the twelfth century there was little in Rome to recall its former glory; large parts within its walls had been abandoned. At the same time, Paris and London were still just towns of moderate size and their populations were not more than twenty thousand. Constantinople, by contrast, had, at a conservative estimate, 375,000 inhabitants, i.e. almost twenty times the size of London and Paris. Moreover the people living within its walls in 1050 are estimated to have outnumbered the entire population of the kingdom of England.[1727]

The crusaders disembarked on 24 June at Chalcedon, on the opposite side of the Bosporus from the imperial city. Two days later they marched north to Scutari, where they encamped waiting for the Byzantines to rise in rebellion, depose the usurper, and welcome their 'rightful heir'.[1728] They were soon to be disappointed. In his letter dispatched to the West, Hugh of Saint Pol recorded that the crusaders 'were stunned, very much astonished that none of the friends or family of the young man [Alexios] ... or any messenger of theirs came to him'.[1729] In their letter to Innocent, Baldwin, Hugh and Louis informed the pope that 'contrary to the opinion of all, we discovered the minds of all the citizens firmly set against us and, likewise, the city closed off to its lord by walls and war machines'.[1730]

As in the case of Isaak II and Patriarch Dositheos during the crusade of Frederick I, Alexios III had engaged in a propaganda campaign demonising the crusaders. According to Baldwin, Hugh and Louis, 'having ... called an abominable meeting with the people, [Alexios III] infected both the aristocrats and the plebs with venomous harangues to the point that he asserted the Latins had come to destroy their ancient liberty, and they were hastening to return the place and its people to the Roman Pontiff and to subjugate the empire to the laws of the Latins'.[1731] Alexios's propaganda strategy was effective. Having adroitly exploited the Byzantines' values and religious sentiments, the ruler succeeded in fuelling the fires of prejudice and hatred against the Latins. The three Latin nobles complained bitterly that, at the

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[1727] Harris, 2003, 5.
[1728] Madden, 2005, 107.
[1729] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 190.
[1730] *The Registers*, 82. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 153-4.
[1731] Ibid.

sight of the crusaders, the Byzantines had reacted 'as though an infidel people (*populus infidelis*), who proposed to despoil the sacred places and inexorably eradicate the Christian religion, had drawn near'.[1732]

On 1 July Latin and Byzantine forces engaged in their first military conflict. The Greeks were routed. The following day, Alexios III sent an ambassador to the crusaders. Pretending ignorance of the Westerners' intentions, the emperor enquired 'why, and for what purpose, ... [the crusaders] have entered this land over which he rules'.[1733] As in his earlier correspondence with Innocent, Alexios appealed to the Westerners' sense of Christian brotherhood in order to shame them into withdrawing from his empire. As reported by Villehardouin, the imperial ambassador declared to the crusaders that 'you are Christians just as he [Alexios III] is, and he knows very well that you have left your own country to deliver the Holy Land oversea, and the Holy Cross and Sepulchre'.[1734] Further, the imperial envoy attempted to entice the Westerners to withdraw by notifying them that 'if you are poor and in want of supplies, he [Alexios III] will give you a share of his provisions and his money'.[1735] The message concluded with a thinly disguised threat: 'if you refuse to leave, he [Alexios] would be reluctant to do you harm, yet it is in his power to do so ... you would not, supposing he chose to harm you, be able to leave this country without losing many of your men and suffering defeat'.[1736]

The crusaders' reply to the imperial envoy, presented by Conon of Béthune, gives us significant insight into the Western view of the legitimacy of a sovereign. To Alexios III's enquiry as to why the crusading host had entered his empire, the crusaders' 'answer is that we have not entered *his* dominions, since he has wrongfully taken possession of this land, in defiance of God, and of right and justice. It belongs to his nephew [the Prince Alexios], ... the Emperor Isaak's son'.[1737] The crusaders eventually invited Alexios III to abdicate the throne in favour of the Prince Alexios; otherwise, they would be obliged to resort to force.

The episode of the arrival of the Byzantine envoy at the crusading camp and the subsequent conversation with the leaders appear to have soon leaked out to the rank and file. Robert's account largely squares with that of Villehardouin. As the chronicler recounts,

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[1732] Ibid.; *Die Register*, VI, 359.
[1733] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 63.
[1734] Ibid.
[1735] Ibid.
[1736] Ibid.
[1737] Ibid. Emphasis added.

Alexios III 'sent loyal messengers to enquire what they [the crusaders] sought there and why they had come'.[1738] Clari has Alexios's envoys declare that if the crusaders 'wanted some of his [the emperor's] gold or silver, he would send it to them very willingly'.[1739] Rejecting Alexios's 'gold and silver', the leaders stated that 'they wanted the emperor to abdicate from the empire, as he was not holding it legitimately nor fairly (*mie a droit ne loiaument*), and they informed him that they had the rightful heir (*le droit oir*) with them, Alexios, the son of the Emperor Isaak'.[1740]

Alexios III's embassy seems to have convinced the leaders that the Byzantine ruler had been unaware of the reason of the crusaders' detour to Constantinople. If the emperor himself was ignorant, let alone his subjects.[1741] Judging, or rather misjudging, the situation by feudal standards, the Westerners still believed sincerely that once the common Byzantine people saw their 'rightful lord', they would enthusiastically welcome him and topple the usurper. Therefore, they decided to take Prince Alexios on a galley and row close to the city walls. Villehardouin records that, while parading the young man, the crusaders reassured the Byzantines that they had travelled to Constantinople not to do them harm, but to 'guard and defend' them.[1742] Most importantly, the crusaders instructed the Constantinopolitans in the legitimacy of the young Alexios and the illegitimacy of Alexios III, as these were, of course, viewed through Western feudal eyes. They presented the prince to the populace as both their *seignor naturel*[1743] ('natural lord') and *drois oirs*[1744] ('rightful heir'), while declaring that Alexios III 'rules over you without just or fair claim to be your Emperor, in defiance of God and the right. You know very well how treacherously he has acted towards the man who is his lord and his brother, putting out his eyes and wickedly and wrongfully taking his empire from him'.[1745]

The display of Prince Alexios did not yield the desired result. The crusaders' proclamations of Prince Alexios's rightfulness met with the complete indifference of the inhabitants of Constantinople. According to Clari, the Constantinopolitans stated 'that they did not recognise him [Prince Alexios] as their lord and that they did not know who he was. ...

[1738] Clari, *Conquête*, 51.
[1739] Ibid.
[1740] Ibid.
[1741] Queller and Madden, 1997, 113.
[1742] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 64.
[1743] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 146.
[1744] Ibid., 148.
[1745] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 64.

they knew nothing about him'.[1746] In an attempt to explain why 'not a single man ... dared show himself on the young prince's side',[1747] Villehardouin argues that the Byzantines feared Alexios III. His claim, however, is unfounded. The Western noble had failed to appreciate that the Constantinopolitans' apathy was due to the fact that the Western feudalistic principles of the *seignor naturel* and *drois oirs* had no substance in Byzantium and did not appeal to the Byzantines. For them, a usurper emperor was fully legitimate, while an overthrown emperor or his descendants had no legal rights to the imperial throne.

The crusaders had travelled to Constantinople under the illusion that they would be received as friends while their protégé would be eagerly welcomed by the Byzantines as their 'rightful' emperor. However, their hopes that the young Alexios would be installed on the throne without resort to military action soon faded away. The only option remaining was war. An attack on Constantinople was a highly dangerous undertaking. The size and fortifications of the Byzantine capital inspired fear in the Western crusaders. Constantinople had been impregnable for centuries. Its walls were far more imposing than any Westerner could have hitherto imagined. The land-walls, stretching from the Golden Horn to the Sea of Marmara, were about nine metres high and four and a half metres thick, and reinforced with ninety-six huge towers. Therefore, an assault by land was daunting, but equally intimidating was an attack by sea because of the city's sea-walls. Any would-be attackers of Constantinople were faced with the fact that since its foundation the city had never fallen to its attackers, but rather had successfully repelled all such attempts.[1748]

The fear that the crusaders felt at the sight of the great fortifications of the imperial city is conveyed by Villehardouin, who admits that 'there was indeed no man so brave and daring that his flesh did not shudder at the sight [of the size and strong fortifications of Constantinople][1749] [...] it was a sight to fill the heart with pride and apprehension'.[1750] Nevertheless, the crusading leadership decided that on 5 July the army would cross the Bosporus and land at Galata at the northern shore of the Golden Horn. This huge inlet, on the south shore of which lies Constantinople, was the imperial city's main port. As Philips argues, this undertaking of the crusaders was 'the largest amphibious invasion yet attempted in

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[1746] Clari, *Conquête*, 51.
[1747] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 64.
[1748] Harris, 2003, 4-5.
[1749] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 59.
[1750] Ibid., 68.

medieval Europe'.[1751] The Westerners were indeed well-aware of the dangers involved. Villehardouin 'can assure you, [that it was] one of the most formidable enterprises ever to be undertaken'.[1752] Clari records that the Western knights 'all made confession and took communion', because, as confessed by the same chronicler, 'they were greatly afraid of landing on the Constantinople side'.[1753]

On 5 July the crusading army successfully crossed the Bosporus and landed at Galata. The following day the crusaders captured the tower of Galata and the chain stretching across the entrance of the Golden Horn was uncoupled. The port of Constantinople was subsequently occupied by the Venetians. On 17 July the Venetian fleet attacked the sea-walls along the Golden Horn, while the crusading army made an assault on a section of the land walls, which was easily fended off by the city's defenders. Alexios III finally led his army out against the crusaders. The Westerners were heavily outnumbered by the imperial army.[1754] With a propensity for exaggeration, Villehardouin avows that 'so many men came streaming out [of the gates of Constantinople] that you would have thought the whole world was there assembled'.[1755] Nevertheless, despite his massive numerical superiority, Alexios III and his army finally withdrew to Constantinople and the battle was avoided.

The emperor's retreat came as a complete surprise to the crusaders. In their letter to Innocent, Baldwin, Louis and Hugh contemptuously recounted that Alexios III 'ignominiously turns his reins and retreats'.[1756] In his letter to R. de Balues, Hugh asserted that 'when they [the Byzantines] saw that we were brave and steadfast ... they rightly became terrified and confused'.[1757] From his monastery at Auxerre, Robert related that 'the tyrant [Alexios III] with his men, so much astonished at the boldness of our men, [and] terrified by divine influence, immediately fled back'.[1758] The vehement Gunther of Pairis records that 'hardly had he [Alexios III] tested the military prowess of our people in a brief battle, when he shamefully turned to flight, distrusting his cause and the cowardice of his companions'.[1759] Going a step further, the chronicler claims that Alexios 'did not deem [his companions] sufficiently loyal

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[1751] Phillips, 2004, 166.
[1752] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 65.
[1753] Clari, *Conquête*, 51.
[1754] Queller and Madden, 1997, 114-25 ; Phillips, 2004, 166-77.
[1755] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 72.
[1756] *The Registers*, 83.
[1757] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 197.
[1758] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 266.
[1759] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 93.

(*fidos*) to himself because of the disgraceful acts (*flagicia*) he had committed'.[1760] In Western imagination, Alexios's blinding of his brother and usurpation of the throne sufficed to deprive the emperor of the loyalty of his subjects. This view was based on a Western misconception. A Byzantine ruler was never judged by his people on the means of his accession to the throne, but on the effectiveness of his government. Besides, in Byzantium, if an individual had been successful in usurping the imperial throne, his success was perceived as a sign of divine approval.[1761]

The Westerners were not alone in censuring Alexios for his retreat. The Byzantine Niketas Choniates comments bitterly that the emperor 'returned in utter disgrace [in Constantinople] ... because of his love for his life and his cowardice'.[1762] Even his decision to face the crusaders had been necessitated by the fact that 'he saw the masses bristling with anger, heaping abuse upon him, and hurling insults against him' because he was 'choosing to remain safe inside the palace and resolving to offer no assistance to the defiled City'.[1763] The Byzantines were doubtless furious at their emperor's withdrawal. An interesting Western understanding of the Constantinopolitans' reaction is offered by Clari. According to his account, when Alexios withdrew to Constantinople with his army, 'he was severely criticised by the ladies and the young girls and by everyone else, because he had not fought against so few men as the Franks were with such a great force as he had led out'.[1764] The accusation of cowardice by women against men was considered very humiliating by the Westerners of the High Middle Ages, an era in which the chivalric ideal predominated.[1765] In Alexios's case, the accusation is reinforced by the fact that the withdrawing Byzantines vastly outnumbered the Western knights.

The charges of cowardice hurled against the Byzantine emperor by his subjects, and especially by the *dames* and *demiseles*, at the end of paragraph 48 of Clari's work, stand in direct contrast to a preceding episode at the end of paragraph 47. To Robert's romantic mind, when the count of Saint Pol and the knight Pierre of Amiens began advancing at the trot on Alexios III's army,

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[1760] Ibid.; Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 140.
[1761] Moss, 1966, 14.
[1762] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 299.
[1763] Ibid., 298-9.
[1764] Clari, *Conquête*, 63.
[1765] Robertou tou Klari, 1990, 116, n. 343.

> the ladies and the maidens of the palace [of Constantinople] had come up to the windows and other people from the city, both women and young girls, had climbed on the city walls to watch that [crusading] squadron ride past and the emperor on the other side, and they were saying to each other that it looked as if ours [the crusaders] were made up of such very handsome angels, because they were so richly armed and their horses so finely caparisoned.[1766]

The episode evokes a scene of courtly romance and constitutes an attempt by Clari to exalt the crusading battle in which he, moreover, participated. However, while one senses a certain exaggeration on the part of the chronicler, a degree of admiration and awe among the Byzantine people at the sight of the heavy cavalry of the Westerners might be considered undeniable. The heavily armoured Western knights, mounted on their horses which were protected by trappings and armour, never went unremarked by Byzantine observers.[1767]

Alexios's retreat on 17 July possibly becomes more understandable in the light of the terrifying reputation of the heavily armoured Western knights.[1768] Back in the 1140s Anna Komnena recorded that 'a mounted Kelt [Western knight] is irresistible', his armour made him 'almost, if not entirely invulnerable'.[1769] Similarly, Choniates comments that 'the Western nations', which 'wore armor into battle',[1770] had 'irresistible power'.[1771] As he asserts, 'the Roman forces were unequal to the task of standing up against the Western armies, that they were like earthen pots striking kettles',[1772] or like 'an army of deer ... [striking] a roaring lion'.[1773]

In the night of 17-18 July, Alexios III fled Constantinople. Isaak II was brought back to the imperial palace and restored to the throne. Emissaries were immediately dispatched to the crusaders announcing that Alexios was gone and Isaak was restored as emperor. As Villehardouin relates, the crusaders' 'joy on hearing it [the news] was such as cannot well be described, for no greater joy was ever felt by anyone in this world'.[1774] Alexios's flight was understood by the crusaders to be evidence of the working of God. Hugh of Saint Pol

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[1766] Clari, *Conquête*, 61.
[1767] R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950-1350* (London, 1993), 60-3, 71.
[1768] Ibid., 73.
[1769] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 416.
[1770] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 113.
[1771] Ibid., 115.
[1772] Ibid., 113.
[1773] Ibid., 307.
[1774] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 73.

inevitably viewed this turn of events as effected 'through the handiwork of God',[1775] while Villehardouin does 'now ask you to consider the miracles of our Lord – how wonderful they are whenever it pleases him to perform them'.[1776]

Alexios IV and the Greek-Latin Co-Existence

The Fragile Byzantine-Latin Alliance

At dawn of 18 July, the crusaders put on their armour and prepared their weapons, since, according to Villehardouin, 'none of them put much trust in the Greeks'.[1777] Phillips argues that

> suspicion of Byzantine duplicity dated back to the First Crusade when Emperor Alexios I had failed to bring support to the crusaders at the siege of Antioch in 1098. Greek treachery was widely trumpeted as the reason for the crushing defeats suffered by the kings of France and Germany during the Second Crusade. The massacre of Westerners in 1182 and the later alliance with Saladin served to consolidate a deeply held scepticism concerning Byzantine reliability.[1778]

Phillip's argument requires some examination. As seen in Chapter 1, *some* of the Latin sources of the First Crusade were indeed hostile to Alexios when describing the crusaders' march through the European territories of the Byzantine Empire and the crusading leaders' stay in Constantinople. Nevertheless, Alexios's failure to bring support to the crusaders at Antioch was hardly considered an indication of Byzantine duplicity. On the contrary, the blame for the emperor's failure to assist the crusaders at Antioch was generally pinned on Stephen of Blois.[1779] And anyway, it is hardly possible that the men on the Fourth Crusade were aware even of Alexios's alleged *dolis* in his dealings with the knights on the First Crusade. The evidence provided by our eyewitness primary sources does not point to such a conclusion. Further, as seen in Chapter 2, it was not so widely believed among the Latins that the German and French defeats during the Second Crusade were due to 'Greek treachery'.[1780] Besides,

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[1775] Hugh of Saint Pol, *Report*, 198.
[1776] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 73.
[1777] Ibid., 74.
[1778] Phillips, 2004, 185.
[1779] Chapter 1, 54.
[1780] Chapter 2, 133-51.

Manuel was remembered by the Latins as a great benefactor of theirs rather than a traitor – the account of Robert the Clari well testifies to this. As to the 1182 massacre, it has been demonstrated in Chapter 3 that it had made no considerable impression on the West.[1781] Finally, the vast majority of the crusaders must have hardly been aware of the rumoured alliance between Isaak and Saladin against the Germans of the Third Crusade. Besides, whatever had happened in the past, Isaak was now the father-in-law of the Staufen Philip of Swabia and the crusaders saw themselves as the defenders of the rights of the overthrown emperor and his son Alexios. By a huge irony the son of Isaak's arch-enemy Frederick I became the stalwart champion of the claims of Isaak and his son. Isaak had believed that the Third Crusade plotted to overthrow him and therefore did his best to obstruct it. Ironically, the Fourth Crusade came to defend his and his son's 'rights'.

It is most improbable that at the dawn of 18 July any of the above factors played a part in leading the crusaders to put on their armour. Villehardouin makes not even a passing reference to any of the aforementioned issues in his work. The fact that 'none of them [the crusaders] put much trust in the Greeks' is easily explained without going back in history. The military conflict between Latins and Greeks during July 1203 was enough reason to have generated a certain degree of mistrust between the two groups.

On 18 July the crusaders sent four envoys to Isaak to ask him to ratify the terms that his son Alexios negotiated. The ambassadors were conducted to the palace of Blachernae. A taste of the magnificence and wealth of the Byzantine imperial court is given by Villehardouin, who was one of the envoys:

> On entering the building they found the Emperor Isaak, arrayed in such costly robes that one would have looked in vain to find a man anywhere more richly dressed. Beside him sat the Empress [Margaret] his wife a very beautiful woman, who was the King of Hungary's sister.[1782] So many great lords and ladies were also there that there was hardly room to turn round. The ladies in particular were so richly attired that they could not have been any finer.[1783]

Villehardouin by no means exaggerates. Identical descriptions of ambassadorial receptions by Byzantine emperors can be found in other medieval chroniclers. It was nothing less than the traditional tactic of Byzantine diplomacy to dazzle foreigners with pageantry and all the

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[1781] Chapter 3, 178-88.
[1782] Margaret was the eldest daughter of King Bela III (1172-96) and sister of King Emeric.
[1783] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 74.

trappings of wealth and power.[1784] One may mention Liudprand of Cremona's embassy to the court of Constantine VII (913-59)[1785] or the contemporary description by Choniates of how Alexios III prepared to receive the German envoys of Henry VI on Christmas Day 1196.[1786] On the eve of the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the ends and means of Byzantine diplomacy still remained unaltered. Although having been ostensibly disdained by the envoys of the powerful Henry VII, the ostentatious display of Byzantine wealth still impressed Western nobles like Villeharduin.

Isaak reluctantly ratified the treaty between Prince Alexios and the crusaders; the old emperor was well aware that the promises of his son would be hard to fulfill.[1787] Subsequently, the young Alexios was escorted into the Byzantine capital and 1 August 1203 was fixed as the day for his coronation as co-emperor.

On 19 July, Isaak II and Alexios persuaded the crusaders to pitch camp outside Constantinople, and specifically in the quarter of Pera. According to Villehardouin, the emperor and his son claimed that 'if they [the crusaders] took up their quarters in Constantinople there was a risk of disputes arising between them and the Greeks, as a consequence of which the city might possibly be destroyed'.[1788] In his letter to Innocent after his coronation as emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin explained that 'lest a foreign setting different from our way of life (*moribus nostris aduersa barbaries*) provide fuel to the discord (*discordia*) between us and the Greeks, we left the city at the request of the emperor'.[1789] Clari claims that the crusaders 'dared not remain in the city at all because of the treacherous (*traiteur*) Greeks'.[1790] Gunther of Pairis records that the crusaders agreed to leave Constantinople since Latins and Greeks 'were two people of such diverse language and customs (*duo populi tam diversis lingua et moribus*) who did not have much love for one another (*satis mutua dilectio*)'.[1791]

Given the conflict between Latin crusaders and Greeks during July 1203, a degree of mistrust and dislike between the two groups as well as apprehension that disputes may arise

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[1784] Harris, 2003, 140.
[1785] Liudprand of Cremona, *Antapodosis*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. P. Chiesa, *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 156 (Turnhout, 1998), 147; Liudprand of Cremona, *Antapodosis*, in *The Embassy to Constantinople and Other Writings*, ed. John Julius Norwich, trans. F. A. Wright (London, 1993), 153.
[1786] See above.
[1787] Madden, 2005, 110.
[1788] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 76.
[1789] *Die Register*, VII, 254; *The Registers*, 100-1.
[1790] Clari, *Conquête*, 68-9.
[1791] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 142; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 94.

between them were certainly not without foundation. Nonetheless, the claims of Baldwin, newly arrived at Constantinople, and especially of Gunther, possibly never meeting a Greek, are to a great degree based on ignorance and stereotypes. Differences between Latins and Byzantines in *lingua et moribus* had not prevented peaceful co-habitation between the two groups in the twelfth-century Byzantine Empire. Despite sporadic tensions as the anti-Latin pogrom in 1182, there had always been Latin traders, civil servants, and mercenaries in Constantinople. William of Tyre admits that the Byzantines 'had given [Westerners] their daughters, nieces, and sisters as wives, and ... by long living together, had become their friends'.[1792] Choniates concedes that the Byzantines and the Westerners 'are closely associated and frequently share the same dwelling'.[1793] The reason that the crusaders were asked to encamp in Pera was certainly *not* the diversity of the language and customs between Latins and Greeks. A crusading army had never been allowed within the walls of Constantinople, let alone staying there, especially after a conflict between Latin crusaders and Greeks during July 1203.

Nevertheless, in contrast to previous crusaders, the knights of the Fourth Crusade were free to visit Constantinople whenever they wished.[1794] As Villehardouin informs us, not only did the crusaders visit the city's shrines and pilgrimage sites, but also 'the Greeks and the French ... became on friendly terms with each other in all respects, including trade and other matters'.[1795] According to the eye-witness author of the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, after Isaak's restoration, 'harmony [was] effected between Greeks and Latins'.[1796] Although the crusaders and the Byzantines must have initially regarded each other with some distrust and anxiety, favourable cooperative contact between the two groups appears to have soon ameliorated and enhanced the crusaders' attitudes to the Greeks and *vice versa*.

The new emperor Alexios IV was quick to pay half of the money he promised to the crusaders and began paying the rest in installments. However, the sums of money still due to his Western allies were huge, while the treasuries were almost empty. Alexios IV needed first of all time to acquire the required amounts and secondly the crusaders' aid to subdue and assert his authority over provincial Byzantium which was still largely controlled by Alexios

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[1792] William of Tyre, *Deeds*, II, 464.
[1793] Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 301; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 167. '*καὶ σώμασι συναπτόμεθα καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πολλάκις κληρούμεθα οἴκησιν*'.
[1794] Queller and Madden, 1997, 136.
[1795] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 76.
[1796] *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 217.

III. Having made Adrianople his temporary capital, Alexios III awaited the right opportunity to march on Constantinople and regain the throne. Thus, following his coronation, Alexios IV summoned the crusading leaders and offered to hire their army until March 1204.[1797] As Villehardouin recounts, Alexios said to the doge of Venice and the crusading nobles that 'the Greeks as a whole are full of resentment because it is by your help that I have regained my empire ... the Greeks, I must tell you, hate me because of you; if you leave me, I shall loose my empire, and they will put me to death'.[1798] Whether Alexios ever said these things is hard to know. In any case, however, a closer examination of this statement is required.

Phillips argues that 'the role of the crusaders as the men who had delivered Prince Alexios to the imperial title raised potentially enormous anxieties and animosities'.[1799] Elsewhere, the same scholar asserts that 'the crusaders' overt responsibility for imposing a change of regime on the Greeks ... fuelled resentment towards all aliens'.[1800] Does the primary evidence, however, support the thesis that Alexios IV and the crusaders were hated by the Byzantines because the new emperor had gained the imperial throne with Latin aid? That this exactly was allegedly claimed by Alexios, in his attempt to gain time, is not adequate corroborating evidence.

The fact that Alexios IV had ascended the imperial throne with foreign military assistance was not without precedence in Byzantium. In 1081 Alexios Komnenos and in 1182 Andronikos Komnenos had seized the Byzantine throne with the aid of foreign mercenaries. The army of Alexios I was allowed to loot Constantinople for three days. Anna Komnena records that her father's mercenaries spared 'neither houses nor churches nor even the innermost sanctuaries'.[1801] At least nothing of this sort happened in 1203. As Queller and Madden observe, 'the successful armed rebellion of young Alexios Angelos against his uncle ranks among the most bloodless coups in Byzantine history'.[1802] Therefore, why should the Byzantines have felt resentment against Alexios IV and his allies?

To the Greeks, whether Alexios III or Alexios IV reigned was a matter of small importance, so long as they themselves were not inconvenienced.[1803] If Clari is to be believed - and I think he should - when Alexios III retreated in Constantinople in 17 July, the enraged

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[1797] Phillips, 2004, 200-2; Madden, 2005, 111.
[1798] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 77.
[1799] Phillips, 2004, 201.
[1800] Ibid., 206.
[1801] Komnena, *Alexiad*, 98.
[1802] Queller and Madden, 1997, 135.
[1803] Ibid., 111; Madden, 2005, 110.

citizens bluntly said to him that unless he did 'deliver them from the Franks who had besieged them ... they would go for the young man whom the Franks had brought and would make him their emperor and their lord'.[1804] In their letter to Innocent, the crusading nobles related that, following Alexios III's flight, 'a large number of Greek nobles come to the [crusading] camp and joyously seek out' Prince Alexios.[1805] Similarly, Clari relates that, when Alexios III had fled, the citizens of Constantinople opened the gates of the city 'and came out to the camp of the Franks and asked and searched for Alexios ... his friends honoured him greatly and very joyfully'.[1806] Furthermore, according to Choniates, once the young prince had been escorted into Constantinople, 'the entire citizenry ... ran in a body to the palace in order to behold the son with his father and to pay homage to both'.[1807]

Our evidence testifies to the fact that once Alexios IV was installed on the throne, at least the majority of the Constantinopolitans were well disposed to their new ruler. There had been no hatred towards either Alexios IV or the crusaders. The cooperative contact between Latins and Greeks further supports this conclusion.

Having agreed to Alexios IV's request to stay in his service until March 1204, the crusaders accompanied by the Byzantine emperor left Constantinople about the middle of August for the expedition that sought to extend the ruler's power over the Byzantine provinces. During the absence of Alexios IV and the crusading army, two unhappy incidents occurred in Constantinople and upset, if not destroyed, the harmony between Latins and Greeks. Slightly before or probably on 18 August the Constantinopolitan mob attacked the Pisan and Amalfitan inhabitants of the capital, 'making no distinction between friend and foe', according to Choniates.[1808] As the chronicler relates, 'the Amalfitans ... had been nurtured in Roman [i.e. Byzantine] customs' and 'the Pisans ... had chosen to make Constantinople their home'.[1809] However, following the Constantinopolitan mob's attack on them, a large number of the Latin inhabitants of Constantinople left the city and sought refuge in the crusading camp in Galata.

Brand, Madden and Queller, and Phillips all agree that the main motivation behind the mob's violent behaviour was anti-Latin sentiment, the causes of which the same scholars have

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[1804] Clari, *Conquête*, 65.
[1805] *The Registers*, 83.
[1806] Clari, *Conquête*, 65.
[1807] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 302.
[1808] Ibid.
[1809] Ibid.

tried to explain.[1810] Of the various causes suggested, three seem to be the most reasonable, convincing, and adequately corroborated by the available data: the crusading army's ongoing presence outside Constantinople, the heavy taxation imposed by Alexios IV to acquire the needed sums of money he owed his allies, and the despoilment of churches and monasteries to the same end.

The worst was to come very soon. On 19 August, a group of Flemish, Pisans and Venetians raided a mosque outside the walls of Constantinople. Brand, Angold, and Phillips favour the view that the raid was in retaliation for the attack on Pisans and Amalfitans in Constantinople.[1811] This claim, however, is open to objection. Why should the Latins attack the Muslims in revenge for the Greeks' attack on the Italians? As has been seen, from the biased viewpoint of the Westerner who had never lived in the East and probably had never come into contact with a Muslim, all the Saracens were perceived as hateful infidels while the existence of mosques in a Christian city was outrageous. To the prejudiced Western crusaders, peaceful co-habitation between Christians and Muslims was unimaginable. The newly arrived crusaders, who had sworn to exterminate the infidels, certainly took a dim view of the existence of Muslims and mosques in Constantinople. As Queller and Madden rightly observe, 'the Islamic place of worship was an inviting target'.[1812] The Italian inhabitants of Constantinople as well as the crusaders undoubtedly felt rage following the Byzantine mob's attack on Pisans and Amalfitans. This rage had to find an outlet and the detested infidels were a perfect one. In other words, the Muslims served as scapegoats to expunge the Latins' anger, just as the Italian inhabitants of Constantinople had served as scapegoats to expunge the Greek mob's resentment against the crusaders.

The attack on the mosque inaugurated a disastrous series of events, related in detail by Choniates.[1813] Several Greeks naturally came to the assistance of their Muslim neighbours who had been assailed by the newcomers. To defend themselves, the withdrawing crusaders set fire to the mosque. Some of them entered Constantinople through the open gates and set other locations ablaze. What followed was, according to Madden, 'one of the most destructive urban fires in human history'.[1814] The fire burned for three days, leaving at least 100, 000

[1810] Brand, 1968, 246-7; Queller and Madden, 1997, 144-5; Phillips, 2004, 206.
[1811] Brand, 1968, 247; Angold, 2003, 95; Phillips, 2004, 207.
[1812] Queller and Madden, 1997, 145.
[1813] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 302-4.
[1814] Madden, 2005, 112.

Constantinopolitans homeless.[1815] Fearful of reprisals, the remaining Latin inhabitants of Constantinople left the capital and departed for the crusading camp in Galata.[1816]

Two of our Western sources, Villehardouin and the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, refer to the two episodes of August 1203. Although their version of events is not as accurate and detailed as that of Choniates, they provide valuable information on the Western view of the incidents and on their impact on the relations between the crusaders and the Byzantines. First of all, the two accounts actually fail to dissociate the two episodes but treat them as a single incident. Villehardouin records that 'the Greeks and the Latins living in the city [Constantinople] - *and there were very many of the latter* - became involved in a brawl'.[1817] The chronicler relates that a fire was set by 'certain people'.[1818] Although he maintains ignorance of their identity, he condemns their action. Villehardouin further informs us of the crusading nobles' reaction at the sight of the burning city from their camp at Galata: 'they were overcome with grief and pity as they watched the great churches and the lordly palaces crumbling and falling in ruins'.[1819] The catastrophic consequences of the incident for the Latin-Byzantine relations are reported by the same author: 'none of the Latins living in Constantinople ... dared remain in the city any longer' and '[the incident] created a rift between the Greeks and the Franks, who were never again on such friendly terms as they had been before. Neither side knew which to blame for this coolness, and that weighed heavily on the minds of both'.[1820]

The *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* provides a version less detailed than that of Villehardouin. According to it, 'a riot happened to break out between the Greeks and the Latins' and 'both sides flew to arms'.[1821] To protect themselves, the Latins set a fire. Following the incident, no Westerners 'stayed behind in the city'.[1822] Since not only the author of the *Devastatio* but also Villehardouin, an important and well-informed crusading noble, were ignorant of the actual course of events, we could quite safely assume that the large majority of the Western crusaders were similarly unaware. The two episodes of August appear to have been remembered by most of the crusaders as the 'riot ... between the Greeks and the

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[1815] Queller and Madden, 1997, 145-6; Phillips, 2004, 209.
[1816] Queller and Madden, 1997, 146.
[1817] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 79. Emphasis added.
[1818] Ibid.
[1819] Ibid.
[1820] Ibid., 79-80.
[1821] *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 217.
[1822] Ibid., 218.

Latins' that provoked a breach in Byzantine-Latin relations and upset the harmony between the two groups. Almost all the Latin inhabitants of Constantinople and 100, 000 Greeks found themselves homeless as a direct consequence of the anti-Latin attack and the devastating fire. It was only too natural that the incident would generate outright hatred between Latins and Greeks.

The August breach in Byzantine-Latin relations was, for the moment, only at a popular level. As the author of the *Devastatio* relates, the crusading leaders who remained in Constantinople intervened and an uneasy peace was re-established.[1823] For how long, however, could the popular sentiment be ignored or controlled by the leadership of both sides?

'He Abandons Us - He upon Whom We Had Conferred So Many Benefits': the Termination of the Byzantine-Latin Alliance

While Alexios IV and the crusaders were subduing the Byzantine provinces, back in Constantinople Isaak endeavoured to acquire the sum required by the Westerners. Despite his efforts, the emperor could not make the financial payments due. The crusading leaders who remained in Constantinople sent word to the barons accompanying Alexios IV, asking them to return to the capital since they were not being paid their due. Consequently, on 11 November 1203 the expeditionary force arrived back at the city.[1824]

When Alexios IV returned to Constantinople, his relation with the crusaders was still cordial and remained so for a few weeks. To meet the amounts due to his allies, the emperor resorted to plundering churches and to financial exactions. The Greeks' anti-Latin sentiment reached a peak. Afflicted by the terrible fire of August and the ongoing exactions of money, the Constantinopolitans wanted the crusaders driven out. The *Hystoria Constantinopolitana* provides a largely accurate Western assessment of the Byzantine sentiment and view of the crusaders. According to Gunther,

> most [Constantinopolitans] were grumbling that he [Alexios IV] showed inordinate affection for people who were pilgrims and strangers to their customs, [and] had already handed over to them ... almost all the wealth of Greece, and proposed to lavish yet as much or perhaps even more on them, although his kingdom was already despoiled ... they even dared to censure the king himself

[1823] Ibid.
[1824] Phillips, 2004, 209.

> openly, telling him publicly not to despoil his kingdom in order to reward foreigners and not to turn the profit of others into their own impoverishment.[1825]

Alexios was in a desperate situation. In Gunther's words, 'you could see him severely disturbed, as though torn between the wickedness of his people (*suorum nequicia*) and the love of ours (*amor nostrorum*) [the crusaders]'.[1826] Although Gunther's contrasting the Greeks' *nequicia* and the crusaders' *amor* obviously constitutes part of the rhetoric of the *Hystoria Constantinopolitana*, it remains true that Alexios was deeply troubled. The emperor appreciated that, in order to maintain his throne, he had to stop alienating his Greek subjects. However, to achieve this, he had to go against his allies. He therefore began to cool towards the crusaders and made only token payments to them. By the end of November the funds ceased altogether. Nevertheless, the emperor was very careful not to renounce his commitments to his Western allies.[1827]

On 1 December, a new conflict between a group of Latins and a number of Byzantines broke out in Constantinople, ending in the killing of people from both sides. The *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, our only source for the incident, denounces the brutality of the Greeks, as those Latins 'whom they captured they killed without mercy and burned their corpses. They spared neither age nor gender'.[1828] Nevertheless, the anonymous author does not fail to attribute a large share of the blame to the Latins 'who had so rashly taken up arms against the Greeks'.[1829] According to the *Devastatio*, 'the Latin army's barons were dismayed by this calamity'[1830] and, when a number of crusaders from Galata tried to cross over to aid their fellows, the crusading leaders prevented them. As in August 1203, the crusading leadership endeavoured to avert a major conflict and to maintain the nominal peace between crusaders and Byzantines. The crusaders and Alexios IV were still sworn allies.

In early December the crusaders finally decided to send envoys to Alexios asking him to honour their contract. Villehardouin, who was once again a member of the embassy to the Byzantine court, assures his audience that the ambassadors 'had embarked on a difficult and dangerous adventure' because of the 'treachery' of the Greeks.[1831] Given the serious

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[1825] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 94-5.
[1826] Ibid., 95; Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 142.
[1827] Queller and Madden, 147, 150; Phillips, 2004, 214-15; Tyerman, 2006, 548-9.
[1828] *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 219.
[1829] Ibid.
[1830] Ibid.
[1831] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 82.

deterioration in relations between Latins and Greeks, reinforced by Alexios IV's coolness towards the crusaders, the envoys' anxiety about entering Constantinople is certainly understandable.

When the crusading envoys entered the audience chamber of the imperial palace, they found Alexios IV enthroned side by side with Isaak II. The hall was filled with courtiers, and everything had been arranged to overawe the ambassadors with pomp and magnificence. As Villehardouin admits, 'the assembly [had] all the character of a powerful prince's court'.[1832] However, as in the case of Henry VI's embassy to Constantinople in 1196, the Byzantines' ostentatious show of wealth and power did not prevent the Western envoys from presenting the Byzantine ruler with a threatening ultimatum. They demanded that the emperor fulfill his commitments to the crusaders. If he failed to do so, the crusaders 'will no longer regard you [Alexios] as their lord and their friend, but will use every means in their power to obtain their due ... they will not do anything to injure either yourself or any other person without fair warning of their intention to commence hostilities'.[1833] The ambassadors concluded by having a dig at Alexios IV: the crusaders 'had never acted treacherously – that is not the custom in their country'.[1834] The insinuation was clear: the Westerners were honourable and principled, in marked contrast to the Byzantine emperor who had betrayed his allies.

The crusaders' ultimatum was automatically considered deeply offensive to the status of a Byzantine emperor. Both Alexios IV and his court were greatly outraged. Villehardouin vividly recounts how

> the Greeks were much amazed and deeply shocked by this openly defiant message, and declared that no one had ever yet been so bold as to dare issue such a challenge to an Emperor of Constantinople in his own hall. The Emperor Alexios himself, and all the other Greeks ... scowled fiercely at the envoys. The noise of angry voices filled the hall.[1835]

Such was the aggressive tone of the Byzantine reaction to those showing disrespect for the traditional status of the emperor of the Romans. Despite the drastic decline and steady territorial shrinkage of the Byzantine Empire, for the Byzantines their ruler was still God's viceroy on earth, the only and most powerful emperor of the Romans. How could some

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[1832] Ibid.
[1833] Ibid.
[1834] Ibid.
[1835] Ibid., 82-3.

Western barbarians dare to offend him in front of his own court? The Byzantines rigidly maintained an inflated sense of their own and their ruler's importance. Ironically, the episode took place only four months before the fall and dismemberment of the declining Byzantine Empire.

Alexios IV never actually gave a response to the crusading envoys. It would have been political suicide for him to ignore the general anti-Latin sentiment of his court and nobles and try to conciliate the crusaders. For the crusaders, however, the Byzantines' outraged reaction to the ultimatum and Alexios's silence and fierce scowl was tantamount to rejection.[1836] The Byzantine-Latin alliance was officially terminated.

Alexios's change of attitude to the crusaders was an issue addressed by the Westerners, who naturally attempted to explain what caused the emperor's about-face. Villehardouin bitterly relates that Alexios, 'who had managed all his affairs very well, and felt confident that he had now gained the upper hand, became filled with pride' and 'adopted a haughty attitude with the barons'.[1837] In his letter to Innocent, Baldwin recorded that 'with an unexpected turn of mind, either out of innate malice (*innata malitia*) or else seduced by the treachery of the Greeks (*Grecorum seductus perfidia*), he [Alexios IV] abandons us'.[1838] Later in the same letter, Baldwin relates that 'according to rumor (*ut dicebatur*), it was he [Isaak] who had turned his son's sentiment away from us'.[1839] The Anonymous of Soissons recounts that 'having been deceived by the advice of the Greeks and of his own father ... he [Alexios IV] refused to fulfill his commitment to journey to Jerusalem which he had promised, pledged, and confirmed by sacred oath'.[1840] Despite the allegations and rumours that Alexios's change of attitude was due to his father's influence, it should be noted that, according to Choniates, Isaak in fact 'encouraged him [Alexios] to ignore the idle talk of the vulgar populace and to bestow the highest honours on those who had restored him to his country [i.e. the crusaders]'.[1841]

Amongst the rank and file, there seems to have been a different impression as to who was responsible for Alexios IV's change of mind and behaviour. Clari imputes the emperor's about-turn to Alexios Doukas Mourtzouphlos, the leader of the anti-crusader faction in the

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[1836] Queller and Madden, 1997, 155; Phillips, 2004, 217.
[1837] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 81.
[1838] *Die Register*, VII, 254; *The Registers*, 101.
[1839] *Die Register*, VII, 255; *The Registers*, 102.
[1840] *Anonymous of Soissons*, 233.
[1841] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 302-4.

imperial court[1842] and later emperor - following the deposition of Alexios IV. Clari portrays Mourtzouphlos as advising Alexios: 'Ah! sire, you have paid them [the crusaders] too much, do not pay them any more! You have paid them so much that you have been completely robbed. Send them away and make them quit your land'.[1843] As has been seen, Alexios IV had not given a response to the crusading envoys sent to him in December asking him to honour their contract. However, Clari, always valuable for the insights he provides into the state of mind of the common soldier, makes the emperor echo Mourtzouphlos's alleged advice to him: 'he answered the messengers that he would pay them [the crusaders] nothing for he had already paid too much and that he did not fear them at all. Rather he sent word to them that they should go away and leave his land'.[1844] Clari imagined Alexios even threatened the crusaders that 'if they did not leave soon, he would do them harm'.[1845]

Despite divergence of opinion as to who was to blame for Alexios's change of attitude, the majority of the Westerners appear to have agreed that the emperor had betrayed his benefactors, the crusaders. Villehardouin decries Alexios's 'haughty attitude' towards 'those who had done him such great service',[1846] while the Anonymous of Halberstadt condemns the emperor as 'ungrateful for the favours received'.[1847] In his letter to the pope, Baldwin related that 'he [Alexios] abandons us - he upon whom we had conferred so many benefits (*beneficia*)'.[1848] Baldwin goes on to denounce the Byzantine ruler as 'a perjurer and liar (*periurus et mendax*) in regard to all of the promises that he made to us ... [he] incurs perjury (*periuria*) for each and every oath he swore to us'.[1849] In a letter that Doge Dandolo dispatched to Innocent most probably in June 1204, he similarly labelled Alexios IV, as well as his father, as 'liars and perjurers'.[1850] To defame the two emperors further and catch the pope's attention, Dandolo alleged that the crusaders had 'disavowed them [Alexios IV and Isaak] as both enemies of the Holy Roman Church and traitors to Christendom (*inimicantes sancte Romane ecclesie et Christianitatis proditores*)'.[1851] This information, not substantiated by any other account, was undoubtedly fabricated to portray Alexios IV and Isaak in the most negative light

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[1842] Phillips, 2004, 215.
[1843] Clari, *Conquête*, 71.
[1844] Ibid., 73.
[1845] Ibid.
[1846] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 81.
[1847] *Deeds of the Bishops of Halberstadt*, 255.
[1848] *Die Register*, VII, 254; *The Registers*, 101.
[1849] *Die Register*, VII, 254; *The Registers*, 101.
[1850] *The Registers*, 130.
[1851] Ibid.

possible - the strong propagandistic overtones of Dandolo's assertion are obvious. It is worthwhile noting how Baldwin and Dandolo, endeavouring to gain papal approval for the crusader's subsequent actions, use much sharper language than Villeharduin or the Anonymous of Halberstadt to describe Alexios IV.

Clari adds to his narrative a meeting between Alexios IV and Dandolo. Faral has convincingly argued that this is a garbled and misplaced account of the later meeting between Dandolo and Mourtzouphlos.[1852] Nevertheless, the story is of great interest since it provides us with unique insight into how Alexios's turnaround was viewed by the rank and file. Clari has Dandolo remind Alexios IV that 'we [the crusaders] pulled you out of great misery. Then we made you lord and crowned you as emperor'.[1853] Subsequently, the doge asks the emperor if he would fulfill his covenant with the crusaders. To Alexios's negative reply, Dandolo, fuming with indignation, yells: 'wicked boy; we have raised you from shit ... and we will put you back in the shit; I defy you and understand that I will do you all the harm I can from this moment on'.[1854]

Since Alexios IV would not pay his debt, the crusaders began raiding the lands surrounding Constantinople to 'seize so much of his [Alexios's] property that they would be paid'.[1855] The emperor often sent troops to defend areas attacked by the Westerners, but avoided a major engagement with his former allies.[1856] As in the case of Alexios III, the Constantinopolitans demanded that Alexios IV lead the imperial army against the unbearable Westerners.[1857] Gunther gives an accurate assessment of the anti-crusader attitude and sentiment in Constantinople: the emperor 'should, along with them [the Byzantines], attack and destroy those strangers [the crusaders], as though they were invaders greedy for the possessions of others'.[1858] The young emperor kept promising that he would fight the crusaders but he never did so, and thus the Constantinopolitans became more hostile toward him.[1859]

Around 20 December 1203 and then on 1 January 1204 the Byzantines unsuccessfully attempted to destroy the crusading fleet with fire ships. Phillips correctly argues that it is

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[1852] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, II, 15, n. 1.
[1853] Clari, *Conquête*, 73.
[1854] Ibid.
[1855] Ibid.
[1856] Queller and Madden, 1997, 157; Madden, 2005, 112-3.
[1857] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 306-7.
[1858] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 95.
[1859] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 307.

doubtful that the attack had been orchestrated by Alexios. It was more probably the work of the anti-crusader faction.[1860] However, in the rank-and-file crusaders' eyes, Alexios was not without blame for the incident. Clari fervently exclaims, 'what the emperor and the traitors (*traiteur*) who were around him do but devise a great act of treachery (*une grant traison*)'.[1861] In the crusading nobles' opinion, the blame lay exclusively with Alexios. Villehardouin ironically remarks that 'such was the return the Emperor Alexios had wanted to make us [the crusaders] for the services we had rendered him'.[1862] Baldwin of Flanders is equally sarcastic, observing that 'forsaking our aid, he [Alexios IV] vainly contemplates doing battle against us and seeks to burn the fleet that had led and raised him to the throne'.[1863] The emperor was clearly perceived as ungrateful towards those to whom he owed his throne.

Crusading nobility, clergy, and rank and file shared the same view: despite the great service done to him by the crusaders, Alexios had showed himself untrustworthy and ungrateful towards his benefactor. As seen, his about-face was ascribed either to 'innate malice' or to the influence of his father, or of Alexios Mourtzouphlos, or of 'the Greeks' in general. The majority of the Westerners seem to have been unable - or probably unwilling - to appreciate the desperate situation in which Alexios IV found himself in the aftermath of his enthronement. His attempts to fulfill the extravagant promises he had made so lightly to the crusaders resulted in the alienation of his subjects and earned him their hatred. When Alexios eventually tried to distance himself from the crusaders, he incurred their resentment. The young emperor was a tragic figure, trapped in a situation over which he had no control and from which there was no real escape.

By the end of January 1204 Alexios IV's popularity with his Byzantine subjects reached its nadir. On 27 January, a young nobleman, Nikolaos Kannavos, was crowned as new emperor in Hagia Sophia. A panicked Alexios IV attempted to call in the crusaders to drive out his rival by offering them the Blachernae Palace. This precipitated the emperor's downfall. On the night of 27-8 January Mourtzouphlos arrested and imprisoned Alexios, and proclaimed himself emperor. On 5 February he was crowned Alexios V. On 8 January Kannavos was also incarcerated, while Isaak, very soon after, died.[1864]

[1860] Phillips, 2004, 220.
[1861] Clari, *Conquête*, 73.
[1862] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 84.
[1863] *The Registers*, 101.
[1864] Queller and Madden, 1997, 159-65; Phillips, 2004, 222-6.

Morchofles li traitres

When Alexios V assumed the imperial insignia, the anti-crusader feeling in Constantinople reached its climax. The crusaders were well aware of the Byzantine hatred towards them. As Baldwin of Flanders records, 'with the Greek clergy and people crying out that we be wiped off the face of the Earth in short order and with the Greeks thirsting for so much of our blood, the ... traitor [Alexios V] renews the war against us'.[1865] Alexios V did everything he could to prevent the crusading raids on the countryside. However, despite their numerical superiority, the Byzantines were no match for the heavily armoured Western knights.

On 6 January, Alexios V, with a substantial military force, made an ambush against Henry of Flanders who had with him thirty knights and several mounted sergeants. Alexios V carried with him the icon of the Mother of God, which the Byzantine rulers used as a battle standard, reckoning it, in Choniates's words, 'as their fellow general'.[1866] The icon appears to have caught the imagination of the Western crusaders, almost certainly unfamiliar with the sacred images of the Eastern Church: before 1204, with the exception of Rome, icons seem to have played no important part in Western Christian worship.[1867] Villehardouin relates that the icon 'was one in which he [Alexios V] and the other Greeks placed great faith, because it bore the picture of Our Lady',[1868] while Clari reports that 'the emperors ... put such great faith in this icon that they truly believe that anyone who carries it into battle cannot be defeated'.[1869] The author of the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* and Ralph of Coggeshall viewed, and describe, the icon as a symbol of imperial power.[1870] An overwhelmed Clari tries to convey its richness to his audience: it 'was all of gold and all studded with rich precious stones'.[1871] As the same author assures his reader, 'nothing as rich and as beautiful had ever been seen'.[1872] Although Alexios carried with him the icon, he was finally defeated. The religious Clari does not dispute over the miraculous properties with which the icon was credited by the Byzantines. On the contrary, he himself, adopting Byzantine belief, tries to justify why the miraculous power of

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[1865] *The Registers*, 102.
[1866] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 312.
[1867] H. Belting, *Likeness and Presence. A History of the Image before the Era of Art* (Chicago, 1994), 63-73, 308, 311-14.
[1868] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 86.
[1869] Clari, *Conquête*, 81.
[1870] *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 220; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicle*, 285.
[1871] Clari, *Conquête*, 83.
[1872] Ibid.

the icon did not work in Alexios V's favour. He asserts that since Alexios 'had no right to carry it, we believe that he was defeated'.[1873] Why, however, does Clari claim this?

On 7 February, a meeting was arranged between Alexios V and Doge Dandolo to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict. Dandolo 'objected that there could be no guarantee of peace with one who had shut up his lord in prison and had snatched away his throne, after having disregarded the sanctity of an oath, fealty, and a covenant'.[1874] The familiar Western conception that a coup was an absolutely repugnant act of treachery emerges once again. Baldwin of Flanders reviles Mourtzouphlos for applying 'sacrilegious hands on a sleeping lord [Alexios IV]' and denounces him as a 'perfidious imperial interloper' (*perfidus incubator imperii*), a 'traitor' (*proditor*) and 'perjurious (*periurus*) to his lord'.[1875] When Baldwin comes to describe Mourtzouphlos's subsequent murder of Alexios IV on the night of 8-9 February, he draws a parallel between him and Judas.[1876]

Of Mourtzouphlos, Villehardouin exclaims 'Have you ever heard of any people guilty of such atrocious treachery!'.[1877] Clari relates that 'the Greeks, who were traitors (*li traitre*) to the emperor [Alexios IV], and Morchuflex [Mourtzouphlos] ... plotted a great act of treachery (*une grant traïson*)',[1878] i.e. Alexios IV's overthrow and murder by strangulation. The chronicler loses no opportunity to decry Alexios V as *Morchofles li traitres* (traitor).[1879] This explains why, from Clari's standpoint, Mourtzouphlos had no right to carry the icon of the Mother of God. Likewise, the author of the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* condemns the seizure and imprisonment of Alexios IV and describes Mourtzouphlos as 'the author of this great treason'.[1880] Ralph of Coggeshall records that Alexios IV 'was murdered through the treachery of a certain Morkulfus [*sic*]', who is denounced as a 'traitor', 'who had aspired to the throne for a long while'.[1881]

Predictably, the most vehement vilification of Alexios V comes from Gunther of Pairis. Gunther censures the Byzantine ruler for having 'crowned himself with the diadem, as though he were a man of royal lineage (*homo regii generis*) and even related by blood (*sanguine*

[1873] Ibid., 81.
[1874] *The Registers*, 104.
[1875] Ibid., 102, 104 ; *Die Register*, VII, 255, 256.
[1876] *Die Register*, VII, 257; *The Registers*, 105.
[1877] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 84.
[1878] Clari, *Conquête*, 74-5.
[1879] Ibid., 76, 80, 86, 94,96.
[1880] *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 220.
[1881] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicle*, 285.

propinquus)'.[1882] This is another judgement of Byzantine politics by Western feudalistic standards. As has been already seen in Chapter 1, in Byzantium there was no particular need for the sovereign to come from a royal lineage.[1883] An emperor who had been an ordinary man before assuming power as the result of a palace coup was no less legitimate than an emperor who ascended the throne on the strength of being born of a dynastic line. Gunther accuses Alexios V of 'occupying the royal throne with both audacity and insolence', and decries him as 'treacherous' (*perfidus*), 'perpetrator of a very vicious crime' (*gravissimi sceleris perpetrator*), a 'cruel' and 'execrable parricide' (*crudelis parricida [...] execrabilis parricida*), an 'accursed' and 'nefarious man' (*homo sceleratus ... homo nepharius*).[1884] While these quotations are taken from the prose part of the *Hystoria*, the most venomous attacks against Alexios V occur in poems thirteen and twenty. Having referred to Mourtzouphlos's usurpation of the imperial throne, Gunther concludes chapter thirteen of his work by stating that 'we, greatly repelled by the impiety (*impietas*) of his deed, are thus compelled to cry out';[1885] the first four lines of the poem that immediately follows read:

> Oh, crime! Oh, madness! Oh, fraud! A tyranny to be feared!
> Oh, new barbarism, unknown in earlier years!
> What race, what land, what age has known the equal of that
> Which God and reason have far removed from piety?[1886]

Poem twenty follows the prose description of Alexios V's later execution by the crusaders. The last ten lines of the poem are a flood of hostile invective at Mourtzouphlos:

> Savage! Dregs of humanity! Your heart is pitiless and beastly
> While you kill your lord. Savage! Dregs of humanity!
> Both you and all your kind I detest and loathe;
> You and all your kind deserve to be planted in a grave.
> I call you a blasphemer, faithless butcher of kings;
> Despiser of laws, I call you a blasphemer.
> Justly you fall suddenly, since deceitfully you rush for the heights,
> And in imitation of your fall, justly you fall suddenly.
> Faithless, gruesome bandit, worthily will you spend eternity
> In the stinking, black Abyss, faithless, gruesome bandit.[1887]

[1882] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 143; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 95.
[1883] Chapter 1, 73-4.
[1884] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 127, 143-4, 146, 164-5; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 82, 95-6, 98, 114-15.
[1885] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 143; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 95.
[1886] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 95.
[1887] Ibid., 116.

Already in poem ten of his work, before embarking on his detailed account of the events that led to the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople, Gunther had alluded to Alexios V's murder of Alexios IV and the subsequent conquest of the Byzantine imperial capital by the Latins. The poem constitutes an invitation to the reader to pay careful attention to what follows as well as a tirade of abuse against the Greeks and Constantinople:

> Here, come on; take a breath. Reader, learn of the marvels
> That, by reason of their ominous nature, we recount with righteous anger.
> Learn, note mentally, the things we write ...
> Learn of the accursed deed, far removed from piety [i.e. Alexios V's murder of Alexios IV]
> Marvel at the mad race, a profane race [the Greeks].
> ...
> Greece, the scum of scum (*fex fecis*) - a people impious to Greek kings
> Whom it is wont to butcher[1888] or blind.[1889]
> An evil city (*urbs mala*), full of deceit (*plena dolis*) and unworthy of the sun's light.
> Constantinople: a hardworking folk - but only for deceits (*fraudibus*)
> A people ignorant of government, happily subject to no law;
> Citizens of sacrilege (*cives sacrilegi*), a people impious to its own king;
> An idle (*iners*), cowardly (*pavidum*) rabble, an unfaithful (*malefidum*) burden to its kings;
> A people in whom evil deceit (*fraus mala*) has found a comfortable home.
> Yet unquestionably in the course of events it will pay for its crimes (*scelera*),
> And within a few days it will atone for its impious deeds,
> And, conquered by a brave yet tiny band,
> This vile people will suffer its fate, because of the ignominious death of a youth.[1890]

In his poem of passionate rhetorical denunciation of Alexios IV's murder, Gunther shows himself disgusted at the Greeks' *impium factum*, for which the crusaders had to make them pay. The passage is thinly disguised rhetoric largely aimed at justifying and legitimising *ab initio* the events that will follow, especially the Latin conquest of Constantinople. In actual fact, however, Alexios IV's murder was greeted with mixed feelings in the crusading army. As Clari informs us, some 'said that they were sorry that he had been killed in this way'.[1891]

[1888] A reference to Alexios IV's murder.
[1889] A reference to Isaak II's blinding.
[1890] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 135-6; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 89-90. I made changes to Andrea's translation.
[1891] Clari, *Conquête*, 77.

However, others 'said that anyone who cared about the death of Alexios should be cursed, for he had not been willing to keep his agreements with the pilgrims'.[1892]

'Through This You Might Camouflage Your Digression Rather Than That the Daughter Return to the Mother': Pope Innocent's Distrust of the Crusaders' Motives

The news of Alexios IV's overthrow and death did not reach Rome right away. Ironically, in early February, when Alexios IV was already deposed - or even dead, Innocent sent a letter to him addressing him as 'Alexios, Illustrious Emperor of Constantinople'.[1893] The pope praised Alexios for his 'pious passion ... to the point that you have desired church unity (*ecclesiasticam unitatem*) and you have yearned for the member to return to the head and the daughter to return to the mother and the Church of Constantinople, which has for quite some time (*multo tempore*) denied its debt of devotion to the Apostolic See, to show reverence, obedience, and honour to it'.[1894] Innocent also referred to the fact that the former emperor 'affirmed by oath that you would render full devotion to us and our successors, just as your predecessors, the Catholic emperors, are known to have rendered from ancient times (*antiquitis*) to our predecessors, the orthodox fathers - the Roman Pontiffs'.[1895]

All that was required of Alexios IV was his and the Church of Constantinople's submission to the papacy. It is worth noticing that the amount of time that had passed since the Church of Constantinople 'denied its debt of *devotio* to the Apostolic See' remained unspecified. Similarly indefinite remained the date that Alexios's predecessors, the *imperatores catholici*, ceased rendering devotion to Innocent's predecessors, the *orthodoxi Romani pontifices*. The date of the alleged rebellion of the Church of Constantinople against that of Rome was anything but clear to the pope's mind, let alone to the mind of any other *Latinus*.

In his letter, Innocent urged Alexios to 'balance deeds against declarations' and 'accomplish what you have sworn to do'.[1896] The pope appealed to Alexios's sense of justice

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[1892] Ibid.
[1893] *Die Register*, VI, 386; *The Registers*, 86.
[1894] *Die Register*, VI, 386-7; *The Registers*, 86. I made a minor amendment to Andrea's translation.
[1895] *Die Register*, VI, 386; *The Registers*, 86.
[1896] *The Registers*, 86-7.

by declaring: 'for inasmuch as you were restored to the throne through the aid of the Latins ... you ought, not without good reason, to honour the Roman Church, whose sons have so stood by you'.[1897] Further rewards were promised: 'the Apostolic See will take pains to strengthen it [the Byzantine Empire] effectively'; the Latins 'will especially be able to bestow on you [Alexios] and the empire of Constantinople needed protection'.[1898] If the Byzantine ruler offered the much desired church union, he would receive in exchange Western support and assistance - this axiom would, in fact, remain the cornerstone of papal policy toward the Byzantine Empire until the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Innocent's letter, however, was never to reach Alexios IV.

At around the time Innocent sent his letter to Alexios IV, a second letter was dispatched by the pope to the crusading leaders. In his missive to the crusaders, Innocent adopted a severe tone, clearly expressing his fear that because of their diversion to Constantinople they 'are again polluted with the stain of excommunication'.[1899] In fact, several members of the papal curia, and probably Innocent himself, distrusted the crusaders' motives for the detour to the Byzantine capital. As reported by the pope, the crusaders had claimed in their letters that they had procured Alexios IV's 'binding himself by oath to canonically render full obedience' to the papacy and to 'vigorously influence the Eastern Church toward that same end'.[1900] However, as Innocent related, 'some people firmly believe that you [the crusaders] did it to justify yourselves so that through this you might camouflage your digression rather than that the daughter return to the mother'.[1901] Such was the pope's and his curia's distrust of the crusaders' motives.

As has been demonstrated above, Alexios IV's promise to subject the Church of Constantinople to that of Rome does not seem to have particularly informed the crusaders' decision to travel to Constantinople. Further, after Alexios IV's enthronement, the crusaders do not appear to have been especially anxious to press the new emperor to fulfill this part of the treaty. This must have soon become clear to the pope. Therefore, as 'both a true indication of the devotion of the ... emperor [Alexios IV] and clear proof of your [the crusaders'] guilelessness', Innocent demanded that Alexios IV cause 'the patriarch [of Constantinople] to recognise ... the primacy (*primatum*) and *magisterium* of the Roman Church, ... to promise

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[1897] Ibid., 87.
[1898] Ibid., 86-7.
[1899] Ibid., 88.
[1900] Ibid., 88-9.
[1901] Ibid., 89.

reverence and obedience to us, and to request from the Apostolic See a *pallium*'.[1902] In other words, Innocent wanted the emperor to force the patriarch into admission of the Roman supremacy and submission to the pope, the fundamental axiom of the reforming papacy. Otherwise, the crusaders 'will appear to have added a second transgression to the first that you rushed into at Zara'.[1903] Finally, Innocent made clear to the crusaders that although he wished that 'the Church of Constantinople might return to devotion to and reverence for the Apostolic See', he did 'long with a greater intensity for the relief of the Holy Land, lest support for it, postponed thus far, be delayed further'.[1904] Jerusalem remained the first priority on the papal agenda.

In early February, Innocent sent another two letters, this time to the bishops of Soissons and Troyes. In the first one, the pope acknowledged the fact that two bishops 'ardently desire that the Greek Church come back to Rome and that the member return to the head ... and that there be no distinction whatsoever between Latins and Greeks but that they be made one (*uniantur*) in both the Catholic faith and ecclesiastical unity (*tam in fide catholica quam in unitate ecclesiastica*)'.[1905] However, as in his letter to the leaders, the pope expressed his distrust of the crusaders' motives: 'the crusaders might claim that they labored to this end [ecclesiastical unity], nevertheless, it seems to other people that what they did they did more so to justify themselves than out of devotion to the Church'.[1906] In his second letter, Innocent reminded the two bishops of his earlier prohibition against invading 'the lands of Christians' and of the fact that the crusaders were 'expressly' forbidden to 'attack or pillage the lands of the Greeks'.[1907] Innocent concluded that 'although we would have hoped that the Church of Constantinople returned to allegiance to the Roman Church ... we fear they [the crusaders] have incurred again the sentence of excommunication'.[1908] Innocent was manifestly both skeptical about the course of events and upset that the crusaders disregarded his wishes and prohibitions.

The pope composed and dispatched his letters pointlessly. In February the situation in the Byzantine Empire was completely different: a new emperor reigned in Constantinople. The

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[1902] Ibid., 89-90; *Die Register*, VI, 388.
[1903] *The Registers*, 89.
[1904] Ibid., 90.
[1905] Ibid., 91; *Die Register*, VI, 390.
[1906] *The Registers*, 91.
[1907] Ibid., 93-4. I made changes to Andrea's translation.
[1908] Ibid., 94.

crusaders' treaties with Alexios IV had died with him.[1909] As Clari reports, Alexios V threatened to 'kill them all [the crusaders]' if they did not 'depart and vacate his land ... within a week'.[1910] To the best of my knowledge, apart from Clari, no other contemporary source refers to the fact that the crusaders were given a week to withdraw from the Byzantine Empire. Probably, some writers were not aware of this. However, others, as Villehardouin and Baldwin, were certainly well aware of Alexios V's ultimatum, but conveniently forgot to mention it, preferring instead to portray the crusaders as compelled to attack Constantinople as an act of self-defense. As the passionately anti-Greek Gunther claims, the crusaders 'saw themselves confined in a hostile land, in the midst of the wickedest race of people (*pessime nacionis*) ... they could, most certainly, expect nothing but death from the new king [Alexios V] and the inhabitants of the city'.[1911] Elsewhere in his account, the chronicler maintains that the crusaders were not 'able to disengage from there [the Byzantine Empire] without substantial effort and danger, because of the Greeks' innumerable ships, with which, our people believed, the Greeks would pursue and attack them quite fiercely should they flee'.[1912] Despite Gunther's assertion, the Byzantine fleet was practically non-existent in 1204.[1913]

It is interesting that, as in the case of the medieval authors, the majority of modern scholars fails to refer to the fact that the crusaders were given a week to withdraw from the Byzantine Empire.[1914] Tyerman asserts that 'conquest [was] the only choice'.[1915] It is true that the crusaders were short of supplies and in a very difficult situation. Nevertheless, they could still have left the Byzantine Empire, however impoverished they were. As Madden rightly points out, 'their need was real, but without doubt they were also greedy'.[1916] Therefore, in early February 1204 they reached the decision to stay and conquer Constantinople for themselves.[1917]

[1909] T. F. Madden, 'Vows and Contracts in the Fourth Crusade: The Treaty of Zara and the Attack on Constantinople in 1204', *International History Review*, 15 (1993), 459-60.
[1910] Clari, *Conquête*, 77.
[1911] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 145; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 97.
[1912] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 89.
[1913] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 296-7. Cf. J. H. Pryor, 'The Venetian Fleet for the Fourth Crusade and the Diversion of the Crusade to Constantinople', in *The Experience of Crusading*, 1 (Cambridge, 2003), 121.
[1914] Phillips, who mentions Alexios V's ultimatum, mistakenly places it immediately after Mourtzouphlos's imprisonment of Alexios IV on the night of 27-8 January and certainly before Alexios IV's murder on the night of 8-9 February. See Phillips, 2004, 226. In fact, Robert of Clari places the ultimatum immediately after news of Alexios VI's murder reached the crusader camp. See Clari, *Conquête*, 77.
[1915] Tyerman, 2006, 550.
[1916] Madden, 1993, 462.
[1917] Queller and Madden, 1992, 463; Angold, 2003, 98.

Capture and Sack of Constantinople

'They Should Not Be at All Afraid to Attack the Greeks, For They Were the Enemies of God': Legitimisation of the Attack on Constantinople

Shortly after the crusaders were informed of Alexios IV's death, the leaders, prelates, and doge of Venice held a conference. After some examination of the situation, the clergy declared that the war against the Byzantines was 'just and lawful'[1918] for two reasons. First, since Alexios V was guilty of Alexios IV's murder, he 'had no right to hold lands', while the Byzantines 'who consented to such a thing [Alexios IV's murder] were accomplices in the crime'.[1919] Secondly, 'over and above all this, the Greeks as a people had seceded from the Church of Rome'.[1920] The supposed secession of the Greeks and their church, which had been hardly mentioned during the crusaders' discussions as to whether they should travel to Constantinople, was now fully exploited for propaganda purposes to legitimise an attack on the Christian Byzantine capital. The crusading clergy further reassured the leaders that 'if you fight to conquer this land [Constantinople] with the right intention of bringing it under the authority of Rome, all those of you who die after making confession shall benefit from the indulgence granted by the Pope'.[1921] The prelates lied. Not only had the pope never granted indulgence to crusaders attacking Constantinople, but he had even expressly forbidden an assault on the Byzantine capital. The crusading clergy's assurances amounted to total disregard of Innocent's wishes and prohibitions.

In March 1204 the crusading leaders and Doge Dandolo drew up a new treaty that stipulated how the spoils and the Byzantine Empire would be divided, an emperor elected, and a patriarch chosen. The two sides also agreed to stay together in the region until March 1205 to consolidate the new political settlement.[1922] Clari's account provides some additional information, particularly valuable to our study, but usually disregarded by modern historians:

[1918] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 85.
[1919] Ibid.
[1920] Ibid.
[1921] Ibid.
[1922] For the partition treaty, see Riley-Smith, 2005, 158; Lock, 1995, 40-3; Queller and Madden, 1997, 175-6; Phillips, 2004, 238-41; Tyerman, 2006, 550-1.

> all those in the camp were made ... to swear on relics that ... they would not use force on any woman or rob her of the clothes ... For anyone who was guilty of this would be killed. They were made to swear on the relics that they would not lay a hand on any monk or cleric or priest, unless he were under arms.[1923]

Although, after the fall of Constantinople, the oath was broken by many crusaders, it is still worthy of closer examination. It is worthwhile to underline that, despite the fact that the Byzantines had been denounced by the crusading clergy as accomplices in Alexios IV's murder and secessionists from the Church of Rome, Greek women and, what is more, Greek clerics and monks were still to be spared and treated with respect; oath-breakers would face the death penalty. The crusading clergy and nobility were well aware that their decision to attack Constantinople was arbitrary and ignored papal orders. The clerics knew well that the papal indulgence that they promised was void, and their declarations were a complete distortion of Innocent's wishes and constituted a radical departure from the pope's policy towards the Greeks. They knew that the war against the Byzantines was not as 'just and lawful' as they proclaimed. Being under the pressure of a guilty conscience for their decision to attack a Christian city disregarding and even distorting papal instructions, the crusading clergy and nobility struggled to have Constantinople conquered at the least possible cost in lives, especially of civilians and clergy. The mere fact that the army was obliged to swear on relics that they would not lay hands on Greek clerics and monks demonstrates that, even in March 1204, the Greeks were still silently acknowledged as Christian brothers rather than hated schismatics. This, however, was to change in April 1204.

On 9 April 1204, the crusaders attacked Constantinople. While the Byzantines suffered almost no casualties, the Westerners had heavy losses.[1924] The crusaders were dismayed and lost heart. The clergy immediately used its influence to boost their spirit. To exhort the demoralised army to fervor, there was only one last resort: to completely 'de-Christianise' and demonise the Greeks. By playing on the crusaders' religious sentiments, loyalty to the pope, *Latinitas*, and the feudal ideal of *loiauté* to one's *seigneur droiturier*, the clerics blatantly propagandised to instill hatred for the Greeks and demonstrate that an attack against them was fully righteous. As Clari relates,

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[1923] Clari, *Conquête*, 85.
[1924] Queller and Madden, 1997, 177-9; Phillips, 2004, 241-4.

> the bishops and the priests in the camp conferred together, and their opinion was that the battle was just (*droituriere*) and it was right to attack them [the Byzantines]. For in times past the people of the city had obeyed the creed of Rome, and now they were disobeying it, when they said the Roman creed had no value and that all those who believed in it were dogs. And the bishops said that in the circumstances it was their duty to attack them and that it was in no way a sin, rather it was a great work of charity.[1925]

A new attack was planned for Monday, 12 April. As Clari reports, after the sermon on Sunday morning of 11 April, the crusading bishops once again

> proved to the pilgrims that the battle was just (*droituriere*). For they [the Byzantines] were traitors (*traiteur*) and murderers (*mordrisseeur*), who were disloyal (*desloial*) when they had murdered their rightful lord (*seigneur droiturier*), and they were worse than Jews (*pieur que Juis*). The bishops said that in the name of God and the pope they were absolving all those who attacked them, and the bishops commanded the pilgrims to confess and take communion very devoutly, and that they should not be at all afraid to attack the Greeks, for they were the enemies (*enemi*) of God.[1926]

The crusading clergy's deliberately planned propaganda speeches intended to shape and manipulate the crusading host's perceptions of the Greeks, fan the fires of anti-Byzantine sentiment, and persuade the Westerners of the justice and legitimacy of an attack on Constantinople. Clari's account is in full agreement with that of Villehardouin as to the two reasons that the clergy advanced to justify and legitimise an attack on the Byzantine capital: the Byzantines were disobedient to the Church of Rome, and were also *traiteur*, *mordrisseeur*, and *desloial* since they had murdered Alexios IV, who was, according to the Western feudal perspective, their *seigneur droiturier*.

The accusation against the Byzantines that they denounced the 'Roman creed' as having 'no value' and described the Latin Christians as 'dogs' has certainly a measure of truth. As has been seen in Chapter 3, while the German army of the Third Crusade was marching through the Byzantine Empire, the Byzantine clerks and monks launched into vehement tirades against the Germans condemning them as heretics, while the Patriarch of Constantinople himself decried them as dogs.[1927] This is not to suggest that the Latin prelates of the Fourth Crusade were necessarily aware of the Byzantines' condemnation of the Germans of the Third Crusade.

[1925] Clari, *Conquête*, 86-7.
[1926] Ibid., 88-9.
[1927] Chapter 3, 205-7.

What is much more probable is that the same bitter denunciation of the Latins was made by the Byzantine clergy in 1203-4. At this time, however, denunciation became the spur to counter-denunciation, thus resulting in the Byzantines being demonised by the crusading clergy.

The portrayal of the Byzantines as 'worse than Jews' intended to further ignite the crusading host's fury. The Jews were considered Christ-killers, as a result of which they experienced much violence, especially in the Latin West. Among other things, the Westerners condemned the Jews as the worst enemies of God, allies of the devil and enemies of Christendom since, according to the Scriptures, they had deliberately killed Christ.[1928] Therefore, by decrying the Byzantines as worse than the hateful Jews, the crusading prelates doubtless stirred up the hatred of the crusading masses, subject to the influence of their spiritual leaders and easily swayed by propaganda. The Western clergy's propagandist speeches climaxed with the condemnation of the Byzantines as *enemi Damedieu*, a designation usually reserved to describe the Muslims. In addition to the Byzantines' portrayal as 'enemies of God', the absolution given to the crusaders by their bishops 'in the name of God and the pope' not only justified the attack on Constantinople, but also transformed the war against the Greeks into a crusade.[1929] The irony, however, is that the pope had never endorsed an assault on the Byzantine capital; he had explicitly forbidden it. Not only had the crusading prelates totally ignored the papal admonitions, but they also spread lies and deception, and abused their authority by absolving *de par Dieu et de par l'apostoile* the crusaders' attacking the Greeks.

On 12-13 April 1204, the crusaders, roused to a fever pitch, attacked Constantinople and eventually managed to breach its walls. Alexios V, following Alexios III's example, fled. In poem seventeen, Gunther incites the 'honoured soldier of Christ' to 'break into the city [Constantinople] ... crush cowards ... instill terror', but exhorts the crusaders 'to spare the blood' and 'remember they [the Byzantines] are brothers (*fratres*)'.[1930] Despite his prejudiced view and hatred for the Byzantines, Gunther clearly allows that, after all, the Greeks were

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[1928] J. Riley-Smith, 'Christian Violence and the Crusades', in *Religious Violence between Christians and Jews: Medieval Roots, Modern Perspectives*, ed. A. S. Abulafia (Basingstoke, 2002), 12; J. Cohen, 'Christian Theology and Anti-Jewish Violence in the Middle Ages: Connections and Disjunctions', in ibid., 47 and 49; A. S. Abulafia, 'The Intellectual and Spiritual Quest for Christ and Central Medieval Persecution of Jews', in ibid., 61, 66, 79; M. R. Cohen, 'Anti-Jewish Violence and the Place of the Jews in Christendom and in Islam: A Paradigm', in ibid., 111, 116-17, 127, 129; G. I. Langmuir, 'At the Frontiers of Faith', in ibid., 143.

[1929] Madden, 1993, 463, 468.

[1930] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 155; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 105-6.

Christian brethren. The same chronicler reports that the crusaders refrained from a 'massive carnage' (*cedis copia*) after the conquest of Constantinople, 'since they had often been admonished by the [crusader] clerics ... - Martin and others - that, insofar as it was possible, they should stay their hands from blood'.[1931] Although Andrea accepts Gunther's testimony,[1932] we should remain extremely sceptical of its reliability: it is very difficult to reconcile Gunther's account with that of Clari which describes the crusading clergy's blatant propaganda against the Greeks; Clari is positively the more authoritative of the two accounts.

However, is it possible at all to accept the trustworthiness of Gunther's testimony? To answer this, we first have to ask ourselves *when* the crusading prelates, including Martin who only reached Constantinople on 1 January 1204,[1933] might have attempted to restrain the crusaders from killing Greeks, especially given the fact that from the official termination of the Byzantine-Latin alliance in December 1204 until the conquest of Constantinople on 13 April 1204, there was war between the Byzantines and the crusaders. As Madden has rightly argued, the war was, from the Western viewpoint, 'two different wars'.[1934] During the first one, which lasted until Alexios IV's murder in February 1204, the crusaders raided the lands surrounding Constantinople to 'seize so much of his [Alexios IV's] property that they would be paid' since the emperor would not pay the debt owed. No conquest was attempted at this stage. During this 'first war', the clergy may well have admonished the crusaders to avoid shedding the blood of their co-religionists. But even at some point during the second war, i.e. between Alexios IV's murder and the conquest of Constantinople, the crusaders, as has been seen, were obliged to swear on relics that they would spare at least the women, the clergy and the monks. Therefore, we could conclude that Gunther's testimony may well be reliable. Nevertheless, the author's failure to relate that the crusading clergy finally 'de-Christianised' and demonised the Greeks requires some investigation. We should not exclude the possibility that Abbot Martin had deliberately concealed the truth from Gunther. However, it is very probable that the writer was aware of the crusading clerics' anti-Greek propaganda but suppressed information on this issue, either because the clergy's proclamations and speeches ignored and distorted papal instructions, or because Gunther himself, who, after all, considered the Greeks as Christian brethren did not want to refer to their 'de-Christianisation' by the

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[1931] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 156; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 107.
[1932] Andrea, 1980, 293.
[1933] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 88, 160, n. 127.
[1934] Madden, 1993, 461.

crusading clergy. The mere fact that the *Hystoria Constantinopolitana* takes the form of an apologia for the attack on Constantinople testifies to the burden of guilt that weighed on its author's mind.

On 13 April 1204, Constantinople was finally in Latin hands. The two former Byzantine emperors, Alexios III and Alexios V, were now both refugees. A few months later Alexios III managed to capture and blind Alexios V. Villehardouin raises the moral question: 'Judge for yourselves, after hearing of this treachery, whether people who could treat each other with such savage cruelty would be fit to hold lands or would deserve to loose them?'.[1935] The answer comes from the Western crusaders themselves; according to Villehardouin, when they heard how Alexios III had torn out Mourtzouphlos's eyes, the crusaders 'roundly declared that people who could betray each other so treacherously had no right to hold lands'.[1936] The record of the episode of Alexios V's blinding by Alexios III and Villehardouin's comments that follow aim to prove that the two former Byzantine emperors were unsuitable for the imperial throne and had no right to rule since they were traitors and cruel savages. Indirectly, the chronicler, by recording the episode and commenting on it, attempts to legitimise the conquest of the Byzantine Empire.

'Since the History of This World Was Told, So Great, Noble and Rich a Treasure Was Never Seen Nor Won': the Sack of Constantinople

The extent of the massacre of Greeks that followed the capture of Constantinople is certainly difficult to be estimated due to the diversity of the available evidence. Six eyewitnesses, namely Villehardouin, the author of the *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, Baldwin of Flanders, Dandolo, Choniates, and Nikolaos Mesarites present a picture of a substantial slaughter.[1937] However, Clari records that 'after the capture of the city no harm was done to poor or rich; rather anyone who wanted to go went and anyone who wanted remained'.[1938] Although we cannot determine the extent of the carnage, this was certainly not massive. In the immediate aftermath of the conquest of Constantinople, the city was still 'largely peopled with

[1935] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 99.
[1936] Ibid., 100.
[1937] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 91; *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, 221; *The Registers*, 106, 130; Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 313. Nikolaos Mesarites's account of the sack of Constantinople is translated in Brand, 1968, 269.
[1938] Clari, *Conquête*, 99.

Greeks',[1939] as recorded by Villehardouin. Further, our primary sources attest that 'the Greeks' were present at the coronation of the Latin emperor of Constantinople on 16 May 1204 and at the execution of Alexios V in November 1204.[1940]

After its capture Constantinople was systematically sacked for three days. The palaces of the Constantinopolitan elite as well as churches and monasteries were stripped of everything valuable. As Madden points out, 'the sack of Constantinople ranks as one of the most profitable and shameful in history'.[1941] The wealth of the *urbs regia* that had never failed to dazzle the Westerners was converted into the vast and sumptuous booty taken by the crusaders after the capture of the imperial city. As Clari asserts, the loot 'was so rich ... the great wealth ... was a true marvel'.[1942] The impressed chronicler struggles to estimate the quantity and quality of the booty taken from the city:

> since the history of this world was told, so great, noble and rich a treasure was never seen nor won, neither in the time of Alexander nor in the time of Charlemagne, either before or since; nor do I think in my opinion that there was so much property in the forty richest cities in the world as was found in the heart of Constantinople.[1943]

As Clari informs us, 'the Greeks state that two thirds of the world's property was in Constantinople and the third part was scattered throughout the world'.[1944] It is not implausible that the Constantinopolitans, with their exaggerated sense of the importance of their own city, claimed for the *Basileuousa* 'two thirds of the world's property'. Clari, who himself estimates the wealth of Constantinople to exceed that of 'the forty richest cities in the world', seems to accept rather than dispute the Greeks' assertion.

Villehardouin employs language analogous to that of Clari in his attempt to communicate the vastness of the booty gained in Constantinople: 'so much, indeed, that no one could estimate its amount or its value. It included ... every choicest thing to be found on this earth'.[1945] Eventually, Villehardouin's description, like Clari's, reaches a climax with a

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[1939] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 98.
[1940] Clari, *Conquête*, 117; *The Registers*, 108; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 115.
[1941] Madden, 2005, 118.
[1942] Clari, *Conquête*, 99.
[1943] Ibid.
[1944] Ibid.
[1945] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 92.

declaration in the third person that, 'to his knowledge, so much booty had never been gained in any city since the creation of the world'.[1946]

Gunther of Pairis's similarly endeavours to communicate the great amount of the booty won in the Byzantine capital. As he relates, the crusaders 'discovered in abundance ... everywhere, so great a wealth of gold and silver, so great a magnificence of gems and clothing, so great a profusion of valuable trade goods, so great a bounty of foodstuffs, homes so exceptional and so filled with commodities of every sort, that they were all suddenly transformed from aliens and paupers into very rich citizens'.[1947] Baldwin of Flanders is more laconic but his astonishment at the immensity of the loot taken is still obvious: 'an innumerable amount of ... all those things that people judge to be riches is plundered. Such an inestimable abundance is discovered that the entire Latin World does not seem to possess as much'.[1948]

The immense treasure amassed in the two imperial palaces within Constantinople astonished both Villehardouin and Clari. Referring to the Great Palace, Villehardouin declares: 'words fail me when it comes to describing the treasures found in that palace, for there was such a store of precious things that one could not possibly count them'.[1949] The palace of Blachernae and its sumptuous treasures captured the imagination of Clari, who relates that

> this palace was so rich and so noble that no one could describe or make known to you the great nobility and the great richness of this palace. In this Palace of Blachernae was found a very rich and great treasure where they found the rich crowns which had belonged to emperors who lived long ago and the rich golden jewels and the rich silks with gold thread and the rich imperial robes and the rich precious stones and so many other riches that no one could count the great gold and silver treasure which was found in the palace.[1950]

[1946] Ibid.
[1947] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 107.
[1948] *The Registers*, 107.
[1949] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 92.
[1950] Clari, *Conquête*, 103.

Conclusions

'O City, city, eye of all cities, universal boast ... once garbed in royal silk and purple and now filthy and squalid and heir to many evils ... now thy luxurious garments and elegant royal veils are rent and torn',[1951] lamented the Byzantine historian Choniates of the capture and sack of the Queen of Cities. On 12 April 1204, for the first time in its 874-year history, the impregnable city of Constantinople succumbed to a foreign army and the tottering Byzantine Empire was portioned out among its conquerors.

The four-year attempts of Pope Innocent III to draw the Byzantine Empire into his grand design of one Christendom united against the infidel behind the banner of the papacy had come to nothing. In the bitterest of ironies, the crusade, in which Innocent had struggled to engage the Byzantine Empire, having got out of the pope's control, ended up destroying the ancient empire on Bosporus. Innocent utterly failed to prevent his crusade from attacking Zara, a city of his 'most beloved son in Christ, Emeric, distinguished king of the Hungarians'[1952] and from toppling his 'beloved son in Christ, the emperor of Constantinople'[1953] Alexios III. Despite his considerably large number of letters and explicit prohibitions against attacking Christians, Innocent failed to control his crusaders. In the course of the Fourth Crusade, the limitations of papal authority were totally exposed.

What is indisputably true, and should always be kept in mind, is that the diversion of the Fourth Crusade first to Zara and then to Constantinople came about only after much debate and disagreement which resulted in the crusading army being badly affected by desertions: as in the case of previous crusades, an attack against Christians was abhorrent to a great part of the crusaders. The ideal of Christian fraternity did emerge in the course of the Fourth Crusade but finally failed to prevent an attack first on Zara and secondly on Constantinople. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that, until the very end, the crusading clergy was very reluctant to delegitimise the Greeks through the de-Christianisation of their image.

Concerning Constantinople in particular, it has become clear that an attack and conquest was not in the crusaders' minds from the outset. Their only plan was to overthrow the *tyrannus* Alexios III and install on the imperial throne *li drois oirs*, Prince Alexios. In the crusaders' mind, it was a charitable deed to restore the legitimate heir to his inheritance. Even

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[1951] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 317.
[1952] *The Registers*, 43.
[1953] Ibid., 67.

when their relations with their ex-protégé had been badly deteriorated, the crusaders did not consider attacking him or his capital, however betrayed they felt. Only when Alexios V was deposed and murdered did the Westerners decide to conquer the Byzantine Empire from the new usurper Alexios V, perhaps the most vilified of all Byzantine emperors in Latin historiography. Alexios V killed Alexios IV in order to nullify his treaties with the Westerners and leave the crusaders with no justification for their presence outside the walls of Constantinople.[1954] Alexios V believed that with Alexios IV dead the crusaders would be compelled to withdraw from the Byzantine Empire. With the benefit of hindsight, we could state that Alexios V's murdering the crusaders' ex-protégé was an imprudent action. It achieved the opposite result, making it legitimate for the crusaders to stay and conquer the Byzantine Empire.

[1954] Madden, 1993, 459-60.

Chapter 5

LATIN REACTIONS TO AND AFTERMATH OF 1204

The final chapter deals with the Latin reactions to and aftermath of 1204 and is subdivided into three sections. The first section, which investigates the Western view of the Latin capture and sack of Constantinople, is subdivided into four parts: the first examines how the translation of relics from Constantinople to the West was perceived by the Westerners; the second discusses how the Latin conquest of the Byzantine capital was received and viewed in the West; the third explores Innocent's high expectations from the Latin succession in Constantinople, namely his anticipation that the Latin conquest of the Byzantine capital would effect the union of the Western and Eastern Churches; the fourth deals with the high hopes raised in the West in the aftermath of the Latin conquest of Constantinople, namely the belief that the conquest of the Byzantine capital would be followed by the liberation of Muslim-held Jerusalem and Alexandria; and the fifth investigates the disillusionment and sceptisism arising in the West when it eventually became clear that the Latin conquest of Constantinople was more of a problem than a solution. The second section of this chapter examines the reception of the first two Latin Emperors by the Greeks, while the third scrutinises the scholarly view that the chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade despised the Greeks.

The Sources

In this chapter, along with the primary sources examined in Chapter 4, we will investigate three German minor accounts for the Fourth Crusade, which were composed in the West after 1204. These are incorporated in the chronicles of Arnold of Lübeck, the Benedictine Otto of Saint Blasien, and the Provost Burchard of Ursberg (1177-1231). Being near enough to the events they describe, the three German authors were relatively well informed. The accounts' main significance, however, lies in what they disclose about how the Byzantines and the Latin conquest of Constantinople were perceived in Western Europe in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. Apart from oral sources, one of the three authors, Arnold, used the letter of Baldwin

of Flanders, Hugh of Saint Pol, and Louis of Blois, as well as the letter of Baldwin I. The German chronicler reproduces the two letters and prefaces them with a series of comments.[1955]

A key source investigated in this chapter is the account of Henry of Valenciennes, which begins soon after the end of Villehardouin's account, and constitutes our sole source for the Latin Empire of Constantinople for the years 1208-9. Henry of Valenciennes from Hainaut was almost certainly a writer, a poet, and perhaps a cleric who, after a life of sin, took the cross as a penitent and was attached to the household of Henry of Hainaut, who in 1206 succeeded his brother Baldwin as emperor of the Latin Empire of Constantinople. Valenciennes's clear and detailed narrative covers a little more than one year of Henry's reign, from May 1208 to July 1209, before ending abruptly for no very obvious reason. Completely dedicated to his emperor, the chronicler presents him as a glorious hero to his intended audience, the feudal nobility of Western Europe. Although Valenciennes was close to the court, he probably did not, unlike Villehardouin, have access to the highest circle of decision-makers. Consequently he, like Clari, has less inside information and, therefore, gives an outsider's view of events. A further point of comparison lies in the fact that, although Valenciennes's chronicle only covers the brief span of 1208-9, it nonetheless shares Clari's interest in the thoughts and mentality of the common man of its era.[1956]

Western View of the Latin Conquest of Constantinople

'Divine Goodness ... So Arranged ... That the Western Church, Illuminated By the Inviolable Relics ... Should Rejoice Forever': *translatio reliquiarum* from Constantinople to the West

Constantinople owed its prestige not only to its power, size, wealth and buildings, but also to its status as the largest storehouse of relics in the Christian world. It was either a popular destination of pilgrimage in its own right or a stop on the pilgrim's itinerary to the Holy Land.[1957] The relic-obsessed Westerners were deeply impressed once they entered the imperial capital. As we have seen, Fulcher of Chartres, who arrived in Constantinople in 1097,

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[1955] Angold, 2003, 115-6; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicle*, 265-75.
[1956] Noble, 2001, 399-416; Noble, 1999, 202-11; P. S. Noble, 'Henry of Valenciennes', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 2 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 577; Errikou tes Balansien, *Η Ιστορία του Αυτοκράτορα Ερρίκου της Κωνσταντινούπολης*, trans. Kostas Antypas (Athens, 1987), 18-23.
[1957] Riley, 2005, 159; Harris, 2003, 11.

enthusiastically refers to its opulence in holy relics. A little over a century later, the chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade were also impressed by the number of relics in Constantinople. Villehardouin recounts that these relics 'were beyond all description; for there were at that time as many in Constantinople as in all the rest of the world'.[1958] Clari, who devotes twelve paragraphs of his work to Constantinople's wealth, gives a much more detailed description of the rich and countless relics of the city and the miraculous properties attributed to them.[1959] Needless to say that neither the authenticity of these relics nor their miraculous properties are questioned. In many cases, Clari adorns his description of the relics with stories that he had heard about them, seemingly from Byzantines. Interestingly, the chronicler shows a genuine interest and trust in what his Greek informants told him.

Following the conquest of Constantinople thousands of relics housed in the churches and monasteries of the Byzantine capital were grabbed and shipped back to Western Europe.[1960] Although *furtum sacrum* - sacred theft - had a long history, there were doubts as to its legitimacy. Therefore, authors of *translationes* felt the need to provide some justification or explanation for relic thefts;[1961] some of our Western writers of translation of relics from Constantinople to the West are no exception. Back in the early twelfth century, even the ardently anti-Alexian Robert the Monk, when referring to Raymond of Aguilers's proposal to attack Constantinople, averred that 'there was *no justification* (*non erat ratio*) for sacking such a royal city [Constantinople] and so many churches consecrated to God, nor for burning so many holy relics or taking them from their resting-places'.[1962] Gunther, who, as we know, had read Robert's *Historia Iherosolimitana*,[1963] felt obligated to justify the very actions for which 'there was no justification', according to the most popular history of the First Crusade. The chronicler relates in his Abbot Martin's defence that, unlike other pilgrims' 'stealing gold, silver, and every sort of precious article', Martin committed *sacrilegium* only 'in a holy cause' (*in re sacra*).[1964] Already in chapter eleven, the chronicler had declared his conviction that the Byzantines 'had shown themselves unworthy (*indignos*)' of the relics, and therefore 'Divine Goodness' (*divina bonitas*) decided 'that the Western Church, illuminated by the inviolable

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[1958] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 76.
[1959] Clari, *Conquête*, 99-111.
[1960] Madden, 2005, 118.
[1961] P. J. Geary, *Furta Sacra: Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages, 800-1100* (Princeton, 1978), 132, 136, 142-3.
[1962] Robert the Monk, *Historia*, 749; Robert the Monk, *History*, 99. Emphasis added.
[1963] Andrea, 1980, 280.
[1964] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 159; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 109.

relics ... should rejoice forever'.[1965] Later, in chapter twenty-four, Gunther will return to the same theme. After enumerating the relics transferred from Constantinople to the church at Pairis, he asserts that the capture of Constantinople 'was done under the shelter of divine grace, in order that so many important, deeply venerated relics would arrive at our church'.[1966]

Otto of Saint Blasien viewed the translation in similar terms. After reporting that Martin carried back to the West 'many relics of the saints' and 'through these he greatly ennobled all of Germany', Otto goes on to account for God's punishing the Greeks '*not* through pagans *but* through Christians': 'this was made necessary by the merits of the saints, so that their magnificent relics would not be polluted by pagan hands. Rather, transferred to another place, they would be venerated with due honour by Christians'.[1967]

Although both Gunther and Otto appear to have approved of the Latin conquest of Constantinople and the subsequent translation of relics to the West, their attempt to justify these actions evidences that they were not altogether comfortable. What is more, other Latin authors went as far as to expressly raise doubts about the legitimacy of the *furtum sacrum* that followed the capture of Constantinople. Authoring his chronicle in the early thirteenth century, Provost Burchard of Ursberg invited his reader to judge himself whether the relics carried back to Pairis by Martin were stolen (*furtive*). The chronicler immediately proceeds to pose a rhetorical question: 'could the pope justify such a theft (*rapina*) carried out against a Christian people (*populo christiano*), as the theft (*furtum*) of the people of Israel in Egypt was justified by divine authority'?[1968] Latin uncertainty about the legitimacy of the sack of the Christian Byzantine capital by the Fourth Crusade is plainly reflected in Burchard of Ursberg's chronicle.

Super omnia mirabilia mirabile

On 9 May 1204 Baldwin of Flanders was elected emperor of the newly established Latin Empire of Constantinople and was crowned on the 16 of the same month. After his coronation, the new emperor sent at least four similar letters to Western Europe reporting the unexpected

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[1965] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 137-8; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 91.
[1966] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 127.
[1967] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*, 81-2. Emphasis added. I made changes in the English translation in Andrea, Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 15.
[1968] Burchard of Ursperg, *Die chronik des propstes Burchard von Ursberg*, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger and Bernhard von Simson, *MGH, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis separatim editi*, 16 (Hanover, 1916), 87-88.

turn of events in Constantinople and giving a detailed narrative of the events that led to the capture of the Byzantine capital.[1969] In the version dispatched to the pope, Emperor Baldwin endeavours to convey the idea that 'the hand of the Lord guided all of these events' (*manus Domini operetur hec omnia*) and 'we [the crusaders] do not wrongly lay claim to this victory for ourselves ... this was done by the Lord (*a Domino factum est istud*), and it is a miracle above all miracles in our eyes'.[1970] This notion cannot be dismissed as mere propaganda. It is a view that seems to have represented genuine Latin popular opinion. To medieval minds, if this unexpected turn of events and the crusader's conquest of Constantinople had not been God's plan, how else could it be explained?

As Villehardouin informs us, after the capture of Constantinople the crusaders 'gave thanks to our Lord for the honour and the victory He had granted them, ... since the whole of their army numbered no more than twenty thousand men, and with His help they had conquered four hundred thousand, or more, and that in the greatest, most powerful, and most strongly fortified city in the world'.[1971] The Anonymous of Halberstadt introduces his account of the events in Constantinople by inviting his readers to consider 'the wondrous manner in which the Lord effected miracles through an army as insignificant as it was underrated'.[1972] The same notion is highlighted most powerfully in the *Hystoria Constantinopolitana* of Gunther, who strives to impress upon us that 'we have to believe (*credendum est*) that ... [the turn of events] followed from the incontrovertible Providence of God (*Dei disposicio*)'.[1973]

Constantinople was captured on 13 April and, since Palm Sunday fell on 18 April, Gunther suggests that 'God so arranged it that the army of Christ would triumphantly break into this faithless city (*perfidam urbem*) [Constantinople] on the very day on which Christ, arriving for the triumph of Passion, entered the Holy City [Jerusalem]'.[1974] In order to further reinforce the view that the conquest of Constantinople had been caused by God, Gunther employs an argument similar to that used by Villehardouin. He states in the first person: 'I also do not believe that without the indisputable miracle of divine favour this exceedingly

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[1969] *The Registers*, 98.
[1970] Ibid., 100, 107; *Die Register*, VII, 253, 259.
[1971] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 93.
[1972] *Deeds of the Bishops of Halberstadt*, 255.
[1973] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 140; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 93.
[1974] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 155; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 105.

well-fortified city [Constantinople] ... could have been surrendered into the hands of a few, suddenly, so openly, and so easily'.[1975]

From Gunther's standpoint, 'those monumental and miraculous events', i.e. the diversion of the Fourth Crusade and the capture of the Byzantine Empire, 'were conducted to their outcome along a fixed but secret path'.[1976] They were done by God's authorship (*Deo auctore facta sunt*);[1977] they were divine works (*divina opera*).[1978] In poem eleven and chapter twelve, Gunther fully elaborates his views on the 'Divine Mind (*mens divina*), which the Greeks call *Noys*',[1979] and which drives human history. According to Gunther,

> ...all phenomena executed in diverse ages
> Proceed according to a law, constant but known to absolutely no one,
> Save One [God] ...[1980]

In his letter to Innocent, Baldwin I introduces his accounts of events from Alexios IV's 'unexpected turn of mind' to his own election and coronation as emperor of Constantinople, by contrasting 'the deeds of God' (*opera Dei*), i.e. the Latin conquest of Constantinople, with 'the deeds of demons' (*opera demonum*), i.e. what 'Greece, with a new Greek emperor [Alexios V] and with its usual perfidy (*ex perfidia consueta*) ... rendered unto us [the crusaders]'.[1981] This is clearly a rhetorical device aimed at prejudicing the pope against the Greeks and justifying the Latin capture of the Byzantine capital. Baldwin's advisers had conveniently resorted to the arsenal of stereotypes to discredit the Greeks in the eyes of the pope.

In his letter, apart from advancing the notion that the Latin conquest of Constantinople was nothing less than a miracle, Emperor Baldwin supports the view that the capture of the Byzantine capital would be of benefit to both the papacy and the crusading cause. As he puts it, the crusaders 'attack the city ... for the honour of the Holy Roman Church and for the relief of the Holy Land (*pro honore sancte Romane ecclesie, et subventione Terre sancte*)'.[1982] His subsequent elevation to the throne was again 'for the honour of God and of the Roman Church

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[1975] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 112.
[1976] Ibid., 91. Cf. 89, 109.
[1977] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 178.
[1978] Ibid., 180.
[1979],Ibid., 140.
[1980] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 92.
[1981] *Die Register*, VII, 254; *The Registers*, 100.
[1982] *Die Register*, VII, 257; *The Registers*, 105. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 156-63.

and for the relief of the Holy Land'.[1983] According to Baldwin, Latins of *Outremer*, who were present at his enthronement, were particularly joyful for the new state of affairs in Constantinople, 'just as if the Holy City [Jerusalem] had been restored to Christian worship'.[1984] The reason for their 'incalculable and unrestrained' 'joy'[1985] was that the Byzantine capital, which had 'vigorously stood in opposition to and been an adversary of (*potenter adversaria stetit et contradixit*) ... the Roman Church and the land of Jerusalem', 'dedicated itself' to both, 'to the perpetual confusion of the enemies of the Holy Cross'.[1986]

As we saw in Chapter 3, during the march of the German crusading expedition through the Byzantine Empire and during Richard's military campaign against Isaak of Cyprus, wild stories of Byzantine-Muslim conspiracies against the Latins circulated widely among the crusaders and the Franks of *Outremer*.[1987] These stories were enhanced and eventually enshrined as truth. Believing that the Byzantines worked for their destruction, the Latin settlers naturally raised their hopes too high immediately after the Latin conquest of Constantinople. As reported by Baldwin,

> it is this city [Constantinople], which in the most unclean rite of the heathens - sucking blood by turn as a sign of fraternal union (*pro fraterna societate sanguinibus alternis ebibitis*) - very often dared to secure deadly friendships (*amicitias ferales*) with the infidels, and its quite fruitful breast long fed these same infidel, and it deviated into worldly arrogance by providing arms, ships, and foodstuffs.[1988]

The statement is a mixture of some of the main accusations against Emperor Isaak II and Isaak of Cyprus, found in the primary sources of the Third Crusade. Both Byzantine rulers were imagined to have exchanged blood with Saladin to seal deadly alliances against the Latins, while rumours persisted that military and naval assistance was sent to the sultan from Byzantium and *vice versa*.

The source of Baldwin's information cannot be definitely identified. It is possible that the Latin emperor's informers were Latin settlers of Palestine. However, it is very probable that Baldwin's informants were crusading leaders such as Villehardouin and Hugh of Saint Pol,

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[1983] *The Registers*, 108.
[1984] Ibid.
[1985] Ibid.
[1986] Ibid.; *Die Register*, VII, 259.
[1987] Chapter 3, 212-31, 238-46.
[1988] *Die Register*, VII, 259; *The Registers*, 108.

both veterans of the Third Crusade. The two crusading nobles had participated in the siege of Acre, and it is most likely that they had been aware of the rumours, according to which, Isaak II had colluded with Saladin to destroy the German crusaders. Why, then, had not the crusading leaders and clergy used Isaak's purported alliance with the Muslim leader against the Third Crusade as justification for the crusading attacks on Constantinople in April 1204? This is not difficult to explain. The Fourth Crusade had ended up in Bosporus to defend Isaak's and, particularly, his son's claims on the imperial throne. The fact that Isaak had allegedly allied himself with Saladin against the Germans of the Third Crusade had not prevented veterans of the expedition, such as Villehardouin and Hugh, from supporting the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople to install Prince Alexios on the throne. However, the alleged alliance between Isaak and Saladin must have been at the back of some of the crusaders' mind. It must not be accidental that after relations between Alexios IV and the crusaders came to an end, Isaak was suspected of turning his son against the Westerners and rumours began to circulate that 'it was he [Isaak] who had turned his son's sentiment away from us'. Those leaders, however, who may well have been aware of the supposed Byzantine-Muslim alliance, never leaked this information to the crusading army. This would have placed them in a very embarrassing position. Even when Baldwin wrote to the pope that Constantinople 'often dared to secure deadly friendships with the infidels', he took care not to mention Isaak's name; he rather referred to Byzantine-Muslim *amicitias ferales* in a general and vague way.

Baldwin's accusations that the Byzantines operated in collusion with the infidels are followed by a barrage of charges against them that were intended to further inflame Innocent and legitimise the Latin conquest of Constantinople. The first two accusations are completely ludicrous and it is highly questionable whether they were taken seriously by the pope. Supposedly, Constantinople 'out of hatred for the Apostolic dignity, could scarcely bear to hear the name of the prince of the apostles [Peter] and ... conceded not one Greek church to him who received from the Lord Himself dominion over all churches'.[1989] The second charge refers to the iconoclasm of the eighth and ninth centuries.[1990] To fall back on iconoclasm to justify an event that occurred in 1204 was out of place. However, the accusations that follow are much more appropriate.

[1989] *The Registers*, 108.
[1990] Ibid.

The Latin emperor records that 'among the execrable rites that it [Constantinople] had devised for itself in contempt for the authority of Scripture, it even quite often presumed to diminish salvific baptism by repeating it'.[1991] The Byzantine practice of re-baptising in the Eastern rite persons who had already been baptised in the Latin rite had always, and justifiably, been viewed with resentment by the Latins. Suffice it to recall Odo of Deuil's pointed comments on the Byzantine practices of rebaptism and of purification of the altars on which a Latin priest had celebrated mass.[1992] As has been mentioned, even when Innocent accepted Greek customs and rites at the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215, he did not countenance these two practices. Persons guilty of these deeds were to be excommunicated and deposed.[1993]

Emperor Baldwin further accused Constantinople of regarding 'all Latins worthy of being called not humans but dogs, the shedding of whose blood they almost reckoned among the works of merit'.[1994] As has been seen, this accusation, which had been used by the crusading prelates to discredit the Greeks before the final assault on Constantinople, did not lack validity. Finally, the Latin emperor condemned the fact that in the Greek Church 'lay monks ... in contempt of priests possessed all authority to bind and loose',[1995] i.e. to absolve sins, a power belonging exclusively to ordained priests according to the teaching of the early thirteenth-century Roman Church.[1996]

Having enumerated the *iniquitates* of the Greeks, 'iniquities that provoked the Lord Himself *ad nauseam*',[1997] Baldwin clearly and eloquently expresses the conviction that *through* the crusaders Divine Providence worked to punish the Greeks for their crimes: 'Divine Justice (*divina iustitia*), through our [the crusaders'] ministry (*nostro ministerio*) and with fitting vengeance, punished such absurdities as cannot be explained within the limitations of a letter, and with the expulsion of people who hated God and loved themselves, it gave us a land overflowing with an abundance of every sort of good thing'.[1998]

Baldwin's letter to the pope was a masterpiece of propaganda to legitimise the Latin conquest of Constantinople. It should be born in mind, however, that before sailing to

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[1991] Ibid., 108-9.
[1992] Chapter 2, 111-12.
[1993] Andrea, 2005, 112-15.
[1994] *The Registers*, 109.
[1995] Ibid.
[1996] Ibid., 109, n. 406.
[1997] Ibid., 109; *Die Register*, VII, 260. I made an amendment to Andrea's translation.
[1998] *Die Register*, VII, 260; *The Registers*, 109.

Constantinople in 1203, the future Latin emperor was *not* prejudiced or ill-disposed toward the Byzantines and their empire. Attention should be drawn in this connection to the *Chronicon Hanoniense*, composed during the years 1195 and 1196 by the Flemish cleric Gilbert of Mons (c. 1150-1225).[1999] Although not a source for the Fourth Crusade, the importance of this chronicle is due to the fact that its author became Court chaplain to Count Baldwin V of Hainaut (1171-95) and the VIII of Flanders (1191-4), Emperor Baldwin's father, in 1175 and the count's first notary most likely in 1184 while holding the office of chancellor of Hainaut from 1178/80 to 1195. Therefore, Gilbert's account reveals some useful insight into the perception of the Byzantine Empire in the courts of Hainaut and Flanders, less than a decade before the Fourth Crusade. Gilbert refers to Alexios I's sending 'envoys to France with letters to stir up the princes, so that they would come to the aid of desolate Jerusalem and imperiled Greece' and requesting 'help and advice from Urban ... concerning the incursions of the heathens'.[2000] The chronicler gives a largely impartial account of the First Crusade and, although deploring 'Tatin's [i.e. Tatikios's] treachery (*perfidiam*) against the Christians', is not hostile to Alexios, whom he describes as 'beloved' (*dilectus*) by Pope Urban.[2001] Gilbert makes no reference to the Second Crusade. In his brief account of the Third Crusade, for which he based himself on first-hand reports from returning crusaders to Hainaut, Gilbert relates that, when the Emperor Frederick 'came to the land of the emperor of Constantinople ... he discovered the emperor to be a rebel (*rebellis*), [and therefore] he attacked him as if an enemy of Christ (*inimicum Christi*) and destroyed many of his cities'.[2002] According to Gilbert, Frederick's 'intention was to bring the emperor of Constantinople with him, or at least be sufficiently secure from him concerning a good and peaceful crossing for himself and his men and for having provisions'.[2003] No mention is made of Isaak's alleged alliance with Saladin and, in fact, Isaak is not even referred to by name. On the whole, the *Chronicon Hanoniense* evidences that in the courts of Hainaut and Flanders there was little interest in the Byzantine Empire, and certainly no anti-Byzantine sentiment.

[1999] Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle*, xxvii-xxviii, xxxiii-xxxvii. According to Napran, the *Chronicon Hanoniense* 'remains one of our most accurate sources for the political and military history of the twelfth century'. To the best of my knowledge, the *Chronicon Hanoniense* has not been taken into account in the discussions of the Fourth Crusade.

[2000] Ibid., 27. Cf. 25.

[2001] Ibid., 27, 29; Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicon Hanoniense*, *MGH SS*, 21, 503-4.

[2002] Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicon Hanoniense*, *MGH SS*, 21, 566; Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle*, 128. I made minor amendments to Napran's translation.

[2003] Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle*, 128.

In his propagandistic letter, having struggled to convince Innocent of the righteousness of the crusaders' actions in Byzantium, Baldwin does not neglect to reassure the pope that he intends to continue on toward Palestine once 'that land [the Latin empire] stabilised by the settlement of our people'.[2004] The emperor thus asks Innocent to 'inflame with salutary admonitions the inhabitants of the West ... of every sort of class and of each sex ... [to] come to us and ... faithfully serve our empire [Latin Empire of Constantinople]' with the promise of 'an Apostolic indulgence'.[2005] The Latin Empire was coming to be realised as a crusader state in the pattern of those in Syria and Palestine. Baldwin's priorities were therefore settlement and defense which would ensure the survival of his crusader state. The emperor struggled to secure the same papal indulgence for those who would serve his empire as that granted to crusaders defending the crusader states in Syria and Palestine.

The conviction advanced by Baldwin that the Byzantines had been punished by God is also echoed in the accounts of Gunther of Pairis and Otto of Saint Blasien. After enumerating the reasons that led the crusading leaders to accept Prince Alexios's proposals, Gunther states that 'there was also, we believe, another far older and more powerful reason ... namely the decision of Divine Goodness which so arranged, through this pattern of events, that this people [the Byzantines], proud because of its wealth, should be humbled by their very pride and recalled to the peace and concord (*pax et concordia*) of the holy Catholic Church'.[2006] Elsewhere, Gunther claims that Constantinople's 'magnitude and might' (*magnitudo atque potencia*) accounted for the fact that the city had 'been a rebel (*rebellis*) against the Roman See for so long (*multo tempore*)' – obviously, the date of the alleged rebellion remained obscure to the writer.[2007] Like Emperor Baldwin, Gunther endeavours to convince its audience that Divine Providence acted *through* the crusaders. As the chronicler puts it, 'it just has to be believed (*credendum est*) that God so ordained it that this city ... was returned to the unity of the Church (*unitas ecclesiastica*) through our [the crusaders'] power and by an unforeseen victory'.[2008] To further rationalise, and justify, God's effecting the conquest of Constantinople by the Latins, Gunther goes as far as to warn that it 'would have been most disastrous' 'had that people [the Greeks] been conquered by persons of another faith, heathen (*gentiles*) or

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[2004] *The Registers*, 109.
[2005] Ibid., 110.
[2006] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 137; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 91.
[2007] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 134; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 89.
[2008] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 134; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 89.

heretic (*hereticos*), or ... had it been forced to convert to their error'.[2009] The major significance of this statement is that, in his attempt to justify the Latin conquest of Constantinople, Gunther indirectly acknowledges that, although he considered the Greeks rebels against the Roman Church, he still did *not* regard them as *hereticos*.

Otto, whose short discussion on the Fourth Crusade is rather inaccurate, mistakenly relates that the crusaders 'took the route to Jerusalem through Greece, where they were entangled in crafts and injuries by the Greeks and especially the Constantinopolitans'.[2010] Later in his account, the chronicler asserts that since antiquity the Greeks had inflicted injuries upon all pilgrims marching to Jerusalem through Byzantine territory.[2011] With the outcome of the Fourth Crusade, 'the severe Judge, God Almighty, avenged the injuries done his pilgrims... The Lord God of vengeance repaid the proud with retribution'.[2012]

Otto's accusation against the Greeks of inflicting *iniurias* on *peregrinos ab antiquo* should be compared with a similar charge made by Gunther: as the chronicler maintains, Constantinople 'had always been faithless to pilgrims (*infida peregrinis*)', but following its conquest by the Latins 'by God's will' (*volente Deo*), it 'will remain faithful and supportive (*fida et unanimis*)'.[2013] Both authors appealed to the past to justify the capture of Constantinople in 1204. The question that naturally arises is what the two writers had in mind when accusing the Greeks. As has been said, Gunther had read the *Historia Iherosolimitana*, the vehemently anti-Alexian account of the First Crusade authored by Robert the Monk.[2014] Otto of Saint Blasien, in his brief account of the Third Crusade, criticises the 'inhumanity' shown by the Greeks to the German crusaders and records with satisfaction that the *Greca astucia* was eventually defeated by the *potencia Germanica*.[2015] However, this is not enough to explain the term *ab antiquo* used by the author. The explanation lies in Otto of Freising's *Chronica*, which Otto of Saint Blasien continues. In Chapter 1 we saw that Otto of Freising's account on the First Crusade is derived from the earlier work of Ekkehard of Aura and thus is similarly anti-Alexian. According to the *Chronica*, the leaders of the First Crusade 'suffered much from the treachery (*dolis*) of the emperor Alexios'.[2016] As to the knights of the 'Crusade

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[2009] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 138; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 91. Emphasis added.
[2010] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*, 81.
[2011] Ibid.
[2012] Ibid. Cf. Psalm 93: 1-2.
[2013] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 138; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 91.
[2014] Andrea, 1980, 280.
[2015] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*, 47.
[2016] Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 311; Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*, 2002, 406.

of 1101', 'the emperor Alexios treacherously exposed them in narrow passes and cruelly killed almost all of them'.[2017] Otto of Saint Blasien was well aware of these accusations - however baseless - against the Emperor Alexios, thus being led to claim that the Greeks inflicted *iniurias* on *peregrinos ab antique*.

One should be very cautious when interpreting the testimonies of Gunther of Pairis and Otto of Saint Blasien. Manifestly, old accusations levelled against Alexios by the chroniclers of the First Crusade were conveniently brought up by some *well-read* early thirteenth-century authors such as Gunther and Otto - to whom texts of the First Crusade had been available - to justify the Latin capture of Constantinople. This, however, does *not* mean that considerations of this sort informed the crusaders' actions in 1202-4. As discussed, *none* of our primary eyewitness sources suggests that the men on the Fourth Crusade were aware of Alexios's alleged *dolis* in his dealings with the First Crusade. As for Manuel, he was remembered by the Latins as a political friend, staunch supporter and champion of theirs rather than as a traitor. Isaak's hostility to the German crusaders and alleged alliance with Saladin against them may well have been known to veterans of the Third Crusade, but both aspects were carefully concealed from the rest of the army and conveniently forgotten until Baldwin I wrote his letter to Innocent to justify the Latin conquest of Constantinople. But even at this stage, no direct reference was made to Isaak.

Innocent could never have imagined the outcome of his crusade. Had, however, the pope really dreamt of a Latin capture of Constantinople, as Gunther claims? The chronicler reassures his reader that

> the supreme pontiff had for a considerable time hated (*oderat*) that city, as had his predecessors, since already for so long it had been in rebellion (*rebellis*) against the Roman Church and had differed from the catholic faith (*a fide catholica*) in certain articles of faith, such as the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit, who the Greeks deny proceeds from the Son, and in the liturgy of the sacrifice of the mass, since they, by custom, use fermented bread.[2018]

Therefore, as reported by Gunther, Innocent 'hoped, if it were possible, for it [Constantinople] *to be captured* (*expugnari*) without bloodshed by a Catholic people (*a gente catholica*), as long as he did not have to fear the destruction of our army'.[2019]

[2017] Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 317; Otto of Freising, *Two Cities*, 411.
[2018] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 129; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 83-4.
[2019] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 129; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 84. Emphasis added.

Gunther's testimony on Innocent's allegedly hostile attitude toward the Greeks has attracted the attention of modern scholars. Andrea takes Gunther's testimony at face value, thus being led to argue that the *Hystoria* provides us 'a valuable insight into Innocent III's attitude and policy toward the diversion to Constantinople. Through Gunther and Martin [who was at the papal court in March 1203] we enter into a papal consistory where Innocent *freely expresses (!)* his distaste for the Greeks'.[2020] Swietek is more skeptical of Gunther's evidence. As this scholar argues, 'there is no reason to doubt the essential veracity of Gunther's account of the pope's *statement (!)*, but its inclusion in so extended a form seems intended to buttress his own denunciation of the Greek state'.[2021] Schmandt favours a completely different view. According to this commentator, 'so obsessed were the crusaders with their anti-Byzantine prejudices that they transferred their own emotions to Pope Innocent'.[2022]

Coherently with the orientation of this interpretation, it appears that Gunther's testimony is heavily coloured by hindsight and obviously aimed at justifying the crusaders' disobedience to the orders of Innocent, whose 'advice and decision' (*consilium et sentencia*), as the chronicler acknowledges, was 'that our people [the crusaders] should sail directly to Alexandria',[2023] and *not* divert to Constantinople. By making Innocent hope for a Latin bloodless capture of Constantinople which would not lead to the destruction of the crusading army, Gunther intended his reader to excuse the crusaders' disobedience that ensued, pointing out that this finally resulted in what the pope had hoped for. In other words, 'the end justifies the means'.

The sheer fact that Gunther makes Innocent hope for Constantinople *expugnari* at a stage when the only proposal considered was to install Prince Alexios on the throne, and when nobody could imagine, still less consider, a conquest of the Byzantine capital, is enough to dispute the validity of the chronicler's testimony, which has been superficially accepted by Andrea and Swietek. The fact that Gunther portrays the pope allegedly hoping for Constantinople to be captured, but fearing the Byzantine fleet, should also arouse our suspicion. The pope must have been well aware that no Byzantine fleet survived. As seen, the 'innumerable ships'[2024] and 'vessels in countless numbers'[2025] of the Byzantines existed only

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[2020] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 58. Cf. Andrea, 1980, 287. Emphasis added.
[2021] Swietek, 1978, 77. Emphasis added.
[2022] Schmandt, 1975, 212.
[2023] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 130; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 84.
[2024] Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 89.
[2025] Ibid., 84.

in Gunther's imagination. Nevertheless, even if the pope said, as Gunther claims, that the Byzantines possessed a formidable fleet, he doubtless did so in order to intimidate the crusaders and deter them from undertaking to assist Prince Alexios.

It is also very important to add that, although Gunther tells his audience that Innocent and his predecessors hated Constantinople, *nowhere* does the chronicler say that the pope freely expressed his allegedly anti-Byzantine feelings. This is Andrea's and Swietek's (mistaken) understanding. Finally, as regards Schmandt's interpretation that 'so obsessed were the crusaders with their anti-Byzantine prejudices that they transferred their own emotions to Pope Innocent', I would argue that it is rather unreasonable to understand the statement of an apologist for the Latin conquest of Constantinople as obsession of the crusaders with 'anti-Byzantine prejudices'. We should try to explain the apologist's motivation behind his writing, rather than talking of anti-Byzantine sentiment among the crusaders. After all, Gunther himself was not a crusader and thus his views should not be considered as representing crusader opinion.

It should be noted in this connection that when referring to the discussions between the crusading leaders and Prince Alexios at Zara, Gunther claims that the crusaders 'did not think its [Constantinople's] *conquest* (*oppressio*) by our people would displease very much either the supreme pontiff or even God', since Constantinople was *rebellis et odiosa* to the Roman Church.[2026] Andrea understands this passage as demonstrating that the crusaders were aware of 'the pope's true sentiments toward Byzantium'.[2027] It is enough to repeat that when discussions about Prince Alexios's proposal were taking place, nobody could think, or even imagine, that Constantinople was to be eventually conquered by the Latins. By having the crusaders assume, at this early stage, that the Latin conquest of Constantinople would not be displeasing to the pope or God, Gunther aimed once more at legitimising the event. Andrea's view, therefore, turns out to be totally groundless.

What is a *fact* is that Innocent had repeatedly tried to avert a diversion to Constantinople and an attack on the Greeks - but to no avail. Nonetheless, the unanticipated news of the Latin capture of the imperial capital was greeted with joy and was viewed as a miracle by the pope, i.e. in the same manner as by the other Latin authors examined. As we are informed by the letter that Innocent dispatched to the Emperor Baldwin on 7 November 1204, the pope

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[2026] Ibid., 90; Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 137. Emphasis added.
[2027] Andrea, 1980, 288.

'rejoiced in the Lord and in the strength of His power because He ... has deigned to work magnificent miracles with you for the praise and glory of His Name, for the honour and profit of the Apostolic See, and for the benefit and exaltation of the Christian people'.[2028] Innocent placed Baldwin as well as his 'land and people, under the primary protection of Saint Peter and under our [the pope's] special protection, resolutely ordering ... all peoples that they support and defend ... [Baldwin's] lands and people'.[2029] Further, the pope did 'charge and command all clerics, as well as the lay crusaders ... in the Christian army by reason of hope for remission [of sins] and the indulgence that the Apostolic See offers them, to assist you [Baldwin] prudently and mightily in defending and holding onto the empire of Constantinople'.[2030]

The Latin emperor must have certainly felt satisfied with Innocent's response. All of his requests were granted. We should try to explain, however, the radical change in the pope's attitude from express prohibition of attacking the Byzantines to joyous reception of the news of the Latin conquest of Constantinople and wholehearted acceptance of the Latin empire. For *four* years, Innocent had striven to secure from Alexios III both the union of the churches and Byzantine support for his crusade. All his efforts, however, met with frustration. Therefore, the 'miraculous', and unanticipated, installation of a Latin emperor in Constantinople who was loyal and obedient to the pope and devoted to the crusading cause was naturally warmly welcomed. In Innocent's words, 'by the just judgement of God' (*iusto Dei iudicio*), the Byzantine Empire had now been 'transferred (*est translatum*) from the proud to the humble, from the disobedient to the obedient, from schismatics to Catholics (*a scismaticis ad catholicos*), so that it might rise through the virtue of obedience to goodness because through the sin of disobedience it fell into evil'.[2031]

It is interesting to note in this context that, from the viewpoint of Robert of Auxerre, the Latin conquest of Constantinople was not a *translatio* (as in the pope's eyes) but a *reditus* of the *Constantinopolitanum imperium* from the Greeks to the Latins, and represented a reversal of fortunes – interestingly, it was not attributed to Divine Providence. As the chronicler relates, 'in the same year [1204] a stupendous and utterly unexpected change of events (*rerum mutatio*) occurs at Constantinople, and the renowned Eastern Empire is being taken by force

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[2028] *The Registers*, 114.
[2029] Ibid.
[2030] Ibid.
[2031] Ibid., 115; *Die Register*, VII, 263.

from the hands of the Greeks and driven *back (!)* (*redigitur*) to the rule of the Latins'.[2032] When precisely the *orientale imperium* had supposedly changed hands from the rule of the Latins to that of the Greeks was without doubt far from clear in the chronicler's mind. The historical kernel behind this otherwise unsound statement must be the linguistic Hellenisation of the Byzantine state, its administrative machineries, and all that relied on or was connected to it, a process well under way as early as the later sixth century and successfully completed during the middle decades of the seventh century.[2033]

High Expectations: the Daughter's Return to the Mother and the Union of the Churches

In a letter of 13 November 1204 to the crusading clergy, the pope again described the Latin capture of Constantinople as a transfer 'from the proud to the humble, from the disobedient to the obedient, from schismatics to Catholics, namely from the Greeks to the Latins'.[2034] Innocent reassured the Latin clerics that 'surely, this was done by the Lord (*a Domino factum est*) and is wondrous in our eyes'.[2035] To support this view, the pope resorted to the Old Testament, and more specifically to the Book of the Prophet Daniel, according to which, 'God in Heaven ... changes times and transfers kingdoms'.[2036] From Innocent's perspective, God effected the transfer of the Byzantine Empire to the Latins 'so that He might exalt the most holy Roman Church'.[2037] Making full use of the reformers' language, the pope proclaims that 'He [God] returns the daughter to the mother (*filiam ad matrem*), the part to the whole (*partem ad totum*), and the member to the head (*membrum ad caput*)'.[2038]

In a second letter to the crusading clerics, dated 21 January 1205, Innocent is using Luke's Gospel account of the miraculous catch of fish to draw some parallels, which offer us an insight into the pope's view of the Church of Constantinople. According to the biblical story, one day Christ saw two boats anchored along the shore of the Lake of Gennesaret. One of the boats belonged to Simon Peter and Andrew, and the other to James and John. Christ asked Simon Peter to launch his boat out into deep water and let down his nets for a big catch

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[2032] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 267. Emphasis added.
[2033] J. F. Haldon, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century: The Transformation of a Culture*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1997), 403-4.
[2034] *The Registers*, 116-17.
[2035] Ibid., 117; *Die Register*, VII, 264.
[2036] *The Registers*, 116. Cf. Daniel 2:21-2.
[2037] Ibid., 117.
[2038] Ibid.; *Die Register*, VII, 264.

of fish. Simon Peter did so and, when he and Andrew drew in the net, they caught such a large number of fish that their net began to break. Therefore, they signaled their partners in the other boat to come to their assistance. James and John came and filled both boats so full that they almost sank.[2039]

Innocent draws three analogies: first, between Simon Peter's boat and the Church of Rome; secondly, between the fishes and the pagans and schismatics who had recently been converted or returned to unity through the labour of the Roman Church; and thirdly, between 'the other boat', that of James and John, and 'the Greek Church, which had made itself "other" (*aliam*) when it presumed to separate itself (*se alienare*) from the unity of the universal Church (*ab unitate universalis ecclesie*)'.[2040] As Simon Peter signaled James and John, Innocent 'signaled them [the Greeks] when we instructed them through our letters and messengers to come and help us'[2041] – this is an indirect reference to Innocent's earlier letters to Alexios III and Patriarch John X. Ultimately, as the pope puts it, 'by reason of the grace of God ... when the empire of Constantinople was transferred ... from the Greeks to the Latins, the Church of Constantinople also returned to obedience to the Apostolic See, ... so that in the future an undivided fellowship (*societas indivisa*) might continue between us [the Latins] and them [the Greeks]'.[2042] Obviously, from Innocent's distant viewpoint, the Latin conquest of Constantinople automatically entailed the union of the Western and Eastern Churches.[2043]

What is important to note in Innocent's letter is the prominent position that the Church of Constantinople and the Greeks held in the pope's outlook. Although the Church of Rome was indisputably the 'head' and the 'mother', the Byzantines and their church were still acknowledged as a special and indispensable part of the Christian Church, as 'the other boat', the other half of the Roman Church. Innocent expanded his view of the Greeks by affirming: 'to be sure, we acknowledge them as brothers, comrades, and friends (*fratres, socios et amicos*)'.[2044] The pope felt a strong sense of responsibility towards the Byzantines. As he made clear, 'although we hold an office of higher authority over them, still this higher

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[2039] Luke 5:1-11.
[2040] *Die Register*, VII, 355; *The Registers*, 134.
[2041] *The Registers*, 134.
[2042] Ibid.; *Die Register*, VII, 355-6.
[2043] H. Tillmann, *Pope Innocent III*, trans. W. Sax (Amsterdam, 1980), 264; Gill, 1973, 100.
[2044] *Die Register*, VII, 356; *The Registers*, 134.

authority does not carry with it dominion but rather servitude, in conformity with what the Lord said to the apostles: "... he who is the greater among you will be the servant of all"'.[2045]

As to his conception of the status of the Church of Constantinople, Innocent was very explicit in his letter of 25 April 1205 to the Greek clergy of the Latin empire: 'the Church of Constantinople deserves to hold the position of primacy (*primatum*) among the other churches - *after the Apostolic See* (*post apostolicam sedem*) - even though some time ago it turned away from obedience to it'.[2046] As the pope asserted, the Church of Constantinople was the Church of Rome's 'special daughter' (*specialis filia*).[2047] On 30 March 1205, in his consecration of the Venetian Thomas Morosini as patriarch of Constantinople, Innocent developed more fully the notion of the 'special daughter'. The Church of Rome

> raised it [the Church of Constantinople] from the dust, elevated it ... so that it [the Church of Rome] might give her [the Church of Constantinople] preference by privilege of dignity to Alexandria and Antioch and Jerusalem and it might after itself exalt her before others, so that when many daughters gather riches, she alone by the special grace of her mother will excel all.[2048]

On 15 May 1205, the pope wrote again to the Emperor Baldwin. Since, from his standpoint, the Churches of Rome and Constantinople were now united, Innocent turned his attention to dogmatic issues that divided the two churches. As the pope recorded, 'the Greek Church ... which by virtue of age ought to have been the teacher, appears, on the contrary, to stand in need, so that she must be taught the first principles of the beginning of God's Words because she sinned against Him'.[2049] In his letter, Innocent makes reference to both the *Filioque* issue and the Greek use of leavened bread for the Eucharist, whereas the Latin Church used unleaved bread (*azyme*).[2050] He then explains that *through* the crusaders, 'His sanctified ... people', and 'with an evil people brought to an evil ruin', God 'handed over His vineyard to be tended by other cultivators, who would return its fruit to Him at the proper time'.[2051] The pope goes on to specify what should be the next step: 'with the Greek empire transferred from the disobedient and the superstitious to the sons of obedience and the pious ... it is necessary

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[2045] *The Registers*, 134. Cf. Luke 22:25-6.
[2046] Ibid., 158; *Die Register*, VIII, 99. Emphasis added.
[2047] *Die Register*, VIII, 99; *The Registers*, 158.
[2048] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 179.
[2049] *The Registers*, 155.
[2050] Ibid.
[2051] Ibid., 155-6.

that the priestly rites be transferred, so that Ephraim, who has returned to Judah, might feast upon the *azymes* of sincerity and truth, the old leavened bread having been thrown away'.[2052]

Andrea has argued that Innocent's letter to Baldwin evidences the 'policy of necessary Latinisation of the Byzantine Rite that was taking shape in his [the pope's] mind upon having learned of the capture of Constantinople'.[2053] This scholar's interpretation seems convincing. Nonetheless, whatever 'was taking shape in his mind' in May 1205, already by August 1206 Innocent began to pursue, and counsel, a more moderate policy. This is evidenced in the pope's response to Patriarch Morosini's enquiry whether he 'should permit the Greeks to practice the sacrifices and other sacraments according to their custom (*more suo*) or rather compel them [to practise] according to that of the Latins'.[2054] The pope instructed the patriarch 'to maintain them [the Greeks] in their rite, if he could not win them over, until the Apostolic See agreed to a different settlement after mature reflection'.[2055] Innocent was shrewd enough to know that a policy of Latinisation of the Greek Church would meet with Greek resistance and would be doomed to failure. There was no reason to take such a risk. As before 1204, the top priority in papal agenda was papal primacy, not rite.

High Hopes: 'the Greek Church ... Might Liberate its Two Sisters'

As we saw in our examination of Baldwin's letter to Innocent, a climate of hope for the future of the Holy Land was nourished and developed among the Latin settlers of Palestine in the immediate aftermath of the Latin conquest of Constantinople. At the same time, the elated Latin emperor proclaimed that he was elevated to the throne of Constantinople 'for the relief of the Holy Land'. The euphoria soon spread to the West. In his letter of 7 November 1204 to Baldwin, Innocent wrote that 'through the aid of its [the empire of Constantinople's] assistance the Holy Land might be more easily liberated from pagan hands'.[2056] In the papal letter of 21 January 1205 to the crusading clerics, Innocent's elation knew no bounds. The pope's expectations reached extreme levels and his imagination ran wild. As he maintained, since 'the Greek Church is returning to obedience to the Apostolic See ... it might liberate its two sisters: namely, the Churches of Alexandria and Jerusalem, which are held captive under

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[2052] Ibid., 156.
[2053] Andrea, 2005, 114. Cf. Tillmann, 1980, 264-5.
[2054] *PL* 215: 964-5.
[2055] Ibid., 965.
[2056] *The Registers*, 114-15.

the yoke of the king of Egypt and unwillingly serve Pharaoh'.[2057] Further, according to the pope's vision, 'after all Christians have been entirely brought back to obedience to the Apostolic See, then a multitude of the heathens will enter the faith, and so all of Israel will be saved'.[2058]

In spring 1205 Innocent was still over-optimistic about the future of the Holy Land. Sometime between 25 April and 25 May 1205 the pope wrote to all the crusaders at Constantinople maintaining that 'the Lord has deemed it worthy to open the way to us for the recovery of this [Holy] land through the miraculous transferral of this [the Byzantine] empire'.[2059] To the pope's mind, the conquest of Constantinople guaranteed the recovery of the Holy Land. In his words, 'to hold one is almost to recover the other'.[2060] Innocent went as far as to calculate that 'had He [God] transferred the empire of Constantinople to the Latins from the Greeks ... before the overthrow of the Eastern land [in 1187], perhaps Christendom would not today bewail the desolation of the province of Jerusalem'.[2061] Finally, as in his letter of 7 November 1204, Innocent instructed all the crusaders 'to tarry in the regions of Romania for the space of a year, giving beneficial advice and elective aid' to the Emperor Baldwin I 'in order to solidify this same [Latin] empire in its devotion to the Apostolic See and to us and to keep it more firmly under Latin lordship'.[2062]

In his letter of late May 1205 to the crusading clergy, Innocent recounted that Christ had joined Greeks and Latins 'through the sacraments of faith'.[2063] However, 'after the Greeks broke the chain of peace and departed from unity, they also grew weak'.[2064] The pope once again referred to the *Filioque* issue and the Greek use of leavened bread and insisted on his conviction that it was God that had transferred the Byzantine Empire 'from the superstitious to the religious, from schismatics to Catholics, from the disobedient to the devout'.[2065] As several other Latins, Innocent maintained that the Greeks had been 'worthy of punishment' and therefore God struck them down and gave their land to the crusaders.[2066] Further, the pope continued to insist, and dream, that God had effected 'the change of this [Byzantine] empire ...

[2057] Ibid., 136.
[2058] Ibid., 135-6.
[2059] Ibid., 162.
[2060] Ibid.
[2061] Ibid., 161-2.
[2062] Ibid., 162.
[2063] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 170.
[2064] Ibid., 171.
[2065] Ibid.
[2066] Ibid.

since in this way the Holy Land can be aided more usefully, indeed in this way it may perhaps be recovered from misfortune'.[2067] Endeavouring to secure human resources for Baldwin I, Innocent envisioned that 'after the [Latin] empire of Constantinople has been strengthened and the church there established in devotion to the Apostolic See, the same emperor [Baldwin I] with a strong hand and right arm extended may have the power to hasten to fight the barbarous nations who hold and occupy the [Holy] land'.[2068] It is obvious that, from the papal perspective, the conquest of Constantinople was merely the first stage in a 'wonderful' divine plan for the capture of Jerusalem. To use Innocent's words, 'the Lord Jesus Christ ... who began to carry out this work in a wonderful way may bring it to an even more wonderful conclusion to the praise and glory of his name'.[2069]

Baldwin's and Innocent's over-optimism about the future of the Holy Land was shared by many other Latins. As the anonymous author of the *Gesta Innocentii* reports, 'by holding the Empire of Constantinople, that by Divine Judgement the Latins subjected to themselves, there was hope that the Jerusalemite province might easily be liberated from the hands of the pagans'.[2070] Gunther of Pairis was of the same mind; he stressed that 'it is ... significant that the oft-mentioned city [Constantinople] ... following *volente Deo* a change of citizenry, will remain *fida et unanimis* [to the crusaders] and render us aid (*auxilium*) in fighting the barbarians and in capturing and holding the Holy Land - an aid that is more significant because of its closer proximity'.[2071] The Latins had always been considering Constantinople of special importance in the defense of the crusader states, especially due to the fact that the city was physically much closer to *Outremer*. The Latin hopes in the aftermath of the Latin conquest of the imperial capital were not totally unreasonable. Were these bright hopes, however, to be realised?

Disillusionment: 'By That from Which We Appeared to Have Profited Up to Now We Are Impoverished'

The euphoria that swept the Latin world immediately after the conquest of Constantinople soon began to fade as disturbing news from the East reached the West. Many crusaders

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[2067] Ibid., 172.
[2068] Ibid.
[2069] Ibid.
[2070] Ibid., 170.
[2071] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 138; Gunther of Pairis, *Capture*, 91.

departed the Holy Land for Constantinople upon learning of the opportunities created by the conquest of the city and the dismemberment of the Byzantine Empire.[2072] Thus, the crusader states were being drained of human resources. In Palestine King Amalric II of Jerusalem and his infant son died in April and February 1205 respectively. On 14 April 1205 the Latin conquerors of the Byzantine Empire were crushed by the Bulgarian Tsar Kalojan and Baldwin was captured, never to return to Constantinople again.[2073] Thus, it began to be realised that the Latin empire could not effectively defend itself, let alone the Latin states of Syria and Palestine. What is more, Cardinal Peter Capuano had dispensed from their crusading vow all crusaders who remained in the Latin empire for an additional year of service. The Fourth Crusade was in fact over. At the same time, horrific accounts of the three-day sack of Constantinople reached Innocent's ears.[2074]

On 12 July 1205, Innocent wrote a letter to Cardinal Peter Capuano. The pope was 'more than a little amazed and perturbed' upon hearing that Peter and Cardinal Soffredo of Santa Prassede 'abandoned the province of Jerusalem in a time of great necessity and are arriving by ship at Constantinople'.[2075] Innocent reprimanded the two cardinals because, while they 'had been obligated to look for greater help there [in Palestine] and to summon others ... to hasten to the aid of that same land, [they] sailed from there to Greece'.[2076] As a result, 'not only pilgrims [i.e. crusaders] but even natives of the land [i.e. Latins of *Outremer*], following in ... [the cardinals'] footsteps, ... arrived at Constantinople'.[2077] The well-informed author of the *Gesta Innocentii* similarly reports that 'such a multitude not only of laity but also of clergy followed them [the cardinals] that almost all foreigners [i.e. crusaders] and many natives [i.e. Latins of *Outremer*], deserted the province of Jerusalem and went to Constantinople'.[2078] Consequently, to use Innocent's words, the Holy Land 'remained destitute of men and military forces ... since all of its friends have abandoned it ... and there is no one from among all of its loved ones who can console it'.[2079] The pope's statement is echoed by Robert of Auxerre: 'when both pilgrims and natives went from Jerusalem to the Constantinopolitan regions, this

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[2072] Lock, 2006, 86.
[2073] Ibid., 87.
[2074] *The Registers*, 163.
[2075] Ibid.
[2076] Ibid., 164.
[2077] Ibid.
[2078] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 173.
[2079] *The Registers*, 164.

land remained almost entirely destitute of men and military forces'.[2080] Hence, as Innocent judged, the 'enemies [of the Holy Land] appear to have been placed in a position of advantage'.[2081] From Innocent's standpoint, 'the things that have happened to it [the Holy Land] most recently on ... [the two cardinals'] account are worse than those that happened earlier'.[2082]

The Latin conquest of Constantinople, which had been hailed with jubilation only a few months earlier, now came under sharp criticism. The pope chided the two cardinals for not having 'been mindful of and given careful thought to the purpose of your legation'.[2083] As Innocent reproachfully reminded them, they had been dispatched '*not* to capture the empire of Constantinople but for the defense of the remnants of the Holy Land and for the restoration of what has been lost ... *not* to seize temporal riches but to earn eternal riches'.[2084]

The fact that Innocent's initial euphoria gave way to disappointment after a realistic evaluation of the new state of affairs is clearly evident in what the pope does 'report with grief and shame: By that from which we appeared to have profited up to now we are impoverished, and by that from which we believed we were, above all else, made the greater we are reduced'.[2085] Innocent's statement speaks volumes about his frustration and despair at having his high hopes dashed. The Latin conquest of Constantinople finally proved to be a boomerang.

The disillusioned Innocent was not only worried about the future of the Holy Land; he also began to question what he had taken for granted immediately after the conquest of Constantinople, namely that the Churches of Constantinople and Rome were now reunited. Having heard of the full horrors of the sack of the Byzantine capital, the pope was wise enough to fully appreciate what it meant for his reunification plans. He rhetorically asks: 'how will the Greek Church, afflicted to some degree by persecutions, return to ecclesiastical unity and devotion to the Apostolic See, a church which has seen in the Latins nothing except an example of affliction and the works of Hell, so that now it *rightly* (*merito*) detests them more than dogs?'[2086]

[2080] Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, 26, 269.
[2081] *The Registers*, 164.
[2082] Ibid.
[2083] Ibid., 165.
[2084] Ibid. Emphasis added.
[2085] Ibid., 166.
[2086] Ibid.; *Die Register*, VIII, 232. Emphasis added.

The crusaders' conduct during the sack of Constantinople had certainly earned them the enmity of a part of the Byzantines, especially Constantinopolitans. Choniates describes the crusaders as the 'forerunners of Antichrist chief agents and harbingers of his anticipated ungodly deeds, ...[who] seeking to avenge the Holy Sepulchre, ... raged openly against Christ and sinned by overturning the cross with the cross they bore on their backs'.[2087] Innocent basically shared the same stance, and rebuked Peter Capuano angrily for the crusaders' sack of Constantinople. To the pope's mind, the Byzantines were now fully justified in their dislike of the Latins. The following quotation from the papal letter of 12 July 1205 is a telling comment on Innocent's frustration:

> For they, who were believed to be seeking things not for themselves but for Jesus Christ, showed no mercy for reasons of religion, age, or sex, staining with *the blood of Christians* swords that they should have used on *pagans*. They committed acts of lewdness, adultery, and fornication in the sight of all, and they exposed both matrons and virgins, even those dedicated to God, to the filth of the lowborn. It was not enough for them to empty the imperial treasuries and to plunder the spoils of princes and lesser folk, but rather they extended their hands to church treasuries and, what was more serious, to their possessions, even ripping away silver tablets from altars and breaking them into pieces among themselves, violating sacristies and crosses, and *carrying away relics* (*reliquias asportantes*).[2088]

It is worth noting that even the theft of relics which the Latin apologists in the West had striven to justify was condemned by the pope.

In late summer or early autumn 1205, Innocent, replying to a now-lost letter from Boniface of Montferrat, repeated almost verbatim his bitter reproaches against the crusaders for their conduct after the fall of Constantinople. He further reminded the marquis of the earlier papal prohibition of invading or violating Christian territories and severely reprimanded the crusaders for attacking the Byzantines and occupying Constantinople.[2089] Innocent's change of mind is obvious in his avowal that 'all of you [the crusaders], having no jurisdiction or power over the Greeks, appear to have rashly turned away from the purity of your vow when you took up arms *not against Saracens but Christians*, not aiming to recover Jerusalem but to attack Constantinople'.[2090]

[2087] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 316.
[2088] *Die Register*, VIII, 232; *The Registers*,166. Emphasis added.
[2089] *The Registers*, 173-4. Cf. *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 168.
[2090] Ibid., 173. Emphasis added. I made a change to Andrea's translation.

From Innocent's reply we learn that, in his letter to the pope, Boniface had

> alleged that, inasmuch as you [the crusaders] were driven by a lack of food, without which you were unable to complete the vow of the Cross, it was legitimate for you, by reason of such great necessity, to hire your services to him [Prince Alexios] who seemed to be pursuing a just cause, especially since by this act you would finally attend to the relief of the Holy Land and the profit of the Apostolic See.[2091]

In order to justify the diversion to Constantinople, Boniface had employed four arguments: lack of supplies, legitimacy of Alexios, relief to the Holy Land, and profit of the Church of Rome. Although, as has been argued, the last consideration had not particularly influenced the leader's decision to travel to Constantinople, the crusading nobility was very careful to emphasise it in its dealings with the West, especially the pope. Nevertheless, despite Boniface's going to great pains to justify the diversion to the Byzantine capital, Innocent, distrusting the purity of the crusaders' motives, bluntly declared what he now believed to be the real motivation behind the detour: 'earthly wealth'.[2092] In his introduction to a copy of the letter, the anonymous author of the *Gesta Innocentii*, the work reflecting the curial perspective, reports that

> it did not seem to be a sufficient excuse to make it legal for men [the crusaders] to attack the Greeks on the ground that they had withdrawn themselves from the obedience of the Apostolic See and they were not willing to aid the Holy Land ... and ... that Emperor Alexios [III] occupied the empire that he wrongfully seized from his brother, since they received no power from above to punish.[2093]

Innocent's letter to Boniface did not reflect papal views alone. The author of the *Gesta* informs us that, since the pope had 'began very vehemently to doubt what he should do in so important a business [i.e. the outcome of the Fourth Crusade] ... he had held diligent discussion not only with the cardinals but also with archbishops and bishops and other prudent men of whom there were then many from diverse parts at the Apostolic See'.[2094] Innocent's missive was obviously the result of discussions between the pope and several clerics from the

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[2091] Ibid., 174. Cf. ibid., 172.
[2092] Ibid., 173.
[2093] *Deeds of Pope Innocent III*, 166.
[2094] Ibid.

Latin world, and therefore represented the opinion of a large group of Latin higher ecclesiastics.

Despite his reproaches against the crusaders, Innocent never disputed that the outcome of his crusade was the result of Divine Providence - after all, to the medieval mind, God was the arbiter of human history. As seen in Chapter 2, even the disastrous outcome of the Second Crusade was ascribed by a number of Western writers to the inscrutable Divine Will, the hidden ways of God.[2095] More than half a century later, using analogous language, Innocent III declared that 'the judgements of God have to this point been sometimes hidden'.[2096] This was clearly articulated in both the Old and New Testaments. Resorting first to the Psalms, the pope states that Divine Judgements 'are called by the prophet [David] "a great abyss"'.[2097] Then, Innocent proceeds to quote a passage from Paul's epistle to the Romans in which 'the Apostle is forced to exclaim: "Oh, the depth of the riches of God's wisdom and knowledge! How incomprehensible are His judgements and beyond understanding His ways!".[2098] Therefore, as the pope declared, 'we do not wish to judge rashly regarding such a profound judgement, especially when we are not fully informed regarding the truth of the matter'.[2099]

Arnold of Lübeck basically echoes these papal views. The chronicler begins his account of the Fourth Crusade by praising 'the great and famous and worthy of narration deeds',[2100] i.e. the Latin conquest of Constantinople. Although Arnold asserts that these 'new and wonderful things ... were done through the work *or* permission of God', he states clearly that 'an appropriate outcome is not yet making clear whether they were the deeds of God or of men'.[2101] Arnold draws a parallel between the Latins and the biblical Job, to whose affliction God consented after Satan asked for permission to test his faith.[2102] The implication is clear, especially taking into consideration that in the Book of Job, Elihu, one of Job's friends, explains that human beings cannot comprehend the great things done by God 'who is perfect in knowledge' and 'excellent ... in judgement'.[2103]

Since he was not yet in a position to fathom God's mysterious judgements, Innocent confined himself to speculating that

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[2095] Chapter 2, 134-5.
[2096] *The Registers*, 175.
[2097] Ibid. Cf. Psalm 36:6.
[2098] Ibid. Cf. Romans 11:33.
[2099] Ibid.
[2100] Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica Slavorum*, *MGH SS*, 21, 223.
[2101] Ibid.
[2102] Ibid. Cf. *Job* 1-42.
[2103] Job 37:5, 14, 16, 23.

> it appears to have been divine judgement that they [the Byzantines], who for so long have been mercifully tolerated and so often had been zealously admonished, not only by others but even by us,[2104] and *who did not wish to return to the unity of the Church*, and *who did not want to impart any aid to the Holy Land*, lost their place and people through the agency of those [the crusaders] who equally sought both [objectives].[2105]

Union of the churches and assistance to the Holy Land were the two keystones of Innocent's negotiations with Alexios III. In the pope's eyes, since the Byzantines had failed to pursue the two objectives, they lost their empire 'to those who equally sought both'. Having returned to the theme of the Byzantines' 'just punishment', Innocent explains that 'they [the Byzantines] were fit to be justly punished because of the sin that they committed against God'.[2106]

Despite rebuking the crusaders, the pope, 'putting aside unresolved issues', i.e. divine judgements, and 'having a healthy consideration equally ... for the Holy Land as well as for the Apostolic See' had 'taken care to give you [the crusaders] an unambiguous response on ... [one] matter':[2107] what should be done with the conquered Byzantine Empire. Innocent instructed Boniface 'to hold and defend the land that has been acquired and acquire [more] land to be held and defended, ruling in justice the people subject to you'.[2108] Despite his reproaches against the papal legates and the crusading nobles for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, and despite his growing recognition that the Latin Empire drained the Holy Land of resources, Innocent was not prepared to hand the conquered territories back to the Greeks. The pope seemed to still have a faint, or rather vain, hope that the conquest of the Byzantine Empire, effected by Divine Judgement, would ultimately lead to the highly desired union of the churches and the recovery of the Holy Land.

Latin Emperors: 'Emperors of the Greeks'?

On 16 May 1204, Baldwin of Flanders was crowned emperor of the Latin Empire of Constantinople at a solemn ceremony. His coronation, described in considerable detail by Clari,[2109] was apparently modelled on Byzantine ceremonial as witnessed by the Latins at

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[2104] Another reference to Innocent's earlier letters to Alexios III and Patriarch John X.
[2105] *The Registers*, 174. Emphasis added.
[2106] Ibid., 175.
[2107] Ibid.
[2108] Ibid.
[2109] Clari, *Conquête*, 114-17.

Alexios IV's enthronement, which, to use Villehardouin's words, had been 'celebrated with the same dignity and honours as was the custom for Greek emperors'.[2110] During Alexios's coronation, the Westerners would have carefully observed all due Byzantine ceremonial for such an occasion. They had become aware of the solemnity and honours with which, according to Byzantine custom, the enthronement of an emperor should be celebrated. As a result, the coronation of Baldwin, nine and a half months after that of Alexios IV, seems to have broadly copied Byzantine ritual. From the very beginning the new Latin emperor desired to present himself as successor to the Byzantine imperial tradition in order to legitimise his authority, attach prestige to himself and reconcile his new Byzantine subjects to the Latin conquest.[2111]

In keeping with Byzantine tradition, Baldwin's coronation took place in the church of Hagia Sophia, where the new emperor was invested with the Byzantine imperial garments. A stunned Robert of Clari describes the

> scarlet satin hose and a pair of shoes whose whole surface was studded with precious stones ... a very rich coat fastened with gold buttons ... the pallium ... completely covered with rich precious stones ... [and] a very rich cloak ... completely covered in valuable, precious stones ... the eagles which were on it were made of gems and gleamed, so that it looked as if the whole cloak was on fire.[2112]

Following his anointment, Baldwin was crowned. In all his magnificence the new emperor sat on a high throne, 'holding in his hand his sceptre and in the other hand a golden globe with a cross on top'.[2113] Both the sceptre and the orb, symbols of total power, had been held by the Byzantine emperors, thus projecting themselves as masters of the Christian world. Emperors of Byzantium represented in this particular fashion can be seen even today in surviving masterpieces of Byzantine Art.[2114] In his full majesty as emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin

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[2110] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 76. See P. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204-1500* (London - New York, 1995), 167-9; Lock, 'The Latin Emperors as Heirs to Byzantium', in *New Constantines: The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th centuries: Papers of the Twenty-sixth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, St. Andrews, March 1992*, ed. P. Magdalino (Aldershot, 1994), 302-3; R. L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204-1261', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 2 (Madison; London, 1969), 189; Robertou tou Klari, 1990, 169 n. 498.

[2111] Lock, 1995, 36, 43-5; Lock, 1994, 295, 301; Wolff, 1969, 189-90.

[2112] Clari, *Conquête*, 115.

[2113] Ibid., 117.

[2114] E.g. the roundel of Emperor John II Komnenos, in the Byzantine Collection at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington DC.

definitely impressed all the eyewitnesses. As Clari estimates, 'the decorations which he [Baldwin] had on him were worth more than the treasure of a rich king'.[2115]

In his letter to Innocent, written after his coronation, the Emperor Baldwin records that he had been elevated to the imperial throne 'with joyful celebration, and even, as is their custom, with the Greeks' applauding (*more suo applaudentibus Grecis*)'.[2116] Similarly, the anonymous of Soissons relates that 'with the Greeks applauding, they [the Latins] had him [Baldwin] crowned in the church of Sancta Sophia'.[2117] Leaving Hagia Sophia, the new emperor was taken to the palace of Boukoleon and seated, according to Clari, 'on the throne of Constantine (*en le caiiere Coustentin*)'.[2118] Then 'all the Greeks who were there adored him as the holy emperor (*saint empereeur*)'.[2119] The people of Constantinople, who had played an important political role after Manuel's death and had offered little resistance to the crusaders either in August 1203 or in April 1204,[2120] seem to have had no misgivings about the fact that their new emperor was not Greek. Since he had been solemnly crowned, thus receiving divine unction, [2121] Baldwin was legitimately acclaimed as *ἅγιος βασιλεύς* (*saint empereeur*).

It is interesting to note that Robert of Clari's perception of the Byzantine imperial throne as *caiiere Coustentin* was informed by Byzantine political ideology, which considered the Byzantine emperors as heirs of Constantine the Great, the first Christian emperor, whose sainthood guaranteed the legitimacy of successive Byzantine rulers.[2122] In his narrative of Isaak II's coronation, Robert had similarly recounted that the people of Constantinople 'sat him [Isaak II] on the throne of Constantine (*en la caiere Coustentin*). And as soon as he was sitting on the throne of Constantine, they adored him as the Holy Emperor (*saint empereeur*)'.[2123] The use of identical language to describe the enthronements of Isaak II and Baldwin I demonstrates that the Latin emperor had successfully convinced the crusading rank and file of the continuity of Byzantine imperial tradition. This idea of continuity was not confined to the lesser knights in the ranks of the crusading army. The Anonymous of Halberstadt, who had depended for information on the eyewitness account of Bishop Conrad

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[2115] Clari, *Conquête*, 117.
[2116] *The Registers*, 108.
[2117] *Anonymous of Soissons*, 235.
[2118] Clari, *Conquête*, 116-17.
[2119] Ibid.
[2120] Angold, 1999, 277.
[2121] Dagron, 2003, 154-5; Ensslin, 1967, 2, 8-9.
[2122] Dagron, 2003, 128, 149; Magdalino, 1994, 3; Angold, 1997, 212.
[2123] Clari, *Conquête*, 30-1.

of Halberstadt, describes Baldwin I 'as emperor of the Greeks', i.e. in the same way the Westerners used to designate the Byzantine emperors up to 1204. Even as far as in England Baldwin I was perceived as heir of the Greek emperors and was thus expected to behave accordingly, following his predecessors' customs. Ralph of Coggeshall believed that Baldwin lost the Battle of Adrianople on 14 April 1205 because 'he forgot to carry the ... [Holy] Cross with him', 'which the emperors had customarily carried into battle when fighting their enemies, so that they might triumph over their foes by reason of the power of the Holy Cross'.[2124]

After his coronation on 16 May 1204, Baldwin I marched out of Constantinople with his forces to subdue the land and extend his own influence. Clari relates that

> as he [Baldwin] came to the castles and the cities, they [the Byzantines] surrendered to him without argument. And the keys were brought out to him. And the priests and the clerics in their vestments came out in procession to meet him and welcome him, and the Greeks worshipped him as the holy emperor (*saint empereur*).[2125]

As Villehardouin informs us, in Adrianople 'the people gave him a very cordial welcome, and ... acknowledged the Emperor as their lord',[2126] and 'begged him ... to leave a garrison in their city because Johanitza [i.e. the Bulgarian Tsar Kalojan] ... had subjected them to frequent attacks'.[2127] In Thessaloniki the populace of the city 'surrendered the place to him on condition that he would govern them in accordance with the usages and customs observed by all Greek emperors up to that day'.[2128] Villehardouin's account is corroborated by that of Niketas Choniates. According to the Byzantine historian, 'as Baldwin approached Thessaloniki, the entire populace streamed out and with loud, clear shouts joyously surrendered themselves and their city to him ... he [Baldwin I] ... delivered to them [people of Thessaloniki] a letter written in red ink, confirming the city in all her customary privileges'.[2129] As in the case of the populace of Constantinople, the Greek inhabitants of the provinces of the former Byzantine Empire were willing to accept a Latin emperor, so long as

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[2124] Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicle*, 289.
[2125] Clari, *Conquête*, 118-19.
[2126] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 99.
[2127] Ibid., 100.
[2128] Ibid., 101.
[2129] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 329.

he was prepared to protect them and govern them according to 'the usages and customs' heretofore observed by his Greek predecessors.

The Greeks of the provinces were not particularly disturbed by the capture and sack of their capital. In the decades after Manuel's death, Constantinople had been increasingly isolated from the Byzantine provinces.[2130] The provincials harboured resentment against the capital and its citizens, and therefore derived satisfaction from the downfall of the Constantinopolitan elite. After the capture of Constantinople, Niketas Choniates and his companions fled to Selymbria, a Thracian coastal town, where they had first-hand experience of the hostility of the natives. Choniates, with an air of Constantinopolitan snobbery, records indignantly: 'the rustics and baseborn greatly taunted those of us from Byzantion [Constantinople]. They foolishly called the misery of our poverty and nakedness the equality of civic rights'.[2131] In the eyes of the provincials, the Constantinopolitan elite's downfall was *ἰσοπολιτεία*, equality of status.

By September 1204, Baldwin had established his position in the area between Constantinople and Thessaloniki south of the range of Rhodope and won the loyalty of the Greeks of the region. In September 1204, a committee of 12 Venetians and 12 Franks partitioned the territories of the former Byzantine Empire between the Latin emperor, the crusaders and the Venetians, even though many of these territories were never actually to be controlled by the Latins, but remained under the authority of independent Greek rulers.[2132] As recorded by Villehardouin, 'all [the Latins] began, in a greater or less degree, to administer their estates with so little concern for the rights of others that the Greeks began to hate them and cherish resentment against them in their hearts'.[2133] Western behaviour seems to have alienated the Byzantines and have generated, at a very early stage, their loathing of the conquerors. Since Villehardouin himself blames Latin excesses for Byzantine hatred, there is little reason to disbelieve him.

As Lock rightly argues, 'the loyalty of the Greeks seemed to have been a critical factor for the Latin position in Thrace'.[2134] This changed in early 1205, when the Greeks abandoned the Westerners and sought accommodation with the Bulgarian Tsar Kalojan. Although, earlier in his work, Villehardouin allowed that the Latins' behaviour earned them the enmity of the

[2130] Angold, 1999, 276.
[2131] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 326.
[2132] Lock, 1995, 45-52.
[2133] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 108.
[2134] Lock, 1995, 52.

Byzantines, when he comes to describe the Greeks' revolt, the chronicler records: 'the Greeks, who were very perfidious (*mult ...desloial*), still harboured treachery (*felonie*) in their hearts'.[2135] The Byzantine rebellion reinforced in Villehardouin's eyes the paradigm of Byzantine perfidy.

The collaboration between Greeks and Bulgarians was not to last long. When in late February 1206 Kalojan began laying waste to the Byzantine towns that had allied themselves with him, the Greeks send messengers to Constantinople seeking to make peace with the Latins and promising to 'give their undivided support to the regent [Henry of Hainaut, brother of the captured Baldwin I], so that Greeks and Franks might live together as friends'.[2136] According to Villehardouin, after negotiations, 'peace was re-established between the Greeks and the Franks'.[2137] Henry advanced to Adrianople and, 'as soon as the people in the city saw the French arriving, they came out in procession, bearing all their crosses, and showed such joy as has never been seen before'.[2138]

Upon confirmation of Baldwin's death, Henry of Hainaut succeeded to the throne of the Latin Empire on 20 August 1206. The new emperor, continuing his brother's policy, presented himself as heir to the Byzantine imperial tradition. Being by far the most capable and shrewd of all the Latin emperors, Henry showed an unusually realistic spirit for his era. During his reign, apart from presenting himself as legitimate successor to the Byzantine emperors by appropriating all the external trappings of his rank, he also adopted a policy of Byzantine-Frankish cooperation and did not hesitate to elevate Greeks to important positions.[2139] Therefore, as evidenced by the accounts of Villehardouin, and especially of Valenciennes, Henry was quite popular amongst his Byzantine subjects.

Once on the imperial throne, Henry was faced with a new invasion by Kalojan. The invasion was eventually driven off and 20,000 Greeks, who had been taken prisoners by the Bulgarian tsar, together with their cattle and other belongings in carts were rescued by the emperor.[2140] As Villehardouin informs us, the released prisoners were kept apart from the troops, 'and a strict guard was kept over them and their belongings, so that they did not lose a

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[2135] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 115; Villehardouin, *Conquête*, II, 142. I made some changes in Shaw's translation.
[2136] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 138.
[2137] Ibid., 139. Cf. Lock, 1995, 54.
[2138] Ibid., 141.
[2139] Errikou tes Balansien, 1987, 10-16; P. S. Noble, 'Henry of Constantinople', in *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. V. Murray, 2 (Santa Barbara, CA; Oxford, 2006), 571-2; D. M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1993), 11-12.
[2140] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 144-6. Cf. Lock, 1995, 54.

single pennyworth of what they possessed'.[2141] The release of the captives and their subsequent treatment must have certainly boosted the popularity of Henry among his Greek subjects.

Valenciennes's account of a military campaign of Emperor Henry in central Greece in spring and summer 1209 is particularly telling of the popularity that Henry enjoyed among his Greek subjects. As the chronicler informs us, when the emperor arrived in Halmyros in April 1209, the Greeks sallied forth to meet him since they strongly desired his presence. They made a procession with icons, a sign of submission and welcome, and chanted to Henry the *Polychronion*, the ritual cheering by which the Byzantines wished long life to their emperors. According to Valenciennes, the Greek inhabitants of Halmyros said that as long as God guarded the emperor, they could live safely and honourably.[2142] When Henry passed Clisoura, the Greeks again went to bow down before him,[2143] and, as Valenciennes recounts, upon the Latin emperor's entry to Thebes, so loud was the *Polychronion* of the Greek priests and *archontes*,[2144] men and women, and so grand was the tumult of drums and trumpets, that all the ground shook.[2145] When Henry entered Chalkis, he was once more welcomed with great joy by the Byzantines of the city and the region, who met him with a grand commotion of trumpets and other instruments and finally conducted him into the church of the Virgin to pray.[2146]

As our primary material evidences, Baldwin I and especially his successor, Henry, had largely succeeded in reconciling their Byzantine subjects to the Latin conquest. Their success seems to owe both to their tendency to present themselves as successors to the Byzantine imperial tradition and to the adoption, particularly by Henry, of a policy of Byzantine-Frankish cooperation. Nevertheless, in actual fact the Latin emperors never acquired, and

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[2141] Ibid., 145.
[2142] Henri de Valenciennes, *Histoire*, 105.
[2143] Ibid., 110.
[2144] It is noteworthy that the chronicler uses *papas* and *alcontes*. It is an attempt of transliteration of the respective Greek words although incorrectly. Instead of *papades* (=priests, plural), the chronicler uses *papas* (=priest, singular) because as it seems either he was not aware of the plural form of the word or he thought that the word has the same form in both the singular and the plural. Moreover, the chronicler instead of *archontes* uses *alcontes* that is presumably the way the word sounded to him.
[2145] Henri de Valenciennes, *Histoire*, 111.
[2146] Ibid., 116. Cf. the illustration on *folio* 145r of the *Madrid Skylitzes* illuminated manuscript (Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Vitrine 26-2), a twelfth-century version of the *synopsis historiarum* (*Σύνοψις Ἱστοριῶν*), a history of the Byzantine Empire from 813 to 1057 by John Skylitzes. The illustration depicts the citizens of Constantinople welcoming Nikephoros Phokas in the capital with 'honours and the sounds of trumpets and cymbals' (*μετ' εὐφημιῶν καὶ κρότων καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ κυμβάλων*). The citizens are represented bearing trumpets, a drum and a harp. The miniature evokes the enthusiastic welcome with grand tumult of instruments received by the Latin emperor Henry in Thebes and Chalkis.

perhaps did not even perceive, the real status and power of the Byzantine *basileus*. In ironic contrast to the symbols of total power held by them at their coronation ceremony, the Latin emperors remained Western feudal rulers with a limited authority which was only a shadow of the fullness of that once enjoyed by their Greek predecessors.[2147]

Chronicles of the Fourth Crusade: 'Venom against the Greeks'?

The conflict between Greeks and Latins in the period between June 1203 and April 1204 must have naturally generated mistrust and antipathy between the two groups. Is Angold, however, right to talk of 'venom directed against the Greeks by Villehardouin and other chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade'?[2148] Our examination of a wide range of primary sources has demonstrated that all the Western authors revile the two imperial usurpers, Alexios III and Alexios IV. Gunther of Pairis, the apologist *par excellence* of the Latin conquest of Constantinople, unleashes torrents of vituperation not only against the two emperors but against all Greeks, despite the fact that he acknowledges them as Christian brothers. Nevertheless, the vehemently anti-Greek sentiment of the *Hystoria* is missing from the other two major clerical accounts of the Fourth Crusade. Similarly, the other chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade and especially the eyewitness authors who had been on the crusade themselves are not particularly hostile to the Greeks as a whole.

The eyewitness *Devastatio Constantinopolitana* is a very impartial account and, as has been examined, its anonymous author does not refrain from criticising the Latins when necessary. And what about our two main eyewitness authors of the Fourth Crusade? Noble claims that Villehardouin is 'full of contempt for the Greeks, who, in his eyes, were treacherous, schismatic, and unfit to hold their land'.[2149] According to the same scholar, the history of the Byzantine Empire up to the time of the Fourth Crusade, 'which Robert relates, serves to bring out the innate cruelty and treachery of the Greeks whom Robert despises'.[2150] As in the case of the rest of the Western contemporary authors, Villehardouin and Clari vilify Alexios III and Alexios V. It is also true that the two French authors show contempt for the Greeks' failure to stand and fight and their usual resort to flight. The negative assessment of

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[2147] Lock, 1994, 301, 303-4; Wolff, 1969, 190; Mayer, 1988, 204.
[2148] Angold, 2003, 60.
[2149] Noble, 2006, 507.
[2150] Clari, *Conquête*, xxv.

the Greeks' military skills and abilities is neither stereotypical nor based on pure prejudice. It is not merely an attempt to extol Latin valour by contrasting it to Greek cowardice. The negative assessment seems to be warranted. Even the Greek historian Choniates denounces the 'cowardly' Greeks who 'were unable to gaze upon the front of the helm of a single knight so terrible in form and spectacular in size and took to their customary flight'.[2151] Is this, however, sufficient evidence to support Angold's and Noble's statements?

Regarding Noble's assertion that, in Villehardouin's eyes, the Greeks were schismatics, it is enough to state that nowhere in his account does the chronicler denounce the Greeks as such. Villehardouin only refers to Prince Alexios's promise to 'place his whole empire under the authority of Rome, from which it has long been estranged', and to the crusading clergy's later assertion that 'the Greeks as a people had seceded from the Church of Rome'.[2152] Nowhere else in his chronicle does Villehardouin either mention the Greeks' 'disobedience' to the Church of Rome, or refer to any theological differences between the Eastern and Western Churches. It should be underlined in this connection that *neither* Villehardouin *nor* any other of our authors describes the Greeks as schismatics. All our Western accounts of the Fourth Crusade refer to the Greeks as disobedient to the Church of Rome. Even Innocent III himself, in his letters dated before the Latin conquest of Constantinople, *never* describes the Greeks as schismatics. Only *after* April 1204, the Greeks are designated by the pope as *scismatici*, as opposed to the Latins who are described as *catholici*, thus justifying the Latin conquest of Constantinople as ending a schism. Noble's statement on Villehardouin as well as the assertion of Schmandt that 'both the clerical and the lay historians of the Fourth Crusade understood that the Byzantines were schismatics, not heretics, but ... they saw this as a distinction without a difference'[2153] are groundless.

Villehardouin and Clari do condemn the Greeks as *desloial* and *traitre* but only sporadically – this is clear throughout our investigation. Given the bulk of the two sources, the very few denunciations of the Greeks as treacherous are not sufficient to permit us to conclude that Villehardouin and Clari despised and were full of contempt for the Greeks, whom they regarded as treacherous. In actual fact, the Greeks are, in several cases, perceived by the two French chroniclers as equal and friendly human beings. Villehardouin recorded that following Alexios III's flight from Constantinople, 'the Greeks and the French ... became on friendly

[2151] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 313.
[2152] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 50, 85.
[2153] Schmandt, 1975, 219.

terms with each other in all respects'.[2154] The chronicler did not hesitate to criticise the crusaders themselves for their 'covetousness' that alienated the Greeks after September 1204.[2155] He even allowed that when in March 1207 the Bulgarian Tsar Kalojan once again besieged Adrianople, the men inside the city, '*both* Greeks and Latins, resisted bravely'.[2156]

Villehardouin does not spare praise to individual Greeks. What is more surprising is that some of these individuals had fought against the Westerners. Constantinos Laskaris had fought the Latins during the first siege of Constantinople and in March 1205 in the Battle of Adramyttion, where he led the army of his brother Theodore I Laskaris (1208-22) against Henry of Flanders – after the conquest of Constantinople Theodore established the 'Empire of Nicaea' in the Asiatic territories of the former Byzantine Empire and opposed the Latins.[2157] On two occasions, Villehardouin describes Constantinos Laskaris as 'one of the best (*meilleurs*) Greeks'.[2158] Leo Sgouros, a member of the Greek aristocracy in southern Greece who also resisted the Franks,[2159] is described by Villehardouin as very shrewd and prudent (*mult sage et engigneus*).[2160]

Apart from Laskaris and Sgouros who had both been enemies of the Latins, there were Greek *archontes* that had been prepared to collaborate with the conquerors. As we are informed by Villehardouin, an *archon* of the south-west Peloponnese approached the Latin noble Geoffrey of Villehardouin the younger (nephew of the chronicler Villehardouin) as he wintered at Methone in late 1204.[2161] The *archon*, who is identified by modern scholars as either Leo Chamateros[2162] or John Kantakouzenos,[2163] 'greeted him [Villehardouin the younger] very courteously'[2164] and proposed a military cooperation between them to their mutual territorial advantage. Having 'made an alliance, confirmed by oath', the Greek *archon* and the Latin noble 'together conquered a great part of the country'.[2165] As the chronicler

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[2154] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 76.
[2155] Ibid., 108.
[2156] Ibid., 152. Emphasis added.
[2157] M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204-1261* (Oxford, 1975).
[2158] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 69, 112.
[2159] Lock, 1995, 70-2.
[2160] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, II, 142.
[2161] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 113.
[2162] Lock, 1995, 71.
[2163] Billardouinou, 2002, 151, n. 298.
[2164] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 113.
[2165] Ibid.

Villehardouin relates, 'Geoffrey de Villehardouin (the younger) always found this Greek a very loyal ally'.[2166]

As regards Clari, the fact that, in his work, the chronicler includes a digression dealing with former Byzantine emperors undoubtedly served to provide the intended readers information on the history of the Byzantine Empire, *not* 'to bring out the innate cruelty and treachery of the Greeks whom Robert despises'. Andronikos I and Alexios III were condemned for their treachery, but Isaak and particularly Manuel were held in high esteem by Clari. Manuel was perceived as a model emperor, *li boins empereres*[2167] *par excellence*. But Clari also paints a favourable picture of Isaak II, 'the brave and bold (*vaillans et hardis*)'[2168] man who released Constantinople and the Greeks from the *traiteur* Andronikos and became *saint empereeur*[2169] *par miracle*.[2170] The miraculous accession of Isaak to the throne was a belief that was shared, and undoubtedly propagated, by the emperor himself, who, according to Choniates, 'was absolutely convinced that he had received the throne from God'.[2171] Clari does not appear to have questioned the truth of the *miracle*, but rather seems to have been similarly convinced of God's elevating Isaak to the throne.

Manuel and Isaak are not the only Greeks favourably perceived by Clari. The woman who, according to the chronicler, hid Isaak in her house when Andronikos I was trying to find and kill him, is described as *la boine femme*.[2172] The man who proposed to tie the overthrown Andronikos on a camel and lead him through Constantinople so that the people would take revenge over him is described as *un sage homme*.[2173] In addition, there were even holy men amongst the Greeks. According to Clari, once there was *un saint homme en Coustantinoble*.[2174] Christ appeared to the holy man and asked him for a cloth wrapped about him in order to imprint His divine image on it thus enabling the holy man to touch the sick with it and heal them.[2175]

[2166] Ibid.
[2167] Clari, *Conquête*, 110.
[2168] Ibid., 28-9.
[2169] Ibid., 30
[2170] Ibid., 34.
[2171] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 233.
[2172] Clari, *Conquête*, 26-7.
[2173] Ibid., 34-5.
[2174] Ibid., 100.
[2175] Ibid., 100-3. The story is a variation of the legend of the 'Image of Edessa', see Robert of Clari, 1936, 104, n. 103.

In August 1204 the Emperor Baldwin I and Boniface of Montferrat had been on the brink of civil war. While the emperor desired to accept the surrender of Thessaloniki and re-grant it to Boniface as a fief, the marquis insisted that he conquer the city himself. Enraged, Boniface attacked and captured Demotica and besieged Adrianople.[2176] Moreover, he proclaimed Manuel, the firstborn son of Isaak II and Margaret of Hungary, emperor in an attempt to win the support of the Greeks.[2177] According to Clari, when Boniface saw that he could not capture Adrianople, he presented the inhabitants of the city with Margaret and her two children by Isaak.[2178] When the marquis asked the people of Adrianople why they did not recognise one of the two children as their ruler, a man replied: 'go to Constantinople and have him crowned. And when he has sat on the throne of Constantine (*en le caiiere Coustentin*), and we know that, then we will do with him what we should'.[2179]

Although Lock accepts the credibility of Clari,[2180] the story is unlikely to be true. As we are informed by Villehardouin, while Boniface was besieging Adrianople, Margaret was actually in Demotica.[2181] Villehardouin was in a better position than Clari to know the facts as he had been sent from Constantinople to the besieged Adrianople to placate Boniface.[2182] Moreover, Clari's claim that Boniface asked the people of Adrianople to 'recognise one of the children as your lord' is untrue, since, as we know, the marquis had already proclaimed the firstborn son emperor. Nevertheless, Clari's story is important for providing crucial insight into the chronicler's perception of the Greeks and their mentality. Clari had been impressed by the notions of the *saint empereeur* and of *le caiiere Coustentin* that bestowed legitimacy upon its occupants. The chronicler and his comrades in the rank and file had eventually come to realise that, for the Greeks, a legitimate emperor did not necessarily have to belong to a royal lineage; legitimacy was accorded to the emperor upon solemn coronation and enthronement. What is more, Clari finally subscribes to the Greek view of the legitimacy of an emperor: the citizen of Adrianople who gave the fitting reply to Boniface is described as *uns sages hons* (a wise man). The circulation of the story about the marquis and the *sages* man is a testimony to the Westerners' entering into Greek mentality.

[2176] Lock, 1995, 50, 57.
[2177] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 329. Boniface married Margaret after Isaak's death.
[2178] Clari, *Conquête*, 121.
[2179] Ibid.
[2180] Lock, 1994, 303.
[2181] Villehardouin, *Conquest*, 103.
[2182] Phillips, 2004, 284.

Byzantine religious customs, particularly the Greeks' strong faith in icons, appear to have also impressed Clari, who, as has been seen, adopted the Byzantine beliefs in the miraculous properties of certain Byzantine icons. In addition, the chronicler was fascinated to hear – and seems to have believed - all kinds of tales narrated by the Greeks of Constantinople: 'the Greeks state that two thirds of the world's property was in Constantinople';[2183] on a gate of Constantinople 'was a golden globe which was made so magically that the Greeks said that as long as the globe was there, no thunderbolts would strike the city';[2184] 'in front of the church of Saint Sophia ... was an emperor cast in copper on a large copper horse ... the Greeks said that this was the Emperor Heraclius';[2185] 'an icon of Our Lady ... was richer than I can say ... the Greeks said that it was the first image of Our Lady which was ever made or painted. The Greeks had such great faith in this image that they worshipped it above everything else, and it was carried in procession every Tuesday; the Greeks ... made great gifts to it'.[2186] Clari, far from despising the Greeks, had a vivid interest in their customs and culture and appears to have had significant contact with them.

Finally, Henry of Valenciennes, a chronicler at the Latin imperial court, appears to have borne no resentment toward the Greeks, with whom he had come into considerable contact. On the contrary, he happily describes the tremendous welcome that the Greeks extended to the Emperor Henry during his military campaign in central Greece in spring and summer 1209. Thus, as in the case of Villehardouin and Clari, Henry of Valenciennes conveys to his audience the favour that the Latin emperor enjoyed among his Greek subjects. Furthermore, Henry of Valenciennes does not hesitate to praise individual Greeks, such as David Komnenos, who became vassal of the Emperor Henry in 1206.[2187] David, together with his brother Alexios, set up the 'Empire of Trepizond', one of the Greek states established in the territories of the former Byzantine Empire.[2188] According to the chronicler Henry, Emperor Henry was greatly saddened by the news that Theodore Laskaris attacked the capital of the

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[2183] Clari, *Conquête*, 99.
[2184] Ibid., 107.
[2185] Ibid., 105.
[2186] Ibid., 131. This was the portrait of the Virgin that laid claim to have been painted by Saint Luke. For a discussion of this Marian icon, see Belting, 1994, 73-7.
[2187] Errikou tes Balansien, 1987, 54-5, n. 93.
[2188] Harris, 2003, 165-6. Alexios became the first emperor of the 'Empire of Trepizond'. His reign lasted from 1204 to 1222.

'Empire of Trepizond' in 1207 because David had always been loyal to him.[2189] Consequently, the Latin emperor hurried to Asia Minor and rescued his Greek ally.

A close reading of the chronicles of the Fourth Crusade reveals that, with the exception of Gunther of Pairis, the Latin authors were *not* particularly hostile towards the Greeks. The contact between Latins and Greeks had undoubtedly led to negative feelings between the two groups. Nevertheless, this contact had also produced positive feelings and attitudes, at least on the part of the Latins. Westerners, especially those who had been on the crusade and the Latin empire themselves, often cooperated with the Greeks, sympathised with them, began to enter into their mentality. They demonstrated a strong interest in the Byzantine Christian culture, which, after all, was a sibling one.

Conclusions

In the West, the news of the capture of Constantinople was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm and elation. To medieval minds, the Latin conquest of the impregnable Byzantine capital naturally appeared to be the outcome of God's will and was therefore explained as the working of Divine Providence in history. Viewing the *translatio* of the Byzantine Empire from the Greeks to the Latins through rose-tinted spectacles, several Westerners were led to believe that the union of the Eastern and Western Churches was accomplished and the liberation of the Churches of Jerusalem and Alexandria was at hand. The euphoria, however, that swept Western Europe in the months immediately following the fall of Constantinople soon proved ill-founded and gave way to skepticism and disappointment. As a response to this baffling outcome, as in the case of the Second Crusade, several Westerners, including the pope himself, resorted to the axiom that the working of Divine Providence remains hidden from the understanding of humans.

Although, in the opinion of the fallen Constantinopolitan elite, 'it was an evil thing to serve a Latin whose speech differed from that of the Hellenes',[2190] the Byzantines beyond Constantinople and large sections of the Constantinopolitan populace were prepared to accept their Latin emperors and the new *status quo*. So long as they were protected and well treated, the Greeks were ready to collaborate and welcome their Latin emperors with the same gestures

[2189] Errikou tes Balansien, 1987, 54.
[2190] Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 331.

extended to their Greek predecessors. The Byzantines were naturally more concerned with their welfare than preoccupied about the identity of who was seated on the throne of Constantinople. Besides, in the Byzantine Empire, an individual's successful seizure of the imperial throne was perceived in itself as a token of divine approval. In 1204 God approved of Baldwin's succeeding to the throne. His coronation, which in its greatest part seems to have followed Byzantine ceremonial, had convinced the Greeks of the legitimacy of their new Latin emperor, whom they worshipped as *saint empereeur*. With Baldwin's ascending *la caiere Coustentin* amid the celebratory cheers of the crowds in Constantinople the Fourth Crusade was over, together with the Byzantine Empire's days as a great power.

CONCLUSIONS

1204: THE CULMINATION OF A CENTURY OF GROWING MISTRUST AND HOSTILITY *OR* THE RESULT OF A SERIES OF ACCIDENTS?

Res accidencia:[2191] this is how Gunther of Pairis viewed the events that led to the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople and the capture of the Byzantine Empire. In terms of modern scholarly literature, this view, which came to be described as the 'theory of accidents', has been favoured and developed by Queller. The results of the research of this thesis fully bear Queller out, as opposed to those scholars who support the view that the events of 1204 were the inevitable result of mounting animosity in Latin Christendom toward the Byzantines. There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople and the eventual conquest of the Byzantine Empire were the culmination of a century of growing mistrust and hostility between the Latins and the Greeks. The Fourth Crusade turned towards Constantinople in response to the appeal made by Prince Alexios to install him on the imperial throne, while the crusaders decided to conquer the Byzantine capital *only* in early February 1204.

The very view that an 'anti-Byzantine' sentiment purportedly swept Western Europe during the twelfth century is false. This belief was shared by several Byzantine authors, who saw twelfth-century Europe in terms of a-united-West-versus-Byzantium and regarded the crusades as a sinister plot against their empire. The idea of the unity of the West was a Byzantine misconception and found expression in the use of the generic term *Latinoi*,[2192] which encompassed all those who unambiguously acknowledged the ultimate authority of Rome in spiritual affairs. Nevertheless, despite the fact that with the crusading movement the Latin world achieved a degree of unity under the banner of the papacy, this loose unity hardly lasted as long as a crusade. Whilst the Byzantines were members of a political as well as a cultural entity, the Latins were not. Latin identity was only cultural, *not* political.

In the twelfth and early thirteenth century, Latins and Byzantines were members of a religious community, namely Christendom. The ideal of Christian fraternity between the Latins and the Byzantines was shared by Latin rulers, nobles, clerics, and common people.

[2191] Gunther of Pairis, *Hystoria*, 135.
[2192] Kazhdan, 2001, 99.

This is well attested to by a large number of primary accounts examined in this thesis. Even the most anti-Byzantine authors such as Odo of Deuil, the anonymous of the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, Richard de Templo, and Gunther of Pairis acknowledged the Byzantines as Christian brothers. As our analysis of a wide range of chronicles has demonstrated, there was no real religious hatred for the Byzantines during the twelfth century. The so-called 'schism of 1054' seems hardly to have made any impact on the Latins - if it did not go altogether unnoticed by them. Although the very term *scisma* was used by Latin authors to describe the schisms caused in the Western Church by the anti-popes of the eleventh and twelfth centuries,[2193] it was not employed to describe the relations between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople. Similarly, while the charge of *scismaticus* was levelled wholesale by Latin writers against the anti-popes, the German emperors who chose them, and the Latin ecclesiastics siding with them,[2194] it was never raised against the Greeks. As we have seen, even in March 1204, the Greeks were still silently recognised as Christian brethren. The de-christianisation of their image by the crusading clergy came about *only* in April 1204. The fact that *no* clerical account of the Fourth Crusade refers to it speaks volumes about its perceived illegitimacy. It was clearly a transgression which the crusading clergy hoped would soon be forgotten. Most telling of all, the most outrageous aspect of the Latin conquest and sack of Constantinople was precisely that the offenses were committed against fellow Christians, hence the need for a special plea in defence of the episode.

Although a religious community, Christendom was *not* a unified political entity. A re-union of the whole of Christendom, *including* the Byzantine Empire, behind the banner of the papacy through the crusading movement was what the reforming popes had dreamed of. Although a degree of unity was achieved during the course of a crusade, outside the crusading movement Christendom was still split into various units of power, one of them being the Byzantine Empire. Despite the fact that during a crusade attacking and killing Christian

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[2193] Bernold of Constance, *Chronicon*, 436; Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolomyta*, 17; John of Salisbury, *Letters*, 126-7, 228-9, 554-5.

[2194] In his *Chronicon*, Bernold of Constance decried the imperialist Archbishop Tedald of Milan (d. after 1083) as *caput scismaticorum* and *antichristus*. The pro-imperial Bishop Otto of Strasbourg (1182-1100) is denounced by the same author as *Strazburgensis scismaticus* and *pseudoepiscopus*. Bernold of Constance, *Chronicon*, 453, 476, 540. In his letter of c. September-October 1167 to Pope Alexander, John of Salisbury vilified Frederick I as *auctor scismatis*. In a series of letters written between November 1166 and May 1168 to Master Gerard Pucelle, a learned canonist, John contemptuously referred to Rainald of Dassel, Archbishop of Cologne (1159-67) and supporter of the anti-popes Victor IV (1159-64) and Pascal III (1164-8), as *scismaticus Coloniensis* and condemned him as *caput scismatis* as well as *scismatis faber, incentor et signifer*. John of Salisbury, *Letters*, 228-9, 376-7, 396-7, 592-3.

brothers was deemed deplorable and could cause a scandal, outside the crusades the various Christian units of power regularly waged wars on and killed each other.

The Byzantine Empire was a power firmly assimilated to the political system of Christendom, a player in the intricate web of shifting alliances in twelfth-century Europe. Despite allegations that Manuel had betrayed the German crusading expedition of the Second Crusade to the Turks, Conrad himself formed an anti-Sicilian alliance with the Byzantine emperor even before the Second Crusade was over. After the accession of Frederick I to the German throne, Manuel went over to the camp of the papacy, which opposed the German emperor, not hesitating to make an alliance even with his Sicilian arch-enemies, the Hautevilles. Despite the fact that in 1148 Louis VII accused Manuel that he had betrayed the French of the Second Crusade to the Turks in Asia Minor, he made a marriage alliance with the Byzantine ruler thirty years later. Although Isaak II had been charged by many Latins with allying himself with Saladin against the German expedition of the Third Crusade, his daughter was later married to the Hohenstaufen pretender to the German kingship and the Western Roman Empire, and the Fourth Crusade travelled to Constantinople to install his son on the throne. In the opposing camp, Pope Innocent favoured his ally Alexios III against Prince Alexios and his Hohenstaufen brother-in-law, and endeavoured, for four years, to draw the Byzantine Empire into his grand design of one Christendom united against the 'infidel' behind the banner of the papacy. As to the Italian city-states, while the Venetians attacked Constantinople in 1203, the Pisans, who basked in Alexios III's favour, vigorously defended the Byzantine capital. Twelfth-century Christendom resembled a mosaic of powers with conflicting interests. It was *not* an entity consisting of two opposing groups, the Latins and the Greeks.

The fact that Alexios I was cast as a *tyrannus* by Guibert of Nogent and Ekkehard of Aura, while the same name-calling was applied to Isaak II by Richard de Templo should not be overstated. The concept of *tyrannus* as a wicked, cruel, and oppressive ruler formed part of the political language of the twelfth century.[2195] Latin rulers themselves were also condemned as 'tyrants' by other Latins. Roger II of Sicily was decried as a 'tyrant' by King Conrad, Otto of Freising, and the author of the *Annales Magdeburgenses*.[2196] Frederick Barbarossa was

[2195] H. Wieruszowski, 'Roger II of Sicily, *Rex-Tyrannus*, In Twelfth-Century Political Thought', *Speculum*, 38 (1963), 54, 65.
[2196] *RHGF*, 15, 536; Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 338, 346; *Annales Magdeburgenses*, *MGH SS*, 16, 164.

damned as *Teutonicus tyrannus* by John of Salisbury.[2197] Henry VI was denounced as a 'tyrant' by Eleanor, duchess of Aquitaine (1137-1204).[2198] William Longchamp, Bishop of Ely and Richard I's chancellor, in the hands of whom the English king left the government of England when he departed on crusade, is labelled as 'an unbearable tyrant' (*tyrannum importabilem*) by William of Newburgh.[2199] Reynald of Châtillon's 'tyranny' (*tyrannis*) over the Cypriots is denounced by William of Tyre.[2200]

The accusations and epithets hurled at individual Byzantine rulers by Latin authors were by no means reserved for the *imperatores Constantinopolitani*. While Ekkehard of Aura condemns Alexios as a 'persecutor of the church', Otto of Freising casts Roger II as an 'enemy of the church' (*ecclesiae hostem*).[2201] In the same year that Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, wrote his personal letter to Roger II flattering the Norman king and unleashing a stream of vituperation against Manuel, Wibalt, abbot of Stavelot and Korvey, sent a letter to Manuel decrying the king of Sicily as a *tyrannus* and an 'enemy of God' (*Dei inimicus*) while extolling Manuel's *gloriosam majestatem* and praising the *sanctum et terribile imperium* (i.e. the Byzantine Empire) for 'its veneration of divine worship, its right order of laws, its regard for civil justice, its strength and military discipline, its endless abundance of riches'.[2202] While, in her letter to Frederick, Queen Sibylla branded Isaak II as a 'persecutor of the church of God', her contemporary, and much more powerful, Eleanor, in a letter abounding in biblical quotations and sent to Pope Celestine III (1191-8), denounced Henry VI as an enemy of the church, accusing him of having despoiled churches and oppressed the holy, not sparing monks, recluses, hermits, nuns, or lepers.[2203]

Otto of Freising damned not only Alexios but also Henry IV as *Deo contrarius*. Having condemned Isaak as 'one equal to, or rather worse than Saladin', William of Newburgh, using almost identical terms, decries Henry VI as 'another Saladin' (*alter Saladinus*), or even one 'worse than the Turks', a 'more relentless' and 'more avaricious Saladin'.[2204] Albert of

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[2197] See John of Salisbury's letters of August 1165 to Thomas Becket, archbishop of Canterbury, of June 1166 to Bartholomew, bishop of Exeter, and of August 1169 to Baldwin, archdeacon of Totnes. John of Salisbury, *Letters*, 52-3, 102-3, 656-7. Cf. John of Salisbury's letter of c. September-October 1167 to Pope Alexander, in ibid., 370-9.

[2198] *PL* 206: 1265-8. Eleanor was the wife of Louis VII of France from 1137 until 1152 and of Henry II of England from 1152 until 1189.

[2199] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 333.

[2200] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 63A, 844.

[2201] Otto of Freising, *Chronica*, 338.

[2202] *PL* 189: 1310-11

[2203] *PL* 206: 1265-8.

[2204] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 387.

Aachen brands Bohemond as deceitful (*subdolus*) and greedy (*auarus*).[2205] Stephen of Blois was labelled as a coward by the vast majority of the Latin chroniclers of the First Crusade. Frederick I was vilified as *Christianorum hostis* by John of Salisbury.[2206] Richard de Templo deplored the 'hidden treachery' (*occultae insidiae*) of Leopold V of Austria and Henry VI, and challenged their *Christianitas*, exclaiming that they 'were believed to share the Christian profession – if only it were true!'[2207] William of Newburgh cast Leopold as a 'greedy and perfidious man' (*homo avarus et perfidus*) and a 'most iniquitous duke' (*dux nequissimus*).[2208] Henry VI's 'avarice' (*avaritia*), as well as the 'craft' (*astutia*) and the 'malice' (*malitia*) of Philip II of France are denounced by this same chronicler.[2209] The anonymous author of the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris* asserts that 'Richard, the king of England ... merited everyone's indignation (*indignatio*)' and twice deplores his 'arrogance' (*arrogantia*), for which the ruler was in due course punished by the 'just judgement of God'.[2210] Otto of Saint Blasien regards the English king as a paradigm of *Anglica perfidia*.[2211] Several other examples could be cited.

Like all other Christian rulers, the Byzantine emperors had *both* friends and enemies in Christendom. As has been seen, while Alexios was regarded by some Latins as a *tyrannus*, he was extolled by others as *magnificus imperator*. As to Manuel, he had eventually become an object of admiration among the Latins. Andronikos was a 'tyrant' *par excellence*, but his condemnation was mainly due to his tyranny over his own people rather than to the Latin massacre of 1182, which did not really make much impression on the West. Although Isaak II was denounced by several accounts of the Third Crusade, the men on the Fourth Crusade and the accounts of the latter expedition were generally well disposed towards him.

It is true that individuals on the Crusade of 1101 and the Second Crusade considered that the Byzantine emperors had betrayed the crusaders to the Turks and therefore harboured a great deal of ill feeling towards them. Those Italians who suffered during the Latin massacre of 1182 doubtless hated the Greeks for the rest of their lives. Some of the Latins, such as William of Tyre, who happened to hear about the Italians' sufferings, obviously sympathised

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[2205] Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 476-7.
[2206] See John of Salisbury's letter of c. December 1167-March 1168 to Baldwin of Boulogne, archdeacon of Sudbury. John of Salisbury, *Letters*, 458-9.
[2207] Richard de Templo, *Itinerarium*, 443-4; Richard de Templo, *Chronicle*, 383.
[2208] William of Newburgh, *Historia*, I, 383.
[2209] Ibid., 358, 387, 389.
[2210] *Historia de expeditione*, 100-1; *History of the Expedition*, 157-60.
[2211] Otto of Saint Blasien, *Chronica*, 55.

with them. It is also true that the armed conflict between Germans and Byzantines during the marching of the German expedition of the Third Crusade through the Byzantine Empire naturally aroused the German hatred of the Greeks. Nevertheless, a general, lasting and ineradicable Latin hatred of the Greeks never existed. Although the rhetoric of certain twelfth-century Latin authors catches the eye, it is neither representative of the Latin historiography nor reflects general Latin public opinion. Besides, in an age when the printing press had not yet developed, only a few copies of the 'anti-Byzantine' texts could circulate among the Latins. The extent of the actual readership in the Middle Ages was also highly limited because of widespread illiteracy. Information was normally obtained and circulated orally. The oral tradition is doubtless powerful in shaping attitudes, perceptions and memory. However, both oral tradition and collective memory are bound to fade after several decades and vanish in a few more.

The contact between the Westerners and the Byzantines established by the crusades involved only a relatively small part of the Western world - in other words it was not a really full-scale contact - and was simply too temporary and short-lived to result in a universal and permanent Latin hatred of the Greeks. The Latin powers, especially those in the West, were in much more permanent contact between each other, a contact frequently characterised by a history of conflict. The kings of England and the Capetians were almost constantly engaged in wars against one another; hence the French and the English had more reasons to hate each other than to hate the Byzantines.[2212] Although the French Odo and the German Gunther revile the Greeks, the bitter enmity between the French and the Germans that established itself in the early twelfth century and persisted well after the Second World War was predictably more intense and deeply ingrained than French or German animosity towards the Byzantines.[2213] The Lombard cities of northern Italy had ample grounds to detest the German emperors who threatened their autonomy rather than the Greeks. The same is true of the people of Rome.[2214]

[2212] William of Newburgh describes the French as 'by nature aggressive and also arrogant' (*natura feroces simul et arrogantes*). On his account of their retreat in battle during the Revolt of 1173-4 against Henry II, the chronicler records: 'those who a little earlier seemed as lions with fierce spirits and the roaring of high-sounding words, were suddenly found to be like hares in retreat and flight'. William of Newburgh, *English Affairs: Book II*, 122-5.

[2213] Guibert of Nogent relates that in his presence 'a certain archdeacon of Mainz' vilified (*vilipenderit*) the French as 'idle' (*inertes*) and 'feeble' (*marcidos*) and 'derisively' (*irrisorie*) described them as *Francones*. Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 108. Cf. also Odo of Deuil's sharp remarks about the Germans in Chapter 2, 109-10.

[2214] According to Ekkehard of Aura, the Investiture Contest 'made us [the Germans] hateful (*invisos*) and hostile (*infestos*) to the Romans, and the Romans to us'. Ekkehard of Aura, *Hierosolomyta*, 17.

The Genoese, the Pisans, and the Venetians, rivals for commercial predominance in Constantinople and the Levant, naturally looked at each other, rather than at the Byzantines, with loathing. Any resentment that the popes might have felt against the Byzantine emperors was by far surpassed by the papacy's visceral hatred of the German rulers, especially the Hohenstaufen.

The Byzantines never occupied a prominent place in the collective memory of the vast West. It was rather the Westerners, and the Latins in general, who had gradually taken up a significant place in the cultural memory of the Byzantines due to the influx of Latin mercenaries, merchants, and civil servants into the twelfth-century Byzantine Empire, to the passing of unruly crusaders through the Byzantine territories, and to the Norman invasions of the empire. Nevertheless, the question of the motives for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade does not lie with how the Byzantines viewed the Latins but how the Latins viewed the Byzantines. From the Latin perspective, the Byzantine Empire was an integral part of the Christian world and the most important political developments, and scandals (for which the people in the Middle Ages had an insatiable appetite), in this part of Christendom were recorded by several Western annalists and chroniclers.

With the exception of the vitriolic diatribes directed against the Greeks by certain authors as examined in this dissertation, there is little evidence of animosity towards the Byzantines in the chronicles and annals written by the Latins in the period under investigation. Latin attitudes to Byzantium generally ranged from indifference to apathy, and certainly no 'decades of anti-Byzantine feeling' informed the decision of the men on the Fourth Crusade to travel to Constantinople and eventually to attack the Byzantine capital. The sack that ensued the capture of Constantinople can be fully explained if the months of armed conflict between Latins and Greeks in 1203-4 as well as human greed are taken into consideration.

To explain relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Latin world and to interpret crusading texts in the light of the outcome of the Fourth Crusade is a grave error. The same is true of trying to explain the diversion to, attack on, and sack of Constantinople by looking at the period between 1095 and 1204 searching for 'anti-Byzantine' texts and passages, and 'abortive crusading plans' to attack the Byzantine capital, plans that allegedly prefigure the Fourth Crusade. The outcome of the Fourth Crusade is fully explained if we examine in detail 'the complex chain of events' starting in the second half of 1201, when Prince Alexios escaped to the West. The 'century of deteriorating relations, largely stemming from the

crusades themselves' is a statement, or rather, a myth simply not substantiated by the evidence. The same is true of the assertion that 'antipathy ... had been cultivated for decades in the West against Byzantium'. Universal twelfth-century Latin hatred of the Byzantines is, beyond doubt, a product of the intolerance of modern scholarship, rather than the reality of the twelfth-century Latin world, as I hope to have shown throughout this thesis.

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