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RICHARD II AND IRELAND, 1395-9

Richard II and Ireland, 1395-9

This thesis seeks to examine the development of royal policy in the lordship from 1395-9--from the time of Richard's first expedition until his deposition. Many different topics come within the scope of this examination--there are for example chapters on the administration of the lordship and on the English background to the period. The theme which provides unity for the thesis is however the question of Richard's interest in the lordship and the repercussions of this unusual royal intervention. To facilitate an understanding of the importance of the period I have included some introductory material surveying briefly the history of royal relations with Gaelic Ireland, for Richard's principal achievement in Ireland was I believe his reestablishment of contact between the crown and the chiefs who controlled most of the country outside the small area still responding to the wishes of the Dublin government. In my view Richard's policy on the first expedition was essentially an attempt to restate the legal unity of his Irish lordship, containing Gaelic and Anglo-Irish subjects alike, and his success in this marks the decade as a high point in the medieval lordship, despite the fact that the submissions were abandoned and the peace broken. The rest of the thesis, in examining the pressures and developments contributing to the subsequent collapse, reveals what was apparently a fairly consistent royal interest, maintained from 1395 and reaching its logical culmination in the second expedition. The findings of my research make it clear I feel that Richard's involvement in Ireland had greater significance for both contemporary Ireland and England than is usually appreciated.

Dorothy B. Johnston.

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Richard II and Ireland, 1395-9

by

Dorothy Blane Johnston

Submitted for the degree of Ph.D. at Trinity College, Dublin University.

September 1976

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not previously been submitted for a degree at this or any other university.

Dorothy Johnston

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* * *

List of abbreviations

This list is not intended to provide full bibliographical details but to elucidate obscure footnote entries and to guide the reader to the relevant entry in the bibliography. Many titles which have been shortened in the footnotes are not in fact included here as they are easily identifiable. Full descriptions of manuscripts identified by number are also reserved for the bibliography.

A.Clon.	Annals of Clonmacnoise
A.Conn.	Annals of Connacht
A.F.M.	Annals of the Four Masters
A.L.C.	Annals of Loch Cé
A.U.	Annals of Ulster
Annals of Ireland	Annals of Ireland by Friar John Clyn and Thady Dowling
Archaeologia xx	Creton, Jehan, Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard, in Archaeologia, xx.
B.I.H.R.	Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
br.	brevia
br. dir. baron.	brevia directa baronibus
br. retorn.	brevia retornabilia
B.M.	British Museum
C.C.H.	Rotulorum Patentium et Clausorum Cancellariae Hiberniae Calendarium
C.C.R.	Calendar of Close Rolls
C.D.I.	Calendar of Documents relating to Ireland
C.I.P.M.	Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem
C.J.R.	Calendar of Justiciary Rolls
C.O.D.	Calendar of Ormond Deeds
C.P.R.	Calendar of Patent Rolls
D.N.B.	Dictionary of National Biography
E.H.R.	English Historical Review

Foedera	Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cujuscunque generis acta publica, ed. T.Rymer
Gen. Off.	Genealogical Office
I.H.S.	Irish Historical Studies
J.R.S.A.I.	Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland
King's Council in Ireland	A Roll of Proceedings of the King's Council in Ireland, 16 Richard II, ed. J.Graves
mem.	memoranda
N.L.I.	National Library of Ireland
P.R.I.A.	Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy
P.R.O.	Public Record Office
P.R.O.I.	Public Record Office, Ireland
Proceedings and Ordinances	Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England, ed. Sir N.H.Nicolas
R.C.	Record Commission
R.C.B.Lib.	Representative Church Body Library
R.S.	Rolls Series
Rept. D.K.	Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records
R.I.A.	Royal Irish Academy
Rot.Parl.	Rotuli Parliamentorum
Statutes and Ordinances	Statutes and Ordinances and Acts of the Parliament of Ireland, King John to Henry V, ed. H.F.Berry
T.C.D.	Trinity College Dublin
T.R.H.S.	Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
Tout, Chapters	T.F.Tout, Chapters in Medieval Administrative History
Traison et Mort	Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart deux Roy d'Angleterre

Introduction

Part i -- The subject under examination

When Curtis in 1927 published his transcripts of documents concerning the Gaelic submissions to Richard his primary concern was with the events of the 1394-5 expedition itself, and little analysis was offered as to Richard's general Irish policies.[1] The necessity for further work on royal interests in Ireland in the 1390s has lately become clear, as recent studies on Richard II in England have opened up new possibilities concerning both Richard's own personality and abilities and the character and aims of his monarchy.[2] So far these historical advances have been of little profit to Anglo-Irish history, despite the obviously important role of Ireland in Richard's ultimate downfall. In examining Richard's involvement in the lordship during his last years I have attempted in the thesis to retain a balance between aspects of English and Anglo-Irish interest, but the dual orientation was in itself inevitable. While the primary purpose has been an effort to understand a particular period of Anglo-Irish history, unity in theme is provided by Richard himself acting as both king of England and lord of Ireland. Some chapters are consequently more concerned with English developments and others with Irish, though all try to demonstrate the contemporary inter-relations of English and Irish affairs.

Although by English historical standards the Irish lordship in the 1390s appears to be a relatively unresearched field, the decade has in fact received a fair degree of critical attention, if within narrowly limited areas. In studying the subject of Richard II and his

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1 E.Curtis, Richard II in Ireland, and 'Unpublished letters from Richard II', P.R.I.A., xxxvii (1927) C, pp 276-303.

2 For a representative survey of the new approach, see F.R.H. du Boulay and C. Barron, (ed.s) The Reign of Richard II.

relations with Ireland during this short period one must as a result work on several levels. On the one hand, modern interpretations of Richard's reign in England are available, which, built on a huge body of accumulated studies and material, reveal detail about Richard's government in spheres such as royal patronage and foreign policy. The highly complex picture which emerges of the English monarchy and the tensions and pressures affecting it inevitably bears upon royal policy in Ireland, where unfortunately neither the background historical research nor the record evidence exists to duplicate these studies. Irish historians have, however, provided sufficient account of Richard's first expedition--drawing upon editions of royal letters and transcripts of Gaelic submissions--to enable one to build in this area at least upon the work of former researchers.[1] At yet another level, however, virtually no examination of the sources has been as yet undertaken, and thus with some questions historical research must start at the very foundations. In examining, for instance, the administration of the lordship, one must first seek to establish the personnel in office and in what manner the offices normally functioned at this time, before ever approaching the central theme of Richard's involvement in the lordship. As a result, the level of understanding achieved in the different chapters is uneven, and several do little more than offer direction for more general Anglo-Irish studies.

In examining Richard II's policy towards Ireland one must bear in mind that his involvement in the lordship was on a completely different level from any predecessor, and that comparison with the

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1 Curtis, op.cit.; J.F.Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions to Ireland', J.R.S.A.I., xciii (1963) pp 135-49; also Lydon, The Lordship of Ireland, pp 231-40; J.Otway-Ruthven, A history of Medieval Ireland, pp 326-38, for recent accounts of the period.

approaches of other kings is of limited value. To previous fourteenth century monarchs the problem of Ireland intruded largely through questions concerning the Anglo-Irish lieges--their willingness to aid the king, their demands for aid from the king and other such issues. The native Irish featured usually in a different role--as an enemy increasingly hostile to the Anglo-Irish and the king's officers, whose rebellion called for military reprisals. Under Richard, by comparison, the Gaelic chiefs came once more into direct communication with the English crown, partly it is true as defeated rebels, but also as suppliant subjects, akin to the Anglo-Irish lieges. Once Richard made the decision to come to Ireland this re-establishment of relations with the Irish was inevitable. The submissions made to him, which formed the cornerstone of what one might term his Irish policy, could not have been achieved by any absentee king. In them and in the explanations given by the Irish when they wrote to Richard about their submissions one can see a direct link between Richard and Henry II and John, the only medieval kings to achieve anything approaching this kind of overlordship. The winning of these submissions inevitably affected the position of the Anglo-Irish in the lordship, for any favours granted to loyal Irishmen implied a threat to the entrenched privileges of the Anglo-Irish. While full effectiveness of the submissions cannot have been considered likely, the possibility, and its failure to materialize, dominates the 1395-9 period.

In order to place these submissions within the context of Anglo-Irish history, it has seemed necessary to give some introductory account of the background of relations between the English crown and the Gaelic Irish since the twelfth century conquest. This facilitates an understanding of both royal and Irish concerns in

the 1390s. One can see, for example, why Richard's achievement in winning such widespread submissions remained of enormous significance, despite the obvious failure of the government subsequently to implement them. Contemporaries themselves recognized their importance, proposing in 1421 a crusade to punish the Irish chiefs who in breaking their oaths of homage were bound to pay huge sums into the Papal Camera.[1] We can see in retrospect that Richard's statement of overlordship at this juncture marked a unique point in the history of the medieval lordship, linking the first submissions of the Irish to Henry II to the ultimate Tudor claim to be kings of Ireland.

The thesis itself divides naturally into three main sections, dealing respectively with the periods of the first expedition, the interim between the two expeditions, and the background to the 1399 venture. In the first section the expedition is examined through its policies and effects upon the position of both the Gaelic chiefs and the Anglo-Irish, along with some consideration of the English element which participated. Although a considerable bulk of evidence in available, it was decided not to make a detailed examination of the administrative organization of the expedition. Not only is a brief account already available,[2] but it was felt that a close examination of the 1399 expedition was sufficient to demonstrate the normal organization of such a venture, and that to repeat the exercise for 1394-5 would upset the balance of the thesis, turning it into a study of English administrative practices.

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1 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 565-7
2 Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions'.

In examining the first expedition I have attempted to unravel the development of Richard's submission policy, in so far as this helps to explain the nature of the policy itself. The letters of the Irish chiefs to Richard, and the sequence of their submissions are then used, in the light of the examination of past relations between the crown and the Irish, to analyze the motives of the chiefs in question and Richard's own objectives. The chapter dealing with the Anglo-Irish involvement in this describes Anglo-Irish and English participation in the expedition, paying particular attention to the different interests of those concerned and to the likelihood of their involvement in and support for Richard's policies.

The second section comprises three chapters covering the period from 1395-9. One concerns the role of the king's chief governors in Ireland during these years. The chief governor, as representative of the absentee lord, played a crucial part in determining the success or failure of royal policy in the lordship. Scarcity of material on the office, both in this and preceding periods, necessitated some general examination of the chief governor's normal obligations and powers, providing material which is at times of only peripheral interest to Richard's own policies. Any illumination of the function of this office helps, however, to explain how royal policy for the lordship was normally developed and implemented. The following chapter examines the lordship's administration in a more general way. Of particular interest are the offices of chancellor and treasurer, both of which undergo certain changes during the 1390s. Material on day to day administration is unfortunately lacking, nor is it possible to establish exactly the personnel in office throughout the period. There is however sufficient evidence to show that the Irish administration

underwent a severe internal crisis about 1397 which if not the direct result of Richard's innovations certainly had a profound effect upon the ability of his administration to govern. The final chapter of the section attempts to unravel the process by which the fragile peace achieved by Richard in 1395 broke down during the following four years. The examination throws further light on direct relations between the king and both Irish chiefs and Anglo-Irish magnates and demonstrates his continuing interest in the problems of the lordship.

In the last section, concerning the second expedition, and its background, attention inevitably focusses on Richard's role as king of England and the effects upon his reign of involvement in Ireland. This necessitates, first of all, examination of the English background to the Irish problem, showing how the political crises of Richard's last years had their impact upon the lordship. It reveals some contemporary English attitudes towards the problem of Ireland, demonstrating a high level of general ignorance about the lordship and Richard's intentions there. The next chapter gives a general account of the organization of the expedition, viewed as an exercise in English administration. In itself of importance, in describing procedures and systems probably typical of most such ventures, the evidence also proves that the enterprise was on a much larger scale than previously suspected, comparable in fact to the effort of 1394-5. The final chapter, describing the expedition itself, seeks to discover in so far as is possible what Richard intended to do on this enterprise and how much he accomplished. The second half of this chapter is concerned with the period after Richard's abrupt departure from the country. It examines the immediate impact of the Bolingbroke crisis upon the lordship and in what state it was left in the summer of 1399. The subsequent conclusion elaborates on this, describing the position of early Lancastrian Ireland in the light of Richard's recent involvement.

Part ii -- The sources

Throughout most of the later medieval period in Anglo-Ireland one is inhibited by lack of evidence in either manuscript or published form in choosing freely the questions to be investigated. The loss of the bulk of the lordship's records, which in any case dealt only on occasion with events in Gaelic Ireland, has meant that topics examined in any research are to a significant degree determined by the chance of source survival. Thus, for example, treatment of the implementation of Richard's Irish policies after the first expedition has been brief and speculative, while certain aspects of the administrative organization responsible for the second expedition are described in relative detail. In studying the 1390s some particular limitations must be faced. By this time the auditing of Irish accounts at Westminster was unusual, Richard's last treasurers specifically receiving freedom from the obligation. As a result English records contain relatively little about the state of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish chancery records of the period appear to have already had large gaps by the eighteenth century, and thus we do not even have secondary transcripts or calendared extracts for several years. On the other hand, Richard's own involvement in the country means that the English sources are unusually rich in information on royal relations with Ireland, though Richard's deposition had a profound effect upon the evidence recorded and subsequent historical judgements of his policy. The curtailment of the second expedition after six weeks, and the failure after the Lancastrian usurpation of many officials and knights to render account, inevitably creates difficulties in measuring Richard's achievements in 1399. On a few occasions the deposition context actually adds to our information, as for instance when officers accounting for goods lost in Wales on their return

reveal some of the supplies brought to Ireland,[1] but for the most part the reverse is true. For example, information on the organization of the second expedition, while sufficient to indicate the lines upon which it was administered, is far too scanty to give proof of the size of the naval force or the victualling operation. Many of the individuals involved simply did not account and resisted all Henry's efforts to make them do so.[2]

The principal sources used may for convenience be divided into three general headings: I) Records surviving in Ireland in published or manuscript form, including private family collections.
II) Records surviving in England, mostly in the Public Record Office, London, but including also miscellaneous items found in different collections
III) Narrative sources of four main types; i.e. a) Irish Annals; b) Anglo-Irish narrative sources; c) English chronicles; d) French chronicles.

I) Record sources surviving in Ireland[3]

For the records emanating from the Irish chancery and exchequer during this period one is largely dependent upon the secondary evidence of manuscript transcripts and printed sources. This can create difficulties. Not only is there a danger of scribal error in some of the transcripts, but many items survive only in abbreviated and occasionally ambiguous form. Tresham's Rotulorum Cancellariae Hiberniae Calendarium includes close and patent rolls for 18 Richard II (1394-5),

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1 See below, pp 527-9

2 The memoranda rolls of Henry IV show several efforts to follow up men who did not account; e.g. E 368/179 Michaelmas br. retorn., membrane unnumbered, and E 368/180 Mich. br. retorn., m 159, both of which concern shipping prests. Some may have completely escaped exchequer attention. There is no record for instance in the memoranda rolls up until 9 H.IV of any summons for John Henour, who received £1,193.13.0 on 13 May 1399 to make payments to mariners. (E 403/562, 13 May)

3 Fuller details of all sources referred to here can be found in the bibliography.

but from then there is a gap until 1 Henry IV (1399-1400), nearly five years later. Some few additional items of interest are found in Ferguson's extracts from the patent and close rolls of Ireland in the Royal Irish Academy (MS 12.D.16), and in Harris's 'Collectanea de Rebus Hibernicis', vol. iv (Nat. Lib. MS 4), though here again the rolls from 19-23 Richard II were not apparently available to the transcribers. The Harris transcripts are, however, far fuller than Tresham's calendar and often give information not available elsewhere. Chartae Privilegie et Immunitates--a collection of documents taken from the Irish chancery rolls--covers the period to 1395, and contains a few of the grants made on the first expedition. Betham's extracts from the Justiciary Rolls provides several interesting notices, though mostly from an earlier period (Gen.Office, MS 192). Little information is available upon Irish parliamentary proceedings, though Berry's Statutes and Ordinances is useful for the period both before and after Richard's involvement. To some extent these deficiencies of evidence are compensated for by the unique survival of the council roll of 1392-3, edited by Graves, which is enormously important in establishing the Anglo-Irish background to the period. In the same volume can also be found Graves's transcripts of certain important documents, notably the 1399 petition to the king.

Material from the medieval Irish exchequer is extremely limited. Ferguson's Collections from the Memoranda Rolls (vol ii) and his Repertory to the Memoranda Rolls (vols i-ii), preserved in the Dublin Public Record Office, contain several items of interest, as do his Memoranda Roll Extracts in the Academy (MS 24.H.17). The entries are often, however, too brief to be of real value. The Record Commission's Calendar of the Memoranda Rolls, vol 33 (R.C.8/33) is more generally useful, in its transcripts from the roll of 1397-8, and the Public Record Office Calendar, iii, provides much important material from

Memoranda Roll 1 Henry IV. Pipe Roll material from the period survives in Betham's and Ferguson's extracts, though each of these contains only a few items from the 1390s (N.L.I. MS 761 and R.I.A. MS 12.D.10).

Other miscellaneous sources throw further light on Anglo-Ireland during these years. Some, like the Delafield Manuscripts (P.R.O.I. MS 2675) and the Graves Manuscripts (R.C.B.Lib. MSS 2-4), are in themselves collections from the official records of the lordship and reflect the particular purpose lying behind their compilation. Certain narrative works, such as Hore's History of Wexford, quote from the now lost records of the Dublin government, particularly the memoranda rolls. Considerable use was also made of the Calendar of Ormond Deeds and the Calendar of Carew MSS, though these and other collections of family deeds are most valuable in providing background and rarely offer evidence central to the theme of Richard's involvement.

II) Records surviving in England

The most important body of material available in England is found either in the Public Record Office or in publications of its records. The printed collections which I found most useful were the Calendars of Close and Patent Rolls, Rotuli Parliamentorum, Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council in England, vol i, and Rymer's Foedera. Information in these sources is mostly of a miscellaneous nature, though a collection of royal correspondence concerning the first expedition, found in the proceedings of the council, is of particular interest. Many other published documents were consulted--both from private collections and government records—and some, such as the formulary printed as Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions, were of considerable incidental use. The printed records of greatest importance to me were probably Curtis's transcripts of the Gaelic submissions and the letters of the Irish

chiefs to Richard in 1394-5 as enrolled on the memoranda rolls. The evidence they provide serves as a basis for our knowledge of Richard's policy and Gaelic attitudes towards him and is perhaps the greatest single advantage in studying this royal expedition as compared to that of either John or Henry II.

Of the unpublished material available the sources I found most useful were the Enrolled Foreign Accounts, Exchequer Accounts Various, Enrolled Wardrobe and Household Accounts, Issue Rolls and Memoranda Rolls, all preserved in the Public Record Office. As few detailed Irish ministerial accounts were presented at Westminster during the period, each of these sources is primarily of value in its miscellaneous information on English involvement in the lordship. The Wardrobe and Household material includes for example the account of John Carp as keeper of the privy wardrobe during the second expedition, though unfortunately his detailed account book has not survived. In using these sources for Anglo-Irish history one is constantly being reminded that they were the normal records of the English administration directed towards the king's domestic needs and their value, even when referring specifically to Irish concerns, is often less than one might hope. Affairs within Ireland itself are even less adequately documented. Mortimer's account covering his governorship contains no detail about expenditure and Scrope's enrolled account of his justiciarship, with the supporting retinue roll, is exceptional in the evidence it offers on post-1395 developments in Ireland. Other series of records more selectively examined included Chancery Proceedings, Warrants for the Great Seal, Patent Rolls, Pipe Rolls, Warrants for Issue, Ministers' Accounts, Ancient Petitions and Chester Records. Of particular interest in these sources are the accounts of the receiver of Mortimer's Denbigh lordship, in the Ministers' Accounts series, and

the Chester Recognizance Rolls which contain a considerable body of information on the background to Richard's second Irish enterprise.

Some of the most interesting individual items came however from sources outside the Public Record Office. In the British Museum, Cotton MS Titus B XI, apart from containing many late fourteenth century items now in print, contains two original drafts of a hitherto unpublished letter from Richard to O'Neill after the first expedition. In Hoccleve's Formulary, also in the British Museum, are two important royal letters of 1396, one to the king's ministers in Ireland and one to the Earl of Desmond. Further items of more miscellaneous interest came from a variety of other sources in the museum, as listed in the bibliography.

In Lambeth Palace Library consulation of the original volumes shows that the Calendar of Carew MSS does less than justice to both an important petition and a conciliar memorandum dating from about 1397. Together these documents provided a basis for the examination of the Irish administration in the period.

III) Narrative sources

a) Irish Annals: The annals pay little attention to Richard's involvement in Ireland, and are mainly useful in providing a background knowledge of events in Gaelic Ireland. Of particular value is the Rawlinson B 488 document, printed in Miscellaneous Irish Annals. Emanating apparently from Lough Ree, county Longford, this independent source contains many interesting references to the first expedition, though none at all to the second. Although evidence from the annals is always rather difficult to use in establishing precisely the political state of Gaelic Ireland, there are additional complications in this respect during the 1390s. The Annals of Connacht and the

Annals of Loch Cé, parallel texts, both have gaps from 1395-8. Furthermore, several of the annals are a year out in their dating from 1398,[1] and difficulties of discovering exactly when events happened within a particular year are consequently much greater. Although specific items have been used from the annals to establish some account of the breakdown of peace 1395-9, unreliability of dating had reduced the significance of this evidence. The survival for this period of a unique collection of letters from Gaelic chiefs to Richard II underlines the unsatisfactory nature of the annals as a source of evidence on political relations between Gaelic and Anglo-Irish areas. There is no hint in most of the annals, with the possible exception of the Miscellaneous Irish Annals, of the widespread submissions made by the Gaelic Irish to the king or of the motives spelled out in their letters expressing their willingness to come in. While the failure of, for instance, the Annals of the Four Masters even to mention the second expedition presumably indicates its lack of significance for the Irish chiefs, the poor quality of annalistic references to the 1394-5 enterprise shows that one can place little weight on the negative evidence of ommissions by the compilers.

b) Anglo-Irish narratives: There are only two Anglo-Irish narrative sources of any importance for this period. Henry of Marlborough's fifteenth century Chronicle of Ireland contains only some brief items of interest for the 1390s, though it is very important for the immediate post-Ricardian period. Thady Dowling's Annals of Ireland are of some interest, particularly in his account of events in the vicinity of Leighlin, county Carlow, where Dowling lived as the

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1 On this question see year notes in the Annals of Ulster, iii, pp 42-57 passim.

treasurer and chancellor of the diocese in the early seventeenth century and where he may possibly have drawn on local traditions.

c) The English chronicles: These are mainly of value for the information they provide on royal preparations and for the English view of Irish affairs which they reveal. Only rarely do they show an awareness of events within the lordship, the St Albans accounts being in this respect the best informed. Some sources stand out for special reasons, such as Adam of Usk's attention to Mortimer interests and the earl's relations with Richard. By and large, however, the English political crises of the 1390s dominates the evidence, and the level of attention to the second expedition particularly reflects the circumstances of Richard's deposition.

d) The French sources: For the events of the first and second expeditions the fullest narrative accounts are French. Froissart describes in some detail accounts taken from English knights who participated in 1394-5 and gives an interesting and well-known view of Richard's successes. Accompanying the 1399 expedition was a French squire apparently called Jean Creton, who later composed a metrical poem about the enterprise and about the general background to Richard's deposition. Though propagandist in parts, the anti-Lancastrian bias does not greatly affect the value of the evidence on Ireland, which does much to compensate for the general dearth of contemporary records.[1]

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1 Creton's account is so important that the reliability of his evidence is discussed separately below, Appendix I, pp 519-30.

Part iii -- An introductory account of relations between the Crown and Gaelic Ireland.

While it seems likely that the exact nature of the bond established between Henry II and the Irish chiefs in 1172 must remain obscure, it is worth attempting to place the 1395 submissions in their historical context by reviewing the evidence on this question and on the crown's subsequent relations with Gaelic Ireland. The unsatisfactory nature of many examinations of the 1172 submissions seems to have resulted in large measure from ill-defined terminology. Allowance has not always been made for the fact that official and chronicle records come from twelfth century Norman England, whose political structures were largely moulded by feudal customs. Thus such terms as 'homage', 'fealty', 'vassalage', 'liegeman' and 'lord' were used and have regularly been repeated in descriptions of Henry's dealings with Gaelic Ireland. In fact agreements to give hostages and promise tribute for one's kingdom conform so little with contemporary feudal practice in England that the terminology is misleading. The obvious nature of this problem has meant that only rarely does one find a feudal interpretation of the Norman conquest of Ireland explicitly stated, with the Irish seen as holding their land of Henry II by oaths of homage.[1] A more common approach has shown recognition of the fact that the submission bond meant different things to both parties. It is certain that the prominence given in feudal societies on the continent and in England to land tenure dependent on military service makes 'feudalism' a dangerous label to apply in Gaelic Ireland, where different patterns

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1 e.g. A.G.Richey, A short history of the Irish people, pp 154-6.

of landholding made such practices virtually inoperable.[1] To a large extent the problem of interpretation centres on this question of land, as Orpen made clear when he explained that John's title of Dominus Hibernie in 1177 'appropriately expresses the feudal and territorial relation which it was desired to create'.[2] This view has affected attitudes towards political relations in the lordship, which appears to be limited to the area of colonization, though the position of Gaelic Ireland is confused by the continued use of feudal terms. Thus, for instance, Curtis wrote:

> While the colonial lords were John's fideles, the kings of Connacht, Limerick, Cork and Ulster were acknowledged as such by King and Pope and were vassals rather than subjects of the English crown.(3)

A new approach has been facilitated by Professor's Warren's recent assessment of Henry II's Irish policy.[4] Stressing the importance of land to feudal homage, he rejects the notion that the Irish chiefs can have entered such a contract and comes out strongly in favour of their having done only fealty to Henry, promising by this merely to be faithful to him. The agreement reached between Henry and Rory O'Connor in the Treaty of Windsor was certainly very different from that respecting Scotland in the Treaty of Falaise in 1174, an undoubtedly feudal settlement describing the Scottish king as the enfeoffed vassal of Henry.[5]

It is unfortunate that evidence on the form of the twelfth century Irish submissions is altogether lacking in record sources

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1 For a brief account of some aspects of Gaelic land-holding see K.Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland, pp 22-3, 37, 57-67 etc.

2 G.H.Orpen, Ireland under the Normans, ii, 31

3 Curtis, Medieval Ireland, p 103

4 W.L.Warren, Henry II, pp 201-2; this follows the arguments already expressed in his article, 'The interpretation of twelfth century Irish history', Historical Studies, vii (1969) pp 1-19.

5 Warren, Henry II, pp 201-2; cf pp 184-5

and ambiguously phrased in contemporary chronicles. According to Giraldus Cambrensis, MacMurrough was referred to by Henry as homini et fideli nostro,[1] though he speaks of the rest of the Irishmen as giving only fealty, with an emphasis on hostages and tribute which indeed discounts any conventional feudal agreement.[2] Contemporary English chroniclers offer a variety of interpretations. Roger of Howden, for instance, says that the Irish chiefs received Henry in dominum et regem Hiberniae et homines sui devenerunt, et ei et heredibus sui fidelitatem juraverunt contra omnes homines, a form closely approximating to the oath of liege homage stripped of land holding implications.[3] The version in Gesta Henrici Secundi claims however that they became Henry's men in respect of their lands, though other sources only specify fealty.[4] These differing accounts serve to illustrate the flexibility of feudal forms in the late twelfth century. Whether the oath taken by the Irishmen was one of fealty or full homage, its precise meaning in the Irish context remains uncertain today and was possibly not very widely understood even by contemporaries.[5]

The most probable interpretation of these early submissions on the evidence at present available is that Henry in Ireland made use of a purely political variant on the feudal oath of homage, making the loyalty dependent upon his position as king rather than upon a particular fief, the legal 'cause' in feudal custom of a vassal's obligations.[6]

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1 Expugnatio Hibernica, Giraldi Cambrensis Opera, V. p 227.

2 ibid., pp 277-9.

3 Chronicle of Roger Howden, ed. W.Stubbs. ii, 30; cf Warren, Henry II, p 201 n 2, where he says that Howden only mentions fealty.

4 ed. W.Stubbs, i, 25; in view of all the evidence that no fiefs were in question, it is likely that the chronicler here interpreted the news of Irish homages in the light of common feudal patterns. The historical works of Ralph of Diceto, ed. Stubbs, i, 348, also mentions homage though Gervase of Canterbury, Gesta Regnum, ed. Stubbs, p 80, only specifies fealty.

5 For some comparisons with contemporary conquest in Wales see A.J.Roderick, 'The feudal relation between the English crown and the Welsh princes', History, xxxvii (1952) pp 201-12 passim.

6 See,e.g., F.L.Ganshof, Feudalism, pp 138-9

Glanvill speaks of this homage of lordship, pro dominio solo, which is due only to the king.[1] The advantage of such homage over mere fealty lay in the superiority of a legal obligation over a moral compulsion.[2] By this process, 'Ligeantia is hardening towards allegiance--obedience of the subject--though without offence to the letter of feudalism'.[3] By the late fourteenth century the concept of liege homage being owed by all subjects had clearly developed. We read, for instance, of a Scotsman in 1385 who, after twelve years in England, 'is willing to become the king's liege and has done homage' and is therefore 'admitted to the king's allegiance to live during good behaviour within the realm'.[4] While some confusion of terms inevitably resulted from this development, it is at least clear that a man doing liege homage to the king did not necessarily hold land as a tenant in chief.

The Treaty of Windsor in 1175 is certainly consistent with this interpretation. Rory O'Connor is here referred to as Henry's liegeman and is said to owe service as well as tribute and hostages to the king. The treaty is not however feudal in form, and though the land-holding implications of subordinate kingship are already becoming apparent--Rory being obliged to remove from their lands those who become rebels to Henry--the agreement specifies only that Rory holds his regality of the king.[5] In this we see clearly that subsequent attempts to confiscate or grant away rebel Irish lands were justified by reference not to any specific feudal contract but to royal claims on Gaelic obedience. Other examples in a non-royal context in the following

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1 Glanvill, Treatise on the laws and customs of England, ed. G.D.G.Hall, book ix, ch ii, p 106.

2 J.E.A.Joliffe, The constitutional history of medieval England, pp 162-3.

3 ibid., 206-7; also p 219. For the English crown's use of an oath taking ceremony to secure the political loyalty of all knights see Sir Frank Stenton, First century of English feudalism, pp 113, 137 n 5.

4 C.P.R. 1385-9 p 53

5 Foedera, i, p 41

centuries demonstrate the continuing importance in relations with Gaelic Ireland of lordship or regality rather than a land based vassalage, the best known being probably the 1269 agreement that William de Burgh may 'drive O'Neill from his regality which he is bound to hold of him' if he fails to keep the conditions.[1]

Some of the most convincing evidence that the Gaelic chiefs were not initially regarded as enfeoffed vassals and only occasionally attained that status can be seen in thirteenth century relations between English kings and the O'Connor family. Particularly illuminating is the evidence concerning Cathal Crovderg's offer in 1204 to surrender two-thirds of Connacht to John, paying him tribute for it, and to hold the remainder in fee as a barony for an annual rent of 100 marks.[2] The incident strongly suggests that feudal landholding was not a normal part of Gaelic submissions to the king.[3] Subsequent evidence on the position of the O'Connors reveals efforts to retain their loyalty and services while not according them the rights of feudal status. In 1215, for instance, two substantially similar grants of Connacht, one to Richard de Burgh and the other to Cathal Crovderg, contained the significant distinction that the Anglo-Norman was to hold his grant pro homagio et servicio suo.[4] The practical inferiority of the grants like that to Cathal Crovderg was seen in the inability of their holders to establish primogeniture, or indeed any form of secure inheritance, and the ease with which such grants were over-ruled in favour of purely feudal claimants, despite the fact that the Irish evidently wished to

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1 'MSS of Lord de Lisle and Dudley', in Historical MSS Commission, 3rd Rept. (1887), p 231. For examples of comparable relationships see C.O.D., i, no 268; ii no 34.

2 C.D.I. 1171-1251, nos 222, 279; for the background to this see R.W.Dudley Edwards, 'Anglo-Norman relations with Connacht 1169-1224', I.H.S. (1939) esp pp 150-1.

3 cf Edwards, who supports the view that 1175 established a feudal relation between Rory and Henry and says that Cathal Crovderg's position after 1205 approximated that of Rory earlier. (op.cit., pp 137, 151)

4 Rotuli Chartarum, ed. T.D.Hardy, i, part i, p 219.

retain these royal grants for their sons.[1] The quasi-feudal nature of these Irishmen's land tenure— dependent as it was on faithful service though the full range of customary feudal incidents was not apparently applied--continued for some time into the thirteenth century.[2] By the mid-century there can, however, have been little possibility of establishing a dual pattern of land holding in Ireland under the crown and the increasing degree of rebellion among the families who had previously sought such security of title in effect removed the land question from the highest level of Anglo-Irish relations. Very rarely after this did the Irish express a wish to hold land of the king directly.[3] The Irish lords who continued to live within reach of the government's authority were usually in tenurial arrangements with the great Anglo-Irish lords, not the crown.[4] The development helps to explain the distance created between the crown and Gaelic Ireland, as well as the tendency for the rest of the medieval period to omit land holding from the usual terms of submission.

Whatever the importance of land in the earliest submissions may have been, the bond between king and native Irish chiefs certainly did not rest simply on this. Some of the latter may indeed have procured royal charters concerning land, but their oaths of fealty and homage were enough in themselves to require their service to the king. That the Irish themselves accepted this obligation is evident in a 1215 entry in the Annals of Clonmacnoise which refers to the Irish forces owing service to the king of England. This service later extended to

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1 e.g. C.D.I. 1171-1251, no 1184 (Cathal Crovderg, 1224)

2 For examples concerning O'Brien and O'Connor see C.D.I. 1171-1251 no 3054 and Orpen, Ireland under the Normans, iii, 185, 224, 230.

3 A notable exception is the 1317 'Remonstrance' of O'Neill to the pope. See Irish Historical Documents, p 44 and below, p 26.

4 e.g. 1347 submission of O'More of Leix, which mentions land because he held of the manor of Dunamase, in the king's hands. (Gen. Office, MS 192 pp 53-5)

cover all Irishmen who had not personally done homage to an English king but who subsequently submitted to the king's representative. Thus, although many of the Ulster chiefs held aloof in the twelfth century and were only partially brought into contact with the crown by 1210,[1] their service was required by Henry III in his Scottish wars.[2] The lordship of Ulster was in the king's hand at this point, and the service demanded may reflect the earl's relations with local Irishmen,[3] but this cannot be true of all later summonses. In 1314 twenty-six different Irishmen from all areas were called upon to come to Scotland.[4] In 1335 an interesting writ summoned three types of men from Ireland--knights, Irish princes, and esquires. The fourteen named were apparently called for the same reason as the others--_juxta ligeantia vestra debitum_.[5] Although the government was optimistic in anticipating this level of Gaelic aid the cumulative effect of occasions such as this is interesting. It shows that the English crown considered its Irish subjects throughout this period as being in a relationship with the king analagous to its feudal tenants. As the king's subjects the Irish, by virtue of their liegiance, still owed service if necessary to the crown.

In understanding the collapse of relations between the crown and Gaelic Ireland, one must be aware that the Irish did not simply make their submissions to avert an immediate military threat but understood clearly the obligations of lordship which their submissions imposed upon the crown. That a man receiving the political allegiance of others

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1 e.g. Orpen, _Ireland under the Normans_, i, 266; Aedh O'Neill did assist John in 1210 and presumably had submitted to him in some form, but there is no record concerning the other important Ulster tribes, like the Cenell Conaill. (See, e.g., Otway-Ruthven, _Medieval Ireland_, p 81)

2 _C.D.I., 1171-1251_, no 2716

3 Otway-Ruthven, _Medieval Ireland_, p 192

4 _Foedera_, iii, 476

5 ibid., iv, 643: for the response see R. Nicholson, 'An Irish expedition to Scotland in 1335', _I.H.S._, xiii (1963) pp 197-211.

was bound to give something in return was a fundamental concept in feudal and Gaelic societies alike--the common element in both being summed up as protection. By the twelfth century the basic feudal obligation of the lord to protect his vassal had often gone beyond its origins of war and physical violence to a more sophisticated concept of rights and privileges which the lord must help to preserve, but the principle of protection was still implicit in every level of political life. Similarly, in Gaelic society comairce or 'protection' was a common reason for submission, the justification for which might last only so long as the lord could provide it.[1]

The failure of the English crown to provide such protection would be difficult to catalogue. One can perhaps see one of the first examples in the Treaty of Windsor itself which arbitrarily removed to Rory's immediate overlordship areas such as Limerick and Cork whose chiefs in 1172 had done homage to Henry. In the later alienation of the Irish chiefs many different elements played a part, individual Gaelic ambitions being themselves an important factor. A large share of the blame must however lie in the persistence of the two legal systems within the lordship. Although there is no suggestion that the Gaelic Irish generally desired to be incorporated within the common law area, their legal position vis a vis the Anglo-Irish was inevitably affected by their inability to plead in the king's courts.[2] That the legal distinction between them and the Anglo-Irish could become a mark of inferiority was borne

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1 For a discussion of this concept see K.Simms, 'Gaelic Lordships in Ulster in the later middle ages', (T.C.D. Ph.D. thesis, submitted 1976) pp 113-7.

2 For the divisive effects of this attitude towards the Irish in law see, e.g., Sir John Davies, Discovery of True Causes, pp 103-44, passim. Modern research has confirmed many of his conclusions. See in particular B.Murphy, 'The status of the native Irish after 1331', The Irish Jurist, ii (1967) pp 116-25; G.H.Hand, 'The status of the native Irish, 1272-1331', ibid., i (1966) pp 93-111; Otway-Ruthven, 'The native Irish and English law', I.H.S., vii (1951) pp 1-16 and 'The request of the Irish for English law, 1277-1301', ibid., vi (1949) pp 261-70.

out by grants of law to the five bloods and by other exceptions. The situation added greatly to the crown's difficulties in implementing its own obligation to protect the rights and position of those who had submitted, particularly as the absentee king acted through an administration which spoke for and through the settlers. To some extent both the king and the Gaelic Irish suffered as a result, for the failure to establish one legal system at once created a divide between the crown and Gaelic Ireland and established the sword as the only effective remedy against rebellious Irishmen. The wedge consequently driven between the two nations and between crown and Irish had far greater implications than the resentments of the few Irishmen who expressed awareness that English law could carry privileges.[1]

An interesting area in which the growing distinctions between the races can be seen is that of the terminology used in official documents. It not only demonstrates an increasing awareness of the political separation of the Gaelic areas but is also of considerable importance in assessing part of Richard's policy for the lordship. In the later thirteenth century the legal view of the lordship--comprising both Gaelic and Anglo-Norman subjects of the king--can be seen in the legislation of 1297 concerning law and order which consistently referred to the resurgent Irish as 'felons', liable to judicial punishment and forfeiture for their crimes within the lordship.[2] Despite the government's manifest inability in the early fourteenth century to enforce justice among the Irish the concept was for a time maintained that the king's peace had been broken by the civil disobedience of the trouble-makers, and references to the Irish 'felons' continue,[3] as well as

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1 An example of such exceptional awareness can be found in the 1317 Remonstrance; see below, p 26.

2 e.g. C.J.R. 1305-7, p 290; Chartae, Privilegie et Immunitates, p 52.

3 e.g. Statutes and Ordinances, p 278.

to the 'divers malefactors and disturbers of our peace',[1] more usually rendered as 'malefactors both English and Irish'.[2] Increasingly, however, the spread of lawlessness throughout the country forced a recognition of the state of endemic war, and the entrenched position of the Anglo-Irish, dependent for survival on government support, became more pronounced. The Irishman came to be viewed as naturally hostile, while the Englishman, however degenerate or troublesome, was always considered a potentially loyal liege. It was not surprising that, when the need to differentiate between 'us' and 'them' became in the critical circumstances of the fourteenth century a first principle of political life, it produced and sustained a terminology expressing this distinction. One is able to discern in documents emanating from the Anglo-Irish chancery the clear development of a formula--'Irish enemy and English rebel'--enabling the government to refer to the common menace of English and Irish disturbers of the peace while maintaining a distinction between them. It became general therefore that where a local area suffered from chronic unrest, involving all sections of the community, the writs referring to the situation would isolate the 'Irish enemy' from the 'English rebels', ignoring any mingling of race or territorial dispersal which might call in question the literal accuracy of the description. By the late fourteenth century the phrase 'Irish enemy and English rebel' was in such general use that one or other of the racial adjectives could be omitted while leaving the general sense unaffected.[3]

In themselves the words 'enemy' and 'rebel'--whether the Latin inimicus

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1 e.g. Statutes and Ordinances, p 278
2 e.g. Chartae, Privilegie et Immunitates, p 45
3 e.g. King's Council in Ireland, no 107; see also the form Hibernicos et Anglicos inimicos et rebelles--e.g. Chartae, Privilegie et Immunitates, pp 74, 88.

and rebellus or the French enemi and rebel--carry no obvious legal and political distinction. That is to say, one cannot prove that the Irishman's position in law--which has been likened to that of an alien in England[1]--made the term 'enemy' more fitting than 'rebel'. In fact, when English troublemakers were not also in question the Irish were frequently simply termed 'rebels'.[2] Discrimination against the Irish in law did however give meaning to the necessity for racial identification. The situation had similarities to Wales, where many distinctions in law between the races depended on the ability to identify the pure Welsh--meri Walici.[3] The very wording of a grant--that the grantee be 'free English'--shows how the lordship saw the legal rights of its Gaelic inhabitants.[4] With the growing pressure from Gaelic Ireland in the fourteenth century it was inevitable that the earlier licensed position of the 'mere Irish' within the lordship should give way to a situation of presumed hostility until loyalty was somehow proved, and the terminology reflects a sense of nations at war.[5] This assumption of Gaelic enmity lay behind the 'racial' legislation of the fourteenth century which by attempting to control relations between the nations established as a political ideal the concept of social and cultural barriers. An Anglo-Irishman's degeneracy constituted rebellion because it made him like the Irish and therefore, ipso facto, rebellious.[6] Even the most degenerate, however, remained in name English, and care was taken that legislation against the Irish should not be used to hinder the gentes Anglicae nacionis tam de Anglie

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1 Murphy, 'Status of the native Irish', pp 116-38 passim.

2 e.g. Chartae, Privilegie et Immunitates, pp 84, 87; Statutes and Ordinances, p 500.

3 R.Davies, 'Colonial Wales', Past and Present, lxv,(1974), 12-3, 21.

4 e.g. C.P.R. 1408-13, p 388

5 e.g. Foedera, vii, 643; see also Minot's constitutions, in Gwynn, 'Provincial and diocesan decrees', Archivum Hibernicorum, xi(1944) 100-1.

6 A view still being held in the sixteenth century. See, e.g., 'The Gerrard Papers', Analecta Hibernica, ii, 96.

quam de Hibernie.[1]

It is difficult to discover evidence on the Gaelic view of these developments, but some at least survives to show that the Irish felt the crown to have neglected its duties towards them. The original desire for protection was no less real in the fourteenth century, and however little the king had done to aid them he was ultimately the only possible arbiter between the Irish and the mesne lords, who since 1172 had gradually blocked Irish access to the crown. In the Remonstrance of 1317 Donal O'Neill protested bitterly about the treachery practised by those 'who call themselves of the middle nation' and stated that he had written to Edward II offering that 'to his greater advantage and to our peace we would hold our land, due by right to us alone, from him immediately without any opposition'. He furthermore indicted the kings of England for their failure 'to do and exhibit orderly governance to us and several of us'.[2] The understanding shown in this document of the obligations of lordship along with the bitterness towards the mesne lords demonstrate consistent Irish attitudes linking the submissions to Henry and John with those to Richard.

O'Neill's claim in the Remonstrance that 'we neither can nor should be held guilty of perjury or disloyalty on this account since neither we nor our fathers have ever done homage or taken any other oath of fealty to him or his fathers' is worth particular attention. Whether or not Aedh O'Neill did in fact do homage when he submitted to John in 1210, Donal O'Neill's statement in 1317 focusses our attention on the fact that not only was homage and fealty recognized by the Irish as carrying significance but that it was indeed impossible for the Irish

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1 e.g. Statutes and Ordinances, p 480

2 Irish Historical Documents, pp 33-46; although the context of the Bruce invasion gives the document a propagandist character, its exposition of an Irish legal viewpoint is unique and most valuable.

chiefs to have taken oaths of homage with any regularity, in the absence of the king from Ireland. Fealty, which was simply an oath of loyalty, could be taken before a representative, but homage, and presumably this included liege homage to the king, must normally be done in person before the lord.[1] Thus, for example, in the late thirteenth century the general practice was for Anglo-Irish tenants in chief who were about to take livery of their estates to swear fealty to the king before the justiciar with the obligation of then going to England within a particular time to do homage in person to the king.[2] Not until 1399 did a lieutenant, the Duke of Surrey, have power personally to receive the homages of such men.[3] Concerning the Irish, it appears that the chief governors did take an oath from men submitting to the crown.[4] The form of oath is unknown and it seems on occasion to have been omitted, at least from the subsequent record. Arrangements by which peace was made can often be best described as contracts to keep the peace, quite different from the terms one would expect to be imposed upon rebel subjects.[5] Occasionally the Irishmen 'recognized' their liege position, but again there is no record of an oath.[6] Even the Duke of Clarence, the king's son, seems to have made peace for a limited period of time by indenture with O'Neill, instead of simply accepting an oath of permanent loyalty.[7] While the evidence is inconclusive, there is a strong suggestion therefore that oaths of homage were not and could not normally be taken of the Irish by chief

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1 e.g. M.Bloch, Feudal Society, pp 146-7
2 e.g. C.J.R. 1295-1303, pp 148, 246
3 C.P.R. 1396-9, p 476
4 i.e. As part of their power to admittendi ad fidem et pacem nostram tam Anglicos quam Hibernicos; e.g. Windsor in 1369, C 66/ 279 m 25.
5 e.g. MacMurrough in 1295, C.J.R. 1295-1303, p 61; also MacNamara in 1367, Cal. Carew MSS, v, 481-2.
6 e.g. Gen. Office MS 192, pp 53-4; Cal.Carew MSS, v, 481, 479-80.
7 H.J.Lawlor, 'A calendar of the Register of Archbishop Sweteman', P.R.I.A., xxix C (1911) no 232.

governors. What they probably did was receive simple oaths of fealty with, at the most, promises that the Irish would keep the peace and behave as loyal lieges should.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the political vacuum resulting from the absence of the king himself was increasingly filled by ambitious Anglo-Irishmen who effectively established themselves as intermediaries between the Gaelic Irish and the king, depending partly on the Irish within their political influence.[1] The indentures of retinue which describe an important element in these lord's contacts with the Irish show that to some extent the Gaelic chiefs could be absorbed within the Anglo-Irish political community.[2] At the same time, a distinction was usually maintained in such agreements between Anglo-Irish retainers whose indentures contained 'saving clauses', protecting the rights of the king and sometimes of another lord, and the Irishmen who usually undertook to serve simply 'against all whomsoever'.[3] This difference reflects the increasing tendency to see the Irish as not, even in theory, the natural subjects of the English king, owing liegiance first to him.

Irishmen did not, however, indent to serve only with private lords. Many were retained to aid the king's government against troublemakers of either race, and documentation concerning such arrangements provides valuable evidence about the official view of the Irishmen's status. It seems that the service frequently had the

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1 See, e.g., above, p 19.

2 e.g. Red Book of Kildare, ed. G. MacNiocaill, no 166.

3 e.g. C.O.D., ii, nos 33, 37, 39; cf nos 35, 36. This was not quite invariable. See e.g. the retinue arrangement of McBreen of Ahirlagh with Ormond in 1377, ibid. no 219.

character of a money-fief arrangement--a natural alternative in Ireland to a conventional land based feudalism. Money fiefs have been associated more with political and diplomatic functions, but they could also be given for military services.[1] This appears to be the explanation of Dermot MacMurrough's grant of 80 marks in 1367, 'while he shall behave well and faithfully towards us'.[2] Dermot's service included attendance upon the lieutenant whom he advised as to the best method of reducing the O'Tooles to peace.[3] Occasionally an oath accompanied the granting of such fees, as when Art MacMurrough in 1377 swore for 40 marks to be the king's liege man.[4]

The possibility that some form of oath was taken, with the implication that loyalty to the king depended upon the fee arrangement, could be interpreted as an implied limitation of the king's rights as lord of Ireland. It was possibly a realization of this which, along with a lack of confidence in MacMurrough's willingness to fulfil his duties, lay behind the government's attempt to alter the character of the 80 mark annual payment to MacMurrough. When Art was admitted to the peace in January 1378 and swore to give certain services his request that he be granted the customary 80 marks p.a. nomine feodi was refused by the council who instead agreed to grant him 80 marks pro bono gestu suo penes nos quamdiu nobis placuerit nomine rewardi.[5] Subsequent payments show that the substitution of 'reward' for 'fee' was maintained for a time,[6] though it seems that the distinction was then allowed to lapse, and later treasurers' accounts

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1 For general background on the money fief see B.D.Lyon, 'The money fief under the English kings', E.H.R., lxvi (1951) 161-93 passim.

2 E 101/245/3/33; particulars relating to the account of Stephen Vale, treasurer of Ireland.

3 E 101/245/3/252; particulars relating to the same account.

4 E 101/246/4/81; particulars relating to the account of Alexander Balscot, treasurer of Ireland.

5 E 101/246/5/3; particulars relating to the same account.

6 E 101/246/3/73, (1382-3); E 101/246/4/120, (1377); particulars relating also to Balscot's account.

enter payments to Art MacMurrough as well as to Gerald O'Byrne as 'fees'.[1] The system of paying subjects of the king to be at peace continued. Though in their origin these fee payments had obviously quite a different character to 'Blackrent', they were by the end of the fourteenth century becomeing steadily more difficult to distinguish from such exactions.

It is clear that by the 1390s the sense in which the Gaelic Irish remained subjects of the king was very vague indeed. Not only were they in frequent hostilities with the king's government, but the very way in which they were brought to peace, by parleys, truces and indentures, implied that their loyalty was a matter of personal choice and could be withdrawn at will. The lordship's totality was also consciously limited by the Dublin government, in actions like the Statutes of Kilkenny, which recognized in law the separate Gaelic and Anglo-Irish political interests. It is only rarely that one sees records showing a belief in the lordship's indivisibility and in the position of the Gaelic Irish as subjects of the King. It can be seen for example in the submission terms of O'More of Leix in 1347 when he promised to act in future 'in the faith and liegiance of the lord king',[3] and again when the O'Neills in 1390 agreed to become the 'king's liegemen, and to be true for ever to the king and to the Earl of March'.[4] Believed in by neither side, such arrangements typify those Gaelic submissions whose validity depended on the ability of the superior power to enforce them. In the face of the Dublin government's increasing incapacity to do this, it was indeed an opportune moment for the king of England to return to his lordship and re-establish his personal relationship with all his lieges.

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1 E 364/32/F, account of Robert Crulle, treasurer of Ireland.
2 e.g. Murgh O'Brien in 1377 (Statutes and Ordinances, p 473)
3 Gen. Office, MS 192, pp 53-4
4 Cal.Carew MSS., v, 481

Section I -- The first expedition, 1394-5

Chapter 1

The development of Richard's policy and the submissions of Gaelic Ireland

Part i -- The origins of the expedition and the growth of royal policy

The motives which have been suggested to explain Richard II's Irish campaign in 1394 have varied widely. They include suggestions that he came looking for consolation in action after his wife's death, that his visit was really an anti-Clementist crusade, or that he was using an Irish expedition to test his personal military strength preparatory to full scale autocracy in England.[1] In fact, there is little problem in seeing why it was decided to make a royal expedition--so obvious was the need for some drastic measure;[2] the problem is rather in understanding the timing of the venture. The ultimate explanation for the campaign seems to lie in the coincidence of Irish needs and royal opportunity to fulfil them.

By the 1390s the crisis in the late fourteenth century lordship was an accepted fact. The 1385 request for a royal expedition had claimed that the land might be conquered 'at this next season'. If it were absolutely out of the question for the king to come 'the greatest and most trustworthy lord of England' was requested in his place.[3] There is no evidence that Richard believed fully in the imminence of the lordship's collapse, but it is significant that after the failure of de Vere--prevented by distractions in England from ever making effective his ducal authority in Ireland--Richard appointed Sir John Stanley as governor, expressly binding him to surrender office in the event of an expedition by the king himself, one of his uncles or the Earl of March.[4] Already, in 1388, Thomas Mortimer and the Duke of Gloucester had been suggested as joint governors of Ireland,[5] though

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1 E Curtis, Medieval Ireland p 265; E.Perroy, L'Angleterre et le grand schisme d'Occident, pp 96, 102; T.F.Tout, Chapters in administrative history, iii, 487-95.

2 Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 135

3 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 485-7

4 E 101/247/1/3

5 C.C.H., p 142 no 238

neither this nor the appointment of Thomas as justiciar in March 1389 seems to have had any effect.[1] There was certainly no question that the difficulties involved in maintaining the lordship should be met by any abrogation of the king's rights in Ireland. The English parliament, however weary of war taxation it may have been, made this clear in its indignant attack upon the suggestion that de Vere should be king of Ireland--Ireland had been, it said, part of the English crown for as long as anyone could remember and the preceding kings had been lords of Ireland without any mesne lords between themselves and the lieges. To suggest severing the tie of liegiance by handing the country over to a favourite was not a possible solution to the problem, but was construed rather as blatant treason, bound to operate to the detriment of the crown and the sure destruction of the lieges of Ireland themselves.[2] After this implied reprimand it was not surprising that Richard, unable to delegate ultimate responsibility, began instead to emphasize a stronger personal role. Stanley's indenture, on 30 July 1389, followed by only a few months Richard's assertion of his majority and may be seen as the first move in a relatively consistent policy of involvement in Ireland, lasting until his deposition.[3]

At what precise point Richard decided to come himself to Ireland is difficult to determine. His immediate priorities naturally lay in England, and problems of policy, both domestic and foreign, were to occupy him for some years. One of the first pledges of Richard's personal government in the summer of 1389 was the reduction of the

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1 C.P.R. 1388-92 p 20

2 Rot.Parl.,iii, p 231 art xi

3 Richard's declaration of personal rule came on 3 May. (Foedera, vii, 614)

heavy war taxation, to be achieved through the establishment of peace with France.[1] In June a truce was proclaimed, to last until August 1392.[2] Richard was at this time still very unsure of his position in England, and one probably need look no further than this for an explanation of his postponed involvement in Ireland.[3] The 1390-1 period saw, moreover, a brief but apparently serious crisis in Anglo-French relations in Italy which necessitated immediate diplomatic action and continuing attention there.[4] Peace was however maintained and in April 1392 the truce was extended for another eighteen months.[5]

Meanwhile Stanley's lieutenancy in Ireland had collapsed in failure. Before the completion of his three year indenture he was replaced on 11 September 1391 by the Bishop of Meath and an enquiry was ordered into his alleged official misconduct.[6] In fact, Stanley did not lose royal favour[7]--the difficulties he had encountered were possibly recognized as being inherent in the office, on a par with the resentment faced earlier by both Windsor and Courtenay.[8] Whatever the truth about Stanely's term of office, it had been decided by late 1391 to replace him by a more impressive and effective governor--the king's youngest uncle, Thomas Duke of Gloucester. This decision, which recalls the 1385 petition and the conditions expressed in Stanley's indenture, may be seen as an admission of the crisis facing the lordship.

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1 J.N.Palmer, England, France and Christendom, 1377-99, p 142.
2 Foedera, vii, 623-30, 633-4; below, pp 349 ff.
3 For the English background see M.McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, pp 462-70.
4 J.N.Palmer, 'English foreign policy, 1388-99', in F.R.H.du Boulay and C.M.Barron, (ed.) The Reign of Richard II, pp 75-108 passim.
5 Foedera, vii, 719.
6 C.P.R. 1388-92 p 479; E 101/247/1 mm 2-7; C.C.H. p 148 nos 42-3.
7 In November he was granted licence to receive his revenues in absence for twelve years. (C.P.R. 1388-92 p 499); below, p 158.
8 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp 306-8, 317-9.

It has generally been assumed that Gloucester's indenture was actually made about May 1392 when the first indications of preparation are found.[1] The undated document which survives specified, however, that part of his stipend was to be paid on the approaching 23 April, provided that the king was informed before Easter (14 April in 1392) of the duke's return to England and willingness to go to Ireland, if he should indeed make the voyage to Prussia.[2] The document--which with its many erasures and additions was clearly a draft--appears therefore to date from before October 1391 when Gloucester embarked for Prussia.[3] The decision to send the duke to Ireland was thus apparently made soon after Stanley's removal and it seems likely that the Bishop of Meath was never more than a temporary appointee.

The terms of Gloucester's draft indenture reveal his appointment as a major effort to restore Ireland to the king's obedience. The duke was appointed for fifteen years and was given a vested interest in the reconquest of land as well as a grant of 34,000 marks for his first three years in office. The liberal nature of his powers may be evidence either of Richard's attempts to make the offer more attractive or Gloucester's own efforts at bargaining. It was even thought by contemporaries that Gloucester had been given Ireland as a duchy.[4] Gloucester was not required to go immediately to Ireland--the first payment was to be at Easter and the next one when he was ready to embark--but concern in the council in the new year suggests that the Irish situation was worsening and that immediate action was thought desirable. The exact nature of the crisis is not indicated,

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1 e.g. Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 323; Tuck 'Anglo-Irish relations, 1382-93', P.R.I.A., lxix C (1970) pp 27-8.

2 B.M. Cotton MS Titus B XI, f 19; printed in J.T.Gilbert, History of the Viceroys, pp 552-6.

3 Foedera, vii, 705

4 Historia Anglicana, ii, 211.

but it may have been connected with the activities in Meath of O'Reilly who ultimately had to be bought off with a 'black rent' of 80 marks.[1] The situation in Leinster was also serious, with Carlow, the centre of government, recently under particularly heavy attack.[2] So grave was the crisis that the Duke of Lancaster in February 1392 gave his opinion that part of Gloucester's retinue should be sent ahead at his own cost.[3] In March Thomas Mortimer, negotiating with the English council on Gloucester's behalf, asked for an immediate advance of money, and pleaded that en cas que le terre soit empeirez le moiene temps qil soit deschargez envers le Roi.[4] In April and May preparations continued,[5] to be cut short in July by the cancellation of the indenture by the king, who gave as his reason the state of relations with France.[6] It is difficult to estimate the truth of this excuse, for the 1392 talks appear to have made a positive contribution to the cause of peace, and the truce certainly remained in force, being extended till September 1394.[7] The cancellation may, alternatively, be blamed on the quarrel between Richard and the city of London, in the settlement of which Walsingham claimed that Gloucester played an important part.[8] It is also possible that the Irish crisis which provoked Gloucester's appointment and the urgent conciliar discussions of the spring had by now been eased without the feared collapse of the lordship. The most likely

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1 King's council in Ireland, no 162.
2 ibid., e.g. no 5.
3 J.F.Baldwin, The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages, p 498
4 ibid., p 500
5 B.M. Add. MS 40,859 A; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 86; Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 557-8; E 101/74/1/2 et seq. (indentures of Gloucester's retinue.)
6 Titus B XI, ff 18,19,185.
7 Palmer, England France and Christendom, p 145; cf Tuck, Richard II and the English nobility, p 28; Foedera vii, 748.
8 C.Barron,'The quarrel of Richard II with London 1392-7', in du Boulay and Barron, The Reign of Richard II, pp 173-201 passim; Historia Anglicana, ii, 209, 210.

explanation for Richard's change of mind is, however, that with the prolongation of the truce in April 1392 the king now anticipated an early opportunity to go to Ireland himself, and decided therefore to cancel Gloucester's expedition before the duke should be ensconced in a position of authority in Ireland. Such a possibility seems to have been considered when the indenture was first drawn up, for it made provision for the expedition's cancellation by the king.[1] Gloucester's record of poor relations with Richard is another important factor. Though there is no specific reason to think that the indenture was cancelled for personal reasons, Richard may possibly have come to regret giving Gloucester such potential authority and sought to break the indenture as soon as a reasonable excuse was offered.

From the time of the cancellation of Gloucester's enterprise Richard's Irish policy was apparently consciously aiming at the expedition of two years later. The declared intention, in appointing Ormond as justiciar for one year, that Mortimer would be sent over as a governor was probably made for the sake of the Anglo-Irish, to appease them in their disappointment about Gloucester. In his letter to Dublin explaining Gloucester's recall, Richard referred to the wish of Anglo-Ireland that the land should not be governed par nul de petit estat, and the knowledge of Mortimer's intended arrival probably influenced Ormond in accepting the office.[2] To meet immediate needs an advance force was sent with 2,000 marks,[3] and the small expeditions of Philip Darcy and Thomas Mortimer within the year helped to tide over the gap left by Gloucester's removal.[4] Wrangling over

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1 Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 552-6; Baldwin, King's council, pp 503-504; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 243.
2 Titus B XI, f 185.
3 E 403/543 (8 July); C.P.R. 1391-6 p 134.
4 ibid., pp 195, 231 (Darcy, October 1392); ibid., p 357 (Mortimer, summer 1393).

the inheritance of Mortimer, still a minor, prevented his coming to Ireland till the time of the king's expedition itself,[1] but it is likely that for much of this intervening period the king's intention to make a royal expedition was common knowledge. In January 1393 a parliamentary grant was made, upon the specific condition that the king go in person on a campaign either to France, Scotland or Ireland,[2] and it was probably during the spring of 1393 that an Irish expedition was definitely decided upon. Mortimer himself, in a petition which seems to date from March-May 1393, requested that certain hostages be brought to England and kept there, until the king himself went to Ireland.[3] The delay for another eighteen months may have been partly due to foreign affairs—with Charles VI's insanity holding up all negotiations for six months.[4] After they resumed in March 1394 it seems that progress was made, before negotiations broke off in June, in order, it has been suggested, to give John of Gaunt an opportunity to settle Gascony--a crucial element in the talks.[5] The breathing space coincided with the first overt preparations for an Irish campaign, in June 1394,[6] and in this light it is difficult not to see the expedition of October as a long-standing royal ambition, grasped at as soon as a reasonable opportunity was afforded.

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1 For the background to this see A.Tuck, 'Anglo-Irish relations', pp 15-31 passim.

2 Rot. Parl., iii, 300. In March 1394 the collection of the remainder of the subsidy was ordered, demonstrating that the conditions upon which the grant had been made were to be fulfilled. (Cal. Fine Rolls 1391-9 p 94)

3 S.C.8/189/9434; for the petition and its background see Appendix V, below, pp 559-63.

4 Palmer, England, France and Christendom, p 149.

5 ibid., pp 149-66 passim.

6 e.g. On 16 June preparations for shipping began and all Irishmen in England were ordered home.(C.P.R. 1391-6 p 420; C.C.R. 1391-6 p 295)

It is easy enough to point to the state of the lordship as the sufficient explanation for a royal expedition, but rather more difficult to see what such a venture was intended to achieve. No king had come to Ireland since 1210, and both then and in 1172 greater concern seems to have been shown for the king's relations with his Anglo-Norman barons than for the internal state of the lordship. The situation facing Richard was obviously very different in that all troublemakers and enemies of the peace had been in theory the king's subjects for the better part of two centuries. Inevitably his policy foresaw the punishment of such rebels and was to some extent a continuation of the fourteenth century policy of armed intervention from England--though the very fact that the expedition was led by the lord of Ireland in person reduced its resemblance to the earlier military campaigns financed from England.[1]

In most of the general announcements about the impending venture two main objectives were presented--the punishment of all rebels and the provision of good government for the country.[2] Richard never, at this point, distinguished between the two races in Ireland and one must assume that his intent to punish those who had gone 'against their liegiance' applied equally to Anglo-Irish and to Irish. Nor did he specify by what measures he intended to improve the country's government, though presumably his desire 'that peace be cherished and the laws and customs of the land kept, justice be ministered to his subjects and such as are disobedient and rebellious be punished' referred to deficiencies of the civil government as well as to the military problem.[3]

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1 The continuity between earlier campaigns and Richard's own expedition has been examined by Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', pp135-8.

2 Foedera, vii, 789; Anglo-Norman Letters, no 3; etc

3 C.C.R. 1392-6 p 220; for information on the terminology employed in England, see below, pp 392-4, 398-401.

In England at least it was generally held that the expedition was punitive, aimed against the Gaelic tribes. He was described as going ad domandum Hybernencium rebellionem,[1] or ad debellandum Hibernicos sibi rebellantes,[2] and one chronicler actually specified that he was going to aid Hibernici veri Anglici against the puros Hibernicos.[3] The official terminology however remained consistent in making no such racial distinction between the Irish and Anglo-Irish--Richard's subjects being seen rather as 'lieges' or 'rebels'. This was for instance the form used in a letter to Archbishop Colton of Armagh, which though undated seems from its sense to have been written within a few years before the expedition. Richard thanked the archbishop for his services, especially for the 'good rule and governance which you have made in the salvation of our loyal lieges around you in your area'. He asked him to continue this work,

> as we wish...,as soon as we can, to ordain and establish such governance throughout our land of Ireland that our faithful lieges will be pleased and our rebels punished for their faults.(4)

Clearly Richard himself did not view this enterprise as a purely punitive measure to support the Anglo-Irish interest. He may even have written to some of the Irish prior to his arrival in the country, though our inability to date the correspondence referred to by O'Neill when he spoke of 'your Majesty's letters stating that part cause of your coming to Ireland was that you would do justice to every man'[5] prevents us from being certain on this point.[6] There is in any case no doubt that Richard intended not only to meet the immediate military threat but to attend to the general condition of government throughout the

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1 Chronicon Adae de Usk, (ed.) Sir E.M.Thompson, p 9.
2 Chronicon Henrici Knighton, (ed.) J.R.Lumby, ii, 321-2.
3 Eulogium Historiarium sive Temporis Chronicon,(ed)F.S.Haydon,iii,370.
4 Anglo-Norman Letters, no 7; the 'good work' probably referred to Colton's part in bringing O'Neill to peace.(Curtis,Richard II, pp 210 -11)
5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 129-31, 210-11.
6 cf ibid., pp 27-9.

the lordship.

These obvious limitations on our knowledge of royal policy for Ireland on the eve of the expedition help to explain the difficulties facing any analysis of subsequent events. Once in Ireland Richard's policy is, with one major exception, best understood from his actions. The exception is his letter on 1 February to the English council giving a resumé of the problem as he saw it, and requesting conciliar advice.[1] This letter, frequently quoted with reference to the expedition, has in recent years been subjected to some reinterpretation. The critical passage stated:

> ...en notre terre Dirland sont trois maneres de gentz, cestassavoir Irrois savages nos enemis Irrois rebelx et Engleis obeissantz...

and carried on to show that in Richard's opinion the Irish had rebelled because of the injustices they had suffered on the one hand and for lack of redress on the other. If they were not wisely dealt with and given hope of favour he feared that they would join with the enemy. He therefore proposed to grant them charters of general pardon par fin et fee, but pending the council's advice had decided for the moment merely to take the Irish rebels into his special protection until 25 April, by which time they were to have come and shown the causes of their rebellion. The council's reply of 19 March approved Richard's policy, saying that he and his council in Ireland knew more of this matter than his advisors in England. They recommended that heavy fines be imposed and the pardons forfeited if the rebels did not come in within a certain time.[2] The significance of the passage describing the different classes and the special position of the rebels was demonstrated by the council's verbatim quotation of it in this reply.

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1 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 55-7
2 ibid., pp 61-3

It clearly requires examination before any attempt is made to assess Richard's possible policies.

The problem of interpretation lies in the precise identity of the three groups mentioned, as for many years it was assumed that the Irish rebels were in fact Anglo-Irish degenerates.[1] Professor Otway-Ruthven has, however, recently demonstrated the improbability of this, by showing that the racial distinction was consistently recognized in terminology used by both English and Irish.[2] Although to men in England the two races in Ireland were by this time occasionally indistinguishable,[3] the king himself cannot have been in danger of this kind of error. It seems certain in fact that the 'Irish rebels' were those native Irishmen who had broken away from the king's allegiance, and made war on the settlers. Unfortunately the other groups mentioned are not so easily identified. It has been suggested that the term 'wild Irish our enemy' represented a class of people who had never submitted to the English crown,[4] but this possibility of a political description which admitted a limitation of the king's lordship is hard to sustain. Not only is it difficult to isolate known examples of such a group,[5] but the very concept conflicts with our knowledge of Richard's attitude towards Ireland and his projected policies. Legislation in the past had covered the entire country, in no way prejudiced by the government's obvious incapacity to effect policies in the Gaelic areas.[6] To discover what Richard meant by his description 'wild' one must in

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1 Most notably by Curtis, Richard II, pp 35-6, whose analysis of the submissions and letters is obviously affected by this interpretation.

2 Medieval Ireland, pp 333-4; above, pp 23-4

3 Above, p 39; below, p 392-4, 398-401.

4 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 334

5 ibid., n 49

6 e.g. In the late thirteenth century it was said of grants of the king's peace that pax illa stabilis erit et ei valeret per totam Hiberniam. (Rotuli Parliamentorum hactenus inediti, (ed.) H.G.Richardson and G.O.Sayles, pp 44-5)

fact risk some digression to examine other contemporary usage of the term.

Although the adjective 'wild'--sauvage--had not hitherto been regularly used in an Irish context, the concept of a 'wild man' was familiar to medieval thought, particularly in art and literature.[1] 'Wildness' could cover several points; the physical appearance of the man; the manner in which he lived--generally alone and in forests or isolated country places; his ignorance of the normal habits of 'civilized' life; and a weakness of intellect which was accompanied by a lack of moral sense and an inability to understand God. Perhaps the most dominant characteristic was however his readiness to fight, even with his own kind. It was said that 'when several wildmen meet the result is usually a battle of all against all, fought fiercely without regard for those rules which medieval custom imposed upon the knight'.[2] It was perhaps inevitable that 'wildmen' came to be seen as a suitable epithet, not simply for the Irish but for other large groups or races whose social mores were alien to the mainstream of Western medieval life.

When we read, for example, in Sir Degrevant, of 'wylde men of the west', it is probable the the Welsh are actually in question.[3] A detailed description of the nature of wildness is given by John of Fordun in his account of the people of Scotland, whom he divides into the lowland urbanized civilized people and the warlike types of the islands and mountains.[4] Other writers about Scotland used the same concept.[5] There is a close parallel here to the Traison et Mort, where

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1 For the following account see R.Bernheimer, Wild men in the middle ages--a study in art, sentiment and demonology, passim; also Lydon, Lordship of Ireland, pp 283-4.

2 Bernheimer, Wild men in the middle ages, p 11

3 (ed.) L.F.Casson, pp 81, lxv, lxxiii

4 Chronica Gestis Scotorum, ed. W.Skrene, i, book II, chapter ix, p 42

5 See J. Barnie, War in Medieval Society, p 50, quoting from Higden, Froissart and Minot.

the people of Ireland are divided between the urbanized Anglicized section and the gens sauvaige who live in the mountains.[1] On the expedition itself the Archbishop of Tuam uses the word feroci to describe the king's enemies in Connacht.[2] At least two other literary expressions of the same feeling date also from this decade. In Rum and the Soth-segger Richard is said to have gone to fight 'the wild Yrisshe' and Creton in his account of the second expedition talks of the Irish qui sont presque sauvage.[3] Nor are official documents free of this form. In 1401 one Nicholas Hogonona is said to have been imprisoned because he was a 'wildehirissheman and an enemy of the king'.[4] A few years later a description of hostilities in Munster calls the participants brutos Hibernicos rebelles nostros.[5] From these years on the term is more and more frequently met with, until one rarely finds 'Irish' without the adjective 'wild'. By the sixteenth century the 'wild Irishry' are being described as 'mortal and natural enemies'.[6]

Although Richard's letter which spoke of the 'wild Irish' seems rather in advance of its time, the attitude which made this description natural had long been evident. The Irish were themselves not ignorant of the approach; sensitivity on the issue was seen in 1317 when Donal O'Neill complained that he and his people had been driven out by the English and forced to live 'like beasts'.[7] Many of the measures against degeneracy in the fourteenth century sprang directly from the same fear that what was unfamiliar was therefore both hostile and inferior. Richard was voicing no new thoughts about the Irish, but simply giving

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1 Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart, (ed.) B. Williams, p 28.
2 Curtis, Richard II, p 128
3 (ed.) M. Day and R.Steele, p 1 line 10; Archaeologia, xx, 301.
4 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 370
5 E 368/178 Hilary Recorda, m 47
6 W.F.Nugent, 'Carlow in the middle ages', J.R.S.A.I., lxxxv,(1955), 76
7 Irish Historical Documents, p 39

expression to a widespread prejudice.

This interpretation of 'wild Irish' makes it unlikely that the term was intended to denote a precise political identification. The same was obviously true of the 'obedient English', for that form left out of account the Anglo-Irish rebels who constituted a major element in the country's current disorders. Richard's famous policy statement of 1 February is apparently therefore not defensible as a political description of the country, and is unlikely to have been meant as such by the king himself. His real objective in this letter is better understood in the light of his overall policy, which as expressed in the rest of his correspondence and in his actions was clearly aimed at restoring the 'rebel Irish' to the position of loyal lieges within the lordship. The English council was unlikely to have favourably received a policy designed to pardon all the rebels and enemies in Ireland--the war there had been too protracted for such an idea to seem desirable. Thus the 'wild Irish enemy' and 'obedient English' groups served primarily as a contrast of extremes, making more attractive the crucial matter of Richard's theories on the 'rebel Irish'.

This interpretation is borne out by the rest of the letter, which gives further information about Richard's plans for the rebel Irish. By 1 February he had clearly come to believe that there were two sides to the question of Irish rebellion, and was inclined to be sympathetic towards those Irishmen who asked for justice and protection from the Anglo-Irish. This was in fact a logical development of his pre-expeditionary aims, and one can see him moving towards this point long before February. An open policy of giving justice to all his subjects led naturally to an examination of the position of the Irish rebels who claimed that their present behaviour resulted from past injustices. By 8 January at least Irishmen were addressing Richard in terms showing confidence in the king's readiness to forgive. On that day O'Connor

Faly wrote admitting past transgressions, for -- 'I found none to do justice between the English and me'. He was now ready to submit, 'and to do justice to the English who may complain of me, similarly having like justice from them'.[1] The Irish were already apparently aware that negotiated submission was possible and that Richard's policy was not to seek retribution. Other correspondence showed a similar expectation of mercy and a fair hearing. Niall Og wrote itemizing the wrongs he had suffered and claiming that Richard had written to him saying that he came to Ireland in order to give justice to all.[2] From the sense of the letter it would appear to have been written before the king met Niall Mor O'Neill in January, well before Richard wrote informing the English council of his policy on 1 February. Even in Leinster itself, where the submissions resulted from a vigorous campaign, Richard did not apparently seek vengeance on the rebels. The Leinster submissions in themselves followed the same form as those made by other Irish chiefs--the severity of policy lying not here but in additional terms concerning the land of Leinster. The settlement of the province appears in fact to have been less punitive than reconstructive--as can be seen from the position of Gerald O'Byrne, who agreed on 7 January to leave Leinster, confirmed the undertaking on 18 February, yet wrote to the king on 18 January complaining of Ormond's attempts to take from him the lands of which the king had recently given him the custody.[3] Such a complaint against a royal councillor by a lately defeated rebel demonstrates that in Leinster too the king must have given the Irish cause to anticipate his favour.

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 129, 209-10

2 ibid. pp 129-31. Other letters showed a similar assumption that Richard would hear Irish complaints sympathetically, but were of too late or too uncertain a date to be useful in this context. e.g. ibid pp 122,125

3 ibid., pp 166, 169, 141-2; for further detail on the Leinster settlement see below pp 67-86.

It is clear therefore that any change of policy in February, based on a desire to do justice and show mercy, represented no complete volte-face but a moderately altered attitude. That some change occurred must, however, be accepted. Richard himself admitted this to be why he sought conciliar advice, and the council's reply referring to its past approval of action against the rebels made its understanding of the change quite clear. In January, before Richard met Niall Mor O'Neill, he wrote to a bishop in England speaking of the news that O'Neill and others would submit, recognize their faults and receive for them whatever the king might devise.[1] The expressed policy of 1 February, recognizing the justification for Gaelic rebellion, revealed a definite change in attitude.

It is worth bearing in mind some of the influences that must have affected Richard's views at this time, the most obvious incident of importance being perhaps the consultation which took place in Dublin about Christmas, concerning policy towards the Irish. Archbishop O'Kelly of Tuam was as a result of these discussions active in procuring submissions in Connacht during the following months.[2] One of the submitting chiefs, his kinsman Malachy O'Kelly, consequently wrote to the king in March with a strong complaint against the Earl of Ormond.[3] His expectation of favour probably dated from the December meetings at Dublin, and one can assume that at this time Richard heard information about the political situation in the lordship which increased his willingness to listen to Irish grievances. Although the one piece of legislation which we know to have come from the November/December parliament at Dublin controlled the supply of provisions to the Irish, and obviously reflected a state of war,[4] the presence of

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1 Anglo-Norman Letters, no 143
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 127-8
3 ibid. p 122
4 Statutes and Ordinances, p 499; below, p 71.

some of the Leinster chiefs in Dublin at this time made it evident that a major part of the campaign was over. O'Byrne, O'Nolan and O'Toole at least had come with Richard to Dublin in November, though MacMurrough was left at large.[1] These Irish chiefs were probably not in prison in Dublin, but were to some extent on public show during these weeks, giving rise to the belief that to the parliament at Dublin came 'both his lieges and those who had recently submitted to him'.[2] Richard certainly had sufficient opportunity for contact with these Irishmen to be aware by the end of the year that the rights and wrongs of Irish rebellion could not be easily decided with any hope of lasting peace. The evidence of Anglo-Irish ambition shown in Ormond's attack upon O'Byrne may also have disposed Richard to accept at face value complaints about Anglo-Irishmen elsewhere. It was in any case by late January already clear that the military force employed in subduing Leinster would not be required throughout the country. Richard wrote to the council that not only would the Irish relinquish Leinster but Niall Mor had done homage for himself and on behalf of his sons, and the captains of Munster and Connacht were prepared to come and likewise do homage.[3] The meeting on 20 January when O'Neill and Mortimer disagreed in the king's presence must have further contributed in opening Richard's eyes to a Gaelic view of rights and loyalties.[4] In the circumstances it was inevitable that Richard received the approaches of the Irish in a generous spirit. To impose harsh penalties on those who had voluntarily submitted would have needlessly prolonged the military struggle. It was also probable that this attitude caused a

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1 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters of Richard II', P.R.I.A., xxxvii C (1927) pp 285, 291; Miscellaneous Irish Annals, p 153; below, p 70.
2 Historia Anglicana, ii, 215
3 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 287
4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 105-7; 144-6; below, p 91.

softening too in his Leinster policy--particularly so as the recruitment of the Leinster Irish to fight elsewhere with the promise of land may have been a useful threat in the early stages, but can only have been an embarrassment when the peaceful submissions of other rebels snowballed.

The importance of Richard's exposition of his policy to the rebel Irish lies partly in its practical results--the most comprehensive group of submissions since the lordship was established--but also in the rationale it reveals behind these submissions. Whatever Richard thought about the Irish rebels, one would have expected him to receive many of their submissions. A successful campaign in Leinster not only reduced that province but provided a harsh example for the Irish of other areas, and the submissions in themselves might have resulted from this fear. They cannot be seen as a sign of Richard's decision to show favour to the Irish. That favour is instead shown in the absence of punishment of late rebels, and in Richard's subsequent dealings with them. We know, for instance, that several Irishmen were knighted. Household accounts for this year describe the delivery of special robes at Kilkenny for Brian O'Brien of Thomond and O'Neill, who were knighted during the expedition.[1] The annals mention that Niall O'Neill received a knighthood,[2] and Niall Og was, by his own admission, 'knight by your creation'.[3] O'Connor Don was also knighted, on 1 May,[4] and it is possible that MacMurrough too was so honoured.[5] Richard's favour to the Irish is also implied from his continuing friendly relations with some of the chiefs in the period after the expedition.[6]

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1 E 159/175 Mich. brevia directa baronibus, m 31
2 Miscellaneous Irish Annals, p 153
3 Curtis, Richard II, p 136
4 ibid., pp 99-100
5 Though Froissart's account of the knighting of O'Brien, MacMurrough, O'Neill and O'Connor on 25 March in Dublin is obviously inaccurate in its details. (Oeuvres de Froissart,(ed.) K.de Lettenhove, xv, 170-8.)
6 e.g.O'Neill; see below, pp 329-30.

Nevertheless, though the existence of submissions may be in itself unremarkable, their nature and scope offer evidence of a definite royal policy, reflecting Richard's view of the Irish problem. Had Richard received these rebels 'into the king's peace', imposing perhaps considerable fines for the favour, as the Anglo-Irish government frequently did,[1] and as the council in England wished, his achievement might have demonstrated immediate tactical supremacy, but must have crumbled away once the Irish next rebelled. The settlement reached by Richard was quite different. It was largely dependent, as the letters of the chiefs show, upon Richard's position as king and giver of justice and made evident the potential authority of a monarch resident in Ireland. Richard's comprehension of the problem is shown by his remarks on the state of the rebel Irish and his subsequent efforts to procure as far-reaching submissions as he could. Hardly less significant is the Gaelic Irishmen's understanding of the opportunity presented by the royal visit and their readiness to affirm their liege relationship to the king. The submissions Richard took from the Irish were not the accidental by-product of a show of force, but marked the first and necessary step of a restoration of royal position, giving the lordship a unity through the crown that it had never hitherto possessed.[2]

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1 e.g. MacNamara submitting to William of Windsor was required to acknowledge his offence against the king and to pay 1,000 cows as an amercement. (Cal. Carew MSS, v, 481-2)

2 cf R. Dunlop's review of Curtis, Richard II, in History, xii (1928) p 353, where he suggests that Curtis overemphasized the importance of the submissions and that in fact their subsequent inability to contain Irish ambitions reduces their significance.

In understanding the king's objectives in 1395 and the importance of his submission settlement one must bear in mind the background of royal relations with the Gaelic Irish since 1169.[1] For many writers in the past the significance of the submissions was slight.[2] Rapidly won, and just as rapidly broken, they were seen as fitting into the pattern of Gaelic society where submissions could honourably be made under a present threat, without any obligation to keep the peace once the threat was removed. Richard's willingness to negotiate was seen in fact as a sign of weakness.[3] Since the publication of Curtis's transcripts of the public instruments brought to England after the expedition, and the royal letters revealing the seriousness of the Leinster campaign and its success, more credit has been given to both sides--to Richard for the painstaking way in which he procured submissions binding the Irish of almost the entire country not merely to keep the peace but to become his liege subjects, and to the Irish for the concern their letters show that they should stand in the king's favour and receive his protection against the great Anglo-Irishmen.[4] For both parties the submissions signified more than paper documents.

As the oaths of liege homage, which comprised the central element of the submissions, were taken of all the main Irishmen, it is clear that the submissions resulted from general policy rather than particular circumstances. Where Richard wished to attend to a specific local situation he did so by accompanying agreements, leaving unaltered the main articles of the oath.[5] It is therefore easier to understand

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1 Above pp 15 - 30

2 e.g. R.Cox, Hibernia Anglicana, p 137; T.Leland, The history of Ireland, i, 341-2; M.Haverty, History of Ireland, p 306; etc.

3 e.g. J.T.Gilbert, A history of the Viceroys of Ireland, p 269

4 Curtis, Richard II, and 'Unpublished letters'; the importance of the military aspect has been brought out by Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions'.

5 e.g. In Ulster and Leinster; below, pp 76-80, 91-2.

Richard's overall policy if one examines these oaths of homage in a general way, before considering provincial situations and varying settlements.

The form of submission followed a common medieval pattern. The submitting man, in the presence usually of the king himself, or of a specially empowered representative,[1] removed his cap, girdle and weapons, and on his knees put his hands, palms joined, between those of the king, swearing his oath of homage. This comprised the usual feudal ceremony.[2] The oath usually taken by the Irishmen is worth repeating in full:

> Ego...devenio ligeus homo Domini Ricardi Regis Anglie et Francie necnon Domini Hibernie supremi domini mei et mee nacionis necnon heredum suorum Anglie regum ab isto die imposterum de vita et membris et terreno honore (3) ita quod in me vite necisque habeat et habeant potestatem eidemque et heredibus suis inperpetuum fidelis ero in omnibus ipsum ac heredes suos contra quoscumque mundanos iuxta meum et omnium meorum posse defendere iuvabo et obediens ero legibus mandatis et ordinacionibus ipsorum et ipsorum cuiuslibet: veniam dicto domino meo Regi et suis heredibus Anglie regibus ad ipsius et ipsorum parliamentum et consilium vel alias quandocumque pro me miserit vel miserint seu ex parte ipsius et ipsorum, ipsorum vel loca tenencium cum fuero requisitus vocatus vel premunitus: ad ipsum Dominum Regem heredes et loca tenentes suos et eorum quemlibet bene et fideliter veniam consulendus et faciam in omnibus et singulis id quod bonus et fidelis ligeus homo facere debet et tenetur naturali ligeo domino suo. Sic Deus me adiuvet et hec sancta Dei evangelia. (4)

This was followed by a ceremonial kissing of the gospels and a further corporal oath affirming this 'allegiance and fealty to the king'. Occasionally a further oath bound the Irishman to pay a sum to the Papal Camera should he violate his oath,[5] and the king then admitted

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1 Feudal homage, as distinct from fealty, was normally done in person. (M.Bloch, Feudal Society, pp 146-7; above p 27)

2 Ganshof, Feudalism, p 66

3 This phrase--life, limb and earthly honour--commonly occurred in agreements between rulers and vassals and did not refer to any fief in respect of which the submitting man did homage. See, e.g. 1177 Treaty of Ivry between Louis VIII and Henry II, where each swore to preserve the life, limbs and earthly honour of each other. (Warren, Henry II, pp 145-6.)This point is important to the argument below, pp 58-9 etc.

4 e.g. Curtis, Richard II, pp 58-9

5 Below, pp 64-5.

him as his liege. The official record which was then made might be requested at this point either by the king, his new liege, or both.[1]

There were a few exceptions to this normal oath. The Leinster Irish in January swore for instance merely to be faithful with a promise that they would become the king's lieges.[2] The explanation probably lies in the fact that the Earl of Nottingham did not yet have power to receive homages on the king's behalf.[3] On other occasions it is difficult to know whether abbreviations in the oath implied the full form or deliberately left out specific clauses. For instance, Niall Mor O'Neill on 20 January promised simply to become the king's liegeman --

> in life and limb and earthly honour, to live and die with you against all men and both I and all the aforesaid, my sons, my whole nation and kin, and all my subjects will bear true fealty to you and your heirs--

with no mention of parliament, giving counsel, or obedience to the laws of the lordship. He took the same oath on behalf of his son Niall Og, and the simplicity in form may have resulted from the preliminary nature of the settlement.[4] Another variation of limited significance appears to lie in the oath taken by Donal Morghysson in Dublin on 2 February, which obliged him to obey the king's laws but made no reference to parliament.[5] A similarly shortened oath was taken by Art O'Dempsey in April.[6] In this case the reason may lave lain in the background of Art's submission, for he alone of the submitting Irish came in as a recognized rebel, with a cord about his neck, asking forgiveness for his misdeeds.[7] On the whole, however, it is difficult

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1 Below, p 65

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 170 - 1; below, p 76 ff

3 Nottingham was granted this power in February, before he ultimately took the oaths of homage. Curtis, Richard II, p 165

4 ibid., pp 105-7, 191; also 144-6, 223; Niall Mor was empowered to act for his son, but the agreement was made conditional upon Niall Og coming in person to submit.

5 ibid., p 116

6 ibid., pp 62-3

7 Below, pp 72-4

to hold that such differences indicated varying obligations.[1] The oath taken by Donough O'Byrne, for instance, appears to have been unique in form, but in fact it survives only in a descriptive account and its contents show it to be a freely expanded version of the normal oath.[2] The case of Geoffrey O'Brennan, Fennan MacGillapatrick, Thomas Carragh, and Shane O'Nolan provides another example.[3] They swore merely to submit to the royal will when they came in on 18 February, but Thomas Carragh Kavanagh did do full liege homage later in March,[4] and the earlier exception cannot be taken to mean that particular Irishmen were bound by an obligation inferior to liege homage. Conclusive proof of the limited significance of these anomalies appears to lie in Brian O'Brien's two submissions. On 1 March he took the full form of liege homage,[5] but when he confirmed this later in the month at Quin he merely swore liegiance, fealty, military defence against all enemies and obedience to royal commands and ordinances. His uirrighs on that occasion seem to have taken the same oath.[6] The variation in form would seem to have been accidental, associated perhaps with the fact that this document was not formally certified by Thomas Sparkeford, the public notary who attested the other official records.[7] It is possible therefore that any submission mentioning liege homage involved a fairly standard oath which might however vary without affecting the obligation. If this was the case, it does not matter greatly that we do not know precisely what oath

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1 Note also Shan MacMahon, who was obliged to come to parliament but not specifically bound to give counsel. (Curtis, Richard II, pp102-3)

2 ibid. pp 61 - 2.

3 ibid., pp 74-5

4 ibid., pp 104-5

5 ibid., pp 93-4

6 M.Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', J.R.S.A.I., lxvii (1937) pp 231-3

7 See A.Gwynn, 'Richard II and the chieftains of Thomond', in North Munster Antiquaries Journal, vii (1956) p 6 for the suggestion that this was the reason the Quin submissions were not included with the other documents brought to London.

was taken by Aedh and Thomas O'Kennedy, or Brian and Dermot O'Brien, beyond the fact that it was of liege homage.[1]

Evidence of Richard's serious intentions in procuring submissions was most clearly demonstrated by his thorough attmept to bring in as broad an area as possible. This involved not only the submissions of the chiefs but that of many of the uirrighs. In each province the policy was enacted in a slightly different way. In Leinster most of the submissions were made locally in mid-February to Nottingham, specially empowered to receive oaths of homage.[2] Only Donough O'Byrne, Gerald O'Byrne's tanaiste, seems to have made formal homage at this time before the king in Dublin.[3] The resulting list containing some fifteen submissions shows that whatever MacMurrough's position was in the province neither he nor O'Byrne were specifically empowered to do liege homage for their uirrighs, though MacMurrough's undertaking in the original indenture of January that he would make war on any of certain named Irishmen going against the agreement implied his ultimate power to make them the king's liege men and to enforce their liegiance.[4] Extensive as they were, Richard was not content with these February submissions and activity continued in the province almost until his departure. At the end of March more submissions were taken, several of the men repeating oaths of liege homage they had already taken in February.[5] This unusual repetition of the ceremony of liege homage probably occurred because of Richard's own presence in the area. At the same time, the settlement was extended and oaths were taken from men so far unmentioned. The last Leinster submission, that of Art O'Dempsey, did not occur until 21 April, though Art's

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 91-3
2 ibid., pp 75-85
3 ibid. pp 61-2
4 ibid., pp 75-85; below p
5 Malachy O'More, O'Toole, Thomas Carragh and Donal O'Nolan all repeated oaths. (Curtis, Richard II, pp 75-85)

continued hostilities to the king account at once for the delay and for the necessity to procure his personal oath when he did submit.[1]

For Ulster the picture is incomplete. We know neither what measures were taken to bring in the men of the north-west--principally O'Donnell, Maguire, O'Doherty, O'Boyle and MacSweeny--nor how the submissions of O'Neill's uirrighs were finally taken. The latter point raised some problems, for while O'Neill claimed to speak for all the Irish within his influence[2] Mortimer demanded the immediate lordship of the Ulster Irish, which O'Neill had usurped.[3] Meanwhile Magennis and MacDonnell showed themselves anxious to establish direct links with the crown.[4] There was, however, no doubt about the royal position--dissensions between O'Neill and Mortimer were to be settled only after

> the said Irish of Ulster shall come in person before the king or earl to take oath of supreme allegiance and fealty to the king and oath of fealty to the earl.(5)

The statement made clear the royal priorities; personal allegiance from subjects to their king was aimed at from all the Irish chiefs, but the relation thus established between them and the king was not intended to upset any feudal rights possessed by the Anglo-Irish lords.

It is, however, in the Munster submissions of O'Brien that the pattern of local ceremonies of homage, supplementing the major ones to Richard, becomes most clear. The lucky survival of the record made at Quin proves that the Irish chief might repeat his oath in an assembly intended really to formalize the submissions of his uirrighs.[6] If, as seems quite probable, the pattern was general, one is led to

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 62-3
2 See his letter of 26 February; ibid., pp 143-4.
3 ibid. pp 144-6
4 ibid., pp 87-90
5 ibid., pp 144-6, 223-4
6 Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', pp 231-3

conclude that the picture Curtis gives of the extent of the submissions is incomplete and that they were even more comprehensive than he suspected. A third record, just prior to Richard's departure, shows that Richard was not content even with the list of homages from Quin, but accepted O'Brien's personal undertaking for the liege submissions of yet more uirrighs.[1] From Munster too comes the information that preliminary submissions were taken from the Irish by relatively minor knights, occupied locally in negotiations and campaigns. Thus in March the Earl of Rutland described how William Heron had received the submission of 'Cormac Dirmot MacCarthy' who swore 'to be for all his days your loyal liege'.[2] In fact, this MacCarthy later made the usual personal submission to the king.[3]

The evidence from the rest of the country is less complete. Richard's own presence in Meath made it possible for a considerable number of men from that area to make their oaths of liege homage personally to him.[4] This was naturally not so in Connacht, where in any case the procuring of submissions began later and was still in a preliminary stage in April. It was probably for that reason that O'Connor Don was, like O'Brien, recognized as responsible for the liege homage of his presumed uirrighs.[5] This policy was expedient--certainly preferable to Richard's leaving the country without any form of submissions from the men concerned. It is likely that more of these chiefs would have done homage in person to the king had the expedition not been cut short. The evidence from each province confirms, in brief, the impression that Richard not only aimed at a nominal restoration of relations with the most important of the

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 90-3; Gwynn,'Richard II and Thomond', pp 7-8.
2 ibid. pp 123-4, 204-5
3 ibid., p 115
4 ibid., pp 97-8, 101-4, 111-3, 117-8
5 ibid., pp 90-3

Irishmen, but was concerned to include in this bond as many subordinate chiefs as possible. The settlement he achieved could not have been accomplished by any representative, however active, for oaths of liegiance were normally done only in person. Richard's officers sent over just prior to the expedition to prepare the way were for instance empowered to receive only fealty, not homage.[1]

Any cursory examination reveals that the submissions of the Irishmen to Richard established the former as his full subjects, but it is not always appreciated how specifically the oath of homage detailed the nature of the relationship. It is possible in 1395, by contrast to 1172 or 1210, to prove that Gaelic submissions to the king were intended to bring the Irish into the ordinary government of the lordship. This at least is the only interpretation possible of the clauses binding the Irishmen to be obedient to the legibus, mandatis et ordinacionibus of the king or his heirs, to come to parliaments and councils, to give counsel and to act in all things as faithful liegemen. 'Liege', it must be remembered, was by the late fourteenth century virtually synonymous with 'subject'. In Ireland examples from contemporary legislation show that 'liege' more often had overtones of racial identity than feudal standing, 'English lieges' being for instance contrasted with 'the Irish'.[2] There is no evidence that the Irish chiefs after 1395 were indeed summoned to parliament, though there is a suggestion that Richard's Christmas parliament at Dublin was attended by the Irish in his company.[3] Although the oaths did not specifically mention the legal status of the Irishmen, it would seem that in becoming the king's liegemen the Irish also acquired rights of English law. This was true at least of O'Connor Don, who received

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1 Foedera, vii, 782-3; above p 51 n 1
2 Statutes and Ordinances, p 445 cl 12 etc
3 Historia Anglicana, ii, 215; above p 47

letters patent stating that as the king's liege he should henceforth be free to answer in any court in Ireland and to acquire land 'as a true Englishman' notwithstanding any statute to the contrary.[1] A fifteenth century description of his position clearly linked his submission with his privileges in law--gil et son issue et tut sa nacion serrioent ses lieges et Dengleis condicioun....[2] A similar association of liege homage and English law was made later in the fifteenth century when, for instance, a grant of English law was made dependent upon the condition 'that the said Cormac (MacCarthy) make liege homage to us as is lawful'.[3] It seems fairly certain therefore that Richard's intention in the submissions was not merely to end present disturbances in the country but to establish once and for all his lordship as a legal entity under his direct authority.

The oath of liege homage, though undoubtedly feudal in origin, was used in this case to establish not a fee holding relationship but that of liegiance--in short, Glanvill's homage of lordship.[4] Homage done in respect of a fee normally referred to the 'cause' of the bond, a clause absent from every Irishman's oath of liegiance.[5] Only the Leinster men swore to hold lands of Richard 'for liege homage and befitting duty done therefore', and their oaths of liege homage were not dependent upon the arrangement which was recorded in a separate indenture.[6] There was of course nothing to prevent individual Irishmen from being in a tenurial relationship with the crown,[7] but the

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1 E 163/7/12/6 I owe this reference to Professor Otway-Ruthven who has kindly allowed me to use her transcript of the document.

2 ibid. no 3

3 C.O.D., iii, no 273 (1488)

4 Above p 18

5 Above pp 17-8; see, e.g., Rupert of Bavaria in 1397, who swore to serve Richard 'as an enfeoffed vassal'.(Foedera, vii, 855)

6 Curtis, Richard II, pp 75-85

7 MacMurrough, whose recognition in Norragh is known, was the best example of this. See Curtis, Richard II, pp 75-85.

oaths carefully avoid the suggestion that the homage depended on any such fee. Furthermore it is clearly impossible to believe that every Irishman, great and small, who submitted in 1395 could have become a feudal tenant in chief of the crown—in the vested interests of the Anglo-Irish lords who assisted in procuring the submissions lies one reason at least why such a settlement was unlikely.[1] There is in short little doubt that the relationship established by Richard in these oaths of submission concerned that between a king and his subjects, not that of a lord and his enfeoffed vassals.

One curious feature of the oath which requires mention is the fact that in almost every case the Irishman swore on his own behalf to be the liege subject not just of Richard but of his heirs, kings of England. This in itself contrasted with the feudal oath, which though customarily imposing obligations on the heirs of both parties explicitly bound only the principals.[2] Of the Gaelic submissions only Niall Mor's agreement with Richard on 20 January specifically said that the chief did homage 'for my sons and all my nation and kin, and all my subjects', promising to keep faith with both Richard and his heirs.[3] One must also note the grant of English law to O'Connor, which was apparently guaranteed to his heirs of both sexes, and it is probable that on other similar occasions mention was made of the submitting man's heirs.[4] Presumably the nature of inheritance to Irish kingship, and the Gaelic view of overlordship, was responsible for the omission of clauses binding the heirs of the submitting men, as it would have been in Richard's interest to procure such agreements had it been possible. It was at least a significant achievement

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1 cf Curtis, Richard II, pp 266, 274
2 Ganshof, Feudalism, p 101
3 Curtis, Richard II, p 106
4 Above, p 58

that he won recognition of both his own rights and those of his successors as lords of Ireland.

While Richard's comprehensive efforts to define his legal relations with all his subjects indicated that he understood how the lordship of Ireland was being eroded by a persistent tendency to discriminate between the loyal English lieges and the Irish enemy, it is interesting to note that the Irish showed their own familiarity with the concept of lordship Richard was attempting to restore. The point should not perhaps be overstated, for it is difficult to tell from their letters how much of what was written was their own words and to what extent these Latin documents had been influenced by the royal envoys, but it is certain that a number of the Irish claimed to recognize the king's rightful authority in all Ireland and, furthermore, sought royal protection not simply as an ally, or vassal, but as liege and subject. In some cases this was explicitly stated--as for instance by Taig MacCarthy who admitted that Desmond had been his dominus, referred to himself in relation to the king as vestrum, and said that he had never risen contra ligeanciam meam.[1] More often, however, a knowledge of the king's legal claims in Ireland was implicitly assumed in phrases which reflected much more than diplomatic form. Thus letter after letter prior to the oaths of liege homage referred to its sender as vester ligeus homo, vester subditus ligeus, vester humilis obediens subditus, vester humilis ligeus, vester humilis et fidelis ligeus, or vester humilis subditus et homo ligeus--a variety in phrasing showing a common acceptance of the liege concept as interchangeable with that of subject.[2] It also reveals that the liege-subject status of the Irish was not created by Richard, merely confirmed or redefined--an impression borne out by the way in which

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1 Curtis Richard II, p 74

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 88, 114, 121, 122, 129, 131; letters of MacDonnell, Turloch O'Connor Ruadh, O'Connor Faly, O'Connor Don and O'Neill.

MacMurrough, for instance, was described when submitting as ligium... natum Hibernicum.[1] There were enough local variations to suggest that these forms were not mere convention. O'Brien, for instance, referred to himself and his predecessors as the king's nativi.[2] O'Brien was also one of those who addressed Richard as his king, rather than lord,[3] and this interesting form, used also by Malachy O'Kelly, Archbishop of Tuam, Muirchertach Magennis, and Maghnus O'Cahan served to emphasize Richard's regality as opposed to his feudal overlordship.[4] Thus O'Neill and the Irish of Ulster were to do homage 'to the lord King',[5] and the Archbishop of Tuam even referred to vestri regni...de Connactia.[6] The letters repeatedly referred to Richard as king of England and followed diplomatic form in crediting Richard with divine support and approval. One was addressed: 'Greeting in him through whom kings reign and princes rule'.[7] While the phrases may tell us more about the clerk who wrote them than the desires of the Irish chiefs, awareness of such notions must be linked with, for instance, the knowledge that Art MacMurrough was at this time using a seal inscribed 'Art MacMurrough Dei Gracia Rex Lagenie'.[8] Clearly the Gaelic Irishmen's view of overlordship included a concept of kingship which in general terms would have been familiar throughout much of medieval Europe.

Before using these letters to any great extent it is necessary to note certain characteristics in their form and content. There is,

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1 Curtis, Richard II, p 81
2 ibid., p 136
3 ibid., p 137
4 ibid., pp 122, 127, 140, 142; also see oath of homage, above p 51
5 Curtis, Richard II, p 146
6 ibid., p 128; use of the form regnum Hiberniae was not wholly unprecedented outside Ireland. See, e.g., John's submission to the Pope in 1213. (W.Stubbs, Select Charters, pp 279-81)
7 Curtis, Richard II, p 124
8 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 286

for a start, a general tendency to flatter and praise the king. O'Carrol of Ely, for example, speaks of Richard's power:

> whose magnificent deeds resound through the whole world, which protects and defends the orphans and gives ready heed to the widows seeking justice, which is ever inclined to take away the griefs of subjects....(1)

Despite the deference shown throughout the letters, the most striking impression is not one of submission but of assertion of past loyalty and of wrongs suffered at the hands of the English. At times the tone is frankly arrogant. Malachy O'Kelly writes:

> I make known to you that I and my father have, for the defence of your realm and lordship and of your lieges and subjects, suffered infinite losses and wrongs, manslaughter, ruin and plunderings; nor have I up to now received any amends from your officers but am expecting recompense and grace from your Highness.(2)

It seems that the Irish, once they accepted the fact that Richard would give a sympathetic ear to their excuses for rebellion, were not slow to absolve themselves entirely from all blame. The letters undoubtedly show a widespread understanding of the concept of lordship and an acceptance of Richard's rights as overlord, but at the same time it is clear that the protestations of loyalty cannot have been fully credited by either side, and there are obvious dangers in using the letters too literally to discover the motives of the submitting Irish.

In some cases, however, the letters do offer valuable information on the Irishmen's reasons for coming in to the king. The submissions were clearly not made without serious consideration of the effects upon the Irishmen's position. Various southern chiefs actually consulted with O'Neill on the subject and O'Neill later claimed that his own prestige had suffered from his submission.[3] O'Neill's letters show clearly his fear that submitting might not be to his advantage,

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 96, 183
2 ibid., pp 122, 203
3 ibid., pp 143-4, 133-4

and it is possible that the delays of other chiefs came from a like, though unexpressed, caution. Several gave the plausible reason that they could not come in person because others would take advantage of their absence,[1] and a few required security of some sort before they did come.[2] It was occasionally specifically stated that a visit to the king would be opposed locally.[3] Some were undoubtedly brought in by the example of what had happened in Leinster; and others by the fear that they would suffer should neighbours and rivals receive royal favour.[4] For many, however, hope of royal favour was a powerful attraction, and these pleaded their past loyalty, or justified their default, reminding the king of his power to give justice. Thus Magennis, for example, was eager to offer submission which would assert his independent position of O'Neill.[5] Felim O'Toole, though the Leinster agreement recognized MacMurrough's power to enforce his submission, seems to have held a similar hope that he could appeal to Richard as vestrum subditum against the exactions of MacMurrough,[6] and it is possible that other petty Irish chiefs also desired freedom from local overlords, Irish or English. O'Connor Faly on 7 January admitted his past failings but claimed that there was none who would do justice between himself and the English.[7] A common complaint was the position of the mesne lords. Ormond and Mortimer were particularly mentioned by O'Kelly, MacCarthy and O'Neill.[8] Magennis and O'Cahan similarly complained of Edmund Savage and others.[9] Even where specific troubles were not mentioned it may be presumed that the submitting Irish anticipated royal protection as the result of their liege homage.

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1 Curtis, Richard II. pp 67-8 (Taig MacCarthy); 95-7 (Taig O'Carrol).
2 ibid. pp 140-1 (Magennis)
3 ibid., p 121 (Turloch O'Connor)
4 ibid., pp 113-4 (Turloch O'Connor Don)
5 ibid., pp 88-90
6 ibid., pp 75-85; 125-6
7 ibid., p 129
8 ibid., pp 122; 67-8; 124-5.
9 ibid., pp 88-90; 142-3.

The Irishmen's references to their own obligations are particularly interesting, revealing a basic difference in understanding between themselves and Richard which helps to explain the ineffectiveness of the submissions. They saw lordship in a personal Gaelic sense, involving hostages, military hosting and other incidents, but stopping short of any complete integration within the king's machinery of government and administration. A particularly clear example of the attitude was expressed by Taig O'Carrol, who claimed to have acted faithfully as the king's subditus, by virtue of which relationship he intends

> vexillum vestrum regium prosequi et manu armata eum contra inimicos vestros defendere.

For this reason he and his predecessors gave hostages in the past, in token of submission, and he himself,

> in perpetuam servitutem me et meos homines potencie vestre excellentissime tradidi; consequens est ergo quod iure dominii immediate vester sum servus et subditus specialis ab aliorum dominio Hibernicorum prorsus exemptus.(1)

Other Irishmen expressed themselves in a similar way, stressing the military aspect of their duties, with mention of the hostages they would give as a sign of their submission,[2] but while assuming the king would in future grant them justice there was no specific concern with their future rights in law.

If it is not by now sufficiently clear that the submissions were seriously taken on both sides, any doubt must be allayed by a consideration of two points recorded after almost every oath. The royal concern was demonstrated in the undertaking required of the principal chiefs to pay sizable sums of money to the papal camera should they break their oaths. This unusual form of fine in Ireland demonstrated

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1 Curtis, Richard II, p 96
2 ibid., p 129 (O'Connor Faly)

an interesting reinforcement of the ecclesiastical sanctions for oath breaking, but is also significant in revealing through its scale of payment the relative positions of the Irishmen and the degree of threat they were taken to pose. In the event of the oath being broken twelve of the most important men guaranteed to pay 20,000 marks each,[1] two others were to give 10,000 marks,[2] twenty-seven were to forfeit £1,000,[3] and two were bound to render 1,000 marks.[4] The cumulative impression from these fines is that Richard sought to make the oaths as binding as possible.

The sincerity of the Irishmen was indicated from their concern to secure public instruments recording their submissions. We do not know if the letters patent granted to O'Connor Don were unusual,[5] but most of the instruments certainly recorded Irish requests for notarial documents.[6] Occasionally the king's own request was specified,[7] but it is probable that the presence of the notary made an official record inevitable, and that the king did not necessarily request an instrument on each occasion. The wishes of the Irishmen were however specifically recorded and this desire they showed to have public evidence of their oaths proves that the ceremony had considerable significance for them.

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1 i.e. Niall Og, Maurice Magennis, Niall O'Hanlon, Gerald O'Byrne, Art MacMurrough, Turloch O'Connor Don, O'Brien of Thomond, Taig MacCarthy, Donal MacCarthy, Turloch O'Brien, Cormac son of Donal MacCarthy and Cormac son of Dermot MacCarthy. (Curtis, Richard II, pp 69, 70, 71, 78, 91, 94, 108, 112, 115)

2 Donal O'Nolan and Malachy O'More (ibid., p 78)

3 Lawoge and Shane O'More, O'Connor Faly, David Mor MacManus, E. MacGerailt Geoffrey O'Brennan, Fennan MacGillapatrick, Thomas Carragh, Shane O'Nolan, Leynagh O'Connor, O'Toole, Donough O'Byrne, Bernard and Dermot O'Brien, Taig O'Carrol, Shane MacMahon, Thomas O'Dwyer and Philip O'Kennedy.(ibid. pp 91, 94, 103, 112)Also Sioda MacNamara and his son, Taig MacMahon and his son, Cu-abha MacGorman and his son Melaghlin, Rory O'Dea, Connor O'Connor, and Rory O'Loughlin. (Ronan,'Some medieval documents', pp 232-3)

4 Cormac O'Melaghlin and Niall O'Molloy (Curtis, Richard II, p 112)

5 Above p 58.

6 e.g. ...super quibus omnibus et singulis dictus...requisivit me notarium publicum quod conficerem sibi publicem instrumentum.(Curtis, Richard II, p 59)

7 e.g. O'Neill's submission:...dictus Rex Ricardus secundus Anglie ex parte una et Mellanus O'Neyll senior ex parte altera requisiverunt me quod conficerem eis publica instrumenta. (ibid., p 107)

Part ii -- The submissions of the Gaelic chiefs

Preparations for the forthcoming expedition began in June 1394. On 16 June any further grants of pardon under the Irish great seal were forbidden and in July certain judicial decisions were postponed until the king should come himself.[1] Considerable activity on both sides of the Irish sea continued from June to September, involving the impressment of ships, recruitment of soldiers and the provision of victuals.[2] The scale of the enterprise was probably responsible, along with the death of Queen Anne,[3] for at least two delays. Originally planned for mid-August, the expedition was postponed until 14 September and finally sailed at the end of September.[4] Meanwhile the Bishop of Meath, John Stanley and Baldwin Raddington were commissioned to investigate the state of Ireland, their duties being to receive the fealty of all rebels wishing to submit, to supervise the defence of the lordship against the Irish, to investigate any negligence of officials and generally to be in a position to notify the king of all preparations when he should arrive.[5] Meath and Stanley both had some experience of office in Ireland,[6] and Stanley was also a household retainer of the king, the ultimate successor of Raddington as controller of the household in 1397.[7] Raddington's participation in this mission emphasized from the start the household's role--often isolated as one of the expedition's most dominant characteristics.[8] The sum result of these arrangements was the most impressive late

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1 C.C.R. 1392-6 p 220; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 520

2 ibid. pp 420, 451; C.C.R. 1392-6 pp 295, 302, 308 etc; as explained above, p 4, I have not made a detailed study of the organization of the enterprise.

3 Oeuvres de Froissart, xv, 137

4 C.C.R. 1392-6 pp 295, 308; Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 277

5 Foedera, vii, 782-3

6 Stanley had acted for de Vere before serving himself as justiciar. (Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, 319-23 passim) See also below, p 158; For Meath see ibid., pp 138, 247ff.

7 Tout, Chapters, iv, 198-200

8 ibid., iii, 485-95; iv, 196-8; Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', passim.

medieval demonstration of royal strength in Ireland. Estimated by Froissart as 4,000 men at arms and 30,000 archers,[1] the real numerical strength is not precisely known, but a recent examination suggests between eight and ten thousand all told, a figure considerable even by the standards of English expeditions to France.[2] Richard's only previous military venture, to Scotland in 1385, gathered a force of about 13,000--the third largest army mustered by England in the fourteenth century--but this was only kept in arms for about six weeks.[3] There seems no doubt from the size of the force brought to Ireland that Richard and his advisors anticipated hard fighting as well as negotiation.

The expedition itself can be examined most conveniently in geographic areas--the problem of Leinster presenting a particularly well-defined topic.[4] It would seem to have been Richard's intention to deal first with this province, for he landed on 2 October not in Dublin but at Waterford.[5] Considering the attention which in recent years had been focused on Leinster this can have caused no surprise. The fees which were paid to MacMurrough and other Leinster Irishmen by no means kept them permanently at peace. In the summer of 1393 O'Byrne was at war, and O'Toole retained against him.[6] The greatest problem was always, however, MacMurrough and his associates. In the summer of 1390, for instance, MacMurrough and O'Carrol, described as les greindez dez voz enemys par decea, were at open war.[7] Art was admitted to the peace and granted his fee once more in October 1390, but on 25 July 1392 he again broke the peace. By July 1393 he was yet again in receipt of a fee.[8] The

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1 Oeuvres de Froissart, xv, 139

2 Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', pp 142-3 For the scale of the preparations see ibid., pp 138-43.

3 N.B.Lewis,'The last medieval summons of the English feudal levy', E.H.R., lxxiii (1958) pp 5-6.

4 For the approximate location of the main chiefs involved see the map below, p 87.

5 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', pp 277, 279.

6 N.L.I. MS 4 ff 47, 48

7 E 101/247/3; certificate as to the muster of Stanley's retinue.

8 N.L.I. MS 4, f 48

government's incapacity to meet the Irish threat effectively meant that this political instability and intermittent war were almost inevitable. Hostilities by MacMurrough and his uirrighs were politically serious for their presence in the very heart of Leinster cut communications between areas remaining loyal to the king and gave the Irish a stranglehold which made the lordship's ultimate disintegration seem only a matter of time. Both Carlow, the centre of the administration, and Kilkenny, an important Leinster stronghold, were periodically under attack.[1] The question of whether or not to continue the appeasement of the Irish by recognizing their authority as captains of their nations, in nominal obedience to the king, had recently been complicated by the marriage of Art MacMurrough to the Anglo-Irish heiress, Elizabeth de Veel, giving him a claim to the barony of Norragh, held in chief of the Earl of Kildare. Elizabeth, 'for her adherence to MacMorgh, one of the principal enemies of the king in Ireland', was disinherited in January 1391, though a writ of April 1393, requiring the payment to her of her rents as heiress of the barony of Calf, suggests that her continued possession was given some recognition.[2] The question was a controversial one, but only one aspect of the complex structure of political life in Leinster. It was inevitable that any serious attempt to revitalize the lordship should start with this area.

Richard's progress north was in the nature of a campaign. Letters which describe the successes show that MacMurrough and the other Leinster Irishmen were harried by attacks on different sides--the essence of the strategy being a system of fortified wards encircling the Irish and enabling contingents of the royal army to make attacking raids.[3] The

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1 King's Council in Ireland, nos 5,7, etc.
2 C.C.H. p 148 no 27; King's Council in Ireland no 189
3 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', passim. For the military campaign see Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions'. passim.

Irish, hemmed in, could not indefinitely evade the enemy, and their ultimate reduction was inevitable. Although the swift conclusion of the campaign might suggest that there was no real resistance the evidence shows otherwise. It was probably soon after Richard landed that MacMurrough attacked and burned New Ross, though whether this actually began hostilities is unknown.[1] He seems to have then moved further north, to his own stronghold in Idrone, county Carlow, where the Leinster Irish congregated in an attempt to resist, under MacMurrough, the royal army.[2] No major Irish victory is recorded, though Walsingham describes how they harrassed the royal army with rapid raiding ventures.[3] It is likely that the English lords, who were in charge of gardes, began their military duties soon after arriving at Waterford, and that when Richard speaks of leaving the city on 19 October he is referring to his own royal party, not the entire army.[4] Thus the three day campaign which he describes, lasting from Monday 26 October to Wednesday 28, and resulting in the submissions of MacMurrough, O'Byrne, O'Toole and O'Nolan would seem to have been the tail end of the operation. Richard's letter, not unnaturally, puts emphasis on these final moments when he in person took the field, but it is clear from another, anonymous, letter that the wards under Rutland, Beaumont, Nottingham, Holland and Percy had already cut off the Irish from any hope of aid or escape and by successful preys greatly reduced their ability to withstand any prolonged attack.[5] In one raid cattle 'up to the number of 8,000' were captured, and the burning of the villages must have destroyed many essential provisions. The sacking by Nottingham of MacMurrough's own stronghold in Idrone was probably the moment of

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1 A.F.M., 1394; Misc. Irish Annals, p 153, implies that it did.

2 This is indicated by the submission on the same day of O'Byrne, O'Nolan and MacMurrough in O'Nolans's country--the barony of Forth beside Idrone in county Carlow. Below, p 70.

3 Historia Anglicana, ii, 215

4 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 284

5 ibid., pp 285-7 The reduction of the Irish by spoiling their supplies was a recognized form of attack; e.g. in 1370 the constable of Newcastle MacKinegan was rewarded for burning a barn of grain belonging to the O'Byrnes. (E 101/245/3/184; documents subsidiary to the account of the treasurer, Stephen Vale.)

climax in the campaign.[1] On that occasion MacMurrough was nearly taken and his seal--inscribed Sigillum Arthurii MacMurgh Dei Gracie Regie Lagenie--and various other personal belongings were captured.

Even then the Irish did not immediately capitulate and several skirmishes took place.[2] However, the encirclement of the area meant that MacMurrough and his allies could neither retreat nor move elsewhere looking for aid. O'Nolan was the first to submit, within forty-eight hours, but before the day was out MacMurrough, O'Byrne, O'Toole and possibly others had joined him. MacMurrough and the others swore to be faithful and loyal subjects—any punishment for their rebellion being for the moment postponed. MacMurrough was left at large, but Richard claimed to have brought the other chiefs with him to Dublin.[3] Matters were left in this state until January when MacMurrough sealed an indenture with Nottingham arranging the settlement of Leinster.

According to the annals Ormond was a key man in these events. The Four Masters gives this description:

> Art, son of Art, waged war with the king of England and his people and numbers of them were slain by him. He went at last to the king's house, at the solicitation of the English and Irish of Leinster; but he was detained a prisoner on the complaint of the lord Justice, i.e. the Earl of Ormond. He was afterwards liberated; but O'Brien, O'More and John O'Noland were kept in custody after him. (4)

This account minimizes the military defeat suffered by MacMurrough and there seems to be more accuracy in the version given in Miscellaneous Irish Annals, which describes how the royal army besieged Garbhcoill:

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1 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', pp 285-7: cf p 284, where Richard claims to have been present himself.

2 ibidl, p 284

3 ibid., pp 284-5; that John O'Nolan, rather than his father and chief, Donal, was brought (A.F.M., 1394; Curtis, Richard II, pp 78,79) suggests that not all these chiefs in fact came to Dublin. O'Byrne too may have been represented by his tanaiste, Donough, in Dublin in early February. (ibid., p 61)

4 A.F.M., 1394; this 'O'Brien' was probably in fact O'Byrne.

> ...and MacMurchadha, O Bron, O Nuallain and O Mordha submitted to the king. MacMurchadha returned home safely after having submitted to the king but the (other) aforementioned Gaels were taken prisoner and the king brought them to Dublin.(1)

An obscure and contradictory statement in the same annals records that 'MacMurchadha refused to submit on any terms or condition',[2] but this entry possibly refers not to the original defeat but to MacMurrough's subsequent refusal to leave Leinster. There may well have been considerable confusion at the time as to what had really happened, and it is not unlikely that MacMurrough himself underplayed the degree of his defeat.

So far as we know MacMurrough did not in fact come to blows again with Richard's forces, and may even have helped to bring some of the Irish to peace, though he was guilty of raiding Irish neighbours.[3] The military campaign did not, however, end with the October submissions, and where necessary raids continued. Anticipation of further military action can be seen in the one surviving item of legislation from the Dublin parliament of late November, which prohibited any subject from supplying the Irish 'not abiding among our English lieges' with food, horses, armour or other provisions.[4] The initial campaign in Leinster, though crucial, should not be seen as the total military achievement of the expedition, for the strength of the royal army was maintained, and even increased, throughout the expedition. Gloucester, sent to report to the council and parliament in England, returned in February with men and equipment.[5] The council's letters and the Issue Rolls show that Richard's request for more money was agreed with and met, partly

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1 Miscellaneous Irish Annals, p 153; Garbhcoill was in Idrone.
2 ibid.
3 See O'Toole's complaint: Curtis, Richard II, pp 125-6; below p 84.
4 Statutes and Ordinances, p 499
5 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 525, 586, 587; E 403/550 (8 February, 22 March)

by subsidy grants and partly by individual loans.[1] Although the general deployment of the royal army after October is obscure, it is certain that Ormond at least was active in Leinster, and probable that he was acting with some part of that army. His exploits, spoken of in the annals, cannot be dated, though references to his aggressions in Irish letters to the king indicate that at least some of his campaigns were during the early months of 1395.[2] The Four Masters records that 'the Earl of Ormond mustered a force, (and marched) into Leinster to spoil it, and he burned and spoiled Gailne (and) the territory of O'Kelly of Magh Druchtain and then returned home'.[3] This raid may have led to the sumbission on 29 March of O'Kelly of Leighlin diocese with O'More of Leix.[4] This evidence on the role of Anglo-Irish magnates like Ormond highlights one of Richard's great difficulties in bringing the Irish into the lordship as full subjects, for such men, though the necessary agents of Richard's policy, tended to pursue personal ambitions in the name of the king and were therefore mistrusted by the Irish.

Little information survives about continued resistance in Leinster, but it is certain that at least some elements held out. The O'Dempseys, troublesome for some years, provide one such example. In 1383 Dermot O'Dempsey, chief, had been slain by the English,[5] and in 1394, possibly before the expedition began, Aodh O'Dempsey, described as 'an excellent son of an under king', was killed after taking

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1 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 53, 60-1; Anglo-Norman Letters, no 108; Rot. Parl., iii, 329; Cal.Fine Rolls 1391-9 p 138; C.C.R. 1392-6 p 393; E 403/551 (28 January, 22 March); E 159/ 172 Mich. br. dir. baron.. m 13.

2 O'Byrne wrote on 18 January complaining of Ormond's aggression, and O'Kelly expressed similar fears in early March.(Curtis, Richard II, pp 141-2, 109-11.)

3 A.F.M., 1394, where a note places this campaign in Leix. The precise dating is difficult--this raid may have been made during the first autumn campaign.

4 Curtis, Richard II, p 101

5 A.F.M., 1394.

a prey from the Anglo-Irish.[1] In the same year Turloch O'Dempsey, the chief's son, was slain and his head was brought to the king in Dublin. This in itself suggests stubborn resistance, for Richard was usually gracious to defeated Irish rebels.[2] Turloch's death may have resulted from a raid made by the earl of Nottingham in the first weeks of the expedition. He could however be the chief referred to in a letter recording Nottingham's attack on a land called 'D.', which resulted in the death of 'one of the greater captains and evildoers of the country, called T. of D., who was beheaded and sent to the king at P.'(Dublin).[3] At that point the raids may have been directed also against O'Connor Faly, who wrote in abject terms on 7 January to the king admitting past transgressions, though swearing that he had been loyal since the king arrived, and asking to be admitted as full liege, to be allowed to serve with the king in his wars and give him hostages.[4] That O'Connor had in fact resisted is seen from the annals which describe the expulsion of the 'people of the king of England' from Offaly which they were attempting to raid, and the capture by O'Connor of sixty horses after the slaughter of many enemies.[5] Presumably O'Connor's reduction followed this, and had been successfully accomplished by early January. We know that the Earl of Kildare was engaged on a campaign in Leinster in early January, possibly in connection with the Irish of his own area.[6] Though O'Connor Faly was O'Dempsey's immediate overlord, he did not bring O'Dempsey in with him, and the latter was taken to pose a particular threat. A contemporary document written in England describes Richard's progress at a point

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1 Recorded in Miscellaneous Irish Annals, before reference is made to the expedition but in A.F.M. after the entry describing Richard's arrival.

2 A.Clon., A.F.M., Misc. Irish Annals

3 Curtis,'Unpublished letters', pp 286, 292-3; Curtis suggests that 'D.' means the Duffry near Enniscorthy.(ibid., p 302) It is difficult to be certain as the initials in these letters are often unreliable.

4 Curtis, Richard II, p 129

5 A.F.M., 1395

6 C.C.H., p 154 no 53

in the campaign, after the rest of Leinster had submitted.[1] It shows that O'Dempsey was still resisting the king and had become a special problem in the completion of the province's reduction. The account divides the Leinster Irish into two main branches—O'Byrne, O'Toole, O'Nolan on the one side and on the other MacMurrough, O'Brennan, O'More and the O'Dempseys, all in the lordship of MacMurrough. Each of these, except O'Dempsey, is said to have agreed to keep the peace, on condition of leaving Leinster to serve the king in his wars. There is no record of the subsequent campaign against O'Dempsey, but it must have been prolonged, for not until 21 April did Art O'Dempsey come before the king in Kilkenny.[2] Unlike the other submitting chiefs, he came in as a defeated rebel, with a rope around his neck, and asked for mercy. This the king granted, and Art swore an oath of liege homage to him.

O'Dempsey's long resistance is difficult to understand, for he was not a chief of sufficient standing normally to take such independent action. The explanation lies perhaps in his relations with the Anglo-Irish lords of Ormond and Kildare. It is certainly significant that about 1420 the O'Dempseys were indicted by an Anglo-Irishman writing for the next earl of Ormond, in terms which describe them as 'the roote of the netille' from which have sprung the weeds that destroyed the county of Kildare.[3] There must have been some reason of great importance which kept O'Dempsey in arms against the king in 1395, and it may well have lain in considerations of local politics and in the knowledge of the privileged position occupied by Ormond and his peers.

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1 B.M. Hargrave MS 313 f 54; see below, App VI, pp 563-5

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 62-4

3 Three Prose versions of the Secreta Secretorum, ed. R.Steele, p 164.

Richard's itinerary, 1394-5



While the recalcitrance of men like O'Dempsey necessitated some continued campaigning in Leinster, Richard was finalizing his policy for the rest of the province. This, in brief, required the defeated Irishmen to yield their Leinster lands to the king, and go elsewhere at his wages with the right to hold any land they might conquer immediately of the king.[1] The settlement was possibly first worked out before the rest of Gaelic Ireland showed any eagerness to submit, and Richard may indeed have wished to attract the Leinster men into his service to fight in other areas. Although his army was formidable, any full scale campaign would draw troops from Leinster--an undesirable prospect unless the Leinster Irish were somehow made harmless.

Close examination of the indenture made between Nottingham and MacMurrough on 7 January makes it clear, however, that Richard's policy was no simple evacuation of Leinster.[2] Art promised first to deliver

> plenariam possessionem omnium terrarum tenementorum castellorum ...que per prefatum Arthurum seu suos collegas homines seu adherentes nuper occupata fuerunt infra patriam Lagenum....

He guaranteed that he and all his men would keep fealty for ever, and obey the king's laws and commands. By the first Sunday in Lent (28 February) he undertook to

> relinquet totam patriam Lagenum ad veram obedienciam usum et disposicionem dicti domini regis...

saving his movable goods, and to give the son of his brother Thomas Carragh Kavanagh as hostage within a fortnight as security for the agreement. The king was then to make provision for Art, in the form of 80 marks p.a. for ever, to himself and his heirs, and his full rights in his wife's barony of Norragh. He and his fighting men would then

> relinquet totam patriam Lagenum...et ibunt...et habebunt vadia de Domino nostro Rege competenter pro tempore...

while they conquered other areas occupied by the king's rebels. Any

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 80-5
2 ibid.

lands so acquired Art and his men might hold of the king and his heirs for ever, as true lieges' by liege homage and befitting duty done therefore'.

O'Byrne, O'More, 'O'Murgha', 'MacCoha', O'Dunn, 'MacKerelt', David More MacManus and all of Hy Kinsella[1] then undertook likewise to deliver up their possessions in Leinster, apart from movable goods, and to be maintained in the king's household with yearly fees for their lives, as well as wages for fighting other rebels. Their right to any lands they conquered was confirmed and they were to give hostages to the king as surety. For the moment the chiefs swore to remain at peace, promising

> stabunt in locis suis usque in primam diem dominicam Quadragesimo prenominatam pacifice ne permittent aliquos rebelles Domini nostri seu malefactores in locis et partibus suis recipi set eos expellent pro posse a finibus suis. (2)

Should anything happen to contravene the terms of the indenture before 28 February the peace was not to be considered broken, but might be restored with a fortnight's notice. Art's position as dominant lord in the province was recognized by his undertaking to make war on anyone violating the agreement.[3]

Careful reading of the indenture minimizes the significance of the suggested evacuation of Leinster. That the chiefs were to remain where they were, in peace, until 28 February but were at the same time bound to relinquish their lands in Leinster to the king by that date suggests that they were not in fact being driven out of the province, merely

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1 From the absence of first names I assume that these men were chiefs. 'O'Murgha' apparently refers to O'Morchoe, vassal of MacMurrough. David Mor MacManus came from this family and established a separate line. 'MacCoha' appears to represent MacEochaidh, or Keogh, but it is uncertain who either he or MacKerelt (MacGerailt?) were. O'Dunn was a neighbour of O'Dempsey and the immediate vassal of O'Connor Faly. (Curtis, Richard II notes pp 227-40 passim)

2 ibid., pp 83-4

3 MacMurrough's supremacy in Leinster had been recognized in this way by the government for over a century. e.g. A 1295 agreement bound MacMurrough to make war on O'Byrne and O'Toole should they break the peace. (C.J.R. 1295-1303, p 61)

surrendering their lands there to the king's disposition. The military service required of the fighting men 'for the time being' clearly concerned the current struggle against the rebel Irish, and it seems possible that Richard hoped in early January for early submissions but was prepared to use the Leinster Irish by late February if other areas were still holding out. The question of the lands is most explicitly dealt with in the terms concerning Art. His relinquishing of lands applied, according to the submission, specifically to his recent conquests, and even then the clause that he was to leave them to 'the obedience, use and disposition of the king' could bear the interpretation that he was merely yielding all claim to the lands. He was clearly surrendering the right to call himself 'King of Leinster'.[1] The king's primary concern would appear to have been with the legal title to the lands. The 'recently occupied' areas presumably belonged by right to someone else who could recover them if the Irish relinquished possession. On the other hand, lands 'conquered from the enemy' were normally at the king's disposal, and so Richard was prepared to offer the Irish such lands, to hold directly of him.[2]

The plan appears so ambitious that one must doubt if it was ever seriously meant in detail. Not only would innumerable difficulties have arisen in trying to decide which lands the Irish held illegally, but the possibility that the men of Leinster could not only have fought the rest of Gaelic Ireland but have taken the land of other chiefs hardly seems feasible. Such a policy would have ruined Richard's chances of receiving wide-spread submissions, and in view of the evident

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1 Above, p 72

2 See, e.g., Edmund Mortimer's powers in 1379-- C.P.R. 1377-81 p 392.

seriousness of his submission taking it seems more probable that the Leinster settlement meant less than it seems to say. The agreement certainly made possible some regularization of land claims within Leinster; the Irish may possibly have hoped by this means for a measure of secure land title. That no full evacuation of Leinster was intended was made explicit by the grant of Norragh to MacMurrough, for Norragh's position in the heart of the Leinster lordship made impossible any firmly defined English land. The subsequent letter of O'Byrne to Richard proves that other chiefs were promised like security in their own areas of Leinster. O'Byrne wrote on 18 January complaining of Ormond's aggressions, and saying that, though he had agreed to the king's recent grant of some of his lands to Gloucester and Scrope, on condition of his retaining custody of part of the area, his free enjoyment of the grant was now being impeded by Ormond's claims.[1] Richard's settlement of Leinster must from the start have allowed for a coexistence of Gaelic and Anglo-Irish subjects of the king.

It does seem, however, that Richard did seriously intend to recruit some of the Leinster Irish into his army. His manner of doing this is interesting--annual fees supplemented by wages was not the normal method of retaining Irish mercenaries. Though some Gaelic chiefs, like MacMurrough, had previously been granted fees, Irishmen were more usually paid only for the service they did on particular occasions.[2] An alternative method was that used by John Talbot in 1417 when he forced defeated rebels to sue for peace and serve in the lieutenant's army against all other rebels.[3] The fees granted by Richard to the Irish sound so like money fees that he appears to have envisaged the

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 141-2
2 e.g. MacNamara and O'Kelly in 1374 (E 101/245/7)
3 Original Letters illustrative of English history, ed. H.Ellis. i, 56-7.

retaining of Irishmen in his household, fitting in with his general system of household knights and yeomen of the crown. His letters to England do not clarify the matter. In late January, for instance, he wrote that touz nos rebelx de nostre terre de L(einstre) nous ont promys de voider en brief icelle terre de L(einstre)....[1] This ambiguous statement was clearly an insufficient description of his Leinster policy, and it may have been a poor level of communication between Richard and England which led people there to believe that the Irishmen were permanently retained as Richard's mercenaries, to fight if necessary outside Ireland for him. A contemporary English description of the Leinster settlement stated that the Irish should by the first Sunday in Lent voide the lond of Lenstre man and good, and that they should then serve the king in his wars anywhere in Ireland, or in other londes.[2]

When reduced to its essence the Leinster agreement remained a considerable achievement. The arrangement concerning the mercenaries could, it is true, have backfired on the king, had the Irish really demanded lands elsewhere, or were their payments subsequently to lapse. The experience of Art MacMurrough's fee in the past had demonstrated that such a practice did not guarantee loyalty or good behaviour. On the whole, however, granting of fees to a number of the Irish would certainly help to entice Gaelic chiefs into the royal lordship and was likely to make for stability in the province--essential if Leinster was to be recovered to the king's control. The prime legal achievement lay in persuading MacMurrough, who clepud himself Kyng of Lenstre, to yield all rights of the king, holding what position he could by

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1 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 287
2 B.M. Hargrave MS 313 f 54

virtue of the king's official grant and approval.[1] While not necessarily removing all the Irish from the province the submissions left the way free for considerable redistribution of territory. Richard was obviously impressed by Leinster's potential, writing that the province, now conquered and at peace, was

> the most beautiful, pleasant and delightful that any man would find...in any part among other rebels in our land of Ireland. (2)

Descriptions such as this, and 'most famous, fair and fertile', indicate that Richard was not only enthusiastic himself about the areas prospects but wished to convince others of its worth.[3] That his policy aimed at some reinforcement of the Anglo-Irish element in his lordship cannot be doubted--one must not forget his attempt before the expedition to compel the return of Irishmen living in England.[4] Upon new grantees in Leinster would depend the success of the province's settlement and its ability to avert future breakdown, but land grants in themselves were pointless without Gaelic recognition that the land was his to dispose of. The logic of Richard's Leinster policy becomes clearer when one considers his general desire to admit the Irish fully into his lordship as liege subjects, not to exclude them or reinforce the divisions between them and the Anglo-Irish.

There is little evidence on Leinster in the months between the achievement of this settlement in January and Richard's departure in May. The grants made in the province to his followers--Gloucester, Nottingham, Scrope, Despenser, Beaumont and Janico Dartas--may well date from the time of his agreement with MacMurrough and the other chiefs. That to Dartas was enrolled on 12 December, and Gloucester

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1 B.M. Hargrave MS 313 f 54
2 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', pp 284-5, 292
3 ibid.,pp 287, 294
4 C.C.R. 1392-6 pp 295, 390

and Scrope clearly had received theirs by mid-January.[1] These grants were not simply the result of the Leinster submissions--for Rutland's grant as Earl of Cork lay in Munster--but there was obviously a connection. It seems that Richard was more anxious to put new English blood into the area than some at least of the donees were to receive such rewards. Certainly their acquisitions had little appeal for Dartas and Gloucester, and the behaviour of the other men in question suggests that they too found little to attract them in Leinster.[2] When these grants were made Richard probably still intended to remove some of the Irish from the province, at least temporarily, and also to reduce considerably the area of land held by them, and the main problem of the period which follows is to know exactly when Richard accepted this as impracticable.

It is difficult to see why the agreement of 7 January was not proclaimed until mid-February, when the Leinster chiefs came, did liege homage, and agreed to the conditions of the indenture.[3] The time lag is significant, for in the interim Richard had written to the council announcing his projected change of policy.[4] That the January indenture was confirmed as it stood suggests that Richard did not see it as being particularly harsh to the late rebels of Leinster. By this time it also was unlikely that the Irish of Leinster would be needed to fight elsewhere, or that there would be any lands available for their conquest.[5] Nottingham's task in mid-February was, therefore, neither to punish the Irish by immediate expulsion, nor to mobilize them at once for military service. While the concept of 'captains and leaders of fighting men quitting and leaving the land of Leinster'

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1 C.C.H., p 154 no 52; Curtis, Richard II, pp 141-2; below, pp 169-71.
2 Below, pp 177-8.
3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 75-85
4 Above p 40 ff
5 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 294, shows that O'Neill and the southern chiefs were ready to submit by late January.

was still the accepted basis of the agreement,[1] Nottingham was probably instructed to impose the January settlement in as generous a manner as would conform with the existing position of the Anglo-Irish and the recent grants to the English. The terms of his authority on 12 February licensed Nottingham to distribute 'lands and habitations' to such men at his discretion, and required Ormond and Desmond as well as all other subjects to help Nottingham in this matter. The locality of the lands in question was never specified, though the presence of Ormond and Nottingham suggests that Leinster itself might have been included. Unfortunately there is no evidence as to any such distribution and for further information on the policy one must look to subsequent events in the province.

Between 16 and 19 February oaths of liege homage were made by Gerald and Donough O'Byrne, Donal O'Nolan, Malachy O'More, Lawoge and Shane O'More, Murgh O'Connor Faly, Art MacMurrough, David Mor MacManus, E.MacGerailt, Leynagh Ferrson O'Connor of Hyrth, and O'Toole, Geoffrey O'Brennan, Fennan MacGillapatrick, Thomas Carragh and Shane O'Nolan also submitted.[2] These submissions were made before the Earl of Nottingham, acting in his capacity as the king's agent, and it was natural that where possible the agreements were repeated before the king in person. The February submissions bore comparison in fact to those made to Nottingham at Quin by O'Brien and his uirrighs.[3] There is no evidence that the submissions made to Richard in late March as he moved south were anything but confirmations of still valid agreements.[4] At this

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1 So expressed in Nottingham's grant of powers, dated on 12 February. (Curtis, Richard II, pp 76-7)

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 77-80 For their identification see above, p 78; Malachy O'More was captain of his nation (Curtis, Richard II, p 78); Lawoge and Shane O'More are not precisely identifiable, but apparently represented the O'Mores of Slievemargy, a junior branch of the O'Mores of Leix; Murrough O'Connor Faly was captain of his nation (ibid.) and Ieynagh Ferrson O'Connor of Hurth represented a branch of the O'Connor Falys. It is not certain if Geoffrey O'Brennan and Fennan MacGillapatrick were chiefs. Geoffrey certainly was by 1399.(C.O.D.,ii,no 347)

3 See below, p 107

4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 100-1, 104-5.

stage the names of Touhe and Philip O'Kelly, members of the O'Kellys of Leix, were added, and Gilpatrick O'More, who apparently became Lord of Leix in 1404, added his personal submission to the earlier one of Malachy O'More.[1]

These personal meetings with the Irish were not confined to ceremonies of oath taking. For example, Felim O'Toole, submitting at Castledermot on 29 March, confirmed the full Leinster agreement and received certain unspecified privileges and grants in return.[2] The arrangement seems inconsistent, for his letter referring to the problems created by the Anglo-Irish of Ballymore and the Irish of Hy Kinsella shows that the king by this time had recognized O'Toole's position in Leinster and specifically granted him rights to trade with the Anglo-Irish town of Ballymore, well within the Leinster lordship. The letter refers to O'Toole's inability to see the king after Easter--11 April--as promised, and would seem to date from mid-April.[3] It provides conclusive proof that the Leinster settlement was still considered to be in force at that time, though O'Toole's comment, 'for the privilege you granted me is of no effect', indicates that by now it was becoming difficult for Richard to convince the Irishmen of the effectiveness of his power and protection. While we do not know if the other men submitting in March were similarly granted favours by the king, we can at least be sure that their repetition of Art's indenture did not preclude privileges to them within Leinster. Each of the submitting men swore indeed to keep the arrangements made between Nottingham and MacMurrough and O'Byrne, despite the fact that 28 February was long past and no specific renegotiation had taken place.

It is clear that neither side saw the arrangement as broken, and

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 101, 105; A.F.M., 1404
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 100-1
3 ibid., pp 125-6

as it had not been fulfilled one must presume that by this stage the decision not to implement it fully had been mutually accepted. Interpreted broadly it simply guaranteed Irish peace and recognized the king's ultimate rights as lord of the province and its men. The fact that the fees of MacMurrough and other captains were subsequently paid shows that Richard believed this part of the settlement must still be honoured.[1] At the same time, as the king did not wish to use their services elsewhere in Ireland, and was unable to grant them the lands they were supposed to conquer, he had no alternative--if he wished to retain their loyalty—but to regularize the Irishmen's position within Leinster. This did not of course mean a return to pre-1394 conditions, and control in some areas was certainly wrested from the Irish. On 1 April several former reeves of MacMurrough's, 'styling himself lord of certain lands and possessions of a part of Leinster', now swore to answer for the office before Nottingham, the rightful lord.[2] This happened at New Leighlin, and the area in question was probably the barony of Idrone which MacMurrough had annexed,[3] and where he had fought his campaign against Richard. It is doubtful that he was now content with his barony of Norragh and 80 marks p.a. His raid upon O'Toole, possibly one of many such, looks very like an attempt to reimpose his lordship, for he not only seized animals but took O'Toole's son as hostage.[4]

There are indications that circumstances forced Richard to recognize the weak basis of the peace, viable only so long as it served Irish as well as royal interests. Already, in the oaths of homage in February, a symbolic distinction between MacMurrough and the other Irish had been admitted when the former made his submission, contrary to feudal practice, seated upon a horse.[5] More significantly perhaps, the condition that

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1 Below, pp 319-20
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 64-5
3 N.L.I., MS 15, ff 344-5
4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 125-6
5 ibid., p 78; cf Ganshof, Feudalism, pp 66, 68. In the only other case of an Irishman so submitting it was stated that Gilpatrick Roe O'More was infirm and thus sat, like Richard, upon a horse.(Curtis, Richard II, 105)

he would discipline any rebellious Irish in his lordship indicated that the liegiancy Richard hoped for depended to a great extent on MacMurrough's co-operation. It is worth noting the numbers of Irishmen bound in their submissions to observe the peace made between MacMurrough and Nottingham, a recognition from the start of the king's limited ability to deal with them independently of MacMurrough.[1] Furthermore, Richard did not, so far as we know, retaliate after MacMurrough's attacks on O'Toole, though the knowledge that the sheriff of Kildare was summoned with a force in early April indicates that campainging of some sort continued in Leinster until even this late date in the expedition.[2] Finally, an ominous sign for the future safety of the peace was seen on 14 April when Art confirmed his undertaking of January before two bishops in a place by Castlecomer,[3] for although Richard was at this time not many miles away in Kilkenny, Art made no move to come to him. When one considers this in conjunction with the absence of any recorded personal submission to Richard--apart from that of October--and the absence of any recorded MacMurrough letters, there seems little doubt that MacMurrough's state of submission was maintained with no great enthusiasm. His meeting with the bishops at Castlecomer reads like a compromise agreement; while not repudiating his submission he would not come in person before the king. The most logical explanation for Richard's apparently indecisive policy towards Leinster in these last days of the expedition lies in his desire to maintain the delicately balanced peace and not to provoke retaliation by extreme demands.

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1 e.g. O'Connor Faly; Curtis, Richard II, p 109; also ibid., p 105 etc.
2 C.C.H., p 155 no 65
3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 98-9

Map locating the main Irish and Anglo-Irish families involved in the 1395 submission settlement



Although Leinster, and MacMurrough, had presented in recent years the lordship's most acute problem, the situation in Ulster was also bleak. Prolonged minorities drained the power of the earldom, with Mortimer's seneschals, the Savages, pursuing careers in many ways similar to those of the great Ulster Irish chiefs themselves.[1] In 1391 it was admitted that very little profit could be got from Ulster and that the capture of Carrickfergus castle and the loss of the adjacent country 'is much to be feared'.[2] Any projected restoration of the area to the crown was inevitably complicated by the question of the earl's rights. In recent years royal authority in the area had been so feebly maintained that the king was obliged to pay compensation to Mortimer for losses to the earldom while in the king's hands.[3] Moreover, the controversy concerning O'Neill's hostages made it clear that royal officers had for some time compromised with the O'Neills rather than take a firm line and risk a full-scale northern crisis. Thus Niall Cg, although recognized to be attempting a general conquest of Ireland, calling himself 'king of Ireland', was released in 1390. His pledges were in turn released, despite a specific royal prohibition following Mortimer's complaint to the king about the damages suffered to his lordship as a result of O'Neill's raids and the weakness of the king's ministers.[4] Anxious perhaps at the prospect of Mortimer coming in person to Ulster, O'Neill in fact made peace before the expedition began, renewing presumably the agreement made with Stanley in 1389.[5] O'Neill later referred to his good behaviour since this peace, to which

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1 e.g. A.U., 1383
2 C.P.R. 1388-92 p 405
3 E 403/543 (7 July 1393); see also below, p 186
4 E 101/247/1/4 (investigation into Stanley's administration); for the background to this and Mortimer's petition (S.C. 8/189/9434) see Appendix V, below pp 559 - 63.
5 Cal.Carew MSS., v, 481

Ormond and Archbishop Colton were witnesses, though he accused the English of Louth for many injuries since then.[1] It was possibly after this settlement that Richard wrote to Archbishop Colton, thanking him for his services in settling disorders in the area.[2] His letter and its background makes it clear that, although Ulster still presented a particular problem, some basis for peaceful negotiation with the Irish had been achieved before Richard arrived.

It seems probable that the O'Neills' anxiety about their own position now that Roger Mortimer's minority was at an end and their desire to minimize the earl's claims explains the considerable success which Richard's policy enjoyed in Ulster. It is true that in other areas too the Irish were tempted by the offers of justice and protection, but only in Ulster is there evidence that royal promises were still being sought and the peace honoured months after the king had left the country. The royal policy here, as elsewhere, hinged on Irish acceptance of Richard as lord of Ireland, demonstrated in the oaths of liege homage. Richard supported Mortimer's position as earl, and the O'Neill submissions show that they recognized this. That they still sought his protection against their legal overlord demonstrated the potential capacity of Richard's policy to reunify the lordship under the crown.

Richard's own promises of justice and the diplomatic skill of Archbishop Colton are revealed in the number of letters surviving from the O'Neills to Richard during the expedition. By such means was established the feeling of mutual self-interest which safeguarded the

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 129-31

2 Above, p 39; alternatively the letter may have been that delivered to Colton in August 1391 by John Elyngham. (E 403/533, 12 August.)

peace after the expedition ended.[1] The threat of force was not, of course, entirely absent--the successful reduction of Leinster provided an object lesson for any chief thinking of resistance. For the O'Neills, however, the advantages of submission were clearly understood to lie as much in the future protection of the king as in the present staving off of military action. Thus Niall Og protested at the conduct of the English of Louth, and requested safe conduct to come to the king's presence,[2] and Niall Mor, with greater show of diplomatic humility, said that he had always recognized the king's lordship, though forced by lack of justice personally to take redress. He asked therefore for royal protection, that the king might be

> shield and helmet of justice between my lord the earl of Ulster and me in case he be provoked by stern advice to exact more from me than by right he should.(3)

This particular letter was written apparently from the marches of Dundalk--O'Neill apologized for having offended the king by coming there in force--and probably dated from late December or early January. On 8 January Richard wrote from Dublin to England, telling how O'Neill and other rebels were willing to come in, admit their faults and submit to the king's will.[4] Proof that the O'Neills were indeed prepared to come in if necessary by this time is found in Niall Og's proxy of 6 January for his father to submit fully on his behalf.[5] At the same time, uncertainty as to the repercussions of submissions left much of Gaelic Ireland unconvinced of its wisdom, and to some extent the first contacts between Niall Mor and Richard must be seen as tentative approaches from which the Irish would have withdrawn had they seemed disadvantageous.[6]

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 68-9, 86-7, 124-5, 127, 129-136, 143-6.
2 ibid. pp 129-31
3 ibid., pp 131-2, 211-12
4 Anglo-Norman letters, no 143
5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 85-7
6 Below, pp 92-3.

The liege submission of Niall Mor took place on 20 January at and was accompanied by terms settling the state of Ulster--obliging the O'Neills to surrender the bonnacht of all the Irish of the province of Ulster to Mortimer, along with any other service they and their ancestors were bound to render. That O'Neill negotiated with Mortimer on this occasion is shown by the references to a dissension 'arisen between the earl and Niall O'Neill in the presence of the king', concerning the immediate homage and tenure of certain Ulster Irishmen, but Richard postponed any judgement on the issue until 24 June, leaving time for the Irish in question to submit both to him and to Mortimer. The entire agreement was to be invalidated if Niall Og did not come in by 7 March, at Dublin or Drogheda, to make liege homage. It was also decided to postpone till 24 June the question of redress for wrongs done to O'Neill by the English.[1]

This agreement of 20 January appears to have been of a preliminary nature--leaving open the options for further negotiation when the position of the rest of Ulster would be clear. In itself the submission broke no new ground, and bears remarkable resemblance to Stanley's indenture with O'Neill in 1390.[2] It was stipulated on that occasion that the O'Neills were to be the king's liege men, swearing to be true for ever to the king and the Earl of March; they were to yield the bonnacht to the king while the earldom was in his hands, and from then on to Mortimer; furthermore the king, and the earl, were to have for ever, as fully as they ever had, 'the lordships, rents, exactions and answerings of all the Irishmen of Ulster and Uriell', reserving to the O'Neills themselves 'such things as of old custom they have been used to have of them'. The advantage to the O'Neills in the 1390 agreement

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 105-7, 190-2, 144-6, 223-4
2 Cal.Carew MSS, v, 481

was the absence of any sanction by which it might be enforced, and the unspecified nature of the exact rights. The room left for difference on these rights obviously caused the dissension which arose with Mortimer in 1395. It is clear that Niall Mor in January 1395 came prepared to surrender at least as much as he had done to Stanley earlier. Niall Og's proxy shows that, before he himself was fully decided to submit, he authorized his father to do liege homage in his name, to surrender any possessions unlawfully held by him 'especially the bonnacht of the Irish of Ulster', and to do anything necessary to establish peace and make it binding upon him.[1] The difference in 1395 lay principally in the O'Neill motives for the submissions, to which they were not reduced by military superiority but freely chose. Mortimer's own presence in the country and the probability that the issue of his rights would almost certainly mean war led them to see in Richard's arrival a unique opportunity for negotiations to be conducted with a possibility of success for O'Neill.

These motives can be more fully understood through the background to Niall Og's submissions and from letters describing his hopes and fears. The tentative arrangements made with Niall Mor in January by no means settled his son's commitment to submit, though, as the agreement recognized, the personal submission of Niall Og was crucial. That negotiations had been underway with other prominent chiefs of Munster and Connacht, among whom O'Neill by tradition could claim a certain nominal supremacy, indicates that opinion was still divided about the wisdom of going to meet the king, even after Niall Mor himself had gone to Dundalk. A letter of Niall Og's to Archbishop Colton on 26 February referred to the presence of envoys from O'Brien,

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 85-7

O'Connor, MacCarthy and others from the south at a recent meeting of the Ulster chiefs summoned, on Colton's advice, to discuss the question of Niall Og's submission.[1] This evidence of semi-national consultation shows the seriousness with which Gaelic Ireland viewed submissions to the crown, with the southern men apparently anxious that O'Neill should hold aloof--'urging us strongly not to go to the king'. Apparently Richard, despite his assurances to the contrary,[2] could still in late January have faced provincial resistance if not general war. O'Neill stressed the point, perhaps so that Colton, and the king, should understand his difficult position. If he were to suffer by submission, if for instance 'the king should take from us the lordship over our Irishmen, we would be held to scorn by all the Irish and Scots'. A month later, and after he had indeed submitted, Niall wrote in the same vein that 'I cannot trust my people since they see me turning away from them to your Majesty'.[3] O'Neill's reasons for following Colton's advice rather than that of the dissident Irish were based, he claimed, on a belief that the king would not arbitrarily injure his position. This belief indicates that Niall Mor had been favourably impressed by the king's sincerity in the January meeting. Although there were no guarantees that his position would not be adversly affected, the alternative, to resist, was in any case still more dangerous. The certainty of war with Mortimer was in itself a serious prospect, but even more damaging to O'Neill personally would have been the independent submissions of other Irishmen, leaving himself isolated and helpless. The danger was a real one. Not only Magennis--often hostile to O'Neill--offered the king his immediate allegiance, but MacDonnell, O'Neill's own

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 143-4, 222-3
2 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 287
3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 133-4, 213

constable, wrote to Richard on 25 February in terms which by-passed altogether any prior O'Neill claim to his service.[1] O'Neill's position in Ulster, whatever his support in the south, would have been quite untenable if he lost the lordship of the Ulster Irish in this way. Furthermore, a crucial factor was the fate of certain O'Neill hostages taken into the hands of the king in 1391 but now held by Mortimer.[2] One of these, Felimidh, was Niall Og's youngest son, for whom he had particular affection. His letters repeatedly referred to Felimidh's possible removal from Trim to the king's care and the fear that he might die in prison as other hostages had done.[3]

There were signs in the weeks following Niall Og's submission on 16 March that he did receive certain favours. He seems, for a start, to have been knighted by the king, referring to himself in a subsequent letter as de vestra creacione miles.[4] Furthermore O'Neill, writing on 24 March, referred to 'the divers honours and manifold benefits conferred upon me by your Majesty', requesting with some confidence a favour for the abbey at Armagh.[5] Another letter, probably written about the end of March or early April, complained of a toll that was being exacted on horses contrary to the king's command and asked for a proclamation against this.[6] At the same time, Niall Og was clearly not entirely confident about his future position. He assured the king that he would do anything at all required, send his eldest son if necessary, and certainly come himself in full array if summoned. He informed the king that he had threatened Donal O'Connor of Sligo with war if he did not submit.[7] O'Neill's need for concern was very real. Not only were

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 87-8
2 Above, p 88
3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 133-6, 143-4. In July 1393 the king had ordered the delivery of these from his justiciar to Mortimer, and their transfer to Trim presumably followed. (C.C.R. 1392-6 p 157)
4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 134-6; above p 48
5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 133-4, 213
6 ibid., pp 132-3; this toll at Dundalk suggests that there was some control over Irish entry into the area.
7 ibid., pp 133-4

the hostages still in Mortimer's care--thereby intimating royal support of the earl--but the king had not as yet reached any firm decision about the complicated question of rights and duties in Ulster. The nature of O'Neill's dilemma was made clear as the rumour spread that the king was about to leave the country with the Ulster question still unsettled. There is a note of desperation in Niall Og's letter, where he spoke of the rumour that Mortimer would then attack him and ruthlessly destroy him if unopposed:

> ...on the one hand, if I do not resist in obedience to your Majesty, he will make war on me a outrance, and all my supporters will proclaim me dastard; on the other hand, if I resist him my rivals will say that I have become rebel and traitor to your Majesty....

He therefore requested a decision, preferably in the presence of the earl as well as himself, before the king sailed. The dominant note in the letter is, significantly, his belief that the king had power to settle the dispute between himself and his overlord. He asked that Richard ordain 'what I ought to do regarding my lord the earl and what according to your pleasure he should be content with, and I will gladly do your will', and specifically requested the release of Felimidh and that he should be told the earl's reply concerning MacDonnell's bonnacht.[1] Another O'Neill letter of April, possibly from Niall Mor, similarly requested a personal interview before the king should depart. It spoke of enemies who would greatly rejoice at Mortimer's anticipated attack and warned the king not to believe anyone'who would sow distrust between your Majesty and me'.[2]

It is difficult to know precisely what Richard's intentions were with respect to Ulster. Quite apart from his early letters to O'Neill,

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 134-6, 214-6
2 ibid., pp 124-5, 205-6.

his statement of policy on 1 February, made just after his meeting with Niall Mor, shows that in principle he recognized some of the difficulties of the Irish position which had prompted their rebellion.[1] His readiness to come to terms with the Irish is therefore understandable. The primary concern in Ulster was undoubtedly the maintenance of peace and his tardiness in coming to a settlement between Mortimer and O'Neill claims suggests that no settlement was likely. The dilemma was indeed considerable if Mortimer was going to insist on any full restoration of the earldom's former rights, for the O'Neills' late fourteenth century supremacy rested on their successful erosion and usurpation of these very rights. It is possible that, in recognition of this and remembering the differences between Niall Mor and Mortimer in his presence, he deliberately kept Mortimer out of the way in March--the earl's absence is at least strongly implied from the fact that he witnessed none of the Ulster submissions in March, nor any other document surviving from this visit to Drogheda.[2] At the same time, Richard, by requiring that the Ulster Irish do fealty to Mortimer as their immediate lord when doing homage to himself, recognized Mortimer's position as mesne lord.[3] He appears to have seen the problem as being essentially an internal one of the Ulster earldom which he would however attend to 'if it touches us in any(thing)'. This viewpoint was expressed in a letter of November 1395 which shows a position virtually unchanged since January at Drogheda--with the crown still insisting that O'Neill pay the _bonnacht_ to the earl and that the services of Ulster be divided between O'Neill and Mortimer.[4]

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1 Above, p 40 ff

2 e.g. Curtis, Richard II pp 59-60, 69-70, 72,98, 102-3; see also grants in Chartae, Privilegia et Immunitates, p 92, witnessed by the most important people on the expedition.

3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 144-6

4 B.M. Cotton MS Titus B XI, items 7, 20 and below, App.VIII pp 567-70, and 330.

It is possible that Richard initially was unwilling to make any decision about the services of the Ulster Irish until all the Irish chiefs had submitted. Although Niall Mor claimed in January to become a liegeman both for himself, his sons, his nation and his subjects,[1] no list of his uirrighs was given, and the controversial nature of the lordship of these Irishmen must have necessitated some formal procedure, perhaps on the lines of the O'Brien submissions at Quin.[2] When Richard left the country he saw the problem as merely postponed--not settled or forgotten. He subsequently tried to bring O'Neill to him at Westminster,[3] and though he did not apparently see O'Neill as the latter requested before he left Ireland it is likely that he wrote or sent an envoy reaffirming his commitment to settle the dispute fairly. While there is no proof that he actually imposed controls on Mortimer to prevent him breaking the peace prematurely, some such precaution seems indicated from the earl's lack of activity in Ulster in the following months and the evidence that the province was still at peace, still awaiting Richard's decision, at the end of 1395.[4]

Richard's relations with other Ulster chiefs clarify some problems of the province's political life. Reference has already been made to the letters of MacDonnell and Magennis. That of Shane MacDonnell, written from Armagh on 25 February, described how his relative, the Lord of the Isles, who was the king's liegeman,[5] expelled him from there and that he was for this reason living in Ireland 'and up to this have

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 105-7

2 Below, p 107; See also the Leinster ones where it is made clear which men MacMurrough had within his lordship; above p 77.

3 B.M. Cotton MS Titus B XI, items 7 and 20

4 ibid., and see below, pp 329-30.

5 The then lord of the Isles did in fact hold certain lands by feudal service of the earldom of Ulster; in July 1402 John of the Isles indentured with Henry IV to do service as liege man for these lands, as long as the earldom was in the king's hands. (Mem. roll, H.IV, P.R.O.I., Fergusson's Repertory, p 54)

been sojourning with...O'Neill in dire hardship'. He would, he claimed, have come to the king had he been in the country when he arrived, but offered now to make amends by coming 'to be your liegeman, captain and constable throughout all your land of Ireland with as many armed men as you wish me to have with your royal Majesty'. This he would do 'whether O'Neill comes to your presence or not'.[1] Like O'Neill, MacDonnell seems to have been given the impression by Archbishop Colton, who was to act as intermediary in any communications, that Richard would receive him graciously. The curious offer to establish a troop of royal gallowglasses suggests that word of the Leinster men's recruitment had spread north, but the real interest of the letter lies in the division it implies between MacDonnell and O'Neill. Their relationship centred on the question of the bonnacht--a word of various meanings including 'a right or obligation of military service, a free quartering of soldiers, military aid, a subsidy, or military service.'[2] In the early fourteenth century the earls of Ulster had 'a constable of the Bonnaught',[3] and quite apart from being bound to give service themselves to the earl the Irish also had mercenaries of the earl billetted on them.[4] After the death of the Brown Earl in 1333 it was impossible to maintain the system, but the ascendancy of the O'Neills in the later fourteenth century was in part based, as the submissions show, on their usurpation of the custom. Precisely how the bonnacht functioned at this point is not known. Magennis's promise to solvendo et satisfaciendo Bonathagium et cetera omnia servicia et dominia suggests that it might have had the form of tax in this case,[5] but it is at least certain from

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 87-8
2 An Irish-English Dictionary, (ed) P.S.Dineen
3 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland p 216
4 G.H.Orpen, 'Medieval earldom of Ulster', J.R.S.A.I., xlv (1915) pp 141-2; C.C.R. 1343-5 p 239
5 Curtis, Richard II, p 89

references to 'MacDonald's bonaght' that the disposition of MacDonnell's gallowglasses was the main issue,[1] and it seems probable that O'Neill hoped to retain the right to billet these troops on the lands of his sub-chiefs. MacDonnell's willingness to submit independently of O'Neill and to leave O'Neill's service reveals a grave weakness in O'Neill's position, and helps to explain the O'Neill concern to find royal favour. MacDonnell ultimately submitted on 16 March--the same day as O'Neill. Although nothing in his submission recognized any bond with O'Neill, he did subsequently remain within the O'Neill lordship.[2]

In the case of Magennis, an assertion of independence of O'Neill was not unexpected, for they were often in hostilities.[3] Magennis admitted in his letters to fear of O'Neill, Edmund Savage, MacQuillan and O'Hanlon, and stressed that it was in the interests of the earl of Ulster that he, Magennis, should hold Iveagh, for without it he would be seriously weakened--the implication being not simply that such an action was unjust but that it would expose the earldom to danger.[4] At the same time, Magennis expressed concern that he should not meet the fate of his brother and son who were taken by Edmund Mortimer when they came to submit in 1381, his brother Art subsequently dying in prison of the plague,[5] and requested that the present earl, whom he was willing to recognize as his immediate overlord, be present when he would do homage to the king. This would ensure Mortimer's acceptance of any royal decision concerning Magennis. Magennis meanwhile showed himself prepared to pay the bonnacht 'and all the other services and duties

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1 Curtis, Richard II, p 136
2 ibid., pp 57-9
3 e.g. A.F.M., 1380, 1400 etc
4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 88-90
5 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 314; A.Clon., 1383

anciently due', promising to obey his lord the earl 'as is fitting'. His submission ultimately took place on 16 March, on the same day as O'Neill's and MacDonnell's.[1] Magennis's letter of 9 March had shown great reluctance to leave his own lands exposed to the family and allies of O'Neill,[2] and it was possibly deliberately arranged that several of these Ulster Irishmen came at the same time to the king, confident in the knowledge that rivals and neighbours were similarly occupied.

None of the Ulster submissions actually specified O'Neill's position as overlord, for the oaths of liege homage here as elsewhere referred exclusively to the individual's relationship with the king. On 16 March too Niall and Cu Uladh O'Hanlon made oaths of liege homage.[3] The O'Hanlons were within the O'Neill lordship.[4] Niall, who was brought to peace in October 1391,[5] was apparently the chief and Cu Uladh may well have been his tanaiste. Already on 10 March Shane MacMahon of Oriel had submitted,[6] and the Ulster settlement concluded on 19 March with the oaths of Cu Uladh Magennis, Philip and Aedh MacMahon, Adam MacGilmore and MacCabe, the last mentioned being a gallowglass captain who sometimes served the MacMahons and was presumably brought in by them.[7] Of the three MacMahons who submitted it appears that Philip, who died in 1402, was the chief,[8] though Aedh and Shane, his brothers, were possibly men of some importance too.[9] Cu Uladh

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1 Curtis, Richard II, p 70
2 ibid., pp 140-1
3 ibid., pp 70-1; p 60
4 e.g. E 101/247/1/4 shows that the O'Neills gave O'Hanlon hostages to the government in 1390.
5 C.C.H. p 148 no 55
6 Curtis, Richard II, p 102
7 ibid., pp 97-8
8 A.F.M., 1402
9 See,e.g., K.Simms. 'Gaelic Lordships in Ulster in the later Middle Ages', p 343.

Magennis was described in 1396 when he died as 'heir to the lordship', and presumably was tanaiste to Maurice Magennis in 1395.[1] Adam MacGilmore, submitting at the same time, was probably the successor of Cu Uladh MacGilmore, who died in 1391.[2]

One final note on the successful submission of Ulster is provided from a letter from O'Cahan to the Archbishop of Armagh, written apparently after Niall Mor made peace in January. O'Cahan said that as one of O'Neill's 'men' he was bound by the same peace--proving that not all the subchiefs who accepted the benefits of submission did homage in person to the king.[3] The letter also demonstrates O'Cahan's faith in Colton, who was requested to obtain redress in the king's court for losses suffered by O'Cahan, and to endeavour to have him confirmed by the king in possession of his lordship in Derry, for whatever rents were customary. This letter, like that of Magennis, probably represents a general optimism among the Ulster Irish that recognition of Richard could be turned to their own practical advantage. It certainly makes clear the Irish distinction between lordship of land and lordship of men, O'Cahan desiring to hold his land for rent from the king while admitting himself to be in the immediate political lordship of O'Neill.

While Mortimer may not have actively campaigned in or negotiated with Gaelic Ulster, he was apparently allowed a free rein in procuring submissions as lord of Trim, and it is possible that he had a hand also in some of the Ulster submissions east of the Bann, such as that of MacGilmore. As lord of Trim he accepted the submission of O'Farrel

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1 A.F.M., 1396
2 A.U., 1391
3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 142-3

who 'returned home with honour on that occasion'.[1] This may have happened as early as December. Certainly he received the submission of John O'Reilly on 12 December at Kells, making an indenture with him which apparently included an oath to the effect that the latter was, with his people and heirs, the liege subject of the king and his heirs.[2] Submissions made to Mortimer were probably not limited to these two which happen to have survived. In fact it seems reasonable to assume that the oaths of liege homage done by various men of an area comprising Louth, Meath and Westmeath to Richard in March were partly the result of Mortimer's activity during the winter. Most of these submissions took place on 14 March when the king was at Drogheda awaiting the Ulster men. On that day he received the liege homage of Connor O'Melaghlin, Murgh Ban O'Farrel, Ross O'Farrel, Thomas O'Farrel, Gilla Isa and Maolmordh O'Reilly, Melaghlin and Muircherch Mageoghegan, Shinnagh, MacTaidhg, Magawley and Niall O'Molloy.[3] These were not all of course chiefs of nations and the identity of the men in question helps to show how comprehensive a settlement Richard sought where possible. Connor O'Melaghlin was possibly already chief, though described when he died as de iure king of Meath.[4] The O'Farrels are more confused. John O'Farrel, the chief who apparently submitted to Mortimer, is not mentioned here, but the Thomas in question was probably his first cousin who had in 1392 and subsequently in 1398 contested the kingship.[5] Murrough Ban O'Farrel was, however, of a different branch

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1 Miscellaneous Irish Annals, p 153

2 'A statute of the fortieth year of Edward III', (ed. and trans. by J.Hardiman) in Tracts Relating to Ireland, p 88 n b, from Irish Patent Rolls, 3 H.IV.

3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 97-8, 102-3, 117-8, and notes pp 227-43 passim.

4 A.L.C., 1401; the form suggests his title was in dispute.

5 Misc. Irish Annals, p 145; A.L.C., 1398

of the family, head of the Clann Sheain, and it is possible that Ross also belonged to that group.[1] The O'Reilly family too had two branches by this time, and the Maolmuire and Gilla Isa who submitted to Richard were apparently of the Clann Mahon, though in fact Maolmuire ultimately did become lord of Breffny in 1402.[2] The Mageoghans mentioned here are similarly obscure. Possibly they represent Melaghlin Mor, who was deprived of the chieftainship in 1409,[3] and Murtough Og, who was raiding in the 1390s and died in 1401.[4] Donnchad Shionnach was chief of his family at this time, and Awley son of Awley, headed the Magawleys.[5] MacTaidhg, whose area is difficult to identify, was apparently a neighbour of Magawley's.[6] Niall O'Molloy may have been tanaiste for Hugh, who he seems to have succeeded in 1400.[7] The absence of Hugh O'Molloy's recorded submission is not necessarily significant, for neither do notarial deeds survive showing the submission of John O'Reilly and John O'Farrel.[8] The official record is undoubtedly incomplete.

Mortimer made no appearance in these submissions and it is possible that continuing activity in Meath and Westmeath explains his absence from Drogheda at this crucial point. Certainly Cormac O'Melaghlin did not submit until 16 April at Kilkenny.[9] Although this may have had no significance, there was a possible connection with the number of north Munster submissions about that time. Cormac, who was to become chief in 1401,[10] submitted together with Dermot O'Connor Faly, with whom he

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1 A.F.M., 1398; there may have been a connection between this Ross and Rossa O'Farrel of the Clann Sheain who contested the lordship of Annaly in 1445. (A.F.M.)
2 Misc. Irish Annals, pp 155, 169; A.F.M., 1402, 1403
3 A.L.C., 1409
4 A.F.M., 1398; A.L.C., 1401
5 Misc. Irish Annals, pp 151, 145, 169
6 Curtis, Richard II, pp 230-1
7 A.F.M., 1400, 1425
8 Above, p 102, notes 1 and 2
9 Curtis, Richard II, pp 103-4
10 A.L.C., 1401; Misc. Irish Annals, p 165

had been associated in raids on Westmeath in 1393.[1] The repetition of Niall O'Molloy's submission on 25 April provides a further hint that, even after 14 March, there may have been trouble in Westmeath linked with disturbances in Leinster, Munster and Connacht which required Mortimer's absence from Drogheda.[2]

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In Munster the chronology of events is still more difficult to establish, for the letters of the Irish chiefs--our main evidence on the background of the submissions--were often undated and of such doubtful sincerity that the real circumstances are frequently obscure. Such for instance was Brian O'Brien's first letter, recorded on 4 February.[3] In apologizing for not writing sooner O'Brien intimated that enquiry had been made into his failure to make some approach to the king when he arrived. He now protested his loyalty, offering full compensation for any misdeeds and promising to bind himself and all his subjects to fulfil any obligations the king requires. Swearing that he had acquired nothing by conquest and held only what the king's predecessors granted him, he offered justice 'by our common and ancient usages practised to this day amongst us' to any Irish or English making complaint against him. Though submissive, the letter was not abjectly humble. O'Brien had clearly no thought of surrendering all his rights, such as the freedom to use the royal arms and standards, 'and other liberties as in the future shall be more fully declared'.[4] This letter must

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1 Misc. Irish Annals, p 149

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 111-3; this was one of the few submissions to be witnessed by Mortimer.

3 ibid., pp 74-5, 163-4

4 ibid. The notary pointed out that the letter was sealed with red wax containing three leopards. Froissart's story that Richard, to please the Irish, assumed the arms of Edward the Confessor instead of the leopards and lilies of England may be connected with this O'Brien claim. (Oeuvres de Froissart, xv, 179-81) Richard in fact impaled the two arms, though possibly not until 1397. (M.Clarke, 'The Wilton Diptych', Fourteenth Century Studies, pp 274-5)

have been partly what prompted Richard to write in late January that

> those who call themselves kings and captains of M(unster) ...by their own free will wish to come in all haste to obey us and to make their homage and fealty in as humble and obedient manner as they can devise.(1)

However, it must have been after this that representatives were sent from O'Brien and MacCarthy to O'Neill's council in Ulster,[2] and the implication that they would support him in not submitting detracts from O'Brien's earlier promise of loyalty.

From early in February comes the first evidence that attention was turning towards the serious reduction of Munster. On 12 February, when Richard granted powers to Nottingham to receive in his name the homage of the Leinster Irish, like powers were given to him in respect of Brian O'Brien of Thomond.[3] In both these tasks he was to be aided by the earls of Ormond and Desmond. The chance survival of this O'Brien document not only proves that the instruments of submission brought to London were by no means complete, but also suggests that similar arrangements were made with Rutland to bring in the Irish of Desmond, a task upon which he was engaged in March.[4] Rutland was active before this in negotiations with the Irish of the south-west, receiving the submission of Donough Morghetson in Wexford on 15 January.[5] He was by this stage already being addressed as Earl of Cork, a title which probably carried with it lands and responsibilities in procuring submissions from the area around Cork. It was possibly not coincidence that Rutland was back in Dublin on 2 February,[6] presumably to consult with the king, and that MacCarthy, whose submission Rutland was commissioned to procure, wrote to the king on 13 February.[7] This letter of Taig

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1 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', pp 287, 294
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 143-4; above pp 92-3
3 Above, p 83; Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', pp 231-2
4 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', pp 287-8; below, pp 108-9.
5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 146-7; this man is difficult to identify, but may be, as Curtis suggests, either a MacMurrough or O'Morchoe--definitely within the lordship of MacMurrough. (ibid., p 232)
6 ibid., pp 115-6
7 ibid., pp 67-8, 158-9

MacCarthy--described as princeps Hibernicorum Dessemonie--expressed concern that the king be convinced of his loyalty and implies that MacCarthy was summoned to Richard's presence. Like O'Brien he protested his good behaviour to the king since the conquest, swearing that

> never did I at the incitement of other Irishmen of your land rise against you or yours contrary to my allegiance (ligeanciam).

He recognized that his only possessions were lands obtained from the king or 'my lord the earl of Desmond', and pleaded ignorance 'of the matter moved against me by the Earl of Ormond on the part of your Majesty'. As he was currently engaged in a parley with a kinsman 'in the parts of county Cork' he could not safely leave his country, but promised that he would come to the king and do anything he wanted as sooh as the king reached Munster. Again, one must remember that at the time of writing this MacCarthy had recently sent envoys to the meeting of the Ulster chiefs.[1]

Within the next few weeks rapid progress must have been made, for on 1 March Brian O'Brien came to Dublin and did liege homage to the king.[2] He may on this occasion have been knighted by the king.[3] This followed two more O'Brien letters, both of uncertain date. One stressed the history of O'Brien loyalty to the crown, most recently shown in the submission to Lionel of Clarence, whom O'Brien thought to have been the brother of Richard. He offered to give pledges to answer in law any opponents who 'betray' (tradere) O'Brien to the king.[4] The second letter reveals that O'Brien met Ormond in Limerick city and journeyed to Dublin with him, Ormond being with Rutland and Nottingham among the witnesses to O'Brien's submission to the king.[5] There was no hint of

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1 Above, pp 92-3, 105
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 93-4
3 E 159/175 Mich. br. dir. baron., m 31; above p 48
4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 136, 216
5 ibid. pp 137, 93-4

any campaigning behind these events, though the Ormond escort suggests that O'Brien might not voluntarily have made the journey. That his submission was considered in the light of only a first move in Thomond's reduction which as yet had little practical reality is indicated from Richard's own words when, writing later in the month to England, he explained that he was going to Munster from which he had not yet received any obeissance.[1] The problem cannot have been urgent, for Richard left Dublin shortly after O'Brien's submission to go north and receive the allegiance of Ulster, taking with him Nottingham whom he had empowered to receive submissions in Munster.[2] Nottingham cannot, therefore, have had much campaigning to do before receiving at Quin, probably on 24 March,[3] confirmation of O'Brien's submission and the personal allegiance of his uirrighs--Sioda MacNamara and his son Maccon Mor, Taig MacMahon and his son Taig Og, Cu-abha MacGorman and his son Melachlin, Rory O'Dea, Connor O'Connor, and Rory O'Loghlin.[4] Even this was not felt to be sufficiently complete. On 29 April Brian's son Dermot O'Brien submitted along with a certain Bernard O'Brien son of Taig,[5] the Earl of Ormond acting as their interpreter. On the same occasion it was stated by the Bishops of

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1 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters ', pp 287-8

2 Nottingham witnessed various documents at Drogheda. e.g. Curtis, Richard II, pp 59-60, 69-71 etc

3 Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', p 231 gives the date as 4 March. A.Gwynn, 'Richard II and the chieftains of Thomond', points out that this is unlikely if O'Brien was in Dublin on 1 March, but as the original of the transcript examined by Ronan is no longer extant it is impossible to be sure. Gwynn suggests 14 March, but Nottingham's presence with the king in Drogheda (above n 2) rules this out, and the next most logical suggestion is 24 March.

4 Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', and Gwynn, 'Richard II and the chieftains of Thomond', passim; the names all come from the Clare area, Connor being of the Corcomroe branch of the O'Connors and the MacMahons holding the Corca Vaskin area.(See map above, p 87)

5 It is unlikely that this was Brian son of Mahon chief of Thomond as Curtis suggests, for Brian O'Brien of Thomond agreed to pay 20,000 marks if he broke faith, not £1,000 as this Brian did.(Curtis, Richard II, p 233)

Kilfenora and Kilmacduagh that Brian O'Brien himself had power to do homage for Laurence MacNamara, Taig MacMahon, Cornelius O'Connor, Iriel O'Lochlin, Cornelius O'Dea, Odo O'Hehir, and Donal O'Hehir--a list complementing that recorded at Quin.[1] Together these lists apparently include all the Irish within O'Brien's lordship. The Quin document states that each of the men was chief of his nation. We know very little of these men, but Cu-abha was later described as 'a man of trust to O'Brien',[2] and it seems certain that their submission followed naturally from that of Brian O'Brien himself. Possibly the further list, approved by the bishops, was drawn up partly in order to bind the successors to these chiefs, though of course the O'Hehirs had not yet been specifically included in any submission. It is also possible that the different names conceal internal disputes--certainly in the case of the O'Lochlins Rory had yielded place by 1396 to Iriel who was himself later slain in a family conflict.[3] Whatever the precise background of these documents, it is certain that they demonstrate royal determination to pursue and strengthen the bonds of allegiance throughout the levels of lordship.

It is possible that some degree of hostility lay behind this anxiety to bind the O'Briens and their associates by personal oaths, though the only recorded instance was the destructive raid upon the Limerick area in 1395 by Turlough son of Murrough na Raithnighe O'Brien who 'waged war with the people of the king (of England) in Munster and Leinster'.[4] There was defeat of at least this individual behind his submission on 25 April to Richard.[5] There is less doubt about the resistance shown on the part of the MacCarthy clan. Rutland--in Dublin on 1 March[6]--wrote

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 90-3; Gwynn, 'Richard II and the chieftains of Thomond', p 5, has corrected Curtis's date from 20 to 29 April.
2 A.L.C., 1412
3 A.F.M., 1396
4 A.F.M., 1395
5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 111-3
6 ibid., pp 93-4

to Richard from Kilcullen on his way to Cork on 5 March, informing him that the Lord of Muskerry was prepared to come in. Rutland had been sent word from William Heroun, announcing that this 'Cormoke Dirmot Maccarthi has come and submitted himself and sworn on the Holy Gospels to be for all his days your loyal liege without deceit, variance or falsehood all his life...'.[1] Further hostilities may have occurred after Rutland reached Cork, but this was possibly the letter Richard was referring to when he wrote that Rutland had won a great victory, capturing and killing many enemies including an important MacCarthy chief. MacCarthy Mor as a result submitted a noz paix et obeissance before Rutland himself.[2] Following this, on 6 April at Kilkenny, Taig MacCarthy Mor of Desmond, Donal MacCarthy Reagh of Carbry, Cormac son of Donal and Cormac son of Dermot MacCarthy, lord of Muskerry, all did liege homage, the measure of the trouble they had caused evident in the 20,000 marks each of the men guaranteed to pay to the Papal Camera for any breach of the agreement.[3]

There is some circumstantial evidence to the effect that the hostilities of the MacCarthys and of Turlough O'Brien were not isolated incidents but part of a wider resistance. Submitting with Turlough were Thomas O'Dwyer and Philip Don O'Kennedy.[4] Bearing in mind the geographic proximity of Turlough to O'Dwyer and O'Kennedy of Ormond, their submission with him probably indicates complicity in his campaign. If this were the case, it must have been related to the position of the Earl of Ormond in whose sphere of influence the lands of these men lay. The Butler lordship had suffered considerable losses from the O'Kennedys in particular during the fourteenth century, to the extent that Gowran, a new castle, replaced Nenagh as the lordship's chief

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 123-4, 204-5, 229
2 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 288
3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 108, 115
4 ibid., pp 111-3

fortress.[1] It is certainly strange that Ormond seems to have played no part in procuring the submissions of, in particular, the O'Kennedys--and that though present at the ceremony of homage of Aedh and Thomas O'Kennedy on 29 April he did not even act as their interpreter.[2] Whatever may be the case of O'Kennedy and O'Dwyer, the connection of O'Brien and MacCarthy hostilities lies in the probability that Ormond and his lands were the target in both--MacCarthy having made plain by his letter that Ormond was his enemy with the king.[3]

Other Munster hostilities to the north of his earldom may have also involved Ormond--such as the resistance of Taig O'Carrol of Ely. A raiding party of Nottingham's was overtaken in this area and defeated, many of the English being killed and the horses taken.[4] Taig himself apparently made no move to submit until he wrote to Richard on 17 April.[5] By these last weeks of April all resistance in Munster seems to have collapsed, and Richard's letter referring to Munster points to some hard campaigning behind this. He stated that Nottingham, who was at Quin probably on 24 March,

> has been of late in the lands of G. son of O., who is held to be one of the great captains of those parts, and has taken his castle and burned and destroyed his lands and country far and wide. (6)

The identity of the captain in question is obscure, but the wording and our knowledge of Nottingham's presence in Thomond in late March suggests

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1 1 C.A.Empey, 'The Butler Lordship', (T.C.D., unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1970) treats of the effects on the lordship of the Gaelic resurgence in ch. v passim, especially, for the O'Dwyers, O'Brien of Arran, O'Kennedy, and O'Carrol, pp 156-8, 160-4, 165-71, 173-8. Relations with the Leinster and Connacht Irish are also dealt with; ibid. pp 195-200, 203, 205-12,226-9.

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 90-3; on the same day he acted for William de Burgo, Turloch O'Connor Don, Brian and Dermot O'Brien.

3 ibid. pp 67-8; above, p 106

4 A.F.M., 1395

5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 95-7

6 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', pp 288, 295

a Munster man.[1] Though Taig may not have been the target of this campaign, he had certainly lost all ability to resist by the time he wrote to Richard. His letter was recorded with the note that it had been sent 'for the sake of obtaining pardon'. Its tone made plain, without ever admitting rebellion, that the writer required mercy but feared vengeance. O'Carrol in very abject terms protests his and his predecessors' obedience to the king and his intention as 'your special subject' to follow the royal standard against the king's enemies. He reminded the king of the hostages he and his predecessors had given in the past which meant, he claimed, that by the law of lordship, 'I am your immediate servant and special subject absolutely exempt from the lordship of other Irishmen'. He pleaded not to be obliged to appear in person before Richard, 'in the midst of my enemies'--not for any disrespect of the king but for fear of his powerful enemies.[2] Despite this, O'Carrol did in fact submit four days later before Richard at Kilkenny, giving a particularly clear example of an Irish chieftain complying reluctantly with Richard's demands.[3] The letter itself creates some problems of interpretation. O'Carrol's enemies were obviously men he assumed would have influence with the king, and though he referred explicitly to his freedom from the overlordship of any Irishmen one cannot help feeling that the menace he feared was not purely Gaelic. Although Ormond, who possessed some authority over his area, was his brother-in law,[4] Taig was not always amenable to his influence. The earl's father as justiciar in 1379 had had to face an alliance of Taig, Murgh O'Brien and MacMurrough, and in the following years repeated

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1 Curtis suggests Gerald O'Byrne, but even if the initials could be relied upon there is no evidence that it was him rather than Geoffrey O'Brennan, Gill Isa O'Reilly, or anyone else. In any case, the context suggests a Munster man.

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 95-7, 183-4

3 ibid., pp 94-5

4 Curtis, Medieval Ireland, p 258.

references are found to the problem of the O'Carrols, often acting against Ormond or his people in the company of O'Brien, O'Dwyer and others.[1] The conclusion of Taig's letter--'I admit you then to be my immediate lord and no other'--left no room for Ormond as a mesne lord, and it would seem certain that, at the very least, this would have created problems if he had met Richard and Ormond together. If this interpretation is correct we have the probable explanation for the late submission--on 16 April--of another Ormond chieftain, Taig O'Meagher, whose territory in the modern barony of Ikerrin lay adjacent to that of O'Carrol in Ely.[2]

The progress of submission in Munster would seem, by comparison to Ulster, to have encountered many troubles. Ormond appears to have made ambitious use of his position as an agent of the king's policy to revive old family claims in some areas at least, and the probability is that his general aggression made more difficult the task of Nottingham, Rutland and others, by sowing fear and suspicion among the Gaelic occupants of these lands. It can hardly be coincidence that so many of the chiefs in each province who delayed submitting were positioned around the outskirts of the Butler lordship. O'Dempsey lay close to O'Carrol, and O'Molloy of Meath was situated not far to the north. His association in action with O'Carrol and others of the south is the most likely explanation for his submission on 25 April, in the company of Turloch O'Brien, O'Dwyer, and Philip O'Kennedy.[3] Cormac O'Malaghlin, whose submission on 1 April has already been mentioned, was another close neighbour, and to O'Molloy's north-west lay O'Kelly of Hy Many, whose specific complaints about Ormond and friendly references to John of Desmond prove that the problems of Munster were not contained within that province but had far-reaching repercussions.

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1 e.g. C.O.D., ii, nos 237, 356; above, p 67.
2 Curtis, Richard II, p 65
3 ibid., pp 111-3

In Connacht the submission policy was least effectively followed--a result it appears of difficult circumstances rather than any deliberate restraint or lack of interest on Richard's part. That Connacht was by this time virtually beyond the control of the Dublin government had been demonstrated in the 1388-9 Galway revolt. On that occasion the marchants of Galway defied the royal officials, in charge of the city during the minority of its lord, Roger Mortimer, and offered the keys to William de Burgh, the Clanrickard Burke, rendering him allegiance. The sheriff, Walter Bermingham of Athenry, would not give a safe conduct in 1391 to the justices coming to investigate this treason, and £10 had to be paid instead to O'Kelly of Hy Many.[1] So bad was the situation that in 1393 the Bishop of Annaghdown was licensed to retain 200 archers in England for employment in Ireland until he achieved possession of his see and its revenues.[2] It was thus from the start unlikely that Connacht could be effectively recovered to the king's obedience, but it was perhaps for that very reason all the more necessary that formal submissions should be taken and the position of the chief lords, both Anglo-Irish and Gaelic, regularized.

The first information concerning Connacht came in a letter of 11 March from Archbishop O'Kelly of Tuam, reporting on his progress in the province since he saw Richard at Christmas in Dublin.[3] The tone of the letter suggests chronic unrest in Connacht rather than any organized resistance to the king. He asked that the king receive favourably 'for the profit of your realm' such men as he had persuaded to write offering their allegiance; these could then presumably aid the archbishop who

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1 Curtis, 'The pardon of Henry Blake of Galway', Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society, xvi, (1935) p 187

2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 301

3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 127-8, 208-9

since his arrival in the province had had no peace from the king's enemies there, his own church and possessions being destroyed and his diocese generally attacked. By resistance the archbishop had managed to take some manors, but the situation remained very critical and he asked for aid and to be excused from any forthcoming meeting of parliament. On the same day his kinsman Malachy O'Kelly of Hy Many wrote protesting his own and his ancestor's continued loyalty to the kings of England and the hope that he would receive compensation for injuries done to him by the king's English and Irish enemies. He explained that he would have come sooner to meet the king, only that his enemies and rivals warring against both himself and Thomas de Burgh, 'your faithful liege', made it impossible for him to leave his country. He could not come in until the king provided some remedy. He mentioned in particular his fear of Ormond, who was attempting to take 'on account of your power' lands held by his ancestors a century earlier but which were since occupied by the O'Connors and other enemies of Connacht and held in peace by the O'Kellys for the past eighty years. When he knew that the king would give him remedy for these troubles O'Kelly would be ready to make war for the king against all enemies, and to this end he asked for the security of letters patent from the king and the earl.[1] A later letter repeated much of the content of this, with slight variations, O'Kelly here expressing the hope that he would soon receive compensation for all losses suffered in the king's service. He named John of Desmond as his fully informed envoy to the king, '...now that the time of joy and gladness approaches, namely the power of your Majesty...'. The king was to hear Desmond and let him know his reply to O'Kelly, especially concerning Ormond's intention to assert his rights over O'Kelly's possessions.[2]

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 109-11, 194
2 ibid. pp 122-3, 203-4

These letters offer us valuable information on the general situation of Connacht, and the king's policy there. The king had not apparently by early March sent any force to the province capable of compelling submissions in his name, but instead confined himself to diplomatic overtures. O'Kelly's second letter suggests, however, that Richard was himself reported to be approaching Connacht, presumably after dealing with the chiefs of Munster from his head quarters at Kilkenny, and this rumour must have speeded the rate of Connacht's submission. The greatest value of the correspondence lies however in the light it throws on relationships among the men of Connacht. The usual picture of the province at this time sees it, most simply, as politically divided between the two O'Connors and the two MacWilliam Burkes, with other subsidiary chiefs allying round these groups. O'Connor Don, the more powerful O'Connor, was usually in alliance with William, the Clanrickard Burke, while O'Connor Ruadh, his rival, acted together with Thomas MacWilliam Burke of Mayo. O'Kelly, who with Clanrickard and others had made O'Connor Don chief in 1384,[1] was one of O'Connor Don's uirrighs. The letters reveal a more complex picture. O'Kelly's enemies of 11 March, who prevented him coming to the king, seem to have been centred round O'Connor Don himself. Certainly, by contrasting the occupation of Ormond's lands by O'Connor--described as emulos--with his own peaceful and officially recognized possession of it, O'Kelly apparently disclaimed any dependence on O'Connor. His friendly reference to Thomas de Burgh implied that current pressures were shifting alliances in the province in a profound way. Furthermore, he showed suspicion of the current Earl of Ormond, while obviously trusting John

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1 A.L.C., 1384; for information on the O'Connors see Curtis, Richard II, pp 234-5; the general pattern of alliances is illustrated in A.F.M., 1384-6, passim.

of Desmond--son of the earl and ambitious rival of Butler claims[1]--to plead his case before the king. The significance of this is made still greater when one sees O'Connor Don promising on 3 April to come to Richard in the company of the Earl of Ormond, 'though it is against the wishes of some Irishmen of my lordship'.[2]

Further information from the O'Connor side amplifies the picture. An O'Connor, it will be remembered, was one of those Irishmen represented at the Ulster meeting concerning Niall Og's submission, and though we do not know which one it is probable that the dominant Turlough O'Connor Don was the chief in question. There is no evidence until April concerning any projected submission of O'Connor, but references to both Ormond and John of Desmond in the province suggest that by early April at least the Earls of Desmond and Ormond had received similar instructions here as in Thomond and Leinster--namely to aid a general submission policy. There is, however, no suggestion that Nottingham or any other English lord was actively involved. One may at least be certain that the Archbishop of Tuam was not left quite unaided in his task, as he indicated he had been until 11 March.

A primary difficulty in using the evidence on the O'Connors is that the particular branch of the family was not always specified. There is no doubt, however, about the letter of 3 April. Signed 'Turloch O'Connor Mor, lord of the Irish of Connacht', and dated from O'Connor Don's castle of Roscommon, it described O'Connor Don's rivalry with O'Connor Roe. He told Richard that he, the king's true subditus, was as the heir of his predecessor, the lawful lord of most of the Irish of Connacht. He still possessed much of the lands and lordships

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1 See below, pp 325-7.
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 113-4, 196-7

granted to the O'Connors by the kings of England, despite the rivalry of Turloch Ruadh, who aspired to be called 'O'Connor'.To him O'Connor said he had allowed possession of a certain area near his lordship, but he asked the king not to credit any message from O'Connor Ruadh until he himself should come in the company of Ormond.[1] Reading between the lines it is obvious that O'Connor Don was more worried than he admitted about his rival. He was concerned to emphasize throughout his position as 'true and lawful heir', calling O'Connor Ruadh 'bastard and son of a bastard'--as if he feared that Richard would and could prefer the senior claim of O'Connor Ruadh to his own practical supremacy.[2] O'Connor Don certainly exaggerated the difference in power between himself and his kinsman, calling him 'a man of little power' whose position depended entirely on his own favour. This background probably explains his amenability to Ormond's influence, and the suspicion that John of Desmond was involved with Ormond's rival in the area suggests a considerable degree of intrigue behind the ultimate submission of Connacht.

O'Connor Ruadh's activities are impossible to prove, but a letter of 15 April, in tone quite unlike the one from O'Connor Don earlier, was probably from him. Sent simply from vestre...servitor humilis O Conchur de Connacia, it offered in humble terms the writer's service to the king. He claimed no rights of lordship, but referred to 'a certain rival of my blood' who was preventing his passage to the king, and said that this adversary was not to be given a hearing until he came himself.[3] On the following day was recorded the submission of a Turlough O'Connor of Connacht, and as it is unlikely that O'Connor Ruadh

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 113-4, 196-7

2 O'Connor Ruadh was in fact of the elder line. See Curtis, Richard II, pp 234-5

3 ibid., pp 121, 203

could have come to Kilkenny so quickly the record seems to refer to O'Connor Don.[1] One must doubt therefore the statement in the annals that O'Connor Ruadh submitted before his rival,[2] though it is possible that he had made some formal oath to a representative of the king's before O'Connor Don came in. Whatever was the precise sequence of events, in the following weeks O'Connor Don undoubtedly consolidated his position both in the province and vis a vis the king. He was perhaps enabled to do this by the disinclination or inability of other Connacht men to come in person to the king and receive his favours. On 21 April Taig O'Kelly submitted,[3] along with O'Carrol of Ely--the area's resistance to Ormond apparently at an end.

So far as Richard was concerned O'Connor Don was the paramount chief in Connacht and when he repeated his submission at Kilkenny on 29 April he was recognized as having power to do homage for a comprehensive list of Connacht Irish, ranging from Sligo in the north to his own territory around Roscommon.[4] Malachy O'Kelly was named, along with Donal O'Connor (of Sligo), Tomaltach Ogara, Rory O'Down, Shane and Taig O'Hara, Tomaltach MacDonagh, Maelruana MacDermott, Eoghan O'Madden, Christanus O'Mauryan, Odo O'Manly, Taig O'Beirne, Dermot O'Flanagan, Shane MacDermott and Tiernan O'Rourke. It must have been patently obvious that O'Connor Don's real power over these men was at best nominal, and there is unfortunately no way of knowing how far the list represented his true uirrighs.[5] The new alliance which had developed in the province persisted for some time, determining the nature of support Malachy O'Kelly and his son Conor could win

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1 Curtis, Richard II, p 66

2 A.F.M., 1395

3 Curtis, Richard II, p 95: Taig may have been Malachy's tanaiste, though in fact he did not become king of Hy Many until 1404, after the death of Conor who took the kingship on Malachy's death in 1402. (Misc. Irish Annals, pp 173, 167); below. p 119 n 1

4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 90-3

5 See e.g. O'Neill's effective lordship over O'Connor of Sligo; above, p 94

in 1397.[1] Richard's willingness to accept such nominal submissions through a doubtfully effective overlord contrasted markedly with his policy in every other province--the explanation clearly lying in convenience. Ready at Waterford to depart, the king could delay no longer for a more thorough list of submissions. Aware of the unfinished nature of his work in Connacht, he seems to have been concerned to make O'Connor Don's position in the province as secure as possible, in the hope that a strong local chief recognized by the crown might be able to bring this distant area back more fully within the lordship's authority. To this end he knighted O'Connor Don,[2] and formally granted to him Roscommon castle, which he had occupied for some time.[3] His liege homage was not simply a matter of form, but was accompanied by full rights of English law for himself and all descendents of both sexes, with power to acquire land and to sue in any court.[4] His recognition at the same time of the main Anglo-Irish degenerates of the area--notably Walter Bermingham and the two MacWilliam Burkes--completed his expedient policy of confirming the status quo in the area, in the hope that the result would make for security and a renewal of royal influence.[5]

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1 Misc. Irish Annals, pp 157-9; Conor was apparently trying to usurp the kingship.

2 On 1 May--Curtis, Richard II, pp 99-100; cf, Froissart's account, above p 48 n 5.

3 E 163/7/12/6 and 3; above p 60; Roscommon castle had allegedly been in Irish hands since 1331 at least (Statutes and Ordinances, p335); for O'Connor's possession see A.Conn., 1375

4 Above p 58.

5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 99-100; below, p 127.

Chapter 2

Anglo-Irish and English involvement in the first expedition, 1394-5

Part i -- Richard and his Anglo-Irish subjects

In stating that Ireland was divided between two types of Irish people and the 'obedient English' [1] Richard was guilty of an over-simplification, for the rebel English presented almost as great a problem to the lordship as did the Irish menace. Anglo-Irish rebellion was manifested in two possible ways. The most obvious form was outright defiance of the government, often involving local disturbances of the peace in which the rebels were associated with their Gaelic neighbours. A more insidious type of rebellion was seen in degeneracy.[2] In certain areas descendents of the English settlers had refused to accept the English manner of land inheritance and themselves took possession, adopting many Irish ways of life.[3] In many cases the government's relations with Anglo-Irish families were markedly similar to its relations with their Irish neighbours.[4] Legislation however repeatedly sought to control contacts between the nations, for any indiscriminate mixing of race and cultural habits was felt to be dangerous to the unity of the lordship and its ability to combat local disturbances.[5] Information on the effect of this legislation is unfortunately scarce; the evidence for instance that the Earl of Desmond sent his son to be fostered gives only an inkling of the extent of his associations with Gaelic Ireland.[6] Strictly speaking, in fact, the vast majority of Anglo-Irishmen were guilty of some measure of rebellion, ranging from mere technicalities

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1 Above, p 40 ff

2 This distinction was still being made in the time of chancellor Gerrard in the mid-sixteenth century. ('Gerrard Papers', Analecta Hibernica, ii, pp 95-6)

3 e.g. The de Burghs in Connacht. (Curtis, Medieval Ireland, pp 211-2, 237 etc)

4 See, e.g., E.Curtis, 'The clan system among the English settlers in Ireland', E.H.R., xxv (1910) pp 116-20.

5 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 211, 388, 432-7 etc

6 C.C.H., p 139 no 82; Curtis, Medieval Ireland, p 234 and note.

to outright treason. The most significant offenders were those actually in arms against the government and those whose geographical position virtually placed them beyond the scope of government control. Unfortunately these very groups were the most difficult to punish, and often the government was constrained to forgive their past offences and approve their local control in the hope that some measure of royal authority might be, vicariously, recognized.[1] There was certainly no easy solution to the problem of Anglo-Irish rebellion. Legislation served little purpose without effective enforcement, but the alternative of military action, unless it could be sustained, might only precipitate more serious unrest once the forces were removed. The only point on which the government and Anglo-Irish interests consistently agreed was that English blood should always retain its racial identity, distinguishing even the most inveterate rebel from his Gaelic associates.

In examining Richard's attitude to the question of Anglo-Irish rebels one must remember his approach to the Gaelic problem, which made irrelevant many of the issues concerning degeneracy. Whether or not the two communities could ever live at peace, it would certainly have been impolitic to enact or enforce discriminatory legislation at a time when the Gaelic population was being encouraged back within the lordship. One can thus understand the description 'obedient English', for 'obedient' in this context referred simply to an acceptance of Richard's rights as lord of Ireland. While the Irish were in all cases presumed to be outside the peace, or in some condition that necessitated a renewal of their legal relationship with the king, the Anglo-Irish were in general presumed to be loyal. The loyalty of the great Anglo-Irish lords to Richard probably made the assumption seem logical--it is certainly

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1 e.g. The appointment of a member of the dominant de Burgh family as custos of Connacht. (C.C.H., p 141, no 216)

worth noting that the most important Anglo-Irish magnates whose oaths of homage were specifically recorded were men who held large areas contrary to the laws of feudal inheritance, recognizing no Anglo-Irish superior who might guarantee their obedience.[1] In most cases, however, the loyalty of the Anglo-Irish was presumed, following in essence a policy of compromise familiar to the country. No reprisals were to be taken for past offences, and only those who continued to resist were forced to submit as rebels. The Anglo-Irish were relied upon to support Richard, and their dealings with him can be traced through the normal channels of civil government, such as action in the courts, or petitions to the council. Such evidence as survives indicates that Richard envisaged no new policy for them, but accepted them as they were and counted on their future loyalty to him.

It is disappointing that our information on this subject is so slight, for the reaction of the Anglo-Irish was crucial to the success of Richard's Gaelic policy. Richard's attempt to bring the native Irish within the lordship and to remove barriers which had long existed between them and the Anglo-Irish inevitably depended upon Anglo-Irish cooperation. It is worth noting in this context the typical attitude of contemporary Anglo-Irishmen to any suggestion that an Irishman should receive privileges. When, for example, the Bishop of Leighlin in 1393 contested the rights of the Irish Bishop of Killaloe, who had already taken his oath of allegiance, he gave as a consideration for his case, 'that it is heretofore a marvellous thing that an Irishman should be in a more favourable position than any Englishman'.[2] The assumption that to be 'English' was to be privileged gave meaning to the insistence upon the racial

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1 Below, p 127.
2 King's Council in Ireland, no 116

distinction, and it was not to be expected that the Irish would suddenly be accepted as equal in position. Richard's plan to grant favours to Irishmen was almost certain to meet with opposition from the dominant Anglo-Irish lords, who saw in the royal visit a unique opportunity for strengthening their position and recouping their past losses. The revival by the Earl of Ormond of old land claims in Irish areas is only one example of the possibilities afforded to ambitious Anglo-Irishmen by the predicament of the native chiefs, who recognized that any resistance to royal favourites might ruin their own chances of royal favour.[1] While Richard remained in the country his policy operated in unreal conditions, and the real test came with his departure. For the rapid return to pre-expeditionary conditions both the Irish themselves and the crown bore considerable responsibility. To each party the submissions had meant different things and when the anticipated gains failed to materialize quickly collapse was inevitable. The sheer impracticability of measures such as the attendance of native Irishmen at parliaments and councils suggests that the entire submission policy was perhaps doomed to failure, but it remains true that dependence upon the Anglo-Irish to implement the settlement was crucial in its failure. One of the major weaknesses in Richard's understanding of Ireland was his failure to come to grips with the true interests of his 'obedient English' subjects, whose privileged position was implicitly attacked by his policy for Gaelic Ireland.

It is possible that in the early stages of the campaign Richard did not fully grasp the importance of racial distinctions in Ireland. His first reference to the situation was certainly ambiguous and recalls writs about preparations for the expedition which referred simply to

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1 See, e.g., Niall Og O'Neill for a clear recognition by the Irish of the dilemma; above p 95; below, pp 135-7.

the 'rebellious subjects' without denoting race.[1] He wrote:

> ...our loyal lieges come in to offer us their services against every design of the others who have been rebels and adversaries to us in our absence. And furthermore there are others, who, doubtful because of their wrong doing of obtaining grace, remove themselves, fly and intend if it is possible to quit our said land, so we are informed.(2)

The statement may refer largely, if not completely, to native Irishmen. In the subsequent evidence on the expedition, however, Richard's preoccupation with Gaelic submissions was made explicit. His letter of 1 February which referred to the 'obedient English' and described the plight of the rebel Irish showed that the object of the expedition had become the reassertion of relations with this group.[3] He did not apparently attempt a like policy with the Anglo-Irish rebels; it is significant that although some of the Anglo-Irish probably communicated with him during the expedition, only letters from the Gaelic Irish were made public instruments and no single letter from any Anglo-Irishman survives among some twenty-three which were taken to England as permanent records of Richard's success. The exceptional submissions of Anglo-Irishmen seem to have been by-products of the policy towards the Gaelic Irish, with whom the Anglo-Irish were associated either in action or in way of life. While they offer important evidence on Richard's activities in Ireland these instruments cannot be seen as revealing his policy towards the Anglo-Irish in general.

In these few records of Anglo-Irish submission the distinction between the Anglo-Irish and native Irish was always made clear, though in fact the documents probably resulted from associations between the men in question and submitting Irishmen. Such, for instance, is the case of Henry Talon, 'an Englishman and a rebel', who submitted to 'the royal will and ordinance' in the company of the Leinster Irish. Henry Talon's

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1 e.g. Foedera, vii, 789; C.C.R. 1392-6 p 220; above pp 38-9
2 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 290
3 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 55-7; above, p 40 ff

oath and position differed in no way from his Gaelic neighbours, and it is probable that his geographical position in Idrone, county Carlow, put him within the lordship of MacMurrough, who here swore to enforce these Leinster submissions.[1] Rather more difficult to identify and understand are three instruments recording Anglo-Irish submissions in early April. On 3 April in Kilkenny a record was made of the oath of Adam Tobin, who, described as 'an Englishman of Ireland and a rebel', submitted in terms which made clear his past resistance. He fell on his feet with a cord about his neck, and asked for mercy, 'confessing himself on account of his offences worthy to be punished by death'. The king pardoned him.[2] Three days later William and Mayv Barret, who were similarly described, were also pardoned.[3] The instruments referring to both Tobyn and the Barrets merely show their submissions and pardon, but all other Anglo-Irishmen who were the subjects of public instruments took oaths of homage the same, so far as we can see, as those taken by the Irish. On 6 April too, for instance, was recorded tha oath of Maurice fitz Maurice Geraldine, described as 'an English knight born in Ireland', and Thomas MacShane. In their case there was no mention of rebellion and they swore simply the oath of liege homage.[4]

It is probable that there was some connection between these three articles and the general reduction of Munster, begun in late March and recorded in the first weeks of April.[5] The Tobins, originally called 'de Saint Aubyn', held the barony of Comsey in county Tipperary with a branch in county Kilkenny, and Adam's submission is easily explained by the royal presence in Kilkenny at this date. This Adam Tobyn was probably the man whose son had in 1382 been kept in Kilkenny castle as one of the

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 79, 84, 168, 172 and notes p 240
2 ibid., pp 71-2, 161-2
3 ibid., p 73
4 ibid., pp 72-3
5 Above, pp 105-112

hostages for Richard St. Aubyn and others of Comsey.[1] The family had probably been in rebellion at some time since Richard arrived in the country--neither the Irish nor Anglo-Irishmen normally submitted in this way, with ropes around their necks. The Tobins may have acted in 1395 in association with a general movement of the south and south-west aimed primarily, as has been suggested, against the local dominance of the Earl of Ormond.[2] The submissions of Maurice fitz Maurice and Thomas MacShane on 6 April were certainly linked with those of the MacCarthys and others about the same time. This fitz Maurice was, it has been suggested, one of the family of the White Knight, who came from Kilmallok in county Limerick.[3] On the same day as he made his own submission he translated for MacCarthy Mor.[4] Thomas MacShane was possibly the Knight of Glin, whose brother, the first Lord of Kerry, was a close neighbour to MacCarthy Mor.[5] It was probably no coincidence that fitz Maurice and MacShane submitted at the same time as this important Munster chief, but one cannot now tell whether they actively aided his submission or merely delayed their own until the outcome of his resistance was clear. Undoubtedly William and Mayv Barret had been more actively hostile. They probably belonged to the Barrets of Cork, situated near Blarney, a family like the Tobins with a long history of rebellion.[6] It has been suggested that the Barrets of Tirawley were here in question, but the evidence is unconvincing, considering that we know of no pressure which had yet been brought on Mayo.[7] It seems more likely that a Munster family was involved, rather than two isolated men from the north-west.

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1 C.C.H., p 117 no 60
2 Above, pp 105-112
3 Curtis, Richard II, p 228
4 ibid., p 108
5 ibid., p 228
6 e.g. C.C.H., p 118 no 87; 114 no 202
7 cf Curtis, Richard II, p 227

The next, and final, Anglo-Irish submissions of note might loosely be termed the Connacht group--Turloch O'Connor Don being featured in both documents--though some distant associates were also included. When O'Connor Don came to Waterford on 29 April to repeat his oath and be recognized as having power to submit on behalf of certain uirrighs, he came in the company of William de Burgh, Mac William Uachtar.[1] At the same time O'Brien was recognized as having authority over various Irishmen in Munster, and several Anglo-Irish Munster men submitted on their own account. Included among these were Theobald fitz Walter, apparently one of the Burkes of Castleconnel, whose family was descended from Edmund son of the Red Earl.[2] Davy Gall de Burgh, a descendent also of the Red Earl and leader of the Burkes in county Kilkenny, also submitted. Of these Anglo-Irishmen only fitz Walter was described as 'rebel', and although there seems to have been an obvious association between all these submissions and the process of the Gaelic settlement in Munster and Connacht, it would be difficult to establish the exact background of the oaths. More revealing in this respect was the instrument of 1 May which recorded the knighting of both William de Burgh and Walter Bermingham of Athenry in the company of O'Connor Don.[3] It was said that both the Anglo-Irishmen had formerly been in rebellion, but there is no suggestion that any campaign had forced them to come in. On the contrary, the record states that the king made them knights,

> seeing that they had come to him and desiring that they should not leave him without some gift or honour....

It is not unlikely that Bermingham and de Burgh as well as O'Connor Don received some further grant or privilege on this occasion.[4]

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 90-3; above, p 118.
2 Curtis, Richard II, p 228
3 ibid., pp 99-100
4 For O'Connor's grant, see above, pp 58, 119.

These instruments obviously do not describe the full extent of Anglo-Irish contacts with the king. The problem is partly one of record survival, for the king's dealings with his Anglo-Irish subjects are seen most clearly through the normal chancery and exchequer records of government, of which little remains. We know, for instance, of Thomas Burke's meeting with the king and favourable reception only from a statement in the annals that

> MacWilliam Burke, i.e. Thomas, went into the king's house and received great honour and lordship and chieftainship over the English of Connaught.(1)

This was possibly the man in mind when the keeper of the Great Wardrobe recorded the delivery to an unidentified 'filz William Burke' of robes on the occasion of his being knighted.[2] Thomas may indeed have been granted certain privileges by Richard: there was a later tradition that he held some authority in Connacht, being described in the annals as 'lord of the English of Connaught'.[3] The probability that both the Burkes were knighted by the king throws light on his policy for Connacht. There, where he was least able to make Gaelic submissions effective, it says much for his grasp of realities that he thus recognized the claims of the lordship's only possible representatives, despite the fact that their territory comprised the inheritance of the Earl of March. The same readiness to back the authority of a powerful and potentially loyal Anglo-Irishman was seen also in the reappointment of Gerald Dillon as constable of Athlone, confirming the change of August 1393 when he replaced the O'Caseys, who had held the castle for many years by royal grant.[4] After this time the Dillons became in fact hereditary constables

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1 A.F.M., 1394
2 E 159/175, Easter, br. dir. baron., m 31; above, p 48.
3 A.F.M., 1398
4 N.L.I., MS 4, f 67; C.C.H., p 153 no 13; for the O'Caseys in Athlone see ibid., p 123 nos 8, 11, 21; p 127 nos 5, 199-200; p 134 nos 124-6; p 139 no 96 etc.

of Athlone.[1] This type of political strategy was on quite a different level from other dealings with petty Anglo-Irish rebels, whose relative unimportance was probably the reason for their not being the subjects of public instruments. Such for instance were Malmore Ocoign, Anglicus of Castlemartin in Kildare and Patrick Brengane of Russelstoun, Anglicus oriundus, who both received signet letters of pardon on 28 April.[2] One has no way of knowing how many other minor offendors similarly petitioned the king but did not secure chancery enrolment of their grants. Another chance survival records the pardon of Henry Blake, one of the instigators of the 1388 revolt of Galway city against the king's ministers and in favour of William de Burgh. Richard's pardon for this transgression--all the more serious as Galway, a part of the Mortimer inheritance, was in the king's hands and it was a royal appointee whose authority had been rejected--is not really surprising in view of his gracious policy towards William de Burgh himself. The case illustrates well, however, the spirit of amnesty evident in Richard's dealings with his Anglo-Irish subjects.[3]

Henry Blake's pardon also demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing between normal government process and Richard's unusual dealings with his Anglo-Irish rebels. In the majority of cases heard before Richard, or writs sealed in his presence, we have no such precise information about the participants. The main value of such documents lies in their description of Richard's activities during the expedition; once the initial campaign was over it is clear that he involved himself in the normal government of the country, authorizing writs, hearing petitions, granting pardons and other favours. While many of the items recorded routine affairs of government, the royal presence

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1 Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland, p 177
2 C.C.H., p 151 nos 9-10
3 Curtis, 'The pardon of Henry Blake of Galway in 1395', p 87

was bound to increase the flow of business in all spheres. Although much of this would have been carried out by his own signet officers and is not therefore available for study,[1] what remains on the Irish rolls of chancery and elsewhere gives some idea of the variety of matters requiring attention. Many individuals received pardons, for offences ranging from John Dowdall's non-appearance in court to the Bishop of Emly's failure to come to parliament in 1377-8.[2] David Wogan, on the other hand, received a general pardon, the king's reason being that he came to Ireland 'for the justification and happy government of his people and subjects there'.[3] Even defaulting officers could petition for pardons, though the case of Patrick de la Freigne showed that the king did not lightly surrender his financial rights. Patrick was in debt for £344.4.6 for his account as late sheriff of the liberty of Kilkenny. The king pardoned him £200 of this if his claim of poverty could be proved, and inquisitions had to be held after the king left the country before the pardon was effective.[4] In other cases towns and religious communities received favours; not only were existing privileges confirmed but new ones were granted. The mayor of Drogheda received 50/- p.a. for ten years.[5] The Carmelites in Dublin and Mellifont Abbey were among those receiving confirmation of former grants while the Friars Preachers were granted an annuity of 35 marks.[6] Offices also lay in the king's bestowing, and records show that they were granted, or exemption from them won, with the king's approval.[7] At all levels of public life individuals used the opportunity of the royal visit to petition for Richard's favour.

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1 Below, pp 141-2.
2 Dowdall Deeds, (ed.) C.McNeill and J.Otway-Ruthven, p 134 nos 333-5; P.R.O.I., Ferguson's Collections, ii, f 88, from Mem. Roll 18-19 R.II.
3 Mem. Roll 22 R.II, m 30, in R.C.B.Lib., Graves MS 4, p 319.
4 Mem. Roll 19 R.II, m 65, from R.C.B.Lib., Graves MS 2 p 67
5 Cal.Charter Rolls 1341-1417, pp 176-7
6 C.P.R.1399-1401, pp 510, 538, 334
7 e.g. C.C.H., p 153 nos 13, 44; P.R.O.I., Ferguson's Collections, ii, f 106.

In the context of Richard's general policy, however, interest centres on his relations with the great Anglo-Irishmen, who gave him aid and upon whom the future of the settlement depended. We know little of Richard's possible dealings with Anglo-Irish knights in the course of the expedition. Edward Perrers, a knight of Kildare, stood out as one who received royal favour, being knighted by the king probably after distinguished service in the field.[1] His connections with Nottingham may have brought him into the limelight to an unusual degree.[2] Other Anglo-Irish knights were used in procuring submissions from the Irish,[3] though men who came over with Richard were regularly employed on this work.[4]

Little is known of the details of Anglo-Irish military aid supplied this year. In December 1393 a general summons had requested all who held land by royal service to attend Ormond, the justiciar, in person at Kilmallock, to meet the danger presented to Leinster and Munster by O'Brien and his associates,[5] but none of the references to aid in 1394-5 is as specific as this. In December 1394 the king's lieges of county Kilkenny, in the king's service at the command of the seneschal of the king's household, were excused amercements incurred by their absence from parliament.[6] It is probable that the service had been a general one in the counties involved in the king's campaigns. It was said of this parliament that the Anglo-Irish granted a subsidy there to Richard, a not unlikely possibility, though there is no record evidence directly concerning it.[7] The only other specific mention of local levies comes in April and shows that local forces continued to be used throughout the expedition

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 600 He received 'the order of knighthood'. As he was already a knight in the late 1370s it is possible that the order of the Garter was meant here.

2 e.g. C.P.R.1399-1401 p 145

3 e.g. David Wogan, Edward Perrers himself; Curtis, Richard II, 84-5, 94.

4 Below, pp 162-4 etc.

5 N.L.I., MS 4, f 75

6 C.C.H., p 154 no 40

7 An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II - Henry IV, written before 1471, (ed.) J.S.Davies, App. p 110

to supplement the royal army. On 4 April the sheriff of Kildare was ordered to go to Leighlin Bridge with four men for every cultivated carucate of land in the county, each equipped for eight days service.[1] Though the military involvement of the Anglo-Irish is thus uncertain, some contribution was inevitable and must have helped enormously in Richard's successful campaigns.[2]

Sufficient information is however available to enable some speculations about the possible roles played by the three great Anglo-Irish Earls of Ormond, Desmond and Kildare. Least is known about the Earl of Kildare, either on the expedition or during the entire decade. Gerald fitz Maurice fitz Thomas,who became earlin 1390, did not apparently hold any of the central offices of government until 1405, after the death of the earl of Ormond.[3] The Council Roll of 1392-3 shows that he had quartered kernes at Ballymore Eustace, to the annoyance of the Archbishop of Dublin,[4] and it is possible that he used his position as earl to expand his possessions at this time. There were certainly two cases of pleas of novel disseisin against him during the first expedition.[5] We know that he was involved in campaigns in Leinster in early January 1395,[6] and it seems likely that throughout the expedition he aided the king's forces in procuring Leinster submissions. The long resistance of O'Dempsey may here be significant; their territories coincided, and it was O'Connor Faly, whose uirrigh O'Dempsey generally was, who was to capture Kildare in 1398.[7] It does not seem that Kildare was high in the king's confidence during the expedition; although he presumably attended the parliament in November, and was certainly summoned to the projected

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1 C.C.H., p 155 no 65
2 See Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions' for an estimate of 2,000 Anglo-Irish supporters.
3 He was then elected justiciar by the Irish Council. (Wood, 'The office of chief governor of Ireland', P.R.I.A.,xxxvi C (1923) p 233)
4 King's Council in Ireland, no 115
5 C.C.H., p 153 no 23; p 154 no 53
6 ibid., p 154 no 53
7 A.F.M., 1398; see also above pp 72-4.

one in April,[1] he did not apparently take part in the submission settlement and was never named as a witness to any of the public instruments. Unlike Ormond and Desmond, he was not specifically named as an important magnate whose cooperation was necessary for Nottingham to achieve his settlement.[2] Shortly after the king himself left the country Kildare visited England, possibly to discuss continuing policy for Ireland.[3] On the whole, however, there is nothing to suggest that he either sought or obtained a position of any influence in the royal council during these months.

The evidence on the role of Gerald, Earl of Desmond, is only slightly more revealing. Gerald, the third earl, had held a position of importance in the country since the mid-century, establishing close personal and cultural connections with Gaelic Munster.[4] No satisfactory settlement could have been made in south Leinster or Munster without his cooperation, but how or on what terms this was procured is not clear. He was presumably with the king before Christmas, for his presence at the parliament in Dublin would have been requested. The first precise information about him comes in the record of Nottingham's powers of early February, which stated that he was to receive the aid of both Ormond and Desmond in Thomond and Leinster.[5] They were named here not, it seems, as formers of policy, but as important magnates whose help was necessary to implement royal policy. It is possible that Desmond was already showing his age--he was to die within three years[6]--and that this explains his relative inactivity. His son John seems in fact to have been more active in negotiating with the Irish,

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1 C.C.H., p 155 no 69
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 76-7; Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', p 231
3 C.C.H., p 152 nos 28-9
4 See, e.g., above p 120, n 6; for Gaelic views of him see notices of his death in 1398, A.F.M., A.U.
5 Curtis, Richard II, pp 76-7; Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', p 231.
6 A.F.M., 1398; below, Appendix III, pp 554-6.

acting as translator for Dermot O'Connor Faly who submitted on 16 April, and representing O'Kelly's interests with the king.[1] In the latter instance, the fact that Ormond was pursuing his ambitions in O'Kelly's territory suggests that John of Desmond became involved for reasons other than those of royal policy. The areas of Ormond and Desmond influence touched in many points; less than a decade earlier Kildare had been required to arbitrate in a case of disputed interests,[2] and within a few years John of Desmond was to kill the brother of the earl of Ormond in Waterford.[3] It seems likely that John of Desmond used the opportunity afforded by the submission policy of the expedition to extend his contacts among the Irish hostile to Ormond. Although active in this way, neither Desmond nor his son seems to have been of the king's council in these months--if this was indeed the meaning of their absence from the witness lists of the instruments of submission. It is known that the king summoned Desmond to his presence, to answer for his occupation of the royal castle and manor of Dungarvan.[4] No subsequent decision is recorded, but when John of Desmond, the next earl, died it was said that he had held the manor and town of Dungarvan with its appurtenances in chief by knight service.[5] Richard may have granted the third earl some privileges in this or other matters. Certainly he was to refer in a later letter to the 'great favour' shown to Desmond in 1395,[6] though no record survives to show what this might have been.

There can be no doubt of the favour enjoyed by the Earl of Ormond or the scope of his activities during the expedition. His status as an

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 103, 122-3
2 C.C.H., p 137 no 220
3 Below, pp 325-7.
4 C.C.H., p 153 no 3
5 C.C.D., iii, no 45
6 B.M. Add.MS 24062 p 122; below, Appendix IX pp 570-4.

English knight made him, for a start, acceptable to English magnates, and must have given him some advantage over his more insular Anglo-Irish peers. Froissart describes him as 'a valiant knight of England', whose lands in Ireland were then in some dispute and at risk from the Irish.[1] The earl's position as acting justiciar when the king arrived made his assistance in any case indispensable.[2] He had been in office in the months preceding the expedition when the king's own officers were sent ahead to investigate the state of the country,[3] and it is probable that his help and direction lay behind their ultimate recommendations. Richard undoubtedly had Anglo-Irish advice in working out his plan of campaign. As Ormond remained an important agent of the general policy it seems probable that he had given conciliar support to it. He must at least have supplied much of the information which directed Richard towards his ultimate policy. Ormond's participation in the Leinster campaign, though unrecorded in the official accounts, is certain; it has been noted that the Irish annals credit him with procuring MacMurrough's reduction.[4] Froissart gives a like impression.[5] He was certainly active in Leinster and Connacht after the Leinster Irish had officially submitted.[6] As with Desmond and Kildare, he was not among that group of magnates who consistently witnessed instruments of submission, and was presumably therefore employed locally rather than in the king's entourage. Like Desmond he was to aid the settlement of the Irish by Nottingham in Leinster and Thomond,[7] and it was presumably in this capacity that he persuaded Brian O'Brien to submit and escorted him to Dublin from Limerick early in March.[8] There he

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1 Oeuvres de Froissart, xv, 139
2 He had acted since his appointment in 1392, renewed in 1393. (C.P.R. 1391-6, pp 126, 275)
3 Foedera, vii, 782-3; C.C.R. 1392-6 p 220
4 Above, pp 70-1.
5 Oeuvres de Froissart, xv, 170
6 Curtis, Richard II, pp 110-11, 122-3, 141-2
7 Above, p 133 n 2
8 Curtis, Richard II, p 137

translated the oath for O'Brien and witnessed the instrument of submission, but in other submissions where he was involved he merely served as translator.[1] He acted in this way for Turloch O'Connor Don and Brian and Dermot O'Brien on 20 April, O'Connor Don having come in, like O'Brien of Thomond, in Ormond's company.[2] Although he appears to be acting here as an agent of royal policy, the evidence indicates that concern for his own lordship was never far from his mind. That he was determined not to lose personally by his service in procuring submissions is quite clear; in areas as far apart as Wicklow and Roscommon, and possibly as far south as Cork, he was accused of taking advantage of the royal presence to pursue aggressive ambitions, confident that the Irish would not risk Richard's wrath by retaliation.[3] This self-confidence suggests that he was very sure of Richard's favour; in Wicklow at least his activities ran directly counter to Richard's proposed settlement. There is certainly no sign at any point in this decade that Ormond forfeited Richard's approval, and one must conclude that his apparently strong personality held some influence over Richard, who at the very least seems to have recognized the necessity of not antagonizing the most powerful resident Anglo-Irish magnate.

It is clear, however, that Richard's general policy for the Irish was not altogether in the interests of many prominent Anglo-Irishmen. Just as Richard apparently recognized the possession by O'Byrne of an area in Wicklow which Ormond claimed,[4] so too in other cases his determination to be merciful to former rebels implied an attack on Anglo-Irish vested interests, even when he specifically recognized the position of the mesne lord.[5] There were undoubtedly certain areas

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 93, 91
2 ibid., pp 113-4
3 ibid., pp 109-11, 122, 141.
4 ibid. p 141
5 e.g. As with Mortimer in Ulster; ibid., pp 144-6.

in which the Anglo-Irish may have dominated the council. It is likely for instance that the Leinster campaign was inspired and directed by them, for its success hinged not on novel methods but on adequate supplies of men and equipment to carry out a familiar strategy of wards and raids. The late formation of Richard's over-all policy--in February 1395--suggests however that his acceptance of the grievances of the Irish was not the result of Anglo-Irish advice sought on his first arrival but of his own observations and those of the English magnates with him. There were of course some men with extensive experience in Ireland who must have played an important part in determining Richard's attitude to the problem. Archbishop Colton of Armagh, for instance, stands out as being one such man who was likely to have influenced policy. Though capable of taking advantage of his influence to secure privileges,[1] he was primarily, it seems, a royal servant, and was certainly not obsessed with his own career in Ireland.[2] Experienced in the government of the lordship under the most adverse circumstances,[3] his solution to the crisis apparently favoured compromise with the Irish, to be reached by mutual understanding. Ability to achieve such understanding was a particularly necessary quality in an Archbishop of Armagh, as much of the see lay in the Irish area.[4] Colton had clearly played some part in the arrangement concerning Niall Og's hostages, being one of the men who was ordered to deliver some of these sureties to Mortimer in October 1393.[5] He seems to have been instrumental, with the earl of Ormond, in procuring peace with

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1 e.g. Cal.Fine Rolls 1391-9 p 157

2 In subsequent years he served Richard on embassies abroad. (E 403/554 14 December) For his general career see Acts of Archbishop Colton in his visitation of Derry, 1397, (ed.) W.Reeves, pp i-ii.

3 In 1381 he was obliged to become justiciar after Mortimer's death and the refusal of both Ormond and Desmond to undertake the responsibility. (Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 136)

4 e.g. 'Calendar of Archbishop Sweteman's Register', (ed.) H.J. Lawlor, P.R.I.A., xxix C (1911) no 7

5 N.L.I. MS 4, f 65

the O'Neills before the expedition began, and was in correspondence with the king concerning his efforts.[1] The letters of the Ulster Irish themselves demonstrate the influence of Colton in the province, for whose quiet submission he may have been largely responsible.[2] It is possible that other ecclesiastical figures assisted the policy in their own areas. Alexander Balscot, Bishop of Meath, stood as high in the royal favour after the expedition as before, and was even rewarded for his services on the royal council during these months.[3] His close association with the Anglo-Irish magnates makes it seem unlikely however that he favoured any policy which might have endangered their position.[4] His work with the royal council, like that of the Archbishop of Dublin, is explained by his rank in the lordship and the impossibility of implementing important policies without him.

The difficulty of establishing to exactly what degree Richard's policies received Anglo-Irish cooperation remains a central problem of the expedition. Irish submissions were not in themselves against the Anglo-Irish interest, but the manner in which Richard received them and his intention to accept, by and large, the status quo in the lordship, cannot have been enthusiastically received by men who had lost considerable areas to the Irish and who were accustomed to seeing compromise and negotiation as an unproductive second best to effective military action. Any attempt to analyze motives and reactions is hindered by our limited understanding of Richard's overall policies. He was obviously attempting a general restatement of the legal bonds between himself and all his subjects, but it is impossible now to see what policy was envisaged when the Irish, inevitably, took up arms once more.

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 129-31; above, pp 39, 88-9; Anglo-Norman letters, no 7.

2 Above, pp 88-101 passim

3 Appointed chancellor in June 1395. (C.C.H., p 152 nos 46-8) For his reward see E 403/551 (19 July).

4 For his subsequent career and affiliations see below, pp 247-8 ff.

Armed action would presumably be, as in the past, the legitimate defence of the Anglo-Irish. It is at least clear that personal interests were not generally allowed to take advantage of the royal presence by aggressive attacks on Irishmen willing to submit. The restraining influence of the king was recognized by the Irish themselves. Not only is this implied throughout the letters of the Gaelic chiefs to the king, but one of the annals actually states:

> King Richard...went across again (to England) with power and honour from all Irishmen, as he deserved, for there were few men in his time as estimable as he.(1)

To some extent therefore the practical future of Richard's policy was immaterial in determining the reaction of the Anglo-Irish magnates to it. What was important to them was their inability, despite the overwhelming strength of the royal army, to settle old scores with the Irish without running the risk of Irish complaint to the king. It seems beyond question that such a situation must have produced resentment and frustration within a section of the Anglo-Irish population.

In recognizing the probability of this reaction on the part of the Anglo-Irish magnates one is led to two main conclusions. It seems, first of all, that Richard's strength on the expedition lay not simply in his military resources which could reestablish the lordship on the Anglo-Irishmen's own terms, but in a distinct royal policy which he was able to formulate and impose. One is obliged to accept therefore that Richard must have had both independence of spirit and considerable political skill. Secondly, we see revealed one of the main weaknesses of Richard's policy for Ireland--that the legal gains it won for the crown jeopardized the country's delicate political balance. Inevitably the personal presence of the king in the lordship, by altering the

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1 Misc. Irish Annals, p 155

expectations of the Irish, created new tensions which could only be resolved by either the successful implementation of the king's policies or the removal once more of the crown from the centre of the stage. Richard's idealistic attempt to achieve unity within the lordship by conciliating the Irish in fact exposed the real strength of the crown in Ireland--its common interest with the Anglo-Irish magnates who dominated the country through their lordships.

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Part ii — English participation in the expedition

As a major royal enterprise the expedition of 1394-5 saw far greater English involvement than previous fourteenth century campaigns in Ireland. Some of the groups drawn into the national effort had relatively little importance for the expedition's ultimate policy. The concern of the army, for instance, was limited to supplying the force necessary to pacify the country. On quite a different level was responsibility for Richard's political policy. This lay primarily with the council and with certain individuals who had an interest in its implementation both in the immediate future and in the period after the expedition ended. The most helpful division between the people involved is perhaps one separating those whose concerns with Ireland were temporary, arising from their involvement in a royal campaign, and those who had previous or future links with Ireland and upon whom was to depend many of the conditions which ultimately decided the settlement's fate. Although this latter group is the more important in examining the subsequent breakdown in Ireland, a study of the former reveals some conciliar influences which directed Richard towards his own particular policies.

A notable characteristic of Richard's council on the expedition was its concentration of prominent clerical advisors. Although to some extent the scale of the expedition made their presence as natural as that of the great magnates of the land, their contribution seems to have been particularly significant on this campaign. Richard Medford, Bishop of Chichester and then treasurer of Ireland, had a long record of service to Richard in England, being in fact the secretary whose use of the signet in 1385 the chancellor had refused to condone and who was subsequently arrested briefly by the Appellants in 1388.[1] Since that time the signet had been little used in England to initiate government business, but Roger Walden, its keeper in 1394, was an important officer on the Irish expedition.[2] The signet was fully utilized in these months: its legitimate use in Ireland may even have put it into slightly better repute in Richard's subsequent years in England.[3] Walden and his associates contributed therefore an element of clerical experience committed to the crown which facilitated Richard's policies for Ireland. Submission may have been won initially by military force, but the work of the king's clerical officers was indispensable in bringing the Irish to Richard and in following through the administrative details of recording oaths and granting charters. Their clerical role was important at two level. The presence of highly trained clerks and notaries--such as Thomas Sparkeford, Robert Boleyn and John Melton--meant that the technical deficiencies or partisan qualities of Anglo-Irish clerks became to some extent irrelevant, and that Richard's relations with the Irish were, even at this level, conducted by his own accompanying servants.[4] The role of the more

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1 Tout, Chapters, v, 216-8
2 ibid., p 221
3 ibid., pp 221-2
4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 57-118 passim

politically important clerical advisors is less easy to determine. Obviously Walden, and his assistant and deputy John Lincoln,[1] acted in a definitely professional capacity, but as 'clerical careerists' one must associate with them Tideman, Bishop of Llandaff,[2] and Thomas Merke, monk of Westminster.[3] Both of these men witnessed submissions in the king's presence,[4] and must have been involved in policy decisions. On a different level again were Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of York, and Thomas Braybrook, Bishop of London,[5] who witnessed some documents in March but whose presence resulted from their mission to Ireland to report to the king and who were not intimately concerned with Irish affairs. It is impossible to estimate how much advice these English councillors gave to Richard in directing his Irish policy, but unquestionably they had then, as in England, some influence and our knowledge of their presence with Richard helps to explain how he formed a policy that was distinctively royal rather than Anglo-Irish in approach.

As might be expected, the expedition had considerable impact upon the Irish administration, one of the most important effects being the temporary injection of aid from the more highly qualified English clerks and officers.[6] Although some English officers remained subsequently in Ireland, to implement the royal policies and further their own careers, the involvement of such men was usually brief and concerned more with the perennial questions of maladministration and official incompetence than with the political policies of the expedition--that

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1 For Lincoln's career see Tout, Chapters, v, 216, 221-4. He acted when Walden went to England during the expedition.

2 He had been a royal physician. He was translated to Worcester in 1395 for his good services. (M.McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, p 474)

3 ibid. He was shortly to become the Bishop of Carlisle, and always remained loyal to Richard.

4 Below, p 163.

5 They were in England when the lords of Parliament wrote to the king in mid-February, but attended Richard in Drogheda early in March. (Curtis, Richard II, pp 137-9, 59 etc)

6 See below, pp 250-2.

being primarily the concern of the signet officers. In the military sphere many of the knights and esquires exercised as little lasting influence on matters of policy. Their immediate task accomplished, they returned home. This was true to some extent even of the greatest knights on the expedition, for those who had no personal Irish concerns or associations with Irish landholders naturally had a limited interest in the country. Although in some cases knights and esquires coming on the expedition as strangers to Ireland acquired by personal ambition or as rewards for good service some stake in the country,[1] the more significant type of man who came from England was, so far as the evidence allows us to see, of the absentee class--that group of men who held land and other possessions in Ireland but lived permanently in England.

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The question of absenteeism was one which troubled many areas of uncertain peace in the fourteenth century. Not only Ireland, but Scotland, Wales and other places sought legislation to ensure that inhabitants would not desert their lands leaving them exposed to hostile incursions.[2] The first recorded official attention to the problem in Ireland came in 1297 when a parliament at Dublin provided for distraint if necessary to compel landholders dwelling in the land of peace to provide for the defence of their lands in the march, and to ensure that adequate defence was left by magnates living in England and taking revenues out of Ireland.[3] In the next half century various other remedies were tried.[4] In 1351 the issues of property in the land of peace became liable to forfeiture if the owners held land in the march

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1 e.g. John de Liverpull, below, 262, note 6.

2 Scotland, 1384-5, in Rot. Parl., iii, 200; the problem was mentioned with reference to Calais, Guyenne and Ireland in 1409-10, ibid., p 625. In 1401 a letter from Prince Henry recommended absentee legislation for Wales. (Anglo-Norman letters, no 209)

3 Statutes and Ordinances, p 201, art.s II, III

4 ibid., pp 271, 279, 329 etc

which they did not defend in person or by deputy. Forfeiture of the issues of lands held by absentees in England was also recommended.[1] In the 1360s the expedition of Lionel of Clarence highlighted the absentee question. Sixty-five named non-residents were ordered to defend their lands and to give the king their counsel concerning Ireland.[2] In 1362 an absentee subsidy was granted, allowing to the king for two years the revenues of landowners who had still not come to Ireland.[3] By the end of the period of Clarence's involvement, the problem was still critical and the ordinance of 1368 provided for the forfeiture of an absentee's lands if he failed to supply proper defence. Recognition of the seriousness of the problem was demonstrated by the claim that all the current evils resulted from the prevalence of absenteeism since the first days of the lordship.[4] Although some responded to this particular order by selling out to resident Anglo-Irishmen,[5] much land remained in the hands of absentee lords. The effects of the ordinance have not been systematically studied, but it seems that many of the great non-residents, although their lands were originally forfeited, subsequently procured licences of exemption with little difficulty.[6] The 1380 ordinance--which provided for the forfeiture of two thirds of the revenues of those who were abroad on the king's service or studying in England--was more practical in approach and perhaps suited both the government and the absentees better. The defaulting non-resident was still left with a stake in his land, and the government did not have to effect a possibly difficult confiscation.[7] In addition, the temporary absentees, those who were, perhaps, usually

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1 Statutes and Ordinances, p 391 art.s XVIII,XIX
2 C.C.R. 1360-64, p 254
3 Cal.Fine Rolls 1356-68 p 244
4 Statutes and Ordinances, p 470
5 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp 296-7
6 e.g. C.P.R. 1370-74, pp 12, 69, 83, 87, 88, 92, 116, 285
7 Rot. Parl., iii, 85

resident in Ireland but travelled regularly to look after their interests elsewhere, could be more easily moved against by a seizure of a part of their issues than by taking control of all their land for a limited time.[1]

The practical working of the policy is difficult to unravel. Many non-residents after 1380, as in the 1370s, procured licences of exemption, and men who could prove their absence was on the king's service sometimes gained complete freedom to levy their rents, although the ordinance required that they should pay one third.[2] When the Duke of Gloucester was appointed lieutenant in 1391 his indenture referred to the problem--specifying that 'all the statutes made in England touching the land of Ireland be held to', except in the case of eight or ten persons named by the king.[3] In Ireland the legislation was periodically acted upon, in the form of commissions of enquiry into the names and estates of men absent without licence--one such being that of October 1393.[4] These regular enquiries and the reconfirmation of the legislation early in the next reign suggest that it was on the whole felt to be efficacious.[5] The 1392-3 Council Roll gives some examples of its administration. Philip, Lord Darcy, newly arrived in the country, testified that his tenants had been paying two thirds of the rents to the exchequer since the statute against absentees 'by tallies and assignments made out of the Treasury', and were being distrained upon for still more. Although he was allowed three years absence now from Ireland the £8 arrears from his tenants was not pardoned and no mention was made of the fact that in 1384 he had received a

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1 This applied particularly to ecclesiastics who themselves accepted the principle of confiscation for absence. (e.g. Bishop of Ossory, 1388-9, R.C.B.Lib., Graves MS 4 pp 276-9)

2 e.g. C.P.R. 1381-5 pp 131, 274, 385

3 J.T.Gilbert, A history of the viceroys of Ireland, p 556; C.P.R. 1391-6, pp 16, 24, 28

4 Mem. Roll. 17 R.II, m 53, in R.C.B.Lib., Graves MS 3, p 287; see also C.C.H., p 142 no 221(1388-9)

5 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 501-3

licence of absence.[1] The council certainly did not lightly grant the privilege of absence with revenues; in one case a petitioner asking for five years absence with full rents was granted only two; in another case a petitioner seeking three years was allowed one.[2] Sometimes those who had forfeited appealled. Richard Bishop of Ossory claimed that he should only have been required to give one third of his revenues as he was absent on the king's service, not the two thirds that were in fact seized and he requested restitution of the £40 difference. A full investigation was ordered.[3] The apparent regularity with which commissioners were appointed to enquire into the number of absentees indicates that there already existed on the eve of the expedition an effective machinery for dealing with the question of absentee proprietors, making unnecessary any new proclamation.[4]

A problem however which was closely associated with absenteeism and which did indeed demand action was the increasing scale of emigration from Ireland by non-propertied men, particularly labourers. This movement probably went hand in glove with absenteeism; non-residence of landlords put a greater burden upon the population that was left and few areas were by the 1390s certain of stability and civil order, even if they were adequately defended against the Irish. Attempts had been made in earlier years to prevent the emigration of labour from the country,[5] but such prohibitions did not control the problem. Walsingham stated as a fact of common knowledge that in recent years many had come to England looking for money, leaving the lordship weakened and open to

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1 King's council in Ireland, nos 141-2; C.P.R. 1381-5 p 385
2 King's Council in Ireland, nos 197, 120
3 ibid., no 124
4 See e.g. above p 145 n 4
5 Statutes and Ordinances, p 465, art. XXXIV (1366)

considerable danger from the Irish.[1] He mentioned this in connection with his report of the ordinance issued by Richard in June 1394, that all men born in Ireland should return there at once to defend it[2]--the first sign of an official attempt to return to Ireland men other than absentee proprietors. While the order was clearly related to preparations for the 1394-5 expedition, it reveals that Richard intended also to strengthen the Anglo-Irish lordship by increasing its population and thus its ability to defend itself. The hints at resettlement in Leinster followed directly from this policy.[3] The importance which the depleted population had for contemporaries was seen again within a few years when Surrey stipulated as a condition of his lieutenancy that he should bring with him a couple from every parish in England.[4] This suggestion was not in itself novel, for individual lordships had earlier in the century recognized the need to encourage further settlement from Wales and England. In 1327, for instance, it was said of the lordship of Ulster that for lack of people barely one tenth of the land was settled.[5] By the end of the century, however, the problem was apparently so serious that it required central governmental attention.

However essential the repopulation of Ireland by loyal subjects was felt to be, subsequent years were to prove the failure of the policy. It is probable that many Anglo-Irish were indeed encouraged back in these months--but the existence of some 450 licences of exemption proves the unpopularity of the measure among the emigrants as well as its efficient administration at that particular time.[6] Of those who came, nothing is known and it seems likely that some at least of the people who in the following years were willing to pay for permission to leave the country

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1 Historia Anglicana, ii, 215
2 C.C.R. 1392-6 pp 295, 390
3 Above p 81.
4 Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 560-1
5 B.M. Add.MS 25,459 I owe this reference to Miss P.Connolly who kindly allowed me to see her transcript of the document.
6 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 454-6 etc The men in question are sometimes described, generally as artisans, merchants or chaplains.

contrary to legislation were re-emigrating in disillusion.[1] In 1409-10 it was found necessary to pass additional legislation prohibiting mariners from carrying such people in their ships.[2]

Although the existing provisions against the non-residents rendered unnecessary any specific legislation for them at this time, efforts to recruit support for the expedition were probably directed particularly towards this group. The absence of new measures to deal with the problem makes it all the more difficult to assess the role of the absentees, or even to identify them. It does not seem possible, for instance, to establish how many former absentees had in the 1370s and 1380s sold their interests in Ireland. Much of the expedition's work naturally fell into the hands of the non-residents who did return--their numbers increased by Richard's grants of lands and rights in Ireland to Englishmen during the expedition. The attitude of this class towards Ireland and its ultimate unwillingness to become deeply involved in the fate of the country was to be a crucial element in the breakdown of subsequent years. As their contribution was primarily personal it is through a knowledge of them as individuals that their role can be most profitably examined.

As the question of absenteeism has yet to receive thorough historical examination, it is difficult to grasp a general picture of the problem's importance. It may be helpful therefore to isolate one particular example where we can clearly see both the crucial effects of non-residence and the attempts to solve Ireland's problems by requiring particular absentees to bear the burden. The obvious example is of course Roger Mortimer, Earl of March, Ulster and Connacht, the most important, next

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1 Lambeth MS 619. ff 207-8; below p 293.
2 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 517-9

to the king, of the non-residents. The manner in which Clarence, Edmund Mortimer, and his son Roger were all looked upon as natural governors of Ireland gives some idea of the importance of the Earldom of Ulster, particularly when allied to the Mortimer interest in Trim and Leinster. Any serious effort to bring Connacht back into the king's obedience or to control the Irish of Ulster inevitably required the support of the earl. As lordship in Ireland was based to a considerable extent on a man's personal authority rather than his legal ownership of land, prolonged absence from the country always weakened the control of a non-resident. In the case of Roger Mortimer, whose potential importance was recognized when he succeeded his father as lieutenant at the age of five,[1] a long minority spent in England was an additional disadvantage, and the gains won during his father's brief campaign of 1380-1 were as rapidly lost. While a minor the lordship lay in the king's hand, making its defence a royal obligation. The inability of the government to bear this burden was most clearly seen in the crises in the area in the early 1390s. In Meath O'Reilly had to be bought off by one of the first examples of black rent.[2] In Ulster the deterioration of the lordship and its inability to withstand the Irish was recognized both by Mortimer, who complained to the king, and by the king himself, who agreed to pay the earl 1,000 marks as compensation.[3] The obvious solution to the problem was the earl's arrival to shoulder his own burdens as soon as possible. In the circumstances of the late fourteenth century--when the holder of the lieutenancy was liable to suffer personal financial loss[4]--it was not surprising that Mortimer became a natural choice of governor as soon

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1 C.P.R. 1381-5 p 88
2 King's Council in Ireland, no 162
3 See above, p 88; below Appendix V, pp 559-63.
4 Below, pp 216-7.

as his minority ended. The attempt to send him over while still a minor highlighted the lordship's dependence upon him and his resources.[1]

This important point--the absentees' resources outside Ireland--was crucial in determining both their own position and the official attitude towards them. It seems probable that the readiness to grant licences of absence to the magnates was directly related to the possibility that some of their wealth might nevertheless be ploughed back into Ireland. Any stringent attempts to confiscate the lands of such men could fail to increase their involvement, leading instead to a rapid abandonment of their Irish interests. It is clear that Mortimer at least, and other absentees perhaps to a lesser degree, were prepared to invest their profits elsewhere in their lands in Ireland,[2] until presumably the difference between cost and anticipated returns became too great. It is probably safe to assume therefore that many of the absentees supporting the first expedition were not unwilling participants, but had a keen personal interest in the safety of the lordship. The profitability of their lands is not at present known, but the number of surviving petitions which requested custody of land points to a ready market.[3] Some of the lands in question were said to be 'wasted and destroyed' or to 'lie untilled for the want of good custody', and it seems clear that even the most unprotected lands could have some value.[4] In one case Edward Perrers, the petitioner, was willing to continue to pay a farm of £4 for lands 'seated in the march on the enemy's frontier' which were in imminent danger of being wasted.[5] Thomas Butler in another petition revealed one way in which the government attempted to offset the problems of derelict lordships. By asserting that

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1 Below,pp 184-7; for further consideration of Mortimer as a returning absentee see below, pp 345-7.

2 e.g. S.C.6/1184/22-3 (Denbigh accounts); below,pp 232-3.

3 King's Council in Ireland, nos 19, 21, 23, 63, 134, 153, 170 etc

4 e.g. ibid., nos 24, 54

5 ibid., no 81

certain lands in the cantred of Offagh in Tipperary were utterly destroyed by the negligence and default of their owners and that the surrounding area was thereby laid open to the enemy, he was able to request a grant of the land to hold to himself and his heirs for ever in accordance with a statute made at Kilkenny.[1] Normally, however, the petitions merely sought lands which were for the moment in the king's hand. This evidence of a general demand for land indicates that if the absentees could not make a profit from their property they could at least have sold it to local interests for whom it would have had more value. It is necessary to remember that those absentees who did not sell their Irish lands accepted in theory the obligations as well as the profits accruing from their property, and that their duty to provide adequate defence was a burden which could offer them positive returns. Optimism in England about the potential profit of lands in Ireland was probably not general, but it can on occasion be seen. When, for instance, the Duke of Gloucester made an indenture in 1392 to serve as lieutenant in Ireland one of the conditions made was that he might acquire lands conquered from the enemy with power to retain them for his heirs.[2] The current critical state of the lordship could not be doubted, but such a desire to acquire land there--demonstrated by so many of the governors[3]—suggests that profits were still possible and that the future prospects of the country were not thought to be altogether hopeless.

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1 King's Council in Ireland no 183 The statute in question is possibly article XVIII of the Statutes of Kilkenny (1366) which provided for the grant in fee or in farm of waste lands to idelmen who were willing to take lands of the king. (Statutes and Ordinances, p 449)

2 Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 552-6

3 e.g. Both William de Windsor and John Stanley; below, pp 158-9.

The prominence given on the expedition to a number of returning absentees was not, however, entirely due to their possession of Irish lands, for many of these men were,as important English knights, natural participants in such a royal venture. Status in England clearly determined the role of many individuals--some of whom had no known interests in Ireland. This becomes clear when one looks at payments of prests from the king's household.[1] The knights mentioned by name were Thomas, Duke of Gloucester; Edward, Earl of Rutland; Roger, Earl of March; Thomas, Earl of Nottingham; John, Earl of Huntingdon; Thomas, Lord Despenser; Thomas Holland; John, Lord Beaumont; Thomas Lord Bardolf, and Hugh le Despenser. Of these men the Earl of March, who indented to serve with 700 men,[2] was the greatest absentee, but as an English magnate and cousin to the king he would have probably been included anyway. Edward, Earl of Rutland, another cousin, had no Irish interests that we know of, though he was subsequently to acquire them. He promised to bring 200 supporters.[3] Thomas, Duke of Gloucester, whose retinue numbered 400,[4] was, as an uncle of the king's and constable of England, another natural participant, even with his history of opposition to the crown. His interests in Ireland are not easy to establish. It is not known whether Eva Marshal's inheritance in Leinster, a part of which Humphrey de Bohun held early in the fourteenth century, was still in the family's hands when Gloucester married one of the Bohun heiresses.[5] Though Gloucester's father in law had held a quarter of the Badlesmere inheritance by virtue of his wife's claim, her share of Youghal and Inchiquin subsequently went to Mortimer, her heir from her first marriage.[6]

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1 i.e. John Carp's account as keeper of the King's Wardrobe, E361/5/25.

2 Two bannerets, eight knights, ninety men at arms, 200 mounted archers and 400 foot archers. See E 403/548 (27 July).

3 ibid., ten knights, forty men at arms, 150 mounted archers.

4 ibid., three bannerets, twenty knights, seventy-seven men at arms, 200 mounted archers and 100 foot archers.

5 Orpen, Ireland under the Normans, iii, 103-6: Complete Peerage, v, 719-29.

6 ibid.; Edmund Mortimer sold his share in 1374. (C.O.D., ii, no187)

Gloucester may however have had interest in the Stafford inheritance in Ireland. His daughter Anne, who was married to the young earl of Stafford, was left a widow in 1392. Although the king's council in Ireland awarded the custody of the Stafford lands in November 1392 first to Walter Cantewelle and then to the Earl of Ormond, it seems likely that Anne's father interested himself closely in their fate, holding as he did the wardship of the Stafford inheritance in England and the marriage of the heir.[1]

It is similarly difficult to assess the Irish interests of the two Despensers. Thomas, lord Despenser of Glamorgan, who brought with him 174 men,[2] was the heir of Edward Despenser. He was still a minor but was given livery of his estates in March, 1394, presumably because of the forthcoming expedition.[3] Although in the direct line of descent from Eleanor Despenser, who had brought one third of Kilkenny into the Despenser family, the inheritance of the land had been altered by Eleanor's and her husband's subsequent alienation to the Bishop of Ely.[4] When the lands returned to the family they were settled upon a younger branch, and so the Lords of Glamorgan lost their claim. Thomas was, however, certainly entitled to the inheritance of his mother, Elizabeth daughter and heir of Bartholomew de Burghersh.[5] Her father had sold his share of the de Verdon lands,[6] but apparently retained the lands that

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1 King's Council in Ireland, nos 29, 47; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 133; Cal. Fine Rolls 1391-9 p 54; it is not stated whether this included the Irish lands, but when William Stafford died in 1395 Gloucester was given the same interest in the person and estate of the next heir, specifically with the custody of the Irish lands.(C.P.R. 1396-9 p 574; C.C.R. 1396-9, 138)

2 Two knights, twenty-two men at arms, fifty mounted archers and 100 foot archers. (E 403/548, 27 July)

3 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 384

4 In 1352 the Bishop's heir granted them to Thomas Ferrers aand Anne le Despenser his widow, with remainder to Anne's younger son Hugh and Hugh's wife Alice, the grantor's daughter.(C.P.R. 1334-8 pp 106, 164-5; C.O.D., ii, no 287) The entire transaction is summarized in E.St.J. Brooks, Knights' Fees, pp 198-200)

5 Complete Peerage, iv, 278-82.

6 Otway-Ruthven, 'The partition of the de Verdon lands in Ireland in 1332', P.R.I.A., lxvi C (1967) p 417.

had come to him in Waterford through his wife, Cecily de Weylond.[1] Livery of these lands, Ballygunnar and Kiloteron, was given to Elizabeth Despenser after Edward died in 1375,[2] despite their previous forfeiture under the absentee legislation, and she was ordered 'to perform all charges due'.[3] Hugh Despenser had, on the other hand, sold his Irish interests. He was the son of Hugh and Alice Despenser and the cousin, it seems, of Thomas. The Despenser lands in Kilkenny had come to him.[4] In 1379 he had taken livery of his Irish estates, when he came with Edmund Mortimer to Ireland.[5] He obtained in 1382 and 1383 licences of absence for his lands, but in 1385 a new licence, for one year only, required that he contribute to the land's defence while absent.[6] The same condition was made in 1389,[7] and it is possible that steady demands from Ireland precipitated his sale of Kilkenny and all his rights in the liberty to James Earl of Ormond in 1391.[8] Hugh's participation in the campaign must not therefore be seen as the return of an absentee but followed naturally from his associations with other magnates involved and his military career in France.[9]

Thomas Mowbray, Earl of Nottingham, who brought with him a retinue of 240 men, had by comparison very definite personal interests in Ireland, though their exact nature is uncertain. His grandmother, Margaret Countess of Norfolk, was the eldest daughter and heiress of Thomas de Brotherton, to whom the liberty of Carlow had been granted in 1312.[10]

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1 C.I.P.M., v, nos 390, 424: vi, no 227: xii, no 322; C.P.R. 1333-7 p 393.
2 C.C.R. 1374-7 pp 298-9: see also C.P.R. 1370-4, p 285.
3 Whether Thomas held them in 1395 is unknown. There is in fact a record showing that he had a licence of absence in 18 R.II (1394-5), but this may date from the end of the expedition, and refer to lands lately acquired. (Gen. Off., MS 192 p 315)
4 Complete Peerage, iv, 278-82: above p 153 note 4.
5 Cal.Fine Rolls 1377-83 p 175: C.P.R. 1377-81 p 409; C.C.H., p 107 nos 2, 10.
6 C.P.R. 1381-5 pp 131, 274; ibid., 1385-9 p 52.
7 C.P.R. 1388-92 p 49
8 C.O.D., ii, no 297
9 His licence for absence in 1389 said that he was going to Brittany with the Earl of Huntingdon. C.P.R. 1388-92 p 49.
10 Complete Peerage, ix, 599-601

The lordship of Carlow had latterly been in abeyance, and the lands in the king's hands, because of Margaret's continued absence in England and her unlicensed alienation to Lord Hastings of certain lands.[1] However, on 21 September, 1394, as an obvious preliminary to the expedition, she had full restitution as the heir of Thomas de Brotherton of extensive lands and rights in Fotherd, County Carlow; Balysex, county Kildare; and New Ross, Old Ross and Harvey's Island in county Wexford.[2] It seems in fact that the lordship of Carlow was revived at this time in her name, and that although Thomas Mowbray was named as the lord of certain reeves submitting in this area he acted on the expedition as her representative rather than as full titular lord of Carlow.[3]

Of the other knights mentioned in the household prests none had comparable Irish connections. John, Earl of Huntingdon, had been named in 1382 as the lieutenant of Ireland,[4] and though he did not actually come to Ireland he received in August 1383 300 marks compensation for costs incurred in preparations,[5] and is known to have had a significant number of associates from Ireland.[6] He was half-brother to the king, through Joan of Kent, and was at this stage generally considered a royal favourite. He had also been associated in his early career with the Duke of Lancaster, serving with some success as constable of his army in Spain.[7] The Thomas Holland mentioned may have been the Earl of Kent, Huntingdon's brother and another of Richard's half-brothers, though the absence of his full title suggests that it was Kent's son,

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1 C.I.P.M., xiv, no 148

2 B.M. Harleian MS 2138, p 56; cf C.I.P.M., iv, no 434, showing these to be some of the estates of Ralph de Bigod in 1306.

3 Curtis, Richard II, p 155; when his grandmother died in 1399 the lordship was granted to Surrey's custody until Mowbray, then in exile, should take livery of it. (C.P.R. 1396-9 p 572)

4 C.P.R. 1381-5 p 160

5 E 404/13/87 no 23

6 e.g. Thomas de Middelton, Cornelius de Clone, and Robert de Herford; C.P.R. 1381-5 pp 173, 316; C.C.R. 1381-5 p 467.

7 A.Goodman, The loyal conspiracy, p 48

another Thomas Holland, whom we know to have been on the expedition.[1] Thomas Holland the younger was very much a royal favourite, but in any case the family's relationship to the king sufficiently accounts for their support of the expedition. John, Lord Beaumont, is less easily placed. He possessed no known Irish lands, but nor was he to any particular degree a knight of the court. His services in France, on the Scottish marches and on diplomatic missions for the king probably made his participation in the 1394-5 expedition inevitable and the subsequent generous grant of land to him suggests that he had indeed played an important role.[2] His retinue was comparatively small—only seventy-nine men--but the evidence that he increased it in the course of the expedition supports the suggestion that his contribution was significant.[3] The final knight mentioned, Lord Bardolf, again had no known Irish interests, and possibly in his case an association with the crown and royal favourites explained his presence with a retinue of thirty-one.[4] His mother when widowed had remarried and was now the wife of Thomas Mortimer, Roger's uncle, who was also on the expedition.[5]

This list in the household rolls is by no means a comprehensive one, omitting the names even of some who were officers in the household. It is possible that the payments it referred to were made in Ireland. There is certainly evidence in the Issue Rolls that payments for the first quarter were made separately to the magnates concerned--the entries providing more names and details about retinues.[6] Among these payments Mortimer, the Duke of Gloucester, the Earls of Rutland,

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1 Complete Peerage, vii, 154-9; C.P.R. 1391-6, p 554.
2 Complete Peerage, ii, 61; below, pp 165-7.
3 E 403/548 (27 July); i.e. with nineteen men at arms and sixty archers. He subsequently accounted for seven men at arms and forty-one archers which he retained for the last quarter in Ireland. (E 159/172, Mich., br. dir. baron..m 1)
4 E 403/548 (27 July); one knight, ten men at arms and twenty archers. He had served with Mowbray in France. (Goodman, Loyal Conspiracy, p 16
5 Complete Peerage, i, 418-20.
6 E 403/548 (27 July); etc.

and Nottingham, the Lords Bardolf, Beaumont and Despenser, all appeared again. As well as this, however, Thomas Percy, William Scrope and Lord Lovell were mentioned. Percy's presence on the expedition, as steward of the household, was almost indispensable, though his lack of personal interest can perhaps be detected in the small size of his retinue--only sixty-nine men.[1] William Scrope, who also brought sixty-nine men, was chamberlain to the king and at this time just coming into prominence.[2] It seems likely that the talents which were to make him within a few years treasurer of England and foremost royal advisor were already being shown. Lord Lovell too was qualified for service by his history of loyalty to Richard, having been among the household knights expelled by the Appellants in 1388.[3] He brought a retinue of seventy-nine men with him.[4]

Notices of protections and appointments of attornies provide other details about individuals who came on the expedition. Such a record gives the name of Thomas Mortimer, Roger's uncle, who had come to Ireland in the summer of 1393 to act as Roger's lieutenant.[5] Also in Mortimer's retinue was Thomas Carrew, knight, probably the absentee claimant to Idrone which was at present in the possession of MacMurrough.[6] Carrew also inherited claims to Balymaclethan in county Meath, Birton in county Kildare and Cloughmantagh in county Kilkenny, of which he still held at least Balymaclethan in 1398.[7] Rather different was the

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1 E 402/548 (27 July); 19 men at arms, 40 mounted archers and 10 foot archers.

2 ibid.; 19 men at arms, 40 mounted archers and 10 foot archers.

3 Goodman, Loyal conspiracy, p 19

4 E 403/548 (27 July); 1 knight, 18 men at arms and 60 mounted archers.

5 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 481, 357; N.L.I. MS 4 f 65

6 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 481; an inquisition proved his claim to Idrone in March 1395. (N.L.I.MS 15 ff 344-5)

7 C.C.H., p 109 no 77; P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, p 127, from Mem. Roll 1 H.IV m 41. Birton was in the barony of Moone, county Kildare and Cloghmantagh in the barony of Crannagh, county Kilkenny, but the location of Balymaclethan is not certain.

position of Robert, Lord Morlee, who belonged to the king's retinue.[1] His position as hereditary marshal of Ireland had been forfeited late in Edward III's reign by non-residence.[2] Subsequent petitions showed Morlee's concern not to lose the office,[3] and he apparently continued to use the title.[4] However, in 1392 John Thame, herberger of the king's household, was appointed by the king to be Marshal of the chief place, of the common bench and exchequer in Ireland, to have compensation if Morlee should succeed in proving his own claim.[5] Morlee did not receive confirmation in the office until 1408, and another royal favourite was in fact granted the position in 1395,[6] but the evidence concerning his long pursued claim indicates that in 1394-5 he was at least a man with personal interests in Ireland's fate.[7] The rolls also recorded the name of John Stanley, who was in fact sent ahead with other household officers to prepare for the expedition.[8] During his earlier term in office as governor of Ireland he had established personal interests in the country, acquiring for instance by royal grant the manor of Blackcastle in Meath.[9] He may therefore be supposed to have returned as an absentee,[10] though his immediate importance was as a household knight of great influence and a useful agent of royal policy. His only recorded action of the expedition was his taking of the oaths of loyalty by two reeves, who had served MacMurrough, to the king and their new lord, the Earl Marshal— a fact which suggests a possible alliance of interests between Stanley and that powerful magnate.[11] Another participant whose Irish interests

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 471
2 C.P.R. 1367-70 p 381; Complete Peerage, ix, App. H, p 58.
3 e.g. Rot. Parl., iii, 130
4 Rymer, Foedera, vii, 706
5 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 74
6 Mem. Roll 1 H.IV, m 28, in P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, p 71.
7 C.P.R. 1408-11 p 56
8 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 469
9 C.O.D., ii, no 211; he sold the property in 1399, ibid., no 340.
10 C.P.R. 1389-92 p 449
11 Curtis, Richard II, p 64

stemmed from former office in the country was John de Windsor, heir to William de Windsor, who had acquired estates in Youghal and Inchiquin when serving as lieutenant in 1372.[1]

Several Englishmen who came to Ireland in 1394-5 appear to have held rival claims to the same estates there--as for instance in the case of the Wexford lordship. Richard Talbot, who received a protection because of the expedition, was probably Lord Talbot, claimant to the liberty of Wexford.[2] Whether or not his claim had been recognized by October 1394,[3] he may possibly have held other lands in Ireland dating from his participation in Mortimer's expedition of 1380.[4] The Gilbert Talbot who received a similar protection may have been Richard's eleven year old son, a possibility supporting the argument for family interests in the country.[5] Reginald de Grey, the rival claimant to Wexford, also participated in the expedition,[6] and another man who may have been interested in the Wexford lordship was William Arundel, nephew to Richard fitz Alan, Earl of Arundel.[7] William himself probably came to Ireland as a royal retainer and favourite,[8] but it is possible that on the expedition he represented the interests of his uncle whose wife Philippa was given livery of her dower in Wexford as Countess of Pembroke in August 1394, despite the absence of herself and her husband.[9]

One representative of an old Anglo-Irish family who received a protection in 1394 was William, Lord Ferrers of Groby.[10] His grandfather

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 501; C.O.D., ii, no 179 (1372); John his heir sold it in 1413, ibid., iii, no 2.
2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 499
3 Below, pp 173-6.
4 C.P.R. 1377-81 p 584: the Talbots had not yet acquired the claim to part of the de Verdon lands around Lough Sewdy, which came to Richard's son John through marriage to the de Furnival heiress. (Complete Peerage, v, 589-90; xii, p 620; C.C.H. p 225 no 21.)
5 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 476
6 ibid., p 474
7 ibid. His relationship is explained in C.I.P.M., xv, no 184 and C.P.R. 1377-81 p 438.
8 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 178, 246, 371, 345, 378 etc.
9 C.C.R. 1392-6 p 318
10 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 482

had in 1364 sold his share of the de Verdon lands except for Lough Sewdy.[1] It is possible that the land left to him was of no profit, for a plea for reduction of scutage had been made in 1369,[2] but the fifteenth century claim by the Talbots to their share of this area suggests that the land continued to be potentially profitable.[3] Lord Ferrers is not known to have had licences of absence in the period prior to this, and the family's interest in Ireland is to some extent confused by the activities of Henry Ferrers, cousin to William, Lord Ferrers, who died in 1375. This Henry Ferrers had married Joan Tuyt in 1364 and another Irish widow in 1376 and had since been required to contribute to the defence of his lands in Ireland while absent.[4] He may by 1394 have died; he is certainly not known to have taken any part in Richard's expedition. The Lough Sewdy area may also have interested Ralph de Neville, knight, who possibly acted during these months on behalf of Thomas Neville, the holder through his wife, Joan de Furnival, of part of the de Verdon inheritance there,[5] though it is not known that the Nevilles of Raby held in their own right any Irish estates.

While most of the knights on the expedition were thus natural participants in any royal campaign, it is clear that a number had indirect connections with or personal interests in the lordship of Ireland. Many other names should probably be added to this selective account. Sir John de Bohun, for example, is not definitely known to have been on the expedition, but he may well have gone.[6] The knights mentioned here probably include

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1 Otway-Ruthven, 'Partition of the de Verdon lands', p 417.
2 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 301 n 54
3 C.C.H. p 225 no 21
4 Complete Peerage, v, 352, note; C.P.R. 1377-81 p 528 etc. He went to Ireland in 1381.(C.P.R. 1381-5 p 9)
5 Complete Peerage, v, 589-90; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 509; Thomas Neville, remaining in England, acted for Ralph. (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 509)
6 He had indentured to serve with Gloucester in 1392, went to Ireland in 1398 and was still in possession of Irish lands, though absentee, early in the next century. (B.M.Add. MS 40,859 A; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 375; P.R.O.I. Ferguson's Repertory, xv, p 8, from Mem. Roll 5 H.IV.)

however most of those whose participation in the expedition had unusual potential significance.

The contribution of these knights varied enormously, some being actively involved in the campaigns while others aided the making of general policy and many engaged in activities which are now completely obscure. Gloucester, for instance, did not arrive in Ireland until a fortnight after the main body of the army, and, though present with the royal party which accomplished Leinster's ultimate reduction, he cannot have played any considerable role in the preliminary campaigns.[1] He was sent, moreover, to England in the new year to report on progress, returning to Ireland with an endorsement of Richard's policy by the English parliament and the support of more money and men.[2] The evidence suggests that he played a comparatively passive role in Ireland itself, though one must remember that his sizable retinue was probably well employed on his behalf. It has been suggested that he was outshone by the king's younger courtiers during the expedition, but the knowledge that Richard delayed his advance against the Leinster Irish until Gloucester arrived indicates that his position of authority was recognized and his counsel valued.[3]

There is on the other hand no doubt that Thomas Mowbray, Earl of Nottingham, played a part of great importance, both in the campaigns and in the recording of submissions, though it is worth noting that reliance on the records of submission inevitably gives prominence to men engaged on this aspect of the expedition. His role in Leinster derived naturally from his position as heir to the lordship of Carlow, but the notice of similar

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1 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 284

2 E 403/550 (15 February); C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 586-7; Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 57-61.

3 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 284; cf Goodman, Loyal conspiracy, pp 62-3.

powers in Thomond suggests that he was not acting simply in his capacity as the heir to a great Anglo-Irish lordship, but as the agent of a royal policy.[1] Undoubtedly his own interests were favoured by any weakening of the Leinster Irish, and it is not surprising that we find him particularly active in the initial campaigns there. One account credits him with 'several fine encounters' with MacMurrough's people, and asserts that it was he who nearly captured MacMurrough and his wife.[2] In this campaigning period, where the warding strategy was followed with such success, other centres were commanded by the Earls of Rutland and Beaumont, Thomas Holland and Thomas Percy.[3] It seems that all these men acquitted themselves well, and it is probable that subsequent grants to at least some of them were in the nature of rewards. Presumably they continued to give the same service during the rest of the campaign, though in fact apart from Nottingham only Rutland is known to have been assigned to bring a particular area under control. His exploits in Munster, where he brought the MacCarthy's to submission, have already been described.[4]

Undoubtedly many more men must have distinguished themselves than we now have evidence of. Nor would all of these have been magnates, or even knights. Men such as Janico Dartas, for instance, apparently made their reputation on the Irish expedition.[5] Others, like John de Liverpool, who subsequently remained in Ireland, seem to have advanced their own careers through the military opportunities provided by the expedition.[6] Some knights engaged in the record of submissions are also

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1 Above, pp 83; 105
2 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 293; cf p 291
3 ibid., p 291
4 Above, pp 105, 108-9 etc
5 For an account of his career see E.Curtis, 'Janico Dartas, Richard II's Gascon squire', J.R.S.A.I., lxiii (1933) pp 182-205.
6 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 451. He later became constable of Wicklow castle and then seneschal of Ulster.(C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 10; C.C.H., p 167 no73; p 184 no 156.) Other members of his family followed similar careers in Ireland; e.g. C.C.H. p 193 no 175.

worth noting, showing how the returning absentees were assisted by royal retainers from England as well as by the expected Anglo-Irish men. Thus the witness lists to the Leinster agreement of January and to the Thomond record of March included Sir John Golafre, Sir William Faringdon, and Jean de Grailly along with Edward Perrers, David Wogan, Edmund de Vale of the Hospitallers and others.[1] For the most part, however, the submissions before the king were witnessed by the prominent clerics in the king's company. The Bishops of Llandaff, and Chichester[2] appeared constantly, aided sometimes by Thomas Merke of Westminster.[3] The Anglo-Irish Archbishops of Dublin and Armagh,[4] and the Bishops of Leighlin and Waterford and Lismore,[5] as well as other ecclesiastical dignitaries,[6] assisted mainly where their local areas were concerned. The household nucleus was emphasized by the participation in these important instruments of John Boor, Dean of the King's Chapel, and John Borghull, the king's confessor.[7] The knights involved varied considerably, the ones appearing most frequently being Huntingdon, Rutland, Nottingham, Percy and William Scrope.[8] The absence of a man's name at times seems to have indicated his activity in different areas rather than his lack of involvement in the expedition's submission policy.[9] We know, for instance, from Rutland's letter to Richard that the preliminary stages of the MacCarthy submissions in Munster were to some degree effected by William Heroun, who actually received an oath of loyalty from Cormac MacCarthy, Lord of Muskerry, yet in no

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1 Curtis, Richard II, p 85; Ronan, 'Some medieval documents', p 233.
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 59-63; 67-70; 93 etc.
3 ibid., pp 97, 100, 114.
4 ibid., pp 61, 63, 69, 72, 73, 93, 107 etc.
5 ibid., pp 61, 63, 67, 84, 93 etc
6 e.g. Archbishop of Cashel (ibid., p 62); Bishop of Meath (ibid., p 94); Bishop of London (ibid., p 68); Archbishop of York (ibid., p 68) etc.
7 ibid., pp 72, 100
8 Huntingdon, ibid., pp 63, 67, 73, 93, 101; Rutland, ibid., pp 63, 73, 93; Nottingham, ibid., pp 59, 69, 70, 93; Scrope, ibid., pp 59, 62, 67, 69; Percy, ibid., pp 69, 70, 98, 101, 102.
9 e.g. Arundel, ibid., p 75; Luttrel, ibid., pp 94, 103; Scrope, ibid., p 94.

submission document was this knight mentioned as a witness.[1] Such use of English knights in different areas must have been general, yet their contribution went for the most part unrecognized. For instance, the letter from Magennis requesting that William Scrope be the emissary sent to meet him with signet letters of safe conduct is the only evidence that Scrope's work on the expedition must have often taken him away from court, where, from his presence on the witness lists of submission documents, one would assume that he normally remained.[2] Other fluctuations in these witness lists probably reflected similar local assignments elsewhere. It has already been shown that Mortimer did not witness any of the surviving submissions made by men from his area of influence [3]—proving that the interests shown by absentees in their lordships cannot accurately be gauged from the submission records. Unfortunately there is virtually no alternative source. Letters describing the campaign refer only to the first stages of the expedition and to particular incidents. The calendared chancery rolls of Ireland are very uninformative, confirming the impression that much business must have been accomplished with the signet, not the great seal of Ireland. They do give some slight glimpse of the variety of activity engaged in by those on the expedition. Thomas Percy is shown, for instance, as acting in his official capacity as steward of the household to arrest certain goods.[4] On the other hand, Thomas Mortimer, whose absentee interests would be otherwise unknown, is seen to have brought an assize of novel disseisin against one Thomas More.[5] The impression these two entries give of the public interest of those with no ties in Ireland and the private ambitions of the absentees

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1 Curtis, Richard II, p 123
2 ibid., p 219
3 Above, p 96, n 2
4 C.C.H., p 154 nos 30, 56
5 ibid., p 153 no 12

is probably a fairly accurate, if simple, view of the different roles the knights of England had to play in Ireland in 1394-5.

Part of the value in assessing the role of the absentees and other Englishmen on the expedition lies in the probability that their future view of the country was moulded by their experiences there. For the English magnates without Irish interests their experience was important in determining their attitude to Richard's Irish policies in the following years. For the absentees, however, personal experience in Ireland could be turned to immediate practical use--in investigating the potential of Irish interests and the degree of responsibility that was justified. It may be useful at this point to identify more particularly the absentees in question, as the composition of the group had altered somewhat during the expedition, with grants of lands to men who had distinguished themselves in Ireland. Unfortunately in only a few cases were these grants enrolled, and one must assume that the resulting picture is incomplete.

One of the very few grants to be so enrolled was that made to John de Beaumont. The letters patent, made at Waterford on 28 April, recorded the grant to Beaumont of all castles, towns, manors, lands, tenements, rents, services and other rights arising within an area bounded by the Slaney on the south and the Blackwater at Arklow on the north, and stretching from the sea on the east to the boundaries of Kildare and Carlow on the west.[1] The exact location of the grant presents some problems of interpretation, for it apparently encroached considerably upon the lands of other lords, particularly those of the liberty of Wexford. Only the lands of the Earl of Ormond were specifically excepted

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1 C.C.H., pp 152-3 no 53

from the calendared version of Beaumont's grant, though an early seventeenth century account stated that the lands of Roche, Synott, Wadding, and the Bishop of Ferns were among other exceptions.[1] The manors included were named subsequently as those of 'Farringmall, O'Felmigh, Shermall, Lymalogoughe, Shilela, Gory, and Dipps', from which it has been shown that some of the fees in question had been held by de Bigod, Lord of Carlow, while others belonged originally to the de Valence Lord of Wexford.[2] To some extent the problem is lessened by the condition of the lands themselves, for the area was in the heart of Gaelic Leinster, long outside the control of the lordship.[3] As early as 1307 it was stated that some of the lands in part of the Wexford lordship no longer rendered royal service, being 'waste and destroyed' by the war of the Irish.[4] Beaumont's grant cannot therefore have been viewed either by himself or contemporaries as a generous gift to a royal favourite. On the contrary, the contingent obligations and responsibilities must have been apparent to all from the beginning. For a start, the grant seems to have been made about the time of the submission of the Leinster chiefs and their agreement to surrender their lands in Leinster, not, as has been suggested, just prior to Richard's departure, when the Leinster agreement was already in jeopardy. Such a conclusion is at least indicated by the fact that on 4 February a writ was enrolled ordering the clerk of the hanaper to deliver without fee to Beaumont the letters by which the king had granted divers castles, manors and lands to him.[5] The enrolment of 28 April probably referred back to the same grant, without revealing

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1 Calendar of Patent Rolls of Ireland, James I, p 401
2 ibid.; Brooks, Knights' Fees, pp 6-7, 135-6
3 ibid., p 135
4 C.I.P.M., v, 22; vi, 325; vii, 293
5 C.C.H., p 154 no 49

the actual date of its donation.[1] The grant therefore gives direct evidence on Richard's plans for the lands which had come into the possession of the Irish in Leinster and which it was now thought possible to resettle. It shows that Beaumont was given the area in question not merely with its existing rights but as one lordship with powers comparable to those held in the great liberties of Ireland. He was to have all feudal rights belonging to the area, and advowsons of churches. He might hold a court before his seneschal which would have cognizance of all pleas and complaints, both those of the crown and others, arising within the stated boundaries and he might both compel attendance and receive all fines arising from the actions. He had full return of writs within this territory, no mention being made even of the exemption of any crosslands. All these rights he was to hold for himself and his heirs for ever by the service of one knight. On one level these powers indeed seem generous, for of the Irish lordships only the liberty of Meath is known to have possessed the four pleas of the Crown--rape, arson, forestall and treasure trove.[2] In Beaumont's case, however, the overall benefactor was not the grantee but the king. The lord of a liberty was always a royal agent with restrictions upon his independence.[3] Beaumont, it is clear, was initially expected to provide the local authority to enforce the submission policy in Leinster, and the existence of his grant shows how Richard did indeed follow up the instruments of submission with some practical measures. Had Beaumont stayed in Ireland and made his grant effective the land in question might well have become a stable area under the crown, containing both Irish and Anglo-Irish in Beaumont's lordship. The policy seems a realistic one, given the

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1 C.C.H., pp 152-3, no 53; cf Curtis, Medieval Ireland, p 274 etc
2 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 182
3 ibid., pp 181-7 passim, for an account of the liberties of Ireland.

Irish submissions. Unfortunately Beaumont did not remain long enough to have any hope of establishing effective authority.[1]

Beaumont's grant was probably only one of many such made in late 1394 or early 1395, as the king took advantage of his successes in Leinster. Such grants were probably made under the signet, or under the great seal but not enrolled.[2] We have only an incidental reference in the rolls to, for instance, the grant made to Janico Dartas. On 12 December he was ordered not to intrude in the manor of Rathdown, in taking possession of lands recently granted to him in the manors of 'Kenlyeston, Suttonestoun, Kilerok, Carrykmayne, Whitestoun, Termok, Killaghtre, Kilmartoun, Ballyronan, and Kilmol' and other lands.[3] It was made clear that this grant had been partly the result of the rebellion and forfeiture of the Anglo-Irishmen, though Dartas himself subsequently referred in scathing terms to his piece of land 'in the country of the Irish rebels'.[4] It was certainly true that the pressure of the Irish on this area south of Dublin, which in the past had presumably encouraged the degeneracy of the Anglo-Irish there, was seen as detracting greatly from the attractiveness of the grant. Dartas probably exaggerated somewhat when he described his grant in disparaging terms, but the subsequent return of some of the land to the Archbold family suggests that it was indeed of little profit: in other areas Dartas showed no such readiness to relinquish his acquisitions.[5] His obvious lack of enthusiasm about the grant indicates that he was given these particular lands by the king's decision rather than as a result of any personal petition. That he was given lands at all was obviously as a reward for his useful services to the

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1 Beaumont died in 1396, having never returned to Ireland. (Complete Peerage, ii, 61)

2 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 334 n 50

3 C.C.H., p 154 no 52

4 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 288

5 ibid.; C.C.H., p 172 no 7; Curtis, 'Janico Dartas', passim.

king on the expedition, but the nature of the lands, about which Dartas had no illusions, showed that Richard did not reward his favourites over generously.[1] It seems indeed that the grant to Dartas fitted into the general context of royal policy after the initial reduction of Leinster. On men like Dartas was laid the responsibility of protecting the settlement and strengthening the lordship, and it was probably Dartas's clear understanding of the obligations involved in his grant which was to make him so unimpressed about its potential profit.

About other grants made by Richard at this time even less precise information is available. Gerald O'Byrne's letter of 18 January explicitly stated that Gaelic lands in Leinster had been redistributed, with the knowledge and apparently the assent of the Irishmen themselves.[2] O'Byrne referred to his surrender of 'all the possessions, lands and tenements which I had in my country, for you to dispose of at your will', and went on to describe how the king 'gave to the Duke of Gloucester and to your Chamberlain of Ireland certain domains within the said country', making O'Byrne himself custodian at the king's pleasure of the rest of the area. This is the only information we have from the expedition's documentary records that Gloucester and William Scrope, who was known on the expedition as the king's chamberlain of Ireland,[3] were granted lands in Wicklow. The evidence supports the impression given by the grants to Beaumont and Dartas--namely that lands occupied by rebels were granted to Englishmen in an effort to revitalize the lordship. Although it is possible that Scrope's personal interests in Wicklow were followed up in subsequent years, when his brother acted as justiciar,[4] there is no evidence to suggest that Gloucester's

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1 The exploits of 'J.D.' probably referred to these services. (Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 293)

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 141, 220; above, p 79.

3 Curtis, Richard II, p 140

4 Below, pp 344-5.

grant was in any case effective, and he appears to have thought little of the value of any investment in Ireland.[1]

The unattractiveness of land which was virtually in the possession of the Irish--particularly when Richard showed himself willing to hear Gaelic complaints about English and Anglo-Irish aggression--probably made the prospects of donees in Leinster particularly bleak. There can have been little incentive subsequently to pay for enrolment of the grants, and the inadequacies of our evidence are thus partly explained. In the absence of such instruments one is dependent upon any evidence which may be available and conclusions are necessarily speculative. A document of some interest in this respect, though its uncertain provenance requires caution in its use, is that preserved in Hargrave 313.[2] Part of this document recites seven grants allegedly made in the course of the expedition. The document cannot be accepted as literally accurate, being obviously a description relying upon another source, but it is useful in helping to identify the names of men receiving grants and the possible location of the lands. That a measure of truth does lie behind the source can easily be demonstrated by its account of the grants to Dartas and Beaumont. It says that Beaumont was given 'the county of Wexford with all its appurtenances' and that 'Janico esquier to the king' received 'Kenleiston' with all its appurtenances. Naturally in these cases the record of the patent rolls is a preferable authority, but where official instruments have not survived Hargrave 313 appears sufficiently well-informed to merit serious consideration. In the case of Gloucester and Scrope Hargrave 313 confirms O'Byrne's story that they received grants in his territory. The details of the account are, however, confused. It is said that Gloucester received 'nine castles of Harkyngan'--probably

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1 Below, p 177.
2 B.M. Hargrave MS 313, f 54; below Appendix VI, pp 563-5.

an ignorant rendering of 'Newcastle Mackinegan', near Wicklow. This was a royal castle and its alienation 'with all appurtenances' was unlikely, but Gloucester may have been granted its custody. The grant to Scrope is said to have been of 'the castle of Wicklow and the town there and all the lands of Gerald Obrin'. According to O'Byrne's own letter this was obviously only partly true. Scrope may however have been given custody of Wicklow, another royal castle.

Part of the interest of this document in Hargrave 313 lies in the fact that three other people are named as receiving lands, though we have no record evidence substantiating the account. It is perhaps obvious that the Earl of Rutland, who was made Earl of Cork sometime before 15 January,[1] must have received lands or rights of some sort along with the title, though no instrument survives recording this. Hargrave 313 unfortunately tells us only that he was granted the whole county of Cork with all appurtenances--an account which cannot be substantiated though Rutland may have indeed received Cork as a liberty.[2] We can at least be certain that the earl acquired some landed rights in Cork. No reference in subsequent years reveals any more about this, although Rutland's interests in the area are confirmed by the fact that a group of men called 'Rutland's retinue' continued to provide defence in Munster after the expedition ended.[3] Another man who according to only this document received a grant of land on the expedition was Thomas Mowbray, the Earl Marshal and Earl of Nottingham. He is said to have received the castle of 'Keffyn' with all that county and all the lands around MacMurrough. It seems most unlikely that Castle Kevin--if this was indeed the correct meaning of 'Keffyn'--was really given to Mowbray, for it belonged to the Archbishop of Dublin and was situated near Glendalough, not near the centre of MacMurrough's

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 146-7; above, p 105
2 In the petition of 1399 Cork was named as a liberty. Below, p 512.
3 Below, pp 311-2.

power.[1] Castle Kevin had not apparently been maintained; early in Richard's reign Nicholas Dagworth had taken into the King's hands the manor of Swords which had been granted to the archbishop in 1260 to enable him to erect and maintain Castlekevin.[2] One cannot however doubt the essential fact, that Nottingham's absentee interests were strengthened during the expeditionary months. He was referred to as lord of the area dominated by MacMurrough, by virtue of his relationship to Margaret, Countess of Norfolk, and he himself was definitely made constable of Carlow castle.[3] The final grant mentioned in this document is that to the Lord 'Lesepencer' of 'the county of Waterford with all its appurtenances'. This again, in the absence of any confirmatory evidence, is difficult to accept in its entirety. As heir to Elizabeth de Burghersh Despenser did however have a potential foothold in Waterford and there is no inherent improbability in the suggestion that he was granted something in that area.[4]

It is probable that many other similar grants, now lost, were made during Richard's months in Ireland. Nor were all these necessarily within Leinster, where the Irish submission settlement made specific reference to landholding. Rutland's acquisitions, for instance, lay in Cork, and another grant which has accidentally survived through a later inspeximus record shows that William Scrope received extensive privileges in Louth and Drogheda.[5] The evidence of this settlement is relevant in any examination of Richard's successes in Ireland. Not only does it reveal,

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1 Orpen, Ireland under the Normans, iv, 14

2 C.C.R. 1377-81 p 383; the archbishop contested the seizure, but the result is not recorded. (See P.R.O.I. R.C.8/33, pp 60-2, from Mem. Roll 3 R.II)

3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 19; Curtis, Richard II, pp 155-6 The reeves were to hold their office before the Lord Marshal 'their lord as it is asserted', and not MacMurrough.

4 Above, pp 153-4

5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 318; below, pp 228-9.

through the grants themselves, the policy which was intended to strengthen Anglo-Ireland, but it demonstrates the difficulties facing any attempt to identify the principal landholders upon whom lay responsibility for the future peace of the country.

The case of the lordship of Wexford offers a particularly good example of our inability to trace land titles with real precision, and our consequent difficulties in tracing the fate of Richard's settlement. The direct Hastings line, which had held Wexford since the death of Aymer de Valence, died out in 1389.[1] Many inquisitions were taken in England to establish the heir, but the results were not conclusive. Some gave the verdict in favour of Reginald de Grey of Ruthyn, whose grandmother, Elizabeth Hastings, was the daughter of Isobel de Valence of Wexford and John Hastings. Others said that the true descent was through a younger sister of Aymer de Valence, Joan, who had married John Comyn and whose existing heirs were Richard Talbot and the two daughters of David de Strathbogie, the Earl of Athol, who was dead. In other inquisitions Hugh Hastings and William de la Zouche were said to be the heirs, but by October 1391 the issue had been resolved in England in favour of Reginald de Grey. It seems that he had been seriously opposed by Richard Talbot, and Strathbogie's daughters, who disputed that Reginald's grandmother was in fact the daughter of John Hastings and Isobel de Valence. As they twice failed to appear to support their claim in court the decision was given in favour of de Grey who did homage and fealty to Richard and was given livery of the Hastings lands in England and Calais.[2] At the same time, an order was made that Philippa, the widow of John Hastings, and now the wife of the Earl of Arundel, was to be given livery of her dower.[3] As a similar order

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1 Dugdale, Baronage of England, i, 578
2 C.C.R. 1389-92 pp 410-15
3 ibid., p 413


William de Valence m Joan de Munchency
Aymer
Isobel m John Hastings
Joan m John Comyn
John Hastings
Elizabeth m Roger Grey
Elizabeth m Richard Talbot
Joan m David de Strathbogie
Laurence Hastings
Reginald, Lord Grey de Ruthyn (d 1388)
Gilbert Talbot (d 1387)
David de Strathbogie
John Hastings
Reginald, Lord Grey de Ruthyn (d 1444)
Richard Talbot (d 1396)
David de Strathbogie (d 1367)
John Hastings (o.s.p. 1389)
Gilbert Talbot
John, Lord Furnival
John Scrope m Elizabeth
Philippa m John Halsham

with respect to her dower in Ireland does not seem to have been made until August 1394, it seems possible that the process of proving the heir in Ireland had been delayed.[1] From March 1392 the Earl of Ormond acted as attorney for one year for both the Strathbogie daughters and their husbands, and de Grey's failure to prove his title in Ireland may have been related to Ormond's efforts on his rivals' behalf.[2] The delivery of Philippa's dower, which in fact was ordered to be made in August 1394 in de Grey's presence, and de Grey's own use of the title 'lord of Wexford' in July 1394 suggest that before the expedition began the issue was resolved in his favour.[3] However, on 24 April 1395 the record at Kilkenny of a recent decision by 'the king himself' named as the heirs of Hastings in Wexford Richard Talbot, John le Scroop, knight, and Elizabeth his wife, and John Halsham with Philippa his wife--in other words Richard Talbot and the daughters of Strathbogie.[4] It does indeed seem that Richard was subsequently called Lord of Wexford, and it may be that his services on the expedition won for him a favourable decision on the Hastings inheritance in Ireland.[5] The issue did not, however, rest there. After Talbot's death in 1396 the coheirs seem to have lost or abandoned their claim. Reginald de Grey went to Ireland in 1398, on matters concerning his inheritance,[6] and he apparently had livery of his estates there while Richard was still king.[7] The lordship subsequently descended through Gilbert Talbot to his brother John, though de Grey's heir was still using the Wexford title in 1465.[8]

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1 C.C.R. 1392-6 p 318
2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 43
3 C.C.R. 1392-6 p 318; E 371/153 m 25
4 C.C.H., p 152 no 37
5 Complete Peerage, xi, 699
6 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 347
7 C.C.R. 1396-9 p 145; Hore, History of Wexford, v, 126, from Mem. 3 H.IV.
8 Complete Peerage, xi, 699; C.C.H. p 229 no 107a: de Grey had very recently appointed attornies in Ireland. (ibid., p 218 no 19) It is possible that he sold his interest to the Talbots, but his maintenance of the Wexford title and his 1425 petition for a place in parliament, allegedly usurped by Talbot, points to a conflict of interests. (Rot. Parl., iv, 312)

The confusion surrounding title to the liberty in the 1390s indicates one of the difficulties facing Richard in any attempt to revitalize the country through local lordships.

Possession of Irish interests naturally affected the Englishmen's and Anglo-Irish absentees' subsequent view of royal policy towards the lordship. It is difficult to measure exactly how England's political community regarded Ireland after the expedition.[1] From the point of view of consistent government policy it is worth bearing in mind that the combination of household officers and royal favourites so important in Ireland in 1394-5 did not change dramatically in the English political upheavals of 1397. The Earl of Nottingham went into exile and Gloucester died in prison, while Thomas Mortimer went into hiding in Ireland. The core of hostility to the court, seen in Arundel, Warwick and Archbishop Arundel, had, however, played little part in the Irish enterprise and their disappearance from the scene had limited significance for the lordship. On the contrary, Richard's English council of later years depended greatly on men who had proven their abilities and loyalties in Ireland, both among the clerical officers and the magnates of the land.[2] It may be assumed therefore that until the end of the reign not only Richard but his closest advisors had unusual experience and knowledge of affairs in Ireland, a point worth remembering in considering Richard's reasons for returning there in 1399. Precisely what this group thought of Ireland cannot now be known, but it is certain that among English people in general the lack of lasting success in Ireland produced a desire to dissociate themselves from the problems of the lordship. This insularity was

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1 Below, p 385 ff.

2 See, e.g., the subsequent career of Walden, keeper of the signet on the expedition. (Tout, Chapters, v, 221)

seen already in 1395, when the additional grant for Ireland contained the proviso that it should not constitute a precedent.[1] As for the English who came on the expedition, it is probable that to them the Anglo-Irish were as alien as they had been to Clarence's army in the 1360s.[2] The absence of rich towns to be sacked and the concentration on a political rather than military solution to Ireland's problems probably added to the unattractiveness of the country for the average knight. It was hardly surprising that the call to Richard's second expedition there only four years later met in places with a hostile reception.[3]

The most significant aspect of this feeling of disenchantment lay, from the point of view of Anglo-Ireland, in its impact upon those with lands in the country. For Richard's settlement to work their presence, or at least continued investment, was essential. The grants of Irish land to worthy knights were not simply gestures of favour but a practical insurance against rapid reversal to pre-expeditionary conditions. It seems, unfortunately, that even these men who had personally gained from the expedition were disillusioned with Ireland's potential. The Duke of Gloucester, for instance, who in 1392 had been prepared to come and govern the country, after winning in his indenture the right to acquire and retain land in the country, returned to England in 1395 unimpressed by his new lands in Wicklow and apparently content never to go again to Ireland.[4] Janico Dartas, a relatively obscure squire, only beginning his ambitious career, complained that the location of his new lands made them virtually untenable and certainly unprofitable.[5]

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1 Rot. Parl.,iii, 330

2 Statutes and Ordinances, p 437 art 4 was probably a result of this feeling.

3 For this question of English attitudes to Ireland, see below,p 385ff.

4 Oeuvres de Froissart, xvi, 5

5 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 288; above p 168

As he was speaking partly of Anglo-Irish lands which had been forfeited by the rebellion of the degenerate Harolds and Archbolds his remarks gave a glimpse of the divide between Anglo-Irish and English attitudes. Janico showed, moreover, that even a newcomer like himself could grasp the unliklihood of lasting peace with the treacherous Irish. It is not improbable that his views were typical and that even the royal advisors closest to the king were aware that the chances of substantial improvement after the submissions were slim. Although there is no direct evidence showing agreement among other absentees with this viewpoint, their actions indicated, at the least, a low level of interest in Ireland. Rutland was required to maintain his retinue in Cork for some time, though not, it seems, out of his own pocket, and apparently showed no real interest at all in Ireland during the next four years.[1] The same was true of Nottingham, Beaumont, Despenser and the others who had come. William Scrope, who came to Ireland as a comparatively untried officer,left it immediately after the expedition ended, despite the rights and offices he had been granted in the country.

There is no doubt that Richard himself was partly to blame for the rapid exodus of the absentees once he himself left the country. Many of the prominent clerical figure, for example, who received licences of absence during the following years were employed by Richard on diplomatic missions to France and Rome.[2] Other bishops who received licences included the Bishop of Cork, the Bishop of Ossory and the

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1 A petition apparently addressed to the Earl of Rutland and Cork 'the king's deputy' and to a parliament assembled at Dublin early in the next decade suggests that Rutland did in fact maintain a long-standing connection with the area, but the uncertain provenance of the document, which survives only in transcript, prevents one accepting its authority as sufficient. No other source in fact confirms that Rutland indeed held office in Ireland under Henry IV.(Cal.Carew MSS,V, 441 and Lambeth MS 623 ff 18-19, MS 614 f 201)

2 e.g. Archbishop of Dublin (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 687); Archbishop of Armagh (P.R.O.I.,Calendar, iii,p 98, from Mem. Roll 1 H.IV, m 35 d)

the Bishop of Lismore and Waterford.[1] Though their reasons for travelling are unknown, it is possible that they were attracted to Richard's court with its considerable clerical element. If Richard was not to blame for the absence of these men, he certainly held ultimate responsibility for the grants of offices in Ireland to favourites empowered to enjoy the profits in England and exercise the office by deputy. Such grants probably demonstrated Richard's determination to make use of the revenues of the country and his need to reward faithful servants rather than any real complacency about the state of Ireland. This exploitation of Irish resources was inevitable, and it would be a mistake to judge these gifts too readily as the foolish dissipation of heavily strained assets. Evidence on the subject tends to be distorted, for the loss of so many Anglo-Irish records and the survival of the English ones concentrates our attention on grants which were recorded in England. As this was a comparatively rare occurrence our information on patronage in Anglo-Ireland is very imprecise. Undoubtedly there were occasions when Richard made direct grants in England of, for instance, offices in Ireland to men who had licence to hold them for life by deputy--a form which suggests that the office was being used to augment revenue and that the appointment was not purely concerned with the obligations of office. One can see this clearly from two grants made prior to the expedition. In May 1394 William Kilmyngton was made constable of Carlow Castle for life, and in June William Braunspath was similarly appointed constable of Limerick Castle. Both were empowered to hold office by deputy, and as Kilmyngton was sergeant of the larder in the king's household it is

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1 Bishop of Cork (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 723); Bishop of Ossory (ibid., p 717); Bishop of Lismore and Waterford (C.P.R. 1396-9 p 220).

most unlikely that he was ever intended to become the acting commander of Carlow.[1] Into this category too came John Lowyk's appointment in 1395 as collector of the customs of Ireland, an office which, as yeoman of the robes, he clearly had to exercise by deputy.[2] Other grants made during the expedition contained similar licences of absence. John Fekenham, one of the ushers of the chamber, received 'all the lands, rents and services with wards, marriages, fees, advowsans of churches, escheats, forfeitures, wreck of sea and other appurtenances in Ballybrigyn, Ballythermor, Molaragh, Ballyrolly, Stevenestoun and in Doulagh in the barony of Ballyrothery, with licence to dwell in England without restriction'.[3] William Ashe, another usher of the chamber, was made the Marshal in the Chief Place and Common Bench and Exchequer and usher in the Exchequer, with power to exercise the offices by deputy.[4] John Lincoln, a king's clerk of some importance, who had been granted the prebend of Castleknock in 1393, was granted leave to hold it in absence.[5]

It is impossible--in our ignorance of the exact number of such grants or their value--to estimate their effects upon Ireland. While rewards of this nature to useful servants were to be expected, the cumulative effect may have been an actual increase in the frequency of absenteeism. This pattern was certainly pronounced at the highest level, for as we have seen Richard granted land in Ireland to many men whom he cannot seriously have intended to take up residence in Ireland. That the new landlords, like Beaumont and Rutland, did not assume their

1 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 407, 502
2 ibid., p 618
3 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 341; C.C.H. p 153 no 59
4 P.R.O.I.Calendar, iii, p 71, from Mem. Roll 1 H. IV, m 28; cf above p 158.
5 C.P.R.1391-6 p 332; C.C.H., p 153 no 58; see also C.P.R.1396-9, pp 221, 344, 382 for other grants.

Irish responsibilities can to a certain extent be explained by their immediate appointment to go to France on negotiations concerning Richard's marriage.[1] While still in Ireland Richard suggested that he might send Rutland, Huntingdon, March, or two of them, with the Archbishop of Dublin or another Bishop, and his chamberlain Scrope to meet the French representatives.[2] In fact, all of these men except Mortimer did leave Ireland after the expedition, greatly decreasing the chances of the settlement's survival.

While vague patterns can be discerned, one cannot unfortunately be sure of the actions of the majority of knights concerned and there is evidence that a few at least took a new interest in Ireland at this time. Gilbert Talbot in February and Thomas Holland in March appointed attornies in England for one year, and may have stayed in Ireland after the expedition returned home in May.[3] Thomas Carrew, whose claim to Idrone was recognized on the expedition, was mentioned as being in Mortimer's company in October 1395, and his presence must have helped to protect the new settlement of Leinster.[4] He apparently remained in Ireland until July 1398.[5] Thomas Mortimer also stayed in the country, but his presence was probably adequately explained not by his own personal interests but by his position as uncle and advisor to Roger Mortimer, lieutenant of Ulster, Connacht, and Meath.[6]

In Mortimer we can see something of the dilemma behind the absentee problem and indeed that of the Anglo-Irish magnates at this point. Mortimer's office in Ireland caused no surprise, it being in

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1 Foedera, vii, 803
2 Anglo-Norman Letters, no 109
3 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 536, 554
4 ibid., p 619
5 P.R.O.I., Calendar, iii, p 127, from Mem.Roll 1 H.IV m 41.
6 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 56

a sense his heritage. That he was not unwilling to shoulder the burden is suggested by his concern at the malgovernance of his earldom while in the king's hands, and the terms of indenture in 1392 which provided for his use of personal funds in the onerous task.[1] For Mortimer absenteeism was in fact the accidental by-product of his enormous wealth outside Ireland, not the conscious abandonment of an unprofitable area. The expedition should in theory have favoured his interests, by dealing with Irish grievances and promoting stability. In fact, as a returning absentee it was not in Mortimer's interest to preserve the existing situation. He wanted restitution of all that had been wrested from the original lordship. This led to his disagreement with O'Neill in Richard's presence and coloured much of the subsequent submission policy in Ulster.[2] After Richard left, Mortimer as lieutenant seems to have been bound to support the royal policy, which included no unwarranted aggression against the Irish. That Mortimer finally, apparently on his own initiative, used the forces of Anglo-Ireland to attack and burn an unsuspecting Armagh demonstrated a weakness inherent in all late fourteenth century attempts to make the absentees come home in person. When they did so the difference between their nominal and actual powers increased political tension in the lordship, so that instead of being centres of stability and obedience for the crown they were liable to become potential disturbers of the peace. In the situation facing men like Mortimer when Richard left Ireland in 1395 lay a formidable challenge for the prospects of continued peace in the country.

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1 Tuck, 'Anglo-Irish relations, 1382-93', p 29; above pp 148-50.
2 Above, pp 89 - 97.

Section II -- The period between the expeditions, 1395-9

Chapter 3

The chief governors of Ireland and their relations with the crown, 1395-9

Part i -- The holders of office and the chronology of their appointments

The success or failure of Richard's policies in 1395, indeed their very implementation, depended inevitably upon the calibre of the men left to govern the country after the king's departure. Through an examination of the office of the chief governor one can in part understand how Richard from 1395-9 viewed the fate of his recent settlement and how his continued interest and involvement affected the Anglo-Irish government. In making this study one must first ascertain who held office during the period and in what manner they were appointed, for no secondary account covers fully either the sequence of governors or the background to particular nominations. The office's general late fourteenth century development must also be examined, for until one knows the powers normally exercised by the chief governor one cannot identify any increase or diminution of royal control over the lieutenants in 1395-9. The lack of a definitive study of the office of chief governor during the later middle ages has thus made inevitable some digression from the particular events of the 1390s. In the course of the examination certain incidental information has emerged which throws a speculative light on some aspects of the office, though it must be emphasized that the raison d'être for the study lay in the problem of Richard's relations with his lieutenants over the short period between the expeditions.[1]

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1 The main sources on the office of chief governor are H.Wood, 'The office of chief governor of Ireland', P.R.I.A., xxxvi (1923)C, and J.Otway-Ruthven,'The chief governor of medieval Ireland', J.R.S.A.I., xcv (1965). Many of the questions examined in this chapter were provoked by the patterns suggested by H.G.Richardson and G.O.Sayles, The Irish Parliament in the Middle Ages, and The Administration of Ireland.

The importance of the office of chief governor in Richard's plans for Ireland was evident even before the expedition ended, in the king's unusual decision to divide authority between two men. Roger Mortimer, Earl of March, was named as lieutenant of Ulster, Connacht, and Meath, and William Scrope as justiciar in Leinster, Munster and Louth. The family backgrounds and careers of the two men differed widely and it is worth examining briefly the reasons for their initial appointments and the developments in this arrangement over the subsequent two years.

Mortimer, heir to the earldom of Ulster, was in almost every way the man most suitable for appointment as lieutenant. As the greatest, next to the king, of the notable absentees, he belonged to that class which was regularly looked to in efforts to restore the lordship. His grandfather, Lionel of Clarence, and father, Edmund Mortimer, had both led important expeditions to the country. That Roger himself, at the age of five, had briefly held office illustrated clearly the importance of the family for Anglo-Ireland, regardless of the abilities of its individual members to fulfil the country's expectations.[1] Roger Mortimer himself was first hinted at as the possible leader of an expedition in 1389, when John Stanley's indenture provided that it might be cancelled in the event of an expedition by the king himself, one of his uncles, or the Earl of March.[2] Until Mortimer came of age, however, there were difficulties in giving him so responsible an office, and when in 1392 the king promised to send Mortimer to replace the Duke of Gloucester as lieutenant it was apparently this issue of Mortimer's minority which kept him in England.[3] By late 1394 these difficulties were over and Mortimer was without question

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1 C.P.R. 1381-5 p 88; for further information on Mortimer see below, pp345-7; above, 149-50.

2 E 101/247/1/3

3 Tuck, 'Anglo-Irish relations 1382-93', pp 29-31.

the obvious candidate for the lieutenancy. Furthermore he was it seems acceptable to the Anglo-Irish, being the very type of 'great and trustworthy lord' for which they had petitioned in 1385 should the king not come himself.[1] Mortimer was one of the few Anglo-Irish lords who could bear the financial burden the lieutenancy of Ireland had become, and it was recognized in the negotiations concerning his appointment in 1392 that he would need to use the revenues of his English and Welsh estates.[2] That Mortimer was prepared to use these financial resources in Ireland naturally increased the king's dependence upon him.

For Mortimer himself the office, though it could be an onerous burden, must have had some attractions in 1395. Not only would it allow him to further his personal interests in his capacity as Lord of Trim and Earl of Ulster and Connacht, but it also gave him an opportunity to ensure that Richard's policies towards the Irish, and particularly O'Neill, would be concluded in a manner least affecting these personal interests. There were considerable dangers for Mortimer in seeing anyone else take supreme control in the country, especially if he himself were to become again an absentee and liable to legislation affecting the profits of his lands.

The nature of such dangers had been clearly seen during Roger's minority when the political gain achieved by the capture of Niall O'Neill and many other important Ulster Irishmen was lost by the government's readiness to surrender the hostages for monetary gain. The fact that O'Neill had been invading Louth and attempting to make, it was claimed, 'a general conquest of all of Ireland' meant that settlements with him had to be concerned with more than the fate of the Mortimer lordship.[3] Mortimer certainly

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1 Statutes and Ordinances, p 487

2 Printed as an appendix to the 'French metrical history of the Deposition of King Richard the Second', ed. J.Webb, Archaeologia, xx (1824) p 146 ff.

3 E 101/247/1/4

felt that his own interests and those of the justiciar were very different, petitioning the king that:

> now your said officers there, greedy for 1,000 cows and ten hostages of little or no value to them, have agreed to deliver him, to the perpetual destruction of the said lordship of Ulster. (1)

Only Mortimer's personal presence in Ireland could, however, effectively avert interference in his lordship there—a point proved by the fact that Brian O'Neill's release did take place in 1393, despite Richard's approval of Mortimer's arguments against it.[2] The subsequent gift to Mortimer of 1,000 marks indemnification for the damage to his estates while in wardship was undoubtedly connected with this royal inability to protect his interests.[3] In a period when the immediate military danger was seen to lie in Leinster, only Mortimer's personal control of government could guarantee a degree of security for his more distant territories. The need to protect his interests was of course particularly strong after the generous reception given to the Ulster Irish by Richard, and with the question of exact rights in the province still undecided.

Considered from all angles it seems in fact that Mortimer's appointment in 1395 was virtually inevitable. Even the business concerning Richard's French marriage did not bring Mortimer away from Ireland, as it did so many other magnates after the expedition. In May 1395 Richard had to apologize to Charles VI that he could not have his nearest in line seal certain letters patent, for he was au present en notre terre Dirlande.[4] For Mortimer to be appointed lieutenant served the interests of Mortimer, the king and of course the country. It is clear, however, that the appointment did not mean that Richard supported his case in the issue

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1 S.C. 8/189/9434: internal evidence dates this document to March-May 1393. See above, p 88; below, Appendix V, pp 559-63.

2 For the petition and its background see below, Appendix V, pp559-63.

3 E 403/543 (7 July)

4 Diplomatic correspondence of Richard II, ed. E.Perroy, no 228.

with O'Neill in Ulster; on the contrary the indications are that that problem remained unresolved after the king left the country.

That Richard had reservations about the choice of Mortimer from the start can be seen in the type of man he named as co-governor, William Scrope. He came from a family with a history of royal service. His father, Sir Richard Scrope, was steward of the household at the start of the reign, and, though he subsequently offended Richard by refusing to seal some of his grants when chancellor in 1381, he was moderate in his opposition and pleaded with Richard's opponents to show clemency to the Earl of Suffolk in 1386.[1] William, the eldest son, began his career in the service of the Duke of Lancaster, acting as his seneschal in Guienne in 1390.[2] His rise in royal favour in England probably dated from about 1392. From then until the time of the expedition he appeared on the rolls as the king's sub-chamberlain, receiving the custodies of various castles and acting on royal commissions.[3] The king's approval of his services can be seen in a letter, probably of late 1394, from Richard to a bishop, referring to Scrope who ad bien et sagement fet son message.[4] It would seem that William was already demonstrating the political qualities of which he subsequently showed himself possessed, qualifying himself to belong to that group of 'English administrators' who were regularly appointed to govern in Ireland.[5] In subsequent years in England he continued to serve the king faithfully, being in particular a key man in the counter-appeal of 1397, and in the development of the royal policy in Richard's last years. As treasurer of England at the end of the reign he became the focus for opposition to Richard's policies, losing his life when Henry Bolingbroke

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1 D.N.B., xvii, 1080-2
2 M.G.A.Vale, English Gascony 1399-1453, p 32
3 e.g. C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 232, 309, 433
4 Anglo-Norman letters, no 126
5 See, e.g., Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 234

entered Bristol.[1]

The contrast between Mortimer's background and that of Scrope is very clear. As a tested royal servant Scrope might have been expected to exploit the Gaelic submissions in a manner closer to the royal interests than someone with existing family concerns in the country. One cannot argue that Richard intended Scrope to be any definite check on Mortimer, whose responsibility for authorizing writs under the great seal gave him superior powers.[2] Scrope's own absence from Ireland, though possibly not foreseen when he was appointed, must also have left Mortimer considerable independence, however effectively William was deputized by his brother Stephen. It would seem, however, that the split governorship in itself and the choice of Scrope as justiciar indicate a wish to counterbalance Mortimer's influence and suggest that the king was disinclined to have the fate of his expedition left totally in the earl's hands.

The confused chronology of these men's appointments from 1395-7 has never been satisfactorily unravelled. Their different patents and indentures do however repay examination, in understanding both Richard's policy at this particular time and the decision of 1397 to replace the dual governorship first by Mortimer acting alone and then by Thomas Holland, Duke of Surrey. Scrope's indenture was made on 17 April 1395 and Mortimer's on 20 April, both to take effect from 25 April.[3] It seems likely that the choice of these particular men

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1 Rot. Parl., iii, 347-8; R.Davies, 'The principality of Chester', in F.R.H.du Boulay and C. Barron, (ed.s) The Reign of Richard II, p 275 for an account of Scrope's importance in the consolidation of royal power in the west. Also Rot. Parl., iii, 656

2 Below, pp 202-3.

3 Their enrolled accounts: E 364/31/D and E 364/33/A. Unfortunately neither indenture survives, and as they were made in Ireland there is no record of the appointments in the English patent rolls.

was part of a long-term policy, rather than any sudden decision in late April. As early as November 1394 Scrope acquired a stake in the country by his appointment as constable of Dublin castle.[1] Not only was he apparently given land surrendered by O'Byrne, but on 20 February he was granted custody of all Louth, with full financial and executive powers there. On 20 March this was followed by a similar grant in Drogheda.[2] There seems no doubt that his later office as justiciar in these areas was connected with the earlier grants--especially since we know that James Cottenham and the Duke of Surrey received similar grants in Louth as a direct result of their official responsibilities in the country.[3] There is evidence suggesting that Roger Mortimer was also prepared for office in Ireland before April. The promise of 1392 that Mortimer would soon be sent as lieutenant naturally singled him out now as the most obvious appointee.[4] Furthermore, on 10 February 1395 he received a protection with clause volumus for three years, although other participants in the expedition at the same time received protections for only six months.[5] O'Neill certainly believed that Mortimer was going to stay in Ireland after the king's departure, and feared greatly that Mortimer would begin an aggressive campaign--a not unlikely fear if it was generally rumoured that Mortimer was to remain as the king's lieutenant.[6] The appointments of Mortimer and Scrope were in fact probably decided upon long before Richard knew in April that he must shortly return home.

In the absence of Scrope's indenture of 17 April 1397 it is difficult to establish how long the appointment was intended to last.

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1 C.C.H., p 153, no 25
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 174; discussed below, pp 228-9.
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 187, 485; see below, pp 229-30.
4 King's Council in Ireland, p 258 ff
5 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 536
6 Curtis, Richard II, pp 205, 214-5

As his account mentions two indentures, covering in all eighteen months, and as an indenture from 24 September 1396 for six months survives, it seems certain that the original appointment was intended to last one year.[1] In fact, the appointment was confirmed for another six months in April 1396, at the same time as Mortimer's powers as chief governor were renewed,[2] and April 1396 was therefore presumably the occasion when Privy Seal letters were issued giving Scrope authority for another six months.[3] The pattern of events is further complicated by the fact that both halves of Scrope's 24 September 1396 indenture survive, a fact normally suggesting cancellation.[4] Furthermore, we know that Stephen Scrope, William's deputy, visited England in the summer of 1396 and apparently himself sealed an indenture with the king which was referred to when Stephen on 13 September 1396 was named in person as justiciar of Munster, Leinster and Louth for the next six months.[5] There was no mention of his being William's deputy, nor did William have specific authority to appoint a deputy by his indenture of 24 September, which was a purely military agreement, specifying retinue and wages.[6] One should not attach too much significance to the various confusions surrounding Scrope's office, for Scrope's account shows William to have held the office nominally for the full two years, and Stephen's name in the record of appointment had, apparently, no political significance. William's continued personal responsibility can also be seen in the wording of Mortimer's

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1 E 364/31/D and E 101/41/34; his enrolled account and particulars mention this indenture, operative from 25 April. The account refers to a two year period in office, but in a sense possibly referring to the completed term rather than the original undertaking.

2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 715

3 E 364/31/D and E 101/41/34

4 E 101/69/1 nos 293, 294; the indentures were operative from 13 October.

5 E 364/31/D and E 101/41/34; C.P.R. 1396-9 p 23 and C 66/344 m 20.

6 E 101/69/1 no 293

appointment on 25 September 1396, where he was told to take counsel with William Scrope, the king's justiciar.[1] Stephen, it should be made clear, actually acted as deputy for the full two years.[2]

Roger Mortimer's appointments followed a slightly different sequence. Again, the original indenture is lost, but the evidence that his powers were subsequently confirmed by several short term in indentures is significant.[3] The final indenture of 20 September has survived and reveals that an indenture made on 16 January 1396 was operative from 25 April for three months, being extended by another indenture of 1 June for the next three months. By the document of September 1396 it was agreed that Mortimer should act for a further six months.[4] This evidence is supported by the patent roll appointments on 25 April 1396 and 25 September 1396.[5] It is difficult to understand the motive for these short term indentures. They suggest at least that the original agreement of April 1395 bound Mortimer for only one year. It is possible that Mortimer's absence in Ireland complicated the process by which the indentures were drawn up and sealed and that in the circumstances short term agreements were mutually more acceptable. There remains however a suspicion that one or other of the parties was not anxious to prolong the earl's responsibilities in the lordship.

Some weight is given to this possibility by an interesting departure in January 1397 from the terms of Mortimer's previous indenture of September 1396, which had renewed him in office for six months.[6] On

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 29
2 E 101/41/39
3 E 364/33/A
4 E 101/69/1 no 292
5 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 711 and 1396-9 p 29
6 E 101/69/1 no 292 and C.P.R. 1391-6 p 711

23 January Edmund Mortimer, not Roger, was named as lieutenant in Ulster, Connacht and Meath until midsummer.[1] The Edmund in question was not identified, but it seems probable that he was Roger's brother.[2] An account from Mortimer's lordship of Denbigh actually referred to money sent to Edmund, brother of the lord, in May-June 1397.[3] Just as the appointment of Stephen Scrope in September 1396 did not affect William Scrope's ultimate responsibility to account, so too Roger Mortimer in his final account included this period when his brother had actually held the office, and one cannot therefore place too much importance on the appointment. Edmund was to serve in the next year as Roger's official deputy during another visit to England, and it would probably be accurate to see his service in the previous year as being in the same capacity.[4] It seems, however, that the appointment of Edmund Mortimer in January 1397 did at least have greater political significance than that of Stephen Scrope. Roger Mortimer was, unlike William Scrope, still in Ireland--he did not go to England until April 1397.[5] He had, furthermore, recently upset the delicate balance of power in Ulster by attacking Armagh and embarking upon open war with the O'Neills, and the possibility that Richard gave authority to Edmund Mortimer, over-riding his brother's prior claim, as a disciplinary measure cannot be absolutely ruled out. At the very least, the appointment of Edmund Mortimer for six months suggests a strong royal desire that Roger Mortimer should come himself to England for consultation with the king.

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 58 and C 66/345 m 25
2 cf Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 335
3 S.C. 6/1184/23; below pp 232-3.
4 Wood, 'Chief governors', p 231
5 S.C. 6/1184/22

In the event, Mortimer was evidently able to convince Richard of his loyalty and fitness for office and his visit to England was followed by important changes in the governorship of Ireland. His appointment as lieutenant of all Ireland on 24 April 1397 marked the end of the experiment in divided control. Plans were being made to effect this change well before the April date. Already on 19 March a payment of £1,000 to Mortimer described him as 'lieutenant of Ireland', taking annually for seven years the sum of 5,000 marks.[1] When Mortimer himself made a fresh indenture with the king on 20 April it was agreed that he serve for three years from 25 April following for 5,000 marks p.a.[2] Considerable negotiation apparently took place before this appointment was finally made, as a decision had earlier been taken to send Thomas Holland, the king's nephew, as lieutenant for nine years, taking 6,000 marks each year. Compensation of £1,000 was later paid to Holland as a result of the cancellation of his indenture, the reason given being that the Earl of March would serve for nine years, at 4,000 marks p.a. at a saving of 18,000 marks to the king.[3] The discrepancy between Mortimer's period of service and stipend as given in the compensation to Holland and as specified in Mortimer's own indenture suggests that some degree of bargaining took place between Mortimer and the king. Presumably the reduction of length of service from nine to three years offered Mortimer a chance to have his terms of service reviewed sooner, and also gave the king greater freedom for the future. Later issue roll payments showed that there continued to be some confusion as to whether or not his appointment was for seven years, the period first mentioned in March.[4]

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1 E 101/327/14, prestita roll.
2 E 404/14/96/160; the indenture itself does not survive.
3 E 403/555 (25 May); E 403/556 (8 October).
4 e.g. E 403/555 (22 August).

Political affairs in England at this juncture undoubtedly exercised an important influence in Mortimer's April appointment and the cancellation of Holland's indenture. Both Mortimer's and Richard's motives for the earl's return to Ireland, and Richard's desire for the moment to economize on the Irish government must be considered against the background of the developing crisis in England. It seems certain at least that Mortimer's delay in England until August was connected with Richard's moves against his baronial opponents in July.[1] During Roger's continued absence Edmund Mortimer acted for him in Ireland, at least as late as 18 July.[2] Already on 10 June Roger had secured the services of Edward Perrers as a second deputy, to act in those parts of the country whose control he had acquired in March.[3]

Less than five months elapsed between Mortimer's return to Ireland in August 1397 and his next visit to England--summoned this time to give his public support to Richard's recent political successes. The intervening months saw attention focussed on Roger's failure to send Thomas Mortimer to England and on a projected royal expedition to Ireland--circumstances which undoubtedly preoccupied Mortimer and reduced his ability to make effective his lieutenancy.[4] While the period from Mortimer's appointment in April 1397 to his replacement by Holland in July 1398 was therefore apparently uneventful on the surface, it offers plenty of scope for speculation on the relations between Richard and his lieutenant. With antagonistic elements in England faced and removed, the former suggestions of tension between Richard and Mortimer--most strikingly evident in the 1395 decision to split the governorship of the lordship--became more pronounced.

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1 The effect of the crisis in England upon Mortimer's position is more fully dealt with below, pp 358-60

2 Wood, 'Chief governors', p 231, shows Edmund was testing documents on this date, quoting from the Irish memoranda rolls. See also P.R.O.I. R.C.8/33 p 267, from Mem. Roll 21-2 R.II m 43, for document tested on 26 May.

3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 147

4 Below, pp 365-8.

Some contemporaries at least saw in Mortimer a popular hero, fit to stand up against the increasing tyrannies of the king.[1] During the months which Mortimer lingered in England after the parliament he failed, significantly, to receive a single payment of his stipend, though it was increasingly in arrears.[2] His April reappointment cannot be seen as any new sign of royal favour, being merely the restatement of his appointment for the two years it had still to run. The fact that such a restatement was considered necessary may even be a sign that Mortimer was bargaining for some security in his position before returning to Ireland, for on the face of it there was no need for any confirmation of his appointment.[3] It seems unlikely that we shall ever know precisely what happened during the first half of 1398, but we can at least be fairly certain that had Richard suspected Mortimer of constituting any definite or immediate threat, he would not have returned him to the potential recruiting ground of Ireland. Preparations for his shipping began in April and he presumably was in Ireland again by early May.[4]

On 26 July 1398 Thomas Holland, now bearing the title of Duke of Surrey, was appointed as the king's lieutenant for three years.[5] The appointment was to be effective from 1 September, but Mortimer had already been killed in a skirmish in Leinster on 20 July and the order of 27 July that he was 'not to meddle in the office of lieutenant after the coming thither of Thomas Duke of Surrey' never reached him.[6] Considering Holland's earlier appointment in 1397 and the signs that Mortimer failed to hold the king's favour while Holland by contrast

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1 Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp 18-9; below, p 372.
2 E 364/33/D
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 336
4 S.C.6/1184/23
5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 402
6 ibid. p 325; below pp 338-9.

was in receipt of rewards for his services in the royal policy against the Appellants, the ultimate replacement of Mortimer by the Duke of Surrey is no great surprise. Richard in sending Surrey was apparently fulfilling a long term policy for Ireland as soon as he conveniently could. By the summer of 1398 he seems to have been determined to return to Ireland in person, and his immediate need was for a trusted magnate with stipend and retinue adequate to prepare the way for further involvement. In Thomas Holland he found a compromise between the types of men represented by Mortimer and Scrope. Holland, like Mortimer his brother in law,[1] belonged to one of the most important families of the land, his grandmother Joan of Kent being the mother by her marriage to the Black Prince of Richard II himself. Like Scrope, however, he lacked the enormous estates of a Mortimer and depended for his position and advancement upon royal favour. Although Richard's replacement of Mortimer may have had its origins in the English political context it also demonstrated the king's desire to have an outsider in office, free from local connections with the Anglo-Irish families and personal ambitions within the Gaelic areas.

The death of Mortimer meant that Surrey was spared the difficult task of superseding him as lieutenant. In the state of emergency following Mortimer's death Reginald de Grey, recently arrived in Ireland on private business concerning his inheritance, was elected justiciar by the Irish council.[2] Surrey himself seems to have arrived in Dublin early in October.[3] His shipping was ordered to assemble on 1 September but

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1 Complete Peerage, vii, 156-9

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 347; he is seen testing documents in September (P.R.O.I.Calendar, iii, p 78 from Mem. Roll 1 H.IV m 30; Wood, 'Chief governors', p 231 from Mem. Roll 22 R.II mm 19, 25).

3 The last recorded document witnessed by de Grey and the first by Surrey were dated 21 September and 8 October respectively. (P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, pp 78, 45, from Mem. Rpll 1 H.IV, mm 30, 21 d)

did not apparently sail until 2 October.[1] From then until the royal expedition Surrey remained in control, receiving additional powers and commissions in January 1399.[2] There seems no doubt that his primary task was to ensure adequate arrangements for the royal expedition, for which preparations began in England early in February, and his term of office has thus quite a different character from the previous four years.

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Part ii — The chief governors' powers, civil and military

The first point to be considered in examining the powers of Scrope and Mortimer in office is the very question of their split authority. While such a division of control was unusual, if not unique, its occurrence demonstrated the continuing flexibility of the office and its powers. No earlier case of divided resources was quite parallel. When, for instance, the Earl of Kildare was appointed in February 1376 after Windsor's departure he was made responsible primarily for Leinster, with the Bishop of Meath acting as his subordinate in Munster and Meath.[3] A variation on this form of territorial limitation was seen under the Earl of Ormond in 1377, who had power to assign a portion of his retinue to a deputy who would go to the area in need.[4] The increasing tendency to divide command at this time is said to have been due to the pressures of war and the incapacity of the government, forced on occasion to recognize the practical authority of locally dominant powers.[5]

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1 E 101/42/8 and E 101/42/6. Henry of Marlborough, Chronicle of Ireland, p 16 says that he arrived on the feast day of St Mark, 'the pope and confessor'. The feast day of St Mark, 'pope and martyr', fell on 16 January but 7 October, a more likely date, was in fact the feast of Saints Mark and Apuleius, Martyrs.

2 C.P.R. 1396-9, p 472

3 C.P.R. 1374-7, p 244

4 E 101/246/13, indenture with Ossory, treasurer of Ireland.

5 Otway-Ruthven, 'Chief governors', p 232

So, for instance, in 1400 Gilbert Halsale was appointed to act in Ulster and Thomas de Burgh in Connacht as deputies of John Stanley.[1] Obviously the situation in 1395 was different in that the double appointment mirrored a deliberate policy for more intensive political control, and the two officers in question held independent powers from the king himself rather than one acting as the other's deputy or both acting together to face an immediate military danger.

The most striking precedent for this 1395 arrangement lay in the appointment of the Earl of Ormond as justiciar in 1393, with the explicit condition that he interfere in no way in the inheritance of the Earl of March.[2] This in effect gave Ormond an area of control resembling territorially the area granted to Scrope in 1395. Unfortunately we have no information as to how far Ormond's powers in 1393-4 extended in practice, or by what means the rest of the country was controlled. Bearing in mind that Richard in July 1392 had promised to send Mortimer as governor to Ireland, it seems likely that the earl himself and no other official was made responsible for his lordship in 1393. On 18 June Roger was granted the full livery of all his possessions in Ireland.[3] Meanwhile, on 24 June, Alexander Balscot, Bishop of Meath, and Robert Eure were admitted as Roger's guardians in Ireland along with Thomas Mortimer and Walter Brugge.[4] For some unknown reason, possibly illness,[5] Mortimer delayed in England, the excuse being given that 'the king is unwilling to dispense with his presence'.[6] His interests were now, however, in capable hands. On 12 July shipping was ordered for Thomas Mortimer, his uncle, with his retinue of 120 men at arms

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1 C.C.H., p 157 nos 72-4

2 The indenture is summarized in his account, E 364/35/A; '...dictus comes retentus fuit penes prefatum nuper Regem justiciarius suus in terra Hibernia...de hereditate comitis Marchie in eadem terra Hibernie dumtaxat excepta....

3 His lands in England were not released to him until the following February. C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 284, 375

4 ibid., p 304

5 B.M. Egerton Roll 8739 refers to his illness from May-June 1393.

6 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 313.

and archers, and in the same month £1,000 compensation was paid to Mortimer for damages suffered to his possessions during his minority.[1] It seems likely that these events should be viewed in the light of Mortimer's petition of earlier this year, complaining about the negligence of the king's ministers in looking after his inheritance.[2] It is also possible that Ormond's own protestations in October 1392 about his incapacity to bear the financial burden of the office may have been a factor influencing the king's decision to limit his responsibilities in the country a year later.[3]

However obscure the details now are, there was obviously a connection between this compromise solution of 1393 and the Mortimer/Scrope appointment of 1395. The expedition which had intervened lessens the significance of the parallel, however, for it reduced the immediate military danger of 1393 and left the Dublin government facing instead the political challenge of maintaining the submission settlement. The expedient of a dual governorship was required to meet the difficult moment when the king himself and his army withdrew their restraining influence. Furthermore, Mortimer's own presence in the country, and Scrope's early departure, leaving a deputy to fulfil his duties, created a political situation very different from that of 1393, especially when one also considers Scrope's absence of established interests or connections in the country. In 1395 the government, though divided, was obviously dominated by Mortimer's superior position and authority.

Apart from illustrating the flexibility of the office of chief governor, the issue of Scrope and Mortimer's divided control highlights an old problem about the subject—the exact definition of 'lieutenant'

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 357
2 Above, pp 185-6
3 King's council in Ireland, pp xvi, xvii.

and 'justiciar'. Mortimer was consistently termed lieutenant, while Scrope was always in his patents of appointment named as justiciar. The late fourteenth century was the period which saw the governor's most common title change from justiciar to lieutenant, but as yet we have no clear idea what this signified.[1] If a difference in power was implied the point is naturally important. It is difficult to reach any certain conclusion about this. Thomas of Lancaster in 1401 was the first lieutenant who we know was specifically granted 'all which pertains to the office of Justice', but the years before the development in formula showed inconsistencies in the granting of powers, which make it impossible to assert that all chief governors automatically acquired the powers of their predecessors.[2] Wood believed that justiciars were inferior in position to lieutenants but his case cannot be sustained. We know now for instance that certain justiciars did indeed make 'indentures with the king on their appointment setting out the sums for which they agreed to undertake the government of Ireland', a privilege which Wood believed was enjoyed solely by the lieutenants.[3] More recently it has been pointed out that in fact the powers of a justiciar and lieutenant 'do not appear to differ greatly in the fourteenth century', though a king's lieutenant might well have a superior status to a mere justiciar.[4] This theory receives added weight from the fact that Mortimer, the lieutenant, in 1395 took precedence over the justiciar Scrope.

Evidence on the question, however, shows inconsistencies in terminology which complicate the problem. Sir John Stanley, for instance, made an indenture in 1399 to serve as the king's justiciar in Ireland, but

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1 See Richardson and Sayles, Administration, pp 11-14 for an examination of the different titles. Their views are coloured by their interpretation of Edmund Mortimer's 1379 appointment. (Below, pp 217-22)

2 C 66/364 m 5

3 'Chief governors', p 217. For indentures made by justiciars see e.g. Stanley in 1389 (E 101/247/1/3); Ormond in 1393 (referred to in E 364/35/A).

4 Otway-Ruthven, 'chief governors', p 228

exchequer deliveries referred to him as lieutenant, and it is under that title that his patent was enrolled in Ireland.[1] Most interestingly, his patent on the English rolls now reads 'lieutenant', but the word covers an erased shorter term, probably 'justice'.[2] This alteration suggests that some recognized significance was attached to the title, the reason for the confusion in Stanley's case arising perhaps from the fact that his 1399 indenture was so similar to his earlier one of 1389 that the title may, in error, have been left the same.[3]

The period when Scrope acted as justiciar throws some further light on the subject, though it fails to solve the problem. There was clearly an element of confusion about his correct title, with the issue and prestita rolls on some occasions calling him the king's 'lieutenant'.[4] At least one difference between Scrope's position as justiciar and Mortimer's as lieutenant is however clear. Scrope claimed the usual £500 fee which was customary for justiciars in the past. This was not specified in his original indenture, but quarterly payments of it began almost at once, and Scrope was subsequently given allowance in his account, despite the indenture's omission. The sum was still taken to oblige its recipient to maintain twenty men at arms and Scrope was therefore disallowed twenty names on his retinue list, his fee as justiciar being considered a remuneration quite distinct from his stipend.[5] It is interesting that this £500 fee was paid to Scrope from the English exchequer instead of, as was customary, at Dublin. Although the irregularity with which Irish treasurers accounted makes

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1 E 101/69/2 no 307; E 403/564 (17 December 1399) and E 404/16/728; C.C.H., p 155 no 1.

2 C.P.R. 1399-1401, p 92 and C 66/356 m 32. The alteration was noted by J.H.Wylie, History of England under Henry IV, i, 223.

3 cf E 101/247/1/3

4 E 101/327/14/(25 December 1396 and 9 August 1397) and E 403/555 (9 August)

5 E 402/551 (12 June); E 159/174 Mich. br. bar., m 23; E 364/31/4; the names are crossed off the retinue list, E 101/41/39; see also below, pp 315-6.

it difficult to be certain that lieutenants never received this fee, it is hard to find any instance where they did, and their indentures certainly did not normally mention it. That Scrope by virtue of his title could claim a fee customary to the office while Mortimer did not is one of the clearest indications that to contemporaries there was an obvious distinction between the two titles. This view is supported by the fact that William Scrope's indenture of September 1396 referred to him as 'justice of Ireland', without making any territorial distinction, suggesting that any clash with Mortimer's authroity was avoided by this use of the alternative title.[1]

The circumstances in which Mortimer and Scrope acted, being simultaneously governors in different parts of the country, were in fact so unusual that no earlier appointments offer useful grounds for comparison. To some extent the territorial limitations meant that neither officer would normally encroach on the other, but considerable cooperation was nevertheless necessary if the central government was to function efficiently. Differences in their powers can be seen in two significant areas. On 26 April 1396, the day after Mortimer's appointment as lieutenant for the next six months was confirmed, he was granted sole authority to authorize all documents under the great seal of Ireland, 'notwithstanding the full power granted to...William as king's justice in the parts aforesaid'.[2] Although this is the first record of such a power, it is probable that Mortimer held it from the time of his first patent--also now lost--in April 1395. The power was repeated in the following September, and, significantly, in January 1397, when Edmund Mortimer received similar authority to attest documents in his own name.[3] As Scrope's own appointments had given

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1 E 101/69/1 no 293 Stephen Scrope's patent of appointment retained the geographic limitations however. See C.P.R. 1396-9, p 23; above, p 190.

2 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 715, 711

3 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 29, 62

him the usual power of justiciars, to grant pardons and to make letters patent, 'under our seal which we use in our land of Ireland', this additional authority of Mortimer's must be seen in the light of an administrative expedient, designed primarily to preserve unity of government rather than to limit Scrope's functions.[1] Its effect was that any document issued on Scrope's initiative was, nevertheless, tested in Mortimer's name, and it is thus of course virtually impossible to estimate Scrope's contribution to government. The expedient must inevitably have underlined the subordinate role of the justiciar.

Another specific provision of the appointments, concerning the power to make war, confirms the impression that Mortimer's powers were greater than Scrope's and that he could take official action within Scrope's territory. Again the additional power resulted from expediency, to cover an awkwardness created by the dual governorship. In April 1396 a patent confirming Mortimer in office granted him power in Ulster, Connacht and Meath:

> to make war upon, chastise and punish Irish and English rebels invading for the purpose of spoiling, attacking or laying waste any of those parts or any of the earl's lordships in the parts of Leinster Munster or Louth, taking counsel with William Lescroop, king's justice there. (2)

This marked the first time that such power to make war was defined, the reason clearly lying in the particular circumstances of 1395-7.[3] Mortimer's office was, as we have seen, closely bound up with his personal lordship, but his area of authority excluded his lands in Leinster. The patent overcame this difficulty by specifying that he could indeed make war in Leinster if his lands there were under attack.

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1 For Scrope's power to use the seal see, e.g., C 66/344 m 20, giving Stephen's appointment in September 1396.

2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 715 The powers of Stephen Scrope and Roger Mortimer in September 1396 brought out the comparison clearly, being identical except for this clause concerning the making of war. See C 66/344 mm 16, 20.

3 See Otway-Ruthven, 'Chief governors', p 230, for an alternative view on the meaning of the increasing definition of powers.

Though the defensive terms of this power to make war and the necessity to consult with Scrope are both interesting conditions of the patent, even more striking in this attention to Mortimer's interests is the earl's pre-eminence in government and the king's dependence upon him.

In attempting to understand Richard's policies towards the lordship through a study of his representatives there, one of the greatest drawbacks is our ignorance of any negotiations between the king and his appointees before they took up office. Though some chief governors, mainly justiciars, were appointed by royal patent without any evidence of prior discussion with the king, it is certain that all who made indentures of service engaged in some degree of bargaining. In the absence of any specific information on this regarding either Scrope of Mortimer, it is worth looking at some other examples to see the area normally covered by such bargains and so to understand more precisely the office's flexibility. The earliest evidence of such negotiations prior to appointments concerns John Darcy in 1328. There is nothing to suggest that the long list of requests he made was in any way unusual except in its survival.[1] His petition covered a variety of subjects: the personalities to hold office under him; the right to receive to the king's peace and grant pardon; control over the exchequer; power to lease wasted lands; a plea for a general grant of English law to the Irish to be made by statute in Ireland; and various other matters. After this example there is no further explicit evidence of bargaining until the 1390s, but it is clear that it continued. The indentures made by successive governors were, unlike the patents by which justiciars were usually appointed, the products of particular circumstances and their varying conditions show the items under discussion. For

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1 Printed in J.F.Baldwin, The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages, pp 473-5, from P.R.O., Parliamentary Proceedings, vi, 10.

instance, when in 1373 William of Windsor was returned to Ireland for another term his indenture included the provision that reasonable ordinance be made for the government of the country by the king and his council, taking the advice of Windsor.[1] Although most indentures were primarily concerned with military retinues and provisions for musters, shipping and conditions of military service, they often gave some attention also to the administrative government of the country and where they did so one may assume a background of negotiation. The indenture of the Duke of Gloucester in 1392 was a particularly good example, covering such issues as the appointing of officers and and absentee legislation, as well as Gloucester's military obligations and the manner of his payment and rewards.[2] The next decade provides three examples of negotiations about the office, respecting the appointments of the Earl of March in 1392, the Duke of Surrey in 1398 and the Duke of Lancaster in the early years of Henry IV.[3] The matters discussed varied enormously in scope. Lancaster's conditions were particularly interesting, for they concerned such matters as power to admit to the king's peace and grant pardons, which one would assume was inherent in the office, yet his petition was headed: Ceux sont les poyntes et articles queux mon Seignur Thomas de Lancastre...demande davoir en sa commission du lieutenauncie et gouvernance de la terre dirlande. It seems clear from this that all lieutenants, however normal the circumstances of their appointments, would have made some such requests guaranteeing to them the powers of the office. The background

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1 E 101/33/3 Windsor made other stipulations too. See Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, p 83 n 64.

2 B.M. Cotton MS Titus B XI f 29, printed in Gilbert, History of the viceroys, pp 552-6. For the idea that this document was in fact a draft, dating from the period of negotiation itself, see above, p 34.

3 B.M. Titus B XI f 35, printed in Archaeologia, xx, 246; Titus B XI ff 6, 252, printed in Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 560-1; C 81/609/1649 B. It is not certain to which of Lancaster's appointments this document referred.

of bargaining which is suggested from some patents and indentures could cover many powers claimed by past governors, adding to the flexibility of the office. It helps to explain how the unusual arrangement of a divided governorship could be established without leading to a clash of authority between the justiciar and the lieutenant. From the powers and indentures of Scrope and Mortimer it seems that the scope of any negotiations must have been limited. Apart from the provisions made necessary by the peculiar circumstances of divided control, there was nothing in the patent which one would not expect any Anglo-Irish justiciar also to have possessed. They were each empowered:

> to cause the king's peace to be kept...to punish all the lieges both Irish and English...who offend against the laws and customs, each according to his merits and to the aforesaid laws and customs, by whatever ways shall seem best to him... and to receive to our peace English and Irish rebels,...and give them pardons...for all homicides etc committed in those parts;...to make letters patent under our seal which we use in Ireland;...to receive fines and ransoms to the king's use; to do all which pertains to the office of justiciar/lieutenant and which is necessary for the good rule of those parts; with power to take sufficient victuals for the household and his men and with carriage for them...(1)

If anything, these powers gave both Mortimer and Scrope less independence than other contemporary governors, and apparently revealed Richard's determination to retain control of the situation so far as was possible. Neither governor, for instance, was given specific powers in the appointment of officers. Nor had they express authority to grant out wasted and conquered lands or to reverse the recent royal decision to move the common bench and exchequer back to Dublin, although all these powers had increasingly been granted to chief governors.[2] Explicit power to appoint a deputy was also omitted. In fact, Scrope,

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1 C 66/344 m 20; C 66/345 m 25

2 e.g. Edmund Mortimer, 1379 (Foedera, iv, 72); Philip Courtenay, 1385 (C 66/319 m 26); Thomas of Lancaster, October 1404 (C 66/372 m 32).

in rendering his account, had special allowance to cover the fact that he exercised the office throughout by deputy.[1] It is arguable, furthermore, that Mortimer did not possess the power. Not only was Edmund Mortimer, in effect a deputy, appointed by the king under English letters patent but when Roger's other deputy, Edmund Perrers, received a writ of aid from England in June 1397 it was said that Mortimer, following his own appointment as lieutenant, now requested a licence to name Perrers as deputy in his absence.[2] Later in 1397 Mortimer was specifically ordered to appoint a sufficient deputy when he next came to England[3]— further support for the theory that he did not have a general power to do so. Even the special power which Mortimer received of making war can, as has been shown, be interpreted as a limitation upon him, for the condition that war was to be made only to deal with those 'invading for the purpose of spoiling, attacking or laying waste' would seem to have precluded aggression by the governors themselves.[4] Coming as this did after the Irish chiefs' submissions to Richard, this can be interpreted as a possible restraint on the ambitions of the king's officers.

In the light of our present knowledge on the normal powers of governors it is difficult to speculate on the possibility that Mortimer and Scrope were comparatively restricted. The divided authority was possibly responsible for the impression, making necessary a very general form of appointment. In the absence of any specification, however, the result must have been to increase the potential control of the king and the real authority of the Irish council. Though the question is much too broad to be adequately dealt with here, it is clear that the expanding powers of governors in the preceding period had largely been

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1 E 159/174 Hilary br. baron., m 3
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 58, 147; C 66/346 m 7.
3 Foedera, viii, 21
4 Above, p 203

won at the expense of the council, and a lack of explicit provision of these powers may have revitalized conciliar activity during the following years.[1]

The scope of their powers is not made clearer by the surviving indentures of either Scrope or Mortimer, both of which concentrate on the military side of the office. These, more than anything else, reveal the seriousness of Richard's intentions to maintain the lordship's defence and to leave in the hands of his governors there the capacity to preserve his recent settlements. The indentures were concerned only with the length of appointment, the size of the retinue and its payment. Mortimer in addition had power to change the composition of his retinue as the need arose, and Scrope had the privilege of being free to surrender his office should his payments fall into arrears.[2] Both men indented to serve with retinues of 100 men at arms--including for Mortimer thirteen and for Scrope seven knights--and 400 mounted archers.[3] In fact Scrope claimed wages for seven knights, 100 men at arms and 400 mounted archers, though the pay of twenty men at arms was disallowed, as his fee of £500 as justiciar was supposed to cover a retinue of this number.[4] This retinue apparently included a force of twelve men, six of his own and six of the Earl of Rutland, who served during this time in Munster. These men were, it seems, under Scrope's personal control and for accounting purposes were considered a part of his full retinue, although he received payment for them in addition to his stipend.[5] There is no suggestion that Rutland retained responsibility

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1 e.g. The control of subordinate officers was as late as the 1370s exercised by the justiciar only with the advice of his inner council. (C.P.R. 1370-4, p 340, Windsor; C.O.D.,ii, no 215, Ormond; cf Foedera, iv, 72, Edmund Mortimer; C 66/319 m 26, Courtenay; Gilbert, Viceroys, 552-6, Gloucester.) The power to pardon, which both Scrope and Mortimer possessed, had similarly been a general function of the justiciar in council earlier in the century. (e.g. C.P.R. 1334-8, p 477, John de Charlton.)

2 E 101/69/1 nos 292, 293

3 ibid; see also their enrolled accounts, E 364/33/D and E 364/31/D.

4 E 101/41/34 and E 364/31/D

5 E 403/551 (12 June); E 403/554 (22 October and 20 January); E 403/555 (9 August.)

for the ward said to be serving in his name, and in fact he was ultimately summoned to account for only the first prest.[1] The force which Scrope's account described seems therefore to have been approximately the full complement of his indentured retinue.

Mortimer too kept his retinue near to full strength, though availing himself of the power granted to him to replace men at arms by archers and mounted by foot archers whenever he felt it was advisable.[2] Though Scrope did not apparently have this power, it was certainly not unique.[3] As a result Mortimer's retinue was more variable in composition than Scrope's. For the first year he accounted for the wages of himself, receiving a banneret's pay, twelve knights, eighty-seven esquires, 390 mounted archers and twenty foot archers, pleading the evidence of one retinue roll, unfortunately lost. Three muster rolls of the following year, also missing, proved that his retinue of archers had then been changed to 320 mounted and 160 foot archers.[4] It seems clear that the basic nucleus was provided by the knights and esquires supplemented by fluctuating forces of archers.[5]

As a combined force of some 200 men at arms and 800 archers these two retinues certainly offered the lordship an unusual military strength. It was not, of course, comparable to the armed force mustered for the first expedition, when Mortimer alone had indented to serve for six months with two bannerets, eight knights out of 100 men at arms, 200 mounted archers and 400 foot archers.[6] It was, nevertheless, by late

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1 This was received in the spring of 1395 from John Carp in the household, who recorded the delivery in E 101/403/1. Rutland pleaded a pardon from all debts and accounts and was excused. (E 368/172 Easter br. retorn., m233)

2 E 364/31/D; E 101/69/1/292

3 e.g. Sir John Stanley in 1399 (E 101/69/2/307)

4 E 364/31/D

5 It does not appear that either Scrope or Mortimer were required to recruit their retinues in England, as certain other indentures had stipulated. (e.g. Ormond in 1378, E 101/246/13)

6 E 101/68/10/236 Although Mortimer was already in line for office this indenture gave no indication that he might stay beyond the six months specified.

fourteenth century standards a very considerable size for a standing army, dependent upon quarterly stipends from England. Some random comparisons may illustrate this. Robert Ashton in 1372 had sixty men at arms and 100 English archers, supplemented by 280 Irish recruits, including hobelars.[1] Windsor's more imposing force of 1373 was 200 men at arms and 400 archers.[2] Ormond in 1378 was in command of 40 men at arms and 140 archers.[3] De Vere, it is true, was supposed to support the enormous retinue of 500 men at arms and 1,000 archers in 1386, but in 1389 Stanley was appointed with a more normal strength of 100 men at arms and 400 archers.[4] When the retinues of Scrope and Mortimer from 1395-7 are seen in relation to these figures, it is clear that the lordship did not revert suddenly to a state of neglect with Richard's departure. The armies left were sufficiently large to be effective and, under separate control, had enough mobility to cover a greater area of the country than was usual.

That the military indentures disclosed the heart of Richard's policy in a way which the patents of appointment did not was seen very clearly in April 1397 when Mortimer was finally given control of the whole country. It seems probable that in Scrope's absence his brother Stephen Scrope, as deputy, had occupied an increasingly subordinate role to the lieutenant, and that the reunification of control in one office was only a matter of time. Mortimer's patent of appointment failed to indicate any way in which his position had changed, apart from the fact that his powers were now to extend over the entire country.[5] His indenture of April 1397 showed, however, that he was to serve on substantially different terms from those of the previous two years.[6] He was to

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1 E 101/32/25
2 E 101/33/3
3 E 101/246/13
4 Foedera, vii, 503; E 101/247/1/8
5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 118, and C 66/346 m 26
6 The indenture, mentioned in the patent, does not survive but is quoted in a warrant for issue. E 404/14/96 part 2 no 160

govern the country for three years, receiving 5,000 marks p.a. From 1395-7 Mortimer and Scrope had each received stipends of about £5,460 to support their separate retinues, totalling an annual outlay of £10,920.[1] The £3333 which Mortimer was to receive for the year from April 1397 shows instantly the enormous cut-back in subsidy which Richard now proposed. The withdrawal of Scrope's force in itself weakened the lordship and Mortimer's own retinue must either have been reduced or paid for by himself. The reasons for this sudden change may have had little to do with circumstance in Ireland, lying instead in the financial pressures upon the king in England, but the effect of the economy was certainly to alter the character of the post-expeditionary government. It is not surprising that Richard's subission settlement seems to have accelerated its collapse after this point, with the removal of the military force which had, on the whole, protected it.

Although the replacement of Mortimer by Thomas Holland in July 1398 marked another development in Richard's plans for Ireland, this change was not at first apparent in the powers of office. Holland's initial patent followed precisely the terms of Mortimer's in April 1397, as confirmed in April 1398.[2] A more obvious distinction lay in his military strength, for his retinue considerably exceeded Mortimer's. His annual stipend of 11,500 marks (£7,666.13.4) more than doubled that which Mortimer had lately been receiving, and apparently indicated a return to heavy military involvement financed from England.[3] This presumably reflected Richard's realization that the lordship needed such investment to maintain its position. The appointment of Holland was viewed probably from the start as an interim measure until Richard could himself come. Holland certainly appears to have delayed any really heavy campaigning

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1 E 403/555 (12 June)
2 C 66/346 m 19; C 66/349 m 21; C 66/ 350 m 19
3 E 403/561 (18 November)

and even increased his retinue just prior to the second expedition when as a result of another indenture he received wages of war at the rate of £10,260 a year, to maintain two bannerets, fourteen knights, 134 esquires and 800 archers.[1]

Although the powers granted to Surrey in July were exactly the same as those in Mortimer's earlier patent, there is a strong probability that Surrey had tried to acquire fuller powers, similar to the extensive rights granted to certain earlier governors but withheld from Mortimer and Scrope. The evidence comes from a record of certain conditions he presented before taking the office, entitled Les points pur la saufe garde de la terre de Irland demandez par le counte Mareschal.[2] The title of Marshal fixes the identity on Surrey and also indicates that the petition dates from Surrey's second appointment in 1398, though whether or not it reflected the old indenture is unknown.[3] The stipulations were not fully adopted but the demands themselves and Richard's responses to them throw an important light on the office of the lieutenant at this juncture.

Many of the items concerned Surrey's terms of appointment, his retinue and its payment. He wished to be appointed for seven years with a retinue of 500 men at arms and 1,000 archers. Exact stipulations were made about payment in advance to guard against possible default. Furthermore, he wanted a special regard of 1,000 marks p.a. as well as shipping costs, and payment of all expenses incurred in the recruitment of men to keep his retinue at full strength. To secure his financial position he asked that certain customs or other revenues be assigned to meet the Irish payments. As regards his particular military duties,

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1 E 403/562 (13 May) He received in fact only half a quarter's pay but the yearly rate shows the scale of his increased involvement more clearly.

2 Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 560-1; above, p 205.

3 Surrey was made Marshal on 30 January 1398. (C.P.R. 1396-9 p 399) cf Cal.Carew MSS, v, 378, where Thomas Lancaster was credited with these requests.

he requested the right to increase or reduce his retinue as the time of year necessitated, and to have sufficient persons to view his muster so that he could have due allowance in his account. In addition he wished to be able to appoint a deputy and join the king should he go to war in person. Most of these items would have been fairly normal in military indentures of this time. They reveal Surrey's desire to have a large army with guarantees of its financial backing. We do not know how many of these items were in fact granted, but it is certain that Surrey's actual retinue was much smaller than the one he offered to lead.

The other items in this document covered a variety of topics. Surrey asked, for instance, that every one or two parishes in England send a man and woman at the king's expense to Ireland to live there on the marches. No record of any response to this remains. The remaining clauses, which are perhaps the most important, concern Surrey's general powers as governor. He petitioned to have the lieutenancy for seven years, in 'the manner that the Earl of March or William de Wyndesore had it in their times, or better if it should be necessary for the profit of the king, the country or the lieutenant'.[1] Further on he specifically requested power to remove officers, to give benefices with and without cure and to move the common bench and exchequer 'with all other points which some of the lieutenants of the king had'. In conclusion he requested the repeal of all manner of grants of royal possessions, along with any exemptions to the absentee legislation.

In so far as we can see from Surrey's patent of July 1398 none of these requests were at that time granted. It would appear that Richard, despite the appointment of his favourite, intended to emphasize

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1 Edmund Mortimer, appointed in 1379, was almost certainly the Earl of March referred to here.

the office's military role and minimize its scope for independent ambitions. At some stage during Holland's first months in office, however, this decision was changed, with the result that Holland on 22 January 1399 received new and important powers, giving once more to the lieutenant in person many significant executive functions.[1] Presumably with the royal determination to return to Ireland the possible dangers of enhancing the lieutenant's position were outweighed by the advantages of having a strong and effective head of government. He was given, for instance, full powers to supervise the king's ministers, removing the inefficient and appointing new ones, except for the chancellor and treasurer who were, however, to be appointed with his approval. He was, furthermore, allowed to move the common bench and exchequer to wherever he thought best, except the lordship of the Earl of March. He received both these powers in exactly the same form as Edmund Mortimer had in 1379, and it is probable that the exclusion from the March lordships can be explained most accurately by reference to the earlier appointment, when Richard was obviously trying to prevent the consolidation of magnate/government interests in one area.[2] Close examination of the patent suggests in fact that it was largely copied from Edmund Mortimer's in 1379, for it followed precisely the wording of the earlier patent, although normally such documents varied widely in form. The appointment included power:

> to receive to the king's fealty and peace rebels against the king, whether English or Irish; grant pardons, general and special; make letters patent under the king's Irish seal, receive fines and ransoms to the king's use and grant in fee or otherwise lands got in war back from the king's enemies, as well as confiscated lands of rebels, to fit persons remaining loyal etc; to demise, with the assent of the chancellor and treasurer there, all lands wasted by war and derelict to tenants willing to take them for

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 472 and C 66/351 m 20
2 Foedera, iv, 72 (1707, Record edition)

> reasonable farm;...and generally to do and order all things for its good government and safety and recovery of the king's rights there, although they should more need the king's special mandate.(1)

At the same time Surrey was given licence to present to certain benefices that fell vacant after his arrival.[2] The parallel to Edmund Mortimer's powers of 1379 is made still clearer by the royal order, also of 22 January 1399, that Surrey investigate the country's revenues and malgovernance, the authorization substantially repeating one to Edmund Mortimer twenty years earlier. Surrey was commissioned to enquire into:

> all manors, lands, rents, wardships, marriages and offices in Ireland heretofore given and granted to any persons by letters patent under the great seal of England in fee, for life, for term of years or at pleasure, and touching the true value thereof, and to seize the same into the king's hand if he shall find reasonable cause to do so for the honour and advantage of the king and the improvement of the state of Ireland and expend the issues and profits thereof according to his discretion on the maintenance of the war in Ireland toward the support of the great costs which must be incurred by the king in that behalf; as the king has been informed by some messages and lieges from Ireland by their petition made to him and his council that the aforesaid gifts and grants have been so commonly and fraudulently made, and the fees taken for the said offices are so excessive, that the king's revenues and profits of Ireland are diminished and taken away to such an extent that little remains for the maintenance of the war and the other charges which daily arise there....(3)

It is possible that representations about the lordship's poor state were indeed made to Richard at this time, but in fact these powers can be fully explained by reference to Richard's forthcoming expedition and his desire that Surrey make all necessary preparations. The same explanation may be given for yet another power granted to the lieutenant on 20 January— to take in Ireland the homages of lords and magnates 'for the greater security of that country which by frequent war is in great peril by

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 472 The original wording of Surrey's powers (C 66/351 m 20) can be seen in Edmund Mortimer's patent, Foedera, iv, 72.
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 476, 501
3 Cal.Fine Rolls 1391-9 p 293; cf C.P.R. 1379-81 p 483

their absence'.[1] Such men were normally obliged to come to England and do homage personally to the king--an arrangement obviously ill-suited to the months just prior to a royal expedition.

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Part iii — The financial powers and resources of the chief governors

Of all areas of ignorance about the chief governorship that respecting the office's financial powers has perhaps the greatest significance for any examination of relations between the king and his representatives. To assess the attractions of the office or the scope it offered to different incumbents one must know how it was financed and what guarantees were made by the king that it would not be too heavy a burden. While this is true to some extent of the entire history of the office, it had become by the late fourteenth century a matter of major political importance, as the weakness of the Irish exchequer impeded the capacity of successive governors in protecting the country effectively. So unattractive was the office that in 1372 Richard de Pembridge actually refused the appointment.[2] When the Earl of Ormond relinquished control in 1379 he agreed to settle for 1,000 marks instead of pressing for full payment of all royal debts to him, and English and Irish revenues had to be assigned to clear the debt.[3] Increasing disinclination to take up the office, even among those most closely affected, was seen in 1381 after Edmund Mortimer's death when both the Earl of Ormond and the Earl of Desmond refused the burden, and it was found impossible to finance the retinue requested by Thomas Mortimer as the condition upon which he would serve. The chancellor, John Colton, finally accepted the office, provided he might surrender

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 476
2 C.C.R. 1369-74 p 420
3 C.O.D., ii, no 237

it at the next parliament.[1] By the 1390s the situation was not, it seems, any better, and Ormond protested when appointed in 1392 that 'the charge seems to us very difficult...nor do we know how we can sustain it without great dishonour and destruction of our poor and simple estate'.[2] This recurring concern with the burden of the office demonstrates the need to examine Scrope's and Mortimer's financial position. Any conclusions about royal policy for Ireland are incomplete if they do not take the crown's constant difficulties in subsidizing the Irish government into account.

To understand the complexity of this problem it is necessary to give some preliminary consideration to the previous history of the office's financial powers. The political importance of these powers has been clearly expressed by Mr Richardson and Professor Sayles. Their studies form a suitable starting point in any examination of Richard's reign, for they have deduced from exchequer material that in 1379 began a period with a distinctly different character from that which went before.[3] They believe that the appointment then of Edmund Mortimer 'marks a radical departure', in that Mortimer and his successors were to have all the normal revenues of Ireland as well as taxes and were not required to account to the English exchequer.[4] On this basis they postulate 'a broad distinction between Edwardian and later lieutenants'.[5] With the appointment, they say, 'the king, so far as he could, contracted out of the burden of governing Ireland'.[6] The pattern they suggest is not therefore simply a development in administrative history, but reflects a basic change in outlook of the king to his lordship. It expresses a political policy with which the fifteenth century became

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1 Parliaments and Councils of Medieval Ireland, no 66

2 King's Council in Ireland, pp xvi-xvii.

3 See their Administration of Ireland; The Irish Parliament in the Middle Ages; and 'Irish revenue, 1278-1384', P.R.I.A., lxii C (1962) passim.

4 Administration, p 13; in fact they identify only two other lieutenants, Courtenay and Gloucester, with such powers. (Irish Parliament, pp 151-3)

5 Administration, p 13

6 ibid., p 6

familiar--delegation of responsibility with the inevitable medieval corollary of public office in private hands. In view of what has been suggested about Richard's unwillingness to give his governors the fullest powers possible from 1395-9, it is obviously necessary to discover exactly what such financial control would have meant and whether or not Scrope and Mortimer in fact possessed this power.

It is necessary, for a start, to keep Mr Richardson's and Professor Sayles's remarks about 1379 within the perspective of their own financial studies. In surveying the administrative history of the lordship they describe the early emergence of justiciar, treasurer and other officers. The justiciar in the early stages had extensive financial powers, and was superior in such matters to the treasurer. From the late thirteenth century, however, the balance in powers was more even, and the treasurer, not the justiciar, accounted at Westminster for the revenues of the country.[1] This continued until the mid-fourteenth century, but then, they remark, 'when the king undertook the financing of military expeditions in Ireland the corollary was an account rendered at Westminster'.[2] The first such account was that of Lionel of Clarence. While the treasurer continued to account for ordinary revenue, the clerk of the wages, or some other such official, was now answerable for stipends of lieutenants who were indentured with specific retinues. Unfortunately the financial system was not clear cut. Difficulties arose under both Clarence and Willian of Windsor in the treasurer's account, which omitted taxation and other unusual receipts specifically raised to meet the military needs of the lieutenant. It was after only these two examples of the new arrangement that another change came in the 1379 indenture which, they claim, granted the ordinary revenues of the country to

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1 Administration, p 57
2 ibid., p 61

the lieutenant. The following period they say was marked by this change in attitude. In their account of the development they emphasize at times administrative expediency, but in general the keynote is political disengagement and a voluntary weakening of interest in Ireland. For instance, they say that the example of Richard Medford in 1398 illustrates 'the position under Richard II when the king's council had adopted the policy of limiting the king's commitments in Ireland and of striking a bargain with the lieutenant or the treasurer, as the case might be, so that the English exchequer would be freed from close scrutiny of Irish accounts'.[1] Their interpretation of developments as a deliberate disengagement from Irish responsibilities is summed up in the sentence: 'The later lieutenants were...viceroys rather than ministers'.[2]

Leaving aside for the moment Mr Richardson's and Professor Sayles's conclusions about the effect of these changes upon relations with the crown and the English administration, it is clear that the key issue was one of control of expenditure. In the late thirteenth century, for example, when the justiciars were still the most important accountants, they appear to have held extensive financial authority. Robert de Ufford in 1276 was, for instance, granted the keeping of Ireland and

> so much of the issues of the land of Ireland as shall be sufficient for the expenses of himself and his retinue in the custody thereof; the whole of the said issues to be at the disposal of the said Robert for the said purpose. (3)

By comparison the powers of John Wogan in 1295 were more restricted. He was to receive, in times of war, 'the expenses he is put to in going with horses and arms and the king's army there', but the money was in fact to be paid to a particular clerk appointed for that purpose by the exchequer and that individual was to account for it.[4] This order

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1 Administration, p 59; below, pp 242-5.
2 Administration, p 13
3 C.P.R. 1272-81 p 149; Richardson and Sayles, Administration, p 52.
4 C.P.R. 1292- 1301, p 155

followed the 1293 alteration in the accounting process, when the authoritative account of the Irish revenues became that by the treasurer.[1]

During at least the first half of the fourteenth century it would seem that the control over the issues of Irish revenue was made the responsibility of the most important officers of the lordship. This was explicitly stated on several occasions. In 1337, for instance, the treasurer was ordered 'to observe this ordinance that all payments out of the king's treasure in that land...shall in future be made by the counsel and advice of the justice and chancellor, payments for fees of ministers only excepted'.[2] In 1352 a special order stated that no great sum of money, beyond the usual fees of ministers, was to be paid by the Irish treasurer without the advice of the chancellor and justiciar.[3] The problem of control is even more strikingly illustrated in a writ of 1359 which showed that justiciars had in the past interfered in the treasurer's domain, issuing mandates which impeded the levying of debts, and ordered that the treasurers were to ignore mandates made by the justiciar without the assent of the chancellor, the treasurer himself, and others.[4] Although the situation became more complex under Clarence and Windsor, when the treasurers failed to account for taxation raised specifically to meet the governor's military needs,[5] control over the country's ordinary revenues remained in the hands of this inner council. The account of the Bishop of Ossory from 1376-84 stated, for instance, that various gifts and rewards were made both by the advice and order of the king's lieutenant and the king's justiciar of Ireland and the council of the king there.[6] Still more explicit was the order

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1 Richardson and Sayles, Administration, p 56
2 C.P.R. 1334-8 p 477
3 C.P.R. 1350-4 pp 154-5
4 C.P.R. 1354-8 p 520
5 Above, p 218.
6 E 364/18/F

to Ossory in 1378 that the sum of money brought from England was to be expended only by the advice of Ormond, the justiciar, acting with the chancellor, the treasurer, the Earl of Kildare and others of the king's council there.[1]

There are, therefore, two important background elements to Edmund Mortimer's unusual indenture of 1379--the fact that the chief ministers normally had joint responsibility in authorizing issues and the knowledge that the governor was increasingly at personal loss as a result of the decline in revenues. In powers referring to the control of revenues after 1379 one sees the combination of two developments in the office--a move to reduce the risks of the governor's financial position by further enhancing his personal executive authority. What in effect he was granted was the full use of the Irish revenues, on much the same terms as Robert de Ufford, thus reversing the pattern of the previous century. It is not surprising that the treasurers' accounts after this dwindled to insignificance and were finally dropped altogether.[2]

This interpretation of the 1379 'radical departure' is sustained by a detailed examination of Mortimer's powers and the circumstances of the grant. The financial powers were given in his indenture, not in his patent of appointment. The stipend was first described:

> and the said earl shall take of our lord the king for himself and for all the men which he will retain with him for the wars and for the government of the...land for all the said time 20,000 marks....

There followed an account of the dates by which payment was to be made--10,000 marks between the date of the indenture, 28 June, and February following, and 5,000 marks in each of the next two years. The significant

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1 E 364/18/F; see also his indenture, E 101/246/13.
2 i.e. under Thomas of Lancaster; below, p226.

clause followed:

> ...and beyond this--of all the profits and revenues which... can be levied and received to the use of our lord the king of his land of Ireland...--there shall be spent on the war there what shall seem to the said earl to be needful and necessary for the profit of our lord the king and of his said land during the said three years by the hand of the treasurer of Ireland...and by the advice of the said earl and his orders to be made by his letters as his warrant to the said treasurer. And the rest of the said profits and revenues shall be kept to the use of...the king.... And the said earl will not be held to account for his retinue nor for the aforesaid sums of 20,000 marks and 1,000 marks to our said lord the king....

Guarantees followed that the earl would receive the full 10,000 marks before he departed and that he would be quit of all responsibility and free to depart from Ireland should payments fall behind.[1] It is clear from this that Mortimer, far from being granted full personal use of the Irish revenues, had rather acquired the power to spend Irish revenues on the king's business. Full rights in the Irish revenues remained in the king's hands and the crucial change in control took place within the inner circle of the Irish council leaving unaffected the king's authority. There was no suggestion of 'contracting out' of government. The clause freeing Mortimer from account referred only to his stipend and shipping costs, for the Irish treasurer would continue to account for the country's revenues.

The circumstances of Mortimer's appointment in 1379 throw some further light on the question. The king's finances were at a low ebb, both in Ireland and in England. Edmund actually lent the king money to finance the campaign, receiving jewels as security.[2] While thus facing the probability of default in England on his stipendary payments, it is not surprising that Mortimer sought greater financial freedoms in Ireland. There are hints of earlier developments towards some means of guaranteeing

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1 The indenture itself, E 101/246/13, is poorly preserved and difficult to read, but is quoted in full in a later memoranda roll notice, E 159/174 Trinity communia (no membrance number given). See below, Appendix IV, pp 556-9.

2 C.P.R. 1379-81 p 391

the governor's ability to fulfil his office. William of Windsor, for example, had been granted the right to acquire lands and rights worth 1,000 marks p.a.,[1] and Ormond had found it necessary to use his personal fortune in the office.[2] The king's desire that Mortimer should not likewise find the Irish treasury empty is seen in a writ of September 1379, ordering the treasurer to collect all the profits and revenues of Ireland and to keep them safe 'making no payment to any man till further order'.[3] In the following April it was expressly admitted that 'the king's revenues there are insufficient for the maintenance of the war and other charges'.[4] Whether or not the granting of control over the revenues enabled the governors to wage war more effectively is difficult to prove, but it certainly gave a necessary backing to the office, recognizing at last the personal risks which all governors faced.

For the remainder of the fourteenth century, and into the fifteenth century too, the chief governors were with increasing frequency allowed the use of Irish revenues. Philip Courtenay, for instance, was granted for the government of Ireland all the profits of the country which could be raised 'beyond the normal and necessary charges'.[5] When Courtenay was later discharged he took action to recover for himself these rents and issues of Ireland which had been granted to him 'for the performance of charges therein'.[6] He was subsequently freed from account, with the explanation that any proceedings would have shown that the king owed him 'great sums of money' for his retinue, and it is possible that his stipend was originally supposed to have been met by the Irish exchequer.[7] Such powers could suit both king and governor, in that the more

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1 C.P.R. 1367-70 p 225
2 C.O.D., ii, no 237
3 C.C.R. 1377-81 p 268
4 C.P.R. 1379-81 p 483
5 E 364/18/F, Ossory's account.
6 C.C.R. 1385-9 p 232
7 E 159/171 Easter, br. baronibus, m 3.

effective the government the more profit would accrue. One can see this clearly in the case of de Vere, who with full revenues also had full responsibilities. Though de Vere as Marquis was assigned 30,000 marks he was bound to render 5,000 marks yearly at the English exchequer after the first two years. When he became duke it was agreed that no money need be paid until Ireland was conquered.[1] It is not likely that anyone was confident about such a prospect, but its inclusion as a condition signified the extent to which royal interest and indirect control was being maintained; if necessary the grant to de Vere could be reviewed and presumably altered in accordance with the king's interests. Meanwhile money was still ploughed into the country and the treasurer still accounted at Westminster.[2] In actual fact, the situation was so bad that grants of Irish revenues gave little chance for profit, and governors continued to seek the security of stipendary agreements. Thus, for example, John Stanley in 1389 was granted an annual fee of 8,000 marks of which 3,000 marks of the first year's fee were specifically assigned upon the Irish revenues. Should he fail to procure this in Ireland he was to be free to apply to the English exchequer. Similarly, although it was said that full payment in the next two years should be met by the Irish exchequer it was also agreed that the English exchequer would meet any default.[3]

While the governor's financial position was clearly undergoing change, there was not apparently in these early stages any deliberate granting away of royal authority, and the enhanced powers of the lieutenant represented a strength more potential than real. Continuing liability

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1 Rot. Parl., iii, 209-10; Report on the Dignity of a Peer, v, 80.

2 See Robert Crulle's account for 9-11 R.II, (incorrectly described on the title of the roll and in the P.R.O. Index of Foreign Accounts as 19-21 R. II). This account, covering two years, stated that the ordinary revenue amounted to £4,556.15.6 'from the rents, farms, escheats, great and small customs and other issues of the said land'. (E 364/32/F)

3 E 101/247/1/3

of treasurers to account was a recognition of this fact. At the same time, it was inevitable that these accounts gave an increasingly less adequate picture of the manner in which the king's Irish revenues were disbursed. The Bishop of Ossory, for instance, referred to Courtenay's powers to receive the revenues and stated simply that for this reason he gave him £3,436.[1] Courtenay was not obliged to account and so presumably this money virtually disappeared. It is against this background that one must see some of the charges made against John Stanley in 1391. As we know, his stipend was to be met partly from the Irish revenues, but it seems likely that his endeavours to obtain payment met with difficulties, necessitating an order that enquiry should be made into the exact amount of revenues and profits which Stanley received.[2] The account of Robert Crulle for the period covering Stanley's term of office covers also the period of de Vere and of Ormond, and as the powers of these different men varied the account provides no evidence for firm conclusions. The authority behind warrants was not clarified.[3] The account is, however, primarily important for its proof that acquisition of control over Irish revenues was not in the early stages accompanied by obligation to account--that duty being still fulfilled, however inadequately, by the Irish treasurer. The situation was not even changed by Gloucester's indenture in 1392, which for the first time expressly stated that the lieutenant need not account for any Irish revenues he received.[4] Ormond's indenture of 1393 made no mention of accounting, but the fact that he too semms to have been given control of the revenues suggests that it was becoming a fairly normal extension of power,not reserved to the highest ranking lieutenants. Ormond was to take a fee

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1 E 364/18/F and E 364/19/B
2 E 101/247/1/2
3 This was Crulle's second account, from 14-17 R.II, in E 364/31/C.
4 Titus B XI, f 29, as printed in Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 552-6.

of 3,000 marks,

> beyond the revenues and profits of the said land which can be levied during that year without extortion or oppression of the subjects of...the king, excepting the revenues and profits of the lands and lordships of the inheritance of...the Earl of March....(1)

Leaving aside for the moment the important 1395-9 period, it is worth looking ahead to some early fifteenth century developments in this area. The financial state of the king's exchequer in England as well as Ireland was by then even weaker. In the case of Stanley in 1399 an attempt was made to throw the whole burden of his 8,000 marks stipend upon the Irish exchequer, but by the time he was recalled some sixteen months later he had only in fact received a total of £7,999.6.8 of which a bare £160 came from Ireland, and of the English assignment he had been unable to cash tallies worth £2,246.6.8.[2] The default and over-assignment continued under Thomas of Lancaster, who in 1403 was given power to receive as lieutenant all issues belonging to the king in Ireland and to 'apply them to the defence of that land and other charges there'.[3] His authority to hear locally the accounts of Irish treasurers and other ministers seems to have been a recognition of the dwindling importance of the treasurer's account to the English exchequer, now that the revenues of the government were usually at the disposal of the lieutenant.[4]

Even yet, however, the pattern altered according to the individuals in office. In 1413 Stanley was told 'to receive all issues pertaining to the king and apply them for the defence of the land and other charges', a formula much the same as the grant to Lancaster.[5] John Talbot in 1414 received the same right, with his freedom from account explicitly stated and he also had the power to hear all accounts locally.[6] In 1420,

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1 E 364/35/A
2 E 101/69/2/307; E 404/19/259
3 C.P.R. 1401-5 p 212
4 E 368/176 Hilary communia m 58
5 C.P.R. 1413-6 pp 53-4
6 'Gerrard Papers', pp 221-4

however, the Earl of Ormond was granted powers similar to those of Stanley in 1389--serving for a fixed stipend, of 2,500 marks, which was to be paid from England if the Irish revenues did not suffice.[1] While a stipend made payable upon the Irish revenues might become in effect a grant of those revenues, there remained a distinction in form and potential authority between such powers, showing that the chief governor's financial position was still flexible in the time of Henry VI.

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This varying pattern clearly provides no final answers to the question of the chief governor's financial powers from 1395-9. There are, however, certain indications that in April 1395 Scrope and Mortimer were comparatively restricted in this quarter. As the general powers of these governors show, Richard apparently concentrated on the importance of the office as a military command. The indentures which survive for part of the period reveal that in payment too this aspect was stressed. No stipend for the office was named, and the governors were instead to be paid on the basis of a daily wage dependent on the size and composition of their military retinues.[2] The enrolled accounts made no mention of a stipend, apart from Scrope's fee of £500 as justiciar.[3]

Independent evidence strengthens the impression that these governors did not have personal control over Irish revenues. A petition, dating probably from early 1397, which complained of the poor government and poverty of the country stated as one clause that:

> the justice or lieutenant used to hold their sessions throughout the land by virtue of which sessions they levied great sums of fines and amercements to their own use for the time when the revenues were in their hands, and now, for all the

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1 E 101/247/10; cf C.O.D., iii, 67-9, where this is dated by Curtis to 1429.

2 E 101/69/1/292&293

3 E 364/33/D and E 364/31/D

> time when the revenues have been in the king's hands, the king has never received a half-penny by this means.(1)

This strongly suggests that Scrope and Mortimer did not have the supreme financial control in Ireland which some of their predecessors had held.

The corollary of any such restraint would have been to enhance the position of the other great officers of Ireland. Proof of this is lacking, but it is interesting to note that the following period saw tension developing within the Irish administration. Trouble seems to have centred on the office of treasurer, filled by Richard Medford, Bishop of Salisbury. The bishop had been granted the office with a novel clause--the freedom from accounting for any of the ordinary Irish revenues.[2] There is nothing to associate this exemption with the previous grants of revenues to chief governors, and the fact that it was possessed only by Richard's last two treasurers and abandoned as soon as Henry IV became king indicates that it was instead a part of Richard's general policy for Ireland in his last years--an attempt most probably to revitalize the office of treasurer and give its holders added incentive to increase the exchequer's efficiency.[3]

One point of dispute between the treasurer and the other officers of the Irish administration throws further light on the subject of revenue grants to chief governors. This concerned the grant of Louth and Drogheda to William Scrope.[4] On 20 February 1395 he was made for life:

> keeper of the king's whole lordship in Uriell as well within the country of Louth as elsewhere within Uriell, with the fee farms, customs, lands and tenements, and all liberties, franchises, escheats, marriages, wardships, reliefs, homages, fealties,

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1 Lambeth Palace Library, Carew MS 619 f 207; below, pp 279-80.

2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 584

3 ibid., 1396-9 p 410 for Robert Faryngton's appointment. The question of these appointments and Richard's general policy is discussed at greater length below, pp 242-5.

4 Carew MS 618 f 208 and S.C. 8/252/12536; for further detail on the dispute see below, pp 262, 302 etc.

> bondages, hundreds, fairs, markets, free customs, meadows, woods, pastures, fisheries, suits of court of free and bond tenants, with issues, revenues, rents, fines, amercements, wreck of the sea, forfeitures, etc. belonging to the said lordship together with the exercise in person or by deputy of the offices of sheriff, escheator, customers, bailiffs etc therein and the return of writs, goods and chattels of felons, fugitives, outlaws, escapes of prisoners etc without rendering aught therefore to the king. (1)

On 20 March following he was given like power in Drogheda, both on the side of Meath and of Uriell:

> to hold the same at fee farm, with the offices of escheator, gauger, clerk of the market and customers of the king's cocket, together with goods and chattels of felons, fugitives, outlaws, escapes of prisoners etc, without rendering aught therefore to the king. (2)

Although this grant might appear to be an example of excessive generosity to a favourite, particularly in the fact that it was made for life, it clearly should be interpreted in the light of Scrope's office as justiciar. The grant was in fact surrendered in April 1397, when Scrope ceased to be justiciar.[3] In the grant we can see Richard's recognition that the justiciar needed immediate control of at least a certain portion of the Irish revenues if he were to be sure of sufficient ready cash to fulfil his duties. Such explicit removal of a considerable proportion of the country's ordinary revenues from the control of the exchequer confirms the impression that Scrope did not have a general grant of these revenues. We have no evidence concerning any similar grant to Mortimer--quite possibly he was expected to manage with the support of his own personal resources in the country.

The position does not seem to have greatly changed after April 1397 when Mortimer acquired sole authority in the whole country. Louth and Drogheda remained outside the control of the Irish exchequer, as all the profits of the area were granted to James Cottenham from 22 April 1397,

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 174
2 ibid.
3 ibid.

apparently so that he could more effectively finance his office as keeper of the king's castles of Wicklow, Newcastle MacKinegan and Kendleston.[1] Mortimer's own indenture shows only minor changes. He now had a definite stipend, of 5,000 marks, which was to be met by cash payment or assignment in England. If the payments were not met he could leave the country freely. He was not obliged to account for his retinue or for any sums received from the king.[2]

With Surrey's term of office one is even less certain of the lieutenant's financial position. The similarity of his extended powers in January 1399 to those of Edmund Mortimer in 1379 suggests that he may also have received that lieutenant's financial authority. He certainly was told to make inquisition into various sources of profit and 'to seize the same into the king's hands...and expend the issues and profits thereof according to his discretion on the maintenance of the war in Ireland...'.[3] When Surrey, like Scrope and Cottenham before him, received the profits of Louth and Drogheda in March 1399 it is therefore impossible to know whether these were the first Irish revenues granted to him or whether he received them now only because the former grant to Cottenham had previously separated them from the receipts of the rest of the country.[4] Surrey, at least in the last six months of his office, may in fact have had full rights to disburse the Irish revenues.

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Although one cannot be absolutely certain that Scrope and Mortimer, and for a time even Surrey, were thus limited in the scope of their authority, the lack of definite proof does not completely preclude speculation on the nature of the governor's general financial relations with the crown. Control over Irish revenues was an additional aid in office,

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 187
2 E 404/14/96/ part 2 no 160
3 Cal. Fine Rolls 1391-9 p 293; above, p 214; cf C.P.R. 1379-81 p 483.
4 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 485

but lieutenants with this power still depended to a great extent on cash subsidies from England. With Scrope and Mortimer these came in the form of their wages of retinue, and, in the case of Scrope, of his £500 fee payable in England. The financial pressures which were obviously building up for Richard, leading him to reduce enormously the strength of the Irish government in 1397, lay not in the state of the Irish revenues but in the English exchequer's capacity to maintain these heavy charges. These pressures explain why the king, from circumstances rather than policy, was increasingly compelled to share the burden of Irish government with others more solvent than himself.

The accounts of both Scrope and Mortimer show that neither received the full amount due from England. After Scrope's two years in office he was owed £832.16.7 by the king. Mortimer, after three years, was owed £544.11.7¾,[1] although for the last year his greatly reduced stipend must have lessened the chance of default. That both men were aware of the risks involved is clear from their indentures. Scrope's in September 1397 specified that he be freed from the office in the event of default, and Mortimer's of April 1397 carried the same condition.[2] Although such conditions for subsequent cancellation were quite normal in military indentures of Irish lieutenants,[3] the introduction of the passage into Mortimer's indenture after he had experienced two years of service, and the general tone of the indenture, suggests that both parties viewed such a deterioration in position as a distinct possibility. Mortimer was apparently anxious to protect himself should the accumulated non-payment become an intolerable burden.

Mortimer was, however, in quite a different position from Scrope in his background resources in England. Scrope was largely dependent on royal favour; Mortimer could fall back on his inheritance in Wales. That

1 E 364/33/A and E 364/31/D
2 E 101/69/1/293 and E 404/14/96 part 2 no 160
3 e.g. Gloucester in 1392; Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 552-6.

this was to be expected can be seen from the document of 1392 outlining the conditions made by Mortimer's guardians before he would be allowed to accept the office.[1] Fortunately several accounts from Mortimer's Denbigh lordship survive and throw light on this aspect.[2] They show that money, men and supplies were all sent over to Ireland and supplemented the meagre assets of the government there. In places of course this reflected the normal workings of a great lordship, and it is difficult at times to distinguish private and official elements. For instance, in 1396-7 the wages of Mortimer's own household officials serving him in Ireland were quite naturally met from the Welsh lordship, and similarly the sending of eleven pairs of mill stones to Drogheda, may simply reflect the cohesiveness of the entire Mortimer lordship, but other items show a more obvious draining of Welsh resources to meet Mortimer's burden of office. We read, for instance of the officers of Mortimer's Welsh estates gathering 1,000 marks to send to Mortimer in Ireland. and of the carriage at another time of £300 from Denbigh to Chester to deliver to Thomas Walweyn, treasurer of war in Ireland. There are also references to shipping of horses and equipment and to deliveries at various times to Thomas Walweyn, of the money accruing from different parts of the lordship. The money was clearly intended to cover some of the earl's personal expenses as well as his costs in office, and there is one reference at least to £330 being received by the treasurer of his household in Ireland. It is difficult to be precise about the origin of all the money provided, or its exact amount; a certain proportion may have come via the lordship from London.[3]

The same lack of precision characterizes the Denbigh account of 1397-8, but again the impression is one of heavy investment in Mortimer's office. Thus we read of the expenses of Philip ap Morgan and others,

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1 Above, pp 184-5
2 S.C. 6/1184/22 & 23
3 S.C. 6/1184/22

> going from Wales to the parts of Ireland to the lord Edward, brother of the lord there, both with money of the said lord received from various receivers of the March of Wales and with other different equipment of his....

It is interesting that even the organization of Mortimer's own shipping seems to have been partly paid for out of his own revenues, although this was a royal obligation by the terms of his contract. In this year too another payment was made 'for the carriage of £600 of the lord's money'. Many other items demonstrate the involvement of the entire Mortimer lordship in Ireland at this time--the payment of messengers, the activity of the treasurer of war, presumably recruiting and collecting money, and the organization of any shipments required for Ireland. The latter category could even extend to the shipping of John Cheyne and others of his retinue, going to Ireland on the lord's business during one of his visits to England.[1] This investment of private resources was probably not unusual, and may indeed have been inevitable at a time when government payments could lag far behind expenditure, but its significance should be noted as evidence not only of Mortimer's personal interest in the fate of Ireland, but also of the dependence, indirectly, of the crown upon the resources of a private individual.

Richard, it is clear, needed Mortimer's personal wealth when he appointed him lieutenant in 1397.[2] When, however, Surrey replaced him in 1398 the increase in stipend from Mortimer's 5,000 marks to 11,500 marks probably reflected Richard's awareness that Surrey, without great landed wealth, needed this heavy subsidization. The fairly punctual payments of the stipend demonstrate the importance Richard attached to Irish needs at this time, and his acceptance of the fact that effective government must depend upon the chief governor's financial assets. The decision to grant Surrey the profits of Louth and Drogheda was--whether or not he had a general grant of Irish revenues--part and parcel of this

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1 S.C. 6/1184/23
2 Above, p 193.

same determination to give the lieutenant the capacity to govern.

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It is difficult to generalize about the position of chief governors during these years, for the office clearly remained flexible. In this matter of financial powers our ignorance about the general administration of the Irish exchequer at this time prevents any definite conclusions. It does, however, seem certain that no immediate diminution of royal authority in Ireland resulted from grants of revenues to lieutenants. The evidence that these financial powers apparently elevated the justiciar over his fellow officers tallies with what we know about lieutenants' other special administrative and executive powers, which seem to have been expanding in scope throughout the second half of the century. The possibility that both Scrope and Roger Mortimer, and Thomas Holland initially, received more restricted authority cannot now be proved, but the indications suggesting this deserve serious attention. To restrain the growing independence of the chief governor was a policy fitting in well with the post-expeditionary period, for although the lieutenant's enhanced powers could mean a survival of some degree of government it was not necessarily the best government possible. Ormond's indenture of 1393, with its reference to possible oppressions and extortions, shows how the profit motive could influence a chief governor to press the country beyond its ability to pay. Whether or not Richard did indeed make an issue of the chief governor's powers, it is certain that he recognized the office to be central to his ambitions in Ireland and used his continuing control over the appointees to implement, so far as was possible, his personal policies for the country.

Chapter 4

The administration of the lordship, 1395-9

Part i -- Administrative developments in Ireland after the 1394-5 expedition

The poor survival of sources on the administration of the lordship in the 1390s makes it difficult to attempt any analysis of contemporary developments in government. One cannot, for instance, identify with certainty all the main office holders, nor is it easy to relate the isolated evidence which does emerge to its wider late medieval context. The general poverty of Irish administrative history means that frequent digressions to examine obscure procedures and powers of offices inevitably accompany any assessment of the evidence. What emerges from the study is, for the most part, an incomplete but fairly straightforward account of developments within the administration during this period—frequently lacking immediate association with royal policy during and after the expedition. Of more obvious significance in this respect are the documents examined in the second part of the chapter. Arising directly out of the administrative arrangements made for Ireland by Richard in 1395, they demonstrate certain tensions engendered by Richard's policies. Many items in these two documents reflect, however, issues recurring in other petitions about the state of Ireland and clearly belong to the mainstream of developments in Anglo-Irish medieval government. Most of the tentative conclusions which emerge from the examination are not therefore limited to the problems of the administration after Richard's expedition but have also a general bearing on long term problems and developments.

That the country's administration was, despite the deficiencies of the material, an inevitable focus of attention after Richard's expedition

perhaps needs no elaboration. It was normal that, during periods of crisis in the lordship, concern of the English crown was not limited to the question of relations with the Gaelic Irish, but turned also to the internal running of the lordship and the character of its administration. Charges of official malpractice--by negligence and incompetence as well as by peculation--were standard ingredients of fourteenth century petitions on the state of the country,[1] and English attempts to inject new vigour into efforts against the encroaching Irish often coincided with changes of personnel in the highest offices and varying degrees of administrative reform.[2] The 1357 ordinance for the state of Ireland expressed clearly the crown's recognition that the country needed reform, admitting that the crisis had arisen 'through default of government and the neglect and carelessness of the royal officers there, both great and small'.[3] Petitions which asked for a remedy were probably sincere in their complaints, though they may often have been prompted not by details of administrative mismanagement but by a generally irksome regime--a clash of personalities frequently lay behind calls for reform.[4] As medieval government depended greatly on the self-interest of its administrators, it was accepted that the perquisites of office extended beyond specific fees or rigidly defined dues. The dividing line between honest government and corruption was vague and might be bent to a considerable degree if the holder of office were generally popular. On the other hand, it was easy to find instances of such shortcomings to cite, if ammunition

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1 e.g. 1345 petition, printed in King's Council in Ireland, pp 314-22 passim; 1399 petition, ibid., pp 261-9 passim; petition of Henry V, printed in Proceedings and Ordinances, ii, 43-52 passim.

2 e.g. Clarence's involvement in the 1360s was accompanied by a reform ordinance and saw significant changes in the personnel of government. (Statutes and Ordinances, pp 423-9; Richardson and Sayles, Administration, list of officers, passim.)

3 Statutes and Ordinances, p 408

4 e.g., John Morice in 1341 (Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp 258-60); William of Windsor in the 1370s (M.V.Clarke, 'William of Windsor in Ireland', Fourteenth Century Studies, pp 146-82 passim).

were needed with which to attack a generally unpopular official.[1] Not all charges of maladministration had underlying political motives. The petitions of 1345 and 1399, for instance, complained of incompetence and ignorance among the chancery and exchequer clerks.[2] Such attention to the standards of clerical competence was inevitably an important element in any reform attempt.

Another more specific motive for investigation which touched the heart of the administrative question was the lordship's financial situation and the Irish exchequer's relations with England. In the earlier fourteenth century Ireland had ceased to be a source of profit to the English crown.[3] As the area of real authority continued to dwindle the government's capacity to collect the country's revenues proportionately shrank. From the mid-century efforts were made to stem the evident decline, always with the underlying hope that a safe and thriving lordship would also be a profitable one. The involvement of Clarence, though costly, was justified by the hope that Ireland might be made to pay her own way, and possibly even contribute something to the royal revenue.[4] Windsor's term of office necessitated further investment, but efforts to finance his campagins by taxation in Ireland demonstrated a belief that the Anglo-Irish lieges could pay more than they claimed.[5] Part at least of the problem certainly lay in the exchequer's inability to collect and control the disbursement of revenues. Many sources were assigned, reducing the cash flow into the exchequer, and complaints suggest that tallies were occasionally made uncashable

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1 The fifteenth century gives several examples of the degree to which public opinion could swing, as successive powerful governors were praised and castigated in turn. e.g. Talbot and Ormond in 1428, 1441 etc. (Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp 365-7, 370-2)

2 King's Council in Ireland, pp 320-1, 261-9

3 See, e.g., J.F.Lydon, 'Edward II and the revenues of Ireland in 1311-2', I.H.S., xiv (1965) pp 39-57 passim; Richardson and Sayles, 'Irish revenue 1278-1384', 90-1.

4 Rot. Parl., ii, 289

5 Lydon' William of Windsor and the Irish parliament', E.H.R., lxxx (1965), esp. pp 256-8.

by local resistance.[1] The treasure in the exchequer itself was obviously inadequate to meet the growing demands of the lordship's military crisis. The records of the period are full of evidence of the Dublin government's poverty, and its inability to bear the burden was spelled out by specific embassies to the king.[2] During the early part of Richard's reign some optimism was still felt about the possibility of revitalizing the Irish finances. De Vere's first indenture, for example, carried an obligation to render 5,000 marks yearly at the English exchequer, though the removal of the condition when he was made duke apparently recognized the impossibility of this.[3] Meanwhile the English commons, tiring of the lack of visible returns for their investment, specified that their 1395 grant for the Irish expedition was not to constitute a precedent.[4] Increasing strain on the royal purse ensured that any prolonged activity in the country would ultimately seek to reform its financial state, if only to pay for the current involvement.

With these chronic problems of malgovernance and declining revenues to be faced, the lordship's general administration was inevitably a focus of attention during the first expedition. Long before the expedition materialized it was apparent that this would be so. As far back as 1391 investigations into Stanley's term of office specifically required the commissioners to ascertain the country's revenues as well as to scrutinize the records of all courts and investigate the behaviour of the king's officials.[5] The results of this part of the investigation are unknown,[6] and no further action was recorded until 1393, when the

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1 e.g. King's Council in Ireland, no 113; C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 397 etc
2 e.g. King's Council in Ireland, nos 36, 114, 162; E 101/246/3/227, item in the treasurer's account, 1382.
3 Above, p 224
4 Rot. Parl., iii, 330; below, pp 394-5.
5 C.P.R. 1388-92 pp 404-5
6 For the results of the commissioners' other enquiries see below Appendix V, pp 559 - 63.

royal expedition was known to be imminent.[1] The renewed attention took the form of a series of appointments. In March John Acton, clerk, became second chamberlain of the exchequer, followed in May by Robert Burnell as second baron of the exchequer, Laurence Neuton as king's serjeant at arms in Ireland and the Bishop of Ossory as the new chancellor.[2] It was also in May that Ormond was retained in the office of justiciar for one more year, and in July the king's clerk John de Thorpe became treasurer.[3] The king's writ of July 1393 ordering his officers in Ireland to view letters patent of the late king made clear Richard's concern that the new appointees would begin to overhaul the administration, for the order apparently referred back to the reform ordinance of 1357. The July writ spoke of the lack of good government and the carelessness of officers, which caused 'manifold troubles and grievances', isolating in particular the desolation of the marches and their inability to withstand the enemy's attacks.[4]

Statements about the forthcoming expedition as the time of the enterprise approached continued to imply that the necessity for 'good government' was seen to be as important as the immediate conquest of the Irish. Thus Richard wrote to his justiciar there, the Earl of Ormond, that he was coming with a desire for

> the good ruling and prosperous government of Ireland and of the whole people and his lieges there, that peace be cherished and laws and customs of the land kept, justice be administered to his subjects, and such as are disobedient and rebellious be punished and their licentiousness restrained....(5)

So too he wrote to Philip Duke of Burgundy in September informing him of his intent to go:

> both to punish and correct our rebels there and to bring about and establish good government and just rule for the faithful lieges....(6)

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1 Above p 37
2 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 251, 262, 269, 276.
3 E 364/35/A (Ormond's account); C.P.R. 1391-6 p 310
4 C.C.R. 1392-6 p 228
5 ibid., p 220
6 Anglo-Norman Letters, no 3

Although it is virtually impossible now to see the detail of any royal attempt to reform the lordship's government, in certain areas change definitely can be associated with the expeditionary period. The most obvious is of course the alteration in the office of chief governor which, as has been seen, was divided after the first expedition, making possible an unusual degree of control over the country.[1] The chief governor's function lay primarily, however, in the lordship's defence, and though he was closely involved in the country's administration his position merits examination in its own right. Of the other main changes the most important were the different terms of the patents appointing the chancellor and treasurer, and the removal of the exchequer and common bench back to Dublin.

It would probably be misleading to credit Richard or his advisors with great initiative in returning the centre of government to Dublin, for the evidence suggests that the move had become almost inevitable by the 1390s. There is little information available on the actual transfer. On 6 November 1394 the king at Dublin ordered the treasurer and barons of the exchequer at Carlow to adjourn all pleas and actions before them until 20 January by which time they were to have removed, with their rolls, to Dublin. Another similar order was sent to the justice of the bench at Carlow.[2] It was stated that the removal was necessary 'for the greater advantage of the people'. This transfer reversed the situation prevailing since Clarence brought the exchequer and common bench to Carlow some thirty years previously.[3] The motive then for changing the seat of government seems to have been a mixture of focussing effort on a valuable march area and facilitating the accounting

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1 Above, esp pp 197-202
2 C.C.H., p 154 nos 54-5; P.R.O.I., Ferguson Collections, ii, f 100.
3 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 287

and other business of officers and lieges in the more distant parts of the south. From the start it was necessary to subsidise beyond normal fees officers operating in Carlow's frontier conditions.[1] This continued to be so, as officers regularly received rewards beyond their fees 'for reason of the stay in Carlow'.[2] Some of the dangers of the situation are illustrated in the 1392 Council Roll, which recites numerous cases of damages to the lands and personal property of administrative officials forced to reside in Carlow.[3] The town itself was on occasion wasted and destroyed, and weakened by the war and emigration.[4] The absence of regular records makes it difficult to gauge the efficiency of the Carlow administration, but its initial justification had probably disappeared long before the 1390s. In itself expensive, it was by no means as convenient as Dublin would be for the lieges of Meath, Louth, and adjoining areas. In times of crisis the exchequer and common bench actually had to evacuate the town. Thus for example in 1372 the removal to Dublin of the money and seals of the Irish exchequer was ordered, and in 1379 Ormond adjourned all pleas to Naas, because Carlow was almost entirely destroyed.[5] In recognition of the situation both Mortimer in 1379 and Courtenay in 1385 were empowered to move the exchequer and common bench to any other part of the country, except the lordship of the Earl of March himself,[6] though the permanent site remained at Carlow. As late as 1392 it was stated that the rebuilding of the town was essential as Carlow represented 'the head and comfort of Leinster',[7] and in July 1393 money had to be advanced to repair Carlow castle where the government's

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1 e.g. E 364/7/C (Account of Walter Dalby, treasurer) I am indebted to Miss P.Connolly for this reference.
2 e.g. 364/31/C (Irish treasurer's account, 1391-3)
3 e.g. King's Council in Ireland, no 7
4 ibid., no 5
5 N.L.I. MS 3, f 78; R.C.N. Lib., Graves MS 4, p 245.
6 Foedera, iv,72; C 66/319 m 26
7 King's Council in Ireland, no 5

records were stored.[1] By this time the situation in Leinster was so critical that the march land bordered on Dublin itself.[2] Carlow was no longer an outpost in the land of peace but an isolated centre whose access from Dublin and other areas was frequently impossible.

While Richard's decision to return the centre of government to Dublin was therefore a logical one, the move was undoubtedly significant. It was characteristic of the king's general policies at the time. Dublin city, with its own royal castle, was a more suitable centre for royal government than Carlow, no longer in the king's hands but held by the Countess of Norfolk, whose grandson Thomas Mowbray, Earl of Nottingham, had custody of Carlow castle.[3] In geographic terms alone Dublin was a more natural centre and the establishment of Richard's government there demonstrated his concern not simply with Leinster and the south-east but with the entire lordship. The importance of the royal city of Dublin was to be further stressed in the next few years by arrangements seeking to keep the chancellor permanently in residence there, and by repairs undertaken in the royal castle in Dublin.[4]

The changes in the manner of appointing both chancellor and treasurer carried a different significance for the Irish administration, affecting as they did the lordship's relations with the crown and the English government. The appointment of Richard Medford, Bishop of Chichester, as treasurer of Ireland in October 1394, though enrolled after the king had landed in Ireland, must be considered as evidence of Richard's

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1 N.L.I. MS 4, f 46
2 e.g. P.R.O.I. Lodge MSS, vol i, p 45; R.I.A., MS 12.D.16, p 87 etc.
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 19
4 Below, pp 248, 296-7.

policy leading up to the expedition.[1] Medford was to serve during pleasure, receiving the usual fee. An additional grant was made:

> to the said bishop, for his indemnity, that that he be not accountable to the king for the revenues of Ireland or of any sums of money to be received or delivered by him or his officers at the receipt of the said exchequer by reason of his office, and that he be not impeached therefore by the king or his heirs; provided that if any sums be paid to him for the defence of Ireland or for other reasons by the king or treasurer of England he be accountable for such sums and taking them out of the realm.

It is difficult to understand Richard's reason for granting this unusual power. The Irish exchequer's relations with England were of course fundamental to royal policy, and it seems curious that the first treasurer specifically released from accounting in England should have been appointed just prior to a massive royal effort to restore the lordship to royal control. It is unlikely that the grant simply expressed Richard's generosity to a favourite, for to give such an office to a man of no experience in the Irish administration was a doubtful favour. Nor does it appear to have been the result of exchequer desire to be free of this burden of Irish accounts.[2] It had admittedly become increasingly difficult to bring Irish officers to account, but it was accepted that every officer must account and the exchequer assiduously followed any defaulters.[3] Medford himself had to procure a writ in 1398 confirming his freedom from account and was required to prove

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 584 He was appointed on 4 October, but the additional powers were enrolled on 5 October 1394. (E 368/170 Easter communia, recorda m 11) The calendar, however, records both under 4 October, and adds to the confusion by enrolling the appointment again the following year, explaining 'Vacated because otherwise in the 18 year'. (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 621)This must be the origin for the claim made by Richardson and Sayles that the appointment was made in 1395.(Administration, pp 59-60)

2 cf Richardson and Sayles, Administration, p 59

3 The English memoranda roll of that very year carried summonses to account to William Chaumbre, John Troye and William Bishop of Ferns, all recent treasurers of Ireland, quite apart from numerous references to lesser officers summoned to answer for money given to them by the evidence of other accounting treasurers. (E 368/167 Mich. br.retorn., mm 25-7)

that he had received no money during the twenty-four hours while he was treasurer but before his freedom from account was enrolled.[1] Furthermore, the policy of granting this power, continued in Faryntgon's appointment in 1398,[2] was abandoned after Richard's deposition, so it is difficult to interpret the move as a simplification of Irish financial practices, recognizing the effective independence of the Irish exchequer. Under Henry IV treasurers were again required to account in England and when the practical difficulties of this were finally faced it was in a way acceptable to traditional administrative practices--by authorizing the lieutenant to hear accounts locally.[3] The powers of Medford and Faryngton who were 'not to be held to account' and would not be disturbed in this by 'the king, his ministers or his heirs' imply on the contrary a total freedom from the burden of accounting for the revenues of Ireland. As it seems unlikely that English exchequer recommendations can have provoked such a grant, its origins must have lain in Richard's own policy for Ireland in October 1394. Obviously the king at such a time was not disposing of the office--central to his control in Ireland--in a casual manner. One must remember Medford's background and his reputation as a loyal servant of the crown. Originally a royal clerk he had suffered imprisonment in the 1388 crisis at the hands of the Appellants.[4] Elevated to Chichester in March 1390 he had since served the king on official business and was soon to be rewarded by his translation to Salisbury.[5] The most probable explanation for the new power is that Richard realized the unlikelihood of immediate

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1 E 368/170 Easter communia recorda m 11, printed in Richardson and Sayles, Administration, pp 276-8.
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 410
3 C.P.R. 1401-5 p 456 and C 66/372 (Thomas of Lancaster); also 'Gerrard papers', p 221 (John Talbot).
4 C.C.R. 1385-9 p 382
5 C.P.R. 1388-92 p 288; ibid. 1391-6 p 664 (February 1396)

profit from Ireland, and that the freedom from account represented a bargain by which Medford gained an unusual degree of self-interest in the job. This hypothesis seems borne out by two important facts. We find first of all that Chichester himself, when finally exonerated from account, sought to make his deputies account for the money they had received and disbursed in office.[1] The implication is that he suspected them of having made a profit. Secondly, we find that after two years of the arrangement relations broke down completely within the Irish administration, with the treasurer's deputy apparently acquiring enemies on all sides.[2] The obvious explanation for this is that he was doing his job with unusual efficiency. The entire episode seems more characteristic of a calculated effort to revive the Irish treasurer's interest in office than of a casual bestowal of royal favour.

A similar blend of calculation and caution can be seen in the appointment of Alexander Balscot as chancellor in June 1395, shortly after the expedition ended.[3] To understand the importance of this appointment in relation to Richard's general policies it is necessary to consider the role played by the chancellor in the Irish administration and the normal powers of the office. Although the chancellor was originally subordinate to the treasurer, he had by the early fourteenth century established precedence in the Irish council, second only to the chief governor in rank.[4] By the late fourteenth century the chancellor's potential power was considerable, for his co-operation was essential in authenticating the council's orders. The example of the Archbishop of Dublin who exceeded his duties during the Courtenay crisis is an extreme one, but it illustrates the degree of authority the chancellor

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1 E 368/170 Easter communia recorda, m 11
2 Below, p 257 ff.
3 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 582
4 Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, p 28

might exercise. The king had to command this archbishop:

> to desist from calling together the council and summoning the parliament in Ireland, laying imposts upon the people there, granting charters of pardon and taking great fines for the same to his own use, without special authority of the king or of... his lieutenant in Ireland, and not to meddle under any pretence in aught save matters which may concern his office and the needful ruling and defence of Ireland, especially in the lieutenant's absence....(1)

Even when there was no apparent dissension within the government in Ireland the power of the custodian of the Irish great seal was considerable. In 1394, for instance, the presentation of a clerk to a benefice was revoked, for it had been sealed by the chancellor in Ireland who had no authority to make any such presentation.[2] In the early fifteenth century the office's capacity to be a channel for political dissension in the lordship was again demonstrated when Laurence Merbury held the office, and refused to seal an important document being sent to England.[3]

By normal procedure the chancellor of Ireland was appointed during pleasure, receiving for his duties a set fee as well as the issues of the great seal.[4] By the late fourteenth century these issues were insufficient to cover the costs of the chancellor's obligations, and frequently additional payments had to be made to reimburse him from the exchequer's funds. In 1382, for example, Colton as chancellor received £80 compensation as the issues of the seal were too small to pay for his retinue.[5] In April 1394 a reward of £20 to Richard Bishop of Ossory mentioned his various services and explained that his fee in office only covered one third of his expenses.[6] Whatever power accrued to the chancellor through his office, it clearly was not at this time a source

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1 C.C.R. 1381-5 p 500
2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 517
3 Statutes and Ordinances, p 567
4 e.g. Parliaments and Councils, pp 18-9; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 276
5 E 101/246/2/35
6 C.C.H., p 150 no 1

of great financial profit to him.

Against this background must be considered the appointment of Alexander Balscot. He was in many respects an obvious choice for the office. Though an Englishman by birth, he was by 1394 a very experienced Irish administrator, having already acted as justiciar, chancellor and treasurer.[1] His record was not entirely spotless, for though he claimed to have taken the muster of Stanley's retinue in 1390 an independent inquisition asserted that no muster was made.[2] He apparently retained Richard's favour, for in September 1391 he was himself named as justiciar after Stanley left, and in 1393 received a letter from the king appointing him to his council as 'we trust entirely in you'.[3] Balscot served Richard on his council in Ireland during the expedition and the subsequent reward of 100 marks to him indicates that his usefulness was recognized.[4] The choice of man can therefore cause little surprise.

The terms of his patent are, however, of interest. He was appointed during pleasure and with the usual fee, but the issues and profits of the great seal were for the first time reserved to the king. Balscot was furthermore obliged to find a keeper of the rolls and other clerks for the chancery and maintain them 'at his table', supporting them when on eyre. One of these clerks was to be assigned to keep the hanaper. For these charges the chancellor was to receive £80 a year--making

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1 W.Harris, (ed.) The whole works of Sir James Ware concerning Ireland, i, 147-8, states that his real name was Petit, and his birthplace was Balscot in Oxford. He was a canon of St. Canice's, Kilkenny, until he became Bishop of Ossory in 1371. His translation in 1386 'at the instance of the clergy of Meath' to Meath diocese must be seen as a measure of his full adaptation to Anglo-Ireland. For the offices he held see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp 318, 321 and Cal.Fine Rolls, 1377-83,11.

2 E 101/247/3 (certificate concerning Stanley's muster); cf E 101/247/1/4 (inquisition concerning state of Ireland and Stanley's government.

3 C.P.R. 1388-92 p 479; King's Council in Ireland, pp 255-7.

4 E 403/551 (19 July, 1395)

altogether an annual fee of £120--from the issues of the hanaper. If the hanaper could not pay the sum he was to be paid by the Irish exchequer, though priority was to be given to the fees of lately submitting Irishmen.[1] On the same day--6 July--a licence to him to deputize others in his office shows that his appointment required him to be resident in Dublin 'for the quiet of his lieges'. The stipulation was associated with the split governorship of Ireland and the fact that Scrope and Mortimer could not easily meet.[2] Only in urgent cases was the chancellor to leave Dublin. Otherwise the chief governors were to come instead to the chancery. The chancellor was empowered to appoint a deputy keeper to bring the seal out of Dublin should the necessity arise and should he not be able to do so himself. Presumably the chief governors preferred the chancery to be established in a fixed place, but the provision suggests an attempt to institutionalize the department and reduce the mobility and potential independence of the chancellor. This concentration on Dublin was probably part of a general policy move which must be seen in the light of the exchequer and common bench transfer from Carlow. Dublin, it seems, was to be the focus for Richard's new-style government, as the renovations to be made to Dublin castle were to demonstrate.[3]

In these new arrangements Richard was clearly attempting a general overhaul of the department. The stipulation that the chancellor maintain certain nominated clerks must have made for greater efficiency and discipline among the subordinate officers. As past petitions had shown, clerical incompetence severely handicapped the government.[4] The lack of specialization--which is suggested by the fact that an officer could hitherto receive reward for his labours in both the exchequer and chancery--would presumably cease once the chancery clerks became an organized unit,

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 602
2 ibid., p 607
3 Below, pp 296-7.
4 Above, p 237.

as in England.[1] The contemporary English chancery had recently been itself the subject of a group of ordinances, revealing the department as a highly disciplined institution.[2] Comparison with English chancery practice also illuminates the problem of the new arrangement concerning issues of the Irish great seal. In the mid-thirteenth century Henry III reserved the issues of the English seal to himself, reducing the chancellor to a salaried official receiving 400 marks from the clerk of the hanaper--a stipend which rose by 1330 to £500.[3] The reservation in 1395 of the Irish issues must therefore be considered in part as an effort to bring the Irish administration into line with English practice. At the same time, the move attempted to deal with a basic problem in the chancery--its tendency to become a financial liability to the chancellor. The guaranteed fee of £120 p.a.--which may well have resulted from the representations of Balscot himself or other Irish officers--was an advantage to a present incumbent, while at the same time the crown's interests were protected by reserving the issues to the king. The profits of the hanaper would be used to pay the chancellor, with any deficit being made good at the exchequer. Any improvement in the situation would however give future profits of the great seal to the king, not the chancellor, and meanwhile the clerk of the hanaper was responsible for accounting for the profits of the office.[4] Given the uncertainty of the receipts of the office, the new arrangement was to the immediate advantage of an honest chancellor, while guaranteeing future profits to the king. Although the effect seems to have been the direct opposite of the grant to the treasurer, who was freed from obligation to account, there was in each of the appointments a common element of mutual self interest between the king and his chief officers.

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1 e.g. King's Council in Ireland, no 7; on the corporate character of the English chancery see Tout, Chapters, iii, 210-13.

2 B. Wilkinson, The chancery under Edward III, pp 214-23; the ordinances have been attributed to 12 R.II, 1388-9.

3 ibid., pp 7, 62

4 e.g. Hugh Bavent was summoned to account for the period from 20 October 1399.(E 368/177 Mich., br. retorn., m 143)

The grant was certainly not over generous to the new chancellor, for some such recognition of the burden of the office had become inevitable. In 1398 Thomas Cranley was granted 10/- daily beyond his fee of £40 when he became chancellor, more than doubling the addition of £80 to Balscot's fee, and from then on it was customary to give from 5/- to 10/- daily.[1] Although Richard's reorganization of the chancery showed a realistic grasp of some of its problems, it can hardly be termed a fundamental or ambitious reform programme.

Information on other developments in the administration during and immediately after the expedition is scanty, coming mainly from notices about individuals who held office. This provides an essential background for any understanding of the subsequent period, particularly in enabling one to see the contribution made by English clerks appointed to the Irish administration at the time of the expedition. Some of these men returned to England soon after Richard, and the grant of Irish offices to them may have been partly as a supplementary bonus for their labours in the king's company in Ireland. At the same time, for the administration their period in office was undoubtedly associated with reform.[2] Changing the personnel in office was a more usual and effective means of achieving administrative reform than the issuing of ordinances. The men so appointed tended to be either known personal adherents of Richard's--such as Richard Medford, the new Irish treasurer--or to have distinguished themselves by service in office in England, like Robert Faryngton. Their contribution to the Irish administration

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 409; Otway-Ruthven, 'The medieval Irish chancery', Album Helen Maud Cam, ii (1961) p 125. The condition that a deficit in the hanaper was to be made good by the exchequer also appeared in later appointments. e.g. C.P.R. 1408-13 p 172.

2 See the inclusion of their names among the officers requested in an attempt to reform the Irish administration in 1397. Below, pp 299-301.

was to be considerable, not least in the tensions their presence gave rise to.

One of the offices which saw several changes during the expeditionary months was that of chancellor, the choice of Balscot not being made until June 1395.[1] In July 1394, prior to the expedition, Robert Sutton had replaced the Bishop of Ossory, the existing chancellor, as keeper of the great seal.[2] Sutton himself was replaced during the expedition by Robert Waldby, Archbishop of Dublin, who had previously held the office in 1392,[3] and who after his appointment itinerated most of the time with the king, witnessing many of the submissions.[4] When obliged to go from Kilkenny to Dublin on 11 April 1395 he left the great seal in the custody of Robert Faryngton, keeper of the rolls, who held it for a week until the chancellor's return.[5] It is probable that Waldby's period in office saw some general scrutiny of the department, leading to Balscot's new patent in June 1395.

The Englishman Faryngton is an important example of Richard's introduction of new men into the Irish administration. He was made keeper of the rolls of chancery on 15 January 1395, with a grant of ten marks annually beyond the usual fee of £20.[6] Some indication of his standing may be seen in the fact that a special ship was impressed to bring him to Ireland with his men and horses. He was accompanied by Robert Claydon, another English official serving on the expedition.[7] Claydon was made keeper of the hanaper in Ireland before 28 January.[8] Both Claydon and Faryngton received rewards from the English exchequer for their

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 502
2 ibid., pp 270, 449
3 ibid., pp 51, 115; Waldby's 1394-5 appointment was presumably made in Ireland and has not survived.
4 Curtis, Richard II, pp 61, 63, 72-4, 93, 97, 99 etc.
5 C.C.H., p 155 nos 62-3; P.R.O.I., Ferguson Collections, ii, f 119.
6 C.C.H. p 151 no 3
7 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 522; E 403/551 (22 October)
8 ibid.; C.C.H. p 154 no 47

expenses on the journey, as did William Hankeford, sergeant at law.[1] Hankeford and Faryngton, as well as William Screne, also received robes during their stay in Ireland.[2] This William Screne was actually a clerk of of Irish birth, who had studied law in England since 1380. He was appointed chief baron during the first expedition, but left the country before the end of 1395 to pursue his career in England.[3] Hankeford was a more prominent figure. As a notable English justice, his appointment in Ireland has been associated with an attempt to strengthen the quality of the king's justice there.[4] Like Faryngton he was given his own ship to transport himself and his entourage to Ireland. It is not known exactly when he was made chief justice of the king's bench—as the justiciar's bench was known after Richard's first expedition[5]--but presumably it happened soon after his arrival.[6] He was acting by 10 January.[7] In this work in Ireland Hankeford has been associated with another Englishman, William Sturmy, who was witnessing Irish submissions in March as 'justice to the lord king', but whose career in Ireland after that date is obscure.[8]

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1 E 403/550 (12 November) Faryngton received £20, Claydon 10 marks and Hankeford 50 marks.

2 E 159/175 Mich. br. baron., m 30

3 Elrington Ball, Judges in Ireland, p 169; C.C.H. p 152 no 20.

4 e.g. Sir John Davies, Discoverie of the true causes, p 225

5 A classified schedule..of the plea rolls preserved in the Bermingham Tower, supplement in Irish Record Commission's Eighth Report (1818); Catalogue of Justiciary Rolls, in 28th Rept. of Deputy Keeper, (1895), App. I.

6 References to his shipping occurred on 18 November; C.P.R. 1391-6, p 526.

7 Chartularies of St. Mary's Abbey, ii, p xx, note.

8 Davies, Discoverie of true causes, p 225, giving as his source the no longer extant Hilary pleas of the king's bench in Ireland, 18 R.II; Curtis, Richard II, p 118; retained by the king for life in 1392, Sturmy subsequently served in England on various commissions. (C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 182, 651, 89 etc). In August 1394 attornies were named to act for him during his Irish absence, but he had returned to England at least as early as 1396. (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 487; C.C.R. 1392-6 p 499)

It is particularly difficult in the administrative sphere to draw a line at the date of Richard's departure from Ireland. Richard, as we know, was brought back to England by pressing concerns there and on the continent, not by the achievement of his ambitions in Ireland, and in no field was his immediate continuing interest so marked as in that of administration. The developments begun in the months of the expedition seem to have reached their climax during June and July 1395, when new changes were made in the personnel of government, marking the end of the large scale involvement of the expeditionary period. The treasurer himself returned to England. Medford had possibly always been a figurehead in the office; his subsequent account claimed that since 5 October 1394, when he himself received his powers, John Melton had been acting as his deputy.[1] Melton was certainly acting from 12 June and probably much earlier.[2] He had been a clerk of the treasury of receipt in England, and had also served the king on special commissions, most recently in helping to procure the submissions in Ireland.[3] His experience showed, in fact, that Medford's departure was not to be followed by a return to Anglo-Irish control of the exchequer. In mid-summer Melton went to England, presumably to report on events since the king's departure and to receive instructions.[4] It was probably at this time that the thirty-nine articles of submission and associated letters of the Irish were delivered by the treasurer and enrolled on the memoranda roll.[5] Melton was accompanied

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1 E 368/170 Easter, communia recorda, m 11

2 C.C.H., p 152, no 20

3 C.C.R. 1389-92, p 192; E 403/554 (assignment of money, 14 December 1395, as reward for labours in repair of York castle); Curtis, Richard II, p 76 (named as clerk of Lincoln diocese who read out the Leinster submissions).

4 C.C.H., p 152, no 20

5 The delivery took place on 25 June. (E 159/171 Trinity recorda, no membrane number given.)

by other important officers--shipping having been ordered on 12 June for the passage of Melton, William Henkeford, William Screne, and Robert Claydon--and the inference is that Richard was finalizing his arrangements about Irish policy in general and the Irish administration in particular.[1] Robert Faryngton also appears to have returned to England during June and on 18 June John Kirkeby, another official experienced in the king's service in England, succeeded as keeper of the rolls of chancery.[2] The Anglo-Irish lieges may also have been represented in the negotiations in England, for on 15 and 18 June letters were enrolled nominating attornies in Ireland for the Earl of Kildare and David Wogan, a prominent Kildare knight.[3] Hankeford possibly remained in Ireland for some time--certainly when Thomas Everdon and John Kirkeby were appointed keepers of the great seal on 19 June it was specified that they act on Hankeford's advice.[4] He must, however, have left before the autumn, for by 14 October the Anglo-Irish Peter Rowe, a man of former experience in the justiciar's court,[5] was serving as chief justice of the king's bench.[6] The appointment of Everdon and Kirkeby followed Waldby's replacement as chancellor by Alexander Balscot, Bishop of Meath, on 10 June.[7] They acted until he took up office on 1 August,[8] and it seems certain that Balscot was with the other prominent officers in England during this summer period. One cannot be sure that Kirkeby left Ireland after

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1 C.C.H., p 152 no 20

2 ibid., nos 23-5, 41; Faryngton received money for his shipping on 19 July in England.(E 403/551) Kirkeby was a clerk of the English chancery who had been Master of Oxford University. (Elrington Ball, Judges in Ireland, p 171)

3 C.C.H., p 152 nos 28-9, 40

4 ibid., no 42

5 Elrington Ball, Judges in Ireland, p 167

6 Chart. St Mary's, ii, xx, note; Catalogue of Justiciary Rolls, p 90, names Peter Rowe as chief justice, 19 R. II, taken from the Red Book of the exchequer. He was serving in 1396, according to T.C.D. MS 659, p 295.

7 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 582; C.C.H., p 152 no 42.

8 ibid., nos 46-8

this, for a grant to him of £20 in January 1397, referring to his costs in serving in the Irish chancery, followed in September 1398 by his appointment as keeper of the rolls of chancery in Ireland, suggests that he may have retained some office in Ireland after his fellow Englishmen had gone.[1] He was certainly named as an attorney in Ireland in November and December 1395.[2] Whatever his position, he was definitely not the man chosen by Balscot to be keeper of the rolls in 1395. Kirkeby was supplanted in this office on 10 July, after only three weeks, by Robert Sutton, presumably at the wish of the new chancellor.[3] Sutton had given long service in the offices of keeper of the rolls and keeper of the hanaper,[4] and his talents must have been known to Balscot. This replacement of one of the newly arrived English clerks by an Anglo-Irishman was ordered under the English great seal and may possibly indicate a bargain between Richard and his new chancellor. What other chancery appointments were made is not certain. Although Robert Claydon appears to have stayed at least until the end of 1395 in Ireland,[5] it seems unlikely that he retained the clerkship of the hanaper—a point of possible significance, in view of the recent reservation of the great seal's issues to the king.[6] Already, therefore, by July 1395 it can be seen that with English clerks like Melton in the exchequer and the Anglo-Irish prelate Balscot at the chancery the two main offices in the Irish administration were controlled by men of very different backgrounds--a point which soon became of considerable significance.

In the years which followed the expedition study of the lordship's administration is hampered by our ignorance of Ireland's normal

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9, pp 70, 414
2 C.P.R. 1391-6, pp 643, 634
3 C.C.H., p 152 no 4; C.P.R. 1391-6 p 599
4 C.C.H., p 131 no 41; ibid., p 148 no 45 etc
5 He was named as attorney in November and December. C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 634, 643
6 Claydon certainly appears to have lost the office by 1397 when he he was suggested as a suitable English candidate for it. Below, p 299.

administrative arrangements. It is virtually impossible to judge the extent to which subsequent developments were related to the unusual degree of royal interest in the 1390s. One example which illustrates well the general lack of record material concerns the apparently unusual position of Louth and Drogheda during the next four years. We know only through a later inspeximus record that Richard during the first expedition granted Louth and Drogheda to his justiciar Scrope along with extensive financial and administrative rights.[1] Similar powers were granted to Cottenham and Surrey after Scrope relinquished his office, but it is not known whether anyone held such authority prior to 1395.[2] The grants seem to have been intended to ensure sufficient financial backing for certain key officers, for the powers in effect conferred financial benefits comparable to a generous grant of revenues from the exchequer. Unfortunately virtually nothing is known of the repercussions of the development upon the Irish administration. The immediate effect appears to have been the removal of a potentially profitable area from the Dublin government's direct control. Scrope, Cottenham and Surrey all exercised the office of sheriff by virtue of their grants, and at least Scrope had deputies nominated to fill some of the other offices.[3] That friction was caused within the administration by this extremely generous grant is shown by Scrope's later petition for relief from the investigations of the Irish exchequer.[4] It is difficult to understand how the gift of Louth and Drogheda to Scrope, Cottenham and Surrey fitted into a policy of strengthening the central administration.

Until early 1396 the evidence gives little hint of any significant developments following the king's departure. The absence of John

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 174; above, pp 228-9

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 187 and C 66/347 m 22; C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 483, 480, 500; above, p 229.

3 N.L.I. MS 761 f 272; P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, p 62, from Mem. Roll 1 H.IV,m 26; e.g. Thomas Hill was acting as escheator for Scrope by 20 June 1395. (C.C.H. p 152 no 51)

4 S.C. 8/252/12536; below, pp 262, 302 etc.

Melton, the treasurer's lieutenant, was prolonged, and Stephen Roche, Abbot of St. Mary's in Dublin, acted for him as his deputy, at least from 7 October until late January 1396.[1] Melton had, in fact, been making preparations to return to Ireland in early October, but the earliest reference to him being back in office in Dublin dates from 20 January.[2] It was apparently towards the end of January that a parliament held at Dublin decided that the worsening situation--in particular the internecine strife of the Ormond and Desmond followers--warranted a plea for further aid from the king.[3] The chancellor, Bishop Balscot of Meath, was sent as emissary along with David Wogan, returned from his visit of June 1395, to request a further royal expedition. Mortimer's letter in April to the treasurer of England, while it does not suggest that the lordship's defence faced any real emergency, clearly reveals Mortimer's confidence in the Bishop of Meath and his anxiety that he should return without delay to Ireland. This Balscot apparently did in May.[4]

The first signs of overt antagonism towards the deputy treasurer, John Melton, appear towards the end of 1396. It is probably accurate to see Melton's difficulties against the familiar background of tension between English ministers in Ireland and Anglo-Irish officials. The fourteenth century had seen earlier incidents of such hostility, involving Englishmen in conflict with a section of the Anglo-Irish population who resented their interference and their attempts at reform.[5] The antipathy occasionally evident between the English born in Ireland and the English born in England partly explains the Anglo-Irish resentment

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1 Above, p 253; Chart. St. Mary's, ii, xx, note; cf below, p 269.

2 E 159/172 Mich. recorda (no membrane number); C.P.R. 1391-6, pp 623, 652; R.I.A. MS 24/H/17, f 11.

3 Below, p 324 ff.

4 ibid., pp 331-2; see the protection granted to his esquire, 17 May. C.P.R. 1391-6 p 595.

5 e.g. John Morice's experience in 1341. (Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp 258-60)

of English ministers,[1] but it also rested to some degree upon the varying personal interests of English royal servants and the Anglo-Irishmen. The Bishop of Meath, for example, was himself an Englishman, but his familiarity with Irish government and his interests in his diocese gave him more in common with men such as the Earl of Ormond than with the English prelate and absentee treasurer of Ireland, Richard Medford. Roger Mortimer, the Earl of Ulster, was similarly identified with the interests of Anglo-Ireland, despite his long absence from the country. Although to some extent there were inevitably contacts between prominent Anglo-Irish figures—Bishop Balscot had, for instance, been named in 1393 as one of the guardians of Mortimer's interests in Ireland[2]—no formal group existed as such, and it is often difficult to pinpoint precisely what the common interests of such men were. It is similarly impossible to see a clearly defined alliance of English administrators in Ireland. Though individual Englishmen serving in Ireland may have had former associations in England, the Irish situation probably offered different opportunities to each man, who responded accordingly. For some, such as Hankeford, involvement in Ireland was short-lived. Others adapted to varying degrees, occasionally embarking on permanent careers in the lordship.[3] It is clear that men like John Melton--English trained clerks whose future careers depended upon royal recognition of loyal service--were unlikely to have always supported or received the cooperation of their Anglo-Irish counterparts. While it would probably be misleading to speak of any firm division between the Anglo-Irish and the new men, it is nevertheless true that tensions within the government, which may have been rooted in conflicting personal and official interests, were exacerbated by such differences in background.

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1 e.g. Statutes and Ordinances, p 437
2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 304
3 e.g. Richard Gille; see below, p 268 note 1.

By January 1396 Melton was, apart from Stephen Scrope, the only Englishman still occupying a senior position in the Irish administration.[1] This isolated position probably increased the gravity of his disagreements with local interests. His difficulties apparently came to a head in the issue of the prebend of Howth, made vacant by the death of Walter Brugge, archdeacon of Meath and a long-term retainer of the Earl of March.[2] Melton was presented to the prebend by the crown on 20 October 1396.[3] Meanwhile John Taaf, member of a prominent Meath family, who in 1389 had received Papal Provision to the canonry with expectation of the prebend when vacant, had taken possession of it in September.[4] On 5 November the king ordered Taaf's arrest and his transfer to London to answer to the council in England.[5] A petition presented by Melton in May 1397 to the English council claimed that the sheriff of Dublin had indeed arrested him, but with the aid of friends he had escaped.[6] After this, Melton asserts, the chancellor, Bishop Balscot,

> being of the council and covyne of the said John Taaf concerning the aforesaid wrongdoings and contempts granted and ordered letters patent of supersedeas under your seal there against your regality.

Taaf was thus free from further action in Ireland. Furthermore, the chancellor, with Thomas Bathe, James Cottenham and John Taaf himself, and 'many others being by covyne in agreement with them', actually arrested the treasurer John Melton, giving Taaf opportunity to take possession of the prebend and be ratified in it. Melton was held in Dublin castle

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1 C.P.R. 1401-5 p 86, showing a grant witnessed by the most important Irish officers.

2 He held the prebend from 1389 until his death in late September 1396. (Elrington Ball, Judges in Ireland, p 165) He was still employed during these years in the service of Mortimer. (e.g. C.P.R. 1396-9 p 8)

3 H.J.Lawlor, Fasti of St. Patrick's Cathedral, p 116.

4 ibid., pp 116-7; Cal. Papal Registers, Papal Letters, IV, 1362-1404, p 344.

5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 53; here he is said to have been papally provided against the royally presented clerk Walter Brugge.

6 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 69-72

until he could find surety of 1,000 marks that he would not send anyone nor go himself to England to pursue the matter before the king. Proclamation was made that no one dare to bring Melton or his supporters to England,

> so that your needful business and all other things belonging to the office of treasurer were delayed and disrupted....

Meanwhile, Taaf, having occupied the prebend 'by force and arms', was pardoned and received from the king in England ratification in his possession. Melton's petition does not state when he received his freedom, but he was probably released once Taaf had achieved his objective, the English ratification of 15 February 1397.[1] Melton then took the matter to the English council. The council agreed on 25 May that Taaf should be arrested and brought before them along with all the relevant information.[2] The order for this arrest was enrolled on 5 June 1397.[3]

On one level these proceedings appear fairly straightforward It was a period in which disputes over ecclesiastical benefices were not uncommon—during the same decade at least two other prebends of St Patrick's were similarly contested.[4] Nor is it surprising that one contestant was a royal official and the other an Anglo-Irishman possessing links with the area and the former prebendary. The problem in the case of Melton and Taaf lies in Melton's position as acting treasurer, and in the suggestion that the chancellor opposed him in the matter, even depriving him of his freedom and his ability to fulfil his administrative duties. Information from two other undated documents fills in some gaps in the story. One of these documents, a petition to the king, makes reference to Melton's difficulties with the chancellor

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9, pp 57, 77
2 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 69-72
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 159
4 e.g. Tassagard and Lusk (Lawlor, Fasti, pp 125-6, 163)

and James Cottenham, and apparently dates from the early weeks of 1397.[1] The other document--a memorandum of the English council--seems to belong to the late summer or early autumn of 1397.[2] While both these documents refer to general administrative problems in Ireland at this time, they cannot be fully understood without a knowledge of Melton's dispute with Taaf. Together they establish a picture of deteriorating relations between the king's chief ministers in Ireland, with Melton receiving little co-operation from other officials by late 1396. The circumstances suggest that the prebend of Howth was not really the key issue, but a precipitating factor in the breakdown of Melton's position.

From the petition of early 1397 we learn of an attempted arrest of Melton by James Cottenham and Laurence Neuton, sergeant at arms, when Melton was riding towards Drogheda and elsewhere in county Meath before the previous Christmas, 'to enquire concerning the king's profit and to levy his debts to pay the Irish'.[3] Melton asserted that 'he did not know nor yet knows' why Cottenham searched all the country for Melton to arrest him. It is interesting that this document makes no mention of the disputed prebend, strengthening the possibility that other issues were behind Cottenham's hostility. The pattern of Cottenham's career helps to explain this incident. As an esquire of some importance he occupied a position of trust both in charge of Kendleston ward and under Stephen Scrope, in whose company he served.[4] He was William Scrope's deputy in Dublin castle, a fact which in itself implicated him in Melton's arrest, and he was of sufficient importance

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1 Lambeth, Carew MS 619, f 207; below, pp 275 ff ; also Appendix, X pp 575-9.

2 Lambeth, Carew MS 619, f 208; below, pp 295 ff ; also Appendix X pp 579-82.

3 Carew MS 619, f 207; below p 294.

4 E 101/41/39; below p 539 ; C.C.H., p 153-4 no 25; C.P.R.1391-6, p 727 and E 368/174 Hilary br. retorn., m 296.

and responsibility to be sent as an envoy to Richard in late 1395 or early 1396, returning in January 1396 with Donard O'Byrne under guard.[1] It is unlikely that in his attempt to arrest Melton in December 1396 he acted entirely from personal motives, or even from a sense of identity with the chancellor, Taaf and other Anglo-Irishmen, but rather in the capacity of Scrope's agent. William Scrope, it will be remembered, had been granted considerable financial powers in Louth and Drogheda, to be held without accounting to the Irish exchequer, a grant undoubtedly against the treasurer's interests. Melton's attempts subsequently to force Scrope to account give a fair indication of his attitude towards the grant and help to explain why he and Scrope, whom one would expect to have joined in interest againt the Anglo-Irish, in fact opposed one another.[2] Melton's journey towards Drogheda in an effort to secure royal revenues was probably seen as infringing upon Scrope's authority in that area. Melton, however, was astute enough not to attack Scrope personally, for the latter's influence with the king in England was steadily growing. Instead, the petition of early 1397 bitterly indicted Cottenham on five different counts, concentrating on his abuses in the office of deputy admiral and mentioning no association with Scrope which might excuse his actions.[3]

There is no known response to this petition, but Melton's personal complaint about Taaf in May, giving the dispute over Howth as the reason for Cottenham's attempt to arrest him, fails to remove all doubt that Melton's conflict was not in fact the key to the incident.[4] Scrope himself was so favoured by the king that he could most easily be attacked, with caution, through his associates. Predictably enough,

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 174; above pp 229-30; below p 321.
2 Below, p 302.
3 Below, pp 292-5.
4 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 69-72

Scrope must have stood by Cottenham, who in July was made constable of Dublin, Kendleston and Newcastle MacKinegan, at the same time as he received the generous grants in Louth and Drogheda.[1] From these summer months dates the conciliar memorandum concerning the administration.[2] That Melton apparently failed to dislodge Cottenham and his associates from royal favour is borne out by the fact that the only implied reference to Cottenham in the document is a general recommendation about the powers of admirals.[3] A mention of the Howth prebend shows that this question was not yet finally settled[4]—it had clearly been decided either not to give full credence to Melton's tale of grievances or not to act upon them. The council responded now to Melton's request for a writ of praemunire against Taaf in moderate terms, granting him 'as much as may be done in accordance with the law', but the council's approval of Melton in office indicates that the king and his council did support Melton in his capacity as treasurer against the Anglo-Irish elements of the administration.

Even this action in the council did not, however, entirely resolve the treasurer's problems. Melton did not actually return to Ireland until October at least, when he went armed with special protections to prevent further attacks upon him in office. On 16 October his petition requesting such aid was granted, making clear that Melton had the king's full confidence.[5] One of his new responsibilities on his return to Ireland was to be the supervision of the repairs and renovations of Dublin castle, to facilitate which he was granted privy seal letters to the Earls of March, Kildare and Ormond, the mayor of Dublin and Cottenham himself, ordering them to be eidantz et favorantz. Melton's

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 187 and C 66/347 m 22
2 Below, p 295 ff.
3 Below, p 302.
4 Below, p 302.
5 C 49/47/33

full protection included the significant condition that neither he nor his men be disturbed by any indictment or accusation but that any such be postponed until the king next came to Ireland. This proclamation was to be made by the mayor of Dublin. Furthermore, letters patent under the great seal were to be sent to all officers of the king, ordering Melton's admission to his office as lieutenant of the treasurer, Richard Metford, now the Bishop of Salisbury. No mention was made of Howth prebend--it was either already confirmed to Melton or was one of those items on which action was to be postponed.[1] The promised letters patent were duly enrolled on 26 October.[2] They specified that Melton

> fears arrest under pretext of various indictments before justices by malice of his enemies, which indictments the king wills shall be specially reserved for trial on his arrival in Ireland, before himself and the council, and not elsewhere.

The next day shipping for Melton's transport was ordered 'most speedily' and after this he apparently returned to Ireland where there is no further indication of any difficulties.[3]

The manner in which the difficulties of the Irish administration were resolved in the autumn of 1397 was clearly related to the situation facing Richard in England at that time and to some extent can only be understood against this background.[4] The summer months of 1397 saw the climax of Richard's domestic ambitions with his removal of the magnates who had headed the opposition to him of the 1380s. With events of such significance taking place in England, the official approach to the problems of Ireland's government was, not surprisingly, largely one of compromise. It would perhaps have been possible to reach a simple compromise solution by dismissing Melton, had the substance of

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1 Taaf ultimately received confirmation in Howth after Melton's death, in May 1398. (C.P.R. 1396-9, p 337)

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 248

3 ibid., p 307

4 Below, pp 363-6.

his charges not been so serious. The dilemma was made greater by the question of Mortimer, who by the autumn of 1397 was under suspicion for his inability or unwillingness to surrender his uncle Thomas Mortimer to answer a charge of treason. The exact relationship between the problem of Mortimer's independence and the difficulties faced by Melton is hard to gauge, but it is probable that by October 1397 Mortimer could no longer be considered in isolation from the Anglo-Irish faction opposing the treasurer. Mortimer's original offence—his attack upon Armagh in 1396--had been undertaken with the aid of the Anglo-Irish, and his similar interests gave him close contacts with the great men of Anglo-Ireland.[1]

That by October 1397 the question of Melton's position and the problem of Thomas Mortimer were part of the same issue is seen from three documents which, all dated 26 October 1397 and all referring to Richard's intended forthcoming expedition, gave Melton on the one hand full protection against any hostile officials in Ireland and prohibited the chancellor and Mortimer on the other from taking any administrative initiative until the king arrived, and particularly from granting any major pardons.[2] The removal on 15 October of Bishop Balscot as chancellor and his replacement by the Bishop of London had already demonstrated Richard's displeasure at Balscot's interference with Melton's pursuit of his duties.[3] The arrangement was essentially an interim measure. In fact, the Bishop of London could not be spared from other duties and within two days Robert Sutton, an experienced Anglo-Irish official who for many years had worked with the Bishop of Meath, was appointed keeper of the great seal.[4] The limitation of reform to the dismissal of only the Bishop of Meath illustrates the spirit of compromise lying behind Melton's return to Ireland.

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1 A.F.M., 1396; above, p 182; below, p 362 ff.
2 C.C.R. 1396-9 pp 157, 154; C.P.R. 1396-9 p 248; below, p p 367-8.
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 218
4 ibid., p 246; above, p 255.

The routine work of exchequer administration had probably not been radically disturbed by the difficulties Melton encountered in office. Though the question of the subordinate officers' loyalties and group interests is extremely interesting they were certainly ill-defined and it is therefore unlikely that any full-scale confrontation took place which brought the machinery of government to a standstill. We have occasional references to exchequer actions and local inquisitions—enough to show that the government continued to function in routine matters. There is, in particular, evidence that the exchequer was investigating carefully cases where land titles were in question, taking into the king's hands the disputed property until it could be proved whether it belonged by right to the claimant or the crown.[1] On 7 January, 1397, a general inquisition into all royal rights in Wexford was conducted by Thomas Taillour, clerk, and John Coryngham,[2] and the information that Thomas Taillour and John Lumbard were conducting enquiries in the summer of 1398 into all the king's lands in Kilkenny, as Thomas Taillour and John Eylward had in April 1396, suggests that the exchequer during these years continued to investigate thoroughly the king's potential revenues in Ireland.[3]

As well as giving almost no information on the routine work of the administration during the 1390s, the surviving record evidence only occasionally reveals the identity of the lesser office holders. It is not always possible to relate the information provided to the reconstructed outline of events. It is, for instance, difficult to see the significance of the appointment of John Skot on 5 February 1397 as

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1 P.R.O.I., Lodge MSS, vol i, p 348, from Patent Roll(?) 1 H.IV, m 3.

2 Hore, Wexford, v, 125, from Mem. Roll 20 R. II; Coryngham was later named as one of the executors of Melton's will. (E 368/170, Easter communia recorda, m 11)

3 Lawlor, 'Calendar of Liber Ruber of the Diocese of Ossory', P.R.I.A. xxvii C (1909) pp 191-2; R.C.B.Lib., Graves MS 2, pp 33-8.

deputy to John Lowick, collector of the customs in Dublin, Cork, Waterford, Limerick and elsewhere, and then on 10 March as chief remembrancer of Ireland with the stipulation that he exercise the office in person.[1] Skot had been appointed in March 1396 to buy skins and furs for the wardrobe in Ireland, and this, allied to his association with Lowick, suggests that he was probably an Englishman attached to the royal household.[2] It is possible that, although his appointments of February and March 1397 coincided with the period of Melton's arrest, his advance in the Irish administration should be seen in terms of his background and suitability in the eyes of the Englishman Melton, who may have nominated him before his personal difficulties became acute. Certainly one can see in other cases that men of English training or associations continued to be appointed to serve in the exchequer. On 23 May 1397, for example, John Humbleton became chief chamberlain of the exchequer during pleasure.[3] Humbleton seems to have had some measure of royal favour and also a connection with Melton,[4] and it is probably significant that his appointment from England coincided with the week in which Melton's petition was received by the English council.[5] Humbleton's assistant as second chamberlain of the exchequer is also worth notice. He was Richard Gille, a servant of William Scrope's,who since the first expedition and perhaps earlier had steadily expanded his contacts among the Anglo-Irish and his share of administrative offices. Originally appointed during pleasure, his confirmation in office during good behaviour, at the supplication of

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 61, 104
2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 729
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 122
4 He received various grants in Ireland in 1394-5, (C.P.R. 1391-6, pp 406, 414, 416, 603) but was opposed by Anglo-Irish interests in receipt of a grant made when Ormond was justiciar.(ibid., pp 427, 520) In October 1395 he acted with Melton as attorney, though a licence for absence was enrolled for him in August.(C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 632, 661)
5 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 69-72; above,p 259 ff.

William Rickhill, one of the justices of the common bench in England, may indicate that Gille's position was not wholly assured.[1] Another appointment of significant date was that of Robert Burnell to the office of second baron of the exchequer during good behaviour on 5 July 1397.[2] Burnell had already served in the office, but may not have been committed to any Anglo-Irish group. His appointment in 1393 contained the proviso 'notwithstanding any grant thereof by any of the king's officers in Ireland', and this suggestion that Ormond and his council preferred someone else in Ireland gives a possible reason for his suitability to support Melton in 1397.[3]

During the summer of 1397 when Melton came to England to pursue his case in person another deputy treasurer was appointed. It seems likely that he was named either by Melton as his deputy or by the Anglo-Irish council, for Richard Medford subsequently showed no knowledge of him in his account.[4] The man in question is said to have been an unknown William Colchan, named as acting in Dublin on 10 July 1397,[5] though this transcript is possibly an inaccurate rendering of William Boltham, a man of considerable experience in the Irish exchequer.[6] This man seems to have held office until Melton returned in late October--some 'William' was undoubtedly acting on 18 October in Dublin, though his surname is now lost.[7] When Melton finally resumed office he was

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1 Gille was in Ireland at least as early as 1391 (C.P.R. 1388-92, p 449). In February 1395 he was appointed controller of the customs in Dublin and Drogheda, empowered to act by deptuy, and was granted in April the offices of auditor of the exchequer during good behaviour and second chamberlain during pleasure (ibid., 1391-6 p 716). The confirmation of February is found ibid., 1396-9 p 64.) He was appointed to collect Scrope's rents in Louth and Drogheda (ibid., p 174). His capture some years later in Drogheda in execution of his duties may indicate long standing local opposition to him (C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 468; C.C.H., p 156 no 42).

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 171

3 ibid., 1391-6, pp 262, 264

4 E 368/170 Easter communia recorda, m 11.

5 Hore, Wexford, v, 125, from Mem. Roll 20 R.II.

6 e.g. C.C.H., p 112 no 102; p 148 no 36; C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 113; a William Boltham is named as treasurer in 1396-7 (T.C.D. MS 659 p 319).

7 P.R.O.I., R.C.8/33, p 27, from Mem. 21 R. II, m 3.

probably supported by the new appointee to the office of chancellor of the exchequer—John de Waddesworth, king's clerk.[1] Waddesworth's career is obscure, but his subsequent expulsion from the treasury of St Patrick's by a group of Anglo-Irishmen suggests an alien background.[2]

There is no indication that further conflicts of interest developed in the administration after Melton's return. Inquisitions in early 1398 by Thomas Taillour, second remembrancer, into royal debts as well as official extortions may reflect a general concern with the conduct of officers, but there is no evidence either of fundamental institutional reforms or of investigations into the actions of any specific individuals.[3] In any case, the death of Melton sometime in early 1398 must have altered the situation, enabling the administration to settle down and to forget the recent disturbances.[4] By 23 February 1398 Melton was succeeded by Nicholas Macclesfeld, a man with close English connections as well as considerable experience in the Anglo-Irish government.[5] Macclesfeld's precise authority is uncertain, for though described as the deputy of Richard Medford, now Bishop of Salisbury, the bishop in his account named instead Stephen Roche, Abbot of St Mary's as his deputy after Melton.[6] Roche had already served in 1395, and there is no evidence that he held office again.[7] Even if he did, Medford's failure to mention Macclesfeld indicates how little control or indeed interest the bishop had in his office. His summons to account in the Easter term, 1398, suggests in any case that by this time he no longer held even nominal authority in the

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 225
2 E 159/181 Hilary br. retorn. (no membrane number)
3 P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/33, pp 183-6, from Mem. 21 R.II, m 4
4 E 368/170 Easter communia recorda, m 11
5 P.R.O.I., R.C.8/33 pp 183-6 from Mem. 21 R.II, m 4; Ferguson Collections ii, f 128 from Mem. 20 R. II m 20 d; Macclesfeld was apparently connected to the family who served for many years in the English administration (C.P.R. 1396-9 p 354 etc). He became remembrancer in Ireland in September 1392 and in August 1393 he was appointed joint admiral, with the proviso that he should not be removed 'except by the king's mandate under his seal'. (C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 173, 308)
6 E 368/170 Easter communia recorda, m 11.
7 Above, p 257.

office.[1] Macclesfeld continued to act as deputy treasurer in the summer of 1398 though so far as we know no new treasurer was formally appointed until Robert Faryngton's patent was enrolled on 10 September.[2]

In 1398 occurred a series of appointments which suggests an intensification of Richard's policy to appoint Englishmen to office in Ireland, possibly in delayed response to some of Melton's problems. To postulate a pattern is perhaps dangerous--it is difficult to determine now, for instance, the significance of Gerard de Raes's appointment in February as chief engrosser of the king's exchequer in Ireland for life, to execute the office in person or by deputy, though the probability that he was not an Anglo-Irishman gives rise to some speculation.[3] Even more obscure is the reason for Humbleton's replacement after less than a year in the office of chief chamberlain by an unknown John Boyle on 10 May 1398.[4] Of more obvious importance was the appointment of Thomas Cranley, Archbishop of Dublin, on 24 April to be chancellor of Ireland during pleasure. Cranley's early career had been in England, where he had been a chancellor of Oxford University and held a prebend in York,[5] and his appointment indicates the deliberate choice of a local magnate who might however be able to work with any English officers appointed. He seems to have been loyal to the crown, and a comparatively honest official.[6] In fact, Cranley delayed some time in England and his place was filled by the native born Thomas Bathe, archdeacon of Meath.[7] Bathe had, early in Richard's reign, acted as clerk of the wages when Balscot, then Bishop of Ossory, was

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1 E 368/170 Easter communia recorda, m 11.

2 Lawlor, 'Calendar of Liber Ruber', pp 191-2; C.P.R. 1396-9 p 410.

3 ibid., p 327; in 1398 he was named as 'king's servant in England' (ibid., pp 349, 406). On the first expedition he was made king's jailor in Ireland for life.(C.C.H., p 15 , no 57)

4 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 338 See pardon for homicide granted to a Chester man of this name in 1395. (ibid., 1391-6, p 578)

5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 344; Elrington Ball, Judges in Ireland, p 171.

6 His government was later described as 'a good example to be followed'. (Statutes and Ordinances, p 569)

7 C.P.R. 1396-9, p 346

treasurer.[1] Though the successive appointments of Sutton and Bathe as keepers of the great seal indicate a measure of continuing Anglo-Irish influence in government, Cranley was nevertheless a more active absentee chancellor than his predecessor the Bishop of London. When Sutton was appointed keeper of the seal the previous October he, not the bishop, was to receive five shillings daily from the hanaper for the support of himself and other chancery clerks till the chancellor should arrive.[2] Cranley himself, however, received a larger grant for the same purpose, presumably paying his deputy in turn.[3] His appointment marks the end of the interim arrangement established after Balscot's dismissal in October 1398 and shows that Richard, while not embarking on any novel reform programme, was not prepared either to hand the chancery directly back to the control of the Anglo-Irish interests.

Although the appointment of John Barry in August as king's attorney in Ireland shows that Anglo-Irishmen were still being nominated to important offices, it is not surprising that Cranley's appointment was followed within five months by the grant of the treasurership to another Englishman, Robert Faryngton.[4] It must have been clear for at least a year that an absentee treasurer with minimal control over his deputies was not the best method of governing Ireland. The choice of Faryngton himself was significant, showing that Richard was still committed to his policy of controlling the exchequer through an English trained clerk. Faryngton had served on the first expedition and briefly held office in Ireland.[5] He had been named as a possible choice for chancellor when Melton was at the height of his difficulties,[6] and

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1 E 368/168 Mich. br. retorn., m 4 d.
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 223
3 ibid., p 409
4 ibid., pp 374, 410
5 Above, pp 251-2
6 Below, p 299.

Richard's appointment of him as treasurer constituted a rather belated approval of the reforming proposals of that time. It must indeed have been decided to appoint him sometime before the September enrolment--already on 23 August he had received a generous reward of £40 to pay his expenses in going to Ireland as treasurer.[1] Faryngton was possibly not very keen to take the office; although the Faryngtons had landed interests in Dublin as the heirs of John Comyn,[2] Robert himself may have suffered from ill health which made him reluctant to leave his comfortable post in England.[2] In accepting the office he appears to have driven a hard bargain with the king. He not only received it on the same potentially generous terms as the Bishop of Chichester had done--with freedom from accounting for the ordinary revenues--but was furthermore granted beyond his fee six shillings and eight pence daily for his household expenses, as well as the expenses of 'outfit and reoutfit for his passage to Ireland and return thence'. In addition to this he obtained approval that he retain his rank in the English chancery as a clerk of the first grade.[3] He clearly feared the effect on his career of a period as treasurer in Ireland and tried to safeguard himself. As he was in a position to know the nature of the problems Melton had faced, his caution in taking the office adds weight to the argument that Melton had personally suffered through it. In the days following Faryngton's appointment two other officers were named, both supporting Richard's policy of reinforcing the English element in the administration. On 20 September 1398 John Maufeld was made clerk of the hanaper, replacing the Bishop of Meath's nominee, and on 26 September 1398 John Kirkeby became keeper of the rolls, with the same fees that Faryngton

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1 C.C.R. 1396-9 p 245

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 283 refers to his services in Ireland during and after the first expedition 'while weak in body'.

3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 411; see Tout, Chapters, iii, 444, for a description of the different degrees of clerks.

had when, on the first expedition and afterwards, he had held the office.[1] Within a month Gerard de Raes was confirmed as chief engrosser for life, a confirmation which perhaps indicates some local opposition to his grant of the previous February.[2]

Faryngton apparently arrived in Ireland in late September, to be followed by Surrey and Cranley in early October.[3] We have no evidence at all to tell us how the administration of the next year functioned, but it is unlikely that, with the main offices in the hands of these men of common background and interests, it saw much friction. The focus during these months was undoubtedly the forthcoming expedition and the policies followed by these men in office should perhaps be seen as preparatory to this event, rather than as the results of recent problems of government. The considerable preparations of this period for the expedition are hinted at in Faryngton's account for money received from England, where he shows that he received £280 between February and June 1399 to be spent on repairs to the great hall and castle of Dublin.[4] Otherwise, however, the events of this year are completely obscure and one cannot tell what attention if any Richard paid to the administration in the months preceding his second venture.

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It is impossible with so little evidence to give any final judgementson Richard's administrative policies during these years. One can barely, for a start, ascertain what these policies were, though

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 411, 414; Maufeld's origins are unknown but the name, sometimes spelt 'Maghfeld' was familiar in England.(e.g. C.P.R. 1388-92 p 235) For Kirkeby see above, pp 254-5.

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 449, and reconfirmation on 10 December, ibid., p 459; the possibility that his position depended on royal favour is supported by the fact that he was one of the few men not reappointed by Henry IV.

3 Above, p 197 n 1

4 E 364/34/I

for this the sources are not entirely to blame. It is unlikely that medieval governments saw administrative problems as requiring the long-term policies that other ages favour. The highest administrative posts were offices of political importance and cannot be examined in isolation from the general political background. It is unlikely therefore that one will find administrative policies of importance that were held to consistently. The grant to Scrope of Louth and Drogheda, which struck at the interests of the new treasurer and the policy evident during his term of office, exemplifies the type of anomaly which characterized medieval government. At the same time, there was during these years a remarkable consistency of attitude in certain areas. The changes in the patents of the treasurer and chancellor, dating from the appointments of Chichester and Meath, were maintained throughout the period and the same type of man continued to be appointed to these offices--Anglo-Irish interests dominating the chancery and English clerks controlling the exchequer. Even after the crisis of 1397 this approach was maintained, although the personalities in office were changed. It seems, therefore, that one can credit Richard during these years with a general policy towards the Irish administration, however much he left the detail of it for his ministers to work out. How they coped with the situation for the two years after the first expedition ended is demonstrated most clearly by a study of the petition and conciliar document which resulted from the hostilities Melton encountered.

Part ii — The state of the Irish administration in 1397, as revealed in two documents from Carew MS 619, Lambeth Palace Library.

The survival among the Carew manuscripts of two documents from Melton's period in office has facilitated a greater understanding both of the treasurer's personal difficulties in Ireland and of the condition of the Irish administration in the 1390s. These documents, which were rather poorly calendared in the Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts, have attracted little attention.[1] The memorandum of council[2] has been wholly neglected, though the lengthy petition,[3] after being misunderstood by Cox who believed it was presented to Richard when he was first in Ireland,[4] has lately received critical attention from Mr Richardson and Professor Sayles who assign it with greater accuracy to 1396.[5] Internal evidence in fact suggests a date for the petition around the New Year 1396/7, or in the first weeks of 1397. An attempted arrest of the sub-treasurer Melton by James Cottenham is said to have occurred before the previous Christmas. Melton's petition of May 1397 shows that he was in fact seized by Cottenham early in the year.[6] It seems certain therefore that the unsuccessful attempt to arrest Melton occurred before Christmas 1396 and that his petition complaining of the incident dates from the following weeks, before Cottenham actually succeeded in his objective. Other evidence supports this theory. The two references, for instance, to the 'lieutenant of the Justice'—apparently speaking of a still active officer—must have had Stephen Scrope in mind. He occupied this office from April 1395-

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1 Calendar Carew MSS, v, pp 384-5, 465; the petition has been calendared from a transcript in MS 608 f 61 d rather than from the fourteenth century document in MS 619 f 207.
2 Carew MS 619, f 207; see below, appendix X pp 574-9
3 Carew MS 619, f 208; see below, appendix X pp 579-82.
4 R.Cox, Hibernia Anglicana, i, 319
5 Irish Parliament, p 37 n 100
6 Above, p 261 ff.

April 1397 as deputy to his brother William.[1] If the petition dates from early 1398--which is possible only if one assumes that Cottenham tried to arrest the sub-treasurer again after exactly one year--this term would have had little meaning, for by then Mortimer governed the entire country. Further confirmation of the 1396/7 date lies in the impression given of virtual breakdown of government. This can be fitted into our knowledge of the personnel in office in late 1396, but would be much less credible a year later when recognition of the shortcomings of the existing administration had resulted in the various changes described. The case is not perhaps conclusive, but there is a strong probability that the petition does belong to the early weeks of 1397.

The exact provenance of the document remains unknown but it undoubtedly came either from Melton himself or a group of his associates closely interested in the administration of the exchequer.[2] Although its survival with the later conciliar memorandum supports the belief that it did receive official attention, there is no proof that the petition ever reached the king or his council, and we cannot assume that Richard's actions in the following months were made in the knowledge of Melton's charges. The document, which is headed 'Reminder to speak to our lord the king and to his council concerning the state and government of the land of Ireland', enumerates various problems, occasionally explaining the cause and suggesting a remedy. Ignorance of normal administrative practices creates difficulties in understanding some of the items. In general however the document adds enormously to our picture of the lordship in these critical years, though, as a product of crisis, it is obviously essential to use caution in extrapolating particular clauses.[3]

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1 E 101/41/39 describes his retinue.

2 As the petition shows a clear identification with Melton's interests, I have, for convenience of discussion, assumed that it came from his pen. cf Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, p 37 n 100, for the suggestion that it was sent from the Irish council acting independently of the chief governor.

3 cf ibid., p 37 n 100; p 154 n 66; p 115 n 25; p 215 n 30.

The petition begins with a request concerning the retinues of the chief governors. These, it is claimed, were commonly kept only at one third of their indentured strength because of the greed of lieutenants who presumably pocketed the wages not paid. The lordship was thus weakened, to the advantage of the Irish. It is difficult to estimate the accuracy of this charge. It would seem to have been intended primarily against Stephen Scrope, as 'lieutenant of the Justice', though the use of the plural form in a later phrase suggests that other governors, past or present, were also in question. We have no means of checking Mortimer's retinue, but a roll of Scrope's does survive. While showing evidence of certain curious features in the retinue it gives little weight to a charge of large scale corruption, and in view of Scrope's apparently vigorous campaigns against the Irish it seems unlikely that his retinue was very much lower than it should have been.[1] There may, however, have been a germ of truth in the charge--it was not unusual for commanders to be accused of making a profit by keeping a reduced retinue[2]--but it was probably an exaggeration. That a petition closely identified with the treasurer should ask for melior surveiance in this matter is interesting, for the normal mustering practice required the treasurer himself along with the chancellor and other notables to inspect the retinue.[3] The complaint suggests both that Richard's financial interests were being carefully watched and that there was a lack of co-operation between some at least of the great officers of state.

The second clause of the petition confirms this impression, in the specific grievance that forfeitures of war, which ought to go to the king, were being kept by the lieutenant of the justiciar. This complaint casts an interesting light on the character of Scrope's campaign in Leinster, confirming the view that in the period after the

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1 E 101/41/39; see also below, pp 309-10,and App. II, pp 531-554.

2 Both Windsor and Stanley had faced such charges. See Clarke, 'William of Windsor', p 186 and E 101 /247/1/7, 9.

3 e.g. Stanley's indenture of 1399--E 101/69/2/307.

king's departure the justiciar's activities were not limited to the problems of peace-keeping but were sufficiently aggressive to arouse controversy over rights to his profits of war.

The question of such profits is an obscure one in medieval Ireland, where the nominal inclusion of all men within the king's lordship complicated the legal title of goods of outlaws captured in war. According to English law the goods of a felon belonged to the crown and this appears to have been the principle followed after hostilities with the Leinster Irish in the late thirteenth century.[1] Other references to 'the king's portion of preys' taken by men in his pay indicate, however, that the customs of continental warfare concerning booty of war also applied in Ireland.[2] To some extent therefore we may assume that the spoils of war in late fourteenth century Ireland were distributed in a similar fashion to contemporary England, where men throughout the ranks relinquished a proportion of their gains to the commander in chief who in turn gave the king a share--the king's usual profit being one third.[3] A similar customary distribution of profit covered prisoners to be ransomed, who might if sufficiently important be handed directly to the king or commanding officer in return for a lump sum.[4] Several examples from Ireland suggest that these practices were commonly followed, despite the different character of military expeditions within the lordship. In 1392, for example, indentures with the prospective lieutenant the Duke of Gloucester specified that he should have one third of all 'gains of war' taken by these knights with the right to important prisoners on reasonable terms.[5] Six years later when Mortimer retained a knight to serve in

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1 Holdsworth, History of English law (4th ed., 1936), ii, 358; e.g. C.J.R. 1295-1303 p 367.

2 e.g. Catalogue of Pipe Rolls, Edward I, in 38th Rept. D.K. (1906) App. ii, pp 54, 63.

3 D.Hay, 'The division of the spoils of war in fourteenth century England', T.R.H.S., 5th ser., iv (1954) pp 91-109, esp. 95-9.

4 ibid., esp. pp 99-101.

5 e.g. E 101/74/1/2.

Ireland he made similar stipulations.[1] The same arrangement about the surrender of 'captains or chieftains of a nation or of a country' was again made in 1420 by the lieutenant, the Earl of Ormond, and it seems probable that the provision was a normal and necessary part of a chief governor's authority.[2] What remains obscure is the proportion of booty accruing to the royal revenues. There appears to be no reference to any possible profits of war in the surviving indentures of chief governors with the king, and it is therefore difficult to assess the justification of this claim that Scrope took to himself gains which belonged to the king. The complaint should be related to other mentions in the petition of the governors' financial rights, past and present.[3] Profits of war were presumably viewed as extraordinary revenue and the chief governors may indeed have had more immediate responsibility for them than they would have had for ordinary revenues paid into the exchequer. Given the failure of the king's indentures with his chief governors to mention such spoils, their ultimate title and the validity of Melton's complaint must unfortunately remain obscure.

The issue of the chief governor's financial powers links this problem of booty with the question of profits from the king's bench, also considered in the second item on the petition. It is claimed that when the justiciar or lieutenant used to 'hold their sessions' they received to their own use, while the revenues were in their hands, large sums from fines and amercements, but that the king received nothing by this although the revenues were now in his hands. The details of the change by which the justiciar's court became known as the king's bench after the first expedition are obscure, and it is impossible to know whether or not this charge referred to the results of a recent institutional

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1 Holmes, Estates of the higher nobility, p 130.
2 C.O.D., iii, no 38.
3 Below, pp 280, 283-5 etc.

development, concerning perhaps the authority of the chief justice of the bench. On the whole it is more likely that the complaint had a broader context than the courts of justice. Chief governors had before this time occasionally enjoyed full use of the revenues of the country, and this complaint probably reveals one effect of such a system. Officers enjoying the financial profits of their work may well have been more conscientious in discharging their responsibilities than those obliged to render all receipts to the exchequer with no certainty that any reward or even stipend would be regularly forthcoming. As has been shown, the financial powers of Scrope and Mortimer in this respect are uncertain during this period,[1] but the wording of the complaint supports the suggestion that they received only stipendary remuneration and as a result were less efficient than others had been in carrying out their duties. There is here again the implication that the treasurer carefully guarded the crown's financial interests.

Clause three also concerns declining revenue, this time from the profits of the chancery. It is claimed that under former justiciars and lieutenants, such as the Bishop of Meath, fines for charters under the Irish great seal ranged from £20 - £100, bringing in profits of 2,000 marks to the exchequer after officers had been paid. Now, however, fines were commonly from one mark to eleven pence, and income was paltry. In this statement there was obviously gross exaggeration. The previous decades gave many examples of the poverty of the Irish chancery and no suggestion of any profit: it was even admitted in 1395 that the profits of the hanaper might not suffice to pay chancery officials.[2] An examination of fines entered in the calendar of Irish Chancery rolls shows their amounts throughout the decade varied enormously, according

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1 See above, p 227 ff
2 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 602

presumably to the status of the grantee and the reason for the charter. Thus, for instance, John Beaumont paid nothing for his charter of grants to him in Ireland. Two other petitioners of lesser importance were similarly favoured in 1394-5, but such fines as were enrolled varied from 6/8 to 5 marks.[1] The 1392 Council Roll gives a similar picture, as some charters were granted without fines and others brought into the hanaper amounts varying from 6/8 to 5 marks, an unusually high one being 20 marks.[2]

Although the complaint must therefore be treated with some caution, it has very interesting implications. It was clearly related to the recent change in the chancery's financial organization, with the profits of the great seal accruing to the king instead of the chancellor, who was to be compensated by a generous increase in his fee.[3] The statement that these profits were now negligible reveals the treasurer's lack of confidence in the chancellor himself. The chief governors were also implicated, for Melton contrasted the current situation with that prevailing under former justiciars and lieutenants, citing in particular the Bishop of Meath, then chancellor, as one who when chief governor had been responsible for greater profits to the chancery than it could now collect. This statement presumably referred to the fact that the chief governor and his council apparently fixed many of the fines for charters or awarded exemption from them.[4] The complaint reveals, in fact, a lack of understanding not just between the treasurer and chancellor but between the treasurer and the rest of the administration.

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1 C.C.H., p 154 nos 49, 47-8, 26-8; p 151 no 8; p 152 nos 36, 38-9; p 153 no 14.

2 King's Council in Ireland, nos 79, 80, 56, 60, 76, 77-8, 57, 1, 41, 51, etc.

3 Above, pp 245-50.

4 e.g. Above, note 2; fees in England in the reign of Edward II were fixed and, depending on the type in question, ran at either 16/4 or £7.11.8, without including any incidental sums paid to minor chancery officials. (Wilkinson, The chancery under Edward III, pp 59-60.)

Clause four, by contrast, has no obvious connection with the background of Richard's involvement and policies, though it does confirm the consistent exchequer interest of the petitioner. It claims that inquests made by the escheator which resulted in the seizure of lands into the king's hand frequently became ineffective, as after the lands had been granted out for some time their holders managed to forge other inquests to secure full title, thus removing the king's hands and cheating the crown of its profits. Obviously, if this were the case there must have been official connivance by the escheator or his deputies, if not the chancellor too, as letters patent would have been required. The allegation may describe a familiar abuse of power, for earlier fourteenth century petitions showed a like concern with control of the escheator.[1] It is possible that this criticism of the escheator, who was responsible for most of the king's feudal revenue, was related to various exchequer surveys of the time into all royal rights.[2] The attack was certainly more specific than that of three years later which complained that the then escheator took a fee of £42, giving the king no profits, whereas his predecessors had paid for the privilege of the office and brought a surplus to the exchequer.[3] It is unlikely, however, that there was a real possibility at this time of reviving the profits of the escheatry. The office had dwindled in importance during the fourteenth century and was by the 1390s commonly held by deputy.[4] The complaints which continued in the early fifteenth century were particularly vocal on the subject of the insufficient deputies previously appointed. It was requested that only those holding £20 in land or rent in fee within Ireland should have the office and that they should not be allowed to appoint deputies.[5]

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1 e.g. Statutes and Ordinances, 351 (1342); King's Council in Ireland, pp 316-7 (1345).

2 Above, p 266.

3 King's Council in Ireland, pp 261-9.

4 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 162; in 1392 John Adelem's deputy in Kilkenny 'and elsewhere' was Robert Dullard.(C.O.D., ii, no 318)

5 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 524,525 (1410)

Possibly the real measure of Melton's concern with this problem lies in the fact that he made no recommendation to remove the current absentee officials and the escheator did not feature among the group of important ministers whom it was felt later in 1397 ought to be appointed from England.[1]

The dwindling profits of the land are again considered in clause five, the subject this time being special subsidies. It was claimed that earlier lieutenants and justiciars were granted subsidies for the wars at the rate of about 20/- a ploughland, to be accountable to local auditors, not at the exchequer. This, Melton claims, not only reduced the amount of money available to the central government but also made it impossible for the exchequer to assess accurately the full revenues of the country. The complaint raises several points, the most immediate being the inaccuracy of Melton's estimate of past subsidies. It is unlikely that the normal rate had lately been anything like 20/- on each carucate of land. Under William of Windsor, who managed to collect more money by this means than other chief governors, subsidies rose to one mark on each carucate, but the evidence suggests that after this they fell again.[2] Occasions when under Henry IV a local levy ran at 10/- or 6/8 on each carucate should be contrasted with lesser rates of, for instance, 9d.[3] While Melton was therefore exaggerating his grievance the rest of his complaint may have been justified. It is true that chief governors since the appointment of Edmund Mortimer in 1379 did occasionally possess specific right to the proceeds of taxation,[4] and even before that time treasurers' accounts sometimes encountered difficulties for omitting to cover this 'extraordinary' revenue which was paid directly to the chief governor.[5] Although the financial authority of Scrope and Mortimer is uncertain, the 1395-9 period may have seen

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1 i.e. John Adelem, C.P.R. 1391-6 p 11; below, pp 299-301.
2 Clarke, 'William of Windsor', pp 164-73 passim.
3 C.C.H., p 158 nos 119, 4; p 178 no 77 (c)
4 E 159/174 Trinity recorda (no membrane numbers); above, p 221 ff.
5 Richardson and Sayles, Administration, pp 60-1.

a continued distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary revenues of the country, leaving the governors sole responsibility for the subsidies.[1] Such a situation would almost certainly have created problems with a treasurer of Melton's type. Even if this was not the case, the complaint may remain justified, for Melton was partly referring to past circumstances which had created the exchequer's current weakness. His attack on the system of local accounts is also credible. Local accounting was increasingly common at this stage, particularly when a sum was raised to meet a specific defence problem.[2] Even the amercements of keepers of the peace would occasionally be collected, spent and accounted for all within their local area.[3] In pinpointing such standard practices of the Irish exchequer as being amongst the causes of the revenue's decline this complaint shows again the thoroughness of Melton's examination of the Irish finances.

Allied to the issue of subsidies is the question of customs grants. The petition complains that after the king's departure Melton was unable to procure in parliament or council any grant to the king of certain customs, though in earlier times, when the revenues of the country were in the hands of chief governors, these customs had been very profitable. It is clear that this cannot have meant the Great or Petty Customs, which became fixed sources of income in 1275 and 1303 respectively.[4] The customs in question have in fact been identified as those specifically granted for three years to Windsor in 1369 and again for three years to Mortimer in 1380.[5] There had been considerable

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1 cf Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, p 154, where they assume that the petition here refers to the chief governor's right to receive the revenues of Ireland without rendering an account.

2 e.g. The corporation grants of Clonmel in 1371 (P.R.O.I. R.C.8/33 pp 53-60) and Galway in 1396 (C.P.R. 1401-5 p 86)

3 e.g. C.C.H. p 136 no 213; p 137 nos 215-6.

4 M.D.O'Sullivan, Italian Merchant Bankers in Ireland in the Thirteenth Century, p 62.

5 Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, pp 114-5; Statutes and Ordinances, p 478.

opposition when the grant was first made, in exceptional circumstances, 'for the salvation and defence of our land which...has sustained many damages'.[1] Melton implies here that the customs had become a regular feature, but this claim cannot be substantiated. The impression given, that the refusal of representatives to approve this grant to the king was connected with the fact that the chief governor no longer received the proceeds of such a subsidy, provides a further illustration of the political disadvantages of limiting the governor's financial interests in the country.

In clause six attention turns to the profits of the king's bench, allegedly too meagre to pay even the fee of the chief justice. The problem was in part an elaboration on clause two, which was confined to the question of the chief governors' past interests in the profits of the justiciar's court. Melton gives in this complaint, as the reason for the court's dwindling profits, the justice's inability--either through fear or corruption--to fulfil his duties properly,[2] and goes on to claim that this was true of all officers who live for long in Ireland. He furthermore asserts that the practice of allowing the justices of both benches to take the fines into their own hands resulted in fines being smaller than they should be.

The reference here to the means by which the decisions of justices were unlawfully influenced raises no great problem. One can readily credit the existence of such abuses, though our evidence is unfortunately too poor to substantiate the allegation at this time. It is interesting that Melton specifically points out the problem of English officers in

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1 Parliaments and Councils, pp 27-8; Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, pp 80, 85-6.

2 ibid., p 215 n 130, quotes this clause as evidence of corruption in the courts. Richardson and Sayles assume that the Justice in question was the justiciar, William Scrope.

Ireland adapting to local standards of official behaviour, but again the complaint cannot have been uncommon. More difficult to understand is the statement that justices had the authority to receive fines into their own hands, and that such fines were therefore smaller than they should have been. Without this statement one would assume that the Irish courts followed the English procedure concerning such fines--the estreats of fines and amercements being delivered into the exchequer from where lists were sent to sheriffs who would collect fines arising in their areas.[1] One can well believe that if the justices imposed fines for immediate payment they may have been moved to fix them at a lower rate than if payment was to be made later to another official or at the exchequer. Corruption need not necessarily be suspected, for in hard times ready payment deserved a discount. The only possible hint of such a practice is seen in the appointment of John Gifford in 1386 as justice of the common bench without any fee.[2] It is not known how Gifford was paid for his duties but the continuation of the more normal appointment of justices 'with the usual fees' dilutes the possible significance of this exception.[3] In our present state of ignorance about this problem it is difficult to make any further comment on Melton's particular grievance, beyond the obvious fact that it reveals yet another area of exchequer investigation into royal revenues and yet another official whose honesty and competence Melton suspected.

Clause seven brings Melton's personal problems to the fore, in a complaint that the chancellor would not receive the treasurer's bills nor give him the necessary authority under the great seal. This is the central evidence for the postulated breakdown in government at this

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1 W.A.Morris, 'The sheriff', in The English government at work, ed. W.A.Morris and J.Strayer, ii, 80.

2 Gen. Office, MS 192 p 272; C.C.H. p 131, no 40.

3 e.g. C.P.R. 1399-1401 pp 113, 120.

time, but unfortunately the entry gives no detail beyond stating that the bills in question were about custody of land. The extent of the treasurer's powers in this area is uncertain. He naturally had a particular interest in granting the custody of land which was in the king's hands.[1] Such grants appear to have commonly had conciliar approval,[2] and even the greatest lieutenants had limited authority to dispose of land.[3] When Surrey in 1399 was given power to grant lands recovered in war or confiscated by rebels it was said that he might demise 'with the assent of the chancellor and treasurer there all lands wasted by war and derelict'.[4] Authority on this matter varied according to the position and state of the land and to the type of grant being made. It is doubtful that the treasurer himself ever had sole power to authorize land custodies, and the real grievance here appears to have been on a different level—in the chancellor's refusal to accept writs emanating from the exchequer whatever their ultimate authority. It is possible that the issue of land custodies was in fact only an example of this administrative problem, not the cause. The complaint must be read in the knowledge of Melton's claim in May 1397 that the covyn acting against him in the prebend of Howth was headed by the chancellor, the Bishop of Meath.[5] Meath's hostility to Melton in office was bound up in their personal conflict and this particular complaint illustrates only one point at which the quarrel affected relations between their departments. It is interesting to note how the absence of personal names from the petition gives a false impression that personalities were not in fact significant in the treasurer's quarrel with the chancellor.

Clause eight reveals yet another area of hostility to Melton's

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1 Statutes and Ordinances, p 425 (1361 reform measure)
2 e.g. King's council in Ireland, nos 17-9, 21, 23-4.
3 e.g. Edmund Mortimer in 1379, C.P.R. 1377-81 p 392.
4 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 472
5 Above, p 259 ff.

activities, this time in local resistance to exchequer investigation. The petition complains that the treasurer was being impeded in his duty to make 'searches' in the realm for the king's profit by the mayors of Dublin and Cork. It is perhaps surprising to see Dublin mentioned in this context, for one would expect it to have been more amenable to investigation than distant Cork. In the case of Cork one can see some of the background to the investigations. In 1392 the city was, in consideration of damages inflicted upon it by neighbouring Irish, granted the arrears of its farm for four years past and the farm itself for the next four years, 'for the defence and fortification of the city and the repair of its walls and bridges'.[1] Melton's 'searches' may have tried to ascertain how this money had been spent or to investigate the amount that would fall due in 1397 when the grant ran out. Farms from cities were still viewed as sources from which the ordinary expenses of government could be met, despite increasing grants of exemption from the burden for a set number of years. In 1393, for instance, the farmers of Cork were ordered to honour, despite the grant just mentioned, a £20 tally on their farm.[2] A measure of Cork's poor response to exchequer investigations was seen in December 1400 when Henry IV pardoned the city £429.6.8 owed for four years arrears of farm and for amercements incurred 'by reason of undue return of writs and because they have not made their proffer and have not rendered their account yearly and for the green wax'.[3] A comparable situation existed in Dublin in 1401 when the mayor and bailiffs refused to honour a forty mark tally because they had been granted quittance of half their farm for two years. The solution reached was that they pay the creditor but be themselves allowed

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 203
2 King's Council in Ireland, no 113.
3 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 400

the forty marks in their farm for the third year.[1] Such occasions demonstrate the Irish exchequer's considerable dependence on these farms, which it could not really afford to grant away. They also indicate an increasing decentralization of financial control--borne out by the many murage and pavage grants of this time[2]--which made almost inevitable a confrontation with Melton's investigations. The efficiency with which Melton's administration seems to have enquired into the king's revenue from all sources was unlikely to have met with approval from the cities.

The next item is more general, concerning the position of the English rebels--a standard subject of much contemporary legislation.[3] Selected here for particular attention are the families of the 'Botillers, Aubyns, Powers, Burkyns, Gerardyns and Barettz', as well as plusours autres sects des kynreddes. Melton's approach to this problem of Anglo-Irish rebellion was unusually severe. He blames the inadequacy of the chief governor's retinue for his ineffective control and failure to punish the rebels, whose extortions and disturbances went unchecked also by the heads of the great families. This, claims Melton, was to the 'shame and damage' of the king and he requests a remedy. The suggestion that a stronger governor might use force to quell the rebels contrasts with some contemporary treatments of the problem. The petition of 1399, for example, advocated military action only where the English rebels were joined to the Irish rebels.[4] It suggested no specific course, but implied that these people should somehow be made answerable at law. Melton's complaint is similarly vague about a remedy, but his attention to the governor's military capacity indicates that

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1 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 479

2 e.g. Limerick (1391), Drogheda (1392), Trim (1393), Kilkenny (1394) etc. (Chartae, Privilegia et Immunitates, pp 88-9)

3 The problem was first identified in legislation of the early fourteenth century. (Statutes and Ordinances, p 267 etc)

4 King's Council in Ireland, pp 261-9, cl. 5-7; below, p 511.

he was thinking in practical terms of a possible campaign to end such rebellion by force. His remarks hint again at dissension within the Irish council, this time with the chief governor and possibly magnates such as the Earl of Ormond himself.

Clause ten is a straightforward request for direction on the matter of paying annuities to the Irish chiefs. No names are mentioned and the wording is left vague, almost ambiguous--the phrase ascun and the singular form leaving uncertain the extent of the rebellion. The item probably referred to no particular individual. It is of course significant that such a request was felt necessary, for it shows how important Richard felt these annuities to be. Taken together with Richard's instructions of July 1395 that these fees were to receive priority at the exchequer, this proves that the Irish council itself cannot have had the authority to discontinue the payments without prior royal consultation.[1] Furthermore, the petition reveals that as late as early 1397 the Irish were not seen to be in a state of inveterate hostility. For the treasurer to request advice as one of more of the Irish had risen with banners displayed--the sign of open war tantamount in England to treason[2]--does not mean that all the Irish had likewise rebelled but rather implies the contrary.[3]

The next is the last of the general items, and makes explicit some of Melton's frustration with the Irish government. In this he requests that all the officers of the king in Ireland--both military and civil--be appointed from England of the wisest and most loyal possible, for without this 'the said land will never be prosperous or well-governed'. Behind this recommendation lay a long tradition of complaints about officers in Ireland, their calibre and their conduct. Charges of incompetence were not new--over forty years previously the crown had

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 602
2 M.Keen, The Laws of War in the Middle Ages, pp 105-7, esp. 107 n 4.
3 Below, pp 321-4 etc.

considered the investigation of all officers below the rank of treasurer because they were reported to be 'almost entirely ignorant of the rule and exercise of their offices'.[1] In the early fifteenth century complaints were made in a similar vein.[2] The sending of English administrators was a natural royal response to such requests for better government. Not only would such clerks be better trained, but their benefices and possessions in England afforded the crown some measure of control over them. However, as far back as 1341 such a solution had been found unworkable, meeting with a strong Anglo-Irish reaction,[3] and it was likely that it would be similarly greeted in the 1390s. The accomplishment of far-reaching or permanent reform could not be achieved simply by the appointment of alien officers, without roots and contacts amongst the magnates on whose co-operation they depended. The Anglo-Irish petition of 1342, complaining of English officials, said that they were ignorant of the state of the country and were extortionate in office because they had ~~less~~ fewer assets than local officials.[4] Melton himself admitted the tendency for officers in Ireland to adapt after a while to local conditions,[5] while he himself represented another danger of English appointments--absentee figureheads acting through deputies. This abuse came under particular attack in 1399, when it was stated that many exchequer officials were unlettered, holding their offices for the sake of the fees, and executing them by deputy.[6] Although Melton, perhaps because of his own position, paid no attention to the question of such absentee ministers, his emphasis on the necessity that all the king's ministers in Ireland should if possible be appointed of the most wise and loyal men that could be found in England indicates

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1 C.P.R. 1349-54 p 198
2 King's Council in Ireland pp 261-9 cl 19
3 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp 258-60; Statutes and Ordinances, pp 333-61.
4 ibid., p 345
5 Above, pp 285-6
6 King's Council in Ireland, pp 261-9 cl 20; below, pp 512-3.

how serious a part his own English background must have played in his problems.

After this climax the petition peters out in a series of complaints against James Cottenham, their bitter tone poorly concealing a private antagonism between himself and Melton. Precisely why the two men were so opposed to each other is now unknown--possibly Cottenham was, of those hostile to Melton, the safest man to attack.[1] Furthermore, clauses thirteen and sixteen indicate that he had alienated others than Melton; he had ignored orders from the council and was considered guilty of 'various offences against the king and his ministers'. If the petition is to be believed, Cottenham seems to have acquired power in many areas, and to have used it quite without scruple in pursuit of his own interests. He was first accused of exceeding the rightful powers of the office of admiral, in which he claimed to be the deputy of the Earl of Rutland. Cottenham was said to have held the Admiral's court in the country without accounting for the profits to the king. This contravened a statute of 13 Richard II which specified that the admiral's court only had jurisdiction in matters done at sea, not those arising within the realm.[2] The statute may not as yet have been expressly proclaimed in Ireland, and its existence in England indicates that Cottenham was in any case doing little more than other holders of the office had done.[3] His authority is not so clear. Rutland was indeed admiral at this time, acting from 1394-8.[4] In October 1395 he had named as his deputy in Dublin a certain William Shareshull.[5] Whether or not Rutland appointed a general deputy to act throughout the country is uncertain until William Cornewalsh is found acting early in 1398.[6]

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1 On Cottenham, see above, p 261 ff
2 Statutes of the Realm, ii, 62, cl. v.
3 It was proclaimed in Ireland in 1402. (Statutes and Ordinances, p 507)
4 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 520; ibid., 1396-9 p 334.
5 R.I.A. Mem. Roll extracts, 24/H/17 f 33
6 Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous 1392-99, pp 101-2 no 220.

It is quite possible that Cornewalsh had recently superseded Cottenham, following Melton's attack.

Melton then goes on to accuse Cottenham of various extortions in office. He is said to have levied a twelve pence subsidy on every wey of grain leaving the country and to have charged each man or woman crossing the sea amounts varying from 13-40 pence--all done'without authority and despite having been warned by the council to cease such misdeeds'. Exported grain was actually one of the items on which Melton had wished to impose a customs duty, though when imposed in 1369 it had been at the rate of 6/8 for each wey.[1] He may have tried to justify the charge on all persons crossing the sea by reference to the necessity for anybody leaving the country to procure a licence. In 1392 the admiral was ordered to keep the late ordinance that 'no man, of what estate or condition soever he may be, has a right to pass the sea out of the said land'. Any such traveller had to have special licence from the council.[2] Statutory evidence also survives concerning the emigration of labourers.[3] It is clear however that Cottenham in fixing such fines had been acting without proper authority, and generally using his power to extort money where possible. He was, furthermore, charged with exporting foodstuffs despite the statutes forbidding this, and with bringing false money from Scotland into Ireland. The export of victuals had been forbidden during the first expedition and was not allowed again until May 1397.[4] The reference to money from Scotland is interesting, for it shows how this problem was exacerbated by self-interested officials like Cottenham, making it almost impossible to deal with. Legislation on the subject had been passed at least as early as 1299,[5] but the hold of the inferior Scottish groat continued

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1 Above, pp 284-5; Parliaments and Councils, pp 27-8.
2 King's Council in Ireland, p 162 no 138.
3 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 467, 519, 524 etc.
4 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 119
5 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 221-7

to create problems in the north-east of the country until the end of the fourteenth century.[1] Measures to prevent the traffic would have been impossible to implement with the deputy admiral himself an offender.

While these charges against Cottenham are impossible to prove, they probably contain some measure of truth. They exemplify particularly well the problem of appointment and control of officers at this time. An able and efficient officer, acting from self-interest, could do as much or more harm to the royal cause as an incompetent one. Cottenham undoubtedly seems to have exceeded the tolerated degree of official misconduct but under a different treasurer his interests might possibly have been brought in line with those of the crown. His misdeeds do not seem to have lost him Scrope's or the king's favour. He remained in this position of importance at least until October 1397 when Melton requested that his letters of protection should be addressed to Cottenham by name, as well as other important individuals.[2] It is likely that after Melton's return and Meath's dismissal from office Cottenham gradually fell from favour until in March 1399 all his known offices and powers were granted to Surrey, the new lieutenant.[3] Cottenham reappeared under Henry IV but never again occupied a position of much authority.[4] The lengths to which Melton went to attack Cottenham's conduct in office are made clear from clause fifteen which describes how Cottenham with an armed band scoured Meath for Melton in an attempt to arrest him.[5] Precisely why Cottenham did this is uncertain, but whether connected with the prebend of Howth or the rights of Scrope in Louth and Drogheda[6] it is obvious that Cottenham's participation in the incident made some official petition to England about

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1 M.Dolley, Medieval Anglo-Irish coins, p 16
2 Above, p 263
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 480, 483
4 e.g. C.C.H. p 158 no 109
5 Above, p 261
6 Above, pp 259-63.

his conduct inevitable. The clauses concerning Cottenham are primarily important not for their detail on his corrupt practices in office but for the extent of breakdown they reveal between Melton and the rest of the administration.

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The second document under consideration is quite different in form and content, but clearly originated in the same context of the Irish administration's problems. The closest date possible is sometime between July and October 1397. In July William Scrope's rights in Louth and Drogheda were transferred to James Cottenham, the grant being backdated to April.[1] This conciliar document requests that evidence of the date of Scrope's surrender be sent to Ireland. Presumably this request followed news of the grant to Cottenham and reveals uncertainty about who would be answerable for, in particular, the period from April to July.[2] These articles must however have been presented to the council before October, when Melton was actually returned in office to Ireland with the requested protection.[3] The differences in the structure of this document--particularly its brevity of style and use of Latin--are probably due to its different purpose, for it is as clearly a memorandum of council as the earlier document was a petition. In content there are differences too--the petition embodied a series of complaints whilst the conciliar document reads like a blueprint for action. Although the origins of both documents are equally obscure, it is clear that they had much in common, and the second document may actually represent the outcome of the first, as it finally came before the council for consideration after months of editing and

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 174, 187

2 An alternative interpretation is that the July enrollment of Scrope's surrender actually resulted from the request to the council, but this would mean that Cottenham's grant had in fact been made in April 1397, which is unlikely from the wording of the patent. (C 66/347 m 22)

3 Above, pp 263-4

investigation. The identification with Melton's interests in the exchequer, already noted in the petition, is just as explicit in the conciliar document, removing any doubt that it came from another faction or an official English source. The various subjects covered in the document--appointment of officers, the rights of the treasurer, and the position of John Melton--raise the possibility that it in fact represents a series of points upon which action was demanded before Melton would return in office to Ireland.[1] This interpretation, while probably correct, is impossible to substantiate. We have fortunately the council's answers to some of the requests, though the first six replies are completely lost.

The document begins with an item not in the original petition--a request that the temporalities of the vacant see of Dublin should be used while in the king's hands for the repair of the hall within Dublin castle. The see of Dublin lay vacant during much of 1397 after the death of Richard Northalis and before Thomas Cranley received ratification of his possession of it in December.[2] The repair of Dublin castle was a matter which Richard, like certain former chief governors, obviously considered to be of some importance. In the 1360s Clarence turned his attention to this problem, though he may have done little more than effect temporary improvements to make his own stay more pleasant.[3] Edmund Mortimer in 1380 found the castle in such an appalling state that he could not even keep the records there in safety, let alone use the building for a council or parliament.[4] Whatever improvements he achieved were obviously insufficient to halt the decay, and Richard made various arrangements after his first expedition to ensure the castle's repair. In April 1396 John Inglewood and John

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1 For examples of the conditions made by governors, see above, pp 204-6.
2 'Register of Archbishop Alen', p 234; C.P.R. 1396-9 p 271.
3 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 287
4 E 101/246/2/161

Blythe were commissioned to provide building materials to repair 'Dublin castle and the hall and the buildings therein' and to arrest workmen, bringing two carpenters, two masons and two plumbers 'of the better sort' with them to Ireland.[1] It is interesting that both the workmen and their provisions, 'stone, timber, tiles, lead and nails', were provided from England and Wales as well as Ireland, illustrating how little building was being done in the lordship. This work continued from April 1396 until March 1399 but we have little idea as to how it was financed.[2] The request that the revenues of the see of Dublin be earmarked for this task suggests that the burden placed too great a strain on the Irish exchequer. There is no record of the response to this request but Richard was ultimately obliged to send £100 from England during the treasurership of Robert Faryngton to be spent specifically on 'the repair and mending of defects in the dwellings and other buildings within Dublin castle--because of the coming of our lord the king...'.[3] Richard's interest in this task was probably concerned with his high standards of personal comfort as well as the needs of the castle as a military fortress.[4]

The items following this in the memorandum are among the most interesting in the document. They concern the personnel in various offices, and ask for sweeping changes to be made, nominating individuals who might be more suitable. The choice of names reveals an acceptance of the principle already expressed in the petition--that the Irish administration be Anglicized.[5] These items also offer incidental information on the procedure for choosing officers, a subject on which contemporary evidence is slight.

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 693

2 P.R.O.I., Calendar, iii, p 26, from Mem. Roll 1 H.IV, m 15. Inglewood and Blythe were exonerated their account.

3 E 403/561 (21 February)

4 For Richard's other building projects and work on royal residences see H.M.Colvin. History of the King's Works, e.g., i, pp 529-33, ii, 968, 998, 1008 etc.

5 Above, pp 290-1

It is known that offices could be acquired in various ways, sometimes by direct individual petition to the king,[1] sometimes through appointment by a higher minister, like the chancellor,[2] and frequently by grants from the chief governor who might receive special power to confer certain offices.[3] In practice the Irish council probably had considerable opportunity to make its voice heard--it had certainly been granted specific powers in 1331 to remove and replace insufficient officers[4]--though it could be over-ruled by royal appointment under the English great seal.[5] Irish appointments were therefore sometimes confirmed by letters patent under the English great seal.[6] Powers of dismissal were carefully guarded and it seems that even the Irish council acting in unison was obliged to petition the crown to remove an officer when he had been royally appointed.[7] By the late fourteenth century lieutenants were commonly receiving power to remove from office all but the most important of ministers. In 1379, for instance, Edmund Mortimer was empowered to replace at his own discretion any incompetent officers apart from the chancellor and treasurer who were however to be appointed with his approval. The same power was granted to Surrey in 1398, though neither Roger Mortimer nor William Scrope had any such defined control of appointments in their patents.[8] Stanley in 1399 had certain powers of appointment, but was ordered to act in this with the assent of the council and was excluded from interfering in the most important offices.[9] Gloucester's indenture specified that he

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1 e.g. P.S.O. 1/1/11

2 e.g. Bishop Balscot of Meath in 1395 (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 602)

3 This often went with the power to dismiss officers. See below, n 8-9 and p 299 n 1-2.

4 Statutes and Ordinances, p 329

5 This is the implication of Burnell's patent in 1393. (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 264)

6 e.g. C.P.R. 1396-9 p 188

7 e.g. Hugh Paryngton (C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 113; S.C. 8/118/5859); See also appointment of Macclesfeld and Swetenham (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 308).

8 Foedera, iv, 72; C 66/351 m 20; cf C 66/344 m 20 and C 66/349 m 21 etc; above, pp 206, 214.

9 C 66/356 m 32

should have power over some offices, but that if he wished to remove the justices of either bench or the chief baron of the exchequer he should notify the king and name two or three possible alternatives from whom the king might choose a successor.[1] This stipulation probably reflected the usual procedure with regard to offices--it is likely that royal appointments under the English great seal were often the result of recommendations by the council in Ireland and it is known that as early as 1328 a lieutenant might nominate some of the chief officers he wished to serve under him in Ireland.[2]

From the document under consideration here it is clear that while ultimate authority lay in England the procedure in appointing officers was as yet flexible and could vary according to the situation and the influence of the people concerned. A significant number of the names were already familiar to Ireland from the period of the first expedition. They were men of experience in the king's service in England, the kind who had taken office briefly in Ireland in 1394-5 but had shortly afterwards returned home. The choice of these men is our strongest proof that the evident conflict in the Irish administration was exacerbated, if not caused, by tension between English and Anglo-Irish interests. This is clearly seen in the wish to replace Meath as chancellor by either Hankeford or Faryngton, both of whom had been associated with the reforming efforts of the expeditionary months. Other suggested changes show that the removal of the chancellor was not in itself seen as sufficient reform and Kirkeby and Claydon, two more English trained clerks with Irish experience, were requested for the offices of keeper of the rolls and clerk of the hanaper.[3] John Lilleston, proposed as clerk of the crown, had not so far as we know previously held any specific office in Ireland, though he had certainly been in

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1 Gilbert, Viceroys, pp 552-6

2 Baldwin, King's Council in England, pp 473-5.

3 See above for Faryngton, pp 251-2; Hankeford, pp 252-4; Claydon, pp 251, 254-5; and Kirkeby, pp 254-5.

the country during the first expedition.[1] The significance of his nomination lies apparently in his English blood. Thomas Rede of Wales, suggested for the office of chief justice of the king's bench, may have been even less acquainted with the Irish administration. His apparent Mortimer connections may have played a part in bringing forward his name, though our uncertainty of Mortimer's relations with Melton creates difficulties about this suggestion.[2] Hugh Lutrell, proposed as second justice, had certainly been on the first expedition, when he witnessed submissions and, perhaps significantly, was associated with a group of men including John of Desmond against what seems to have been a number of Butler connections.[3] Thomas Freesby is another unknown. He had acted as attorney in England for various persons serving in Ireland, which suggests that he was himself an Englishman.[4] At the very least estimate, his nomination to the office of justice of the common bench and chief baron of the exchequer confirms the impression that an attempt was being made to purge the administration. of the familiar Anglo-Irish personnel. John Castleton, nominated as baron of the exchequer has a completely obscure background. He may possibly have been a local man, but the absence of his name from any surviving records makes it unlikely that he had ever held an office of importance in Ireland. John Breton, suggested for the office of chief remembrancer of the exchequer had on the other hand served for some time in Ireland, long enough to be classed as a local appointee. Acting on commissions from at least as early as 1380-1, he was already named as chief remembrancer and deputy treasurer of Ireland in 1388.[5]

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1 In early 1395 he was made attorney in Ireland for one of the king's clerks, Thomas Middelton. (C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 519, 555) Middelton's attornies in December were Kirkeby and Claydon.(ibid., p 643)

2 He was Mortimer's attorney in England in 1398.(C.P.R. 1396-9 p 349) He acted on commissions in south Wales.(e.g. C.C.R. 1392-6 p 516)

3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 94, 103; C.C.H., p 154 no 59. He came to Ireland in 1399. (C.P.R. 1396-9 p 525)

4 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 146, 552, 558

5 C.C.H., p 109 no 73; see also Selected cases in the court of the king's bench, ed. G.O.Sayles, vii, 70.

His nomination to be returned to the office indicates that, if Anglo-Irish, he was at least in agreement with the policies of the treasurer. Had he been appointed he would have replaced John Skot who, though apparently English himself, had been given the office of remembrancer in March 1397 during the period of Melton's eclipse from power.[1] A similar neutrality may have been expected of the last man to be mentioned --Robert Lughtburgh, whom the document requests be made one of the commission to enquire into the dealings of past officers. Robert Lughtburgh was a name familiar in the Irish administration, acting as second engrosser of the exchequer at least as early as 1356.[2] A Robert Loughtburgh was said in 1377, upon being appointed escheator of Ireland, to have been recommended to the king,[3] and the man's position as mainpernor for the royal retainer John Slegh, collector of the customs of Ireland, shows that he had indeed an ear in high places.[4] Lughtburgh's name subsequently disappears from the records and he had certainly lost the office of escheator by 1386.[5] Possibly by 1397 either he or perhaps a son was considered to be a suitably disinterested officer for this administrative investigation in Ireland.

The remaining clauses of the document offer no such detailed expansion of the petition, but omit some items and contract others, adding only a few. Melton's personal problems are openly mentioned, and can also be inferred from some of the requests. The plea, for instance, that a statement be made against papal provisions probably reflects his contest with Taaf in Howth. Legislation against papal provisions was not extended to Ireland until 1411, though the question

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1 Above, pp 266-7
2 C.P.R. 1354-8, p 427
3 Cal. Fine Rolls 1377-83, pp 12, 15
4 ibid.; Slegh was the king's butler and received various favours. (e.g. C.P.R. 1391-6 p 13)
5 C.C.H., p 132 no 55

of control of ecclesiastical appointments had long been a matter engaging local interests as well as conflicting royal and papal claims.[1] Another clause specifically asks for a writ of praemunire against Taaf, and to this the council agrees. That Melton still feared trouble is apparent from the request for both a special protection and for letters to be sent to the king's ministers and people in Ireland ordering them to admit Melton freely to his office without opposition. He also wished to have authority to appoint deputies, and though the answers to these items do not survive in full he was apparently granted what protection was 'just' and such powers as normally pertained to the office. There is no mention of Cottenham, though a general request for the proclamation of the statute concerning admirals undoubtedly refers back to Cottenham's alleged exactions. The omission of Cottenham's name was clearly determined by his position in the royal confidence in July 1397.[2] It is interesting that the council approves here the request that the date upon which William Scrope surrendered his grant be certified in Ireland. The reason for this was obviously Melton's desire to call Scrope to account for the profits of Louth and Drogheda, despite the specific exemption in Scrope's grant from any obligation to account. As a result of the council's agreement Scrope had ultimately to petition the king for relief from the Irish exchequer's investigations.[3]

Further evidence on the exchequer interests of the document occur in clause nine which asks that the treasurer of Ireland and his lieutenant receive English authorization to appoint auditors to hear the accounts of former treasurers of Ireland and to certify them to the king. The partially surviving reply to this records that 'the treasurer there

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1 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 528-9; see also R.Dudley Edwards, 'Kings of England and Papal Provision in Fifteenth Century Ireland', in Essays presented to A. Gwynn, passim.

2 Above, p 263

3 S.C. 8/252/12536

is accountable in the English exchequer', apparently a flat denial of the request. The background to this item is obscure. Presumably it was felt that officers in Ireland could more easily follow defaulting treasurers than the English exchequer at Westminster. There were at this time several outstanding accounts, the most recent being that of William de Chaumbre.[1] The same year saw Robert Crulle rendering his account from 14-17 Richard II,[1] and the English council may indeed have felt that the English exchequer was itself capable of following up any accounts. The request does at least show that accounting was still a subject for debate, with the English council apparently mistrustful of any localism—a significant fact in view of Melton's and Faryngton's own complete freedom from account.

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One may view the evidence given to us through these documents on two main levels. One concerns the general administrative background of late medieval Ireland. In this context, for example, Melton's focus on control of appointments can be related to the issue of the Talbot/Ormond struggle in the next century, adding to our understanding of both periods.[2] Even when examining the material at the other level, concerning the immediate crisis facing the treasurer, it is necessary to keep in mind the normal patterns of Irish administration, for like all records produced by a crisis these documents omit items not felt to be pertinent to the original issue. There is, for instance, no attention at all given to the perennial problem of absentees, although the years between the expeditions saw a formidable list of licences to absentees. The evidence of licences may primarily show exchequer

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1 E 364/31/C

2 See M.Griffith, 'The Talbot-Ormond struggle for control of the Anglo-Irish government, 1414-47', I.H.S., ii (1941) pp 376-97 passim.

vigilance, but the numbers involved must certainly have constituted a problem.[1] One can hardly speculate on Melton's reasons for failing to recommend action on this matter—he was possibly acutely aware of the rank and favour of many absentees--but his restraint does emphasize the limitations of a picture based on the 1397 petition and concilar memorandum.

Once these limitations are recognized it is, however, possible to extract considerable value from the documents. They confirm beyond doubt that Melton in the exchequer conducted a general survey of the royal finances. His frustration in these efforts is shown when he complains that freedom from exchequer accountability for the profits of taxation has helped to produce the king's current state of ignorance about the real revenues of the country. The documents also reveal some of the drawbacks of Richard's new policies, concentrating once more on the financial effects. The items referring to the decline in the country's revenues since the chief governors lost the power to take them into their own hands, and to the similar decline in the profits of the great seal, are particularly interesting. Not only do they show a high degree of self interest in the conduct of the king's chief ministers, which must be related to the subsequent attractions of office, but they also reveal that the administration was not improved as a result of Richard's expeditionary reforms and that in fact his efforts to stress royal rights reduced the incentive of the governor and chancellor to fulfil their duties efficiently. Even allowing for a measure of exaggeration on Melton's part, it is clear that he was critical of the effects of the change.

The chancellor, the Bishop of Meath, was undoubtedly viewed by Melton as the main culprit for the breakdown. It is difficult to see why the petition does not procede to the logical step of denouncing him by name. Presumably Meath was known to have received Richard's favour

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1 Above, pp 178-81

and the king's expressed policy was for Anglo-Irish men to control the chancery. The former point is beyond dispute,[1] and the latter is strongly implied by the retention of Sutton and Bathe as deputies in the office and the ultimate appointment of the Anglo-Irish prelate Cranley rather than an English clerk when Meath was finally removed.[2]

Melton's strongest recommendations concern this very question of Anglo-Irishmen in office. The views he expresses are unambiguous: only respected men from England could be trusted. Even Englishmen staying for long in Ireland were suspect, for they inevitably adapted to local conditions. The insistence upon this point was partly of course Melton's defence against any Anglo-Irish attack, but some of his recommendations reveal his own alien status and indicate that caution must be used in accepting his advice about what was best for Ireland. For instance, to discipline the rebel Burkes, Butlers and Geraldines with the sword was to invite local reaction and the loss of huge areas to the lordship. The suggestion was logical, but out of tune with Richard's own known attitudes towards rebels in Ireland, whom he tended rather to court and coax into allegiance. A similar lack of political judgement is evident in the recommendations for new officers from England. The men Melton favoured were not lowly clerks whose English administrative training made them superior to their Anglo-Irish counterparts but high ranking political appointees operating on the very level at which Anglo-Irish control was seen as essential by the local magnates. It was inevitable that Richard would continue to compromise on this issue. In the impossibility of appointing either a completely English or Irish administration lay the essence of his dilemma in governing the lordship and a primary cause of the ephemeral nature of his success.

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1 e.g. E 403/551 (19 July); C.P.R. 1396-9 p 112

2 Above, pp 255, 270-1.

Chapter 5

The breakdown of peace, 1395-9

In any attempt to examine the fate of Richard's settlement after he left Ireland in May 1395 one's attention is inevitably drawn to events in Leinster from April 1395 - April 1397. This concentration results from the lucky survival of a roll of wages describing the deployment of Scrope's retinue during these two years.[1] The roll identifies various places in Leinster and Munster warded by Scrope's retinue and gives the strength of each ward. While there is an obvious danger that this emphasis upon one area may distort the picture--for no such material survives concerning the deployment of Mortimer's retinue in Ulster, Connacht or Meath, or describing the defence of any part of Ireland after April 1397--it is true that Leinster's defence was strategically crucial to the lordship. Richard's campaign had begun there, and his submission policy resulted from his Leinster experiences. It was probable that, just as the Gaelic chiefs followed the example of Leinster in rendering allegiance, so might they have taken their lead from Leinster in resuming hostilities. It is certainly true that as long as Leinster remained secure there was still hope for Richard's settlement, and an examination of the settlement's breakdown which concentrates upon this province is therefore perhaps not so unfairly weighted as might at first appear.

Scrope's system of using wards to defend the south-eastern area was by no means new to the lordship. The strategy had been used by Richard's army during the 1394-5 expedition to accomplish Leinster's reduction,[2] and Scrope's policy had clearly a close connection with

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1 E 101/41/39

2 Above, pp 70-2.

these earlier tactics. Though the warding system was familiar to Ireland for over a century, few details are known of how it functioned.[1] The 'ward' itself seems to have been the body of men engaged in the defence of a particular area. In 1369, for instance, we see payment being made for a 'sufficient ward' maintained in a castle on the Carlow march.[2] Men serving in such wards could be recruited in different ways. In the early thirteenth century it was claimed that the guarding of the marches could be the occasion of an individual's service to the king.[3] John de Sandford's use of wards in the 1280s shows that men initially served in accordance with their feudal obligations but remained in wards for wages from the exchequer after the expiry date of the service.[4] Occasionally warding was a community responsibility, organized through the offices of sheriff and keeper of the peace. The latter officer was required to enforce the Statutes of Winchester and Kilkenny, which together expressed the obligation on communities to maintain themselves prepared for war.[5] On occasion local communities won specific exemption from coming to wards, musters and parleys called by the keepers of the peace, and in such hard-pressed areas recruitment for wards presumably depended upon professional soldiers.[6]

The warding system was flexible not only in its varying sources of manpower but in its purpose. Depending on its intensity--on the number of wards, their size and the duration of their services--the policy could be geared to meet different demands. An obvious distinction must be made between, for instance, local community wards, organized

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1 A discussion of the system can be found in R. Frame, 'The Dublin government and Gaelic Ireland, 1272-1361', (Ph.D. thesis, T.C.D., 1971) pp 67-74 and in his article 'English officials and Irish chiefs in the fourteenth century', E.H.R., xc (1975) pp 756-7.

2 E 101/245/3/337; particulars of account of Stephen Vale, treasurer.

3 C.D.I.,i, no 1581

4 ibid., iii, no 559

5 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 180; see,e.g., below, p 340.

6 e.g. Chartae, Privilegia et Immunitates, p 84

to defend an area against an immediate threat, and the wards which were established by the government and paid for by the exchequer. Included among the former were the wards which persons living in the land of peace were obliged to establish upon their lands in the march, to prevent the free passage of marauding Irishmen.[1] The wards established from time to time by the government were, by contrast, capable of waging a more aggressive campaign. Their significance lay less in the individual forces than in the number of centres established and their proximity to each other. With a well organized and efficiently backed system of wards a comparatively large area needed little man-power to retain the initiative in local defence. As a means of pacifying the country such a system had many advantages over full scale expeditions by the justiciar from Dublin, which tended to bring at best temporary relief from hostilities. It follows, however, that a warding system of sufficient strength to guarantee a permanent defence could not be maintained by community obligation but depended upon exchequer financing. Warding was therefore expensive, and, in the nature of fourteenth century conditions of government finances, rarely prolonged. The tendency was for the strength to fall with inadequate backing, making inevitable a loosening of local control. Castles, which were the focal points of many wards, might continue to be held, but often were no more than isolated ill-provisioned strong-holds, providing refuge in times of crisis. In 1376, for example, Wicklow had to be provisioned from the sea, as it was unsafe to send goods by land.[2] In 1379 it was said that Enniscorthy had been defended by Mathias fitz Henry for five years, for a mere 40/-.[3] It is likely that many such centres established of necessity a _modus vivendi_ with their Irish neighbours. Inevitably, therefore, wards can only be seen

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1 _Statutes and Ordinances_, p 199 (legislation of 1297)
2 _C.C.H._, p 100 nos 35-6
3 Hore, _History of Wexford_, vi, 352

operating efficiently during periods of attempted recovery, when investment of English aid was made in efforts to revitalize the land of peace, and make the lordship self-sufficient. Any evidence of warding may be taken as a sign of unusual involvement and admission of responsibility for the problems of the lordship.

Scrope's roll of wages, describing the wards over the two year period when he was in office, is divided into eight quarters, the names of the men being given every time in their wards, which alter slightly on each occasion.[1] It would appear from this roll that Scrope maintained his retinue throughout the two years at approximately the numbers specified in his indenture--100 men at arms and 400 archers.[2] This is rather difficult to credit, for it is unlikely that replacements were always immediately found when gaps occurred in the ranks. The literal accuracy of the roll can certainly be called in question on some occasions. For instance, the only two men of the entire retinue whom we know to have acted in Louth are James Cottenham and Laurence Neuton,[3] though according to this roll these men were warding Kendleston and Wexford respectively. Furthermore, though we know that James Cottenham made at least one trip to England,[4] not only does this go unrecorded on the roll of wages but his companions on the trip--presumably drawn from some of the wards--cannot be identified from the lists. A close examination of the roll reveals other puzzling aspects which, while not proof of large scale default, suggest that some at least of the entries may have been fictitious. On several occasions, for instance, the same names appear in two different wards during the one quarter, a practice occurring too often to be written off as the coincidence of common names. Another interesting feature is the

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1 E 101/41/39
2 E 101/69/1 no 293
3 Carew MS 619 f 207; above, p 261
4 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 727; Scrope's enrolled account refers to several journeys to England, but does not state which of his retinue was involved. (E 364/31/D)

movement between ranks, men at arms doing duty occasionally with the archers and vice versa. Our ignorance of normal warding and mustering practices makes it difficult to speculate on these anomalies, but it seems reasonable to suppose that Scrope's actual retinue may have been smaller than the roll implies.[1] The warding of Leinster while it remained at peace cannot have held many attractions for professional soldiers who came to Ireland expecting booty and ransoms as in France,[2] and it is possible that Scrope had difficulty in keeping men in service. In this context should be noted the complaint of 1397 that the retinues of lieutenants and justiciars often amounted to only a third of their supposed strength.[3] The charge may have been directed against Scrope himself. The evidence remains, however, inconclusive, and in view of the fact that Scrope clearly attended to his responsibilities in Leinster with some success it seems probable that any falsification which may have occurred in the compilation of the rolls was on a small scale. In general therefore we can accept that the roll gives a roughly accurate description of the defence system in Leinster.[4]

A general survey of the roll reveals a strong local character. In particular among those of Anglo-Irish origin may be noted William Wellesley, knight, who for some time held authority in Scrope's own retinue. This Kildare knight was active during the first expedition, acting as interpreter in March 1395 when O'Connor Faly submitted.[5] His previous military experience included a campaign against the O'Dempseys in 1391-2.[6] Other familiar Anglo-Irish names appearing in these wards include Peter Holt, Thomas Vale, John Braham and Robert

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1 For a more detailed examination of the roll see Appendix II, below, pp 531-54.

2 See,e.g., Walter fitz Walter's indenture with Mortimer in 1397, printed in Holmes, Estates of the higher nobility, p 131.

3 Above p 277

4 On some of the difficulties presented by retinue musters and accounts see K.B.McFarlane, The nobility of later medieval England, 26-7.

5 Curtis, Richard II, p 109

6 E 364/31/C; Crulle's account as treasurer.

Herford, and the general impression is one of considerable Anglo-Irish recruitment.[1]

Before examining the strategy revealed in the roll it is necessary to consider the peculiar position of the Cork ward. In each quarter it is said that the men in Cork served 'in a certain ward of the Earl of Rutland's there'. As we know, Edward, Earl of Rutland, was made Earl of Cork in 1394-5, presumably acquiring land there at the same time. It is not unreasonable to suppose that he was required to leave a certain number of men to ward the area and that these were joined by some of Scrope's retinue. The exact position of the earl is however obscure. From the start he apparently received royal funds. Payment of £318.10 was made by the hands of John Bathe and William Chesterton to the earl 'on the wages of divers knights, esquires and archers left in Ireland after the return of the king from there'.[2] On 15 June, however, William Scrope was paid, as well as an instalment of his stipend and fee of justiciar, £109.4.0 as the wages and rewards of twelve knights staying in the service of the king in the land of Munster of whom six were of Scrope's retinue and six of Rutland's.[3] Henceforth all payments to these twelve men at arms--presumably the Cork ward--were in Scrope's name, as seen from his roll of wages and from his enrolled account. As Rutland never accounted, it is difficult to see what measure, if any, of responsibility he had.[4] It was perhaps inevitable that Scrope ultimately took over control of both the money and men, incorporating the ward within his own retinue, though it is curious that all payments to the Cork men were made by Thomas Bathe, the rest of Scrope's retinue being paid by William Perriar, his clerk of the wages.[5] Furthermore, this Munster retinue was separately

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1 This explains why Scrope was able to return to England with his retinue in 1397 with only six ships. (E 364/31/D)

2 E 361/5/25; John Carp's account in the household.

3 E 403/551 (15 June)

4 Henry IV excused his account, as noted in E 368/172, Easter br. retorn., m 233.

5 E 101/41/39

mentioned both in issue roll payments and in the subsequent account, implying that it was additional to Scrope's indentured force. The identity of the men in the Cork ward throws no light on the position. During the period two grants of clause volumus protections were recorded to men said to be 'staying in Ireland in the company of Edward Earl of Rutland and Cork'. William Ardern on 1 July received one for a year.[1] His name was subsequently added to Scrope's wages roll, but there is no further record of Thomas Fleming who received a similar protection on 2 July 1396.[2] In general the roll shows men from Cork moving freely into other wards in Scrope's retinue. In view of Rutland's obvious preoccupation with affairs outside Ireland it seems unlikely that he was closely involved with the activities of this retinue.[3] Certainly by early 1397 the men in question were absorbed into the general body of Scrope's retinue in Leinster.

The position of the wards of 1395-7 shows that the government was concerned with both north and south Leinster, though as time went on the emphasis shifted increasingly northwards. For most of the period there were seven wards, between them covering an area stretching from Ballymore to Cork. This small number of large wards provides an interesting contrast to the twelve small wards established by Rokeby in 1355.[4] Scrope's wards fell into two main groups, north and south, and together they show a serious effort to contain Irish ambitions in Leinster. The southern ones were widely spread--in counties Wexford and Cork, at Thomastown and at Carlow. The Wexford contingent was described in the first quarter as serving in 'divers wards', but by October 1395 the men appear to have combined as one force, said to be 'in a certain ward in county Wexford'. To the north the O'Byrnes

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1 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 595
2 ibid., 1396-9 p 2
3 He went on an embassy to France from July-September 1395. (E 159/172, Mich. br. baron., no membrane numbers).
4 Frame, 'English officials and Irish chiefs', p 774

and their neighbours were more closely watched by wards at Ballymore, Wicklow and Newcastle Mackinegan, and Kendleston. In January 1397 the Cork and Wexford garrisons were withdrawn to form a new centre at Dunlavin, strengthening the encirclement of the north Leinster Irish. Scrope's retinue, unattached to any centre, formed a unifying element in the scheme, enabling mobility for attack and providing a reserve of support for weak spots.

Some of the alterations in the wards, as described in the following chart, are very interesting. Fluctuations of one or two may represent loss by death or capture, but other changes were often the result of men being moved into another ward and can be most logically explained as changes of policy. Although the total number of men was virtually unchanged during the two years, their deployment altered significantly. The outlying wards were reduced in strength, while the Wicklow wards were maintained and reinforced by the formation of Dunlavin. The changes did not take place gradually, but were mostly seen in the last six to nine months of the two years. The policy became evident in July 1396, when the strength of Wexford, Carlow and Thomastown was reduced and the men sent to Ballymore, Kendleston and Wicklow. This occurred about the time of Scrope's visit to England. In October, after his return, the Cork ward was halved, to be removed altogether in January. The Wexford ward, already halved, was disbanded at the same time. Carlow also showed very considerable reductions by the final quarter, but presumably the strategic importance of both it and Thomastown along the Barrow and Nore determined their survival in some strength.

During most of the period in question the composition of the wards altered little.[1] As a rule each ward was defended by the same

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1 More detailed analysis of the changes can be seen in appendix II, below pp 531-54.

Breakdown of Scrope's retinue, 1395-7[1]

Periods covered		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Cork	A	20	13	11	11	12	13	5	-
	B	80	60	40	40	40	40	19	-
Wexford	A	11	6	6	5	7	5	5	-
	B	24	24	20	22	22	12	12	-
Carlow	A	12	9	9	9	9	8	13	6
	B	50	50	51	51	52	26	26	20
Thomastown	A	5	9	7	5	5	6	7	8
	B	32	32	32	33	32	20	22	26
Wicklow and Newcastle Mackinegan	A	5	5	5	6	5	11	5	5
	B	44	44	44	44	44	48	58	41
Ballymore	A	10	9	14	13	14	9	9	13
	B	54	54	57	54	54	64	64	50
Kendleston	A	5	9	9	8	5	5	55	5
	B	16	26	26	26	26	30	30	20
Scrope's retinue	A	38	46	47	49	49	49	57	58
	B	100	110	130	130	130	160	169	179
Dunlavin	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64
Total	A	106	106	108	106	106	106	106	104
	B	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400

1 The periods were as follows: I, April-July 1395; II, July-October 1395; III, October 1395-January 1396; IV, January-April 1396; V, April-July 1396; VI, July-October 1396; VII, October 1396-January 1397; VIII, January-April 1397.

'A' signifies the number of men at arms and 'B' the number of archers.

Kendleston, in the barony of Rathdown, is given its usual late-fourteenth century form, Kenleston.(Price, Place names of Wicklow, v, 322)

Location of wards, 1395-7



1 Cork
2 Wexford, and county
3 Thomastown
4 Carlow, and county
5 Dunlavin
6 Wicklow
7 Newcastle Mackinegan
8 Ballymore
9 Kendleston

group of people throughout the period. Occasionally the roll shows that names which disappear are then found in other wards, or in Scrope's retinue, but often the men who cause such fluctuations in the numbers come and go without further mention. If the mortality rate had been high, the regular names would presumably have varied more. In the case of Thomastown, for instance, a basic force of five men at arms serves for five quarters, till two of them disappear. The remaining force is composed of different men in each quarter, who generally do not appear elsewhere on the roll. The same pattern recurs in the other wards. The Wicklow wards show the most interesting changes. Kendleston and Wicklow retain the same force of knights and men at arms in the final quarter, but their archers are increased as Cork and Wexford are reduced. Ballymore's ward remains fairly constant, but the proximity of Dunlavin with its very considerable force alters the military strength in the area appreciably. In this development July 1396 again seems to be crucial, though the Dunlavin ward is not established until the following January. It is difficult to speculate, in the absence of any information about military campaigns in these areas, on the policy behind the changes. We do know that neither the Wexford nor Cork ward was wiped out by the enemy, for the eight men at arms who were given the warding of Dunlavin came from these centres. Presumably the campaigns that were undoubtedly being carried on in Wicklow required all possible reinforcements, but it remains unclear whether the move demonstrates the failure of the system of wards so far and should be seen as a sign of retreat or whether it was an incidental by-product of an aggressive war in Wicklow.

In the course of these changes Scrope's own retinue was joined periodically by additional support. In only one quarter does its numbers remain even; at every other count they have increased and the final total shows that Scrope's personal following now included

twenty more men at arms and seventy-nine archers, though the size of the entire retinue has remained unchanged. There is no indication from the lists that this force included any specific body of twenty men at arms which as justiciar Scrope was obliged to maintain. In each quarter the auditors cancel twenty names from the rolls, but none is a member of Scrope's own company, and this body of twenty appears to be an administrative fiction rather than a real personal retinue attached to Scrope.[1] It seems probable that the company of men serving with Scrope was employed in aggressive tactics during this period, operating in co-operation with the more defence-oriented wards to maintain the pressure on the Leinster Irish. The fact that men withdrawn from the southern wards were not always added to the defensive strength of other centres but tended to join Scrope's own group supports the impression that the withdrawal was not solely to ease the pressure on the Wicklow wards. In fact, the continuing expansion of the justiciar's mobile force, which was most suited to co-ordinating and aggressive tactics, suggests that the military initiative in Wicklow remained with the forces of the government.

This evidence on the warding of Leinster suggests that events in Ireland during these two years should now be reinterpreted.[2] The very existence of the wards, acting from 25 April--almost a month before Richard left the country and therefore, presumably, established with his approval--shows a level of continued royal interest greater than has generally been suspected. The wards were obviously intended to safeguard the Leinster settlement as it existed in April 1395. By this time it was clear that a possible evacuation of Leinster by the Irish

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1 About ten of the cancelled names, belonging to different wards, are repeated each time. The rest vary, some appearing in only one quarter.

2 It has generally been assumed that with the departure of the royal army in 1395 the defence of Leinster reverted to pre-1394 conditions, allowing the Irish immediately to rebel. (e.g. Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 147)

chiefs was no longer at issue.[1] Continuing peace depended not on this unlikely condition but on the government's ability to avert any open war or repudiation of the recent submissions. The wards demonstrate a realization of this, an understanding that articles of submission in themselves would not guarantee peace. Furthermore, one can see in the varying strengths of the wards some indication of the areas most at risk--though conclusions based on this evidence must remain speculative. It is for instance possible to argue that the reduction of a ward could equally well indicate increased security, or a hopeless situation, or indeed a crisis in the defences of another area. As evidence on the collapse of the settlement the warding information is therefore very inadequate, its value lying to a great extent in the lack of alternative sources.

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The crucial point in any fourteenth century attempt to pacify Leinster lay in the position of MacMurrough. So long as he remained within the peace open war was unlikely to become general. In order to forfeit his rights as a man 'at peace' it appears that an Irish chief had to make public his disavowal of the crown's authority. To make raids upon neighbouring Irish, though the habit was reprehensible and could lead to open war, was something he might engage in without suffering official reprisals. To ride, however, in open war with banners displayed against an official of the king was another matter—necessitating a new oath of submission before he could return to a state of peace.[2] At the time of Richard's departure from Ireland MacMurrough was therefore still at peace and the submissions of February still in force,

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1 Above, pp 77-87

2 Thus, for instance, the treasurer in 1397 asked for instructions about the payment of pensions to Irish captains who since their submissions have levee a guerre ove baner displaies. (Carew MS 619, f 207)

though he had made at least one local raid, against O'Toole, and possibly many others.[1] It is difficult to speculate on the nature of the threat MacMurrough posed at this time. Unlike O'Neill or other chiefs he left no letters to reveal his attitudes and concerns. It is not easy to see whether he gained or lost appreciably by the terms of peace. While the recognition of his right to Norragh and 80 marks p.a. was an advantage, the fee had in fact become almost customary and the gain of Norragh was offset by the loss of other areas.[2] What is most difficult to gauge from the submission documents is the extent to which his lordship was affected by his defeat. Richard, it is true, recognized MacMurrough's supremacy by binding him to enforce the submissions of lesser chiefs in the province,[3] but at the same time he took from him the title of 'King of Leinster', and bound all chiefs to take an oath of liege homage directly to himself as lord of Ireland, a measure which may have weakened MacMurrough's power to attract Irishmen into his lordship. The evidence is in fact inconclusive. There is no reason to suppose that MacMurrough would have immediately made war on the justiciar once the king was out of the country, though nor is there any likelihood that he would refrain from so doing should he be provoked or if a suitable opportunity presented itself.

The evidence of the annals unfortunately throws little light on the question of the settlement's breakdown in Leinster.[4] The Four

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1 Curtis, Richard II, pp 125-6; above p 85.
2 Above, p85.
3 Curtis, Richard II, p 84
4 The only account of MacMurrough taking the initiative occurs in a fragment of historical notes preserved in Lambeth Carew MS 621,ff 1-2 (Cal. Carew MSS, v, 341). The entries are headed 'Brief notes from the ancient membranes of the Cathedral Church of the Holy Trinity, Dublin'. The dating of some of these entries is inaccurate and it is probable that the 1396 hostilities credited to MacMurrough actually occurred in 1386. (cf A.U., 1386) Confirmation of this comes from T.C.D. MS 574, p 36, which gives many of the same items as the Carew MS, dating the MacMurrough attack to 1386.

Masters merely records:

> Although MacMurrough had gone into the king's house he did not afterwards keep faith with him.(1)

This is too general to be useful—it may simply refer to MacMurrough's subsequent and undisputed revolt within the next four or five years. The same annals also record in 1395 an attempt by the English of Leinster to take Art prisoner by treachery, and his escape. This is again inconclusive. The 'English' in question are not identified and the item may reflect only some local quarrel, not involving the government forces. The suggestion that MacMurrough could have been taken treacherously indicates in any case that he had placed some trust in the Leinster English. The picture is reminiscent of the situation in Ulster where O'Neill, holding to Richard's peace, was taken by surprise when Mortimer attacked Armagh in 1396.[2] Although there may well have been tension in Leinster there is no evidence of open war, and it is indeed possible that MacMurrough was relatively subdued. The immediate threat to peace may have come here, as elsewhere, from Anglo-Irish ambitions rather than inveterate Gaelic rebellion and in the absence of any detail about hostilities it must remain difficult to speculate on the degree of tension or unrest.[3] The most convincing proof of all that MacMurrough and other Irish captains did not immediately rebel is seen, however, in the matter of payments to the Irish. At least as late as July 1395 the 'payments of all sums granted whilst the king was in Ireland to Irishmen submitting to the king's allegiance' had priority at the exchequer, and in February 1396 was recorded a pension to Donard O'Byrne.[4] A query about these payments in a petition

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1 A.F.M., 1395
2 Below, p 332.
3 At Michaelmas 1395 Geoffrey de Vale, sheriff of Carlow, appeared in the exchequer and produced a writ showing that he had been warring with the justiciar against MacGillapatrick at Kilkenny, but the brief entry does not state when the hostilities occurred and it seems likely that the writ excused some past default of the sheriff's.(R.C.B. Lib., Graves MS 4 p 307, from Mem. Roll 19 R.II, m 5d)
4 C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 602, 670; below p 321

of early 1397 suggests that even at this late stage the Irish were not recognized as confirmed rebels.[1]

The evidence of the wards certainly favours the idea that Mac Murrough offered no serious threat at this time. Already in April 1395 the concentration of strength was in north Leinster and this continued to be true for the next two years. The Carlow, Wexford and Thomastown wards were too distant from each other to have a comparable aggressive capacity, and presumably were intended to maintain the status quo in south Leinster. The withdrawal north which intensified the concentration there began in mid-1396, perhaps after the victory which the annals attribute to O'Toole.[2] There is no record or hint that the position in south Leinster was in any way critical, for had MacMurrough been at open war it is probable that attention would have focussed instead on him. The reduction of the wards in his area suggests that the settlement met with trouble first in north Leinster, probably as a result of pressure on the Irish to relinquish land and rights they had usurped, and that under Scrope's handling this area continued to receive and ultimately to demand most attention.

While the details of the story remain obscure, it is probable that William Scrope's claims to lands in O'Byrne's area was a contributory factor in the accelerating unrest of this area.[3] Already when the king was in the country O'Byrne had complained to him of Ormond's ambitions,[4] and it is possible that the grant to William Scrope led his brother to pursue his duties in the area with more self-interest than was good for the peace of the country. O'Toole too had complained that the English of Ballymore were unwilling to honour the trading privileges Richard had granted him there,[5] and these and other grievances may have imperilled the fate of Richard's settlement.

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1 Above, p 317 note 2
2 A.F.M., 1396; below, p 322.
3 Above, p 169
4 Curtis, Richard II, p 141
5 ibid., pp 125-6

Richard's involvement in Leinster was not limited to his approval of the wards established there, for as a result of the widespread submissions he took hostages from some of the men. He brought eight of these pledges with him to England, where they were entrusted to the custody of William Scrope.[1] Some at least of these men came from Leinster--hostages from MacMurrough and O'Byrne being specifically mentioned.[2]

In the two years that followed intermittent contact continued between Richard and the Leinster Irish, though it is difficult to understand its character, or to explain the royal policy being followed. In February 1396, for instance, Donard O'Byrne appeared in England. This presumably was Donough, tanist in 1395 to Gerald O'Byrne his father whom he succeeded in 1398.[3] He had gone to Dublin with Richard and took his oath there to the king in February 1395.[4] It is probable that a year later he was acting on his father's behalf when he came to England and received a grant of 80 marks p.a., to be paid at the Irish exchequer for life or until further order.[5] This is the first detail of pensions due to Irish captains other than MacMurrough, as had been promised in the submissions, though in view of the position of O'Byrne within the lordship and his earlier receipt of fees from the government it is not surprising.[6] It is impossible now to see the background of this grant, but Donard's visit in the company of James Cottenham who was in charge of the Kendleston ward and Scrope's deputy in Dublin castle must have been linked with the military achievements of the government in the north Leinster area.[7] Donard's journey to England

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1 E 364/32/H; Scrope's enrolled account

2 The son of MacMurrough was named as one of those to be returned to Ireland in 1399. (E403/562, 3 May) Teke abrenne hostagium pro abrenne de leinstre died in June 1396 in custody. (E 364/32/H)

3 A.Clon., 1398

4 Curtis, Richard II, p 61

5 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 670

6 See,e.g., his fee in 1386 in the treasurer's account, E 364/32/F.

7 C.P.R. 1391-6 p 727; also C.C.H. pp 153-4 no 25: E 368/174 Hilary br. retorn., m 296; and above, pp 261-2.

and receipt of a pension suggests that Scrope's campaigns must have had some success. It seems likely that an agreement was reached at this time between O'Byrne and the rival Anglo-Irish and English ambitions which had started the trouble. The visit to England and the grant at least reveal continued royal interest in the province and, despite the evident pressures on the peace, can be taken to indicate the maintenance or restatement of the settlement left by Richard in April 1395.

The troubles of north Leinster had not, however, concerned the O'Byrnes alone. In 1396 was recorded a victory of the O'Tooles over

> the Anglo-Irish and Saxons of Leinster, in which the English were dreadfully slaughtered; and six score (of their) heads were carried for exhibition before O'Toole, besides a great many prisoners and spoils of arms, horses and armour.(1)

The O'Tooles, according to their chief's letter to Richard, had wished for nothing more than to live in peace with the Anglo-Irish, with free access to their markets and fairs. They, as well as the O'Byrnes, had encountered Anglo-Irish opposition to the terms of Richard's settlement,[2] and it may have been this which drove them into hostilities after the king's departure. This O'Toole victory was obviously important, but may have actually been a lucky accident for them. There is no evidence of any confederation of Irishmen, and the O'Tooles alone were not comparable to the O'Byrnes or MacMurroughs.

The situation in Leinster by mid-1396 seems to have been one of intermittent unrest rather than unmanageable warfare. It was apparently felt safe to let Scrope leave the country in the summer to spend a month in England consulting with the king, bringing with him Donard O'Byrne

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1 A.F.M., 1396
2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 125-6

and eleven other Irishmen.[1] The only other one of these known by name is Thomas Carragh Kavanagh, the man whose son was chosen to be MacMurrough's hostage when he submitted in January 1395.[2] This company crossed in August, with 100 horses and men, and the following month returned 'after having spoken with the king and being licensed to return into Ireland'.[3] There is no hint that the Irishmen were left as hostages or prisoners--the purpose of their visit seems to have been purely consultative.[4]

The evidence of this visit is the clearest proof we have of Richard's continuing close involvement in the fate of his recent settlement. We cannot know exactly what occurred, but it is clear that the leading Irish of Leinster were still in submission and that the settlement of 1395 or something similar was still considered viable. The initiative had apparently not yet been lost by the government. This impression is confirmed by an entry in the annals describing how Taig O'Carrol of Ely, returning about this time from a pilgrimage to Rome, was well received by Richard in the company of O'Byrne and 'Thomas Calva MacMurchad' and subsequently recruited to go with the

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1 The particulars of Scrope's account (E 101/41/34) give details of his journey to England in August 20 R.II (1396) and return in September. In his enrolled account (E 364/31/D) this is repeated, but in one instance the date of his visit with 'Donard Obren' is given as 18 R.II (1394-5). This is repeated in a warrant for issue of January, 1398, after his account was rendered. (E 404/14/96/25) This voyage of 18 R.II, which is also repeated in the Memoranda Rolls (E 159/174, Hilary communia m 3) would appear to be a clerical error, arising out of the mistake in the enrolled account. The independent evidence of Richard Kays' account in the pipe rolls shows that the return of these Irishmen took place between 19 and 28 September 1396.(E 372/247, London.)

2 Above, p 77; Thomas Carragh is mentioned in Richard Kays' account, (above, n 1), as is 'Dybryn de Lenstre'. Kays was ordered on 8 September 1396 to arrest shipping 'for the passage of certain lieges of the king from Ireland who lately came to England in attendance upon the king's person'. (C.P.R. 1396-9 p 53)

3 E 101/41/34

4 Scrope may have brought over some prisoners, unless to order to keep Matthew Barret of Ireland in the Tower of London until further order is simply coincidence.(C.C.R. 1396-9 p 7) The record suggests a fairly stringent attitude at this time towards Anglo-Irish rebels.

king when he went to Calais for his wedding. Presumably his presence was the visible proof of Richard's success over his turbulent Irish subjects.[1]

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Other evidence of the same year reveals that unruly behaviour among the Anglo-Irish may have been causing as much official concern as the Gaelic unrest. A parliament at Dublin, which met probably in January 1396, sent the chancellor, Bishop Balscot of Meath, and David Wogan to report to the king on the state of the land since his departure.[2] Both of these representatives had been active in the policies of the first expedition, the bishop serving on the king's council while in Ireland and Wogan acting as witness to various submissions.[3] Richard's ensuing letters, one to all public officials in Ireland and the other to the Earl of Desmond, give some idea of the fate of his policy and show that considerable difficulties were already being experienced.[4] The embassy had apparently asked for another royal expedition and Richard's reply that he would come as soon as possible 'to accomplish the conquest of the said land' shows no optimism about the state of affairs after the first expedition. The content of the general letter, promising to reward all who have been loyal and threatening to punish any who impede his ministers in any way, suggests that the government of the lordship was experiencing difficulty in exercising control. Richard sternly commands all his

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1 A.F.M., from O'Donovan's notes to 1396, taken from marginal additions of O'Flaherty's MS, quoting from the now lost Book of Lecan of the MacFirbises.

2 For the dating of this assembly see Appendix IX, pp 570-4.

3 E 403/551 (19 July); Curtis, Richard II, pp 84-5.

4 B.M.Add. MS 24062, pp 106, 122; see Appendix IX, below pp 570-4.

lieges that

> they shall not damage, aggrieve, molest or disturb...those who have held faith and borne themselves loyally to us since our departure...and from now on shall hold to our peace and obedience...unless by the advice of our lieutenant, justice and other officers and ministers there.

This would seem to be a warning not to provoke peaceful Irish into rebellion, and suggests a hope that general war might be averted. The letter to Desmond is of particular interest, showing that the most serious disturbance of the time was created not by the Irish but the Anglo-Irish. Desmond is warned that complaints have reached the king about his conduct and that of his family and adherents; he is expressly made responsible for anyone of his name disturbing the peace:

> Understand with certainty that if from now on you misbehave towards us or any of our lieges, or if any of your said cousins or adherents misbehave, attributing to you the misdeed, if such occurs, we shall then act towards you as towards them which in this case shall be at fault and we shall inflict such punishment that all those of our said land shall take it for an example in future times....

The stern rebuke of this letter almost certainly referred to the recent slaying in Waterford of an illegitimate brother of the Earl of Ormond by John, heir to the Earl of Desmond. A note in the Four Masters states baldly that 'Thomas Butler was killed by the Geraldines',[1] but another record gives the story more fully:

> John fitz Thomas at Waterford with his followers killed Thomas le Butler the brother of the Earl of Ormond, whence great harm was caused to the lords of both nations, but the Earl of Desmond on behalf of his nation reached a settlement with the Earl of Ormond for the death of his brother, to the sum of 800 marks in silver.(2)

It would seem beyond doubt that this entry refers to the incident which occasioned the outcry against Desmond in parliament and partly prompted the appeal to Richard. It may even be inferred, from Richard's apparent

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1 A.F.M., 1396; added in O'Donovan's notes, quoting from O'Flaherty's manuscript additions from MacFirbise.

2 B.M. Add.MS 4793 f 74; this consists of a page containing just over a dozen entries in a late seventeenth century hand, headed 'Annales Anonymali'.

ignorance of the settlement reached between the two earls, that the parties were brought to terms after the embassy had been sent, maybe as a result of the king's letter.

It is not easy to identify exactly both the parties in the quarrel. John fitz Thomas was clearly John, son of Gerald the third earl of Desmond, whom he succeeded in 1398. John was by the 1390s already adult and pursuing his own ambitions in Munster. These included his appointment as sheriff of Waterford.[1] 'Thomas Butler, brother of the Earl of Ormond' is not so easily identified, for Thomas was a common family name. The first, second and fourth earls all had illegitimate sons called Thomas and the third earl apparently had two.[2] The obvious choice for this Thomas must be the man who is named in 1393 as the son of the late earl.[3] It seems that he had been occupied for some time past in defending the lieges of counties Cork, Tipperary and Kilkenny, for which services he was suitably rewarded by the council of his half-brother, third Earl of Ormond and then justiciar of Ireland.[4] It has been assumed that this Thomas was he who in 1403 became Prior of Kilmainham, but in fact the prior is spoken of as the brother of the fourth earl and must therefore have been an illegitimate son of the third earl and nephew of the Thomas active in the early 1390s.[5]

The incident at Waterford and its repercussions require no elaborate explanations. The tension between Desmond and Ormond was a constant fact of Anglo-Irish political life at this time—an inevitable result

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1 King's Council in Ireland, no 155; also ibid., no 109.

2 T.Blake-Butler, 'Thomas le Botiller, prior of Kilmainham, 1403-1419', The Irish Genealogist, i (1937-42), pp 362-72, quoting from an early nineteenth century MS pedigree, now in the College of Arms, London.

3 e.g. King's Council in Ireland, no 183

4 ibid., no 13

5 cf Blake-Butler, 'Thomas le Botiller', p 362. The prior is referred to as brother of the fourth earl in the course of accusations made against Ormond in 1422. (M.Griffith, 'The Talbot-Ormond struggle', Irish Historical Studies, ii (1941) p 393)

perhaps of their proximity and territorial ambitions. The Bishop of Cloyne's claim in 1380 that: 'There are two in Munster who destroy us and our goods, namely the Earl of Ormond and the Earl of Desmond with their followers', held good for much of the period.[1] The two earls had in fact close personal ties, strengthened by marriage alliances, but where their interests diverged the activities of junior members and friends probably exacerbated the tension. In 1394-5, for instance, two groups of men, one including John of Desmond and the other composed of Butler connections, mainperned in the chancery that neither Geoffrey Cusak nor John Shriggley should injure the other.[2] The alignment of interested parties meant that any breach of the peace could affect the entire lordship.

This episode is of great interest in any assesment of Richard's policies towards Ireland. It highlights, for a start, one of the hazards facing any peaceful settlement—the threat posed by unruly Anglo-Irish subjects of the lordship. Richard's letters establish beyond doubt his awareness of the problem, and his own continued concern for the lordship. His promise to come again to Ireland if necessary must be borne in mind in considering events from now until 1399. The tone of Richard's warning to Desmond implies furthermore that he had heard and accepted a version of events supporting the Butler position--a fact of considerable significance in view of the earlier allegations that Ormond had pursued personal ambitions against the Irish.[3] It is clear that Ormond retained the king's favour and it seems likely that the Irishmen who made complaint to Richard about him were disappointed.

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1 C.O.D., ii, no 245
2 C.C.H., p 154, nos 43, 59
3 See above, pp 109-12, 135-6.

Scrappy though the information about Leinster and Munster has been, it is far fuller than the evidence about events in the rest of the country both during these two years and the next two until the second expedition. None of Scrope's retinue was officially stationed in Louth and it is impossible to discover evidence of military activities there. Even more serious is our ignorance about the situation in Ulster, Connacht and Meath. We have little idea as to how Mortimer used his retinue from April 1395-7, or whether he copied the warding system of Leinster. There are fortunately some dated documents showing his location at particular times. As chancery documents during this period were all issued in the name of Mortimer as lieutenant, even when they concerned Scrope's area of control, and as the chancery was not necessarily in the same place as the lieutenant, the evidence of the dating clauses is not certain proof of Mortimer's location.[1] It is arguable, however, that where we find documents dated in Meath and other areas of Mortimer's authority the lieutenant was likely to have been present, or in that general area. With this evidence it is easier to make some general conjectures about the progress of events.

At the beginning of Mortimer's term of office he was in Leinster, in attendance upon the king, witnessing Irish submissions in Kilkenny on 21 and 25 April.[2] His next moves are unknown, but it is possible that then as later he acted against the Leinster Irish in conjunction with Scrope, and the record that in this year numerous Welshmen were killed by O'Toole may refer to Mortimer's activities at this time.[3] Mortimer may have stayed in Leinster for some time, though letters dated in his name at Dublin on 10 May, 18 June and 8 July are not

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1 Above, pp 202-3

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 63, 113

3 Miscellaneous Irish Annals, p 155; no precise date is given, though Richard's return to England has already been recorded. Scrope's retinue contains some, though not many, Welsh names, whereas Mortimer, with his Marcher estates, had many Welsh men serving in his household. (e.g. Denbigh Accounts, S.C. 6/1184/22-3

conclusive proof of his presence there.[1] He had certainly moved to his own area of responsibility by late autumn and at Rathwire on 8 November witnessed letters patent granting murage and pavage rights to Galway city for 40 years.[2] It is possible that Mortimer was brought to Westmeath at this time by the exploits of the son of Pierce Dalton, who having already engaged in battle with other Daltons then raided and destroyed much of the area.[3] The reception of these representatives from Galway is our earliest hint that Mortimer's practical ambitions extended beyond his claims in Ulster and Trim, for the grant specified that the officials in charge of the subsidy were to render their accounts before the treasurer of the lordship of Connacht, not the exchequer of Ireland. Local accounts were, of course, fairly common, but the grant remains important evidence of some contact between Mortimer and his Connacht interests.[4]

At about the same time--on 4 November--a letter from Richard to O'Neill shows that in Ulster, as in Leinster, the 1395 settlement was being maintained, despite O'Neill's fears that Richard's departure would precipitate an invasion of the province by Mortimer.[5] Although it is not certain that the letter, which survives in what appears to be two draft documents, ever reached O'Neill, it is nevertheless an important record--the sole such letter to an Irish chief to survive--and gives us our only evidence concerning Richard's views on Ulster after the expedition ended.[6] It confirms the impression drawn from

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1 C.C.H., p 154 no 26; P.R.O.I. Ferguson Collections, ii, f 101; 'Calendar of Christ Church Deeds', 20th Report D.K., App. vii.

2 C.P.R. 1401-5, p 86

3 Misc. Annals, p 155, states that Pierce made numerous raids on the Galls 'and he burned Sonnach, including houses and churches and burned a great part of Ormhidhe'.

4 e.g. C.C.H. p 137 nos 215-6; R.C.B.Lib., Graves MS 4, pp 272-4.

5 Above p 95; for the letters see Appendix VII, below, pp 567-70.

6 B.M. Harley MS 3988, ff 39-40d, contains a formulary letter dated 13 October 19 R.II (1395) from Richard to John of Gaunt, enquiring about the behaviour of the people of Ireland towards the Scottish enemy. Gaunt's reply is also given. From the background it seems probable that this correspondence actually dates from 9 R.II (1385), after the brief Scottish campaign and just before the October parliament. (See Tuck, Richard II and the English nobility, pp 97-9, for this background.)

earlier letters of Irish chiefs to Richard--that he wrote to them in terms which showed his understanding of their problems. In this letter O'Neill is addressed as the king's loyal liege and thanked for his recent services since Richard left the country. Richard agrees that O'Neill's visit to England should be deferred until he is more free to go, though his immediate preoccupations are not specified. When these 'impediments' are removed O'Neill is to come as quickly as possible to Richard, so that the matter between himself and the Earl of March might be settled. Richard promises to provide a suitable remedy 'if it touches us in anything'--a clear indication that he still wishes to interpret the quarrel as a private one between O'Neill and his immediate overlord.[1] He orders O'Neill to render the bonnacht and other services to Mortimer, as he had agreed to do in the king's presence at Drogheda, and promises himself to give full justice in deciding upon any matters of controversy between the men.

> Furthermore we have ordered our said cousin to treat you graciously and well, as you can more fully see from the content of our letters, of which we send you a copy included with these presents....

This glimpse of royal policy after the expedition helps to explain Mortimer's restraint--a restraint at least inferred from the absence of any recorded Ulster campaign in 1395. O'Neill clearly had kept the peace. He must have seen that so long as Richard remained closely involved it was in his interests to do so, until a satisfactory agreement could be made with Mortimer. This may well explain the lack of any mention of a retaliatory raid after Donal, son of Henry Avery, made an incursion into the town of O'Neill and carried off O'Neill's wife and other prisoners, taking them to the English.[2] At the same time,

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1 See above, pp 95-7.
2 A.F.M., 1395.

O'Neill's failure to surrender the agreed services to Mortimer meant that matters between himself and the earl were still unsettled. O'Neill may have hoped to use the king's favour to delay such surrender as long as possible. Richard's readiness to send O'Neill a copy of his letter to Mortimer is significant and indicates that clear instructions were given to Mortimer not to upset the peace in Ulster by unreasonable demands upon O'Neill. That the peace was unbroken at the end of the year, despite the tension which prevented O'Neill's absence, must have been a direct result of the knowledge of Richard's wishes and his continuing interest in developments.

Mortimer may have spent Christmas 1395 in his castle at Trim, where he was on 1 January 1396.[1] Sometime that month he came to Dublin, possibly to attend a parliament there.[2] On 26 January he witnessed in the company of Scrope another grant to Galway--giving this time the right to elect a sovereign for the town and to have the liberties that the burgesses of Drogheda had, saving to the lord of the town his rights.[3] Mortimer may have stayed in Dublin for some months. He was certainly at Kilmainham in April when he wrote to the treasurer of England. In this letter he asks Waldby to speak for him in the king's council in various matters about to be brought before it. He makes the point that the course he wants to follow is in the king's interests:

> ...understanding that I do not think to pursue anything which will be against our lord the king nor his profit, but, as I think if the thing be well examined, which will be as much or more for his profit as for mine....(4)

Precisely what Mortimer was referring to here is uncertain. He expresses concern in the letter that the chancellor, the Bishop of Meath, should have his business expedited and be allowed to return

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 428

2 See below, Appendix IX, pp 570-4.

3 C.P.R. 1401-5 p 86; he was in Kilmainham on 20 January. (P.R.O.I. Ferguson Collections, ii, f 178)

4 Anglo-Norman Letters no 15; alternative text in B.M. Royal MS 10 B IX, f 3.

to Ireland, and it is possible that internal difficulties in the lordship--particularly, perhaps, the disturbances between the Butlers and Geraldines--were preoccupying him. The letter makes clear, however, that Mortimer was uncertain about the degree of backing he could expect from the king, and felt some restraints upon his freedom of action.

Whatever may have been the outcome of his plea to England, Mortimer's activities during 1396 were more aggressive than formerly. He ventured once more into the midland area. With a company of 'Galls and Gaels' he attacked the Clann Sheain branch of the O'Farrels, burning their castle at Tuloch, county Longford. In a raid on the O'Reillys he then cut through areas in county Cavan, killing the son of Giolla Iosa O'Reilly, who had submitted to Richard in 1395.[1] These campaigns show him making effective his lordship of Trim. John O'Reilly, as captain of his nation, had already submitted to Mortimer at Kells on 12 December 1394, and the necessity for a raid in 1396 suggests that he was not fulfilling the terms of his submission, although the death of the son of Giolla Iosa, a member of the Clann Mahon branch of the O'Reillys, raises the possibility that the raid concerned internal dissensions within the family.[2] On 28 October Mortimer was at Dundalk and it was possibly after this, towards the end of the year, that he finally moved against O'Neill, first in a surprise raid and then in a full scale assault on Armagh which he took and destroyed. He was accompanied in this invasion by the Earls of Ormond and Kildare, the 'Galls of Ireland and a host of the Gaels'.[3] Following this it

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1 Misc. Annals, p 155; Curtis, Richard II, p 118; above pp 102-3.
2 Above, p 103.
3 Misc. Annals, p 157; O'Donovan's notes in A.F.M., 1396, from the lost Book of Lecan include the note: Idem Mortimerus cum Anglis Lageniae et Momoniae in Ultoniam irrumpit: Ardmachia 4 noctes moratus multa damna intulit, et ab O'Nello recepit.

was reported that the English took sway over Ulster.[1] The death of Magennis's heir at the hands of the English was possibly linked to these events.[2]

It is difficult now to see what prompted the invasion of Armagh a year after Richard's optimistic letter to O'Neill. Possibly the weakness of the O'Neills which made the exhibition such a success for Mortimer was already known and was too tempting to be resisted. Although it seems now that this attack was the logical culmination of Mortimer's attempt to win back his lordship--an attack on Ulster was perhaps inevitable after the penetration of Longford and Cavan the previous year--yet the 'treachery' mentioned in describing his preliminary raid and the ease with which he seems to have achieved his objective suggests that the O'Neills were ill-prepared for such a development and taken by surprise. There seems little doubt that Mortimer was the aggressor in this campaign and, furthermore, that the move was contrary to Richard's expressed policy and made inevitable the collapse of his settlement in Ulster.

To what extent this attack upon Armagh was responsible for the changes which followed in the office of chief governor remains uncertain. The appointment of Edmund Mortimer in January, although his brother was still in Ireland, looks very like a reprimand for Mortimer, as does the suggestion that Thomas Holland be appointed as lieutenant. Roger Mortimer's stay in England from April-August may have been partly intended to exculpate himself from the consequences of his attack on O'Neill. There were, however, other considerations, financial and political, leading Richard to the logical step of reappointing Mortimer in April, and though it seems that Mortimer's action in Ulster had been contrary to royal wishes and must have left a legacy of some

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1 Misc. Annals, p 157 (1396)
2 A.F.M., 1396

bitterness and tension between the earl and the king, it is impossible to prove that any particular event followed as a consequence.[1]

When Mortimer returned in August 1397 as lieutenant of the entire country for the next three years an alteration in defence tactics was inevitable, for the indentured military forces of the lordship were reduced by half.[2] Scrope had returned to England in April, taking presumably with him most of his non-Anglo-Irish retinue.[3] It is likely that from this point the government was increasingly on the defensive. For the rest of the year at least serious trouble was averted, possibly by Mortimer's aggressive tactics in Leinster which anticipated and forestalled any immediate Gaelic resurgence. Scrope's old wards were probably altered considerably, but their location at traditional key points in the province ensured that most of them would survive in some form. In July 1397, for instance, James Cottenham was confirmed in his appointment from the previous 22 April as keeper of the king's castles of Wicklow, Newcastle Mackinegan and Kendleston.[4] We also know that David Estmond was paid 40/- on 10 July 1397 for his custody of Wexford castle for the last year, though Scrope's Wexford ward had been withdrawn in January 1397.[5] Mortimer's success in Leinster is shown in the entry of the annals: 'An attack by the earl on the Leinstermen and he took sway over this side of Leinster'.[6] His authority extended also into Westmeath where he built a castle at Finnea.[7] So far as we know there was no campaign in Ulster this year. Indeed Mortimer had little opportunity after he returned, and seems to have spent

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1 See above, pp 192-3; below, pp 358-9 ff.
2 Above, pp 210-11.
3 E 364/31/D
4 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 187
5 Hore, History of Wexford, v, 125, quoting from Mem. 20 R. II.
6 Misc. Annals, p 161 (1397). The Roscommon/Longford origin of these annals suggests that 'this side of Leinster' may mean the territories of O'Connor Faly and O'Dempsey.
7 ibid.; this was in the barony of Fore.

his time mostly in the south.[1]

His absence from the north can probably be explained by his reduced strength this year, as well as the knowledge in 1397 that it was not wise to risk the king's anger in any way. It is unlikely that he continued to hold sway in Ulster for long with less than half the force of the previous year at his disposal, especially as he was now responsible for the entire country. Possibly his position was maintained in the first part of the year, as his brother Edmund was looking after his interests in Ulster, Connacht and Meath, while Edmund Perrers in the early summer became his deputy in the rest of the country.[2] It is the lack of any activity in the latter half of the year which really indicates his inferior position by this time.

The indenture of 23 November 1397 by which Ormond agreed to serve in Mortimer's retinue when required may be seen as a sign of Mortimer's effort to strengthen his support within Ireland. By this agreement Mortimer granted Dunboyne and Moymet, long in dispute, to William Butler, to descend in turn to the Earl of Ormond. In return, Ormond and William Butler promised to

> make their retinue with the said earl in war and peace for the term of their lives, and swear to be of his council and loyally advise him to their full power, and labour in his company or that of his deputies in the war of Ireland with as many men as they bring with them according as they or either of them can reasonably do, to be equipped by the said earl of March at his reasonable costs. (3)

This concern to increase the numbers of committed followers must have been partly the result of Mortimer's reduced retinue at this time, though

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1 On 9 September he was at Trim. (S.C. 6/1184/23), but was possibly in Dublin by 10 October. (C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 200) On 20 October he was in Connell, county Kildare. (Holmes, Estates of the higher nobility, p 129, where 'Conal' is given as, or in, Connacht) He was again in Trim on 23 November (C.O.D., ii, no 323) but was back again in Dublin in early December, when he welcomed the Catalan pilgrim Count Perelhos. (J.P. Mahaffy, 'Two early tours of Ireland', Hermathena, xviii (1919) pp 4-5.)

2 Above, p 194.

3 C.O.D., ii, no 323; for the background to the claims to Dunboyne and Moymet see ibid., iii, 349-63.

it probably reflects also his position of increasing political insecurity as Richard's ambitions grew in England, and as Mortimer failed to surrender his uncle Thomas to answer charges of treason.[1]

The weakened ability of Mortimer to wield authority within his own lordship was hinted at in two descriptions of Ulster at the close of the year--from Archbishop Colton's visitation of Derry and from the account of a Catalan pilgrim. These, taken together, give the impression that the province's submission was at an end, but that there was no open war or real danger from O'Neill. Colton's visitation took place in October. He was admittedly on good terms with O'Neill, but even so it is unlikely that he would have made this expedition had the lordship been actively engaged in war with the Ulster Irish.[2] The Count de Perelhos visited O'Neill in December 1397. He was warned by Mortimer of the extreme dangers of the journey, in terms which support the theory that Mortimer's authority in the province was minimal. Colton also advised him against crossing O'Neill's land, and the escort he provided turned back when they came to the area of O'Neill supremacy. In speaking of the military customs of the O'Neills Perelhos remarks: '...for a long time they have been fighting with the English and the king of England cannot get the better of them'.[3] It is clear that Mortimer by this time was unable to exact the obedience which his raid of the previous year entitled him to expect. Fortunately for him, the O'Neills were temporarily preoccupied with the ambitions of the sons of Henry Avery, and with the O'Donnells, but the submission of the province to Niall og in 1398 after the O'Donnell threat had been faced was the logical outcome of Mortimer's inactivity

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1 Below, pp 365-6.

2 Acts of Archbishop Colton...in his Visitation of Derry, ed. W. Reeves

3 Mahaffy, 'Two early tours in Ireland'. p 7.

of the preceding year.[1]

It seems to have been in 1398 that the situation in Leinster became really critical as the dilution of strength had its inevitable effect. The 'Galls of Dublin' had for instance to look to their own defence, making a successful attack on 'the Leinstermen'.[2] The reduction of the almost constant involvement of the last four years provoked the natural retaliation, and Mortimer's absence in Meath at the end of 1397 and in England from January to April 1398 provided the opportunity.[3] It was probably during this second visit to England that the forces of the government led by Edmund Mortimer and the Earl of Ormond defeated the O'Byrnes in battle. The 'winning of his chief house' was, according to Marlborough, the occasion of the knighting of Sir Christopher Preston, Sir John Bedlow, Sir Edward Loundres, Sir John Loundres, Sir William Nugent, Walter de la Hyde and Robert Cadell--whose names verify the impression that Mortimer brought supporters from Meath to supplement the forces in Leinster.[4] When Mortimer returned in April he moved south immediately, witnessing a grant on 24 April at Naas.[5] On 13 May, however, he was at Trim, and must have been absent three days later when in Leinster the O'Tooles achieved a considerable victory, slaying forty Englishmen, including John

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1 A.F.M., 1397, 1398; these annals give the impression that the supremacy of O'Neill in 1398 is related to his successes against O'Donnell, who alone does not submit. However, the statement that the English as well as the Irish of the province 'went into the house of O'Neill and gave him hostages and other pledges of submission' suggests such a low ebb in the Mortimer fortunes that the entry may follow the news of Mortimer's death in July 1398. In any case, the absence of any mention of hostilities with the lordship points to a power vaccuum created by withdrawal, not defeat. (See below, p 340)

2 Misc. Annals, p 161 (1398)

3 Above, p 335 n 1; S.C. 6/1184/23

4 Henry Marlborough's Chronicle of Ireland, ii. 1397. Although Marlborough dates this to the preceding year, the mention of Edmund Mortimer as lieutenant in the company of the Earl of Ormond suggests early 1398 when Edmund was Roger's deputy assisted by Ormond.

5 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 81

fitz William, Thomas Talbot and Thomas Comyn.[1] This is in fact the only indication prior to Mortimer's death that the Irish were having any significant success in Leinster, but it is impossible to read into the single entry any general pattern. The crisis brought Mortimer south again, where on 10 June a council at Naas granted him a subsidy.[2] The grant was made 'in maintenance of the war in Leinster, if it should last one quarter of a year longer'.[3] Its collection was, however, left to his successor in office, for on 20 July Mortimer was killed, somewhere in county Carlow.

It is possible that Mortimer's death resulted from a surprise ambush. He is reputed to have been clothed in Irish garb, riding in the Irish fashion and is said in one account to have been without friends or arms, though this conflicts with the information that a number of the English were slain.[4] There is also some doubt as to who was responsible. The Irish annals name O'Byrne and O'Toole, but other accounts suggest a confederation of the main Leinster tribes.[5] Certainly by the time of the second expedition MacMurrough was being held responsible, though this may have been assumed from his supremacy in the province in 1399.[6] There is also some question about the location of the ambush. Marlborough, followed subsequently by Holinshed and others, names 'Kenlis in Leinster'.[7] The Wigmore chronicler gives 'Kenles in Hibernia' and Adam of Usk renders it as 'Kenlesoe in Hibernia'.[8] Thady Dowling states that the incident occurred at Callestown, and

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1 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 180; Henry Marlborough's Chronicle of Ireland, 1398.

2 P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, p 137. from Mem. 1 H.IV m 43 d, refers to the grant made by the clergy of Armagh 'among the English'.

3 N.L.I., MS 761, p 291.

4 Wigmore Chronicle, in Monasticon Anglicanum, ed. W.Dugdale, vi, 354; Annales Ricardi Secundi, p 229; A.Clon.

5 A.Clon., A.F.M.; The Annals of Ireland by Friar John Clyn and Thady Dowling, ed. R.Butler, p 25.

6 Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard, ed. J. Webb, in Archaeologia, xx (1824) p 42.

7 Chronicle of Ireland, p 16; Holinshed's Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland, vi, 259.

8 Wigmore Chronicle, p 354; Adae de Usk, p 19.

his mention of Myshall as one of the two neighbouring parishes fixes the site in county Carlow, probably at Kellistown there.[1]

The other recorded disturbances in the province this year may have followed this event. Glendalough was burned in the summer—retaliation presumably for the O'Toole victory in May.[2] O'Nolan—whose territory occupied the barony of Forth, where Kellistown lay—was killed by the English.[3] While the lieutenant's death was said to be at the hands of the O'Byrnes and O'Tooles, yet his presence in Carlow suggests that south Leinster was now showing unrest, a suspicion strengthened by the slaying of Walter MacDavid Burke by the English of Munster.[4]

It is difficult now to unravel cause and effect from these undated events, but there is no doubt that by the end of 1398 the precarious peace which had grown from Richard's policy was shattered. Not only were the Irish in general rebellion, but the lordship was greatly weakened by the death of Mortimer, the capture of the Earl of Kildare by O'Connor Faly and the death of the Earl of Desmond.[5] The latter was succeeded by his son John—the same who had caused a major breach with Ormond two years before and was subsequently credited with acting in cooperation with MacMurrough against Ormond.[6] It is probable that the state of affairs in Ireland deteriorated rapidly during the next ten months until the second expedition. The locally appointed justiciar—Reginald de Grey—held control for some months until Surrey, appointed before Mortimer's death, arrived in October.[7] We know very little of

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1 Annals of Ireland, p 25; although writing in the sixteenth century Dowling's own position in county Carlow gives weight to his story. (above, 13)

2 A.Conn., A. Clon.; above pp 337-8.

3 A.Conn.; A.Clon.

4 ibid.; MacDavid is named by Dowling as among those responsible for Mortimer's death. (op. cit., p 25)

5 A.Clon., 1398

6 See above, pp 325-7; below, p 509.

7 Above, p 196.

de Grey's activities, apart from the fact that he was granted a subsidy from county Louth as well as a local subsidy in his own area of influence.[1] The Louth subsidy of £40 was granted at a council summoned to Dunboyne on 1 August and then adjourned to Naas on 12 August.[2] Presumably the council was called before Mortimer died and moved south in response to the crisis. In Meath at least justices of the peace were ordered on 2 September to make a general assesment of arms, and to keep the statutes of Winchester and Kilkenny, presumably to ensure a state of readiness in the event of an emergency.[3] De Grey's position as lord of the liberty of Wexford makes it likely that his term of office saw MacMurrough's final breach with the king and reassertion of his former supremacy over the rebellious Irish of Leinster. He was certainly regarded as the greatest enemy by the time of the second expedition, though the fact that the barony of Norragh was not granted away until 16 May 1399 suggests that the recognition of MacMurrough's rebel status was comparatively recent.[4]

Elsewhere too the situation deteriorated. Niall Og, now holding sway over Ulster, seized the opportunity to plunder and expel the English.[5] The chronology of his success is obscure. Mortimer's death probably provoked some reaction in Ulster, but whether this was the submissions recorded in 1398 or the forcible expulsion of 1399 is unknown.[6] Preoccupations with the O'Donnells and the Clann Henry Avery may have delayed militant action, and this possibility makes the sequence of events even more difficult to follow. In any case there is no doubt

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1 N.L.I. MS 761, pp 291-2; Hore, History of Wexford, vi, 208, quoting Mem. 22 R.II, refers to a £20 subsidy from the diocese of Ferns.
2 N.L.I. MS 761, pp 291-2.
3 P.R.O.I.Calendar, iii, p 36, from Mem. 1 H.IV m 18 d.
4 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 572; the grant was made to Surrey, during the life of Art MacMurrough, 'who has forfeited to the king'.
5 A.F.M., 1399
6 See above, p 337 n 1; Curtis, 'The bonnaght of Ulster', Hermathena, xxi (1931), p 104, takes the former view.

that the province was in rebellion by 1399. By the time of Richard's arrival in June 1399 the position was worse in Ulster than it had been in 1395, when the fears aroused by the arrival of an adult earl of Ulster had helped to win the Irish to Richard's side. The attempt in 1398 by supporters of Thomas O'Farrell to supplant his senior kinsman John, who had submitted to Mortimer and was supported by the English of Meath, was perhaps a sign of the shifting power balance after the earl's influence was removed.[1] Little indeed remained of the achievements of Richard's first expedition when he returned in 1399, and it was clear that only successful military action could procure any significant submissions.

It does not seem that Surrey made any great advances during his term in office, although the force he led represented a considerable increase in fighting strength.[2] One of his first recorded actions was the grant of land in south Dublin, 'by the march of the Irish rebels, the O'Tothills', to one Matthew Lappyng, but there are no details to show this to be part of any new incentive in the area.[3] For much of the period it must have been known that Richard intended himself to make an expedition, and Surrey was thus not in a position to pursue an independent policy. It is possible that Surrey on arrival moved north to Meath, where he had been granted custody of the Mortimer estates--we know at least that the Coram Rege rolls show the justiciar's court to have met on 28 October at Drogheda.[4] The events of the winter are obscure and in the spring preparations for the royal expedition dominated events. It was not Surrey's role to launch any major offensive until the king himself would arrive. At Easter time Surrey was recruiting

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1 A.F.M., 1398; see also above, pp 101-2.
2 Above, p 211.
3 C.P.R. 1399-1401, p 188, dated 18 October 1398.
4 P.R.O.I., Delafield MS, p 262.

through his retainers more men in England to add to his already sizable following.[1] The victory won by his forces on the eve of the expedition indicates the success of his arrangements, and points to the hopeful prospects of the second expedition.[2]

This account of the breakdown of peace has concentrated almost exclusively on events in Leinster and Ulster, as these are the only two areas where evidence is available on royal policy and where the situation can be examined in the context of the attempted settlement of 1395. In the rest of the country government influence was so slight that the effects of Richard's visit must have soon evaporated. The expedient of recognizing the authority of local magnates achieved little more than theoretical gains. Thus, for instance, the grant of Roscommon castle to O'Connor Don brought the government no discernible benefits, though it possibly had local repercussions of which we know nothing.[3] The local pattern of intermittent unrest continued apparently uninterrupted, unaffected by royal policy. In 1397, for instance, Henry Marlborough recorded that:

> Sir Thomas Burgh and Sir Walter Bermingham slue sixe hundred Irishmen with their captain MacDowne.(4)

The incident which this referred to apparently concerned a local dispute involving an O'Donnell attempt to install the sons of Cathal Og O'Connor in Sligo, and saw an alignment of Thomas de Burgh and O'Connor Roe against O'Connor Don and William de Burgh.[5] The battle emphasizes the local context of politics in Connacht; during these years there is no sign that O'Connor Don and Thomas de Burgh felt

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1 See account of Richard Seymour in Mem. Roll, E.159/176, Hilary communia, m 12.

2 Below, p 463.

3 Above, p 119.

4 Chronicle of Ireland, p 15.

5 A.Clon., Misc. Annals. Bermingham is not mentioned in any account, but there seems to be no doubt about the incident in question. The 'captain MacDowne' is possibly Tomaltach MacDonnchadha, king of Tirerill, county Sligo, who was killed in this engagement. (Misc. Annals.)

bound, as recipients of royal favour, to bury their differences and be a force for unity or peace in the province. The submissions of the Connacht chiefs had never, so far as we know, even the small degree of success that they enjoyed in Ulster and Leinster.

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Just as the evidence can give only a partial picture of the gradual breakdown of Richard's peace, so it is insufficient for us to see precisely why the collapse occurred. One obvious cause which is worth drawing attention to lies in the diversity of interests at play and the tensions between them. Conflict between royal and individual baronial interests can be seen from the very first days of the lordship but rarely, under an absentee crown, did it become so marked as after Richard's first expedition. The view that strong personal interests were in large measure responsible for the resumption of hostilities is worth considering as an explanation for the events of these years.

The biggest group whose personal interests were affected by royal willingness to conciliate the Irish was the prominent Anglo-Irish lords whose lands were not partly in Gaelic hands. We may perhaps take the Earl of Ormond as an example, though in his rank and diversity of interests he was by no means typical. The way in which Ormond tried already while Richard was in Ireland to exploit the situation to his own advantage has already been described.[1] It is difficult to blame him for attempting to recover those lands originally in his lordship and now taken by the Irish, but the possible repercussions of such actions upon Richard's plans for peace were serious. Although Richard appears to have excused Ormond the aggressions

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1 See above, pp 109-12, 135-6, 327.

of which he was accused, it is likely that tensions with the Gaelic chiefs were not removed. Any further sign of Ormond's personal ambitions—and it is probable that there were many such signs—might be the excuse for renewed hostilities.

In men like Stephen Scrope one sees a different combination of interests working. There was a later tradition that Stephen during these years was excessively harsh and oppressive in his government.[1] Even if this were true, there is no evidence that he was particularly greedy for the spoils of office, and neither this, nor his later period in office—for which the records are better—show any attempt to build up private land interests.[2] William Scrope, his brother, had however been given land in the area of the O'Byrnes—an area showing a particular degree of unrest.[3] It might therefore be assumed that campaigns in the area simply reflect the justiciar's personal interests. In fact the problem is not that straightforward. O'Byrne had recognized Scrope's claims in his area, or said he had, long before Richard left Ireland and complained only of Ormond's aggression.[4] It is possible that O'Byrne did not expect Scrope, an Englishman without possessions in Ireland, to make his grant effective. William Scrope had moreover considerable interests in Louth in result of a grant which gave him all the profits of the county, but so far as we know Stephen did not involve himself personally in this area.[5] It would seem therefore that Stephen's concentration on north Leinster was not just for personal profit, but an official response to a critical situation there. Once involved, he quite possibly took care to further his own family's concerns, but the two visits of Donard O'Byrne to England in 1396

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1 Two Bokes of the History of Ireland by E. Campion, ed. A.F. Vossen, p 103.
2 C.C.R., temp Henry IV, passim.
3 Curtis, Richard II, pp 141-2; above, pp 169,320.
4 Curtis, Richard II, p 141
5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 174; above pp 228-9.

and his grant from the king show that royal involvement was still considerable. Responsibility for policy in Leinster for at least two years after Richard left the country did not rest exclusively on the justiciar, but on the crown, and we may assume that the policy itself reflects on the whole royal priorities, not the justiciar's ambitions.

In Roger Mortimer, Earl of March, one can see yet another 'type' with an important role to play in Anglo-Ireland--the returning absentee.[1] Mortimer's position was to some extent unique, and it is worth digressing briefly to consider his background and personal expectations in this particular aspect. To contemporaries Mortimer was something greater than any other lord, possessing unusual potential from his background in Wales and Ireland and his nearness in line to the throne of England. This is most clearly seen in a praise poem by Iolo Goch, the Welsh bard, containing the following lines concerning Ireland:

> Through confidence from the height of breeding
> Boldly wilt thou conquer Connaught.
> Go over the sea and destroy Meath
> To the furthest part of the unruly country;
> The town of Trim is from thine own father;
> Thine are castles fair of shape.
> This was the fairness of the land of Matholwch,
> Heart of black Ireland.
> Raise thy standard, a beautiful sail,
> Thy progress is irresistible.
> Make an ambush--may 300 be struck down--
> Mighty lord, upon MacMurchadha,
> Cut, rend and strike, straight ahead,
> Yonder to Keleistown through its heart.
> Make haste and claim completely
> The land of Ulster, thou of Elystan's fame.
> That is a dominion(?) filling a false boundary,
> Demand it as thine on the edge of Dundalk,
> After capturing Great Niall, my lord,--
> Ulster dog from a stock of false growth--
> Thou, belfry of fame, wilt kill
> The people of Ulster with every further blow.(2)

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1 See above, pp 88, 148-50.

2 From 'Mawl i Syr Rosier Mortimer', translated by E.I.Rowland, 'Iolo Goch', in Essays in Memory of Angus Matheson, ed. J.Carney and D.Greene, p 124.

It would clearly have been difficult for Mortimer to combine his own ambitions with the restraints imposed upon him in the office of lieutenant. It was generally understood, among Irish as well as Anglo-Irish, that he would seek to make his lordship effective again. His arrival in Ireland was greeted with the remark, 'The Earl of March arrived in Ireland of a purpose to get the rents of the inhabitants of the kingdom'--conveying in a sentence the impression of almost regal authority.[1] Before Richard left Ireland, however, it was clear that Mortimer's titles could not become effective without the reversal of some of Richard's policies--most strikingly in the case of Connacht where the junior de Burghs who had seized the de Burgh lands there, had been received and pardoned.[2] The Mortimer rights were not supposed to be affected by this, but in fact the royal favour shown to these men--both of whom were knighted--meant that Roger's freedom of action in the province was lessened.[3] So far as we know, Mortimer made little attempt to pursue his interests in Connacht, and the implied contradiction between royal and private interests was not realized there. In Ulster, however, although Richard recognized fully Mortimer's rights as mesne lord and wished O'Neill to fulfil all his obligations, he was anxious that Mortimer handle the matter with care and not precipitate trouble by enforcing these rights before O'Neill was prepared to render them freely. The results of this tension were far reaching, both for the peace of the lordship and for the state of Mortimer's relations with the king. We may presume that personal motives again played a role in Mortimer's activities in Leinster, where he held considerable lands, though

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1 A.Clon., 1394

2 Curtis, Richard II, pp 91, 100.

3 The rights of the lordship of Connacht were apparently intact when granted to Stephen Scrope to govern in 1402-3. (C.C.H., p 172 no 25b)

their relation with royal interests is here unknown.[1]

The prime example of the role of personal interests in the breakdown of peace is, of course, Mortimer's unprovoked attack upon Armagh. In this we can see most clearly the dilemma involved. On the one hand, Richard was absolutely right in recognizing the danger military action held for his settlement—within a year of this attack Ulster was again lost. On the other hand, Mortimer's position as lord of Ulster, Trim and Connacht carried with it an obligation to make his lordship effective or ultimately to lose it. Richard's policy in fact demanded too great a sacrifice from the men on whom he depended to implement it, making inevitable a conflict of interest. The collapse of his submission policy was due in large measure to the tensions generated by that policy. It is to his credit that the policy was ever anything more than a paper settlement.

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1 For his claim to lands in Leix, the portion of Eva Marshal, see Orpen, Ireland under the Normans, iv, 32.

Section III -- The second expedition and its English background

Chapter 6

The English background to Richard's involvement in Ireland, 1395-9.

Part i -- Political developments in England and their effects upon the lordship.

The occasional importance of Ireland in an understanding of late fourteenth century political conflict in England has long been accepted, with certain particular incidents--such as Henry Bolingbroke's landing in England while Richard was absent in Ireland--underlining the point.[1] It has even been suggested that the undoubted success which the king enjoyed in Ireland in 1394-5 affected his later career, bringing him back to England 'inspired with an ardent desire to overthrow the compromise of 1389 and to exalt to the full the regality which he had long boasted to be inherent in the kingly office'.[2] Whether or not such opinions are true, there is no question that events in Ireland could exercise their influence across the water. Inevitably the lesson applied also in reverse. The policies of the English crown towards its Irish lordship were usually moulded by the immediate situation, bearing in mind the crown's position in all its dominions. Thus, for example, response to an Anglo-Irish plea for royal intervention came not after the petition was sent in 1385 but in 1394 when the king and English council finally decided the time was appropriate.[3]

The period from 1395 to 1399 saw no major exception to the general rule that Irish needs rarely received priority. Between the expeditions Richard's policies towards his lordship were, as always, determined by the particular circumstances facing the crown in England. A full understanding of the role played by English affairs in the events

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1 e.g. Tuck, 'Anglo-Irish relations', p 15
2 Tout, Chapters, iii, 495
3 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 484-7

which led to Richard's 1399 expedition to Ireland will probably have to wait upon a generally accepted analysis of the crisis in England and in particular of Richard's motives in his final years. One can, however, discern certain general areas in which events in England had crucial repercussions in Ireland. Of most obvious significance were the developments in foreign affairs, the growing hostility of the barons and the king's financial difficulties. One cannot always easily identify the relation of these causes and their effects in Ireland. It is extremely difficult, for example, to understand the average Englishman's attitude towards Ireland during this decade, though there are indications that Richard's policy of close involvement in the lordship became increasingly unpopular. Although the limitations on research in this area are considerable, the evidence helps to widen our understanding of the pressures being exercised upon affairs in the later fourteenth century lordship.

It seems appropriate to begin this examination with a look at England's foreign policy, for it was to considerations of foreign involvement that Ireland's needs so often in the fourteenth century fell victim. Time and again English reaction to the chronic problems of the lordship was determined by its continental commitments, a striking example being the coincidence of the Treaty of Bretigny and the Duke of Clarence's major expedition of 1361.[1] Any prospects of permanent peace or long term truce were therefore of crucial importance for the future of the lordship.

That such a prospect was being envisaged by the late fourteenth century is fairly certain. Naturally enough, the state of war was not thought of as a permanency. When, for instance, the English in 1378 acquired Brest from the Duke of Brittany the terms specified that it be returned in the event of a peace or long truce.[2] In 1389

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1 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 285
2 Foedera, vii, 190-4

the Treaty of Leulingham brought to an end the most intensive twenty years of the war so far. Itself apparently the product of a growing desire for peace on the part of both the main protagonists, it was followed by sustained efforts to find a still more lasting solution.[1] Dr. Palmer, in a recent analysis of English foreign policy under Richard, has shown that Ireland at this period could gain in a very immediate way from continental disengagement. The ransom of de Blois, for instance, which in 1385 signified the end of potential influence in Brittany, was granted to de Vere to enable him to undertake the reconquest of Ireland.[2]

With the first expedition the inter-relation of Irish and continental affairs became even more striking. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that Richard's personal involvement in Ireland, though obviously related to chronic Irish needs, found its immediate origin in his comparative freedom from continental commitments.[3] The policies he developed in 1394-5 were formed in the expectation of continuing peace. His confidence in England's security was demonstrated in his request that business should not be forwarded for his attention in Ireland but be attended to by his representatives in England. The evidence that despite this an urgent embassy was in fact sent to the king in Ireland from France in early April provides some foundation for the suggestion that Richard's precipitate return to England at the end of April was prompted by a diplomatic crisis concerning Richard's second marriage, the French having reacted strongly to the idea of a marriage alliance between England and Aragon.[4] It is clear, however,

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1 See, e.g., J.N.Palmer, England, France and Christendom, 1377-99, pp 1-25 passim; although some of Palmer's premises have been called in question this issue of the desirability of peace seems beyond doubt. (cf M.G.A.Vale, review of England, France and Christendom, in E.H.R. lxxxviii (1973), pp 848-53)

2 Palmer, op.cit., p 63

3 See above, pp 32-3, 36-7.

4 Palmer, 'The background to Richard's marriage to Isabella of France', B.I.H.R., xliv (1971) pp 1-5, 16-17; England, France and Christendom, pp 166-7.

that after meeting Charles VI's envoys in Ireland Richard was prepared to seek a French bride, nearly related to Charles himself. While the important arrangements concerning the final choice of the bride and the details of the policy may indeed have necessitated consultation with his advisors in England, the stable relation with France does not seem to have been seriously endangered by this matter.[1] More ominous for the state of peace at this time was Gascon resistance to the establishment of Lancaster as Duke of Aquitaine. It has been argued that this was the cornerstone of a policy directed towards permanent Anglo-French peace, the failure of which was made inevitable by Gascon intransigence.[2] Whatever may be the truth of these wider issues, the most important consideration from an Anglo-Irish viewpoint was that no real threat of general European war materialized and negotiations for a long-term truce were, in conjunction with the projected French marriage, taken up as soon as Richard returned from Ireland. On 8 July ambassadors were empowered to treat with Charles concerning the truce and the marriage of his young daughter Isabel with Richard.[3]

For Ireland the most immediate implication of these continued peace efforts was that any guaranteed freedom from continental obligations would leave Richard and his resources freer in the future to cope with the problem of the lordship. Supplies of further money and men might reasonably be expected to continue. On the other hand, the immediate desire to secure a long-term truce and to conclude a marriage settlement in the crown's best interests meant that the current deployment of Richard's key advisors in Ireland could not be maintained.

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1 See letter from Richard in Ireland to Charles, Anglo-Norman Letters, no 109.

2 Palmer, England, France and Christendom, passim, esp. pp 152-63.

3 Foedera, vii, 802-5.

While still in Ireland the king accepted this and, in writing to Charles VI, named as possible envoys the Earls of Rutland, Huntingdon and March, the Archbishop of Dublin and the Bishop of Chichester, along with William Scrope.[1] Of these only the Earl of Huntingdon did not have immediate commitments in Ireland, directly concerned with the recent settlements. The others all had responsibilities to varying degrees, the most involved being of course Mortimer and Scrope as joint governors and Chichester as treasurer. In fact, only Mortimer was left in Ireland after Richard and the army withdrew in April 1395. Added to these men in the ensuing embassy to France was Thomas Mowbray, who had, too, enormous responsibilities in Ireland.[2] However concerned Richard may have been about the state of the lordship, his removal of so many key men made clear that the level of involvement of the expeditionary months would not be maintained and that Irish affairs, though they might receive relatively more attention than in earlier decades, would continue to suffer from a demonstrable degree of neglect. There was no possibility that the lordship would continue to receive priority.

Fortunately for Richard's prestige, the settlement he had won in Ireland lasted, at least superficially, until after the truce with France was arranged and his marriage solemnized. Richard's successes in Ireland had undoubtedly added for a time to his international stature, for the English king's inability to control his Irish subjects had been no secret to rulers on the continent. While Richard was still in Ireland Charles VI wrote to him, congratulating him for having won the return to his obedience of a great number of the Irish 'without great battle or spilling of blood'.[3] When Richard went to meet Charles

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1 Anglo-Norman Letters, no 109. The names are not given in full here, but the identification of the initials is clear from later events. See above, p 181.

2 Foedera, vii, 802-3.

3 Anglo-Norman Letters, no 172.

and Isabella at Calais in October 1396 to finalize the proposed twenty-eight year truce and to receive his bride he brought with him a number of Irish chiefs.[1] This visible sign of his achievements in Ireland not only demonstrates how the expedition added to his reputation on the continent but also indicates some continuing effectiveness of the expeditionary settlement. The achievement of his foreign policy did not, it seems, involve any general collapse of control in Ireland, despite the degree to which it preoccupied Richard and his advisors. The domestic crisis which developed in England soon after the visit to Calais was, however, to bear more directly upon the fate of the Irish settlement.

Recent research has done much to unravel the complications of Richard's foreign policy, making it impossible, for instance, for any one simply to maintain that Richard pursued a pro-French policy in line with the general wishes of his father in law.[2] Nor, apparently, did his Imperial ambitions seriously endanger the entente with France.[3] The new studies have not as yet, however, given a convincing analysis of the relationship between Richard's foreign policy and the development of the domestic crisis. It is difficult, for example, to reconcile Dr Palmer's farseeing statesman--'responsible, consistent and hard-headed'[4]--who could manoeuvre his way out of continental confrontations, with the monarch who at home was increasingly losing control of the country he sought to subdue.[5] There apparently was, nevertheless,

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1 See above, pp 323-4.

2 See,e.g., E.Perroy, The Hundred Years War, pp 198-9, for such a view.

3 e.g. B.de Mesquita, 'The foreign policy of Richard II in 1397', E.H.R., lvi (1941) pp 628-37 argues this case.

4 'English foreign policy 1388-99', The Reign of Richard II, ed. du Boulay and Barron, p 107.

5 Palmer follows this line consistently. Of another incident he says: 'Richard is revealed as a ruler who played the diplomatic game with enough zest to over-reach himself, but also with enough balance to accept his losses philosophically in such a situation.'('Marriage to Isabella of France', p 16)

a direct link between Richard's final entente with France in 1396 and the resumption of wide-spread criticism of the government at home. From this point until the final act of deposition lay a series of incidents showing, from hindsight, a steady deterioration in Richard's position vis a vis his subjects.

To a significant degree contemporaries saw a connection between the domestic tension and Richard's foreign policy, though the nature of the relationship was thought to vary enormously. The St Albans chronicles, for instance, tried to explain the arrests in July by reference to Richard's ambitions to be made emperor, saying that his policy of tyrannizing his subjects followed the visit to the court of various German ambassadors in June, and the remarks allegedly made at that time that a king who could not control his own subjects would not be a good choice as emperor.[1] It was believed by some that the lords would be released once Richard demonstrated to the German envoys his ability to quell opposition.[2] In 1399 the same chronicler reported a rumour more directly related to criticism of Richard's evident raprochement with France. He relates that the king was thought to be planning to sell Calais to the French, associating the move with Richard's increasingly oppressive government.[3] Froissart tells a similar story.[4] The fullest and most generally utilized source of information on this topic is not, however, found in an English account but in the Traison et Mort du Roy Richart II, a French narrative account written after Richard's deposition. This account specifically blames the French peace and marriage for the development of a baronial conspiracy, leading

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1 Annales Ricardi Secundi, pp 199-200
2 ibid., pp 202-3
3 ibid., p 236
4 Oeuvres de Froissart, xvi, pp 15-6.

directly to Richard's moves against the ringleaders.[1]

That there was some connection between the peace and the domestic crisis is strongly indicated by the chronology of events. Since Richard had taken up the reins of personal government in 1389 the country had been relatively free from internal strife and the crown had certainly escaped direct criticism. With the arrival of Richard's French bride, however, the former hostility to the court and to its policies recurred. In January 1397, less than four months after Richard's marriage at Calais, Thomas Haxey presented his petition to the king in parliament, criticizing, amongst other things, the extravagance of the royal household.[2] This petition has, whatever its origins, been pinpointed as the starting point of Richard's final crisis with his barons.[3] In the same January parliament the commons refused to subsidize the proposed expedition of the Earls of Nottingham and Rutland to Italy, and in the following month Gloucester and Arundel were both, according to one authority, significantly absent from a meeting of the council.[4] While events suggest that these signs of increasing disaffection were linked with foreign policy, it was the Traison et Mort which popularized the idea of a baronial conspiracy organized by a disappointed war party. The anonymous French writer's version of the alleged plottings of Gloucester, Arundel, Warwick and others became, along with that of Froissart, the main source for other French authorities who accepted his account of the hostility roused in England by Richard's close links with France. That contemporaries found the story readily credible is in itself significant, though the details of

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1 For further details on this chronicle see below, pp 519-20.

2 Rot.Parl., iii, 339

3 For contrasting views, all recognizing the importance of the petition, see Steel, Richard II, pp 224-7; Jones, The royal policy of Richard II, pp 72-3; Tuck, Richard II and the English nobility, pp 182-3.

4 Historia vitae et regni Ricardi II, p 129.

the account cannot be relied upon.

According to the Traison et Mort, the renewed hostility of the king's former critics occurred after the return to England of the Brest garrison.[1] This in fact happened in late June 1397, and it is difficult to believe that any definite conspiracy could have developed in the brief period between this and the arrest of the earls about 10 July.[2] Furthermore, the surrender of Brest, which was held only until a long truce or peace be achieved, must have been recognized as inevitable after the 1396 settlement with France, and in itself was as unlikely to arouse domestic hostility as the comparable surrender of Cherbourg to the king of Navarre had in 1394.[3] It is, however, quite possible that the return of the soldiers from Brest marked the point at which resentment about Richard's general policies became overt. Although the continental garrisons would ultimately return home in the event of peace, the question of their surrender was always an emotive issue. In 1389, for instance, the Appellants had charged the king's advisors with treasonably seeking support against the Appellant council by proposing to sell Calais, Cherbourg and Brest to the French.[4]

For the many dissident Englishmen who were alarmed by Richard's peace policies in 1396 and his marriage to a French child of six, the Duke of Gloucester became an obvious gathering point of opposition to the court. His own views on relations with France are not recorded, but he was certainly no supporter of royal policy in this period.

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1 Traison et Mort, p 1

2 Foedera, vii, 852-3; Jones, Ducal Brittany, pp 138-9, 219; Annales Ricardi Secundi, pp 201-5; see, e.g., Tuck, Richard II, 183-4 for a general criticism of the Traison et Mort story.

3 Foedera, vii, pp 190-4, 201-2, 756; Jones, Ducal Brittany, p 117; Anglo-Norman Letters, no 141.

4 Rot. Parl., iii, pp 232-3, art.s 23, 28-32; p 243, art 16.

He was noticably absent from all the negotiations leading to the peace, in marked contrast to his personal interest in the previous years, and his lack of involvement may well have led him to express strong criticism of the royal policy. Most disturbing must have been the clause in the January 1396 powers to treat for peace, arranging for Richard to request the aid of the French king against any of his subjects and 'against all manner of people who owe him any obedience'.[1] Though this provision was not included in the final treaty its statement at any time cannot have made for confidence between Richard and his subjects. As the negotiations with France had been the main activity occupying Richard since his Irish expedition it seems probable that Gloucester's hostility in 1397 lay in his dislike of the policy, though it is also possible that his position in court had suffered with the elevation of new servants and favourites since the expedition.[2] Froissart, who paints Gloucester as a hot-headed war-mongerer, gives the impression that the duke was disliked and feared by many of the king's companions.[3]

Gloucester's movements in these critical months deserve particular attention, for he was singled out by many contemporaries as leader of the opposition to Richard's policies in 1397. Not only was his February absence from council judged to be a significant measure of his disaffection,[4] but most of the French chronicles agree that he disapproved of Richard's peace efforts and, particularly, the restoration of Brest and Cherbourg.[5] One of the fullest accounts comes from Froissart.[6] He too credits Gloucester with being the mastermind

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1 Foedera, vii, 911
2 Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy, p 94; Tuck, Richard II, pp 180-1.
3 Oeuvres de Froissart, xvi, pp 1-5.
4 Above, p 354 note 4.
5 e.g. Chronigraphia regnum Francorum, iii, 143.
6 Oeuvres de Froissart, xvi, pp 1-24 passim.

attempting to organize latent animosities into full opposition and, though the details of his narrative are in parts clearly inaccurate, it contains several interesting suggestions. He tells us how Gloucester at Pleshy received various knights, sounding out their political sympathies. At this point we can see the incipient crisis beginning to bear directly upon affairs in Ireland, for one of those approached by the duke was Roger Mortimer, whom Froissart mistakenly calls 'John', the Earl of March. Gloucester, says Froissart was prepared to replace Richard as king by Mortimer, but the latter was not enthusiastic:

> The earl of March was very taken aback when he heard his uncle suggest such a course, but, though young, he dissembled, and replied wisely, saying, to satisfy his uncle and get away from there, that the matter was so great that he would seek advice. The Duke of Gloucester, when he saw his nephew's attitude, asked him to keep the matter secret, and he said that he would. And the earl left his uncle as soon as he could, and went to his inheritance in the Irish march, and after that would not listen either by letter or treaty, to what his uncle proposed, excusing himself well and wisely....(1)

Although in the detail of this episode, such as the suggestion that Mortimer was viewed as a possible replacement for Richard, Froissart's authority may be suspect, there seems little reason to doubt the gist of the report that Mortimer was approached by Gloucester but refused to commit himself. The story is in itself perfectly credible and there seems no obvious reason for Froissart to have made it up. We know that Mortimer was in England from sometime in April until August,[2] and it is likely that the discontented Gloucester sought to discover his opinion soon after his arrival from Ireland. Even if Froissart merely repeats a rumour of uncertain foundation, the story reveals the delicacy of Mortimer's political position. He must certainly have been made aware of the rising tension when he came into England and his actions during this period must be understood against this political background.

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1 Oeuvres de Froissart, xvi, pp 7-8.

2 S.C. 6/1184/22 refers to preparations made in the Denbigh lordship for his arrival and supplies left after his departure.

That the situation had significant implications for Irish affairs is obvious.

One problem this raises lies in deciding whether the reappointment of Mortimer as lieutenant in April was connected with events in England. Though, as we have seen, Edmund Mortimer was named as lieutenant in January 1397 until midsummer, payments continued to be made to Roger as lieutenant of Ulster, Munster and Connacht, and his later account showed that he retained responsibility as governor throughout the period.[1] The suggestion that Thomas Holland replace Mortimer in Ireland was apparently abandoned by the middle of March when Mortimer was referred to as 'lieutenant of Ireland for seven years'.[2] It is therefore almost certain that by the time of Mortimer's arrival in April the decision to retain him in office with a new indenture had already been taken. The developing baronial unrest in England--of which Mortimer can have known little more than vague rumour--may in fact have been of little significance in persuading him to return to Ireland for a further prolonged period. On the other hand, awareness of growing dissent possibly influenced Richard in his desire to keep the favourite Holland at hand during the critical months ahead. The overtures which Froissart claims Gloucester made to Mortimer must have come after April and their bearing upon affairs in Ireland was probably limited to the timing of Mortimer's return to his responsibilities in the lordship. The possibility that Mortimer was concerned for his own position in England fully explains why he lingered there and upon his Welsh lands until August, despite the fact that orders for his shipping went out on

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 62; E 364/33/A

2 E 403/555 (25 May) and E 101/327/14; for further detail see above, pp 193-4.

12 May and that he had already been given money to cover his return passage.[1] On 27 May he was in Dartford, Kent, and on 1 June back at London.[2] On 10 June a writ of aid in favour of Edward Perrers, enabling him to act in Roger's absence, was directed to all the king's subjects in Munster and Leinster, from which we may presume that Roger's intention to prolong his stay in England met with the king's approval.[3] We know that he left for Ireland from Denbigh sometime in August, but the delay throughout July is not explained. There probably was at least some connection with the domestic crisis in England, which came to a climax on 8 July when Warwick was suddenly arrested.[4] Gloucester and Arundel were then seized 'for great number of misprisions and oppressions by them committed against the king and people', Richard promising that details of their faults would be declared at the next meeting of parliament.[5]

Richard's precise motives for taking this extreme action have never been clear, for the subsequent charges in parliament provided none of the promised explanations. The evidence suggests that Richard, growing uneasy because of the rumoured opposition to his recent actions, sought to out-manoeuver his opponents by removing the men who had in the past been most vocal in their criticism. Whether or not a plot ever existed, the events of July certainly show Richard holding the initiative. Continuing receipts of favours--Gloucester, for instance, was granted livery of the Stafford lands in his wardship in Ireland as recently as 29 June[6]--lulled

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 118; E 404/14/96 part ii, no 130.
2 S.C. 6/1184/22
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 147.
4 Annales Ricardi Secundi, pp 201-5.
5 C.C.R. 1396-9 pp 147-8, 208.
6 ibid., p 138.

the suspicions of the lords, who apparently were completely taken by surprise when Richard ordered their arrest.[1]

Further light is thrown on these events when the arrests are related to the 6 July summons of Thomas Mortimer, Roger's uncle, to come from Ireland to the king.[2] Thomas Mortimer's principal association with Richard's opponents dated from his participation in the Radcot Bridge campaign against de Vere in 1387, though he had since then served as a retainer of the Duke of Gloucester.[3] Although Richard himself in these early stages hastened to assure the country--alarmed that he was seeking vengeance for the events of a decade past--that retainers of the appealled men and others of their company with them 'in recent assemblies and ridings within the realm' need not fear recriminatory action,[4] the summons of Thomas was obviously linked to the July arrests and proved that behaviour during the 1386-8 crisis was to be the basis of judging political reliability in 1397. The sending of the writ to Thomas before the crisis actually broke in England in fact suggests a well-timed coup by the king against his former opponents,[5] and makes even more remote the possibility that any plot against the king existed, for Gloucester's mutterings were unlikely to have involved Thomas Mortimer in Ireland in any current conspiracy. That in his present situation Thomas was suspected of being a potential danger to the king is difficult to explain, but a possible solution may lie in his close relationship

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1 Annales Ricardi Secundi, pp 201-5.
2 E 403/555 (6 July)
3 Rot. Parl.,iii, 376-7, art.s 5-7: see above, p 35.
4 C.C.R. 1396-9, p 208
5 The writ, which does not survive, is probably that brought by Edward Dee under the great seal. (Rot.Parl.,iii, 380 art.9;below,p366.)

to the Earl of March. Roger had remained free, so far as we know, of all involvements with the king's domestic critics. He was at the same time an enormously important and popular figure, the king's heir presumptive[1] and allied by marriage, blood and rank to those who were increasingly hostile to Richard. The attack on Thomas Mortimer may in part have been designed to serve also as a lesson to Roger, warning him of the penalty for incurring the king's wrath.

Roger Mortimer's reactions to the developments of early July are not recorded. He may not even have been aware for some time of the writ sent to Ireland summoning his uncle. On 12 June he had secured for a fee of 100/- a licence to grant to Thomas a manor in Essex which he himself held in chief.[2] That Thomas found a safe refuge in Ireland even after Roger returned there is probably proof in itself of his nephew's support, but Roger's prime concern during July as he lingered on his Welsh lordship must have been the likelihood of his own escape from Richard's suspicions. To await developments in his Welsh stronghold was a natural move. The king's govenment in England may have been unaware of the length of Mortimer's delay in returning to Ireland. On 9 August a criour was paid to deliver two writs under the great seal to the earl of March and the Bishop of Meath, the chancellor, possibly in an effort to prevent Thomas Mortimer evading his July summons.[3] Mortimer's departure from Denbigh in August shows at least that Richard did not directly include Roger among those of suspect loyalty. He was, it seems, one of the very few magnates of his class not to be involved on either side in the 1397 counter-appeal, and, as he had been in England during the critical

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1 e.g. Kirby, Henry IV, p 52; cf criticism of Tuck, Richard II, pp 205-6, who argues that Gaunt was the more natural successor.

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 153

3 E 403/555 (9August)

months, his neutrality was probably, as Froissart suggests, due to his own deliberate caution. It was no mean achievement. The future remained, however, uncertain. The events of July-August left people ignorant of the crown's real motives in confronting its most powerful critics, and Mortimer, on returning to look after the deteriorating situation in Ireland, was undoubtedly less free than at any time before to devote all his interests or energies to the crisis facing Richard's policy in the lordship.

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that these developments in England coincided with a major upheaval in the Irish administration, featuring petitions to the council in England and a general breakdown of control in the lordship.[1] There is no evidence that in their origins the sub-treasurer Melton's difficulties were in any way concerned with the crown's problems in England, except perhaps in that Richard's absorption in the French negotiations in late 1396 and the domestic opposition from early 1397 may have limited his freedom to deal with complaints from Ireland. In the English background, however, lies the answer to at least some of the mystery surrounding the solution of this problem, for the compromise by which Melton's difficulties were resolved was partly a result of the domestic pressures on Richard in the late summer of 1397. The evidence, moreover, casts further light on Mortimer's relations with the king. Mortimer's own close association with the Bishop of Meath and the Anglo-Irish magates may have personally implicated him in some of Melton's complaints. It is at least certain that the grievances of Melton and his charges against the government must have been extremely awkward for Mortimer to counter at this particular juncture. As the dismissal of the Bishop of Meath at least partly vindicated the

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1 See above, esp. pp 259-64.

sub-treasurer, it is probable that Mortimer himself was not considered entirely blameless but was allowed to return to Ireland in a spirit of expediency. The decision effectively neutralized Mortimer, and ensured that the involvement in the Irish lordship which had isolated him from Richard's domestic opponents would continue. After his departure Richard continued to delay action on Melton's case until in October he finally resolved the issue by a simple compromise solution. In understanding this the timing of the decision to restore Melton to office in Ireland is significant. Melton's petition for certain specific protections was granted on 16 October, just a fortnight after the adjournment on 29 September of the crucial parliament at Westminster, which heard of the fate of Gloucester and decided that of Warwick and Arundel.[1] The decision on Melton's position was probably made early in October, as soon as the pressing issues of the parliament were dealt with. The same spirit of compromise can be seen when on 15 October the Bishop of Meath was removed, only to be replaced by a nominal chancellor who acted through Robert Sutton, an associate of Meath's.[2] Furthermore, none of the people suggested for Irish office in a contemporary document concerning reform was in fact appointed. Melton's accusations against James Cottenham were not followed up, as Cottenham continued for months to occupy a position of high favour. The indications in fact all support the interpretation that Richard, in postponing a decision on Melton's position from May to October 1397 and in attempting then to avoid a confrontation between the elements which a full investigation of the charges would involve, was glossing over the problem in a way

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1 C 49/47/33
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 218, 246.

which can best be explained by reference to his domestic ambitions in 1397.[1]

It is impossible either to distinguish a clear policy in the handling of Melton's complaint or to ascertain how he worked out his compromise back in Ireland, for the situation he returned to was dominated by new issues--the question of Thomas Mortimer and the possibility of another royal visit. Thomas's failure to appear in England undoubtedly gave Richard some anxiety and good cause to suspect the loyalties of his lieutenant the Earl of March. We have seen how in July Thomas Mortimer himself was summoned.[2] In August instructions about an undisclosed task were sent to both Mortimer and the Bishop of Meath, and though their contents are unknown it is possible that the writs enrolled in the close rolls on 4 September were either the August instructions themselves or a repetition of them.[3] Mortimer here was told on pain of forfeiture to arrest his uncle Thomas and to send him to England and the chancellor was ordered to give Mortimer the same command under the Irish great seal. On 24 September Roger Mortimer was required upon pain of forfeiture of life and limb to send Thomas to England within three months, to see that he received no aid or counsel if he did not come to England, and to take custody of all his adherents.[4] This order referred to the 'treasons against the king's estate' of which Thomas Mortimer had lately been appealled in parliament and impeached by the commons. The appeal in question, in the September parliament, had specifically accused Thomas Mortimer of riding in 1387 with Gloucester and Arundel against

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1 That no investigation or disciplinary action was made remains an hypothesis, but it seems certain that notices concerning any such enquiry would have survived, at least on the English memoranda rolls.

2 E 403/555 (6 July)

3 ibid. (9 August); C.C.R. 1396-9 pp 161, 244

4 ibid., p 227

the king's friends and with being generally implicated in the treasonous activities of that year.[1] It was testified in that parliament that Edward Dee, the king's sergeant, had been sent to Ireland to summon Thomas long before the present parliament but that Thomas, on receiving word of the summons, withdrew 'among the Irish rebels' and that neither the sergeant himself nor any Irish minister dared to go to him there. In his absence the appeal asked that Thomas be convicted and his lands declared forfeit, but the king ordered that he should have three months to present himself on pain of being judged a traitor and forfeiting all his possessions.[2] Roger Mortimer was himself ordered on 15 October, soon after the parliament ended, to come to the forthcoming session of parliament, adjourned to meet at Shrewsbury on 27 January.[3] His failure to deliver Thomas had probably aroused in Richard some suspicion of his lieutenant, making it all the more important that Mortimer should be seen to give public support to the recent events. His summons to parliament expressed clearly the king's wish that he should make no excuse which might in any way delay or defer the king's business.[4]

In view of the attention given to Thomas Mortimer's position, the evidence concerning his fate deserves some examination. He may well have been in Ireland when the summonses began to arrive--we know at least that he was there on 20 March 1397.[5] Though he possibly found refuge for some time among the Gaelic Irish, his chances of being able to remain in the country indefinitely were slim. The Miscellaneous Irish Annals, the only native source which mentions the

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1 Rot.Parl., iii, 376-7, art.s 5-7
2 ibid., p 380, art. 9; p 352 art. 19
3 Report...touching the Dignity of a Peer, iii, 761.
4 C.C.R. 1396-9 p 222
5 P.R.O.I., Calendar, iii, p 145, from Mem. 1 H.IV, f 46 f.

troubles in England at any length, claim that Thomas Mortimer was banished by the king to Scotland. The story would appear to have been written in the knowledge of subsequent events, for it follows the garbled entry that in 1397 'the Duke of Lancaster was ruined by the King of England, i.e. his own father's brother, to avenge the murder he had committed at the instigation of the king when he ruined the Archbishop and others'.[1] The suggestion that he went to Scotland may indeed be true. An entry of May 1399 in the patent rolls, granting safe conduct at the request of the Duke of Rothesay to two yeomen who had been living lately with Thomas Mortimer, knight, deceased, closes the incident for us.[2]

That Richard did not entirely trust the Earl of March to co-operate with him is certainly implied by his orders of 26 October. Two writs to Mortimer were enrolled on that day. The king seems to have thought it possible that Mortimer may have already prepared his departure, and therefore took the added precaution of addressing the writs either to Mortimer or his representative, Mortimer having been directed to appoint a deputy for whose actions he would be prepared to answer. Both the writs of 26 October were ostensibly necessitated by the king's imminent expedition to Ireland. One ordered Mortimer:

> not to charge or compel the king's officers save only the justices of the bench to pass out of the city of Dublin to any parts of Ireland before the king's coming or until further order, as for the good and sure ruling of Ireland the king has made disposition to shortly come hither in person, and his will is that the keeper of the great seal of Ireland, the representative of the treasurer or other officers there, save the said justices, depart not out of the said city before his coming and be not charged to do so. (3)

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1 Misc. Annals, p 161
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 575
3 C.C.R. 1396-9 p 157

The other writ concerned the granting of pardons:

> Strict order to make or grant no remissions or pardons for treasons or other high crime nor order charter thereof to be made under the great seal; as...the king has made disposition shortly to come to Ireland in person, willing for particular causes that before his coming or until further orders no such pardons be made or granted to any persons thereof, English or Irish, but that the same be to him wholly reserved. The king has charged Robert de Sutton, his clerk, keeper of the said seal, to cause or suffer no charters or pardon to be sealed in the king's absence as long as he shall have the keeping thereof.(1)

The order concerning the free movement of the king's officers may reflect royal awareness of the recent charges of maladministration. On the same day, 26 October, was also recorded Melton's special protection, providing for a stay in any action against him before any justices in Ireland until the king himself arrived.[2] It is indeed possible that the three orders simply reveal Richard finally coming to grips with the problems of the Irish administration by limiting its action until he could arrive in person. As he had not, however, made other obvious preparations for such an expedition this virtual standstill of government more probably originated in Richard's concern for his own security while Thomas Mortimer remained at large. The removal of Meath from the chancery is similarly of undoubted significance in considering the outcome of Melton's complaints, but his replacement and the specific order to his successor not to seal any charter of pardon must also be seen in terms of Richard's fear that an appealled traitor was at large in Ireland undisturbed by the lieutenant his uncle who had, until 26 October, the power to grant him a pardon in that country.[3]

This background to the projected expedition of 1397 illustrates very clearly the importance for Anglo-Irish history of establishing

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1 C.C.R. 1396-9 p 154
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 248; above, p 265
3 C 66/346 m 26

the English context. Only thus can one put into perspective Richard's genuine interest in Ireland. It is not difficult to understand the necessity for further attention to the lordship's problems, in view of the continuing deterioration of the crown's position in Ireland, with the 1394-5 settlement in virtual collapse. This breakdown was apparently clear to Richard from earlier in the year, and his desire to make another royal expedition had long been known. Richard's letter to the Earl of Desmond, dating from mid-1396, clearly stated his determination to come once more to Ireland in the event of a general collapse.[1] According to Froissart, the Duke of Gloucester, prior to Richard's final settlement with France, commented upon a rumour that Richard would use the men released from continental involvement in a reconquest of Ireland. Gloucester did not think much of their prospects and complained that,

> Ireland is not a land for conquest or profit. The Irish are a poor and an evil people and have a very poor and uninhabitable land, and what is conquered in one year is lost in another. (2)

There was, furthermore, a belief that the parliament of September 1397 met in the knowledge of a second Irish venture, and that the new titles bestowed on certain men at that time were designed to ensure their loyalty in anticipation of Richard's absence.[3] Thus, while it is true that Ireland was apparently relegated down the scale of priorities during the crucial summer months of 1397, as the whole axis of power shifted in England, it rapidly resumed importance in Richard's eyes as the climax of the English crisis passed. It is unlikely that any other monarch but Richard II would have turned close attention to Ireland again in October, revealing plans for an

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1 B.M.Add. MS 24062, pp 122, 106; above, pp 324-5.
2 Oeuvres de Froissart, xvi, p 5.
3 Chronique du religieux de St. Denys, ii, 670-1.

expedition there despite the fact that parliament was due to meet again in the new year. On the face of it such a plan seems unwise. Richard, however, knew nothing in October of the confrontation between Bolingbroke and the Earl of Nottingham which was to occur in December, nor of the major crisis which ensued and was only partially solved by the banishment of both parties in September 1398.[1] Whatever the truth of the plots and rumours suggested at the time, there is no doubt that the quarrel between the earls revealed something of contemporaries' reaction to Richard's late successes against his enemies, showing in particular a fear of the king's possible future ambitions. Richard, however, in ignorance of the divisions among his own recent supporters, may well have felt in October that he would be free for another Irish enterprise after a brief session of parliament in late January. It seems certain that, though the announcement of his intention in October 1397 was precipitated by events related to the political developments in England, and, specifically, to the question of Thomas Mortimer, he was definitely resolved by this point to return as soon as possible to the Irish lordship.

Apart from the three mentions, on 26 October, of a forthcoming, expedition, we are almost without any information on the subject. The expedition was clearly not so imminent as was claimed, or some evidence of preparations would have survived. From one single indenture of 27 December the serious intent of the expedition is proved, though its timing was still uncertain. The indenture in question describes how Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester and seneschal of the king's household, agreed to serve for six months 'because of the voyage which the king our lord will make to his land of Ireland'. Percy was to

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1 Rot.Parl., iii, 360, art. 53; pp 382-4, art. 11; for a critical account see, e.g., Tuck, Richard II, pp 207-9.

bring with him forty men at arms and one hundred mounted archers. No date for departure was given, but he was to be ready to sail six weeks after this notice, and the second half of his first quarter's pay was to fall due before he sailed, with shipping paid for by the king. Provision was made for the repayment of all money obtained, should the indenture be countermanded before Percy departed. Both halves of the indenture survive in the records, indicating that it was indeed cancelled.[1] Percy certainly did not go to Ireland before 1399.

The contents of this indenture are very similar to those surviving from other expeditions--even the clause arranging for repayment of money in the event of a cancellation was not uncommon. More unusual, however, was the lack of a precise date for the expedition's departure and this inability to specify when Percy ought to be ready indicates that by 27 December Richard was not certain when he would be free to leave England. It seems probable that until the parliament of late January was over no major enterprise could be embarked upon, and the likelihood is that Richard was becoming increasingly aware of the unrest in the country and among his own followers following the September counter-appeal. The treasonous conversation which allegedly took place between Nottingham and Bolingbroke occurred just after this indenture was made. In the event, the quarrel between the two earls dominated the parliament at Shrewsbury and put paid to Richard's immediate plans for an Irish venture.

The Shrewsbury parliament, which opened on 27 January, was, like the September one in Westminster, overawed by the presence of Richard's Cheshire guards, amounting to a private army wearing the king's livery.[2]

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1 E 101/69/296; the king's half is ibid., no 297.

2 Davies, 'The principality of Chester', in Reign of Richard II, ed. du Boulay and Barron, pp 268-9; Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp 11,23,154,169.

Ignorant though we are of many elements in the development of Richard's tyranny, there can be no doubt that this flaunting of his military strength revealed his increasing mistrust of England's political community. It is particularly significant therefore to see that Mortimer on his arrival at Shrewsbury was acclaimed as a popular hero, one fit to deliver the people from Richard's excesses. While Adam of Usk was a partisan figure, and very probably embroidered the facts to some extent, the general outline of his account is sufficiently credible to merit serious consideration.[1] Of the events at Shrewsbury he gives the following description:

> To this parliament was summoned and came that noble knight the Earl of March...a youth of exceeding uprightness, who had no part nor share in such designs and wanton deeds of the king. Him the people received with joy and delight, going forth to meet him to the number of 20,000, clad in hoods of his colours red and white, and hoping through him for deliverance from the grievious evil of such a king. But he bore himself wisely and with prudence: for the king and others who were only half-friends, envying his virtue, laid snares for him, seeking occasions to complain against him. But he, as though he cared not for the turmoil among the people, feigned in the king's presence, pretending that his deeds were pleasing to him, although...they displeased him much. Yet the king mistrusted, and being ever evil-minded against him, for the others dared it not, thought with his own hands to slay him. And, with others thereto sworn, the king did ever seek occasion to destroy him, excusing his evil purpose in that the earl had received in Ireland, some while after his banishment, Sir Thomas Mortimer, a bold knight, his uncle, who had been banished by them, and whom they sorely feared, and had also before his departure furnished him with money. And so, in secret among themselves, they doomed the earl, striving to find a time to destroy him, and boasting that they would share his lands amongst them. (2)

As the account moves straight from this point to the story of Mortimer's replacement in the summer by the Duke of Surrey, who, says Usk, 'hated him bitterly', it is difficult to see how much resentment was

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1 Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp xi-xiv, showing Adam's connection with the Mortimer family and with the Arundels, notable opponents of Richard's.

2 ibid., pp 18-9, 164-5.

actually shown to Mortimer at the parliament and how much was the product of later events. Mortimer certainly seems to have complied with the king's wishes and approved the recent events by taking an oath to uphold the deeds of the Westminster parliament, including the sentence against his uncle.[1] One can only guess at the excuses he must have given the king for his failure to bring Thomas from Ireland. He was possibly able to persuade Richard that Thomas had indeed gone to Scotland. The reference to his enemies who were said to be plotting to get his lands is obscure: it probably refers to the Earl of Salisbury's efforts to secure Denbigh about this time.[2] On the whole, however, the evidence concurs with Usk's view that Mortimer concealed his feelings about recent events and gave his public support to Richard. The similarity between this account and Froissart's story about Mortimer's desire to remain uninvolved in any plots is striking, and shows an interesting streak of caution in Mortimer's character which is not made apparent by his exploits in Ireland.

That Mortimer in January suffered no personal attack and took no stand himself in opposition to the crown is clear from his appointment to the commission which was intended to carry out certain tasks after parliament was dissolved.[3] Although the powers of the commission were later illegally extended, apparently to enable Richard to overcome the problem Bolingbroke presented after his father, the Duke of Lancaster, died in March 1399, there was no evidence in the commission's early life that it might be used to infringe the liberties of the people by rendering parliament superfluous.[4] At the same time, the

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1 Rot. Parl., iii, 357, art.46

2 ibid., p 352,art.25. The king ordered that a writ of scire facias be executed. See also Adae de Usk, pp 17, 162.

3 Rot.Parl.,iii,368, art.74.

4 e.g. Tout, Chapters, iv, 35-41; J.G.Edwards, 'The parliamentary committee of 1398', E.H.R.,xl (1925), pp 321-33, passim.

Shrewsbury parliament made quite evident that the crisis concerning the appealled lords was not yet over, and the insecurity which had begun to dominate relations between Richard and his subjects was clearly demonstrated. At Westminster, Richard had promised a general pardon to all but fifty individuals and other exceptions not yet specified.[1] Now, at Shrewsbury, he approved this pardon only after parliament made him a customs grant for life instead of a fixed period and granted him three half subsidies.[2] At the very least, this suggested royal ambitions to limit parliament's future role.

To some extent this feeling of insecurity was not accidental. Richard must have realized that he consciously fostered it when he refused to divulge, at Westminster in September, the names of those who were to be excepted from any pardon.[3] A request at Shrewsbury that a full general pardon be granted met with the response that Richard wished first to see what the community would do for him.[4] After the subsidy grant he confirmed the promised amnesty, but insisted that those benefitting must individually sue for it. Any one who had ridden with the appealled lords in 1387 was required to procure an individual pardon by 24 June, but there was no guarantee that men admitting involvement with the 1388 appellants would be any safer as a result.[5] As the 24 June date was extended to Michaelmas, so the pressures to sue for pardon mounted. In February 1399 a reference to an extension of the general pardon revealed that it was not itself a permanent grant.[6] There is no doubt that Richard himself always reacted strongly

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1 Rot.Parl.,iii, 347.
2 ibid., 368-9, art.s 75-7
3 ibid., p 347: 369, art. 77
4 ibid., p 359, art. 49
5 ibid., p 369 art. 77; for the background and development of these events see C.Barron, 'The tyranny of Richard II',B.I.H.R., xli, (1968), passim.
6 C.C.R., 1396-9 p 438

to any suggestion of opposition or hostility, but his extreme sensitivity on the point from 1397 shows a complete breakdown in the mutual confidence of king and community. His apparent belief that obedience could be won by fear was a gross miscalculation, and arising, as it seems to have done, from his own deep felt insecurity it seriously calls into question his ability to make realistic political judgements in these last years.

Although the deterioration of Richard's position in the country was a gradual process, the signs of future developments were all clearly evident by the time of the parliament at Shrewsbury in January 1398. The extent of Richard's vindictiveness towards those who had stood against him ten years earlier was still uncertain, but there was now no question of those events being forgiven and forgotten. At the same time, Richard's dependence on his strong support from the Cheshire archers and his use of them as a private army to overawe opposition was already arousing hostility. Furthermore, the redistribution of the inheritance of the appealled lords gave anyone thinking of criticising the king good cause to fear for his possessions if not his life.[1] That Mortimer in these circumstances, however much he was looked to as a popular leader, declined to stand in opposition in parliament to the king is not therefore surprising. When opposition became tantamount to treason, the type of action which had characterized, for instance, the Good Parliament of 1376 was no longer feasible.

It is against this background that we must consider Mortimer's stay in England until April when his appointment was confirmed for another two years.[2] It is logical to assume that his delayed return to Ireland after parliament ended was to some extent associated with

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1 See,e.g., Goodman, Loyal conspiracy, p 71.
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 336

the political tension in England. Mortimer, while not in disgrace, was certainly not in high favour. It was extremely difficult for any prominent knight to remain neutral in the circumstances of 1397 and Mortimer's position was vulnerable. His lack of any receipt of favours--such as the counter-appellants were given--and his inability to secure even a single payment of his stipend during the three months he spent in England[1] both support the idea that while remaining free of involvement with the 'traitors' he did not become associated with the select group of Richard's closest advisors. A possible explanation of his activity in these months might be that he was trying to stabilize his position with the king, and specifically to secure his continued office in Ireland. One must of course beware of exaggerating the importance of Ireland for Mortimer's ambitions, but, bearing in mind Richard's own personal interest in the lordship, this interpretation does not seem to stretch the evidence too far. Furthermore, given the state of political tension in England, where associations with fellow magnates offered no security against the king, Mortimer's removal from the centre of the action would possibly make him less vulnerable to future attacks. He was at least less likely if absent in Ireland to be implicated in future alleged conspiracies. There certainly seems little doubt that Mortimer consciously desired to return to Ireland. His 1397 indenture had provided for his free release from the office in the event of non-payment of his stipend, and as this was well in arrears, and was to remain so, Mortimer could presumably have obtained his release from the lieutenancy. The repetition of his appointment in April 1398 is itself significant. As the original appointment of April 1397 had been effective for three years

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1 E 364/33/D; see above, p 195.

there was no obvious necessity for a new patent. The 1398 appointment repeats exactly the words of the previous year,[1] and with its reference simply to 'an indenture made with the king' there is no way of knowing for certain whether the terms on which Mortimer held office were bound by the same indenture as in the previous year. They probably were, but the repetition of the appointment, and Mortimer's return to Ireland as soon as the new appointment was confirmed, suggests that there may have been uncertainty and possibly even renewed bargaining over the issue.

These upheavals in the centre of political power in England inevitably affected Ireland. The impression of continuity in policy which Mortimer's return in office gives is misleading, for developments in England had considerably distracted his attention over the last year from affairs in Ireland. In the months that followed his position remained somewhat precarious, and the decision to replace him in July 1397 by Thomas Holland may have been no great surprise to him, had he been alive to hear of it. Richard may indeed have felt jealousy of his cousin's enthusiastic reception at Shrewsbury, but Mortimer's dismissal did not rest on this basis alone. It had its root in Mortimer's past handling of Richard's Irish settlement, in Richard's indenture with Thomas Holland of early 1397 which circumstances had forced him to cancel, and above all in the recent polarization of political figures in England which had marked Thomas Holland clearly as one of those in favour while leaving Mortimer isolated and hovering on the brink of disfavour. Richard in his last years gave no potential critic the benefit of the doubt, viewing all opposition with fearful suspicion. It is possible that he actually judged Mortimer to be responsible for the failure of his policy in Ireland, and preferred

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1 C 66/349 m 21; cf C 66/346 m 26.

to trust the lieutenancy to one of his own favourites in the important period of preparation for the royal expedition. However understandable it may thus appear, Mortimer's dismissal cannot have been lightly made and its significance should not be underestimated. His return to Ireland in April 1398 had demonstrated the king's unwillingness to make an enemy of the earl, and the reversal of this decision in July could have endangered Richard's control of both England and Anglo-Ireland. The removal of so powerful a figure was full of potential danger, and Mortimer's death in Ireland, before he could return to England in open hostility, was for Richard a very lucky accident. The charge that Richard had attacked Mortimer, as he had the appellant earls, was not one commonly reported.[1] Walsingham, for instance, said that Richard swore to avenge the death of Mortimer by going personally to Ireland to quell the rebels there.[2] It is likely that feeling against Richard would have been even more intense had Mortimer returned to England deprived of his office.

In considering Mortimer's replacement in 1398 by Thomas Holland, the Duke of Surrey, one must take account of Richard's financial position in these years. The terms by which Mortimer had been appointed and Holland's indenture cancelled in April 1397 suggests that a necessity to compromise lay behind the decision.[3] This was the reason given by the king himself, in paying Holland £1,000 compensation for breaking the agreement. The entry in the issue rolls shows that Holland agreed to govern Ireland for nine years with 6,000 marks a year, but that Mortimer was then appointed to serve for nine years at 4,000 marks p.a. the saving to the king is said to have been 18,000 marks.[4] In fact,

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1 But see Adam of Usk, above p 371.
2 Annales Ricardi Secundi, p 229.
3 See above, p 193.
4 E 403/555 (25 May)

Mortimer was appointed to serve for three years with a stipend of 5,000 marks, which suggests perhaps a compromise on the king's original plans.[1] It seems probable that this financial excuse for Holland's replacement is correct, though one must also bear in mind the developing political situation in England in the spring and Holland's loyal and well-rewarded service to the king after the July crisis. When Holland finally came in 1398 his smaller personal resources necessitated more financial backing than Mortimer had enjoyed, indicating the English exchequer's increased capacity to invest money in Ireland.[2]

The effects of these economies of 1397-8 upon Ireland have already been briefly mentioned,[3] and the problem here is to establish the background in England of Richard's financial position. A primary reason for Richard's unusual degree of involvement in Ireland was that the latter half of his reign saw the coincidence of opportunity, interest and financial capacity to invest in such a venture. The message had frequently been spelled out, in words and actions, that Ireland could not expect heavy subsidization over the head of continental or other royal claims.[4] In 1382, for instance, the king explained that the lordship must find a solution in self-defence, for he was preparing for a foreign expedition and could spare no cash.[5] In the period after Richard's death, when the sending of the king's son Thomas showed an awareness of the urgent need to deal with Irish rebellion, measures again foundered on the head of finance, for the insolvency suffered by Henry IV kept successive chief governors short of money and made impossible any chance of effective restoration of power.[6]

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1 E 404/14/96 part ii, no 160
2 See above, p 230.
3 Above, pp 210-11, 334.
4 Above, pp 237-8.
5 Foedera, vii, 352
6 Below, pp 505-6.

One cannot appreciate Richard's unusual investment in Ireland in his last years or understand the financial difficulties he must have faced without a knowledge of the preceding period and an awareness of his successor's financial problems.

The problems facing any king attempting to finance a military expedition are particularly important in the context of the 1390s, for Richard's alleged financial extortions played a direct part in the English domestic crisis which ended the expedition, forming one of the chief grounds of complaint against him in the deposition articles. There seems no doubt that the weaknesses of governmental finance, evident in over-assignment and bad tallies, were being experienced increasingly in the late fourteenth century, though the problem did not reach crisis proportions until the Lancastrians came to power.[1] Men were aware of the possible political repercussions of default of payment. About the time of the first expedition, for example, a request that Henry Percy in Gascony should be paid for his service in accordance with his indenture explained the king's desire 'that our honour should be kept there, and that the said Henry have no grounds for complaint to us about the said cause'.[2] In 1398 the captain of Calais, while making no complaint himself, requested that his soldiers be duly paid in accordance with his indenture 'so that they do not have in my time grounds or cause for protesting or complaining as they have had in the time of others'.[3] Calais was one of the most important military commands to suffer regular default, both under Richard II and Henry IV, while Ireland by comparison was not greatly affected until John Stanley's term of office in 1399.[4] Stanley and his successors

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1 Steel, Receipt of the exchequer, pp 114-7, 407-8, etc.
2 Anglo-Norman Letters, no 179
3 ibid., no 192
4 Steel, Receipt of the exchequer, p 133

found it so difficult to secure payment or to cash tallies that elaborate arrangements concerning the precise assignments to be made were occasionally incorporated into indentures, in vain efforts to guarantee payment of the stipends.[1] It had, however, long been recognized by governors of Ireland that the government was liable to financial default, either by not meeting its commitments at all or by over-assigning its resources. As far back as 1373 William of Windsor's indenture specified that he should be free to depart without blame should his stipend not be paid by the agreed time.[2] Roger Mortimer's appointment in 1397, which included a similar condition, showed comparable uncertainty and lack of confidence in the government's ability to pay its way.[3]

Thus, while it may be true that Richard's disengagement from the continent gave the crown's finances 'a prosperity and a buoyancy unequalled in the whole middle ages',[4] a perennial problem of cash nevertheless remained, necessitating large scale borrowing and additional subsidies in the event of any unusual enterprise. The situation was clearly spelled out in May 1398, in Richard's response to Manuel II's plea for aid for Constantinople. .In excusing himself for his present inability to send supplies, Richard complained at some length of his domestic troubles and explained that the expense of restoring order and suppression rebellion had emptied his treasury.[5]

In these circumstance, the question of another Irish expedition obviously posed a major financial problem. The first expedition had been financed primarily from a half subsidy granted in January 1393

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1 e.g. Thomas of Lancaster; see Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 313.
2 E 101/33/3
3 E 404/14/96 part ii, no 160
4 Steel, Receipt of the exchequer, p 359
5 Official correspondence of Thomas Bekyngton, ed. G. Williams, i, 285-7.

in the event of Richard making an expedition in person to the continent, Scotland, or Ireland.[1] Loans totalling over £20,000 were received in the Michaelmas term 1394-5 and in January 1395 a lay subsidy was granted in parliament followed by a clerical tenth in February.[2] Some at least of the loans, as well as the parliamentary subsidy, were prompted by pleas from Richard in Ireland, who soon exhausted the resources brought with him in October.[3] The effective financial organization of the first expedition in its initial preparations and in the continued support from England enabled Richard to pay his way in the country and to keep his troops disciplined by meeting their wages promptly. It was singled out by contemporaries as an important factor contributing to Richard's success.[4]

The second expedition falls within the period of Richard's 'tyranny' and it is as a result difficult to see precisely how it was financed. The illegal exactions of which the king was subsequently accused dated back in some cases to the 1396-7 period and were not apparently directly connected with Irish needs. Richard's ability to use his power in an unscrupulous fashion in order to squeeze money from the richer elements in the community was not, of course, a new development, having already been used with some success against London in 1392.[5] The difference after 1396 was that former restraints upon Richard's devious plans for procuring money were removed. The first of the new exactions which made Richard's last years so unpopular were the 'Blank Charters', the earliest examples of which apparently date from 1396 itself.[6] It cannot be proved from the evidence of the 'Blank

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1 Rot.Parl.,iii, 301-2, art.11.
2 Steel, Receipt of the exchequer, pp 70-2.
3 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 50-63, passim
4 Oeuvres de Froissart, xv, 168-9.
5 C.Barron,'The quarrel of Richard II and London, 1392', in Reign of Richard II, ed. du Boulay and Barron, pp 173-201 passim.
6 Barron, 'Tyranny of Richard II', pp 10-12.

Charters' and fines for pardon that Richard was desperately looking for money to finance his campaign, for the primary origin of the sources of money seems to have lain in the political advantages they offered the king. Furthermore, Richard had incurred other heavy financial demands, not only in his visit to Calais in late 1396 and in the diplomatic policy he subsequently developed of retaining continental allies, but also as a result of his enlarged household and ambitious building programme.[1] From late 1397, however, there was undoubtedly a connection between Richard's plans for Ireland and his attempts to find more money. Dr Steel has noted, for example, that Richard's much criticized failure to repay loans received in the period of heavy borrowing from late 1396 on was not a wholesale repudiation of debts. On the contrary, it was generally the loans made after Easter 1397 which suffered default of repayment by the agreed date of Easter 1398.[2] By that time Richard was already making plans for the Irish venture, and the failure to pay, though politically unwise, may have been financially expedient. Apart from these loans Richard's additional revenue in his last years came from the first of three half subsidies voted in the parliament of January 1398 and bringing in over £11,000 by the end of the year, and the clerical tenth of the same time.[3] The fines and forfeitures, also bitterly attacked in the deposition articles, totalled in all less than £13,000.[4] Added to these sums must have been various other payments of which the receipt rolls give no information. The dowry of the king's French

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1 See, e.g., Steel, Richard II, p 229

2 Receipt of the exchequer, pp 119-20; believing that Richard decided to go to Ireland only after the death of Mortimer in July, 1398, Steel is uncertain that the Irish crisis can have been Richard's justification for repudiating these debts some four months earlier.

3 ibid., pp 79-80.

4 ibid., p 119.

bride was apparently, for instance, paid directly to the king in the chamber, and one instalment at least went in bulk to Ireland, unrecorded by the English exchequer.[1] There may have been other payments, in gifts of cash or valuables, into the king's personal coffers at this time, possibly in efforts to seek or retain royal favour, but if so they too have gone without record and it is unlikely that their amounts added significantly to the king's financial assets. One of the deposition articles complained of the excessive demands made by Richard on ecclesiastical houses, from whom he requested horses, carts and great sums of money, to help him in his Irish expedition. For fear of the king many were said to have complied, to their great impoverishment.[2] It is interesting to note that the Irish venture was blamed, no mention being made of the king's grant of £2,000 on 3 May to the Emperor of Constantinople, 'in fighting for the faith'.[3]

The details of this much debated question of Richard's final tyranny, the exact form it took, its causes and effects, lie beyond the scope of the present examination, though one needs to be aware of the conflict to understand the fate of Richard's second expedition to Ireland. The most relevant point is perhaps not the financial resources made available for the expedition, but the alienation of England's political community, for while these sums undoubtedly swelled the exchequer's receipts their monetary importance appears to have been secondary to the power they gave the king over whole sections of the population.[4] There seems little doubt that the measures used raised adequate supplies for the Irish campaign. When Richard returned from Ireland in July considerable sums were left, as yet untouched, behind him.[5] As the campaign itself was so brief, we

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1 Below, pp 412-3.
2 Rot.Parl., iii, 420, art.39.
3 E 403/562 (3 May)
4 For the effects of Richard's financial exactions upon public opinion see Rot.Parl., iii, 417-22, art.s 24,31,32,38,39,43, etc.
5 See below, pp 499-500.

are unable to see whether or not it could have been successfully financed for the intended year. Although the measures by which Richard raised some of his supplies were widely criticised by his contemporaries, and were ultimately shown to have been achieved at too great a political cost, his financial profit does not in fact seem to have been extraordinary. Dr Steel, himself generally critical of Richard's final years, shows that some of Richard's most hated exactions brought in surprisingly little cash.[1] The logical conclusion is that hostility to Richard lay less in the amount demanded than in the manner of the demand and the policy for which the money was needed. It is important therefore to examine how people in England viewed the situation in the lordship and Richard's attempts to deal with it. In their attitudes one finds some explanations for the lack of sympathy between the king and the community and the deepening hostility as his interest in Ireland grew.

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Part ii -- English consciousness of the lordship and its problems

Although the majority of Englishmen probably thought very little about Ireland throughout most of the fourteenth century, the lordship was forced upon English consciousness to an unusual degree during the period of Richard's personal involvement in the 1390s. Richard's own interest stands demonstrated in the events of the two expeditions, and something has already been said of the attitudes felt by those with personal interests and experiences in the lordship-- the absentee knights and lords.[2] It is also, however, worth looking at the contemporary responses of other sections of the community to

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1 Receipt of the exchequer, pp 118-9
2 See above, pp 176-8.

the Irish question--in particular the 'official' element as voiced in parliament and council, and the 'private' element as revealed in the chronicles. Both sources reveal a low level of interest and knowledge on Irish affairs, and aid our understanding of Richard's problems in pursuing a vigorous Irish policy.

The poor survival of English conciliar documents prior to the fifteenth century makes it difficult to discover how often or on what level the question of Ireland was faced by the king's advisors in council. Presumably Richard's first expedition was itself planned with the help of the English council, whose subsequent correspondence with the king during the expedition reveals something of its members' level of interest and competence in Irish affairs. The dominant theme throughout these letters is conciliar satisfaction with Richard's success, combined with reservations about his necessity to linger in Ireland after receiving the submissions of the Irish. Close examination in fact reveals a very shallow understanding of the basic nature of the Irish problem and the viable solutions. To begin with, the councillors believed that MacMurrough's submission had been won after Richard took the field against his rebels.[1] While technically accurate, and borne out by Richard's letters lauding his own exploits, such a view of the expeditionary campaign oversimplified matters and suggests that the council saw strategy in Ireland as comparable to that used in continental expeditions. There is no hint that they realized how much more than mere physical supremacy lay behind the submission of the Gaelic chiefs, or that Richard could not deal with them as he might a conquered enemy. The council's letter of mid-February, in response to Richard's request for advice, reveals that this lack of understanding deepened as the royal policy developed.[2] Its

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1 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 52-3
2 ibid., pp 57-9

members congratulated Richard for having 'conquered' the great part of Ireland,a term which suggests that they saw Richard as waging an aggressive war against the external enemies of the lordship, though they also admitted, presumably repeating the king's own phrases, that the rebels 'have come humbly to your obedience and have submitted their men and their lands to your disposition, and they swear to be your faithful lieges from now on'. Disliking, perhaps, the policies as explained by Richard's letter and his envoy the Duke of Gloucester, the council acknowledged its own reduced competence in Irish affairs. Its members certainly wanted no part in the responsibility for implementing policies in Ireland and pleaded that Richard had a more competent group of advisors than themselves with him in Ireland. They expressed, with humility, their belief that Richard had satisfactorily dealt with the country's most pressing problems, and that he should now return to England. The council seems to have been in some doubt as to what excuse would bring him home most speedily and the letter referred first of all to 'causes touching the honour of both you and the realm', later deleting this in favour of a more forceful warning about the Scots who threatened to break the truce.

The last council letter of note on this subject was written on 19 March, in direct response to Richard's detailed exposition of his policy and plea for advice on 1 February.[1] Referring back to their own earlier response to the articles sent with Gloucester, the councillors now agreed to retract their earlier recommendation for firm action and approved that the pardons outlined by the king should be granted, 'considering the changing times and relying greatly on the wise opinion and superior discretion of you and of your said

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1 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 61-3

council who have more knowledge in this part than we'. They made, however, the interesting recommendation that the pardons be conditional upon the making of fines and ransoms by the submitting rebels, as great as they could bear without 'outrageous destruction'. These sums were intended to support the safeguard and governance of Ireland after Richard's departure, so that 'the people of your realm' be not charged with this burden. Any further profits the king himself might keep to maintain his royal estate.

This advice must be read in the knowledge that Richard's own letter to the council showed that he himself strongly favoured the idea of pardons, and that any disapproval would need to have been carefully worded and presented. Not surprisingly, the council's reply did not risk royal displeasure by expressing doubts about his Irish policy. The wording of the letters shows that actions and policies were always carefully presented to the king, and the flattery which runs through the correspondence seems to go beyond the normal form of diplomatic courtesy. A possible hint of serious desire not to offend the king may perhaps be seen in one letter, evidently a draft, where the phrase come voz ditz comuns aussi desiront has been deleted.[1] The sentence refers to matters which were discussed in parliament and the most obvious reason for the change in the text was that a reference to what the commons wished the king to do was not felt to add to the weight of the council's own plea. The commons themselves, writing to the king about this time, were careful to place full responsibility for the desire that the king should return home quickly upon the shoulders of the lords in parliament.[2]

It is interesting to note that the council stressed the importance of fines and ransoms. This was justified by Richard's own

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1 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 59

2 Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London, H, ed. R.R. Sharpe, p 420; below, p 396.

reference to his intention to grant general pardons 'by fine and fee under our seal'.[1] Although payment of fines and ransoms was a normal consequence of making peace with the king, to impose excessive fines in the current situation would have been to negate the novelty and potential efficacy of Richard's new policy, and there is no evidence that he himself made the pardons generally dependent upon any such condition. The council's advice suggests in fact strong reservations about the new approach, based possibly upon a lack of understanding of the real situation in Ireland. The idea that Richard was in a position to impose punitive fines was far from being accurate. The idea that such fines, if imposed, would be sufficient to make solvent the Irish government and strengthen the King's personal finances was completely without foundation. This was the type of attitude which impeded possible recovery by leading the English government consistently to underestimate Ireland's needs.

Perhaps it is misleading to place too much emphasis on this conciliar correspondence, for the king's own absence and that of so many notables of the land made this particular body somewhat atypical. It was, nevertheless clear that by this period the conciliar institution wielded considerable power and influence, particularly, one may assume, during the peculiar circumstances of York's regency. That Richard in Ireland, with his own perfectly adequate counselling resources about him, should have thought it necessary to request specifically the English council's approval of his clemency policy certainly seems significant. He was possibly simply informing the council of a new policy. On the other hand, the principal pressure which necessitated

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1 Proceedings and Ordinances, i, 55

English conciliar backing of this policy was almost certainly the realization of all parties that Richard's settlement might not succeed and that it would involve continued practical assistance for some time. The council obviously wanted no confrontation with Richard on the question of Ireland, but it also understood the possible burdens imposed by his new policy, its members being realistic enough to know that a fundamental redistribution of favours in Ireland, particularly with respect to rebel Irishmen, could not be effected without cost to England. The recommendations on fines and ransoms made quite explicit a determination to disengage financially from Ireland, in so far as might be possible, after the expedition. It was a clear pointer to future conflict and, as the attitude of many Englishmen towards the lordship, deserves serious consideration.

The impressions about Ireland expressed in these conciliar letters are by and large similar to those found in other official notices, notably the rolls of parliament. Here again, Ireland rarely intruded, and it is difficult to see exactly how her position was judged by the majority of Englishmen. She was undoubtedly seen as part of the English king's inalienable patrimony--charges of treason against Richard's ministers who allowed the grant of the Dukedom of Ireland to de Vere offer the best evidence of this attitude.[1] There was, furthermore, acceptance that Ireland was bound to the government in England more closely than the king's continental lordships. Not only did common law hold in Ireland, but any statutory legislation might be applied there. In 1383-4 a petition in parliament requesting the proclamation in Ireland of an order of Edward III's concerning ecclesiastical benefices pleaded as justification that 'your lieges of Ireland are ruled and governed by the laws, statutes and ordinances

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1 Rot.Parl., iii, 231, art.11

made in England as much as those in England'.[1] Not surprisingly, this close association in government occasionally caused resentment in Ireland, where separate interests and customs had been developing for two centuries. A notable example of Anglo-Irish independence occurred in 1376 when William of Windsor, governor at that time, ordered the elections in Ireland of men to be sent to England with power to grant the king an aid. The returns showed unanimity of opinion that by Irish custom there was no obligation to send elected representatives out of the country for any such purpose.[2] The same spirit of territorial separatism is indicated by the evidence that on 2 October 1385 at the request of the lords and commons at a great council it was agreed to confirm 'a liberty which they had in Ireland, not being answerable out of Ireland'.[3]

The confusion apparent in these different opinions as to Ireland's legislative status must be noted in a study of general attitudes towards the lordship. Perhaps the most significant fact to emerge in this context is the continuing English ignorance of the exact situation of the Irish lordship--especially of the shrinking area under Anglo-Irish control and the extent of the crown's inability to govern. Assumptions that Ireland was wholly within English law-making competence left out of account the peculiar composition of a society increasingly in a state of siege and of necessity developing local customs and adaptations of laws and regulations formulated for England. The political confrontation between the Gaelic Irish and the English born in Ireland was the area most beyond the comprehension of those inexperienced in Irish life. To the Englishman the Irish

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1 C.C.R. 1392-6 p 35

2 Lydon, 'William of Windsor and the Irish parliament', E.H.R. lxxx, (1965), pp 262-6.

3 P.R.O.I., Ferguson Collections, ii, f 22.

rebel was an enemy of the king, in arms against his lord. He was to be proceeded against preferably by force of arms and, when defeated, suitably punished. Then he would presumably return to the allegiance of his lord the king. This summary perhaps does less than justice to the English observer, who were also capable of seeing the Irish as a hostile force, aggressively attacking a limited lordship, but it was undoubtedly a general attitude accepted by large numbers. Incidents where Englishmen born in Ireland and Englishmen born in England came to blows arose in part, it seems certain, from the pure Englishman's inability to distinguish the Anglo-Irishman racially or politically from his Gaelic neighbours, or at least from his disinclination to accord the Anglo-Irishman his accustomed place of privilege in the lordship. Already at the time of Lionel of Clarence this antipathy had constituted so serious a problem that legislation prohibiting the use of the insults 'English hobbe' and 'Irish dogge' was actually enacted.[1] The simple level of political understanding shown in such incidents greatly understated the extent of the danger posed to the Anglo-Irish community by the Gaelic revival, and also failed to take into account the considerable areas in which English and Irish could increasingly be judged as one, adapting culturally and compromising politically to form a society quite unlike anything outside the more extreme marcher areas of England.

In the terminology they employ when referring to Ireland the records demonstrate very clearly this poor understanding in England of the lordship's political situation. It has already been shown that great care was taken in Ireland to distinguish in official notices between the Anglo-Irish and the Gaelic Irish.[2] In England, however,

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1 Statutes and Ordinances, p 437
2 Above pp 23-6, 38.

the chancery tended to omit the racial distinction. The absentee legislation of 1381 for instance stated simply that 'those who have possessions in Ireland' should defend them, and a similar phrase, 'those who were born in Ireland', was used in the 1393 order to all non-residents to return to the country.[1] Looking ahead to the Lancastrian period, one sees that this tendency not to distinguish between the races could lead to ambiguity in the records, as increasingly phrases such as gentz neez en Irland were rendered simply as Irrois. It is probable that in, for instance, the expulsion order of 1413 the Irrois in question were not solely, if at all, men of Gaelic origin.[2] Some three years later, an Anglo-Irish petition which attempted to prevent the attendance of Gaelic Irish at parliament showed anxiety to make the division between the races explicit for those in England who were failing to grasp the importance of the distinction. The petition described how:

> le dite terre est devise par deux nations, c'est assavoir, les ditz suppliantz, Engloys et de Engloys nation; et les Irrois nation, enemyes a notre sire le Roy....(3)

In 1421-2 a petition requesting the restatement of the 1413 expulsion order expressed in part this distinction. Of the students creating a disturbance,

> ascuns sont lieges notre sire neez en Irland, et les autres ne sont my lieges notre sire le Roy, mes enemyes...nome Wylde Irishmen....(4)

The final statute, however, referred simply to gentz neez en Irland and the resulting ambiguity makes the statute read to us like the absentee legislation for Anglo-Irishmen while allowing a contemporary chronicle interpretation of Ibernienses.[5]

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1 Rot.Parl.,iii, 85; C.C.R. 1392-6 pp 295, 390.
2 Statutes of the Realm, ii, 173
3 Rot.Parl.,iv,102
4 ibid., p 190
5 ibid.; Chronicon Adae de Usk, p 131

The consistent element in official terminology from England lay in a wariness of any form which might lead to a limitation of royal rights. This is at least the logical explanation for certain alterations made in the framing of statutes from petitions. The petition of 1417, for instance, which insisted on the separate status of les Irrois nations, enemyes a notre sire le Roy, was subsequently expressed as law in the form Irrois rebeux a Roi. The clause in the 1421 petition which implied that the 'wild Irishmen' in question were outside the king's allegiance was simply omitted in the final statute.[1] This too was the attitude most apparent in the documents dating from the period of Richard's expeditions to Ireland. Repeatedly it was stated that he was going to deal with the problem of his 'rebels' or 'those who are disobedient' there--no race being specified and no regular use of the 'Irish enemy' term being made.[2]

Although the terminology employed by the English chancery can obviously demonstrate interesting long-term attitudes towards Ireland, its evidence on the effects of the Irish experience in 1394-5 is poor. English record sources on the whole tell us little about the king's policies or how the news from Ireland was received in England. The parliament which met at Westminster on 27 January 1395 devoted considerable attention to Ireland, with the Duke of Gloucester and other companions attending in person to explain the king's progress in Ireland and to request further financial aid for the campaign. Gloucester's account of the royal victories was presumably intended to help convince the commons that another grant was necessary and would be put to profitable use.[3] Concern about the necessity of the commons continuing to finance Ireland's recovery was apparently

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1 Statutes of the Realm, ii, 197-8, 214; Rot.Parl., iv, 102, 190.
2 e.g. Foedera, vii, 782-3, 289; Rot.Parl., iii, 329; above, pp 38-9.
3 Rot.Parl., iii, 329

expressed, for the grant ultimately contained the condition that

> the said commons, their heirs, successors and the said realm of England be as free concerning the wars of Ireland as they were before this present grant. (1)

The commons clearly saw Richard's exploits in Ireland primarily in military terms. Though ready to supply further aid so that he could finish his work of conquering the rebels, they were determined that new Irish obligations should not become a regular feature, just as the burden of continental war was easing.

We are fortunate in having the record of a letter sent by the commonalty of England to Richard after this parliament. It shows very clearly an anxiety about the additional grant which had been made. Though submissive in tone, the point is nevertheless clearly made--that the commons would not willingly bear any further burdens. They are confident that Richard will hear them kindly:

> wher for thei be sek you mekely and lowely to your highnesse yat ye welle consider the pouert of your pouere communes forseid.

They explained:

> that this charge yat yeur poeple has granted myght noght have ben borne bot onely to shew to your high lordshipe her gode wille and kyndnesse....

After praising the manner in which the regency council has governed in Richard's absence, the letter goes on to request Richard's return as soon as possible, in terms which indicate that the lords asked the commons to add their weight to the council's plea. The letter concludes with a hope that their request be not taken for a desire

> to ster you fro no thyng that myght be perelle to your land yat ye have conquered and put in obeissance.(2)

The letter confirms the impression gleaned from conciliar and

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1 Rot.Parl.,iii, 330
2 Letter Book H, p 420

parliamentary records, that in England Richard was understood to have virtually accomplished the conquest of Ireland by January 1395, and that it was not thought necessary or desirable for the commons to continue to support Ireland's recovery beyond the immediate future.

In the period between the expeditions Ireland again faded from the forefront of English political life. We do not know precisely when Richard himself decided to return, but as he was certainly promising publicly to do so from late 1397 it is probable that from this time on his intention was common knowledge. The coincidence of the coup in England against his former opponents and this renewal of the Irish question was not really surprising, for the Irish problem had been left unfinished in 1395 and Richard was simply using the first opportunity to return to it. The timing was, however, unfortunate, for the country, thoroughly alarmed at the recent domestic upheavals, tended to see Richard's Irish ambitions in the most sinister light imaginable. It was admittedly unprecedented for a reigning monarch to visit his Irish lordship twice, but only in a climate of intense suspicion about Richard's ambitions in general could the venture have seemed a threat. From the point of view of Anglo-Irish history, the most important conclusion which emerges is that England judged Richard's second Irish expedition in the light of the English situation and English domestic interests. Just as anxiety had been roused in the 1380s by the grant of Ireland to de Vere--a grant which in fact gave the duke as many burdens as privileges--so too in 1398-9 many observers in England felt that the move to Ireland signified a dangerous transfer of power, ignoring altogether the situation in Ireland itself.

There was little opportunity for the suspicions to find an official voice, for Richard's last parliaments were dominated by royal policy concerning the final stages of his moves against opposition

in England. No parliament met in the period immediately prior to the enterprise. One can, however, see in the articles of deposition which were presented in Henry IV's first parliament some hint of the extent to which opposition in the country to Richard's general character of government became focussed on the issue of his Irish expedition. He was accused specifically of taking the treasure, crowns, reliquaries and other jewels out of the kingdom to Ireland without the consent of the estates of the realm.[1] The crucial point here lies in the evident fear that once in Ireland Richard would be beyond parliament's control and possibly quite independent of that institution.[2] That in fact Richard in Ireland would depend utterly on continuing support from England is not strictly material--ignorance on the state of Anglo-Ireland was so profound that the commons were probably expressing here a very sincere fear. The other articles which specifically mentioned Ireland concentrated on the financial burden imposed on the country as a consequence of Richard's Irish ambitions. The ecclesiastical community complained that they were required to give horses, carts and money and feared to refuse.[3] The bald phrase, 'by reason of his voyage to be made into Ireland', was given by the clergy as a sufficient explanation for Richard's extortions and although the other financial grievances did not specifically mention Ireland a similar thinking probably lay behind them all. The evidence of these articles shows yet again an incomprehension of the extent of Ireland's needs, a lack of interest in possible remedies and above all and most interestingly a deep suspicion of Richard's ultimate policy as king--to solve the Irish question.

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1 Rot.Parl., iii, 420 art. 41

2 i.e. Through the special parliamentary commission. (Rot.Parl.,iii, p 418 art. 25; Annales Ricardi Secundi, 239-40; below, pp 402-3.

3 Rot.Parl., iii, 420, art. 39

Many of the same attitudes and patterns are apparent in the evidence of the chroniclers. In, for example, the basic question of terminology there are numerous examples to show that for an Englishman the Anglo-Irish comprised an alien race, more akin to the Irish than the English. In 1394, for instance, different accounts from St. Albans showed a variety of forms being used to describe the order that all men born in Ireland and living in England were bound to return to their own country.[1] Walsingham stated that jussi sunt omnes Hibernici, per totam regnum evacuare. He added the interesting explanation that many Hibernici had come to England, unde contigit quod mere Hibernici, Anglicorum Hibernicorum aemuli, partem insulae quae paruerat Regi Angliae vastaverunt. In another version he claimed that because of the absence of many of the Hibernici the meri Hibernici, Anglicorum adversarii are creating trouble.[2] Another chronicler actually stated that Richard went on the expedition to aid the Hibernici veri Anglici against the puros Hibernicos.[3] In the early fifteenth century Adam of Usk showed the same tendency to call men born in Ireland Iberniensis, though the probability is that they were Anglo-Irish.[4] The ignorance which such statements demonstrated about the importance given to the racial distinction within the lordship was obviously very widespread. Not only can it also be seen in official records,[5] but earlier evidence concerning the different Oxford schools shows that as far back as 1252 a group of students from Ireland containing both Anglo-Irish and Gaelic names was called Ybernienses.[6]

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1 For this order see C.C.R. 1392-6, p 295
2 Ypodigma Neustriae, pp 366-7; Historia Anglicana, ii, 215.
3 Eulogium Historiarum, iii, 370
4 Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp 120, 131
5 Above, pp 391-2.
6 A.Gwynn, Anglo-Irish church life in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, pp 25-6.

The chronicles did in fact show a general ignorance and tendency to oversimplify when referring to the problem of Ireland, similar in many respects to the attitudes expressed in the official records. In understanding the difficulties facing the lordship it was sometimes implied that the problem could be easily remedied. Walsingham, for instance, when he said that Edward III used to receive £30,000 annually from the lordship, while Richard had to invest 30,000 marks each year for its defence, implied that the deficit could be reversed again by simple expedients, such as the return home of emigrant Anglo-Irishmen and a firm attack upon the rebels.[1] The chroniclers were naturally freer than any official to give current opinions, and their evidence often illuminates the polite formulae of the public records. In 1387, for instance, the Monk of Evesham gave a forthright criticism of the grants to de Vere, first as Marquis of Dublin and then as Duke of Ireland.[2] The suspicions with which Richard's later plans for Ireland were viewed date perhaps from that period when it was noted that Richard not only made this extraordinary grant to his favourite but involved himself personally in its implementation by accompanying de Vere to the West Country when he was preparing for the expedition. The fact that this occurred in the context of the appellant crisis when de Vere was thought by some to be preparing for war on Richard's domestic critics rather than on the Irish rebels made Richard's participation all the more suspect.[3]

The circumstances of the first expedition in 1394, which took place with the full approval of the political community, meant that it was not made an issue for attack by any of the chronicles. Commentary on it is, however, interesting from other angles. The Irish problem

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1 Annales Ricardi Secundi, p 172
2 Historia vitae et regni Ricardi II, pp 66-7, 77.
3 ibid., pp 84-5.

was seen, for a start, in simple military terms. Rex Ricardus cum grande exercitu perrexit in Hiberniam ad debellandum Hibernicos sibi rebellantes.[1] This opinion was of course quite accurate, having been drawn from the obvious preparations for a warlike campaign, and from the government's own statements about the enterprise--which tended to emphasize the king's great labours 'in striving to overcome the rebels of Ireland'.[2] For the most part it is clear that English information about the expedition followed the Westminster parliament in January 1395, when Richard's progress was explained and the additional grant made. The Kirkstall chronicle, for instance, credited Richard with procuring homagiis omnium regulorum Hibernie personaliter.[3] Walsingham elaborated on the submissions to Richard. Coacti...sunt se Regi submittere plures magnates, quos 'reges' vocat plebs rustica regionis; quorum quosdam Rex secum detinuit, ne nova aliqua molirentur.[4] Details on these 'kings' described a mixture of great and small chiefs, not all of Irish race:

> Erant autem qui se submiserant, Power cum filio suo, Abron, Makmouth, cum presbytero Powerensi, Dyml, Damgwyth, Dymsyn et Archi (Araly). (5)

It is probable that Richard in his messages home stressed his achievements in not simply conquering the Irish by force but in bringing them into a political relationship with the crown. Walsingham noted that the king held a parliament at Dublin after Christmas, ad quod convenerunt tam ligei sui quam illi qui dudum submiserant se eidem.[6] While this chronicler apparently had unusual knowledge on Irish affairs, his general comprehension of the situation in Ireland and the problems

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1 Henry Knighton, ii, 321
2 e.g. Cal.Fine Rolls 1391-9, p 138
3 Clarke and Denholm Young, 'The Kirkstall Chronicle', B.J.R.L., 1 (1931) p 129.
4 Ypodigma Neustria, p 367
5 Annales Ricardi Secundi, p 173
6 Ypodigma Neustria, p 368

to be faced there was not above average. He made no distinction between Irish and Anglo-Irish rebels, but on the other hand implied an unclarified distinction between the 'king's lieges' and 'those who had submitted'. Beyond the issue of Richard's ability to gain submission he had little interest in the Irish problem. In, for example, remarking upon the new grant to be made for Richard's expenses in Ireland his attention was focussed not upon the king's policies for that country but upon the commons' proviso that they were not bound to make the grant, but did so this once, 'for affection of the king'.[1]

It was inevitable that authors writing some years later, when free to express their feelings about Richard and aware of the collapse of Richard's Irish settlement, made little of the exploits of his first expedition, and the gains that had proved so illusory. The Monk of Evesham referred to Richard's knighting of certain Irishmen, and claimed that some were given considerable annual fees from the king's exchequer, but,

> illi, dolo et iniquitate pleni, suam ingratitudinem ostendentes, atque malum pro bono reddentes, post decessum Regis deteriores fuerunt, sicut mos illorum est semper in occultis proditionibus confidere. (2)

Adam of Usk similarly wrote with hindsight. The king, he notes, went with a great army to subdue the rebellion of the Irish. Sed modicum ibi ad votum placere tunc se fingentes, statim post ejus recessum rebellare noscuntur.[3] Again, such comments, apart from being inaccurate in fact, greatly over-simplified the nature of the problem.

When Ireland began to return to the attention of the chroniclers,

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1 Ypodigma Neustria, p 368
2 Historia vitae et regni Ricardi II, p 127
3 Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp 9, 151.

after the death of Mortimer, the dominant theme was not Richard's plans for Ireland's recovery but Richard's domestic ambitions. Not unnaturally, considering the brevity of the campaign and its abrupt end, few chronicles gave any account of Richard's progress in Ireland. Walsingham did claim that Richard at first won some successes but was apparently referring to the very early stages of the campaign.[1] He did not seem to realize or care about the extent of Richard's interest in the lordship's welfare. Although we know that Richard had been planning the venture from at least 1397, Walsingham believed that Mortimer's death in battle against the Irish in July 1398 inspired Richard with thoughts of vengeance, providing sufficient reason for the full scale expedition.[2] There was no doubt in his mind that this enterprise was the reason for Richard's financial extortions from this time.

> Fecitque prae parationem maximam, extorquens pecunias, exigens equos et quadrigas, victualia pro profectione sua rapiens, nilque solvens. (3)

While these charges may have had some justification in fact, the general unease concerning Richard's ambitions in Ireland is more difficult to understand. It apparently rested upon the suspicion felt about Richard and his ambitions in England and upon a misunderstanding of the situation in the lordship itself. Walsingham, for instance, repeated the rumour that Richard brought sufficient support to rule from Ireland, though in fact he did not have a quorum of the parliamentary commission which might have made this possible.[4] The idea, however, that he was thinking of altering the territorial basis of

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1 Ypodigma Neustria, p 384
2 ibid., p 381
3 ibid., pp 381-3
4 ibid., pp 383-4; Edwards, 'Parliamentary committee of 1398', E.H.R., xl (1925), pp 330-2.

his power was supported by sufficient evidence to seem credible. Already in 1392 there had been moves to transfer the legislative and administrative centre from London to York.[1] More recently, the elevation of Chester into a royal principality had encouraged a fear that an independent base of royal power was being established in the west.[2] In Adam of Usk's writing we see how extravagant the fears about Richard had become. He described how Richard had planned to crown the Duke of Surrey as king of Ireland with great ceremony,

> and had thought to sweep away in destruction many nobles of the realm of England who were to be craftily summoned to that great ceremony seeking to enrich with their possessions the same earl and other young men. (3)

Though Surrey's position in Richard's favour is not in doubt,[4] there is no evidence to support such a claim, and Adam's source possibly lay in his own bitterness at Surrey's replacement of the Earl of March. He alone of the chroniclers reported that Surrey was appointed before Mortimer died, and that Mortimer's death was welcomed by the king's friends.[5] The idea that a favourite would be rewarded by powers in Ireland is, however, significant. It harks back to the 1386-8 period when Richard's grant to de Vere in Ireland had been viewed with similar suspicion. Yet again the commentary of the English chroniclers reveals considerable ignorance of Ireland's potential. It is certainly clear that whatever policies Richard envisaged for restoring the lordship to relative peace and prosperity were not generally understood and received no sympathetic support from the population at large.

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1 Barron, 'The quarrel of Richard II and London', pp 181-3.
2 Davies, 'Richard II and Chester', in Reign of Richard II, ed. Barron and du Boulay, pp 256-79 passim.
3 Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp 36, 190
4 See, e.g., Richard's will, leaving Surrey £10,000. (Foedera, viii, pp 75-7.)
5 Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp 19, 165

Chapter 7

The organization of the second expedition

Part i -- The household character of the Irish expeditions

There has always been a temptation in examining Richard's expeditions to Ireland to concentrate upon their household character. Professor Tout, who viewed the Irish expeditions as exercises in household administration, shows that in 1395 at least £28,718.15.0 was disbursed as *vadia guerre* by John Carp, the keeper of the king's wardrobe, to commanders serving in Ireland.[1] His conclusion that the army was 'the household in arms, largely directed by the household officers and financed by the wardrobe clerks' is accompanied by the view that from now 'Richard's autocracy began to clothe itself in military garb'.[2] Professor Tout claims that the same method of organization was followed in 1399,[3] but on such a small scale that he describes the second expedition as being 'of inferior military interest'.[4] This dependence upon household material carries certain obvious dangers, particularly in the troubled circumstances of the 1390s, leading one to accept too readily a picture which helps to explain Richard's narrow base of support in the final crisis in England. The significance attached to the presence on the expedition of many household retainers and a considerable proportion of the king's personal wealth presents another associated problem which also deserves critical attention. It has been pointed out, with some implied criticism, that in 1399 the king's 'miscellaneous train' included minstrels, the royal painter, goldsmiths and other artisans,

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1 Tout, *Chapters*, iii, 489; see E 101/403/1.
2 Tout, *Chapters*, iv, 209; iii, 487; Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 141.
3 Tout, *Chapters*, iv, 53-4.
4 ibid., p 209.

as well as a considerable number of prominent clerics and much of the 'pomp and trappings of monarchy'.[1] In fact, some household contribution and a considerable display of the paraphernalia of monarchy was inevitable on any royal expedition. In view of past concentration upon these aspects of Richard's Irish ventures it is essential to examine in some depth the nature of the household involvement, as regards both the organization of the army and the claims concerning the extravagance of Richard's entourage before looking at the detailed organization of shipping, commissariat arrangements, provision of equipment and recruitment of men.

It has been suggested on the basis of Tout's work that the armies of 1394-5 and 1399 were a throw-back to the time of Edward I, 'an almost complete departure from the contract system which had developed during the Hundred Years War'.[2] The parallel is a logical one. Tout himself, with reference to the wardrobe of Edward I, speaks of the king's army as being essentially 'the household in arms', the same phrase as he uses to describe the 1394-5 campaign.[3] It is clear, however, that this phrase cannot carry the same meaning in the late thirteenth century as it does a century later, either for contemporaries or for historians. The armies of Edward I were recruited, commanded and paid in very different ways from those of late Edward III, as well as from those of Richard II. Under Edward I, for example, many of the most important knights served at their own expense.[4] Although 'almost all the paid troops employed by Edward I received their wages from the household',[5] the royal army which went into the field was very

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1 Tout, Chapters, iv, 54; Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 148.
2 Tout, Chapters, iv, 222-3; Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 141; Tuck, Richard II, p 173; etc.
3 Tout, Chapters, ii, 133; iv, 209.
4 M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I, pp 70-1 etc.
5 ibid., p 50

differently constituted from that of 1395, when the magnates were included on the wardrobe's payroll. Under Edward I the household character was closely associated with the command exercised by the household nucleus upon the army as a whole, so much so that its failure to provide a solid united body in the Scottish campaigns of 1305-7 has been said to make inappropriate the description 'a household in arms'.[1]

In fact, the difficulties in the fourteenth century of distinguishing between the crown's public and private capacities made inevitable some justification for a 'household in arms' concept on most royal expeditions, though the phrase may denote different things in different circumstances. Tout himself compares the Irish expeditions with that of Edward III from 1338-40 in the Netherlands,[2] and the continuing household character of royal campaigns to Scotland in the 1320s and 1330s can also be illustrated.[3] At the same time, changes in the character of the king's army became evident as the Hundred Years War progressed. In 1369, for instance, the army going to France seems to have been largely composed of retinencia regis, most of whom were temporarily attached to the household.[4] However, the household character of this army apparently derived not from a strong nucleus attached permanently to the king's service as under Edward I but from the way in which the royal expedition was administered.[5] Presumably it was possible on an expedition of this type to utilize the increasingly common fourteenth century practice of persuading individual commanders to indent with the king, agreeing to serve for a particular length of time.[6] The Walton ordinances of 1338, which established a

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1 Prestwich, War, politics and finance, pp 55-6.
2 Tout, Chapters, iii, 490
3 A.Prince, 'The payment of army wages in Edward III's reign', Speculum, xix, (1944) pp 137-9.
4 J.W.Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France', E.H.R. (1964) pp 720-1.
5 In fact the queen died and Edward did not go on this venture. (ibid.)
6 For an account of this practice see N.B.Lewis, 'The organization of indentured retinues in fourteenth century England', T.R.H.S. xxcii, 29-39.

general paymaster for the king's wars and sought to regulate the household, aided the process by which the household's active role in military expeditions lessened in significance.[1] The direct exchequer payment followed by personal account, which characterized the new system, was in any case a logical development once the king began to rely for the main body of his army upon individuals serving under contract.[2]

One of the most fundamental changes of the fourteenth century affecting the household's potential military and political role lay in its enforced financial dependence upon the exchequer. Tout himself emphasizes this point, showing how during the fourteenth century the various offices of the household, from wardrobe to chamber, were brought to rely upon the exchequer for most of their funding.[3] In postulating a particular significance for the household under Richard II one must remember Tout's own insistence upon the unity of the royal administration at this time, which made inappropriate such clashes between the household and other great offices of state as had featured in earlier periods of household initiative. This unity 'made it somewhat a matter of indifference from which sources the king procured the money he needed', with some items of national expenditure--such as border fortresses--being charged to the household while personal items--like the wages of some of his retainers--are found on the issue rolls.[4] Tout discounts the idea that an institutional chamber was the main agent of Richard's 'autocracy':

> No effort was made to revive the chamber once more as a rival to the exchequer national office of finance, for both exchequer

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1 Tout, Chapters, iii, 69-74, 149.
2 Prince, 'Payment of army wages', p 16.
3 Tout, Chapters, iv, 85, 313-25, etc.
4 ibid., iv, 209, 213, 212, etc.

> and chamber were now closely related parts of a single financial machine. (1)

The position of Richard's favourite, William Scrope, as treasurer of England during Richard's final years is but one example indicating the limitations of a concentration upon the household at this period.[2] One must also remember that the wardrobe of the household was increasingly a department of account--a public office with its own permanent staff attached more to the office than the person of the king--rather than a politically active force.[3]

In the case of the 1394-5 expedition one naturally expects a far greater focus on the household than occurred during the French campaigns when the king in person did not participate. It is in estimating the significance one should attach to this utilization of household personnel that the dangers arise. There seems no doubt that the wardrobe was made responsible for disbursing payments to commanders. All those retained to serve, including the great magnates, are seen to receive their pay from the wardrobe, and the conclusion that the royal army represented the household in arms is perhaps inevitable.[4] The issue rolls show, however, that the money to pay this army, which came from the exchequer, was not all delivered directly to Carp himself or to the cofferer John Stacy, a considerable proportion being paid instead to the individual commanders. The entries give Carp's name in the margin, but continue, for example '_per manus_ Thomas Duke of Gloucester'.[5] Carp's ultimate responsibility for such payments can have been little more than a book-keeping fiction. The sense in which the 1394-5 army was a 'household in arms' loses much of its significance as a result.

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1 Tout, _Chapters_, iv, 343

2 For a survey of Scrope's career see _D.N.B._, xvii, 1086-8.

3 Tout, _Chapters_, iv, 223-4.

4 E 101/403/1 (Particulars of Carp's account in wardrobe of the household, 17-19 R.II)

5 E 403/548 (27 July)

In itself this discovery might seem to be merely of minor administrative interest. Its importance, with reference to Richard's Irish expeditions, lies in the fact that the book-keeping fiction was dispensed with by the time of the second expedition, thus altering the value of evidence deriving from household sources. Professor Tout's conclusions on the military insignificance of the expeditionary army depend upon the household accounts, which show Carp and the cofferer Thomas More paying out a paltry £4,894.10.[1] It is presumably on this foundation that historians have based their judgements of Richard's second expedition as being a small affair, involving few beyond the immediate household.[2] In fact, the issue rolls of this term reveal the names of many magnates serving with sizable contingents, receiving pay directly, with ultimate responsibility to account falling upon them, rather than the keeper of the wardrobe.[3] The alteration is reflected in the receipt rolls where after 1395 large prestita restituta, associated with the procedure for paying armies, disappear, as individual commanders themselves receive direct assignments.[4]

One exception in 1399 to this practice of paying commanders in their own names was Reginald de Grey, whose payment in the issue rolls appears in the form 'To John Carp, keeper of the wardrobe, per manus Reginald...'.[5] De Grey subsequently appears in Carp's enrolled account as a banneret who along with other men served in Ireland in the king's company.[6] His inclusion in the household retinue suggests that he was personally retained by the king and owed service not simply

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1 Tout, Chapters, iv, 209; E 361/5/26 (Carp's enrolled account)
2 This is the implication in Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', 147-8.
3 E 403/562 passim; see below, p 452 etc.
4 Steel, Receipt of the exchequer, p 108; Steel refers here only to the large war prests featuring in the receipt rolls until 1395, not to the issue roll entries of sums apparently paid directly to commanders but still nominally credited to a household agent.
5 E 403/562 (16 April)
6 E 361/5/26

as the result of a military indenture for this campaign. It follows that the other commanders serving by contract and paid personally by the exchequer were not significantly involved in the household organization.

Much of the detail concerning recruitment and payments admittedly remains to be explained. The evidence, for example, that prominent household retainers made indentures of war in 1394 shows that to contrast an army whose strength lay in its household retainers with one raised by contract is too simple an approach. Baldwin Raddington, for instance, indented to serve in 1394 for six months with forty-six followers, to be paid according to specified terms, his position as controller of the household going unmentioned. William Scrope, the king's chamberlain and Thomas Percy, steward of the household, made similar arrangements.[1] Presumably the position of these men in the household would have required their personal attendance, but not their service with retinues, this being provided by contracts identical to those which secured the services of great magnates like Gloucester.[2] In 1399 the indentures similarly reveal no difference in obligation between the great officers of the household such as Exeter and Worcester, and unattached men like the Earl of Gloucester, recruited for service in this particular enterprise.[3]

Some of the difficulties encountered in this examination of the nature of Richard's household support are lessened when one relates them to their proper late fourteenth century context, free from parallels with the royal households of an earlier era. Undoubtedly Richard's household did increase its military strength. The controllers of Richard's household, first Baldwin Raddington and then John Stanley, built up a personal retinue of the yeomen of the crown, whose nucleus

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1 E 101/69/1 nos 283, 286, 287.
2 ibid., no 289.
3 e.g., ibid., nos 299, 300.

lay in the Cheshire archers.[1] The crown in the 1390s adopted on a large scale the practice of indentured retinues, wearing Richard's livery, comparable to the retinues already gathering around many of the greater magnates.[2] The so-called 'household element' of Richard's army on the Irish expeditions lay in this personal retinue and shows him adopting the characteristic fourteenth century method of attracting military support, combining this following of personal retainers with the indentured short term retinues required from the knights and earls of England. The resulting royal army undoubtedly had a strong household nucleus, paralleling one presumes the household retinues of a military commander such as the Black Prince.[3] The numerical strength and personal loyalty of Richard's household followers certainly gave them an importance which contrasts with the contract armies of Edwardian continental campaigns, but a false emphasis results if one sees the magnates in 1394 as joining 'an army under Richard's personal control and under household direction'.[4] There is no evidence to credit the household nucleus with overall command of the expedition and to describe the army as 'the household in arms' is simply inadequate.

These conclusions become firmer when one examines the contribution actually made by household retainers on the expeditions. As regards the military campaign, their role does not seem to have been significant. Examination for the first expedition has already shown that the individual magnates, Rutland, Nottingham, Mortimer and others acted with their retinues apparently as independent units, within their own designated areas of responsibility. Presumably there was some co-ordinating agency, but there is no suggestion that Baldwin Raddington,

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1 Tout, Chapters, iv, 198-9.

2 See,e.g., P.L.Storey, 'Liveries and commissions of the peace, 1388-90', in du Boulay and Barron, Reign of Richard II, esp. p 151 and R.Davies 'The principality of Chester', (ibid.), esp pp 267-9.

3 H.J.Hewitt, The Black Prince's expedition of 1355-7, pp 15-20.

4 Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 141.

as controller of the household, filled this need rather than the king's council itself. The brevity of the campaign in 1394-5 may have limited the household's potential for military leadership to some extent, but it is difficult to believe that any practical control of the royal army which it might have assumed would have gone entirely unmentioned in contemporary accounts. As has been seen, the king himself, and presumably the household nucleus, only participated in the final stages of the Leinster campaign.[1] The term 'household in arms' seems therefore to have little validity on the second expedition in the sense of an army recruited through and controlled by the household's military personnel. The household's military role lay apparently in the provision of a core of men from the king's personal retinue rather than at the level of organization or command.

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The problem of assessing the household's role is not, however, limited to military affairs. Questions concerning the courtly splendour brought by Richard to Ireland, and the choice of personnel accompanying him cannot be resolved without reference to the household. These topics tend to be considered in the light of rumours and adverse feelings voiced at the time of the Lancastrian usurpation, and the fact that any king making a long expedition outside the country would inevitably be accompanied by members of his court and much royal wealth is often ignored.

One aspect demonstrating this, and bearing directly on the role of the household, concerns part of the king's financial supplies. Richard in Ireland, through his chamberlain Stephen Scrope, delivered £14,148.6 'of the king's gold' to the custody of Surrey, the lieutenant, in the

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1 See above, pp 68-70.

form of 84,888 crowns and sixteen shillings.[1] The ultimate origin of the sum was almost certainly Isabella's dowry. The dowry had been settled by the 1396 marriage contract as 800,000 franks. 300,000 was to be paid on the wedding day, with the balance falling due in yearly instalments of 100,000 franks.[2] English exchequer records touch only briefly on these payments, for they were made directly to the king in his chamber. Thus in March 1397, for instance, the king lent to the exchequer £6,666.13.4 from the chamber, in the form of 40,000 French crowns.[3] In December 1399 a sum of 87,988 crowns, equal to £14,666.13.4, was paid into the exchequer, presumably because Richard himself could no longer use it and Henry, though king, had no personal claim to it.[4] The similarity of the amount sent to Ireland is striking and prompts one to conclude that the 84,888 crowns sixteen shillings were all or part of the dowry due in 1398. While this evidence proves the inadequacy of exchequer records as a source for ascertaining the king's financial supplies, it leaves obscure the significance of the chamber's financial role. Presumably much of the wealth Richard was accused of having extorted from his subjects 'by reason of his voyage to be made into Ireland'[5] fell into the hands of household officers, but in view of Richard's use at the same time of exchequer funds and his receipt of a subsidy[6] it would be misleading to see the expedition as a household financed affair. Nor, however, can one dismiss as insignificant Richard's use of large amounts of private wealth provided through the chamber. The specific accusation that he removed from the kingdom the treasure, crowns, reliquaries and other jewels which belonged to

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1 E 159/176 Easter communia, m 31; E 159/177 Michaelmas communia, m 23; E 159/178 Mich. communia, m 19. (The crown was worth 3/4)
2 Palmer, England, France and Christendom, p 174
3 Steel, Receipt of the exchequer, p 75
4 ibid., pp 81-2
5 Rot.Parl., iii, 420 art. 39: see above, p 402
6 Above, pp 382-5

him and to past monarchs without the consent of the estates of the realm demonstrates the difficulty of isolating the king's private fortune from the impersonal wealth of the crown.

Some truth undoubtedly lay behind the assertion that Richard brought a considerable store of valuables with him to Ireland. This is revealed in the accounts of various household officers, who mention the transport of many items not specifically concerned with military needs. There was even at one stage a suggestion that the queen, Isabella, should accompany Richard, and various preparations were made before this plan was abandoned.[1] One cannot be certain about the extent to which household goods were brought to Ireland, for the accounts virtually all covered the entire year, and disbursements frequently did not specify their date or purpose. Of the approximate figure of £46,000 which Carp spent as keeper of the wardrobe there is, for example, no means of telling how much is attributable to the expedition.[2] Several of the officers named by Carp were definitely in Ireland with considerable household stores in their custody. Among these were Richard Butler, servant of the pantry; Gregory Ballard, butler: John Halton, servant of the scullery; Robert Clay, confectioner; John Hastings, ewerer; William Lorchon, saucer; Nicholas Inglefeld, servant of the counting house; Richard Feld, almoner: Richard Hemme, baker; John Brethe, spicer; John Gravesend, caterer; and William Staundon, poulterer. On returning from the expedition these officers lost or were robbed of goods valuing £2,508.10.1--in itself an indication of the way in which the household was responsible for royal comforts in Ireland. The goods consisted mainly of vessels of gold and silver, though provisions of food were also lost.[3] The names probably reveal only a few of the household

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1 C.P.R. 1401-5 p 248; C 66/369 m 14

2 E 361/5/26

3 The losses, summarized ibid. in Carp's account, are described in greater detail in the memoranda rolls. (E 368/175 Mich. communia mm 17,24; E 368/176 Mich.communia, mm 18,32,60; ibid., Hilary mm 53,114; E 368/177 Mich. communia, m 16)

officers in charge of Richard's personal valuables on the expedition. For instance, John Boor, late dean of the royal chapel, delivered to Henry IV two lists of 'jewels, vestments and ornaments' seized at Pembroke on the king's return.[1]

The attention given by Richard's enemies to the presence of such regalia undoubtedly lies in part in the sustained efforts subsequently made by Henry and his ministers to secure possession of the goods.[2] In itself the presence of a considerable number of precious articles on the expedition cannot have required elaborate explanation. Many of the goods served practical needs. Furthermore, a king of Richard's taste was unlikely to have envisaged a year in Ireland without making ample provision for his comfort. Any difference between his 1394 and 1399 preparations in this matter can easily be explained as either the result of his experience of Dublin standards in 1394-5 or his close contact since then with the luxury enjoyed by the French court. The king could not have been expected, on an expedition planned to last one year, to content himself with the bare essentials of a brief military campaign.

Not only did the household organization provide Richard with many aids to his comfort, enabling him to go suitably equipped to impress his subjects in Ireland, but it also arranged for the presence of certain essential personnel. Embroiderers were needed to help in the making not only of the king's courtly clothing but also of his military apparel, and banners.[3] Painters were also required, to decorate various items of the military equipment with the king's arms and other emblems.[4] In addition the king would need his minstrels, not to divert him and his court from the serious business in hand, but to provide necessary

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1 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 381
2 See below, p 488 ff.
3 E 361/5/9; below, pp 436-7; C.P.R. 1396-9 p 550
4 E 361/5/9; below, p 437.

entertainment during the frequent and inevitable delays, an important antidote to boredom and disaffection. The approval which the French chronicler of the expedition expresses when describing the musical entertainments shows how acceptable it was to contemporaries, even when engaged on campaigns.[1]

While there remains no doubt that Richard through his household brought many goods of value with him to Ireland, the evidence does not suggest that the scale of preparations was greater than one might expect on any royal expedition. The extravagance of the claims made--such as the suggestion that Richard brought the coronation oil with him to Ireland[2]--must be treated with caution as they so clearly reflect the circumstances of the deposition.

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The real importance of the household on Richard's Irish expeditions seems in short to have lain neither in the sense that the army was an enlarged household serving under the guidance of household officers, nor in the fact that it provided Richard with the comforts of court, but in the contribution of individuals attached to Richard through household office. At any level of organization the household could expedite business. On the expedition itself particular officials, such as William Scrope, might be used on diplomatic missions, concerning for instance the Irish submissions.[3] The household's most obvious work lay, however, in the administrative organization of the expedition. In some respects household offices, such as the privy wardrobe, possessed stores necessary for any military expedition, and would have made important disbursements to commanders whether or not the king took the field. Inevitably the role of such departments acquired an added significance when a royal expedition was being prepared. The following

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1 Archaeologia, xx, pp 19, 60-1.
2 Eulogium Historiarum, iii, 380.
3 Curtis, Richard II. p 140

sections, concerning the detailed organization of shipping, provisions and the army, repeatedly refer to the household and its officers. Their contribution was, it must be stressed, administrative rather than political—the expeditionary force which they efficiently brought into being was not, so far as we can tell, subsequently directed or controlled by household agency.

Part ii — The organization of shipping, 1399

It is possible to reconstruct only a skeletal picture of the shipping arrangements made for the transport of troops and equipment to Ireland, the evidence being in general limited to the work of certain officers who subsequently accounted at the exchequer for prests received and wages disbursed. In this, as in so many other areas, some accounts seem to have been pardoned or forgotten in the confusion following the deposition.[1] We have few details of masters and mariners or their ships--too limited to suggest their total numbers; we know nothing of the difficulty with which their arrest was accomplished; there is no evidence of the adaptation of ships for horses and troop transport, and there is, finally, virtually no information on the shipping strength of the returning army. The material does however provide an interesting account of how the whole business of shipping impressment operated, as well as yielding important details about the expedition itself.[2]

In the replacement on 16 January 1399 of John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset, as admiral of the fleet in the north and west and in Ireland

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1 See above, p 8, n 2

2 The main general sources drawn on in the following section were Sir N.Nicolas, A short history of the royal navy, vol ii, passim; H.J. Hewitt, The organization of war under Edward III, esp. chapter iv; the shipping arrangements on Richard's first expedition are examined in Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', pp 138-40.

by Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, we see the first move towards the expedition's naval organization.[1] Percy, who was simultaneously steward of the household, was given power to appoint deputies when not at liberty to discharge his duties as admiral. His appointment shows the utilization of experienced household officers in the administration of the expedition. We have no details of his activities as admiral, but he presumably exercised a general supervisory and co-ordinating role in shipping arrangements, as admirals normally did during military campaigns.

Shipping for the army seems to have been the first aspect of the expedition's administration to receive attention. On 7 February a writ of aid was issued enabling Thomas Wodyngfeld, king's sergeant at arms, to take shipping of twenty-five tons and upwards from Colchester, Orwell and Ipswich to Newcastle on Tyne and to see that it reached Milford Haven or Bristol by 6 April. On the same day similar writs were issued for John Parant, covering the area from Southampton to London; for Robert Markely, from Poole to Devon, Cornwall and Somerset; and for Simon Blakebourn in north and south Wales, Chester, Lancaster and Bristol. The ships collected in south Wales were to assemble at Haverford; those in north Wales Chester and Lancaster at Liverpool and Chester.[2] On 11 February Robert Markely, Thomas Wodyngfeld and Simon Blakebourn all received wages of £5 for the arrest of ships and mariners. John Parant similarly received £4, his payment specifying that this arrest of mariners and ships was made 'for the voyage of the lord king going in his own person to Ireland with the dukes, earls, barons, knights and other esquires of his following'.[3] The names of these men recur in prests during the next three months; they were clearly those

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 479
2 ibid., p 511
3 E 403/561 (11 February)

primarily responsible for the preliminary impressment of ships and mariners. On 14 April another sergeant at arms is seen to have joined this work, as Richard Kays was paid wages of £4 to arrest ships and barges, with sufficient mariners to sail them, in north Wales, Chester and Liverpool.[1] On 15 April Kays received a writ of aid enabling him to arrest all such ships of twenty-five tons and upwards.[2]

Little evidence survives to show what difficulties were encountered by the king's men in their attempts to impress vessels, though one may presume that merchant shipping resented this disruption of its normal business. There were occasional protests about the thorough way in which these officers impressed all likely vessels. On 16 March, for instance, Thomas Wodyngfeld was ordered to release several vessels of Norfolk as they were suitable only for fishing.[3] This rare glimpse of the way in which impressment could affect the seafaring community also indicates that arrests went ahead fairly quickly once the orders had gone out in February. Further confirmation of this can be found in a notice of 3 May when Simon Blakebourn was paid to go to the Isle of Wight and enquire there whether or not the shipping in the area was friendly.[4] It is clear that Blakebourn had finished his work of recruiting masters and men in the Welsh area, and that John Parant, responsible for shipping around the Isle of Wight, was no longer in the vicinity when the suspicious looking craft was sighted.

The work of these sergeants at arms was essentially preliminary: they were not usually charged with the payment of the masters of ships and mariners. Thus when on 27 March Wodyngfeld was paid a further £5 wages Ralph Branketre, clerk, was given a similar amount as his wages for paying the masters and mariners arrested by Wodyngfeld.[5] The prest

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1 E 403/562 (14 April)
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 584
3 C.C.R. 1396-9 p 446
4 E 403/562 (3 May)
5 E 101/328/1 (27 March); Prestita Roll.

of £100 given to Branketre on 14 April presumably represents the money he would have needed in this task of paying 'wages of mariners arrested in northern parts by Thomas Wodyngfeld'.[1] Different officers were similarly commissioned to pay the mariners arrested by other sergeants at arms. Again on 14 April—the day when Parant, Markely and Blakebourn all received further wages on their commissions to arrest ships--Geoffrey Colet, clerk, was given £200, with an additional £5 for his wages, to pay the wages of mariners arrested by John Parant from the Bridge of London to the port of Southampton and the Isle of Wight, and to speed their assembly at Bristol, Haverford and Chester.[2] Further information on Colet's part in the payment of mariners is given on 12 July when he was named as a clerk of the Exchequer of Receipt, being given additional wages of £12.14.0 for his expenses on various tasks, including the carriage of a sum of money to Chester for delivery to certain clerks who were to pay the mariners there. Occupied on this business for twenty-six days--from 12 April when he left London till his return on 7 May--his expenses included the wages of three archers and the hiring of two horses, going in his company for the safe carriage of the said money.[3] It was on 14 April too that John Bentely, esquire, received £133.6.8 to pay the mariners arrested by Simon Blakebourn from Bristol to Cardygan in Wales. His wages were £6.13.4 and at the same time, for the same wages, Roger Handanby, clerk, was similarly sent with £200 to pay the mariners arrested by Markely in Devon and Cornwall. John Newbold, clerk, meanwhile received £66.13.4 with £4 wages to pay the various ships arrested by Kays in north Wales, Chester and Liverpool.[4]

As the impressed shipping made its way to the west those connected

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1 E 403/562 (14 April)
2 ibid.
3 E 101/328/1 (12 July)
4 ibid., (14 April); most of the items on this prestita roll can also be found on the issue rolls for this year--i.e. E 403/561, 562.

with its assembly, and particularly the clerks of wages involved in its payment, continue to be mentioned, while the sergeants at arms responsible for the original prests tend to disappear from view. On 13 May John Newbold received £133.6.8 from Geoffrey Colet--presumably part of the money on the transport of which from London to Chester Colet received the protection mentioned above. This was to be used to make payments with in Liverpool and Chester.[1] Colet was not alone in this task of bringing money for shipping from London, for on 12 July a certain Roger Westwode received £7.5.5 as wages for himself and those engaged with him on the safe conduct of £11,000 of the king's money which was being sent to Milford to make payments there concerning the king's passage.[2] It is not known what became of this large sum, but presumably a considerable proportion was intended for the payment of troops rather than mariners. The July entry must refer back to Westwode's activities of earlier months, for it was probably from this sum that on 13 May Westwode delivered to John Bentley £333.6.8 to pay mariners arrested in Bristol, Bridgewater and Barnestaple, and gave £101 to John Chamberleyn, master of the king's ships.[3] On the same day he gave to John Henour, esquire, £1,193.11.1 to pay the wages of 'masters and mariners of various ships being under arrest in the ports of Milford and Waterford'.[4] This entry is particularly interesting, for not only is it the first mention of impressment in Ireland for the current voyage, but the large amount pinpoints Milford as the likely centre for embarkation, despite the fact that some shipping assembled further north.[5] It furthermore indicates an advanced state of preparation which fits in well with the chronicler's statement that the royal party was waiting at least ten days before a favourable wind came

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1 E 403/562 (13 May)
2 ibid., (12 July)
3 ibid., (13 May)
4 ibid.
5 Above, p 418.

about 29 May.[1]

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As the arrest of shipping by the king's sergeants at arms concerned commercial ships which were not normally involved in the transport of troops or royal expeditions, to concentrate on this may lead to a false emphasis, for the nucleus of the naval force which assembled at Milford was certainly the king's own ships. Because they were constantly in royal service their activities do not suddenly become a matter of record--as with the commercial shipping--and in John Chamberleyn's account as master of the king's ships the common problem arises of trying to separate purely expeditionary items from the rest. One can, however, see something of the role of these ships prior to the expedition. Chamberleyn accounts for various disbursements to three masters of the king's ships--John Bremhill, master of the 'Gracedieu de la Tour', Richard Elys, master of 'la Nicholas de la Tour', and John Mayhewe, master of 'la Trinite de la Tour'.[2] Sometime in February these vessels were sent to Portugal to buy and transport wines for the king's household. Mayhewe, in the 'Trinity', arrived at Milford on 7 March, where he waited with the wines in his custody until 18 April for the expedition to begin. The two other royal ships spent from 3 March to 18 April similarly waiting in the Thames. On 14 April Chamberleyn, as clerk of these ships, received £100 to repair certain defects within them and to do some new work to them in preparation for the Irish voyage.[3] On 13 May at Pembroke in Wales he received £101 prest

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1 Archaeologia, xx, p 19

2 E 364/39/F; unless otherwise stated all the following details come from this account of Chamberleyn's.

3 E 403/562 (14 April); Devon, Issues of the exchequer, pp 269-70, uses this item as authority for the statement that new ships were made, but it seems more likely, from the wording and the amount, that repairs and adaptations were all he was required to do.

for the wages of Mayhewe and others, 'being in the king's ships and barges', both for the trip to Portugal and the Irish expedition.[1] The bargeas in question may have been either the two other royal ships already named, by now arrived from London, or different vessels not named in the account. During the period he was allegedly waiting at Milford to embark, John Mayhewe, master of the 'Trinity', at least was not inactive. On 3 May he received 40/-, 'being sent by sea to Bristol to search there for cables and other equipment both to set up a rudder and for the good state of the said ship'. He journeyed not in the 'Trinity' but in a certain small boat (batellus).[2] Many of the extensive repairs and buying of equipment which Chamberleyn's account refers to but does not date probably took place at this time.

Some of these repairs may have concerned not only the king's three ships but arrested commercial vessels too. The royal ships, recently made ready for a trip to Portugal, were unlikely to have needed more large scale repairs.[3] The heading of Chamberleyn's account in itself indicates that more was involved than the overhaul of the three named vessels. It speaks of 'the repair and improvement of the king's ships, barges, balingers, and small boats', though again one is left uncertain whether these vessels constituted the king's permanent naval force or included temporarily arrested shipping. This account refers to various items bought between 14 April and 29 September, and this long period makes it even more difficult to be precise about the charges incurred by the expedition itself. On the whole it seems likely that the various kinds of ropes--e.g. skenes de twyne, ropes vocata hausers, corda vocata wyndynhauser, corda vocata bowlynes, corda pro knottyng--cables and other equipment like lanterns, tar and timber were for the royal

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1 E 403/562 (13 May)
2 ibid., (3 May)
3 E 364/39/F

ships themselves, though presumably a large supply could be disbursed to other ships if required. The master of the king's ships was not apparently required to ensure that all impressed ships were adequately fitted out. That the three royal ships were accompanied by smaller vessels is evident from the heading of Mayhewe's expenses, 'concerning the said ship, the 'Trinity',and a batellus attached to the said ship' --probably the very batellus in which Mayhewe went from Milford to Chester to find equipment for the ship. The supplies mentioned are mostly miscellaneous naval items, but it is interesting to note the provision of 'one trestle table with two trestles ordered for the said king'. This item, along with the fact that the two other royal ships --the 'Nicholas' and the 'Gracedieu'--received far less in the way of new equipment strongly suggests that the 'Trinity' was the ship made ready to carry the king himself. In all, expenses on equipment during these months came to £105.7.11½.[1]

It would be misleading to see arrangements concerning the king's ships as different in character from arrested shipping in general. The royal navy was embryonic, and similar special commissions were required to make the king's ships ready for an expedition as were needed to impress civilian shipping. Thus, for instance, on 16 April Richard Elys, master of the 'Nicholas',was instructed to arrest twenty-five mariners; John Brembre, of the 'Gracedieu', was similarly required to arrest forty-five mariners at the king's charges.[2] As the 'Nicholas' in all only had twenty-five mariners and the 'Gracedieu' forty-eight, they plainly had no permanent crew of any size.[3] The payment of these crews also demonstrates how little autonomy the king's personal naval resources had, for though the masters were paid by John Chamberleyn he

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1 E 364/39/F

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 584; 'Brembre' is the form given here, but this presumably refers to the man called 'Bremhill' in Chamberleyn's account.

3 E 364/39/F

was paid from the same fund that was used to pay the masters of arrested commercial shipping. On 13 May, for instance, he received a prest of £101 from Roger Westwode in Pembroke.[1]

Although of these paymasters only John Bentely and John Newbold appear to have rendered account specifically for shipping prests, the information they provide adds considerably to our picture of naval arrangements. John Bentely describes how the mariners arrested by Simon Blakebourn served on a voyage from 14 May to 5 June. In fact, Richard landed in Waterford on 1 June,[2] but it seems that the expedition was delayed by bad weather and may well have been in readiness at Haverford and Liverpool from 14 May.[3] As Bentely was instructed to arrange for the passage of the arrested shipping to Liverpool and Haverford, it seems logical to assume that there were two distinct gatherings in these different ports. The larger group paid by Bentely served for twenty-one days (from 14 May - 5 June), and consisted of forty-five masters of forty-five ships, barges and balingers and sixteen constables—each at 6d a day. Mariners numbering 556 were paid 3d a day, each one receiving a regard of 6d for each of the three weeks served. The total payment was £215.14.0. The other group served for only fourteen days, no dates being mentioned. This was an inferior force; although there were forty-nine masters with their ships there were only fifty mariners and apparently no constable. This group received regarda for two weeks and was in all paid £131.13.6. Finally Bentely himself received £1.3.4 for carrying the money from London to Bristol and Wales with a guard of archers.[4]

As John Newbold's account was more detailed we can establish fairly

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1 E 403/562 (13 May); see above, p 421
2 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters from Richard II', p 289.
3 Above, pp 421-2.
4 E 364/43/C; the details about these ships and crews were given in a certain roll of particulars which does not seem to have survived.

exactly the shipping strength paid by him.[1] Newbold, a clerk, was appointed by the treasurer to make these payments, on which task he received £470.13.4 from April to July. The final instalment of £266.13.4.was said to have been given to him by Robert Parys, chamberlain of Chester, on 30 July.[2] Newbold was allegedly occupied in making shipping payments from 14 April until the end of August when he returned to London--a surprisingly long time after the expedition itself had ended. It is likely that during this period he helped to organize the shipping of the Duke of Aumarle and the return shipping to England.[3] At various times he sent messengers to the king and the treasurer at London, keeping them informed of the number of ships and mariners arrested to date. The ports to which these vessels were to be brought were named as Chester, Bristol and Haverford. The list he gives of fifty-five masters and ships is particularly interesting, for, although the details of account state that the ships were arrested at different places in north Wales, Chester and Liverpool, at least fourteen vessels came from Ireland.[4] The wages of masters covered the period from 24 April to the last day of July.

One of Newbold's payments--to John Montagu, Earl of Salisbury--is specially worth noting in that it suggests a rather different arrangement for paying shipping expenses. Salisbury received £24 from Newbold and apparently himself paid various masters and mariners of different ships which were ready at Poole to take the earl to Ireland on 28 May. There is no evidence that other commanders played a similar role in the payment of ships. There seem however to have been precedents for

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1 E 364/36/I and E 101/531/31; enrolled account and particulars, rendered by his executors in 1401-2.

2 E 364/36/I

3 The date should probably read 31 July; see below, p 430.

4 For this shipping see below, Appendix VII, pp 565-6. This system of using two embarkation points parallels arrangements for the first expedition. (e.g. C.P.R. 1391-6 p 520)

this practice from the first expedition, when the orders for arrest of shipping sometimes specifically stated that the vessels were for the use of a particular commander.[1]

In a few cases the masters who made indentures with the king's officers prior to the expedition and received prests from men like Newbold did give corroborative evidence of these arrests and payments in their own accounts. For instance, in 1403-4 William Hucheron, and John Hucheron of 'Swanwych' and Nicholas Dygonell, master of 'la Margaret' of Corfe, accounted for £31.13.4 received by them, at 6d a day, and their forty-seven mariners, at 3d a day, from 21 April,

> on which day they were arrested by the aforesaid Richard Kays at Poole in Dorset...and for sailing from there to Haverford, awaiting there the arrival of the king, and for sailing from there to Ireland and returning thence into England until 22 August then following, on which day they returned to Poole.(2)

As late as 1410-11 similar accounts were rendered by John Bigbroke and Richard Bawe, also masters of ships arrested by Kays and paid by Newbold.[3] In the same year Richard Butte and Nicholas Shawe accounted for £9.6.8 likewise received by them. Their period of service is said to have been from 9 April, when they were arrested at Sutherland, to 15 August, when they returned to England. Thomas Caudray, John Belle and Adam Towneshende accounted at the same time for their services from 14 April until the last day of July.[4] It is said that the ships were impressed to convey men and horses but there is no mention of any necessary adaptation of them to suit this purpose. Equipping with specially broad gangways and hurdles to separate animals in transit was essential before an ordinary ship could safely transport horses.[5] Such refitting may have been included in the aliis expensis necessariis

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1 e.g. C.P.R. 1391-6 p 523
2 E 364/38/E
3 E 364/45/D
4 ibid.; see also particulars in E 101/42/9.
5 Hewitt, Organization of war, pp 79, 86-7.

mentioned, for instance, in Bigbroke's account, but the omission of detail from the accounts suggests that this work was the responsibility of the king's officers themselves.

Of the masters of the king's ships, only the account of John Mayhewe has survived. It covers the period when he went to Portugal and after the expedition until 29 September and therefore includes many expenses unconnected with the Irish enterprise.[1] Mayhewe names John Spencer as the clerk lately appointed to pay the wages and regarda of masters, constables and mariners of ships, barges and other vessels for the passage of the king, 'Thomas, late Duke of Gloucester', and other unspecified people and for their repassage to England. As the account definitely refers to the second expedition the reference to the Duke of Gloucester would appear to be in error for Thomas Despencer, Earl of Gloucester.[2] Although Spencer, who had served in this capacity as a paymaster on the first expedition,[3] is here said to have been appointed by the council, whereas Newbold was named by the treasurer, their function in disbursing money for shipping seems to have been similar. It is possible that other such paymasters were also appointed.

In general Mayhewe's account confirms that of John Chamberleyn. Mayhewe and one constable were paid 6d a day, and were accompanied by fifty-two mariners at 3d a day and sixteen boys at 1½d a day. The mariners received a weekly regard of 6d each from 18 April until 22 August, during which time the wages for the voyage were paid. Mayhewe also received three casks of flour as a prest at Milford, and subsequently two more casks at Dublin, but otherwise little is known of the victualling of these ships.[4]

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1 E 364/40/B

2 The error is repeated also in the particulars, E 101/42/11, and in the memoranda rolls, E 159/182, Mich. br. dir. baron., m 30.

3 E 364/33/E

4 These prests appear in Carp's account in the household, E 361/5/26, and see below, p 429.

Household sources provide more information relevant to this question of victualling the ships. Carp's account records that flour and wine prests were made to seventeen masters, ranging in amounts from £55.16.2 to £2.4.2. The majority of the items have the marginal 'separately received by them from Richard Hamme at Dublin as prest on wages of themselves and their mariners being in the said ships'. The three royal ships and some of the vessels paid by Newbold are named, but the remainder feature in no extant account.[1] As the prests that are recorded here were mostly made in Dublin and were relatively few in number, they probably do not demonstrate the normal method of providing ships with victuals, but an unusual procedure resulting from the hasty return to England of either the Earl of Salisbury or of Richard.[2] Although prest upon wages was a familiar method of releasing provisions during war, there is no sign that disbursement of household supplies to masters of ships was their normal source of victuals.[3] We have, unfortunately, no information about any other more usual method.

The difficulties in finding evidence of Richard's shipping for the expedition apply particularly to the return voyage. On the outward journey orders were duly enrolled and payments made from the English exchequer, but the rapidity with which Richard left Ireland and his probable use of the Irish chancery to organize the army's return means that very few records actually survive. It is interesting to note that the king's sergeants at arms were apparently engaged in arresting ships in England for the king's repassage, though none of the exchequer references to this work give any detail of the date of the return voyage or the shipping strength. Thomas Wodyngfeld, for example, is merely said to have been involved in the arrest of ships for the king's

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1 E 361/5/26

2 Below, pp 478-80.

3 A.E.Prince, 'The army and navy', in The English government at work, ed. J.F.Willard, and W.A. Morris, i, 374-5.

repassage, receiving 44/2½ for the task.[1] He subsequently accounted for his work in arresting shipping for the outward journey and for various other tasks and presumably as a result of this was quit of further obligation to account.[2] Simon Blakebourn and Robert Markely, whose accounts cover the period up until 20 June and 12 June respectively, do not seem to have been involved in the return expedition, though they may well have arrested the shipping in which the Duke of Aumarle joined Richard at Dublin.[3] References to Richard Hembrigge and to Henry Rither are more informative. Rither, as esquire, was commissioned by letters patent[4] to arrest ships for the king's repassage and to pay mariners. There is no record of any account, either for him or for Hembrigge, but the writ freeing the latter from account shows that he too was involved in the arrest of ships.[5]

These references, though offering no detail, do at least demonstrate that the royal return was, despite its unusual haste, at least partly organized through the familiar agencies. Further confirmation of this comes from the accounts concerning particular ships which were in the royal service long after the Irish expedition had begun, sometimes until the end of July or into August. Among such ships were for instance those arrested by Kays and paid by Newbold for a period from 14 April until 31 July.[6] Obviously these vessels were still available to Richard when he decided to return to England. It would appear therefore that the shipping did not all immediately disperse upon arrival in Ireland, although presumably many masters seized an opportunity to slip away.[7]

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1 E 159/177 Trinity, br. dir. baron. m 17

2 E 364/36/H; see also Pipe Roll E 372/245, Item London.

3 E 364/36/H; E 364/38/E; Archaeologia, xx, p 45.

4 There is no sign of these letters in the Calendar of Patent Rolls.

5 E 372/245, Item London; E 372/247, Item London.

6 E 101/42/9, E 101/531/31; cf Enrolled Account, E 364/36/I, which says that Newbold was busy until 31 August, apparently in error for 31 July. See also E 364/38/E, and above, p 426.

7 This regularly happened on continental campaigns. See Hewitt, Organization of war, pp 91-2.

While any conclusion on the strength of the return shipping must remain tentative, it seems certain at least that Richard was not quite without naval support when news reached him of the crisis in England but possessed a sufficient nucleus to transport part of the army immediately and the remainder of his force without too long a delay.

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As regards the overall picture of naval support on the expedition, there appears to be sufficient evidence of efficient organization to indicate shipping arrests and associated activities of a normal pattern. While the information leaves us in doubt on many important aspects, it does at least indicate that by early May shipping of considerable strength was already assembled at two centres--to the north near Chester and Liverpool and to the south in the Milford/Haverford area--waiting a favourable moment to embark for Ireland.

Part iii Commissariat arrangements

Very little material of any kind is available on the subject of commissariat arrangements for the expedition. Evidence for both Irish ventures centres on the role of the household, whose officers were responsible for much of the preliminary work in the provision of victuals. The use of the form 'for the king's household' in orders concerning the provision of victuals shows how the army itself was sometimes viewed as an enlarged household. One must be wary of overstating the political importance of this, for in itself the approach reveals little more than administrative convenience, a natural result of the king's own presence on the expedition. On the first expedition household officials were sent ahead to Ireland to make arrangements for entertainments and supplies.[1] Local purveyance by English sheriffs was

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1 C.P.R.1391-6, pp 448, 451 etc.

apparently intended primarily to feed the army on its way to Milford-haven, though provision was also made for English sheriffs to send supplies direct to Ireland.[1] It is probable that the same pattern was followed in 1399, though this cannot be proved. That the wardrobe had at least a strong interest in the task of providing victuals is seen in Carp's entry concerning £12,438, an unspecified part of which was owed 'to various creditors for different victuals bought from them for the expenses of the household'.[2] The account provides no further detail as to how this operation was carried out, and one is obliged to reconstruct the picture from a number of miscellaneous governmental records.

On 1 March John Stanley, controller of the household, and Robert Wytteney, knight, were granted a writ of aid to take sufficient boats for catching fish at sea for the expenses of the household in the Irish expedition and 'to stay as long as the king stays there, at his charges'. Three days later the same men were appointed to provide corn, coal, wood, hay, oats and other necessities for the household in Ireland, and to take workmen and employ them to stay there in the king's service as long as should stay in Ireland.[3] John Stanley, it should be noted, had accompanied Baldwin Raddington, the then controller of the household, on a similar commission in 1394, and presumably followed the same system as on that occasion. Although the details remain obscure, it is clear that these officers were intended to purvey in England as well as in Ireland. Need for sufficient supplies necessitated strict control of food sales in England, in which connection should be noted the petition presented and granted in Henry's first

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1 Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 140; C.C.R. 1392-6 pp 364, 406.
2 E 361/5/26
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 511, 480; Sir Richard Witney was harbinger of the household. (Tout, Chapters, iv, 54)

parliament that anyone might bring fish freely to London, notwithstanding a patent of prohibition dating from the time of Richard's journey to Ireland.[1] There is some hint that arrangements were not as thorough as was usual on such an expedition, in the grant of a licence on 26 March to Roger Scrope to export from England and Ireland 200 quarters of wheat without customs in order to supply provisions for the Isle of Man.[2] At the same time, the very necessity for this licence shows that export of grain was being carefully limited.[3] The importance of the household officers in the arrangements is emphasized in a writ of aid for William Monketon and seven others on 28 April, who, acting as deputies for Thomas Brounflete, chief butler, were to provide wines for the expenses of the household in England, Wales and Ireland and to arrange for their carriage on the king's journey to and return from Ireland.[4] Already by this time the king's ships had returned from Portugal with a consignment of wines which remained in their custody until the expedition began.[5] Presumably it was because wine was not readily available in large quantities in Ireland that it features so prominently in these preparations, while no such details survive describing the purveyance of more local products.

Information on some of these wines comes from records describing how Thomas Brounflete, Richard's butler, transferred goods in his possession after the expedition ended to the custody of John Mersshe in Ireland. These supplies included 56 tons and one pipe of Gascon wine, one ton of sweet wine, one ton of Osey, two buttes of Malmsey and five buttes of Romney, valuing in all £345.5.10.[6] A large proportion of this wine was not consumed in the course of the expedition, an

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1 Rot. Parl., iii, 444
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 498
3 This was customary during such an expedition. See e.g. the prohibition on the export of victuals in 1394-5, C.P.R. 1396-9 p 119.
4 C.P.R.1396-9 p 536
5 Above, p 422.
6 E 364/39/E

indication that the preparations in this quarter at least were sufficient for the brief duration of the campaign.

In general however record evidence on the provision of victuals is insufficient for one to assess the efficiency of arrangements. The chronicles are more informative, revealing that problems arose in connection with commissariat arrangements on the expedition which had not been encountered in 1394-5. Froissart's account of the first expedition praises those responsible for its organization, remarking upon the importance of the king's ability to keep the army in regular pay and food.[1] By comparison, the chronicler Creton testifies to the hardship undergone by the knights and horses within three weeks of landing at Waterford in 1399. Before leaving Kilkenny--'every man at the outset had made the best provision that he could of bread, wine and corn'. Shortly afterwards however the situation became critical:

> nothing was to be got; not even a penny-worth was to be bought by anyone who had not brought it with him. In this condition was the army obliged to remain eleven days, unable to find anything, save only a few green oats for the horses, which... were quite faint; and many of them perished of hunger. No one would believe the distress of the men, high and low....(2)

Although the degree of difficulty and hardship is probably exaggerated, it appears that when presented with a hostile territory allowing no opportunity to live off the land, the commissariat arrangements of the expedition collapsed.

The explanation for this breakdown in supplies probably lies in the long delay before the king reached Dublin. Creton claims that once there there was 'such abundance of merchandize and provisions that it was said that neither flour nor fish, bread, corn nor wine nor other store was any dearer for all the army of the king'.[3] This picture of

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1 Oeuvres de Froissart, xv, 168
2 Archaeologia, xx, 35
3 ibid., p 44; see also below p 474.

plenty is borne out by the fact that three relief ships laden with wine and provisions were sent from Dublin to help the hungry army.[1] That Richard's slow progress affected the provision of supplies is not surprising. He had delayed at least ten days before leaving Milford, and subsequently spent about a week in Waterford and a fortnight in Kilkenny awaiting the arrival of the Duke of Aumarle. Presumably the supplies brought with the army were soon used up, along with the prey of cattle taken by Surrey at the time of the king's arrival in Ireland.[2] Stanley's preparations, concentrated on Dublin, would it seems have been sufficient for the needs of the army had Richard not taken so long to reach this base of supply. Proof that in at least one area the supplies had been adequate is provided in an order sent over on 15 March 1400 to Robert Crull and Thomas Everdon, clerks, to sell the supplies of wood and coal left at Dublin 'of the provision of fuel made for the household of Richard II when he was last in Ireland'.[3] We also know that a surplus of wine was subsequently delivered to Henry IV's butler and other goods left in Ireland by Richard included a store of oats in Swords castle.[4]

Part iv -- The provision of arms, artillery and other equipment

The provision of arms and artillery, being issued usually from central stores which were required to account for deliveries, is a subject more fully recorded than the purveying of food. It is true that quantities of arrows might be ordered from the shires, and horses would certainly be locally purveyed, but heavy armour, and the trappings for a military expedition-- pavilions, for instance--were kept in store. The great wardrobe--described by Tout as a storehouse for spices, clothes,

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1 Archaeologia, xx, p 35
2 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters from Richard II', p 289.
3 Cal.Fine Rolls 1399-1403, p 50
4 Above, p 433; E 368/173 Trinity communia m 153; below pp 485-6.

and jewels with the duties of buying, manufacture of arms, storage, disbursement and accounts--is one focal point, but military equipment itself was mostly located in the privy wardrobe in the Tower of London.[1] These central stores were involved in the equipping of all military expeditions, and not solely concerned with the activities of the household.[2] Clearly, however, the participation of the king in these enterprises increased the importance of the household administration, a point exemplified by John Lufwyk's position during the second expedition as both keeper of the privy wardrobe and receiver of the chamber.[3] From the surviving wardrobe and household accounts some picture emerges of the organization of military supplies for the expedition.

John Macclesfeld, the elder, who had incidentally been with Richard on the first expedition,[4] accounted in 1399-1400 for his custody of the great wardrobe from Michaelmas 1398 for one year.[5] This enrolled account omitted many details. It reveals nothing, for instance, of the role of William Serle, named in a writ of allowance to Macclesfeld as a valet de robes in the king's chamber, receiving various items from the wardrobe.[6] Furthermore the lack of detail in the account makes it difficult to separate the wardrobe's normal business from that concerning the expedition. At best one knows the area of expense and the type of goods made available but not their quantity. Before 30 March 1399, for instance, Macclesfeld paid to Robert Ashecombe, the king's embroiderer, £333.6.2½ for his various expenses in making robes

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1 Tout, Chapters, iv, 469-77
2 ibid., p 450
3 E 364/34/G (account as receiver of the chamber); E 364/34/D, (account as keeper of the privy wardrobe).
4 See Tout, Chapters, iv, 386,n, for biographical details.
5 E 361/5/9 & 10.
6 E 159/177 Hilary br. dir. baron., m 30.

and clerical garments with hoods and other necessaries, as well as for the stitching of various standards for the king and others for the voyage to Ireland. Obviously such items required some time to prepare. After this date he paid John Cavendish, Ashecombe's successor in office, £255.19.11¾ for his expenses in embroidering various sleeveless tunics, banners, mantels, canopies and other things with the king's arms tam pro pace quam pro guerre for his journey to Ireland. Other vague entries mention a total of £351.12.0 paid to Thomas Prince, pictor, including work for the jousts at Lichfield at Christmas as well as the stamping of various trappings, coats of arms, banners, penons and pensells with different arms both of the king and others for the voyage to Ireland. Again, the payment of £143.1.10½ for Macclesfeld's own expenses in the carriage of various beds and other equipment of the king's from the wardrobe in London to Lichfield, Windsor, Westminster and to Chester and other places towards Ireland was included with various other costs within the great wardrobe, such as supplies for the funeral of the Duke of Lancaster in March. The same lack of detail is seen in a list of disbursements to various royal officials. Ashecombe and Cavendish received unspecified goods in their functions as king's embroiderers; Stephen atte Fryth, the king's armourer, was given requirements for making 'equipment for the king's body, both for peace and war, in the said voyage and elsewhere'; William Wyncelowe, king's pavillioner, was occupied in the safeguarding and repair of various tents; Adam atte Wode, valet of the king's beds, was responsible for their store, and the custody of various canopies and other equipment both in England and Ireland;[1] Thomas Thorn, the king's usher, had the care of various hangings and their packing; Giles Frensh, valet of

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1 E 403/562 (15 April) shows Adam being paid at the exchequer in the name of Macclesfeld for this task.

the privy wardrobe in Windsor, was also responsible for certain royal bedding, its packing and safe conduct to Ireland: John Spertgrave, clerk of the spicery, was given items for his store in Ireland and John Boor, dean of the king's chapel in his household, was given goods to enable his repair of various vestments and ornaments in his care and their transport to Ireland at different times. Other less obviously expeditionary items include the delivery of stores to Christopher Tildesley, goldsmith, for his repair of various ornaments--though this particular delivery may be related to John Boor's commission.[1]

A long list follows of the goods released to these officers, but it is impossible to say who received which items. The following account gives an idea of the miscellaneous nature of stores in the great wardrobe's custody, some of which may have been of use in the Irish enterprise:

> 2,550 hammars and eight iron hammars, one axe, 100 scuti de papiro de armis Regis depictis, four haubercs, one pair of mail arms, two pairs of steel arms, two cuirasses, twelve leather belts, 300 buckles of copper, one trestle table, one pair of trestles, one smelting furnace, one trussyngbed, one portable altar made of wood, ten banners of worsted stitched with the king's arms, ten standards of worsted similarly stitched, four pensells stamped with the king's badge, 84 throngs of gilt silver for the body armour of the king's hauberc, belt and doublet....

The wardrobe could undoubtedly fill a variety of needs and the demands made upon it by the Irish expedition were bound to have been considerable.

Macclesfeld's account also records the deliveries made to Richard Redeman, as master of the warhorses and other great horses of the king. Roger Javyn and Hicholas Harewod, clerks of the king's stable, received various saddles, harnesses, halters, bridles, surcingles, stirrups, headpieces and other equipment, though not all were for the actual expedition. These concerned the king's own following--commanders with indentures like Aumarle, Salisbury and others would have supplied their

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1 Most of these officials were familiar royal servants and accompanied the expedition; e.g. John Boor, Thomas Prince and Christopher Tildesley. (C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 545, 566, 573)

own men with horses.[1] Some of the items thus delivered to Redeman seem to have been elaborately decorated--as for instance 100 scutcheons of worsted, embroidered with the king's arms and those of St Edward. Presumably most of the equipment was taken to Ireland, but items like 'one high saddle for jousting' are more doubtful. An unspecified amount of these goods was probably unconnected with the needs of the expedition. Although the surviving indentures did not stipulate it, compensation seems to have been paid for horses lost in service, in accordance with the usual practice, and Carp's household account includes an item of £8,444.13.10 covering certain miscellaneous gifts, fees and robes as well as 'the buying of horses for various officers of the household and the restoration of horses made to different clerks esquires and officers of the king'.[2]

Of all Macclesfeld's deliveries, those to Redeman can alone be corroborated by the recipient's own account.[3] Redeman, who was one of Richard's Cheshire knights,[4] was imprisoned at Chester after landing with Richard from Ireland, and either disposed of his horses or had a number stolen from him. His account, covering the entire year, gives no details as to the number of horses brought to Ireland. It shows that Redeman bought and sold horses as the need arose, receiving animals also at different times as gifts of the king. In this context should be noted the writ of aid on 2 March for Hugh Chadesle, appointed until 29 September to purvey locally the necessary horses for wagons and carts for the Irish expedition.[5] As the order also required the provision of all necessary equipment, which appears to have been the great wardrobe's concern,[6] it is possible that Chadesle was proceeding

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1 e.g. E 101/69/1/301; see Hewitt, Black Prince's expedition, p 32.
2 E 361/5/26
3 E 364/37/D
4 E 101/42/10; Chester muster roll of Michaelmas 1398; see below, p501.
5 Foedera, viii, 67
6 e.g. Redeman - Macclesfeld indenture; E 101/403 file 19 no 47.

on wardrobe instructions. The purveyed goods would then be handed over to Redeman. A suggestion that the results were inadequate is seen in the appointment of John Hilton on 10 June, after the expedition had begun, to buy sufficient horses at the king's charge and to deliver them to Redeman, or his deputy, though if these horses ever reached Ireland is unknown.[1] Local officers were also involved in procuring these supplies--the sheriffs of Essex and Hereford for example were later distrained upon to account for horses, mares, arms, bows and arrows arrested after Michaelmas 1398.[2] Of particular interest is Redeman's reference to the sale of three horses--two 'trotters', and one 'palfrey'--which had been weakened in the journey from Ireland.

John Lufwyk's important account as keeper of the privy wardrobe also covers the full year, but its lack of clarity in describing the expeditionary effort is to some extent compensated for by the surviving roll of particulars.[3] By no means all the goods itemized in Lufwyk's enrolled account came to Ireland. The significance of the privy wardrobe's role in Ireland should not be overstated, for it was by this time primarily a place of safe custody rather than an active department.[4] Its yearly receipts were low, revenue often coming mainly from the sale of old stock.[5] Undoubtedly the needs of the Irish expedition stimulated the activity of the wardrobe, though the absence of information about other sources of military supplies--such as local stores--has perhaps given a false impression of the importance of this department.[6]

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 585

2 E 368/181 Hilary br. retorn., m 193.

3 E 364/34/D; the particulars are in E 101/403/20. Unless otherwise stated these are the sources for all the following details.

4 Tout, Chapters, iv, 469.

5 ibid., pp 465-6.

6 See Tout, 'Firearms in England in the fourteenth century', in Collected Papers of T.F.Tout, pp 243-5, on local stores as alternative sources of supply to the wardrobe.

The undoubted significance of the wardrobe's contribution in 1399 can be seen in Lufwyk's own arrival in Ireland with a considerable supply of military equipment--having apparently left the unwanted stores in the custody of a deputy in London.[1] He was responsible for providing the king with the armour and artillery required for the campaign, for its transport to Ireland and presumably for its disbursement when required. Supplies were not simply handed over at the start of the expedition to the king or chief commanders, but remained in Lufwyk's custody throughout the period. His account specifies for instance the expenses of eighty carts from Waterford to Kilkenny and on to Dublin, and also describes the final transfer of goods by Luffwyk to the custody of Robert Crull in Dublin castle before Richard's return to England. This was apparently an emergency measure to leave the king free to travel quickly. Presumably the goods would normally have remained in Lufwyk's possession until used up.[2]

The first reference to stores of the privy wardrobe being sent to Ireland occurs on 10 April when the delivery of a variety of goods to the king was ordered. This list includes: 3,000 sheaves of arrows; 1,500 bows; 20 gross of cords for bows: 200 large shields (pavys); 200 long lances with 200 heads; 259 haubercs. Containers were also listed, presumably for the transport of the supplies: 29 long coffers; 70 short coffers; 7 Reynifact (?); 4 large cases for crossbows; 40 pipes; 60 empty barrels; and 7 leather bags. This, however, was not the entire supply. Lufwyk accounted in all for the carriage to Ireland of:

> 6,000 sheaves of arrows, 2,000 bows, 50 gross of cords for arrows, 500 large shields, 500 lances, 500 haubercs, 8 double guns with all the necessary apparatus--i.e. 200 round stones,

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1 Tout, Chapters, iv, 466
2 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 79

200 lbs of gunpowder, 200 tampons, 8 firpannes, 16 touches, 8 bellows and 8 hammars,

and also sufficient coffers, pipes and barrels for packing the above equipment. The items whose delivery was ordered on 10 April were obviously only one part of the equipment supplied at various times for use in Ireland.

The most interesting items in this list are the eight guns with their equipment. It is not known if these were used--all eight, their equipment apparently intact, were left in Dublin castle after the expedition. Some considerable trouble was taken over the preparation of these guns for the campaign: ten workmen for sixteen days and two for twenty-six days at sixpence a day were involved in their overhaul and in setting them on stands (truncatione); four men worked for eight days at twelve pence a day in rounding the 200 stones for the cannons. There is no way of knowing if these were the only guns taken to Ireland--certainly in every specific mention the number of guns is always given as eight, though Lufwyk had in his care in the wardrobe forty-three cannons of copper and iron with certain necessary equipment—108 lbs of saltpetre, 922 lbs of gunpowder, 848 lbs of lead pellets, 2,256 round stones, and many other items.

It is significant that Richard, already familiar with Irish warfare, should have thought these guns an advantage in 1399. The taking of castles does not normally feature in accounts of attempts to subdue the rebellious Gaelic chiefs, who did not customarily build or inhabit such fortified dwellings as would necessitate artillery. It was, however, known for the Irish to take and occupy Anglo-Irish castles, holding them against their late owners.[1] It was presumably the fear of such an eventuality which led to the order in 1400 that the castle

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1 e.g. Ferns in the 1350s; see Hore, History of Wexford, vi, 13.

of Kelaghmore be razed to the ground as it could not effectively be maintained.[1] There are references from about the same period to a castle in the hands of O'Byrne, and Richard himself had granted to O'Connor Don the custody of Roscommon castle, thus recognizing his effective possession of it.[2] As far back as 1331 it had been stated that the castles of Roscommon, Randown, Athlone and Bunratty were, with others, fallen into the hands of the Irish enemy.[3] Such cases of Anglo-Norman built defences lying in Gaelic hands were probably a common feature of Gaelic resurgence. Presumably Richard's new artillery was intended for use against such defences though it is possible that the rebel English comprised the prime target.

Other glimpses of the preparations of the privy wardrobe show that not all the goods sent were in supply. A list of articles purchased at a cost of £354.3.4 included about half the arrows and cords for bows, most of the bows and all the lances as well as sixty hatchets of war not mentioned among the items specified for use in Ireland.[4] On 28 March Robert Bridford, keeper of the king's bows in the Tower of London, was appointed to take 'bowyers and stryngers' for the making of bows for the Tower and for Calais and Ireland, and to put them to work at the king's expense.[5] On 26 April John Bushy clerk of the privy wardrobe was assigned £388.10.8 on behalf of Lufwyk from the exchequer for the provision of arrows for the expedition.[6] Lufwyk's account also contains details regarding the manufacture or purchase of barrels and long and short boxes for the carriage of weapons.[7] The privy wardrobe received most of its £500 income that year between the

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1 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 268
2 i.e. 'Kyllamehan' castle; see payment to constable Hugh Standish in E 404/16/750; for Roscommon castle see above, p 119.
3 Statutes and Ordinances, pp 335-7
4 E 364/34/D
5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 496
6 E 403/562 (26 April)
7 E 101/403/20

sum delivered on 26 April and £100 paid on 5 May to Lufwyk's clerk John Taunton for the provision of certain artillery.[1]

Many items had to be newly made or repaired. Twenty-two old haubercs helped to make and refit 500 haubercs--the work taking twenty men twenty-four days at 12d a day. Thomas Littleton, king's painter, received £83.6.8 for painting these in different colours. It took twenty workers sixty days, sixteen workers forty days and ten workers twenty days at 6d a day to make 500 new large shields. Twenty long boxes cost 3/3 each; seventy short ones cost 1/6 or 1/3 each and were used for the transport of artillery and other equipment. Eight hundred nails of varying prices were accounted for. The haubercs were carried in 60 barrels, and 40 pipes held the arrows and cords for bows. Finally, for packing the stores from the wardrobe into these containers eight workmen for ten days and ten for two days each received sixpence a day. The containers were brought from the Tower to the water in four days by eight workmen and then taken to Redcliff for embarkation, the protection of eighty casks during this journey costing 20/-. They were landed at Waterford at the cost of fourpence a cask, and then payments were made for the carriage of all eighty carts through Leinster to Dublin.[2]

These lists represented however only a fraction of the total goods in Lufwyk's charge in the privy wardrobe, and it is possible that some of the other armour in stock was also brought. A selection of such items might have included the following: 785 light helmets, 116 pairs of plate gloves, 845 large and ordinary shields, 21 fendours for ships, 5 springalds (siege engines) and 800 bolts for siege engines, 197 cuirasses, 9 sets of horse armour of mail, 9 pairs of thigh armour,

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1 E 101/328/1

2 E 101/403/20; see also below, p 475.

101 crossbows, 9,000 bolts for crossbows and 27,200 heads of such bolts, 190 pensells of silk and taffeta and 8,000 short lances called darts. There were many more such items, all of some military importance, but described here in such miscellaneous quantities that they had evidently been accumulated in the wardrobe over a number of years and were perhaps unsuitable for the 1399 campaign. The mention of springalds is interesting, for the account of that years shows that as well as fitting lances and arrows with head Lufwyk also fitted 255 springaldbolts with heads. There is no evidence that siege equipment was brought to Ireland and these preparations were possibly for continental use, but their inclusion with other, obviously expeditionary, expenses must be noted.

As mentioned before, a considerable proportion of the arms and artillery sent to Ireland was stored in Dublin castle when Richard returned to England. It is interesting to compare a list of these articles with the provisions we know to have been initially sent over. There were 141 haubercs, 500 bows, 3,000 sheaves of arrows, 30 gross of cords for bows, 300 lances, 400 heads of lances, 300 large shields, eight guns with stands for each gun, 200 lbs of gunpowder, 200 tampons, 200 round stones for guns, eight bellows, eight hammars, sixteen touches, eight fripannes.[1] The guns had not, it seems, been used, but it is difficult beyond that to speculate on the missing equipment. For instance, the 349 haubercs may have been issued at Waterford, or immediately prior to Richard's return to England, and the same is true of the lances, shields, and other depleted supplies. Whatever had happened to the goods it is clear that preparations had been

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1 E 364/34/H and E 101/403/20; a slightly different version, with storage details, is in C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 79.

adequate for the brief duration of the campaign. That the scale of the privy wardrobe's preparations was quite different from that of the great French expeditions is also apparent. In the 1350s, for instance, Rothwell in the privy wardrobe built up a peacetime stock of over 4,000 bows along with 23,000 sheaves of arrows and 340 gross of bow strings, and in 1359 preparatory to the king's expedition sent out orders to increase these supplies.[1] Certainly no one could with accuracy claim that Richard in 1399 drained England of all her military resources, or that the meeting of his requirements imposed a particularly heavy burden on the country.[2]

Part v — The strength of the army

Some of the most interesting conclusions about the organization of the 1399 expedition concern the army itself. It has already been pointed out that too concentrated attention upon the household sources led in the past to this enterprise being dismissed as 'of inferior military interest'.[3] This approach failed to consider the unity of the country's financial system where war prests could equally well be made by either the exchequer or the household. The majority of payments to Cheshire archers on the expedition were made, for instance, by prests from the household, but a few individual Cheshire knights received their money directly at the exchequer. When all these sources are examined the expeditionary force cannot be so easily dismissed.

The first mention of recruitment of troops for the expedition occurred on 24 February when a writ addressed to Richard de Venables, knight, and William de Breton, knight, and Thomas le Grosvenour in

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1 Hewitt, Organization of war, p 69
2 cf Ypodigma Neustria, p 381; above p 402.
3 Above, pp 404, 408-10.

Cheshire ordered the muster in the hundred of 'Northwic' of all men between sixteen and sixty, and the choice of eighty archers from this assembly to accompany the king to Ireland. They were to be ready from 14 April and the place of array was specified. Similar commissions were issued for six other areas, but not apparently for precisely the same numbers, for when one was reissued on 15 May in the name of two different arrayers the quota required was said to be sixty archers.[1] These musters may however have gathered as many as 400-500 archers.

Cheshire was already supplying Richard with a permanent retinue of some considerable size. A roll of Michaelmas 1398 described the retained force of the next six months as about 750 men, including ten knights and 97 esquires. The core of this retinue was 311 archers arranged in squadrons of 44-46 men each, under John Legh, Richard Cholmondeley, Ralph Davenport, Adam Bostok, John Donne, Thomas Beeston and Thomas Holford. Two reserve contingents made up the force of 750.[2] Presumably most of this force was still available to serve Richard on the second expedition. John Michel, king's sergeant at arms, was sent on 2 May to Chester to pay the king's esquires and knights, and his delivery of £2,639 to Robert Parys, king's chamberlain in Chester, for the wages of ten knights, 110 men at arms and 900 archers shows that the Cheshire retinue was slightly augmented during 1399.[3] The money delivered by Michel came from the household rather than the exchequer, but it seems probable that the £3,000 paid to the wardrobe as wages of war by the exchequer on 2 May actually included the sum which Michel was at that time commissioned to bring to Chester.[4] The money paid the troops for one quarter year, at the

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1 Chester 2/73; recognizance roll of the palatinate of Chester.
2 E 101/42/10, analyzed in R.R.Davies, 'Richard II and the principality of Chester', in du Boulay and Barron, Reign of Richard II, 268
3 E 403/562 (12 July)
4 ibid., 2 May

rate of 2/- a day for each knight, 12d a day for each esquire and 6d a day for each archer from 30 April when they began their journey from the city of Chester until 30 July.[1] The muster at Chester in late April was apparently taken by Geoffrey Colet, although he was not paid for this task until 12 July.[2]

In examining the recruitment of troops for the second expedition it is logical to connect the augmentation of the Cheshire retinue with the commissions of array ordered on 24 February. It seems that the men so recruited by the standard methods may have joined what was in fact Richard's personal force wearing his own livery. A consideration of the men involved in these commissions of array supports the theory, for several of them--such as Richard de Venables, John de Pulle and William de Legh—feature as knights and esquires in the bodyguard muster of 1398. Presumably to this same force also belonged the valetts of the county of Chester who on 13 May were paid £20.9.6 by Roger Westwode. Unfortunately no details of their names or position are known, beyond the fact that they were told to be present within 'Bostokwache' and 'Holfordwache' in the king's company at his wages from 1 June.[3] On the same day the exchequer issued, via Roger Westwode, £477.15.0 to Thomas Beston, Richard Cholmeley, John Lee, Adam Bostok, Ralph Davenport, 'esquires of county Chester', and 100 archers going with them to Ireland. These men formed part of the Cheshire retinue's core,[4] and their payment with 100 archers suggests that the force was not organized as one unit at this time.[5]

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1 E 364/37/E (Parys's account); the date of delivery to Parys is here said to have been 11 July, given on the issue rolls as 12 July. The issue roll entry refers however to a receipt between Michel and Parys already in the hanaper and it seems that the July date was merely the occasion of an official record of an earlier transaction.

2 E 403/562 (12 July)

3 ibid., 13 May

4 E 101/42/10; above, p 447.

5 E 403/562 (13 May)

The same conclusion is intimated by the payment to John Hasilton, valet of Chester, of £13.6.8 as wages of war for himself and forty-five archers going to Ireland.[1] In view of these independent entries it is impossible to be sure that Parys was responsible for paying the entire force from Cheshire.

In all, therefore, a considerable body of support came from Richard's new principality of Chester. At its most conservative estimate ten knights,110 men at arms and 900 archers, it could be extended by several hundred if the different entries refer to different contingents.

The first, and only specific, mention of other retainers of the crown in the expeditionary preparations came in a writ of 23 March sent out to all the sheriffs of England ordering them to proclaim:

> that all yeomen of the livery of the crown who take of the king yearly wages shall under pain of losing livery and wages draw speedily towards the city of London, to be there before the council on Wednesday in Easter week next ready to act as the council shall direct. (2)

There is unfortunately no information about the size or composition of these troops. Their payment was probably included in the £4,894.10.7 disbursed by the household as wages of war for Reginald de Grey de Ruthyn, banneret, and other bannerets, knights and esquires, clerks, valets, archers and other men in the king's service in Ireland.[3] Carp's account itself gives details only of about £33 paid to about fifteen named retainers, said to be receiving wages of war in Ireland. On 17 May deliveries were made to Thomas Brounflete (40/-); John

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1 E 403/562 (12 July)

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 489; the date in question was 26 March, and the summons cannot therefore have been meant literally. (cf Tout, Chapters, iv, 53, where the date is given as 2 April, the Wednesday after Easter.)

3 E 361/5/26; these deliveries were said to be made on 17 May, 21 R.II, but as the account does not cover that period and the early date is suspicious it seems probable that this is a mistake for 22 R. II (1399).

Waryn, John Oke, Ralph Stanley, Ralph Hamelyn, Robert Peyton, and Thomas Prynce (42/6 each); Christopher Tildesley (£10.5.0); John Eyn, Nicholas van Spire, John Sparrowe, Thomas Brigge, John Seward, Thomas Dawe and Stephen Letford (15/- each). Several of these men--Brounflete, Tildesley and Prince for example--are known to have been household retainers and the others presumably occupied similar positions.[1] The issue rolls show that de Grey received in Carp's name £99 on 16 April for himself and his retinue of 55 men, and that Stephen Scrope in the same way received £200.5.0 on 6 May,[2] but little further information is available on the household retinue or wardrobe payments.

It is difficult to understand all of Carp's entries or the connection between them and the issue roll payments. One cannot be sure, for instance, that Carp's reference to the wages of de Grey refers to the 16 April prest from the exchequer rather than to a later disbursement direct from Thomas More, paymaster of the wardrobe. The issue rolls show that the wardrobe actually was credited with £8,748 during the first fortnight in May, in four different prests.[3] These prests were all said to have been received by Thomas More himself, and presumably were intended for expeditionary payments rather than any normal wardrobe expenses. The discrepancy between this large sum and the figure of £4,894 which Carp admits to having disbursed as wages of war is perhaps partly explained by his expenses in buying horses, giving compensation for lost horses, and granting prests to various ships,

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1 Above p 436 etc

2 E 403/562 (16 April, 6 May); Webb, Archaeologia, xx, p 46 n, says that William Scrope was retained to serve with 40 men at arms and 100 archers, though in fact he stayed in England. Webb's authority is not given, but it seems possible that he confused the two brothers and that it was Stephen, not William, who made this indenture.

3 E 403/562 (2 May, 6 May, and two on 13 May).

but an element of uncertainty remains over the exact amount finally paid by the household in military expenses.[1]

Three other individuals involved in the expedition who should perhaps be seen as part of the household contingent were Edmund Holland, brother of the Duke of Surrey, Humphrey, son of the late Duke of Gloucester and Henry, son of the exiled Earl of Hereford. Although these three are not named in the wardrobe accounts, their rank as unknighted boys excludes any real comparison between them and other knights featuring on the issue rolls. In the military sense they might more properly be considered among the king's entourage. In this capacity, Edmund Holland, 'going in the king's company to Ireland', received £120 for his equipment and that of the men going with him.[2] The other two boys received prests of £148 each to enable themselves similarly to be equipped--pro armaturis Jackes Cotearmature et aliis harnesiis.[3]

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Considerably more information survives on the strength of the army that was contracted by indenture with different commanders. Few actual indentures are extant, and these are in rather poor condition, but the payments entered on the issue rolls frequently specified the size of the contingent, its composition and the length of intended service. The surviving indentures are those of Thomas, Earl of Gloucester, John, Duke of Exeter, and Edward, Duke of Aumarle. Gloucester on 10 April promised to serve with thirty-five men at arms--four knights and thirty-one esquires[4]--and 100 mounted archers, supplying

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1 E 361/5/26
2 E 403/562 (14 April and 2 May)
3 E 403/562 (2 and 6 May)
4 These figures are supplied from the issue roll E 403/562 (16 April), because of the poor state of the indenture, E 101/69/1/299.

one mason and one carpenter for each twenty archers. They were to be ready at the sea by 18 May, but were to receive pay for the first half of the first quarter from 13 April, the other half falling due when they reached the sea. No details were given of the pay or assignment of the remainder of the wages. The term of service, here indecipherable, is seen from other indentures to have been one year. In addition, shipping was to be provided for Gloucester at the king's costs. If the voyage were countermanded by the king, the earl would be held to repay all prests already received. The other indentures--poorly preserved--seem to be similar in all conditions except for the size of the contingents,[1] details of which are more easily supplied from the issue rolls. There Exeter's force is said to have been composed of 140 men at arms and 500 archers, and Aumarle's of four bannerets, twelve knights, 124 esquires and 600 archers.[2] From the same source we see that John, Earl of Salisbury, served with three knights, thirty-two esquires and 100 archers, Thomas Percy with two knights, thirty-four esquires and 100 archers. All these men received their first quarter's pay in two halves, on 16 April and 13 May. According to the conditions of Gloucester's indenture this suggests that by 13 May they were ready at the sea, but as we know that Aumarle at least was not this must have been a condition which might be waived.[3]

To these troops we must add the Duke of Surrey's force. Although Surrey was himself serving as lieutenant of Ireland, the issue rolls reveal that he was retained specially for the king's voyage to Ireland, contracting to serve him with a retinue of two bannerets, fourteen knights, 134 esquires and 800 archers.[4]

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1 E 101/69/1 nos 299-301

2 E 403/562 (16 April); Aumarle's indenture (E 101/69/1/301) definitely gives the figure 600 archers, but his payment of 13 May (E 403/562) reads 800 archers, and his retinue was possibly increased.

3 E 403/562 (16 April, 13 May); on his delay see below, pp 521-3.

4 E 403/562 (13 May)

It is possible that Richard wished to retain by indenture even more troops than this, if the story that Sir Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, and his son refused to agree to serve as requested can be believed. For this they were said to have been banished, the sentence subsequently being commuted.[1] There is certainly no evidence that either man went to Ireland in 1399. Furthermore, Percy was Bolingbroke's first source of support and seems to have been a focus of discontent at the time of the expedition.[2]

In all, however, prests to the contracted troops amounted to £6,194.14.6, guaranteeing the services of 536 men at arms and 2,400 archers.

The size of these contracted retinues is significant. Though fewer in number they were proportionately larger than those serving on the first expedition, and prove the inaccuracy of the claim that Richard's second expedition was a small household affair. This effectively dispels the idea that Richard was in any way jealous of the magnates who brought large retinues with them.[3] On the first expedition Mortimer had the largest retinue, with a force of two bannerets, eight knights, 99 squires, 200 horse and 400 foot archers--700 men in all. The Duke of Gloucester, Nottingham, Rutland, (now Duke of Aumarle), Despenser (now Earl of Gloucester) and Holland (now Duke of Surrey) between them brought 1,200 men--Gloucester's retinue of 400 being twice the size of any other.[4] Thus with Mortimer's force the great magnates had added only 1,900 men to Richard's army in 1394, whereas the indentured retinues of 1399 supplied troops totalling 2,736. Furthermore, the commitment in 1399

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1 Oeuvres de Froissart, xvi, pp 152-3
2 Tuck, Richard II, pp 201-2, 214-5 etc
3 cf Walsingham's comment; Annales Ricardi Secundi, pp 238-9.
4 Tout, Chapters, iii, 489-90

was for one year's service, not six months as on the first expedition.[1] This unusually long length of service was an important indication of the seriousness of Richard's intention to settle the problems of the lordship.

Before coming to any conclusions about the size of the force finally made available the possible strength of Anglo-Irish sources must be considered. This has been estimated as about 2,000 for the first expedition,[2] and it seems probable that this figure would be roughly correct for 1399 as well. There is unfortunately no information at all about commissions of array or local levies in Ireland, but presumably organization paralleled the first expedition. Inquisitions were certainly taken in Ireland concerning absentee landholders in April 1399.[3] As the indentures which survive show that the magnates contracted only to bring mounted archers with them, it was probably assumed that the necessary force of footmen could be recruited locally in Ireland, though unfortunately the point cannot be demonstrated.

While conclusions must of course be tentative, one can with confidence say that the army bore comparison in size to the forces mustered for many of the continental campaigns of the earlier fourteenth century. The army of 12,000 which served for instance in 1359 was exceptional and the force of 32,000 mustered in 1346-7 was in a class of its own. Figures more commonly ranged from 4,000 to 6,000.[4] Obviously the army of 1394-5, estimated as between eight and ten

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1 e.g. E 101/69/1 nos 283, 287; cf nos 299-301 etc

2 Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 142

3 e.g. At Trim; see P.R.O.I., Calendar, iii, p 149 from Mem. 1 H. IV, m 47 d.

4 On this point see,e.g., K.B.McFarlane, 'England and the Hundred Years War', Past and Present, xxii (1962) pp 4-5, and Sherborne, 'The English navy, shipping and manpower, 1369-89', Past and Present, xxxvii (1967) p 171.

thousand, was an unusually large force and was unlikely to be assembled again for an Irish campaign within five years.[1] In 1399 we can see that at least 3,550 men were supplied between the retinues of the magnates and the Cheshire forces. This leaves out of account other yeomen of the crown and the forces available to the king in Ireland, numbering between them at least 1,000 to 2,000. The minimum strength of the army would appear to have been therefore about 4,500 men, and the final total may have been considerably in excess of this. Such a force was certainly not insignificant, either in the effects resulting from its mustering in England or in the potential military power it provided the king with in Ireland.

Part vi -- Personnel accompanying Richard on his second expedition

Before leaving the question of the expedition's organization it is worth looking more closely at the identity of those who gave Richard their personal support on this enterprise, not simply as military commanders but as advisors in council, lay and clerical. Although on many points there are comparisons in this respect with the first expedition, the vicissitudes of fate in the intervening four years meant that several individuals prominent in 1394-5 were not present in 1399. Most important among these were the Duke of Gloucester and the Earls of Nottingham and March. In an Irish context the latter two were of particular significance. Nottingham's presence had been crucial in procuring the Leinster submissions of the first expedition, and, though it would seem that the lordship of Carlow was at that time still nominally in the hands of his grandmother the Duchess of Norfolk, Nottingham's close concern with that

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1 Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', pp 142-3.

area meant that a vacuum followed his exile and forfeiture.[1] The Mortimer estates were, furthermore, in the king's hands during the minority of Roger's heir. When the Duke of Surrey took over the Irish justiciarship from de Grey he was given the custody of Carlow castle, the centre of Nottingham's authority and the wardship of the Mortimer lands.[2] The reason probably lay as much in the political importance of these estates--which the king could not afford to lose to the lordship and chose therefore to give into the direct care of his chief representative--as in their possible monetary returns. No custodian, however, could wield quite the authority of a lord in person and it is clear that the absence of claimants to the lordships of Carlow and Ulster, Connacht and Trim was a serious drawback in 1399.

Without these great absentees a disproportionate importance may have been attached to certain less significant personalities. Some, such as the Earl of Gloucester and the Duke of Aumarle, had had experience of Irish warfare dating from 1394-5. Thomas Despenser, the present Earl of Gloucester, was himself an absentee and one of those said to have gained more lands during the first expedition, presumably the reward for good services. He was to play a prominent role in 1399, negotiating in Richard's stead with MacMurrough.[3] Aumarle, as Earl of Rutland, had been more obviously important on the first expedition, and though his interests in Ireland are uncertain it is probable that some land rights went with his title of Earl of Cork. Although he was a man who obviously enjoyed the king's favour, it is likely that much of his potential value to Richard in 1399 lay also in his past experience and successes in Ireland. Nor were these

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1 Complete Peerage, ix, 599-604; Curtis, Richard II, p 64; C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 19, 572; C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 145.

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 572, 429

3 Archaeologia, xx, pp 37-43

the only men with a fund of Irish experience enabling them to guide current policy. Thomas Percy was still in office as seneschal of the king's household. John Stanley had replaced Raddington as controller of the household, but as he had assisted Raddington in that post in 1394-5 he was familiar with the problems to be faced in Ireland. Thomas Holland, who was probably on the first expedition, played a crucial role in 1399 as the lieutenant acting when Richard arrived. Other less significant absentees who participated included Reginald de Grey and Philip Darcy,[1] but many more knights who had come in 1394 appeared again in 1399. Among these were Lord Lovell, Lord Bardolf, Lord Morley, John de Wyndesore, Hugh Despenser and Hugh Luttrell.[2] John Holland, the Earl of Kent and now the Duke of Exeter and chamberlain of England, was again present.[3] Although William Scrope remained in England, his brother Stephen, who had for two years deputized for him as justiciar of Ireland, returned from a mission to France in time to accompany the expedition.[4] Janico Dartas, another who had distinguished himself in 1394-5, received a protection to go to Ireland on 1 April.[5] There were some, it is true, without any experience of Irish warfare, and there is evidence that one at least of Richard's continental retainers--Peter de Craon--accompanied him.[6] The strength of the army lay however in the nucleus of men who had been on the previous expedition, some of whom had since served in Ireland and possessed an intimate knowledge of the

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1 Above, p 450; C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 378, 524; Darcy came to Ireland in the summer of 1398.

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 543, 538,525, 576, 541, 551.

3 ibid., p 527

4 Above, p 450 n 2; E 159/184 Easter br. baron.,m 4; E 403/562, 3 May.

5 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 498

6 ibid., p 576; he was retained in February 1399 (E 101/328/1, 21 February); he subsequently left goods in Ireland.(E 159/179 Hilary br. dir. baron., m 4)

country and its problems.

Information on the Anglo-Irish supporters is less revealing. The Earl of Ormond appears to have been in England in the spring of 1399. He was at least granted on 14 February full respite of all debts until the autumn by which time the king would be in the country.[1] It is possible that he in fact travelled to Ireland with the expedition; on 5 April he appointed an attorney to act for him in England.[2] The evidence proves that, whether or not he had been implicated in the Irish administration's late upheavals and in Mortimer's fall from favour, he was himself back in the king's good graces before the expedition began, and it is likely that he occupied a key position among the advisors who supported another Irish venture at this juncture. Rather less is known of the position of the Earls of Kildare and Desmond. John, now Earl of Desmond, was the very man who had recently caused friction with the Butlers, prompting Richard's stern letter to his father. There is no suggestion that he in any way opposed Richard's policies, but nor is there any hint that he actively aided them. The Earl of Kildare is shrouded in comparable obscurity. He had not distinguished himself in the interim between the expeditions, failing to maintain the peace with his Irish neighbours and even falling captive to O'Connor Faly.[3] We do not know when or on what terms he was released, but there is no evidence to suggest that he rivalled Ormond at this time among the great lords of Ireland. Ormond's prime asset on both expeditions--his possessions in both countries which gave him close associations with the pre-eminent men

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 484; also E 159/175 Hilary br. baron., m 18; R.C.B.Lib., Graves MS 4, p 319 from Mem. 22 R. II, m 29. He presumably went to England after 22 January 1399, when he sealed an agreement of mutual aid with the Bishop of Cloyne at Youghal. (C.O.D., ii, no 337)

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 514

3 A.F.M., 1398

in England, the Irish lordship and Gaelic Ireland--was an advantage not equalled by any other magnate.

Among those who formed Richard's non-military counsellors the patterns discerned in 1394-5 were again followed. Many of the same personalities, and even more of the same types, came in the king's entourage. The signet was once more the authorizing agent of the king's will, though the secretary was no longer Roger Walden but the clerk John Lincoln who had assisted him in 1395.[1] There was a large body of clerical supporters, many of the dignitaries having also served in 1395. Thomas Merke, now Bishop of Carlisle, and John Boor, dean of the king's chapel--both of whom had witnessed submissions in 1395--were present.[2] Richard Metford, Bishop of Salisbury, was an obvious member of the party, for he had been nominal treasurer of Ireland for some years.[3] John Burghill, Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield,had also been present in Ireland in 1395 when as king's confessor he witnessed at least one submission.[4] Another episcopal participant, Guy Mone of St David's, had long been an influential member of the king's council in England and might be expected to give useful advice in Ireland too.[5] Robert Braybrook, Bishop of London, was another with an obvious role to play. He had visited the king in Ireland in the course of the first expedition, and in 1398 was appointed chancellor of Ireland, though he never apparently took up the office.[6] His experience in political life adds to the significance of his presence in Ireland in 1399. By contrast, Henry Beaufort, Bishop of Lincoln, was a young untried cleric, who owed his position to his relationship with Bolingbroke,

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 524, 550; Tout, Chapters, v, 221-4.
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 538, 545; Curtis, Richard II, pp 72, 97, 114.
3 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 546; above, p 242 ff
4 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 550; Curtis, Richard II, p 187.
5 Archaeologia, xx, 83
6 C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 218, 550: above, p 265.

his half-brother. It may well be true that Richard felt safer with Henry Beaufort in his company.[1]

There is no doubt that Richard's council had, with these men, a large clerical group, and that the proportion of important knights to clerics was less than in 1394-5. Without a knowledge of the manner in which the council functioned one cannot however know how this change affected the making of policy. Many of the bishops had themselves experience of Ireland, and men like William of Colchester, Abbot of Westminster, who came as strangers to Ireland purely, it seems, for reasons of royal favour, were exceptional rather than the rule.[2] It is probable that more significant at the policy-making level was the apparently minor role played by the Anglo-Irish clerics in 1399. In 1394-5 their advice and influence was heavily drawn upon, but there are no indications that this happened in 1399. Although to some extent this impression may be the result of chance record survival, there is no doubt that circumstances for some of the Irish clerics had altered since 1395. Colton of Armagh had been closely associated with the settlement in Ulster and his potential influence on Richard's council may have been weakened by the province's collapse.[3] The Bishop of Meath, also in favour during the first expedition, may have suffered similarly from his involvement in the recent conflict within the administration. Anglo-Irish influence may have been still further weakened by the nomination of the Englishman Cranley to the see of Dublin.[4] It is therefore possible that the fund of political experience normally available through the dignitaries of the Anglo-Irish church was less influential than usual in 1399.

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 553; Tout, Chapters, iv, 55.

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 546

3 Colton, lately in Rome, seems to have returned to Ireland by early 1399, though the clergy accompanying him remained abroad. (E403/561 7 December; T.C.D. MS 653 p 49; P.R.O.I. Calendar, p 98, from Mem. 1 H.IV m 35 d.)

4 Foedera, viii, 64.

Chapter 8

The second expedition

Part i -- The campaigning period, 1 June - 17 July 1399

While the scale of the 1399 expedition was clearly sufficient for it to have made considerable impact upon the lordship, the poor survival of records unfortunately prevents us measuring its effect, or even determining the detail of Richard's policies. That we have, for instance, only one letter from Richard during the summer of 1399 illustrates the contrast between evidence available on the two expeditions.[1] Furthermore, the material which is available describes only the first steps of the projected enterprise. Had the expedition not been cut short by external pressures concerning the king's position in England, much more might have been achieved in Ireland. In the absence of the necessary evidence many questions concerned with the brief enterprise cannot be adequately treated. In particular, the king's own contribution, his abilities and policies, remain a central point of ignorance, for his apparently increasing lack of judgement and dependence on a narrowly based council of which key figures were left in England puts a question mark over his ability to make political judgements at this juncture. Without a knowledge of the extent to which Richard relied upon the advice of his barons and counsellors we cannot hope to understand fully the train of events. In the circumstances considerable weight has inevitably been given to the evidence of a metrical poem known by the name of its putative author Jean Creton, who claimed to be present throughout most of the expedition. Though in some areas its information is demonstrably inaccurate,

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1 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters from Richard II', p 289

the account is for the most part credible and informative.[1] Thus, while some aspects of the campaign seem bound to remain obscure, a combination of such record and chronicle sources enables one to arrive at a general outline of the expedition's fate.

In attempting to assess Richard's policies in 1399 it is well to bear in mind the precedent of 1394-5. On that occasion Richard's first concern was the military subjection of Leinster. Only after this was accomplished did his long term plans for political settlement throughout the country emerge. Had the first expedition been cut short at six weeks, little would had survived of the military victory already won in the south-east. Bearing this in mind, one cannot rule out the possibility that 1399 might have seen comparable achievements had the expedition lasted its intended period. It is likely that beyond the immediate military danger to be faced in Leinster Richard had no clearly defined political objective when he arrived in Ireland. The military tactics of June-July 1399 were in fact the preliminary steps intended to repeat the rapid reduction of Leinster in October 1394 and Richard's failure to defeat MacMurrough and his allies as speedily in 1399, though a serious blow, was not irreversible. On balance, therefore, the move against MacMurrough does not require the explanation that Richard was seeking vengeance for the death of Mortimer,[2] for it was the natural start to a royal military expedition designed to reassert control throughout the lordship.

The earliest evidence on the expedition comes from Richard's only surviving letter of the campaign, written probably to the Duke of York after the king's safe arrival in Waterford on 1 June.[3] The

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1 See below, Appendix I, pp 519-30.
2 e.g. Lydon, 'Richard II's expeditions', p 147.
3 Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', pp 289, 297-8

port did not impress its visitors. Creton describes how 'the wretched and filthy people, some in rags, others girt with a rope had the one a hole, the other a hut, for their dwelling'.[1] Richard's letter was however concerned with the immediate military problem. Already successes had been won against the Irish, though not by the king's own forces. The Duke of Surrey, who as lieutenant had been in the country for some eight months, had taken a great prey of beasts, and, possibly in the same action, his men were successful in a raid upon MacMurrough and O'Byrne. Richard, reporting that 157 armed men and kerns were killed in this encounter, goes on to comment:

> We have had a very good beginning, trusting in the Almighty that he will lead us and that shortly to a good conclusion of our undertaking.

The council in England may have published this good news. Certainly Walsingham was aware that the campaign met initially with some success.[2] According to Henry of Marlborough these early victories were continued, though again it seems by the forces of Surrey and others already in the country rather than the king's new arrivals.[3] On the Friday following, he tells us, 'Jenicho'—presumably Janico Dartas—and other Englishmen slew some 200 Irishmen 'at Ford in Kenlish in county Kildare'. On the next day, the citizens of Dublin ventured forth and slew thirty-three Irishmen of O'Byrne's country, taking prisoner some eighty men, women and children. Dowling reports the same successes, though he says that the Dubliners slew forty of the enemy, returning with thirty-three captives.[4] Despite Richard's claim to 'a good beginning' there is nothing in the evidence to credit him personally with any of the successes. In fact Surrey's victory may simply have

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1 Archaeologia, xx, 22, 297
2 Historia Anglicana, ii, 232; see below, p 470.
3 Chronicle of Ireland, p 16
4 The Annals of Ireland, p 25; see below, p 469.

been reported to him as he arrived, for there is evidence that Surrey did not journey with the king from Waterford, being in Dublin by mid-June when Richard was still at Kilkenny.[1]

While in Waterford Richard presumably attended to the normal routine of official businees prompted by the royal visit. On 1 June a certain Robert Eland was granted ten marks p.a., notwithstanding the statute against absentees. Similarly on 23 June at Kilkenny the king appointed a Dartmouth mariner named William St John as water bailiff in all ports between Kinsale and Blaskey in Ireland.[2] Such records, however slight their significance, at least demonstrate that on this level of patronage Richard acted in 1399 much as he did in 1394-5. Creton merely says of this early period that Richard was well received by the common people and merchants in Waterford, where he stayed for six days before departing with his men for Kilkenny.[3] There he delayed about a fortnight, apparently awaiting the arrival of Aumarle.[4] Creton appears to exaggerate the significance of the duke's late arrival, and one should bear in mind the king's similar wait in 1394 for the Duke of Gloucester.[5] Even without Aumarle's considerable force,[6] Richard had an army capable of engaging in an active campaign, and it is likely that he lingered in Kilkenny partly from choice, in order to meet with his advisors in council and be brought up to date with developments since he left the country in 1395.

According to Creton the royal army stayed in Kilkenny until the eve of St John the Baptist's day. On 23 June Richard and his army

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1 E 101/247/4; indenture of receipt from the treasurer, 17 June.
2 C.P.R. 1399-1401, pp 258, 134
3 Archaeologia, xx, 23
4 ibid., pp 23-4
5 On Aumarle's role see Appendix I. pp 521-3; for Gloucester see Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', p 284.
6 Aumarle indented to bring 750 men with him, though this may have been extended by 200; see above, p 452 note 2.

marched towards the woods expecting to find there MacMurrough, who was rumoured to have 3,000 supporters.[1] The English advanced in battle array, anticipating immediate hostilities. The Irish, however, remained hidden and Richard decided either to burn them out or reduce their supplies and morale by the familiar policy of wasting the countryside.[2] His orders to burn the surrounding area led to the destruction of several neighbouring villages. Then, preparatory to the campaign itself, the king erected his standard in a clearing before the woods, and, as was customary,[3] knighted several of the youngest who were about to take part in their first military action. One of these boys was Henry Bolingbroke's son, who, incidentally, was apparently again knighted later by his own father.[4] He was later to become Henry V. Creton--a foreigner unfamiliar with the lesser English nobility--did not know the names of the other eight or ten boys knighted, but Humphrey of Gloucester, heir to the late duke, was probably among them.[5] The knowledge that Henry was knighted in this way and expected to bear arms in the forthcoming campaign leads one to treat with caution the report that he was brought as a hostage for his father's good behaviour.[6] Although his presence in the king's household may have been in part to ensure his father's quiescence, he was clearly treated with all honour by Richard until the news of Bolingbroke's landing became known, and even then Richard apparently excused the young Henry of all blame.[7] Later fifteenth century accounts in fact claimed that when the boy finally arrived from Ireland he went to

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1 Archaeologia, xx, p 28
2 This was also done in 1394. (Curtis, 'Unpublished letters', 283-5)
3 See,e.g., the first expedition. (ibid., p 284)
4 Chronicon Adae de Usk tells of Henry knighting his 'four sons' in 1399. The Patent Rolls of the Duchy of Lancaster refer to a relief granted for the knighting of the king's eldest son.(Report of D.K., England, xl (1879), Appendix 4, p 530)
5 See above, p 451.
6 e.g. Annales Ricardi Secundi, pp 247-8
7 ibid., p 247

Richard at Chester and only reluctantly acquiesced in his father's order that he abandon the king.[1] It has indeed been suggested that in Prince Henry's loyalty to Richard lay the seeds of his subsequent differences with his father.[2]

After these preparations Richard's army entered the wood, assisted by a large group--some 2,500 according to Creton--of local men who helped to cut a path through the difficult terrain.[3] Not only wood but heavy undergrowth and possibly marsh hampered the soldiers, and Creton leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that progress was physically taxing. This journey through the woods saw no major confrontation with the enemy, of whom Creton makes some interesting observations. MacMurrough, he says, 'is accustomed to dwell at all seasons' in these woods. His supporters were unlike anything Creton was familiar with. 'Wilder people I never saw; they did not appear to me to be much dismayed by the English'. He refers in passing to the Irishmen's fear of the archers, their custom of shouting on going into battle, the skill they showed in attacking with long darts and the swiftness of their horses.[4] The royal army seems for the most part to have been well disciplined and organized. Driving the Irish before it, it suffered its main casualties when the vanguard was attacked or when individuals went off to forage or became separated from the main body. On such occasions their nimble horses gave the Irish an advantage, but many of them were brought down by the archers when they came within range of the army itself. Richard was possibly involved in some of the minor affrays: Creton reports that his courage was 'extraordinary', though he seems to be referring here to the king's general resolve,

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1 The Brut, ed. F.W.E.Brie, ii, 545
2 McFarlane, Lancastrian kings and Lollard knights, pp 104-5, 120-2.
3 Archaeologia, xx, 32
4 ibid., pp 27-8, 298-9; 32-4, 301.

despite his losses, to conquer telz gens, qui sont presque sauvage.[1]

Although Richard's policy, in its aim to subdue first MacMurrough and his allies, bore a general resemblance to that of 1394, the tactics described by Creton had certain clear differences from the earlier campaign. The strategy which in 1394 reduced MacMurrough so rapidly had consisted of a system of encircling wards manned by comparatively small bodies of knights and archers who could at their convenience make preys and ravaging raids against the enemy. The royal core to the army only featured in the final moments of the campaign. The evidence on 1399 is too slight for one to draw any firm conclusion explaining the change in tactics. It may be that the Irish themselves did not withdraw in the solid group which had enabled the army of 1394 to enclose them. It also seems possible that Anglo-Irish advice was behind the planning of the October 1394 campaign and that this was absent or failed to carry as much weight in 1399. Creton's lack of any mention of Anglo-Irishmen, whether or not it means that they were simply not present, is certainly an indication that they were not generally recognized as the guiding hand behind military policy. It is also possible that Creton's knowledge of the military campaign was limited, and that the successes of Surrey and his company represented another arm of a two pronged attack upon MacMurrough of which the Frenchman was ignorant.[2] It remains certain, however, that Richard himself advanced on this occasion in the vanguard of his army, throwing it as a solid force against the Irish rather than deploying it from different positions.

The failure of the policy tempts one to view it as the product of Richard's lack of judgement and headstrong nature. Undoubtedly the

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1 Archaeologia, xx, pp 32-4, 301
2 Above, p 463; below, pp 469-70.

experience of two centuries had proved that Irish terrain was unsuited to heavy armed cavalry. At the same time, the army's strength, particularly in the core of over 1,000 Cheshire men, lay in the archers,[1] and these could be more useful in a large scale confrontation than in fleeting cattle raids. Creton himself talks of the deadly effect, in physical and psychological terms, of the archers upon the Irishmen,[2] and it may be that the council had a feasible and daring aim in view--to force the Irish to turn and fight in battle. The Irish clearly had no intention of doing so, and the inevitably slow progress of the army into their stronghold, however impressive, gave them ample time to hide their cattle and escape themselves. It is on the whole rather surprising that the army remained intact, if somewhat battered, after this attempt, and credit should perhaps be given to Richard for having had the courage to tackle the central problem of Leinster with such direct methods and for not succumbing to the inevitable difficulties. To bring his men safely through MacMurrough's territory was in itself an unusual achievement which cannot have left MacMurrough quite indifferent.

The imposing force of Richard's army advancing through the heart of Gaelic Leinster undoubtedly achieved a certain measure of psychological success. The only submission Creton actually mentions occurred, it seems, on Gaelic initiative without any specific defeat.[3] Creton calls this chief an uncle of MacMurrough's, but his identity has never been satisfactorily established. The Irishman came into Richard's camp as a defeated rebel, with a halter round his neck and drawn sword in his hand, to sue for mercy. Many others 'of his retinue' accompanied him. Richard's army may possibly have cut these

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1 From the retinues of the magnates came about 540 men at arms and 2,400 archers. (Above, p 453)

2 Archaeologia, xx, 32-3

3 ibid., pp 34-5, 302

men off from the main group of Irish rebels in the course of its advance. It is difficult to believe that the native force could not have escaped had they seen any point in further resistance. That Richard himself was still hopeful of repeating his previous successes and winning a general submission is perhaps indicated by his merciful reception of MacMurrough's uncle and followers whom he apparently pardoned, provided they swore 'to be faithful to me for the time to come'. Although this sounds like the reimposition of the oath of liege homage which had characterized his 1395 settlement, the pardon of a defeated rebel who promised future loyalty was so common an occurrence in Anglo-Ireland that one must be careful not to read too much into Creton's wording of the account.

This impression of some military success is supported by independent authorities. According to Dowling, who though he was writing nearly two centuries later spoke with some special knowledge of the area in question, O'Nolan submitted to the king at this time.[1] Under the year 1398 he first tells how Richard came to Ireland in this year to revenge the death of Mortimer.

> About that time O'Nolan began to give annually for eleven years six of the more noble born of his country to the lord king at the wish and choice of the lord king, and 2,000 young cows each year for seven years.

There is no corroborative evidence for this agreement. If true, it is interesting not simply in demonstrating Richard's ability to force terms but in the different attitudes towards peace settlements it reveals. So far as we know, Richard did not demand fines of submitting Irishmen at other times, though he occasionally took hostages.[2] Possibly we should see this stringency as Richard's response to the rebellion of recent years. Dowling's accuracy is perhaps vouched for

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1 The Annals of Ireland, p 25; on Dowling see above, pp 13-14.
2 Above, p 321.

by the next entry, which records that 'Janico de Arthois, Gascoyn' killed 200 Irish in county Kildare after Richard arrived and that the next day the people of Dublin killed some forty enemies and took 33 captives. This, as we have seen, was also reported by Henry Marlborough, the account differing only in details.[1] Walsingham, one of the few English chroniclers to give any attention to the expedition, not only recorded that Richard met at first with success in Ireland but also showed a knowledge of the exploits of Dartas, and Surrey:

> Dux Southereyae, ante faciem suam missus, multa in Hibernia probe gessit. Quidam etiam Almannicus (natione) nomine 'Ranyeo' (Janicho) per idem tempus, (Hiberniensium multos) prostravit, multos cepit, multos ad deditionem coegit. (2)

The cumulative effect of these references to MacMurrough's uncle, O'Nolan, Surrey, Dartas and the Dubliners suggests at least some moderate success on Richard's behalf in the early stages of his expedition. While he cannot be directly credited with all the actions, it seems probable that royal inspiration and perhaps the assistance of advance troops lay behind these events and their timing.

The Irish annals add further weight to the view that Richard's army made solid advances in 1399. Owing to the brevity of the expedition it is not even mentioned by some authorities.[3] Others simply record Richard's advent without remark.[4] The Annals of Connacht, however, state:

> King Risderd, King of England, came to Ireland this year and Art MacMurchadha, King of Leinster, was greatly weakened by the king and the rest of the English.(5)

Another, perhaps related, entry of that year describes how MacMurrough made an expedition, but was attacked by the English of Leinster and

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1 Above, p 463
2 ibid.: Annales Ricardi Secundi, p 239 (Alternative text in brackets.)
3 e.g. A.F.M.
4 e.g., A.U., 1398
5 Under 1398

Meath, who slaughtered his hired troops and many followers. The Annals of Clonmacnoise and the Annals of Loch Ce repeat both entries, combining them as one.[1] In view of these accounts it seems clear that Richard's military achievement cannot be so easily dismissed as was done by Creton, who appears to have lacked the experience or knowledge to judge the full impact of the campaign upon the Irish.

We are, however, entirely dependent upon Creton for evidence on negotiations which took place between Richard and MacMurrough. Some contact was probably made with the Gaelic chief before the royal army actually left Kilkenny. Creton claims that MacMurrough

> would neither submit nor obey him (Richard) in any way, but affirmed that he was the rightful king of Ireland (Dibernie estre roy) and that he would never cease from war and the defence of his country till his death; he said that the wish to deprive him of it by conquest was unlawful. (2)

Being an outsider with no background knowledge of the Irish situation, Creton probably interpreted the information that MacMurrough refused to submit by the use of concepts familiar to him, and one cannot place reliance on his precise wording which contrasts so markedly with the letters of other Irish chiefs to Richard in 1394-5. Even when swearing that Anglo-Irish aggressions justified their rebellion, the Gaelic chiefs carefully protested their loyalty to the English crown.[3] There is no suggestion that they saw themselves as independent rulers outside the king's jurisdiction. MacMurrough himself leaves no evidence as to his attitude in 1395, apart from his willingness to submit and to make an oath of liege homage. His behaviour had always indicated, moreover, a full acceptance of nominal royal authority. Often in a state of peace, MacMurrough had so much

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1 Also under 1398.
2 Archaeologia, xx, 27, 298
3 e.g. Curtis, Richard II, pp 144-6 etc.

regard for his position within the lordship that he sought recompense from the government against aggressive Anglo-Irish neighbours who broke a truce.[1] He tried repeatedly to secure his right to a pension from the government for faithful service and to his possession of the barony of Norragh within the lordship.[2] In view of this background and in the knowledge that MacMurrough was to receive his pension once more and be recognized in his right to Norragh by April 1400[3] it is unlikely that he ever actually claimed to be rightful king of Ireland, or refused to submit on any terms whatsoever. His defiance does, however, suggest that Richard was making fairly stringent terms before accepting MacMurrough's submission.

According to Creton, the king himself renewed contact with MacMurrough after the submission of the chief's uncle, by sending an envoy to him, promising that he would be pardoned if he came in as a defeated rebel and,

> ...quassez terres et chasteaulx lui donroit
> Ailleurs que la.(4)

Presumably the point at issue here was the barony of Norragh, confirmed to MacMurrough in 1395 but confiscated and granted to Surrey in 1399, for although Creton's phrase sounds reminiscent of the 1395 settlement of Leinster there can have been little hope by 1399 of reviving it in full. Possibly Creton, from his knowledge of former events and from the rumours around him, simply assumed that these were Richard's terms in 1399 too. Whatever Richard proposed at this stage, MacMurrough clearly was not prepared to accept. In view of the past readiness of Gaelic chiefs to see personal advantages in submitting to the king, this resistance suggests that Richard's

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1 e.g. E 101/246/6/28 (November 1384)
2 e.g. E 101/246/7/21 (September 1384)
3 C.C.H., p 156 no 42
4 Archaeologia, xx, 35, 302

messengers to MacMurrough were more likely to have threatened some form of punishment for his recent misdeeds than to have offered the generous terms Creton suggests. Richard's determination to discipline MacMurrough and the latter's fear that submission would not mean an advantageous pardon offer the most logical explanation for the campaign which followed.

In Creton's opinion these negotiations failed because MacMurrough knew that the royal army was running out of supplies and was confident that the king could effect no immediate punishment. While the explanation was probably the product of hindsight, there seems to be no doubt that the failure of the commissariat arrangements to sustain the burdens of the campaign forced Richard temporarily to abandon the submission of Leinster. It was impossible, says Creton, to buy any provisions for eleven days. Only a few green oats were available for the horses, some of whom died after the combined effects of the harsh weather and lack of food. MacMurrough was blamed for this, and it is possible that he indeed made it impossible for the army to forage with impunity. The hardship was allegedly endured by all ranks in the army. 'I really witnessed', says Creton, 'that on some days five or six of them had but a single loaf; some there were, even gentlemen, knights and esquires who did not eat a morsel for five days together'.[1] The army would appear to have been on the point of utter destruction when three relief ships arrived at the location. That, after eating and drinking their fill, the soldiers were able to strike camp the next day and prepare to march to Dublin none the worse of their hardships is a measure of Creton's exaggeration of the crisis. It is certain at least that the conditions cannot have been critical for the eleven days he claims.

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1 Archaeologia, xx, pp 35, 303

The most convincing proof that, despite these difficulties, the army was still a force to be reckoned with lies in MacMurrough's anxiety to initiate peace negotiations himself.

The ultimate explanation for this breakdown in organization is not easy to find. Commissariat arrangements had probably not been intended to meet the needs of the entire army marching through hostile territory. That purveyance was adequately made for the expedition can be seen in Creton's comments on the plentiful provisions available in Dublin at a cheap price. The mishap met with by Richard's army suggests that the officers in charge of purveying goods for the expedition expected Richard to reach Dublin much earlier, and presumably to supplement his supplies by preys of cattle from the Irish. As Creton's account makes clear, it was the difficult terrain and bad weather as much as hunger which affected the horses, and, quite possibly, the knights.[1] On balance it seems probable that while Creton exaggerated the length and severity of the crisis he demonstrates some genuine drawbacks to Richard's policy and reflects an awareness among the army that this was a harsh campaign of little immediate profit.

Creton does not identify the place reached by the army when it was relieved by supplies arriving in three ships sent from Dublin. As Richard seems to have been marching through the heart of the wooded Gaelic area, he may have reached Arklow by this time. It is not explained how the ships knew where to come or when. They were possibly ordinary supply ships directed to rendezvous with the army at Arklow or Wicklow, unaware of the urgent need which faced Richard's men.

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1 Creton elsewhere (Archaeologia, xx, pp 45, 309) remarks on the stormy period which prevented shipping from coming to Ireland for about six weeks. The annals do not confirm that this year was noted for any natural mishaps, other than the plague. (e.g. A.Conn., 1398) See also above, p 434.

An examination of food prests from the household to ships indicates the possible identity of these vessels. The masters of the 'Cok John' of Dublin, the 'Trinity' of Waterford and the 'Magdalen' of Drogheda all received very sizable amounts of flour and wine, far in excess of the usual quantities, and were possibly being employed to carry the provisions.[1] These may well have been the ships whose reception by the troops Creton describes so vividly. The fact that the prest to the 'Trinity' was delivered at Dalkey suggests a possible connection between the relief operation and the arrival at Dalkey from Kilkenny of eighty carts transporting goods of the privy wardrobe for the king's use in Ireland.[2] It is said that these military provisions were carried sixty leagues from Waterford to Dalkey, then forty leagues from Dalkey to Kilkenny, and finally thirty-six leagues from Dalkey to Dublin. Possibly the clerk, unfamiliar with Irish geography, reversed the names of Dalkey and Kilkenny, but the inaccuracy is probably explained by the fact that the same amount was paid for each journey, regardless of the distance covered. Although these provisions may have accompanied Richard throughout the campaign, it seems possible that they arrived in Dalkey in advance of the royal army and were accompanied by news prompting the dispatch of the relief ships to the king.

It was a mendicant friar who informed Richard of MacMurrough's willingness to negotiate, just as the king was about to depart for Dublin.[3] Richard agreed, but was not apparently in a conciliatory mood, and according to Creton told the Earl of Gloucester, Thomas Despenser--chosen to conduct the negotiations with a company of 200 lances and 1,000 archers--to make clear to MacMurrough 'the great

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1 E 361/5/26
2 E 101/403/20
3 Archaeologia, xx, pp 37-43, 304-7

outrage' which he had done. The place at which they met is described as a gap beside a small river between two woods, close to the mountains and at some distance from the sea. Creton, anxious to see MacMurrough for himself, accompanied Gloucester's force. He gives therefore a first-hand account of MacMurrough's appearance. MacMurrough is described as he galloped down from the mountain on a magnificent horse worth, it is said, 400 cows as they reckon things in Ireland. He bore a long dart in his right hand:

> He was a fine large man, wonderfully active. To look at he seemed very stern and savage and an able man. (1)

It is likely, however, that Creton only later discovered the content of the talks between the principals, for MacMurrough and Gloucester advanced ahead of their men in order to negotiate, attended presumably by interpreters. It seems that Gloucester concentrated on MacMurrough's past misdeeds, particularly his failure to keep loyalty. He was held personally responsible, according to Creton, for the death of Mortimer. No agreement was reached and MacMurrough and the earl departed in haste. Gloucester is said to have reported to the king that MacMurrough refused to consider submission if punishment or reprisals of any kind should follow, but demanded pardon without reserve. Creton reports that when Richard heard of MacMurrough's attitude he grew pale with anger and swore

> Que jamaiz jour ne se departira
> Dimbernie, jusquatant quil laura
> Ou vif ou mort. (2)

Whether or not Creton's detail can be relied upon, the failure to come to terms seems to indicate that the king's conditions for MacMurrough's pardon were stringent. There is certainly a contrast to 1395, when

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1 Archaeologia, xx, 39-40, 306
2 ibid., pp 44, 307

submitting rebels were graciously received. Although it has been suggested that in the earlier negotiations of 1399 Richard had also demanded more than MacMurrough was prepared to concede, it is likely that a hardening of attitudes on both sides had resulted from the recent campaign.

As nothing further could be done immediately and the provisions from the ships had been used up, Richard moved at once to Dublin. There the army could recuperate, for the town was well supplied with all necessities, and Richard could plan a fresh strategy. This consisted, according to Creton, of sending out three detachments of men to hunt for MacMurrough and bring him in. Creton gives no further details on the tactics involved, but in view of the descriptions of the first campaign, when individual commanders had succeeded by encircling the Leinster Irish with a ring of wards, it seems possible that these three detachments were intended similarly to establish local wards. It is certainly unlikely that they were sent into the wilds of Leinster with instructions simply to hunt for and capture MacMurrough, as Creton suggests. According to him the captor was to receive 100 gold marks for his success.[1] Richard clearly viewed the reduction of MacMurrough as an essential preliminary to his Irish policy, and Creton asserts that he announced he would if necessary wait for the autumn and burn out MacMurrough. As these bands of men left Dublin on their mission the Duke of Aumarle finally arrived, with his retinue in 100 ships.[2]

Although Creton attaches considerable significance to the circumstances of Aumarle's arrival, there is no evidence to support his suggestion that already the duke was plotting with Henry Bolingbroke

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1 Archaeologia, xx, 45, 308.
2 Archaeologia, xx, 45, 309

for Richard's downfall and had deliberately delayed his arrival in Ireland to that end.[1] On the contrary, Aumarle's duties on the northern border, and the stormy weather which isolated Richard in Ireland for some weeks, probably combined to make the delay both inevitable and involuntary.[2] The news of Bolingbroke's return to England appears to have followed soon after Aumarle's arrival in Dublin. From this point the expedition was, to all intents and purposes, over, as the king made ready to leave the country.

A certain degree of obscurity has always surrounded the circumstances of Richard's return to England. Creton claims that Richard's council in Dublin, hearing the news of the fall of Bristol, proposed the king's immediate return, but Aumarle, 'resolved upon a trick', persuaded Richard to send ahead the Earl of Salisbury to north Wales in the 100 barges available at Dublin while he himself went to Waterford, using the opportunity to gather together all his army, and sufficient shipping, in the south east.[3] Creton represents Aumarle acting in this as a traitor, committed to Bolingbroke's cause--a view repeated in a letter of some years later which purports to have been written by Creton in France to Richard, hiding in Scotland.[4] Other contemporary accounts support the view that the journey met with some delays, though they disagree as to the cause. The Dieulacres Chronicle says that Richard was delayed in Ireland by insanum consilium while Walsingham gives a confused account of how Richard, on the point of departing for England, disembarked, moved to another port, and sailed seven days later.[5] The three accounts clearly have a

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1 On this question, see below, Appendix I. pp 521-3.
2 Ibid.
3 Archaeologia, xx, 45-60, 310-5
4 Printed in an article by P.W.Dillon, 'Remarks on the manner of death of Richard II', Archaeologia, xxviii (1840) p 187.
5 Ed. Clarke and Galbraith, Bull. J.R.Lib., xiv (1930) p 172; Annales Ricardi Secundi, ii, 248

common basis, agreeing at least that some delay occurred, probably through a decision to embark from Waterford rather than Dublin.

While the details remain obscure, there is sufficient evidence to reveal the broad outline of developments. News probably reached Richard of an approaching crisis about 12 July, a week after the dispatch of a messenger from London.[1] By 17 July, when Richard himself left Dublin, it is likely that he had received more detail of the danger to be faced and knew that his ministers in England were rallying to the west country to make a concerted stand with him on his arrival home.[2] A later report that the regent York rode to Bristol 'against the coming from Ireland of Richard II' leaves uncertain who had decided upon the strategy,[3] but in view of the speed with which events progressed it was almost certainly York himself who chose to move towards Bristol, and informed the king that he would await him there. The probability that Richard received some such message after he had made initial preparations for his return to England removes some of the obscurity surrounding his departure. It would seem therefore in reconstructing events that the council in Ireland met the first news of the crisis by a decision to split the army, sending some ahead to Chester under Salisbury to rally the support that Richard might reasonably expect from that quarter. This must have occurred about 17 July.[4] The advice which prompted this move was not, despite Creton's comments, necessarily treacherous. Little shipping can have been available in Dublin, apart from that which had lately carried Aumarle and his retinue. Some impressment for the voyage actually took place in England, but this must have involved delays.[5] Furthermore, the army itself had

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1 E 403/562 (4 July); further details below, Appendix I, pp 524-6.
2 E 403/562 (12 July); see Appendix I, pp 524-6.
3 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 381
4 E 364/34/G; below p 480
5 Above, pp 429-31

been dispatched into Leinster and could not have been immediately mobilized with any ease. That Richard should send an advance force was, therefore, an argument with some logic. His own removal to Waterford was a natural extension of this decision, probably precipitated by the news that his ministers would be rallying in Bristol, a port more readily accessible from Waterford than Dublin.[1] We do know that some shipping sailed directly from Dublin to Bristol, but the demands of Salisbury's vessels must have accounted for most of the vessels available.[2] Although much of the shipping which had brought Richard to Waterford had presumably dispersed by this stage, sufficient merchant shipping was probably available in the south east to impress for a trip to Bristol. It is said that Richard left Dublin for England on 17 July,[3] but in fact he probably only began to travel south to Waterford at this point, delaying his sea crossing about a week.[4] His ultimate date of arrival at Milford may therefore have been about 27-8 July, just too late for him to save Bristol.[5] While certain problems undoubtedly remain with this conjectured chronology, it appears to fit most of the facts and dispels at least some of the misapprehensions which have arisen from conflicting chronicle accounts.

Two points of particular interest for Ireland emerge from this story of Richard's departure. To begin with, we are able at last to judge the approximate length of the expedition itself, and to see the juncture at which Richard's interest in Ireland ceased to have priority. Some previous estimates, which suggested dates into August for the return, left unexplained the king's activities during the last fortnight of July.[6] Secondly, the discovery that Aumarle's advice was

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1 E.M.Carus-Wilson, Medieval Merchant Venturers, pp 14-5, 18-20.
2 e.g. E 368/176 Hilary br. retorn., m 53 etc; below, p 529.
3 E 364/34/G
4 Annales Ricardi Secundi, 248; below, Appendix I, p 526.
5 Below Appendix I, p 527.
6 e.g. E.Jones, 'An examination of the authorship of The Deposition and Death of Richard II', Speculum, xv (1940) pp 460-5 passim.

not necessarily treasonous clarifies some problems in understanding the role of different personalities on the Irish campaign. Although both Aumarle and Thomas Percy subsequently joined Henry in Wales, there is no evidence to bolster the opinion that these men in Ireland had been less than loyal to Richard. Had they wished to engineer the king's downfall they would hardly have allowed Richard and his closest advisors to escape north in order to stage a possibly successful stand with Salisbury and the men of Chester. It seems probable that with the news of Bristol's collapse and the joining of Henry by their relatives the Duke of York and the Earl of Northumberland, these men bowed to the circumstances of the moment and at that point abandoned the king.

With the knowledge that Richard's entire expedition lasted only some seven weeks we are left with the problem of explaining his activities during the three weeks after early July when he reached Dublin. It seems probable that Richard in the early part of the period was reassessing his policy and possibly engaging in diplomatic overtures to other Irishmen who had submitted in 1395. No contemporary evidence survives concerning this, and there is no suggestion that he actually received any more submissions. While no records show conclusively Richard's own activities, there are hints about the movements of other prominent men describing how, until the end of the expeditionary period, normal business continued to be conducted. We see, for instance, that John Stanley and the Earl of Ormond were in Dublin on 6 July and 14 July.[1] As Stanley came to Ireland ahead of the expedition and as we have no certain evidence that Ormond was with the royal party this throws no light on Richard's own whereabouts. This transaction of 14 July was witnessed by Janico Dartas, whose

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1 C.O.D., ii, nos 340, 341

military exploits of the previous months were widely recorded, though again he may not have been with the main body of the royal army. Nor is there any certainty that Richard was present when great seal letters were issued in his name at Dublin apparently on 12 July--recording a grant to St Thomas the Martyr at Dublin[1]--and on 13 July --concerning the fishing rights of the Prior of St Thomas the Greater at Athy.[2] Official business of the time included arrangements made at Dublin on 10 July for the collection of the subsidy granted to de Grey the previous year.[3] As the signet was probably the instrument used by the king, no trace of his own activities survives. After news reached him of the English crisis and he himself moved from Dublin on 17 July some attention was presumably given to the problem of the continued government of the country. We do not know if any further contact was made with the Leinster Irish, but the suggestion that Richard delayed over-long in Ireland should be seen in terms of the critical situation there. It may have been urgently necessary, as the king was journeying south, to spend some time ensuring that the country was left in comparative safety.

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Part ii -- The end of Richard's involvement in Ireland in 1399

In the precipitate ending of the expedition lies a large measure of responsibility for Richard's failure, not simply to subdue the Gaelic Irish upon this occasion but to leave the lordship after his deposition any more secure than before the massive investment. Further light is thrown upon this facet of the problem by information

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1 P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, pp 48-9 from Mem. 1 H.IV m 22. The date of this grant is not certain: the entry refers to a writ issued on 12 July last but the writ, then quoted, is dated 23 July, a.r.r.2(3).

2 P.R.O.I.Calendar, iii, pp 14-5, from Mem. 1 H. IV m 8.

3 Hore, History of Wexford, iv, 282; see also P.R.O.I.Calendar, iii, pp 42-3, from Mem. 1 H.IV m 20 d, and C.C.R. 1413-9 p 169, for other references to the king's activities in Ireland.

regarding the circumstances of Richard's withdrawal. Detail concerning the return to England of men and supplies reveals that the removal was not complete, leaving many provisions, both royal and private, within Ireland. While in part this must have been due to difficulties of shipping, it is clear that certain articles of considerable value and some military importance were deliberately left behind. There is no obvious explanation for this. Presumably Richard wished to see exactly how affairs stood in England before coming to an absolute decision to remove all the expeditionary materials from the lordship. It follows that the king's return to Ireland after the Bolingbroke crisis should be settled was, in July 1399, still apparently considered possible. Richard's failure to do so and Henry's subsequent efforts to recover all the late king's possessions and supplies from the lordship meant that the effects of the crisis were not limited to the critical July-August period but continued into the first years of the next century. The differing attitudes of Richard and Henry towards their Irish responsibilities demonstrated by this evidence helps to explain why the deposition had such a profound impact upon the lordship.

Of all the goods which were left in Ireland after Richard's departure those in the custody of John Luffwyk, keeper of the privy wardrobe, have been most fully documented. Luffwyk was one of the few important officers of the English administration to be left behind, and it is likely that he was intended to follow Richard with the goods in his care as soon as it suited Richard in England to summon him. He probably occupied a key role in Ireland in the weeks following Richard's departure. His importance was not limited to concern with the custody and disbursement of goods from the privy wardrobe. In his capacity as receiver of the chamber he spent 100 marks received

from the Duke of Surrey's clerk in paying four esquires and forty archers employed at Dublin to safeguard the king's great horses and certain royal jewels in his care. This task lasted from the king's departure from the city on 17 July to 30 August. After this time he maintained Richard's two esquires and sixteen valets who brought the jewels from Dublin to Kenilworth castle between 30 August and 15 September and paid various other expenses concerning the carriage of the jewels during the entire period.[1] From the date and the reference to Kenilworth castle we see that these goods remained in Ireland until the crisis in England was over, but that Bolingbroke, once sure of his position and before he was actually declared king, sent for the property of his predecessor in Ireland. Information concerning other military goods in Luffwyk's care in the privy wardrobe shows that they were transferred from his custody into that of Robert Crulle, a prominent clerk. This apparently happened after Richard's collapse in England was certain; we know at least that it was done on the order of Peter Bukton, a noted Lancastrian retainer,[2] who was unlikely to have left England on such a mission until Henry's position there was assured.[3] Information on these goods shows that Richard's supply of armour and weapons had by no means been exhausted in the brief Leinster campaign and that the guns and associated equipment specially prepared for the expedition were still apparently intact.[4] Luffwyk stored the equipment in the great hall of Dublin castle after Richard's departure, until such time as the king might send further orders.[5] After Crulle was given custody of the stores

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1 E 364/34/G; E 159/177, Mich. br. baron., m 25; E 159/176 Easter communia, m 31.

2 e.g. Kirby, Henry IV, pp 33, 35 etc

3 E 364/34/H; E 101/403/20; E 368/173 Trinity br. retorn.,m 292; N.L.I. MS 761 ff 276-9; C.C.R.1399-1402 p 79.

4 Above, p 445.

5 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 79

they remained in Dublin castle with Henry's approval until on 25 March he ordered the Irish chancellor and treasurer and Crulle himself to deliver to Nicholas Stowe, servant of Stephen Flecher of London, all the property left behind by Luffwyk.[1] Stowe was paid £3.6.8 on 7 April to bring the equipment to London.[2] Once there the goods were immediately transported by sea to Scotland where Henry had urgent need of them.[3] Crulle was subsequently called upon to account for these goods, on the evidence of Luffwyk's account,[4] and a notice concerning his responsibility adds the interesting detail that he also had in his custody a 'pipe' containing arrows belonging to the Bishop of St David's.[5]

Crulle was, however, entrusted not only with the military equipment left by Richard but with other provisions accumulated to meet the needs of the expedition and unused by the time the king departed from Ireland.[6] When they came into Crulle's care is unclear: possibly they too were transferred from the custody of Luffwyk by Bukton. Among the most interesting items on the list are firewood and coal provided for the king's household in Ireland. On 15 March 1400 Crulle and another clerk, Thomas Everdon, were ordered from England to use their own discretion in selling this fuel, both that left in the Abbey of St. Thomas the Martyr at Dublin and that left in Dublin castle itself.[7] For the wood and coal which they sold they received £20, though further sales brought in £3.6.8 from the timber in Dublin castle and £6.13.0 from that in the monastery of St. Thomas the Martyr,

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1 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 79
2 E 403/564 (7 April)
3 E 403/567 (6 July, 1400)
4 E 368/173 Trinity br. retorn., m 292 and Hilary m 272
5 N.L.I. MS 761 ff 276-9
6 ibid. More detailed information in the English memoranda rolls describes how the Irish account exonerated Crulle and Everdon from accounting for the sales at the English exchequer.(E 368/173 Trinity communia,m153)
7 Cal.Fine Rolls 1399-1405 p 50

as well as a sum of 13/4 for five wagon loads of charcoal. Ten weights of glass (ponderii vitri) at 1/4 each, and a certain quantity of oats found in Swords castle, brought in a further £5.13.4. They accounted for £26.13.4 as the price of seven tons of wine left in Dublin castle and six tons of flour. As well as the military supplies already quoted, equipment included seven wagons with iron tyres.

Of the £63 said to be due from the sales made by Everdon and Crulle nothing remained in the exchequer at the time of their account.[1] Damage to the roll partly obscures the explanation for this lack of money. It is stated, however, that Crulle was allowed £32.2.6 by prince Henry, presumably before the latter left Ireland, to cover the costs of shipping different horses of the late king to England as well as for the charges concerning the repair of Dublin castle and for the provisioning of firewood and other necessities for the castle. He was also granted £24 from the price of six tons of wine and six tons of grain. A royal writ was furthermore cited specifying that he should be allowed the money taken from the sale of the late king's goods to cover his expenses. As a result Crulle had a balance in his favour of £6.4.2.[2] The Irish exchequer was apparently satisfied with the evidence of Crulle and Everdon, and resisted efforts over the next years by the English exchequer to procure a more precise account of what had happened to Richard's goods, based presumably on an assumption that they were worth more than the two clerks had claimed. Crulle was still being summoned in 1408-9 to answer for the difference between his estimate of the value of the wine and that of John Mersh who had delivered it to him.[3]

The belief that Richard not only brought considerable riches to

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1 This total should in fact have read £63.19.8.
2 This is by using the exchequer totals. The real surplus was £5.7.6.
3 E 368/181 Hilary communia, m 50

Ireland but left valuable goods there on his departure provides a key to understanding a number of the contemporary records. Many items belonging to the royal household were lost in Wales on the return journey and repeated orders for inquisitions on both sides of the Irish sea indicate that Henry was not prepared to accept the loss. By 8 September 1399 Henry's letters patent had resulted in the delivery to the mayor of Bristol of certain unspecified goods of Richard and those who had accompanied him to Ireland.[1] On 16 September a full enquiry was instituted in Bristol and any ports of Cornwall and Devon into the jewels, goods and chattels of the king and any of the magnates of the realm with him on his return or of his ministers in England who had journeyed to Bristol.[2] Orders concerning these inquisitions were repeated the following May, and again in December 1400.[3] Various items came to light as a result--such as 'three pewter dishes, a chest with eighteen bows and twenty-four arrows...two horses,...three books...eight bows'.[4] We learn that Bremhill, who was master of one of the king's ships,[5] came to Plymouth but nine tons containing 'divers goods' were carried off his ship and lost.[6] The evidence removes any doubt that the returning campaigners came with the bare military equipment needed to defeat Bolingbroke. Off one ship were taken goods and jewels valuing £160. A ship belonging to the Duke of Surrey contained personal valuables estimated at £1,000.[7] It took considerable time to lay hands on even the items which had been safely stored. Not until May 1400 were the precious

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1 Cal. Inquisitions Miscellaneous, Chancery, 1399-1422, p 74 nos 152-3.
2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 596
3 ibid., pp 312, 415
4 Cal.Inq. Misc. 1399-1422 p 71 no 133
5 E 364/39/F
6 Cal. Inq. Misc. 1399-1422 p 70 no 132
7 ibid., p 77 no 163; see also ibid., nos 161-2 (pp 76-7); nos 152-3 (p 74); further details below, Appendix I. pp 527-9 etc.

goods of Richard's found at Haverford castle finally delivered to London,[1] and it was the following November-December when John Boor, late dean of Richard's chapel, delivered up the jewels in his custody and received a writ of exoneration for other items which had been seized in the lordship of Gower.[2] In the following years references continue to be found concerning the inquisitions into goods lost at the time of Richard's return to England, though the rebellion of the lords loyal to Richard and their subsequent forfeiture early in 1400 complicated the question of goods which had been in their care.[3]

At the same time serious efforts were made to recover the items of value believed to have been stored or abandoned in Ireland. On 21 December 1399 John Stanley as governor was ordered to make enquiry into all Richard's possessions still in the country.[4] The immediate outcome is not known, but it was apparently believed in England that Stanley had indeed seized certain goods, for on 6 May 1401 he was told 'to keep until further order all goods and chattels, armour, artillery, harness etc of the late king now in Ireland without diminution, delivering up no parcel thereof.'[5] Stanley does not seem to have cooperated fully on this matter: summoned some years later to account for the goods seized as a result of these commissions he asserted that he had never received the writs ordering the inquisitions and that therefore had made no seizures. As the writ of December 1399 was entered on the Irish Chancery rolls, Stanley's excuse seems unlikely.[6] In Ireland as in England this question of the goods

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1 E 101/335/3; E 403/567 (13 May); Palgrave, Antient Kalendars and Inventories, iii, pp 358-61.

2 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 381; E 368/174 Mich. communia, m 65

3 E 159/180 Mich comm. m 21; E 159/182 Mich. comm. m 9; E 368/173 Easter comm. m 136; ibid., Trinity br. retorn. m 292 etc.

4 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 214

5 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 342

6 C.C.H., p 155 no 2; Stanley produced a pardon for all accounts and the English exchequer dropped the matter.(E 368/178 Mich.comm. m 26)

left over from the expedition was somewhat obscured by the rebellion of several important magnates and the subsequent confiscation of their goods. It seems to have been in response to the rebellion of early 1400 that the Earl of Ormond and Richard Rede received with others a commission on 23 March to enquire into various matters dating back to the time of the expedition. They were to discover what castles, manors, lands and tenements belonged to 'divers evildoers' who had forfeited to the king, and to ascertain their goods and chattels as well as those of the late king. Fresh extents of the lands were to be sent with the seized goods to London as quickly as possible. Anyone hostile to the king's wishes was to be arrested and imprisoned till further notice. The context suggests that the enemies in question comprised anti-Lancastrians rather than Gaelic Irish rebels. Ormond and his associates were also ordered to sell any victuals found for the use of these enemies and to answer for the sale in England. No returns were in fact made, and Ormond and Rede claimed, as had Stanley, that the letters patent were never received and that therefore nothing had been done in the matter.[1] The exchequer then sought to bring the men to account through two Lancastrian associates who were also supposed to have served on the commission. These were the Mirreson brothers,[2] and with them were named Thomas Burgh, John Darcy, Richard Gille, Richard Syddegreve, John Secte, John Rytham, Philip Basset, William fitz Gerald, John Barry of Wexford as well as Richard Rede and the Earl of Ormond.[3] There is no evidence on the Irish side to suggest that these men had in fact conducted the inquisitions, though we know that Ormond

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1 E 368/174 Easter communia, m 114

2 In 1400 they were collectors of the customs in Ireland, with extensive powers to make inquisitions in all ports. (C.C.H. p 159 no10)

3 E 368/179 Mich. br.retorn. (membranes not numbered.)

was appointed with Edward Perers, Thomas Everdon, John Lumbard and Walter Euere to a general commission of enquiry in Kilkenny, Waterford, Tipperary, Cork and Limerick on 9 May 1400.[1] That the English exchequer remained convinced of the existence of some accountable action is demonstrated in the decision at the start of Henry V's reign to move against Ormond in this matter through his property in England.[2]

Other references to miscellaneous items brought from Ireland to England at various times after Richard's deposition reinforce this picture of persistent efforts by Henry and his ministers to gain possession of any goods brought to Ireland for the expedition and not expended there. There is even a suggestion, with reference to the goods of the Great Wardrobe, that Henry was already sending orders to Ireland by 3 August, apparently before Richard had actually yielded to him. On that date various workmen involved in the making and repair of tents began their task of bringing back the king's tents and pavilions, seemingly on the order of Perer Bukton, a man high in Henry's favour, though it is perhaps more likely that Bukton was not responsible for the original order but arrived in Ireland in time to authorize delivery of the goods to Henry's ministers.[3] Other disbursements concerning the king's tents show that William Loveney, as keeper of the great wardrobe, paid William Wencelowe, late pavilioner, £3.18.10 for the safe custody and carriage of certain tents from Dublin to Dalkey and elsewhere in Ireland to London, a task which occupied him from the end of September until 24 November. Adam atte Wode with two helpers was employed about the same time in transporting the king's

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1 C.C.H., p 158 no 113
2 E 368/174 Easter communia, m 114
3 E 361/5/11

beds from Ireland to London, and another servant, Thomas Godgrave, received 40/- to cover his expenses in bringing certain unspecified goods out of Ireland at the time of Richard's own departure.[1] During the latter part of August Henry certainly did send envoys to Ireland, possibly with the primary aim of bringing prince Henry from Trim. He is said to have arrived in Chester before his father's departure with Richard for London.[2] Henry Dryhurste, the man who transported the prince, was also commissioned to bring from Dublin Richard's chapel with all its belongings.[3] Adam of Usk says that William Bagot came in chains with prince Henry.[4] The Kirkstall chronicler claims, however, that Bagot was captured in Ireland and brought to parliament to answer for his crimes by Peter Bukton.[5] These entries should perhaps be combined, indicating that Bukton may have gone to Ireland primarily to act as escort for the prince and that references to his presence may be dated to mid-August.

Bukton is also mentioned in connection with the delivery of wines left behind in Dublin. Richard's butler Thomas Brounflete--one of the household officers to lose goods in his care in Wales[6]--handed over certain wines to the custody of John Mershe before he left Ireland.[7] Mershe's account stated that the bulk of this was delivered to three different masters of ships for transport to England. Five tons were given, on Bukton's special order, to Henry Hoghton for the store in Holt castle; three tons were given in alms to prisoners in the royal castle of Dublin, and the remaining supply was sold to meet the

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1 E 361/5/11
2 Above, pp 465-6
3 E 403/570 (5 March 1401); E 404/16/394
4 Chronicon Adae de Usk, p 180
5 ed. Clarke and Galbraith, Bull.J.R.Lib., 1 (1931), p 133
6 E 159/178 Mich.br.baron. m 39; for details see Appendix I, pp 527-8.
7 For more details see above, p 433.

costs of the journey and custody.[1] Crulle denied that the wine had been worth as much as Mershe claimed.[2] Attempts to bring the mariners to account for their shipments were not much more successful. William Mannyng showed that all the wines on his ship as well as all his own goods were lost after he ran into a storm off Cornwall. Hewesson, in fear of the storm, jettisoned twelve tons of wine and claimed later to have delivered the rest to the king's chief butler, though the exchequer remained unsatisfied.[3] Mershe's shipment apparently took place on 12 September 1399, before Richard was formally deposed but after Henry had won practical authority.[4]

While the bulk of the evidence concentrates upon the royal goods left in Ireland, many individual knights and magnates were also forced in the haste of their return to England to leave possessions in Ireland for later transport. They may have privately recovered some of these items, but evidence does survive concerning others. Horses presented a particularly serious problem to an army requiring rapid shipping, and it was presumably the difficulty of arranging suitably adapted carrier ships which led to large numbers being temporarily abandoned. Richard Redeman, master of the king's horses, did bring some animals with him back to Chester, where a number which had been weakened by their ordeal had to be sold off.[5] We have already seen that Luffwyk kept royal horses in his custody after this time in Dublin, and it was

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1 E 364/39/E; E 159/182 Hilary br. baron., m 3; the account makes no reference to £46 granted to him in November 1403, repeated March 1404, in recompense for his charges in shipping Richard's wines and flour back to England. (C.P.R. 1401-5 p 352; C.C.R. 1402-5 p 265)

2 Above, p 486

3 E 364/43/A; E 368/178 Trinity communia, m 108; E 368/182 Mich. status et visus compoti, m 229.

4 E 364/43/A; the month, missing in the account, is unlikely to have been as early as August,and '12...23 R.II' could not describe any other month than September. Hewesson in fact claimed to have delivered the wine in London on 2 October.

5 E 364/37/D

possibly these horses which Richard Cliderowe was paid to bring from Ireland to London sometime after the middle of August 1399.[1] Reference is also made however to the 'property, harnesses and horses' of Edward Earl of Rutland, late the Duke of Aumarle, which he seemingly had left in Ireland, and on the same day--21 February 1400--William Mirreson was paid for bringing Surrey's horses from Ireland to Lancaster.[2] In April 1402 the king ordered payment to Martin Pole, lately Surrey's master of the horses, who had brought the duke's horses from 'trowda' (Drogheda?) in Ireland to the king.[3] Surrey's goods had of course become forfeit by his rebellion against Henry--a situation spelled out in references to his arrows found in Ireland, all of which were granted to Janico Dartas as a gift.[4] The late Earl of Huntingdon, Surrey's uncle and another rebel, suffered a like fate, and a writ survives specifying rival claims to his property found in Ireland by Reginald de Grey, who arrested it on condition that some of it go to England and some be left with the king's ministers, and the Earl of Ormond who took some of the goods from de Grey into his own hands.[5]

Of all the items taken out of the country by the servants of Richard perhaps the most important for Anglo-Ireland was the money stored at Trim. References to this treasure make it clear that Surrey, to whom had been granted the custody of the Mortimer lands while in wardship,[6] had established his family at the castle of Trim by the time of his return to England with Richard--a fact which helps to explain why Bolingbroke's son was lodged there rather than in Dublin and why Surrey's horses seem to have been shipped some time later from Drogheda. Apparently Stephen Scrope, Richard's chamberlain, delivered to Surrey's

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1 E 364/36/F
2 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 49; E 403/564 (21 February)
3 E 404/17/469; E 403/578 (7 Dec., 1403; 6 March, 1404)
4 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 335
5 ibid., p 145
6 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 429

servants in Ireland £14,148.16.0 'of the king's gold', from which source various payments were made by Surrey's ministers at Trim after he had departed with Richard to England.[1] Concerning this enormous store there is little information. It was almost certainly a part of Isabella's dowry, paid directly to the king in his chamber and brought to Ireland to support the expeditionary expenses.[2] Its transfer to the custody of Surrey's wife in Trim is of great interest, for it indicates that the money was deliberately left behind. Although the king may have taken with him that part of the sum never accounted for, his decision to let the bulk of it remain in Ireland suggests that he had no immediate lack of cash but preferred to leave this reserve, like the military supplies, in Ireland until the situation in England was clarified.

Surrey was therefore accountable for an enormous sum of money, as his stipend and other payments to him were apparently quite distinct from this portion of the king's gold entrusted to him at Trim. Though as the expedition began only ten months of his first year in office had passed, Surrey had already received more than the £7,666.13.4 due to him annually, being held to account for £7,872.12.10½.[3] He was ultimately responsible therefore for about £22,000. Unfortunately exchequer information appears to concern only the royal treasure deposited in Trim, and we have no indication as to how Surrey spent the large stipend. Two cedules concerning this treasure of £14,148.16.0 were made on the information of John Heryng, a clerk in Surrey's employ, and delivered on 14 May 1400 to the treasurer. The cedules themselves do not survive, but memoranda notices show how the exchequer tried to bring to account various people named in them as receiving

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1 E 159/176 Easter communia m 31; E 159/177 Mich.comm. m 23; E 159/178 Mich.comm. m 19.

2 See above pp 412-3.

3 E 403/561 (2 Dec. etc.) For disbursements to him and a summary of his obligation to account see also E 403/560-2 passim and E 372/245, York.

money. Where it is possible to establish the date of disbursements they are seen to have been made about the time of the crisis which ended the expedition, either just before Richard left or within the following critical months. Although this information provides only a partial account of the total sums in Surrey's care, its evidence on certain interesting prests enlightens an obscure period.

Few items demonstrate more completely Henry's determination to bring late Ricardians to account fully for the money left in Ireland than the example of Richard Seymour. On 13 February 1400 the treasurer of England informed the exchequer that Seymour had received 360 marks in Ireland sometime in 1398-9 which he was to bring to Surrey in England. The information had come from Janico Dartas, who claimed to have heard it from a certain clerk of Surrey's in London on 12 February. On 21 February Seymour appeared before the exchequer and stated that when Surrey in Ireland had told him to prepare to accompany him to England he had agreed that Seymour receive 300 marks regard from John Heryng at Trim, as he had to date received nothing for his services to the duke. He denied that the money was intended for delivery to Surrey in England and protested his ignorance about any further 60 marks. Subsequently John Heryng himself appeared, to confirm that he had, on the authorization of Surrey's wife, indeed disbursed 300 marks along with a sum of £20 for Richard to bring to the duke in England. Seymour reappeared, insisting that the 300 marks was in lieu of payment for his services in the duke's company since 20 September 1398, though he now admitted to having received from Heryng a further £20 which he claimed was a personal loan. He was willing to answer for it to the king. The court agreed that he should, and decided to deliberate further on the other 300 marks.[1] Subsequent summonses suggest that

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1 E 159/176 Hilary communia m 12

his explanation was doubted, and the case dragged on until in 1408-9 he died.[1] Quite apart from giving interesting detail on one of Surrey's retainers,[2] this incident reveals some of the confusion which evidently occurred as the king and his retainers left the country.

Other items provide similar glimpses of the crisis. John Luffwyk's prest of 100 marks from Heryng has already been mentioned. Luffwyk claimed that the money was spent on the upkeep of Richard's servants and his great horses left in Ireland and the information that he received this from Heryng at Trim suggests that although Richard apparently left from Dublin on 17 July his officials remaining behind were concentrated upon Trim. This supports the contention that the money in Surrey's care was to cover general expeditionary expenses rather than Surrey's personal obligations. Some of the other items might, however, equally well have been charged against Surrey's stipend. The duke ordered, for instance, that 150 marks of the king's gold be delivered by one John Warre to James Cottenham, named as constable of Dublin, for the works of the castle.[3] Earlier in the year Surrey had, presumably from his own stipend, made similar deliveries of money to Cottenham through the treasurer Faryngton for the works in Dublin castle.[4] This man Warre was obviously a clerk in Surrey's employ, being also required to produce an indenture made between Hugh de Wolaton, named as late treasurer of Holland's household, and the earl himself, concerning the delivery of 450 marks.[5] Wolaton himself was called upon to answer for 550 marks delivered to him of this gold at Trim and elsewhere, a sum which he allegedly received 'on the expenses

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1 E 159/177 Hilary br. retorn. (membrane not numbered); E 159/176 Hilary communia m 12.

2 This amplifies the notices about Seymour in C.P.R. 1396-9, 409,429.

3 E 159/184 Mich. br. retorn. (membrane not numbered)

4 E 101/247/4; E 364/34/ I.

5 E 159/177 Hilary br. retorn.(membrane not numbered); the 'John Vaire' shown here appears to be the same man.

of the said household'—giving clear evidence of the blurred distinction between the immediate royal needs of the emergency and Surrey's personal obligations.[1] Apparently the money left at Trim was used to meet expenses which occurred of virtually any nature. This is seen in the process taken to bring the duke's wife herself to account for different sums released by Heryng on her authority. Edmund, the duke's brother, was given 65 marks for the maintenance of his horses 'after he came from Ireland to England'; six marks 6/8 were given by her as a gift to the servants of prince Henry, being kept in Trim; 500 marks were spent by Edmund and the duchess in shipping from Ireland and in various household rewards; and 27 marks 7/10 were paid to different servants and on chamber expenses of the household.[2] Unfortunately--from a record point of view--she was granted a pardon for these debts in May 1401 and no more information appears to have been recorded.[3] It seems certain, however, that at the time of returning to England Surrey's wife still had at least 500 marks of the money. This impression is strengthened by the information that Heryng paid 200 marks for masses for the late duke, after his death in early 1400.[4]

Richard Seymour was only one of several people summoned to account for money sent by Heryng from Trim to Surrey. The inability to date the prests makes it impossible to see what policies lay behind the deliveries--whether, for instance, money was sent to Surrey on his request or whether it was forwarded whenever a suitable messenger was available. Thomas Botiller apparently received 200 marks for

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1 E 159/177 Hilary br. retorn. (membrane not numbered)
2 ibid.; also E 159/178 Mich. communia m 19
3 E 159/177 Easter br. baron.m 20; C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 479
4 E 159/177 Hilary br. retorn. (membrane not numbered); it is not stated that the money for this came from the same source as the payments made at Trim, but the location of the summons among the Irish prests infers this.

this purpose and Thomas Clerk, John Nettelworth and William Staunford were together entrusted with a 400 mark prest. Many prests were, however, for much less significant amounts. For instance, Henry Hone, goldsmith, 'Petirkyn' and William Clerk, who each received fifteen marks, were possibly here being paid a regular fee as household retainers.[1] The purpose of the 45 mark delivery to Geoffrey Davenport, said to be the late duke's chancellor, is not stated, nor is that of the fee of £2 to one Ralph Lenham, though this latter sum may possibly have been payment to a messenger, such as David Messager, to whom Surrey's receiver general in England paid £2 for making a journey to Ireland.[2]

These sums, however, together make up an insignificant proportion of the £14,148 in question. The only really large sums to be disbursed while Surrey's wife was still authorizing prests seem to have been to Robert Swalo who clearly received a very large amount though the exact figure is not certain.[3] The money is said on this occasion to have been intended partly for the expenses of the duke's household and the war in Ireland and partly for delivery to Surrey in England. As Swalo could not be found, being reputedly dead after the rebellion at Oxford, this money was never accounted for, and details about its quantity and destination are not available. We do know, however, that on 3 August Robert Swalo received, allegedly at Dublin, not Trim, a sum of £3,601.6.7 from John Heryng in the presence of Edward Perrers and Hugh de Wolaton.[4] This sum may, however, have been only part of the money received 'at various times' by Swalo. It is said to have

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1 E 159/177 Hilary br. retorn. (membrane not numbered)
2 ibid., Easter br. baron., m 5d
3 E 159/176 Easter communia m 42; the sum is given as 600,102 marks --clearly a scribal error. Possibly the clerk meant the sum to read 6,102 marks, which would fit in with other information concerning the amount of gold available at Trim.
4 E 101/247/5

been paid to cover household expenses in Ireland, with no mention of any being sent to Surrey in England.

The two remaining prests of which we have any information were both made to Lancastrian servants after Henry had succeeded in taking Richard captive in Wales. Peter Bukton, whom as we have seen was among the first of Henry's retainers to be sent to Ireland, received 919 marks ten shillings at Trim by the hands of Laurence Merbury, another Lancastrian.[1] The circumstances and motive for the payment are unknown, for Bukton produced a royal writ exonerating him from accounting for all sums of money, jewels and other goods received in England and Ireland--wording which suggests that he was empowered to seize on Henry's behalf valuables which had belonged to Richard and his supporters. On 28 August, the final prest, a large sum of £6,544.13.4, was delivered at Trim by the Duchess of Surrey to John Waterton and Robert Hethcote. This delivery was obviously a direct result of Henry's successes in England. Waterton and Hethcote, who are known to have had Lancastrian associations, left Chester on 16 August when Henry's victory was assured. They apparently took with them Richard Maudeleyne, a clerk high in Richard's favour who subsequently died in Richard's cause. Presumably Maudeleyn vouched for their authority to Surrey's officials in Ireland: a later account claimed significantly that Maudeleyn had come and drained Ireland of cash.[2] These men did not pay the money from Trim into the English exchequer but gave it directly to Henry Langdon, valet of the robes, for Henry IV's own use. They also brought other miscellaneous goods back to London, including horses and carts from Ireland. This mission, which lasted 58 days

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1 E 159/177 Mich. communia m 23
2 King's Council in Ireland, p 261

until their return to London on 13 October, was clearly of considerable importance in transferring authority in Ireland from Richard's men to Henry's. It is logical to suppose that Waterton and his companions would have laid their hands on any large sum of treasure still in Ireland and their failure to take more than £6,544 from Trim suggests that most of Richard's treasure had been already disbursed.

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Given the nature of the evidence it is obvious that any conclusions about the deployment of Richard's supplies after the expedition ended must be tentative. There is even less material available on the fate of the army and personnel left after Richard's departure to maintain control in Ireland. From various references in the English sources we can at least identify certain key men who did not stay. Most of the prominent men in Richard's council seem to have either gone ahead with the earl of Salisbury or accompanied Richard himself. Creton shows how Salisbury, Exeter, Worcester, Aumarle and Surrey all played roles in Richard's subsequent submission to Henry in Wales. It seems certain that 'Edmund de Kent' who apparently served as governor of the country when Surrey left with Richard, was in fact the Duke's brother, though it is not known who appointed him or on what terms. He was presumably appointed in July, though the only references discovered to his period in office show him witnessing acts as custos on 28 September and 27 October.[1] Edmund was a young man and cannot have had any great experience. It is unlikely that he could, without very solid backing, have kept up any hard-line expeditionary policies

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1 P.R.O.I.Calendar, iii, pp 16. 1, from Mem.1 H.IV, mm 8, 102; see also Wood, 'Chief governors', p 232; on Edmund's background see Complete Peerage, vii, 159-60.

Richard may have been preparing to engage in. Of the important knights who might have been left to aid him only Gloucester, Thomas Despenser, seems a real possibility. He is not known to have been with Richard as he journeyed from south Wales to Chester, and the rumour, reported by Adam of Usk, that Humphrey, son of the late duke of Gloucester, was poisoned by the lord Despenser in Ireland suggests that he may have been left in charge of the hostages at Trim. The general content of Adam's statement seems quite accurate; he knew that Bolingbroke's son was imprisoned with Humphrey at Trim and that he was returned to Bolingbroke along with great treasure belonging to the late king.[1] Otherwise, however, Edmund Holland can have had few supporters of any rank in Ireland. The earl of Ormond later swore that he lost an indenture concerning his last period as lieutenant when he was in Wales, apparently at this time, and this otherwise unsubstantiated evidence of Anglo-Irish participation suggests that Richard returned home with all the support he could muster in Ireland. In this context must be noted the comment in Traison et Mort, that after Richard's army had suffered many desertions on arrival in Wales, 'of those who remained the greater part were foreigners and foreign soldiers' (estrangiers et souldoyers estranger).[2] Most of Richard's household retainers and officers of importance certainly seem to have accompanied him and some, such as Richard Redeman and Janico Dartas, were imprisoned at Chester by Henry.[3] Dartas was released on 20 August, on the main-prise of John Stanley who appears to have been one of the first Ricardian officers of note to receive Henry's confidence.[4] The point at which Richard was abandoned by Stanley, who held the militarily

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1 Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp 29, 180
2 Traison et Mort, pp 42, 190
3 E 364/37/D; Chester 2/73 m 7
4 Chester 2/73 m 7

important office of controller of the household, very probably marked a significant turn in Henry's favour.

It seems that the rank and file of the expeditionary army also returned with Salisbury and Richard to Wales. The chronicles give varying reports of the size of the armies sent to both north and south Wales, and the usual element of exaggeration makes their estimates almost worthless. The monk of St Denys, for instance, gives the figure of 30,000 but as this chronicler actually credits Richard with the pacification of Ireland his authority is obviously dubious.[1] Creton claims, even more wildly, that Salisbury mustered an army of 40,000.[2] No figures are given for Richard's army, but it is implied that he returned with the full host--ordering all those 'who could bear arms' to embark--which however dispersed in south Wales. The Kirkstall chronicle states that 10,000 armed men were brought from Ireland, and that this support was doubled in south Wales.[3] In the circumstances, the hints from record evidence of considerable forces arriving from Ireland are particularly interesting. An account from the lordship of Brecon refers, for instance, to the efforts made to 'resist the malice of King Richard and other enemies of the lord coming from Ireland', though unfortunately no further details are supplied.[4] Despite the lack of positive evidence it seems fair to presume that Richard did muster what forces he could on his return from Ireland, and that, though he may have been impeded by difficulties in shipping, when he finally arrived it was with the bulk of his expeditionary troops and possibly an element of Anglo-Irish support.

When the available evidence concerning the deployment of troops, money and goods in these critical months is considered together it

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1 Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, pp 712-3.
2 Archaeologia, xx, 63
3 Bull. J.R.Lib., 1 (1931) p 133
4 S.C. 6/1157/4

becomes apparent that the entire expedition must be evaluated in the light of the Bolingbroke crisis. When this occurred royal priorities altered, and Ireland's needs moved once more to the background. The horses, armour and money which remained in the country seem to have been left there primarily to await developments in England, not for local use. The reservation of the money in Surrey's care to the king's use and its delivery to Henry's men in August 1399 meant that his retinue, without wages, gradually deserted and left the country quite without defence.[1] At least one of the men deputized by Surrey to occupy an office in his absence similarly went without pay: John Liverpool was not paid until November 1399 for his custody of Wicklow castle which he had held for over four months.[2] Liverpool managed to survive Surrey's disgrace,[3] but others suffering similar default may have fallen with Surrey or lacked sufficient influence to press their claims in England. This recurrent financial weakness was but one aspect of a generally deteriorating situation, associated with the political developments in England. From intense involvement royal policy changed almost overnight to virtual neglect, removing even Ormond from the scene. That MacMurrough, Desmond and O'Neill were all threatening war within a short time is hardly surprising. It seems in fact that the final word on the expedition must be that its obvious failure lay not in insurmountable deficiencies of organization or policy, or even in the conduct of the campaign itself, but in the manner in which the royal intervention was abruptly and involuntarily ended.

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1 Above, p 499; King's council in Ireland, p 261

2 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 480; E 404/15/101

3 He was confirmed in office on 9 October and continued for some years to hold Wicklow. (Above, p 162 note 6)

Conclusion

With Richard's deposition the crown's attitude towards Ireland underwent a fundamental change. The sustained involvement of the previous decade was not allowed to reach a natural conclusion but yielded place to a more familiar approach of intermittent activity and general neglect. It is therefore unwise to judge either Richard's aborted second expedition or his more general Irish achievements entirely in the light of subsequent Lancastrian crises. The lordship was admittedly not at peace in 1399, but at the same time it is probable that had Richard remained king he would have turned again to his interests there and might well have established a settlement of greater stability.

The nature of this change in royal policy after 1399 was determined by certain definite factors--most notably the different personality of Henry IV, the threats to his security upon the throne, and the monarchy's extreme financial straits. Richard's attachment to Ireland derived, one suspects, from his delight in the enormous potential of the crown there--free from the restraints and demands of England's established political community--and the ease with which he could apparently reduce the troublesome Irish to submission. Such motives held little appeal for Henry, who, furthermore, could see in his own success proof of the possible cost to an English king of involvement in Ireland.[1] Anxiety that such dangers should not arise again can possibly be seen in the request of parliament in October 1399 that the young Henry should not be sent out of the realm until the country be more assured of peace.[2] Though the same parliament asked for action respecting the safeguard of Ireland, it was clearly not expected that

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1 e.g. McFarlane, Lancastrian kings and Lollard knights, p 102.
2 Anglo-Norman Letters, no XXIV

this should ever reach the levels recently seen under Richard. The issue rolls, with their lack of references to Ireland, show how attention had shifted to the more immediate dangers presented by Scotland and Wales, and the use of Irish resources in these efforts--Irish shipping for the Scottish war and Irish victuals for the Welsh castles[1] --drove home the lesson that Ireland was again low on the crown's list of problems.[2] Not surprisingly, the lack of a consistent and adequately supported policy for the lordship led to further deterioration in the situation there, with recurring demands ultimately prompting the speaker in the 1406 parliament to complain that despite the great sums being invested in the country it was in no better order or safety than before, being in fact en voie perdicion et en pointe d'estre tout outrement destruyt.[3] One is probably not reading too much into the evidence to sense increasing disillusion with the lordship in this period and a growing lack of sympathy with appeals from Anglo-Ireland.

An important aspect of the problem was of course the other more pressing demands upon Henry IV and the English exchequer's increasing inability to meet them. Although Henry himself was aware of his limited treasure,[4] the practice of assignment, or rather of over-assignment, seems to have encouraged optimism about possible revenues. The dangers of the system for Ireland were highlighted during the lieutenancy of Thomas of Lancaster, who was initially appointed to serve for six years at 12,000 marks but who was consistently unable to secure payment of the money assigned to him.[5] Lancaster's 1408 indenture reduced his

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1 For shipping see C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 169; victuals, C.P.R. 1401-5, pp 54, 61, 189 etc.

2 On these problems see e.g. Kirby, Henry IV, pp 99-109 etc.

3 Rot.Parl., iii, 473, 577

4 e.g. Anglo-Norman letters, no 331, being a letter sent from the treasurer Laurence d'Allerthorpe to Henry IV.

5 E 404/16/728; for details on the financial background to Lancaster's lieutenancy see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, 342-3; Lydon, Lordship of Ireland, pp 246-7.

stipend, already lowered to 9,000 marks, to 7,000 marks and gave explicit instructions about payment in an effort to minimize the cumulative effects of default.[1] However, the prior claims of the household, prince Henry, prince John and the Earl of Westmorland were all made clear in this document, which supports other contemporary evidence that Lancaster, even when 'all his jewels and silver vessels were pledged', was not given priority of payment over the claims of either the household or Calais.[2] Such a policy was perhaps little more than political realism, for Ireland, always on the brink of disaster, always apparently survived and investment had made little appreciable difference. In England however, as the background to the Percy revolt of 1403 demonstrated, financial default could jeopardize the crown itself.[3]

That the first years of Lancastrian rule in Ireland were mainly noted for an increasing incapacity to support military intervention of a traditional type tends to obscure the nature of the change from Ricardian to Henrician policies. It is true that in Stanley's and Lancaster's enterprises the lordship received a significant degree of attention, but this should not be understood as a continuation of Richard's aims for the lordship. It seems fairly clear that the involvement sprang from considerations about the new king's security. There were two distinct elements to this problem in Ireland, for Richard's deposition at once gave opportunity to the Gaelic Irish to rebel with relative impunity and raised the possibility that Anglo-Ireland might rally to the support of the late king. The withdrawal of Richard's expeditionary army provided the first opportunity for the Irish, and the political vacuum which followed must have encouraged Gaelic

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1 B.M.Cotton MS Titus B XI, f 7

2 e.g. C.P.R. 1405-8 p 18

3 Proceedings and Ordinances, ii, 57, 204; cf J.M.Bean, 'Henry IV and the Percies', History, xliv (1959) pp 222-3.

ambitions. It seems at least certain that any who still hoped for advantages from submitting to the king shelved such prospects and reverted to undisciplined independence, their period of submission brought to a legitimate conclusion. The impact on Anglo-Ireland must have been even more profound, for though the ground gained by Richard was apparently lost, he had at least demonstrated a real interest in the lordship and a willingness to invest money in it. It was possibly believed in England that certain elements in Ireland were either rallying to Richard's support or preparing to choose their own successor to him. This is at least suggested in a London chronicle's account of the October 1399 parliament, which explained that Ireland required attention because 'they of Irelond been in poynte to chose a kyng amonges hem. And to dysclayme that they wole holde of you'.[1] There is admittedly little record support for such a suggestion--though investigations into forfeitures of rebels, with the proviso that the results of such inquisitions be certified into the English chancery, hinted at some such recalcitrance.[2] That writs in Ireland were still running in Richard's name until 15 December, when the chancellor was ordered to amend the seal, may perhaps be adduced as further support for the argument.[3] It was said that the chancellor and treasurer 'were not certified of the king's taking upon him the royal estate'. The offence may have been little more than negligence--it is worth noting that a similar delay occurred in changing the seal after Edward III's death.[4] However, the fact that Ormond's private deeds were still at the end of October being dated according to Richard's regnal year is perhaps evidence of some reluctance to accept the turn in events.[5] Although in

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1 The Great Chronicle of London, ed. A.H.Thomas and I.D.Thornley, p 80.
2 e.g. Cal.Fine Rolls 1399-1405 pp 51-2
3 C.C.R. 1399-1402 p 5
4 Foedera, vii, 174
5 C.O.D., ii, no 343

the event Anglo-Ireland was ready to accept pragmatically the new king, uncertainty about this may well have been felt in England and the decision of December 1399 to send Stanley and to ensure that his indenture could be broken if the king or one of his family could be spared for duty in Ireland was probably linked to such a belief.[1]

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The necessity to take into account events in England when examining early Lancastrian policy in Ireland applies too in any effort to estimate the success of Richard's policies in Ireland. They cannot be seen solely in terms either of the lordship itself or of Richard's problems in England, but must involve consideration of the king's deposition and the lack of continuity in royal policy in the early fifteenth century. An Anglo-Irish account of some years later described for instance how Richard in Ireland 'lytill or noone esploit dit', but associated that failure with Richard's defects in England as a monarch 'who ruled evilly beyond law and God.'[2] The Lancastrian usurpation undoubtedly had a considerable effect upon the lordship--not just in reinterpreting the history of Richard's last years but in creating a situation where novel pressures upon the Westminster government influenced response to the lordship's needs. As a result it is extremely difficult to ascertain precisely what lasting achievement Richard made, either in pacifying the country or in dealing with its administrative weaknesses.

The problem is to some extent alleviated by the survival of a petition dating from September-October 1399.[3] This document, which was probably sent with an envoy empowered to discuss matters more thoroughly, was headed 'credentials for the message sent to England by the guardian of the land of Ireland and by the council there', and

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1 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 92; E 101/69/2/307
2 Secreta Secretorum, pp 136-7
3 King's council in Ireland, pp 261-9

presumably came from the council still headed by Edmund Holland, custos of Ireland.[1] The document, dating probably from about October 1399, reveals the state of the lordship at a crucial point, after Richard's withdrawal but before Henry made any definite plans for Ireland.

That the document dates from at least no earlier than September is proved by its complaint that Surrey's retinue had been forced to disband for lack of pay, as the money left by the lieutenant was seized and taken to England by Maudeleyn despite the Irish council's pleas to spend it on the lordship's defence. This removal of the treasure from Trim in fact occurred on 28 August 1399.[2] The clause referring to MacMurrough suggests in fact that 29 September had already passed. MacMurrough was described as having been at war before Richard ever came to Ireland, but particularly insistent since his departure upon restitution of the barony of Norragh and his 80 marks fee. After negotiations with the council it had been decided to pay MacMurrough a certain sum until the king gave his decision on the matter, but MacMurrough apparently stipulated that he must be satisfied by the end of September. The petition's statement that he was now at open war, in alliance with Desmond against Ormond, seems to be proof that Michaelmas had come and gone without the appeasement of MacMurrough. Further evidence of a circumstantial nature which suggests that the petition was received in England about mid-October lies in a series of appointments to Irish offices in late October. Although it was inevitable that the new king would grant his officers fresh patents as their commissions lapsed with Richard's deposition, the identity of the men appointed in October seems to follow from certain clauses in the petition.[3] It is indeed possible that the document represented local response to royal

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1 So described on 27 October 1399.(P.R.O.I.Calendar, iii, p 18, from Mem. 1 H.IV, m 10)

2 Above, p 499

3 Below, pp 514-6.

enquiry about the behaviour of past officers and their suitability for reappointment. If so, the petition must have dated from early in the month.

Inevitably, the petition reflected the unusual political circumstances of the time of Henry's usurpation. There is no evidence that news of this had yet reached Ireland, but the very absence of comment in the document suggests that the Irish council was still uncertain about the outcome of English events and was careful to assume neither that Richard was defeated nor Henry victorious. The position of Edmund Holland, custos and brother of the Ricardian favourite Thomas Holland, in itself must have necessitated caution. That Holland apparently remained in office for some considerable time is possibly proof of Henry's preoccupations elsewhere in his first months and his desire to keep involvement in Ireland at a minimum. Holland was certainly acting on 27 October, and possibly much later.[1] His successor, Alexander Balscot Bishop of Meath, does not appear as witnessing documents until January 1400,[2] by which time he must have been acting as deputy to John Stanley, appointed in December 1399.[3] This petition reflected therefore, we may assume, the views of a government little changed since the expedition. It is worth noting that at no time were the main officers of the crown indicted in the petition for the present crisis--it being rather attributed to long-standing problems and the earlier dissipation of resources.

The question of MacMurrough was not the only point of conflict with Gaelic Ireland during these months. O'Neill too was threatening war, with a large force assembled and ready to act if he did not immediately receive his son (Felimidh) and other hostages whose deliverance he

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1 Above p 509 note 1.

2 P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, p 71 from Mem 1 H.IV m 28; it was apparently in late January or February that the late duke's widow and Edmund Holland were taken at Liverpool, presumably on returning from Ireland. (C.P.R. 1399-1401, pp 182, 206, 267)

3 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 92

understood Richard to have promised in 1395.[1] Both on this point and concerning MacMurrough's demands the Irish council appealled for a remedy--complete exhaustion of Irish revenues making it impossible for the council itself to authorize effective action. The state of relations with the rest of Gaelic Ireland was, if possible, even more depressing than that revealed in the hints of war from MacMurrough and O'Neill. One can infer a situation too bleak to be catalogued in detail from the statement that the Irish enemies 'are strong and arrogant and of great power and there is neither rule nor power to resist them', for the English marchers neither could nor would attack them without strong support. The English rebels were then named--as the families of the Butlers, Powers, Geraldines, Berminghams, Daltons, Barrets, Dillons and others. These were said to be amenable to no law or justice but caused great distress among the loyal population, 'putting them to greater duress than do the Irish enemies'. Their collusions with the Irish enemy made retaliation difficult and the resulting fear of physical violence so incapacitated the royal officers that 'the king has no profit of the revenues of the land because the law cannot be executed'. While these clauses probably contained an element of exaggeration, common in all such petitions, they are, in general terms, quite credible, and clearly reveal how little had changed in the previous five years.[2]

The petition's description of the state of Ireland was not, however, limited to the obvious deterioration in law and order--the last fourteen clauses being general comments about the country's civil administration, intended to explain its current ill-governance and lack of revenue. One of the chief grievances was the amount of land, with offices and

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1 Above, p 94

2 The threats from O'Neill and the settlements subsequently made with MacMurrough and other Gaelic chiefs are recorded in C.C.H., p 158 no 119; p 159 no 7; p 156 no 42; p 165 nos 232-3, 236-7.

revenues, lost to the crown by grants to private individuals. Of the counties still obedient to the law only Dublin and part of Kildare were in the king's hands--Uriell being granted out, and Meath, Ulster, Wexford, Cork, Tipperary and 'many other counties' being held as liberties.[1] Part of the country was recognized to be completely beyond control, through war and lack of justice--the counties named including Carlow, Kilkenny and Waterford as well as the more distant Kerry, Limerick, Connacht and Roscommon. Here at least is proof that the writers of the petition strengthened their case by exaggeration, for the sheriffs of Carlow, Waterford and Kilkenny all made proffers at Easter 1400 and the state of the country cannot have been so bleak as was portrayed.[2]

That concern about the country's declining revenues underlay several clauses was occasionally made explicit. The city of Waterford was for instance said to have been granted the cocket and custom and feefarm for twenty years to enclose the town, though the obligation had not been fulfilled.[3] This item may explain the inspeximus of Waterford's charters in November 1399 with certain exceptions.[4] Waterford had perhaps recently been the centre of attention for a particular reason and was therefore mentioned by name, though many other comparable cases probably existed. The petition merely stated:

> ...all the profits of the land...which are...of any value are asked for and given to others, so that no profit comes to the exchequer to pay the fees and charges and other things, whereas the revenues...used to pay a great part of the expenses of the war.

It was, significantly, claimed that these charges upon the revenues, despite their decline, had been increased by fees and annuities to both Irish and English--beyond what the exchequer could support.

The final clauses referred to various administrative offices, and

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1 For Uriell see above, pp 228-9; that Cork was named among the liberties perhaps reflects the grant to Rutland--above p 171.

2 P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, p 8, from Mem. 1 H.IV, m 4.

3 Chartae, Privilegie et Immunitates, pp 82, 83.

4 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 242; see also ibid., pp 243, 244.

indicated considerable room for reform. It was claimed that no baron of the exchequer knew the law, and that other officers in the exchequer were similarly ignorant--exercising their offices, which they purchased for the sake of the fees, by deputies.[1] Singled out in particular were the offices of remembrancer, chief and second engrosser, 'of whom the greater part do not know a letter'. As so often in such petitions, the current state was contrasted with a former ideal. It was said for instance that the escheator used to pay 100 marks p.a. for the office, and give a profit to the king, but that they now took a £42 stipend and paid nothing to the exchequer.[2] Similarly the current system of appointment of customs collectors for life with £50 p.a. was contrasted with a former period when the customs of Ireland formed a substantial part of the revenues, before so much was assigned.[3] The most striking effect of these clauses comes not from their veracity or merit but from the way in which they mitigate the first half of the petition with its pronouncements of doom. Clearly the situation had not so far deteriorated that the lordship's security was the only vital issue. The significant proportion of the petition given to administrative detail suggests in fact a background of administrative investigation more commonly associated with stability. It supports the impression that it may have been intended to inform the English administration of the state of the land, with greater consideration of English than Irish political pressures.

Although the petition's concern for the state of the country's

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1 cf similar complaint in 1421 (Statutes and Ordinances, p 575)

2 The escheator did indeed hold office for life, but while he took various fees, amounting to about £40 p.a., he was answerable to the exchequer for the issues of the office. (C.P.R. 1391-6 p 11; E 403/571. 14 March, compensation to Adeleyme for loss of fee; Cal.Fine Rolls 1377-83, 15)

3 Collectors of customs also held office for life at a certain fee, again with the obligation to account for all issues and profits. e.g. C.P.R. 1391-6 p 618; Cal.Fine Rolls 1377-83 p 12.

revenues appears to reveal the ineffectiveness of any administrative reforms of the last decade, one cannot simply see the complaints as a reaction to ill-judged and unsuccessful policies. In some areas--the granting out of Louth for instance--specific Ricardian measures were attacked, but for the most part the complaints merely demonstrated that administrative reform and exchequer revival depended upon peace in the country and an ability to execute justice. To some extent in fact the petition confirms the impression of the earlier 1397 document, that in the years following Richard's first expedition an investigation was conducted into the lordship's financial state.

That the 1399 petition too had a strong exchequer interest is beyond doubt. Robert Faryngton, still treasurer, was clearly one of those responsible for its drafting. Faryngton's background in office in England, and his apparent reluctance to come to Ireland, hint that some at least of the charges in the petition should be understood against the standards set by the specialized departments of the English administration. That Faryngton was not held responsible for the state of the Irish revenues is demonstrated by his reappointment on 29 October as treasurer during pleasure, a burden from which he was not released until the following May on his own plea of ill health.[1] It is probable too that his influence played a part in some of the October appointments.

These appointments, dating from 20 October to 4 November, showed sufficient consistency with the personnel of the previous few years to reveal that in Ireland perhaps even more than in England Henry's coronation did not see large scale upheavals in the administration.[2] Richard Rede was appointed chief baron of the exchequer and Robert Burnell and Hugh de Faryngton also named as barons.[3] Of these only

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1 Above, 271-3; C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 112; S.C. 8/118/5859; C.P.R. 1396-9 p 283.

2 On this continuity in England see Tout, Chapters, iv, 60-67.

3 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 113

Burnell had held the office before,[1] and the fact that Rede was not sworn in until 13 January 1400 suggests that he came from England after his appointment.[2] Hugh Faryngton, the third baron, was Robert's brother and may have been appointed as a favour to the ailing and reluctant treasurer, though when he was subsequently dropped from the office the motive was ostensibly one of economy.[3] At the same time however two other appointments gave office in the exchequer to Anglo-Irishmen who had long experience in the Irish administration. William Boltham as chief engrosser and Robert Sutton as chief chamberlain respectively superseded Gerard de Raes and John Boyle, two obscure newcomers to the Irish administration.[4] Gerard de Raes, who had himself replaced William Boltham, had apparently retained his office through favour in England.[5] It seems probable that the petition was supported by verbal criticisms, resulting in the reappointment of these familiar and experienced ministers. Nor were the changes limited to the exchequer. On 20 October also were recorded the appointments of John Kirkeby as keeper of the rolls of chancery and Hugh Bavent as clerk of the hanaper.[6] Kirkeby already held the office, and his reappointment, like that of Faryngton, signifies Henry's approval of Richard's principal appointees. Bavent was however a newcomer to Irish office, though he subsequently rose to the rank of treasurer.[7] At the same time, Stephen Bray and John fitz Adam were respectively appointed justices of the king's bench and common bench in Ireland.[8] Neither man was particularly prominent in Ireland, though Bray is known to have acted

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 171

2 P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, pp 73-4 from Mem. 1 H.IV, m 29; he had served in office both in England and Ireland.(Ball, Irish Judges, 171-2.)

3 S.C. 8/118/5859

4 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 113; above p 270; C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 338, 449.

5 ibid., pp 449, 459

6 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 113

7 C.P.R. 1422-9 p 205

8 C.P.R. 1399-1401 pp 113, 120

as chief justice from 1396-8.[1] It is possible that their obscurity merely indicates the poor survival of records. Concluding this series of significant appointments were the patents of William Ashe, confirmed as marshal in the king's bench, common bench, and exchequer, and of Ralph Standish as escheator and clerk of the markets in Ireland.[2] Both offices were held by deputy--Ashe appointing Hugh Bavent to act for him in early November.[3] Standish's exact area of responsibility is not certain, as Westminster appointments had already named John Cawode as clerk of the markets in Meath and the Mirreson brothers as collectors in all ports.[4]

The conclusions that can be drawn from this glimpse of administrative reorganization are limited--perhaps the most significant being that considerable continuity between the Ricardian and Henrician governments is evident. One certainly cannot claim that these few changes in personnel had any lasting impact upon the quality of government--as the next decades saw recurring attention to complaints about clerks of the market, escheators and ignorant clerks.[5] In some areas the reforms associated with Richard's involvement carried on for a period. In the chancery for example a greater attempt was made to keep the chancellor resident in Dublin, and when circumstances forced him personally to attend to business elsewhere he occasionally empowered a deputy to seal documents in his absence.[6] The issues of the seal remained reserved to the king and the clerk of the hanaper was summoned to account in England.[7] On the whole, however, the momentum of the previous decade was lost, and the effects of Ricardian investigations into

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1 T.C.D. MS 659, p 295 (list of officials); Bray was already chief justice of the common bench in 1380. (P.R.O.I. R.C. 8/33, p 85)
2 C.P.R. 1399-1401 pp 40, 48
3 P.R.O.I. Calendar, iii, p 71 from Mem. 1 H.IV m 28.
4 ibid., p 76 from Mem. 1 H.IV m 29; C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 158.
5 e.g. Statutes and Ordinances, pp 522, 525, 575-7.
6 e.g. C.C.H., p 158 no 112
7 e.g. E 368/177 Mich. br. retorn., m 143.

revenues and suggested official reforms were soon dissipated by Lancastrian neglect.

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As for Richard's principal ambition, his attempt to bring peace by re-establishing legal relations with all his lieges--this policy above all others required long term stability and continuing interest, if not regular royal visits, to be effective. Although Richard had already apparently failed by 1399 it is possible that something could yet have been salvaged and built into a firm settlement. How far he had yet to go could however be seen in the 1399 petition. Nothing, perhaps, pinpointed more neatly Richard's failure to accomplish the lordship's legal unity than the distinct treatment of rebel English and Gaelic Irish in the 1399 petition--the problem being identified as 'the rebellion and falseness of the English rebels on the one side and... the war of the Irish enemies on the other'. That the fifteenth century, which saw English neglect of Ireland achieve its height, brought little or no change in terminology referring to the different races within the lordship comes therefore as no surprise. The advances made by Richard were largely theoretical and could not in themselves alter the structure of power in the lordship. Already in 1397 for instance occurred examples of the Irish still being identified by blood, still suffering the effects of the Statutes of Kilkenny.[1] Occasionally in the following period the problem of Gaelic Ireland was referred to in a way which at once recognized the importance of the liege submissions and admitted their lack of effect. Thus for instance the petition of 1421 which proposed a crusade against oath-breaking Irishmen described how they had become _dislieges et rebeux_ since the time of Richard.[2] Later in the fifteenth century attempts to recognize the liege status

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1 e.g. Lawlor, _Fasti St Patrick's_, p 85
2 _Statutes and Ordinances_, pp 564-6

of submitting Irishmen could occasionally be discerned. At best these still left outside the lordship the majority of 'Irish enemies' who did not submit. At worst they led to statement like that of 1447, which explained that if any 'Irish enemy' who had become the king's liege later broke the peace then 'any liege man' could act against such an 'Irishman received to liegiance' as against a man who had never become liege, without any legal restraints.[1] The position of such licensed enemies of the lordship was still more clearly spelled out by the 1431 statement that any Irishman found among the English lieges during time of peace or truce might be proceeded against as if he were an enemy of the king, unless he had a special licence to be there.[2] It appears therefore that despite the continuing desire to admit rebels to the king's allegiance, the established political divisions in the country militated against the liegiance of an Irishman effectively altering his natural tendencies either to rebel or to become an object of discrimination. Although the increasing level of degeneracy tended to confuse this issue, the restatement in Poynings' parliament of 1494 of the principles of the 1366 legislation showed how little official thinking on the problems of Ireland had changed in the previous century and a half.[3] Seen from this perspective one can appreciate the reality of Richard's achievement. Whether or not his policies developed as the natural response of a royal visit to Ireland, their potential ability to come to grips with the Irish situation was altogether novel. Though their clearest ultimate success was to strengthen Henry VIII's title as king of Ireland, their prime historical value is perhaps to cast into relief other more traditional policies for Ireland.

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1 Statutes of Ireland, Henry VI, pp 88-90

2 ibid., pp 44-5

3 A. Conway, Henry VIII's relations with Scotland and Ireland, pp 118-43, esp. 122-3.

Appendices

Appendix I

The value of the Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard, attributed to Creton, as a source of historical evidence on the 1399 expedition.

For many of the details concerning Richard's last months in office and his deposition the fullest narrative source is a group of French writings, dating apparently from the first years of the fifteenth century. The two principal accounts have become commonly known as the Traison et Mort du Roy Richart II and the Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard, the latter often being referred to as 'Creton's metrical poem', after the name of its putative author.[1] The similar treatment of the period in other French chronicles of the same time has led to the view that the writers comprise a 'French school', quite distinct in sympathies and factual content from contemporary English chronicles.[2] The theme of these two particular works is Henry's usurpation of Richard's crown and the tone is undoubtedly propagandist in parts. It is usually accepted that in the treatment of the Irish expedition these French sources have a common origin in Creton's poem. The Traison et Mort, while beginning in 1397, apparently with first hand information, borrows from Creton not just the substance but the detail of events from June to August 1399.[3] It is not, however, by any means a verbatim copy of the metrical poem, even during these months. Its author omits the personal element which makes Creton's story so vivid, and there are some significant variations in detail, partly a result of the author's

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1 Traison et Mort, ed. and trans. by B.Williams; Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard, ed. and trans. by J.Webb, Archaeologia, xx (1824) pp 1-423 (henceforth Archaeologia, xx.)

2 See,e.g., M.V.Clarke, 'The deposition of Richard II', Fourteenth Century Studies, p 67; M.McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, p 548; L.D.Duls, Richard II in the early chronicles, pp 232-4.

3 cf Opinion of J.W.Sherborne, 'Richard II's return to Wales, July 1399', Welsh History Review, vii(1975) p 397.

tendency in the Traison et Mort to exaggerate even more than Creton.[1] Sometimes his comments amplify Creton's simpler narrative, as for instance when he describes Ireland as being divided between a nation which used a form of English and dwelt in the towns and another nation--une maniere de gens saugaige--who lived in the country and followed strange customs. Of these 'MacMore' was reputedly the most powerful chief, claiming to be king of Ireland.[2] The Traison et Mort also alters Creton's chronology of events, but these differences are insignificant.[3] In short, although the Traison et Mort gives us an independent account of events both before and after the Irish expedition its author clearly draws heavily on Creton from the point at which Richard left for Ireland until his return to Wales. Differences between the versions tend to be of form, not content, attributable often to different literary styles.[4] Of the two sources one is obliged to rely therefore upon the superior authority of Creton's poem.

As it was Creton's account of the misfortunes met with by Richard's army which, in the absence of any submission records, led to the belief that the expedition was short and inglorious,[5] it is necessary to give his information a critical examination. The most obvious drawback of the poem as a source of historical material is that Creton evidently embroidered on the facts at his disposal when crucial information was lacking. While he presents insufficient evidence for one to believe that he was in the council's confidence he nevertheless purports to give verbatim crucial speeches of his principal characters, such as the king himself and the Duke of Aumarle.[6] Clearly one ought not to credit

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1 e.g. Traison et Mort, p 173; cf Archaeologia, xx, pp 28,32.
2 Traison et Mort, pp 28, 171
3 e.g. Traison et Mort, pp 174, 32; cf Archaeologia, xx, pp 35,309. For the similarity of their material see e.g. the meeting with MacMurrough, Traison et Mort, p 31, Archaeologia, xx, 305-6.
4 e.g. In their handling of the incident when Richard heard of Henry's landing. Traison et Mort, p 41; Archaeologia, xx, pp 310, 314.
5 e.g. J.Ramsay, Genesis of Lancaster, ii, 349-50 etc.
6 e.g. Archaeologia, xx, 55-8, 312-3.

the detail of such accounts. His limited perspective is seen in his very concentration upon Leinster and the danger of MacMurrough--only one of the many facets of the Irish problem requiring Richard's attention. Creton appears to have known nothing of any royal overtures in other Gaelic areas, though some were very probably made.

Perhaps the most significant of his literary devices was, however, his use of the role of the Duke of Aumarle to develop a dramatic theme. This he achieved by referring to his later desertion of Richard on each occasion when his name appeared, casting him ultimately as the traitor who personally had engineered the king's fall. From the first notice of his failure to join the king at Kilkenny he is said to have 'acted in a strange and evil manner throughout'.[1] As considerable attentio has been paid in historical examinations of Richard's final crisis to the role of Aumarle and this possibility that he betrayed Richard with bad advice,[2] the background to the charge requires further scrutiny.

Although Aumarle's abilities had not yet brought him any great fame, he undoubtedly enjoyed royal favour, and for a young man had made considerable advances since his exploits on the first expedition. He represented Richard's cause in the French marriage negotiations, the only member of the royal blood among the king's envoys.[3] Richard's favours to him after he served as a counter-appellant in 1397 were considerable.[4] While royal patronage benefitted the duke, Armarle's support added significantly to Richard's party. There was no question, for instance, that Aumarle's right to the possessions confiscated from the Appellants could have been viewed with the kind of hostility roused by William Scrope's rise to power. Aumarle's failure to join the expedition

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1 Archaeologia, xx, pp 24-5, 298
2 e.g. Steel, Richard II, pp 262-3.
3 Foedera, vii, 802-5.
4 Rot.Parl.,iii, 374 ff; C.P.R. 1396-9 pp 201,205,281 etc.

when it began does not seem to have had any deep political significance. As Warden of the West March he was occupied in the north prior to the expedition.[1] Sometime in late May he delivered to the exchequer an indenture made on 14 May between the son of the king of Scotland and himself, prolonging the truce between England and Scotland.[2] Only then was he free to prepare for Ireland, and some delay after the main body of the army had sailed was probably unavoidable. While presumably aware of the unrest in England, he is unlikely to have actually plotted with Henry for Richard's downfall. Although in the north Henry was to find ready supporters in the Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland, Aumarle's own position depended on Richard's favour against the claims of the northern men themselves and Northumberland and Westmorland were unlikely to have seen in Aumarle a potential ally.[3] Furthermore, his father, the Duke of York, was Richard's regent in England, and must have become aware if Aumarle was deliberately lingering in England. Though York showed lack of resolve when actually faced by Bolingbroke in rebellion, there is no suggestion that he would at any time have been party to a treasonable plot to invite Henry to return or would have approved such behaviour on the part of his son.

It seems probable therefore that Aumarle's delay was innocent and that the story which Creton built up round it was the product of hind-sight. By the time Creton was writing Aumarle had engaged in plot and counter-plot, establishing a reputation as the arch villain in Richard's camp, both before and after the deposition.[4] Creton's depiction of Aumarle in this light obscures the evidence concerning his true role,

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1 Rotuli Scotiae, ii, 140, 142, 147; E 403/561 (5 March, 27 March etc

2 Palgrave, Antient Kalendars and Inventories, ii, 59-60.

3 For the background see Tuck, 'Richard II and the border magnates', Northern History, iii, (1968) passim, esp p 49.

4 Archaeologia, xx, 211-16, 403-7.

making no mention of his past Irish experiences and his frequent services to the king. His preoccupation with Aumarle's responsibility for Richard's future deposition is seen clearly in his account of the king's reception of Aumarle at Dublin. Though the king's favourite--'there was no man alive whom he loved better'--the poem implies that Aumarle's delay was due to his plotting with Richard's enemies. Creton does not even bother to repeat Aumarle's own excuses, and does not refer in this context either to his duties in the north or to the recent storms which had impeded shipping.[1]

While the role cast for Aumarle has an obvious explanation in hindsight and literary technique, it is more difficult to understand the chronology followed in Creton's narrative. Doubts as to Creton's reliability really hinge on this problem, for his dating is in itself confusing and flatly contradicts other chronicler and record statements about the length of the expedition and the timing of Richard's return to Wales. The poem rarely mentions actual dates and Creton's chronology can only be established by adding the number of days said to have passed between certain events--a method which makes inevitable some degree of error. The first part of the account is, however, fairly straightforward. Creton arrived from Paris at Milford Haven in the company of a French knight in time to sail with the king to Waterford, which was reached on 1 June.[2] After six days there the army moved to Kilkenny where it waited another fortnight before starting out in battle array on 23 June.[3] From this point the sequence of events is less certain. It is said that for eleven days rations were in short supply. This interval probably dated from the time of leaving Kilkenny until the meeting with relief ships just before the army at last

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1 Archaeologia, xx, 45, 309: Creton himself mentions the bad weather in a different context--ibid.

2 ibid., 13-22, 295-7: Curtis, 'Unpublished letters from Richard', 2

3 Archaeologia, xx, 27, 298.

arrived in Dublin.[1] It seems unlikely that Richard can have reached the city before 3-4 July.[2] After this a fortnight was spent in Dublin itself.[3] The six weeks which passed without news from England during the protracted storms seem therefore to have comprised the period from arrival at Waterford rather than, as is implied, from the time Dublin was reached.[4] Thus, according to Creton's internal evidence it is possible that Richard did leave Dublin about 17 July. The chronology is upset however by Creton's claim that the news which reached Dublin after this six weeks of isolation told of the fall of Bristol and the execution of Scrope, Bushy and Green by Bolongbroke.[5] The poem refers to consultation on a Saturday about a possible departure on Monday, and, as we know that Bristol fell on 29 July,[6] it would seem that the earliest date for this projected return was Monday 2 August. Creton claims that he did indeed depart then with Salisbury, but that Richard and the rest of the army delayed some time. A figure of eighteen days is mentioned but it is not clear whether this time passed before Richard left Ireland for south Wales or before he met Salisbury again at Conway.[7] As Salisbury is said to have kept an army in the field for a fortnight, the eighteen days probably refers to the total length of time between his departure and the reunion with the king at Conway. At all events, on Creton's account Richard cannot have been at Conway before 19 August.[8]

Though a case has in the past been made for the accuracy of Creton's chronology, recent research has generally followed the conclusions of

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1 Archaeologia, xx, 34, 302

2 cf Henry of Marlborough, Chronicle of Ireland, pp 16-7, for the claim that Richard was in Dublin by 28 June.

3 Archaeologia, xx, 45, 308.

4 cf ibid., 45, 309

5 He says that Richard heard that his treasurer (Scrope) had been executed. (Archaeologia, xx, 46, 310)

6 Rot. Parl.,iii, 656, referring to Green's execution.

7 Archaeologia,xx, 75, 320

8 ibid., pp 151, 369

Clarke and Galbraith, that Richard reached Wales before the end of July.[1] Remaining differences of opinion tend on the whole to be concerned with the detail of Richard's actual collapse and capture rather than with the early evidence about his reception of the news in Ireland and the process by which he returned to Wales.[2] This dismissal of Creton's account inevitably puts into question the accuracy of his other statements about events in Ireland. In order to understand the error and re-evaluate the rest of the poem it is therefore worth recapitulating some of the arguments about Richard's return in the light of new evidence on the background.

The date of Henry's arrival in England has never been authoritatively established, but it probably occurred at the end of June or in the first days of July.[3] There can therefore be no truth in the accounts that Richard in Ireland heard of the crisis about 24 June, though there may have been some early intimation of Henry's preparations in France.[4] The council in England was presumably alerted first by the news that Bolingbroke had taken advantage of Philip of Burgundy's absence from Paris to make an alliance with the Duke of Orleans and depart for England.[5] A state of crisis was certainly recognized from early in the month. On 3 July an order was made for the retaking of Pevensy castle near Hastings, reputed to be in the hands of invading enemies.[6] It was probably in order to bring the news of this to Richard that on 4 July a messenger was paid for a journey to Ireland with certain

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1 For the pro-Creton case see E.J.Jones, 'An examination of the authorship of the Deposition and Death of Richard II, attributed to Creton Speculum, xv (1940), 460-77; cf Clarke, Fourteenth Century Studies, 53-98 passim; followed by McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p 492; Steel, Richard II, p 267; Tuck, Richard II, pp 218-9 etc.

2 e.g. Sherborne, 'Richard II's return to Wales', passim.

3 e.g. R.Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster, p 317.

4 e.g. Historia vitae et regni Ricardi II, p 149; Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden, ix, 506; Marlborough says that he received news of Henry's landing on 28 June. (Chronicle of Ireland, p 16)

5 See, e.g., Kirby, Henry IV, p 54.

6 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 596

news for the king and other messengers sent to summon magnates still in England to the service of the regent.[1] When however Richard Penry, valet to William Bagot himself, was dispatched to Ireland on 12 July he probably brought more accurate information about the crisis.[2] On the same day the messenger who had informed the council of Henry's landing was paid.[3]

There is no difficulty therefore in believing that Richard was ready to leave Dublin by 17 July--the date given by John Luffwyk, accounting later for articles then left in his possession.[4] The date is confirmed by the enrolment at Chester on 19 July of Salisbury's mandate, authorized by letters under the signet, to raise support for the king in north Wales and Chester.[5] As other evidence from the area shows that Chester castle was put into a state of defence as early as 3 July, and that letters were sent to Richard in Ireland, the king may actually have learnt of the crisis first from this source.[6] Further south Bolingbroke's lordship of Brecon had also made early preparations when the trouble began--holding itself in armed readiness for a period of about six weeks 'to resist the malice of King Richard and other enemies of the lord coming from Ireland'.[7]

Richard apparently delayed about a week longer in Ireland, gathering together his army, moving south to Waterford and mobilizing shipping.[8] He departed therefore from Waterford about 24-5 July, a date close to

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1 E 403/562 (4 July)
2 ibid., 12 July.
3 ibid., 12 July.
4 E 364/34/G; see the confusion which arose about this date due to a misprint in Eulogium Historiarum, iii, p lxii n 1, repeated by Clarke, 'Dieulacres Chronicle', Bull. J.R.Lib., xiv (1930) p 172, and corrected by J.W.H.Redfern, Bull. J.R.Lib., xv (1931) p 7.
5 Chester 2/73; cf Sherborne, 'Richard II's return to Wales', p 392, where he presumes that the original appointment in Ireland was of 19 July.
6 S.C. 6/774/10; Robert Parys's account as Chamberlain of Chester.
7 S.C. 6/1157/4, account of the receiver of Brecon; the item mentioning six weeks is cancelled in the account, but there is no reason to suspect that this was because of the length of time given.
8 Above, pp 479-80.

that given by several contemporary chronicles.[1] Heading for Bristol to rendezvous with his ministers,[2] he presumably landed in south Wales about 27 July, the day before Henry himself triumphantly entered Bristol. Walsingham's report that Scrope's execution on this occasion was prompted by the news of the king's arrival in the vicinity may thus in fact be true.[3] Richard's precipitate flight north supports the view that, too late to save Bristol, he staked all on the chance of reaching Salisbury and his army in north Wales. The position of Bristol and the timing of its surrender is crucial in explaining both Richard's desire to go to south Wales and his immediate removal north from that area when he landed.[4]

Independent record evidence gives some detail on events in south Wales at this juncture, for among those left behind while Richard hastened north was a number of his household officers, laden with the goods of the household in their charge. Many of these items were lost in the subsequent troubles, and the process by which Henry's exchequer tried to bring the men in question to account reveals something of the royal army's fate.[5] Reference is made to Richard's landing at Haverford where, incidentally, his seneschal Thomas Percy was constable for life.[6] A large amount of Richard's personal baggage left there was later inventoried and delivered to Henry after the deposition.[7] Another

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1 e.g. Chronicon Adae de Usk, p 27 (22 July); Historia vitae et regni Ricardi II, p 149 and Polychronicon, viii, 25 (25 July).

2 C.P.R. 1399-1401 p 381

3 Annales Ricardi Secundi, p 247

4 cf The interpretation of Sherborne, 'Richard II's return to Wales', passim, where Bristol is not even mentioned.

5 Carp's accounts mention the items lost. (E 361/5/26-7) The writ of acquittance is printed in Anglo-Norman Letters, no 381, but the most detailed accounts are in the Memoranda Rolls: e.g. E 159/178 Mich. br. baron., m 39; E 159/179 Mich. br. baron., m 20; E 368/175 Mich. communia mm 17, 24, 29, 30; E 368/176 Mich. communia mm 18, 32, 53, 60, 82, 104, 114; E 368/177 Mich. communia, m 16.

6 E 368/175 Mich. communia m 24; E 368/176 Hilary br. retorn., m 53; C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 210-11.

7 E 101/335/3; See also Palgrave, Antient Kalendars and Inventories of the exchequer, iii, 358-61.

account states that Richard landed at Milford, the site given by Creton, but as the returning army probably disembarked at various points along the coast from Haverfordwest to Bristol it is not surprising that the exact location was not generally known.[1]

The memoranda notices concerning the lost items show that by 1 August Richard seems to have already departed from the main body of the army. On that day Sir Thomas Percy, acting as seneschal of the household, took many possessions of the king into the care of the constable of Carmarthen castle, keeping himself the keys of the chests in which the goods were locked.[2] Other royal possessions were similarly stored in Pembroke castle.[3] The area was not considered safe and Carmarthen castle was in fact sacked and the goods carred off, allegedly by the Welsh.[4] It is possible that Richard had left the army at Carmarthen. Percy, the army presumably by now already dispersed, probably made his way north immediately after this. Although Creton claims that he and his followers were robbed by lawless Welshmen on their journey,[5] they may in fact have met with raiding parties from Henry's army, moving north to Chester. Certainly, it is said that William Staunden, sergeant of the king's pullerie, was robbed of many provisions on 3 August between Leominster and Ludlow.[6] Usk, who gives Henry's itinerary in some detail, shows that Henry was in Leominster on 3 August and in Ludlow the next day, so the robbers were most probably of his company.[7] Whether Percy and Aumarle at this stage voluntarily joined Bolingbroke, or whether circumstances forced them after they left Carmarthen to take a route full of dangers for any royal supporters is

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1 E 368/178 Mich. br. retorn., m 215; Archaeologia, xx, 75; see also Traison et Mort, pp 188, 194.
2 e.g. E 368/175 Mich comm. m 24; E 368/176 Hilary comm. m 60; Trinity comm. m 104 etc.
3 E 368/175 Mich. comm., m 17
4 ibid., m 24; E 368/176 Hilary comm. m 60; Trinity comm. m 104 etc.
5 Archaeologia, xx, 99-106; also Chronicon Adae de Usk, p 27 etc.
6 E 368/176 Mich. comm., m 32
7 Chronicon Adae de Usk, p 25

not our present concern. Some of Richard's men certainly came by chance into contact with the rebels.[1] Further evidence of the royal company's activities lies in the record of a payment of £500 on 29 July to Richard Maudeleyn at Whiteland Abbey.[2] This was made by Thomas More, the king's cofferer, and Maudeleyn and John Serle, valet of the king's robes, were 'to keep it to the use of the king himself'. The proximity of Whiteland Abbey to Carmarthen puts beyond doubt the presence of Richard's supporters, if not himself, in this area at the time of Bristol's fall.

Creton's chronology, which hinges on the claim that Richard was unaware of events in England until he received the news of Bristol's collapse, clearly cannot be substantiated. Although this discovery seems to put in doubt Creton's other evidence, there is an obvious explanation for the error which fits in well with what has already been noted about Creton's literary licence in enlarging on the facts at his disposal. He seems in short to have used his subsequent knowledge of events to explain an earlier unaccountable change in royal policy. It is quite probable that the army itself and many others in Richard's company were not initially told the nature of the news which had come from England after the first week in July. Possibly the news actually came, as suggested, from Chester, in the form of local rumour. To divulge to the army, after their unsuccessful Leinster campaign, that Henry was raising England against the king might have invited desertion. Creton, ignorant of the content of the early messages, may well have presumed when he later came to write his account that the news which broke up the expedition told in fact of the fall of Bristol. In the same manner, his account of Richard's subsequent exploits in Wales

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1 e.g. The ships arriving at Bristol from Dublin; E 368/176 Hilary br. retorn.,m 53; E 368/175 Mich. comm.,mm 24, 30; E 368/176 Mich. comm., m 32; Hilary comm., m 60 and Hilary br. retorn.,m 18; E 368/177 Mich. comm., m 16 etc.

2 E 361/5/26

leaves much unsaid and is in places demonstrably inaccurate.[1] Here too Creton appears to use literary licence to fill in from accounts which he subsequently heard obscure passages in the story.

In using Creton as an original source one must accept, evidently, some limitations in his work. He is, for a start, clearly unreliable in his dating. More serious is the discovery that unambiguous statements, such as the news about Bristol, may on occasion be doubted. There is, however, no reason to suppose that he deliberately falsified the evidence, especially in his account of affairs in Ireland. The propagandist nature of his work really concerns Richard's position as king of England, and for the most part the Irish expedition is described with a convincing mixture of good and bad aspects, not always revealing Richard or his government in a favourable light. The poem's most dangerous quality, with reference to Ireland, is the tendency to exaggerate and put into the mouths of characters speeches--such as MacMurrough's extravagant defiance of Richard--which are probably wholly imaginary. While it remains a unique and informative account of an Irish expedition, one must clearly be extremely cautious in accepting its detail as the reliable statements of a fully informed eye-witness.

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1 Apart from his confusing account of Richard's activities in Wales, which cannot be substantiated or disproved, he is guilty in places of giving dates which we know to be impossible--e.g. that Henry set out from Chester to meet Richard on 22 August. (Archaeologia, xx, 151, 369; cf Clarke, Fourteenth Century Studies, p 72)

Appendix II

The retinue of Stephen Scrope from 1395-7, as described in E 101/41/39.

The lists which follow in this appendix have been compiled from the retinue roll of Stephen Scrope, William Scrope's deputy as justiciar of Munster, Leinster and Louth. The roll is described as 'Payments of wages of William Lescrope...by the hands of William Periar, clerk of the wages of Stephen Lescrope...', and was presented by William Scrope in the course of his account. The scrutiny of the auditors is made clear from the names they have disallowed, with the explanation that William as justiciar was himself obliged to provide for twenty men at arms. No sums of money are actually itemized on the roll[1] and it seems probable that this document in fact summarized other material --evidence concerning musters and the payment of wages--and was compiled after the two years service were over to facilitate the account.

The roll consists of eight membranes, each describing the retinue in one quarter of the two year period--the names being divided into the wards in which they served. An examination of these wards shows their composition to have been on the whole relatively stable. To demonstrate this I have listed the men in their wards, roughly in the order in which they appeared. Some inconsistencies were inevitable, as new men were added to fill the gaps, but these serve to highlight the stability of the bulk of the retinue. In the lists the quarterly periods are numbered from one to eight and the wards symbolized by letters A - I. These letters represent the following groups: A - Stephen Scrope's own retinue; B - Cork; C - Carlow; D - Ballymore; E - Thomastown; F - Kendleston; G - Wicklow and Newcastle MacKinegan; H - Wexford; I - Dunlavin.

Two of the membranes, describing the first and fifth quarters, are damaged on the right hand side, making it impossible to decipher some of

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1 cf E 101/42/10, roll of wages for Richard's Cheshire retinue, where the payment to each man is separately entered.

the surnames, but in most such cases the consistency of the names throughout the remaining quarters enable one to suggest possible identifications. Such names have been bracketted in the lists. Considerable variations in the spelling of names occurs, sometimes raising the suspicion that the men were in fact replaced by others with similar names. Where there is no serious question of identity I have usually adopted a standard form for the sake of clarity, while showing examples of the differences found, without further comment. Where, however, the alteration was such that the man's identity was called in question, or where the first name was changed, I have indicated this with an asterisk. In the latter case, of changing first names, clerical errors may have been responsible, though the possibilities must also be considered that the individual in question was a different unrelated person or that a man might have nominated a member of his family to replace him or represent him in the retinue for a time. In several such instances it can be seen that the first name is altered where the individual appears to change his ward, and in these cases it may well be that a different man was in question. Such movements, along with spelling variations, the poor condition of parts of the roll and the very nature of the attempted compilation, have probably made inevitable some degree of error in the lists, but the general pattern can nevertheless be seen.

Although the primary purpose of these lists was to enable an easy understanding of the composition of the retinue and changes in it, the study brought to light certain specific problems. Of particular interest is the frequency of duplication of names, signifying it seems the service of one man in two different wards during the same quarter, and the curious practice of describing a man in one quarter as an archer and then as a man at arms.

Any comments about the significance of name duplication must be tentative, for the obvious answer, that two men could easily bear the same name, can never be absolutely dismissed. It seems interesting, however, to note the frequency of such duplications, and to facilitate this another list has been added to that of the retinue, indicating which names appear twice or more during the same quarter in different wards. It is probable that some of these forty-seven names reveal nothing more than a common or similar name shared by two individuals, but it is unlikely that all the instances can bear this interpretation. Some points in particular seem worth noting. It is at once apparent, for instance, that Scrope's own retinue, the force which comprised group A, features with disproportionate frequency on the list, contributing about half the instances. If one accepts that the same men were named in two wards during the one period this discovery is no surprise, for such duplication would be more easily arranged with the members of a mobile unattached group, who might be deployed for some time at a local base, but retain their positions within the main force. Looking at the other examples, one can also note how duplicated names in fixed wards often concerned bases which were geographically close, such as Carlow and Ballymore, though the frequency with which names in Cork were doubled with names in the heart of Leinster makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions. The times at which examples of the practice are found seem to be without significance--varying throughout the two years. It is unlikely therefore to have been the product of any particular local emergency. Although some of the names in question consistently appear in two different wards, it is more common to find the double service lasting only two to three quarters. A curious feature of these names is the tendency for the first name to vary. A consistently different first name has been taken to indicate

a different personality, and such people have not been included in the list, but of the rest who served at any one time under the same name a surprising number subsequently seem to change their first name. Such variations do occur throughout the retinue roll, but not with any great frequency. The explanation lies perhaps in clerical error. Alternatively it may be that a man doing double service was subsequently replaced by a member of his family in one of the wards.

In our present state of knowledge about normal warding arrangements it is difficult to speculate on the meaning of any double service. No comparable practice has been found in studies of the organization of fourteenth century retinues. Presumably such double service was only likely to occur where a retinue was divided, as in Ireland, into wards. A parallel may be found in fifteenth century English armies on the continent, where the development of a semi-permanent army in the field made necessary increased control over retinue musters. In 1421 an ordinance forbidding soldiers to leave one retinue for another seems to have been directed against the practice followed by some captains of filling temporary gaps in the ranks with whatever men might be available at the moment of his muster.[1] A logical sequence of such a practice might be the nominal double service of such men in two retinues. While the meaning of the examples found in Scrope's retinue remains, therefore, obscure, there seems no doubt that the occasions of double service are sufficiently numerous to have some significance, and that the evidence suggest the use of a practice designed to maintain a fictitious picture of a retinue at full strength.

The following lists contain the names of about thirty-six men who appear to serve at one time as archers and at another as men at arms. For ease of reference the men in question have been entered in both the

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1 R.G.Newhall, Muster and Review, a problem of English military administration, pp 11-12.

list of men at arms and archers, the different service being distinguished by not capitalizing the ward letters in question. In three of the cases discovered suspicion arises because the same name appears in different wards at the same time, serving in different capacities. Thus, for example, John Ballard is seen to serve in the first two quarters as a man at arms in the Cork ward and as an archer in the Ballymore ward.[1] In such an instance it is possible that two men actually bore the same name but in most of the other thirty-three cases discovered it seems certain that the men in question did indeed change their form of service from one quarter to another. This is particularly clear when the man remained throughout his service in the one ward. In most cases the men in question served as archers, but appeared as men at arms in one quarter, reverting again to their role as archers in the next quarter. In four cases however the opposite happened, as a man at arms took up the position of archer for a time.[2]

The periods and places when these curious alterations in the retinue occurred may possibly be significant. Of the thirty-two names--leaving out of account the instances already referred to when names are duplicated elsewhere on the roll--two concern the Carlow ward between periods three and four; five concern the same ward in the next quarter; three concern the Ballymore ward between periods two and three; while ten concern the same ward in the next quarter and two in the following quarter. Of the remaining nine instances the Thomastown ward accounts for four--three of them between the first two quarters and the fourth towards the end of the two years; the Cork ward only features one case, between the second and third quarters; Kendleston saw two men alter their service in the first four quarters; and Scrope's own

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1 See also Richard Wyche, John Scot and William Hayholme.

2 i.e. Laurence Sprote, Walter Pelleston and William Clifford in ward D, period 3-4, and Richard Kempe, moving from G-C, period 6-7.

retinue sees only one example. In both this last case and the remaining one, concerning Wicklow, the same name occurs only after an interval without service, making it less certain that the same individual featured.

It is difficult to comment on the significance of these discoveries. The anomalies occur with sufficient consistency in certain wards for proof that more than scribal error was involved. It is possible that Ballymore and Carlow suffered more losses than other wards and elevated archers temporarily to the position of men at arms to make up the required numbers for mustering purposes, but it is difficult to explain why in one quarter three men were so raised and three others temporarily demoted to the rank of archer. Perhaps in this case a scribal error is the only logical explanation. Accusations about lieutenant's retinues being inadequate were so common that one is tempted to explain away the problem as one of account. Stanley and Windsor had both faced charges of maintaining insufficient retinues, and the petition concerning the government of Ireland which was sent to Richard in 1397 seems to accuse Stephen Scrope specifically of keeping his retinue below strength for financial reasons.[1] If Scrope's retinue was not honestly and regularly mustered--a point on which we have no information--it is possible that deficiencies in strength among the men at arms could have been concealed by naming archers as serving in that capacity. Scrope's indenture provided for the payment of sixpence a day to each mounted archer, whereas the men at arms received wages varying from two shillings for the knight to one shilling for each squire.[2] Alternatively the solution may lie in the nature of the military retinue itself and in the possibility that mobility between the ranks was more general than is usually thought. This does not seem particularly

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1 Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 323; Clarke, Fourteenth Century Studies, p 186; above p 277.

2 E 101/69/1/293

likely--an examination of continental retinues in the fourteenth century has shown that a commander might be unable to recruit the required number of knights and would substitute squires to make up the complement, but the result would be quite different from a retinue at full nominal strength but containing archers named as men at arms.[1] Possibly the explanation of the practice will be revealed when further work is done on the organization of such retinues--for there is evidence of a similar feature in rolls of the 1360s.[2] While the information about this curious aspect of Scrope's retinue throws little light on its military effectiveness, it does illustrate an area of ignorance in an important aspect of fourteenth century military practice.

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1 Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-80', E.H.R. lxxix (1964) p 744.

2 I have a note to this effect from Miss P.Connolly, based on her study of Clarence's retinue roll 1361-4--E 101/28/18.

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Stephen Scrope's retinue--Arpil 1395-April 1397

Men at arms

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Stephen Scrope	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Preston	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Barton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Nicholas Haiwode	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Roger Barton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Anthony de Syvill (Seville)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Andrew Bures (Burys)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Bridport	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Cawode	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Mene	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Wysham	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Gilbert White	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Weston	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Spis (Spicer)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Hampton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Geoffrey Bentlay	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Hardegrave	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Thwaiter	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Nicholas Ins (Inse)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Philip Worthing (Worthinter)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John Barton (Burton)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Radulph Cotton (Sutton)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Pomfret	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Periare (Perianer)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Geagre (Geatre)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Brit (Bryte)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Colman	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Kelet (Keler)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Broun	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Cervell	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Rundesey (Randesey)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Henry Hoton (Hoteron)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Newerk	A	A	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Langton	A	A	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Alcotes	A	A	A	A	A	-	-	A
Robert*(Richard) Whyce(Wyse†)	A*	A	A	A	A†	A	A	A
John Neville (jr)	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Ballard (Hallard*)	B	B	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*
Robert White (Whyte)	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Waleys	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Pelter	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Edward Drake	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Nicholas Waleys	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Dollard (Dullard)	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
Henry Tevier	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Thwait	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Phelpedale	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Castell	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Cogan	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
William Arderne	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Squier	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
Hugh Colin (Coly)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Whit	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
Richard Sperston (Sperlton)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	-
John Repast	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
Thomas Monfasse (Monfort)	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Neville	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	-
Peter Holt	C	C	C	C	C	-	-	I
William(John*) Burgate	C	C*	C*	C	C	A	A	A
John(Nicholas*) Maxfeld	C	C*	C*	C	C	A	-	-
John Cherbury	C	C	C	C	C	A	D	-
John Wode	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	E
Robert Marton	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
William(John*) Lyndesey	C	C*	C*	C	C	C	C	-
John(Richard*) Prendergest	C	C*	C*	C	C	A	-	-
Robert(John*) Rokkill	C	C*	C*	C	C	C	C	-
Richard(Thomas*) Morton	C	C*	C*	C	C	C	C	E
John Lamplowe	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Stacy	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Menell her Nikill Hauberk	D	d	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Lancastre	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Schot(Scote)	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Rodyngton	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Hert	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John Waryn	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Porfyn	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Plunket	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Hexany (Exam)	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Braham (Braine)	E	E	E	E	E	-	-	E
John Lenthere (Louthe)	E	E	E	E	E	-	-	-
William Vernour	E	E	E	E	E	-	-	-
Richard Rodiard	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
William Paston	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
James Cottenham	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
John Greve (Grave)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
William Hayholme	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
John Walle(Valle)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
William Ossard(Offard)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Hugh Curtoys	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Gilbert Langsome(Langsane)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Henry Holderbey	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Eustace	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Nicholas Draske	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Nicholas Orell	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	-
Robert Burgh	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
William Orell	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
William Mallyng	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
Simon Breton	H	H	H	-	-	-	-	-
Laurence Neuton	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
William Fremond	H	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Roger(Simon*) Laurence	H	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*
Richard Wygton	H	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
George Wall	H	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Swale	H	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Hachet	-	-	-	A	A	-	-	a
William Wellesley	-	-	-	-	-	A	A	A
Richard Perers	-	-	-	A	A	-	A	A
Roger(Richard*) Dode	b*	b*	B	B	B	B	B	I
John fitz Roger	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
Thomas(John*,Richard†) Rykil	-	-	B	B*	B	B	B†	I†
John Chirley (Shilley)	-	-	D	D	D	D	D	D
Thomas Sygrym	-	-	D	D	D	D	D	D
Walter Bondon (Sondon)	-	-	D	D	D	D	D	D
Robert Herford	-	-	D	D	D	D	D	D
Thomas Vale	-	-	-	-	-	C	C	C
John Meryden	-	-	D	D	D	D	-	-
John Scalys	d	d	d	D	D	D	-	-
John Yonge(Yonger)	d	d	d	D	-	-	-	-
John Ferrour	d	d	d	D	-	-	-	-
John Wogan	d	d	d	D	d	d	d	d
Alan Walton	d	d	d	D	d	d	d	d
William Leye(Leys)	d	d	d	D	d	d	d	d
Alan Colton (Adam Colle)	d	d	d	D	d	d	d	d
Robert Mayhew	-	E	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas Bykley	e	E	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Hancok(Jankrok)	e	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Wyche	e	E	e	d	-	-	-	a
John Fanlerton	-	F	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Loundres	-	F	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Richard(John*) Smyth(Smythwyk)	-	F*	F	F*	-	-	-	-
Richard Kyrchynton (Kirtling)	f	F	f	F	f	f	f	-
Richard Everard	-	-	-	F	-	-	-	-
William Kneslyng	-	-	-	G	-	-	-	-
Laurence Sprote	-	-	D	d	D	D	D	D
Walter Pelleston	-	-	D	d	D	d	d	d
William Clifford	-	-	D	d	D	D	D	D
Roger Ruston (Rys)	-	-	D	d	D	d	d	d
Jacob Mayhew(Mayller*)	d	d	D	d	d*	d*	d*	d*
William Crokeston	d	d	D	d	d	d	d	d
Richard Lemeroy	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
Richard fitz John	-	-	E	-	-	-	-	-
John Wolvertoun	-	-	E	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas Roche	-	-	F	-	-	-	-	-
John Holeresie	-	-	F	-	-	-	-	-
Laurence Pemberton	-	-	F	-	-	-	-	-
Janico Billynger	-	-	-	-	B	-	-	-
Geoffrey Tesson	d	d	d	d	D	d	d	d
Richard Coke	d	d	d	d	D	d	d	d
John Borwer	-	-	-	-	D	-	-	-
Richard Broun	-	-	-	-	H	-	-	-
John Snaper	-	-	-	-	H	-	-	-
Jacob Jovet	-	-	-	-	-	B	-	-
Richard Hert	-	-	-	-	-	B	-	-
William Frein	-	-	-	-	-	E	E	-
Nicholas Orway	-	-	-	-	-	E	-	-
William Hardegill(Hardegrave)	e	e	e	e	e	E	e	C
Richard Flecher	-	-	-	-	-	E	-	-
John Stanton	-	-	-	-	-	G	-	-
Richard Gille	-	-	-	-	-	G	-	-
Thomas Trilbne	-	-	-	-	-	G	-	-
John de Lamore	-	-	-	-	-	G	-	-
Richard Kympe(Kemp)	-	-	-	-	-	G	c	-
John Weston	-	-	-	-	-	G	-	-
Robert Doudale	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	-
Henry Broun	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	A
Henry Broun	-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-
John Lyle	-	-	-	-	-	-	D	D
Richard Typer	-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-
Richard Curtoys	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
Thomas*(John) Lowys (Lowes)	c	c*	c	c	c	c	C	E
John Meneryk (Menreth*)	b*	b*	-	-	-	-	E	-
Thomas Walton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
John Kirkeby	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
John Taff	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
John Perers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
John Danport	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
William Goldesburgh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	D
John Rase	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	D
Richard Philipott	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	D
John Norton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	D
John Arthre	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E
Robert Elmeshale (Elmeston)	c	c	c	c	c	c	C	E
Richard Lanton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	C
William Calton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	C

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Thomas Foster	c	c	c	c	c	c	C	i
Robert Banburgh	c	c	c	c	c	c	C	i
Richard Brit (Berton*)	c	c*	c	c	c	c	C	i
John Rosmond	c	c	c	c	c	c	C	i
John Knote	-	-	-	-	c	C	c	i
John Meye	-	-	-	-	c	C	c	i
Richard Haket	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	A
	*	*	*					
Archers								
Radulph Rede	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Jacob Langley	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Claiton(Claghton)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Toule	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Furners(Furnays)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Radulph Brace	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Holm(Holmyn)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Selby	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Geoffrey Davi	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Owain Penreth	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Boys	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Dutton(Sutton*)	A	A	A	A*	A	A*	A*	A*
Roger Hurst	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Horsam	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Hilbrond	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Mayhewe	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Pakike	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Langschane	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Simon (Saundre) Langley	A	A	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas Wilkinson	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Nowell	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Hugh Leche	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Gernon	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Asmold	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Sutton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Mounfort	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Geoffrey Toule	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas More	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Laurence Holiwode(Holiday*)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A*
William Snap (Snapper)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Ferrers	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Jaket	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Bednell	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Saunderson	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Hilton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Stratford	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Counslay (Knosley,Knosle)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Duk	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Goos	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Perous(Pirroun)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Kendale	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Pain	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Cateby	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Richard Toule	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Reginald Lamport	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Michael Taffard	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Davison	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert*(Thomas) Ramsune	A*	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Claghton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Buffard	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Basset	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Alan Romford	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Rede	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Harwych	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Lapwench(Lappynge)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Meriweder*(Meriden)	A*	A*	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Faunt	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Forest	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Henry Bedington	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Dakyn of Hogg	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Peper	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Greve	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Matthew Rede	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Laurence Begg	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Alan Bikling(Bilkington)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Shelford	A	A	A	A	A	-	-	-
Henry Boucher	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Simon Saxford	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Claiton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Smallwod(Small')	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Maston	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Jacob Grene	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Parker	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Godard(Bodard*)	A	A*	A	A	A	A	A*	A
Edward Adamson	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Grench*(Grynton)	A*	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Scharp	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Smythson	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Nicholas Daniell	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Simon Bray	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Arnold	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Trompet	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Candich(Candysh)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Garner(Gorner)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Jacob Barton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Perpount	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Gadder	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Milington(Millynge)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Biron (Byron)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
David Langer	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Clifton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Davi	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Davi Stoill	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Laurence Whyte	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Michael Osbarn	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Gilbert(Simon) Langwod	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Monkton(Monton)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Cook	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Richard Usher	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Barger	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Thomas	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Ferrour	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Derby	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Fletcher	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Whit	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Philip Enyas	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Massy	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Totenale	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Placy	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Wales	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Stanford(Stafford)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Apillwith(Apilwyk)	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Davy(Dawe)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
Jacob(John*) Mayheu	B	B	A*	A*	-	-	-	-
Griffin(Philip*) Davy	B	B	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*
John Yardesle	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Comyn	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Mason	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Archebold	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Wyschowe	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
William Grenys	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Carrewe(Garrowe)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
William Marthyn(Morthynter)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Cnosford(Counsley)	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Menreth (Menryk*)	B	B	-	-	-	-	e-	-
John Palmer	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
Richard(Roger*) Dode	B	B	b*	b*	b*	b*	b*	i*
John Waldof	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
Thomas Wardell(Vardell)	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
Walter Fletcher	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Walter Rede	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Smyth	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard*(John) Clerk	B*	B*	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Rawe(Bawe)	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Doure	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert*(William) Broun	B*	B*	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Bell	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
Henry Stanley	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
Jacob Wodekoc	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Scot	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
Philip Mareschall	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Pomfret	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Helmeshall(Elmshall)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
Ralph Petyt	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
John Adam	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Reson	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
William*(John) Bouland	B*	B*	B	B	B	B	B	I
John Ferrour	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Edward Wode	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Perquaiter	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A
John More	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Fissher	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Cogan	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Scalys	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
William Ricrost	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
Robert Lang(Langer)	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Schillis	B	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
Robert Shepeye(Shippey)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Glasyer(Glasner)	B	B	B	B	B	-	B	I
John Mildeschane(Middish)	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
William Lang(Langer)	B	F	F	F	-	-	-	-
Thomas Walsh	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	I
Thomas Dardys	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	I
John(Richard*) Furneys	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	I
John Slegh	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
John Peyntour	B	F	F	F	-	-	-	-
William Purveour	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
William Whith(Whyte)	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Richard Young	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
William Roche	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	I
John fitz John	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Durant	B	-	A	-	-	-	-	-
John Lincoln	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Erward	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Chambury	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Blundell	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Penale	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philip Seriam	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ralph Tattel	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Newson	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Christopher Singilton	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
Thurston Banaster	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Dibochestre	C	C	C	C	C	-	-	-
Richard Bryte(Berton*)	C	C*	C	C	C	C	c	I
John Rosmond	C	C	C	C	C	C	c	i
John Botiller	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
Robert*(Richard) Morton	C*	C	C	C	C	D*	D	I
Thomas Forster	C	C	C	C	C	C	c	I
John Vernoun	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
William Baron	C	C	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Blondell	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Richem	C	-	-	C	-	A	A	A
John Somerton	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Matthew Wyggemore	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Young(Yonge)	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Gere	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
Edward Walsheman(Walsh)	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	E
Thomas Bondon*(Bandon)	C*	C	C*	C	A	A	A	A
John Durant	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Dankyn Delbeg(Dellet)	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	-
John(Davy*) fitz William	C	C	C*	C*	C*	A*	A*	A*
Walter(Richard*) Scrivener	C	C	C	C	C	A*	A*	A*
John Barry	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Patrick Hereford	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John More	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Denham	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
Robert Bykirk	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	E
William Ferrour	C	C	C	C	-	-	-	-
William Rider	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	E
John Scarburgh	C	C	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John(Thomas*) Lowes(Lose)	C	C*	C	C	C	C	c	e
Robert Banburgh	C	C	C	C	C	C	c	i
John Thikeness	C	C	C	C	C	-	-	-
Hugh Malban	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Kendale	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Painter(Peyntour)	C	C	-	-	-	-	-	-
William*(Henry) Penreth	C*	C	C	C	C	A	-	-
Nicholas Bury	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
William Sully	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
Robert Rowell(Rowyk)	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
Hugh Lyncoln	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
John Hegyn	C	C	-	C	C	-	-	-
John Javin	C	C	C	C	C	-	A	A
Robert Elmeshale(Elmeston)	C	C	C	C	C	C	c	e
John Chamberleyn	C	C	C	C	C	D	D	I
William Rynkedin	C	C	C	-	-	-	-	-
William(Thomas*) Watton	C	C	E	E	E*	E*	E*	C*
John Josep	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Sutton	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	D
John Byrun	D	D	D	D	-	-	-	D
John Somerton	D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Scalys(Schalis)	D	D	-	d	d	d	-	D
William Gibb(Gille)	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Geoffrey Tesson	D	D	D	D	d	D	D	D
John Becumsane(Bekensfeld)	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Banaster	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Roger Couper	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	I
Roger Bury(Burrell*)	D	D	D	D	D*	D*	D*	D
Richard(John*) Wauter(Water)	D	D	D	D*	D	D*	D	D
Richard Somerton	-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-
John Spollard	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Robert*(Richard) Baroun	D*	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Edward Wolf	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Ferrour	D	D	D	d	-	-	-	d
William Rider(Rydell*, Rydde†)	D	D	D†	D†	D*	D*	D*	D*
Richard Cok	D	D	D	D	d	D	D	D
John Lang (Robert Langtre*)	D	D	D	D	D*	D*	D*	D
Walter(William*) Wolward†(Wolford)	D†	D†	D†	D	D*	D*	D*	D
John Paintour	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Richard Shellers	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Walter Hereford	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Richard Mercam	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Orway	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	D
Adam Walsche	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Alan Walton	D	D	D	d	D	D	D	D
John Savage	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Yonger	D	D	D	d	-	-	-	-
John Schirton(Chirton)	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Umfray	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Nicholas Bury	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
William Leys	D	D	D	d	D	D	D	D
John Gernon	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	D
Walter Bean	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Hugh Leche	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Jacob Mayhewe(Mailler*)	D	D	d	D	D*	D*	D*	D*
Thomas Parker	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John Ballard	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Ralph(Philip*) Grace(Brace)	D	D	D	D*	D*	D*	D*	D*
Jacob(Janico*)Semay	D	D	D	D	D	D*	D*	D*
Thomas Laurok	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Alan Colton (Adam Colle*)	D	D	D	d	D*	D*	D*	D*
William Crokeston	D	D	d	D	D	D	D	D
John Traille	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John W(ogan) (1)	D	D	D	d	D	D	D	D
John (Becket)	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-
Edward Haw(ardy)	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Adam Pyr(on)	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	-
John H(egyn)	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas M(ore)	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	-
John Sm(yth) (1)	D	D	D	D	-	-	-	-
Roger Rys(Ruston*)	D	D	d*	D	d	D	D	D
Thomas Brene	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
Nicholas Coton	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
John*(Nicholas) Blake	E*	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
Richard Wyche	E	e	E	D	-	-	-	A
William Milingter(Millynge)	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
William Crall	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
John Warden(Wardell)	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
Richard Rhys	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
William*(Walter) Botiller	E*	E	E	E	E	-	-	-
John Furnays(Furnace)	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
William Scharp	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
Robert Dalton	E	E	E	E	E	E	-	E
John Sharton	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
Adam Goslyn(Gose)	E	E	E	E	-	-	-	-
William Fynch	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
John Barbour	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
Thomas Shirley	E	E	E	E	-	-	-	-
John Austyn	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
John Pikton	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
Thomas Bilkey	E	e	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Ferrour	E	E	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Sakton	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
Nicholas Kent	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
John Jancok	E	e	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas Meriweder	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
John W(odecroft) (1)	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
William Gi(lton)	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
William Tyndal(Fyndell)	E	E	E	E	C	C	C	E
John La(ton)	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
Saunder (Kyng)	E	E	E	E	E	E	-	E
Hugh(John) Pemberton	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
William Hardegrave*(Hardgyll)	E*	E	E	E	E*	e	E	c
William Tal(bot)	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	-
Richard Kirtling	F	f	F	f	F	F	F	-
John(Thomas*) Smith(Smythwyk) (1)	F*	-	F	F	F*	F*	F*	F

1 The names between these numbers are partially lost in the first quarter but have been supplied from later membranes, as explained above.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John Faukener	F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Gilton	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Peter Ailleward	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Rouland Olyver	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Peter Adamson	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Richard Porter	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Thomas Hamond	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Adam Lintlinter(Literington)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
William Prixton	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Adam Westville	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
John (Sarfeld) (1)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	I
William Saxton	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	I
Walter (Clerk) (1)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	I
Richard Bryt	F	F	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Stacy	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Richard Folyte	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Sampson	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Tannar*(Tangard)	G*	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Spenser	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Bowere	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Bowdard	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Richard Bertram	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
Alisaunder Burgh	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	-
William Hayholme	G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Colman	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Henry Rochefort	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
William Bris	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Richard Barford	G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Walter Hutton	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Thomas Bolsore	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Hide	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Thomas Spenser	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	E
Hugh Barbour	G	G	G	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Cantwell	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Chiff(Clyff)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Freman	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Thomas Hampton	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Richard Uriell	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Nicholas Champion	G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Faxe(Foxe)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Cullam(Colman)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Richard Furnyvale	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Richard Maderslay(Yardesley*)	G	G	G	G*	G*	G*	G*	-
Richard Rokley	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Barbour	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	-
Roger Pope	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Davi Stoly	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Howell	G	G	-	G	-	-	-	-
Richard Burton	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
William Clerk	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Henry Barbour	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Broun	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Harsigg(Horschigg)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G

1 See p 546 note 1.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Thomas (Walker) (1)	G	G	-	G	G	G	G	E
William K(ent)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Richard (Clyte)	G	G	-	G	G	-	G	E
Thomas (Bagot)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Adam T(aillour) (1)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Christopher Langton	H	H	H	H	H	E	E	C
William Burgh (Burgham)	H	H	H	H	H	G	G	G
Henry de Loueff (Henry Leute*)	H	H	H	H*	H*	H*	H*	I*
Richard Coke	H	H	-	-	-	-	-	-
William(Richard*) Webbe	H	H	H	H*	H*	H*	H*	I*
William Sakirly	H	H	H	H	H	F	F	F
Richard Buksawe	H	H	H	H	H	G	G	G
William Tomelynson	H	H	H	H	H	G	G	-
John Madersay(Yardesby)	H	H	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Slokare	H	H	H	H	H	F	F	F
Thomas Spendelove	H	H	H	-	-	-	-	-
John Blakbourn	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
John Blaker	H	H	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicholas Baker	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
John Kendal	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
John (Aleyn) (2)	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
Walter (Lawless) (2)	H	H	H	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Roche	H	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
David Walsche	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
Thomas Cornewaile	H	H	H	H	H	G	G	G
Thomas Asshewe	H	H	H	H	H	F	F	F
John Lilleston(Hilleston)	-	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Henry Clinton	-	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Halyn(Hamlyn)	-	A	A	A	-	-	-	-
John Gelys	-	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Jordan	-	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Gase(Gaston)	-	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Barbour	-	A	A	A	A	A	-	A
William Spensholme	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Simon Berkard	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gilbert Rexton	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Rider	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas(Simon*) Osnay(Th.Osmandham†)	C*	B	-	-	-	-	C†	-
Richard Rampton	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Geoffrey Mussen	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
Owain (John*) Penreth	-	C	C	C	C	A*	A*	A*
Uriell Lowys	-	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Richard Tromper	-	-	D	D	D	-	-	-
Richard Wynder	-	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Richard Bernard	-	E	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Snapford	-	E	-	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Craxton	-	E	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Bentle	-	F	-	-	-	-	-	-
Robert Malsey	-	F	-	-	-	-	-	-
William Hatton	-	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Robert Holyn	-	G	G	G	G	G	G	G

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1 See p 546 note 1.

2 Of the seven indicipherable names in the Wicklow ward in period 1, these are the only ones which can be given a possible identification.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nicholas(Walter*) Tyrell	-	H	H	H*	H*	H*	H*	I*
John Trody	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Bandon*(Balton)	-	-	A*	A*	A	A	A	A
John Rotyn	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Wyse	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Wellesley	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Somerton	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Hynderwyll(Hynderley)	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
John aburgh(Haburgh)	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Wyld	-	-	B	B	B	B	-	-
Henry Wyld	-	-	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Fynglase	-	-	B	B	B	B	A	A
Roger Crompe	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
Michael Brayles	-	-	B	B	B	B	A	A
Richard Doudale	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	A
Henry Quaite(Waiter)	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
John Madok	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
George Fayth	-	-	B	B	B	B	A	A
William Crook(Coke)	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
John Kynton	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
William Dymnok	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
Richard Glaston	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	I
John Teyle	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-
John Inston	-	-	C	C	C	D	D	I
John Wytsard	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-
William Doket	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Cary	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas Eldirfeld	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
Peter Avery	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Geritays	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
William Smyth	-	-	D	-	D	D	D	D
John Goldyn	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
William Maureward	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
John Cosfeld	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
William Harper	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	-
William Telyn	-	-	E	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Brounflete	-	-	F	-	-	-	-	-
John Lytel	-	-	F	-	-	-	-	-
John Grey	-	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Davi Smert	-	-	H	H	H	H	H	-
Richard Rother	-	-	H	H	H	H	H	I
Michael Holm	-	-	H	H	H	H	H	I
Thomas Dase	-	-	-	A	-	-	-	-
Richard Ine	-	-	-	A	-	-	-	-
Richard Draper	-	B	B	B	B	B	B	I
John Rolland	-	-	-	B	-	-	-	-
John Omfray	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-
Thomas Andrew	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-
Philip Andrew	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-
William Godfray	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-
Laurence Sprote	-	-	d	D	d	d	d	d
Walter Pelleston	-	-	d	D	-	D	D	-
William Clifford	-	-	d	D	d	d	d	d
Thomas Waron	-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-
Thomas Hore	-	-	-	D	D	D	D	-
Adam Broun	-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-
Robert Rypon(Ryffon)	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
William Callan	-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-
John Hilton	-	-	-	D	D	D	D	-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John Horwey	-	-	-	D	-	D	D	-
John Wylton	-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-
Simon Swyft	-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-
Peter Savage	-	-	-	D	D	D	D	-
John Shirman	-	-	-	E	-	-	-	-
Simon Barfeld	-	-	-	E	-	-	-	-
William Hamlyn	-	-	-	E	-	-	-	-
Richard Bakpys	-	-	-	E	-	-	-	-
John fitz Richard	-	-	-	E	-	-	-	-
Richard Dearest	-	-	-	F	-	-	-	-
Richard Arnew	-	-	-	F	-	-	-	-
Hugh Taillour(Taille)	-	-	-	G	G	G	G	G
Thomas Russell	-	-	-	H	H	H	H	I
Richard Shipton	-	-	-	H	H	-	-	-
William Louthe	-	-	-	H	H	H	H	I
Gilbert Hoddar	-	-	-	H	H	-	-	-
Adam Gascon	-	-	-	-	A	A	A	A
Richard Fernyge	-	-	-	-	A	-	-	-
Richard Vase	-	-	-	-	A	A	-	-
John Meye	-	-	-	-	C	c	C	I
John Knote	-	-	-	-	C	c	C	I
John Voisyn	-	-	-	-	C	-	-	-
John Tostam	-	-	-	-	C	-	-	-
John Brymgham	-	-	-	-	C	C	C	E
Richard Birlauk	-	-	-	-	C	-	-	-
Thomas Malwass	-	-	-	-	C	-	-	-
Richard Smelter(Smert)	-	-	-	-	D	-	-	C
John Bygton	-	-	-	-	D	D	D	-
John Horpole	-	-	-	-	D	D	D	-
William*(John) Mann	-	-	-	-	D*	A	A	A
John Forte	-	-	-	-	D	D	D	-
William*(Thomas) Lacy	-	-	-	-	D*	D	D	I
Richard Coltham	-	-	-	-	D	D	D	-
Geoffrey Oslern	-	-	-	-	D	D	D	-
John Saunder	-	-	-	-	D	-	-	-
Simon Preston	-	-	-	D	D	-	-	-
William Tenberton	-	-	-	-	E	E	E	C
Thomas Horley	-	-	-	-	E	C	C	E
John Penkeston	-	-	-	-	E	E	E	C
Maurice Fotour	-	-	-	-	E	E	E	C
John Nugent	-	-	-	-	F	F	F	F
John Pyers	-	-	E	-	F	F	F	I
John Cry(Croo)	-	-	-	-	F	F	F	F
Richard Goldesburgh	-	-	-	-	F	F	F	F
Thomas Neuton	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-
John Cleym	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-
James Hales	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-
James Gillinger	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-
William Dyngley	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-
John Clifford	-	-	-	-	-	A	A	A
John Welles	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-
John Weldon	-	-	-	-	-	A	A	A
Richard Malton	-	-	-	-	-	C	-	-
Peter Loringer	-	-	-	-	-	C	-	-
Richard Kyng	-	-	-	-	-	C	C	-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Walter Buite	-	-	-	-	-	C	C	-
Richard Gase	-	-	-	-	E	C	C	E
John Henry	-	-	-	-	-	E	E	C
William Burgham	-	-	-	-	-	F	F	I
John Nowell	-	-	-	-	-	G	G	G
Walter Boyvill	-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-
Laurence Ferrour	-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-
Geoffrey Raynold	-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-
Richard Kempe	-	-	-	-	-	ɛ	C	-
Walter Romsyn	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
Simon Carlyngter	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
Robert Daniell	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
William Bacheler	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
John Roma	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
Peter Hilliard	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
John Craunford	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
Thomas Pettam(William Pectan*)	-	-	-	-	D*	D	D	-
Robert Stodford	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
William Osbarn	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
William of Balir	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
John Perkinson	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
John Rous	-	-	-	-	-	-	G	-
John Sely	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
John Hyden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
Simon Kelly	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
John Haket	-	-	-	a	a	-	-	A
John Apilton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
Richard Scarbourgh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
William Calverton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
Laurence Bailler	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	C
Richard Torpley	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	G
William Rodyerd	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E
Richard Purfray	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E
John Bartour	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E
Adam Lintlinton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	I
Thomas Rynger	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	I
John Rynger	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	I
John Rapton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	I
Richard Knaper	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	I
John Semay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A

List of names appearing in different wards during the same period

John Ballard (Hallard*) (1)	B	B	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*
John Ballard	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Thomas Bondon*(Bandon)	C*	C	C*	C	A	A	A	A
Thomas Bandon*(Balton)	-	-	A*	A*	A	A	A	A

1 In this list the men at arms are underlined. Several of the names are among those appearing at one time as archers and later as men at arms, and in such cases the name has only been written once, the distinction being made by use of capital letters.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John Barbour	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	-
John Barbour	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
John Barbour	-	A	A	A	A	A	-	A
John(Nicholas*) Blake	E	E*	E*	E*	E*	E*	E*	C*
John Blaker	H	H	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Blundell	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Richard Blondell	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Radulph Brace	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Radulph*Philip) Grace†(Brace)	D*†	D*	D*	D	D	D	D	D
Richard Brit(Bryte)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Brit (Berton*)	c	c*	c	c	c	c	C	i
Richard Bryt	F	F	-	-	-	-	-	-
Henry Broun	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	A
Henry Broun	-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-
Nicholas Bury	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Nicholas Bury	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Byrun	D	D	D	D	-	-	-	D
John Biron(Byron)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Coke	H	H	-	-	—	-	-	-
Richard Cok	D	D	D	D	d	D	D	D
Richard Doudale	-	-	B	B	B	B	B	A
Richard Doudale	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	I
John Durant	B	-	A	-	-	-	-	-
John Durant	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
Robert Elmeshale(Elmeston)	C	C	C	C	C	C	c	e
Robert Elmshall(Helmeshall)	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
William Ferrour	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Ferrour	C	C	C	C	-	-	-	-
William Ferrour	E	E	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Ferrour	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Ferrour	D	D	D	d	-	-	-	-
John Furners(Furnays)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Furnays(Furnace)	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
John(Richard*) Furneys	B	F	F	F	F*	F*	F*	I*
John Gernon	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Gernon	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	D
Adam Goos	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Goslyn(Gose)	E	E	E	E	-	-	-	-
William Hayholme	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
William Hayholme	G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John Hegyn	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	-
John Hegyn	C	C	-	C	C	-	-	-
John Hilton	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Hilton	-	-	-	D	D	D	D	-
Robert Holin(Holmyn)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Robert Holyn	-	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Hugh Leche	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Hugh Leche	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Adam Lintinton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	I
Adam Linterington(Lintlinter)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Jacob(John*) Mayheu	B	B	A*	A*	-	-	-	-
Jacob Mayhewe(Mailler*)	D	D	d	D	D*	D*	D*	D*
Thomas Meriweder	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
Thomas Meriweder(Meriden*)	A	A	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*	A*
William Millington(Millynge)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
William Milingter(milynge)	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
John More	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John More	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Neville	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	-
John Neville(jr)	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Parker	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas Parker	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Owain Penreth	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Owain(John*) Penreth	-	C	C	C	C	A*	A*	A*
John Peyntour	B	F	F	F	-	-	-	-
John Paintour(Peyntour)	C	C	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Paintour	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Adam Peroun(Pirroun)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Adam Pyron	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	-
William Rider	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	E
William Rider(Ridell*,Rydde†)	D	D	D†	D†	D*	D*	D*	D*
William Rider	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Scalys	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Scalys(Schallis)	D	D	-	d	d	d	-	D
John Schirton(Chirton)	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
John Sharton	E	E	E	E	E	C	C	E
John Scot	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A
John Schot(Scote)	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
John(Thomas*) Smyth(Smythwyk)	F	-	F	F	F*	F*	F*	F
John Smyth	D	D	D	D	-	-	-	-
John Smith	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-
John(Richard*) Smyth(Smythwyk)	-	F	F*	F	-	-	-	-
John Somerton	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Somerton	D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Davi Stoille	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Davi Stoily(Stoly)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
John Sutton(Dutton*)	A	A	A	A*	A	A*	A*	A*
John Sutton	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	-
John Weston	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
John Weston	-	-	-	-	-	G	-	-
Richard(Robert*) Whyce(Wyse)	A*	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Richard Wyche	e	E	e	d	-	-	-	-
John Young(Yonge)	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Yonger	D	D	D	d	-	-	-	-
John Kendale	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	A
John Kendale	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	I
Thomas More	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Thomas More	D	D	D	-	-	-	-	-

* * *

Appendix III

A note concerning succession to the earldom of Desmond

Although the dispute concerning rightful title to the Desmond lordship only began in the early fifteenth century, there has long been confusion about when exactly John, the fourth earl, died. The date most commonly given is 1400,[1] presumably on the evidence of the Irish chancery rolls which on 30 May 1400 record the order for an inquisition into the late earl's goods.[2] The Calendar gives no detail, but apparently the original writ said that John died on 4 March.[3] This evidence conflicts with a sixteenth century inspeximus of

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1 e.g. Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p 342 note.
2 C.C.H., p 159 no 8
3 Complete Peerage, iv, 245

inquisitions taken in 1420-1, which claimed that John actually died on 12 October 1398.[1] The background to these inquisitions—which found the present heir to be James, John's brother, against the claims of John's son Thomas whom James had expelled in 1411—is obscure in itself, but the length of time which had elapsed since the event makes the unanimity of the findings appear definitely suspicious.

The annals also give contradictory evidence. There is general agreement that Gerald the third earl died in 1398, and the Four Masters and Annals of Clonmacnoise say that John his heir also died that year. 'MacCarthy's Book' says that he drowned in the Suir in the course of an expedition against Ormond, but the editor seems to have placed the event in 1398 by reference to other annalistic authorities.[2] The Four Masters repeat the notice of the death in 1399, and a note deriving from MacFirbise adds that John drowned in 1399 at the ford of Ath an Droichid. The same year is given in the Annals of Ulster. As the years fall within that period when the Annals of Ulster tended to date events one year later than other annals, and as their superior authority has frequently been demonstrated it seems that the evidence thus far favours a date in 1399.[3]

Circumstantial confirmation of a date at least later than September 1399 comes in the petition sent to England after Richard's second expedition. It is claimed that the Earl of Desmond was threatening to ally with MacMurrough against the Earl of Ormond.[4] It is not very likely that references to possible aggressions by Desmond Geraldines on behalf of John's heir would have implied that the earl himself was responsible, when Thomas was so obviously a minor, incapable as yet of directing his own policies.

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1 C.O.D., iii, no 45
2 Misc. Irish Annals, p 111
3 Above p 13
4 King's Council in Ireland, pp 262-3

A list of annalistic entries, mainly concerning the Butler family in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, perhaps clinches the argument in favour of a date in early March 1400.[1] A notice here states that John, son of Gerald, had come with a great army of both English and Irish into county Tipperary and made peace with the Earl of Ormond at the monastery of 'Inishawnaght'.[2] This occurred on 'die Sabbati following the octaves of St. M.'(Matthias?) 1400. The octaves of St. Matthias (3 March) is so close to the date given in the chancery writ that it seems reasonable to accept the authority of this entry for the date of John's death.

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Appendix IV

Edmund Mortimer's indenture in 1379 -- E 159/174 Trinity communia (no membrane number.)

....Cest endenture faite entre notre sire le Roy dune part et Monsieur Esmon de Mortymer Conte de la Marche dautre part tesmoigne que le dit conte est demorez devers notre sire le roy son lieutenant en la terre dirlande par troys ans commenceantz le jour que le dit conte serra primierement venuz et arrivez en sa person en mesme la terre dirlande de la quele terre il avera le governement durantz mesmes les troys ans. Et prendra de notre sire le roy mesme le Conte pur lui et pur toutz ses gentz qil retendra ovesque lui pur les guerres et pur le governement de la terre avantdite par tout le dit temps vyngt milles marcs des queles il serra paiez de deux milles marcs prestement en main et, entre cy et la feste de la Chandeleur prochein venante, il serra paiez de oyt milles marcs; cestassavoir a la feste

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1 B.M. Add. MS 4793 p 74

2 Presumably Inishlounaght, a Cistercian house on the Suir. (Gwynn and Hadcock, Medieval religious houses, Ireland, map in folder.)

de Noel prochein venante de troys milles marcs et a la feste de Seint Hillaire prochein ensuant de cynk milles marcs, et serra paiez a la feste de la chandelure en une an prochein venant de cynk milles marks et a la fest de la Chandeleur adonqes prochein ensuant dautres cynk milles marcs en parpaiement de les vyngt milles marcs avantdites.

Et outre ce de toutz les profitz et revenuz que purront estre levez et recevez al oeps de notre dit sire le Roy de sa dit terre Dirlande par les ditz troys ans sibien de taxes tallages et subsides a grantier par le clergie et par les lays gents illoeqes come dautres profitz et revenuz queconqes, outre les chargez de mesme la terre que sembleront au dit conte estre ordinaires et busoignables et outre les fees et gages des officers et ministers necessaires et acustumes de la dit terre serra despenduz sur la guerre illoeques ce que semblera au dit conte busoignable et necessaire pur le profit de notre dit sire le Roy et de la terre susdite durantz les ditz trois ans par la main du Tresorer Dirlande esteant pur le temps et par lavys du dit Conte et par ses mandements affair par ses lettres a mesme le Tresorer pur son garant et le remanant des ditz profitz et revenuz serra sauvez al oeps de notre sire le Roy susdite. Et avera auxi le dit Conte de mesme notre sire le Roy mille livres pur la demorer de mesme la conte et de ses gentz a la meer et sur la meer sur leur passage et pur les coustages de leur dit passage.

Et serra le dit conte en sa propre persone a la meer et touz ceux qi irront en sa compaignie en Irlande a la feste de la Chandeleur prochein venant tout prest a passer devers les dites parties a la quele feste ou devant il serra paiez de les mille livres avantdites.

Et ne serra le dit conte tenuz daconter de sa retenue ne de les sommes de vyngt milles marcs et mille livres avantdites a notre sire le roy susdit.

Et si par cas le dit viage del aler du dit Conte vers Irlande soit

contremandez ou autrement destourbez non pas en sa defaute, si ne serra il tenuz de repaier a notre dit sire le Roy aucune partie de les ditz deux mille marcs ne nulles deniers queux outre ycelle somme le dit Conte avera despenduz a cause de mesme le viage de les sommes desusdites.

Et ne serra tenuz le dit Conte a departier hors Dengleterre devers le dit terre dirlande tanque il soit paiez de les primers dys mille marcs et mille livres desusdits. Et en cas que ascun des paiement affaire au dit conte de cynk mille marcs a la feste de la Chandeleure prochein venant en un an ou de les cynk mille marcs a lui apaier a mesme la feste delors prochein avenir come desus ne soit fait au dit Conte deins un moys prochein apres aucun des ditz termes ou si ascuns des commissions que serront faites au dit Conte de son poair de lieutenancie de des autres choses conteint en cest present endenture ou ascun article de ceux que sont expressez en les ditz commissions ou en mesme lendenture soient ou soit par notre sire le Roy repellez dedeins les troys ans susdites que delors enavant bien lise au dit conte de cesser du dit office de lieutenant et de tout la governement de la dit terre et en puisse franchement departier et aler la ou lui plerra et aussi a la fyn des ditz troys ans non obstante cest present endenture sanz blame ou offense encourre devers notre sire le Roy avantdit et nientmains lui serront allouez et paiez par notre sire le Roy lafferant que lui purra estre dehu pur le temps qil y avera demorez saunz paiement apres ascuns des ditz termes par vertue des covenantz susditz.

Et avera le dit conte par tout le temps des ditz troys ans suffissant poair par letters desouz le grant seal de notre dit sire le Roy Dengleterre a presenter a touz benefices de Seint Eglise curez iusqes a la taxe de quarant marcs par an et a faire collacion de toutes benefices de Seint Eglise nient curez iusqes a la taxe de vyngt marcs par an et serront voidez deinz les ditz troys ans en la dite terre dirlande, regardantz a la donacion presentement ou collacion de notre dit sire le Roy en

son droit tant en eglise cathedrale et collegiales come autres queconqes forsprises toutes dignitees et forsprises aussi les benefices as queux notre sire le Roy avera a nomer ou a presenter es dites partiez de lauctorite de notre seint pier le pape, et aussi a ratifier et confermer lestat des possessours de toutz benefices de seint eglise en Irland, par resonable fyn ent aprendre a loeps de notre sire le Roy susdit; et a remuer les Commun Bank et Leschequer de notre sire le Roy dirlande au lieu que semblera mieulx au dit conte illoeqes pur profit de mesme notre sire le Roy et de sa terre dirlande avantdite forspris en les seigneuries de dit Conte mesme en celles parties. Et le dit conte et ses qui irront hors Dengleterre et demoreront ovesque lui en Irlande en le service de notre sire le Roy durantz les ditz troys ans ou partie diceux averont de notre dit sire le Roy lettres de proteccion desouz son grant seal ovesque la clause volumus parmy la certificacion du dit conte sur ce affair desouz son seal au gardein du prive seal de notre dit sire le Roy en manere acustume en tesmoignance de quele chose a la partie de ceste endenture demorant devers le dit conte notre dit sire le Roy ad fait mettre son prive seal.

Donez a Westmenster le xxviii jour de Juyn lan du regne du notre dit sire le Roy tierz.

* * *

Appendix V

Petition on behalf of Roger Mortimer to the king -- S.C. 8/189/9434.

....Supplie votre liege et norry le counte de la Marche que come la greinde partie de la seignurie Dulvestier qest en votre garde a cause du moindre age de (dit Norry)/gaste...destruit et moult par la prise et foole deliverance dun Neel Oneel cheveteyn des Irrois Dulvestier qestoit delivere pour certeine raunseon et pour diverses hostages en seurte (de la pees) / des queux Breen leisne filz le dit

Oneel estoit un qest uncore en garde de vos ministres Dirland, et le dit Oneel puis sa dite deliverance sovent foitz nient eiantz.../ forsfaitoure de ses ditz hostages ad chivache ove grand poair des Irrois et Escotz et arz et gaste sibien la dite seignourie Dulvestier que contient pluis que vi^{xx} lieux en longure et l en [leaure] /grande partie de voz terres el coun...de Uriell en Ireland: et ore voz dites officers illeoqes pour covetise de m^{l} vaches et x hostages de petite eu nulle value a eux [proferrez par le dit] /Oneel pour la deliverance son dit filz sont accordez pour lui deliverer a perpetuelee destrucion de la dite seignurie Dulvestier qar depuis que le dit enemy nad esperny que petit ou rien de ses malfaites pour...forsfaite/ de son filz propre il semble qil espernera meins pour la forsfaitour des autre filz, que plese a votre graciouse hautesse sibien en salvacion de vos terres come del petit qest remys del heritage votre dit lieux.../comander votre conseil denvoier en haste par brief par auscun de vos sergeantz darmes as vos Justice Chaunceller et Tresorer Dirlande lour chargeant et commandant sur lour ligeance et [sur peyne de] /forsfaitour de qantque ils pouront forsfaire devers vous qils ne facent le dit Breen estre delivere par nulle voie einz qils lui facent envoier sauvement a vous en Engleterre par le dit sergeantz et y demoier issint en garde tantque votre honurable venue as dites parties ou que vous soiez ent outrement avisez.

The background to this document lies in the capture of Niall óg O'Neill in 1388-9, the terms of his delivery and the subsequent fate of the hostages delivered as pledges for his good behaviour. Our most detailed information on these events results from a contemporary investigation into the state of Ireland and in particular into Stanley's conduct of government. One document sent to England following an

inquisition held at Drogheda in May 1391 described the capture of Niall Og and his subsequent release.[1] O'Neill's seizure apparently occurred when he was meeting with other Irishmen of Ulster. Advance knowledge of this gathering enabled Edmund Loundres to reach an agreement with the chancellor, the Bishop of Meath, on 30 September 1388 at Kilorgan by which half of O'Neill's ransom, should he be taken, was to go to the king and the other half along with the ransoms of any other Irish involved was to remain to Loundres. Immediately after this O'Neill was indeed taken, by the gates of Inchelaghan in Ultonia inter Hibernicos.[2] He was brought to Meath by Loundres and then delivered into the justiciar Stanley's hands. A council which met at Drogheda to debate his release was attended by representatives from Dublin and Meath. They believed it to be to the king's advantage to release him, provided that he give ransom, deliver hostages, make reparation for past misdeeds and restore the bonnaght of Ulster to the earl. O'Neill's weakness of body was given as a reason, and if it was believed that he might shortly die this desire to release him on specified terms is understandable. However, the men of Louth withheld their assent, and reminded the rest that Niall had ridden upon the lordship with banners displayed, invading and destroying Louth and calling himself king of Ireland, seeking to effect a general conquest of totam terram Hibernie. The council therefore finally decided against his release. Despite this, the justiciar and council subsequently on their own initiative concluded an agreement with O'Neill by which he was to be delivered for a ransom of 2,000 marks and certain hostages.

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1 E 101/247/1 m 4

2 Kilorgan's location is obscure but it is possible that Inchelaghan was Inishloughan or Enishlaghlin in the barony of Upper Massareene, county Antrim, close to county Down. (Hogan, Onomasticon Goedelicum)

Details about these hostages reveal that several escaped custody, some were never delivered and others were insignificant. In all only six were actually held. Nor was the ransom fully paid. Stanley, the Bishop of Meath, Michael Darcy--sheriff of Meath, Edmund Loundres, and Edmund Perers--a prominent knight, between them received 1,200 cows and five horses. It was claimed that O'Neill was then released, without making any other reparation for his misdeeds.

On several points this story finds corroboration elsewhere.[1] Of particular interest is the information that Stanley's agreement with Niall Og concerning his release was recorded in an indenture of 20 February 1390 and subsequently approved by a parliament held at Tristledermot on 12 March.[2] The indenture apparently bound the O'Neills as the king's liege men, obliged to recognize Mortimer's position and to surrender to him the bonnaght and any other usurped services.[3]

The immediate background of this petition is the suggestion some three years later that the hostages surrendered in 1390 should be in turn released. Mortimer, or more probably his guardians, expressed bitterness about the earlier delivery of Niall Og, who had not honoured his promises of good behaviour but continued to attack and waste the lordship. The petition's anxiety that Breen, Niall Og's son, should not now be released, as was being contemplated, for 1,000 cows and ten hostages of little or no value indicates that Mortimer was probably prompted to appeal to the king after hearing of Una O'Neill's meeting with the justiciar at Drogheda about March 1393, for Una as Breen's mother apparently negotiated his delivery.[4] Richard seems to have received Mortimer's complaint with sympathy, but was unable to act in time to prevent Breen's release. On 29 June 1393 he wrote to his

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1 e.g. C.C.H., p 145 no 140; A.F.M., 1389; 'Gerrard Papers', p 214.
2 C.C.H. p 147, nos 240, 222.
3 Cal.Carew MSS, v, 481
4 King's council in Ireland, p 191

ministers in Ireland, ordering them to give any hostages still in their custody into the hands of Mortimer, and expressing his displeasure that despite the late royal order not to proceed with any such releases 'it has come by credible report to the king that they have set the said Bernard free in contempt of the king and to the hurt of his subjects and peril of their utter ruin'.[1] Other events of the same weeks also relate to the petition. On 18 June Mortimer, though still a minor, was allowed livery of his Irish estates, and guardians were named to look after his interests in the lordship.[2] Recognition of the justification of his grievance is seen on 7 July, when he was paid 1,000 marks compensation for the destruction inflicted upon his inheritance while in the king's hands.[3] In the circumstances it is not surprising that Niall Og O'Neill was subsequently troubled about the safety of his son Felimidh, moved to Trim, or that he feared Mortimer, once he came in person, would not long delay an attack upon Gaelic Ulster.[4]

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Appendix VI

B.M. Hargrave MS 313, f 54

Hargrave MS 313 contains a transcipt of a portion of the Red Book of the Exchequer bound together with certain miscellaneous exchequer material.[5] Folio 54, and its dorse, relating to Ireland, follows several exchequer entries concerning Shropshire, dating c 9-17 Richard II. There are four items of Irish interest. The first is a description of Leinster, written at some point during the first expedition--probably in early January or February.[6] On the dorse

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1 C.C.R. 1392-6 pp 158, 157
2 C.P.R. 1392-6 pp 284, 304
3 E 403/543
4 Above, pp 88-9 ff.
5 See Red Book of the Exchequer, ed. Hubert Hall, i, p 1.
6 The items are in a late fourteenth or early fifteenth century hand. See also above, pp 73, 170 ff.

is a brief entry stating that Richard went to Ireland about 25 September 1394. This is followed by a short description of the origins of the main Irish families--showing despite its lack of accuracy that in the popular view Ireland was thought to be divided into five distinct provinces. The last entry describes the grants Richard made to his followers in Ireland and is a valuable addition to our information on this question.

Hargrave MS 313, f 54

Leynstre ys the furthe party of Irland and MacMurgh clepud hem self kyng of Leynstre[1] & al the champayn cuntree ys englyshrye & al the forest cuntre ys Irysshure and thys Macmurgh hath at ys ledyng hys lordes Obrenne Oteel Onowland & hur childrun in that o syde of Englysshrie & in that other ben MacMurgh of Kenssles Obrynan Omor & the dymsees. Al these aron yoldon to the peese & hir pees y cryed save the dymsees, & they aron yoldon on thys condicone that they schulle voide the lond of Leynstre man and good by the furste sonday of . Lenton & after that they shullen be wythe the kyng as hys sowdiours in to what place of Irland the Kyng wil or in other londes and they shullen halde of the kyng as hys liege men wher everé they bee.[2]

(dorse) Anno domino millesimo ccc nonagesimo quarto Ricardus Rex Anglie Secundus post conquestum cepit viagium suum in Hiberniam circa festum Sancti Michaelis Archangeli.

Bryan Bore fuist Roy de tout Irland, le quele avoit iiii filcz; cestassavoir le primer fuist appelle Mowrwe apres la mort de soun piere fuist seígnur de Leynestre, Obrian fuist le seconde filcz et fuist seignur de Mounestre, Neel fuist le tierce filcz et fuist seignur de Olystre, Conore fuist le quatre filcz et fuist seignur de Conawne et le quinte partie avoit Molannayn et est nome Methe.

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1 'Leynestre' covers an erasure, possibly 'Ybernie'.

2 I have supplied what punctuation there is in these transcripts.

Ceux sont lez parcelles de terres lez queux le Roy ad done a diverses sires esteantz ov luy en le viage suisdit; cestassavoir emprimes a le Duc de Gloucester ix chastelles de Markyngan ove toutz les appurtenantz, auxi al Counte de Roteland tout le Countee de Cork Omystre ov toutz les appurtenantz, auxi al Counte de Notyngham le chastell de Keffyn ov tout cele countee et lez terrez entour MacMurgh, auxi a William Scrop le chastel de Wynkynglowe et la ville dycell et toutz les terres de Gerald Obrin, auxi a le sire lespencer le Counte de Waterford ove toutz lez appurtenantz, auxi al sire Bealmont le countee de Weyesford ov toutz les appourtenantz, auxi a Janico esquier le Roy Kenleiston ove toutz les appurtenantz.

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Appendix VII

Summary of shipping prests delivered to various masters by John Newbold, April - August, 1399 -- E 364/36/I.

Master	Ship	Home port	Prest
William Walaston	George	Chester	£15
William Couper	Mariebote	Chester	£15
John Cokeson	Gracedieu	Chester	£14
John Stanes	Cokeson	Chester	£20
Robert Coterell	Cogson	Chester	£41.10.0
David Madley	la Marie	Burton	£9.6.8
John Hull	la Marie	Liverpool	£16.10.0
Thomas Caudray	le Peter	Liverpool	£13.10.0
Richard Baron	Gabriel	Liverpool	£6.15.0
[not named]	le Lytylmarie	Liverpool	£4.12.6
John Bell	la Nichol	Liverpool	£8
Adam Touneshende	la Maudeleyn	Liverpool	£6
Robert Walay	la Litylmary	Liverpool	£4
Robert Stancy	la Trinite	Liverpool	£3
Alex Thomson	la James	Secombe	£3.10.0
Th. Mareschall	le Redship	Newcastle on Tyne	£4.10.0
Philip John	la Margaret	Guernsey	£1.11.8
John Milnersone	la Marie	Maner(Isle of Man?)	£2.1.8
John Toriton	la George	Dublin	£2
John Hoker	la Mighell	Dublin	£3.6.8
John Benet	la James	Dublin	£2.13.4
John Ilcombe	la Patrike	Dublin	£1.10.0
Oliver James	la Marie	Dublin	£6.6.8
Robert Porter	la Margaret	Dublin	£3.6.8
James Roche	la Trinite	Dublin	£9.10.0

Master	Ship	Home port	Prest
John Crabbe	la Christophre	Dublin	£1.13.4
Michael Brayne	la Trinite	Drogheda	£5
Thomas Hassh	la Katerine	Malahide	£1.6.8
Henry Walssh	Andrew	Baldoyle	£6.13.4
John Blake	le Peter	Malahide	£4.6.8
John Harald	la cog John	Malahide	£3.6.8
Richard Bawe	la Marie	Heth(Howth?)	£3.6.8
Richard Shawe	le Christofre	Southampton	£3.6.8
William Hamon	la Joabell	Portsmouth	£4.3.4
John Aubrey	la Trinite	Hoke(?)	£6.5.0
John Godyer	la Bartholomew	Sandwich	£12.6.8
John Harrer	la Marie	Southampton	£6
John Bigbroke	la Trinite	Heth(Howth?)	£6.13.4
Richard Butte	le Michel	Southampton	£8
John Colpot	le Christofre	Southampton	£5
John Webbe	la Marie	Hamble	£5.6.0
William Hoggeley	le Matthew	Poole	£2.6.8
John Dounley	le Marie	Poole	£19.6.8
John Chat	la James	Poole	£12.6.8
Nicholas Fox	la Trinite	Dublin	£4
Geoffrey Hathe	la Margaret	Poole	£9.13.4
Thomas Fers	la Trinite	Poole	£9.13.4
Richard Bole	le Edward	Poole	£10.6.8
William Hucheron	le Marie	Swanwych(Swanage?)	£12.6.8
John Hucheron	le Mariot	Swanwych(Swanage?)	£9.13.4
Richard Dygonell	la Margaret	Corfe	£9.13.4
Thomas Fisher	le Marie	Dartmouth	£1.13.4
Henry Hendman	le Mighell	Rochester	£6
Thomas Clerk	le Trinite	Bristol	£2.10.0
Nicholas Bigge	le Trinite	Dartmouth	£3
Robert Walley	la Lytilmarie	Liverpool	£4
John Montagu, Earl of Salisbury			£24

Although in these lists the size of the ships and the number of mariners each carried is not specified, it is noticeable that the Irish vessels were generally smaller. Where possible the home port has been given according to its modern name, though occasionally this identification was impossible. It is worth noting that the prest of £4 to Robert Walay or Walley of Liverpool appears to have been entered twice.

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Appendix VIII

Two drafts of a letter from the king to O'Neill, November 1395 -- from B.M.Cotton MS Titus B XI

Item no 7 Letter A

Rex Anglie et Francie et dominus Hibernie.

Dilecte et fidelis ligie noster. Super fidelitatis obsequio et tuo gestu laudabili quos a tempore recessus nostri de terra nostra Hibernie erga nos et subditos nostros illarum parcium exhibere cura[vi]sti ad aures nostris illa certitudo per.../ non solum nostre Regie magestati complacuit vereciam ad referendum tibi proinde grates immensas nos reddidit inclinatos et reddet imposterum succedente illorum continuatione felici favorabiliores in cunctis.../agendis pro quibus ad nos duxeris recurrendis. Cum autem sicut tue iam pridem nobis presentate littere continebant adeo fueris variis negociis impeditus quod personam tuam nostro non potueris conspectui pres.../ voto absenciam tuam pronunc habere censuimus excusatam dummodo cessante impedimento legitimo quam cicius poteris ad nostram presentiam facias te conferre, volentes preterea quod de materiis inter predilectum consanguineum/ comitem Marchie et Ultonie et te indeterminate pendentibus clare nos facias informari, ut vos ad unitatem et bonum concordie[sic]deo propitio reducere valeamus; si vero contigerit nos in aliquo vestrum aliquem.../ de oportuno curabimus in ea parte remedio providere. Volumus insuper quod Bonaghtum sive Bonatagium et cetera servicia dicto consanguineo per te debita et coram nobis apud Droghda recepcionis homagii.../ tempore concordata sibi facias exnunc imposterum absque contradiccione quacumque persolvi prout nostre indignacionis aculeum et gravamen exinde verisimiliter eventurum si quod absit contrarius nostre voluntatis at.../ premissionis emergat volueris evitare. Sciturus quod super hiis que debita et servicia huius ut de tempore retroacto contingunt [1]taliter ordinabimus quod uterque vestrum debeat merito contentari[1] et si qua

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1 Interlined

fuit alia super quibus inter vos fuerit materia controversie vel dissensionis exorta parati erimus utrique parti iusticie complementum prout ad nos attinet exhibere. Cupientes etemin ut tranquillitate fruaris mandavimus dicto consanguineo nostro per litteras nostras hac vice sibi trans/missas quod graciose et benevole de futuro te faciat pertractari. Datum....

Item no 21 Letter B

Rex Anglie et Francie et dominus Hibernie.

Dilecte et fidelis ligie noster. Ob fidelitatem et bonum gestum a tempore recessus nostri de terra nostra Hibernie per te erga nos et nostros habitos et impensos grates tibi referrimus et in cunctis agendis tuis redd.../[dein] de favorabiliores, et quia prout per litteras tuas iam tarde nobis presentatas concepimus quod variis impedimentis propeditus ad presenciam nostram accedere minime potuisti absenci.../ quo ad presens habebimus excusatam dumtamen quam cito cessante legitimo impedimento hoc facere poteris ad nos accessum habeas volentes quatinus de materiis inter predilectum consanguineum/ nostrum comitem Marchie et Ultonie et te pendentibus nos facias plene informari ut ipsum et te ad unitatem valeamus deo volente reducere. Sciturus quod si contingat nos in aliquo.../ defectum reperire de remedio oportuno curabimus providere. Volumus insuper quod Bonaghtum sive Bonatagium et cetera servicia dicto consanguineo nostro sibi per te debita et coram nobis apud.../Droghda tempore recepcionis homagii tui concordata sibi facias persolvi absque contradiccione aliquali et si qua fuerint alia super quibus orta fuerit contraversia parati erimus utrique.../ facere iusticie complementum. Preterhec mandavimus dicto consanguineo nostro de tractando te graciose et benevole prout ex serie litterarum nostrarum quarum copiam tibi mittimus presentibus inter/clusam poterit plenius apparere. Datum sub privato sigillo nostro apud villam nostram Oxonie quarto die Novembris.

It is clear from the internal evidence that this letter was intended for O'Neill, either Niall Mor or his son Niall Og. Of no one else is it likely to have been said that he submitted recently to the king at Drogheda and promised then to render the bonnaght and other services to the Earl of March. In the British Museum Catalogue of the Cotton Manuscripts letter A is, however, described as 'A royal letter to some officer in Ireland, commending his conduct and desiring that some differences between him and the Earl of March and Ulster might be accommodated'. Letter B is said to be 'another transcript of letter A '. This inaccurate description has presumably been responsible for the lack of attention so far accorded to it by historians.

Both documents are in the same clear, late fourteenth century hand, similar in many respects to the calligraphy of identified Privy Seal clerks of the period.[1] The documents are obviously draft versions of the same letter, A being apparently an earlier attempt than B. The Latin of the former version is at times careless and letter B, while giving essentially the same message, omits several superfluous passages and altogether seems a clearer and more polished product. The interlineation in letter A and the absence of a dating clause seem further proof that this was indeed a preliminary draft. A curious feature of letter B is that it contains one clear slit in the centre and a possible second one at the right hand edge.[2] Despite this suggestion that the document was at some stage folded and sealed in the customary manner,[3] it seems certain that this particular draft cannot have been sent to O'Neill but remained with other Privy Seal records in the British archives until found by Sir Robert Cotton.

There remains no certainty that a final draft was made, sealed

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1 e.g. P.Chaplais, English royal documents, King John-Henry VI, plate 19.

2 The document's condition prevents any certainty about this slit.

3 Chaplais, op.cit., pp 30-1, describes the sealing procedures used with privy seal documents.

and delivered to O'Neill, though the probability is that this happened. The date upon which such a letter would have been sent must have been close to the 4 November, as given in version B. There is little difficulty in identifying the year in question as 1395. From the content the letter is clearly after the first expedition, but before the peace of Ulster was known to have been broken by Mortimer's attack on Armagh--in other words either 1395 or 1396. In 1396 Richard went to Calais in October to collect his bride, the marriage ceremony actually being performed on 4 November itself.[1] On 4 November 1395 the Privy Seal was however making grants at Oxford[2] and it seems therefore certain that the letter to O'Neill dates from that year, six months after the first expedition ended.

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Appendix IX

Two unpublished letters from Richard concerning Ireland, taken from B.M. Additional Manuscript 24062--'Formulary of documents passed under the Privy Seal, compiled and written by Thomas Hocclyf, the poet'.

1) p 106

R...A touz viscontes mairs bailiffs sovereins provostes et autres noz liges de notre terre dirlande, saluz. Savoir vous faisons que le message--a nous envoiez hors de notre parlement dareinement tenuz a notre citee de Dyvelyn en notre dite terre par lonurable piere en Dieu Levesque de Mid notre chanceller de mesme notre terre et notre chier et foial David Ogan Chivaler avons pleinement entenduz--et parmy le report dez ditz Evesque et David a nous fait en celle partie, avons conceux que [3]les[3] ditz noz lieges obeissantz illoeques desirent

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1 Palmer, England, France and Christendom, p 176
2 e.g. C.P.R. 1391-6 p 644
3 Interlined.

grandement notre venue en notre propre persone en notre terre avantdite. Si sumes en purpos de visiter ov leide de dieu mesme notre terre si tost come faire le pourrons bonement, tant pur leeste et confort de noz ditz lieges obeissantz, come pur acomplir parmy la grace de notre Sire la conqueste dycelle notre terre et de guerdoner a lors ceux qi puis notre departir dilloeques soy ont bonement porter et leur ligeance envers nous loialment gardez et les autres punir et chastier chescuny selonc son desert, mandantz chargeantz et fermement enioignantz a touz noz ditz lieges de notre dite terre sur peine de forfaiture de quaconque ils purront forfaire envers nous que a noz commandemantz et leyees et aussy noz ministres illoeques ils soient entendantz et obeiantz [1]et[1] a ceux qi soi ont foialment tenuz et loialment portez a nous puis notre departir de notre dite terre, et desore soi tiegnent a notre pees et obeissance ne as autres qiconces ils ne facent ne de tant come en eux est soffrent estre fait mal damage grief moleste ne inquietacion queconque, sinon par avys de noz lieutenant justice et autres officers et ministres illoeques. Et si viens soit a aucune de noz liges obeissantz non duement mespris ou meffait vous avantditz mairs baillifs sovereins provostes et noz ditz autres ministres illoeques le facez si avant come a vous appartient duement corriger et redresser solonc noz leyes en celles parties. En tesmoignance de quele chose nous avons fait faire noz lettres patentes. Don etc....

2) p 122

Conte de Dessemond. Parmy les grandes compleintes de noz liges assemblez en notre parlement darreinement tenuz en notre citee de Dyvelyn en notre terre Dirlande avons entenduz et sumes pleinement certifiez que du mal port tant de vous, come de voz

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1 Interlined.

cousins et aherdanz envers nous et noz liges obeissans illoeques puis notre departir hors de notre terre avantdite, dont consideree la grande grace que nous vous fismes qant nous y estiens darreinement, nous merveillons tresgrandement et nous ent tenons tresmal content. Si vous commandons et chargeons si estroitement come plus poons et sur toutes les indignacion et forfaiture que vous purrez encourrir envers nous que les trespasses par vous et voz diz cousins et aherdanz ensi faitz a nous et a noz diz liges obeissanz facez duement amender et redresser sanz difficultee queconque, sique nous neons matire de prendre grevousement devers vous ne aucuns de voz diz cousins et aherdanz a cause de voz trespasses susdiz, vous aiant ainsy et faisant aussi voz diz cousins et aherdanz lour avoir et porter envers nous et noz diz liges desore par tiele manoir que nous neons plus conpleinte de vous ne de nul de eux sur le peril qappent. Entendant de certein que si desore vous vous mespreignez envers nous ou aucuns de noz diz liges, ou si nul de voz diz cousins ou aherdanz se mespreignent, la mesprision des queux si aucune aviegne la votre nous reputerans, nous prendrons ainsy devers vous come devers ceux qen ce cas serront trovez en deffaute et vous ferons ainsy punir que touz de notre terre en prendront essample en temps avenir. Don etc....

It is difficult to date these letters precisely, as no evidence has survived which throws any light on the assembly or embassy in question. However, the mention of David Ogan is obviously linked with the absentee's pardon of May 1398 granted to David Wogan, 'lately chosen by the lords and commonalty of Ireland in parliament held at Dublin one of the ambassadors of that land to report its condition to the king, and who for that reason stayed long with

the king in England and at Calais at Michaelmas in the twentieth year and previously'.[1] This suggests that the parliament took place in the summer of 1396.[2] It seems however that Wogan had private concerns in England, and may have delayed there some time on that account.[3] It is therefore possible that the parliament occurred much earlier in the year. Evidence concerning the Bishop of Meath certainly favours this interpretation. A letter of 16 April, dating apparently from 1396, shows Roger Mortimer, lieutenant of Ulster, Connacht and Meath, requesting the treasurer of England to expedite, among other things, the Irish chancellor's return--indicating that the bishop had already been absent some time from Ireland.[4] In fact, the bishop seems to have returned to Ireland in May.[5] It is probable therefore that the parliament which sent Wogan and Bishop Balscot to England met in early 1396 or even late 1395.

An examination of grants witnessed by Mortimer as lord lieutenant during this time narrows the choice of date still further. His activities from July until November 1395 are unknown, but on

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1 C.P.R. 1396-9 p 340

2 Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, p 347, draw this conclusion.

3 Because of his English inheritance he was given a licence, dated 4 October 1397, to be absent from Ireland from 15 August last. (C.P.R. 1396-9 p 209) In June 1395, during an earlier absence, he appointed attornies to act for him in Ireland.(C.C.H., p 152 no 40)

4 This letter is printed in Anglo-Norman letters, no 15. A slightly different version, giving the address to Roger Walden, treasurer of England, and the dating clause, 16 April, at 'Kilmayon' appears in B.M. Royal MS 10 B IX, f 3. Walden was superseded as treasurer by April 1398 and the Bishop of Meath was by then no longer chancellor, so the year must have been either 1396 or 1397. Mortimer himself was in England in April 1397.(S.C. 6/1184/22) The evidence that he was in Dublin on 26 April 1396 seems to clinch the argument in favour of this year.(Hore, History of Wexford, v, 124, quoting from Mem. 19 R.II)

5 Clause volumus protections of 16 May were issued to his companions Robert Lovel and William Byfeld. Walter Pasford, staying in his company, received a similar protection the following day. (C.P.R. 1391-6 pp 712, 705)

8 November he was at Rathwire in Westmeath.[1] Our next information places him at Trim on 1 January 1396, but after this he immediately moved south to Dublin where on 26 January he witnessed another grant.[2] This last document is particularly interesting, for with the exception of the treasurer the most important men in the government were also witnesses. Named in the calendar are Stephen Scrope, lieutenant of the justiciar; Bishop of Meath, chancellor; the Earl of Ormond; the Earl of Kildare; Peter Rowe, justice of the Bench; and John fitz Maurice, justice of the Common Bench--the essential members of the Irish council.[3] The grant in question was one of liberties to Galway--not a matter which would have necessitated unusual authorization--and it seems that only convenience can explain the choice of witnesses. There is a strong probability that the presence of these men in Dublin at this particular time was no coincidence but rather the occasion of the parliament which instructed the embassy in question.[4] Richard's subsequent letters date therefore almost certainly from the spring or early summer of 1396.

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Appendix X

Two documents from Lambeth Palace Library, MS 619 concerning Ireland.

These documents are both in a late fourteenth or early fifteenth century hand, and the parchment is in fairly good condition, though some margins and the dorse of f 208 have suffered. As the transcript shows, the Latin of the conciliar memorandum is often careless, supporting the theory that it was little more than a note, aiding the council's deliberations. Why Latin was used at all is uncertain, for most conciliar documents of the period survive in French. The background to these documents, which were both concerned with the Irish administration's

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1 C.P.R. 1401-5 p 86

2 ibid., 1396-9 p 428; 1401-5 p 86.

3 Richardson and Sayles, Irish Parliament, p 34, have drawn attention to this in their general study of the Irish council.

4 Though the Desmond Geraldines now took less part in government (ibid.. 34-5 n 84 etc) the earl's absence is significant in view of the

difficulties between the expeditions, has already been examined.[1]

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1) Lambeth MS 619 f 207

Remembrance de parler a notre Sire le Roy et son counseil pour lestat et gouvernaile de la terre dirlande.[2]

i)[3] En primes que desormes meliour surveiance soit ordeigne pour le retenu del Lieutenant du Justice de la terre pour ceo que la ou il dusse avoir eu le plein noumbre de ses gentz pour les guerres ils ne use mye avoir la tierce parte pour lour singler lucre agrant counfort de les Irrois et deceite du Roy et sa dite terre dont remedie covyent estre fait.

ii) Item la ou soloit estre que le Justice ou lieutenant soloient tenir lour sessiones parmy toute la terre par vertu des queux sessions pour le temps que les revenuz furent en lour mayns ils leverunt grands [4]sommes des[4] fines et amercementz a lour oeps propre, et ore pour tout le temps que les revenus ont este es mayns le Roy james ne fuist par celle voie gaygne a Roy un mail et la ou les forfaitours de guerre apparteinent a Roi de toutz les forfaitours quont este pris par le dit lieutenant del justice rien vient al oeps du Roy.

iii) Item la ou la grand seal le Roy ou la chauncelerie Dirlande soloit rendre en Leschequer MM marcz et plus outre les fees paiez as officers de la dite place et ore les issues de la dite seal ne poent suffir a paier tant soulement le Chaunceller dicell et cest a cause que la ou que gentz mesprisours de diverses felonies et plusours autres causes soloient faire fines pour lour chartres avoir en temps que levesque de Mid et autres furent justices et lieutenantz, ascuns C livres, ascuns C marcs, ascuns XL livres, ascuns XX livres, et ascuns plus et ascuns meyns, ore ils facent fines de une marc, X soldz, demi marc, ou XL deniers. Et ensi de toutz maners fines faitz en mesme la place sont plus meyns que soloient estre a grant arerissement de les revenuz susditz.

iv) Item la ou le eschetour Dirlande sovent par son office preigne

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1 Above pp 275-7, 295-6 etc.
2 'Tempore Regis R.II', has been added here in a later hand.
3 The numbers in this and the following document are mine.

diverses enquestes des terres et tenementz deinz mesme la terre par queux enquestes meyntfoitz il trove vraie cause deux seisir, et les seise es mayns le Roy et tost apres viendra un et prie qil poet traversere le dicte office apres quel priere il demandra les ditz terres avoir par lettres patentes si a Roy appartient, et ensi les tiendra si longement come loy plerra tanque il regarde temps de forger enqueste ove brocage de ouster la mayn le Roy de les dites terres et tenementz ovesque les issues del jour qils furent pris es mayns le Roy avantdit issint que nul profit poet escheiere a notre dit Sire le Roy.

v) Item la cause que les revenues de la terre sont trop petitz et le Roy et la roialme et son counseil neiount conusance de les profitz et issues de la terre est pour ce que devant ces heures meyntfoitz en temps de chescun Justice ou lieutenant ount estre granter plusours taxes et talliages ascun foitz XX soldz de la carrue de terre ascun foitz plus ascun foitz meyns par lez communes de la terre en sustentacion des guerres le Roy, et les chauncellers ent ount fait lettres patentes as certeines gentz de chescun paiis de lever mesmes les taxes toutdiz ove cest clause--Ita quod compotus inde coram Priore Sancte Trinitatis Dublin. et tali et tali et non ad Scaccarium nostrum reddatur. Et la ou lieutenantz et Justices devant ces heures eiont levez a lour oeps grandz subsidies des diverses merchandises issantz dehors la terre et venauntz en la terre come de drap, de frument, de feer, de seel, de peaux, lanuz et conyz, samoun, salts, congre et plusours autres choses, appellez avoir depois depuisque le departir notre sire le Roy hors Dirlande rienz de tieux subsidies fuist a luy grantez pour rienz que le lieutenant del Tresorer illeoques puissoit moer ne en parlement ne en conseil a grande damage du Roy et anyntissement de ses revenuez susditz.

vi) Item come [1]a[1] la ou governaile de la Banc le Roy toutz les issues dicelle ne puissent mye paier le Justice ses fees et gages pour exercer le dit office pour ceo que le dit Justice nose mye ne sache ne voet iusticer nully de sa mesprisioun solonc la leye pur poure destre are ou tuez ou a cause dalliance affinite ou brocage. Et ensement est de toutz autres officers que sont enhabitez de longe demourge en la dit terre. Et auxi ils ont lettres patentes de prendre fyns et amercimentz [2]par [1]du les ditz Bancs[1] ses propres mayns par qoi les fines sont plus petitz qils dussent estre.

vii) Item la ou y appartient a loffice du Tresorer de faire billes desoutz son seal a le Chaunceller sub hac forma--Fiant lettres patentes sub magno sigillo tali vel tali de custodia terrarum et tenementorum in N. habendo etc--le dit Chaunceller ne voit recevir tieux billes ne eux executer endisant qil ne voet obeier a tieux mandementz entendant qil doit estre comandez de le Tresorer par celle forme a damage du Roy et arerissement de les issues del dit seal.

viii) Item la ou y appertient a loffice del dit Tresorer de feare serchours deinz le Roialme notre sire le Roy les mairs et baillifs de certeins citees cestassavoir de Duvelin et Cork ne veullent my suffrer serchours estre fait pour le Roy dedeinz lour baillies a grande damage du Roy et la cause est pour ceo que les officers illeoqes sont nyent tendres ne diligentz de chastiser aschun mesprision en celle partie.

ix) Item come a la torcionouse governaile et mauveis gesture de les Engleis rebelles come de Botilers, Aubyns, Powers, Burkyns, Gerardyns, Barettz et plusours autres sects des kynreddes est pour ceo que par fieblesse et trop petit poair du justice ou son lieutenant enfaillantz lour noumbre des gentz nyent esteantz de poair de chastier lour mesprisions que par soeffrance de lour chefeteyns

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1 Interlined.

2 The interlined phrase which follows should perhaps have rightly been placed here.

ils font tiel riot que le liege people est destruit et anyntissez a grande hounte et damage du Roy dont covyent remedie estre fait.

x) Item y est assavoir du Roy et son counseil la ou ascun de les Irrois capiteins depuisque le Roy passa hors de la terre ou apres le temps qil devenoit homme liege a qi pour son bone service le Roy luy ad done un annuitee et en apres ad levee a guerre ove baner displaies sil doit estre paie de sa dite annuite ou nyent.

xi) Item que toutz les officers le Roy sibien pour la defence come pour la leye en la dit terre soient ordinez hors Dengleterre de les plus et vaillantz sages et loialx que purront estre troves sanz que le ordinance la dit terre james estoisera en prosperite nen bone governaile.

xii) Item la ou y est ordeignez par estatutz faitz des Admiralx que nul Admiral eit cognisance des plees et quereles que moent dedeinz la terre ou les corps de les countees et que toutz les forfaitours fines et amercimentz escheiantz parmy les sessions en mesmes les lieus appartienent a Roy, James Cottenham pretendant luy deputee al honurable sire le conte de Rotelande Admiral Dirlande par colour du dite office ad pris et preigne inquisiciones et presentementz de eaux que concelerunt ou asporterunt lour custumes par vertu des queles inquisiciones et presentementz il ad pris de plusours gentz fines amercimentz ranceons et forfaites a son propre oeps en grante prejudice du Roy et derogacion de ses courtes et leyes sanz respounse au Roi de nul denier.

xiii) Item le dit James par colour de mesme loffice ad pris et prigne de jour en jour un subsidie par luy mesmes ordeigne et levee de XII d. de chescun Waye de frument passant la meer hors dascun port ou lieu illoeqes en grande prejudice du Roi et son liege people. Et de chescun vivant homme ou femme passant la meer ascun XL d., dascun II s., dascun XII d et dascun plus et dascun meyns sanz

auctorite non obstante ceo qil ad este garniz par le counseil de lacher ses maynes de tieux mesprisions faitz au Roi et son liege poeple dont y covyent estre fait due et hastie remedie.

xiv) Item soit remedie fait de ceo que le dit James ad troiz foitz envoiez ses niefs en Escoce ove vitailles de vyn et floure de frument et ares et secs encontre lestatut. Et de la faux monoie qil fist porter hors descoce en Irlande en grande arerissement de le liege poeple du Roy.

xv) Item la ou le lieutenant de Tresorer devant le fest de Novel darrein passe estoit chivachant vers Drogheda et ailours el countee de Mid denquerrer pour profit du Roy et de lever ses dettes pour paiement de les Irrois en mesme le temps le dit James ove grande coupe des gentz armes et un Laurence Neweton sergeant darmes ovesque luy enserchantz tout le paiis davoir arrestuz le dit lieutenant a quel propos il ne conust ne unqes conu a grande arerissement de lestat de le tresorer et son dite lieutenant et grevouse damage a notre dit Sire le Roy.

xvi) Item que charge soit done as certeins foialx lieges le Roi denquerrer de mesprisiones et distourbances et violence que le dit James ad fait et procurez a Roi et ses ministres illoeques sibien en anienisement de ses oevereignes come en derrogacion de sa Regalie et droit come a la haute counseil y poet estre declarrez plus a plein.

2) Lambeth MS 619, f 208

Pro statu Hibernie

1) In primis quod dominus Rex concedere dignetur temporalia archiepiscopati Dublin. cum acciderint dum in manu sua extiterint per litteras patentes sub sigillo Anglie pro reperacione magne aule infra castrum Regis Dublin.

ii)[1] Item quod constituere dignetur officiarios suos capitales extra Anglie pro maiori comodo suo, videlicet Willelmum Hankeford vel dominum Robertum Faryngton Cancellarium Hibernie, Johannem Kirkeby custodem

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1 Marginalia record 'Cancellaria' beside this item.

Rotulorum, Robertum Claydon clericum hanaperii et Johannem Lilleston Clericum corone.

iii)[1] Item Thomam Rede de Wallie Capitalem Justiciarium et Hugonem Lutrell militem secundarium Justiciarium.

iv) Item Thomas Freesby Justiciarium [2]Communi Banci[2] et capitalem Baronem Scaccarii similiter. Johannes Castleton vel Johannes Brettan capitalem rememoratorem ibidem.

v) Item quod dominus Rex concedere dignetur commissionem sub magno sigillo Anglie prefati Willelmo Hankeford, Hugoni Lutrell, Thome Freesby, et Roberto Loughteburgh ad inquirendum de quibuscumque officiariis et eorum factis qui ante hec tempora fuerunt ac de quibuscumque transgressionibus extorcionibus gravaminibus et oppressionibus populi etc in qualiter cumque.

vi) Item quod concedere dignetur sub magno sigillo Anglie statuta contra admirallos et eorum deputatos et contra provisores diversis annis edita in terram Hiberniam pro comodo et statu regis mittenda et ibidem proclamanda.

vii) Item quod Johannes Melton locumtenens Thesaurarii Regis Hibernie possit habere sub magno sigillo Anglie specialem protectionem pro salva defensione sua erga quascumque prout Jacobus Billyngford clericus corone discreto consilio domino Regis satis plane scit declarare.

viii) Item quod idem locumtenens habeat breve patens sub magno sigillo Anglie directum omnibus fidelibus ministris et subditis Regis ibidem quod libere admitti possit ad officium dicti Thesaurarii excercendum absque perturbacione seu impeticione aliquali aliqua ordinacionis seu concessione sub sigillo Regis Hibernie in contrarius seu aliquo altero modo facta non obstante. Et quod idem locumtenens facere possit deputatum seu deputatos in officio predicti quociens necesse fuerit vel oportunum.

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1 Marginalia by the following items record 'Bancus Regis, Communis Bancus, et Scaccarius'.

2 Interlined.

3 For Billingford, clerk of the crown, and his earlier visit to Ireland see C.C.R. 1392-6 p 370; ibid., 1396-9 p 73.

ix) Item quod dominus Rex concedere dignetur litteras patentes sub magno sigillo Anglie Thesaurarium Hibernie [1]et[1] eius locumtenenti [2]qui nunc sunt[2] quod ipsi possint constituere et ordinare auditores idoneos ad audiendos compota omnium Thesaurariorum Hibernie ante hec tempore computaturorum et ad eorum compota consilio domini Regis in Anglie certificanda pro comodo Regis.

x) Item quod dominus Rex dignetur precipere consilio suo quod ipse certificent in Hibernia quo die et anno Willelmus Lescrop miles sursum reddidit dicto domino Regi comitatus Uriel et villam de Drogheda cum proficuis earundem.

xi) Item quod dominus Rex concedere dignetur sub magno sigillo Anglie pro Johanne Melton clerico presentato dicti domini Regis ad prebendam de Houth in ecclesia cathedrali Dublin. breve de praemunire factum [2]versus[2] magistrum Johannem Taaf provisorem [2]apostolicum[2] et adversarium dicti Johannis Melton et contra quoscumque fautoros consulentes et auxiliantes prout lex exigit etc.

[Item xi is on the dorse of the document and there too can be found some of the responses to the requests. Numbers i-vi inclusive are completely lost.]

vii) Habet litteram protectionis secundum...ius exposcit.

viii) Respondetur quod pertinet ad officium Thesaurarii Hibernie.

ix) Respondetur quod Thesaurarius ibidem est computabilis in Scaccario Anglie.

x) Constat consilio.

Ultimis articuli conceditur per consilium in quantum potest fieri secundum legem et prosequatur prefatus Johannes ad Cameram.

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1 Interlined, replacing 'vel' which is crossed out.
2 Interlined.

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The following lists indicate the main sources consulted in the course of my research. In general only those works actually referred to in the thesis have been included in the bibliography. In listing original sources I give only a general description of the type of material found in the different records, as fuller details are more conveniently provided in particular footnotes.

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E 101 -- Exchequer, King's Remembrancer, Accounts Various

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E 401 -- Exchequer, Receipt Rolls

E 403 -- Exchequer, Issue Rolls

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