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TITLE

LEARNED NATIONALISM: THEODOR HERZL'S TRANSFORMATION FROM GERMAN NATIONALIST TO JEWISH NATIONALIST

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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BY

TRAVIS JUSTIN ROMANY

0. Front Matter

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and it is entirely my own work. I confirm that the work has been completed in full compliance with relevant university policies, including the Academic Integrity policy, the Trinity Policy on Good Research Practice, and the guidance on AI and GenAI in Teaching, Learning, Assessment and Research.

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SUMMARY

This dissertation explores the motivations of a minority ethnic group within an existing, modern state to become nationalist. It hypothesizes that minority political nationalism may be motivated by their exclusion from modern centralised states by politically powerful, ethno-nationalisms. It considers the case of Theodor Herzl who founded Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, in 1896 while he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Theodor Herzl developed Political Zionism as a response to the exclusive, antisemitic politics of Christian Austro-German nationalism in the imperial capital of Vienna after the 1880s.

The dissertation's hypothesis is,

> The modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy facilitated the emergence of an exclusive, Christian Austro-German nationalism in its capital of Vienna in the 19th Century. Viennese Jews became insecure when they were excluded from Viennese society via Christian Austro-German nationalism's antisemitism. Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism in response to the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society as a means of restoring his social security as an excluded Viennese Jew.

This work tests its hypothesis through two complementary methods. The first method is the presentation of a narrative case study around the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society, and the emergence of Theodor Herzl as a Jewish nationalist between 1860 and 1896. It is argued that Jews were incorporated into the Habsburg state's institutions after the state was centralised. Austro-Hungarian Jews experienced rapid upward social mobility as they gained new opportunities in society. Jewish integration and success in the Austrian half of the monarchy, in particular, could

be attributed to their willing assimilation into its Austro-German social hierarchy via German assimilation. The rapid integration of Jews in the Habsburg state by 1879 was followed by an equally swift decline in their social inclusion by the 1890s. The antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese society coincided with inter-ethnic competition in the capital's political system. This work argues that Theodor Herzl founded political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism, as a response to the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Christian, Austro-German nationalism.

Analyses of a sample of Theodor Herzl's primary documents will be used to support the claims made in the case study. The presentation of results from these discourse analyses is the second method by which this work tests its hypothesis. Herzl's representations of his experiences with Christian-German antisemitism in his discourse lends support to this work's claims around the nationalist exclusion of Jews as a minority group. Viennese Jews, including Theodor Herzl, saw themselves as socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged as a result of antisemitism's nationalist exclusion. Finally, it is argued that Theodor Herzl's experiences of nationalist exclusion and social insecurity motivated him
to found political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism.

ACKNOWLEDGDEMENTS

My favourite quotation from Theodor Herzl during this dissertation was one of his self-deprecating reflections on intellectual Jews. Herzl wrote:

> They were to be freed from the hardships of trade and commerce. And so the younger generation entered the “liberal” professions *en masse*. The result was an unfortunate surplus of trained men who could find no work, but were at the same time spoiled for a modest way of life. … Those who had some means gradually used them up, or else continued to live on the paternal purse. (Herzl, Altneuland: The Old New Land, 2009, p. 8)

Theodor Herzl and I can both lay claim to the title of underemployed, Jewish academics with ‘degrees (we) could not back up with a shilling.’ (Herzl, 2009, p. 8) I can alternatively choose to focus on my gratitude for my family who freely gave of themselves to support my academic ambitions. I dedicate this dissertation to my mother and father, above all. I am grateful for their financial support, of course, but I could not have completed this dissertation without their unlimited emotional support. This was especially true during the last two years.

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ABSTRACT

TITLE

LEARNED NATIONALISM: THEODOR HERZL'S TRANSFORMATION FROM

GERMAN NATIONALIST TO JEWISH NATIONALIST

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There is an established, theorised relationship in International Relations amongst inter-state war, the centralisation of modern states, and the emergence of political nationalism within them. This claim was famously encapsulated in Charles Tilly's 1975 aphorism "War made the state and the state made war." Theorists of nationalism, like Charles Tilly, argue that nationalism spread across the global inter-state system because nation-states were more successful in inter-state wars compared to non-nationalised states. This work goes beyond conventional theories of modern nationalism when it argues that inter-state war did not only incentivise the centralisation and nationalisation of states but it may have been responsible for the creation of national identities themselves.

This work uses the emergence of Theodor Herzl's political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism, in the modern Austro-Hungarian state to test its claims. The first claim is that the political choices made during the modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy resulted in a distribution of social power that was biased towards Catholic, Austro-German, men in Austria by Vienna's Liberal Era (1867-1879). The second hypothetical claim is that biased, centralised, state institutions in Austria, and its capital of Vienna, created observable patterns of durable inequality between groups by the 19th Century. These patterns of durable inequality were based on objective social relations but were later defined as subjective national identities by groups who perceived that their social success aligned with categories of durable inequality. Finally, this work argues that the dominant political nationalism in Vienna by the late 19th Century was led by Christian, Austro-German, men who formalised Vienna's patterns of durable inequality in its political system via the nationalist exclusion of competitive Jews. It concluded that Theodor Herzl responded to the insecurity of Jews in 19th Century Vienna by calling for a Jewish nation-state as a means of solving their social inequality. Theodor Herzl created and defined the Jewish national identity as a result of his exclusion from the Viennese political system.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Summary of Research

This dissertation explores the motivations of a minority ethnic group within an existing, modern state to become nationalist. It hypothesizes that minority political nationalism may be motivated by their exclusion from modern centralised states by politically powerful, ethno-nationalisms. It considers the case of Theodor Herzl who founded Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, in 1896 while he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Theodor Herzl developed Political Zionism as a response to the exclusive, antisemitic politics of Christian Austro-German nationalism in the imperial capital of Vienna after the 1880s.

Intra-state conflict has been the most common form of inter-group strife since the Second World War. The prevalence of intra-state conflict is correlated with division of the world into exclusive nation-states.[1] Nationalism became a dominant political ideology across the European continent, and Europe's imperial possessions, after the French Revolution. These principles were later encapsulated in Woodrow Wilson's 14 points which asserted the right of peoples to their national independence. The right to national self-determination became the basis for waves of colonial independence movements across Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and beyond. Competing demands for national autonomy continues to motivate intra-state conflict across the globe.

This work presents a hypothesis to explain one form of intra-national conflict. It looks at the exclusion of minorities from dominant, political national movements within existing

[1] (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023)

states, and the subsequent secession of those excluded minorities via their own political nationalism. The dissertation's hypothesis is,

> The modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy facilitated the emergence of an exclusive, Christian Austro-German nationalism in its capital of Vienna in the 19th Century. Viennese Jews became insecure when they were excluded from Viennese society via Christian Austro-German nationalism's antisemitism. Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism in response to the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society as a means of restoring his social security as an excluded Viennese Jew.

The hypothesis includes three claims. The first claim is that the political choices made during the modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy resulted in a distribution of social power that was biased towards Catholic, Austro-German, men in Austria by Vienna's Liberal Era (1867-1879). Modernisation theory, and theories of modern nationalism, argue that modern states were created when societies were centralised around state institutions. These state institutions included a centrally commanded military, a centralised political system and bureaucracy, a capitalist economy, and a dominant culture, amongst others. The second hypothetical claim is that biased, centralised, state institutions in Austria, and its capital of Vienna, created observable patterns of durable inequality between groups by the 19th Century. These patterns of durable inequality were based on objective social relations but were later defined as subjective national identities by groups who perceived that their social success aligned with categories of durable inequality. This work argues that the dominant political nationalism in Vienna by the late 19th Century was led by Christian, Austro-German, men who wished to formalise Vienna's patterns of durable inequality in its political system via the nationalist exclusion of competitive Jews. The modern, nationalist exclusion of Jews from society is known as antisemitism. Antisemitism meant that Jews were becoming insecure relative to Christian-Germans in Vienna. Viennese

Jews had an incentive to secede from Viennese society, and from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, by creating their own modern centralised state, national identity, and political nationalism. This work concludes that one excluded Viennese Jew, Theodor Herzl, was attempting this goal when he created Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, in 1896.

This work tests its hypothesis through two complementary methods. The first method is the presentation of a narrative case study around the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society, and the emergence of Theodor Herzl as a Jewish nationalist between 1860 and 1896. The case study is set within Vienna's political and social environment that followed the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Theorists of modern nationalism argue that states are centralised before their intra-state populations become nationalist, i.e., before their populations consciously define their identities via their differing inclusion in the centralised state. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's various intra-state groups were defining their relative places across the monarchy's territories between the 1830s and the First World War. This period provides the context for the case study's analyses of the emergence of Theodor Herzl's Jewish Political Zionism in Viennese politics and society. It will be argued that Jews were incorporated into the Habsburg state's institutions after the state was centralised. Austro-Hungarian Jews experienced rapid upward social mobility as they gained new opportunities in society. Jewish integration and success in the Austrian half of the monarchy, in particular, could be attributed to their willing assimilation into its Austro-German social hierarchy via German assimilation.

The rapid integration of Jews in the Habsburg state by 1879 was followed by an equally swift decline in their social inclusion by the 1890s. The antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese society coincided with inter-ethnic competition in the capital's political system. The emergence of a politically successful but antisemitic, Christian Austro-

German nationalism disadvantaged Jews in Viennese society. Theodor Herzl lived his entire life within the preceding social context. This work argues that Theodor Herzl founded political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism, as a response to the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Christian, Austro-German nationalism.

Analyses of a sample of Theodor Herzl's primary documents will be used to support the claims made in the case study. The presentation of results from these discourse analyses is the second method by which this work tests its hypothesis. Herzl's representations of his experiences with Christian-German antisemitism in his discourse lends support to this work's claims around the nationalist exclusion of Jews as a minority group. Viennese Jews, including Theodor Herzl, saw themselves as socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged as a result of antisemitism's nationalist exclusion. Finally, it is argued that Theodor Herzl's experiences of nationalist exclusion and social insecurity motivated him to found political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism.

1.2 Dissertation Outline

1.2.1 Outline Summary

This work progresses across three sections. The first section presents this work's theoretical and methodological foundations. It starts with *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework* which presents the theories of International Relations and Sociology used in this work. These theories provide the theoretical context that underpins the hypothesis. Chapter 2 specifically justifies the International Relations theory of neorealism, and the sociological theories of modern nationalism, as the most appropriate for this work's purposes. Chapter 3 *Research Methodology* translates the theoretical framework into a practicable research plan. It also develops the hypothesis,

its theoretical claims, and the associated research questions. It finally presents Discourse Analysis as one research methodology that will be applied when testing this work's hypothesis. This work's theoretical and methodological foundations are followed by the second section, *Case Study: The Transformation of Theodor Herzl from a German Nationalist to Jewish Nationalist Between 1867 and 1896*. The narrative case study is structured around the hypothesis and research questions. The second section includes Chapters 4, 5, and 6. This case study explores the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Viennese society via antisemitism, and the emergence of Theodor Herzl as a Jewish nationalist between 1848 and 1896. This dissertation closes with a final section which applies the research methodology of Discourse Analysis to a sample of Theodor Herzl's primary documents. Theodor Herzl's writings position his Jewish nationalism within the wider story of the centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the emergence of Christian, Austro-German, nationalism in Vienna. The section, Discourse Analysis, covers Chapters, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

1.2.2 Detailed Outline

Section: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations

The first of this dissertation's three sections develops its theoretical and methodological foundations. This section includes Chapter 2 *Literature Review* and *Theoretical Framework*, and Chapter 3 *Research Methodology*. This work's formal research hypothesis is presented in Chapter 3 as the following:

> The modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy facilitated the emergence of an exclusive, Christian Austro-German nationalism in its capital city of Vienna in the 19th Century. Viennese Jews became insecure when they were excluded from Viennese society via Christian Austro-German nationalism's antisemitism. Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism in response to the

antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society as a means of restoring his social security as an excluded Viennese Jew.

The fields of International Relations and Sociology provide the theoretical context for the inter-state and intra-state relations considered in the hypothesis. Chapter 2 *Literature Review and Theoretical Framework*. The hypothesis relies on the theoretical assumption that states are responsive to the inter-state system. If so, it may then be possible that centralisation was an emergent policy choice for states to improve their security during inter-state conflict. This hypothetical claim mixes the theoretical assumptions of neorealism and the sociological field of nationalism. Theorists of nationalism generally agree that nationalism is a modern political process.[2] While theorists have formed a consensus around the modernity of the nation-state as a political unit, there is a stark divide on the origins of the underlying national populations and their national identities. Still, a plurality, if not majority, of theorists have coalesced around the modernity of the nation. 'Modernists' claim that self-conscious nations are 'wholly modern, dating from around the period of the French Revolution at the earliest, driven by the set of socio-economic and political changes that followed in the nineteenth century'.[3] Theorists of modern nationalism claim that states responded to inter-state conflict through the creation of institutions which centralised the authority of the state. Once a state is centralised, its institutions are assumed to become the dominant arena for intra-state contests over power. These theories of modern nationalism will be used to connect inter-state conflict to the domestic society of a centralised state via its national institutions.

Chapter 2 further synthesises theories of neorealism and modern nationalism to develop a framework for the relationship between inter-state war, the centralisation of states, and the emergence of political nationalism. First, it presents a detailed argument on why the

[2] (Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 72)
[3] (Coakely, 2018, p. 332)

centralisation of intra-state societies may have been an effective strategy for inter-state war. To do so, the chapter defines the general, or pre-centralised, state according to theories of neorealism and modern nationalism. It is assumed that the inter-state system is composed of states with an interest in survival. It is also assumed that the inter-state system is anarchical, without a superior authority to adjudicate inter-state conflicts. States within this system are functionally identical with a responsibility for their own survival. According to neorealism, a state's survival is dependent on its ability to maintain material capabilities that exceed those of competing states during inter-state war.[4] One offshoot of neorealism, neoclassical realism, argues that a state's ability to extract material capabilities from its intra-state society is directly related to 'the strength and structure of states relative to their societies, because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy'.[5] This establishes a competitive relationship between the state and its intra-state society over the control of resources, including labour, land, and capital.

Theorists of modern nationalism argue, in turn, that the centralisation of intra-state societies emerged as an attractive strategy for inter-state war because it gave states greater control of intra-state resources. European states were incentivized to converge around centralised states if they wanted to survive during inter-state war. 'Survival of the fittest' during inter-state war therefore pushed states towards centralisation by favouring 'military, extractive, administrative, and sometimes even distributive and productive organizations in a relatively coordinated central structure.'[6] Michael Mann defined the centralised state as, 'a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality… (where) political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a territorially

[4] (Waltz, 1979, pp. 97-99) (Tilly, 1992, p. 30)
[5] (Rose, 1998, p. 147)
[6] (Tilly, 1992, p. 21)

demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force'.[7]

Chapter 2 continues with the argument that success within centralised states became defined by access to the state institutions that were responses to inter-state war. State institutions are sources of political, economic, and social benefits with nation-states. The governing elites who centralised states have an incentive to maintain their privileged positions within its institutions as a result. Access to state institutions may become restricted to those who possess features of the governing elite. It is argued that their features become the basis for inclusion and success in the modern state. These features became mythologised as a 'national identity' within political nationalism. Conversely, if social power is derived from state institutions, the inclusion of individuals who are dissimilar to those in the national movement may threaten the status quo distribution of social power. Excluded groups are labelled as minorities. Minorities who are excluded from state institutions may have an incentivize to create their own nation-states as a means of restoring losses to their social power.

Chapter 3 *Research Methodology* translates the theoretical framework that was developed in Chapter 2 into a practicable research plan. First, the chapter details how the earlier, theoretical arguments around the connection between modern centralised states and political nationalism will be tested with a case study. The case study looks at the emergence of Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, as a minority nationalism within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1896. Political Zionism was developed by the 19th Century Jewish, political activist, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904). The case study will be discussed in detail below, but it will be narratively structured around

[7] (Mann, 2012b, p. 55)

three research questions which provide its analytical framework. The research questions are:

i) Can minority identities be an outcome of social exclusion from dominant national movements?

ii) Are minority individuals insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements? and,

iii) Do minority individuals attempt to restore their security by creating a new nation-state based on their shared minority identity?

The case study will be one means of testing the validity of this work's hypothesis. Additional direct evidence will be sought through the Discourse Analysis of Theodor Herzl's writings as the founder of Jewish political nationalism. The case study serves a secondary function of providing background context for the narratively lean output of Discourse Analysis. This will be in addition to their separate function as direct evidence for the hypothesis. Discourse Analysis is a rigorous, experimental methodology from the social sciences which 'examines patterns of discourse across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used'.[8] Discourse Analysis allows analysis of the language used by social groups to reveal their perceptions of themselves, others, their environments, and their actions. Discourse Analysis will be used to review a sample of Theodor Herzl's documentary resources from the mid 19th Century to the early 20th Century.

After presenting the hypothesis and its research questions, Chapter 3 will discuss the methodological suitability of Discourse Analysis for this work's purposes. Discourse Analysis allows researchers to analyse an author's discourse to reconstruct their identities and their social environments outside of their texts. One aspect of an author's

[8] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 196)

social context is their group identities. If discourse represents an author's complete social context, it should also be representative of their group perspectives.[9] The concept of identity relies on another field within Sociology known as Social Identity Theory. According to social theories of identity, identities are understandings and representations of oneself which emerge from processes 'of social interaction in which other people are defining a person to himself.'[10] In other words, individuals define themselves by internalising the perspectives that others have of them. They do so by taking on the roles given to them by the individuals, groups, and communities that are important to them and which are necessary for their continued existence.[11] This work argues that state institutions became social boundaries which defined inclusion in Viennese society. If Theodor Herzl experienced that he was excluded as a Jewish minority from Christian Austro-German nationalism, then his assigned minority identity should be represented in his written discourse according to Discourse Analysis. This supports the suitability of Discourse Analysis for this work's purposes.

Finally, Chapter 3 *Research Methodology* closes by outlining the steps of applying Discourse Analysis as a research methodology. These steps must be followed if results are to be experimentally valid. These steps include measures around sampling procedures, data collection, and data analysis. Chapter 3 concludes by establishing this work's adherence to the research principles of Discourse Analysis and the possible validity of its findings.

Section: Case Study: The Transformation of Theodor Herzl from a German Nationalist to Jewish Nationalist Between 1867 and 1896

[9] (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)
[10] (Blumer, 1969, p. 12)
[11] (Mead, 1934, p. 186) (Blumer, 1969, p. 13)

Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism when he called for a Jewish nation-state in 1896. Herzl's call to action cannot be separated from his life experiences as a Jew in late-19th Century Vienna. The life and work of Theodor Herzl require the context of a political system that was in transition from relatively inclusive political liberalism to exclusive, antisemitic, Christian, Austro-German nationalism. This section presents the story of the Habsburg Empire's German-assimilating Jews, and of Theodor Herzl, through the lens of this work's research questions.

The experience of Theodor Herzl and Vienna's German-assimilated Jews in the 19th Century will be divided into three chapters that document the rise and fall of Jewish inclusion in Austria. This section opens with *Chapter 4: Case Study: Part 1. Theodor Herzl and the Assimilation of Germanised Habsburg Jews into Austrian Society Between 1848-1879.* This chapter discusses the positive integration of Jews in the Habsburg Empire via German assimilation. Jewish assimilation is further subdivided into two periods. The 'emancipation' period covers 1848-1867 and saw the removal of legal obstacles to Jewish participation in Habsburg society. Theodor Herzl entered the world as an emancipated Jew. He was born in 1860 in Pest to a wealthy, Hungarian, commercial family. Emancipation was followed by a 'liberal golden age' for Austro-Hungarian Jews who experienced rapid upward social mobility as they gained opportunities in Habsburg society. This second period peaked in the 1870s before gradually declining after the emergence of Christian, Austro-German nationalism which undermined social and political liberalism.

Chapter 5: Case Study: Part 2. The Rise of Christian Austro-German Nationalism and the Exclusion of Jews in Vienna (1879-1896) continues with the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese and Austrian society by Christian, Austro-German nationalists. This phase is marked by the election of Karl Lueger as the antisemitic mayor of Vienna in 1895. Viennese, German-assimilated Jews went from being amongst the most

successful and integrated groups in the 1860s and 1870s to being threatened with absolute social exclusion from Christian, Austro-German nationalism by the 1890s. This work argues that this social shift may have happened as a side effect of inter-ethnic conflict within the centralised Habsburg Empire. Chapter 5 opens with the end of Vienna's Liberal Era after 1879 and the political rise of anti-liberal non-Germans and the lower classes in the 1880s. Inter-ethnic competition between Germans and non-Germans, in particular, threatened the established status of Germans within Cisleithanian politics. A German nationalist crisis manifested as social resistance by Cisleithanian Germans to loses to their longstanding prerogatives in political and social institutions. The symbolic 'otherness' of Jews combined with resentment towards their social success and competition to foster a Christian Austro-German national movement that was defined by antisemitism. This period covering the transition from Jewish integration to exclusion overlapped with Theodor Herzl's development in Vienna. This work argues that the experience of both social integration in the 1870s, and subsequent exclusion in the 1880s and 1890s, pushed Herzl from German nationalist to Jewish nationalist.

Finally, Theodor Herzl's shift towards Jewish nationalism came after Jews like himself were excluded from Christian, Austro-German nationalism. This social transformation is discussed in *Chapter 6: Case Study: Part 3. Theodor Herzl and the Creation of Political Zionism as a Response to Christian, Austro-German Political Antisemitism.* Herzl was greatly embittered by his rejection from Viennese society by Christian Austro-German nationalism and it was in this period that he began engaging the future of Jews in Europe, antisemitism, and Jewish nationalism. It was through his rejection from Austro-German society that Herzl came to perceive Jews as part of a single social and political people who needed a nation-state of their own. Herzl's experience of the 'Jewish problem', or nationalist antisemitism, manifested in a call for a separate Jewish nation-state in his political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat* (the Jewish State), in1896.

The case study provides the historical context for the following section which presents the same narrative in Theodor Herzl's own words via Discourse Analysis. Both sections corroborate one another, and together they lend support to this work's hypothesis around the social construction of minority national identities and nationalism after their exclusion from modern centralised state-societies.

Section: Discourse Analysis

The final section of this work applies the research methodology of Discourse Analysis to a sample of Theodor Herzl's primary documents. The earlier case study defends this work's hypothesis on the emergence of political Jewish nationalism, and its associated claims, through an historic narrative that is supported by authoritative, secondary and tertiary sources. Alternatively, the application of Discourse Analysis to Theodor Herzl's own writings will test this work's claims using the words of the founder of Political Zionism himself.

This dissertation primarily relies on three groups of Theodor Herzl's discourse. It analyses i) his literary characters' evolving social relationships in *Das Neue Ghetto* and *Altneuland*, ii) his self-reflections in his personal diaries, and iii) his explicit political ideologies that were presented in his political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat*, and in a limited selection of newspaper articles written for the Jewish nationalist newspaper, *Die Welt*.

Discourse Analysis allows researchers to analyse an author's discourse to reconstruct their identities and their social environments outside of their texts.[12] Analyses of Theodor Herzl's writings should allow this work to establish Herzl's understanding of his identity

[12] (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)

as an emancipated, German-assimilated, Jewish professional in 19th Century Vienna using a valid, social scientific methodology. Theodor Herzl's discourse will be used to argue that he saw himself as a Jewish minority in his relationships and interactions with his social environment. Furthermore, if discourse represents an author's complete social context, it should also be representative of their group identities.[13] Herzl's representations of his personal identity should therefore reflect the social identities of other, similar Viennese Jews. This would be important if Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism, as presented in *Der Judenstaat*, would be meaningful and attractive for other Viennese, Habsburg, and even European Jews outside of Herzl as an individual.

The Discourse Analysis of Theodor Herzl's writings is structured by this work's hypothesis and its associated research questions. Theodor Herzl came into adulthood in a modern, bureaucratically centralised, state-society as a successful, assimilated Habsburg subject. He personally experienced the transition of Jews from being partially, but significantly, integrated within Viennese society by 1879 to their subsequent antisemitic exclusion by the 1890s due to Christian, Austro-German nationalism. Herzl's life experiences overlap with this work's hypothetical claims that i) minority identities can be outcome of social exclusion from politically relevant national movements, and ii) minority individuals are socially insecure compared to individuals within dominant national movements. It is also claimed that Herzl's experiences of nationalist antisemitic exclusion motivated his decision to found political Jewish nationalism as the solution to the 'Jewish Problem'. This assertion aligns with the final hypothetical claim that minorities may be motivated to pursue their own nation-states to restore their security.

The section, Discourse Analysis, unfolds over four chapters which mirror the structure of the research questions and the case study. *Chapter 7. Discourse Analysis: Part 1.*

[13] (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)

Theodor Herzl's Representation of the Jewish Minority Identity in 19th Century Vienna opens the section. It will be argued that Herzl's representations of his identity as a Jew within the late 19th Century Vienna relied on his relationship to that society, i.e., his identity was not described as being independent of social relationships within the Viennese social complex. It is not sufficient for Herzl's identity to be socially defined for this work's purposes. He must also perceive himself, and other Jews, as social minorities who were being excluded from Viennese society via an antisemitic, Christian, Austro-German nationalism. *Chapter 8. Discourse Analysis: Part 2. Theodor Herzl and the Antisemitic Exclusion of Jews in Fin de Siècle Vienna* emphasises the changing relationship between German-assimilated Jews and Austro-German Christians in Vienna, Austria. Herzl's understanding of his identity was explicitly represented in his discourse through his diagnosis of modern antisemitism. Herzl constructed a narrative across his discourse which argued that Viennese Jews were integrated into a centralised, Habsburg state-society through the mid-19th Century. Jews were then excluded from the imperial capital in the second half of the 19th Century by a politically ascendant Austro-German nationalism. Herzl's experiences in Vienna and other European capitals led him to conclude that the antisemitic exclusion of Jews was a continent-wide phenomenon linked to the emergence of popular ethno-nationalisms within modern, centralised states. Theodor Herzl believed that the shared experience of contemporary, European antisemitism was driving not just Austrian Jews, but all European Jews, towards a shared minority identity. Chapter 8 ends with Theodor Herzl's early proposals on solving the Jewish Problem, or the exclusion of Jews from modern societies by antisemitic national movements.

Finally, *Chapter 9. Discourse Analysis: Part 3. Political Zionism and Theodor Herzl's Vision of the Modern, Jewish Nation-State* and *Chapter 10. Discourse Analysis: Part 4. Theodor Herzl's Vision of a Popular Jewish National Identity* trace Theodor Herzl's discursive journey as he processed the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Vienna,

Austria, and Europe at large. These closing chapters argue that Herzl's visions for a future Jewish nation-state and his concept of the Jewish national identity, were patterned on the modern, centralised Habsburg state and Christian Austro-German nationalism, respectively. This work argues that one theoretical contribution of Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism was his belief that the nation-state was a combination of modern, bureaucratically centralised, and capitalist state-societies that were hierarchically organised around ethno-national identities. Both elements were necessary in Theodor Herzl's representations of his future Jewish nation-state. Altogether, the arguments in this third and final section support this dissertation's hypothesis on the relationship amongst i) the centralisation of modern states, ii) the characteristics of the national movements that subsequently emerge, and iii) the motivation for minority nationalisms by groups who are excluded from dominant political nationalisms in those societies.

Section: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This dissertation explores the motivations of a minority ethnic group within an existing, modern state to become nationalist. It hypothesizes that subjective minority nationalism may be motivated by their exclusion from modern centralised states by politically powerful, ethno-nationalisms. It considers the case of Theodor Herzl who founded Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, in 1896 while he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Theodor Herzl developed Political Zionism as a response to the exclusive, antisemitic politics of Christian Austro-German nationalism in the imperial capital of Vienna after the 1880s.

This work's hypothesis implies a number of assumptions which have to be positioned within the existing literature. There are three interconnected theoretical assumptions to be addressed. The first assumption is that the nationalisation of intra-state societies was an effective strategy for inter-state war. Theories of modern nationalism claim that inter-state war had a predictable effect on the interests and structure on states. The nationalisation of states emerged as a dominant strategy for the conduct of inter-state war and encouraged states to become modern and centralised. The modern centralisation of states transformed the domestic intra-state relationships within nationalised societies by empowering the centralised state relative to its intra-state society. This work does not directly address the events of inter-state war which may have motivated the modern centralisation of the states it considers, namely the creation of the modern Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It uses these theories as a background

assumption when discussing modern, 19th Century Austro-Hungarian political and other social systems.

One important note on terminology is that this dissertation uses the term 'modern centralised states' in place of 'nationalised states' to avoid confusion. This work distinguishes between the coordination of state-societies via centralised political, military, economic, and ideological power, which is sometimes called 'nationalisation'[14], and the subjective perceptions of ethnic groups about their relationship with, or ownership of, state societies, which is known as 'nationality' or the 'nation'.[15] 'Nationalism' is a modern political concept which argues 'that the political and national unit should be congruent.'[16] In other words, 'nationalism' argues that 'nationalised' states should be governed by a 'nation'. To avoid confusion, this work separates the more objective processes of modern state centralisation from the subjective concept of nationality and the political ideology of nationalism.

The above discussion leads into this work's second theoretical assumption. This dissertation argues that the modern centralisation of states may have facilitated modern national identities. Modern nationalists agree that governing elites centralised societies when they imposed uniform 'languages, religions, currencies, legal systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transport, and communication.'[17] Modern nationalists also argue that the resulting social homogenization of intra-state societies was the basis for a shared national culture or national identity.[18] This work takes a number of implicit arguments around nationality from a range of modern nationalist academics and makes it an explicit assumption of its

[14] (Mann, 2012b, p. 55)
[15] (Smith, 1995, p. 57)
[16] (Gellner, 2009, p. 1)
[17] (Tilly, 1992, p. 100)
[18] (Mann, 2012a, p. 436)

hypothesis. This work argues that the choices that governing elites made during the modern centralisation of states may have biased inclusion and success within the state towards the features of its governing elites. They could do this because they controlled the state's institutions, including its political, military, economic, and ideological institutions. Differential access to state institutions may have created different pathways for social inclusion and success depending on someone's alignment with the features of the founding, governing elite. The choices of governing elites during modern centralisation may have sorted the intra-state population into a hierarchical society depending on someone's relative overlap with the elite-biased, distribution of power. The governing elite may have consciously, or subconsciously, laid the foundations for later subjective perceptions of national belonging, or 'nationality', in their state-societies. Conventional theorists of modern nationalism, like Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, discuss these processes but they treat modern state centralisation and the emergence of political nationalism as a single, continuous step. This work disaggregates these processes into intermediary steps so it can analyse interactions within intra-state societies. Namely, it looks at the interactions between those who were relatively more included within a modern state's institutions, or those who went on to define its dominant subjective nationality, and those who were relatively excluded, who this work refers to as 'minorities'.

It is finally assumed that if state institutions can be biased towards groups with social features that align with the pre-existing, military-political, state elites, then they may become the catalyst for exclusive national identities and their political nationalisms. If social power is derived from access to state institutions, the inclusion of individuals who are dissimilar to historic governing elites may threaten the status quo distribution of social power in the modern state-society. The threat of competition from minorities may therefore justify their exclusion from state institutions, and ultimately, from the state itself via political nationalism. One prominent theorist of minority, or small-nation, nationalism,

Miroslav Hroch, also argued that secessionist, minority nationalism may result from the material struggle between groups based on their ethno-linguistic differences.[19] This work argues that those ethno-linguistic differences may have been embedded in state institutions before the emergence of subjective, self-conscious nationalisms. This may have biased the state towards specific national outcomes. This final claim also suggests that minorities who are excluded from political nationalisms may have an incentivize to create their own modern nation-states as a means of restoring losses to their social power. Theories of group identity, including citizenship, will be utilized to support this claim that emergent minority nationalisms may be an outcome of the emergence of political nationalism in existing states. Altogether, this chapter presents one theoretical explanation for the emergence of secessionist, minority nationalisms in modern centralised states which were shifting towards exclusive political nationalisms.

2.2 Modern State Centralisation and Inter-State War

2.2.1 Introduction

Theories of modern nationalism claim that modern centralised states were historically recent phenomenon which emerged from new military, political, and economic opportunities. This work relies on the assumption that state centralisation was a novel strategy for inter-state war and it will justify its selection over the alternatives. Next, theories of modern state centralisation will be explored in depth to understand the relationship amongst the modern state, inter-state war, and the structure of intra-state society. After establishing the relationship amongst these elements, the following section will argue that both political nationalisms, and minority identities, may have been products of the modern centralisation of states.

[19] (Hroch, 2000, p. 185)

This section argues that neorealist theories of international relations and some modernist theories of nationalism share important assumptions on the relationship between inter-state war and the creation of modern, centralised states. Both groups of theories claim that states have an interest in their own survival. These theories also claim that the greatest threat to the survival of states is inter-state war. They continue that states defend their survival using resources they extract from their intra-state systems. This suggests that intra-state systems are regulated by states' efforts 'to acquire the means of war and preparation for war'.[20] Changes to the structure of intra-state systems may therefore be motivated by states' defence of their survival in the inter-state system. One such transformation of intra-state systems may have been the transition from the feudal era to the national era if these theories are to be accepted.

Modernist theories of nationalism argue that the nationalisation of the state was an emergent strategy that bolstered states' military effectiveness during inter-state war. The nationalisation of states for military purposes restructured intra-state systems by creating centrally administered, contiguous societies. Michael Mann defined the nationalised state as, 'a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality… (where) political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force'.[21] Centralised intra-state systems integrated their populations into their modern societies. The creation of centralised states transferred its population's political and social relations to the level of the state, while also empowering the state over these relations. These changes to the objective relationships within centralised states are claimed to be the foundation for subsequent subjective experiences of nationalism that will be discussed in a following section.

[20] (Tilly, 1992, p. 14)
[21] (Mann, 2012b, p. 55)

This section first defines the features of the pre-national state. Neorealism and modern nationalism claim that the core features of states, and their inter-state systems, existed for centuries before states were nationalised. Centralisation was merely an emergent strategy for survival in a belligerent inter-state system, albeit a strategy that became globally dominant. Defining the pre-centralised state will help explain why centralisation was an attractive strategy for survival during inter-state war. This chapter will then discuss how the transition towards modern states transformed the domestic intra-state relationships within centralised societies.

2.2.2 Pre-Centralised States in Modern Nationalism

Modern nationalism's concept of the general state, or pre-centralised state, must be established before it can be used to analyse the emergence of modern states. This section defines the general state and its constituent elements according to modern nationalism. Theories of modern nationalism emerged from the field of sociology and are distinct from theories of international relations.[22] Many sociological theories of modern nationalism still share neorealism's focus on inter-state war and its effects on state politics. Analysing centralisation with both theories of modern nationalism and neorealism is theoretically consistent because they share assumptions.[23] The richly detailed historical accounts found in sociological research may even provide empirical context for international relations' abstract theorising. Neorealism claims that its 'Balance-of-power politics prevails wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive'.[24] The modern nationalists referenced in this work agree with neorealism that the ordering

[22] (Lawson & Shilliam, 2010, p. 69)
[23] (Lawson & Shilliam, 2010, pp. 71-74)
[24] (Waltz, 1979, p. 121)

principle of the inter-state system between the 15th and 20th Centuries was anarchical. They also agree that states within this system were functionally identical with a responsibility for their own survival. Finally, they argue that a state's survival into the modern era was dependent on its ability to boost its material capabilities via the nationalisation of their states.[25]

Similar to neorealism's Kenneth Waltz, the sociologist and modern nationalist, Charles Tilly, defined states as, 'organizations that controlled the principal concentrated means of coercion within delimited territories, and exercised priority in some respects over all other organizations acting within the territories.'[26] Tilly's definition of the state lacks both the historical claims of primordial nationalists, and the contemporary social roles popularly associated with states. For Tilly, 'state structure appeared chiefly as a by-product of rulers' efforts to acquire the means of war and preparation for war.'[27] Tilly argued that states use their monopoly on the legitimate use of violence for three primary purposes. 'State-making' and 'War-making' use violence to maintain sovereignty within and without the state, respectively. 'Protection' is the defence against rivals to the state's existing rulers and their allies. Tilly adds a fourth ancillary activity for states of 'Extraction', which involves extracting the means to conduct the first three activities from a subject population.[28] Michael Mann concurs with Tilly's concept of the state when he claims that 'external defence and aggression, and the preservation of basic public order, were the overwhelming public functions' of states across European history'.[29]

Tilly's and Mann's concept of the state suggests that inter-state and intra-state systems simultaneously emerged when owners of violence established exclusive territorial zones

[25] (Waltz, 1979, pp. 97-99) (Tilly, 1992, p. 30)
[26] (Tilly, 1992, p. 5)
[27] (Tilly, 1992, p. 14)
[28] (Tilly, 1992, p. 97)
[29] (Mann, 2012a, p. 423)

to extract resources for their own benefit. They allocated some of those resources to defend their exclusive zones from other domestic claimants in the intra-state system. States formed inter-state systems to the extent that they defended their exclusive intra-state systems from other states through inter-state war.[30] Theorists of modern nationalism argue that a state's domestic structures, including its political mechanisms for extracting resources, were motivated by its interest in survival during inter-state war. Tilly summarized this crucial link between inter-state war and the structure of the domestic state-society in his famous quote, 'war made the state, and the state made war'.[31] This aligns with a core assumption of neorealism that a state's survival in the inter-state system is dependent on its accumulated intra-state resources. The offshoot of neorealism, neoclassical realism, goes further and explicitly connects inter-state war to domestic political structures when it argues that a state's survival is directly related to 'the strength and structure of states relative to their societies, because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy'.[32] The structure of the intra-state society, and specifically the extractive relationships between the state and its subject population, cannot be understood without the context of inter-state war.

State-societies may be motivated and regulated by the state's need to extract material resources for inter-state war. At the same time, such definitions of the state do not define the nature of the extractive relationship between the state and its population; It only means that an extractive relationship exists to fund the state's use of violence. Theorists of modern nationalism rely on historical accounts to claim that states were synonymous with the elites who founded and controlled them. The elite's identities and interests were equivalent to those of the state. Tilly argued that through the 20th Century, 'national interest synthesized the interests of the dominant classes.'[33] International relations and

[30] (Tilly, 1992, pp. 131-132)
[31] (Tilly, 1975, p. 42)
[32] (Rose, 1998, p. 147)
[33] (Tilly, 1992, p. 185)

sociology both assume that an actor's identity interacts with their interests to cause their actions.[34] A state's relationship to its population during extraction can be defined using the identities and interests of its state-controlling elite. Tilly claims that every ruler of a state 'who controlled substantial coercive means tried to maintain a secure area within which he could enjoy the returns of coercion, plus a fortified buffer zone … to protect the secure area.'[35] The elite-state's interests were distinct from, and opposed to, the needs and interests of the general population. The state's interest was the maintenance and expansion of the elite's disproportionate wealth. The survival of the state equated to the continuation of the elite's advantaged position in the inter-state and intra-state social systems.[36] This is why Tilly defines 'protection', or the defence against rivals to the state's existing rulers and their allies, as a core activity of the state. Tilly is arguing that the state is not merely an abstract institution that conducts inter-state war on behalf of a population but is a distinct class who uses violence to extract resources from subjugated populations. Elites only use a portion of the state's resources to defend their accumulated wealth from domestic and external rivals. The state's secure centre is occupied by the state's elite, while the wider population resides in a physical and social 'provincial buffer' between the state and its rivals. Mann affirms Tilly's views when he claimed that the centralised state may include a set of governing institutions, but it is also the specific people who control those institutions. Historically, access to the state was legally and socially limited to a homogenous, closed elite.[37] For example, under the United States Constitution (1787) elected federal positions in the state government were open to citizens, but in the 18th Century, voting franchise was denied to large portions of the population and this effectively excluded them from the state.[38] Black men did not gain the right to vote until the 15th Amendment (1870), and women until the 19th

[34] (Theys, 2018, p. 2) (Hopf, 1998, p. 176)
[35] (Tilly, 1992, p. 184)
[36] (Tilly, 2015, p. 68)
[37] (Mann, 2012a, p. 436)
[38] (Tillman, 2021, p. 3)

Amendment (1920). Access to state offices was directly correlated to a class's voting rights.[39] This had the effect of limiting participation in the state to a restricted, elite class of American White men who had an interest in reproducing their privileged social status into subsequent generations.[40] Each state-society is assumed to have its own unique, self-interested, ruling elite.

This work retains the distinction between the state and it subjects during its analyses of intra-state systems. It is more familiar to view the state as a unitary actor because political analyses of states frequently focus on inter-state relations, and the state is the only relevant actor at that level of analysis. Conventional international relations treat states as unitary actors during inter-state war because states are the only legitimate users of violence in the inter-state system.[41] The state's domination of its domestic society, via its monopoly on legitimate violence, is a pre-requisite to its conduct of inter-state war. This makes other sub-state actors irrelevant in the inter-state system. Alternatively, the domestic state-society should be disaggregated during analyses of intra-state systems, and distinctions should be made between the state and other groups during sub-state analyses.[42] Intra-sate systems may be dominated by an elite state, but this domination must be continuously maintained. Intra-states systems are composed of distinct actors with competing identities and interests. According to modern nationalism, intra-state relationships between the state and its society are regulated by the demands of inter-state war. Even before centralisation, historical records show that European political systems were motivated by inter-state war. States used their authority to extract resources for military purposes that were already used and valued by subject populations, including their manpower, food, land, and other raw materials.[43] The

[39] (Congressional Black Caucas Foundation, 2024), (Center for American Women and Politics, 2024)
[40] (Schaeffer, 2020)
[41] (Waltz, 1979, p. 118)
[42] (Waltz, 1979, p. 118)
[43] (Tilly, 1992, p. 131)

general population had a competing interest in retaining control over the maximum amount of their resources. The state's extractions for inter-state war politicized their subjects' social lives and led to bargaining over the conditions through which the state could extract resources.[44] The state's monopoly on violence was generally insufficient to extract the necessary resources from its population using force alone. The state used its disproportionate coercive and social power to favourably negotiate further extractions from its subject population. These unequal negotiations formalized the relationship between the dominant state and its subordinate subjects as 'legal citizenship', or the accumulations of rights and obligations that subjects have *vis-à-vis* the state.[45] The negotiated rights, privileges, and obligations of citizenship may therefore be an observable proxy for the hierarchical intra-state relationships between the state and its subjects as distinct parties.

Some sociologists, including Mann, disagree with maintaining the distinction between state and society into the modern era because they argue that when citizens gained representative rights in the state that the state then became an extension of its population without separate interests.[46] It is a common idea in political theory that nationalism merged the class of 'political' citizens, who had governing rights in the state, with the class of 'legal' citizens, who had general legal rights and obligations.[47] Mann cited Marshall who claimed that nation-states ultimately offered inclusive civil, political, and social rights of citizenship.[48] This work claims, and will attempt to demonstrate, that the historical centralisation of states could be biased towards the governing elite. These biases persisted across generations. Elites defined and controlled access to state institutions at the time of their creation. They were strongly incentivised to maintain their

[44] (Mann, 2012b, p. 250)
[45] (Bellamy, 2008, pp. 42-44)
[46] (Mann, 2012b, p. 44)
[47] (Bellamy, 2008, p. 43)
[48] (Mann, 2012b, pp. 19-20)

positions in those institutions by limiting or biasing access to their own class. These biases defined the possibilities for inclusion and exclusion in different state-societies. Even Mann conceded that despite the extensions of privileges to wider populations that the old elites maintained disproportionate power into the 20th Century because they were embedded in the state's political institutions at the time of centralisation.[49] Even today, nation-states with ostensibly equal national citizenship continue to reflect real, disproportionate biases in political, economic, and social power that favours the founding elite. For example, before the Bolivian Indigenous Revolution in 1852, the powerful White elite (10% of the population) had already nationalised Bolivian society around their political and economic systems, and European language. Despite the subsequent extension of political rights to the majority mixed and indigenous populations, the White population continues to disproportionately benefit from Bolivian national society because they defined the terms for success in the Bolivian nation at its creation.[50]

This section argued that states had an interest in survival during inter-state war even before the creation of nationalised states. Pre-centralised states existed in an anarchical inter-state system. They were responsible for their own survival. Their survival was dependent on the relative distribution of material capabilities amongst competing states. States are not considered to be abstract mechanisms for the extraction of material resources to be used in inter-state war, though. They are defined as the specific, elite-populations invested with the monopoly over these activities. The centralisation of states emerged as one strategy to boost a state's material capabilities because it gave the state direct, unmediated control over a territory, its population, and its resources. Centralisation empowered the state elite relative to its intra-state society, and it

[49] (Mann, 2012b, p. 65)
[50] (Alesina, Easterly, Devleeschauwer, & Kurlat, 2003, p. 16)

subsequently restructured contests for power within that system. The emergence and spread of modern, centralised states will be considered in the following section.

2.2.3 Theories of Modern Nationalism and the Centralisation of States

Having established a working definition for modern nationalism's concept of a general state, this work can now discuss how modern nationalism explains the emergence of centralised states specifically. Modern nationalism disagrees with other theories that nationalism was the outcome of spontaneously emergent, subjective national consciousnesses. Marshall is credited with defining 'the standard narrative of the evolution of modern citizenship'.[51] Marshall used the British experience to argue that citizenship was the product of interrelated processes of 'state-building, the emergence of commercial and industrial society, and the construction of a national consciousness'.[52] The centralisation of states restructured social relations and resulted in a succession of class struggles which made popular nationalism possible.[53] Marshall's arguments imply that societies had to be centralised before their populations could experience feelings of national identity. His argument supports concepts of modern nationalism over primordial national identities and their variations. Similarly, the sociologist Miroslav Hroch studied dozens of national movements in his work, 'Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe', and he found that nowhere was nationalist agitation sufficient by itself 'to bring the national movement successfully into the mass phase.'[54] Hroch argued that the modern nation-state represented an objective shift in the reality of European intra-state societies. The popular national movements that were observed in the 19th and 20th Centuries are claimed to be reactions to the centralised economic

[51] (Bellamy, 2008, p. 45)
[52] (Bellamy, 2008, p. 46)
[53] (Bellamy, 2008, p. 47)
[54] (Hroch, 2000, p. 178)

and political processes that began centuries earlier.[55] Popular nationalism was a manifestation of underlying political, economic, and social intra-state relationships between the state and its subjects. In Hroch's words, popular nationalism only became possible because of 'the objective relations constituted by … the general social transformation … of capitalist society.'[56] Hroch observed that nationalist 'self-recognition moved through broader and broader layers of the population, travelling in the same direction as the transformation of feudal into capitalist society'.[57] Hroch focuses on centralised economies and does not directly connect them to inter-state war, but if the state was motivated by inter-state war, while simultaneously being necessary for the creation of centralised economies, then it is possible to link these two activities. Modern nationalists argue that domestic state policy is motivated by rulers' efforts to acquire the means of war and to prepare for war. The state was needed to facilitate, regulate, and support the transition towards capitalism but it would only do so if capitalism supported the state's survival in the inter-state system. Tilly argued that if a state's military capacity in the inter-state system is limited by its domestic resources, then the state has an incentive to regulate and grow its economy as the source of those resources. He claims that nationalised economies increased a state's resources, and this made nationalisation an effective strategy in inter-state war.[58] Altogether, this suggests a link between inter-state war, the objective transformations of intra-state social relationships via the centralisation of the modern state, and the subsequent subjective experience of nationalism by its population.

[55] (Hroch, 2000, p. 178)
[56] (Hroch, 2000, p. 178)
[57] (Hroch, 2000, p. 10)
[58] (Tilly, 1992, p. 186)

Centralised States and the Intra-State System

The modern centralisation of states for military purposes restructured intra-state systems by creating centrally administered, contiguous societies. This increased the density of social interactions within intra-state systems and created organic societies. Michael Mann defined the nationalised state as, 'a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality… (where) political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force.'[59] Before centralisation, populations 'lived predominantly in local or regional power networks.'[60] The creation of centralised states transferred the population's political and social relations to the level of the state. Centralised societies were larger than their predecessors, but contemporary technological and administrative limitations placed upper limits on their possible sizes.[61] State borders represented the limitations of the state's reach, and they cut populations off from direct relationships with other inter-state powers and societies. Using Mann's terminology, centralised societies physically and socially caged populations within the modern state.[62]

Societies were centralised through a range of activities that were in service to inter-state war. One thing that these activities had in common was that they empowered the state relative to its society. As mentioned previously, centralisation started with the expansion of state-level military conscription and taxation. Taxation funded the military, while the military enforced tax collection. Centralised conscription and taxation legitimised the direct, unmediated authority of the state over its population. National militaries and taxation also required extensive physical infrastructure. This infrastructure had its own

[59] (Mann, 2012b, p. 55)
[60] (Mann, 2012b, p. 20)
[61] (Tilly, 1992, p. 39)
[62] (Mann, 2012b, p. 20)

independent, integrative effects on the intra-state population. Finally, the state's interest in maximizing its domestic resources gave it a role in managing the centralised economy. The state's involvement in facilitating and governing a capitalist economy gave the state power over its subjects' economic welfare and relationships. The creation of territorially defined national economies also gave populations a material interest in the success and performance of their states versus other states. Altogether, the centralisation of the state had practical implications for the lives of its subjects because it created an intra-state society where major aspects of social life were anchored to an elite-led, hierarchical, centralised state whose primary interest was its own survival.[63]

The most immediate experience of nationalisation for many populations was the shift to direct monetary taxation and military conscription by the state. The demands of inter-state war incentivised states to increase their available resources by expanding the direct taxation and conscription of their populations. Direct taxation and conscription, administered by a permanent bureaucracy, established the authority of the state over society. States did so by increasing the 'extractive bulk' of the state through 'the development of new state bureaucracies and administrations.'[64] Bureaucracies were embedded amongst the general population and formed a direct link between the population and the centralised state. In previous eras, taxation for wars was extracted through limited, intermittent appeals for specific conflicts.[65] The enlarged costs of war in the nationalist era meant that taxation and debt repayments extended into peacetime. Taxation, and the bureaucracies that administered it, became permanent features in the lives of civilians. The creation of standing armies had a similar effect.[66]

[63] (Mann, 2012a, p. 436)
[64] (Mann, 2012a, p. 433)
[65] (Mann, 2012b, p. 66)
[66] (Tilly, 1992, p. 89)

Centralised bureaucracies and militaries required extensive infrastructure. This infrastructure is associated with the state's modern civilian functions but were initially built for military and administrative purposes.[67] For example, the state established communication networks between its centre and periphery to coordinate its military and bureaucracies. These communication networks included postal services and telegraphy. Similar logic lay behind transportation infrastructure. This was used for the movement of the state's personnel and resources via roads, railways, and river systems. Even social infrastructure, like state education and healthcare, were originally limited to military officers and civil servants.[68] National infrastructure may have been established to facilitate inter-state war, but they were adaptable for civilian use. In Tilly's words, the 'militarisation' of intra-state societies made their 'civilianisation' possible.[69] Access to national infrastructure provided social and material benefits and this made it desirable to the general population. At the same time, infrastructure was controlled by the state, and this gave it power over society. Infrastructure would become an important integrative and homogenising tool for state governments to dominate their populations.

State infrastructure was costly, and the state was incentivised to maximize its efficiency in a competitive inter-state system. State infrastructure required territorial contiguity to be efficient. This contrasted with previous political eras where powerful states could exist as patchwork collections of territories that were spread across the European continent, and beyond. The efficiency of centralised administration and infrastructure led states to emphasize their core homelands versus their far-flung provinces. For example, until the 15th Century, the Duchy of Burgundy had many of the features of powerful modern states, including supreme legal authority and an effective fiscal-military regime, but the inefficiency of its territorial discontinuity led to its demise in the inter-state system.[70]

[67] (Mann, 2012a, p. 437)
[68] (Berenger, 1997, pp. 226-227)
[69] (Tilly, 1992, p. 122)
[70] (Mann, 2012a, pp. 18, 438)

Centrally administered and contiguous states restructured the intra-state system by increasing the density of social interactions within society compared to interactions outside of it. Physical and social contiguity within defined territories facilitated feelings of attachment and identification between populations and their state-societies. Again, this was an instance where bureaucratic and military incentives supported the social and physical centralisation of intra-state populations.

Finally, a state's gross domestic product is relevant to the state because it represents the resources that may be extracted for inter-state conflict through taxation. Through historical trial-and-error, states learned that its taxable resources were maximised if they had 'access to a combination of large rural populations, capitalists, and relatively commercialised economies... They set the terms of war, and their form of state became'[71] dominant. This was for two reasons. Tilly argued that taxes on liquid, or money-based, economies yielded higher returns than feudalism's illiquid, tribute-based economies.[72] Tilly also argued that capitalist economies were not just more efficient to tax than feudal economies, but also presented more opportunities for growing, and taxing, the economy.[73] Together, these reasons led nationalising states to favour capitalism over other economic systems.

States began directly protecting, supporting, and coordinating capitalist economies to expand their tax bases for military purposes. Capitalism is frequently synonymous with the lack of government intervention, but 'capitalism has always required the state to implement and sustain it. The free market and the free enterprise are not literally free; they are embedded in a legal order and regulated by the state.'[74] Intra-state commerce required the state to draft uniform legal systems which they enforced using its monopoly

[71] (Tilly, 1992, p. 58)
[72] (Tilly, 1992, p. 89)
[73] (Tilly, 1992, pp. 88-89)
[74] (Harris & Delanty, 2023, p. 339)

on violence. For example, in growing urban areas, the state regulated and guaranteed private-property transactions and commercial contracts. Inter-state trade also required the state's protection. As early as the 13th Century, England established customs and excise duties on exports. These taxes funded the state's navy which, in turn, protected its overseas traders. Spain and France followed England's lead.[75] The state's regulation of capitalist markets, trade and property 'gave the state new resources that it could use to enhance its own power', while fundamentally restructuring the population's relationships to one another, and to the means of production.[76] State-backed capitalism restructured intra-society by commoditizing labour and production which freed labourers from feudal estates. It extended private property rights which also redefined the relationship between people and the lands they inhabited. Finally, the state's fiscal and monetary policies integrated the population into national, and inter-national, commercial markets and away from local barter systems.[77] The state's power over these systems allowed it to favour its interests over those of the population. It cannot be neglected that the state's motivation to regulate the economy was based on the state's interest in its own survival during inter-state war. Norbert Elias argued that the link between national tax revenues and the national military forged a mutual dependency between the two. Elias concluded that the national economy and the national military would not exist with one another, and they must be jointly understood.[78]

Conclusion

This section argued that states pursuing their interest of survival in an anarchical inter-state system incentivized them to maximize the intra-state resources under their control. Modernist nationalists claimed that the preparation for inter-state war, including the

[75] (Mann, 2012a, p. 427)
[76] (Mann, 2012a, p. 423) p.423)
[77] (Harris & Delanty, 2023)
[78] (Elias, 1982, p. 104)

extraction of resources from their territories and populations, created the states' domestic structures. At the same time, these theorists argued that state structures are dominated by the prevailing elites who claimed control over them. Centralisation was one strategy for inter-state war that increased the available resources of states, but it simultaneously increased the power of state institutions, and of the elites who controlled them, over their subject populations. The newfound centrality of state institutions had the effect of creating hierarchical, centralised state societies which were biased towards the interests of dominant elites. The state's biases towards its governing elites may have defined the criteria of future national identities which defined the rights of individuals to belong and succeed within modern centralised societies. The creation of exclusive, hierarchical institutions will be considered in the following section.

2.3 The Transition from Centralised State Societies to Subjective Nationalism

2.3.1 Theories of Nationalism

A central claim of this work's hypothesis is that the modern centralisation of states, the concept of modern national identities, and the political ideology of 'nationalism', are all recent historical innovations. Most mainstream scholars accept that nation-states are modern developments which 'appeared in the last two centuries and are the products of … the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state … (and) modern processes like capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, (and) secularism.'[79] These domestic processes are often theorized to be responses to inter-state conflict.[80] Modern state centralisation may have motivated these military, political, and economic transformations. The political unit, or the state, gained unmediated, centralised control of a territory, its population, and its resources through modern centralisation. This work

[79] (Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 72)
[80] (Tilly, 1992, p. 137)

hypothesises that one outcome of state centralisation is the definition of a state's national unit, or 'nation' via political nationalism. The 'nation' emerges as 'named human population, sharing a (connection to a) territory, common myths, historical memories, a public culture, a common economy and legal rights and duties for all its members'.[81]

While theorists have formed a consensus around the modernity of the nation-state as a political unit, there is a stark divide on the origins of the underlying national populations and their national identities. The majority of theorists have coalesced around the modernity of the nation. 'Modernists', as they are known, claim that self-conscious nations are 'wholly modern, dating from around the period of the French Revolution at the earliest, driven by the set of socio-economic and political changes that followed in the nineteenth century'.[82] Furthermore, they argue that there was nothing inevitable in the rise of specific ethnic identities and their transformation into nationalisms. The nation did not arise from intrinsic biological or cultural differences between peoples from this perspective.[83] The ideological nation is the by-product of the social transformations that accompanied modernism according to modernists. John Breuilly, Paul Brass, Eric Hobsbawm, and Ernest Gellner, amongst others, argued that evolutions in inter-state war incentivised the commoditization of labour during industrialization, and the liberalization of politics following the Enlightenment and French Revolution. These social changes bolstered states' military effectiveness but also posed a problem for elite ruling classes who were responsible for inter-state conflict. They had to find new ways to legitimise their authority over society after the decline of their traditional governing institutions, like religion and absolute monarchy. Modern nationalists argued that the nation was an eventual answer to this problem. State elites invented or selected cultural markers to differentiate their populations from others. The sequestration of populations

[81] (Smith, 1995, p. 57)
[82] (Coakely, 2018, p. 332)
[83] (Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 148)

into centralise states facilitated their control over their defined societies.[84] The sense of belonging to these societies, or 'nationality', became the basis for the nation-state, and importantly from a theoretical standpoint, were constructed after the creation of the modern state.

The strength of modern nationalism versus its alternatives is its empirical observability. For example, John Breuilly, in 'Nationalism and the State', reviewed thirty individual cases of modern nationalism and found that they followed the pattern outlined above.[85] Miroslav Hroch separately reviewed the development of nationalism in dozens of smaller European populations.[86] He also consistently observed that nationalism came after modern political and economic evolutions in European societies. This work emphasises a distinction between the modern processes which were used to centralise states before the 19th Century, which is commonly called 'nationalisation'. 'Nationalism' will refer to later political movements within already centralised states when citizens demanded political and social rights based on their concept of shared identities. 'Nationalism' is frequently used as a comprehensive term to refer to both periods, even within modern nationalism, but they represent distinct eras in the development of modern nation-states.

The main alternative to the modernists is a diminishing but prominent group of theorists known as 'primordialists' who argue that nations pre-date modernity and are 'prior to all experience and interaction … and are 'natural' or 'spiritual', rather than sociological'.[87] Primordialists argue that the concept of the nation is intrinsic and recurrent to human society across time. These theorists concede that the political ideology of nationalism is a modern phenomenon but argue that human organization into nation-states was the natural, historical culmination for pre-existing nationalities. Primordialists explain group

[84] (Ozkirimli, 2010, pp. 86-87)
[85] (Breuilly, 1994)
[86] (Hroch, 2000)
[87] (Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 55)

solidarity via 'primordial' ties which ‘bind’ people together. For example, Pierre van den Berghe argues for 'sociobiological' nationalism. He claims that the nation has a pre-existing, objective basis, ‘defined by common descent and maintained by endogamy’.[88] Van de Berghe argues that reciprocity is more commonly observed amongst kin groups in nature, while competition is more prevalent between family groups. For genetic primordialists, contemporary nations are the descendants of these ancient kin groups. Other primordialists base national solidarity on perceived cultural similarities such as language, religion, territory and kinship, as reflected in the work of Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz.[89] Cultural primordialists claim that collective beliefs in national cultural bonds are an ancient idea which predates the nation state. Nations cater for the fundamental needs of human beings to locate themselves in time and place and to belong to something sacred and are thus part and parcel of human existence.[90]

Finally, ‘ethno-symbolist’ nationalists occupy the theoretical space between modernist and primordial nationalism. Anthony D. Smith is a prominent contributor to this school. Smith accepted the modern emergence of nation-states but he argued that, ‘modern nations cannot be understood without taking pre-existing ethnic components into account, the lack of which is likely to create serious impediments to nation-building’.[91] For Smith, nations ‘emerged from efforts to cope with problems of modernity through rediscovery, reinterpretation and political exploitation of ethnic symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions’.[92] Smith argues that pre-existing ethnicities were the only identity capable of supporting political nationalism and ‘the role of modernization was more that of a catalyst than of an initiating or driving force behind the rise of nations and nationalism. This also implies that it is not possible to invent just any identity, or

[88] (Van den Berghe, 2005, p. 114)
[89] (Ozkirimli, 2010, pp. 55-58)
[90] (Ichijo & Uzelac, 2005, p. 51)
[91] (Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 148)
[92] (Coakely, 2018, p. 6)

weld together any heterogeneous population. Nations are not invented, but historically constituted'.[93]

Primordialist and ethno-symbolist theories of nationalism face shared criticisms from modern nationalists. Modernists do not deny that 'social groups have always asserted a collective identity, (or that they used these identities to) distinguish themselves from other groups.'[94] Modernists contend that one cannot conflate these shared identities with the modern nation-state. Some pre-modern identities may have resembled modern nations along many criteria but this is distinct from the intentional construction of the political nation-state system.[95] Another critique of primordialism and ethno-symbolism from a modernist perspective is that its practitioners inaccurately project modern national identities and concepts on to historical, pre-centralised societies. Human societies may have always formed around collective identities but not necessarily the identities that became nations. Primordialists selectively project the features of specific modern nations to past communities to make the case that nations always existed as natural social forms. Anthropologists reject the false primacy that primordialists and ethno-symbolists place on some cultural or genetic characteristics across time, while ignoring others. As evidence, anthropologists present profiles of pre-modern communities who were socially organized around different criteria than those selected by primordialists and ethno-symbolists; in other words, there was nothing inherently significant in the cultural markers emphasized by ethno-symbolists and primordialists as necessary for the creation of the nation-state, and these features only gained significance after states

[93] (Coakely, 2018, p. 6)
[94] (Hobsbawm, 2005, p. 80)
[95] (Hobsbawm, 2005, p. 80)

2.3.2 The Relationship Between Historic State Centralisation and Emergent Political Nationalisms

Introduction

Modern nationalists claim that inter-state war restructured intra-state societies. This section considers how the restructuring of intra-state societies via centralisation may have preceded national identities and political nationalisms. Modern nationalists agree that state elites centralised societies when they imposed uniform 'languages, religions, currencies, legal systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transport, and communication.'[96] Modern nationalists also argue that the resulting social homogenization was the basis for a shared national culture or identity.[97] National identities emerged when 'general social conditions made for standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures'[98] that pervaded intra-state societies. The link between inter-state war and the centralisation of intra-state systems suggests that the resulting national identities are also embedded with the interests and assumptions of inter-state conflict. Specifically, national cultures are biased towards maintaining the state elite's survival during inter-state war, and the continuation of their advantaged position within intra-state societies. This section details how the centralisation of intra-state societies may create the foundations of national identities that favour founding elites. It will also discuss how others within modern centralised state are sorted into a hierarchical society depending on their relative overlap with the elite-biased identity.

[96] (Tilly, 1992, p. 100)
[97] (Mann, 2012a, p. 436)
[98] (Gellner, 2009, p. 54)

Centralisation structured the relationships within intra-state societies, especially between states and their subject populations. In his book, 'Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties', Charles Tilly argued that repeated transactions 'compound into identities, create and transform social boundaries, and accumulate durable social ties'.[99] Transactions in the intra-state system compound into identities that are experienced as a 'common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the population together in their homeland.'[100] State elites have a disproportionate effect on state-based identities because they dominate and regulate the social transactions within centralised intra-state systems. Furthermore, the identities that are defined by state elites will be biased towards their own interests, i.e., the elite-state's interest in defending and maintaining their exclusive, lucrative, extraction zones from other elite-states during inter-state war.

The elite-biased transactions which underlie state-based identities may formally be described as cultures of 'durable inequality'. Durable inequality refers to organized differences in advantages using classification systems.[101] It occurs when transactions across a 'categorical boundary … a) regularly yield net advantages to people on one side of the boundary and also b) reproduce the boundary'.[102] Durable inequality is implemented when 'agents utilize paired, unequal categories at crucial organizational boundaries'.[103] Organizational boundaries may include state employment, admission to higher education, access to public infrastructure, etc. Inclusion within favoured categories determines an individual's ability to cross an organizational boundary. States

[99] (Tilly, 2015, p. 17)
[100] (Smith, 1991, p. 11)
[101] (Tilly, 2015, p. 106)
[102] (Tilly, 2015, p. 164)
[103] (Tilly, 2015, p. 108)

create durable inequality when they use systems of extraction and allocation to redistribute resources towards their own class and its supporters.[104] The centralisation of intra-state society followed this pattern. Elite-led states historically used 'systems of social closure, exclusion, and control'[105] to favour themselves over other groups but this took on new significance when they centralised the totality of intra-state society. All major social functions became subordinate to the elite-led state and its interests. An individual's position within intra-state society, relative to the state elite, became the most significant determinant of their social outcomes.[106] This argument is supported by reviewing who had access to state institutions, and their benefits, in centralised societies. The most advantaged positions in state institutions were restricted to the elite strata, including in the civil service and military. The elite 'recruited from its own ranks, and maintained its monopoly on the higher and better paid professions'.[107] The state elite also erected self-serving barriers to secondary and higher education because they offered 'cultural capital, realizable in employment in the army, civil administration, law courts, and capitalist economy'.[108] When powerful groups successfully establish categorical inequality at one boundary, they codify those categories and transplant them to other boundaries to reproduce their advantaged positions across society. Centralisation already incentivised uniform administrations and this facilitated the spread of elite-biased categorical inequality across the intra-state system.[109] In Tilly's words, 'When many organizations adopt the same categorical distinctions, those distinctions become more pervasive and decisive in social life at large'.[110] Ultimately, the centralisation of intra-state societies gave elites different and unequal preparation for success within their states.[111] Ongoing social interaction established that success in the

[104] (Tilly, 2015, pp. 108-109)
[105] (Tilly, 2015, p. 107)
[106] (Tilly, 2015, pp. 153-157)
[107] (Hroch, 2000, p. 189)
[108] (Mann, 2012b, p. 246)
[109] (Tilly, 1992, p. 100)
[110] (Tilly, 2015, p. 109)
[111] (Tilly, 2015, p. 109)

centralised intra-state environment was correlated with membership in the elite classes. The 'elite' is a collective noun that described the social features which gave them access to their advantaged class. This network of elite features, including their biological and cultural markers, became commonly understood across centralised societies as the basis for inclusion in the modern state and its institutions. In other words, these elite features could become the tangible building blocks of a territory's future national identity.

Elites may maintain and reproduce cultures of durable inequality in three ways. First, history is full of examples where founding elites resorted to violence to displace non-elites who directly competed with them for social and material resources. These forms of violence may include genocide and the forcible transfer of non-elite populations. Such violence was widely experienced by many non-elite minorities in established states, and by indigenous peoples from colonial settlers.[112] Second, elites can preserve durable inequality in a more benign way through their physical occupation of higher offices. This gives them the power to exclude non-elites from national institutions through in-group nepotism. State elites inherit this type of power because they were the established authority during the transition to nationalisation. It has been suggested that the democratisation of nation-states reduced elite-biased categorical inequality because subject populations gained the right to participate in public politics.[113] Michael Mann's historical research contests this with his claim that old elites continued in positions of power into the 20th Century, and 'in all countries some political power was or is wielded by an 'upper class' centred on 'old money', usually landed or banking.'[114] Mann adds that even when economic power shifted towards capitalist classes that old regimes became incorporated into them by becoming capitalists.[115] The old state elites were never fully displaced by the masses and they retained the ability to directly maintain

[112] (Gellner, 2009, p. 86)
[113] (Tilly, 2015, p. 287)
[114] (Mann, 2012a, p. 418)
[115] (Mann, 2012b, p. 248)

social inequality. By doing so, state elites reproduced a social reality where inclusion in the modern state favoured their membership. The third way that state elites define state cultures goes beyond their physical blocking of access to national institutions and extends from the cultures they created via their control of modern societies. State cultures can maintain elite-biased categorical inequality because they exist outside of individual actors and become intersubjective, self-sustaining constraints on societies. Tilly argued that repeated social transactions compounds into identities which represent a consensus about a social reality.[116] The content of a culture's social consensus is represented by what George Mead called the 'generalized other'. The generalized other contains 'the law that is to be obeyed; it is the system, it is the customs, informal and formal rules, procedures, taboos, traditions, morals.'[117] The elite's control of state institutions gives them a monopoly in defining the general other in a centralised intra-state society. That monopoly subsequently gave elites the ability to bias state identities towards themselves.

State identities are political identities and state elites controlled the political systems of intra-state societies.[118] Governing elites legally established that claims on the state were, and in many cases still are, legally dependent on an individuals' alignment with their features. These may include preferred skin colour, genders, religious beliefs, cultural habits, and ages. One prominent example was the selection of official languages which favoured the languages of the ruling elite versus non-elite vernaculars.[119] Another example were the historical class, gender, and religious restrictions for accessing public education that excluded non-elites.[120] Once established in law and custom, the general other applies to all individuals in society who internalize it as a social consensus. This is

[116] (Tilly, 2015, p. 17)
[117] (Charon, 2010, p. 158)
[118] (Tilly, 2015, p. 95)
[119] (Tilly, 2015, p. 268)
[120] (Mann, 2012a, p. 443)

the case even if the social consensus is biased against them. Excluded, disadvantaged individuals cannot interact with others in national society to satisfy their interests unless they 'agree to some extent to control their own actions through applying the consensus that has arisen'.[121] During social transactions it is necessary to perceive one's own place relative to the general other. An individual's understanding of themselves, and their position in centralised society, is therefore not only defined by the individual but also by the elite-defined generalized other.[122]

Cultures are durable once they become established in practice. This is especially true in cultures of inequality because the powerful elite has the means to maintain biased cultures, while everyone else accepts them as a by-product of achieving their other goals.[123] When observable social transactions compound into ideational cultures they start resembling the contemporary concept of 'nationality' as a sense of belonging within a nation state. Alexander Wendt argued that the outcomes of ongoing social interaction become inscribed in ''collective memory', the myths, narratives, and traditions that constitute who a group is and how it relates to others.'[124] Wendt argued that when shared knowledge is established it is 'kept alive through the generations by an on-going process of socialization and ritual enactment.'[125] Even when states become more legally inclusive through negotiation or revolution, the enduring cultural preference for elite features remains because of their compounded historic effects. Historical boundaries can maintain systems of inequality that persist beyond changes to law because they are reproduced in thought and practice. This may include the persistence of exclusive social networks and social biases. For example, Singapore has legal equality for citizens but speakers of 'English, Chinese, and Malay experience such different environments from

[121] (Charon, 2010, p. 158)
[122] (Blumer, 1969, p. 85)
[123] (Mann, 2012a, p. 436)
[124] (Wendt, 1999, p. 162)
[125] (Wendt, 1999, p. 162)

birth that few of them ever cross boundaries among the schools and careers that separate the three categories'.[126] This example, amongst others, demonstrates how hierarchies of belonging and success in modern societies can follow historical patterns of division along gender, education, ethnicity, sexuality, age, and place of origin after formal equality is granted because those divisions existed during the earlier centralisation of intra-state societies. Altogether, an individual's understanding of their categorical membership within a state occurs after elite-biased political relations are established as the state's culture. Tilly ultimately claims that national identities, or inclusion within nation states, is the outcome of political relations. Social categories do not pre-exist the political relations which create them.[127]

Finally, this work differs from its referenced authors in one key aspect. These authors make the argument that the state was centralised as a response to inter-state war. They all agree that states were centralised through the direct intervention of the governing elite in the modern era. They also claim that the elite's domination of the centralisation process created cultures of durable inequality where inclusion in the state was definitively biased towards the possession of elite characteristics. At the same time, these authors frequently revert to the language of 'historic nations' when referring to different peoples. This may imply that these groups were pre-existing to political nationalism and were revived during the modern nationalist era.[128] This work explicitly claims that national identities were constructed during the centralisation of intra-state societies. National identities extend from the features of the coincidental governing elite at the time of centralisation. This work concedes to modern nationalists, like Anthony D. Smith, that modern national cultures were generally not imagined *ex nihilo* but were created in the context of established 'ethnic cultures, replete with their own customs,

[126] (Tilly, 2015, p. 156)
[127] (Tilly, 2015, pp. 153-157)
[128] (Hroch, 2000, p. 9)

languages, myths, memories and symbols, often preserved in the rituals, cults and liturgies.'[129] This suggests that the prevailing elite culture within a territory at the time of centralisation may have had historic roots. It may also suggest that the parts of the wider population may have already integrated into the governing elite's culture as a result of pre-centralisation political, material, and social struggles. It does not imply, though, that that specific elite culture at the time of centralisation was intrinsic, or natural, to a people or territory, only that it was a historically durable social construction. For example, Joseph Stalin famously defined the nation as 'a historically evolved stable community arising on the foundation of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in the community of culture.'[130] All of these features are socially malleable and are subject to change depending on the prevailing governing elite at any time.

This section claimed that contemporary national identities are likely to be biased towards the elites who governed the state during its historical centralisation. Modern national identities are political identities and state elites had political control over their states' institutions during their creation. Their ongoing dominance of these institutions set the precedent that inclusion and success within the centralised state was biased towards those who were more aligned with the features of the founding elite. Over time, the preference for elite features became embedded in the centralised state as a common understanding of who belonged within the state-society. This shared understanding was subsequently mythologised into a national identity. As in all systems of durable inequality, there were those who were excluded from accessing centralised societies. This work claims that the multivariate nature of national identities implies that exclusion from the modern state occurred on a spectrum depending on a group's relative overlap with the elite-biased identity, i.e. groups were excluded to the extent that they differed

[129] (Smith, 2009, p. 57)
[130] (Davis, 1967, p. 163)

from the founding elite. Any group who did not perfectly align with the elite identity were labelled ‘minorities’ and they will be considered in the following section.

Minority Identities Within Nation-States

Modern nationalism differs from other theories when it rejects that nations are based on pre-existing, ethno-linguistic populations. The previous section argued that diversity in intra-state societies are manifestations of underlying struggles around objective social relationships, including access to power and wealth. The presence of ethnic conflict in intra-state societies extends from the inability of state cultures to equally accommodate the entire intra-state population. State cultures fail to do so because they were not constructed to be universally inclusive, but to maintain the dominant position of a historic elite within a hierarchical society. This work posits that inclusion within elite-biased states exists on a spectrum. The founding elite’s demography will disproportionately form the core of a state’s identity. Others will be partially included based on their relative overlap with the features of the founding elite. Their subordinate classes within centralised societies become minority identities. Some intra-state populations may be labelled as so dissimilar to the founding elite that they are effectively excluded from the society and will be considered non-nationals. Hierarchical inclusion may account for the observable diversity and social outcomes within contemporary nation-states. For the purposes of this work, it may also explain why excluded minorities become nationalist. To make this argument, this section first claims that the founding elite’s demography has a persistent, positive effect on inclusion and success within centralised intra-state societies. This makes the features of the founding elite into the archetype for a national identity. It will then claim that the identities of all other individuals within the nation-state are dependent on their relative position to the founding elite. Finally, it will discuss why some non-elite populations may choose to become nationalist in response to their exclusion from the nation-state via political nationalism.

It must first be established that it is possible, if not likely, that the demographics of founding elites are disproportionately advantaged in nationalised societies. It is apparent that contemporary national societies contain populations outside of the founding elite. Some theorists suggest that this is due to the democratisation of centralised societies which makes them universally inclusive.[131] Alternatively, elite-biased political nationalism does not claim that non-elites will be fully excluded from centralised societies but rather that the needs of the founding elite will be disproportionately satisfied given their social dominance at the time of centralisation. The United States of America is one example of an ostensibly equal, civic, national society that privileges individuals who possess the features of the founding elite. On one hand, the contemporary population of the United States is very different from that of its founding class of White, Protestant Christian, men. At the signing of its Declaration of Independence in 1776, fifty-six delegates of the Second Continental Congress represented the thirteen founding colonies of the United States of America. They were all White, Christian men. All but one were Protestant.[132] In 2024, the country is only 58.9% White, 70% Christian, and 49.6% male.[133] Nonetheless, two and a half centuries after independence, White, Christian, American men are still overrepresented in national institutions, while also being disproportionately wealthy. The parliamentarians of the 2023 US Congress are 88% Christian, 75% Non-Hispanic White, and 71% male.[134] White men are also the highest average earners after Asian men, with the latter population being boosted by a migrant selection bias.[135] It is not unreasonable to assume that elite-biased cultures of durable inequality may privilege the demography of founding elites across time.

[131] (Mann, 2012b, p. 44)
[132] (National Archives, 2021)
[133] (United States Census Bureau, 2024)
[134] (Schaeffer, 2023)
[135] (Patten, 2016)

A number of explanations for the continued existence of non-elites within national societies may be derived from modern nationalism. These explanations allow for the presence of non-elites within nation-states while still privileging the features of the founding elite. First, founding elites are not motivated to control centralised societies for their own sake, but to satisfy their interests. The founding elite will therefore attempt to secure the most advantaged positions for themselves while allowing other populations to exist below them.[136] The elite class is generally insufficient to operate the total intra-state system by themselves and this creates openings for non-elites, albeit in subordinate positions. For instance, the top 1%, of American earners, as a proxy for its modern elite, only includes 1.5 million men, while 161 million people are employed in the American workforce.[137] The elite class will use their social power to prevent direct competition in the state's privileged core using the methods outlined in the previous section. These will include displacing violence, in-group nepotism, and cultures of durable inequality. In the United States, this manifested as white nationalist, violent institutions like the Ku Klux Klan, racially biased 'Jim Crow'-era legal systems, and the maintenance of exclusive social networks. One real-world example highlights these attempts and their effects. The top 12 American universities educate under 1% of students but account for 10% of Fortune 500 CEOs, 75% of Supreme Court Justices, 25% of the US Senate, and 13.4% of the top 1% of earners. At the same time, the overwhelmingly White, male elite are twice as likely to attend these universities compared to non-elites with similar academic performance. Furthermore, elite universities, like Harvard, are eight times as likely to accept the descendants of past students, who are also disproportionately White and male.[138] Concerning wealth, 88% of the top 1% of earners live in White heterosexual households. Men contribute 83% of the income in those households.[139] Altogether, this data supports the claim that the

[136] (Tilly, 2015, pp. 110-111)
[137] (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2024)
[138] (Chetty, Deming, & Friedman, 2023)
[139] (Yavorsky, Keister, & Qian, 2020)

demographic features of the founding American elite are correlated with success in its contemporary political and private institutions. This work claims that elite-biased national identities are a necessary part of nationalisms.

Finally, the American case may be used to support the claim that non-elite populations will be included within centralised intra-state societies to the extent that they partially overlap with the demographics of the founding elite. National identities are measures of belonging within nationalised societies, and since elite demographics predict inclusion and success within centralised states, they may also be the archetype for national identities. The more an individual's demographic profile differs from the founding elite, the worse they perform in the national society. Their subordinate positions under the national elite become mutually understood minority identities. For example, after American White men, earnings are highest for Asian women, subject to the same sampling biases as Asian men, followed by White women, Black men, Hispanic men, and Hispanic women.[140] Economic success in the United States is a function of education, experience, and occupation, which in turn, have been shown to be the outcomes of prevailing cultures of durable inequality.[141] Durable inequality transforms observable demographic features into symbolic objects that become meaningful during social interactions. Individuals perceive their relative inclusion or exclusion within national societies using their personal attributes as social objects. At the same time, individuals tend to correspond to their environments through categorical, and not individual, differences. They position their relative attributes and experiences into collective categorical nouns, such as White woman or Black man in the American case. Group identities emerge from their shared social experiences.[142] Through repeated interactions, individuals start accepting and acting through their assigned shared

[140] (Patten, 2016)
[141] (Kochhar, 2023)
[142] (Tilly, 2015, p. 108)

identities.[143] Using Tilly's words, subordinate social groups, 'put on a performance of mutual, public claim making by paired identities. In the name of their asserted collective identity, interlocutors for actors demand, command, require, request … or otherwise make claims on assets that lie under (the elite's) control.'[144] It is through this process that every individual within a centralised intra-state society comes to understand the extent of their partial inclusion within a hierarchical national identity. The outcome is a tiered, hierarchical, centralised intra-state society where elites maintain a circumscribed national identity based on their own features. All other social minorities will be included within the society to the extent that they overlap with the elite class. Minorities may integrate into the favoured elite class through coincidental physiognomic overlap, inter-marriage, or assimilation. Excluded groups will remain in permanent subordination in society if they cannot, or will not, assimilate into the elite identity by retaining entropy-resistant traits like skin colour, religious beliefs, and cultural habits that diverge from the historical elite.[145]

2.4 Seceding National Minorities

2.4.1 Introduction

The previous section discussed how modern, centralised intra-state environments may be transformed into hierarchical national societies. Most national societies approach a *modus vivendi* where subordinate social minorities embrace elite-biased 'national forms of organization as a by-product of their goals and the available means of reaching them.'[146] The prevalence of minorities within contemporary nation-states supports this. Minorities adapt to the national elite's exploitation and opportunity hoarding by

[143] (Tilly, 2015, p. 95)
[144] (Tilly, 2015, p. 97)
[145] (Gellner, 2009, p. 63)
[146] (Mann, 2012a, p. 436)

assimilating into the elite identity as far as they can or want. They also create new coping mechanisms, including targeted political strategies, limited resistance, and in-group mutual aid.[147]

At the same time, the modern nationalist era is replete with secessionist movements which attempted to withdraw from national societies. These are nearly always launched by ethno-linguistic minorities seeking the right to be governed by their own members.[148] This section argues that secessionist nationalisms may be important vectors for the spread of the ideologies of modernist nationalism into new nation-states. Minority secessionist nationalisms are not predicted to be *tabulae rasae.* They are rather claimed to be ideologically continuous with the host states that they withdrew from. Miroslav Hroch claimed that secessionist nationalism results from the material struggle between ruling elites and oppressed minorities that were manifest in their ethno-linguistic differences.[149] Hroch continued that these secessionist nationalisms would most likely be led by those minorities who were most similar to the governing elite in the host state because they were the most aware of the benefits of being included within a centralised society. [150] Elite-adjacent minorities are relatively similar to the elites who exclude them from state institutions. The elite-biased minority national identities that these elite-adjacent minorities create may therefore also be similar to the external features and internal beliefs of the exclusive elite. The latter would include beliefs around the benefits that ruling elites can accrue in nationalised societies via their control of national institutions. This section concludes that the high likelihood of elite-adjacent minorities being the leadership of secessionist nation-states, combined with their desire to control centralised societies for their own benefit, may provide the motivation for them to lead secessionist minority national movements. This claim satisfies this work's hypothesis

[147] (Tilly, 2015, p. 63)
[148] (Krause, 2022, pp. 788, 802)
[149] (Hroch, 2000, p. 185)
[150] (Hroch, 2000, p. 13)

which asks whether minority individuals attempt to enhance their physical and social security by creating a new nation-state based on their shared minority identity.

2.4.2 The Limits of National Inclusion Within Nation-States

It is apparent that not all minorities choose to secede from nation-states to form their own national societies. Michael Mann observed that when intra-state societies were nationalised that there were three possible outcomes based on the state's ability to incorporate populations.[151] The nation-state would be relatively stable if its centralised state institutions could potentially absorb the majority of the population to a minimum extent. Mann called these instances of 'state-supporting nationalism'.[152] Mann's historical research suggests that state-supporting nationalism depended on relatively higher levels of overlap between the features of the elite and the remaining population. This facilitated greater social mobility for non-elite minorities and reduced their incentives for secession.[153] Inclusion may be due to higher overlap between the physical attributes of the elite and the wider population. Inclusion may also be due to greater possibilities for assimilation into the elite-biased national identity. This may be through religious conversion, inter-marriage, or purchased ennoblement.[154] In both cases, the elite's barriers to state institutions are weak enough to be partially penetrated by the masses.[155] Mann cites Britain and France as historical examples of state-supporting nationalism.[156] Alternatively, Mann claims that if state institutions are based on narrower, more exclusive elite identities they may exclude sufficiently large minority populations to make secession a preferable choice. Mann referred to these instances as 'state-subverting nationalisms' and cites the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy as one example

[151] (Mann, 2012b, p. 218)
[152] (Mann, 2012b, p. 250)
[153] (Mann, 2012b, pp. 224-237)
[154] (Mann, 2012b, p. 219)
[155] (Tilly, 2015, p. 59)
[156] (Mann, 2012b, p. 225)

of it.[157] The Habsburg elite's identity was so narrowly defined that it effectively excluded other populations from the Christian Austro-German nationalism that emerged in its political centre of Vienna. Minority groups responded with minority national movements of their own. Finally, Mann points to the rare example of 'state-creating nationalisms' where the elite national identity was so broad and porous that it effectively included non-elite populations that existed outside their state boundaries. This allowed the state to incorporate new populations into larger nation states. Mann cites Prussian-led Germany as an example of state-creating nationalism.[158]

2.4.3 The Secession of Minorities into Their Own Nation-States

Modern nationalists like Max Weber, Charles Tilly, and Michael Mann study nationalism from the perspective of state elites in the established European nation-states. These theorists focus on the elite's role in nationalism as they were the 'only interest group that consciously willed the development of the national state.'[159] They assume that all other groups were subsumed by the elites' nationalising projects. Alternatively, the Czech sociologist, Miroslav Hroch, is renowned for his bottom-up study of minority nationalisms in East and Central Europe. This makes Hroch uniquely suitable for understanding secessionist national movements. Hroch affirms this work's argument for modern state centralisation followed by political nationalism with his claim that 'national self-recognition moved through broader and broader layers of the population, travelling in the same direction as the transformation of feudal into capitalist society.'[160] Hroch continues that, 'the process by which the mass of people became aware of their national identity … ran parallel to their struggle against the ruling class.'[161] Exposure to the

[157] (Mann, 2012b, p. 250)
[158] (Mann, 2012b, p. 218)
[159] (Mann, 2012a, p. 436)
[160] (Hroch, 2000, p. 10)
[161] (Hroch, 2000, p. 10)

ideologies of nationalism was insufficient for the creation of minority national identities. There must also be accompanying inequality in the distribution of resources in those societies, and an awareness by the minority group that their corresponding disadvantage is based on their assigned categorical membership.[162] Hroch argues that 'conflicts of interest between classes and groups whose members were divided at the same time by the fact that they belonged to different linguistic or national groups had indisputable significance for the intensification of the national movement.'[163] In other words, national awakening requires both a decline in a minority group's objective material conditions after centralisation, and the subjective awareness of their disadvantaged status within political nationalism.[164] It may also be implied from Hroch's theories that the centralisation of the intra-state society, and its objective social transformations, precedes popular nationalism and the awareness of national identities.

Hroch argued that a minority group's degree of social mobility and level of social communication may be used to measure their tendency to become nationalist.[165] Minority national movements are more likely to emerge when limitations to a group's vertical mobility combines with an advanced ability to vocalise and transmit information about their social disadvantage. Hroch identified an important subset of individuals in minority groups who gained national consciousness earlier than others because they were the closest to being included in elite-biased national identities. Their adjacency to the elite meant that they generally had higher social standing, advanced education, and were employed in the highest occupations available to non-elites.[166] At the same time, they would have been the first members of their minority group to experience barriers to social mobility as centralisation moved through their intra-state society. These

[162] (Hroch, 2000, p. 12)
[163] (Hroch, 2000, p. 185)
[164] (Hroch, 2000, p. 185)
[165] (Hroch, 2000, p. 186)
[166] (Hroch, 2000, p. 15)

individuals had the highest ability to interpret and articulate the causes of their categorical inequality. Hroch labelled these individuals as the 'patriots' and defined them as those 'who were most easily accessible to national consciousness and ready earlier than others to become national activists.'[167] The minority patriots' identities were created when the state elite allowed them to enter the middle and lower strata of society during the centralisation of intra-state societies. The elite gave them access to some higher education to fulfil their subordinate roles. The patriots became aware that their social ascent into the modern state, and their access to its benefits, required assimilation into the elite identity. This included the adoption of elite features like their languages, religions, appearances, and social customs. 'In so far as (they) did not (or could not) assimilate they faced an obstacle which impeded and disproportionately reduced their chance of rising into a higher social position.'[168] Hroch's observations of small group nationalisms in Europe led to his claim that patriotic agitation was frequently a pre-requisite to mass nationalism in minority groups. The patriots were necessary to frame the political, legal, economic, and social inequality of their group to others who were similarly excluded from the elite-biased modern state based on their shared features.[169]

The patriots understood that they were part of a constructed, 'large social group integrated … by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness.'[170] The patriots defined their minority nationality using the shared experience of their group's inferior social position but that did not equate to seeing themselves as equal within the minority nationality. Members of minority national groups are excluded based on their shared dissimilarity with the state elite but members within the group also occupy distinct classes from one another based

[167] (Hroch, 2000, p. 13)
[168] (Hroch, 2000, p. 189)
[169] (Hroch, 2000, pp. 14-15)
[170] (Hroch, 1993, p. 4)

on their relative differences. This may include differences like their individual education, physical appearances, social habits, religious denominations, etc. For example, Jews were banned from settling in Vienna until 1848 but 200 wealthy Jewish banking and industrial families had provisional residency because of their usefulness to the Austrian Monarchy.[171] All Jews faced the same legal status in the Habsburg Empire but they had different experiences based on their individual attributes. Jews, like all minorities, were aware of their relative identities and acted through these identities during social interactions with one another. Hroch observed that the creation of small nations involved an exchange of ruling classes. The elite-adjacent, minority patriots were more likely to see themselves as the natural, superior leaders of their own national society versus other members. 'The leaders of these movements aim for a very specific goal: to complete the social structure of the nation by creating a capitalist class corresponding to that of the (exclusive nationalism), in which they would come to enjoy a salient position themselves.'[172] Using this work's framework, nationalist leaders sought to recreate centralised, capitalist, intra-state societies that were simultaneously defensible and sovereign in the inter-state system. It may therefore be implied that successful secessionist nationalisms are not simply the withdrawal of homogenous excluded groups from existing national societies but the recreation of complete, hierarchical, unequal societies if they are to be viable in their intra-state and inter-state systems.

Members of minority nationalities may be incentivised to secede if they will be relatively more advantaged in a national society of their own. Again, this does not imply the equality of all minorities within their own nation, but lower inequality for each sub-group within the minority nationality. This is achieved through proximity to an elite class that more closely resembles oneself. This claim is often framed as the nationalist motivation to be governed by members of one's own nation. Each class within the minority identity

[171] (Beller, 1989, p. 168)
[172] (Hroch, 1993, p. 15)

wants to maximize their own inclusion and success, and they retain the incentive to position their specific sub-identity at the centre of the emergent minority national identity. Hroch argued that minority national identities 'inevitably became a battlefield for the pursuit of power, not only in struggle against the ruling nation, but within … the national movement as well.'[173] It has been established that the patriots were drawn from the highest social category which was as yet accessible to the members of the oppressed nationality and this meant that they significantly overlapped with the features of the dominant elite-biased, national identity of their oppressors.[174] Minority patriots were the most aware of the benefits of elite-biased cultures of categorical inequality in centralised intra-state systems and they were incentivised to capture these benefits for themselves. The patriots would be best positioned to capture and dominate the minority national identity as a result. The process of assimilation into elite identities meant that minority patriots not only outwardly resembled elites, but they also internalized their ideologies, assumptions, and interests. The minority national patriots copied their elite oppressors and developed an interest in creating their own centralised hierarchical intra-state societies that were also defensible in the inter-state system. To do so, they seceded from exclusive political nationalisms to create new nationalised intra-state societies that they could dominate and regulate using the same methods as the old elites, namely, displacing violence, in-group nepotism, and cultures of durable inequality. The minority patriots claimed superiority in the minority nation and defined their minority national identities using their own elite-biased features. All other members of the minority nationality would be subordinate to the patriot elites in the new nation state.

Like it does for other national identities, this work predicts that the minority national identity will be defined around the features of whichever group becomes its founding governing elite. Hroch claimed that the patriot class would be the most likely to hold this

[173] (Hroch, 1993, p. 13)
[174] (Hroch, 2000, pp. 179-181)

position in an emerging national identity.[175] This implies that the minority national identity of a seceding nationalism would be defined by, and biased towards, these patriots. A patriot-biased, minority national identity, by extension, also implies that secessionist national identities will contain the assumptions of the host state's elite identity. This is because the patriot's identities were constructed during their interrupted assimilation into the host state's elite-biased social hierarchy. Patriots strived to become elites in the host state and adopted as many elite features as they were allowed to. This included imitations of elite physical appearances, languages, education, and other social customs. Minority patriots did not only outwardly resemble the dominant elites but would have also internalised their belief systems through their attempted socialisation into elite-biased state cultures. These belief systems included elite perspectives around the motivations and principles of the centralised state in the inter-state and intra-state systems. It also included beliefs around their natural right to rule the state and nation versus any other group. The other classes within the new hierarchical identity who are subordinate to the founding patriot elites would begin a new cycle of assimilation into the patriot-biased national identity and will absorb its belief systems in the process. The resulting patriot-biased minority national identity could therefore be a medium for the spread of the ideologies of state centralisation and nationalism into their new nation-state via the patriot class. Elite-adjacent minority patriots may attempt to enhance their own physical and social insecurity by creating secessionist national movements, and in the process, they may create new minority-led modern societies that enhances the relative security of their subordinate co-minorities. The relative increases in security for all subordinate classes of that minority may motivate a mass nationalism which seeks a new nation-state around their shared minority identity.

[175] (Hroch, 2000, p. 13)

Altogether, any discussion on minority national identities must recognize that they cannot be separated from the centralisation of existing intra-state societies in response to inter-state war, the creation of elite-biased social hierarchies during centralisation, and the exclusion of minorities from political nationalisms based on those social hierarchies. The demands of inter-state war generated unequal intra-state societies, which in turn created minorities as objective social classes. Unequal modern societies also created hierarchies within minority groups, with the minority patriots being the most suited to lead their minority's secession. Inter-state war may be ultimately responsible for the spread of political nationalism across existing states in the inter-state system, but it may also have been responsible for the transmission of the nationalist ideologies within intra-state societies. The relevance of inter-state war to political nationalism will be embedded within emergent national movements and in the conduct of their future nation states.

2.5 Conclusion

This work seeks to explain why minorities become nationalist within existing, modern states in response to their exclusion from dominant political nationalisms. This chapter used theories of International Relations and nationalism as the social context for the relationship between states and their intra-state societies. It built upon those theories to develop this work's theoretical framework for the relationship amongst i) inter-state war, ii) the creation of hierarchical identities within centralised state-societies, and iii) the emergence of minority nationalisms amongst those who are excluded from state institutions via political nationalism. It argued that inter-state war has an effect on the conduct of states, and on the structure of their intra-state societies. It was argued that centralisation emerged as a dominant strategy for the survival of states during inter-state war. This had a homogenising effect on the inter-state system but also on the internal structure of states. States, and their governing elites, gained organisational power over

their centralised societies. Social inclusion and mobility within states became biased towards the features of the governing elite. This may have sorted the intra-state population into a hierarchical society depending on their relative overlap with the elite-biased identity. Finally, some groups within the state may have been excluded from society via emergent political nationalisms to the extent that it was in their interest to secede from that state. They were incentivised to create a new, more accommodating, national society of their own. Having established this work's theoretical foundations, this work now turns towards the research methodologies that it will employ to test its hypothesis.

3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This dissertation's theoretical objective is to understand why minority populations within existing modern and nationalising states secede to create new nation-states of their own. It considers the case of Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, which was developed by the 19th Century Jewish figure, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), while he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Political Zionism led to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The previous chapter developed a theoretical framework for the decision of minority groups to become nationalist. This work claims that modern centralised states may have biases in their state institutions towards the features of their governing elite. These biases may embed patterns of durable inequality in their institutions which predict different levels of success in society. These patterns may subsequently be formalised in self-conscious political nationalisms which defines inclusion in society around ethno-national identities. Finally, groups who are excluded from dominant political nationalisms may have an incentive to create political nationalisms of their own as a means of restoring their social security. This hypothesis will be tested against the case of Theodor Herzl's life in 19th Century Vienna to determine if there is support for its assumptions and claims.

Three research questions were constructed to determine if there is support for the hypothesis. These questions are i) Can minority identities be an outcome of social exclusion from dominant national movements? ii) Are minority individuals insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements? and, iii) Do minority individuals attempt to restore their security by creating a new nation-state based on their shared minority identity?

The research methodology of 'Discourse Analysis' will be used to answer the research questions. Discourse Analysis is a research methodology that 'examines patterns of discourse across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used'.[176] Discourse Analysis allows analysis of the language used by social groups to reveal their perceptions of themselves, others, their environments, and their actions. Specifically, Discourse Analysis will be used to review a sample of Theodor Herzl's documentary resources from the mid-to-late 19th Century. These resources were drawn from prominent examples of Theodor Herzl's writings, and therefore meet Discourse Analysis' standards of authenticity, credibility, and representativeness to support the validity of hypothetical claims.[177]

3.2 The Hypothesis and Research Questions

3.2.1 The Hypothesis

This dissertation's formal hypothesis is the following:

> The modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy facilitated the emergence of an exclusive, Christian Austro-German nationalism in its capital of Vienna in the 19th Century. Viennese Jews became insecure when they were excluded from Viennese society via Christian Austro-German nationalism's antisemitism. Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism in response to the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society as a means of restoring his social security as an excluded Viennese Jew.

The hypothesis includes three assumptions. The first is that the decision of modern states to centralise was a policy response to the incentives of the inter-state system.

[176] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 196)
[177] (Scott J. , 2014, p. 1)

The second assumption is that the centralisation of states facilitated the creation of popular nationalisms due to biases within state institutions. Political nationalisms may not precede the centralisation of modern states. Finally, the third claim is that groups within centralised states who are excluded from political nationalisms are insecure relative to those within them. These minorities have an incentive to secede from states and create their own national identities and political nationalisms as a means of restoring their security.

3.2.2 Deriving Research Questions from the Hypothesis

Three research questions are derived from the hypothesis to test whether there is support for its assumptions and claims. First, it must be determined whether biases within the institutions of modern centralised states can predict differing levels of inclusion within their societies. This work claims that biases within state institutions are manifested in observable political national movements who attempt to formalise the boundaries of social inclusion via national identities. This implies that minority identities are constructed through social processes and that they are not genetically intrinsic to individuals or groups. With the case of 19th Century Jewish political nationalism, it is hypothesized that Theodor Herzl perceived that he was a member of a modern Jewish minority when he was excluded from an emergent, antisemitic, Christian Austro-German political nationalism in Vienna. Herzl's understanding of his contemporary Jewish identity was distinct from historical Jewish identities in Europe according to his discourse.

If minority identities are found to be socially constructed, it must then be determined whether minorities are insecure within modern states because of their minority statuses. A further research question is derived from this. It asks, 'Are minority individuals insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements?' Christian

Austro-German nationalism in Vienna was politically successful. It then explicitly attempted to translate its antisemitic political programmes into municipal and state policy. This will be used as evidence when answering the second research question. Theodor Herzl defined his inferior social status through the lens of 19th Century, Viennese, political antisemitism.

If positive support is found for the preceding questions, it may then be asked whether minorities attempt to restore their security by creating a new nation-state based on their shared minority identities? This final question asks why minorities decide to create their own nation-states and how they attempt to do so. Specifically, if support is found for the claims that the minority Jewish identity was constructed within modern centralised states that were politically nationalising, and that minority Jews were relatively insecure because of their exclusion from dominant national movements, it could then be asked whether this insecurity was the motivation to establish a new Jewish nation-state. To do this, it must be determined how Theodor Herzl, as a 19th Century Viennese Jew, perceived the role of political nationalism in security of their citizens, and how he sought to create a functional Jewish nation-state. Having outlined the research questions that were derived from the hypothesis, this chapter can now turn to discussing the research methodology of Discourse Analysis and how it may be used to answer these research questions.

3.3 Discourse Analysis

3.3.1 Introduction

'Discourse' is any use of written or spoken language to communicate meaning.[178] Discourse Analysis:

> examines patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used. … It examines how the use of language is influenced by relationships between participants as well as the effects the use of language has upon social identities and relations. It also considers how views of the world, and identities, are constructed through the use of discourse.[179]

Discourse analysts claim that there is a relationship between 'linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour.'[180] By analysing the discourses of Theodor Herzl, as a 19th Century European Jew, it may therefore be possible to determine how he perceived and reacted to his social environments.[181] Referring to the hypothesis and research questions, this would include analysing how Theodor Herzl's identity changed over time via his interaction with other actors, including political nationalisms within modern centralised states. Social theories of identity, including theories of Symbolic Interactionism, may be used to define concepts of 'identity' that are represented in discourse. According to social theories of identity, identities are understandings and representations of oneself which emerge from processes 'of social interaction in which other people are defining a

[178] (Cambridge Dictionary, 2025)
[179] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 196)
[180] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 196)
[181] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 331)

person to himself.'[182] It is expected that a new Jewish minority identity would have entered Jewish discourse via Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism after he perceived that Austrian and European political systems were becoming nationalist and antisemitic. Discourse analyses should also reveal how Theodor Herzl, as a 19th Century Viennese and European Jew, perceived his security environment and any insecurities he faced. It is expected that Herzl's 19th Century discourse would reflect perceptions of increasing insecurity amongst Viennese and European Jews due to their being socially excluded via political antisemitism. Finally, Discourse Analysis would allow analyses of how Theodor Herzl understood nationalism, and nation-states, as well as the reasons he pursued a Jewish nation-state. It is expected that the development of Political Zionism by Theodor Herzl in his 19th Century discourse would be presented as a solution to the insecurity that Austrian and European Jews faced due to their minority statuses within European states.

3.3.2 The Methodological Suitability of Discourse Analysis

This section considers the theoretical assumptions of Discourse Analysis that make it a suitable research methodology for answering this work's research questions. Discourse Analysis allows researchers to analyse an author's discourse to reconstruct their identities and their social environments outside of their texts. Decisions to act are based on an actor's understanding of their identities and social context. Discourse analyses that reveal an actor's identities and contexts may then be used to explain their actions. One aspect of an author's social context is their group identities. If discourse represents an author's complete social context, it should also be representative of their group perspectives.[183] Besides reconstructing an author's historical social context, Discourse Analysis may then be used to understand how the perspectives of a group identity can

[182] (Blumer, 1969, p. 12)
[183] (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)

influence their choice of actions. Taken together, Discourse Analysis should be a suitable methodology to reconstruct how Theodor Herzl, as a 19th Century European Jewish writer, perceived himself and his social environment. This methodology should also be suitable to reconstruct how he acted based on those perceptions.

This reconstructed social environment would also provide an understanding of the Jewish group identity in 19th Century Europe and how it may have framed the decisions of other Jews to act during this time. This would include their formal, collective decision to pursue their own nation-state by the early-to-mid 20th Century. It is outside of the scope of this dissertation, but Herzl's political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat*, which outlined Political Zionism, was enthusiastically distributed across Europe after its release. Its ideas were accepted by large swathes of the Jewish population upon release. This resulted in the formal creation of Jewish national institutions at the First Zionist Congress in 1897 by delegations from across the continent, and the world. This may be evidence that Herzl's discourse reflected ideas that were meaningful to other European Jews outside of himself as an individual.

3.3.3 Identity, Society, and Discourse

Theories of Symbolic Interactionism claim that identities are social objects that are 'formed, learned, and transmitted through' processes of interaction.[184] 'Objects' are anything that can be indicated or referenced. Referring to an object as 'social' means that they are 'formed and transformed by defining processes that take place in social interaction.'[185] It may be helpful to contrast the claim that identities are social objects with alternative approaches. Primordial nationalism represents identities as 'non-social' objects which have meanings that are intrinsic to them based on their objective

[184] (Blumer, 1969, p. 12)
[185] (Blumer, 1969, p. 69)

compositions.[186] The strictest adherents to primordialism argue that their sociobiological identities are historically persistent and independent of social interaction.[187] They claim that identities are internally cohesive using common physical features, shared genetics, and durable cultures, that are consistent across time and which may be tied to single places of origin. This work takes the opposing view and assumes that identities are socially defined in the societies within which they arise.

According to social theories of identity, identities are understandings and representations of oneself which emerge from processes 'of social interaction in which other people are defining a person to himself.'[188] In other words, individuals define themselves by internalising the perspectives that others have of them. They do so by taking on the roles given to them by the individuals, groups, and communities that are important to them and which are necessary for their continued existence.[189] As George Herbert Mead wrote in the seminal, Mind, Self, and Society (1934), 'the raw materials out of which this particular individual is born would not be a self but for his relationship to others in the community of which he is a part.'[190] Mead is arguing that the recognisable elements of an identity are not intrinsic to individuals but gain meaning through their relationships with their society

Decisions to act are based on an individual's definition of a situation. People activate the socially relevant parts of their identities to help them define situations.[191] The identities that people activate in different social settings may be revealed by the discourses they use; i.e., they may employ different styles of language, vocabulary, phrases, topics, etc. that are associated with a particular social identity.[192] Changes in

[186] (Blumer, 1969, p. 3)
[187] (Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 53)
[188] (Blumer, 1969, p. 12)
[189] (Mead, 1934, p. 186) (Blumer, 1969, p. 13)
[190] (Mead, 1934, p. 200)
[191] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 204)
[192] (Gibbs, 2014, pp. 306-307), (Paltridge, 2014, p. 204)

an individual's discourse may be seen as evidence for changes in their active identities and social contexts.

Discourse is a social arena where an author uses language to represent their identities for themselves and others to observe. Identity is a summarizing label for a person's understanding of who they are, relative to others, within a social context. Discourse may be evidence for, and a mediator of, an author's identities and social environments.[193] All language, including discourse, exists for its social function as 'shared (meaning) that … users draw upon to communicate with each other'.[194] 'These meanings, however, change over time in relation to particular contexts of use and changes in the social, cultural, and ideological backgrounds to this use.'[195] Since the meaning and use of language depends on contemporary social relationships, they reflect the wider society at that time and not just the perspective of an individual author.[196] An author's use of language and discourse to represent their identities is therefore a socially regulated act that is dependent on the structure of society.[197] It was previously claimed that more powerful actors have a greater influence over social relationships than less powerful actors, and this includes how language is commonly defined and used within a society. When authors represent their social identities through their discourse, they are implicitly or explicitly relying upon the prevailing discourses of society as defined by those with power.[198] An author's use of discourse to represent their identities and their social environments should therefore reflect how both have been defined in the discourses of the powerful within that social context. The hypothesis claims that Theodor Herzl, as a Jewish individual within the Austrian state, was labelled as an excluded minority in the 19th Century via political antisemitism. Since 19th Century European Jews were relatively

[193] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 332)
[194] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 197)
[195] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 204)
[196] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 332) (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)
[197] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 332) (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)
[198] (Gidley, 2014, pp. 46-50)

powerless compared to dominant European political nationalisms their identities could have been defined by those political movements. The adoption of a nationalist discourse by Theodor Herzl, as a 19th Century European Jew, to represent his inferior identity and social context should reflect the positions of powerful European political nationalisms.

3.3.4 Group Identity, Individual Discourse, and Action

Individuals decide to act using the relevant identities for a social context, and the most relevant identities in some contexts may be their group affiliations. Individuals can act through a group perspective, and individuals who share a group identity may act in similar ways and may cooperate with one another, but group identities cannot 'act' on their own; What is perceived as 'group action' may more accurately be defined as the simultaneous action of individuals who are motivated to act from an overlapping identity and perspective. This work hypothesises that European individuals' national group identities became the most politically relevant in the 19th and 20th Centuries because of the dominance of political ethno-nationalism over their social contexts. Individuals would have been motivated to act through the perspective of their own ethno-national group identities. This would include their decision to demand their own exclusive nation-states. The social dominance of national identities may explain the decision of individual European Jews to cooperate with one another towards securing their own Jewish nation-state.

Discourse Analysis can be used to explain how group identities, such as national identities, are both formed and integrated into an individual's personal identity and discourse. When different people interact with a society using the same identity, they may have common experiences during their social interactions with others. An individual's discourse is evidence for their social identities, or who they perceive they are relative to others in society. If individuals use their discourse to represent common

experiences, their discourses may become a shared story that promotes identification with others who share those identities and experiences.[199] These individuals may develop an overlapping discourse that becomes a group identity with a shared vocabulary, phraseology, and narrative framing.[200] Once a group identity is constructed, and an individual perceives themselves as part of that group, they may adopt the narrative of the group into their personal discourse. An individual's personal discourse which motivates their decisions to act may therefore reflect the perspective of their relevant group identity in a social situation. The modern, Jewish, minority identity may have been assigned to Jewish individuals, but over time they may have internalized their common social experiences based on their assigned identities as Jewish minorities. Their overlapping discourses may eventually have been perceived as a shared discourse for a new group identity, i.e., these people would have begun to see themselves not as individual, minority European Jews, but as members of a common group that was excluded from European nation-states. Additionally, before European political nationalism, individuals may have belonged to the Jewish religion and/or ethnicity, but they may have prioritized different identities that emphasized their non-Jewish selves. It is claimed that once nationalism became the predominant social and political context in Europe, European Jews would act through the perspective of their assigned minority group identities. Once European Jews attached themselves to a group-based Jewish identity, they may have been motivated to cooperate to secure their own nation-state based on their shared perception of being a stateless, insecure, national minority within European nation-states.

[199] (Gibbs, 2014, p. 306)
[200] (Gibbs, 2014, p. 307)

3.4 Applying Discourse Analysis

3.4.1 Introduction

Having established that Discourse Analysis may be a suitable research methodology for this work's purposes, this chapter can now outline how this methodology will be applied. This will be done in four steps; First, a coding procedure will be established. Coding is the process of defining units of analysis.[201] In Discourse Analysis, the units of analysis are called 'interpretive repertoires', and include the words, phrases, idioms, and meanings that reveal a particular aspect of an author's perspective, and thereby their social contexts.[202] Second, a sampling procedure will be developed to identify and collect the documentary resources to answer the research questions. The third step of the Discourse Analysis methodology will be the data collection procedure. Data collection includes the review of the sampled discourses to identify the presence of units of analysis that were coded in the previous steps. The fourth and final step of the methodology will be the analysis and interpretation of the collected data.

3.4.2 Step 1: Coding the Units of Analysis

Discourse Analysis will be used to answer the research questions to determine if there is support for this work's hypothesis. This will involve reviewing samples of discourse from the 19th Century Jewish political activist, Theodor Herzl. Herzl's patterns of language can reveal the relationships between himself, his identity, and his external social environments.[203] Furthermore, changes in Herzl's patterns of language may reveal changing relationships between Herzl and the society he lived in. Patterns of

[201] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 319)
[202] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 333)
[203] (Paltridge, 2014, p. 196)

language are defined using 'linguistic repertoires'. These are the units of analysis in Discourse Analysis. Linguistic repertoires are clusters of terms, descriptions, and figures of speech that are made up of defined words, phrases, idioms, and meanings.[204] Linguistic repertoires may either be 'manifest' or 'latent'; manifest units are 'visible, surface text elements such as words, sentences or symbols'.[205] Latent units are semantic, or related to meaning.[206] The presence of a specific linguistic repertoire reveals an author's cognitive processes, including how they perceive, categorize, and react to their social worlds.[207]

Researchers should construct a list of linguistic repertoires for their subject of interest to code units of analysis. Researchers should explicitly associate each unit of analysis with the social meaning they represent. Units of analysis should be selected so that their appearance is 'theoretically important and meaningful and (relates) … to the central question of the study.'[208] Units should be clearly defined and unambiguous so that their appearance, frequency, context, and intensity could be measured for later analyses.[209]

This work's relevant linguistic repertoires were derived from the framework developed in *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework*. That chapter developed a narrative that linked the modern centralisation of states, to the creation of hierarchical social identities via biases in states institutions. These biases were manifest in dominant political nationalisms within those states, and in the emergence of minority identities and nationalisms. The theoretical terminology that was defined at each step of the narrative form this work's linguistic repertoires. These include terminology related to modern political nationalism, personal and group identity, and individual and group security.

[204] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 333)
[205] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 319)
[206] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 319)
[207] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 333)
[208] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 334)
[209] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 318)

3.4.3 Step 2: Sampling Procedure

Discourse Analysis looks at patterns in the use of language within sampled discourses to reveal relationships between language and the social contexts in which they were used. For a researcher to make valid claims about a social context they must select a sufficient sample of discourses for the issue being analysed. The sociologist, Herbert Blumer, established criteria for selecting data sources in social science research; These include representativeness, adequacy, and reliability.[210] The first step when sampling data is to define the authors, regions, and time periods that will make a sample representative of the 'activities, attitudes, and feelings which characterized a particular historical instance (of interest)'.[211]

This work is interested in identifying the moment that a minority decides to secede from a modern state due to its exclusion from its dominant political nationalisms. Theodor Herzl's 1896 pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State), has been selected as the defining primary document where political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism, entered the 19th Century European Jewish consciousness. This choice is supported by major scholars of Political Zionism.[212] Theodor Herzl's The Jewish State represented an observable pivot in the European Jewish identity from pre-nationalist to nationalist.

The baseline for the pre-nationalist Viennese Jewish identity can be defined using Herzl's discourse that preceded *Der Judenstaat*. Herzl wrote a theatrical play, *Das Neue Ghetto* (The New Ghetto) in 1894 which was his first theatrical work on the Jewish Question in Europe. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, Herzl outlined the transition of European Jewry

[210] (Mariampolski & Hughes, 2014, p. 61) (Gidley, 2014, p. 45)
[211] (Mariampolski & Hughes, 2014, p. 61) (Gidley, 2014, p. 45)
[212] (Avineri, 2014, p. 85), (Kornberg, 1993, p. 164)

from accepted members of their host societies into excluded, non-national minorities. An English-language version of this play could not be sourced. A German-language copy was sourced from the University of Michigan. The copy was published in 1903 by the *Industrie* printing house. This researcher worked with the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies at University College London to translate the German edition into an English-language copy. This researcher's contribution to the English-language copy was producing the initial, rough translation using automated translation software, and editing it for grammatical consistency. He also edited the translated text for theoretical consistency with contemporary, English-language, Political Science.

The third major documentary resource to be analysed will be Herzl's 1902 novel, *Altneuland* (The Old New Land). This novel was a detailed representation of Theodor Herzl's vision for a future Jewish national state in Historic Israel or Ottoman Palestine. *Der Judenstaat* is a relatively lean source despite its historical significance. Herzl's *Altneuland* is around three times longer than *Der Judenstaat* and can be used to add detail and context to Herzl's earlier work. At the same time, *Altneuland* was written when Theodor Herzl was a well-known Jewish nationalist figure across Europe, and it reflected his new status as a political figure who was sensitive to his work being consumed by important constituencies. This means that *Alteneuland* may be a distinct source of its own and any links to *Der Judenstaat* must be made with caution. This is especially relevant because this work is investigating the European Jewish identity at a specific place and time, i.e. Central Europe in 1896 when *Der Judenstaat* was published.

Fourth, Theodor Herzl's personal diaries are a valuable supplement to the above primary documents. Suzanne Berns, the curator of the Theodor Herzl Archives, argues that the diaries,

> combined the qualities of a confessional notebook, a policy manual, and a diplomatic log. In them, Herzl tested rhetorical strategies, outlined his political

> agenda, and evaluated encounters with global leaders, financiers, and religious authorities. They serve as both a record of his evolving ideology and a study in leadership under pressure.[213]

Theodor Herzl's private diaries provide an unfiltered insight into how he perceived his social world. The other primary documents were written with public consumption in mind. Theodor Herzl was a savvy political journalist, lawyer, and playwright. He shaped his public discourse to suit his audiences. His private discourse reveals a more passionate and unfiltered political mind. Theodor Herzl's diaries have been widely translated and distributed. They cover nearly 2,000 pages across 18 volumes, and from the years 1895 to his death in 1904. One limitation of the diaries is that Herzl began keeping them in 1895 after he was already a Jewish nationalist. They are less useful for understanding his transition towards Jewish nationalism. On the other hand, they are invaluable when attempting to understand his perceptions of his social environment and his motivations in the late 19th Century.

Finally, the four major documentary references will be supported by other works by Herzl including his speeches to the Jewish-nationalist political conventions, or the Zionist Congresses, a limited selection of his newspaper articles for the Zionist newspaper, *Die Welt*, and by his private correspondence.

There is a general concern in the social sciences that samples of historical documents may not fully represent a society as a whole because there may be biases in the original production and preservation of documents.[214] This may be less of an issue for Discourse Analysis since it explicitly relies on discourses being reflective of the structure of the society in which they were produced. This structure would include a society's biases, including which voices were dominant. *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical*

[213] (Berns, 2025)
[214] (Scott J. , 2014, p. 6)

Framework argued that the higher social standing of national patriots, like Theodor Herzl, may have been an important predictor of their future leadership roles in national movements. Therefore, the disproportionate focus on upper-class, elitist, intellectuals, like Theodor Herzl, may be the appropriate choice if the aim is to represent the construction of minority national movements in 19th Century European societies. The discourses of authors like Herzl were prioritized during that period because of their social standing and they should therefore be emphasized in contemporary analyses.

Once a sample is defined, researchers may then determine whether the available resources are 'adequate'. Adequacy depends on which documents were preserved and transmitted to the present.[215] 'The major constraint in using primary data sources is that data collection and transmission procedures are beyond the control of the researcher. They are artifacts of what was recorded and survived'.[216] When making historical claims using archival resources, there is 'significance to be attached to the presence or absence of material'.[217] Biases over which documents ultimately survived may be the outcome of intervening periods, and their unique social structures and biases; These may change the distribution of discourses in historical archives over time. If this is the case, the surviving historical discourses may not be representative of a society on the issue of interest and may undermine historical claims based on archival research. The presence and severity of this issue may be measured by comparing the ideal sample of resources based on the measures of representativeness with the available resources in an archive's registry. If gaps are found in an archive's adequacy these should be addressed during data interpretation as qualifiers on any claims made. The documents considered in this work were prominent at the time of their publishing. These works have survived to the present day. This obviates some issues around 'adequacy'. It was known

[215] (Mariampolski & Hughes, 2014, p. 63)
[216] (Mariampolski & Hughes, 2014, pp. 61-62)
[217] (Burgess, 2014, p. 15)

then, as now, that *Der Judenstaat* was Theodor Herzl's foundational document for Political Zionism. Theodor Herzl's prominence within his lifetime, and his centrality to the Zionist movement, meant that there was a contemporary effort to preserve his public and private discourse. These include the other documents references in this work. Herzl's prominence, combined with his relatively short life and political career, means that his discourse has survived and could be sufficiently reviewed to identify the most relevant documents for this work's purposes.[218]

Finally, researchers should evaluate the reliability of the historical documents they use as data during their analyses. Reliability is measured by both the credibility of the documents' original authors, and the accuracy of the transmission of their discourses over time.[219] Similar to above, the first issue is less consequential in Discourse Analysis because it is interested in the perspective of authors themselves and how that reflects a subjective social world, rather than using those perspectives to recreate an objective reality. Researchers should still determine whether the documents they analyse are similar to the original documents as they were produced. Otherwise, they may not be accurate representations of the original authors' perspectives, and therefore invalid according to the principles of Discourse Analysis. The accuracy of the surviving documents selected for this work may have one minor issue concerning their reliability. All the documents analysed in this work are English translations of their 19th Century German originals. Furthermore, the translators of these texts may have made anachronistic choices during their translations by applying terminology from modern political concepts and ideologies to a time when they were non-existent or inappropriate. Reviews of this work's sample of documents suggests that this may not be a significant issue. First, translators would be aware that multiple translations of Herzl's works exist

[218] Note: Theodor Herzl died in 1904 at the age of 44. This was less than a decade after he published *Der Judenstaat* in 1896.
[219] (Mariampolski & Hughes, 2014, p. 64)

and these act as a check on their reliability. Furthermore, reviews of this work's sample of Theodor Herzl's translated texts did not present any major deviations from the political thought of his lifetime. This is facilitated by the fact that Theodor Herzl consciously, explicitly, and consistently referred to the political and social ideologies of his time and place as part of his political platform. This means that the translations of his discourse can be compared with other reliable contemporary discourse to support the reliability of the reproductions of his discourse.

3.4.4 Step 3: Data Collection

After the units of analysis have been defined, and the samples have been selected, a discourse analyst may then collect the data that will be analysed and interpreted to answer their research questions. This process includes multiple readings of each sampled discourse and recording the appearance, frequency, significance, prominence, and context of each linguistic repertoire.[220] This is more than a quantitative summary of the presence of a linguistic repertoire and must involve qualitative analysis. The research should, 'study the text semantically and syntactically, employ rules of logic, relate the meaning of parts of the text to the whole document and the general thinking of the author'.[221] The output of the data collection process will be transcripts of each sampled discourse with annotations for the presence and context of units of analysis within them.

3.4.5 Step 4: Data Analysis and Interpretation

The final step of Discourse Analysis is data analysis and interpretation. The data collection step revealed the presence of linguistic repertoires in samples of discourse.

[220] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 316)
[221] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 320)

The appearance of units of analysis in a sampled discourse is ‘not considered accidental but is taken to express an author's thinking patterns or to correspond with a speaker's communicative intentions. Such occurrences are thought to signify 'cognitive representations of social reality''.[222] In line with the principles of Discourse Analysis, this presence of a unit of analysis reflects the relationship between the use of that linguistic repertoire and the social context in which it was used. The data will be analysed and interpreted to answer the research questions, and to determine if there is support for the underlying hypothesis. Specifically, the data will be used as evidence to understand when Theodor Herzl decided that European Jews, like himself, were minorities in nationalising European states based on their changing self-perspectives as reflected in their discourses. It would then be used to determine if Theodor Herzl, as a Viennese Jew, perceived and described himself as increasingly insecure in 19th Century Europe. It will also be determined whether his insecurity was understood to be based on his exclusion from Christian Austro-German nationalism. Finally, the data will be used to understand how Theodor Herzl perceived nationalism, and the role that nationalism could have in restoring Jewish senses of security.

3.5 Conclusion

This dissertation’s theoretical objective is to understand why minority populations within existing modern and nationalising states secede to create new nation-states of their own. It considers the case of Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, which was developed by the 19th Century Jewish figure, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), while he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This chapter argued that the research methodology of Discourse Analysis may be a suitable means for resolving this work’s

[222] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 320)

hypothesis. Specifically, it was argued that Discourse Analysis may be used to answer three research questions that were derived from the hypothesis.

Chapter 4 then discussed the methodological suitability of Discourse Analysis for addressing the hypothesis and its research questions. It argued that identity is a social object according to theories of social identity. Identities are the products of an individual's place within a social context, including the position of an individual within a society. Theories of social identity also claim that group identities are embedded in an individual's identity, and they may capture features of a group beyond an individual's personal experiences. Discourse Analysis claims that patterns of language are representative of the user's underlying social context, including their individual and group identities. Taken together, Discourse Analysis should be a suitable methodology to address this work's hypothesis for the creation of minority national identities in existing state-societies. Specifically, Discourse Analysis may be used to establish that Theodor Herzl's discourse was an adequate representation of his underlying identity as a Jew within 19th Century Austrian society.

Chapter 4 *Methodology* is the second and final chapter in this work's section on its theoretical and methodological foundations. *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework* established the theoretical background for this work's hypothesis and analyses. It reviewed the theories of International Relations and modern nationalism that address this work's assumptions around the modern centralisation of states. Chapter 2 then presented this work's interpretation of the relationship between the centralisation of modern states and the creation of exclusive political nationalisms within them. It also outlined this work's claims and assumptions around the creation of minority nationalisms, and national identities, within existing states. Finally, *Chapter 3 Research Methodology* presented the methodology of Discourse Analysis as a suitable

means for testing its hypothesis. This work will now apply these theoretical and methodical foundations to its case study and discourse analyses.

Section: Case Study: The Transformation of Theodor Herzl from a German Nationalist to Jewish Nationalist Between 1867 and 1896

4. Case Study: Part 1. Theodor Herzl and the Assimilation of Germanised Habsburg Jews into Austrian Society Between 1848-1879

4.1 Section Introduction

Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism when he called for a Jewish nation-state in 1896. Herzl's call to action cannot be separated from his life experiences as a Jew in late-19th Century Vienna.[223] The life and work of Theodor Herzl require the context of a political society that was in transition from relatively inclusive political liberalism to exclusive, antisemitic, Christian, Austro-German, nationalism. As Jacques Kornberg wrote, 'Zionism was the outcome of … rejection, ostracism, and political powerlessness.'[224] This section presents the story of the Habsburg Empire's German-assimilating Jews, and of Theodor Herzl, through the lens of this work's research questions. First, it supports this work's hypothesis that Viennese Jews became excluded minorities during the rise of a powerful, exclusive, Austro-German national movement. It will also discuss how Viennese Jews, including Theodor Herzl, were socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged as a result of their exclusion from that national movement. Finally, it will argue that these experiences of exclusion and social insecurity motivated Theodor Herzl to found political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism. Altogether, the story of the Viennese Jews, the life of Theodor Herzl, and the

[223] Note: Much of the background data in this chapter concerning the status of Jews in the Austrian Monarchy were originally sourced for the final paper of a taught module, ID7003, at Trinity College Dublin. Some of the data is reproduced verbatim from that final paper. The module's instructors and my PhD supervisor approved of this purpose before I registered for the module. This reproduction is in line with Trinity College Dublin's 'Guidelines for the Submission of Theses and Dissertations' for previously published work.

[224] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 8)

emergence of Political Zionism will be shown to be inseparable from the social context of a two-step process in The Habsburg Empire, and its capital of Vienna. The first step was the advantageous inclusion of Jews during Austria's Liberal Era between 1867-1879. The second was the threatened, antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Vienna's political, economic, and social systems in the 1880s and 1890s.

The experience of Theodor Herzl and Vienna's German-assimilated Jews in the 19th Century will be divided into three chapters that document the rise and fall of Jewish inclusion in Austria. This section opens with *Chapter 4: Case Study: Part 1. Theodor Herzl and the Assimilation of Germanised Habsburg Jews into Austrian Society Between 1848-1879.* As its title suggests, this chapter discusses the positive integration of Jews in the Habsburg Empire via German assimilation. Jewish assimilation is further subdivided into two periods. The 'emancipation' period covers 1848-1867 and saw the removal of legal obstacles to Jewish participation in Habsburg society. This occurred as part of the broader integration of ethnicities and classes into European politics, societies, and economies following the continent-wide revolutions of 1848. Ethnic minorities and the lower classes were granted expanded civil and political rights to increase their productivity in centralising states, and to reduce their revolutionary urges.[225] Theodor Herzl entered the world as an emancipated Jew. He was born in 1860 in Pest to a wealthy, Hungarian, commercial family. As was typical for nouveau-riche provincial Jews, he was educated in the imperial capital, Vienna.[226] Emancipation was followed by a 'liberal golden age' for Austro-Hungarian Jews who experienced rapid upward social mobility as they gained opportunities in Habsburg society. This second period peaked in the 1870s before gradually declining after the emergence of Christian, Austro-German nationalism which undermined social and political liberalism. Herzl entered the University of Vienna in 1878 near the end of the Liberal Era. Jews still faced some formal

[225] (Avineri, 2014, p. 28)
[226] (Cohen, 1959, p. 19)

and informal restrictions but they also had more opportunities for social advancement than ever before.[227] A Jewish Herzl could never fully assimilate into the Austro-German social identity but he subscribed to German culture and nationalism because it promised tolerance and inclusion for German-assimilated minorities.[228] The failure of liberalism and the rise of Christian, Austro-German, ethno-nationalism affected Herzl's academic, social, and professional prospects.

Chapter 5: Case Study: Part 2. The Rise of Christian Austro-German Nationalism and the Exclusion of Jews in Vienna (1879-1896) continues with the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese and Austrian society by Christian, Austro-German nationalists. This phase is marked by the election of Karl Lueger as the antisemitic mayor of Vienna in 1895. Jews across Europe experienced inter-national conflict alongside other minorities during the continent's political evolution towards narrower, ethno-national identities. Unlike other minorities, though, European Jews were generally a small and dispersed minority, and the construction of their reactive national identities would be unlike any other. It is no coincidence that Theodor Herzl's nationalist awakening overlapped with the rise and fall of Jewish inclusion in Austrian society. The experiences of Cisleithanian Jews, including those of Theodor Herzl, aligned with Miroslav Hroch's predictions for small-nation nationalism and the patriots who advocated for it.[229] The aforementioned periods help contextualize the life of Theodor Herzl as he progressed from a loyal, emancipated, and Germanised Habsburg subject to an excluded and nationalist Jew. It is an analytical choice of this work to limit its focus to the Habsburg Jewish populations that formed Theodor Herzl's immediate social environments. The Habsburg Jewry was far too large, geographically dispersed, and socially diverse to be fully considered for the purposes of this work. This choice is consistent with the precepts of Discourse

[227] (Avineri, 2014, p. 28)
[228] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 6)
[229] Discussed in Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Analysis. Herzl's understanding of his Jewish identity within the nationalising Habsburg Empire was informed by his own experiences, and the experiences of other Jews that he directly observed. In fact, it is known that Herzl only began studying wider Jewish demography in his later life after he became a Jewish nationalist.[230] Specifically, this case study will focus on Herzl's early years in Hungary, and his adolescence and adulthood in the imperial capital of Vienna.

Theodor Herzl's shift towards Jewish nationalism came after Jews like himself were excluded from Christian, Austro-German nationalism. This social transformation is discussed in *Chapter 6: Case Study: Part 3. Theodor Herzl and the Creation of Political Zionism as a Response to Christian, Austro-German Political Antisemitism.* Herzl was greatly embittered by his rejection from Viennese society and it was in this period that he began engaging the future of Jews in Europe, antisemitism, and Jewish nationalism. It was through his rejection from Austro-German society that Herzl came to perceive Jews as part of a 'large social group integrated … by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical).'[231] As Miroslav Hroch explained, national exclusion by the ruling class of a centralised state may be a necessary process by which minorities become aware of their own national identities.[232]

[230] (Avineri, 2014, pp. 93-97)
[231] (Hroch, 2000, p. 4)
[232] (Hroch, 2000, p. 8)

4.2 The Birth of Theodor Herzl into an Emancipated Jewry (1848-1867)

4.2.1 Introduction

The evolution of Hungarian society is relevant for understanding Theodor Herzl's early life as a 19th Century Hungarian Jew, and for his future in Viennese society. Later sections discuss why German assimilation was advantageous but also insufficient for social mobility in Vienna. Wealth and higher education were requirements for political suffrage and elite cultural participation. The embourgeoisement of Jews in Hungary was facilitated by the latter's unique social structure. The German assimilation and social progress that the Herzl family experienced in Hungary facilitated Theodor Herzl's later social ascent in Vienna. This work argues that Theodor Herzl's failed social mobility was a precondition for Political Zionism and its philosophies.

Theodor Herzl was born in the Kingdom of Hungary in 1860 before the creation of the Dual Monarchy. Hungarian society was distinct from the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire due to its persistent feudal social structure and its delayed transition to modernity.[233] Hungary was sharply divided between a powerful, compact nobility and agrarian masses. Hungary was without a significant, independent middle class until the mid-19th Century. Unlike their counterparts in Austria and the Czech lands, the Hungarian noble class did not generally transition to capitalism and industrialism after the end of serfdom. The Hungarian peasantry lacked the capacity to do so on their own. This created an opening for Hungarian Jews to disproportionately become the Hungarian bourgeoisie. 'Hungarian capitalism was almost exclusively in Jewish hands since the aristocracy and gentry looked down on industry and commerce.'[234] The Hungarian nobility recognized that Jews were a vital link to modernity and the

[233] (Ben-David, Joseph, 1997, p. 61)
[234] (Kann, 1945, p. 366)

nationalisation of the state, and this protected Jews from state-led antisemitism through the early 20th Century.[235]

The emancipation of the Jews in Hungary was granted by both the central Habsburg state and the regional Hungarian Diet for social, economic, and nationalist reasons. There were earlier attempts to integrate Jews into Hungarian society but the modern emancipation programme began after 1840. The earlier 18th Century Habsburg reforms integrated an insular Hungarian Jewry into the Habsburg state's centralising authority. These foundations in the German language, German identity, modern education, and military service prepared the Jewish population for later and more widespread reforms in the 19th Century. The emancipatory reforms after 1840 built on earlier efforts and transformed the Jewish population from rural small business owners, craftsmen, and traders into Hungary's urban and industrial class. Theodor Herzl's family history followed the progression of Jewish emancipation in Hungary. It is consistent with Miroslav Hroch's theories of small-nation nationalism to claim that Theodor Herzl's evolution into the Jewish nationalist patriot may have been an outcome of these emancipatory reforms and the acculturated Jewish society that they created.

4.2.2 Early Jewish Integration in the Kingdom of Hungary: 1781-1848

Emperor Joseph II issued the Edicts of Toleration in 1781 to turn the Jews into useful subjects. The edicts were implemented in the Kingdom of Hungary as the *Sistematica Gentis Judaicae Regulatio* on 31 March 1783. Many of the associated reforms lapsed at the emperor's death in 1790 but they had lasting effects on Hungarian Jewry.[236] Jewish identities were transformed when they were ordered to adopt German names. This was done to register Jews in the Germanising Habsburg administrative state and

[235] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 364)
[236] (Silber, 2008a)

central military. Visible symbols of Jewish appearance were either abolished or made optional, including once-mandatory beards. The Jewish languages of Hebrew and Yiddish were banned outside of religious practice, and official documents had to be written in Hungary's state languages of German, Latin, or Hungarian.[237] These reforms integrated insular Jews into a standardised imperial political culture.

The edicts also attempted to integrate Jews into the economic and social life of the modernising monarchy. Census data indicates that Jews occupied the geographical and social periphery before the 1780s. Of the 80,000 Hungarian Jews, one-third were unemployed and destitute, one-third were small business owners and artisans in agrarian villages, and the remainder were small rural traders. A very narrow upper class of merchants existed.[238] In the 18th Century, Jews were economically constricted and bound to their feudal landlords. Peddling was the primary occupation listed for Jews in the census of 1735-1738.[239] The new edicts banned traditional Jewish occupations but also created a modern education system. Twenty-three secondary schools were established for Jewish boys to prepare them for modern occupations, including mathematics, and reading and writing in the state languages. They also gained access to guild apprenticeships and universities for the first time. Jews were technically conscripted into the Hungarian armies but they avoided service in practice. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars interacted with the other social transformations of Hungarian Jews to produce an economic boom for the Jewish population.[240] Hungarian Jews were ideally suited to become commercial suppliers for the centralised armed forces. Their modern German-language education and urban links complemented their experience in the rural trade economy to create a broadened Jewish commercial class

[237] (Silber, 2008b)
[238] (Silber, 2008b)
[239] (Ben-David, Joseph, 1997, p. 63)
[240] (Ben-David, Joseph, 1997, p. 73)

in Hungarian towns and cities.[241] Finally, Jews were allowed to legally reside anywhere, excluding the strictly controlled mining towns. By the 1830s, 40% of Jews lived in larger market towns and 6% lived in the city of Pest.[242] These reforms transformed the social profile of Hungarian Jews within a century.

4.2.3 Jewish Emancipation in the Kingdom of Hungary: 1848-1867

The Hungarian nobility and burghers initially resented the freedoms extended to Jews after the Edicts of Toleration. The Hungarian nobility softened their stance in the first half of the 19th Century because they saw the value of the Jewish commercial class to Hungary's own nationalist aspirations. The experiences of the French and Napoleonic Wars revealed that commercial Jews were experienced in economic development, commerce, and marketing. The Hungarian nobility lacked these skills themselves. The Habsburgs already understood these benefits of Jewish integration since Joseph II. The nobility set about to reform the civil status of Jews to further integrate them into Hungarian society.[243]Jews became a favoured class under the Hungarian elite and were granted relative equality in Law 29 of 1840.[244]

Emancipatory reforms accelerated during the neo-absolutist era after the failed Hungarian National Revolution of 1848. The centralised Austro-German state directly ruled the Kingdom of Hungary until 1867. The Habsburg state's Germanising policies returned to a defeated Hungary and these affected its Jews in particular.[245] Jews were once again free to move to the cities to pursue opportunities in the 1850s. In 1850, 17,618 Jews lived in Buda and Pest. By the late 1860s, 45,000 of the 135,000 Hungarian

[241] (Silber, 2008b)
[242] (Silber, 2008a)
[243] (Ben-David, Joseph, 1997, p. 73)
[244] (Cohen, 1959, p. 19)
[245] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 27)

Jews lived in Pest, with a further 10,000 in other cities. This ballooned to 100,000 Jews, or 20% of the united Budapest's population by 1890. Jewish urbanisation was complemented by a reinvigorated push towards formal education. Over three hundred German-language secondary schools were established for Jews, and German became the common language amongst the Jewish population by the end of the decade. These changes formed the 'basis for a broad urban-based Jewish middle class and later the rise of the Jewish *zaibatsu*, a small coterie of businessmen that helped to foster Hungary's independent national industry and banking system.'[246] Altogether, these social changes, including 'free migration, the emerging bourgeois class, the influence of (liberal) Reform Judaism among German Jewry, economic development'[247] and the expansion of the education system gradually transformed Western Hungary's Jewish population towards political, social, and economic liberalism.[248]

Theodor Herzl entered the world during this transformative era. Herzl's family was representative of a Jewry in transition and they straddled the old and new Jewish worlds. Like most urbanised Jews, 'the families of Herzl's parents moved from the provinces after incentives of the Industrial Revolution'[249] to the large cities and capitals. His father, Jacob Herzl, was born in 1835 in Semlin, outside of Belgrade. Jacob Herzl was a religiously observant grandson of a rabbi, and his father, Simon Leib Herzl, 'was a pious and active member in the Jewish community of (Semlin) and a well-respected merchant.'[250] Jacob was educated in one of the Habsburg's national secondary schools before moving to Pest in 1856.[251] He opened a successful transport and commission agency in 1857. He married Jeanette Diament, the daughter of a wealthy, secular,

[246] (Silber, 2008b)
[247] (Ben-David, Joseph, 1997, p. 69)
[248] (Ben-David, Joseph, 1997, p. 57)
[249] (Avineri, 2014, p. 52)
[250] (Shnidman, 2018) (Cohen, 1959, p. 19)
[251] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 60)

German-acculturated, Jewish industrialist. Jeanette's family intermarried or converted to Christianity to integrate into Pest society.[252]

Theodor Herzl was born on 2 May 1860. His family spoke German and Hungarian at home, and not Yiddish.[253] The family home was close to the Great Synagogue in Pest's Jewish Quarter. A young Theodor worshiped with his father on Shabbat and holidays. He also attended the Jewish preparatory school.[254] His religious father ensured that he had an education in Hebrew and Jewish theology with a private tutor. At the same time, German-oriented, liberal Jews from across the Habsburg Empire's Czech and Hungarian provinces followed a well-defined socio-cultural progression that was upward funnelling, mobile, and integrative.[255] This social pathway is discussed below in detail in 4.3. Social and political liberalism was attractive to these Jews. Under liberalism, individuals had intrinsic civil rights that were disconnected from their religion, place of origin, or other social features. Liberalism's inclusivity promised to end anti-Jewish sentiment by making Jews full members of their societies. The educational and economic opportunities from German assimilation proved enticing.[256] Like Herzl's forebearers, German-speaking Jewish industrialists and merchants made their money in the empire's provinces before moving to the regional or imperial capital cities. Hungarian Jews maximized the opportunities of emancipation and followed the same social pathways as their Cisleithanian counterparts. By 1910, they owned 85% of financial institutions, 54% of commercial firms, and 11.9% of industries. Hungarian Jews also managed these businesses; They were 42% of financial managers, 62% of

[252] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 13)
[253] (Avineri, 2014, p. 52)
[254] (Cohen, 1959, p. 13)
[255] (McCagg, 1989, p. 148)
[256] (Patai, 1996, p. 313) (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 369)

commercial managers, and 43.9% of industrial managers.[257] At a time when 3.8% of the population could be considered middle class, 25% of the middle class was Jewish.[258]

The Jewish commercial and industrial class enrolled their sons in the German-language *realschulen* (general secondary schools), or the more rigorous *gymnasiums*. These young men then advanced to the empire's universities.[259] Jewish scions subsequently entered the liberal professions at the forefront of middle-class society. By 1867, 20% of *gymnasium* students were Jewish. Hungarian Jews were 51.6% of medical students and 35.5% of political science students at universities. Jews were 62.1% of private doctors, 41% of public doctors, and 36.8% of journalists in this period.[260] In line with expectations, Theodor was enrolled in the *realschule* at age 10 but local antisemitism forced his parents to transfer him to the classical *gymnasium*, which had a Jewish majority.[261]

4.2.4 Jewish Emancipation in Hungary after 1867

Jews became full citizens of a modern constitutional state after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. Theodor Herzl was 7 years old when all remaining legal encumbrances on Jews and other minorities were removed across the newly styled 'Dual Monarchy of Austria and Hungary'. The Kingdom of Hungary regained its prior functional independence after nearly two decades of Austrian martial law. 'The Compromise of 1867 created a two-headed, quasi-federal system. Two capitals, two parliaments, two PMs, two cabinets, with a common government responsible for foreign affairs, the military, and the finances.'[262]

[257] (Patai, 1996, p. 433)
[258] (Patai, 1996, p. 439)
[259] (Beller, 1989, p. 34)
[260] (Patai, 1996, p. 435)
[261] (Penslar, 2020, pp. 17-18) (Kornberg, 1993, pp. 13-14)
[262] (Avineri, 2014, p. 48)

Since the Middle Ages, the Hungarian Magyar 'aristocracy and the gentry landowners preserved their ascendancy in Hungarian society. … Each group possessed independent social power while, arguably, no other social group did so enduringly on a wide scale.'[263] The Hungarian elite controlled the land, the resources, the population, and the political institutions in the counties and in the central parliament.[264] Hungarian politics continued to be dominated by an ethnic Hungarian, or Magyar, aristocracy after the Compromise. 'Restricted voting rights and gerrymandered districts helped to assure the Hungarian Liberal Party a safe majority in the parliament from the mid-1870s through the 1890s, and the Liberal Party ministers carefully managed legislative business.'[265] Gary Cohen wrote that Hungary's Magyar political liberals and Austria's German liberals 'both used systems of limited suffrage and gerrymandering of the parliamentary voting districts to bolster the strength of their propertied and educated constituents and protect their own partisan interest.'[266.267] Hungary was nominally governed by a liberal party from the 1870s through the Great War, but it lacked most of the enlightened ideologies that is traditionally associated with liberalism. The exception was a high property requirement that limited franchise to 6% of the population.[268] This proportion persisted into the 20th Century.[269] 'In Hungary, the Magyar propertied and bureaucratic elites' resistance to suffrage reform and government efforts to centralize state administration impeded the penetration of societal interests into policy making during the whole dualist era.'[270] Voting rights were denied for 'the poor peasants, the workers, part of the petite bourgeoisie, clerks and servants.'[271] The government and Hungarian Diet also suppressed the involvement of other ethnicities and nationalities within the state. In

[263] (Peter, 1992, p. 77)
[264] (Peter, 1992, p. 77)
[265] (Cohen G. , 2007, p. 255)
[266] (Cohen G. , 2007, p. 249)
[267] The Austrian case is considered in the following section, 4.2.
[268] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 361)
[269] (Peter, Laszlo, 1997, p. 87)
[270] (Cohen G. , 2007, p. 255)
[271] (Berenger, 1997, p. 241)

Hungary, the slim majority of Magyars 'held 405 parliamentary seats, whereas the "minority" of 45.5 percent was represented by 8 deputies, 3 Slovaks and 5 Rumanians'.[272] Magyar control of the state's central administration, 'the Budapest parliament and the counties meant that the non-Magyar nationalities and the lower classes had little direct role in Hungary's government and public administration'[273] through the mid-to-late 19th Century. Furthermore, the Hungarian Liberal Party discriminated against their co-ethnics and only addressed the needs of the narrow elite.[274] Laszlo Peter cites that for decades after 1867 the presidency, the cabinet, and the 'parliament was, by and large, a 'one class' assembly of landowners and their descendants. The upper chamber was as securely dominated by the aristocracy as the elected chamber was by the gentry. Three-quarters of the House of Magnates' members were titled nobles even after the I885 reform. Again, over three-quarters of the House of Representatives' members belonged to the nobility.'[275]

Unlike conventional liberalism, Hungarian politics did not represent the political and economic compromises between the middle classes against the aristocracy. It was the cooperative effort between the nobility and the bourgeoisie, who were subservient to the needs of the ruling class.[276] 'Social and economic barriers (also) prevented the proletarian classes, Magyars as well as minority nationalities,'[277] from rising to fill these roles. Hungarian Jews became the bourgeoisie because the 'aristocracy and gentry looked down on industry and commerce'[278], and Jews were the most suited to fill these roles. As Raphael Patai wrote, Hungarian Jews 'were considered a necessary

[272] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 360)
[273] (Cohen G. , 2007, p. 263)
[274] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 360)
[275] (Peter, Laszlo, 1997, p. 89)
[276] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 360)
[277] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 363)
[278] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 366)

complementary element in the Hungarian social pyramid, one who performed the tasks Christian Hungarians were unable, or rather unwilling, to shoulder.'[279]

Similar to Austria though, Jews were tacitly blocked from the highest levels of the Hungarian government, including in the army, the judiciary, and the civil service. This exclusion was even stronger in Hungary than in Austria. Whereas 36% of government employees in Austria were German, 96% of public employees were Magyar.[280] This was because the Hungarian nobility and gentry were significantly poorer than their Austrian counterparts with over two-thirds of the nobility being classified as poor. They bore the epithet of the 'sandalled nobles'.[281] The Magyar gentry, and especially the lower gentry, defended their exclusive access to public offices after serfdom ended when they discovered that they were unsuited for other types of work.[282]

Inclusion in post-1867 Hungary came at a cost, and Jews were expected to assimilate into the Magyar identity below the nobility. Magyars were actually a minority in Hungary (including Croatia-Slavonia) at 45.5% of the population. 35.5% were Germans, and the rest were Rumanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Ruthenians, and Croats. With Jews being historically German-acculturated, and being nearly 5% of the population, the dominant Magyars were keen to assimilate the valuable Jewish population to maintain Magyar dominance in their own nationalising society.[283] The Hungarian state attempted to transform Germanised Jews into Magyars using similar methods to the earlier Germanisation programs. The spokesman for the Hungarian Liberal Party argued that 'Since patriotism is inconceivable without a common language, our task must be to create one ... What we expect from them is not only that they speak the Magyar

[279] (Patai, 1996, p. 360)
[280] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 360)
[281] (Peter, Laszlo, 1992, p. 80)
[282] (Patai, 1996, p. 433)
[283] (Kann R. A., 1945, p. 359)

vernacular but that they start to feel like Magyars themselves.'[284] 'Overnight, the Jewish school system universally switched to Magyar as the language of instruction.'[285] In the mid-1870s the Hungarian state 'worked to make Magyar the language of all important government services, … and to require Magyar as a subject in the higher forms of all elementary and in all secondary schools.'[286] After 1867, the Hungarian state similarly demanded that all universities and technical colleges in Hungary proper used Magyar as the language of instruction.'[287]

In the post-1867 period, social mobility in Hungary became tied to Magyarization. Many Hungarian Jews adapted as European Jews had done for centuries and they began assimilating into the dominant Magyar culture. In 1848, Hungary's Jews spoke German or Yiddish but by the turn of the century 75% of Jews listed Hungarian as their mother tongue. Only 54.4% of the dominant Hungarian Roman Catholics could make that claim.[288] Another indicator of the Magyarization of Hungarian Jews was the substitution of their German names for Hungarian ones. 'The state played a crucial role in this process: during the Dualist Era, Hungary, unlike Germany and Russia, encouraged Jews to change their names … When the trend was at its height between 1881 and 1919, altogether an estimated 45,000 Jews changed their names, constituting about 60 percent of all name changers.'[289]

4.2.5 Hungarian Nationalism and the Emigration of German Assimilated Jews

The fifty years between the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 and the First World War were perceived as one 'golden age' for Hungarian Jews. Jews were equal members

[284] (Cohen G. , 2007, p. 263)
[285] (Silber, 2008b)
[286] (Cohen G. , 2007, p. 262)
[287] ((Cohen G. , 2007, p. 263)
[288] (Patai, 1996, p. 431)
[289] (Silber, 2008b)

of the Hungarian nation for the first time. There were no formal provisions that disadvantaged them as Jews.[290] They had become the 'most-educated, intellectual, and well-to-do element in the country'[291], and beyond that, they were also appreciated for their achievements in a way that was unthinkable in late-19th Century Austria. Not all Hungarian Jews chose to Magyarize, though. Many German-acculturated Hungarian Jews held on to their German identities due to their attachment to the Austrian Habsburg state and society, and their belief in the liberal values of the German Reformation. These Jews were uncertain that modern liberalism would continue in a politically underdeveloped and autocratic Hungary. German liberals, in general, were aware that they were a privileged minority in the Habsburg Empire. Self-confessed ethnic Germans were only one-third of the total Habsburg population. Ethnic Germans were minorities everywhere in the empire besides Austria but their dominance of the central administration, as discussed in Section 4.2, meant that 'the state language was German; the capital city was German. Vienna's university was one of the foremost places of German learning. Germans headed the bureaucracy; the constitution was based on the principle of (State Germandom) – Germans in Austria were the ruling class.'[292] As a result, the minority of ethnic Germans continued to be 'the most urbanized, most educated and prosperous, (and) dominant in government and in the army. The empire's high culture – theatre, music, the arts, literature – and its academic and scientific culture, were all German.'[293] In the 1860s and 1870s, Germans advocated for equality for all groups in the Cisleithanian half of the empire without regard for religious, national, or linguistic backgrounds as long as they assimilated below them into the Austro-German culture.[294] Germans believed in the 'need to assimilate minority nationalities into Germandom'[295] as a means of reinforcing the centralised, German-led, Habsburg state.

[290] (Patai, 1996, p. 359)
[291] (Patai, 1996, p. 358)
[292] (Beller, 1989, p. 144)
[293] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 43)
[294] (Capkova, 2012, p. 67) (Beller, 1989, p. 154)
[295] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 43)

They hoped that assimilation into a German-dominated culture would prevent the diffusion of power amongst autonomous, national societies, where Germans could become subordinate classes.[296] Theirs was not an unfounded fear, as competing groups, including the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, were demanding nationally privileged states of their own within the Habsburg Empire. 19th Century German liberals found safe havens within Hungary's major cities and larger towns. Laszlo Peter argued that that Hungary's liberal bourgeoisie of wealthy merchants, bankers, and industrialists were majority Germans and German-affiliated Jews. The wealth of the Hungarian urban bourgeoisie gave them some cultural independence from Magyar domination and they maintained 'an outsider mentality' and an attachment to the central empire.[297] This marginal independence before 1867 allowed many Hungarian, German-assimilated Jews to cultivate and deepen their German identities.

After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867, Germanised Hungarian Jews who did not wish to Magyarize contributed to a major wave of Jewish immigrants to Austria from the 1860s to 1880s.[298] 43.5% of Vienna's Jews were of Hungarian origin in the years after the Compromise.[299] Theodor Herzl and his family were amongst these Hungarian emigres. Many Jews across the empire linked their civil equality and social mobility to German liberalism, and the associated German Reformation and Enlightenment. These sentiments were felt not only in Hungary but also amongst Germanised Jews in the Czech lands after the emergence of anti-German, Czech nationalism there. Liberalism offered a 'more secular, egalitarian society that would remove remaining barriers'[300] for Jews. Many liberal Jews across the Habsburg Empire therefore saw the promotion of German culture, and German assimilation, as keys to their own success. Vienna was

[296] (Beller, 1989, p. 155)
[297] (Peter, 1992, pp. 78, 90)
[298] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 27)
[299] (McCagg, 1989, p. 145)
[300] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 46)

seen as the most secure and attractive bastion of German culture, making it a desirable target for Jewish immigration from across the empire.[301] Like many upwardly mobile Jews, the Herzl family believed that political shifts in Hungary, the Czech lands, and Polish Galicia meant that Vienna was one of the few stable bastions of German-hood that they could depend on to maintain their social status. This was reflected in waves of Jewish migration to Vienna after 1867. [302] Jacob Herzl's attachment to German liberalism was demonstrated by his refusal to Magyarize his German family name after 1867.[303] The Herzl family decided to leave Budapest after the rise of Magyar nationalism in the 1870s. Theodor Herzl entered the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna in the Autumn of 1878. Theodor's only sibling, Pauline, died of Typhus in 1878 and his parents joined their son in the Imperial capital soon after.[304]

4.3 19th Century Political Liberalism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire

4.3.1 Introduction

This dissertation builds upon contemporary scholarship which argues that Austrian political liberalism defined a social hierarchy in Vienna around the economic, social, gender, and ethnic features of its political class between the 1860s and 1870s. Across Europe, the prerequisites for political enfranchisement were either the historic privileges of the nobility and the church, or the wealth and education of the liberal middle classes.[305] The same groups were disproportionately German in the Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as discussed below. This gave its enfranchised classes a distinctly German character. German liberal political parties maintained a numerical

[301] (Beller, 1989, p. 165)
[302] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 37)
[303] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 13)
[304] (Avineri, 2014, p. 51) (Kornberg, 1993, p. 6) (Penslar, 2020, p. 21)
[305] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 59)

majority in Cisleithania's central political institutions for nearly two decades from 1861 to 1879.[306] Austrian politics largely excluded women from its voting franchise in the *Reichsrat* elections of 1873, and this left powerful and wealthy German men at its political core. Some of the Austrian political historians who advanced these arguments include Birgitta Bader-Zaar (2024), Imke Meyer (2009), Steven Beller (2018), Gary B. Cohen (1986), and Jean Berenger (2014). This dissertation adds to their scholarship with the argument that Theodor Herzl incorporated this elite liberal hierarchy into his Political Zionism in 1895/1896 to maintain his class' physical and social security in a new Jewish state. This section establishes Austrian political liberalism in the middle third of the 19th Century as a baseline for Theodor Herzl's political philosophies in the late 19th Century.

Austrian political liberalism emerged during the radical liberal revolutions of the 1840s. 'After a brief interlude of participatory options during the revolutionary period of the late 1840s, elected bodies were (re)introduced in the early 1860s.'[307] Compromises between the liberals and the old establishment supported the enfranchisement of wider groups of Austrian citizens below the nobility.[308] The political franchise was disproportionately biased towards a restricted population that was socially elite, and either genealogically German or German self-identifying. A German-biased political liberalism established itself as a dominant force in the Cisleithanian legislature from 1861 to 1879.[309] Liberalism's combination of political dominance and restricted membership also shaped Vienna's social structure outside of politics. The electoral system privileged certain strata of society, namely, the wealthy and highly educated over the citizens paying lower taxes.[310] Steven Beller argued that Vienna's dominant Austro-German social character

[306] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 112)
[307] (Bader-Zaar, Democratization and the Practices of Voting , 2022, p. 109)
[308] (Bader-Zaar, Democratization and the Practices of Voting , 2022, p. 109)
[309] (Meyer, 2009, p. 4)
[310] (Bader-Zaar, Democratization and the Practices of Voting , 2022, p. 110)

meant that social groups positioned themselves relative to the German liberal political class. He argued that Vienna had a cosmopolitan pluralist reputation but that if a resident wanted to succeed in politics, economics, and culture, 'the boundaries of this pluralist integration were much narrower, and higher, than is often assumed.'[311] Political liberalism defined Vienna's social groups and structed their interactions through the end of the 19th Century, even after liberalism was no longer a dominant political force.

Vienna's political hierarchy is relevant for this work's thesis because political liberalism and the emancipation of Jews in the Habsburg Empire were mutually reinforcing phenomenon. The rise of political liberalism in Vienna was associated with a golden age of social mobility for German-assimilated Jews in the capital city. Viennese Jews were able to rapidly ascend into Vienna's bourgeoisie because of their willingness to culturally assimilate into Vienna's German culture. This simultaneously facilitated Jewish alignment with German political liberalism.[312] The decline of liberalism in central Austrian politics, and the rise of antisemitism in the capital, also had overlapping motivations. The decline of liberal politics led to the inclusion of other ethnicities and economic classes in the Reichsrat, which in turn led to the mobilization of German ethno-nationalist student movements and politicians.[313] The Jewish association with political and social liberalism tied Viennese Jews to the fate of liberalism in the mid-to-late 19th Century. Understanding the rise and fall of liberal politics in 19th Century Vienna is therefore essential to understanding Viennese society and the antisemitism that emerged within it. Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism was authored in this social context, and these historical developments are reflected in his political philosophies.

[311] (Beller, S. 1997, p. 117)
[312] (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 67), (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 118)
[313] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 65), (McGrath, William J., 1967. p. 196-197)

4.3.2 Austria's Liberal Era

'Liberal ideas of representation were first realised in Habsburg Austria during the revolution of 1848.'[314] The liberal bourgeoisie sought political inclusion in that revolution. They were suppressed by the state at the time but their political and social demands persisted.[315] The balance of power between the imperial state and the liberals shifted favourably towards the latter in the early 1860s. Emperor Francis Joseph was compelled to make political concessions to the bourgeois liberals after the empire lost its Italian provinces in the Second Italian War of Independence (1859-1860). The empire faced ongoing fiscal crises linked to its 19th Century wars.[316] In their 2024 work, Bader-Zaar explicitly linked the state's poor finances, and its need for economic expansion, to the Habsburg Empire's military defeats. She argued that the empire's fragile position 'forced the Emperor to allow a parliament and more autonomy for Habsburg Austria's crown-lands and municipalities.'[317] The Habsburg state drafted and enforced legal frameworks which supported liberal politics and economics. The state also provided the physical and financial infrastructure of a modern, capitalist economy.[318] The industrial and commercial middle classes contributed to an economic boom that lasted through the 1870s.[319] The mutually beneficial relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie was formalised via the latter's political inclusion. The political class of the 1860s-70s was intentionally and narrowly restricted to 'the rising wealthy bourgeoisie and the nobility'[320]. Political and economic power rested with a defined subset of Austrian society, estimated at around 6% of the adult, male population. Universal (male) suffrage would not be extended until the 1890s. The ethnic, economic, gender, and social distinctions between

[314] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 61)
[315] (Meyer, 2009, p. 1)
[316] (Meyer, 2009, p. 1)
[317] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 62)
[318] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 131)
[319] (Berenger, 1997, p. 225)
[320] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 62)

the bourgeois liberals and other groups would be meaningful for social relations in Vienna. Imke Meyer argued that the social and economic advantages they accrued during the Liberal Era would persist even after the German liberals lost their political majority in 1879, and through the end of the 19th Century.[321]

Imke Meyer argues that the power of the Viennese nobility and wealthy, relative to others, was the product of the severely restricted voting franchise. Bader-Zaar's detailed analyses of suffrage in Austria provides a direct link between political suffrage and the construction of a social hierarchy in Vienna around the features of the disproportionately German nobility, intelligentsia, and bourgeois liberals. Bader-Zaar also argued that the identity of the political class was intentional by its designers. Bader-Zaar wrote that when constitutional reform commenced in the early 1860s in the Habsburg Monarchy it ensured that 'certain interests, based especially on property and wealth, as well as learning, found adequate representation.'[322] Beller concurred when he wrote that 'the liberal constitution may have sought civil equality for all but it only granted political rights to the wealthy and educated individuals of society.'[323] Bader-Zaar continued that when the state was compelled to expand suffrage in later years it still aimed 'to preserve the political influence of the nobility, the wealthy middle-class, and local notables for as long as possible.'[324] She summarized that, 'generally, the right to vote was based on the payment of a minimum amount of taxes on landed property, ownership of a house, or on income from employment, business, or trade. In addition, voters with higher education—the so-called "intelligentsia" i.e. the clergy, civil servants, (retired) military officers, university graduates, and teachers in public schools—could qualify.'[325] Employment, on its own, was insufficient for political rights and 'additional restrictions

[321] (Meyer, 2009, p. 4)
[322] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 59)
[323] (Beller, 1989, p. 67)
[324] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, pp. 59-60, 67)
[325] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 64)

were imposed, which excluded workers receiving daily or weekly wages, servants and individuals supported by public charity.'[326] The wealthy Cisleithanian and Viennese bourgeoisie gained substantial political inclusion alongside the old nobility when wealth and education became the conditions for accessing political power.[327] This created a restricted, privileged political class around these social features.

The Austrian electoral system 'covered three levels of voting: local government, crownland diets, and the Lower House of the Austrian parliament' [328] which encompassed the territories and populations of the Cisleithanian half of the empire. These voting levels were constructed to favour hereditary power, wealth, and education. At each level, votes were apportioned along a curial system with unequal representation that favoured the great noble landowners on one hand, and 'the wealthy bourgeoisie that was represented in the chambers and urban municipalities, while putting less economically powerful municipalities in the curia of rural communities at a disadvantage.'[329] Church leaders and some dignitaries also had automatic membership.[330] In the Austrian parliament, the aristocracy were secure in their privileges in the parliament's upper house, or the *Herrenhaus* (House of Lords).[331] Below them was the *Reichsrat*, or lower chamber of the bicameral parliament.[332] The *Reichsrat* was initially elected indirectly by the regional diets but direct elections were enacted after 1873. Steven Beller cites that the electoral biases of the 'old, diet-based system was carried over into the new, direct system.'[333] Beller continues that the 'machinations of curial and boundary drawing meant that 219 of the members of the new Reichsrat were in the German Liberal camp. Moreover, the new term … was extended to six years … It

[326] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 61)
[327] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 62)
[328] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 61)
[329] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 64)
[330] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 64)
[331] (Berenger, 1997, p. 236)
[332] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 33)
[333] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 142)

was a transparent attempt to cement German Liberal hegemony in place.'[334] Bader-Zaar highlights the extent of the inequality in the Austrian political system. She cites that even in the late-19th Century *Reichsrat* elections 'the small curia of great landowners, which accounted for approximately 0.1 per cent of all voters, elected 20 per cent of the Lower House of the Reichsrat members. On the other hand, the voters enfranchised in the general curia, constituting roughly 62.8 per cent of all voters, only elected 17 per cent of the members. … Two other curiae sustained this highly hierarchical form of representation: the small curia of chambers of commerce elected 5 percent and the curia of cities and towns, representing 7.8 per cent of all voters, elected 28 per cent of the parliamentary members.'[335] This dissertation's analyses of the 1879 *Reichsrat* elections show a similar, or greater, bias towards the upper classes than Bader-Zaar's data on the 1897 elections. The 1879 election was at the end of the Liberal Era and occurred before democratic expansions of the franchise to lower classes in 1882, 1896, and 1907.[336] The curia of large landowners elected 24% of Reichsrat deputies in 1879. The two curiae of the 'chambers of commerce' and 'cities, markets, and industrial centres' collectively elected 39% of deputies. 63% of deputies were therefore drawn from the empire's noble and economic elite.

Finally, the *Reichsrat* elections of 1873 added further restrictions around 'citizenship, a legal age (twenty-four) and male gender (except for the curia of great landowners) to voting qualifications.'[337] Voting rights were previously gender agnostic and these new restrictions saw the exclusion of the female gender from political power in Vienna. Bader-Zaar suggests that the female gender was excluded once the Austrian political system was able to preserve the power of the nobility and the wealthy middle class

[334] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 142)
[335] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 66)
[336] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 63)
[337] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 65)

without their participation.[338] Bader-Zaar explicitly argues for the division of Austrian politics around an elite-biased hierarchy in her data.

4.3.3 The Ethno-German Character of Austrian Political Liberalism

The political inequalities detailed by Bader-Zaar worked in favour of avowedly German, liberal political parties. Many prominent Austrian political historians attest to the ethno-German character of the Austrian political system during this time. Jean Berenger wrote that the curia system favoured the disproportionately aristocratic, propertied, and wealthy Germans over non-Germans. He argued that the liberal regime that controlled the national parliament, or the *Reichsrat,* between 1867-1879 was therefore not only capitalist but also disproportionately German.[339] Imke Meyer explicitly highlights the German character of the liberals when discussing their political dominance until the elections of 1879. Meyer wrote, 'After 1873, a rather restrictive franchise nevertheless ensured the dominance of German Liberals in the parliament until 1879.'[340] Cohen also refers to a specifically 'German liberal movement (which) emerged as a political force in Austria in the middle third of the nineteenth century.'[341] Steven Beller goes into detail for the *Reichsrat* elections between 1861 and 1879. Recall that before 1873, the *Reichsrat* was indirectly elected by the regional diets and this reflected the distribution of political power there. Beller cites that in the *Reichsrat* of 1861, '119 of its 203 members were in the German liberal, 'burgerlich' camp, broadly defined.'[342] Beller details that the February Patent which established the modern *Reichsrat* favoured the German liberals 'in the way in which a complex structure of the curias, and the formula for the relative representation of provinces, was manipulated in an extraordinary 'electoral geometry'

[338] (Bader-Zaar, 3 Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 2024, p. 60)
[339] (Berenger, 1997, p. 211)
[340] (Meyer, 2009, pp. 1-2)
[341] (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 67)
[342] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 112)

that assured a German dominance within the parliament.'[343] A liberal majority was repeated in the *Reichsrat* elections in 1867 when German parties secured 118 of 203 deputies. The German Liberal camp later won 219 of the expanded 353 seats in the first direct *Reichsrat* elections in 1873 in Cisleithanian half of the now Austro-Hungarian Empire. This political majority was despite Germans being only 37% of the population of Cisleithania.[344]

The ethno-German character of Vienna's liberal politics is more directly observed in this work's analyses of the 1879 *Reichsrat* elections. These analyses looked at the individual deputies in addition to their party affiliations. The empire's censuses started recording the languages of respondents after 1869 but many non-Germans spoke German, as it was the primary language of administration and higher education in Cisleithania. Nonetheless, Stergar and Scheer argued that many respondents to the census perceived it as a measure of ethnic or national self-identification. They wrote, 'Because language use was understood as a reflection of nationality, the results of the census buttressed the illusion that the entire population of the Habsburg Monarchy belonged to one of the nine ethnolinguistic nations.'[345] This work chose to measure ethnicity using names because there was a consistent correlation across the names listed in 19th Century records, the corresponding entries in the 21st Century biographies of those individuals, and their ethnic categories in genealogical dictionaries. The 21st Century records accounted for earlier clerical misclassifications in the 19th Century records. It was observed that 202 of the 353 deputies (57%) in the Cisleithanian *Reichsrat* had ethnic German surnames despite Germans being around 37% of the underlying population in 1870. German ethnic biases were more pronounced in the higher curia as claimed by Berenger.[346] These curiae were already grossly overrepresented in the

[343] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, pp. 111-112)
[344] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 135)
[345] (Stergar & Scheer, 2018)
[346] (Berenger, 1997, p. 211)

Reichsrat based on the populations they represented, as argued by Bader-Zaar, but this data reveals that they were also predominantly German. 76% of the 21 deputies elected from the curia of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry had German names. Over 64% of the deputies from the curia of the Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centres had German names. Over 56% of the deputies in the curia of Large Landowners had German surnames.

German overrepresentation was also observed outside of the traditional Austrian heartlands. It is expected that there would be high German representation in Upper and Lower Austria, and Salzburg, due to their histories and underlying demography, and this was the case. It may also be expected that there would be lower German representation in the more recently annexed and culturally distinct Polish provinces in Galicia, or the peripheral and mixed southern provinces of Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia. These provinces were always relatively successful at maintaining distinct social systems outside of German Austrian control because of the political dynamics between Vienna and these territories. On the other hand, the Czech lands were longstanding Habsburg possessions and were always strategically and economically important in the old Holy Roman Empire. Ethno-German overrepresentation in Bohemian politics represented the historic penetration of its social systems. This was reflected in the political representation of its regional diet and in the *Reichsrat.* 71% of deputies representing Bohemia in the 1879 *Reichsrat* had German surnames. 61% of Moravian deputies and 80% of Silesian deputies had German names, respectively. German overrepresentation the Czech lands may be explained by the disproportionate representation of ethnic Germans in the elite curiae of the 'Large Landowners', 'Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and Cities', and 'Markets, and Industrial Centres'. For example, Germans represented 83%, 100%, and 69% of the Bohemian deputies in these three curiae.[347] Altogether, the

[347] The proportions are 67%/100%, 67%/0%, and 77%/75% in Moravia and Silesia, respectively. There were no deputies for the Chambers of Commerce curia from Silesia in 1879.

overrepresentation of Germans in the *Reichsrat* elections of 1879 is strongly supported. Recall that Steven Beller argued that the gerrymandering that favoured Germans in the *Reichsrat*'s direct elections were continuations of the same patterns in the regional Diets from prior decades, and this reflected the distribution of regional political power. The Liberal Era may be reasonably characterised by a German ethnic character based on this data.

4.3.4 Viennese Jews in the German Liberal Era

Viennese Liberal Jews will be considered in detail in the following section but Viennese Jews disproportionately overlapped with Austria's German, liberal, political class when compared with other ethnic groups. 19th Century Jewish emancipation emerged from classical liberalism. Classical liberalism promoted economic freedom. These freedoms included the freedom of occupation, education and training, and residency, that were often the most prominent and tangible features of 18th to 19th Century Jewish emancipation in the Habsburg Empire. Emancipated Jews became major drivers of Cisleithanian urbanization, laissez-faire capitalism, and liberal politics. The governing liberals in the *Reichsrat* were supported by the bourgeoisie from industry, finance, commerce, the civil service, and the free professions. The Germanised Habsburg Jews were disproportionately represented in these areas and frequently formed the majorities in many sectors. The social overlap between Habsburg Jews and the Liberal Party saw the election of 4 Jewish deputies in the Reichsrat of 1867-1874. This number rose to 13 in the session from 1873-1879 and remained fairly constant through 1897. [348] At the same time, this work's analyses of election data reveal that Jewish deputies remained within the declining liberal parties through the end of the 19th Century.[349] Jewish representation in the Vienna City Council also declined during the 1880s and the next

[348] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 27)
[349] (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 67)

chapter will discuss how this was the first Austrian entity to fall to German Christian Antisemitism via the Christian Social Party.[350] The direct political power of Jews declined when elite liberalism gave way to mass and ethnic Viennese politics after 1879.

Liberalism remained an elite political ideology until politics expanded to the labouring masses in the late-19th and 20th Centuries. The fall of Vienna's political liberalism will be addressed in the next chapter, but in summary, Cisleithania's non-Germans and its lower middle classes demanded their own political representation. Their sheer numbers meant that they could no longer be ignored. The German liberal political majority and Jewish emancipation were intertwined. The rise and fall of classical liberalism in the Habsburg Empire overlapped with the integration and subsequent exclusion of Jews from Viennese society within Theodor Herzl's lifetime.

4.4 Liberal Jews of Vienna

4.4.1 The Origins Jews in Vienna

Vienna experienced unprecedented immigration during the second half of the 19th Century. 'In 1857, the city had a population of 480,000. By 1890, it was up to 1,360,00; by 1910 2,030.000.'[351] Immigrants arrived in large numbers from Lower Austria and the Bohemian crownlands, and later from Hungary and Galicia.[352] Jews were amongst these immigrants. Unlike the rest of the Habsburg Empire, Jews were far less present in Vienna, and Lower Austria, in the mid-19th Century. Jews were expelled from Austria in 1669, and could not return until 1848, and then only in strictly controlled numbers.[353] Around 1848, only 1,800 Jews had the legal right to live In Vienna, but the unofficial

[350] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 27)
[351] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 117)
[352] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 117)
[353] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 27)

Jewish population may have been closer to 6,000-7,000 Jews, in a city-wide population of 410,000. Jews were between 0.5%-1.7% of the city's residents at a time when Jews made up 4.5% of the Austrian half of the Empire.[354] Vienna's legal residents were the *Tolerierten*, or the approximately 200 tolerated, wealthy, Jewish households from industry or finance who served the empire's interests.[355] The origins of Vienna's Jewish population provide insight on their social profiles and attitudes. The earliest pre-emancipation population of Viennese Jews were wealthy families who were born in Vienna, or those who could have afforded to purchase early residencies. This group anchored the Viennese Jewish population. They were German-assimilated, liberal, educated, and modern. They were also conspicuous in their behaviours, and preferences.[356] This dominant Jewish bourgeoisie provided a model for advancement for other Jews, while also dictating the culture of the Viennese middle class.[357]

Vienna's Jewish population exploded after restrictions were lifted.[358] It peaked in proportional terms at 12% of the city by 1890 (99,441 Jewish residents) and reached an absolute peak of 175,318 Jewish residents (8.76% of the total) by 1910.[359] The majority of Jews in Lower Austria lived in Vienna and were not dispersed across Austria in exclusively Jewish or rural villages. One early reliable census of the Jewish population in Austria cites that of the 52,350 Jews who lived in Lower Austria in 1869, 40,926 (78%) of them lived in Vienna.[360]

Marsha Rozenblit writes that 'Jewish migration began in the 1850s, swelled in the 1860s and 70s, and grew larger still in the antisemitic 1880s, '90s, (and) early 1900s.'[361]

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[354] (McCagg, 1989, p. 145) (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 37)
[355] (Beller, 1989, p. 168)
[356] (McCagg, 1989, p. 146)
[357] (McCagg, 1989, p. 149)
[358] (Meyer, 2009, p. 2)
[359] (Beller, 2008, p. 24) (Meyer, 2009, p. 2)
[360] (McCagg, 1989, p. 145)
[361] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 35)

Habsburg Jews were attracted to Vienna for many reasons. The capital offered greater opportunities for social mobility after centuries of social restrictions in the provinces. Most of the Jews who migrated to Vienna were poor, despite there being significant pockets of middle class and wealthier immigrants. At the same time, Jews improved their conditions relatively quickly when compared to others.[362] 45% of Jews lived in the relatively poor second administrative district, but this was at a time when 2/3 of Viennese Christians were poor, or very poor.[363] Rozenblit writes, 'Jewish immigrants to Vienna were thus very successful. They had come to a very exciting city, »the city«, the heart of the Habsburg Empire. They came to it because it offered them lots of opportunities: economic opportunity, freedom, the right to remake themselves.'[364] Rozenblit also acknowledges the antisemitic surge in late 19th Century Vienna but argues that Jewish immigrants were still pushed towards the capital because of antisemitism and rising nationalist tensions in the empire's Czech and Polish provinces.[365] Many Czechs resented that the Jewish commercial class 'spoke German and voted for German liberal parties (rather than for Czech nationalist parties) in the late nineteenth century. They also resented the fact that in many cities dominated by a German-speaking economic elite, Jewish votes for German parties often tipped the scales in favor of those parties.'[366] Rozenblit notes similar pressures amongst Polish nationalists at the same time.[367] Vienna was also antisemitic but the imperial government acted in defense of Jews against antisemites and guaranteed the rights of Jews.[368]

There were three overlapping waves of Jewish immigration to the capital after residency restrictions were lifted.[369] 'The first wave in the 1850s and 1860s, was mainly from the

[362] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 38)
[363] (McCagg, 1989, p. 145)
[364] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 52)
[365] (Rozenblit, 2007, pp. 42-43)
[366] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 42)
[367] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 42)
[368] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 43)
[369] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 37)

Czech lands.'[370] By 1869, 14% of Vienna's Jewish population were from Bohemia, and 20.6% from Moravia and Silesia. Between 1870 and 1910, around 1/3 of Vienna's expanded Jewish population emigrated from the Czech lands.[371] Vienna's early immigrant Jewish population in the 19th Century were initially modern-oriented and liberal. This meant that their 'upward mobility (in Vienna) did not develop slowly, over several generations, but was relatively sudden.'[372] Bohemian Jews were German assimilated before 1848 due to Bohemia's early commercialization and industrialization. Successive programs of German-biased administration in the Czech lands meant that the German language and culture defined the middle and upper classes there in the 19th Century. Cohen writes that, 'even while in the ghettos, most of the Jews of Prague and the other larger Jewish communities in Bohemia and Moravia preferred the language and culture of the dominant German-speaking elements of Austria, and the political and social values of the emerging German liberal movement.'[373] 'The Germanization of the Jews of Bohemia and Moravia began at the end of the eighteenth century, when Emperor Joseph II issued his Edict of Toleration (1781/82). This edict removed some of the onerous economic restrictions on the Jews, but also required them to learn German.'[374] Rozenblit argues that this was part of Emperor Joseph II's 'general schemes to centralize and Germanize his realm, the Edict of Toleration required Jews either to attend Christian schools, or establish German-Jewish schools.'[375] Rozenblit continues that this program was easier in the Czech lands because of the Habsburg administration was more established and dominant versus the Hungarian or Galician lands.[376] German acculturation applied to the Czech majority and the German minority alike. Formal education was taught in German and this only changed with the resurgence of Czech

[370] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 27)
[371] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 38)
[372] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 28)
[373] (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 57)
[374] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 46)
[375] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 46)
[376] ((Rozenblit, 2007, p. 47)

nationalism in later decades.[377] When Jews lived in the cities, like Prague, they chose to fully integrate into the German minority because German assimilationists had a wider range of economic and political opportunities.[378] Gary Cohen writes that, 'Local conditions in Prague and in other cities in the Bohemian Lands, where the German middle classes soon found themselves locked in political competition with Czech forces, particularly favoured the inclusion of middle-class and lower middle-class Jews in German liberal politics.'[379] The Moravian and Silesian immigrants were also the products of the earlier Germanisation and secularization of education across the Czech lands.[380] German assimilated and politically affiliated Jews were generally part of the dominant German-leaning commercial class in rural, Czech-speaking small towns across these provinces.[381]

A second wave of Hungarian Jews immigrated to Vienna in the years after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (1867). These 'were a mix of the prosperous and acculturated with a fair number of poor.'[382] Jews of Hungarian origin would form 42%-45% of Vienna's Jewish population between 1869-1880.[383] The majority (70%) of Hungarian immigrants were German-acculturated Jews from western Slovakia, western Hungary and Budapest who rejected Magyar nationalism in the Hungarian half of the empire after 1867.[384] The social profile of these types of Hungarian Jews were discussed in the previous section. The second Hungarian wave included Theodor Herzl and his parents.

Finally, there was a third wave after the 1860s from Galician Poland. Galician Jews comprised 11.8% of the Viennese Jews. The earlier immigrants in the third wave were

[377] (McCagg, 1989, p. 67)
[378] (McCagg, 1989, pp. 76-77), (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 131)
[379] (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 68)
[380] (McCagg, 1989, p. 145)
[381] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 42)
[382] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 28)
[383] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 40)
[384] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 27), (Rozenblit, 2007, pp. 39-40)

from the enlightened, western half of Galicia, and not from its Hasidic, or ultra-conservative, east. Galician immigrants became decidedly more religious by the 1880s.[385] Poor and unacculturated Galician Jews constituted the main Jewish immigrants through the First World War.[386] It is outside this work's time period but Galician and Bukovinian Jews increased significantly due to fears of invasion by the Russian army after 1914.[387]

4.4.2 The Social Profile of Jews in Vienna

Steven Beller refers to Vienna as Central Europe's economic powerhouse and bastion of German liberal civilization. 'Vienna was primarily defined by its prestigious university, the *Burgtheater*, the Neue Freie Presse, the coffeehouse, and the society of the *Ringstrasse* and the "productive bourgeoisie" (*schaffendes Biirgertum*)—a center of "*Bildung und Besitz*."'[388] The imperial capital's cultural hierarchy was reflected in its political system that was restricted to its nobility and its economic and cultural elite, as described in the previous section, 4.2. Beller continues that Vienna's cultural and political inclusion depended on 'education or property and preferably both. For a prospective newcomer to this Vienna, therefore, the best way to succeed in this Vienna was to get a good education to gain status and also, one hoped, the wherewithal to pursue a financially lucrative career and thus qualify on both counts.'[389] Beller argues that this is why Jews were both drawn to Vienna and were successful within it. Jews were indoctrinated into the German language and culture as solutions to their historic anti-Jewish exclusion. The types of Jews who were immigrating to Vienna before the 1890s, as described by Rozenblit (2007) above, were mainly German-assimilated Jews

[385] (McCagg, 1989, p. 148), (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 40)
[386] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 28)
[387] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 41)
[388] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 118)
[389] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 118)

who internalized the German liberal vision. Regardless of their financial position, they were 'eminently bourgeois in their attitudes, (and were) fully aware of the practical benefits of a sound education.'[390] German-assimilation gave Jews greater social mobility in Vienna's liberal politics, economy, and culture, and this was represented in their disproportionate representation in its institutions.

By the 1870s, Viennese Jewry were socially 'upward-funnelling, mobile, and integrative.'[391] This created a largely middle-class, liberal, Jewish population. A plurality of Jewish immigrant families followed a well-defined socio-cultural progression starting with German-speaking industrialists and merchants. These wealthy families made their money in the provinces before moving to the imperial capital. They represented around 11% of all owners of industry, and 30.71% of those in commerce.[392] 'Jews abandoned traditional Jewish occupations in petty trade, middlemen in the peasant economy of the provinces, and adopted urban occupations. Many of them became respectable businessmen, shopkeepers or merchants of one sort or another, or industrialists, usually in light industry, especially textile or clothing production.'[393] Commercial Jewish families enrolled their sons in the German-language *gymnasiums* (the elite level of secondary schools). Between 1870-1920, Jewish boys represented 32.2% of gymnasium students at a time when Jews were between 8.76%-12% of Vienna's population.[394] In contrast to other populations, secondary education was the norm for Jewish families in Vienna, and Jews were overrepresented by up to a factor of 5. The majority of Viennese Jewish families, even those outside the elite, used education as a path for integration and Beller estimates that 43% of all Jewish boys in Vienna attended secondary school in the late 19th Century.[395] These young men then advanced to the University of Vienna's

[390] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 118)
[391] (McCagg, 1989, p. 148)
[392] (Beller, 1989, p. 48)
[393] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 50)
[394] (Beller, 1989, p. 52)
[395] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 119)

prestigious German-language, Law and Medical faculties, where in 1890, for example, they represented 22% of law students, and 48% of medical students.[396] In 1881, Jews were 61% of all doctors, and by 1890, they were 58% of all lawyers.[397] Steven Beller claims that the term 'Jewish press' was appropriate for Vienna in this period. All major liberal newspapers were owned, edited, and nearly fully staffed by Jews. This included Theodor Herzl's future employer, the *Neue Freie Presse* (New Free Press). Even conservative newspapers were staffed by Jewish writers, as Jews comprised more than 50% of all journalists.[398] Other Viennese Jews 'took up careers as business employees (*Angestellte*), as clerks, salesmen, or managers in private enterprises in the city, especially in the banks, insurance companies, and large corporations that formed in the early twentieth century.'[399] Rozenblit argues the observable preponderance of Jews across all levels Vienna's modern liberal economy revealed the extent to which they were successfully German-assimilated. Even at the lower levels, working Jews 'had to speak, read, and write German well; he had to dress and act respectably; and, probably he also had to violate the Jewish Sabbath and work on Saturday.'[400]

Unspoken anti-Jewishness, coupled with historical national privileges for Catholic Germans and nobility, prevented Jews from obtaining higher positions in the bureaucracy, the army, the judiciary, and the diplomatic service.[401] Beller explained,

> Jews were able to prosper within the Monarchy as businessmen, as financiers, as independent professionals, as artists and writers, but the symbolic heart of the state, the Habsburg bureaucracy, was largely closed to them as Jews.

[396] (Beller, 1989, p. 34)
[397] (Beller, 1989, p. 37)
[398] (Beller, 1989, pp. 38-39)
[399] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 50)
[400] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 50)
[401] (Beller, 1989, pp. 38-39)

> While the state did not directly encourage political antisemitism, … the Habsburg state exhibited a sort of "structural antisemitism" that separated Jews from the de facto embodiment of the state, its higher administration.[402]

Jews were recruited into the lower civil service after the 1880s in very modest numbers. A number were lower-level instructors in university faculties and a few became assistant or full professors.[403] 'Jews were brought into the lower echelons of government and the academy, and it was understood that baptism (to Catholicism) was a condition of advancement. Certainly, no unbaptised Jew would have been granted a cabinet position. For Jews to hold positions associated with the authority of the state was still considered inappropriate.'[404] Furthermore, despite their civil equality and high levels of acculturation, Viennese Jews existed apart from their Christian German contemporaries in other ways. The Jewish bourgeoisie occupied their own neighbourhoods, social circles, and sometimes occupations. Intermarriage and mixed social relations were rare without conversion to Christianity. The highest classes of Jews may have been the exception to this social segregation.[405] Beller cites Rozenblit who found upon closer analysis that Jewish students in secondary and higher learning may have been German-acculturated but that they were also socially segregated from their non-Jewish, German contemporaries. Beller concludes that 'Jewish children tended to develop in parallel with their non-Jewish counterparts and not together with them.'[406] This may have been a feature of Jewish life within Vienna's German liberal culture as a general rule.

Beller details that successful Viennese citizens could not be solely defined by the city's liberal economics and politics. Vienna was not just one of the 'fastest growing industrial centers in Central Europe' or 'a thriving commercial and financial center'.[407] Successful

[402] (Beller S. , The World of Yesterday Revisited, 1996, p. 45)
[403] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 30)
[404] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 30)
[405] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 30)
[406] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 121)
[407] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 118)

integration also meant adopting traditionally '"Viennese" attitudes and customs, such as a love of music and theatricality and of the good life, as well as *Schlamperei*, *Gemutlichkeit* and *Wiener Schmdh*—to be translated respectively, if not accurately, as slovenliness, cordiality, and charming flattery. To integrate into this Vienna, one had to take fully on board what one might term the traditional popular culture of the city.'[408] In practice, this meant attending the *Burgtheater*, 'the coffeehouse, and the society of the *Ringstrasse*.'[409] Jews were prominently featured in these Viennese cultural institutions. Klaus Hodl argues that Jews went beyond being participants in Vienna's elite culture and were major contributors. He stresses the 'interactive relationship and cultural exchange between Jews and non-Jews, resulting in an entanglement of Jewish and non-Jewish narratives.'[410] Jews did not just adopt Vienna's German high culture they helped shape it. It is no coincidence that the most respected and vocal advocate for German liberalism was the Jewish-owned and staffed *Neue Freie Presse.*

Another visible representation of Jewish integration into Vienna was their physical presence in the city's central *Ringstrasse.* Klaus Hodl argues that physical space was a representation of a group's integration into Vienna as 'the bastion of liberalism and the culture of the written word'.[411] Hodl wrote that, 'people at the periphery (in the Viennese suburbs) made up the third curia of voters in communal elections, that is to say they paid only the minimum tax of at least five gulden. Economically, they were hard pressed, caught up in a daily struggle to avoid their descent down the social ladder. They associated economic reforms brought about by liberalism, which had had an adverse impact on them, with the Jews, whose purported influence Lueger promised to curtail.'[412] The groups in the city center 'were more inclined to consider (the illiberal periphery) as

[408] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 118)
[409] (Beller S. , The City as Integrator, 1997, p. 118)
[410] (Hodl, 2007, pp. 84-85)
[411] (Hodl, 2007, p. 87)
[412] (Hodl, 2007, p. 87)

a threat to the accomplishments introduced by the Liberals and were determined to forestall'[413] them. The *Ringstrasse* was the nexus of Vienna's most important 'public monuments and private mansions, which unlike those in the old city, were occupied, not by the aristocracy, but businessmen.' The *Ringstrasse* housed the city's most imposing edifices including the *Rathaus* (the Vienna City Hall), 'the parliament, the university, and … the Hofburg theatre.'[414] Berenger writes that, 'of the fifty-five buildings built by private individuals … two belonged to archdukes, seven to nobles, eight to members of the bourgeoisie and thirty-eight to representatives of the new monied aristocracy, bankers and industrialists.'[415] Berenger adds that 'many of the upper classes who inhabited the *Ringstrasse*, the bankers and industrialists, were of Jewish origin.'[416] The fashionable Jewish upper classes set the style for the wider bourgeoisie and the Viennese bourgeois culture was debated and defined in their salons.[417] The social mobility of Jews through the Vienna's German liberal economic, professional, and educational hierarchy was visibly represented by their presence in Vienna's physical centre.

Finally, the economic and social successes of Viennese Jews meant that they disproportionately met the various thresholds for political suffrage in Vienna and they were part of the 'liberal fold as an almost compact ethnic religious group.'[418] The association between German liberalism and the Viennese Jewry was reflected in the political affiliations of the Jewish deputies in the *Reichsrat* elections of 1879. The story of the Jewish deputies of the 1879 *Reichsrat* elections were typical of Jews in the German Liberal Era of the 1870s. In summary, these Jewish men were German-oriented, politically liberal representatives of the Viennese, Czech, and Polish bourgeoisie. The Austrian Parliament maintains rigorous biographies for every

[413] (Hodl, 2007, p. 87)
[414] (Berenger, 1997, p. 231)
[415] (Berenger, 1997, p. 227)
[416] (Berenger, 1997, p. 247)
[417] (Peck & Holmes, 2016, pp. 81-82)
[418] (Kann R. , 1948, p. 241)

parliamentarian from 1848 through the present day. Chapter 3 Methodology detailed how this dissertation compared the list of deputies in the 1879 *Reichsrat* with the Austrian Parliament's biographies to profile these deputies. These profiles included their religions. This dissertation's database of deputies identified 16 deputies who were classified as Jewish.[419] This is directly proportional to the Jewish population of Cisleithania in the 1870s. The Jewish deputies elected to the 1879 *Reichsrat* were overwhelmingly affiliated with German political liberalism, as expected. 11 of the 16 deputies represented the Liberal Party, with an additional 3 coming from the liberal United Progressive Party. The remaining two Jewish deputies represented the Polish Party and its insular political system. The social profile of the deputies also reflects the narrative developed above. 13 of the deputies were drawn from either the curiae of the "Chambers of Commerce and Industry" or the "Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers". 75% of the deputies had either secondary or tertiary education. The same proportion also had conventionally German surnames. Looking at their regional diversity, ¼ of the Jewish deputies represented Viennese districts. ½ of them represented the Czech regions of Bohemia and Moravia. The remaining 3 deputies represented the Galician region. Altogether, the social profiles of the Jewish deputies elected to the 1879 *Reichsrat* align with the conventional narrative of the Viennese and Cisleithanian Jews being part of the Liberal Era's German-affiliated, educated, liberal bourgeoisie.

4.4.3 Conclusion

The advanced integration of Vienna's Jews into its German liberal society afforded Jews great social advantages in the middle third of the 19th Century. At the same time, it made Viennese Jews a visible symbol of German liberalism for the reasons discussed in this section. For instance, Berenger wrote that many of the bankers and industrials who

[419] This figure exceeds other sources, including Kornberg (1993). The Austrian Parliament's biographies sometimes classify Jewish converts to Christianity as Jews.

prominently occupied the mansions of the *Ringstrasse* were of Jewish origin and it was not difficult to convince the embittered victims of liberalism's economic failures that the Jews were to blame.[420] Meyer agreed, and they argued that the 'ascent of many Jews into financially comfortable circumstances caused anxiety in particular for many members of the artisan and shopkeeping classes, who saw their own economic territory threatened, and who had envied the political power many bourgeois Jews gained during the earlier liberalization period.'[421] Economic resentment by petite bourgeoise Christian Germans combined with the aforementioned ethnic resentment of Czechs, Poles, and other ethnic minorities. These groups historically conflated Germanized Jews with their perceived economic and political oppression in their home provinces, and in the capital. [422] Meyer succinctly concludes that 'The expansion of the franchise created a situation in which a virulent anti Semitism could gain a political foothold. Bourgeois Jews, then, were hit especially hard by the demise of Liberalism in Austria: not only did they lose political power, but they likewise faced an increasingly anti-Semitic climate in a Habsburg Empire now under growing stress created by internal political tensions, ethnic strife, and external challenges.'[423] In other words, the security that Vienna's Jews gained during the German Liberal Era would be threatened when liberalism ended. The decline of political liberalism, and its relationship to rising antisemitism, is discussed in the next chapter.

[420] (Berenger, 1997, p. 247)
[421] (Meyer, 2009, p. 2)
[422] (Rozenblit, 2007, p. 42)
[423] (Meyer, 2009, p. 2)

4.5 Theodor Herzl in Vienna during the Liberal Golden Age

4.5.1 Introduction

This section presents a socially ascendent Theodor Herzl in Vienna's Liberal Era as a precursor to his later exclusion from Viennese society in the following chapters. Political liberalism facilitated Theodor Herzl's social mobility. The decline of liberalism after 1879 correlated with the antisemitic exclusion that Herzl experienced in the following two decades. This work argues that it was the combination of Theodor Herzl's positive assimilation in the Liberal Era and his exclusion from antisemitic Christian Austro-German nationalism that led him to Political Zionism. He understood the benefits of social inclusion before it was taken away from him based on his Jewish identity.

Theodor Herzl's words and deeds in the late 19th Century reveal a number of insights about how he saw himself and the place of Jews in Vienna at the twilight of the formal Liberal Era. These insights are discussed throughout this section. The first was that Theodor Herzl recognised that he, his family, and Viennese Jews at large existed within a hierarchical society that prioritised German assimilation as a condition for inclusion and success. This hierarchy based on historical privilege, economic class, education, and political suffrage was outlined in Section 4.2. The experiences of emancipated Jews taught Theodor Herzl that a person's relative alignment with Vienna's Austro-German culture translated into different and unequal preparation for success in the imperial capital's politics, economics, and society. This section reveals how closely Theodor Herzl (hereinafter referred to as Herzl) and his family adhered to the social pathway established in the previous section. Herzl was socialised into the society's German bias from birth and it is unsurprising that even from a young age Herzl recognised and valued his German assimilation. The prevailing social consensus also informed Herzl's perspective towards Jewishness as an obstacle to social inclusion. The teenage Herzl

sought to shed any internal and external expressions of his Jewish identity. Herzl did not believe that Jews were equal to Germans in Viennese society, but unlike contemporary primordial nationalists who linked Jewish exclusion to natural differences, Theodor Herzl argued that Jewish inequality and inferiority were social outcomes of their historical unequal treatment in Europe. Herzl, like other upwardly mobile 19th Century Jews, clung to the belief that emancipation gave Jews the opportunity to shed their negative Jewish social traits by allowing them to fully integrate into the dominant Austro-German society. Later in his life, and in the midst of a resurgent Austrian antisemitism, Herzl reflected on the failure of Jews, like himself, to merge into Viennese society via assimilation. Herzl reveals that this was their intention when he lamented the failure of Jews to do so. In *Der Judenstaat* he wrote, 'We might perhaps be able to merge ourselves entirely into surrounding races, if (antisemites) were to leave us in peace for a space of two generations. But they will not leave us in peace.'[424] Herzl's diary entries reveal that his desire to assimilate existed from his earliest days, and that it was only a matter of how deeply he was willing to do so. He wrote, 'There might have been a time when I would have liked to get away from (his Jewish distinction)—into the Christian fold, anywhere.'[425]

4.5.2 Theodor Herzl's German-Assimilated, Bourgeois, Liberal Identity at the End of the Liberal Era

Theodor Herzl's family followed the established path for Jewish social mobility and inclusion in the Habsburg's imperial capital. The Herzl family were part of the second wave of Hungarian, German-acculturated, Jewish immigrants to Vienna after 1867. Jewish emancipation and assimilation were not solely about material success. Theodor Herzl's parents, and Theodor himself, understood that their acceptance into Vienna's

[424] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 2019, p. 7)
[425] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 4)

German-assimilated, Jewish society depended on how closely they mirrored the Jewish bourgeoisie. The Jewish bourgeoisie, themselves, were patterned on their Christian German counterparts. Everyone was conscious of their relative place in society. Both branches of Theodor Herzl's family were from provincial wealthy commercial families who immigrated to the imperial capital. *Nouveau riche* commercial families were not accepted as social equals in Vienna's Jewish society and Theodor Herzl's parents wanted their son to have an acceptable liberal arts education and profession. Herzl's pursuit of a *Doctor Juris* at the University of Vienna added to the family's honour and helped them 'escape the taint of commerce.'[426]

Theodor Herzl revealed deep social-psychological conflicts towards his Jewish identity during his life. Every stage of Herzl's adult life revealed someone who was dissatisfied with their relative exclusion from the national society they lived in. Herzl's internal appraisals of his exclusion manifested in his external actions and writings. Theodor Herzl was representative of his generation's willingness 'to conform to the terms of emancipation and assimilation at the price of his Jewishness.'[427] Herzl idolised the 'German spirit' and he believed that emancipation made Jews into Germans.[428] For instance, a 16-year-old Herzl wrote of himself as part of an awakened German nation in his 1875 poem, *'We Shall Not Go to Canossa'*. The title was a popular phrase amongst German nationalists and was an allegory for the historical suppression of the German people by foreign powers.[429] Jewish emancipation and German acculturation taught Jews that cultural distinctiveness was a hindrance to success in a German national society. Herzl adopted these beliefs and mocked Jews who were not Germanised.[430] In glorifying German superiority Herzl adopted German and European biases towards

[426] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 60) (Cohen, 1959, p. 33)
[427] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 26)
[428] (Penslar, 2020, p. 22)
[429] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 15)
[430] (Penslar, 2020, p. 22)

Jews. This fostered self-hatred towards his Jewishness. Herzl argued that 'Jews were beset with vices and deficiencies that could only be overcome through assimilation to Christian society.'[431] Herzl internalised Jewish stereotypes and he thought Jews were 'inferior: cowardly, unmanly, preoccupied with money, bereft of idealism.'[432] Herzl did not believe these traits were inherent in Jews but were due to 'their enforced segregation from the general culture. These peculiarities would be erased if they were welcomed into society.'[433] Herzl contested that stereotypical Jewish features were products of social and historical circumstances.[434] A despised Jewish society was the product of 'their imperative to survive in an economic order that was imposed on them, restricting them to a narrow range of businesses.'[435]

Antisemites 'routinely depicted Jewish men as physically weak, lacking bravery and resolve, and prone to nervous disorders.'[436] Many Habsburg Jews who were desperate for Christian acceptance willingly accepted and repeated these negative antisemitic stereotypes. Herzl did as well but he also 'attributed all that made Jews distinctive to Christian persecution.'[437] Herzl often referenced the social construction of European Jewry, as he did in *Der Judenstaat* writing, 'We are what the Ghetto made us.'[438] Herzl extended this belief to the stereotypical physical appearances of Jews, including their 'pale and puny physique.'[439] Jewish physiognomy was not just indicative of undesirable Jewish occupations but also the legal and cultural prohibitions that prevented Jews from intermarrying with Christian Germans. Herzl wrote that 'crossbreeding of the western races with the so-called oriental one (the Jews) on the basis of a common state religion

[431] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 16)
[432] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 2)
[433] (Avineri, 2014, p. 53)
[434] (Avineri, 2014, p. 53)
[435] (Avineri, 2014, p. 55)
[436] (Penslar, 2020, p. 25)
[437] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 24)
[438] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 2019, p. 3)
[439] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 24)

(German nationalism) – that is the desirable great solution.'[440] Here, Herzl is arguing that stigmatized Jewish physical features were not signs of a distinct Jewish race but symbolic of their social exclusion and oppression.

Herzl's views towards the superiority of his adopted German identity, and the relative inferiority of his Jewish identity, suggests that he understood the correlation between assimilation into the dominant Austro-German identity and the social prospects for Jews in the Habsburg Empire. The widespread active German acculturation of Viennese Jews discussed in Section 4.3 further suggests that this was a commonly felt sentiment. The previous section detailed that the average Jewish family in Vienna followed this social pathway. Herzl may have gone beyond his Jewish contemporaries with his belief that Austrian national society was not just German-led but also elite-led. Herzl aspired to be more than a member of the acculturated Jewish bourgeoisie in Vienna and he mimicked the Austro-German aristocracy. 'Vienna was defined by the elite values of aristocracy, … - rather than the capitalist middle class – (the aristocracy) set the cultural, social and moral tone'[441] of the capital city's identity. Herzl perceived that the aristocracy enjoyed a secure social status within the Viennese society, even when compared to other Christian Germans. He envied the aristocracy's self-confidence in society compared to Jewish marginality and insecurity.[442] Herzl understood that his legal studies could not give him the social inclusion he craved. Jews were informally excluded from the highest positions of the judiciary. 'Aesthetic cultivation was one of the few ways of achieving a sense of full membership and high status in Viennese society.'[443] Herzl was determined to pursue a pseudo-aristocratic career in the arts as a writer and playwright. He often spoke of having one of his plays at the imperial state theatre, the *Burghtheater*. The fact that Jewish writers were generally excluded there demonstrated his desire to transcend

[440] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 24)
[441] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 6)
[442] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 62)
[443] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 60)

the limitations of his Jewishness in the national Habsburg society.[444] Herzl achieved this goal by 1888-1889.[445]

Some early evidence that Herzl saw the Jewish condition as the social outcome of historical European exclusion was his strident rejection of racial antisemitism which attributed negatively perceived Jewish features to genetic determinism. In 1882, Herzl read a racially antisemitic work by Professor Eugen Duhring entitled, 'The Jewish Problem as a Problem of Racial Character and Its Danger to the Existence of Peoples, Morals and Culture.'[446] Herzl later wrote in his diaries that Duhring's book affected him so deeply that it led him 'to concern himself seriously with the Jewish question' for the first time.[447] He repeated the claim in a letter to the Chief Rabbi of Vienna.[448] Upon first reading Duhring's book, Herzl agreed with many, if not most, of Duhring's antisemitic stereotyping of Jews but rejected that these were biological features of a Jewish race. Herzl responded with an extended historical argument on how European Jewish society was a social construct that existed relative to, and because of, a dominant and oppressive Christian society. To believe otherwise would have meant that Jews would be permanently inferior to the Germans he idolised. It would also mean that emancipation and social integration into the German nation could not overcome the inferior social status of Jews in Europe.[449] When Herzl wrote about the exclusion of Jews in Austria, he consistently argued that it was due to others not tolerating Jews as equals and not because Jews were a permanently alien group. For instance, when describing the causes of antisemitism and inter-ethnic conflict in *Der Judenstaat* he wrote, 'In the principal countries where Anti-Semitism prevails, it does so as a result of the emancipation of the Jews. .... we stepped out of it only to enter into fierce competition

[444] (Avineri, 2014, p. 56)
[445] (Avineri, 2014, p. 56)
[446] (Cohen, 1959, p. 30)
[447] (Herzl, 1960, p. 4)
[448] (Avineri, Theodor Herzl's Diaries as a Bildungsroman, 1999, p. 8)
[449] (Avineri, 2014, pp. 53-56)

with the middle classes.'[450] Herzl's rejection of racial antisemitism was a rejection of primordial nationalism. Primordial nationalists, like Duhring, argue that nations pre-date modernity and are 'prior to all experience and interaction … and are natural … versus sociological.'[451] In his rebuttal to Duhring, Herzl unequivocally denied that Jews were a separate race or nation. Jews were a social category that was the outcome of modern social processes. Herzl felt that he had to take Professor Duhring's book seriously because of the latter's prestige in German academic society. Jews could not afford to have racial antisemitism be presented with Duhring's 'scientific stamp of legitimacy.'[452] Theodor Herzl still hoped that Duhring's antisemitism was the last breath of outdated European discrimination.[453]

Section 4.2 detailed that German liberal political parties controlled the *Reichsrat* between 1867-1879. This period defined the 'Liberal Era' in Vienna. Emperor Franz Joseph and his cabinet attempted to accommodate emerging provincial and class identities by favouring a more inclusive *Reichsrat* after 1879.[454] The following chapter will relate how this, in turn, fostered a reactionary and antisemitic popular, Christian, Austro-German nationalism.[455] Theodor Herzl immigrated to the imperial capital in 1878 near the end of liberalism's *Reichsrat* majority. Miroslav Hroch's theories of small-nation nationalism would suggest that Herzl's arrival to Vienna at this precise juncture was consequential for his transformation into a national patriot. Hroch predicted that groups become nationalist when they encounter obstacles to their social mobility due to their identities. Patriots tend to become national leaders because they were socially primed to be upwardly mobile but their ascents were blocked due to their minority identities. If Theodor Herzl came to Vienna even ten years earlier, at the height of the Liberal Era,

[450] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 2019, p. 5)
[451] (Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 55)
[452] (Avineri, 2014, p. 54)
[453] (Avineri, 2014, p. 56)
[454] (Beller, 2018, p. 128)
[455] (Berenger, 1997, p. 211)

he may not have encountered sufficient antisemitism to turn him into a Jewish nationalist. Herzl matured in a Habsburg society that promised rapid Jewish integration through the 1870s before undermining that promise in the 1880s. Hroch's prediction aligns with this work's thesis that national movements, and their champions, are products of social processes and are not extensions of primordial nationalities.

4.5.3 Theodor Herzl at the University of Vienna

Theodor Herzl enrolled in the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna in the autumn of 1878. Herzl studied Roman law which prepared him for later political work on Jewish nationalism. He sat his final examinations in 1883 and graduated without distinction in 1884.[456] Herzl studied law as a concession to his socially conscious parents. Law also gave him a fallback career if his literary ambitions failed.[457] Herzl's social life at university was more indicative of his motivation to assimilate into a hierarchical Austro-German national society than his academic life. Israel Cohen wrote that, 'The university was a mirror of the political complexity of the capital of what was then a large and polyracial empire, and the student unions were likewise variegated – some liberal, some German chauvinists, and some aggressive antisemites.'[458] Higher education was less accessible in the 19th Century and it served as a selective 'sorting house' for future careers in the relatively small civil service and lucrative liberal professions. Competition was stiff and students were eager to establish social and political connections.[459] This was especially true for the university's social clubs which were proxies for wider ethnic and class conflicts over state patronage and social inclusion. 'Membership (in the clubs) did not

[456] (Avineri, 2014, p. 56) (Cohen I. , 1959, pp. 27-33)
[457] (Cohen I. , 1959, p. 27)
[458] (Cohen I. , 1959, p. 28)
[459] (Cohen I. , 1959, p. 28)

end with graduation … Members became “old boys” when they graduated, they met annually and claimed favours and special loyalty from each other.’[460]

Herzl wanted to enter German high society after graduation and was keen to establish his credentials as an acculturated German subject. Multiethnic and inclusive social clubs existed, and Jews tended towards these in higher proportions than German nationalist clubs, but Theodor Herzl avoided them.[461] McGrath wrote that student clubs were an early bellwether for the rise of German nationalism at the expense of 19th Century liberalism in Austrian politics.[462] McGrath wrote, ‘Bismarck's creation of a united German empire stimulated the nationalist feelings of the German-speaking students at the University of Vienna so greatly that in December 1870, the government was forced to’[463] monitor and regulate student groups for extreme German nationalist views. McGrath continued that by 1878 many of these German nationalist students ‘were already entering upon their professional careers, and they set about trying to realize their aims directly’[464] through anti-liberal, German nationalist programmes. Herzl may have been naïve when he did not fully grasp the relationship between German ethno-nationalism and antisemitism in the university’s social clubs. Herzl joined one of these German-leaning clubs the *Akademische Lesehalle* (Academic Reading Room). The *Leshalle* represented the university’s ethnic distribution with around 75% German members. Herzl would later come to the painful realization that his Christian German contemporaries at the University of Vienna would use German nationalism to attack the liberal ideals that guaranteed his social inclusion as a Jew. This is discussed in the next chapter which looks at Herzl’s experiences with antisemitism during political liberal’s decline. For the time being, though, Herzl was known in the *Akademische Lesehalle* as

[460] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 43)
[461] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 42)
[462] (McGrath, 1967, p. 187)
[463] ((McGrath, 1967, p. 187)
[464] (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)

a strident German nationalist and was even formally accused of being anti-Habsburg due to his pan-Germanism.[465] A contemporary of Theodor Herzl noted that Herzl chaired the *Lesehalle*'s social club and organised 'beer-drinking evenings featuring German nationalist songs.'[466] The same person noted that, 'At the time the waves of the German nationalist movement was rising high in this student association; Herzl was one of its most enthusiastic champions.'[467]

Theodor Herzl was concurrently a member of a militant, German-nationalist, and Austrian imperialist student club, *Albia.*[468] He was but one of the club's three Jewish members. *Albia* was part of the Assembly of Delegates of German National Fraternities. *Albia*'s members met to 'discuss politics, celebrate patriotic holidays, … and sing nationalist songs.'[469] The club and its political affiliations were well-known and their distinct uniform marked its members.[470] Herzl wore his membership as a badge of honour because he knew that *Albia* would never have accepted him 'without having satisfied itself about his German nationalist credentials.'[471] 'Herzl did not mind the anti-Jewish barbs that saturated Albia's beery, German chauvinist air as long as he was accorded respect'.[472]

Theodor Herzl's membership in the *Lesehalle* and *Albia* indicated his desire to 'expunge his Jewish traits and take on Germanic traits. In addition, *Albia* was fervently anti-Magyar. Acceptance meant that Herzl had overcome the twin blight of his Jewish and Hungarian origins.'[473] In establishing his Germanness, Herzl was not satisfied with

[465] (Cohen, 1959, p. 28)
[466] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 40)
[467] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 40)
[468] (Penslar, 2020, p. 24)
[469] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 29)
[470] (Cohen, 1959, p. 28)
[471] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 43)
[472] (Penslar, 2020, p. 25)
[473] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 35)

simply being accepted by Christian Germans, he also felt the need to disparage non-Germans and other Jews. The Jewish historian and scholar of minority self-hatred, Sander Gilman, argued that Jews may publicly display disdain for Jewishness to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the dominant culture.[474] It is noteworthy that Herzl did not discriminate against all Jews equally but did so based on their perceived proximity to German culture. *Albia* was founded by Bohemian Germans, and it was already cited in section 4.3 that urban, Bohemian Jews were accepted as part of Prague's German community.[475] Alternatively, Herzl was openly contemptuous of Polish Jews since they were perceived as non-German and oriental.[476] Theodor Herzl used levels of German assimilation, economic class, education, etc. to arrange himself and other Jews along Vienna's Austro-German social hierarchy. This suggests that Herzl internalised this hierarchy as a social fact and that he saw his place in Vienna through this lens.

4.5.4 Theodor Herzl Enters Viennese Society as a Fully Realised Liberal Jew

Theodor Herzl was a social product of his time and place. Being a German-acculturated, and relatively wealthy, Habsburg Jew in the Liberal Era meant that Herzl had the best opportunities that European Jews faced in centuries. Herzl was conscious of his status within Viennese national society and was determined to advance as far as possible. Herzl began writing *feuilletons*, or 'sketches in a light and whimsical vein – which formed a regular feature of Europe's newspapers' while still at university.[477] *Feuilletons* reviewed high society venues, events, or holiday destinations and were popular amongst the upper classes. 'The liberal, *Berliner Tageblatt*, took him on as a regular

[474] (Gilman, 1986, pp. 2-5)
[475] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 42)
[476] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 77)
[477] (Cohen, 1959, p. 33)

contributor.'[478] Herzl was awarded his *Doctor Juris* in 1884 and was admitted to the bar as a law intern in the Viennese *Landesgericht*, or Supreme Court. He then practiced in the Commercial Court until 1885.[479] Herzl never intended to be a full-time lawyer and left his legal practice within a year.[480] Herzl's theatrical ambitions eventually stalled but he became an established journalist in the Viennese and Berliner press by the mid-1880s. Herzl reached his professional zenith as a contributor to 'the most influential and widely read paper in Central Europe'[481], the Jewish-owned *Neue Freie Presse* (New Free Press) in 1888. Theodor Herzl's social standing in liberal society meant that he was eligible to marry Julie Naschauer, the daughter of a Jewish millionaire with holdings 'in oil fields, factories, and Danube River shipping.'[482] Julie was a 'golden-haired, blue-eyed girl'[483] who appealed to the German assimilationist Herzl, who alternatively described himself as stereotypically dark and slim. For his part, Herzl's liberal credentials added social respectability to the commercial Naschauer family. Theodor and Julie welcomed the first of their three children one year later in 1890.[484] Theodor Herzl was the picture of the socially integrated Germanised Jew at the end of the Liberal Era.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter began with the birth of Theodor Herzl into a newly emancipated Habsburg Jewry in the Kingdom of Hungary. Theodor Herzl's forebearers were amongst the first generations of Jews who benefitted from legal emancipation and social integration into Cisleithanian society. Herzl's family experienced the rapid social mobility that many of their co-ethnics were experiencing. The young Theodor entered the world into a

[478] (Avineri, 2014, p. 58)
[479] (Cohen, 1959, p. 35)
[480] (Penslar, 2020, p. 27)
[481] (Cohen, 1959, p. 40)
[482] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 148)
[483] (Cohen, 1959, p. 43)
[484] (Cohen, 1959, p. 43)

bourgeois family that valued the Austro-German society that made their success possible.

The Herzl family moved to Vienna when Theodor begun his legal studies at the prestigious University of Vienna. Once again, the Herzls were following the established pathway for Jewish social mobility from commercial life in the provinces to the imperial capital and its liberal bourgeois culture. At the same time, Theodor's young adulthood coincided with the end of the same political liberalism that facilitated Jewish integration and success after 1848. Political liberalism was on the decline in Austrian society by Theodor's 18th birthday in 1878. Theodor's time at university was therefore a dual-sided experience. The Germanised, elitist, and urbane Theodor Herzl initially assimilated into German student life and he was proud of this accomplishment. By the end of his studies, though, Vienna, was experiencing the rise of inter-ethnic conflict that would define Austrian politics through the 20th Century. Theodor Herzl's career as a lawyer and journalist allowed him to observe the political shift in Austria towards antisemitic, Christian German nationalism in the 1880s and 1890s. Herzl watched the rise of popular ethno-nationalism in Austria with dismay. Herzl ultimately accepted that Jews were being expelled from Austrian society. The Jews, like the Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and other excluded national minorities would need their own political nationalism to defend their security. These social evolutions will be discussed in the remainder of this case study in the next two chapters.

5. Case Study: Part 2. The Rise of Christian Austro-German Nationalism and the Exclusion of Jews in Vienna (1879-1896)

5.1 Introduction

This case study presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 outlines one model for the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese society in the late 19th Century. Specifically, it addresses the question of how Viennese, German-assimilated Jews went from being amongst the most successful and integrated groups in the 1860s and 1870s to being threatened with absolute social exclusion from Christian, Austro-German nationalism by the 1890s. This work argues that this social shift may have happened as a side effect of inter-ethnic conflict within the centralised Habsburg Empire. First, the previous chapter discussed that the political liberalism had a dual effect on Cisleithania's social system. On one hand, liberalism rewarded assimilation into a political system that was German-led and German biased, and which valued wealth and education. Jews embraced this system and were successful within it. At the same time, liberalism disenfranchised and excluded groups who either could not, or would not, adapt to its political and social hierarchy. Exclusion created resentment amongst non-Germans, and the German and non-German petite bourgeoisie and lower classes. This dynamic formed the basis for social competition which came to a head in the post-liberal era, and which is also the subject of this chapter.

Chapter 5 opens with a discussion on the end of Vienna's Liberal Era after 1879 and the political rise of anti-liberal non-Germans and the lower classes in the 1880s. Inter-ethnic competition between Germans and non-Germans, in particular, threatened the established status of Germans within Cisleithanian politics. A German nationalist crisis manifested as social resistance by Cisleithanian Germans to loses to their longstanding prerogatives in political and social institutions. This argument was advanced by Oscar

Karbach, Robert Wistrich, and Willam J. McGrath, in particular. One manifestation of the German social angst was the relevance of Pan-Germanism as a means of combatting the social rise of non-Germans in Central Europe. Christian and Jewish Germans, including Georg von Schönerer, Victor Adler, and Heinrich Friedjung, were prominent proponents of these ideologies. This ideology was also strongly embraced by German university students. The aforementioned authors argued that German university students internalised Pan-Germanism's radical ethnic ideas and this connected the Pan-Germanism of the 1880s to the popular Christian, Austro-German nationalism of the 1890s. Karbach argued that the inter-ethnic competition that was embedded in both Pan-Germanism and Austro-German nationalism vilified the 'other' in Cisleithanian society. He wrote that Jews were the 'weakest spot in the totality of citizens, and the attack was to be launched under cover of a shrewd propaganda which would conceal the real objective by pointing up the "exotic strangeness" of the Jewish group.'[485] The symbolic 'otherness' of Jews combined with resentment towards their social success and competition to foster antisemitism within German nationalism. Alternatively, Steven Beller argued that non-Germans in Cisleithania still associated Germanised Jews with their own oppression in the Liberal Era. This may have left Viennese Jews as politically and socially isolated by the 1890s.[486] Altogether, this period covering the transition from Jewish integration to exclusion overlapped with Theodor Herzl's development in Vienna. This work argues that the experience of both social integration in the 1870s, and subsequent exclusion in the 1880s and 1890s, pushed Herzl from German nationalist to Jewish nationalist. This final step will be covered in the case study's third chapter, Chapter 6.

[485] (Karbach, 1945, p. 13)
[486] (Beller S. , The World of Yesterday Revisited, 1996, p. 47)

5.2 The State of Austrian Political Liberalism in the 1870s

Chapter 4 reviewed how political liberalism emerged as a compromise between the imperial state and the bourgeoisie during the neo-absolutist era between 1849-1860. German liberals from the propertied and educated classes were opposed to the emperor's authoritarianism but liberals overlapped with Franz Joseph in other areas.[487] Both were committed to a centralised Habsburg Empire led by a German, educated, and wealthy elite. First, both sides were also politically elitist. Čapková reminds that German Liberalism sought 'equality for all, but only allows capable, educated, and propertied individuals to take over leadership of society.'[488] These elite-biased beliefs were translated into an electoral system that was based on 'property qualification, direct taxation, and noble property. To qualify to vote, it was necessary to pay at least 10 florins in direct tax.'[489]

Political exclusion affected German lower state officials and petit bourgeoisie who were disenfranchised based on their lower economic statuses. Chapter 4 also argued that the distribution of power amongst enfranchised classes also favoured Germans over non-Germans.[490] As Robert Kann and Gary Cohen argued, Austrian liberalism was a largely narrow, German, upper middle-class movement which protected the 'advancement of the political and economic interests of the German-speaking middle classes.'[491] Alternatively, the classes who were underrepresented within Austrian liberalism were aware of their relative political exclusion. These classes included the disenfranchised German lower classes and the non-German ethnicities who were underrepresented in the liberal political parties. Both groups were motivated by their relative exclusion into

[487] (Berenger, 1997, p. 186)
[488] (Capkova, 2012, p. 68; Wistrich, 1983)
[489] (Berenger, 1997, p. 241)
[490] (Berenger, 1997, p. 241)
[491] (Cohen, 1967, p.),(Kann R. , 1948, p. 241)

political action. Excluded non-German nationalists, including those amongst the Czechs and Poles, formed the backbone of the anti-liberal, imperial governments of the 1880s.[492] Other German constituencies, including the lower middle classes of 'shopkeepers, merchants, schoolteachers, (Catholic) clerics, but also … middle-ranking government officials'[493] were excluded from political liberalism because of the high economic threshold for political franchise. Austro-German political liberalism also interacted with the German petite bourgeoise via the former's anti-Catholicism. Austro-German liberalism was in an 'embittered and irreconcilable struggle … against the Catholic Church'[494] which it saw as an impediment to the reunification of Austrian Germans with other German Protestants. Austrian liberalism affected Catholic authorities who lost relative power during the secularism of absolutism and liberalism, including clerics, priests, and teachers from the old religious schools.[495] The German petite bourgeoisie resented their exclusion from political liberalism but were tolerant of it as long they experienced moderate levels of social mobility. They were willing to cede political power to the wealthy elites, and their preference for unregulated *laissez faire* capitalism, as long as society as a whole prospered.

A European economic downturn between the 1870s and 1890s overturned the tenuous social contract between empowered liberals and other groups. Viennese society experienced the economic crisis as a stock market collapse in 1873. Many small depositors from the disenfranchised classes 'were ruined by the crash and the philosophy of free enterprise suffered a severe blow.'[496] These included small merchants, farmers, and craftsmen. A depressed economic climate 'heightened post-73 competition for jobs in the educated professions'[497] and this fuelled competition amongst

[492] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 165)
[493] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 257)
[494] (Karbach, 1945, p. 11)
[495] (Kann R. , 1948, p. 241)
[496] (Berenger, 1997, p. 239)
[497] (Hagen, 2012, p. 217)

ethnic groups in universities. Economic competition between Germans and non-Germans emerged, but the downturn also revealed resentment by 'frustrated (Christian-German) *Mittelstand* groups for whom the Jews provided most unwelcomed economic competition.'[498] Altogether, the reputation of political liberalism suffered alongside economic liberalism. A number of liberal politicians 'were members of the boards of directors'[499] in the failed industrial and banking firms. Liberal parliamentarians and cabinet members were implicated in fraudulent stock promotion and stock transactions. Liberalism and the 'Liberal Party was tainted'[500] as a result, and Vienna entered new political eras based on ratcheting inter-ethnic and inter-class competition.[501]

The liberals may have been able to endure the public's hostility after the 1873 crash if they had the backing of the emperor, but they lost that support at the same time. Recall that Austrian liberalism was defined by its efforts to exclude non-Germans and the lower classes. At the same time, liberalism was also defined by a delicate competition for power with the Habsburg monarchy as the former attempted to establish a constitutional monarchy in Austria.[502] Liberalism lost its tacit acceptance from the lower, excluded classes at the same time as it was losing support from the higher political authorities. The liberal politicians in the Austrian Diet overstepped established boundaries and they lost the emperor's favour in 1879 when they opposed the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia. The German nationalist factions within the liberal parties believed they were 'defending German national interests from the inclusion of yet more Slavs'[503] into the empire. Emperor 'Franz Joseph thought the opposition to the exercise of his prerogative as an implicit breaking of the bargain with the Liberals, and a direct threat to his power

[498] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 257)
[499] (Berenger, 1997, p. 239)
[500] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 51)
[501] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 149)
[502] (Cohen G. , 2007, p. 247) (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 67)
[503] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 154)

(which it was).'[504] The emperor decided to end the liberal domination of politics in Vienna. The losses of Political Liberalism's legitimacy from both above and below meant that 'the liberalisation since the 1860s had appeared to have run its course.'[505] Unwittingly, the transition away from the stable Liberal Era opened the door to the national and political upheavals of the late 19th Century.

5.3 The Decline of Political Liberalism in Viennese Politics and Society

Political liberalism persisted in Cisleithania beyond the formal end of the Liberal Era in 1879. For instance, Gary Cohen reminds that 'the Constitutional (or Liberal) Party and its successors … retained overwhelming strength among the heavily middle-class and lower middle-class German minority of Prague until the end of the Monarchy.'[506] At the same time, the shift from liberal governance reflected significant social changes in the capital beyond formal politics. These changes defined the city's major political and social divides through the end of the 19th Century and beyond. The loss of the emperor's support for the liberal parties led to the appointment of Count Eduard Taaffe as Minister-President from 1879-1893. Taaffe's governments were supported by ethnically and economically diverse, anti-liberal coalitions. Taafe's 15 years of governance effectively shut out the elite, German liberals from the central government, while opening the door for non-Germans and the lower classes. Taaffe's political concessions to his diverse coalition created significant social angst amongst the once-dominant German liberals, and this hastened the emergence of ethno-German political nationalism in Vienna. Steven Beller argued that the composition of the liberals of the 1870s was already showing signs of German ethno-nationalism even before the Taaffe regime, so Viennese society was primed for the contentious divisions that followed.[507] It is worth

[504] ((Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 154) (Meyer, 2009, pp. 1-2)
[505] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 157)
[506] (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 58)
[507] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 148)

noting that Taaffe's time in power, and the social changes that accompanied it, overlapped with Theodor Herzl's transition in Vienna from German nationalist to Jewish nationalist. These changes were also prominently manifested in Herzl's immediate social environments, especially amongst the student body of the University of Vienna. Together, this makes the Taaffe era a significant period for understanding Theodor Herzl and his political philosophies.

The liberals' earlier, high status in Vienna was reflected in their clear majority in the 1873 Reichsrat elections, where they secured 219 of 353 deputies.[508] Their reputation was diminished before the next elections in 1879, primarily due to them being 'morally compromised by their associations with finance and big business'[509] after the financial crash. 'The 1879 elections put an end to the liberal era. The liberals gained a derisory majority in the imperial council with 172 seats.'[510] The emperor's rejection of the liberals meant that he froze them out of power, despite their slim majority. The emperor appointed Count Taaffe and his 'Iron Ring' anti-liberal coalition of conservatives, clericals, federalists, non-German nationalists, and independent deputies.[511] Taaffe's dependence on the liberals in the Reichsrat's Upper House to pass legislation meant that his political concessions to his anti-liberal coalition still had to balance competing interests. Nonetheless, Taaffe gradually expanded ethnic and class inclusion throughout the 1880s at the expense of the German liberals. McGrath wrote that 'Taaffe's 'Iron Ring' government united the clerical conservatives in parliament with the representatives of the Slavic peoples of the empire, a combination which drove the German liberal parties into opposition and initiated a pro-gramme of concessions to the Slavs, particularly the Czechs.'[512] More importantly, Cisleithanian Germans were aware that this was the

[508] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 146)
[509] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 149)
[510] (Berenger, 1997, p. 239)
[511] (Meyer, 2009, p. 1) (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 160)
[512] (McGrath, 1967, pp. 196-197)

intention of Taaffe's regime. German constituents organised against Taafe's policies, and this strengthened a German identity based on a shared threat. Steven Beller succinctly summarised Taaffe's policies which he also described as intentionally eroding ethno-German dominance in Cisleithania.[513] Beller wrote that as early as 1880, Taaffe catered to his Bohemian allies when he made Czech a bureaucratic language in those provinces. German Bohemians immediately became suspicious.[514] Germans were wealthier than their Czech counterparts and paid the majority of taxes despite being a minority of the population. They associated their social and economic success with German being the '*lingua franca* of education, commerce and administration'.[515] Taaffe followed this by splitting Prague's Charles University into Czech and German sections, creating new pathways for Czech social mobility in Bohemia.[516] Taaffe then explicitly and successfully elevated Czech politicians above German politicians in the provinces institutions, including the Bohemian Diet, via a series of election reforms. Taaffe manipulated the composition of the curiae and expanded the voting franchise to engineer a Czech majority. The effect was that the German population lost their political dominance in the region by the 1885 elections. The final blow came in 1886 when the government elevated Czech to a full, internal language of Bohemian and Moravian institutions at the expense of Germans, who generally did not speak Czech. Germans saw this as a direct threat to their economic opportunity and social mobility, and they unsuccessfully attempted to maintain separate German-language institutions.[517]

Taafe's coalition extended beyond the ethnic minorities and he enacted political concessions to his other constituents, including the lower classes. They had the same effect, though, of undermining the German liberals. Berenger cites that in 1882 the

[513] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 163)
[514] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 162)
[515] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 161)
[516] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 163)
[517] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 163)

government lowered the voting qualification from '10 to 5 florins and so enlarged the electoral body to include the petite bourgeoisie.'[518] This was significant because the petite-bourgeoisie were 'both more anti-liberal and also more composed of non-German nationalities in the provinces.'[519] Finally, Taaffe redistributed power towards the liberals' other nemesis, the Catholic Church, by reinstating their authority over education.[520] Altogether, the shift from German liberalism to Taaffe's diverse coalition saw meaningful social changes for the status of both sides in Cisleithania. This became the foundation for new political and social competition in the 1880s and 1890s.

5.4 The German Nationalist Crisis after 1879

This section argues that German ethno-nationalism in Cisleithania was grounded in wider political conflict and was not just a spontaneous expression of emergent nationalism.[521] The previous chapter presented arguments from a range of authors who argued that Cisleithania's political liberalism was biased towards educated and upper-class Germans. Cisleithanian Germans did not need to explicitly affirm their superiority within the political and social system before the end of the Liberal Era in 1879. The western half of the empire was centralised relatively quickly across 125 years. State centralisation accelerated pro-German norms that had been developing in the Duchy of Austria since the 12th Century, and in the Kingdom of Bohemia since the early 16th Century. 18th and 19th Century centralisation created clear winners and losers between enfranchised, upper-class and educated Germans on one hand, and non-Germans and the lower classes on the other. The decline of political liberalism was an opportunity to confront these inequalities, and this programme was undertaken by Cisleithania's new post-liberal government under Count Eduard von Taaffe.

[518] (Berenger, 1997, p. 212)
[519] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 164)
[520] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 163)
[521] (Kann R. , 1948, p. 243)

Taaffe's government drew its support not from the German liberals but from 'a majority consisting of (German) Catholic conservatives and Polish, Slovene and partly Czech national groups.'[522] The Taaffe government ruled from 1879 until 1893 and was succeeded by similar governments through the turn of the century. It has already been discussed how Taaffe and his successors undermined bourgeois German dominance by expanding voting rights to the lower classes, and by promoting ethnic inclusivity in Cisleithania.[523] According to McGrath, 'Taaffe's 'Iron Ring' government united the clerical conservatives in parliament with the representatives of the Slavic peoples of the empire, a combination which drove the German liberal parties into opposition and initiated a programme of concessions to the Slavs, particularly the Czechs.'[524] Taaffe's reforms elicited a sharp response amongst Germans. 'The former self confidence among Germans about their dominant position in the Austrian part of the empire ended and gave rise to a siege mentality.'[525] Germans were demographic minorities nearly everywhere in the Dual Monarchy outside of Austria. This was despite their overrepresentation within political institutions, especially in the Cisleithanian half of the empire. Germans equated political equality with non-Germans with their own political and social subordination. An article from 1880 in the University of Vienna's student newspaper reflected reactionary German ethno-consciousness when it wrote, 'The answer will be, because we first want to protect our identity. There we have it. At the moment when what is German is most threatened in Austria, the Germans unite…'[526]

Even before the end of the Liberal Era, some Habsburg Germans were already perceiving a competition between the social privileges they held as Germans, and the

[522] (Kann R. , 1948, p. 243)
[523] (Berenger, 1997, pp. 211-213)
[524] (McGrath, 1967, pp. 196-197)
[525] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 36)
[526] (McGrath, 1967, p. 196)

demographic reality of a multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. Early German responses to threats to their social power were various supra-state German identities to re-establish their numerical and social dominance over Central Europe. The creation of the German Empire in 1871 reduced the options for Habsburg pan-Germanists. Austro-German nationalism intensified after they were excluded from the German Empire. 'With Austria excluded from the German reconstruction, it was but to be expected that the centre of gravity might shift toward the Austrian Slavs who formed the majority of the population, a tendency which gradual democratization could only hasten.'[527] Beller argued that in the Reichsrat elections of 1873 that a sizeable faction of younger liberals was already German nationalist as a result. The 'Young Liberals' perceived the threat of an inclusive 'Austrian national identity and (they) emphasised the greatness and power of German culture instead.'[528] This faction was opposed to the 'Old Liberals' who were still dominant in the party, and who were loyal to the integrity of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire and the emperor.[529]

Immediately after the formation of the German Empire, 'Austro-German groups began to openly voice claims which could only be described as subversive from the point of view of official Austrian policy. One political programme issued on February 15th of that year (1868), for example, demanded "reunion with Germany of those parts of Austria which had belonged to the German Federation" … and "a close alliance of Austria with Germany, that is, with the leading German State [Prussia], against any foe.'[530] An election manifesto issued in 1870 in Vienna 'attacked "the so-called European, cosmopolitan or purely humanitarian democracy," and maintained that the most important problem for German Austria was the issue of the struggle of the non-German nationalities against Germanism. "We believe," declared this document, "that the most

[527] (Karbach, 1945, p. 4) (Karbach, 1945, p. 4)
[528] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 148)
[529] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 149)
[530] (Karbach, 1945, p. 5)

favourable solution of this problem from the point of view of the German people in Austria is not a question of law, but of power."'[531] Oscar Karbach argued that the German nationalist political programme developed in this early period would become the main points of later, prominent Austro-German nationalist politicians in the 1880s and 1890s.[532] The decline of the Old Liberals after the economic crash of 1873 meant that 'It was this more nationalist, and less accommodating, more decisive, and selfish brand of politics (of the Young Liberals) that was on the ascendant.'[533] Christian Germans across Cisleithania were willing to renounce ordinary politics if that meant the restoration of German superiority. They were willing to abandon the earlier ideals of political liberalism and 'all the great nineteenth-century values: parliamentary government, liberalism, socialism, liberty and civil equality'[534] to maintain German dominance in Cisleithania. Inter-ethnic conflict over power and resources incentivised Austrian Germans to establish strategically exclusive identities via explicit ethnic politics.

German angst accelerated in the post-liberal era and found its strongest expression amongst university students in Austria and Bohemia. This is unsurprising. Mann wrote that, 'European universities were amongst the earliest arenas for modern nationalist conflict, and their students were the vanguard of nationalist consciousness. University students in nationalising societies understood that their future economic welfare depended on the distribution of social power in centralising and nationalising societies.[535] There may be a proportional relationship between the potential for competition over future opportunities, and the intensity of inter-group conflict. To this end, Robert Wistrich argued that student activism at the University of Vienna presaged the capital city's swing towards radical German nationalism in the following decades.

[531] (Karbach, 1945, p. 5)
[532] (Karbach, 1945, p. 5)
[533] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 157)
[534] (Berenger, 1997, p. 251)
[535] (Mann, 2012b, p. 239)

Wistrich wrote ‘that Austria was the cradle of the "most strident and popular radical right-wing social movements that Europe was to see before the days of Mussolini and Hitler," and that "the voters of the Empire (would become) more polarized into radical right and radical left than the citizens of any other European nation."’[536] McGrath argued that the Taaffe reforms had ‘the immediate effect of driving most of the remaining moderates into the *deutschnational* camp’[537] as evidenced by the election of German nationalists to the leadership of the important student clubs. McGrath concluded that ‘The policies of the Taaffe government thus had the effect of completing the radicalization of the German students at the university, and by mid-1880’s the radicals were completely triumphant.’[538]

The shift amongst Austrian university students towards radical German ethno-nationalism had important effects on the capital’s future political environment. Students were indoctrinated into the philosophies of ethno-nationalism, including the seminally important Linz Programme authored by Georg von Schönerer’s *Deutsche Klub*. This charter ‘influenced all the mass political movements of modern Austria, centred on demands for radical social and political reform as well as for the satisfaction of extreme German nationalist ambitions.’[539] By the time these students entered their professional lives across Vienna and Cisleithania they were determined to realise their German nationalist aims directly.[540]

The period between 1879 and the early 1890s was significant for Theodor Herzl’s political development. This is discussed in detail below, but Herzl’s university life and his future political context was shaped by the interaction between the post-liberal Taafe

[536] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 252)
[537] (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)
[538] (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)
[539] (McGrath, 1967, p. 198)
[540] (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)

era and an emergent, reactionary, German nationalism. This work has argued that Theodor Herzl's social environment structured his transformation from German nationalist to Jewish nationalist. On one hand, Theodor Herzl entered the University of Vienna at the end of the Liberal Era when German students were adopting ethno-German political programmes as their guiding ideologies. Herzl was an enthusiastic proponent of these ideologies. At the same time, it was also in this period where German nationalism began using antisemitism as an expression of its exclusive ethnic identity. Herzl was meaningfully affected by this shift towards antisemitism while he was at the University of Vienna. Vienna's political environment in the mid-1880s and 1890s was subsequently defined by the antisemitic, German ethno-nationalism that grew out of the student movements. The evolutions in Viennese politics culminated in the election of an antisemitic municipal government under Karl Lueger and the rise of antisemitic political parties in the Reichsrat. Theodor Herzl pointed to these events as the catalyst for Political Zionism.

5.5 The Vulnerability of Habsburg Jews at the End of the Liberal Era

The post-liberal era saw the gradual political and social exclusion of Viennese Jews which culminated in fierce antisemitism by the turn of the century. It is well-established that Jews became the victims of politically rooted antisemitism in the capital city by the 1890s. This chapter presents one argument for how Jews went from being successfully assimilated Habsburg subjects in the 1860s and 1870s to being under the first explicitly antisemitic municipal government by 1897. The political exclusion of Jews in the late-19th Century is argued to be one outcome of the evolving political relationships amongst the i) German liberal bourgeoisie, ii) the German petite bourgeoisie, and iii) the other ethnicities in Cisleithania, with a special emphasis on the Czechs. In the 1880s and 1890s, each of these three groups experienced evolving political relationships amongst one other, and between themselves and Cisleithania's Jews. First, non-German

populations, including the Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and others, gained greater political inclusion and power in the 1880s for reasons discussed above. Germanised Jews were strongly associated with a politically exclusive German liberalism in Cisleithania by its non-German ethnicities, especially the Czechs.[541] Authors, like Gary Cohen, argued that German-assimilated Jews were synonymous with the oppressive 'Germans' in the eyes of the newly empowered minorities due to their deep integration in political liberalism's institutions and from their liberal voting patterns.[542] The German petite bourgeoisie also perceived themselves as victims of political liberalism's exclusive ideologies. The disproportionate success of Jews in the Liberal Era after centuries of historical anti-Jewishness meant that the German petite-bourgeoisie resented Jews, and they were often hostile towards them after the former gained political rights in the 1880s and beyond. For their part, the old German liberal bourgeoisie began perceiving successful Jews as political, economic, and social competition after the economic crash of 1873. They embraced the opportunity to suppress German Jewish social mobility in the post-liberal era. The bourgeois and petite-bourgeois Christian Germans were already uniting around an emergent German ethno-nationalism in Vienna as a response to Taaffe's political concessions to the other Cisleithanian ethnicities. Petite bourgeois, Christian Germans united with bourgeois defectors from the discredited Liberal Party to reestablish German social dominance. Decades of German acculturation in the provinces meant that marginalised Germanised Jews could not appeal to other oppressed minorities when they were excluded from the new cross-class, Christian German nationalism. After the collapse of liberalism, Viennese Jews were perceived as 'too German', and 'too liberal', and could not join the other ethnic parties, but they were no longer considered 'German' by a new coalition of cross-class, Christian Austro-Germans. Viennese Jews were increasingly isolated in the city's politics as a result.[543]

[541] (Cohen, 1986, p. 58)
[542] (Cohen, 1986, p. 58)
[543] (McCagg, 1989, pp. 156-157) (Capkova, 2012, pp. 58-59)

Viennese and Cisleithanian Jews were protected from political antisemitism until the end of the Liberal Era in 1879. Liberal Cisleithanian politics were led by two groups, the imperial regime and the German liberals. Both groups had incentives to foster Jewish integration. From the perspective of Habsburg emperors, Jews were an asset to be cultivated. Successive regimes sought to 'enhance economic usefulness of Jews and to transform them into useful subjects.'[544] Jewish emancipation was by order of the crown despite public opinion.[545] 'Many of the freedoms between 1849-1860 were (enacted) in the neo absolutist period against the wishes of the church and public opinion'.[546] As discussed above, many Cisleithanian Jews were also tightly integrated with bourgeois German liberalism due to their German assimilation, higher economic statuses, and education. Jews were part of the 'liberal fold as an almost compact ethnic religious group.'[547]

Expansions in voting rights after 1882 diluted the protective power of the state, and when combined with the decline of the Liberal Party, Viennese Jews lost their political cover from popular antisemitism.[548] Shlomo Avineri claims that a 'careful look at the process of emancipation would have revealed undercurrents of future antisemitism.'[549] Antisemitism in late-19th Century Habsburg politics was not just based on pre-modern anti-Jewishness but was directly linked to Jewish emancipation and their successes in the modernising Habsburg state. Avineri claims that the antisemitic attitude of non-elites 'were determined more by their class interests.'[550] Jacques Kornberg similarly expressed that in the mid-to-late 19th Century antisemitism was framed using economic

[544] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 33)
[545] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 33)
[546] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 33)
[547] (Kann R. , 1948, p. 241)
[548] (Kornberg, 1993, pp. 31-34)
[549] (Avineri, 2014, p. 34)
[550] (Avineri, 2014, p. 35)

motifs and not through religious or cultural framings.[551] The German petite-bourgeoisie, or lower-middle classes, came into direct competition with Habsburg Jews during the neo-absolutist and liberal eras. Their political powerlessness meant that they could not stifle Jewish competition as they had done in the past. In 1859, the state enacted trade regulations 'which destroyed guild monopolies, (and) opened up industry and trade to Jews.'[552] The industrial code of 1859 'was an act of economic rationalisation by the state'[553] meant to enhance its national productivity and tax revenues. Artists could not compete with the industrialisation and commercialisation of their crafts, and Jews were highly represented, if not dominant, in these processes. Habsburg Jews were also the public faces of the financial sector, despite the concentration of Christians amongst the directors of financial firms. The crash of 1873 impoverished many in the lower-middle classes and this meant that 'the Jewish position in the eyes of the gentile world thus became completely identified with … the unchecked aggressive power of laissez-faire capitalism.'[554] The wealthy financial and industrial Jewish bourgeoisie were highly visible amongst the mansions in Vienna's *Ringstrasse*, while also being the direct overseers of Christian middle- and lower-class workforces.[555] For their part, wealthier, liberal, Christian Germans resented competition from their Jewish peers in the empire's universities and in the declining professional job market after the 1873 stock market crash. Across the German middle class, it 'was not difficult to convince the embittered victims of economic transformation that the Jews were to blame.'[556]

The only feature that defined and distinguished Germanised Viennese Jews from their former Christian German allies was their Jewishness. German liberalism could comfortably accept competition from Germanised Jews when the economy was doing

[551] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 96)
[552] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 99)
[553] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 33)
[554] (Kann R. , 1948, p. 241)
[555] (Berenger, 1997, p. 247)
[556] (Berenger, 1997, p. 247)

well. This identity became narrowed to Austro-German Christians when the economy contracted because Jewish inclusion now came to the detriment of the Christian Germans. Vienna's Christian Germans formed a broad antisemitic coalition that drew on defectors from the old Liberal Party and lower-middle class democrats, nationalists, clerics, and artisans. Their partnership culminated in the Christian Social Party, and their antisemitic mayoral candidate, Karl Lueger. German industrial workers formed the Social Democratic Workers Party, and by 1911 these two German factions formed the largest delegations in the Austrian Diet. The majority of Bourgeois Jews could not join the antisemitic Christian German nationalists, nor could they support the anti-bourgeoisie German socialists.[557]

The transition from German liberalism to Christian Austro-German nationalism in Austria is evident when comparing the composition of the Cisleithanian Reichsrat at the end of the Liberal Era in 1879 and the elections of 1897. The German liberals secured a majority in the 1879 elections, even though they were not invited to form a government by the emperor. 219 of the 353 Reichsrat deputies were drawn from the liberal parties. The upper curiae of the Large Landholders, the Chambers of Commerce, and the urban constituencies were solidly liberal while the rural seats were more open to anti-liberal influences.[558] This work analysed contemporary Reichsrat election reports from the Habsburg's Austrian Central Statistical Commission. These analyses revealed that Austrian urban and rural middle classes, in particular, had shifted towards antisemitic Christian German nationalism. The 'Christian Socials' were the most popular party amongst Lower Austria's 'Cities and Towns', 'Rural', and 'General' curiae.[559] The second most popular party amongst the Rural curia was the pan-Germanist *Deutsche Volkspartei* (German People's Party).[560] This section argued that the Viennese

[557] (Berenger, 1997, p. 248)
[558] (Beller, 2018, p. 149)
[559] (Central Statistical Commission, 1897, p. XXVI)
[560] (K. K. Statistischen Central-Commission, 1897, p. XXVI)

bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie were the most likely to reject Jewish inclusion after the crash of 1873 for their own economic reasons. The German liberal bourgeoisie faced direct economic competition from German-assimilated Jews in a contracting economy. The German petite bourgeoisie held long-standing anti-Jewish resentments since they historically opposed economic competition from Jews, while also associating the Jewish bourgeoisie with their political suppression in the Liberal Era. It was no surprise that the German petite bourgeoisie flocked to the Christian Socials when they gained political suffrage. Alternatively, this work also argued that the upper classes were relatively unaffected by political competition at the lower levels of society because their positions in the state's socio-economic order was secure. The Austrian upper classes were still dominant in the military, economy, and diplomatic corps. There was less reason for Austria's upper echelons to become antisemitic German nationalists. The social stability amongst the upper classes was reflected in the 1897 Reichsrat results. The small curiae of the Large Landowners and the Chambers of Commerce still favoured the *Deutsch-Liberals* over the Christian Socials and other antisemitic, German nationalist parties in the Reichsrat elections of 1897.[561]

The same election reports from the 1897 Reichsrat elections reveal the demographic split between ascendant Czech nationalists and the sizeable German minority in the Czech lands. Taafe's political gerrymandering in favour of the Czechs bore fruit and Bohemian and Moravian voters were split unevenly in favour of the Czech nationalist 'Young Czechs' followed by the 'German Liberal' parties.[562] Silesia saw the continued dominance of the Polish parties, reflecting the distribution of power there.[563] The Czech lands, in particular, reveal intense competition between increasingly strident Czech

[561] (K. K. Statistischen Central-Commission, 1897, p. XXVI)
[562] (K. K. Statistischen Central-Commission, 1897, p. XXVII)
[563] (K. K. Statistischen Central-Commission, 1897, p. XXVII)

nationalists and the minority German liberals.[564] Jews overwhelmingly represented in the latter camp despite its diminishing political prospects.[565]

5.6 Theodor Herzl's Early Encounters with Nationalist Antisemitism at the University of Vienna

Theodor Herzl's time at the University of Vienna between 1878 and 1884 overlapped with the political changes in Austria that were discussed above. This overlap positioned Theodor Herzl within Vienna's political context during the city's transition from elite German liberalism to the expansion of political suffrage and the emergence of popular German ethno-nationalism. As in this work's discussion of Herzl's earlier life, Theodor Herzl was an archetypical representation of Germanised, liberal Jews in Cisleithania. His life events followed an established pathway for someone of his social background and he has to be considered within that social context. For example, Chapter 4 discussed how Herzl entered the university as a member of a militant, German-nationalist, and Austrian imperialist student club, *Albia.*[566] This was in the twilight of the German Liberal Era in Vienna and assimilated, liberal Jews were still accepted within Vienna's German-led society. Herzl's German nationalism at the University of Vienna aligned with the prominent role of Jews in German nationalism, and German liberal politics in Vienna, and across Cisleithania. Liberal Jewish thinkers were at the philosophical core of the German nationalist 'Young Liberals', including personalities like Victor Adler and Heinrich Friedjung.[567] These Jewish German nationalists advocated for German dominance and against an inclusive 'Austrian national identity'.[568] Herzl was amongst these students and he spent his early years at the University of Vienna as one

[564] (K. K. Statistischen Central-Commission, 1897, p. XXVII)
[565] (Cohen G. B., 1986, p. 58)
[566] (Penslar, 2020, p. 24)
[567] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 148)
[568] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 148)

of the German-assimilated Jewish liberals who opposed greater political inclusion. At the same time, it was during this period that Christian German students in the University of Vienna's fraternities, who were also adherents to the 'Adler Group's' German ethno-nationalism, became 'the most prominent instigators of the student antisemitic demonstrations'[569] Herzl was subsequently a victim of social rejection and German nationalist antisemitism by the time he concluded his studies. Herzl emerged from this social and political context, and his experiences at the University of Vienna were significant for his future political philosophies. This included his belief that German nationalism was based on inter-group competition over economic and social rights. Herzl would not primarily represent nationalism as the aspirations of a genealogically, culturally, or historically distinct people but as a vehicle for economic and political security.

This section discuses Theodor Herzl's young adulthood which straddled a period between Germanised Jews being accepted within the Austro-German liberal identity and the subsequent antisemitic exclusion of Jews. Herzl entered university five years after the economic crisis which fomented nationalist antisemitism amongst Christian Germans. Habsburg Jews, like Herzl, still believed in the promises of German assimilation and social mobility but were also starting to observe undercurrents of anti-Jewish resentment amongst Christian Germans. On one hand, it will be argued that Herzl perceived himself as a bourgeois German nationalist when he strongly fought against the Taaffe regime's ethnic and class inclusion. The previous chapter argued that Herzl maintained an assimilationist Austro-German identity while suppressing his Jewish and Hungarian social features while he was a student in Vienna. He believed that assimilation could alleviate the historical disabilities of all Jews in Europe. At the same time, it will also be shown that Herzl was explicitly aware that elite German

[569] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 148)

dominance over the empire's other ethno-linguistic groups and classes was starting to bleed into resentment of German-Jewish competition. European universities were amongst the earliest arenas for modern nationalist conflict, and their students were the vanguard of nationalist consciousness.[570] It is therefore theoretically and empirically consistent that Theodor Herzl would encounter antisemitism at the University of Vienna. Austro-German university students during the economic straits of the 1870s-1890s were particularly sensitive to their future prospects and they were disproportionately pan-Germanists.[571] Also discussed above was that Cisleithanian Pan-Germanists advocated for their domination over society, politics, and economy. Pan-Germanists sought the political and cultural unity of the southern German states as a means of establishing a demographic majority over competing ethno-linguistic groups. This political ideology was well-represented amongst the University of Vienna's student body, especially in their embrace of two public personalities. The first being the German nationalist politician, Georg von Schönerer. The second was Richard Wagner as a symbol of German nationalism, unity, and cultural superiority. It was via this generation of university graduates that German ethno-nationalism became established in Viennese politics and society in the following decade.[572] (Have to streamline this last couple of paragraphs)

This work's hypothesized material basis for pan-Germanism meant that any competition to German social mobility was deemed a threat to that group. Czech Slavs were significant ethnic competition for Habsburg Germans in Cisleithania due to their demographic preponderance. Czech equality was a major topic at the empire's universities. In 1881-1882, Minister-President Taaffe elevated Czech to an official administrative language in Cisleithania. This advantaged Czechs over Germans in the

[570] (Mann, 2012b, p. 239)
[571] (Cohen, 1959, p. 28)
[572] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 252)

civil service because most Czechs had to be bilingual in its German-biased institutions, while Germans rarely spoke Czech.[573] McGrath argued that, 'the policies of the Taaffe government thus had the effect of completing the radicalization of the German students at the university, and by mid-1881 the radicals were completely triumphant.'[574] He added that the Taaffe programme 'had the immediate effect of driving most of the remaining (German) moderates into the *deutschnational* camp.'[575] As evidence, McGrath pointed to the swing amongst the university's clubs to extreme German nationalism. The popular *Akademische Lesehalle* (Academic Reading Hall) was already known to be German nationalist, but even the moderate and liberal *Deutsch-Osterreichische Leseverein* (The German Austrian Reading Association) adopted the *Lesehalle*'s nationalist programme in 1881.[576] Theodor Herzl was amongst the German nationalist students who joined protests against the language ordinances, and the subsequent division of the university in Prague into Czech and German sections, because these policies undermined German as the dominant language.[577]

Alternatively, and unexpectedly for Herzl, the tightening Habsburg economy also made Germanised Jews targets for their bourgeois, Christian German peers. Inter-ethnic competition heightened perceptions of ethnic difference and encouraged narrower ethnic identities. Jews were not exempt from the Christian German belief that 'others' were threats to their material welfare, and surplus to their society. In 1875, two years after the 1873 economic crisis, one of the most prominent university professors, Theodor Billroth, made a landmark speech that marked one of the earliest instances of modern Austrian antisemitism which specifically targeted successful, German-assimilated Jews. Professor Billroth contested the influx of Jewish students into his medical faculty and he

[573] (Berenger, 1997, p. 251)
[574] (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)
[575] (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)
[576] (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)
[577] (Capkova, 2012, p. 61) (Kornberg, 1993, p. 44) (McGrath, 1967, p. 197)

was strongly supported by Christian German students.[578] Antisemitism became established in student-led social organisations, the *Burschenschaften*, by the 1880s. The previous chapter noted that Herzl was the social chair of the University of Vienna's pro-German *Akademische Lesehalle* (Academic Reading Room). The same social club invited a violent and antisemitic pan-Germanist, Georg von Schönerer to speak in 1881. Von Schönerer was later invited to speak at Herzl's other social club, *Albia*, for its 10th anniversary to Herzl's dismay.[579]

Georg von Schönerer was a notable influence on antisemitic, German ethno-nationalism in Viennese politics, and he is worth considering further. Correspondence between contemporary Austrian and Prussian diplomats revealed the belief that von Schönerer's German national movement 'has embraced ever-widening circles … The whole of the intelligentsia, the university graduates, the merchants, nay even a part of the farmers, are

affected by it. Professors and students of the universities and high schools are followers of Schoenerer.'[580] Note that the same constituencies who were susceptible to Schönerer were also politically ascendant in Vienna in the 1880s and 1890s. Von Schönerer was the son of a Christian German industrialist who was ennobled in the 19th Century. He was a Reichsrat deputy for a German liberal party and at one time, 'seemed to be the unquestioned future leader of the Austrian Germans; gentiles and Jews alike.'[581] Von Schönerer initially worked with Jewish, German nationalist intellectuals, including Victor Adler and Heinrich Friedjung, to develop German nationalism's political program in Austria. His work influenced all other German parties in the state.[582] At the same time, 'Von Schönerer is important because he was the first to perceive the possibilities of

[578] (Beller S. , 2018, p. 191)
[579] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 41)
[580] (Karbach, 1945, pp. 10-11)
[581] (Karbach, 1945, p. 14)
[582] (Karbach, 1945, pp. 7-8)

antisemitism as an instrument for forcing the direction of foreign policy and disrupting, for partisan ends, the internal structure of the state.'[583] 'After a considerable struggle within the (pan-Germanist) movement, Schönerer was able to make anti-semitism an article of faith of the *deutschnational* movement. The rise of anti-semitism drove Jews such as Adler and Friedjung, as well as their gentile friend Pernerstorfer, from the movement'.[584] Schönerer's inclusion of antisemitism in the German nationalist political programme would be adopted by the German nationalist politicians that followed him.

Von Schönerer was more radical than most, and he advocated for the annexation of the Habsburg Empire by Prussia to form a single German Empire. He also spent his time as a deputy in the Reichsrat arguing 'against the introduction of universal and equal suffrage, realizing that this would give the Slavonic nationalities'[585] a parliamentary majority. He even declared on the floor of the Reichsrat in 1878 that he wished that 'Austria already belonged to the German Empire'[586] Emperor Franz Joseph was wary of Georg von Schönerer's treasonous views, and the authorities shuttered his speech at the *Akademische Lesehalle*.[587] It is therefore significant that von Schönerer was embraced amongst Austro-German students at this junction of Viennese political and social history. The predecessor to the *Akademische Lesehalle*, the *Lesseverein der deutschen Studenten Wiens* (Reading Society of German Students of Vienna), had already been closed when the state saw it as a danger to the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire because of its strong pan-Germanist sympathies. The German nationalist *Leseverein* was popular 'by far the largest and most influential student organization at the university'[588] which supports the presence of German nationalist sentiment amongst the University of Vienna's faculty and students. Its rallies were often

[583] (Karbach, 1945, p. 3)
[584] (McGrath, 1967, p. 198)
[585] (Karbach, 1945, p. 29)
[586] (Karbach, 1945, p. 8)
[587] (Berenger, 1997, p. 253)
[588] (McGrath, 1967, p. 194)

attended by thousands of members and observers.[589] 'The society was able, without exaggeration, to refer to itself as the 'social and intellectual centre of Vienna's German-speaking students', and to note that a description of the society's activities would in itself be a sketch of the life and aspirations of Vienna's students. When the government dissolved the society, its members not only protested vigorously, but by joining en masse the rival *Akademische Lesehalle*, were able to take over that organization.'[590]

Even though von Schönerer's 1881 speech to the *Lesehalle* is known as a landmark antisemitic shift in Vienna, it is not known how Herzl reacted to von Schönerer's speeches at the time.[591] At the same time, antisemitism would lead Herzl to resign from his beloved student club, *Albia*, in 1883. German student unions held a memorial for the rabid antisemite, Richard Wagner, that became a platform for antisemitic speeches, including from members of *Albia*. 4,000 students were in attendance. The 'memorial procession sponsored by university students was so well attended that when it turned into a German nationalist demonstration the police had considerable difficulty breaking it up.'[592] Herzl was not at the memorial but he wrote an emotional letter to his fraternity brothers because of their attendance and he resigned his membership.[593] *Albia* and other German social clubs stopped accepting Jewish members altogether after 1894.[594] Shlomo Avineri identified this as a university-wide turn away from Jews. He wrote, 'After all, it was in (Herzl's) student days at the Law Faculty of Vienna University that Herzl found himself, like many other Jewish students, excluded from the local student fraternities (the *Burschenschaften*), because the Austrian fraternities, under the influence of anti-Semitic politicians and writers like Schönerer and his Pan-German

[589] (McGrath, 1967, p. 194)
[590] (McGrath, 1967, p. 195)
[591] (Beller, 2018, p. 172)
[592] (McGrath, 1967, p. 194)
[593] (Avineri, 2014, p. 56), (Kornberg, 1993, pp. 49-51)
[594] (Beller S. , 2018, p. 201) (Kornberg, 1993, p. 103)

movement, were the first to exclude "non-Aryans" from their midst.'[595] The antisemitic exclusion of Jews from their place within the German identity began at the University of Vienna but these students would transfer their antisemitic, Christian Austro-German nationalism to the wider Viennese society and politics in the following decade.

Theodor Herzl's time at the University of Vienna between 1878 and 1884 mirrored the social transformations that were underway in Vienna. He experienced the swing from the inclusion of Germanised Jews as accepted members of the Austro-German, liberal identity to the antisemitic exclusion of Jews by the time he graduated. This is why this work argues that Theodor Herzl, and his political evolution towards Jewish nationalism, should be considered as a product of his time and place. The antisemitic exclusion of the once-accepted German, liberal Jews for economic and political reasons would only accelerate with the rise of Christian German nationalism in Vienna after 1885. This period is considered in the following section.

5.7 Christian German Nationalism in Habsburg Politics

President-Minister Taaffe weakened the German liberals by lowering the property qualification by half, from 10 florins to 5 florins, in 1882.[596] Steven Beller wrote that this expanded the voting franchise amongst non-German ethnic minorities, on one hand, and anti-liberal lower classes, on the other.[597] In Vienna, Taafe's reforms expanded the suffrage 'to lower levels of the middle classes: small businessmen, artisans, and peasants with modest holdings, a stratum ignored and suppressed by Liberal hegemony.'[598] Robert Wistrich wrote that the anti-liberalism and German ethno-

[595] (Avineri, Herzl's Road to Zionism, 1998, p. 10)
[596] (Berenger, 1997, p. 250)
[597] (Beller S. , The Habsburg Monarchy: 1815-1918, 2018, p. 164)
[598] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 91)

nationalism fostered the antisemitic German nationalism of the 1880s and 1890s. He wrote,

> Both Social Catholicism and antisemitism had emerged in the 1880s as the ideological articulation and political vehicles for these endangered strata in the Austro-German Bürgertum, to express their protest against liberal political pieties which had sacrificed them to the "Moloch of Capitalism." Moreover, precisely the two most antisemitic groups in the delicate coalition of interests that eventually made up the Christian-Social party- the depressed artisans and the Catholic clerics - were truly indispensable to it for the mobilization of cadres and the winning both of mass support and official respectability.[599]

State-level politics in the *Reichsrat* was initially less affected by the expansion in suffrage because its curiae were still biased towards traditional elites. The 'general' curia of the lower classes could only elect 17% of the total deputies.[600] The powerful Vienna City Council was more sensitive to changes in voting rights because its three curiae were nearly equally weighted, and the third curia was dominated by the petite bourgeoisie.[601] Male suffrage was subsequently expanded in the empire towards universal rights between 1882 and 1906.[602] The Vienna City Council was therefore an early bellwether for the effects of Christian German democratisation in Austria. Reviews of the 1897 *Reichsrat* elections support this claim. Its election results reveal that the Christian Socials were the dominant party in the Cisleithanian Diet amongst Austrian bourgeois and petite bourgeois voters by 1897.[603]

[599] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 257)
[600] (Berenger, 1997, p. 212)
[601] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 91)
[602] (Berenger, 1997, p. 211)
[603] (K. K. Statistischen Central-Commission, 1897, p. XXVI)

The same classes who gained voting rights in 1882 were the most resentful of liberalism's economic and political displacement, and as argued above, they associated liberalism with Jews. The first antisemitic party to emerge after the 1882 reforms was the *Oesterreichische Reformverein* (Austrian Reform Association) from 'affluent artisans, small factory owners, lawyers and schoolteachers.'[604] This party was politically insignificant but their platform presaged later demands to exclude Jews from the nation-state by reversing Jewish emancipation. They wanted to re-establish limits to Jewish 'landownership, occupational freedom, and exclusion from public posts.'[605] This movement 'aimed to abrogate the emancipation of the Austrian Jews and reduce them to their former restricted legal status. Jews would not be permitted to acquire real estate either in the cities or in rural areas; they would be excluded from all public office, and their rights as burghers, merchants and tradesmen would be restricted by law. Holubek wanted also to forbid the employment of Christian women by Jews.'[606]

The same Georg von Schönerer who was so influential amongst German students at the University of Vienna led the charge to normalise antisemitism within German ethno-nationalist politics beyond these early efforts. Oscar Karbach elegantly outlined one argument on how Austro-German Jews were the perfect antagonist to motivate Christian German unity in the 1880s by Schönerer, and later antisemitic politicians. Karbach aligned with this work's argument, and others cited in this document, including those of Shlomo Avineri, when he argued that Christian German antisemitism was never simply rebranded, historical 'Jew-hatred'. Karbach argued that 19th Century Austro-German antisemites, like Schönerer, used the economic and social successes of Austrian Jews as symbols for the dangers that the general 'other' posed to Christian German social mobility. Schönerer's pan-Germanism was always about the primacy of Christian

[604] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 32)
[605] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 32)
[606] (Karbach, 1945, p. 17)

Germans in Central Europe in opposition to non-Germans, especially the Slavic peoples. The problem was that the Cisleithanian Slavs, especially the Czechs, were still on the social ascent after Taafe's reforms, and were a future threat to continued German supremacy. Jews were already established in Vienna as a visible, non-Christian German symbol of the social threat that Christian Germans faced in a multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. This was especially true after Christian Germans perceived that the empire was no longer willing to guarantee the continued privileges of its Christian German population. The threat of successful, liberal Jews was even easier to perceive after the crash of 1873. They were economic competition to the German bourgeoisie in the liberal professions, and in the universities and gymnasium that prepared Christian Germans for them. Jews were also a potent symbol of a minority who exerted economic and political dominance over the petite bourgeoisie in the Liberal Era. Cisleithanian Jews could be used as a preview for what the social mobility of other Cisleithanian minorities could become. As Karbach wrote, Jews were the 'weakest spot in the totality of citizens, and the attack was to be launched under cover of a shrewd propaganda which would conceal the real objective by pointing up the "exotic strangeness" of the Jewish group.'[607] Schönerer turned on his close Jewish associates to make this point and he '"built up" (the Jew) as the eternal, implacable foe, with whom it was impossible to come to terms and who must ultimately be driven from the territory of the state.'[608] Schönerer was creating an ideology of racial antisemitism in his efforts to maintain Christian Austro-German political, social, and economic primacy in a multi-ethnic state. One of Schönerer's Nazi biographers looked to his philosopher when he wrote that Schönerer 'found supreme justification for his struggle [against the Jews] in the fact that he waged it for the salvation of his German people." Thus, he progressed to national racial

[607] (Karbach, 1945, p. 13)
[608] (Karbach, 1945, p. 13)

antisemitism.'[609] '"The Jews," he wrote, "are an alien and hostile nation and race, who regard it as the prerogative of their tribe to exploit and enslave us."'[610]

Karbach wrote that the 'election of 1885 formed the turning-point of von Schönerer's attitude towards the Jews. On May 1st of that year, he added a further point to the (pan-Germanist) Linz Program, declaring that "the elimination of Jewish influence from all spheres of public life is an indispensable condition for the accomplishment of our reforms."'[611] The strong influence of the Linz Programme on German ethno-national politics meant that this ideology became firmly attached to antisemitism.

By the elections of 1886, there was a significant Christian German voting bloc consisting of 'bankers, merchants, as well as high state officials, artists, academics, and prominent members of the free professions.'[612] The 'United Christians' outperformed the Liberal Party by 1889. Catholic conservatives leveraged lower middle class economic distress to re-centre religion in Austrian society after the secularisation of previous decades. Pope Leo XIII and the Habsburg clerical class endorsed German Catholic nationalism.[613] The economic and political interests of these diverse constituencies overlapped with their shared religion and Austrian patriotism to support the creation of a cross-class, national political party. The centralisation of the Habsburg state after 1740 under Empress Maria Theresa and Joseph II in response to inter-state wars constructed a centralised economy and administration that favoured Christian German men.[614] This demographic became accustomed to their social and material privileges in the Habsburg nationalised state and their implicit identity was made explicit when their dominance was

[609] (Karbach, 1945, p. 15)
[610] (Karbach, 1945, p. 15)
[611] (Karbach, 1945, p. 15)
[612] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 91)
[613] (Berenger, 1997, p. 247)
[614] (Bader-Zaar, 2024, p. 62)

challenged. The material conditions that were the foundation of the Austro-German identity existed before the underlying population was aware of it.

The United Christians became the Christian Social Party in 1893 and were led by the antisemitic populist, Karl Lueger.[615] Lueger was a 'demagogue who could speak to the artisans and lower middle-class of Vienna, who were victims of the 1873 crash, the economic crisis, and the decline of the artisan class in the face of large-scale industry'.[616] Lueger agitated Christian Germans by blaming their economic and social concerns on the majority Czech populations in Bohemia, and the 'control of the Austrian press and economy'[617] by the Jews in Austria. Lueger promised that if the Christian Socials governed, they would 'repeal Emancipation, expropriate Jewish property, and expel Jews from Austria.'[618] The breadth of the Christian Social coalition meant that renegade liberals, democrats, German nationals, clericals, and the petite bourgeoisie had their own reasons to rally behind Lueger's campaigns against these two populations.[619] The Christian Socials won the Vienna City Council elections in 1895 with an outright majority. Vienna became the first European capital with an elected antisemitic government.[620] They initially had a small impact on the national scene but further democratisation would make them the most significant bloc in the *Reichsrat*, alongside German socialists, by the turn of the century.[621] Franz Joseph rejected Lueger's subversive politics and refused to certify his appointment as mayor.[622] By 1897, the emperor and national government could no longer deny Karl Lueger's repeated electoral victories and Lueger became the mayor of Vienna.[623] The state defended Jewish economic and social rights

[615] (Cohen, 1959, p. 78)
[616] (Berenger, 1997, p. 247)
[617] (Avineri, 2014, p. 91)
[618] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 94)
[619] (Beller S. , 2018, p. 200), (Cohen I. , 1959, p. 193)
[620] (Beller S. , 1989, p. 12)
[621] (Berenger, 1997, pp. 247-250)
[622] (Avineri, 2014, p. 91)
[623] (Avineri, 2014, p. 92)

but antisemitism became an established part of the capital city. The political constituency that Lueger inherited from Schönerer 'was such that he could not simply abandon the anti-Jewish rhetoric which had helped him to climb to power. Christian socialism, it must be remembered, comprised a large, diverse, and heterogeneous group of frustrated *Mittelstand* groups for whom the Jews provided most unwelcomed economic competition.'[624] Vienna was the setting of open antisemitic attacks on businesses, verbal abuse and slander, and random violence.[625]

Viennese Jews faced a political program that was being translated into policies that sought to eliminate, 'Jews from the civil service, medical and legal professions, and small businesses, as well as the abolition of peddling.'[626] Democratisation meant that the Austro-German identity was being explicitly defined by its opposition to non-Germans and/or non-Christians. As Steven Beller wrote, 'In the "hegemonic" German populace, two of the main political groupings, the Christian Socials and the German Nationalists and Liberals, were either openly antisemitic or tolerant of antisemitism within their ranks. - The third main group, the socialists, were not antisemitic, … (but they) felt the need to practice a studied ambivalence on the issue, fearful as they were of the attraction of antisemitic rhetoric and explanations for their working-class constituents.'[627] Alternatively, Czech nationalism was one outcome of the competition with German Liberals and then Christian German nationalism. One legacy of this competition was that they, and other minority nationalisms, were less open to historically German-oriented Jews. Beller continued that these movements followed their German Christian counterparts and 'the Monarchy's "Central European" populace- far from a paragon of live-and-let-live tolerance and liberality-possessed a system of popular beliefs, traditions, assumptions, and practices that ingrained antisemitism in virtually all

[624] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 257)
[625] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 94)
[626] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 256)
[627] (Beller S. , The World of Yesterday Revisited, 1996, p. 47)

"minority" national movements.'[628] Finally, Beller wrote that after being excluded from Christian German and minority nationalism, Jews had access to, 'one serious attempt at forming a left-liberal party, which espoused tolerant policies in the face of ethnic feuding and was staunchly, resolutely against antisemitism, was the *Sozialpolitiker*. Yet this never got beyond the confines of Vienna; indeed, it remained restricted to those electoral districts where the Jewish vote was strongest. This is not surprising because the party was in effect, as well as in its parliamentary deputies, the last gasp of progressive Jewish left-liberalism in the Monarchy.'[629] Cisleithanian Jews, and Viennese Jews above all, faced an antisemitic future in their society and they were aware of it. Wistrich summarised the situation in the following quote:

> No one familiar with the press of that period, with the parliamentary debates in the Reichsrat, or those in the City Council or the Lower Austrian Landtag can indeed fail to be struck by the aggressive intensity of fin-de-siecle Viennese antisemitic rhetoric. The fact that a plebeian movement had triumphed in Vienna in large part owing to an antisemitic programme, that it was intensely popular, and seemed to represent the very antithesis of political liberalism could not be but a cause of concern.[630]

Theodor Herzl was amongst the Jews observed this situation, and while most Jews of his class believed that this was their inevitable, unpleasant but manageable future within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Herzl did not. Herzl began understanding that antisemitism would not stop until the Jews were permanently excluded from this hostile society and its antisemitic political movements, and that Jews needed a political nationalism, and state, of their own. Theodor Herzl's ultimate shift from German

[628] (Beller S. , The World of Yesterday Revisited, 1996, p. 47)
[629] (Beller S. , The World of Yesterday Revisited, 1996, p. 48)
[630] (Wistrich, 1983, p. 256)

nationalist to Jewish nationalist will be considered in the following, final chapter of this work's case study. Chapter 6 culminates with Theodor Herzl's publishing of his Jewish political nationalist manifesto, *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State), in 1896.

6. Case Study: Part 3. Theodor Herzl and the Creation of Jewish Political Nationalism

6.1 Introduction

This final chapter of the case study explores Theodor Herzl's shift from avowed German nationalist to Jewish nationalist. This transformation culminated in the publishing of his political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State), in 1896.

6.2 Theodor Herzl and Christian German Nationalism

Theodor Herzl spent the years after his graduation pursuing his elite-assimilationist ambitions of being a playwright and journalist. Herzl left his legal practice two years after his graduation to pursue these goals. Herzl was propelled to prominence in Central Europe after the unexpected success of one of his plays, *Tabarin*, in New York City in 1886. By the mid-1880s 'he was an established journalist, appearing regularly in the Viennese and Berliner press.'[631] He was a regular contributor to the liberal *Berliner Tageblatt*[632] and was first published in the famous *Neue Freie Presse* (New Free Press) in 1888.[633] He had intermittent successes as a playwright in Prague, Berlin, and Vienna's national theatre, the *Burgtheater*, between 1888-89.[634] Herzl did not ignore Christian Social antisemitism in Vienna, though. As early as 1891, Herzl drafted a novel that addressed antisemitism. He did not complete the novel because he was offered a long sought-after job with the New Free Press as its Paris political correspondent. He held that position for 4 years.[635] Herzl wrote surveys on antisemitism and the Jewish question

[631] (Cohen, 1959, p. 36)
[632] (Avineri, 2014, p. 58)
[633] (Cohen, 1959, p. 42)
[634] (Avineri, 2014, p. 58)
[635] (Penslar, 2020, p. 6) (Kornberg, 1993, pp. 89,99)

for the New Free Press in 1892 and 1893.[636] Herzl observed antisemitism in Paris but was more invested in how it was affecting his home of Vienna.[637]

Theodor Herzl's concerns over Austrian antisemitism grew in parallel with Christian Austro-German nationalism's political gains in Vienna. Karl Lueger was amongst the 13 United Christian delegates to the national *Reichsrat*, while the party gained half of the Viennese districts in the local elections of 1891.[638] By 1892, Herzl considered Austrian 'antisemitism a "movement", or an organized force, too powerful to "suppress"… a powerful and ongoing political force.'[639] Herzl's employer, the New Free Press, lamented 'Just another small step and Lueger is a master of the city council, and Vienna the only metropolis in the world with the stigma of an antisemitic administration'.[640]

Herzl concluded that Austrian antisemitism was a backlash against Jewish civil emancipation and assimilation.[641] Herzl wrote in his diaries, 'The emancipation of the Jews, which I consider just as much a failure on political grounds as I approve of it enthusiastically and gratefully for human reasons, came too late. It was no longer possible to emancipate us by legislation and in our old places of residence.'[642] Herzl lamented that emancipation was too sudden, and that Jews gained social success in Austria without gaining social acceptance by Christians. This created the possibility that Jews could be seen as an alien and competitive force in Viennese society. He later wrote,

> They have tried (solving the Jewish Question) through emancipation, but it came too late. It does no good to declare abruptly in the Legal Gazette: "Starting

[636] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 99)
[637] (Kornberg, 1993, pp. 89-90)
[638] (Berenger, 1997, pp. 247-248) (Kornberg, 1993, pp. 91-92)
[639] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 99)
[640] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 139)
[641] (Herzl, 1946, p. 5)
[642] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 180)

> tomorrow, all men will be equal." This sort of thing is believed only by beerhall politicians and their higher colleagues, the classroom theorists, and drivelling fools in Clubs…
>
> Would it not have been better to let the Jews rise to emancipation gradually and during this ascent assimilate them, gently or vigorously, depending on circumstances? Perhaps! … But it would have been necessary to put emancipation after assimilation, not the other way around; that was bad thinking. Bur in any case, it is too late for this, too.[643]

Herzl argued that the antisemitism in Christian Austro-German nationalism was not about abstract 'nationality', or Christian German ethnicity. It was the social outcomes of elite liberalism, and the representation of Jews in liberal politics and economy.[644] Herzl would later describe the popular backlash against Jewish social mobility in the Liberal Era in his novel *Altneuland* (Old New Land). He framed the antisemitic backlash using social and economic terms and did not emphasise ethnic or religious terminology. Herzl saw Jewish national exclusion as an outcome of material conflict in a nationalising society:

> The persecutions were social and economic. Jewish merchants were boycotted, Jewish workingmen starved out, Jewish professional men proscribed - As workingmen, the Jews were hated by their Christian fellows for undercutting wages. As businessmen, they were denounced as profiteers. Whether Jews were rich or poor or middle-class, they were hated just the same. They were criticized for enriching themselves, and they were criticized for spending money. They were neither to produce nor to consume. They were forced out of government posts.[645]

[643] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, pp. 120-121)
[644] (Herzl, 1946, p. 6) (Kornberg, 1993, p. 100)
[645] (Herzl, 2009, p. 54)

Herzl would later describe the potential emigration of Jews as an economic boon to Christian Germans in their national economy. He once again connected antisemitism in nationalised societies to the economic and social competition that Jews represented:

> (Christians) would benefit from the removal of a rivalry with a Jewish proletariat; and Christians would likewise profit by the exodus, as they would be able to occupy the positions thus vacated.[646]

Herzl's first instinct in addressing antisemitism, though, was to advocate against the continued democratisation of the Habsburg Empire. He hoped that the elite, exclusive Liberal Party could placate the demands of the lower classes using social reforms and welfare as substitutes for voting rights.[647] This proposal was unworkable because the 1882 extensions of suffrage already set political liberalism on a decline in Austria. For their part, liberal Christian Germans understood that the old politics were obsolete and they either defected to the Christian German nationalists or attempted to shift the Liberal Party rightward to appeal to Christian German voters.[648] The reconfiguration of bourgeois Christian Austro-German loyalties allowed them to maintain their privileged positions within the Austrian state but by doing so they also left the Jews without their former allies. Absolutism and liberalism were revealed to be double-edged swords for Habsburg Jews. Their emancipation programmes transformed Jews from an excluded and oppressed population by integrating them into the national economy and society. At the same time, they made Jews into direct economic and social competition for Christian Germans.[649] The philosophies of economic liberalism meant that Jewish successes in a capitalist national economy simultaneously and negatively affected large swathes of the lower-middle class population, many of whom were also Christian Germans. The absolutist and liberal political systems also depended on the political exclusion of the

[646] (Avineri, 2014, p. 93)
[647] (Avineri, 2014, p. 92)
[648] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 90)
[649] (Avineri, 2014, p. 37)

very same classes. Of course, aristocratic and bourgeois Christian Germans created the political systems but they were able to scapegoat liberal Habsburg Jews when those systems were no longer viable in maintaining the *status quo* of the Habsburg national society.

The resulting alliance between the German bourgeoisie and the lower middle classes, including 'the petite bourgeoisie, corporate and bureaucratic careerists, and professionals'[650] in Christian, Austro-German nationalism was the death knell for Jewish inclusion in Austria because it created a viable, alternative German government to bourgeois liberalism. The preponderance of the lower middle classes relative to the narrow elites meant that similar alliances were taking place across Europe, and they became the basis for stable national politics, societies, and identities. The institutionalisation of these arrangements in national constitutions and institutions was the main reinforcer of the nation-state in the 20th Century.[651]

German nationalists below the secure elites rejected equality with populations who were dissimilar to them because according to the philosophies of nationalism, in-group homogeneity was the basis for national inclusion and success. The highest elites were often less hostile to subordinate minorities because minorities could not compete with them directly. The German bourgeoisie and lower-middle class did not accept direct competition from dissimilar groups, like Jews. Jews had two choices, either accept a return to their pre-emancipation statuses in the state-society, or they could be totally excluded from the nationalising state via political and social antisemitism. Theodor Herzl learned the lessons of Christian Austro-German nationalism and would incorporate his experiences with cross-class, mass nationalism in his designs for the Jewish national state. For the time being, though, he debated whether Jews could become more

[650] (Mann, 2012b, p. 589)
[651] (Mann, 2012b, p. 589)

assimilated into Christian Austro-German nationalism to maintain their social inclusion, or whether they would need a national state of their own.

6.3 Theodor Herzl's Alternative Solutions to the Jewish Problem

Theodor Herzl framed the Jewish problem in the Austrian Empire as a national issue after the rise of Christian German nationalism, even if he did not yet see Jewish nationalism as the solution. Herzl's solutions for the Jewish problem in the early 1890s included Jewish mass-baptism into Christianity, Jews advocating for political socialism, or even Jews accepting antisemitism in the hope that it transformed Jews into a population that was acceptable to German gentiles.[652] Many observers condemn Herzl's proposals as panicked, irrational overreactions to the Jewish crisis of the 1890s. Closer analysis reveals that Herzl understood that Jewish exclusion was based on their misalignment with the features of Christian Austro-German nationalism. Mass-baptism was the most obvious in this regard. Herzl accepted that Christianity was a *sine qua non* for inclusion in that national movement. Jews previously attempted German assimilation while retaining their Judaism but once the Christian German masses gained political rights, they demanded the enforcement of the Christian German exclusivity. Christian conversion was one way to gain acceptance into the Habsburg national identity.[653] Alternatively, Herzl offered socialism as a solution to the Jewish problem because he recognised that capitalism made Jews into economic competition for German, gentile nationalists. Herzl believed that economic competition was the driving force for late-19th Century antisemitism, and socialism's economic collectivism could allow Jews to remain

[652] (Kornberg, 1993, pp. 115-124)
[653] (Penslar, 2020, p. 62)

as Jews in Habsburg society.[654] Finally, Herzl identified that Jewish visibility contributed towards antisemitism and he regrettably blamed Jews for this. Herzl believed that Austrian antisemitism could incentivise wealthier Jews into being less conspicuous in displaying their wealth and success, and less imposing over their gentile workforces.[655] Herzl hoped that Jews could fade into the social background while maintaining their presence and privileges in the national society. Herzl's proposals were unrealistic for his political and social environment but it is notable that they were advocated for, and implemented by, Jews in other nationalising states, like in the Russian Empire. Some of Herzl's proposals, like a socialist economy, depended on an unrealistic restructuring of modern Austria. Other proposals, like Christian conversion, may have worked, and did work in other societies, but it required time for Jews to erase the memory of their social distinctiveness. Habsburg Jews were facing an immediate existential crisis in the 1890s. As Herzl himself wrote:

> We might perhaps be able to merge ourselves entirely into surrounding races, if these were to leave us in peace for a space of two generations. But they will not leave us in peace. For a little period they manage to tolerate us, and then their hostility breaks out again and again.[656]

By 1895, Herzl came to the realisation that Jews would be in a permanently subordinate and threatened condition within already-formed, nationalised societies. It was too late for Jews to remain as Jews in the context of a nationalised Austrian Empire. Jews would only be able to restore their security in a new national society of their own.

[654] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 5-7)
[655] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 117)
[656] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 1946, p. 7)

6.4 Theodor Herzl's Acceptance of Jewish Exclusion from Christian Austro-German Nationalism

Theodor Herzl began writing his first explicitly Jewish play, *Das Neue Ghetto* (The New Ghetto), on October 21st, 1894, and he completed it on November 8th. The New Ghetto was an important penultimate step in Theodor Herzl's evolution towards Jewish nationalism. The New Ghetto was a deeply personal work for Herzl where he simultaneously accepted Jewish rejection from Christian Austro-German nationalism, while also overcoming the Jewish self-contempt he developed during his lifelong German assimilation. Theodor Herzl could not conceive of a positive, independent Jewish identity before the transformative catharsis of writing the New Ghetto.

The New Ghetto was a story of 'ostracism and betrayal among the Jews of Vienna. It portrays the devastating effect of modern antisemitism on assimilated Jews, like Herzl himself. Herzl depicts a Christian Viennese society unattainable for Jews, who were thrown back into a new, invisible ghetto.'[657] The 'new Jewish ghetto' was the liminal space that successful, assimilated Jews were pushed into after they were expelled from Austro-German, Viennese society. Like many of Herzl's literary works, the play's protagonist, Jacob Samuel, was an avatar for Herzl as a bourgeois, assimilated, Jewish lawyer in Vienna. The New Ghetto will be analysed in depth in the following chapter, but its emotional core revolves around Jacob Samuel coping with the loss of his closest Christian German friend, Franz Wurzlechner. The deteriorating perception of Jews in Vienna led Franz to cut social ties with Jacob before his own social standing was diminished.[658] Jacob and Franz' separation is a clear metaphor for collapsing liberal, bourgeois, Jewish-Christian relations, and the scapegoating of Jews by Christians. The New Ghetto's overarching storyline is a confrontation between Jacob and a wealthy,

[657] (Brenner, 2022, p. 113)
[658] (Herzl, 1903, p. 34)

aristocratic, but antisemitic German figure, Captain Ritter von Schramm. The drama with von Schramm goes into detail on the economy and society that Germanised Jews and Christian Germans built together. The Christian von Schramm insults Jews using antisemitic language after their failed joint venture. The Jewish Jacob slaps von Schramm and is challenged to a duel where Jacob is killed.[659] The play concludes that both groups were never able to truly transcend their boundaries. The play reserves its most emotional language for the tender moments between Franz and a dying Jacob, and the regret that Jacob feels over Franz's rejection. Jacob then turns to the Jews around him and warns them that there is no future within the new social ghetto of an antisemitic Viennese society.[660]

Theodor Herzl's choice to end the play with a duel between Christian and Jewish Germans carries great symbolic weight. Jacques Kornberg reminds that duelling was 'the code of honour of aristocrats, officers, and university students, (and) carried high status… By the early 1890s in Austria, sentiment was building against accepting Jews as equal and honourable foes in the duel.'[661] Herzl's Jewish avatar challenging a Christian, Austro-German antisemite to a duel was a reclamation of Jewish honour but also a tacit acknowledgement that Christian Austro-Germans no longer considered Germanised Jews as their equals by the 1890s. This interpretation of Herzl's psyche seems to be supported by one of his diary entries from a year later, in 1895. He wrote,

> One of my dreams during the period of uncertainty was to force Alois Lichtenstein, Schönerer or Lueger to a duel. If I had been shot, a letter left behind by me would have told the world that I fell a victim to this most unjust movement. Thus, my death might at least have improved the heads and hearts of men. But if I had shot my opponent, I wanted to make a magnificent speech before the court, first expressing

[659] (Herzl, 1903, p. 85)
[660] (Herzl, 1903, pp. 98-100)
[661] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 125)

> my regrets at "the death of an honorable man," like Morès who had stabbed Captain Mayer to death. Then I would have gone into the Jewish Question, making a powerful, Lassalle-like speech which would have shaken and moved the jury and inspired respect from the court, leading to my acquittal. Thereupon the Jews would have offered to make me a member of parliament.[662]

It is worth noting that by this point Theodor Herzl conflated different antisemitic German nationalists, like Lichtenstein, Schönerer, and Lueger into a general antisemitic movement.

Finally, Shlomo Avineri notes that Herzl began work on The New Ghetto before the Dreyfus Affair was widely known. Herzl did cover the trial of Alfred Dreyfus in December 1894 but that was after the play was completed.[663] Herzl also explicitly assumed Dreyfus' guilt in his contemporary coverage of the court martial and never discussed Dreyfus' Jewishness at the time.[664] Alternatively, The New Ghetto was based exclusively on Jewish life in Vienna and the Habsburg Empire. Altogether, this supports the claim that despite Herzl's later assertions, his first steps towards Jewish nationalism were based on the nationalist exclusion of Jews in Vienna and not an overnight epiphany in Paris.

6.5 Theodor Herzl and Political Zionism

6.5.1 Theodor Herzl's Social Profile and His Future Political Activism

Theodor Herzl's social profile made him uniquely prescient concerning political antisemitism compared to the other Habsburg Jews, even when considering Jews of his social class. Herzl was politically acute. He was trained as a lawyer and was familiar

[662] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 83)
[663] (Avineri, 2014, pp. 66-75) (Kornberg, 1993, p. 190)
[664] (Avineri, 2014, p. 66)

with political systems. This allowed him to not just observe but to analyse political developments in a way that lay people could not. For instance, Herzl predicted that popular antisemitism would be translated into nationalist politics after the antisemitic lower-middle classes gained voting rights.[665] Herzl's legal education was directly represented in the text of *Der Judenstaat* in 1896.[666] Herzl was also a successful political journalist for the most influential liberal newspaper in Central Europe. His work for the New Free Press gave him direct access to the most powerful politicians in Europe. He regularly corresponded with the French President and Foreign Minister, for example.[667] Theodor Herzl was able to engage in politics in a way that was denied to most Jews because of discrimination. Herzl understood this about himself. He wrote in his diaries, 'The Neue Freie Presse sent me to Paris as its correspondent. I took the job because I sensed at once how much I would see and leam of the world in that post; … In Paris I was in the midst of politics — at least as an observer. I saw how the world is run.'[668] Herzl did not see himself as a passive observer of politics, either, but as an active and influential force. He brought this self-belief to his later work on Jewish nationalism.

Additionally, Theodor Herzl's life as an expatriate journalist in Paris between 1891-1895 gave him the physical, emotional, and analytical distance to objectively consider the unfolding Jewish national problem in Vienna.[669] He was able to compare the Jewish situation in Vienna against what he saw in Paris and the other European political capitals. Much of his personal correspondence during the rise of German Christian nationalism in Austria discussed these comparisons.[670] In one example, he wrote, 'Here (in Paris) I reached a higher, more disinterested view of anti-Semitism, from which at least I did not have to suffer directly. In Austria or in Germany I must constantly fear that

[665] (Avineri, 2014, pp. 88-89)
[666] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 166)
[667] (Cohen, 1959, p. 74)
[668] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 5)
[669] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 89)
[670] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 99)

someone will shout “Hep, hep!” after me. But here I pass through the crowd unrecognized.’[671]

Theodor Herzl was socially ambitious and was not satisfied being an average bourgeois Jew. He wanted to transcend his Jewish minority status and aspired to full membership within Viennese society. In line with Mirsolav Hroch’s theoretical predictions for national patriots, Herzl’s elite aspirations made him especially aware of the limitations on Jews within the Viennese social hierarchy. Herzl existed in the upper tiers of this hierarchy and he understood what exclusion would mean for Jews, like himself. Herzl’s dissatisfaction over Jewish exclusion was represented in his play, *Das Neue Ghetto* (The New Ghetto) in 1894.

Finally, and maybe speculatively, Herzl’s wealth may have given him the freedom to engage large, abstract concerns like Jewish nationalism. Herzl lived off of his parents’ and wife’s fortunes and was not dependent on his own earnings.[672] Unlike other bourgeois, professional Jews, Herzl had the freedom to develop his theoretical insights. If he were a working professional, like the many Jewish doctors, practicing lawyers, or industrialists he may not have the leisure to do so.

6.5.2 Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State)

This chapter ends with the decision of Theodor Herzl to found Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism. Theodor Herzl’s concept of Jewish nationalism, and his vision for a future Jewish nationality and nation-state, will be discussed in this work’s Discourse Analysis chapters to avoid overlap. The purpose of this case study was to present the life of Theodor Herzl to support this work’s hypothesis that German-

[671] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 5)
[672] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 148)

assimilated, Viennese Jews became excluded minorities during the imperial capital's shift from an inclusive political liberalism towards exclusive, antisemitic, Austro-German nationalism. It discussed how this class of Habsburg Jews, which included Theodor Herzl, could be socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged as a result of their exclusion from the city's political and social institutions. Finally, this chapter will argue that Herzl's experiences of nationalist exclusion and social insecurity motivated Theodor Herzl to found political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism. After exploring alternatives to Jewish nationalism in the early 1890s, Herzl's work, correspondence, and other surviving writings demonstrated a shift towards the realisation that Jews were excluded by Christian Austro-German nationalism. Herzl decided that Jews needed a Jewish nation-state of their own. As he wrote in May 1895,

> Now, if we had a united political leadership… we could tackle the solution of the Jewish question—from above, from below, from all sides. The aim that we will pursue once we have a centre, a head, will determine the means. There are two possible aims: *either we stay where we are or we emigrate somewhere else* (My emphasis).[673]

Herzl's manifesto for Political Zionism was published a year after the above quotation in *Der Judenstaat*, or The Jewish State, on February 14, 1896. Herzl decided that the Jews would 'emigrate somewhere else'.

Vienna was seething with antisemitism by 1895. The Christian Socials followed through on their political programme and Jews were experiencing social and economic exclusion everywhere. Jews were 'denied all municipal contracts, excluded from public administration, and barred from communal undertakings. Many also had difficulties in securing domiciliary rights in Vienna.'[674] The early antisemitism that Herzl experienced at the University of Vienna was now fully entrenched there. 'German nationalists

[673] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 20)
[674] (Cohen, 1959, pp. 78-79)

provoked, abused, and attacked their Jewish fellow students, and even drove them away.'[675] It is worth noting that practices of Viennese antisemitism were displacing Jews from the economy and politics, and excluding them from the means of accessing these social institutions via formal education. Antisemitism was a nationalist issue that was distinct from historical anti-Judaism. Austro-German antisemitism's goal was to eject Jews from their nationalising society. Theodor Herzl summarised 'the social circumstances of post-Emancipation Europe, Austria-Hungary, and Germany'[676] through this lens:

> (Jews) were neither to produce nor to consume. They were forced out of government posts. The law courts were prejudiced against them. It became clear that under these circumstances, they must either become the deadly enemies of society that was so unjust to them, or seek out a refuge for themselves.[677]

The election of Karl Lueger as the mayor of Vienna in 1895 coincided with Herzl's ultimate determination that Jews had no place in a nationalising Europe. Herzl observed that the democratic 'expansion of the right to vote for the Austrian parliament had strengthened the various nationalist movements, while in Vienna it had brought to power an anti-Czech, anti-Semitic nationalist.'[678] Lueger was democratically voted into office and Herzl acknowledged that this would be possible across other European nation-states. 'If the country that had treated the Jews best during the nineteenth century was about to … pose serious challenges to the well-being of its Jewish population'[679] then what hope did Jews have elsewhere in Europe? Herzl had already accepted that Jews needed a nation-state by late 1895, but this election made him redouble his efforts. Theodor Herzl wrote about Lueger's election in September 1895. It is an eerie, unsettling

[675] (Cohen, 1959, p. 79)
[676] (Avineri, 2014, p. 177)
[677] (Herzl, 2009, p. 54)
[678] (Avineri, 2014, p. 92)
[679] (Avineri, 2014, p. 93)

passage that reveals how Herzl viewed the situation in Vienna. It is also worth presenting in full. Herzl wrote,

> In Vienna, the City Council elections took place on the day before Erev Rosh Hashanah. All the mandates were won by the anti-Semites. The mood among the Jews is one of despair. The Christians have been badly stirred up. The movement is not really a noisy one. For me, who am used to the clamour of popular agitation in Paris, things are even much too quiet. I find this calm more sinister. Yet one sees looks of hatred everywhere, even if one does not seek them in people's eyes with the watchful fear of a man suffering from a persecution mania.
>
> On election day I was outside the polls in the *Leopoldstadt*, taking a brief look at some of the hatred and the anger at close range.
>
> Toward evening I went to the *Landstrasse* district. In front of the polling place a silent, tense crowd. Suddenly Dr. Lueger came out to the square. Enthusiastic cheers; women waved white kerchiefs from the windows. The police held the crowd back. A man next to me said with tender warmth but in a quiet tone of voice:
>
> "That is our *Führer*!"
>
> Actually, these words showed me more than all the declamation and abuse how deeply anti-Semitism is rooted in the hearts of these people.[680]

The above passage was written in late 1895 and Theodor Herzl was already a committed Jewish nationalist by this point. Herzl was in a manic mood and he was constantly wrestling with how the Jewish national state would be created. He swung from wild fantasies of Jews withdrawing from Europe in grand public parades with cheering Christians, to practical exercises, like learning the socioeconomic statuses of

[680] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, pp. 243-244)

Europe's different Jewish populations. His closest acquaintances were concerned but in retrospect Herzl's behaviour seems in line with a figure who frequently processed his world through his self-centred, fantastical, if not megalomaniacal, literary imagination.[681] Herzl was also engaging more realistic approaches for pursuing the Jewish state. By June 1895, Herzl determined that a Jewish national state meant that Jews could 'realize the goals of emancipation and assimilation by themselves, … rid themselves of the stigma of Jewishness, gain in Jewish pride, become their own masters, and at the same time win gentile acceptable and respect by their new dignified, self-assertive stance.'[682]

Herzl understood the general concept of modern states and nationalism through his life experiences in the Habsburg Empire, and via the political antisemitism of Christian Austro-German nationalism. In both instances, he appreciated politics as a top-down project which integrated a population into a centralised society for its own purposes. Theodor Herzl was always familiar with the power of the state to centralise and direct society. He was the legacy of imperial Jewish emancipation from above. The Habsburg state 'created a modern German school system for Jews, made them subject to military conscription, abolished Jewish juridical autonomy, insisted the Jews drop the use of Hebrew in public documents and adopt German names, encouraged them to abandon distinctive dress, and opened trade and handicrafts.'[683] Herzl's bourgeois social status in the 1880s, and his observations of antisemitic popular suffrage in the 1890s, also reinforced Herzl's belief that the nation-state needed to be an elite project above the masses. Finally, Theodor Herzl's career as a leading political journalist meant that he interacted with Europe's political elite and he saw them as a natural and necessary feature of modern and national politics.[684] Herzl's first moves towards creating a Jewish state were therefore appeals to other European and Jewish elites to join his movement.

[681] (Avineri, 2014, pp. 93-97)
[682] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 161)
[683] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 165)
[684] (Cohen, 1959, p. 74)

Implicit in Herzl's approach was the chronological order of theoretical modern nationalism. The centralised state was the driving force behind a nationalist society, and not vice versa. Herzl's worldview aligned with theories of modern nationalism where nation-states were motivated by modern political and socio-economic processes. Ideological nationalities were the by-products of the social transformations that accompanied modernism.[685] Jacques Kornberg argues that Theodor Herzl's state-led, political solution to the Jewish problem is what distinguished Herzl's Political Zionism from other contemporary 'Zionist' proposals which also envisioned the emigration of Jews to a national home. Herzl 'made sovereignty the immediate, rather than eventual goal of Zionism. Aiming for statehood was to precede the formation of a broadly-based Jewish nationalist movement.'[686] Shlomo Avineri concurred with Kornberg when he argued the following:

> Herzl's analysis of the Jewish issue led to the conclusion that it had to be dealt with on the diplomatic and international front, a view that would later be called 'Political Zionism'. The plight of the Jews was no more than a symptom of a much more fundamental and severe problem - the European crisis of the end of the nineteenth century. No Jewish thinker before Herzl (maybe Hess) had placed the future of the Jewish people within this broad perspective of international politics.[687]

Theodor Herzl may have understood that nation-states were elite political creations but he was mistaken about which classes within the elite would be open to Jewish nationalism. State governance in Herzl's lifetime was based on alliances between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie. The problem was that in minority nationalism the wealthiest minorities do not have the same incentives to withdraw from the dominant national

[685] (Coakely, 2018, p. 332)
[686] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 164)
[687] (Avineri, 2014, p. 85)

society as the bourgeoisie. Miroslav Hroch observed this phenomenon across the minority national movements he studied. He wrote that, 'The more wealthy the social stratum, the larger the section of it which was assimilated to, or already belonging to the ruling nation.'[688] The wealthiest European Jews were not sufficiently threatened to desire a national society of their own. This was especially true of the small, ennobled Jewish aristocracy that Herzl courted be his partners in Political Zionism, including the Rothschilds and Hirschs.[689] Herzl invested months of work in 1895 trying to convince the Jewish aristocracy to fund and support political Jewish nationalism. His efforts were a complete failure, with most wealthy Jews refusing to meet with Herzl at all. Political Zionism would be an elite project, but its elite would be drawn from the bourgeoisie, like Herzl. As Hroch predicted, 'It was those strata which lay beneath the very rich and above the poor'[690] who had both the incentives and capabilities to lead national movements in minority nationalisms. Herzl was falling into what would be become the established pattern for minority nationalism in Europe.

Theodor Herzl's failed elite outreach was not a complete waste. His preparations for the lobbying of the Jewish upper classes became the framework for The Jewish State. To prepare himself for these anticipated meetings, Herzl gathered data on relevant topics and sought the advice of countless informed people. It was during this time that Herzl first met other European Jewish activists, like the *Hoveivei Zion* movement which was already engaged in the settlement of Palestine.[691] Herzl's research produced tangible results. For instance, Herzl's extensive research went into a 22-page memorandum on Political Zionism that he presented to Baron Maurice de Hirsch in May 1895.[692] Baron Hirsh had already invested millions of British pounds into the Jewish Colonization

[688] (Hroch, 2000, p. 161)
[689] (Cohen, 1959, p. 69)
[690] (Hroch, 2000, p. 161)
[691] (Avineri, 2014, p. 114)
[692] (Laqueur, 2003, p. 144)

Association which was transplanting threatened 'Jews from Russia and Rumania to the Argentine and other parts of America.'[693] Herzl assumed that Baron Hirsch would be open to Political Zionism, but he stopped Herzl ¼-way through his presentation and politely ended their meeting. A political upheaval was a step too far for assimilated wealthy Jews who depended on the European *status quo*.[694] A month later, Herzl drafted a detailed memorandum to present to the Rothschild family, but they refused the meeting.[695] It was this memorandum written in June 1895, 'Address to the Rothschilds', that formed the outline for *Der Judenstaat*.[696] On June 11 1895 Herzl recorded, 'If I cannot mobilize either the Rothschilds or the dwarf millionaires, I will publish the plan as a book.'[697]

Herzl returned to Vienna from Paris on July 27, 1895, to seek a publisher for The Jewish State, and to gain support for its ideas.[698] The owners of the New Free Press were resistant because while they were Jews they were 'patriotic and ardent Austro-Germans'[699] first. Herzl recalled in his diaries, 'In the course of my very first talk with Bacher (one owner of the newspaper), which took place on the day of my arrival, I realized that he would be completely unreceptive to my ideas—in fact, might fight them tooth and nail.'[700] Herzl crossed the European continent rallying support for Political Zionism amongst prominent Jews through the end of 1895. One outcome of these meetings was a recommendation that he submit his pamphlet to the Anglo-Jewish newspaper, the Jewish Chronicle.[701] It was in 'this paper on January 17, 1896, under the title *A Solution of the Jewish Question*'[702] that Political Zionism first appeared for

[693] (Cohen, 1959, p. 69)
[694] (Avineri, 2014, p. 107)
[695] (Laqueur, 2003, p. 144) (Avineri, 2014, p. 112) (Cohen, 1959, p. 74)
[696] (Laqueur, 2003, p. 147) (Cohen, 1959, p. 73)
[697] (Avineri, 2014, p. 112)
[698] (Cohen, 1959, p. 76)
[699] (Cohen, 1959, p. 79)
[700] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, pp. 239-240)
[701] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 286)
[702] (Cohen, 1959, p. 87)

public consumption. One week later, the work was introduced to Jews in the Russian Empire via a review in a popular Hebrew-language newspaper in Warsaw. Theodor Herzl secured a publisher for the pamphlet in Germany and Austria.[703] On February 14, 1896, Theodor Herzl received the first 500 copies of *Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage* (The Jewish State: Proposal of a Modern Solution for the Jewish Question).[704] The book would have an initial run of 3000 copies but it immediately entered the European Jewish consciousness through its reviews and commentaries 'in dozens of Jewish newspapers in Central and Eastern Europe.'[705] In addition to the German original, 'in 1896 alone an English translation appeared in London, a Hebrew one in Warsaw, a Yiddish version in Galicia, a Romanian one in Botoșani, a Bulgarian one in Sofia, a Russian one in St. Petersburg, and a French one in Paris.'[706] Jews across the continent read about Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism. Theodor Herzl's pamphlet ended with the following words, 'The Jews wish to have a State, and they shall have one. We shall live at last as free men on our own soil, and die peacefully in our own home.'[707]

6.6 Conclusion

This section, *Case Study: The Transformation of Theodor Herzl from a German Nationalist to Jewish Nationalist Between 1867 and 1896* covered chapters 4, 5, and 6. The case study presented the life of Theodor Herzl in the social context of the imperial capital of Vienna. Vienna accepted German-assimilated Jews in the first half of Theodor Herzl's life in its Liberal Era, but it transitioned to antisemitic, Austro-German, nationalist politics in his adulthood. In the first of its three chapters, the case study positioned

[703] (Laqueur, 2003, p. 147)
[704] (Cohen, 1959, p. 90)
[705] (Avineri, 2014, p. 115)
[706] (Avineri, 2014, p. 115)
[707] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 2019, p. 71)

Theodor Herzl as a member of an emancipated Habsburg Jewry who were willing assimilationists in the nationalised Austrian Monarchy. Chapter 4 covered the birth of Theodor Herzl into an emancipated, German-assimilated, commercial family in Hungary. Jews across the Habsburg Empire were enjoying the benefits of their new, statutory equality. The Herzl family, like many of their contemporaries, experienced rapid social mobility after emancipation and they attempted to integrate into Austro-German society as far as possible. In Chapter 5, Viennese Jews experienced an abrupt disruption to their social integration after the emergence of Christian, Austro-German nationalism in the 1880s and 1890s. Finally, in this chapter, Chapter 6, Theodor Herzl linked rising antisemitism to the nationalist exclusion of Jews from the Austrian society. Chapter 6 discussed how Theodor Herzl confronted his nationalist exclusion as a member of a socially constructed Jewish minority.[708] Theodor Herzl explored different alternatives to reintegrate Jews into Vienna's Austro-German identity. Herzl ultimately determined that Jews could never be equal, socially successful, members of Viennese society while also remaining Jews. Jews needed a national society and identity of their own. Theodor Herzl called for a Jewish nation-state in his political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat*, in 1896.

This case study presented the transformation of Theodor Herzl from a loyal subject of the Habsburg Empire into a secessionist Jewish nationalist. It was a narrative re-telling of Herzl's life in the imperial capital while the city was succumbing to antisemitic, ethno-nationalist politics. The case study provided the historical context for the following section which presents the same story in Theodor Herzl's own words using Discourse Analysis. Both sections corroborate one another, and together they lend support to this work's hypothesis around the social construction of minority national identities after they are excluded from emergent, politically powerful, nationalisms. The two chapters in the

[708] (Hroch, 2000, p. 4)

following section present Theodor Herzl's personal discourse around the national exclusion of Jews from Viennese society, and from Europe as a whole. These chapters also present Theodor Herzl's concept of a future Jewish nation-state as the only solution to Jewish exclusion from nationalising European societies.

Section: Discourse Analysis

7. Discourse Analysis: Part 1. Theodor Herzl's Representation of the Jewish Minority Identity in 19th Century Vienna

7.1 Section Introduction

The final section of this work applies the research methodology of Discourse Analysis to a sample of Theodor Herzl's primary documents. This work primarily relies on three groups of Theodor Herzl's discourse. It analyses i) his literary characters' evolving social relationships in *Das Neue Ghetto* and *Altneuland*, ii) his self-reflections in his personal diaries, and iii) his explicit political ideologies that were presented in his political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat*, and in a limited selection of newspaper articles written for the Jewish nationalist newspaper, *Die Welt*.

The Discourse Analysis of Theodor Herzl's writings is structured by this work's hypothesis and its associated research questions. Theodor Herzl came into adulthood in a modern, bureaucratically centralised, state-society as a successful, assimilated Habsburg subject. He personally experienced the transition of Jews from being partially, but significantly, integrated within Viennese society by 1879 to their subsequent antisemitic exclusion by the 1890s due to Christian, Austro-German nationalism. Herzl's life experiences overlap with this work's hypothetical claims that i) minority identities can be outcome of social exclusion from politically relevant national movements, and ii) minority individuals are socially insecure compared to individuals within dominant national movements. It is also claimed that Herzl's experiences of nationalist antisemitic exclusion motivated his decision to found political Jewish nationalism as the solution to the 'Jewish Problem'. This assertion aligns with the final hypothetical claim that minorities may be motivated to pursue their own nation-states to restore their security.

Chapter 7. Discourse Analysis: Part 1. Theodor Herzl's Representation of the Jewish Minority Identity in 19th Century Vienna opens the section. Theodor Herzl's discourse will be used to argue that he perceived his minority Jewish identity through his relationships and interactions with his social environment. It will be argued that Herzl's representations of his identity as a Jew within the late 19th Century Vienna relied on his relationship to that society, i.e., his identity was not described as being independent of social relationships.

Furthermore, it is not sufficient for Herzl's identity to be socially defined for this work's purposes. He must also perceive himself, and other Jews, as social minorities who were being excluded from Viennese society via an antisemitic, Christian, Austro-German nationalism. *Chapter 8. Discourse Analysis: Part 2. Theodor Herzl and the Antisemitic Exclusion of Jews in Fin de Siècle Vienna* emphasises the changing relationship between German-assimilated Jews and Austro-German Christians in Vienna, Austria. Herzl's understanding of his identity was explicitly represented in his discourse through his diagnosis of modern antisemitism. Herzl constructed a narrative across his discourse which argued that Viennese Jews were integrated into a centralised, Habsburg state-society through the mid-19th Century. Jews were then excluded from the imperial capital in the second half of the 19th Century by a politically ascendant Austro-German nationalism. Herzl's experiences in Vienna and other European capitals led him to conclude that the antisemitic exclusion of Jews was a continent-wide phenomenon linked to the emergence of popular ethno-nationalisms within modern, centralised states. Theodor Herzl believed that the shared experience of contemporary, European antisemitism was driving not just Austrian Jews, but all European Jews, towards a shared minority identity. Chapter 8 ends with Theodor Herzl's early proposals on solving the Jewish Problem, or the exclusion of Jews from modern societies by antisemitic national movements.

Herzl's eventually accepted that Jews could not remain within Vienna, Austria, or even in Europe, while maintaining their current social identities, which included their contemporary social mobility and success. This realisation guided Theodor Herzl to Jewish political nationalism as a means of restoring Jewish security. *Chapter 9. Discourse Analysis: Part 3. Political Zionism and Theodor Herzl's Vision of the Modern, Jewish Nation-State* and *Chapter 10. Discourse Analysis: Part 4. Theodor Herzl's Vision of a Popular Jewish National Identity* trace Theodor Herzl's discursive journey as he processed the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Vienna, Austria, and Europe at large. These closing chapters argue that Herzl's visions for a future Jewish nation-state and his concept of the Jewish national identity, were patterned on the modern, centralised Habsburg state and Christian Austro-German nationalism, respectively. This work argues that one theoretical contribution of Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism was his belief that the nation-state was a combination of modern, bureaucratically centralised, and capitalist state-societies that were hierarchically organised around ethno-national identities. Both elements were necessary in Theodor Herzl's representations of his future Jewish nation-state. On one hand, Herzl perceived that his contemporary social status was tied to the structure and opportunities of the modern Habsburg state. On the other hand, Herzl perceived that Christian Austro-German were the most secure in Austria because of their position in Christian Austro-German nationalism's social hierarchy. In other words, Herzl understood the benefits of political nationalism which merges the political unit of the state with a social identity. He was determined to recreate political nationalism in a new Jewish nation-state with Jews as the basis for its national identity.

7.2 Theodor Herzl's Representation of the 19th Century Jewish Minority Identity

7.2.1 Introduction

Theories of modern nationalism argue that national identities are socially defined during the creation of modern, centralized states. This should include the experience of having a minority identity within an existing state-society. The sociological theory of Symbolic Interactionism adds theoretical support to this assumption. This theory was discussed in detail in *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework.* Symbolic Interactionism claims that people act towards objects based on the meanings that they have for them, and that these meanings arise out of their social interactions with others.[709] Identities are social objects that are constructed within social contexts. Specifically, an individual's understanding of their identity, or who they are, is defined via the perceptions that influential others have of them. These others may include their personal relations, like their families, but it also includes anyone or anything that has a significant influence over them, including professional contacts and political authorities.[710] The social construction of identities is an essential theoretical prerequisite for this work's claims that identities, including the Jewish minority and national identities, were defined and redefined alongside wider political and social evolutions in the modern era. Theodor Herzl represented his Jewish identity in the Cisleithanian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as socially subordinate to his representations of dominant Christian Austro-Germans. This characterization suggests that Christian Austro-Germans were Theodor Herzl's reference for understanding the place of Jews in his society. The Jewish and Christian Germanic identities were intertwined in Herzl's writings and cannot be dissociated.

[709] (Blumer, 1969, p. 4)
[710] (Mead, 1934, p. 186)

The case study argued that Viennese society was defined by a German-biased, liberal, social system between the 1840s and 1870s. The distribution of social power favored noble, wealthy, and/or educated Christian Austro-Germans when considering political offices, political representation, administrative languages, higher education languages, distribution of economic wealth, etc. The system may have been biased towards Christian Austro-Germans, but all groups could experience social integration and upward social mobility if they assimilated into this culture, albeit along a social hierarchy. Herzl, like many Jews, understood this social system and he aspired to an elite German identity as a means of upward social mobility. His representations of social success typically aligned with idealised aristocratic and bourgeois Christian Austro-Germans.

Herzl subsequently incorporated the social changes in Vienna between the 1880s and 1890s in his writings. During this time, Herzl represented an Austrian society where Christian Germans were gaining increasingly exclusive rights and privileges due to their disproportionate power in Vienna's political system. Jews were being increasingly excluded despite their high levels of social integration. Herzl therefore did not represent the Christian Austro-German identity as fixed. The dominant Austro-German political identity was being continuously refined and narrowed towards the features of Christian Autsro-Germans as they gained political and social rights. The dominant Austro-German political identity started deemphasizing the role of wealth and education as a requirement for political inclusion in Herzl's lifetime. The same political identity simultaneously elevated the importance of Christianity alongside Germanness. This had the effect of narrowing the Austro-German identity to Christian Austro-Germans who actively excluded their former Jewish peers from their social circles. Herzl perceived that Jews were being demoted in the Austro-German political identity when compared to the Liberal Era as a result. Even Christian Germans who were economically subordinate to Herzl's representations of Jewish characters, such as Christian household staff,

perceived themselves as socially superior to the Jews who employed them. These same groups were deferential to wealth in previous generations in line with the old political identity. The Jewish German and Christian German identities were therefore socially contingent and evolving, and not inherent to Austrian society.

Herzl tended to represent his Jewish characters as successful and assimilated while also being socially excluded. On one hand, these were the Jews in Herzl's social circle, so his choice seems natural. He spent his entire life as a wealthy, assimilated, bourgeois Jew and had little interaction with, or even knowledge of, the wider European Jewry before he became nationalist.[711] On the other hand, Herzl seems to have made the choice to represent Jews as being equal to their Christian Austro-German peers to emphasize that their exclusion from Austro-German society was based on anti-Jewish bias alone. Jews were consistently represented as equally educated, wealthy, cultured, physically attractive, religious, and sociable as their Christian Austro-German peers but were still denied full social equality within the evolving Austro-German identity. Lower class Jews were less frequently represented in Herzl's work but were still shown as sympathetic, and as the explicit products of their social environments. This was another way that Herzl argued that the Jewish situation was imposed on Jews by society and not independent of it.

Finally, Herzl represented the Jewish identity as one that was maintained through social interaction. Herzl rejected pseudo-scientific claims of Jewish racial or genetic differences as explanations for their social exclusivity. He relied on the modern history of Central European Jews to argue that Jews were only seen as inferior because Christian Germans enforced their inferiority. Jews would continue to assimilate into German culture until they were equal to other constituents if given the chance. Herzl's

[711] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 4)

descriptions of Christian Austro-German superiority, Jewish inferiority, and the widening of the social gap between their identities will now be considered in detail using Herzl's discourse.

7.3 Christian Austro-Germans in Theodor Herzl's Discourse

7.3.1 Introduction

It is a deliberate choice of this work to present the Catholic Austro-German identity before discussing the Jewish minority identity. The Christian German identity was socially dominant in Herzl's worldview, and the Jewish identity was defined relative to it by both Christians and Jews alike. Theodor Herzl's representations of the Christian social majority fell into two categories. The first was a generalized 'social other' represented by 'they' or 'them' when discussing the Jewish Question. These representations represented the late-19th Century antisemitic mob and are generally negative. The second form included individual characters representing classes of stereotypical Christian Germans, and fictional adaptations of specific, prominent Christian Germans. The few instances where Herzl fictionalized real individuals were often negative as they were the embodiments of the generalized, antisemitic Christian other. Alternatively, Herzl's representations of Christian German upper classes were nearly always demonstrated as socially superior, if not always likeable. Herzl wanted to be these people, or at least wanted their acceptance, and he resented his inability to do that through his assimilation. Finally, Herzl portrayed Vienna's Austro-German identity as being in flux due to social, political, and economic changes in the late 19th Century. What it meant to be a dominant Austro-German in Vienna was not static but evolved as society evolved through the 1870s to 1890s.

7.3.2 The Christian German Aristocracy

Theodor Herzl saw the mid-19th Century Austrian state, with its modern, German, liberalising political ideals, as positive forces which were responsible for the legal, economic, and social integration of Jews. This benevolent and paternalistic modern German culture was embodied in one of Herzl's central characters from *Altneuland*, a German nobleman named Adalbert Kingscourt.4[712] His real surname was 'Koenigshoff' and he was a former German military officer who sought his fortune in the New World.[713] *Altneuland* was written later in Herzl's career in 1902 and it can be argued that Koenigshoff's anglicised name represented Herzl's widening of his political programme from German Central Europe to include Imperial Britain and industrial America. Herzl believed that German culture was paramount in Europe, but that Britain and the USA represented global and technological ambitions that were also embodied in Political Zionism. He wrote in his diaries that this was why he first serialised *Der Judenstaat* in London before publishing it in Austria.[714] Both aspects of German and Anglo-American culture were represented in Adalbert Kingscourt in Herzl's *Altneuland.*

Nonetheless, dialogue between Kingscourt and Herzl's avatar, Friedrich Lowenberg, positioned Kingscourt in the high German culture which accepted Jews as productive, assimilated subjects in Central Europe. Kingscourt represented the idealised German aristocracy who existed above the society that they ruled.[715] Before democratisation, the ruling nobility, and the emperor especially, occupied a conflicting duality around *la noblesse oblige* and *lèse-majesté.* The nobility had the natural right to rule society on one hand but they were simultaneously absolved of responsibility for social outcomes and were beyond criticism. Theodor Herzl incorporated these beliefs in his representation of Kingscourt as a proxy for the old regime during the political turmoil of the late 19th Century. The nobility was presented as a natural moral authority who were

[712] (Avineri, Herzl: Theodor Herzl and the Foundation of the Jewish State, 2014, p. 170)
[713] (Herzl, Altneuland: The Old New Land, 2009, p. 26)
[714] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 276)
[715] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 62)

being usurped by the illegitimate lower classes. The antisemitism of the 1870s-90s was caused by the political inclusion of the petite bourgeoisie. The Austrian state's imperial government defended the rights of Jews from the non-elite, antisemitic Christian Socialists in the Vienna City Council and the *Reichsrat*. The noble Kingscourt valued assimilated Jews and accepted their place in society. Herzl's avatar in *Altneuland*, Friedrich Löwenberg, explicitly receives Kingscourt's affirmation when he asked if his Jewishness was socially acceptable. Kingscourt replied, 'You are a man. I can see that. And you seem to be an educated man. … Everything else is frightfully unimportant.'[716] Herzl needed the approval of the old elites to see himself as worthwhile, but he also believed that the 'true' elites of the old regime saw him that way. Herzl's dialogue in *Altneuland* mirrored an earlier passage from his diaries after a meeting with German Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898. Herzl met the kaiser to request his official protection of Jews in their own national state, but he also sought the same aristocratic approval of Jews that he did from Kingscourt four years later in *Altneuland*. Herzl wrote in his diaries, 'He looks sharply and powerfully at you - the Kaiser! - and when he is pleased by an observation or phrase, his lips are pressed together and his splendid eyes say: "I understand you - you are my man - first class."'[717]

The noble Kingscourt was disgusted by the depths of contemporary society's 'wretched struggles, its uncleanness, its disloyalties.'[718] Kingscourt was also cuckolded by his dishonourable younger nephew and his young wife, who represented the disloyalty and immorality of the new political class. The political ideals of late-19th Century Austria were being attacked by anti-Habsburg and antisemitic pan-German nationalists, like Georg von Schönerer, who inspired Cisleithania's Christian German nationalism.[719]The noble Kingscourt withdrew from society in *Altneuland* as a representation of the Austrian

[716] (Herzl, Altneuland: The Old New Land, 2009, p. 29)
[717] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 728)
[718] (Herzl, Altneuland: The Old New Land, 2009, p. 27)
[719] This was discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

nobility's declining power in the new political order.[720] Emperor Franz Joseph was the real-world embodiment of the old regime's paternal protection of Jews in the face of rising antisemitic exclusion. Herzl had good reason to believe that the emperor and the Austrian state wanted to continue in that role into the late-19th and 20th Centuries but were failing due to the rising lower classes. For instance, Shlomo Avineri wrote,

> 'To this Herzl's diaries add an awareness of the brittleness and vulnerability of what appeared to many liberals—and primarily Jewish liberals—as the best political guarantee against bigotry and intolerance: the multinational Habsburg Empire, in whose lands Jews enjoyed equal rights, religious tolerance, unprecedented economic prosperity, and social mobility and protection under the law, all presided over by the patriarchal yet liberal symbolism of the Old Emperor. Herzl devoted innumerable entries in his diaries to evidence suggesting that this benign, liberal empire was about to unravel, due to the combined pressures of competing social and national movements. (emphasis added).'[721]

It was of course Emperor Franz Joseph who opposed the appointment of Karl Lueger as mayor of Vienna due to his radical positions. Avineri concurred that it was '*by popular* choice and against the express wishes of the government of Emperor Franz Joseph, to the post of mayor of Vienna—the first time an avowedly anti-Semitic politician was elected to public office in open, free elections anywhere in 19th-century Europe. (emphasis added)'[722] Steven Beller agreed with Avineri. Beller wrote that, 'A good case can, admittedly, be made that by the last decades of Francis Joseph's reign, the imperial state apparatus served as a bulwark against any antisemitic attack on the rights of Jews in the Monarchy, and that even in the case of the army, it exercised its regulations in such a way as to avoid intentional discrimination against Jews.'[723] Beller argued that

[720] (Herzl, Altneuland: The Old New Land, 2009, p. 27)
[721] (Avineri, Herzl's Road to Zionism, 1998, p. 11)
[722] (Avineri, Herzl's Road to Zionism, 1998, p. 10)
[723] (Beller S. , The World of Yesterday Revisited, 1996, p. 44)

Emperor Franz Joseph saw antisemitism as a threat to the ideals and survival of his multiethnic empire. Beller wrote, 'relative to the disastrous rise of political antisemitism among the Viennese, the Bohemian Germans, and almost all the other national populations (with the large exception of the Magyar ruling class in Hungary) - that Francis Joseph became more protective of his Jewish subjects and, conversely, appeared to them in a better light, compared to almost everyone else.'[724]

7.3.3 The Christian-German Lower Nobility and Bourgeoisie

Two opposing characters in *Das Neue Ghetto* were proxies for two groups of Christian Germans that Herzl encountered in his immediate social environment. The higher aristocracy did not intermingle with the bourgeois classes, and especially the Jewish bourgeoisie.[725] The Christian lower nobility and bourgeoisie came into contact with Jews at the empire's elite secondary schools and universities, and in the liberal professions. Some of these gentiles accepted Jews as social peers in the liberal elite. This was especially true if these Christians were also socially ascendant. Other gentiles were more hostile towards Jews and only begrudgingly accepted Jewish elevation into the upper middle classes. They worked alongside Jews but resented the social competition that this historically alien and subordinate group represented. Vienna's Christian German lower nobility and bourgeoisie would largely abandon their bourgeois Jewish associates during the rise of Christian German nationalism. This was represented by their changing voting patterns from liberal political parties towards antisemitic Christian German parties between the 1870s and 1890s.[726] As discussed in the case study, the extension of political rights to the lower middle classes in the late 19th Century meant that Viennese society transitioned from the Liberal Era's horizontal social classes based

[724] (Beller S. , The World of Yesterday Revisited, 1996, p. 44)
[725] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 30)
[726] Shifting voting patterns were discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

on elite-biased political and economic rights towards Christian nationalism's vertical classes built around cross-class, ethno-German identities. Herzl represented the abandonment of Jews by the lower nobility and liberal bourgeoisie during this transition in his play, *Das Neue Ghetto*. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, Herzl was represented by the young Jewish lawyer, Dr Jacob Samuel. Bourgeois Christian Germans were represented by Jacob's closest friend and former law school classmate, Franz Wurzlechner. When introducing Franz to his new bride, Jacob says, 'That's Doctor Wurzlechner, my friend! … My parents and that one were my family before I met you.'[727] Franz Wurzlechner represented the bourgeois, Christian Germans who were willing to legitimise Jewish assimilation by socialising with their Jewish peers. It must be remembered that bourgeois, Christian Germans were themselves imitating the Austrian aristocracy. Their social mobility within the hierarchical, Austrian society depended on this. These bourgeois, Christian German individuals were simultaneously the most socially proximate to assimilating Jews and acted as the template for them to conform to. The features of bourgeois German Christians were therefore important elements of the 19th Century German Jewish identity within Vienna's larger Christian German social structure. After their social break, Jacob described Franz to his mother in these terms,

> He meant a lot to me. Actually, more than I ever showed him. We only think in terms of people. He was not only a friend to me, he was also the "Christian fellow citizen" who liked to socialize with me. It was so flattering - we always have something of the ghetto in us. Gratitude when we are treated like other people. I wanted to be grateful to him for that by modelling myself on him, adopting his habits as far as I could, speaking his language, thinking his thoughts.[728]

In this passage, Herzl affirms that his identity was that of a Jew trying to assimilate into the dominant Austro-German culture. Bourgeois Christian-Germans were established within Viennese society. Jews were newcomers who had to learn the cultural features

[727] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 13)
[728] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 41)

of the social identity while their Christian bourgeois peers were the most accessible means of doing so. During their emotional departure Jacob tells Franz this in explicit terms, 'Thank you for your good friendship over the years. I've learned a lot from you too. … Accents, expressions, gestures. How to bow without fawning and how to stand up without defiance and everything!'[729] This excerpt not only supports Jacob's, and Herzl's, conscious imitation of Christian Germans but also his acknowledgement that despite his assimilation he was subordinate to Franz and other Christians. Herzl acknowledges the urge to be accepted by Christians in Viennese society when Jacob Samuel's wife, Hermine, asks him why being accepted by Jews is not sufficient for his social fulfilment. Hermine says, 'If they don't accept you outside - here you are accepted. Look, all my people like you. They speak with respect of your talent and character. Isn't that enough for you?'[730] Jewish inferiority applied to Jacob as an individual, but also to the assimilated German Jewish identity. Both Jacob and Franz acted towards the Jewish German identity as being marginally distant from the core of the Christian German identity in 19th Century Austria. Christian-German inclusion was described when Jacob discussed the double-standard applied to Germanised Jews. In one scene, Franz tells Jacob that the latter should ignore social slights to his honour but Jacob responds, 'I can't - because I'm a Jew. You, you can take things like that more easily. If you, Franz Wurzlechner, settle a story like that amicably, you are a calm, intelligent person. I, Jacob Samuel, am a coward"[731]

The second class of Christian-Germans that Herzl interacted with were represented by the German lower noble, Captain von Schramm.[732] Schramm was written to have the same age as Jacob and Franz to establish their social comparability. Schramm inherited a mining enterprise from his father, but his spendthrift lifestyle meant that 'for ten years

[729] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 35)
[730] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 44)
[731] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 25)
[732] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 21)

they have only taken money out of the mine and put nothing into it.'[733] Schramm represents the same younger, ennobled generation from *Altneuland* who abandoned the morality and responsibilities of their class. Schramm, and the upper classes like him, are also antisemitic. They do not socialise with Jews unless it advanced their commercial interests. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, Schramm is openly contemptuous of wealthy and bourgeois Jews but enters into a joint venture with Jacob's brother-in-law to save his inherited mine. Schramm resents his necessary association with, and reliance on, Jews. Schramm exhibits his Christian German disdain for Jews, even assimilated Jews, when he leaves Jacob's wedding luncheon early. He apologies that 'There are too many — people here for me.'[734] A nearby guest later says, 'He wanted to say: too many Jews!'[735] Schramm reflects the antisemitic stereotyping around Jews and the liberal professions, especially banking. He tolerates interactions with Jews because he expects a financial reward for doing so. Jacob's sister-in-law, and wife of Schramm's Jewish business partner, attempts to establish her own social credentials at Jacob's wedding feast. She asks for a meeting with Schramm's sister, who is also a countess by marriage. Schramm goes to great lengths to avoid the meeting. Herzl's stage directions indicate that Schramm showed visible astonishment at the request for a meeting between a Jew and a noblewoman. He only regained his composure to maintain his business relations.[736]

7.3.4 The Christian German Petite Bourgeoisie and Lower Classes

Altneuland's Kingscourt, and *Das Neue Ghetto*'s Schramm and Wurzlechner represent the Christian German old nobility, the lower nobility, and the bourgeoisie, respectively, at the end of the Liberal Era. Alternatively, Herzl tends to represent the petite bourgeoisie and other lower classes in the Christian nationalist period as a general

[733] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 50)
[734] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 26)
[735] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 26)
[736] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 26)

antisemitic mob. Christian-German society was depersonalised and became an exclusionary force on the Jews in *Der Judenstaat*. A generalised other, or 'they', excluded the Jews after Herzl's nationalist awakening. 'They' persecuted Jews. 'They' blocked the Jews' social ascent.[737] In other places, Christian Austro-German nationalists are reduced to pithy antisemitic outbursts. This is how Herzl defines that identity in the opening passages to *Der Judenstaat* in particular. Herzl's lengthy dialogue from his other works becomes perfunctory, 'No dealings with Jews!'[738], or the German language, '"*Juden raus!"* (Out with the Jews!)'[739] Pervasive political and social German-led antisemitism was an established feature of Jewish life by the mid-1890s when Herzl wrote *Der Judenstaat*. It was ever-present across the German lands according to Herzl. He wrote in June 1895, 'In Austria and Germany I had always to tremble lest someone shout HEP! HEP! after me.'[740] Herzl also wrote that he only ever experienced direct antisemitic attacks in public spaces that were open to everyone and not in bourgeois or upper-class enclaves. He wrote that he was called racist slurs when leaving 'a cheap concert hall'[741] after drinking beers or by random aggressors as he drove by in a carriage.[742] Antisemitism was sudden, violent, and anonymous in Herzl's characterisations of the German masses.

Some depth is added to the petite bourgeoisie Christian identity in Herzl's *Altneuland*. *Altneuland* is generally portrayed as a utopian novel describing Herzl's vision for a Jewish state, but he also used it as a critique of late-19th Century Viennese politics and society. The emergence of the Christian-German nationalist figure, Karl Lueger, from the lower middle classes was described in Chapters 5 and 6. Lueger was the antisemitic mayor of the Vienna City Council in the late 19th Century. Herzl embodies Lueger in his

[737] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 1946, p. 1)
[738] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 1946, p. 1)
[739] (Herzl, The Jewish State, 1946, p. 2)
[740] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 5)
[741] (Herzl, 1960, p. 5)
[742] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 5-6)

negative characterisation of Rabbi Dr Geyer in *Altneuland*.[743] Geyer led a Jewish, populist, and racist political party in the Jewish state's elections. 'Geyer maintains that citizenship and voting rights should be restricted to Jews in a Jewish state. Arabs and other non-Jews should not be expelled, but they should not be part of the body politic either.'[744] The parallels with Lueger and the antisemitic Christian Socials are clear. Geyer preys on the fears of the Jewish petite bourgeoisie and proletariat using the trappings of their shared religion and lower social status. Geyer was not a genuine rabbi of the Jewish faith but used his religion for immediate political advantage.[745] The word 'Geyer' is German for vulture, or bird of prey, and Herzl characterises Geyer as preying on the masses who recently gained voting rights. Herzl wrote in *Altneuland*: It is not the rich alone who make the decisions, but the whole community. Communal leadership is no longer a reward for success in business. … Therefore, the instincts of the masses must be flattered … An anti-alien slogan is proclaimed. A non-Jew must not be accepted by the New Society. The fewer get a place near the platter, the larger the portion for each.[746] For their part, the Jewish lower classes adopt Geyer's worldview towards aliens. A Jewish farmer affirms his support for Geyer at a political rally when he both praised racism and nativism as moral. He said, 'We were not worthy to have the sun shine upon us. Because we don't want to ours.'[747] This speaker, Mendel, represented 'the ethnic nation' and he claimed ownership over society itself. He did not accept rebuttals that their society was built alongside wider communities of assimilated minorities.[748] In the preceding quote, Herzl argued that the expansion of suffrage to the lower classes preceded the creation of exclusive, ethno-national boundaries. Political inclusion was previously based on economic and social success and could accommodate others who fit those criteria but once the masses gained the right to vote, political and social

[743] (Herzl, 2009, p. 109)
[744] (Avineri, Rereading Herzl's Old-New Land, 2012)
[745] (Herzl, 2009, p. 109)
[746] (Herzl, 2009, p. 110)
[747] (Herzl, 2009, p. 112)
[748] (Herzl, 2009, p. 106)

inclusion was defined along ethno-national lines. Herzl represented these changing attitudes when portraying lower class Christian Germans. They were once deferential to the leadership rights of wealth and education but now saw themselves as superior to anyone who was not Christian German. Herzl gave voice to this sentiment in the opening of *Das Neue Ghetto* when the Christian household servants were in private conversation. The cook, Wabi, and the maids, Kathi and Resi, discussed their Jewish employers as follows:

> Resi (sits): The rabbi is just taking his time. Rich people have long weddings.
>
> Wabi.: Yes, rich! They all have diamonds like that. Like the Kieselstemers.
>
> Resi.: They're just Jews!
>
> Wabi (looks at her).: I like the groom.
>
> Resi: Such a nice a Jew!
>
> Wabi.: Oh well, Mrs. Resi, he is clean.[749]

The Christian German servants are respectful of their employers in their presence but have internalised their superiority based on their Christian, Austro-German identity.

Finally, and similar to the other classes of Christian Germans, the Christian lower classes were also a restraint on the Jews around them. Assimilationist Jews in Herzl's discourse were aware that they were being observed by Christians and were uncomfortable displaying their Jewishness lest their Germanness was doubted. The topic of antisemitism was discussed at a dinner party attended by bourgeois Jews in *Altneuland*. The host displayed her hesitance at discussing this uniquely Jewish topic in front of her Christian staff. The scene was as follows:

> I am proud to be a Jew," asserted Laschner. "Because, if I were not proud, I should still be a Jew. I therefore prefer to be proud." The two serving maids left the room to bring in the next course. "It is better not to discuss Jewish matters in the presence of servants," remarked the hostess. "Pardon me, madam," retorted

[749] (Herzl, 1903, pp. 2-3)

> Blau quickly. “I thought your servants knew you were Jews.” Some of the guests laughed. “Still,” declared Schlesinger authoritatively, “there’s no need to shout it from the housetops.”[750]

This section presented the scope of the Christian Austro-German society in Theodor Herzl’s discourse. Christian Austro-Germans from all social classes are represented as secure within the post-Liberal Viennese society. Christian Germans also regulate the Jewish identity and the behaviour of Jews. Herzl saw the upper classes as a paternalistic authority above society. They were a social and moral standard for all of society, Jews and Gentiles alike. The governing nobility also provided the opportunities for society to thrive. The character of the elderly, gentlemanly Adalbert Kingscourt encapsulated Herzl’s worldview around the old Habsburg elite. The Christian-German lower aristocracy and middle classes were represented as the template for Jewish social mobility in Habsburg Cisleithania. Jews could not generally enter the aristocracy, so most assimilationist Jews saw the Christian-German bourgeoisie as the highest, achievable, social status within the empire. At the same time, Herzl represented the growing divide between bourgeois Jews and Christians in his lifetime. The Christian bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie were coalescing around a shared Christian-German identity that excluded Jews. Their rejection of Habsburg Jews was represented by growing antisemitism. Finally, even the lowest classes of Christian Germans were shown to be relatively more included in the new Viennese political identity based on their alignment with the emerging ideals of Christian German popular politics.

[750] (Herzl, 2009, p. 17)

7.4 The Social Construction of the Jewish Identity in Theodor Herzl's Discourse

The previous section argued that Christian Austro-Germans across social classes shaped the modern Central European Jewish identity. The highest classes of Christian Germans facilitated Jewish social mobility and inclusion. The Christian German bourgeoisie alternatively acted as social templates for Jews to pattern themselves on. Finally, Christian Germans were a social threat to be defended against when looking at the politically ascendant and antisemitic petite-bourgeoisie and lower classes. In each case, Christian Germans were a powerful force over what it meant to be Jewish in 19th Century Cisleithania. This section expands on Theodor Herzl's argument with his belief that European Christians always defined the social identities of European Jews across history. Christians consistently manipulated Jewish identities for their own benefits outside of occasional and temporary periods of social freedom and integration. Christians could do so because they had the power to define and redefine what it meant to be Jewish in Europe to benefit Christians. They controlled the social, political, and economic opportunities of Jews to maximise Christian advantages. For their part, European Jews consistently optimised around the limitations imposed upon them by European Christians. The difference in the modern era was that European societies, politics, and economies were being centralised around states and state boundaries. Jews could no longer retreat to ghettoes within societies or move to other European states when they faced local Christian persecution as they had in the past. Herzl concluded that Jewish political nationalism was one way to escape European Christian constraints since Christians would never allow Jews to fully integrate as equals. Jews would not regress to old identities or create new ones, but they would transplant their current, desirable, bourgeois liberal identities to a new society of their own. Herzl's representations of the Jewish identity, and its social outcomes, were based on the historical domination of Jews by European Christians. Herzl argued against any

connection between Jews being a distinct minority group and any genetic distinctiveness. He repeatedly argued that the Jewish social profile was the outcome of generations of Christian anti-Jewishness and antisemitism. Habsburg Jews were allowed to partially assimilate into the Austrian bourgeoisie as part of the larger Christian, Austro-German identity by the mid 19th Century. Jews attained civil equality in the Austro-Hungarian Empire but unspoken anti-Jewishness, coupled with historical national privileges for Catholic Germans and the nobility, prevented Jews from penetrating deeper into Austrian society.[751] Outside of a few notable banking families, the Austrian bourgeoisie was the upper social limit on how far Jews could integrate into Austrian society.[752] The Austrian Jewish bourgeoisie became the template for assimilation for other Jewish classes within the Austrian Empire and was the basis for the 19th Century Habsburg Jewish identity.[753]

Other Jews were evaluated relative to the Jewish bourgeoisie. Theodor Herzl poetically addressed the social origins of the 19th Century, Jewish, Austro-German identity in *Das Neue Ghetto*. He argued that just as his Christian German friend, Franz Wurzlechner, was a product of history, so was the Jewish Jacob Samuel. Herzl began, 'So (Franz) is also what his ancestors were. That is: what fate made his ancestors into. It is not his fault. It is not your merit.'[754] Turning towards a Jewish audience, Herzl wrote,

> 'And it wasn't even nature that made us what we are, but history. You forced us onto money - and now we are suddenly not supposed to cling to money! First you kept us in slavery for a thousand years - then from one day to the next we are supposed to be free inwardly too! Who is free inwardly?'[755]

[751] (Beller, 1989, pp. 38-39)
[752] (McCagg, 1989, p. 146)
[753] (McCagg, 1989, p. 149)
[754] (Herzl, 1903, p. 36)
[755] (Herzl, 1903, p. 36)

The preceding passage contains some recurrent themes in Herzl's representations of the social nature of the Jewish identity. The first theme is that Christian domination shaped the Jewish social profile. The social possibilities for Jews were defined by Christians. This included where they lived, their belonging in those societies, and their livelihoods within them. It also included their physical appearances, their modes of dress, and as Herzl argued, even their internal beliefs and norms.[756] In every instance, Jews were optimising their outcomes based on situations that were imposed upon them. In other words, the Jewish identity and their choices were not independent from Christian society as primordial nationalists would argue. Herzl explicitly refers to the Jewish association with finance and the other bourgeois professions in the preceding passage. In *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl added that the Jewish association with finance existed because, 'We are what the Ghetto made us. We have doubtless attained pre-eminence in finance, because medieval conditions drove us to it. The same process is now being repeated. Modern conditions force us again into finance, now the stock-exchange, by keeping us out of all other branches of industry.'[757] Herzl reiterates that the bourgeoisie professions were an upper limit placed on Jews because of Christian restrictions when he argued, '(Jews) are debarred from filling even moderately high positions, either in the army, or in any public or private capacity.'[758] Outside of their livelihoods, Herzl also argued that perceptions of Jewish indigeneity and social belonging were defined by Christians. He wrote that,

> (Jews) have honestly endeavoured everywhere to merge ourselves in the social life of surrounding communities. … In vain are we loyal patriots, our loyalty in some places running to extremes; in vain do we make the same sacrifices of life and property as our fellow citizens; in vain do we strive to increase the fame of

[756] (Herzl, 1946, p. XVII)
[757] (Herzl, 1946, p. 3)
[758] (Herzl, 1946, p. 1)

> our native land in science and art, or her wealth by trade and commerce. In countries where we have lived for centuries we are still cried down as strangers, and often by those whose ancestors were not yet domiciled… The majority may decide which are the strangers.[759]

As discussed in previous chapters, Jews were limited in where they could live based on residency restrictions. In the above passage, Jews are doubly excluded when they attempt to integrate into the societies where they were actually allowed to reside. Jews tried to assimilate into their social environments by not just adhering to external signs of belonging but also by internalising feelings of patriotism and other social norms. Herzl defined assimilation as, 'external conformity in dress, habits, customs, and language, identity also of (internal) feeling and manner.'[760] Jews were willing to transform who they were, both inside and out, to be accepted in European society. These sentiments were echoed in Herzl's diaries in June 1895. He wrote, 'To the Kaiser I shall say: Let our people go! We are strangers here; we are not permitted to assimilate with the people, nor are we able to do so. Let us go!'[761]

The one exception to Jewish assimilation was their retention of 'the faith of our fathers'.[762] Religion is a cultural norm and is not intrinsic to peoples. European regimes used religion as an important political tool to structure their intra-state systems. For instance, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) confirmed the right of sovereigns to choose which Christian denomination formed the basis of their political systems.[763] Christianity was used for its organisational value in European societies and the refusal of Jews to abandon their own religion meant that they were

[759] (Herzl, 1946, p. XVI)
[760] (Herzl, 1946, p. XVII)
[761] (Herzl, 1960, p. 23)
[762] (Herzl, 1946, p. XVI)
[763] (Tilly, 1992, p. 167)

perceived as being in competition with that society. Austrian society temporarily deemphasised Catholicism in its identity in the mid-19th Century and this created an opening for Jews to assimilate into the wider society. The emergence of Christian German nationalism in the 1880s reintroduced Catholicism as *sine quo non* for the Viennese identity and Jews were once again perceived as social outsiders despite their high levels of assimilation in other areas.

Another theme in Herzl's representations of the social nature of the Jewish identity were his arguments that the features of the Jewish identity were defined and redefined across time by persistent Christian bias. The ongoing social exclusion of Jews forced them into a separate social group defined by their Jewishness. The relationship between Jews and Christians were not just established in the past but was reaffirmed in every generation. Herzl wrote that 'Modern Anti-Semitism is not to be confounded with the religious persecution of the Jews of former times. It does occasionally take a somewhat religious bias, but the main current of the aggressive movement has now changed.'[764] Medieval relationships between Christians and Jews were defined in that social context but Herzl argued that emancipation represented a new justification for Jewish exclusion. Implicit in Herzl's arguments is that Christians employed anti Jewishness and antisemitism for their social and material welfare. Jews once again found themselves oppressed by Christian hostility but for different reasons from past biases. Herzl wrote, 'In the principal countries where Anti-Semitism prevails, it does so as a result of the emancipation of Jews.'[765] He continued:

> When Jews were given legal and civic equality, they became a 'bourgeois people' and this redefined the relationship between Christians and Jews compared to the past. Jews left the old ghettoes to enter into fierce competition with the middle classes. Hence our emancipation set us suddenly within this

[764] (Herzl, 1946, p. 5)
[765] (Herzl, 1946, p. 5)

> middle-class circle, where we have a double pressure to sustain, from within and from without.[766]

Christian-Jewish relations changed when emancipation expanded the social opportunities for Jews but this created a new, different social conflict between Jews and Christians. The one thing successive periods of Jewish-Christian competition had in common was that they defined Jews as a distinct social group. Historic anti-Jewishness and national antisemitism socially defined the limits of the Jewish identity and this led Herzl to conclude that, 'whether we like it or not, we are now, and shall henceforth remain, a historic group with unmistakable characteristics common to us all. We are one people – our enemies have made us one in our despite, as repeatedly happens in history.'[767]

Herzl concluded that despite the brief period of Jewish inclusion after emancipation that the Christian social majority would always oppress Jews if it benefitted themselves as the social majority. The difference in modern, centralised states from prior eras was that the entire society was now largely integrated into a centralised intra-state system. Jews could no longer escape oppression within their own corporate sub-society, or 'ghetto', after states became centralised around all-encompassing economic and political systems. Herzl argued that emancipation could not be reversed and that Jews could not return to former subordinate, but possibly more secure, identities when they were segregated from Christian society in ghettoes.[768] Herzl understood that his attempts at assimilation were insufficient for him to be considered part of the emerging Christian Austro-German nationalism because Jews were defined as a distinct group. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, antisemitic Christian bias defined Jacob Samuel's identity and his exclusion from Austrian society, just as it did for Herzl. Herzl attributed this sentiment to

[766] (Herzl, 1946, p. 6)
[767] (Herzl, 1946, p. 8)
[768] (Herzl, 1946, p. 6)

Jacob Samuel in *Das Neue Ghetto*. Franz Wurzlechner wanted to remain friends with Jacob but he could not overlook his Jewishness. Jacob responds, 'It's over for us, Wurzlechner! … to be with you or with Wasserstein (another Jew), then I have chosen. I belong to Wasserstein, whether he is rich or poor. I cannot blame him for anything, just as I cannot praise you. You are each only where your history has placed you.'

7.5 The Jewish Bourgeoisie as an Ideal in the Jewish Hierarchy

7.5.1 Introduction

The interactive nature of social identities means that many of the features of the bourgeois, Jewish, Austro-German identity were defined relative to the bourgeois Christian Germans they aspired to become. This claim was supported in Chapter 4 when it discussed the motivations for Cisleithanian Jews to assimilate into the dominant Austro- German identity. It was also supported in the previous section above on how Herzl perceived the Christian German identity. Jews wanted to be accepted within the elite-defined, Austro-German identity and they attempted to emulate the features of the elite as far as socially possible. Aspirational Cisleithanian Jews adopted the social pathways of successful bourgeois Christian Germans, including enrolling in the same elite secondary schools and universities. Jews entered the same liberal professions as their Christian peers. Assimilating Jews went beyond adopting the social profiles of bourgeois Christian Germans, like their education and professions. They also adopted their social features, including their dress, accents, mannerisms, and other social norms. Theodor Herzl's belief that the 19th Century Jewish identity was anchored to bourgeois liberalism had implications beyond Vienna and Cisleithania. By 1895, Herzl argued that Cisleithanian Jews were being excluded from an increasingly antisemitic society. As argued above, he also believed that Jews could not revert to a pre-emancipation Jewish identity in Cisleithania's modern, centralised state-society. Herzl did not want to do that

either. He, like many other Jews, embraced the social opportunities given to Jews via emancipation and bourgeois liberalism. Herzl became determined to transfer an intact19th Century Jewish society to a new national home where Jews could securely maintain the social gains they achieved in Europe. Herzl's understanding of the Jewish social hierarchy as it was in his lifetime would therefore become an important building block of the society he intended to create in the new Jewish state. This section further defines the Austro-German Jewish identity from Herzl's perspective. Whereas the section on the Christian German identity represented different classes of Christian Germans, this section explores Herzl's understanding of the breadth of Jewish German society. He predominantly focused on different types of bourgeois Jews while only sometimes representing the Jews in the upper and lower classes. The Jewish bourgeoisie was Herzl's anchor for understanding the Habsburg Jewry because it was the highest, broadly attainable, social position for most assimilating Jews. He represented the Jewish German identity as imitative and subordinate to the bourgeois, Christian, Austro-German identity but he also reflected the diversity within the Jewish bourgeoisie. In line with this work's claims of a hierarchical Austrian national identity, Herzl represented Jewish bourgeois individuals as variably successful in their assimilation into Austrian society based on their relative overlap with its elite features. The most integrated Jews became models for other Jews to further emulate. Jacob Samuel's upper bourgeoisie brother-in-law, Rheinberg, played this role in *Das Neue Ghetto*.[769] Leopold Weinberger, Schlesinger, and the Laschners similarly played these roles in Herzl's representation of the pre-nationalist, Austro-Jewish bourgeoisie in *Altneuland*. Other bourgeois Jews, including Herzl's avatars, are unfavourably evaluated relative to this upper bourgeoisie. Notably, the former are envied by other Jews not just for their wealth but also for their access to Christian and aristocratic society. They either meet or marginally transcend the upper limits placed on Jews at this time. The few

[769] (Herzl, Das Neue Ghetto, 1903, p. 18)

ennobled Jewish aristocrats that Herzl references exist beyond the upper bourgeoisie and also outside of his social circle. Herzl's diary entries around his awkward meetings with the wealthiest Jews, like the Hirschs or the Rothschilds, reveal that despite his own moderate wealth and status that the upper classes existed beyond Herzl's understanding and he could not adequately represent them.

Herzl's interest in lower class Jewry changes over time. Before his nationalist awakening, Herzl believed that the Jewish bourgeoisie emerged from the lower classes, and they are seen as a sympathetic and unfortunate relic of Christian anti-Jewishness who are waiting to be assimilated into the new Jewish bourgeoisie. Herzl only attempted to seriously study the Jewish lower classes across Europe after he became interested in Jewish nationalism in the 1890s.[770]

Finally, the Jewish religion is valued in Herzl's discourse for its instrumental purposes. Jewish observance is a sign that Jews are as moral and respectable as Catholic Germans in Austria, and as Christian Europeans in the future Jewish state. The precepts of Judaism are not singled out as being important for the Jewish identity. Judaism is always seen as valuable, but religious Jewish individuals, typically rabbis, are inconsistently presented. They are generally outside of the bourgeoisie and are often, but not always, representations of the pre-nationalist, conservative status quo.

7.5.2 The Jewish Upper Bourgeoisie

When defining the bourgeois Jewish identity in Theodor Herzl's discourse it should be remembered that he transitioned from a bourgeois German nationalist to a Jewish nationalist within a relatively short period in the 1890s. Herzl's representation of the

[770] (Herzl, 1960, p. 12)

German-assimilated, upper bourgeois Jews changed during this time. They were initially presented as a desirable ideal for European Jews, like himself, in the early 1890s. They then became an impediment to Political Zionism by the turn of the century because they opposed Jewish emigration. This was especially true of the highest classes of Jews who were unaffected by antisemitism and felt secure in Europe. Chapter 7 addresses Herzl's earlier view of the upper bourgeoisie, and their intended role in the current and future Jewish societies. Chapter 8 reveals how Herzl displaced them from the Jewish national identity after their hostility towards Political Zionism. There are some common denominators to Herzl's representations of bourgeois Jews through the mid-1890s. The first observation was that Herzl perceived that the success and social security of the wealthiest and most assimilated classes of Jews were tied to their social overlap with the wealthy and noble Christian Europeans. This observation reinforced that social assimilation into the dominant culture was a positive pathway for social security. It also reaffirmed that success and security was unequally distributed along a hierarchy based on a group's ability to access and control social power. The second common observation is somewhat related. Herzl associated Jewish social mobility and security with the Habsburg Liberal Era's social hierarchy. This was discussed above. The highest classes of the Christian nobility and bourgeoisie guaranteed and facilitated Jewish emancipation and integration. Theodor Herzl ascribed the same role to the Jewish upper bourgeoisie, and it was no coincidence that he approached them to play this role in the new Jewish national home. Herzl's actions reveal his understanding of the 19th Century social order and his desire to adopt it into Political Zionism. Returning to the first point, Theodor Herzl admired the Jewish upper bourgeoisie not just for their wealth but because they were Jewish symbols of social acceptance by Christian Austro-German society. They were able to achieve this social success due to their overlap with the features of Austro-German social majority. Jacob Samuel's Jewish brother-in-law in *Das Neue Ghetto* was a very wealthy financier named Rheinberg. His name connotes his relative Germanness as he shares it with both a city in west Germany and the Rhine River, which defines the

historic frontiers of Germany. Herzl's stage notes indicates that Rheinberg 'doesn't look Jewish, upright posture, reddish *Cavalleristen's* (cavalry officer's) beard'. Rheinberg's wealth and Christian German appearance means that he can mingle with elite Christians and even the aristocracy. He is also keen to establish his superior status in front of other bourgeois Jews. He is seen promenading with the same Captain von Shramm who left Jacob's wedding banquet early to avoid stereotypical Jews. Rheinberg exclaims, 'Have they seen me? Well, I'm going with him...Captain von Schramm is my friend.'[771] He also boasts without further prompting that, 'My dear Wasserstein, I also have a *Hofrath* (court councillor).' The *Hofrath* were amongst the '*crème de la crème'*[772] of the political elite in Austria. He concludes the sentiment by saying, 'You don't seem to know that the finest people are at my *soirees*.'[773] Rheinberg was referring to the court councillor, and other elite Christians by extension.

Outside of his literary works, Theodor Herzl acknowledged in his diaries that access to Christian Germans by Jews was dependent on wealth and assimilation. In the same entry he wrote that less wealthy Jews were even willing to entertain less desirable Christian guests just to have a public association with Christians. These Jews were willing to 'buy' the appearance of social acceptance of Christian Germans. This was evidence of conscious social positioning of bourgeois Jews along Vienna's social hierarchy. In June 1895, Herzl wrote, 'As you know, with the exception of the wealthiest, Jews have almost no social relations with Gentiles. A Jew who does not happen to support a few dinner-table parasites, spongers, and Gentile flunkeys does not know any Gentiles at all.'[774]

[771] (Herzl, 1903, p. 21)
[772] (Deak, 2015, pp. 54-55)
[773] (Herzl, 1903, p. 21)
[774] (Herzl, 1960, p. 150)

Herzl established Rheinberg's social superiority from the start. The other bourgeois Jews admire and depend on Rheinberg, and both he and they are aware of his social status. Rheinberg's command over other Jews pervades *Das Neue* Ghetto but is especially embodied in the character of Wasserstein, his financial agent. Like other bourgeois Jews, Wasserstein models himself on Rheinberg. Wasserstein says this about Rheinberg, '(Daughters) are brought up to be millionaires. So, when I fell in love with Miss Hermine, I said to myself: Wasserstein, now you have to be a millionaire. I took Rheinberg as my model, who married the other Hellmann three years ago.'[775] Jacob Samuel married Hermine as a bourgeois lawyer but he puts himself into debt trying to keep up with his wife's material needs.[776] The assimilated, wealthy Jews are the winners amongst the Viennese Jewry. This theme was repeated in the opening chapters of *Altneuland*. Herzl caricatured the scope of the Jewish upper bourgeoisie with Mr Laschner, 'one of the most important men on the stock exchange'[777] and his fashionable wife. There was also Schlesinger, 'the confidential representative of Baron Goldstein. He is obnoxious, but very popular.'[778] Finally there are the Weinbergers, a very wealthy, commercial, Bohemian-Moravian family.[779] In both *Das Neue Ghetto* and *Altneuland*, Herzl's avatars, who are both lawyers like himself, are subordinate to, and dependent upon, the wealthiest Jewish bourgeoisie. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, Jacob Samuel's debts are paid by Rheinberg in exchange for dubious requests that offend his morality. In *Altneuland*, Weinberg steals Frederich Loewenberg's intended fiancée. Herzl accepted, but also resented, his subordination to the upper bourgeoisie. They had money, power, success, and were a gateway to Christian society. Herzl writes in *Altneuland*, 'In the Loeffler set, where nothing counted except pleasure and the good things in life, money was all. And yet, he himself was dependent upon this circle of the Jewish bourgeoisie.

[775] (Herzl, 1903, p. 7)
[776] (Herzl, 1903, p. 12)
[777] (Herzl, 2009, p. 11)
[778] (Herzl, 2009, p. 11)
[779] (Herzl, 2009, p. 11)

With these people, yet, and upon these people, he had to live: It would be altogether too fantastic to dream of a client like Baron Goldstein. Christian society and a Christian clientele were the most unattainable things in the world.'[780]

The wealthiest amongst the Jewish bourgeoisie may have been privileged in society but Herzl also believed that they had financial, social, and even political obligations to lesser Jews in the way that the European Christian aristocracies had paternal obligations to their societies. This is the second common theme in Herzl's representations of the Jewish upper bourgeoisie. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, Rheinberg's financial and social position created the expectation that he would support the Jews around him when they needed him, even if he exploited that power. Herzl held this as a personal belief, and it was represented in his writings in a few ways. Herzl believed that the wealthiest Jews had a similar *noblesse oblige* as the Christian aristocracy. It was an automatic and natural response for him to turn to the Jewish moneyed aristocracy to fund and lead the Jewish national state when he developed the idea in 1895. Herzl wrote in June 1895 that the Jews needed a national home and that he would 'bring to the Rothschilds and the big Jews their historical mission.'[781] Herzl did not just believe that the Jewish upper bourgeoisie had a financial responsibility to the Jewish nation, but that they were the most suited for political leadership because they were successful in modern, capitalist societies. This is worth emphasizing. Herzl's automatic extension of political leadership to the Jewish upper bourgeoisie over the Jewish nation stemmed from his desire to recreate a modern European society in a new Jewish state. He was not reverting to historical or ancient criteria for Jewish leadership but was relying on contemporary standards. He wrote in his diaries in July 1895, 'I consider money an excellent means of political evaluation … Anyone who has earned a lot of money honestly must be a very capable man, a clever speculator, a practical inventor, an industrious, thrifty person—all

[780] (Herzl, 2009, p. 19)
[781] (Herzl, 1960, p. 37)

qualities eminently useful for guiding the state.'[782] He says it even more explicitly in an earlier diary entry when he wrote, 'Businessmen are best suited for conducting political affairs.'[783]

One of Theodor Herzl's first actions towards implementing Jewish political nationalism was requesting a meeting with Maurice, Baron de Hirsch, to fund the Jewish state. He secured a meeting with the Jewish baron and told him as much, '"The money?" (Herzl) said, laughing and contrary. "I shall collect a national Jewish loan of ten billion marks (from the wealthy Jews)."'[784] Herzl's belief in the appropriateness of an elite-led social order was so strong that he desired to hand over leadership of the Jewish state to the Rothschilds even at the expense of his own social status, and that of his class. Herzl wrote, 'We shall probably model the Constitution after that of Venice … If the Rothschilds join with us, the first *Doge* is to be a Rothschild. I will not and never shall be a *Doge*.'[785] Theodor Herzl felt inferior to the wealthy and the titled, indicating a self-acknowledgment of his position along his contemporary social hierarchy. He endearingly exhibited his social inferiority during his first visit to Baron Hirsch's estate in Paris in 1895. He gushed over his surroundings in his diary when he wrote, 'I drove up to the Rue de L'Elysée. A palace. The grand courtyard, the noble side-stairway—to say nothing of the main staircase—made a strong impression on me. Wealth affects me only in the guise of beauty. And there everything was of genuine beauty. Old pictures, marble, muted gobelins. *Donnerwetter!*'[786] The entire encounter with Baron de Hirsch revealed Herzl's internal feelings of awe, inferiority, and occasional resentfulness when in the presence of wealthy Jews. These were the same feelings that he ascribed to his personal avatars

[782] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 199)
[783] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 198)
[784] (Herzl, 1960, p. 23)
[785] (Herzl, 1960, p. 39)
[786] (Herzl, 1960, p. 18)

in his literary works. One episode may highlight this mix of feelings. Herzl recounted that Baron Hirsch interrupted him throughout his presentation until Herzl said,

> "I didn't interrupt you although I hadn't finished. I was interested to hear just what you have in mind. But I realize that it would be pointless to go on presenting my ideas to you." (Baron Hirsch) then remarked in a benevolent tone, much as if I had asked him for a position in his banking house: "I do see that you are an intelligent man." I merely smiled to myself. Such things as my undertaking are above personal vanity. I am going to see and hear many more things of this sort.'[787]

Herzl was simultaneously aware that he was speaking to someone that he considered his social better, he also knew that he relied on this person, but he was also annoyed that he could not assert himself more strongly given his lower position. At the same time, Herzl was easily placated at the faintest sign of approval by a superior in his internal hierarchy. In the end, Baron de Hirsch refused to support Herzl's Political Zionism but Herzl's belief in the role of the aristocracy was so strong that he shifted his focus to the Rothschilds, despite Baron de Hirsch explicitly telling him that the wealthy Jews would not want to be part of his project.[788] Herzl wrote that 'I have been to Hirsch, I am going to Rothschild, as *Moltke* went from Denmark to Prussia.'[789] In Herzl's mind, the wealthy nobility were still the natural heads of society, and Hirsch was the unfortunate outlier. The episode revealed more about Theodor Herzl's internal view of the social order than of the real world. It was therefore useful for understanding how his ideas of social hierarchy were embedded into his Political Zionism. Herzl was attempting to recreate a European social order in his new Jewish state to reestablish Jewish security.

[787] (Herzl, 1960, p. 23)
[788] (Herzl, 1960, p. 24)
[789] (Herzl, 1960, p. 34)

7.5.3 Liberal Bourgeois Professionals at the Centre of the Jewish Identity

Liberal, professional Jews below the upper bourgeoisie formed the bulk of the Jewish middle class in Vienna. Theodor Herzl's own pathway to bourgeois success was characteristic of Jewish social mobility in the 19th Century Austrian Empire. The Jewish, lower bourgeoisie were a mix of wealthy commercial families, generally from the empire's provinces, and liberal professionals, who were educated in Vienna and other urban centres. As discussed previously, these groups frequently intermarried as a means of improving the social statuses of one another.[790] Provincial commercial families financially supported their professional sons-in-law, while the latter added urbane respectability to their families. The mix of commercial and professional bourgeois Jews were well- represented in Herzl's discourse. At the same time, Herzl prioritised liberal, professional, Jewish men due to their relative proximity to Christian Germans. Herzl's avatars in *Das Neue Ghetto* and *Altneuland* were both lawyers working in Vienna. Nearly every non-commercial, male actor portrayed in Herzl's representations of the bourgeoisie were also liberal professionals. In addition to the aforementioned financiers, there were the medical doctor, Dr. Bichler, in *Das Neue Ghetto*[791], and the banker, Schiffmann, in *Altneuland*.[792] The centrality of the professional bourgeoisie continued in Herzl's representations of a future Jewish society. They are the architects, scientists, and engineers, who represent the best of a modern Jewry in *Der Judenstaat* and *Altneuland*. These professionals are presented as the natural leaders of the Jewish nation state.[793] Herzl went beyond representing the predominance of the professional Jewish bourgeoisie in the middle class. He also defined their angst during the rising nationalist exclusion from late-19th Century Vienna. In *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl argued with a hint of ironic self-criticism that antisemitism was creating a growing class of

[790] See Chapter 4
[791] (Herzl, 1903, p. 12)
[792] (Herzl, 2009, p. 9)
[793] (Herzl, 1946, p. 9) (Herzl, 2009, pp. 156-157)

'mediocre intellects, who cannot find an outlet downwards or upwards – that is to say, no wholesome outlet in either direction.'[794] Herzl's avatar in *Altneuland* was a young lawyer, Dr. Friedrich Loewenberg. *Altneuland* opens with a sombre Friedrich in a Viennese café surrounded by several young men 'in the same boat as himself, … these budding physicians, newly baked jurists, freshly graduated engineers. They had completed their professional studies and now they had nothing to do. Most of them were Jews.'[795] An extended passage summarises the prospects for these young Jewish men in more detail,

> They were really only a kind of superior proletariat, victims of a viewpoint that had dominated middle-class Jewry twenty or thirty years before: the sons must not be what the fathers had been. … And so, the younger generation entered the "liberal" professions *en masse*. The result was an unfortunate surplus of trained men who could find no work, but were at the same time spoiled for a modest way of life. They could not, like their Christian colleagues, slip into public posts … Nevertheless, they had the obligations of their "station in life", an arrogant sense of class distinction, and degrees that they could not back up with a shilling. Those who had some means gradually used them up, or else continued to live on the paternal purse. Others were on the lookout for eligible partners, facing the delicious prospect of servitude to wealthy fathers-in-law. … Some in their need became journalists trafficked in public opinion. Others ran about to public assemblies … where they could make useful party connections.[796]

Herzl was also fearful that the underemployment of the Jewish professional bourgeoisie from antisemitism was driving them towards anti-social political ideologies, like

[794] (Herzl, 1946, p. 6)
[795] (Herzl, 2009, p. 7)
[796] (Herzl, 2009, p. 8)

socialism. Herzl valued his contemporary society and the shift of the bourgeoisie to political subversion represented their ultimate expulsion from society. Herzl wrote in *Die Welt,* 'The exodus of Jewish masses to the land of their forefathers would not only bring relief to the states shaken by anti-Semitism, in which the Jews are being driven to the extreme subversive parties.'[797] Herzl summarised the state of turn-of-the-century Austrian Jewry in these two preceding passages. Emancipation promised civil, economic, and social equality, but the failures of the professional bourgeoisie represented the exclusion of Jews from the Austrian national society. The passage also supports this work's earlier outline for the integration and subsequent rejection of Jews from Austrian society. The economic downturn after 1873 generated unemployment and heightened competition between German Jewish and German Christian liberals. Antisemitism meant that Jews could not rely on public sector employment to absorb their unemployed young men. Poorer Jews were accustomed to their way of life for generations, but as predicted by Miroslav Hroch, excluded bourgeois minorities could not accept the social demotion that came with national exclusion. These liberal professionals were incentivised to become nationalist agitators to maintain their social status. For the time being, Herzl represented them as a dissatisfied group who were aware of their deteriorating situation due to Christian-German exclusion. The wealthiest bourgeoisie could escape the national exclusion that antisemitism represented. Herzl wrote in *Der Judenstaat*,

> The Jews must previously acquire economic power sufficiently great to overcome all social prejudice against them. The aristocracy may serve as an example of this, for in its ranks occur the proportionately largest numbers of mixed marriages. The Jewish families which rebuild the old nobility with their coin, become gradually absorbed.[798]

[797] (Herzl, Der Kongress, 1897, p. 2)
[798] (Herzl, 1946, p. XVIII)

This was not an option for most professional Jews and though they were frequently successful they also regretted the failure of emancipation and assimilation. Wasserstein, from *Das Neue Ghetto*, gave voice to the conflict between material success and his national exclusion as a Jew, 'How am I doing? I have to buy everything - with money. I have to pay for friendship, for love, pay so that people don't look at me askance - as if I was always in a guest house... If I have money, people call me Herr von Wasserstein to my face – and laugh at me when I turn around... (Softly.) I feel sorry for myself.[799]

Conversion to Christianity was another means of escaping antisemitism for bourgeois professional Jews but this had its own drawbacks. Herzl wrote his character, Dr. Bichler, as a Christian convert.[800] He tells Wasserstein that he did it as the 'individual solution to the (Jewish) question'[801] Conversion was as Bichler put it, 'At least an attempt at a solution … Because – between us – it is not solved by that.'[802] Bichler is one of the only Jewish characters besides Jacob who freely converses with the Christian German, Franz Wurzlechner, but even so, his social circle is still other Jews. He is simultaneously seen as a traitor amongst Jews. He does not belong anywhere.[803]

Finally, amongst the Jewish bourgeois liberals, Herzl retains his most negative characterisation for the literary Jews who are unproductive due to the situation in Vienna and are content being paid humourists. These are represented by the characters of Gruen and Blau.[804] They are 'the two wittiest men in Vienna. No reception, no wedding, no betrothal party or anything else comes off without them.'[805] Herzl's avatar, Loewenberg, despises the duo and treats them as a warning for what assimilated, liberal Jews can become if they have no purpose. Theodor Herzl's strong focus on the social

[799] (Herzl, 1903, p. 85)
[800] (Herzl, 1903, p. 11)
[801] (Herzl, 1903, p. 11)
[802] (Herzl, 1903, p. 11)
[803] (Herzl, 1903, p. 29)
[804] (Herzl, 2009, p. 13)
[805] (Herzl, 2009, p. 13)

anxiety of the Jewish, Austro-German, professional bourgeoisie is revealing. He was, of course, one of them and he saw that their upward social mobility was being denied in Austria because of the antisemitism in Christian German nationalism. The creation of Jewish national state was not just a means to restore Jewish security as a whole, but it also allowed Herzl to restore the professional bourgeoisie's social status specifically. Herzl knew that the professional bourgeoisie were central to a modern, liberal, national economy and society. He was guaranteeing their continued social standing in a new Jewish state by calling for the recreation of a modern European society there. Later debates between Zionist factions would reveal that the new state's social structure was not a forgone conclusion. Herzl's preferences were deliberate and but one choice amongst many. The interplay between the insecurity of the bourgeoisie in 1890s Austria and their role in a future Jewish nation state is expressed in one of Herzl's most direct diary entries on the issue from June 1895 when he was developing Political Zionism. He wrote,

> And even in the first stages of this undertaking the crowds of our aspiring youth will find employment: all the engineers, architects, technicians, chemists, physicians, lawyers, who have come out of the Ghetto in the last thirty years and believed that they would find their bread and their little bit of honour outside of petty Jewish trading affairs; who now find themselves desperate and are beginning to constitute a frightful educated proletariat, but to whom all my love belongs, and whose numbers I want to multiply just as you want to diminish them, in whom I see the future and still slumbering strength of the Jews. In a word, my own sort. And out of these educated proletarians I shall build the general staff and the cadres of an army that will seek the land, find the land and conquer the land.[806]

[806] (Herzl, 1960, p. 28)

Herzl's writings reveal an important insight into the purposes of political nationalism. This work's literature review discussed how national patriots are frequently portrayed as the disinterested agents of the wider national people. Others argued that the bourgeoisie are frequently the vanguard of minority nationalisms because they are the first to experience interruptions to their own social mobility from dominant nationalisms in modern societies. This work's interpretation of Herzl's Political Zionism adds an additional layer to these arguments. Herzl's emphasis on restoring the security of his own class in a new nation state suggests that national patriots may also be self-interested. Their leadership in national movements allows them to prioritise their own social status in future nation-states.

7.5.4 The Jewish Hierarchy Below the Professional Bourgeoisie

Herzl was a bourgeois, liberal professional and it may have been natural for him to centre himself in the Jewish identity, but the liberal professions were valued by the wider Viennese, Austro-German, Jewry. The liberal professions were seen as symbols of assimilation into Austrian society. Aforementioned quotations from Herzl support this. The liberal professions were the most accessible means for middle class Jews to gain proximity to the Austro-German identity and its benefits. The social classes and occupations above the bourgeoisie were generally off limit to Jews due to historical privileges for the Christian German aristocracy and from antisemitism. The liberal professions provided social access to bourgeois Christian Germans who were closer than Jews to Vienna's elite, Austro-German, Christian identity. Herzl described this in *Das Neue Ghetto* when he wrote that the Jewish Jacob Samuel modelled himself on his Christian German peer, Franz Wurzlechner.[807] Herzl subsequently claimed in *Altneuland* that Jews of his generation faced a shared social pressure to become liberal

[807] (Herzl, 1903, p. 41)

professionals by their commercial families.[808] Commercial success was not enough to secure the place of Jews within Austrian society. They also needed to assimilate into the culture of Austria's elite as far as possible. It may be argued that this work previously claimed that the wealthiest bourgeoisie were the ideal for 19th Century Jews, but the distinction between the wealthiest bourgeoisie and the liberal professionals was a "difference in degree" of wealth, and not a 'difference in kind'. The wealthiest bourgeoisie were more successful members of the same social group as the liberal professionals. Their wealth and social acceptability were based on the same occupations as the liberal professionals, namely finance, but sometimes medicine and law. The provincial, commercial, Jewish families were seen as a marginally inferior social group to the bourgeois professionals because of their dissimilarity with the Viennese high culture. Overall, this created a social hierarchy amongst Cisleithanian Jews that was patterned on the social hierarchy in Vienna. Groups with relatively greater overlap with the aristocratic, Christian, German, and male Viennese identity were valued more than those who were less so. The Jewish identity in 19th Century was constructed in the context of the modern, centralised, Austrian state and society. The wealthiest Jews, including the banking families like the Rothschilds, were seen as synonymous with the Austrian and European aristocracies. Everyone else were measured by their relative alignment with this centralised identity. This affected the relatively lower position of the commercial bourgeoisie, but it also had implications for the roles and possibilities of Jewish women, and for the Jewish lower classes.

Wealthy commercial Jews had instrumental value for the professional bourgeoisie in Herzl's discourse. Herzl treated them as useful tools for his individual and national purposes. On an individual level, their commercial wealth supported the lifestyles of the younger, or less wealthy, liberal professionals, like Herzl himself. At the same time, the

[808] (Herzl, 2009, p. 8)

commercial bourgeoisie were portrayed as relatively invisible and silent actors in Herzl's discourse. Their value came from their support of liberal professionals and not much more. On a broader scope, Herzl later valued their role in capitalism in the future Jewish nation, but he excluded them from his portrayals of Jewish leadership. The latter case will be addressed in the following chapter, but both portrayals represent commercial Jews below liberal professionals. For instance, Herzl described the commercial bourgeoisie through his avatar's intended parents-in-law, the Loeffler family in *Altneuland*. The Loefflers lived 'on the second floor of a large house on Gonzaga Street, the ground floor being occupied by (their) cloth firm.'[809] Gonzaga was in the very heart of central Vienna. The Loefflers hosted a dinner party attended by wealthy financiers, younger liberal professionals like Friedrich Lowenberg and Schiffman, and the two humourists, but the Loefflers themselves were not prominent in the scene. The witty, fashionable, and topical dinnertime conversation is led by the liberal bourgeoisie and readers barely hear from the Loefflers themselves.[810] The pattern is repeated in the wedding party at the start of *Das Neue Ghetto* and throughout that work. Jacob Samuel's new bride, Hermine, is the daughter of another cloth-producing, commercial family, the Hellmanns.[811] They pay for the wedding, and are at the wedding party, but they are barely mentioned. Herzl only gives voices to the Jewish liberal professionals and Christians at the event. Furthermore, Mr. Hellman is openly discussed as the source of a future inheritance. Dr. Bichler comments that, 'Mr. Hellmann is not that rich after all.'[812] Wasserstein responds, 'I don't think much of him either. Let's say a hundred thousand guilders. And that's what the business is all about. When he dies one day - which hopefully will never happen…"[813] Dr. Bichler then laughs. Wasserstein mocks the Hellmann's wealth but the same amount of money was treated as a windfall by the

[809] (Herzl, 2009, p. 12)
[810] (Herzl, 2009, pp. 12-18)
[811] (Herzl, 1903, p. 11)
[812] (Herzl, 1903, p. 7)
[813] (Herzl, 1903, p. 7)

wealthier Rheinberg in a later conversation.[814] It is also noted that a poor miner's wage at the time was around one guilder per day.[815]

Finally, Herzl doubted the capabilities of wealthy commercial Jews to understand modern antisemitism and the need for Political Zionism. This was in contrast to his representations of the bourgeois professionals who would lead the Jewish nation and state. He attended a dinner party with a well-to-do Viennese Jewish family, and he could not convince them of the dangers of Viennese political antisemitism. He lamented that despite his probing they could not articulate the Jewish problem. Herzl wrote,

> In the evening I dined with the Schiffs. Their in-laws from Vienna were visiting them. Well-to-do, educated, depressed people. They moaned softly about anti-Semitism, to which I continually steered the conversation… They do not suspect it, but they are Ghetto types, quiet, decent, timorous. Most of our people are like that. Will they understand the call to be free and become human beings?[816]

Herzl's discourse around the commercial Jewish bourgeoisie mirrors his representations of Jewish women, i.e., they exist to support the liberal professional men in their lives. Herzl reflected Austrian society and he portrayed women, in general, through their roles as mothers, wives, and daughters. They existed in the private domain of the home. As with Hermine Hellmann above, young women were generally represented as providing access to their father's wealth and were valuable for their dowries. Theodor Herzl lived off of his commercial father-in-law, and his own commercial parents. Julie Herzl funded her husband's extravagant lifestyle despite his modest livelihood as a journalist. 'They lived in a fashionable district in Paris and had 4 servants paid for by her dowry.'[817]

[814] (Herzl, 1903, p. 47)
[815] (Herzl, 1903, p. 58)
[816] (Herzl, 1960, p. 46)
[817] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 151)

Jewish wives were also ornamental representations of their husbands' success in Austrian society. Mr Laschner is introduced as 'one of the most important men on the stock exchange — a large speculator.'[818] His wife is immediately presented as a fashionable socialite at the centre of her social group, 'Mrs. Laschner sat in a corner with some equally overdressed women passionately discussing millinery.'[819] Wealthy Jewish women were well known in German society for their ostentatious displays of their husband's wealth. The German Christian Kingscourt declares in *Altneuland*, '"Ah, here they are at last!" jeered Kingscourt, grimly pleased. "The Jewesses with the diamonds, I mean! I really missed them. I had said to myself that this whole thing must be a hoax — that perhaps we were not really in Jewland at all. Now I see it's real. The ostrich feather hats, the gaudy silk dresses, the Israelitish women with their jewels.'[820]

Jewish women were portrayed as not having any interests or personalities beyond their public-facing appearances, even when alone with their husbands. In one of their few, extended interactions, Hermine Samuel laments to her husband, Jacob, that she cannot afford the latest fashions and asks him to go into further debt for her sake. Their exchange was as follows:

> Hermine: And if you wanted something from (Rheinberg).
>
> Jacob: I don't want anything from him.
>
> Hermine: Oh, Jaques, don't be like that. . . Think, you could make me happy.
>
> Jacob: Flattering cat.
>
> Hermine: And if you ask him to help you out now …
>
> Jacob *(excited):* You know? . . .
>
> Hermine: I guessed it — how you refused to give me money for my autumn toilette.

[818] (Herzl, 2009, p. 13)
[819] (Herzl, 2009, p. 13)
[820] (Herzl, 2009, p. 134)

Jacob: Unwillingly.

Hermine: Say a word to him and you'll have what you need.

Jacob: And what you need![821]

Jewish women were not only valued as representations of bourgeois success, but also as a means of producing Jewish children who looked more like Christian Germans. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, Jacob tells his parents, 'Oh yes, I come from good parents! But there is a new strain in our blood - not bad either. I wish for children who look like her.'[822] Herzl's portrayals of the wives of his avatars were modelled on his own wife, Julie Herzl. Julie was positively described as 'a golden-haired, blue-eyed girl'[823] compared to negative references to Theodor as stereotypically 'dark and thin'[824]. The appropriate bride could boost the assimilation prospects for successive generations.

Herzl contrasted the different potentials between men and women in his notes for a future novel 'which is to contain real people'.[825] One character, 'Heinrich's gushing young brother … will be "trained" to be a ruler in the novel.'[826] Alternatively, he wrote the only female character as a girl who 'missed her "natural calling" and died from it. But what a splendid mother she would have made!'[827] A common theme of women in Herzl's concept of society was that they did the tasks that valuable men needed, but which they could not do themselves or which were below their capabilities. In an early draft of Political Zionism, Herzl condescendingly summarised women's role as follows,

The small businesses will be operated only by women, I think. You can see how this will relieve the pressure for women's rights. Women can easily take care of

[821] (Herzl, 1903, pp. 44-45)
[822] (Herzl, 1903, p. 15)
[823] (Cohen, 1959, p. 43)
[824] (Cohen, 1959, p. 23)
[825] (Herzl, 1960, p. 199)
[826] (Herzl, 1960, p. 200)
[827] (Herzl, 1960, p. 199)

> such businesses in addition to their household chores, even if they are pregnant, and can also supervise their girls and small boys. The bigger boys we shall take, for we can use them all.[828]

Finally, bourgeois Jewish wives and mothers were valued by Jewish men in Herzl's discourse for their emotional support. Jacob's mother advises Hermine:

> A Jewish lady must be more to her husband than a Christian one. Because our men have to bear the burden when they go out. So the house should be a home for them. Dress up just for him, think just of him, live just for him.[829]

It must be remembered that Theodor Herzl is writing these words, and they may represent his expectations for Jewish women. Jacob's mother, in particular, mirrors Herzl's relationship with his own mother and she frequently worries over Jacob, and comforts and advises him.[830,831] Herzl's views of Jewish women appear to evolve in his representations of the Jewish national society in Palestine but this may only be a surface level change. Herzl grants women political suffrage and liberal occupations there but he also excludes them from leadership roles. He also frequently voices that their place is in the home once they are married. Herzl's representations of women in the future Jewish state will be considered in the following chapter.

The final group in the 19th Century Austro-Jewish hierarchy below the professional bourgeoisie was the Jewish working class. Once again, they are defined relative to Herzl as a liberal, bourgeois professional. Herzl represented them in two interrelated ways. The first was in the context of 19th Century Austria. The Jewish working class were described as a 'bourgeoisie-in-waiting' after emancipation. They could become assimilated, modern Jews if they followed the same social pathway set by the

[828] (Herzl, 1960, p. 156)
[829] (Herzl, 1903, p. 17)
[830] (Herzl, 1903, p. 41)
[831] (Herzl, 1903, p. 100)

established Jewish bourgeoisie. Herzl represented these lower-class Jews in *Altneuland*'s Littwak family. Friedrich Loewenberg met a Polish Jewish peddler, Hayim Littwak, and his son, David. Herzl considered Polish Jews to be the most unassimilated group amongst the Viennese immigrants.[832] The Littwak family are destitute and indebted. Friedrich assists the family and the 10-year-old David promises to repay him. David says, 'Yes. I have heard that one who studies becomes a free, strong man'.[833] David continued, '"God will make me a strong man," he said. "And then I shall repay you."'[834] Friedrich became determined to help David and he bequeathed to the Littwaks the unimaginable sum of five thousand guilders.[835] Friedrich meets a bourgeois David decades later in the Jewish state and he thinks to himself, 'So this was the Jewboy beggar! A free, healthy, cultured man who gazed steadfastly upon the world and seemed to stand firmly in his shoes. David had barely referred to his own circumstances in life; he could hardly be poor, though, if he lived in this district of villas and mansions. He seemed to be a prominent citizen, too.'[836]

The Jewish lower classes were poor and oriental because of their historical social oppression, and not because of any intrinsic Jewishness as Christians claimed. The Jewish identity was socially contingent and mutable, and emancipation could transform it. The story of David Littwak represented not only the social possibilities for lower class Jews but the role that the professional bourgeoisie had in nurturing them. Herzl believed that the Jewish bourgeoisie had a *noblesse oblige* towards the Jewish poor, or an elite social responsibility for their welfare. In *Das Neue* Ghetto, Jacob is seen as moral for his *pro bono* legal representation of the suffering mine workers.[837] Alternatively,

[832] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 76)
[833] (Herzl, 2009, p. 24)
[834] (Herzl, 2009, p. 24)
[835] (Herzl, 2009, p. 32)
[836] (Herzl, 2009, p. 57)
[837] (Herzl, 1903, p. 57)

Rheinberg and Von Schramm are seen as immoral for failing to protect the miners under their employment.[838]

Herzl took his elite paternalism to the extreme in his representation of the Jewish working class in the Jewish nation-state. The working class became a faceless factor of production to be commanded, coerced, and employed by the bourgeois leadership without any agency of their own. For instance, Herzl wrote in the Zionist newspaper *Die Welt* that he already assigned the Russian Jewry to be the Jewish state's proletariat. He wrote that they 'The efficiency of these (Russian) craftsmen and unskilled labourers is indeed one of the foundations of our plan. It is their task to undertake the first cultivation work in the desolate land. They shall, they will be the land-builders. But we never imagined anything other than that they would depend on our spiritual help and guidance dependent be.'[839] The last sentence of that quote was reflected elsewhere in Herzl's diaries. He did not believe that the Jewish lower classes should have autonomy over their personal time, and that this should be used to indoctrinate them into the ideals of the state-society. He wrote, 'Pastimes for the workers after working hours. They make music (Workers' Orchestras). But the main thing: Jewish National Passion Plays from ancient times (Maccabees) and the Middle Ages. Fear, pity, pride, and adult education in the form of diversion.'[840] Herzl believed that elite control over the Jewish proletariat would be beneficial for all Jews, and that

7.6 Conclusion

Chapter 7 presented Theodor Herzl as an assimilated minority within Vienna's Austro-German culture. Herzl internalised and reproduced his society's German-biased

[838] (Herzl, 1903, p. 65)
[839] (Herzl, Russische Juden, 1897, p. 4)
[840] (Herzl, Der Kongress, 1897)

distribution of political, economic, and social power in his discourse. He did this through his literary representations of Christian Germans at the centre of an Austro-German, Roman Catholic, and male identity. Herzl simultaneously positioned the Habsburg Jewry within the prevailing distribution of power. Theodor Herzl represented the identities of Jews in 19th Vienna as relative to the identities of Christian Austro-Germans. Herzl's representations of Jewish social mobility and success mirrored the overall distribution of inclusion and success in Vienna's centralized and nationalising political system. Jews existed parallel to their Christian contemporaries and modelled themselves on their Christian peers as these were the most accessible templates for assimilation into both the Austrian state-society and early Austro-German nationalism. Chapter 8 follows and it will present the exclusion of Jews from the Viennese political, economic, and social systems.

8. Discourse Analysis: Part 2. Theodor Herzl and the Antisemitic Exclusion of Jews in Fin de Siècle Vienna

8.1 Introduction

Research Question 1 analyses the social construction of minority identities in existing societies. Research Question 2 asks whether minorities are relatively subordinate and insecure compared to those who are accepted within dominant national movements. It should be apparent by now that these two questions are interrelated when discussing minority identities within existing societies. This work has argued that individual and group minorities are constructed relative to surrounding nationalisms and nationalising societies. They are not completely pre-social or intrinsic to groups. Minorities are simultaneously, and necessarily, disadvantaged compared to those within dominant nationalisms since they are more likely to be excluded from central institutions, like the economy, politics, education, etc.. The exclusion of minorities may be formal, including via legal restrictions and other oppressive or exclusive polices. Exclusion may also be social and extra-political, and can be represented as social bias, including racism. Both forms of exclusion interact with each other in nationalising societies and are frequently only possible when a national movement is dominant within a particular social context, i.e. the ability to exclude others requires power. This work goes beyond similar arguments of modern nationalism when it argues that which groups gain the power to define the national identity, and to thereby exclude others, is not based on whether they are an objective majority within a territory. Ethnicities, including nationality, is social and subjective. This work argues that the specific, dominant, popular national movements that emerge in a society's later periods were only possible because they emerged from historical distributions of social power that favored their social features in prior eras. This has been this work's interpretation of 19th Century Austrian history and the emergence of political and popular antisemitism in *fin de siècle* Vienna. Antisemitic, Christian,

German nationalism could emerge in the late 19th Century because Christian German men were historically favored in Austrian politics and society before they became nationalist. At a minimum, this work argues that Theodor Herzl shared this interpretation of his social environment, and he modelled his own Political Zionism, or Jewish political nationalism, on it. He centered his own identity within Political Zionism because he perceived that this dynamic in 19th Century Vienna was the basis of Christian Austro-German social and political security.

The previous chapter disproportionately focused on the first research question, and its conclusion that the Jewish identity in the 19th Century Habsburg Empire society was defined relative to the Austro-German, Catholic, and male identity that was first implicit in Austrian Liberalism and subsequently explicit in Austro-German Christian nationalism. This defined the social possibilities for Jews within Viennese society in both periods. This chapter shifts its focus towards Research Question 2 more explicitly. Question 2 asked whether minority individuals are insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements? This chapter explores how Jews became increasingly disadvantaged in last quarter of the 19th Century because they were considered to be alien minorities after the emergence of Christian, Austro-German nationalism.

This chapter addresses Research Question 2 around the social inferiority of Viennese Jews in the late 19th Century in a number of steps. First, it establishes that antisemitism existed and that it informed the social identities of Viennese Jews, including Theodor Herzl. Second, it argues that antisemitism was experienced as social and political exclusion based on inter-ethnic competition, and not from historic, anti-Jewish bias. Third, it reflects Herzl's belief that contemporary antisemitism and the failure of emancipation created the modern Jewish nation by creating a shared experience for distinct populations of European Jews.

This chapter concludes with a review of Theodor Herzl's alternatives to Jewish nationalism before his shift to Political Zionism in 1895. Antisemitism reached new heights in the 1880s and 1890s, and this incentivized Jews to intensively seek solutions to the Jewish Question. Jews began to question methods for not only their individual survival in antisemitic societies, but also for their joint survival as a Jewish people in a nationalising Europe. The Jewish attempts to address modern antisemitism is a clear sign that they believed their Jewishness was making them an inferior social group in their contemporary societies. This may be evidence for this work's second research question on whether minorities were insecure in societies that were being politically conquered by ethno-national political movements, as was the case in 1890s Vienna. Herzl pinpointed two causes for the Jewish Problem in Austria. The first was the retention of the Jewish faith in a political system that was dominated by explicit Christian Austro-Germans. Herzl considered the mass conversion of Jews to Christianity as a solution to this problem. The second source of antisemitism was the economic competition between Jews and Christians that motivated Vienna's antisemitic Christians. Modern capitalism pitted individuals against one another so Herzl considered the possibility of cooperative economic systems that removed this competition, including socialism. Herzl found both alternatives to be unsatisfactory, and he started considering a secessionist Jewish national movement, or Political Zionism. The following chapter will address this work's final, fourth research question on whether Theodor Herzl attempted to restore the security of himself, and all European Jews, by creating a new nation-state based on their Jewish minority identity.

8.2 Theodor Herzl, Antisemitism, and the Modern Jewish Identity in *Fin de Siècle* Vienna

8.2.1 Contemporary Antisemitism as a Known and Shared Experience

The case studies in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 argued that complex, inter-ethnic conflict between Germans and other ethnicities in the Habsburg Empire, including the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, pushed Vienna's political system towards a narrower male, Christian, Austro-German identity by the turn of the 20th Century. Vienna's Christian Germans formed a broad coalition in Christian Austro-German nationalism that drew on defectors from the old Liberal Party and lower-middle class democrats, nationalists, clerics, and artisans to defend the state's German bias. Jews were pushed out of the Austro-German identity and became representative of alien non-Christians and non-Germans in the Austrian capital. German-Christian nationalism culminated in the Christian Social Party, and their antisemitic mayoral candidate, Karl Lueger. Herzl represented the rise of antisemitic, Christian-German nationalism in two ways. The first was through his empirical analysis and reflections on historical events in his political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat*, in his opening to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, and in his personal diary entries. The other way was in his literary works where his Jewish German and Christian German characters ended their former associations due to Christian antisemitism.

One standout feature of Theodor Herzl's analytical discussions of antisemitism is that he did not feel the need to spend much time establishing the fact that antisemitism, or Jewish nationalist exclusion, existed. Jews seemed to be aware that they were being violently excluded from Vienna, Cisleithania, and from Europe at large. For instance, in his opening speech to the First Zionist Congress, in front of a pan-European Jewish audience, Herzl only spends 15-20% of the address discussing antisemitism as the basis for the Jewish Problem. Most of his 1897 address is spent on Political Zionism as the novel solution to an accepted problem. Similarly, in *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl spends a few pages in the opening chapter discussing Christian-German antisemitism and about 90% of the pamphlet on the principles of Political Zionism. This implies that his Jewish audience also perceived that antisemitism was an established fact of late 19th Century

politics and society. In his address to the Zionist Congress, Herzl told the audience, 'And in this era, which is otherwise so sublime, we see and feel ourselves everywhere surrounded by the old hatred. Anti-Semitism is the modern name of this movement, which is only too well known to you.'[841] Herzl repeated the claim that antisemitism was a European phenomenon linked to nationalism in an 1895 draft of a speech intended for the Rothschild family. He argued that the Jewish Problem, or the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from European societies due to popular nationalism, would overtake the continent. Herzl wrote in this proposed speech,

> Will it be a revolutionary expropriation from below or a reactionary confiscation from above? Will they chase us away? Will they kill us?
>
> I have a fair idea that it will take all these forms, and others. In one of the countries, probably France, there will come a social revolution whose first victims will needs be the big bankers and the Jews…
>
> In Russia there will simply be a confiscation from above. In Germany they will make emergency laws as soon as the Kaiser can no longer manage the *Reichstag.* In Austria people will let themselves be intimidated by the Viennese rabble and deliver up the Jews. There, you see, the mob can achieve anything once it rears up. It does not know this yet, but the leaders will teach it.
>
> So they will drive us out of these countries and kill us in the others, where we take refuge. Is there then no salvation?[842]

The shared experience and perceptions of modern antisemitism amongst European Jews lends credence to theoretical claims from Discourse Analysis that the meaning and use of language depends on contemporary social relationships. Language reflects the wider society at that time and not just the perspective of an individual author.[843] One aspect of an author's social context is their group identities. If discourse represents an

[841] (Reimer, 2019, p. 93)
[842] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 131-132)
[843] (Sarantakos, 2013, p. 332), (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)

author's complete social context, it should also be representative of their group's perspectives.[844]

8.2.2 Theodor Herzl's Understanding of Antisemitism as Social Exclusion from a Modern Nationalising Society

Theodor Herzl argued that antisemitism was real and pervasive, but he also argued that antisemitism emerged from contemporary social conflicts and not from intrinsic differences between peoples. He emphasized that the insecurity associated with the Jewish minority identity was a product of Christian German competition with Jews. Jews were experiencing insecurity in European society not because of historical anti-Jewishness but because Jews were an excluded minority in the society that Christian, Austro-German nationalists were attempting to dominate. Herzl wrote, 'In the principal countries where Anti-Semitism prevails, it does so as a result of the emancipation of the Jews. … For we had … developed while in the Ghetto into a bourgeois people, and we stepped out of it only to enter into fierce competition with the middle classes.'[845] Herzl describes the antisemitism that defined his contemporary Jewish identity through inter-class conflict between Jews and powerful Christian nationalists. He does not use religious framing to describe the Jewish Problem. Jews are not subordinate because of their religious beliefs but because they are perceived as being in competition with Christians in a nationalising society that was now governed by self-conscious Christian Germans. He describes the subordinate status of Jews through a modern socio-economic lens,

> Is it true that, in countries where we live in perceptible numbers, the position of Jewish lawyers, doctors, men of science, teachers, and officials of all descriptions, become daily more intolerable? True, that the Jewish middle

[844] (Gidley, 2014, p. 47)
[845] (Herzl, 1946, p. 6)

> classes are seriously threatened? True, that the passions of the mob are incited against our wealthy representatives? True that our poor endure greater sufferings than any other proletariat?[846]

Theodor Herzl further argued that the modern Jewish Problem existed because the emancipation of Jews was premature when it did not assimilate Jews before granting them civil equality. Persistent Jewishness meant that Jews were perceived as alien in modern societies that favored social homogeneity. The retention of Judaism, a social and not biological feature, meant that Jews were brought into economic, social, and political conflict with dominant non-Jews who could weaponize their otherness during social competition. Jewish assimilation into the dominant culture could have avoided this. Herzl said as much in a letter to the retired German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. He wrote,

> They have tried it through emancipation, but it came too late. It does no good to declare abruptly in the Legal Gazette: "Starting tomorrow, all men will be equal." … Would it not have been better to let the Jews rise to emancipation gradually and during this ascent assimilate them, gently or vigorously, depending on circumstances? Perhaps! How? One could have passed them through the filter of mixed marriages and ensured a new generation of Christians. But it would have been necessary to put emancipation after assimilation, not the other way around; that was bad thinking. But in any case, it is too late for this, too.[847]

Theodor Herzl's discussions of social exclusion overlap with this work's historical review of late-19th Century Vienna and the antisemitic political platforms of Christian German nationalists. German nationalists wanted to re-establish limits to Jewish 'landownership, occupational freedom, and exclusion from public posts.'[848] Karl Lueger, as the leader of

[846] (Herzl, 1903, p. 2)
[847] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 120-121)
[848] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 32)

the Christian Socials, said it plainly. He promised that if the Christian Socials governed, they would 'repeal Emancipation, expropriate Jewish property, and expel Jews from Austria.'[849] The opening sentences of *Der Judenstaat* supports that these antisemitic political platforms were being implemented, and that Jews were aware of it. Herzl wrote in this extended quotation,

> No one can deny the gravity of the Jews' situation. Wherever they live in perceptible numbers, they are more or less persecuted. Their equality before the law, guaranteed by statute, has become practically a dead letter. They are debarred from filling even moderately high positions, either in the army, or in any public or private capacity. And attempts are made to crowd them out of business also. "No dealing with Jews!" Attacks in Parliaments, in assemblies, in the press, in the pulpit, in the streets, on journeys … become daily more numerous.[850]

The above quotations suggests that Theodor Herzl not only understood that Jews were being excluded from Viennese society but also that the power to monopolize inclusion was the basis for Christian German's social security. In other words, antisemitism, or any ethnic or national exclusivity, could be used to a dominant's group advantage during social conflict. Herzl incorporated Karl Lueger's proposed policies with near identical language into his draft proposals for Political Zionism. These proposals are used here to emphasize that Herzl linked a group's security in a nationalised society to ethnic exclusivity. This was his experience of antisemitism in late-19th Century Vienna, and he extended the concept to the new Jewish nation-state. Herzl's beliefs are reflected in a short excerpt from his diaries that never made it into the final version of *Der Judenstaat.* Herzl proposed that the Jewish nation state should implement policies to ensure that Jews will ultimately own all land there via the 'voluntary expropriation' of property from non-Jews. This idea did not emerge in a vacuum but was a mirrored reflection of Christian, Austro-German nationalism. Herzl wrote on June 12, 1895,

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[849] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 94)
[850] (Herzl, 1946, p. 1)

> The voluntary expropriation will be accomplished through our secret agents. The (Jewish) Company would pay excessive prices.
>
> We shall then sell only to Jews, and all real estate will be traded only among Jews. To be sure, we shall not be able to do this by declaring other sales invalid. Even if this did not run counter to the modem world's sense of justice, our power would not suffice to force it through.
>
> Therefore, we must safeguard each of our sales of immovables through an option of re-purchase on the part of the Company. That is, if the owner wants to sell the property, we shall have the right to buy it back at our original sale price.[851]

Herzl mirrors the language of the political antisemites when connecting insecurity of excluded minorities and the security of dominant national groups. The preceding quotation is evidence that this was how he perceived political and social antisemitism in 19th Century Vienna.

8.2.3 Theodor Herzl's Belief that Antisemitism Created the Modern Jewish Identity

Theodor Herzl argued that the insecurity of Jews within politically nationalising European societies allowed Jews to perceive themselves as a common group based on their joint experiences of antisemitism. The shared sense of belonging to the 19th Century Jewish identity was an outcome of antisemitism and was not independent of it. Herzl wrote this in *Der Judenstaat* in 1896, and he repeated it at the First Zionist Congress in 1897. In *Der Judenstaat* he wrote, 'Thus, whether we like it or not, we are now, and shall henceforth remain, a historic group with unmistakable characteristics common to us all.'[852] At the Zionist Congress, Herzl told his audience that 'The feeling of group solidarity (amongst Jews) … was in the process of complete dissolution when we were

[851] (Herzl, 1960, p. 89)
[852] (Herzl, 1946, p. 8)

attacked by anti-Semitism. The latter has caused it to regain its strength. We have, so to speak, come home.'[853] Herzl adds, 'We would scarcely have come together were it otherwise. There has been a long hiatus in our sharing of a common destiny.'[854] Herzl explicitly argued that the 19th Century Jewish identity was a product of their shared subordination and exclusion in nationalising European societies.

Theodor Herzl therefore perceived that nationalist antisemitism was pushing Jews into a shared social identity. He also perceived that antisemitism was motivated by competition with bourgeois and petite bourgeois Jews over economic, political, and social opportunities. He was initially mistaken around one key aspect of the modern Jewish identity, though. He mistakenly assumed that the Jewish upper bourgeoisie were experiencing the modern Jewish identity in the same way as other Jews. His error adds support for this work's arguments around the social dynamics of identity creation in nationalising societies. The politically ascendant Christian Austro-Germans in the bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, and the lower classes who were behind Viennese antisemitism were not in social competition with the Jewish upper classes. The Jewish upper bourgeoisie was therefore outside of the constructed, modern Jewish identity. They were not experiencing the Jewish Problem and would not be motivated by Herzl's Political Zionism. The Jewish identity was being defined around the Jewish professional bourgeoisie. Christian Austro-German politicians defined their antisemitism around this Jewish sub-group, and this antisemitism defined the modern Jewish identity. The fact that the upper bourgeoisie did not perceive antisemitism because they were not in direct competition with the Christian German bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie is additional evidence that contemporary social competition was the cause of antisemitism and not Jewishness alone.

[853] (Reimer, 2019, p. 93).
[854] (Reimer, 2019, p. 92)

Theodor Herzl eventually learned the above lesson. In hindsight, Herzl's discourse around Viennese Jewish society suggests that he always understood the distinction between the Jewish upper classes and other Jews as discussed in Chapter 7. There are contradictions between his consistent representation of the modern Jewish identity as the outcome of social conflict from within the professional bourgeoisie, but he still included the upper bourgeoisie in his initial drafts of Jewish political nationalism. He was eventually forced to explicitly accept that the Jewish upper classes existed outside the modern Jewish, national identity when they rejected his Political Zionism. He then consciously recentered his political philosophies around the Jewish professional bourgeoisie. For instance, in *Das Neue Ghetto*, Herzl wrote that perceptions of Jewish competition by Christians in the professional bourgeoisie would ultimately define the modern Jewish identity. His character Jacob Samuels explained this to Wasserstein after the latter won financial gains at the expense of his Christian competitors. Jacob told Wasserstein, 'Don't you understand me? You're harming us! The Jews! Because these large movements of money are also destroying (Christians). And the victims accuse the Jews . . . Who is big enough to see the connection between things? People only see people.'[855] Christian German antisemites were motivated by social competition at this specific socio-economic level and were incentivized to exclude Jews from competing with them in their nationalising society.

Theodor Herzl's eventual realization that the Jewish upper bourgeoise existed outside his modern, Jewish national identity overlap with this work's claims that a minority's experiences with social exclusion can depend on their relative overlap with a society's accepted social hierarchy. This is worth emphasizing when answering this work's research questions around the social creation of minority national identities. Herzl eventually understood that the highest classes of bourgeois Jews overlapped so

[855] (Herzl, 1903, p. 54)

strongly with Austrian and European nobility that they existed above the effects of antisemitism and they did not experience it in the same way as the Jews in lower social classes. This meant that they did not experience a shared social identity with other European Jews despite their Jewishness. This is further evidence that experience of antisemitism was not solely based on someone being Jewish but was an extension of contemporary social competition. The disconnect between the Jewish upper bourgeoisie and other Jews makes sense in retrospect. The Christian Austro-German nobility was socially superior to the Christian bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie who were leading Vienna's contemporary antisemitism. The Christian Austro-German political agitators framed the Jewish Problem as direct social competition with their Jewish counterparts. The same groups had much less social competition with, and social power over, both the Christian Austro-German and Jewish upper bourgeoisies above them. Herzl summarized this concept succinctly in the following, 'In our upper classes (antisemitism) causes unpleasantness, in our middle classes continual and grave anxieties, in our lower classes absolute despair.' [856] Herzl is arguing that Jews experienced antisemitism relative to their overlap with the social hierarchies in their societies. Specifically, Herzl argued that the level of inclusion within Austrian society predicted the level of insecurity amongst Jewish minorities. The wealthiest are moderately inconvenienced by antisemitism because they are relatively more aligned with the elite-biased, Austrian hierarchy. Insecurity increased for Jews as they were differentiated from the Austro-German identity below the upper bourgeoisie. At the same time, Herzl mirrors arguments by the sociologist Miroslav Hroch when he argues that the despite the Jewish poor forming the bulk of the population that the Jewish minority identity would be best articulated by its bourgeoisie. They would be the most conscious of their social exclusion in nationalising societies due to their education and direct experience with modern societies.

[856] (Herzl, 1946, p. 2)

Wealthy Jews felt relative security within the state because they were historically secure, even before Jewish emancipation. They had residency rights in Vienna even before Emancipation in 1848, for instance. The relative security amongst the wealthiest Jews meant that they were also the least receptive to Herzl's Political Zionism before he published *Der Judenstaat*. Herzl experienced this in both Austria but also across Europe. This distressed Herzl greatly since he wanted to recreate his European society in the Jewish state along the same social hierarchy, but the wealthiest Jews rejected the concept of Political Zionism. This was discussed in the previous chapter after Herzl's first meeting with Baron Hirsch. Herzl pinned his hopes on the Rothschilds but as he wrote in his diaries in 1896, '(Edmond) Rothschild will hear nothing whatever of the matter; he does not believe that anything can be accomplished with the Sultan, and at any rate will not cooperate. He considers what I am doing dangerous, because I am rendering the patriotism of the Jews suspect …'[857] Many years later, in 1902, Herzl again quoted a Rothschild who told him that, 'There would never be anti-Semitism in England, etc. In France it had been another story, etc. He did not believe in *Zionism.* … He was an Englishman and wanted to remain one.'[858] Both quotes are important and revealing. They indicated that the Rothschilds, as symbols of the Jewish upper bourgeoisie, were not experiencing the same antisemitism as the Jewish professional bourgeoisie and other classes of Jews due to their social position.

Herzl's failure to convince the Jewish upper bourgeoisie over the need for Political Zionism led him to appeal to fellow bourgeois Jews to become the core of Political Zionism. He did so at the First Zionist Congress when he said,

> The first reaction the Jews of today had to this movement (Antisemitism) was surprise, which then changed to pain and anger. Our enemies do not perhaps

[857] (Herzl, 1960, p. 352)
[858] (Herzl, 1960, p. 1291)

> realize how deeply-touching our very souls- they wounded those among us, whom they quite possibly were not primarily seeking to harm. It was precisely modern, educated Jewry, which had outgrown the ghetto and lost the old habits of haggling, that was thrust through to the heart.[859]

Herzl finally understood that the bourgeoisie would be the most capable of perceiving that their insecurity was based on their exclusion from nationalising European societies. Antisemitism was not just old anti-Jewishness. The bourgeoisie were best equipped to explain this phenomenon to other Jews because they were the highest class of minority Jews who were being excluded from these emerging political systems. Their higher status gave them the necessary social profile, including their advanced education and their experience in social institutions, to articulate their exclusion as minorities.

This section closes with a review of how Theodor Herzl represented the emergence of Christian Austro-German nationalism, and the features of its nationalist antisemitism, in his literary works. All of the ideas discussed above were represented in his theatrical play, *Das Neue Ghetto*. First, the rise of Christian German nationalism is described in *Das Neue Ghetto*. Herzl represented the social excision of Jews from the Austrian Christian characters. The two groups of bourgeois Christian Germans who interacted with bourgeois Jews abandoned their Jewish peers after the emergence of Christian German nationalism in the 1870s-1890s. As discussed in Chapter 7, the extension of political rights to the Christian petite bourgeoisie merged them into a single political bloc with the liberal bourgeoisie. They organised against non-Christian and non-German participation in Austrian society due to emerging ethnic and class conflicts. Jews were seen as both ethnic and economic competition, and they were excluded from this narrowed social identity. Herzl represented that the Christian German identity was

[859] (Reimer, 2019, p. 93)

transformed in his own lifetime due to contemporary political, economic, and social transformations.

The Austrian Liberal Party was on the decline after the economic crisis of 1873 and the expansion of suffrage in 1882.[860] The German Christian nationalism that replaced it was openly antisemitic. Gentile liberals dissociated from Jews to retain their political standing. The split between *Das Neue Ghetto's* Franz Wurzlechner and Jacob Samuel represented this break between liberal Christians and Jews. Franz announced his separation from Jacob in a private meeting in Jacob's office. They express an easy, natural companionship at the start of the scene until Franz communicates his decision to break things off. Franz tells his friend, 'Jacob, believe me, I can't do anything else. If only you knew everything. "I - I want to turn to politics.'[861] Franz elaborated by adopting the rhetoric of the Christian nationalists, 'I can't give my opponents the weapon of having so much to do with Jews, with stockbrokers. That immediately means: the Jew's servant!'[862] Franz cannot maintain his relationship with Jacob if he wants to remain within Christian Austro-German politics. Jacob is being ejected from that society and Franz resents that Jacob's Jewishness means that he cannot remain his friend. Franz tells Jacob, 'You have — a different environment, a different society —— in which I cannot find my place. … It's not your fault — and yet I'm sometimes angry with you.'[863] The Austro-German identity was now further defined by Christianity and Jews were no longer acceptable.

Captain von Schramm does not have Franz Wurzlechner's regrets around his separation from the Jews when the Austro-German national identity excluded them. Schramm's joint venture with Jacob Samuel's brother-in-law had meaning beyond that

[860] (Berenger, 1997, p. 250)
[861] (Herzl, 1903, p. 36)
[862] (Herzl, 1903, p. 36)
[863] (Herzl, 1903, p. 34)

specific enterprise. It represented the joint industrial and commercial economy that liberal Jews and Christians built together in the Liberal Era. Christians were willing to work with Jews when their cooperation was economically productive but then scapegoated Jews when the economy failed. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, the mine collapses, as a symbol for the failed economy, and Schramm is financially ruined. Schramm's first instinct was to attribute the failure to a Jewish conspiracy because the Jewish characters did not lose their own wealth after the collapse.[864] He said, 'I have been robbed of all my belongings. You will probably try to convince me that everything was done fairly. … Yes, of course, the trick has already been carried out. Now I have already been robbed!'[865] Again, Herzl is drawing directly on the antisemitic conspiracies around Jewish control of the press and economy to the disadvantage of Christians. The Austro-German political identity was inclusive of Jews in the Liberal Era at the start of the play, but by the end of *Das Neue Ghetto* Jews are expelled from the narrower German national identity because of social evolutions in Viennese political society. The exclusion of Jews from Austrian politics in *Das Neue Ghetto* is consistently represented in Herzl's literary works, but also in his academic analyses of the inferiority of the Jewish minority in nationalised European states. It is also corroborated by this work's historical review of the political environment in the late 19th Century. Jews were assigned an inferior minority identity by Christians using exclusionary antisemitic politics. The Jewish minority was insecure in that society as a result.

[864] (Herzl, 1903, p. 85)
[865] (Herzl, 1903, p. 82)

8.3 Theodor Herzl's Alternatives to Jewish Political Nationalism

8.3.1 Introduction

This work's second research question asks 'Are minority individuals insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements? This section claims that Theodor Herzl's search for solutions to antisemitism in late 19th Century Vienna may be evidence that he saw Jews as a disadvantages and inferior ethnic minority after the rise of Christian Austro-German nationalism in the city. Herzl's alternative proposals to Jewish nationalism were also an important intermediary step for the creation of Political Zionism and is worth considering in any case. These proposals connected Herzl's nationalist, antisemitic exclusion from Viennese society to his ultimate decision to become a Jewish nationalist. He explored different ways to transform the Jewish identity to make it acceptable to Christian Austro-German nationalists but his failure led him to Jewish nationalism. This work has claimed that Herzl framed the Jewish Problem using concepts of social competition between German Christians and Germanised Jews. Herzl directly linked Jewish emancipation and social competition to antisemitism. He distinguished antisemitism from historical anti-Jewishness based on the Jewish faith.[866] He argued that Christian jealousy and resentment at Jewish successes made 19th Century Jews into a single social group. Herzl wrote, 'We are one people – our enemies have made us one in our despite, as repeatedly happens in history.'[867] Jews were classified as a distinct social group because their social success overlapped with their choice to remain Jewish in a nationalising, Christian, Austro-German political system. Herzl therefore identified two causes for the Jewish Problem. The first was the Jewish identity, the second was a capitalist society which demanded competition between Jews

[866] (Herzl, 1946, p. 5)
[867] (Herzl, 1946, p. 8)

and Christians. Herzl's alternatives to Political Zionism inadequately addressed both of these, leaving Jewish nationalism as his only solution.

8.3.2 Theodor Herzl and the Mass Conversion of Jews as a Solution to the Jewish Problem

Herzl famously called for the mass conversion of Jews to Catholicism before he advocated for Jewish nationalism. If Jews were being ejected from Austro-German, Catholic politics because of their Jewishness, then Jews should convert to erase this obstacle to their security. Herzl still saw 'full assimilation as the ultimate goal of Jewry.'[868] Herzl was willing to sacrifice Judaism if it meant that Jews could be accepted within Viennese society. In *Das Neue Ghetto*, Herzl argued that piecemeal, individual conversions could not solve antisemitism because converted Jews still maintained Jewish social circles. This was why his character of the convert, Dr. Bichler, could not escape antisemitism completely.[869] European Jews needed to abandon their Jewish identity all at once if assimilation was to work. He wrote to his editor, Moriz Benedikt, that 'I am not in the least resistant to formal conversion to Christianity.'[870] Herzl imagined a grand, mass conversion ceremony before St. Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna that was sanctioned by the Roman Catholic pope. Herzl later denied in *Der Judenstaat* that he was calling for Jewish assimilation into Christianity but he quickly contradicted himself when he wrote, 'We might perhaps be able to merge ourselves entirely into surrounding races, if these were to leave us in peace for a space of two generations.'[871] The issue with mass conversion was that the majority of Jews did not want to convert to Christianity. This was an unworkable, and impractical, solution.

[868] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 116)
[869] (Herzl, 1903, p. 11)
[870] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 116)
[871] (Herzl, 1946, p. 7)

Another problem with Christian conversion, according to Herzl, was that 19th Century, Christian Germans did not hate Jews simply because they were Jews, but because they were social competition. Christian Germans became antisemitic after Jews were emancipated and became competition for Christian liberals. Bourgeois Jews were also the overseers of the Christian petite bourgeoisie as part of the liberal class. Finally, they represented the capitalist economy in rural areas where they acted as the primary tradesmen and financiers. Economic and political setbacks for Christian Germans in the 1870s and 1880s led them to seek an excuse to reduce their social competition with successful Jews in all these categories. Removing Jewish competition from society was the goal for Christian Germans, and not the removal of Judaism, *per se*. Herzl hints at this when he wrote, 'The world is provoked by our prosperity, because it has for many centuries been accustomed to consider us as the most contemptible among the poverty-stricken.'[872] Theodor Herzl was even angered when the German kaiser told him as much, even though he was essentially agreeing with Herzl's main argument that Jews were resented for their economic relations and not just their ethnicity. The kaiser referred to Jews as Herzl's *Landsleute* (fellow countrymen) 'in an unfriendly tone'[873] and agreed that Europe may be better off if at least some Jews emigrated to their own nation-state. Herzl recalled the meeting with the emperor in his diaries. He wrote, '"There are elements," he said, "among your people whom it would be quite a good thing to settle in Palestine. I am thinking of Hesse, for example, where there are usurers at work among the rural population. If these people took their possessions and went to settle in the colonies, they could be more useful."'[874] Jewish success combined with their distinctiveness to cause Jews to be singled-out and excluded from a Christian dominated society.

[872] (Herzl, 1946, p. 7)
[873] (Herzl, 1960, p. 728)
[874] (Herzl, 1960, p. 728)

Herzl explored this concept in more depth in *Altneuland*. The novel is set in the early 20th Century after the founding of a utopian, Jewish national home in Palestine. Herzl's characters reflect on the amelioration of antisemitism in Europe after a plurality of Jews emigrated out of Europe for the Jewish nation-state. The remaining, smaller population of European Jews were no longer seen as a major source of social and economic competition, and antisemitism soon disappeared. Herzl argued that assimilated Jews could successfully remain within German national societies due to their high overlap with Christian Germans, as long as they were not in sufficient numbers to threaten Christians. Herzl wrote, 'And the condition of those who remained behind was improved. Ever since Jewish competition had either decreased or disappeared altogether, they were safe from attack.'[875] Jews could only maintain their distinctiveness in a nationalising Christian society if they were no longer perceived as competition. Jewishness was not a problem on its own. Herzl continues this line of argument later in Altenuland. He wrote in this extended passage:

> The result (of Jewish emigration) was that Christian professional men no longer looked askance at their Jewish colleagues, for they were no longer annoying competitors. In such circumstances, commercial envy and hatred gradually disappeared. … Jews were granted full citizenship rights not only on paper, but in everyday life. … Only after those Jews who were forced out of Europe had been settled in their own land, the well-meant measures of emancipation became effective everywhere. … Jews who wished to assimilate with other peoples now felt free to do so openly … There were also some who wished to adopt the majority religion, and these could now do so with being suspected … for it was no longer to one's advantage to abandon Judaism. … Those Jews who

[875] (Herzl, 2009, p. 137)

> felt akin to their fellow-citizens in everything but their religion enjoyed undiminished esteem as adherents of a minority faith.[876,877]

The preceding discussion was not meant as a prelude to Herzl's justification for a Jewish national state but was meant to highlight that Herzl initially advocated for mass Jewish conversions to Christianity because he believed that it could remove the perception of Jews as numerous, alien competitors by the Austro-German Christians. Jews could not remain in Chrisitan German societies as sizeable populations of self-identifying Jews. They had to choose one or the other.

8.3.3 Theodor Herzl and Jewish Socialism as a Solution to the Jewish Problem

If the erasure of Jewishness was not a practical solution for the Jewish Problem, then Herzl flirted with the idea that capitalist national economies should be substituted with more socialist ones. If capitalism could not be replaced altogether, he at least argued for greater social consciousness amongst capitalists. Herzl hoped that this would alleviate the antisemitic accusations against Jews as dominant economic competitors, and as the exploiters of the petite bourgeoisie and the labouring classes. Herzl introduces this argument in *Das Neue Ghetto*. Jacob Samuel and Franz Wurzlechner discussed these topics before their social rupture. Herzl wrote the following scene:

> Jacob: You know that I have had to defend a few poor devils of socialists recently. In doing so, I have gotten closer to them on a human level and thought fondly of them.
>
> Franz (quietly): Did you end up becoming one yourself?

[876] (Herzl, 2009, p. 139)

[877] Note: This author is aware that the Third German Reich regrettably applied Theodor Herzl's logic when justifying the Holocaust of the Jews. Theodor Herzl believed that the predominance of Jews in German society was one cause of modern, national, antisemitism and he was arguing for the reduction of the Jewish population through voluntary emigration as its solution, versus their violent eradication by Christian Germans.

> Jacob: Not that. You may be right, but I don't understand. I don't want to let capital be eradicated. Too much would be destroyed, too much culture. I don't want to banish industry, the urge to save and the spirit of invention from the earth. And useful enterprises should have their rich reward - up to a certain limit.
>
> Franz: Yes, where is the limit?
>
> Jacob: That's what I'm looking for.[878]

Herzl wrote *Das Neue Ghetto* one year before he wrote *Der Judenstaat*. Herzl did not object to the accumulation of wealth in capitalism but he was afraid that unregulated capitalism was breeding resentment against Jews by Christians because the former were so prominent in the upper rungs of capitalism, industry, finance, and commerce. Herzl represents these sentiments using the mining disaster in *Das Neue Ghetto*.[879] The collapsed mine was a joint venture between bourgeois Christians and Jews and it killed many labourers who were previously striking for better conditions from their bourgeois managers. The miners only returned to work because they were starving. Wasserstein, the Jewish financial agent, coincidentally profited from the failed venture, while the Christian partner, von Schramm, was financially ruined.[880] Herzl summarised his distaste for this type of financial speculation earlier in *Das Neue Ghetto* because of the effect it had on the oppressed workers, yes, but also for the reputation of Jews. Jacob Samuel tells Wasserstein, 'Don't you understand me? You're harming us! The Jews! Because these large movements of money are also destroying people. And the victims accuse the Jews (alone).'[881] Herzl supported his sentiments from the preceding quote in his diaries. In a draft of a speech to the Rothschilds he wrote,

> In fact, that kind of capital yields a tremendously increasing return in large amounts. *The social question is contained in this*. Why are you managing so many industries? Why do you send men to work underground and bring up coal

[878] (Herzl, 1903, p. 33)
[879] (Herzl, 1903, p. 65)
[880] (Herzl, 1903, pp. 65-68)
[881] (Herzl, 1903, p. 54)

> amidst terrible dangers and for meagre wages? I cannot imagine this to be pleasant, even for the mine owners. For I do not believe, and do not pretend to believe, that capitalists are heartless. I am not an agitator, but a peacemaker.[882]

Herzl's issue with capitalism was that the shared Jewish identity was being defined by the negative effects of capitalism and finance even though only a minority of Jews were dominant in these industries. Christians perceived this as oppression from Jews as a socially distinct group. This was the same point that Herzl resented from above when Herzl attributed it to Kaiser Willhelm II. He knew that these antisemitic attitudes were creating a general Jewish identity.

Herzl presents his alternative to unchecked capitalism in *Altneuland*. Again, this passage is not presented as a representation of Herzl's future Jewish state but rather as evidence that Herzl believed that unmediated capitalism was making the European-Jewish bourgeoisie insecure, and all Jews by extension. Herzl argued for co-operative industrial and commercial societies in the Jewish national society. He wrote:

> And yet (co-operative) method provides the mean between individualism and collectivism. The individual is not deprived of the stimulus and pleasure of private property, while, at the same time, he is able … to resist capitalist domination. … We did not have to ruin anyone in order to ease the lot of our masses.[883]

Herzl, and other assimilated European Jews, did not live in his hypothetical, future utopia. Herzl knew that the Jewish minority in Austria was powerless to transform the Austrian society. He claimed in *Der Judenstaat* that 'Educated Jews without means are now fast becoming Socialists. Hence we are certain to suffer very severely in the struggle between classes, because we stand in the most exposed position in the camps of both Socialists and capitalists.'[884] Jews were too small in number, and too politically

[882] (Herzl, 1960, 155)
[883] (Herzl, 2009, pp. 69-70)
[884] (Herzl, 1946, p. 3)

excluded, to shape European national societies. They could only be victims despite which side they chose. The shift of alienated bourgeois Jews towards socialism, and the dangers therein, was not an unsubstantiated threat in Herzl's mind and he wrote about it elsewhere. In a letter to the former German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, he wrote,

> Just try to rescind the legal equality of the Jews. (Only their legal equality exists, anyway. What a misunderstood doctrine for the men from the beerhall!) What would be the consequences of that? Immediately all Jews, not only the poor ones as hitherto, but the rich ones as well, would join the Socialist Party with all their resources.[885]

Furthermore, the topic reemerged during a meeting with Kaiser Willhelm II and Prince von Bulow, the German Foreign Minister in 1898. It appears that politically active but disenchanted Jews were in fact becoming moving towards fringe opposition movements to the dismay of the German government. Von Bulow rebuked Herzl with the following words, 'The Kaiser's grandfather and father, and His Majesty himself had always shown themselves gracious toward the Jews, and now the Jews were to be seen among all the opposition parties, even the anti-monarchical ones.'[886] Herzl's fears around the political exclusion and radicalization of the Jewish bourgeoisie were coming to pass.

Both of Theodor Herzl's alternatives to Jewish nationalism were insufficient to alleviate the exclusion of Jews from European societies. Jews were already classified as an undesirable, distinct minority group by the social majority and could not remain in those societies unless their Jewishness completely disappeared through mass conversion. On the other hand, Jews would continue to be excluded if they clung to their Jewishness while also remaining successful and numerous participants in European capitalist systems. Herzl also did not want to get rid of capitalism to reduce inter-ethnic competition because capitalism was desirable on its own. Capitalist economies were a

[885] (Herzl, 1960, p. 121)
[886] (Herzl, 1960, p. 729)

sign of modern societies, and they brought social prosperity to Jews. After Herzl explored the alternatives, he determined that Jewishness and the participation of Jews in modern, capitalist economies, were essential elements of the 19th Century Jewish identity. If they could not be those things as minorities within antisemitic European societies then they should create a modern, Jewish, national society and identity of their own.

8.4 Conclusion

This section addressed two of this dissertation's three research questions. The questions are i) Can minority identities be an outcome of social exclusion from dominant national movements?; ii) Are minority individuals insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements? *Chapter 7 Theodor Herzl's Representation of the Jewish Minority Identity in 19th Century Vienna* addressed the first question by arguing that Theodor Herzl represented the baseline of the modern Jewish identity as being constructed relative to Vienna's elite, Christian, Austro-German, and male identity. He did this because the latter group were disproportionately represented in Vienna's political, economic, and social institutions by the mid-to-late 19th Century. This chapter, *Chapter 8 Theodor Herzl and the Exclusion of Jews in Fin de Siècle Vienna*, looked at the second research question on whether Viennese and Cisleithanian Jews were disadvantaged in that society due to their minority Jewish identity.

Both Chapters 7 and 8 argued that the social construction of the modern Jewish identity meant that the first two research questions are necessarily interconnected. The baseline, Austro-German, Jewish minority identity that was established in the 18th and 19th Centuries came into conflict with politically ascendant, Christian, Austro-Germans who resented inter-ethnic competition with Jews. Herzl's discourse reflected that

politically powerful Christians were using antisemitism to exclude Jews from society, and that Jews were conscious of their ongoing exclusion. Herzl further argued that European antisemitism was pushing not just Austrian Jews, but all European Jews, into a single social identity that left them outside of mainstream, European political systems.

Theodor Herzl subsequently explored two alternatives to solving the Jewish Problem, or the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from nationalising societies, that addressed their causes. He explored the mass conversion of Jews into Catholicism to remove the social stigma around Jewishness. He also explored the possibility of moving away from socially competitive capitalist economies to collective socialist systems. His exploration of solutions to the Jewish Problem reveals that he believed that Jews were being socially excluded from Viennese society due to their Jewishness. The Jewish identity was inferior in this political system. The inadequacy of his alternatives to Jewish nationalism leads to this work's final research question on Theodor Herzl's use of Political Zionism to restore Jewish security after their antisemitic exclusion from Viennese society by antisemitic, Christian Austro-Germans. The following two chapters will argue that Theodor Herzl relied on his 18th and 19th Century, European Jewish identity as the basis for a new Jewish nation-state and national identity.

9. Discourse Analysis: Part 3. Political Zionism and Theodor Herzl's Vision of the Modern, Jewish Nation-State

9.1 Introduction

Chapter 9 tests the final claim of this work's hypothesis through its analysis of Theodor Herzl's discourse. The hypothesis asked whether Theodor Hezl was attempting to restore the security of Jews after their perceived exclusion from European societies by calling for a new nation-state of their own. The first essential element of this hypothesis is whether Theodor Herzl intended Jews to have a sovereign state. Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism, or political Jewish nationalism, when he published his pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) in 1896. There is still surprising debate on whether this was Herzl's intention in *Der Judenstaat.* Herzl definitively declared in that work that, 'The Jews wish to have a State, and they shall have one.'[887] The hypothesis' second claim is that Theodor Herzl called for a Jewish nation-state to restore Jewish security after they were excluded from nationalising European societies. This claim also seems to be well-supported in Herzl's discourse. Herzl opened his political pamphlet by recounting the exclusion of Jews from nationalising European societies via antisemitism.[888] Antisemitism was a modern, nationalist phenomenon that was distinct from historic anti-Jewishness. He then argued that the Jews were physically and socially insecure because of their social exclusion.[889] Jewish insecurity justified a national movement according to Theodor Herzl.[890] This work's hypothesis is positively supported using this account of Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism.

[887] (Herzl, 1946, p. 71)
[888] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 5-6)
[889] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 6-8)
[890] (Reimer, 2019, p. 93)

This work's theoretical assumptions go beyond the simpler questions around Theodor Herzl's demand for a Jewish nation-state, though. These theoretical assumptions were developed in *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework* and were narratively explored in the case study in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. These assumptions were embodied in this work's three research questions which included, i) Can minority identities be an outcome of social exclusion from dominant national movements?; ii) Are minority individuals insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements?; iii) Do minority individuals attempt to restore their security by creating a new nation-state based on their shared minority identity? Theodor Herzl's discourse around his Jewish nation-state would have to positively reflect these assumptions if this work's claims are to be fully supported. The first two chapters of this section on Discourse Analysis, Chapters 7 and 8, explored these assumptions in Theodor Herzl's discourse as they related to the Jewish population within nationalising European societies. Chapter 9 attempts to answer whether he adopted the same assumptions into his proposals for a future Jewish nation-state. This would support this work's ultimate theoretical assertion that the exclusion of minorities from existing nationalising societies leads them to recreate modern state centralisation and political nationalism in new states. The theoretical assumptions were as follows. This work hypothesised a relationship amongst i) the centralisation of European states in the modern era, ii) the emergence of ethno-nationalist movements in those states, and iii) subsequent, reactive minority nationalisms. It was claimed that the centralisation of states involved the creation of state institutions. Accessing these central institutions became a significant criterion for social success in these societies. This work argued that access to these institutions were not neutral, though. They were biased towards the social features of their creators because they were sources of social power. As a result, it was further claimed that the state's population was incentivised to assimilate into the cultural features of the state elites as a means of accessing its institutions, and their associated benefits. Popular nationalism may have been a conscious effort to formalise the

preferential access to state institutions around a defined identity, called the national identity. As Ernest Gellner wrote, nationalism is activated when a society is organized around the principle 'that the political and national unit should be congruent.'[891] In other words, political nationalism controls access to the state via a defined national identity. Finally, groups who attempted to access state institutions, but who were excluded based on their misalignment with the emerging national identity, may have an incentive to secede from the state and create their own nation-state to restore their lost social security.

This chapter argues that Theodor Herzl's representations of the Jewish national identity support this work's theoretical claims for the emergence of minority nationalisms in European nation-states. First, it was already established in the previous chapter that Theodor Herzl, and Jews like him, were attempting to assimilate into Vienna's centralised Austro-German culture as a means of accessing its social institutions. Herzl understood the benefits of being included within that society. The previous chapter also argued that when Herzl realised Jews were being excluded from Viennese society via antisemitism that his first instinct was to make the Jewish population more acceptable to the Christian antisemites. Herzl was even willing to sacrifice Judaism and Jewishness if it allowed Jews to remain within Viennese society. It was only when Herzl concluded that the alternatives to nationalism were impossible for his particular social context that he accepted Jewish nationalism as the last resort.

Theodor Herzl ultimately accepted that Jews were being permanently excluded from Viennese society via antisemitic, Christian, Austro-German nationalism. Herzl's vision for the Jewish nation-state was a recreation of the centralised and nationalising European societies that were excluding him and other Jews. Herzl also envisaged the

[891] (Gellner, 2009, p. 1)

Jewish national identity as a continuation of their 19th Century, European-Jewish identity. *Der Judenstaat* described the Jewish nation-state in these terms, 'Let the sovereignty be granted us over the portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the reasonable requirements of a nation.'[892] This statement, and his later descriptions of the Jewish nation-state across his other works, suggest Herzl's desire a modern, centralised nation-state that was functionally and structurally identical to other states. The primary difference was that Jews were secure within this state-society's institutions as full political and social participants. This chapter specifically argues that Theodor Herzl's vision of the Jewish nation-state mirrored Vienna and Habsburg Cisleithania. This included its governance structures, its centralised military and bureaucracy, and a centralised capitalist economy, but also in its observable shift towards popular nationalism as the basis for politics.

9.2 Theodor Herzl's Vision for the Jewish Nation-State

This section analyses Theodor Herzl's advocacy for a Jewish national state as the solution to antisemitism. Its first claim is that, at a minimum, Theodor Herzl called for a politically autonomous, national society where Jews were at the centre of its national identity. Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism was distinguished from other forms of Zionism when it claimed that the creation of a new national society of Jews was the solution to antisemitism, or the nationalist exclusion of Jews from existing states.

The second claim is that Theodor Herzl's concept of the nation-state, and its practical implementation, was modelled on the nationalising Cisleithanian society that he was seceding from. In general, Herzl saw the Jewish nation-state as an extension of European society. As detailed above, this work hypothesises that nation-states are the

[892] (Herzl, 1946, p. 8)

combination of two successive political periods. The first was the centralisation of European societies in the modern era under elite governance. This created the political, economic, and social infrastructure of these modernising states. The second period occurred when political rights were expanded to the bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, and eventually to the lower classes. This second period also saw the emergence of popular ethno-nationalist politics as societies defined who could access the benefits of the aforementioned modern, centralised states. Both periods are reflected in Theodor Herzl's proposals for a modern, Jewish nation-state. Section 9.2 considers the first half of this argument around the creation of a modern, centralised state, while 9.3 considers Theodor Herzl's concept of the state's popular, ethno-national identity.

In the 19th and early 20th Centuries, many European societies were in the middle of political transitions. *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework* presented arguments by modernist nationalists like Michael Mann and Charles Tilly who claimed that most European societies were functionally centralised between the 17th and 19th Centuries.[893] Governance was dominated by the traditional elites alongside some of the bourgeoisie.[894] This period defined the modern legal, economic, and political frameworks of modern, European, centralised states. These states provided the physical and financial infrastructure of a modern, capitalist economy. Steven Beller argued that this was also the case in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire.[895] Theodor Herzl was a social product of Austrian society. When Herzl envisaged a new Jewish nation-state, he did not begin with a *tabula rasa* but adopted the features of the society that surrounded him. Herzl observed that Christian Austro-Germans were secure in the Cisleithanian capital of Vienna. This was supported via his descriptions of

[893] (Mann, 2012b, p. 5) (Mann, 2012b, pp. 19-20)
[894] (Bader-Zaar, 2024, p. 62)
[895] (Beller, 2018, p. 131)

Christian Austro-Germans in the previous chapters. Theodor Herzl perceived that the creation of a Jewish nation state could similarly improve Jewish security.

According to the above argument, Theodor Herzl would first need to recreate the Austrian social hierarchy in his new Jewish state. Minority national secessionism has historically prioritised the bourgeois professional classes in their national leadership. Cisleithania was not bourgeois-led, though. The aristocracy, including the emperor, sat at the top of society with the immediately bourgeoisie below them. Herzl did, in fact, attempt to create a Jewish aristocracy in the Jewish nation-state but the Jewish upper bourgeoisie, and the few European nobility amongst them, refused to join Political Zionism. Herzl's outreach to the Jewish bourgeoisie to become the new national aristocracy supports the claim that Herzl was attempting to recreate Viennese society. Miroslav Hroch understood this social dynamic within minority nationalism and he argued that the professional bourgeoisie, like Herzl, would be receptive to political nationalism because they would be the first to suffer nationalist exclusion in existing societies. The upper bourgeoise were not similarly excluded.[896] The Jewish national society that Herzl envisaged was modelled on Vienna's social structure but he had to position the Jewish professional bourgeoisie as its elite in place of the upper bourgeoisie. As a result, the Jewish national identity in Theodor Herzl's discourse was centred on Theodor Herzl's social features and not those from its upper bourgeoisie. Others in the Jewish nation were evaluated relative to his idealised bourgeois identity.

Finally, Theodor Herzl envisaged that the Jewish elite leadership would be responsible for the creation of a modern, centralised, capitalist economy which was supported by its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This was the role that European governments played during the modernization of their states.

[896] (Hroch, 2000, p. 15)

9.3 A State for Jews

Theodor Herzl opened *Der Judenstaat* with a summary of the Jewish Problem in Europe. He claimed that antisemitism, or the national exclusion of Jews from European societies, made continued Jewish residency untenable in those societies.[897] Herzl wrote elsewhere, 'Above all, I recognized the emptiness and futility of efforts to "combat anti-Semitism." Declamations made in writing or in closed circles do no good whatever.'[898] Theodor Herzl's arguments for a Jewish nation-state were tied to antisemitism from the start. He did not describe his Jewish nation-state as a natural aspiration for the Jewish people that was separate from antisemitism. One diary entry from June 14, 1895, read as follows,

> The Promised Land, where it is all right for us to have hooked noses, black or red beards, and bandy legs without being despised for these things alone. Where at last we can live as free men on our own soil and die in peace in our own homeland.
>
> Where we, too, can expect honor as a reward for great deeds; …
>
> So that the derisive cry "Jew!" may become an honorable appellation, like "German," "Englishman," "Frenchman"—in short, like that of all civilized peoples… And in the meantime, the Jews in thousands of places are being mocked, tormented, beaten, plundered, inveighed against and slain. No, gentlemen, (the Jewish state) is an instantaneous solution. In the twinkling of an eye, I shall bring anti-Semitism throughout the world to a standstill.[899]

[897] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 1-8)
[898] (Herzl, 1960, p. 6)
[899] (Herzl, 1960, p. 101)

Herzl presented his solution to the Jewish Problem under the title, 'The Plan' in *Der Judenstaat*,.[900] He wrote, 'Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the reasonable requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves.'[901] Herzl closed *Der Judenstaat* by reiterating the purpose of his political pamphlet. He wrote, 'Let me repeat once more my opening words: The Jews wish to have a State, and they shall have one. We shall live at last as free men on our own soil.'[902] Herzl prepared a speech for the Rothschild family a year before publishing *Der* Judenstaat. In it, he declared that the creation of an independent, sovereign, Jewish nation-state was always the goal of Political Zionism. Herzl wrote, 'I shall now tell you the main features of our policy. Our goal must be to acquire the country we occupy as an independent one immediately after we declare ourselves a State. For this reason, we shall probably grant financial advantages to the receiving country, although they must not take the form of a tribute.'[903] Even here, Herzl was opposed to the idea of creating an autonomous enclave within an existing state. He wanted the Jews to purchase their independence if necessary and to disconnect themselves from any superior political authority. Herzl was calling for a state according to the accepted use of the term in his time. Herzl uses the term 'sovereignty' in his opening statements but he consistently used the word 'state' throughout the text, including in his closing passage. The term, 'state', is also used in the original German language text in these instances.[904] Furthermore, in his chapter, 'Society of Jews and Jewish State', Theodor Herzl positions his Jewish nation-state in the context of existing European states, and alongside other new, recognised, states.[905] He wrote:

> But previous to the framing of a constitution, and the during the creation of a new State, these principles (the relationship between government and citizen)

[900] (Herzl, 1946, p. 8)
[901] (Herzl, 1946, p. 8)
[902] (Herzl, 1946, p. 71)
[903] (Herzl, 1960, p. 134)
[904] (Herzl, Der Judenstaat (German Edition), 2017, p. 73)
[905] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 51-52)

> assume great practical importance. We know and see for ourselves that States still continue to be created. Colonies secede from the mother country. Vassals fall away from their suzerain; newly opened territories are immediately formed into free States. … A State is formed, not by pieces of land (alone), but rather by a number of men united under sovereign rule.[906]

Herzl's concept of the Jewish state overlaps with general concept of political states, i.e. states as the sole, sovereign authorities over defined territories.

Theodor Herzl did not simply present his Jewish nation-state as a hypothetical possibility. He intended to create a real political entity. He believed the Jewish state existed when it was declared at the First Zionist Congress in August 1897 in Basle, Switzerland. In other words, Herzl began organising the First Zionist Congress to make the state a reality and it existed from that moment on. In September 1897, Theodor Herzl famously described the outcome of the congress as follows, 'At Basle I founded the Jewish State.'[907] The preceding quote is well-known but Herzl followed it with an important political idea. He wrote, 'The foundation of a State lies in the will of the people for a State, yes, even in the will of one sufficiently powerful individual (*L'État c'est moi* [I am the State]— Louis XIV). Territory is only the material basis; the State, even when it possesses territory, is always something abstract.'[908] Herzl's Jewish state was not a future entity but was created when the idea was declared and accepted at the First Zionist Congress. Herzl continued, 'At Basel, then, I created this abstraction… I gradually worked the people into the mood for a State and made them feel that they were its National Assembly.'[909]

[906] (Herzl, 1946, p. 52)
[907] (Herzl, 1960, p. 582)
[908] (Herzl, 1960, p. 581)
[909] (Herzl, 1960, p. 581)

The First Zionist Congress was part of an extended plan to translate *Der Judenstaat* into reality. He believed the state existed in the abstract after the Congress, but he simultaneously worked towards its physical creation. As early as June 1895, two years earlier, Herzl was sketching the practical plan for the Jewish state. It was a long list of activities, including the start of a publicity campaign via the Zionist Congresses, but it also included concrete steps like the raising of funds, negotiations over the purchase of land in the future state, the recruitment of the population, and the purchase of transportation infrastructure to move people and goods to the new territory.[910]

Despite all of this, there are still debates around the nomenclature for Herzl's nationalist entity, including whether it should be called a 'state', but there is little doubt that Theodor Herzl was calling for a distinct, territorial, nationalised society for Jews. It is often suggested that *Der Judenstaat* may be translated as the 'Situation of the Jews', instead of its conventional meaning of 'the Jews' state'. Theodor Herzl used a different term for his evaluation of the conditions of European Jews in the late-19th Century. Herzl compared this investigation, *Zustände der Juden* (the Condition of the Jews), to his political pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat* (the Jewish State), as follows,

> Was it then that I conceived the plan of writing on "The Situation of the Jews," (*Zustände der Juden*) or had I conceived it earlier? Now I remember that it was earlier… I wanted to visit the localities where the vagaries of history had strewn Jewish communities: particularly Russia, Galicia, Hungary, Bohemia; later, the Orient, the new Zion colonies; finally, Western Europe again.[911]

[910] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 34-35)
[911] (Herzl, 1960, p. 12)

9.4 Theodor Herzl's Imitation of Modern European Societies in the Jewish Nation-State

9.4.1 Introduction

Theodor Herzl's envisioned his Jewish nation-state as a recreation of Austrian and European political systems. The exception was that Jews were positioned at their political and national centres. Similarities between European systems and Herzl's Jewish state supports the claim that he was attempting to enhance Jewish security by recreating what he observed in Europe. Herzl saw that Christian dominance over European politics and societies was their source of social security. Conversely, he experienced that Jews were insecure due to their relative exclusion after emancipation, and their threatened absolute exclusion after the rise of antisemitic popular nationalism. Herzl was incentivised to recreate European societies with Jews at the centre in Ottoman Palestine.[912]

Theodor Herzl represented his desire to re-create modern European societies in two ways. One way was through the recreation of its intra-state, political structures. 19th Century Habsburg Jews experienced that both their earlier inclusion in the Austrian Liberal Era, and their subsequent exclusion after the rise of Austro-German nationalism, depended on who controlled Cisleithanian politics. This work argues that Theodor Herzl's experiences in both political eras led Herzl to recreate the earlier Liberal Era from the 1860s and 1870s in his Jewish nation-state. The security of that period contrasted in Herzl's writings with his representations of the volatility and insecurity of the 1880s and 90s. Herzl linked expansions to democratic suffrage to the rise of antisemitic, Austro-German, nationalist politics in Vienna.

[912] Theodor Herzl referred to the territory as 'Palestine' in *Der Judenstaat*. He did this while still acknowledging the historic connection between Jews and that land. (Herzl, 1946, p. 11)

A second way that Herzl attempted to recreate European society in the Jewish nation-state was through the imitation of their centralised societies. Herzl understood the relationship between the state's bureaucratic centralisation and their modern capitalist economies. Each element supported the other, and both were disproportionately dominated by Austro-German Christians in Cisleithania, as argued in the case study. Herzl advocated for the importation of European and American technology, social systems, and norms into the Jewish state. On one hand, Herzl was trying to establish the Jewish nation as equal to its European peers. The theme of defending the equality of Jews and Christians was common in his earlier discourse.[913] On the other hand, the imitation of European society was also a means for Herzl to recreate the modern societies that guaranteed Christian European security so well. Herzl went to great lengths to establish that Political Zionism was not adding to the concept of the nation-state. He was substituting a Christian European state with a Jewish one.

9.4.2 Elite-Biased European Politics as the Model for Theodor Herzl's Jewish Nation-State

This section analyses Theodor Herzl's recreation of European political systems in his Jewish state. One notable feature of Theodor Herzl's concept of the Jewish nation-state was that he was attempting to recreate the political structures of Austria's elite-biased, Neoabsolutist and Liberal eras between the 1840s-1860s. It was during this period that bourgeois, professional Jews, like Herzl, experienced the maximum inclusion and social mobility. This was discussed in Chapter 4. The extension of democratic suffrage to the lower classes and minorities in the 1880s-1890s caused insecurity for Jews in the German-oriented, Western half of the empire especially. Cisleithania was socially

[913] (Herzl, 1903, p. 95)

relevant for German-assimilating Jews. The post-Liberal Era also brought attacks on the privileges of the elite-led order. The earlier eras represented stability for Herzl and for his interests as a Jewish professional. One historian of Habsburg politics, John Deak, discussed the political progression of the Austrian Empire. Deak's representation of the Habsburg national administration after 1840 described a top-down, elite-biased, political hierarchy. The empire's representative institutions were subordinate to the centralised state and they primarily existed to implement directives they received from above.[914] Habsburg politics evolved in the Neoabsolutist era when the Reichsrat, or upper aristocratic house of the assembly, existed alongside the emperor. The latter still maintained its ultimate authority over the state. Together, they represented the elite governance of the Austrian national society.[915] Finally, after the 1880s, the administration shifted towards popular politics, with expansions of political suffrage to wider segments of the population.[916] This culminated with universal, male suffrage by 1906.[917] It also coincided with the emergence of Christian, Austro-German, popular nationalism and its antisemitism.

Theodor Herzl advocated for political administration in the Jewish state that was closer to 1840s-1860s Austria. In his utopian representation of the Jewish nation-state, *Altneuland*, he consistently represented a small, elite, coterie of quasi-authoritarian, bourgeois technocrats as the unchallenged leaders of the Jewish nation. In *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl discussed themes of elitism and his distrust for democracy. He concluded in that work that, 'I think a democratic monarchy and an aristocratic republic are the most superior forms of a State.' [918] Representative institutions existed in Herzl's discourse in their mid-19th Century form as weak checks on the political executive, and

[914] (Deak, 2015, p. 44)
[915] (Deak, 2015, p. 119)
[916] (Deak, 2015, p. 204)
[917] (Deak, 2015, p. 243)
[918] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 58-59)

not as the relatively independent and combative institutions that they would become in later years. Herzl described his vision for constrained representative institutions under a strong government and state as follows,

> Let the gabbers play parliament to their heart's content. But only one Chamber of Deputies which cannot overthrow the government but only deny it particular resources. This will suffice for a public control… The ruler will name the government. It remains to be considered, however, how the ruler's arbitrariness may be kept in check. For, since the Chamber is not supposed to overthrow the government, a ruler could surround himself with straw men.[919]

The Jewish Aristocracy

It has been alluded to a number of times that there is a disconnect between Theodor Herzl's ultimate centring of the Jewish professional bourgeoisie in the Jewish national hierarchy versus this work simultaneously claiming that Herzl was attempting to recreate the aristocratic political hierarchy that John Deak described above. Herzl did explore various forms of monarchical government but he ran into philosophical and ultimately practical problems. It is worth noting that this section relies heavily on Theodor Herzl's diary entries from 1895 when he was developing Political Zionism. These entries provide access to his unfiltered ideas about Political Zionism. *Der Judenstaat* was published a year later but its positions are tempered because Herzl was aware of its various public audiences. On June 15, 1895, Herzl expressed his preference for a constitutional Jewish monarchy in the new state. He wrote, 'I am a staunch advocate of monarchic institutions because they favor a stable policy and the interests of a historically illustrious family, one born and educated to rule—interests that are bound up with the preservation of the state.'[920] Herzl concluded though that 'our history has been interrupted too long for us

[919] (Herzl, 1960, p. 211)
[920] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 168-169)

to attempt to resume this institution.'[921] If a true Jewish monarchy was not possible then Theodor Herzl pivoted to an institution that mirrored contemporary Jewish society with its revered upper bourgeoisie. He proposed that the Jewish state could be an aristocratic republic modelled on the Republic of Venice. Venice was ruled by oligarchies of wealthy families and Herzl proposed this model for the Jewish state many times, and to diverse audiences.[922] He wrote in his diaries, 'We shall probably model the Constitution after that of Venice, but profit by her bad experiences by preventing them. If the Rothschilds join with us, the first Doge is to be a Rothschild.'[923]

The Rothschilds became Theodor Herzl's preference to lead the Jewish state after he was rebuffed by Baron Maurice de Hirsch. Herzl viewed the Rothschilds in similar a way to other European aristocratic dynasties. He did not see them as individual bankers who would fund the state with charitable donations. They were the 'Rothschild Family Council'[924] who would assume the political, social, economic, and diplomatic leadership of the Jewish state. They would play a similar role to the Habsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, or the historic families of the Venetian Doge and its Great Council. In Herzl's draft of the 'Address to the (Rothschild) Family' he described their intended role as such,

> We shall liquidate the Rothschilds in the same way that we liquidate the smallest shipping agent or shopkeeper. This means that the *Society* (the Jewish state) will absorb the House of Rothschild.
>
> This, too, will happen in the most natural way in the world. … the present-day Rothschilds, will be used in our State, as directors of our financial system or as other government officials, as governors of provinces or as our diplomatic

[921] (Herzl, 1960, 169)
[922] (Herzl, 1960, p. 170, 213, 372)
[923] (Herzl, 1960, p. 39)
[924] (Herzl, 1960, p. 111)

representatives to foreign powers. Through your connections with the European aristocracy, you will be well suited for the diplomatic service.'[925]

Theodor Herzl went further and argued that the Jewish state would directly substitute the titles of Jewish nobility in Europe with titles in the Jewish state. This was a direct importation of the European social order versus an indigenous and organic Jewish national society. Herzl developed these ideas in a series of proposals. He wrote,

> For certain exalted purposes of our policy we need a State nobility, just as we shall have one single decoration (along the lines of the *légion d'honneur* [legion of honor]). This decoration will be called "Jewish honor"! It will consist of a yellow badge, and so we shall make our new honor out of our old disgrace.[926]
>
> We shall not give you any titles that might sound ridiculous in the beginning. You will simply be the representatives of the Jews in this place or that.[927]
>
> We shall recognize the present noblemen among the Jews if they bring proof to our free Office of Nobility by a certain date.[928]
>
> Once the time has come when other nations consider it expedient, and us worthy enough, to send ambassadors to us, we shall gladly return this compliment. When the other Jews, those of moderate wealth, who are now Consuls-General and the like, join us, we shall make them our representatives in their present localities.[929]

[925] (Herzl, 1960, p. 167)
[926] (Herzl, 1960, p. 168)
[927] (Herzl, 1960, p. 167)
[928] (Herzl, 1960, p. 168)
[929] (Herzl, 1960, p. 167)

Finally, Herzl also expected that the Rothschilds and the other Jewish aristocracy would be the same social templates for the lower classes as the European aristocracy was in their societies. He wrote, 'Then, too, over there you will set a good example to the rich by starting beautiful art collections, erecting fine buildings, and making gorgeous gardens.'[930]

The major flaw with Theodor Herzl's dependence on the existing Jewish aristocracy to lead the Jewish state was that they had no intention of leaving European society. The wealthiest Jewish classes above the bourgeoisie were the least likely to become Jewish nationalists because they were relatively secure in Europe. Baron Maurice de Hirsch rejected Herzl's Political Zionism before he published *Der Judenstaat*, for example. Herzl believed that Baron Hirsch's resistance to Jewish political nationalism was temporary and that he would accept the idea if the Rothschilds did. Herzl wrote, 'Baron Hirsch (who will appear as the great rebel immediately after I have made an agreement with the Rothschilds) I must handle with sovereign amiability.'[931]

The Rothschilds were revealed to be equally as hostile to Political Zionism as Baron Hirsch. In May 1896, Herzl wrote, 'Rothschild will hear nothing whatever of the matter; he does not believe that anything can be accomplished with the Sultan, and at any rate will not cooperate. He considers what I am doing dangerous, because I am rendering the patriotism of the Jews suspect.'[932] The Rothschilds were still against the idea many years later in 1902. Theodor Herzl was called to testify before the British Parliament's Royal Commission for Alien Immigration on the Jewish Problem in Europe.[933] A Rothschild pressured Herzl on the matter. Herzl recalled him saying,

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[930] (Herzl, 1960, p. 167)
[931] (Herzl, 1960, p. 43)
[932] (Herzl, 1960, p. 353)
[933] (Herzl, 1960, p. 1651)

> ‘There would never be anti-Semitism in England, etc. In France it had been another story, etc. He said he was no Zionist. We would never get Palestine, etc. He was an Englishman and wanted to remain one. He "desired” that I should say this and that to the Alien Commission, and not say this and the other (referring to Political Zionism).’[934]

Herzl disagreed with the upper bourgeoisie’s belief that they would be permanently untouched by European nationalist antisemitism. He stated as much when one of his envoys was rebuffed by Edmond Rothschild in Paris. Herzl wrote, ‘After this, there is something comical about today’s dispatches from Paris, which report street demonstrations against the Jews and in particular the Rothschilds. In front of the same house on the Rue Laffitte where on Friday E. R. had rejected my friend Nordau, the mob cried on Sunday: “Down with the Jews!”’ [935] Nonetheless, the intransigence of the Jewish upper bourgeoisie meant that Herzl recalibrated the leadership of the Jewish nation towards the professional bourgeoisie. They were always going to have a major role in the Jewish state, as they did in modern European societies, but now they would also assume the ultimate political and social leadership. Going forward, when Herzl envisaged an elite-led Jewish state, he was projecting the professional bourgeoisie into the role of Miroslav Hroch’s middle class, national patriots.[936] Hroch predicted this in his theories because he understood that the Jewish professional bourgeoisie had the most to gain from secession and were the most likely to lead national movements as its new ‘aristocratic elite’.

[934] (Herzl, 1960, p. 1291)
[935] (Herzl, 1960, p. 352)
[936] (Hroch, 2000, p. 13)

Anti-Democracy

Theodor Herzl only appealed to the Jewish masses to support Political Zionism after the Jewish upper bourgeoisie rejected it. He wanted the latter to advance his political programme but he needed public Jewish support after the wealthy and politically connected Jews showed little interest. Herzl realised that this may be necessary after his failed meeting with Baron Hirsch. Still, the masses were his last resort. He wrote a short note in his diary in June 1895,

> 1st stage: The Rothschilds.
>
> 2nd stage: The midget millionaires.
>
> 3rd stage: The little people (i.e., wide publicity!) If it comes to this stage, the first two will rue the day.[937]

At the same time, Herzl never intended to cede political power in the Jewish state to the masses via popular democracy. Theodor Herzl's experiences with antisemitic, Austro-German popular nationalism in Vienna turned him against democracy. Herzl unambiguously summarised his position thusly, 'Democracy is political nonsense which can only be decided upon by a mob in the excitement of a revolution.'[938] He later expanded on his issues with democracy.

> I am against democracy because it is extreme in its approval and disapproval, tends to idle parliamentary babble, and produces that base class of men, the professional politicians. Nor are the present-day nations really suited to the democratic form of government; and I believe they will become less and less suited to it. For democracy presupposes a very simple morality, and our morality

[937] (Herzl, 1960, p. 44)
[938] (Herzl, 1960, p. 126)

> is becoming ever more complex with the advance of commerce and civilization.[939]

Herzl specifically linked his distrust in democracy to his observations that the masses are undereducated, passionate, and easily swayed by ideological demagogues. In other words, he was describing his experiences with Christian, Austro-German nationalism under Karl Lueger. Herzl did not believe that the Jewish masses would be any more resistant to these pressures than the German masses. Herzl preferred elite rule in both environments. He described his views in the following passage,

> *Le ressort d'une démocratie est la vertu* [the concern of a democracy is virtue], said wise Montesquieu. And where will you find this virtue—political virtue, I mean? I have no faith in the political virtue of our people, because we are no different from the rest of modern men … The masses are more prone even than parliaments to be misled by every kind of heresy and lend a willing ear to every ranting demagogue. Neither internal nor external policy can be formulated in popular assembly. … Politics must work from the top down.[940]

Theodor Herzl was not afraid of exposing his personal views and he imported the above quotation into *Der Judenstaat* for all to read. It became part of Political Zionism's official programme. There again, he advocated against the political inclusion of the Jewish lower classes. He wrote in this extended quotation:

> Nations are also really not fit for unlimited democracy at present, and will become less and less fitted for it in the future … The masses are also more prone even than Parliaments to be led away by heterodox opinions, and to be swayed by vigorous ranting. It is impossible to formulate a wise internal or external policy in

[939] (Herzl, 1960, p. 169)
[940] (Herzl, 1960, p. 169)

> a popular assembly. Politics must take shape in the upper strata and work downwards.[941]

Finally, and much like the case of European politics after the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna, Herzl was willing to use state violence to pacify the lower classes in the intra-state system if they challenged the centralised state. He described this as follows:

> Our people, who are receiving the new country from the Society (the Jewish nation-state) will also thankfully accept the new constitution it offers them. Should they, however, show signs of rebellion they will be promptly crushed. The Society cannot permit the exercise of its functions to be interrupted by short-sighted or ill-disposed individuals.[942]

Theodor Herzl's anti-democratic and pro-elite stance shaped the political structures in his Jewish state. These proposals are a clear reversion to the political structures of the Liberal Era. They are also reversal of the expanded political suffrage to the petite-bourgeoisie and lower classes. The proposed parliament was unicameral and it reflected a similar distribution of power to that of Austria during the formal Liberal Era, i.e. it disproportionately favoured the aristocracy, and the economic and educated elites, over other groups. Herzl described the structure of the Jewish state's future parliament in July 1895. He wrote,

> One-third of this Chamber will be named by the ruler upon the recommendation of the government (a life-time appointment) … Another third will be elected by the learned academies, the universities, schools of art and technology, chambers of commerce, and trade associations. The final third will be elected by

[941] (Herzl, 1946, p. 59)
[942] (Herzl, 1946, p. 60)

> the community councils (an election commission to examine authorizations), or perhaps by the provinces after a scrutiny of voting lists.[943]

Birgitta Bader-Zaar was cited in Chapter 4's case study on the Austrian Liberal Era when she described the Austrian curial system in similar terms to Herzl's proposals for the Jewish state's elite-biased parliament. Votes were apportioned along a curial system with unequal representation that favoured the great noble landowners on one hand, and 'the wealthy bourgeoisie that was represented in the chambers and urban municipalities, while putting less economically powerful municipalities in the curia of rural communities at a disadvantage.'[944] This dissertation's analyses of the 1879 Austrian *Reichsrat* elections supports the comparison between the Austrian Liberal Era and Herzl's own proposals for a Jewish state parliament. The curia of large landowners elected 24% of Reichsrat deputies in 1879. The two curiae of the 'chambers of commerce' and 'cities, markets, and industrial centres' collectively elected 39% of deputies. 63% of deputies were therefore drawn from Cisleithania's noble and economic elite.[945]

Herzl's anti-democratic biases even motivated him to hypothetically reverse the extensions of political suffrage that occurred in Cisleithania after 1882. The property qualification was lowered there by half, from 10 florins to 5 florins, in 1882.[946] This expanded the suffrage 'to lower levels of the middle classes: small businessmen, artisans, and peasants with modest holdings, a stratum ignored and suppressed by Liberal hegemony.'[947] Theodor Herzl connected the expanded suffrage and democratisation with the social upheavals of the 1880s and 1890s. He wrote in 1895 that,

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[943] (Herzl, 1960, p. 211)
[944] (Bader-Zaar, 2024, p. 64)
[945] (Bader-Zaar, 2024, p. 63)
[946] (Berenger, 1997, p. 250)
[947] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 91)

> I must introduce educational considerations into the census. The franchise can be qualified as follows: literacy required to vote for delegates to the Constitutional Assembly, advanced education for the election of higher representatives, etc. Thus, I can make levels of representation out of educational levels. To be eligible for election by one level, a candidate must himself hold the franchise of the next higher level.[948]

The parliament's deputies would generally have limited authority over the state, but Herzl also gave them the power to elect the head of state. By disproportionately defining the composition of the Jewish state parliament towards the Jewish elites, Theodor Herzl was recreating the Liberal Era that John Deak described above. There would be social and ideological alignment between the executive state and the representative parliament. This is especially true when Herzl proposed that two-thirds of the parliament would be drawn from the political and social elites directly while also later stipulating that the Jewish head of state would be elected by a two-thirds majority in that body.[949]

Theodor Herzl relied on his legal education to justify his elite, bourgeois leadership of both Jewish nationalism and the future Jewish nation-state. Herzl argued that modern states were built on a social contract between governors and the governed. Herzl presented an historical legal principle of the *negotiorum gestio* (roughly, 'Business Manager') for this purpose. He wrote, 'some legal basis is indispensable to explain the somewhat oppressive relationship in which subjects occasionally stand to rulers. I believe it is to be found in the *negotiorum gestio*, wherein the body of citizens represent the *dominus negotiorum* (Business Owner), and the government represents the

[948] (Herzl, 1960, p. 127)
[949] (Herzl, 1960, p. 220)

gestor.'[950] Herzl argued that the national exclusion of Jews from the Austrian nation justified his role as *gestor* when he wrote, 'The action of the gestor of the State is sufficiently warranted if the common cause is in danger, and the dominus is prevented, either by want of will or by some other reason, from helping itself.'[951]

Herzl mirrored preceding generations of Austrian leadership by arguing that threats to the nation justified his claims to the title of the people's national representative. This precedent was set when Emperor Francis claimed his role as the state's natural protector during the French Wars to justify his authority. It was also reflected in Prince Metternich's claiming of political leadership after the Congress of Vienna to protect European nationalised states from popular revolutions. Herzl argued that the direness of the Jewish situation justified his assumption of autocratic authority. He described this as follows:

> A State is created by a nation's struggle for existence. In any such struggle it is impossible to obtain proper authority in circumstantial fashion beforehand. In fact, any previous attempt to obtain a regular decree from the majority would probably ruin the undertaking from the outset. For internal schisms would make the people defenceless against external dangers. We cannot all be of one mind; the gestor will therefore simply take the leadership into his hands and march in the van.[952]

The *negotiorum gestio* is represented by one of Theodor Herzl's avatars, Joseph Levy, who was the mythical architect of the Jewish nation-state in *Altneuland*.[953] It was also represented by an institution known as the Jewish Society in *Altneuland* and *Der Judenstaat*. Levy and the Society were 'authorised to confer and treat with Governments

[950] (Herzl, 1946, p. 53)
[951] (Herzl, 1946, p. 54)
[952] (Herzl, 1946, p. 53)
[953] (Herzl, 2009, p. 147)

in the name of our people. The Society will thus be acknowledged in its relations with Governments as a State-creating power.'[954] This work has consistently claimed that whosoever forms the founding class of the nation-state will have disproportionate power to define its national identity via their control of its national institutions. The Jewish Society was meant to be responsible for the pre-state 'preparatory work in the domains of science and politics'.[955] Herzl implemented his vision for the bourgeois-led state of scientists, professionals, and politicians in *Altneuland*. An audience in the novel listened to a pre-recorded speech by Joseph Levy where he said:

> I established general headquarters in London at once and appointed as department heads men whom either I knew personally, or who came highly recommended. There was Smith for passenger traffic. Steineck for construction, Rubenz for freight, Warszawski for purchasing machinery, Alladino for land purchase, Kohn and Brownstone for the commissariat, Harburger for seeds and saplings, Leonkin for the accounting department. Wellner was my general secretary. I name them as they occur to me. Fischer was my first assistant and chief engineer until his premature death.[956]

Herzl established Jewish bourgeois, liberal, professionals as the founding leaders of the Jewish nation due to their necessity in building the nation-state. He continued that the nation-state's national institutions would extend from the Jewish Society. He described their centrality as follows, 'Internally, that is to say, in its relations with the Jewish people, the Society will create all the first indispensable institutions; it will be the nucleus out of which the public organizations of the Jewish State will later on be developed.'[957] Altogether, Theodor Herzl was establishing the Jewish bourgeoisie as the core of the Jewish national-identity in the same way that the educated, Austrian nobility were the

[954] (Herzl, 1946, p. 10)
[955] (Herzl, 1946, p. 9)
[956] (Herzl, 2009, p. 156)
[957] (Herzl, 1946, p. 56)

social core of the Liberal Era. Jewish nationalism was a means for the Jewish bourgeoisie to restore their security after they were excluded from European societies via nationalist antisemitism.

9.5 A National Capitalist Economy and the Maintenance of the Intra-Jewish Hierarchy

9.5.1 Introduction

The similarity between 19th Century European politics and Herzl's descriptions of his political systems was used to argue that Herzl was attempting to recreate European political hierarchies within Political Zionism. Herzl was also incentivised to recreate a centralised capitalist economy in the Jewish state because it preserved the prevailing social order amongst Jews from Europe. 19th Century European states facilitated capitalism because there was a mutually beneficial relationship between the economy and the strength of the state. This was discussed in depth in *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework* but the main assumptions will be reviewed here because it reinforces why Theodor Herzl was so adamant on the economic structure of the Jewish nation-state. Charles Tilly argued that the state's power is derived from the sum of the resources under its control. A state's resources directly underpin its monopoly on legitimate violence in both the inter-state and intra-state systems. Tilly argued that if a state's material resources is limited by its domestic resources, then the state has an incentive to regulate and grow its economy as the source of those resources. Capitalism emerged as the most prolific economic system in this regard.[958] Capitalism is frequently synonymous with the lack of government intervention, but 'capitalism has always required the state to implement and sustain it. The free market and the free enterprise

[958] (Tilly, 1992, p. 186)

are not literally free; they are embedded in a legal order and regulated by the state.'[959] Theodor Herzl did not emphasize inter-state war in Political Zionism because he thought that he could guarantee the legitimacy of the Jewish state through diplomatic and economic agreements. This is discussed more below. On the other hand, Herzl was very conscious about the intra-state power that economic control gave the state and its capitalists. Theodor Herzl observed this asymmetric relationship in the Liberal Era between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie on one side, and the petite bourgeoisie, lower classes, and ethnic minorities on the other. Herzl used state-led capitalism to dominate the social system in the Jewish state. State-backed capitalism restructured intra-society by commoditizing labour and production. It extended private property rights which also redefined the relationship between people and the lands they inhabited. Finally, the state's fiscal and monetary policies integrated the population into national, and inter-national, commercial markets and away from local barter systems.[960] The bourgeoisie were central in capitalism, and a capitalist economic system would give them power over any society.

Herzl was far more direct in his discourse about his desire to explicitly imitate European modernity during the nationalisation of his Jewish state. Herzl repeatedly drew upon these themes in *Altneuland* but he introduced them in *Der Judenstaat*. Herzl wrote:

> If we wish found a State today, we shall not do it in a way which would have been the only possible one a thousand years ago. It is foolish to revert to old stages of civilisation, as many Zionists would like to do. Supposing, for example, we were obliged to clear a country of wild beasts, we should not set about the business in the fashion of Europeans of the fifth century.[961]

[959] (Harris & Delanty, 2023, p. 339)
[960] (Harris & Delanty, 2023)
[961] (Herzl, 1946, p. 9)

Herzl was attempting to accomplish two goals in the preceding quote. The first was a repudiation of the First Aliyah. This was the first modern, organised, emigration of Jews to Palestine in the 1880s via agricultural settlement. These early Zionists were trying to counter antisemitism with a Jewish society that was ideologically independent of the prevailing system of nation-states.[962] If successful, they would have displaced Herzl's bourgeoisie at the centre of the Jewish identity. A second reason was that Herzl wanted the Jewish state to be on par with modern European societies. There was an external element where Herzl was attempting to establish the equality of the Jewish state in the eyes of Europeans. There was also an internal element to Herzl's mandate that the modern Jewish economy should be modelled on European counterparts. If the Jewish bourgeoisie had control of both politics and the economy their power would be unrivalled within the social hierarchy. In *Altneuland*, the German-Christian character, Kingscourt, noticed similarities between Imperial Germany's national institutions and those in the Jewish state. His suspicions were confirmed when he is told that all Jewish national 'institutions already existed elsewhere twenty years ago.[963] Herzl repeated this theme in an earlier dialogue with Kingscourt when he wrote, '"Were we to take obsolete stuff when we could have new things just as cheaply?" cried Steineck. "Moreover, everything you see here already existed in Europe and America a quarter century ago.'[964] When describing the modernity of the nationalised Jewish society, one of its representatives remarked:

> Never in history were cities built so quickly or so well, because never before were so many technical facilities available. By the end of the nineteenth century humanity had already achieved a high degree of technical skill. We merely had to transplant existing inventions to this country.[965]

[962] (Laqueur, 2003, p. 129)
[963] (Herzl, 2009, p. 210)
[964] (Herzl, 2009, p. 102)
[965] (Herzl, 2009, p. 56)

Herzl's characters were referring to 'the public and commercial buildings'[966] but these were representative of the Jewish national society as a whole.

Herzl repeatedly emphasised that the professional bourgeoisie built the national society to remove any doubt as to who deserved the credit for the modern, Jewish nation-state. Herzl wrote:

> The Jewish settlers who streamed into the country had brought with them the experience of the whole civilised world. The trained men graduated from universities, technical, agricultural and commercial colleges … (The) intelligentsia, for whom there were no opportunities in the anti-Semitic countries … brought the latest methods of applied science into the country.[967]

Herzl was making it clear that his national society was modelled on the European nation-states that Jews left behind, and that professional, bourgeois, Jewish men were at its forefront.

9.5.2 Theodor Herzl and the Transfer of a Capitalist Social Hierarchy from Europe to the Jewish State

In *Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework*, this work argued that members of minority ethnicities may be incentivised to secede if they would be relatively more advantaged in a national society of their own. This did not imply the equality of all minorities within their own nation, but lower inequality for each sub-group within the minority nationality compared to their previous society. This could be achieved through proximity to a governing class that more closely resembled oneself. Each class within the minority would want to maximize their own inclusion and success, and they have an incentive to position their specific identity as the governing elite of the minority national

[966] (Herzl, 2009, p. 56)
[967] (Herzl, 2009, p. 102)

identity. Miroslav Hroch argued that minority national identities 'inevitably became a battlefield for the pursuit of power, not only in struggle against the ruling nation, but within … the national movement as well.'[968] The previous chapters argued that the Jewish minority identity in Vienna was organised around the bourgeoisie as its ideal. Theodor Herzl was a member of the Jewish bourgeoisie and saw his class as the natural leaders of the Jewish identity in Austria, but also in the future Jewish nation-state. Taken together, Theodor Herzl argued for the recreation of a national capitalist economy in the new Jewish nation-state. He did this for two reasons. On one hand, nationalised, capitalist economies were seen as key elements in the creation of modern centralising states and this was the social system Herzl observed in Austria's Liberal Era. Charles Tilly argued that modern centralising economies favoured capitalism over other economic systems because they were easier to tax, and they also presented more opportunities for growing the economy.[969] At the same time, Herzl was incentivised to recreate a nationalised capitalist economy in the Jewish state because it preserved the prevailing social order amongst Jews from Europe. It was already discussed that in *Altneuland* Herzl recreated modern European societies in the Jewish state, including their infrastructure, technology, banking systems, etc. Theodor Herzl spent just as much time employing capitalism as a means of maintaining an intra-Jewish hierarchy that favoured the bourgeoisie in the Jewish nation-state. The lower classes and the petite bourgeoisie were necessary to build the physical infrastructure of the state. At the same time, also provided the capitalist proletariat and economic markets that made the professional and commercial bourgeoisie viable. Theodor Herzl's Political Zionism recreated a complete state society that was advantageous of upper classes. This helped to entrench the Jewish bourgeoisie at the core of the Jewish national identity.

[968] (Hroch, 1993, p. 13)
[969] (Tilly, 1992, pp. 88-89)

The Jewish Company was amongst the two most important national institutions in *Der Judenstaat*. The other was the Jewish Society. The Jewish Company was tasked with managing the transfer of the Jewish population, and its wealth, from Europe to the new Jewish state.[970] Herzl modelled the Jewish Company 'on the lines of a great trading association'[971] like the British East India Company. It had an identical structure to the latter. It would be 'founded as a joint-stock company, subject to English jurisdiction, framed according to English laws, and under the protection of England. Its principal centre will be in London.'[972] The 'Jewish Company' even retained its English-language title in the German-language edition of *Der Judenstaat*.[973] Herzl's choices around the Jewish Company extended from his belief that European institutions and innovations should be adopted by the Jewish State because they were the most modern and efficient.[974] Herzl looked at England as a global, colonial power, and while he did not see the Jewish nation-state in Palestine as a colonial project, he saw British colonial structures as the most efficient for transferring large populations and capital to new territories.

Theodor Herzl tasked the Jewish Company with transferring European Jews to the Jewish state while maintaining their class structures. It was not mandatory, but the Jewish Company attempted to transfer Jews as groups of families and friends to maintain their social networks. These groups were to be re-established in the Jewish state in the same towns.[975] Herzl described these plans in more detail in his diaries,

> Our people are to emigrate in groups of families and friends… But I should always like to use trains and boats that have only one class. On such long trips the poor are bothered by differences in wealth… Every locality will form a group.

[970] (Herzl, 1946, p. 9)
[971] (Herzl, 1946, p. 13)
[972] (Herzl, 1946, p. 13)
[973] (Herzl, 2017, p. 21)
[974] (Herzl, 2009, p. 102)
[975] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 38-42)

> In the large cities there will be several district groups which will communicate by means of elected representatives. There is nothing obligatory about this division into districts; … In transit and on the other side, the Central Housing Office, headed by the Director of Housing, will have provided suitable housing.[976]

The Subordinate Jewish Lower Classes and Petite Bourgeoisie

The lower, labouring classes were to be sent to the Jewish state first. They would perform unpaid labour to construct the 'roads, bridges, railways, and telegraphs; regulate rivers, and build their own habitations; their labour will create trade, (and) trade will create markets.'[977] Jewish labourers were to receive basic housing, education, and healthcare in return for building the Jewish state.[978] Labourers were required to be employed and could be jailed otherwise.[979] The labouring class would not just be employed in state enterprises and in infrastructure works but would be centrally organised and made available for private capitalists. Herzl described his labour system in the following passage,

> Finally, we are offering entrepreneurs a centralized labor pool. An employer applies to the Central Employment Office which charges him only a fee required for its operating expenses (office rent, salaries, postage, and telegram charges). The employer sends a telegram: Require tomorrow 500 unskilled laborers for three days (or three weeks or three months). The next day the 500 men requested arrive at his agricultural or industrial establishment. Our Central Employment Office collects them from various places where they may happen to become available. The migration of laborers in search of work will be improved

[976] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 149-150)
[977] (Herzl, 1946, p. 9)
[978] (Herzl, 1946, p. 18) (Herzl, 1960, p. 137)
[979] (Herzl, 1946, p. 41)

> along military lines and changed from a crude procedure into a meaningful institution. We shall, of course, supply no slave labor, but only seven-hour laborers who will keep their—that is, our—organization and retain their seniority as regards rank, advancement, and pensions even when they change their location.[980]

Herzl argued that the Jewish lower classes would submit to state control because antisemitism in Europe made the Jewish 'poor endure greater sufferings than any other proletariat.'[981] In line with this work's theoretical claims, Herzl predicted that the Jewish working classes would be more secure in a Jewish nation-state. At the same time, Herzl's proposals provided no opportunities for labouring Jews to ascend into the Jewish bourgeoisie in the Jewish national society. Their social mobility was constrained and they could not displace the existing European Jewish bourgeoisie before the latter immigrated to the Jewish state.

Herzl believed that antisemitism would motivate Jewish emigration to the Jewish state. He also believed that German assimilation was correlated with social development. These two assumptions combined in Herzl's plans when he assigned Russian Jews to become the Jewish state's lower classes. Herzl believed in the social superiority of modern, Western Europeans and he described his stereotypical perceptions of Russian Jews in the Zionist newspaper, *Die Welt*. He opened the article with the following when referring to the Russian Jewry, 'There is also a certain Western European arrogance which treats the Jews of other countries as backward creatures. He is always a barbarian who is not understood "Barbarus I am who understands I am a barbarian."'[982] He was also aware that the five million Russian Jews were experiencing not just social antisemitism in that Empire, but also physical insecurity in pogroms. This, combined with

[980] (Herzl, 1960, p. 148)
[981] (Herzl, 1946, p. 2)
[982] (Herzl, 1897, p. 4)

their oriental, pre-modern background meant that they were ideally suited to become the Jewish labouring masses under the direction of the Western European, Jewish bourgeoisie. In the same *Die Welt* article Herzl wrote,

> The efficiency of these (Russian) craftsmen and unskilled labourers is indeed one of the foundations of our plan. It is their task to undertake the first cultivation work in the desolate land. They shall, they will be the land-builders. But we never imagined anything other than that they would depend on our spiritual help and guidance dependent be.[983]

Herzl repeated the argument in his diaries. He assumed figurative possession of all Russian Jews and was determined to direct them as an impersonal factor of capitalist production. He wrote,

> My Russian Jews, who constitute the great reservoir of unskilled labourers, will be organized into labour battalions. They will be given labour ranks, as in the army, perhaps even badges to indicate them, and advance according to their efficiency and seniority.[984]

Herzl wrote about his plans for the Russian Jewry elsewhere. Again, they are seen as the state's possession without self-determination. Herzl wrote,

> I shall inform my unskilled labourers from Russia that they can advance and later at least get tobacco shops (*a state-owned, for-profit business*) and the like (if they are not fitted to become officers of the labour battalions). Therefore, they will properly use the rest of the seven-hour day for self-improvement in workers' and trade schools.[985]

Herzl positioned the Jewish petite bourgeoisie under similar state direction, albeit with additional freedoms. It is noteworthy that by this time the petite bourgeoisie were already

[983] (Herzl, 1897, p. 4)
[984] (Herzl, 1960, p. 85)
[985] (Herzl, 1960, p. 98)

enfranchised in Vienna and had the same political and social rights as the bourgeoisie. Herzl was socially relegating this class to their Liberal Era social status. The language he uses to describe the petite bourgeoisie is not the same he uses to describe the status an authority of the professional bourgeoisie. He wrote,

> 'As for the independent artisans, the small master craftsmen, we want to foster them with a view to the future progress of technology … These independent workers, too, shall be sought out by our Central Employment Office. A Local Group will apply to this office: we need so-and-so-many carpenters, locksmiths, glaziers, etc. The Central Office will make this public and the people will come forward. They and their families will move to the place where they are needed and remain there.'[986]

The Superior Jewish Bourgeoisie: The Professional, Commercial, and Upper Classes

It was introduced above that the Jewish lower classes were necessary to build the physical foundations of the new Jewish state, but Herzl also subtly described them as the necessary social foundations which supported the Jewish professional and commercial bourgeoisie. The lower classes were necessary to make the Jewish bourgeoisie possible. Theodor Herzl was recreating a complete, hierarchical national society in the new Jewish state.

The Jewish, bourgeois, professionals who managed the lower classes emigrated from Europe because they were underemployed due to antisemitism there.[987] Herzl envisaged the direct transfer of bourgeois Jews from Europe to the Jewish state without any loss of status. He wrote, 'All Jews who have been serving as officials of such public

[986] (Herzl, 1960, p. 148-149)
[987] (Herzl, 1946, p. 42)

institutions in Europe will freely transfer into the service of our State, receiving positions at least as good and, besides, chances for advancement, etc., which at present a Jew does not have even in a private institution.'[988] The creation of the Jewish state gave these bourgeois professionals purpose. Herzl described this in his diaries in the following extended passage. He used incredibly personal and empathetic language that was not used towards the lower classes, or even for the commercial bourgeoisie.

> And this undertaking will even in its first stages provide employment for an aspiring multitude of our young people: all the engineers, architects, technologists, chemists, physicians, lawyers, who have emerged from the ghetto during the last thirty years and who thought that they would gain their livelihood and their bit of honor outside the higgling and haggling Jewish trades. They must now be getting desperate and are beginning to constitute a frightful proletariat of intellectuals. *But all my love belongs to them*, and I want to increase their numbers even as you wish to decrease them. In them I see the future, as yet dormant strength of the Jews. *In a word, my kind of people.* Out of this proletariat of intellectuals, I shall form the general staff and the cadres of the army which is to seek, discover, and take over the land. Their very departure will create some breathing space for the (Jewish) middle classes in anti-Semitic countries and ease the pressure (My emphasis).[989]

Theodor Herzl was effectively creating demand for the Jewish professional bourgeoisie who would be necessary to construct and manage 'our later railways, our immigration fleets and our war fleet… we shall build houses, palaces, workers' dwellings, schools, theatres, museums, government houses, hospitals, lunatic asylums - in brief, cities.'[990]

[988] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 161-162)
[989] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 28-29)
[990] (Herzl, 1960, pp. p. 29)

Herzl wrote elsewhere that these foundations will attract the European bourgeoisie to the new state. He wrote,

> The middle classes will automatically be drawn along by our movement. Some will have their sons on the other side, as officials of the Society, judges, lawyers, physicians, architects, railroad engineers, bridge-builders, etc. Others will have daughters married to our workers. These will all be good matches, for those who come with us will rise high, especially the pioneers who will be rewarded for their devotion.[991]

The centralised and technocratic development and management of the Jewish state may seem logical but Herzl was also giving the professional bourgeoisie a great deal of bureaucratic power to define the Jewish state from its outset, and their elevated position within it. He gave them that authority explicitly in his discourse when he wrote,

> As soon as our geographers have decided on the location and the international and private purchase contracts have been concluded, a ship will sail to take possession of the land. This ship will carry administrative officials, technicians of all kinds, and delegates of the Local Groups.
>
> These pioneers will have three tasks: first, the exact scientific investigation of all natural properties of the land; second, the establishment of a tightly centralized administration; third, the distribution of the land.[992]

The creation of a new national market by the labouring classes and the nascent professional bourgeoisie could subsequently attract the commercial bourgeoisie to establish their enterprises in the Jewish nation-state.[993] The Jewish Company did not just facilitate the transfer of Jewish populations to the Jewish state. It was also

[991] (Herzl, 1960, pp. 152)
[992] (Herzl, 1960, p. 174)
[993] (Herzl, 1946, p. 23)

responsible for liquidating and transferring Jewish real estate, and other non-transferable property, from Europe to the Jewish state. Theodor Herzl presented complex means for doing this, but the goal was to maintain the intra-Jewish hierarchy.[994] This helped maintain the wealth and status of the Jewish commercial bourgeoisie in particular. Herzl foresaw that the Jewish Company could facilitate the transplanting of the Jewish commercial from Europe to the Jewish state through capitalism and commercial means. He wrote,

> Induce all big Jewish-owned factories, businesses, etc. to establish branches over there (analogous to the overseas editions of the newspapers). In this way they will be able gradually to transfer their plant and inventory as well as their business experience to the other side. This is the transplanting of businesses; it will immediately produce employment, commerce, etc., and meet needs in the usual manner. In the transplanting of businesses, too, those left behind will gradually pass over into the hands of Gentiles. Crises will be prevented.[995]

Finally, Herzl still held out hope that the Jewish upper bourgeoisie would be enticed to the Jewish state once a complete social system was established there. He believed that once it the society was sufficiently advanced that wealthiest, bourgeois, European Jews would immigrate to the Jewish state, thereby recreating the social hierarchy that Jews maintained in Europe.[996] The Jewish Company was intended to manage enormous resources to ensure that Jewish wealth did not lose value when masses of Jews sold their homes, businesses, and other property to emigrate to the Jewish state. The result was that the distribution of wealth, opportunity, and status in the Jewish state was the same as it was in Europe.

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[994] (Herzl, 1946, pp. 24-25)
[995] (Herzl, 1960, p. 86)
[996] (Herzl, 1946, p. 23)

9.6 The Jewish National Military and the Jewish State's Monopoly on Violence

Theodor Herzl did not generally focus on inter-state warfare in his discourse. This work suggests that Herzl's choice was representative of inter-state politics of his time. Just as Herzl was reconstructing 19th Century, European, intra-state politics in his representations of the Jewish state, he may have also been reflecting the contemporary European inter-state system. Herzl's inter-state environment was established after the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. The Congress of Vienna was a pact that established inter-state society as an oligarchy of sovereign states.[997] Having established an erstwhile stable order amongst states, Prince Metternich and Europe's monarchs were free to dominate their intra-state societies.[998] The inter-state system was a relatively settled community, and they managed a peaceful *status quo* amongst themselves. When Theodor Herzl called for the creation of a Jewish nation-state, he asked that 'the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of globe large enough to satisfy the reasonable requirements of a nation.'[999] Herzl's expectations around inter-state politics revolved around peaceful negotiations for the establishment of a Jewish nation-state. Herzl famously attempted to negotiate with European monarchs, like the German Kaiser and the Ottoman Sultan, to secure a Jewish nation-state in Ottoman Palestine.[1000] Herzl was opposed to the bottom-up construction of the Jewish nation-state via Jewish immigration without the sanction of the global powers. The Jewish Society was to be externally acknowledged 'as a State-forming power'.[1001] Herzl envisaged that 'The Society of Jews will treat with the present masters of the land, putting itself under the protectorate of the European Powers.'[1002] Herzl was attempting to establish the Jewish Society in the

[997] (Langhorne, 1986, p. 314)
[998] (Siemann, 2019, p. 269)
[999] (Herzl, 1946, p. 8)
[1000] (Laqueur, 2003, p. 173)
[1001] (Herzl, 1946, p. 56)
[1002] (Herzl, 1946, p. 10)

pantheon of existing states in the inter-state system, while simultaneously centring the Jewish bourgeoisie as the new elite via their control of the Jewish Society.

With the above discussion in mind, Theodor Herzl declared that 'The Jewish State is conceived as a neutral one. It will therefore require only an army of volunteers, equipped, of course, with every requisite of modern warfare, to preserve order internally and externally.'[1003] The Jewish nation-state was not meant to be demilitarised, though. Herzl did not think that the Jewish nation-state would have to be established by force but he still gave it the monopoly on violence that all nation-states claim in their societies for the preservation of the state. In *Der Judenstaat*, the section entitled 'The Army' is probably the shortest and is limited to the two sentences quoted above. At the same time, Herzl secreted the details of the Jewish state's violent institutions in other parts of his political pamphlet. For instance, and in imitation of the British East India Company, Herzl claimed that ten percent of all male Jewish colonists would be employed in the Jewish Company as its defensive forces.[1004] This would put the Jewish national military on par with the Habsburg Empire's forces during the French Wars, in proportional terms.[1005] Herzl was prepared to deploy these forces if the Jewish state was threatened. He wrote, 'I think the Jews will always have sufficient enemies, much as every other nation has. … Our present civilisation possesses weapons powerful enough for its self-defence.'[1006]

Herzl was more explicit about employing the state's monopoly on legitimate violence against the Jewish intra-state population, and its Jewish lower classes in particular, if they threatened state interests. Herzl claimed that 'no more force will be exercised on any one than is necessary for the preservation of the State and the upholding of its

[1003] (Herzl, 1946, p. 62)
[1004] (Herzl, 1946, p. 23)
[1005] (Rothenberg, 1973, p. 1) (Berkovich & Wenzel, 2024, p. 109)
[1006] (Herzl, 1946, p. 68)

statutes.'[1007] It was previously cited that Herzl was also willing to suppress popular revolts using the state's martial forces.[1008] The preservation of the state also meant the suppression of industrial action against state enterprises. Herzl described this 'Mines, particularly, will be operated only by the State, because even with a seven-hour day mine workers should not be subject to an entrepreneur's parsimony. The State will not economize on safety measures. But there is no striking against it.'[1009] Herzl was also willing to suppress free speech if it affected the state. He wrote,

> 'Take my word for it: I understand the State. We shall also have a grand council of State jurists. We shall impose extensive but firm limits on public opinion, especially in the beginning. You can imagine that I as a journalist am concerned about the freedom and honour of my profession. But we certainly cannot permit our work to be disturbed by obtuse or malicious individuals.'[1010]

Altogether, this mirrored the role of the Habsburg military in the post-Congress of Vienna period through the 1860s when it suppressed local revolutions and labour disturbances. Herzl described the Jewish bourgeoisie as the leadership of the both the Jewish Society and the Jewish Company. That means that they would control its intra-state and inter-state uses of state violence. By extension, the preservation of the state would coincide with the bourgeoisie's interests because Herzl was willing to use state violence to defend public and private, or commercial, interests. The use of state violence in the Jewish nation-state cannot be separated from the interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie as its founding class, and the maintenance of the intra-Jewish hierarchy in the new state.

[1007] (Herzl, 1946, p. 47)
[1008] (Herzl, 1946, p. 60)
[1009] (Herzl, 1960, p. 162)
[1010] (Herzl, 1960, p. 170)

9.7 Conclusion

Theodor Herzl's vision for the Jewish nation-state was a recreation of the centralised and nationalising European societies that were excluding him and other Jews. This chapter reviewed Theodor Herzl's vision for a modern, 19th Century state. This work has argued that two elements were necessary for Theodor Herzl's understanding of modern nationalism. They were the combination of modern state structures and a defined national identity. Herzl therefore also envisaged the Jewish national identity as a continuation of their 19th Century, European-Jewish identity. The latter will be addressed in this section's final chapter, *Chapter 10. Discourse Analysis: Part 4. Theodor Herzl's Vision of a Popular Jewish National Identity*.

10. Discourse Analysis: Part 4. Theodor Herzl's Vision of a Popular Jewish National Identity

10.1 Introduction

Herzl's Jewish national identity was not a reversion to a socially independent, pre-European Jewish identity. Herzl's representations of the Jewish national identity are claimed to be a recreation of both the distribution of power in the pre-nationalist Liberal Era and from the self-conscious political nationalism exhibited by the Christian, Austro-German nationalists. The combination of the distribution of social power in these two eras would define Theodor Herzl's Jewish national identity. It is claimed that Theodor Herzl was attempting to recreate an elite-biased, Jewish, and male national identity that mirrored Vienna's own elite-biased identity from the Liberal Era, and which was made explicit in Christian, Austro-German nationalism. He initially attempted to import a Jewish bourgeois aristocracy from Europe but they were unreceptive to Political Zionism. Theodor Herzl pivoted to a new hierarchy with bourgeois, professional Jews at its apex. In both proposed social hierarchies, Herzl was trying to restore his own political, social, and economic security that he lost in *fin de siècle* Vienna. Herzl's choices would simultaneously define the social prospects for the Jewish lower classes, Jewish women, and non-Jews within a Jewish nation-state.

The previous chapter argued that the creation of a centralised modern state could lay the foundations of a Jewish national identity. The modern Jewish state constructed a social hierarchy around elite politics, bureaucratic centralisation, and capitalist organisation. Bourgeois Jews were at the social apex in each category. This section's final chapter argues that Theodor Herzl's proposed state structures could support a popular, Jewish, national identity. This work suggested that this process was occurring in Vienna during the rise of Christian Austro-German nationalism in the 1880s

and 1890s. National movements abound, but this work claims that they are more likely to gain political traction if the society has built-in biases in its state's institutions, including in its politics, bureaucracy, economy, education, military, etc. The particular Jewish national identity portrayed in Theodor Herzl's discourse is supported by the social, economic, and political power that he afforded to bourgeois Jews in the state's national institutions.

Theodor Herzl may have been attempting to recreate European societies in the Jewish nation-state. This argument is supported in Herzl's representations of how Jews experienced the Jewish national identity in his discourse. One common denominator across Herzl's descriptions of Jewish life in their nation-state was that it was modelled on his life in Vienna. The exception was that Jews formed the cultural core in the Jewish state instead of being subordinate to Christians. The Jewish national society was a recreation of Vienna, Austria and Europe in nearly every other way. Alternatively, in Herzl's descriptions of the Jewish national society there is very little that is uniquely Jewish, Levantine, or Middle Eastern, i.e. the Jewish nation-state was not a reversion to an independent, pre-European, Jewish identity. Jewish cultural elements were represented, including places of worships and holidays, but this work claims that these had instrumental and not intrinsic religious value. Religious institutions were substitutions for their Christian counterparts in Europe and were valued for their roles in centring Jews within the national society. Theodor Herzl's representations on non-Jews in the Jewish state also seem to be based on the place of minorities within the Austro-German Christian national identity (Shockingly, including social exclusion in the diaries). Herzl accorded non-Jewish minorities the same status as Jews in Austria's Liberal Era. Once again, this supports his idealisation of this earlier period. Non-Jews had civil equality in Herzl's Jewish state but were still subordinate to Jews. Finally, this section will consider the female gender in Herzl's Jewish national identity. Herzl has mirrored the Austria national identity to this point, and his perspectives towards gender was no

different. Wealthy educated men have a near monopoly on political, economic, and social power in Herzl's Jewish state while women only exist relative to the men in their lives.

10.2 Judaism in the Jewish National Identity

Theodor Herzl represented the Jewish nation-state as a multifaceted, complete society that catered to 'faith, business, and amusement'.[1011] Herzl wrote of the Jewish society, 'Whereas one of these objects by itself would certainly allure the masses, all these centres of attraction combined would be fully qualified permanently to hold and satisfy them.'[1012] This analysis continues with the role of the Jewish faith, and Jewishness. Judaism played a similar role to Christianity in Europe. It bound the population, both Jews and non-Jews, into a shared culture and society that was disproportionately influenced by its Christian aristocratic and religious leaders at the top. Judaism and Jewishness also played a role in ordering the national society into a social hierarchy with Jews at the top. Herzl frequently claimed that the New Society (another name for the Jewish nation-state) 'did not care whether a man sought the eternal verities in a temple, church or a mosque, in an art museum or at a philharmonic concert.'[1013] Herzl added that, 'Religion had been excluded from public affairs once and for all.'[1014] At the same time, Herzl consistently represented the Jewish national society as being anchored to Jewishness. This was a recurring theme in Herzl's discourse in his cited works. He would frequently say something in an unambiguous declaration but then contradict himself in his implementation of those ideals.[1015] For instance, the Jewish state is presented as equally inclusive of all peoples but it is physically and socially

[1011] (Herzl, 1946, p. 47)
[1012] (Herzl, 1946, p. 47)
[1013] (Herzl, 2009, pp. 199-200)
[1014] (Herzl, 2009, p. 199)
[1015] Other instances of Herzl's self-contradictions will be considered. These include his views towards the military, economic classes, women, and minorities.

organised around Judaism and Jewishness in Herzl's descriptions of it. The Jewish holy city, Jerusalem, was its national capital, and the rebuilt Jewish Temple was at the centre of Jerusalem as a national landmark. Muslim, Jewish, and Christian institutions coexisted in Jerusalem's centre but the Jewish Temple stood above them. It was always visible as a 'wonderful structure of white and gold, whose roof rested on a whole forest of marble columns with gilt capitals.'[1016] Access to the Temple was not available to everyone, either, but was restricted to the Jewish national elite since seats were permanently assigned.[1017] It is also worth noting that Herzl wrote that Jews could fulfil Judaism anywhere in the world but that the Temple was significant because it was a national symbol, in addition to being a Jewish symbol. He wrote, 'Yet only here was the true Temple. Why? Because only here had the Jews built up a free commonwealth in which they could strive for the loftiest human aims.'[1018] Elite Jews, and their Jewish institutions, were at the physical centre of the new nation-state. Jerusalem's physical arrangement mirrored Vienna with its Stephensplatz as the central square. The square was capped off by St Stephen's Cathedral as the national house of worship, but also as the symbol of the nation. Jews could replace Christians at the national centre of their own nation-state.

The nation-state's physical space was centred around the Jewish Temple but Judaism also organised 'time' in the Jewish state. Judaism structured social life for both Jews and non-Jews. Herzl would have experienced a similar effect from Christianity in Europe. The Christian calendar, including its holidays, fasts, and feasts, shaped European social life and these was imposed upon Jews as minorities. Christianity created a hierarchy for belonging and participation in European national societies. Herzl described that the Jewish nation-state observed the Sabbath as a national society. He wrote that,

[1016] (Herzl, 2009, p. 191)
[1017] (Herzl, 2009, p. 194)
[1018] (Herzl, 2009, p. 196)

Jerusalem's 'streets which at noon had been alive with traffic were now suddenly stilled. Very few motor cars were to be seen; all the shops were closed. Slowly and peacefully the Sabbath fell upon the bustling city.'[1019] Jerusalem was described as a cosmopolitan, diverse city but all residents were subject to Jewish cultural rhythms. Similarly, the Jewish holiday of Passover was described as the key national holiday in the same vein as Easter in Europe, which it temporally coincided with. *Altneuland*'s protagonist, David Littwak, hosted the Passover feast at his home and it was attended by Jews, but also included non-Jewish dignitaries.[1020] Passover was a national holiday for all citizens of the Jewish nation-state, despite their personal faiths. Herzl attached a national role to prayer in the Jewish Temple and he did the same for Passover. Everyone in attendance, including Jews and non-Jews, were required to participate in the holiday's Jewish rituals. These rituals included the recitation of the Jewish exodus from Egypt under Moses and the Jewish God.[1021] At the same time, the culmination of the Passover celebration in *Altneuland* was a retelling of the story of the Jewish national project.[1022] The national prophet of the Jewish people's modern exodus from Europe, Joseph Levy, narrated the story on preserved recordings.[1023] The Jewish holiday of Passover was not just a Judaic festival but an affirmation of Jewish primacy in the national hierarchy for all participants.

Theodor Herzl argued that Judaism would facilitate the ingathering of Jewish immigrants to the state. Antisemitism was an external pressure that pushed Jews into a single identity and towards the Jewish state. At the same time, Herzl argued that Judaism was one of the few remaining cultural features that internally bound Jews to other Jews. Theodor Herzl knew that Judaism could be exploited to attract Jews to the new state alongside the figurative 'push' they were receiving from European antisemitism. As Herzl

[1019] (Herzl, 2009, p. 191)
[1020] (Herzl, 2009, p. 145)
[1021] (Herzl, 2009, pp. 145-146)
[1022] (Herzl, 2009, p. 148)
[1023] (Herzl, 2009, p. 148)

wrote in his diaries, 'We recognize our historic identity only by the faith of our fathers, because we have long since inextinguishably absorbed the languages of various nationalities.'[1024] Herzl believed that the mere restoration of ancient Jewish religious sites would appeal to Jews. He wrote this in his diaries,

> Do I need to illustrate the phenomenon of masses and the ways of attracting them to any desired spot by discussing religious pilgrimages, too?
>
> This speech may have to be published, and I do not wish to offend anyone's religious sensibilities by words which could be misinterpreted.
>
> Let me just mention in passing what the pilgrimage to Mecca means in the Mohammedan world, Lourdes and the Holy Mantle at Treves to the Catholics, and so many other places from which people return home comforted by their faith.[1025]

Herzl intended that rabbis would be coopted by the Jewish state for its political purposes. He integrated the rabbis into the state apparatus when he wrote, 'The Rabbis will then regularly receive the advices of the Society (the state) and announce and interpret them to their congregations. Israel will pray for us and for itself.'[1026] Herzl expounded on this idea further when he wrote,

> Each group will have its Rabbi who is traveling with his congregation. You can see how naturally all these groups fall into place. A Local Group will have a Rabbi as its nucleus; there will be as many such groups as there are Rabbis… they will impart their enthusiasm to the others from their pulpits. Imagine with what fervour our old saying "Next year in the Promised Land!" will be spoken henceforth. There is no need to call any special assemblies with a lot of blather. This propaganda will be included in the religious service, and properly so.[1027]

[1024] (Herzl, 1960, p. 151)
[1025] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 155)
[1026] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 151)
[1027] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, pp. 150-151)

At the same time, Herzl acknowledged that he was using rabbis for their social value without giving them any political power. He wrote,

> Shall we, then, end up by having a theocracy? No! Faith unites us, science makes us free. Therefore, we shall permit no theocratic velleities on the part of our clergy to arise. We shall know how to restrict them to their temples, just as we shall restrict our professional soldiers to their barracks.[1028]

Judaism and Jewishness were organising principles for the Jewish national identity in Herzl's Jewish state. It filled a similar function as Christianity in Europe, in general, and Catholicism in Austria, specifically. The Austrian emperor was the historical defender of Catholicism in Europe. This was a legacy of the Habsburgs being the Holy Roman Emperors. Christianity physically and socially ordered the functioning of the Austrian state and impacted all of its subjects. Christianity was also a defining principle of Christian Austro-German nationalism by definition. Judaism played similar roles in creating a social hierarchy in the Jewish national identity and Jewish nation-state.

10.3 European Culture and Language in the Jewish Nation-State

It was claimed that Theodor Herzl was attempting to recreate the Christian, Austro-German national society that excluded Jews. Herzl, like most bourgeois Jews of his generation, spent his life assimilating into the Austrian national identity and he valued its culture as his own. Herzl's concept of the Jewish nation-state was a means for him to recreate the European culture that excluded Jews. Herzl was not advocating for the development of indigenous cultural institutions that were independent of Europe in his Jewish nation-state. The Jewish national identity was constructed relative to European culture. In this regard, Herzl was famously opposed to the revivification of Hebrew as

[1028] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 171)

the Jewish national language.[1029] He advocated for the retention of a shared European language. The exclusion of Jews from European social life was a symbol of their insecurity in those societies. Herzl presented the Jewish nation-state as an opportunity to restore Jewish security when he described Jews as full members of the European cultural institutions that excluded them in Europe.

In *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl referred to culture as the 'little habits and comforts of the ordinary man.'[1030] He assured his readers that the European culture at the centre of their social lives could be replicated in the Jewish state. He writes, 'Whoever has seen anything of the world knows that just these little daily customs can be transplanted everywhere. … There are English hotels in Egypt … Vienna cafes in South Africa … German operas in America. … When we journey out of Egypt again, we shall not leave the fleshpots behind.'[1031] Herzl continued, 'Every man will find his customs again in the local groups but they will be better, more beautiful, and more agreeable than before.'[1032] Herzl was not advocating for the creation of an indigenous Jewish national culture, but the recreation of European cultures that were simultaneously inclusive of Jews. Jewish nationalism was an attempt to repair their exclusion from European societies.

Theodor Herzl published *Altneuland* in 1902 after Political Zionism was known amongst European Jews. (Context of late in life, and failure) It showed them what a future Jewish nation-state could be. The novel portrays the transition of Jews from an increasingly antisemitic Austrian society to a secure, Jewish nation-state. The novel's arc uses the emigration of Jews from a European cultural centre in Austria to an identical social setting in Palestine to argue that Jews could recreate a European society where Jews were safe. It may be unsurprising that Herzl, as a playwright, used the building of

[1029] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 171)
[1030] (Herzl, 1946, p. 49)
[1031] (Herzl, 1946, p. 49)
[1032] (Herzl, 1946, p. 49)

European theatres in the Jewish state as a symbol for the restoration of Jewish inclusion and social security. *Altneuland*'s opening chapters described a dinner party attended by the Jewish bourgeoisie. Herzl positioned European culture at the centre of their social lives before their conversation turned to antisemitism. The scene was as follows:

> "I have been at the Wiedener Theatre," (Blau) reported, "attending a first night performance." His announcement aroused interest. Ladies and gentlemen gathered around him, and he proceeded. "The first act, to everyone's surprise did not fall flat." "Moriz," called Mrs. Laschner imperiously to her husband, "I want to see that play tomorrow night."[1033]

Herzl interwove Austrian antisemitism and Jewish attachment to Viennese culture. They were connected in Herzl's eyes because antisemitism threatened to exclude Jews from the Austrian national society. The dinner conversation continued as follows:

> (Dr. Weiss) remarked in a slightly raised voice that things were becoming worse in Moravia. "In the provincial towns," he said, "our people are in actual peril. When the Germans are in a bad mood, they break Jewish windows. When the Czechs are out of sorts, they break into Jewish homes. … Mrs. Laschner chose this moment to scream to her husband, "Moriz! You must take me to the Burg Theatre the day after tomorrow!"

This scene may be interpreted as Herzl chastising the Jewish bourgeoisie for avoiding the reality of antisemitism but he also used the scene to present his vision of European culture coexisting with Jewish security in their own nation-state. Dr. Weiss continued after Mrs. Laschner's interruption, 'A new movement has arisen within the last few years, which is called Zionism. Its aim is to solve the Jewish problem through colonisation on a large scale.'[1034] Mrs. Laschner later responds, '"Will there be theatres in Palestine?" … "If not, I shall not go there."[1035] A few chapters later, the novel's protagonists entered

[1033] (Herzl, 2009, p. 14)
[1034] (Herzl, 2009, p. 15)
[1035] (Herzl, 2009, p. 16)

their box at the national opera house that was built by the Jewish state. The foreign characters, Friedrich and Kingscourt, were surprised at the magnificence of the building. The local bourgeois leader, David, responded, 'Palestine now has the same comforts as in the European large cities.'[1036] 'In the next box sat two bejewelled and overdressed women'[1037] and they were, of course, the same Mrs. Laschner and her daughter from the earlier scene.[1038] The Jewish Problem in Europe was resolved when Jews recreated European culture in the Jewish state.

The establishment of a theatrical social life in Palestine that was on par with Europe was an important symbol in *Altneuland* and it was referenced throughout the novel. This parity should not be underestimated or trivialised. Herzl used the theatre to establish that Jews were equal to Christian Europeans in their own state. One character reminded their European visitors that they could attend the same 'plays which they can see as well in London or Berlin or Paris, though, as it happens, there are excellent French and Italian companies in Haifa just now.'[1039] Herzl wrote that Jews were able to create Jewish plays and operas that were amongst the 'best compositions of recent years, rich though the period has been in musical creation.'[1040] Finally, Herzl used the presence of European high culture to demonstrate that the same social pathways from Europe were available to Jews in their state. The impoverished child, David Littwak, from the novel's opening chapters represented his successful transition to the Jewish bourgeoisie through his ownership of a box at the Jewish opera house.[1041]

Herzl emphasised European-style theatres as a symbol of Jewish parity but he also made other references to the recreation of European culture in the Jewish nation state.

[1036] (Herzl, 2009, p. 82)
[1037] (Herzl, 2009, p. 82)
[1038] (Herzl, 2009, p. 82)
[1039] (Herzl, 2009, p. 76)
[1040] (Herzl, 2009, p. 76)
[1041] (Herzl, 2009, p. 76)

He wrote about the national home of Jewish art and philosophy at a Jewish Academy that was 'patterned after the centuries-old model of the French Academy. … The forty members of the Academy also formed a Jewish Legion of Honor like the French Legion of Honor.'[1042] Jewish cities were also consistently described as copies of their European counterparts. They had the same 'immense squares bordered by the high arcades of stately buildings … (which) housed colonial banks and the branch offices of European shipping companies'.[1043] 'The city itself seemed thoroughly European'[1044] in their building styles, infrastructure, and amenities.

Finally, Herzl briefly discussed language in the Jewish national identity. Herzl was known to be hostile to Hebrew. In *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl argued that there was no reason for Jews to abandon their European languages. He wrote, 'We shall remain in the new country what we now are here, and we shall never cease to cherish the memory of the native land out of which we have been driven.'[1045] He understood that a national language was necessary but argued that the national leadership would select the 'language which proves itself useful for general intercourse.'[1046] European languages were core to the Jewish national identity in Herzl's eyes. The Jewish nation-state was not an opportunity to revive Jewish culture for Herzl, but an opportunity for Jews to continue their assimilated European identities in a secure space.

10.4 Non-Jews in the Jewish Nation-State

Theodor Herzl's descriptions of the status of non-Jews in the Jewish state supports that Herzl saw Jewish nationalism as the basis for the restoration of Jewish security. Jews

[1042] (Herzl, 2009, p. 200)
[1043] (Herzl, 2009, p. 51)
[1044] (Herzl, 2009, p. 51)
[1045] (Herzl, 1946, p. 60)
[1046] (Herzl, 1946, p. 61)

needed to centre themselves in their own national identity if they were to be secure once again. Non-Jews were still represented in Theodor Herzl's Jewish nation-state. This may be used as evidence that Herzl was not advocating for imitations of the Christian German nationalism of the 1880s and 1890s, but for the inclusive Austrian liberalism of the 1840s to 1860s. Herzl envisaged the place non-Jews in the Jewish nation-state in the same way that Jews were integrated into the Austrian nation in the Liberal Era. Herzl accorded minorities the same advantages as emancipated, European Jews in the mid-19th Century. They had freedom of religion, occupation, and residence. Herzl declared the following,

> It goes without saying that we shall respectfully tolerate persons of other faiths and protect their property, their honour, and their freedom with the harshest means of coercion. This is another area in which we shall set the entire old world a wonderful example.[1047]

Herzl also wrote in *Der Judenstaat* that:

> Every man will be as free and undisturbed in his faith or his disbelief as he is in nationality. And if it should occur that men of different creeds and different nationalities came to live amongst us, we should accord them honourable protection, and equality before the law.[1048]

Finally, he repeated the idea of civil equality in *Alteneuland*. He wrote that 'As far as religion goes, you will find Christian, Mohammedan, Budhist, and Brahmin houses of worship near our own synagogues.'[1049] Herzl's language in the above quotes mirrors Emperor Joseph II's Patent of Toleration (1871) and the Edict of Tolerance (1782). These decrees granted non-Catholics civil equality in the Habsburg Empire and were the basis for Jewish assimilation into the Austrian state. [1050] These edicts did not translate into the experience of non-Catholics and non-Germans participating equally in

[1047] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 88)
[1048] (Herzl, 1946, p. 61)
[1049] (Herzl, 2009, p. 55)
[1050] (Scott H. M., 1990, p. 170)

the Austrian state, though. The social and political ceiling placed on Germanised Jews in the Austrian Empire was evidence of this. This framing of minority inclusion in the Jewish nation-state also meant that assimilated non-Jews were subordinate to Jews, just as assimilated Jews were subordinate to Christians in Europe. Non-Jews were absent from Herzl's representations of political and social power in his Jewish nation. Jewish security in their own nation-state demanded the recreation of a national hierarchy.

Despite their civil equality, non-Jews were absent from Theodor Herzl's descriptions of political power in the Jewish state. This was reserved for bourgeois, Jewish men. Non-Jews were portrayed as socially proximate to elite-Jews, much like assimilated Jews in Europe, but they were never described as having power. Joseph Levy only mentioned Jewish names when he described its founding class of bourgeois professionals in the pre-recorded retelling of the Jewish national story above.[1051] The contemporary leadership of the Jewish state were also all Jews. This included the Jewish medical doctor, Dr. Eichenstamm, who was the Jewish state's aged president.[1052] After Dr. Eichenstamm's death, the Jewish assembly gathered to select its next leader, and once again, the candidates were only European Jews. The candidates included the founder of the Jewish state, Joseph Levy, the Jewish president of the national Academy, Professor Marcus, and the novel's protagonist, David Littwak.[1053]

Theodor Herzl's representation of minorities in the Jewish state is best described in his character of an Arab Muslim citizen, Reschid Bey, in *Altneuland*.[1054] Reschid is presented as the mirror image of Jacob Samuel from *Das Neue Ghetto*. Jacob's success and integration into the Austrian national identity is derived from his imitation of the

[1051] (Herzl, 2009, p. 156)
[1052] (Herzl, 2009, pp. 86-87)
[1053] (Herzl, 2009, p. 214)
[1054] (Herzl, 2009, p. 56)

Christian bourgeoisie. Recall that Jacob told his Christian friend, Franz Wurzlechner, the following:

(Franz) meant a lot to me. Actually, more than I ever showed him. We only think in terms of people. He was not only a friend to me, he was also the "Christian fellow citizen" who liked to socialize with me. … I wanted to be grateful to him for that by modelling myself on him, adopting his habits as far as I could, speaking his language, thinking his thoughts.[1055]

Reschid Bey and David Littwak had the same relationship in *Altneuland*. Reschid is introduced as David's close acquaintance. He is speaking German and wears a European suit.[1056] The following scene is how Reschid was initially described to readers:

> "Who's the little Muslim?" (Kingscourt) asked. "He studied in Berlin," replied David laughingly. "His father was among the first to understand the beneficent character of the Jewish immigration, and enriched himself, because he kept pace with our economic progress, Reschid himself is a member of our New Society."[1057]

Reschid Bey's acceptance in the Jewish nation-state is based on his family's assimilation into the Jewish national identity. He followed the same social pathway as Jews in Austria. His father benefitted from Jewish nationalisation and he owned successful commercial enterprises. His son, Reschid, then went on to complete a PhD in Chemistry at a European university and entered the liberal, professional bourgeoisie.[1058]

[1055] (Herzl, 1903, p. 41)
[1056] (Herzl, 2009, p. 56)
[1057] (Herzl, 2009, p. 56) (Herzl, 2009, p. 130)
[1058] (Herzl, 2009, p. 97)

Reschid Bey is self-conscious that his social mobility and success is dependent on the nationalisation of the state by Jews, and their supremacy within it. Reschid initially argued that his ancestors were the originators of citrus production in Palestine. He was admonished by the national architect, Dr. Steineck, for not acknowledging the Jewish nationalisation of the territory. He told Reschid, '"I don't deny that you had orange groves before we came" thundered Steineck, "but you could never get full value out of them."'[1059] Reschid was humbled and he accepted Steineck's assertion. He said, '"That is correct. … Our orange transport has multiplied tenfold since we have had good transportation facilities to connect us with the whole world. Everything here has increased in value since your immigration."'[1060] Much like Jacob Samuel attributed his success to the Austrian nation-state in *Das Neue Ghetto*, Reschid was paying tribute to the Jewish nation-state here. Reschid accepted his social subordination and was satisfied with his partial integration into the Jewish national identity as a Muslim Arab. He even admitted this explicitly when he acknowledged that he gave up his rights to his ancestral lands as a condition for his citizenship in the Jewish state. The Jewish Society owned all land in the state and Reschid had to sell his land to the state and take them back on lease.[1061] (Could add non-Jewish land restrictions here) The Jewish Society which owned the land was controlled by the Jewish political class. Theodor Herzl did not necessarily use the character and story of Reschid Bey to disenfranchise Arabs. Herzl wanted nothing more than to be a partially assimilated member of the Austrian nation in his younger years. Herzl was simply positioning Jews at the top of the social hierarchy to guarantee their own security. He believed that non-Jews would be willing to accept partial inclusion in the Jewish-nation state and would not see it as a disability.

[1059] (Herzl, 2009, p. 97)
[1060] (Herzl, 2009, p. 97)
[1061] (Herzl, 2009, p. 98)

Arabs, like Reschid Bey, were represented as the new assimilated bourgeois minorities, in the same way that Jews were in mid-19th Century Austria. They were also subordinate to Jews, thereby establishing the beginnings of a national hierarchy. This work claimed that inclusion in a national identity is based on overlap with its national founders and Arabs obtained their mid-level status through assimilation into the Jewish national identity. The less a group overlapped with the national elite, the lower their status in the nation-state. This was the case for Africans in *Altneuland*. Black citizens were represented twice in that work and were at the lowest social rung in both instances.[1062] The first was a 'liveried negro' servant who worked for David Littwak.[1063] Another black character was a 'negro footman' who also worked for David. The footman was presented using contemporary stereotypes. Herzl wrote, 'the negro played a jolly tune on his horn'[1064] for the amusement of David's child. These were not flattering representations of Black residents in the Jewish state but Herzl later added context to his characterisations. Herzl's Black characters were at the bottom of the social hierarchy because they had not yet been integrated into national societies. He applied the same diagnosis to pre-emancipation Jews in the Austrian Empire. It was already argued in Case Study 2 that Herzl rejected Eugen Duhring's racial antisemitism and any suggestion that a group's social profile was genetically inherent. Herzl used Arabs and Africans as proxies for Jews and other minorities in Europe. Their social statuses were dependent on their assimilation into national societies. His characterisations are racist in that they prioritise a Euro-centric view of social development but this is distinct from creating a racial hierarchy around genetics. Herzl drew direct comparisons between the Jewish Problem, or the national exclusion of Jews in Europe, and the 'Negro Problem' in Western nation-states. He voiced these views through a Jewish scientist, Professor Steineck, who was the brother of the national architect in *Altneuland*. Professor Steineck

[1062] The term 'Black' is used versus 'African' because Theodor Herzl referred to Black populations outside of Africa in his writings. The term 'African' is too narrow.
[1063] (Herzl, 2009, p. 52)
[1064] (Herzl, 2009, p. 93)

said, 'The depths of that problem, in all their horror, only a Jew can fathom.'[1065] Like Jews in Europe, Africans were the victims of Christian European exploitation and Steineck advocated for a national home for Africans as a solution to their national exclusion and its effects. Herzl wrote, 'Think of the hair-raising horrors of the slave trade. Human beings, because their skins are black, are stolen, carried off, and sold. Their descendants grow up in alien surroundings despised and hated because their skin.'[1066] He concluded, 'Now that I have lived to see the restoration of the Jews, I should like to pave the way for the restoration of the Negroes.'[1067] Herzl's approach to this issue will raise concerns amongst modern audiences but it revealed his belief that assimilation and/or nationalism were the general solutions to the insecurity that minorities faced when they were excluded from national societies.

Theodor Herzl's private views on non-Jews in his Jewish nation-state reveal a more damning perspective on his intentions towards civil equality. These views were documented in two of Theodor Herzl's diaries from June 1895 when he was first developing Political Zionism. They are presented in this work because they may reveal more overlap between Herzl's Political Zionism and antisemitic Christian Austro-German nationalism than is generally discussed. These views may provide support for this work's theoretical assertion that Theodor Herzl was recreating the political and social systems which were forcing Jews out of Vienna, Austria and Europe. His language and ideas come dangerously close to the Christian Social's antisemitic, political promises to 'repeal Emancipation, expropriate Jewish property, and expel Jews from Austria.'[1068] The first passage reads as follows,

[1065] (Herzl, 2009, p. 133)
[1066] (Herzl, 2009, p. 133)
[1067] (Herzl, 2009, p. 133)
[1068] (Kornberg, 1993, p. 94)

> When we occupy the land, we shall bring immediate benefits to the state that receives us. We must expropriate gently the private property on the estates assigned to us.
>
> We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country.
>
> The property-owners will come over to our side. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. Let the owners of immovable property believe that they are cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we are not going to sell them anything back.[1069]

The second passage followed,

> The voluntary expropriation will be accomplished through our secret agents. The Company would pay excessive prices. We shall then sell only to Jews, and all real estate will be traded only among Jews. To be sure, we shall not be able to do this by declaring other sales invalid. Even if this did not run counter to the modem world's sense of justice, our power would not suffice to force it through.
>
> Therefore, we must safeguard each of our sales of immovables through an option of re-purchase on the part of the Company. That is, if the owner wants to sell the property, we shall have the right to buy it back at our original sale price…
>
> This option of re-purchase will be a special privilege that cannot be revoked by a mortgage.[1070]

Theodor Herzl did not incorporate these ideas into the final version of *Der Judenstaat* in 1896. They were also not part of his future public presentations of Political Zionism. It must also be noted that Herzl's literary presentation of non-Jews in the Jewish state in *Altneuland*, which were presented in detail above, were written much later in 1902, when

[1069] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 88)
[1070] (Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 1960, p. 89)

compared to the diary entries from 1895. Theodor Herzl was decidedly more accepting of diversity, and sympathetic towards non-Jews in the Jewish nation-state, by this point.

10.5 Women in the Jewish Nation-State

To this point, it has been argued that Herzl was recreating the elite, Austro-German, Catholic, male national identity for Jews as a means of restoring Jewish security. Herzl defined a Jewish national identity that prioritised elite, bourgeois, educated Jews at its core. The final element of his national identity was his prioritisation of men over women. Theodor Herzl used nationalism to restore the security of all Jews, but he prioritised his own identity above those of other Jews. His identity was constructed relative to an Austrian society that also subordinated women to men. Similar to his representations of non-Jews, Herzl actually granted greater social mobility for women than they experienced in Europe at that time, but he also denied their ascension into the Jewish political, economic, and social elite.

On one hand, women had civil equality in the Jewish nation-state. David Littwak declared,

> "In our New Society the women have equal rights with men." … "They have active and passive suffrage as a matter of course. They worked faithfully beside us during the reconstruction period. … It would have been the blackest ingratitude if we had relegated them to the servants' hall or to a harem."[1071]

Herzl, via David, attested to the equality of women but Herzl denied it to them in practice. Herzl literally relegated women to servile roles, and to their roles as wives. This work already described Herzl's subordinate representations of Jewish women in Europe in *Das Neue Ghetto* and those themes persisted in his later discourse. In *Der Judenstaat*,

[1071] (Herzl, 2009, pp. 60-61)

Herzl described Jewish men as the 'Lawyers, doctors, scientists of every description, young traders …. who now escape from oppression in their native country to earn a living in (the Jewish state)' but women are the 'daughters of the middle classes (who) will have married these ambitious men.'[1072] Women are valued for the reproduction of future Jews through their roles as wives and mothers. The first generations of Jews in the Jewish state could only earn monetary income through overtime work but overtime is restricted to men there. 'Women will not be allowed to perform any arduous labour, nor to work overtime. … Pregnant women will be relieved of all work … We want our future generations to be strong men and women.'[1073] Women had no means of generating economic and social independence from men.

Herzl extended these constraints into his Jewish utopia in *Altneuland*. Women were educated in his Jewish state, and they also had political rights, but they were not expected to exercise them, especially if it contradicted their roles as wives and mothers. The bourgeois national leader, David Littwak, tells his European guests that his wife '"nursed our little boy, and so forgot a bit about her inalienable rights. She used to belong to the radical opposition. That is how I met her, as an opponent. Now she opposes me only at home, as loyally as you can imagine, however"'[1074] David's sister, Miriam, is an educated teacher at the girl's high school but she is also primed to be the future wife of the novel's other protagonist, Friedrich Loewenberg. Friedrich tells Miriam, that he admires 'a woman who remains obediently behind'[1075] at home while men are out. Friedrich was referring to Reshid Bey's wife, Fatma. She is described as 'well bred and well educated'[1076] but the audience never sees her. Fatma remains at home 'because she wants her husband to enjoy this little trip'[1077] with David. Jewish Women are present

[1072] (Herzl, 1946, p. 42)
[1073] (Herzl, 1946, p. 20)
[1074] (Herzl, 2009, p. 61)
[1075] (Herzl, 2009, p. 94)
[1076] (Herzl, 2009, p. 77)
[1077] (Herzl, 2009, p. 94)

in the trip but Herzl uses Fatma as a proxy for Jewish women in the Austrian national hierarchy. Upper-class, Christian women had higher status and could be seen amongst Christian and Jewish men, but Jewish women were a step below their husbands and did not have the same rights. Herzl represented this in *Das Neue Ghetto* when Jacob Samuel's wealthy sister-in-law was denied a meeting with Captain von Schramm's aristocratic sister because she was a Jewish woman in that society.[1078] This discrepancy was mirrored in the Jewish state. Friedrich and Miriam socialise on equal terms with British aristocrats, Lord and Lady Sudbury, at another point in *Altneuland* because they were at the apex of the Jewish national identity. Miriam and Lady Lillian do not have the same social restrictions as the wife of a non-Jewish minority.[1079] Fatma Bey's subordinate position was a representation of the ethno-national hierarchy in the Jewish state. Jewish bourgeois men were at the top, Jewish bourgeois women and Arab bourgeois men were below them. Arab bourgeois women were further subordinate, and so forth.

10.6 Conclusion

This dissertation concluded by performing Discourse Analysis on a sample of Theodor Herzl's primary documents. The section, Discourse Analysis, mirrored this work's narrative case study of Jews in 19th Century Vienna. Chapters 4 and 5 presented the first half of the Jewish story. Jews from across the Habsburg Empire experienced the removal of legal and social disabilities that had plagued them for centuries. Jews were successively granted equal rights of occupation, residence, and education during this time. In other words, Jews were allowed to integrate into Habsburg society via their access to its state institutions, including its military, bureaucracy, economy, and culture. Jews experienced rapid social mobility as a result. Theodor Herzl's status as a relatively

[1078] (Herzl, 1903, p. 26)
[1079] (Herzl, 2009, pp. 198-199)

wealthy, educated, bourgeois professional in the 1870s made him representative of the modern Jewish experience.

Analyses of Theodor Herzl's discourse before he became a Jewish nationalist aligned with this work's theoretical predictions for minorities who are allowed to partially assimilate into a state-society. Chapter 7 presented Theodor Herzl as an assimilated minority within Vienna's elite, Austro-German culture. Herzl internalised and reproduced that society's distribution of political, economic, and social power. He did this through his literary representations of the Christian-German aristocracy at the apex of society, the lower nobility and bourgeoisie as its privileged middle class, and the Christian-German petite bourgeoisie and lower classes as a subordinate but ascending group in that society. He simultaneously positioned the Viennese Jewry within the prevailing distribution of social power. Herzl centred the Jewish bourgeoisie as the ideal for the Jewish minority identity because it was the highest social position that was generally attainable for Jews in 19th Century Vienna.

Chapters 4 and 5 represented the increasing inclusion of Jews in the Habsburg society. Alternatively, Chapter 6 of the case study represented their subsequent exclusion from that society as it shifted towards a Christian Austro-German nationalism that rejected the inclusion of non-Germans and non-Christians. Pervasive Christian-German antisemitism became representative of the Viennese politics. Theodor Herzl, like many bourgeois Jews of his generation, experienced feelings of resentment, insecurity, and general angst during their displacement from Viennese, and even European society. Herzl processed this trauma by representing failed relationships between German-Christians and German-assimilated Jews in his discourse. He then attempted to negotiate reforms of the Jewish identity that would allow Jews to remain within Vienna's nationalising political society. He finally accepted that Jews were being permanently

excluded from Viennese society and that Jews would need a national society of their own. These were the subjects of Chapter 8.

Chapters 9 and 10 presented Theodor Herzl's representations of a Jewish nation-state and Jewish national identity that could restore Jewish security after they were ejected from Viennese society. A key theme of these chapters was that Theodor Herzl's Jewish nation-state and national identity were continuations of Jewish life in Europe. He modelled the Jewish state's political institutions and national society on those of the modern, centralised Habsburg state. The difference was that he created a Jewish national identity that gave Jews full inclusion in the state's institutions. Theodor Herzl recreated Vienna's Jewish society, including its distribution of political, economic, and social power, while giving Jews the security that came with maximum nationalist political inclusion

11. Conclusion

11.1 Summary of Findings

This dissertation explores the motivations of a minority ethnic group within an existing, modern state to become nationalist. Intra-state conflict has been the most common form of warfare since the Second World War. The prevalence of intra-state conflict is correlated with division of the world into exclusive nation-states since the Great War. The frequent inability of existing states to accommodate diverse populations has shaped politics in the 20th Century through the present day. This work derived one hypothesis to explain the preceding observation. It hypothesised a relationship amongst i) the modern centralisation of states ii) ethnic biases within state institutions that favoured the founders of modern states, and iii) the subsequent emergence of explicit political nationalisms and national identities around the biases inherent in state institutions. More specifically this dissertation considered the case of Theodor Herzl who founded Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, in 1896 while he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Theodor Herzl developed Political Zionism as a response to the exclusive, antisemitic politics of Christian Austro-German nationalism in the imperial capital of Vienna after the 1880s. The hypothesis was presented as follows:

> The modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy facilitated the emergence of an exclusive, Christian Austro-German nationalism in its capital of Vienna in the 19th Century. Viennese Jews became insecure when they were excluded from Viennese society via Christian Austro-German nationalism's antisemitism. Theodor Herzl founded Political Zionism in response to the antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society as a means of restoring his social security as an excluded Viennese Jew.

The hypothesis included three claims. The first claim was that the political choices made during the modern centralisation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy resulted in a distribution of social power that was biased towards Catholic, Austro-German, men in Austria by Vienna's Liberal Era (1867-1879). Modernisation theory, and theories of modern nationalism, argue that modern states were created when societies were centralised around state institutions. These state institutions included a centrally commanded military, a centralised political system and bureaucracy, a capitalist economy, and a dominant culture, amongst others. The second hypothetical claim was that biased, centralised, state institutions in Austria, and its capital of Vienna, created observable patterns of durable inequality between groups by the 19th Century. These patterns of durable inequality were based on objective social relations but were later defined as subjective national identities by groups who perceived that their social success aligned with categories of durable inequality. This work argued that the dominant political nationalism in Vienna by the late 19th Century was led by Christian, Austro-German, men who wished to formalise Vienna's patterns of durable inequality in its political system via the nationalist exclusion of competitive Jews. The modern, nationalist exclusion of Jews from society is known as antisemitism. Antisemitism meant that Jews were becoming insecure relative to Christian-Germans in Vienna. Viennese Jews had an incentive to secede from Viennese society, and from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, by creating their own modern centralised state, national identity, and political nationalism. This work concluded that one excluded Viennese Jew, Theodor Herzl, was attempting this goal when he created Jewish political nationalism, or Political Zionism, in 1896.

The hypothesis was further refined into three research questions.

i) Can minority identities be an outcome of social exclusion from dominant national movements?

ii) Are minority individuals insecure compared to individuals included within dominant national movements? and,

iii) Do minority individuals attempt to restore their security by creating a new nation-state based on their shared minority identity?

This work addressed its hypothesis and research questions in two complementary ways. The first method was the presentation of a narrative case study around the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Viennese politics and society, and the emergence of Theodor Herzl as a Jewish nationalist between 1860 and 1896. It was argued that Jews were incorporated into the Habsburg state's institutions after the state was centralised. Austro-Hungarian Jews experienced rapid upward social mobility as they gained new opportunities in society. Jewish integration and success in the Austrian half of the monarchy, in particular, could be attributed to their willing assimilation into its Austro-German social hierarchy via German assimilation.

The rapid integration of Jews in the Habsburg state by 1879 was followed by an equally swift decline in their social inclusion by the 1890s. The antisemitic exclusion of Jews from Viennese society coincided with inter-ethnic competition in the capital's political system. The emergence of a politically successful but antisemitic, Christian Austro-German nationalism disadvantaged Jews in Viennese society. Theodor Herzl lived his entire life within the preceding social context. This work argues that Theodor Herzl founded political Jewish nationalism, or Political Zionism, as a response to the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Christian, Austro-German nationalism.

The final section of this work was a Discourse Analysis of a sample of Theodor Herzl's primary documents. It was argued that Theodor Herzl's discourse aligned with this work's claims that Jews were integrated into Habsburg society through the mid-19th Century before being excluded from its political system via antisemitism from Christian

Austro-German nationalism the second half of the 19th Century. Herzl's discursive narrative was reconstructed using his literary characters' evolving social relationships in *Das Neue Ghetto* and *Altneuland*, via his explicit political ideology in *Der Judenstaat,* in his opening speech at the First Zionist Congress in 1897, and in his personal and political reflections in his diaries. Before his turn to Jewish nationalism, Theodor Herzl's discourse consistently represented Jews as socially assimilated and integrated subjects who were on the brink of being excluded from its society via politically motivated antisemitism. Herzl represented Christian-Germans as politically dominant in the imperial capital of Vienna and he gave them the social power to define inclusion with its political system. He conversely represented the Jewish identity as being socially dependent on superior Christian-Germans. Theodor Herzl represented the nationalist exclusion of Jews from Viennese society through the social rejection of Jews by Christian Austro-Germans. Theodor Herzl's discourse therefore supported this work's hypothesis and research questions when he revealed his beliefs that his Jewish minority identity was assigned to him via his social position within Viennese political society. He also revealed that he was insecure due to his minority identity within the Austrian state-society.

This work concluded by analysing Theodor Herzl's use of political Jewish nationalism as a means of restoring his lost social security. It was argued that this was his aim when he called for a new Jewish nation-state in *Der Judenstaat* in 1896. It would have been insufficient for this work's aims if it stopped at Theodor Herzl's call for a Jewish nation-state as his solution to their nationalist exclusion. This could have exposed this research to counterarguments that the emergence of Jewish nationalism was evidence that Jews were always a socially independent nation in Europe. This work concluded by demonstrating that Theodor Herzl's vision for the Jewish nation-state was a recreation of the centralised Austrian state and its emergent political hierarchy found in Christian Austro-German nationalism. The overlap between the Austrian state and society and

Theodor Herzl's hypothesised Jewish nation-state was used to argue that Theodor Herzl's aims for Jewish nationalism was the restoration of the security he lost in Austria, and in Europe. Theodor Herzl recreated the security he previously felt within the Habsburg Empire's Jewish society, including his position near the top of its political, economic, and social hierarchy, while simultaneously giving Jews the security that came with maximum political and social inclusion in their own nation-state.

11.2 Contribution to Knowledge and the Scope of Future Research

This work's contribution to knowledge extends from its interest in the secession of minority groups from established state-societies and their creation of novel national identities. In this work's introduction, it was anecdotally observed that secessionist national identities have consistent overlaps with the political nationalisms of the states they secede from. This suggested that there may be links between the political nationalisation of both societies. The popular, alternative argument is that minorities secede from existing states to realise their pre-existing, socially independent, national identities. This work adopted the position of modern nationalism when it argued that nationalism is a modern political process. Specifically, it built upon theories of modern nationalism which connect the modern centralisation of states to the emergence of popular nationalisms. It went beyond these conventional theories of modern nationalism, though, when it argued that the national identities defined in political nationalisms may be outcomes of the centralisation of states. This work therefore presented a critical concept of national identity which positioned it as a product of social processes without an independent, pre-social basis. In ordinary language, this work rejected the existence of objective, 'historical' nations and provided one explanation for the social construction of contemporary national identities. This work accepts that there may be persistent features to social identities within defined territories due to historical political and social legacies but it still contends that these are historical coincidences and do not represent

any natural association between a territory and a single identity as claimed by primordial nationalism. Specifically, this work claims that national identities will be biased towards the features of whoever were the prevailing, governing elite at the time of the state's modern centralisation.

This dissertation concludes by presenting two avenues for future research that builds upon its findings. The first may look at the development of the Jewish national identity after its creation by Theodor Herzl in 1896, through the foundation of the modern State of Israel in 1948, and to the present day. The modern state of Israel still bears striking similarities to the Theodor Herzl's original vision for the Jewish nation-state and its national identity. If this work argued for the transference of the ideologies of nationalism from an existing political nationalism to a minority nationalism, then future research may be able to show how these ideologies of nationalism are manifested in the new nation-state's state institutions. This may provide insights into the spread of not just nation-states but also the ideologies of nationalism across space and time. It may also help guide our understanding of the possibilities and limitations for ethnic coexistence within nation-states with institutionally defined, national identities. This would not just apply to the relationship between Jews and Palestinians within the State of Israel, but also for the relationship between European and non-European Jews within that national society.

A second avenue for research is more theoretical and may lend further support to this work's claims around the social contingency of national identities. This work implies that national identities are complementary, both within the inter-state system, and within intra-state societies. 18th and 19th Century European nation-states defined their national identities relative to one another and this was heightened during instances of inter-state war. For instance, French language and culture were classified as alien and hostile by the Habsburg state during and after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. These became the targets of Metternich's secret police and censors. These wars

therefore re-emphasised the centrality of the Austro-German culture in the Habsburg state. If European state-cultures were defined in opposition to one another during inter-state wars, and these same cultures were later used to exclude minorities from their nationalised political systems, this suggests that minority national identities across nation-states may have unexplored links. This seems to be the case for the European Jewish identity in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Jews across different European states were able to conceive of themselves as a single national group based on their shared exclusion from European political nationalisms, which were in turn, defined relative to one another in prior centuries. It may be worthwhile to explore how the simultaneous exclusion of Jews from European political systems in the 19th and 20th Centuries fostered a sense of belonging to a shared Jewish nationality.

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Appendix A: The 1879 Austrian Reichsrat Elections and Its Delegates

Case Study: The Transformation of Theodor Herzl from a German Nationalist to Jewish Nationalist Between 1867 and 1896 references this dissertation's original dataset for the 1879 Austrian *Reichsrat* elections. This dataset combines two data sources. The first is the official election results for the 1879 Austrian parliamentary elections. The election results were published in the archived document, 'Imperial Council elections of 1879 in Austria, Presented Statistically and Comparatively Based on Official Data.'[1080] This document was translated from its original German to English with automated translation software. The second data source was the 'The Austrian Parliament 1848-1918. A collective biography'. This data set presented,

> The collected data of all members of the Austrian central parliaments from 1848 to 1918 are evaluated in a longitudinal section. In addition to recording parliamentary activity, the focus is on the presentation of the age and professional structure, professional competence, regional origin and political and social activity outside the parliament as well as the explanation of the political framework conditions.[1081]

This dissertation's dataset manually cross-referenced the 19th Century pamphlet of election results with the 'Aldgasser directory of Reichsrat delegates' to produce a biographical database for all 352 members of the 1879 Reichsrat. It then traced the political progression of these delegates across the 1885, 1891, and 1897 Reichsrat elections. The dataset is presented below and the original data is available upon request.

[1080] (Neumann-Spallart, 1880)
[1081] (Adlgasser, 2025)

1879

:p 1: Enter name
Step 2:

No.	Curia	Region	District	Name in Election Results	Name in Biographies	Place of Birth	German Name	Religion	Highest Education	1873	1879	1885	1891	1897
1	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Karl Baron von Kielmansegg	Kielmansegg (Kielmannsegge), Karl Freiherr von	Austria	1	1	3	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Association of Large Landowners
2	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Peter Baron von Pirquet	Pirquet, Peter Freiherr von Cesenatico	Austria	0	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	United German Left
3	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Eduard Ritter von Raab	Raab, Eduard Ritter von	Romania	1	1	3		Liberals			
4	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Heinrich Baron von Dobihoff	Dobihoff-Dier, Heinrich Freiherr von	Austria	1	1	3	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Association of Large Landowners
5	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Christian Count Kinsky	Christian Graf Kinsky	Austria	0	1	3	Center	Liberals			
6	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Gustav Baron von Suttner	Suttner, Gustav Ritter von, Freiherr von	Austria	1	1	3		Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	United German Left
7	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Alexander Prince Croy	Croy, Alexander Prince of	Austria	0	1	0		Center			
8	Large Landowner	Lower Austria	Vienna	Berthold Froschel	Froech, Berthold (Ignaz)	Austria	1	1	3		Right Center			
9	Large Landowner	Upper Austria	Linz	Sigmund Freiherr von Handel	Handel, Sigismund (Sigmund) Freiherr von	Austria	1	1	3		United Progressive Party			
10	Large Landowner	Upper Austria	Linz	August Dehne	Dehne, August Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3		United Progressive Party			
11	Large Landowner	Upper Austria	Linz	Franz Gross	Gross, Franz Dr. iur.	Silesia	1	1	3	Progress	Liberals	Liberals	Liberals	Liberals
12	Large Landowner	Salzburg	Salzburg	Victor Fuchs	Fuchs, Victor von (1888), Freiherr von (1908) Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3		Right Center	Center	Conservative	Catholic People's Party
13	Large Landowner	Styria	Graz	Mathias Lohninger	Lohninger, Mathias	Austria	1	1	0		Liberals			
14	Large Landowner	Styria	Graz	Bartholomaus Ritter von Carneri	Carneri, Bartholomäus von, Ritter von	Tyrol	0	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club		
15	Large Landowner	Styria	Graz	Rudolf Freih von Hackelberg-Landau	Hackelberg-Landau, Rudolf Adam Freiherr von	Styria	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	Association of Constitutional Large Landowners	
16	Large Landowner	Styria	Graz	Johann Paul Pauer	Pauer, Johann Paul	Styria	1	1	2	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club		
17	Large Landowner	Carinthia	Klagenfurt	Ernst Ritter von Edlmann	Edlmann, Ernst Ritter von (1872) Dr. iur.	Carinthia	1	1	3		Liberals			
18	Large Landowner	Carniola	Ljubljana	Yosef Freiherr von Schwegel	Schwegel, Josef Ritter von (1870), Freiherr von (1875)	Carniola	1	1	3		Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Association of Large Landowners
19	Large Landowner	Carniola	Ljubljana	Benno Freiherr von Taufferer	Taufferer, Benno Freiherr von	Carniola	1	1	0		Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
20	Large Landowner	Gorizia-Gradisca	Gorizia	Alois Ritter Pajer von Mon	Pajer, Luigi Ritter von Monriva (1875) Dr. iur.	Gorizia	0	1	3		Liberals			
21	Large Landowner	Istria	Parenzo	Jakob Freiherr von Lazzarini	Lazarini (seit 1859 Lazarini-Battiala), Giacomo Lodovico Freiherr von	Istria	0	1	0		Liberals			
22	Large Landowner	Tyrol	Innsbruch	Yosef Wieser	Wieser, Joseph	Tyrol	1	1	3		Right Center			
23	Large Landowner	Tyrol	Innsbruch	Andreas Edler von Hofer	Hofer, Andreas Edler von Passeier Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3		Liberals			
24	Large Landowner	Tyrol	Innsbruch	Alois von Makowitz	Mackowitz, Alois von	Tyrol	0	1	3		Liberals			
25	Large Landowner	Tyrol	Innsbruch	Peter Graf Consolati	Consolati, Pietro Graf	Tyrol	0	1	3		Liberals			
26	Large Landowner	Tyrol	Innsbruch	Robert Graf Torlago	Torlago, Robert Graf	Tyrol	0	1	3		Liberals		United German Left	Association of Large Landowners
27	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Franz Count Deym	Deym, Franz Graf	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
28	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Emanuel Ritter von Forster	Forster, Emanuel Ritter von (1873) Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3	Center	Liberals			
29	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Friedrich Karl Count Kinsky	Friedrich Karl Count Kinsky	Austria	0	1	0		Bohemian			
30	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Hieronymus Count Mannsfeld	Hieronymus Count Mannsfeld	Galicia	1	1	0		Liberals			
31	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Ludwig Baron von Oppenheimer	Ludwig Baron von Oppenheimer	Austria	1	2	0	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
32	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Alois Atgraf Salm-Reitterscheidt	Alois Atgraf Salm-Reitterscheidt	Bohemia	1	1	0		Other			
33	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Josef Stanglar	Josef Stanglar	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
34	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Franz Pfeifer	Franz Pfeifer	Bohemia	1	1	2		Liberals			
35	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Christian Ritter vott Shaffer	Schäffer, Christian Ritter von, Ritter von Aumonin (1871)	Austria	1	1	0		Bohemian			
36	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Friedrich Jakesch Ritter von Wartenhorst	Jakesch, Friedrich Ritter von Wartenhorst (1871) Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Other	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Association of Large Landowners
37	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Sisinio Freih Pretis v Cagnodo	de Pretis, Sisinio von (1842), Freiherr von (1871) Cagnodo Dr. iur.	Hamburg	0	1	3	Other	Other			
38	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Alfred Freiherr Pfeil-Scharfenstein	Pfeil-Scharffenstein, Alfred Freiherr von	Venice	1	1	3		Bohemian			
39	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Max Freiherr vott Scharschmid	Scharschmid, Max Ritter, Freiherr (1872) von Adlertreu	Austria	1	1	3	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
40	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Adolf Weik	Weiß, Adolf Ritter von Tessbach	Moravia	1	1	3	Center	Liberals			
41	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Leopold Count Wolkenstein	Wolkenstein-Trostburg, Leopold Graf (1831-1893)	Bohemia	1	1	3		United Progressive Party			
42	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Karl Moriz Count Zedwiz	Zedtwitz, Karl Moriz Graf	Galicia	1	4	3	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Association of Large Landowners
43	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Heinrich Count Clam-Martinic	Clam-Martinic, Heinrich Karl Graf	Hungary	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
44	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Richard Count Clam-Martinic	Clam-Martinic, Richard Graf	Austria	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
45	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Georg Prince Lobkowitz	Lobkowicz (Lobkowitz), Jiří Kristián (Georg Christian) Fürst	Austria	0	1	3		Bohemian			
46	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Cajetan Posselt	Posselt, Kajetan (Anton)	Bohemia	1	1	3	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club		
47	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Josef Muller	Müller, Josef (1821-1883)	Bohemia	1	1	2		United Progressive Party			
48	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Franz Count Thun Hohenstein	Thun-Hohenstein, Franz Graf, Prince (1911)	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
49	Large Landowner	Bohemia	Prague	Ferdinand Freiherr Kot von Dobrz	Kotz von Dobř, Ferdinand von, Freiherr (1869)	Bohemia	1	1	3	Center	Liberals			
50	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Egbert Graf Belcredi	Belcredi, Egbert Graf	Moravia	0	1	2		Czech			
51	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Sigismund Graf Berthold	Berchtold, Sigmund Graf	Moravia	1	1	3		Other	Other		
52	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Adolf Graf Dubsky	Adolf Graf Dubsky	Austria	0	1	3	Center	Other	Liberal Center	Liberal Center	
53	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Ernst Landgrave Furstenberg	Ernst Landgraf, Fürstenberg	Austria	1	1	3		Other	Other		
54	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Ernst Freiherr Gudenau-Mirbach	Gudenau-Mirbach, Ernst Freiherr von M., Freiherr von G.-M (1868), Count Mirbach-Harff (1882)	Prussia	1	1	3		Other			
55	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Ernst Freiherr Loudon	Loudon, Ernst Freiherr von	Austria	0	1	2	Center	Other			
56	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Hugo Altgraff Salm-Reifferscheidt	Salm-Reifferscheidt, Hugo Karl Franz Altgraf, Prince (1888)	Bohemia	1	1	3		Other			
57	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Felix Graf Vetter von der Lilie	Vetter von der Lilie, Felix Graf	Moravia	1	1	3		Other	Other		
58	Large Landowner	Moravia	Brno	Georg Graf Stockau	Stockau, Georg Graf	Moravia	1	1	3		Other			
59	Large Landowner	Silesia	Opava	Georg Freiherr von Bees	Bees, Georg Freiherr von	Silesia	1	1	3	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
60	Large Landowner	Silesia	Opava	Emanuel Freiherr von Spens-Boden	Spens-Booden, Emanuel Freiherr von	Silesia	1	1	3	Center	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Association of Large Landowners
61	Large Landowner	Silesia	Opava	Moriz Rohrmann	Rohrmann, Moritz	Austria	1	1	3		Liberals			
62	Large Landowner	Galicia	Krakow	Leon Ritter von Chrzanowski	Chrzanowski, Leon Ritter von	Poland	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish
63	Large Landowner	Galicia	Bodowice	Ladislaus Haller von Hallerburg	Haller, Władysław Noble of Hallenburg	Galicia	1	1	3		Polish			
64	Large Landowner	Galicia	Bodjnia	Heinrich Freiherr von Konopfa	Konopka, Henryk Freiherr von	Galicia	0	1	2		Polish			
65	Large Landowner	Galicia	Zarnow	Eduard Ritter von Dzwonlowsti	Dzwonkowski, Edward Ritter of	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish		
66	Large Landowner	Galicia	Novy Saco	Faustin Ritter von Starzewsti	Żuk-Skarszewski (Skarszewski-Żuk), Faustyn Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish	Polish	Polish	
67	Large Landowner	Galicia	Raesom	Ludwig Ruczka	Ruczka, Ludwik	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish	
68	Large Landowner	Galicia	Przemysl	Sigmund Ritter von Kozlowski	Kozlowski, Zygmunt Knight of	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
69	Large Landowner	Galicia	Sanof	Georg Furkst Czartonski	Czartoryski, Jerzy Fürst	Saxony	0	1	0	Polish	Polish	Polish		
70	Large Landowner	Galicia	Sambor	Ludwig Ritter von Skrzynski	Skrzyński, Ludwik Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
71	Large Landowner	Galicia	Faworow	Severin Ritter von Smarzewski	Smarzewski, Seweryn Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish		
72	Large Landowner	Galicia	Botfiero	Julian Czerkawski	Czerkawski, Julian von Dr. phil. Dr. med.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
73	Large Landowner	Galicia	Lemberg	Oswald Bartmarski	Bartmański, Oswald	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			
74	Large Landowner	Galicia	Bloczow	Apollinar Ritter von Zaworski	Jawórski, Apolinary Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish
75	Large Landowner	Galicia	Brzezan	Alfons Ritter von Czaykowski	Czaykowski (Czajkowski), (Michał) Alfons Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish	Polish		
76	Large Landowner	Galicia	Rohown	Miciesiaus von Onyszkiewicz	Onyszkiewicz, Mieczysław Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			
77	Large Landowner	Galicia	Stryi	Apollinar Ritter von Hoppen	Hoppen, Apolinary Ritter von	Galicia	1	1	3		Polish	Polish		
78	Large Landowner	Galicia	Stanislau	Adalbert Graf Dzieduszycik	Dzieduszycki, Wojciech (Adalbert) Graf Dr. phil.	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish	Polish		Polish
79	Large Landowner	Galicia	Rolomnja	Nikolaus Krzystokowicz	Krzysztofowicz, Mikołaj Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	0		Polish			
80	Large Landowner	Galicia	Baleszczht	Thomas Ritter von Horodyski	Horodyski, Tomasz Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	2		Polish			
81	Large Landowner	Galicia	Tarnopol	August Graf Starzenski	Starzeński, August Graf	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish	Polish		
82	Large Landowner	Bukovina	Czernowitz	Karl von Stremayr	Stremayr, Karl von Dr. iur.	Styria	1	1	3	Other	Other			
83	Large Landowner	Bukovina	Czernowitz	Georgie von Hormuzaki	Hormuzaki (Hurmuzaki), Gheorghe Ritter von, Freiherr von (1881)	Bukovina	0	5	3	Right Center	Right Center			
84	Large Landowner	Bukovina	Czernowitz	Victor Ritter von Styrza	Styrcea (Stârcea; bis 1880 Styrza), Viktor Ritter von, Freiherr von (1880)	Burkovina	0	5	3		Right Center			
85	Large Landowner	Dalmatia	Bara	Manfred Borelli Conte de Wrana	Borelli (Vranski), Manfred Graf (di Vrana)	Dalmatia	0	1	3		Right Center	Liberal Center		
86	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Lower Austria	Vienna	Rudolf Iabary	Iabary, Rudolf	Saxony	0	4	2	Left	Liberals	Liberals		
87	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Lower Austria	Vienna	Mauthner, Max Freiherr von (1902)	Mauthner, Max Freiherr von (1902)	Bohemia	1	2	2		Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Free Association of German Deputies
88	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Upper Austria	Linz	Wilhelm Schaup	Schaup, Wilhelm Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Left	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
89	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Styria	Graz	Count Gundacker Wurmbrand	Wurmbrand-Stuppach, Gundacker Graf	Bohemia	1	1	3		United Progressive	German-Austrian Club		
90	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Styria	Leoben	Baron Ludwig von Schock	Zschock, Ludwig Freiherr von	Graz	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club		
91	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Carinthia	Klagenfurt	Gustav Pacher von Theinburg	Pacher, Gustav von Theinburg	Lower Austria	1	1	0		United Progressive	German-Austrian Club		
92	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Trieste	Trieste	Yosef Teuschl	Teuschl, Josef Michael	Lower Austria	1	1	0	Left	Liberals			
93	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bohemia	Prague	Adolf Schwab	Schwab, Adolf	Bohemia	1	2	2	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	Free Association of German Deputies	
94	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bohemia	Prague	Max Ritter von Dormitzer	Dormitzer (Dormizer), Max (Markus) Ritter von (1866)	Bohemia	1	2	0	Left	Liberals			
95	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bohemia	Reichenberg	Franz Edler von Siegmund	Siegmund, Franz Edler von (1873)	Bohemia	1	1	0		Liberals			
96	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bohemia	Reichenberg	Alexander Peez	Peez, Alexander von (1899) Dr. iur.	Prussia	1	1	3	Left	United Progressive		United German Left	German Progessive Party
97	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bohemia	Eger	Ernst Edler von Plener	Plener, Ernst Edler von, Freiherr von (1907) Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
98	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bohemia	Bilsen	Josef Furth	Fürth, Josef Ritter von (1880)	Bohemia	1	2	3	Left	Liberals			
99	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bohemia	Budweis	Josef Schelr	Schier, Josef	Bohemia	1	1	1	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
100	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Moravia	Brno	Julius Ritter von Gomperz	Gomperz, Julius Ritter von (1879)	Moravia	1	2	3	Constitutional	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
101	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Moravia	Brno	Yosef Neuwirth	Neuwirth, Josef	Moravia	1	2	3	Left	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
102	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Moravia	Olmutz	Emmanuel Ritter von Proskowetz	Proskowetz, Emanuel Ritter (1873) v. Proskow u. Marstorff (1881)	Bohemia	0	1	3	Left	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	Free Association of German Deputies
103	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Galicia	Lviv	Max Bodynski	Bodyński, Maksymilian	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			

104	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Galicia	Krakau	Arnold Rappaport	Rapoport, Arnold Edler von Porada (1890) Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	2	3		Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish
105	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Galicia	Brody	Nathan Ritter von Kallir	Kallir, Nathan Edler von (1869), Ritter von (1874)	Galicia	0	2	0	Left	Liberals	United Left		
106	Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Bukovina	Czernowitz	Heinrich Wagner	Wagner, Heinrich	Galicia	1	2	3		Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
107	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Rudolf Brestel	Brestel, Rudolf Dr. phil.	Austria	1	1	3	Left	Liberals			
108	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Ignaz Kuranda	Kuranda, Ignaz Dr. phil.	Bohemia	0	2	3	Left	Liberals			
109	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Heinrich Jaques	Jaques, Heinrich Dr. iur.	Austria	0	2	3		United Progressive	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
110	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Karl Hoffer	Hoffer, Karl Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Progress	United Progressive			
111	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Eduard Suess	Suess (Sueß), Eduard	England	1	4	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
112	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Alfred Lenz	Lenz, Alfred von (1888)	Austria	1	4	3		Liberals			
113	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Michael Matscheko	Matscheko, Michael Ritter von (1895)	Austria	1	1	3		Liberals	German-Austrian Club		
114	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Johann Heinrich Steudel	Steudel, Johann	Austria	1	4	2	Democrats	United Progressive			
115	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Josef Kopp	Kopp, Josef Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	German Progessive Party
116	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Adolf Wiesenburg	Wiesenburg, Adolf Edler von Hochsee (1902)	Austria	1	1	0		United Progressive			
117	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Ferdinand Kronawetter	Kronawetter, Ferdinand Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Democrats	United Progressive	Other	Other	Free Association
118	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Vienna	Franz Loblich	Loblich, Franz	Austria	1	1	0		United Progressive			
119	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	St Polten	Johann Ofner	Ofner, Johann Dr. iur.	Tyrol	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club		
120	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Krems	Theodor Dobler	Dobler, Theodor	Austria	1	1	3		United Progressive	German-Austrian Club		
121	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Korneuburg	Alois Czedik von Brundelsberg	Czedik, Alois von (1857), Freiherr (1884) v. Bründlsberg, v. B. und Eysenberg (1897)	Croatia	0	1	3		Liberals			
122	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Baden	Wenzel Listkandl	Lustkandl, Wenzel Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		United Progressive	United Left		
123	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Lower Austria	Wiener Neustadt	Josef Pock	Pöck, Josef Edler von Frauenkirch	Austria	1	1	2		United Progressive			
124	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Upper Austria	Linz	Max Edlbacher	Edlbacher, Max Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive			
125	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Upper Austria	Linz	Karl Foltz	Foltz, Karl	Austria	1	4	3		Liberals			
126	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Upper Austria	Freistadt	Max Ritter von Spaun	Spaun, Maximilian Reichsritter von Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3		United Progressive	German	United German Left	
127	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Upper Austria	Steyr	Franz Wickhoff	Wickhoff, Franz	Austria	1	1	0	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian Club		
128	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Upper Austria	Wels	Julius Count Falkenhayn	Falkenhayn, Julius Graf	Austria	1	1	3		Other	Other	Conservative	Conservative
129	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Upper Austria	Ried	Heinrich Klinkosch	Klinkosch, Heinrich	Austria	1	1	2		United Progressive	German		
130	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Salzburg	Salzburg	Franz Keil	Keil, Franz Dr. iur.	Salzburg	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
131	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Salzburg	St Johann	Johann Wegscheider	Wegscheider, Johann Dr. iur.	Tyrol	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German-Austrian Club		
132	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Graz Inner City	Karl Rechbauer	Rechbauer, Karl Dr. iur.	Styria	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive			
133	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Graz Suburbs	Ferdinand Portugall	Portugall, Ferdinand Dr. iur.	Styria	0	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive			
134	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Leoben	Josef Heilsberg	Heilsberg, Josef Alfred Dr. med. Dr. iur.	Moravia	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German	United German Left	
135	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Judenberg	Robert Baron von Walterskirchen	Walterskirchen, Robert Freiherr von	Hungary	1	1	0	Progressive	United Progressive	United Left		
136	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Hartberg	Oskar Falke	Falke, Oskar	Austria	1	1	3		United Progressive			
137	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Leibnitz	Julius Magg	Magg, Julius Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3		United Progressive	German-Austrian Club		
138	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Marburg	Ferdinand Duchatsch	Duchatsch, Ferdinand Dr. iur.	Styria	1	1	3		United Progressive			
139	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Styria	Cilli	Richard Foregger	Foregger, Richard von F. zum Greiffenthurn (1904) Dr. iur.	Styria	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German	Other	
140	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Carinthia	Klagenfurt	Leopold Knight von Moro	Moro, Leopold Ritter von	Carinthia	0	1	3		Liberals	German-Austrian Club	United German Left	
141	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Carinthia	St Veit	Valerius Knight	Ritter, Valerius	Prussia	1	4	3	Progressive	Liberals	German-Austrian Club		
142	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Carinthia	Villach	Anton Moritsch	Moritsch, Anton	Carinthia	1	1	0	Progressive	Liberals			
143	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Carniola	Ljubljana	Josef Knight Schneid von Treuenfeld	Schneid, Josef Ritter von Treuenfeld (1867)	Austria	1	1	3		Center Right			
144	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Carniola	Adelsberg	Joseph Poklukar	Poklukar, Josip Dr. iur.	Krain	0	1	3		Center Right			
145	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Carniola	Rudolfswerth	Albin Count Margheri-Comandona	Margheri di Commandona, Albin Graf	Krain	0	1	2		Center Right			
146	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Trieste	Trieste	Paul Ritter von Wittmann	Wittmann, Paul Ritter von (1871) Dr. iur.	Trieste	1	1	3		Liberals			
147	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Trieste	Trieste	Josef Rabl	Rabl, Josef Dr. iur.	Carinthia	1	1	3		Liberals			
148	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Trieste	Trieste	Johann Nabergoj	Nabergoj, Ivan	Trieste	0	1	1	Other	Center Right	Center Right	Croatian-Slovenian	
149	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Gorizia-Gradisca	Gorizia	Franz Count Coronini-Cronberg	Coronini-Cronberg, Franz Graf	Gorz	0	1	3	Left	Other	Liberal Center		
150	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Istria	Parenzo	Franz Vidulich	Vidulich, Francesco Dr. iur.	Istria	0	1	3	Left	Liberals	Liberal Center		
151	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Tyrol	Innsbruck	Tobias Ritter Wildauer von Wildhasen	Wildauer, Tobias Ritter von Wildhausen (1862) Dr. phil.	Tyrol	1	1	3	Progress	Liberal	German-Austrian	United German Left	
152	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Tyrol	Bolanzo	Johann Freiherr von Giovanelli	Giovanelli, Johann Freiherr von (1839)	Tyrol	0	1	3		Center Right			
153	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Tyrol	Brigen	Josef Freiherr von Dipauli	Dipauli (Di Pauli), Josef Freiherr von Treuheim	Tyrol	0	1	3		Center Right	Center	Conservatives	Catholic People
154	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Tyrol	Trento	Johann Freiherr von Ciani	Ciani, Giovanni Ritter von, Freiherr von (1871)	Tyrol	0	1	3	Left	Other	Trentino	Other	Italian
155	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Tyrol	Rovereredo	Karl Edler von Bertolini	Bertolini, Carlo Edler von Monteplaneta (Monte Planeta) Dr. iur.	Tyrol	0	1	3	Left	Other	Trentino		
156	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Vorarlberg	Bregenz	Johann Waibel	Waibel, Johann Georg Dr. med.	Vorarlberg	1	1	3		Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	
157	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Prague	Josef Prachensky	Prachenský, Josef Stanislav Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
158	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Prague	Franz Ladislaus Rieger	Rieger, František Ladislav Freiherr von (1897) Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
159	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Prague	Rudolf Alter	Alter, Rudolf Ritter (1882), Freiherr (1912) von Waltrecht Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
160	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Karolinenthal	Alois Oliva	Oliva, Alois	Bohemia	0	1	2		Bohemian			
161	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Schlan	Julius Gregr	Grégr, Julius Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
162	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Pribram	Josef Jirecek	Jireček, Josef Dr. phil.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
163	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Jungbunzlau	Karl Mattusch	Mattuš, Karel Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
164	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Kolin	Hubert Pesely	Veselý, Hubert Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
165	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Eger	Ernst Bareuther	Bareuther, Ernst Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	4	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German	German National	
166	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Falkenau	Heinrich Reschauer	Reschauer, Heinrich	Austria	1	1	2		United Progressive			
167	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Karlovy Vary	Victor Russ	Russ, Viktor Wilhelm Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	German Progessive Party
168	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Saaz	Anton Banhans	Banhans, Anton Freiherr von (1886) Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian		
169	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Aussig	Karl Wolfrum	Wolfrum, Karl	Bavaria	1	4	2	Left	Liberals			
170	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Leitmeritz	Anton Meissler	Meissler, Anton	Bohemia	1	4	2	Progressive	United Progressive	German	United German Left	
171	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Detschen	Franz Klier	Klier, Franz Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3	Left	United Progressive			
172	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Rumburg	Josef Wunsche	Wünsche, Josef	Bohemia	1	1	0		Liberals			
173	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Schluckenau	Franz Richter	Franz Xaver Richter	Bohemia	1	1	0	Left	Liberals			
174	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Liberec	Franz Ritter von Liebieg	Liebieg, Franz Ritter von (1867), Freiherr von (1883)	Bohemia	1	1	2	Left	Liberals			
175	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Jablonec	Gustav Robert Gross	Groß, Gustav Robert Dr. phil.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Liberals			
176	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Jicin	Alois Jansa	Jansa, Alois Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
177	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Trautenau	Hermann Hallwich	Hallwich, Hermann Dr. phil.	Bohemia	1	1	3	Left	United Progressive	German	United German Left	
178	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Hradec Kralove	Anton Ottokar Zeithammer	Zeithammer, Antonín Otakar	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
179	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Pardubice	Johan Zak	Žák, Jan Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
180	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Caslau	Karl Roth	Roth, Karel Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
181	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Litomerice	Edmund Kaizl	Kaizl, Edmund Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
182	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Tabor	Emanuel Kletecka	Kletečka, Emanuel	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
183	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Wittingau	Wendelin Grunwald	Grünwald, Vendelín Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
184	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Budweis	Eduard Claudi	Claudi, Eduard	Bohemia	0	1	3	Left	Liberals			
185	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Krumau	Friedrich Nitsche	Nitsche, Friedrich Edler von Hohenplan (1909) Dr. iur.	Tyrol	1	1	3		Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	German Progessive Party
186	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Pisek	Johann Suda	Suda, Jan	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
187	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Pilsen	Josef Krofta	Krofta, Josef Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
188	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bohemia	Mies	Anton Stohr	Stoehr, Anton Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	German Progessive Party
189	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Brno	Karl Van der Strass von Hohenstraeten	van der Strass, Karl Ritter von Hohenstraetan (1875) Dr. iur.	Moravia	0	1	3	Left	United Progressive			
190	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Brno	Christian Ritter D'Elvert	dʼElvert, Christian Ritter (1864)	Moravia	0	1	3	Left	Liberals			
191	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Mahrisch-Trubau	Johann Budig	Budig, Johann	Moravia	1	1	3		United Progressive			
192	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Meustadtl	Josef Fanderlik	Fanderlík, Josef Dr. iur.	Moravia	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian	Moravian	
193	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Iglau	Eduard Sturm	Sturm, Eduard Dr. iur.	Moravia	1	1	3	Left	United Progressive	German-Austrian		
194	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Znojmo	Karl Panowsky	Panowsky, Karl	Moravia	0	1	2		United Progressive			
195	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Nikolsburg	Rudolf Auspitz	Auspitz, Rudolf	Austria	1	2	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	Free Association of German Deputies
196	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Kromeriz	Adolf Promber	Prombér, Adolf Dr. iur.	Moravia	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive	German-Austrian	United German Left	Free Association of German Deputies
197	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Hollezov	Ignaz Wurm	Wurm, Ignát	Moravia	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
198	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Neutitschein	Alfred Skene	Alfred Skene	Netherlands	1	1	0	Left	United Progressive	German-Austrian		
199	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Weisskirchen	Zacharias Herrmann	Herrmann, Zacharias	Moravia	1	1	2		Liberals			
200	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Sternberg	Adolf Beer	Beer, Adolf Dr. phil.	Moravia	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	
201	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Moravia	Cimus	August Weeber	Weeber, August Dr. iur.	Moravia	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	
202	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Silesia	Opava	Emil Sax	Sax, Emil Dr. iur.	Silesia	1	1	3		Liberals			
203	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Silesia	Jelenia Gora	Max Menger	Menger, Max von Wolfensgrün (nicht geführt) Dr. iur.	Galicia	1	1	3		United Progressive	German	United German Left	German Progessive Party
204	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Silesia	Teschen	Johann Demel Ritter von Elswehr	Demel, Johann Ritter von Elswehr (1867) Dr. iur.	Silesia	0	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	
205	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Silesia	Bielitz	Theodor Haase	Haase, Theodor Karl Dr. phil.	Galicia	1	4	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	German Progessive Party
206	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Lemberg	Franz Smolka	Smolka, Franciszek Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish	
207	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Lemberg	Ludwig Wolski	Wolski, Ludwik Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			
208	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Krakow	Ferdinand Weigel	Weigel, Ferdynand (Fernand) Dr. iur.	Galicia	1	1	3	Polish	Polish		Polish	
209	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Krakow	Andreas Rydzowski	Rydzowski, Andrzej Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
210	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Biala	Julian Dunajewski	Dunajewski, Julian Ritter von Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish		
211	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Tarnow	Johann Splawinski	Splawiński, Jan Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			
212	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Rzeszow	Ambros Towarnicki	Towarnicki, Ambrozy Dr. med.	Galicia	0	3	3		Polish			
213	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Przemysl	Alexander Dworski	Dworski, Aleksander Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
214	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Sambor	Otto Hausner	Hausner, Otto	Galicia	1	1	3		Polish	Polish		
215	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Tarnopol	Cusebius Czerkawski	Czerkawski (Čerkavs'kyj), Euzebiusz Dr. phil.	Galicia	0	3	3	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish	

216	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Stanislau	Ignaz Ritter von Kaminski	Kamiński, Ignacy Ritter von Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
217	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Kolomyia	Simon Schreiber	Schreiber (Sofer), Simon	Hungary	1	2	0		Polish			
218	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Galicia	Brody	Eduard Sochor Ritter von Friedrichsthal	Sochor, Eduard Ritter (1874), Freiherr (1898) von Friedrichsthal Dr. iur.	Moravia	0	1	3		Other	Liberal Center		
219	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bukovina	Czernowitz	Anton Kochanowski Ritter von Skawczan	Kochanowski, Anton Ritter (1873), Freiherr (1898) von Stawczan Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Center	Liberals			
220	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Bukovina	Suczawa	Victor Osenheim Ritter von Ponteurin	Ofenheim, Viktor Ritter von Ponteuxin (1867)	Austria	1	1	3		Other			
221	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Dalmatia	Zara	Anton Ritter von Sukup	Šupuk, Ante Ritter von	Dalmatia	0	1	1		Center Right	Center Right	Conservatives	Slavic Christian Nationals
222	Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers	Dalmatia	Spalato	Doimus Rendic von Miocevic	Rendić von Miočević, Duje (Dujam, Dojmo) Dr. iur.	Dalmatia	0	1	3		Center Right			
223	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	St Pölten	Karl Pirko	Pirko, Karl	Bohemia	0	1	0		Liberals	German-Austrian		
224	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Amstetten	Johann Obemdorfer	Obemdorfer, Johann	Austria	0	1	1		Center Right	Center	Conservatives	Christian-Social Association
225	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Krems	Heinrich Fumkranz	Fürnkranz, Heinrich (1828-1896)	Austria	1	1	2		United Progressive	Association of German Nationals	German National	
226	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Zwettl	Georg Ritter von Schonerer	Schönerer, Georg Ritter von (1860; Verlust des Adelsprädikats 1889-1917)	Austria	1	1	2	Progress	Other	Association of German Nationals	Association of German Nationals	Schonerer Group
227	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Korneuburg	Anton Ruf	Ruf, Anton	Austria	1	1	0		Center Right			
228	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Mitselbach	Georg Granitsch	Granitsch, Georg Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Left	Liberals			
229	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Wiener Neustadt	Nicolaus Dumba	Dumba, Nikolaus	Austria	1	5	2	Left	Liberals			
230	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Sechshaus	Friedrich Suess	Suess (Sueß), Friedrich	England	1	4	2	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian		
231	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Hernals	Alexander Friedmann	Friedmann, Alexander	Hungary	1	2	2		Liberals			
232	Rural Communities	Lower Austria	Hietzing	Josef Schoffel	Schöffel, Josef	Bohemia	1	1	2	Progressive	United Progressive			
233	Rural Communities	Upper Austria	Linz	Johann Zeilberger	Zeilberger, Johann	Austria	1	1	1		Center Right			
234	Rural Communities	Upper Austria	Freistadt	Heinrich Brandis	Brandis, Heinrich Graf	Styria	1	1	2	Center Right	Center Right	Center		
235	Rural Communities	Upper Austria	Rohrbach	Franz Fischer	Fischer, Franz	Austria	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right		
236	Rural Communities	Upper Austria	Scharding	Gregor Zehetmayr	Zehetmayr, Johann	Austria	1	1	1		Center Right	Center	Conservatives	Catholic People
237	Rural Communities	Upper Austria	Ried	Gregor Doblhamer	Doblhamer, Gregor (Johann)	Austria	1	1	3		Center Right	Center	Conservatives	Catholic People
238	Rural Communities	Upper Austria	Wels	Adalbert Edler von Pflugl	Pflugl, Albert Karl Dismas Noble from	Austria	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right			
239	Rural Communities	Upper Austria	Smunden	Franz Noska	Noska, Franz	Austria	0	1	0		Center Right			
240	Rural Communities	Salzburg	Salzburg	Georg Lienbacher	Lienbacher, Georg	Salzburg	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center	Free Association for Economic Reform on a Christian Basis	
241	Rural Communities	Salzburg	St Johann	Matthias Neumayer	Neumayer, Mathias	Salzburg	1	1	0	Center Right	Center Right	Center		
242	Rural Communities	Styria	Graz	Joseph Schmidbauer	Schmidbauer, Josef	Styria	1	1	0		Center Right			
243	Rural Communities	Styria	Judenberg	Alois Posch	Posch, Alois	Styria	1	1	2		United Progressive	German	German National	Association of the German People
244	Rural Communities	Styria	Judenberg	Anton Barnfeind	Bärnfeind, Anton Josef	Styria	1	1	0	Center Right	Center Right			
245	Rural Communities	Styria	Hartberg	Alois Prince Liechtenstein	Liechtenstein, Alois (Aloys) Prince	Austria	1	1	3		Center Right	Center	Free Association for Economic Reform on a Christian Basis	Christian-Social Association
246	Rural Communities	Styria	Feldbach	Alfred Price Liechtenstein	Liechtenstein, Alfred Prinz	Bohemia	1	1	3		Center Right			
247	Rural Communities	Styria	Leibnitz	Alois Karlon	Karlon, Alois	Styria	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center	Conservatives	Catholic People
248	Rural Communities	Styria	Marburg	Hermann Baron von Goedel-Lannoy	Gödel-Lannoy, Hermann Ritter von G. (1862), Ritter G. v. Lannoy (1872), Freiherr von G.-L. (1873) Dr. iur.	Styria	1	1	3		Center Right	Other		
249	Rural Communities	Styria	Pettau	Michael Herman	Herman, Mihael (Michael)	Styria	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right			
250	Rural Communities	Styria	Cilli	Josef Vosnjak	Vošnjak, Josip Dr. med.	Styria	0	1	3	Center Right	Center Right			
251	Rural Communities	Carinthia	Klagenfurt	Peter Lax	Lax, Peter	Carinthia	1	1	0		Liberals	United Left		
252	Rural Communities	Carinthia	St Veit	Josef Ottitsch	Ottitsch, Josef	Carinthia	1	1	2		Liberals			
253	Rural Communities	Carinthia	Billach	Bartholomaus Wrann	Wrann, Bartholomäus Dr. iur.	Carinthia	1	1	3		Liberals			
254	Rural Communities	Carinthia	Spittal	Oswald Nischelwitzer	Nischelwitzer, Oswald	Carinthia	1	1	2	Progressive	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	
255	Rural Communities	Carniola	Ljubljana	Karl Klun	Klun, Karol (Karel)	Krain	1	1	3		Center Right	Center Right	Conservatives	
256	Rural Communities	Carniola	Adelsberg	Adolf Obresa	Obreza (Obresa), Adolf	Krain	0	1	2		Center Right			
257	Rural Communities	Carniola	Carniola	Karl Count Hohenwart	Hohenwart, Karl Sigmund Graf von	Austria	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right	Conservatives	Conservatives
258	Rural Communities	Carniola	Rudolfswerth	Wilhelm Pfeifer	Pfeifer, Viljem (Wilhelm)	Krain	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right	Conservatives	Slavic Christian Nationals
259	Rural Communities	Carniola	Gottschee	Josef Count Barbo-Waxenstein	Barbo-Waxenstein, Josef Emanuel Gra	Krain	1	1	0	Center Right	Center Right			
260	Rural Communities	Gorizia-Gradisca	Goria	Andreas Winkler	Winkler, Andrej (Andreas) Freiherr von (1883)	Gorz and Gradisca	1	1	3	Center	Center Right			
261	Rural Communities	Gorizia-Gradisca	Gradisca	Eugen Valussi	Valussi, Eugenio Carlo Dr. theol.	Lombardo-Venetia	0	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right		
262	Rural Communities	Istria	Parenzo	Johann de Franceschi	de Franceschi, Giovanni Battista	Istria	0	1	3	Left	Liberals	Liberal Center		
263	Rural Communities	Istria	Pisino	Dominik Vitezic	Vitezić, Dinko Dr. iur.	Istria	0	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right		
264	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Innsbruck	Ferdinand Freiherr von Sternbach	Sternbach, Ferdinand Freiherr von	Tyrol	1	1	0	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right		
265	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Schwaz	Ignaz Freiherr von Giovanelli	Giovanelli, Ignaz Ritter von, Freiherr von (1839)	Tyrol	0	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right		
266	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Justice	Josef Greuter	Greuter, Josef	Tyrol	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center Right		
267	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Bolanzo	Franz von Zallinger-Stillendorf	Zallinger (-Stillendorf), Franz von	Tyrol	1	1	3		Center Right	Center	Conservatives	Catholic People
268	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Bruneck	Friedrich Graf	Graf, Friedrich Ritter von Gaderthurn (1883) Dr. iur.	Tyrol	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right			
269	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Trento	Alois Freiherr von Hippoliti	Hippoliti, Luigi Freiherr von Paradiso und Montebello	Tyrol	0	1	3		Center Right			
270	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Cles	Nikolaus Negrelli	Negrelli, Nicolò (Nicola)	Tyrol	0	1	3		Center Right			
271	Rural Communities	Tyrol	Roveredo	Alois Don Gentilini	Gentilini, Luigi	Tyrol	0	1	3		Center	Trentino		
272	Rural Communities	Vorarlberg	Bregenz	Josef Oelz	Oelz (Ölz), Josef Anton Dr. med.	Vorarlberg	1	1	3	Center Right	Center Right	Center		
273	Rural Communities	Vorarlberg	Feldkirch	Johann Thurnher	Thurnher, Johann	Vorarlberg	1	1	2	Center Right	Center Right	Center		
274	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Karolinenthal	Franz Tilscher	Tilscher, Franz	Moravia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian	Bohemian National Deputies	
275	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Smichow	Alois Pravoslav Trojan	Trojan, Alois Pravoslav Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian	Bohemian National Deputies	
276	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Raudnitz	Johann Kutschera	Kučera, Jan Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian		Bohemian	
277	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Pribram	Karl Adamek	Adámek, Karel Dr. iur.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian		Bohemian	
278	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Kolin	Vincenz Hevera	Hevera, Čeněk	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
279	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Eger	Anton Tausche	Tausche, Anton	Bohemia	1	1	2		United Progressive	German	United German Left	
280	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Carlsbad	Adolf Ritter von Obentraut	Obentraut, Adolf Ritter von	Bohemia	1	1	3		United Progressive			
281	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Saaz	Josef Muller	Müller, Josef (1821-1883)	Bohemia	1	1	2		United Progressive			
282	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Leitmeritz	Josef Strebitz	Josef Stříbitz	Bohemia	1	1	0		United Progressive	German		
283	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Teschen	Eduard Herbst	Herbst, Eduard Dr. iur.	Austria	1	1	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian	United German Left	
284	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Bohmosch-Leipa	Josef Kirschner	Kirschner, Josef	Bohemia	1	1	0		United Progressive	German	United German Left	German Progressive Party
285	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Jungbunzlau	Franz Jerabek	Ječábek, František Venceslav Dr. phil.	Bohemia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
286	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Reichenberg	Wenzel Neumann	Neumann, Wenzel	Bohemia	1	1	0	Left	Liberals			
287	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Jicin	Josef Maschek	Josef Ladislav Mašek	Bohemia	0	1	0		Bohemian	Bohemian		
288	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Trautenau	Franz Roser	Roser, Franz Moriz Dr. med.	Bohemia	1	2	3	Progress	United Progressive	German	United German Left	German Progressive Party
289	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Koniggratz	Johann Graf Harrach	Harrach, Jan (Johann) Graf	Austria	1	1	3		Bohemian			
290	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Reichenau	Karl Adamek	Adámek, Karel	Bohemia	0	1	2		Bohemian	Bohemian	Bohemian National Deputies	Bohemian Nation Deputies
291	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Chrudim	Josef Klimesch	Josef Klimeš	Bohemia	0	1	2		Bohemian			
292	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Leitomysl	Johann Urbanek	Urbanek, Johann	Bohemia	0	1	0		United Progressive			
293	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Caslau	Jaromir Celakowsky	Čelakovský, Jaromír Dr. iur.	Prussia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
294	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Deutsch-Brod	Franz Neubauer	Neubauer, František	Bohemia	1	1	0		Bohemian			
295	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Tabor	Gustav Ritter von Wiedersperg	Wiedersperger von Wiedersperg, Gustav Ritter Dr. med.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian	Bohemian	Bohemian
296	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Selcan	Josef Gartner	Gärtner, Josef	Bohemia	1	1	0		Bohemian			
297	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Krumau	Mathias Kopi	Köppi, Mathias (Matthäus)	Bohemia	1	1	0	Left	Liberals			
298	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Budweis	Wilhelm Platzer	Platzer, Vilém	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
299	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Bisek	Johan Pasaky										
300	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Mies	Adolf Prince of Schwarzenberg	Schwarzenberg, Adolf Josef Erbprinz, Prince (1888)	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
301	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Pilsen	Franz Brauner	Brauner, František August Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3		Bohemian			
302	Rural Communities	Bohemia	Plan	Anton Waldert	Waldert, Anton Dr. iur.	Bohemia	1	1	3	Left	Liberals			
303	Rural Communities	Moravia	Brno	Woltjang Kusy	Kusý, Wolfgang Dr. iur.	Moravia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian		
304	Rural Communities	Moravia	Kromeriz	Franz Skopalik	Skopalík, František	Moravia	0	1	1		Bohemian	Bohemian		
305	Rural Communities	Moravia	Littau	Jacob Nedopil	Nedopil, Jakob	Moravia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
306	Rural Communities	Moravia	Boskowitz	Alois Prazak	Pražák, Alois Freiherr von (1882) Dr. iur.	Moravia	0	1	3		Other	Other	Other	
307	Rural Communities	Moravia	Iglau	Anton Mezrik	Mezrik, Antonín Ritter von (1883) Dr. iur.	Moravia	0	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian	Moravian	
308	Rural Communities	Moravia	Znojmo	Johann Fux	Fux, Johann Dr. iur.	Moravia	1	1	3	Progressive	United Progressive			
309	Rural Communities	Moravia	Auspis	Franz Weber	Weber, František	Moravia	1	1	3		Bohemian	Bohemian	Moravian	
310	Rural Communities	Moravia	Ung. Gradisch	Franz Schrom										
311	Rural Communities	Moravia	Wal. Meseritsch	Alois Mikyska	Mikyška, Alois Dr. iur.	Moravia	0	1	3		Bohemian			
312	Rural Communities	Moravia	Reutitschein	Franz Neusser	Neusser, Franz	Moravia	1	1	3		Progress	German-Austrian		
313	Rural Communities	Moravia	Olmutz	Anton Schmidt	Schmidt, Anton	Moravia	1	1	2		United Progressive	German-Austrian		
314	Rural Communities	Silesia	Troppau	Adolf Schmuk	Schmuk (Jewelry), Rudolf	Silesia	1	1	2		Liberals			
315	Rural Communities	Silesia	Freudenthal	Eduard Siegl	Siegl, Eduard	Moravia	1	1	3	Left	United Progressive	German		
316	Rural Communities	Silesia	Teschen	Franz Obratschal	Obratschal, Franz	Silesia	0	1	2		Liberals			
317	Rural Communities	Galicia	Krakow	Stanislaus Count Mieroszowski	Mieroszewski (Mieroszowice-M.), Stanisław von, Graf M.-M. (1869)	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
318	Rural Communities	Galicia	Biala	Florian Ziemialkowski	Ziemiałkowski, Florian (Florjan, Floryan) Freiherr von (1886) Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish		
319	Rural Communities	Galicia	Wadowice	Josef Freiherr von Baum	Baum, Józef Freiherr von Appelshofen	Galicia	0	1	2	Polish	Polish			
320	Rural Communities	Galicia	Neu-Sandec	Johann Chelmeki	Chełmecki, Jan Dr. theol.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
321	Rural Communities	Galicia	Bochnia	Stanislaus Ritter von Madjeski	Madeyski, Stanisław Ritter von Poray Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish
322	Rural Communities	Galicia	Tarnow	Josef Martusiewicz	Martusiewicz, Józef	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			
323	Rural Communities	Galicia	Ropczyce	Johann Graf Tarnowski	Tarnowski, Jan Józef Graf	Galicia	0	1	2	Polish	Polish			
324	Rural Communities	Galicia	Rzeszow	Ladislaus Graf Tyszkiewicz	Tyszkiewicz, Zdzisław Graf	Galicia	0	1	0		Polish	Polish	Polish	
325	Rural Communities	Galicia	Lancut	Anton Ritter von Oborski	Oborski, Antoni Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			
326	Rural Communities	Galicia	Jaslo	Josef Jasinski	Jasiński, Józef Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish		
327	Rural Communities	Galicia	Sanok	Eduard Ritter von Gniewosz-Olexow	Gniewosz-Olexów, Edward Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish	

328	Rural Communities	Galicia	Przemysl	Josef Ritter von Tyszkowski	Tyszkowski, Józef Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3		Polish			
329	Rural Communities	Galicia	Jaroslau	Johann Graf Krasicki	Krasicki, Jan Graf	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
330	Rural Communities	Galicia	Sambor	Stefan Graf Zamoyski	Zamoyski, Jan Graf	Poland	0	1	0		Polish			
331	Rural Communities	Galicia	Stryi	Basil Kowalski	Kowalski, Bazyli (Basil)	Galicia	0	3	3	Ruthenan	Other	Liberal Center		
332	Rural Communities	Galicia	Rzeszow	Dionys Kulaczkowski	Kulaczkowski (KulaČkovs'kyj), Dionys (Dionizij)	Galicia	0	3	3		Liberal Center			
333	Rural Communities	Galicia	Lemberg	Cornel Ritter von Krzeczunowicz	Krzeczunowicz, Kornel Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
334	Rural Communities	Galicia	Zolkiew	Ladislaus Ritter von Fedorowicz	Fedorowicz, Władysław Walenty Ritter von	Galicia	0	3	3		Polish			
335	Rural Communities	Galicia	Brody	Titus Ritter von Kielanowski	Kielanowski, Tytus Ritter von	Other	0	1	3	Polish	Polish			
336	Rural Communities	Galicia	Bloczow	Ignaz Zborowski	Zborowski, Ignacy Ritter von (1882) Dr. iur.	Bukovina	0	1	3		Polish			
337	Rural Communities	Galicia	Brzezan	Josef Krzysztonowicz	Krzysztofowicz, Józef	Galicia	0	1	0		Polish			
338	Rural Communities	Galicia	Stanislau	Julian Furst Puzyna	Puzyna, Julian Ritter (Kniaz) von Kozielsko	Galicia	0	1	0		Polish			
339	Rural Communities	Galicia	Kolomyja	Johann Ozwarkiewicz	Ozarkiewicz (Ozarkevyč), Ivan	Galicia	0	3	3	Ruthenan	Other	Ruthenan		
340	Rural Communities	Galicia	Zaleszczyki	Anton Ritter von Zara-Chamiec	Chamiec, Antoni Ritter von Iasa-Ch.	Poland	0	1	3		Polish	Polish		
341	Rural Communities	Galicia	Buczacz	Nicolaus Ritter von Wolanski	Wolański, Mikołaj Ritter von, Graf (1888)	Poland	0	1	3		Polish	Polish	Polish	
342	Rural Communities	Galicia	Trembowla	Erasmus Ritter von Wolanski	Wolański, Erazm Ritter von	Galicia	0	1	2		Polish			
343	Rural Communities	Galicia	Tarnopol	Casimir Ritter von Grocholski	Grocholski, Kazimierz Ritter von Dr. iur.	Galicia	0	1	3	Polish	Polish	Polish		
344	Rural Communities	Buksvina	Czernowitz	Constatin Tomaszczuk	Tomaszczuk, Konstantin Dr. iur.	Bukovina	0	3	3	Left	Liberals	German-Austrian		
345	Rural Communities	Bukovina	Wiznitz	Johann von Zotta	Zotta, Ioan Ritter by Dr. iur.	Bukovina	0	3	3		Center Right			
346	Rural Communities	Bukovina	Radautz	Julius Baron von Horst	Horst, Julius Freiherr von (1877)	Transylvania	1	1	2	Other	Other			
347	Rural Communities	Dalmatia	Zara	Gustav Ivanic	Ivanić (Ivanics), Gustav (Gustavo) Dr. med.	Dalmatia	0	1	3		Other			
348	Rural Communities	Dalmatia	Sebenico	Lorenz Monti	Monti, Lovro Dr. iur.	Dalmatia	0	1	3	Other	Center Right			
349	Rural Communities	Dalmatia	Spalato	Caesrar Bulat	Bulat, Gajo Filomen Dr. iur.	Dalmatia	0	1	3		Center Right	Center Right	Conservatives	Slavic Christian National Federation
350	Rural Communities	Dalmatia	Signed	Michael Klaic	Klaić, Milo (Mihovil) Dr. arch.	Dalmatia	0	1	3	Other	Center Right	Center Right	Conservatives	
351	Rural Communities	Dalmatia	Ragusa	Raphael Count Pozza	Pozza (Pucić), Rafo (Raffaele) Graf Dr. iur.	Dalmatia	0	1	3		Center Right	Center Right		
352	Rural Communities	Dalmatia	Cattaro	Georg Count Voinovic de Uzicki	Vojnović de Užički, Đorđe (Georg) Conte	Dalmatia	0	3	3		Center Right	Center Right		

KEY

Religion

Roman Catholic	1
Jew	2
Greek Catholic	3
Evangelical	4

Education

Unknown	0
Primary	1
Secondary	2
Tertiary	3

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