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EXPLAINING THE PERSISTENCE OF FACTIONALISM IN PARTIES

PhD in Political Science

2012

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SUMMARY

This thesis examines the causes of the persistence of factions in parties. It undertakes this analysis using both qualitative and quantitative methods by performing statistical analysis at the level of the country and the party. It also looks in depth at case studies in Japan, Botswana and Ireland.

It begins by outlining the state of knowledge about the causes of factionalism, and discusses the definitional issues around the concept. A definition is presented for factionalism that can be applied on a cross-national basis. Those variables at the party level and at the country level identified by the literature as explaining the causes of factionalism are also discussed. The development of a measure of "perceived factionalism" is outlined and it is shown how this can be used in quantitative analysis on a cross-country basis.

We firstly examine the role of electoral systems in explaining factionalism, using data from 85 countries. Our main finding here is that the less proportional an electoral system, the more factionalised parties are. We also examine other possible causes of factionalism at the national level, such as executive-legislature relations and party finance rules. We found slight support for the argument that there is slightly more factionalism in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems.

At the party level, we investigated whether or not there were characteristics of a party that made it more conducive for factions to persist. Using data concerning some 479 parties in 85 countries, we found some support for the argument there is a positive relationship between the size of a party and the level of factionalism, as well as the fact that newer parties are less likely to contain factions. We also present a multi-level analysis integrating party and country variables

and find that party characteristics explain factionalism more than institutional effects.

To investigate the complex causal relationships that underlie the persistence of factions, we look at the extent of factionalism in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, the Botswana Democratic Party, the Botswana National Front and Fianna Fáil in Ireland. Firstly, we find there is evidence to suggest that electoral systems can facilitate the emergence of factionalism, without necessarily being the cause. Secondly, we observe that internal party structures and rules are important in explaining factionalism, particularly the manner in which the party leader is chosen and whether or not control of the party is in the hands of one level of the party. Thirdly, we argue that the interaction of institutions with party structures can also explain the extent of factionalism.

The contribution made by this thesis to the scholarly literature is a study that looks at factionalism on a cross-country basis, and attempts to establish if claims made in the abundant single-case studies of factionalism can be validated at the macro-level. While it shows that the size of parties is a key determinant in explaining the extent of factionalism, it also shows that parties may have certain historical characteristics that can define the extent to which factions persist (or not).

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Abstract

This chapter introduces the content of the research project – explaining the causes of the persistence of factionalism in parties. It opens by setting out the contribution that this project will make, namely the analysis of factionalism across countries, using a single definition. It discusses the significance of factions in the study of politics, and in the life of parties. It looks briefly at the state of the literature concerning the study of factionalism in parties. Following this, it provides an outline of the theoretical approach underlying the thesis, and then discusses the construction of the dependent variable, as well as an introduction to the data being employed. Each of the subsequent chapters are outlined, in terms of the hypotheses presented in each one, namely the relationship between electoral systems and factionalism; the effect of national institutional factors on factionalism and the role of party characteristics in explaining factionalism in parties. A brief summary of results is also presented.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Section 1: Introduction

Parties are the basis for a significant proportion of study in political science, guided by the assumption that they are unitary actors. The apparent presence of factions suggests that parties are not always the fundamental level of political, electoral and legislative activity. Work done in recent years acknowledges the importance of factions in shaping political outcomes (for example, Laver and Shepsle 1990; McCubbins and Thies 1997; Mershon 2001; Chambers 2008) but there seems to be an absence of an integrated theory to explain the persistence of factionalism tested using cross-national data.

This project improves this situation by offering a single definition of factions and it outlines a theory as to why they persist. It will test this theory through a number of hypotheses based on country-level and party-level features. National level factors include the electoral system (especially the degree of intra-party competition that is encouraged by such a system); the degree of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature; the structure of the state and the regulations governing party finance in a country. Party characteristics include the effects of leadership on factionalism, electoral dominance and its policy position. Data is drawn from a mass survey of experts which allows for analysis of variations in the levels of factionalism at both inter-party and at inter-country level, and case studies are also used to explore the more complex causal mechanisms that underlie the persistence of factionalism.

This chapter outlines the overall framework of the thesis. Section 2 discusses the significance of the topic. Section 3 identifies areas in which this project can contribute to that body of knowledge. Section 4 outlines the broad theoretical approach. Section 5 introduces the conceptualisation and measurement of the dependent variable. Section 6 outlines subsequent chapters. Section 7 concludes.

Section 2: Significance of Topic

Academic analysis aside, the role of factions was brought into focus in April 2011 when the former prime minister of Australia and leader of the Australian Labor Party (well-known for being factionalised), Kevin Rudd, was efficiently dispatched by the powerful factions in his party in favour of his deputy Julia Gillard. The rise of the Tea Party inside the Republican Party in the United States has also focused attention on the emergence of stable factions.

Parties structure political competition in states, and also provide members of the elites who manage the state apparatus. Parties, inter-party activity and intra-party activity are shaped by a number of factors, both internal and external. This research seeks to explain why there is variation in higher levels of persistent factionalism between parties and countries. While much has been written on parties in recent years, there has not been the same emphasis on the causes giving rise to factionalism, or at least a systematic attempt to explain it on a cross-national basis.

Factions can have significant bearing on a range of political outcomes, whether this is the policy positions that are adopted by the party, the coalition options open to a party, the breadth of political opinion that exists inside the organisation, the allocation of ministerial office or the cohesion of governing parties (for example, Laver and Shepsle 1990; McCubbins and Thies 1997; Mershon 2001 and Chambers 2008), and understanding the reasons for the persistence of those factions is important.

There is now a renewed interest in factions and factionalism as evidenced by recent work (Chambers, 2008; Boucek, 2009). Developments over the last thirty years have yielded a larger amount of data which can be used to assess the original propositions put forward by other scholars in the past. For example, reforms in

electoral systems around the world have occurred; many parties have had to compete under changed sets of circumstances. Changes in the ways that parties compete, structure themselves and finance themselves have taken place.

Section 3: Explaining Factionalism thus far & Contribution of this Study

The definition of faction and factionalism has been a matter of much academic debate, and we present this debate in detail in Chapter 2. Drawing on this work, we define a faction as an intra-party group that seeks to influence decisions taken in the party but confines its political activity to the party. This group must be self-aware, recognisable to the party, identifiable to external actors and be characterised by a certain degree of institutionalisation, such as the holding of regular meetings, a group headquarters or lasting through more than one parliamentary term.

Examining the sources of factionalism can be done in terms of incentive structures, as discussed by Hine (1982) and Morgenstern (2001), or the "structure of opportunities" as outlined by Sartori (1976), *i.e.* whether or not the existence of certain factors facilitates the pursuit of certain aims. This approach to the study of intra-party politics can also be motivated by the 'Exit, Voice and Loyalty' analysis put forward by Hirschman (1970). Essentially, he views three strategies being open to members of a party: exit (leaving the party); voice (expressing discontent, probably through a faction); and loyalty (not choosing to express discontent).

Examples of such incentive structures include the electoral system, whether it be that intra-party choice is available to voters, which gives an effective incentive for party cohesion to collapse (Katz 1986: 101) or that electoral systems facilitate the emergence of two or three large parties, which facilitate factions because small parties find it difficult to achieve electoral success (Rose 1964; Seyd, 1972;

Brand, 1989; Seyd, 1972; McAllister, 1991). As we will see below, the main gap in the literature is the ambiguity as to what characteristic of the electoral system is conducive to the existence of factionalism. We structure our hypotheses to try and isolate different aspects of electoral systems.

Also, it is worth considering whether or not there is a relationship between the persistence of factionalism and the power of the legislature *vis-à-vis* the executive, as has been done in such studies as Rasch (1999), Sánchez de Dios (1999) and Giannetti and Laver (2005). For example, Giannetti and Laver (2005, p.3) maintain that incentive structures created by parliamentary government differ to those in presidential systems, and can have a bearing on the degree of factionalisation. While party cohesion itself is of interest, the ability of the executive to discipline the parliamentary party is of interest to us, and whether or not multiple centres of power may exist inside the party. In this project, we set up a number of hypotheses to try and capture that effect. Work has been done in this area, and especially pertinent to our research is Sieberer's (2006) findings on the determinants of party unity in parliamentary democracies. Party unity and factionalism are two closely related concepts and it is worth taking note of previous studies relating to it when framing this project (Borz, 2006).

Looking at the characteristics of parties themselves, such as internal decision-making, historical developments and candidate selection, we are presented with further reasons to explain the persistence of factionalism. However, the theory in this area is largely derived from single case studies. Cole (1989, p.79) cites the fact that the French Socialist Party was formed from six initial groups that merged together to form the party, but that the fault-lines created by this merger remained institutionalised over time. Hanley (1986, p.46) and Leigh (2000) point to intra-party electoral systems for the party executive or internal candidate selection mechanisms as methods which can facilitate factionalism. Hrebenar (2000) puts forward that

one of the primary reasons that factionalism is such a significant characteristic of the LDP is because the regular election (required by party statutes) of the party president, combined with the near-permanence of the LDP in government, meant that incentives existed for factions to persist to win the party presidency and thus payoffs in terms of office and policy goals.

Party finance rules have also been considered. The actors who raise the funds that a party requires may influence how that finance is spent. Equally, those rules that govern how money is raised and who receives it have a bearing on the extent of factionalism - the more money that a certain actor raises, the more power that actor holds in the party. Equally, those who dispense those resources have the power to distribute patronage, and can hold influence. In such instances, the incentives for factions to persist are strong, especially where resources are crucial to assisting in re-election. Most of the work done in testing this hypothesis relates to the role of party finance in the maintenance of factions in the Japanese Liberal Democrats (recent examples include Blechinger, 2000, and Hee Park, 2001) – the core argument being that public finance of parties tends to bring about a corresponding drop in factionalism in the party, something that we test in this study.

There are other factors that may have a role in facilitating the existence of factions in parties. Zariski (1960, p.42) was among the first to allude to the effect of the party system on the level of party factionalism, claiming that multi-party systems promoted multi-factionalism as parties would be pulled in different directions, when deciding with which parties to ally in coalition formation. Sartori (1976, p.102) hypothesised that the number of ideologically based factions would be inversely related to the number of parties. Similarly, there is work that posits that where one party dominates the party system, there is likely to be a high degree of factionalism,

resulting from the breadth of social coverage in such dominant parties.

There is no dearth of theoretical approaches to the study of factionalism. Neither is there a lack of effort in applying these approaches to empirical analysis. The most significant gap in the literature on factionalism is the lack of large sample cross-national analysis. This project goes some distance towards explaining the common pattern in institutions and across parties in explaining the extent of factionalism.

Section 4: Theoretical Framework

We couch the theoretical basis of this research in the language of Aldrich (1995), assuming that, like parties, factions are designed as endogenous institutions, whose goals are to capture and use the party to achieve their own goals. We assume that individual legislators are utility-maximising: they pursue office-seeking or policy-seeking objectives. In order to maximise this utility an individual chooses from a strategy set that includes the strategies of choosing to join/maintain/form a faction, leave a party, or just adhere to the party line. Each strategy yields different payoffs which are predicated on the probability of each strategy succeeding. The probability of each strategy succeeding is determined by external and internal incentive structures. Those incentive structures underpin the hypotheses tested in subsequent chapters.

In order to understand the theoretical basis in another way, we refer to Hirschman's work (1970): we seek to explain why the 'voice strategy' is chosen by party members who maintain factions, as opposed to the 'exit strategy' to form new parties. However, we should be careful not to suggest that the only alternative to joining a faction in a party is to leave the party. People who form factions may have no intention of leaving the party, but rather seek to control the party and/or the policies that it pursues. We ask what are the reasons

that allow actors inside parties to gain higher pay-offs from forming and maintaining factions, rather than not forming.

Hirschman's approach builds upon Schattschneider (1960) who documents the nature of conflicts, and how conflicts may be unequal in their intensity. While the most intense conflicts may define the nature of party competition, conflict may exist at the sub-party level also. We are interested in those incentives that facilitate intra-party conflict to manifest as factions, and where these incentives can be found.

As mentioned above, we draw on the definitional discussion to present our definition of factions as follows:

A faction is any intra-party group with the following characteristics:

(1) It does not present candidates for elections outside the party under a factional label;

(2) It has a self-awareness;

(3) It has political aims – be they based on policy, patronage or leadership, and tries to achieve them inside the party apparatus;

(4) It is visible to external observers as a bloc inside the party;

(5) It is defined by a degree of organisation that is also externally observable, though not necessarily a high degree of organisation;

(6) It pursues its political activity inside the party, i.e. the party is the only political arena in which it participates and;

(7) Its existence is not mandated by the party rules.

Section 5: Measuring Factionalism

The measurement of factionalism is a challenging task. As Boucek (2009) notes, there is much discussion and confusion relating to what

exactly factionalism is. We are dealing with the level of factionalism, i.e. our research seeks to take a snapshot of how factionalised a party is at a certain point in time - 2008. This contrasts with other research that deals with tracking the existence of factions, e.g. Boucek's work on the LDP and the Italian DC (2003) where the number of 'effective factions' in a party was tracked over time. The concept that we are trying to capture with our measurement is the idea that the intra-party dynamic of a party is defined by factional interaction inside that party.

While counting the number of 'effective factions' in terms of the legislative party or the national party congress may give us an idea of how many factions there are, it does not give us any idea of the intensity of the factional conflict that exists inside the particular party. Even so, the sourcing of data on such factions for cross-national analysis can be particularly difficult. In the absence of such primary sources, we need to use secondary data.

We measure the degree of factionalism in a party using the results of a survey managed under the auspices of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project at Duke University. Experts (political scientists and journalists) were asked to identify whether or not factions existed in the legislative group or national congress of a party. It is plausible to assume that if factionalism is a characteristic of the party at these levels, that then factionalism will be a characteristic of the entire party. This approach to measuring factionalism has been used before, both by surveying experts and by surveying MPs (Kopecký, 1995 and Borz, 2006). We then take the proportion of respondents who identify factions as existing in a party as a measure of the degree of factionalism that characterises a party. This approach captures factionalism as a characteristic of a party, for example if all or the majority of respondents are agreed that factions exist in a party, it is fair to infer that factions play a significant role in intra-party life. Again, we do not differentiate between factions on

the basis of career or ideological motivations but are interested in the manner in which how such motivations for intra-party conflict persist as factions. We discuss the construction of the dependent variable and other measurement issues in more detail in Chapter 3.

Section 6: Chapter Plan

In Chapter 2, we provide a thorough account of the body of literature on factionalism. Firstly, we discuss in detail the importance of factionalism to understanding how parties work, whether this is in terms of explaining budgetary policy, leadership change, government formation or portfolio allocation. Secondly, we discuss the definitional issues around factions – a major stumbling block has been the lack of a common definition of factions and factionalism. We show the different stages in the development of a definition for a faction, and present a definition developed from this debate.
Finally, we analyse the different explanations that have been presented to explain factionalism. One point worth noting in this discussion (and above) is that most of the studies seeking to explain factionalism in parties deal with no more than one or two cases. We divide the studies into two groups – those studies that deal with the effects of country-level factors on the extent of factionalism in parties and those that seek to explain factionalism using the characteristics of the parties themselves. When discussing the effects of country-level factors, we find that there is merit in borrowing from explanations of other concepts related to factionalism, such as party unity or party voting cohesion. At the party level, we discuss the role of party dominance in explaining factionalism, the historical conditions of party formation and the internal organisational procedures used in the party such as elections to the party executive and candidate selection methods.

In Chapter 3, we introduce the methodology being used in the thesis in establishing and conceptualising the dependent variable being used. Firstly, we discuss the various methods used to measure

factionalism, and the difficulties with conceptualising factionalism and how conventional methods of measuring party unity (such as roll-call voting) do not satisfactorily capture the concept. Secondly, we lay out the specific definition of a faction used in this thesis and outline the vignettes of a notional scale of factionalism. Thirdly, we introduce the data being used and explain how it was gathered, discussing its strengths and weaknesses. We have access to data concerning 479 parties across 85 countries. We provide some preliminary descriptive analysis of our dependent variable and look at the variation in expert opinion and the variation in the degree of reliability that characterises the responses.

We construct the actual measurement of our dependent variable using two measures. Our first measure is designed to capture the extent of factionalism in individual parties – the proportion of experts that identify factions in a particular party. The second measure is designed to capture the extent of factionalism at the national level, by taking the score of each party and constructing a weighted average based on the vote share and seat share that each party got at the preceding legislative election. We investigate if there are patterns in the data in terms of regions and levels of political freedom. We observe no particularly striking patterns in this regard, except in the case of Europe, where the extent of factionalism is lower than other regions around the world and that there is no substantively significant pattern across different levels of political freedom.

In Chapter 4, we take account of the effect of electoral systems on the persistence of factionalism. We begin by outlining the special place that electoral systems have been assigned in the explanation of factionalism in parties, and explore the literature that discusses factionalism and electoral systems, examining aspects such as the number of parties or the prevalence of intra-party preferential voting. We employ the Hirschman framework of "voice", "exit" and

"loyalty" which is relevant to explaining how electoral rules can foster the persistence of factions. We lay out a number of hypotheses dealing with the role of district magnitude (as a measure of proportionality); the height of the effective or legal electoral threshold; the effective number of electoral or legislative parties increases; the role of closed-lists and; the relationship between intra-party preferential voting and factionalism. We find evidence to support the effect of the number of parties on factionalism as well as closed-list electoral systems. We find that intraparty preferential voting has little effective bearing on factionalism in its own right, but when combined with district magnitude, we find that it operates in the opposite direction to that theorised by Katz.

In Chapter 5, we explore the relationship between factionalism and other country-level factors based around electoral systems. Firstly, we explore the limited amount of analysis that has been done in investigating the relationship between the level of factionalism in a country and other institutional factors. Secondly, we lay out a number of hypotheses dealing with whether or not a country uses a presidential regime or not; the autonomy and influence of the legislature; the effect of federalism; and regulations governing the registration and financing of parties. We find limited evidence to support the role of presidential regimes in fostering factionalism, as well as the influence of the legislature and the availability of public funding.

In Chapter 6, we concentrate on those factors that give incentives to persistence of factionalism at the level of the party. We explore those party-based factors that have been used to explain variation in factionalism across parties. The hypotheses we present include the share of seats a party has won (historically as well as their current share); governmental incumbency; the frequency of leadership change; the role of policy preferences and; the circumstances of formation of the party. We find evidence supporting the role of

incumbency, leadership change, the number of groups merging to form the party and party size in explaining factionalism. At the end of Chapter 6, we also present a multi-level model that shows the primacy of party-based factors in explaining the level of factionalism in a party.

In Chapter 7, we look at real-world examples of factionalism in an effort to examine the complex causal mechanisms that underpin factionalism. We begin by examining the Japanese Liberal Democratic party and find that factionalism in the LDP is a legacy of the formation of the party, and of the former SNTV electoral system that was used in Japan, but that internal party rules play a role in providing incentives for the existence of factions. Turning to Botswana, we compare the cases of the Botswana Democratic Party and the Botswana National Front. We find here that the FPTP electoral system creates high exit costs for factions in the BDP but that internal party rules also facilitate the existence of factions in both. Finally, we investigate the case of Fianna Fáil in Ireland. Given previous research, we would expect that Fianna Fáil would be factionalised because of its (historical) dominance and the fact that PR-STV (used in Ireland) is such an open electoral system. We explain this by showing that the interaction between national institutional variables and characteristics of the party matter in determining the extent to which incentives exist for factionalism.

In Chapter 8, we present our conclusions. The evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 seems to suggest that the analysis of factions as units of political competition in their own right is borne out. We show that factions are more likely to exist where electoral competition is dominated by two or three large parties and that the more proportional an electoral system is, the less likely it is that parties will be characterised by factionalism, though the effects of institutions are not as strong as thought by the literature. When discussing the characteristics of the party, this view of factions is

corroborated. If a party was formed from a merger, its size and the frequency of leadership change all have a role in explaining factionalism. In sum, we show that where it is rational (or where they have always traditionally existed) for factions to persist at the sub-party level, there is evidence to suggest that they do so and do so with the purpose of political competition.

Section 7: Conclusion

This thesis addresses a very important question in the political science literature, and the research itself will, no doubt, raise many interesting questions deserving of further study. While studies of individual country cases abound, and even the odd one or two comparative analyses between two or three countries exists the larger number of cases in this investigation will allow for the testing of a more general, robust theory of factionalisation, incorporating more independent variables for a fuller understanding of why factions persist. This will add to the construction of a theory of factions from which generalisations can be made. At the very least, this project will have the outcome of checking which of these explanations put forward to explain factionalism do not apply beyond the case from which the explanation was derived.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Abstract

There is a substantial body of research done on factions and factionalism in particular countries, albeit that more often than not the particular country being studied inspires the definition and the theoretical framework underpinning such a study. This chapter brings that research together and looks to identify promising hypotheses which can be tested as part of the research project. Firstly, we discuss those studies where factionalism has been treated as an independent variable. Next, we review the discussion of the definition of factionalism, and present a definition of faction built upon previous research. We then lay out the theoretical approach being used to study factionalism in our project, drawing on various theoretical approaches that have been taken to the study of parties and organisations. We review previous research and discuss country-level variables that provide incentives for the existence of factionalism in parties. We also do this for those studies that have explained factionalism using party-level variables. We then conclude the chapter and chart the way forward for our research project.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Section 1: Introduction

The study of factions and factionalism within parties has not received the same amount of attention as parties. This is to be expected to a certain extent, given that parties are the vehicles through which political competition takes place in liberal democracies around the world. However, the assumption of the party as the unitary actor deserves attention in its own right, and requires an understanding of the nature of intra-party politics. Studying factions and factionalism inside parties gives us one particularly useful and intriguing perspective into these mechanics and certainly improves our understanding of why parties adopt the policies and make the decisions that they do.

However, the words 'faction' and 'factionalism' have both suffered from what can best be described as a 'bad press', from as far back as Madison's condemnation of the 'politics of faction' in the Federalist Papers. Their use in political discourse has always been characterised by strong negative connotations and factionalism has been perceived as a scourge on parties. In addition to this, the research done on factions has been hampered by other factors such as the lack of agreement as to what actually constitutes a faction, and difficulties in gathering information on factions. One reason for this is that party managers, who are usually required to convey an impression of harmonious party unity, are reluctant to give information about levels of factionalism in their parties.

There is a substantial body of research done on factions and factionalism in particular countries, albeit that usually the particular country being studied informs the definition and the theoretical framework used. There is certainly scope to bring together the common elements of this research to bear on a cross-national investigation of factionalism. This chapter brings that research

together and shows how this research project fits into this body of work. Section 2 looks at those studies where the factionalism has been treated as an independent variable, i.e. examining the consequences of factionalism. Section 3 deals with the definitional aspects of factions and factionalism. It reviews the discussion in this area, and presents the discussion that will be used in this project. Section 4 lays out the theoretical approach being used to study factionalism, drawing on various theoretical approaches that have been taken to the study of parties and organisations, and then the conceptualisation of the dependent variable. It also briefly examines the measurement of factions and factionalism, which is entirely linked with the decision that is made as regards their definition – something that is elaborated upon further in Chapter 3. Section 5 examines country-level variables that have been identified as providing incentives for the existence of factionalism in parties. Section 6 examines the research done on the features of parties that encourage, or at least maintain the existence of factionalism in parties. Section 7 concludes the chapter.

Obviously, there are many case studies that explain factionalism in particular parties or in particular countries. However, those explanations that may apply in the case of one country or party are not always generalizable. We find that the role of the electoral system has often been cited as a cause of factionalism, particularly if it penalises the existence of smaller parties. There are some interesting points made in relation to the role of intra-party preferential voting, and while the Japanese case provides some justification for its analysis as a determinant of factionalism, there are few other studies that look at its effect. In terms of regime type, presidential systems seem to feature higher levels of factionalism than parliamentary systems, although this is inspired by the American experience.

In relation to party-level features, the history of a party is certainly a common theme in explaining factionalism, especially the conditions of its formation. There is mixed evidence that suggests factionalism can be explained by looking at the organisational features of parties though it is often difficult to discern the direction of the causality. The role of party finance in explaining factionalism, inspired by the Japanese experience, is difficult to establish given the lack of research on the relationship between factions and finance rules. In the ensuing discussion, we explore each of these themes, but then isolate those hypotheses/determinants that have been inspired by previous research and have some grounding in evidence.

Section 2: Factionalism as an independent variable

Undoubtedly the most significant consequence of studying factions at all is that their persistence calls into question the unitary actor assumption that is so fundamental to the study of parties in political science. The study of factions gives us great insight into how politics at the sub-party level is transacted.

Laver and Shepsle (1990) assess the importance of factions bargaining inside a party and the effect that this has on government formation. They transfer the framework of inter-party coalition formation to inter-faction coalition formation at the party level. Mitchell (1999) points to the enforcement mechanisms inside parties but also looks at the effects of intraparty revolts against government policy positions, showing the relevance of factions when determining a government's policy position.

Such consequences can be explored further using a more micro-level analysis of government and the effect of factions on parties. Mershon (2001) emphasises the importance of factions in that they provided an invisible stability in policy making during a time of volatility in the duration of Italian governments. This complements work done on Japan by Bouissou (2001) where the opposite was analysed – the

duration of governments was stable but policy positions were unstable because of the need to accommodate the different factions by constantly reshuffling government personnel. A point is raised by Bouissou (p.596) towards the end of his paper in which he asks whether or not the office-seeking motivation of factions was the primary factor in bringing about instability in policy positions. The basis of factions (whether or not they have been set up to bring about a particular policy position or to support some of their own members in leadership positions in the party) has a bearing on the consequences they bring about. It is arguable as to whether or not this theory would be valid in the Italian case (Mershon, 2001, p. 577), in that factions in the Italian DC were nominally set up to pursue particular policy directions inside the party.

The importance of the control that factions exert on the direction of their parties is recounted in works such as McCubbins and Thies (1997) where the influence that party factions in the Japanese LDP have over spending priorities during the party's frequent periods in government is illustrated. This specific role of factions is further explored by Brauninger and Debus (2005) where they show that German party factions play a significant role in the allocation of ministerial portfolios when ministers are more independent in exercising their functions. This lends credence to the argument that such factionalised parties are like managing a coalition of smaller parties because ministers can treat their portfolios like individual fiefdoms.

Research done on the relationship between government duration and factionalism shows that the more factionalised a party in government, the less likely that government will last. This is the hypothesis tested by Druckman (1996), supported by his data on Western European governments. The effect of factions on prime-ministerial power is tested by Budge (1985) who finds that reshuffles are more common in single-party governments. One interpretation of

this is that where single-party governments are more likely, it follows that factions are more likely to play a role which could cause more frequent reshuffles. Constant reshuffling of government personnel can be a manifestation of the power of factions in dictating the holders of ministerial (or party) offices. More recently, Chambers (2008) discusses the effect of factions on the durability of governments in Thailand and Budge, Ezrow and McDonald (2010) show the effect of internal factionalisation on the policy positions adopted by a party.

A function of factions that is also worth mentioning, given its prevalence in the factional culture of the Italian Christian Democrats, is the structure that it gives to the distribution of patronage inside parties. Kopecký and Scherlis (2008: 363) argue that patronage is used as a reward for factional membership and is crucial to the internal factional struggle that takes place in parties. To support this claim, they use the example of the widespread use of such patronage in the factional struggle in the Spanish Socialist party when they won power in 1982. Historically, such patronage (including government posts) would be used to maintain the structure and cohesion of a factionalised party (Kopecký and Mair, 2011: 14). Parties in which this occurred included the Italian PSI, Japanese LDP and the Austrian SDAP and OVP. The use of patronage to maintain the factional structure of a party suggests that office-seeking motivations are among the reasons for persistence of factions in parties.

The study of factionalism as an independent variable has meant that the conceptualisation of faction has become less clear. This has had a noticeable effect on the definition that is adopted in relation to what a faction is.

Section 2: Definitional Issues

One of the main areas of discussion in this field is how exactly to identify a faction. In ordinary everyday use, the Oxford English Dictionary defines 'faction' to mean

> *'a class, sort, or set of persons'* or *'a party in the state or in any community or association. Always with opprobrious sense, conveying the imputation of selfish or mischievous ends or turbulent or unscrupulous methods'* (Oxford English Dictionary 2009).

The word derives from the Latin word *'factionem'* which comes from the verb *'facere'* which means *'to do'*, which implies that the noun "faction" means 'a making or doing'. In ancient Rome, a faction was often one of the companies that competed for contracts at the chariot races. The earliest incarnations of parties were referred to as factions. One of the earliest pejorative references to factionalism can be traced back to Madison's famous *Federalist Papers* where he refers to nature of a faction as being

> *'a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community'* (Madison 1787).

Taking this discussion to more recent time, as conducted in political science, perhaps it is put best by Ralph Zariski (1978, p. 32) in his often-quoted statement that 'this prominent field of political science is in a state of disarray'.

The fact that factions, and hence factionalism, do not have a concise universal definition is not reason enough to abandon them as an area of study. Instances exist throughout the discipline where an ambiguous definition has not hampered the study of particular phenomena (the study of war being an example (Andreani, 2004)).

The purpose of the discussion that follows is to use the abundance of analysis and observation to show that the definition used for factionalism is that one that has evolved over time. We examine the early definitions of factionalism, and track how these very general definitions became more specific in nature. Of particular interest here is the reason for the faction's emergence, the level of organisation that defines the faction, the extent of factionalism and where factions fit into the categorisation of intra-party activity. We show that factionalism as a definition has moved from being very open to more specific and has then retreated back towards a certain general nature that can be applied across countries, but that journey has been inspired by the individual cases, and the need for cross-country comparison requires a generally applicable definition.

Despite theorists such as Duverger (1964, p.120-1) being aware of the existence of factions, little attention was given in earlier literature to their definition. One of the first such definitions of faction was provided by Harold Lasswell in the 1931 *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* as being:

> *'any constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies. The faction arises in the struggle for power and represents a division on details of application and not on principles'* (cited in Köllner and Basedau 2005).

The definition given by Key (1949, p.16) was a development in explaining faction, in that it described a restrictive quality. He referred to factions as being any group inside a party 'who unite at a particular time in support of a candidate'.

For the purposes of his study - electoral party machines in the American South - this meaning served its required purpose. Key also remarked on the 'impressive continuity' of some of these factions.

This continuity, in all senses, was to become one of the greatest obstacles in streamlining a definition of faction. Other American scholars followed in tweaking the definition – Ranney and Kendall (1956, p.126) defined a faction as 'an element inside a party whose purpose is to control the personnel and policy of the party'[1] and Ranney (1975, p.23) referred to faction as 'an organisation [that] strives to concert its resources to induce the party to adopt some policies and reject others'. While these definitions provided a platform by which scholars could begin looking in a structured way at intra-party politics, they did not go beyond the generic label of sub-party groups.

Hine (1982) implies that the 1960s and the 1970s were an interesting time for parties because new issue arose which challenged the previously established policy positions of parties, and focused more attention on the sub-party level. Around this time, there was a tendency towards emphasising the structural nature of particular intra-party groups. Zariski (1960) had previously referred to factions as groups that 'seek to control the party organisation' (p.29) and alluded to the self-awareness criterion, i.e. members of a faction are aware that they are a member of a faction. In fact Zariski expanded on all definitions put forward previously to his work, and defined a faction as:

> *'any intra-party combination, clique or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organised to act collectively – as a distinct bloc within the party – to achieve their goals'.*

Furthermore, he made reference to the necessity for an organisational capacity and set down a codification of Key's 'impressive continuity' (p.34).

Zariski also laid out a definition of factions that allowed for different categories of factions – not necessarily based on policy, but perhaps

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[1] Cited in Rose (1964) – p.34

personality and strategy also (pp.34-35). Nyomarkay (1965, p.22) set out these parameters clearly, referring to factions as 'groups of individuals joined together' where there is 'a certain degree of permanence resting on some organisational basis'. He pointed out that factional competition is separate from other forms of intraparty group disagreement.

This was expanded upon by the likes of Rose (1964) who differentiated between two types of intra-party politics – the tendency (defined by him as 'a stable set of attitudes' (p. 37)) and the faction which was seen as being 'a stable set of politicians' (p.37). The important thing to note here is that during this period, factions were being given attention as political actors in their own right and there was a growing consensus that intra-party politics was more complex than had been previously thought. This provided foundations for research questioning the unitary actor assumption such as Sinnott (1989) and Laver and Shepsle (1990).

Rose (1964) makes a point concerning the definition of faction and refers to the negative connotations associated with the word faction. Sartori (1976) and Hanley (1986) both build upon this arguing that the negative implications associated with the lay-definition of faction (self-interest, inflexibility *etc.*) prejudice its use as a concept in political science. In both instances, they opt for the word 'fraction' to describe the organised sub-party groups that other writers had referred to as factions. The argument for its replacement is weak; all groups in political transactions could be regarded as having pejorative undertones. Despite the neutrality of the term "fraction", its usage never really caught on and scholars in the field opted to use the taxonomy developed by Rose, as well as the fact that the new term it could also have been confused with the German word for parliamentary party – "fraktion".

In addition to the progress being made in political science, sociologists started working on defining factions in a sociological sense. Nicholas (1977, pp.57-58) delineates five characteristics of a faction which he sees as conflict and political groups but need not be institutionalised[2]. This assertion goes against the claims made by previous theorists (Rose (1964) claimed that factions are factions because they *are* institutionalised in their nature). Nicholas also points to the diverse, interpersonal and hierarchical structure of factions, which illustrated the clientelist nature of factions used in definitions in the study of Italian and Japanese factions. Beller and Belloni (1976) diverge from Nicholas' definition arguing that the institutionalisation of factions makes them distinct as intraparty groups – characteristics like completeness, durability and formalisation are key components for them in conceptualising a political definition of faction (p.548). At this stage, most scholars agreed that the dimension of organisation in a faction (Sartori, 1976, p.74) was important but little academic consensus existed about the necessary amount of organisation needed to define factions.

Beller and Belloni followed with a conceptualisation of a theory of factions built on a number of country case studies where factions were significant players in party competition. Here, there was also remarkable disparity on the actual definition of the concept of faction but did succeed in identifying 'the dimensions of the lack of agreement' (Beller & Belloni, p.417). They argues that factions are self-aware intraparty groups, legitimate units by which to study political competition and are built around a leadership structure (not necessarily the incumbent leader of the party: perhaps a potential challenger to that leader) who exploits a client-patron type relationship inside an acknowledged hierarchical structure. The level of institutionalisation is considered important, because this indicates

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[2] I take institutionalised to mean a group that is self-aware and has a formal degree of organisation around it.

whether or not the division giving rise to factions in the party is a deep structural, personality-based or ideological one that persists over time and over leaders or, merely an opportunistic group designed to maximise the spoils available to the leader of the faction.

The ambiguity of the necessary extent of this organisational/bureaucratic criterion is evident throughout Belloni and Beller's volume. Belloni (1978) refers to the Italian case where 'the factions are quite developed organisationally, with names, internal hierarchies and more or less routine procedures' (p.74), whereas alternatively Aronoff suggests grading the degree of institutionalisation on a scale, choosing not to lay down certain criteria that should be met (p.111). This divergence reaches a point where McDonald (1978, p.222-3) chooses to use differing definitions for factions in the Colombian and Uruguayan cases!

However, an interesting argument is made by Roback and James (1978, p.330) that factions have another possible definition – not just as conflicting intraparty groups, but also potential proto-parties. This varies with Zariski's earlier definition that the aim of factions is to 'compete for the acquisition of influence over the principal institutions of intra-party government' (p.29).

Zuckerman (1979) elaborates using faction and political group interchangeably, (p.20) – factions in his view are political intra-party groups that are defined by the uneven distribution of power that exists in them. It is also significant that Zuckerman implies (p.22) that the degree of faction is directly correlated with degree of institutionalisation, which suggested that the study of factions could be done using a continuous spectrum instead of a discrete scale.

Hine (1982, p.39) builds on his initial definition and presents three dimensions of classification – organisation, divisional reasons/duration (policy/strategy) and scope/coverage. This final

factor is new to the analysis given that it asks at what levels of the party intraparty competition takes place. He also coins the concept of the *issue group* which allows for the classification of a group that tries to influence party policy on one particular issue, and does not go beyond this issue - it is not rooted in a deep structural division that characterises intra-party debate (general economic policy for example).

Further criteria are laid out by Torovnik and Mendilow (1986) from examining Israeli factions, where they claim that a faction differs from a party in that factions do not participate in national elections (p.114). They identify the dimensions that differentiate parties from factions as being (1) the degree of institutionalisation; (2) the common interest underpinning the faction; (3) the degree of permanence and (4) the degree of visibility of the faction.

Hanley[3] (1986) builds upon Hine's work and looks at how extensively the faction permeates through all levels of the party, *e.g.* youth wings, using the example of the French Socialist party. In Sinnott's (1989) work on placing factions inside a party, coverage, or where factional competition is most evident, is not an issue – Hine's dimension of "coverage" was not explored further in later studies of factions.

In recent times, there has been a two-pronged approach to putting together a definition of factions – collecting all the works done in the area to date and justifying research based on a combination of these, or defining factions in view of the particular party/theory/process being examined. Reiter (2004, p.251) puts it best when he states that 'factionalism is one of the most widely discussed but under-theorised aspects of party politics'. Budge (1985) presents one such example of a case-based definition of factions defining them as groups which

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[3] Despite using 'fraction' instead of 'faction' *à la* Sartori (1976)

look to attain 'predominance over the others, which enables it to shape electoral and government programmes' – with no mention of organisation or coverage as discussed above.

Druckman (1996) takes a much more useful definition of factionalism, grounding his measurement in Janda's work (1980, pp119-123) who measures different types of factionalism - ideological, issue-based, leadership and strategy, which avoids the definitional problem. Laver and Shepsle (1990) steer clear of the definitional debate but rather just label all intraparty groups as factions, which is arguably acceptable given that the thrust of the particular paper concerns theoretical modelling. Leigh (2000) defines the faction in light of a specific case (Australian Labor Party) as 'organised power groupings' (p.427). This contrasts with McAllister (1991, p.208) where he discusses the agreed parameters of ambiguity when looking to explain the concept of faction in political science, and uses the classification between tendency and faction to differentiate between the two parties he discussed. Webb (2000) also takes this approach, in that he recognises that there is no specific intraparty unit for each party- indeed there may be a tendency in a party that has cross-cutting membership with a faction in the same party.

Recent developments look at alternative definitions of factionalism, that are variants on the actual definitions conceived by earlier theorists. Morgenstern (2001) employs the continuous classification of factions, linking the prevalence of factions with the party system in each country, but this is grounded in his analysis of Uruguay, but which represented a new way of accounting for differences between intra-party groups. Bettcher (2005, p.342) takes another step in this direction, differentiating between factions by their motivation for existence (policy or office-based). Bettcher concludes motivational differences have an effect on the extent of factions' organisational reach in the party.

Gillespie *et al.* (1995) maintain difficulties with a single definition of factionalism. Like Roback and James (1978), they state clearly that the tendency of the conventional theory of factionalism is to exclude the role of a faction as a proto-party as opposed to solely being an intraparty group. This is unhelpful particularly in relation to countries where party systems are in a state of flux. Summarising one of the difficulties with defining factions, they argue that the concept of faction is culturally subjective one. This is a point of view defended by Grynaviski (2004) when he cites marked organisational and structural differences between traditional American factions and their counterparts in India and other countries.

However, the classification lines between different intra-party groups (tendencies or single-issue groups) are blurred, and this causes great difficulties dealing with the identification and measurement of factions in a party. Chambers (2008) in his study of Thai governments defines factions as '*the often-temporary grouping together of politicians and their support groups within and apart from an overarching party structure*' (p.305). The allusion to a temporary nature is different from the conventional approach to defining faction where permanence is usually an identifying characteristic.

In a 2005 working paper, Köllner and Basedau use a definition of factions that draws on all the pertinent literature thus far and define a faction as any intra-party grouping that (1) exists for a certain amount of time; (2) has a minimum amount of organisation; (3) a common self-awareness; (4) has active political goals and (5) can be distinguished as a bloc within the party (p.8-9). This pattern towards a more general definition is reinforced by Boucek (2009a) who defines factions as 'identifiable sub-party groups reflecting intra-party divisions and differentiated degrees of institutionalisation', or simply 'groups within larger groups' (2009b: p.468).

Boucek (2009b) refers to Zariski's definition, in setting out her opinion on factionalism. Given that the primary drawback of the majority of the other definitions put forward is that they differentiate different intra-party groups on somewhat arbitrary grounds which are difficult to clearly demarcate. In order to eliminate this arbitrary nature from definition of a faction, it makes sense to use as universally applicable a definition of faction as possible, drawing on the above discussion. While the more specific definitions mentioned above may have been of use in individual case studies, a more general definition of faction similar to those presented in the past is useful.

Hence, the definition to be used by this research project is as follows:

A faction is any intra-party group with the following characteristics:

(1) It does not present candidates for elections outside the party under a factional label

(2) It has a self-awareness

(3) It has political aims – be they based on policy, patronage or leadership, and tries to achieve them inside the party apparatus.

(4) It is visible to external observers as a bloc inside the party and

(5) It is defined by a degree of organisation that is also externally observable, though not necessarily a high degree of organisation.

In fact, mindful of the Belloni and Beller volume, this definition is consistent with their claim that any unified scheme of definition of faction would determine that factions are 'organisational units of political competition' (p.447).

While the definition laid out above has distinguished between factions and other intra-party groups, it is worthwhile to examine why certain intra-party groups should not be regarded as being factions. There are five criteria laid out above that set a faction apart from other intra-party groups. However, various types of intra-party groups exist that our definition does not distinguish from factions. The discussion above has concentrated primarily on those groups that are formed inside the party, but does not take account of intra-party groups that may have been established before the party came into existence or groups that represent a particular component of the party's membership.

Trade unions are an example of such an intra-party group. Brand (1989) describes the consolidated nature of the trade union movement in the British Labour Party. While they do not have parliamentary representation, they do have representatives on the party executive and hold sway in electing the leader of the party. The 2010 election of Ed Miliband as leader was said to be due to the influence of trade union votes in the electoral college selecting him as leader. Similarly, Merkl (1978: 250) argued that attempts at faction formation in the German SPD were based on the large number of trade union members. However, while the trade union attempted to consolidate a faction inside the party, it ultimately failed and trade union members pursued their goals external to the party.

This last point is central to distinguishing a faction from a trade union. The literature that we have discussed above has argued that the overarching goal of the faction is to take control of the party and to pursue its goals solely through the party itself. A trade union is not constrained in that same way – it may pursue its goals outside the party apparatus if it so wishes. For factions to pursue their goals outside the party, they would have to become a party in their own right. Cyr (1978: 293) is correct to state that the structured organisation of trade unions, as well as their financial abilities and

close links give them qualities similar to a faction, though the fact that they mobilize in more than one sphere (e.g. inside the party and outside it) means that they are distinct from a faction.

In many cases as Köllner and Basedau (2005: 20) argue, trade unions are (usually) external sponsors to the formation of a political party and hold a special relationship with it. Given this unique role, trade unions may choose to give allegiance to certain factions and use them as a vehicle for their political aims, as occurs in the case of the Australian Labor Party (Mulé 2002). The shifting nature of this allegiance as described by Cyr (1978: 292-3), as well as their capacity to act externally highlights their distinctiveness from factions.

Another aspect worth addressing briefly is the role of groups who represent particular categories of the party's membership, such as women's forums or youth wings. While they may be unable to act externally to the party to achieve their aims (though this is not always true), there is a question as to whether or not they can be regarded as a faction. A sensible way in which to address this question is to examine the basis for the existence of such groups. If such groups are mandated by the party rules, then they just become a vehicle through which the faction may pursue its aims, similar in nature to a party's national executive. On the other hand, if their foundation is autonomous from the party's constitutional rules, then we can regard them as a faction in the normal sense as long as they fulfil the five criteria laid out in the definition above.

Scholar	Definition
V.O. Key	*Factions were seen as political machines that rowed in behind certain candidates in order to win the party primary.*
Richard Rose	*Factions were considered a type of intra-party unit. Tendencies were considered the other type. The difference between the two was the self-awareness of factions and the degree of organisation characterising them.*
Raphael Zariski	*Any intra-party group whose members share common identity and purpose and organise as a distinct bloc in the party to achieve their goals*
Giovanni Sartori	*Factions are considered to be sub-units of a party.*
Kenneth Janda	*Factions followed Zariski's definition, but were differentiated on the basis of why they had been established*
David Hine	*Factions organise on three dimensions – organisation, scope and ideological division*
Kim Eric Bettcher	*Factions organise on the basis of ideology and career motivations.*
Thesis	*A faction is any intra-party group with the following characteristics: it does not present candidates for elections outside the party under a factional label; it has a self-awareness; it has political aims – be they based on policy, patronage or leadership, and tries to achieve them inside the party apparatus; it is visible to external observers as a bloc inside the party; it is defined by a degree of organisation that is also externally observable, though not necessarily a high degree of organisation; it pursues its activity only inside the party and; its existence is not mandated by the party's rules.*

Table 2.1: Evolution of Definition of Factionalism (Source: Boucek 2009)

To address this need for distinction, we add a sixth and seventh criterion to our definition, as follows:

(6) It pursues its political activity inside the party, i.e. the party is the only political arena in which it participates.

(7) Its existence is not mandated by the party rules.

We derive from this, a definition of factionalism which we regard as:

Factionalism in a party can best be described as a situation where factions exist inside a party, and satisfy a number of criteria, as set out above.

Table 2.1 presents a summary of the different definitions proposed for factions and factionalism (Boucek 2009: 458).

Section 3: Theoretical Model

While the actual conceptualisation of the dependent variable is dealt with at length in Chapter 3, this section of the chapter looks to explain factionalism as a characteristic of a party, looking at this from the viewpoint of the individual member, any faction in the process of being formed, or any faction in existence and the overall environment within which the party operates.

From the perspective of the individual party member (at any level of the party organisation), we assume that they have a number of goals that they wish to achieve through the party, and these goals may be office-seeking or policy seeking. In order to achieve these goals inside the party, the individual member must choose from a set of strategies that will affect their probability of achieving each of these goals. This discussion is analogous to the discussion of the reasons for which ambitious politicians affiliate with parties in Aldrich (1995:52).

In deciding how best to achieve their goal of policy or acquisition of office, the individual member may well decide that affiliation with a faction is the best avenue open to them. Naturally enough, this is contingent on how extensive factions are in the party, and whether or not they are the primary vehicle of intra-party competition that exists. The probability of a faction assisting an individual member in the goals is almost always a function of the existence of factions in the party. The more extensive factionalism is, the higher is the probability that affiliation with a faction will assist the individual

member in achieving their particular goals. From this, we understand that the higher this probability is (the more extensive factionalism is inside the party), the greater the incentive for individual members to join factions and factionalism as a characteristic of the party persists.

From the point of view of a faction seeking to form (we shall refer to such as a proto-faction), or indeed a faction that is already in existence, the work done by Hirschman (1970) on "Exit, Voice and Loyalty" is instructive. The analytical approach employed is extremely useful in the discussion and analysis of factionalism in parties, as illustrated by Kato (1998) in her discussion of the Japanese LDP.

Hirschman posits that actors or small clusters inside a larger group (a body of customers, an alliance of nations *etc.*) have three options available to them in response to the behaviour of the larger group – exit (defection/disassociation from the larger), voice (qualified continued association inside the group, but by no means independent of the larger group – this qualified association is manifest and tangible) and loyalty (no qualification to membership of the larger body and subsumed into the larger body entirely, with no discernible conflicting characteristics or behaviours).

We assume that factions or proto-factions also have particular goals, policy or office-based similar to those of the individuals that comprise them. The likelihood of the faction or proto-faction deciding to pursue any of the above strategies is usually determined by the incentive structures within which they operate. These can be internal to the party (e.g. party rules) or they can be external to the party (e.g. electoral system). It follows that where this likelihood varies, the choice of strategy varies also.

For example, where an electoral system discriminates against small new parties, there is an incentive for a proto-faction, that might

become a new party, or a faction that might become a party, to remain inside the larger party, in that it has a higher chance of achieving its aims rather than risking annihilation under a punitive (to smaller parties, at least) electoral system. Given that every proto-faction or faction approaches this existential question from the margin[4], factionalism can become quite extensive inside a party, and obviously this depends on the structures that shape these likelihoods for them.

The final perspective from which to examine the onset of factionalism in a party is certainly from that of the party itself. This can be best analysed using work done by Panebianco (1988, especially Chapter 4), who discusses the differences in the types of evolution parties follow. In fact, one of the key variables upon which he differentiates parties is how institutionalised they are (ibid., p. 53). This is a measure of how the party becomes an institution, the extent to which it acquires organisational stability. A party that is institutionalised (Panebianco 1988: 55-57) is one that is defined by a certain level of internal systemic coherence (i.e. internal sub-groups, such as factions, are not major players in how the party operates). Additionally, such a party is independent of the environment within which it operates, i.e. it is independent of other organisations external to it.

Basedau and Stroh (2008: 8) lay out four main criteria by which institutionalisation of parties might be measured: coherence, how rooted they are in society, the depth of organisation and autonomy from external influences. Other indicators include characteristics such as how much of the party's organisation exists independent of the parliamentary group, how similarly organised the structure is at all levels of the party, the financing of the organisation, the

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[4] Alternatively, it may also explain why parties would merge to form a larger party, and then become factions themselves inside that new party.

relationships it has with external organisations and the extent to which the rules of the party reflect the actual reality of what occurs inside the party. It is useful to think of an institutionalised party as one which has "solidified" itself in the party system of a country. Panebianco (p. 56) discusses the existence of factionalism in a party in terms of the party's "systemness" or internal structural coherence, which is a one of two components of his measure of institutionalisation. Where a party leaves significant autonomy for organisational matters to sub-groups (factions, for example), the party is characterised by a low level of "systemness". On the other hand, where the resources and internal party activity are controlled by a highly centralised organisation, the sub-groups have much less autonomy *vis-à-vis* the party itself.

Panebianco does not argue that these differing levels of "systemness" explain factionalism, but rather that they affect the character of the sub-groups that exist in a party. Where there are differences in this level of systemness, there are differences in the characteristics of the sub-groups –the sub-groups become less distinct from the party as control is centralised, and vice versa. We can draw parallels between this approach and the idea of a cluster party, or a "federated host party", as advanced by Torgovnik and Mendilow (1986). In such a party, the host party acts as an umbrella for a number of smaller party-groups or factions that exist inside the party; such a group comes together to maximise electoral gain. The host party itself is not highly institutionalised in such a situation, but rather the member-groups or factions have a significant degree of autonomy.

It is worth noting other contributions to this discussion. Bettcher (2005) examines the importance of understanding the incentive structures that bring about factionalism in a party, and shows that where these incentive structures differ, the character and nature of those factions differ also. Boucek (2009) also adds the idea that ultimately factionalism is a function of the structural incentives, both

inside and external to the party, that exist at any particular time, but that these incentives can change over time as well as in their nature.

For the purposes of our research project, we posit that factionalism is a function of the interaction of structures that face individual members of the party, groups that could be factions, groups that are factions and the party itself. The incentive structures that each of these actors face may not always be identical. The interaction between these sets of actors and the structures they face affect the decisions that they make about how best to engage in intra-party competition. The purpose of this research project is to investigate how variation in those structures changes the likelihood that the above actors choose particular courses of action, and specifically when the existence of factionalism is a result of those actions. One of the core assumptions that underlie this research is that actors (individuals or groups) inside parties will be open to whatever sort of group activity that they believe will allow them to further their goals, whatever their basis.

Rather than just using single measures, such as the number of factions, we attempt, as shown below, to explain factionalism as a characteristic of a party. We believe that this does a better job of actually looking at the extent of factionalism in a party, which may not always be represented all that well in a single measure of the number of factions. We will expand upon this further in Chapter 3.

Section 4: Country-level Explanations

Now that we have established the theoretical model with which we look to explain factionalism in parties, it falls to us to look at those independent variables that could be responsible for the existence of factionalism. To couch this discussion in terms of the theoretical model that we outlined in the previous section, it is best to think of these independent variables as being linked to the incentive structures that determine the extent of factionalism in the party, both

external (national) and internal (party). In this section, we examine the literature that has been used to explain factionalism and factions as a result of the country-level features that exist, whereas in Section 5, we look to those features that comprise the features of a particular party. We deal with those institutional and country-level variables in the sub-sections below, specifically the role of the electoral system, the role of the party system, whether or not the country had an executive president, or used a federal system.

Section 4.1: Electoral Systems

The character of the national electoral system, the rules it employs and the role of parties can all bear upon the extent to which factionalism becomes a part of those constituent parties. Ultimately, given that the electoral system is the institution that determines the allocation of seats, and thus government posts (where applicable), to parties, it is pertinent to intra-party activity and can foster the emergence of factionalism.

There are various elements of electoral systems that are of interest when trying to explain the extent of factionalism in a party. Zariski (1960: 37-41) discusses the importance of the size of the local unit of representation, in determining exactly the extent to which factions could proliferate in a party. The size of this local unit of representation determines what the "vote-catching unit" is going to be (Sartori, 1976: 80), which then has consequences for the existence of factions.

Katz's insights into the effects of electoral systems on factionalism and intra-party politics are quite telling. He claims that where the electoral system allows for intraparty preference votes to be cast, there is an effective incentive for cohesion in the party to collapse (1986, p.101). He mentions a number of cases (Japan and Italy) where this is true –arguing that where preference between candidates of the same party can be expressed, the individual candidate cannot

rely solely on the party for their election. The nature of the campaign becomes candidate-centred as opposed to party-centred. In order to distinguish themselves from their running mates, candidates will require extra resources for their campaigns. Factions may perform a sponsoring role in providing candidates with resources for their campaign. Even if factions didn't exist at that stage already, candidates could form factions as vehicles by which to gather extra communal resources for their campaigns, or at the least to give them an extra label by which they could differentiate themselves.
Morgenstern (2001) describes how the Uruguayan system facilitates voters casting a ballot for a faction list from their choice of party list (p.239). This represents an incentive for groups inside the party to mobilise and manifest themselves as factions. Browne and Kim (2003) illustrate this further in their discussion of the Japanese electoral system before 1993 – where Japan's multimember district meant that often members of the LDP would be running against each other in the same constituency, providing an incentive to each candidate to distinguish themselves from their colleagues (p. 112).

The effect of the pre-1993 electoral system on the extent of factionalism in parties in Japan, especially the LDP, is one that is well documented by a range of sources (Reed 1990; Cox *et al.* 2000; Hrebenar 2000; Köllner 2004). Browne and Kim (2003) maintain that Japan's multimember electoral districts, combined with the SNTV electoral system, meant that often members of the LDP would be running against each other in the same constituency, providing an incentive to each candidate to distinguish themselves from their colleagues (p. 112). Similarly, the now defunct Italian Christian Democratic Party was often regarded as showcasing an ideal type of factionalism, as documented in Zariski (1960) and Beller & Belloni (1978), given the scope that existed for voters to express preferences between candidates from the same party in the same district. However, while the old Italian electoral system was described as a

cause of the DC's factionalism, it is not entirely accurate to claim that it was the only cause, but may have been an amplifying factor.

Torgvonik and Mendilow (1986) discuss the characteristics of Israeli 'host parties' that are collections of factions an example being the Liberal-Herut party formed in 1965. The motivations for the formation of such parties, and hence institutionalisation of such factions, are rooted in a desire to increase electoral effectiveness of all the groups inside it. In a way, the Israeli examples mirror the experience of other parties, given that small parties come together as factions to form a federal party, as opposed to a party being divided into factions or a loose alliance of smaller parties being formed. Examples abound of such cases such as the LDP in Japan and the Socialist Party in France as we discuss below.

However, evidence from states where PR-STV is used and where constituencies are multi-member ones. PR-STV is one of the more open electoral systems in the world (Farrell and McAllister 2006) calls the above discussion into question. Using this system, voters usually indicate their first preferred candidate (known as a first preference vote), their second preferred candidate and so on, until they reach the end of the ballot paper or have no discernible preference between the remaining candidates at the end of the ballot paper. Given that multi-seat constituencies are the norm in countries where STV is used in the legislative election, it is usual for larger parties to present more than one candidate to voters in a particular constituency (especially if they want to have any real chance of being in the driving-seat when it comes to government formation). We would then expect that the presence of competition between co-partisans would make more acute the need for candidates or legislators from the same party to cultivate an individual vote for themselves, and that they would seek the support of intra-party factions in so doing. However, where factions did not already exist, such support would not be sought. This raises an interesting point in

light of the above discussion – the existence of intra-party preferential voting would seem to foster the persistence of factionalism, as opposed to being the cause of it – something we examine in detail in Chapter 7.

Katz (1980) and Hine (1982) argue that Irish politicians tend to set up their bailiwicks at local level and that these political machines are built around the local individual but do not tend to exist above that. Similarly, there is a conspicuous lack of literature on the relationship between the existence of stable intra-party groups and the effects of the electoral system in the Maltese case, where PR-STV is the electoral system, though this is probably as much a result of the rarity of use of PR-STV as anything else. While it is correct to state that factionalism is not present in countries that employ PR-STV, it is worthwhile to investigate why the structures of those systems do not facilitate factionalism.

One explanation has been put forward to attempt to account for this apparent inconsistency – the existence of incentives to candidates to cultivate a personal vote, but without the expected resultant lack of party cohesion, and hence existence of factions. Katz (1980, p. 9) quotes Nathaniel Thayer as underlining the importance of money in Japanese politics relative to Irish political campaigning and that the high costs associated with inter-party and intra-party campaigns for the Japanese candidate provide an incentive for faction leaders to form groups across constituencies to attain the loyalty of potential candidates. This would seem to suggest that party financing plays a significant part in deciding the level of factionalism in a party or not.

Additionally, it is worth pointing out that competition for support from voters makes the persistence of factions more likely for the reason that campaigns for votes from the electorate against co-partisans are likely to require more resources than persuasion of internal party selectorates. Obviously, as stated before, the existence

of this intra-party preferential vote does not guarantee the emergence of factionalism, but can certainly facilitate it.

A further explanation concerns the significantly high amount of party discipline that characterises parliamentary politics in Ireland and Malta. One of the reasons put forward to explain this phenomenon argues that parliamentary systems of government lends itself to a greater deal of party discipline and parliamentary cohesion than in presidential systems, something we turn to below. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that a supposed collapse in party cohesion, induced by the cultivation of personal vote, might not necessarily lead to incentives for factions to persist. Incentives to cultivate a personal vote could be so strong that candidates do not have any incentive to maintain a sub-party group.

Thayer's 'money politics' explanation falls short when explaining other cases of factionalism however. Plenty has been written on the British experience of factions in the Labour Party and the Conservative Party (Rose, 1964; Brand, 1989; Seyd, 1972), though that the British House of Commons is elected on a basis of one MP per constituency using a plurality system. This is similar to the Australian case, where factions are quite prevalent (McAllister, 1991). Both Australia and Britain operate electoral systems that are based upon single-member districts, and copartisans are not in competition with one another for seats before the electorate. However, while we come across countries where factionalism persists despite the fact that their electoral systems do not allow intra-party electoral competition this does not mean that intra-party electoral competition has no role to play in increasing the likelihood of factionalism. In fact, we could attribute the reason for existence of factions in both Australian and British parties to the fact that they operate majoritarian electoral systems which penalise the existence of small parties, something with which we deal below. Interestingly, Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999) maintain that despite electoral

reform in Japan (movement from multimember constituencies to single member districts supplemented by closed party lists) factions still persist, though they have diminished in importance somewhat.

Section 4.2: Party Systems

The party system has also been found to have some bearing on factionalism in parties. Moving from a single-party system to a dominant-party system, we also find some work which posits that systems where one party dominates increases the likelihood that there is a high degree of factionalism – Key's work in relation to the Southern Democrats in the United States is a case in point as the analysis of the Congress Party in India, the Christian Democrats in Italy and the Liberal Democrats in Japan undertaken by Belloni and Beller (1976, p. 533). Such dominant parties tend to be characterised by their breadth of social coverage, which could lead to alliances inside the parties. In essence, the factionalisation of a party is a by-product of the party's own success in maximising its vote share! Laver and Schilperoord (2005) describe such parties as 'aggregators' given that they adopt policy positions as a result of intra-party democracy. An interesting observation to make here is around the Swedish party system where there is a dominant party, but a no observable factionalism.

Arguments are similar when discussing a two-party system. McAllister (1991, p. 210) identifies the existence of factions in the Australian Labor Party as being as a result of parties' convergence towards the centre in a two party system, and this is the result of a non-proportional representation electoral system. Such electoral systems do not guarantee the existence of a two party system but certainly make it more difficult for breakaway factions to survive as independent parties. Brand (1989, pp. 161-163) makes a similar argument in relation to the changes in society that affected the Conservatives and the Labour parties and their need to appeal to broader social bases. This is where the observation made by Sartori

above is quite resonant – the existence of a two party system (that might be because of a non-PR electoral system) can indeed have an indirect effect on the extent of factionalism.

Section 4.3: Regime Types

The democratic regime type of a country could have a bearing on the extent of factionalism in parties. The crucial difference here lies between countries using presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary systems. Where there is a tendency towards clear-cut separation of powers between branches of government, more centres of gravity (the chairs of legislative committees could be on a par with members of the executive) will develop inside the party that facilitate the distribution of patronage or promotion from various sources. Therefore, factions can persist in the absence of one overall authority leading the governmental party. Also, where the overall size of the parliamentary party is bigger, we expect the development of more centres of gravity and more diversity of opinion, and hence a tendency towards more factionalism in the party itself.

Samuels (2002) proposes that democratic regime type has a bearing upon the way in which parties organise themselves, and argues that Epstein (1967, p.35) claims that institutional structures condition party development. Consistent with the theoretical framework that we presented in the previous section, parties respond to the different incentives created by the choice of institutions. Samuels (468-471) claims that the presidential system is likely to encourage "coat-tail effects" among legislative candidates – where aspirant legislators ally themselves with a certain presidential candidate in the hope that they will be successful in using their association to achieve electoral success. He also argues that the separation of the executive from the legislature shifts the focus of the party towards winning the presidency as opposed to winning a legislative majority. We can expect two characteristics of parties in presidential systems. Firstly, given the high electoral threshold involved in achieving success in a

presidential election, parties will engage in more extensive vote-seeking behaviour, and look to attract more diverse groups. These groups might become factions themselves, or pre-existing factions might provide an avenue through which to win the electoral support of these groups, and thus an incentive persists for their existence insider the party. More specifically, Samuels (p. 471) states that presidential elections will involve setting aside policy concern and the formation of electoral coalitions with the specific aim of winning the election. Secondly, parties in presidential systems are likely to be defined by the success or failure of the *de facto* party leader, i.e. the president. It follows that where there are legislative elections, candidates from the president's party may decide to distance themselves from the president, which provide an incentive to maintain a faction on the basis of policy perhaps.

Furthermore, in the case of parties that nominate presidential candidates using intra-party elections, candidates benefit from the support of an organised grouping within the party organisation, and these groupings may be factions. An example of such a case can be found in the Acción Democrática of Venezuela, as documented by Coppedge (1994), where intra-party factions competed against one another for control of the party's nomination for president. Similarly, the Argentine presidential election has been characterised by the factional nature of the competition (Wiesehomeir & Benoit, 2009).

The role of a directly elected prime minister (DEPM) is of a similar nature to that of a president, and the effect of its introduction in Israel in 1992 makes for interesting reading. O'Malley (2006) claims that the significance of smaller parties in Israel was increased in terms of the relationship between the legislature and the executive. This is similar to the role factions would play in a two-party system (the Israeli electoral system is extremely proportional, and facilitates smaller parties). A particularly informative statement by O'Malley (p. 155) is

> *"the interests of the DEPMs and the party they lead also come into conflict. A DEPM cannot afford to attack other parties as the party s/he leads would wish him or her to for electoral purposes. This is, firstly, because the DEPM leads and must maintain a coalition government and also because the prime ministerial candidate cannot afford to offend voters of other parties."*

If we were to substitute the word 'faction' for 'party' in the above passage, it would succinctly explain the different incentive structures faced by members of parties under different governmental structures. He goes on to maintain that Japan and Italy also considered the introduction of a directly elected prime minister. It is worth noting that both of those countries are often cited as states in which factionalism is a characteristic of parties, and if anything the introduction of a directly elected executive position would have increased the factionalism in the parties in question. Ironically, it was anticipated that the introduction of the direct election of the prime minister would give the prime minister extra legitimacy in face of the power of factions, but would actually give the factions further incentives to persist as they would battle with one another to secure the party's nomination for the prime-ministerial election, as we discussed above. The effect of parliamentary government is that it couples the electoral success of a party with the chief executive, and does not facilitate the proliferation of alternative power bases in the form of competing factions.

The role of faction leaders as described by Gunther & Hopkin (2002, p.212), would become much more apparent in a presidential system. As they maintain, the control over promotion of members of the party to more prominent positions lies in the hands of faction leaders, and especially so in a presidential system where the legislature (and appointment to legislative positions of seniority) and executive are separate bodies.

Other institutional arrangements that may have a bearing on factions are mentioned by Köllner and Basedau (2005, p.17). These include the levels of government present in a state – a federal structure can promote the existence of factions that have regional bases (Reiter, 2004). Similarly, we might expect that public financing could have a negative effect on the existence of factions, given that subsidies for parties are usually controlled and distributed through the central party leadership, thus depriving factions of a financial power base (this is discussed in more detail below).

Category	Independent Variable	Hypothesis
Electoral Systems	*District Magnitude*	As district magnitude increases, the proportionality of an electoral system increases, and there are fewer barriers to entry for small parties. This results in lower levels of factionalism
	Intraparty preferential vote	Where voters are permitted to cast an intraparty preferential vote, parties are more likely to feature higher levels of factionalism
Party Systems	*Dominant Parties*	Where there is a dominant party in a country's party system, that party is likely to be factionalised
	Number of parties in party system	As the number of parties competing in a party system increases, the level of factionalism in a country's parties decreases
Regime Types	*Nature of executive*	Where the executive is elected separately from the legislature, there is likely to be a lower level of factionalism.
	Relationship between executive and legislature	If the legislature is separate from the executive, then the levels of factionalism in parties will be higher.
	Federal Systems	Federal systems of government foster factions in parties at the national level

Table 2.2: Country-based hypotheses in explaining factionalism

Table 2.2 outlines the main country-based hypotheses explored by the literature to explain the degree of factionalism in parties. Institutional arrangements in place in a particular country have some bearing on the extent of factionalism in parties in a particular country. However, the work in this area would seem to indicate that there is no one set of institutions that foster incentives for factionalism, but rather that the interaction of various institutional types can facilitate the emergence of factionalism.

Section 5: Party-level Explanations

In a similar vein to looking at the literature that examines the incentive structures created by certain institutional architectures, it is worth looking at characteristics of parties that may have the same effect, albeit at a lower level than that of the country.

Section 5.1: Historical Conditions of Formation

We now turn to the micro-characteristics of individual parties and investigate whether or not factors such as the history of the party, the internal decision-making processes about candidates and party administration and the amount of specialised and institutionalised units in the party have any bearing on the persistence of factionalism.

Cole (1989, p.79) attributed the factional nature of the French Socialist party to the fact that it had been formed from six distinct groups. Hanley (1986, p.30) builds upon this citing the ideological differences that marked those different forming groups from each other and guaranteed a certain amount of conflict inside the party. Similarly, the Japanese Liberal Democratic party was formed from a merger of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party which led to the existence of two sub-party leader-based groups that encouraged factionalism inside the party (Fukui in Beller and Belloni (1978), p.48). 'Ready-made' factionalism can certainly be a contributory factor to a characteristic factionalism, if conflicts based on ideology

or on leadership are not resolved to collective benefit in the early days following a merger.

Section 5.2: Internal Party Organisation

Internal decision-making procedures may well have an effect on the degree of factionalism. Beller and Belloni (1976) refer to this characteristic as 'permissiveness' (p. 548). The evidence does not appear to support the claim that factionalism was created by these decision-making procedures but most definitely goes a certain way to making sure that the factional politics in each party persists. The most intuitive claim made in this area was that made by Sartori (1976, p.100) where he argued that when the electoral system for the national party executive or main decision-making body is based on proportional representation, factions are much more likely to persist, especially factions based on matters of ideology.

However, the intra-party electoral system will only have consequences where the national executive body has real decision-making power. This point is corroborated by Cole (1989: 82) where he claims that the role of Mitterrand in the party had more consequences for the persistence of factions in the French Socialist Party rather than the internal party's electoral system. Factionalism in the French Socialist Party was a function of Mitterrand's popularity rather than the internal party electoral rules. The role of the internal party electoral system may be overstated, i.e. the electoral system does not necessarily cause the existence of factions, but may assist in their persistence. It is useful to think of an electoral system as a sound speaker. A sound speaker does not regulate the tone or melody of the music but can amplify it or lessen it. The effect is similar in the case of an electoral system – intra-party electoral systems may amplify the causes of factions in a party and thus foster their emergence, but do not necessarily cause them.

That being said, the election of the LDP president in Japan is a 'winner takes all' electoral system, which we would expect to mitigate the effects of factions but instead we find that factions are designed to make sure that the leaders of each faction are potential leaders of the party (Cox *et al.*, 1999, p.48). 'Winner-takes-all' is a crude and misleading classification though, because when appointing a cabinet, the party president must take factional strengths into account[5].

Hanley (1986, p. 46) claims that the PR system of electing people to leadership positions, such as to the party executive body, in the party incentivised a high degree of factionalism. He discusses this in light of the experience of the CERES faction in the French Socialist Party. He argues that this system of representation ensured that 'several major groups' were able to exist inside the national structure (p.49). Leigh (2000) makes a similar claim in relation to the Australian Labor Party.

In addition to this, candidate selection may indeed have some bearing on whether or not factions persist – as Zuckerman (1979, pp. 144 -146) claims when discussing the breadth of the influence of the Christian Democrats on Italian local politics. A centralised system may deprive factions of the opportunity to influence candidate selection at local level, and a decentralised system will lessen the ability of the party leadership to nominate candidates loyal to it, or to the leadership's faction, though Carty (2010: 150) argues that the lack of factionalism in the Canadian Liberal Party is a result of the fact that the party is fragmented into "hundreds of disparate constituency organisations with highly volatile memberships". On the other hand, if candidate selection is centralised, then an incentive exists for factions to win places on the candidate selection body. This

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[5] This seemed to cease as a procedure under the previous Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi.

claim does not appear to be entirely corroborated by Grynaviski (2004, p.515) where he claims that Key's ideas in relation to the importance of factions in political competition are not supported by the evidence in relation to elections in the Southern states of the US. Perhaps, the role of faction in candidate selection is difficult to discern as claimed by Moraes (2004: 4), especially if factions do not have a particular legal status in the party rules. He argues that the faction is central to candidate selection in Uruguay, because of the unique nature of the Uruguayan electoral system that gives factions a very particular role in the selection of candidates - faction leaders control ballot access. However, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule, in that factions are officially recognised inside parties.

Generally speaking though, when using organisational-based explanations for factionalism, we should be aware of a potential endogeneity problem. Factionalism may result from a particular way of organising a party, or a particular way of organising a party may be because of factionalism in that party.

In an interesting analysis of the British Social Democratic Party, McKee (1989) makes some points that are telling concerning the relevance of party structures, specifically rules that ban or regulate the existence of factions. The structure of the SDP was rigid, yet facilitated the establishment of single-issue groups (p.178) that were known as 'associated organisations' (p.170). Rather than attempt to eliminate factionalism, the SDP sought to regulate the activity of factions. Therefore we can conclude that rigid party structures do not stifle factional activity entirely. Seyd (1972) refers to the 'party inside a party status' of the Monday Club (p.472). Hine (1982, p.46) discusses this issue also, referring to the importance of how different ways of representing different interest groups may act as a precursor to factional conflict. Allan (2002) discusses the importance of rule changes in the Australian Labor Party and the consequences that had for faction bosses – placing the votes of affiliated organisation

members on a par with rank-and-file members when selecting parliamentary candidates. Despite the fact that only about ten per cent of ALP members are members of factions, they wield enormous influence on the party, especially in the candidate selection procedures. This shows the way in which rules facilitate factionalism, despite factions not commanding large memberships. On a side note, but in a similar vein, Köllner and Basedau (2005, p.20) describe rules in the German Greens that require two thirds of delegates to assent to certain decisions which in turn give significant power to intra-party groups.

However, we could take a broader view of the effect of organisational features of parties on factions, and cite the work of Carty (2004). Carty claims that factions serve as integrative devices inside parties that are organised in a stratarchial fashion. In parties that are made up of local autonomous units, there is an incentive for aspirant leaders (or indeed any office-seeking personnel) to establish and maintain factions in order to co-ordinate the activity of various intra-party units. Such a structure may facilitate the emergence of factions, in the absence of a central controlling leadership, though they cannot be identified as a universal cause – factions forming a party may have designed an organisational structure to facilitate their preservation. However, we should also be aware that this is only the case where factions themselves operate at all levels of the party and can thus bind together the different levels which, if the party really is a stratarchy, would otherwise be operating independently of each other.

Section 5.3: Party Finance Rules

Köllner & Basedau (2005) maintain that the relationship between party financing and the extent of factionalism is one that has not been given a lot of attention in recent times. The predominant focus of work in this regard tends to focus on the Japanese LDP, given the central role factions play in providing party finance, as mentioned

above (Ferdinand (2003)). It is interesting to note that reforms to party finance and electoral reform were carried out together in 1993, given the apparent link that existed between the two issues, in terms of Japanese politics. These reforms included limits on the amount of money that could be raised by individual candidates, and they also allowed for the provision of public subsidies to parties in order to achieve party-centred campaigns, rather than faction-sponsored or candidate-centred campaigns.

Ferdinand (2003) traces the effect of party finance and the mechanism by which it facilitated the existence of factions inside the LDP. Responsibility for fundraising was not centralised, but was devolved to individual candidates, and faction leaders "acquired a financial basis". Following on from this, competition between factions was based upon fund-raising ability as opposed to policy difference. Given the intra-party competition that is characteristic of the SNTV electoral system, money proved to be a solid resource for candidates seeking to differentiate themselves from each other, and where factions can provide resources to candidates to assist in this, it creates an incentive for the faction to continue. We can summarise by stating that the centralisation of party fundraising and party expenditure will tend towards removing, or at least weakening, the power bases of factional leaders. The power bases of factional leaders, in the case of party finance at least, stemmed from the client-patron relationship that characterises factions (a similar example could be found in the case of the Italian Christian Democrats (Zuckerman, 1979).

It is worth noting that public funding for parties has been introduced in Japan, at both the local and national level, as well as the fact that there has been a drastic drop in donations from private corporate interests (Reed, 2002: 247), but factions (known as *habatsu* in Japan) have not entirely disappeared either. On first glance, it would seem that these reforms should diminish the parts played by both *habatsu*

and the *kōenkai* (local fund-raising groups for individual candidates), given that there is little incentive for them to fundraise and dispense financial assistance to members of each faction. This is certainly corroborated by Hee Park (2001: 440) – *habatsu* can only mobilize 10% of the resources that they could have done in the days before the reforms were implemented. Reed (2002: 247) points to loopholes in the legislation regulating funding of parties which have allowed to *kōenkai* to proliferate in many districts (one legislator formed seven groups in his constituency in order to maximise revenue (Blechinger, 2000: 3)), because of its ambiguous designation of what organisations can receive funding.

Habatsu still continue to exist however, which suggests that they are not established on a financial basis entirely. Carlson (2011) subjects the Japanese party finance reforms to analysis and investigates whether or not they had the desired effect – the mitigation of factionalism in parties. He finds that while public subsidies were made available to members of the party, and candidates seeking re-election, the amounts involved did not entirely provide relief from fund-raising pressures. It was intended that provision of public funding (p.14) would lead to party-centred campaigns, and thus deprive factions of one of the attractions that they held for members of the party. So, while public funding did have some effect in minimising the degree of intra-party conflict, Carlson makes the argument that loopholes in party finance rules will be exploited - one such loophole in the Japanese case was that once public subsidies were received by the party, there were not universal rules governing their distribution inside the party in place, thus allowing for the emergence of "entrepreneurial politicians" in the manner in which funds are allocated across the organisation. Table 2.3 outlines the main party-based hypotheses identified by the literature that have been used to explain factionalism.

Category	Independent Variable	Hypothesis
Historical Conditions	*Merger of parties lead to creation of party*	Where parties merge together to form a new party, factionalism in the new party will be high
Internal Procedures	*Intra-party electoral system*	Where the mechanism to elect people to the party executive is based on PR, and when that party executive has real authority, factionalism is more likely to persist.
	Candidate Selection	Where candidate selection is centralised, the level of factionalism is likely to be lower.
Funding of parties	*Provision of Public Subsidies*	Where public subsidies are made available to parties and channelled through the leadership of those parties, the level of factionalism will be lower.

Table 2.3: Party-based hypotheses in explaining factionalism

Section 6: Conclusion

In concluding this chapter, it is worth taking stock of the work that has been done in looking at factionalism and explaining the extent to which it differs in different parties. We have discussed the definitional problems that have beset the study of factionalism in parties, and arrived at a definition that does not exclude different types of intra-party groups on the basis of certain typologies. We have set out the theoretical structure that informs the incentives that exist at both party-level and country-level for factionalism to emerge. Factions may be formed for many different reasons, but the factors and incentives that facilitate their emergence vary across countries and parties. On a country level, we have theorised that those institutional structures that facilitate the emergence of different centres of power in a party can facilitate the persistence of factionalism in a party. The extent of this factionalism can be seen as a function of the interaction between the different institutional features. However, we have also observed that the circumstances of particular countries seem to inspire the findings made in relation to

factionalism. We found that research suggests that the nature of the party system has some bearing on factionalism, as does the role of intra-party preferential voting. In both instances, these effects have not been tested across different countries. This is also true in the case of presidentialism and federalism – while some research indicates that they can explain factionalism in some countries, there is none that suggests a universal pattern.

Furthermore, parties may have certain characteristics that make it easier for factions to exist – the rules may not ban the existence of factions, the candidate selection mechanisms propagate the factions and the hierarchical structure of parties, both in terms of finance and structural constraints, affect the extent and type of factionalism in parties. Again, the interaction of different characteristics may inform the amount, extent and institutionalisation of factionalism in a party. The research that we discuss above seems to indicate that internal party rules play a role in explaining factionalism albeit, that as discussed above, the direction of causality in such a relationship can be difficult to identify. One pattern that we do observe in the discussion above is that the historical conditions surrounding the formation of a party do matter and this pattern is observable in more than one party.

We now turn to measuring the effect of interactions between institutional features and party characteristics on factionalism. In the next few chapters, we seek to explain what facilitates the emergence of factionalism in the first instance, and secondly what causes the variation in the factionalism in parties. We begin by discussing how to measure factionalism.

Chapter 3: Methodology, Research Design & Descriptive Analysis

Abstract

This chapter discusses the main methodology in this project, discusses the measurement of factionalism and introduces us to the main set of data being used in this project. Firstly, we look at previous attempts to measure factions, factional activity and factionalism. Next, we turn to the conceptualisation of the dependent variable, 'factionalism' and how it is measured. Following this discussion, we introduce the data being used, describe the method in which it was collected and illustrate its validity in measuring factionalism. We then present the data itself, in a descriptive fashion, both on a party level and on a country level. We present some patterns in the data, by regional breakdown and in relation to the levels of democratic freedom. We deal with the appropriate statistical method by which to analyse the data. Finally, we conclude the chapter and lay out a road map for analysis in further chapters.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN & DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Section 1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain and justify the main methodology being used in the large sample component of the thesis. It explains the manner in which the dependent variable being studied is defined, conceptualised and measured so as to allow the testing of hypotheses. We pay attention to the particular advantages that are involved with this methodology and discuss its shortcomings and weaknesses and how best to address them. We present an empirical discussion of the dependent variable and look at variations in it.

The chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 looks at previous attempts to measure factions, factional activity and factionalism. Section 3 deals with the conceptualisation of the dependent variable, 'factionalism', and how it is measured. Section 4 introduces the data being used, describes the method in which it was collected, and addresses its limitations and how these limitations may be best addressed. Section 5 presents the data itself, in a descriptive fashion, both on a party level and on a country level. Section 6 concludes the chapter and brings together all the points raised in the chapter and points to the further analysis to be undertaken in subsequent chapters.

Section 2: The Dependent Variable - Specification

Before embarking on a description of how factionalism will be measured in this research project, it is worth taking a brief look at alternative approaches that have been taken to measurement in this area. There is a conventional method that has been used by some, i.e. physically counting the membership of factions by using secondary sources to identify members (Garvin, 1981; Cox et al., 2000). Such secondary sources usually include current affairs articles from mainstream media, or 'who's who' directories. Boucek (2003) uses

primary data when assigning members to members of factions in the DC and the LDP, based on public declarations of voting intentions by members of factions at party conferences. Such a system of measurement, while desirable in theory, may not always be feasible given the reluctance of party managers (or indeed, party members) to reveal the members of party factions, or where there is an absence of secondary publications tracking such memberships.

Shih (2004) uses a predictive mode of analysis by guessing which members are likely to be members of a particular faction in the Chinese Communist Party, based on their social ties, their place of birth and socio-economic background. Chambers (2008) puts together an interview pool of politicians and political scientists to identify members of factions and Beal and McAllister (1989) and McAllister (1991) use candidate surveys to match members of factions to the attitudinal clusters that exist in those parties.

The prevalence of factions in parties in the southern parts of the United States also led to a large amount of interest in how to measure them. Key (1949) puts together a typology that was frequently employed in describing types of factionalism – unifactional (one dominant faction), bifactional (two factions evenly matched in the party) and multifactional (there are three or more factions competing inside the party). This typology is built upon in work by Black (1983) and Van Wingen (1984). Echols and Ranney (1976, p. 147) convert Douglas Rae's measurement of multi-partyism into an index of factionalism that measures the extent of factionalism inside a party, based on the number of votes each faction gets in the internal party elections, usually in selecting the party's candidate for governor. Obviously, the main problem is the fact that such primary elections are rare in countries outside the US.

Members of parties are often asked in surveys whether or not there are factions in existence in their party, and the responses are usually

dichotomous in nature, without necessarily giving any information on the factions in those parties. The Borz (2009) measurement of factionalism is an example of such. Bäck (2008) employs two alternative measures of factionalism when asking Swedish municipal councillors about factionalism in their parties – studying the spread of councillors' self-placement on a left-right policy scale, using the standard deviation of those placements, and asking them, on a scale, how likely they are to agree with a statement such as "There are various groups in my party that have vastly different opinions on important issues" (p.79). Such measures can suffer from the fact that while there may be policy disagreements in the party, factions may not be the obvious manifestation of that. Conversely, while factions may exist in the party, they might not be because of the policy disagreement in that party revealed by such a survey. Heath (2003) also uses the existence of a split in the party as a proxy measure of factional dynamics.

While each of these particular modes of measurement is desirable in their own right, each particular measure is usually inspired by the particular case examined. Where work has been done across countries, it has tended to rest upon classificatory systems and typologies rather than on a scale on which cases may be compared.

There are other concepts related to the study of factionalism. One is party cohesion, namely the extent to which parties vote cohesively in parliament together – the study of which is best known from work by Janda (1980) and various studies of roll-call voting in the US Congress and the European Parliament. Observable implications here do not always guarantee a measure of factionalism (factions may meet before a vote and compromise on an outcome – thus no direct measurement of the factional dynamic is clear) they do not always give us a measure of factionalism in this party, especially in the case of European parties who vote en bloc usually, regardless of whether they are factionalised or not.

A conceptually similar measure to factionalism is that of party unity, for which data exists and has been compiled through the use of expert surveys, such as Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2003). The empirical association between party unity and factionalism has also been shown (Borz, 2006), despite the fact that the measure for factionalism is not as robust or as informative as we would like. Party unity is better defined in terms of attitudinal homogeneity, and the lack of such may not necessarily manifest itself in the form of intra-party factional competition, though it may do in the case of those factions that are ideologically based.

Section 3: Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is the degree of factionalism that characterises a party. In previous work, the emphasis in the study of factionalism has been on categorisation of the intra-party groups that exist inside a party, such as tendencies, single-issue groups, factions of interest and factions of principle. Typologies abound which attempt to place certain subunits into particular categories based on certain criteria such as Rose (1964), Hine (1982) and Bettcher (2005). Such typologies are constrained by the fact that there are no "critical points", at which we can differentiate between these different types of groups. While scholars that constructed these typologies identify the dimensions upon which decisions are made about placement of certain types of intra-party groups, Boucek (2009, 459) claims that they do not operationalise these dimensions in order to identify the critical points at which sub-group type A becomes sub-group type B. More often than not, the criteria for differentiating these groups can seem arbitrary.

In framing our dependent variable, we must be mindful of a number of things. A continuous measure of factionalism in a party would allow for cross-case comparison on a large scale. Secondly, the dependent variable must be as consistently defined as possible.

Thirdly, it is important that the dependent variable draws on as wide a base of information as possible. Fourthly, it must be a universal measurement.

The dependent variable in this study is the degree of factionalism inside a party. This captures the nature of intra-party group interaction in the party, not necessarily competition, as some sub-party groups may well have co-operative functions inside the party organisation. This measure does not solely deal with factions, but rather deals with all intra-party groups, as described by Rose (1964), Hine (1982) and Bettcher (2005). Differences in the types of intra-party groups lead to a difference in the degree of factionalism, i.e. the type of competition that exists between intra-party groups in the party. This measure will provide information on the norms for intra-party group behaviour inside those parties that are being examined. To recap from Chapter 2, we define a faction as follows:

A faction is any intra-party group with the following characteristics:

(1) It does not present candidates for elections outside the party under a factional label

(2) It has a self-awareness

(3) It has political aims, be they based on policy, patronage or leadership, and tries to achieve them inside the party apparatus.

(4) It is visible to external observers as a bloc inside the party and

(5) It is defined by a degree of organisation, though this degree of organisation can vary.

(6) It pursues its political activity inside the party, i.e. the party is the only political arena in which it participates.

(7) Its existence is not mandated by the party rules.

Furthermore, we define factionalism as the following:

Factionalism is a situation where factions exist inside a party and where factions satisfy the above criteria and are a distinct feature of that party that sets it apart from other parties.

For example, a party may have lots of factions but these factions may have no real effect on how the party operates. A measurement that tells us that party A has 3 factions of sizes x, y and z does not necessarily tell us about the internal dynamic of that party, nor does it give us any useful information about how the factions operate inside that party. Factions x, y and z may seek only to influence decisions on a particular dimension of little or no importance to the party, and it is fair to conclude that in such a party the level of factionalism is low. Hence, any measurement that we use should capture the extent of this process of factionalism inside the particular party being studied.

Given that we have now identified the dimensions which comprise the measure of factionalism, we now identify the two "ideal" types of party which give us the vignettes of the scale. One of these points is represented by the "typical monolith" of the party where the party is an entirely unitary actor. The other extreme point is one where the party resembles a cluster party, as detailed by Torgovnik and Mendilow (1986: 115) and Mendilow (1982). This cluster party is best thought of as the type that resembles a party before it breaks up into smaller parties. Torgovnik and Mendilow identify one type of party that figures at the highest point on all of the above dimensions – the "federal faction" party. Such a party has the following characteristics:

- Factions in that party are characterised by full institutionalisation – clear leadership, clear organisational apparatus, formal procedures and rules;

- Factions in that party maintain normal and visible relationships with the main party apparatus;
- It is composed entirely of factions
- There is an intensive level of competition between the factions inside the party;
- It is improbable that a member of the party is not a member of a faction;
- Factions in that party are durable and last throughout time;
- Factions in the party extend through every level of the party – from the grassroots level right up to the parliamentary party and:
- Factions in the party have the ability to collect and maintain its own resources.

One feature included in some lists of the features of "ideal type" factions is that a faction based upon a question of ideology is more likely to be permanent than one which is established for other reasons. Given that our theoretical model makes no distinction between the motivations for the formation of factions, we do not include this feature.

A party that is at the upper end of this scale is a party that to external observers contains factions that satisfy all of the above criteria, and one upon which all external observers agree contains factions. On the other end there are parties that do not contain factionalism as described above. In this case, we infer that if external observers do not observe factions then it is plausible to assume that factions may not be as pronounced and as publicly observable as they may be in other parties.

Section 4: Data

In choosing the research tool most desirable for measuring our dependent variable, the degree of factionalism, we must be conscious of a number of things. Firstly, we need a tool that can be applied across a relatively large number of cases, i.e. we need to be able to collect data that is homogenous in origin and allows for as valid a comparison as possible. Secondly, we need to use a tool that allows data to be interpreted consistently across a number of cases, especially in relation to the application of a certain theoretical framework, i.e. we need the understanding of faction to be thought of in the same way in the case of data point A as with data point B. This validates the assumption of unit homogeneity that is necessary for robust political scientific investigation.

Factionalism is a specific characteristic, and requires the expertise of someone who is knowledgeable on the inner workings of particular parties. On counting methods, information may not always be available on the membership of factions, or it may not always be feasible to collect that information. Information from votes held at party conferences may be restricted, for example. Surveys that measure the attitudes of party members may provide a guide as to what factions or competitive dimensions exist inside a party, but are limited in that they may not always provide an adequate picture of actual self-aware groups that exist inside the party. It is worth noting here, that the only large sample analysis of parties that included various measures of factionalism to date is the Janda ICCP (1980) project, which was reliant on coding of secondary literature, supported by country experts. Regrettably, this data has not been employed in many other studies of factionalism.

The primary source of the data for the measurement of our dependent variable comes from an expert survey co-ordinated by the Project on Democratic Accountability and Democratic Linkages at Duke University (Kitschelt *et al.* 2009). The purpose of the project was to

analyse the differences in party organisation, party characteristics, party structures and mechanisms of party accountability across different countries. This particular expert survey was deployed over 85 countries (these countries and parties are detailed in Appendix A), and covered 479 parties. In each country, the survey pool was made up of a minimum of ten political science experts as well as a number of journalists.

The question of interest to us concerns the existence of factions in a party and read as follows:

"*Within a party's National Convention and Parliamentary Caucus we often find relatively stable factions, intra-party subgroups of like-minded individuals that act as a unified body on matters of party politics. These factions may have independent access to financial and political resources, and their membership generally shows some stability over time.*
In your opinion, do the following parties have stable factional groups in their National Conventions or Parliamentary Caucuses?"

Respondents were then presented with a list of the major parties in their own country, and asked to answer "Yes" or "No" to the question posited above. The question also included a "Don't Know" option for respondents. The value for the dependent variable that we then extrapolate at the party level is the proportion of experts that reply "Yes". The values for the dependent variable are thus bounded by 0 and 1, where 0 signifies that none of the experts surveyed believed that factions, as outlined above, exist in the party in question, and where 1 then indicates that all experts surveyed believed that the party in question features factions as they are described in the above definition. We discuss the construction of the dependent variable at the country-level in the next section.

Before proceeding to analyse the data itself in detail, it would be wise to address the nature of the method of data collection itself and examine any possible flaws or weaknesses inherent in it, and how to address those flaws in our analysis.

The use of respondents with expertise on factionalism as a source for data for the dependent variable is not uncommon. As mentioned before, media publications have often been used in this particular subfield to make judgements about those who should be included and counted as members of factions (Cox et al, 2000). In addition to this, Janda (1980) collected data on the basis of collecting information from secondary literature, and used country experts to validate it. In this vein, it would seem sensible that both journalists (who have first-hand experience of observing politics in a particular country) and political scientists (who can bring academic objectivity to bear on their responses) would be included in the pool of potential respondents. Precedent for the construction of a composite pool of such experts was made by Chambers (2008) in his analysis of factions in Thai parties.

The use of journalists to act as respondents in surveys is not unprecedented. In their analysis of political space in six European countries, Kriesi *et al.* (2006) use the editorial content of newspapers in each of the countries to place the parties on certain dimensions. Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) support this approach, and claim that if journalists were asked to complete expert surveys in the placement of parties on a left-right scale, for example, there would be little difference in the responses elicited from journalists as opposed to those elicited from experts.

The majority of research projects that ask journalists to respond to an academic's questions include studies from the field of political communication. One of the older ones is the study concluded by Tunstall (1970) who conducted a survey and interview process of

British parliamentary correspondents in relation to their roles and their interactions. Both parts of the data collection process yielded a high response rate for the survey of 85% and 46 interviews lasting up to and over an hour. Walgrave (2008), a political scientist at the University of Antwerp, asked journalists about the agenda-setting power of the media. As well as surveying politicians, it also contacted "all national TV, radio, newspaper, magazine, and Internet journalists covering domestic affairs and national politics in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium". In this case, the response rate among journalists was 66%. This number includes those respondent journalists who returned a useful "questionnaire". Van Dalen et *al.* (2009) report a 32% response rate of British journalists to the surveys that they sent out. A cross-national survey of journalists completed between 1991 and 1993 yielded a response rate from 36% to 51% in different countries (Patterson and Donsbach, 1996).

Political scientists in Purdue University have also used interviewing to elicit information from journalists (Clawson et al., 2005). Pfetsch (2001) used semi structured interviews to gather data on political communication roles in the USA and Washington. In these interviews, there was a pool of respondents constructed that included both political operatives and journalists. Larsson (2002) also used a composite pool of both politicians and journalists to gather data on the interaction between politicians and the media. Journalists can provide a unique insight into the internal life of parties, as demonstrated by Chambers (2008) in his measurement of Thai factionalism through interviews of political journalists.

In a wider sense, the use of experts to provide information on cases or subjects of interest is a methodology that is widely used in the discipline in a number of areas. One such area is the placement of parties on policy dimensions, and Mair (2001) discusses the benefits and limits of employing expert judgements. Experts, whether they are journalists or academics, are in an excellent position to use the

information that they have previously absorbed to come to a conclusion on a particular question.

The value of the dependent variable is based upon the proportion of expert respondents who identify factions in the party based on the definition provided. We exclude the respondents who choose the "don't know" option in the survey, and then we express the number of experts who answer "yes" to factionalism as a proportion of those who gave a definite answer to the question. The reason that we choose to omit those who answer that they do not know is that they have self-identified as not being in a position to make a judgement about that party, and thus it is plausible to infer that they would not be able to answer the question (Kitschelt 2011: 24). In any case, we have no information on what their responses might be.

Now, we explain how the value of the dependent variable for each observation is calculated. For example, suppose that 50 experts are faced with the question in relation to Party A. If six of these respondents choose not to answer this question, then we are left with 44 experts. If 33 of these 44 answer "yes" to the question as to whether the party is factionalised, the value that is assigned to that party on the dependent variable is 0.75, i.e. $33 \div 44$.

We then turn to the question as to how this score should be interpreted. Obviously, it would be a leap of faith to suggest that Party A is "75% factionalised" – intuitively this is a difficult concept to visualise. Rather, it is much more reasonable to maintain that, of the experts who felt that they had enough expertise about the level of factionalism in Party A, there was almost consensus over the fact that factions existed in that party. In that sense, it makes more sense to think of the dependent variable as a measure of "perceived factionalism". The "true" level of factionalism, for the purposes of our analysis, is an unobserved variable and we treat it as a latent variable when measuring it. For example, some might think that a

measure of voting cohesion might be a useful indicator of the level of factionalism that exists in a party, as a "proxy variable" of sorts. However, such a measure precludes the possibility that intra-party conflict would not be reflected on the parliamentary floors. While factions might disagree over the particular stance that the party should take on a question in parliament, they may settle this disagreement before voting in the house. So, while the factions have wielded some influence in the party in deciding its policy position, the observable action of voting does not reflect the extent of factionalism in that party. In the absence of such "proxy variables", we most look to measure this particular characteristic using another measure. There are no "proxy variables" that lend themselves to analysis.

This means that rather than measure the true level of factionalism, we are actually measuring the perceived level of factionalism in a party. However, this indicator contains error. This error may be due to a number of factors. The knowledge of each of the experts may vary – the exclusion of those respondents who declined to answer the question mitigates that effect somewhat. This is a point that is discussed by one of the directors of the survey itself (Kitschelt 2011: 24) – he argues that the inclusion of a "don't know" option is something that reduces the possible error in this respect. Importantly, this number of experts varied from *party* to *party*, showing that respondents did not assume they knew everything about all parties in their country. Also, the size of this error is reduced by the number of experts that are surveyed. Secondly, the cut-off point at which each experts believes factions to be present in a party may vary from expert to expert, i.e. their interpretation of what a faction is and what characteristics it has. While it is difficult to entirely dispose of this source of error, the specific nature of the definition presented to respondents does make this cut-off point clearer.

A similar methodological approach is taken in studies of political corruption, where the 'true" extent of corruption is inferred from perceived levels of corruption. The measurement of corruption is inherently very difficult because of the fact that it is by its nature an illicit and illegal activity, and thus not susceptible to observation. Transparency International uses a number of indices to measure the extent of corruption in a country, two of which are based on perceptions of corruption rather than "hard" measurement of incidences of corruption. The first of these is the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is based upon the aggregation of public opinions about the extent of corruption. The second is the Global Corruption Barometer which measures the opinions of firms from around the world in relation to the quality of governance in a country. Parallels can be drawn with the measurement of factionalism when discussing these indicators. While it is difficult to measure the true level of corruption in a country, despite the drawbacks of perception-based measures, there is a strong association between the "true" level of corruption and the "perceived" level of corruption. Similarly, the average value of the individual responses concerning corruption provides the value of the measure of perceived "corruption" in a country. In an analogous fashion to our computation of the perceived factionalism score for each party, a country might have a perceived corruption "score" of 75 on a scale running from 0 to 100. This does not mean that it is in some sense "75 per cent corrupt", but it does mean that our best estimate of its "true" level of corruption on a 0–100 scale is 75. Naturally, wherever the perception of any variable is concerned, there is likely to be bias.

This measurement of perception is not something that is unknown in the measurement of factionalism. There is a precedent for using such an indicator in the measure of intra-party activity, especially one that is reliant on a dichotomous response to a question. Kopecký (1995: 142) describes a similar process by which factionalism was measured

in Czech parties. As part of a parliamentary study conducted during 1993, Czech MPs were asked a question "Are there any subgroups or currents in your parliamentary club?" They were asked two subsequent questions: whether or not they belonged to one of those groups, and then to identify which group that it was. As we noted above, this measure may not have been a perfect measure of factionalism in each party, but it represented the most satisfactory approach available and it did capture the level of "perceived factionalism" that exists in each party. Importantly, Kopecký notes that as the proportion of MPs surveyed who identify subgroups in their party increases, this is strongly associated with the existence of internal tensions or factionalism in those parties. It is reasonable to expect that in such cases there is a higher level of intra-party tension in parties where there is more of a consensus that intra-party divisions exist. He does note that these subgroups are not necessarily institutionalised factions, though the manner in which he interprets the measure is useful in our analysis in subsequent chapters. In a similar vein, we can therefore reasonably infer that the proportion of experts who consider a party factionalised is highly correlated with the 'true' level of factionalism.

In order to further establish the validity of this particular indicator, we also provide evidence from other sources that corroborates it. We present a sample of parties in Table 3.1 that have been identified by the secondary literature as containing factions with the factionalism scores for each party. We observe that there is a strong association between those parties that feature prominently in the literature when factionalism is being discussed, and those parties whose "perceived factionalism" score is 1 or is approaching 1. This provides us with increased confidence that the measure we are employing does provide a reliable indicator of factionalism.

Party	Country	Source	Factionalism Score
Australian Labor Party	Australia	McAllister 1991	1
Botswana Democratic Party	Botswana	Molomo and Somolekae 2000	0.86
CSSD	Czech Republic	Kopecký 1995	0.8
ODS	Czech Republic	Kopecký 1995	0.92
Parti Socialiste	France	Cole 1989	1
India National Congress	India	Heath *et al.* 2007	0.86
Democratic Party of Japan	Japan	Kollner 2004	0.78
Liberal Democratic Party	Japan	Cox *et al* 2000	1
Colarados	Uruguay	Morgenstern 2001	1
Nationals	Uruguay	Morgenstern 2001	1
Democrats	USA	Reiter 2004	0.87
Republicans	USA	Reiter 2004	0.87

Table 3.1: Association between factionalism score and parties identified in the literature as being factionalised

While the above table is useful in showing the validity of the measure that we have employed, there still remains a question about the interpretation of intermediate values between 0 and 1. It is reasonable to expect that as a party's score tends toward 1 the level of agreement among the experts who responded and identified stable factions increased. Given the specific nature of the definition presented to respondents, it is plausible to assume that in such cases factionalism is a characteristic of those parties. The same is true when the score approaches 0 – experts are agreed that there are no factions in such parties. However, how do we interpret scores like 0.4, 0.5 or 0.6? In such cases, experts are far from being in agreement about whether or not factions exist in such parties. For

example, in the case of a party that scores 0.4, this means that 40% of the respondents who *answered* the question identified factions, and that 60% didn't. Hence, 40% of those respondents read the definition and identified factions in that party, according to their knowledge. Importantly, it also tells us that, based on their knowledge, 60% of respondents did not observe factions. While we cannot necessarily assume with certainty that a party is 100% factionalised simply because all the experts surveyed say that factions exist in it, it is reasonable to proceed on the basis that factionalism is a significant characteristic of that party, and a widely observed one at that. And as this value changes, the level of factionalism in a party may not be so strong that it is immediately clear to all respondents, who then answer the question on factionalism accordingly. Where factionalism is a well-known characteristic of a party, then its score should approach 1. Similarly, where factions exist but are not well-known or do not have large memberships it is not unreasonable to expect that some respondents will not identify factionalism in that party and that this will be captured by our measure, i.e. that the factionalism score will be lower than 1 but not 0. Of course, a health warning should apply here – there may not be perfect correlation. However, we have reason to believe as shown above that there is correlation between the extent of factionalism as a real characteristic of a party and its measure of perceived factionalism.

Generally speaking, the average score yielded from an expert survey is simply the expected value of the responses. So, if there is a true 0/1 (unknown) value of factionalism, say, and experts report their assessment of that, our expected value of the true underlying value is simply the sample average, or in this case the proportion of experts surveyed who identify factions. Obviously, in such instances it is important to note that the expected value of a binary variable can take values intermediate to 0 and 1; indeed it always will unless all the realisations of the binary value are either 0 or 1.

In order to deal with some of the shortcomings of this measurement of the dependent variable identified above, we take a number of steps. Firstly, to take account of the uncertainty (i.e. accounting for the fact that the number of experts that answer about each party varies) in the data, in the statistical models presented in later chapters we use weighted least squares regression rather than ordinary least squares. The weights in question are the number of experts that answered the question for each party (or the weighted average of experts that answered by country).

To deal with potential false precision in the data (i.e. whether or not the estimates are driven by a very small proportion of the experts asked to respond to the survey), we employ weighted least squares where the weight in question is the proportion of experts available that answered the question. These are reported in Appendix B. As we will see, these results do not differ from the WLS models using the number of experts as weights.

In order to test the robustness of our measure, i.e. to minimise the possibility that results are driven by outliers, we constructed an alternative specification of the dependent variable so that all parties would be coded as 1 or 0 as above, and then constructed a national weighted average (by seat and vote share) and subject this to WLS analysis as well. In our party-based analysis (as we will see in Chapter 6) we employ a logit model on the party-based dependent variable, coding all parties that had a factionalism score exceeding 0.5 as 1 and all those with a factionalism score below 0.5 as 0. In both instances, results did not differ significantly from the WLS models using the proportion-based measures.

Section 5: Measuring Factionalism using expert responses: Empirical Discussion

479 parties across 85 countries were included in this survey. A full list of all parties, and the number of respondents for each are presented in Appendix A. Countries covered by this survey were countries in which competitive elections had been held. This group of countries includes both democratic states and semi-democratic polities: the important criterion for the designers of this particular survey was that elections were competitive, something we discuss in detail below.

At least 13 experts were contacted in each country, of whom ten were political scientists and three were journalists. In the majority of cases, there were more than 13 respondents to the survey. The average number of respondents that answered per party was 13.73; the lowest number was 2 and the highest number was 71. We pointed out earlier that there was a "don't know" option on the question. As well as this, a number of respondents chose not to answer this question at all. For the purposes of analysis, we treat such cases as "don't know" responses. We thus measure the response rate in terms of the proportion of experts that responded to the question with "yes" or "no" (which we use as weight in the WLS models in later chapters).

In terms of the response rates to the question on factionalism for each party, the average response rate was 85%. The lowest response rate for a case was 14%, and in a number of cases (106), all respondents who were contacted took part in the survey and answered the particular question pertaining to factionalism. Only 12 cases (2.5% of the total number of cases) elicited a response rate of less than 50%.

Given that the possible responses to the question on factionalism were binary in nature, the information that the standard deviation

yields is somewhat restrictive. There is some usefulness in looking at the measure, as while it does not add any information to what we can glean from the aggregation of the expert responses, it does inform a discussion about the varying levels of agreement among experts about the cases being evaluated. Again, the nature of the binary response means that wherever experts were in total agreement about the existence of factions in a party, the standard deviation was equal to 0. Therefore, wherever the experts have all answered "Yes", the value of the dependent variable is 1 and the standard deviation is 0. Equally, where all the experts have answered "No", the value of the dependent variable is 0 and the standard deviation is also 0. Thus, we can also deduce that as the standard deviation approaches 0.5, the experts are more evenly divided, as would also be evidenced from the value of the dependent variable being 0.5. there is little we can deduce from any detailed examination of the standard deviation in this case, besides observing that there were 52 cases where experts were in total agreement on the responses that they gave; of these 33 were cases where all the respondents believed that there were no factions present in the party being examined, and there were 19 cases where all experts were agreed that factionalism was a characteristic of that party. Put another way, there were 52 cases that corresponded to the "vignettes" that we identified in the previous section.



Figure 3.1: Distribution of Values on Dependent Variable

A histogram of the values of the dependent variable at party level is presented in Figure 3.1. We notice that the distribution of values on the dependent variable shows a slight skew in the data, i.e. more parties are characterised by low observed levels of factionalism. The numbers of cases in each range of values is given in Table 3.2.

Factionalism Score	%	N
=0	6.8	33
<.1	3.1	15
<.2	13.4	64
<.3	9.4	45
<.4	11.2	54
<.5	9.2	44
<.6	12.9	62
<.7	9.6	46
<.8	9.2	44
<.9	7.1	34
<1	4	19
=1	4	19
Total	100%	479

Table 3.2: Distribution of cases per value on dependent variable

The mean value of the dependent variable is 0.46, and the standard deviation of the distribution is 0.29. In terms of the distribution of the data, the lower 25% of observations include and lie below 0.2, and the upper quartile spans from 0.69 to 1. The median value is 0.44.

A normal probability plot is depicted in Figure 3.2 and shows that the distribution approximates normality, and we do not require any transformation of the values of the dependent variable.



Figure 3.2: Normal Probability Plot of Values of Dependent Variable

Given that the analysis that follows in Chapters 4 and 5 deal with institutional design and independent variables measured at the national level, we now discuss the design of the dependent variable for use in that analysis. We create two sets of summary indices for each of the 85 countries in the dataset, weighted by the proportion of votes and seats that each party got at the previous legislative election before 2007in their countries.

To illustrate how this value was calculated, we use the scores for Ireland and Irish parties. Table 3.3 displays the calculations for the Irish value of the two indices, and shows how the dependent variable for each country. Essentially, we are calculating the weighted average of factionalism scores for each country[6], and using the proportion of votes and seats each party won at the most recent general election in their country (the 2007 general election in the Irish example below) as the weights upon which to build both indices.

[6] As discussed in a previous section, an alternative specification of this indicator used is based on weighted averages by seat and vote share using values of 1 or 0 for each party (parties with a score of 0.5 or greater would be recoded as 1, and those less than 0.5 recoded as 0).

Party	Factionalism Score (1)	Proportion of votes won (2)	=(1)×(2)	Proportion of seats won (3)	= (1) ×(3)
Fianna Fáil	0.12	0.42	0.05	0.47	0.056
Fine Gael	0.12	0.274	0.033	0.307	0.037
Labour	0.25	0.103	0.026	0.12	0.03
Progressive Democrats	0.12	0.028	0.003	0.012	0.001
Sinn Féin	0.14	0.071	0.01	0.024	0.003
Green Party	0.12	0.045	0.005	0.036	0.004
		Index based on vote-share=	*0.127*	*Index based on seat-share=*	*0.131*

Table 3.3: Calculating the dependent variable indices for Ireland

The results for these indices in each country are displayed in Table 3.4. Like the cases at party level, the distribution of both of these indices is normal, and unsurprisingly both are highly correlated (r=0.94). Figure 3.3 shows the correlation between the two as well as a ranking of different countries in terms of factionalism of their parties and Figure 3.4 shows their respective distributions. However, on performing a paired t-test between the two indices, we find that statistically, the summary index weighted by seats gives a higher national score for factionalism, on average. An advantage of constructing the measure in this fashion is that it allows us to take account of factionalism as a feature of a country, as opposed to solely examining it on a party level. We can also illustrate the validity of this data by examining which countries are towards the top of the scale in terms of factionalism being a national phenomenon across parties.

Country	Summary Index (votes)	Summary Index (seats)	N (Parties)	N (Average Respondents)
Albania	0.17	0.22	5	11
Angola	0.31	0.31	3	10
Argentina	0.03	0.07	5	15
Australia	0.70	0.82	4	9
Austria	0.60	0.63	5	15
Bangladesh	0.49	0.54	4	13
Belgium	0.39	0.40	12	6
Benin	0.23	0.44	5	8
Bolivia	0.45	0.47	4	10
Botswana	0.75	0.83	3	13
Brazil	0.47	0.51	11	14
Bulgaria	0.41	0.43	7	12
Canada	0.31	0.31	5	9
Chile	0.57	0.60	6	17
Colombia	0.39	0.42	7	10
Costa Rica	0.61	0.72	4	14
Croatia	0.17	0.19	10	15
Czech Rep	0.77	0.81	5	24
Denmark	0.31	0.31	8	16
Dom. Rep.	0.92	0.94	3	12
Ecuador	0.07	0.09	6	13
Egypt	0.00	0.00	4	7
El Salvador	0.76	0.76	4	9
Estonia	0.61	0.63	6	8
Finland	0.38	0.29	8	15
France	0.58	0.69	7	15
Georgia	0.65	0.84	4	8
Germany	0.83	0.87	7	19
Ghana	0.86	0.92	3	10
Greece	0.53	0.54	5	14
Guatemala	0.35	0.43	7	7
Honduras	0.79	0.82	2	10
Hungary	0.49	0.51	5	14
India	0.69	0.58	17	31
Indonesia	0.39	0.44	7	13
Ireland	0.13	0.13	6	8
Israel	0.46	0.49	9	25
Italy	0.58	0.61	9	21
Jamaica	0.78	0.79	2	12
Japan	0.77	0.81	5	17
Kenya	0.16	0.50	4	16
Latvia	0.42	0.47	8	11
Lithuania	0.30	0.32	7	15
Macedonia	0.08	0.07	5	11
Malaysia	0.61	0.52	5	21
Mali	----[7]	0.39	5	9
Mauritius	0.82	0.59	6	9
Mexico	0.82	0.83	5	16

[7] Information on the proportion of seats won by each arty in the Malian parliamentary election in 2007 was not available.

Moldova	0.33	0.38	6	12
Mongolia	0.79	0.80	5	13
Mozambique	0.48	0.52	2	16
Namibia	0.50	0.46	5	11
Netherlands	0.37	0.38	9	10
New Zealand	0.74	0.75	8	11
Nicaragua	0.41	0.46	3	8
Niger	0.45	0.50	4	9
Nigeria	0.58	0.60	3	34
Norway	0.30	0.32	7	26
Pakistan	0.36	0.32	6	18
Panama	0.46	0.58	6	7
Paraguay	0.69	0.79	7	10
Peru	0.53	0.69	5	10
Poland	0.36	0.36	6	12
Portugal	0.65	0.69	5	19
Romania	0.47	0.51	6	14
Russia	0.51	0.54	6	13
Senegal	0.24	0.29	5	11
Serbia	0.16	0.17	7	8
Slovakia	0.18	0.20	6	10
Slovenia	0.64	0.66	8	12
South Africa	0.49	0.49	3	10
South Korea	0.60	0.73	3	15
Spain	0.46	0.48	5	16
Sweden	0.50	0.53	8	16
Switzerland	0.61	0.64	7	12
Taiwan	0.55	0.57	2	17
Tanzania	0.70	0.79	3	14
Thailand	0.81	0.82	7	8
Turkey	0.54	0.60	7	9
UK	0.43	0.54	3	13
USA	0.84	0.87	2	16
Ukraine	0.67	0.74	6	20
Uruguay	0.97	0.99	3	16
Venezuela	0.33	0.38	6	7
Zambia	0.23	0.41	5	15
AVERAGE	**0.49**	**0.54**	**6**	**13**

Table 3.4: Summary indices of factionalism at national-level



Figure 3.3: Ranking of Countries on Summary Indices



Figure 3.4: Distribution of Summary Indices

In looking at the distribution of both indices, they both approximate a normal distribution, apart from a spike towards the higher end of the

scale, explained by the fact that larger parties are likely to be more factionalised and contribute more to the national score.

Following examination of both sets of indices, we can be encouraged by the fact that countries that the scholarly literature has identified as ones in which factionalism features prominently as a characteristic in a particular country. Scholars like Reiter (2004), Morgenstern(2001), McAllister (1991), Cox, Rosenbluth & Thies (2000) and Mershon(2001) have all pointed to the existence of factionalism in countries such as the USA, Botswana, Uruguay, Australia, Japan and Italy; all of which feature towards the higher end of the scale described above as do India, the Dominican Republic, Botswana and Germany. As an aside, it is worth noting that the cases mentioned in Beller and Belloni (1978)[8] and Gillespie et al. (1995)[9] generally feature towards the upper end of both of the summary indices above. In fact, the cases examined in Beller and Belloni's volume, on average, have a higher score on the dependent variable than those that were not included.

It is important to note also that this measure takes account of factionalism as a characteristic of a country as opposed to just that of a party, and that while some countries may have parties that are characterised by the existence of factions, this may be specific just to that particular party. Examples of countries where this appears to be the case are the UK (the British Labour Party was always known for the extent of its factions, which was not always true of the Liberal Democrats, say) and France (Cole (1989) claims that the French Socialist Party has historically always been quite factionalised (it has a dependent variable value of 1), though the French score lies between 0.59 and 0.68). Interestingly, countries toward the lower end of the scale include Ireland, Canada and Argentina – countries that

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[8] Japan, Italy, Israel, France, India, Colombia, Uruguay, Germany, Bolivia, UK, Chile and USA

[9] Spain, Portugal, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Turkey

have not featured prominently in case studies of factionalism. The above discussion shows that the data collected by Kitschelt et al. (2009) provides enough variation on both dimensions to do just that.

We turn now to the examination of geographical patterns in the data, both in terms of the 479 parties available to us, and the 85 countries that are of interest to us. A health warning should be provided here, in that we cannot expect to assume that we can make universal judgements about the propensity towards factionalism, based on regional locations. We do not have an equal proportion of countries from each region (the European component is the largest part). The geographical breakdown of the data is reported in Table 3.5.

Region	N (Countries)	N (Parties)
Africa	16	63
Asia	12	74
Europe	34	227
North America	10	36
Oceania	2	12
South America	11	67
TOTAL	**85**	**479**

Table 3.5: Geographical Distribution of Data

Tables 3.6 and 3.7 shed some light on the sort of patterns that exist in the data across regions. Table 3.6 presents three metrics. The first is a measure of the average value of the dependent variable at the level of the party in each of the six regions. The second is a measure of the average score on the national summary index, weighted by vote proportions and the third is the average regional score on the national summary index, weighted by proportion of legislative seats. Table 3.7 subjects these measures to statistical analysis, using t-tests to ascertain whether there is a significant difference between parties and countries by region.

Region	Average Value – Party	Average Value – Country (by votes)	Average Value – Country (by seats)
Africa	.5	.43	.5
Asia	.53	.6	.62
Europe	.4	.44	.47
North America	.61	.67	.71
Oceania	.47	.72	.78
South America	.47	.44	.49

Table 3.6: Dependent Variable Values by Region

We used an ANOVA analysis that to test for differences in factionalism scores across parties and countries. When we tested across regions in terms of the 479 individual parties, we found that the mean value for parties differed significantly across regions (F-statistic was 5.06 and p-value was 0.002). When we performed the same test across our country-based indices, we found a difference in the mean factionalism scores of countries across regions. In the case of the summary index that was weighted by votes, the F-statistic was 3.26 and the p-value was 0.01 and on the other national summary index weighted by proportion of seats, the F-statistic was 3.18 and the p-value was 0.0114 – evidence of a varying level of factionalism across regions.

Region	Average Value – Party	Average Value – Country (by votes)	Average Value – Country (by seats)
Africa	-.058	.08	.04
Asia	-.084**	-.12*	-.1
Europe	.12***	.089*	.11*
North America	-.14**	-.2**	-.2**
Oceania	-.01	-.23	-.25
South America	-.02	.06	.05

Table 3.7: Results of T-tests for Significant Differences at Regional Level
(Negative differences imply that cases in that region, on average, have a higher value)
****Significant at 0.001; **Significant at 0.01; *Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1*

The most striking pattern from Table 3.7 is that European parties are statistically less likely to be characterised by factionalism than those parties that are not in Europe and this also true in terms of European countries. Of the six regions, Europe is the only region in which this is the case.

On the other hand, the scores from North America and Asia imply that factionalism tends to be higher in those regions. Across all three of the measures, both countries and parties in North America and Asia tend to have higher levels of factionalism.

Regarding the other regions, the patterns are less significant. In regard to Africa, there is a slight difference that is significant between the parties, though not as significant as cases in North America and Asia. Interestingly however, there is a difference in terms of the national summary indices, which can probably be attributed to the manner in which electoral systems in those countries translate the number of votes to seats. Though this difference is negligible in magnitude, it is statistically significant. While there is a larger difference in the Oceania cases at national level, we must apply a health warning given that there are only 2 country-cases here and 12 party-cases (the average of these is not different from levels of factionalism in non-Oceania parties).

Claiming that parties and party systems in more developed countries or advanced party systems are less factionalised does not appear to make sense, given the prevalence of higher levels of factionalism in North America and Oceania. Similarly, the patterns as evident in South America and Africa do not seem to lend themselves to that ready analysis either. We investigate these inter-regional and intra-regional differences further in Chapters 4 and 5 where we look at electoral rules and institutional design in detail.

While we look at the effect of institutional design and regime type in detail in Chapter 5, it is worth undertaking a cursory analysis of our cases to establish whether or not the lack of a totally free and functioning democracy has any bearing on our dependent variable. On examination of the cases in question, 59 countries, which between them account for 354 parties, are countries that were deemed by Freedom House (2008) to be free, i.e. where there is open political competition, an independent media and respect for civil liberties. 23 countries lie in the partly free category and they account for countries containing 109 parties. There are 3 countries in the not free category and they account for 16 parties.

Firstly, we categorised all countries according to the Freedom House measures as reported above. The second measure we used was the Polity score for measuring regime types. Given that this survey was deployed in 2007/2008, we used the Freedom House and Polity Scores from 2006. Across the three Freedom House categories, we found that in terms of all 479 of our cases, levels of factionalism did not differ significantly across the three categories. The F-statistic (476, 2) calculated was 0.01 and the p-value was 0.9881.

Using the summary index weighted by seats, we found that across countries, there is some reason (though not hugely statistically significant) to believe that factionalism as a national characteristic varies – the F-statistic (82, 2) calculated was 2.68 and the p-value was 0.07, significant at the 10% level. Similarly, when using the summary index weighted by votes, the F-statistic (82, 2) calculated was 2.52 and the p-value was 0.09. This appears to suggest that while parties do not differ across categories, countries do seem to – but that the statistical evidence for this was weak. Table 3.8 presents an analysis of the national summary indices to ascertain among which categories there are differences between countries in terms of factionalism. The differences presented are those differences

between the average national level of factionalism (on both indices) in countries in each category of freedom, and those that are not.

	Summary index, by seats	Summary index, by votes
Totally Free (59 countries)	-.09†	-.1*
Partly Free (23 countries)	.05	.08*
Not Free at all (3 countries)	.26*	.21†

Table 3.8: T-test for Significant Differences in terms of democratic freedom
(Negative differences infer that cases in that category, on average, have a higher value of factionalism)
****Significant at 0.001; **Significant at 0.01; *Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1*

In examining the results that have been presented by Table 3.8, it is difficult to draw a concrete conclusion. While there are some differences in the levels of factionalism at national level, there is weak statistical significance. The most striking pattern is that of countries in the "not free" category. While the differences are statistically significant, the size of the difference is quite striking. The difference is positive, which would imply that parties in such countries are less factionalised. This is contrary to the general argument in relation to single-party states and countries in which large parties hold a monopoly on electoral competition.

Generally, it would be expected that in such countries, the pressure for factions to persist would be higher than more open countries, given that aspirant politicians who are unable to form their own parties would face huge incentives to set up intra-party groups to challenge incumbent leaders. Of course, the converse to this argument is that in countries that are not free, it could be more difficult to form factions in parties, especially if political freedoms are not widespread.

This aspect of the data merits further examination. To that end, we use an alternative measure of political freedom – the Polity score

(Marshall *et al.*, 2007) which avoid the problems of categorisation of cases that is inherent in the use of the Freedom House typology. As an initial test for correlation, we map our national summary indices against the polity scale, the results of which are presented in Figure 3.5.



Figure 3.5: Correlation between Polity Scores and National Values of the Dependent Variable

There is no clear correlation evident here, besides a large clustering of country-cases at the higher end of the polity scale. The correlation coefficients between the summary indices and the polity scores corroborate the story told in our scatter-plots above. In the case of the relationship between the summary index weighted by seat share and the polity score, r= 0.1009, and in the case of the relationship between the summary index weighted by vote share and the polity score, the r=0.1044. Neither is statistically significant which suggests that the level of political freedom does not seem to have any bearing on the level of intra-party factionalism that exists in a country

Section 6: Conclusion

The methodology described in this chapter draws on previous experience in the operationalisation of factions and factionalism, and uses the strengths of these measures in putting together a unique and comparable measure of factionalism in partiesThe fact that this methodology will provide a continuous scale upon which

factionalism can be measured is an important strength of this study because it allows for large sample analysis and comparison.

In this chapter, we provided a brief overview of previous methods of measuring factionalism in parties. We pointed out that the general limitation of such methods is that they are often informed by the particular case being studied. We discussed the source of the data being analysed in this chapter, and also addressed some of its limitations (and how we propose to address them), as well as providing information on its reliability in terms of the response rate. We then described the dependent variable and discussed it in terms of its distribution. We outlined the construction of a measure for national factionalism. We discussed regional variations in the data and found significant differences in average levels of factionalism. We also addressed the differences in political rights across the country-cases and found that we do not have enough evidence, or cases by which we can assume that there is an omitted variable bias in our analysis, i.e. factors related to political rights have some effect on the levels of factionalism reported in parties and countries.

Chapter 4: Electoral Systems & Factionalism

Abstract

In Chapter 4, we take account of the effect of electoral systems on the persistence of factionalism. We begin by outlining factions have been associated with particular characteristics of an electoral system and that electoral reform has often been used to achieve the mitigation of factionalism. We then turn to the literature that discusses factionalism and electoral systems and we find that intraparty preferential voting has been theorised to have a significant impact on the persistence of factions in parties, as well as the fact that the lower the number of parties in a party system, then the higher the likelihood that factions will persist in those parties.

Following this discussion, we present our theoretical framework and present a number of hypotheses to be tested. We employ the Hirschman framework of "voice", "exit" and "loyalty" which has particular relevance in explaining how electoral rules foster the persistence of factions. We find evidence to support the claim that the less proportional the electoral system, the more factionalised parties are. We posit that as the effective number of electoral or legislative parties increases, the level of factionalism will decrease, and find evidence to support this. We claim that where an electoral system is based on closed-lists or has a closed-list component, the level of factionalism will decrease – we observe some weak patterns here, but there is no overwhelmingly strong evidence to support the claim. We explore the relationship between intra-party preferential voting and factionalism, and find that as district magnitude increases in systems that allow intra-party preferential voting, factions are less likely to persist.

CHAPTER 4: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS & FACTIONALISM

Section 1: Introduction

In this chapter and the next, we look in detail at the between-country variation, and we attempt to explain it by examining the various characteristics of institutions in both. In this chapter, we examine the role of the electoral system in particular. The association between electoral systems and the persistence of intra-party factions has long been hypothesised to exist, but outside of case-studies of individual countries and parties, the extent of the influence that electoral systems have on factionalism has not been explored on a cross-national basis.

The purpose of this chapter is to look at the different aspects of electoral systems and to see how they influence the levels of factionalism that characterise parties in a country. We do this using both bivariate and multivariate analysis. Section 2 examines the previous work done in examining the relationship between electoral systems and the levels of factionalism. Section 3 introduces the theory underlying the relationship between electoral system design and levels of factionalism that characterise a party and consequently a country. Section 4 details the hypotheses that we propose to test and it also explains the causal mechanism underlying each. Section 5 presents bivariate analysis of our independent variables. Section 6 then gives the results of our multivariate model and discusses them. Section 7 discusses the significance of our findings and places them in the context of work on factionalism, and makes some observations on the influence of electoral system choice on the onset of factionalism in parties.

At the outset, an important assumption to make in studying factions, and factors that facilitate the emergence of factions in a party in a country, is that conflict in parties may arise about for many reasons. These may include personal difficulties, differences over policy and

rivalries in relation to positions of leadership in a party. The aim of this chapter, and indeed the research project itself, is not to explain these reasons for internal division but rather to explain whether or not there are certain institutional features in countries that lead to a consolidation of such splits in parties that take form as intra-party groups. Electoral systems are not the always the most significant factor in determining political outcomes in a country, but may have a bearing on the intra-party characteristics of parties. It is with this in mind that we look at other institutional arrangements in the next chapter.

The question may be posited however as to why the effects of electoral systems merit a chapter in their own right. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) are two examples of parties that were beset by powerful and stable intra-party groups in the latter part of the 20th century. Indeed, the existence of factions in these two parties was one of the driving forces in determining the extent of political reforms that took place in Japan and Italy in 1993 – electoral system change was a major component of both sets of reforms. Interestingly however, factions in the LDP persist to this day, in spite of the adoption of a new electoral system. In the case of the Italian DC, the party was wiped out in electoral terms because of its deep unpopularity. In both cases of reform, actors held that the electoral systems in use were among the major causes of the factionalism that had been endemic in both parties. While this concerned only two parties in two countries, it does raise an interest in the relationship that exists between the electoral system in place in a country and the intra-party characteristics in that country.

The main finding of this chapter is that the less proportional an electoral system, the higher the level of factionalism in parties in that country. There are two reasons for this:

- Firstly, legislators who would form a new party under a PR system realise that under a non-PR system, such a party would not be successful, so it is logical for them to stay inside the larger party as a faction and;
- Secondly, in non-PR systems, there are fewer parties, and those parties contain more diverse opinions than in parties that would exist in multi-party systems under PR systems – this is conducive to the emergence of factions.

Also, we find evidence that questioned Katz's claim that factionalism increases as district magnitude in open-list electoral systems increases. While we tested this hypothesis, we found that the opposite was true, and we discuss this below.

Section 2: Previous work addressing the relationship

The hypothesised relationship between electoral system design and the existence of factions in parties has often been tested in relation a single case.This leads to a situation where we can draw on this work and bring together the common themes that will then provide a useful starting ground for us in our examination of the effects of the electoral systems, and particular elements of them. These themes include the role of PR systems versus majoritarian systems, the role of intra-party preference voting and the effect of mixed electoral systems.

Electoral systems matter because they represent the fundamental link between society and the legislature elected. In any study of the institutional effects on the onset of factionalism, there is an endogenity problem. The inauguration of particular institutional types may have been inspired by political actors such as parties that were factionalised before establishing those new institutions. While this results in a situation where we cannot explain ***why*** factions came about in a party, it does not necessarily impede our attempts to

explain why factions go on to be fostered in a party. If anything, institutions that are deliberately designed to perpetuate factions (as was the case with the Uruguayan electoral system) are worthy of study in that they allow us to examine the mechanisms and incentives that will foster factions.

In their analysis of factionalism in southern and eastern Europe, Gillespie, Waller and Lópéz Nieto (1995: 187) maintain that the electoral system itself is of manifest importance, though they do not go into further detail on the matter! Equally, in their framework for the study of factions, Köllner and Basedau (2005: 18) do not extensively deal with the mechanisms of electoral systems that could be identified as fostering factionalism. They do make one important contribution in that they maintain that in analysing the effect of electoral systems, it is difficult to state clearly whether or not proportional list systems and majoritarian systems have an instantly recognisable bearing on factionalism. Indeed, they outline two possible causal mechanisms – proportional representational systems based on closed lists can provide incentives for factions to secure higher positioning for their members. In the case of majoritarian electoral systems, the fact that such systems tend to squeeze out smaller parties can "foster the concentration of political forces and thus also factionalism" as documented in the United Kingdom (Rose, 1964) or France (Cole 1989 or Campbell and Charlton 1978).

For example, Aronoff (1978: 113) points to the role of the proportional representational electoral system in fostering factions in Israeli parties. The use of an electoral system that treated the entire country as one constituency and was exceptionally proportional (because of a low entry threshold) in allocating seats encouraged a multiplicity of parties and factions. It should also be noted that the basis for such factions to exist lies in the ideological diversity that existed in Israel in its earlier years of statehood. However, as found by Mendilow (1982) and Torgovnik and Mendilow (1986), the

advent of federated parties composed of factions came about as a response to the constant splitting off of new parties that was fostered by the Israeli electoral system, similar in nature to the legalization of traditional party factions in Colombia as pointed out by Moreno (2005).

This would suggest that we must look beneath the useful classification of electoral systems as being proportional or majoritarian and examine whether or not there are particular details in electoral systems that could be described as fostering the participation of factions, though an important point to make again is that they are not responsible for the formation of factions.

The ability of voters to cast an intra-party preferential ballot is a particular element of electoral systems that has featured frequently in studies of electoral systems that are deemed to foster the participation of factions. Zariski (1960: 36) made the first steps in this regard[10] in "venturing" a hypothesis that proportional representation list systems did not necessarily enable party leaderships to suppress factions in their own parties. This, he argued, rested on a number of other factors including district magnitude, a decentralised party structure, whether or not voters were able to express a preferential vote, and if that preferential vote could be expressed between candidates of the same party. If anything, this contribution by Zariski underlined the fact that in the study of the effect of electoral systems on the existence of factions in parties, analysis needed to go further than the typological distinction of different types of electoral systems.

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[10] Key (1949) did point out that the existence of direct primary elections at state levels in the USA combined with a run-off election did have a bearing on the persistence of factions in political parties, especially where one party was the dominant party in that state.. However, where two parties are competitive, this effect still remains because internal party conflict gets played out during a campaign and gives incentives to factions to develop their strength.

This same contribution was further augmented by McDonald (1978: 240) who pointed out that the existence of a proportional representational electoral system in Colombia and Uruguay did not 'necessarily encourage or produce proliferation of parties' and that the particular incentives created by the Uruguayan electoral system[11], in particular, encouraged the existence of party factions. This was built upon by Morgenstern (2001: 250) who pointed out that where particular rules such as 'primaries, open-list systems and other rules that allow factional participation in elections' exist in the electoral systems, they may foster durable factions.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, this shows the relevance of intra-party voting in fostering certain types of intra-party activity. Katz (1980) cites the existence of such elements as providing the basis upon which factions existed in the cases of the Japanese LDP and the Italian DC (p.103). In fact, Katz (1980: 34) claimed that where an intra-party preference vote could be expressed in constituencies with small district magnitude, factions based on personalities would be encouraged, and where there were larger districts, such factions "will reflect the distribution of electorally mobilizable resources". In both the Italian and Japanese cases, the intense intra-party competition in both parties at constituency level was underlined by the dominance of both parties in their respective country's politics. The role of the intraparty preference vote was examined in both cases extensively. In the case of Japan, the single non-transferable vote system that was used until 1994 meant that in order to win a majority of seats in the legislature, parties would run multi-candidate tickets for election in constituencies (Köllner, 2004: 92). In such instances, especially in the case of the LDP, factions fulfilled a role in that they were able to

[11] Essentially, the Uruguayan electoral system allows a 'primary election inside a general election' (McDonald, 1978: 232) – parties (*lemas*) present closed lists composed of individual *sub-lemas* (factions) and parties are allocated seats on the basis of the total vote each sub-lema wins. As such, a vote for the faction also works as a vote for the party.

provide resources for candidates (Cox and Rosenbluth 1999 or Kohno 1997).

Belloni (1978:98-99) claims that the Italian electoral system (that was used until 1994) allowed voters to express a preference between candidates of the same party. He also claims that "use of the preference votes has increased sharply among DC and PSI voters in direct relation to the increase in the degree of intra-party competition among organised factions in the two parties". This would suggest that parties in Italy were aware of the incentives created by the systems and sought to exploit them in as far as they could.

Of particular interest to us in this regard are mixed systems, i.e. systems that have more than one tier of representative elected. For example, such systems may elect a proportion of the members of a legislature at national level, and the remaining proportion at the level of local or regional constituencies. Some work has been done on examining whether or not the mixed member proportional representation system adopted in Japan after 1994 has had any bearing on the fostering of factionalism. In their initial examination of the post 1994 electoral reforms Cox, Rosenbluth & Thies (1999: 55-56) tentatively suggested that factions played less of a role in the new mixed system than that they played under the SNTV system – but that they had not entirely disappeared off the radar. Krauss and Pekkanen (2004: 30) discuss the ability of the LDP to adapt to the new Japanese electoral system which has resulted in factional influence being moved on from the arena of candidate selection to the allocation of government posts, and also a diminution in factional influence. The experience from Japan seems to underline the fact that electoral systems can foster factions in a party, rather than motivating the formation of factions themselves.

The role of electoral thresholds also plays a role. Drawing on an analysis of factionalism in Turkey, Türsen (1995:170) claims that the

high electoral thresholds result in a situation where there few incentives against factionalism, given that the electoral system seems to discriminate against smaller parties. Lewis (1995: 120) supports this assertion, pointing out that the adoption of an electoral threshold in Poland "opened the way to greater differentiation and division within the leading forces". As was the case with majoritarian electoral systems, when the electoral threshold is high, there is an incentive for factions to remain as factions within a large party because if they break away and go it alone, they may well fail to gain representation in parliament.

Section 3: Why should electoral systems have a bearing on factionalism in parties? Discussion of theory

Inside parties, there will be members of those parties who wish to win political offices for the purpose of office-seeking or policy-seeking roles, though in order for them to do so they are required to channel their prospective careers through the structure of the party. As Sartori (2005: 86) claims, intra-party arrangements are of importance when the party is the only mechanism by which people with intent of following a political career can do so.

In understanding the relationship between the effects of institutions on the incentives for factions to be maintained, the perspective offered by Hirschman (1970) is of particular use – we recap our discussion from Chapter 2. Essentially, Hirschman posits that actors or small clusters inside a larger group (a body of customers, an alliance of nations *etc.*) have three options available to them in response to the behaviour of the larger group – exit (defection/disassociation from the larger), voice (qualified continued association inside the group, but by no means independent of the larger group – this qualified association is manifest and tangible) and loyalty (no qualification to membership of the larger body and

subsumed into the larger body entirely, with no discernible conflicting characteristics or behaviours).

If we extend this mode of analysis to a party, within which there are actors who may not have identical goals in relation to achieving certain policy outcomes, or attaining particular offices, it usefully summarises the options available to members of that party. Exit means that they will resign from the party, either ending their political career in the party, or participating in politics under an alternative banner. Loyalty means that they will remain inside the party, even if they have misgivings with the decisions being made in the party in relation to policy and leadership positions. The choice of interest to us, in this paper, is that of Voice – those party members who remain inside the party, but who are not entirely satisfied with the way in which certain policy outcomes are achieved by the party, or alternatively the holders of governmental offices nominated from the party. This particular course of action would transpire in the form of joining a faction inside the party, i.e. expressing discord with the party without necessarily abandoning the organisation.

While we cannot suggest that the Voice option can only be expressed in terms of the fostering of factions, it could be expressed through parliamentary rebellion or resignation from senior party posts, it does give us a useful theoretical basis from which to investigate the incentive structures that face aspirant legislators who are bound to pursue a political career inside their own party. Ultimately, a legislator or a group of legislators that want to pursue policy-seeking or office-seeking goals will choose an option that maximises their prospective success in pursuing those goals. However, the Voice option cannot solely be regarded as being equal to participation in a faction. A legislator or a group of legislators may express discontent with party policy or party leadership at various points in time but do nothing else about it. It then seems sensible to adapt Hirschman's typology somewhat and split the Voice option into two - Voice

expressed without using a degree of intraparty organisation and Voice that is expressed using a degree of intraparty organisation. It is the latter option that is of theoretical interest to us: the dependent variable that we introduced in Chapter 3 (the extent to which intraparty organisations (factions) exist in parties in a country)

The importance of electoral institutions in this calculus is evident when we examine the environments within which parties operate. The probability of the success of each of the three strategies is affected by the institutional environments within which parties operate (and individual legislators). For example, in a country where there are only two main parties competing because of effective barriers to entry, it will be much more difficult for a legislator or a group of legislators to set up a new party of their own and succeed or for them to function as a single actor.

Before proceeding to developing specific hypotheses, we examine this electoral calculus under a number of different headings. The typology of this electoral calculus may be divided into three categories – party-based calculus, personal-vote-seeking-based calculus and political career advancement-calculus. All three of those categories share the fact that they all contain decisions that must be made by potential factions or faction members in deciding which of the three options from above to follow, or in other words how likely it is that they will choose Voice and allow a faction to persist in the particular party. Fundamental to all three decisions is the fact that the legislator or group making the decision in each cases is assumed to be motivated to pursue a political career, so that they will be in a position to attain their aims, whether they be policy or office-based.

In discussing the party-based calculus, we examine the perspective of the potential solo legislator or group of legislators that want to further their particular office-seeking or policy-seeking goals. If they disagree with a certain agenda being pursued by the party, perhaps dissatisfaction with the leadership of the party (or a desire to take

over that leadership themselves) or a fundamental tenet of party policy, they are faced with a decision: whether to continue with their membership in that particular party or to form a new one. Indeed, the probability of their choosing to remain as an institutionalised faction inside the party is a function of the probability of success of any new party which is in turn a function of the ability of the electoral system to exclude smaller parties from that country's particular politics. Specifically, other things being equal, factions are more likely to emerge when the electoral system is not very proportional.

The second set of decisions can be summarised in terms of career-advancement. This decision to form or join a faction is made in relation to the potential advancement of individuals' or groups' political careers inside the party structure. As a decision, it takes place before the legislator has been elected or has been put in a position to attain their particular goals. If we suppose that a seat in the legislature is ultimately the motivation for a political career, then we assume that the legislator makes their decision to continue their political career on the basis of how likely it is that they will be able to begin it. This in turn is then a function of their own ability to begin their own political career, or conversely of their party leadership to control access to candidature for the party.

Finally, looking at the decision inherent in the personal-vote seeking calculus, we are examining the perspective from the aspirant legislator or the legislator seeking re-election. Obviously, one of the primary motivations of any such person is to secure their election or re-election, and this motivation, in turn, informs their thinking and influences their action. Similar to the party-based calculus described above, the personal-vote-seeking calculus takes into account the fact that legislators will look to secure as many resources as possible to ensure that they hold or are elected to a legislative seat. The decision that then faces the legislator is to look at the possible resources that are available to them with a view to securing their seat in light of the

particular structures that then characterise the election contest that they are facing. The "demand" that a legislator will have for the support of a faction is then a function of the level of competitiveness that faces the legislator, and in terms of the personal vote, the importance of securing a substantial personal vote to secure re-election. If that legislator's party has more candidates per seat that it wins, the electoral system plays a part in determining which legislator then takes that seat (Carey & Shugart, 1995: 417). Then, the legislator's "demand" for the support of a faction is a function of that particular electoral formula: where there is a significant personal vote to be garnered, then it follows that legislator's "demand" for support of a faction will be significant also. While this demand may sustain a faction, it cannot necessarily guarantee that a faction will come into existence. The faction[12] may have come about in circumstances like those described in the party-based calculus or because of exogenous factors.

Section 4: The proposed effects of electoral systems on factionalism. Statement of hypotheses and description of independent variables

We use the decisions described above as our starting point for these hypotheses. We turn first of all to the party-based calculus. In this decision-making process, it follows that those that would organise a sub-party organisation do so with a view to securing a set of policy or office-based aims. Earlier we stated that a potential proto-party that dissented with certain policies or leaders in the main party might take account of the nature of the electoral system, before deciding whether or not to leave the party or to express dissent as a faction in the party. The obvious indicator of interest for those that would form a new party will be to examine the number of parties that emerge

[12] Also, the resources available to that faction may have a bearing (Gillespie *et al.* (1995: 187)– something we deal with in Chapter 5

following elections in that country, and to use that to gauge the possible success of any new party.

Before discussing the causal mechanism in detail, we state our first hypothesis:

H1: Countries in which the electoral system is more advantageous to larger parties will experience higher levels of factionalism in parties.

The logic underlying this particularly hypothesis is as laid out above. Where the electoral system creates high barriers to entry for new parties, it would seem to suggest that the prospects for success of a new party are low, and the incentives for factions to persist are higher. In addition, the number of parties in effective electoral competition in a particular country may also take into account the particular history of that country – for example, a party's dominance may not be as a result of the electoral system, but because of deep-seated cultural factors. Using the party system as an indicator captures this effect also. A useful measure here is the effective number of parties, based on votes and seats as described by Lakso and Taagepera (1979).

Another manner by which to assess the permissiveness of the electoral system would be to look at the district magnitude. Obviously, it is easier for a new party to win a seat in a multi-member district than it is for such a party to win a seat in a single-member district. As Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 124) put it, district magnitude is the "decisive factor" in deciding as to the level of proportionality that exists in a country. In the case of mixed systems, we need to calculate a district magnitude that takes account of the multi-tier nature of these electoral systems.

Legislators may take account of the rule in an electoral system which sets the hurdle of votes over which parties must jump in order to be represented in the legislature. To this end, the existence of a legal threshold, at national or local level, (for example, as low as 0.67% in the Netherlands), if one exists in a particular country (as it does in Denmark for example), should act as a deterrent to would-be parties that wish to come into existence and would provide an incentive for factions to persist. Outside of legal thresholds, many electoral systems feature national effective thresholds as described by Taagepera (2002). These thresholds are related to the district magnitude as mentioned above, and again determine how difficult it is for new parties to win representation to the legislature.

We turn now to the second set of decisions described in the previous section – the career advancement-based calculus. The role of parties in determining which of their candidates get access to the ballot is crucial to the success of the political career of a legislator or a group of legislators. Where voters have power to determine, in whole or in part, which of a party's candidates receive its seats, parties will be more factionalised. On the other hand, where it is the candidate selectors alone who determine this, parties will be less factionalised. We present two hypotheses to test this:

H2: *Countries in which the electoral system gives a party's candidate selectors more power in determining which of its candidates take that party's seats are likely to have lower levels of factionalism.*

H3: *Levels of factionalism in parties in a country are likely to be inversely related to the proportion of seats in the national legislature that are elected using a mechanism where the party leadership has total control over those of its candidates who are elected to those seats to which the party is entitled on the basis of its share of the vote.*

In considering these particular hypotheses, we take into account the fact the importance of the amount of power that candidate selectors have in determining which candidates get the party seats. Of course, there is also the possibility that where two factions are competing in a party, the dominant faction would move to suppress the other faction by disadvantaging them on the party's lists of candidates. We measure this particular independent variable (whether an electoral system is based on closed lists of candidates) by using a simple dichotomous variable, whether or not party lists are presented to voters as a *fait accompli*. We also use the Ballot measure from Shugart & Carey (1995) to capture the extent to which access to the ballot is controlled by parties[13].

The other hypothesis presented above deals with the mixed and parallel systems that have become more common in countries around the world. Electoral systems may have more than one tier upon which legislators are elected, and this may mean that different selectors pick list candidates for those who pick constituency ones. We measure this independent variable on the basis of the proportion of seats that are elected in the legislature on the basis of closed party-lists. This will range from 0 to 1. Thus, as that proportion approaches 1, we expect that the levels of factionalism would be lower at a national level in those countries.

We turn now to the third type of decision that a legislator faces - that of the personal-vote seeking calculus that was mentioned previously. This is related to the level of intra-party competition that a legislator will face at the election. We regard this as a function of the ability of

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[13] This is a trichotomous variable which focuses attention on the degree of control parties have over access to the ballot paper. 0 is allocated to systems where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which candidates are elected. 1 is allocated to systems where parties control access to ballots but not the order in which candidates receive seats. 2 is allocated to systems where there are few (if any) impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot.

the voter to express intra-party preference between candidates of the same party. We state the following hypotheses:

H4: *Countries in which the electoral system gives voters the ability to express intra-party preference between candidates of the same party will have higher levels of factionalism.*

H5: *Countries in which the electoral system gives voter the ability to express intra-party preference between candidates of the same party will have higher levels of factionalism in its parties as the district magnitude of such constituencies increases.*

The intuition underlying these hypotheses is similar to the description we gave of the personal-vote-seeking calculus. The aspirant legislators, in order to ward off challenges from co-partisans, seek support from factions that will provide resources for them to secure their election, and their seats. In other words, where the reputation of the candidate is not necessarily entirely bound to the fate of the party and a personal vote could prove useful (or indeed essential) to securing re-election. To that end, it is rational for such a candidate to enlist the support of a faction to support their re-election efforts, and this provides an incentive that fosters the persistence of factions in a party.

In measuring intra-party preference, we use a number of indicators. Firstly, we measure using a dichotomous variable that is coded between those systems that allow voters to express preference between candidates or parties. Secondly, we employ the typology outlined by Shugart and Carey (1995) that measures the Vote[14]

[14] This is a trichotomous variable which focuses attention on the distinction between casting votes for either parties or individual candidates. 0 is allocated to systems where voters can only vote for a party. 1 is allocated to systems where voters have multiple votes of r multiple candidates or where votes may choose either a party or a candidate. 2 is allocated to systems where voters can only choose an individual candidate.

dimension of the personal vote. This has been developed and modified for mixed systems by Johnson and Wallack (2006). Thirdly, we also use the measure of intra-party preference that is set out by Farrell and McAllister (2004: 11).

Our fifth hypothesis looks to focus on the actual effect of intra-party competition. We assume that intra-party competition will be more pronounced where there are more seats available to be filled at the election. We propose to capture this effect by using an interaction term between the intra-party preference measures mentioned above and the district magnitude along the same lines of the measure developed by Chang and Golden (2006: 121).

Section 5: Empirical Analysis & Bivariate Analysis of Independent Variables

We turn to our first hypothesis which related to the general character of the electoral system in use in the country. Table 4.1 describes the different types of electoral systems in use in the 85 countries used in our dataset. The differences presented represent the difference between the average levels of factionalism in countries using a particular system type and those that do not. A negative difference indicates that the level of factionalism is lower in countries using that electoral system type, while a positive difference shows that factionalism is higher in countries using that electoral system type.

We performed an ANOVA test to ascertain whether there is any difference in the average levels of factionalism between the different groups of electoral systems. The average levels of factionalism (on both measures of the dependent variable) differed between the ten groups. In relation to the dependent variable measured on the basis of the proportion of seats won by each party, the F-score (9, 75) was 1.7 and this was just significant at the 10% level of significance

Electoral System Type	N	Diff (seats)	Diff (votes)
Alternative Vote ∞	1	+.28	+.21
Block Vote ∞	1	+.06	+0.33
First Past the Post	12	+.09	+.07
First Past the Post (using primary) ∞	1	+.34	+.35
Closed List PR	26	-.13***	-.13***
List PR (allowance for preferential/open voting)	21	+.03	+.05
Mixed Member (Proportional)	8	+.05	+.06
Mixed Member (Parallel Tiers)	10	+.07	+.06
Single Transferable Vote ∞	1	-.41	-.37
Two Round (run-off)	4	-.07	-.16
TOTAL	***85***		

Table 4.1:Distribution of Electoral System Types, and differences in levels of factionalism. ∞ Low sample size impedes analysis here.
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

When using the weighted average of factionalism based on the proportion of votes won by each party, they differ also – the F-score (9, 75) was 1.99 and this was significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that electoral systems have an effect on the level of factionalism that exists in each country.

On another level, we used t-tests to establish which electoral systems were more likely to result in fostering higher levels of factionalism in parties in each country. The results of this analysis are also presented in Table 4.1, using both the seats-based measure of the dependent variable and the votes-based measure of the dependent variable. Of the 10 different electoral system classifications, the most statistically significant difference that is evident is in the case of closed list PR systems, across both dependent variables, i.e. factionalism is lower in countries that use such systems. This provides some qualified support for our second hypothesis as laid out in the previous section, and is something which we discuss in more detail below. While the analysis is somewhat hampered in the fact that there are four categories that only contain 1 country, it does lend support to the fact

that electoral system type alone does not appear to account for the differing levels of factionalism.

However, if we retreat up the ladder of generality and reclassify the electoral systems in terms of the families in which they find themselves, we see clearer patterns emerge. Table 4.2 reclassifies our categories into three: majoritarian, proportional and mixed systems. We repeat the analysis from above and perform an ANOVA analysis across the three families. The results here are interesting. When we analyse across the three families in terms of our dependent variable, weighted by votes, we find that the three groups do not differ significantly: F (2, 82) was 1.79 and the p-value was 0.17. However, when we perform the ANOVA test across the dependent variable, weighted by votes, we find that there were significant differences across the three electoral system families: the F-score (2, 82) was 2.63 and this was statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value=0.08). This may be due to the fact that the share of votes a party may be distorted by the electoral systems and results in a different proportion of seats.

Electoral System Type	N	Diff (seats)	Diff (votes)
Majoritarian	19	+.09	+.06
Proportional	48	-.11**	-.09*
Mixed	18	+.07	+.07
TOTAL	**85**		

Table 4.2: Distribution of Electoral System Families

(Negative difference implies that levels of factionalism are lower in countries using that electoral system type)

**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

While the difference between different electoral system families does not seem to be all that striking, Table 4.2 presents another striking result – that is that countries that use electoral systems that are proportional are less likely to feature factionalism. To put this in context, the maximum score for a country on our dependent variable

is 1, *i.e.* all the experts surveyed about parties in that country agreed that all the parties in that country contained stable and institutional factions, and then 0 represents an entirely opposite situation – not one expert surveyed in each country about each party considered that those parties had factions in them. We see that countries that use proportional electoral systems are 10% less likely to have parties that have factions in them than those that don't. This appears to be contrary to the claim made by Kollner & Basedau (2005: 21) that proportional systems encourage factionalism, though we subject this claim to further analysis below.

There is a significant degree of collinearity between our independent variables, given that elements of an electoral system interact together to yield a particular outcome. In that regard, there is some limit to dealing with each hypothesis individually, though it does give us a picture of the expected causal directions that we will observe in the multivariate model presented in section 6.

We turn to our first hypothesis, which deals with the extent to which an electoral system represents smaller parties and advantages larger ones. There are a number of indicators which we can use to examine this effect. The first one that we use is to examine the district magnitude of an electoral system – we calculated this using a number of sources (IDEA website; Johnson & Wallack (2006); IPU Parline database (www.ipu.org) and the World Bank Database of Political Institutions). For mixed systems, we took the average district magnitude of all districts, as per the approach taken in the World Bank Database of Political Institutions.

Figure 4.1 presents a two-way scatter plot of the level of factionalism in a country (weighted by votes and seats) and the logarithm of

district magnitude[15] in that country. We see a weak pattern in both diagrams – as district magnitude increases, the level of factionalism in each country declines. In fact, in both cases the correlation coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. In the case of the dependent variable weighted by seats, the correlation coefficient is -.24 and in the case of its vote-weighted counterpart is -.18. Once again, there is a difference that is probably due to the distorting effect of electoral systems, but the relationship is clear.



Figure 4.1: Relationship between District Magnitude and Levels of Factionalism

[15] We use the log to give us a clearer picture of the relationship given the existence of outliers in terms of district magnitude, like the Netherlands and Israel.

That being said however, it is clear that there is considerable noise in both diagrams, which suggests that there may be some other characteristic at work. We notice quite a number of outliers on the plot – especially countries that use single-member plurality systems, like Canada and the United Kingdom. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) have developed a measure that estimates how difficult it is to win a seat at district level. In some systems, there is also a minimum threshold of votes which parties must exceed in order to be represented at all in the legislature. To track the effect of this particular hurdle on the representation of smaller parties, we took the maximum of either the effective threshold[16] or the legal threshold and examined the relationship, scattergrams are presented in Figure 4.2.

Again, the relationship here is not universal but there is a pattern. There is some support to the claim that a higher electoral threshold results in a higher level of factionalism, not unexpected given what was evident in the case of district magnitude. On examination of the correlation coefficients, we find that both correlations are statistically significant at the 5% level and positive correlation is true in both cases (the coefficient is 0.22 in the case of the level of factionalism weighted by votes, and 0.3 where the level of factionalism is weighted by seats)[17].

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[16] This is calculated as 75%/M+1 where M is the district magnitude.

[17] To complement this analysis, we also examined the correlation between the level of factionalism in a country and the national effective threshold as devised by Taagepera (2001). The results of this analysis bore out the positive relationship between level of factionalism weighted by votes and seats (correlation coefficients were 0.16 and 0.21 respectively, though only the correlation between the national effective threshold and the level of factionalism weighted by seats was statistically significant (at the 5% level)).



Figure 4.2: Relationship between Electoral Thresholds and Levels of Factionalism

The preceding analysis would seem to suggest that there is something else at work in determining the level of factionalism in a country's parties, outside of the general proportionality of the system. Suppose that there has always been one or two dominant parties in a country's party system (Uruguay is (or at least was) a good example, or Ireland or Japan) for historical or cultural reasons, and that despite the proportionality of an electoral system, such is the level of support that these parties attract that it is extremely difficult for newer parties to differentiate themselves and carve out an

electoral base[18]. This provides a basis upon which to introduce a useful indicator – the effective number of electoral parties (based on the number of votes). This captures dominance of one particular party. Figure 4.3 maps the relationship between both our dependent variable indicators and the effective number of electoral parties, as calculated using the Excel formula available at http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php.

Here, the relationship is striking. We can see a very clear pattern between the effective number of parties in a country and the level of factionalism that is evident in that country. The correlation coefficients in both cases are statistically significant at the 1% level, and the coefficients are both equal to -0.38. This suggests that the electoral dominance of particular parties has a bearing on the fostering of factions in other parties in the country, and corroborates arguments made by Zariski (1978: 27-28) and Pridham (1995: 10-11) that countries in which some parties are dominant are countries which can be characterised by factionalism. This particular claim may be open to the charge that this is more a matter of coincidence rather than causation –just because one or two parties dominate the political landscape at one election, does the argument hold that this leads to higher levels of factionalism in parties?

[18] It is telling that the *Colorados* and *Blancos* (formerly dominant Uruguayan political parties) were only beaten in a recent election by a federated host party that was based upon a coalition of smaller parties, like that described in Chapter 3.





Figure 4.3: Relationship between the Effective Number of Electoral Parties and Levels of Factionalism

Figure 4.4 presents a map of the relationship between levels of factionalism in parties and the historical average number of effective electoral parties using data from Carey & Hix (2010). This confirms the story told in Figure 4.3 – that where a smaller number of parties dominate the political landscape, we can expect higher levels of factionalism.



Figure 4.4: Relationship between the Historic Average of Effective Number of Electoral Parties and Levels of Factionalism

Both correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and were also almost identical in value, -.33 in the case of our seats-based dependent variable and -.35 in the case of our votes-based dependent variable. We observe that the effective number of electoral parties is negatively related to the levels of factionalism.

Indeed, one further level of analysis upon which we can examine the relationship underlying our first hypothesis would be to examine the effect that the effective number of legislative parties have on the level of factionalism in a country. This particular measure not only captures the shape of the party system in a country, but also takes account of any distorting effect of the electoral system. In a way, it

mixes together all three of the previous indicators. Figure 4.5 displays the relationship between the effective number of legislative parties and the two measures of our dependent variable – the relationship is striking here. A negative correlation is clear, though there is significant clustering over towards the left of each map. The correlation coefficient in both instances is statistically significant at the 1% level and in the case of the correlation between the effective number of legislative parties and the level of factionalism, weighted by seat share is -.35 and is -.32 in the case of the alternative measure of the level of factionalism.





Figure 4.5: Relationship between the Effective Number of Electoral Parties and Levels of Factionalism

This relationship is further corroborated by Figure 4.6 which maps the correlation between the historical average of the effective number of parties and the national level of factionalism.





Figure 4.6: Relationship between the Historic Average of Effective Number of Legislative Parties and Levels of Factionalism

The correlation coefficients are slightly lower, though both are still statistically significant at the 2% level of significance (r = -.28 in the case of the vote share-based dependent variable, and -.26). Again the negative relationship is clear here and pronounced. The party system seems to be a key factor in explaining the level of factionalism. It is important to be aware that while the party system and the electoral system is related, they are not deterministically so.

We turn to our next two hypotheses – the role of closed list systems in providing disincentives to the fostering of factionalism: a simple binary measure of the effect of closed-list PR systems, and an assessment of whether factionalism is lower as the proportion of seats in the legislature filled using closed lists decreases.

We use a number of indicators to investigate the effect of closed-list systems– notably the Ballot indicator as described by Shugart and Carey (1995) and developed by Johnson and Wallack (2006). As stated earlier, there are three possible values that it can take 0, 1 and 2. 0 represents a situation where parties control access to ballots as well as the order in which candidates are elected. 1 is assigned to systems where parties control access to ballots but not the order in which candidates receive seats. 2 is assigned to systems where there are few (if any) impediments to individual candidates' ability to appear on the ballot. We expect that where parties exercise the most control over access to the ballot paper, parties will be less factionalised.

In the case of mixed systems, Johnson and Wallack (2006) calculated the weighted average of the ballot score of two or three tiers that compose the electoral system. The correlation coefficients between both measures of our dependent variable and this weighted average were not statistically significant, but denoted a very weak positive association between control to ballot access and the level of factionalism, as envisioned by the hypothesis. We then disaggregated this average score and assigned a score to each tier in electoral systems where more than one tier is used to fill seats. ANOVA analysis on our dependent variable measures indicated there was no significant difference among the three groups of ballot access in our sample.

We saw earlier that of the 10 different electoral systems being analysed in this chapter, countries that used closed-list PR electoral

systems were the only group of countries that were characterised by a statistically significant difference (at the 1% level) in the levels of factionalism on both of our measures. While the average value of all cases on our votes-based and seats-based dependent variables were .49 and .54 respectively, the average of cases that used only closed-list PR systems were .4 and .44 respectively. This displays some support for the supposed relationship in our second hypothesis – closed-list PR systems give parties the ability to suppress factionalism.

The next measure we use captures the proportion of seats in the legislature that are filled using closed lists in multi-member districts. Figure 4.7 maps the relationship between this proportion of seats and the level of factionalism in each country.



Figure 4.7: Relationship between the Proportion of Closed-List Electoral Seats in Legislature and Level of Factionalism

There is no particularly striking pattern evident in these scatterplots, though this is probably due to the lack of variation between 0 and 1. What is noticeable however is that the general distribution of cases where there are no seats filled in the legislature using closed list PR is on a higher level than those that have some element of their legislature filled using closed lists. In a manner, while not identical, this is consistent with the finding made by Sieber (2006) who claims that party unity is marginally less in countries that use candidate-centred electoral systems than those that are party-centred. However, multivariate analysis in the next section will shed more light on this particular relationship.

This finding does throw some doubt on the claim made by Kollner & Basedau (2005: 21) that proportional systems encourage factionalism, and especially that closed-lists prove to be an arena where factions battle to place their candidates. However it would seem that there is more validity in the counter-claim that where voters have a say in the placing of candidates, there is a greater incentive for factions to support particular candidates because they can mobilise resources behind those particular candidates.

Our final set of independent variables deal with the question of intra-party competition. At the outset, we first perform a simple t-test to analyse the average difference in levels of factionalism in countries that allow for some degree of intra-party preference party voting[19] in the electoral system. Using both measures of our dependent variable, we find that there is a difference, but it is not statistically significant in either case. -.06 (votes-based) and -.02 (seats-based) are the differences, which implies that those systems that do incorporate preferential voting have slightly higher levels of factionalism on a national scale.

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[19] Where the district magnitude exceeds one

Using the measure developed by Shugart and Carey (Vote) that captures whether or not voters vote for parties, or have the option of choosing individual candidates, we repeat the approach used above in our analysis of the Ballot structure. There are three possible values that it can take: 0, 1 and 2. 0 is allocated to systems where voters can only vote for a party. 1 is allocated to systems where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates or where votes may choose either a party or a candidate. 2 is allocated to systems where voters can only choose individual candidates. Again, for mixed systems, we calculate a weighted average. The correlation coefficients of the correlation between this weighted average and our dependent variable were not statistically significant but do imply a weak positive association between the two (r=0.44 and 0.26 in the seats-based measure and the votes-based measure respectively).

If we look at the disaggregated levels of this average (*i.e.* at the level of the single-member district and at the level of the multi-member district), we can establish whether or not the type of district at which intra-party preference is expressed has any bearing on the level of factionalism. ANOVA analysis tells us that there is no such effect at the level of the single-member district, given that intra-party competition would not manifest itself electorally in such a case. However, in examining multi-member district levels, we find that there is variation at the 5% level of statistical significance across the three categories in terms of our seats-based dependent variable (F (2, 59) =3.07). The statistical significance is not pronounced in the case of the alternative measure. Delving beneath the surface, Table 4.3 breaks down the differences between the three Vote categories for the cases available, and assesses if these differences are statistically significant.

Value for Vote	Number of Cases	Difference in Factionalism (Seats)	Difference in Factionalism (Votes)
Vote = 0	33	.09*	.07
Vote=1	24	-.13***	-.1*
Vote=2	5	.11	.09

Table 4.3: Categorical Analysis of Vote, in Multi-member districts

(Negative difference implies that levels of factionalism are lower in countries that fall in that category)

**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

The most striking result from this table is that where voters have the option to vote for parties or candidates (Vote=1), the level of factionalism in such countries is lower. Additionally, countries where voters only choose a party at the multi-member district tier have higher levels of factionalism. In cases where voters may only choose a candidate, there is no statistical significance in the difference, but the positive sign implies that such systems have higher levels of factionalism. A word of caution should be given when interpreting these results however - this only deals with the sections of legislatures that are elected using multi-member districts, so its explanatory power is limited. In addition, it is not as robust a finding as it could be, given that the same patterns are not mirrored to the same level of statistical significance in terms of our alternative (votes-based) measure of our dependent variable.

Finally, we also use a measure of intraparty preferential voting developed by Farrell and McAllister (2006) (for which they collected data on 28 of the cases in our sample) that is based on the three dimensions of Shugart and Carey's analysis of personal vote-seeking incentives. While the measure that they develop is not ordinal in nature, it is categorical and it does capture variation of the intra-party element of electoral systems. We subjected both measures of our dependent variable to ANOVA analysis using the different values, and we found that in the case of the measure of factionalism, based

on seat-share, there was variation at the 10% level (F (8, 19) = 2.23), and in terms of the measure based on vote-share this pattern was not borne out (F (8, 19) = 1.31 and p-value= 0.2971). The small sample size here limits the information that we can extrapolate from this, but on the face of it there does not appear to be a lot of explanatory power in the intra-party preferential variable in accounting for different levels of factionalism in countries.

Thus far, it would seem that in terms of bi-variate analysis, there is little evidence to support any positive correlation between intra-party preferential voting and the level of factionalism. However, multi-variate analysis, to which we turn in the next section, may shed more light on the relationships explored by our hypotheses.

Section 6: Multi-Variate Analysis

In designing our model for multi-variate analysis, we have to be conscious of the fact that the dependent variable being used is a proportion, and is bounded by 0 and 1. Thus, it follows that we cannot just use conventional OLS regression to predict the coefficients in the model. Rather, we use a logit transformation of the measures of the dependent variable that allows us to fit it to an OLS line[20]. With this in place, we can then perform OLS regression. As mentioned in Chapter 3, we employ weighted least squares to account for uncertainty in the data, and the weights we use are the average number of experts that answered for each country[21]. Tables

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[20]Suppose that y is our dependent variable, and XB is the matrix of coefficients and independent variables, we suppose then that our model can be described as $y = \frac{1}{1+\exp(-XB)}$, then the transformation we use for the dependent variable will then result in $\ln(y/(1-y)) = XB$. The original variable is now mapped to the real line.

[21] Also, as mentioned in Chapter 3, we present a number of alternative specifications of these models in Appendix B. We present results of WLS regressions that use the proportion of experts that answered as weights. We also

4.4 and 4.5 present the results of our models. Table 4.4 uses the dependent variable, based on seat-share and Table 4.5 uses the dependent variable that is based on vote-share.

In both cases, there are a number of different models (7 in total under each model specification) presented, that capture the effect of adding variables at different stages. The purpose of this method is to show that there are indeed certain elements that add to each model's explanatory power, but also to try and control for the unavoidable collinearity that will occur in the model itself, given that the effects of electoral systems are being examined. Our independent variables are drawn from the measures described in Section 5, and in each case we have chosen an independent variable that best captures the effect described in the pertinent hypothesis. The only different one being used is an interaction term between the possibility of intra-party preference by voters and the average district magnitude. The inspiration for this particular variable comes from the work of Chang and Golden (2007: 123) who found that the interaction between district magnitude and open-list systems was a statistically significant determinant of corruption in countries.

Generally, we find that all models presented have explanatory power at an extremely high statistically significant level, though the total variance explained does not exceed 30% in any case. We find evidence to suggest that electoral thresholds certainly have an effect

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present the results of a generalised linear model, using a logit link and the binomial family when modelling it, as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Both are weighted in the same manner as our WLS regressions. As Gill (2001) claims, the GLM we employ is ideal for our analysis for two reasons in particular: firstly, the data collected does not have high frequencies at the extreme points of the scale; and secondly the GLM allows us to include the extreme points in our analysis, unlike other approaches. Finally, we also present models based on weighted averages of country factionalism scores, where parties have been recoded as 0 or 1. In all cases, the results do not differ from the findings presented here.

on the levels of factionalism in a country, based on the results of Models 1 and 2 – the positive sign corroborated what we claimed in Hypothesis 1. Equally, the effective number of electoral parties is highly significant, and is one of the only variables that retain statistical significance across all our models.

The direction is intuitive also; as the number of effective electoral parties increases, then the level of factionalism in each country declines – presumably because there are fewer barriers to entry for smaller newer would-be parties. Model 3 bears this out in relation to the representation of legislative parties, also and in the same direction as the number of electoral parties. However we find that the significance of the threshold variable is reduced, presumably because of the collinearity that would be expected between the number of legislative parties and the threshold of representation of the legislature.

Turning to Models 4 and 5, where we add the variables associated with Hypotheses 2 and 3, we find that closed-list representation matters in determining the level of factionalism in a country. In both the case of our binary measure and the proportion-based measures, we see statistical significance and a direction that is consistent with our hypotheses. The negative sign implies that where closed lists are a characteristic of an electoral system, there will be lower levels of factionalism in that country. Interestingly, the statistical significance of the threshold variable is lost, and we can attribute that to the collinearity that would be associated with PR systems (closed-list) and the threshold for representation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max. of effective or legal threshold	1.888**	1.570*	1.379*	0.479	0.787	0.376	0.002
	(0.80)	(0.81)	(0.80)	(1.01)	(0.97)	(1.43)	(1.45)
Avg. district magnitude	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.193***		-0.196***	-0.206***	-0.209***	-0.202***
		(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.191***				
			(0.07)				
Closed-list PR system (1=yes)				-0.698**			
				(0.34)			
Proportion of seats elected by closed-list PR					-0.619*	-0.775	-0.902*
					(0.34)	(0.52)	(0.53)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.175	-0.114
						(0.47)	(0.47)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.012***
							(0.00)
Constant	-0.070	0.900**	0.739*	1.297**	1.314**	1.516**	1.621**
	(0.24)	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.70)	(0.70)
N	83	79	83	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.051	0.180	0.139	0.236	0.225	0.226	0.245

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.4: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted national average by seat share) using weighted least squares (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max. of effective or legal threshold	1.834**	1.762*	1.482	0.592	0.843	0.458	0.048
	(0.81)	(0.94)	(0.94)	(1.10)	(1.03)	(1.39)	(1.41)
Avg. district magnitude	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.157**		-0.161**	-0.173**	-0.176**	-0.168**
		(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.127*				
			(0.07)				
Closed-list PR system (1=yes)				-0.750**			
				(0.33)			
Proportion of seats elected by closed-list PR					-0.728**	-0.874	-1.013*
					(0.33)	(0.53)	(0.54)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.163	-0.098
						(0.45)	(0.45)
(Average district magnitude) x (Intra-party preferential voting)							-0.013***
							(0.00)
Constant	-0.224	0.551	0.312	0.981*	1.041**	1.231*	1.347*
	(0.22)	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.68)	(0.69)
N	82	79	82	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.051	0.157	0.091	0.228	0.225	0.226	0.250

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.5: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted least squares (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Models 6 and 7 take account of the measures of our fourth and fifth hypotheses – the role that intra-party preferential voting plays in affecting the level of factionalism. On the inclusion of our dummy variable that measures the existence of intra-party voting at any level of the electoral system (outside of internal party candidate selection –

we code 1 for the United States in this regard, given the existence of open party primary elections), there is no statistically significant pattern evident. However in model 7, our interaction term yields a surprising finding. The sign on the coefficient, and the level of statistical significance associated with it implies that where intra-party preferential voting is a characteristic of the electoral system, the higher the district magnitude of such a system – it will result in a lower level of factionalism. In other words, the greater the district magnitude, the existence of intraparty voting will decrease the level of factionalism as that district magnitude increases.

Interestingly, this goes against the direction of our fourth and fifth hypotheses, and would also seem to contradict the argument made by Katz (1980) that larger districts with intra-party voting would seem to result in higher levels of factionalism. However, that argument was qualified by the availability of electorally mobilizable resources (which we do not control for, but are difficult to measure). It does however bring into focus a point made earlier in this thesis, that there are certain limitations to the case-study approach that defines the study of factions. Interestingly, of all models, Model 7 is by far the one with the most explanatory power as denoted by the r-squared diagnostic. looking from model to model, we see that the consistently statistically significant determinants of the level of factionalism are the effective number of parties, the role of closed lists in the electoral system (though a weaker relationship) and intra-party preferential voting. There is evidence to support our first, second and third hypotheses. Our fourth and fifth hypotheses are not borne out by this analysis, but we find that there is evidence to support a relationship of a different direction between factionalism and intraparty voting in larger districts than that previously assumed. We get greater confidence from observing that across both measures of our dependent variable, the effects of the explanatory variables are constant.

Section 7: Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed the relationship between electoral systems in use in a country and the level of factionalism that is observed in that country (weighted by seat share and vote share). We began the chapter by laying out the reason that electoral systems merit an analysis in their own right of their relationship with the existence of factions in parties. We then looked at the previous work done in relation to examining and tracing this particular relationship. We explained the theory underlying the relationship between electoral systems and factionalism. We set out the hypotheses for testing, namely that countries that use electoral systems that disadvantage smaller parties are likely to feature higher levels of factionalism; electoral systems that are based on the use of closed lists are likely to result in a lower level of factionalism and that the ability for voters to exercise intra-party preferential voting will result in higher levels of factionalism. We then analysed each of the independent variables being used to measure the effects in our hypotheses on a bivariate basis, and then presented the findings as specified by our multi-variate model. Following this, we discussed the predictive power of the models presented.

The findings in this chapter appear to validate certain hypotheses, and these findings are presented in Table 4.6. We set out at the beginning that there were three different decisions that legislators made when deciding upon their career trajectory.

Hypothesis	Confirmed & Level of Significance
Countries in which the electoral system is more advantageous to larger parties will experience higher levels of factionalism in its parties	Yes at 1% level of significance
Countries in which the electoral system means that candidate selectors determine, in whole, which of the party's candidates get its seats are likely to have lower levels of factionalism in its parties.	Weak evidence – not constant across all models
Countries in which the electoral system means that candidate selectors determine, in part, which of the party's candidates get its seats are likely to have lower levels of factionalism in its parties in inverse relation with the size of this proportion of seats in the legislature chosen in this manner	Weak evidence – not constant across all models
Countries in which the electoral system gives voters the ability to express intra-party preference between candidates of the same party will have higher levels of factionalism in its parties	No
Countries in which the electoral system gives voter the ability to express intra-party preference between candidates of the same party will have higher levels of factionalism in its parties as the district magnitude increases.	No, opposite direction is true at the 1% level of significance.

Table 4.6 *Results of analysis of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism*

Firstly, we set out that before deciding to remain totally loyal to a party, to express organised dissent (to join or allow a faction to persist) in a party or to leave a party entirely, legislators would carefully look at the electoral system and the effects that it has. They will take account of the likelihood of the success of a new party, and the prospects that such a new party might have. In this regard, our model supports this theory. The effective number of electoral parties, the effective number of legislative parties[22] and the threshold for representation all showed that they had a significant effect on the level of factionalism. it would seem to suggest that where electoral systems disadvantage smaller parties, then incentives for factionalism will exist in those countries. We can then extrapolate that where an electoral system tends towards majoritarianism, it is more likely that factionalism will feature in its major parties.

[22] Although not reported, where the effective number of legislative parties was used instead of electoral parties, it retained significance across all models. The effective number of electoral parties is a useful control in that it takes account of one party's particular historical or cultural dominance, but also represents the effect of the majoritarian system in that people will vote strategically before the system translates votes into seats.

Secondly, we examined the role of closed lists in suppressing factionalism, and we found that there was very weak evidence to suggest that factionalism is negatively related with the use of closed-list electoral system. This is would call into question the theory outlined in Section 3; there appears to be a weak relationship between such electoral systems and the decision to maintain a faction in a party.

Thirdly, we found that intra-party preferential voting does matter, but only at different levels of average district magnitude. Our finding here is interesting in that it seems to challenge Katz's assertion that the reason that factions have not been fostered in countries like Ireland is because of the small district size of Irish parliamentary constituencies. If anything, our model suggests that it is in the case of larger districts, intra-party voting has even less of a bearing on the existence of factionalism. The interaction between the average size of districts and intra-party preferential voting suggests that as districts become larger, and if voters are in a position to choose between candidates of the same party then there will be less incentive for factions to persist in that party. This could be explained as follows: where a district becomes larger, intra-party competition is less likely to be as intense than we would expect in a smaller district, because it is likely that smaller parties will be represented in the legislature (given that district magnitude is increasing), and so potential faction members can go and win election as a party in their own right – thus differentiating themselves from other party members becomes less important. Of course, it is worth pointing out that spending power is something that we have held constant, and this may have an effect on factionalism.

All in all, this chapter has shown that electoral systems do matter in discussing factionalism in parties. Our main finding is that the less proportional an electoral system, the more factionalised parties are. We can attribute to this to:

- Legislators who would break away and form a new party under a PR system realise that a non-PR system would create high barriers to entry for such a new party, and hence remain inside the larger party as a faction and;
- In non-PR systems, there tend to be fewer parties which, by definition, contain a wider range of opinion than does the large number of parties in multiparty system under a PR electoral system – such a dispersion of opinion is conducive to the emergence of factions.

CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING FACTIONALISM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Abstract

In Chapter 5, we explore the relationship between factionalism and other country-level factors that are not based around electoral systems. Firstly, we explore the limited amount of analysis that has been done in investigating the relationship between the level of factionalism in a country and other institutional factors. Of particular interest to us here was whether or not the country in question uses a presidential system of government or a parliamentary system.. Moving beyond the presidential-parliamentary dichotomy, we present a number of hypotheses relating to the relationship between executive and legislature. In light of the debate in the literature about the effects of federalism on factionalism, we posit that where a federal system of government was in place, there would be higher levels of factionalism in place. We also concern ourselves with the role that regulations governing the registration of parties and whether or not MPs are allowed to cross the parliamentary floor (party-switching) without facing a penalty. In relation to the role of party finance, we postulate that where public subsidies are made available to parties the level of factionalism will be lower. Equally, where there is a ban put in place on private donations, we claim that this reduces the ability of factions to raise resources and impedes their ability to attract new members, thus calling their existence into question.

In the bivariate and multivariate analysis that follow, we find support for the claim that presidential systems do determine the level of factionalism in a country, as does the amount of influence that the legislature can yield over the executive. we find that where public funding is made available to parties, this removes some of the incentives for factions to persist in such parties.

CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING FACTIONALISM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Section 1: Introduction

In this chapter, we examine other institutional structures that we would expect to provide incentives for factionalism in parties. These can be divided into two categories: constitutional design and rules of party competition.

Firstly, in relation to constitutional design, we observe a number of relationships. We deal specifically with the relationship between executives and legislatures in different countries, looking in particular at whether or not the existence of an executive president has any bearing on the extent of factionalism in a country. Also, we take account of the extent to which the legislature and the executive are fused, and investigate whether or not the more legislative powers (outside of the government or the party leadership) available to parliamentarians provide an incentive to the persistence of factions. We examine the relationship between the overall administrative structures of a state, whether it is federal or unitary in nature, and the degree to which factionalism may persist as a result of this.

Secondly, in relation to the rules of party competition, we take account of two substantial issues. We initially take account of the rules relating to the regulation of parties in countries, and investigate to what extent, if any; these rules have a bearing on the extent of factionalism in such countries. There rules relate to the establishment of parties in countries and the criteria which they must satisfy. We also investigate the extent to which national laws relating to party activity can promote factionalism in parties. We then turn to the role of money in politics, in relation to party funding and the permeation of money in politics: to use Thayer's phrase (1996), whether *money politics* underpins factionalism in a country. Here, we look at the role of public funding of parties in a country, and the manner in which this is distributed among parties. Outside of the formal rules

governing the financing of parties, we also look at the informal norms governing the relationship between money and politics, given that national laws may not be reflective of the actual relationship that might exists.

While we have established in the previous chapter that electoral systems do have an impact on the level of factionalism in parties in a country, the literature concerning factionalism would seem to suggest that in some countries there are other factors, such as those mentioned above, at play. This chapter seeks to address that by engaging in a theoretically-based investigation of the effects of non-electoral institutional determinants. Additionally, this chapter explores certain institutional relationships that have not received much attention in the literature heretofore.

The chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses previous work completed by scholars analysing the effect of such determinants as listed above on factionalism. Section 3 details the theory and derives the hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. Section 4 performs bivariate analysis of the independent variables being examined. Section 5 discusses the results of our multivariate analysis and the associated models. Section 6 discusses the implications of our findings and concludes the chapter.

In the bivariate and multivariate analysis that follow, we find support for the claim that presidential systems do determine the level of factionalism in a country, as does the amount of influence that the legislature can yield over the executive. We find that where public funding is made available to parties, this removes some of the incentives for factions to persist in such parties.

Section 2: Previous Investigations of National Determinants of Factionalism

As stated above, when investigating national determinants of factionalism outside of electoral systems, it makes sense to divide them into two categories – those that are based on the institutional design and those that deal with the rules surrounding the regulation of parties and party finance. Perhaps the most fundamental question relating to the relationship between factionalism and national institutional determinants relates to the basic institutional structure of a country, in terms of how the executive and the legislature are set up. In other words, the existence of an executive president independent of the legislature is something that may cause incentives to exist which foster factionalism in a party.

The most obvious example is the American case. Factionalism has always been considered to be a characteristic of parties in the United States (Reiter 2004, Grynaviski 2004), and it has been noted in the analysis of presidential candidate selection conventions from as far back as 1968 (Pomper, 1971), given the fixed regularity of presidential elections, that an incentive exists for the maintenance of factions that could support potential presidential nominees. A similar argument is made by Coppedge (1997: 172) about the Venezuelan political system. Indeed, where term limits exist, the likelihood that factions will persist is augmented, given that the turnover of candidates for the presidency will be increased. Equally, in the case of semi-presidential party systems, the personal rivalries that may provide the basis for faction formation can be accentuated by the existence of an elected executive president (Cole, 1989).

Similarly, the Brazilian case shows that the existence of an executive presidency can lead to the creation of pro-presidential and anti-presidential factions in the president's own party (Amorin Neto and Santos, 2001). The incentives for these factions to persist were primarily due to the necessity for a president to build coalitions in the legislature, to ensure legislative support for their particular policy programmes. This can be attributed to the fact that the executive

exists independently of the legislature and is not reliant on it for its existence. As Borz (2006: 33) claims, in such instances neither the executive nor the legislature can put an end to the legal existence of the other. Therefore factions of the president's party in the legislature may be able to vote against the president's programme without being fearful of precipitating dissolution of the legislature. Equally, the president might have to negotiate with such factions in order to ensure the passage of their policy proposals.

Another formal characteristic of the state structure to which it is worth turning attention is whether or not the state in question is federal in nature. The existence of different tiers of government provides incentives for regionally based factions to persist, especially if those levels of government are in a position to distribute resources at the sub-national level. This was particularly evident in India in the case of the Congress party, where the distinct regional power bases of state politicians provided the basis for faction formation, and which were fostered then by the federal structure (Heath et al., 2005:151). Similarly, in the case of Spanish parties, the existence of the autonomous provincial governmental tier provided for a tension between central party leadership and provincial party organisations in choosing candidates and party policy (Hopkin, 2005: 386). In their analysis of Spanish parties, Verge and Gómez (2011) maintain that party organisation rules combined with a federal system of government can also have a bearing on the level of factionalism observable in a party. In other words, where party rules are decentralised because of the non-unitary nature of the country, it then follows that factionalism can be likely to be a characteristic of parties that compete in that country, if strong regional tendencies exist.

On the other hand, Carty (2010) makes the argument that the existence of a federal political structure provides an outlet for those regional power bases, i.e. that those would-be factions would direct more of an orientation to the provinces rather than foster factions at

the federal level. On a related note (party cohesion), Epstein (1967: 32) and Key (1964: 334) both agreed that federal forms of government tend towards more disunited parties, especially in the American case given the prevalence of local actors who may be in a position to challenge national policies that they view as harmful or adverse.

While there is an abundant literature on the relationships between party discipline in parliaments, this is not necessarily transferable to analysis of factionalism. One reason for this is that voting dissent may not reflect the existence of factions.

It is worth pointing out also that in parliamentary systems the executive and legislature are not legally separate bodies and there is nothing inherent in parliamentary systems to suggest that factions are less likely to persist. For example, a party's factions might decide to vote together on legislative proposals having negotiated a particular outcome between them rather than openly defying their party leadership. Indeed factions may well exist in the "parliamentary fit parties" that Sartori (1997: 94) mentions, and negotiate a common outcome between themselves, so that party voting appears cohesive to the external observer.

However, while the overall character of parliamentary systems may not have a bearing on the persistence of factions, there may be components of the institutional make-up of a parliament that would create incentives for factionalism to persist. One such component is the existence of rules that forbid party members from switching parties in parliament (Köllner & Basedau, 2005: 17) or from defecting from the party for which they were originally elected.

These rules are similar in nature to the effect of thresholds[23] as in the case of electoral systems. Where divisions occur inside parties, the existence of such rules provides an incentive for the persistence of factions (at least until the next legislative election).

Other regulations will also have some bearing on the incentives that exist for the persistence of factionalism. Generally, these regulations can have the same effect as stated above, i.e. the creation of barriers to entry to political competition. The effect of these regulations has not received much attention in the literature, however, which may indicate that there is no empirical basis to it, or alternatively that it has not been addressed as yet. We can look to countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where parties that are based exclusively on ethnicity, region and religion are forbidden. As a result, parties are multi-ethnic in nature, which means that they may contain factions formed on the basis of social cleavages and because of the prohibitions mentioned above, these factions then persist, as we discuss below.

A particular set of rules worth examining to assess their impact (if any) on factionalism in parties include party finance rules and the overall nature of the involvement of money and financial resources in political competition. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the analysis of the relationship between factionalism and party financing concerns Japan, and more specifically the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Italian Christian Democrats. Sartori (1976: 93-95) describes the manner in which a country's party finance rules may affect the incentive structures that foster factionalism. Given that the LDP was formed from a merger of two parties (something we examine in further detail in our next chapter), party finance was not distributed through the central party leadership but followed the fault-lines of

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[23] in that they increase the difficulty for the entry of new parties to political competition, or at least stymie their parliamentary representation between elections.

that merger. This contrasted with the Italian case, where party finance was usually distributed through the central party leadership.

However, Sartori makes the argument that where resources are important to parties, private donations of money will find its way to the level of the party at which this money will achieve the highest return. Therefore, it follows that where the party leadership is the place where returns from financial donations are maximised (in the pursuit of particular policy objectives, for example), then it makes little sense to fund factions. On the other hand, where factions are viewed as the best avenue through which party policy may be influenced, it is logical to assume that donations will be made through the factions. However, if private donations were forbidden by law or public subsidies were channelled to the party through this leadership and not through its legislators, it follows then that the incentives (or at least the resource bases) for factionalism are likely to be lessened.

Ferdinand (2003: 63) finds that reforms of party finance rules in Japan after 1994 had the express intention of making parties stronger relative to their factions, and sought to achieve this by providing public subsidies to central party headquarters, so as to weaken the fund-raising influence of the factions. There is mixed evidence as to whether or not these reforms achieved these particular outcomes. If party finance rules do not allow for the funding of parties by channels other than the central party leadership, they deprive potential faction leaders of the ability to attract new members. As Ockey (1994: 255) claims, faction leaders in Thai parties had responsibility for financing of candidates' campaigns, and ensured that their own position was entrenched inside the party. Also, it is telling that in Japanese attempts to try and mitigate the influence of factions (and conversely to increase the strength of parties, and by extension party leaderships), reform of party finance rules was one of

the first areas to which authorities turned, e.g. through channelling public subsidies through the central party leadership.

Surprisingly, and symptomatic of this area of study generally, is that there has been little analysis of the relationship between factionalism and these rules, and whether Sartori's initial theory concerning party finance is borne out in reality. On a related note, as mentioned in previous chapters, factions usually have negative connotations – usually corruption by virtue of their role in fund-raising and eliciting financial resources for their members (Thayer 1969 ; Ockley 1994 ; Hee Park 2001; Kollner 2004). The role of party finance rules, and indeed a broader analysis of the interaction between money and politics in a country should shed some light on the incentives that exist for the fostering of factionalism.

Section 3: Theory & Hypotheses

There are two categories evident in the structures which we discuss in this section. The first category deals with the formal regime type of a country, namely the relationship between the executive and the legislature and whether or not the country in question is federal in nature. The second category deals with regulation of the party and its behaviour, i.e. whether legislators can switch party memberships or how those parties are financed. Common to both categories is that the incentives created by both categories of rules and structures can foster factionalism in parties. If we return to the starting assumptions which we made in the previous chapter (that a legislator is motivated by policy-based or office-seeking motivations in their career), we can trace potential causal mechanisms that explain how the structures and rules mentioned above would foster factionalism in parties.

We turn to the first category mentioned above – the formal institutional structures of a state. To begin we examine the impact of

presidentialism. We expect that presidentialism would lead to factionalism in parties, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the most obvious reason is that elections to executive office would have a reductive effect on the number of *presidentialable*[24] parties. This is down to the fact that a presidential election is based on a "winner-takes-all" approach and that a presidency cannot be divided proportionally. This creates an effective barrier to entry. In fact, this effect is similar in nature to the relationship between the effective number of legislative/electoral parties and factionalism that was explored in the previous chapter.

A politician who aspires to be a president with executive powers would be best served by remaining in a party that is large enough to serve as a vehicle through which to realise their presidential ambitions, though in order to achieve this would have to maintain an organisation through which to advance their candidacy in the party. This brings us to the next element of presidentialism that provides incentives to the fostering of factionalism: the regular nomination of a candidate for the presidency. Presidential elections (given that the executive is distinct from the legislature) occur at statutorily defined intervals. Aspirant presidential candidates know that the party will need to nominate a presidential candidate for the election, and so there remains an incentive for a faction to persist over this period of time, in order to win the party's nomination. This contrasts with a parliamentary system of government where, while elections may be held at regular intervals, the potential prime minister is not (re)nominated by a party, as a separate candidate[25], before the election.

There was a parallel with the presidential system in a parliamentary system in Japan during the post-war dominance of the LDP, as

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[24] That is parties that could feasibly win a presidential election.
[25] Excluding the exception cited in Chapter 2 of the directly elected prime minister as happened in Israel.

described by Hrebenar (2000). Given that it was almost generally assumed that the LDP would win every election, and that the leader of the party would invariably become prime minister, there was an incentive for factions to exist so that they would win the party leadership (not unlike a presidential nomination). Added to this was the existence of a regular election for the party leadership (every 5 years), which meant that factions expected that the prime minister/party leader would be regularly replaced and thus their persistence was incentivised.

The final element of a presidential system that would foster factionalism is certainly the relationship between the president and legislators from their own party. As pointed out above, the election of the president is separate from that of the legislature, and defeat of the president's legislative proposals in parliament do not have the consequences of dissolution of the legislature. If we add to this the fact that legislators from the president's party may have their party's presidential nomination in their sights, then this creates an additional incentive for factionalism; opponents (for the party's nomination) of a president's policy proposals may be able to mobilise factions on this basis.

Hypothesis 1: In countries where there is a presidential system of government (an executive branch legally separate and distinct from the legislature), the parties in such countries are likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.

Hypothesis 2: In countries where there is a presidential system of government (an executive branch legally separate and distinct from the legislature), the lower the effective number of presidential parties the higher levels of factionalism that is likely to be observed in the parties in that country.

Though our hypotheses convey that, on a theoretical basis, presidentialism should result in higher levels of factionalism than those in parliamentary systems of government, factionalism has also featured in parliamentary systems of government. In this vein, we turn now to another element of the relationship between the legislature and the executive – namely the powers available to members of the legislature.

The argument made here is similar in nature to the argument regarding the role of closed-list electoral systems in the previous chapter – the more scope there is for central control by a party leadership over all elements in the political system, the less likely that factionalism will be a characteristic of parties in that polity. We explain this relationship in terms of the link between executive and legislature in a parliamentary setting. While parliamentary indiscipline can have greater consequences for a chief executive chosen under a parliamentary system rather than a presidential system (in that it can topple a government, or cause dissolution of the legislature), it does not preclude the existence of factions in parliamentary systems. There is little reason to suggest that faction leaders in parties that hold the premiership do not have an interest in winning that premiership at some stage, and parliamentary powers available to them may allow them to realise that aim without causing the collapse of the government.

Thus, the relationship between the legislature and the executive will have some bearing on factionalism in parties. Firstly, if the legislature is autonomous from the executive (or as it grows more autonomous), incentives exist to foster factionalism, in that the fates of the executive and the legislature are not bound up together. In such circumstances, a government party's legislators may decide that some of them can mobilise as a group in order to challenge the actions of the executive, without necessarily placing the fate of the legislature in peril (i.e. dissolution).

Secondly, if the legislature can exert influence over the executive, it follows then that incentives exist for factions to exist in parties also. Suppose that the government party's ministers propose a certain policy and that there exists ideological differences inside the government party. A faction based on policy, may choose to try and amend or challenge that policy if they are faced with the availability of formal procedures by which they could do so. Alternatively, a faction based around an individual might use such procedures to challenge the leadership of their own party.

Hypothesis 3: Where the legislature is more autonomous from the executive in terms of the formal powers assigned to it, there will be higher levels of factionalism.

Hypothesis 4: Where the legislature is able to exercise influence over the executive in terms of the formal powers assigned to it, there will be higher levels of factionalism.

Next, we examine whether or not a federal state structure has bearing on the extent of factionalism. As pointed out above, there is no clear causal direction evident from discussion in the literature. On one hand, we would expect that where there is a federal structure of government in existence, we find that regional or sub-national interests will be represented in national parties and that these provide a basis upon which factions will persist at the national level. However we are faced with Carty's (2010) argument as stated earlier that while Canada is a federal country, factions have not featured in Canadian parties as much as we might expect. Taking these contradictory claims into account, it is still worth testing if the classic theoretical argument presented by Key (1964) holds, namely that federalism has a decentralising effect on a party system, and hence provides incentives for factionalism to persist.

Hypothesis 5: Federalism leads to higher levels of factionalism in parties.

One of the main findings from Chapter 4 was that access to the electoral arena mattered in terms of the incentives that exist for factions to persist in parties. However, electoral systems are not the only set of rules that can have a bearing on the extent of factionalism in parties. We would expect that the prohibition of party-switching will have a bearing on the existence of factions in parties. Janda (2009:4) defines party-switching as "leaving the party for which they were elected and joining another party or becoming an independent MP". Where legislators who wish to leave a party are faced with the prospect of losing their parliamentary seat, they may then decide to opt to remain in the party, but to form a faction.

Hypothesis 6: The existence of regulations which prohibit party-switching among parliamentarians lead to higher levels of factionalism in parties.

Similarly, where parliamentarians do wish to leave their own party, the decision to do so may also be affected by the level of difficulty involved in setting up a party of their own. For example, such a new party may be required to fulfil a number of certain criteria – i.e. a certain proportion of its candidates must come from a particular gender or it must organise itself in a minimum number of regions in the country. The effect of these regulations is similar in nature to the barriers to entry of a market. For example, these regulations may be designed to stop the emergence of ethnically-based or solely regionally-based parties, and then it is logical to assume where ethnic cleavages or regional cleavages exist, these will transpire as factions inside parties. This is a point we discuss further below.

Hypothesis 7: A higher level of difficulty created by the regulations governing the registration of parties results in higher levels of factionalism in parties in that country.

Parties need financial resources to fight elections and to engage in political activity. As Williams (2000: 1) puts it "money buys the access, favours, skills, goods and service that are essential to effective party activity". Party finance rules play a significant role– who donates money; how money is channelled to parties; the perceived importance of money in politics and the extent to which public subsidies are made available to parties.

Fundamental to understanding the relationship between party finance and factions is the fact that (as Sartori (1976) claimed) if factions are in a position to fundraise and to accept donations, then the incentives for them to persist still exist. Where money is channelled directly to the party leadership, rather than candidates (for example provision of a staff member or administration costs), we would expect that factionalism is less likely to exist, i.e. clientelist linkages that define some factions are less likely. Thus factions are impeded in their ability to channel funds to their members, thus weakening the power of faction leaders. Similarly, where private donations to parties are prohibited or even limited, we would expect that the incentives for factions to persist are diminished.

Another aspect of this question in which we are interested is the importance of private donations in politics. The logic underlying this is that factions of legislators will be established inside their parties on the basis of office-motivations or policy-motivations (as laid out in our initial theory) and will then elicit financial support to assist in the pursuit of their motivations, given that money is considered an important factor in the politics of a country. They are then in a position to offer financial resources to other legislators, who are

motivated by a need to achieve re-election, so adding to the membership of their faction.

Hypothesis 8: In countries where private donations to parties are banned or capped, there will be lower levels of factionalism.

Hypothesis 9: In countries where there is a close relationship between private financial donations to parties and public policy, factionalism will be higher in parties.

Hypothesis 10: In countries where parties receive public funding, there will be lower levels of factionalism.

Finally, we take account of the social characteristics of a society. As Köllner and Basedau (2005:12) argue, factions may also have the function of speaking for certain sectional or social groups. These groups can be based upon ethnicity, religion or even linguistic diversity. Deep cleavages in a society may manifest themselves in the parties in a country, or may go below the party-level and represent themselves as factions.

Hypothesis 11: Countries characterised by linguistic, ethnic or religious fractionalistion are more likely to feature higher levels of factionalism.

Section 4: Empirical Analysis & Bivariate Analysis of Independent Variables

We classify the 85 countries in our dataset according to the type of the governmental regime, as identified by Gerring and Thacker (2004). We classify the regimes in three categories: presidential (those regimes where a fixed-term president is elected separately from the legislature and appoints a group of ministers who are not collectively responsible to the fixed-term legislature), semi-presidential (a president is elected separately from the legislature, and there is a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively

responsible to the legislature) and parliamentary (where there is an unelected or indirectly elected head of state and a prime minister and cabinet are collectively appointed from the legislature). Table 5.1 presents this classification. The differences presented are the differences between the level of factionalism in countries using a certain regime type and those that don't.

Regime Type	N	Average (seats) *Difference in italics*	Average(votes) *Difference in italics*
Presidential	38	0.54 ***(+0.015)***	0.47 ***(-0.038)***
Semi-Presidential	13	0.52 ***(-0.015)***	0.48 ***(-0.01)***
Parliamentary	34	0.54 ***(+0.026)***	0.52 ***(+0.07)***
TOTAL	**85**	**0.54**	**0.49**

Table 5.1: Distribution of Regime Types and Average Levels of Factionalism

(Positive difference implies that levels of factionalism are higher in countries using that regime type)

Having used t-tests to test the differences between each of the categories, we find that there is no statistically significant difference between regimes on the basis of the types of government used in them. This would seem to offer little evidence for our first hypothesis. However, if we take the 85 regimes and recode them again according to a dichotomous variable – we code them as either tending towards presidentialism, or tending towards parliamentarism.

In performing this coding, we reclassified those systems where the president presides directly over the meeting of government ministers as presidential, and those where the head of state does not preside over the government as parliamentary. Essentially, we recoded those regimes as presidential where the presidents are endowed with strong executive competences, in order to capture the personalistic element that such regimes might incentivise inside parties, especially in the

nomination phase. The results of this classification are presented in Table 5.2.

Regime Type	N	Average (seats)	Average(votes)
Presidential	40	0.57	0.50
Parliamentary	45	0.50	0.49
Difference		*0.07*	*+.01*
TOTAL	**85**	**0.54**	**0.49**

Table 5.2: Distribution of Presidential Systems and Parliamentary Systems and Average Levels of Factionalism

The results in this instance are equally striking, in that they offer weak support for our first hypothesis. While there is certainly a difference in the average level of factionalism in these cases, neither is statistically significant, and in the case of the index based on votes, this difference is minimal. One avenue worth exploring in order to explain this outcome would be to account for the levels of democracy in the various countries. While we decided not to include this in our models based on electoral systems in Chapter 4, and found that there was little relationship between factionalism and the level of democracy (based on Freedom House Scores and the Polity Scale) in Chapter 3, we believe that it merits investigation in this instance. The reason we give for this is that the lack of political freedom could affect the extent to which nominations to the presidency are open to internal party competition, and the extent to which personalism might play a heightened role in such countries.

If the presidency is not open to competition publicly, it is possible that such a state of affairs would also discourage factionalism inside the party, whereas in a fully democratic state, factionalism would be incentivised by the existence of a presidency with strong executive competences.

To operationalise this, we drop all 26 regimes that do not satisfy the Freedom House definition of a fully democratic country. We then

perform t-tests on the average dependent variable values of the remaining 59 regimes. The results are presented in Table 5.3. While they offer some more support for our first hypothesis, that evidence is not extremely strong.

Regime Type	N	Average (seats)	Average(votes)
Presidential	22	0.64	0.56
Parliamentary	37	0.52	0.50
Difference		*-.12***	*-.06*
TOTAL	**59**	**0.56**	**0.53**

Table 5.3: Distribution of Presidential Systems and Parliamentary Systems and Average Levels of Factionalism in countries that satisfy the Freedom House definition of "fully democratic"
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

In fact the difference in this instance is statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. This is not mirrored in the votes-based dependent variable (the p-value in this case was 0.319), though there is a substantial difference between the two averages[26].

We next turn to examination of those particular countries that use presidential regimes, and analyse whether or not such systems have a reductive effect on the number of parties, and therefore create an implicit threshold to parties to entering into this competition. To examine this effect, we isolated all those cases in our dataset that used presidential systems of government and investigated whether or not there was any correlation between the effective number of presidential electoral parties (calculated from the results of the most recent presidential election, using data from each country's electoral commission website before December 2007 (when the survey was collected)) and the national level of factionalism.

[26] Interestingly, when we perform ANOVA analysis using the three categories of regimes from Gerring and Thacker (2004) and drop all cases that do not satisfy the Freedom House definition of democratic state, we find no significant differences across the categories either.

We find that there was correlation in the case of both measures of our dependent variable, and in the expected direction. The scattergrams in Figure 5.1 display a clear relationship which lends weight to the theorised relationship – as the effective number or presidential electoral parties (ENPEP) decreases, the level of factionalism increases.

The correlation coefficient between the ENPEP and the votes-based measure of factionalism is -.31 and this is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (p-value is 0.05). In the case of the correlation between the ENPEP and the seats-based measure of factionalism, the correlation coefficient is -.24 and there is some weak statistical significance (p-value is 0.132). The negative sign in both instances intimates the theorised relationship, though it is not as strong as we would expect. There is evidence then to support Hypothesis 2 – where presidential systems have a reductive effect on the effective number of presidential electoral parties, factionalism is more likely to become a characteristic of parties in that country. On initial inspection, this tallies with our findings in the previous chapter in that the party system in a country can determine the extent of factionalism in a party. In a broader sense, this suggests that barriers to entry to the political arena are central to explaining the existence of factionalism in parties in a country. In fact, the evidence from analysis of presidentialism regarding the ENPEP seems to suggest that the type of party system (presidential) is significant in determining the level of factionalism.

Given that we applied a filtering to our cases above to control for the lack of total democracy in a country, we do the same below in analysing the correlation between the ENPEP and the level of factionalism in parties in a country. Proving that the correlation improves once countries that are not considered "free" are excluded from the analysis will show a case for including it as a control

variable in the multivariate models to be presented in the following section.



Figure 5.1: Relationship between the Effective Number of Presidential Electoral Parties and Level of Factionalism

Once we exclude those countries (23) that do not satisfy the democratic freedom criterion discussed above, the relationship

between the level of factionalism and ENPEP becomes stronger. In total, we are left with 22 cases, and in this group the correlation between the ENPEP and the level of factionalism (weighted by seat-share) is -0.56 and this is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (p-value= 0.0071). Similarly, the correlation coefficient between ENPEP and the level of factionalism (weighted by vote-share) is -0.62 and again this measure is statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance (p-value = 0.002). We have shown here that in presidential democracies, the greater the fragmentation of the vote, the lower the level of factionalism.





Figure 5.2: Relationship between the Effective Number of Presidential Electoral Parties and Level of Factionalism (controlling for level of democracy)

Interestingly, while the existence of the presidential system does not show a strikingly clear tendency towards the fostering of factionalism in parties, there is some evidence to suggest that presidentialism does foster factionalism. This particular aspect is made all the more striking in the diagrams in Figure 5.2 that show the relationship between factionalism and the ENPEP in countries that are considered to be entirely democratic.

We turn now to deal with the properties of the legislature in the particular country. Of interest to us here are the formal powers and procedures available to the legislature. As we recall, Hypotheses 3 and 4 both set out that where a legislature is more autonomous from the executive, and where it can wield influence over the executive, we expect to find higher levels of factionalism in parties in such countries. To measure the effects of these particular procedures and incentives, we use the measures of parliamentary power as developed by Fish and Kroenig (2009).

While Fish and Kroenig have developed an index of parliamentary powers, the two indices of interest are the measures that they develop

of how the legislature can wield power over the executive, and procedures that maintain autonomy of the legislature from the executive. Before discussing each of these particular measures, it is worth pointing out that the nature of all indices established in the measure of these parliamentary powers are additive, i.e. each individual power or procedure that is investigated is coded in a dichotomous manner: the parliament either has this power or it doesn't. The main index and each of the sub-indices are counts of the number of powers in each category or in total that each parliament has. The usual health warning applies – formal procedures do not necessarily reflect the reality of what goes on politically. However, the existence of formal powers describes the potential avenues available to legislators, and describes the structure of the environment within which legislators operate. Also, it makes sense to suggest that the more of these powers that exist in any particular parliament, the more incentives that face legislators.

The first sub-index of interest to us is the index that measures institutional autonomy. It measures the availability of nine powers, and ranges from 0 to 9. The powers that it takes account of are:

- The legislature is immune to dissolution by the executive;
- The executive lacks decree power;
- The legislature can pass laws that are not subject to veto by the executive, or they can over-ride any veto that the executive exercises over is laws;
- The legislature's laws are not subject to judicial review;
- The legislature can initiate bills in all policy areas – the executive lacks gate-keeping authority;
- The executive must spend all funds appropriated by the legislature;

- The legislature controls the resources that finance its internal operations;
- Members of legislature are immune from criminal prosecution and;
- All members of the legislature are elected.

The second sub-index is a count of the number of powers related to the legislature's influence over the executive that the national legislature possesses. This variable ranges from zero (least powerful) to nine (most powerful). The powers that this sub-index measures are as follows:

- The legislature can impeach the president or replace the prime minister without the involvement of other bodies;
- Members of the legislature can serve simultaneously as members of the government;
- The legislature has the power of summons over executive branch officials and can hear evidence from such officials before its committees;
- The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the executive;
- The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the police force and the military;
- The legislature appoints the prime minister;
- The country lacks a directly elected presidency;
- The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

On initial examination, we find that there is little support for our third hypothesis: that the more autonomy legislatures have relative to the executive, there will be higher levels of factionalism. The

correlation coefficient between the autonomy index and the votes-based factionalism measure is -0.05, but is not statistically significant. Similarly, the relationship between the autonomy index and the seats-based factionalism measure is -0.1, and is not statistically significant either.

Turning to the analysis of our fourth hypothesis, the extent to which the legislature can influence the behaviour of the executive, the relationship seems to be similarly weak, though it follows the direction as laid out by our hypothesis. The correlation coefficient between the seats-based factionalism measure and the influence index is 0.047, but is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient between the votes-based measure and the level of legislature influence is 0.17, and this teeters on the edge of statistical significance at the 0.1 level (p-value is 0.12). If we control for "freedom" as above, there is less of a relationship evident. In fact the correlation coefficients between the two different factionalism measures and the influence index have opposing signs, and neither is statistically significant. While the direction of the relationship in this case is consistent with the direction of our hypothesis,



Figure 5.3: Relationship between the Extent of Influence the Legislature has over the Executive and Level of Factionalism

the relationship is not as strong as we would have expected. Figure 5.3 shows a graphical representation of the correlations, without controlling for freedom.

Based on the above analysis, and the analysis of our third hypothesis, it is difficult to see that legislative rules or powers have any particular bearing on the extent of factionalism in parties.

We turn next to the last independent variable in our category of national institutional variables – the role of federalism. In order to capture the level of federalism in a country, we use the Gerring-Thacker federalism index, because it captures the differences in types of federalism and decentralised government. The scale they use ranges from one to 5, where five indicates the higher level of federalism and one indicates the lowest level of federalism, or shows that a country is unitary. There are two elements that they use to create this scale:

- They code each country according to the structure of its sub-national government: 1 indicates a non-federal structure; 2 indicates a semi-federal structure (devolved government or autonomous communities) and 3 indicates a federal structure;

- In addition, they also code for bicameralism (this is justified on the basis that strong bicameralism is a necessary though not sufficient, condition of any federal state). Here 0 indicates a country where there is no upper house or the upper house is quite weak; 1 denotes a country where the upper house is on a par with the lower house and 2 denotes a country where the upper house can dominate the lower house on some issues.

We find there is a very weak positive relationship between factionalism and the level of federalism as measured on the Gerring-Thacker scale. The correlation coefficient between it and the votes-based measure of factionalism is 0.176 and this is not statistically significant (p-value=0.1129), and in the case of the correlation between federalism and the seats-based measure of factionalism, we find that the correlation coefficient is 0.1 but this is not a statistically significant relationship. This weakness is borne out by Figure 5.4.

This preliminary analysis does not support Carty's assertion that factionalism is discouraged in federal systems.



Figure 5.4: Relationship between the level of federalism and level of factionalism

We next turn to the regulations on party-switching in parliament, and the establishment of new parties. The first regulation of interest is that regarding the ability of MPs to leave the party for which they were elected, without losing their seat in parliament. Janda (2009)

lists the countries that have such regulations in force. There are 21 such cases in our group of countries in total and the differences in the average levels of factionalism (on both the votes-based and seats-based measures) are shown in Table 5.4.

	N	Average (seats)	Average(votes)
Regulations banning party-switching	21	0.55	0.51
No regulations banning party-switching	64	0.53	0.49
Difference	85	*-0.018*	*-.016*

Table 5.4: Distribution of Regulations banning Party-Switching

Countries where such regulations exist have marginally higher average levels of factionalism than countries that do not. However, in both cases there are no statistically significant differences between the average levels of factionalism. This difference increases when we control for freedom (i.e. include those countries that fall in the "free" category – 11 such countries had floor-switching bans) - +0.06 in the case of the votes-based measure, and +0.03 in the case of the seats-based measure. Again, there these differences were not statistically significant. It would appear that there is some weak evidence to suggest that they have a marginal effect, but not enough that effect can be distinguished from random chance.

We turn now to those regulations that concern the registration of new parties. We collected a number of regulation types from the ACE Electoral Knowledge Website, and then dichotomously coded whether or not such regulations had to be satisfied in the country-cases we deal with and where information on such cases was available. We then subjected the average levels of factionalism (vote-based and seat-based) of the two groups (those that had such a regulation in force, and those that didn't) to t-tests to see if there was a statistical difference between the two. The results of this particular

analysis are presented in Table 5.5. The first thing worth noting is that not all regulations would seem to have the same effect on the levels of factionalism in each country. This underlines the difference between these regulations and electoral rules – regulations are easier to satisfy than electoral rules and on the face of it can hardly be suggested to inhibit the emergence of new parties.

Regulation Type	N[27]	Difference (seats-based)	Difference (votes-based)
Party registration requires a minimum number of candidates of each gender	2/81	-0.323**	-0.323**
Party registration requires a minimum number of parliamentary candidates	14/81	-0.101	-0.127*
Party registration requires a notification period	36/81	-0.041	-0.01
Party registration requires deposit	22/81	-0.022	-0.002
Party registration requires that a certain number of electors' signatures be presented when establishing a party	44/81	+0.109**	+0.126**
Party registration requires that parties formally register with the agency managing elections in the country	77/81	-0.022	+0.005
Party registration requires that the party has branches/candidates in a minimum number of regions/sub-national units in the country	22/81	+0.114**	+.091*

Table 5.5: Differences in levels of Factionalism according to existence of party registration regulations
Positive difference implies that countries employing that regulation have a higher level of factionalism
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

The results in Table 5.5 make for interesting reading. The resounding story told is that party registration regulations do not particularly matter when it comes to explain the differing levels of factionalism between parties in countries, and in the majority of cases the levels

[27] (Number of countries using such a regulation)/(Number of countries for which information was available)

of factionalism in countries with certain regulations are *lower* than those that do not use them.

Firstly, the 2 countries that ask for gender quotas in membership and parliamentary candidates to be satisfied have lower levels of factionalism than the 79 that don't. Explanatory power is very limited here, given the small sample size. The other interesting pattern evident from Table 5.5 is the effect of regional quotas on the persistence of intra-party groups[28]. We found that the 22 countries that required that parties had either party branches or candidates present in a minimum number of regions or sub-national units around the country. This is consistent with our earlier discussion in Section 2, where we pointed out that where parties are required to establish a "broad church" approach, would-be parties remain as factions inside the main parties, because they are unable to muster the multi-regional support that they would be required to in order to register. The effect of this regulation is similar in nature to an electoral threshold, in that it controls access to the political or electoral arena.

What is puzzling however is that we would expect that countries where such requirements are necessary would be defined by regional cleavages, and thus would employ federal systems of government. However, as we showed earlier federalism has a weak, at best, relationship with factionalism. One way of squaring this circle would be to suggest that countries where such requirements exist are characterised by significant ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages, something we explore below.

As a final method of analysis, we also added up the number of regulations that were in operation in each country – giving a scale that ranged from 0 to 7. There was little correlation between this

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[28] It is worth noting that our earlier finding that federalism does not explain the persistence of factionalism, though the need to have a regional diversity in a party does seem to matter.

"difficulty" measure and either of the measures of factionalism. However, like the measurement of legislative parties discussed above, this measure has limitations in that it may not necessarily capture the total level of difficulty involved in registering or setting up a party in a country.

We next perform bivariate analysis are those that deal with the nature of party finance, and the extent to which money is considered to be important in a country's political culture. To do so, we draw on data collected from the IDEA Database on party Finance and the Inter-American Development Bank Database on Governance. Hypothesis 8 stated that where public funding was made available to parties, the power that factions had in mobilising resources to fellow party members was lessened, and thus diminished the incentives for them to exist. Table 5.6 presents the results of a test to analyse the differences in levels of factionalism between countries that provide public subsidies for their parties and countries that don't. While the differences are not statistically significant, they do suggest that where public funding is made available to parties, there is a neglible difference in the levels of factionalism, and in the direction that our hypothesis assumes.

Regulation Type	**N**[29]	**Difference (seats-based)**	**Difference (votes-based)**
Public subsidies are made available to parties	77/85	-0.033	-0.066

Table 5.6: Differences in levels of Factionalism according to provision of public subsidies
Positive difference implies that countries employing that regulation have a higher level of factionalism
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

[29] (Number of countries using such a regulation)/(Number of countries for which information was available)

However, in the absence of data that gives information in the differences of the size of public subsidies, we are unable to subject this particular hypothesis to any further analysis, suffice it to say that there is some weak evidence to suggest that where public subsidies are made available to parties, they lessen some of incentives that would foster factionalism.

Another point worth noting in this regard is a claim made by Pierre, Svasand and Widfelt (2000: 22). They argue that where public subsidies are introduced, that they may actually foster the creation of new parties rather than petrify a party system. In this regard, it is worthwhile looking at the differences in the rules used to distribute the public subsidies. We look at the difference in the two main types of rules used to give out party funding – equality of public subsidies, and subsidies based on a party's previous performance in the election. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.7.

Public Funding Type	**N**[30]	**Difference (seats-based)**	**Difference (votes-based)**
Public subsidies are made available to parties equally upon registration	2/54	+0.147	+ 0.164
Public subsidies are made available to parties based on their performance at the most recent election	52/57	- 0.164	-0.164*

Table 5.7: Differences in levels of Factionalism according to the rules used for provision of public subsidies
Positive difference implies that countries employing that regulation have a higher level of factionalism
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

While the difference is not statistically significant, it suggests that where public funding is distributed according to a party's previous electoral performance, the levels of factionalism are lower. However,

[30] (Number of countries using such a regulation)/(Number of countries for which information was available)

the relationship is not that clear-cut and we are unable to confidently distinguish it from random chance.

The counterpoint to the provision of public subsidies is the rules that structure the collection of private donations. We use the framework developed by the IDEA for classifying the sorts of private donations that may be made to parties. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.8.

Type of Donation Ban	N[31]	Difference (seats-based)	Difference (votes-based)
Ban of any kind of the below	*49/72*	*-0.060*	*-.097**
Ban on corporate donations	17/72	+0.0406	+0.0198
Ban on donations from companies that hold government contracts or tenders	21/72	+0.044	+0.0036
Ban on donations from trade unions	13/72	+ 0.001	-0.053
Ban on foreign donations	32/71	-0.023	- 0.021
Ban on non-cash donations (in kind benefits)	4/71	-0.021	-.0124
Ban on other types of donations (e.g. other parties, state organs, government agencies)	25/72	- 0.028	- 0.0616
Ban or capping on anonymous donations being made	39/70	- 0.061	-0.0768

Table 5.8: Differences in levels of factionalism according to types of private donation bans
Positive difference implies that countries employing that regulation have a higher level of factionalism
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

The first thing worth pointing out about the results of our analysis in Table 5.8 is that where there is a ban on at least one type of donation, that this coincides with a decrease in the level of factionalism that

[31] (Number of countries using such a regulation)/(Number of countries for which information was available)

features in that particular country. In the case of our votes-based measure, this difference is significant and is marginally statistically significant in the case of the seats-based measure. This would seem to suggest that the ability of parties to solicit private donations is impeded, and that this has some effect on the ability of factions to persist in parties. However, when we disaggregate the types of ban in place, we find some interesting patterns.

Firstly, we notice that there are no statistically significant differences evident over any of the categories. Secondly, some types of bans are associated with *increasing* levels of factionalism, such as donations from government contractors and corporate donations. Thirdly, the banning or capping of anonymous donations seems to be associated with lower levels of factionalism; however this relationship is weak given the lack of statistical significance. So it would seem that based on the evidence from the table above, that there is little evidence to suggest that party finance rules have a bearing on the extent of factionalism, and if they do, it is a weak effect.

Finally, we identified those countries that had a ceiling on the amount a donor could contribute and identified the size of that donation. On performing a t-test on the difference between those countries (we found information for 69 of our cases, 25 of which had a cap on political donations) that have a cap on the potential size of donations that can be made, and those that didn't; we find that there is a difference. Countries without such caps have higher levels of factionalism (0.54 was the average value on the votes-based measure, and 0.57 on the seats-based measure) than those do not feature such laws (0.48 on the votes-based measure, and 0.53 on the seats-based measure), though in neither case was the difference statistically significant. When we actually take the size of the donations caps themselves into account, we find that there is not a clear relationship between the two.

From the above discussion, we find that it appears that the rules that structure the financing of parties have little effect on the levels of factionalism. In order to make our discussion as robust as possible, we now turn to the environment within which parties operate. Obviously, there is no readily available indicator by which we could measure the extent to which *money politics* is a part of the political culture in a country, i.e. can the persistence of factions in a party be explained by the "demand" for changes in public policy that can be solicited by financial donations.

In order to do this, we took the responses to questions from the World Economic Forum's 2007 Executive Opinion Survey as part of the Global Competitiveness Report. In each case, an average of 94 Chief Executive Officers from a sample of companies operating in the country was polled. The survey itself dealt with governance and the two questions that we chose as our measures were as follows:

- "How common are illegal donations to parties in your country?" This scale ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that such donations are common and 7 indicates that they never occur.

- "To what extent do legal contributions to parties have a direct influence on specific public policy outcomes?" This scale ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates a perceived close link between donations and policy and 7 indicates little direct influence on policy.

We took the average value given by respondents and then analysed them against the measures for our dependent variable. We mapped these correlations in Figure 5.5. From this analysis, we notice that of the two responses, the measure of the influence that contributions have on public policy is the strongest relationship.


Level of Factionalism (weighted by vote-share)
How commons are illegal political donations in your country?
Fitted values


Level of Factionalism (weighted by seat-share)
How common are illegal political donations in your country?
Fitted values


Level of Factionalism (weighted by seat-share)
Extent of direct influence of legal political contributions on policy outcomes
Fitted values



Figure 5.5: Relationship between extent of influence and illegal political donations and level of factionalism

The correlation coefficients for the relationships mapped above are given in Table 5.9. Of the two responses, the perception of business executives about the proximity of the link between political donations and specific policy outcomes and the level of factionalism is the stronger.

	Level of Factionalism (seats)	**Level of Factionalism (votes)**
Extent of illegal political donations	0.1408	0.1686
Extent of influence of legal political donations on policy	0.1680	0.2373**

Table 5.9: Correlation coefficients between measures of influence and extent of illegal donations and the level of factionalism
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

Similar to a number of independent variables that we have analysed heretofore, we find that there is a relationship in the direction that we assumed. We have some weak support then, all else being equal, for the hypothesis that in a political culture where financial support is considered to be an important currency in political life, levels of factionalism will be higher.

Taking the whole of the analysis concerning the role of party finance, finance rules and political cultural rules into account, it would seem while the variables that we identified in our hypotheses do play a part, they do not possess a great deal of explanatory power.

Finally, we test the bivariate relationship between fractionalisation of a society and the level of factionalism. To do this, we analyse the correlation between our national measure of factionalism (weighted by votes and seats) and various measures of fractionalisation. We employ the indices used by Alesina et al. (2003) to measure the ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation of societies. The results are presented in Table 5.10.

	Level of Factionalism (weighted by seat share)	Level of Factionalism (weighted by vote share)
Ethnic fractionalisation	-0.11	-0.17
Linguistic fractionalisation	-0.02	-0.08
Religious fractionalisation	0.2*	0.17

Table 5.10: Correlation coefficients between measures of societal fractionalisation and the level of factionalism
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

There is no clear pattern evident in Table 5.10. While the expect direction of our hypothesis is that the higher the fractionalisation index, the higher the level of factionalism. In the cases of linguistic and ethnic fractionalism, the correlation coefficients are not statistically significant (as well as being quite low), and the sign does not indicate the expected relationship. In the case of religious fractionalisation, there is a slight positive relationship which indicates some association.

Before proceeding to our multivariate analysis, it is worth observing that the clear patterns that were obvious in our analysis of electoral

systems in the previous chapter are not as clear-cut here. Heretofore, explanatory approaches to factionalism have centred on the incentives created by the electoral system in use in a country. In this regard, it is important to take account of the fact that incentive structures may also interact with cultural variables, or at least the level of democracy in a country, something that we control for in the next section, given that it proved to have an effect in our analysis of presidentialism.

Section 5: Multivariate Analysis

Similar to Chapter 4, we present model specifications using both measures of our dependent variable (the level of factionalism, weighted by parties' vote-share and parties' seat-share). The model specification is based on a logit transformation of the dependent variable estimated using WLS, where the weights used are the numbers of experts answering the survey question in each country[32].

Tables 5.11 and 5.12 present estimation results. We present 6 models in total in each instance. The first model examines the effect of the presidential hypotheses (H1, H2); the second deals with the impact of federalism (H5); the third examines the legislature's influence and institutional autonomy (H3, H4); the fourth adds the effects of the regulations-based hypotheses (H6 and H7) and the fifth adds the effects of the party finance rules and public funding (H8, H9 and H10). The sixth model presented drops all cases that are not classified as "free" by the Freedom House political freedom index. We do this to show the robustness of our findings and because it provides for an alternative method by which we can account for political freedom in a country.

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[32] Like Chapter 4, the results of alternative specifications are presented in Appendix B. They do not differ hugely from the results presented here.

In order to initially capture that effect, we added a control variable to all our models – that is when a country falls into the "free" category. Another control variable that we used in initial analysis, but omitted from our models was the age of the party system (measured by the length of time since the country began to use free and fair multi-party elections) which was not significant, nor did its inclusion bring any other effect into statistical significance. In fact its inclusion brought the explanatory power of the total models themselves into question.

Generally speaking, the models all bear explanatory power as indicated by the significant F-scores. In terms of the variation explained by each model, they explain between 16 and 25% of the total variation in the dependent variable. This explained variation reaches near to 50% in the model that includes all "free" cases.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.683**	0.711**	0.600**	0.602**	0.397	0.445	0.376	0.379	0.477	
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.36)	
Effective number of pres. elec. parties	-0.450**	-0.484**	-0.383	-0.364	-0.409*	-0.381	-0.382	-0.347	-0.336	-0.81**
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.36)
Presidential system	1.859***	1.996***	2.347***	2.214***	2.489**	2.387**	2.449**	2.232**	2.292**	4.501**
	(0.61)	(0.65)	(0.72)	(0.83)	(1.11)	(1.06)	(1.06)	(1.03)	(1.10)	(1.76)
Federalism Index		0.037	0.049	0.033	0.014	0.005	0.030	0.015	-0.007	0.010
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Legislature influence over executive			0.205*	0.205*	0.194	0.204	0.200	0.210	0.205	0.319
			(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.21)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.111	-0.128						
			(0.08)	(0.09)						
Ban on "floor crossing"				-0.200						
				(0.28)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.205	0.277	0.176	0.159	0.263	0.216	0.281
				(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.39)
No ban on any type of private donation					1.108	0.578	0.680	0.935	0.184	0.439
					(1.60)	(1.54)	(1.59)	(1.71)	(1.54)	(1.74)
Party receives public funding					-1.131*	-1.089**	-1.123**	-1.065*	-0.975*	-1.360**
					(0.57)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.62)	(0.55)	(0.61)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.414	0.546*	0.506	0.593*	0.508	0.316
					(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations on policy)					-0.307	-0.200	-0.195	-0.264	-0.116	-0.153
					(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.41)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.014	-0.018	-0.017	-0.014	
						(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.886			
							(0.76)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.496		
								(0.59)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.663	
									(0.65)	
Constant	-0.490*	-0.577*	-1.311	-1.141	-2.204	-2.585	-2.048	-2.624	-2.854	-2.169
	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.87)	(0.91)	(1.65)	(1.75)	(1.55)	(1.76)	(1.74)	(1.97)
N	84	81	81	79	67	67	67	66	67	48
R^2	0.177	0.200	0.251	0.243	0.257	0.277	0.296	0.284	0.289	0.395

Robust standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.11: Estimation results of cross - national determinants of factionalism (weighted national average by seat share) using weighted least squares (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.711**	0.759***	0.654**	0.664**	0.451	0.523	0.444	0.414	0.534	
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.36)	
Effective number of pres. elec. parties	-0.48**	-0.49**	-0.410	-0.367	-0.44*	-0.396	-0.395	-0.349	-0.379	-0.893**
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Presidential system	1.636***	1.692**	2.009***	1.788**	2.049*	1.890*	1.962**	1.709*	1.855*	4.342***
	(0.60)	(0.65)	(0.72)	(0.80)	(1.04)	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.96)	(1.01)	(1.59)
Federalism Index		0.108	0.120*	0.105	0.073	0.060	0.088	0.078	0.056	0.052
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Legislature influence over executive			0.178	0.181	0.163	0.170	0.171	0.189	0.171	0.325*
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.090	-0.100						
			(0.08)	(0.09)						
Ban on "floor crossing"				-0.134						
				(0.27)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.292	0.460	0.323	0.310	0.449	0.339	0.532
				(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.34)
No ban on any type of private donation					1.157	0.466	0.562	0.765	0.309	0.754
					(1.59)	(1.53)	(1.57)	(1.61)	(1.53)	(1.71)
Party receives public funding					-1.123**	-1.064**	-1.110**	-1.098**	-1.020**	-1.520***
					(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.39)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.374	0.546*	0.499	0.594**	0.530*	0.308
					(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations on policy)					-0.287	-0.148	-0.140	-0.201	-0.114	-0.191
					(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.40)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.018*	-0.022*	-0.021*	-0.018*	
						(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.894			
							(0.73)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.557		
								(0.58)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.264	
									(0.61)	
Constant	-0.55**	-0.816**	-1.484*	-1.421	-2.127	-2.583*	-2.053	-2.635*	-2.693*	-2.260
	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.87)	(0.95)	(1.48)	(1.53)	(1.36)	(1.53)	(1.54)	(1.62)
N	83	80	80	78	66	66	66	65	66	47
R^2	0.172	0.207	0.245	0.237	0.290	0.327	0.346	0.339	0.328	0.469

Robust standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.12: Estimation results of cross - national determinants of factionalism (weighted national average by vote share) using weighted least squares (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Turning firstly to the results presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, we notice that across all models the use of a presidential system of government is highly significant, as is the effective number of presidential electoral parties. As we expected, the sign on the coefficient lends strong support to our first and second hypotheses, that presidential systems foster incentives to factionalism, and that the reductive effect on parties that such elections have also foster factionalism tendencies. It is worth noting that in the model based on "free" countries only, the effect of the presidential-based independent variables is much more pronounced – this suggests that where political freedom is higher, factions are more likely to persist. This is an intuitive finding, and is also borne out by the direction of the coefficient on the freedom control variable. We can explain this by pointing out that where political organisation is free and uninhibited, that in such cases factions are more likely to organise and, importantly, that alternative challengers may emerge in parties for presidential nominations for example.

When we include federalism as part of our analysis, we find that while the coefficient seems to suggest that as countries have a more federal structure, this results in a higher level of factionalism. However, this effect is not statistically significant across all models, and does not attain significance when we just look at "free" countries. This would appear to call into question the assertions that federalism matters in determining the persistence of factions – this analysis suggests that there is little effect in the case of the countries examined here. While federalism may be identified as the basis upon which factions form, our analysis here would seem to suggest that it does not mean that it is crucial to explaining factionalism. In this respect, both schools of thought in respect of factionalism could be true and might depend on a country's circumstances, which we explore in Chapter 7. A federal structure might well foster factionalism in India, while having a reducing role in Canada.

When we include the measures of the legislature's autonomy and the influence that it has over the executive, we notice that the legislature's autonomy has no statistically significant effect in explaining the level of factionalism. However, there is some support for our fourth hypothesis: that the more influence the legislature can exert over the executive, the higher the levels of factionalism. This lends some slight support to our theory as outlined above, that where the legislature can exert control over the executive, an incentive exists for factions to persist because there may be alternative ways for legislators in the governing party, say, to challenge office-holders from their own party or seek alternative policies contrary to those of their party leadership. In a sense, it is similar in nature to the separation between an executive president and a legislature in a presidential system, thus highlighting the importance of executive-legislature relations to explaining factional persistence in parties.

Moving to the regulations that concern parties and party organisation in countries, we find no evidence for prohibition of floor-crossing determining the extent of factionalism in a country across any of our models. This is also mirrored in terms of the existence of the regional quotas requirement in registering parties. Even when we control for countries that do not fall into the free category, this effect does not amount to statistical significance. However, while the effects are not significant, in the case of registration rules, the sign on the coefficients is consistent with the direction indicated by our hypothesis as set out above. On the other hand, the sign on the coefficient concerning floor-crossing would seem to indicate that the causal direction in this case is different from that which we hypothesised. However, in the absence of statistical significance, it is difficult to extrapolate a universally applicable relationship.

Moving to the independent variables that deal with party finance rules, the findings are most interesting, especially in light of the pejorative connotation that has between associated with factions and

factionalism, in light of corruption scandals that have been attributed to factions in the past. Our findings here show that the provision of public funding is a significant determinant in the level of factionalism that exists in parties.

The negative coefficient indicates that where public funding is made available to parties this then means levels of factionalism will be lower in such countries. This is consistent with our claim earlier on, that where the provision of financial resources is made through party leadership by public subsidy, that this removes one of the incentives and demands for factions to exist – the provision of resources to its members. This is similar to our finding in the previous chapter that closed-list PR systems where we theorised that party leaderships could mitigate the influence of party factions through centralised candidate selection, if the party leadership controls candidate selection. Anywhere that the party leadership is given direct control reduces the extent of factionalism, and public subsidy is one way in which they achieve this.

When it comes to regulation of private donations, we found that there is no significant effect. We framed the variable slightly differently, asking whether or not there was any sort of a ban on private donations in existence in the country. This had no discernible effect, and this was mirrored in our measure of the extent of "money politics", the perception of how responsive parties were to specific contributions. In order to subject this to further analysis, we created an interaction term between the existence of a donation ban and our measure of "money politics". The idea underlying this is to capture the effect of an "open-gate political culture" where private actors are unfettered in their access to influence policy outcomes, and provide a market to factions to seek financial support. This had no discernible statistically significant effect, though the coefficient was positive, but on examination this variable was very statistically insignificant. However, such a link between support for parties and policy outcomes may be as a result of poverty in a country – i.e. where

factions are gathering resources for the re-election of their members, say, they then turn to those actors with the most resources – private companies. In such circumstances, it is plausible that the link between policy and financial contributions becomes more pronounced.

We attempt to capture this effect by controlling for GDP per capita in our model – that variable is significant and in a negative direction. This indicates that as countries become wealthier, the level of factionalism is lower. When this control is included, the perception of influence measure becomes statistically significant. We can interpret this as giving some weak support to our contention that as the link between contributions and policy outcomes becomes more focused, factionalism becomes higher when we control for the average level of income in a country. Again, though the effect of the regulation of such donations has no dis, though this effect is not borne out across all models.

Section 6: Conclusion

Given that there has been little in the way of cross-national studies of the determinants of factionalism, the purpose of this chapter has been to shed some light upon the causal processes outside of electoral systems that determine the extent of factionalism in parties. We started out by pointing to the dearth of research that exists in relation to studies, and then we set out our theory explaining how we assumed that factions persist when faced when faced with certain incentives and incentive structures. Table 5.13 presents a summary of our hypotheses tested and the results.

Hypothesis	Confirmed & Level of Significance
In countries where there is a presidential system of government (an executive branch legally separate and distinct from the legislature), the parties in such countries are likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.	Yes at 1% level of significance
In countries where there is a presidential system of government (an executive branch legally separate and distinct from the legislature), the lower the effective number of presidential parties the higher levels of factionalism that is likely to be observed in the parties in that country..	Yes, at 5% level of significance
Where the legislature is more autonomous from the executive in terms of the formal powers assigned to it, there will be higher levels of factionalism.	No
Where the legislature is able to exercise influence over the executive in terms of the formal powers assigned to it, there will be higher levels of factionalism.	Mixed evidence - not constant across all models
Federalism leads to higher levels of factionalism in parties.	No
Bans on party-switching lead to higher levels of factionalism	No
A higher level of difficulty created by the regulations governing the registration of parties results in higher levels of factionalism in that country.	No
Where private donations are banned or capped, there are lower levels of factionalism.	No
Where there is a close relationship between financial donations to parties and public policy, factionalism will be higher	No
Where parties receive public funding, factionalism will be lower	Yes, at 5% level of significance
Where a society features religious, ethnic or linguistic fractionalisation, factionalism will be higher.	No

Table 5.13: Results of analysis of national institutional factors affecting factionalism

Given that studies of factions in Uruguay and Brazil, as well as France, are often framed in light of the role of the executive president that those countries have, we should not be too surprised at the fact that presidential systems lead to higher levels of factionalism. The regularity of elections, and the fact that the legislature is separate from the president in such countries both create incentives for factions to persist. This shows that where ambitious politicians seek to hold presidential office, it makes sense to maintain a faction inside a large party, rather than establish a new party.

This is a theme that is emerging across the analysis – where office is at stake, and where the probability of achieving that office is heightened by maintaining a faction inside a larger party rather than establishing a new party, factions are more likely to persist.

Our findings on federalism reflect the debate in the literature on the effects of federalism on factionalism – indeterminate. This may indicate that federalism interacts with another aspect of a country's political culture or institutional structure – though as stated above, we controlled for fractionalisation of countries, and have dealt with the bulk of institutional structures of theoretical relevance in this chapter and the last. It would seem, with the less than certain exception of regional quota registration requirements for parties, that formal barriers to entry in the form of party regulations have little bearing on the extent of factionalism, again suggesting that the real barriers to entry to the political arena that parties face are electoral ones.

Of particular interest to political reformers are our findings in relation to the effect of party financing regimes and the relationship between money and politics. We found that the provision of public funding did matter, in that it lessens the incentives for factionalism in parties. We should note here that Van Biezen and Kopecký (2007: 241) found that public financing is the rule rather than the exception in modern democracies, and that there is little explanatory power in this particular variable. On the other hand, however, we didn't find that a heavily regulated party finance regime had any significant bearing on the levels of factionalism, and even when a lax regime was combined with a culture where specific policy outcomes could be "bought" by financial donations to parties; there was little effect on factionalism. When we took account of the income of a country, we found some evidence underlying the theory that a culture characterised by a close relationship between money and politics can provide incentives for factions to persist.

The overall message of this chapter, like the chapter before it, is that factions persist in environments where the stakes are high – winning presidential office or seeking election to a legislature. Factions

respond to incentives that allow them to achieve their aims in the most efficient way possible.

Chapter 6: Explaining the Persistence of Factionalism at the Party Level

Abstract

In this chapter, we concentrate on those factors that give incentives to the persistence of factionalism at the level of the party. Once again, we draw on the extensive number of case studies to explore those party-based factors that have been used to explain degrees of factionalism in parties. We posit that where a party has been dominant historically in terms of its seat share, it is more likely to be characterised by a higher level of factionalism. we claim that as party's share of seats increases, it will be characterised by a higher level of factionalism. In both cases, we find evidence to support out claims. Looking at internal party processes, we hypothesise that as a party's candidate selection mechanism becomes more centralised, then the level of factionalism will be lower, and find no evidence to support this. We explore the effects of leadership and put forward that where a party has not changed its leadership since its foundation, it is less likely to feature high degrees of factionalism. Following on from that, we then claim that where the leadership of a party changes frequently, the incentives for factions to persist are quite high – this is borne out by our analysis Finally, we explore whether or not parties closer to the centre of the political spectrum are more likely to be factionalised than those that tend towards its extreme ends, and find no evidence to support this.

Chapter 6: Explaining the Persistence of Factionalism at the Party Level

Section 1: Introduction

In this chapter, we seek to look to characteristics of the parties themselves and seek to explain the extent of factionalism in the context of these. While institutional structures are of interest in that they may bring about general incentives to factionalism, there may be characteristics of parties themselves that lead to factionalist tendencies. If anything, the findings of the previous two chapters have shown that while institutions only go some distance to explaining factionalism as a characteristic of parties, they do not provide the only explanation.

The next section lays out the literature dealing with the traits of parties and the manner in which these may encourage factionalism as a characteristic of parties. Section 3 outlines the theory underlying the chapter and sets out the different hypotheses that we seek to test empirically in the chapter. Section 4 explores the bivariate relationships between our dependent variable and each independent variable. Section 5 presents and discusses the multivariate models tested as part of this chapter. Section 6 presents the results of a multi-level model which incorporates both country-level and party-level variables. Section 7 concludes.

We find that the proportion of seats that a party holds in the legislature has a bearing on its level of factionalism, as does its historical average share of seats in the legislature. We find no evidence to suggest that candidate selection rules have any bearing on factionalism, but the regularity of leadership change does. Where a party has not changed its leader since its foundation, there is some evidence to suggest that this will mean lower levels of factionalism. Where a party is formed from a merger, it is more likely to be factionalised and where the number of parties involved in this merger increases, the higher the level of factionalism.

Section 2: Analysis on the effect of party-based factors on factionalism

In terms of the particular traits that parties have, there are a number that have been of interest to scholars of factionalism. These traits include the electoral strength and/or dominance of a party, the internal organisation rules, the historical conditions of formation, the ideology of the party and its candidate selection procedures. The first area concerns the strength of the party, in terms of its electoral success, and its success in holding governmental office. Pridham (1995:10-11) maintains that electoral strength encourages factionalism, especially in the case of dominant parties: such parties control the levers of power, and so incentives can be created towards factionalism on two fronts: on the basis of patronage and office-holding and on the basis of ideology and policy. Both of these sources are brought into focus by the persistent dominance of such parties in holding office.

Boucek (2010) pays particular attention to the existence of factions in dominant parties. She claims that parties tend towards factionalism and disunity the longer they are in power, given that the incentives for maintaining discipline are lessened and the access to resources that such longevity in power provides. This dominance is a function of 'electoral market conditions' - given that such conditions affect the costs of exit of factions that aspire to be parties in their own right, an argument we presented in Chapter 4. When we add this dominance to the role of factions in structuring office or policy pay-off, we have a self-reinforcing cycle, where factions are crucial to receiving an office payoff, but given that this is the process in force in a party, the incentive for their persistence exists, the case of the Japanese LDP being a good example of this (Boissou 2001, Gianetti and Laver, 2005). Dominance in executive office of a party can institutionalise factions (Köllner 2004: 103). However Eric Bettcher (2005: 355) argues that when factions are "exclusively motivated by

patronage and their structures ossified, they compromised their parties' adaptability", and that in such instances the dominance of the party was called into question. A special case worth considering here is the persistence of factions in single-party states, such as the Chinese Communist Party (Huang 2000: 428). In this case, the argument is that factions persist in the party (given that other parties are not permitted to exist), and provide a similar, though not identical, function in providing some degree of political pluralism given the lack of multiparty competition. In a related vein, Reiter (2004b: 269) says that size matters in determining the level of factionalism in a party, i.e. larger parties will be more likely to feature factions than smaller ones.

On the other hand, Kopecký (1995: 149) claims that incumbency in office gives parties and their leaderships a common sense of responsibility (in the Czech case at least), which he suggests mitigates the persistence of factional conflicts. However, he qualifies this (p.149) by maintaining that where a party system is in early development, it follows that the formation of new parties may also play a role in reducing the persistence of factional conflicts.

When it comes to the historical characteristics of a party, its formation may have a role in determining the level of factionalism that persists. As Beller and Belloni (1978: 436) argue, the origin of a party in a union or merger of parties may preserve the identity of those predecessor parties. The German FDP and CDU are two such examples (Merkl 1978:247) – the FDP united two different traditions of German liberalism which is still evident. Similar examples include the Israeli Labour Party (Aronoff 1978) and the French Socialist Party (Campbell and Charlton 1978; Cole 1989). It is a trait shared by both of the main Japanese parties, the Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberal Democratic Party –both feature high degrees of factionalism and both were formed by mergers, albeit in the case of the DPJ this merger was much more recent (Köllner, 2004). On the

other side of the coin, parties that are formed from intra-party splits are more likely to have lower levels of factionalism, given that exiting a party is an easier way to achieve political aims (if the institutional structures do not penalise it) than remaining inside a party (Kopecky 1995: 140).

Internal party organisation is also a variable of considerable relevance. The intraparty electoral system used for elections to the party governing body or inside the party can explain the persistence of factions. Leigh (2000) claims that the introduction of proportional representation inside the Australian Labor Party led to the entrenchment of factions, given that he claims that the ALP was characterised by institutionalised factions only after this event. Sartori (1976: 98) argues that a highly proportional internal electoral system "will encourage and produce fission", and will encourage the persistence of factions. Cole (1989: 82) makes the argument that this causal relationship may not be all that clear-cut, because he claims that the PR electoral system had little direct bearing on the nature of factions in the French Socialist Party compared to the authority of Mitterrand inside the party.

Formal rules may mask what really happens – Allan (2002: 51) claims that in the Australian Labor Party, while it is characterised by factionalism, less than ten per cent are members of factions. Factions have a significant stranglehold over the party through control of the party conference agenda, or by "branch stacking" – the recruitment of new party members to influence a particular party ballot. Beller and Belloni (1978: 437) quote Zariski as claiming that such intraparty PR systems are more a result of factionalism, than a cause thereof, so consideration of endogenity in this relationship is important.

In addition, the nature of leadership selection rules can affect the extent of factionalism. As we saw above, Garvin (1981: 114) claims that the formal election of a leader of Fianna Fáil facilitated the

emergence of factions, whereas before that "leaders had "emerged" by informal processes" and "the internal turmoil of Fianna Fáil was the result of the party's failure to find a satisfactory substitute for the old and unquestioned pecking order". This suggests that formal arrangements for the election of the party leader may prove to provide incentives to factionalism. It is worth pointing out (as we have seen in earlier chapters) that this analysis is unique in identifying factionalism in Irish parties, but the arguments regarding the role of leadership selection rules do have resonance. Equally, given that the president of the Japanese LDP would normally be Prime Minister (at least before 1993), an extra incentive was provided for factions to persist in following prospective candidates (Hrebenar 1992: 259). Also of interest is the role of intra-party primary elections in American parties, given that in these elections voters make the choice between candidates rather than paid-up party members. Generally, candidate selection procedures may facilitate the persistence of factions, though equally may be a result of factionalism rather than a cause thereof.

Zariski (1960: 44) focuses attention on the nature of the party structure itself, arguing that loosely organised parties will contain more factions than branch-based parties. He does sound a word of warning in relation to the study of the relationship between party organisation and factionalism – two features may coincide, but endogeneity is an issue in such analysis. Köllner & Basedau (2005: 19) also maintain that in identifying the causality between factionalism and party organisation; it is difficult to isolate the correct direction. Does factionalism result from the structure of the party, or is the structure of the party a function of factionalism?

This discussion is particularly relevant in the context of the discussion of the role of mergers in determining the level of factionalism in a party. This ambiguous relationship is highlighted by Carty's (2004: 14-16) analysis, where he claims that factions and

factional leaders can act as co-ordinating devices between autonomous intra-party units, and are not a consequence of the organisational structure, but equally can act as mechanisms to divide or split a party in such instances. Also, Corkill (1995: 66) claims that factionalism may thrive in an environment where party organisation and discipline is weak, and where the party system has not been consolidated.

While factionalism is a feature of the major Japanese parties, internal discipline (such as the banning of faction organisation) can prevent the emergence of factions as has been done in the case of the Japanese Communist Party and the Kōmeitō (Neary 2002: 67), or in the case of some other Communist parties (Belloni and Beller, 1976:548; Zariski 1960: 44). On the other hand, McKee (1989: 170) claims the SDP's rules allowed for recognition of "associated groups" which was an incentive to factionalism for some groups, but that the organisation itself was dominated by the leader which reduced these factionalist incentives. Equally, Seyd (1972: 486) claims that one of better known factions in the Labour Party was only tolerated by the leadership because it acted as a propaganda body for the leadership. However, he also claims that the Monday Club in the Conservative party was highly structured and organised and that it was tolerated by the leadership.

Factions have also been viewed as having an integrative function for parties – primarily because they can broaden the electoral appeal of a party. Parties in such cases can be thought of as "big tent" parties (McAllister, 1991). Webb (2000: 172) makes a similar argument regarding British parties: given that the majoritarian electoral system in the UK creates an extremely high barrier, the main parties will be broad coalitions of "varied social interests and ideological persuasions". Von Beyme (1985: 228) posits that factionalism will increase where parties are more oriented to power and patronage than ideology, though claims that movement back towards ideology has

been the basis upon which factions have formed in the German case. Beller and Belloni (1978: 435) maintain that "polyclassism" can augment factionalism, i.e. "looseness or vagueness of party ideology may be an associated conditioning factor of factionalism". This is corroborated by Fukui (1978: 49-50) in his comparison of the (then) Japanese Socialist Party and the LDP – their tolerance of various constituencies encourages "pluralist tendencies and competition". On the other hand, Reiter (2004a) claims that where ideology takes on less of a dividing role inside parties, such as in the United States, then presidential candidacies become the basis upon which factions persist, something worth being mindful of when considering the growth of the Tea Party movement.

Finally, the volume edited by Gillespie, Waller and Nieto (1995: 187-188) underlines the importance of age in determining the level of factionalism, both the age of the party itself and the age of the party systems. New parties can be dominated by their founding leader, and this reduces the incentives to factionalism in the party, or personal loyalties inside a new party may be perceived as being more important than party loyalties in such instances (Magone 1995: 92, 99). Alternatively, as new parties find their feet in view of the political system that faces them, factions may form depending on the structure of opportunities that face them, i.e. whether it is rational for those factions to remain as factions or to form as new parties themselves.

There is much written on the cases of individual parties, and those party specific-factors that influence factionalism. Given the unique nature of some of those factors, they may not be always applicable to other cases. In the next section, we outline the theory and hypotheses underlying our empirical analysis.

Section 3: Theory & Hypotheses

While we have discussed the manner in which factions can facilitate legislators in light of certain institutional arrangements, in this chapter we now turn to the characteristics of the parties themselves. Before proceeding with setting out the theory, it is worth elaborating on a point made earlier. In studying the relationship between party characteristics and factionalism, there may be significant endogeneity. For example, when discussing the role of the electoral system for the leader of the party, factions inside a party may have designed such a system to allow them to maintain control inside the party and over the leadership contest. In such instances, the casual direction is not always clear.

However, it is not entirely unreasonable to claim that if factions do design an electoral system, say, that maximises outcomes available to them at time *t*, then if we make an observation of the level of factionalism at time *t+1*, that the electoral system that they designed provides incentives for factions to persist, which of course was their express intention. Essentially, as in the other chapters, the measure of factionalism employed in this project is one that takes a snapshot of factionalism at a moment in time and there is some explanatory power in using party characteristics and structures to explain that level of factionalism. There is, of course, an on-going debate in the literature on factionalism considering factionalism as a dynamic process, most recently by Boucek (2009).

In terms of dealing with those party characteristics that may provide incentives to factionalism in parties, we propose to divide them into two categories: those that concern the party's relation to the rest of the political world and those that concern the internal features of its organisation. The former regards those characteristics that foster factionalist tendencies because of the manner in which external factors affect the party. On the other hand, the latter concerns characteristics that are inherent to the party– these incentives are

independent of any short-term factors that would usually foster factionalism, and have become well-established in the life of the party. This distinction is useful in that it shows the effect of external factors as distinct from internal traits of the party itself.

Perhaps one of the most obvious features to which we can attribute persistence of factionalism is the electoral success of the party. While we proved earlier that where electoral competition is dominated by fewer parties, factions are more likely to persist, it is worth investigating whether the size of the party has a bearing on factionalism. On the face of it, it is reasonable to assume that where there is a large group of individuals, more importantly ambitious political actors, with particular motivations in terms of office-seeking or policy goals, their ambitions increases and as a result the likelihood of factionalism (the vehicles through which they might pursue those goals in an intra-party context) also increases.

Where this diversity represents different socio-economic interests, there is scope for factions to persist to represent such interests. Additionally, where there is a large legislative party, the linkages between the leadership of such a party and its backbenchers or less senior members can grow weaker. This can leave a power vacuum, where there is then space for factions to provide linkages between junior and senior members. Finally, where a party possess legislative strength, control of the party is a glittering prize in its own right. Where party control that can lead to direct policy outcomes, say, is at stake, this can provide a fertile ground where factions can persist to win control over the party. From the perspective of the legislator, affiliating to a faction can put the legislator in a position to realise their own policy or office goal, and in a party where there is much distance between the leadership and the backbenchers, this is a tempting incentive. Legislators seeking re-election look for support from factions, given that the more successful a party is, the more legislators will look to seek re-election.

Accounting for all the processes as laid out above, we can now state our first hypothesis as follows:

H1: There will be higher levels of factionalism in parties with larger seat shares in the legislature.

Related to the size of a party in terms of legislative strength is whether or not that party holds governmental office. Being in government can lead to policy-based divisions in parties that are heightened by the fact that the government party is to affect changes in a particular area. This creates an incentive for factions to persist, in that control of the government rests on control of the party - an aim to which the faction aspires. On the other hand, parties in government may have to contain intra-party conflict in order to provide for effective government. However, this does not necessarily mean that factionalism will be contained, just because party leaderships desire it. It could simply mean that voting cohesion should be kept as high as possible. In fact, in order to keep voting cohesion in the party as high as possible, the party leadership could choose to negotiate with factions in order to achieve a compromise that all factions could then support. Such a mechanism could be organised through the distribution of government portfolios. In such instances, where factions are used to contain intra-party conflict and where there are pay-offs in terms of government office appointments, then incentives for the persistence of factions are quite clear. Hence, while the theoretical expectation would be that intra-party conflict needs to be contained in order to achieve high levels of vote unity, working with factions may be the vehicles through which voting unity can be achieved.

We have already shown in a previous chapter that presidential systems matter in determining the level of factionalism that characterises a party. To bring it down to the level of the party, it then follows that those parties that supply an executive president are

likely to feature persistent factions. For example, members of the president's party may wish to succeed him or her, and organise in the meantime in the form of a faction. Similarly, those parties that supply the prime minister in a parliamentary system of government are also likely to have their attention focused on possible succession. Additionally, given that the replacement of a prime minister does not require an election (unlike a presidential system), factions will persist in such parties that supply the prime minister.

The reason underlying this is that when a party holds the prime minister-ship and when that position becomes vacant, factions in the legislative party are the best way to organise the competition for such a contest. Finally, those parties that are in government, either supporting a president or members of a coalition in a parliamentary system of government, will have a tendency towards factionalism, given that the policies that the party espoused before entering government are different from those that it supports while in government, for example such a conflict would concern "fundamentalists" and "office-seeking electoral realists".

H2: Parties that are in government are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism than those that are not.

In their analysis of the extent of factionalism in the then newer party systems of southern and eastern Europe, Gillespie *et al.* (1995) make the general point that where a party is young or only established, external factors can have a significant bearing on the degree to which the initial intra-party conflict that exists at a party's foundation persists as factions in later time. Some parties may choose to exclude potential factions at foundation in order to avoid the institutionalisation of factions in the future, as happened in a number of cases in Portugal and Spain (Pridham 1995: 27). In this respect, charismatic leadership at the foundation of a party can work to

overcome intra-party conflict, and thus avoid the persistence of factions in that party. Obviously, leadership charisma is a different thing to operationalise and measure.

We posit that where a party has not changed its leader since its foundation, it is plausible to assume that factions have not had an opportunity to emerge. Obviously, this is far from a perfect method by which to capture this effect. It does, however, take account of the ability of one leader to unite a party entirely around their leadership, and given the power base that this charisma provides, potential faction leaders are deprived of the power bases that could thus support them.

H3: Parties that have not changed their leader since their foundation are more likely to be characterised by lower levels of factionalism.

We now move to the discussion of those hypotheses that deal with variables that characterise the party's fundamental structure. Here, we deal with those characteristics that deal with the party's ideological position, the candidate selection rules in use in the party, its historical electoral dominance, the effective terms of its leaders and the historical conditions around the formation of the party. In effect, these variables provide a picture of the history of the party, which influences the incentives that exist toward the persistence of factions in a party.

In our discussion of hypotheses 1 and 2 above, we outlined that the bigger a party is in terms of legislative strength, and where parties have access to governmental office, they are likely to feature higher levels of factionalism. Where a party has been historically dominant in terms of legislative strength, we can expect that the effects of legislative strength described above become more reinforced over time. In such parties, it is plausible that they have been in power for a

long time, and this can accentuate the level of conflict that might exist between policy-based factions. Added to this is the fact that faction leaders (through intra-party negotiation or through holding government offices) have controlled the distribution of resources, which provide the basis for patronage-based factions. Finally, in order to maintain such dominance, such parties have to appeal electorally to a broad range of different social groups. Interestingly, Köllner and Basedau (2005: 19) maintain that the exit costs for factions from dominant parties are made higher by the fact that once the factions break away from the dominant party, they lose all access to the policy-based and patronage-based incentives that were available to them as components of the dominant party.

Additionally, if a faction did break away from a strong party, it is plausible to suggest that it would not get access to government again, especially if the dominant party remained dominant. The breakaway factions from the Japanese LDP provide an interesting example. In 1976, a group of LDP MPs broke away to become a party called the New Liberal Club, which later was re-absorbed into the Japanese LDP, after entering coalition with the LDP for a brief period of time. While in 1993, the LDP was put out of power by a number of smaller parties, it still maintained its dominance. In fact, while the LDP was only able to form a minority government after the 1996 election, it soon regained a majority of legislative seats by re-absorbing some of its former members.

H4: Parties that have a history of legislative strength are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.

We next theorise that as parties move toward the centre, the more likely that it is that they will appeal to a broader range of socio-economic groups. This can be described in terms of the "polyclassisim" mentioned above. The converse of this argument is that those parties that move toward the extreme ends of the political

spectrum are likely to feature less diversity of opinion among their members.

Of course, the fact that parties move towards the centre of the ideological spectrum may also be a function of the fact that they wish to broaden their electoral appeal. In such a situation, it is logical to observe that factions can serve an adaptive function in broadening a party's electoral appeal. The Australian Labor Party is a case in point, in that its factions are based upon a range of different ideological points, the Left faction and the Labor Right faction for example. Where a party does seek to occupy the centre ground, this creates an environment within which factions can flourish, given that they can avoid the party being left susceptible to attacks on its flanks.

H5: Parties that are closer to the centre of the political spectrum are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.

Using party organisation as an independent variable to explain the persistence of factionalism has its limits. There is the possible endogeneity problem – do factions persist because of the type of organisational structure, or has the organisational structure been designed by factions in order to maintain their influence?

If the former is true, then we have little reason to be overly concerned about endogeneity, given that under this assumption, the causation is unidirectional. If the latter is true, then it is plausible to assume that the organisational structure has been designed with the express purpose of facilitating the persistence of factions, and that there is some explanatory power in organisation as an independent variable.

Firstly, we deal with the role of candidate selection procedures. We theorise that where candidate selection is determined centrally at the level of the party leadership, the incentives for factions to persist are weaker than in situations where candidate selection is devolved to

other lower level decision-making bodies in the party. We account for this difference by arguing that decentralised candidate selection at local level provides a basis for factions to appeal to other power bases rather than the party leadership. This is not dissimilar to the role of closed-list PR systems – where parties determined the order of election of candidates, we found that factions were less likely to persist. Our sixth hypothesis is presented below.

H6: Parties that use decentralised methods of candidate selection are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.

Of interest to us also is the role of the leaders of a party. We have discussed already the role of the regular leadership election for president of the LDP in fostering factions[33]. Additionally, we have analysed the role of regular national presidential elections in determining the persistence of factions in parties. However, the rules as laid out by party statutes do not necessarily reflect the reality that exists inside parties. For example, in the case of Fianna Fáil in Ireland, the party statutes lay out that the party president is to be elected by the party conference at regular intervals, though in reality this is a rubber-stamping exercise of the decision made by the party parliamentary group, whenever a vacancy occurs in the leadership. While party rules might have some explanatory power in determining factionalism, they may not necessarily capture the effect of the rules regarding leadership in the party in explaining the effect of factionalism.

Instead, it is useful to examine the frequency with which the party leader is changed in the party. We postulate that where party leaders are changed frequently, a potential leader faces an incentive to maintain a faction to support their candidacy for leadership. As the

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[33] The fact that the LDP was almost permanently in government also ensured the competitiveness of these elections. In fact, the effects of these elections were not entirely dissimilar to the effects of a presidential primary selection contest in a presidential democracy.

frequency of the leadership change increases, so too does the incentive for factions to persist. Obviously, there is a need to be aware of the fact that leadership change may well be a function of the existence of factions in the party. However, if we take account of the frequency of leadership change over the entire lifetime of the party, it is a plausible assumption to make that when faced with a high frequency of leadership contests over time that this remains a very strong incentive for factions to persist.

H7: Parties in which there are frequent changes of leadership are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.

The final independent variables which we outline deal with the historical conditions relating to the foundation of the party. Of particular interest to us in this regard is whether or not the party was formed as a result of a split from a previous party, or whether it came about as a result of a merger between existing parties. We argue that where a party emerges as a result of a split that it would have existed as a faction inside its former host party before the split. Hence, the new party is less likely to be characterised by the existence of factions. Thus it avoids the institutionalised existence of intra-party conflict. In such cases, the leadership of the new party may have a significant degree of authority (by virtue of the fact that they brought the new party into existence for example) and is able to unite the party around them, so as to reduce the incentives for the persistence of factions.

On the other hand, where the merger of a number of parties leads to the creation of a new party, we may expect that the identities of these former parties are not absorbed into the new party immediately upon the merger. The fault-lines of such previous divisions continue into the new party, and where legislators identify with their former party, an incentive is created for these parties to persist as factions in their new host party. Additionally, where there is a large number of parties that merge, the probability is higher that these party identities will

persist as factions. It is plausible to assume where a large number of parties do merge together to form a new party, electoral success is one of the motivations. In such cases, the merger can be regarded as a marriage of convenience whereby parties take a strategic decision to optimise their electoral gain in order to realise policy goals or office-based motivations. If this is the case, then it is probable that the former parties will persist as factions to ensure that they attain such payoffs, and as this number of former parties increases, then the likelihood that factions persist increases also.

H8: Parties that were formed by a split from another party are likely to be characterised by lower levels of factionalism.
H9: Parties that were formed through a merger of parties are likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.
H10: The more parties that were involved in a merger that led to the creation of a party, the higher levels of factionalism in that new party.

As a control variable, we include the age of the party in that Magone (1995: 92, 99) claims that personal loyalties to factions are more important than party affiliation in the early formative years of a country's party system.

Section 4: Bivariate Relationships & Discussion of Independent Variables

As we described in Chapter 3, the measure of factionalism at the level of the party ranges from 0 to 1. 0 implies that no experts surveyed considered that factions existed and 1 implied that all the experts surveyed agreed that the party was characterised by the existence of stable factions[34].

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[34] Before proceeding with the presentation of the results of the bivariate analysis, it is worth pointing out that it was extremely difficult to acquire data on some independent variables for some parties. There are a number of reasons for this. For

We turn to the analysis of individual hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 claimed that where parties have higher numbers of MPs, they are more likely to feature a high degree of factionalism. In order to test this variable, we examined the correlation between the proportion of seats in the national legislature that each party won at the most recent legislative election and the proportion of experts that identified factions in such a party. The correlation coefficient in this instance was 0.39, and was statistically significant at the 0.001 level – as the proportion of seats increases, so does the level of factionalism evident in a party. A scatter-plot of this relationship is presented in Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1: Relationship between the Proportion of Seats won and Level of Factionalism

example, the history of some parties is extremely difficult to trace. Secondly, information relating to internal party procedures is difficult to come across. Thirdly, especially in the case of newer democracies, parties are constantly changing, and in some cases parties that were part of the original survey in 2007/2008 have since disappeared or have been merged into larger parties. However, in compiling this particular dataset, we have attempted to capture as accurate a picture as possible of the state of the 479 parties included at the time of the particular survey.

A particularly striking pattern in Figure 6.1 is the marked increase in the level of factionalism as the proportion of seats exceeds 30% of available seats. Interestingly, those parties that won under 20% of legislative seats seem to vary in relation to their level of factionalism. After this point, the relationship becomes much clearer.

To underline this particular tendency for larger parties to be more likely to feature persistent factions, we divided the parties into two groups – those that held 50% or more of the seats in the legislature and those with less than 50% and examined whether or not the differences between the averages of both groups were statistically significant. We sought to capture whether or not there was a difference in the level of factionalism in dominant and non-dominant parties. The results of this test are presented in Table 6.1. We found that there was a marked difference that was statistically significant. There is strong evidence for the validity of our first hypothesis – the percentage of MPs a party holds is positively related to the level of factionalism that characterises that party.

	N	**Average Level of Factionalism**
Parties that exceed 50% of the seats in the legislature	39	0.61
Parties that hold below 50% of the seats in the legislature	440	0.45
Difference	*479*	*0.16****

Table 6.1: Average scores of dominant parties and non-dominant parties
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

We next turn to a related independent variable, as described by our second hypothesis. This hypothesis stated that where a party was in a position where it controlled executive office the level of factionalism would be higher. We measured this effect using three different

indicators. Table 6.2 presents the results of this analysis. We identified those parties that provided the executive president, those parties that provided the prime minister and those parties that were members of coalition governments in parliamentary systems, or any party that held governmental office.

Once again, the patterns here are extremely striking. In all three cases, the level of factionalism is higher in the cases of those parties that provide the president, prime minister or are themselves members of the government. This lends considerable support to our second hypothesis that incumbent parties are likely to foster factions than non-governing parties. We should sound one note of caution however. Being in government does not cause intra-party conflict or factions to emerge, but may strengthen the incentives that exist for factions to persist, given that if they succeed in influencing the party, they will also be able to control the direction of government and realise their aims, whether they be policy-based or office-based.

	Yes	**No**	*Difference*
Does party provide the president?	0.67	0.44	*0.23****
	(38)	(441)	
Does party provide the prime minister?	0.58	0.44	*0.14****
	(56)	(423)	
Does the party participate as a member of a government, either in coalition or on its own?	0.55	0.42	*0.13****
	(142)	(337)	

Table 6.2: Examining the effect of government incumbency on the level of factionalism. Brackets denote number of cases in category.
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

We see a marked increase in the level of factionalism in a party that provides an executive president compared to a party that just participates in government in any form. The effects of government membership may be accentuated by the fact that the fates of the executive and the legislature are not bound together. Seeking to

replace the president from one's party may not be the only reason members of a party may persist as a faction. They may wish to set themselves apart from the presidency in order to secure their own re-election.

Equally, the effect of a party providing the prime minister leads to a higher level of factionalism. This would appear to suggest that factional competition in government parties increases as does the seniority of the position held, i.e. whether or not the party provides the chief executive or not. This is intuitive – if factions are driven by motivations that centre on office-seeking or policy preferences, the probability that they will attain those preferences (through influence in government) increases in line with the seniority of the position held by their host party.

The evidence presented in Table 6.2 does not necessarily disprove Kopecký's (1995) argument that parties in government band together and avoid intra-party conflict. While intra-party conflict will always exist in a party, the incentives for that conflict to persist as factions in a party are strengthened by entry into government. As stated above, factions may prove to be a mechanism through which intra-party conflict can be managed. Additionally, it is plausible to assume that factions are more likely in government parties than in opposition parties, because a potential faction's aims are more achievable when their party is in government.

Our third hypothesis has its roots in the volume on factionalism in new party systems edited by Gillespie *et al.* (1995). We claimed above that where a party had not changed its leader since its foundation, the likelihood of factions was likely to be much lower than those that had experienced one leadership change. To examine this relationship, we identified all those parties in our dataset that had had only one leader since their foundation as a party. We found information on leadership for 442 of the 479 parties. Of these, 129

(29%) had had only 1 leader since their foundation until the end of 2007. We then compared the difference in factionalism across the two groups. The results of this t-test analysis are presented in Table 6.3.

	Yes	**No**	*Difference*
Has the party only had one leader since its foundation?	0.33 (129)	0.5 (313)	*-0.17****

*Table 6.3: Examining the lack of leadership change on the level of factionalism. Brackets denote number of cases in category. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

The results of Table 6.3 support our hypothesis. There is a clear and extremely statistically significant difference in the level of factionalism identified by experts in parties that have not changed their leader since their foundation and those that have. To underline this point even more, Table 6.4 shows the average levels of factionalism in parties that have had one leader, two leaders and three leaders. We notice a pattern here – the more leaders a party has had, the higher its level of factionalism. We can account for this by considering that when a party's leadership contest is convened, that each of the prospective leadership candidates has an incentive to mobilise a support group to support their candidacy. These support groups may then persist as factions, which results in a higher level of factionalism. We will explore the overall effect of leadership change below.

	1 leader	**2 leaders**	**3 leaders**	**4 leaders**	**5+ leaders**
Number of leaders since party's foundation	0.33 (129)	0.42 (107)	0.52 (53)	0.51 (42)	0.55 (128)

Table 6.4: Examining the change in the level of factionalism as the number of leaders increases. Brackets denote number of cases in category.

It is also worth looking at the relationship between the age of the party and the level of factionalism, given that we will include it as a control variable in our multivariate analysis that follows. There are competing perspectives from which we can explore this relationship. The first claims that, where parties are undergoing a period of transition or foundation, especially in new and emerging democracy, the level of factionalism may be quite high, given that the party system is consolidating itself and that personalism may be a divisive factor (Gillespie *et al.*: 187).

Alternatively, Heidar and Koole (2000: 19) argue that the age of the party leads to an increase in the political experience of the party elite, and the older the party is, the more "mature" it gets. However, as parties consolidate themselves in the party system, factions also consolidate themselves. They may decide to persist in the party, or to form a party in their right. Therefore, there is no strong theoretical reason to believe that young parties are more likely to feature factionalism than older parties. If anything, having shown that parties that have not changed their leader since their establishment have lower levels of factionalism, there is little reason to think that the age of a party will operate in the opposite direction.



Figure 6.2: Relationship between the Age of Party and Level of Factionalism

To examine this correlation, we present a scatter-plot in Figure 6.2. We see that while there is random variation in parties that are under 50 years of age, there is a weak positive relationship between age and the level of factionalism, implying that as parties get older, factions persist. The correlation coefficient in this case is 0.2312 and the relationship is statistically significant. If we consider that factions have been the manner within which intra-party conflict has been managed historically, then as a party becomes older, there is little reason to suggest that factions will stop persisting, all other things being equal.

Our fourth hypothesis concerned the historical strength of parties. We theorised that where parties had been historically strong, that there was a higher likelihood for factions to persist. We measure this historical legislative strength by taking the average percentage share of seats in the legislature that each party won in all open and free democratic elections since 1945. We include all those parties for which data exists (Benoit, Herzog and Caulfield, 2009) - 222 of the 479 parties. Where a party changed its name, we credited it with election results won under its old name. Where two parties merged together into a new party, we took the overall average seat share of both parties. We illustrate the relationship in a scatter-plot of these average values in Figure 6.3. Unsurprisingly, given what we saw when examining the relationship between the legislative size of parties and factionalism, we observe that there is a positive relationship between historical legislative seat share and levels of factionalism. The relationship is quite clear, and it is plausible to suggest that where a party is strong historically, it is also likely that those parties would have also have been in government. The relationship evident here corroborates the argument that parties that have had more electoral success provide fertile ground for the persistence of factions. The correlation coefficient is 0.34 and this correlation is statistically significant ay the 0.001 level.



Figure 6.3: Relationship between the Average Historical Seat Share and Level of Factionalism

Our next hypothesis dealt with the position that the party occupied on the ideological spectrum. The claim we made in this regard was that as parties tended toward the centre of the political spectrum, they were more likely to feature factions for a number of reasons, whether this be to appeal to a broad range of socio-economic groups, or to prevent the party being outflanked by extremists outside the party. A point of interest that is made in relation to the ideological position of a party and intra-party conflict is made by Janda and King (1985) that as parties tend towards the "left" end of the political spectrum, they are more likely to be much more centralised. There is little theoretical reason to expect that parties of the left would be more likely to feature persistent factions than parties of the right, however.

In order to measure the placing of parties on the ideological spectrum, we use the dataset compiled by Benoit and Laver (2006). We use this for two reasons. The first is that it is one of the only datasets available that provides information on a significant amount of the parties in our dataset (220 out of 479). The expert surveys from which these scores were derived were taken very near to the

time that the experts' responses concerning the persistence of factions in the parties covered in our dataset were collected. Secondly, the scale is easy to interpret for our purposes, ranging from 1 to 20 - we assume that the centre of this scale is at the 10.5 point.

Figure 6.4 presents a scatter-plot between the level of factionalism in countries and the ideological position each party holds on the Benoit-Laver left-right scale.



Figure 6.4: Relationship between the Ideological Position of a Party and Level of Factionalism

The striking picture illustrated by this scatterplot is that there is no clear relationship between ideological placement and the level of factionalism. The statistical measures corroborate this: the correlation coefficient between the two indicates an extremely weak relationship, r=-0.05 and there was no statistically significant relationship between the two.

In order to capture the effect of where a party is on the political spectrum and how this may determine the level of factionalism in a party, we adapt the measure discussed above somewhat. We choose the centre point of the ideological spectrum (10.5) and then subtract

the Benoit-Laver left-rights score for each available party from it. Then, in order to magnify the effect of extremist parties, we squared this figure, so that those parties that were extremely either left-wing or extremely right-wing would have their distance from the centre increased – squaring emphasises larger distances. We then analysed the correlation between this measure of policy extremity and the level of factionalism featuring in a party. The scatterplot is presented in Figure 6.5.



Figure 6.5: Relationship between a party's degree of policy extremism and level of factionalism

The relationship depicted in Figure 6.5 shows that there is some very weak evidence for believing that as the extremism of a party increases, the level of factionalism decreases. This weak evidence is borne out by the correlation coefficient (r=-0.11) and while not statistically significant at the 0.1 level, it is just bordering on it (p-value= 0.12).

We turn now to an organisational hypothesis – the role of candidate selection rules in facilitating the emergence of factionalism. As we pointed out above, there are a number of reasons to be cautious about using candidate selection as an independent variable in attempting to explain the level of factionalism in a party. Factions in a party may

have designed a candidate selection system to satisfy their own desires, and analysis of candidate selection mechanisms may be quite biased. It is also plausible to assume that in some cases that factions may have engaged in bargaining behind closed doors to secure placing for their candidates.

In order to control for the problem of endogeneity, we propose to employ a measure of candidate selection that takes account of the rules that existed in a number of parties between 1988 and 2001. In this instance, we assume that the incentives created by such systems in the past were central to explaining the persistence of factions now. We use the Lundell (2004: 31) measure of centralised candidate selection. This index ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes that the candidate selection procedure in a party is decentralised to local selection committees and local members, and 5 indicates where selection takes place at the national level, and only includes the national party leader, a national party section committee or the national party executive.

The intervening points capture variation between these two points, i.e. where there is mixture of local and national selection procedures. Of the parties in our dataset, 66 still exist and are included in the original Lundell dataset. This impedes our ability to identify any universal patterns across cases. To examine whether or not there was variation over the five categories of candidate selection examined, we performed ANOVA analysis and found that there was no statistically significant variation across the categories ($F(4, 61) = 0.55$ and p-value=0.2853). It would appear then that there is little explanatory power in this particular measure of candidate selection. In fact, when we included it as part of our multivariate analysis, we found that its inclusion usually resulted in the severe lack of explanatory power in the model itself. For the sake of completeness, we present the average levels of factionalism for each category of candidate selection in Table 6.5 to examine whether or not there is

any discernible pattern (despite not being statistically significant) in the relation between the persistence of factionalism and the degree of centralised candidate selection.

Centralisation of Candidate Selection Mechanism	Average Level of Factionalism
1=Selection at local party meetings, by local selection committees or by primaries open for all party members	0.43 (7)
2=Selection at the district level by a selection committee, by the executive district organ or at a convention (congress, conference) by delegates from the local parties	0.46 (13)
3=The same as 1 or 2 but regional or national organs exercise influence over the selection process	0.53 (26)
4=The same as 5, but local, district or regional organs exercise influence over the selection process, but decisions are taken at the national level	0.6 (14)
5=Selection by the party leader, by the national executive organ, by a national selection committee, or by primaries at the national level.	0.49 (6)

Table 6.5: Average scores of factionalism for each category of candidate selection mechanism. Brackets denote number of cases in category. Source: Lundell (2004)

The averages detailed in Table 6.5 above appear to indicate that where the candidate selection procedures become more centralised, the level of factionalism becomes higher. In the absence of any firmer evidence, we are unable to explore this relationship any further. It is worthwhile to bear the warning of Köllner and Basedau (2005: p.20) in mind when examining these findings however, where "it can be suggested that organisational structures of parties offer the weakest starting point for general explanations".

We showed above that parties that have had only one leader since its foundation have lower levels of factionalism and that when they had changed their leader at least once, such parties were characterised by a higher level of factionalism. We have already explained that formal party rules regarding the selection of the leader may not give us a

real picture of the incentives under which factions operate. However, the frequency with which the leadership of the party changes does.

To measure this, we counted the number of leaders (the individual who was designated as the most senior party officer (this title differed from party to party, such as chairman, first secretary, parliamentary group leader or president) and where this information was not available, we counted the parliamentary group leader or pre-election nominee for president or prime minister) of a party since its foundation. We then calculated the average term length of each leader by dividing the age of the party at the end of 2008 by the number of leaders it had since its establishment.

Obviously, older parties are likely to have more leadership changes, so we needed to standardise this measure to control for party age. To do this, we then expressed the average term length of leaders as a proportion of the total age of the party. Thus, those parties that had not changed their leader once since foundation had a score on this measure of 1, whereas those parties than had changed their leader once over their history had a score of 0.5, parties that had three leaders had a score of 0.333 and so on. The more frequent the change of leadership, the lower this score becomes.

Before proceeding to analysis of the bivariate relationship between these two, we should discuss the possibility of endogeneity in discussing this particular hypothesis. It is plausible to suggest that frequent leadership turnover is partly a function of the level of factionalism that exists in a party. Frequent factional challenges may lead to instability in the number of leaders in a party. However, while factions may cause frequent changes in leadership, the fact that they do presents them with an incentive to persist. The persistence of factions in such cases is self-reinforcing. As the frequency of leaders increases, the incentives for factions to persist also increase, given the likelihood that a leadership contest may occur quite frequently.

Given that factions are driven by office and policy motives, and that leadership of the party provides an avenue by which to achieve these motives, the competition for the leadership of the party is crucial to factions.

We identified the number of leaders for 444 of the parties in our sample. The minimum number of leaders was 1 and the maximum number of leaders was 46 (the PRI in Mexico, a dominant party and one that features significant factionalism). 236 of these cases only had one leader or two. We converted the number of leaders into our standardised measure as described above. We then plotted the relationship between the leadership change measure and the level of factionalism in a party – this is shown in Figure 6.6.



Figure 6.6: Relationship between a party's frequency of leadership change and level of factionalism

The observed relationship is as we theorised – that as leadership change becomes more frequent, the incentives for the persistence of factions become stronger. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is -.31, implying that as the leadership change becomes more frequent (our measure assumes a lower value), then the level of factionalism increases. This correlation is statistically significant at the 0.0001 level, which assures us that a relationship exists.

This finding supports the analysis of factions as politically competitive organisations in their own right – a prospective leader of a party faces an incentive to maintain a faction in order to be ready to challenge or compete for the leadership. Factions will maintain a standing organisation in the party, if leadership elections are a frequent occurrence – something that was very clear when we considered the difference in factionalism in parties that had experienced their first change in leadership and those that hadn't.

The final area of interest to us in this section is the role of historical factors in influencing the level of factionalism that persists in a party. Here, we examine the conditions around the genesis of the party – whether or not the party was formed by a merger or whether the party came into being as a result of a split with another party. For the purposes of measurement, we define a merger as being a case where more than one party come together to form a new party and where the name is different from both predecessor parties. Of the 479 parties in the dataset, we were able to establish information about whether or not a merger was involved in the foundation of the party in 474 cases. Equally, we defined a split as where more than one MP defected from a party and then went to set up their own organisation using that group of MPs. Additionally, we include those parties where one MP left their former party and set up a party around themselves. We were able to ascertain whether or not the party was formed by a split in 472 of the 479 cases.

Table 6.6 presents the results of a t-test analysis to ascertain whether or not there are statistically significant differences between the two categories of party formation.

	Yes	No	*Difference*
Was the party formed from a merger?	0.54	0.43	*0.11***
	(135)	(339)	
Was the party formed from a split?	0.35	0.48	*-0.13***
	(77)	(395)	

Table 6.6: Examining the historical conditions of party formation on the level of factionalism. Brackets denote number of cases in category.
**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<.01*

The results presented in Table 6.6 suggest that there is validity in both hypotheses presented. In the case of parties formed from mergers, the level of observed factionalism is higher than in those that were not, as laid out by our hypothesis. In relation to parties that were formed from splits, our hypothesis is borne out on initial inspection. Parties that were formed from splits have lower observed levels of factionalism, suggesting that in such a case, would-be factions have split away from their host party. However, it is useful to delve beneath the dichotomous classification presented above to investigate whether or not we can rely entirely on the foundational conditions of a party in a merger or a split to explain variations in the levels of factionalism.

We examine the subset of parties that were formed from splits – 74 parties in total. 33 of the 74 cases (46%) formed from splits were also parties where there had only been one leader. The fact that almost half of the cases in this sub-sample had had no leadership contest since their foundation suggests that the variation in factionalism cannot entirely be explained by the fact that they were formed by a split. If a party was formed from a split, this does not mean that intra-party conflict will not feature in it. It is much more plausible to suggest that intra-party conflict will manifest itself as factions in such parties when (or if) it has been expressed during leadership contests in the party. If we examine the remaining 41 cases of parties that were formed from splits but had more than one leader, we find that 31 of these cases have had 2, 3 or 4 leaders and

that only 10 of the 77 overall have had more than four leaders. This lends limited support to the explanation we have just offered – the more leadership contests that a party has experienced partly accounts for the variation in the observed level of factionalism. Of course, leadership contests are only one feature of parties that give incentives to factions to persist.

If we look at the nature of mergers in some extra detail, the number of parties and/or groups merging to form a new party gives some indication of the amount of different identities that are coming together to form a new party, which in turn provide an incentive for those groups to persist as factions in the new party. Firstly, if we take the 135 cases in our dataset that were formed as a result of a merger, we find that the correlation coefficient between the number of merging parties and the level of factionalism is positive (r=0.13) but that the relationship is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1470). This suggests that there is some relationship between the two but is not very pronounced. This may be because the dependent variable does not count the number of factions (which intuitively, we would expect to be significantly correlated with the number or merging parties) but rather is a continuous measure of factionalism as a characteristic of the party's intra-party activity.

Table 6.7 breaks down the average level of factionalism in the cases of parties that were formed by mergers according to the number of parties involved in each merger. One of the particularly striking points to note is that the bulk of mergers were between 2 or 3 predecessor parties. However, we notice that the level of factionalism increases sharply when more than 4 parties are involved in a merger. We can rationalise this in the sense that where only two parties are coming together in a merger they are likely to be compatible ideologically, and thus ideological difference is unlikely to be as much of an incentive to factionalism as it might be in the

case of four or more parties coming together, as happened in the formation of the CD&V in Belgium.

Number of Parties involved in Merger	Average Level of Factionalism
2 parties involved	0.5
	(66)
3 parties involved	0.52
	(34)
4 parties involved	0.61
	(18)
5 parties involved	0.74
	(6)
6 parties involved	0.72
	(2)
7 parties involved	0.72
	(1)
8 parties involved	0.91
	(2)
9 parties involved	0.32
	(3)
10 parties involved	No cases
11 parties involved	0.42
	(1)
12 parties involved	0.68
	(2)

Table 6.7: Average level of factionalism in parties formed by merger according to number of parties involved in each merger. Brackets denote number of cases in category

A final point worth noting is that the sharp rise in factionalism evident after 4-party mergers does not continue, but rather starts to decline. This implies that the relative sizes of the groups in 9-party mergers and over are quite small, and that the incentives to factional persistence are lower. However, this is more an observation rather than an interpretation, given that extremely small sample size in those cases.

Section 5: Multivariate Analysis

As we have encountered before in Chapters 4 and 5, the nature of our dependent variable is such that it cannot be analysed directly using OLS. The reason for this is that it is a proportion (the proportion of experts identifying factions in a party) therefore prior to analysis it must be fitted to the OLS line using a logit transformation, as in previous chapters. We do this for all values in our sample. However, given that 62 of our observations are either 0 or 1 a logit transformation in these cases would normally result in missing values. To maintain the completeness of the dataset, we propose to replace those values that are 0 with 0.001 and those values that are 1 with 0.999. This allows us to perform our analysis on the entire dataset. Once again, we employ WLS regression using the number of experts that answered the survey question on factionalism as a weight[35].

We present six different models for analysis. Like the analysis of the independent variables below, we divide these models into two groups – those party characteristics that relate to the party's relationship to the political world (historical dominance, policy extremism, historical conditions of foundation, leadership change and candidate selection), and those characteristics that internal to the party (the proportion of seats in the legislature that the party holds, whether or not the party is in government, whether it provides the prime minister or president at the time that the survey was taken, and whether or not the party has changed its leader since it was established). Additionally, we include the age of the party as a control variable. As we pointed out above, the age of the party may account for the number of leaders that a party has had, for example.

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[35] Two alternative specifications are presented in Appendix B. One is based on WLS where the weight used is the proportion of experts

Table 6.8 presents the results of the multivariate analysis. Models 1-3 look at the first set of non-fundamental characteristics. Model 1 includes the proportion of seats, whether or not the party has changed its leader since foundation and whether it provides the president where the country uses a presidential system of government in its analysis. Model 2 looks at the same effects, though examines whether or not the party in question supplies the prime minister, whereas Model 3 replaces provision of the prime minister with the participation of the party in government in any capacity. Models 4 and 5 examine the fundamental characteristics only. Model 4 takes account of the historical legislative dominance of the party, its level of ideological extremism, the extent to which party leadership has frequently changed over time and the historical conditions of the formation of the party, whether it was formed from a merger or a split. Model 5 deals with the same variables, but in line with the bivariate analysis of the historical conditions above, also controls for the number of merging parties in the formation merger, and also controls for parties that have not experienced a change in leadership during their history. We do not present candidate selection in the analysis in this section, because on inclusion in any of the models, it calls the entire explanatory power of the model into question, as indicated by the statistical significance of the F-score. Finally, Model 6 integrates the two sets of variables.

In examining the results presented in Table 6.8, there is consistency in the findings across all models. Firstly, the proportion of seats does matter, and of the independent variables analysed this is one of the most statistically significant predictors of factionalism.

This hypothesis is corroborated further by the fact that where a party competed in elections in the past, the historical average of the proportion of seats won by that party is a significant predictor of the level of factionalism. Interestingly, when we investigated whether or not the two measures were correlated, they were, but the correlation

coefficient did not exceed 0.4, indicating that while the two measures are related, they capture two different aspects of party strength. The coefficient is in the direction we expect also; as the proportion of seats increases so too does the level of factionalism observed in the party.

We notice that the effect of government occupancy and government membership is non-significant in the first three models. While the coefficient indicates a negative relationship, this relationship is not significant. However, in model 6, we see that when we control for other party characteristics, the participation of a party in government is related to the level of factionalism to a statistically significant extent, and the coefficient indicates that this relationship is a positive one, consistent with the hypothesis we set out originally.

Looking at the measures of age and the level of policy extremism as features of a party, we find little evidence to suggest that policy extremism has any bearing on the persistence of factionalism in a party.

As a control variable, age shows no statistical significance when we include the extent of leadership change. This is unsurprising, given the inevitable collinearity between the number of leaders a party has, and its age. Though, whenever age proves to be a statistically significant predictor, the coefficient intimates that this is a positive relationship, i.e. where a party is older - the level of factionalism increases. If we consider this briefly, the relationship is intuitive. The persistence of factionalism is self-reinforcing

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proportion of seats held in legislature	3.895*** (0.68)	3.580*** (0.85)	3.506*** (0.71)			3.736*** (1.32)
Has not changed leader since foundation	- 0.912*** (0.27)	- 0.952*** (0.27)	- 0.948*** (0.27)		0.907 (0.79)	1.349* (0.81)
Party provided the president	-0.673 (0.55)					
Age of party	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
Party provided the prime minister		-0.234 (0.39)				
Party was participating in government			-0.133 (0.27)			0.597* (0.32)
Historical average of seats won				4.465*** (1.14)	4.573*** (1.17)	1.547 (1.41)
Squared distance of party's position from centre of policy spectrum				-0.001 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Leadership change (1/(number of leaders))				-1.325* (0.73)	- 2.609** (1.05)	- 2.831*** (1.04)
Party was formed by a merger				1.420*** (0.37)		
Party was formed from split				0.642 (0.50)	0.553 (0.50)	0.354 (0.50)
Number of parties merging to form					0.284*** (0.10)	0.289*** (0.09)
Constant	- 0.688*** (0.21)	- 0.656*** (0.20)	- 0.633*** (0.21)	- 1.199** (0.46)	-0.626 (0.46)	-1.023** (0.46)
N	435	435	435	196	195	193
R^2	0.145	0.142	0.141	0.203	0.193	0.243

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6.8: Estimation results of party-based determinants of factionalism using weighted least squares (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country

. If intra-party conflict manifests itself as factionalism at time *t*, then there exists an incentive for other party members to maintain factions so that they will be able to compete in this dimension of intra-party conflict, related to the ratchet effect mentioned above. Of course, central to understanding this is the *source* of intra-party conflict which as we stated in chapter 3 falls outside the scope of this research project.

All models indicate that the question of leadership change is a significant factor in determining the level of factionalism. More specifically, the variable that we set up to establish whether or not a party has changed its leader since its establishment remains significant across the first three models. Where there has only been one leader in these cases, the level of factionalism is decreased. When we move to Models 4 through 6, the measure of how often there has been a change of leadership is extremely significant and the coefficient is in the direction that we expect. To recap, our measure ranged from 1 to 0, where 1 indicated that there had been no leadership change and as it tended towards 0, the frequency of leadership change became more pronounced. we would expect that the coefficient in such a case would be negative, i.e. as the frequency increases (our measure gets smaller), the coefficient is negative. This is borne out by our model, and again this lends weight to the incentive-based approach to explaining factionalism. The incentives created by frequent leadership change do have a bearing on the persistence of factionalism, even when we control for age (given human life expectancy, parties will have to change their leaders at some stage).

Finally, in relation to the historical conditions that surround the establishment of parties, we find that parties formed from splits from other parties are no more or no less likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism, when other factors are held equal. On

the other hand, the often mentioned relationship from the literature – that parties formed from mergers are characterised by higher levels of factionalism is borne out, on both fronts. On the dichotomous question of whether or not a merger led to the foundation of the party, there was a significant relationship here and the coefficient was in the expected direction. This relationship is further corroborated by the finding in Models 5 and 6[36] – that as the number of merging parties that form a new party increases, the level of observed factionalism in that party will be higher. Table 6.9 lists the hypotheses that were tested and reports which ones were confirmed, and at what level of significance.

Hypothesis	Confirmed & Level of Significance
There will be higher levels of factionalism in parties with larger proportion of seats in the legislature.	Yes at 5% level of significance
Parties that are in government are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism than those that are not.	Yes at 5% level of significance
Parties that have not changed their leader since their foundation are more likely to be characterised by lower levels of factionalism.	Yes at 10% level of significance
Parties that have a history of legislative dominance are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.	Yes at 5% level of significance (when current seat share is not included in model)
Parties that are closer to the centre of the political spectrum are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.	No
Parties that use decentralised methods of candidate selection are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.	No
Parties in which there are frequent changes of leadership are more likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.	Yes at 1% level of significance.
Parties that were formed by a split from another party are likely to be characterised by lower levels of factionalism.	No
Parties that were formed through a merger of parties are likely to be characterised by higher levels of factionalism.	Yes at 1% level of significance.
The more parties that were involved in a merger that led to the creation of a party, the higher level of factionalism in that new party.	Yes at 1% level of significance.

Table 6.9: Results of analysis of party-based determinants of factionalism

[36] As a result of multicollinearity between the two merger based measures, we dropped the dichotomous merger variable in Models 5 and 6.

Section 6: Multi-level Model

As a final test of our empirical results, we present the results of a multi-level model (party in country) in Table 6.10. The purpose of this model is to look at all the variables tested in our analysis and to assess, when they are brought together, which variables have a statistically significant bearing on the level of factionalism in a party, when both country and party differences are taken into account. There are a number of different specifications of the multi-level model reported. We do this to address the collinearity that exists between the measures that we have employed, and to check the robustness of our results[37]. Also, we do so to maximise the observations available, by excluding the measures of historical seat share and the policy-based measure as we do in a number of models. Not all variables presented in the previous analyses are reported, because of the inevitable collinearity (e.g. the maximum or effective and legal threshold and average district magnitude) and they do not show statistical significance.

In relation to institutional and national-level effects, the results are quite weak - suggesting much more of a muted effect than has been suggested by the literature. While some models present results where national and institutional measures are statistically significant, the patterns are not consistent across all models. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation indices display some weak statistical significance in one specification, but this is not reflected in other specifications. Both seem to have opposite directions. The effect of the electoral system is hidden somewhat by the fact that we control for the proportion of seats won by individual parties. When we do not include this (as in model 7), the effective number of electoral parties

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[37] I have also subjected this model to a Hausman test against the alternative of a fixed effects specification (in order to ensure I am using the most appropriate model for this type of analysis), and am confident that the chosen approach is appropriate.

is statistically significant. This is consistent with our earlier finding that the greater the number of parties competing, the lower the level of factionalism. Other variables that show marginal significance include the measure of federalism, whether or not a political regime is presidential and the ability of the legislature to influence the executive. In all three cases, the direction is consistent with that shown by our earlier hypotheses and analysis. However, this does not hold across all models. One characteristic that does show strong explanatory power across all models is the wealth of a country (a control that we included in a previous chapter), and suggests that the poorer a country, the more likely factions are to persist. This has consequences for research about the motivations for factions, and whether or not factions based on clientelism are more likely in developing countries.

At the party level, there are clearer findings. The proportion of seats that a party wins is highly statistically significant, and where it is not included, the historical share of the seats won by a party is. We explain this with recourse to the incentives created by factions to persist when in a bigger party, and as discussed above, this variable absorbs any of the explanatory power of our electoral system variables. This is further corroborated by the fact that the proportion of votes won by a party shows strong statistical significance as well, emphasising that the bigger the party, the more likely it is that factions persist.

Participation in government has some explanatory power, though there is correlation here with the proportion of seats won. When a party has been formed by a merger, this has a bearing on the level of factionalism, and the positive sign indicates that this is consistent with our original hypothesis. This positive relationship also holds true in the case of the number of constituent parts that came together to form a party. The measure of leadership change proves to be statistically significant across all models as well. This reinforces the

point made earlier – that where leadership change happens regularly, there remains an incentive for factions to persist.

Two things are clear from the above discussion. Firstly, the effect of institutions is not as universally clear or as direct as has been suggested by the literature. The electoral system plays a role in determining the barriers to entry for factions into the political market, but only when interacting with the country's party system. Secondly, party characteristics, and importantly, historical characteristics (especially around its foundation) of a party contribute towards explaining the persistence of factionalism. This highlights the importance of path dependence in explaining the persistence of factionalism. If factions do not get formed (for a particular reason) in a party, then institutions may not necessarily cause their emergence. For factions to persist, they must, of course, first emerge, something for which it is difficult to control statistically (though investigating whether a party was formed by a merger or not is one way of doing so).

In the following chapter, we probe this aspect somewhat further. We attempt to get "under the bonnet" of particular political parties, namely Fianna Fáil from Ireland, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party – one a party which has never featured stable factions and the other identified by the literature as a "textbook example" of a factionalised party. We examine the two main parties in Botswana – the BDP and the BNF. Both have been identified as being factionalised, though national institutions cannot be blamed for the persistence of factions in both. The above multi-level model shows us that it is difficult to discuss those particular types of interactions using statistical modelling. As we see in Chapter 7, case studies are important in illuminating these complex causal mechanisms.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Average district magnitude	-0.002	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties	0.006		-0.018	-0.011	0.000	-0.012	-0.022**
	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Effective number of legislative parties		-0.004					
		(0.03)					
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR	0.237		-0.057	-0.014		-0.088	-0.079
	(0.18)		(0.08)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)	0.198	0.078	0.008	0.018	0.005	0.007	-0.027
	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.06)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)	-0.005	-0.006	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Presidential System?	1.038	0.541***	0.099	0.117	0.068	0.050	0.116**
	(0.92)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.58)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Federalism Index	0.071	0.066**	0.019	0.019			0.009
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)
Legislature influence over executive	0.085**	0.066*	0.015	0.015	0.029		
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)		
Legislature's institutional autonomy	-0.018	-0.007	0.025				
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)				
Party registration requires regional quotas	0.071	-0.094	0.025	0.018	0.043		
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.18)		
Party receives public funding	.	.	-0.254*	-0.198	.	-0.026	-0.081
	.	.	(0.14)	(0.13)	.	(0.08)	(0.08)
No ban on any type of private donation	1.561	0.937	-0.224	-0.191	-0.582		
	(2.17)	(2.02)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(2.24)		
Perception of influence of donations on policy	-0.008	-0.019	0.058	0.040	0.020	0.042	-0.017
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations)	-0.225	-0.114	0.031	0.033	0.115		
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.39)		
Country: is "free"	0.143	0.195	0.015	0.025	0.180		
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.14)		
Gross Domestic Product per capita (2006 - $000)	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.005	-0.01***	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation	-0.572	-0.586*	0.074				
	(0.44)	(0.33)	(0.16)				
Linguistic	0.706	0.617*	0.042				

fractionalisation	(0.51)	(0.36)	(0.14)				
Religious fractionalisation	0.064 (0.33)	0.004 (0.25)	-0.118 (0.14)				
Proportion of seats held in legislature	***0.459**** (0.13)		***0.371**** (0.09)			***0.426**** (0.08)	
Has not changed leader since foundation	0.040 (0.10)	0.021 (0.10)	0.130* (0.08)	0.097 (0.08)	0.055 (0.10)	0.128** (0.06)	0.096 (0.06)
Party was participating in government	0.061 (0.04)	0.089** (0.04)	0.047 (0.03)	0.052* (0.03)		0.031 (0.03)	0.106*** (0.03)
Squared distance of party's position from centre of policy spectrum	-0.001 (0.00)				-0.001 (0.00)		
Leadership change (1/(number of leaders))	***-0.209*** (0.14)	***-0.292**** (0.14)	***-0.38**** (0.12)	***-0.34**** (0.12)	***-0.245**** (0.13)	***-0.403**** (0.08)	***-0.394**** (0.09)
Party was formed from split	0.012 (0.06)	-0.003 (0.06)	-0.016 (0.04)	-0.015 (0.04)	0.004 (0.06)		
Party was formed by a merger	***0.160**** (0.04)		***0.140**** (0.03)		***0.142**** (0.04)		
Age of party	0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)			
Historical average of seats won		***0.005**** (0.00)					
Number of parties merging to form		***0.021**** (0.01)		***0.032**** (0.01)		***0.032**** (0.01)	***0.034**** (0.01)
Proportion of votes won				***0.473**** ***(0.11)***	***0.650**** ***(0.14)***		
Constant	-0.384 (0.46)	-0.020 (0.40)	0.418 (0.28)	0.476* (0.24)	0.057 (0.41)	0.522*** (0.15)	0.808*** (0.14)
Observations	182	182	340	335	182	399	395
Log-likelihood	-49.98	-51.15	-55.73	-52.57	-41.44	-21.37	-38.13

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6.10: Results of multi-level model estimating the determinants of factionalism (party in country)[38]

Section 7: Conclusions

In this chapter, we examined the role that party-based factors have to play in explaining the level of factionalism that characterises a party. We began by outlining the literature in this area and showed that

[38] As above, the number of observations changes because of the availability of data on the policy preferences of each party.

there has been no systematic analysis of the determinants of persistent factionalism across parties heretofore. We then proceeded to develop a number of hypotheses in the same theoretical vein as other chapters, i.e. that incentives can exist in parties that will lead to the persistence of factionalism. These hypotheses proposed relationships between the persistence of factionalism and a number of independent variables. These included the legislative strength of parties, the leadership history of parties, its historical legislative dominance; the candidate selection procedure used in parties and the historical conditions surrounding the formation of the parties. We subjected these independent variables to bivariate analysis, and then proceeded to investigate the same relationships using multivariate methods.

We found evidence that corroborates some of the theoretical relationship that we set out. We established that factionalism is more likely to persist in larger legislative parties than smaller ones. This was also borne out in terms of the historical average legislative seat share that parties win. We established that frequent leadership change (that may be a function of factionalism) is inversely related with factionalism, and demonstrated that the existence of a leadership contest puts incentives in place for factions to persist in parties, or at least where there is a history of frequent leadership change, incentives exist for factions to persist so that they will be able to mobilise in such leadership contests. Related to this is the fact that when one leader dominates a party for a large part of its history, the level of factionalism is lower. This suggests that leaders who control a party, and or set it up around themselves are in a better position to stop the emergence and persistence of factionalism.

While on the face of it, participation in government would seem to be important (at least in terms of our bivariate analysis), when we held other factors constant the importance of this factor in explaining factionalism was not as important as initially seemed to be the case.

Equally, age and ideological extremism gave us no reason in particular to suggest that they determined the level of factionalism in parties.

The question now follows as to what the overall story that this chapter tells is. It seems that the evidence presented in this chapter would support Sartori's conceptualisation of faction as a competitive political organisation that responds to incentives, whether those incentives are created by institutions or by party characteristics. The analysis performed in this chapter shows the strength in performing a large-sample analysis to text the general applicability of the patterns that have been identified in the literature on factionalism before this. On the other hand, a drawback of the measure that we have employed is that it is quite simple and straightforward, and does not capture the degree of the intensity of factional competition, and only really looks at parties at the parliamentary level without recourse to the broader party organisation, where factions may also exist.

Chapter 7: Factionalism in Focus

Abstract

This chapter takes a look at real-world examples of factionalism and uses them as a window onto complex causal mechanisms that may explain the persistence of factionalism which could not be adequately controlled for in statistical analysis. We begin by examining factionalism in the Japanese Liberal Democratic party. Factionalism in the LDP is a legacy of the formation of the party, and facilitated by the former SNTV electoral system that was used in Japan, but that internal party rules play a role in providing incentives for the existence of factions. Compare the cases of the Botswana Democratic Party and the Botswana National Front, we find that the FPTP electoral system creates high exit costs for factions and internal party rules also facilitate the existence of factions but is not the only reason for the persistence of factions. Internal party rules matter as well. Finally, we turn to the other end of scale and investigate the case why Fianna Fáil in Ireland is not factionalised10. However, this is not the case. We explain this by showing that the interaction between national institutional variables and characteristics of the party matter in determining the extent to which incentives exist for the factionalisation of a party.

CHAPTER 7: FACTIONALISM IN FOCUS

Section 1: Introduction:

In the previous chapters, we discussed the measurement of factionalism on a cross-country basis and found that the size of the party is a key determinant in explaining factionalism. The effects of institutions were muted, and the particular circumstances of a party were central to understanding why it was factionalised. However, as we pointed out in chapter 2, one of the most significant features of the study of factionalism has been the disagreement, or at least the lack of agreement, over what actually constitutes a faction from country to country. In this chapter, we take a number of real-life cases and subject them to analysis using hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2, and show that explaining the persistence of factionalism can also be explained by more complex causal mechanisms than may be visible in statistical analysis.

We begin with a brief analysis of factionalism in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), an oft-cited example of a factionalised party. Secondly, we look at factionalism in the two main parties in Botswana – the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the Botswana National Front (BNF). Botswana is an interesting case, in that it is one of the longest established democracies in Africa and has a relatively well-established party system. Both parties are known for the level of factionalism that characterises them.. Finally, we look at the converse and discuss a party that contains no observable and institutional factions, Fianna Fáil (FF) in Ireland. FF provides yet another interesting case in that it satisfies many characteristics identified as being central to explaining factionalism in a party. Ireland operates a very open electoral system that incentivises candidate-centred competition which, theoretically should be conducive to the emergence of factions. FF was a dominant party (until 2012, anyway) which lead to an expectation of a higher degree of factionalism. However, this is not the case.

Section 2 discusses the operation of factions in the LDP, and is followed by a discussion of factionalism in Botswana. Section 4 looks in detail at the puzzle of faction-less Fianna Fáil. Section 5 examines the extent to which the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 are valid in respect of our four cases, and offers some concluding remarks.

Section 2: The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was formed as a result of a merger between the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party in 1955, and like other parties formed as a result of a merger, the fault-lines never really faded away (for a similar argument in the case of the French Socialist Party, see Hanley (1988)). factions were able to manifest themselves at the sub-party level. Between this time and 1993, the LDP was renowned for its intense internal factional competition (Beller and Belloni, 1978; Cox, Rosenbluth & Thies, 1999), as well as remaining unchallenged as the dominant party in the Japanese party system. Noticeably, its factions were characterised by a significant degree of institutionalisation and durability. Although the number of factions varied over time, as did the leaders of each of those factions, generally there seemed to be a core group of around five factions in existence (Hrebenar, 2000).

Scandals characterised Japanese politics from the 1970s on, and this corruption was generally associated with factions in the LDP. The public's frustration with corruption[39] in public life resulted in the

[39] There is little doubt that the electoral system was considered one of the main reasons for the prevalence of factions, especially given that Japan until 1993 conducted its elections under the Single Non Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which invariably pitted candidates from the same party against each other in multimember districts. Intra-party competition provided an incentive for candidates to look to factional leaders to assist in funding expensive and highly personalised campaigns, thus providing a demand for the persistence of factional competition. Coupled with this intense intraparty competition were the high costs of running such personalised election campaigns which led to the creation and maintenance of strong links with big business, giving rise to the description of Japanese politics as

LDP's fall from power in 1993 and the coming to office of a multi-party coalition, which introduced a number of political reforms which targeted the electoral system (changing from the old SNTV system to a parallel mixed-list system) and the rules around political financing (restrictions were introduced on private fundraising, and public financing of parties was expanded).

We focus in particular on the factions in the LDP from 1993 until 2007. Much has been written on the extent of factions since 1993 (for useful overviews, see Cox, Rosenbluth & Thies (1999), Hee Park (2001) or Kollner (2004)). Kollner (2004: 87) observes that LDP factions constantly re-invent themselves, especially when their demise has been forecast. Cox *et al.* (1999) argue that while factions still exist, their influence on party members has diminished, suggesting that they are not the only 'command and control' mechanism for party management that they used to be (Kato, 1998).

The factions that had been the primary focus of analysis before 1993 – the *habatsu* – have certainly diminished in the significance that they have relative to the party, but are still so institutionalised that some of them have their own websites (for an example, see http://www.seiwaken.jp/seiwaken/seiwaken.html#03). There are currently 8 factions recognised by the party leadership. The fact that the party leadership recognise the factions illustrates the level of institutionalisation. Krauss and Pekkanen (2004) identify two other types of sub-party groups at work in the LDP – *zoku* which are composed of party legislators who have interest or expertise in a particular policy area, and *kōenkai*, who are essentially groups of supporters brought together into a 'political machine' for re-election purposes. The latter two sub-party groups fall into the classification of factions made by Bettcher (2005) between those established for

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'money politics' – which led to a number of scandals that became associated with LDP factions.

policy reasons and those motivated to secure the election of a potential or incumbent legislator. There is a relationship of sorts between the *habatsu* and the *kōenkai*, in that both have an electoral function but feature at different levels of the party hierarchy. Before 1993, the *habatsu* would have been the first port of call for aspiring legislators seeking election. A survey of literature on the prevalence of factions following the 1993 reforms suggests that *habatsu* still exist and have some relevance. On the other hand, *kōenkai* have expanded in strength and significance, albeit at the local level of the party (Krauss & Pekkanen (2004), Mulgan (2000), Hee Park (2001)). *Habatsu* now play a role in the election of the party president and, when the party is in in government, the manner in which governmental posts are allocated.

The factions themselves are centred on powerful members of the LDP considered to be potential leadership candidates. While the titles of the factions usually include "Research Group", the main aim of the *habatsu* is to compete with one another when a new leader of the LDP is being selected. That being said, the factions represent the broad policy tendencies that reflect the merger of the Liberal and Democratic parties. There are differences between different factions on questions of policy, especially in terms of economics and foreign affairs such as whether economic reform should be more extensive, and the level of engagement Japan should have with China in foreign relations. However policy discourse does not seem to be the most important reason underpinning factions. Despite the fact that *zoku* always seemed to be a natural home for those Diet members who were eager to provide 'pork' for interest groups they represented in the past, there has been little salient division on policy. Under Koizumi's leadership, there was division on the question of postal reform, but this was largely co-incident with the factional fault-lines evident in the party already (and could have been a function of leadership competition rather than policy discourse). Chairmanship of the Policy Research Committee in the LDP is considered quite a

substantial prize and is highly sought after by faction leaders in the LDP.

The role of the electoral systems is often regarded as one of the main drivers of factionalism in the LDP. The reforms mentioned above allowed introduced a parallel mixed member proportional representation system, where about 3/5 of members of the lower house would be elected from single member districts and the remainder of members would be elected on the basis of proportional allocation from party lists. Many expected that this reform would lessen the persistence of factions, because it was envisaged that intra-party electoral competition would be made redundant at the constituency level. One of the major conclusions of Cox *et al.* (1999) is that the role of factional leaders in securing LDP endorsements for their followers has diminished significantly. Similarly Ehrhadt's (2006) analysis of factional loyalties at the national level shows that the prevalence of *habatsu* is not what it used to be. There is now a lack of demand for *habatsu* membership locally, in that for the self-interested aspiring legislator, national faction membership is no longer necessary at the constituency level. On the other hand, Pekkanen *et al.* (2006) posit that if the individual in question is unable to guarantee their re-election, having been elected as a party list nominee, they are more likely to look to other sources to maximise their chances of re-election. This is one such incentive for the persistence of *habatsu*.

Despite the stated aim of the electoral reforms to cause the decline of *habatsu*, Krauss and Pekkanen (2004) argue that the introduction of single member districts has in fact led to a growth of *kōenkai* (local personalised factions) rather than a reduction in their influence. These groups are designed to secure re-election for their leader (i.e. the local Diet member), but since the 1993 reforms, they have become more and more identifiable as entities in themselves, rather than being a subsidiary of the national faction. They are highly

personalised organisations also – Krauss et al. (2004: 11 -13) illustrate that these 'machines' are no longer exclusive to members of the LDP but are also open to non-party supporters, who are not bound to support the party lists at elections. These new personalised factions are fulfilling a new role previously not addressed – an integrative function - facilitating voters who would not ordinarily support the LDP but who mobilise behind a particular candidate. The new electoral system seems to have altered the balance in the relationship between the *habatsu* and the *kōenkai.*

Secondly, the question of party finance has been held up as contributing towards the persistence of factionalism in the LDP. It is interesting to note that reforms to party finance and electoral reform were carried out together in 1993, and were seen to go hand-in-hand. Public funding for parties has been introduced at both the local and national level, and a drastic drop in donations from private corporate interests has followed (Reed, 2002: 247). On first glance, it would seem that this should diminish the parts played by both the *habatsu* and the *kōenkai*, given that there is little incentive for them to fundraise and dispense financial assistance to members of each faction. This is certainly corroborated by Hee Park (2001: 440) – *habatsu* can mobilize only 10% of the resources that they could have done before the reforms were implemented. Reed (2002: 247) points to loopholes in the legislation regulating funding of parties which have allowed *kōenkai* to proliferate in many districts (one legislator formed seven groups in his constituency in order to maximise revenue (Blechinger, 2000: 3)), because of its ambiguous designation of what organisations can receive funding. He also points to an increase in party-centred campaigning, which has reduced the role of the *habatsu* considerably – candidates now prefer to do their own fundraising through the local level of the *kōenkai.*

The internal decision-making processes and leadership structure of the party have been put forward as possible explanations of LDP

factionalism. Hrebenar (2000) argues that one of the reasons factions have persisted in the LDP is because of the regular election of the party president. Aspirants to this post assume that in order to have a good chance of winning the glittering prize, it is in their interest to maintain a standing coalition of members to support them in such a contest. However, even this assumption had come under scrutiny in the years following the 1993 reforms. Ehrhadt (2001) found that factional influences mattered less when the LDP chose a new leader. In fact, many believed that the election of Koizumi Junichiro marked a watershed moment in Japanese politics in 2001, because he won without the support of the largest faction, (which had been deemed necessary for victory in the leadership contest). However, Hee Park (2004: 452) argues that factional influence still mattered because Koizumi resigned as leader of a faction, in order to win the support of other factions. This was an admission on his part that factions were important in management of the party. Factions who did not support him in that election subsequently caused great difficulty for him and his government, and his exceptional popularity among the voters somewhat insulated him from factional attacks. It is hard to see how any other prime minister could have withstood it, given the fact that factions in the past could force a prime minister from office (Hrebenar, 2000). Furthermore, both his successors, Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda took account of factions in the party, for example appointing factions leaders to senior positions (*Asahi Shinbun*, 28th September 2007), or securing their support by meeting with them (*Asahi Shinbun*, 25th September 2007). Thus it would seem that despite some attenuation in the electoral role of the *habatsu* as evidenced by Ehrhadt (2001), factions still seem to be inherent to the leadership selection process.

In sum, we reforms in the electoral system and the party finance rules caused a lessening in the incentives that exists for factions at the national level, and the services that they would have provided for members are now conducted through more locally-based factions.

That being said, the manner in which the LDP chooses its party leader provides an incentive for the existence of factions at the national level. This shows that path dependency is something worth taking account of when discussing the persistence of factions. Despite institutional reforms design to lessen the factionalised character of the LDP, it did not become "un-factionalised" as a result.

Section 3: Botswana

Botswana has often been regarded as one of the shining lights of African democracy, described as 'a rare bird' by Taylor (2003). Government is based on parliamentary democracy, where a powerful president is both head of state and head of government. Party competition is characterised by the dominance of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has governed without a break since independence in 1966. The main opposition parties are the larger Botswana National Front (BNF) and the Botswana Congress Party (BCP). In this section, we focus on factionalism in both parties until 2008.

Previous analysis of the BDP and BNF has argued that there factions in both parties, but fail to offer explanations as to why those factions persist. The main factions of interest to us in the BDP are known as Barata-Phati (or the Kedikilwe-Kwelagobe faction) and the A-Team (or the Nkate-Merafhe faction), though their names have changed over time. In the BNF, the two factions are known as the Concerned Group and the Parliamentary Caucus Group. The types of factions in the two parties are quite different. According to Molomo & Somolekae (2000), the division in the BNF is between those who are oriented to 'hard' socialist policies and those in favour of pursuing more social democratic ideas. These groups evolved into two factions – one led by party president Moupo and the other led by party vice-president Letshabo. This contrasts with the BDP, where

the faction sees itself primarily as a route for succession to senior posts (similar to the Japanese LDP), so much so that congresses of the party where party organs are chosen are characterised by intense inter-factional fights.

Analysis of the history of both parties since the peak of their factional struggles shows that their respective degrees of factionalism have varied in magnitude. Factional struggles in the BDP intensified once again in 2005, despite that the resignation of President Masire in 1998 was expected to lessen their intensity somewhat (Makgala 2005, Charlton 1993, p.349) – given that he had been associated with the factions themselves. The entry of Ian Khama (the son of the country's first president and founder of the BDP) into the party was designed to provide a unifying force that would serve to reduce the importance of factions, though analysis of internal developments inside the BDP suggests that this strategy met with little success. Observers predicted that with Khama's accession to the presidency, the careful balancing act that he had engineered (*Mmegi*, 28th March 2008) was in danger of collapsing. Also, while factions are not sniping at each other at party conferences, this does not imply that factionalism is dead in a party. It may well mean that the factions are at peace but remain the basis for intra-party management.

Molomo and Somolekae (2000, p.112) suggest that the faction-fighting in the BNF seemed to have diminished following the 1994 elections, when the BNF had become a viable challenger to the BDP. However, faction-fighting intensified once again to lead to a split in the party from which the BCP was formed in 1998. This split did not end the internal faction-fighting, but rather the negative consequences of factionalism in the BNF have become more and more exacerbated, so much so that it is cited as a reason that the

party cannot enter into strategic alliances with other parties (*Mmegi*, 27th April 2005). To underline this final point, 6 of the 12 parties contesting the 2004 elections were splinter groups from the BNF.

Firstly, we examine the role of the electoral system. The electoral system used in Botswana is the First Past the Post (FPTP) system based on single member districts. Our earlier discussion suggests that where candidates from the same party run against each other at elections, because of a larger district magnitude, they may look to factions in order to maximise their potential support at constituency level against copartisans. Competition for a place on the party ticket may be fierce inside the party, and we look at these intra-party tensions when we investigate the effect of candidate selection procedures below.

In Botswana, this intra-party tension does not spill over into the electoral arena. Looking first to the BDP, the fact that FPTP disproportionately punishes smaller parties is a factor in facilitating the persistence of factions inside the party. In fact, the idea of the Kwelagobe faction joining with opposition parties to offer a viable electoral challenge to the BDP was unsuccessfully floated in 2005 (*Mmegi*, 14th January 2005). The fact that there have been no breakaway groups from the BDP since its foundation illustrates that faction members see much more benefit from staying inside the party (*voice*) than from leaving (*exit*). The logic of pursuing policy and office goals as a faction inside the ruling party is displayed further by instance where the BDP won seats in 12 constituencies where it had received less than 50 per cent of the votes – 5 such constituencies in 1999 and 6 such constituencies in 1994 (Molomo and Somolekae 2000, p.114; Molomo and Molefe 2005, 107). Smaller parties would have little hope of electoral success. In Botswana, the electoral

system matters, not because of intra-party electoral competition as was the case in Japan, but because it invariably gives the BDP an overall majority and hence makes it more attractive for many people to remain within the BDP than to leave or join another party.

The BNF seems to have met with the opposite experience. The factional fighting inside that party results in a new party being formed – many opposition parties were formed as splits from the BNF (Molomo & Molefe, 2005 p.113), such as the Botswana Congress Party. In quite a few cases, factions in the BNF transform into a party. However, this does not mean that factional lines evaporated inside the BNF (*Mmegi*, 1st February 2008). There is mixed evidence on the effect of the electoral system on the BNF, because it does not seem to be a deterrent to the formation of breakaway parties. However, factions inside the BNF are not faced with the same costs as those in the BDP. They do not have the same imperative to remain inside the BNF, and formation of a new party may well yield a higher utility for them than remaining inside the party. The BNF's factionalism cannot be attributed to the electoral system. Also, many of those splinter groups formed by splits from the BNF fail to be represented in any significant manner in parliament, which shows that the FPTP electoral system does not facilitate a multiplicity of parties in political competition.

Secondly, we address the role played by executive-legislative relationships. Good (1999, 50) describes the Botswana political system as being characterised by 'centralized political power and weak executive accountability'. The President of Botswana is indirectly elected by MPs, and acts as head of state and government. Good (1999, 51) lists the president's responsibilities as including the appointment of the cabinet, nomination of Specially Elected MPs,

command of the military, and influence over judicial appointments. A number of state agencies report directly to the president, including the police, the Information & Broadcasting centre and the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime. Compared to the reach of the Presidency, the Botswana Parliament is quite weak.

Andeweg (1992) puts forward a typology to analyse the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Kopecký (2001: 97) describes the three elements of this typology: the inter-party mode (interaction takes place between MPs on the basis of whether or not their party is in government – parliament is where party political struggles are played out); the cross-party mode (cross-party coalitions interact with one another, ignoring party boundaries and act on the basis of different social interests) and the non-party mode (members of the executive and members of the legislature interact with each other as members of different institutions; in such cases, parties are loosely organised groups of MPs).

In Botswana, the parliament-government relationship falls into the inter-party mode (Andeweg 1992, 163), i.e. where ministers and MPs face members of the opposition party across the floor of the legislature. The legislature is fused with the executive, given that ministers must also be MPs, and that on election, the President becomes a MP also. This analysis is not directly applicable to the BNF, given that they have never held power, and they have no experience in handling the relationship between government and parliament.

Where the relationship between executive and legislature is defined by the inter-party mode, we expect highly disciplined parties, where

factionalism is not evident. However despite the prevalence of the inter-party mode, factionalism exists in the BDP. Despite the fusion of executive and legislature, the party is still characterised by factionalism – there are MPs who speak out against the government on certain policy issues (e.g. Duke Lefhoko in relation to the privatisation of *Air Botswana*). Additionally, appointments to Cabinet are allocated on a factional basis. Such an instance of this was evident in the make-up of the Cabinet in 2007 by President Mogae's reshuffle, when he brought in members of the Barata-phati faction in order to try to end the intensity of the factional fighting (*Mmegi*, 22nd January 2007). This follows the approach of the Japanese LDP, in apportioning the ministerial posts in accordance with faction size. While the fusion of executive and legislature may theoretically lessen the persistence of factionalism, the causality may go the other way. The composition of the executive may be designed to reflect different factions, and where the executive depends on the support of the legislature (where factions have influence among MPs), factions' preferences are important. Some factional realignments support this claim – such as the switch by Kavis Kario from Barata Phati to the 'A-team' faction of President Khama, and not being rewarded with an expected appointment to cabinet (*Mmegi*, 4th April 2008).

Fusion of the executive and legislature in Botswana does not seem to lead to tremendously cohesive party discipline. That being said, the BDP is not seen as being polarised when it sits in legislature, despite instances of dissenting voices being expressed by MPs inside the parliamentary caucus. In recent years, the leadership of the BDP has moved to allocate ministerial portfolios to reflect the degree of factional strength. Appointment to Cabinet is not seen as a stick to force discipline but as a carrot that ensures factional peace inside the party.

Next, we examine whether or not the factionalism that characterises the BNF and the BDP can be explained by party finance. State funding is not provided to parties in Botswana (Schikonye 2000), and Somolekae (2005, 26) points to the difficulties in obtaining information about the funding of parties. Regulations exist concerning the disclosure of campaign expenditure by individual candidates (Molomo & Sebudubudu 2005, 149), though they are not strictly enforced.

The lack of information on party fundraising makes it difficult to conclusively analyse the role of party financing in facilitating the persistence of factionalism. Using the findings of Somolekae (2005) about the financing of both the BNF and the BDP, links can be made between types of financing and the bearing these had on the persistence of factions. The BDP is certainly the best resourced of all parties that are currently competing in Botswana politics. Somolekae (2005) points to four sources of BDP funding – membership dues, constituency fees, donations by party representatives and private donations. Information on how private donations are raised is scarce, but the literature on the BDP does not suggest that such private donations are solicited by individual factions. Rather, it suggests that all finance fundraised is channelled toward party headquarters and factions do not build up their own war chests.

The BNF cannot compare with the BDP in terms of resources (for example, the BDP was able to provide a vehicle for campaigning purposes at the 2004 elections to every constituency in the country) and is funded primarily by constituency fees, membership subscriptions and donations by representatives (Somolekae 2005, 27). The lack of resources, as well as the fact that these payments are

made directly to the party headquarters mean that there is not sufficient evidence to assess whether or not factionalism in the BNF is encouraged by the way it is financed.

Next we examine the rules relating to leadership inside parties. Earlier discussion suggests that where there are fixed term limits on party leaders, there is more of an incentive for factions to persist, as a standing 'support group' for prospective leadership candidates. In both the BDP and the BNF, there are no term limits on those elected as party president (Somolekae 2005, 34; Lekorwe 2005, 125 & 131) – described as life presidency syndrome.

However, much is made of the pre-eminence of faction fighting at the congresses of both the BDP and BNF. Arty congresses feature there seems to be intense competition for seats in the senior hierarchy of the party. In both parties, the central committee is a significant actor wields considerable influence. Though the central committee does not appoint the party president of the BDP, it does choose the chairman of the BDP, who usually goes on to become the next president of the party. This importance is also evident in the BNF central committee (*Mmegi*, 21st February 2007) in that when the party president did not agree with the position of the central committee, he was not able to over-rule it.

On examination of reports about congresses held by the BNF and the BDP, it is clear that factions mobilise themselves at such events in order to maximise their representation on crucial party organs. Contests for positions such as secretary general and party chairman are often the subject of heated battle between factions –BDP congresses in recent years illustrate this, as does the intense nature of

competition for membership of the BNF Central Committee (*Mmegi*, 20th July 2005; 21st May 2007). The campaign led to displace Daniel Kwelagobe as secretary general was symptomatic of the factional divisions in the BDP, as was the extent of competition between the groups led by Moupo and Letshabo in the BNF congress held in May 2007. While there is no evidence that contested elections in a party encourages the persistence of factions, it is plausible to suggest that it assists in their persistence when factions are self-aware and contest such elections as a cohesive group. Added to this is the fact that such elections are held at regular intervals and that there is an incentive for factions in the BDP and BNF to persist in order to acquire seats on these bodies. The BDP constitution dictates that interna; elections are held every two years and in the case of the BNF, such elections are held every three years.

An instance of the importance of the role played by factions on these bodies was illustrated in 1997 when the then President Masire moved to cancel elections to the party's central committee and apportioned seats to represent factions based on their strength in the party (Molomo 2000, 96). The power of factions in the BDP was further evident at the 2008 congress where proposals to increase the powers of the presidency and to increase the term of office of the party's central committee were rejected (*Mmegi*, 28th March 2008). Factions mobilised to work against a measure designed to reduce their influence.

The dominance of the BDP and the effect that this has on internal party procedures is also worth discussing. Molomo (2000, 107) claims that when the vice-president was not perceived to be the automatic successor to the President of Botswana, then factionalism in the BDP would decline considerably. This would seem to be

counter-intuitive, in that factions would bring significant influence to bear on the choice of the central committee for vice-president. Mokopakgosi and Molomo (2000, 12) explain this by arguing that while the presidency of the party is uncontested, factions are motivated by the 'struggle for strategic positions in parties'.

Given that the BDP is a dominant party, it is worth discussing whether this characteristic explains factionalism. Obviously, this doesn't apply in the case of the BNF. Du Toit (1999, 197) provides a number of reasons for BDP dominance - constitutional factors such as a majoritarian electoral system; the fact they implemented a number of socially desirable policies, given that they were starting from 'a very low base of social delivery and pervasive scarcity'; and lack of ideological issues affecting the BDP but their focus on advocating development policies. Mokopakgosi and Molomo (2000) attribute this to the ability of the BDP to project itself as a national movement following independence standing above the ideological wrangling consuming other parties. Its dominance is reinforced by the electoral system and the financial advantages it has because of its electoral appeal and dominance. Commentators (*Mmegi*, 22nd January 2007) claim that BDP factions are driven by the idea that politicians in that party are interested only in their own self-enrichment, and given that the BDP is almost certain to be in power, there is huge potential for maximising such payoffs from patronage. Formation of a faction threatens the stability of the party and increases the likelihood that a legislator will be rewarded by appointment to cabinet or through granting patronage.

The dominance of the BDP can be attributed by its ability to attract significantly higher resources and the disproportional advantages it has under the electoral system. Indeed, rather than those variables

themselves explaining the extent of factionalism in the BDP, they explain the dominance of the BDP in Botswana politics, which can be used to explain the factionalism.

Examining now the effect of candidate selection rules, the Botswana electoral system is based on single member districts. Both the BNF and the BDP select candidates to contest these constituencies using internal primary elections (EISA 2004, 10). Lekorwe (2005, 133-145) provides an in-depth analysis of the primary election processes in both parties as well examining in particular the primary elections held in advance of the 1989 elections. Both parties introduced the procedures in the late 1980s in order to deal with the increasing number of party members that were seeking to contest parliamentary and local government elections on behalf of their respective parties – a pattern that has continued right up until the present day. Both parties have explicit procedures and regulations laid out as to how to run the primaries. These primary elections have not been characterised by transparency, and thus analysis of the processes at play in them is difficult to understand (EISA 2004, 11). The specific procedures that are followed in the BDP and the BNF are briefly outlined below, based on the information provided by the regulations relating to the primary elections of these parties as well as Lekorwe (2005) and Somolekae (2005).

In the BDP, the primary election was conducted using an electoral college, which selected candidates who were then vetted by the party's central committee. Following increasing dissatisfaction with this process, the party introduced a new system of primary election in 2001 known as *bulela ditswe* – meaning 'open to all'. The reforms introduced here centred on the opening up of the electoral college to all members of the local nominating organisation, though the central

commitee still play a significant role in vetting the candidates that are nominated. This has increased the administrative workload on the party in organising elections and it is not clear whether or not these primary elections are really 'open to all' given the degree of administrative inefficiency.

In the BNF, primary elections (introduced in 1989) are and have always been based on the open primary system where all members of the local nominating organisation are free to cast a vote for each candidate. In contrast to the BDP, the central organs of the BNF have much less of a say in actually overruling the wishes of the local organisation. The feature that is common between both parties however is that they both provide candidates for the primary elections with a clear code of conduct on how to behave themselves during the primary election campaign.

The effect that these particular candidate selection procedures have on the persistence of factions become clear when we examine individual elections that have been held in both parties. Molomo (2000, 79-80) discusses an anecdotal example, from the constituency of Shoshong. The incumbent MP claimed attempts were made by the leader of the Barata Phati faction, Daniel Kwelagobe (also secretary-general at the time) to unseat him in favour of a member of Kwelagobe's faction. Like BDP central committee elections, primary elections are fought along factional lines, given that faction leaders at the national level seek to maximise their influence in the parliamentary caucus. Analysis of the last few primary elections in the BDP shows that they are bitter affairs.

An example of one such contest was the Molepolole South constituency (*Mmegi*, 19th September 2007). Competition at primary level in this constituency was between Daniel Kwelagobe and Shima Monageng. While the result of the previous primary between them had been pretty clear-cut with Kwelagobe winning 78% of the internal vote (*BDP Primary Elections 2003: Preliminary Results*), the matter of interest here was the intervention of Jacob Nkate in the campaign between the two – Nkate was a leading member of the 'A-Team' faction. Another example relates to the Kgatleng East constituency where the Barata Phati faction is dominant, but a challenge was mounted by the 'A-Team faction' that threatened to cost the party the seat (*Mmegi*, 6th November 2007).

There are plenty of similar examples from recent primary contests in the BNF also. The resignation of the Elections' Board of the BNF in January 2008 over the row between the two main factions in the party showed the importance of primary elections in facilitating the persistence of factions. The Letshabo faction accused the dominant Moupo faction of moving to rig the primary elections against their faction members (*Mmegi*, 25th January 2008) – to the extent that the Moupo faction was being accused of attempting to consolidate its influence over the party through the primary elections. A point worth noting here is that the BNF central committee is unable to deselect candidates chosen by primary election (illustrated by its inability to add Moupo as a candidate for election, given that he had failed to win a nomination at primary level), meaning that the prize at primary election is greater, and increasing the incentive for a faction to persist.

Despite the fact that the party presidency is not often seen as a major issue of intra-party competition, the regular elections to the central

committees in both organisations are often fought along factional lines and prove to be extremely important to factions. This is further corroborated by the workings surrounding the internal candidate selection procedures, where factions seek to get as many of their members as possible elected on the party ticket. As mentioned previously, there is a difference between the two parties – the central committee of the BDP may reject candidates as elected by local primaries, whereas the BNF is unable to do so. This extra procedure in the case of the BDP can be seen as a factor that works against the persistence of factions, but this is not a strong conclusion, given the fact that factions play a role in choosing members of the party's central committee. The two parties take very different attitudes to the prevalence of factionalism. The BDP recognises the persistence of factions in its party and has taken steps to bring about factional peace, such as the Schlemmer report of 1997 and the Mogae reshuffle where members of rival factions were appointed to cabinet. On the other hand, the BNF is characterised by the Moupo faction's attempt to destroy the Letshabo faction, rather than incorporating it into the party with a view to securing factional peace.

In sum, both the BDP and the BNF are characterised by persistent factionalism. There is an important difference in the characteristics of the two types of faction. Factions in the BNF may see themselves as driven much more by ideological reasons, as opposed to the control of patronage and self-enrichment which many believe to be the underlying motivation for factions in the BDP. Our analysis has shown that rather than institutional factors, it is internal factors of Botswana parties that encourage the persistence of factions, which tallies with the findings of our multi-level model in Chapter 6.

Section 4: Why are there no factions in Fianna Fáil?

One area of interest that has yet to be explored in detail by the many studies of factionalism is the study of those parties that do not contain factions, despite there being a theoretical expectation that they might. One such instance of such a case study is that done by Carty (2010: 140-153). In it, he discusses the reasons that the Liberal Party in Canada does not contain factions, despite the fact that it was until recently a dominant party in Canadian politics, similar to the LDP in Japan and the DC in Italy. He argues that this is a puzzle because we would usually expect the dominance of the Liberal party to be accompanied by factionalism. He explains the lack of factions in the Liberals with reference to the organisational structure of the party, the manner by which the leadership is elected, the lack of a central office – specifically the lack of "a coherent or permanent organisation". He argues that the party does not exist as a corporate organisation between the parliamentary party and the individual constituency organisations, and when combined with the membership's control over the leadership of the party, the incentives for factions are minimised.

Looking to national institutions, he argues that the federal nature of the Canadian political system means that there has been separation of national and provincial party organisations. The single-member plurality electoral system provides an incentive to the party to maintain a culture of discipline and unity in order to maximise the possibility that it might form a single-party government. This final claim is more plausible if we take into account that the electoral system interacts with the federal structure of the political system and the party's organisational features, rather than assume that such a majoritarian electoral system, that creates high entry barriers for smaller parties and high exit costs for factions, would disincentivise the emergence of factions.

In this section, we deal with a similar puzzle and try to explain why Fianna Fáil has no factions. On initial inspection, we would expect

that under Ireland's extremely open electoral system, combined with the historical dominance of Fianna Fáil as a party and its "broad church" appeal in electoral terms, factions would certainly be a characteristic of the internal life of the party.

Fianna Fáil was formed in 1926, having been established from the rump of the anti-Treaty Sinn Féin group. From that point, it established itself as one of the most successful parties Europe and in the world. Indeed, this dominance was underscored by the fact that its demise in the 2011 general election was hailed as a wipe-out of cataclysmic proportions. Of all the parties in Ireland, it is the one that has spent the most amount of time in government, and all of its leaders (excluding the incumbent) have been Taoiseach at some stage in their career, a distinction it shares with no other party. Interestingly, FF was formed from a faction inside Sinn Féin, as was its arch-rival Cumann na nGaedheal (which later became the modern Fine Gael party). Following its formation, Fianna Fáil put great emphasis on consolidating its organisation at grassroots level. It organised cumainn (branches) in every locality in the country, and largely mobilised its membership base using a structure that mirrored the old anti-Treaty IRA, placing great emphasis on discipline.

It first entered government in 1932, and following this event consolidated its position as the leading party in Irish politics by appealing to various sectors of society outside its traditional rural support base in the west of the country (Mair and Weeks 2004: 145). This is partly explained by the fact that while FF sees itself as a sort of "microcosm" of the nation, at times it is difficult to discern its preferences in social or economic policy.

When it comes to a discussion of factionalism in Fianna Fáil, there is little in the way of academic analysis. Janda's analysis of parties (Janda 1980: 268-279), suggested that there was no evidence of leadership, strategic, tactical or ideological factionalism in FF and

that there was little reason to suggest that FF was not a cohesive voting body in the Dáil. This could be attributed in some part to the domination by Eamon de Valera of the party for its first 33 years. There was little organised movement to depose him, and none that manifested as a faction. Seán Lemass succeeded Éamon de Valera as leader of the party in 1959, and was in turn succeeded by Jack Lynch. Jack Lynch's accession to the leadership was interesting in that he emerged as a compromise candidate between two proto-factions that seemed likely to emerge. He remained as leader until 1979. Up until this point, there was little organised factionalism in FF, explained in part by the fact that there were no leadership elections that would facilitate their emergence.

However, in his analysis of FF's second leadership election, Garvin (1981) identifies the existence of two factions formed around the question of the leadership of Charles Haughey, who won the 1979 contest. These factions did not become institutionalised in the same way that factions in the Japanese LDP might have, though they did have some degree of stability as evidenced by the frequent challenges to Haughey's leadership of the party in the 1980s. They became observable when the names of a group of FF TDs known as the "Gang of 22" were published in advance of one such confidence vote. This proto-faction did not establish rules about membership or raise funds to finance its own activities, i.e. it did not demonstrate the sort of autonomy that we would expect to see from factions as evident in other cases. It seemed to fade out of existence, once Haughey succeeded in 1985 in expelling long-time critic Des O'Malley, who later went onto to establish the Progressive Democrats with other former FF TDs, as well as former members of other parties.

Scandals continued to dog Haughey's leadership of the party and another undercurrent seeking to move him out of office came into being, led by his former Minister for Finance, Albert Reynolds. The

discovery of Haughey's involvement in a phone-tapping scandal led to his resignation as Taoiseach, ironically forced by his then coalition partners in the Progressive Democrats. Once Haughey resigned the leadership, two competing groups competed to win the leadership of the party (and also to become Taoiseach) – the rump of the pro-Haughey group, led by Bertie Ahern and what was known as the "Country-and-Western"[40] brigade led by Albert Reynolds.

On coming to office, Reynolds promoted close supporters to senior positions and demoted a large number of TDs who had been loyal to Haughey. This did not cause the emergence of an anti-Reynolds factions but did nothing to heal the divisions that still existed. Reynolds continued as leader of the party until the end of 1994, when he was succeeded by Bertie Ahern who led the party for over 13 years. Ahern's management of the party centred around unity given the divisions that had existed during Haughey's leadership. This approach was chosen as Reynolds' resignation as party leader also coincided with FF's departure from government. Ahern realised that internal fighting was not electorally appealing, and worked to heal the divisions of previous years. This involved promoting pro-Reynolds supporters to senior positions and pre-empting the emergence of dissent by offering promotion to would-be dissidents. Ahern succeeded in maintaining a semblance of unity and success in leading FF into government on three consecutive occasions.

He was succeeded by Brian Cowen in 2008. Economic crisis and plummeting levels of popularity worked to bring Cowen's leadership of the party into question on a number of occasions. This resulted in a growing group of deputies who questioned his ability to lead the party (and by extension, the government) which led to a confidence motion being tabled in his leadership in 2010. While there significant

[40] It was called this, because of the rural background of its members, and because Albert Reynolds had managed a successful business in operating dance halls around Ireland.

disagreement about his competence as Taoiseach and party leader, this failed to manifest itself as an institutionalised faction.

The aim of the above discussion has to been to show that while there have been many bases upon which factional competition could have been established inside Fianna Fáil, there has not been an emergence of stable institutionalised factions in the party itself. Throughout the history of the party, the closest it came to this form of factionalism was during the Haughey leadership. In fact, Carty (1988: 234) suggested that this intra-party conflict was heading towards institutionalised factionalism. He claims evidence for this on the basis of the fact that political directories now referred to FF TDs' factional affiliations as part of their biographical details. He argues that at times, it appeared that some pro-Haughey FF TDs were trying to take votes away from anti-Haughey running mates and that this seemed to suggest a level of organisation in the two groups. The evidence for this is tenuous however – while there may have been pronounced competition between pro-Haughey and anti-Haughey FF TDs who shared a constituency, there is no reason to believe that this competition was on the basis of factions, i.e. there were no faction leaders who provided extra resources to their members to secure their (re) election. Additionally, if there were such national-level factions being organised, surely they would have dissipated when Des O'Malley left to form the Progressive Democrats, something facilitated by the electoral system which we discuss further below.

Given the experience of other dominant parties around the world, such as the Italian Christian Democrats, the Japanese Liberal Democrats, the Botswana Democratic Party and the Indian Congress Party, it is surprising to see that Fianna Fáil has not been beset by the same sort of stable factionalism that characterises those parties. In parties that hold a near-permanent grip over governmental office, factions provide for open competition in those because the party has access to and control over resources and career-based rewards and

this provides an incentive for factions to emerge. Fianna Fáil's dominance of Irish electoral politics for so long was as a result of its ability to appeal to various classes and sectoral interests (Gallagher 1981: 60), though this broad based electoral support did not result in the establishment of factional politics. The first reason for this can be found in the general ethos of the party – Carty (1988: 232) claims that FF is an intensely leader-focused party. Discipline is considered important to the success of the party, something that was reinforced by the fact that for many years Irish party competition was based upon Fianna Fáil versus the "Rest" (Mair 2011: 289). Fianna Fáil placed great importance on being able to provide stable and strong one-party government.

Secondly, there are infrequent elections to the leadership – this removes the incentive to maintain a faction for would-be party leaders. The lack of regularity of leadership elections does not provide a time horizon for potential factions to focus on, and the fact that the leadership is so powerful inside the party (in giving promotions, for example) means that there is little reason to form a faction for office-based reasons. Thirdly, Fianna Fáil's broad-based appeal (Gallagher 1981: 60) means that while it draws support from different sectors and classes; it also attracts a politician who is motivated by office-based concerns. From the viewpoint of such an actor, given the central role of the party leader in promoting party members and their significant power, there is little reason to maintain a faction when opportunities to challenge the leader are infrequent. In fact, it is probably telling that the closest that Fianna Fáil came to institutionalised factions was when challenges to the party leadership were more frequent than had been in the past.

When we turn to the internal rules of the party, we find further explanations for the lack of factionalism. In his discussion of the possibility of factionalism emerging in Fianna Fáil, Carty (1988: 234) raised the possibility that Fianna Fáil would transfer its internal

battles to the arena of the national conference – something that never transpired. Even at the level of the party's national executive, we find that intra-party conflict does not spill over into this arena –the national executive expelled Des O'Malley at Haughey's behest. One explanation for this is that it and the ordinary membership are both excluded from the election of the party leader, so there is little incentive for factions to emerge at either level. Also, given that policy decisions are effectively in the control of the party leadership, or at best, the parliamentary party, there is no incentive for policy-based factions to emerge at the national conference or in the national executive.

Carty (2010: 144) argues that the three distinct faces of parties are not visible in the Canadian Liberals. Katz (2002: 93 – 101) describes these three faces as the party in public office, the party in central office/headquarters and the party on the ground. These three different faces of Fianna Fáil Fáil can be thought of as the parliamentary party group, the Ard Chomhairle (national executive committee) and the ordinary membership of the party. Each different face interacts with one another and defines the manner by which the internal politics of the party works itself out. Obviously, the interests represented by each of these components matters as does the relative power of each. For example, a party where each face has similar levels of influence will have a different intra-party character to one where one face dominates.

The relationship between the three faces in Fianna Fáil is not a balanced one. The most important face is that of the parliamentary party. It chooses and dismisses the party leader. The frontbench and ministerial officeholders (when the party is in government) are drawn from among its ranks. It determines the policy of the party, and it is the only part of the party that is supported by a public mandate. The second face of the party is the party on the ground. Party members have a role in the selection of party candidates,

though there had been a move towards centralisation of candidate selection in recent years (Galligan 2003: 44; Weeks 2008: 52). This pattern was reversed at the 2011 election, where local party organisations were given responsibility for selecting parliamentary candidates (Reidy 2011: 54). However, ordinary members have no role in selecting the party leader and in many ways are entirely divorced from the internal decision-making process when it comes to the policy direction of the party. Even in the selection of candidates, the membership makes their decision through delegate conventions as opposed to internal primary elections – which dilutes the link between ordinary party members and candidate selection.

The third face of the party is perhaps the most interesting, because on initial inspection it seems that there is a strong "party in central office" in Fianna Fáil. It has a well-resourced central office and a very clear extra-parliamentary structure (manifest in the national executive) but these are not considered major actors in the life of the party. Their role is considered to be more administrative rather than political, and this structure seems to be an instrument through which the leadership can exercise control over the entire organisation rather than one that acts as a check on the party leadership. Importantly, the national executive is influenced strongly by the parliamentary party (Marsh 2004: 163), and its membership is elected from different constituencies. The role of the national executive is somewhat minor in the formation of party policy. It has no role in determining the party leader and is primarily concerned with party management and administration.

So then, rather than three distinct faces, we have one face that can wear different masks. The role of the parliamentary party is dominant throughout the entire party. It has primacy in determining the party leadership and the direction of party policy. The national executive committee is not in a position to challenge this primacy, given the fact that the party rules give it no role in these tasks and

members of the parliamentary party feature strongly in its membership. Importantly though, the national executive gives legitimacy to the decisions taken by the parliamentary party, a recent example being the appointment of the Constituencies Committee to identify potential general election candidates for the 2002 and 2007 general elections. Finally, the party on the ground play a role in the selection of parliamentary candidates, but has no involvement in choosing the leadership of the party. What we see is an organisation that is built around the parliamentary elite, and effectively the most important arena where intra-party conflict can be played out. In this regard, we can explain why factions do not exist at the membership level of the party or on the national executive – because there is nothing to be gained by their formation.

We then turn to the question of why factions do not emerge inside the parliamentary party, given that it is the most arena of intra-party conflict in the party. To explain this, we can turn to the role of national-level institutions. We turn first to the electoral system. Ireland operates the PR-STV electoral system in multi-member constituencies that have 3, 4 or 5 seats. The proportional nature of the electoral system means that the exit costs that face factions that leave a party are lower than they would be in the case of a majoritarian system, as in the case of factions in Botswana. Members who might break away and form a new party realise that under a non-PR system such a venture would have little success; they choose to remain inside the party as a faction. PR-STV does not flout this pattern, in that it facilitates a multi-party system (Gallagher 2005: 520). This was illustrated in the ability of the breakaway faction that Des O'Malley led out of Fianna Fáil to become a party in its own right in the Progressive Democrats.The electoral system facilitated its emergence as a party, which goes some distance towards explaining the lack of institutionalised factions in Fianna Fáil.

PR-STV is one of the more open electoral systems in the world (Farrell and McAllister 2006). Multi-seat constituencies are used in

Ireland and it is usual for larger parties to present more than one candidate to voters in a particular constituency (especially if they want to have any real chance of being in the driving-seat when it comes to government formation). This is particularly true in the case of Fianna Fáil who up until 2011 usually presented multi-candidate tickets in constituencies. Based on the effect of the incentives this creates and the bearing that this has on factionalism in parties, we would expect that factions would emerge (to provide extra resources to candidates to strengthen their campaigns for individual votes), as we discussed in the Japanese case above. National factions do not exist in Fianna Fáil that perform this function. There are usually candidate-focused organisations inside the party that are semi-institutionalised without coming together at the national level. Carty (1988: 234) claims that personal factions at local level feature prominently inside Fianna Fáil whose primary aim is (re)election. We are left with a paradox as to why these personal factions persist at local level, but do not feature at national level.

We can explain this particular puzzle with recourse to the "three faces" approach mentioned earlier. We pointed out that the party on the ground was where the primary responsibility for candidate selection lies. When we take into account that this level of the party is divorced from decision making, there is not an incentive for a faction that exists at both levels. The focus of the grassroots membership is on the local candidate, but given that this face of the party has no say in the election of the party leader and little influence in the direction of party policy for Fianna Fáil, there is no incentive for a faction to persist that integrates the two levels.

To recap on our earlier analogy, there are not three distinct faces in Fianna Fáil, but rather one face that wears masks to control the other aspects of the party. That one face is the parliamentary party, and given that it is the most powerful element of the party, the question must be posed as to why factions do not emerge inside the

parliamentary party itself. Even if the other "faces" of the party are irrelevant in the internal life of Fianna Fáil, surely the incentives created by dominance would give rise to factions. Surely, factions would be more likely to emerge when the arena of internal party competition is much smaller than one that included the grassroots membership and the party's national executive competition. We can explain this puzzle by looking at the power of patronage available to the leader. When in government, the party leader has control over all significant parliamentary and government appointments such as government ministers and junior ministers. Given that such positions are filled almost solely from the membership of the parliamentary party, the incentive to create and maintain a faction in opposition to the leader is smaller than we would expect were this not the case. Given that there are usually thirty or so such ministerial positions in the gift of the Taoiseach, as well as a number of committee chairs (subject to agreement with coalition partners) there is a high incentive for loyalty to the leader which diminishes further the likelihood that institutionalised factions will emerge. Additionally, the lack of regular leadership elections to the leadership of Fianna Fáil means that there is little reason for potential factions to emerge to contest such elections. Combined with the appointment power of the party leadership, this means that the party-leader can pre-empt a challenge from an organised faction, thus reducing the incentives for factions to emerge because the likelihood that such factions will succeed is quite slight.

Mair (2011: 291) makes a general point about Irish politics that is particularly relevant in the above discussion of Fianna Fáil. He argues that TDs in Ireland operate in two separate spheres – a local sphere and a national sphere and they are agents to principals in both spheres, the local electorate and the party leadership respectively.

Usually, the political system works to ensure that there is little, if any, conflict between these two spheres. This avoids situations where

a TD may have to choose between local priorities and national priorities on a regular basis. This argument can inform our understanding of the lack of factionalism in Fianna Fáil. The effective party structure mirrors the separate existence of these two spheres. Rather than a situation where local party members are involved in national policy direction, they are kept out of this decision-making process, though they do have a say in candidate selection. This local focus leads to personal factions being set up at local level in order to secure candidates' re-selection. At the other side, the national party that can have a say over policy is under the control of the party leadership through the influence that it exerts through appointments of patronage.

Section 5: Conclusion

The three sections above looked at factionalism in different contexts. A number of common themes emerged from our discussion. The first of these is that institutions can facilitate the emergence of factionalism, but do not necessarily cause it. For example, we noticed in the case of the LDP and FF that factions could build up around individual candidates, though the two cases differed in whether or not such factions were aggregated at the national level.

The second is that the internal structure of the party is important. The experiences of the BDP and the BNF show the relevance of this. Similarly, we see that the rules concerning the regular re-election of the LDP party president give an incentive to factions to maintain an institutional presence, whereas the lack of such rules (and the relative novelty of leadership elections) in Fianna Fáil work to reduce the extent of institutionalised factions. The three faces approach was instrumental in explaining the lack of faction in Fianna Fáil, while the internal institutions of the party were where the factions of the BNF and BDP did battle.

The third theme is that it is difficult to treat one variable in isolation, without considering the impact that the interaction between different variables has on factionalism. For example, we saw that when the internal power structure of Fianna Fáil interacts with the "fusion" of legislature and executive (when the party is in government) and its dominance, there are fewer incentives for factions to emerge.

The fourth theme concerns the importance of a "ratchet effect". While institutions may be reformed (as happened in Japan), can a party become "non-factionalised"? Associated with this is the question that where there are few divisions in a party on policy or office-seeking motives, institutions or party rules alone cannot cause factions. Again, the role of institutions/party rules may be to exacerbate party divisions into institutionalised factions though where no divisions exist, institutions/rules cannot cause factionalism on their own. The fact that the LDP was formed from a merger probably gave a basis upon which factions could organise, whereas there was no such basis in Fianna Fáil. In fact, had Fianna Fáil ever become factionalised, there would appear to be some evidence that Irish electoral system would have facilitated the persistence of such factions, but the effect of the internal structure of the party would have mitigated that.

In a way, we have shown the limits of large sample analysis in explaining factionalism. Statistical analysis makes it difficult to control for country-specific or party-specific factors. The case studies discussed above illuminate the complexity of causal relationships involved in the persistence of factionalism. While the literature suggests that institutions play a significant role in determining the persistence of factionalism, the discussion above shows that real-world causal mechanisms are much more complex than the literature envisages. While institutions may create incentives that facilitate the persistence of factions, measuring their effect does not take account of path dependency, or the interaction between the institutions and

internal characteristics of the party or the particular circumstances that brought the faction into being.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Abstract

This chapter identifies the overall contribution of the thesis, as well as identifying the contribution of each individual chapter plan. It maps the way forward for the study of factionalism, especially in terms of measuring its change over time, developing a more powerful measure of factionalism and making for a more robust definition that is clearer in its identification of factions.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Section 1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the findings of the thesis and to discuss their consequences for our understanding of factionalism and its place in the internal life of parties. We have pointed out that the strength of the study of factionalism is the abundance of data available from cases studies, though we also pointed out that one of the key weaknesses is that the lack of systematic cross-national analysis and across parties. We developed a theoretical perspective from which we could approach the study of the persistence of factionalism.

We emphasised the importance of differentiating between persistence of factionalism and causation of factionalism. We introduced a systematic measure based of factionalism based on available data and adapted it to measure factionalism at the country-level and the party-level. We showed that electoral systems matter in determining the persistence of factions, but not in ways that we had previously assumed. We demonstrated that national institutions that provide incentives for factions to persist, or alternatively deprive factions of those incentives, have a bearing on the extent of factionalism at a national level. We displayed that this incentive-based approach to explaining factionalism has a role to play in explaining factionalism at the party-level as well. Overall, we have shown that while intra-party conflict exists in all parties, when it faces certain incentives, it persists in the form of factions. We have also been conscious of the fact that while persistence of factionalism can be explained by incentive-based approaches, it is not the only predictor as evidenced by the results presented in our statistical analysis.

The rest of the chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 details the conclusions and contributions of each chapter in detail. Section 3 discusses the broader findings of the thesis in terms of the

existing body of knowledge on the study of factionalism and charts possible paths forward for the study of it.

Section 2: Chapter Contributions

In Chapter 1, we outlined the general approach of the thesis. We began by establishing the importance of understand why factions persist, given that factions have consequences for the behaviour of parties. We gave a brief summary of the work done on explaining factionalism and the persistence of factionalism so far. We outlined the basis of the theoretical model of the thesis and laid out the path for the project in terms of data collection and chapter structure.

In Chapter 2, we provided a thorough account of the body of literature that concerns the study of factionalism. There were four main sections to this chapter. Firstly, we discussed the importance of factionalism to understanding how parties work in terms of budgetary policy, leadership change, government formation or portfolio allocation. Either way, while factions have been shown to have significant consequences for the behaviour of parties there has been little development of cross-national analysis of factionalism as a dependent variable. As we showed in Chapter 2, one of the major stumbling blocks in this respect has been the lack of a common definition of factionalism, or indeed the nature of a faction. We showed the different stages in the development of a definition for a faction, and made the point that more often than not, the definition that is used in identifying a faction is associated with the particular case study under analysis. One of the contributions of this thesis is that we add to this definitional debate by pointing out that the study of factionalism is better served when agreement exists regarding definition of a faction, and we make a proposal in this regard. Building on this, we found grounds for agreement on the definition of a faction, rooted in the definition put forward by Zariski (1960) and subsequently used by Janda (1980) and Boucek (2009).

We then moved to analyse the different explanations that have been presented to explain factionalism. One point that we noted in this discussion, and throughout the thesis, is that most studies that explain factionalism in parties usually deal with no more than one or two cases. We showed that explanations consist of country-level explanations and party-level explanations. Among those factors identified in terms of explaining factionalism at the national level were the electoral system, the relationship between the legislature and the executive, the national party system, party finance rules and the overall structure of a country's political system. These same factors provided the basis upon which we developed our hypotheses in later chapters. When discussing the effects of country-level factors, we found that there is merit in borrowing from explanations of other concepts related to factionalism, such as party unity or party voting cohesion, and we do so throughout this thesis. At the party level, we discussed the role of party dominance in explaining factionalism, the historical conditions of party formation and the internal organisational procedures used in the party such as elections to the party executive and candidate selection methods.

In Chapter 3, we introduced the methodology being used in the thesis in establishing and conceptualising the dependent variable being used. We began with a discussion of the various methods used to measure factionalism, and the difficulties associated with conceptualising factionalism. Factionalism is a particular form of intra-party conflict and does not lend itself to measurement by conventional methods of measuring party unity (such as roll-call voting). Secondly, we outlined the understanding of factionalism taken in this thesis. We laid out a specific definition of a faction, and from that we then defined factionalism as a concept. We presented the vignettes of this scale, laying out ideal types of those parties that are entirely characterised by factionalism and those that are not. We discussed the advantages of eliciting responses from experts, but also

identified a number of weaknesses with our particular measure, and set out how we proposed to address them.

Following this, we then moved to construct the actual measurement of our dependent variable and present two measures – one based on the party-level and one based on the country-level. We performed some exploratory descriptive analysis of the data. Firstly, we sought to identify patterns across the different regions in terms of the extent of factionalism. We found that there were no particularly striking patterns in this regard, except in the case of Europe, where the extent of factionalism is lower than average than in other regions around the world.

We also took account of the difference in political freedom across the 85 countries in our dataset. We found that there was no substantively significant pattern across different levels of political freedom, using two different measures – suggesting that the lack of full political/democratic freedom does not cause a bias towards or against factionalism in our dataset.

In Chapter 4, we took account of the effect of electoral systems on the persistence of factionalism. We found that factions have been associated with particular characteristics of an electoral system and that electoral reform has often been used to achieve the mitigation of factionalism. Employing the Hirschman framework of "voice", "exit" and "loyalty" had particular relevance in explaining how electoral rules foster the persistence of factions. We found that the number of parties competing in a country has a bearing on the effect of factionalism in a country. We found that intraparty preferential voting has little effective bearing on factionalism in its own right, but when combined with district magnitude, we find that it operates in the opposite direction to that theorised by Katz – larger districts electing MPs using preferential voting actually reduce the persistence of factionalism. Importantly, the results of this chapter suggest that

the previously theorised relationship between PR national electoral systems and the extent of factionalism (that a PR system leads to more factions being formed in parties because the amount of potential government coalition partners available to a party is increased) is not borne out empirically.

In Chapter 5, we explored the relationship between factionalism and other country-level factors that are not based on electoral systems. The primary purpose of this chapter was to analyse whether the incentives-based approach extended outside of electoral systems. We found that it did to a limited extent, in that those variables that proved significant in explaining factionalism were related to electoral competition. Firstly, we explore the limited amount of analysis that has been done in investigating the relationship between the level of factionalism in a country and other institutional factors. Of particular interest to us here was whether or not the country in question used a presidential system of government or a parliamentary system. We also looked at whether levels of factionalism would be higher where the legislature was more autonomous from the executive and could wield more influence over the executive, as well as looking at the effect of federalism. We also concerned ourselves with the role of regulations governing the registration of parties and whether or not MPs are allowed to cross the parliamentary floor (party-switching) without facing a penalty.

In the bivariate and multivariate analysis that followed, we found support for the claim that the existence of presidential systems affects the level of factionalism in a country. We found that where public funding is made available to parties, that this removes some of the incentives for factions to persist in such parties, but that there is no discernible effect on the level of factionalism when private donations are banned.

In Chapter 6, we concentrated on those factors that give incentives to persistence of factionalism at the level of the party. We argued that where a party has been historically strong in terms of its seat share, then it is more likely to be characterised by a higher level of factionalism. We claimed that as party's share of seats increases, it is likely to be characterised by a higher level of factionalism. We explored a similar effect in terms of incumbency. Looking at internal party processes, we hypothesised that as a party's candidate selection mechanism becomes more centralised, then the level of factionalism will be lower. We explored the effects of leadership and put forward that where a party has not changed its leadership since its foundation, then it is less likely to feature high degrees of factionalism. Following on from that, we then claimed that where the leadership of a party changes frequently, in those instances, the incentives for factions to persist are quite high. Finally, we explored whether or not more centrist parties were more likely to be factionalised than those that tend towards the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum. Our bivariate and multivariate analysis lent support to our hypotheses regarding incumbency and party size. Also of interest was the fact that frequent leadership changes were associated with a higher level of factionalism.

We also presented a multi-level model in Chapter 6 that took account of both country-level and party-level variables when trying to explain factionalism. This found that party-level variables are stronger when explaining factionalism than the effect of institutions, particular the party's size and its historical characteristics.

In Chapter 7, we explored the conclusions presented by Chapters 4, 5 and 6 by looking at "real-world" examples. In this chapter, we sought to explore the complex causal mechanisms that underpin the persistence of factionalism in political parties, by examining the interaction between party-level variables and country-level variables touched on by our multi-level model. We began by looking at the

study of factionalism in one of the "classic" cases in this area – the Japanese Liberal Democrats. Secondly, we systematically compared two cases inside a country – the Botswana Democratic Party and the Botswana National Front. Thirdly, we investigated why there were no factions in Fianna Fáil in Ireland, despite the fact that the literature on factionalism would seem to suggest that we would expect factions to exist in that party.

A number of common themes emerged from our discussion of the above cases. The first of these themes is that institutions can facilitate the emergence of factionalism, but do not necessarily cause it. Despite of the institutional reforms introduced in Japan, the power of factions was weakened, but the extent of factionalism was not necessarily lessened by these reforms. Secondly, evidence from the four cases analysed showed that the internal structure of the party is important in determining the extent of factionalism in a party. Similarly, we saw that the rules concerning the regular re-election of the LDP party president give an incentive to factions to maintain an institutional presence, whereas the lack of such rules (and the relative novelty of leadership elections) in Fianna Fáil work to reduce the extent of institutionalised factions.

The third theme identified was the difficulty with treating one variable in isolation, without considering the impact that the interaction between different variables has on factionalism. For example, we saw that when the internal power structure of Fianna Fáil interacts with the "fusion" of legislature and executive (when the party is in government) and its dominance, there were fewer incentives for factions to emerge.

The evidence that we have presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 especially would seem to suggest that the analysis of factions as units of political competition in their own right is justified. We show that factions are more likely to exist where electoral competition is

dominated by two or three large parties, and that the more proportional an electoral system is, the less likely it is that parties will be characterised by factionalism. However, where party leaderships have control over the order of election of its candidates, we find that the persistence of factions is less likely. Essentially, when the ability of factions to compete inside the party is impeded, they are less likely to exist.

Additionally, where party leaderships are put in a position (through the provision of public funding to parties – not dissimilar to the effects of closed-list electoral systems on the extent of factionalism) where they control and dispense resources in the party, they remove the ability of factions to compete inside the party. When discussing the characteristics of the party, this view of factions was corroborated. We showed that where a party was formed from a merger, factionalism was likely to be higher, and the degree of factionalism increased with the number of parties that were involved in such a merger. Dominance ensures the existence of an intra-party arena in which factions can compete for control of the party which will result in significant payoffs in terms of policy and office, as did frequent leadership change. In sum, we showed that where it is rational for factions to persist at the sub-party level, there is evidence to suggest that they do so.

Section 3: General Discussion

In this section, we interpret our findings in a general context. What has become clear from this thesis is that factions respond to incentives and that where these incentives are in place factions are more likely to persist. if these incentives don't exist, factions are less likely to persist. One common pattern that emerges in our analysis is that significant incentives are usually related to the career trajectories of politicians, e.g. how easy it is to enter the electoral arena, the opportunity of being elected to *executive* office, the probability of becoming leader of the party or being in a party that dominates

political life. This would appear to corroborate Sartori's identification of factions as a unit of political competition in their own right – the difference being that such groups compete inside parties but are also conscious of what Boucek (2009) refers to as the "electoral market". So, using our incentives-based analysis, we can postulate that while parties compete with each other, factions play two "games" as it were – one inside the party (as evidenced by the effect of leadership change on factionalism, for example) and the other in the national arena (whether or not politics is dominated by two or three larger parties), in that they are constantly assessing whether the probability of achieving their aims is increased by remaining in the party or whether or not they are viable in a party in their own right.

We should also be conscious of the "ratchet" effect (whether or not factionalised parties can ever become unfactionalised). In the Japanese case, we might attribute factionalism in the LDP to the pre-1993 electoral system that had intra-party choice, but factionalism still continues in that party despite voters not having the option of intra-party choice. As seen from the examples we discussed in Chapter 7, the persistence of factions can be explained by institutions and party characteristics, but a significant determinant of factional persistence is the existence of factions in the first instance.

One area of importance that may explain the limits to the incentives-based approach to factionalism is role of political culture. This is one particular area of analysis that is difficult to measure quantitatively, but where the abundance of case study analysis can give thought to a manner in which to capture this relationship. The role of clientelist practices in political culture is one specific area that has been theorised to have an influence on the extent of factionalism in parties, and would certainly provide the basis for interesting research.

The study of factionalism in political system has always played second fiddle in terms of analysis in political science. It is seldom the bridesmaid in the analysis of parties, let alone the bride. However, this has not been the result of a lack of effort from various scholars who have published extensively on factionalism using case studies. The study of factionalism now needs to incorporate an integrated framework and a common definition so that the abundance of work done can be understood and built upon. Once this has been established, it can be explained to look at all the different levels of a party. The next logical step after this is to measure the extent of factionalism in a party in a manner that takes account of the overall membership of factions, and the intensity of the conflict they incur with other factions inside the party.

There are two promising avenues of research which scholars of factionalism can now follow. The first is to pursue the theoretical framework developed by Boucek (2009). Boueck argues that factionalisation is a dynamic process. Our understanding of the effect of institutions on factionalism would be augmented significantly if we were able to track their effect over time. It would go considerable distance towards explaining the "ratchet" effect that we discussed in earlier chapters, i.e. whether or not a factionalised party can become non-factionalised –is factionalisation a one-way street? With a measurable framework that would track the changes in factionalism, greater insights would be achieved into whether or not factionalisation is irreversible, and would provide relevant evidence for policymakers concerned with the mitigation of factionalism.

In order to achieve this, a scale that looks specifically at the institutionalisation of factions is necessary. Fundamental to this is a clear scheme of classification of the levels of institutionalisation of a faction. One of the aspects of the definitional debate concerning factionalism is the nature of the institutionalisation of the factions. As we saw in Chapter 7 the level of this institutionalisation can differ

from party to party, and country to country and research needs to move beyond "high degree of institutionalisation". At the very least, this will bring further clarity to the definition of faction, and at most will provide a robust framework for further cross-country and quantitative analysis in this field.

Other elements of a measurement framework to get as accurate a picture of the factionalism would include the level of institutionalisation of factions, as mentioned above. A second element would be the level of permeation of the party – does the faction exist beyond the parliamentary party or caucus level, and if so, at how many levels can it be found? A final element worth considering would be the size of the membership of individual factions, as well as the total combined membership of factions inside the parliamentary party or the entire party organisation, whichever is more appropriate. Combination of these three elements would make for an insightful picture of factionalism in a party, though thought would have to be given as to how best to gather this data.

This thesis has sought to show the potential for large-sample analysis in the study of factionalism. It has also acknowledged the shortcomings of such analysis in examining the interaction between country-level and party-level variables, and sought to overcome this by looking at real-world examples of factionalism. It has shown the strength of the case-study method in explaining the persistence of factionalism in parties. Importantly, it has used it to explain why there are no factions in a party, something that cross-country quantitative analysis might not have achieved so readily. We have seen evidence to support previously held theories about factionalism, but also evidence that questions the validity of some others. It is but a first step. To continue, a more robust measurement of factionalism needs to be developed.

Factions can serve a useful purpose for parties (maintaining electoral support) and countries (providing an extra link of responsiveness to government parties and strengthening the link between citizens and governments). Before we get to this stage, we need to understand how they work and persist. To do so, we need to harness the abundance of information that exists to develop a common framework. Further research is certainly desirable.

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APPENDIX A: VALUES OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR ALL PARTIES, BY COUNTRY

Country	Party	% of experts answering "yes"	Experts responded	Experts asked	% responded
Albania	PDT	0.17	12	12	100%
	PS	0.5	12	12	100%
	LSI	0	11	12	92%
	PR	0	11	12	92%
	PBDNj	0.2	10	12	83%
Angola	MPLA	0.25	12	12	100%
	UNITA	0.5	10	12	83%
	PRS	0.12	9	12	75%
Argentina	P.Justicialista	0.41	22	22	100%
	Unión Cívica Radical	0.45	22	22	100%
	Alianza Frente para la victoria	0	3	22	14%
	Frente para la victoria	0	21	22	95%
	PRO	0	9	22	41%
Australia	The Liberal Party	0.67	9	10	90%
	The Labor Party (ALP)	1	10	10	100%
	The Nationals	0.25	8	10	80%
	The Australian Greens	0.14	7	10	70%
Austria	SPÖ	0.73	15	15	100%
	ÖVP	0.53	15	15	100%
	Grüne	0.13	15	15	100%
	FPÖ	1	14	15	93%
	BZÖ	0.8	15	15	100%
Bangladesh	PARTY Bangladesh	0.62	13	13	100%
	Awami League	0.42	12	13	92%
	Jamat-E-I	0.33	12	13	92%
	Jatiya Party	0.62	13	13	100%
Belgium	CD&V	0.83	6	6	100%
	VB	0	6	6	100%
	Open VLD	0.17	6	6	100%
	SP.a-Spirit	0.33	6	6	100%
	NV-A	0	6	6	100%
	LDD	0	6	6	100%
	Groen!	0	6	6	100%
	MR	0.5	6	7	86%

	PS	0.5	6	7	86%
	CDH	1	7	7	100%
	Ecolo	0	5	7	71%
	FN	0	4	7	57%
Benin	The Cauri Forces for an Emerging Benin	0.33	9	10	90%
	Social Democratic Party	0.62	8	10	80%
	Democratic Renewal Party	0.5	8	10	80%
	The Key Force	0.25	8	10	80%
	G-13	0.5	6	10	60%
Bolivia	Juicios sobre MAS	0.55	11	14	79%
	Juicios sobre PODEMOS	0.36	11	14	79%
	Juicios sobre MNR	0.64	11	14	79%
	Juicios sobre Frente de Unidad Nacional	0.12	8	14	57%
Botswana	Botswana Democratic Party	0.86	14	15	93%
	Botswana National Front	0.71	14	15	93%
	Botswana Congress Party	0.7	10	15	67%
Brazil	PFL	0.53	17	20	85%
	PL	0.33	12	20	60%
	PMDB	0.75	16	20	80%
	PP	0.42	12	20	60%
	PSB	0.45	11	20	55%
	PSDB	0.47	17	20	85%
	PT	0.83	18	20	90%
	PTB	0.4	10	20	50%
	PDT	0.21	14	20	70%
	PCdoBR	0.13	15	20	75%
	PPS	0.36	11	20	55%
Bulgaria	BSP	0.92	13	13	100%
	NDSV	0.33	12	13	92%
	DPS	0	12	13	92%
	Ataka	0	10	13	77%
	ODS	0.42	12	13	92%
	DSB	0.15	13	13	100%
	GERB	0.15	13	13	100%
Canada	Bloc Québécois	0	7	12	58%
	Conservative Party	0.36	11	12	92%

	Green Party	0.14	7	12	58%
	Liberal Party	0.4	10	12	83%
	New Democratic Party	0.3	10	12	83%
Chile	P.R.S.D	0.36	11	21	52%
	U.D.I	0.22	18	21	86%
	P.S	0.89	19	21	90%
	R.N	0.74	19	21	90%
	P.D.C	0.95	19	21	90%
	P.P.D	0.78	18	21	86%
Colombia	P.L.C.	0.64	11	12	92%
	Partido Conservador	0.67	12	12	100%
	Partido de la U	0.45	11	12	92%
	Cambio Radical	0.22	9	12	75%
	Polo Democrático Alternativo	0.67	12	12	100%
	Convergencia Ciudadana	0.17	6	12	50%
	Mov. Alas Equipo Colombia	0.14	7	12	58%
Costa Rica	P.A.C	0.69	13	18	72%
	P.L.N	0.87	15	18	83%
	Mov. Libertario	0.69	13	18	72%
	P.U.S.C	0.73	15	18	83%
Croatia	HDZ	0.25	16	16	100%
	SDP	0.19	16	16	100%
	HNS	0.12	16	16	100%
	HSS	0.19	16	16	100%
	HSLS	0	16	16	100%
	HSP	0	16	16	100%
	HSU	0	12	16	75%
	IDS	0.14	14	16	88%
	HDSSB	0.06	16	16	100%
	SDSS	0.14	14	16	88%
Czech Rep	Civic Democratic Party	0.92	24	26	92%
	Czech Social Democratic Party	0.8	25	26	96%
	Christian and Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People's Party	0.79	24	26	92%
	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	0.5	24	26	92%
	Green Party	0.96	25	26	96%

Dominican Republic	PRD	1	12	12	100%
	PRSC	0.75	12	12	100%
	Partido de la Liberación Dominicana	1	12	12	100%
Denmark	Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet)	0.5	16	16	100%
	Social Liberals (Det Radikale Venstre)	0.25	16	16	100%
	Conservatives (Det Konservative Folkeparti)	0.4	15	16	94%
	Socialist People's Party (SF)	0.19	16	16	100%
	Liberals (Venstre)	0.33	15	16	94%
	Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)	0.12	16	16	100%
	Unity List (Enhedslisten)	0.12	16	16	100%
	New alliance (Ny alliance)	0	15	16	94%
Ecuador	Partido Social Cristiano	0.54	13	14	93%
	Izquierda Democrática	0.77	13	14	93%
	PRE	0.08	13	14	93%
	Pachakutik	0.38	13	14	93%
	PRIAN	0.23	13	14	93%
	Partido Sociedad Patriotica	0.31	13	14	93%
Egypt	National Democratic Party	0.56	9	9	100%
	Muslim Brotherhood	0.75	8	9	89%
	Wafd	0.17	6	9	67%
	Tagammu	0.33	6	9	67%
El Salvador	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista	0.8	10	14	71%
	P. Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional	0.78	9	14	64%
	Partido de Conciliación Nacional	0.75	8	14	57%
	Partido Demócrata Cristiano	0.75	8	14	57%
Estonia	Reform	0.56	9	9	100%
	Kesk	0.62	8	9	89%
	IRL	0.78	9	9	100%
	Rahvaliit	0.71	7	9	78%

	SDE	0.75	8	9	89%
	Rohelised	0.33	6	9	67%
Finland	KESK	0.5	16	18	89%
	SDP	0.37	16	18	89%
	KOK	0.31	16	18	89%
	VAS	0.69	16	18	89%
	VIHR	0.19	16	18	89%
	KD	0.27	15	18	83%
	RKP/SFP	0.5	14	18	78%
	PS	0.14	14	18	78%
France	Front National (FN)	0.44	16	17	94%
	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP)	0.62	16	17	94%
	Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem)	0.08	13	17	76%
	Parti Socialiste (PS)	1	16	17	94%
	Les Verts	0.94	16	17	94%
	Parti Communiste Français (PCF)	0.81	16	17	94%
	Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR)	0.53	15	17	88%
Georgia	United National Movement (UNM)	0.89	9	9	100%
	Christian Democratic Movement (CDM)	0.33	6	9	67%
	Georgian Labor Party (GLP)	0.34	9	9	100%
	New Rights (Conservative) Party of Georgia (NCP)	0.43	7	9	78%
Germany	CDU	0.91	23	23	100%
	CSU	0.44	18	23	78%
	SPD	1	23	23	100%
	FDP	0.5	18	23	78%
	Gruene	0.96	23	23	100%
	Linke	0.86	21	23	91%
	Radical Right	0.11	9	23	39%
Ghana	New Patriotic Party	0.92	12	13	92%
	National Democratic Congress	1	12	13	92%
	People's National Convention	0.14	7	13	54%
Greece	ND	0.47	15	15	100%

	PASOK	0.73	15	15	100%
	KKE	0.08	13	15	87%
	SYRIZA	0.93	15	15	100%
	LAOS	0.18	11	15	73%
Guatemala	FRG	0.22	9	10	90%
	GANA	0.56	9	10	90%
	INT	0	3	10	30%
	PAN	0.33	9	10	90%
	PP	0.29	7	10	70%
	PSN	0.17	6	10	60%
	UNE	0.67	9	10	90%
Honduras	Bancada Liberal	0.9	10	12	83%
	Bancada Nacional	0.9	10	12	83%
Hungary	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége	0.5	14	15	93%
	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	0.09	11	15	73%
	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség	0.33	15	15	100%
	Magyar Demokrata Fórum	0.36	14	15	93%
	Magyar Szocialista Párt	0.73	15	15	100%
India	BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party)	0.2	51	80	64%
	BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party)	0.92	71	80	89%
	CPI (Communist Party of India)	0.39	59	80	74%
	CPI/Marxist	0.57	60	80	75%
	INC (Indian National Congress)	0.86	71	80	89%
	Nationalist Congress Party	0.46	35	56	63%
	Janata Dal (United)	0.79	19	31	61%
	Rashtriya Janata Dal	0.27	33	56	59%
	Shirmani Akali Dal	0.35	17	31	55%
	Samajwadi Party	0.36	22	31	71%
	Shiv Sena	0.47	15	25	60%
	All India Trinamool Congress	0.11	9	25	36%
	Biju Janata Dal	0.11	9	25	36%
	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagarm	0.5	12	24	50%
	Anna DMK	0.25	12	24	50%
	Telugu Desam Party	0.56	16	24	67%

	Janata Dal (Secular)	0.31	13	24	54%
Indonesia	Partai Amanah Nasional	0.5	12	14	86%
	Golongan Karya	0.72	14	14	100%
	Partai Demokrat	0.17	12	14	86%
	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	0.23	13	14	93%
	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	0.58	14	14	100%
	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	0.42	12	14	86%
	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	0.65	14	14	100%
Ireland	Fianna Fáil (FF)	0.12	8	10	80%
	Fine Gael (FG)	0.12	8	10	80%
	Progressive Democrats (PDs	0.12	8	10	80%
	Sinn Féin (SF)	0.14	7	10	70%
	Greens (Gr)	0.12	8	10	80%
	Labour (Lab)	0.25	8	10	80%
Israel	Kadima	0.2	25	27	93%
	Labor - Meimad	0.96	27	27	100%
	Shas	0.52	25	27	93%
	Likud	0.85	27	27	100%
	Israel Beiteinu	0.24	21	27	78%
	National Unity - Mafdal	0.77	26	27	96%
	Pensioners' Party	0.29	24	27	89%
	Torah and Shabbat Judaism (Aguda)	0.61	23	27	85%
	Meretz	0.73	26	27	96%
Italy	Forza Italia (FI)	0.32	25	26	96%
	Alleanza Nazionale (AN)	0.92	24	26	92%
	Lega Nord (LN)	0.12	25	26	96%
	Partito Democratico (PD)	0.96	25	26	96%
	Italia dei Valori (IdV)	0.04	23	26	88%
	Unione di Centro (Udc)	0.43	23	26	88%
	Rifondazione Comunista (Rc)	0.91	23	26	88%
	S□tiroler Volkspartei (SVP)	0.1	10	26	38%
	Movimento per l'Autonomia (Mpa)	0	15	26	58%
Jamaica	Jamaica Labor Party	0.82	11	13	85%

	People's National Party	0.75	12	13	92%
Japan	Liberal Democratic Party Japan	1	19	19	100%
	Democratic Party Japan	0.78	18	19	95%
	Komei Party	0.07	15	19	79%
	Japanese Communist Party	0.11	18	19	95%
	Japanese Social Democratic Party	0.27	15	19	79%
Kenya	Kenya African National Union	0.56	16	16	100%
	Orange Democratic Movement	0.75	16	16	100%
	Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya	0.44	16	16	100%
	Party of National Unity	0.33	15	16	94%
Latvia	TP	0.42	12	13	92%
	JL	0.58	12	13	92%
	ZZS	0.5	12	13	92%
	SC	0.5	12	13	92%
	LPP/LC	0.45	11	13	85%
	TB/LNNK	0.36	11	13	85%
	PCTVL	0.3	10	13	77%
	LSDSP	0.2	10	13	77%
Lithuania	Labor party	0.12	16	17	94%
	Liberal Democratic Party	0.29	14	17	82%
	Liberal and Center Union	0.27	15	17	88%
	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	0.5	16	17	94%
	New Union (Social Liberals)	0.25	16	17	94%
	Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives)	0.8	15	17	88%
	Peasants and New Democratic Party Union	0.14	14	17	82%
Macedonia	SDSM	0.2	10	11	91%
	VMRO-DPMNE	0	10	11	91%
	NSDP	0.2	11	11	100%
	DUI	0.09	11	11	100%
	DPA	0.09	11	11	100%
Malaysia	United Malays National Organisation	0.71	21	22	95%
	Malaysian Chinese	0.76	21	22	95%

	Association				
	People's Justice Party	0.65	20	22	91%
	Democratic Action Party	0.57	21	22	95%
	Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party	0.8	20	22	91%
Mali	The Union for the Republic and Democracy	0.67	9	12	75%
	The Rally for Mali	0.56	9	12	75%
	The Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally	0.33	9	12	75%
	The Alliance for Democracy in Mali	0.6	10	12	83%
	The National Congress for Democratic Initiative	0.4	10	12	83%
Mauritius	Mauritian Labour Party	0.91	11	11	100%
	Mauritian Party of Xavier-Luc Duval	0.67	9	11	82%
	Mauritian Militant Movement	1	11	11	100%
	Mauritian Social Movement	0.73	11	11	100%
	Organisation of the People of Rodrigues	0.6	5	10	50%
	Rodrigues Movement	0.8	5	10	50%
Mexico	PRI	0.84	19	20	95%
	PAN	0.84	19	20	95%
	PRD	0.89	19	20	95%
	P.V.E.M	0.33	12	20	60%
	CONVERGENCIA	0.36	11	20	55%
Moldova	Communist Party of Moldova	0.33	12	14	86%
	Christian-Democratic People's Party	0	12	14	86%
	Party Alliance Our Moldova	0.67	12	14	86%
	Democratic Party of Moldova	0.58	12	14	86%
	Liberal Party of Moldova	0.08	12	14	86%
	Social-Democratic Party of Moldova	0.58	12	14	86%
Mongolia	Democratic Party	0.87	15	15	100%
	Civic Will Party	0.17	12	15	80%
	Mongolian People's	0.93	15	15	100%

	Revolutionary Party				
	National New Party	0.09	11	15	73%
	Motherland Party	0.08	12	15	80%
Mozambique	Liberation Front of Mozambique	0.62	16	16	100%
	Mozambican National Resistance	0.33	15	16	94%
Namibia	South West Africa People's Organization	0.58	12	13	92%
	Congress of Democrats	0.25	12	13	92%
	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance	0.36	11	13	85%
	National Unity Democratic Organization	0.18	11	13	85%
	United Democratic Front	0.27	11	13	85%
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	0.6	10	12	83%
	Labour Party	0.5	10	12	83%
	Socialist Party	0.1	10	12	83%
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	0.4	10	12	83%
	Party for Freedom	0	9	12	75%
	GreenLeft	0.4	10	12	83%
	Christian Union	0.11	9	12	75%
	Democrats 66	0.2	10	12	83%
	Proud of the Netherlands	0	8	12	67%
New Zealand	Labour	0.85	13	13	100%
	National	0.85	13	13	100%
	Green	0.42	12	13	92%
	NZ First	0.27	11	13	85%
	ACT	0.36	11	13	85%
	Maori	0.3	10	13	77%
	United Future	0.22	9	13	69%
	Progressive	0.33	9	13	69%
Nicaragua	Azul y Blanco	0.33	6	10	60%
	FSLN	0.56	9	10	90%
	Partido Liberal	0.75	8	10	80%
Niger	National Movement for the Development of Society	0.67	9	9	100%
	Democratic and Social Convention	0.56	9	9	100%

	Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism	0.62	8	9	89%
	Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress	0.44	9	9	100%
Nigeria	African Congress	0.43	30	38	79%
	All Nigeria People's Party	0.57	37	38	97%
	People's Democratic Party	0.64	36	38	95%
Norway	Centre Party (Senterpartiet)	0.08	25	34	74%
	Christian People□ Party (Kristelig folkeparti)	0.26	27	34	79%
	Conservative Party (Høyre)	0.25	24	34	71%
	Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet)	0.52	29	34	85%
	Liberal Party (Venstre)	0.08	24	34	71%
	Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet)	0.12	25	34	74%
	Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk venstreparti)	0.5	28	34	82%
Pakistan	PPP	0.58	19	22	86%
	PML-N	0.56	18	22	82%
	PML-Q	0.42	19	22	86%
	MQM	0.35	17	22	77%
	ANP	0.61	18	22	82%
	JUI-F	0.35	17	22	77%
Panama	P. Revolucionario Democrático	0.86	7	8	88%
	P. Arnulfista	0.43	7	8	88%
	P. Molirena	0.14	7	8	88%
	P. Solidaridad	0.17	6	8	75%
	P. Cambio Democrático	0	7	8	88%
	P. Liberación Nacional	0.2	5	8	63%
Paraguay	ANR	1	13	13	100%
	PLRA	1	13	13	100%
	PPQ	0.31	13	13	100%
	PUNACE	0.15	13	13	100%
	PPS	0.44	9	13	69%
	PDP	0	4	13	31%
	MPT	0.67	3	13	23%
Peru	Unión por el Perú	0.8	10	11	91%

	Partido Aprista Peruano	0.64	11	11	100%
	Unidad Nacional	1	10	11	91%
	Alianza por el futuro	0.3	10	11	91%
	Frente de Centro	0.57	7	11	64%
Poland	PO	0.29	14	14	100%
	PiS	0.31	13	14	93%
	SLD	0.79	14	14	100%
	PSL	0.38	13	14	93%
	SRP	0	10	14	71%
	LPR	0	10	14	71%
Portugal	Socialist Party	0.75	20	20	100%
	Social Democratic Party	0.75	20	20	100%
	Portuguese Communist Party	0.16	19	20	95%
	Social Democratic Center-Popular Party	0.55	20	20	100%
	Leftist Bloc	0.47	17	20	85%
Romania	Partidul Social Democrat	0.79	14	14	100%
	Partidul Democrat Liberal	0.43	14	14	100%
	Partidul National Liberal	0.43	14	14	100%
	Partidul Romania Mare	0.21	14	14	100%
	Uniunea Democrata Maghiara din Romania	0.77	13	14	93%
	Partidul Conservator	0.21	14	14	100%
Russia	United Russia	0.64	14	14	100%
	CPRF	0.43	14	14	100%
	LDPR	0	13	14	93%
	SR	0.42	12	14	86%
	SPS	0.5	12	14	86%
	Yabloko	0.77	13	14	93%
Senegal	Senegalese Democratic Party	0.33	12	12	100%
	Socialist Party	0.36	11	12	92%
	Party of Independence and Labour	0.09	11	12	92%
	African Party for Democracy and Socialism	0.18	11	12	92%
	Alliance of the Forces of Progress	0.18	11	12	92%

Serbia	SRS	0.12	8	10	80%
	DS	0.29	7	10	70%
	DSS	0.14	7	10	70%
	G17+	0.12	8	10	80%
	NS	0.12	8	10	80%
	SPS	0.29	7	10	70%
	LDP	0.12	8	10	80%
Slovakia	Direction - Social Democracy	0.2	10	13	77%
	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party	0	10	13	77%
	Slovak National Party	0.1	10	13	77%
	Party of Hungarian Coalition	0.78	9	13	69%
	People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	0	11	13	85%
	Christian Democratic Movement	0.2	10	13	77%
Slovenia	Social Democrats	0.62	14	14	100%
	Slovenian Democratic Party	0.79	13	14	93%
	For Real	0.55	11	14	79%
	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia	0.5	10	14	71%
	Slovenian National Party	0.34	12	14	86%
	Slovenian People's Party	0.85	13	14	93%
	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	0.69	13	14	93%
	New Slovenia ¡V Christian People's Party	0.63	8	14	57%
South Africa	African National Congress	0.64	11	12	92%
	Democratic Alliance	0.3	10	12	83%
	Inkatha Freedom Party	0.11	9	12	75%
South Korea	GNP	0.87	15	15	100%
	UDP	0.73	15	15	100%
	LFP	0.47	15	15	100%
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers Party	0.5	16	18	89%
	Popular Party	0.47	17	18	94%

	United Left	0.87	15	18	83%
	Convergence and Union	0.6	15	18	83%
	Basque Nationalist	0.67	15	18	83%
Sweden	Moderata samlingspartiet	0.47	19	20	95%
	Centerpartiet	0.53	17	20	85%
	olkpartiet liberalerna	0.53	17	20	85%
	Kristdemokraterna	0.47	15	20	75%
	Miljöpartiet de Gröna	0.31	16	20	80%
	Socialdemokraterna	0.63	19	20	95%
	Vänsterpartiet	0.53	19	20	95%
	Sverigedemokraterna	0	7	20	35%
Switzerland	CVP	0.86	14	15	93%
	FDP	0.69	13	15	87%
	SP	0.64	14	15	93%
	SVP	0.69	13	15	87%
	Gruene	0.5	12	15	80%
	LPS	0.12	8	15	53%
	Lega	0.1	10	15	67%
Taiwan	Kuomintang	0.5	16	19	84%
	Democratic Progressive Party	1	18	19	95%
Tanzania	Party of the Revolution	0.79	14	16	88%
	Party for Democracy and Progress	0.54	13	16	81%
	Civic United Front	0.71	14	16	88%
Thailand	Pracharaj Party	0.37	8	9	89%
	Pue Pandin Party	0.75	8	9	89%
	Chart Thai	0.62	8	9	89%
	Matchima Thipatai	0.75	8	9	89%
	Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana	0.75	8	9	89%
	Palang Prachachon	0.87	8	9	89%
	Prachatipat	0.87	8	9	89%
Turkey	Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (AKP)	0.67	12	12	100%
	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	0.67	12	12	100%
	Demokrat Parti (DP)	0.5	6	12	50%
	Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)	0.56	9	12	75%

	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP)	0.38	8	12	67%
	Milliyetc,i Hareket Partisi (MHP)	0.3	10	12	83%
	Saadet Partisi (SP)	0.13	8	12	67%
UK	Labour Party	0.69	13	13	100%
	Conservative Party	0.46	13	13	100%
	Liberal Democratic Party	0.17	12	13	92%
Ukraine	Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko	0.59	22	22	100%
	Party of Regions	0.9	20	22	91%
	Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc	0.86	22	22	100%
	Communist Party	0.5	18	22	82%
	Lytvyn Bloc	0.44	18	22	82%
	Socialist Party	0.53	17	22	77%
Uruguay	P.Nacional	1	16	17	94%
	P.Colorado	1	16	17	94%
	P.Encuentro Progresista Frente Amplio-Nva mayoria	1	16	17	94%
USA	Democratic Party	0.87	16	16	100%
	Republican Party	0.87	16	16	100%
Venezuela	MVR	0.5	12	12	100%
	Podemos	0.18	11	12	92%
	PPT	0.18	11	12	92%
	PCV	0	6	12	50%
	Un Nuevo Tiempo	1	2	12	17%
	Primero Justicia	1	2	12	17%
Zambia	Movement for Multi-party Democracy	0.61	18	19	95%
	United National Independence Party	0.41	17	19	89%
	United Party for National Development	0.41	17	19	89%
	Forum for Democracy and Development	0.2	10	19	53%
	Patriotic Front	0.27	15	19	79%

APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS – RESULTS

Tables in this appendix:

Table B.1: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.2: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.3: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.4: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.5: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.6: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.7: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.8: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.9: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.10: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country. Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.11: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.12: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.13: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.14: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.15: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.16: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.17: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.18: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.19: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.20: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country. Party scores are either 1 or 0.

Table B.21: Estimation results of party-based determinants of factionalism using weighted least squares (weights are proportion of available experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

Table B.22: Estimation results of party-based determinants of factionalism using weighted least squares (weights are proportion of available experts multiplied by number of experts)

Table B.23: Estimation results of party-based determinants of factionalism using logistic regression (observations with factionalism score≥0.5 coded as 1 and those with factionalism score <0.5 are coded as 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max. of effective or legal threshold	2.328*** (0.82)	1.689* (0.87)	1.568* (0.83)	0.564 (1.03)	0.792 (1.01)	0.469 (1.27)	0.094 (1.29)
Avg. district magnitude	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.193*** (0.06)		-0.201*** (0.06)	-0.211*** (0.06)	-0.212*** (0.06)	-0.205*** (0.06)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.203*** (0.07)				
Closed-list PR system (1=yes)				-0.666** (0.32)			
Proportion of seats elected by closed-list PR					-0.648* (0.33)	-0.778 (0.48)	-0.909* (0.49)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.145 (0.43)	-0.096 (0.43)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.011*** (0.00)
Constant	-0.135 (0.22)	0.849* (0.44)	0.721* (0.39)	1.271** (0.50)	1.323** (0.52)	1.485** (0.62)	1.591** (0.62)
N	83	79	83	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.072	0.189	0.154	0.242	0.238	0.239	0.257

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.1: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max. of effective or legal threshold	1.962**	1.462*	1.300	0.240	0.400	0.334	-0.076
	(0.84)	(0.83)	(0.89)	(0.96)	(0.93)	(1.17)	(1.18)
Avg. district magnitude	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.182***		-0.192***	-0.205***	-0.205***	-0.197***
		(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.164**				
			(0.06)				
Closed-list PR system (1=yes)				-0.721**			
				(0.30)			
Proportion of seats elected by closed-list PR					-0.766**	-0.793*	-0.937**
					(0.31)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.029	0.023
						(0.40)	(0.40)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.012***
							(0.00)
Constant	-0.273	0.655	0.421	1.116**	1.219**	1.253**	1.369**
	(0.20)	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.56)	(0.56)
N	82	79	82	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.055	0.181	0.111	0.250	0.258	0.258	0.282

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.745**	0.679**	0.579**	0.329	0.416	0.266	0.085
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.57)	(0.59)
Avg district magnitude	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.070***		-0.072***	-0.076***	-0.078***	-0.074***
		(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.072***				
			(0.02)				
Closed-list electoral system				-0.224*			
				(0.13)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.178	-0.228	-0.285
					(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.055	-0.038
						(0.16)	(0.15)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.006***
							(0.00)
Constant	-0.737***	-0.404***	-0.442***	-0.273*	-0.267*	-0.197	-0.145
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Observations	83	79	83	79	79	79	79

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.3: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.758**	0.723**	0.613*	0.332	0.389	0.313	0.082
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.57)	(0.59)
Avg district magnitude	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.057**		-0.060**	-0.065**	-0.066**	-0.062**
		(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.047				
			(0.03)				
Closed-list electoral system				-0.260**			
				(0.12)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.233**	-0.258	-0.332*
					(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.028	-0.005
						(0.16)	(0.15)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.008***
							(0.00)
Constant	-0.788***	-0.510***	-0.589***	-0.361*	-0.335*	-0.301	-0.232
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Observations	82	79	82	79	79	79	79

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.4: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.875***	0.699**	0.626**	0.332	0.371	0.201	0.027
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.52)	(0.53)
Avg district magnitude	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.075***		-0.078***	-0.084***	-0.085***	-0.081***
		(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.084***				
			(0.02)				
Closed-list				-0.217*			
				(0.12)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.202*	-0.261	-0.318*
					(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.063	-0.049
						(0.14)	(0.14)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.006***
							(0.00)
Constant	-0.758***	-0.400***	-0.424***	-0.264*	-0.231	-0.152	-0.103
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Observations	83	79	83	79	79	79	79

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.5: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.794**	0.617**	0.532	0.192	0.178	0.150	-0.065
	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.48)	(0.49)
Avg district magnitude	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.078***		-0.081***	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.086***
		(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.074***				
			(0.03)				
Closed-list electoral system				-0.262**			
				(0.12)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.278**	-0.288*	-0.360**
					(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.010	0.005
						(0.14)	(0.14)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.007***
							(0.00)
Constant	-0.808***	-0.431***	-0.507***	-0.273*	-0.201	-0.189	-0.129
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Observations	82	79	82	79	79	79	79

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.6: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.567**	0.407*	0.430**	0.225	0.261	0.040	-0.068
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Avg district magnitude	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.045***		-0.046***	-0.048***	-0.049***	-0.047***
		(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.051***				
			(0.01)				
Closed-list system				-0.116			
				(0.09)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.115	-0.199	-0.236*
					(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.094	-0.077
						(0.10)	(0.10)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.004***
							(0.00)
Constant	0.518***	0.752***	0.736***	0.818***	0.829***	0.938***	0.969***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Observations	83	79	83	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.068	0.159	0.163	0.183	0.183	0.189	0.212

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.7: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.551**	0.446*	0.448*	0.242	0.259	0.026	-0.090
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Avg district magnitude	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.038***		-0.039***	-0.041***	-0.043***	-0.041***
		(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.037**				
			(0.02)				
Closed-list system				-0.130			
				(0.08)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.148*	-0.236**	-0.275**
					(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.099	-0.081
						(0.10)	(0.10)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.004***
							(0.00)
Constant	0.493***	0.687***	0.649***	0.761***	0.786***	0.901***	0.934***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Observations	82	79	82	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.068	0.143	0.120	0.176	0.186	0.193	0.223

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.8: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.621***	0.439*	0.443*	0.260	0.287	0.092	-0.019
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Avg district magnitude	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.042***		-0.043***	-0.045***	-0.046***	-0.044***
		(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.047***				
			(0.02)				
Closed-list system				-0.105			
				(0.09)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.109	-0.188	-0.227*
					(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.087	-0.073
						(0.10)	(0.10)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.003***
							(0.00)
Constant	0.512***	0.728***	0.712***	0.795***	0.808***	0.906***	0.937***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Observations	83	79	83	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.070	0.142	0.136	0.161	0.162	0.167	0.190

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.9: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Max of effective or legal threshold	0.521**	0.350	0.352	0.134	0.144	-0.008	-0.124
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Avg district magnitude	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Effective number of electoral parties		-0.043***		-0.045***	-0.047***	-0.048***	-0.046***
		(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Effective number of legislative parties			-0.042***				
			(0.02)				
Closed-list system				-0.127			
				(0.08)			
Proportion of seats filled using closed-list PR					-0.148*	-0.210*	-0.251**
					(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Intra-party preferential voting (1=yes)						-0.068	-0.053
						(0.10)	(0.10)
(Average district magnitude) x (Preferential intra-party voting)							-0.004***
							(0.00)
Constant	0.489***	0.711***	0.666***	0.793***	0.820***	0.897***	0.930***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	82	79	82	79	79	79	79
R^2	0.052	0.142	0.106	0.173	0.183	0.187	0.215

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.10: Estimation results of electoral system-based determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country. Party scores are either 1 or 0.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.653**	0.684**	0.608**	0.646**	0.403	0.506	0.463	0.456	0.510	
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.36)	
Effective number of pres. elec. parties	-0.42**	-0.46**	-0.340	-0.294	-0.335	-0.293	-0.271	-0.258	-0.268	-0.84**
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.39)
Presidential system	1.821***	1.981***	2.324***	2.114***	2.471**	2.294**	2.303**	2.147**	2.251**	4.704**
	(0.58)	(0.61)	(0.66)	(0.78)	(1.01)	(0.96)	(0.95)	(0.96)	(0.98)	(1.81)
Federalism Index		0.051	0.074	0.064	0.052	0.059	0.088	0.066	0.048	0.061
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Legislature influence over executive			0.216*	0.226*	0.229	0.251	0.250	0.254*	0.247	0.303
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.119	-0.128						
			(0.08)	(0.09)						
Ban on "floor crossing"				-0.130						
				(0.29)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.352	0.418	0.372	0.355	0.436	0.388	0.301
				(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.39)
No ban on any type of private donation					0.410	-0.027	0.091	0.144	-0.261	-0.479
					(1.51)	(1.42)	(1.48)	(1.47)	(1.41)	(1.61)
Party receives public funding					- 1.145**	- 1.038**	- 1.045**	- 1.048*	- 0.969*	- 1.346**
					(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.56)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.320	0.510*	0.481	0.559*	0.479	0.204
					(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations on policy)					-0.113	-0.030	-0.025	-0.066	0.017	0.086
					(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.39)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						- 0.020*	- 0.025*	- 0.022*	-0.019	
						(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-1.078			
							(0.72)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.384		
								(0.53)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.461	
									(0.65)	
Constant	-0.516*	-0.612*	-1.411	-1.454	-2.273	- 2.997*	-2.475	- 3.032*	- 3.119*	-1.843
	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.87)	(0.96)	(1.57)	(1.69)	(1.49)	(1.70)	(1.71)	(1.78)
N	84	81	81	79	67	67	67	66	67	48
R^2	0.168	0.196	0.251	0.248	0.249	0.283	0.314	0.288	0.289	0.398

Table B.11: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.687**	0.723**	0.649**	0.680**	0.434	0.557	0.504	0.466	0.558	
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.35)	
Effective number of pres. elec. parties	-0.422**	-0.444**	-0.350	-0.291	-0.359	-0.307	-0.283	-0.254	-0.304	-0.927**
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.39)
Presidential system	1.554***	1.624***	1.927***	1.679**	2.041**	1.816**	1.837**	1.623*	1.813**	4.612***
	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.63)	(0.72)	(0.94)	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.90)	(1.62)
Federalism Index		0.095	0.118*	0.112	0.101	0.106	0.139	0.122	0.105	0.083
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Legislature influence over executive			0.181*	0.199*	0.200	0.217	0.224	0.234	0.217	0.320*
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.094	-0.102						
			(0.09)	(0.09)						
Ban on "floor crossing"				-0.105						
				(0.28)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.382	0.567*	0.501	0.497	0.616*	0.503	0.494
				(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.35)
No ban on any type of private donation					0.348	-0.155	-0.031	0.012	-0.177	-0.371
					(1.48)	(1.38)	(1.42)	(1.37)	(1.37)	(1.56)
Party receives public funding					-1.281***	-1.160***	-1.176***	-1.215***	-1.154**	-1.648***
					(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.34)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.278	0.492*	0.455	0.550**	0.489*	0.192
					(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations on policy)					-0.075	0.019	0.025	-0.015	0.024	0.081
					(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.36)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.022*	-0.028**	-0.025**	-0.022*	
						(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-1.074			
							(0.69)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.501		
								(0.52)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.043	
									(0.60)	
Constant	-0.615**	-0.805**	-1.508*	-1.617*	-2.022	-2.780*	-2.290*	-2.859*	-2.792*	-1.805
	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.87)	(0.96)	(1.41)	(1.48)	(1.31)	(1.48)	(1.51)	(1.48)
N	83	80	80	78	66	66	66	65	66	47
R^2	0.152	0.181	0.220	0.217	0.270	0.317	0.350	0.331	0.317	0.465

Table B.12: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted least squares (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.243***	0.258***	0.223**	0.240**	0.166	0.161	0.127	0.126	0.170	
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.147**	-0.161**	-0.132*	-0.124	-0.118	-0.110	-0.113	-0.094	-0.089	-0.175
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Presidential system	0.596***	0.645***	0.819***	0.770***	0.819**	0.774**	0.838**	0.730**	0.717**	1.097**
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.53)
Federalism Index		0.015	0.018	0.013	0.015	0.011	0.017	0.015	0.009	0.017
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Legislature influence over executive			0.078***	0.077***	0.077	0.078	0.083	0.085	0.077	0.098
			(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.036	-0.035						
			(0.03)	(0.03)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.053						
				(0.10)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.109	0.155	0.131	0.134	0.170	0.134	0.138
				(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
No ban on any type of private donation					0.160	0.024	0.099	0.083	-0.135	0.144
					(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.60)	(0.50)	(0.54)
Party receives public funding					-0.433**	-0.410**	-0.411**	-0.407*	-0.376*	-0.425**
					(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.117*	0.133*	0.103	0.155**	0.123*	0.092
					(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations)					-0.060	-0.030	-0.034	-0.042	0.004	-0.050
					(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.332			
							(0.24)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.148		
								(0.19)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.260	
									(0.22)	
Constant	-0.863***	-0.901***	-1.228***	-1.230***	-1.442**	-1.465**	-1.274**	-1.535**	-1.567**	-1.361
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.65)	(0.62)	(0.54)	(0.68)	(0.64)	(0.92)
Observations	84	81	81	79	67	67	67	66	67	48
R^2										

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.13: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.302***	0.318***	0.278***	0.297***	0.234*	0.223*	0.180	0.168	0.230*	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.178***	-0.177**	-0.145*	-0.137*	-0.150*	-0.135*	-0.139*	-0.113	-0.124	-0.220*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Presidential system	0.602***	0.592***	0.791***	0.741***	0.789**	0.712**	0.793**	0.648*	0.686*	1.226**
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.51)
Federalism Index		0.045*	0.048**	0.044**	0.039*	0.031	0.040*	0.039*	0.030	0.037
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Legislature influence over executive			0.087***	0.086**	0.071	0.071	0.077	0.080	0.072	0.114
			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.038	-0.035						
			(0.03)	(0.04)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.057						
				(0.10)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.146	0.208*	0.157	0.149	0.204*	0.164	0.193*
				(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
No ban on any type of private donation					0.181	-0.057	0.007	0.021	-0.121	0.241
					(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.53)
Party receives public funding					-0.485***	-0.436**	-0.439***	-0.410*	-0.420**	-0.496***
					(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.108	0.144**	0.108	0.172**	0.139*	0.098
					(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations)					-0.054	-0.004	-0.002	-0.018	0.010	-0.059
					(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.005	-0.006	-0.006*	-0.005	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.398			
							(0.26)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.217		
								(0.19)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.119	
									(0.21)	
Constant	-0.927***	-1.035***	-1.408***	-1.446***	-1.474**	-1.531***	-1.300***	-1.633**	-1.587***	-1.545**
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.28)	(0.38)	(0.64)	(0.59)	(0.50)	(0.65)	(0.60)	(0.79)
Observations	83	80	80	78	66	66	66	65	66	47

Robust standard errors in parentheses
(* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$)

Table B.14: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(1(
Country is "free"	0.233**	0.250***	0.221**	0.243**	0.172	0.177	0.149	0.148	0.177	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.143**	-0.162**	-0.123*	-0.109	-0.101	-0.090	-0.089	-0.074	-0.077	-0.1
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.1
Presidential system	0.606***	0.668***	0.81***	0.754***	0.872***	0.795**	0.851***	0.752**	0.765**	1.14(
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.4
Federalism Index		0.015	0.022	0.025	0.025	0.021	0.030	0.026	0.020	0.0
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.0
Legislature influence over executive			0.078***	0.084***	0.092	0.093	0.098*	0.099	0.091	0.0
			(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.0
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.039	-0.035						
			(0.03)	(0.03)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.031						
				(0.10)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.144	0.181*	0.159	0.160*	0.194*	0.161	0.1(
				(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.1
No ban on any type of private donation					-0.040	-0.205	-0.139	-0.202	-0.276	-0.0
					(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.4
Party receives public funding					-	-0.39**	-	-	-	-
					0.437***		0.383***	0.403**	0.378**	0.42
					(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.1
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.100	0.134*	0.099	0.154**	0.123*	0.0
					(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.0
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations)					-0.003	0.031	0.033	0.029	0.045	0.0(
					(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.1
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.004	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.405**			
							(0.20)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.114		
								(0.16)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.178	
									(0.22)	
Constant	-0.88***	-0.91***	-1.23***	-1.32***	-1.55***	-	-1.41***	-1.7***	-	-1.3(
						1.63***			1.67***	
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.60)	(0.57)	(0.46)	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.8
Observations	84	81	81	79	67	67	67	66	67	4

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.15: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.296***	0.310***	0.281**	0.299**	0.224*	0.231*	0.199*	0.184	0.231*	
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.137**	-0.122	-0.131*	-0.116	-0.116	-0.093	-0.113	-0.233**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Presidential system	0.616***	0.630***	0.787***	0.727***	0.832**	0.739**	0.814**	0.673**	0.735**	1.314***
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.46)
Federalism Index		0.037	0.044**	0.048**	0.045**	0.039*	0.049**	0.047**	0.039*	0.046*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Legislature influence over executive			0.084***	0.093***	0.086	0.086	0.091*	0.094	0.086	0.114
			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.040	-0.037						
			(0.03)	(0.04)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.040						
				(0.10)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.172*	0.240**	0.202*	0.187*	0.244**	0.204*	0.210**
				(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
No ban on any type of private donation					-0.080	-0.283	-0.226	-0.266	-0.295	-0.061
					(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.50)
Party receives public funding					-	-	-	-0.464**	-	-
					0.536***	0.475***	0.458***		0.472***	0.537***
					(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.090	0.139*	0.102	0.169**	0.137*	0.074
					(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence)					0.013	0.053	0.060	0.049	0.055	0.020
					(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.007**	-0.006*	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.471**			
							(0.24)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.178		
								(0.17)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.029	
									(0.21)	
Constant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.473**
	0.959***	1.031***	1.388***	1.505***	1.510***	1.628***	1.386***	1.730***	1.637***	
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.44)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.70)
Observations	83	80	80	78	66	66	66	65	66	47

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.16: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using weighted generalized linear model using logistic link and binomial family (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10
Country is "free"	0.078	0.080	0.070	0.075	0.021	0.030	0.026	0.014	0.044	
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.105**	-0.108**	-0.099*	-0.081	-0.090*	-0.085	-0.085	-0.077	-0.065	-0.1
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.0
Presidential system	0.452***	0.466***	0.496***	0.405**	0.447**	0.427**	0.431**	0.404**	0.385**	0.67
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.2
Federalism Index		0.017	0.018	0.013	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.002	-0.0
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.0
Legislature influence over executive			0.018	0.019	0.013	0.015	0.015	0.018	0.015	0.0
			(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.0
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.010	-0.013						
			(0.02)	(0.03)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.041						
				(0.08)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.112	0.121	0.102	0.101	0.119	0.119	0.1
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.0
No ban on any type of private donation					0.230	0.127	0.133	0.029	-0.046	0.0
					(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.5
Party receives public funding					-	-	-	-	-0.276*	-
					0.334**	0.326**	0.328**	0.364***		0.455
					(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.1
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.135*	0.160*	0.158*	0.163*	0.143*	0.1
					(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.0
(No ban_onon any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations					-0.071	-0.051	-0.050	-0.034	-0.014	-0.0
					(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.1
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.055			
							(0.20)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								0.001		
								(0.13)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.291	
									(0.20)	
Constant	0.500***	0.467***	0.405*	0.417*	0.225	0.151	0.184	0.161	0.033	0.3
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.3
Observations	84	81	81	79	67	67	67	66	67	48
R^2	0.134	0.151	0.157	0.159	0.252	0.264	0.265	0.267	0.299	0.2

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.17: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are number of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.091	0.098	0.097	0.099	0.040	0.057	0.049	0.031	0.066	
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.106***	-0.103**	-0.094**	-0.071	-0.088**	-0.078*	-0.078	-0.066	-0.066	-0.126*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Presidential system	0.399***	0.391***	0.407***	0.299*	0.357*	0.320*	0.328*	0.282	0.294	0.655**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.27)
Federalism Index		0.036**	0.037**	0.032*	0.028*	0.025	0.028	0.029*	0.022	0.017
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Legislature influence over executive			0.016	0.019	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.018	0.013	0.044
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.018	-0.021						
			(0.02)	(0.03)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.036						
				(0.08)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.129*	0.156**	0.123	0.122	0.151*	0.135*	0.190**
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
No ban on any type of private donation					0.234	0.071	0.082	-0.000	-0.040	0.112
					(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.51)
Party receives public funding					-0.358***	-0.345***	-0.350***	-0.386***	-0.313**	-0.504***
					(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.116*	0.157**	0.151**	0.163**	0.145*	0.104
					(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations)					-0.058	-0.025	-0.025	-0.013	-0.001	-0.036
					(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.004*	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.004*	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.099			
							(0.18)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.047		
								(0.13)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.188	
									(0.18)	
Constant	0.484***	0.402***	0.392*	0.388	0.240	0.133	0.192	0.138	0.055	0.237
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Observations	83	80	80	78	66	66	66	65	66	47
R^2	0.111	0.153	0.162	0.172	0.314	0.347	0.351	0.359	0.363	0.372

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.18: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are number of experts who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		(8)	(9)	(1
Country is "free"	0.076	0.076	0.067	0.079	0.024	0.050	0.045	0.036	0.051	
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.091**	-0.096**	-0.083*	-0.059	-0.069	-0.059	-0.056	-0.049	-0.049	-0.1
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.(
Presidential system	0.42***	0.428***	0.468***	0.37**	0.447***	0.402**	0.403**	0.376**	0.384**	0.68
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.:
Federalism Index		0.021	0.024	0.023	0.020	0.021	0.025	0.024	0.017	0.0
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.(
Legislature influence over executive			0.024	0.031	0.026	0.031	0.031	0.035	0.030	0.0
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.(
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.012	-0.015						
			(0.02)	(0.03)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.034						
				(0.09)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.140*	0.141*	0.129*	0.127	0.148*	0.136*	0.1
				(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.(
No ban on any type of private donation					0.096	-0.014	0.000	-0.118	-0.109	-0.(
					(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.4
Party receives public funding					-0.349**	-	-	-	-	-
						0.322***	0.322***	0.360***	0.294**	0.44(
					(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.116*	0.164**	0.160**	0.166**	0.151*	0.0
					(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.(
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence)					-0.031	-0.010	-0.010	0.008	0.009	-0.(
					(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.128			
							(0.20)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								0.005		
								(0.13)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.187	
									(0.19)	
Constant	0.491***	0.459***	0.364	0.317	0.169	-0.013	0.049	-0.008	-0.063	0.2
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.:
Observations	84	81	81	79	67	67	67	66	67	4
R^2	0.112	0.130	0.140	0.152	0.244	0.279	0.286	0.285	0.293	0.2

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.19: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by seats) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country). Party scores are either 1 or 0.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Country is "free"	0.090	0.092	0.089	0.096	0.033	0.065	0.058	0.042	0.066	
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	
Effective number of electoral parties (presidential)	-0.095***	-0.094**	-0.082**	-0.056	-0.073*	-0.060	-0.056	-0.045	-0.055	-0.129*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Presidential system	0.376***	0.365***	0.386***	0.285*	0.375**	0.315*	0.318*	0.271	0.308*	0.709**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.28)
Federalism Index		0.034*	0.036*	0.036*	0.036**	0.038**	0.043**	0.042**	0.036*	0.029
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Legislature influence over executive			0.019	0.028	0.024	0.028	0.029	0.034	0.028	0.046
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Legislature's institutional autonomy			-0.017	-0.021						
			(0.02)	(0.03)						
ban on "floor crossing"				-0.034						
				(0.08)						
Party registration requires regional quotas				0.141*	0.173**	0.156**	0.155*	0.187**	0.159**	0.176*
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
No ban on any type of private donation					0.066	-0.067	-0.049	-0.145	-0.109	-0.078
					(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.47)
Party receives public funding					-0.409***	-0.377***	-0.379***	-0.419***	-0.365***	-0.524***
					(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Perception of influence of donations on policy					0.100*	0.156**	0.151**	0.164**	0.151**	0.085
					(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
(No ban on any type of private donation)x(Perception of influence of donations)					-0.013	0.012	0.013	0.025	0.021	0.015
					(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Gross Domestic Product (2006 - $000)						-0.006**	-0.007**	-0.006**	-0.006**	
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Ethnic fractionalisation							-0.158			
							(0.18)			
Linguistic fractionalisation								-0.051		
								(0.13)		
Religious fractionalisation									0.083	
									(0.17)	
Constant	0.462***	0.402***	0.367	0.313	0.222	0.021	0.093	0.015	-0.002	0.260
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Observations	83	80	80	78	66	66	66	65	66	47
R^2	0.095	0.123	0.134	0.147	0.309	0.360	0.371	0.379	0.363	0.377

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.20: Estimation results of national determinants of factionalism (weighted by votes) using WLS (weights are proportions of experts contacted who answered question on factionalism in each country. Party scores are either 1 or 0.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proportion of seats held in legislature	4.050*** (0.65)	4.121*** (0.76)	3.788*** (0.67)			3.425** (1.60)
Has not changed leader since foundation	- 0.878*** (0.29)	- 0.920*** (0.29)	- 0.900*** (0.29)		1.333 (0.88)	1.743* (0.90)
Party provided the president	-0.460 (0.48)					
Age of party	0.006* (0.00)	0.007** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Party provided the prime minister		-0.469 (0.36)				
Party was participating in government			-0.095 (0.27)			0.581* (0.32)
Historical average of seats won				4.527*** (1.23)	4.714*** (1.24)	1.975 (1.76)
Squared distance of party's position from centre of policy spectrum				-0.007 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Leadership change (1/(number of leaders))				-1.459* (0.75)	- 3.203*** (1.12)	- 3.383*** (1.13)
Party was formed by a merger				1.316*** (0.37)		
Party was formed from split				0.561 (0.61)	0.465 (0.59)	0.338 (0.62)
Number of parties merging to form					0.290*** (0.10)	0.301*** (0.09)
Constant	- 0.922*** (0.21)	- 0.907*** (0.21)	- 0.884*** (0.21)	-1.217** (0.49)	-0.540 (0.48)	-0.918* (0.49)
N	435	435	435	196	195	193
R^2	0.151	0.153	0.150	0.205	0.207	0.248

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.21: Estimation results of party-based determinants of factionalism using weighted least squares (weights are proportion of available experts who answered question on factionalism in each country)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proportion of seats held in legislature	3.755*** (0.70)	3.443*** (0.87)	3.355*** (0.72)			3.701*** (1.36)
Has not changed leader since foundation	- 0.904*** (0.28)	- 0.951*** (0.28)	- 0.943*** (0.28)		1.000 (0.84)	1.428* (0.86)
Party provided the president	-0.674 (0.56)					
Age of party	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.00)
Party provided the prime minister		-0.245 (0.39)				
Party was participating in government			-0.129 (0.27)			0.580* (0.33)
Historical average of seats won				4.587*** (1.18)	4.677*** (1.21)	1.591 (1.48)
Squared distance of party's position from centre of policy spectrum				-0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Leadership change (1/(number of leaders))				-1.300* (0.74)	-2.721** (1.11)	- 2.933*** (1.11)
Party was formed by a merger				1.505*** (0.38)		
Party was formed from split				0.667 (0.51)	0.558 (0.51)	0.370 (0.51)
Number of parties merging to form					0.292*** (0.10)	0.297*** (0.09)
Constant	- 0.625*** (0.22)	- 0.590*** (0.21)	-0.567** (0.22)	-1.195** (0.47)	-0.555 (0.49)	-0.946** (0.48)
N	435	435	435	196	195	193
R^2	0.142	0.139	0.138	0.217	0.203	0.251

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.22: Estimation results of party-based determinants of factionalism using weighted least squares (weights are proportion of available experts multiplied by number of experts)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proportion of seats held in legislature	3.705*** (0.82)	4.358*** (0.90)	3.790*** (0.80)			1.722 (1.32)
Has not changed leader since foundation	- 0.858*** (0.26)	- 0.849*** (0.26)	- 0.836*** (0.26)		1.368 (0.88)	1.814* (0.97)
Party provided the president	0.515 (0.54)					
Age of party	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.010* (0.01)	-0.010* (0.01)
Party provided the prime minister		-0.342 (0.40)				
Party was participating in government			0.221 (0.25)			0.724** (0.34)
Historical average of seats won				3.827*** (1.21)	4.007*** (1.20)	2.450* (1.38)
Squared distance of party's position from centre of policy spectrum				-0.006 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Leadership change (1/(number of leaders))				-1.370** (0.62)	-3.082** (1.24)	- 3.398** (1.33)
Party was formed by a merger				0.654* (0.35)		
Party was formed from split				-0.001 (0.52)	-0.034 (0.52)	-0.173 (0.54)
Number of parties merging to form					0.152 (0.11)	0.161 (0.11)
Constant	- 0.605*** (0.20)	- 0.641*** (0.20)	- 0.645*** (0.20)	-0.169 (0.49)	0.398 (0.56)	0.086 (0.58)
N	435	435	435	196	195	193

Table B.23: Estimation results of party-based determinants of factionalism using logistic regression (observations with factionalism score≥0.5 coded as 1 and those with factionalism score <0.5 are coded as 0)